AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND THE POLITICS OF THE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

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By

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ABSTRACT

Though nearly all states in the international system are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the same cannot be said of the more recent nonproliferation agreements designed to advance the goals of the NPT. Together these treaties and agreements make up the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The project asks: what explains variation in NPT members’ commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime? Contrary to recent research that largely points to domestic political variables, such as regime type, to explain institutional commitment, the project theorizes that nuclear nonproliferation regime is best conceptualized as a hegemonic order in which variation in states’ favorability toward U.S. global leadership explains variation in commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This research employs quantitative analysis drawn from an original dataset of nuclear nonproliferation commitment indicators as well as detailed case studies of nonproliferation decision-making in Japan, Egypt, and Indonesia drawn from over 35 elite interviews and archival research. Empirical findings indicate support for the proposed theory. The findings suggest this particular regime may be unsustainable without a hegemonic backer, leading to questions about the future of nuclear proliferation amidst the projected relative decline of U.S. economic power.
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And then there is my husband, Ryan, and our two daughters, Sydney and Josephina. I began the PhD program a week before getting married. I brought Ken Waltz to read by the pool on our honeymoon (in hindsight, this was probably not the best idea). We have “vacationed” to conference locations. He has sat through many dinners that revolved around academic conversations and departmental goings-on. In short, Ryan has been there every step of the way, through difficult course work, endless papers (many of which he proofread), comprehensive exams, conferences and research trips, and too many conversations about international relations theory. His patience for this process has been unwavering and for that I am deeply grateful. My children have had a tired, and often distracted mother as I worked to complete this project. They provide me motivation and inspiration on a daily basis and I hope that they also seek out hard challenges and find the personal satisfaction in completing them. It is to Ryan, Sydney, and Josephina that I dedicate this effort.

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<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>CPPNM</td>
<td>Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTBT</td>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEFCON</td>
<td>Defense Readiness Condition</td>
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<td>ENDC</td>
<td>Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>HINW</td>
<td>Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>INF</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTBT</td>
<td>Limited Test Ban Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle</td>
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<td>MLF</td>
<td>Multilateral Force</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>National Nuclear Security Agency</td>
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<td>NNWS</td>
<td>Non-Nuclear Weapons States</td>
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<td>NPT</td>
<td>Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSG</td>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
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<td>PNE</td>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosion</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The 1970 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the most widespread arms control treaty in history. The non-nuclear weapons states in the NPT have committed to forgo possession of the most powerful weapon on the planet. And yet, many of these states have been slow to support additional treaties, agreements, and activities that also promote the goal of nuclear nonproliferation. For example, some states, such as Canada, Jordan, Japan, Ireland, and New Zealand, have signed on to every new regime agreement and activity, most within a relatively short amount of time. Others, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, acceded to the NPT but have been unwilling to sign, ratify, or join many additional regime agreements and activities. Most NPT states fall somewhere in between.

The variation in NPT states’ commitment to elements of the larger nuclear nonproliferation regime raises a question: if states have ratified the NPT, the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, what explains variation in states’ commitment to other aspects of the regime? In other words, why are some NPT states more committed to the nuclear nonproliferation regime than others?

Employing a theory based on the leadership of the hegemon, this project argues NPT members most favorable to the hegemon’s global leadership are most likely to commit, and commit more quickly, to additional elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime after minimal diplomatic outreach. Less favorable states are less likely to support new nonproliferation initiatives, and when they do, will join more slowly. Moreover, states less
favorable to hegemonic leadership will often require threats or inducements from the hegemon in order to commit.

This theory is based on the premise that the most powerful states have a strategic interest in nuclear nonproliferation.¹ Nuclear weapons in the possession of other states threaten these powers in a number of ways: limiting power-projection capabilities, threatening areas of strategic interest, and menacing domestic and allied populations. Because the hegemon has the greatest strategic interest in preventing additional nuclear weapons states, it pursues nonproliferation globally. As a result, other states associate nonproliferation with the hegemon and therefore their commitment to the nonproliferation regime reflects their favorability to the hegemon’s global leadership.

In the nuclear age, the United States has been this hegemonic power. Because of its strategic concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons, the United States has been the primary catalyst in developing the nonproliferation regime. Of all states, the United States has expended the greatest amount of time and resources in garnering regime commitments to reduce the number of additional nuclear weapons states and to protect fissile material from getting into the hands of dangerous actors.

This argument stands in contrast to recent scholarship arguing that international institutional commitments are heavily shaped by domestic political institutions.² To provide a

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small sampling of this literature, scholars find differences in regime type explain variation in advocacy surrounding early European human rights treaties,\(^3\) ascension to the International Criminal Court,\(^4\) and the propensity to enter preferential trading arrangements.\(^5\) Other scholars find democratization leads states to enter all types of international organizations because joining allows leaders to credibly commit to democratic reforms.\(^6\) In contrast to the preponderance of research connecting regime type and other domestic level variables to treaty and agreement ascension, this project instead points to the importance of international factors, specifically the role of the hegemon, in explaining variation in nonproliferation regime participation. This conclusion thus suggests that commitment to security institutions may be explained by different mechanisms than those driving commitment to other types of multilateral institutions.

Scholars have a limited understanding of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and why states agree to participate in its many activities and agreements.\(^7\) In a recent review of the nonproliferation literature, Scott D. Sagan argues, “We know very little about why different governments joined the NPT and how their interests and interpretations have shaped the patterns


of their compliance behavior.” Similarly, William C. Potter, in an article assessing causes of nuclear restraint, argues that it is challenging to make predictions about the future of nonproliferation because of “the underdeveloped state of research on foreign policy forecasting in general and nuclear decision-making in particular.”

Employing both large-N quantitative analysis and detailed case studies, I conduct an analysis on the determinants and mechanisms of states’ commitment to the regime. To preview the findings, this project’s quantitative analysis contends that favorability toward the U.S.-led order has a statistically and substantively significant effect on nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment. Favorability to U.S. global leadership is proxied using UN General Assembly voting data, a commonly used indicator for such preferences. These findings suggest that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is best considered a hegemonic order. Contrary to recent literature on international agreements, I do not find support for the idea that domestic political variables are an important driver of nonproliferation commitments. I also find little support that resisting additional commitments is related to hedging behavior born from external security threats.

The qualitative case studies trace the decision-making of three key states within the nuclear nonproliferation regime—Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt—surrounding three elements of the regime: ratification of the NPT, the 1995 extension of the NPT, and conclusion of the 1997 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol Safeguards agreement.

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Together the quantitative and qualitative findings indicate strong support for a theory of commitment based on hegemonic leadership.

This project makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. Empirically, using a newly developed dataset, it finds that variation in commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime is best explained by variation in states’ favorability toward the hegemon’s global leadership. The case study research, based on archival materials and over 35 interviews with current and former diplomats, provides new information about the U.S. role in promoting nuclear nonproliferation. Theoretically, the findings in this project indicate that the nuclear nonproliferation regime should be conceptualized as a hegemonic order, in which the most powerful state shapes the decision-making of all other states. This conclusion is significant for the future of nonproliferation efforts as it suggests that the order may not continue without a superpower backer, or “after hegemony.”

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime is the NPT, established in 1968, which commits most signatories to eschew the development of nuclear weapons, while promising these states access to peaceful nuclear technology. In addition, the treaty commits all states, including the five “declared” nuclear weapons states as of the treaty’s drafting (United States, USSR, China, France, United Kingdom), to pursue negotiations, in good faith, toward disarmament. By establishing the NPT, the primary drafters, the United States and Soviet Union, sought to prevent additional nuclear weapons states at a time when all technically capable states were

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expected to proliferate. Through agreements with the IAEA, NPT members agreed to make their nuclear activities transparent to international inspectors. Since entry into force of the treaty in 1970, the international community has established a number of additional agreements to address the potential danger from both nuclear weapons proliferation and the misuse of nuclear materials. For the purposes of this project, I define the nuclear nonproliferation regime as the set of institutions and activities aimed at curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons and dangerous nuclear materials.

In addition to the NPT, a number of treaties comprise the formal architecture of the nonproliferation regime. Some of the most important treaties include the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, the Model Additional Protocol, and five regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zones. In recent years, United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, which requires improvement in states’ export control laws, has also been an important part of the regime, especially in the aftermath of revelations about AQ Khan’s illicit nuclear supply ring. Informal elements of the regime include the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of nuclear technology supplier states that sets guidelines on sales of nuclear technology, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S. effort to promote global cooperation on the interdiction of illicit nuclear materials and technologies.

Answering the question of why some NPT member states commit more broadly to the regime than others contributes both to the theoretical understanding of the nuclear

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nonproliferation regime and to the ability to make well-informed nonproliferation policy. Theoretically, this project digs into the question of international regime commitment and how it may vary across a single regime. There is little contemporary literature on commitment to security regimes generally or to the nuclear nonproliferation regime specifically. Much of the nonproliferation regime literature comes from the early days of the NPT, before the permanent extension of the treaty in 1995, and does not include an examination of the more recent elements of the regime such as the IAEA’s Model Additional Protocol or UNSC Resolution 1540.

The findings of this project will also have implications for policymakers seeking to understand historical behavior of states within the regime. Learning why some states adhered to regime elements provides insight into mechanisms for gaining additional adherents to the various aspects of the regime. This exploration also serves to illustrate the opportunities and limitations of U.S. efforts to influence commitment in some states.

*The Importance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime*

Some may ask whether nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment matters. On the one hand, it was Iran’s membership in the NPT and the IAEA’s many reports about Iran, in its capacity as the monitor for the NPT, that eventually led to Iran’s referral to the UN Security Council, six rounds of economic sanctions and the current negotiations over Iran’s program with the P-5+1. Without the web of norms and institutions surrounding NPT—and Iran’s initial commitment to this regime—the international community as a whole would likely know far less about Iran’s nuclear program. On the other hand, some prominent scholars argue that the NPT
has little effect on nonproliferation.\textsuperscript{13} They primarily argue that the NPT has not constrained those states that ratified the treaty and then sought nuclear weapons, and that compliant states were not going to proliferate regardless of the treaty. In effect, the NPT only screens, it does not constrain, or as Richard K. Betts writes, “Treaties can only ratify interests.”\textsuperscript{14} These critics see such institutions as simply reflecting the power dynamics in the international system with scant independent influence on global politics.\textsuperscript{15} These criticisms reflect a narrow understanding of the treaty and the regime—an institution that has been around for almost half a century.

There are a number of reasons the nonproliferation regime is and has been consequential for international security. First, both qualitative and quantitative literature has found that the NPT has had some constraining effect on states’ proliferation behavior.\textsuperscript{16} Second, the regime has helped create and promote global standards of appropriate state behavior related to nuclear weapons and materials. Most proliferators in recent decades are states that are labeled “rogue” for other reasons besides seeking nuclear weapons. “Good” states do not proliferate in the


current era. It is notable that most new states to the international system have quickly joined the NPT. As scholar William Walker writes about the newly emergent post-Soviet states, “the NPT was…used as a political and legal template for distributing nuclear status, legally and legitimately, across the former Soviet space.” In the absence of an NPT it is difficult to imagine how states could so quickly and convincingly declare themselves non-nuclear weapons states in a manner that is universally recognized. Third, commitment to the treaty—whose members have held meetings every five years since 1970—creates nonproliferation stake-holders within state bureaucracies that could help counteract potential government factions seeking nuclear weapons. Fourth, full commitment to the nonproliferation regime increases the hurdles to cheating. Factions within a state seeking to proliferate must either contend with others who take their states’ NPT commitment seriously or make the program deeply hidden. Because of regular inspections, states under IAEA safeguards will have difficulty hiding a clandestine program, especially if the state has the most stringent safeguard agreements. Fifth, if states are fully committed, the nonproliferation regime makes cheating more obvious to the international community. If a state expels IAEA inspectors or refuses to respond to questions from the IAEA about their fissile material, it sends a strong message to the international community to pay more attention to what is transpiring in that state. IAEA safeguards provide a tripwire or a warning bell to the international community, which would be less obvious absent this regime. Finally, when states do cheat and seek nuclear weapons while in the NPT, the regime infrastructure creates a means to develop a unified response to noncompliance. This is exemplified in the response to

Iranian nuclear activities since 2002, in which the IAEA Board of Governors has referred Iran to the UN Security Council. Without these treaty mechanisms it would be significantly more difficult for the United States and others to put the amount of economic pressure on Tehran to bring them to the negotiating table.

In sum, the argument that global hegemons use institutions to create global order to advance their own interests is not the same thing as arguing that institutions are meaningless. Those who see these institutions as epiphenomenal are missing many of the benefits that come from the treaty after the majority of nations have ratified. It is unlikely many of these benefits—creating hurdles to proliferation, providing warning when it occurs, and establishing mechanisms to address proliferation—would be as successful absent such an institution. For the specific case of the NPT, the academic debate over whether treaties constrain or screen becomes less relevant: the treaty creates institutionalized monitoring and punishing mechanisms that would not exist without the treaty.18 The “screen or constrain” debate discounts another important point: states are not static entities whose interests are frozen when they ratify a treaty. A state may ratify the NPT and then decide to pursue a nuclear program years later, but—because it is a treaty member—taking actions that contravene the treaty becomes more difficult.

**Plan for the Dissertation**

This project is divided into eight chapters. The following chapter, Chapter Two, details the theoretical argument of the dissertation, a theory based on hegemonic leadership, and

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presents hypotheses derived from this argument. It follows with an explanation of alternative hypotheses.

Chapter Three provides evidence of one of the key theoretical assumptions of the project: that the United States has been the leader of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime throughout the nuclear age. By taking advantage of newly declassified U.S. government documents, expert interviews, and secondary sources, the chapter illustrates the ways in which the United States developed and promoted the nonproliferation regime from the Truman administration to the Obama administration.

Chapters Four through Seven comprise the empirical tests of the project’s argument. Chapter Four provides statistical evidence of the theory. The quantitative work employs an original dataset of nuclear nonproliferation commitment indicators from 1968 to 2012.

Chapters Five, Six, and Seven provide cases studies of nonproliferation decision-making for three states, Japan, Indonesia and Egypt. Chapter Five examines the decisions of Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt to join the NPT. Though this project aims to explain variation in regime commitment among states that are already NPT members, it is plausible that mechanisms of the theory of hegemonic leadership would be evident in the states’ initial decisions to join the regime.

Chapter Six chronicles Japanese, Egyptian and Indonesian decision-making during one of the most important episodes in the history of the nuclear nonproliferation regime: the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, in which all treaty members had to decide if and how to extend the treaty after its first 25 years in force. This period illustrates how the United States and its closest allies campaigned to ensure the treaty would be extended indefinitely.
Chapter Seven covers Japanese, Egyptian, and Indonesian decisions to adopt or reject the Model Additional Protocol, a more stringent nuclear safeguards agreement developed by the IAEA in the 1990s.

The conclusion, Chapter Eight, reviews the central argument of the project and discusses implications of the findings. The theoretical implications center on how this research fits into the broader institutional literature. The conclusion ends with a discussion of current trends that are undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime and policy-recommendations for U.S. nonproliferation policy.
CHAPTER TWO: THEORIES OF REGIME COMMITMENT

The purpose of this project is to better understand why some NPT member states commit to the nuclear nonproliferation regime more than others. All NPT states, by joining the treaty, have committed to nonproliferation goals, but not all states have agreed to or participated in subsequent efforts to strengthen these goals.

This chapter begins by explaining this project’s conceptualization of commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The chapter then presents the project’s theoretical argument that patterns of states’ behavior within the nuclear nonproliferation regime over time are best explained by understanding variation in favorability toward U.S. global leadership. The theory predicts that states more favorable to U.S. global leadership will have higher levels of commitment to the regime, while states less favorable to U.S. leadership will have lower levels of commitment. The chapter then explores possible alternative explanations by drawing on major theories of international relations. In the remaining chapters these theories will be tested by employing large-N quantitative analysis and detailed case studies.

**Conceptualizing Commitment to the Regime**

In much of the nonproliferation literature, commitment to the NPT regime simply means a lack of nuclear weapons proliferation. If a state does not have a nuclear weapons program it is assumed to be cooperating with the regime. This project, however, conceptualizes commitment more specifically to mean joining the treaties, agreements, and activities meant to strengthen global efforts to stop the proliferation, transfer, or use of nuclear weapons, or related technology and fissile materials. By this definition an NPT state may eschew a domestic nuclear weapons
program, but be less committed to the regime through weak export control laws, or the absence of an Additional Protocol safeguards agreement with the IAEA, or failure to ratify the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Weapons. A fully committed NPT state has ratified or joined all of the additional agreements and activities that make up the regime.

The complexity of nuclear nonproliferation makes this broader definition more appropriate to both understanding and promoting nonproliferation. Curtailing the dangers of nuclear proliferation requires a number of distinct efforts: discouraging the demand for nuclear weapons programs, proliferation-proofing civilian nuclear energy programs, safeguarding existing stocks of nuclear material, and creating strong export control laws to prevent the spread of nuclear technology. The regime may be thought of as a series of sieves representing different regime elements, which when nestled together leave a smaller and smaller set of pathways for proliferators to develop nuclear weapons. It is difficult to block all paths completely, but as global commitment across the entirety of the regime increases, it becomes more and more difficult to proliferate.

It is expected that the specific reasons behind regime commitment, or lack of commitment, vary by state, by regime element, and by time period. Different states will assess the costs and benefits of committing differently based on domestic and international politics, as will their individual leaders in a given period. Some regime elements will be perceived as more costly than others due to their requirements. The costs of regime commitment have also likely changed over time. In the first decade of the NPT, non-commitment meant something quite different than in the early 2000s when few states were outside of the regime. Similarly, as more
and more states ratify the Additional Protocol or comply with UNSC Resolution 1540, those non-committed states may feel more pressure to join, increasing perceived costs of non-involvement. Nonetheless, this project assumes that because different regime elements are united by their underlying goal of curtailing the dangers of nuclear weapons and materials, there will be generalizable patterns to explain NPT states’ behavior within the regime.

In operationalizing commitment with the regime, I have looked to specific agreements and activities where states have made choices about their levels of commitment, whether through the ratification of treaties, statements about the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995, or the implementation of nonproliferation agreements. These actions are observable and measurable, but they are not the only possible means to assess commitment to the regime. Other studies could examine commitment by exploring how states promote or undermine global nonproliferation norms or how states behave in the quinquennial Review Conference for the NPT. With little extant systematic research on the NPT regime, examining specific regime activities and agreements is the most fruitful avenue to improve understanding of state behavior within this regime.

It is also important to note that the concept of commitment examined here is distinct from compliance. Compliance in the institutional literature usually refers to whether a state is abiding by the requirements of the agreement to which it has signed. Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter define compliance as “a state of conformity or identity between an actor's behavior and a specified rule.”¹⁹ In some cases, non-compliance with international treaties and agreements is

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egregious and obvious, such as torturing citizens while a signatory of the Convention Against
Torture or pursuing nuclear weapons while a non-nuclear weapon state within the NPT. In
general this latter topic has been examined by the nonproliferation literature as it seeks to better
understand why states proliferate, and will not be considered at length in this project. There are
other lesser examples of non-compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime, including
submitting safeguards declarations to the IAEA late or not submitting them at all. Though it is
preferable that states do not submit their safeguards declarations late, in most cases this delay has
little substantive meaning and is not a major topic of study. Commitment as examined here—
defined as signing on to or joining new nonproliferation treaties, agreements, and activities that
strengthen nonproliferation efforts—is substantially more meaningful than minor compliance
measures within the regime. The nuclear nonproliferation regime is strengthened as more states
join treaties and agreements and they become universal. Thus each decision of a state not to
commit has negative implications for the regime as a whole. States take these decisions quite
seriously; choosing to join or not join has implications for states’ relations with those in their
region and with states around the world. Therefore, more analytical leverage is gained and the
regime is better understood through an examination of commitment to regime elements instead
of examining minor cases of non-compliance with regime elements. In the majority of the cases,
states are in compliance with the spirit of regime agreements to which they have joined, but
some have decided not to take on additional regime burdens—understanding why is the focus of
the present study.
A Theory of Regime Commitment

A theory addressing this question of variation in regime commitment must explain why some states join post-NPT nuclear nonproliferation agreements relatively quickly, why some states join after a delay, and why some states do not join at all. Major theories of international relations offer a number of potential answers to this question. In brief, neo-realists may suggest that some states are reluctant to commit because they are hedging on nuclear weapons development, or that some may commit more than others because they are coerced by more powerful states. Neo-liberal institutionalists would argue that variation in commitment is based on variation in states’ cost-benefit analyses regarding the offerings of each new institution or that participation in the regime over time would alter states’ interests so that they become more committed. Domestic liberal theorists may point to regime type, suggesting that democracies or democratizing states are more likely to commit. Finally, constructivists may explain variation in commitment through variation in internalization of a nonproliferation norm among states, with normatively committed states joining agreements sooner.

In contrast, the argument presented in this project is not captured fully by any single major theory of international relations, but draws from multiple perspectives. At its root, this theory accounts for the unique role of the hegemon in developing the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the many tools of persuasion available to this powerful state in promoting regime adherence. Indeed, I argue a theory explaining states’ commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime must account for the hegemon as this power has played the most significant role in creating, re-creating, and promoting the nuclear nonproliferation regime. To briefly summarize, I argue that because the hegemon has the greatest strategic interest in
preventing additional nuclear weapons-capable states, the hegemon uses a number of mechanisms, including multilateral institutions, to promote nuclear nonproliferation globally. The hegemon then uses the many tools at its disposal to encourage all states in the international system to commit to these institutions. States thus associate the regime with the hegemon’s global leadership. States more favorable to the hegemon’s global leadership commit more quickly based on diplomatic requests made by the hegemon and its closest allies; states less favorable to the hegemon’s global leadership are more resistant to commit and thus the hegemon is required to engage in more costly persuasive measures including inducements and threats.

Academic literature offers a number of definitions of hegemony.\textsuperscript{20} For the purposes of this project a global hegemon is defined by its material power, authority, and the character of its ties to other states. In terms of its material power, the hegemon is a state in the international system that is dominant economically and militarily. With this power, the hegemon creates order in the international system through the creation of global rules that are to its advantage.\textsuperscript{21} These rules may relate to diplomacy, economics, and war and peace.\textsuperscript{22} Because of its overwhelming material power, the hegemon has many tools of persuasion in the form of carrots and sticks. Beyond its material power, the hegemon is also characterized by the authority it holds over many

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\item\textsuperscript{22} Gilpin 1981, 36.
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states in the system. With this authority it is able to convince some states to act in its preferred ways without resorting to coercion. A hegemon’s authority is rooted in its outsized material power, but it also stems from states perceiving the hegemon’s leadership is legitimate, that the hegemon has a “right” to such authority. Finally, a hegemon is defined by the ties it maintains to other states, namely “informal authority” ties between the hegemon and other states. All other states share weak ties among themselves as well. This organizational structure makes hegemony distinct from empire, which is characterized by a hub and spoke structure in which the majority of ties are between the imperial ruler (hub) and the periphery, with the periphery units having few or no ties among themselves.

This project’s overall theoretical argument has three distinct parts. First, this theory argues that the most powerful states have the greatest strategic interest in preventing additional nuclear weapons states. Existing scholarship indicates that we should expect the most powerful states in the international system to prioritize nuclear nonproliferation more than other states. This is certainly true for hegemonic powers. Why is this so? The strongest states in the system have the greatest power projection capabilities and strategic interests spanning the globe. Thus, nuclear weapons in the possession of others are grave threats not only to the hegemon’s domestic population, but also to its ability to project power and secure its global interests. In short, nuclear weapons allow weak states to become strong. Moreover, the presence of additional nuclear powers increases the chances that hegemonic powers could be drawn into a conflict.

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23 Nexon and Wright, “What’s at Stake,” 256-257.
24 Ibid., 257.
26 Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb,” 113-133.
involving nuclear weapons, with potentially devastating consequences. Finally, nuclear weapons proliferation could contribute to a change at the regional or systemic level whereby the hegemon loses its position of primacy.  

Second, based on the hegemon’s strategic interest in preventing additional nuclear weapons states, the hegemon uses all of the tools afforded by its powerful position to curtail additional proliferation. One of the most cost-effective ways for a hegemon to establish global rules is through the creation of multilateral institutions. The hegemon then uses a number of tools of persuasion to convince the other states in the international system to sign on and participate in these institutions. Together the global institutions aimed at preventing additional nuclear weapons states make up the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  

Finally, this theory posits that variation in nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment is best explained by variation in states’ favorability toward the hegemon and its global leadership. Because the hegemon has established and promoted the nonproliferation regime, other states in the international system associate this regime with the hegemon’s global leadership. How quickly states commit to elements of the regime, and if they decide to commit at all, is in large part related to their view of the hegemon’s global order. Favorable states are quicker to commit, while less favorable states take longer to join, if they do so at all. The hegemon uses different tools of persuasion depending on the states’ favorability, with minimal diplomacy often sufficient for more favorable states, while greater diplomatic attention, inducements, and even threats may be required to persuade less favorable states to join.

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Empirically, this theory applies to the United States and its promotion of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. After World War II, the United States emerged as a hegemonic power with a dominant position over a large portion of the globe. In this position, the United States ushered in a new system of global governance and established rules largely through the creation of international institutions. In shaping this international order, the United States competed with the Soviet Union, but it was the United States that was best characterized as a hegemon during this period, due to its global economic, military, and political dominance. Even though analysts often overestimated the Soviet Union, CIA assessments from the Cold War made clear that the United States was the largest economy in the world. As the chart below indicates, U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was significantly more than Soviet GDP throughout the Cold War.

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29 Soviet mechanisms of rule over the Warsaw Pact states suggest it is better characterized as an imperial power than a hegemonic one. See Nexon and Wright, “What’s at State,” 262.
Figure 1: U.S. Versus Soviet GDP (in Millions) During the Cold War

In terms of the military competition between the rivals, in certain years the USSR outspent the United States, but they lagged behind in developing advanced technology.\(^3\) Moreover, the U.S. Air Force and Navy were superior to those of the Soviet Union, providing the United States with global power projection capabilities. Politically, the United States led an alliance system in Europe and the Pacific that dwarfed that of the Warsaw Pact. Within these states, and many others, the United States held a position of authority, where it did not have to

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resort to coercion to convince states to behave in ways that were consonant with its own interests. The one area where the two Cold War rivals were closer in terms of measures of national power was in their vast nuclear arsenals, the possession of which was the reason they were able to cooperate on matters of nuclear nonproliferation.

As a global hegemon, the United States has had the greatest strategic interest in preventing additional states from developing nuclear weapons. Historian Francis Gavin argues than nuclear nonproliferation has been an underappreciated grand strategy of the United States throughout the nuclear age. As Chapter Three will illustrate, successive presidential administrations have devoted a great deal of energy and resources to nuclear nonproliferation. This strategic logic of nuclear nonproliferation for the United States was evident when President Lyndon Johnson briefed President-elect Richard Nixon in December 1968. Of five topics for discussion with the new president, Johnson included the NPT and explained his reason for supporting it, which is worth quoting at length:

…there is a danger that small nuclear capabilities may develop in parts of the world where there are vital U.S. interests… Therefore, if we fail in the NPT and these small nuclear capabilities develop, a future American President could be faced with the dilemma of either withdrawing or diluting the American commitment in a vital area—with dangerous consequences for stability and peace—or running the risk that another nation might draw us into nuclear war.

As a result of its strategic interest in nuclear nonproliferation, the United States was the dominant state in terms of spearheading the creation of additional multilateral institutions and

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33 Briefing Notes for President Johnson, December 12, 1968. SSRS-261710-i1-6. Italics added.

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activities in support of the NPT and nuclear nonproliferation. As early as 1945, the United States began considering institutional means of limiting proliferation. The United States led the process of drafting the statute for the IAEA in 1957. By the 1960s, shared U.S. and Soviet concerns about global proliferation led to the creation of the NPT, the foundational treaty of the nonproliferation regime, a process detailed in Chapter Three. Since then, the United States has been the leading state in establishing additional agreements and institutions that make up the formal architecture of the regime: international IAEA safeguards agreements, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), UNSC Resolution 1540, and a number of agreements aimed at securing nuclear material.

Though the Soviet Union cooperated with the United States on nuclear nonproliferation during the Cold War, it was the United States as the hegemon that took the lead in these efforts. As one former official who worked on nonproliferation stated, “we did not look to them for leadership or innovation.”

