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Title:
|
Buying Votes and International Organizations
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Author:
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Dreher, Axel (Heidelberg University, Heidelberg, Germany); Vreeland, James Raymond (Georgetown University, Washington D.C.)
|
|
Abstract:
|
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying.
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Permanent Link:
|
http://hdl.handle.net/10822/551525
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|
Date Issued:
|
2011
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Date Created:
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2011
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|
Subject:
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IMF
;
UN Security Council
;
Voting
;
Aid
|
