PREDICTING THE LIKELIHOOD OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

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By

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ABSTRACT

Genocide is a crime against international law that destroys groups of people and destabilizes societies. Although most world leaders admonish acts of mass violence, others choose to ignore the indicators that genocide may occur. I conducted a formal statistical analysis of environmental situational factors that may be present in a country, and whether or not there is a link to the eventual occurrence of genocide. Specifically, I tested my hypothesis that there is a relationship between regime type and the likelihood of genocide. I predicted that countries with democratic regimes would be less likely to experience genocide, and countries with autocratic regimes would be more likely to experience genocide. Using world data on religious oppression, civil war, years since last war, regime type, and census information, my hypothesis was convincingly supported. Countries with democratic regimes are in fact less likely to experience genocide, and countries with autocratic regimes are more likely to experience genocide; however, the effect of an autocratic regime on the likelihood was of smaller magnitude than I had anticipated. I found additionally that most religious oppression variables predicted a significant relationship with the likelihood of genocide occurrence. If a country observes an official religion, it is less likely to experience genocide; if a country places official legal restrictions on religion, it is more likely to experience genocide. If a country forces
observance of religious laws of another group on some of its people, that country is significantly more likely to experience genocide; if a country conducts state-sponsored surveillance on minority religious activities, it is less likely to experience genocide. Additionally, if a country’s GDP per capita increases, it is more likely to experience genocide.
The writing of this thesis is dedicated to my family – notably my husband Mike, my son Porter, my mom Sue and my dad Rick – and friends who have supported me along the way. Additionally, I’d like to thank my thesis advisor Andrew Wise; his patience, intelligence, and guidance were unmatched. I owe the inspiration for this thesis topic to a visit to Srebrenica, Bosnia and Herzegovina, where a woman whose husband and brother were murdered welcomed me into her home for dinner. She told me about the days leading up to the massacre, and begged me to take the story back to America for all to hear. In a way, I now have.

Many thanks,
Sarah
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I. Introduction

In this thesis, I study the environmental situations that devolve into mass killings of populations, specifically genocidal violence. My hypothesis is that there is a clear relationship between the political, ethnic, religious, and economic landscape of a given country or territory, and the eventual occurrence of genocide. Specifically, I predict that there will be a relationship between regime type and the likelihood of genocide. I predict that countries with democratic regimes will be less likely to experience genocide, and countries with autocratic regimes will be more likely to experience genocide. I study this using data on religious oppression and imbalance, economic inequality, civil war, prior genocidal violence, and political regime type. Using the data available to me, I analyze the probability that genocide will occur, given the presence of aforementioned situational factors, which constitute my variables. This study will work to define potential threats to groups of humans, and ultimately forecast the future likelihood of genocidal violence.

It is important to recognize that major episodes of political violence are occurring consistently over time, and that if a newly formed central governing body has too little authority to effectively maintain stability and protection of a nation’s borders and population, a nation is susceptible to civil war or hostile takeovers. Historically, political instability also leads to mass killings, or genocide. Global policymakers should be concerned with potential human rights disasters for ethical reasons, but also for financial motivations. In reference to U.S. large-scale political involvement, the United States
spends $30 billion a year on foreign aid\(^1\), yet American security interests are continually threatened.

The paper proceeds as follows: Section II will explore the background of the issue, and will cite the discussion of genocide in the literature. Section III will discuss the theoretical framework that applies theories of violence escalation from Section II. In Section IV, I introduce the data and descriptive statistics being used to test this empirical equation. Section V will offer the empirical model and equation estimation that studies the relationship between environmental factors in a given country and the probability of genocidal violence. In Section VI, I offer an analysis of the results that my regression predicts. Finally, Section VII offers both a conclusion to my study, as well as policy recommendations moving forward based upon my conclusions.

\(^1\) Available at www.oecd.org, visited [October 1, 2015].
II. **Background and Literature Review**

In this section, I offer a background to the concept and origination of the term ‘genocide,’ and introduce some literature that has discussed the occurrences of genocide throughout history. The discussions involve attempts to identify markers for and causes of mass killings, similar to the motivations for my research.

A. Background: Genocide is Not New to This World; Only Its Definition

Throughout history, there have been well-documented wars, conflicts, and territorial disputes that have resulted in large numbers of human casualties. When discussed today, the term ‘genocide’ evokes emotions associated with the grim reality that humans can be destructive and seemingly unstoppable when presented with the opportunity to seize power, land, or money. The act of genocide is nothing new, but the term itself was coined in fairly recent history. In his 1943 book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, Raphael Lemkin introduced the concept of genocide, as well as the word itself. He writes, “By "genocide" we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. This new word, coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modern development, is made from the ancient Greek word *genos* (race, tribe) and the Latin *cide* (killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homocide, infanticide, etc. Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves” (Lemkin 1943). The definition that Lemkin provides is how I have
come to understand genocide – the destruction of a people, not necessarily the
elimination of a territory or country. I think of genocide as a commitment of mass
murder against an identified group of people, instead of the eradication of a country.

Genocide may also be defined as “the promotion, execution, and/or implied
consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil
war, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a
communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.”

The 1948 United Nations Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide “confirms that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war, is a crime under international law which
parties to the Convention undertake ‘to prevent and to punish’ (article 1). The primary
responsibility to prevent and stop genocide lies with the State in which this crime takes
place.”