34 A declassified State Department telegram on Soviet nonproliferation efforts from October 1974, as the United States is seeking to convene the Nuclear Suppliers Group, is telling. Drafted by ACDA and sent to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, it reads in part, “The Soviets have also recognized the need for more international attention to physical security of weapons grade materials, although they have indicated they would not take the initiative on the this subject.”

In its position as global hegemon, the United States has devoted a considerable part of its bureaucracy to promoting nonproliferation around the globe and to maintaining the institutions that support its nonproliferation goals. These efforts set the U.S. promotion of nonproliferation apart from the Soviet Union, and have been no less significant since the end of the Cold War. With the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (until 1999), the relevant State Department bureaus, the National Nuclear Security Administration (since 2000), diplomats working around the world in U.S. embassies, and relevant members of the U.S. intelligence community, the number of individuals marshalled by the United States both regularly and on an ad hoc basis to promote nuclear nonproliferation has been unparalleled. This level of effort is a testament both to U.S. power and to its interest in preventing additional nuclear weapons states.36

The United States has used a portfolio of tools to encourage universal participation in new regime agreements and activities. For each, the United States begins with limited diplomatic efforts aimed at all states. If these initial efforts fail, the United States will continue with more intensive persuasive tools including inducements and coercion. In more concrete terms, when a new nonproliferation initiative is established, the State Department sends demarches around the world promoting the new nonproliferation initiative, stating the importance with which the United States holds the agreement, and requesting that the state join. In many cases, diplomats will meet with foreign leaders to discuss the initiative, educating the representatives about its requirements.37 At this point, some states will commit to the regime. Not all states, however,

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36 Nonetheless, different U.S. presidential administrations have shown varying levels of interest in nuclear nonproliferation, a fact that at times has hampered U.S. efforts. This discussion will be detailed in Chapter Three.

37 It should be noted that this process is not unique to nuclear nonproliferation policy, but reflects U.S. multilateral policy promotion.
respond positively to these diplomatic and educational efforts and the United States must employ additional and often more time-consuming tools to garner their commitment. These tools include sending high level U.S. officials, offering inducements, tightening domestic rules of nuclear supply, and in rare instances, issuing threats.

In each communication regarding the regime, U.S. leaders make clear that nonproliferation is a priority to the United States. Implied within this message is that the United States will not look positively on states that are uncooperative. As the George H. W. Bush administration stated in *National Security Directive 70*,

> The United States should make clear to potential proliferators and suppliers that their relationship with the United States across the board, including such areas as technology transfer, will be affected by their performance on nonproliferation issues and conformity to key international nonproliferation norms.  

What determines if states will respond positively to initial U.S. diplomatic efforts and commit quickly to new nonproliferation initiatives or resist and take longer to commit? The answer lies in states’ perspectives on the United States and its global leadership. Based on the prominent role played by the United States in establishing and supporting the nuclear nonproliferation regime, many states view the regime as inseparable from the United States and its global leadership. Thus the variation in states’ commitment to the regime is in large part based upon how favorably states view the hegemon (the United States) and its global leadership at the time when a new regime element is developed. States that view hegemonic (U.S.) global leadership.

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leadership favorably at the time are more likely to sign on relatively quickly, while states that are less favorable will be slower, if they join at all.

This variation in states’ perspectives on U.S. global leadership leads to varying levels of acceptance of new nonproliferation agreements and activities and results in the United States using different tools of persuasion depending on the states. Favorable states will require only limited diplomatic forays from the United States in order to agree to commit, while less favorable states will require greater levels of effort by the United States.

When a new nonproliferation agreement or activity is established, for almost all states the hegemon engages in:

- Requests for commitment through demarches and ministerial meetings, mainly orchestrated through the State Department
- Broad public appeals from U.S. leadership
- Organizing the signing of group pledges or joint statements to commit

For states that view the hegemon favorably, who perceive the United States as a rightful authority, these tools are typically sufficient to secure commitment to different elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Conversely, for states that view the hegemon less favorably, these diplomatic approaches are likely to be insufficient. The hegemon may still be able to garner regime commitment, though it often takes longer and requires use of additional tools:

- Direct personal appeals from top U.S. leadership, often multiple appeals
- Appeals from close U.S. allies
- Changing the “rules of the game” of the NPT bargain over the supply of civilian nuclear technology, for example, by establishing the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1975, or the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which required a greater level of nonproliferation commitment in exchange for nuclear technology
- Providing inducements or reminding foreign leaders of the benefits the United States provides to their states, while asking for nonproliferation commitment
• Engaging in threats\(^{39}\)

As a hegemonic power, an unprecedented power in many ways, states around the world have many divergent perspectives on U.S. global leadership.\(^{40}\) Some states are skeptical of U.S. actions and motivations based on its vast economic and military power.\(^{41}\) Other states are more likely to perceive the United States as a benevolent hegemon, with legitimate authority, consistent with arguments by G. John Ikenberry, who contends the United States is perceived as less of a threat because it is a liberal power that has bound itself through a set of multilateral institutions.\(^{42}\) And of course these perspectives of U.S. leadership change over time, as the dispositions of other states change, or as U.S. policies change. A state’s level of favorability toward the United States is not static.

What does it mean for states to be favorable to U.S. global leadership? States that are favorable to the hegemon’s leadership have a general appreciation for the character of the order provided by the hegemon. They generally agree with its underlying goals, if not always the means of achieving them. Favorable states see the extant order as preferable to any reasonable alternative, including the lack of any hegemonic order. These states may not benefit from every aspect of the hegemon’s order, but they find the benefits outweigh the detriments. In most cases

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\(^{39}\) These mechanisms of hegemonic influence distinguish the nuclear nonproliferation regime from the constitutional order in G. John Ikenberry’s *After Victory*. Though G. John Ikenberry characterizes the post-World War II system as a constitutional order, U.S. nonproliferation policy has been closer to his definition of a hegemonic order in which “compliance and participation within the order is ultimately ensured by a range of power capacities available to the hegemon—military power, financial capital market access, technology, and so forth.” See G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 27. Nexon and Wright consider Ikenberry’s constitutional order to be a distinct subset of hegemonic orders. See Nexon and Wright, “What’s at Stake,” 257.


\(^{41}\) Ibid.

\(^{42}\) Ikenberry, *After Victory*. 28
the population within a state shares a similar sense of favorability toward the hegemon as the state’s leadership.

Because there is no systematic way to directly measure how all foreign leaders perceive U.S. global leadership over time, this project examines a number of observable implications of states’ perception of U.S. global leadership. We can recognize and identify states that are more favorable through a number of factors:

- **States in nuclear alliances**: A state in a nuclear alliance with the United States trusts some portion of its existential security to the hegemon. Its security is in part based on the maintenance of the U.S.-led order and thus states “under the nuclear umbrella” are expected to be highly favorable toward U.S. leadership.

- **States with frequent, high level diplomatic visits to the United States**: In general we would expect that states that regularly send their leaders to the United States or invite U.S. leaders to their own states are more favorable toward U.S. leadership.

- **States that express support for U.S. foreign policies, especially related to war**: States that are willing to support U.S. foreign military actions are likely to be more favorably to U.S. global leadership.

- **States that make positive statements about the role of U.S. leadership in the world**: Leaders who make positive statements about the United States and particularly about the role the United States plays in the world are expected are favorable to the U.S.-led order.

- **States with favorable public opinion scores toward the United States**: Though there are likely to be some exceptions, on balance public opinion polling of a state’s domestic population that indicates approval of the United States is likely to indicate that the regime is favorable to U.S. global leadership. This is likely regardless of the regime type of the state.

- **States that vote consistently with the United States in the UN General Assembly**: States that vote more consistently with the United States in the General Assembly, where the votes are non-binding and thus largely symbolic, are more likely to be favorable to U.S. leadership as indicated by their shared foreign policy preferences across a number of global issue areas.

Indicators that states are less favorable to U.S. leadership include:
• **States with leaders who make negative comments about the United States and its role in the world**: States with leaders that have a pattern of publicly criticizing the United States and its foreign policies are unfavorable to U.S. global leadership.

• **States with unfavorable public opinion scores toward the United States**: If public polling indicates that the domestic population within in a state disapproves of the United States or otherwise has a negative opinion of the United States the state is likely to be unfavorable toward U.S. global leadership.

• **States that vote less consistently with the United States in the UN General Assembly**: States that consistently vote against the United States or the U.S.-led order are likely to be unfavorable to U.S. global leadership.

• **States that hold leadership positions in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)**: Though not always the case, holding a leadership position in the NAM is likely an indicator that a state is less favorable toward U.S. leadership. This is especially true in the post-Cold War era. The NAM was founded in the Cold War to bring together states not aligned with either the U.S. or Soviet-led bloc. Today the group often positions itself at a counterpoint to the U.S.-led order.

This theory proposes that foreign leaders have rarely made calculations about joining elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime without considering their own position toward the United States and its global leadership. This is because of the vast power of the United States and its role in promoting the regime. Because this theory is predicated on the power inherent to the hegemon, it is most consistent with a realist perspective on international relations. The idea that hegemonic powers create institutions to their benefit, however, is also consistent with neo-liberal institutionalism.\(^43\) In addition, this theory suggests, as neo-liberal institutionalists would, that states make cost–benefit assessments about joining new institutions within the regime; only in this case the hegemon’s preferences play a very prominent role in the calculation. This theory is also consistent with liberal theories of U.S. leadership, in that at least some states may be favorable to U.S. leadership because they see the United States as a benign hegemon due to its

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\(^{43}\) For example, Keohane’s *After Hegemony.*
commitment to institutions and liberal values. Moreover, constructivists may argue the United States has promoted a nonproliferation norm and over time states that have internalized this norm are more likely to commit to the regime.\textsuperscript{44} While each of these other theories may hold some truth, all of them are rooted in the powerful position of the hegemon and its strategic promotion of nuclear nonproliferation.

Before moving on to alternative theories of nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment, it is worth considering if the theory presented here is relevant to other issue areas beyond nuclear nonproliferation. Can this theory be generalized? In broad terms, this theory is consistent with a growing literature on how powerful states use multilateral institutions to their advantage. Recent research indicates that powerful states use global economic institutions to reach other foreign policy goals,\textsuperscript{45} or use one global institution to affect outcomes in another,\textsuperscript{46} or bend the rules within institutions to better serve their interests.\textsuperscript{47}

More specifically, this theory is likely to apply in cases in which the most powerful state (or states) has a greater strategic interest in a particular policy outcome with global relevance than other states and seeks to create a treaty regime to address that interest. This discussion will

continue in the conclusion, but in the future this could apply to arms control measures related to the space and cyber warfare—arenas where the most powerful states are especially vulnerable.

**Alternative Theories of Regime Commitment**

Alternative explanations that stem from the major theories of international relations are investigated below. Within each section, the alternative theory is explained, along with the theory’s likely explanations to account for variation in nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment. Each section concludes with expectations of the theory for both the large-N quantitative work and the case studies.

**Neo-Realism**

Neo-realism, or structural realism, understands the world as an anarchical system in which there is no political authority above states. States are sovereign, rational, unitary actors whose primary goal is survival in a system in which all states have at least some offensive military potential. States must rely on self-help to survive as they cannot trust the intentions of any other states.48

This project’s key theoretical proposition, that variation in favorability toward U.S. global leadership explains variation in nuclear nonproliferation commitment, is largely consistent with a neo-realist perspective. What are other plausible neo-realist explanations for the variation we see in states’ commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime? First, neo-realists could argue that states only joined the NPT and subsequent agreements because they did not plan on developing nuclear weapons in the first place, and thus the institutions only screened for states

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that were not going to develop weapons anyway. The states that have committed the most to the regime are those that have decided to forgo developing nuclear weapons. Or, they could argue the regime does not constrain state behavior by pointing to states such as Iraq, Libya, Syria, and perhaps Iran, as states that acceded to the NPT and then proceeded to develop indigenous nuclear weapons programs despite their regime commitments. One problem for neo-realists here is explaining why some states decided to join and cheat, while other states decided to remain outside of the regime and develop nuclear weapons (i.e., Israel, India, and Pakistan). If regimes do not matter, if they do not constrain behavior, why wouldn’t all states join for the benefits and then cheat if and when they decided they required nuclear weapons? Factors of self-help and security do not seem to explain this variation and thus opening the “black box” of the state is required to explain why states have behaved differently within the regime. Furthermore, if states are primarily concerned with cheating, why didn’t the cheating exposed in the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear weapons cases cause other states to defect from the regime? Why did states remain in the regime and many commit further?

Second, neo-realists may also expect states under the protection of nuclear umbrellas to be more likely to commit to elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime than states without this protection. Protection offered by nuclear weapons states means committing to the regime is less costly. This expectation is certainly consistent with the idea that states more favorable to U.S. leadership commit to the regime, but as a singular explanation it may be too simplistic as it does not account for states outside of the nuclear umbrella that are quick to commit. In addition, a theory based upon the strength of nuclear guarantees is somewhat problematic for neo-realism
because it is based on states trusting that other states will provide for their security on a long-term basis, contrary to the expectations of a purely self-help system.

Third, neo-realists may theorize that states commit to the regime because they are coerced into commitment by stronger states. There is certainly evidence of the United States attempting to pressure states to join the NPT and then commit to newer regime elements. But as the United States has tried to encourage all states to join all elements of the regime, this theory has trouble explaining the variation in commitment. If it is all about coercion, why are some states more susceptible to this pressure than others? Neo-realists would perhaps expect the weakest states to be most likely to commit because they are more vulnerable to coercion, but this is not in fact what the empirical evidence indicates.

Finally, perhaps the strongest neo-realist theory, one that accounts for variation in commitment, is that states in more difficult security circumstances, such as long-term rivalries, are less likely to join additional regime commitments than states that are more secure. It is possible these states became NPT members under pressure from more powerful states, or under different leadership. They live with this obligation because NPT withdrawal could make them less secure by appearing to overtly signal nuclear weapons intentions. Instead, these states try to join as few new agreements and activities as possible. This hedging strategy allows states in difficult security circumstance to maintain the option, or even the perception that they are maintaining the option, to develop nuclear weapons. Hedging may even provide security benefits by making adversaries think a state is considering nuclear weapons, even if it has not made such a decision yet.
Recent research indicates that an increasing percentage of global conflict over time is stemming from interstate rivalries.\textsuperscript{49} One way states may choose to address these ongoing conflicts is through developing a nuclear weapons program.\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, Sonali Singh and Christopher Way find that states in enduring rivalries are more likely to explore, pursue, and acquire nuclear weapons than other states.\textsuperscript{51} As this appears to be the strongest neo-realist theory, it will be tested against the other competing theories.

**Expectations derived from a hedging theory to explain variation in commitment:**

If insecure states are less likely than more secure states to commit to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we would expect certain correlations between variables in the quantitative tests and patterns of evidence within the qualitative cases. The large-N quantitative analysis will test the following hypothesis:

**Hedging Hypothesis:** States in difficult security environments are less likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements.

If this hypothesis were true, in the case studies we would expect that states in rivalries with significant security concerns would be slower to commit to the regime. These states would be especially hesitant to ratify agreements with regular inspections, such as the Additional Protocol. We may see leaders of these states making both veiled and overt references to nuclear


\textsuperscript{51} Singh and Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test.”
weapons programs, as a way of signaling to their adversaries. These states may discuss
developing a civilian nuclear program with minimal safeguards could cause concern to their
adversaries. We also would expect these states to pursue missile technology that is consistent
with delivery of nuclear weapons.

**Neo-Liberal Institutionalism**

With its focus on institutions, neo-liberal institutionalism (NLI) is perhaps the most
obvious theoretical perspective to examine when seeking an explanation for states’ behavior
within the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Accepting neo-realist assumptions that sovereign
states pursue self-help in order to survive in an anarchic system, NLI is nonetheless more
optimistic than neo-realism about the prospects for state cooperation in the international system.
According to NLI, states commit to institutions for a number of reasons: lowered transaction
costs, increased transparency among states, the provision of information, compliance monitoring,
the ability to make commitments credible, and the facilitation of reciprocity. Proponents of NLI
thus expect that states will undertake cost-benefit assessments, taking all these benefits of
institutions into account and comparing them to the costs, when determining whether or not to
commit to international institutions. Based on the benefits provided by the institutions in the
regime, neo-liberal institutionalists would be less surprised than realists by the apparent success
of the NPT and the broader nonproliferation regime, and the small number of states that have
proliferated since the treaty entered into force.

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Neo-liberal institutionalists would expect that participation in the regime over time would alter states’ preferences. States may become more committed to nuclear nonproliferation goals the longer they are in the regime. From this perspective, we may expect all NPT states to be quicker to ratify each new agreement over time as their interest in nonproliferation has grown. A cursory examination of the empirical record indicates this is not in fact the case, and this hypothesis has difficulty explaining high levels of variation in commitment and time to commitment.

A second plausible NLI explanation for variation in states’ commitment to the NPT and the nonproliferation regime is that non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) can access peaceful nuclear technology assistance promised through Article IV of the treaty. For some states, especially those less able to provide for their energy needs with indigenous resources, civilian nuclear technology could be a major benefit of committing to the regime. Thus variation in energy needs may explain variation in regime commitment. Indeed, Karthika Sasikumar and Christopher Way find those states with higher energy needs are quicker to ratify the NPT, so there is some existing evidence for the relationship between seeking energy and nonproliferation regime commitment.\(^{53}\)

Another commonly cited cost-benefit assessment within the nuclear nonproliferation regime involves the NPT bargain inherent in Article VI of the NPT: NNWS agree to nuclear forbearance in exchange for a commitment by the five declared nuclear weapons states (NWS) to pursue negotiations toward eventual nuclear disarmament. States may consider this bargain, the

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benefits of a nuclear-free world, and the nuclear weapons states’ progress toward this goal when assessing the benefits or detriments of their own additional commitment to the regime. That NPT states commit less to new nonproliferation agreements and activities because of the perceived slow progress by NWS toward nuclear disarmament is widely assumed to be true among arms control advocates and policy-makers. Leaders from both NWS and NNWS have made statements in support of the idea that further effort toward nuclear disarmament by the NWS is necessary to gain commitment to other elements of the nonproliferation regime. A 2008 report from a commission put together by IAEA Director General Mohammad El-Baradei concluded that “mounting resentment” over lack of progress on disarmament by the NWS “makes it much more difficult to agree on steps that are urgently needed to strengthen the global effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons—even though such steps would serve the interests of all.” The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review Report makes this connection explicitly: “By…meeting our NPT Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament – we can put ourselves in a much stronger position to persuade our NPT partners to join with us in adopting the measures needed to reinvigorate the nonproliferation regime and secure nuclear materials worldwide.”

NLI has two weaknesses in using the disarmament bargain to explain variation in regime commitment. First, there appears to be little variation among states disappointed by the progress of the bargain to explain variation in commitment. Almost all NNWS vocally and publicly express dissatisfaction with the perceived lack of disarmament progress by the five NWS.

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55 2010 NPR, v-vi.
Second, if this bargain is a significant part of the cost-benefit analysis for states considering their regime commitment, why haven’t more states defected as they complain about lack of disarmament progress? States claim not to receive a major benefit associated with joining the regime and yet they remain members. The one existing study of this claim finds little empirical support for this connection. Matthew Kroenig finds that there is not a direct link between NWS nuclear reductions and key proliferation outcomes including the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program, the provision of sensitive nuclear assistance, and voting on nonproliferation issues in the United Nations.\(^{56}\)

Despite weaknesses of these two theories of NPT regime bargains, they are some of the most commonly cited explanations for regime behavior in the academic literature and so both will be tested in this project.

**Expectations derived from NPT bargains to explain variation in commitment:**

If states behave in accordance with NLI, we would expect certain correlations between variables in the quantitative tests and patterns of evidence within the qualitative cases. Based on this discussion, the empirical portion of the project will test the following hypothesis:

*Nuclear Energy Hypothesis: States that import a large percentage of their energy will be more likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements to ensure the supply of peaceful nuclear technology.*

This hypothesis follows directly from one of the largest benefits of joining the NPT regime, the provision of peaceful nuclear technology promised by Article IV of the NPT. We may expect that states that import most of their energy, and are thus susceptible to the ups and

downs of the global oil and gas markets or the whims of suppliers, to be more interested in committing to the nonproliferation regime to ensure access to civilian nuclear energy programs. The regime both allows states to receive peaceful nuclear technology and provides a means for states to signal benign intentions when they are seeking technology that is inherently dual-use for both electricity and weapons.

The second NPT bargain hypothesis that will be tested is:

Disarmament Hypothesis: States that are disappointed in the lack of disarmament progress by the five nuclear weapons states in the NPT will be less likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements and activities.

In the case studies of states’ decision-making regarding the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we would expect that state leaders engage in cost-benefit thinking about each regime element when deciding whether to commit. In their decision-making processes, this theory suggests leaders would focus on both the general benefits of multilateral institutions, as well as the specific benefits afforded by the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We would expect to see evidence of leaders weighing the costs and benefits of each particular element of the regime in advance of deciding whether or not to join.

For the nuclear energy hypothesis, we would see evidence that states would consider joining elements of the regime concurrently with planning for a new or expanded civilian nuclear program. We would also expect the pro-nuclear faction within states, regulators, and members of industry, to support joining additional regime agreements.

Given the disarmament hypothesis, we would expect that states would discuss this bargain rhetorically, but more importantly, if disarmament progress is driving their commitment or lack of commitment, we would expect more commitment following disarmament actions.
taken by the five NWS within the treaty and a reluctance to commit further until such actions are taken.

**Democratic Regime Type**

A large and growing research program in international relations points to regime type as a key variable in explaining outcomes in international politics. A number of scholars find that democracies commit more than other regime types to many global institutions, and they tend to maintain deeper commitments to these institutions.\(^{57}\) Based on this research, we may expect that variation in nuclear nonproliferation commitment is best explained by variation in regime type, with democracies quicker and more likely to commit. The particular qualities of democracies are thought to explain deeper levels of institutional commitment.

One such unique quality is the level of institutionalization within democracies themselves. As Beth Simmons explains, because “liberal democratic regimes share an affinity with prevalent international legal processes and institutions, they tend to be more willing to depend on the rule of law for their external affairs as well.”\(^{58}\) Thus democratic regimes are more comfortable with international binding institutions, which should make them more likely to commit to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We would also expect democracies to be more comfortable with the increasing levels of institutionalization of the regime in the 45 years since the NPT entered force. Compared to democracies, non-democratic states may be less interested in or less comfortable with further binding themselves to an increasingly deep regime. Not only

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do we presume democracies to be more likely to join these institutions, but we expect them to uphold their commitments. Stephen Miller and Scott Sagan have argued that nonproliferation regime commitments from democracies are more durable,\textsuperscript{59} likely because of the practice of relying on the rule of law. Similarly, it appears thus far that no democracy has cheated within the NPT; those states that have cheated and developed weapons programs while in the NPT were all non-democracies\textsuperscript{60} and were more likely to be personalist dictatorships.\textsuperscript{61} Because of their commitment to institutions, we would expect that democracies would be less likely to undermine such institutions due to cheating or not committing to additional regime elements.

A second quality of democracies that leads to increased commitment to institutions is leaders’ attentiveness to the will of the domestic population when that population is supportive of such institutions. Human rights scholars have pointed to the role of civil society in promoting treaty compliance. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui find that in states with strong civil society lobbies in favor of human rights’ treaties, domestic legislation mirrors the treaties and state compliance will remain high. Without this pressure, states will be less compliant with the international agreements they have signed.\textsuperscript{62} Human rights treaties may be “empty promises,” but the treaties empower domestic groups to promote the same behavior enshrined in the treaties.\textsuperscript{63} Similarly, in the realm of trade agreements, Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner,

\textsuperscript{60} Miller and Sagan, “Nuclear power,” 11.
\textsuperscript{61} Christopher Way and Jessica L. P. Weeks, “Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation,” \textit{American Journal of Political Science} 58, no. 3 (2014): 705–719. Though Way and Weeks examine the connection between nuclear weapons proliferation and governments characterized as “personalist dictatorships,” and not nonproliferation regime commitment, personalist dictatorships appear to be the states most likely to cheat on the NPT.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 1373.
and B. Peter Rosendorff find that democracies are more likely to sign free trade agreements. In this case cooperation is hastened by electoral pressure.\textsuperscript{64} Xinyuan Dai also finds a domestic constituency compliance mechanism that incorporates both electoral leverage and the informational status of different constituencies in his examination of state compliance with a European pollution treaty.\textsuperscript{65} This mechanism may explain democratic commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime when citizens are knowledgeable about nuclear nonproliferation and make their positions known to their elected officials. Citizens are most likely to be knowledgeable when nuclear weapons are salient to the state for historical reasons, such as having experience with: nuclear testing or use, basing of nuclear weapons on their soil, or the negative effects of nuclear waste. For example, there has been some research on the role of anti-nuclear groups in influencing proliferation decisions in Europe and Japan where nuclear weapons have been highly salient,\textsuperscript{66} and thus it is plausible this same pressure would influence decision-making about different elements of the nonproliferation regime.

This discussion of democracies committing to the nuclear nonproliferation regime may lead some to then wonder why two of the four parties outside of the regime, India and Israel, are democracies. The unique features of democracies also suggest why certain democracies chose not to join the NPT regime. In general we expect democracies to abide by the agreements they sign, and this is borne out in the facts about NPT cheating. Only non-democracies have cheated

\textsuperscript{64} Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, “Why Democracies Cooperate More.”


while in the regime. Thus it appears that democracies that planned to develop nuclear weapons would not ratify the treaty in the first place because they knew they would not be able to comply with their legal agreement. Democracies that had nuclear weapons programs, such as Sweden and Switzerland, ended their weapons programs before joining the treaty. Matthew Fuhrmann and Jeffrey D. Berejikian find that constraints on the executive, such that characterize democratic states, are correlated negatively with cheating in the NPT. Once in the NPT, non-democratic states are more likely than democracies to cheat and proliferate because they are generally less constrained domestically. Fuhrmann and Berejikian argue that if they do seek nuclear weapons, democracies are more likely to choose a strategy of absenteeism within the treaty regime. These absent states, whose numbers have dwindled over time, are not cooperating with the regime, but they are not cheating because they have not joined in the first place.

Based on this theory of democratic commitment to institutions, we would expect to see the most democratic states ratifying more regime agreements and ratifying them more quickly than the least democratic states. This theory appears relevant when considering the states that have been the strongest supporters of nonproliferation activities; Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are all liberal democracies with a strong track record in promoting specific steps to bolster both global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.

There are, however, some problems with a democratic regime-type theory of nonproliferation commitment. Research indicates that non-democratic states are more likely to

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68 Again, this is consistent with the argument made in Way and Weeks 2015.
cheat within the NPT. If a state will consider cheating anyway and it gains benefits from ratification, why not join the treaty regime and its subsequent agreements? If a state does not take its commitments seriously, why not join the agreements for the benefits of appearing to comply? If this is the thinking of an autocratic state leader, we would expect this type of state to commit just as quickly as a democracy. Cheating states usually have power concentrated among a small number of individuals, making it easier and quicker to ratify agreements than for a more democratic regime with a wider selectorate and varied competitive interests. Therefore, the regime type explanation may not provide much analytical leverage when seeking to explain variation in commitment to the regime. Both democracies and autocracies may ratify relatively quickly but for very different reasons.

Expectations derived from democratic regime type theory to explain variation in commitment:

Based on this discussion, the empirical analysis will test the following hypothesis:

*Democratic Regime Type Hypothesis: Democracies will be more likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements than non-democracies.*

In the case study research, we would expect to see that democracies are quicker to join the regime and more interested in committing to additional elements in the regime. Discussions over joining and deepening involvement in the regime and would illustrate that the government is developing its position with consideration to public opinion and different factions within the population. We would expect that decisions related to the regime would reflect public opinion. The public would be more engaged about the regime when nuclear weapons and materials are salient based on the state’s history. We would also expect states that are democratizing to be
more likely to join the elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially if they have populations where nuclear issues are salient.

**Summary of Theoretical Expectations**

The table below summarizes the expectations of each theory above for the quantitative and qualitative analysis.

