Featuring

Moral Meritocracies
Elitism in Confucian Thought and Its Compatibility with Democracy

Alexander Hamilton, Classical Models and Ideals, and the Deadlocked Presidential Election of 1800

Secularization Theory and Its Recent Opponents

The Political Emergence of Asian Americans

The Model of Non-Religious Governance in Medieval Spain

Republicanism in Theory and Practice

Descendants of the Sons of God from Genesis to David

Plato and Nietzsche on the Truth of Myth and Allegory

The Roles of Women in Roman Comedy

Cultural Mischaracterization in Maria Edgeworth’s Lame Jervis

Fragmented Identities in Feminist Writing

Religious and Educational Insights into the Unified Self

Interview with Professor Catherine M. Keesling

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Dear Reader,

We all believe that education aims at improving us somehow. To be denied one outright is certainly a grave misfortune; yet even for those of us who can claim to have received something of an education in the course of our lives, what exactly we have accomplished in all our years of classes and schoolwork is seldom immediately apparent. In the humanities especially, it is all too easy to doubt whether so ponderous an investment of time and treasure can yield anything of value beyond the academy itself. One is tempted to entertain the thought that academic training is either charming and inconsequential, or arduous and costly. What is it that we are expected to achieve during this process, and why does it matter?

The essays collected in this journal do not directly address that question. Rather, they suggest an answer by means of demonstration. In each written work that comprises this journal, a university student has investigated and analyzed an issue and argued for a conclusion. By doing so, these authors have displayed a curiosity about the world around them and a desire to be not merely acquainted with the appearance of things, but to know things, and to exhibit this more profound understanding through written presentations. Whether these authors have reached some measure of truth is for the reader to decide; that they have labored in earnest towards that goal is beyond question. If education truly aims to improve us, then for my own part, I can think of no greater improvement for a human being than to relinquish idleness of the mind and to be eager for an undertaking of such gravity.

The publication of this journal was made possible by the generous support of Bill Mumma (SFS ’81) and Eric Wind (SFS ’09), and I thank them once again for their contributions to the realization of this issue. Professor Thomas Kerch deserves recognition for setting the vision and objectives for Utraque Unum, as does Billy Muran for his inspired leadership of the Tocqueville Forum Student Fellows this past year. All of the section editors—Micah Musser, Jack Thiemel, Benjamin Brazzel, Amelia Irvine, Annee Lyons, and Jake Dyson—performed their duties admirably, and their enthusiasm and diligence have not gone unappreciated. Mitchell Tu was invaluable as managing editor and source of comic relief. Most importantly of all, I would like to recognize the efforts of not only the authors published in this issue, but of all the students who submitted essays to Utraque Unum this semester. That there was such eagerness from so many individuals to participate in this project is a testament to Georgetown University’s continuing success as an institution of higher education.

Nicholas E. Richards
Editor-in-Chief
The most striking fact about contemporary university students is that there is no longer any canon of books which forms their taste and imagination ... This state of affairs itself reflects the deeper fact of the decay of the common understanding of—and agreement on—first principles that is characteristic of our times.” These words were written nearly thirty years ago by University of Chicago Professor Allan Bloom in his critique of American culture and values, *The Closing of the American Mind*. At the time of its publication Bloom’s critical analysis of American higher education engendered much contentious debate among scholars and the lay public. The writer and political analyst David Reiff labelled Bloom and his book “vengeful, reactionary, and antidemocratic.” On the positive side, New York Times reviewer Roger Kimball concluded that the book was “an unparalleled reflection on the whole question of what it means to be a student in today’s intellectual and moral climate.” The list of quotes, both positive and negative, could go on and on.

As participants in the Tocqueville Forum it should go without saying that we accept Bloom’s advocacy of the Great Books as perhaps the most important component of education in a Liberal Arts University. Those who have dismissed Bloom’s work tend to devalue the importance of possessing an understanding of the canon as not being particularly useful in a world driven by economic considerations. There is also a sense among these critics that education is not about forming the character of students, rather education is for the sake of acquiring a certain set of skills that will translate into a lucrative career.

While Bloom had many sympathetic supporters when *The Closing of the American Mind* was published, the sort of impassioned support that he once received has greatly diminished. We are currently experiencing a rather vigorous assault on the Great Books tradition and the value of a liberal arts education. For example, Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin has recently signed legislation for higher education funding that incentivizes certain technology programs over the humanities. Bevin is on record stating: “There will be more incentives to electrical engineers than French literature majors, there just will. All the people in the world who want to study French literature can do so, they’re just not going to be subsidized by the taxpayers like engineers will be, for example.” There is an irony in the fact that Governor Bevin himself has a degree in the Humanities, a B.A. in East Asian Studies, with a focus on the literature and culture of Japan. Similar assaults on the value of the liberal arts is taking place in other states as well. We need only recall that former presidential candidate, Senator Marco Rubio claimed “Welders make more money than philosophers. We need more welders and less [sic] philosophers.” According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Rubio’s claim is factually untrue.
In light of the attack on the liberal arts, what then is the value of the Great Books for students in the twenty-first century? Well, the ideas and arguments contained in these works provide us with a knowledge of our cultural and intellectual heritage. They are the foundation of our commonly shared cultural traditions. Ultimately, they lead to a knowledge and understanding of ourselves, our origins, and they give us the ability to understand those who come from other traditions. In short, the Great Books and a liberal arts education are the very ground from which our character is developed, and inform who we are and how we interact with others. The thoughts and works of art handed down to us from antiquity should be regarded as our most treasured possessions to which we can repeatedly turn to for insight and guidance in an increasingly complex world.

Additionally, the canon of Great Books lends to the formation of our critical thinking abilities, which is a skill that is fundamentally necessary if we are to critique the world around us, as well as our place in it. Knowledge of the ideas contained in the Great Books empowers us to question what we are told to believe and think by family, friends, politicians, and even teachers. In order for humanity to progress we must be willing to pose the difficult questions about ourselves and the values we hold. This is an arduous and lifelong process that sometimes will reaffirm our views, but at other times will cause us to revalue positions which we once held dear. We are the product of traditions which we cannot and should not ignore, but if through the application of knowledge, understanding, and careful critical analysis we find that some things require revision, then we are equipped with the tools to make any necessary and desirable change. The knowledge and critical thinking skills acquired from the Great Books and a liberal arts education are precisely the tools needed to accomplish this task successfully. The Great Books are invaluable compared to a welder’s torch.

I will conclude with two brief quotes from Allan Bloom, quotes that succinctly express the view that we must continue to adhere to the Great Books and a liberal arts education. “The failure to read good books both enfeebles the vision and strengthens our most fatal tendency—the belief that the here and now is all there is.” “Education is the movement from darkness to light.” Let us make certain that we try to avoid the dark and always strive toward the light.

Thomas M. Kerch
Interim Director, Tocqueville Forum
Confucian thought, with its emphasis on communitarianism, has been at the center of the “Asian values” debate—a challenge mounted by several East Asian leaders and intellectuals in the 1990s against the supposed universality of Western concepts such as democracy and human rights. The late Lee Kuan Yew, the first Prime Minister of Singapore, was one of the key proponents of the “Asian values” thesis. Lee often invoked supposedly Confucian traits such as filial piety, hard work, and respect for authority, to justify Singapore’s economic success without the need for Western liberal democracy. Nevertheless, his espousal of “Asian values” has been criticized as being no more than “a politically motivated desire to bolster and legitimate the authoritarian nature of [Singapore’s] government.”

Today, although the notion of “Asian values” has been largely discredited as a myth, scholars have continued to argue over the compatibility of Confucian thought with liberal democratic principles. That said, any attempt to articulate a synthesis between the two must acknowledge the fact of elitism: it is not only an established feature in the governance structures of many East Asian societies where Confucianism has most relevance, but more importantly, a central feature of the Confucian political vision contained within the canonical Confucian texts. Through an examination of the Analects, as well as the Mencius and Xunzi, I seek to illustrate that the Confucian political vision presented in those texts is elitist but not exploitative. Although the ideal Confucian government is a moral meritocracy in which only the virtuous have the opportunity for political participation, the texts also call for a genuine equality of opportunity, which moderates any exploitative tendencies that may ensue. Furthermore, this conception of a non-exploitative Confucian meritocracy is useful because it offers a way to mitigate the risks of incompetent officials being elected to power in democracies. By examining and refining the existing literature on how the Confucian political vision can be synthesized with democracy, we can also envision the manner in which such non-exploitative Confucian meritocracy may be conceived in practice.

The Rule of the Virtuous

In order to make sense of the political vision presented in the Confucian texts, we have to turn to the idea of virtue, which is the dominant theme in Confucian thought—both at an ethical level from the individual’s perspective, as well as at a political level from the ruler’s perspective. The ethical prescription for individuals is clearly marked out in this quote from Confucius in the Analects: “I set my heart on the Way, base myself on virtue, lean upon benevolence for support and take my recreation in the arts.” Virtue or dé is thus the means by which an individual can align himself with the Way or dao—the ultimate reality that permeates all aspects of the universe.
Although the Way has several “layers of meaning,” Confucianism seems to focus mainly on rén dào, which embodies “the ethical ideal of good human life as a whole” based upon harmonious human interactions. Confucian virtue therefore prioritizes a certain manner of behaviour and action toward others, which is exemplified by the figure of the gentleman or jūn zĭ: “he was respectful in the manner he conducted himself; he was reverent in the service of his lord; in caring for the common people, he was generous and, in employing their services, he was just.” This virtue of the gentleman is termed benevolence or rén, which was construed in the Analects as “the most important moral quality” for an individual. After all, it is only through benevolence that a gentleman can “make a name for himself” and benevolence is a moral quality that he can never give up, “not even for as long as it takes to eat a meal.”

For the Confucians, however, virtue is not merely an individual ethical ideal. It is important politically as well because it is closely linked to good government. In the Analects, Confucius says that an individual who cannot make himself correct has no business participating in government. This view is echoed in the Mencius, which asserts that it is “shameful to take one’s place at the court of a prince without putting the Way into effect.” Similarly, according to the Xunzi, a true king is one who “captures a people by means of virtue” and whose benevolence “towers over the world.” Indeed, as presented in all three texts, for a ruler to be considered good, he needs to be a virtuous individual first. Moreover, according to the Analects, a ruler can only be benevolent if he puts the virtuous qualities of respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness, quickness, and generosity “into practice in the Empire.” The practice of good government and the cultivation of individual virtue on the part of the ruler are therefore mutually constitutive: the ruler’s virtue enables the practice of good government, just as the practice of good government facilitates the ruler’s cultivation of individual virtue.

While all three Confucian texts establish that the ideal ruler needs to be virtuous for his rule to be effective, they all also express a sense of realism with regard to the possibility of everyone becoming virtuous. In other words, practically speaking, not everyone can become virtuous even if they have the innate capacity for virtue. This is suggested in the Analects through this quote from Confucius: “Men are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of repeated practice.” This divergence can account for why Confucius states that “the common people can be made to follow a path but not to understand it.” Perhaps, due to their circumstances, the common people generally “make no effort to study even after having been vexed by difficulties.” Hence, given that benevolence should be accompanied by a love for learning, the fact that the common people are less inclined to study—and by extension, learn—means that they are probably less able to become virtuous. It should therefore not be surprising that moral virtue is said to be “rare among the common people for quite a long time.”

The situation in the Mencius and Xunzi is similar, although these two texts are more explicit about the fact that everyone has the capacity to become virtuous. In the Mencius, the heart of compassion, which is the “germ of benevolence,” is said to be present in everyone. The Xunzi, on the other hand, asserts that “by birth, people are originally petty people.” Nevertheless, it also states that the gentleman and the petty man have the same “endowment, nature, intelligence, and capabilities,” suggesting that anyone can become benevolent if he cultivates himself sufficiently. As in the Analects, however, both the Mencius and Xunzi have doubts regarding the possibility of everyone becoming virtuous in practice, with the former almost echoing Confucius: “the multitude can be said never to understand what they practise, to notice what they repeatedly do, or to be aware of the path they follow all their lives.” The Xunzi frames it most succinctly: “it is the case that anyone on the streets can become Yu, but it is not necessarily
the case that anyone on the streets will be able to become a Yu.”

Now, given that a ruler has to be virtuous to be effective and that not everyone has a realistic chance of becoming virtuous, it seems that the Confucian texts restrict many people—the non-virtuous—from having political authority. Furthermore, virtue is apparently a requirement for ministerial or other governmental positions too. As the Analects highlights, “the term ‘great minister’ refers to those who serve their lord according to the Way and who, when this is no longer possible, relinquish office.” The idea that a minister or government official has to be virtuous is found in the Mencius too, which warns ministers not to discard the “honours bestowed by Heaven” such as benevolence. After all, “a state which fails to employ good and wise men [i.e. virtuous ministers] will end by suffering annexation.” In a similar vein, the Xunzi defines the ruler’s proper occupation as picking benevolent ministers who “all abide by the Way and aim at what is correct in their work.” Thus, by imposing the criteria of virtue for eligibility to be a ruler or a minister, the Confucian texts effectively suggest an elitist political vision. This elitism is based on the premise that the ideal ruler and his ministers are more adept at political decision-making than the masses due to their virtue.

Such political elitism as outlined in the Confucian texts is meritocratic, but not necessarily egalitarian in the context of political participation. The sense of realism in the texts with regard to the possibility of everyone becoming virtuous, as described earlier, is crucial for this understanding. Since everyone has the potential to be virtuous, the state has to ensure that those who eventually become so have a shot at governance, i.e. the state has to be meritocratic. As the Xunzi enthusiastically proclaims, the “worthy and capable” should be promoted “without waiting for them to rise through the ranks.” However, given that not everyone becomes virtuous in practice, not everyone can take part in government; in other words, political participation has to be unequal.

Taking into account our contemporary disdain for any mention of inequality, it is useful here to differentiate between the following two notions of equality: that of outcomes and that of opportunity. A meritocracy is unequal with regard to outcomes, but it needs to maintain an equality of opportunity for the meritorious in society to have a genuine chance at entering the elite group. Within the Confucian context, this equality of opportunity is manifested in two stages.

The first stage is the state’s commitment to ensure the material welfare of the people. In the Analects, the government has a role in providing food and arms to the people for their sustenance and security. Similarly, the Xunzi calls for the state to enrich the people through government. The reason why the material welfare of the people should be a state imperative is alluded to in the Mencius: “In governing the Empire, the sage tries to make food as plentiful as water and fire. When that happens, how can there be any amongst his people who are not benevolent?” In other words, the material necessities of life should be provided to the common people so that the cultivation of their own virtue becomes possible, which leads us to the next stage.

The state’s responsibility for the cultivation of virtue in its people through education is the basis of the second stage. Here, it is important to note that the cultivation of virtue has to be self-motivated. Any external attempt to do so forcefully is bound to fail. This can be seen in the story about “the man from Sung” contained in the Mencius, which depicts a man who tried to get his seedlings to grow by pulling on them, thus causing them to die. In a similar manner, the state should not use education to force the people to be virtuous; rather, education should be a guide to allow the people to go about cultivating their virtue on their own. This facilitative nature of Confucian education, as opposed to the potentially more authoritative nature of Confucian government, might be the reason why good government and good education is differentiated in the Mencius: “Good government does
not win the people as does good education. [...] Good government wins the wealth of the people; good education wins their hearts.”

At the same time, it is also extremely crucial that everyone has access to education. As Confucius says in the Analects, “I have never denied instruction to anyone [...]” In this manner, by ensuring that the education it provides is facilitative and open to all, the state can effectively guarantee the equality of opportunity for its people to cultivate their own virtue.

At this point, we have identified the principal qualities that underlie the Confucian political ideal using extensive textual evidence from the Analects, Mencius and Xunzi. In short, the Confucian political ideal can be said to be a “moral meritocracy,” in which the embodiment of virtue is the criteria for taking part in government. Although the texts do allow for everyone to become virtuous, they also acknowledge that this is not probable realistically. Moreover, central to this meritocratic vision is the notion of equality of opportunity, in which the Confucian state has to ensure that everyone is given the chance to cultivate their virtue through the provision of the material necessities of life and education. In other words, the Confucian state has the obligation to set a foundation from which all its people can cultivate virtue, but it does not have the obligation to allow all of them to participate in government, given the realistic assumption that not everyone will succeed at becoming virtuous.

Against Exploitative Hierarchies
The recognition that the Confucian political vision calls for a genuine equality of opportunity allows us to claim that a Confucian moral meritocracy is not exploitative. The elitism that underlies such a meritocracy should not be guilty of the conventional criticisms often levied against elitisms, such as the following articulated by Tan Sor-Hoon:

Elites are often autonomous and not accountable to the people for their decisions, and this undermines government by the people. Elites are an internally homogeneous group, unified and conscious of their special identity, and thus able to perpetuate their position of privilege at the expense of others, especially the masses.

Firstly, while it is true that elites are “an internally homogeneous group” to the extent that they are all supposed to embody virtue, this does not mean that they are necessarily exploitative. The need to maintain a genuine equality of opportunity entails that the virtuous elite in a Confucian moral meritocracy is not supposed to “perpetuate [its] position of privilege at the expense of others.” Secondly, it is not true that a Confucian moral meritocracy is “not accountable to the people” since the virtuous elite is still required to consult the common people. For instance, in the Analects, Confucius advises the ruler to consider the opinions of the “multitude” when making executive decisions. Likewise, in the Mencius, the ruler’s efforts to advance good and wise men and promote them to ministers should be informed by the views of the men in the capital, which can be taken to refer to the common people in general. Hence, the virtuous elite is still supposed to be accountable to the people in so far as the former has to consult the latter when making decisions. The fact that the Mencius explicitly outlines the need for consultation when describing the process of advancing the meritorious further illustrates the importance attributed to a genuine equality of opportunity.

In a similar vein, while attempting to elucidate the foundations of a Confucian democracy “from within the [Confucian] value system” itself, Brooke Ackerly argues that Confucianism does not support “exploitative social or political hierarchies.” Her depiction of benevolence as “potentially realizable by all of humanity” necessitates institutions that do not “constrain anyone’s potential” or “prejudge the potential contributions of all.” In other words, her vision of the Confucian political ideal is one that is free from discriminatory institutions, which is exactly what is required by a genuine equality of opportunity.
The Virtue of a Moral Meritocracy

This conception of a non-exploitative Confucian meritocracy is useful in constructing a viable synthesis between Confucian political thought and liberal democracy because it offers a way to mitigate the risks of incompetent officials being elected to power in democracies. Indeed, John Stuart Mill, in his essay Considerations on Representative Government, outlines two dangers that a representative democracy will face, one being the tyranny of the majority and the second being the “danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion which controls it.” The meritocratic ideal behind the Confucian political vision specifically addresses this latter concern about the expertise of those governing. Simply put, those who fail to achieve this ideal of virtue—in spite of a genuine equality of opportunity—have to become disqualified from political participation, in order to reduce the risk of incompetent governments being established.

Daniel Bell’s “examination model” and Bai Tongdong’s “leveled model” are two well-known attempts of synthesizing Confucian meritocracy and democracy. Both models seek to mitigate the risk of incompetent governments that was described earlier. In Bell’s case, examinations serve as the basis to determine those who are fit for government. Those who pass the examinations will then take up positions in the “Confucian” upper house of a bicameral legislature, in which majorities in the democratically-elected lower house can be overridden by supermajorities in the upper house. Bai, on the other hand, allows for democratic participation by the people only in local affairs, arguing that they are more familiar with such local affairs than the distant central government, but not necessarily so for national affairs. He concludes by asserting that “how much space is given to democratic participation depends upon how likely it is the participants will be able to make sound decisions that are based upon public interest.” As can be seen, both models preserve the meritocratic ideal by setting it as a bulwark against the risk of democratically-elected officials who are incompetent. They are therefore completely compatible with the conception of a non-exploitative Confucian meritocracy if they both ensure a genuine equality of opportunity.

Nevertheless, these models are not perfect and there are legitimate grounds for criticism against them. For one, the possibility of testing for virtue is problematic, although Li Chenyang offered a way to alleviate this problem by complementing knowledge-based examinations with qún-zhòng píng-yì or public opinion surveys on a candidate’s virtue. Interestingly, the solution offered to the problem of accurately assessing virtue is an emphasis on public opinion, or more generally, more democracy. Another criticism of the above models, and of moral meritocracies more generally, is that if the process of political participation itself is integral to the cultivation of virtue, then the argument that virtue should be a criterion for political participation will become moot. This brings to mind another of Mill’s ideas in Considerations on Representative Government, in which he states that democratic political participation as ensured by liberal rights is an enabling factor for human flourishing. Furthermore, as was pointed out earlier, the Confucian texts do see the practice of good government and the cultivation of individual virtue as mutually constitutive too. Finally, one can also question the supposed link between virtue and political competency, especially in a modern context in which a number of governing functions require specialized knowledge.

With these criticisms in mind, I find Tan Sor-Hoon’s refinement of Bell’s model particularly relevant, in which she calls for political authority to be functionally differentiated. In her view, experts in a specific subject area should be given decision-making power over their respective fields of expertise. Although Tan believed that a focus on elitism is misguided while conceptualizing Confucian government, her refinement of Bell’s “examination model” can still be
considered elitist. Instead of a single elitist body, the “Confucian” upper house in Bell’s model or national-level politicians in Bai’s model, Tan’s functionally differentiated body of experts forms the elite class, albeit a more diffused one. Nevertheless, according to her, this approach “takes better account of the diversity of decision-making abilities needed in different policy areas as well as the limitations of individuals, where no one person could possibly make good decisions on every policy issue.” Furthermore, these expert institutions should only have jurisdiction over issues in which “the chances of people making the right choices are especially slim and the harm that would be done by the wrong choices especially great.” A contemporary example of such expert institutions are central banks, which are headed by professional economists and often immune from political pressures. Tan’s suggested model may therefore simply involve more aspects of government being like central banks.

Perhaps such a differentiated and limited meritocracy is a more effective synthesis between a Confucian moral meritocracy with democracy and thus be a useful refinement to both Bell’s and Bai’s models. The functional differentiation can cater to the variety of specialized skills needed for modern governments while the limited scope of meritocracy will still allow people to participate in politics and nurture their civic consciousness, or in Mill’s words, learn “to feel for and with his fellow-citizens.” In doing so, they might still be able to cultivate their virtue too; after all, when Confucius was asked about benevolence in the Analects, he did say: “Love your fellow men.”

In summary, there are a number of points we have to consider when thinking about the political vision within the Confucian tradition. At the very foundation of Confucian political thinking, as shown by the Analects, Mencius and Xunzi, is an unequivocally elitist political vision: a moral meritocracy. Nevertheless, this is a balanced by the need to maintain a genuine equality of opportunity, which ensures that the meritocratic system does not degenerate into an exploitative hierarchy. Such a conception of a non-exploitative meritocracy supports Bell’s assertion that “modern democratic regimes have an interest in accommodating elite rule” since it offers a way to mitigate the risk inherent in democracy of incompetency. In this regard, an effective synthesis between a Confucian moral meritocracy and democracy can take the form of Bell’s “examination model” or Bai’s “levelled model,” with the added caveat that they should incorporate Tan’s idea of a functionally differentiated form of elitism so as to better handle the increased variety of specialized skills needed for modern governments.

ZongXian Eugene Ang is a senior in the School of Foreign Service studying International Politics.
As Ron Chernow has noted, “Few figures in American history have aroused such visceral love or loathing as Alexander Hamilton.” An autodidact of the first order, Hamilton was quite familiar with and influenced by a number of classical Greek and Roman authors. Between his time at Elizabethtown Academy, a New Jersey preparatory school, and King’s College (now Columbia University), Hamilton became familiar with Virgil, Cicero, Plutarch, Demosthenes and Aristotle, among others. This familiarity is shown through his writing, which often includes classical references, themes, and values.

This paper focuses on Hamilton’s explicit or implicit use of classical models and anti-models, in the context of a particularly fascinating episode in his life: his surprising decision to advocate the election of detested political enemy Thomas Jefferson over Aaron Burr when the House of Representatives decided in 1801 who would succeed John Adams as President. Hamilton’s anxiety over the prospect of a Burr presidency was no doubt motivated by the utterly distasteful prospect that Burr (against whom he had fought in the 1800 campaign) would not only hold the highest office in the national government, but would also be at the head of the nascent Federalist “party,” in which Hamilton played such a prominent role. However, his apprehension was also grounded in elements of his classically-influenced political philosophy, including his view that a growing and vibrant United States depended on a strong national government governed by a virtuous and energetic executive and guided by the common good. He was convinced that the election of Burr would run directly counter to these principles. In exhorting Federalists to vote for Jefferson rather than Burr, Hamilton drew on classically-infused political principles, likening Burr to Catiline, the founders’ classical Roman rogue.

Classical Influences on Alexander Hamilton’s Vision of the Virtuous, Energetic, and Active Chief Executive

Hamilton on the Role of Government and the American Constitution

The fabric of Hamilton’s thought was woven with threads of different intellectual and moral systems. Hamilton was convinced by thinkers
such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Bern-
ard Mandeville (and by his own experience) that self-interest motivated men and that gov-
ernment must ground the public good in that motivation. In Federalist No. 6 he reminds read-
ers that “men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious.” It was, he said, “a principle of hu-
man nature” that political institutions must be founded on “men’s interests.” And yet he also re-
marked that a wise legislator would channel and direct these interests to the public good.

Hamilton’s beliefs about the relationship between self-interest and the public good did not lead him to the sharply limited government and predominantly agrarian society desired by Jefferson. Instead, Hamilton’s political thinking was grounded in classical “moral and positive assumptions about the role of government.” He believed that classical values of obligation, community, moral purpose, as well as national leadership, could be preserved in a non-agrar-
ian, commercially-oriented economy. With passionate intensity, he attempted to guide and organize a modern economy into a state preserving a classical purpose and unity.

Hamilton’s view of the appropriate structure for the American republic was shaped by a mixed government perspective. Jottings from which he spoke at the Constitutional Convention refer to “Aristotle-Cicero-Montesquieu-Neckar,” before cryptically noting that government ought to be in the hands of both the “few” and the “many,” with their “separated interests” mutually “checked” by a monarchical element. The new American experiment needed a strong and vigorous chief magistrate should lead the young na-
tional government in the adventure of creating and maintaining a great society. When reading Plutarch as a young officer, he noted that “in the origins of the great states of antiquity there appeared first powerful founders . . . and then the great lawgivers.” Years later, in Federalist No. 70, Hamilton evoked these themes when he wrote that “energy” in the executive is “essential” for protecting the nation against foreign attacks, overseeing the steady administration of laws, protecting property against “irregular and high-handed” insurrections, and securing liberty against “the assaults of ambition, of faction, of anarchy.”

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Hamilton: Virtue and the Chief Executive

Inherent in an executive with expansive powers, many in the founding era feared, was unscrupu-
lous, tyrannical rule. Constitutional constraints on presidential power (with classical models) and virtuous leaders were meant to buttress against tyranny. To be sure, Hamilton bore no illusions about the perfectibility of human nature. In Federalist No. 6 he criticized Pericles for actions taken for private motives as examples of “national tranquility” being “sacrificed to personal advantage, or personal gratifica-
tion.” Nonetheless, he was “ardently Classical” in his conviction that “some men possessed the wisdom, honor, and patriotism to make a good
(nonpartisan) government possible. . .”69 It is quite probable that Hamilton’s views on the virtuous statesman were influenced by Cicero, including the Roman statesman’s work On Duties, which describes practical ethics with an emphasis on social and political morality.70 Cicero writes that a statesman should “serve the common advantage,” and he is critical of those seeking to grab as much wealth as possible. He adds that “to use public affairs for one’s profit is not only dishonourable, but criminal and wicked too.”71

Moreover, from biographical sources, the man’s likely educational curricula, and language found in his writings, we can with some confidence conclude that Hamilton was familiar with major portions of Aristotle’s work and was aware of Aristotle’s three qualifications “required of those who are to fill the highest offices: (1) first of all, loyalty to the established constitution, (2) great administrative capacity, and (3) virtue and justice of the kind proper to the particular form of government.”72

Hamilton also expressed admiration for aristocrats distinguished by their pursuit of justice and their unwillingness to “flatter the follies of the people.”73 He envisioned these “aristocratic” qualities in the president, the Constitution’s chief magistrate, noting in Federalist No. 71 that, while the “deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct” of the leaders to whom it entrusts the management of affairs, there may well be situations where the “guardians” of the people’s interests may need to “withstand the temporary delusion” of the people, in order to give them time and opportunity for more “cool and sedate reflection.” In Federalist No. 68, Hamilton extols the advantages of the process of selecting a president through the system of an electoral college. This procedure, he argues, “affords a moral certainty that the office of president will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”

It was through this system of beliefs, molded by classical influences, that Hamilton filtered Aaron Burr’s conduct and evaluated his character.

### Hamilton Opposes Burr, The Antithesis Of His Idea of the Virtuous Chief Executive

#### The Election of 1800: A Snapshot

Bitterly contested, and emotionally charged, the election of 1800 was a bruising rematch of the 1796 bout between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson (which Adams had won by a narrow margin). Wary and often distressed by the flexing of federal powers during the Washington and Adams administrations, many rural, southern Democratic-Republicans supported Jefferson. They were inclined “to embrace an image of a rural agrarian republic.”74 The opposing Federalists, supported by Hamilton, believed that the fortunes of the young republic depended on continuing commercial and industrial growth, fostered by an energetic national government.

The Federalists were divided, however, by the time of the election of 1800 and the end of Adams’ term, in no small part due to the marked differences between Hamilton and his followers and Adams on foreign policy toward France. Hamilton’s differences with Adams “cost Adams the full support of the party and thus election.”75 Still, the election was close. New York provided Jefferson his slender victory margin, largely due to the efforts of Aaron Burr. Because of his contributions to the Republican cause, Burr had been given a spot on the ballot with Jefferson.76

The Republican victory came, however, with a stunning twist: when the ballots were counted in the Electoral College, there was a tie in votes (seventy-three votes apiece) between Jefferson and Burr. At the time, the Constitution gave each elector two votes, with the person receiving a majority becoming president and the person with the second greatest number becoming vice president. Republican electors created the tie by giving one vote to Jefferson and the other
to Burr. The lame-duck House of Representatives (then dominated by Federalists) would now have the responsibility of deciding who would be president and vice president. Each of the sixteen states was allowed a single vote for president, as determined by the majority of its delegation. The ultimate winner would need a simple majority of nine states voting for him.

It was evident that the American electorate intended to choose Jefferson as president. Burr, however, while seeming to profess loyalty to Jefferson, had not expressed an unambiguous willingness to defer to Jefferson, e.g., by declaring that he would refuse to accept the presidency if voting in the House led to his selection. Rumors were afoot of Federalist support in the House for Burr. The emerging Federalist strategy, it was reported in some quarters, was either to elect Burr in the House and co-opt him for their own uses, or, failing that, to thwart the election of any president and seize federal power outright. In the end, on the thirty-sixth ballot, Jefferson became president by a margin of ten states to four with some Federalists abstaining.