The actual number of historical genocides is hard to delineate, as there is no one
universally accepted definition or threshold that the term embodies. There are, however,
groups of international policymakers that are willing to coalesce on the topic. “At the
2005 World Summit, Heads of State and Government unanimously affirmed that “each
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” They agreed that, when
appropriate, the international community should assist States in exercising that
responsibility by building their protection capacities before crises and conflicts break out.
However, when a state is “manifestly failing” to protect its population from the four
specified crimes, the Heads of State and Government confirmed that the international

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2 Harff, Genocidewatch.org, visited [October 1, 2015].
community was prepared to take collective action, through the Security Council and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{4}

Rifts between regions or political groups can be divisive and threatening to unity, but societies can learn from past atrocities. The world is forever impacted by instances of religious and ethnically driven mass slayings of populations. The Holocaust, for example, catalyzed important changes to large-scale philosophy on prevention and prohibition of mass murder. According to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the continuing impact of the Holocaust includes the following:

- Criminal trials established that the government officials who commit crimes against humanity could be held accountable by international tribunals
- International protection of human rights was expanded
- The idea of “informed consent” influences ethical approaches to medical experimentation on human beings
- Broadened protections for refugees

B. Literature Addresses Genocide at Length

Professor William Schabas addressed the codification of genocide as an international crime in \textit{Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes} (2000). Schabas points out that genocide is really no different than the crime of homicide, in the eyes of the law, although it has been infamously difficult to bring perpetrators to justice in instances of genocide, because the perpetrators are usually those in power. Thus, Schabas infers, the legal systems are ‘on their side.’ The international protection of human rights is a relatively new concept in the history of the world, and it requires that civilized peoples

\footnote{\textsuperscript{4} Available at www.un.org, visited [October 1, 2015].}
adopt the concept of basic human protections and rights. The idea has been present for some time, however. Schabas discusses the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman Government in the early twentieth century, and illustrates that France, Great Britain, and Russia did condemn those responsible. Recognizing parity of rights can be difficult in a world that contains cultures that may not recognize peoples’ ethnicities, beliefs, religions, and so forth, as equal.

South African sociologist Leo Kuper presented a reasonable theory regarding one of the origins of genocide in his book *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (1981), which is that colonialism is a root cause for massacre. Kuper was careful to qualify individual colonialism situations based upon their unique characteristics (i.e. not all colonial invasions led to genocide), but offered that typically, land and economic grabs may result in ridding a territory of its previous inhabitants and cultures. This is believable, as existing nations of people would naturally be reluctant to relinquish their land and markets; and invading powers that have the ‘upper hand’ in terms of weaponry and armies may be inclined to seize others’ assets. Ultimately, conflict would turn violent as both sides are fighting for survival of their communities within the invaded or colonized land.

Robert Melson looks at the link between revolution and war, and eventual genocide in *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*. This sort of publication is significant to my research, because the author is attempting to authenticate clear connections between the variable of conflict and the occurrence of genocide. Melson theorizes that “genocide often is the end result of a complex process that starts when revolutionaries smash an old regime and, in its wake, try to construct a
society that is pure according to ideological standards” (Melson 1992). Certainly this is the accepted philosophy of Hitler, who orchestrated arguably the worst (and best known) genocide in history.

Donna L. Horowitz attempts to draw connections between ethnicity and genocide, specifically conflict between ethnic groups, in *The Deadly Ethnic Riot* (2001). This work is important for my research, as it helps to validate ethnic conflict as a credible variable that may lead to acts of genocide. Horowitz specifically discusses civilian ethnic groups fighting other civilian ethnic groups, which debunks some theories that those in power almost always commit genocides. Additionally, the author points out that these types of conflicts often occur when there is political uncertainty, which could be at least partially attributed to regime type or change (also a variable I measure).

In his book *Death Squad: The Anthology of State Terror* (2000), Jeffrey A. Sluka focuses less on civilian conflicts and more on state-led violence. This work is potentially important for my research, as I examine whether regime type has an impact on the occurrence of genocide. If in fact there is a connection between state terror and attempts to eliminate populations (as the author implies), my regression should also illustrate the association.

Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn take a look at the history of genocides, and then explore how the theory has evolved into an accepted international condemnation in their book, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (1990). This work does discuss the Native Americans in different territories, and the massacre of their populations for land grabs. Because the qualification of ‘what is genocide’ is not universally agreed upon, often times the slaughter of native populations is left out of the
genocide conversations. Interestingly, the authors use the phrase ‘collective denial,’ which I believe has been practiced by aggressors throughout history. Those who exploit others are rarely willing to admit to the atrocities their people have committed.

In another analysis of the history of genocidal acts, Dinah Shelton wrote a research paper entitled “Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity” in 2005. Shelton says “it is estimated that more than 250 armed conflicts have occurred since World War II, with casualties numbering upwards of 170 million people” (Shelton 2005). This work not only documents what the author considers to be a history of genocides, but also crimes against humanity in general, such as rape, torture, kidnapping, etc. It may be argued that all genocides are a crime against humanity, but not all crimes against humanity qualify as genocide or even murders of groups of people.

