REORIENTATION: TIME AND SPACE IN THE CULTURAL SITES OF HIZBALLAH AND MARCH 14 IN LEBANON

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ABSTRACT

This study groups Hizballah’s museums and temporary exhibitions with March 14’s memorials, posters, and reconstructed downtown district of Beirut under the rubric of “cultural sites” in order to compare both phenomena. The comparison of the two seemingly disparate projects reveals them as means of articulating political ideology with lived experience by using techniques of representation and commemoration to render such basic dimensions as time and space once again legible and meaningful after the far-reaching dislocation of the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War. Widespread displacement and migration, the dismemberment of space into particularized cantons of difference, and the disruption of normal temporal rhythms meant that time and space were no longer reliable aspects of experience. After the war, Hizballah and March 14 (led by the Future Movement) embarked on projects of place-making that engaged with time and space: through commemoration of martyrs (for both groups) and uses of two kinds of heterotopias (museums for Hizballah, and Timothy Mitchell’s “the world-as-exhibition” for March 14). In doing so, they created understandings of time and space that offer the prospect of reorientation.

Following cultural geography in its understanding of culture as both inherently political and intrinsically emplaced, the study brings together literatures on commemoration, representation, the museum, the archive, and the simulacrum to illustrate how the two groups have created heterotopias that not only are different from the rest of the world, but remake that world. Each project offers a mode of apprehending time and space, and the values that arise from them—history, geography, desired futures—that can resolve the disorientation of the Civil War in favor of a holistic understanding not simply of Lebanon, but of one’s place in it. These modes of apprehension constitute what Richard Sennett has termed “an approach to difference after violence,” or how the molding of space reflects and responds to social difference that has led to past violence. Thus examining the two place-making projects reveals, in addition to aspects of Hizballah’s and March 14’s agenda, how difference is continuing to operate in Lebanon after the war.
For my teachers, who taught me to teach myself.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1
  Methods ....................................................................................................................... 7
  Theory and Literature ................................................................................................. 11
    Space: Heterotopias ................................................................................................. 17
    Time: Commemoration and Silence ........................................................................ 24
Chapter 1: Hizballah ................................................................................................... 30
  Space: Narrative Journeys in Symbolic Geography ................................................. 32
  Time: Archive Fever and Magical Value ..................................................................... 42
  Form: The Museum as Technology .......................................................................... 62
Chapter 2: March 14 .................................................................................................... 68
  Space: The World-as-Exhibition ............................................................................... 75
  Time: Hariri and Simulacra .................................................................................... 94
  Form: Simulacrum as Sleight of Hand ..................................................................... 106
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 109
Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 121
TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Hizballah’s Geography.................................................................29
Figure 2: Solidère District.........................................................................66
Figure 3: Points of Interest in Solidère....................................................67
Introduction

2005 was a year of political realignment in Lebanon. The longstanding hegemony of a ruling coalition between Sunni and Maronite elites had been waning for at least the previous two decades as various Shi‘i movements asserted their interests,¹ but it was the protests following the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri that made the new political reality manifest. The “Cedar Revolution,” as it became known, brought two key issues to the fore: the Syrian role in Lebanese politics, and Hizballah’s unique status as an armed force not under government control. The protests that ensued allowed for a show of support on each side: Hizballah organized a pro-Syrian, pro-armament demonstration on March 8th that gathered hundreds of thousands, while a Sunni-Maronite-Druze alliance staged a series of protests against both issues culminating in a record-setting demonstration of roughly one million protestors on March 14th.² The political scene from the elections that took place later that spring until the present has been defined by the rivalry of coalitions named for these events: a Sunni-Maronite March 14 bloc (the Druze Progressive Socialist Party left the coalition in 2011), and a Shi‘a-Maronite March 8 bloc.

The precise makeup and power position of each of these coalitions has changed over time. I am interested less in tracing these ups and downs—the changing of hands of parliament seats, the careers of particular politicians—than in the highly divergent, yet strangely parallel projects of place-making and exhibition each faction has engaged in. (I follow Sarah Pink and

¹ Of course it is also true that this hegemony was deeply upset by the outbreak of civil war in 1975 (bringing the tally of years to thirty), but in theory the coalition could have reasserted itself thereafter—and in fact, for a time, it did, under Syrian influence. The 2005 realignment was the result of long-growing Shi‘i power, not solely of the war itself.
² Lucia Volk, Memorials and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2010), 162.
Edward Casey’s definition of “place” as not simply space but a made event or process inscribed on both time and space. Notably, both projects actually predate the 2005 shift; each is the domain of a particular mainstay group within its respective faction, which began its work before the Cedar Revolution. Hizballah (a key partner in March 8) has worked steadily since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 to enshrine its place as the heroic frontline of Lebanon’s defense—the Resistance—in three museums and two temporary exhibitions. (As the sites I am analyzing in this paper all belong to Hizballah proper, “March 8” will only be mentioned when referring specifically to the political bloc including but not limited to Hizballah.) March 14 includes what is now the Future Movement, a Sunni party centered around the Hariri family; the family is still a principal stakeholder in Solidère, the real estate company formed by Rafiq Hariri to reconstruct downtown Beirut starting in 1994. Solidère’s transformation of Beirut has, as will be detailed further, created an environment new to and unique in Lebanon, much as Hizballah’s museums have. The Future Movement is also the main political presence at the Hariri Memorial, which sits in Martyrs’ Square adjacent to the zone of reconstruction; with its March 14 partners, Future is also the sponsor of the memorial posters still adorning the square, and the 2007 “I Love Life” public relations campaign. (The blurry boundaries between The Future Movement, Solidère, and March 14 require me to use these three names somewhat interchangeably: while they refer to distinct organizations, it should be understood that I consider all three as actors in the same sociopolitical impulse that has created the projects listed briefly above. Comparing, say, Solidère to Hizballah as place-makers should not be considered distinct from comparing March 14 or The

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Future Movement to the Shi‘i group. When referring to the collection of projects undertaken by the three as a whole, I will designate the author in question as “March 14.”

The above may appear a disparate list of projects, and indeed their apparent lack of relationship may be the reason for the absence of any literature drawing connections between them. There is a growing literature on Hizballah’s efforts in the realm of place-making, and a more extensive one on Solidère; but Solidère does not seem to have been connected with the Hariri memorial or the posters still gazing down at Martyrs’ Square, and the three together have not been dealt with in relation to Hizballah’s activity. It is the contention of this thesis that the two sets of projects do have important points of thematic and strategic commonality, even as their methods and forms appear to be almost totally unalike. The result is an array of tensions: political tensions between the two groups; geographical, cognitive, and sensory tensions between

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7 An exception is Lucia Volk’s gestures toward both developments toward the end of her book, but as they are outside the purview of the book’s main subject, she does not deal with them exhaustively or in particularly comparative fashion. See Lucia Volk, *Memorials and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon*, op. cit.
the experiences each is attempting to produce; and the inherent tension between and within projects that are both convergent and divergent. This last contradiction exists in both content—the two projects mobilize some overlapping concepts for competing ends—and in form—these overlapping concepts are mobilized in ways that appear, on the surface, to have nothing to do with one another.

The aim of this paper is to excavate the sources, natures, and products of this concatenation of tensions: to ask why each group has produced the projects it has in the way that it has, and in particular to read the two projects against one another. Discovering how they have mobilized common categories in different ways and for different purposes will have, I hope, implications for an array of literatures, from theories of commemoration to those of the archive and the museum, of visual representation as practice and politics, of geography and of the postwar. Finally, the phenomenon is revealing about the current phase of Lebanese politics.

I say “the current phase” because it seems clear that the political scene in the country is of a different form now than it was for the bulk of the 20th century. That 2005 was the inflection point is not obvious: one could equally locate it in 1990, when the war officially ended, or in 2000, when the Israeli withdrawal began the real transition to something like a postwar existence. No matter what year we choose, it is clear that 2005’s Cedar Revolution was a result as much as a cause, a moment in which something that had already been building became apparent. The two projects of place-making the thesis will examine predated that moment and have continued past it, rendering them a useful way of not only examining this political shift but understanding it through more than its most obvious signs, the compositions of parliaments and the contents of political speech. These are the worlds that Hizballah and the Future Movement are not only trying to shape but actually bringing forth.
The two “worlds” in question here are divergent, as noted, in form and aesthetic: Hizballah has enthusiastically embraced the technologies of exhibition, in temporary exhibits and in permanent museums, while March 14 has avoided museums almost altogether. The former’s installations have relied on martial, pastoral, and monumental aesthetics, while the latter’s have emphasized urban, cosmopolitan, and eclectic aesthetics. Though both have created commemorative sites for assassinated individuals they posit as martyrs—Rafiq Hariri for March 14, and Imad Mughniyeh (a former head of intelligence) for Hizballah—they have done so on almost completely different terms, in radically different locales and with quite disparate rhetorical content. Moreover, while the Hariri Memorial has stood for some years and is intended to be permanent, the exhibition in memory of Mughniyeh was a temporary affair. The divergence in these cases is all the more notable for the ostensibly analogous nature of the two. It stands here as emblematic of the generalized divergence between the created worlds of Hizballah and The Future Movement/March 14, which the paper will explore in depth.

At the same time, however, these two worlds mobilize particular themes, or perhaps topos, in common: time and space. Moreover, both do so primarily by means of exercises in representation. I suggest “topos” in the rhetorical rather than the literary sense,8 a “place to find something,” firstly in order to emphasize that these themes may manifest quite differently. The general categories, the topoi, of space and time appear in both: I do not posit similarity in how either of these may appear, or to what end rhetorically and politically. I recall the sense of “a place to find something” secondly because it is my contention that both groups are in search of a reorientation in these projects of place-making, of world-building, after the intense dislocation of the Civil War. In this sense the topoi of time and space become the scenes of this search, the

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8 “Topos” is more commonly found in social-science literature in its literary sense, meaning essentially a theme or a trope.
places where orientation in time and space can be found. In addition, martyrdom appears in both Hizballah’s and March 14’s works as an attendant discourse secondary to this search for temporal and spatial orientation; finally, both proceed—however differently—in this search through intense investment in operations of representation, through language and image. Time and space are found represented in the sites our two factions have instantiated, and stitched through the representations of martyrs which occupy, or sometimes constitute, those sites. It is with this understanding that March 14’s and Hizballah’s place-making become comparable. Uncovering these commonalities reveals a discursive and operational aspect of the two groups’ ongoing political contestation that runs deeper than pure political speech. Venturing into their constructed geographic worlds, we find not only what they say for the cameras but what they display for a more immediate audience; not only what they want their listeners to think but what they want their visitors to feel. Their commonalities in the use of time, space, and martyrdom point to greater similarity, even unity, than one might immediately suspect upon viewing these constructions. Yet their formal, aesthetic, and discursive differences underline that while they stand, in some ways, in surprisingly much the same place, they command profoundly different views from that point.

In the remainder of this introduction I will describe my research methods and lay out the conceptual background of the larger argument, reviewing some relevant works in the process. Chapter 1 will then examine Hizballah’s project closely, detailing what this project consists of and how it searches for, and represents, time and space, with martyrs often serving as a conduit for representation and orientation. Chapter 2 will do much the same for March 14’s project, relying on the findings of Chapter 1 in order to compare these sites’ rummagings in the “places” of time and space, and their uses of representation and of martyrdom, with Hizballah’s. The
paper will then conclude by taking a step back to think once more about not only what the two projects have in common, but how they make sense as responses to the Civil War and its dislocation.

**Methods**

This thesis is based on field research conducted in Lebanon in the summer of 2015, as well as my experiences during earlier visits to the country in the summer of 2009. During my fieldwork, I intended to study museums in Lebanon in general, with a particular emphasis on Hizballah’s institutions. As my research progressed, it became clear to me that March 14’s place-making was essential to the understanding I was developing of Hizballah’s. Unfortunately, this realization came after I left the country; therefore, while I visited Hizballah’s museums and a number of museums with less overt political affiliation, I did not visit the Solidère district or the Hariri memorial with the mindset or intent of a researcher. As a result, my work on March 14’s sites is far more dependent on primary and secondary sources. Happily, March 14 (and Solidère in particular) is highly attuned to public relations and new media, so there is extensive documentation of all the relevant sites online—not only in direct promotional materials but also through individual documentation on social media and other websites.

In 2015, then, I visited Hizballah’s museums in Mleeta, Baalbek, and Khiam personally. Having read Owen Dwyer and Derek Alderman’s “Memorial Landscapes” with particular care, I worked to apply the rubrics they offered when on these visits. Their guidance on how to examine a site as a *text*, as an *arena* (of contesting voices and interests), and as a *performance* (of historical interpretation) helped me to approach these museums with more nuance and perspicacity, and in particular from a social geographic standpoint. I also applied these rubrics to

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some of my visits to other sites, e.g. the Sea Castle in Tyre (a UNESCO World Heritage Site),
though these did not ultimately figure into the thesis. They did, however, allow me a greater
understanding of commemorative and touristic sites in Lebanon as a contextual whole. I visited
Mleeta and Khiam twice each, documenting my visits extensively through photographs and
sometimes short videos. (In one visit to each of these museums I was accompanied by a
Lebanese friend, whom I will refer to in Chapter 1 as J; his reactions were of great interest to
me.) I rely also on some secondary sources in discussing the two, as these sources offer not only
different perspectives but further access to the thinking of the individuals who worked to create
and run these sites as museums. I visited Baalbek only once on this trip; I do not rely on
secondary sources to the same degree for this museum because they largely do not exist. The site
is mysteriously absent from both academic and popular coverage. I also visited the Baalbek
museum once prior, as a tourist in the summer of 2009. Since I was not there as a researcher, I
made no notes, but the experience left a strong impression in my memory. I have done my best to
draw on this impression in writing about the site in Chapter 1.

During the 2015 trip, I made multiple visits to the National Museum in Beirut; one to the
Palestinian museum in the Shatila Palestinian refugee camp; two to the Palestinian museum near
Tyre; one to the Robert Mouawad Museum in Beirut; one to the Audi Soap Museum in Tyre; one
to the Sea Castle in the same city; and one to the heritage museum that is part of the al-Saha
Traditional Village complex in Beirut’s Shi‘i-dominated suburb al-daityeh, which is frequently
associated with Hizballah. I also walked around the outside of the proposed museum Beit Beirut,
though I was not able to gain access to its interior, and visited a broadly inclusive exhibit of
Walid Raad’s works at the New York Museum of Modern Art twice. (I was able to attend one of
Raad’s performances at the exhibition as well and later interviewed him.) While these places are
not all directly implicated in the thesis, they contributed to my understanding of the state of
tourism, commemoration, and visual representation in and about Lebanon across a variety of
locations and (presumed) audiences. In the Palestinian museums I was welcomed and guided
personally by the creator-curatorial of each. (The Shatila museum is the creation of Muhammad Al-
Khatib, a resident of the camp; the Tyre museum, of Mahmoud Dakwar, also a resident of the
area and a former UNRWA teacher.) While I would not characterize our interactions as formal
interviews, we discussed the museums, their histories, and their contents at length, as well as
each man’s life. I recorded parts of these conversations, as well as making notes immediately
after the fact. At al-Saha—which is a hotel, a café, a snack shop, an antique shop, a culturally-
themed shopping mall, and more besides—10—I was guided personally through the museum by a
manager of the complex’s hotel. He had less relevant information to give me, but was clearly
eager to show off al-Saha’s offerings. Finally, I also visited the Museum on the Seam in
Jerusalem once as a useful analogue to what Beit Beirut might become if it is ever realized
beyond press, funding, and plans. I documented all of these visits extensively through
photographs and videos taken on my smartphone whenever I was able.11

While I did not visit any March 14 sites in the capacity of a researcher, I did pass by
several of them regularly. Martyrs’ Square, which contains the Hariri Memorial and which abuts
the Solidère district, is a major hub of Beirut. I walked through it at least weekly. I attended
several social events in the Solidère district, including one near the Solidère-built art gallery

10 For some discussion of the al-Saha complex, see Harb and Deeb, Leisurely Islam.
11 I did so at Khiam, Mleeta, the Sea Castle, the Soap Museum, the Museum on the Seam, and both
Palestinian museums. My ability to record my visit to the Mouawad Museum was limited by the fact that
photographs are not allowed in the museum. When I asked the desk attendant about the photography
policy, he told me it was forbidden, and then—glancing around briefly—told me that I could photograph
anything I liked so long as I watched out for the security cameras. I did my best to follow his directive,
though I’m sure I made a rather poor covert operator. I was limited at al-Saha by the mundane fact that
my cellphone battery ran out of power partway through the visit.
known as the Beirut Exhibition Center, which I will discuss in Chapter 2. I also spent some time in the Solidère district as a tourist during my earlier trip to Lebanon in 2009, and draw on those memories in Chapter 2 as best I can. As noted above, I rely much more on textual and visual sources for discussion of March 14’s place-making, but feel confident in doing so because these sites are extremely well-documented by any standard and covered much more exhaustively in academic literature than Hizballah’s. Similarly, while I did not seek to interview any Lebanese tourism professionals, I happened to have a conversation with one regarding Hizballah’s museums in the larger context of commemoration of the Civil War and what he called “dark tourism.” Many such chance conversations and encounters inform my research. At the same time, this project is not and was never conceived as an ethnography. My interest has always been not in how the various publics that make up Lebanon receive the acts of place-making I am investigating, but rather in what the authors of these places are seeking to accomplish and project. This understanding is indeed reflected in my employment of Dwyer and Alderman’s work, which asks the researcher not to enter into the consciousness of the audience but rather to investigate the site as it is presented and recruited by those with discursive and political power to shape it.

In all of these cases I am naturally drawing not only on my own memories and notes, but also on photographs and videos—some mine, some other—as well as primary and secondary textual sources. In this effort I have relied on Sarah Pink’s *Doing Visual Ethnography*, Foucauldian understandings of discourse analysis, my own background in literary close reading, and the invaluable conceptual lenses provided by the literature to be reviewed in the next section.

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12 This is a different visit from the one mentioned in reference to the Baalbek museum, though it took place during the same summer. The first trip was in the middle of my study abroad, perhaps in July; the second took place after my study was finished, probably in August or early September.  
13 For a listing of the relevant literature, see note 7 above.  
I have, of course, done my best to filter out my own biases. By the same token, I have worked to recognize the biases and the political intentions behind the discourses and representations to be found in every site under discussion in this thesis. This last becomes particularly salient with regard to March 14’s sites, since I am relying more on how these sites’ authors present them than in other cases. In working not only to see these discourses and worldviews for what they are, but also to understand how they appear outside the consciousness that gave birth to them, I have therefore relied extensively not only on documentation and promotional material focused on the sites themselves, but also on the rich academic and polemic literature that deals with them from Lebanese writers as well as outsiders. It is my hope that I have succeeded in triangulating from all of these inputs to an understanding that represents them as they actually appear.

*Theory and Literature*

If Hizballah and March 14 are in search of time and space—two areas on which a staggering amount has been written—examining these attempts at orientation requires a framework of time and space of our own. The two are naturally difficult to tease apart from one another, especially so because they intersect with nearly every other category relevant to the investigation. Both groups’ projects are, first of all, exercises in representation—of a past, a future, a sacrifice, a political value. They represent through exhibition and constructed geographies, and much of what they seek to represent is either temporal (the past and future) or spatial (a geographic understanding of the world). The museum, the archive, and the memorial are all spatial forms with inherent dimensions of time in addition to their spatial logics. Moreover, representation itself is in some ways both inherently temporal and spatial: something must exist *prior* to being represented and *apart* from the signs that represent it. Even that which is first objectified upon being represented is understood to be prior to the representation; it stands
“behind” it in a spatial but also a temporal sense, even if no such chronological succession took place. The representation depends from the represented; in this sense what is represented is understood to be “first.”

This understanding of representation follows Foucault\(^\text{15}\) more so than Peirceian semiotics, which understands representation as a less temporal system largely because meaning—indeed even the self—is constituted by positioning relative to a world of signs.\(^\text{16}\) Signs and things are so mutually constituted, so eternally receding into further acts of representation, that little can be said to be prior to anything else. Foucault’s approach is more useful here because the attempt to reconstitute time and space after wartime dislocation takes place in a moment of “crisis in representation,” as tension between remembering and forgetting trauma creates an absence of representative and narrative forms.\(^\text{17}\) Donna Haraway notes that in such moments, “Figuration is about resetting the stage for possible pasts and futures.”\(^\text{18}\) Note that once again, space is necessary to time: setting the stage for past and future.

This unavoidable interweaving of time and space through representation makes an orderly unpacking of time, space, and the attendant forms and discourses relevant to this paper a matter less of taking each one at a time (so to speak) than of shuttling back and forth among them as time gives way to space and back again. With this in mind, then, I will start by establishing that dislocation in time and space, requiring reorientation, occurred at all.

\(^{15}\) Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970). A similar sentiment can be found in Derrida’s


\(^{17}\) Cooke, “Aesthetics of Auto-Destruction,” 400.

As Samir Khalaf notes in “Urban Design and the Recovery of Beirut,” one of the primary experiences of the Lebanese Civil war was disruption of time and space as structures of daily life:

Altogether, and perhaps most unsettling, is the way the tempo of war has imposed its own perilous time frames, dictating traffic flows, spaces to be used or avoided. Time, space, movement and interaction all became enveloped with contingency and uncertainty.

As Khalaf also notes, this profound dislocation in daily routine was accompanied by massive displacement throughout the country, as people fled to safety only to be displaced again, and yet again. The adeptness Beirutis developed in adapting to “jarring modulations and precipitous shifts in the use of time and space” thus coexisted with, and emerged alongside, a profound sense of dislocation and rootlessness as familiar landscapes disappeared with distance or destruction. In the same volume, Maha Yahya discusses how this process recreated Beirut and indeed much of Lebanon as an environment defined by discontinuous enclaves instead of a holistic, integrated spatial system; these enclaves were delimited by both military boundaries and social cues, from posters to what party or militia’s media channels dominated. Jad Tabet observes that space during the war disintegrated into “a paranoiac dismemberment of space into more and more secluded territories.” The artist Walid Raad described this dismemberment thus:

You might say: these car bombings happen at rush hour, so I’m no longer going to cross Beirut, or the Queensboro Bridge, then... If everybody decides to no longer work 9 to 5 and starts working 5 to 10, that’s going to be a different city. What you end up with is a system of rural kinship that invades the urban. All of a sudden you start living in a

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20 Ibid., 37.
21 Ibid.
23 Jad Tabet, “Towards a Master Plan for Post-War Lebanon,” Recovering Beirut, op. cit., 81-100; p89.
Raad also has observed, for example, that victims of car bombings create for themselves during
the moment of catastrophe “a dislocated time…in which there is no past, and there can be no
certain future.” During the war, then, neither space nor time could be relied upon. The past fell
out of reach and the future receded into uncertainty and fear: there was no recognizable space on
which to write them and no reliable sense of time by which to measure them. It is logical,
perhaps even inevitable that the two political groups that have arisen as the key players on the
postwar scene—Hizballah with March 8, and The Future Movement with March 14—are those
that have engaged most directly and extensively with time and space. Doing so means they are
able not only to present political programs or to represent interests but to provide a particular
type of tangible good: a graspable representation of reality that renders time and space legible
again.

The book I have just drawn on so extensively, *Recovering Beirut*, is a rich resource
regarding space for our purposes. Its introduction by Richard Sennett delineates a key relation
between urban space and violence: urban design presents itself as a solution to violence, but
perhaps it is better understood as a reification of past violence. A tradition inherited in large part
from post-civil-war France of dividing groups whose differences are perceived as potentially
violent, normally justified by “technological efficiency and the division of labor,” appears “[i]n
Beirut…as a logic of war-time space made into peace-time space.” (It must be noted that
Sennett is not arguing that this violence of space is unique to Beirut, but rather that what exists in
many other cities became more evident in Beirut in the immediate context of postwar

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26 Ibid., 30-31.
reconstruction.) Considering the construction of space as a reification of violence will be instructive in particular for the Solidère project, which has been criticized for its discontinuity with—the rest of Beirut, and which is understood by many Lebanese outside March 14’s political umbrella to be exclusive. That is, considering Solidère as an instance of Sennett’s “problem of constructing an urban frame for difference” builds connection between Solidère’s planning and the violence that preceded it. It will also allow us to think about some of Hizballah’s projects in contrast: while many of these are hardly urban, they, too, contain an approach to difference after violence.