Hamilton Urges Federalist Electors to Vote For Jefferson

In December 1800, Hamilton was privy to rumors that Federalists in Congress might prefer Burr to Jefferson and barraged Federalists with letters attacking Burr and urging them to cast ballots for Jefferson. As far as Hamilton was concerned the survival of the American nation was at peril. “There is no circumstance which has occurred in the course of our political affairs that has given me so much pain as the idea that Mr. Burr might be elevated to the Presidency by the means of the Federalists,” Hamilton told Oliver Wolcott, Jr. If the Federalist party elected Burr, it would be exposed “to the disgrace of a defeat in an attempt to elevate to the first place in the government one of the worse men in the community.” “The appointment of Burr as president would disgrace our country abroad,” he informed Theodore Sedgwick. “No agreement with him could be relied upon.”

Hamilton’s strongly held views about Burr as President were shaped by approximately fifteen years of personal, professional and political contacts. The son of a prominent Presbyterian minister and grandson of Jonathan Edwards, Burr served with distinction in the Continental Army and, after the war, practiced law in New York and entered politics. Both highly proficient New York lawyers, Hamilton and Burr often socialized with one another. The first wedge of hostility between them can be traced to 1789, when Burr and Hamilton campaigned together for Robert Yates, candidate for New York governor, yet Burr accepted the position of attorney general when Yates’s opponent, George Clinton, won the election. In 1791, Burr defeated Philip Schuyler, Hamilton’s father-in-law, in the race for the United States Senate and, as a Senator, consistently sided with those opposed to Hamilton’s financial agenda and Washington’s foreign policy. Burr also helped decide (as a referee of sorts) a disputed (and probably rigged) gubernatorial election in New York, in favor of Clinton and against Hamilton’s candidate—after Burr had earlier unsuccessfully tried to put together a coalition of disaffected Clintonians and Federalists to support himself for governor against Clinton.

Hamilton subsequently opposed Burr’s candidacy for the vice-presidency in 1792, and two years later blocked his nomination as American minister to France. Burr retired from the Senate in 1797. The following year, he returned to the New York Assembly, where his conduct subjected him to charges that he had abused the public trust for his personal benefit, leading a defeat of the Republicans in the 1799 state election, with Burr turned out of office.

Down, but not out, Burr returned to help the Republicans capture the presidency in 1800, employing his political organizational skills in New York and other states as well. He helped the Republicans win control of the State Assembly, delivering New York’s electoral college vote to the Republican side. For these efforts he was considered the presumptive vice president.
Hamilton: The Case Against Burr

Hamilton’s most fully detailed and organized arguments attacking Burr are found in his January 4, 1801 letter (and enclosure) to John Rutledge, Jr.85 They were informed, we suggest, by the classical lessons he had learned so well, explicitly expressed in his comparison of Burr to Catiline.

First, as Hamilton saw it, Burr’s personal character, private debts, and lack of political principles made him susceptible to conduct serving his own personal needs at the expense of the country. Thus, Hamilton labels Burr a “profligate” and “voluptuary in the extreme, with uncommon habits of expence”; claims he was “suspected on strong grounds of having corruptly served the views of the Holland Company, in the capacity of a member of our legislature”; and refers to Burr’s “several breaches of probity in his pecuniary transactions.” Moreover, Burr was “without a doubt insolvent for a large deficit.” Given his personal habits and the extent of his financial precariousness, Burr as president would resort to “unworthy expedients”—such as bargains with foreign powers, combinations with public agents from which he might personally gain, or probably even war.86 Corruption of this scale, only satisfying Burr’s private ambition and interests and flouting the public interest, bears no resemblance to the virtuous conduct of the Greek and Roman founders about whom Hamilton read in Plutarch.

Second, Burr’s record did not justify his ascension to the presidency. Hamilton denigrated Burr’s military record in the Revolutionary War, further charging that in civil life Burr “has never projected nor aided in producing a single measure of important public utility.” In fact, Hamilton argues, Burr constantly sided with those opposed to “federal measures before and since” the ratification of the Constitution and “has been uniformly the opposer of the Federal Administration.”87 Burr’s record, as Hamilton saw it, was wholly inconsistent with the “loyalty to the constitution” and “great administrative capacity” that Aristotle believed are characteristics required of those holding high office.88 And how could he be a wise lawgiver needed by the young United States, like Lycurgus and Numa Pompilius had been for Sparta and Rome?89

Third, and perhaps most damning, “[n]o mortal can tell what [Burr’s] political principles are” and “[h]e has talked all around the compass.” Hamilton added:

The truth seems to be that he has no plan but that of getting power by any means and keeping it by all means. It is probable that if he has any theory ‘tis that of simple despotism.90

One cannot imagine Cicero commending a statesman without any principle, and Aristotle would certainly not conclude that a man with “no plan but that of getting power by any means” possesses the “virtue and justice” proper to the presidency. Not surprisingly, Hamilton basically concludes that Burr would be a despotic tyrant.91

Fourth, Burr’s objective was the “establishment of Supreme Power in his own person.” Possessing “an irregular and inordinate ambition,” and “[c]old and collected by nature and habit,” he “never loses sight of his object and scruples no means of accomplishing it.”92 This description of Burr resonates with that of the leader, denounced by Cicero in On Duties, with a “greed” to be king and master of the people, “approving the death of laws and liberty, and counting . . . oppression—a foul and hateful thing—as something glorious.”93 Unlike other Federalists, Hamilton did not think Burr would be a harmless, lackadaisical president. “He is sanguine enough to hope everything, daring enough to attempt everything, wicked enough to scruple nothing,” Hamilton told Gouverneur Morris.94

Burr: “The Catiline of America”

The founders detested certain classical figures, such as Sulla, Marc Antony, and Julius Caesar, whose corruption and dishonorable conduct gave rise to the imposition of tyrannical rule in Rome and the destruction of liberty.95 Sensitive to charges that the strong national government advocated by him would result in tyranny, Hamilton countered in Federalist No. 1 that
“dangerous liberty more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the people, than under the forbidding appearances of zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government.”

In Hamilton’s view, Lucius Sergius Catilina (Catiline) fell into this category. Catiline, from whose revolutionary machinations Cicero saved (or believed he saved) the Roman republic in 63 B.C., was frequently used as an anti-model in the political debates and controversies where one side or another claimed to be the true champion of liberty and enemy of tyranny. Hamilton’s correspondence attacking Burr after the 1800 election often refers to Catiline. He concludes his December 16, 1800 letter to Oliver Wolcott, Jr. with the assertion that Burr “is truly the Catiline of America.” Catiline is later mentioned in a letter to James Bayard, where Hamilton pleads with Bayard that it is preferable for the Republican “antifederalists” to be answerable for the “elevation of an exceptionable man” (i.e., Jefferson) than for the Federalists to be “answerable for a man who on all hands is acknowledged to be a complete Cataline [sic] in his practice and principles (i.e., Burr).”

In doing so, Hamilton was comparing Burr’s capacity to weaken or destroy the young American republic with Catiline’s attempt to destroy Roman republican government. Catiline was a corrupt, debt-ridden aristocrat; Hamilton charged Burr with personal profligacy, indebtedness, and breaches of probity. As Plutarch notes, Catiline was chosen as “captain” by “profligate citizens”; a “great part of the young men of the city were corrupted by him.” In his letter to Rutledge, Hamilton picks up on these very words, declaring that “like Catiline, [Burr] is indefatigable in courting the young and the profligate,” because “he knows well the weak sides of human nature, and takes care to play in with the passions of all with whom he has intercourse.”

Further supporting Hamilton’s assessment of the danger to the Constitution from a Burr presidency, as well as his comparison of Burr to Catiline, was a disturbing conversation he had with Burr in 1798, when Hamilton was inspector general of the army. “General, you are now at the head of the army,” Burr had told Hamilton. “You are a man of the first talents and of vast influence. Our constitution is a miserable paper machine. You have it in your power to demolish it and give us a proper one and you owe it to your friends and the country to do it.” To which Hamilton had replied, “Why Col. Burr, in the first place, the little army I command is totally inadequate to the object you mention. And in the second place, if the army was adequate, I am much too troubled with that thing called morality to make the attempt.” Reverting to French, Burr pooh-poohed this timidity: “General, all things are moral to great souls!”

3. Hamilton: The Case For Jefferson over Burr
In early January 1801, Hamilton heard that Federalist momentum was growing for Burr. Later it was reported that the Federalists were decidedly tipped in favor of Burr over Jefferson. Faced with this terrifying nightmare of “Catiline’s” election, Hamilton was compelled to come up with as candid, balanced, and nuanced appraisal of Jefferson as he was capable. In doing so, he needed to rehabilitate in some way the portrait of Jefferson painted by Federalists during the 1800 campaign: a demagogue with a Jacobin mindset, propagating destructive ideologies. Hamilton wrote Oliver Wolcott that Jefferson “is by far not so dangerous a man and he has pretensions to character.” He also thought that Jefferson was much more talented than the overrated Burr; the latter was “far more cunning than wise, far more dexterous than able. In my opinion, he is inferior in real ability to Jefferson.” Jefferson’s “pretensions to character” and significant “talent” apparently indicated to Hamilton at least a modicum of virtue. In a mid-December 1800 letter to Wolcott, Hamilton urged that the Federalists should try to make a deal with Jefferson: let him keep the National Bank and the navy, and maintain neutrality, and they would acquiesce in his election. Apparently, Hamilton believed that one could be a principled virtuous statesman, and still compromise with opponents in at least some fashion, without
losing any claim to virtue. In the end, if forced to choose, and however distasteful it might be, Hamilton preferred Jefferson with the wrong principles to Burr without any.\textsuperscript{104}

**Conclusion**

The picture painted of Burr by Hamilton (and others) has been disputed or questioned by some recent historians.\textsuperscript{105} They claim that Burr’s political gambits were skillful anticipations of modern politics and campaigning and that Burr’s conduct was not much more “voluptuary” and “profligate” than that of Hamilton himself.\textsuperscript{106} And, of course, one might argue that the concept of disinterested, virtuous leadership devoted to the common good is, if not fanciful, difficult to define, interpret, and apply in the world of practical politics. Whatever the merits of these views, the evidence is fairly compelling that Hamilton was genuinely concerned that fellow Federalists would elect to the highest office a highly opportunistic man, with a very strong propensity to self-serving conduct.

Cognizant of the different vying interests in modern societies, Hamilton believed it important that government leadership at the highest levels be virtuous and attempt to stand above and help arbitrate partial interests to promote the common good. These perspectives, if not wholly formed by classical influences and models, were certainly influenced by them. Hamilton also believed that the process for electing the president would result in virtuous chief magistrates, yet election of Burr would be pretty solid evidence to the contrary. Burr was bright, liberally educated, talented, and cosmopolitan, the type of person that many founders expected to participate in the new government and to transcend localism and special interests in positions of national leadership. Nonetheless, it appeared to Hamilton that Burr’s character and history of political gamesmanship and trickery, largely to serve his own personal interests and ambition, were well outside of and beyond the concept of disinterested republican leadership. Instead, Burr “was right down in the pits with all the narrow, self-seeking factions and interests.”\textsuperscript{107}

What many Federalists found attractive about Burr was repulsive to Hamilton. Burr’s selfish ambition and proclivity to promote whatever would get him reelected, those Federalists believed, would prevent him from dismantling the Federalists’ national and commercial systems, from which he personally benefited. For Hamilton, however, this reputation for “selfishness” was the problem. Burr may have been a harbinger of the pragmatism of many politicians, but for Hamilton what mattered, particularly in this novel but fragile Constitution, was the kind of virtuous character associated with classical republicanism and aimed at the public good.\textsuperscript{108}

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A Crisis of Paradigms

Secularization Theory and Its Recent Opponents

James Pennell

It is ironic that debates over the validity of the secularization thesis have been a central focus in the sociology of religion in recent decades, considering the fact that the theory remained unchallenged by almost every leading figure in the study of religion prior to the 1960s and achieved “a truly paradigmatic status within the modern social sciences.”

As religious belief and practice have continued to flourish despite global modernization, however, the central tenets of the previously uncontested thesis began to be questioned, leading many sociologists to declare secularization as a myth put forward by their European counterparts. This has prompted lively debate between researchers who continue to defend the inevitability of modern secularization and those who claim that religiosity will survive and flourish in the midst of global modernity. The following paper seeks to investigate and critically examine the different paradigms with which various scholars have approached the questions of modernization, secularization, and global religion.

The traditional theory of secularization argues that the processes of modernization act in such a way as to emancipate societal spheres from religion, which is consequentially either pushed into the marginal private spheres of society or is completely eradicated. This approach to the question of secularization and its relation to modernization ultimately finds its foundations in the Enlightenment critique of religion as a pre-rational worldview to be overtaken by the advancement of reason, which will help liberate the secular spheres of science and education from religious institutions’ authority over the classification and ordering of social reality. This is the position held by the vast majority of the founding fathers of the social-scientific study of religion. Max Weber, for example, argues that the differentiation of social spheres leads to a disintegration of the walls separating the “religious” and the “secular,” thereby allowing them to recognize their “internal and lawful autonomy.” Eventually such a process leads to the augmentation of the social structuring power of the economic, political, and scientific spheres. As a result, the religious sphere is relegated to a less important role within modern society, which would undergo a process of rationalization by which people become disenchanted with the metaphysical claims of religion. Durkheim’s theory of modernization goes further and contends that societies will create new gods in the form of secular values such as nationalism, scientific progress, and human rights. Others such as Auguste Comte and Sigmund Freud believed that modernization and scientific progress would deliver humanity from its “neurotic illusions,” pushing society forward and allowing it to escape from the “theological stage” of its social evolution.
Before we go any further, it is of utmost importance to distinguish between three different meanings of the word “secularization.” As Casanova points out, the term can refer to “the decline of religious beliefs and practices in modern societies,” “the privatization of religion,” or “the differentiation of the secular spheres.”

The process of societal differentiation is an undeniable historical fact, but the European school of social theory has often conflated all three of these concepts, thereby driving proponents of the secularization thesis to argue that a dramatic fall in religious belief and practice is the inevitable consequence of modern functional differentiation. In large part, the assumption that the liberation of institutional spheres inexorably leads to the progressive decline of religiosity is a view that is rooted in the Enlightenment critique of religion, which argues that humanity will replace religion with “reason” as society undergoes rationalization, individualization, and industrialization. Thus, it seems as though the traditional paradigm has the propensity to explain secularization (i.e. a decline in religiosity) with the processes of modernization, which indeed seems to carry a great deal of explanatory power in the context of Western Europe.

As a matter of history, the whole of reality in medieval Europe was socially constructed in a way that divided “this world” into two distinct spheres, “the religious” and “the secular.” Thus, it was the One, Holy, Catholic, and Apostolic Church that acted as the sole mediator between these two worlds, thereby granting it the authority to structure and classify society in this dualistic manner. As a result, all parts of social life in medieval Europe were organized and regulated according to Christian precepts and teachings. Monarchs claimed legitimacy on the basis of divine right, economics was grounded in Christian ethical theory, and, as Casanova points out, “the differentiation between religious sin, moral offense, and legal crime was not yet clear.” Even education within the medieval university system was established upon the traditions of scholasticism and the Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis so that Christian religion also structured the means of knowledge and learning. In this way, European secularization can be thought of as the historical process by which the organizing religious principles that structure “this world” break down in such a way that “the entire medieval system of classification disappears, to be replaced by new systems of spatial structuration of the [societal] spheres . . . within which religion will have to find its own place.”

Therefore, in accordance with the traditional functionalist paradigm of secularization, the religious sphere of society will become increasingly marginalized, eventually leading to a dramatic decline in religious belief and practice.

Two contemporary defenders of the traditional secularization paradigm are Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, who argue that the decline in religiosity in the West has been shaped by the long-term reduction in “existential security,” which is related to levels of human development and socioeconomic equality. In other words, the attractiveness of religious belief becomes far more salient in contexts where the life and survival of the individual is at greater risk, so that the importance of religious values will generally decrease in societies where there are higher levels of human security and economic equality.

The proposition put forward by Norris and Inglehart falls very much in line with the European conception of the relationship between modernization and religion. In contending that religious devotion generally declines with increases in economic security, they present religion as a refuge for people facing the constant vulnerability and instability of their socioeconomic insecurities, and who therefore turn to the appeals of the supernatural realm when faced with such challenges. They present data that is predominantly drawn from Western Europe to argue that the processes of human development and social equality generally reduce the degree of religiosity within countries where there are fewer cases of daily life-threatening risks. In other words, through the process of modernization, “religion becomes less central as people’s
lives become less vulnerable to the constant threat of death, disease, and misfortune.”

Norris and Inglehart use the data that they draw from Western Europe to contend that religious belief and devotion tend to decline starkly as societies transition from agrarian to industrial economies, and fall even a bit more as they shift to postindustrial systems. They maintain that as secular orientations become more widespread in industrial and postindustrial societies, religion eventually takes on a diminished role and remains especially prevalent only amongst the most vulnerable and poorest classes; they also observe, however, that religiosity tends to have an even further weakened presence in more egalitarian countries such as Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. The authors propose a mechanism to explain this phenomenon by contending that the processes associated with industrial modernization such as industrialization, urbanization, and widespread education have served to alleviate the social ills that incline people towards religion in the first place. Moreover, they argue that it is through the means of the welfare state and income redistribution that postindustrial societies with coordinated economic markets become even more secular, as such institutions act to treat feelings of vulnerability and social anxiety. In this way, they maintain that religiosity has fallen most significantly “in postindustrial societies where the social welfare role of religious institutions has been displaced most fully by public services for health, education, and social security provided by the state sector.”

Although the authors have developed a theory that seems to line up very closely with the empirical evidence in Western Europe, they may be much too haste in making the assumption that the rest of the modern world will follow in line with this paradigm as time goes on. The United States is possibly the most obvious piece of counterevidence to their theory, seeing as how it is perhaps that most modern and postindustrial country in the world while still exhibiting high degrees of religious belief and practice. Norris and Inglehart, while acknowledging the fact that the data is ambiguous, believe that religion still plays such a vital role in the United States because there are higher degrees of existential insecurity stemming from socioeconomic inequality than there are in Europe. Therefore, despite the general affluence of American society, the people “face greater anxieties than citizens in other industrialized countries” due to greater levels of income inequality and the lack of guaranteed public services such as medical insurance and university education.

If this were the case, we would expect indicators for religious belief and practice to line up with levels of education, but this is not what the evidence suggests. In fact, within the United States it is those citizens with higher degrees of education who tend to exhibit greater religiosity that those who are less educated. As Casanova points out, Alexis de Tocqueville, in his observations of democratic civil society in the United States, is one of the first European intellectuals to counter the argument originally offered by the European philosophes, and now by both Norris and Inglehart, “that the advancement of education and reason and the advancement of democratic freedoms would make religion politically irrelevant.”

The authors also point to evidence from the 1990s that demonstrates that the proportion of Americans who claim to have no religious identity has recently increased, and argue that such indicators show that secular attitudes have grown stronger amongst the population and “may bring the United States slightly closer to public opinion in Western Europe.” While there may certainly be a growing number of “nones” in the United States, this does not necessarily mean that the population is becoming increasingly secularist. Before making such an assumption, one must recognize that of the respondents who do not claim any religious affiliation, there is a rather small proportion of people who claim to be atheists or agnostics.

Indeed, most “nones” are members of the population who remain “spiritual, but not
religious,” or what we can characterize as “believing without belonging.” Thus, it seems as though Norris and Inglehart place too much confidence in their prediction that Western Europe is the sole model for modernization, behind which the rest of the world will follow in a normative-teleological theory of linear historical development, in which religion will become increasingly marginalized. In not being able to account for anomalous modern developed countries that exhibit substantial degrees of religiosity (e.g. Poland, Switzerland, Italy, Ireland, and the United States) the traditional paradigm offered by Norris, Inglehart, and countless others is far too Eurocentric in its approach to the question of secularization.

More recently, American sociologists have responded to the traditional paradigm by labeling it as a myth that has been perpetrated by European intellectuals since the first days of the Enlightenment’s critique of religion. The new “American” paradigm that has emerged as a response to the traditional theories of secularization rejects the long-held assumption that differentiation, industrialization, and rationalization necessarily and inevitably lead to a decline in religious belief and practice. Consequently, the new paradigm presents a model that envisions a rational choice theory of religious markets that seeks to “postulate a general structural relationship between disestablishment or state deregulation, open and free competitive and pluralistic religious markets, and high levels of individual religiosity.” In this vein of thought, the new paradigm contends that low degrees of religious practice in Europe are due not to the processes of modernization, but rather to the preservation of established national churches and highly regulated religious markets. Thus, while Europeans have traditionally viewed the United States as an exception to the process of modern secularization, proponents of the new paradigm see Europe as the exceptional case.

Thus, it is doctrines such as freedom from the establishment of religion, freedom of religious exercise, and the separation of church and state that gave rise to the model of religious pluralism and competition in the United States. Moreover, such a voluntaristic system of civil society is conducive in driving people to more strongly identify with a particular religious group. Yet again, Casanova observes a democratic trend that Tocqueville noticed much earlier, which is that “modernity . . . offers new and expanded possibility for the construction of communities of all kinds as voluntary associations, and particularly for the construction of new religious communities as voluntary congregations.” Indeed, this is a phenomenon that can be further validated by the fact that immigrants tend to become more religious while living in the United States, where religious association remains “the preeminent voluntary associational form” and a fundamental category of identity. This, in turn, creates an incentive for immigrants to associate with a particular denomination in an attempt to imitate and adapt to American sociocultural norms and values.

In a seemingly direct response to the contentions put forward by Norris and Inglehart, Roger Finke and Rodney Stark seek to challenge those sociologists who view religion “as an epiphenomenon . . . serving to appease the lower classes, legitimate existing political power, and impede effective rational thought.” They contend that defenders of the traditional paradigm continue to define secularization in a very narrow sense, as only meaning the transition of various social functions from the religious sphere to differentiated secular spheres—this is a process that they recognize as an indisputable social fact. Thus, instead of defining secularization as the mere process of deinstitutionalization, Finke and Stark want to find ways of comparing levels of religious belief and practice across countries by investigating specific propositions and independent variables that attempt to explain variations between different societies. To this end, the authors put forward a paradigm based on rational choice theory that sees the religious environment as synonymous with an economic
marketplace in which actors behave in a manner that is well reasoned and methodical.

The authors contend that levels of commitment are determined by the supply-side of the market, thereby allowing religiosity to flourish most in societies with unregulated and pluralistic religious economies, which spur competition between firms and drives them to satisfy the greatest number of market niches. Thus, while the traditional paradigm emphasizes demand as the most important factor influencing religious behaviors, the new paradigm, as it is presented by Finke and Stark, argues that the state of religious markets is determined by whether or not firms are able to meet the tastes and preferences of society. As a result, the fall of religious monopolies, the deregulation of religious markets, and the freedom of religion generally lead to an increase in individual commitments, as more firms gain access to the economy and compete for adherents.

Finke and Stark believe that this paradigm best explains why levels of religious vitality are high in United States and low in Western Europe. The former was a country founded on the principles of religious toleration and freedom from the establishment of a national church, which allowed for free and open competition between religious firms. Many European countries, on the other hand, have historically had national churches or confessional systems with highly regulated and monopolistic religious economies, thereby diminishing clergymen’s motivation to attract consumers, which in turn has led to lower degrees of religiosity in the long-run. Finke and Stark also note Latin America as an example of how the introduction of religious competition can generate higher levels of commitment. For centuries, the Roman Catholic Church had been the dominant cultural and religious actor until their authority began to erode and evangelical Protestant missionaries brought a greater number of sects into the marketplace. As a result, leaders within the Church were forced to improve their marketing and “evangelical efforts [by] using techniques that were remarkably similar to [those of] their Protestant competitors.”

Stephen Warner is another defender of the new paradigm for the sociological study of religion, and yet again points out that the religious situation in the United States stands in direct contrast with the traditional secularization thesis. He notes that a quick glance at American history reveals the fact that church membership and religious practice experienced tremendous proportional growth during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, periods in which the country experienced swift growth in industrialization and urbanization. While adherents of the European paradigm would simply classify such data as anomalous, Warner maintains that the “analytic key” for understanding religion in the United States is “the disestablishment of the churches and the rise of an open market for religion,” which cultivate higher levels of religious mobilization and permit adaptation to an ever-changing society, thereby making the American religious situation “institutionally distinct.”

Apart from reiterating the importance of free and pluralistic religious markets, Warner emphasizes the role of spiritual entrepreneurs and innovators who compete to market their commodities and who challenge the taken-for-granted religious nature of outdated and monopolistic prebendary systems, in which religious leaders have little incentive to attract new consumers due to a lack of ideological opposition. Therefore, one of the primary reasons for the explosion of religious vitality in the United States during the nineteenth century was due to the fact that highly skilled activists such as Jonathan Edwards and George Whitefield were able to successfully advertise their product. Furthermore, the new paradigm also challenges the long-accepted notion that urban areas are intrinsically ill-disposed environments for religiosity, and claims that cities are actually able to provide the social mobility and resources that help religious communities flourish. Moreover, cities offer the perfect milieu for a dynamic exchange of ideas and robust competition between
the suppliers of religious goods and services, and thus frequently serve as hubs for communal religious revivals and new church plants.\textsuperscript{135}

The model put forward by Starke, Finke, and Warner places a great deal of importance on the notion that religion acts as a prominent vehicle for social change and empowerment. The former authors point to how Roman Catholicism served as a major unifying force for French Canadians in Quebec, seeing as how “the Catholic Church protected their rights, guarded their institutions, and preserved the French culture and language.” As French Canadians started to gain more rights and autonomy in the 1960s, however, the Church lost its role as the “sole guardian of French Canadians’ institutions and culture,” and thus began to exert a far weaker influence over Québécois society.\textsuperscript{136} Warner notes the first wave of feminism during the Second Great Awakening and the vital role of black churches during the Civil Rights Movement as other examples of how dynamic religious pluralism can encourage group solidarity and provide avenues for religious institutions to serve as channels for political empowerment.\textsuperscript{137}

Unlike the traditional theory of secularization, which treats religion as something that is primordially fixed and ascriptive, the new paradigm places a great of importance on the individual and his agency in choosing a religious identity, thus reflecting the fluidity of pluralistic religious environments. This is evidenced by the fact that an increasing proportion of Americans are switching denominations within their lifetime, which tends to reflect an even greater degree of religious involvement, given that converts tend to be more faithful when they choose to commit to a religious community by a matter of their own volition. Warner claims that this phenomenon, which he calls “the new voluntarism,” challenges the givenness of religion in monopolistic environments, spurs more “intense, revivalistic competition,” and fosters greater institutional strength.\textsuperscript{138}

More recently, scholars have challenged both the European and American paradigms by criticizing each’s attempt to convert sociology into a “science,” with universal social laws that mimic those of nature. They contend that while the traditional theory still relies too heavily on the Enlightenment critique of religion and has a focus that is far too Eurocentric, the new paradigm unfairly seeks to systematize the study of religion and society by transforming religious dynamics into a theory of supply-side economics. To this end, researchers such as José Casanova and Peter Beyer have urged scholars to adopt an approach that emphasizes the use of a “comparative historical analysis that [can] account for different patterns of secularization.”\textsuperscript{139}

Casanova writes that “a proper rethinking of secularization will require a critical examination of the diverse patterns of differentiation and fusion of the religious and the secular and their mutual constitution across all world religions,” as well as a “contextualization of categories . . . [that recognizes] the multiple and diverse historical patterns of secularization and differentiation within European and Western societies.”\textsuperscript{140} In this vein of thought, we should acknowledge the existence of multiple modernities and not view secularization as an unvarying, teleological, and universal phenomenon. Moreover, in his understanding of Europe as an exceptional case in its process of secularization, he argues that European modernity has served as a catalyst for the differentiation and coexistence of religious and secular spheres, but not for the emergence of religious pluralism that we observe in the rest of the world as a result of globalization. It is to this end that he argues for a conceptualization of religious pluralization that prioritizes the processes of globalization over the developments of modernization.\textsuperscript{141}

This paper has sought to summarize and thoughtfully evaluate the major positions that currently surround the discussions over secularization and global religious trends. The long-accepted European theory that spheri- cal differentiation eventually leads to religious decline no longer seems to be a justifiable position. The special case of secularization in
Europe should not, however, be immediately discarded as many American sociologists have suggested—instead, the most fruitful scholarship should compel us to utilize a comparative historical approach in order to investigate why modernity in the European context fostered greater secularity, while it failed to do so in the United States and the rest of the world. In the same way, scholars ought to explore the factors that make the religious markets theory helpful in analyzing the American religious situation, while also pointing out the paradigm’s shortcomings in other contexts. Above all, those who study religion and society must adopt a global perspective, which should prevent any theoretical paradigm from gaining a monopoly over sociological research.

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Over the past decade, Asians have quietly but steadfastly become America’s fastest growing ethnic group, and in the process, increased their ability to be an influential political contingency. As the country’s most rapidly expanding, best educated, and highest-income racial group, Asian Americans have more political clout now than ever before.143

Despite an overall mediocre level of political participation,144 they remain an influential demographic. The group has untapped potential, but several barriers limit greater political involvement. Asian Americans have faced significant obstacles in their pursuit of a shared identity—largely attributed to the religious and ethnic diversity within the group itself. The variety of Asian American backgrounds has made it difficult for the group as a whole to establish its electoral value, and has limited the full integration of Asians into U.S. society and politics.

From the beginning of the group’s history in America, Asians have been challenged by racial discrimination—severely limiting political participation then, and continuing to have profound effects today. A Pew Research Center study concluded that Asian immigrants, “[enduring] generations of officially sanctioned racial prejudice,”145 were branded as outsiders by the same political system that propagated the U.S. as an ethnic “melting pot” and “land of opportunity.” From the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 until the National Origins Act of 1924, politicians effectively forbade all immigration from Asia and fueled the racist sentiment of “yellow peril.” This mentality continued through World War II, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt denied the basic civil rights of Japanese American citizens, and ordered their relocation to internment camps. Additionally, until 1952,146 Asian Americans were forbidden to “give testimony in courts,” denied naturalization, and disenfranchised.147 In these ways, Asians were considered “perpetual foreigners”—not seen as equals or true Americans. A breakthrough finally came in 1965, with the Immigration and Nationality Act lifting the racist, restrictive immigration quotas and policies. Since then, there have been consistent, large waves of Asian immigrants entering into the U.S. In the last half century alone, the percentage of Asian Americans out of the total U.S. population has risen from 1% to 6%.148 Despite this increasing growth rate, the ever-expanding Asian community remains internally conflicted, due to its striking heterogeneity.

The extreme religious diversity of Asian Americans is unmatched by any other U.S. ethnic group,149 presenting unique challenges in its attempts to build collective political power. Differences in makeup of the Asian subgroups are due to “each country of origin subgroup [having] its own unique history, culture, language, religious beliefs, economic and demographic traits, social and political values, and pathways into America.”150 While this sounds like the circumstances of most immigrants, the intense pluralism of
Asian Americans is exemplified through the variety of their religions. The majority of Asians fall into America’s two main categories, Christians and the religiously unaffiliated, at 42% and 26%, respectively. At the same time, the group represents a “mosaic of faiths,” as there is “no single religion that dominates the religious preference of Asian Americans.” About 14% of Asian Americans follow Buddhism, made up of primarily Vietnamese and Japanese Americans, while approximately 10%—over half of all Indian Americans—observe Hinduism. Several other religions, such as Islam, Sikhism, and Jainism constitute the remainder. The plurality of religion within the Asian American community is compelling, as it consists of groups that are exceptionally religious and groups that are exceptionally secular. For example, in several ways—such as higher church attendance and deeper belief—Asian evangelicals express greater dedication to their faith than white evangelicals. Similarly, the population of Asian Americans who classify themselves as unaffiliated are 7 percentage points higher than the U.S. average, and “tend to report lower levels of religious commitment than unaffiliated Americans as a whole.” The absence of a central faith hurts the Asian American community, as it inhibits racial unity in the way that Catholicism largely connects Hispanics and the Baptist tradition connects African Americans.