In *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, Jonathan Glover looks at the similarities in psychology that lead to brutality. Glover also offers that the last century has been the most brutal in all of history, one reason being that advancing technology allows for higher numbers of human casualties with less effort expended. It may be perceived that Glover’s work seems a bit theoretical and less grounded in reality. He makes a point that many may agree with: “keeping the past alive may help to prevent atrocities” (Glover 1999).

In *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide* (2013), Jacques Semelin advocates for genocide to have its own place in the social sciences. He suggests that genocide is the result of people or groups that suffer from a ‘delusional reality’ and eventually are ingrained with the motivation to purify their surroundings by eliminating those they deem to be the enemy. It may be true that authoritarian regimes have
exclusive control, and if a certain type of person is in the lead role, they are capable of rationalizing mass violence against a group of people and organizing the mass violence.

Another analysis on the psychology of brutality comes from Ervin Staub in his work *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Staub suggests that group aggression can be the result of “cultural and social patterns predisposing to violence, historical circumstances resulting in persistent life problems, and needs and modes of adaptation arising from the interaction of these influences” (Staub 1989). Staub also offers a welcome reprieve from the discussion of human assaults when he highlights that there are also caring people in this world that are willing to help and breed other caring people who are less likely to commit group aggression.

On the topic of helpful civilians and groups, in *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Nicholas J. Wheeler (2000) predicts that with growing collective agreement that crimes against humanity are unacceptable, humanitarian intervention will become more commonplace, thus preventing escalations of mass violence. He points out a problem with the system as it currently stands, in that humanitarian military intervention must get the ‘go ahead’ from the United Nations Security Council, and this can take too long.

Unquestionably relating to the motivation for my research, John G. Heidenrich’s work *How to Prevent Genocide: A Guide for Policymakers, Scholars, and the Concerned Citizen* (2001) touches on the literal actions necessary in order to prevent escalation into genocidal violence. Specifically, Heidenrich proposes that military intervention is a necessity, even noting that there should always be a United Nations standing force. I appreciate the suggested strategies to prevent escalation and recognize a
potential source of motivation, as his job experience includes time with the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency.

To summarize, my contribution to the literature will offer a quantitative analysis of the relationship between environmental situational factors for a given country, and the probability of the eventual occurrence of genocide. Ultimately, I seek to show that by preventing the escalation of certain types of oppression or conflicts in a territory, global policymakers may avert episodes of mass violence and near-eradication of populations. The literature does a respectable job of addressing legal, military, and humanitarian intervention once genocidal violence has begun, but my goal is to emphasize prevention of violence intensification before it reaches the level of genocide. My aim is that my regression model will indicate whether there are clear markers for eventual genocidal violence.
III. Theoretical Framework

In order to determine whether there is a relationship between the political, religious, and economic landscape of a country and the eventual occurrence of genocide, I use the following theoretical model:

\[ \text{Genocide} = f(\text{Regime Type}, \text{Population Density}, \text{GDP Per Capita Concentration}, \text{Number of Years Since Last War}, \text{Religious Oppression}, \text{Civil Unrest}, \text{Income Inequality}, \mu) \]

This model illustrates that conditions can exist in a country or nation that will make populations vulnerable to mass killings, specifically occurrences of genocide. Literature highlighting the history of mass violence indicates the presence before genocide of at least some of the environmental factors listed above. Testing my regression will indicate the strength of certain situational factors and its contribution to the eventual occurrence of genocide.
IV. Data and Descriptive Statistics

The data form a large dataset including variables associated with markers from past mass killings or genocides. These variables will be used to indicate the likelihood of future genocides based upon attributes occurring simultaneously in a given region. The data form a panel and originally consisted of 12,240 observations, but after a full merge of all sets will include 499 total observations across 58 years (1956 to 2014).

The data come from six sources. The first set of data comes from the PITF (Political Instability Task Force) State Failure Problem Set 1955-2014\(^5\) and offers 281 observations that denote genocide occurred in a given country in a given year. These data are crucial to my research, as they provide valuable data points for my key independent variable. The data are retrieved from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research data page, and the politicide/genocide categories of data are included in their own sets, respectively. The original data were available in .xls format and imported into STATA. If a genocide occurred in a particular country during a given year, I coded the variable as GENOCIDE = 1; for each year and country combination that was missing a genocide indicator, I added an observation where GENOCIDE = 0.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENOCIDE*</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For indicator variables, the mean is replaced with the number of obs. = 1.

\(^5\) Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html, visited [October 29, 2015].
I determine whether or not a country has an autocratic or a democratic regime using the PolityIV Project Regime Characteristics and Transitions data.\textsuperscript{6} Like the PITF State Failure data, these data points were retrieved from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research data page, under the heading of Political Regime Type. I narrowed down the data points to only include whether a country has a regime that is considered autocratic or not or democratic or not during the year of interest. If a country has an autocratic regime during the year of interest, I created and coded the variable AUTOCRACY = 1; if it was not autocratic, I coded the variable AUTOCRACY = 0. Similarly, if a country has a democratic regime during the year of interest, I created and coded the variable DEMOCRACY = 1; if it was not democratic, I coded the variable DEMOCRACY = 0. The original data were available in .xls format and imported into STATA.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Regime Type Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUTOCRACY*</td>
<td>12240</td>
<td>3909</td>
<td>0.466</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY*</td>
<td>12240</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td>0.339</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For indicator variables, the mean is replaced with the number of obs. = 1.

