POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL ATTITUDES
TOWARDS IMMIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
EVIDENCE FROM THE EUROPEAN VALUES STUDY, 2008/2009

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ABSTRACT

Using data from the 2008/2009 wave of the European Values Study, I examine the determinants – demographic, socio-economic and ideological – of individual-level attitudes towards immigrants and of preferences over variously restrictive immigration policy regimes in the European Union (EU-27). In addition to testing the predictions of factor-proportions models with new data, I perform an innovative analysis of the role of political ideology: Using principal components analysis (PCA), I decompose political ideology along three dimensions – social traditionalism, national pride and attachment to laissez-faire views.

My results confirm that predictions from factor-proportions models generally hold, but there appears to be a great deal of variation in the effect of individuals' political ideology: In the pooled EU-27 sample, higher degrees of social traditionalism, national pride and, perhaps surprisingly, stronger attachment to laissez-faire views are associated with less favorable views of immigrants, and with a higher likelihood of supporting restrictions on immigration. There is, however, a great deal of heterogeneity across countries in both the direction and magnitude of these ideological components' effects.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In 2007, the European Union completed its largest-ever round of enlargement: Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union, and followed in the footsteps of ten other countries, mostly in Central and Eastern Europe, that had joined in 2004.¹ The enlargement was associated with the opening up of the European labor market to a large number of new workers, and has led to a wave of significant intra-EU migration. In addition to the enlargement-induced migration, some countries – such as the United Kingdom, Sweden, Germany or the Netherlands – were home to a significant number of immigrants from outside the European Union (Eurostat, 2011), and absorbed additional ones.

Not surprisingly, then, immigration has become a hot political issue in the European Union: In the United Kingdom, which has experienced the largest influx of immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe after the 2004 enlargement, the ‘Polish plumber’ became a symbol of cheap immigrant labor (Galgóczi et al., 2009; Watts, 2006). Popular support, furthermore, appears to have increased for some parties of the extreme right, whose platforms often include calls for more restrictive immigration policies (Coffé et al., 2007; Barkin, 2010): In recent years, anti-immigration parties such the Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*) in Sweden, and the Danish People’s Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*) in Denmark, among others, have made significant electoral gains (Rydgren, 2010; Waterfield, 2010).

The potential for, and experience of, large-scale migration, along with the recent electoral developments, underscore the necessity of understanding how individuals form attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy preferences. Factors that may be relevant include various demographic and labor market characteristics. These include not only age, gender, employment

¹ The European Union’s documents frequently refer to the 2004 and 2007 expansions collectively as the “fifth Enlargement.” See, for instance, Breuss (2009).

status and income, but also one's ideological dispositions: Individuals may differ in their attitudes and in their policy preferences based on how much they support free markets, how wedded they are to social traditions, and how proud they are of their country.

In this thesis, I use data from the 2008/2009 wave of the European Values Study to examine individual-level attitudes towards immigrants and preferences over immigration policy regimes in the European Union (EU) as a whole, as well as in each of its 27 Member States.² In particular, I focus on the following questions:

- What demographic and socio-economic characteristics predict individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and their preferences over variously restrictive immigration policy regimes?
- How do individuals' ideological positions along three dimensions – attachment to *laissez-faire* views, degree of social traditionalism, and national pride – affect their attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy preferences?
- Do the results hold homogeneously across individual Member States? Do some factors predict individuals' attitudes towards immigrants or preferences over immigration policy in some countries, but not in others? Do these factors have a similar effect, both in direction and in magnitude, across all EU countries?

Several features differentiate this thesis from existing research literature on the determinants of individual-level attitudes towards immigration, and on the factors that underlie immigration policy preferences:

² In April 2011, when this thesis was submitted, the European Union had the following 27 Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. (Source: EU, 2011)

- I analyze new data from the 2008/2009 wave of the European Values Study. The full data set was not available until quite recently – December 2010.
- I perform an innovative analysis of the role of political ideology – a channel that may affect individual attitudes and policy preferences, but has hitherto not been paid much attention. Instead of relying on a one-dimensional measure – such as one’s ‘affiliation with the political right’ or a single measure of the degree of nationalism – I decompose political ideology into three components: laissez-faire views, social traditionalism and civic/national pride.
- I estimate separate regressions for each of the EU-27 Member States to test for cross-country heterogeneity. In this way, I can discern whether a particular determinant affects attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policy preferences in similar ways in different European countries.

This thesis proceeds as follows: First, I review the research literature on the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants and on the immigration policy regime preferences. I then describe the data used in my analysis, provide some summary statistics, and explain how relevant variables were constructed or re-coded. After specifying the empirical regression model I use to analyze attitudes towards immigrants and Europeans’ policy preferences, I present my estimation results, and provide suggestions for further research. I then briefly discuss some public policy implications of my findings, and – in the concluding section – summarize my results.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The research literature on the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants, and on preferences over immigration policies, has focused on three principal channels: the labor market channel, the welfare state channel and the education channel. Political ideology has received relatively little attention: If studies gave any consideration to ideological factors at all, they typically included a single variable such as ‘affiliation with the political right,’ or some measure of patriotism (Mayda, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). Such a one-dimensional measure, however, may not adequately capture the complexity of political ideology, and does not allow us to discern which particular dimensions of political ideology may have an effect on individuals’ attitudes towards immigrants, and on their policy preferences.

I begin this section by reviewing the economics and political science literature on the three channels that have been studied most extensively: labor markets, welfare state and education. I then consider, with reference to existing research, why a one-dimensional measure of political ideology may not suffice in the study of immigration attitudes. I conclude the literature review with a brief discussion of how the channel I study – political ideology – relates to the other channels through which attitudes and preferences are formed.

Labor market channel: Much of the literature on the determinants of attitudes towards immigration has aimed to test the predictions of factor-endowments models of international trade. Pioneered by Heckscher (1919) and Ohlin (1933), this class of models focuses on the relative scarcity and abundance of production factors across economies. A prominent feature of these models is the idea of labor market competition: An influx of immigrant labor may increase labor supply, and thus reduce wages for some subset of domestic workers. If immigrants are relatively unskilled, for instance, low-skill domestic workers might see their wages decrease.

In factor-endowments models, a country has a comparative advantage in goods whose production intensively relies on factors that are relatively abundant in its economy. According to Leamer (1995), the key insight of these models is that traded goods can be seen as bundles of production factors (such as land, capital or labor). Exporting these goods amounts, then, to exporting the factors used in their production: “The exchange of commodities internationally is [...] indirect factor arbitrage, transferring the services of otherwise immobile factors of production from locations where these factors are abundant to locations where they are scarce.” (Leamer, 1995) The distributional effect on an individual will depend on her ownership of production factors: Trade should, therefore, benefit individuals who own factors that are relatively abundant in the economy, and hurts the owners of relatively scarce factors (Mayda and Rodrik, 2005).

O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006) discuss the distributional consequences of immigration in factor-endowments models: Suppose that two countries only differ in the proportion of their workforce that is skilled. Skilled wages will then be lower, and unskilled wages higher, relative to a country with a higher proportion of skilled workers. Skilled workers will, therefore, tend to migrate from countries in which skilled labor is abundant and unskilled labor scarce (which the authors denote as ‘rich’) to countries with abundant unskilled labor and scarce skilled labor (‘poor’). As a result, in rich countries, one may expect immigration to hurt unskilled workers in rich countries, but to benefit the skilled ones. This prediction is, of course, reversed in poor countries.

If these distributional impacts translate into individual-level attitudes and policy preferences, one may expect, in rich countries, better educated individuals with high incomes (‘skilled’ workers) to have a more favorable view of immigration and to favor less restrictive immigration policies than those with less education and lower incomes (‘unskilled’). In poor

countries where unskilled labor is abundant, one would expect the opposite pattern: Less educated and lower-income individuals would have a better view of immigrants, and favor less restrictive immigration policies.

Mayda (2006) analyzes data on a variety of developed and developing countries from the 1995-1997 wave of the World Values Survey, as well as from the 1995 International Social Survey Programme (henceforth, ISSP). She finds that the pattern predicted by factor-endowments models generally holds: Skilled individuals favor immigration in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants, and oppose it otherwise. Patriotic and nationalist sentiments, furthermore, have a negative effect on individuals' attitudes towards immigration. Additionally, she finds that the old have less favorable views of immigrants than the young, but does not identify conclusively why that is so: This result, she reports, is consistent with models where pensions depend on current wages (e.g., Scholten and Thum, 1996), rather than on the size of the current tax base (which immigrants can help expand). It may also, however, be due to cultural factors, such as the older generations' attachment to traditional social norms, she says.

Also consistent with factor-endowments accounts of international trade and migration, Mayda (2008) find that the positive impact of individual skill on pro-immigration attitudes is greater in countries that receive unskilled immigrants. Facchini and Mayda (2008) analyze both the 1995 and 2003 rounds of the ISSP, and find very similar effects: A pooled regression that includes all sampled countries suggests that better-educated individuals with higher incomes have, *ceteris paribus*, a more favorable view of immigration. The authors then allow for country-specific impacts in order to account for cross-country differences in the relative skills of the native and immigrant populations. They find that education has a positive effect on pro-immigration attitudes in wealthy countries – which receive lower-skilled immigrants, relative to the natives – but a negative effect in poor countries, which receive more skilled immigrants.

In a similar vein, a study of individual attitudes in 24 countries by O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006), based on the 1995 wave of the ISSP, finds that high-skilled workers are less opposed to immigration than those with low skills. This effect, they find, is stronger in richer and more equal countries. Levels of skill, however, do not appear to affect the attitudes of individuals who are not in the labor force. O'Rourke and Sinnott's results also suggest that patriotic sentiments are associated with less favorable views of migration, although they are wary of a possible reverse causality problem: Patriotism and anti-immigration views may influence each other simultaneously. Overall, O'Rourke and Sinnott conclude that standard factor-endowments models of international trade do well in predicting individual attitudes towards immigration.

In a study focused on the United States, Scheve and Slaughter document, based on data from the 1992, 1994 and 1996 National Election Studies (NES) surveys, a robust relationship between individuals' labor market skills and their preferences emerges: Less-skilled people prefer more restrictionist immigration policies. In a similar vein, Scheve, Hanson and Slaughter (2009) analyze data from the 1992 and 2000 National Election Studies (NES), and find that the relative skill composition of natives and immigrants can help explain policy preferences: In keeping with labor market competition accounts, lower-skilled natives tend to support freer immigration if they live in U.S. states with relatively high-skilled immigrants.

Welfare state channel: An influx of immigrants can affect policies pursued by welfare states: In order to maintain a constant level of social benefits, governments may have to increase tax rates – a *tax adjustment* response. If income redistribution is progressive, greater levels of unskilled (low-income) immigration will have a more negative effect on high-income, relative to low-income, individuals. Alternatively, the government may decide to keep tax rates constant, but instead reduce the per capita benefits – a *benefit adjustment* response.

Facchini and Mayda (2009) examine data from the ISSP and find that, in countries where natives are more skilled on average than immigrants, higher income is associated with less favorable attitudes towards immigration, while a higher degree of skill is correlated with a more positive view. Their findings are consistent with the predictions of the tax adjustment model. They conclude that the labor market and welfare state channels partially offset each other in their effects on attitudes towards immigration: “[T]he very same skilled and high income German businessman may feel ambivalent regarding the arrival of unskilled immigrants since he might benefit from hiring them (labor market complementarity) but be hurt by paying their way through the welfare state,” they write.

Education channel: Another strand of the research literature, by contrast, puts more emphasis on ‘cultural’ explanations of attitudes towards immigration. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) examine data on attitudes from the 2003 wave of the European Social Survey. They find that, across Europe, higher levels of education are associated with greater support for immigration, regardless of the immigrants’ skills. Higher-educated individuals, then, have a more favorable view of immigration, even if the immigrants have a relatively high level of skills and may therefore directly compete with them for employment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the authors claim, fears about labor market competition are not the driving force behind Europeans’ attitudes. Instead, they find that a large part of the connection between education and attitudes is explained by differences in cultural values and beliefs: In particular, Hainmueller and Hiscox argue that higher-educated Europeans are less prejudiced, value cultural diversity more, and are more likely to believe that immigration benefits the host economy. Such a result, the authors argue, is consistent with the findings that immigration only has very small effects on incomes and employment in Europe (Hunt, 1992; Zimmermann, 1995; Hartog and Zorlu, 2005).

Political Ideology: An individual's ideological leanings can be an important predictor of attitudes towards immigration: In studies of survey data from several dozen countries, for instance, Facchini and Mayda (2009) and Mayda (2006) find that one's "political affiliation with the right" co-varies negatively with an individual's pro-immigration stance. Chandler and Tsai (2001) find, after examining data from the General Social Survey in the United States, that political conservatism is associated with a preference for immigration restrictions.

For cross-national comparisons, however, the use of a one-dimensional left-right index to represent political ideology can be problematic: The understanding of what the political right and left stand for differs from country to country (Castles and Mair, 2007; Kriesi et al., 2006; Mair, 2007). In some EU countries, such as France, Italy or Austria, opposition to immigration is most commonly associated with the nationalist right (Mudde, 1999; Fukuyama, 2006; Zincone, 2006). Elsewhere, nationalist politics may also be linked with left-of-center populism (Zaslove, 2006; Greskovits, 2007). Even within the political right, there can be a split between nationalist-populist parties, generally opposed to immigration, and their moderate or more classically liberal rivals, which take a less restrictive view (Vachudova, 2008). In addition, the use of a left-right index raises the problem of simultaneity: An individual's attitude toward immigration may be determined by her position on the left-right ideological continuum, but can just as plausibly be one of the reasons that she would self-identify as left- or right-leaning (Ortega and Polavieja, 2009).

Some authors have argued that a left-right scale of political ideology is generally an appropriate instrument (Huber, 1989; Huber and Inglehart, 1995), while others have opted to include additional dimensions (e.g., Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). My approach is consistent with the latter school of thought: In this thesis, I decompose political ideology into three constituent components: social traditionalism, civic/national pride, and attachment to

laissez-faire views. There are reasons to believe that each of these three ideological components can have an independent effect on individuals' attitudes towards immigrants, and on their preference for restrictive or permissive policies.

Socially traditionalist and nationally proud respondents might, for instance, see immigrants – who may bring their own customs and traditions – as undermining domestic culture or, in some way, threatening – or simply not belonging to – the domestic national or ethnic group. As a result, one would expect higher levels of social traditionalism and national pride to be associated with less favorable views of immigrants, and with a higher likelihood of supporting immigration restrictions (Gijssberts et al., 2004; O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006).

The effect of one's attachment to laissez-faire views is, however, theoretically ambiguous: On the one hand, they may welcome immigrants who came in search of opportunity, consistent with the respondents' belief in the virtues of free-market competition (Riley, 2008). On the other hand, laissez-faire individuals may see foreign newcomers as a drain on public resources and social welfare programs, and might therefore favor more restrictive immigration policy (Mayda, 2006; Facchini and Mayda, 2009). Empirical testing is, then, necessary to tease out which one of these countervailing influences prevails.

3. DATA DESCRIPTION

The European Values Study (EVS), initiated in 1978 by the Amsterdam-based European Values System Study Group (Řehák, 2001), is “a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal research program on how Europeans think about family, work, religion, politics and society.” Since its first wave was administered in 1981 across 16 countries, it has been repeated every nine years (in 1990, 1999 and, most recently, in 2008) in an increasing number of European countries (GESIS, 2010). Survey data from the EVS have been used to study the cultural diversity within Europe (Arts, Haagenars and Halman, 2003), welfare state effects on individual attitudes (Facchini and Mayda, 2009; van Oorschot et al., 2005), public acceptance of euthanasia (Cohen et al., 2006), the relationship between religion and social capital (Halman and Pettersson, 2001), as well as a variety of other topics.

Data collection for the most recent, fourth, wave of the European Values Study took place during 2008 and 2009 (henceforth, EVS 2008), and was coordinated by Tilburg University in the Netherlands. In each of the 46 participating countries,³ a random sample of 1,500 respondents was surveyed in face-to-face interviews. Overall, almost 70,000 Europeans participated in the 2008/2009 wave of the European Values Study (GESIS, 2010). The questionnaires contained 141 questions on a variety of topics: perceptions of life, work, religion, family and marriage, politics and society, moral attitudes, national identity and the environment (GESIS, 2010).