Faith typically informs a group’s social and political views, and the Asian American community is no exception. However, as a result of the wide-ranging nature of Asian American religions, the ethnic group encompasses several different attitudes and perspectives. Evangelical Asian Americans tend to lean conservative; Hindus, Buddhists, and the unaffiliated lean liberal, while other Asian religious groups fall along this spectrum. Mirroring their non-Hispanic white counterparts, Asian evangelicals “overwhelmingly hold conservative views on homosexuality and abortion,” whereas, accordingly, the unaffiliated “overwhelmingly take liberal positions on these social issues.” The subgroups have disparate views according to religious affiliation, revealing that essentially none of the groups “resemble one another in their distribution of political ideology.” Despite this apparent lack of uniformity, the Asian American population appears to be, overall, more progressive than conservative. In fact, the group as a whole leans more left than the general U.S. public. Some ascribe this more liberal political ideology to the group’s comparatively “less religious” nature, as Asians generally tend to view religion as less important than the general American public. Asian Americans thus follow a common political pattern in which a lower emphasis on faith corresponds with a more liberal disposition.

Though favoring a predominantly liberal political ideology, a majority of Asian Americans “tend to not identify with a political party.” This moderate sentiment is especially apparent amongst Buddhists and the unaffiliated. Immediately preceding the 2012 presidential election, half of Asian American voters were undecided or independent—about “three-to-four times greater than the national average.” According to a study by the Asian American Justice Center, this behavior reveals an unwillingness to commit to a certain side and/or a refusal to be pigeonholed. For most American voters, “party identification remains the single most defining marker of their political orientation and behavior,” but many Asian Americans appear to shy away from definitive partisanship.

These reports of party indecision seem almost negligible, however, because Asian American voting trends in the last two presidential elections show astonishing decisiveness. In 2008, exit polls revealed that Obama won 63% of the Asian American vote while McCain won 26%. With the exception Vietnamese Americans, every Asian American subgroup supported Obama over McCain. What surprised many in this election was the unprecedented ability of “individual ethnic groups of the Asian American” population to act as a “single voting bloc for Obama.” In the 2012 election, Obama’s
popularity grew for Asian Americans, as every ethnic subgroup—including the Vietnamese—voted for him over Romney.\(^{168}\) Asian Americans proved themselves to be an instrumental, uniquely powerful demographic. 73% of the group voted for Obama, “exceeding his support among Hispanics and women” and standing firm amongst other demographic groups that “voted more Republican than they did in 2008.”\(^{169}\) In increasing numbers, unlike other groups, Asian American voters began to classify themselves as Democrats. Hindus, Buddhists, and unaffiliated voters were all more willing to say they identified as Democrats following the 2012 election than ever before.\(^{170}\) Thus, despite disliking party identification, Asian Americans were decisively partisan in the last presidential elections. In effect, they solidified their group as a “core Democratic constituency.”\(^{171}\)

Asian Americans contributed to approximately 2.8% of the total electorate\(^{172}\) in the two most recent elections, up from 1.6% in 1996.\(^{173}\) This political participation only incrementally increased, but the group collectively made greater moves towards the Democratic Party during this period. Asian Americans, with the highest socioeconomic levels in the country, baffled politicians and pundits alike with this progression; usually, “the richer people are, the more likely they are to be Republican” and participate in politics.\(^{174}\) The causes and side effects of Asian American success, however, sheds more light on the group’s complicated and uncharacteristic political behavior.

Asian Americans’ elevated socioeconomic status can be seen through their high average annual household income, exceptional education levels, and selective immigration. Relative to the general U.S. median household income of $49,800, Asian Americans as a whole boast an average of $66,000.\(^{175}\) In addition, all five of Asian Americans’ largest religious subgroups exceed the U.S. average in post-graduate education. Succeeding in school is a value strongly encouraged by the religion of most Asian immigrant families. In maintaining their faith, Asians’ “religious practice [promotes] the cultivation of a distinctive ethnic community that [helps] young people to reach higher levels of academic achievement.”\(^{176}\) Hindus especially exemplify this dedication, as the group with by far the highest relative income and education, over all other American religious groups.\(^{177}\) The religiously unaffiliated Asians are somewhat close behind, and although Asian Christians and Buddhists tend to have lower education and income levels when compared to the group as a whole, they still surpass the general public.

The stereotype of Asians as the “model minority” stems from this high level of “educational attainment and economic self-sufficiency”\(^{178}\) that the group has achieved in the U.S. Along with high standards of hard work, perseverance, and self-reliance, the success of Asian Americans may be attributable to the H-1B visa program: “designed to encourage immigration of engineers, scientists, and other highly skilled “guest workers” from abroad.”\(^{179}\) Tens of thousands of immigrants from Asia have arrived under this visa category recently, reflected by their high academic qualifications,\(^{180}\) and exhibited through their aforementioned socioeconomic feats. This has made “recent Asian arrivals the most highly educated cohort of immigrants in U.S. history.”\(^{181}\) Indeed, Asian Americans of all subdivisions have made groundbreaking income and academic achievements in just the last few decades.

As stated before, given this high socioeconomic status, Asian Americans’ gradual shift away from conservatism and relatively minimal political participation is unusual. In fact, in the 1992 Presidential election, Clinton won only 36% of Asian American votes. This was unsurprising, as the group demonstrated “certain characteristics that would ordinarily predict a Republican political affiliation, most strikingly their level of income, which on average, [was] higher than any other ethnic group in the United States.”\(^{182}\) However, with each election since 1992, the share of the Asian American vote for the Democratic candidate has grown progressively larger.\(^{183}\) Many attribute this shift to an increasing sentiment of
racial and social marginalization felt amongst Asian Americans, despite their socioeconomic progress.

To many Asian Americans, “model minority” status is offensive and a myth, as the group feels separate from mainstream society, in both culture and identity. For example, when asked “whether they think of themselves as a typical American or very different from a typical American,” over half of Asian Americans responded with “very different.” Religion plays a significant role, as Asians observing Abrahamic faiths generally view themselves as typical Americans more often than Asians of other faiths, such as Buddhists or Hindus. Even when holding birthplace and time in the U.S. constant, Asians of non-Abrahamic religions report feeling “very different” more frequently than Christians. When Asian Americans label themselves, few tell others that they are simply American, Asian American, or Asian; instead, an overwhelming majority specifies their home country in their self-description (for example, Japanese American). This wide-ranging classification reinforces a sense of “otherness” for Asian Americans, causing divisions within an ethnic group that already feels societally and culturally removed from the general public.

This assortment of self-identification is worth noting by conservatives, who question why Asians lean left politically. Recently, the GOP has gained a reputation of hostility towards immigrants and minorities. This sense of discrimination, though not explicitly aimed at Asians, has nevertheless driven Asian Americans away from conservatism. “Republican rhetoric implying that the non-white “takers” are plundering the white “makers” has cultivated [this] perception” over the years. Although Asian Americans have gained “maker status,” many still feel slighted by Republicans as a minority group. Therefore, Asian Americans have ostensibly rejected a political party that is unreceptive to their needs as a non-white ethnic group.

In general, greater political participation is strongly correlated with higher socioeconomic levels. Having a good education and income usually provides voters with better “material and cognitive resources to digest political information, articulate political opinion, and act upon such knowledge.” Following this logic, Asian Americans should be the most politically active ethnic group in the U.S. However, as demonstrated by the less than impressive voter turnout of 47% in the last two presidential elections—a lower rate than Black and Hispanic groups—Asian American “political participation poses an anomaly to theories of political science.” Asians, as it turns out, have a lower registration and voting rate than any other ethnic group in the country. This lack of political activity is due in part to the absence of partisan mobilization and the fact that the expanding Asian American community contains mostly new immigrants.

Asian Americans, with their mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds, have an internally disorganized voting bloc, and parties appear unwilling to assemble them. As mentioned earlier, many Asian Americans identify as moderate and choose not to be attached to a political party. This disinterest in or aversion to party affiliation seems to parallel the “relatively low rates of partisan mobilization of Asian Americans.” Very few registered Asian voters reported any political communications in the last election. Just 31% of Asian Americans polled in 2012 said they were “contacted by a party, campaign, or candidate, far lower than the 58% for a nationally representative sample.” The diverse issues and backgrounds of the Asian community appear to be a deterrent for party organizers, who can’t or won’t commit the time to understand the group. The failure of Asian Americans to unify their interests has allowed politicians and parties to “neglect the multiple social needs and concerns of this racial group” in this way. This political disregard for the Asian population therefore perpetuates, and is perpetuated by, low rates of Asian American participation and voter turnout.

Since 1965, there has been a continual flow of Asian immigrants into the U.S.—a majority of whom are “foreign-born” (70%) or
“linguistically isolated.” Of those born overseas, only 53% report speaking English well, presenting several unanticipated political hurdles for the Asian community. Language difficulties have slowed immigrants’ naturalization process and limited their ability to fully comprehend electoral issues. Further, despite Voting Rights Act measures that protect citizens of language minorities, there is widespread, “uneven access to language assistance” during elections. Cultural and language barriers that aren’t supposed to exist continue to prevent Asian American citizens from fully engaging in politics. As a result, obstacles that Asian Americans continue to face as a community—with extreme intragroup diversity and old and new forms of sociopolitical marginalization—severely limit collective political participation and negatively impact their political strength.

At the onset of the 20th century, Asians immigrating to the U.S. were primarily unskilled laborers, subjected to racist and xenophobic laws. Currently, as an ethnic group that continues to be composed of mostly immigrants, Asian Americans can claim the highest socioeconomic levels in the country. Despite this success, throughout the decades, the group has struggled to organize their disparate political interests and unify as a comprehensive voting bloc. Their ethnic and religious differences reflect diverse political ideologies, and while the group collectively leans more liberal, a majority of Asian Americans remain moderate. Recent elections have demonstrated support of the Democratic Party, but the independent status of most Asian American voters leaves the group’s political future uncertain. Therefore, the fastest growing ethnic group in the country has the capacity to be a seriously persuasive political contingency. But only when Asian Americans mobilize themselves, political parties invest time and effort into understanding the Asian community, and politicians appreciate the group’s religious and ethnic diversity, can this influence be fully realized.

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Medieval Spain, while not an empire itself, can be compared to the description of empire which Dr. Karen Barkey proposes in her book *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. Dr. Barkey, professor of Sociology and History at Columbia University, defines empire using the metaphor of a wheel comprised of a strong center and extending spokes which are not connected by an outer rim.

In her metaphorical wheel, each of the spokes extends to a different ethnic and religious group connected to the central power; however, they remain explicitly unconnected to each other except by the single central hub. In Medieval Spain, the spokes emphasize the existence of the three distinct groups of Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Yet, the documentation of violent interactions between the groups discounts the possibility of the sole connections occurring through the central hub. Thus, her metaphor alone cannot stand. While the ruler often tried to gain control over relations between the differing groups, there was still much tension connecting them. Significantly, this tension had the potential to, and often did, spark significant amounts of violence without the subduing force of the central government. Dr. Barkey’s metaphor of the wheel is thus apt to describe Medieval Spain in that it illustrates the government’s attempt to control interactions between different religious groups; however, it would be more fitting to utilize a metaphor of a wheel with a fuse connecting each religious spoke, where occasional sparks forced authorities to impose peacekeeping legislation under the guise of religious intervention.

In Medieval Spain, the fuse in the modified version of Barkey’s metaphorical wheel was ever present through the connecting thread of the economy. The economic mechanisms of the society forced an interdependence between all three major religious groups. Much of each group was compelled to specialize in a certain good or service for which the religious group came to be known. With each group providing a different necessity to the others, the economic interdependence permeated daily life. To pay for these necessities, many people of differing religious groups would form monetary bonds through debts and taxes, in addition to the aforementioned simple exchange of goods and services.

The level of this interdependence was seen specifically in the case of the arrival of the Black Plague in 1348, which killed 25-50% of the population in Europe. During this economic and social disaster, Muslims were recognized...
to be of such intrinsic importance to the Spanish agricultural economy that Christian lords successfully petitioned the king to prevent Muslims from emigrating and, hence, leaving their fields unattended. Through this decision, the king acknowledged—and even enforced—the existence of the interdependence of the religious groups; however, in doing so, he created a potentially tenser situation. Through the enforcement of interaction between volatile groups—rather than the simple allowance of coexistence—the strict new regulations had the ability to spark a conflict even while trying to prevent one. This was a risk, however, that the ruler had to take to maintain a prosperous economy. Therefore, the relations of the different religious groups—which comprise the connecting fuse in the metaphorical wheel—were strenuous at best, and because of this social basis for interdependence among furiously competing ideologies, conflicts were always a moment away from igniting.

In times of conflict, the kings of Medieval Spain were forced to use religious ideas and messages for pragmatic solutions to peacekeeping among the varying religious groups—the spokes in the modified version of Barkey’s metaphorical wheel. While the majority of disputes were not of a religious nature, in a community with such clearly defined minority groups, all violence between members of different religious groups constituted religious violence, and thus required a religious solution. In Medieval Spain, religious status determined legal status, and the status of the two groups that were in conflict determined how far violence would be allowed to perpetuate before the state would intervene.

In one instance a series of robberies occurred along a road where Christians, Jews, and Muslims—each a spoke—were all robbed. In an attempt to gain some semblance of justice from the state and to protect from future attacks, the Jews were forced to plead a religious crime. By framing the robberies in this way, the king was able to establish a precedent concerning violent acts against minorities from which they were unable to defend themselves. Thus, in cases of inter-religious violence, perpetrators had to be prosecuted under a religious label, although the desired outcome was simply to maintain peace in the kingdom; non-religious sparks between the spokes were quelled with a religious framework.

In another example of the quelling of religious sparks, in the sixth century, the Jews of Spain were forced to sign a legal contract with the Christian authorities, the Oath of the Jews in the Name of the Prince. In this document, the aforementioned Jews were forced to swear to convert to Christianity in a decision that appears at first to be entirely predicated on religious motivation. While the oath is written from the perspective of the Jews, the actual text to which they were giving their confirmation must have come from a higher Christian power as the Oath refers to the Jews as being a terribly obstinate people—a derogatory image that would not have been self-imposed. Evidence of a Christian author is also prevalent in the relegation of the Jewish religion to a mere set of customs. By juxtaposing the idea of Judaism as a set of customs with the terminology used to describe Christianity as pure beliefs, the Christian ruler who created this document placated the Christian concerns over leniency toward Jews; however, the ruler did not make an attempt to force the Jews to prove their new religion. In regard to Jewish customs, he did not explicitly state that the Jews should consume pork as part of their Oath, only that they must not offend Christians offering the meat. Thus, he exercised religious control merely to maintain the peace between the two groups. Similarly, he did not allow the Christian masses to enforce these conversions. Instead, in another effort to preserve peace—even under the guise of religiously derogatory language—he declared that the final ruling on transgressors would be left up to the king’s own gracious nature. Thus, through the Oath, the Christian government simply tried to prevent religious chaos between the Christians and the Jews—to put out the growing sparks that threatened the control by the central hub—not
impose Christian ideas on an unwilling Jewish population.

In 1265, Alfonso X also codified new laws expressing control and rights in the daily lives of the Jews in Christian Spain which appeared to be strictly religious legislation. Nirenberg argues this law code implies that Jews were kept by the Christians to watch the growth of the “true” religion and as a reminder to the Christians of the people who crucified their savior. While this may have been the message that Alfonso X wanted the Christians reading the law code to internalize—as is seen when he explains the necessity of Jews in a Christian society as reminders of the crucifixion of Jesus—within the text, he creates limits on the rights of the Jews for their own benefit and not as a mere punishment. Alfonso X restricts the rights of Jews to leave their residence on Good Friday; however, this was likely not a punishment, but rather a measure for the safety of the Jews as Christians were especially violent toward Jews on the commemoration of the crucifixion. Thus, by acting from a simply administrative standpoint and restricting and regulating certain rights of the Jews, Alfonso X was able to successfully mitigate the violent tendencies of interactions between religious communities tied together by a short fuse.

The Spanish kings, though, were not limited to legislation in favor of the majority religious group; no single spoke was truly given priority over the others. The rulers also appeared to legislate in favor of the maintenance of other religions; however, this too was done merely to keep the peace. In 1320, King James II ordered his officials to provide protection for the Jews in his kingdom when he was given the news of an impending attack by the Pastoureaux, an armed band of French shepherds. These marauders were on a mission to kill Spanish Jews and had already succeeded in killing 337 French Jews in Montclus. He prohibited his people from harassing Jews or Muslims during this time of outside attack under threat of hanging. After King James II defeated the Pastoureaux, he collected fines from the cities which had complied to the shepherds’ crusade and worked to address claims made by Jews and Muslims with regard to forced conversion to Christianity. While this appears to denote a certain fondness for the minority groups, this too was simply an act of non-religious peacekeeping with an added benefit of monetary gain. Nirenberg argues that this idea of “complicity” that the king established was largely simply a political construction instituted to collect excessive fines rather than to demonstrate a genuine care for the well-being of the Jews and Muslims in his kingdom. However, the resentment against Jews ironically increased among Christians due to the inquisitions into the complicity of the Christian citizens after the shepherds’ crusade. Many letters were written outlining fears by the king’s officials of widespread violence against the Jews. Even after an initial peacekeeping failure, here too, the king urged moderation in responding to the Jews’ violent reaction to the sight of the dead at Montclus; however, the Jews were also paying a large subsidy to the king, the payment of which he likely did not want to interrupt. Thus, acting as a businessman under the guise of religious protection, the Spanish king extinguished threats to minorities, leaving the relationships between the religious groups only slightly strained.

Even at the very end of the Medieval period, the Spanish kings looked to the past precedent of achieving peace under the guise of religious intervention. In 1609, Philip III expelled the Moriscos—converted Muslims still treated as a separate religious group—from Spain; however, even then, he provided them with guidelines to prevent unnecessary violence. The expulsion ensured the most direct path to a more stable kingdom as the violence between the religious groups—even among those who had converted—was unsustainable. In his decree, he acknowledged the general spirit in the kingdom that the Moriscos should be punished severely for maintaining the customs of their old faith. Yet, as in the Oath of the Jews, feigning a gracious and gentle nature, he decided to proceed down a more peaceful path. To prevent harassment on
their journey overseas, Philip III specifically allowed for ten Moriscos of every ship to return to Spain and convey to the new travelers that none had been treated with violence during their passage. This functioned as a method of accountability and forced the transporters to carry out the king’s orders in an honest and swift manner as he intended. Thus, Phillip III, out of necessity to keep the peace, forced the Moriscos from Spain for seemingly religious reasons.

The rulers of Medieval Spain functioned mostly as peacekeeping officials, less concerned with fighting religious battles than providing structure to their domain. The adjustment to Dr. Barkey’s metaphor captures this sentiment by which the sparks of conflict between the interconnected religious groups were put out by repeated intervention. To maintain the strength of the entire wheel, the central hub had to prevent these dangerous sparks by any means necessary. However, each decree had to be disguised under religious intentions to placate the religiously fervent masses which they governed. It was in this context that the religious and the political became truly inseparable, and the Medieval Spanish kings used this knowledge to their advantage. The kings succeeded in their efforts to maintain stability, and the center of the wheel was able to maintain control over the religious spokes.

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Republicanism in Theory and Practice
The Early Diplomatic History of the United States

Andrew Wilson

At the time of America’s founding, the country’s leaders were confronted with important decisions about the future of America’s growth. Would the new nation emulate the European powers? Would it grow within the original thirteen colonies or expand across the continent? In any case, what was the best way to achieve these goals? In answering these questions, United States leaders of multiple factions came to believe that territorial and commercial expansion were vital to their success as a nation and to their security. We shall see how their ideas led to increased support for free trade and the expansion of American territory, which influenced much of America’s interactions with other powers, both European and American. The consequences of the United States’ expansion for itself and for other peoples were ultimately mixed: while American politicians continued to hang onto a vision of expansion in territory and commerce, their actions fell short of the ideal of “virtue” that had characterized early debates on American political economy.

The founder’s vision for the political economy of the newborn United States was influenced by 18th century Enlightenment views on political economy as well as by Great Britain’s transformation through the industrial revolution. Some, particularly the Frenchman Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued that growth in commerce would be accompanied by growth in greed, and a decline in social morals. In his Discourses, Rousseau asked “and what will become of virtue, when one has to get rich at all cost? The ancient politicians forever spoke of morals and virtue; ours speak only of commerce and money.”

He drew unfavorable comparisons between the indulgence in “luxury” by modern European nations and the self-denial of classical republics, particularly Sparta: “There, the other Peoples used to say, men are born virtuous, and the very air of the Country seems to inspire virtue.” At the same time, others were more accepting of societal changes. Bernard Mandeville argued the radical alternative to Rousseau in The Fable of the Bees: what ultimately benefited society the most was “materialism, money grubbing and pleasure seeking.” In fact, he said, “private vices” would produce “publick benefits,” if managed skilfully by politicians. The Scottish Enlightenment thinker David Hume articulated a balance between these two positions, favoring greater commerce, but in moderate terms. Acknowledging that luxury might be an evil, as Rousseau did, Hume argued it was still a lesser evil than the “sloth” which might develop in a
nation without luxury. 222 He asserted that “as society became more commercialized, the social as well as economic ties between men promoted all kinds of beneficial intercourse, resulting in a more civilized, refined and learned culture.” 223 Another Scottish thinker, Adam Smith, also held that economic progress and the development of commercial society would be beneficial both materially and socially. 224 Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, held a particularly complex view of commerce. In The Spirit of the Laws, he argued that increased commerce could eliminate prejudice: “it is almost a general rule, that wherever we find agreeable manners, there commerce flourishes; and that wherever there is commerce, there we meet with agreeable manners.” 225 On the other hand, Montesquieu acknowledged that even as trade created peace between nations, it would loosen the bonds between individuals within society. A concern for one’s own private interest would reduce mankind’s proclivity for hospitality and other moral virtues. 226 One concern of Montesquieu’s, disregarded by the American revolutionaries, was that Republics could only occupy a small expanse of territory. 227

In trying to find the right balance between commerce and virtue, the American founders also drew on European history, in addition to political theory. Benjamin Franklin, who spent considerable time in Europe, was appalled by the corruption and materialism of the British court and declared that “Manufactures are founded on poverty.” 228 England’s large population meant that growth in manufacturing was a necessary evil, useful for “rescuing large numbers of its people from idleness and starvation, since it offered employment for those who could no longer work on the land.” 229 Agreement on manufacturing’s unsavory nature was widespread; even the young Alexander Hamilton, who later became a great admirer of the British system was at one point critical of Britain as an example of a mode of political economy. 230

At the same time the Americans had seen the pros and cons of the European economic system, they also had also seen the struggles carried out as the European powers fought to achieve a balance of power. As Paul Kennedy notes, the Seven Years’ War “overstrained the taxable capacity and social fabric of the great powers” and was in fact what had led Britain to levy the high taxes that angered the American colonists in the first place. 231 However, the course of the American Revolution also taught the colonists that their distance in Europe could prove a strategic advantage. Despite its powerful navy, Britain was 3,000 miles from the American East Coast, and had needed 50,000 troops to win control of Canada with colonial support. 232 Of course, Americans were also aware of their military weakness, for even by 1816 they only possessed 16,000 troops to Great Britain’s 255,000. 233

The American revolutionaries saw an opportunity to make a fresh start in world history—as Thomas Paine said, “to begin the world over again”—but they did not all agree on what that fresh start would look like. The decades following the Declaration of Independence in 1776 saw a succession of factions competing to decide the new nation’s position in the international order. At the time of the Constitution’s signing, the Federalist faction “wanted the United States to take its rightful place among the world’s great nations,” and was concerned with the country’s relative weakness. 235 In contrast, Anti-Federalists initially imagined a smaller role for the new nation, emphasizing the benefits of separation from Europe by an ocean, and believed the U.S. should focus its efforts on domestic development.

During George Washington’s Presidential administration, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton continued to vigorously debate the best direction for the young nation. Drew McCoy describes the difference between the two by noting that what Hamilton envisioned was “development through time,” while republicans, such as Jefferson and Madison, desired “development through space,” particularly territorial expansion. 236 Despite their deep disagreements, both Hamilton and Jefferson agreed.
on that commerce could be socially beneficial. Hamilton favored increased commerce, and had argued in *Federalist 12* that commerce “is now perceived and acknowledged, by all enlightened statesmen, to be the most useful...source of national wealth; and has accordingly become a primary object of their political cares.” Following Hume, Hamilton championed a model of growth and manufacturing that adopted many characteristics of Great Britain, as well as the establishment of trade with Great Britain.

Jeffersonians admired Great Britain less than its rival, France, and although they sought to increase trade, it was mainly to support the export of agricultural products. Their vision for America was based on “an unobstructed access to an ample supply of open land, and a relatively liberal international commercial order that would offer adequate foreign markets for America’s flourishing agricultural surplus.” They envisioned a predominantly agricultural society composed of “virtuous yeoman farmers.”

While such a vision emulated classical republics in emphasizing virtue, it simultaneously broke with Montesquieu’s theories by emphasizing expansion. Thus, neither school of thought wanted to entirely emulate ancient republics. Although they particularly admired the Spartans, the founders envisioned themselves as a more moderate civilization that would “straddle antiquity and modernity.”

Ultimately, despite the efforts of some, particularly Madison, to limit commerce, free trade ultimately won out in American thinking, with significant consequences. In the 1790’s, concerns over trade placed America at the center of disputes between Britain and France, with Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians each pushing for their favorite nation. President Washington argued in his farewell address that the prudent policy for the young republic was to stay out of European affairs: “The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible.” America should honor its current diplomatic commitments, Washington emphasized, but pursue nothing further except commercial ties, for America did not possess the strategic interests in Europe that other great powers did. Thus, America’s vision of free trade and expansion was also influenced by practical concerns as well as republican idealism.

In the decades following Washington’s administration, as debates over foreign policy moved beyond the theoretical, a fervor for expansion endured. Neo-Jeffersonian democrats continued to pursue territorial expansion, opposed centralizing measures, such as a national bank, and celebrated the agrarian farmer as the emblematic common man. They believed that America’s destiny was to extend across the continent, and that its growth would benefit all of humanity. The ensuing decades of American expansion would show just how eagerly their beliefs were embraced.

II

The expansionist ideology adopted by the Americans during the 1790s, and even more so after the “Revolution of 1800,” led them to pursue terms of free trade with other nations and a growth spurt, in both industry and territory, that took them across the North American continent. However, their political and economic vision kept them entangled with the established powers of Europe. America became diplomatically entangled with Britain and France during the 1790s, being bound by alliance to France and by commercial treaties to Great Britain. America claimed the right to trade “non-contraband” items with the French, and were angered when the British extended the definition of contraband to include food and began raiding American shipping. The Washington Administration dispatched Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate a settlement. The Jay Treaty opened British Caribbean colonies to American trade, but was unpopular because it gave in to many British demands on the issue of neutrality. In any case, the treaty’s terms show that American negotiators saw opening ports to American commerce...
as a vital objective, but one that was difficult to achieve.

During the Jefferson Administration, issues of trade again involved America in confrontations with Britain, France and the Barbary Pirates. After war re-emerged in Europe, President Jefferson objected to the raids on American ships by the British and impressment of sailors. At the same time, the British also objected to American merchants using “broken voyages” to avoid wartime restrictions on trade. Jefferson enacted an embargo on American shipping, representing an attempt, albeit an ultimately unsuccessful one, to convince the European powers that the United States was not bound entirely by “Quaker principles.” America’s commitment to war with Britain in 1812 was about avenging the “sense of humiliation at having endured for so long affronts to American sovereignty,” including, among other issues, British encroachments on American shipping and commerce.

American commercial interests and national pride also played a key role was in the American conflict with the Barbary pirates, who had raided American shipping since the 1790s. Without authorization from Congress, President Thomas Jefferson abandoned ransom and negotiation to pursue a limited conflict against the pirates, which he escalated in 1803. American sailors burned a ship the pirates had captured, attempted to overthrow government of Tripoli, and eventually reached a more favorable settlement than any previous negotiations had achieved. The historian George Herring argues that while the war may have been “unimportant” in practical terms, it had great significance for American citizens, boosting “their sense of mission and destiny;” and it certainly laid the groundwork for future military operations to protect commercial goals.

As President, Jefferson pursued his republican vision of territorial expansion, most famously through the Louisiana Purchase. Initially, Jefferson intended for American expansion across the continent to be gradual: “As long as Louisiana remained in the hands of “feeble” Spain, Americans were content to be patient, and Jefferson was certain that in time the United States would acquire it ‘piece by piece.” Beginning a pattern that would be repeated across the continent, American settlers first filtered into Louisiana and began to rely on the Mississippi river for the ability to trade. Despite being in a foreign country, as Herring says, they remained loyal American citizens and were contemptuous towards their nominal government. Although Jefferson’s original goal was the recovery of American trade rights in the city of New Orleans, he was willing to overlook constitutional problems of presidential power to purchase the land. As Herring suggests, because the massive purchase created the space for continued agricultural growth, it “appeared to ensure the preservation of the essentially republican character of American society.” At the same time, using executive power to acquire the territory went against much of Jefferson’s conception of the federal government, showing him to be what Herring calls a “practical idealist.” One could argue, however, that such pragmatism represented a kind of compromise on Jefferson’s principles, or at least shows the difficulty of realizing a truly republican vision in the modern era.

The continued territorial expansion of the United States was buttressed by the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, perhaps the most famous event in the course of antebellum American diplomacy. It stated that while America would not involve itself in affairs on the European continent, the American continents were not to be subject to further colonization or interference by Europe. Ironically, the Doctrine was formulated after British foreign secretary George Canning proposed a joint resolution by the United States and Great Britain opposing European intervention in the Americas. In any case, the Monroe Doctrine was a bold assertion of the United States’ might in the Western hemisphere, although clearly motivated by a desire to expand and protect American territory, and increase trade with independent Latin American
nations, rather than merely ensure American security.

The ensuing decades saw America boldly expand across the rest of the continent. First, the nation acquired Florida through the single-minded efforts of General Andrew Jackson. When he became President, Jackson dispatched Anthony Butler to attempt to purchase from Mexico lands up to the Rio Grande. Butler was unsuccessful, succeeding only in displaying his racist attitudes toward the Mexicans and making clear “his determination to get Texas by fair means or foul.”

When Texas declared its independence, Jackson only hesitated from accepting its entrance into the union because of the explosive issue of slavery, which also reduced American desire to annex Cuba.