Next I used the Ethnic Power Relations 3.01 set offered at UCLA (epr.ucla.edu). This specific set of data was used to satisfy the variables that measure population size,

\textsuperscript{6} Available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html, visited [October 29, 2015].
GDP per capita, and years since a country’s last war in my regression. The data were pulled from the Ethnic Armed Conflict (EAC) PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflicts Data Set to help identify sources of ethnic and secessionist conflicts. The set was available in STATA format and includes 7,908 observations and 80 variables; please note that not all variables included in the dataset were utilized for my research.

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Country Characteristics Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LPOPL</td>
<td>7811</td>
<td>9.210</td>
<td>1.391</td>
<td>5.605</td>
<td>14.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPCAPL</td>
<td>7777</td>
<td>8.205</td>
<td>53.150</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>3302.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPEACEYEARS</td>
<td>7908</td>
<td>16.365</td>
<td>16.498</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data used to predict the association between religious oppression factors and genocide come from the Religion and State Project, Round 2.7 The data were collected by Bar Ilan University in Israel, which states its “… goal is to create a set of measures that systematically gauge the intersection between government and religion.” This dataset was too large for my version of STATA to import, so it was reduced to include only the religious oppression variables I deemed most important for the study: official religion; official legal restrictions [on religion]; restrictions on formal religious organizations; forced observance of religious laws of another group; and state surveillance of minority religious activities not placed on activities of the majority. Each

of these ordinal variables were converted to indicator variables, whereas the variable = 1 if restrictions or observations or state surveillance is enforced, and the variable = 0 if they are not enforced. The original data were available in .xls format and imported into STATA.

Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Religious Oppression Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICIALREL*</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>0.427</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGRELRESTRICT*</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>1096</td>
<td>0.474</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELORGRESTRICT*</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>719</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOROBSRELLAW*</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATESURVREL*</td>
<td>3211</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>0.390</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For indicator variables, the mean is replaced with the number of obs. = 1.

The next data on Intra-State War are derived from the Correlates of War Project.\(^8\)

The content includes the following overview: “The COW Project introduced COW Wars v4.0, 1816-2007 in 2010. The paper ‘The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars (Version 4 of the Data)’\(^9\) by Meredith Reid Sarkees gives an overview of the COW war typology, the descriptions of the basic variables, coding rules and some of the changes since ‘Resort to Arms.’ In March 2010, the New COW War List was released. On June 30, 2010, the Non-State War Data (v4.0) became available. On October

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\(^8\) Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war, visited [October 30, 2015].

\(^9\) Available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2 Data/WarData_NEW/COW Website - Typology of war.pdf, visited [October 30, 2015].
On March 1, 2011, the Inter-State War Data (v4.0) became available online. Finally, we released the Extra-State War Data (v4.0) on December 8, 2011.” Additionally, the site describes Intra-State War Data as: “The Correlates of War (COW) Project has utilized a classification of wars that is based upon the status of territorial entities, in particular focusing on those that are classified as members of the inter-state system (referred to as “states”). This dataset encompasses wars that predominantly take place within the recognized territory of a state, or intra-state wars.” These data are being used to satisfy my civil war variable for my research, and include 442 observations from 28 variables. They were available in .csv format, and imported into STATA. I created and coded the CIVILWAR variable as an indicator so that if a country is experiencing civil war in that particular year, CIVILWAR = 1; if the country is not engaged in civil war for a particular year, CIVILWAR = 0.

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Civil War Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIVILWAR*</td>
<td>12240</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For indicator variables, the mean is replaced with the number of obs. = 1.

Finally, the income inequality variable is measured using the World Bank’s GINI index. Per the site data description, “Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income (or, in some cases, consumption expenditure) among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz

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curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.” These are mostly government survey data, and include some points through the present (year 2015). The original data were available in .xls format and imported into STATA.

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for GINI_INDEX Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GINI_INDEX</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td>40.027</td>
<td>10.297</td>
<td>16.23</td>
<td>99.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A limitation to finding essential data is the difficulty of finding data points for the specific years I was originally seeking to study (post-Soviet era, 1992 to present). This limitation forced me to reconsider the year I start observing variables, and I decided to begin my study the year that the genocide data started, which was in the year 1956. Another limitation is that it is difficult to determine if some datasets are taken from the same original source, and renamed (armed conflict sets in particular). I had to be careful to record original citations and look for similarities among like variable sources. Finally, I experienced difficulty in finding standardized income inequality datasets; this is something that is cited in many articles online as being a problem for researchers everywhere. After consultation with advisors, I decided to use the World Bank GINI
index as the marker for this variable; however, the data were so incomplete that I ultimately decided to use the GINI_INDEX variable one in one estimation.
V. Empirical Model

\[ \text{GENOCIDE} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{AUTOCRACY} + \beta_2\text{DEMOCRACY} + \beta_3\text{LPOPL} + \beta_4\text{GDPCAPL} + \beta_5\text{NPEACEYEARS} + \beta_6\text{OFFICIALREL} + \beta_7\text{LEGRELRESTRICT} + \beta_8\text{RELORGRESTRICT} + \beta_9\text{FOROBSRELLAW} + \beta_{10}\text{STATESURV} + \beta_{11}\text{CIVILWAR} + \beta_{12}\text{GINI_INDEX} + \mu \]