**Table A: Expectations of Each Theoretical Perspective**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Perspective</th>
<th>Quantitative Expectations</th>
<th>Qualitative Expectations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic Leadership Hypothesis</td>
<td><strong>States that are more favorable to U.S. global leadership will be more likely to commit, and quicker to commit, to new nonproliferation regime initiatives.</strong>&lt;br&gt;States that are less favorable to U.S. global leadership will be less likely to commit, and slower to commit, to new nuclear nonproliferation initiatives.</td>
<td>-States favorable to U.S. global leadership:&lt;br&gt;• Will be quicker and more likely to commit following requests by the United States.&lt;br&gt;• Will be likely to commit without significant pressure exerted by the United States and will be less likely to seek a direct quid pro quo for their commitment.&lt;br&gt;• When deliberating will include an assessment of U.S. interests and how their decision to commit or not will affect their relationship with the United States.&lt;br&gt;-States that do not have a favorable disposition toward U.S. global leadership:&lt;br&gt;• Will not commit after a simple diplomatic approach by the United States.&lt;br&gt;• May not commit to new regime elements at all, but when they do, the United States, or one of its closest allies, will have exerted strong diplomatic pressure which may include a combination of carrots and sticks.&lt;br&gt;-For all states there will be evidence that the United States, and at times its closest allies (i.e., UK, Australia, Canada), will be part of states’ decision calculus when considering whether to commit to elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.</td>
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Table A: Expectations of Each Theoretical Perspective (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Perspective</th>
<th>Quantitative Expectations</th>
<th>Qualitative Expectations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nuclear Energy Hypothesis</strong></td>
<td>States that import a large percentage of their energy will be more likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements to ensure the supply of peaceful nuclear technology.</td>
<td>• In general, leaders will engage in cost-benefit assessments about each regime element when deciding whether or not to commit. In their decision-making processes, leaders will focus on both the general benefits of multilateral institutions, as well as the specific benefits afforded by the nuclear nonproliferation regime. • Specifically, states that import most of their energy will be more interested in committing to the nonproliferation regime to ensure access to civilian nuclear energy programs. • States would consider joining elements of the regime concurrently with planning for a new or expanded civilian nuclear program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disarmament Hypothesis</strong></td>
<td>States that are disappointed in the lack of disarmament progress by the five nuclear weapons states in the NPT will be less likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements and activities.</td>
<td>• Due to the disarmament “bargain” in the NPT, there will be more commitment following disarmament actions taken by the five NWS within the treaty and reluctance to commit further until such actions are taken. • States that are reluctant to join will cite a lack of disarmament progress when explaining their position in both private and public settings. • States will discuss the arsenals of the NPT nuclear weapons states when deliberating about joining regime elements. • States that have expressed this concern will then take steps to commit to regime elements when they perceive disarmament progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Regime Type Hypothesis</strong></td>
<td>Democracies will be more likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements than non-democracies.</td>
<td>• Democracies will be quicker to join the regime and more interested in committing to additional elements in the regime. • Discussions over joining and deepening involvement in the regime will illustrate that the state’s leadership is developing its position with consideration to public opinion and different factions within the government. • Decisions related to the regime will reflect public opinion. • The public will be more engaged in debate about the regime when nuclear weapons and materials are salient based on the state’s historical experience. • States that are democratizing will be more likely to join the elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially if nuclear issues are salient to the domestic population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Research Design and Case Selection

In testing hypotheses about nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment, this project will take a mixed-method approach, using both quantitative analysis and detailed qualitative case studies. Together the two methods will provide different but complementary assessments of theories of nuclear nonproliferation commitment.\textsuperscript{70} The large-N analysis will employ an original dataset of indicators of nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment. This analysis tests whether the hypotheses above have explanatory power across all NPT states. The weaknesses of this approach are that it tells us little about specific cases and may direct attention away from important explanations only affecting a small number of states. In addition, the quantitative tests show correlation, but do not help us identify the specific mechanisms at work linking the independent variables to the dependent variables.

The qualitative portion of the dissertation will present a series of structured, focused case study comparisons of three states, Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt, which vary along the dependent variable of regime commitment and the independent variable of favorability to the U.S.-led order.\textsuperscript{71} Process tracing in each case will help overcome some of the weaknesses of quantitative analysis.\textsuperscript{72} Case studies allow for a better understanding of causal processes and permit the comparison of multiple theories at the same time—allowing for the likely possibility of


\textsuperscript{71} On the value of structured, focused case comparisons see George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development}, 61.

equifinality among different theories.\textsuperscript{73} This methodology is appropriate because it allows for the acquisition of comparable data across cases.\textsuperscript{74} As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett admonish, the primary criterion for case selection is relevance to the research objective of the study.\textsuperscript{75} In this case, theory testing is the primary purpose, so the cases have been selected to provide great analytical leverage for testing each of the potential theories described above by varying on both the independent variable of interest and the dependent variable.\textsuperscript{76} For each case, research will establish if the qualitative evidence described above exists to support each of the competing theories.

There are a number of compelling reasons to focus on the three cases of Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt. First, these cases provide variation on both the dependent and independent variables. Japan is a case that is favorable toward the U.S.-led order through the entire period of study. In contrast, historically, Indonesia and Egypt present variation over time in their levels of favorability toward U.S. leadership. The chart below illustrates the variation found in one quantitative indicator of favorability among the three cases, a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting measure, which will be employed for the statistical analysis in Chapter Four.

\textsuperscript{73} George and Bennett, \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development}, 215.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 69.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 83.
\textsuperscript{76} King et al., \textit{Designing Social Inquiry}, 142-146.
Each case study chapter will present evidence of levels of the states’ favorability, based on both quantitative and qualitative indicators, in the specific period under study. The table below summarizes these assessments.

### Table B: Assessment of Favorability to U.S. Global Leadership in Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
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**Figure 2: Japan, Indonesia, & Egypt: Favorability Toward the U.S.-led Order (1968-2012)**

As Table C indicates below, the three cases also provide variation on the dependent variables.

**Table C: Outcomes of Case Study Dependent Variables for Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion of Model Additional Protocol</td>
<td>YES (1999)</td>
<td>YES (1999)</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, these cases also provide variation on other measures of interest for competing theories including those related to regime type, rivalry, regime type, and historical salience of nuclear weapons. This variation allows for a better adjudication of competing theories of regime commitment.

Finally, the decisions of each of these cases are significant to the nuclear nonproliferation regime; thus, having a better understanding of each state is important in and of itself. Japan, as the only state targeted by nuclear weapons in war, holds a unique moral and historical place within the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Indonesia has long prioritized nuclear nonproliferation, and has been a nonproliferation leader within the NAM and within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Egypt has also been a leader within the nonproliferation regime, with a history of well-regarded diplomats, but has been reluctant to commit beyond the NPT.
CHAPTER THREE: U.S. PROMOTION OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

This chapter serves to illustrate the empirical claim made in the previous chapter that the United States has been the primary designer, promoter, and guardian of the nuclear nonproliferation regime since the regime’s inception. The history shows that the United States led efforts to stem nuclear proliferation, though different presidential administrations pursued varying means of achieving this goal. Occasionally proliferation concerns have taken a backseat to competing national goals, but overall there is a strong consistent history of U.S. leaders seeking to stop additional nuclear weapons proliferation. In exceptional cases, such as the Nixon administration, when the chief executive did not prioritize this issue, the U.S. government bureaucracy, especially the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the State Department, continued to promote nonproliferation through their channels of influence within foreign capitals.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower

As former U.S. ambassador and arms controller James E. Goodby recounts, the first “international effort to establish rules about the atom bomb” was penned by Winston Churchill and accepted by President Roosevelt.77 The August 1943 Quebec Agreement governed the cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United States on the atom bomb project. According to the agreement, the two states could not discuss the project with third parties without the other’s consent, and each promised a complete interchange of information. Churchill hoped for a long-lasting UK-U.S. monopoly in nuclear weapons, though scientists in both


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nations correctly anticipated that nuclear secrets would soon spread. Indeed, Churchill and Roosevelt both rejected pleas by physicist Neils Bohr to tell the Soviets about the nuclear weapons program in the hope of establishing some type of international control on nuclear weapons. The two leaders wanted to prevent other states, especially the Soviets, from building nuclear weapons and thus pursued a policy of secrecy.

Truman first learned of the Manhattan Project when he became president in April 1945 following Roosevelt’s death. He warned Stalin of a new weapon while at the July Potsdam Summit after the first U.S. nuclear weapon test was successful—the new president unaware that Soviet intelligence was well-informed of the U.S./UK effort. Thus, Truman was surprised when U.S. intelligence assets sensed a Soviet nuclear explosion in 1949. The Anglo-American monopoly had lasted fewer than four years. Concerned with additional proliferation, Congress abandoned the nuclear sharing agreement put in place by Roosevelt and Churchill, passing the McMahon Act in 1946. The Act established a policy of nuclear secrecy, even to U.S. allies, and helped spur the United Kingdom’s independent nuclear weapons program.

In 1946, Truman appointed Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson to develop a plan for international control of nuclear energy. Acheson put together a committee of consultants for the project, chaired by David Lilienthal, the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The committee’s report, which became known as the Acheson–Lilienthal Report, called for an international body to control all fissile material. Truman supported their plan and financier Bernard Baruch was appointed to negotiate an agreement based on its recommendations. Baruch expanded upon the Acheson-Lilienthal Report adding a proposal that an international body, an

International Atomic Development Authority, would have the power to sanction nations. In practice, the agreement also precluded the possibility of a Soviet nuclear weapons program. Unsurprisingly, the Soviets rejected the plan and it was not adopted. Though unsuccessful at this point, in seeking cooperation with the Soviets on nuclear technology, Truman set a precedent for what was eventually to become decades-long cooperation between adversaries when it came to quelling nuclear proliferation.

Global proliferation of nuclear weapons continued apace both quantitatively and qualitatively in the early 1950s. In 1950, Truman approved the development of thermonuclear weapons. Nuclear destruction could henceforth be measured in megatons. Under a policy of “atomic plenty,” he would also set the United States on a course to develop thousands of nuclear weapons. The UK tested its own nuclear weapon in the desert of Australia in October 1952. The United States tested a thermonuclear weapon a month later. The Soviets followed with a thermonuclear bomb test in August 1953. During his presidency, Dwight D. Eisenhower continued to grow the U.S. arsenal, while also advancing delivery capabilities, including new ballistic missiles and new aircraft. By the end of the Eisenhower presidency, the United States fielded a nuclear triad: bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

The Soviet thermonuclear bomb test in 1953 again surprised the United States with the speed in which the Soviets were advancing in nuclear technology. President Eisenhower became extremely concerned and some in his administration felt the President needed to do more to inform the American people about the dangerous state of affairs. A public relations campaign,
Operation CANDOR, aimed to share the gravity of the global situation with all citizens. Eisenhower used an invitation to speak before the UN General Assembly in December 1953 to share the awful threat of nuclear warfare while also delivering a more hopeful message about peaceful nuclear technology. In his speech, Eisenhower announced his “Atoms for Peace” plan. He proposed the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be set up under the auspices of the UN. Eisenhower proposed an international fuel bank of nuclear material to be used for peaceful purposes. This latter aspect of his plan did not materialize, but the United States did help write the statute for the IAEA, the body that would become responsible for nuclear safeguards under the NPT.

U.S. leaders shared the Atoms for Peace Plan with the Soviets in early 1954. Soviet leaders were skeptical, concerned—rightly so it turned out—that sharing peaceful nuclear technology would lead to the spread of nuclear weapons. They insisted on pursuing their proposal for the complete renunciation of all nuclear weapons. U.S. leaders told the Soviets they would move ahead with the creation of the new atomic agency with or without Soviet support, but the fuel bank idea was dropped. After a draft penned by the United Kingdom was passed to the State Department and revised, the United States convened the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Belgium, and Portugal to negotiate on the text of the statute. The Soviets joined the negotiations in July 1955. The statute for the IAEA entered force in July 1957.

President John F. Kennedy entered the presidency “with the intention to place nuclear arms control and nonproliferation in the center of the American foreign policy agenda,” according to Avner Cohen. President Kennedy achieved a few significant nonproliferation successes during his short tenure as president, including establishing the ACDA and concluding the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).

In September 1961, the Kennedy administration created ACDA, an organization with a focus on strategic arms control, nuclear nonproliferation, and disarmament. The creation of this independent organization ensured that within the U.S. interagency progress there always would be an advocate for arms control and nonproliferation. Whereas the State Department was sometimes known to value bilateral relations over specific U.S. policy priorities and treating proliferation concerns on a case-by-case basis, ACDA would be more likely to advocate general nonproliferation policies regardless of the states involved.

President Kennedy was concerned about additional states developing nuclear weapons, though his policies to curtail programs saw limited success. In February 1962, President Kennedy suggested to British Prime Minister McMillian that the existence of the independent British nuclear arsenal would motivate German proliferation and continued French proliferation. The French had exploded a nuclear device in 1960, raising concerns that the Germans would follow, something both the Americans and Soviets wanted to prevent. Kennedy went as far as to cancel the SkyBolt ballistic missile program in November 1962, a program on which the future

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British nuclear arsenal was based. The British allies were angry with this action and Kennedy sought an alternative. In the end, Kennedy offered Britain U.S. Polaris missiles as a replacement for the abandoned SkyBolt program and the independent British program continued.

Israel was also a target of Kennedy’s proliferation concerns. Cohen concludes that Kennedy was the “most forceful” president in dealing with the Israeli nuclear program.\textsuperscript{81} When Kennedy was elected he ordered a post-mortem on the intelligence community’s failure to detect the Israeli nuclear program earlier. It was only at the end of the Eisenhower administration that the U.S. government became aware of the extent of the program that had begun by the mid-1950s. Kennedy pushed for the Israelis to safeguard their Dimona nuclear reactor and to allow Americans to inspect the facility. After visiting, American scientists reported that Dimona was used for peaceful purposes, despite U.S intelligence community doubts. It was difficult for Kennedy to speak against the report’s conclusions and press Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion further about the purpose of the reactor. In the summer of 1963, President Kennedy went as far as to threaten the U.S.-Israel security relationship if American scientists could not continue to visit Dimona. New Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol relented in August 1963, allowing periodic U.S. visits to Dimona. According to Cohen, it was this weakness of the bilateral approach to nonproliferation that led Kennedy to think more widely about a global nonproliferation strategy.\textsuperscript{82}

Concluding the LTBT with the Soviets was Kennedy’s most lasting contribution to the nonproliferation regime. The greatest crisis of the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, brought

\textsuperscript{81} Cohen, “Israel and the Evolution of U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 1.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 11.
the two adversaries together on this issue after years of stalled negotiations. It was a “turning point” in U.S.-Soviet nonproliferation cooperation.\textsuperscript{83} China’s developing nuclear weapons program, though at this point untested, also pushed the two superpowers toward a test ban.\textsuperscript{84} By the summer of 1963, the Soviets agreed to a nuclear test ban in the water, atmosphere, and space; nuclear tests could now only be conducted underground. The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty in the last weeks of Kennedy’s life.

Historians differ on assessing Kennedy’s role in promoting nuclear nonproliferation. Whereas Cohen writes that “Israel was the awakening that led Kennedy to discover nuclear proliferation as a global U.S. concern” and that he was the first president to truly prioritize global nuclear nonproliferation as American policy,\textsuperscript{85} Francis J. Gavin argues Kennedy’s nonproliferation approach was more ambivalent “and did little to halt proliferation.”\textsuperscript{86} While it is true that Kennedy’s attempts did little to halt proliferation, he did appear to care about the issue, and the LTBT has had lasting significance in curtailing dangerous radioactivity in the atmosphere and as the first multilateral nuclear arms control agreement.

\textit{Lyndon B. Johnson}

“The greatest single requirement is that we find a way to ensure the survival of civilization in the nuclear age. A nuclear war would be the death of all our hopes and it is our

task to see that it does not happen.”

With these words, President Johnson opened and closed his first National Security Council meeting after Kennedy’s assassination. Over the course of his presidency Johnson would galvanize the U.S. bureaucracy and the international community to push forward with a global nuclear nonproliferation treaty. His commitment to nonproliferation stemmed from an appreciation of not only the devastation wrought by nuclear exchange, but by the ways in which additional nuclear states could undermine U.S. power and interests. He also sought to have a legacy as a “man of peace” and saw the NPT as part of that legacy.

In 1961, an Irish resolution in the UN General Assembly called for a global nonproliferation agreement for the third year in a row. For the first time both the Soviets and Americans voted in favor of the resolution. The next year, the United States and Soviet Union began “private bilateral talks” on a possible treaty. Little progress was made toward this aspiration until January 21, 1964 when President Johnson, three months into his unexpected presidency, called for a nonproliferation agreement based on the Irish resolution within the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). This committee was sponsored by the United Nations to promote dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on disarmament-related issues. Both the Americans and Soviets developed draft texts, the United States submitted its draft to ENDC in August 1965, the Soviets submitted their own in September. Early disagreement between the two superpower adversaries occurred over the

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transfer of weapons to another territory; the USSR considered NATO nuclear sharing to be “proliferation,” the United States did not.\textsuperscript{90} Negotiations continued on for over four and a half years.

Anticipation of the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964 put nonproliferation on the forefront of Johnson’s policy agenda, as his advisors assumed others states, including India, Israel, Japan, and Sweden, would follow China’s example.\textsuperscript{91} Nuclear dominos appeared everywhere once China had the bomb. The Chinese test, in October 1964, pushed the two superpowers to cooperate more closely on a nonproliferation treaty. One of the greatest fears for both powers was the possibility of a West German nuclear weapons program, and if China’s proliferation led to weapons programs by new states, West Germany—it was assumed—would have greater incentive to develop its own program. The U.S. plan for a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) in Europe—a policy the Germans enthusiastically supported and one the United States hoped would curb German interest in an independent nuclear program—continued to be a stumbling block between the superpowers, but they continued to hold high level discussions about a potential treaty through 1964 and 1965.

Two weeks after the Chinese denotation, President Johnson commissioned a high-level group to examine U.S. nonproliferation policy and to predict the influence of the Chinese test on international politics. Johnson selected Roswell Gilpatric, a Wall Street lawyer and former Undersecretary of Defense, to lead the effort. The committee studied six issues and wrote four potential courses for U.S. policy action spanning from the United States taking a laissez-faire

\textsuperscript{90} See Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{91} According to a NCS documents, cited in Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” 105.
attitude toward nonproliferation (Option 1) to making it the number one U.S. policy goal, even if this meant taking actions at the expense of allies (Option 4).  

Elements of the U.S. bureaucracy responded differently to the Gilpatric Report. The ACDA argued nonproliferation was the most important U.S. foreign policy goal and should be pursued without exemptions or special-cases, thus favoring Option 4. The State Department was concerned for close allies and sought a policy based on country-by-country considerations.  

On January 21, 1965, the Gilpatric Committee issued its final recommendation: the United States should develop stronger nonproliferation policies; nonproliferation should not be approached on a case-by-case basis, and when goals clash, nonproliferation should take precedence. The Committee recommended a U.S. effort to negotiate a nuclear nonproliferation agreement (which was already underway), a complete test ban treaty, and nuclear weapon free zones. In an action memo dated June 28, 1965, Johnson accepted the report and instructed his administration to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons and, significantly, he put ACDA, not the State Department, in charge of producing new policy. Gavin concludes that the Gilpatric Committee “laid foundations for far more robust nonproliferation policy, which would eventually lead to the negotiation, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)” Gavin writes that this shift traditionally has been underplayed in the strategic literature and argues it was not inevitable.

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94 Ibid., 130.
95 Ibid., 100-135.
96 Ibid., 102.
While the Gilpatric Committee met, U.S. and Soviet leaders were working through the difficult task of negotiating and drafting nonproliferation treaty texts. In a press conference in July 1966, Johnson stated, “We are going to do everything within the power of our most imaginative people to find language which will bring the nuclear powers together in a treaty while will provide nonproliferation. We think it is one of the most important decisions of our time, and we are going to do everything to bring people together on it.”97 In September and October 1966, Secretary Dean Rusk and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, along with the ENDC co-chairs from each country, engaged in intense negotiations. The two sides were able to come together on a basic understanding on nuclear sharing. By December 1966, the Soviets had draft language that the United States accepted.98

For the two years after the United States and USSR agreed upon draft NPT text, U.S. leaders negotiated and consulted with key allies about the treaty. ACDA officials met continuously with U.S. allies—the declassified ACDA archives contain a number of country files with telegrams and meeting records in which foreign leaders ask the United States to clarify the meaning of treaty provisions, respond to concerns about the requirement for safeguards, and make suggestions for alternate phrasing. European allies were one stumbling block in the NPT negotiations. They preferred nuclear facility inspections by EURATOM, a European nuclear organization founded in 1958, and resisted the requirement for IAEA inspections. Other


98 Johnson, The Vantage Point, 479.
countries, especially those close to the United States, did play a role in shaping the final draft text of the treaty. Early U.S. and Soviet drafts included nothing about disarmament and the treaty was to be of unlimited duration.\footnote{“Draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Conference of the Eighteen-nation committee on Disarmament, August 24, 1967. Also, Thomas Graham, Jr., Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law (Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 2002), 258.} The Japanese, Swedes, West Germans and Italians sought a term limit for the treaty. The Japanese suggested treaty reviews every five years.

Many non-nuclear weapons states, including Japan, also sought assurances in the treaty text that they would not be attacked with nuclear weapons by the weapons states. The two superpowers resisted putting this language in the treaty, but did support a UN resolution on security assurances at the UN General Assembly in 1967. In a secret telegram to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan from Secretary Rusk, he instructs “you may wish to point out that making assurances explicitly conditional upon NPT adherence (rather than conditional upon generic non-acquisitions [of nuclear weapons]), would lay proponents of the resolution open to charge of attempting to bribe to coerce NPT adherence by playing on fears over absence of such assurances.”\footnote{Department of State Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Tokyo Ambassador, “NPT Security Assurances – Draft UN Res” (SECRET), November 1967; NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.} This statement again illustrates how much the United States wanted to use all the bargaining leverage it had to gain support for the treaty, but was very concerned with the perception of U.S. coercion or arm-twisting.

Though hundreds of meetings, telegrams, and consultations would suggest a different U.S. message, President Johnson writes that at this time, he encouraged U.S. diplomats “to avoid taking the lead or exerting pressure. Let our allies and others take the initiative...”\footnote{Johnson, The Vantage Point, 479.} This was a
wishful statement, since it would have been obvious that the United States and the Soviets had negotiated and drafted the treaty between themselves, and yet it illustrated an awareness that the treaty and its goals were best served by not being perceived as directed by the United States. ACDA Director William C. Foster was less circumspect about U.S. efforts to promote the treaty. An August 29, 1967 “Eyes only for the Secretary” letter from Director Foster to Secretary Rusk states, “…I hope you will inspire our “salesmen” (Ambassadors) in certain capitals to really put their hearts into their job of convincing their clients that NPT is in their interests and that the United States believes in it and want its broad acceptance. Some of our salesmen seem to have doubts.”

In January 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted separate but identical NPT drafts to the ENDC, including a new amendment on nuclear safeguards, a revised Article IV ensuring all states have the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Article V ensuring the benefit of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) for all parties, and Article VI, also new, providing all treaty parties would pursue negotiations in good faith toward disarmament. In his January 17 State of the Union address, President Johnson announced he hoped to present the NPT to the Senate in the coming year. The draft text was approved by the UN General Assembly in June 1968. Only Albania, Cuba, Tanzania, and Zambia voted against the treaty. Peking voiced opposition to the treaty, making a statement which “branded the draft treaty as a hoax and a conspiracy that would allow the United States and the Soviet Union to restrict ‘the right of non-

102 “Eyes only for the Secretary” letter from ACDA Director William C. Foster to Secretary of State Dean Rusk “Secret,” August 29, 1967, Conference on the ENCD files, Geneva Switzerland (page 2), National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
nuclear powers to the peaceful uses of atomic energy’ and leave them vulnerable to nuclear blackmail”\footnote{“Chronology of principle development relations to Arms Control and disarmament,” 5 (January 19, 1968), ACDA files, General Counsel Disarmament Documents 383-84-005 (Box 1 of 5), NND 968151, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.}

On July 1, 1968, at a White House ceremony, President Johnson and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and more than fifty other nations signed the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty would enter into force once forty nations, in addition to the United States, Soviet Union, and Great Britain, ratified the treaty through national ratification procedures.

The treaty was not immune to international developments and in August the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. Presidential candidate Richard Nixon, though he claimed he generally favored the treaty, suggested delaying U.S. ratification in response.\footnote{Glenn T. Seaborg, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 379.} On September 17, 1968, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended ratification, but the full Senate voted in October to postpone further action on the NPT.\footnote{Ibid., 379.} Nixon won the presidency in November. According to Johnson advisor Glenn T. Seaborg, “White House sources confirmed on Nov 27 that President Johnson was considering calling the Senate into special session in December for the specific purpose of ratifying the treaty.”\footnote{Ibid., 379-380. Also discussed in Johnson, The Vantage Point, 490.} Senate leaders would not approve this measure unless the new President-elect agreed to the session. Nixon originally favored the special session, but later reneged. No special session was called.
A transition meeting between President Johnson and Nixon illustrated the import with which Johnson viewed the NPT. President Johnson briefed President-elect Nixon in December 1968. Of five topics for discussion with the new president Johnson included the NPT and explained his reasons for supporting the NPT.\textsuperscript{107} Johnson’s commitment to the NPT appeared to have only minimally affected Nixon, if at all. In the history of U.S. nonproliferation policy Nixon is something of an anomaly, appearing to care little about nonproliferation and at times exhibiting outright distain for the NPT. Lack of leadership on this issue in the White House did not stop ACDA and other bureaucrats in the U.S. government from promoting the treaty, but they lacked support from the executive.

\textit{Richard Nixon}

For nonproliferation, Gavin writes, the Nixon administration represents “lost years.”\textsuperscript{108} Nixon believed the United States should have nuclear superiority and that it could be beneficial for certain states, such a France or even Japan, to possess nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{109} As president, he stopped pressuring Israel to give up a nuclear weapons program. He and Henry Kissinger thought little of treaties, including the NPT. By the summer of 1974, however, India had detonated a nuclear device, and Kissinger, Nixon, and then President Ford did begin to reassess their approach to nonproliferation.

As a presidential candidate, Richard Nixon issued some reservation about the NPT saying in September 1968 that the United States should negotiate a nonproliferation treaty but he was

\textsuperscript{107} Briefing Notes for President Johnson December 12, 1968. SSRS-261710-i1-6. Italics added.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., 117-119.
“concerned about some of the provisions of the treaty.”¹¹⁰ Three days later he endorsed the treaty, but ordered the Senate to delay ratification until the intentions of the USSR toward Czechoslovakia and other nations could be assessed.”¹¹¹

Once in office, the new administration studied the NPT anew. Nixon’s National Security Council Review Group examined a number of pros and cons of the treaty in the first month of the presidency. In a declassified document from January 1969, the review group leaders wrote to the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Director of Emergency Preparedness about a meeting the next day on the NPT. They report that they had to cast their net wide to come up with “con” arguments against the treaty, and that the con arguments are not necessarily representative of the people on the group.¹¹² Though Nixon and Kissinger were both skeptical of pursuing nonproliferation through a treaty regime, the administration’s NPT review group recognized the same proliferation concerns as the Johnson administration, writing one reason to ratify the treaty: “The further spread of nuclear weapons would increase the threat of nuclear war...Not only would there be the danger that some countries would prove irresponsible in the use or control of nuclear weapons, but there would be an increasing number of nuclear confrontations that could rapidly escalate local conflicts with increased danger of great power involvement.”¹¹³ According to one former U.S. official, Nixon and Kissinger were ready to dispense with the treaty altogether, but Spurgeon Keeny and Morton Halperin convinced the two

¹¹⁰ “Chronology of principle development relating to arms control and disarmament, September –October 1968,” NARA, ACDA archives, 2, Box: 383-84-005 (Box 1 of 5).
¹¹¹ Ibid., 2.
¹¹³ Ibid.
to move forward with the treaty.\textsuperscript{114} This internal White House debate was largely hidden from the State Department.\textsuperscript{115} Kenny and Halperin convinced Nixon and Kissinger that it would hurt U.S. credibility to reject the treaty after the United States had led the negotiations.\textsuperscript{116}

Having agreed to support the treaty’s ratification, the Nixon administration was not interested in pressuring other states to join the treaty. In the memo introducing the NPT review group’s pro and con document, Kissinger told the President that a U.S. decision to ratify did not require a decision on pressing other countries to ratify, as the Johnson administration had. On the campaign to promote the NPT up to this point, the review group’s document reported:

For the last two years the US has carried on a continuing diplomatic campaign to persuade key countries first to support and then to sign the NPT. The key countries that have not yet signed the treaty include the FRG, Israel, India, Pakistan, Switzerland, Japan, Australia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and Italy. The reasons for these countries’ reservations or objections to the treaty vary widely. The extent to which we can influence these countries or be responsive to their concerns also varies widely from country to country.\textsuperscript{117}

The Presidential memo alerting high-level officials on the U.S. decision to ratify the treaty stated, “there should be no efforts by the U.S. Government to pressure other nations…to follow suit. The Government…should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify, while clearly dissociating itself from any plan to bring pressure on these countries to sign

\textsuperscript{114} Author interview with former U.S. official, Washington DC, July 13, 2015.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
on ratify.”