American actions leading up to and during the Mexican American War show the country at the height of expansionist fervor. President John Tyler, who “pushed a broad agenda of commercial and territorial expansion,” first guided the annexation of Texas through Congress. His successor, James K. Polk, acquired rights from Britain to acquire Oregon if American settlers could occupy it fast enough, and he also pursued an aggressive strategy of expansion into California, hoping to gain access to Asian markets, and eventually Mexico. He dispatched envoy John Slidell to Mexico to negotiate the acquisition of both California and territory up to the Rio Grande, in exchange for the forgiveness of some Mexican debt. While these terms were unlikely to win favors in Mexico City, Polk made sure, Herring explains, to encircle Mexico with the U.S. military. Soon after the return of Slidell’s unsuccessful mission, Polk learned that Mexican troops had fired on an American patrol. The shedding of American blood was just the justification Polk needed to begin the war, which ultimately resulted in a massive transfer of territory from Mexico to the United States.

The course of the United States’ expansionism also led it to involvement in Central America. Politician Henry Clay dreamed of a canal linking the Atlantic and Pacific and a land ruled by “a race of ‘Northmen’ who shall supplant the tainted, mongrel and decaying race which now occupies the region.” The United States forged treaties with Colombia and Nicaragua to build Clay’s canal, the former giving it a virtual protectorate. American adventurers and businessmen also intervened gratuitously in Central American affairs, but unlike in the case of Mexico, the US government did not use these individuals’ actions as a pretext for invasion. The adventurer William Walker even set himself up as president in Nicaragua, only to be overthrown by Central Americans supported by his American rival, Cornelius Vanderbilt, and then foiled again by the US government. To Montesquieu, such misadventures would have been perfect evidence that a concern for self-interest had supplanted the veneration of moral virtue.

III

America’s pursuit of commercial expansion led to a great expansion in its territory and power. While it began to earn the respect of the European nations, the ultimate consequences of its actions for Native Americans, Central Americans and the peoples of East Asia and the Pacific were, at best, less than positive. Of all the groups affected by the American ideal of manifest destiny, the native peoples of North America were hurt the worst. The United States from its inception failed to respect Native American rights. Thomas Hietala argues that by justifying American expansionism with the phrase “manifest destiny,” leaders “implicitly sanctioned the dispossession of all non-Anglo peoples on the continent.” In a manner inconsistent with the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson himself wavered on promises to Native Americans that their own right to representative government would be respected. Perhaps the greatest loss for Native Americans, however, was the withdrawal of European recognition after the war of 1812. With little negotiating power left, native peoples were forced to travel the “Trail of Tears” from the American Southeast to reservations across the Mississippi.
U.S. actions toward Mexico also did not positively affect the latter country. As Herring notes, American attitudes towards the Mexicans were sadly typical of the time: “Americans brought to this venture the ethos of the age, clearly defined notions of their own superiority, and the conviction that they were ‘pioneers of civilization,’ as contemporary historian William H. Prescott put it, bringing to a benighted people the blessings of republicanism.” While the Mexican American War brought the United States territory and riches, for Mexico, it brought debt and the loss of half the nation’s territory. The war also led to deep cultural wounds for the Mexicans: it was “a devastating blow to the optimism that had marked its birth, perhaps the supreme tragedy in its history.” The damage dealt to Mexico by the United States was particularly saddening since it was inflicted by one young republican government on another.

America’s involvement in Latin America and the Pacific also brought mixed results. Herring notes that the United States supported the economic development of some Latin American Nations, but also states that “North American racism and expansionism left a bitter legacy.” Interacting with the United States gave nations an admiration for some of its republican principles, but also a desire to assert their independence from American intrusions. For example, when Central American nations banded together to expel William Walker from Nicaragua, they proudly labelled the conflict “the national war.”

American expansion to the Pacific also facilitated trade with peoples beyond the Western Hemisphere. In the following decades, the United States would undertake the opening of Japan, leading to the massive cultural transformations of the Meiji Restoration, and the colonization of islands in the Pacific, including Hawaii. Despite envisioning itself as different from the European powers, America still followed in their footsteps through its “hitchhiking imperialism” in China.

Not surprisingly, the expansions of trade and territory are generally seen as bringing positive changes for the United States, even if they had a negative impact on other peoples. By the time of the Civil War, the United States had transformed from a young republic into an “economic giant.” As Kennedy says: “the ready availability of land in the west, together with constant industrial growth, caused labor to be relatively scarce and wages to be high.”

American expansion also had an influence on the United States themselves: Herring argues that the Mexican American War exposed American citizens to a different culture, “challenging their parochialism and contributing to the growth of national self-awareness.” At the same time territorial expansion benefitted the United States, it also indirectly have led to economic benefits for European nations. As Kennedy asserts, trade tied the United States and Britain closer together and fueled the American economy. As America rose as a power, it would begin to earn greater respect from the nations of Europe, but one might conclude that in doing so it failed in its goal of “beginning the world over again.” At the same time, Herring notes that America’s expansion into Asia fell short of expectations, failing to absorb the country’s agricultural surplus. The addition of new territories also laid the groundwork for the Civil War by raising the issue of slavery in the new territories, especially in the Louisiana Purchase, and later in areas captured during the Mexican American War.

While the United States clearly saw both territorial growth and economic development, they proceeded in a different fashion than either Hamiltonians or Jeffersonians had envisioned. Herring notes that “Commercial and territorial expansion did not head off industrialization and urbanization, as the Jeffersonians had hoped.” America’s commercial and territorial expansion had clearly been successful in some ways, but in much the way that Rousseau might have predicted, America’s prosperity had gone hand in hand with some corruption of its noble republican ideas and the abandonment of any kind of Spartan self-denial. American foreign
policy was at times for the benefit of tycoons like Cornelius Vanderbilt and adventurers like William Walker, rather than the support of agrarian farmers. Thus, while America, had seen material progress throughout the first half of the 19th century, its pursuit of commercial and territorial expansion had harmed Native Americans and had led it to exchange the classical concern for *virtue* that had accompanied the debates in the founding period for calculating, expansionist self-interest.

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Pages 40-45 contained the article "A Giant Problem: Descendants of the Sons of God from Genesis to David" by Nathanael Edwards which has been redacted upon request by the author.
Lies, Analogies, and (In)effectual Words
Plato and Nietzsche on the Truth of Myth and Allegory

Christina Eickenroht

Lies, analogies, and (in)effectual words: these tropes litter the works of Plato and Nietzsche. Throughout the works of both authors, there echoes a haunting question: Can the poetic devices of myths and images point beyond themselves and actually disclose something that is eternally true?

This is the question that drives this paper. We will begin by examining Nietzsche’s understanding of myth before turning to his caustic critique of Plato’s scorn for the poetic arts. We will then attempt to reconcile Plato and Socrates’ apparent scorn for poetic devices with his prolific usage of them. We will trace how Socrates and Plato employ the trope of poetic analogy, comparing their usage of analogy to that of 20th century English writer Charles Williams; here, we will see that Williams’ usage of likenesses and distinctions closely parallels and sheds light upon Socrates and Plato’s own usage of analogies as they seek not only to disclose truth but also to dispel falsehood.

Ultimately, however, we will find that even analogy falls flat—and the whole of the Republic fails as a poetic but futile project—if the divine does not break in.

Nietzsche on the Arts of Myth and Poetry
According to Nietzsche, myth arises as a coping mechanism in response to the fundamental fact that life is terror.

Nietzsche claims that myth, like all art, arises out of the “perpetual strife” and “only periodically intervening reconciliations” of the Apollinian and Dionysian tendencies—this is, the reason and the passions. He claims that all of Greek mythology arose in the following way:

The Greek knew and felt the terror and horror of existence. That he might endure this terror at all, he had to interpose between himself and life the radiant dream-birth of the Olympians... It was in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create these gods from a most profound need.

Nietzsche understands myth, then, to be a projection of a wounded animal who cannot bear to live with the fact that life is terror and, consequently, must tell himself more pleasant stories—all the while remaining vaguely aware that, all along, it is “only his Apollinian consciousness which, like a veil, hid[es] this Dionysian world from vision.”
Nietzsche also claims that superficiality is an essential and telling part of all Greek art. He adamantly states that only the “incessant resistance to the titanic-barbaric nature of the Dionysian” can explain the “defiantly prim,” superficial, and naïve or ‘cheerful’ element of Greek art.327 For this reason, Nietzsche understands the apparent superficiality of Greek myth to be a solemn recognition that the depths of the Dionysian terror can never be plumbed. “Where we encounter the ‘naïve’ in art,” he writes, “we should recognize the highest effect of Apollinian culture,” a culture which “always must first overthrow an empire of Titans and slay monsters” and which “must [triumph] over an abysmal and terrifying view of the world and the keenest susceptibility to suffering through recourse to the most forceful and pleasurable illusions.”328

Nietzsche prizes art, then, first and foremost for its ability to bring vitality. He understands art—created in this Dionysian-Apollinian tension—to be an eruptive, non-rational force that renews the world; he adamantly denies any connection between art and some eternal Truth (the existence of which he denies or at least considers irrelevant). Instead, Nietzsche upholds perspectivism, which he claims is the “basic condition of all life.”329

A Brief Nietzschean Exoteric Reading of Socrates on Myth and Poetry

Indeed, an exoteric reading of Plato’s Republic reveals Socrates’ unilateral scorn for the arts of myth, fable, and poetry precisely because they do not ‘tell the truth.’335 After driving a hard distinction between appearance and reality, Socrates concludes that myth and story—as imitative arts—belong to the poets who “contrive in appearances”336 and not to the philosophers who alone know reality. Consequently, as Nietzsche notes, Socrates “relegates art, every art, to the realm of lies.”337

Indeed, Socrates banishes the poets because their art, being as it is “thrice removed”338 from Truth, not only tells lies but also deceives and damages themselves and their audience: it “corrupts the minds of all who hearken to them, save only those whose knowledge of reality provides an antidote.”339

In the “ancient antagonism” between philosophy and poetry,340 myth seems to be only a corrupting weapon in the hands of the poets.

An Apparent Contradiction: Socrates and Plato Often Employ These Lies

Yet, we find the quintessential philosopher, the “theoretical man”341 who apparently makes reason alone the tyrant,342 resorting to all sorts of myths—not only for the education of the guardians in the city he constructs, but also in his own dialogue with his interlocutors.

Socrates harnesses the formative power of myths and fables for the proper education of the guardians. In laying out the two educations—the education unto music and the education unto gymnastics—Socrates affirms that the formative first education unto music necessarily “include[s] poetry and stories”343 and these must “serve to educate” the city’s potential rulers.344 These tales, he argues, are of utmost importance, as they will shape the city’s guardians from childhood.
Myths and fables retain this shaping power because, according to Socrates, man is the mimetic sort of creature who is wont to “adopt any and all models set before [him].”345 Because these myths will affect the young guardians at their most tender and impressionable age, Socrates institutes strict censorship regarding the content of such fables.346 These tales must portray the gods and men truly—not falsely—and must be in accord with the nature of justice.347 Further, Socrates asserts that such myths will prove essential not only in the education of the guardians but also in the governing of the city at large, as rulers will “have to resort to frequent doses of lies and mystifications for the benefit of their subjects.”348—myths like the myth of the metals, for example.349 Socrates does not, however, see myth as only a tool to be employed in the education of the guardians in this ideal city; rather, he himself employs myths, fables, and imagery for the sake of explanation throughout the Republic. He resorts to the myth of Gyges, for example, to help his interlocutors realize that unless one has seen and embraced the true nature of justice, he would certainly be a tyrant if only they could do so with impunity.350 Later, when Adeimantus asks why philosophers seem so cranky and debased, Socrates replies, “Your question needs to be answered with a parable.”351 In this instance, Socrates even describes himself as one of the very sort he seems to deplore—namely, an imitative artist—as he tells Adeimantus that, “If [he is] to plead [the philosophers’] cause, [he] must resort to fiction, combining a multitude of disparate things like painters do when they concoct a fantastic progeny of stags and goats and the like.”352 Furthermore, all throughout the Republic, Socrates calls his interlocutors to ‘imagine,’353 this or that, most notably in the allegory of the cave. As he attempts to explain how true education comes about, Socrates declares that “allegory may show us best how education—or the lack of it—affects our nature,” and he again calls his interlocutors to “imagine…”354

In fact, the whole of the Republic is a fable of sorts; it is an extended falsehood in words that Plato offers his readers. Plato offers his readers a storied account of the same metaphor that Socrates offers his interlocutors—namely, the metaphor of the city being a soul writ large.355 The irony of the denouncer of parables resorting to a parable does not escape Nietzsche’s notice. Nietzsche exposes what he understands to be Plato’s hypocrisy:

Plato, who in condemning tragedy and art in general certainly did not lag behind the naïve cynicism of his master… was nevertheless constrained by sheer artistic necessity to create an art form that was related to those forms of art which he repudiated.356 Nietzsche here exposes how Plato—even as he stands with his beloved Socrates in asserting that art is “the imitation of a phantom and hence belongs to a sphere even lower than the empirical world”—offers his readers this storied account.

In sum, Socrates and Plato appear to be tyrants at worst and hypocrites at best as they condemn in others what they themselves continue to do—namely, to speak in ‘lying’ myths and images.358

The Language Trap and Two Possible Escapes

Is Nietzsche correct, then, in declaring that Socrates and Plato cannot escape the trap of language?

Socrates and Plato attempt to point beyond myth and image with myth and image. As Nietzsche notes, they “[endeavor] to transcend reality and to represent the idea which underlies this pseudo-reality.”359 But is this possible? Nietzsche concludes that it is not; he claims that Socrates and Plato only “[arrive] by a detour where [they] had always been at home”—that is, as poets.360

Nietzsche is correct in maintaining that myth is first and last unless there exists some truth beyond it and unless words can actually disclose something of this truth. The whole of the Republic remains a falsehood of words and a poetic
but futile project unless a) there does exist some truth or reality to which these myths and images point, and b) these myths and images are actually capable of disclosing something of this external reality. Unless both of these conditions are met, the myths and allegories within the Republic—not to mention the whole of the Republic itself—fail as poetic but ineffectual fictions.

The Question of the Good: The Existence of the Good as Necessary but Insufficient

In regard to the question of the existence of some eternal truth, Socrates claims that the ultimate ground of truth and reality is the Good, which is itself “the very cause of knowledge and truth” and the “chief objective in the pursuit of knowledge.”

If the Good does not exist, however, then all is opinion and perspective, and Nietzsche is right in condemning Socrates and Plato for so relentlessly pursuing their “will to truth” that they take their own opinions and “[baptize them] solemnly as ‘the truth.’” Ultimately, if the Good does not exist, then Plato and Socrates remain merely tyrannical poets: “their ‘knowing’ is creating [values], their creating is legislation, [and] their will to truth is—will to power.” Socrates himself acknowledges that, if the Good does not exist, all falls into relativism and perspectivism: …let us turn to that good fellow who does not believe that there is anything one could call beautiful in itself, who rejects any idea of beauty absolute and unchanging. He is the same fellow who is the lover of spectacles and who believes in many beautiful things but who cannot tolerate anyone saying that beauty is one, that justice is one, and so on. Now I shall put a question and ask him to answer: my friend, will not any of these beautiful things sometimes appear ugly and base? And of the things that are just, will they not sometimes seem unjust? Of holy things, will they not sometimes seem unholy?

If, however, the Good exists and there exists this truth that stands beyond mere opinion, then Nietzsche’s perspectivism falls apart. And, indeed, this is the wager that Plato and Socrates make. Socrates tells the boys that beyond endless opinions and conjectures about shadows, there exists the Good, which “imbues the objects of knowledge and confers upon the knower the power to know”—in other words, the light of the Good illuminates and awakens the soul, enabling a person to know what is actually true and thus to break free from the realm of fallible, shadowy opinion. It is in driving the distinction between opinion and true knowledge that Socrates lays the groundwork for his rebuttal to Nietzsche’s perspectivism. If the Good does exist, then Nietzsche’s perspectivism falls apart.

Even if perspectivism is exposed as absurd, though, the existence of the Good does not give Socrates and Plato a sure escape from the language trap. The existence of the Good proves to be a necessary but ultimately insufficient condition in rendering the internal myths and whole myth of the Republic more than just a fiction. In the end, Socrates and Plato will not attain escape velocity from the language trap unless their poetic words can actually disclose to another a dim intimation of the existence of the Good. Even if the Good exists, the myths of the Republic remain failed poetic projects unless by their very words they can somehow impart the light of the Good to the uninitiated.

The Question of Disclosure through Poetic Language: Perhaps Possible Only by Charles Williams’ Pattern of Analogical Likeness and Distinction

All of the interior fables of the Republic and the whole of the work itself will prove to be ultimately ineffectual unless the words that Socrates and Plato employ can somehow disclose to another the light of the Good. Hence, the crucial question becomes: Can their words disclose this other dimension? If this is possible at all, the otherness and unfamiliarity of the Good will render it possible only by recourse to analogy—that is, by speaking in analogical likenesses and distinctions.
In an attempt to communicate to the boys what is the nature of the Good, Socrates finds himself in a quandary: he must search for words to describe the ineffable. Thrasymachus joins in the chorus with Nietzsche as he, too, criticizes Socrates for constantly reverting to myth and analogy: “Say it at last with clarity and precision, and spare us your ponderous analogies with duty or interest or profit or advantage. They produce nonsense…” Later, when they say that they would be “perfectly content” if Socrates could just explain the Good to them in straightforward speech, Socrates responds, “That would content me, too... But I fear my powers may not be able to reach so far.”

A bit later, Socrates tells Glaucon, “My dear Glaucon, you won’t be able to follow me any further, and not because goodwill is lacking on my part. If I could, I would no longer show you allegories and symbols but the very truth itself.”

Yet, failing to directly show Glaucon and the boys the Good, Socrates persists with his poetic language, determining instead “to speak of what is most nearly like the Good.” Precisely because Socrates cannot show them the Good directly—that is, precisely because the Good is so altogether other from that which is familiar to the boys in the realm of shadows and opinions—he must turn to poetic analogy. He will speak of likenesses, all the while reminding them that he is giving them only the interest on the principal. That is, he will speak in likenesses and distinctions—just as he employs the likeness and distinction pattern between cities and souls throughout the whole of the Republic. It is the ineffability of the Good that justifies Socrates’ usage of tropes that would otherwise be only lies.

As it turns out, if the Good does exist and if it is so altogether other—as Socrates claims it does and is—then myth and poetic imagery are justified as the only recourses that Socrates, as the man who has seen the Good, can employ to speak of it. It is precisely because the Good is ineffable that the man who has seen it must speak in analogues—that is, in myth and poetry—when speaking with those who have not seen it. The only way that he might be able to help the boys to dimly intimate this other dimension is by treading the path of likenesses and distinctions.

It is this pattern of drawing simultaneous likenesses and distinctions that links Socrates to the 20th-century English writer Charles Williams. Williams’ analogical approach to describing God quite closely parallels Socrates’ analogical approach to describing the Good. With his most famous declaration, “This is also Thou; neither is this Thou,” Williams marries the kataphatic and apophatic theological traditions. With this phrase, Williams affirms the human ability to speak positively about who God is while still maintaining that all positive descriptions of Him fall far short of articulating the whole of His essence. In like manner, Socrates draws likenesses between the forms of the unfamiliar intelligible order and the shadows of the familiar visible order—for example by stating that the Good is like the sun while maintaining that there are also crucial distinctions between the two. Speaking in metaphors, Socrates proceeds as Williams does, ever repeating, “This is also the Good; neither is this the Good.”

An Interlude: But Wait, Why Tell Others?

Socrates, however, has already seen the Good and therefore has no need of poetic analogy to understand it for himself. He has seen the principal; he does not need the interest. Why, then, does he continue to labor over language as he does?

It seems that Socrates has seen the Good and its benefits and now desires that others, too, might taste and see. Here, Socrates exhibits that ‘last sin’ that Nietzsche finds so odious—namely, compassionate pity. In Socrates we see little of the “pathos of distance” so championed by Nietzsche. Instead, after having seen the light of the Good himself and being imbued with true knowledge, Socrates goes “down to the Piraeus,” down into the realm of shadowy
opinion. There—like the freed prisoner in the allegory of the cave who returns to the dark cave out of pity for his fellow-prisoners—Socrates engages people in dialogue, hoping to somehow lead them to the Good by disclosing the true and dispelling the false through analogy.

Likeness and Distinction in Speaking of Truth and in Dislodging Falsehood

As we have seen, employing likeness and distinction—that is, analogy—remains the only mechanism by which Socrates can speak of the Good. As it turns out, this analogical pattern proves to be not just the only way in which he might be able to disclose the truth, but also the only way in which he might be able to expose and dislodge deeply-rooted falsehood. In his effort to dispel falsehood, Socrates relies on the lie of words as an antidote—which by nature uses likeness and distinction to remedy the illness of falsehood.

Socrates introduces the ‘noble lie’ to explain why and how a philosopher of clear vision like himself would resort to the poetic devices of the deceitful imitative artists when in conversation with those still trapped in the world of shadows. In short, he asserts that the lie of words is his weapon of choice in combating a much more serious lie—namely, the lie “that finds lodging in the inmost part of men’s souls and remains there to deceive them” by “prevent[ing] [them] from distinguishing between reality and unreality.” Socrates argues that the “true lie is ignorance in the soul of the man deceived,” whereas “the lie in words... does no more than imitate what the true lie does to the soul.” Socrates refers to himself as the doctor who will employ the lies of words as “a kind of medicine or remedy.” Because this lie of words “bears only a somewhat shadowy resemblance to the true lie and is not altogether false,” it functions as a medical antidote would: by containing a bit of poison, it helps the soul to rid itself of the true disease—that is, to dislodge the lie of the soul.

An Unreliable Remedy: The Antidote May Bring Illness Instead of Health

Yet, for those whose eyes have not been illuminated by the light of the Good, these analogies, myths, stories, and images remain a threat. Just as the disease-causing agent of a vaccine may on occasion incite illness rather than health, so also the antidotal lie of words may strengthen rather than dislodge the lie harbored in the soul. As Socrates describes the Good and its benefits by likeness and distinctions, the danger remains that the boys—and all of the uninitiated—may latch onto false understandings and find his analogies “misleading,” as Thrasymachus does. Because they have not seen “what is eternal and unchanging,” they will likely “wander about inspecting swarms of irrelevancies.” For example, in the shift from Book IV to Book V, Socrates beckons Glaucon to “Come up” for better observation, only to be pulled back down by the boys as they press Socrates on his claims about women and children and common possessions. The boys repeatedly mistake the object of their search—the ‘true gold’ of the justice of the soul that comes from the Good—for the “fool’s gold” of justice in the city.

Socrates himself is well aware of this inherent, misleading danger of analogies as he states, “the doctor who is most capable of protecting us from disease is also the most capable of infecting us.” Further, he warns the boys: “take care that [in giving you the interest on the principal] I don’t falsely reckon the interest and unwittingly deceive you.” The danger of deception inherent in poetry and myth which leads Socrates to banish the imitative artists remains a threat, and Socrates even quakes at the possibility of unwittingly deceiving the boys, solemnly declaring, “I truly believe that killing a man involuntarily is a lesser crime than misleading men.” Analogies can heighten both clarity and mystery, and Socrates appears to have no control over which effect it may have in his interlocutors.
Unless the Divine Breaks In, Socrates and Plato Only Heap Up More Lies

In the end, poetry remains a threat because Socrates cannot guarantee that his lie of words will heal the lie of soul; the danger remains that his myths will further darken his interlocutors’ vision instead of illuminating it. Socrates, in the end, shows himself to be rather powerless in his attempts to bring his interlocutors to the light of the Good. Neither Socrates nor his antidotal lies of words can ultimately turn the prisoner. The real source of illumination and conversion turns out to be far more mysterious—and far more divine.398 And ultimately, all of Socrates and Plato’s lies of words remain utterly impotent at best and corrupting at worst if there is no divine illumination.

Even as Socrates acknowledges the power of dialogue, education, and dialectic to aid in the soul’s conversion by trying to direct the man’s dim vision toward the light of the Good,399 he maintains that the turn is fundamentally mysterious: “This will be no child’s game of flipping shells. It is a conversion, a turning of the soul away from the day whose light is darkness to the true day.”400 In the end, no matter how many stories he has told or how many analogies he has employed, it is neither Socrates nor his stories that turn the prisoner; the prisoner “is freed” and “is suddenly compelled” to move by something much more mysterious.401 So, even all of Socrates’ careful lies will remain ineffective unless the light of the Good somehow breaks in to overcome mankind’s resistance to truth and the prisoner is somehow turned—all of which, Socrates says, we would “not be off the mark” to attribute to “god’s providence.”402

Even as he realizes that neither he nor his stories actually cause the awakening of the divine element of the soul, Socrates nonetheless continues to tell his metaphoric fables, convinced that he “cannot remain silent.”403 So he continues to try to point beyond poetry and myth with poetry and myth, hoping—more, praying404—that the divine light of the Good will shine upon his interlocutors.

For this reason, Socrates understands himself to be a midwife: he assists in the birth, but he himself is certainly not the cause of it.405 The best he can do is to wander through the marketplace, recognize the pregnant ones, and help them along in the birth. The Republic, as it were, is the fable he gives to the pregnant ones.406 And even if this fable should help at all, it will be by the divine power. As Socrates suggests, myth and poetry were gifts from the gods to begin with: “it seems to me,” he suggests, “that some god conveyed to men the two arts of music and gymnastic.”407 In addition, referring to the soul-to-city metaphor, he says that it would be “a godsend” if his interlocutors are somehow able “to read the larger letters first and then check the smaller letters against them to see if they correspond”—that is, it would be a miracle attributable to the gods if his interlocutors are somehow able to rightly interpret the likenesses and distinctions that drive the analogy between the city and the soul.408

Unless the divine breaks in through—or even despite409—his lies of words, all of Socrates’ analogies and the whole of the Republic at large remain only innocuous poetic images at best or corrupting lies at worst. The best that Socrates and Plato can do, then, is hope that their myths and stories might function as the vehicle through which the divine gift of illumination is imparted.

The True Effectual Word

Against Socrates’ ineffectual parables that lack the inherent power to illumine a soul, there stands a word that does bring conversion—even through apparent ‘lies of words.’ The monumental distinction between Socrates’ impersonal “the Good” and Williams’ personal “Thou” determines the effectuality of the analogical parable: men speak analogically of the Good without the guarantee of illuminating their hearers, while Williams’ “Thou” is the personal God who effectually reveals Himself by His word.410
After Socrates there would come One who would “[open His] mouth in parables” and “utter what [had] been hidden since the foundation of the world.” Jesus, the eternal Word of God, engaged his interlocutors on the level of metaphor and analogy. Just as Thrasymachus criticizes Socrates for speaking in analogies, so also did Jesus’ disciples ask why He spoke to them in parables. Like Socrates, Jesus also knew that a parable cuts two ways, bringing sight to some and casting others into deeper darkness: “‘For the one who has, more will be given, and he will have an abundance, but from the one who has not, even what he has will be taken away.’”

And yet, there remains one crucial distinction between Socrates and Jesus on the question of the efficacy of speaking in parables: whereas Socrates knows his lies of words are not the true cause of a soul’s turn from darkness to light, Jesus’ words themselves bring life—and in a manner quite different than that of Nietzschean understanding of vitality, for his are the “‘words of eternal life’” that are in accord with eternal truth and so escape the trap of perspectivism. Furthermore, whereas for Plato proper sight and the consequent freedom from perspectivism come from the mysterious divine illumination and not from Socrates’ own parables, “‘hearing [comes] through the word of Christ.’” Unlike Socrates’ fables that may fall flat, the “living and active” word of God accomplishes its purposes:

> For as the rain and the snow come down from heaven and do not return there but water the earth, making it bring forth and sprout, giving seed to the sower and bread to the eater, so shall [His] word be that goes out from [His] mouth; it shall not return to [Him] empty, but it shall accomplish that which [He] purpose[s], and shall succeed in the thing for which [He] sent it.

**Conclusion**

Unless the divine breaks in, myth and poetry remain only innocuous fictions at best and corrupting lies at worst. While the poetic device of analogy may be able to disclose something of the truth and to dispel falsehoods, its ultimate unreliability and inherent power to deceive further renders even its likeness-and-distinction patterns insufficient in the task of illuminating the soul with the truth.

Even the most skilled analogist who wanders through the marketplace ever repeating, “This is also the Good; neither is this the Good,” can only hope and pray that his lies of words will serve as vehicles through which—or despite which—the divine illuminates the minds of men. In the end, “neither he who plants nor he who waters is anything, but only God”—only the divine breaking in—“who gives the growth.”

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Titus Maccius Plautus, a Roman comedian famous for his interpretations of classic Greek plays, wrote scores of shows adored by Roman audiences. Writing in the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C., the author penned uniquely Roman slapstick, incorporating references to subjects ranging from Roman law to the Senate and even the geography of the city. Aside from merely providing a glimpse into the Roman world, influences of Plautus’ work persist through generations of comedic writers. Plautus created unforgettable stock characters, such as the braggart soldier from the play Miles Gloriosus. This character inspired Shakespeare’s Falstaff and the trope appears today in television shows ranging from Glee to Game of Thrones. Plautus’ characterization of women and the roles they play within his work merit further examination, as the tropes he created for women may bear the same influence on modern media.

Plautus’ humor operates by subverting cultural expectations. The author introduces seemingly stereotypical characters and narratives and, in portraying them, deviates from the audience’s expectations. Rather than adhering to the standard plot devices of the era, Plautus creates a purely farcical narrative. He juxtaposes expected characters and scenarios with absurd moments of deviance, creating humor through trope subversion. Plautus’ tendency towards comedic subversion manifests itself in a variety of themes that run throughout his works.

He explores love as a form of financial transaction, playing with the ideas of women-on-loan and a purchased amica, and the tension between the Gods and mortals by, for instance, portraying Mercury as a servus calidus (clever slave) and Jupiter as a senex amans (lecherous/amorous old man). Plautus’ portrayal of women in the comedies Amphitruo and Mostellaria also illustrates his farcical style. The author includes two central female characters in these plays: Philematium and Alcumena. In Mostellaria, a young man (Philolaches) spent his father’s savings to purchase the freedom of a courtesan, Philematium. When the father returns home, a family slave attempts to hide the son’s choice through a series of increasingly absurd lies. In the play, the author characterizes Philematium, the former prostitute, as an honorable lover. In Amphitruo, a pregnant woman has sex with Jupiter, who disguised himself as her husband. When her actual husband, Amphitruo, returns home the next day, chaos ensues. The actions of Jupiter and Mercury, who misdirect the family disguised as Amphitruo and his slave, Sosia, only add to the confusion. In the course of the story, the author establishes Alcumena as the idealized Roman wife while simultaneously placing her within a tragic plot and employing masculine diction in her speech. Plautus’ portrayal of women in Mostellaria and Amphitruo draws upon normative cultural practices, identities, and languages to create humorous tension between the expected and performed narrative.
The Crass Courtesan on the Make
The courtesan character appears frequently in the Roman comic tradition. Typically, courtesans are either older, experienced women pursuing financial gain, or younger women working to attain their freedom. The former strives to attain wealth and security, while the latter appears as more sympathetic and considerate, usually with the goal of attaining or maintaining her freedom. Whatever her motivations, a courtesan does not conform to the Roman concept of a “good woman.” Her active sexuality, unmarried status, and relative independence prevent her from attaining the Roman feminine ideal (chaste, beneath the control of her husband or father, and passively sexual only within her marriage). In Roman comedies, courtesans typically employ bawdy, emasculating repartee, as befitting their unchaste identities. Callidamates and Delphium, another young man and his courtesan girlfriend in Mostellaria, demonstrate the expected raunchy humor surrounding prostitution. Walking to Philolaches’ house, Callidamates asks his girlfriend “ecquid tibi videor ma-ma-madere?” [Do I seem completely ma-ma-madere to you?] Although “ma-ma-madere” translates to “drunk,” Callidamates stammering calls to mind the Latin phrase mamma adire, or “to touch (one’s) breast.” In the same scene, Delphium makes a similarly crass pun to Callidamates on his inability to “stand up.” She says “But I will allow this [to fall], which is in my hand: if you fall, you do not fall without me falling with you.” The phallic humor on Callidamates’ inability to “stay up” after overindulging requires little explication. In short, Roman comics typically portray prostitutes as self-serving women who employ crass humor and fail to attain Roman ideals of womanhood.