How, then, can we compare March 14’s and Hizballah’s response to this failure of time and space across such different forms of place-making? How can a museum be rigorously compared with a PR campaign, for example? We find our answer through theories of culture and of heterotopia. “Culture” is a difficult concept to pin down: it tends to be used rather instinctively to denote whatever is not explicitly politics, or whatever distinguishes one society from another. Don Mitchell argues persuasively that culture is, instead, an ideology: Culture is named and known as culture only when we decide that a practice or object is “cultural,” and such decisions are formed and motivated by ideological concerns closely intertwined with identity—culture makes us who we are—and with politics—labeling something cultural rather than political can reduce controversy and contestation. What is actually the case, for Mitchell, is that culture is an inherently political and also geographic sphere for political contestation and ideological struggle. It is with this in mind that I have referred to both March 14’s and Hizballah’s place-making projects as creating “cultural sites.” While they take on forms usually associated with “culture,”

28 Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut.”
29 Larkin, “Remaking Beirut.”
30 Sennett, 3.
as with museums and leisure districts, they are also sites for ideology and for politics. They are places where the political agenda of both groups can be given cultural and societal elaboration, where these agenda can develop deeper roots that speak not only to viewers’ conscious ideologies but also, more closely, to their lived experiences. And in speaking to these experiences, these sites can also mold them to some degree: this molding is the process of reorientation, of making the experiences of time and space make sense once more.

Turning now to heterotopias, Tabet’s contribution to Recovering Beirut points us toward the proliferation of plans for reconstructing Beirut that occurred throughout the war and were later promoted by Solidère. He notes:

[I]maginary cities [i.e., planned reconstructions] are not opposed to the real city; they exist within it and yet do not coincide with it. It is through this lapse (half-way between the imaginary and reality) that the various reconstruction projects draw the terms of their legitimacy.  

This tension between city-imagined and city-experienced of course recalls Foucault’s notion of the heterotopia, that “other space” held intensely separate from normal space, yet intrinsically connected to it. A heterotopia, for Foucault, either serves through its difference to constitute and condition normal space, or else is made different by its ability to contain and connect to all normal space. 32 Tabet’s understanding of reconstruction plans reflects both qualities: such “imagined projects” “are often rooted within a symbolic, idealistic, perception of space while revealing, at the same time, the underlying patterns dictated by the existing realities.” 34 This symbolic perception of space is equivalent to the second form of heterotopia; the revelation of existing reality, to the first. Imagined space constituted as a symbol (of a social group, a civic idea, a political outcome, etc.) is little different from a part of a heterotopia that represents some

34 Tabet, 90.
normal space: for such normal space to be represented at all, it must first be conceived as an idea. That imagined space can also ineluctably reveal real space is not unlike how “other spaces” of crisis or of deviance serve to let normal space be normal. Heterotopia, however, is important here for reasons far beyond Tabet’s points regarding reconstruction plans.

Space: Heterotopias

Heterotopia is relevant to almost every one of Hizballah’s and March 14’s created sites because, primarily through the representational (symbolic) mode of heterotopia, they create other space that represents and connects to normal spaces. The literature on heterotopia is extensive, but here it is relevant particularly in social geography and museum studies. Marco Cenzatti suggests\(^\text{35}\) that as societies have changed in the last few decades to incorporate understandings of difference beyond the dichotomy of normal/abnormal, heterotopias have proliferated. Heterotopias appear and disappear with greater fluidity than proposed by Foucault, because social relations (economically as well as across norms and deviances) have become more contingent and fluctuating. Crucially, Cenzatti argues that this newer form of heterotopia consists in public spaces constituted by publics which are excluded from, or disinterested in, the default or unmarked public, and which are not fully visible to this default public. These may be fixed, or they may arise in the temporary appropriation of public spaces (as a protest appropriates a central square). What is important to note here is that the heterotopic public space is not necessarily physically invisible; it need only be invisible, in some way impenetrable, to those it does not include (and even then, not absolutely invisible). “It is the very difference of a social group (its marginality) that makes the appropriation of a physical space relevant and gives specificity to the

space produced.”36 In other words, public spaces are only appropriated when they are made fully legible and accessible to a group more particular than the general public. The means of reading and access need not depend only on literal visibility, but rather on the ability to read the relevant signs and to perform the necessary shibboleths.

This observation, of course, is primarily relevant to urban affairs, and thus to March 14. But Cenzatti also notes that “the recognition of multiple instances of publicness shows that public spheres coincide with the production of public spaces.”37 It is well recognized that Lebanon is home to multiple publics; one of these, of course, is served and organized by Hizballah, another feels or felt some allegiance to the figure of Rafiq Hariri, another is catered to by the Solidère project, and both March 8 and March 14 mobilize their own political publics. It is thus useful to consider how appropriations of space by Hizballah and March 14 (that is, Solidère, March 14, and The Future Movement) through the projects under discussion in this paper serve as heterotopias in the sense of public space as well as of representation in the Foucauldian sense, and how they become invisible to outsiders. (This last point is illustrated for a non-urban context by Lucia Volk’s discussion of South Lebanon as a heterotopia for the duration of the Israeli occupation. For non-Southerners, the South became inaccessible, frightening, unknown—invisible.38)

Heterotopias are furthermore valuable here because they are associated with the museum, Hizballah’s favored technology of place-making. Foucault himself made this connection.39 However, his identification of the museum as heterotopic relied on a particular idea of the museum as a total, generalist institution. He argues that museums seek to encompass time—to

36 Ibid., 83.
37 Ibid.
38 Volk, Memoriais and Martyrs, 118.
not only reach back into the past but continue to contain within themselves every new layer of past or history that eventuates. In this sense the museum is a simultaneous collapsing and spreading out of time: all of time is found within it (collapsed) and yet through the modernist techniques of exhibition, time is ordered and displayed (spread out) for the viewer. The trouble here is that museums are not always so general in their scope. More to the point, Hizballah’s certainly are not. Beth Lord has suggested instead that museums are heterotopic—spaces of difference—because they are home to the “difference” inherent in the very act of representation: the cognitive and conceptual distance between signs and things.

This interpretation is potentially destabilizing, since it could in turn suggest that every space of representation is, in some sense, a museum. On the one hand this is useful to the paper, since it makes comparison between Hizballah’s museums and exhibitions and March 14’s interventions in public space more intuitive. On the other, it is damaging, since the point of interest here is not only commonality but contrast, and one key contrast is formal: museums and exhibitions against other forms. I suggest, therefore, that while Lord’s contribution remains useful—considering the difference of representation as constitutive of heterotopia allows us to compare Hizballah’s and March 14’s projects productively—we must add to it considerations of containment. Museums definitionally collect. Their contents are termed collections, and they evolved from the personal collections of the wealthy: the cabinets of curiosities and kunstkammern of the medieval world. Susan Stewart notes that “the collection seeks a form of self-enclosure which is possible because of its ahistoricism. […]All time is made simultaneous or

synchronous within the collection’s world.”42 This point is, of course, closely related to Foucault’s conception of the museum as “heterochronic,” but with a key difference: the collection’s contents are not outside time because they compass it in full; rather, they are outside time because they constitute a time unto themselves. This means, crucially, that museums can satisfactorily be considered heterotopic for our purposes through Lord’s interpretation of difference via representation, without threatening to obliterate important distinctions. We can differentiate a museum from other spaces characterized by representation, such as memorials and archives, through this principle of spatial and temporal “self-enclosure.”

This line of thinking brings another to the fore, namely Timothy Mitchell’s concept of the “world-as-exhibition.”43 I described March 14’s and Hizballah’s place-making projects as constructed “worlds” above with this analytic in mind. Originating in the great exhibitions of 19th-century Europe, the world-as-exhibition is the attempt to represent the totality of a world, a city, a culture, etc. through exhibition. It is also the consequence of doing so, which is losing the ability to apprehend the world as anything but exhibition. This looped form of perception places “the real thing” to which the exhibition is meant to refer “beyond all representation,” as referents are constantly reconstituted as representations in order to render them comprehensible. The idea is useful here in that it establishes representation as a means of parsing space. While it has close ties to the history of the museum and the exhibition—Hizballah’s domain—it is by no means limited to that realm: by definition it spills out of it into the world, “the real thing.” When I say that both groups in question here are creating “worlds,” I mean that they are using exhibitions to build worlds, and that they are building worlds that are, themselves, exhibitions. Not only do

these exhibitions construct exhibitions that function representationally and politically as worlds, they offer an exhibitionary understanding of the world that can travel with the viewer out beyond the exhibition itself. While ultimately this approach falls under the broader heading of heterotopia, it is a useful tool both for showing how the two projects are comparable and for elaborating in what way these heterotopic worlds function. It is precisely through the logic of representation, of exhibition, that they can be made at all.

The other relevant aspect of the “world-as-exhibition” approach is that it requires consideration of the audience. Where the fundamental nature of the world-as-exhibition draws Hizballah’s and March 14’s place-making together under the rubric of exhibition, it also pulls them apart in terms of how these sites affect their visitors. My research did not focus on how Hizballah and March 14’s audiences receive their works—it is not an ethnography of their publics—but the formal and aesthetic choices both groups have made tell us something about who they consider to be their audience, and what effect they would like to produce in them.

In Hizballah’s case, the emphasis on museums and formal exhibitions recalls what Tony Bennett has termed “the exhibitionary complex.” Bennett suggests that exhibitionary institutions participate in, and contrast with, the larger complex of disciplinary relations described by Foucault. Where Foucault was most concerned with the “carceral archipelago” of the institutions that confine, regiment, and surveil (the hospital, the prison, the army, etc.), Bennett is interested in those that display—and display not only their contents for inspection, but also their audiences as both objects and agents of inspection. That Hizballah has turned to the exhibitionary complex for its exercises in world-as-exhibition, its construction of heterotopias, tells us that it is interested in very actively creating a public. It is interested in inviting its

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audience to form itself in a way that accepts Hizballah’s authority as historical narrator and political leader. Moreover, it is interested in interacting with this audience. While not all exhibitionary instances are dialogic (see Kathleen McLean regarding dialogue in museum environments⁴⁶), close study of Hizballah’s museums and exhibitions show a common quality of interaction, what Lara Deeb calls “drawing people in.”⁴⁷ This means not only placing the visitor in a position to identify with the party’s representation of itself, its members, and its martyrs, but also letting the visitor interact directly and indirectly with the space and its contents. As McLean points out, such interactive experiences are some of the most powerful and engaging museums can produce; as Bennett and Mitchell might agree, such a powerful experience can serve very well to shore up the disciplining power of the exhibitionary complex, or the way of seeing proper to the world as-exhibition.

On the other hand, March 14 is much more closely in line with Mitchell’s world-as-exhibition, despite its general eschewal of formal museums and exhibitions. Through its various projects of place-making, March 14 has fairly literally constituted the city as an exhibition space: a world-as-exhibition. Mitchell was interested not only in how exhibitions presented the world to their audiences but how those audiences then carried exhibitionary ways of seeing with them beyond the boundaries of the display. From the Solidère reconstruction project to the digital counters that sat on Hariri family-owned buildings throughout Beirut, adding up the time between Hariri’s death and the end of the attendant investigation,⁴⁸ March 14 has used the city as the very material of its project of representation, its space of exhibition. This observation

naturally recalls our earlier discussion of heterotopia and public space. It also pushes us, via the logic of the world-as-exhibition, to consider who it is that March 14 considers to be the audience for these sites. Saree Makdisi and Albert Naccache have argued persuasively—as, for that matter, have many Beirutis outside academia—that the Solidère project is aimed at global elites in business and tourism. The project’s originator, Rafiq Hariri, conceived it explicitly as such. That Solidère has since sold itself as a project for the revitalization of all Lebanon does not obviate this origin. Corroborating the point is Rami Farouk Daher’s work on contemporary tourism in the Levant, which takes the Solidère project as a paradigmatic example of remaking cities—or at least districts—as tourist attractions. Much more broadly than specific sites, ruins, or activities, neighborhoods and the cultures that inhere in them have become experiential attractions in themselves; one might even call them exhibitions. Such areas constituted as tourist attractions require on the one hand amenities and infrastructure that meet patrons’ standards, and

on the other a sense of local distinctiveness. That Solidère has sought to create a downtown that meets precisely these criteria suggests that its audience is not Beirutis, at least not primarily. March 14’s PR campaign, martyrdom posters, and the aforementioned digital counters function in the same way in terms of their interaction with public space, but differently in terms of audience. While many of them retain some element of exhibiting to foreigners, they are also designed to project a specific message to local viewers.

We have seen, then, that both Hizballah’s and March 14’s projects can be considered heterotopic, by virtue of reliance on representation, of creating particularist public spaces, and of constituting worlds-as-exhibition. We have also established that despite these similarities, the two groups are not going about their projects in quite the same way: museums are distinct from the molding of outdoor, public space. While as previously noted, space and time are not fully separable—and indeed it is notable how often time has emerged as a relevant dimension in distinguishing spaces already—it is fair to say that so far, we have been dealing primarily with the topos of space. I turn, then, to the topos of time, keeping in mind that space is likely to reappear.

_Time: Commemoration and Silence_

Time is a pressing concern in both groups’ works of place-making. All of Hizballah’s, museums and exhibitions are at least partly commemorative, with an emphasis on martyrdom and the loss of Palestine. March 14 is responsible for several explicit memorials, not all of them for Hariri. Some of these are part of the Solidère project; the main Hariri Memorial in Martyrs’ Square is not. Commemoration means, of course, interaction with the past, and coexistence of the past with the present. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has neatly put it, those who recreate and re-
remember pasts “do not succeed such a past: they are its contemporaries.”\textsuperscript{55} What is notable here is that again the aesthetics and forms of commemoration diverge sharply between March 14 and Hizballah, even in the most seemingly analogous of cases. Within each of their two worlds, however, commemoration is a fairly consistent presence across sites and through time. Jeffrey Olick’s approach to commemoration as a genre\textsuperscript{56} becomes useful here. Understanding commemorative discourses as interfaces with the past that also have, themselves, a past—as entities neither wholly constructed in the present nor entirely reactive to their past objects—allows us to consider the two forms of commemoration evident here as more than political propaganda or surface aesthetics. Thinking this way encourages us to search out antecedents to the two modes of commemoration at hand, and indeed they are evident. Volk has detailed ably how the Hariri Memorial has appropriated and adapted what was the broadest public discourse of commemoration in Lebanon for the bulk of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century: Muslim-Christian parity and coexistence in the face of violence.\textsuperscript{57} It must be emphasized that this was a discourse with an explicit dimension of martyrdom. Those commemorated by it from 1916 onward were civilians who died due to political violence. Hizballah’s approach to commemoration has nothing to do with this “memory genre,” as Olick would call it. The organization has developed a distinct method of martyr commemoration in its exhibitionary contexts from 2000 onward. Some of the components of this form appear to be relatively new and responsive to the immediate context;

\textsuperscript{57} Volk, \textit{Memorials and Martyrs}, 168-173.
others have antecedents in Palestinian forms of commemoration and in popular Shiʿi forms of religious commemoration.

Yet in among all this commemoration are steady silences on both sides. Hizballah commemorates the Resistance without mention of the war that necessitated it; March 14 mourns its assassinated icons without reference to the war that conditioned the assassinations. Moreover, Solidère has adopted the language of inner-city revitalization that typically characterizes projects in cities that have decayed through poverty and neglect, not been destroyed by war. Not only whole time periods but whole casts of characters are missing from both groups’ commemorative efforts. As Trouillot has discussed, nothing can be remembered without something else’s being forgotten; nothing can be spoken without accompanying silences. His approach to considering how and why such historical or commemorative silences are produced offers useful tools for discovering why both camps have spoken and silenced particular histories in their acts of commemoration. By this I mean more than a simple political cost-benefit analysis (though this is far from a useless approach, as Olick has demonstrated). I mean that dissecting silences not only in their existence but in their production helps illuminate how what is spoken is spoken. If silence is made, per Trouillot, in the construction of facts (sources), their collocation (archiving), their retrieval (citation or retelling), and their infusion with meaning (narrativization or

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59 See Paulo G. Pinto, “Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Religious Objectification: The Making of Transnational Shiism between Iran and Syria,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27(1) (2007): 109-125. Pinto does not make the connection to Lebanon in the article, but I will expand on it in Chapter 1.


61 Trouillot, Silencing the Past.
historicization), then so too is history. It becomes possible not only to discern and explain what is silent but to do the same for the particular and contingent forms of what is voiced.

The future, of course, is also at issue here, perhaps nowhere more obviously than in Solidère’s slogan: “Beirut: An Ancient City for the Future.” It is present also in the Hariri Memorial, which self-consciously remains unfinished until justice be served, and which counted up the time from Hariri’s death to the end of its investigation—a number always swelling toward a future resolution. The ever-proliferating plans and promises of Solidère’s reconstruction are nearly pure utopian futurism. This futurism relies on the simulacrum, Baudrillard’s term for an image which refers to nothing in reality: though the simulacrum presents itself as an act of representation, it actually represents nothing that exists or ever has. The simulacrum becomes a function of time in March 14’s hands because the group’s place-making project presents distant, archaeological pasts—as well as more recent commemorated ones—and utopian futures as images that represent historical and potential realities that are continuous with not only Lebanon’s recent past but also its residents’ current experience. In fact, these representations have little to do with such realities of life. Thus they allow March 14 to construct an entirely new understanding of history and of orientation in time that is free of potentially troubling specificity and meaningful difference. Meanwhile, the future is found too in Hizballah’s exhibitionary interest in the Dome of the Rock (the long-term, utopian goal). More broadly, it is present in Hizballah’s striking case of archive fever: the archive, of course, is “a movement of the promise and of the future no less than of recording the past.” That is, the archive need only exist in service to the future, and moreover it partly determines the future. (Here Derrida and Trouillot

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62 Ibid., 26.
are in complete agreement.) Statements by Hizballah officials involved with the creation of the museums and exhibitions corroborate this notion: their efforts are explicit attempts to shape political and social outcomes that are yet to come.65

Ultimately, all of these spatial and temporal dimensions add up to something not very complicated at all: the search, as posited earlier, for reorientation in time and space. This search entails highly specified tools for complex engagements with past, present, and future, and with space and geography. It is performed primarily through the commemoration of martyrs and through acts of representation. Past, present, and future intersect in and emerge from the martyr; representation, through exhibition, presents a world-as-exhibition, a rewriting of the landscape to make it legible.

65 See Deeb, “Exhibiting the Just-Lived Past”; Harb and Deeb, Leisurely Islam.
Fig. 1.: Hizballah’s Geography
A map showing the sites of Hizballah’s museums and exhibitions. The red marker denotes March 14’s presence in Beirut, of which more in Chapter 2; the green square just south of Beirut outlines the southern suburbs known as al-dahiyeh, which are associated with Hizballah.
Chapter 1: Hizballah

The place felt a strange combination of sad and dead, and pure and clean. The rubble, the setting sun, the abandonment of it all, the broken-down state of everything (random bits of structural garbage lying around, slasher film toilets, animal waste in some closed rooms, etc.), the tanks still pointing at nothing and the torn flags—it all spoke to destruction, decay. But on the other hand the air was so clean, the temperature so lovely, the views so beautiful, the setting sun so golden—and the playing children didn’t hurt either—that it felt a bit like a cliché of healing. This place of horror was almost forgotten, with no power over anyone; the tanks were play structures for kids; a couple took a selfie on the roof against the beautiful view.66

The above is a description of the former prison and bomb site Khiam, which between those two violent events served as one of Hizballah’s museums. When I typed it into my fieldnotes, I was attempting only to capture the experience of standing in the site at sunset on a summer day. Yet already encoded into this raw impression is a deep awareness of time (the coexistence of past, present and future), and of space (directionality, landscape, and place itself as a repository of meaning). In this chapter I will show how time and space have been intensely present in Khiam as well as Hizballah’s other exhibitionary spaces.

Hizballah’s place-making project consists of three permanent museums and two temporary exhibitions, all dedicated to the group’s Resistance to Israeli occupation and valorizing its martyrs.67 The first exhibition, devoted to Hizballah’s martyrs of the Resistance,

66 Fieldnotes from my visit to Khiam, August 21st, 2015.
67 There are two sites I have chosen not to include here. One is the museum at Qana, a small town in the South that was bombed with terrible civilian casualties once during the occupation and once in the 2006 Six-Day War (a conflict between Israel and Hizballah which nonetheless affected most of Lebanon’s populated centers). The second is Maroun al-Ra’s, a perhaps even smaller town very close to the border with Israel. I have omitted both because they are a) not purely Hizballah’s—or for that matter Lebanese—sites of commemoration, and b) because they are less-visited—by virtue of interest (Qana) or accessibility (Maroun al-Ra’s). On Qana, see Lucia Volk, “Re-Remembering the Dead: A Genealogy of a Martyrs Memorial in South Lebanon,” The Arab Studies Journal 15(1) (Spring 2007): 44-69; idem., Memorials and Martyrs in Lebanon. On Maroun al-Ra’s, which is explicitly understood as an Iranian monument presented via Hizballah, see e.g. Zoi Constantine, “Iran Garden, a little patch of Palestine in Lebanon,” The National (Sep. 28, 2011), http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/iran-garden-a-little-patch-of-palestine-in-lebanon; Nasser Chararah, “Lebanon Army Prohibits Nakba Demonstration in Maroun al-Ras,” al-Monitor (May 16, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/lebanon-army-prevents-nakba-commemoration.html#. I
was mounted in 2000 shortly after Israel’s withdrawal.\(^{68}\) In the same year, Hizballah took over Khiam—a former Israeli prison and torture center in the South—and used it as a museum until it was bombed to rubble by the IDF in 2006.\(^{69}\) The group then embarked on a rapid expansion of its exhibitionary activities. In 2007 it put on a second temporary exhibition dedicated to its recently-assassinated head of security, Imad Mughniyeh, in Beirut (later parlayed into a longer-term installation in Nabatiyye, a southern town and major center of support for Hizballah and other Shi’i groups). Around the same time\(^{70}\) the organization created a small museum, dedicated roughly equally to martyrs and to its martial prowess, next to the ruins at Baalbek. Finally, in 2010 it opened an enormous, open-air “Resistance Museum” complex near the small town of Mleeta in Jabal ‘Amil (the mountainous Shi’i heartland of southern Lebanon), which shifts the focus to Hizballah’s accomplishments in war and logistics. The Mleeta Resistance Museum (henceforth Mleeta) stands somewhat apart from these other efforts in its deep contextual, aesthetic, and discursive investment in a particular form of authenticity by means of rootededness in the landscape.

All of these acts of place-making involve profound engagements with space and time, through martyrdom and through representation. When it comes to space, Hizballah’s sites use

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\(^{70}\) For some reason the Baalbek installation is comparatively mysterious. I was not able to determine during my visit when it was inaugurated, and nowhere have I found this date in my secondary research. I first heard of it in the summer of 2009, so it is at least seven years old.
naming (i.e. the heterotopic recruitment of exhibitionary space as a symbol of ideas and of real space) and the notion of the pathway to create a narrativized geography that offers itself up as a legible experience for the visitor. (Once again, time and space are intermixed: a narrativized geography is one that has a temporal dimension.) In terms of time, these sites engage in two ways: one is through a bracketing of time into a particular period, for which Deeb’s term “the just-lived past” is useful. The second is through an archive’s inherent bridging of past, present, and future. As we will see, the “just-lived past” relies on the heterochronic nature of museums as heterotopias, while the archive reveals political interventions of power into the historical record that will condition the future. Remembering that space and time are inextricable from one another, it is useful to start at least nominally with space. Doing so has the advantage—somewhat ironically—of orienting us to the constructed spaces at hand in Hizballah’s place-making.