Where:

GENOCIDE is an indicator variable, where GENOCIDE=1 if genocide occurred, and GENOCIDE=0 otherwise;

AUTOCRACY is an indicator variable, where AUTOCRACY=1 if country has autocratic regime during a given year, and AUTOCRACY=0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship here – if a country has an autocratic regime, I predict its likelihood of genocide will be higher than if a country does not have an autocratic regime, as autocratic rulers have ordered acts of genocide in the past;

DEMOCRACY is an indicator variable, where DEMOCRACY=1 if country has democratic regime during a given year, and DEMOCRACY=0 otherwise. I anticipate a negative relationship here – if a country has a democratic regime, I predict its likelihood of genocide will be less than if a country does not have a democratic regime, as democracies tend to prioritize protecting the interests and safety of its people;

LPOPL gives the average log of the population size of country of interest during a particular year. I anticipate a positive relationship here – the larger the population size, the higher the likelihood of genocide, as there may be larger numbers of conflicting groups of people;

GDPCAPL gives the average log of the GDP per capita of country of interest during a particular year. I anticipate a positive relationship here – the higher the GDP per capita, the higher the likelihood of genocide, as economic livelihood linked to natural resources often coincides with unstable governments and national economic equality;

NPEACEYEARS gives the number of years since a country’s last war. I anticipate a positive relationship here – the longer the number of peaceful, stable years a country enjoys, the less likely there will be a major violent conflict. Conversely, if a country has experienced few to no years without conflict, I believe they are more likely to experience a violent event that leads to mass casualties;
OFFICIALREL is an indicator variable, where OFFICIALREL=1 if country has an official religion during a given year, and OFFICIALREL=0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship here – if a country observes an official religion, I believe there will be a higher likelihood of genocide, as it may be less likely that country is tolerant of other religions and religious conflict may ensue;

LEGRELRESTRICT is an indicator variable, where LEGRELRESTRICT=1 if country has official legal restrictions on religion during a given year, and LEGRELRESTRICT=0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship here – if a country observes official legal restrictions on religion, I believe there will be a higher likelihood of genocide, as it may be less likely that country is tolerant of other religions and religious conflict may ensue;

RELORGRESTRICT is an indicator variable, where RELORGRESTRICT=1 if country has restrictions on formal religious organizations during a given year, and RELORGRESTRICT=0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship here – if a country restricts formal religious organizations, I believe there will be a higher likelihood of genocide, as it may be less likely that country is tolerant of other religions and religious conflict may ensue;

FOROBSRELLAW is an indicator variable, where FOROBSRELLAW=1 if country forces observance of religious laws of party in leadership during a given year, and FOROBSRELLAW=0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship here – if a country forces observance of the religious laws of the party in leadership, I believe there will be a higher likelihood of genocide, as it may be less likely that country is tolerant of other religions and religious conflict may ensue;

STATESURVREL is an indicator variable, where STATESURVREL=1 if country performs state-sponsored surveillance of minority religious activities during a given year, and STATESURVREL=0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship here – if a country performs state-sponsored surveillance of minority religious activities, I believe there will be a higher likelihood of genocide, as it may be less likely that country is tolerant of other religions and religious conflict may ensue;

CIVILWAR is an indicator variable, where CIVILWAR=1 if country is engaged in a civil war during a given year, and CIVILWAR=0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship here – if a country is experiencing civil war, I predict the likelihood of genocide is higher than if they are not engaged in civil war, as conflict is already present and escalation is more likely;

GINI_INDEX shows the World Bank GINI index for a given country. I anticipate that the more income inequality present in a country, the higher the
likelihood of genocide, as conflicts may begin as a result of desperate economic prospects and impoverished living situations;

And $\mu$ is the random error.

