2003 Iraq War : intelligence or political failure?
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2003 Iraq War : intelligence or political failure?
| dc.creator | Brunson, Dione. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-10T16:31:16Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2012-02-10T16:31:16Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2011 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553294 | |
| dc.description | Thesis (M.A.L.S.)--Georgetown University, 2011.; Includes bibliographical references.; Text (Electronic thesis) in PDF format. The bold U.S. decision to invade Iraq in 2003 was anchored in intelligence justifications that would later challenge U.S. credibility. Policymakers exhibited unusual bureaucratic and public dependencies on intelligence analysis, so much so that efforts were made to create supporting information. To better understand the amplification of intelligence, the use of data to justify invading Iraq will be explored alongside events leading up to the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. This paper will examine the use of intelligence to invade Iraq as well as broader implications for politicization. It will not examine the justness or ethics of going to war with Iraq but, conclude with the implications of abusing intelligence. | en_US |
| dc.format | application/pdf | en_US |
| dc.language | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Georgetown University | en_US |
| dc.source | Liberal Studies Program, Masters dissertations, 2011. | en_US |
| dc.subject | Political Science | en_US |
| dc.title | 2003 Iraq War : intelligence or political failure? | en_US |
| dc.type | Text | en_US |
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