**Space: Narrative Journeys in Symbolic Geography**

Increasingly as Hizballah’s exhibitionary activities have expanded, they have become tied to geography. The 2000 Men of Glory exhibit was careful to create a clear pathway that all visitors would follow. This pathway formed a contained, constructed geography, starting in a garden that represented heaven, moving physically over the Israeli flag (the visitor had to walk over it) to a monument to the martyrs (where attendees were invited to say the *shahada*71 in reverence, sacralizing all the space to follow), and proceeding through a narrative of Resistance and of martyrdom commemoration. (One section of the exhibition presented the chronological development of Hizballah’s commemorative forms.)72 Khiam, of course, is intimately tied to its location. Its value as a site of memory relies on the fact that it is the site itself, not a

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71 The *shahada* is the basic affirmation of Muslim faith.
representation or reminder of it; the prisoners hung by their wrists here and slept here, their captors ate here and the still-occupied land of Palestine is precisely there. (When Hizballah was planning to develop Khiam into a more formal museum, before its destruction in 2006, these plans included an entrance pointing to the al-Aqsa Mosque.\textsuperscript{73}) The 2008 exhibit on Imad Mughniyeh started out in \textit{al-dahtiyeh}, which due to the ties of some of its population to Hizballah was bombarded especially heavily in 2006. It then moved to Nabatiyye, a key site for inter-Shi‘a politics: Nabatiyye is the home of Lebanon’s biggest, most spectacular ‘Ashura’ celebrations (‘Ashura’ is one of the most important Shi‘i holidays\textsuperscript{74}), where contestation between Hizballah and its rival Amal becomes apparent from time to time.\textsuperscript{75} The exhibition also created a defined geographic experience in the form of a distinct pathway, similar to Men of Glory. The visitor began with an array of Hizballah flags and “a giant olive cap of the type worn by Mughniyeh in battles,” proceeded across the Bridge of Victory to the Square of Defeat—with what is, as we shall see, a typical collection of IDF equipment—then went on to the Era of Victory section with Mughniyeh’s personal effects, ending in a souvenir shop. The Beqa’a museum offers a more modest version of this pathway strategy, guiding the viewer through a long, narrow hall hung with portraits of martyrs and culminating in a wide, spacious recreation of a captured Israeli gun emplacement. Its careful reproduction of a slice of the battlefield attempts to transport the viewer to the site of victory in some measure. As far as I can determine, during its operation as a museum between its liberation in 2000 and its destruction by the IDF in 2006, Khiam did not operate in this way unless the semi-formal tourguides made it so; it was not spatially designed by

\textsuperscript{73} Harb and Deeb, “Culture as History and Landscape,” 21.
Hizballah as an explicit museum. It is impossible to know based on accounts from that time whether the tours created a similar pathway, so for this reason I have left it out until later in this chapter.

The truest and most striking form of engagement with place, however, is at Mleeta, the newest of all these sites; so much so that it represents something of a break with its predecessors. The Mleeta Resistance Museum is much grander in scale than all the sites that preceded it, covering 4,500 square meters. Its tagline is “Where the Land speaks to the Sky,” and its logo is an abstract drawing of the eagle sparrow, which is native to the area. The bird was chosen “to represent Mleeta as a symbol of the fighters, reflecting their strength, agility, and refusal to suffer defeat (apparently, eagle sparrow meat is inedible).” The pathway strategy is still in evidence.

One enters past incidental service buildings (restrooms, gift shop, prayer rooms, and administration) and heads to the Square, which is defined around an enormous circular fountain, proportionally low enough relative to its height to feel welcoming and restful rather than monumentally imposing. While I saw no children playing in this square, I found myself imagining such a scene based on my own experiences in public fountains in the U.S. and Europe as a child. Next, one visits the “Multipurpose Hall” to watch short films documenting the Resistance and the creation of Mleeta. Then comes the “Exhibition” (one notes a distinct toning down of the named areas from the Mughniyeh exhibition), where the military intelligence and detritus of the Israeli military presence is presented.

Here the aesthetic presentation becomes more noticeable. Heavy metal frameworks abound on the walls and ceilings, often more decorative than functional. Camouflage nets drape

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76 Harb and Deeb, “Islamic Milieu,” 22.
77 Ibid., 23.
78 This is only my own impression. The fountain recalled the kind of public fountains I played in as a child, those found in public parks; it did not, for me, present itself as a statement calling for awe or a sense of being dwarfed. It was large, but relatively close to the ground.
the corners of display cases and sometimes conceal parts of the building’s ventilation infrastructure. Some Israeli military equipment is set into the floor underfoot and protected with glass, a technique common in tourist sites with ancient pedigree wishing to show off their crypts, cisterns, or antique foundations; the insets also potentially recall graves by their shape and size and the undeniably human-shaped items within them. (A parallel that leaps to mind is the grave markers found in the floors of many European cathedrals.) Other equipment lines the walls, backlit with light that slowly cycles through a range of bright colors.

Leaving the “Exhibition,” the visitor is confronted by the “Abyss.” The Abyss is a deep but wide pit comprising some 3,500 square meters. It contains an impressive amount of large-scale military detritus, including more than one tank. These items are artistically presented half-sunk into the floor or sides of the pit, symbolically bogged down in Israel’s greatest quagmire. The Hebrew acronym for the Israeli Defense Forces (TZ-H-L) appears on the pit’s floor, cracked and out of alignment. The whole is connected by more metal poles, this time in the shape of a spider web that has been ripped to shreds. The web is an invocation of Secretary-General Nasrallah’s speech upon the Israeli withdrawal, when he declared that Israel’s power was “fragile as a spider’s web.”

Notably, a Lebanese friend whom I will call J (a Christian from the Beqa’a with ambivalent feelings toward Hizballah) commented in amazement at the size of one of the tanks and how deeply it was sunk into the earth of the pit’s wall. He wondered aloud how it ended up there; when I commented that the builders probably had machines to help them, he suggested instead that “maybe they found it like that.” This notion is highly unlikely given the

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79 Harb and Deeb, “Islamic Milieu,” 22.
80 Noe, Voice of Hezbollah, [find page]. The spider web is a recurring theme in Nasrallah’s rhetoric.
care and detail devoted to every element of the museum complex, but that this impression of
naturalism occurred to him is revealing about the site’s overall aesthetic and atmosphere.\textsuperscript{81}

The centerpiece of the visiting experience is the following 250-meter hike through the
woods on the mountainside, named simply “the Path.” The pathway is narrow, surrounding the
visitor with trees; on some occasions, trees grow up through the path or set of stairs, with the
pavement carefully shaped around them to avoid disturbing them. Throughout this walk, visitors
pass weapons and covert technology used by the Resistance, always with an explanatory
paragraph mounted on a narrow metal stand rising out of the ground. Scenes are also staged near
the path, in which life-size mannequins and props form tableaux of fighters going about their
duties. Again, texts rising from the earth explain the figures’ activities: a medical unit seeing to
an injury, an artillery unit aiming their weapons, and in one case the site of a soldier’s grave with
the heartfelt story of his death. This fighter, the requisite text explained, dug his own grave while
still active, and visited it to contemplate frequently. He was wounded in battle and dragged
himself, blind and bleeding, in a grueling trek up the mountain until he could lay himself to rest
in his chosen spot.

Rather than arranging these scenes to immediately present themselves as pictures, as in a
diorama, the museum’s design sets them at varying distance from the Path, sometime tens of feet
off into the trees. The distance combined with the camouflaged uniforms and encampments
means the walker must always be on the lookout for such moments. (J was startled more than
once by suddenly noticing a face out of the corner of his eye, thinking someone was really there.
That I did not have the same experience could well be a paper in itself.) Partway through this
walk, one makes one’s way through “the Cave,” a bunker dug into the mountain, which presents

\textsuperscript{81} It is also possible to interpret this comment as sarcastically dismissive of Hizballah’s capabilities.
However, based on his tone and demeanor, and his general orientation to the group, I do not believe that
is what he intended.
the Resistance fighters’ living quarters, prayer room, and command center as they were when in use. One is informed that the Cave was carved into the mountain over the course of three years. The expected explanatory text appears next to some tumbled rock and basic tools—picks, hammers, wheelbarrows—implying that the fighters dug themselves into the very mountain by the sweat off their backs. More than once the fighters’ superior knowledge of the surrounding terrain is presented as the reason for their victory over Israeli forces in particular skirmishes; as Harb and Deeb put it, “the geography of the site is said to have participated in the resistance.”

After the Cave the Path leads to a lookout point that presents a striking panoramic view of the mountain range of which the museum’s site forms a part; the visitor gazes out at a breathtaking landscape under the loudly snapping Lebanese and Hizballah flags. Finally, the experience ends in “Liberation Field,” a manicured garden where plants sit side by side with large-scale weaponry. Each gun is accompanied by detailed information about its classification and its use by the Resistance. The garden’s flat, landscaped quality after the hilly, natural woods, combined with the carefully labeled weapons, produces an effect not unlike an arboretum. It is as though the tools of Resistance sprouted from the very soil. The paths are winding, pleasant, and dotted with benches; all of them lead toward a large, golden sculpture set on a low platform. The sculpture is shaped like a triangle with curved edges, and bears an inscription of the opening phrases of Nasrallah’s speech on the occasion of the liberation of the South, which refers

82 J was highly skeptical of this claim, insisting that Hizballah had to have had some machinery to accomplish the task. “At least make your suggestions believable,” he scoffed. Not being an experienced miner, I cannot speak to the plausibility of their claim or his challenge to it, but his reaction can be seen either as a dismissal of literal power over the landscape by a rival (as will be discussed further, J comes from a family and town deeply implicated in the Lebanese Communist Party’s resistance to the occupation, which Hizballah has conveniently erased from its sites), or as simple skepticism of Hizballah’s claims to various types of competence.
83 Harb and Deeb, “Islamic Milieu,” 22.
84 I suggested this idea to J. He was not familiar with the idea of an arboretum, but when I explained it to him he laughed and agreed that it was a reasonable association with the garden.
extensively to Israel’s weakness and imminent defeat. A looped recording of his delivery of the same words emanates from the monument.

Finally, one returns to the Square, only to climb a steep stairway to “Martyrs Hill.” (In theory one could begin with the stairs—a rare example of pathway ambiguity in a Hizballah exhibition—but the signage and spatial design effectively guide the visitor toward the Exhibition when coming from the entrance.) Martyrs Hill is Mleeta’s highest point, and its final position and steep approach is intended to induce visitors to struggle with some fatigue. This struggle is connected in formal tours to “‘effort’ (juhd) in sympathy with the Resistance fighters.”

Apparently in 2010 when Mleeta first opened, Hizballah planned to add “recreation and accommodation facilities for visitors and a cable car linking the surrounding mountaintops,” but these were not in evidence when I visited in 2015. It seems likely that the Syrian conflict diverted attention and resources from such plans.

The effect is to root Hizballah, its fighters, and its cause to the place in which they have fought. The site was designed to evoke the aesthetics of the resistance itself: military, relatively low-tech, blending in with the landscape. The chief architect commented that “We wanted to show how architecture can challenge straight lines, just like the resistance challenged the enemy.”

Even the buildings housing restrooms by the entrance evoke a sense of being at camp, with their gray, green, and brown colors and relatively low, sloping angles. The group’s project is organic to the environment in which it took place; moreover, the interaction of its built formations with natural growth communicate a sense of respect, even love for the landscape. Land, after all, is what is being fought over here. It is notable in this light that rather than amass the now-familiar collection of martyr memorabilia, Hizballah focuses on a few key individual

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86 Ibid., 24.
87 Ibid., 25.
stories, placing great emphasis on their connections to the place the museum now marks. The martyr who died near the path through the woods, his story reminds us, rests in this very soil. Thus even as the Resistance springs naturally from the land, it also claims the land; the South was reclaimed by their bodies, which lived here, ate here, fought here, and some of which still rest here.

This engagement with place, for all its military trappings, is not a primarily martial experience. Though reports on the Mleeta complex in the popular press sometimes cast it as an oppressive space of war and fear, in reality it is quite the opposite. J commented frequently during our trip through the woods on the pleasant atmosphere of the place, with its frequent rest areas, benches, and water sources. (To be clear, these last were generally not streams, pools, or decorative fountains, but rather utilitarian metal tanks with spigots—not unlike water sources I have seen beside highways in southern Egypt, close to Sudan. They were functional, not atmospheric, except that their basic presence provided a literal comfort in the sense of an amenity.) He remarked repeatedly on how nice it would be to have a party in these spots—to bring some friends, cook over a fire, play some music, maybe have a few drinks. As a Christian from the Beqa’a with an ambivalent opinion on Hizballah, he may have meant these comments somewhat ironically: it is hard to imagine the scenario he offered being amenable to the organization that labored to create the site onto which he was projecting it. Nonetheless, he was sincerely appreciative of the ambience: the cleanliness of the air, the beauty of the surroundings, and the professionalism of the presentation all impressed him. While the final garden is titled the

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88 I find this approach particularly interesting in comparison with Israel’s Holocaust museum, Yad Vashem—which the chief architect mentioned as a potential but ultimately rejected model (see ibid). Yad Vashem emphasizes personalized, individual stories, but does so in great numbers so as to communicate the scale of the catastrophe of ha-Shoah (the Holocaust). Mleeta, on the other hand, selects a few personalized and individual stories to stand as emblematic for the whole Resistance, likely in order to emphasize feelings of community and shared experience.

89 See for example Weinberger, “Inside Hezbollah’s Terror Tech Museum.”
“Victory Field” and features a looped recording of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah’s speech on the occasion of Hizballah’s 2000 victory over Israel, it maintains this quality of comfort and beauty through its landscaping, its wide, curving paths, and again benches to rest and contemplate. Where most military interactions with landscape in the modern era have relied on exclusion of what is not military from that which is, and on technological installations that sometimes have adverse effects on the natural environment, Hizballah has managed to create a harmonious integration of the military and the pastoral. At the same time, the growing network of Hizballah’s sites of exhibition through Lebanon creates a geography of ownership: the group is creating a trail of Resistance tourism and remembrance that not only passes over the landscape but actually marks it.

Consistent through every site, and appearing as well in the linking of these sites together, is the concept of the pathway. Indeed, Mleeta—the apotheosis thus far of Hizballah’s place-making—is centered around the spatial experience titled “the Path.” Even the museum at the al-Saha complex (not Hizballah-made but Hizballah-approved) functions on this principle, taking the visitor chronologically from an avowedly pre-modern Lebanese culture through the 19th and 20th centuries along a clearly designated route. A pathway is certainly one available means of creating a cohesive exhibitionary experience, but it is also necessarily a means of constructing a narrative. Pathways cannot help but be chronological: any such sequence in space is necessarily sequenced in time by the realities of the human body, which can only move along a pathway by moving through time. By the same token, narratives are necessarily chronological, and when told in this physically constructed way, they are spatial.

91 Harb and Deeb, “Culture as History and Geography.”
Pathways are significant in two senses. Firstly, they create a sense of literal guidance: a walker who sees a path stretching out before and behind her feels not necessarily oriented, but at least not lost. Being on a path means clearly going from somewhere to elsewhere in a widely acknowledged sense: if the way were unknown by others, there would be no path. Secondly, while they do not orient their walkers in the larger sense of a bird’s-eye view of a territory, area, or situation, they do situate their walkers relative to the surrounding geography. Frederic Jameson borrowed Kevin Lynch’s term “cognitive mapping” to denote how an individual apprehends their social and spatial world. Lynch meant by it the way in which a person moving through a city conceives of herself relative to the city around her: pathways are the basic fabric of this mapping, as they are the means by which we imagine ourselves moving from somewhere to elsewhere, and a city’s ability to create pathways which feel instinctive and motive—as though we really are getting somewhere—is important to its “imageability,” its navigability and the ease with which it can be mentally apprehended. Jameson takes this idea further. An individual cognitively maps himself relative to the city, but also relative to his whole social world. One moves not only from somewhere to elsewhere but from one social space to another, or from one class to another; one makes one’s way from somewhere to elsewhere not only geographically, but in interactions and in social life.

Hizballah’s emphasis on pathways in its exhibitions resonates with these ideas about paths. This approach creates a sense of comfort and certainty for the visitor: one is never unsure where one is supposed to go, what one is meant to focus on next. As the exhibitions also move the visitor through time, as with the history of the Resistance in the Men of Glory exhibit or with

the progress of the 2006 war with the Imad Mughniyeh display, she feels she is moving from somewhere to elsewhere, and that this progress has been defined and mapped out. Both a geography and a chronology that can be anticipated, followed, and relied upon emerge, often culminating with a symbolic victory of one kind or another. (The emphasis on “victory” bridges, gardens, and so forth in the official, named geographies of these exhibitions is hardly incidental.) For Jameson, cognitive mapping has the potential not only to orient an individual in the city (as in Lynch’s work), but to serve as a way for subjects to know themselves and their world, indeed to develop this knowledge in a way that allows “the capacity to act and struggle.”

This is precisely the object of Hizballah’s place-making: to create an environment in time and space that can be apprehended, or “cognitively mapped,” to successfully orient the visitor and particularly endow them with the capacity for struggle.

**Time: Archive Fever and Magical Value**

Discussing the 2000 “Men of Glory” exhibition and Hizballah’s plans—at the time, not yet realized—for a larger, permanent museum, Lara Deeb describes a tension regarding time that she interprets as a need to document events as history, and yet not to allow them to recede into history. The need to document arises from the recent nature of the events in question: the exhibit opened not long after Israel’s withdrawal, and the victories and losses, the triumph and the martyrdom were intensely immediate. It arises also from the fact that Israel, the United States, and their allies within and without Lebanon have always contested Hizballah’s narration

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94 Jameson, *Postmodernism*, 53. Some methodological discussions in anthropology and particularly visual ethnography have touched, from a different direction, on routes (paths) as a key means of both constituting and understanding place; see Jo Lee and Tim Ingold, “Fieldwork on foot: Perceiving, routing, socializing,” *Locating the Field: Space, Place, and Context in Anthropology*, Simon M. Coleman and Peter Collins, eds. (Oxford: Berg, 2006): 67-86.

95 Deeb, “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’.”
of events. For Hizballah, documenting their experiences is a defensive tactic in this public struggle over truth and over recent history.

To continue to motivate and inspire future generations of Lebanese to participate in the Resistance project, and in the project of the Islamic sphere of which it is a crucial part, this just-lived past must remain part of “current events.” However, in order to create a historical narrative that can compete in a transnational field of discursive power relations dominated by U.S. media, the just-lived past must be cast as acceptable and archived, so that it can—as a “museum”—teach us about something that has happened in “the past.”

This tension between past, present, and future—between finished experience, current event, and impending action—characterizes all of Hizballah’s exhibitionary works since that first exhibit.

Between the end of the occupation and its destruction in the 2006 bombardment, the former IDF prison at Khiam served as a museum. Visitors were often guided by men who had formerly been held prisoner at the site; these guides shared their experiences as prisoners, detailing the torture and abuses to which they were subjected and contorting their bodies to demonstrate what they endured. Such an experience puts the visitor in an unusual relation to time. On the one hand, the man stands before you, whole and free; on the other, his is the very same body that suffered at Israeli hands in the rooms and courtyards through which one walks. His experience is over, but it is not in the past. Or rather: it is in the past, but not of the past. Similarly, at least one such tour ended with a trip up the exterior wall to take in the view southward toward the border and, somewhere out of sight, Jerusalem; an indication of the occupation that has been pushed back but

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96 Ibid., 390.
97 Mona Harb and Lara Deeb, “Culture as History and Landscape: Hizballah’s Efforts to Shape an Islamic Milieu in Lebanon,” Arab Studies Journal 19(1) (2011): 10-41; p19. Video footage of similar tours can be viewed online; see for example Eva Pal, “Khiam prison.mp4,” youtube.com, Apr. 28, 2002, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-1GzTrgMZQ. Additionally, it should be noted that women and children were prisoners at Khiam alongside men, but I have found little evidence of women giving such tours. One hint of a female guide can be found in Ruman Deeb, “Mu’taqal al-Khiam: dhākirat fawq al-anqād,” al-Akhbār, http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/234072. (The date on this article is very uncertain. The webpage lists two different days in 2015, but the text of the article suggests it was written in 2007 or perhaps 2013 [“For over six years, the State has ignored Khiam” could mean more than six years after liberation or more than six years after the 2006 bombardment; the article was clearly written after the site’s destruction].)
not ended.\textsuperscript{98} Implied in this gesture is a reminder of past losses and an invocation of future restoration.

I myself experienced two versions of this guiding through past and present, in ways different from the semi-official guided tours that used to take place. J, who accompanied me to Khiam in the summer of 2015, was among those who first liberated the prison. When the IDF withdrew in 2000, they neither freed the prisoners nor cleared out the site; they simply left it for someone else to deal with. The day after this retreat, J and some of his friends drove over from their village (a smallish Christian town in the Beqa’a) to have a look. They found it just as it had been left, with IDF belongings and rations still strewn around the place and prisoners still in their cells. My friend narrated this experience for me: how they found the gates locked and how he climbed onto his friend’s shoulders to get over the wall; how he wandered through the place until he happened into a cell block, and heard voices. He asked “Who’s that?” and the voices fell silent. He asked again and they began clamoring for release, so he ran back to the gate to tell his friends what he’d found and they came in and helped him. They broke the locks on the cells and let the prisoners out. My “guide” narrated this story for me over the site itself, walking me through his path and telling me exactly where he stood when each event occurred. He added some details that he must have learned after the fact, from prisoners or from Hizballah’s promotion of the story. For example, he pointed out to me the pole in the prison yard where prisoners would be suspended by their wrists for hours, but never suggested that he saw anyone in this position when he quite literally helped liberate Khiam.

J was almost certainly exaggerating his role in this story for my benefit. The story he told of himself visiting with a few friends contradicts other accounts of thousands of locals (from

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
closer by than his village) storming the prison the day after the Israeli withdrawal. In the end, though, whether he himself really experienced these happenings is immaterial. The detail with which he recounted the story—not only what happened, but precisely where within the prison complex—means that whether he was really there or not, he feels present within the narrative, which he clearly knows well. He experienced it as he told it to me, as I did. In his reenactment of this tale of discovery and liberation, the past and the present came together to reanimate the prison: time acting to make Khiam’s chaotic space legible and comprehensible.

This informal tour is the closest experience I had in my fieldwork to the more formal tours by prisoners related by Harb and Deeb. The second of my “tours” was a brief conversation with another friend, a well-to-do young Shi’i woman, L, whose family is from Tyre but who grew up mostly in France. (Indeed, she speaks fluent French and English but barely any Arabic; I actually translated for her more than once.) When I told her I was planning to visit Khiam, L described, unprompted, her own visit there as a child. Her parents took her and her brothers to Khiam perhaps a few weeks after its liberation, wanting them to see and know “the history.” She spoke of this visit with pain and disgust, citing in particular the lingering scent of blood and human decay. She regretted having been taken to see it, and reported that her parents regretted taking the children (whether they actually did or do regret it is impossible for me to know, never having met them). In her account the past became present in a different, visceral way: rather than an orderly narrative like J’s, she offered disjointed sensory experiences with little relation to space or geography. In her repulsion the past violence of the place welled up between us in the present of her idyllic balcony, where we sat overlooking the ocean. The distance of time (between now and then) and of space (between here and there) was momentarily erased. This

100 My fieldnotes on the conversation.
story operates as an example of the disorientation that narratives like J’s—much like those promoted by Hizballah when Khiam was still a functioning museum—soothe and order into comprehensible progressions of time and space. Where J could speak of people, of an experience of closeness to suffering that had narrative and political significance, L had only an incomprehensible impression of bodies without meaning, reduced to fluids and scents.

When I visited Khiam, it lay in ruins. After the 2006 destruction, Hizballah had planned to restore it and develop it further as a museum.\textsuperscript{101} Even before 2006, the organization had extensive plans for what more could be done with the site, which at the time was only moderately altered from the way the Israelis had left it.\textsuperscript{102} Yet nearly ten years after its bombardment, the site remained a wreck. Its external walls were mostly intact, and one or two of the detention buildings were standing, though decrepit. Others sagged against themselves like concrete accordions, and several Hizballah and Lebanese flags flapped in shreds from their poles. A few tanks sat in the main prison yard, some of them aimed southward.