Next I present the results of estimating this equation.
VI. Results and Analysis

Using the data and aforementioned theoretical model, I estimated three models of the relationship between the likelihood of the occurrence of genocide and situational factors present in a country. All the models are highly statistically significant as indicated by Wald Chi$^2$ scores, testing the joint significance of all the variables in an equation, which are all significant at above the 99 percent level of confidence. For purposes of results analysis, I discuss the marginal effects estimated coefficients (Table 8). Ultimately, I decided to use the model that includes democracy and autocracy variables because they added significance to the estimate; I did not include the GINI_INDEX variable in my primary model because it created errors and skewed the results. I believe this is because the GINI data only covered approximately 6 percent of my observations; too many missing observations led to inaccurate estimates. I use Model 3, which includes all the variables except GINI_INDEX, as my primary model for estimating the relationship between likelihood of genocide and situational factors. The Pseudo-$R^2$ figure for Model 1 in the marginal effects logistical regression analysis is high; approximately 31 percent of the likelihood of genocide occurrence is explained by my independent variables in this case. Notice that in Model 2, when GINI_INDEX is included, the pseudo-$R^2$ figure drops so that only 18 percent of the likelihood of genocide occurrence is explained by my independent variables. In Model 3, my primary model, 41.8 percent of the likelihood of genocide occurrence is explained by my independent variables; I consider this to have very high explanatory power.
Table 7: Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Likelihood of Genocide Occurrence and Country Characteristics (Original Coefficients Without Marginal Effects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOCRACY</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>--- (omitted by regression)</td>
<td>3.288 (1.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-1.514 (1.403)</td>
<td>-3.273 (0.876)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPEACEYEARS</td>
<td>-0.233 (0.153)</td>
<td>--- (omitted by regression)</td>
<td>-0.220 (0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICIALREL</td>
<td>-0.522 (0.380)</td>
<td>-15.815 (1.436)</td>
<td>-1.244 (0.452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGRELRESTRICT</td>
<td>1.670 (0.392)</td>
<td>16.640 (2.312)</td>
<td>1.864 (0.523)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELORGRESTRICT</td>
<td>-0.231 (0.543)</td>
<td>-17.025 (1.790)</td>
<td>-0.795 (0.665)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOROBSRELLAW</td>
<td>2.536 (0.486)</td>
<td>0.827 (2.013)</td>
<td>2.309 (0.543)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATESURVREL</td>
<td>-3.073 (0.653)</td>
<td>-1.600 (1.163)</td>
<td>-4.341 (0.771)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVILWAR</td>
<td>1.767 (0.461)</td>
<td>--- (omitted by regression)</td>
<td>1.943 (0.506)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPOPL</td>
<td>-0.249 (0.158)</td>
<td>0.183 (0.843)</td>
<td>0.057 (0.237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPCAPL</td>
<td>0.432 (0.150)</td>
<td>0.431 (0.358)</td>
<td>0.804 (0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI_INDEX</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.036 (0.165)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi^2</td>
<td>47.34***</td>
<td>282.49***</td>
<td>54.93***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-R^2</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p ≤0.01, **p ≤0.05, *p ≤0.1
Table 8: Marginal Effects After Logistic Regression of the Relationship between Likelihood of Genocide Occurrence and Country Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
<th>Coefficient (Robust Standard Error)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTOCRACY</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.015*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(omitted by regression)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>-0.049***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPEACEYEARS</td>
<td>-0.004***</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(omitted by regression)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFFICIALREL</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.382**</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEGRELRESTRICT</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.989***</td>
<td>0.029*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELORGRESTRICT</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.814***</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOROBSRELLAW</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATESURVREL</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.045**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVILWAR</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(omitted by regression)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPOPL</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPCAPL</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.010**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI_INDEX</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 499 31 499
Wald Chi^2 47.34*** 282.49*** 54.93***
Pseudo-R^2 0.310 0.184 0.418

***p ≤0.01, **p ≤0.05, *p ≤0.1
Table 8 shows that, as I hypothesized, there is a statistically significant relationship between a country’s regime type and the likelihood of genocide occurrence. Looking at the relationship between being an autocracy or not [AUTOCRACY] and the likelihood of genocide, we see that the sign on this relationship is positive, indicating that an autocratic regime (versus not autocratic) in a country increases the likelihood of genocide by 1.5 percent, holding constant the other variables in the model. This relationship is statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.1$ level. Although the magnitude of this relationship may appear to be small, this may be due to differing types of autocratic regimes throughout history; no two regimes are exactly alike and the exact effect on treatment of a citizenry is uncertain. Looking at the relationship between being a democracy or not [DEMOCRACY] and likelihood of genocide, we see that the sign on this relationship is negative; this I expected. This indicates that a democratic regime (versus not democratic) in a country decreases the likelihood of genocide by 4.9 percent, holding constant the other variables in the model; and this relationship is nearly statistically significant at conventional levels, as $p>|z| = 0.112$. I actually predicted that the magnitude of this relationship would be equal to or smaller than the relationship between autocratic regime and genocide, and I was incorrect. It does make sense that a democratic regime should be less likely than a non-democratic regime to have genocide; however, I assumed the likelihood of genocide in an autocratic regime would be higher than my estimates produced.

The NPEACEYEARS variable, analyzing the relationship between years since a country’s last war and the occurrence of genocide, produced statistically significant results at the $p \leq 0.01$ level. This time control estimate indicates that for every one-year
increase in the years since a country’s last war, the likelihood of genocide decreases by
0.2 percent, holding constant the other variables in the model. This highly significant, yet
seemingly small magnitude effect may be most useful when looking at many years since
the last war; for instance, if a country has not been to war in 20 years, the likelihood of
genocide decreases by 4 percent, which boasts a more powerful magnitude than its
fractional baseline estimate.