³ The 46 participating countries were, in alphabetical order: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine. Please note that, in some cases, the European Values Study’s country definitions differ from established political boundaries.

A. MEASURING ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

I measure Europeans' attitudes towards immigrants using attitudinal scores from Question 78 of the EVS 2008 questionnaire (reproduced in *Box 3.1*): Respondents were given five pairs of mutually contradictory statements about immigrants. They were then asked to indicate, on a scale from 1 to 10, where they would place on a continuum between these two statements: In each case, a higher score on the ten-point scale indicated a more favorable view of immigrants.⁴

BOX 3.1 – EVS 2008, QUESTION 78

Q78. Please look at the following statements and indicate where you would place your views on this scale:									
Immigrants take jobs away from natives in a country					Immigrants do not take jobs away from natives in a country				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
A country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants					A country's cultural life is not undermined by immigrants				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Immigrants make crime problems worse					Immigrants do not make crime problems worse				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Immigrants are a strain on a country's welfare system					Immigrants are not a strain on a country's welfare system				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
In the future, the proportion of immigrants will become a threat to society					In the future, the proportion of immigrants will not become a threat to society				
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

⁴ In addition to the statement pairs listed in *Box 3.1*, Question 78 contains one additional pair of statements: Respondents are asked to indicate whether they believe that it is better, "for the greater good of society," if immigrants "maintain their distinct customs and traditions," or if they "adopt the customs of the country." Because agreement with either of these statements does not obviously suggest a favorable or unfavorable view of immigrants, I have omitted the corresponding attitudinal scores from my analysis. Instead, the scores may reflect the respondent's preference over a differentialist ("maintain customs") or assimilationist ("adopt to local customs") behavior on the part of immigrants. See, for instance, Brubaker (2001) and Richey (2010).

TABLE 3.1 – VIEWS OF IMMIGRANTS
CORRELATIONS AMONG ATTITUDINAL SCORES

	Do not take jobs away from natives	Do not undermine cultural life	Do not worsen crime problems	Do not strain welfare system	Will not threaten society
Do not take jobs away from natives	---				
Do not undermine cultural life	0.517***	---			
Do not worsen crime problems	0.594***	0.601***	---		
Do not strain welfare system	0.559***	0.493***	0.565***	---	
Will not threaten society	0.527***	0.631***	0.680***	0.540***	---

Notes: Pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

As *Table 3.1* shows, the respondents' attitudinal scores are positively correlated in all of their pair-wise combinations. In other words, an individual who scores above the mean on one of these indicators is also likely to lie above the average on any of the other attitudinal measures: Someone who strongly believes, for instance, that immigrants make crime problem worse will, more often than not, also worry that they take jobs away from natives.

The high correlation among individual attitudinal scores enables us to create an Immigration Attitude Index (IAI), a measure that captures a respondent's overall attitude toward immigrants. It is constructed using principal components analysis, a statistical technique that "reduces data dimensionality by performing a covariance analysis between factors" (Agilent, 2005). Our index is given by the standardized first principal component of answers to the five questions in *Box 3.1*. The first component accounts for 66 percent of the overall variance of the answers, and the index is highly correlated with the underlying attitudinal variables.

Table 3.2 shows the mean values of the Immigration Attitude Index in the population, as well as the mean attitudinal scores for each of its five constituent questions, in each Member State of the European Union. Based on the comprehensive IAI value, it appears that residents of Romania, Sweden and Luxembourg have, on average, the most positive view of immigrants, while inhabitants of Malta, Cyprus and Austria have the worst. *Figures 3.1* and *3.2* suggest that, across countries, there is no clear relationship between attitudes towards immigrants and the size of the immigrant stock relative to the total population in 2009, as measured by Eurostat (2011).

TABLE 3.2 – VIEWS OF IMMIGRANTS
POPULATION MEAN ATTITUDINAL SCORES IN EU-27 COUNTRIES

COUNTRY	MEAN ATTITUDINAL SCORE: Higher score represents a more positive view of immigrants					Immigration Attitudes Index
	Do not take jobs away from natives	Do not undermine cultural life	Do not worsen crime problems	Do not strain welfare system	Will not threaten society	
Romania	5.42	6.35	5.86	5.99	6.03	0.536
Sweden	7.01	6.61	4.78	5.39	6.00	0.524
Luxembourg	6.68	6.82	5.07	5.32	5.55	0.474
France	6.32	6.07	5.89	5.00	5.23	0.407
Poland	5.55	6.64	5.36	4.90	5.55	0.365
Denmark	7.92	6.55	3.83	4.44	5.51	0.350
Spain	5.31	6.10	4.75	5.51	5.39	0.302
Finland	6.19	7.01	4.14	4.60	5.26	0.275
Bulgaria	4.62	6.92	4.62	4.76	5.48	0.255
Portugal	4.76	6.42	4.99	5.17	5.26	0.240
Netherlands	5.78	5.84	4.39	5.03	5.13	0.199
Italy	5.64	6.07	3.66	4.91	4.86	0.137
Estonia	4.94	5.84	4.56	4.40	4.48	0.014
EU-27 Average	5.05	5.73	4.30	4.30	4.60	0.009
Slovenia	5.01	5.60	4.41	4.28	4.69	-0.009
Slovakia	4.70	6.47	4.22	4.05	4.36	-0.044
Belgium	5.13	5.26	4.30	4.08	4.32	-0.083
Czech Rep.	4.75	5.65	3.75	4.14	4.28	-0.132
Latvia	4.35	5.41	4.35	4.34	4.19	-0.136
Greece	4.43	5.56	3.80	4.44	4.10	-0.156
Lithuania	4.45	5.65	4.36	4.14	3.99	-0.171
Ireland	4.15	5.18	4.65	3.46	4.27	-0.207
Hungary	3.50	6.03	3.76	3.57	4.38	-0.248
North. Ireland	4.02	5.10	4.39	3.54	4.03	-0.251
Germany	4.55	5.03	3.49	3.41	4.54	-0.275
Great Britain	4.24	4.64	4.55	3.45	3.81	-0.313
Austria	4.55	4.57	3.42	3.44	4.22	-0.340
Cyprus	3.51	4.44	2.99	3.27	3.17	-0.588
Malta	3.66	3.31	3.58	1.88	2.10	-0.856

FIGURE 3.1 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS:
RELATIONSHIP WITH OVERALL IMMIGRANT POPULATION SIZE

Note: Immigrant stock and population numbers are for 2009, and come from Eurostat (2011). Belgium and Bulgaria are not included, as immigration stock data were not available.

FIGURE 3.2 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS:
RELATIONSHIP WITH IMMIGRANT POPULATION SIZE (FROM OUTSIDE EU-27)

Note: Immigrant stock and population numbers are for 2009, and come from Eurostat (2011). Belgium and Bulgaria are not included, as immigration stock data were not available.

B. MEASURING PREFERENCES OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES

Question 76 of the EVS 2008 questionnaire, reproduced in *Box 3.2*, asks respondents about their preference over four increasingly restrictive immigration policy regimes *vis-à-vis* less developed countries: two relatively permissive ones (“let anyone come,” and “let people come as long as there are jobs available”), and two relatively restrictive ones (“put strict limits on the number of foreigners,” and “prohibit people from coming”), respectively. Preferences for the options are summarized in the ordinal variable *ImmigrationPolicy*.⁵ In most of my analysis, I summarize an individual’s policy preference in a single dummy variable, *Permissive*, which takes on the value of one if the respondent prefers one of the two relatively restrictive immigration regimes, and zero otherwise. “Don’t know” and “no answer” were re-coded as missing values.

BOX 3.2 – EVS 2008, QUESTION 76

Q76. How about people from less developed countries coming here to work? Which one of the following do you think the government should do?

- 1 – let anyone come who wants to
- 2 – let people come as long as there are jobs available
- 3 – put strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here
- 4 – prohibit people coming here from other countries

8 – don’t know (spontaneous)

9 – no answer (spontaneous)

Table 3.3 shows the proportional support for each of the four proposed options, as well as for either of the permissive immigration regimes put together, in each EU Member State. It appears that permissive immigration regimes receive the greatest amount of support in Romania, Slovenia and Spain. On the contrary, permissive immigration policies have the least support in Malta, Hungary and Cyprus.

⁵ The variable *ImmigrationPolicy* is coded in increasing order of permissiveness: 1 = prohibit people from coming; 2 = put strict limits on the number of foreigners; 3 = let people come as long as there are jobs; 4 = let anyone come

TABLE 3.3 – POLICY PREFERENCES IN EU-27 COUNTRIES
POPULATION SUPPORT FOR VARIOUSLY RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION REGIMES

COUNTRY	PROPORTIONAL SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION REGIME				
	Prohibit people from coming	Put strict limits on the number of foreigners	Let people come as long as there are jobs available	Let anyone come	<i>Permissive Immigration Regime</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3) + (4)
Romania	3.9 %	12.4 %	43.7 %	40.1 %	84.7 %
Slovenia	4.1 %	30.5 %	54.8 %	10.6 %	65.4 %
Spain	2.8 %	32.2 %	56.5 %	8.5 %	65.0 %
Luxembourg	2.4 %	38.0 %	53.5 %	6.1 %	59.6 %
Sweden	3.3 %	38.9 %	44.1 %	13.8 %	57.8 %
Portugal	6.2 %	36.2 %	51.5 %	6.1 %	57.6 %
Poland	3.6 %	40.0 %	40.6 %	15.8 %	56.5 %
Lithuania	9.2 %	35.3 %	46.3 %	9.2 %	55.4 %
Estonia	5.7 %	40.9 %	44.7 %	8.6 %	53.4 %
Italy	6.0 %	41.3 %	14.6 %	11.1 %	52.7 %
France	5.9 %	42.1 %	44.6 %	7.5 %	52.1 %
Austria	6.7 %	41.6 %	45.2 %	6.5 %	51.7 %
Slovakia	4.7 %	45.9 %	41.5 %	7.9 %	49.4 %
EU-27 Average	7.3 %	43.8 %	40.0 %	8.5 %	48.5 %
Bulgaria	8.1 %	44.5 %	30.1 %	17.3 %	47.4 %
Finland	2.8 %	51.5 %	37.5 %	8.2 %	45.7 %
Greece	70.0 %	45.3 %	36.9 %	7.8 %	44.7 %
Latvia	11.4 %	43.9 %	36.8 %	7.9 %	44.7 %
Germany	8.0 %	47.8 %	40.0 %	4.3 %	44.3 %
Denmark	1.0 %	55.5 %	38.5 %	4.9 %	43.4 %
Czech Rep.	9.4 %	48.6 %	33.7 %	8.4 %	42.0 %
Belgium	8.4 %	50.0 %	36.5 %	5.1 %	41.6 %
Ireland	8.2 %	50.7 %	36.6 %	4.4 %	41.1 %
Netherlands	4.4 %	54.6 %	37.1 %	3.9 %	41.1 %
Great Britain	10.6 %	54.2 %	32.3 %	2.9 %	35.1 %
North. Ireland	8.8 %	56.8 %	29.5 %	4.9 %	34.4 %
Cyprus	15.1 %	51.1 %	31.3 %	2.5 %	33.8 %
Hungary	14.5 %	53.5 %	28.3 %	3.7 %	32.0 %
Malta	20.4 %	57.0 %	21.2 %	1.3 %	22.5 %

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the relationship between the size of a country's overall and non-EU-27 immigrant stock in 2009 (relative to total population size), and the inhabitants' mean percentage support for a permissive immigration regime: As was the case with attitudes towards immigrants, there is no suggestion of a clear relationship.

FIGURE 3.3 – IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES:
RELATIONSHIP WITH OVERALL IMMIGRANT POPULATION SIZE

Note: Immigrant stock and population numbers are for 2009, and come from Eurostat (2011). Belgium and Bulgaria are not included, as immigration stock data were not available.

FIGURE 3.4 – IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES:
RELATIONSHIP WITH IMMIGRANT POPULATION SIZE (FROM OUTSIDE EU-27)

Note: Immigrant stock and population numbers are for 2009, and come from Eurostat (2011). Belgium and Bulgaria are not included, as immigration stock data were not available.

C. ATTACHMENT TO A LAISSEZ-FAIRE IDEOLOGY

I construct a Laissez-Faire Index (LFI) to measure an individual's ideological attachment to *laissez-faire* values and policies. An individual will score higher on this index if he favors: individual, rather than state, responsibility for general welfare; a positive view of the effects of competition; and private, rather than government, ownership of business and industry. The understanding of what constitutes an ideological preference for *laissez-faire* is likely to be reasonably consistent across surveyed countries, and less likely to be determined by one's views on immigration.

I base the index on Question 58 of the EVS 2008 questionnaire where respondents were asked about their relative agreement with pairs of opposite statements. The relevant questions are reproduced in *Box 3.3*. A higher score on the ten-point scale corresponded to a greater preference for laissez-faire values and policy.

Table 3.4 shows that the respondents' attitudinal scores for Question 58 are positively correlated in all of their pair-wise combinations. An individual who prefers, say, more private ownership of business and industry will also tend to favor greater freedom for firms, more emphasis on individual responsibility, as well as to think that competition is a force for good.

The construction of the Laissez-Faire Index (LFI) is analogous to that of the Immigration Attitude Index (IAI), described earlier: It is the standardized first principal component of the respondents' answers to the four questions summarized in *Box 3.3*. The Laissez-Faire Index accounts for 47.8 percent of the variance in answers, and the index is highly correlated with its component variables.

BOX 3.3 – EVS 2008, QUESTION 58

Q58. On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?

The state should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for

1 2 3 4 5

Individuals should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for

6 7 8 9 10

Competition is harmful, it brings out the worst in people

1 2 3 4 5

Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas

6 7 8 9 10

The state should control firms more effectively

1 2 3 4 5

The state should give more freedom to firms

6 7 8 9 10

Government ownership of business and industry should be increased

1 2 3 4 5

Private ownership of business and industry should be increased

6 7 8 9 10

Note: Scores for the individual statement pairs have been re-coded, both in the analyzed data set and in the reproduction (above) of Question 58, to ensure higher values correspond to a greater agreement with laissez-faire values and policies.

TABLE 3.4 – LAISSEZ-FAIRE IDEOLOGY
CORRELATIONS AMONG ATTITUDINAL SCORES

	More individual responsibility	Competition is good	More freedom to firms	Increase private ownership
More individual responsibility	---			
Competition is good	0.286***	---		
More freedom to firms	0.291***	0.261***	---	
Increase private ownership	0.276***	0.261***	0.430***	---

Notes: Pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 3.5 summarizes the mean values of the Laissez-Faire Index, along with the mean attitudinal scores for each of its four constituent questions, in each Member State. Based on the value of the overall LFI, it seems that residents of Malta, Great Britain and Sweden hold, on average, the strongest laissez-faire views, whereas inhabitants of Hungary, Spain and Greece are least attached to free-market values.