Leaving Khiam in this condition—especially since more traditional, “finished” museums exist now in Mleeta and Baalbek—works almost as well for Hizballah’s purposes as restoration would have.\textsuperscript{103} It is in itself evidence of Israeli violence, the kind of evidence Hizballah collects with fervor in its other exhibition sites to prove and maintain its claim to truth and its right to narrate its own history.\textsuperscript{104} As one of the prisoner-guides told Deeb in 2007, “It was destroyed

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\textsuperscript{101} As of 2007 according to Deeb in “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’,” 393; and still in 2009, according to Harb and Deeb in “Culture as History and Landscape,” 21.
\textsuperscript{102} Deeb, “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’,” 393-4.
\textsuperscript{103} Of course, reconstruction may still be in the offing (though it is hard to imagine it will be a priority until after Hizballah is no longer tied up in the Syrian civil war). As time passes and the audience is less reliably equipped with immediate memories of the events that Khiam stands for, such a project may become more pressing. Khiam is unique among Hizballah’s sites in its ability to testify directly to Israeli abuses; it is likely the group will want to preserve this resource.
\textsuperscript{104} See Deeb in “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’” for more elaboration on this mode of historical claim-making; I would also note that a frequent form of this evidentiary archive is Israeli military detritus (shell
because they [Israel] were trying to erase what they did.”105 Ironically, the site of destruction stands now not as a spot cleansed of Israeli violence but as its double embodiment: the prison that was, narrated by occasional tours and well-known to many Lebanese, and the bombardment that followed, evident to anyone’s eyes. The ruin is obviously not the product of time and decay, but rather of violence. This doubled violence helps again to bring “the past” and “current events” together; to keep the past in the actionable mode of “just-lived,” rather than at the comfortable distance of simple “past.” As one of the designers of the “Men of Glory” exhibit remarked, the intention is not to say “Always remember” but rather “Never forget.”106

Some significant theoretical literature would contradict this view, suggesting that while ruins do introduce a particular experience of time, they serve not to bring past and present together but to emphasize the discontinuity between the two. As Wroczynski puts it, “this unconventional notion of time is not problematic. […] A problem arises when ruins are read allegorically, suggesting that they are a reification of history, that they have no gap.”107 I would disagree in this instance because the “gap” presented by ruins is, for Khiam, precisely the rupture of violence, a rupture that is doubled by its history as a prison and its destruction in 2006. The “gap” of violence is itself the “allegorical” meaning of the ruin, and such reading does not present a “problem” in the sense above. Khiam’s particular nature as a ruin makes the gap of time a symbol in itself. The ruined prison’s standing as a symbol, a potent act of representation, resurrects time as a meaningful dimension understood through a particular space and place.

casing, soldiers’ gear, weapons, even tanks), which appears in quantity at every one of their sites. Khiam has become itself a form of such detritus.

105 Ibid., 394.
106 Ibid., 382.
The Baalbek museum, too, engages in the just-lived past’s particular dance of temporal immediacy. The exhibit culminates after long, narrow rooms in a broader space with a sense of openness. The central display in the room is a recreation of a captured Israeli gun emplacement, with the artillery, smaller handguns, and other military gear arranged, the museum assures the viewer, exactly as they were when the Israelis abandoned the spot being represented. The image evokes the craven Israeli retreat—the placement of helmets scattered on the ground evokes a vivid sense of terrified soldiers casting their belongings behind them as they abandon their post—and necessarily the glorious offensive that caused it. Here the projected emotion is less one of suffering, as at Khiam, but of triumph. (Upbeat, martial music plays throughout the building.) The visitor is transported to that moment of triumph, placed among the victorious Resistance fighters. The exhibition in honor of Imad Mughniyeh, meanwhile, featured a downed Israeli helicopter among its collection of Israeli war equipment, evoking the violence that rained from the sky only months before the show opened in al-daiyeh. The clothes Mughniyeh died in were on display. Martyrdom collections not unlike the one in “Men of Glory,” honoring martyrs of the 2006 war this time, were also included. Again, then, the past is present. Finally, the Mleeta complex offers up this actionable sense of history. It is somewhat more oriented to a true past tense, set as it is in a former Hizballah bunker that, by virtue of having become a tourist site, has abandoned its military purpose to the realm of history. However, it does not allow this sense of finishedness to characterize the entire experience. Along with an unusually large collection of captured military paraphernalia, the museum features detailed information about the

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108 Al-daiyeh is the southern neighborhood of Beirut most commonly identified with Hizballah: much of their work takes place there, and the inhabitants are often affiliated with or at least approving of the group in some way. The exhibit was originally mounted there in 2007, and then moved to Nabatiyye in 2008.

109 Sandels, “Hezbollah exhibit.”
IDF’s current strength—e.g., the types and numbers of planes it boasts. In the “Abyss” described earlier, Hebrew letters spell out the Israeli acronym for its defense forces: TZ-H-L. The letters are broken and haphazard, reinforcing the IDF’s defeat; but they are also at least claimed to be visible to Israeli planes overhead. The battle is won, but the war continues.

This consistent focus on a just-lived past recalls Stewart’s discussion of the collection as a grouping that creates a time unto itself. No matter the temporal origins of the collected items, they exist together in a constructed, contained “present” of their own. By amassing collections that revolve around the Resistance’s particular timeframe, Hizballah is able to mobilize the technology of the museum—its heterochronic nature and its inherent quality of containment—to create a particular narrative of history that serves its interests. More significantly for our purposes, the “present” found in Hizballah’s collections is precisely the just-lived past, which maintains a dimension in the present even as it reifies the past. Hizballah is not interested in encompassing all of the history one might assume to be relevant to the story of the Resistance. Rather, it is interested in framing a particular subset of history as more “real” than the longer-ago pasts found in other museums in Lebanon, and in doing so to frame its audience within that selected past while bracketing out those who would prioritize a different one. This function of the exhibitionary collection is one explanation for Hizballah’s enthusiastic embrace of the museum as the particular form of its constructed geography. The exhibitionary form of the exhibitions

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110 My own visit. See also Harb and Deeb “Culture as History and Landscape.”
111 Harb and Deeb, “Culture as History and Landscape,” 23.
112 Stewart, On Longing, 151.
113 E.g., the National Museum, the Robert Mouawad Museum, the Audi Soap Museum, or the Sea Castle. All of these institutions—otherwise highly varied in focus, purpose, scope, and mode of collecting—reach much further back, not only to pre-war Lebanon but to antiquity.
114 One is tempted to analogize this bracketing to the National Museum, which focuses on antiquity and particularly Phoenician civilization—with which many Christian Lebanese prefer to identify themselves—while barely mentioning the Arab conquest and the arrival of Islam.
collection offers a heterochronic, self-contained “present” uniquely suited to Hizballah’s needs in the production of history.

The second key temporal aspect of Hizballah’s place-making is the logic of the archive. As Derrida described it, the archive is a collection and fixing of the past intended for use in the future.\textsuperscript{115} Trouillot similarly emphasizes that the collection of traces or “facts” of history into archives necessarily conditions any future historical telling of that past, on the basis of what is included and excluded, and how what is included is chosen.\textsuperscript{116} I invoke the archive here firstly because Hizballah’s collecting is explicitly “an active act of production that prepares facts for historical intelligibility.”\textsuperscript{117} Secondly, Hizballah’s various exhibitions have in common two archival impulses. One is the impulse, as Trouillot would put it, to \textit{assemble} such facts for the subsequent production of history; the other, what Suzanne Keen calls “the magical value of the archive.”\textsuperscript{118} Magical value is the power of objects that bear the traces of their owners and originators to create “corporeal connection” across time.

To begin with assembly, Hizballah’s sites communicate a clear case of archive fever. Archive fever is the impulse to collect facts, the traces that events leave behind, lest they be lost to oblivion:

There would indeed be no archive desire without…the possibility of a forgetfulness…beyond or within this simple limit called finiteness or finitude, there is no archive fever without the threat of [the] death drive.\textsuperscript{119}

This urge to assemble is, first of all, obviously analogous to the urgency Deeb detects in Hizballah’s efforts to inscribe its perspective on the past in an authoritative historical

\textsuperscript{115} Derrida, “Archive Fever.”
\textsuperscript{116} Trouillot, \textit{Silencing History}, 51-53.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{119} Derrida, “Archive Fever,” 19.
narrative. In Hizballah’s case the fear of oblivion or of being silenced is quite immediate: in the 2006 bombardment the IDF targeted and destroyed several of the organization’s sites of information and media production. In an almost poetic turn of events, the contents of the Men of Glory exhibit (which had been stored for later incorporation into a permanent museum) were destroyed in the same war. But this fear appears in specifically archival form through two practices of collecting. These are collecting Israeli military detritus, and collecting artifacts of martyrs and martyrdom. The former occurs in all Hizballah’s exhibitions. Shell casings, helmets, pieces of uniform, specialized equipment, weapons, and even tanks appear in pride of place in all of them. As noted, the memorial exhibit for Imad Mughniyeh featured a downed IDF helicopter. Mleeta’s elaborate sculptures are basically found-art assemblages made from such military paraphernalia, and the exhibition hall boasts large amounts of Israeli weapons and gear, artfully arranged and backlit in shifting colors. Again, the centerpiece of the Baalbek museum is a recreation of an Israeli gun emplacement. Khiam boasts several tanks, and for that matter the site itself is a form of military trace. Even the Men of Glory exhibit, the earliest such effort, offered a collection of military detritus. The archival impulse here seems to be equal parts a need for proof, as in Deeb’s discussion of the just-lived past, and a linking of just-lived past battles to their future recurrences. These objects represent not only victory accomplished but a war yet to be finished. Such collections assure a future in which Hizballah can not only recount the occupation, but point to its role in resisting it through what are in one sense trophies. At the same

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120 Deeb herself makes the connection in passing. “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’,” 374.
123 Though the backlighting is not visible in these images, some examples can be seen at http://mleeta.com/mleeta/eng/album6.html.
124 Deeb, “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’,”
time, they bind the viewer to the conflict through his or her response to the objects. Mleeta in particular, with its taunting acronym for IDF pilots, tells its visitors not “Mission Accomplished” but rather “won the battle; will win the war.”

The magical value of the archive, meanwhile, operates primarily through martyrdom collections. Magical value binds the user of the archive to its contents’ beginnings through physical immediacy: not a copy of a manuscript but the very paper upon which some revered author left the traces of his presence. Objects with this magical value offer not simply the opportunity to learn the past through transmitting information but rather “a corporeal connection with the past,” relying on “facts of the body: blood, sweat, tears, spit, paint, and ink.”

Fittingly, two of the most striking examples of magical value in Hizballah’s works come from the two temporary exhibitions, which were both explicitly centered around martyrdom. “Men of Glory,” we must remember, was an immediate valorization of the Resistance’s martyrs after Israel’s withdrawal. As such, it contained extensive collections of martyrs’ personal effects. In the martyrdom context the archived objects are not manuscripts (though some are written documents) but the artifacts of life. The act of display transubstantiates these artifacts into representations of loss but also of the community that bore these losses: visitors to the exhibition could imagine their own family members in a handkerchief or a scribbled poem. The apotheosis of this mode of magical value is the treatment of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, a Hizballah-affiliated ‘alim who was assassinated by Israel during the occupation.

This [exhibit] began with the actual car in which he and his wife and son died and was followed by a shrine to the sayyid. A long funeral procession began as a painting along the wall and emerged as a three-dimensional model of al-Musawi’s coffin being carried by life-size mourners.

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The presence of the car—not a representation of the car but the thing itself—drew on magical value to stimulate feelings of immediacy, closeness, and an experience of violence. The viewer did not simply receive information about an event but stood in its very presence, in proximity to the blood of the ‘alim and his family. The construction of the exhibit then invited the viewer into not only a removed process of grief for a past event but the actual moment in which these deaths were mourned, by the presentation of the funeral proceeding away from the site of catastrophe. (Echoing the narration of Khiam, the invitation to join the funeral procession by walking alongside it through the exhibit re-locates the event in time. The disjointed temporal nature of a car bombing\textsuperscript{128} is resolved through representation of the mourning process into an event which can be made sense of as a noble sacrifice rather than an absurd eruption of violence.)

In the same vein, the exhibition in memory of Imad Mughniyeh featured the clothes he actually died in, as well as similar martyrdom collections.\textsuperscript{129} Mughniyeh’s still-visible blood on the clothes was invoked by a tourguide at least once.\textsuperscript{130} While the Baalbek museum is less prone to this collecting impulse when it comes to martyrs, it offers a painted representation of martyrs’ blood at its entrance.\textsuperscript{131} (This is, of course, not the same as presenting actual bloodstains. This choice of representation could be attributed to an attempt to reach magical value without the necessary materials, or just as easily to the common theme in Hizballah’s and Nasrallah’s rhetoric regarding the blood of martyrs. Baalbek’s deficit on this front, in my opinion, has more

\textsuperscript{128} Raad in Wallach, “The Fine Art of Car Bombings.”
\textsuperscript{129} Worth, “Hezbollah Shrine,”; Sandels, “Hezbollah exhibit hails ‘martyr’.”
\textsuperscript{130} See Worth.
to do with its status as one of Hizballah’s earliest attempts at a permanent museum than a lack of commitment to the tactic of magical value.)

Mleeta, meanwhile, takes a slightly different approach to martyrdom memorabilia. Rather than assembling representations of a wide array of martyrs, the Resistance Museum singles out a few compelling stories. Sayyid al-Musawi reappears: he had a hideout near the bunker, which one passes on the Path through the forest. The alcove is preserved as he left it.\(^{132}\) In it are displayed a Qur’an, prayer mat, a telephone with which to communicate with the command center, AK-47s and ammunition, and other military equipment. The text nearby instructs the viewer that al-Musawi used these items during the occupation.\(^{133}\) The Cave (the bunker dug into the mountain) similarly presents fighters’ living quarters, prayer room, and command center as they were when in use. Although other prayer rooms are available near the entrance to the museum complex, this prayer room is also open for male visitors to use if they wish to pray where the martyred Imad Mughniyeh and Sayyid al-Musawi themselves did.\(^{134}\) The effect in all of these cases is a feeling of connection through Keen’s “facts of the body” with the martyred fighters, via the objects they owned and used.

Khiam, finally, departs somewhat from the theme. While the tours that once animated it acted to connect the visitor again with the bodily reality of resistance fighters’ suffering or

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\(^{132}\) Or at least, this is the museum’s claim. Since he died well after he had transitioned from Commander of the Islamic Resistance to Secretary-General, it seems quite possible this is not literally true. There is no reason to believe, however, that the alcove is not a faithful recreation of how it looked when he used it. Regardless, the effect the museum’s designers want to produce by claiming the site to be as it was in his presence is clear.

\(^{133}\) My friend J, who was with me again, felt certain that these guns were fakes. He singled them out as such; others on display at Mleeta he deemed real. As in the previous note, the truth of this question doesn’t matter in terms of Hizballah’s intentions in the exhibit. The intent is to foster a sense of connection through time with the fallen leader by presenting his possessions. Whether many visitors are as skeptical as J would be a matter for a different, more audience-focused research project.

\(^{134}\) Harb and Deeb, “Islamic Milieu,” 23.
deaths, they did not do so through magical archival value.\textsuperscript{135} Khiam is not a collection (though it once might have become one, had Hizballah gotten around to developing it). It is, as discussed earlier, a monument in itself. The bodily connection that archives can produce through objects that bear some trace of their owners instead was found through the actual bodies of the ex-prisoner guides:

And their stories are with the detention camp. [Even after the destruction] the detention camp was able to become a place that reveals the barbarism of the occupation through what traces are left of it, and through the custodianship of the prisoners. […] In Khiam, the air is still the same. The prisoners feel it, and remember how the cold burned them in the winter and how the violence of the heat upon them lessened in the summer nights.\textsuperscript{136}

In this sense Khiam cannot be considered in terms of the archive, which is always a collection of facts or traces. Yet it operated on much the same principle as the magical value of the archive. Ultimately, magical value arises from “a corporeal connection with the past,” rather than an intellectual one. At Khiam, through their words and their bodies, former prisoners activated just such a corporeal connection; they simply bypassed the archive to do so. Given the importance of archival collection of martyrdom memorabilia in Hizballah’s other exhibitionary spaces, it seems likely that someday in the future Khiam will become an archival site. When these living repositories of history are no longer readily available, Khiam’s magical value will need to be archived; objects may be recruited to preserve that corporeal connection between the visitor and the past.

\textsuperscript{135} It is worth noting that Trouillot argues that tourguides can indeed “perform an archival role” because they are part of “institutions that also sort sources to organize facts, according to themes or periods, into documents to be used and monuments to be explored.” I have chosen not to apply this interpretation to Khiam’s guides not because I believe it to be false, but because the informal nature of Khiam’s museum status even at its height makes it difficult to speak of the kind of historiographic hegemony he is referring to in this discussion. See Trouillot, \textit{Silencing the Past}, 52.

There is one other aspect of the archive at work in Hizballah’s place-making project: what Trouillot terms “archival power.”\textsuperscript{137} Archives are never comprehensive. The very act of archiving a document or an artifact requires the exclusion of other historical traces. More to the point, archives and those with archival power establish certain norms about what belongs in the archive and what does not; what is known or debatable and what is out of the question; what is important and what is ancillary. This normative function is a channel for archival power because archives “convey authority and set the rules for credibility and interdependence; they help select the stories that matter.”\textsuperscript{138} The workings of archival power thus determine some boundaries on what historical narratives can be generated in the future. By the same token, they also determine what stories will never be told. Archival power produces silences just as much as it does history.

Hizballah’s archival activity in its museums and exhibitions certainly produces a particular type of historical narrative. It is the narrative of the Resistance defending all Lebanon against the Israeli occupation, alone and at the cost of many martyrs’ lives. It is also a narrative about the vital importance of martyrdom as an icon of the past and the future. As one of Hizballah’s museum planners put it to Deeb:

“[…T]his project is not just for the display of artifacts and old things…it is history, a message. […] It is a place where you see that this paper [he lifts the saucer from beneath his tea glass and points to it] has a martyr’s handwriting on it, and this martyr…is not famous or important. Instead, this is the handwriting of a person who gave his blood…of a person who went to die so that we can live. The importance of this project is for where we are going, not for where we have been; it is important for the future, not the past.

This planner’s discussion of martyrdom recalls Jameson’s view of orientation (what he would call cognitive mapping) as a quality that, when functioning properly, enables political action.

Though Jameson and Lynch, in discussing the concept, were focused in space, here we can see it in terms of time. What the representations of martyrs offer, for Hizballah, is an understanding for

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\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 51-52.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 52.
\end{flushleft}
the viewer of her place in time: future and past become connected in terms that are meaningful, personal, and political. In this sense even Hizballah’s approach to time can be understood like a pathway—as previously noted, any geographic narrative still has a temporal dimension. Through martyrdom, the exhibitions lead the visitor through a historicized past with a particular meaning (the value of Resistance, the moral significance of struggle, the worth of sacrifice), and invites them into a future that offers the same signifiers. It is through constructed geography that the topos of space is located and made available for orientation or “cognitive mapping”; but it is through the commemoration of martyrs that time becomes available in the same way. Since the importance of the museum project is “for the future, not the past,” all the disorienting events of the Civil War become meaningful history that lead inevitably to a desirable future. The importance of continued action to secure that future thus not only emerges from the museological approach that creates Deeb’s “just-lived past,” with its immediacy and urgency, but becomes natural and unquestionable: it is the tissue that connects past with future, that makes time make sense.

Yet this narrative of history is riddled with strategic silences. Lebanese history prior to the Resistance, including the Civil War that brought it into being, does not appear. Groups other than Hizballah which fought against the occupation are absent. I had a third and final “tour” of Khiam: an interview with a Civil War veteran whom I will refer to as N. He is a Christian who fought with the Lebanese Communist Party’s (LCP) Popular Guard against the Israeli occupation. He was taken prisoner by the IDF and held as a P.O.W. in Israel for ten years. While he was not held in Khiam, he feels connected to the site by politics, by his experiences as a P.O.W., and by locality—he grew up nearby. N feels that people like him are excluded from

139 On how museums’ presence and composition can lead social and political values—even ideology—to appear natural, see Mieke Bal, “Telling, Showing, Showing Off,” Critical Inquiry 18(3) (Spring, 1992): 556-594.
Khiam as a commemorative site. He argued that if Khiam were to be a museum or a monument commemorating the resistance, then it ought to represent all contributing parties, not only Hizballah. Khiam’s legacy should not be a narrative about who “won” but rather an opportunity for equality and mutual understanding in confronting the history of occupation. While N was sympathetic to many of Hizballah’s positions and respected their past performance, he both resented and disdained their attempts to claim the role of defender of the nation for themselves alone.

The same silences appear in Hizballah’s other sites. Deeb noted that the “Men of Glory” exhibit promoted the assumption that resistance was proper to Hizballah. The Islamic Resistance was presented as the sole defender of the nation, positing itself as a standard-bearer of nationalism for all regardless of sectarian or political affiliation. The Baalbek museum did not so much as whisper a hint of any non-Hizballah resistance to the occupation. While Khiam’s prisoners are acknowledged to have been diverse in sect and even allegiance, the site’s common narrative centers Hizballah and ignores the roles of Lebanese individuals in the Israeli-allied Southern Lebanese Army. Mleeta, too, reduces the actors of history to Hizballah and Israel: “The Mleeta narrative of resistance history is one that privileges Hizballah as the only resistance in Lebanon, and in so doing, erases other histories of Lebanese resistance, including those of the Communist Party, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, and Amal.” If the Mughniyeh exhibition made reference to any other Lebanese actors, I have found no mention of it. In Hizballah’s production of history, the group has neither allies nor partners in resistance. Such actors are silenced from the speaking of history.

Hizballah’s other silencing is of broader historical context. The story of Khiam as related

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140 Deeb, “Exhibiting the ‘Just-Lived Past’,” 387. Note the invocation of magical value with the handwriting of the martyr.
in the press, in reported tours, and in all my conversations about it never once noted that the complex was originally a French barracks.  In none of Hizballah’s other exhibitionary works, all of which are oriented toward martyrs of either the Civil War and occupation (Men of Glory, Mleeta) or their aftermath (Mleeta, Mugniyeh), is any discussion of the Civil War itself to be found. Israel’s occupation appears simply as a direct extension of the occupation of Palestine, with no other precipitating events or conditions. Hizballah appears as the occupation’s opponent, necessary and heroic, without an immediate history. (This absence is particularly notable since one of its silenced competitors, Amal, is the very group from which Hizballah’s founders split.) Instead, Men of Glory and Mleeta draw clear connections with Shi‘ism’s foundational narrative, the Battle of Karbala. Much as nation-states produce nationalisms by calling back to a mythic primordial past, Hizballah has always relied on the activist Karbala paradigm of Iran’s Islamic Revolution and Sheikh Musa al-Sadr to structure its identity and provide its repertoire of imagery and symbols. The Baalbek museum and, once upon a time, Khiam, include gift shops which offer Hizballah-branded paraphernalia—keychains bearing the face of the Secretary-General, for example—which mirror the souvenirs for sale at significant

143 Israel’s top decision-makers did have expansionist ambitions in their invasion; it was one of the long-term outcomes Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon intended. Nonetheless, security concerns regarding the PLO’s activity in the South and the increasing instability in Lebanon were the immediate causes and justifications for invading. See Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001 [1999]), 494-516.
Shi‘i pilgrimage sites located in Syria and subsidized by Iran. Thus Hizballah’s sites become connected to a yet larger and older geography of pilgrimage and religious identity with which many of their visitors will be familiar. This familiarity connects Hizballah closely on the level of tangible and consumptive experience both with its political allies and patrons (and their shared geopolitical stance) and with a Shi‘i religiousness that is easily connected with, if not already steeped in, the perspective on Karbala that structures much of Hizballah’s politics, political speech, and worldview.