Philematium: a Low Character of High Character
The Roman audience would expect Philematium to employ the same lowbrow sexual humor and self-serving values that characterize other courtesans. They would be accustomed to the techniques of New Comedy, the Greek tradition that informs Plautus’ plays. New Comedy centers on plots justifying family against passion (which could be represented, for example, by a young man buying a courtesan with whom he has fallen in love). The New Comic tradition expressed an understanding that high-class families would not sanction romantic unions that endangered their family’s socioeconomic status. In a New Comic format, the author would categorize the courtesan love interest as low-class and undesirable, making the impropriety of the match clear to the audience. Take, for instance, the New Comic plot of Menander’s Hecyra, based on the earlier Greek works by Apollodorus of Carystus. In Hecyra, Menander tells the story of a young man, Pamphilus, enamored of a prostitute, Bacchis. However, when Pamphilus enters a marriage with a freeborn woman (Philumena), Bacchis begins to reject his advances, and eventually Pamphilus falls deeply in love with his new wife. Hecyra exhibits a typical New Comic romantic plot, wherein the interests of the family are valued over the initial romantic love (or lust) of an individual. In his portrayal of Philematium, Plautus blatantly flouts this convention. Namely, he portrays Philematium as an upright and desirable woman, elevates her diction and rhetoric, and illustrates a mutually affectionate relationship between her and Philolaches.

Firstly, in order to subvert the expected characteristics of a comic prostitute, Plautus portrays Philematium as possessing the ideal features of a Roman wife: faithfulness to one man, obedience to a husband, and concept of an eternal union. When the old slave-woman Scapha (likely a former prostitute herself) tries to convince Philematium that she should use her freedom to court many men, the following exchange occurs:

SC: By Castor, you certainly make a mistake, [you] who wait on that one man and thus humor that man especially and spurn all others.
It’s alright for married women to serve one lover, not for courtesans…

He will desert you with age and full-ness.

PHILE: That man freed me alone for himself alone at his own expense:

I believe that it is appropriate for me to be devoted to that man alone.437

Here, Philematium expresses the feminine virtue of univera, or being a “one-man woman.” The ideal of univera bears strong connotations of chastity and honor for a Roman wife, and commonly appears on Roman epitaphs.438 This devotion to one man expressed an extremely laudable form of wifely faith. Just like a devoted wife, Philematium shows a desire and willingness to give herself to Philolaches, putting him above all other men.

In the same scene, Philematium expresses the Roman ideal of female obedience to a husband. She constantly questions Scapha about how she can please Philolaches; making requests such as, “Look, dear Scapha, as to whether these clothes suit me. I want to please my Philolaches, my little eye, my patron.” (166-167) She wants to look beautiful and act beautifully not out of personal pride or desire to attract men, but in order to please her lover. A sense of duty appropriate for a Roman matrona motivates Philematium here.439 Roman wives were supposed to act dutifully out of a desire to please their husbands, and Philematium clearly possesses this desire. She promises Philolaches the fidelity (both sexually and emotionally) that Roman husbands praised and valued in their own wives.440

While expressing her faith to and love of Philolaches, she does not employ crude innuendo, but instead relies on upright, philosophical maxims and elevated diction (ex. “Whatever reputation a man has, so he is accustomed to finding reward. If I will have preserved a good reputation for myself, I will be wealthy enough.”)441 Her stately and sophisticated language harkens to mind a wealthy, established woman, not a poor prostitute.442 She defends her husband and her devotion in the high rhetoric of the wealthy, which does not correlate with her poor financial standing and former servitude.

Finally, Philematium also displays the idealized marital desire for an eternal union:

SC: But you think on this one thing: if you look after that man alone

While you now have this age [i.e. while are young], you will complain badly in old age…

PHILE: I ought to have the same gratitude now, since I obtained it, just as once, before I acquired it, when I was caressing that man.443

Rather than accept the idea that Philolaches may abandon her with age, Philematium stubbornly avows her devotion. When Philematium expresses her intent to show the “same gratitude” to Philolaches now as she did formerly, denying Scapha’s supposition that he will abandon her, she affirms her intent to stay with Philolaches as long as he will love her. The concept of eternal love between a husband and wife, although idealistic, appealed just as much to the Roman audience as it does to the modern reader. Eternal love is unrealistic, to be sure, but lovers aspired to it nevertheless.444 A prostitute upon the stage displaying the idealized, romantic sentiments and language of a chaste Roman wife undoubtedly undermined the audience’s expectations for a courtesan character. Instead of an object of derision, the text presents Philematium as a desirable and devoted partner, surpassing all standards in her love of Philolaches. Philematium himself demonstrates how desirable she is, frequently referring to her as “charming” and providing positive evaluation of her romantic affirmations (line 203, “a charming woman and with a chaste character”).445 The subversion of the standard portrayal of a prostitute plays into Plautus’ comedic narrative. He turns the audience’s expectations of the prostitute upside-down in a humorous and heart-warming way, challenging the New Comic tradition of upholding family over romance. In so doing, Plautus creates a “character study” (so to speak) in ideal Roman womanhood. As a prostitute, Philematium would be an object of
crude sexual desire, but the character herself displays the characteristics that men sought in their own wives. Although she should be the object of “low humor,” her language and ideology makes her comparable to a high-class Roman woman. The transgressive and farcical aspect of Plautus’ comedy allows him to tease out the humorous tension between what sorts of women could be sexually and emotionally desirable, and asking the question of his audience: can a woman be both?

A Good Woman

If Plautus was juxtaposing aspects of sexual desire and moral worth in Mostellaria, no such tension exists in Amphitruo. Rather, Plautus begins by establishing Alcumena, Amphitruo’s wife, as a flawless Roman woman. Morally worthy, devoted to her husband, and thoroughly loyal, Alcumena appears to be an outstanding wife. Her virtue and desirability deserves note. Although the narratives of Roman comedies often have the end goal of marriage between a young man and woman, established marriages typically appear in a negative light. In other Plautine works, husbands and wives complain about their relationships and husbands dream of escape. Alcumena and Amphitruo call to mind an idealized, mutually affectionate relationship, rather than the marital strife typically found in the world of comedy. When Jupiter, disguised as Amphitruo, leaves Alcumena to return to the army, she repeatedly protests. She tells him: “You set your wife in tears by your departure” and “that ‘short time’ [until you return] is a long time.” She clearly cherishes her husband, yearning to be with him. When accused of adultery, Alcumena provides a defense that has been described as Roman “good wife porn”:

AL: I do not believe that to be my dowry, which is called a dowry, but [instead my dowry is] chastity and modesty and subdued desire, fear of the gods, love of [my] parents, and concord with [my] relatives, obedience to you and that I am benevolent to the good, [that] I am good to the upright.

She believes that her own worth comes from her proper relationship with her family, especially her husband, and the gods. She values her own chastity and modesty, her own subdued desire and obedience for her husband. These modest, wifely virtues would make Alcumena an irresistible Roman woman, conforming completely to the normative gendered ideal. Her choice of the word “dowry” [dotem] also bears note. In Plautus’ era, although the dowry system remained key to the social order, popular culture displayed hostility towards dowered wives. Roman men believed that wealthy wives who brought large dowries to a marriage undermined the proper power dynamic of a marriage, gaining psychological and financial independence from their monetary worth. Alcumena’s insistence that her value (both personally and to her husband) arises from her “chastity and modesty” rather than her financial worth would demonstrate to the viewers that she maintains a traditional devotion to her husband rather than culturally inappropriate financial and personal independence. Both in her actions and in her values, Plautus shows that Alcumena should be the perfect Roman wife.

The Perfect Woman as a Tragically Adulterous Man

If Amphitruo came home to his perfectly virtuous wife at the end of the war, reunited with her, and enjoyed his family for the rest of his life, Amphitruo would not be a very interesting (or remotely funny) play. Instead, Plautus subverts the character of the virtuous wife with two absurd twists: he makes her into an adulteress, and he highlights the fact that “she” is really a man. With these turns, he burlesques the ideal Roman woman, and explores a typically “tragic” narrative of adultery within the realm of comedy.

When Jupiter (disguised as Amphitruo) tricks Alcmena into sleeping with him, he
throws this upright woman into the dangerous world of adultery. In Roman society, one of the main concerns of marriage was procreation. The purpose of a union between husband and wife was not sex (a man could have sex out of wedlock), but rather the production of legitimate children.\footnote{As such, the punishment for female adultery was extremely harsh, sometimes resulting in death. The harsh punishment to freeborn women and the social threat posed by adultery meant that adultery narratives typically appear in Classical tragedies rather than comedies. However, Alcumena commits adultery without knowing it—she still upholds the values and intentions of a devoted Roman wife.} As such, the punishment for female adultery was extremely harsh, sometimes resulting in death.\footnote{The harsh punishment to freeborn women and the social threat posed by adultery meant that adultery narratives typically appear in Classical tragedies rather than comedies. However, Alcumena commits adultery without knowing it—she still upholds the values and intentions of a devoted Roman wife.} The harsh punishment to freeborn women and the social threat posed by adultery meant that adultery narratives typically appear in Classical tragedies rather than comedies. However, Alcumena commits adultery without knowing it—she still upholds the values and intentions of a devoted Roman wife. \textit{Amphitruo} then becomes a high-stakes “comedy of errors.”\footnote{As Mercury puts it to the audience: “That woman [Alcumena] believes that man [Jupiter] to be her own husband, she who is with an adulterer.” Although the story of adultery is inherently tragic, Alcumena’s own innocence (and the assurance of Jupiter that he will return the marriage to its former harmony\footnote{In this monologue, Alcumena persuades the audience of the importance of virtus. In the Plautine corpus, virtus appears referring both to military, physical courage and “non-aggressive” courage used to protect the homeland (as displayed above). More generally, virtus represents a sort of vaunted manhood, encompassing physical strength, bravery, and moral fortitude. These values were decidedly masculine. The word virtus itself (repeated four times in the excerpt) derives its origin from the word “vir,” or man. The word “penest” in the excerpt, a prodelision literally translated here as “he possesses,” also calls to mind masculinity as a phallic pun on “penis.” The hyper-feminine character expounding on masculinity reminds the audience that a man portrays this wonderful woman. The actor’s gender would be hard to forget—“she” would probably have an over-stuffed false belly to appear pregnant, the exaggeration of which, combined with “her” masculine features and rhetoric, would prevent the audience from suspending their disbelief and imagining that the actor himself was a woman. In short, the audience would no longer be able to ignore the actor’s gender, because the tension between the explicitly female masculine-feminine tension through Alcumena’s own speech. Just after lamenting the loss of her husband, “she” expounds on the subject of \textit{virtus} (masculine virtue):} \begin{quote} AL: Let him be absent, provided that only he returns himself home with praise acquired… \textit{virtus} is the very best reward; \textit{virtus} truly surpasses all things: freedom, health, life, property and parents, the homeland and children are kept safe, are preserved [by it]: \textit{virtus} has everything in itself, all good things are present for him who possesses [penest] \textit{virtus}.\footnote{In this monologue, Alcumena persuades the audience of the importance of virtus. In the Plautine corpus, virtus appears referring both to military, physical courage and “non-aggressive” courage used to protect the homeland (as displayed above). More generally, virtus represents a sort of vaunted manhood, encompassing physical strength, bravery, and moral fortitude. These values were decidedly masculine. The word virtus itself (repeated four times in the excerpt) derives its origin from the word “vir,” or man. The word “penest” in the excerpt, a prodelision literally translated here as “he possesses,” also calls to mind masculinity as a phallic pun on “penis.” The hyper-feminine character expounding on masculinity reminds the audience that a man portrays this wonderful woman. The actor’s gender would be hard to forget—“she” would probably have an over-stuffed false belly to appear pregnant, the exaggeration of which, combined with “her” masculine features and rhetoric, would prevent the audience from suspending their disbelief and imagining that the actor himself was a woman. In short, the audience would no longer be able to ignore the actor’s gender, because the tension between the explicitly female masculine-feminine tension through Alcumena’s own speech. Just after lamenting the loss of her husband, “she” expounds on the subject of \textit{virtus} (masculine virtue):} \end{quote}

Plautus also relies on a key aspect of Roman theater while constructing the humor of Alcumena’s character: all Roman stage actors were men. An inherent comedic contradiction exists when a man portrays the ideal Roman woman. For all her declarations of chastity and honor, Alcumena nonetheless \textit{must} be a man, beneath her mask. Plautus reminds the audience of this
persona and clearly male individual would be too great. The monologue therefore becomes comic, the ideal woman constantly referencing her own masculinity, breaking the fourth wall with comedic reference to “her” own penis and virtus. The unexpected jokes and masculine language from a man disguised “woman” would defy audience’s expectation and probably provoke laughter and amusement. Later in the play, in an attempted divorce speech act between Alcumena and Jupiter, Plautus employs a similar technique:

AL: I have made these words void by [my]
virtus;
Now, because I have separated myself from
impure deeds,
I want to turn myself from impure words.
Goodbye, you have your own property,
return mine.
Do you order associates to go with me?
IU: Are you sane?466

Here, Alcumena again employs the term virtus, this time self-referentially. This diction would be especially bizarre to the Roman audience, coming from a woman. The word choice comes across as an act of burlesque. In a similar instance of transgression, Alcumena initiates the standard Roman divorce formula, telling Jupiter “You have your own property, return mine.”467 Since Roman divorce was a private action that did not require recognition from any church or state, the performative divorce language could hypothetically end a marriage, regardless of which spouse employed it. However, Roman citizens likely did not consider it socially appropriate for a woman to initiate a divorce, and female-initiated divorces occurred very rarely.468 Jupiter himself admits the oddity of the exchange, asking Alcumena “Are you sane?” (Jupiter’s reaction also plays into the theme and language of insanity and sanity throughout Amphitruo, wherein those characters interacting with and perhaps afflicted by contact with the Gods suffer from an apparent madness of proximity, each illogical and seemingly impossible interaction with the Divine propagating confusion and madness that eventually can only be resolved through Jupiter’s intervention.469) Alcumena here takes on a role that decidedly indexes masculinity, creating a humorous gendered tension between her expected behavior as a woman, her masculine language, and the actor’s own gender. Alcumena’s socially masculine language and performative act of divorce reminded the audience that a man lurked beneath her mask, and her unexpected speech acts reinforced this fact in a humorous way. In Alcumena’s character, Plautus toys with the idealized Roman woman, subverting her character both through the events of the story (a woman undone by her own virtue) and through her masculine diction (reminding the audience of the actor’s gender). As with Philematium’s subversion of the prostitute-girlfriend trope, Alcumena serves to surprise and amuse Plautus’ Roman audience, challenging their expectations of narrative and characterization.

Complicating Comedy: Subversive Humor as Indirect Criticism

Plautus’ use of subversive diction and characterization to establish humor, as discussed above, is well attested within scholarship and literary criticism. However, the Plautine farce serves a purpose beyond merely establishing comedic tension. Namely, the subversive humor serves to explore liminal spaces and roles within Roman society. In the examples of Philematium and Alcumena, Plautus reveals the break between women’s expected roles or behavior within the Roman social Discourse and what sort of roles they actually undertook or what sort of behavior individual men found laudable and attractive. The socially normative character of the ideal Roman wife follows the virtues described above: a submissive, dutiful woman, who devotes herself entirely to her man. In practice, though, many women must have deviated from this practice, and many men must have found their non-conforming wives laudable. As a comparison, consider the famous funerary inscription,
the Laudatio Turiae. In the text, the husband of the deceased (a woman named Turia) eulogizes what he considers to be her many virtues. Here, he praises his wife’s performance while protecting the family’s interests in the legal sphere. He claims she “defended [their] common cause by asserting the truth” and he admires the fact that “[she] maintained that [she] would not come under the state of [his] legal guardianship.” Not only does Turia’s husband praise the fact that she remains outside of his legal control, but he also lauds her ability to perform in the courts. Defending the family in the public setting with spontaneous argumentation was a vital aspect of virtus (idealized masculinity, as described above). By praising Turia’s legal performance, her husband expresses an admiration for an implied masculine aspect of her character.

Simultaneously, though, the speaker praises Turia’s decision that they “should both keep the property, instead of [her] getting all of it alone,” indicating that he admired the fact that she did not seek financial independence. He refers to his wife as exhibiting “loyalty, obedience, ... [and] modesty of appearance.” In one funeral inscription, the sometimes-contradictory tension between socially acceptable female behavior and what individual Romans considered laudable or desirable comes to fruition. What Turia’s husband found admirable about his wife at times deviated and at other times conformed to the social Discourse, just as the traits that different individuals find laudable conform to or deviate from normative Discourse today.

Plautus’ female characterizations operate similarly to the Laudatio Turiae. His comedy becomes a sort of social criticism. In the seemingly benign format of humor and the theater, where the audience suspends their disbelief as gods and actors brawl and crack jokes upon the stage, Plautus’ narrative acts as a sort of cultural spotlight, shedding light on and drawing attention to the reality of Roman womanhood (and perhaps Roman life itself): its contradictory liminality. In Philematium’s character (as discussed above), Plautus plays with sexual desirability. He indirectly challenges the audience to reconsider their cultural presuppositions of what kinds of women were acceptable for love and relationships. He acknowledges the unspoken contradiction in the very role of a courtesan in Roman society: that she is simultaneously extremely sexually desirable but morally inferior. She was made less-than-a-citizen through her enslavement, but Roman citizens lusted after her regardless, even fell in love with her.

Alcumena’s masculinization also speaks to tensions between the Roman practice and normative ideal of womanhood. Like Turia, Alcumena exhibits masculine qualities alongside her feminine virtues. Although this ideological “gap” between the two sets of virtues would be comical, Roman viewers might also have seen aspects of their own wives and women they admired in Alcumena when she defended herself and spoke on the ideal of virtus. Alcumena not only adopts many of the Roman female morals, but also can uphold her interests while being emotionally manipulated (in the “divorce speech act” with Jupiter) and demonstrates a potentially laudable masculinity. While exploring the tension between gender norms and gendered practices, Plautus perhaps attempts to cast light on the multifarious ways in which Roman woman would act, both outside and inside standard ideas of femininity. Perhaps this exploration is why, despite their apparent “deviance” both Philematium and Alcumena have ultimately happy endings (a presumably continued relationship with Philolaches and a harmonious relationship with Amphitruo, respectively) by the end of their stories. They are allowed happy endings because they are more than problematically deviant women. Instead, neither strictly conforming to the social Discourse nor strictly deviating from it, they may perform gender in a way mimicking the contradictory social practice(s) of the time. Philematium and Alcumena play with the audience’s preconceptions of what it means to be a woman, at times causing the viewer to reflect on the tension between their own ideals and practices.
Conclusion

Plautus’ women do not behave in the way that the audience assumes they will. Philematium upholds the high ideals of Roman womanhood and remains faithful to Philolaches, defying established tropes of New Comedy. Alcumena, initially established as the faithful wife, takes on masculine language and accidentally becomes an adulteress, despite her faithfulness to her husband. Rather than relying on established tropes, Plautus appeals to the Roman audience by challenging their understanding of characterization and plot. The farcical scenes that he creates, contrasting characters’ expected behavior and unexpected deviance (the ideals of Scapha and Philematium, or Alcumena’s wifely desirability and masculinity), create humor by startling the Roman viewers and playing with key tenets of their cultural narrative. Simultaneously, Plautus uses his comedic subversion as a means by which to challenge the audience’s preconceived social stereotypes. His female characters, by operating at once outside and inside the expected cultural Discourse, conforming and deviating, provoke the viewer to reflect on the double-bind of female social expectations and practices. Beneath the humor, the viewer must confront the tensions between Roman society and the individual, attempting to reconcile the performed transgression and desirability, and perhaps suggesting that the viewers see both sorts of behavior inside themselves. Ultimately, Plautus’ women flout expectations both as an act of humor and of social criticism. Novel and astounding, they explore potential breaks between cultural Discourse and practice that persist to the modern day.

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Maria Edgeworth creates a portrayal of Tipu Sultan in her short story, *Lame Jervas*, of disputable accuracy. Edgeworth included *Lame Jervas* (1804) as a part of a collection of short stories, *Popular Tales*, published five years after the British defeat of Tipu, the ruler of the Kingdom of Mysore. The British killed Tipu in the Siege of Seringapatam in 1799, ending the Fourth—and final—Anglo-Mysore War and subjugating Mysore to British imperial rule. Edgeworth published her work in response to social unrest in Ireland, which had arisen from questions on the justification of empire and moral governance. With these questions being equally relevant in India, Edgeworth poses them in Mysore through her morally pure protagonist, Lame Jervas. There, he encounters a ruler, Tipu Sultan, defined by his “oriental despotism.” Tipu is characterized as inhumane in his treatment of prisoners, oppressive in his religious policies, simple in his approach to technology, and immorally dismissive of bonded laborers. With *Lame Jervas* intended as a “Popular Tale,” this characterization heavily reflects the British cultural view of Tipu. The inaccuracy of this portrayal has significant implications on the themes of Edgeworth’s work, while also informing the reader of her intent to support “moral” British rule.

The title of Chapter XV, “Tygers and Despots are dangerous Friends,” plainly reveals much about Edgeworth’s attitude towards Tipu Sultan. By namelessly referring to Tipu, labeled the Tyger of Mysore, with the epithets, “Tyger” and “Despot,” she relies on her audience to connect to their prior knowledge of what a tyger and despot are in the British context. The title is declaratory and brief in a way that makes it seem incontestable, requiring no additional evidence. In the same way the title of Chapter IV, “A Discovery, grateful Feelings, and strong Fears” is simply descriptive; Chapter XV’s claim about Tipu is also portrayed as an unbiased observation, though a contestable opinion. Edgeworth is able to make these claims because her attitude towards him is derived from British culture and its popular opinions of Tipu at the time.

British culture portrayed Tipu Sultan in the same manner as Edgeworth, revealing her characterization as not unique, but culturally derived. Various types of art, such as plays, paintings, and literature, on Tipu Sultan expose the depth of the integration of his despotic characterization into British culture. Plays, such as *Tippoo Saib; or, British Valour in India* (1791) and *Tipoo Saib; or, the Siege of Bangalore* (1792), released during British campaigns against Tipu and after his defeat in the Third Anglo-Mysore War, reinforced a negative characterization of Tipu in British culture by “obviat[ing] lingering accounts of atrocity” in the Anglo-Mysore Wars. Interestingly, these plays accounted for both British and Mysorean...
atrocities, but through a lens of “British valour and paternalism,” which resonates strongly with Edgeworth’s work.473 Similar to these dual accounts with different portrayals, in Lame Jervas, Edgeworth constructs two models of poor treatment and subjugation in both the coal mines of Cornwall and under Tipu in Mysore. Only the British model is shown to be ultimately beneficial, as the mine owner provides opportunity to Jervas in a paternalistic manner, while Jervas must escape from Tipu’s model.

Paintings also highlight Tipu’s despotic British cultural characterization. For example, in The departure of the sons of Tippoo from the zenana (1793), the painter, Mather Brown, alludes heavily to well-known depictions of Richard III—known as one of the most despotic English kings—in his depiction of Tipu Sultan through mirroring of his stance in other paintings.474 In this way, artwork drew upon British history to better facilitate the cultural understanding of Tipu as a despot. In addition, literature produced later, such as Meadows Taylor’s Tippoo Sultan (1840), continued to portray Tipu as tyrannical, displaying the saliency in British culture of this characterization.475 The influence of these elements of British culture likely caused the Anglo-Irish Edgeworth to integrate a conservatively British view of Tipu into Lame Jervas.

Through an evaluation of historical and recent research on Tipu Sultan’s policies and personality, Edgeworth’s characterization of Tipu is shown to be false to various degrees. For example, Tipu’s treatment of prisoners is shown to be unusually cruel when the false accusation of Omychund, a Gentoo merchant, led to Jervas’s imprisonment. Jervas describes himself as being “feeble...for want of food” and having “sunk into a state of insensibility” due to his mistreatment, longing to return to a freer Britain after “the most miserable day of [his] existence.”476 Edgeworth employs strong language in all three observations when Jervas reflects upon his physical degradation and descent to a lower state of being, where he is deprived to the degree that he loses the basic ability to feel. This lack of sensibility symbolizes Edgeworth’s portrayal of Tipu as inhumane, as his treatment of prisoners deprives Jervas of human sensation and, by extension, his humanity. Furthermore, the strong language mimics that of the accounts provided by James Bristow and Henry Oakes, prisoners under Tipu whose accounts were published in 1792 and 1785, respectively. In both accounts, there is “such an accumulation of expressions of the same semantic field” that it allows us “to detect a deliberate intention to convey a very specific type of profile,” with strong diction like “tyrant” being used frequently to describe Tipu.477 However, through closer analysis of these accounts, one can recognize the targeted diction as hyperbole. This assumption holds because rather than revealing unusually cruel punishment, the accounts instead show various elements of relatively good treatment.478 For example, Oakes describes how prisoners received small allocations to spend at a bazaar in addition to receiving grain quotas.479 The inconsistency of these details with Tipu’s characterization correlates with the inaccuracy of popular depictions such as Edgeworth’s.

Edgeworth was likely influenced by these accounts, as they were widely distributed. Bristow’s account was printed on the best in addition to the cheapest paper to target all classes as his audience and maximize earnings.480 As a result, these accounts impacted both people of a higher class, like Edgeworth, and the audience of common people Edgeworth presumes to address in Lame Jervas with her moral lessons.

A similarity in the diction of both Lame Jervas and Bristow’s account displays the impact of the accounts on Edgeworth’s writing. Bristow explains that his “existence hung on the will of a tyrant,”481 while Jervas complains that he was thrown in a dungeon at “the will of a Sultan.”482 This shows that Edgeworth’s work, through its susceptibility to British cultural influence, inherited a degree of hyperbolic inaccuracy in Tipu’s characterization.

Despite that inaccuracy, Edgeworth’s work accurately reflects the historical uncertainty
about Tipu Sultan’s general religious policy. However, she ignores Tipu’s religion in his characterization, a glaring omission when some historians would even call Mysore a theocratic autocracy due to his religious devotion.483 The Hindu characters of Saheb, a slave Tipu was willing to kill for making a mistake on the telegraph, and Omychund, a dishonest Gentoo merchant Tipu trusted on the issue of Jervas’s betrayal, reveal different aspects of historical views on Tipu’s religious policy. The low valuation of Saheb’s life as a “trifle”484 could exhibit repressive anti-Hindu policies that European authors, like those of The Asiatic Journal, claimed Tipu established.485 However, the initial confidence in Omychund could represent the reality of the high positions in Tipu’s administration that Hindus held and did not lose due to religious affiliation.486 The lack of a consistent characterization of Tipu’s religious policy could be yet another symptom of Edgeworth’s heavy influence by British cultural views. Other British works, such as Taylor’s Tippoo Sultaun, similarly claim through their diction that Tipu is persecutory and then depict him as otherwise, like through his funding of Hindu temples.487 In reality, Tipu oppressed non-Muslims in conquered territories, like through his forced mass conversion of Hindus in Malabar,488 and favored Muslims within his territory; however, he kept peace in Mysore by tolerating Hindus and even patronizing their institutions.489 The limited religious discussion by Edgeworth likely facilitated her development of his negative characterization as amoral and childish, but also may have been limited by a lack of information.

In Edgeworth’s characterization of Tipu Sultan’s personality, she captures only one side of his nature, rendering him a flat character in her negative portrayal with significant inaccuracies—especially with respect to Tipu’s morality. Because a high moral character is so critical to her characterization of Jervas and his success despite Tipu’s depicted despotism, this inaccuracy is particularly important. Edgeworth structures her juxtaposition of the morality of Tipu and Jervas around the issue of bonded labor. Jervas observes that to Tipu’s character, “why he should ask favors for a parcel of mean slaves... was incomprehensible.”490 In this observation, the slaves are objectified and de-individualized through the diction of “parcel.” In the eighteenth century, “mean” specifically meant “not of the nobility or gentry.”491 This observation establishes a focus on class differences in Tipu’s treatment of people, which negates his support for social mobility through the same moral purity pursued by Jervas. Tipu’s inability to comprehend morality beyond class differences allows Edgeworth to create a starker contrast between him and Jervas, making Jervas’s success and British morality appear more acute. In reality, Tipu “introduce[ed] social reforms such as the opposition to bonded labor”492 and took “rudimentary steps towards the abolition of slavery when he prohibited the sale of abandoned girls, eunuchs, orphans, and sex slaves” and gave them food allocations to survive.493 Consequently, Edgeworth’s treatment of Tipu’s attitude towards bonded labor reveals a historical inaccuracy in her characterization.

Another inaccuracy is rooted in the portrayal of Tipu Sultan’s interest in Western technology. Edgeworth reinforces her characterization of Tipu as a despot by showing his interest in technology as due to his desire for childish amusement and his greed. She describes Tipu as accepting technological advancements “with the eagerness of a child who has begged and obtained a play-thing.”494 Portraying Tipu as begging and childish makes him appear weaker and more naïve. Due to the fact that Edgeworth writes after Tipu’s defeat, she could be projecting onto his character her understanding of his defeat, with him at mercy of the British—symbolized by Jervas—despite his fearsome reputation. This characterization juxtaposes him with that of his son, Prince Abdul Calie, who is shown as more mature and possessing more ingenuity, proposing the idea of using portable telegraphs in battle. Edgeworth may have intentionally
created this juxtaposition to comment on the stances of Indian rulers towards the British. Since Abdul Calie subjected himself to a paternal-like educational relationship with Jervas, he would represent “good” Indian rulers that made agreements with the British East India Company; conversely, Tipu would represent the “bad” rulers, rebellious like a child.

Edgeworth also portrays Tipu as greedy in his relationship with technology. For example, when seeing one of Jervas’s tin-mine inventions, his first thought concerned how it could “bring a considerable revenue to the royal treasury.” Historically, Tipu was actually known to be genuinely interested in technology, particularly mechanical devices, of which he built some of his own, such as a “condensing engine.” This learnedness could instead contribute to a characterization of Tipu as an enlightened despot. Furthermore, soldiers in his service said, “his genius was entirely military,” negating Edgeworth’s representation of him as dependent on his son’s genius. These inaccuracies weaken the overall despotic characterization of Tipu, since he is a significantly more complex historical figure than she depicted due to her inherited British cultural understanding of him.