This statement may seem similar to those made in the Johnson administration to avoid the appearance of pressuring other states, but the difference is that the bureaucracy in the Johnson administration and Johnson himself did promote the treaty, Nixon did not.

By February 5, 1969, Nixon recommended treaty ratification in a special message to the Senate, despite the continued Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia. After a round of hearings, the Senate approved the treaty 83-15 on March 13, 1969. A year later, in March 1970, the NPT entered force.

Nixon achieved NPT ratification, but he was not a strong advocate for the treaty, and nonproliferation was arguably a lower priority for him than any other U.S. president in the nuclear age. Instead, Nixon sought to approach nonproliferation through the U.S. dominance of the nuclear energy market. But in this period other states, to include USSR, Belgium, France, Germany, and Canada, were developing advanced nuclear energy expertise, so Nixon sought greater U.S. nuclear technology research, especially in support of breeder reactors. A market-based nonproliferation policy was doomed to fail, as the United States lost its industry edge by the mid-1970s. U.S. market share was decreasing at the same time that the 1973-74 global oil crisis convinced more and more states to pursue nuclear energy, providing many opportunities for non-U.S. technology suppliers.

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120 Ibid., 564.
121 Ibid., 564.
122 Ibid., 564.
Declassified memos and records of conversations inside the Nixon White House reveal Nixon’s true feelings about the NPT. When complaining that the State Department was trying to link the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to the commitments made in the NPT, Nixon complained to Kissinger, “It has not a goddamn thing to do with the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Test Ban treaty and all the rest. This is nuts. I wasn’t for those things, not really.” Kissinger responds, “I wasn’t either.” Then Nixon admits, “I supported nonproliferation because we had to.” Later in this conversation Kissinger complains the State Department was “bugging the daylights out of me,” before his recent Asian trip to pressure the Japanese to ratify the NPT. Kissinger did not cooperate, and said he reiterated a message previously given by Nixon that the United States was putting no pressure on the Japanese.\(^{123}\) Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Japanese did not ratify the NPT while Nixon was in the White House. This conversation between Nixon and Kissinger concludes with Nixon adding,

> Let me say, the State [Department] always puts that Nonproliferation Treaty in there. You know what the reason is? The State Department bureaucracy considers that to be theirs, Henry. Really, it's a selfish damn thing. Now listen, the Nonproliferation Treaty has nothing to do with the security of the United States of America. You know very well.\(^{124}\)

Those in the U.S. arms control bureaucracy promoted the treaty despite minimal support at the highest level of government. Throughout this administration bureaucrats from the State Department and ACDA continued to seek ways to make the treaty more universal. In May 1969, the National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee met to discuss progress on the NPT

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\(^{124}\) Ibid.
and set out different strategies for making progress with states including India, Pakistan, Argentina, Japan, Australia, and the EURATOM countries.\footnote{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972, David I. Goldman, David C. Humphrey, and Edward C. Keefer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007), Document 22.} Promoting ENDC membership for Argentina and Japan was one means considered to help with securing NPT ratification by those states. A telegram to all U.S. diplomatic posts in December 1969, penned by ACDA and approved by the Secretary of State, encouraged all states to ratify as soon as constitutionally or politically possible. It provided an up-to-date status report on all states and noted that recent signatures from Germany and Switzerland may help convince other states to ratify. The telegram asked for the UK’s help in achieving ratification in its former colonies.\footnote{Ibid., Document 42.} In another example, in February 1970, ACDA sent a telegram to embassies of key non-NPT member states hoping to at least secure their signature on the treaty before it entered force in the next month. The memo about the telegram stated that it “makes the point in a low-key way to avoid an impression of arm-twisting.”\footnote{Ibid., Document 44.}

In 1969, President Nixon did focus on the problem of one particular state’s status as a non-NPT member: Israel. By 1968, the United States believed Israel would soon have a nuclear weapons capability. Nixon asked for a study of options, one of which was using the sale of F-4 Phantom aircraft as a carrot for Israeli commitment to the NPT.\footnote{Parker T. Hart to Secretary Dean Rusk, “Issues to be Considered in Connection With Negotiations With Israel for F-4 Phantom Aircraft,” October 15, 1968, Top Secret/Nodis (Note 2)/Sensitive, Source: SN 67-69, Def 12-5 Isr, available from the National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB189/IN-02.pdf (accessed March 14, 2016).} Nixon rejected this option. On September 26, 1969, Nixon met with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. The details of the
meeting remain classified, but it is believed that in this meeting Nixon agreed to stop pressuring
Israel to give up its nuclear weapons program and join the NPT, and Meir agreed that Israel
would not disclose its possession of nuclear weapons or test its capability. This agreement thus
enshrined Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity, which continues to this day.

On May 18, 1974, nonproliferation received renewed attention when India conducted its
so-called “peaceful nuclear explosion” (PNE), taking most of the world by surprise. Afterward,
the U.S. intelligence community prepared a Special National Intelligence Estimate on “Prospects
for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”129 It is notable that this type of comprehensive
estimate had not been prepared since the 1960s, before Nixon was president.130

Five days after the Indian nuclear test, on May 23, Nixon had Kissinger request a study of
U.S. nonproliferation policy and the NPT. “It should consider specifically whether the United
States should press for renewed support for the treaty by those now part to it and accession to the
treaty by those not yet signators [sic], and if so how and to what extent.”131 The Indian test
causd sufficient anxiety in Nixon that he was willing to consider granting greater support to
NPT promotion. Nixon had never been very interested in nonproliferation, but he was also
preoccupied with more pressing priorities, especially Vietnam, SALT, and the growing
Watergate scandal. The Indian PNE brought nonproliferation to the forefront.

129 Special National Intelligence Estimate 4-1-74, “Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 23
130 Ibid.
131 “National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 202 on Nuclear Proliferation,” May 23, 1974, History and
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Institutional Files,
Study Memorandums (1969-1974), Box H-205. Obtained by Fundação Getúlio Vargas,
A month after the Indian test, a meeting on the NPT indicated the change in nonproliferation policy from Johnson to Nixon. At Undersecretary Sisco’s State Department Principals’ and Regionals’ Staff meeting on June 24, Sisco mentioned having just been at a meeting to discuss the U.S. approach to nonproliferation. On the topic of that meeting he asked “…should this government renew what was its historic policy – and we have really eased off under this administration since 1969 – we used to take the lead in trying to get adherence to the NPT. I think we have relaxed on this in fashion I frankly have not liked.”

In July 1974, administration leaders were still grappling with U.S. nonproliferation policy. A background paper for a July 11 meeting led by Secretary Kissinger made statements including “it is still in the US interest to abate the further spread of nuclear weapons” and “we still have time and influence to deter states from acquiring independent nuclear explosive capabilities.” The background paper went on to note that additional nuclear weapons acquisitions by other states would lead to “diminishing American influence.” It concluded in underlined text that “a strong case can be made that policies aimed at deterring further proliferation can be effectively pursued without incurring significant costs or risks.” On the NPT, it stated, “A U.S. policy of relative indifference to the NPT at this juncture can seriously damage our ability to cope with nonproliferation, while reinvigorated efforts on the treaty’s behalf could help prevent such serious damage and help compensate for the set-back represented

133 Memorandum for the S - the Secretary, Subject: Analytical Staff Meeting,” July 11, 1974.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
by the Indian explosion.”  

A month later, a memorandum to Kissinger read, “A U.S. policy of relative indifference to the NPT at this junctures can seriously damage non-proliferation efforts…”

The U.S. government papers and reports in response to the Indian nuclear explosion appear to have finally convinced Nixon of the importance of nonproliferation and perhaps even the NPT as one means of promoting nonproliferation. As the Watergate scandal enveloped Nixon, an August 2, 1974 memo called for the United States to take increased action on the NPT in the months leading up to the 1975 NPT Review Conference. This strategy document to the Secretary from the Director of ACDA listed the two most important steps “to help buttress the NPT” which included “approach[ing] crucial NPT holdouts at high levels with a view toward securing early ratification decisions” and “find[ing] some visible ways in which preferential treatment can be given to NPT parties such as areas as the available of commercial nuclear facilities, fuel, and technological support, and possibly, credit terms.”

As the Nixon administration became the Ford administration in those difficult weeks of August 1974, the Nixon administration seemed to be evolving on its position toward nuclear nonproliferation, or at least Kissinger was. But for most of its tenure, the Nixon Administration is at odds with the theory that the hegemon cares the most about nuclear nonproliferation and

136 Ibid.
137 Fred C. Ikle and Winston Lord to Secretary Kissinger, July 31, 1974, “Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-proliferation Strategy,” (Secret); Tab A, “Non-proliferation: Strategy and Action Program” (Secret), p. 1; ACDA Non-Proliferation Strategy and Action Program, Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, January – August 1974; Office of Administration (Formerly Executive Director Office) Subject Files Pertaining to ACDA Nonproliferation Strategy and Nuclear Safeguards, 1974-1976 (Box 383/98/0085), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Record Group 383, National Archives Building, Maryland.
138 Ibid, 10.
139 Ibid.
will expend resources preventing new nuclear states. The efforts of the Johnson administration meant that ACDA and the State Department continued to promote the treaty under Nixon, but they were hampered by the limited support they received from their executive leadership. Since Nixon, U.S. presidents may have approached the problem in different ways, but by and large they all promote nonproliferation and the NPT. Why was Nixon different?

Joseph Nye writes that, ironically, after the NPT was established, both the Soviet Union and the United States decreased their focus on nuclear nonproliferation. The Soviets had been primarily concerned with West German proliferation and the NPT made this contingency much less likely. Nye writes that Nixon thought Johnson had prioritized nonproliferation at the expense of its allies. He sought to be less “dogmatic” in his approach.\(^{140}\)

Nixon and Kissinger were leading the United States through a period in which America was perceived to be in decline—the military budget was decreasing and the President and his closest advisor expected the world to become increasingly multipolar. A confidential draft of the President’s 1972 Annual Review of Foreign Policy, which unsurprisingly did not mention nuclear proliferation, discussed Europe’s economic growth and noted relations “are now essentially multipolar.”\(^{141}\) In this context, it perhaps makes sense for Nixon to have thought that it might not be so bad if certain allies, such as Japan, proliferated. Consistent with the theory of hegemonic leadership, a perception of waning global reach could change a leader’s calculus.

\(^{140}\) Nye, “U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in a Nonproliferation Regime,” 344.

about horizontal proliferation. As Gavin writes of this period, “U.S. prospects in the global order world were dim.” U.S. power was in decline and the United States might need its allies to take on a greater burden of global security. James Cameron and Or Rabinowitz’s characterization of Nixon’s approach to nonproliferation as “benign neglect and geopolitical pragmatism” is consistent with this explanation.

Most of the states which Nixon considered potential proliferators were U.S. friends or allies. Nixon encouraged French proliferation, did not discourage Israeli proliferation, and refused to pressure the Japanese to give up their right to nuclear weapons under the NPT. Though this was still a unique perspective among most American presidents of the nuclear age, Nixon was hoping to improve the U.S. global position through this limited proliferation of American friends. It was the Indian nuclear explosion, an unexpected development from less developed, non-aligned nation, which led his administration to reconsider its laissez-faire approach. According to one former ACDA diplomat, it was the 1974 explosion that truly initiated modern U.S. nonproliferation policy.

Perception of U.S. decline is not the only plausible reason why Nixon was different than other U.S. presidents when it came to promoting nuclear nonproliferation. After all, President Carter also led the U.S. during a period of similar sentiment and strongly promoted the NPT and

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nonproliferation. Nixon and Kissinger were also unique among U.S. executives in seeing great political utility for nuclear weapons. Nixon sought nuclear superiority for the United States, taking the lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis to be that the United States prevailed because of its superior arsenal. He bemoaned the parity between the two superpowers he inherited, preferring to possess a destabilizing first strike to the strategic stability advocated by arms controllers. Nixon and Kissinger wanted new and more flexible war plans, recognizing that Kennedy and McNamara’s “flexible response” was primarily a rhetorical shift from Eisenhower’s “massive retaliation.” Nixon sought more nuclear weapons options—this would allow more opportunities to exploit nuclear risk but also would have greater credibility than simply a massive attack on the Soviet Union.

The attitude with which Nixon approached nuclear weapons suggests that he did not perceive the same danger from nuclear use as other presidents. Many scholars have chronicled Nixon’s “madman” theory, in which engaging in risky and threatening nuclear actions would bring about U.S. goals by making the adversary perceive that Nixon might be just crazy enough to use nuclear weapons. In October 1969, Nixon ordered a secret nuclear alert to convince the Soviets and the North Vietnamese that the United States may consider nuclear use in the Vietnam War. Similarly, four years later in October 1973, Kissinger ordered the nuclear alert

147 Ibid., 111.
148 Ibid., 113.
level raised to DEFCON 3 to warn the Soviets against intervening unilaterally in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{151}

Thus it was because Nixon and Kissinger saw great utility in nuclear weapons that they were skeptical that a particular treaty, or U.S. nonproliferation policy generally, would be able to convince nations to forgo nuclear weapons. In some cases proliferation might even improve U.S. security by bolstering its allies and friends at a time when the U.S. was thought to be in decline. Furthermore, his flippant remarks about nuclear weapons suggest he did not see them as a grave danger the way Johnson did, or as Carter and Reagan would in the future.

\textit{Gerald Ford}

President Ford continued efforts begun at the end of the Nixon presidency to increase U.S. promotion of nuclear nonproliferation, though he still would not give it the same priority as subsequent administrations. Toward the end of his presidency, the election of 1976 and candidate Jimmy Carter’s emphasis on nonproliferation led Ford to increase his attention in this area.

Initially, President Ford supported Nixon’s market-based approach to nonproliferation. But the recently concluded sale of eight West German reactors and reprocessing technology to Brazil, a non-NPT member, had illustrated the limits of such a policy in a world of alternative nuclear suppliers. U.S. leaders attempted to pressure Bonn to seek assurances from the Brazilians that the reactors would only be used for peaceful purposes.\textsuperscript{152} The Ford administration did find success a few years later in pressuring the French and South Koreans not to move forward with a

\textsuperscript{151} Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” 114.
\textsuperscript{152} Brown, “Presidential leadership and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 565.
sale of reprocessing equipment to South Korea. A study prepared by the Office of International
Security Affairs in the Department of Defense in early 1976 read,

We have strongly indicated to the Koreans that we will not support
this effort and that acquisition of such a plant could affect our
fundamental relationship. We have told the ROKs in the firmest
terms that we will withdraw U.S. support for their nuclear energy
programs if they continue ahead with plans to acquire the
reprocessing plant. There are signs that the Koreans will change
their position. It is essential to persist.\textsuperscript{153}

By the end of his presidency, Ford acknowledged that the United States was no longer the
dominant supplier it once was, “While we remain a leader in this field, other suppliers have come
to share the international market…In short, for nearly a decade the U.S. has not had a monopoly
on nuclear technology. Although our role is large, we are not able to control worldwide nuclear
development.”\textsuperscript{154}

As with the Nixon administration, U.S. bureaucracy was more active in promoting the
nonproliferation regime than the executive during Ford’s tenure. For example, an ACDA memo
from November 12, 1974 put out feelers for restricting U.S.-funded in-kind IAEA assistance to
NPT parties only.\textsuperscript{155} U.S. AID was opposed to such an action and State leaders felt that the
current policy of favoring NPT parties was preferable to restricting aid to non-NPT parties.

\textsuperscript{153} Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia,
2015).
\textsuperscript{155} James L. Malone (ACDA/GC) to The Director, November 12, 1974, Memorandum: “In Kind Support for IAEA;”
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Technical Committee Meeting on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE),
October 1974-December 1974; Office of Administration (Formerly Executive Director Office) Subject Files
Pertaining to ACDA Nonproliferation Strategy and Nuclear Safeguards, 1974-1976 (Box 383/98/0085), U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, Record Group 383, National Archives Building, College Park, Maryland.
The major nonproliferation achievement of the Ford administration was directing the development of what was to become the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Henry Kissinger, “in great secrecy,” initiated the creation of the London Suppliers Group to coordinate export guidelines in reaction to India’s PNE, which was developed using peaceful technology provided by the United States and Canada. In the fall of 1974, U.S. leaders began consulting with the Soviets about a suppliers’ conference. At the first meeting in London in 1975, the United States gathered together the major nuclear exporters: Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, West Germany, Canada, and Japan. At a second meeting a year later, additional supplier-states joined including Belgium, East Germany, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, and Italy. Next, Switzerland and Poland joined and acceded to the guidelines. In some ways, this effort is a continuation of a market-based solution to nuclear proliferation, only this time the United States was coordinating all nuclear suppliers instead of relying on its own market dominance.

The year 1976 saw increased interest in nonproliferation in both Congress and the White House. In June 1976, Congress passed the Symington Amendment, which prohibited the United States from providing economic and military assistance to any country that imported nuclear reprocessing or enrichment technology. In the summer of 1976, a committee convened by the White House and led by Deputy Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Commission, Robert W. Fri, spent six weeks studying the nation’s nuclear policy and developed

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a 50-page report.\footnote{David Binder, “Ford Plans to Issue Nuclear Guidelines,” \textit{The New York Times}, September 14, 1976.} Ford accepted the report’s recommendations and announced a number of policy changes and initiatives in an October 1976 speech held five days before the presidential election. Ford felt added political pressure to deal with this issue at a time when presidential candidate Jimmy Carter was making nonproliferation one of his signature issues. In his speech Ford explained, “for nearly a decade…the United States had not had a monopoly on nuclear technology. Action to control proliferation, therefore, should be an international cooperative effort, requiring an acceleration of U.S. diplomatic initiatives to control the spread of plutonium separating technologies.”\footnote{Alice Buck, “A History of the Energy Research and Development Administration,” March 1982, \url{http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/ERDA\%20History.pdf} (accessed July 28, 2015).} He touted his administration’s leadership in developing the NSG and said all states should understand “that the U.S. believes that nonproliferation objectives must take precedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made.”\footnote{Gerald R. Ford: “Statement on Nuclear Policy,” October 28, 1976. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project, \url{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6561} (accessed July 29, 2015).} Ford called for a hold on the development of a new U.S. reprocessing plant until “uncertainties are resolved.”\footnote{Ibid.} He also asked all nuclear suppliers to be very cautious when considering the supply of reprocessing or enrichment technology, delaying any supply of such technology for at least three years. He announced that U.S. supply would be based on a number of considerations, with adherence to the NPT or maintenance of full-scope safeguards listed as favorable factors.

In sum, the Ford administration emphasized nonproliferation more than its predecessor. The Fri Report echoed the previous findings of the Gilpatric Report of the Johnson administration. Ford’s renewed attention on nuclear proliferation stemmed from a number of
sources: the Indian nuclear test, South Korea and Taiwan seeking reprocessing technology, and electoral pressure based on Carter’s emphasis on proliferation during the 1976 election.

**Jimmy Carter**

As President, Carter had unique experience when it came to nuclear technology—he was a nuclear engineer who had worked on nuclear submarines and participated in the 1952 evaluation of a nuclear meltdown at Chalk River, a reactor in Ontario, Canada. Carter zealously championed nonproliferation during his presidency, including promotion of the NPT. Though he found some success, his methods sometimes frustrated and alienated American industry as well as U.S. friends and allies. Carter is remembered for being a staunch proponent of nuclear nonproliferation, but two of his major efforts actually started during the last years of the Ford administration: curtailing the U.S. fast breeder reactor program and creating more stringent export legislation.

During his presidential campaign nonproliferation was one of Carter’s key issues. In a campaign speech in September 1976, Carter announced that he would stop the development of the Barnwell reprocessing plant in South Carolina, then under construction, until it was safe and necessary and would only allow its operation if it were on a multinational basis.\(^\text{162}\) Carter historians Burton I. Kaufman and Scott Kaufman connect Carter’s emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation to his commitment to morality and human rights, but he also saw the potential for nuclear weapons to undermine U.S. power. They write, “nuclear proliferation and the spread of atomic weapons posed their own threats to human life. Additionally, the spread of nuclear

arms endangered U.S. security by giving enemy states and possibly even terrorists, access to atomic weaponry.”¹⁶³ In his inaugural address he promised, “we will move this year a step toward ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth.”¹⁶⁴

At times, Carter failed in his attempts to pressure states regarding sensitive nuclear technology. In February 1977, Carter asked German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to halt a $4.7 billion sale of nuclear technology, including an enrichment and reprocessing plant, to Brazil because the technology could be used to make nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁵ This would be the first sale of its kind to a country in what was considered the third world.¹⁶⁶ The German Chancellor refused to budge. Carter also upset the Japanese by asking them to stop building a reprocessing plant at Tokai Mura, a part of their national nuclear power generation program. Carter was again concerned that reprocessed material could be made into nuclear bombs. If Japan reprocessed nuclear material then other states may follow the Japanese example. Like Schmidt, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda refused Carter’s pleas. Carter eventually backed down in both of these cases, though he did succeed in convincing France not to sell a reprocessing plant to Pakistan.

On April 7, 1977, the administration announced its new nonproliferation policy.¹⁶⁷ Carter declared the United States would no longer reprocess nuclear fuel. Reprocessing nuclear fuel is one avenue for developing weapons-grade plutonium and therefore Carter wanted to set a global

example by no longer engaging in this practice. He also cancelled the U.S. breeder reactor research program, previously delayed by President Ford, because breeder reactors produce more plutonium than they use and therefore were considered a major proliferation threat. He pledged that U.S. facilities would increase production of enriched uranium so the United States would be a steady source of supply. Carter also announced his administration would convene an international forum to study alternative fuel cycles that would generate power while limiting weapons proliferation risks. Over 50 states would participate in the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) effort over three years, but no revolutionary alternative fuel cycle was found.

On April 27, 1977, Carter sent a bill to Congress with his nuclear nonproliferation plan. His policies called for stricter exports, but were a bit less severe than a bill that was under consideration in Congress, where nonproliferation was also a high priority. In 1978, members of Congress passed, by wide margins, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978. The final bill, signed in March of 1978, was a compromise and went further in its restrictions than Carter had requested. The nuclear industry largely opposed the Act, which required more stringent guidelines than the Nuclear Suppliers Group for U.S. nuclear exports. To be eligible for nuclear cooperation with the United States, states had to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards on all nuclear facilities and not manufacture or acquire any nuclear explosive devices. If current contracts did not comply with these rules they had to be re-negotiated or terminated.

Nuclear technology suppliers in both the United States and abroad were angered by the new U.S. policies. At home, the policies meant the U.S. nuclear industry was less competitive internationally because it was limited in the technology it could sell. Abroad, allies and partners were suspicious that these nonproliferation policies were meant to help U.S. industry. They felt the United States was trying to curtail and stigmatize technology they were developing in order to maintain both an advantage in nuclear technology sales and in energy development. The United States was wealthier than many other nations in terms of its energy resources, and trying to stop breeder reactors seemed to mean other states could not “catch up” with the United States in terms of energy production.

While some U.S. allies were upset by Carter’s nonproliferation efforts, they did agree to continue working together as nuclear suppliers to set guidelines reducing the risks of nuclear technology transfers. By September 1977, the fifteen members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, originally convened by Henry Kissinger, agreed to guidelines for future sales of nuclear technology. They required supplier states to seek assurances from buyers that: materials and technologies would not be used for nuclear explosive devices, material would be protected against theft or sabotage, imported facilities and materials would be under IAEA safeguards and the same rules would apply if the materials or technology were sold to another country. If there were a suspected violation, the supplier states would meet and consider sanctions. The United States and some critics of this agreement would have liked to have the supplier nations agree to full-scope safeguards—which would mean inspection of a nation’s entire nuclear infrastructure, but “agreement would have been impossible.”\textsuperscript{170} By 1978, the suppliers agreed to language that

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., 196.
was published by the IAEA in INFCIRC/254, which became known as the “trigger list.” Items on the list could only be exported if certain IAEA safeguards were in place. The group did not reconvene until 1991 in the aftermath of revelations about the Iraqi nuclear program.

Unlike his predecessors, Carter’s nonproliferation policy emphasized the importance of gaining additional NPT adherents. His administration engaged in diplomatic outreach to states, including Indonesia (discussed in detail in Chapter Five) and Sri Lanka, asking their leaders to ratify the NPT. A 1980 Government Accountability Office report gave President Carter and Vice President Mondale credit for bringing both states into the NPT.¹⁷¹ During the course of Carter’s presidency, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Tuvalu, Cape Verde Islands, St. Lucia, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Barbados, and Turkey all ratified the NPT.¹⁷²

Carter prioritized nonproliferation, and the NPT specifically, more than most U.S. presidents and yet he was not immune to the conflicting pressures faced by hegemonic powers when two policy priorities are pitted against one another. The President’s nonproliferation policies had to take a back seat to more immediate strategic necessities when the United States reestablished previously cut-off military and economic aid to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.¹⁷³ In a secret January 1980 memo, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski passed on advice from the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan that the United States still

¹⁷² Ibid., 21.
had “considerable time to work on non-proliferation in Pakistan” and should thus “first deal vigorously” with the Soviet threat.\textsuperscript{174}

The Carter administration was more successful in curtailing the nuclear ambitions of another potential proliferator: Taiwan. The Taiwanese pursued nuclear activities through the 1970s that indicated an interest in a bomb program. After pressure from both the Ford and Carter administrations, Taiwan stopped its program. The Carter administration insisted that Taiwan dismantle some of its nuclear facilities and convert its heavy water reactor.\textsuperscript{175}

President Carter was unique in his nuclear knowledge among U.S. presidents. He prioritized nuclear nonproliferation from the beginning of his election campaign through the end of his presidency. As president he made many policy changes to promote nonproliferation and took personal interest in promoting the NPT. His policies frustrated allies and industry and he faced many difficulties accomplishing his nonproliferation goals, and yet he succeeded in expanding membership of the NPT.

\textbf{Ronald Reagan}

President Reagan’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation evolved from his candidacy through his two administrations. As a presidential candidate he argued that the United States should not prevent other states from developing nuclear weapons, saying “I just don't think it's any of our business.”\textsuperscript{176} Within an hour of making that statement—and likely after meeting with

\textsuperscript{174} Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski (Secret), Daily Report, January 3, 1980. NARA online.
\textsuperscript{176} Quoted in Daniel Southerland’s “Nonproliferation debate: Carter hit hard, but did Reagan miss opportunity?” \textit{The Christian Science Monitor}, October 30, 1980.
campaign advisers—Reagan announced he supported American efforts to stop proliferation, but did not think the United States could do so. In the first year of his presidency when asked about the U.S. role in preventing proliferation, he told reporters: “…we’re opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and do everything in our power to prevent it.”\(^{177}\) A year later, he stated “we must go at the matter of realistically reducing—if not totally eliminating the nuclear weapons—the threat to the world.”\(^{178}\) He would go on to talk about eliminating nuclear weapons more than 150 times in his presidency.\(^{179}\)

Reagan set his nuclear nonproliferation policy in contrast to Carter’s. In one of his first policy speeches on nonproliferation as the newly elected President, and in National Security Decision Directive 6, he declared that many allies and friends have in recent years “lost confidence in the ability of our nation to recognize their needs” and thus “we must reestablish this Nation as a predictable and reliable partner for peaceful nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards.”\(^{180}\) Like Nixon, Reagan saw the nuclear supply market as an important means of U.S. nonproliferation influence.\(^{181}\) He preferred to evaluate states on a case-by-case basis, distinguishing between risky and non-risky states by allowing the sales of nuclear technology in areas “where it does not constitute a proliferation risk.”\(^{182}\) His nonproliferation speech illustrated an important understanding about nuclear weapons proliferation when he argued the United


\(^{178}\) Anderson and Anderson, *Reagan’s Secret War*: 94.

\(^{179}\) Ibid., 94.