Regarding religious oppression variables, I predicted statistically significant
relationships between the OFFICIALREL, LEGRELRESTRICT, FOROBSRELLAW,
and STATESURVREL variables and likelihood of genocide. There was only one
religious oppression variable, RELORGRESTRICT, that did not produce statistically
significant results. The relationship between the likelihood of genocide and there being
an official religion in a country [OFFICIALREL] is statistically significant at the p ≤0.1
level. If there is an official religion (as opposed to no official religion) in a country, the
likelihood of genocide decreases by 1.4 percent, holding constant the other variables in
the model. This relationship and small magnitude may be explained by venturing that in
countries with an observed official religion, perhaps there are fewer minority religious
groups that clash with one another and incite conflict. Perhaps data are hard to find on
this relationship, as law observes not all majority religions. The estimate produced by
analyzing the relationship between official legal restrictions on religion in a country
[LEGRELRESTRICT] and the likelihood of genocide is statistically significant at the p
≤0.1 level. The model predicts that if there are official legal restrictions on religion in a
country, the likelihood of genocide increases by 2.9 percent, holding constant the other
variables in the model. A likely explanation of this relationship may be that restrictions
on a particular religion may lead to the members of another religion feeling that they are elite and supreme and will allow for the idea that it is rational to eliminate others who don't follow their religious beliefs. Also, those restricted might rebel and genocide on one side or another might result. The relationship between the likelihood of genocide and a country forcing observance of religious laws of another group [FOROBSRELLAW] is statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level. If a country forces observance of religious laws of another group, the likelihood of genocide increases by 6.5 percent, holding constant the other variables in the model. This relationship displays the largest percentage of impact on the likelihood of a genocide occurrence. Perhaps it alludes to a degree of religious domination by the ruling power over less influential populations that observe religions different than that of the governing party. This, in turn, may indicate a tendency to oppress minority populations in other ways; feasibly not excluding violence.

The relationship between state surveillance of minority religious activities [STATESURVREL] and the likelihood of genocide is statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level. If there is state-sponsored surveillance of minority religious activities, the likelihood of genocide decreases by 4.5 percent, holding constant the other variables in the model. Conceivably it is possible that the greater grasp the state has on cultural and religious occurrences in the country, the less likely there will be pockets of extremists able to commit violence at such a magnitude as genocide. The variable in my model controlling for religious oppression that is not statistically significant at conventional levels addresses restrictions on formal religious organizations in a country [RELORGRESTRIC]. One possible explanation for its lack of significance may be that such restrictions may not often be codified; perhaps if restrictions exist, they appear more
so as barriers or challenges to certain religious organizations.

The variable that controls for whether or not a country is in civil war in a specific year [CIVILWAR] did not show statistical significance at conventional levels in this model, however, it was statistically significant at the $p>|z| = 0.124$ level; I consider this to be significant, or at least worth considering. Looking at the relationship between a country being engaged in civil war or not and the likelihood of genocide, we see that the sign on this relationship is positive, indicating that the occurrence of civil war (versus not civil war) in a country increases the likelihood of genocide by 6 percent, holding constant the other variables in the model. The magnitude and sign of this result indicate that serious internal conflict, such as civil war, may in fact lead to greater conflict, such as genocide.

The variable that controls for population in the model [LPOPL] is not statistically significant at conventional levels, and indicates no relationship between population and the likelihood of genocide. This lack of relationship indicator may be due to data issues in gathering population numbers, as many countries do not conduct regular census evaluations.

Finally, the variable controlling for GDP per capita [GDPCAPL] in relationship to the likelihood of genocide shows positive, statistically significant results at the $p \leq 0.05$ level. The model estimates that for every one percent increase in GDP per capita for a country, the likelihood of genocide increases by 1 percent, holding constant the other variables in the model. Although this may appear at first to show a small relationship, take a look at compounded numbers: if a country’s GDP per capita significantly
increases in a given year, so does its likelihood of genocide (i.e. a 50 percent increase in a country’s GDP per capita means a 50 percent increase in the likelihood of genocide). This relationship may indicate that extreme shifts in money may lead to chaotic management of it (the rich get richer and thus more powerful), which can also lead to power shifts and corruption. Conditions such as imbalance of the country’s resources and power may enable the eventual manifestation of atrocities such as genocide. The theory of resource curse, or paradox of plenty, is worth mentioning here – often, countries with valuable natural resources tend not to distribute wealth; therefore stifling economic and living conditions ensue.

I now turn to the implications of these results and conclude.
VII. Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between the environmental situational factors for a given country, and the probability of the eventual occurrence of genocide. Ultimately, I sought to show that by being able to identify markers for ensuing violence, societies may intercede and quell dangerous situations before they intensify. My quantitative statistical analysis does in fact show a sound connection between certain societal factors and the likelihood of an eventual genocide. This information is powerful, as we are now equipped with significant indicators of subsequent mass violence; now we may use this information to recommend changes in law and culture that will help prevent future instances of genocide.

I was not surprised to find that, as I had predicted, there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime type and the probability of genocide. I expected that if a country has an autocratic regime, the chances of genocide would be higher than if a country does not have an autocratic regime; I anticipated this relationship because I think of autocratic regimes as having a history of corruption and less responsiveness to the needs and concerns of their people. I was a bit surprised by the magnitude of this relationship, though; the chances of genocide increased by only 1.5 percent for a country that runs under an autocratic regime. I also expected to find a significant relationship between democratic regime [or not] and the probability of genocide; this was the case, as my results show that democratic regimes are 4.9 percent less likely to have genocide than non-democratic regimes. I expect a democracy to be most concerned with the protection and consideration of its people, which in turn would help to decrease the chances of
major violence or oppression. These findings support the Western argument for the creation of liberal democracies in territories with a history of corruption and violence.