In Lame Jervas, Tipu Sultan assumes the stock characterization of the eastern despot. This characterization results from Edgeworth’s aim to eliminate the public’s consideration of viable alternatives to paternal British rule, seen as the best option for “moral” people like Jervas, and to justify the conquest of Mysore in supporting local colonial efforts. Reflecting Edgeworth’s conformity to British cultural influence again, she adopts the “archetypal Muslim ‘others’” literary motif. Creating the image of the oriental despot also allows for Tipu’s characterization to be self-contained, simplifying Edgeworth’s storytelling by eliminating other actors, such as the British East India Company and Mysore’s ally, France, from the narrative. If Edgeworth’s paternal British system were accurately compared to these other involved actors, alternatives to it would arise and could disrupt the social order she tries to maintain through the message of obedient patience relayed through the actions and disposition of Jervas in her work.

In order to justify British rule as Edgeworth, being Anglo-Irish in a tumultuous Ireland, strives to do, she vilifies and alienates non-British rule. Although Lord Cornwallis, the leader of the British offensive in Mysore, had associated the threat of Tipu with that of France, as seen in his correspondences, France remains unmentioned in Lame Jervas. Because France and Mysore’s alliance had grown to the point that a Jacobin club in Mysore and a Mysorean embassy in Paris were established, mention of Mysore’s interaction with the West could have promoted the idea of a sustainable alternative to conservative British rule. This example of non-imperial cooperation could stimulate a revolutionary attitude dangerous to elites like Edgeworth. It would also undermine the British-Oriental dichotomy conveyed by Edgeworth, which was encompassed by a larger moral-immoral dichotomy. Therefore, for Edgeworth’s view of British morality manifested in Jervas to rest unmitigated, Britain’s enemies had to be characterized as despotic and immoral or remain unmentioned. Furthermore, the historical facts of Tipu Sultan’s progressive blurring of the distinction between East and West “through appropriation of European ideas, tactics, and individuals” posed a threat to the dichotomy that legitimized British rule. As a result, Edgeworth distorted her characterization of Tipu from his historical reality to distinguish his mode of governance as an unadoptable one, even potentially benefitting from British conquest.

Edgeworth conclusively constructs a mischaracterization of Tipu Sultan to promote ideas of governance and morality beneficial to her interests as an elite in the British Empire. She creates a less religious, less moral, less intelligent, and less Westernized version of Tipu to classify him as an oriental despot that must be overcome through fidelity to British principles of order. She simplifies her narrative with a flat, stock character to increase the accessibility
of its theme of “the rewards of industry” to her audience of both commoners and the elite. This simplification facilitated its acceptance into British popular culture through reflection of British popular knowledge about Tipu. Overall, Edgeworth’s portrayal of Tipu is an effective, targeted Anglocentric representation that succeeds in relating her themes in a simple popular tale format.

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Although second-wave feminists were the first to claim that the “personal is political,” one can apply this idea to other attempts to resist oppressive ideology using art and literature. When feminists seek to criticize and change dominant narratives, often their work begins with the self and the personal experience. Deconstructing the binaries that compose such ideologies requires more than a singular self and version of reality; multiple selves and perceptions of the world must be included. Unveiling the hidden parts of the self also reveals the underside of society, demonstrating contradictions in an ideology’s all-encompassing worldview. In literature, this means paying special attention to how a character’s self is constructed and how the idea of truth is communicated. Feminist forms of literature that emphasize multiple subjectivities, like Marjane Satrapi’s *Persepolis* and Anna Deavere Smith’s *Fires in the Mirror*, resist oppressive ideology by making room for multiple versions of the truth, whether those ideologies are patriarchal, fundamentalist, or white supremacist. These works privilege the individual self by drawing from psychoanalysis to reveal what is hidden within the unconscious, use speech and the physical body to communicate what written language cannot, and deny expectations of objectivity by giving space to many voices and perspectives.

The individual acts as the battleground for the political in both feminist criticism and in texts that use alternative forms to communicate resistance. Psychoanalysis has long been a useful tool of feminist thinkers in analyzing how patriarchal ideology is internalized and its effects on the psyche of men and women.

Using the mind as a starting point, conception of self takes on a central role in addressing the larger consequences of the patriarchal system. Marjane Satrapi’s graphic novel *Persepolis*, which describes growing up during the Iranian Revolution, was published in English in 2003. *Persepolis* demonstrates how an individual life can illuminate ideology, by blending her childhood and Iran’s history into an inseparable story. Her own observations of the revolution, viewed through the eyes of a child, are shaped by the violent rhetoric and imagery of her culture. When Marji and her friends attempt to punish a friend for his father’s crimes under the regime, what would be a mundane childhood lesson about forgiveness is precipitated by extraordinary circumstances. The incident includes typical childish fantasy, with nails stolen from a toolbox as the means of their punishment, but the implications of Marji’s familiarity with retribution and torture as officially sanctioned responses are political ones. The subtitle “The Story of a Childhood” reveals how Satrapi uses
the lens of an almost normal childhood to show completely abnormal violence. Using “a childhood” instead of “my childhood” emphasizes the universality of some aspects of Satrapi’s upbringing, while also highlighting the unusual circumstances that made it far from typical. Her intertwining of the private and public spheres demonstrates the importance of the personal experience of oppression and violence. In “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-vision,” Adrienne Rich writes about her own process of developing a feminist consciousness in her writing. She writes of feeling that politics was “not something ‘out there’ but something ‘in here’ and the essence of [her] condition.”

Noting that her feminist politics were incomplete without an expression of her own experience of gender was crucial in realizing that the “objectivity” she strived for was an illusion created by male writers seeking to create a coherent reality aligned with patriarchal ideology.

Anne Deavere Smith’s 1997 one-woman play *Fires in the Mirror* also presents the individual self as the starting point for making sense of social and political conflict. Her telling of the 1991 Crown Heights conflict in Brooklyn, a series of clashes between Brooklyn’s Jewish and African-American populations that started after a black child was killed by a Jewish driver and an uninvolved Jewish man was fatally stabbed, begins not with the igniting event or history of racial tensions, but with her interviewee’s reflections on their own identities. “Identity” is the first scene, in which Ntozake Shange defines identity as “a way of knowing” that she is not “necessarily what’s around me”. This conception of identity as difference becomes important when translated onto a group scale, as in Angela Davis’ reflection on race. Davis suggests moving beyond race as identity, and argues for the necessity of “communities that are not static”. These scenes together show how an individual’s idea of identity is intimately connected to their actions in regards to other groups, suggesting that the self plays an important role in overcoming the differences constructed by social and ideological divisions.

With the knowledge that personal experience is essential to achieving a fuller portrayal of reality in literature, conventional literature that employs a singular or supposedly objective point of view is insufficient. This conflict can be described as the difference between traditional “men’s writing” and what 1970s French psychoanalytic feminists thought of as “women’s writing.” Helene Cixous’ intended *écriture féminine*, at the time a new feminine form of writing, to be a means to undermine patriarchal hierarchical binaries by resisting its rules of linear and rational organization. Since personal experience, down to the language and form of the individual’s written word, plays a critical role in subverting or maintaining patriarchal systems, this form of writing would fight back against the unanimity of perspective that allows binaries to go unchallenged.

*Persepolis* is an example of feminine *écriture*; it is unconventional for a memoir such as Satrapi’s to take the form of a graphic novel, and its form allows her to supersede the limitations of simply describing this period of Iran’s history in written form. Satrapi consciously attempts to complicate binaries to engender cross-cultural communication; crucial to her message is her belief that “there is no such thing as stark good and evil.” Therefore, her writing employs a number of voices to communicate the complicated nature of perceiving and communicating the meaning of the same events. Hillary Chute identifies at least three autobiographical selves in Satrapi’s narrative: the “older, recollective voice” that narrates; the “younger, directly experiencing voice” that speaks in dialogue; and the visual voice in the “presentation of pictorial space.” These different selves build on each other to expand the scope of the story, and at times contradict each other. After the execution of Marji’s uncle Anoosh, Marji rejects her fantasy of God, and is left feeling lost. In a full-page panel Satrapi depicts Marji floating in mostly black space with a few stars and planets while a speech bubble
says, “Marji, run to the basement! We’re being bombed!” The narration adds that Marji is “lost, without any bearings” and that this moment was the beginning of the war. The visual voice adds Marji’s visceral emotional experience of the time, portrayed expressively instead of realistically, while the dialogue adds the immediate reality of the moment. Adult Marjane fills in the gaps that Marji did not know at the time—that this was the beginning of more violence and suffering in Iran.

This multiplicity of perspectives allows Satrapi to tell a more varied story, one informed by real events, the feelings of a child, and her adult knowledge. Satrapi is careful not to allow one dogma, either religious fundamentalism or Western neocolonialism, to maintain a monopoly on the truth. In keeping with Satrapi’s motivation to resist simplistic classifications of good and evil, she paints neither the Westerners nor the fundamentalists completely flatteringly in Persepolis. She challenges even her own leftist father’s hypocrisy regarding his Marxism. Throughout the graphic novel, she infuses her witnessing of real events with her visually shown emotions and childlike fantasies, demonstrating how communicating history truthfully is impossible without privileging personal experience.

Fires in the Mirror is another feminist work that uses an unconventional form to show how multiple points of view can subvert binaries. Anna Deavere Smith’s interviews juxtapose multiple accounts of the Crown Heights riots in Brooklyn in 1991, showing how a supposedly objective historical or journalistic telling simplifies a complicated reality. She privileges individual identity in her performing of each character, recognizing that the events in Crown Heights stem from conflicts between different identities. The tension in America, she claims, “is the tension of identity in motion,” as national identity is inevitably transformed. Often she juxtaposes the performance of a Jewish interviewee with a Black one, forcing us to realize the similarities they share. The account of the car accident in “No Blood at His Feet,” where a young African-American boy was killed by a car carrying a rabbi, contradicts the following story in “Mexican Standoff,” emphasizing different historical injustices and laying the blame on different people. The purpose is to force readers or audience members to question the delineations between guilty and innocent, between oppressed and oppressor, and positing that each individual’s truth is ruled by their group identity and ideology. Smith similarly juxtaposes scenes describing the connection between Blacks and Jews’ religious beliefs and their collective trauma. In “Seven Verses,” Minister Conrad Mohammed claims that African-Americans are in fact “the people that almighty God Allah has selected as his chosen,” not the Jews, and that the transatlantic slave trade was far worse than the Holocaust. However, in “Isaac,” Letty Cottin Pogrebin reads aloud the story of her cousin Isaac who was “chosen as the designated survivor of his town” during the Holocaust and experienced incredible horrors because of his chosen status. Placing inherited memories of the Holocaust and slavery alongside each other demonstrates how trauma informs each group’s religious identity, thus making their “chosen status” appear to be a reaction to a similar experience. This alignment of experiences complicates the narrative that pits Jews and Blacks against each other by using their experiences of oppression to unite instead of divide. By showcasing many selves, Smith bypasses a single ideological lens, letting the fragmented nature of reality subvert the classifications of white supremacy and racism.

Adrienne Rich, author of “When We Dead Awaken: Writing as Re-Vision,” demonstrates how striving to maintain objectivity in writing about gender is ultimately inauthentic and ineffective. She emphasizes the need to express the anger and pain women feel, for following the path of Virginia Woolf in trying for cold detachment “betrays our own reality.” While this angry stage is only the beginning in the development of a more complicated consciousness,
leaving behind the myth of objectivity and recognizing the power of the self are important components in beginning to weaken the hold of patriarchal ideologies on minds, bodies, and cultures.

Bodies are no less important in this relationship between the self and resistance to oppression; the role of speech and the body is essential in communicating a complete message that subverts ideological binaries. Julia Kristeva’s concept of semiotics defines the feminine component of language as the part that involves rhythm, speech and intonation, not just meaning. Similar to *écriture féminine*, Luce Irigaray finds an outlet for feminine expression in “women-speak,” which, unlike patriarchal writing, has multiple meanings and privileges speech over written language. Writers can overcome ideological binaries by using speech, including the way that people speak, as a strategy for conveying a broader and more subjective message than they can within the confines of language itself. Smith, the performer and compiler of *Fires in the Mirror*, values the particular pattern of each character’s words and the expression of their bodies. In “101 Dalmatians,” Wolfe’s striking of his teacup on the saucer for emphasis, as well as other characters’ various inhales and laughs. All serve to express in writing what is visible in life, and thus that the meaning of a person’s words comes not only from the meaning of those words themselves, but also from the motions of that person. Treating speech itself as a method of literary expression recognizes that meaning goes beyond the limited scope of language, in which meaning is externally determined. Individuals can express a more varied truth, including their own individual experiences, through their methods of speech and physical expression. Irigaray argued that women were unable to do more than mimic language within a patriarchal linguistic system; through appreciating speech patterns, Smith gives voice to those trapped or excluded by conventional forms of written communication. Allowing for individual identity within language defies the binaries, whether gender or racial, that ideologies would place her characters within.

Unlike traditional writing, speech-based writing uses gaps to communicate what is inexpressible in words. Kristeva argues that the feminine aspects of writing are not in what the text articulates but rather in what goes unsaid, as well as the breaks in writing. To subvert an ideology that uses language to oppress, one can forgo language and value ruptured syntax or silence as a message in itself. Smith agrees when it comes to identity; she insists that “break from the pattern is where character lives” and that the “American character is alive inside of syntactical breaks.” Both individual and societal meaning can be found where language is insufficient, and hidden truths are expressed in ruptures. *Fires in the Mirror* emphasizes gaps in speech as paths toward identity. In “101 Dalmatians,” Wolfe’s speech becomes punctuated with breaks as he attempts to articulate the more challenging aspects of identity. He pauses multiple times, and stutters at the most crucial phrase of his scene as he claims that his blackness “does not resist--ex--re--/exist in relationship” to Smith’s whiteness. The difficulty of saying this statement aloud comes from its crucial importance to him and its controversial nature. Therefore, his syntactical breaks express a unique part of his identity and a departure from what is easily said with language. The line breaks in *Fires in the Mirror* also attempt to demonstrate the natural flow or unnatural breaks in each individual’s speech. In *Persepolis*, the gaps between panels and negative space both represent an absence of words and a presence of meaning. The gaps allow the reader to fill in what is missing, while the breaks between panels can create meaning by dividing images from one another. One example of the power of gaps in *Persepolis* comes after a bomb destroys Marji’s next-door neighbors house, and she recognizes a bracelet on her dead friend’s wrist. The narration is silent as Marji covers her eyes, and then in the last panel of the chapter, there is only a black space with a
The silence of the blank panel allows the reader to feel Marji’s speechlessness and shock; in the final panel, the reader can imagine her scream of horror, as her emotions are too powerful to express visually. The lack of speech, or language at all, conveys more than direct narration.

Feminist literature treats society psychoanalytically by revealing its repressed or hidden aspects, including the darker underside of ideology. Lacanian psychoanalysis deals with the Imaginary Order, an early stage of childhood based on perceiving images and the illusion of complete union with the world, and the Symbolic Order, which takes precedence once language and social rules precipitate the creation of the Other as a being separate from the self. Although the Symbolic Order rules the conscious mind, the unconscious longs to return to the unregulated state of the Imaginary Order. Therefore in literature the Imaginary Order offers tools to deconstruct deeply ingrained ideological narratives. The Imaginary Order resists ideological systems because it denies the learned “societal norms and expectations of the Symbolic Order.” The Imaginary Order manifests itself in literature that refuses to privilege rationality above emotion or the meaning of words above the meaning of bodies. When individuals acquire language and the Symbolic Order takes hold, according to Lacan, the Symbolic Order is repressed and relegated to the unconscious. Therefore, literature that ventures into this pre-verbal, pre-rational and pre-ideological unconscious reveals hidden truths about the mind and society.

Satrapi recognizes this mission in her work; she seeks to “solve the problems in the basement of a country, not on the surface.” As a young teenager, Marji retreats into her basement, a symbol of the unconscious, and as she descends, she reveals the sins of the regime. Talking directly to the reader, Marji explains that the fundamentalists eventually “admitted that the survival of the regime depended on the war,” thus she exposes the motivations that the government wished to hide. She unmasks her society, revealing that behind the propaganda lies a hidden reality that denies ideology. Her childlike fantasies also suggest the Imaginary Order—instead of telling us the straightforward events of that period, she includes the inventive manifestations of her nonconforming unconscious. Her vision of a prophetic destiny and image of God as a protective, invisible friend do not conform to her parents’ or religious leaders’ expectations of what religion should look like. Since she has not completely absorbed the rules of the Symbolic Order, she maintains the Imaginary Order’s pre-verbal sense of oneness with the celestial. Although Marji’s idea of her destiny is political, tied to a burgeoning class-consciousness, the expression of this concealed part of her self is grounded in “an illusion of fulfillment and control” typical of the Imaginary Order. However, as the pressure of ideology grows stronger and Marji grows older, she loses her fantasy of God and begins to challenge the Symbolic Order more directly. Her outright resistance to the regime and her parent’s authority began with the Imaginary Order, which allows her to question the norms and rules that her society dictates.

_Fires in the Mirror_ also reveals how ideology can require concealment when identity comes into conflict with the norms of the dominant culture. In “Wigs,” Rivkah Siegal describes how she wears a wig when she interacts with the world outside the Lubavitcher community to cover her hair, which is cut short for religious reasons. However, she often “felt fake...like it’s not [her],” and told Smith that her inner conflict over wearing wigs was difficult for her. By performing this interview, Smith reveals what is hidden in Siegal’s life: how concealing her religious identity helps her blend into secular culture but also makes her feel inauthentic. She masks her natural hair, her own identity, in face of American beauty norms while recognizing her own resulting dissonance. This disguising of her cultural and religious heritage mirrors the way in which aspects of Jewish or African-American culture
are often suppressed or changed to mimic mainstream white culture, resulting in a sense of alienation within members of these groups.

The ability of literature to challenge dominant narratives is consistent across many forms of ideologies, whether the struggle is for racial, gender or religious justice. The framework necessary for subverting binaries depends on how the author presents the self, and thus society. Therefore, literature that seeks to resist dominant ideologies must find ways to challenge binaries, reject “objectivity”, and display fragmentation of the self. Alternative forms of literature like Persepolis and Fires in the Mirror exemplify the ideas of feminist psychoanalytic criticism by revealing what is hidden within the individual and group unconscious, valuing speech and the body to the same extent as written language, and allowing multiple voices to speak their realities.

Telling the full story cannot be done within the framework of a dominant ideology, which presupposes one truth. To weaken the hold of such worldviews, literature must expand to make the expression of multiple truths possible. If feminist principles can be applied to literature that challenges a religious establishment or racist ideology, it seems possible that the solutions to diverse forms of oppression are linked together as well. In changing the ways in which we see the world, alternative literature threatens the divisions between people that keep oppressive ideologies powerful. Perhaps not so paradoxically, fragmentation and multiplicity can be the key to solidarity.

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Higher Education, Integration, and Conversion
Religious and Educational Insights into the Unified Self

Samuel Holley

“To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion, to gain an assurance, are so many phrases which denote the process, gradual or sudden, by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities. This at least is what conversion signifies in general terms, whether or not we believe that a direct divine operation is needed to bring such a moral change about.”

—William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience

“Scholars researching the nature of creativity have long recognized the importance of adaptive and integrative learning, and most of the rest of us understand it intuitively: who among us cannot recall such a moment of illumination, when elements from different books, courses, or corners of our lives came together to produce new insight? … Yet we were struck by how little attention most departments and programs have given to cultivating this essential capacity. We were also surprised, and somewhat chagrined, to discover how infrequently some of our students exercise it. For all their extraordinary energy and range, many of the students we encountered lead curiously compartmentalized lives, with little integration between the different spheres of their experience.”

—The Study of Undergraduate Education at Stanford University

Religion promises people a new way of being in the world. The core of many religions’ appeal, regardless of the way a tradition is mediated through culture and history, is that you can be made new. Maybe the religious person is made new by an infused sense of meaning and purpose, or by an experience of transcendent support and strength. Whatever the perceived source of the shift, the Pauline formula You were once... but now echoes a shift
described in various religious traditions. Religion promises transformation.

As does higher education. Nationwide debates about the price of college and an expanding range of educational opportunities have forced innovation in the scholarship of emerging adults’ transformation to self-authorship. Universities such as Georgetown emphasize that the value added of a liberal education is not content delivery but the transformation of students. This emphasis on transformation is largely in reaction to the fact that today’s students enter universities as emerging adults, but by the time they graduate most of them “still have not achieved the kind of self-authorship that would allow them to think independently, make choices, and pursue their dreams.” In response to a changing educational climate and a generation of students loath to mature, schools are investigating ways to cultivate and measure students’ transformation to self-authorship. Higher education—like religion—promises transformation.

The similarities between academic descriptions of religious conversion and higher education literature about the transformation to self-authorship (the process by which one becomes an independent adult) are striking. These similarities were recognized as early as William James’ 1902 publication of The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, a series of lectures whose chapter on conversion beget the academic field of conversion studies. In Varieties, James discusses the relation between religious conversion and “the passage from the child’s small universe to the wider intellectual and spiritual life of maturity,” which he maintains is a normal adolescent phenomenon. James describes the natural growth and maturation that humans experience as they become adults and compares it to the process of conversion, inspiring my decision to put the transformation to self-authorship in conversation with religious conversion.

Amidst the similarities between James’ account of religious conversion and higher education literature’s description of the transformation to self-authorship, however, lie important differences. By exploring these differences in the two similar processes, we will reach a greater understanding of each. First, our explication of James will reveal that he understands converts to experience religious conversion completely passively, which is problematic because the modern conversion studies field makes the “active agency of converts in the conversion process” a prominent theme. Scholarship about young adults’ transformation to self-authorship will provide a model which, when applied to religious conversion, allows us to understand the tension between converts’ active agency and passive acceptance as they convert to a new faith. Second, our explication of the transformation to self-authorship will reveal that young adults become self-authored as they develop the capacity for integration, with integration understood as uniting and synthesizing all the dimensions of one’s life and thought in order to form a unified sense of self. What is implied but not made explicit in this definition is that, without undergoing this process, college students are non-unified, or divided, selves—but higher education literature does not elaborate upon the difference between divided and unified senses of self. Here James’ account of religious conversion in Varieties, with specific description of the ‘divided self,’ provides insight to understand better the difference between young adults who are self-authored and those who are not. Thus analysis of the differences-in-similarity between the two transformations will provide conclusions to shape the way we think about the role of liberal education in the twenty-first century.

James’ Account of Conversion

According to William James’ discussion of conversion in The Varieties of Religious Experience, religious conversion is the process by which one’s religious faith displaces all contenders to become the individual’s primary aim and the primary recipient of her emotional energy, thus turning a divided self into a unified one. The divided self is the self that experiences “great oscillation in the emotional interest” and whose
passions and aims “shift before one almost as rapidly as the sparks that run through burnt-up paper.” The process of transformation and unification (of which conversion is one type) occurs “whenever one aim grows so stable as to expel definitively its previous rivals from the individual’s life.” In order to conceptualize this process, James introduces the phrase the habitual center of a person’s personal energy, which he defines as “the hot place [passionate center] in a man’s consciousness, the group of ideas to which he devotes himself, and from which he works;” this habitual center consumes most of a person’s energy and vitality, leaving little or none left for other aims or purposes. Thus, “To say that a man is ‘converted’ means, in these terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in his consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual center of his energy.” In an earlier lecture, James defines religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.” Thus we can synthesize his terms: James understands conversion as any process of transformation and unification that makes one’s conception of the divine the primary aim in her life, and that expels previous rivals for that position from her life.

Furthermore, James establishes that conversion occurs when an individual submits her conscious self to the power of subconscious forces that she understands to be divine, which does not leave room for active agency in conversion. It appears initially that he addresses the tension between active agency and passive acceptance in this process, because he distinguishes between a volitional type of conversion and a type by self-surrender. However, James quickly moves past the first type “because the difference between the two types is after all not radical,” and explains that volitional types of conversion reach a point at which “self-surrender becomes... indispensable.” This occurs when, after “the will has done its uttermost towards bringing one to the complete unification aspired after,” it still seems “that the very last step must be left to other forces and performed without the help of its activity.” After rushing past the volitional type of conversion, James begins his treatment of conversion by self-surrender and quickly reaches the conclusion that only by letting “subconscious forces take the lead” does a person become transformed. Until the moment of transformation, conscious and subconscious forces may work together to prepare the new center of personal energy, but the process can only finish when one’s consciousness hands control to the subconscious. We experience conversion, then, as “the throwing of our conscious selves upon the mercy of powers which, whatever they may be, are more ideal than we are actually, and make for our redemption.”

It is clear that even James’ account of a volitional type of conversion ultimately results in a moment of surrender—a moment, apparently, when the individual decides to surrender. Yet James disregards true participation in conversion and collapses any appearance of activity into passive acceptance, revealing a tension (between deciding to surrender and surrendering) that he never resolves. True agency in conversion is incompatible with James’ model because he understands conversion ultimately as a destructive process: in conversion, as we have seen, one aim or purpose “expels definitively its previous rivals from the individual’s life.” For James, unity is not achieved in a person by integrating the pluralities she contains; rather, it is achieved by purging from her self-understanding all but one aspect of her identity. By understanding conversion this way, James excludes the possibility that the convert could play an active role, because one’s consciousness is not able to obliterate part of itself. A model that better accords the active agency of converts in conversion would not neglect the sense in which the process is a “giving up” of the self, but would incorporate this aspect of conversion into an integrative understanding of the self. An individual’s “giving up” of certain aims and purposes, then, would mean yielding
those aims and purposes to be regulated by religious ideas, not expelling them completely from one’s life.

As long as James’ interpretive tool is the habitual center of a person’s energy, which consumes one’s energy and vitality and thus leaves little or no room for other aims or purposes, this destructive model of conversion is inescapable. A different interpretive tool could allow for a model in which nonreligious aims and purposes are not expelled, but are instead incorporated into a self-understanding that makes one’s religion central. These aims and purposes, then, would be yielded to one’s religious faith while remaining present. All of a person’s pluralities, rather than fighting among themselves until one emerges victorious and expels the others, would be brought together to form a totality in which religious aims regulate and make sense of the others.

Integration and the Transformation to Self-Authorship

Higher education scholarship about young adults’ transformation to self-authorship provides a model in which an individual develops a unified sense of self by integrating the various aspects of her identity rather than by displacing and expelling most of them. Our investigation of this transformation and the model it provides, however, will reveal that higher education literature about the transformation to self-authorship neglects to explain the reason why an individual’s lacking a unified sense of self disqualifies the possibility of her being self-authored. Accordingly, our description of the transformation to self-authorship anticipates two results: first, a model to understand religious conversion based on higher education literature; second, a discussion of the way that James’ conception of the divided self illuminates the process through which young adults become self-authored. (Throughout this analysis, I use the phrase the transformation to self-authorship as an umbrella to describe what is meant by phrases like “the journey into adulthood,” “the process of maturation,” etc.)

The transformation to self-authorship is the development of an internal sense of self that provides internal authority to author one’s life yet is flexible and open to growth. We derive this understanding from the article “Helping Students Make Their Way to Adulthood: Good Company for the Journey” by Marcia B. Baxter Magolda, the Distinguished Professor of Educational Leadership and Student Affairs in Higher Education at Miami University of Ohio. Magolda explains in the article that the transformation to self-authorship entails “constructing one’s own internal self-definition to guide one’s life and relations with others in the context of external influence” so that one shifts “from reliance on external authority to taking ownership and responsibility for one’s life.” In her study of recent college graduates, she found that without the transformation to self-authorship many of her participants had “become adept at functioning within the control of external influence” but were not prepared “to manage external influence instead” (something expected of them in post-college life). Essentially, they were able to operate within clearly defined boundaries but struggled when expected to help set the boundaries either independently or by negotiating within external influences. They thus struggled “to function independent of authority, make mature decisions in complex contexts, and effectively negotiate among competing interests.”

Navigating among competing interests requires not just a strong sense of internal authority, but also a flexibility to know when to grow and change in the face of external influence. The transformation to self-authorship comprises, then, the development of a sense of self that is simultaneously robust and flexible. An individual makes the transformation to self-authorship by developing the capacity for integration, with integration understood as uniting and synthesizing all the dimensions of one’s life and thought in order to form a unified sense of self. The first step to reach this understanding of integration comes from a document from Georgetown University’s Designing the Future(s)
of the University Initiative, the 2014-2015 “Formation by Design Project Progress Report,” which describes integration in two ways. First, it is understood in terms of outcome: integration means a student will “develop interior freedom and an integrated sense of purpose and identity” in a way analogous to Magolda’s description of the shift from external to internal authority. The report assumes that making connections across one’s life and becoming empowered to make meaning for oneself foster internal authority. Second, the Project Progress Report explains integration as the “Transfer and application of knowledge from one setting or context to another”—and ability that relies on a coherent sense of self that is able to translate meaning across contexts. Another source that discusses integration is the book Transforming Students: Fulfilling the Promise of Higher Education by Elon University professors Charity Johansson and Peter Felten, who explain integration in the context of the transformational process that students undergo. This process begins with a disruption of a person’s worldview, causing her to reflect analytically on her assumptions and reach new understandings, and then to verify and act on the new understandings. All this results in a fourth step: integration of the new understandings, actions, and behaviors into her everyday life.

When the two definitions of integration from Designing the Future(s) are synthesized with Johansson’s and Felten’s description of the transformative process, the result is an understanding of integration as uniting all the dimensions of one’s life in a manner that results in interior freedom, purpose and identity, the ability to transfer and apply knowledge in various settings, and a new way of living everyday life—in short, uniting all the dimensions of one’s life in a manner that results in self-authorship. Since we have already established that the transformation to self-authorship entails developing an interior sense of self, we can insert between integration and its results the middle step of developing this sense of self: integration is consolidating diverse elements of one’s life to form a unified sense of self, which results in self-authorship. Thus we come to our understanding of integration as uniting and synthesizing all the dimensions of one’s life and thought in order to form a unified sense of self.

What we need to explore now is investigate whether integration is an active process. We can do this by determining to what degree external factors affect integration and to what degree it is an internal process: the greater the influence of external factors, the more passive the process, and vice versa. In “Helping Students to Adulthood,” Magolda presents three concepts that are emphasized in environments that empower students with a sense of agency, thus fostering the transformation to self-authorship. Environments conducive to self-authorship emphasize “that knowledge is complex and socially constructed,” “that self is central to knowledge construction,” and “that authority and expertise are shared in the mutual construction of knowledge among peers.” Each of these emphases is designed to encourage students to construct knowledge in conversation with peers and authority figures as well as through scholarship, rather than to receive knowledge passively from external influences. By making students aware of the role of the self in constructing knowledge and making connections across one’s life, such environments provide support and space for students to practice integration. It is important to note that the role of these environments is not to effect integration directly, but to foster it by creating contexts for students to integrate their own lives. Ultimately integration occurs only when students make connections for themselves. Developing the capacity for integration is an internal process, but making students conscious of the ability to integrate the dimensions of their life and thought makes it more likely to occur. Integration is both an internal and external process, thus both an active and a passive process.