\(^{182}\) Ibid., 522.
States should focus efforts on reducing the global instability and insecurity that caused proliferation in first place. This argument was highlighted by ACDA Director Eugene V. Rostow who “insisted that arms control efforts must be accompanied by greater attention to problems of world order.” One historian concluded of the Reagan’s administration’s approach, “…it was evident that if the new administration shares the overall nonproliferation objectives of the Carter administration, it intends to use significantly different means in trying to attain them.”

On June 10, 1983, Ambassador-at-large for nuclear affairs, Richard T. Kennedy, reported to the Secretary of State on the Reagan administration’s nuclear nonproliferation successes to date, listing twenty different accomplishments including policy statements, promoting nuclear safeguards, bilateral consultations, and improved export controls. Most of the details of the memo remain classified, but on the topic of the NPT the memo reads, “The Administration has conducted and is continuing an active diplomatic initiative to encourage countries not yet party to the Treaty to ratify this central instrument of the international nonproliferation regime. In 1981, Egypt became a party. During 1982, four additional states became parties – and Uganda.”

The administration had proliferation failures as well. Pakistan continued to receive military and economic aid for its support in the effort against the Soviets in Afghanistan despite real concerns that it was building a nuclear weapons program. According to government officials, attempts to curtail the Israeli nuclear program, were “essentially dropped from the U.S.

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183 Ibid., 522.
184 Ibid., 523.
185 Memo to the Secretary of State from S/NP Robert T Kennedy, “Non-proliferation accomplishments of the administration to date,” June 10, 1983.
agenda of significant issues to be addressed in bilateral negotiations with Israel.”

The administration also entered in a nuclear cooperation deal with China in 1983 when China joined the IAEA. Critics of the deal noted China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan and Argentina, two states of proliferation concern. The Reagan administration also favored Iraq in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, turning a “blind eye” to many of the nuclear-related procurements made by the Iraqis during these years.

According to historian Walton L. Brown, U.S. nonproliferation policy shifted from “vigilance” under Carter to “laxness” under Reagan, in part because the bipolar relationship with the Soviets took priority. In the nuclear realm, President Reagan was concerned foremost with pursuing arms control with the Soviets. He successfully negotiated the Intermediate range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty in 1987, eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons, and then spent four years pursuing START negotiations. Reagan saw the connection between pursuing nuclear arms control with the Soviets and stemming global nuclear weapons proliferation. In a September 1984 memo to Andrei Gromyko, Reagan wrote,

We both know that other countries have turned to nuclear weapons and more are quietly working to achieve that goal. The danger of such proliferation is the possibility of accidental war brought on by neither of use but triggering a conflict that could ultimately involve us both. But what if we who have the power to destroy the world should join in saving it? If we can reach agreement on reducing and ultimately eliminating these weapons, we could persuade the rest of the world to join us in doing away with all such weapons.

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187 Ibid., 569.
188 Ibid., 567.
Reagan sought to contrast his nuclear nonproliferation policies with those of his predecessor, focusing on becoming a reliable technology supplier and at times supporting allies at the expense of nonproliferation goals. Reagan spoke positively about the NPT and supported its universality in speeches. His major contribution to reducing nuclear risk, however, came in the form of bilateral nuclear reductions with the Soviets, the most lasting nuclear legacy of his two administrations.

George H. W. Bush

President George H. W. Bush initially maintained President Reagan’s nonproliferation policies, but similar to the administrations before him, external events raised the specter of dangerous nuclear proliferation and his policy focus shifted.

First, the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991 left three new nuclear states in its wake. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine possessed Soviet nuclear weapons on their sovereign territory. Concern for the future of these weapons, along with Soviet fissile material and nuclear scientists, brought about an unprecedented nonproliferation effort by both the Bush and Clinton administrations. In exchange for giving up nuclear weapons and material the three states received compensation, aid and assistance from the United States and Russia.\textsuperscript{190} Ukraine delayed on the deal to relinquish its weapons, however, and the Clinton administration would take up that challenge.

Second, after the 1991 Gulf War, dismantling the previously unknown Iraqi nuclear weapons program became one of Bush’s priorities. Ten years earlier, in 1981, Israel had bombed Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in an attempt to delay or stop an Iraqi weapons program.\(^{191}\) In the years after the attack, the Iraqis established a clandestine centrifuge enrichment program with technology from foreign manufacturers.\(^{192}\) Discovered only after the Gulf War, the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, like the Indian explosion in 1974, was a nonproliferation wake-up call. According to Brown, Iraq’s clandestine program reflected the “consequences of complacent nonproliferation policies during the 1980s.”\(^{193}\) This case also illustrated the weakness of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA. Iraq had been inspected consistently for ten years by IAEA inspectors who were only allowed to inspect locations declared by the Iraqis. Ingenious diversionary tactics and subterfuge allowed the Iraqi program to proceed quite literally under the noses of inspectors.\(^{194}\) After the Gulf War, in a process detailed in Chapter Seven, the international community and the IAEA, led by the United States, began developing a new safeguards agreement—the Model Additional Protocol—which became available to states in 1997. The new agreement allows inspectors to access all nuclear-related locations from mines to waste sites within a state and permits short-notice inspections and environmental sampling.\(^{195}\)

\(^{193}\) Brown, “Presidential leadership and U.S. Nonproliferation Policy,” 569.
\(^{195}\) “Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards (INFCIRC/540),” [https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540.pdf](https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc540.pdf) (accessed June 15, 2015).
The nuclear nonproliferation regime also saw some great successes by the end of the Bush administration. France and China, with the end of the Cold War, finally joined the NPT as nuclear weapons states. China joined the NPT for a number of reasons, including its increasing universality—a trend to which U.S. diplomacy was paramount. In addition, the United States had made NPT ascension a condition of finalizing a bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the Chinese\textsuperscript{196} and presented the NPT as a means to improve China’s chances of extending its Most Favorable Nation status.\textsuperscript{197} South Africa, the target of crippling sanctions against its apartheid regime, transitioned to a more democratic state and gave up its nuclear weapons program and joined the NPT.\textsuperscript{198} At home, President Bush ordered the unilateral reduction of U.S. nuclear weapons, through his Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, overseeing one of the largest reductions of nuclear weapons in history.\textsuperscript{199}

\textit{William J. Clinton}

After his election in November 1992, president-elect Clinton was asked about his foreign policy priorities for his first 100 days. He listed “working hard to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological and chemical,” along with pursuing further

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\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{197} “Meeting between the President and Chinese Ambassador Zhu Qizhen,” August 3, 1992, Presidential Meetings, Memorandum of Conversations 7/9/92 - 12/22/92, Presidential Memcons, Presidential Correspondence, Brent Scowcroft Files, Bush Presidential Records, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas.
\end{enumerate}
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nuclear reductions with the Russians, continuing the Middle East Peace Process, and promoting the global economy.\(^{200}\)

From the Bush administration, President Clinton inherited the challenge of promoting NPT ascension in the three former Soviet states with nuclear weapons. Ukraine was the biggest obstacle, as the other two inheritor states, Kazakhstan and Belarus, did not claim ownership of the weapons on their soil and assured the United States they would give them up. As the Bush presidency ended, the Ukrainian parliament delayed its promised ratification of START I and the NPT and held out for increased U.S. aid and security guarantees.\(^{201}\) Clinton resolved this impasse with a trilateral deal inked in January 1994 in which Ukraine received approximately $175 million worth of aid and security assurances from the United States.\(^{202}\) In November 1994, the Ukrainian parliament voted by overwhelming majority to ratify the NPT after receiving security assurances from the United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia and promises of payment for their nuclear weapons and promises of aid.\(^{203}\)

The next proliferation challenge for the Clinton administration was the suspected nuclear weapons program in the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 1993, DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT,\(^{204}\) and the state’s efforts to hide its nuclear


activities from IAEA inspectors suggested that another NPT member that had developed a
clandestine nuclear program while under IAEA safeguards. After sixteen months of
negotiations led by Ambassador Robert Gallucci, the United States and North Korea agreed to a
deal, the “Agreed Framework,” under which the DPRK would freeze its nuclear program and the
United States and allies, including South Korea and Japan, would provide two electricity-
producing light water reactors and annual shipments of $50 million worth of fuel oil and begin
low-level diplomatic relations. After five years, the North Koreans would allow inspectors at
two of its suspected nuclear weapons sites. This deal would ultimate fall apart under the next
administration, though it did delay the North Korean program for a number of years.

Two final nonproliferation accomplishments of the Clinton administration were both
treaty-related: negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and securing indefinite
extension of the NPT. In 1993, President Clinton took a meaningful step toward ending global
nuclear testing when he moved forward in seeking negotiations of a nuclear test ban. President
Bush had established a U.S. moratorium on testing in 1992, and Clinton extended this
moratorium in 1993. A test ban treaty had long been sought by many members of the NPT,
especially the non-nuclear weapons states, and this was a step toward achieving this goal.

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Securing the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT, a process detailed in Chapter Six, was the greatest of Clinton’s nonproliferation accomplishments during his tenure as president. As stipulated in the treaty, after 25 years the treaty members would convene to decide upon the future of the treaty. The treaty could disband, be extended for another discrete period, or become extended indefinitely. From the beginning, the United States “favored” indefinite extension and stridently pursued this goal, ultimately finding success.\footnote{Thomas Graham, \textit{Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 259.}

Clinton’s two terms ended on a pessimistic note for U.S. nonproliferation leadership. In May 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests, Pakistan followed with six tests of its own, confirming for the first time that it was a nuclear-capable state.\footnote{John F. Burns, “Nuclear Anxiety: The Overview; Pakistan, Answering India, Carries Out Nuclear Tests; Clinton's Appeal Rejected, \textit{The New York Times}, May 29, 1998.} In 1999, the Clinton Administration failed to make the case for the CTBT and its ratification was rejected 51-48, a rare failure of an arms control treaty in the U.S. Senate.\footnote{Helen Dewar, “Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty,” \textit{The Washington Post}, October 14, 1999.}

\textit{George W. Bush}

During his tenure, George W. Bush focused a significant amount of high-level attention on the threat of nuclear proliferation. The devastating attacks on September 11, 2001 soon led to fears of terrorists accessing nuclear material to create even greater levels of destruction; together
with an emphasis on “rogue states” with nuclear weapons, these threats became the basis for Bush’s proliferation policies. The means by which the Bush administration approached these challenges, however, left many nonproliferation experts arguing Bush undermined the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The 2000 Republican platform illustrated the distain with which many in the administration felt toward institutional means of addressing nuclear proliferation:

…the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is another anachronism of obsolete strategic thinking. This treaty is not verifiable, not enforceable, and would not enable the United States to ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. It also does not deal with the real dangers of nuclear proliferation, which are rogue regimes — such as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea — that seek to hide their dangerous weapons programs behind weak international treaties. We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise agreements.\(^{213}\)

The Bush administration set out its policy for addressing the threat of nuclear proliferation in its 2002 “National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.”\(^{214}\) Whereas previous presidents emphasized the threat of nuclear proliferation as a risk that the United States would lose freedom of action or could be brought into small wars that could become nuclear, now a greater emphasis was on how nuclear weapons and material could directly threaten the U.S homeland due to terrorists and rogue states.\(^{215}\) The document presented a three-pillared approach to addressing the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD):


\(^{215}\) Ibid.
counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequences management. Though the document did indicate support for strengthening the NPT, the IAEA, and the Model Additional Protocol as part of its nonproliferation pillar, in practice, the first pillar, counterproliferation, received greater emphasis.

The Bush years did witness some nonproliferation successes. Libya gave up its rudimentary nuclear weapons program in 2003 after lengthy diplomacy by Great Britain and the United States.\(^{216}\) A more meaningful success, perhaps, was the dismantlement of the AQ Khan network beginning in January 2004. For years, the father of the Pakistani centrifuge uranium enrichment program had developed a global network of salespeople and manufacturers to sell centrifuge designs and technology and nuclear weapons plans. Known customers of the Khan network included Iran, Iraq, and Libya.\(^{217}\)

These successes were matched by more proliferation challenges by two of the states Bush labelled the “Axis of Evil” in his 2002 State of the Union Address.\(^{218}\) In 2002, an Iranian opposition group in the United States revealed Iran’s secret centrifuge facility at Natanz, leading to IAEA inspections and a report to the IAEA Board of Governors in 2003.\(^{219}\) Thus began over a decade of conflict between Iran and the United States and its allies over Iran’s nuclear program and its intentions. In addition, by 2003, the Agreed Framework, negotiated during the Clinton administration, had broken down. In the same year, the Kim Jung-II regime announced again that

it was exercising its right under NPT’s Article X to withdraw from the treaty, the only state to have done so.\(^{220}\)

As a result of the focus on the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and concerns about rogue states and global proliferation networks, President Bush undertook a number of new initiatives. In May 2003, the administration created the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a global effort to encourage the interdiction of shipments of illicit WMD and WMD-related material around the world. This is a voluntary, informal organization by which states sign on to a Statement of Interdiction Principles, it is not a formal treaty organization.\(^{221}\) With 105 state signatories, the PSI has a great deal of support, but it has not been without critics, including those who argue the interdictions are against the Law of the Seas.\(^{222}\)

In another initiative, the Bush administration developed and pushed for UNSC Resolution 1540 which, passed in 2004, mandated that all UN states strengthen their export laws to prevent the spread of nuclear materials and technology, and especially to keep these items out of the hands of terrorists.\(^{223}\) The means of enforcing this mandate—through the UN Security Council—led some UN members to complain about the origins of the resolution and resist the mandate to make what could be expensive and time consuming changes to their legal and regulatory

\(^{220}\) In fact, the DPRK has not completed the withdrawal paperwork, but for all practical purposes the state is outside of the treaty.


codes. Poorer nations especially chafed at the resolution, though the UNSC has reaffirmed 1540 in multiple resolutions since 2004 and cooperation has increased in the intervening years.

The PSI and UNSC Resolution 1540 both illustrate initiatives that were U.S.-directed and distinct from the formal, institutionalized nuclear nonproliferation regime. Indeed, while the Bush administration prioritized countering the threat of proliferation, the administration can be characterized as maintaining a general disinterest, and even distain, for multilateral institutional approaches to nuclear nonproliferation. The attitude was evident at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. John Bolton led the U.S. preparations for the conference before moving from the State Department to the United Nations. As one former State Department official explained regarding the 2005 NPT Review Conference: “Bolton loathes this type of fora and debate. He has little patience for those who are more concerned about U.S. nukes than about Iran's violations…He just wants to get out of the NPT review process with our skin, and hopefully without much blame for any negative outcome, which unfortunately was virtually preordained in 2005.”

This conference was unable to reach a final consensus document.

In what many nonproliferation experts saw as another a blow to the NPT, the Bush administration pursued a nuclear cooperation deal with India, permitting India to import U.S. nuclear technology despite non-membership in the NPT. One of the “rewards” for joining the NPT for non-nuclear states is access to peaceful nuclear technology as spelled out in Article IV.

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225 Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Dean Rust, Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy, Initial interview date: December 6, 2006.
Critics argued that if non-NPT states received similar benefits, it weakened the NPT regime.\textsuperscript{226} To make this exception for India, the United States had to exert great pressure on members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, who as a whole had to agree to a waiver.

The one aspect of the nonproliferation regime the Bush administration did support was the Model Additional Protocol (AP). In a 2004 speech, President Bush announced a new policy that U.S. nuclear supply would be conditional on a state’s adoption of the AP.\textsuperscript{227} He also sent the AP to the Senate for advice and consent, improving the U.S. position to press other states to ratify the safeguards agreement.

The most controversial legacy of the Bush administration in general, and for nuclear nonproliferation, in particular, was the 2003 war in Iraq, which was ostensibly fought to keep Saddam Hussein from threatening U.S. interests with weapons of mass destruction.\textsuperscript{228}

Despite Bush’s prioritization of nonproliferation, he was strongly criticized by many in the nuclear nonproliferation field. For example, according to nonproliferation expert and advocate Frank Von Hippel, “The Bush administration did about as much damage to nonproliferation as one could imagine anybody doing.”\textsuperscript{229} Von Hippel and other critics argue that Bush damaged the long-standing multilateral, institutional approach to nonproliferation. The Iraq War, the creation of the PSI, and UNSC Resolution 1540 represent Bush’s efforts to reduce the risks of nuclear weapons and material, but the administration’s disregard for the NPT, the CTBT,


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{227} “President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD,” Fort Lesley J. McNair - National Defense University, Washington, DC, February 11, 2004, \url{http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/29290.htm} (accessed March 4, 2016).}


\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{229} Declan Butler, “Bush’s Legacy: The Wasted Years,” \textit{Nature} 457 (January 15, 2009).}
and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty; the nuclear deal with non-NPT member India; and his defense of pre-emptive war all undermined the historical, global institutional effort to curtail proliferation according to many in the arms control community.

**Barack Obama**

President Obama sought to distance himself from Bush administration policies and this included nuclear nonproliferation. Both Presidents cared deeply about the risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, but Obama differentiated his presidency by reaffirming the U.S. commitment to multilateral mechanisms for addressing proliferation, like the NPT, while also continuing to promote both participation in the PSI and global implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540.

The fear of nuclear terrorism remained high during the presidential election of 2008. In his campaign, Barack Obama set the ambitious goal of securing all of the world’s nuclear material within four years.\(^{230}\) One means of achieving this goal was a series of Nuclear Security Summits, the first of which was held in Washington, DC in 2009. In these summits, a selected group of approximately fifty states were invited to discuss the challenges of securing nuclear material. Though the content of the conferences was important, the major benefit of the summits has been the promises or “house gifts” offered by states to take specific steps such as giving up stocks of highly enriched uranium or passing more restrictive export laws. Though the goal of

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securing all the world’s fissile material in four years proved overly ambitious, significant progress has been made with over 6000 tons of nuclear material secured.231

In Prague in April 2009, President Obama stated the United States would “take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons.”232 This speech helped create a more positive atmosphere for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where the parties to the NPT were able to come to consensus on a final document. The document was unique in incorporating Action Plans for each of the three pillars of the NPT, creating something of a scorecard to measure NPT progress.233 One U.S. effort at the conference was attempting to convince other parties of the wisdom of strengthening the withdrawal clause of the NPT, with the idea that states should not go unpunished for using to treaty to import nuclear technology and pursue weapons programs, and then withdraw from the treaty (as the North Koreans did).234 This effort continues the U.S. pattern of seeking to innovate and alter the regime as weaknesses become apparent.

The Obama administration also explicitly connected its commitment to bilateral strategic arms control with the Russians to its nuclear nonproliferation goals. With START expiring on December 3, 2009, the Obama administration worked hard to successfully negotiate a new bilateral arms control treaty. The so-called “New START” agreement entered into force in February 2011, limited the United States and Russia to 1,550 nuclear warheads, 700 deployed delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles by 2018. The dogged

232 President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009.
pursuit of New START and further Obama administration efforts to reduce U.S. arsenal size illustrated that many in the Obama administration believe that there is a direct link between U.S. nuclear reductions and garnering global cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation. For example, leading up to the treaty’s ratification, Secretary Clinton stated, “The new START, treaty demonstrates our commitment to making progress toward disarmament under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the so-called NPT. So as we uphold our commitments and strengthen the NPT, we can hold others accountable to do the same.” New START was supposed to be step one, the administration had plans for pursuing limits on so-called “non-strategic nuclear weapons,” or tactical weapons, but a souring of U.S.-Russian relations—including charges of Russian cheating on the INF treaty—undermined this ambitious agenda.

With less than a year remaining of his presidency, the Obama’s nonproliferation agenda has lost steam. There appears to be little hope of CTBT ratification by the Senate; the 2015 NPT Review Conference ended without a consensus document—with the non-nuclear states and nuclear states very far apart on disarmament; there is still nuclear material to secure; and the Russians are showing little interest in continuing bilateral nuclear arms control talks. One bright spot for the Obama administration was concluding the Iranian nuclear deal in July 14, 2015. If both sides continue to abide by the deal, it could be the most important nonproliferation legacy of the Obama administration.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the many ways in which the United States has served as the nuclear nonproliferation regime architect since the beginning of the nuclear age. With the IAEA, the NPT, the NSG, the Model Additional Protocol, UNSC Resolution 1540, the United States led the world in creating, drafting, and promoting nonproliferation. The foundation for this global leadership is in the vast U.S. bureaucracy devoted to nonproliferation. U.S. government officials working on nonproliferation across the interagency include personnel at the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Energy, across the intelligence community, and formerly within ACDA. The United States has also been the largest funder of the IAEA since its inception. In sum, U.S. resources devoted to promoting nuclear nonproliferation dwarf the efforts of all other states. The story is not always simple however, and the history summarized above provided a number of periods in which U.S. emphasis on nonproliferation diminished only to be reinvigorated. External events, such as India’s 1974 nuclear explosion or revelations about Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program in 1991, spurred renewed action. In addition, the means of addressing proliferation have varied over time and by administration. Some presidents preferred to address proliferation on a case-by-case basis, implicitly sending the message that some states are more trustworthy with nuclear technology than others. Some presidents attempted to rely primarily on U.S. nuclear supply for their nonproliferation influence, while others relied more on the institutional mechanisms of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Finally, the history shows that the United States, as a hegemonic power, did at times sublimate U.S. nonproliferation goals.

to other national security priorities. Nonetheless, over each successive administration since the NPT entered into force, a legion of bureaucrats and diplomats continued to push the universalization of the treaty. In subsequent years, the United States expanded the regime with new initiatives to address weaknesses in the treaty. As one U.S. official stated, the United States usually “writes the first draft and finances the effort.”\textsuperscript{239}

\textsuperscript{239} Author interview with U.S. official, Washington, DC, July 17, 2015.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CORRELATES OF COMMITMENT TO THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

The goal of this chapter is to employ quantitative analysis to test the comparative strength of the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. The analysis finds strong support for a theory of hegemonic leadership and limited support for the other theories. Contrary to much of the academic literature on institutional commitment, the findings below indicate that regime type is not the most significant factor in explaining membership in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As most of the commitment literature focuses on institutions and treaties that are not security-related—whether in the realms of trade, the environment, or human rights—this finding shows that the mechanisms behind commitment to security institutions may be different and that institutional commitment is more complicated than extant literature indicates.

Employing a standard time-series cross-sectional analysis to examine factors of nonproliferation commitment, I use a newly created dataset of nonproliferation regime commitment indicators for all non-nuclear NPT states from 1968, when the NPT opened for signature, to 2010. I begin with logistic analysis of three nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment indicators: conclusion of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and conclusion of the Model Additional Protocol. Two additional tests employ ordered probit and regression analysis to test single-year nonproliferation commitment indicators: a state survey from 1995 on the indefinite extension of the NPT and a measure of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 implementation from 2012.

The chapter begins with a discussion of dependent variables and then explains the independent variables of interest for each hypothesis. A brief discussion of control variables is
followed by an explanation of the quantitative models used. Each independent variable will be
tested against the dependent variables, illustrating the explanatory power of each of the
hypotheses presented in the previous chapter. Finally, the chapter concludes by reporting on the
results of a number of robustness checks on the analysis.

**Dependent Variables**

This project poses a straightforward puzzle: if states have ratified the NPT, the
cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, what explain variation in states’ commitment
to other aspects of regime? As discussed in the previous chapter, the NPT was drafted during the
1960s largely by the United States and Soviet Union with input from non-nuclear weapons
states. Its text was approved by the UN General Assembly in 1968 and it entered force in 1970.
In a process similar to that of other international treaties, states that joined prior to 1970 signed
the treaty and then ratified it at a later date. After 1970, states joined through the single step of
ascension. All but four states in the international system, India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Sudan
have joined the treaty. In 2003, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was the first
and only state to withdraw from the treaty, a process with a three-month notification phase
established in Article X. Chart 3 below illustrates NPT ratifications by year. Nearly one-third of
treaty parties joined within the NPT’s first three years. Ratification slowed to a steady pace with
an uptick in 1975, a year after India exploded its “peaceful” nuclear device, and in the years and
months leading up to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.
Figure 3: NPT Ratifications by Year

DV 1: Comprehensive Safeguards

NPT Article III states that treaty parties must conclude a bilateral Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. Safeguards provide some level of verification that state parties are abiding by the treaty. Specifically, a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement allows the IAEA to assess the correctness and completeness of states’ declared nuclear material ledger and inspect its declared nuclear-related activities to ensure a state is not diverting nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes. To make this assessment, IAEA inspectors may conduct on-site inspections, visits, and undertake other monitoring and evaluation activities to verify the
The IAEA also uses “containment and surveillance techniques, such as tamper-proof seals and cameras that the IAEA installs at facilities.” These activities build confidence in the nonproliferation regime by increasing transparency and providing warnings about potential weapons programs if inspectors report discrepancies between actual and reported state behavior. The dependent variable, CSA RATIFICATION, is a dichotomous variable assigned 0 in the relevant country-years without a conclusion of a safeguards agreement and assigned 1 in the year of conclusion and then in subsequent years the observations are dropped and treated as missing data. The count begins in the year a state ratifies the NPT, or in 1971—the year the IAEA finalized the NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement—if the state ratified the treaty before 1971. The data are coded as missing in the years before a state ratified the NPT, since the state was not under obligation to conclude an NPT Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement before NPT ratification.

Safeguards are bilateral agreements with the IAEA that take some period of time to negotiate and conclude, especially if a state has significant nuclear material and facilities. As such, the treaty stipulates that states must complete a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement within eighteen months of beginning negotiations with the IAEA. These negotiations are

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240 If a state has very little or no nuclear material they are able to attach a “small quantities protocol” (SQP) on to their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. With this protocol states do not receive inspectors. Realizing that this was a weakness of the regime, the IAEA developed new language in 2005 for a “Modified Small Quantities Protocol” (Mod-SQP) that it has asked all states with an SQP to negotiate and conclude. In this analysis all CSA agreements are assessed together regardless of whether a state has a regular CSA or CSA with SQP.


supposed to commence no later than the date of treaty deposit.\textsuperscript{243} Despite this codified timeframe, there is great variation among states in the time that it takes to conclude a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Saudi Arabia is one of the laggards: it ratified the NPT in 1988 but did not conclude its required safeguards agreement until 2009. Syria, Nigeria, Kenya, Bolivia, and Cambodia also concluded their safeguards agreements two decades after NPT ratification. On average it has taken NPT states eight years to complete a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. While this delay does not raise concerns in the case of most states—because they have no nuclear material—it does illustrate the sluggishness with which many states cooperate with the treaty’s requirements. In many cases delays may be related to limited state capacity in the nuclear realm (and thus a proxy for state capacity is included in the models as a control variable), but the timeliness of fulfilling a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement also indicates a state’s commitment to the nonproliferation regime.

**DV 2: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty**

A nuclear test ban treaty was an aspiration codified in the preamble of the NPT and was long sought by non-nuclear weapons states, but it was not until the 1990s that the nuclear states were willing to negotiate such a treaty.\textsuperscript{244} It was at this time that the United States began to view the test ban treaty as a valuable nonproliferation measure and not solely as a disarmament initiative pushed by non-nuclear weapons states.\textsuperscript{245} Interest by some of the nuclear weapons states, in particular the United States, allowed treaty negotiations to move forward. The treaty

\textsuperscript{243} For states that signed and then ratified the treaty, they have 180 days from the entry into force of the treaty to commence negotiations with the IAEA.


\textsuperscript{245} Ibid., 56.
bans all nuclear explosions and has a global verification system to detect such explosions. President Clinton was the first leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the day it opened for signature, in September 1996. The U.S. Senate failed to ratify the treaty in 1999 in a largely partisan vote in the Republican-majority Senate. Clinton vowed to keep fighting for the treaty. The George W. Bush administration did not resubmit the treaty to the Senate. It took a negative view of U.S. ratification, and yet during his administration, the State Department continued to promote the CTBT abroad and the United States continued to pay its part for the Treaty’s global monitoring system. The Obama administration favors the treaty, but is unlikely to pursue ratification without having secured 67 Senate votes, an unlikely outcome in the remaining year of the presidency.

The dependent variable, CTBT RATIFICATION, is a dichotomous variable assigned 0 in the relevant country-years without the ratification of the treaty and assigned 1 in the year of ratification and then in subsequent years the observations are dropped and treated as missing data. The count begins in the year the CTBT opened for signature, 1996.