TABLE 3.5 – LAISSEZ-FAIRE IDEOLOGY
POPULATION MEAN SCORES IN EU-27 COUNTRIES

	MEAN SCORE: Higher score represents greater attachment to laissez-faire				
COUNTRY	More individual responsibility	Competition is good	More freedom to firms	Increase private ownership	Laissez-Faire Index
Malta	6.38	7.97	6.16	6.76	0.412
Great Britain	7.19	7.35	6.34	6.46	0.391
Sweden	6.79	7.38	6.49	6.30	0.362
Ireland	6.79	7.13	6.21	6.53	0.309
Austria	6.82	6.97	6.29	6.46	0.280
Romania	7.12	7.94	5.04	6.38	0.263
North. Ireland	7.43	7.05	5.92	6.12	0.250
Denmark	6.26	7.06	6.01	6.80	0.244
Portugal	6.56	6.72	5.89	6.52	0.154
Germany	6.70	7.41	5.52	5.78	0.136
Czech Rep.	6.25	7.17	5.61	5.87	0.058
Slovenia	5.84	7.11	5.67	6.30	0.057
Netherlands	6.21	6.48	5.79	6.44	0.056
Luxembourg	6.59	6.52	4.92	6.49	0.027
EU-27 Average	6.22	6.92	5.40	5.94	0.014
Bulgaria	5.87	7.81	5.02	5.49	-0.017
Slovakia	6.38	7.55	4.92	5.57	-0.026
Finland	6.43	6.44	5.62	5.81	-0.040
Lithuania	6.15	6.52	5.52	5.86	-0.046
Belgium	6.00	6.36	5.06	6.61	-0.069
France	6.39	6.03	5.41	6.20	-0.083
Poland	5.72	6.60	5.77	5.63	-0.125
Estonia	5.98	7.11	5.19	5.22	-0.166
Italy	5.26	6.55	5.08	6.31	-0.166
Cyprus	6.21	6.38	4.60	5.69	-0.210
Latvia	5.41	7.11	4.86	5.50	-0.236
Greece	5.50	6.58	4.49	5.85	-0.322
Spain	5.40	6.14	5.13	5.52	-0.351
Hungary	5.56	6.71	4.41	4.75	-0.470

D. DEGREE OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM

To capture the degree of various individuals' traditionalist beliefs, I construct the Index of Social Traditionalism (IST). An individual will score higher on the IST if he or she believes that a fulfilling life requires having children, that marriage – or at least a stable, long-term relationship – is a prerequisite for happiness, and that homosexuals should not be able to adopt children. In addition, respondents will score higher if they agree that cohabitation is not acceptable, that one owes it to society to have children, and that children have the principal duty to take care of ill and fragile parents. I derive the index from respondents' answers to Question 47 of the EVS 2008 questionnaire, the relevant parts of which reproduced in *Box 3.4*.

BOX 3.4 – EVS 2008, QUESTION 47

Q47. How would you feel about the following statements? Do you agree or disagree with them?

1 = Disagree strongly 2 = Disagree 3 = Neither agree nor disagree 4 = Agree 5 = Agree strongly

A man has to have children in order to be fulfilled.

1 2 3 4 5

A marriage or a long-term stable relationship is necessary to be happy.

1 2 3 4 5

Homosexual couples should not be able to adopt children.

1 2 3 4 5

It is not alright for two people to live together without getting married.

1 2 3 4 5

It is a duty towards society to have children.

1 2 3 4 5

When a parent is seriously ill or fragile, it is mainly the adult child's duty to take care of him/her.

1 2 3 4 5

Note: Scores for the individual statements have been re-coded, both in the analyzed data set and in the reproduction (above) of Question 47, to ensure higher values correspond to a greater degree of social traditionalism.

TABLE 3.6 – SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM
CORRELATIONS AMONG ATTITUDINAL SCORES

	Need children for fulfillment	Marriage necessary to be happy	Homosexuals cannot adopt children	Cohabitation not alright	Duty to have children	Child takes care of parent
Need children for fulfillment	---					
Marriage necessary to be happy	0.497***	---				
Homosexuals cannot adopt children	0.218***	0.245***	---			
Cohabitation not alright	0.230***	0.232***	0.358***	---		
Duty to have children	0.445***	0.368***	0.208***	0.299***	---	
Child takes care of parent	0.260***	0.313***	0.199***	0.192***	0.296***	---

Notes: Pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficients.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 3.6 shows that the respondents' scores for Question 47 are all positively correlated at the 1 percent statistical significance level. An individual, then, who believes that children are necessary for a fulfilled life is also likely to believe that homosexuals should not be able to adopt children, that cohabitation is not acceptable, that it is one's duty to society to have offspring, as well as that adult children ought to take care of their ill or fragile parents.

The construction of the Index of Social Traditionalism (IST), again, follows that of the Immigration Attitude Index (IAI) and the Laissez-Faire Index (LFI): It is the standardized first principal component of the answers to the six questions summarized in *Box 3.4*. The Index of Social Traditionalism accounts for 41.2 percent of the variance in answers, and correlates highly with its constituent variables.

Table 3.7 provides the estimated population mean values of the Index of Social Traditionalism in each Member State, as well as the mean scores for each of its components. The IST population means suggest that Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece have the EU-27's most socially traditionalist inhabitants. By contrast, the three least socially traditionalist countries are the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland.

TABLE 3.7 – SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM
POPULATION MEAN SCORES IN EU-27 COUNTRIES

	MEAN SCORE: Higher score represents greater degree of social traditionalism						
COUNTRY	Need children for fulfillment	Marriage necessary to be happy	Homosexuals cannot adopt children	Cohabitation not alright	Duty to have children	Child takes care of parent	Index of Social Traditionalism
Bulgaria	4.07	4.13	3.72	2.43	3.87	4.10	0.777
Cyprus	3.75	3.65	4.29	2.75	3.49	4.43	0.710
Greece	3.53	4.47	4.31	2.19	3.26	4.44	0.702
Romania	4.06	4.05	3.83	2.38	3.19	4.25	0.617
Slovakia	3.37	4.07	4.16	2.93	2.86	4.40	0.604
Latvia	4.06	3.90	4.07	2.13	2.94	4.30	0.531
Hungary	3.88	4.32	3.83	2.09	2.99	4.15	0.517
Malta	2.88	3.48	4.08	3.00	3.24	4.10	0.363
Czech Rep.	3.78	3.68	3.22	2.43	3.26	4.02	0.338
Italy	3.34	3.68	4.02	2.57	2.62	4.31	0.320
Estonia	3.77	3.87	3.84	2.06	2.89	3.90	0.299
Lithuania	3.18	3.59	4.11	2.53	2.94	3.97	0.275
Poland	3.15	3.67	4.21	2.40	2.88	4.00	0.256
Portugal	3.17	3.63	3.58	1.90	3.08	4.08	0.109
EU-27	3.15	3.53	3.52	2.08	2.71	3.86	-0.020
Slovenia	3.00	2.97	3.78	2.25	2.77	3.89	-0.115
Germany	2.98	3.63	3.31	1.91	2.68	3.74	-0.143
France	3.29	3.68	3.24	1.46	2.19	4.39	-0.144
Spain	2.75	3.37	2.84	1.69	2.73	4.48	-0.223
Austria	2.86	3.31	3.43	1.74	2.58	3.56	-0.318
Luxembourg	2.93	3.58	3.24	1.48	2.41	3.72	-0.322
Ireland	2.56	3.11	3.27	2.02	2.51	3.38	-0.482
Belgium	2.27	3.34	3.08	1.57	1.98	4.10	-0.578
N. Ireland	2.29	2.77	3.25	2.21	2.30	3.17	-0.691
Great Britain	2.29	3.04	3.14	1.99	2.17	3.13	-0.716
Denmark	3.63	3.00	2.88	1.31	2.14	2.55	-0.718
Finland	2.60	2.71	3.07	1.83	2.08	2.65	-0.878
Sweden	2.11	2.79	2.76	1.36	1.72	2.76	-1.192
Netherlands	1.85	2.45	2.56	1.84	1.73	3.13	-1.198

E. NATIONAL, OR CIVIC, PRIDE

I measure the final dimension of political ideology – the sense of national, or civic, pride – by considering the respondents’ answers to Question 72 of the EVS 2008 questionnaire, reproduced in *Box 3.5* below. If an individual gave one of the four substantive answers – “very proud”, “quite proud”, “not very proud” and “not at all proud” – his or her response was coded using four dummy variables: *VeryProud*, *QuiteProud*, *NotVeryProud* and *NotProud*, respectively. “Don’t know”, “no answer” and “not applicable” were coded as missing values.

BOX 3.5 – EVS 2008, QUESTION 72

Q72. How proud are you to be a [COUNTRY] citizen?

- 1 – very proud
- 2 – quite proud
- 3 – not very proud
- 4 – not at all proud
-
- 8 – don’t know (spontaneous)
- 9 – no answer (spontaneous)
- 7 – not applicable (spontaneous)

F. DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

In explaining the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigrants and of immigration policy preferences, I also focus on the influence of demographic and socio-economic characteristics: These are important to include in the analysis, not only because they are interesting in their own right, but also to avoid omitted variable bias. If these characteristics contribute to an individual's attitudes or policy preferences, and are correlated with each other or with the political ideology variables, excluding some of them could bias regression coefficients (Wooldridge, 2009).

In particular, I include age, gender, employment/student status, foreign-born status, educational achievement and household income. *Female*, *ForeignBorn*, *Employed* and *Student* are dummy variables that are equal to 1 when respondent i is female, born out of the surveyed country, employed (including self-employed) or enrolled as a student, respectively. Since the EVS 2008 does not ask directly about the respondent's age at the time of the survey, I approximate *age* by subtracting his birth year from the year of his interview.

I use the age at which the respondent finished his education (*AgeEducationCompleted*) to proxy for educational achievement. This measure corresponds closely to years of education completed,⁶ a proxy that is frequently used in research literature (Angrist and Krueger, 1991; Farber and Gibbons, 1996; Lleras-Muney, 2005). As such, it provides a relatively consistent way of comparing educational achievement of individuals in different European countries. The EVS 2008 questionnaire also includes a question about educational achievement that focuses on the level of education and degrees completed.⁷ The responses, however, appear to be coded

⁶ Although school starting ages are not uniform across Member States of the European Union (NFER, 2010), we can still use *AgeEducationCompleted* if we believe that, at a given age, the skills acquired in school are roughly equivalent across the sampled countries.

⁷ Question 110: "What is the highest level you have completed in your education?"

somewhat inconsistently across countries, and therefore are not suitable for pooled and comparative analysis.⁸

For household income, I include the self-reported monthly amounts, which include all wages salaries, pensions, and other sources of income. Question 125 of the EVS 2008 questionnaire asks respondents to place their household's income into one of several groups. As a result, monthly income is coded as a categorical, rather than as a continuous, variable. In order to be able to obtain easy-to-interpret coefficients, I construct household income dummies for each of the income groups, represented by the vector *Income*, that take on values of 1 when the individual's monthly household income falls into the corresponding bracket, and 0 otherwise.

TABLE 3.8 – SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

VARIABLE	SOURCE QUESTION FROM THE EVS 2008 QUESTIONNAIRE
<i>Age</i>	Q87: "Can you tell me your year of birth, please" Q137: "Date of the interview"
<i>Female</i>	Q86: "Sex of respondent"
<i>ForeignBorn</i>	Q90: "Were you born in [COUNTRY]?"
<i>Employed</i>	Q15: "Are you yourself employed or not?"
<i>Student</i>	Q111: "Are you yourself gainfully employed at the moment or not?"
<i>AgeEducationCompleted</i>	Q109: "At what age did you complete your full time education, either at school or at an institution of higher education?"
<i>Income</i>	Q125: "Here is a list of incomes and we would like to know in what group your household is, counting all wages, salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in. Just give the letter of the group your household falls into, after taxes and other deductions."

⁸ The inconsistency in response coding is not unexpected, as there is a great deal of diversity across the education systems of EU-27 countries. For an overview of European education systems, see Hörner et al. (2007).

Table 3.9 describes the variables used in my analysis, and summarizes their basic descriptive statistics – number of observations, means and standard deviations – for the pooled and unweighted sample of all EU-27 countries.

TABLE 3.9 – VARIABLE DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
FOR POOLED EU-27 SAMPLE (UNWEIGHTED)

VARIABLE	DESCRIPTION	NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
<i>IAI</i>	Immigration Attitudes Index (1-10)	35,813	0.000	1.000
<i>TakeJobsAway</i>	Do not take jobs away from natives (1-10)	39,228	5.044	2.883
<i>UndermineCulture</i>	Do not undermine cultural life (1-10)	38,697	5.742	2.907
<i>WorsenCrime</i>	Do not worsen crime problems (1-10)	38,704	4.324	2.613
<i>StrainWelfare</i>	Do not strain welfare system (1-10)	38,048	4.297	2.647
<i>ThreatenSociety</i>	Will not threaten society (1-10)	37,765	4.637	2.709
<i>Permissive</i>	Permissive immigration regime preference (dummy)	38,743	0.485	0.500
<i>LFI</i>	Laissez-Faire Index (PCA)	35,357	0.000	1.000
<i>IST</i>	Index of Social Traditionalism (PCA)	36,306	0.000	1.000
	How proud are you to be a citizen?			
<i>NotProud</i>	Not proud at all (dummy)	36,611	0.024	0.152
<i>NotVeryProud</i>	Not very proud (dummy)	36,611	0.092	0.290
<i>QuiteProud</i>	Quite proud (dummy)	36,611	0.426	0.494
<i>VeryProud</i>	Very proud (dummy)	36,611	0.458	0.498
<i>Age</i>	Age of respondent	40,308	48.753	18.051
<i>Female</i>	Is respondent female? (dummy)	40,308	0.558	0.497
<i>ForeignBorn</i>	Foreign-born status (dummy)	40,202	0.081	0.272
<i>Employed</i>	Employment status (dummy)	40,115	0.526	0.499
<i>Student</i>	Student status (dummy)	40,057	0.057	0.232
<i>AgeEducationCompleted</i>	Age at which respondent completed his/her education	38,402	18.873	5.828
<i>Income</i>	Monthly household income dummies (in euros):			
<i>IncomeBelow150</i>	Less than €150	31,373	0.032	0.177
<i>Income150to300</i>	€150 to under €300	31,373	0.070	0.255
<i>Income300to500</i>	€300 to under €500	31,373	0.113	0.316
<i>Income500to1000</i>	€500 to under €1,000	31,373	0.208	0.406
<i>Income1000to1500</i>	€1,000 to under €1,500	31,373	0.146	0.353
<i>Income1500to2000</i>	€1,500 to under €2,000	31,373	0.101	0.302
<i>Income2000to2500</i>	€2,000 to under €2,500	31,373	0.085	0.279
<i>Income2500to3000</i>	€2,500 to under €3,000	31,373	0.067	0.250
<i>Income3000to5000</i>	€3,000 to under €5,000	31,373	0.116	0.321
<i>Income5000to7500</i>	€5,000 to under €7,500	31,373	0.041	0.198
<i>Income7500to10000</i>	€7,500 to under €10,000	31,373	0.012	0.110
<i>IncomeAbove10000</i>	More than €10,000	31,373	0.008	0.090

4. EMPIRICAL MODEL

A. DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

To analyze how various determinants affect Europeans' individual attitudes towards immigrants, I estimate the following regression model by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) both for the pooled sample of respondents from all EU-27 countries, as well as for each Member State separately (**Model A**):

$$\begin{aligned} IAI_{ij} = & \beta_1 Age_{ij} + \beta_2 Female_{ij} + \beta_3 ForeignBorn_{ij} + \beta_4 Employed_{ij} + \beta_5 Student_{ij} + \\ & + \beta_6 LFI_{ij} + \beta_7 IST_{ij} + \beta_8 NotVeryProud_{ij} + \beta_9 QuiteProud_{ij} + \beta_{10} VeryProud_{ij} + \\ & + \beta_{11} AgeCompletedEducation_{ij} + \gamma \textit{Income}_{ij} + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

where i indexes EU-27 countries, j indexes individuals within each country, and γ contains coefficients on the vector *Income* of monthly household income variables. Finally, ε_{ij} represents an individual-specific error term.⁹ Following Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006), I include a full set of country dummies α_i to account for country-specific factors that may affect individuals' baseline attitudes towards immigrants.¹⁰ Appropriate sampling weights were applied to all regressions: *Appendix A* explains their construction.

⁹ The error term is assumed to be independently and identically distributed error term with a zero conditional mean and finite variance.

¹⁰ In separate country regressions, of course, only one country dummy remains, and becomes, in effect, a regular intercept.

B. DETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES

To examine the determinants of individuals' policy preferences over variously restrictive immigration regimes, I estimate a probit regression model with the *Permissive* dummy as the dependent variable.¹¹ I retain all explanatory variables from (**Model A**), described earlier, in order to be able to compare the determinants of attitudes towards immigrants with those of immigration policy preferences. In particular, I use the following specification (**Model B**):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}(\text{Permissive}_{ij} = 1) &= \Phi(\beta_1 \text{Age}_{ij} + \beta_2 \text{Female}_{ij} + \beta_3 \text{ForeignBorn}_{ij} + \\ &\quad + \beta_4 \text{Employed}_{ij} + \beta_5 \text{Student}_{ij} + \beta_6 \text{LFI}_{ij} + \beta_7 \text{IST}_{ij} + \\ &\quad + \beta_8 \text{NotVeryProud}_{ij} + \beta_9 \text{QuiteProud}_{ij} + \beta_{10} \text{VeryProud}_{ij} + \\ &\quad + \beta_{11} \text{AgeCompletedEducation}_{ij} + \gamma \text{Income}_{ij} + \alpha_i) + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned}$$

where, again, i indexes countries, j indexes sampled individuals within them, and γ represents coefficients on the vector of monthly household income dummies. $\Phi(x)$ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.¹² α_i is a vector of country dummies to control for country-specific factors that may influence baseline individual policy preferences, and ε_{ij} is the error term.¹³ *Appendix A* describes the sampling weights that were applied to all regressions.