It is obvious that the two silences depend on one another. To include other actors in the Resistance would naturally lead toward greater contextualization of Hizballah’s relations with these actors and the histories of those relations. By the same token, to discuss Hizballah’s antecedents and predecessors—to complete the temporal chain between its mythic origin and its Resistance narrative—would tend to raise questions about where groups like Amal were during the occupation. It is certainly to Hizballah’s political benefit to memorialize its conflict experience as one of a straightforward face-off between itself and Israel. Moreover, doing otherwise has potential costs: raising the specters of who did what during the war could lead other political actors to attack Hizballah further than they already do, as many of the relevant—and culpable—individuals hold political office to this day. As Olick has shown, discourses of commemoration about the past can and do vary based on the costs and benefits of a particular approach in the present.146

Furthermore, the imagined future that Hizballah promotes relies on the understanding that this straightforward, one-on-one confrontation is unfinished. The invocations of Jerusalem and the hostility to Israel in its works testify to this. One entered the Men of Glory exhibit by walking

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145 On these commodities, see Pinto, “Pilgrimage, Commodities, and Religious Objectification.”
146 Olick, “Genre Memories and Memory Genres.”
over a doormat in the form of an Israeli flag. When Hizballah was planning to develop Khiam into a more formal museum (before 2006), these plans included an entrance pointing to the al-Aqsa Mosque.\textsuperscript{147} As previously noted, tours ended at least sometimes with the view south to Jerusalem. Mleeta displays extensive knowledge of Israeli military data and a challenge to the sky. At the Mughniyeh exhibition, visitors crossed a “‘victory bridge’ decorated with captured Israeli equipment and artillery shells painted in gold.”\textsuperscript{148} This element not only drew individuals into the act of victory by inviting them to walk across its bridge but clearly pointed to a victory not completed but in progress. The exhibition, we must remember, was mounted on the occasion of the assassination of one of Hizballah’s own, and not long after the 2006 war with Israel. Just so do all the collections of Israeli military paraphernalia function: they testify to battles fought and won, yet also to a war that continues into the future. In this sense the silences Hizballah have produced are every bit as crucial as its narratives to creating an orientation in time whose future lines up with its past and present.

Altogether, then, time has been mobilized in a precise and methodical way in Hizballah’s exhibitionary spaces. The recent, painful past is made narrative (comprehensible), triumphant (bearable, sometimes even pleasurable), and fixed (reliable). If one had lost one’s bearings in the war, here one could find them again. The future is laid out as one of continued resistance and eventual triumph, with the pathway into it laid out in an invitation to be mobilized for Hizballah’s political and Resistance ends. Moreover, the very nature of the representation taking place in all these sites encodes time. Evocations of battles and Resistance recall the past occupation, while collections of IDF paraphernalia and gestures toward the continuing work of Resistance point to a more absolute future victory, proceeding directly from that past. The choice

\textsuperscript{147} Harb and Deeb, “Culture as History and Landscape,” 21.
\textsuperscript{148} Sandels, “Hezbollah exhibit.”
of exhibitionary form supports this orientation in time: it lends itself to archival power, or the production of both history and silence, which combine to build a legible sense of time and narrative. Collecting allows the bracketing of time into the just-lived past; archiving opens it to the future.

**Form: The Museum as Technology**

Finally, one of the striking characteristics of the entire project of place-making at hand is its remarkably consistent form. The technology of exhibition—of the museum, or what Tony Bennett calls “the exhibitionary complex”—is apparently very attractive to Hizballah. It has turned to exhibitionary strategies repeatedly and consistently to instantiate its political standing and message in institutions of tourism and leisure. This is not in itself surprising. Museums are a powerful tool for creating disciplined, self-aware publics, for producing hegemony and legitimacy on behalf of their makers, for inculcating understandings of the world reflected in the museum, and, crucially, for inscribing events as history. Such power is precisely what is meant by “the exhibitionary complex,” which denotes the set of modern institutions designed to discipline the public not through the hiding-away of power that confines, surveils, and regiments as in Foucault’s “carceral archipelago,” but rather precisely through the power of exhibiting the public to itself.149

Moreover, the museum is a technology well-suited to Hizballah’s approach to orientation. The aim here, let us remember, is orientation in space and time; museums, being both heterotopic and heterochronic, can be easily recruited to serve that aim. The museum lends itself to the construction of narrative pathways—visitors trace a path through a museum. It also lends itself to the instantiation of symbolized space, as each part of a museum—a gift shop, an information

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booth, a room or gallery dedicated to a particular subject of science, history, or culture—is itself already symbolized. This is another way in which museums are heterotopic: they are “spaces of difference” in that they are dedicated to the difference, the gap, between representation and represented, but they are also heterotopic because they inherently create space that is itself representation. A gallery dedicated to, e.g., English Romantic painters is also a representation of English Romanticism. As we have seen above, Hizballah’s museums and exhibitions take this aspect of the museum to its logical conclusion, making each spatial part of the museum’s whole representative not only of a political idea or historical experience, but also of the actual geography upon which those ideas and experiences have been and are being played out. Thus the historicized and narrativized understanding of geography promoted by these sites becomes deeply entwined with not only their own space, but that of the world beyond. The experience of being socially, spatially, and ideationally oriented within the museum can be maintained after leaving it. Space is no longer the raw, at times chaotic or fragmented, material of experience: it has become place.

The museum is also highly amenable to the construction of legible and politically motivating time, due to two characteristics intrinsic to the form. First, museums can create this type of time through limited apprehensions of time (for example, the just-lived past) because any museum creates its own present time that both emerges from the collection and lends that collection structure and significance. These items are here together—collected, and marked off from other objects in other spaces—because they belong together, in time as well as in space. Just as the great exhibitions and World’s Fairs of the 19th century were premised on the assumption of a “now” that all the collected history, culture, and technology naturally led up to

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150 Lord, “Foucault’s Museum.”
151 See Pink, “Mobilising Visual Ethnography.”
and made both inevitable and correct,\textsuperscript{152} so a museum’s collection relies on a “now” that has brought both the collected items and the viewer together in the same location in time and space. Thus museums such as Hizballah’s, with political content and historical messages, combine a particular understanding of what “now” is—the meaning of the present—with the assemblage of historical traces, archival decisions, and historiographic narrative in order to create, in full, history in every particular.\textsuperscript{153} Secondly, the strategic combination of archival collection and selective silence recruit the museum’s didactic, pedagogic potential. Not every museum works this way. In the eternal tug-of-war between resonance (where objects are described, contextualized, and explicitly given relations with whatever phenomenon they represent) and wonder (where objects are framed in isolation as singular events, with context exchanged for immediate impact), some museums fall further on the wonder end of the spectrum than others.\textsuperscript{154} But most museums—and in particular those which intend to engage with history—rely to a significant degree on resonance, and this resonance is often produced by \textit{explaining}, even \textit{teaching}. The same didactic impulse is also a part of museums’ genealogical material from their inception, when they were intended not only to discipline the body in public but also to discipline the individual mind by “effectively instruct[ing] it in the meaning of history.”\textsuperscript{155} Hizballah’s exhibitions have moved further toward this didacticism as the group has developed and elaborated its approach: the miniature tableaux in “Men of Glory” that depicted a home life that members of the exhibition’s expected audience would recognize are clearly producing resonance in quite a different way from the blocks of explanatory text found throughout the

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\begin{itemize}
\item[152] Bennett, “The Exhibitionary Complex,” 95.
\item[153] I speak of “history in every particular” in reference to Trouillot’s analysis of history as a combination of myriad material and ideational factors, processes, and acts. See \textit{Silencing the Past}.
\item[154] Greenblatt, “Resonance and Wonder.”
\end{itemize}
Mleeta museum. This is a logical choice for an organization whose audience is moving further and further away from the memory of the history on display, if they witnessed it at all. Thus the didactic quality of the museum makes a useful and powerful tool for promoting the understanding of time—the history—that Hizballah has produced with its silences and archives.

We can see, then, how a museum is not simply a place or even a type of institution: it is a technology for structuring and producing understandings of time and space. It has particular capabilities and features—found primarily in its heterotopic and heterochronic nature—that not only allow but invite, perhaps require, engagements with the topoi of space and time. If, as I suggested early in this paper, we consider space and time to be not only dimensions or values but truly topoi, “places to find something,” then the museum is one of the sites where those places exist to be explored. In this sense, Hizballah’s intensive investment in the technology of the museum appears reasonable, perhaps natural. However, Hizballah’s remarkably consistent choice of form and technique becomes more startling when one notes that March 14 has not only chosen different tactics, but avoided museums—for space, for time, and for power projection—altogether.
Fig. 2.: Solidère District
A map showing the full outline of the Solidère district in downtown Beirut, with some points of interest marked.
Fig. 3.: Points of Interest in Solidère
The same area, but at a closer view to better pick out the points of interest, here identified with labels.
Chapter 2: March 14

The character of the prewar city center and the special nature of the place—its history, association with sea and mountains, economic role in the region and links with East and West—are real assets. These will be brought to life once again, and the new challenges and opportunities of the age addressed, through reconstruction of the Central District.\textsuperscript{156}

Now that we have seen how Hizballah’s place-making orients the visitor in space through spatial representation, and in time through memorialization and silence, this chapter will demonstrate how March 14’s place-making does the same. We will see how March 14 diverges from Hizballah in its presentation of time and its interaction with space, and how divergent the two projects are in aesthetic and form—but we will also see how the two ultimately accomplish the same task of orientation. March 14 does not create the kind of constructed, artificial pathways that Hizballah’s exhibitions do. It does not even create exhibitions in the usual, formal sense—it does not build museums or put on exhibitionary events. Nonetheless, March 14 is engaged in the creation of heterotopias: spaces that encode difference, and which are appropriated for a particular rather than a general public. While Hizballah’s heterotopias are primarily exhibitionary and museological, March 14’s are very much in the form of the world-as-exhibition.\textsuperscript{157} They build exhibition into the very fabric of urban space through tourism of a kind quite different from Hizballah’s map of Resistance tourism. Similarly, March 14 is deeply concerned with time; but it gains access to time not through the archive but through constructing an imagined past and future that are attractive enough to use as points of orientation, but not detailed enough to stir up contestation. Hizballah’s primary temporal mode is that of the archive; March 14’s, the simulacrum, the image of something that does not and has never existed.

\textsuperscript{156} Gavin and Maluf, \textit{Beirut Reborn}, op. cit., 13. Note that this is an official publication by Solidère itself; these are not the words of observers.  
\textsuperscript{157} Mitchell, “The World As Exhibition,” op. cit.
March 14’s place-making projects consist of the postwar reconstruction of downtown Beirut through the Solidère project (1994 – present), which includes some memorials, but no museums; a 2005 memorial to the fallen Rafiq Hariri; a deftly calculated PR campaign in 2007; and memorial posters adorning Martyrs’ Square. Its timeline is somewhat murkier chronologically and conceptually than Hizballah’s, as no entity analogous to “March 14” existed prior to the pivotal 2005 assassination. For this reason it is necessary to spend a few words on Rafiq Hariri, who created Solidère and from whose assassination the March 14 bloc emerged.

Rafiq Hariri was born in Saida, a Southern Lebanese coastal town, to a poor Sunni family. Like many of his generation in Arab countries, he moved to Saudi Arabia in the 1970s to look for work, where he got into the construction business; unlike most of his peers, in the course of his career he found the favor of the Saudi King and became fabulously wealthy. He entered Lebanese politics in the mid-1980s as a broker of truces and deals, known less for political clout and acumen than for spreading money around—it was often easier to buy a settlement than to negotiate it purely on the merits. (It should be noted that this is not necessarily a criticism of Mr. Hariri; the highest echelons of diplomacy run on incentives and inducements as much as they do dialogue and compromise.) He became known as the agent of the King of Saudi Arabia in Lebanese affairs, with the checkbook to go with that status. Ultimately he helped to broker the Ta’if Accord that ended the Civil War in 1989, and went on to be Prime Minister twice. He was seen in some quarters as the only one capable of safeguarding Lebanon’s economy as it struggled to recover from the destabilization and losses of the war years, due to his own acumen but also to his wealthy, powerful friends around the world such as King Salman and France’s Jacques Chirac. He was seen by others as a high-handed kleptocrat who cared only for

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158 Most biographical details about Hariri are taken from Blanford, *Killing Mr. Lebanon*, op. cit., unless cited otherwise.
159 Ibid., 42, 43, 78, 86.
business, profits, and the interests of his powerful friends, and who neglected Lebanon outside of
central Beirut in favor of turning it into a playground for the rich.¹⁶⁰ (One of his epithets was
‘āmmar hajar wa dammar bashar: he who builds stones and destroys people.¹⁶¹)

When he died, he was in the process of putting together a political coalition meant to
limit Syrian power over Lebanon’s politics. The al-Asad regime had just forced Parliament to
pass an unconstitutional extension of the term of President Emile Lahoud, a Syrian proxy; while
Hariri had worked with the Syrian regime in the course of his political career, he was finally
moving to clearly oppose its free rein in Lebanon. He was not the first politician seen as anti-
Syrian to die after the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1559, which called for Syria to
withdraw and Hizballah to disarm; indeed, in the weeks leading up to his death he was warned
by many peers and colleagues—including Hizballah’s Nasrallah—to watch his back.¹⁶² His
extensive security, however, was not enough to protect him, and he died along with several of his
bodyguards in a car bombing on February 14, 2005. Other political figures close to him or with
similar positions on UNSCR 1559 died over the course of the following year, including
newspaperman Gibran Tueni, journalist Samir Kassir, and Maronite leader Pierre Gemayel.

Solidère was Hariri’s passion project.¹⁶³ This was true partly for political reasons: he
envisaged a future Beirut that would be a world-class business, trade, and leisure entrepôt, a
status it had once enjoyed and lost to Dubai during the disruption of the civil war. (He was
betting on a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process within the next ten years to render
Beirut geographically advantageous once more; to be fair to Hariri, in the early 1990s this may

¹⁶² Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon, 115-116, 122-123, and see much of the chapter (Chapter Five,
“Showdown,” pp100-127) regarding Nasrallah’s efforts to mediate between Hariri and Bashar al-Asad
and avert a confrontation.
¹⁶³ Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon, 41-43.
not have seemed such an unrealistic prospect as it does in hindsight.) This investment was to achieve the renewal of Beirut as the economic future of all Lebanon, a purpose encoded in its name: an acronym for The Lebanese Company for the Reconstruction of Beirut (Société libanaise pour le développement et la reconstruction de Beyrouth) that neatly works out to the French word for “solidarity.” It was also true, perhaps, for less altruistic reasons. Hariri originally made his money in construction. The creation of Solidère as a “mixed” real estate development company heavily intertwined with the Lebanese state, with private, for-profit interests but stated public-interest goals, offered lucrative opportunities for him and for his friends and allies. It is this aspect of the project, and of Hariri himself, that most literature critical of Solidère foregrounds. Solidère reflected what Saree Makdisi terms “Harirism,” meaning the primacy of capital over governance, intense corruption as a means of expediency, and an orientation to global elites’ transnational tastes and aesthetics (and the infrastructure needed to serve them) rather than the Lebanese public’s needs and desires.164

This paper cannot attempt to discern the dreams of Rafiq Hariri’s heart, but projects like his school in Kfar Falous suggest that he did have a certain faith in construction as a form of politics. He began building the school in 1979, equidistant from towns of different sectarian composition, so that lower-income children could get good educations while mingling across lines of difference. (The school was destroyed by bombing in 1982, a year after it opened.)165 His enthusiasm for the reconstruction of downtown was testified to by his contemporaries well before he had much to offer politically, and he is said to have sometimes preferred to look at building plans before policy matters while he was Prime Minister. He famously not only kept a maquette of the reconstructed downtown he envisioned in his office, but sometimes traveled with

165 Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon, 21-22.
it on his private plane;\textsuperscript{166} he showed it off to visiting dignitaries and businessmen regularly.\textsuperscript{167} I make this point not to try to rehabilitate Hariri from the perception that he was a kleptocrat, but rather to point to the enormous weight and significance assigned to Solidère by its progenitor as well as its observers. Solidère has been in many respects a boondoggle of epic proportions with ramifications for Beirut and for Lebanon that are still unfolding. But it was, at its inception, not only presented as a future of healing for the country and the city, but also conceived of that way by the man who brought it into being. And it was his death that would bring into being the other projects that, alongside Solidère, constitute March 14’s attempt at reorientation in space and time.

The company was founded in 1994.\textsuperscript{168} It was a monument to Hariri’s wealth, power, and connections, an invitation to his international peers in their potential capacities as investors (in the project) and consumers (shoppers and tourists), and a statement about the future of Beirut and of Lebanon. This statement has remained the backbone of what defines March 14 since its birth in the aftermath of Hariri’s death: business-friendly, Western- and Gulf-oriented (in contrast to Hizballah’s allegiance to Iran and enmity with Israel and the U.S.), slick and “modern” rather than martial and “traditional.”\textsuperscript{169} The “I Love Life” PR campaign that swept Beirut in 2007 evinced much the same orientation, so much so that a counter-campaign was mounted,

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{167} Walid Raad showed me internal Solidère photographs of these moments during our interview.
\textsuperscript{168} Saree Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut: Urban Narrative and Spatial Identity in the Age of Solidère,” \textit{Critical Inquiry} 23(3) (Spring, 1997): 660-705. Makdisi provides important, detailed information about the details of Solidère’s composition as well as the ways in which it began to come into being before its official founding.
\textsuperscript{169} While Hizballah is, in fact, profoundly modern, its roots in rural areas considered “backward” (Jabal ‘Amil and the Bek’a), urban environments perceived as messy, crowded, and undesirable by outsiders, and intense Islamic ideology often see it painted as “traditional” or “backward.” This misconception is rooted partly in the usual confusion of modernity with Western-conforming modes of dress, speech, worship, and home life, and partly in the attitude of many other Lebanese toward their Shi’i compatriots. See Deeb, \textit{An Enchanted Modern}; Craig Larkin, “Remaking Beirut: Contesting memory, Space, and the Urban Imaginary of Lebanese Youth,” \textit{City & Community} 9(4) (December, 2010): 414-442.
mockingly titled “I Love Capitalism.” The difference between “I Love Life” and Solidère as messages was an implicit, but still clear jab at Hizballah; in claiming to oppose a “culture of death,” “I Love Life” both exploited and promoted perceptions of its opponent as an Other characterized by violence, suicide bombing, and flagellation to contrast its orientation to investment and (Westernized) modernity as a source of vitality and wholesomeness. The campaign in this way proceeded directly from the groundwork laid by and in Solidère.

Meanwhile, the 2005 Hariri Memorial—which sits just outside the Solidère district, next to the imposing al-Amin Mosque (another Hariri project) on the edge of Martyrs Square—is a somewhat different matter. It was paid for by the Hariri family and built in the days immediately following the assassination, but located on land donated for the purpose by the government. Politically speaking, it is dominated by The Future Movement in particular rather than the broader coalition of March 14—but as we will see shortly, these lines are not sharp. Other Lebanese political figures who were assassinated around the same time as Hariri, and who were politically aligned with him, are also memorialized in downtown Beirut—but these memorials are not the work of the Future Movement or the Hariri family directly. They are instead part of the Solidère project, commissioned by the company from foreign design firms. Meanwhile, Martyrs Square features enormous posters which commemorate other March 14 martyrs (Tueni

170 “Why do I {heart} capitalism?” Wordpress.com (Jan. 17, 2007), https://iheartcapitalism.wordpress.com/about/. This page is part of a blog dedicated to the counter-campaign; its anonymous writer is clearly highly educated and English-speaking.

171 It is also worth noting that this campaign coincided with two others, in Egypt and in Jordan, and was the only one perceived to have this pointed dimension. All three emphasized a culture of life fighting back a culture of death, and presented neoliberal concepts like entrepreneurship as key weapons in this war; Sukarieh, at least, believes that the Lebanese case was unique in that the culture of death was understood by the public to refer to Hizballah, and that Hizballah itself fought back against the implicit insult. All three campaigns clearly had a common political, ideological, and economic agenda, but only in Lebanon was that agenda so actively contested due to the clear identification of political interests with both the “life” and “death” in question. Mayssoun Sukarieh, “The Hope Crusades,” PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review 35(1) (2012): 115–134.

172 Volk, Memorials and Martyrs [find page]
and Gemayel). Martyrs Square has long been central to Beirut in both position and significance. It is there that the men who hatched the first plot for Lebanese independence were hanged by the Ottoman Sultan in 1916; Muslims and Christians together, they died for their nationalist ambitions and formed the bedrock of the old Sunni-Christian discourse of sacrifice and solidarity for the nation that has come to belong to March 14.  

173 However, the square took on additional weight after the first lull in the Civil War in 1977, when planning for reconstruction optimistically began: Martyrs Square was seen as the heart of the city, 174 and by extension the heart of the country. Healing the city’s heart would heal the hearts of the Lebanese people. 175 (This transformation was well prior to Hariri’s involvement.) The other martyrs of Martyrs’ Square are politicians (Gibran Tueni and Pierre Gemayel) who were allied with Hariri in the effort to wrest Lebanon from Syria’s dominance 176 and, like him, died on the way to the Cedar Revolution. Their enormous posters, bearing inscriptions such as “So that Lebanon can live,” recall typical portrayals of the martyrs of 1916. They form a religiously mixed group of men, dressed in unified fashion—the Western-style business suit—presented to the eye as a group. 177 Instead of looking up from the page of a book, however, they gaze down at the vast space of Martyrs’ Square, larger than life.

Already we can see how it becomes difficult to distinguish meaningfully among place-making performed by The Future Movement (henceforth Future), by the larger March 14 coalition, and by Solidère: they overlap with one another. Future’s Hariri Memorial’s closest

175 Volk, *Memorials and Martyrs*, 164.
176 The reality is somewhat more subtle than Hariri’s leading a vanguard against Syrian occupation. While some sources depict him straightforwardly as anti-Syrian (e.g. Volk), others emphasize his desire to reconcile with Bashar al-Asad (e.g. Blanford). For that matter
177 Volk, *Memorials and Martyrs*, 41-43; she makes the same comparison with the Martyrs Square posters on 174.
analogues are the Solidère-built memorials; March 14’s “I Love Life” campaign relies on the values and discourses of Solidère; The Hariri Memorial’s visual iconography of commemoration has been adopted by March 14 as a whole. These connections reflect the underlying political, personal, and financial interconnections among all three organizations, and it is for these reasons that I consider all three as one project. They represent the same values, political orientations, and social-political coalition.

**Space: The world-as-Exhibition**

What unifies March 14’s works is their imbrication with public space. Every one of these self-assertions by March 14 relies on publicness in one way or another. The PR campaign and the posters in Martyrs Square were or are plastered onto the surfaces of the city, constituting the passing crowds as their audience. The posters, located in the symbolically loaded environment of Martyrs Square, rely on the location’s association with nationalism, martyrdom, Lebanon’s earliest political history (via the martyrs of 1916), and its constitution during and after the Civil War as the symbolic heart of the city to inform their message. Solidère itself is public space, in more than one sense: it is a neighborhood theoretically open to and built for all, meant to be strolled through and above all seen; the fact that it includes key public buildings like the Parliament endows it with publicness in the sense that a building is public, belonging to the state and therefore, in theory, the people. (This publicness of Solidère is, in fact, complex and contested; the nature and implications of this complication will be seen later.) Even the Hariri Memorial—the intervention that is most self-contained and private—features a memorial sculpture garden that is open to the square, directly overlooked by an HSBC bank (fittingly enough) and with a statue of the man himself out in the open.
As is obvious, this principle of commonality within March 14’s projects is almost totally different from Hizballah’s emphasis on museums. Museums, as collections, necessarily imply a kind of containment: they enclose their contents so as to be able to gather them together. Even open-air instances like the Mleeta complex are clearly demarcated from the space around them. March 14 does not work this way. Rather than the enclosure of the museum, it sets its spaces apart as heterotopias by other means: the appropriation of public space, and the world-as-exhibition. What, then, can Hizballah’s and March 14’s projects offer in tandem to our understanding? I contend that using one project to examine the other is useful not simply because they exist in the same country at the same time, or because they belong to groups that are directly competing with one another. The two projects have important points of thematic and strategic commonality, even as their methods and forms appear to be almost totally unalike. As I have already noted, these commonalities are centered around mobilizations of time and space. It is here that using one project as a lens through which to view the other becomes revealing.