Our explication of integration and the transformation to self-authorship thus far has shown us the benefits of developing a unified sense of
self, but it has not explained why failing to do so results in a lack of self-authorship or even what it means to lack this unity. When college students do not integrate the dimensions of their lives and thought, they lead “curiously compartmentalized lives” (according to The Study of Undergraduate Education at Stanford University)\textsuperscript{558} and “become parts of people relating to parts of people” (according to an administrator at Boston College).\textsuperscript{559} While these statements provoke visceral negative reactions —after all, we do not want to believe we are compartmentalized selves, or only parts of people—their sources and others writing in the field of higher education do not make explicit the reasons that these are bad ways to live. They do not even explain what it means for persons to lead compartmentalized lives or be parts of people. Instead, because they are writing about education policy and goals rather than about human nature, they focus on practical rather than theoretical and philosophical concerns. They assume human beings should be whole, and they assume the connection between wholeness and self-determination.

Whether or not these assumptions are right, they are not self-evident. In order to provide a clear account of the change higher education should seek to effect in its students, it is necessary both to understand the nature of the person who lacks a unified sense of self and to explain the reasons that the non-unified self cannot be self-authored. We shall see shortly that just as higher education literature’s understanding of integration helps to refine James’ model of religious conversion to account for converts’ agency, so James’ notion of the divided self allows us to understand both the non-unified self and the reason that the transformation to self-authorship requires a unified sense of self.

Higher Education, Integration, and Conversion

Our investigation of James’ account of religious conversion revealed that his model excludes any possibility of converts playing an active role in the process. Because his model describes conversion as a process by which one aim or purpose displaces and expels all others, the convert requires subconscious or external forces to make the final step and obliterate aspects of her conscious identity. In addition, James’ conception of the habitual center of a person’s energy requires a destructive model of conversion because it means that one’s primary aim or purpose consumes one’s psychic energy rather than regulating or redistributing it. Our analysis of James in Part II, therefore, anticipated a model of religious conversion in which a person achieves unity by integration rather than displacement, and in which a person’s religious faith becomes a connecting point of the various aspects of her identity rather than a habitual center which excludes competitors. The explication of integration in Part III provided a framework we can apply to religious conversion, but it also opened new questions—about the nature of the individual without a unified sense of self, and about the reason that the transformation to self-authorship requires a unified sense of self. We can now tie these two strands together and explore the conclusions that arise from putting two transformations in conversation with one another.

The first conclusion is that we can understand religious conversion as integration rather than displacement, an understanding which I call the integration model of religious conversion. In this model, conversion occurs when a person’s religion becomes the integrating principle that brings all the dimensions of her life and thought together in a synthesis, as opposed to James’ model of conversion in which a single dimension of one’s life and thought displaces the others.\textsuperscript{560} A person’s integrating principle is an interpretive tool to understand the role religion plays in the newly converted—thus newly unified—self, akin to James’ concept of the habitual center of a person’s energy. An integrating principle is similar to a habitual center of a person’s energy in that it permeates all aspects of one’s identity, but it differs significantly for two reasons. First, an integrating principle is central to
one’s identity without neglecting other aspects of a person’s identity: even though the integrating principle regulates all of a person’s pluralities and puts them in context as merely one aspect of the unified self, they remain valid components of her self-understanding. Second, in contrast to a habitual center of a person’s energy (which consumes most or all of a person’s psychic energy), an integrating principle allocates energy to the various dimensions of a person’s life. An integrating principle is the dimension of her life and thought that serves as a nexus to connect all the others.

According to the integration model, a person converts to a religion when that religion becomes her integrating principle. Because an integrating principle brings all the dimensions of her life and thought together in a synthesis, it creates a unified sense of self; just as in James’ model, a divided self has become unified. Instead of becoming unified by allowing one dimension of her life and thought to expel the others, however, a person becomes unified by accepting and embracing the various dimensions of her identity and by allowing one of those dimensions—religion—to provide a framework for understanding how they all fit together. In this model, the convert displays active agency in her conversion as well as passive acceptance, as we can see by returning to our discussion in Part III. In the same way that contexts can foster the transformation to self-authorship by equipping students to make their own connections and to construct knowledge for themselves, so too can contexts foster conversion by modeling for individuals the way religion can make sense of all the aspects of their lives. If a potential convert explores a religious context, imagines herself adopting the religion, determines whether she wishes to be part of its community, etc., then she plays an active role in her process of conversion. Even though she may experience the passion and drama of conversion in an instant when suddenly she yields to a new religion, this moment is still the result of deliberate decisions and thinking. And, even in this final moment, she is as much deciding to surrender as she is surrendering. The feeling of the moment may eclipse any feeling of agency, but the individual allows herself to take the final step.

Next, our explorations of James and higher education literature allow us to use James’ notion of the divided self to explain young adults’ transformation to self-authorship. For James, as we have seen, the divided self is the self that experiences “great oscillation in the emotional interest” and whose passions and aims “shift before one almost as rapidly as the sparks that run through burnt-up paper.” This notion illuminates Stanford University’s notion of its students living “curiously compartmentalized lives” and Boston College’s statement that its students have “become parts of people relating to parts of people.” When an individual is unable to find cohesion among the dimensions of her life, then she is unable to find any overarching purpose or meaning that connects the different spheres of her experience. Accordingly, she finds different purposes in different contexts, without an orienting goal or passion or framework to unify her decision making process. She exists in perpetual dynamism, controlled by an ever-changing sense of identity and purpose—in the same way the divided self that James describes experiences great emotional oscillation and its passions and aims shift rapidly. Because an individual without integration is devoid of a unified sense of self to ground her, she relates to the world and to others based solely on the goals she seeks in a specific moment or context. The way she makes decisions depends on context, so the goals that drive her decisions are unsteady and variable. She is a “part of a person” in her relations because she interacts with people based on the goals she seeks in that moment or in that context, rather than based on a unified sense of self. Thus James’ notion of the divided self explains the college student who does not integrate her life. This explanation also explains why integration is essential to self-authorship: without having a consistent set of aims and goals—a consistent decision making process—an individual will not
be able to determine what she wants in the long term. Without a unification of her divided self, she cannot determine what she truly desires or find an integrated sense of identity and purpose, and so lacks self-authorship and the ability to negotiate between self and world.

We have already seen that institutions, in order to foster integration and the transformation to self-authorship, should emphasize to students three things: that knowledge has a complex, socially-constructed nature, that students’ sense of self is central to their ability to construct knowledge, and that expertise and authority are shared in mutual knowledge creation among peers. With our insight about the divided nature of the student without self-authorship, we can go a step further and suggest another way institutions can foster the capacity for integration. Universities should not only make clear to students the way people grow as learners and knowers, but should also provide programs which actively connect different dimensions of students’ lives. Interdisciplinary courses with a blend of theory and practice (integrating job experience with academic learning), which also engage students in reflections about their goals and identities, provide one possible model of the way a program could help students to connect the various aspects of their experience. Of course, just as religious communities can foster religious conversion but ultimately the convert must make a decision to adopt a new religion, so institutional contexts in higher education are not guaranteed to ensure every student becomes self-authored even if designed impeccably to foster integration. Both religion and higher education work to unify the disparate aspects of a person’s identity, but ultimately can hope for no more than to provide environments conducive to a person’s process of transformation and unification.

Integration is at the center of the transformation to self-authorship for the same reason it is at the center of religious conversion. The transformation to self-authorship is the development of a sense of self that simultaneously fosters internal authority and remains flexible to growth and change. Because integration retains the pluralities of a person’s identity, it allows an individual to change aspects of her identity without betraying the unified self. As opposed to James’ model, which reduces the religious convert to nothing more than her religion, the integration model of religious conversion enhances her plural identities by bringing them together to form a totality greater than the sum of its parts. Exploring the value of integration in the context of religious conversion emphasizes its importance in higher education. The problem at many universities today is that students have plural identities and various engagements, but that many do not unite the spheres of their lives to form a totality. If the modern university intends to provide students an education that is more than the sum of its parts—rather than graduate students who have disorganized and disintegrated collections of experiences and learning—then it must be determined to break the boundaries that compartmentalize students’ lives to provide an integrative educational experience.

Conclusion

By comparing religious conversion and the transformation to self-authorship, we reached a better understanding of each. We learned that both religion and education aspire toward human wholeness—consistency of identity and purpose—in a way that brings together all of a person’s pluralities instead of neglecting the dimensions of her life that do not take central place. Our investigation revealed further that without integration and a unified sense of self, college graduates do not have self-authorship and are unprepared for the adult world. Now we can reflect on the implications of these conclusions for our thinking about the mission of liberal education—and Georgetown specifically—in the twenty-first century.

Two centuries after its inception, Georgetown University published Georgetown at Two Hundred: Faculty Reflections on the University’s Future. One of the essays in this volume, “Philosophy
at Georgetown University” by John B. Brough of the Philosophy Department, seems to prophesy a higher education environment in which students would lead compartmentalized lives and become parts of people relating to parts of people. Brough explains that, as of the year 1900 and until around 1970, Georgetown University required each of its undergraduate students to take at least thirty-two credits in philosophy precisely because “philosophy was intended to play an integrating role in the student’s educational experience.”

Philosophy “enjoyed pride of place in the curriculum” as “the culminating moment of a carefully structured classical education.” Without a heavy dose of philosophy, the wisdom of the intellectual environment at the time maintained, students would be without a context to make sense of all their learning. Until 1895 the university catalogues referred specifically to philosophy’s integrating role, but even after this specific formulation disappeared “there can be no question that the integrating function [continued] to be a principal reason for philosophy’s presence for the next six or seven decades.”

Philosophy, of course, lost its pride of place in Georgetown’s curriculum. And it left a vacuum. Today there is no specific place in the curriculum or co-curriculum designed to serve an integrating role in students’ lives. Instead, it is incumbent upon students to find their own integrating principles or spaces—a task not all students accomplish. One problem is that Georgetown’s current institutional design neglects to communicate that an integrated sense of purpose and identity is central to one’s thinking, knowing, and acting. Additionally, there are no programs—excepting the Designing the Future(s) of the University Initiative—whose purpose is to break the boundaries that compartmentalize students’ lives or to provide an educational experience that connects various components of their lives. Because Georgetown is dedicated to educating the whole person, it must devote specific attention and resources to developing the essential capacity of integration—and this is not a new idea. “Underlying the idea of a university,” Wendell Berry reminds us in “The Loss of the University,” is the “the bringing together, the combining into one”—the integration—“of all the disciplines;” in fact, the Latin universus means literally “turned into one.” As a university seeks students’ integration as an intentional educational purpose, it does nothing more than become what it was meant to be.

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Interview with Professor Catherine M. Keesling, Associate Professor of Classics

Nicholas E. Richards

Professor Catherine M. Keesling is an associate professor of Classics at Georgetown University. A recipient of fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Archeological Institute of America, the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, the Fulbright Foundation, and the Mellon Foundation, Professor Keesling is an expert on the sculpture, epigraphy, and historiography of Ancient Greece. She is the author of The Votive Statues of the Athenian Acropolis (Cambridge, 2003), as well as numerous articles and book chapters. In addition to classes on Ancient Greek art, religion, and history, Professor Keesling has most recently taught a seminar on the Athenian democracy.

Professor Keesling recently spoke with Utraque Unum about her research interests, the field of Classics in general, and her experience in academia.

Q. How did you develop an interest in Classics? What made you decide to enter academia?

A. I fell into Classics by degrees. In my first semester of college, I took the year-long art survey course and liked Greek and Roman art better than anything else. Then I thought I should take Latin, which my high school in southern California hadn’t offered. Then I studied Renaissance English drama with Philip Finkelpearl, a wonderful and amazingly learned professor who said in class one day that he really regretted never studying Greek. That made a huge impression upon me. I resolved there and then not to make the same mistake! Going to Greece for six weeks during the summer after my junior year on one of the annual summer sessions of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens sealed the deal for me: I wanted to be a Classical archaeologist. I’m afraid I had no plan B, so it’s a good thing I got into graduate school when I applied.

Q. What drew you to the field of archaeology in particular? What can we learn from the physical evidence of past civilizations that we cannot learn otherwise?

A. Another one of my undergraduate professors at Wellesley, Miranda Marvin, correctly diagnosed me as someone who needs to get outdoors and take insanely long walks in the Mediterranean summer sun in order to thrive. (A side note: I know from firsthand experience how big
an impact undergraduate professors can have, and I try never to lose sight of that in the classroom.) I see the physical evidence that Classical archaeologists study—entire sites such as Athens, buildings, statues, inscriptions, and objects of everyday use—as one part of a well-balanced Classics diet, as it were. The particular objects I spend most of my time studying are inscriptions on stone: sculptor’s signatures on statue bases, inscribed private dedications to the gods, and the public decrees of Athens and other Greek city-states. These kinds of objects give testimony to people, places, events, and ideas beyond the mainstream of Classical authors, and they can send you off to find answers to questions you had never thought of before. Engaging with physical objects hones students’ visual perception and memory. Objects and places can also connect you with a rich history of discovery, reception, and interpretation of Greek and Roman antiquity that to some extent exists independent of Greek and Latin texts.

Q. Would you recommend that your students visit archaeological sites or participate in excavations? What have your own experiences been like?

A. Here I come off as something of a fraud because, in my twenty years teaching at Georgetown, I have become an armchair archaeologist, studying objects in dusty museum storerooms rather than excavating sites myself. The store-room is where I can answer the sorts of research questions I am asking these days, and what I am doing now builds on years’ worth of visits to archaeological sites in Greece. Visiting sites and taking part in archaeological excavations in the Mediterranean are irreplaceable experiences, and students should do these things while they still have the time. Visits to sites and work on excavations have been some of the most memorable moments in my life: listening to BBC radio reports about the Gulf War while excavating the Hellenistic Greek city of Koptos in southern Egypt; seeing the Athenian Acropolis for the first time at dawn one day in June of 1986; having a snowball fight with my fellow students on top of Greek temple foundations at Aulis during a freak blizzard; and being chased by turkeys while hiking up a mountain in Athens!

Q. On the other side of the spectrum, you also have an interest in historiography. What is there to gain from reading ancient writers that we cannot discern from material culture? Who is your favorite ancient writer?

A. I like to study things that we can’t understand without some combination of physical objects and texts. My favorite ancient writer is the fifth-century historian Herodotus, whom I teach both in Greek and in English translation at Georgetown. For Herodotus, the point of writing history was threefold: to challenge the authority of epic poetry as the preferred way of knowing about the past; to record in writing and preserve forever the memory of the outstanding individuals of the past and the wonders of the known world; and to show how overconfidence and transgression of the natural boundaries of human action inevitably lead to the downfall of individuals, cities, and whole peoples. Herodotus’ history on a first reading seems digressive and disorganized, but its structure is actually amazingly sophisticated. Herodotus was also intensely interested in places and objects as evidence for past history, an interest I share. I reread Herodotus every year, and each time I read his history I find something I hadn’t noticed before.

Q. You recently taught a seminar on the Athenian democracy. How did you develop the idea for the course? What has the experience of teaching a seminar been like?

A. I developed this new course because I see a real need at Georgetown for students to learn more about democracy by studying the nuts and bolts of ancient Greece’s most important early experiment in popular governance. I approach this subject not by way of political theory, but...
by looking at what really went on in fifth- and fourth-century B.C. Athens: the political and social institutions and the day-to-day reality. One of my major goals for this course, taught for the first time in Fall 2015, was to introduce students to Thucydides as a source for the Athenian democracy, but also to documents inscribed on stone, which we read in English translation. The students in the seminar came from a variety of different majors, and we met every week for wide-ranging discussions on Athens and on the problems of making democracy work in general.

Q. What have you and your students discovered about the Athenian democracy? Why is studying the Athenian democracy relevant to us today?

A. Democracy resists definition. Many of the institutions of the Athenian democracy assume literacy, which seems to go against the general thinking about pre-modern European societies. Fifth-century Athens had a strong ideology of equality for all male citizens, but in practice both popular assemblies and the people’s courts involved the spectacle of the same elite individuals squaring off repeatedly against one another in front of the rest of the citizen body. The Athenians thought they were better than other Greeks and, for most of the fifth century, sought to achieve domination and fought non-stops wars. The Athenians idealized the modest citizen landowner, but in reality much of the productive land in the Athenian countryside may have been owned by wealthy elites and worked by slaves. These sorts of sharp divisions between ideological constructs and reality are something anyone studying present day democracies needs to come to grips with.

One old view is that the Athenian democracy ceased to exist in any meaningful way after Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander the Great, defeated the Athenians in 338 B.C. and compelled the Greek city-states to come together politically under his own leadership. But some of the most exciting new work being done in Athenian history concerns the city’s culture of honors in the centuries after Philip and Alexander. The Athenians asserted their continuing relevance not by fighting wars, but instead by selectively awarding public honors to both powerful outsiders and the Athenian citizens who negotiated most effectively with them to win concessions for Athens. This is a different vision of what a democracy does.

Q. What are your thoughts on Georgetown’s Jesuit tradition and overall intellectual atmosphere? Have you noticed any changes during your time here?

A. The Jesuit tradition as I understand it is about humanistic learning. New forms and canons of knowledge emerge and we need to embrace them, but at the same time we can’t afford to lose sight of the traditions of humanistic study. And devotion to knowledge isn’t at all incompatible with devotion to others. Georgetown’s undergraduate students have only become more amazing over the course of the twenty years I have taught here. I am grateful to the students for their goodwill in putting up with my eccentricities and failings, and for being willing to come along for the ride in my courses.

Nicholas E. Richards is a junior in the Georgetown College of Arts & Sciences studying Classics and Philosophy.
In Memory of Antonin Scalia (1936-2016)
Two Speeches from the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

The Cohonguroton Oration

Late one Sunday, a young Antonin Scalia mounted Old North Porch, in the footsteps of George Washington, to address Georgetown University’s graduating class of 1957. Scalia delivered the following valedictory speech, named the “Cohonguroton Oration” after an historic Native American name for the Potomac River, at 8:30pm on Sunday, June 9th, 1957.

The flaming sun has set beneath the green hill to the West, and returned to the bosom of the fertile earth which gave him birth. Above, the yellow moon has won domination of the skies, and shares her silent realm with twinkling stars. Below, up from the waters of the river that our fathers called Cohonguroton, up from her secret depths the damp mists of night steal towards us. It is the time when men are wont to sit about a glowing fire, and talk of past and future things. So let us sit and talk tonight.

When a traveler has reached the summit of a lofty hill, he does not descend at once, but pauses a moment, to look back across the land he has traversed and ahead into the valley where he will descend. From such a height he can see clearly the general features of the land which he saw only vaguely, piece by piece, disconnectedly, while he was crossing it. And he can look ahead, to survey the paths that lie before him and avoid the swamps and rapids, chasms and insurmountable cliffs. We stand on such a mountain peak tonight. Many years have we spent climbing up the rugged slope of training. Tomorrow we begin the descent into the valley men call life.

First of all, then, let us turn our gaze back, back while the season came and went four times, and we camped here above Cohonguroton’s shore. Our days were spent in hunting; but our prey was more elusive and more valuable than any forest dear or mountain bear or prairie buffalo. For we were seekers of the truth. Truth has no bones, no flesh, no solid earthly form. You cannot hear her creeping through the forest glades by night; you cannot see her running through the forest paths by day; you cannot watch your arrow speeding straight to thud into her heart. For those who seek her, she is everywhere; for those who do not love her, she is nowhere.

But we have not been alone in our hunt. We have been aided by the stories of the hunts that others made, the great pathfinders in the forest of the mind, long, long ago and far away from us. From their successes we have learned, and from their failures profited. These tales were told us by the Blackrobes, who have made themselves the link between our ancestors and us, the ancient and the now, the Old World and the New. They have handed down a treasure to our care, the precious heritage of a tribe not limited by tongue, or color, or continent, the sacred wisdom of the tribe called man. But neither they nor
we have fully caught the truth. She is too quick, too brave for us. No man can say that he knows all the truth. He can love and pursue her. Then we call him wise.

We have not succeeded, then, in capturing our prey. In any other hunt this would mean failure; but the hunt for truth is unique. The seeking is its own success, for only man is able to hunt the truth. The fishes, birds, and other beasts of earth do not hunger for it; the spirits and all-knowing God already eat their fill. Man alone can hunt the truth; to seek truth is to be most a man. We should measure the success of these past four years, not by the particles of truth that we have captured, for they are only grains of sand along an ocean shore, and soon even these may trickle from our memories. But if, by means of them, we have learned to love the truth, learned the art of hunting her, learned how to think, how to take an idea that lies dead between the pages of a book and make it live within our minds, then we leave here wise, we leave here ardent, skillful seekers of the truth, we leave here men.

So much lies behind us and is past. Now from this mountain where we stand tonight, let us turn around and look ahead, down across the broad green valley into which the trail of our existence winds. What we will do separately in the future is not completely different from what we have done together here in the past. New duties will be added; we shall have to earn our own livelihood, raise a family, nourish and support a new generation of our race. But besides all this, what we must do as men, the essential and distinctive duty of our tribe, is to continue searching for the truth. This goal can never change.

What is the difference, then, between these past four years and the days that lie ahead? It is symbolized by these feathers which I wear tonight. They are the feathers of a chief. We must be leaders where once we followed. We are to head the quest for truth.

Perhaps you think that I exaggerate our mission. But look about, and you will see the truth of what I say. If we will not lead, who will? Eliminate the great number of men who have never heard the voices of the past, who know nothing of the heritage of human wisdom, who begin their hunt alone and totally unaided. These may follow, but they will never lead. Eliminate again the men who have not heard the Word of Christ whispered to the soul. They search, but they do not know what they are searching for. They are not chasing truth, but merely clutching at her shadow. Their eyes can see only the ground, and watch this shadow, while truth wings high above them. They lack the eyes of faith, which alone can pierce into eternity, and so are doomed to lose the way, and miss the truth, and overlook the light.

Who, then, remains? Only ourselves, trained in reason and in faith. If we will not be leaders of a real, a true, a Catholic intellectual life, no one will! We cannot shift responsibility to some vague “chosen few.” We are the chosen few. The responsibility rests upon all of us, whatever our future professions. For the intellectual life, which is essentially the never-ending search for truth of which we spoke, does not belong only to the college and the university. Men are specially trained for it there, as we have been. But it should stretch far beyond, to wherever there is a man to think. It is our task to carry and advance into all sections of our society this distinctively human life, of reason learned and faith believed. If we fail to do this, if we allow the cares of wealth or fame or specialized career, to stifle our spirit of wonder, to turn us from the hunt, to kill in us what was most human, then we shall have betrayed ourselves, our society, our race. If we really love the truth, we will believe that we have been shown a marvelous pathway, that we must brace ourselves at once to follow it, that life will not be worth living if we do not otherwise! The prize is great. The risk is glorious.

The hour is late now, and it is time for us to rise and go our separate ways. The fires around which we have sat these past four years will no more warm us. But they will not go out. Others come to take our places here, to learn as we have done, to hear the ancient wisdom of our tribe, to join its hunt. We go out into life, and leave all
this behind. The camp stays ever fixed, like the river Cohonguroton, while we, like his waters, pass through to the sea.

Constitutional Government and Civic Education

On October 19, 2006, Justice Scalia returned to Georgetown to deliver these remarks in Gaston Hall at the inaugural event of the Tocqueville Forum. They were published in the first issue of Utraque Unum with the expressed written consent of the author. We republish them below.

I am delighted to be here for the inaugural event of the “Tocqueville Forum on the Roots of American Democracy” — a program devoted to deepening students’ understanding of the philosophical and religious foundations of our Republic. That deepening will not take a whole lot of subterranean work; by all accounts and observations, the current understanding is pretty shallow.

According to a study released last month by the Intercollegiate Studies Institute, American college students are woefully uninformed about this Nation’s history and its founding principles. The study warns of a “coming crisis in citizenship” — which may not be an exaggeration. To recount my own admittedly episodic observation: When I teach a class of constitutional law (I did this frequently, at the University of Chicago and Stanford, before becoming a judge, and I continue to do it in one-shot appearances even today) I usually ask how many of the students have read, cover-to-cover the Federalist Papers. I have never seen more than about 5% of the students raise their hands. These are students at the nation’s elite law schools, the brightest men and women, who have a particular interest in law and government. It is truly appalling that they should have reached graduate school without having been exposed to that important element of their national patrimony — the work that best explains the reasons and objectives of the Constitution, and a contribution to human knowledge so profound that it is studied in political-science courses in foreign countries.

One of the ISI study’s findings in particular caught my eye: At several elite schools, including Yale and Georgetown, seniors know less than freshmen about America’s history, government, foreign affairs, and economy. The study calls this “negative learning,” which is of course a euphemism for “getting dumber.” To be fair, one could put an optimistic face upon the finding: perhaps today’s freshmen arrive better educated than the freshmen of three years ago. But even if that were true (and I have no reason to believe it is), it would at least mean that three years of college have not made up for the deficit.

Tonight I want to comment on two aspects of the civic education issue. First, I shall describe the Founders’ views on civic education, to help evaluate how our performance has lived up to expectation. Second, I shall comment on the Supreme Court’s contribution to the coming crisis.

Views representative, I think, of the Founders can be found in Noah Webster’s 1790 essay, “On the Education of Youth in America.” Webster, a zealous patriot, famous lexicographer and educator (a Yale graduate, by the way) stated that American students must “know and love the laws.” “This knowledge,” he wrote, “should be diffused by means of schools and newspapers; and an attachment to the laws may be formed by early impressions upon the mind.” More particularly, Webster prescribed a course of study rich in American history and government:

[E]very child in America should be acquainted with his own country. He should read books that furnish him with ideas that will be useful to him in life and practice. As soon as he opens his lips, he should rehearse the history of his own country; he should lisp the praise of liberty, and of those illustrious heroes and statesmen, who have wrought a revolution in her favor. A selection of essays, respecting the settlement and
geography of America; the history of the late revolution and of the most remarkable characters and events that distinguished it, and a compendium of the principles of the federal and provincial governments, should be the principal school book in the United States. These are interesting objects to every man; they call home the minds of youth and fix them upon the interests of their own country, and they assist in forming attachments to it, as well as in enlarging the understanding.\footnote{568}

A similar approach was recommended by the other prominent founding-era writer on civic education, Benjamin Rush. Rush, signer of the Declaration of Independence, doctor, educator, and prominent essayist, wrote the following: “From the observations that have been made it is plain, that I consider it is possible to convert men into republican machines. This must be done, if we expect them to perform their parts properly, in the great machine of the government of the state.”\footnote{569} (Webster and, Rush, by the way, did not agree about everything. As noted by the editor of a volume of essays on education in the early Republic: “In their disagreement on the role of the Bible in the public schools and in the suitability of instruction in French and the harpsichord for young ladies, Webster and Rush suggest that some educational questions may indeed be eternal.”\footnote{570})

It is fairly clear that what Webster and Rush were recommending was nothing short of indoctrination in republican principles, at least for the young. Thus, a widely shared view of civic education in the early Republic was that our system of education should stop glorifying European culture. Before a broad system of education is to succeed, wrote Webster, “Americans must believe and act from the belief that it is dishonorable to waste life in mimicking the follies of other nations and basking in the sunshine of foreign glory.”\footnote{571} The fear was that educators would glorify a corrupt European culture and would fail to develop our own. Far from mimicking the customs, manners and intellectual fashions abroad, our founders expected us to serve as a model for other nations’ improvement. As Madison explained, \footnote{572}

[t]he American people owe it to themselves, and to the cause of free Government, to prove by their establishments for the advancement and diffusion of Knowledge, that their political Institutions, which are attracting observation from every quarter, and are respected as Models, by the new-born States in our own Hemisphere, are as favorable to the intellectual and moral improvement of Man as they are conformable to his individual & social Rights. What spectacle can be more edifying or more seasonable, than that of Liberty & Learning, each leaning on the other for their mutual & surest support?

How politically incorrect these ideas seem in an age that worships diversity and moral relativism. To be willing to train the young in American principles, one must believe, first, that there is such a thing as distinctive American principles (which is necessarily to say that contrary principles are not American or—dare I say it—unAmerican), and second, that those distinctive American principles are superior to those of other societies. Would anyone, nowadays, expect to hear a public grammar-school principal voicing these exclusionary and un-PC sentiments?

Another focus of the Founders’ writings on education was the importance of discipline. The Founders believed that discipline was a necessary ingredient of civic education not just because it created a proper environment for learning, but because it taught respect for the rule of law. “In the education of youth,” Benjamin Rush explained, “let the authority of our masters be as absolute as possible. The government of schools like the government of private families should be arbitrary, that it may not be severe. By this mode of education, we prepare our youth for the subordination laws and thereby qualify them for becoming good citizens of the republic.”\footnote{572} Webster shared these views: “Here children should be taught the usual branches of
learning; submission to superiors and to laws; the moral or social duties; the history and transactions of their own country; the principles of liberty and government.\textsuperscript{574}

And discipline, naturally, required effective punishment. Webster minced no words:
\begin{quote}
The rod is often necessary in school, especially after children have often been accustomed to disobedience and a licentious behavior at home. All government originates in families, and if neglected there, it will hardly exist in society, but the want of it must be supplied by the rod in school, the penal laws of the state, and the terrors of divine wrath from the pulpit. The government both of families and schools should be absolute.\textsuperscript{575}
\end{quote}

Few of us today would reintroduce the rod, (and, I may add parenthetically, few pulpits dwell upon the terrors of divine wrath). But swift and effective punishment of even the non-physical sort has been all but banished from today’s public-school classrooms, because of the application of due process clause to school affairs (about which more later) and the \textit{in terrorem} effect of litigation.

It should be apparent from several of the passages quoted above that the founders were as interested in teaching virtue as in teaching civics. This is apparent from Article III of the Northwest Ordinance, enacted by the Continental Congress and reenacted by the First Congress. It read in part: “Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” As Madison put it, “[t]he virtues of men are of more consequence to society than their abilities; and for this reason, the heart should be cultivated with more assiduity than the head.” And this could not likely be done, the framers believed, without religion.

I have often thought that one of the foundations for the relative political stability of the West has been the Our Father—and in particular its avowal that we forgive those who have trespassed against us. When I was in high school in New York City there existed an organization called the Catholic Forensic League, in which many of the Catholic high schools would compete in various categories of public speaking: debate, extemporaneous speaking, and oratorical declamation among others. This last category included famous speeches, such as the speech (if I recall its title correctly) of Telemachus to the Gladiators. One of these set pieces reenacted a conversation between a noble Roman and the Bishop of Rome. The Roman, a convert to Christianity, had seen his mother and brother slain before his eyes when Christians who had been invited on some pre-text to the Coliseum saw imperial archers swarm into the arena and let loose a hail of arrows into the crowd. The bishop tells the Roman to fall to his knees and say the Our Father—which he does, haltingly when he comes to “as we forgive those who trespass against us.” I remember being mightily impressed by that bit of theater. Now to be sure, Christians have not always honored that avowal, just as they have often disobeyed other injunctions of their faith. But they have often observed it, so that slaying 20th century Moslem Kosovars because of a Moslem slaughter of Serbs that occurred at Kosovo Polje in 1389 seems to most of us beyond the pale. And of course St. Paul’s letter to the Romans gives the same message: “Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord.” Is there any other good reason—a reason that will appeal to the heart—not to avenge past wrongs?