¹¹ Because survey respondents face a choice among four increasingly restrictive immigration policy regimes, I also estimate an ordered probit model with *ImmigrationPolicy* as the dependent variable, and the same set of regressors: $\text{Prob}(\text{ImmigrationPolicy} = k | \mathbf{X}) = \Phi(\theta_k - \beta\mathbf{X}) - \Phi(\theta_{k-1} - \beta\mathbf{X})$, where β represents coefficients on $\mathbf{X}$, the vector of regressors used in (**Model A**) and (**Model B**). To facilitate interpretation, I only report the (**Model B**) probit marginal effects at the sample mean (or, for dummy variables, the effect of going from 0 to 1) in country-specific regressions. In most cases, ordered probit regressions yield results that are similar to those obtained by running the probit model in (**Model B**): Even if the statistical significance of a coefficient might change, its sign generally remains the same. An additional justification for reporting the probit results derives from the fact that the *Permissive* dummy appears to be a natural choice for the dependent variable: The questionnaire offers two policy regimes that can easily be classified as 'permissive' and two regimes that are clearly 'restrictive.' Some of the differences between probit and ordered probit estimates can thus reflect some variables' effect on attitudes shifts within, rather than between, the 'permissive' and 'restrictive' categories.

¹² The standard normal cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.): $\Phi(x) = \int_{-\infty}^x \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} e^{-\frac{x^2}{2}} dx$

¹³ The error term is assumed to have the same properties as in (**Model A**).

5. ESTIMATION RESULTS

A. DETERMINANTS OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS

A.1. POOLED REGRESSION FOR ALL EU-27 MEMBER STATES

Table 5.1 reports regression results for (**Model A**) on the pooled sample of respondents from all EU-27 countries. To see whether the results for the Immigration Attitudes Index (IAI) also hold for its components, I also estimate the same specification with the constituent variables of the IAI – *TakeJobsAway*, *UndermineCulture*, *WorsenCrime*, *StrainWelfare* and *ThreatenSociety* – as dependent variables, and report the results in the same table.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics: Of the demographic and socio-economic characteristics examined, foreign-born status and being a student appear to have largest effects on Europeans' attitudes towards immigrants: Other things equal, respondents that were born outside of the surveyed country and students have a 0.477 and 0.275 standard deviations more positive view of immigrants, respectively, than natives and non-students. Education improves one's views of immigrants: Five additional years of schooling are associated with a 0.135 standard deviation increase in the IAI. Interestingly, older people appear to have a more positive view of immigrants, *ceteris paribus*. This result is contrary to the research literature, but does not suggest a substantively significant effect: Ten additional years of age would improve the IAI only by 0.02 standard deviations – an effect that is dwarfed by the other determinants of attitudes towards immigrants. Gender does not appear to affect one's views of immigrants.

TABLE 5.1 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
ESTIMATION RESULTS (OLS) FOR POOLED EU-27 SAMPLE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	Immigration Attitudes Index	Do not take jobs away	Do not undermine cultural life	Do not worsen crime problems	Do not strain welfare system	Will not threaten society
age	0.002** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
female	0.011 (0.019)	-0.097 (0.054)	0.004 (0.056)	0.167 (0.051)	0.026 (0.052)	0.011 (0.053)
foreign-born	0.477*** (0.053)	1.229*** (0.137)	1.021*** (0.145)	1.001*** (0.145)	0.976*** (0.147)	0.996*** (0.145)
employed	0.057** (0.025)	0.144** (0.071)	0.126* (0.071)	0.136** (0.066)	0.132* (0.068)	0.131* (0.068)
student	0.275*** (0.060)	0.735*** (0.166)	0.729*** (0.165)	0.766*** (0.158)	0.442*** (0.161)	0.424*** (0.160)
Laissez-Faire Index	-0.071*** (0.011)	-0.083*** (0.030)	-0.203*** (0.030)	-0.160*** (0.028)	-0.147*** (0.029)	-0.167*** (0.029)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.193*** (0.013)	-0.501*** (0.036)	-0.550*** (0.037)	-0.385*** (0.035)	-0.353*** (0.035)	-0.390*** (0.035)
not very proud	-0.160** (0.081)	-0.422* (0.224)	-0.403* (0.223)	-0.174 (0.203)	-0.353* (0.205)	-0.585*** (0.220)
quite proud	-0.157** (0.075)	-0.527** (0.210)	-0.371* (0.208)	-0.385 (0.035)	-0.352* (0.190)	-0.607*** (0.204)
very proud	-0.265*** (0.076)	-0.670*** (0.213)	-0.549*** (0.211)	-0.342* (0.191)	-0.586*** (0.193)	-0.945*** (0.207)
age completed education	0.027*** (0.002)	0.067*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.006)	0.044*** (0.006)	0.068*** (0.005)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	-0.066 (0.080)	-0.340 (0.218)	-0.340 (0.230)	-0.054 (0.199)	0.019 (0.194)	-0.088 (0.224)
€300 to under €500	-0.106 (0.077)	-0.346 (0.211)	-0.291 (0.221)	-0.145 (0.176)	-0.126 (0.187)	-0.144 (0.216)
€500 to under €1,000	-0.092 (0.076)	-0.229 (0.211)	-0.357 (0.220)	-0.112 (0.174)	-0.106 (0.185)	-0.206 (0.216)
€1,000 to under €1,500	-0.089 (0.079)	-0.191 (0.217)	-0.389* (0.227)	-0.041 (0.178)	0.009 (0.189)	-0.321 (0.223)
€1,500 to under €2,000	-0.097 (0.080)	-0.161 (0.223)	-0.470** (0.231)	-0.060 (0.182)	-0.106 (0.193)	-0.340 (0.228)
€2,000 to under €2,500	-0.046 (0.082)	-0.041 (0.226)	-0.336 (0.236)	0.101 (0.187)	0.086 (0.198)	-0.227 (0.233)
€2,500 to under €3,000	0.071 (0.084)	0.294 (0.232)	-0.029 (0.242)	0.254 (0.194)	0.234 (0.206)	0.057 (0.239)
€3,000 to under €5,000	0.091 (0.083)	0.394* (0.229)	-0.071 (0.238)	0.233 (0.189)	0.285 (0.202)	0.162 (0.234)
€5,000 to under €7,500	0.219** (0.090)	0.707*** (0.245)	0.199 (0.257)	0.468** (0.211)	0.571*** (0.220)	0.313* (0.251)
€7,500 to under €10,000	0.114 (0.115)	0.395 (0.299)	0.064 (0.323)	0.218 (0.279)	0.402 (0.287)	0.197 (0.313)
more than €10,000	0.104 (0.125)	0.505 (0.352)	0.149 (0.363)	0.387 (0.323)	0.216 (0.326)	-0.062 (0.331)
Constant	-0.404*** (0.119)	3.870*** (0.334)	4.497*** (0.343)	3.273*** (0.286)	3.815*** (0.293)	4.158*** (0.325)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	21,882	22,864	22,773	22,705	22,537	22,465
Adjusted R ²	0.20	0.17	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.13

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level.

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Employed individuals hold a better view of immigrants: Compared to unemployed respondents, employed Europeans' IAI is, all else equal, predicted to be 0.057 standard deviations higher. There is, furthermore, some suggestion of a positive relationship between monthly household income and attitudes towards immigrants: The coefficients on the household income dummies tend to increase, and even change signs from negative to positive, as the respondent moves from lower levels of income to higher levels. Most of the coefficients, however, are not statistically significant at conventional levels.

Political Ideology: Laissez-faire views are associated with more negative views towards immigrants: A one standard deviation increase in the Laissez-Faire Index (LFI) is associated with a 0.071 standard deviation decrease in the Immigration Attitudes Index (IAI). More socially traditionalist Europeans tend to have relatively worse views of immigrants: An increase in the Index of Social Traditionalism (IST) by one standard deviation leads, *ceteris paribus*, to a 0.193 standard deviation decrease in the IAI. Finally, the statistically significant coefficients on the *NotSoProud*, *QuiteProud* and *VeryProud* dummies suggest that more nationally (or civically) proud individuals tend to have more negative views of immigrants. This appears to be true especially of those who claim to be “very proud” to be citizens of the surveyed country: Other things equal, a “very proud” individual's IAI will be 0.265 standard deviations lower than that of a baseline individual who claims to be “not at all proud.” This is quite a sizeable effect – comparable in size, albeit with the opposite sign, to that of being a student.

Components of the Immigration Attitudes Index: In regression on individual components of the IAI, the signs, as well as the relative magnitudes, of the coefficients remain the same as in the composite IAI regression: The only exception is the variable age, which – in addition to retaining its substantively insignificant coefficient – loses statistical significance in regressions on *WorsenCrime*, *StrainWelfare* and *ThreatenSociety*. Overall, the almost identical

results for the Immigration Attitudes Index and its components indicate that the IAI is a useful indicator of attitudes towards immigrants that consistently captures several dimensions of respondents' views.

A.1. SEPARATE REGRESSIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL EU-27 MEMBER STATES

Table 5.2 reports regression results for (**Model A**), estimated separately for each of the EU-27 Member States. In general, I find that many of the associations from the pooled regression do not hold up consistently across countries: While years of education and foreign-born status remain associated with favorable views of immigrants across EU-27 Member States, the effects of other demographic and socio-economic determinants differ across countries.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics: Foreign-born status and years of education consistently predict more favorable attitudes: In each country where the coefficient on *AgeEducationCompleted* or on the *ForeignBorn* dummy, are statistically significant, they are positive and tend to have substantively large effects. In most countries, gender does not appear to affect an individual's attitudes towards immigrants.¹⁴ The sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on the respondent's age varies from country to country, but generally suggests a substantively insignificant influence. The signs of the statistically significant coefficients on the student-status and employment status dummies vary by country.¹⁵

¹⁴ The exceptions are Belgium, Estonia and Latvia. In Belgium, being female is associated with slightly worse views of immigrants. In Estonia and Latvia, by contrast, women tend to have a much better view of immigrants, other things equal, than men.

¹⁵ Note, furthermore, that the coefficient on the employment status dummy is statistically insignificant in a large number of Member States.

TABLE 5.2 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
ESTIMATION RESULTS (OLS) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES INDEX					
	Austria	Belgium	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czech Rep.	Denmark
age	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)
female	-0.032 (0.060)	-0.090* (0.053)	0.106 (0.075)	-0.014 (0.069)	0.045 (0.062)	0.022 (0.056)
foreign-born	0.402** (0.160)	0.503*** (0.124)	0.315 (0.363)	0.195 (0.208)	0.032 (0.205)	0.315** (0.156)
employed	0.105 (0.084)	-0.131* (0.078)	0.001 (0.096)	-0.008 (0.081)	-0.142* (0.082)	0.111 (0.092)
student	0.820*** (0.174)	-0.307** (0.138)	-0.190 (0.226)	-0.384** (0.200)	-0.402** (0.169)	0.202 (0.192)
Laissez-Faire Index	-0.208*** (0.032)	-0.075** (0.036)	0.089** (0.037)	0.011 (0.034)	0.047 (0.034)	-0.139*** (0.035)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.190*** (0.038)	-0.130*** (0.031)	-0.166*** (0.053)	-0.010 (0.050)	-0.115** (0.047)	-0.147*** (0.041)
not very proud	-0.069 (0.262)	-0.042 (0.234)	-0.026 (0.211)	0.999*** (0.226)	0.195 (0.391)	0.183 (0.252)
quite proud	-0.366 (0.228)	0.098 (0.213)	0.165 (0.201)	0.959*** (0.196)	0.407 (0.385)	-0.308 (0.241)
very proud	-0.471** (0.229)	0.031 (0.216)	-0.096 (0.204)	0.914*** (0.192)	0.523 (0.386)	-0.552** (0.242)
age completed education	0.028*** (0.007)	0.055*** (0.010)	0.005 (0.009)	0.020** (0.009)	0.022*** (0.008)	0.011** (0.004)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	-0.818 (0.651)	-0.268 (0.578)	0.004 (0.115)	0.410 (0.273)	0.055 (0.476)	omitted
€300 to under €500	-0.294 (0.649)	-1.147* (0.675)	-0.145 (0.116)	0.543** (0.266)	-0.298 (0.446)	omitted
€500 to under €1,000	-0.194 (0.639)	-0.702 (0.577)	0.037 (0.140)	0.579** (0.256)	-0.136 (0.440)	0.137 (0.247)
€1,000 to under €1,500	-0.224 (0.635)	-0.406 (0.573)	-0.512 (0.358)	0.517** (0.254)	-0.090 (0.439)	0.107 (0.235)
€1,500 to under €2,000	-0.288 (0.638)	-0.463 (0.572)	-0.583** (0.230)	0.516** (0.255)	-0.161 (0.443)	0.154 (0.228)
€2,000 to under €2,500	-0.164 (0.636)	-0.522 (0.572)	0.651** (0.354)	0.486* (0.255)	-0.066 (0.506)	0.123 (0.230)
€2,500 to under €3,000	-0.232 (0.639)	-0.442 (0.572)	-0.728*** (0.224)	0.622** (0.264)	0.968 (0.647)	0.120 (0.232)
€3,000 to under €5,000	-0.162 (0.638)	-0.448 (0.572)	omitted	0.631** (0.267)	0.392 (0.586)	0.206 (0.216)
€5,000 to under €7,500	0.021 (0.685)	-0.440 (0.576)	omitted	0.352 (0.357)	-0.353 (0.506)	0.452** (0.219)
€7,500 to under €10,000	0.760 (0.675)	-0.176 (0.613)	omitted	-0.247 (0.319)	-0.586 (0.440)	omitted
more than €10,000	-0.030 (0.688)	-0.659 (0.633)	omitted	2.355*** (0.253)	-0.293 (0.901)	0.753** (0.340)
Constant	-0.373 (0.678)	-0.492 (0.658)	0.172 (0.300)	-2.174*** (0.381)	-0.384 (0.615)	0.329 (0.356)
Number of observations	949	1,206	730	571	919	924
R ²	0.25	0.11	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.20

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level.