Public space can become heterotopic when it is “appropriated” to become less strictly public.\(^{178}\) That is, public space is “public” because it is understood to be open to everyone and a place of meeting and intermingling: “[I]t is not simply the fact that this space can be directly confronted that makes it democratic; its democracy, its reciprocity, depends upon its public quality.”\(^{179}\) When that space comes to belong to a group other than the general public—even temporarily—it is appropriated and becomes heterotopic. This matter is particularly relevant to Lebanon as a whole: due to its political system and history, which officially divides political offices, institutions, and indeed the public by religion and sect—and does so unofficially by

\(^{178}\) Cenzatti, “Heterotopias of difference,” op. cit.
class—it is hard to speak often of a truly general public.\textsuperscript{180} (The #YouStink movement that got underway in summer 2015 represents a deviation from this pattern, and the protestors had to go to some trouble to make it so: they emphasized a rejection of all political parties, banners, and slogans, and spoke forcefully about their rejection of all the zu'ama' or political elites.) A protest may appropriate a square, or a festival appropriate a neighborhood; more broadly, a political or social group may appropriate an area such that it becomes associated with it, becomes even symbolic of it, and impenetrable and opaque to others. \textit{Al-dahiyeh} is such a space for Hizballah. Solidère is, for many, such a space for March 14. When Craig Larkin interviewed Lebanese high school students about the district in 2009, these were some of the responses:

It’s good, but it should be more national, all of Lebanon or none…it’s not national, just for a certain religion (Alaa 17, Shi’a, \textit{Haret Harek});

It represents a Westernized Lebanon (Tamara 17, Sunni, \textit{Moseitybe});

The center is beautiful but it doesn’t represent Lebanon, perhaps the Gulf (Pierre 20, Maronite, \textit{Zhgarta});

It’s cosmopolitan, perhaps it represents Rafik [sic] Hariri, it’s mostly elitist and cosmopolitan (Rafik 21, West Beirut).\textsuperscript{181}

Of course these are not the only opinions; some are quite positive. But a great deal of discussion online confirms that at least for a substantial segment of Beirutis, and despite the intentions of city planners before and after the company was founded,\textsuperscript{182} the Solidère district is not a place where groups of differing creed and background can come together.\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{180} This basic notion is present implicitly or explicitly in almost all writing about Lebanon, but a good treatment of it in relation to history and commemoration can be found in Kamal Salibi, \textit{A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 200-234.

\textsuperscript{181} Larkin, “Remaking Beirut,” 427. The italicized words are, like “West Beirut,” the names of the neighborhoods these interlocutors live in.


Solidère, in creating this downtown, appropriated the space to itself in a number of ways. Firstly, it did so literally: the company expropriated all current and former residents of the area and compensated them with shares in the company.\(^{184}\) (The payout on these shares would later be handled far less favorably for such residents than for major investors, especially those in the government or with government connections.\(^{185}\) Secondy, it isolated the area through a combination of building on land reclaimed from the ocean, and bordering the rest of the district with major thoroughfares and parking lots: while driving to it from the airport is made easy and natural by this construction, foot access is less intuitive and not entirely pleasant.\(^{186}\) Thirdly, it has created memorials to assassinated March 14 politicians within its boundaries: one of the few public parks not dominated by a nearby official or archaeological building is the Samir Kassir Garden. Kassir was a journalist well known for his strong views against Syrian domination of Lebanon, who was assassinated by car bomb in the summer of 2005, only a few months after Hariri’s death. His Garden sits near the official building of *Al-Nahar* newspaper, where he worked;\(^{187}\) it is a modern memorial space, with reflecting pool, timber deck for strolling, shade trees, and a small statue of the man.\(^{188}\) Other such memorials dot the district: the Gebran Tueiny [sic] Memorial consists of a “commemorative plaza” which carves the editor-publisher of *al-

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\(^{186}\) Larkin, “Remaking Beirut,” 427; Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut,”  
\(^{187}\) Larkin, 430.  
Nahar’s quoted words into the ground underfoot and surrounds them with plants symbolizing “deep-rootedness” and “the scent of the Lebanese wilderness loved by Tueiny [sic].”\footnote{Solidère, “Gebran Tueiny Memorial,” \textit{Solidère.com}, http://www.solideres.com/city-center/solidere-developments/open-spaces/gebran-tueiny-memorial.} A memorial to Basil Fleihan, an MP who died from injuries resulting from the same bombing that killed Hariri, is also found within Solidère’s boundaries; it appears, however, that it is still a work in progress. The memorial purportedly “is inspired by the constant movement around the site and the waves of the nearby Mediterranean sea,” incorporating “curvilinear, planted, and paved surfaces.”\footnote{Of all the public and memorial spaces, which Solidère seems eager to show off in glossy, attractive photos on its website, this is the only one without any images on its page. The text also notes that a statue of Fleihan “will soon be erected,” though since all such webpages are copyrighted 2002-2015, it’s hard to know how long ago “soon” was promised. Solidère, “Basil Fuleihan [sic] Memorial,” \textit{Solidère.com}, http://www.solideres.com/beirut-central-district/solidere-developments/open-spaces/basil-fuleihan-memorial.} And lastly, the National Unity Square sits just next to the Grand Serail, nestled among that building (a former Ottoman Palace that now serves as the seat of the Prime Minister), one of Beirut’s last synagogues (now disused), a church, and the headquarters of the Council for Development and Reconstruction—the government agency which has been all but taken over by Solidère. It offers a small amount of lawn at the top of the hill, which gives way to broad, shallow stone steps that cascade down the entire wedge-shaped patch of hillside to come to a point. The steps are solid on one side of the park, and on the other side they turn into basins filled with water; down them strolls a larger-than-life statue of Rafiq Hariri himself,\footnote{Solidère, “National Unity Square,” \textit{Solidère.com}, http://www.solideres.com/city-center/solidere-developments/open-spaces/national-unity-square.} much like the one that stands in the garden at the Hariri Memorial. Notably, the “National Unity Square” is referred to elsewhere on the Solidère website as the “Rafic [sic] Hariri Garden.”\footnote{Solidère, “Conservation Area,” \textit{Solidère.com}, http://www.solideres.com/city-center/urban-overview/districts-main-axes/conservation-area.} Here, it seems, national unity is to be found in commemoration of Hariri, March 14’s central martyr.\footnote{See specifically the section about Serail Hill.}
These memorials, all to political figures with close connections to Hariri and who died as part of the same rash of car bombings that ended his life as well as the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, clearly mark the space as being proper to March 14. Public memorials are statements about public values: about what and who should be remembered.\textsuperscript{193} That the public memorials built by Solidère are all aligned with March 14 makes a statement about who this space remembers, and therefore who it is for—what audience it expects to find strolling its streets. Moreover, the memorials all work with explicit symbolism intended to tie their objects to Lebanese landscapes. On the one hand, most of them are located near buildings of political significance; they are tied into a social landscape that carries meaning. The two martyrs with journalistic careers are buried near the prominent headquarters of \textit{An-Nahar} newspaper. National Unity Square, as noted, sits among buildings of Christian and Jewish significance—a nod to the idea of unity across religious difference—and buildings of significance to the state, with the old Ottoman palace serving as the Prime Minister’s headquarters and the CDR headquarters. Since the square centers Hariri as the subject of unity, it sends a message: unity across religious lines can be found not only in Hariri’s legacy but in his impact both as a politician and as a builder. Similarly, the official Hariri Memorial is next to al-Amin Mosque, a Sunni building that was another of Hariri’s passion projects in construction;\textsuperscript{194} faces Martyrs’ Square with its historical valence as “the heart of Beirut” and a center of commemoration; and is backed by the planned site for the Garden of Forgiveness, a war memorial intended to promote reconciliation across difference partly by its location close to several of the most major mosques.

and churches in the area. On the other, these memorials borrow natural elements in reference to the actual landscape of Lebanon for a tidy, limited, aestheticized selection of natural texture, whether through native plants or through the ocean. In this sense they make a statement about the definitively Lebanese character of March 14 and its martyrs; yet at the same time, the thoroughly modern design of the memorials, often executed by foreign firms and clearly intended to allow the memorials to recede into pleasant features of interest for the tourist’s idle interest, places that Lebanese-ness within the boundaries of commercial and leisure-focused pleasure. March 14 as it is represented in its sites is Lebanese in its insistence on unity across religious persisting religious difference—but only on terms favorable to March 14. It is also Lebanese in its inputs, the raw, natural materials on which it draws—but always in a way that suits the palate of the international tourist, allowing comparison with city centers in Europe and the Gulf.

Finally, Solidère communicated visually—through architecture—that the area is more proper to March 14 than it is to any other group. Solidère’s downtown is highly uniform in appearance: it relies heavily on a particular form of palatable eclecticism that combines ancient archaeological finds, Mamluk and Ottoman architecture, French-influenced 20th-century styles, and a contemporary aesthetic that recalls the brand-new cities that have sprung up in the Gulf in recent years, characterized by a color palette ranging from white through tan and beige to dark brown and smooth, polished, modular-looking surfaces. These various textures—old stone, cobbles, polished beigeness, the occasional detail around window or door (of the sort American

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195 Volk, Memorials and Martyrs, 163-165.
196 The TripAdvisor page for Solidère features many reviews that seem likely to have been solicited by the company (a common practice in the age of online consumer reviews). One common feature in such reviews is comparisons with Europe, a sense of being transported to a center of luxury and modern aesthetic convenience. See TripAdvisor.com, “Solidère,” https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-g294005-d534126-Reviews-Solidere-Beirut.html.
homebuyers usually refer to as “character”) make up the facades of buildings as well as the surface underfoot. Landmarks like the Grand Serail, the Ottoman clock tower, and the Zawiya Ibn ‘Iraq (a Mamluk prayer chapel) dot the district, interspersed with high-end shops, cafés, and exclusively priced real estate. Some public parks are present, but as they tend to surround such official buildings, they are not necessarily inviting spaces for citydwellers to pass leisure time socializing: they function more like verdant visual punctuation than like a public utility.¹⁹⁷ (Much the same can be said for many of the memorial parks and plazas.) Solidère presents its district as one characterized by meaningful, indeed symbolic, separation: a southern “Threshold,” a northern “Ancient Past,”¹⁹⁸ a hotel district, a waterfront—but this presentation means little in practice. Though certainly some areas boast more slick skyscrapers and others more buildings with older provenance, as Josep Lluís Manteo observes, “The actual ruins, abundant and from multiple epochs, standardize the setting, giving it the tone of urban continuity characteristic of any historic city, traditional yet generic, understandable to everyone.”¹⁹⁹ What Krunoslav Ivanišin identifies as “a kind of institutionalized ideology of reconstruction of the Levantine city”²⁰⁰ is evident not only in the treatment of the area’s archaeological heritage but how this heritage is interspersed with contemporary notions of the Mediterranean, globally cosmopolitan aesthetic forms of commercialism (the Zara logo is the same everywhere), and “romantic notions of what Arab culture is.”²⁰¹ Thus, though a representational approach to space seems to appear in Solidère’s self-promotion, in reality the space is not made representative by division and

¹⁹⁷ Larkin, “Remaking Beirut,” 430.
²⁰⁰ Krunoslav Ivanišin and Bernard Khoury, “There Is A Combat in Every Context: Interview with Bernard Khoury,” Middle East: Landscape, City, Architecture, op. cit.: 57-59; p58.
²⁰¹ Khoury speaking in ibid., 59.
differentiation—as is the case in Hizballah’s museums. Instead the district’s sprawl of consistent eclecticism opens itself to the tourist who wishes to apprehend it quickly and pleasurably while creating little depth below the surface for a local or a resident to set down roots, as it were; there is little space here good for making everyday memories, the memory of life rather than vacation. Lynch’s pathways with a sense of meaningful and intuitive motion are not much in evidence. (I myself have rarely felt so lost, in an urban setting, as in some parts of Solidère, where a great expanse of attractive sameness stretches in every direction.) Though Solidère promises a Heritage Trail, this is again a tourist attraction, not a quotidian means of navigation.\(^{202}\) (Notably, a 1996 map of the Trail shows it huddled around the area where most of Solidère’s memorials are located.\(^{203}\) The district, in the end, is less the bustling city center it is meant to recall from before the war, and more a showplace for tourists and for elite globetrotters. As Larkin’s interlocutors above noted, it evokes the products of construction found in the Gulf; another refers, as have many people I have spoken to, to Disneyland. The restored monuments do not so much breathe history out around them as they sit in among the boutiques and glossy facades as a form of punctuation, not unlike the green spaces.

This aesthetic approach appropriates the space to March 14 in two ways. On the one hand, it makes the district usable primarily to a particular “clientele,” as Solidère itself terms its

\(^{202}\) The trail’s Facebook page, set up in 2003 and apparently not much edited or attended to since, claims the trail will open in the fall of 2015. No images, maps, or plans of this trail seem to be available other than the one that appears in *Beirut Reborn*, at this point a rather outdated resource; the Solidère website offers only a terse description. However, this description notes that the trail will be marked out by means of bronze medallions set into the pavement. As a native of a city that has a similar trail with similar markings (Boston), I can testify that such trails do little to structure routes and spatial experience for the resident as distinct from the tourist; unless other aspects of the surrounding space force one to be attuned to these markers, one walks over, past, and around them almost totally oblivious to them.

\(^{203}\) Gavin and Maluf, *Beirut Reborn*, 86.
residents and patrons.204 The area is not conducive, as just noted, to casual recreation by non-
resident Beirutis; its shops, and even its highly promoted Beirut Souks (which sit on the site of
the old central market), are far out of the average price range. Indeed, this disparity was cheekily
pointed up by a protest in the summer of 2015 that set up an “Abu Rakhoussa” market, or flea
market, in the Solidère district.205 This clientele evokes March 14 not only because it is precisely
the clientele Rafiq Hariri envisioned when creating Solidère, but also because it matches the
coalition’s general sociopolitical orientation. Even after Hariri’s death, his family maintains its
close connection with Saudi royalty (his son Saad succeeded him in politics as the leader of the
Future Movement, at one point the Prime Minister of Lebanon, and still the conduit for Saudi
interests in Lebanon). The March 14 bloc of which it is a part is generally defined by its Sunni-
Christian makeup and its pro-capitalist, pro-development orientation that welcomes international
business and tourism from the global elite. This orientation is exactly what the “I Love Life”
campaign built on and denoted, and what the “I Love Capitalism” campaign criticized.
Ultimately the aesthetic of the Solidère downtown is reminiscent of high-end shopping centers
around the world far more than it is Beirut’s pre-war downtown, or other parts of the city.206

This appropriation of space renders the district heterotopic because it is, on some level,
exclusionary. It makes it a space of difference because in making it proper to March 14, it must
underscore what makes March 14 different from other groups. March 14 is commercial; March
14 is modern; March 14 is international; March 14 is Lebanese in a way that is explicitly

205 Najib. “Abou Rakhoussa Market In Downtown Beirut, But For The Wrong Reasons.” Blog Baladi,
wrong-reasons/; idem., “What if Solidere Opens A Permanent Abou Rakhoussa (Flea) Market?” Blog
flea-market/.
206 Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut.”
designed, and designer. By this same token the district becomes heterotopic in Foucault’s sense, that of a space which is symbolic of other space. As Solidère’s rhetoric about the construction of memorials clearly denotes, elements have been introduced to the district’s design in order to symbolize aspects of Lebanese topography. These botanical choices represent a far more circumscribed pastoralism than Hizballah’s engagement with the organic at Mleeta: the space being created here is an urban one, and the countryside is reduced past Hizballah’s picturesque control to a source of reference points—a place where plants and scents are found to be replicated in plazas and squares. This is a firmly urbanist viewpoint in which the rural or pastoral exists only as an aesthetic resource.

Moreover, the archaeological heritage of the area—which is one of the oldest urban areas in the world, with history dating back thousands of years—is largely not taken seriously as a means of historical engagement. While some ruins and buildings have been preserved and spruced up to be interspersed with the urban commercial landscape—Zawiya ibn ‘Iraq sits evocatively next to a Zara—astonishing amounts of archaeological material were simply bulldozed into the sea in the construction process. Albert Naccache has detailed the stunning missteps and evasions that characterized Solidère’s engagement with the physical record of history, from the wanton destruction of ancient deposits to the public relations storm that spun what efforts were made toward research and preservation as successful and positive, as opposed to the sub-par stopgap they really were.\(^{207}\) As Naccache noted, the reconstruction project offered a unique opportunity to study what was long known to be underneath Beirut’s downtown, but was never before accessible because the space was being lived on. Moreover, such study offered the chance for Lebanon to confront and perhaps remake its always-troubled national myth, which

suffers from a long-running disagreement about whether Lebanon should consider itself Arab, with the historical and cultural precursors that would imply, or Phoenician, claiming an identity separate from the Arab world and with its origin in classical antiquity. The existing National Museum clearly falls on the Phoenician side of the debate, which does nothing to resolve it; what lay under Beirut could have told a story that allowed the two sides to come to some sort of accommodation, or even offered a third alternative.

Solidère does not seem to have been interested in such an opportunity, possibly in part because it would have undoubtedly led to nerve-wracking political argumentation. Dwyer and Alderman remind us that commemorative sites can be arenas in which different groups battle over representation of the past: not only who and what should be remembered, but how, and how such memory should be tied to the present and future. These contests of memory are inherently political. So soon after the brutal war—remember that Solidère first got underway officially in the mid-1990s—such a contest would not have necessarily been an attractive prospect.

More to the point for our purposes, it is simpler and easier to constitute such heritage as “local flavor.” Flavor is the watchword of touristic offerings that present not a site or an object as the sight for seeing, but rather a neighborhood, culture, and way of life. This is an approach that has become increasingly popular in the Middle East over the last decade or two, though it can be found in urban tourist destinations around the world. Solidère is deeply invested in this

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208 Phoenician artifacts take up a major part of the museum’s central first-floor rooms, and the relief on the central landing of the grand staircase bears a Phoenician inscription. The Arab conquest, meanwhile, is mentioned briefly on the second floor, near the last displays a visitor reaches. The message is quite clear.


210 Rami Farouk Daher, “Reconceptualizing Tourism in the Middle East: Place, Heritage, Mobility and Competitiveness” and “Tourism, Heritage, and Urban Transformations in Jordan and Lebanon: Emerging
approach to culture, which is most simply to market it. As Makdisi has argued, the real investment in the reconstruction was infrastructure: not just roads and plumbing, but cables—the infrastructure required to provide the information connectivity the global business class requires. For Beirut to become the business and leisure entrepôt Hariri envisioned, this infrastructure was absolutely necessary.

Flavor in this context amounts to little more than a marketing advantage, a way to sell the underlying infrastructure; [a] company strategist…goes on to say that the downtown's archaeological and architectural patrimony will form an essential element in the competition between the rebuilt center of Beirut and other regional centers, such as Dubai, that offer a similar technical infrastructure but that lack Beirut's historical richness and hence the kind of flavor that Solidère can lay claim to. "We will play this card," he promises.

As a result, archaeological “patrimony” becomes symbolic, again, of March 14’s project and general political-economic orientation. It appears not as a testament for Beirutis to their history and their ancestry, but as an attractive feature of the new construction for wealthy outsiders. The ruins could easily be modern contrivances rather than centuries-old traces of history; their function is decorative and textural rather than societal.

This transformation has a few important effects. Firstly, it helps explain why no dedicated archaeological or historical museums have been produced by Solidère, despite that the company claimed it intended to build them. The company is far more interested in creating a leisure district than it is pedagogical or historiographic institutions that would serve not only tourists but also Lebanese citizens interested in their country’s antecedents. Thus archaeological displays are found outdoors, in among the shopping and entertainment offerings, as part of a

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212 Ibid., 683.
213 Solidère, “Beirut City Center: Developing the finest city center in the Middle East” (Beirut: Solidère 2012), 21-22.
Heritage Trail designed to carry the visitor through the district. This approach was neatly characterized in Budapest by Nuala Johnson: “Ironically…the Hungarian past will be used to generate foreign [tourist] revenue…yet that heritage is rejected in the civic landscape of the city.”

Ironically, the situation Johnson is describing is, on one level, a precise reversal of Solidère’s. Preexisting monuments and memorials were removed from public space because the history they connoted had become contentious, and placed separately in an open-air museum for “the tourist gaze.” Under Solidère, existing monuments (and new ones) are dotted through ostensibly public space for the tourist gaze rather than collected in a museum for serious engagement. The parallel between the two situations lies in the fact that Solidère, as appropriated, heterotopic space already itself dedicated to the tourist gaze, is not really public space in the usual sense. Rather than demarcating a heterotopia of history—that is, a museum—contained away from the rest of the city, it makes the downtown itself into a space of casual exhibition. This is perhaps the purest possible form of Timothy Mitchell’s world-as-exhibition. Mitchell shows that the exhibitions designed to present a city or a culture tended to train their visitors to apprehend the “real thing” to which the exhibition referred as an exhibition itself.

When one learns a place by exhibitionary means, one loses the ability to apprehend the place itself except by imposing exhibitionary, pictorial qualities onto it. One carries the heterotopic nature of exhibition(where constructed space symbolizes, indeed represents real space)—out past the doors of the exhibition into the world around one.

The problem for the photographer or writer visiting the Middle East was not only to make an accurate picture of the East, but tot set up the East as a picture. One can copy or represent only what appears already to exist representationally—as a picture. The problem, in other words, was to create a distance between oneself and the world, and thus

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to constitute it as something picture-like—as an object on exhibit. This required what was now called a “point of view”: a position set apart and outside.\textsuperscript{216}

Solidère has shortened the process by creating a city that is already, and inherently, an exhibition. The urban space itself becomes the space of representation, with building facades its surfaces. Solidère’s own position is the point of view—the omniscient, overhead gaze of the planner, and the calculating gaze of the investor. Thus its creation is presented to the visitor as an object on view, a tourist attraction and a shining testament to modernity rather than a functional neighborhood in which a local resident might live and work.

This constitution of the district as an exhibitionary space is perhaps best encapsulated by the events of 1998. After several years of demolition work, the downtown area was opened to the public once more. “[A]rtists, photographers, and filmmakers streamed through to record the apocalyptic landscape…. Paintings were hung on the ruin for people to photograph….\textsuperscript{217} Sculptures “perch[ed] atop skyscrapers and loiter[ed] on sidewalks” as part of the “shifting downtown exhibit”\textsuperscript{218}—their presence facilitated by Solidère. In this instance, the space became almost literally an outdoor art gallery, with even its destruction presented for aesthetic consumption and repackaging by the artists of the world. With the destruction thus distanced and aestheticized as an object for coffee table books, art films, and the foot traffic of art lovers, the district would then be rebuilt as a distanced and aestheticized exhibition of capital’s conquest of the wasteland.

Secondly, the transformation of archaeological remains from historical trace to aesthetic feature leaves little room for war commemoration. We will see more of this subject in our

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 229.
\textsuperscript{217} Miriam Cooke, “Beirut Reborn,” op. cit., 411.
\textsuperscript{218} Sarah Gauch, “Lebanon’s Renaissance of the Arts,” \textit{Aramco World} 49(1) (Jan/Feb 1998): 2-11; page number not available, as I accessed the text online via the Aramco World archive. The text can be found at http://archive.aramcoworld.com/issue/199801/lebanon.s.renaissance.of.the.arts.htm.
discussion of time, but for now it is enough to note that while multiple assassinated figures are memorialized within Solidère, they are not offered up with the context of why they died. Much as the Resistance appears as a circumstance detached from any immediate cause within Lebanon for Hizballah, these assassinations are not presented as a consequence of the postwar politics of Syrian domination and competing interests within Lebanon. To do so would, of course, potentially stir up unwanted conversations; but it also would be out of place within the world-as-exhibition being constructed. The individual memorials are aesthetic objects first and foremost, smoothly integrated into Solidère’s mosaic of old and new, modern and flavorful, global and local, natural and urban. Were they serious engagements with Lebanon’s political struggles and associated violence, they would interrupt the exhibition of leisure and consumption; they would require a closing of the distance inherent in the space’s built-in “point of view.”

Both of these qualities are found in the other instances under discussion in this chapter as well. The posters in Martyrs’ Square—one of Pierre Gemayel and one of Gebran Tueni—memorialize assassinated figures, and do so without context. Of course it can be expected that passersby in Martyrs’ Square bring the context themselves: anyone with the most basic knowledge of the war would know that the Gemayel family led the Lebanese Forces group and within it the Phalange militia, and had extensive dealings with Israel that played a major role in that country’s actions during the war. Similiarly, Tueni’s significance as an anti-Syrian figure is well-known; the events of 2005 are barely more than a decade in the past. Of greater interest to us is how these posters are presented. They are truly enormous, visible from across the square. Gemayel’s hangs on a building associated with his family’s Lebanese Forces, and reads, “He lives for Lebanon,” while Tueni’s is mounted on the al-Nahar building and exhorts the viewer to “unite and defend Lebanon.” What it must be defended from is left unstated, but the passerby is
implicated by the command’s association with Tueni to consider Syrian influence, and likely by
extension Hizballah, as the threat in question. Their placement on buildings with direct
associations with these men constitutes the space of Martyrs’ Square—which, despite its
adjacency to Solidère, is still a major crossroads for Beirutis—claims the square at least partially
for March 14. These martyrs are not only presented in Martyrs’ Square but attached to its built
geography, the very material that delineates the square’s margins. Again the surface of the city
becomes an exhibitionary surface, and the city becomes an exhibit.