DV 3: The Model Additional Protocol

Following the 1991 Gulf War, IAEA inspectors were surprised by the extent of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. Inspectors had been visiting Iraq for years under Iraq’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and had not detected its nuclear weapons program. Former IAEA inspector David Kay has recounted numerous tactics by which the Iraqis hid their

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246 Dewar, “Senate Rejects Test Ban Treaty.”
248 Author Correspondence with U.S. official, March 18, 2016.
program, including the use of shell companies to exploit export control loopholes, compartmentalization of projects to such an extent that many scientists did not know what they were ultimately working on, and making several different technology purchases of small amounts to avoid suspicion. The greatest of the Iraqis’ diversion techniques occurred at Al Tawaintha, where they hid their clandestine facilities “in plain sight” next to declared facilities inspectors routinely visited. The Iraqis hid buildings within other buildings, concealed power and water feeds and made important buildings appear less significant by their lack of security and defenses. In fact, IAEA inspectors visited Iraq every six months for a decade without finding anything suspicious. Highly controlled visits meant inspectors only visited three of 100 relevant buildings on the Al Tawaintha campus.

The Iraqi program illustrated a major weakness of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements: inspectors were only allowed to visit locations declared by states. Many members of the international community, led by the United States, called for improved safeguards as a result of the Iraqi revelations. By 1997, members of the IAEA developed text for the “Model Additional Protocol,” a protocol to states’ Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements that expanded the IAEA’s powers. Under the Additional Protocol (AP), IAEA inspectors have the right to access and monitor the entire fuel cycle within a state, from uranium mines to nuclear waste.

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249 Kay, “Denial and deception practices of WMD proliferators: Iraq and beyond.”
250 Ibid., 94.
251 Ibid., 94.
facilities. They can also conduct short-notice visits and take environmental samples. Most importantly, they are able to go beyond declared sites.\textsuperscript{252}

The AP should provide states with an increased degree of confidence about other states’ commitment to the NPT, but it is not universally accepted by all NPT members. The AP was originally introduced as a voluntary measure and some states have balked at efforts to make the AP the universal safeguards standard. Why these states resist this means of improving the regime is one key question of this project.

The dependent variable, AP RATIFICATION, is a dichotomous variable assigned a 0 in the relevant country-years without a conclusion of an agreement and assigned a 1 in the year of conclusion. The count for this variable begins in 1997, the year the IAEA completed the model text for the AP. Before this date, all observations are treated as missing. After a state ratifies the agreement, subsequent country-year observations are dropped and coded as missing data. Like the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement discussed above, the AP requires time for a state to complete its declaration to the IAEA and thus a state’s capacity and the complexity of its nuclear infrastructure may slow its ratification process. For this reason a proxy for state capacity (logged GDP per capita) will be included in these models.

\textit{Independent Variables}

Table D below provides a consolidated list of the hypotheses described in Chapter Two. Each will be tested with quantitative analysis across a number of indicators of nonproliferation regime commitment. A brief discussion of each of the independent variables follows.

\textsuperscript{252} For more in the Additional Protocol, see “Factsheets and FAQs: IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols,”\textsuperscript{a} http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg\_overview.html (accessed January 15, 2014).
Table D: Hypotheses for Quantitative Testing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis Category</th>
<th>Hypothesis:</th>
<th>Quantitative Indicators:</th>
<th>Expected Relationship:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEGEMONIC LEADERSHIP</strong></td>
<td>States that are favorable toward the U.S.-led order most likely to commit, and commit more quickly, to new nonproliferation regime initiatives.</td>
<td>Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten’s ideal point measure based on UNGA votes, Robustness check: Nuclear umbrella membership</td>
<td>Favorability toward the U.S.-led global order will be <strong>positively correlated</strong> with nonproliferation commitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>States that are less favorable to the U.S.-led order are less likely to commit to new nuclear nonproliferation initiatives; when they do commit they will be slower to do so and will be influenced by hegemonic inducements or threats.</td>
<td>Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten’s ideal point measure based on UNGA votes, Combined U.S. military and economic aid variable</td>
<td>Favorability toward the U.S.-led global order will be <strong>positively correlated</strong> with nonproliferation commitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HEDGING</strong></td>
<td>States in difficult security environments are less likely to commit to additional nuclear nonproliferation regime agreements.</td>
<td>Thompson’s rivalry measure, Robustness checks: Diehl and Goertz’s rivalry measure and MID data measures</td>
<td>Rivalry will be <strong>negatively correlated</strong> with commitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ENERGY</strong></td>
<td>States that import a large percentage of their energy resources will be more likely to commit to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.</td>
<td>World Bank indicator on percentage of energy imported</td>
<td>Higher imported energy percentages will be <strong>positively correlated</strong> with commitment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REGIME TYPE</strong></td>
<td>Democracies will be more likely to commit to the nuclear nonproliferation regime than non-democracies.</td>
<td>PolityIV score, Robustness check: Democracy and Dictatorship Variable</td>
<td>Higher Polity scores will be <strong>positively correlated</strong> with commitment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hegemonic Leadership Variables:

**FAVORABILITY TOWARD U.S.-LED ORDER:** This measure employs a new spatial variable of states’ foreign policy preferences developed by Michael Bailey, Anton Strezhnev and Erik
Like many previous scholars (e.g., Gartzke 1998, 2000; Oneal and Russett 1999, Reed et al. 2008), the authors use UN General Assembly voting data to represent states’ foreign policy preferences. Because these votes are non-binding, largely symbolic and thus low cost to states, these votes have become a standard indication among scholars of true preferences. In the past, scholars have used simple dyadic models (S-scores or Tau-B) to measure similarity of votes between pairs of states (or alliance portfolios) to indicate shared preferences. A number of scholars have criticized the use of these measures. Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten improve upon such measures by creating a dynamic spatial model to measure states’ positions toward the U.S.-led order over time. To make the state preference estimates comparable from year to year the authors exploit the fact that since the first UN General Assembly session in 1946, a number of resolutions have been repeated annually. Their “ideal point” measure is an improvement on previous measures in that it allows us to see preference shifts among individual states over time and it allows for better inter-temporal comparisons among states. The authors find their measure is correlated—though not identical to—other measures connected to the U.S.-led order, including liberalism, economic openness, and democratization. This variable should not be mistaken as a proxy for democratization, however, as the bivariate correlation between the variable and measures of democracy using both polity scores and democracy-dictatorship measures is 50%.


254 For criticism on the use Tau-B and alliances to measure similarity, see Curtis S. Signorino and Jeffrey M. Ritter, “Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring Alliance Portfolio Similarity” *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 1 (1991): 115-144. On problems with both measures see Frank M. Häge’s “Choice or Circumstance? Adjusting Measures of Foreign Policy Similarity for Chance Agreement” *Political Analysis* 19, no. 3 (July 2011).
The bivariate correlation between the variable and economic openness is 7.5% and 6% with a common measure of liberalization.\textsuperscript{255}

\textbf{U.S. AID:} This is a combined measure of U.S. military assistance and U.S. economic assistance in constant dollars from 1968 to 2011. Data are provided by the U.S. Overseas Loans & Grants Greenbook.\textsuperscript{256} The economic aid dataset aid is divided into a number of different categories, (e.g. Migration and Refugee Assistance, Development Assistance, Migration and Refugee Assistance). This measure combines all economic aid categories into one measure for each state per year and adds this total to the military aid for each year and then is logged. The measure is a three-year average encompassing the current year and the two years following. The model uses two lag years because aid linked to discussions of nonproliferation activities may not be immediately received by the target state.

\textit{Hedging Measure:}

\textbf{RIVALRY:} This is a dichotomous variable assigned a 0 if a state is not in a rivalry in a particular year and assigned a 1 if a state is in a strategic rivalry. This variable is coded using Thompson’s (2010) rivalry measure. There are a few benefits to this particular operationalization of rivalry. First, the dataset has been coded through 2010, providing more coverage to the period of study. I have self-coded the years 2011 and 2012 for use in one regression analysis. More importantly, Thompson codes rivalries, not by employing counting rules (“dispute density”) that sometimes leave out important relevant dyads, but as those relationships in which the elites of

\textsuperscript{255} OPENNESS is a ratio of a state’s total imports and exports to its GDP. LIBERALIZATION reflects the change in a state’s OPENNESS measure over a five year period.
each country perceive the other as an enemy. In a time-consuming process, Thompson uses historical evidence of states’ foreign policy to determine rivalry based on the perceptions of state decision-makers. Using this systematic approach, Thompson finds more rivalries than are picked up by counting methods used by Diehl and Goertz or Bennett.

*Energy Measure:*

**ENERGY IMPORTS:** Taken from the World Bank’s country indicators, this is a measure of the percentage of total energy usage a state must import to meet its energy needs in a given year.

*Regime Type Measure:*

**REGIME TYPE:** Polity IV data is employed to test the hypothesis that democracies will be more likely to commit to subsequent nonproliferation regime agreements after ratifying the NPT. The coding spans from -10 for extremely autocratic states to 10 for the most democratic states. As a robustness check, I also run the same models employing a dichotomous democracy and a dichotomous autocracy score.

*Control Variables:*

**WARSAW PACT:** Both the United States and Soviet Union cooperated to develop the draft text for the NPT, and as discussed in the previous chapter, both superpowers had an interest in limiting proliferation. Though the United States was the global leader in promoting nuclear

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nonproliferation, we would expect Warsaw Pact states to commit more quickly with the
nonproliferation regime than other states, due to Soviet influence. Because the Soviet Union, like
the United States, prioritized nonproliferation it was anticipated that this variable would be
significant and positive. Table E below shows how quickly Warsaw Pact states ratified the NPT
and concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Table E: Warsaw Pact NPT Ratification and CSA Ratification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warsaw Pact State</th>
<th>NPT Ratification</th>
<th>CSA Ratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GDP PER CAPITA (Logged):** GDP per capita is used to reflect the level of a state’s economic
development and capacity. All things equal, we would expect that it would take longer for lower
capacity states to commit to post-NPT nonproliferation agreements. The GDP per capita data are
taken from the Penn World Tables and logged. In the single year (2012) test of UNSC
Resolution 1540 implementation GDP data are not available from the Penn World Tables and
World Bank Data is substituted for GDP and population to create a GDP per capita variable.\(^{262}\)

**COLD WAR:** This is a dummy variable indicating if a particular year is during the Cold War era.
Country-years 1968 through 1991 are coded 1 and country-years after 1991 are coded 0.

Table F below provides a summary of all of the variables employed in the quantitative
analysis.

\(^{262}\) Population data, in this one case, is extrapolated from World Bank data so a GDP per capita variable can be
constructed. It is also logged.
Table F: Summary of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables of Interest</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorability Toward U.S. Order</td>
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<td>-.1120799</td>
<td>.8356811</td>
<td>-2.486427</td>
<td>2.702833</td>
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<td>U.S. Aid</td>
<td>6292</td>
<td>13.54462</td>
<td>6.327069</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23.1158</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>5666</td>
<td>.2179668</td>
<td>.4129012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
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<td>.6126457</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy Imports</td>
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<td>-94.95311</td>
<td>575.1721</td>
<td>-16723.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
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<td>Control Variables</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Warsaw Pact</td>
<td>7464</td>
<td>.0192926</td>
<td>.1375607</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
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<td>.4850034</td>
<td>.4998087</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
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<td>8.328803</td>
<td>1.273718</td>
<td>5.080978</td>
<td>11.82223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quantitative Models

To test the above hypotheses for the dependent variables of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and Additional Protocol ratifications, I employ Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s method for testing time-series, cross sectional data with binary dependent variables. These are data with many zeroes and a few ones in the years when states ratified an agreement (i.e., “failure” in the language of hazard analysis); the zeroes are temporally related and thus cannot be considered independent observations in ordinary logistic models. The solution developed by Beck, Katz, and Tucker is to employ a time count variable, in this case counting from when a treaty opened for ratification to when a state ratified the treaty. The addition of time count variables—I included a count variable, as well as a count-squared and

264 In this dataset states are only expected to ratify an agreement once, so the years after the “1” are considered missing data. This is different from other common uses of this binary DV, time series data, such as indicators of “peace years” in which there may be alternating ones and zeroes over many years.
a count-cubed variable—corrects for temporally dependent observations.\textsuperscript{265} The models include robust standard errors clustered by country.

Many additional variables could be tested or controlled for in the models below, but I have made deliberate effort to streamline the models as much as possible to avoid so-called “garbage can” models and to ensure that only the most important variables are included.\textsuperscript{266} Moreover, the models only include measures that are theoretically related to both the outcome, commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the primary independent variable of interest, alignment with U.S. foreign policy preferences.

There are two models for each DV, a comprehensive model and a second model without the variables POLITY and ENERGY IMPORTS. Due to data limitations, the inclusion of these two variables result in fewer cases, so I have run models both with and without these variables. The results are largely the same from the first to the second model with some exceptions. Before exploring the detailed model, Table G below indicates the bivariate relationship between each of the dependent variables and FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER. In all three models there is a significant relationship between the variables at the p<.001 levels, suggesting preliminary support for the proposed theory.


### Table G: Bivariate Models for CSA, CTBT, and AP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV: CSA</strong></td>
<td>0.467***</td>
<td>0.599***</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV: CTBT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV: AP</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favorability to U.S. Order</strong></td>
<td>-2.723***</td>
<td>-2.095***</td>
<td>-2.851***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0813)</td>
<td>(0.0881)</td>
<td>(0.0978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>2765</td>
<td>1493</td>
<td>2145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Results of Models 4 and 5: CSA Ratification

Models 4 and 5, on Table H below, demonstrate the correlates of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement ratification. The data in these models span from 1971 when the IAEA finalized the model Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement text through 2010.

These models indicate strong support for a theory of hegemonic leadership. The FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure is highly significant in both the complete and streamlined models. As expected, WARSAW PACT is also highly significant in both models. Once states ratified the treaty, the United States and the USSR likely exerted some level of pressure on states to conclude their agreements; after all, the safeguard agreements are what allow IAEA inspectors to verify that states are complying with the treaty. NPT ratification signals that a state is not planning to develop nuclear weapons, and the ratification of safeguards adds credibility to that signal.

The RIVALRY, POLITY, and ENERGY IMPORTS variables are not significant in either of these two models, indicating little correlation between ratifying a comprehensive safeguards agreement and having a persistent rival, a specific type of government, and high energy needs.
The COLD WAR variable is significant and negative, suggesting that states were slower to complete their comprehensive safeguards requirement during the Cold War than after.

Finally, GDP PER CAPITA is significant and positive in the CSA models, indicating that less capable states took longer to ratify their safeguards agreements. This is expected, as concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA requires time, effort and nuclear expertise.

Results of Models 6 and 7: CTBT Ratification

Models 6 and 7, also in Table H, demonstrate the correlates of CTBT ratification. The data in these models span from 1996 when the treaty opened for signature through 2010 and so the control variables WARSAW PACT and COLD WAR have been dropped from the models on these post-Cold War era indicators of regime commitment.

These models also indicate strong support for a theory of hegemonic leadership. The FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure is highly significant in both models.

The RIVALRY, POLITY, and ENERGY IMPORTS variables are not significant in either of these two models, indicating that there is no correlation between ratifying the CTBT and having a persistent rival, a specific regime type, or high energy needs. Finally, GDP PER CAPITA is significant and positive in both models, indicating that less capable states took longer to ratify the CTBT.267

Results of Models 8 and 9: Additional Protocol Ratification

The Additional Protocol was established in 1997, so these two models take place entirely in the post-Cold War period. As with the CTBT models, the COLD WAR and WARSAW PACT

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267 See Appendix Table A for the bivariate relationship for all DVs. Models are significant at the 99% level.
variables have been dropped. The data in these models span from 1997, when the IAEA completed drafting the Model Additional Protocol, to 2010.

Once again, these tests indicate support for a theory of hegemonic leadership. The FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure remains significant and positive in both models, as shown in Table H below. As with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement models, states more favorable to the U.S. order are more likely to ratify the AP and ratify it sooner. No other variables of interest are significant, providing little support for the alternative theories. GDP PER CAPITA is significant in the comprehensive model, but not in the second model without domestic variables. We would expect this variable to matter, just as with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, because concluding such an agreement requires human capital and technical expertise in the area of nuclear technology.
Table H: Fully Specified Models for CSA, AP, and CTBT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favorability to U.S. Order</strong></td>
<td>0.554**</td>
<td>0.616***</td>
<td>0.950***</td>
<td>0.697***</td>
<td>0.658*</td>
<td>0.758***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.203)</td>
<td>(0.153)</td>
<td>(0.281)</td>
<td>(0.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warsaw Pact</strong></td>
<td>4.522***</td>
<td>4.100***</td>
<td>0.0262</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.579)</td>
<td>(0.479)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rivalry</strong></td>
<td>0.0345</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity</strong></td>
<td>0.0147</td>
<td>-0.0153</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.0454</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0165)</td>
<td>(0.0263)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy Imports</strong></td>
<td>0.00136</td>
<td>0.000848</td>
<td>-0.000307</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000891)</td>
<td>(0.000588)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000664)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cold War</strong></td>
<td>-0.564*</td>
<td>-0.326</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.274*</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logged GDP</strong></td>
<td>0.271*</td>
<td>0.248***</td>
<td>0.381**</td>
<td>0.186*</td>
<td>0.274*</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.0612)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years to DV</strong></td>
<td>0.272**</td>
<td>-0.0597</td>
<td>2.187***</td>
<td>1.637***</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0.694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0859)</td>
<td>(0.0337)</td>
<td>(0.394)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
<td>(0.446)</td>
<td>(0.438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years to DV~2</strong></td>
<td>-0.0186***</td>
<td>0.00215</td>
<td>-0.244***</td>
<td>-0.197***</td>
<td>-0.0387</td>
<td>-0.0396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0053)</td>
<td>(0.00113)</td>
<td>(0.0542)</td>
<td>(0.0423)</td>
<td>(0.0641)</td>
<td>(0.0595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years to DV~3</strong></td>
<td>0.000347***</td>
<td>0.00000368</td>
<td>0.00824***</td>
<td>0.00704***</td>
<td>0.00082</td>
<td>0.000729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0000954)</td>
<td>(0.0000147)</td>
<td>(0.00223)</td>
<td>(0.00174)</td>
<td>(0.00279)</td>
<td>(0.00248)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>-5.319***</td>
<td>-4.407***</td>
<td>-10.15***</td>
<td>-7.305***</td>
<td>-8.411***</td>
<td>-7.395***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.065)</td>
<td>(0.593)</td>
<td>(1.394)</td>
<td>(0.949)</td>
<td>(1.659)</td>
<td>(1.378)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>1383</td>
<td>2506</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>1304</td>
<td>1156</td>
<td>1806</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Substantive Effects

How much does favorability toward the U.S.-led order matter for nonproliferation regime commitment? Using the program Clarify we can assess how much an increase in the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure increases the likelihood that a state will commit to
different elements of the nonproliferation regime in a given year, while controlling for the other relevant independent variables.\textsuperscript{268} For the CSA, an increase in the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean represents an increase in the likelihood of concluding an agreement from 3.6% to 9.6% in a given year.\textsuperscript{269} For the CTBT, an increase in the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure from one standard deviation below the mean (e.g. Bahrain in 2001) to one standard deviation above the mean (e.g. Austria in 2004 or Bulgaria in 2008) represents an increase in likelihood of ratification from 3.9% to 19.8% in a given year, which is a 408% increase in likeliness of ratification in a country year.\textsuperscript{270} For the AP, an increase in the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean increases the likelihood of ratification from 2.3% to 7.6%, which is an increase in 230% for each country year.\textsuperscript{271}

Table I below illustrates the substantive effects of the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER variable for the three indicators representing commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. For all three dependent variables of interest, an increase in the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{269} Other variables are set at their mean values. The 95% Confidence Interval for a FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure of one standard deviation below the mean .023 to .053. The 95% Confidence Interval for a measure of one standard deviation above the mean is .060 to .143.
\item \textsuperscript{270} Other variables are set at their mean values. The 95% Confidence Interval for a FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER of one standard deviation below the mean .024 to .062. The 95% Confidence Interval for a measure of one standard deviation above the mean is .125 to .289.
\item \textsuperscript{271} Other variables are set at their mean values. The 95% Confidence Interval for a FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure of one standard deviation below the mean is .012 to .041. The 95% Confidence Interval for a measure of one standard deviation above the mean is .037 to .135.
\end{itemize}
measure leads to significant increases in the likelihood of nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment.

Table I: Moving Low to High on FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>One standard deviation below mean</th>
<th>One standard deviation above mean</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements</td>
<td>3.6% likelihood of concluding agreement in a given year</td>
<td>9.6% likelihood of concluding agreement in a given year</td>
<td>Increase 167% per country year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty</td>
<td>3.9% likelihood of ratifying in a given year</td>
<td>19.8% likelihood of ratifying in a given year</td>
<td>Increase 408% per country year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Protocol</td>
<td>2.3% likelihood of concluding agreement in a given year</td>
<td>7.6% likelihood of concluding agreement in a given year</td>
<td>Increase 230% per country year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Models

The Hegemonic Leadership Theory predicts that some states will commit to the nonproliferation regime not because of favorability toward the U.S.-led order, but because of side-payments from the hegemon, such as the provision of aid. Perhaps states’ commitment to nuclear nonproliferation is simply reflective of the benefits they are provided by the hegemon.

To better tease out this mechanism, I test the effect of U.S. aid on nonproliferation commitments. Models 10-15 in Table J below are identical to the models above, but FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER has been replaced with U.S. AID, a three year floating average of U.S. bilateral military and economic aid.272

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Table J: U.S. AID Replaces FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combined U.S. Aid</strong></td>
<td>0.0253</td>
<td>0.0300</td>
<td>-0.0192</td>
<td>0.0211</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>-0.0282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0203)</td>
<td>(0.0178)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.0298)</td>
<td>(0.0286)</td>
<td>(0.0319)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Warsaw</strong></td>
<td>3.176***</td>
<td>2.783***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.402)</td>
<td>(0.306)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rivalry</strong></td>
<td>-0.0946</td>
<td>-0.269</td>
<td>-0.0804</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>0.365</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.180)</td>
<td>(0.270)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.360)</td>
<td>(0.296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity</strong></td>
<td>0.0267</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0406</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0891**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0164)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0239)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0329)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Energy Imports</strong></td>
<td>0.0020</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00149</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00121)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000776)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00136)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cold War</strong></td>
<td>-0.513*</td>
<td>-0.523*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.256)</td>
<td>(0.226)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logged GDP pc</strong></td>
<td>0.430***</td>
<td>0.408***</td>
<td>0.423**</td>
<td>0.353***</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.255*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
<td>(0.0769)</td>
<td>(0.143)</td>
<td>(0.0915)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years to DV</strong></td>
<td>0.221**</td>
<td>-0.0857**</td>
<td>2.099***</td>
<td>1.646***</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0842)</td>
<td>(0.0321)</td>
<td>(0.403)</td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(0.453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years to DV~2</strong></td>
<td>-0.0169***</td>
<td>0.00229*</td>
<td>-0.255***</td>
<td>-0.212***</td>
<td>0.0362</td>
<td>0.0112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00572)</td>
<td>(0.00107)</td>
<td>(0.0595)</td>
<td>(0.0491)</td>
<td>(0.0777)</td>
<td>(0.0692)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years to DV~3</strong></td>
<td>0.000321***</td>
<td>-0.0000058</td>
<td>0.00918***</td>
<td>0.00812***</td>
<td>-0.00289</td>
<td>-0.00188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000105)</td>
<td>(0.0000143)</td>
<td>(0.00262)</td>
<td>(0.00215)</td>
<td>(0.00371)</td>
<td>(0.00318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.351)</td>
<td>(0.845)</td>
<td>(1.736)</td>
<td>(1.305)</td>
<td>(1.847)</td>
<td>(1.569)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>1378</td>
<td>2582</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>1291</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>1725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

These models indicate U.S. AID is not significantly correlated with nonproliferation regime commitment. Measures of FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER are distinct from aid, and indicate a different mechanism for commitment. As discussed in the theory section, however, only states that are not favorable to the U.S.-led order are expected to be influenced by the use of hegemonic leverage, coercion, or inducements. In an additional test, I drop those states with...
positive scores on the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure and the bottom five percent of states—the least aligned states that are least likely to commit. After reducing the dataset to this subset of states, I find that U.S. AID is relevant to explaining nonproliferation commitment behavior in the case of the CSA and AP. Models 16 through 21 in Table K indicate U.S. AID is significantly correlated with concluding a CSA and an AP with the IAEA in this smaller pool of states. For the CSA and AP, this positive and significant relationship suggests the possibility of U.S. inducements in explaining commitment among states that are not favorable toward U.S. global leadership. This is not surprising as Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama all have prioritized the universalization of the CSA and the AP. There remains no relationship with aid provisions and CTBT ratification in these additional models. This may be explained by the fact that the George W. Bush administration did not promote CTBT ratification as strongly as Presidents Clinton and Obama.
Table K: U.S. AID with Subset of States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
<th>Model 18</th>
<th>Model 19</th>
<th>Model 20</th>
<th>Model 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined U.S. Aid</td>
<td>0.127*</td>
<td>0.0914*</td>
<td>0.319*</td>
<td>0.296**</td>
<td>0.00285</td>
<td>0.0997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0574)</td>
<td>(0.0445)</td>
<td>(0.152)</td>
<td>(0.0952)</td>
<td>(0.0631)</td>
<td>(0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>0.0815</td>
<td>-0.431</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>-0.480</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.327)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.346)</td>
<td>(0.277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.0299</td>
<td>0.0544</td>
<td>0.0171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0295)</td>
<td>(0.0453)</td>
<td>(0.0291)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy Imports</td>
<td>0.00178</td>
<td>0.00367</td>
<td>0.00138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.00242)</td>
<td>(0.000907)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-1.134*</td>
<td>-0.699</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.531)</td>
<td>(0.383)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Logged GDP</td>
<td>0.522*</td>
<td>0.408***</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.0927</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.195*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
<td>(0.121)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
<td>(0.154)</td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.0968)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years to DV</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>-0.109*</td>
<td>1.224</td>
<td>1.385</td>
<td>1.762**</td>
<td>1.643***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.0446)</td>
<td>(1.039)</td>
<td>(1.053)</td>
<td>(0.574)</td>
<td>(0.443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years to DV~2</td>
<td>-0.0276*</td>
<td>0.00305*</td>
<td>-0.111</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>-0.216**</td>
<td>-0.204**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0118)</td>
<td>(0.00119)</td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(0.139)</td>
<td>(0.0832)</td>
<td>(0.0645)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years to DV~3</td>
<td>0.000477*</td>
<td>-0.00000956</td>
<td>0.00288</td>
<td>0.00431</td>
<td>0.00798*</td>
<td>0.00761**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000188)</td>
<td>(0.0000109)</td>
<td>(0.00639)</td>
<td>(0.00574)</td>
<td>(0.00357)</td>
<td>(0.00277)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.866)</td>
<td>(1.612)</td>
<td>(3.903)</td>
<td>(3.010)</td>
<td>(2.551)</td>
<td>(1.786)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>1585</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Two Additional Tests of Nuclear Nonproliferation Commitment

The tests above provide large-N, time-series analyses of three indicators of nonproliferation commitment among NPT member states, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and Model Additional Protocol ratifications. The two tests below provide single-year tests of nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment: a
survey of state positions on the 1995 indefinite extension of NPT and a 2012 assessment of implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540.

DV 4: 1995 Indefinite Extension Vote Survey

The drafters of the NPT decided that the treaty would not be permanent from its entry into force, but would be reassessed by its members after a period of time. Article X, Section 2 of the NPT reads: “Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.” In the lead up to the 1995 NPT Review Conference where such a decision would take place—the treaty having entered force in 1970—the state parties debated a number of procedural and substantive issues about extension. Should a vote be taken on extension? Should the vote be by majority as stated in the treaty text or be taken by consensus as had become tradition at the Review Conferences? Should the treaty continue for another twenty-five years and be reviewed again or renewed indefinitely? How should the treaty be assessed by its members?

The United States favored indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty from the beginning. Many other states wanted changes in the treaty, promoted conditional extension, or sought to limit the treaty for another specific period of time. Chapter Six provides a detailed account of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

In December 1993, the umbrella group “Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty” formed in the United States for the purpose of promoting indefinite extension of the treaty.

Eighteen advocacy and educational groups with interests in arms control and nonproliferation comprised the organization. From October through December 1994 the group assessed the position of all NPT members on indefinite extension. The survey conducted by the Campaign provides an important snapshot of how states perceived treaty extension in 1994. Though the treaty was ultimately extended unconditionally by consensus without a formal vote in May 1995, these data points collected months before the Review Conference allow another test of theories of nonproliferation regime commitment.