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.2 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
ESTIMATION RESULTS (OLS) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES INDEX					
	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	G. Britain	Greece
age	-0.004* (0.002)	0.015*** (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
female	0.144** (0.069)	0.015 (0.079)	-0.020 (0.056)	0.051 (0.048)	0.014 (0.068)	0.054 (0.061)
foreign-born	0.174 (0.140)	-0.104 (0.242)	0.497*** (0.124)	0.618*** (0.133)	0.476*** (0.129)	0.189 (0.137)
employed	0.007 (0.092)	0.156 (0.095)	0.083 (0.073)	-0.005 (0.062)	-0.027 (0.088)	0.137* (0.083)
student	-0.047 (0.211)	-0.006 (0.238)	0.338** (0.145)	0.509*** (0.174)	0.396 (0.441)	0.184 (0.154)
Laissez-Faire Index	0.021 (0.042)	-0.058 (0.042)	-0.145*** (0.031)	-0.053** (0.026)	-0.212*** (0.032)	-0.067** (0.029)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.039 (0.045)	-0.344*** (0.044)	-0.215*** (0.037)	-0.181*** (0.030)	-0.067 (0.050)	-0.222*** (0.047)
not very proud	-0.360** (0.179)	-0.412 (0.456)	0.171 (0.264)	-0.182 (0.128)	-0.434 (0.365)	-0.577** (0.272)
quite proud	-0.460*** (0.161)	-0.497 (0.435)	0.075 (0.241)	-0.201* (0.120)	-0.205 (0.337)	-0.656*** (0.245)
very proud	-0.623*** (0.164)	-0.413 (0.433)	-0.093 (0.245)	-0.385*** (0.129)	-0.364 (0.335)	-0.800*** (0.242)
age completed education	0.006 (0.008)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.042*** (0.006)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	-0.220 (0.227)	-0.542 (0.420)	omitted	-1.379*** (0.297)	-0.081 (0.0744)	-0.716 (0.462)
€300 to under €500	-0.090 (0.227)	-0.608 (0.380)	-0.953*** (0.299)	-0.972*** (0.211)	-0.238 (0.689)	-0.427 (0.446)
€500 to under €1,000	-0.027 (0.224)	0.170 (0.358)	-0.670*** (0.249)	-0.880*** (0.179)	-0.382 (0.689)	-0.504 (0.439)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.084 (0.235)	-0.472 (0.414)	-0.704*** (0.234)	-0.835*** (0.178)	-0.288 (0.692)	-0.523 (0.440)
€1,500 to under €2,000	0.060 (0.257)	-0.389 (0.356)	-0.551** (0.232)	-0.834*** (0.177)	-0.394 (0.688)	-0.477 (0.445)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.218 (0.266)	0.296 (0.345)	-0.671*** (0.233)	-0.659*** (0.184)	-0.299 (0.694)	-0.801* (0.444)
€2,500 to under €3,000	-0.498 (0.491)	-0.428 (0.337)	-0.408* (0.237)	-0.612*** (0.187)	-0.230 (0.693)	-0.443 (0.453)
€3,000 to under €5,000	0.112 (0.364)	-0.169 (0.324)	-0.407* (0.231)	-0.591*** (0.188)	-0.20 (0.692)	-0.340 (0.464)
€5,000 to under €7,50-0	0.629 (0.391)	-0.229 (0.329)	-0.206 (0.246)	-0.244 (0.229)	0.141 (0.696)	-0.494 (0.518)
€7,500 to under €10,000	0.369 (0.240)	-0.242 (0.350)	omitted	-0.605* (0.344)	-0.019 (0.718)	-0.309 (0.536)
more than €10,000	1.213*** (0.264)	-0.314 (0.376)	-0.022 (0.402)	omitted	0.012 (0.708)	0.041 (0.518)
Constant	0.417 (0.317)	-0.532 (0.578)	0.004 (0.399)	0.0642 (0.232)	-0.344 (0.818)	0.292 (0.495)
Number of observations	897	684	1,255	1,348	827	1,072
R ²	0.07	0.19	0.21	0.13	0.15	0.14

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level.

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.2 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
ESTIMATION RESULTS (OLS) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES INDEX					
	Hungary	Ireland	Italy	Latvia	Lithuania	Luxembourg
age	0.0001 (0.002)	0.007** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.009* (0.005)
female	0.043 (0.050)	-0.092 (0.107)	0.007 (0.077)	0.148** (0.066)	0.056 (0.063)	0.092 (0.104)
foreign-born	0.590** (0.261)	0.217 (0.236)	-0.072 (0.178)	0.412** (0.172)	-0.164 (0.195)	0.039 (0.206)
employed	0.003 (0.063)	0.244* (0.133)	0.086 (0.097)	-0.081 (0.084)	-0.035 (0.089)	0.113 (0.154)
student	-0.184 (0.115)	-0.215 (0.393)	0.342* (0.189)	-0.155 (0.156)	-0.063 (0.167)	-0.031 (0.227)
Laissez-Faire Index	0.100*** (0.030)	-0.030 (0.065)	-0.112** (0.044)	0.003 (0.042)	0.115*** (0.039)	-0.058 (0.059)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.140*** (0.041)	-0.222*** (0.069)	-0.295*** (0.058)	-0.097* (0.056)	-0.194*** (0.052)	-0.033 (0.062)
not very proud	0.209 (0.209)	omitted	-0.467 (0.333)	-0.200 (0.203)	0.273** (0.122)	-0.084 (0.355)
quite proud	0.263 (0.200)	0.988*** (0.206)	-0.492 (0.315)	-0.264 (0.198)	0.477*** (0.113)	-0.379 (0.318)
very proud	0.165 (0.201)	0.972*** (0.159)	-0.343 (0.321)	-0.449** (0.203)	0.472*** (0.128)	-0.559* (0.318)
age completed education	0.026*** (0.008)	0.025** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.008)	0.010** (0.005)	0.012 (0.008)	0.053*** (0.014)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	-0.090 (0.171)	omitted	0.697 (0.666)	0.151 (0.204)	-0.102 (0.228)	1.659*** (0.284)
€300 to under €500	-0.087 (0.160)	0.803** (0.393)	0.587 (0.530)	0.128 (0.196)	0.187 (0.229)	omitted
€500 to under €1,000	0.106 (0.158)	0.387 (0.338)	0.503 (0.474)	0.372* (0.192)	0.029 (0.221)	0.943** (0.421)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.029 (0.173)	0.405 (0.334)	0.617 (0.476)	0.269 (0.204)	0.074 (0.236)	1.195*** (0.250)
€1,500 to under €2,000	0.205 (0.224)	0.260 (0.326)	0.548 (0.477)	0.538** (0.229)	0.392 (0.285)	1.298*** (0.245)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.402 (0.332)	0.320 (0.319)	0.632 (0.478)	0.157 (0.215)	-0.054 (0.482)	1.447*** (0.263)
€2,500 to under €3,000	0.099 (0.408)	0.443 (0.306)	0.829* (0.481)	0.390 (0.271)	0.268 (0.449)	1.694*** (0.218)
€3,000 to under €5,000	-0.501** (0.213)	0.543* (0.306)	0.777 (0.480)	-0.066 (0.269)	omitted	1.804*** (0.177)
€5,000 to under €7,500	omitted	0.252 (0.318)	0.967* (0.514)	omitted	omitted	1.885*** (0.198)
€7,500 to under €10,000	omitted	0.392 (0.352)	0.940 (0.651)	omitted	omitted	1.842*** (0.240)
more than €10,000	omitted	0.822** (0.395)	0.343 (0.500)	omitted	omitted	1.948*** (0.335)
Constant	-0.879 (0.307)	-2.468*** (0.484)	-1.401** (0.585)	-0.255 (0.294)	-0.716 (0.321)	-2.678*** (0.574)
Number of observations	1,151	349	630	708	611	435
R ²	0.09	0.11	0.19	0.09	0.12	0.15

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.2 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
ESTIMATION RESULTS (OLS) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES INDEX					
	Malta	Netherlands	N. Ireland	Poland	Portugal	Romania
age	0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.007 (0.004)	-0.0005 (0.003)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007*** (0.003)
female	-0.076 (0.067)	0.035 (0.051)	0.084 (0.137)	-0.034 (0.067)	0.017 (0.094)	0.102 (0.081)
foreign-born	0.028 (0.199)	0.593*** (0.134)	-0.220 (0.192)	0.441 (0.341)	0.239* (0.136)	omitted
employed	-0.159* (0.087)	0.013 (0.074)	0.084 (0.164)	0.056 (0.082)	0.136 (0.112)	0.091 (0.095)
student	-0.166 (0.434)	-0.418* (0.232)	2.182*** (0.484)	0.274** (0.138)	-0.476 (0.350)	-0.236 (0.264)
Laissez-Faire Index	0.114*** (0.031)	-0.010 (0.034)	0.001 (0.101)	0.049 (0.034)	-0.042 (0.056)	0.019 (0.041)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.068 (0.046)	-0.181*** (0.038)	-0.173 (0.107)	-0.156*** (0.052)	-0.174** (0.070)	-0.243*** (0.060)
not very proud	0.778*** (0.195)	0.121 (0.151)	0.325 (1.067)	-0.468* (0.261)	-0.593 (0.379)	-0.162 (0.376)
quite proud	0.929*** (0.130)	0.131 (0.130)	0.003 (1.021)	-0.229* (0.128)	-0.632* (0.335)	-0.113 (0.366)
very proud	0.908*** (0.127)	-0.092 (0.136)	-0.113 (1.021)	-0.304** (0.126)	-0.644* (0.334)	0.211 (0.365)
age completed education	0.033*** (0.012)	0.027*** (0.006)	0.003 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.004 (0.010)	0.011 (0.008)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	-0.568 (0.494)	0.103 (0.523)	-0.586 (0.566)	0.136 (0.284)	0.576* (0.301)	0.199* (0.120)
€300 to under €500	-0.532 (0.472)	-0.310 (0.486)	-0.499 (0.326)	0.100 (0.268)	1.113*** (0.279)	0.125 (0.125)
€500 to under €1,000	-0.534 (0.469)	0.040 (0.250)	-0.754*** (0.256)	0.079 (0.267)	1.012*** (0.284)	0.209 (0.149)
€1,000 to under €1,500	-0.408 (0.476)	-0.128 (0.251)	-0.183 (0.220)	0.288 (0.277)	1.099*** (0.279)	-0.103 (0.216)
€1,500 to under €2,000	-0.380 (0.483)	-0.055 (0.253)	-0.010 (0.248)	-0.001 (0.305)	1.368*** (0.309)	-0.691*** (0.247)
€2,000 to under €2,500	-0.318 (0.484)	-0.063 (0.252)	-0.267 (0.251)	0.261 (0.381)	1.144*** (0.313)	-0.103 (0.275)
€2,500 to under €3,000	-0.375 (0.504)	0.187 (0.249)	-0.486*** (0.173)	-0.191 (0.346)	0.822** (0.401)	-0.207 (0.472)
€3,000 to under €5,000	-0.392 (0.503)	0.069 (0.251)	-0.021 (0.237)	-0.277 (0.321)	0.772** (0.310)	0.544 (0.369)
€5,000 to under €7,500	-0.676 (0.542)	0.302 (0.265)	-0.136 (0.347)	-0.246 (0.347)	0.780** (0.344)	0.777* (0.444)
€7,500 to under €10,000	-0.434 (0.501)	0.069 (0.280)	-0.796* (0.467)	-0.316 (0.345)	1.256*** (0.322)	0.482 (0.452)
more than €10,000	-0.505 (0.594)	0.063 (0.278)	0.228 (0.275)	-0.329 (0.378)	1.228*** (0.342)	-1.372** (0.445)
Constant	-1.923*** (0.515)	-0.738** (0.337)	-0.464 (1.098)	0.670* (0.389)	-0.625 (0.510)	-0.007 (0.445)
Number of observations	575	1,117	214	789	499	741
R ²	0.10	0.13	0.15	0.05	0.11	0.09

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.2 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
ESTIMATION RESULTS (OLS) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES INDEX			
	Slovakia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden
Age	-0.003 (0.003)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
female	0.048 (0.064)	0.092 (0.072)	-0.050 (0.067)	0.036 (0.099)
foreign-born	0.133 (0.161)	0.833*** (0.163)	0.214 (0.185)	0.542*** (0.171)
employed	0.062 (0.085)	0.045 (0.098)	0.086 (0.092)	0.219 (0.144)
student	0.549** (0.234)	-0.009 (0.160)	0.362 (0.222)	0.158 (0.309)
Laissez-Faire Index	0.043 (0.039)	0.147*** (0.040)	-0.089** (0.044)	-0.573*** (0.049)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.002 (0.044)	-0.239*** (0.049)	-0.241*** (0.039)	-0.364*** (0.063)
not very proud	-0.794** (0.360)	0.516* (0.305)	-0.069 (0.303)	0.097 (0.650)
quite proud	-0.508 (0.345)	0.205 (0.257)	-0.283 (0.254)	0.212 (0.633)
very proud	-0.532 (0.348)	0.002 (0.257)	-0.423* (0.253)	-0.260 (0.631)
age completed education	0.003 (0.012)	0.014* (0.008)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.006)
monthly household income:				
€150 to under €300	0.377 (0.288)	-0.863 (0.634)	-0.149 (0.199)	0.457 (0.706)
€300 to under €500	0.377 (0.286)	-0.767 (0.603)	0.149 (0.228)	0.946 (0.841)
€500 to under €1,000	0.407 (0.289)	-0.669 (0.585)	-0.080 (0.173)	0.859** (0.380)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.230 (0.304)	-0.502 (0.584)	-0.123 (0.164)	0.848*** (0.316)
€1,500 to under €2,000	0.976*** (0.364)	-0.413 (0.586)	-0.303* (0.178)	0.521* (0.279)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.599 (0.545)	-0.376 (0.587)	-0.184 (0.176)	0.871*** (0.274)
€2,500 to under €3,000	0.341 (0.360)	-0.487 (0.594)	-0.048 (0.196)	0.656** (0.284)
€3,000 to under €5,000	1.032** (0.453)	-0.204 (0.587)	-0.183 (0.197)	0.686*** (0.265)
€5,000 to under €7,500	1.386*** (0.296)	-0.155 (0.662)	-0.339* (0.194)	0.811*** (0.301)
€7,500 to under €10,000	omitted	0.278 (0.896)	-0.260 (0.188)	0.305 (0.499)
more than €10,000	omitted	-0.486 (0.631)	-0.304 (0.234)	1.462*** (0.359)
Constant	0.125 (0.469)	-0.389 (0.691)	0.161 (0.331)	-1.475** (0.679)
Number of observations	784	661	695	541
R ²	0.09	0.21	0.15	0.20

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level.

Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

In most countries, there does not appear to be a clear relationship between monthly household income and respondents' attitudes towards immigration: most coefficients on income dummies are not statistically significant at conventional levels. In countries where household income dummies have statistically significant coefficients, there appears to be either a positive association between income and attitudes towards immigrants (such as in Germany or Luxembourg), or a U-shaped relationship with middle-income individuals having the least favorable view (e.g., in Portugal or Sweden): In such cases, furthermore, the effect of various levels of income on attitudes, compared to a baseline individual whose household earns less than €150 a month, tends to be quite sizable. Where household income matters, it matters a great deal.

Political Ideology: In the pooled regression for all EU-27 countries, I found that more laissez-faire, more socially traditionalist and more nationally proud individuals were likely to hold, other things equal, less favorable views of immigrants. When (**Model A**) is estimated separately, a more diverse picture emerges:

Across EU-27 countries, it is more common for laissez-faire individuals to view immigrants in worse light. As *Table 5.3* shows, individuals with stronger laissez-faire views have, *ceteris paribus*, less favorable attitudes towards immigrants in 10 countries, while the opposite is true only in 5 countries. In 13 countries, the coefficient on the Laissez-Faire Index (LFI) is not statistically significant, and the effect can therefore not be signed.

The Index of Social Traditionalism (IST) exhibits the most consistent effect in the country-specific regressions: In as many as 21 countries, greater degree of social traditionalism is associated with worse views of immigrants. Seven countries exhibit no statistically significant association. There is no country in which more socially traditionalist individuals like immigrants better. *Table 5.4* shows which category each of the sampled countries belongs to.

**TABLE 5.3 – EFFECT OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE VIEWS
ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS - BY MEMBER STATE**

COEFFICIENT ON LFI	LIST OF COUNTRIES
positive (+) statistically significant	Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia
negative (-) statistically significant	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Spain, Sweden
not statistically significant	Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia

**TABLE 5.4 – EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM
ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS - BY MEMBER STATE**

COEFFICIENT ON IST	LIST OF COUNTRIES
positive (+) statistically significant	None
negative (-) statistically significant	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
not statistically significant	Cyprus, Estonia, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Malta, Northern Ireland, Slovakia

**TABLE 5.5 – EFFECT OF NATIONAL/CIVIC PRIDE
ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS - BY MEMBER STATE**

COEFFICIENT ON <i>VERY PROUD</i> DUMMY	LIST OF COUNTRIES
positive (+) statistically significant	Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta
negative (-) statistically significant	Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Spain
not statistically significant	Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden

Table 5.5 categorizes EU-27 countries based on the sign and statistical significance of the coefficient on the *VeryProud* dummy: Only in four countries – Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania and Malta – do very nationally proud individual regard immigrants more favorably, holding everything else equal and compared to a baseline of an individual who is “not at all proud” to be a citizen of the sampled country. Very proud individuals exhibit, *ceteris paribus*, less favorable attitudes towards immigrants in 10 countries. The coefficient was not statistically significant in 14 Member States.

Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 depicts, using scatterplots, the relative sizes of regression coefficients on the Laissez-Faire Index, the Index of Social Traditionalism and the *VeryProud* dummy. Several patterns are apparent among the countries whose coefficients are statistically significant: *Figures 5.1 and 5.3* confirm that social traditionalism is everywhere associated with less favorable views of immigrants, and suggest that the magnitude of the effect is relatively similar in all countries. There is, by contrast, a great deal of dispersion in the values of coefficients on both the Laissez-Faire Index and on the *VeryProud* dummy variable. *Figure 5.2* shows that the coefficients on the Laissez-Faire Index and on the *VeryProud* have, for each of the sampled countries, the same sign: Wherever national pride is associated with worse or better views of immigrants, laissez-faire views have the same effect.

FIGURE 5.1 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS:
LAISSEZ-FAIRE INDEX AND INDEX OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM
(REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS BY COUNTRY)

Note: Coefficients that are not statistically significant at the 10% level are plotted as if they were equal to zero. If neither index has a statistically significant coefficient, the country does not appear in the figure.

FIGURE 5.2 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS:
LAISSEZ-FAIRE INDEX AND NATIONAL PRIDE (*VERYPROUD* DUMMY)
(REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS BY COUNTRY)

Note: Coefficients that are not statistically significant at the 10% level are plotted as if they were equal to zero. If neither index has a statistically significant coefficient, the country does not appear in the figure.

FIGURE 5.3 – ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS:
INDEX OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM AND NATIONAL PRIDE (*VERYPROUD* DUMMY)
(REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS BY COUNTRY)

Note: Coefficients that are not statistically significant at the 10% level are plotted as if they were equal to zero. If neither index has a statistically significant coefficient, the country does not appear in the figure.

B. DETERMINANTS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES

B.1. POOLED REGRESSION FOR ALL EU-27 MEMBER STATES

The first column *Table 5.6* reports probit regression results for (**Model B**) on the pooled sample of respondents from all EU-27 countries. Here, the dependent variable is *Permissive*, a dummy that is equal to one if a respondent favors a relatively permissive immigration regime, and to zero otherwise. For ease of interpretation, I report marginal effects at the sample mean for continuous variables, and the effect of an increase from zero to one for dummy variables.

In the second column, I report the raw coefficients of an ordered probit model with the same set of explanatory variables, but with *ImmigrationPolicy*, an ordinal variable whose higher values correspond to a preference for a more permissive immigration policy regime, as the dependent variable.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics: Foreign-born and student status are associated with a preference for less restrictive immigration policies: Holding everything else equal, foreign-born respondents and students are, respectively, 21.9 and 13.5 percentage points, more likely to favor a permissive policy regime. The older and/or more educated an individual is, the more likely he or she is to favor a permissive policy: Four additional years of schooling are associated with a 3.6 percentage point increase in the likelihood of favoring either a policy that lets anyone interested come in, or one that lets immigrants in as long as jobs are available. Although statistically significant, the effect of age is not substantively large: Ten additional years of age only increase the likelihood of favoring a permissive policy by 2 percentage points. Gender does not appear to affect individuals' policy preferences.

TABLE 5.6 – PREFERENCE OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES
ESTIMATION RESULTS (PROBIT) FOR POOLED EU-27 SAMPLE

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	PERMISSIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME PREFERENCE	
	PROBIT ⁺ ON <i>PERMISSIVE</i> DUMMY	ORDERED PROBIT ON 4 REGIMES
age	0.002*** (0.0004)	0.003*** (0.001)
female	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.024)
foreign-born	0.219*** (0.027)	0.444** (0.058)
employed	0.024* (0.014)	0.032 (0.029)
student	0.135*** (0.032)	0.348*** (0.074)
Laissez-Faire Index	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.031** (0.013)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.063*** (0.007)	-0.165** (0.016)
not very proud	-0.039 (0.040)	-0.016 (0.096)
quite proud	-0.092** (0.036)	-0.119 (0.090)
very proud	-0.124*** (0.037)	-0.195** (0.091)
age completed education	0.009*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.003)
monthly household income:		
€150 to under €300	-0.008 (0.042)	-0.089 (0.101)
€300 to under €500	0.033 (0.040)	0.020 (0.101)
€500 to under €1,000	0.034 (0.040)	0.030 (0.099)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.033 (0.041)	0.031 (0.102)
€1,500 to under €2,000	-0.004 (0.042)	0.008 (0.104)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.023 (0.043)	0.026 (0.106)
€2,500 to under €3,000	0.077* (0.044)	0.155 (0.108)
€3,000 to under €5,000	0.090** (0.043)	0.158 (0.106)
€5,000 to under €7,500	0.128*** (0.046)	0.234** (0.111)
€7,500 to under €10,000	0.094 (0.059)	0.131 (0.132)
more than €10,000	0.090 (0.068)	0.220 (0.142)
Country-fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Number of observations	22,623	22,623
Pseudo R ²	0.07	0.06

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level. ⁺Marginal effects reported.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Although employment status appears – in the probit regression – to be associated with a preference for a permissive immigration policy regime, the effect is not large. There does not appear to be strong evidence of a relationship between monthly household income and individuals' preferences over immigration policy regimes: Although some coefficients at relatively high household income levels are positive and statistically significant, most coefficients are not significantly different from zero at conventional levels.

Political Ideology: Greater degrees of social traditionalism and of civic/national pride lead to support for immigration restrictions: A one standard deviation increase in the Index of Social Traditionalism (IST) is associated, *ceteris paribus*, with a 6.3 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of supporting a permissive immigration policy regime. Those who are very proud and those who are quite proud to be citizens of their country are, respectively, 12.4 and 9.2 percentage points more likely to support a restrictive policy – an effect of considerable magnitude. There is some evidence, furthermore, that laissez-faire views lead to preferences for more restrictive immigration policies: In the ordered probit regression, the coefficient on the Laissez-Faire Index is negative and statistically significant, although the effects appears to be small relative to that of social traditionalism and national pride.

All in all, the estimation of the pooled EU-27 (**Model B**) yields results that are quite similar to those obtained from estimating a pooled (**Model A**): In the EU-27 as a whole, in other words, individuals' attitudes towards immigrants, as well as their preferences over variously restrictive immigration policy regimes, appear to be determined in similar ways by the same characteristics. Next, I will estimate (**Model B**) separately for each Member State to examine whether there is cross-country heterogeneity in the determinants of immigration policy preferences.

B.2. SEPARATE REGRESSIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL EU-27 MEMBER STATES

Table 5.7 contains country-by-country regression results for (**Model B**). Some of the relationships from the pooled regression do not hold up when the model is estimated separately for each EU-27 Member State, while others remain unchanged. Overall, the results suggest a considerable amount of cross-country variation in the determinants of individuals' preferences over variously restrictive immigration policy regimes.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics: Foreign-born and student status, as well as years of education, generally remain associated with a preference for a less restrictive policy regime. In most countries, gender does not appear to have a statistically significant association with preferences for more or less restrictive immigration policies. The sign of the coefficient on the respondent's age varies across Member States, but the relationship is not of a substantively significant magnitude. In most country-specific regressions, employment status does not exhibit a statistically significant association with policy preferences.

In only a handful of countries are there hints of a statistically significant relationship between the monthly household income and the respondents' immigration policy preferences: In Austria and Ireland, the coefficients on the set of household income dummies suggest a U-shaped relationship, where individuals from middle-income households are more likely to prefer a restrictive policy regime. In France, there are some suggestions that higher levels of income are associated with a preference for less restrictive policies. Northern Ireland also exhibits a statistically significant relationship that appears to fall somewhere between the U-shape observed in Austria and Ireland, and the more monotonous relationship seen in France.

All in all, the country-by-country coefficients on demographic variables exhibit patterns that are similar to those observed for attitudes towards immigrants in (**Model A**).

TABLE 5.7 – PREFERENCE OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES
ESTIMATION RESULTS (PROBIT) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	PERMISSIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME PREFERENCE DUMMY (<i>Permissive_{ij}</i>)					
	Austria	Belgium	Bulgaria	Cyprus	Czech Rep.	Denmark
age	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0006 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.001)
female	0.012 (0.036)	-0.072** (0.030)	0.006 (0.036)	-0.078* (0.041)	-0.035 (0.034)	-0.047 (0.036)
foreign-born	0.039 (0.081)	0.123* (0.067)	0.243 (0.185)	0.015 (0.115)	0.040 (0.124)	0.061 (0.112)
employed	0.075 (0.049)	-0.026 (0.043)	0.009 (0.046)	-0.015 (0.051)	-0.015 (0.046)	-0.008 (0.055)
student	0.420*** (0.059)	-0.004 (0.087)	0.040 (0.123)	-0.139 (0.116)	-0.047 (0.093)	-0.024 (0.110)
Laissez-Faire Index	-0.039** (0.018)	0.001 (0.018)	0.035** (0.016)	0.061*** (0.020)	0.060*** (0.017)	-0.011 (0.021)
Index of Social Traditionalism	0.002 (0.020)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.091*** (0.026)	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.035 (0.024)	-0.061** (0.025)
not very proud	0.160 (0.105)	-0.042 (0.106)	0.211* (0.103)	0.788*** (0.022)	0.041 (0.190)	-0.197 (0.206)
quite proud	0.058 (0.099)	0.005 (0.100)	0.270*** (0.099)	0.976*** (0.014)	0.049 (0.183)	-0.370* (0.205)
very proud	0.048 (0.100)	-0.028 (0.101)	0.228** (0.101)	0.894*** (0.053)	0.068 (0.185)	-0.422* (0.202)
age completed education	0.011** (0.005)	0.019*** (0.005)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.009* (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	-0.569*** (0.018)	omitted	-0.001 (0.051)	-0.028 (0.289)	-0.118 (0.201)	omitted
€300 to under €500	-0.598*** (0.020)	0.278 (0.339)	-0.028 (0.056)	-0.132 (0.209)	-0.089 (0.202)	omitted
€500 to under €1,000	-0.710*** (0.025)	-0.131 (0.227)	0.076 (0.073)	-0.055 (0.254)	-0.050 (0.207)	-0.011 (0.153)
€1,000 to under €1,500	-0.855*** (0.028)	-0.037 (0.248)	-0.077 (0.128)	-0.106 (0.235)	-0.033 (0.206)	0.101 (0.140)
€1,500 to under €2,000	-0.826*** (0.028)	-0.089 (0.239)	-0.028 (0.214)	-0.141 (0.227)	-0.092 (0.201)	0.065 (0.139)
€2,000 to under €2,500	-0.887*** (0.029)	-0.086 (0.238)	0.321** (0.130)	-0.214 (0.192)	-0.027 (0.246)	0.104 (0.139)
€2,500 to under €3,000	-0.747*** (0.026)	-0.098 (0.236)	omitted	-0.128 (0.222)	0.422 (0.196)	0.098 (0.137)
€3,000 to under €5,000	-0.792*** (0.029)	-0.005 (0.251)	omitted	-0.159 (0.209)	0.296 (0.283)	0.062 (0.127)
€5,000 to under €7,500	-0.576*** (0.018)	0.107 (0.265)	omitted	-0.281 (0.064)	-0.178 (0.265)	0.082 (0.131)
€7,500 to under €10,000	-0.546*** (0.017)	0.036 (0.298)	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
more than €10,000	-0.539*** (0.017)	0.033 (0.310)	omitted	-0.159 (0.229)	-0.176 (0.323)	0.272 (0.166)
Number of observations	934	1,206	876	596	938	930
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.03	0.03	0.07	0.04	0.03

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level. Marginal probit effects reported.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.7 – PREFERENCE OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES
ESTIMATION RESULTS (PROBIT) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	PERMISSIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME PREFERENCE DUMMY (<i>Permissive_{ij}</i>)					
	Estonia	Finland	France	Germany	G. Britain	Greece
age	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.0007 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)
female	0.058 (0.037)	-0.088* (0.045)	-0.046 (0.031)	0.019 (0.029)	0.004 (0.036)	-0.016 (0.033)
foreign-born	-0.019 (0.069)	-0.215 (0.166)	0.211*** (0.059)	0.377*** (0.065)	0.246*** (0.071)	0.107 (0.079)
employed	-0.014 (0.048)	0.064 (0.056)	-0.023 (0.040)	0.069* (0.037)	0.022 (0.045)	0.003 (0.041)
student	0.078 (0.113)	-0.151 (0.144)	0.282*** (0.075)	0.203* (0.102)	-0.046 (0.190)	-0.037 (0.080)
Laissez-Faire Index	0.079*** (0.020)	-0.005 (0.023)	-0.034** (0.016)	0.005 (0.015)	-0.051*** (0.019)	-0.019 (0.015)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.022 (0.025)	-0.101*** (0.027)	-0.094*** (0.020)	-0.064*** (0.017)	-0.032 (0.025)	-0.021 (0.024)
not very proud	-0.131 (0.096)	0.197 (0.237)	-0.010 (0.123)	-0.102 (0.065)	-0.103 (0.118)	-0.058 (0.143)
quite proud	-0.090 (0.089)	0.138 (0.239)	-0.060 (0.112)	-0.190*** (0.064)	-0.186 (0.115)	-0.111 (-0.178)
very proud	-0.247 (0.087)	0.123 (0.238)	-0.187* (0.111)	-0.229*** (0.059)	-0.200* (0.118)	-0.178 (0.133)
age completed education	-0.005 (0.004)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	0.058 (0.114)	-0.058 (0.247)	omitted	-0.313 (0.134)	-0.007 (0.317)	0.246 (0.246)
€300 to under €500	0.015 (0.114)	0.074 (0.233)	-0.447*** (0.096)	-0.111 (0.229)	-0.063 (0.247)	0.307 (0.217)
€500 to under €1,000	0.026 (0.112)	0.052 (0.224)	-0.350* (0.147)	-0.151 (0.215)	-0.116 (0.230)	0.176 (0.239)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.098 (0.116)	-0.043 (0.232)	-0.411** (0.146)	-0.169 (0.219)	-0.044 (0.250)	0.169 (0.240)
€1,500 to under €2,000	0.082 (0.129)	-0.164 (0.196)	-0.342* (0.157)	-0.277 (0.192)	-0.127 (0.222)	0.188 (0.239)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.019 (0.145)	0.026 (0.208)	-0.381** (0.149)	-0.219 (0.199)	-0.128 (0.224)	0.146 (0.244)
€2,500 to under €3,000	-0.097 (0.249)	-0.192 (0.185)	-0.221 (0.178)	-0.173 (0.210)	-0.078 (0.241)	0.135 (0.249)
€3,000 to under €5,000	0.121 (0.166)	-0.081 (0.199)	-0.294 (0.169)	-0.139 (0.220)	-0.008 (0.258)	0.181 (0.248)
€5,000 to under €7,500	omitted	-0.082 (0.199)	-0.223 (0.178)	-0.131 (0.226)	0.064 (0.276)	0.136 (0.274)
€7,500 to under €10,000	omitted	-0.085 (0.207)	0.043 (0.255)	-0.136 (0.255)	-0.083 (0.246)	-0.029 (0.373)
more than €10,000	omitted	-0.362 (0.132)	Omitted	omitted	-0.017 (0.275)	0.312 (0.325)
Number of observations	920	683	1,263	1,348	851	1,102
Pseudo R ²	0.06	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.03