Similarly, the Hariri Memorial makes deliberate and political claims in public space.
While it itself is more contained than most of March 14’s sites, it sits on the edge of Martyrs’
Square. Part of it—a memorial garden featuring another larger-than-life statue of Hariri
himself—is open to the sky. The rest is behind walls, but these walls are impermanent. The
Hariri Memorial itself is not a building; it consists of two large tents containing the graves and
visitors’ spaces, and a small garden outside. Tents first went up on the spot within days after
Hariri’s death, to shelter the gravesite and provide a place for the family to mourn. Keeping
them means leaving the site partially and visibly unfinished. For the patriarch of a wealthy
family whose life’s work was in construction, it is a counterintuitive choice, but the site’s
caretaker implied that it was a comment on the unfinished nature of Hariri’s death, for which no
perpetrator has been identified. When justice is served, the tents will be replaced with
buildings. In this way, the memorial emphasizes that the event of his death is not yet over;
until the case is resolved, it continues to happen. (It is obvious that in addition to space, the
impermanent walls are also a matter of time. This intersection of the two axes should not be
understood as a contradiction or a confusion. Rather, it reflects the degree to which the two are

\[219\] Volk, *Memorials and Martyrs*, 165.

\[220\] Ibid., 173.
inextricable from one another, as discussed in the introduction.) The image of the unfinished memorial interrupts the built facades that line Martyrs’ Square; the sight of it evokes not only Hariri’s present absence, how he and his death continue to haunt Lebanon’s politics, but also reminds the passerby how much of what surrounds him is Hariri’s doing. The memorial sits next to the enormous al-Amin Mosque, another of the man’s passion projects, itself visually reminiscent of similar constructions in the Gulf where Hariri made his money and learned to build. Behind it rises the Solidère downtown with all its import and its inaccessibility to such a passerby. The whole area of the city is, again, an exhibition that Hariri is still putting on.

That this exhibit can be identified with March 14, not only with Hariri, can be seen in the Memorial’s iconography. The Hariri Memorial relies on the particular vocabulary of commemoration that characterized Lebanese memorials through the bulk of the 20th century. As Lucia Volk\textsuperscript{221} has detailed ably, this was a discourse of nationalist commemoration that emerged in the era of Sunni-Maronite cooperation in power, and therefore emphasized Muslim and Christian parity in the experience of martyrdom for the sake of the nation. From the group who conspired against the last Ottoman Sultan for Lebanese independence in 1916 and died for it to the casualties of the 1958 civil war\textsuperscript{222} to the 1996 victims of Israel’s bombs at Qana,\textsuperscript{223} Lebanon has honored civilians who died for their country through the idea that Muslims and Christians suffered and died together equally; that they did not give up their religions to fuse together as unmarked Lebanese, but rather that they kept their confessional identities close to them to the bitter end. What counted was that they did so together and in the same cause. This discourse of

\textsuperscript{221} Volk, \textit{Memorials and Martyrs}.

\textsuperscript{222} This earlier, much shorter war was fought by Christians vs. Sunni Muslims and Druze; the shock of Shi‘i entry into Lebanese politics had not yet arrived.

\textsuperscript{223} The IDF’s bombing of a UN and civilian site at Qana was an incident that shocked the nation into an outpouring of unity across sect and class; it would be repeated in 2006. See Volk, \textit{Memorials and Martyrs}, and idem., “Re-Remembering the Dead: A Genealogy of a Martyrs Memorial in South Lebanon,” \textit{The Arab Studies Journal} 15(1) (Spring 2007): 44-69.
martyrdom and commemoration has ceased to be the discourse of the whole country as Hizballah has created its own ways of commemorating martyrdom; it seems that it now belongs, fittingly, to the remaining Sunni-Maronite alliance—March 14.

This continued use of a discourse that is no longer as neutrally inclusive as it once was can be seen clearly in the Hariri Memorial (opened in 2008). Though this memorial was paid for by the Hariri family, affiliating it most directly with the Future Movement, it uses the iconography of Muslim-Christian solidarity in martyrdom; its message is amenable, in other words, to the whole March 14 coalition. A mural-sized poster covers a wall beside Hariri’s grave that depicts Hariri’s head and shoulders floating opposite his signature al-Amin Mosque, still under construction; between them stands the image of the Martyrs’ Memorial that Hariri had seen restored and returned to Martyrs’ Square. This image has given rise to an iconography of Muslim-Christian solidarity bought with Hariri’s blood (an early descendant-image features Hariri with the Martyrs’ Memorial and a church spire and minaret in the background), which March 14 groups outside the Future Movement have taken up. More straightforwardly, an actual March 14 banner has hung inside the memorial space for some years. As Volk puts it, “Hariri’s graveyard memorial was both a site for mourning and a site for the Future Movement to conduct politics.”

Finally, the 2007 “I Love Life” campaign bundled March 14’s many threads of neoliberal ideology and cosmopolitan aesthetics and projected them around the city—indeed the country—wherever it was found. Its enthusiastic valorization of entrepreneurship, business, modernity, and progress was, as discussed earlier in the chapter, a direct extension of all that Hariri and thus

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224 Volk, *Memorials and Martyrs*, 168-172. Descriptions of the Hariri Memorial in this paragraph refer to the same citation.

225 His bodyguards are also buried in the memorial, but spatially somewhat separate from Hariri’s grave; he is the explicit centerpiece. See Volk.

March 14 stand for. Much as the posters of Martyrs’ Square reconstituted the surface of the city as an exhibitionary one, so did the billboards of the campaign. They assumed by their very presence the existence of a passing viewer who might be amenable to their message, and who would be convinced by the promises of a brighter future through neoliberal business efforts. While the campaign consisted of more than billboards—shirts, bags, and television ads were all elements, and their reach was all but nationwide—it nonetheless imposed itself on the fabric of the city in a way that is, by now, familiar. That the counter-campaign that emerged to mock it produced stickers, fliers, and posters with which to plaster the same sorts of surfaces (buildings, walls, etc.) is telling. The campaign was best contested not on the airwaves nor in the marketplace, but in and indeed on public space: it was a war not only of what space might symbolize, but who could appropriate it. This struggle for public space was also a struggle to define Lebanon’s future, and its tactics proceeded directly from the spatial practices that were used to define the various enclaves of Beirut during and after the war: “public space in Beirut functioned as a visual forum, a grand notice board on which the splintered nature of Lebanese subjectivities and the legacy of the civil war were negotiated…” It was a contest that played out precisely on March 14’s spatial, heterotopic terms.

**Time: Hariri and Simulacra**

Considering the March 14 sites in terms not only of time but of Hizballah-style time—the just-lived past—is instructive. March 14 does engage in something similar, as we will see, centered primarily around the figure of Hariri. At the same time, though, it also departs significantly from this model, choosing less to structure a particular recent chronology for its

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227 Sukarieh, 119.
228 The campaign’s website still offers some helpful templates for stickers and posters which anyone could print out and use: [https://iheartcapitalism.wordpress.com/category/flyers-stickers/](https://iheartcapitalism.wordpress.com/category/flyers-stickers/).
229 Sune Haugbolle, *War and Memory in Lebanon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 162.
viewers than to redirect their attention to much further-distant pasts and futures. Where Hizballah offers up a coherent chronology of the recent past studded with strategic silences, March 14 evokes vague, but appealing ideas of utopian pasts and futures that tend to ignore the recent past altogether. Rather than using archives to structure a pathway from the past into the future, it uses simulacra—images with nothing to refer to, whose referents have never really existed—to create an orientation in time that can proceed without certain unpleasant histories.

*Hariri: commemoration and the just-lived past*

To start with the Hizballah-like just-lived past that centers on Hariri, we must turn back to his memorial. As Volk describes, the Hariri Memorial works consistently to tie Hariri himself directly into the line of martyrs who died for the nation stretching back to 1916. His iconographic presence alongside the Martyrs’ Memorial and a variety of religious buildings puts him in a monumental category of larger-than-life symbols. (Indeed, the statue of him in the Memorial’s garden is over three meters tall.) These choices place him into the past; they recreate his death as a national tragedy to be mourned by all, both Muslims and Christians, and link him into the long chain of Lebanese martyrs. At the same time, much like Hizballah’s “just-lived past,” Hariri’s past-ness is neither comfortable nor complete. At the entrance to the gravesite, an electronic counter used to count up the number of days since Rafiq Hariri’s murder. Next to Hariri’s grave itself is a lighted glass case: “[There], as if in a museum display, was a black leather-bound book titled *The Basic Rules for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.*” (The Special Tribunal was a rare UN investigation of an individual death. While the Tribunal made Lebanese politics very exciting in novel ways for a few years, it produced no verdicts, conclusions, or indeed trials. Ultimately, the norm of assassinations with unnamed culprits continued.) The two

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230 Volk, *Memorials and Martyrs*, 166-175.
231 Ibid., 173.
taken together are clear jabs at the fact that Hariri’s killers have never been identified, nor brought to justice. Every day that passes is not a day further away from Hariri but rather an additional increment of injustice. Similar digital counters “adorning the facades of the late Rafiq Hariri’s many commercial and real estate possessions” counted the 1,476 days until the Tribunal ended its investigation and all the counters stopped, and were taken down.232

The tension of Hizballah’s work with time is between the need to inscribe recent events as history in order to prove its own version of what happened, and the imperative to keep those same events in the realm of current events as part of its ongoing political project. The tension apparent at the Hariri Memorial is startlingly similar. Future and March 14 need to inscribe Rafiq Hariri as a national martyr for all Lebanese, to build an image of their bloc as anti-sectarian and religiously inclusive. At the same time, the bloc needs to keep the fact of his assassination fresh in order to maintain (unspoken) anti-Syrian and, by extension, anti-March-8 sentiment. In both cases, the past must be rendered past in an official, weighty form that confers legitimacy; and in both cases, the past must be maintained in immediacy and emotional power in order to facilitate current and future mobilization.

Simulacra as the production of silence

The two groups share another approach to time: selective silence. Both Hizballah and March 14 have elected, in their commemoration of violence, to avoid any connection to or contextualization with the Civil War. As with the occupation, Hariri’s assassination was a result of relationships and developments that would not have existed without that conflict. Yet aside from the sentence, “They feared you, so they killed you”233 prominently featured on a wall of the Memorial—a hint at the common assumption that it was the Syrian regime that had Hariri

232 Halabi, “Lebanon’s empty notion of justice,” op. cit.
233 Volk, Memorials and Martyrs, 172.
killed—the assassination, much like the Resistance, appears to arise without an origin. This is a matter of contextualization but also of framing in time: cause and effect changes its appearance depending on where one begins and ends the sequence of events. Such choices of framing recall, naturally, Chapter 1’s discussion of archival power: what is forgotten is as important to future understandings of events as what is remembered. Hizballah’s method is to make enthusiastic use of this fact of archival power by creating extensive archival collections whose strategic omissions are lost in the wealth of objects and information: presented with so much, one is less inclined to think about what is missing. Just so does one never miss the sound of birdsong when surrounded by a loud cacophony of voices. March 14 makes extensive use of silence too; but rather than hide it in among a torrent of historical traces and facts, all speaking their histories over and around this silence, it creates monuments to chimerical pasts and futures that have never and may never exist, which camouflage the group’s silences because they come from another reality entirely. These pasts and futures are not missing anything because in their imagined vistas, nothing has actually been erased: it was never there in the first place. With this in mind, March 14’s other major engagement with time begins to come into focus as the operation of the simulacrum.

The Solidère reconstruction project claims to have the interests of the Lebanese and Beirut public at its heart. The reconstructed downtown was to be a place for Lebanese to come together in public congeniality. As we have seen, this claim’s correspondence to reality has been heavily questioned by a variety of authors in academia as well as in the popular press and online. One of the expectations of such a claim, which is indeed found in Solidère’s own promised projects, is the creation of sites and institutions that will offer the city’s history for its residents’ consumption and self-knowledge. However, this promise of history and self-knowledge has
always existed alongside a telling slogan: “An Ancient City for the Future.”\textsuperscript{234} This frame focuses on the edges of time—antiquity and a utopian future—rather than the immediate past, present, and coming years. This temporal focus is the mirror image of the shortened timescale adopted by Hizballah and Future’s Hariri Memorial, in that all three are bent around the same point of silence.

The implications of this approach to time that brackets out the middle in favor of edges have repeatedly manifested in Solidère’s priorities in both reconstruction and construction. Makdisi has demonstrated that the demolition of downtown to make way for Solidère’s plans was needlessly overzealous: “in the months since reconstruction officially began in earnest (summer 1994), more buildings have been demolished than in almost twenty years of artillery bombardment and house-to-house combat.”\textsuperscript{235} What remained, and what could have been salvaged, of the old downtown was almost completely razed.\textsuperscript{236} Similarly, Naccache has shown how much of the archaeological deposits underlying the area was needlessly destroyed.\textsuperscript{237} In its place Solidère has erected a slick district of buildings uniform in its aesthetic of eclectic mélange which, the company claims, preserve aesthetic unity with the old Beirut while building in the modern facilities necessary for the city to join the future. In reality, as Makdisi has shown, the buildings’ appearance make little reference to anything that has ever existed where they now stand. Instead they present a facsimile of an idea of Beirut that has never actually been real; a signifier without signified, an exhibition without referent. This is, of course, the definition of the simulacrum. Makdisi’s diagnosis of this aesthetic approach as a purely capitalistic, postmodern attempt to attract international elites with no real interest in Beirut as it was or is, but only as it

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\textsuperscript{234} Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut,” 662.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{237} Naccache, “Beirut’s Memorycide.”
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may be imagined, instantly recalls Richard Sennett’s evaluation of the state of architecture in the late 20th century: “Post-modernism quotes the past, usually in façade details, a skin of quotes laid over a modern utilitarian surface; quotation is not dialogue.” Richard Sennett, “Introduction,” Recovering Beirut, op. cit., 9.

This quotational aesthetic is precisely the mode of the current trend in tourism that renders cities, or neighborhoods thereof, tourist attractions in themselves: the city as spectacle, culture as “flavor.” “Flavor” is a term for which Makdisi reserves especial disgust. See “Laying Claim to Beirut.” "Flavor” is a term for which Makdisi reserves especial disgust. See “Laying Claim to Beirut.”


The aesthetic and infrastructural choices summarized here and explored more fully above point to what plenty of Lebanese people have been saying for years: Solidère is for someone else. Guerrilla protest actions like the “Abu Roukhoussa” or flea market that local vendors and activists put on in the Beirut Souks area in September 2015 comment directly on the class exclusion built into Solidère’s work; so, too, did the eighteen-month sit-in Hizballah staged in the new downtown area after the Hariri assassination. On one level, that Solidère welcomes only particular sorts of people makes perfect sense: Rafiq Hariri’s vision of reconstruction prioritized recreating Beirut’s status as a financial and leisure hub for the whole Middle East, and as an international mogul he never hesitated to enlist outside parties for what he believed to be Lebanon’s best interests. Attracting foreigners for business and leisure does not necessarily immediately suggest that addressing a brutal and sustained episode of violence. At the same

239 “Flavor” is a term for which Makdisi reserves especial disgust. See “Laying Claim to Beirut.”
243 Blanford, Killing Mr. Lebanon.
time, what a tourism professional I spoke to in Beirut called “dark tourism,” such as the conversions of prisons and concentration camps in Europe and the former Soviet Union to tourist sites, can be—all social considerations aside—quite lucrative. Yet no such “dark” tourist sites have been produced by the company. This professional spoke approvingly of Hizballah’s work in creating Resistance tourism as something that would bring visitors and their revenue to Lebanon, though he is a Beiruti Christian who grew up largely in South Africa; he disapproved of the government’s failure to invest more heavily in tourist and heritage sites as a whole. In a conversation that was as much about political sectarianism as it was about tourism, he commented:

So what I’m saying, you know, Hizballah, they’re just doing their part. They’re not gonna help the country as a whole, they’re only doing their own interest. So to say that Hizballah is responsible for Lebanon’s heritage sites, that’s like, asking too much of them. Right? But to say that Hizballah is not pushing the government for including other heritage sites and expanding, you know, investing in other heritage sites in the country, so that more tourists will come from outside to see them, then yeah, they should. Because everybody is responsible. Everybody is part of the government. But mostly I would blame the whole leadership. Especially I would blame the arba’t’ash [March 14]. They had the chances to do something about it many times; they didn’t.244

As this absence of dark tourism suggests, the explanation of pure palatability does not suffice. Sennett’s astute observation regarding postmodern architecture was part of his discussion of how urban design, especially after war, often seeks to repress violence through a uniform neutrality. Cities are designed not to enshrine difference but to elide it, to defend against it through neutral aesthetics and yet divided structures that keep potential enemies from

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244 This is a real-time transcript typed while he was talking to me. As such it is not quite so accurate as a transcript from recorded audio, but the grammatical errors and filler words reflect his manner of speech accurately in terms of tone and English proficiency. (He specifically used the Arabic arba’t’ash in the midst of his statement made in English.) It should be noted that we had this discussion almost immediately upon my interlocutor’s return from one of the first major #YouStink protests, which no doubt is one reason sectarianism was at the top of his mind; while our other friend, who had gone with him, said the protest was about the trash crisis, this man specifically argued it was about the larger issue of sectarianism.
encountering one another. This type of quiet segregation occurred along sectarian lines in Beirut during the civil war more or less on its own as a response to ongoing violence;\textsuperscript{245} what is unusual about Solidère is that it has created an island that is discontinuous in aesthetic and in access to the rest of the city as a matter of design.\textsuperscript{246} Solidère is not only designed with foreign investment and tourism dollars in mind; it is designed in a way that actively excludes ordinary Lebanese.\textsuperscript{247} This goes beyond the look and purpose of the buildings involved to the company’s dealings with the former property owners of the district. All of their property was summarily expropriated, and they were compensated with stock in the company; between the overzealous demolition, questionable trading practices, and the plan of the new district, most of these owners will never see a payout like those of the foreign investors or investors who hold government posts, and most will never return to their old homes.\textsuperscript{248} With Sennett in mind, Solidère’s choices begin to look as defensive, in the tradition of postwar urban planning, as they do investment-savvy: it has created a space of perfect neutrality for the international eye, but with little in the way of entry point for the local resident.

The company’s focus on a faraway past and a globally-palatable, gleaming future goes further than a simple choice not to prioritize immediate commemoration or even healing. Solidère has actually promised and abandoned projects that would fit into such an endeavor. Notably, these potential resources took the planned form of museums, and it is these that have consistently failed to appear. That it is precisely the museological form—the form Hizballah has

\textsuperscript{245} See chapter 2 of \textit{Recovering Beirut}.

\textsuperscript{246} Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut,” and Tabet, “A Master Plan.”

\textsuperscript{247} In particular, Larkin finds that Shi’i youth feel excluded from the new downtown, and there is extensive discussion on Beiruti blogs (e.g. “Beirut Report” and “Blog Baladi”) about the evils of Solidère on a class level. See also for example Wissam Hojaiban, “In Lebanon, sterile shopping malls show the growing gulf between rich and poor.” \textit{The Guardian}, Mar. 5, 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/05/lebanon-gulf-rich-poor-beirut-luxury

\textsuperscript{248} See Ohrstrom, “Solidere,” and Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut.”
embraced so wholeheartedly—that seems to make Solidère skittish is difficult to ignore. The various planning and advertising materials\textsuperscript{249} the company has published have repeatedly promised museums of various descriptions: of interest here are an archaeological museum that would enshrine the remnants of antique Beirut that lay beneath the old downtown and “The Garden of Forgiveness.”

The Garden of Forgiveness, as the most direct engagement with the Civil War itself, is perhaps the easier absence to explain. It would have been an archaeological park—nestled, in fact, beside the site that became the Hariri Memorial—that linked Christian and Muslim sites with each other and with the new downtown.

The proposed design envisioned a public park that aimed to reintroduce trees and greenery to a bleak post-civil war Martyrs Square. Equally important, the project planners wanted to install footbridges over the archaeological park to link Martyrs Square with the Riyad al-Solh and Nehme Squares to the west, thereby connecting the main churches and mosques in the downtown area. The garden was meant to bridge, literally and symbolically, the ethno-religious divides that had been created by the war. Since the bridges would lead over the archeological park, visitors could witness Lebanon’s multicultural history and reflect on its multicultural present.\textsuperscript{250}

It must be noted that this Garden as described would be heavily heterotopic in the Foucauldian sense. It is primarily a space of display and representation. As we have seen, in heterotopic space every object stands for some other thing, whether a place, a category of objects, or a concept.\textsuperscript{251} The artifacts found in the garden stand for the cultures that left them there as well as cultures or religions extant today; the mixture of provenance in the garden recalls the mixture of backgrounds present in Lebanon; and the emphasis on connection to multiple religious sites and neighborhoods, through the footbridges, represents the hope of reconnection and mutual

\textsuperscript{249} Solidère, “Beirut City Center: Developing the finest city center in the Middle East”; see also Makdisi’s and Naccache’s descriptions of promotional materials, several of which are no longer extant.

\textsuperscript{250} Volk, \textit{Memorials and Martyrs}, 164.

understanding. The Garden would have been an exhibit of one concept of postwar healing. It would still have been part of Solidère’s world-as-exhibition approach, open as it was designed to be to the air and the space around it. The footbridges in particular remove what sense of museum-like containment the Garden could be imagined to have: it is meant to be passed through and over, to make sense in the context of the larger city-exhibition rather than to be a separate space of exhibition in itself. Yet the project was “halted” in 2005 “when the Hariri Memorial became the center of Martyrs Square’s expanding commemorative geography”\(^{252}\)—though why one necessitated the other is not clear. Ten years later, though, the Garden remains in limbo: its website promises that “we” are “working on something awesome!”\(^ {253}\) and the designer’s website more soberly calls it “Unbuilt/On hold.”\(^ {254}\) While there is no knowing whether the Garden will ever appear (and for that matter, whether it would be embraced by the people it was conceived to serve), for now it appears that Solidère has quietly let the project die. The past that lies between “ancient” (aesthetic) and “just-lived” (commemorative) remains out of view.

What does exist, however, are the renderings of the planned Garden, and the website. Like many other projects of Solidère’s, visual representations of something that does not exist and may never come into being—simulacra—are meant to be taken as meaningful progress. Makdisi discusses at length\(^ {255}\) how images of the future, completed district proliferated. Posters and billboards stood and stand next to razed areas depicting the plans for their futures, capturing the imaginations of all who view them and directing them toward a particular, Solidère-approved vision of the city. The children’s book *Beirut: Do we know her?* sought to attract children’s

\(^{252}\) Volk, *Memorials and Martyrs*, 164.
interest in Beirut as a city—a city whose past form they have never seen—as conceived by Solidère. The company published a handsome coffee-table book of its early plans, titled *Beirut Reborn*, replete with maps, illustrations, and utopian promises of “revival,” “vision,” “ideas,” and “character” (another word for “flavor”). The difference between the city as it was and the city as it will be disappears in these texts; Solidère assures its audience—an audience that is, as time goes on and memories are lost, increasingly without outside reference points—that it will recreate the city as it was, effectively instantiating the future city as an accurate, culturally specific, and historicized reproduction despite the fact that in reality this future city is no such thing. The result of an uncritical reading of such a text by the intended audience is acceptance of March 14’s vision of Beirut; of its geography. Thus by illustrating an imagined future that it claims has continuity with the past, Solidère is able to create—in one gesture—a vision of both past and future Beirut that has little to do with any real Beirut of the past.

[Solidère’s Beirut] will be marketed as a re-creation of what was there before, rather than as something that is entirely novel, something that, properly speaking, has no historical depth because it has no past at all, because it is part of a much broader process that has from the beginning tried to strip away the past and lay bare the surface of the city as sheer surface spectacle and as nothing more than that.