In the survey, the positions of the states were coded as FOR, AGAINST, UNDECIDED, LEANING NO, and LEANING YES. The coding for the positions of FOR, AGAINST and UNDECIDED were based on official statements made by each country or based on affiliated group statements. Because LEANING YES and LEANING NO could be coded “based on regional or other factors” and thus were determined based on the Campaign’s own assessment, I am including two different versions of this dependent variable in the models. First I code -1 if a state is AGAINST, 0 if UNDECIDED, and 1 if a state is FOR. I also employ an alternate coding where states are coded -2 for AGAINST, -1 for LEANING NO, 0 for UNDECIDED, 1 for LEANING YES, and 2 for FOR. Because the variables are ordinal I employ an ordered probit model.

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As Models 22 to 25 in Table L demonstrate, the only significant variable is FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER, indicating that positions on indefinite extension of the NPT, the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime, are best explained by a state’s position on the global leadership of the United States. This test provides further support for the Hegemonic Leadership Theory. It is especially meaningful that so many states were publically in favor of
indefinite extension at this time in late 1994 because states had little to lose in the early months by opposing the treaty, and may have had a lot to gain from bargaining with those states seeking indefinite extension, especially the United States. In the qualitative work that follows, I expect to find that the United States used many different means of leverage and influence from the time when this survey was taken through the May 1995 Review Conference to garner unanimous support for extension from states that were opposed in this survey.

Again using the program Clarify, we are able to learn more about the substantive effect of a change from a lower to the higher FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure in the case of this survey. On average, a state scoring one standard deviation below the mean had a 5.6% chance of being in favor of indefinite extension when the poll was taken, whereas a state measuring one standard deviation above the mean on FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER had an 81.1% chance of favoring indefinite extension.

DV 5: 2012 Assessment of UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540 Implementation

In 2004, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1540, obligating all states to establish domestic legislation and security procedures to prevent the proliferation of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. This resolution was drafted and promoted by the George W. Bush administration. Because this resolution focuses on decreasing the likelihood that an individual state will contribute to proliferation through “losing” or exporting dangerous materials and technology, variation in implementation is less likely to stem from security concerns and more likely to arise from differences in state capacity and general interest in cooperating with the UNSC-led effort. The only “systematic” study on implementation of Resolution 1540, by Douglas M. Stinnett et al., finds that state capacity is the primary reason for variation in
cooperation. The problem with this study is that it only examines 30 cases, and thus is not necessarily representative of all states.

In 2012, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a non-profit, non-partisan organization focused on reducing the risks of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, did an assessment of states’ implementation of Resolution 1540. States were assigned a score from 0 to 100 in 20 point increments. This measure serves as the dependent variable for testing Resolution 1540 commitment using a regression model. It is important to note that Resolution 1540 required all members of the UN to abide by its requirements, but the pool of states tested here is limited to NPT members only to make the test consistent with the previous models and because this project is specifically seeking to explain variation in the nonproliferation commitments of NPT members.

Table M: 2012 Assessment of UNSC Resolution 1540 Implementation Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 26</th>
<th>Model 27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DV: 1540 Implementation 2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>DV: 1540 Implementation 2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>Simple Model</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorability to U.S. Order</td>
<td>12.32*** (3.729)</td>
<td>15.38*** (3.400)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>-1.128 (5.891)</td>
<td>0.604 (5.330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>0.464 (0.444)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>10.49*** (1.867)</td>
<td>9.562*** (1.708)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-106.0*** (27.97)</td>
<td>-90.88*** (26.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.4918</td>
<td>0.4637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-squared</td>
<td>0.4735</td>
<td>0.4506</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

As Table M illustrates, Models 26 and 27 provide additional support for the Hegemonic Leadership Theory. As expected, GDP PER CAPITA is significant and positive. A state’s capacity does matter as previous scholars have found, but FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER is significant as well. It is too simple to blame lack of commitment to UNSC Resolution 1540 on state capacity alone; favorability toward U.S. global leadership matters as well.

**Robustness Checks**

To test the strength of the findings above, I conduct a number of robustness checks. The first check tests whether the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure operates similarly to another measure of U.S. affinity, an index created by Erik Gartzke indicating similarity of states’
preferences and also based on UNGA voting data. The measures are calculated using “S” and go through the year 2008. As Appendix Table 1 indicates, Gartzke’s affinity measure is significant in five of the six models, all but the comprehensive AP model.

The second robustness check tests whether the FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure is in fact a proxy for economic liberalization, a variable with which the measure is correlated. The liberalization measure is taken from Fuhrmann and Berejikian. LIBERALIZATION reflects the change in a state’s openness measure over a five year period. Openness is a ratio of a state’s total imports and exports to its GDP. Appendix Table 2 indicates that FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER is not a substitute for LIBERALIZATION. The evidence weighs heavily in support of the fact that FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER is measuring something besides states’ growing openness to the global economy. This finding also provides some evidence against a theory of nuclear nonproliferation commitment that is similar to Etel Solingen’s explanation of nuclear restraint. She argues domestic coalitions pursuing a survival strategy based on economic liberalization are less likely to proliferate.

In the next robustness check, I substituted a dichotomous democracy–dictatorship score for the 20-point Polity measure for regime type. The results are reported in Appendix Table 3. The regime type variable is not significant in any models. The FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER measure remains significant for five of six models.

A final robustness check addresses a potential critique that the universe of cases employed in this analysis is too broad. This study explores nonproliferation commitment among all NPT states with membership in the UN General Assembly. Some may argue that not all of these states matter in terms of future proliferation risks, and would posit the pool of states should be limited to those of more realistic nonproliferation concern. While it is true that not all states are proliferation concerns today, it is also the case that the United States has sought to make these treaties and agreements universal and has attempted to gain the commitment of even the smallest states in the international system. As a 1980 Government Accountability Office report on the NPT explains, “…countries with little or no nuclear capability or potential are not ignored, as adherence by just one additional state increases by two the difference between the number of parties and nonparties and thereby serves to further isolate the nonparty states.”

Indeed, greater universality of the agreements puts pressure on hold-out states and strengthens global norms of nonproliferation. In addition, states that are not proliferation risks today may be so in the future and locking them into regime agreements helps to constrain options down the road. Moreover, any line dividing states of concern from other states is bound to appear arbitrary and raise other questions. Nonetheless, in an attempt to address this critique, the same statistical tests were conducted with a pool of states that excluded all of those with a “small quantities protocol” attached to their IAEA safeguards agreement. These are states with so little fissile material—if any—that their IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement was amended with a protocol that indicates the IAEA will not conduct inspection in these states. If and when these

states do have greater stocks of nuclear material, they drop the protocol from their safeguards agreement. In these tests in Appendix Table 4, FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER remains significant in five of six models. It falls just out of significance for the fully specified AP model, indicating that the findings do not significantly change with a smaller pool of states.

**Conclusion**

In the above analysis of five indicators of nuclear nonproliferation commitment, only one variable consistently finds support across all models: FAVORABILITY TO U.S. ORDER. These findings provide strong support for the Hegemonic Leadership Theory in explaining commitment to the nonproliferation regime. It appears from the quantitative analysis that variation in commitment within the regime through both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods is best understood by a particular state’s favorability toward the U.S.-led order. Those states more favorable to U.S. global leadership are more likely to commit and commit more quickly, whereas less favorable states are less likely and slower to commit. Some less favorable states may be encouraged to commit because of U.S. aid. These insights are an important contribution to our understanding of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The following chapters will seek to uncover the mechanisms of this relationship through qualitative case study research.
CHAPTER FIVE: JAPAN, INDONESIA, AND EGYPT RATIFY THE NPT

As discussed in Chapter Two, the primary purpose of this project is to explain variation in nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment among NPT members. The mechanisms of this project’s theory of hegemonic leadership, however, should find relevance in states’ initial decision to join the NPT,\(^\text{282}\) with the significant caveat that convincing any state to give up its nuclear weapons option, whether the state is favorable to U.S. leadership or not, would be a challenge. The challenge was made more so in the early nuclear age when it was not clear if the NPT would be successful and when it was assumed that many technically-capable states would develop nuclear weapons. This chapter tests theories of nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment by exploring the evidence from the decision-making processes of Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt to join the NPT and conclude Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with the IAEA within eighteen months as required by the treaty.

Japan and the NPT

When developing the NPT, the United States and the Soviet Union were especially concerned about Japan’s ratification due to its advanced industrial status and proximity to two nuclear neighbors, China and the Soviet Union. The United States consulted widely with Japanese leaders over the course of drafting and negotiating the treaty and the Japanese were able to make meaningful additions to the treaty, including the 25-year review following entry

\(^{282}\) Statistical evidence in the appendix of this chapter shows that there is in fact a significant relationship between the favorability toward the U.S. order measure and NPT ratification.
into force and the every-five year reviews. Declassified documents from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the State Department, and the White House during the Lyndon Johnson presidency reveal almost constant discussion with the Japanese to allay their concerns about the treaty. Because Japan was not a member of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC), the body responsible for negotiating the treaty after the United States and USSR submitted draft texts, Japan relied on the United States to offer its input. Japan signed the treaty in 1970, but then delayed ratification. Japan concluded its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1975 and brought the NPT into force in 1976. There are some idiosyncratic elements of this timing, but the Japanese case finds support for a number of theories of regime commitment.

Assessing Japanese Favorability toward U.S. Global Leadership

Japan is considered highly favorable toward U.S. global leadership during this period. Japan’s reliance on the United States for its security meant Japan had a great stake in the U.S.-led order. Japan’s post-World War II constitution prohibits offensive military capability and thus U.S. protection has been the basis of Japanese security. In 1951, the United States and Japan signed the Mutual Security Treaty, in which Japan granted the United States the right to maintain a military presence in Japan, “so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.” In 1960, the two states signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, which committed the United States to

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283 See for example, “NPT,” (Confidential), Department of State Telegram, October 16, 1967. NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
284 See for example, NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
defend Japan and provided for U.S. bases and ports in Japan. The United States affirmed its support for Japan in the 1965 Sato-Johnson Joint Statement, and further reaffirmed the relationship with the 1967 Johnson-Sato Joint Communique.

Additional indicators of Japanese favorability toward U.S.-global leadership include a number of high-level leadership visits between the two nations and positive rhetoric from Japanese leaders about the U.S. role in the international system. U.S. and Japanese leaders issued joint statements and declarations several times between 1970 and 1976. The serving Japanese Prime Minister visited Washington every year in this period. In addition, Emperor Hirohito was welcomed at Elmendorf Air Force Base, in Alaska, in 1971, where he spoke glowingly of the United States. The Emperor also travelled to Washington, DC to meet with the Ford administration in 1975. UNGA voting data from 1968 to 1976 indicated that Japan was in alignment with the U.S.-led order on a broad number of global issues, scoring well above the global average on this measure.

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291 Average on Bailey et al.’s UNGA voting measure during these years from 1968 to 1976 was 1.12. For comparison, the global average was 0.10. They argue the measure “can be interpreted as states’ positions towards the U.S.-led liberal order.”
Japan, the NPT and Hegemonic Leadership

As a state highly favorable to U.S. global leadership, Japan would be expected to be a relatively early adherent to the NPT. However, the nuclear nonproliferation regime did not fully exist before the NPT, and thus the initial choice to join this treaty and eschew the right to develop nuclear weapons was a major decision; states considered a variety of interests when contemplating the treaty. As the only victim of nuclear attack in wartime in a region with several traditional adversaries, Japanese leaders did not have a straightforward or easy decision when it came to NPT ratification. Consistent with a theory of commitment based on hegemonic leadership, the United States played a large role in shaping Japanese interests vis-a-vis the treaty, reassuring and encouraging Japan in order to achieve its ratification. Japan was not as quick to ratify as the theory might expect, however, due to factors both related to mixed signals about the NPT from U.S. administrations during this period (as discussed in Chapter Three) and factors specific to Japanese politics. The case evidence reveals that at times U.S. leaders engaged in bargaining, a tactic that is more likely to occur with states less favorable to U.S. leadership. This speaks to the difficulty of getting any state to join the NPT in the early days of the regime.

By 1967, American leaders interpreted widespread political support for the NPT in Japan, but some reservations remained. These concerns are evident in the extensive bilateral exchanges between U.S. and Japanese officials in this period and can be summarized as having concerns about inequality in the treaty; preserving a potential Japanese nuclear option; and seeking to avoid disadvantaging their nuclear industry.292

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292 ACDA Memorandum to the Acting Director and All Bureau Heads from Samuel De Palma (ACDA/IR), “NPT: Japanese Attitudes; Points they May Raise; Initiatives They May Support,” (Secret), September 5, 1967; NPT Japan
The Lyndon B. Johnson administration first attempted to secure Japan’s NPT ratification as part of the security relationship between the two states. A telegram to the Tokyo Embassy from ACDA in November 1967 indicated the U.S. desire to pressure the Japanese: “While obviously we cannot trade our providing security assurances as a reward for adherence to NPT, we nevertheless need whatever bargaining leverage we can muster to induce broad adherence.” With the 1967 Johnson-Sato Joint Communique reaffirming the security relationship between the two nations, the United States tried to guarantee Japan’s signature of the NPT. The text of the 1967 agreement read in part, “[Japanese and U.S. leadership] took note of the importance of reinforcing the authority and role of the United Nations as a peace keeping organization, of promoting arms control and a reduction of the arms race, including the early conclusion of a Non-Proliferation Treaty…” The inclusion of the NPT in the 1967 text did not bring about Japan’s ratification.

The Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Nobuhiko Ushiba made it clear in September 1968 that Japan would not ratify the NPT until the U.S. Senate ratified it. Japanese leaders said they planned to submit the treaty to the Diet in December 1968, but it would be “embarrassing for Japan to become embroiled in a debate over the treaty against a backdrop of U.S. indecision.” Though the Johnson administration was a strong champion of the treaty, Johnston was unable to

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1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
293 Department of State Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Tokyo Ambassador, “NPT Security Assurances – Draft UN Res” (SECRET), November 15, 1967; NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
296 “Chronology of Principal Developments Relating to Arms Control and Disarmament, September – October 1968,” 3, ACDA Files, Box 383-84-005, Box 1 of 5. National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
achieve U.S. ratification while still in office. President-elect Nixon did not support a special session of Congress for an NPT vote in the lame-duck period after his November 1968 election, thus delaying U.S. ratification at a time when the Japanese leadership appeared to support quick ratification. In a counterfactual case in which President Johnson achieved early U.S. ratification, it appears plausible the Japanese would have followed with their own ratification shortly thereafter, and the theory of hegemonic leadership would find support. This would be a simple case in which a highly favorable state joined a nuclear nonproliferation agreement after clear communication that the United States prioritized the NPT. Instead, Nixon delayed the U.S. NPT vote. In subsequent years, Nixon did not promote the treaty as Johnson had and Japan began a long debate about joining the treaty.

Nixon’s disinterest in NPT promotion caused the Japanese to question U.S. commitment to the NPT. As shown below, delay in Japanese ratification of the NPT until 1976 can in part be explained by the reduction in high level U.S. interest that came with the new administration. In fact, the Japanese perceived that the United States no longer cared about their ratification for much of the early 1970s.

Without clear U.S. support for the treaty, NPT detractors gained prominence and the treaty became much less popular in Japan in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As George Quester recounted in 1970, “Almost no one in Japan is at all enthusiastic about NPT. All opposition parties have taken stands criticizing the treaty. A significant part of the governing Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] is also quietly unhappy about the treaty. Public opinion, to the extent that it is aware of the issue, is negative. So also is business and Japan's major newspapers.”

Japanese reluctance to ratify continued as NPT entry into force loomed in 1970. Once the treaty entered into force based on ratification by the three depository states (United States, USSR, and the United Kingdom) and 40 additional states, Japan would no longer be able to join through the two-step process of signature and ratification and would only be able join through the single step of ascension. The Japanese asked the United States if an exception could be made so they would be able to take the lesser step of signing even after entry into force of the NPT. This abnormal treaty procedure required approval by all three treaty depositories. When the United States asked the British about this abnormal treaty procedure on behalf of Japan, UK leadership responded negatively.\(^7\) Seeing that the window would soon close on the opportunity to sign only, Japan signed the NPT in February 1970.

During the Nixon years, ACDA and State Department officials continued to encourage the Japanese to ratify the treaty, but similar to the Indonesian case below, they found limited cooperation from President Nixon and Nixon advisor Henry Kissinger. State and ACDA implored Kissinger to make a high level statement on the importance of Japanese NPT ratification when he visited the country in 1972. The Acting Director of ACDA wrote to Kissinger in April 1972:

> The specific need for such a reaffirmation of support by you in Japan is pointed up both by recent Japanese press articles and persistent reports from diplomatic sources that the Japanese are under the impression that the U.S. is no longer particularly interested in their adherence to the NPT. They cite the absence of any mention of the NPT in the Nixon-Sato talks and in the President's 1972 Foreign

Policy Report. This impression is being exploited by the Japanese opponents of the treaty.299

In June 1972, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson made a similar request to Kissinger about his upcoming trip to Japan.300 Press coverage of the trip indicates Kissinger did not make a public statement on the NPT to Japanese audiences.301 In a conversation with President Nixon after the trip, Kissinger complained to Nixon, “…on my trip to Japan, the State Department was bugging the daylights out of me and I was getting briefing papers, letters, planted questions, if I would publicly support the Nonproliferation Treaty in Japan and squeeze the Japanese government.” Nixon responded that he hoped Kissinger did not do this and Kissinger assured him by saying, “I didn't. I sort of mumbled around where ever the ambassador was present. But I told Sato and Fukuda privately that what you said in San Clemente is our policy.”302 Kissinger was referring to a meeting in San Clemente in January of that year in which Prime Minter Eisaku Sato asked Nixon if the Japanese should proceed toward NPT ratification. Nixon reportedly told the Japanese Prime Minister, “Each nation should handle this problem in the light of its own circumstances. It is not a matter for us to decide and we respect the right of each nation to decide for itself in the light of its own desires. The United States…is not exerting pressure. In fact…Japan might take its time and thus keep any potential


300 Ibid., Document 57.


enemy concerned.” Then Nixon quickly asked Sato to “forget the preceding remark.” Thus not only did Nixon not urge the Japanese Prime Minister to seek NPT ratification, he suggested the Japanese may want to avoid ratification to make their adversaries think they could be pursuing nuclear weapons. This sentiment is directly at odds with the efforts of ACDA and the State Department at this time.

Nixon’s ambivalence was again evident in a 1974 discussion with the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to Japan. Ambassador James Hodgson asked Nixon, “Another thing—are we serious about the NPT?” Nixon responded “Go through the motions. This is our position, but you have seen the country. You know our position.”

Nixon maintained his wishy-washy position on the NPT while those at the State Department and the ACDA continued to prioritize Japan’s ratification of the NPT. For instance, in a January 1973 State Department memo from Executive Secretary Theodore L. Eliot to Kissinger, Eliot expressed concern that NPT progress was slowing and that key states including Japan had made no recent progress toward ratification. He wrote “despite repeated references by United States’ officials to our full support for broad adherence to the Treaty, Japanese officials continue to indicate that they are not convinced of this because of the lack of a high level U.S. statement on the subject.”

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303 Ibid.
Similarly, in a strategy meeting from August 1974, the ACDA director presented a classified secret document titled “Non-Proliferation: Strategy and Action Program.” In the document, ACDA identified Japan as a country whose ratification was “crucial” to “the continued viability of the treaty.”306 In a specific discussion of “Italy, Japan and others whose adherence to the NPT is especially important,” the document revealed that “Japan appears to have new doubts both about our interest in their ratification and in whether the treaty will be commercially advantageous to Japan.”307 To combat this perception the memo recommended high level demarches to Japan, citing that NPT ratification would facilitate civilian nuclear cooperation, a clear example of an attempt to use inducements to gain Japanese commitment.

In contrast to Nixon, the Ford administration showed interest in promoting the NPT and nonproliferation generally after the unexpected May 1974 Indian nuclear explosion. In the Ford administration’s transition binder, nuclear nonproliferation figured prominently with one policy goal stating, “Support the Non-Proliferation Treaty, particularly in the period leading up to the NPT Review Conference scheduled for May 1975, by working with other Treaty proponents to gain the adherence of non-parties, such as Japan and Italy, and by adding to the benefits which adherence bestows (e.g., improved credit terms for the purchase of nuclear materials and equipment).”308 Though Japan was favorable to U.S. leadership during this period, U.S. leaders

306 Fred C. Ikle and Winston Lord to Secretary Kissinger, July 31, 1974, “Analytical Staff Meeting on Non-proliferation Strategy,” (Secret); Tab A, “Non-proliferation: Strategy and Action Program” (Secret), p. 10; ACDA Non-Proliferation Strategy and Action Program, Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, January – August 1974; Office of Administration (Formerly Executive Director Office) Subject Files Pertaining to ACDA Nonproliferation Strategy and Nuclear Safeguards, 1974-1976 (Box 383/98/0085), U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Record Group 383, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
thought Japan would require inducements in the form of attractive credit offers for the purchase of U.S. civilian nuclear technology in order to join the treaty.

Ford visited Japan in November 1974, the first American president to do so. Secretary Kissinger accompanied the President. In the declassified meeting records of two days of meetings with the Prime Minister, the NPT was not discussed. The only mention of the NPT in the declassified record occurred in a press conference in Japan on November 20, when Secretary Kissinger was asked if the United States received an explanation as to why the NPT had not yet been put to the Japanese Diet for ratification. Kissinger responded that this had not been explained and concluded by stating “The United States favors the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty.”

This was a statement ACDA and State were unable to convince Kissinger to make in his previous visit to Japan during the Nixon administration, but the U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear explosion had shifted focus and promoting the NPT became a more important political goal. But even with this clear statement, the Japanese still perceived U.S. ambivalence about the NPT. In a cable to Kissinger the following February, U.S. officials reported “…some key Japanese leaders feel they have never gotten a clear indication of our position. These leaders include Nakasone, who as SecGen is important in the LDP's decision making process. He has been interpreting your discussions with him last November as an indication that the US has no special interest in or concern over Japan's ratification.”

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The joint U.S.-Japanese statement following Ford and Kissinger’s November visit discussed the importance of nuclear nonproliferation, but is notable for failing to mention the NPT: “The United States and Japan recognize the need for dedicated efforts by all countries … to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices while facilitating the expanded use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”311 It appears that on this trip at least, the Ford administration maintained the Nixon administration’s policy of not directly pressuring the Japanese to ratify the treaty.

There was one other possible pathway of U.S. influence during the Japanese trip in November 1974. During the trip, Kissinger met with former Japanese Prime Minister Sato, a highly influential figure within Japan. There is no record of the conversation during this meeting so it is not known if the NPT was discussed. But, the following month, Sato gave his speech in Oslo as the winner of the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. In the speech Sato called for Japan to ratify the NPT “with the least possible delay.”312

In a February 20, 1975 memo to Kissinger, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Philip C. Habib, and Director of Policy Planning, Winston Lord, reported that Mr. Noda, a Japanese Deputy Director of the UN Bureau, said that Japanese leaders were making the pitch for the NPT, but that this effort would “benefit from a current high level expression of the importance that the U.S. attaches to ratification. Noda was not acting under instructions of the GOJ [Government of Japan] but we think it unlikely that he would have taken

the initiative on this without at least the tacit approval of Vice Minister Togo.” 313 They went on to note, “some Japanese leaders feel that they have never received a clear indication of your position on the NPT…” 314 It is unclear from the evidence if the United States made a statement to Japanese leaders, but it appears likely. In a memo from February 14 to Kissinger, the Embassy in Tokyo and the U.S. mission in Vienna “strongly recommend[ed] an approach be made” on the NPT. 315 The memo suggested stating: “We hope this progress in Vienna [on safeguards] will now make it possible for Japan to ratify the NPT in time to participate in the NPT review conference [in May] as a party.” 316

On February 27, 1975, Prime Minister Miki announced that NPT ratification would be on the Diet’s agenda in the coming legislative session. However, a number of party groups opposed ratification if the three conditions from Japan’s 1970 NPT signature were not met. These conditions included concrete steps toward disarmament by the nuclear-weapon states; protection of the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon states; and a fair and equal system of international safeguards. As debate continued, Miki requested that Foreign Minister Miyazawa visit the United States to meet with Secretary Kissinger. In Japanese government meetings leading up to the trip, leaders agreed that Miyazawa would ask the United States for “more clear-cut cooperation as to the national defense and security of Japan under the Japan-U.S. Security

314 Ibid.
316 Ibid.
Treaty structure.” If provided such assurances, Miki could mitigate the concerns of some of the treaty’s Japanese detractors. With these assurances Miki said the Diet would seek NPT ratification.

Leading up to the Miyazawa visit, U.S. leaders began discussing Japanese NPT ratification. An April 4 memorandum to Kissinger from two high-level officials at State asked whether the United States should be putting more pressure on Japan to ratify the NPT. The memo read, “Finally, there is the NPT, and our drive to strengthen it. Do we want to pressure Japan at this particular time; if India is destined to become a nuclear power of sorts, can we insist that Japan become a permanent non-nuclear power.”

Three days later in an April 7 memo to Nixon from Kissinger in advance of the Miyazawa visit, the Secretary of State wrote, “Ratification of the NPT is being considered by the LDP. Detractors have posed as one condition for their support a reaffirmation of the US security tie to Japan. We can and should restate our commitment in standard terms without bluster.”

The Japanese Foreign Minister had a long and friendly meeting with Kissinger on April 11. In the afternoon the conversation turned briefly to the NPT. The Foreign Minister stated:

The question of security is important for Japan and I would like to talk about that. As you know we are considering ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The government will try

to introduce the NPT at the current Diet session. In that connection the Diet will be discussing security. Your Ambassador and our people in Tokyo have achieved a meeting of the minds on how we can phrase a statement on the general security matter. I would like you to confirm or verify your agreement to that statement.\textsuperscript{321}

Kissinger then agreed to the statement and said he would provide it as press guidance.

The statement to which the Foreign Minister referred was soon released in the Japanese press:

(1) Both Japan and the U.S. are of the judgment that the maintenance of the Security Treaty will be in the interests of both sides, when viewed from a long-range standpoint; (2) U.S. nuclear war potential is an important deterrent power toward aggression against Japan from the outside; (3) the U.S. attaches importance to its treaty obligations that it will take charge of the defense of Japan in case of its being attacked by nuclear or conventional weapons, and Japan will also continue to carry out its obligations based on the Treaty.\textsuperscript{322}

These additional U.S. security assurances helped convince conservative-leaning members of the LDP to go along with treaty ratification.\textsuperscript{323} On August 6, 1975, Japanese Prime Minister Miki and President Ford held a joint press conference in which the Prime Minister expressed his intention to proceed with the necessary steps to bring about Japan's ratification of the NPT “at the earliest possible opportunity.”\textsuperscript{324} Both leaders “expressed their concern over the recent trend toward nuclear proliferation in the world, and agreed that Japan and the United States should


\textsuperscript{322} Quoted in Endicott, “The 1975-76 Debate Over Ratification of the NPT in Japan,” 282.

\textsuperscript{323} Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 68.

participate positively in international efforts for the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the development of adequate safeguards.”

The treaty was not ratified during the 1975 Diet session, however; even with the strengthened U.S. security commitment and Miki’s promise to President Ford, time ran out on the legislative session. The issue remained frozen until the next session in 1976, when Japan ratified the treaty. The House of Representatives voted in favor of the treaty in April, in a vote in which only the Communists rejected, and the House of Councilors held a vote in May, again with all in favor save the Communist members. Ultimately, with the conservatives on board due to additional U.S. security guarantees, and industry’s safeguards concerns met (as discussed below), Japanese leaders “believed that refusing to ratify the NPT was unthinkable due to the rift it would cause with the United States.”

*Japan, the NPT and Hedging*

After China’s first nuclear weapons test in 1964, the Japanese government commissioned a study on the potential development of a Japanese nuclear weapons program. The non-governmental group, issuing reports in 1968 and 1970, found that though Japan had the technical capacity to develop nuclear weapons, it was not in Japan’s best interest as it would hurt its relations with the United States and Japanese geography meant it was more vulnerable to nuclear attack than China. Nonetheless, during NPT deliberations, a minority on the right within the Japanese government wanted to maintain a nuclear weapons option for Japan and forgo the

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325 Ibid.
327 Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 68.
328 Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 63-64.
treaty. By early 1975, when most of the factions were on board with the treaty, this minority remained unconvinced and still wanted to leave the option open. According to a cable reporting back to Kissinger at this time, “while almost all major party figures and Japanese nuclear industry have supported ratification, active minority elements within the LDP remain opposed. These include such influential figures as party secretary general Nakasone, some older right wing elements and younger nationalistic members of the seirankai group [an anti-Communist group], all of whom see the issue as being whether Japan should hold open its ‘nuclear option’ for future generations.”