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level. Marginal probit effects reported.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.7 – PREFERENCE OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES
ESTIMATION RESULTS (PROBIT) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	PERMISSIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME PREFERENCE DUMMY (<i>Permissive_{ij}</i>)					
	Hungary	Ireland	Italy	Latvia	Lithuania	Luxembourg
age	0.002 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
female	-0.008 (0.029)	-0.025 (0.059)	-0.006 (0.042)	0.099*** (0.038)	0.039 (0.041)	0.031 (0.057)
foreign-born	0.208* (0.119)	0.320** (0.124)	0.021 (0.141)	0.210** (0.089)	0.133 (0.093)	0.018 (0.103)
employed	-0.071** (0.035)	0.081 (0.073)	0.057 (0.053)	-0.099** (0.047)	0.036 (0.054)	0.014 (0.077)
student	-0.038 (0.065)	0.136 (0.231)	0.174* (0.094)	-0.113 (0.096)	-0.007 (0.104)	0.021 (0.146)
Laissez-Faire Index	0.063*** (0.015)	0.019 (0.031)	-0.052** (0.022)	0.020 (0.023)	0.073*** (0.021)	0.016 (0.030)
Index of Social Traditionalism	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.086** (0.034)	-0.061** (0.028)	-0.054* (0.031)	-0.115*** (0.033)	-0.023 (0.031)
not very proud	-0.024 (0.101)	omitted	0.053 (0.137)	0.063 (0.109)	0.141* (0.082)	0.099 (0.197)
quite proud	0.026 (0.097)	-0.891*** (0.038)	-0.104 (0.125)	0.030 (0.102)	0.215*** (0.078)	-0.224 (0.165)
very proud	-0.009 (0.098)	-0.933*** (0.039)	-0.030 (0.125)	-0.057 (0.103)	0.254*** (0.076)	-0.245 (0.164)
age completed education	0.005 (0.004)	0.016** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.0002 (0.003)	0.004 (0.005)	0.015* (0.008)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	0.150 (0.109)	omitted	0.031 (0.278)	0.090 (0.130)	0.083 (0.149)	omitted
€300 to under €500	0.117 (0.098)	-0.468*** (0.098)	0.137 (0.229)	0.070 (0.127)	0.119 (0.145)	omitted
€500 to under €1,000	0.166* (0.092)	-0.673*** (0.087)	0.209 (0.188)	0.198 (0.121)	0.029 (0.148)	0.083 (0.283)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.213** (0.109)	-0.665*** (0.093)	0.174 (0.204)	0.276** (0.126)	0.036 (0.155)	0.037 (0.189)
€1,500 to under €2,000	0.148 (0.143)	-0.702*** (0.077)	0.207 (0.192)	0.213 (0.139)	0.046 (0.186)	-0.152 (0.177)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.389** (0.166)	-0.752*** (0.071)	0.241 (0.185)	0.356* (0.158)	-0.256 (0.262)	-0.232 (0.149)
€2,500 to under €3,000	0.307 (0.396)	-0.751*** (0.075)	0.273 (0.168)	0.068 (0.235)	-0.240 (0.299)	0.072 (0.166)
€3,000 to under €5,000	omitted	-0.882*** (0.050)	0.234 (0.185)	-0.107 (0.239)	omitted	-0.080 (0.146)
€5,000 to under €7,500	omitted	-0.667*** (0.089)	0.372** (0.103)	omitted	omitted	-0.026 (0.148)
€7,500 to under €10,000	omitted	-0.514*** (0.098)	0.268 (0.197)	omitted	omitted	0.009 (0.165)
more than €10,000	omitted	-0.512*** (0.098)	0.236 (0.235)	omitted	omitted	omitted
Number of observations	1,166	353	661	778	711	439
Pseudo R ²	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.06

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level. Marginal probit effects reported.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.7 – PREFERENCE OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES
ESTIMATION RESULTS (PROBIT) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	PERMISSIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME PREFERENCE DUMMY (<i>Permissive_{ij}</i>)					
	Malta	Netherlands	N. Ireland	Poland	Portugal	Romania
age	0.005*** (0.002)	0.00006 (0.001)	0.006** (0.003)	0.0008 (0.001)	0.0002 (0.003)	-0.0005 (0.0008)
female	-0.069* (0.042)	-0.017 (0.033)	0.034 (0.077)	-0.015 (0.036)	-0.043 (0.058)	0.032 (0.025)
foreign-born	0.220** (0.120)	0.169** (0.084)	-0.129 (0.132)	0.276 (0.140)	0.168 (0.122)	omitted
employed	0.001 (0.056)	-0.041 (0.047)	0.249*** (0.086)	-0.027 (0.044)	-0.027 (0.069)	0.029 (0.030)
student	0.111 (0.270)	-0.050 (0.174)	0.403 (0.322)	-0.003 (0.083)	omitted	-0.020 (0.085)
Laissez-Faire Index	0.018 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.021)	-0.057 (0.046)	0.020 (0.018)	-0.004 (0.033)	0.016 (0.011)
Index of Social Traditionalism	0.002 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.023)	-0.095* (0.052)	-0.032 (0.026)	-0.101** (0.045)	-0.042** (0.019)
not very proud	-0.206 (0.100)	0.087 (0.109)	-0.069 (0.326)	-0.642*** (0.017)	-0.643*** (0.028)	0.041 (0.067)
quite proud	-0.224 (0.232)	0.045 (0.098)	0.115 (0.242)	-0.993*** (0.004)	-0.981*** (0.012)	0.093 (0.079)
very proud	-0.314 (0.304)	0.0008 (0.101)	0.041 (0.234)	-0.993*** (0.004)	-0.958*** (0.027)	0.095 (0.070)
age completed education	0.016*** (0.006)	0.006** (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.0007 (0.007)	-0.0003 (0.002)
monthly household income:						
€150 to under €300	-0.121 (0.146)	0.422 (0.205)	omitted	-0.001 (0.117)	-0.159 (0.326)	0.007 (0.037)
€300 to under €500	-0.016 (0.193)	0.052 (0.325)	-0.407*** (0.038)	0.075 (0.106)	0.141 (0.265)	-0.012 (0.039)
€500 to under €1,000	-0.024 (0.191)	0.299 (0.177)	-0.767*** (0.045)	0.084 (0.105)	0.029 (0.294)	0.055 (0.038)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.147 (0.228)	0.286 (0.178)	-0.766*** (0.051)	0.187* (0.100)	0.090 (0.286)	0.091* (0.032)
€1,500 to under €2,000	0.040 (0.213)	0.372** (0.162)	-0.645*** (0.050)	0.100 (0.120)	0.160 (0.264)	0.012 (0.084)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.188 (0.249)	0.355* (0.167)	-0.682*** (0.049)	0.145 (0.135)	0.066 (0.299)	-0.043 (0.102)
€2,500 to under €3,000	0.187 (0.260)	0.364** (0.166)	-0.762*** (0.052)	-0.069 (0.173)	0.243 (0.229)	omitted
€3,000 to under €5,000	0.127 (0.256)	0.393** (0.166)	-0.555*** (0.045)	-0.064 (0.162)	0.247 (0.232)	omitted
€5,000 to under €7,500	-0.040 (0.208)	0.366** (0.161)	-0.474*** (0.041)	-0.082 (0.174)	0.114 (0.288)	0.0009 (0.120)
€7,500 to under €10,000	0.143 (0.338)	0.225 (0.200)	omitted	-0.199 (0.278)	0.266 (0.207)	omitted
more than €10,000	omitted	0.314 (0.186)	-0.386*** (0.037)	0.220 (0.230)	0.329 (0.160)	-0.371 (0.330)
Number of observations	591	1,141	218	806	517	791
Pseudo R ²	0.08	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.08	0.04

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level. Marginal probit effects reported.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

TABLE 5.7 – PREFERENCE OVER IMMIGRATION POLICY REGIMES
ESTIMATION RESULTS (PROBIT) FOR EU-27 MEMBER STATES

DEPENDENT VARIABLE → ↓ REGRESSOR	PERMISSIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME PREFERENCE DUMMY (<i>Permissive_{ij}</i>)			
	Slovakia	Slovenia	Spain	Sweden
age	-0.001 (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)
female	-0.045 (0.042)	0.048 (0.039)	0.015 (0.038)	0.014 (0.045)
foreign-born	0.049 (0.096)	0.193*** (0.056)	0.065 (0.083)	0.090 (0.091)
employed	-0.085 (0.052)	0.048 (0.054)	0.056 (0.049)	0.023 (0.064)
student	-0.057 (0.170)	0.167* (0.073)	0.048 (0.109)	0.082 (0.128)
Laissez-Faire Index	-0.003 (0.024)	0.061*** (0.020)	0.034 (0.021)	-0.031 (0.022)
Index of Social Traditionalism	0.038 (0.029)	-0.058** (0.025)	-0.117*** (0.022)	-0.059* (0.031)
not very proud	-0.369** (0.113)	0.166 (0.171)	0.030 (0.146)	0.080 (0.297)
quite proud	-0.320** (0.147)	0.044 (0.211)	0.078 (0.110)	-0.056 (0.313)
very proud	-0.283* (0.151)	-0.015 (0.214)	0.066 (0.115)	-0.117 (0.310)
age completed education	0.009 (0.008)	0.004 (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)
monthly household income:				
€150 to under €300	0.383* (0.158)	0.203 (0.184)	0.042 (0.133)	0.201 (0.295)
€300 to under €500	0.378 (0.201)	0.044 (0.211)	0.116 (0.106)	-0.069 (0.461)
€500 to under €1,000	0.369 (0.228)	-0.002 (0.217)	-0.007 (0.108)	0.273 (0.219)
€1,000 to under €1,500	0.335 (0.201)	0.079 (0.202)	0.030 (0.105)	0.178 (0.289)
€1,500 to under €2,000	0.357 (0.174)	0.064 (0.205)	0.014 (0.111)	0.111 (0.323)
€2,000 to under €2,500	0.304 (0.247)	0.092 (0.197)	0.063 (0.107)	0.182 (0.292)
€2,500 to under €3,000	0.094 (0.374)	0.070 (0.210)	-0.010 (0.123)	0.076 (0.337)
€3,000 to under €5,000	omitted	0.161 (0.173)	-0.047 (0.127)	0.189 (0.329)
€5,000 to under €7,500	omitted	0.039 (0.245)	-0.048 (0.127)	0.221 (0.269)
€7,500 to under €10,000	omitted	-0.203 (0.396)	0.051 (0.127)	0.153 (0.319)
more than €10,000	omitted	omitted	-0.088 (0.179)	0.209 (0.272)
Number of observations	807	680	713	547
Pseudo R ²	0.02	0.07	0.06	0.05

Notes: Significant at the ***1, **5, *10 percent level. Marginal probit effects reported. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses.

Political Ideology: The pooled regression results for (**Model B**) suggested that laissez-faire individuals might be a little more likely to support restrictions on immigration. They, furthermore, suggested that more socially traditionalist and more nationally/civically proud individuals were more likely to support a restrictive regime. A somewhat more diverse picture emerges from the country-by-country estimation of the same model.

There appears to be some cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of laissez-faire views on individuals' preferences over immigration policy regimes. *Table 5.8* shows that, in as many as 17 countries, there does not appear to be a statistically significant relationship. In seven countries, respondent who are more inclined towards laissez-faire are more likely to prefer less restrictive policies. In only four countries – Austria, France, Great Britain and Italy – are individuals with stronger laissez-faire views more likely to favor limits on immigration.

The respondent's degree of social traditionalism is associated with a preference for relatively restrictive immigration policies in all countries where the coefficient on the Index of Social Traditionalism (IST) is statistically significant. As can be seen in *Table 5.9*, in 15 Member States, traditionalist individuals are more likely to support restrictive policies, while the relationship is not statistically significant in 13 countries.

Finally, *Table 5.10* shows that only in three Member States – Bulgaria, Cyprus and Lithuania – do very nationally proud individuals support, *ceteris paribus*, more permissive immigration policies. In nine countries, by contrast, very nationally proud respondents tend to support, other things equal, greater restrictions on immigration. In as many as sixteen Member States, however, there does not appear to be a statistically significant relationship between national/civic pride and immigration policy preferences.

**TABLE 5.8 – EFFECT OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE VIEWS
ON IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES - BY MEMBER STATE**

COEFFICIENT ON LFI	LIST OF COUNTRIES
positive (+) statistically significant	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia
negative (-) statistically significant	Austria, France, Great Britain, Italy
not statistically significant	Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden

**TABLE 5.9 – EFFECT OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM
ON IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES - BY MEMBER STATE**

COEFFICIENT ON IST	LIST OF COUNTRIES
positive (+) statistically significant	none
negative (-) statistically significant	Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
not statistically significant	Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia

**TABLE 5.10 – EFFECT OF NATIONAL/CIVIC PRIDE
ON IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES - BY MEMBER STATE**

COEFFICIENT ON <i>VERY PROUD</i> DUMMY	LIST OF COUNTRIES
positive (+) statistically significant	Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania
negative (-) statistically significant	Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia
not statistically significant	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden

Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 depict the coefficients on the Laissez-Faire Index (LFI), Index of Social Traditionalism (IST) and the *VeryProud* dummy on a scatter plot. As we can see in Figures 5.4 and 5.6, social traditionalism is – in all countries where IST has a statistically significant coefficient - associated with an increased likelihood of supporting restrictive policies. The coefficients on the *LFI* and *VeryProud* always have the same sign: In countries where a greater degree of national pride increases (or, alternatively, decreases) the probability that an individual supports a restrictive immigration regime, so does a stronger attachment to laissez-faire views.

FIGURE 5.4 – PREFERENCES OVER POLICY REGIMES:
LAISSEZ-FAIRE INDEX AND INDEX OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM
(PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS BY COUNTRY)

Note: Coefficients that are not statistically significant at the 10% level are plotted as if they were equal to zero. If neither index has a statistically significant coefficient, the country does not appear in the figure.

FIGURE 5.5 – PREFERENCES OVER POLICY REGIMES:
LAISSEZ-FAIRE INDEX AND NATIONAL PRIDE (*VERYPROUD* DUMMY)
(PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS BY COUNTRY)

Note: Coefficients that are not statistically significant at the 10% level are plotted as if they were equal to zero. If neither index has a statistically significant coefficient, the country does not appear in the figure.

FIGURE 5.6 – PREFERENCES OVER POLICY REGIMES:
INDEX OF SOCIAL TRADITIONALISM AND NATIONAL PRIDE (*VERYPROUD* DUMMY)
(PROBIT MARGINAL EFFECTS BY COUNTRY)

Note: Coefficients that are not statistically significant at the 10% level are plotted as if they were equal to zero. If neither index has a statistically significant coefficient, the country does not appear in the figure.

6. DISCUSSION

In this section, I interpret findings from (**Model A**) and (**Model B**) in the context of hypotheses found in existing research literature. First, I focus on the demographic and socio-economic determinants of attitudes and policy preferences, and relate them to the three channels that have been discussed in previous studies: labor markets, welfare state and education. After that, I turn to political ideology, and consider the effects of one's laissez-faire, socially traditionalist and nationalist views. Finally, I discuss the limitations and shortcomings of my study: These, in my view, suggest potentially fruitful avenues for future research.

Demographic and Socio-Economic Characteristics: In both pooled and country-specific regressions, age generally has only a very small effect on attitudes and preferences, and gender is typically not statistically significantly different from zero. Controlling for the other independent variables, such a finding is not particularly surprising: To the extent that, say, women may perceive immigrants as more or less of a threat due to their occupational choice, one might expect this effect to be picked up by coefficients on variables that are more explicitly socio-economic, such as education, income or employment status.

Being employed is, in the pooled regressions, associated with better views of immigrants and support for permissive policies – exactly as one would expect if labor market competition is important. In regressions for individual EU-27 Member States, however, the coefficient on employment status often loses its statistical significance, and may occasionally reverse its sign.

Years of education, however, appear to have a consistently positive association with favorable attitudes towards immigrants, and with the probability of supporting a permissive immigration policy regime. This result holds across pooled and country-specific regressions. A positive association between education and immigration attitudes is consistent with factor-

proportions models of international trade that stress the labor market channel (O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006; Mayda, 2006, 2008; Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Scheve et al., 2009): In countries where immigrants' skills are low relative to the domestic population, there will be more labor market competition between low-skilled (less educated) domestic workers and immigrants. Such competition can, presumably, lead to worse attitudes and a self-interested preference for strict immigration regimes.

Since I have already controlled for years of education (a proxy for skill), I can use coefficients on the household monthly income dummies to test welfare state channel hypotheses from Facchini and Mayda (2009). Coefficients that increase with income levels would be consistent with a benefit adjustment model of the welfare state: Since individuals expect immigration to lead to cuts in social welfare benefits, rather than to hikes in tax rates, it is the low-income individuals – those who are benefitting more from social spending – that will tend to oppose immigration.

In this analysis, income does not appear to have a clearly discernible effect on respondents' views of immigrants, and on the likelihood that they favor either a restrictive or a permissive policy. To the extent that there are occasional hints of a relationship, they suggest either a positive, or a U-shaped, relationship between income and attitudes/policy preferences. More favorable attitudes towards immigrants among individuals from high-income households is consistent with a benefit adjustment response to immigration: Because high-income individuals do not benefit from the social spending that may be cut, they are more likely to see immigrants in a better light. A U-shaped relationship, with less favorable immigration attitudes and policy preferences in the middle portion of the household income distribution, might arise when individuals expect both cuts in benefits and increases in tax rates. Such findings are somewhat

different from – although in the case of the U-shaped relationship, not entirely contrary to – those of Facchini and Mayda (2009), whose results support for the tax adjustment model.