The absence of the promised archaeological museum follows from this logic, just as it does from the conversion of ancient heritage into window dressing discussed in the segment on space. As we saw in the previous chapter, museums of this sort are generally concerned with resonance, placing artifacts in some degree of historical context: what they were used for, what deities they symbolized, who created them or who used them. Indeed, the National Museum engages extensively in this type of resonance production. But this is not the logic of the simulacrum, the

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256 Makdisi, “Laying Claim to Beirut,” 689-691.
258 Ibid., “Foreword” and Chapter 1.
259 Makdisi, 688.
pure image without past or referent. Rather, it must appear—like the city of Paris in one of the exhibitions Mitchell describes—all at once around the viewer, “a single and solid object,”\textsuperscript{260} implicitly always having been there. What antiquities remain in the district are thus imbricated with its newer fabric as part of a harmonious whole, rather than creating the discontinuities that museums, with their inherent containment and exclusion of the outside, provide.

Such productions of simulacra are not necessarily wholly successful. Sennett observes that after World War II, buildings were put up in haste for people to live in, without care for preserving the marks of war or for the modes of social life people had developed while living among ruins. The result was that the buildings—though themselves whole and functional—took on a certain social character of ruins. People moved out of them as soon as they could. The attempt of these buildings to “obliterate any sense of connection to the past—as though erasure in space could declare a historical cataclysm to be over”\textsuperscript{261} failed because the buildings failed to place the past, present and future in dialogue with one another. This is precisely what Solidère has done, and it may be one reason why lately, to borrow a phrase from a representative blog post, “Down Town Beirut Has Got Everything Except People.”\textsuperscript{262} One of the planners listed as an author of Solidère’s \textit{Beirut Reborn} lamented this state of affairs in a 2014 interview:

\begin{quote}
[…T]\textit{he vision of a mainly residential active, mixed-use Downtown has been partially eclipsed by the fact that a lot of people buying apartments stay only for a month or so a year. It seems everybody wants a part-time apartment in downtown Beirut. This doesn’t bring everyday life to the area.}\textsuperscript{263}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[260] Mitchell, 223.
\item[261] Sennett, op. cit., 8.
\end{footnotes}
It therefore appears that perhaps Solidère has indeed failed, in some invisible yet tangible way, to successfully instantiate its simulacral past and future. Whether this failure will matter to the company or the wider March 14 alliance will likely depend, however, far more on revenues from abroad than on buy-in from any public at home.

Form: Simulacrum as Sleight of Hand

This uneasiness with the wholeness of buildings, their failure to address historical reality, is a subject the artist Walid Raad\textsuperscript{264} has been working on for some years. His project on Solidère is not yet done, and his thoughts are not final. But in our discussion of his work, he repeatedly brought up the idea that the ruined-ness of the area was still haunting its gleaming facades.

Making reference to the work of his friend, the artist and intellectual Jalal Toufic,\textsuperscript{265} he spoke evocatively about how a ruined building can be seen straight through: the holes in its structure create a new geography and new sightlines. He suggests that even after such a building has been patched, that changed sightline never quite goes away: the passerby sees it as it is, but also as it was. He talks about this phenomenon primarily in terms of space, but he also put it memorably in

\textsuperscript{264} Raad is among the best-known and most lauded Lebanese artists working today. His work, which is concerned with the Civil War and its aftereffects in memory, expression/representation, and space, has been a subject of substantial interest among critics and academics. (His more recent work on the institutional and financial infrastructure of the art world, especially in the Middle East, has not attracted the same attention, or at least not yet, and again his Solidère project is still in development.) Therefore a minor literature about him has accumulated: see Wroczynski and Nakas & Schmitz, op. cit., as well as Adrienne Connelly, “Mapping the Atlas Group Archive” (Ph.D. diss., Concordia University, 2012); André Lepecki, “‘After All, This Terror Was Not Without Reason’: Unfiled Notes on the Atlas Group Archive,” \textit{The Drama Review} 50(3) (2006): 88-99; Thomas Micchelli, “Unreliable Informants: A Walid Raad Primer,” \textit{Hyperallergic}, http://hyperallergic.com/243457/unreliable-informants-a-walid-raad-primer/; Markus Schmitz, “Blurring Images: Articulations of Arab-American Crossovers,” in \textit{Postcolonial Translations: Cultural Representation and Critical Spatial Thinking}, Marga Munkelt, Markus Schmitz, Mark Stein, and Silke Stroh, eds. (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2013): 321-352; Lee Smith, “Missing in action: The art of the Atlas Group / Walid Raad,” \textit{Artforum}, 41(6) (Feb., 2003): 124-129.

\textsuperscript{265} Raad was referring specifically to the essay “Ruins” from Toufic’s \textit{(Vampires): An Uneasy Essay on the Undead in Film}. The same essay was reprinted in a collection on Raad’s work “The Atlas Group,” and is cited in the bibliography from that collection. However, \textit{(Vampires)} can be downloaded in its entirety from jalaltoufic.com.
terms of time: when the building’s past and present states are occupying the same space in this way, he thinks of it as being “in motion,” and is trying to discover how one can capture that motion in an image.

This is the dislocation in time and space I have been discussing, and which March 14 and Hizballah both have been trying to address. It evokes a “point of view” where time and space become not only confusing dimensions of their own, but confused with one another: time interferes with space, and the oddness of space is evidence of the dysfunctional nature of time. Hizballah’s solution to this problem was to create highly structured museums with ordered, narrativized chronologies of time and geographies of space, relying heavily on martyrdom commemoration and archival collection to define the content and meaning of those museums. To do so, the group took up the technology of the museum itself as tool and as interface. March 14’s is to create simulacral spaces, whole worlds as exhibitions that sidestep the confusion of space by remaking it completely, and of time by more or less ignoring it. This approach has little in common with Hizballah’s museological technologies: it has none of the same structure, genealogy, or consistency as those techniques. A simulacrum, since it is a mirage unconstrained by a real referent, is by definition whatever it claims to be, and can take on any form. The urgency of martyrdom and the just-lived past is reserved for immediate political happenings, where the future appears as a promise, or even a threat, of resolution. But in its general approach to the problem of disorientation, time, for March 14, becomes a nostalgia for an unreal, perfect past that will be restored in a future utopia where everything is a display to be consumed. The great trick—the sleight of hand—of March 14 is to merge the world-as-exhibition and the real thing by making said world-as-exhibition in the form of a simulacrum. In doing so, the
difference of representation collapses, because in the simulacrum there is no representation at all; only its posture.
Conclusion

After Hariri and others were assassinated, there was a lot of tension in the city. It was expressed overtly in the streets. All the ghettos that had been formed during the 1975-1990 wars were there again, but this time with their immaterial limits intact. You did not need roadblocks or checkpoints, but nonetheless there was a psychological limit that manifested itself overtly again.266

The object of this paper from the beginning has been to read Hizballah’s and March 14’s projects of place-making onto one another. We have seen already how they share certain modes of engaging with time. They also share engagement with place, in that each seeks to both make sense of the landscape for itself and its audience, and to make the landscape its own by almost literally “staking claims” in the sense of pioneering. Hizballah has positioned itself as an organic outgrowth of Lebanon, and in particular southern Lebanon. In doing so, it has also created its own geography, a network of sites that denote and belong to it; a world not only imagined but made, which tourists and adherents can visit for a time. By the same token, the intensively urban and public character of March 14’s place-making has contributed to its ability to create the Beirut Rafiq Hariri imagined, and to impose it on others. The fabric of urban space becomes the surface of March 14’s exhibition and the material of its simulacrum.

Having established these understandings of the two projects, it is worth stepping back to remember how they are connected. Certainly they are both deeply concerned with the topoi of time and space; but ultimately they are both what Sennett called “an approach to difference after violence.” As Sennett showed, space is one of the materials on which violence leaves its mark, not only materially in the form of damage, but socially, culturally, in how space responds after the violence stops. Culture is a notoriously amorphous subject, but it is frequently construed as a

266 Walid Raad, from my interview. Note that this quotation has been edited: my agreement with Raad was that I could record the interview so long as I represented his words through paraphrase, or allowed him to edit and approve any direct quotes. This is, then, a quotation chosen by me but edited and amended by him; I assure the reader that the meaning and content of the quotation is intact from its raw form.
form of “politics by other means” that, given that politics is known in an aphorism as “war by other means,” informs us that culture wars are aptly named. They are conflicts whose ramifications extend from the street corner to the museum, and from the monument to the protest; they shape and are shaped by explicitly political and certainly violent conflicts. This is why all the sites under discussion, even March 14’s shopping mall innocuously named “Beirut Souks,” are cultural sites, though Hizballah’s fall more comfortably under the common, casual usage of the word “culture.” It is also the reason why we find Lebanon’s two most powerful political organizations so heavily invested in the cultural sphere, when the political return on these investments is uncertain and seemingly indirect. Althusser defined ideology as “the representation of the subject’s Imaginary relationship to his or her Real conditions of existence.” Culture, of course, is also an ideology (in terms of how we decide what culture is—what is included in the cultural category—and what culture means once we have identified it) and a field for ideology (in terms of how we struggle over what we want this culture to be like). And what is quite clear from the foregoing investigation is that these projects of place-making and of reorientation are also struggles to define and represent the relations between subjects and material conditions: how the real can be imagined and thus understood. We can therefore conclude that these cultural projects are also ideological and also political, and that indeed what is commonly designated as political for Hizballah and March 14—electoral politics, rhetoric, media and propaganda, alliances, etc.—requires a cultural framework to buttress it. Culture is where their political agenda can be articulated not only with explicitly political realities such as the struggles between Eastern- and Western-facing identities, or geopolitically

between Saudi Arabia and Iran, that have played out through Lebanon for decades now, but also with the basic conditions of experience in Lebanon as those struggles take their toll.

This view of culture, as both a politics in itself and a way of representing the relation between ideational existence (politics) and experienced existence (life—time, space, orientation), places the notion of an approach to difference after violence front and center. It is crucial to recognize these two cultural-political projects as approaches to difference after violence if we wish to understand them, and indeed if all the foregoing analysis is to mean much at all. If they are only responses to disorientation produced by war, somehow separate from the war itself, its trauma, violence, and lasting effect on the society, they are intriguing curiosities. But if we understand that this need for reorientation is intrinsically connected to the violence that produced it, and that reorienting is a matter not only of recovering time and space as legible dimensions of life but also of working out how to live with, and after, that violence, then the two projects become much more. They become not only symptoms of Lebanon’s past but also indications about its potential future. These projects tell us something about how the two groups are dealing with difference not during but after the war, in terms far more elaborate and perhaps more constitutive than those of political rhetoric. It is one thing for groups to clash over competing interests, or even to promote mutual dislike and mistrust. It is quite another for groups to build entire understandings of history, memory, and loss, deeply entwined with topoi so fundamental to life as time and space, that manage to omit one another altogether.

My contention that the place-making projects under discussion here are approaches to difference after violence proceeds from the way I have theorized them both. In trying to discover how to talk about the two comparatively and productively (rather than separately), I realized that both used heterotopia—other space, space of difference—to make sense of space and to orient
within it. That is, only a space of difference can be used to remake understandings of normal space; like getting under the hood of a car to make it run. In each of the two cases, what sort of heterotopia could be created for this purpose was conditioned by available forms of self-understanding and narrative—hence the importance of martyrdom in both cases, the references to existing representational forms like pilgrimage commodities and the iconography of Muslim-Christian solidarity, and the adaptation of forms like the museum and strategies of urban development. In other words, heterotopia was the necessary means of access to reorientation in space, and the nature of each group’s heterotopias was determined by what it had to work with regarding orientation in time. But if both groups are creating spaces of difference to deal with the aftereffects of violence, then their projects of place-making can be nothing but approaches to difference after violence. Time and space are both the objects of the process of reorientation, and they are also its raw material; paradoxically, there is no way to remake, re-engage with, or even reproduce them without manipulating them. One finds time and space by using time and space. The same is true of difference. One cannot employ difference, in the creation of spaces of difference, without also confronting or even producing it.

This assertion regarding difference is borne out on two levels. First is the difference that heterotopias contain, rather than create. This first is the difference, in both cases, of representation, the difference between signs and things. In the museum’s case, this is a straightforward relation of symbology: the sign stands for the thing, but it never claims to totalize it or reproduce it; it is a small part representing the whole idea (of an art movement, a culture, a time period, a person). For Hizballah, the political and polemic nature of their museums means that this difference takes on a particular form: it is the difference between the world as it is (a political reality) and the world as it ought to be (a political goal). Many of the acts of
representation in Hizballah’s museums rely on the difference between martyrs’ having been lost and their sacrifice not being made in vain; between the partial victory against Israel in Lebanon and the desired greater victory against it in Palestine; between occupation and liberation. Of course all of these are ideas in themselves, which are represented in the museums. But at the same time, these representations—no matter the idea represented—are always reminders of an unfinished project. They represent both victory and continuing struggle simultaneously. Thus the gap between signs and things, which is always vibrating between the inherent unity of the sign and thing, and the necessary separation of them for signs to function at all, maps onto the gap between the status quo and the desired triumph: the two are part of one whole, yet neither can exist without being held apart from the other. (One avenue for possible future research is to determine whether this isomorphism between the difference of representation and a political goal exists in other museums with polemic character. I might venture tentatively as an example that Yad Vashem, the Israeli Holocaust museum, produces a similar effect with the difference between what did happen during the Holocaust, and what should have happened during the Holocaust, with the latter positioned as the desired future.) In the case of the world-as-exhibition, the difference of representation is a trickier matter. The difference between the representation and the thing itself remains, but the representation is no longer a symbol; it is a reproduction, as total and realistic as possible, of the real thing. As the viewer takes the pictorial, representative logic of the world-as-exhibition out into the “real” world with him, that difference becomes located in the distance, and the difference, between him and that real world: the distance inherent in a “point of view.” In March 14’s case, the world-as-exhibition places great emphasis on a correctly desirable future city as a representation of what Lebanon should become and, it is implied, really is. The culturalist logic of campaigns like “I Love Life” indeed identifies the
individual mind, the “point of view,” as the key site for this operation: the way forward to a healthy, neoliberal, cosmopolitan, and productive future lies through the individual mind, which must be dedicated to the values of entrepreneurship, volunteerism, and consumption.\footnote{A similar appeal to the “point of view” appears in the way Beirut’s major retail malls, all built since 2003, advertise themselves. I was not able to determine what links, if any, these enterprises have with March 14, but the spirit and values the malls promote seems to be perfectly in line with March 14’s project, and doubtless Hariri would have welcomed them. As Larkin points out, these campaigns are aimed at “a youthful generation in search of identity and meaning, echoing the mantra of consumer self-realization, ‘I buy therefore I am.’” Larkin, “Remaking Beirut,” 428-429.}

We can see, then, that both forms of heterotopia are “spaces of difference” in a very real sense: difference is the material by which they function, because both are founded on representation. This is the difference that they contain and thus necessarily confront. The difference that they create, however, is the difference between themselves—as “other space”—and the rest of the world, or normal space. This difference requires content to operate. Other space cannot be different on a tautological basis of simply being different. This content need not be so determined by the particular form of heterotopia: the form dictates how representation operates and so how difference occurs within it. Here, at the border of the heterotopia, the specifics of cultural context and history are what determines the content of its difference with normal space. For Hizballah, then, its museums are different from normal space because they are a home of Resistance and all that it entails. The sites ask their visitors not only to remember the Occupation and its costs but also to mobilize that memory for the future; they are records of struggle and its progenitors. They go further than other kinds of Hizballah-affiliated spaces (e.g., al-dahiye with its posters of martyrs and culture of piety\footnote{See Deeb, \textit{An Enchanted Modern}.}) because they are official homes of memory and of pedagogy. For March 14, meanwhile, heterotopia is different from other space because it is appropriated. What is ostensibly public space becomes proprietary; it is not only a place for March 14 to represent itself but in large part what actually defines March 14. The
slippage inherent in simulacra between the representation and the real—because the representation is the real, or all the real that can be found—means that representations of Hariri (his memorials) and his actual legacy (the entire district) are one and the same thing. The neoliberal agenda March 14 represents is actually instantiated in the very material of the space; March 14 can be described both by its policies and by the aesthetics of the space it has appropriated (i.e., “modern,” “cosmopolitan,” “global,” connected to the West and the Gulf). In its appropriation of the space, March 14 has made it different from all other space, which by contrast is constructed as haphazard, lacking in infrastructure and planning, parochial. In both cases what makes the heterotopia different from the rest of space is also what makes its progenitor different from other Lebanese actors: its politics and its identity.

Sennett observed that cities’ approach to difference after violence did not actually integrate previously warring groups into an inclusive spatial society, but reified their separation. Groups that have been hostile in their difference remain, in the thinking that creates this reification, forever potentially hostile to each other due to that difference, and so forever different. The spatial separation that holds them apart for fear of resumed hostility therefore becomes a spatial and cultural continuation of violence (war by other means once more). Though this phenomenon can be found in many postwar cities including Paris and Berlin, it has taken hold in Lebanon to an unusually well-organized degree due to the sectarian political system and the particular nature of the Lebanese Civil War. The sectarian system encourages division in even the most public, potentially integrative aspects of life. The war produced countless sectarian organizations that not only handled both military and political activities themselves, but also produced their own forms of media, their own iconographies, and of course—as discussed in the introduction—their own territories. The mistrust and fragmentation promoted by the war and the
disjointed character of Lebanon’s political system mean that this condition of disorientation has not been addressed by a public, inclusive effort toward reintegration and re-orientation. Instead, the various factions have deepened their homogenous grips on their respective towns, quarters, and populations; individuals’ reliance on their communities in the absence of the state allowed them to survive the fragmentation brought by the war, but prevents them from ending it.

This state of affairs means that while some groups have more resources than others to build, serve, and politically motivate their constituencies, and March 14 and Hizballah are the two best endowed, no one group has the power to overcome this spatial, cultural, and social reification of violence. Difference is the organizing principle for all of them, because it is what created them and what allows them to maintain their power. So even Hizballah and March 14, whose resources allow them to have an approach to difference after violence far more so than others (place-making is costly work), do not attempt a reorientation that would also reintegrate either Beirut or Lebanon as a whole. Each creates a Lebanese landscape and a Lebanese history that is holistic, encompassing, satisfying—if one already accepts the group’s perspective. A fervent supporter of the Future Movement would likely take issue with Hizballah’s presentation of its martyrs as not only martyrs of Lebanon but Lebanon’s only martyrs, for example.

In general, then, these approaches to difference after violence are just as Sennett predicts: they entrench difference and operate within its bounds rather than crossing it. The one exception to this pattern is March 14’s Muslim-Christian cooperation. While Hizballah also has Christian partners in its March 8 alliance, they are nowhere to be found in Hizballah’s place-making; the two groups have a political alliance without a cultural undercarriage. (Recall how the Christian fighters of the LCP have been erased from Hizballah’s telling of the Resistance.) March 14 is a different matter. As we saw in Chapter 2, the commemoration of Hariri has drawn on what was
once Lebanon’s dominant discourse of commemoration: solidarity between Sunni Muslims and Christians that does not dissolve religious difference but recognizes each religious identity as valid, and posits Lebanese essence as a quality emerging from that solidarity across difference. The Sunni partners certainly have pride of place in this repurposing of said discourse, but their Christian partners are represented in it and have made active use of it. Here is another example, then, of culture as politics. The old political order of Muslim-Christian elite domination has become, after the major shift of 2005, a community with less national scope ranged against Shi‘i Hizballah and its allies. The singularity of Hizballah’s community-as-represented, compared with the duality of March 14’s, testifies directly to Lebanon’s political history in the 20th century: a Sunni-Christian order that was pushed to one side by rising Shi‘i power. Thus, culture bears the traces of politics, and helps that politics to become natural: for March 14, the difference between Sunni and Shi‘i is more significant than the difference between Sunni and Christian. This is part of what “an approach to difference after violence” means: not the shying away from all lines of difference, but implicit choices about what differences matter.

Understanding what Hizballah and March 14 have created as approaches to difference after violence has extensive implications, for Lebanon and for students of many subjects. March 14 and March 8 represent, among other things, the interests of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Lebanon: both place-making projects have been made possible partly by funds provided by the two patron states. Hence we can see that while both projects represent clear political speech on the part of each movement, creating their own visions of Lebanon’s future and of how its history should be told—and silenced—it also represents the interests of their patrons. Iran is invested in Resistance tourism because it is invested in Resistance more generally—Resistance to Israel, to American hegemony, and to the narratives and histories promoted by those opponents. Saudi Arabia has
been, until recently, invested in Beirut as an “Ancient City for the Future” because it is invested in the larger flows of capital that make such a city thinkable, and because such a city is a bulwark against the influence of Iran. The two projects can be understood—even before Iran and Saudi Arabia began confronting each other more directly across the Middle East in early 2016—as another form of war by other means, a politics of place-making that helps accrue influence not only to March 14 and March 8 but to their benefactors. The events of 2015 and 2016 have witnessed two major developments: the rise of the #YouStink movement, with its rejection of all political elites rather than the usual contestations between them; and Saudi Arabia’s sudden move to further isolate Hizballah, which has involved punishing Lebanon as a whole for its harboring of the group by withdrawing billions of dollars in promised aid and a series of diplomatic moves designed to pressure Lebanon’s politicians to distance themselves from the group.  The Future Movement, and by extension March 14, will be suffering from these losses, much as Hizballah has found its resources stretched by its involvement in the Syrian Civil War. The future of both place-making projects may well be affected a great deal by how these events play out. In this sense they are a kind of barometer for this war by other means: they tell us something about what the proxy powers still at work in Lebanon are willing and able to do, because they proceed from what these powers are willing and able to invest.

On a smaller scale, they tell us a great deal about how both Hizballah and March 14 see themselves, their constituents, and their country. Hizballah’s technique of place-making is, on the whole, quite modern. Museums and archives are the tools of nation-states and empires of old. They are one of the means by which states have typically created and disciplined their subjects. March 14’s techniques, on the other hand, are neoliberal and postmodern. Commercial

enterprise, simulacra, cities as surface attractions rather than as spontaneous, lived-in neighborhoods—these are the tools of the contemporary empire, which is one of brands and images with tacit exclusions and divisions. The two choices of technique demonstrate very different approaches to building and exercising power. They also suggest quite different visions of what Lebanon’s future should and will look like. This contrast—the modern against the postmodern—is one that can be applied to other areas of both groups’ political activities, and which, I believe, will yield useful insights into not only what each of them does, but in what way.

Finally, on a broader conceptual level, this study illustrates the complex interactions of difference, history, memory, space, time, and representation. As with time and space, difference is a pervasive dimension of life, and particularly so after conflict. Negotiating difference is one of the underlying problems common to a vast array of fields of social inquiry. What I hope to have shown with this study is that understanding a society’s or a subculture’s approach to difference lies not only in the practices that are explicitly marked out as signifying difference, but in the differences that are elided; not only in reference to difference but in how difference, even when not explicitly discussed, becomes relevant to even those aspects of life so basic that one might assume them to be shared. Time and space are not only experiential dimensions, or topoi: they are also the material with which difference is given content, form, and aesthetic. An attempt to reorient after dislocation is also an attempt to come to terms with difference in all its fearful reality, however recent, constructed, or arbitrary that reality may be. It is in this way that the two projects I have been examining in this paper serve as powerful examples of how culture, politics, and ideology are intertwined, just as are acts of representation with space and time, and with difference. It is no exaggeration to consider the two “worlds” created here truly as worlds, whole experiences with their own geographies, histories, values, and logics.
To try to recover from the kind of dislocation a war such as Lebanon’s creates is by no means a simple task. It is not simply a matter of narrating history, or of (re-)building buildings. It is nothing less than the challenge of not only building, but *apprehending* the world anew. To do so requires not only a resumption of normal life with its temporal rhythms, or filling in bullet holes, but an ambitious project of relearning how to understand time and space, how to read them and exist in them, alongside the jarring and traumatic reality of differences that have proven to be potentially violent. Examining post-conflict efforts at reconstruction and reconciliation with this understanding can, I hope, offer new insights in many cases. How do groups in different societies and contexts go about reorienting themselves in time and space? How do they choose which differences are reconcilable, and which must remain hard lines of division? How do they put past, present, and future, here, there, and everywhere back into some semblance of order? In Lebanon, they created entire new worlds—heterotopias—and new structures of time—archives and simulacra—and used representation and martyrdom to make coherent worldviews from these laboratories, then set them free. Like the world as exhibition, these worldviews are not limited to the surfaces on which they are mounted or the soil in which they are planted: they are meant to be carried with the viewer out into the “real” world, and forward into the future.
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