It tends to make sense that my study found a relationship between civil war and the probability of genocide, and similarly between the numbers of years since a country’s last war and the probability of genocide. If a country is engaged in a civil war, they are more likely to experience genocide than if they are not engaged in a civil war. Certainly we may assume that conflict of this magnitude may escalate, and also that intra-state wars may be fought between cultural, religious, or political adversaries. It would make sense that these types of groups involved in conflict may want to eliminate the group that they are fighting with. Similarly, I found that the number of years a country is enjoying peace is related to a decrease in the probability of genocide. This seems logical, as the more stable a country is, the less likely it will be that a major episode of violence will erupt. These relationships help the argument that any conflict within a country, no matter how small, may be best extinguished immediately to prevent escalation.

With the multitude of historical references to religious conflict, I expected to find that religious oppression by a country’s leadership on its people would have a significant relationship with the probability of genocidal violence. Religious superiority has been a catalyst for deadly encounters throughout all of human history. Not surprisingly, most of the variables identifying the state’s involvement in religious oppression did show a relationship with an increase in the likelihood of genocide. An analysis that did not follow this trend was that of state surveillance of minority religious activities on the likelihood of genocide; my study shows that the presence of official state surveillance on minority religious activities actually decreases the probability of genocide. Perhaps the
more a state has its ‘finger on the pulse’ of religious activities, the more likely they are to be able to snuff any potential clashes or uprisings. The religious indicator that did not show a significant relationship with predicting the likelihood was whether or not there are restrictions on formal religious organizations. I personally think the data are flawed in this case – if there are restrictions, the global worldview may be that there is unfair religious oppression. Therefore, perhaps restrictions on religious organizations may be practiced ‘off the books’ and data are flawed.

The relationship between GDP per capita and the likelihood of genocide makes sense, because when the GDP increases in a country, we are not sure who is controlling it. Money has proven to be corruptive, and if groups in control of the country’s economic decisions clash with groups that are starving, lacking in basic resources like clean water, shelter, and education, violence has historically ensued.

It is prudent to discuss limitations I encountered during my research. For instance, I believe the GINI index would be useful in examining any links between income inequality and mass violence. If I had this information, perhaps the relationship between increases in a country’s GDP per capita and an increase in the likelihood of genocide would make perfect sense. If we observed great disparities in the control over money in certain countries where GDP has increased, it would make sense that mismanagement of money and resources may lead to violence. Better accuracy in GINI index data would require greater capability or cooperation globally, which is difficult to encourage, or an independent organization that has enough funding to collect census data on income and population around the world. Such an undertaking would be costly and would not necessarily be welcomed by all countries. If this thesis were evolved into a
dissertation, perhaps I would have the opportunity to spend more time trying to independently collect information on income disparity globally, and evaluate if that would make a difference in my statistical analysis.

To conclude, I find that my regression analysis does in fact show that there is a strong relationship between the political, religious, and economic landscape of a country or territory, and the probability of the eventual occurrence of genocide. Moving forward, I offer some policy recommendations that will help to avoid oppression and conflict situations progressing in a given country or territory, which will ultimately help to avoid genocidal violence. Specifically, I refer to the role that global leaders would take in intervening in areas of conflict, and restructuring societies in order to avoid future conflict. I believe this is one way that these nations may protect their own interests from eventual power vacuums created by territories left vulnerable to being overtaken by violent groups or actors. I also believe this is the way that humanitarian interests may be met, protecting vulnerable populations by providing a framework for a stable society.

The recommendations I offer in order to help ensure successful intervention policy include clearly defining objectives before a decision for intervention has been reached. Prior to intervention, it is important to develop a legal framework for reconstructing nations, such as the following:

- Constitutions must ensure (codify) accountability of central government to its inhabitants;
- Constitutions and election laws must be constructed with a security plan – a central military is necessary and must be funded and supplied; and
- Constitutions must be amendable to accommodate changes in society over time.

A governing system that is accountable to its citizens is necessary in order to prevent corruption and too much power concentration. This is important because once
the people lose power, they are susceptible to victimization – a ruling party with access to all the resources (including money and legislative power) can easily terminate dissenting populations. The statistically significant relationship I uncovered between an increase in GDP per capita and an increase in the likelihood of genocide helps to make the connection between corruption measures and resulting violence. Additionally, the military must be accountable to the people; militaries have the capability of overthrowing governing parties and rocking the stability of a nation. A military must be strong enough (and given adequate resources), though, to uphold its responsibility to protect its sovereign nation from outside aggressors. The statistically significant relationship between years since a country’s last war and the likelihood with genocide illustrates that the more peaceful a nation, the less likely a chance of mass violence. A central military may help to prevent conflict and promote stability and peace. Furthermore, a country’s constitution must be written with flexibility to change over time. For example, if religious laws are too strict, it may be within the country’s best interest to loosen religious regulations or surveillance. My study indicates there are significant relationships between state-sponsored religious oppression and the likelihood of genocide. The ability to reverse stifling religious legislation may help to prevent violence. In the end, this may prevent conflict and work to appease most people, most of the time.

By intervening when oppression or conflict is evident in a territory, global leaders may help to prevent the escalation of violence that history has shown to damage defenseless populations of people. This thesis ultimately provides an analysis of contributing factors that may indicate future occurrences of genocide; therefore global
policymakers should be concerned when these factors are present in a country or territory. While the decision to intervene may be delicate, using data as proof of connections between environmental factors and mass violence, world leaders may be able to make informed decisions about aiding or assisting countries at risk.
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