The Founders stressed that a civic education required the teaching of religious values. Benjamin Rush wrote that “[t]he only foundation for a useful education in a republic is to be laid in RELIGION. Without this, there can be no virtue, and without virtue, there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and life of all republican governments.”\textsuperscript{576} He continued:

The complaints that have been made against religion, liberty and learning, have been, against each of them in a separate state. Perhaps like certain liquors, they should only be used in state of mixture. They mutually assist in correcting the abuses, and in
improving the good effects of each other. From the combined and reciprocal influence of religion, liberty and learning upon the morals, manners and knowledge of individuals, of these, upon government, and of government, upon individuals, it is impossible to measure the degrees of happiness and perfection to which mankind may be raised.577

John Adams wrote that a republic “is only to be supported by pure Religion or Austere Morals. Public Virtue cannot exist in a Nation without private, and public Virtue is the only foundation of Republics.”578 And, famously, George Washington’s “Farewell Address” warned that our political prosperity depends on religion and morality:

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labour to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, the firmest props of the duties of Men and citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.579

All this was written, of course, in a day when education was generally not a function of the state, but of parents and churches—though it must be noted that even so adamant a separationist as Thomas Jefferson provided for clergymen on the faculty of his state-funded University of Virginia. Today, of course, civic education at public institutions cannot include religious indoctrination, in even so rudimentary an element of religion as the Ten Commandments. Thus, if the founders are to be believed, our schools can only with difficulty teach morality.

The Founders, of course, did not believe in education for education’s sake. They believed in education for civil government’s sake. Even those Founders who spent more time thinking about constitutional government than civic education shared these views: “A popular Government,” James Madison wrote, “without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.”580 Indeed, in Massachusetts, the connection between civic education and the republican experiment was made a matter of constitutional law: Chapter VI of that State’s 1780 Constitution provided that “[w]isdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of the people [are] necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties.”581

This is, of course, “Republicanism 101.”

If we have lost sight of the founding generation’s vision of civic education, I think it is fair to say that, of late, the Supreme Court has been a factor in the obfuscation. The Court is partly to blame for law students’ failure to study our legal history and traditions. When we live under a “living Constitution” whose content is determined by current popular preferences (or more precisely current judicial preferences) rather than the dispositions solemnly adopted by prior generations, law students have little incentive to study our history and traditions. Who cares what Hamilton, Madison and Jay thought?

As for grade-school and high-school students: Here the Supreme Court has had a more direct role in making civic education more difficult—though some of that role, I expect, is inevitable in a system of public education. As mentioned, the Court has subjected public-school discipline to
due-process review. Swift and certain punishment is a thing of the past; the process has been subjected to law and to lawyers.

The Court has invoked the First Amendment to restrict public educators’ ability to determine what students should learn. In one case, the Court held that a school board’s decision about what books to hold in its library is subject to federal-court review. Once a school has placed a book in its library, the Court held, the First Amendment prohibits the school from removing that book because of its content—which is of course the only sound pedagogical reason for either acquiring or getting rid of a book.

But the due-process and First-Amendment restrictions upon public education must take second and third place in the competition for obstruction of civic education. The winner—the Court’s most destructive line of decisions relating to civic education—is the line of decisions involving the religion clauses. As I have mentioned, the Founders believed morality was essential to the well-being of the Republic, and they believed that religion way to foster morality. Religious values were of therefore central to the Founders’ aspirations for civic education. This is not an anachronistic view, either; it is well reflected in the current sense of society. For example, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the Pledge of Allegiance as unconstitutional under the religion clauses, the Senate unanimously, and the House with only five dissenters, strongly criticized the decision. (We subsequently vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision on standing grounds.)

Yet Supreme Court has adopted the demonstrably unhistorical view that the Constitution forbids—not merely the favoring of one religion over another—but even the favoring of religion in general over irreligion. In Lee v. Weisman, it held that a principal could not invite a rabbi to deliver a benediction at a middle school graduation—a rigorously nondenominational benediction, given that the rabbi was speaking to a middle school in the Bible Belt—because of the “subtle coercive pressure[s]” (in favor of religion, presumably) that such a benediction would produce. Never mind that the practice is as old as public graduation ceremonies themselves. In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court held that student-led, student-initiated prayers at a high school football game violated the Establishment Clause. In short, the Court has rejected as an establishment of religion a public preference for religion over irreligion, when a preference for religion is central to our history and traditions. At best, the Court has shown great hostility towards the Founders’ vision of religion as way to foster civic virtue. At worst, the Court has actively obstructed the fulfillment that vision. Either way, we can all appreciate the irony of the Court’s interpreting the document upon which our constitutional republic is based to prevent public endorsement of the kind of civic virtue necessary to our constitutional democracy’s survival.

Some of the Court’s interference is, as I have suggested, inevitable. I do not think the Ten Commandments are so narrowly sectarian as to be beyond honoring in our public buildings and our public schools. But the Our Father assuredly is. In other words, education by the state cannot possibly have the religious content our framing generation found conducive to the public good. This is one of many reasons why government should not be hostile to private religious education.

* * *

I gather it is a requirement of a talk like this one to quote at least once from Democracy in America. So I shall conclude the keynote address of the inaugural event of the Tocqueville Forum with some Tocqueville. Tocqueville observed:

[The origin of the Americans, or what I have called their point of departure, may be looked upon as the first and most efficacious cause to which the present prosperity of the United States may be attributed. The Americans had the chances of birth in their favor; and their forefathers imported that equality of condition and of intellect into the country whence the democratic republic has very
naturally taken its rise. Nor was this all; for besides this republican condition of society, the early settlers bequeathed to their descendants the customs, manners, and opinions that contribute most to the success of a republic. When I reflect upon the consequences of this primary fact, I think I see the destiny of America embodied in the first Puritan who landed on those shores, just as the whole human race was represented by the first man. 587

I’m with Tocqueville, in that I attribute the prosperity of America to our forefathers’ virtue and intellect being passed down from generation to generation. I hope that through programs like the Tocqueville Forum, educators manage, despite formidable obstacles, to impress upon today’s students a better knowledge and appreciation of our philosophical and religious heritage.

Antonin Scalia graduated in 1957 from the Georgetown College of Arts & Sciences, where he studied history. He served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1986 to 2016. We commemorate the life of one of our country’s great public servants, who was a lifetime champion of the rule of law and a cherished friend.
THE FORUM

Moral Meritocracies: Elitism in Confucian Thought and its Compatibility with Democracy


6 Confucius, 5:16.

7 D. C. Lau, introduction to The Analects, Kindle Location 184.

8 Confucius, 4:5.


12 Ibid., Ch. 9, 73.


14 Ibid., 17:2.

15 Ibid., 8:9.

16 Ibid., 16:9.

17 Ibid., 17: 8.

18 Ibid., 6:29.


20 Xunzi, Ch. 4, 28.

21 Ibid., Ch. 4, 26.

22 Mencius, 7A:5.

23 Xunzi, Ch. 23, 255.


25 Mencius, 6A:16.

26 Ibid., 6B:6.
Xunzi, Ch. 11, 105.

Ibid., Ch. 9, 68.

Confucius, 12:7.

Xunzi, Ch. 10, 84.

Mencius, 7A:23.

Confucius, 12:1.

Mencius, 2A:2.

Ibid., 7A: 14.

Confucius, 7.7.


Confucius, 15:28.

Mencius, 1B:7.


Ibid., 560.

Ibid., 567.


Bai, 28.

Bell, 171.

Bai, 28.

Ibid.


Mill, 328.

Tan, 548.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Mill, 328.

Confucius, 12:22.

Bell, 152.

**Alexander Hamilton, Classical Models and Ideals, and the Deadlocked Presidential Election of 1800**

61 Ibid., 193.
62 Ibid., 194-5.
66 See *Federalist* No. 26.
67 Ketcham, 195.
69 Ketcham, 189.
74 Sharp, 3.
77 Ibid.
81 Chernow, 192-3, 169.
84 “Aaron Burr, 3rd Vice President (1801-1805).”


*Ibid.*.


The characterization of religion as something that people seek when they feel materially insecure strikes one as nearly Marxian, who himself was an early proponent of a teleological, dialectical theory of secularization which sees the religious decline as an inevitable end of human “progress” and societal modernization.


Norris and Inglehart, 94-95.


Warner, 21, 23, 29.


Warner, 38-41. We could easily include the Polish solidarity movement and Irish nationalism to this list as well.


The Political Emergence of Asian Americans

The rise of Asian Americans is a significant phenomenon in contemporary society. According to Pew Research Center's Social Demographic Trends Project, as of the last modified April 4, 2013, the number of Asian Americans has increased by 46% over the past decade, making them a community of 20 million today (Pew Research Center, 2012). Despite being just 3% of the total electorate, Asian Americans have a significant impact on the political landscape, with their numbers expected to nearly double by 2050, reaching close to 36 million (Brookings Institution, 2014).

According to So Young Kim and Russell Jeung, in their work on Asian Americans, Religion, and the 2008 Election, the growth of Asian Americans has been primarily due to the unique spiritualities fostered by Asian Americans, which have contributed to the growth of non-Abrahamic faiths in the U.S. (Kim and Jeung, 2013). The religious makeup of each Asian subgroup often depends on the composition or conditions of their native country. For example, Filipino Americans are mainly Catholic, reflecting the predominantly Roman Catholic population in the Philippines. Similarly, 61% of Korean Americans are Protestant, likely due to high Anglicanism in Korea's modernization process and the appeal of America as a largely Protestant nation (Kim and Jeung, 2013).

Asian evangelicals attend church at a higher weekly rate (76% to 64%) and are more likely to believe their religion is the one, true faith leading to eternal life (72% to 49%). Asian Catholics are also more likely to view religion as very important in their lives (64% to 54%) (Pew Research Center, 2012).

Asian Americans are just 3% of the total electorate, despite being 6% of the total U.S. population. According to The Brookings Institution, in the last decade, the group has boosted their numbers by 46% to make up a community of 20 million today. This massive influx is predicted to persist until 2050, when the U.S. Asian population is forecast to nearly double, to close to 36 million in number (Brookings Institution, 2014).

Asian Americans are a mosaic of faiths, with Asian evangelicals attending church at a higher rate and Asian Catholics more likely to view religion as important in their lives (Pew Research Center, 2012). While some have argued that religion is crucial to preserving the ethnic and/or transnational identity of immigrants in a new land, the recent growth of non-Abrahamic faiths in the U.S. has been primarily due to Asian Americans fostering their unique spiritualities.


From Kim and Jeung, “Asian Americans,” 245.
U.S. Asians say religion is either somewhat (18%) or very (4%) important to them.” As seen in Figure 1 from Pew Research Center’s “Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths”, over half of Chinese Americans are unaffiliated, while 32% of Japanese Americans are unaffiliated—both greater proportions that that of the general population.

Ibid.


Asian Americans are 31% liberal and 24% conservative; the U.S. public reports 24% liberal and 34% conservative.

Refer to Footnote 13; Based on these data, a lower percentage reported a belief in God and less frequent prayer; Asian Americans as a whole seemingly view religion as less important than the public does.

Jeffrey M. Jones, “Asian-Americans Lean Left Politically,” Gallup, last modified February 3, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/125579/asian-americans-lean-left-politically.aspx. Gallup inferred that Asian Americans were “less religious than other racial, ethnic groups” through results from polls on how important religion was in their daily lives, and how often they attend church on a weekly basis (both were low).

“Ibid.”


“2014 Midterms: Patterns and Paradoxes in Voting Among Asian Americans.” 55% of registered voters “chose not to identify as either Democrats or Republicans.”


“Ibid.”


“Ibid., 251.

“Behind the Numbers.”

“2014 Midterms: Patterns and Paradoxes in Voting Among Asian Americans.” Hispanics 71% and women 55%.

“Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths.” Effectively 72% of Hindus, 63% of unaffiliated Asian Americans, and 56% of Buddhist voters.


“Behind the Numbers.”

“Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths.”

Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo.

“The Rise of Asian Americans.” Similarly, when comparing average household wealth, Asian Americans earn $83,000 while U.S. adults earn $68,000.

“Asian Americans: A Mosaic of Faiths.”.

Kim and Jueng, “Asian Americans,” 244.

“Ibid.”

53%. Although the results hold true for both U.S. and foreign-born, Asians born outside of the U.S. are less likely to feel close to their fellow citizens.

“Ibid.”

“Ibid.”


“Ibid.”

“Ibid.”

In 2000, just half of recent Asian immigrants to the U.S. at the time were able to become citizens.


THE ARCHIVE

Quelling the Sparks of Religious Conflict: The Model of Non-Religious Governance in Medieval Spain


199 Ibid., 18.

200 Ibid., 29.

201 Nirenberg, Communities of Violence, 31.

202 Ibid., 32.

203 Oath of the Jews in the Name of the Prince (541).

204 Ibid.

205 Ibid.

206 Ibid.

207 Alfonso X, Las Siete Partidas (1265).

208 Nirenberg, Communities of Violence, 21.

209 Alfonso X, Las Siete Partidas (1265).

210 Ibid., 71-78.

211 Nirenberg, Communities of Violence, 71-78.

212 Ibid., 81.

213 Ibid., 89.

214 Ibid., 91-92.

215 Philip III, Decree of Expulsion of the Moriscos (1609).

216 Ibid.

Republicanism in Theory and Practice: the Early Diplomatic History of the United States


218 Ibid., 12.


220 Hirschman, 18.

221 McCoy, 27.

222 Hirschman, 25.

223 McCoy, 28.

224 Ibid., 35.


226 Ibid.

227 Ibid.

228 McCoy, 51.
229  Ibid., 51-2.
230  Ibid., 60.
232  Ibid., 116.
233  Ibid., 154.
235  Herring, 54.
236  McCoy, 136.
238  McCoy, 146.
239  Herring, 65.
240  McCoy, 186.
241  Ibid., 186.
242  Ibid., 49.
243  Ibid., 138.
245  Ibid.
246  Herring, 74.
247  Ibid., 77.
248  Ibid., 119.
249  Ibid., 126.
250  Ibid., 100.
251  Ibid., 101.
252  Ibid., 103.
253  Ibid., 103.
254  Ibid., 109. Herring also notes on page 176 that in many cases “slavery and expansion marched hand in hand.”
255  Ibid., 93.
256  Ibid., 154-5.
257  Ibid., 174.
258  Ibid., 175.
259  Ibid., 195.
260  Ibid., 199.
THE SANCTUARY
A Giant Problem: Descendants of the Sons of God from Genesis to David

It is widely accepted within biblical scholarship that the five books of the Torah, as well as portions of subsequent books, are comprised of at least four different strands, written by at least four separate authors or schools of authors. References to the giants and their ancestors are for the most part unique to the J (or Yahwist) source, an author who was probably a member of the tribe of Judah writing before 722 B.C. In contrast with more formulaic, legally minded authors such as the P source, which focused heavily on laws and purity, the J author is widely considered the most literary of the sources, writing with a particular eye for the mythic and fantastic (i.e., giants and talking snakes). For more information, see Richard Elliot Friedman’s *Who Wrote the Bible*?

E.A. Speiser, Genesis, Anchor Bible 1, (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 45. In his attempt to interpret the passage, Speiser comments that “the undisguised mythology of this isolated fragment makes it not only atypical of the Bible as a whole but also puzzling and controversial in the extreme. Its problems are legion.” The passage defies clear interpretation, and there is no consensus among biblical scholars as to what it means or why J placed it at this point in the narrative. What follows is an attempt to frame the passage within its literary context, then hypothesize an interpretation in accord with the other references to the sons of elohim and their descendants throughout the Hebrew Scriptures.

Whether the early Israelites were originally at least somewhat polytheistic, and if so, when the change from polytheism to monotheism took place, remains a contested topic in biblical
scholarship. What is clear is that Israel was surrounded by numerous polytheistic nations, and many polytheists lived among the Israelites. Thus, there was a certain cultural permeability between polytheism and Israelite culture. Therefore, it seems prudent to recognize the “Sons of God” mentioned in Genesis 6 are lesser gods, rather than as some sort of angelic beings. Regardless of whether the J author believes in the actual existence of such lesser gods, he uses them within his text as a literary device to ultimately demonstrate the absolute supremacy of YHWH.


283 Gen. 6:4.

284 Alter, 39.

285 Speiser, 46.


289 Alter, 541.

290 See note 228 above.

291 Cleanliness, among the ancient Israelites, was an issue of ritual purity, determining whether an Israelite could approach the tabernacle or not. An unclean Israelite had not necessarily sinned or transgressed against YHWH, as impurity could come from things as simple as menstruation or burying one’s dead relatives. In order to become a moral indictment, the impurity would have to be deliberate, in which case the cleanliness is not so much at issue as the will of the transgressor.

292 Speiser, 46.

293 Gen. 3:23.


300 Gen. 8:21.

301 Num. 13:3-16.


306 Num. 13:30.
Josh. 11:21-22.


Josh. 11: 21-22.


Josh. 11:22.


Josh. 11:22.


Josh. 11:22.


I Sam. 17:4.


Josh. 11:22.


Josh. 11:22.


I Sam. 17:4.


Friedman, 217.

I Sam. 17:32.


Friedman, 51.

**Truth, Lies, and (In)effectual Words: Plato and Nietzsche on the Truth of Myth and Allegory**

It lies beyond the scope of this paper to address Nietzsche’s understanding that “the whole opposition between the subjective and objective… is altogether irrelevant in aesthetics” (*The Birth of Tragedy* 52). We will focus on the art itself rather than the ‘de-individuation’ of the artist who creates it and thereby becomes “no longer an artist” but rather “a work of art” as ‘art arts itself’ through him (*The Birth of Tragedy* 37).


*Ibid.*, 42. Further Note: Nietzsche conceptualizes these ideas by referring to the gods, Apollo and Dionysus—Apollo being the god of truth, reason, poetry, and light; Dionysus being the god of wine, fertility, and ecstasy.

Joshua Mitchell, Lecture (Georgetown University: Fall 2014). Further note: Nietzsche does, indeed, consider such myths to spring out of a “terrible need” for ‘salvation’ from the Dionysian terror—a need that is cured as “art approaches as a saving sorceress, expert at healing. She alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live” (*The Birth of Tragedy*, 41 and 60).

Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 41. Further note: Notably, this is Nietzsche’s understanding of religion as well: “Piety, the ‘life in God,’ seen this way, would appear as the subtlest and final offspring of the fear of truth, as an artist’s workshop and intoxication before the most consistent of all falsifications, as the will to the inversion of truth, to untruth at any price. It may be that until now there has been no more potent means for beautifying man himself than piety: it can turn man into so much art, surface, play of colors, graciousness that his sight no longer makes one suffer” (*Beyond Good and Evil*, 71).
327 Ibid., 17.
328 Ibid., 43.
330 Ibid., 11-12.
331 Ibid., 12.
332 Ibid.,.
333 Ibid., *The Birth of Tragedy*, 94.
334 Ibid., 84.
335 Ibid., 90.
339 Ibid., 595b. Further note: Indeed, even those who have seen the Good have to muster their strength in order to protect themselves from the captivating power of poetry: as Socrates says, they will have to “chant to [themselves] the arguments [they] have already considered” (608a).
340 Ibid., 607c.
341 Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 94.
343 Plato, *The Republic*, 376e.
344 Ibid., 376d.
345 Ibid., 377b.
346 Ibid., 377c.
347 Ibid., 388c-392c.
348 Ibid., 459d.
349 Ibid., 415a-c. The myth of the metals is the myth created and told by rulers to justify differentiation in professions and classes: some people have gold in their souls, some silver, some bronze, and some iron.
350 Ibid., 359d-360d. The myth of Gyges is the story Plato tells about a man who has a ring that allows him to become invisible. With this ring, he can commit evils with impunity. Plato uses this myth to ask whether or not reasonable people would be moral if the threat of consequence were removed.
351 Ibid., 487e.
352 Ibid., 488a.
353 See, for example, Socrates’ analogy of the ship and its captain (488a-489a) and his image of the appetitive part of the soul as the “multicolored creature with many heads” (588c).
354 Ibid., 514a.
355 Ibid., 368d.
And, indeed, this is precisely Nietzsche’s conclusion (Beyond Good and Evil 136).

Plato, The Republic, 508e.

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 90.

Ibid., 136. Further note: Nietzsche claims that this “will to truth” is a manifestation of the ethic of ressentiment, as he understands Socrates himself to be only pursuing power and “play[ing] the tyrant” (Twilight of the Idols 42-43).

Plato, The Republic, 479a.

Ibid., 508e.

Ibid., 478c.

Mitchell, Lecture. Further Note: In physics, this term signifies the minimum speed to which an object must attain in order for it to escape the gravitational pull exerted upon it. Professor Mitchell has employed the term with respect to the language trap, descriptively calling to mind how difficult it is to escape such a pull.

Plato, The Republic, 376d.

Ibid., 506d.

Ibid., 533a.

Ibid., 506e.

Ibid., 507a.

Here, a crucial distinction emerges between Nietzsche and Plato: whereas Nietzsche understands art to be a force that brings vitality within the world of time, Plato understands it to be worthwhile only when it attends to the divine pattern rather than working with the images of mortal patterns. This insight from Professor Joshua Mitchell.

Williams was the mysterious third ‘Inkling’ to C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien.

It lies beyond the scope of this paper to address the ways in which the Good and God are comparable. We will proceed, hoping that the reader will take follow analogy for what it is worth.

This quote permeates the writings of Charles Williams, emerging again and again in his works—particularly in his descriptions of the way of negation and the way of affirmation in his Descent of the Dove (Virginia Beach: Regent College, 2001).

That is, positive and negative theology—speaking about God by positing his attributes (good, holy, just, etc.) versus speaking of God only by saying what He is not (infinite, uncreated, etc.).

Plato, The Republic, 508b-c.

Psalm 34:8.
It is important to note the gentleness that Socrates himself displays throughout the *Republic* and the patience he expects those who have seen the Good to display: only a man who has seen the Good and has “enough trust in the superiority of justice” will be “gentle with the unjust.” Socrates notes how “he will not be angry, for he knows that a man can lead a just life only if the divine element in human nature has consecrated him to a hatred of injustice” (366c-d). This sympathy would, indeed, disgust Nietzsche.

Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 201. Further Note: By “pathos of distance,” Nietzsche refers to that attitude of maintaining distinctions between ranks such that the higher ranks scorn and despise the lower. For Nietzsche, compassion is one of the worst sins because it closes in this distance.


Plato, *The Republic*, 382a-b.


Notably, Nietzsche also recognizes this profound possibility for misunderstanding that exists even in the very function of language: “Words are the acoustical signs for concepts; concepts, however, are more or less definite image signs for often recurring and associated sensations, for groups of sensations. To understand one another, it is not enough that one use the same words; one also has to use the same words for the same species of inner experiences; in the end one has to have one’s experience in common” (*Beyond Good and Evil* 216). Also notably, the fear of this danger of misunderstanding is one of the distinguishing factors between Plato and Nietzsche. Whereas Socrates (and, by extension, Plato) clearly fears being misunderstood, Nietzsche champions misunderstanding—even to the point of
claiming that “every profound thinker is more afraid of being understood than of being misunderstood” (*Beyond Good and Evil* 229). This fear of unwittingly deceiving another by analogy is also what leads strictly apophatic theologians like Maimonies to stray so far away from positive theology: out of fear of wrongly saying what God is—and, in so doing, leading others into idolatry—Maimonides purposes to speak only of what God is not (“Negative Theology,” in *Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Michael Peterson et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010)).

While Nietzsche rules out the possibility of a divine irruption, it is the divine irruption alone that ultimately holds together the whole of the *Republic*. This insight from Professor Joshua Mitchell.


Indeed, Socrates does resort to prayer: “What I fear is that I may mistake the truth, fumbling and dragging my friends with me into error, just at the point where a slip of this sort would do the most damage. So it is, Glaucoun, that I must pray that Nemesis will not come to plague me for the things I am about to say. For I truly believe that killing a man involuntarily is a lesser crime than misleading men about the nature of law and its relation to beauty, goodness, and justice” (451a-b).

404 *Plato*, *The Republic*, 518d.


409 As Socrates notes, the divine irruption tends to wipe the slate clean: “Where divine intervention enters, all rules are set at naught” (492e).

410 The *Theaetetus*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Gutenberg Project, 2013), accessed December 17, 2014, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1726/1726-h/1726-h.htm. Further note: this is another place in which Nietzsche misunderstands Socrates: he claims that Socrates fashioned himself as a “savior” (*Twilight of the Idols*, 44), whereas in reality he understood himself as a midwife, incapable of actually causing the birth or bringing about the needed turn.

411 The direct object “Thou” becomes the subject, the God who reveals Himself.

Matthew 13:35. Further note: It lies beyond the scope of this paper to trace out the many distinctions between Plato and Christ, but some of the notable ones would include the distinction between the Good and God as what versus Whom, the distinction between a noetic problem and a sinfully deficient will (see Augustine), and the distinction between the divine part of the soul being awakened and a whole new birth in Christ. These insights from Professor Joshua Mitchell.

412 *John* 1:1.

413 *Plato*, *The Republic*, 336d.

Matthew 13:12. Further note: It lies beyond the scope of this paper to address the question of fatalism or predestination as related to Socrates or Plato and Jesus, respectively. As far as Plato and Socrates are concerned, this divine spark is “found in everyone—children, women, slaves and freemen, craftsmen, rulers, and subjects,” but yet only some will be enkindled or turned (The Republic, 433d). In the Theaetetus, the fatalism question emerges as some are pregnant and some are not. In the gospels, understanding is likewise considered to be a divine gift, and the parables are said to exist for the explicit purpose of bringing further sight to some and further deafening others.

John 6:68.
Romans 10:17.
Hebrews 4:12.
Isaiah 55:10-11.
Again, as Socrates notes, the divine irruption tends to wipe the slate clean: “Where divine intervention enters, all rules are set at naught” (The Republic, 492e).
1 Corinthians 3:7.

THE PARLOR

Funny Girl: The Roles of Women in Roman Comedy

Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, Plautus.
Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, Plautus, and TVTropes, Miles Gloriosus, accessed online March 26, 2016.
E.g. Plaut. Most. 299-305/Plaut. Amph. 1135, and Plaut. Amph. 515, respectively.
Michael Fontaine, Funny Words in Plautine Comedy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 209.
Plaut. Most. 319.
Fontaine, 203.
Ibid., 74.
Gutenberg. I recognize that I am skipping most of the plot of (and most of what is interesting about) *Hecyra* in this summary, but I wish to keep this essay concise.


438 Treggiari, 233.


440 Treggiari, 237.


442 Gunderson, 135.


444 Treggiari, 230.

445 Gunderson, 132-134. This line (206) itself (and Philo.’s other praise of Phile.) also calls to mind the epitaphic tradition that Treggiari describes, employing language that was commonly used to praise wives on their tombstones.

446 Duckworth, 256—257.


449 Plaut. *Amph*, 528 and 530.

450 Gunderson, 190.


452 Gunderson, 191.

453 Smith, 49.


455 Treggiari, 8-9.


457 Duckworth, 150.


460 Duckworth, 150.


Moore, 159.

Plaut., *Amph.*, 923—929.


Smith, 51. Additionally, usually women who wanted to initiate a divorce employed the advocacy of a male relative or relatives on their behalf.


“Laudatio Turiae,” (ILS 8393), 30.

**The “Oriental Despot”: Cultural Mischaracterization in Maria Edgeworth’s *Lame Jervas***


Kate Teltscher, ‘‘Vocabularies of Vile Epithets’: British Representations of the Sultans of Mysore” in *India Inscribed: European and British Writing on India, 1600-1800* (Delhi: Oxford UP, 1995), 234.


Edgeworth, 45.


Edgeworth, 38.
“April, 01, 1818” in *The Asiatic Journal* (Empire.28), 359.

Kate Brittlebank, “Context” in *Tipu Sultan’s Search for Legitimacy: Islam and Kingship in a Hindu Domain* (Delhi: Oxford UP, 1997), 34.

Chatterjee, 190.


Edgeworth, 44.

Oxford English Dictionary.


Yazdani, 110.

Edgeworth, 33.


Yazdani, 107.

“A PORTRAIT OF TIPPOO SULTAN, WITH AN ACCOUNT OF HIS RESOURCES; BY AN EUROPEAN OFFICER IN HIS SERVICE” in *The Literary Magazine and British Review* [6 (1791)], 270.


Henry Dundas, “Letters of Dundas to Cornwallis and His Successors as Governor General of India, 1786-1799” (30 Jan. 1798: *India, Raj & Empire*).

Teltscher, 238.

Cliona O. Gallchoir, “Maria Edgeworth’s Revolutionary Morality and the Limits of Realism” in *Colby Quarterly* (June 36.2: 2000), 92.

**Fragmented Identities in Feminist Writing: Psychoanalysis in Alternative Literature**


Smith, 100.

Chute, 97.

Satrapi, Persepolis, 71.

Ibid., 37.

Smith, xxxiv.

Ibid., 67-77.

Ibid., 52-58.

Ibid., 59-61.


Ibid.

Tyson, 104.

Ibid., 102.

Smith, 10, 62, 92.

Tyson, 102.

Ibid., 103.

Smith, xxx, xi.

Ibid., 10.

Satrapi, Persepolis, 142.

Ibid.

Tyson 28.

Ibid., 32.


Satrapi, Persepolis, 116.

Ibid., 6, 13.

Tyson, 30.

Satrapi, Persepolis, 71, 76.

Smith, 25.

THE CLOCK TOWER

Higher Education, Integration, and Conversion: Religious and Educational Insights into the Unified Self


James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 186.


James, 183.

Ibid., 181.

Ibid., 183.

Ibid.

Ibid., 36.

Ibid., 193-194.

Ibid.

Ibid., 195.

Ibid., 195-196.

Magolda, 3.

Ibid., 4.

Ibid.


Ibid., .

Charity Johansson and Peter Felten, Transforming Students: Fulfilling the Promise of Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 3.

Magolda, 5-6.

Stanford, “The Study of Undergraduate Education at Stanford University.”.


I borrow the term integrating principle from Philip Gleason, who uses it when he discusses pre-Vatican II American Catholicism: “the main thrust in those years was toward an organically unified Catholic culture in which religious faith constituted the integrating principle that brought all the dimensions of life and thought together in comprehensive and tightly articulated synthesis." I also paraphrase some of his language in my description of integration throughout this paper. The citation for his quotation is: Philip Gleason, Keeping the Faith: American Catholicism Past and Present (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 139.

James, 183.

Ibid., 109.

Ibid., 116.


In Memory of Antonin Scalia (1936-2010): Two Speeches from the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court

Published in The Georgetown College Journal 86 (1957), 12-14.


Ibid., 64-65.


See Rudolph, supra n.1, 41.

Webster, 77.


Webster, 67.

Ibid., at 57-58.

Rush, Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools, supra n.1, at 10.

Rush, Of the Mode of Education, 686.


Madison, 690.

Mass. Const. of 1780, Ch. VI, reprinted in 1 Founders’ Constitution, at 11. See also John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions, in Works 6: 168, 197 (“Children should be educated and instructed in the principles of freedom . . . . The instruction of the people in every kind of knowledge that can be of use to them in the practice of their moral duties, as men, as citizens, and Christians, and of the political and civil duties, as members of society and freemen, ought to be the care of the public, and of all who have any share in the conduct of its affairs . . . .”).


Ibid., 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).


Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835).