Foreign-born and student status are, quite consistently, associated with more favorable attitudes towards immigrants, and with preferences for a less restrictive immigration regime. These findings can be interpreted to suggest that cultural considerations, similar to those outlined by Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), are important: Students and foreign-born inhabitants might well be more tolerant of diversity, and therefore more favorably disposed towards immigrants. In the case of student status, furthermore, a labor market competition argument might apply: Since students are enrolled in school and not exposed to immigrant competition in the labor market, they may hold relatively more favorable views. Students, furthermore, are presumably in the process of acquiring skills that will later turn them into highly skilled workers. If the immigrant workforce is relatively low-skill, students may not expect to compete with immigrants in the future.

All in all, my results can be seen as broadly supportive of the predictions of factor-proportions models of international trade, which rely heavily on labor market competition considerations: Individuals with lower levels of skill and those who are unemployed tend to have less favorable views of immigrants and to favor greater restrictions on their numbers. By contrast, high-skilled individuals and students, who will presumably face less competition from low-skill immigrants, exhibit more favorable attitudes and support fewer limits on immigration.

Political Ideology: As one might expect, social traditionalism is associated with a less favorable attitude towards immigrants, and with a higher likelihood of supporting immigration restrictions. The relationship is very robust: In all countries where regression coefficients are statistically significant, more socially traditionalist individuals exhibit, all else equal, less favorable immigration attitudes and less permissive immigration policy preferences. This, of course, is consistent with a scenario where social traditionalists perceive immigration as a force that undermines traditional social norms.

In the pooled regressions, and in most countries where the coefficient is statistically significant, national/civic pride is also associated with a less favorable disposition towards immigrants and with a preference for strict immigration policies. In the case of attitudes towards immigrants, the only four countries where we find the opposite effect of national pride are Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania and Malta.¹⁶ For policy preferences, the exceptions are Bulgaria, Cyprus and Lithuania. The mechanism that underlies the association of greater national pride with more negative immigration views is likely similar to the one suggested for social traditionalism: Individuals who are proud to be citizens of their countries might see immigrants as a threat to, say, their country's national identity, and would therefore tend to like immigrants less and favor greater restrictions on their inflows.

An examination of the effects of individuals' attachment to laissez-faire views yields results that are not quite as clear-cut: On the one hand, results from pooled EU-27 regressions indicate that more laissez-faire individuals like immigrants less, and that – at least in the ordered probit specification – they are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies. These results suggest that, in the European Union as a whole, laissez-faire individuals' concerns that

¹⁶ As determined by looking at the coefficient on *VeryProud*.

immigrants may put strain on tax rates or public services outweigh their preference for the greater competition and individual initiative that the newcomers may bring.

On the other hand, there appears to be a great deal of heterogeneity across countries: In some countries, more laissez-faire individuals hold less favorable views of immigrants, while in others they like them more, *ceteris paribus*. Similarly, laissez-faire individuals are more likely to support a restrictive immigration policy regime in some Member States, while in others they tend to prefer permissive policies. The countries where laissez-faire individuals exhibit more favorable views of immigrants, furthermore, are not always the same ones as the countries where they prefer fewer restrictions on immigrant inflows.

While the coefficients on many of the demographic and socio-economic variables, as well as those on nationalism and social traditionalism, tend to have relatively consistent signs across EU-27 Member States, the same cannot be said of the effect of one's attachment to laissez-faire views: One possibility that, in some countries, laissez-faire individuals tend to embrace immigrants' individualism and welcome their contributions, while in others they may be concerned about the, real or imagined, pressure immigrants may put on the social welfare system.

A somewhat interesting pattern emerges when one examines the groups of countries in which the regression coefficients on the Laissez-Faire Index are positive, and where they are negative: None of the countries where laissez-faire individuals tend to like immigrants less and to favor immigration restrictions are post-communist, while most of the countries where we see the opposite relationship used to be part of the communist bloc.

These findings raise interesting questions that can become fodder for further research: Perhaps there are differences in how political ideologies are defined, or understood, in post-communist countries and the other Member States of the European Union. Political science

literature certainly suggests that this may be the case: Thorrisdottir et al. (2007), for instance, finds that self-reported left-right political orientations differ between Central and Eastern Europe and established Western democracies. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2010) argue that citizens of post-communist countries tend to rely primarily on economic attitudes in placing themselves on a left-right scale, while citizens elsewhere consider a combination of economic and social attitudes.

LIMITATIONS: The analysis presented in this thesis has, of course, several limitations: These should be construed as opportunities for further research. They include the inability to account for cross-region heterogeneity and to distinguish between different kinds of immigrants, the possibility that respondents may not self-report their attitudes towards immigrants consistently across Member States, and the difficulty – inherent in the use of cross-sectional data – of controlling for individuals' unobserved characteristics.

Although the EVS 2008 questionnaire does include questions that ask what region the respondent inhabits, the research design presented here does not take these answers into account. Yet, determinants of attitudes and policy preferences may plausibly differ across regions: What makes one view immigrants less favorably may not be the same in Belgium's Flanders and Wallonia, in former East and West Germany, or, say, in the north or south of Italy. Such differences could be, for instance, due to differences in the composition of immigrants individual regions receive (e.g., Kurthen, 1995; Debuissou et al., 2004).

The questions in the EVS questionnaire that form the basis of my measures of respondents' attitudes towards immigrants and of their policy preferences, furthermore, do not specify what kinds of immigrants they refer to: Question 78 only refers to "immigrants" in

general, and Question 76 talks about “people from less developed countries.” If individuals view different types of immigrants differently, or if they prefer more or less restrictive policies for specific immigrant groups, this analysis would not be able to pick up on the nuances.

A more subtle limitation concerns the possibility that respondents may not self-report their immigration attitudes or policy preferences consistently across EU-27 Member States: An individual might, for instance, rate himself as favorably or unfavorably disposed towards immigrants compared to his or her country or local average, rather than relative to the overall EU-27 average. Respondents may, furthermore, be sensitive to the questions’ wording or to the scales they are presented with (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). They may also skew their answers to look good in front of their interviewers, or only hold very weak (and therefore potentially unstable) views (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). After considering the importance of the associated measurement error, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that concerns about self-reported and subjective survey measures are serious enough to make their use as dependent variables inadvisable, but not grave enough to rule out their use as explanatory variables.

Finally, there are two concerns related to this study’s use of cross-sectional data:

First, analyzing cross-sectional data from the 2008/2009 wave of the EVS makes it difficult to distinguish between cohort effects and time effects (Yang and Land, 2008): I have, for example, found a very small positive effect of age on one’s attitudes towards immigrants, and on one’s likelihood of supporting a permissive immigration policy regime, controlling for a variety of other factors. Does this mean that an individual is, other things equal, likely to favor immigration more as he or she grows older (a time effect)? Or is the finding just an artifact of the cross-sectional nature of the data: Perhaps the young people in our cross-section like immigrants

better, *ceteris paribus*, than older respondents, but may not necessarily be likely to change their views as they grow older (a cohort effect).

Secondly, individuals may possess unobserved characteristics that are correlated with both immigration attitudes (or with policy preferences), and with some of the independent variables (i.e., the determinants). Since I perform a cross-sectional analysis, the regression coefficients may – as a result – suffer from bias. With a panel data set – one that tracks the same respondents over time, and asks the same questions about their attitudes and policy preferences – researchers could control for such unobserved characteristics, and eliminate possible bias (Wooldridge, 2009).¹⁷ Data from the European Values Study (EVS), however, do not lend themselves to panel analysis methods, as each wave of the European Values Study (EVS) represents a different cross-section (GESIS, 2010).

¹⁷ One could, for instance, difference the data across the EVS waves, or estimate a fixed effects model (for instance, by including individual-specific dummies). For more details, see Wooldridge (2009).

7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This thesis sheds light on the determinants of individuals' attitudes towards immigrants, and of their immigration policy preferences. As such, it contributes valuable information to the public discourse about immigration, a much-contested topic in European politics. My findings have, furthermore, several implications for public policy: These include considerations about the prospects of various political parties and candidates, about the optimal extent of public investment in education, the design of immigration systems and of foreign aid programs, as well as about the redistribution of income.

Nationally proud and socially traditionalist individuals, I have found, hold less favorable views of immigrants, and are more likely to support restrictions on their inflows. People with laissez-faire ideological views, however, may – depending on their country – exhibit more or less favorable attitudes toward immigrants, and prefer more or less permissive immigration policies. Politicians and political analysts may, based on this information, be better able to predict how various political parties' fortunes might change if there is, for instance, an influx of immigrants into specific countries: Traditionalist and nationalist political parties and candidates may fare better, for instance, if they manage to attract voters who are concerned about the rising numbers of immigrants (e.g., Golder, 2003).

To the extent that improving the public's disposition towards immigrants is seen as a desirable public policy goal,¹⁸ the results suggest that greater investment in education may help promote more favorable attitudes: This could happen through cultural or peer effects, or by allowing citizens to become more highly skilled and to face less labor market competition from low-skill immigrants.

¹⁸ Improving the citizens' views of immigrants may, for instance, be seen as one way of facilitating the immigrants' integration into the society at large.

Another policy implication that arises from the finding that higher levels of education are consistently associated with more favorable views of immigrants has to do with the design of immigration policies: If unfavorable views of immigrants are more prevalent among the less skilled domestic population, policy-makers might be able to alleviate that group's concerns by adopting a skill-based immigration system that favors more educated newcomers, such as the one found in Canada or Australia (Bauer et al., 2001; Antecol et al., 2003).

EU-27 Member States could also consider reducing the inflow of low-skill migrants by means that do not involve outright quotas or restrictions: Countries along the Mediterranean Sea could, for instance, consider improving the effectiveness of their foreign aid programs for North African countries. Economic growth in source countries might reduce relatively less skilled individuals' incentives to migrate to wealthier economies in the European Union (Azam and Belinschi, 2008; Ortega and Peri, 2009).

Income does not appear to have a clear association with immigration attitudes and policy preferences in most EU-27 Member States. One interpretation of this finding suggests that concerns about possible tax hikes to support social services or about cuts in social benefits may not be a major driver of immigration attitudes and policy preferences. If this is correct, policy-makers may not be able to manage opposition to immigration by redistributing income. In several countries, however, income does appear to have an effect: If lower-income individuals exhibit less favorable views, policy-makers may be able to mitigate concerns about immigration by redistributing income to them.

Since the effect of age on individuals' attitudes and policy preferences has been found to be very small, it appears unlikely that the aging of the EU-27 population will, by itself, lead to a dramatic change in European's disposition towards immigration. The obvious caveat to this prediction is, of course, that this study does not distinguish between time and cohort effects: If

we cannot say anything definitive about how a single individual's attitudes and preferences change over time, we may not be able to say much about the expected effect of population aging either.

8. CONCLUSION

Immigration is one of the most contentious political issues in the European Union. It is, in part for this reason, important that policy-makers, researchers and the general public understand not only the drivers of immigration, but also the factors that lie behind Europeans' immigration attitudes and policy preferences.

In my thesis, I have analyzed data from the 2008/2009 wave of the European Values Study, a large-scale survey of nearly 70,000 Europeans, to examine what determinants underlie individuals' attitudes towards immigrants and their preferences over variously restrictive immigration policy regimes in the EU-27 Member States. I find that predictions from factor-proportion models, which rely on considerations of labor market competition, generally hold. Ideological factors also appear to be important: Social traditionalism and a greater degree of national/civic pride are associated with less favorable views of immigrants, and with a tendency to support immigration restrictions. The effect of one's attachment to laissez-faire values, however, exhibits a great deal of heterogeneity across EU-27 countries.

My findings have important implications for various areas of public policy: These include the prospects for success among political parties and candidates, the role of public investment in education, the redistribution of income, as well as the design of immigration systems and of foreign aid programs.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF SAMPLING WEIGHTS

In all league tables (which compare EU-27 countries based on, say, their inhabitants' attitudes towards immigrants), as well as in all regressions, I used appropriate probability weights. This appendix describes their sources and construction.

In country-specific regressions and league table results, I used sampling (probability) weights provided as part of the European Values Study (EVS) data set. According to the EVS Method Report, these weights are constructed “on the basis of gender and age categories (-24; 25-34; ...; 65-74; 75 and over),” and “adjust the socio-structural characteristic[s] in the samples to the distribution of gender and age of the universe-population.” (GESIS, 2010)

In all regressions and comparisons across multiple EU-27 Member States, one has to apply weights that also adjust for the relative populations of the countries. Otherwise, the results would overestimate the influence of small countries, and underestimate that of relatively large countries: Due to the relatively constant sample sizes across countries, a given individual from a small country, such as Estonia, has a higher probability of being included in the EVS survey than one from a large country, such as France or Germany.

For this reason, I create new probability weights, which – in addition to adjusting for the gender and age distributions within each Member State - also take account of the differences in population sizes across EU-27 countries. To construct these ‘pooled’ weights for each individual, I multiply the EVS-provided country-specific weights by the share of total EU-27 population in 2008 that the respondent’s country accounts for. In addition, I adjust the resulting weight to have a mean of 1, and to sum to the total number of observations in the sample.

In particular, I used the following procedure to construct pooled weights:

1. Let S_k be the share of total EU-27 population that is accounted for by country k :

$$S_k = \frac{Population_k}{\sum_{i=1}^I Population_i} \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where *Population* represents a country's population in the year 2008, and I is the total number of countries in the sample.

2. The calibration factor C represents the arithmetic mean of the values of S_k across all individuals in the sample:

$$C = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{J_i} S_i}{\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{J_i} 1} \quad (\text{A.2})$$

where I represents the number of sampled countries, and J_i is the total number of respondents in country i .

3. A country-specific adjustment factor can then be calculated by dividing S_k by the calibration factor C :

$$D_k = \frac{S_k}{C} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

4. The final pooled P_{kl} weight for individuals in cross-country regressions and comparisons is simply the product of the country-specific weight W_{kl} , provided with the EVS data, and the adjustment factor D_k :

$$P_{kl} = W_{kl} D_k \quad (\text{A.4})$$

where k indexes countries, and l indexes individual respondents within a country.

We can plug (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.4) to see, in a single expression, how the pooled weight P_{kl} can be derived from the country-specific weight W_{kl} and each country's population in 2008:

$$P_{kl} = W_{kl} \frac{\frac{Population_k}{\sum_{i=1}^I Population_i}}{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{J_i} \left(\frac{Population_i}{\sum_{m=1}^I Population_m} \right)}{\sum_{i=1}^I \sum_{j=1}^{J_i} 1}}$$

where *Population* is a country's total population in 2008, k indexes countries, l indexes respondents within a country, I represents the number of countries in the sample, and J_i is the number of respondents in country i .

Total population estimates for sampled countries come from Eurostat, the European Union's statistical office, and reflect each Member State's estimated population on January 1st, 2008 (Eurostat, 2011). Population numbers for Great Britain and Northern Ireland come from the United Kingdom's Office for National Statistics (ONS), the executive agency of the country's Statistics Authority (ONS, 2011), and are mid-year estimates for 2008.

APPENDIX B: COUNTRY ABBREVIATIONS

Figures in this thesis use the following three-letter abbreviations, listed in alphabetical order here, to denote individual EU-27 Member States:

AUT	Austria
BEL	Belgium
BGR	Bulgaria
CYP	Cyprus
CZE	Czech Republic
DEN	Denmark
EST	Estonia
FIN	Finland
FRA	France
GBR	Great Britain
GER	Germany
GRE	Greece
HUN	Hungary
IRE	Ireland
ITA	Italy
LAT	Latvia
LTU	Lithuania
LUX	Luxembourg
MLT	Malta
NIR	Northern Ireland
NLD	the Netherlands
POL	Poland
POR	Portugal
ROM	Romania
SLO	Slovenia
SPA	Spain
SVK	Slovakia
SWE	Sweden

The abbreviation “EU-27” refers to the average across the EU-27 Member States.

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