A few months later, by the mid-1970s, when Japan had secured additional security assurances from the United States and had developed a favorable safeguards agreement with the IAEA, this group was convinced to go along with the treaty, albeit reluctantly. When the Diet was voting in favor of the treaty, those on the right who were against the treaty protested outside in uniform, with Japanese military songs and World War II flags. This faction contributed to the six-year delay between Japan’s signature and ratification, but this group did not ultimately convince Japanese leaders to disavow the treaty. Proponents of the treaty in Japan’s government, who realized that rejecting the treaty would be detrimental to relations with the United States, were able to mitigate the concerns of the hardliners through additional U.S. security assurances.

Japan, the NPT and Nuclear Energy

The desire to produce indigenous energy through nuclear power was a major factor in Japanese consideration of the NPT and the six year gap between signature and ratification. When

Japan signed the treaty in 1970, one of the conditions for future ratification was equality in the field of civilian nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.\textsuperscript{331} Due to its limited domestic natural energy resources, nuclear power became a promising option for Japan early in the nuclear age. The United States agreed in 1955 to provide the Japanese highly enriched uranium for nuclear reactor research. Japan was one of the first nations to join the IAEA after the Agency’s founding in 1957, showing an early commitment to nuclear energy research.

The Japanese nuclear industry and some government officials thought the NPT and its safeguards could hurt their nascent industry. In a 1967 conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Miki reminded the Secretary that Japan required 100 million tons of oil annually, almost all of which was imported. As a result, Japan planned to become a “great power in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the NPT must not prevent this.”\textsuperscript{332} In meetings to discuss Japanese reservations surrounding the proposed treaty in November 1967, American officials reported that many in the Japanese government and industry “wish that NPT would go away.”\textsuperscript{333} Japanese officials expressed concerns on the potential negative effects of the NPT on their nuclear industry, including industrial espionage, lost time due to compliance with safeguards, and building new nuclear infrastructure.\textsuperscript{334} U.S. officials reported that there were some in Japan who wanted to reserve the nuclear option, but that most of the treaty criticisms stemmed from the nuclear industry.

\textsuperscript{331} Endicott, “The 1975-76 Debate Over Ratification of the NPT in Japan,” 277.
\textsuperscript{332} State Department, Memorandum of Conversation between Takeo Miki, Foreign Minister of Japan and the Secretary of State, “Non-proliferation Treaty” (Part II of II) (Secret) September 16, 1967, p. 2; NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
\textsuperscript{333} Department of State Telegram from Ambassador to Japan to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “US-Japan NPT Experts meeting,” (Secret), November 4, 1967; NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
\textsuperscript{334} Ibid.
In the summer of 1973, Japanese government representatives began to meet with the IAEA to discuss safeguards, a requirement of NPT membership. A breakthrough in its NPT decision-making process occurred in 1975 when Japan and the IAEA concluded a safeguards agreement. Japanese leaders were frustrated that EURATOM, a European multinational nuclear inspecting organization pre-dating the IAEA, was perceived to have received special treatment in its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. This was a concern on political, psychological, and economic grounds, as Japan’s industry expected to compete with European suppliers. In February 1975, the IAEA decided Japan should be treated similarly to EURATOM in its safeguards agreement. Overcoming this hurdle was a necessary factor in Japan being able to consider NPT ratification. In 1975, the NPT’s cause was bolstered further when Yoshitake Sasaki, the Chairman of the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission and Director of the Science and Technology Agency, and Hiromi Arisawa, Chairman of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, came out in support of the treaty.

After Japanese ratification in 1976, Prime Minister Miki met with President Ford and told him, “Now that Japan has ratified the NPT, Mr. President, I wish to request the continued cooperation of the United States in Japan's development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, on which we will have to rely increasingly in the future as a source of power.”

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335 “US-Japan NPT Experts Meeting,” (Confidential); November 4, 1967, Department of State Telegram, pp. 3-4, NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
336 Ibid., 4.
The evidence indicates that protecting its nuclear energy program was a key factor in Japanese decision-making regarding the NPT. Achieving a fair safeguards agreement with the IAEA was a necessary, though not sufficient condition, for ratification of the treaty. This factor accounts for much of the delay in Japan’s ratification, as the safeguards decision was only made in 1975. Ratification, a year later, still required input from the United States, however.

Japan, the NPT and Disarmament

When Japan signed the NPT in 1970, one of the three conditions for future ratification was progress on nuclear disarmament globally. Though Japan was concerned with disarmament, consistent with its so-called nuclear allergy, there is little evidence that this factored strongly into the 1976 decision to ratify the treaty. It is possible that the U.S.-Soviet engagement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), begun in 1969, had a salutary effect on Japanese consideration of the treaty, but there is no explicit evidence that this was a factor in the decision-making process. A Japanese expert familiar with this period said there was little connection between SALT’s progress and NPT ascension. Instead, concerns about the nuclear industry and U.S. preferences weighed heavily.

Japan, the NPT and Regime Type

The Japanese population is commonly referred to as having a “nuclear allergy.” Both the allergy and the democratic government’s need to respond to its effects were relevant to Japan’s multi-year process of grappling with the NPT. As the only nation to experience a nuclear attack, nuclear weapons and proliferation were highly salient to the Japanese population. Widespread anti-nuclear sentiment in the public did not immediately crystalize directly after the attacks at

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however. As Maria Rost Rublee recounts, in the post-war period the United States tried to keep details of the aftermath of the nuclear attacks as muted as possible. It was a decade later, in 1954, when the Japanese fishing boat *Lucky Dragon* was the victim of nuclear fallout from a U.S. nuclear test in the Marshall Islands, that the public largely united against nuclear weapons.\(^{340}\)

Japan’s anti-nuclear policy was codified by Prime Minister Sato in 1967 in the “three non-nuclear principles,” of “not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons” into Japan. Despite making this pronouncement, Prime Minister Sato had at times expressed hope that Japan would develop nuclear weapons and was taken aback by the public’s enthusiasm for the three nuclear principles, for which he later received the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize.\(^{341}\) Sato responded to the public’s enthusiasm for the principles by trying to dilute them soon after by declaring “Four Pillars of Non-Proliferation.” On February 6, 1968, at a Japanese House of Representatives budget meeting, Sato announced the four points: 1. Three non-nuclear principles; 2. Efforts for peaceful nuclear use; 3. Total nuclear disarmament; and 4. Dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent as a means of ensuring Japanese security.\(^{342}\) This new formulation implied that the three non-nuclear principles only applied if the other three pillars remained, thus weakening the three principles.

As a result of the public’s strong anti-nuclear stance, the negotiations of the NPT received widespread attention across Japan. In 1967, a U.S. official in Japan reported back to

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\(^{341}\) Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 58.

\(^{342}\) Ibid.
Washington after a conversation with Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki: the “NPT was a matter of enormous public interest in Japan, with the press carrying almost daily major stories and headlines on the subject. Miki himself had been surprised at public attention that it attracted and government had to demonstrate that it was taking [a] serious and active attitude.”

But the public’s perspectives on the NPT were quite varied, which explains why the period from signature to ratification lasted six years. For some anti-nuclear advocates in the LDP and the Japan Socialist Party, the NPT undermined global nuclear disarmament efforts by allowing the five declared nuclear weapon states to keep their weapons for a period of time. Others on the right within the LDP, as discussed above, opposed the treaty because they wanted Japan to retain a nuclear weapons option. Across the political spectrum, citizens and industry were concerned that the NPT would hinder the developing nuclear energy sector. It was not until 1976 that the concerns of all of these factions were mitigated.

**Japan and the NPT: Conclusion**

As a state favorable to U.S global leadership, Japan would be expected to ratify the NPT relatively quickly compared to other states. In fact, Japan took six years to ratify the treaty after signing reluctantly in 1970. A number of theories of regime commitment are relevant to the length of time required for Japan to join the treaty. First, Japan was unsure of the U.S. commitment to the treaty during much of this period and only in the mid-1970s did it receive a clear message that the U.S. prioritized Japan’s ratification. Second, the length of time is also related to seeking an IAEA safeguards agreements that was deemed fair relative to EURATOM’s

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343 Department of State Telegram from Tokyo Embassy to the Secretary of State, “NPT,” (Secret), April 14, 1967; NPT Japan 1966 & 1967 (folder), Director’s Office NPT Files (383/77/043), Box 4 of 9, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.
agreement. Japan did not want its nuclear energy industry at a disadvantage. In addition, other factors played a part in the delay to ratification. There were those in the Japanese government who wanted to maintain a nuclear option—these folks were appeased through U.S. security reassurances. As a democracy, Japanese leaders were attuned to a spectrum of opinions on the treaty, from those who wanted a weapons option to those on the left that did not think the NPT was strong enough on nuclear disarmament. These factions did not ultimately determine the outcome in this case, but they did contribute to lengthening the decision-making process. Based on the available evidence, the three factors that were necessary for Japan’s ratification in 1976 were a favorable safeguards agreement, high level U.S. interest in Japanese ratification, and U.S. security assurances. Therefore, the two theories most relevant to this case are those related to hegemonic leadership and nuclear energy.

*Indonesia and the NPT*

Indonesia ratified the NPT in the late 1970s. The United States had a relatively close relationship with Indonesia’s leadership during the years leading up to its ratification, and was a significant provider of military and economic aid. At this time, measures of Indonesian favorability toward the U.S.-order were as high as they ever are during the period of study. But available evidence indicates that the Nixon and Ford administrations did not press the Suharto regime to ratify the NPT. It was only under President Carter that the United States pushed for ratification. Indonesia ratified at a time when U.S. leaders were asking for ratification, when its interest in civilian nuclear energy piqued, and when the United States was changing the rules of nuclear supply to make it more difficult for non-treaty members to purchase civilian nuclear technology.
Assessing Indonesian Favorability toward U.S. Global Leadership

During this period, favorability indicators suggest that Indonesia was neither highly favorable (as Japan was) nor highly unfavorable to U.S. global leadership. The mix of indicators places Indonesia in the middle range, on the favorable side of the spectrum. On the UNGA voting indicator, Indonesia’s highest level of favorability occurred during this period in the mid to late-1970s, although except for one year in 1972, Indonesia was below the global average on this measure. By other indicators, however, Indonesia appears more favorable. President Nixon visited President Suharto in 1969 (the first U.S. president to visit the country), and a year later Suharto visited Nixon at the White House—his first foreign visit as Head of State. According to one historian, the period of the Nixon administration is considered by some Indonesians to be the “apex” of bilateral relations between Indonesia and the United States. Suharto visited President Ford at Camp David in July 1975.

President Suharto supported both U.S. global and regional policies and institutions during this time. Though Indonesia was part of the non-aligned movement (NAM) and cared about its NAM credentials, in reality it was Western-leaning. Suharto’s efforts to fight Communism both domestically and regionally put its goals in line with U.S. priorities. In Cambodia, Suharto

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covertly provided arms in support of the U.S.-backed Lon Nol government in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{348} In a 1970 meeting, Suharto told Kissinger the Indonesians “appreciate U.S. participation in the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank”\textsuperscript{349}—key elements of the U.S.-led global order. In return for Indonesian support for its leadership, the Nixon and Ford administrations largely ignored Indonesian abuses in East Timor and the rampant corruption of the regime. Under the Carter administration, friendly relations and the provision U.S. military aid continued with one difference—Carter took a greater interest in human rights and pushed Suharto to release political prisoners.\textsuperscript{350}

Indonesian favorability for the U.S.-led order during this period was closely related to preferential U.S. treatment stemming from Indonesian support in the fight against Communism and the willingness of U.S. leaders to sublimate other U.S. priorities to that goal. The priorities of the Cold War resulted in high-level leader visits, Jakarta’s support of U.S. policy goals in the region, and positive rhetoric about the United States, and yet the UNGA voting data suggests that the two states were not as aligned across the majority of global issues facing the UN General Assembly as the other indicators would suggest. In other words, the two states were in alignment about immediate, high-level policy goals in the region, but their alignment did not go much


deeper. Indonesia during this period is thus considered to be “moderately favorable” to the U.S.-led global order.

Indonesia, NPT Ratification and Hegemonic Leadership

Based on Indonesia’s moderate favorability toward U.S. global leadership in this period, we would expect Indonesia to have ratified the NPT during the course of the Nixon administration with perhaps some amount of limited U.S. persuasion required. The problem with this expectation is that the Nixon and Ford administrations did not ask Suharto to ratify the NPT, or otherwise signal that United States prioritized the treaty. Instead, Indonesian ratification occurred in the late 1970s after the Carter administration focused on the NPT and took personal interest in Indonesian ratification.

Major General Suharto took control of the Indonesian government in October 1965 after a botched coup attempt. He would lead Indonesia until 1998. From his predecessor President Sukarno, Suharto maintained Indonesian’s non-aligned perspective committing allegiance to neither the Soviet Union nor the West, but he did seek greater economic aid from Western states, providing an opportunity for U.S. leverage. In a 1967 assessment, the CIA called Indonesia’s global position “Western-leaning nonalignment” since they interpreted Suharto’s move to non-alignment from Sukarno’s pro-communist position as a means to gain additional Western aid.351 The same CIA assessment states, “…so long as the U.S. continues to assist in the rehabilitation

of the Indonesian economy and the Indonesians retain hope of even greater assistance, their relations with the U.S. are likely to remain as close and cordial as at present.”

In President Suharto, Washington found a more cooperative leader than Sukarno in the nuclear non-proliferation realm. In 1965, the new government agreed “in principle” to IAEA-managed safeguards on the nuclear technology it received from the United States. The Indonesian government signed the safeguards agreement in 1967 in exchange for $350,000 in U.S. nuclear cooperation assistance. This aid had been withheld from the previous regime. In this example we see the first quid pro quo between Indonesia and the United States when it came to nuclear nonproliferation.

The NPT opened for signature in 1968 and Indonesia signed in 1970. There is some early evidence of U.S. concern with Indonesia’s signature and ratification, though there is no evidence of the U.S. exerting specific pressure on Indonesia to sign the NPT at this time.

Indonesia ratified the NPT during a period of increased interest in civilian nuclear technology, discussed in detail in the nuclear energy section below. Though this desire for nuclear energy supports a theory of regime commitment based on the NPT’s promise of civilian nuclear technology, it is also consistent with a theory of hegemonic leadership because the United States undertook regime “rule changes” related to selling nuclear technology in the late 1970s. In particular, the United States initiated additional restrictions on civilian technology

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352 Ibid., 17.
purchases in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and passed a U.S. law in 1978 limiting nuclear supply to states without safeguards. Thus in this case regime commitment theories related to hegemonic leadership and to the desire for civilian nuclear energy overlap and reinforce one another as United States made it very difficult for non-NPT members to access civilian technology during the late 1970s, thus forcing those who wanted nuclear power to consider treaty ratification.

The timing of Indonesia’s ratification of the NPT in the late 1970s also coincided with new and direct pressure by the United States to ratify the treaty, as a theory of hegemonic leadership would expect. There is little mention of the NPT by Indonesian leaders through most of the 1970s and there is no evidence that the Nixon administration pressed Indonesia to ratify the NPT. This does not mean the Nixon administration did not have the opportunity. The archival records indicate numerous interactions between the Suharto and Nixon administrations in the late 1960s and 1970s and no evidence that Nixon or Kissinger ever mentioned the NPT. They discussed the provision of U.S. aid, the Vietnam War, the fight against Communists in Indonesia, policies toward Cambodia, and East Timor. In all of these conversations the NPT is never mentioned.356 The United States provided aid and arms to the Southeast Asian state throughout the Nixon years, so certainly there was a possibility of exerting some pressure. But Nixon placed very little emphasis on garnering universal support for the NPT.

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356 For example, Department of State, SECRET Memorandum from Henry Kissinger for the President, Subject: Your Meeting with President Suharto of Indonesia, May 26, 1970; Memorandum of Conversation, President Suharto of Indonesia, The President, Dr. Kissinger, May 26, 1970; Memorandum of Conversation between President Ford, President Suharto, Dr. Kissinger, et al., July 5, 1975 Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations, Box 13, July 5, 1965 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto. Available online from the George Washington University’s National Security Archive: http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/19750705.pdf (accessed June 6, 2014).
When President Carter entered office in 1976, he prioritized nuclear nonproliferation and personally sought additional NPT members. He took a special interest in Indonesian ratification. In the spring of 1978, Carter sent Vice President Mondale on a multi-country trip that included a stop in Jakarta and the NPT was on the agenda. In an April 1978 memo to President Carter, Mondale wrote, “In my talks with President Suharto and Vice President Malik, I will urge Indonesia to ratify the non-proliferation treaty, I will sign an AID rural electrification loan and I will underline our interest in cooperating in food production and energy programs.”

Vice President Mondale did not plan to lay out an explicit quid pro quo regarding the NPT, but certainly the discussion of U.S. aid combined with encouragement of treaty ratification would be a more convincing message than a plea for the treaty alone.

After the May 1978 Mondale visit, the U.S. embassy in Jakarta reported back on the Vice President’s meetings to the State Department. On the topic of the NPT, the cable read, “NPT. The Vice President explained the importance we attach to the broadest possible adherence to the NPT, and asked when Indonesia might complete the ratification process. Suharto said the Indonesian parliament had reconvened on May 1, and that he expected ratification within the near future.”

In addition to economic aid, the cable indicates that the meeting with the Indonesians also included discussions of military aid.

The Indonesian legislature ratified the NPT on December 18, 1978. In an after action report on Mondale’s trip, written in January 1979, the introduction to the document read: “The

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357 Memorandum for the President from the Vice President, “Visit to the Pacific,” April 26, 1978, Source: NSA Staff Materials, Far East Files, Box 7, Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia.
358 Memorandum for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Status of Actions from the Vice President’s Asian Trip,” January 31, 1979. Carter Library, Atlanta GA.
359 State Department, *State Gazette*, 53 (3129).
record is quite favorable. Many major issues have been resolved or are near resolution.”

“Indonesian ratification of the NPT” was on the lists of favorable results. In the same memo in the section on Indonesia the writer indicated that Vice President Mondale informed Suharto during his trip that the United States had agreed “in principle to sell A-4 aircraft.” Indonesia also requested $35 million credit in FMS (foreign military sales) for FY 1980, after it had been cut the previous year. Later in this same section the memo addressed the NPT: “He [Mondale] urged NPT ratification. Parliament subsequently ratified the NPT. We sent special message of satisfaction.”

As a recipient of military sales and foreign aid, Indonesia was certainly susceptible to U.S. appeals to take the step to ratify the NPT, even without a direct statement of quid pro quo. A memo in Lieutenant Colonel William E. Odom’s files on aid to Indonesia reported U.S. aid per year during the period surrounding Indonesia’s December 1978 NPT ratification as shown in the table below. At the time, Odom was serving as the military advisor to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Table N: U.S. Aid to Indonesia, Fiscal Years 1977-1981

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360 Memorandum for Dr. Zbigrew Brzezinski, “Status of Actions from the Vice President’s Asian Trip,” 1.
361 Ibid.
362 U.S. Assistance to Indonesia (in millions)”, Indonesia 1978-8/8 (folder), General Odom File, Brzezinski Material, National Security Affairs, (Collection 12), General Odom File (Box 26) Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia.
Though the need for nuclear technology and the tightening of global nuclear exports as a result of U.S. leadership are important to understanding Indonesia’s ratification of the NPT, appeals by Carter and Mondale also appear to have been important. A Governmental Accountability Office study from 1980 indicated that ACDA and the State Department believed U.S. diplomacy was a key factor in Indonesia’s ratification: “The State Department notes that Indonesia’s decision to ratify the NPT came after years of low-key diplomatic effort climaxed by a personal appeal by Vice President Mondale.”363 This was a major change from the previous Presidential administrations who apparently did not mention the NPT to Suharto. In addition to Carter’s personal appeals, the United States continued to provide a great deal of support to the Suharto regime in both economic and military aid, likely making it more difficult for Suharto to say no to the U.S. pleas.

**Indonesia, the NPT and Hedging**

There is little evidence that Indonesia was hedging and considering a nuclear weapons option in the period from 1968 to 1978 when it delayed NPT ratification. President Suharto had stopped all talk of nuclear weapons when he came to power, and no evidence suggests he was secretly interested in a nuclear program. Indonesia had championed a nuclear weapons free zone at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, as early as 1971 and appears to have been sincere in this effort.364 Instead of making veiled or overt nuclear threats about nuclear weapons as the hedging theory would predict, when discussing the

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proposed nuclear energy program Foreign Minister Adam Malik aimed to reassure other states by declaring, “Indonesia will not explode a nuclear device in developing its nuclear technology.”

Indonesia, the NPT and Nuclear Energy

A desire for a civilian nuclear energy program influenced the timing of Indonesia’s decision to ratify the NPT. Similar to many countries around the world during the 1970s oil crisis, Indonesia began to plan for a civilian nuclear power program as an alternative to fossil fuels. In 1972, the National Nuclear Agency of Indonesia, BATAN, established a committee to explore the construction of nuclear power plants. In 1974, the Director General of BATAN, Professor Baiquni, announced that his organization’s extant five-year plan was preparing for the development of an Indonesian nuclear energy program with the first reactor set to generate power by 1985. In the next month, Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik announced that they would seek nuclear cooperation agreements with the USSR, Canada, France, and the United States. In 1976, BATAN and the National Electric Authority (PLN) conducted a study with the IAEA that determined that between eight and eighteen reactors could be built on the island of Java by 1992.

Problems with the ambitious nuclear energy plan soon arose. First, prospectors were unable to find indigenous uranium in Indonesia. Then, in 1975, the state oil company Pertamina

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almost went bankrupt, costing the government funds that could have gone to the nascent nuclear program.\textsuperscript{368} Moreover, Indonesia experienced a recession in the mid-1970s that further tapped its limited resources.\textsuperscript{369} It was not until 1979 that the economy began to improve and the nuclear energy option was again viable.\textsuperscript{370} It was at this point that Indonesia ratified the NPT. The history of Indonesia’s desire for nuclear technology provides compelling evidence for the theory that states cooperate with the regime when seeking nuclear technology, but as discussed above, its civilian program was also influenced by international market factors driven by the U.S. policy.

In the mid to late 1970s, Indonesia faced a more constrained international environment as an inexperienced state seeking nuclear technology from global suppliers. India’s 1974 nuclear explosion was a wake-up call that less technologically advanced states could develop nuclear weapons using imported technology. After this watershed event, Henry Kissinger sought agreement from the Soviet Union for the idea of bringing nuclear supplier states together to create a list of sensitive nuclear imports.\textsuperscript{371} The group first met in London in 1975. U.S. leaders knew that export limits would only work in preventing proliferation if all supplier states were following the same guidelines. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) officially began in 1976 and by 1977 included all major suppliers of nuclear technology.\textsuperscript{372} By 1978 the NSG agreed on

\textsuperscript{368} Poneman, “Nuclear Policies in Developing Countries,” 577-578.
\textsuperscript{369} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{370} Ibid.,
\textsuperscript{372} The original 15 members included: Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
guidelines, published by the IAEA, for nuclear supply, including safeguards and lists of trigger items that had to be considered carefully by exporters. It was this post-Indian test environment in which Indonesia sought to develop its civilian nuclear program and began discussing the NPT. Indonesia’s desire for civilian nuclear technology intersected with a new U.S. effort to limit proliferation through technology controls. These controls are consistent with the hegemon’s desire to limit proliferation.

The statements of Indonesian leaders during the period of NPT ratification indicate the ways in which Indonesia’s desire for nuclear technology collided with U.S. efforts to control nuclear technology and U.S. pressure and inducements. In August 1978, the Indonesian Prime Minister explained that the time had come to ratify the treaty because of the requirement of foreign aid, including nuclear aid.\(^{373}\) The same year, Suharto announced his desire for a 30MW nuclear reactor.\(^{374}\) In explaining the need for NPT ratification to the Indonesian parliament, State Minister for Research and Technology of Indonesia, Dr. B.J. Habibie, stated, “…it is necessary to ratify at this time the NPT…as this will lead to talks on foreign aid, especially for nuclear technology cooperation.” He continued, “the government… considers the current international situation as unfavorable for non-NPT countries to obtain aid for the development of nuclear projects. This… can lead to undesirable political effects. Considering the development of politics within and outside the country, Indonesia has come to the conclusion that the time has come for her to ratify the bill.”\(^{375}\) Habibie was likely referring to the limits the United States was placing

\(^{375}\) FBIS “Government Faces Ratification of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. 19 August 1978.
on nuclear supply during this period. By this time, the U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 had further tightened U.S. nuclear exports. In order to receive nuclear cooperation from the United States under this legislation, a state had to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear facilities and vow not to manufacture or acquire any nuclear explosive devices. The United States was also pressuring other supplier states to do the same through the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

When Indonesia deposited its instruments of ratification for the NPT in July 1979, it again included a declaration, part of which emphasized the need for nuclear technology and requiring the treaty as a means of technology:

Indonesia today is actively carrying out its national development. With a view to supporting and accelerating the development process, including the economic and social development, Indonesia has decided from the outset to make use of the nuclear energy [sic] for peaceful purposes. Indonesia’s efforts in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in its national development, require the assistance and cooperation of technologically advanced nuclear countries. With the ratification of this Treaty, the Government of Indonesia wishes to draw the attention of the nuclear countries to their obligations under Article IV of the Treaty and expresses the hope that they would be prepared to cooperate with non-nuclear countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and implement the provisions of Article IV of the Treaty for the benefit of developing countries without discrimination.376

Within a year of NPT ratification, Indonesia concluded its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.377 The swiftness with which Indonesia concluded this agreement

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suggests that having the safeguards required by the NPT and newly required for nuclear trade with the United States and other suppliers was an important factor in ratification. Soon after Indonesian NPT ratification, the government signed nuclear cooperation deals with a number of suppliers, beginning with France and Italy in 1980.\textsuperscript{378} France, Italy, West Germany, and Canada competed to build Indonesia’s first power reactor.\textsuperscript{379} Indonesia signed a deal with West Germany for 30MW reactor in 1982.\textsuperscript{380}

**Indonesia, the NPT and Disarmament**

The disarmament bargain theory does not seem to be at work here based on available evidence. Indonesia did not seek greater disarmament from the United States or other declared nuclear states to secure its cooperation with the NPT. This theory becomes relevant to Indonesian nuclear nonproliferation behavior in the future, but not in this period.

**Indonesia, the NPT and Regime Type**

Indonesia’s regime type appears to have little relevance to the timing and outcome of Indonesia’s deliberations over treaty ratification. Suharto was an authoritarian leader, but the constraints he faced both economically and internationally while seeking nuclear power were more relevant than the lack of constraints placed upon him by domestic institutions or an


\textsuperscript{380} Jakarta ANTARA - 1982-06-12 BATAN, FRG'S INTERATOM SIGN REACTOR CONTRACT DAILY REPORT. Asia & Pacific, FBIS-APA-82-116 on 1982-06-16 Under the heading(s): INDONESIA [Page N3]
electorate. Moreover, there is little evidence of popular domestic interests, beyond perhaps the small group of civilian nuclear energy proponents, playing a role in the decision.

Indonesia and the NPT: Conclusion

Even though Indonesia was moderately favorable to U.S. leadership when the NPT opened for signature and ratification, just as in the Japanese case, the United States still had to ask the Indonesians to ratify before they would consider the treaty. The Indonesian NPT case is consistent with theories related to hegemonic leadership and nuclear energy. The combination of seeking a civilian nuclear program while the United States was tightening export rules and Carter’s high-level diplomacy while promising additional military and economic aid appear to be the key factors in Indonesia’s decision to ratify the NPT in the late 1970s.

*Egypt and the NPT*

Egypt is a curious case in that it has been a seasoned participant in the global nuclear nonproliferation arena as a leader in the Arab world and NAM, while not being especially committed to new elements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Its limited commitment, ratifying the NPT in 1981, can be attributed to a change in grand strategy in which President Anwar al-Sadat sought economic growth through closer ties to the United States, and, similar to Indonesia, a desire for nuclear technology, which the United States had recently limited to states with full-scope IAEA safeguards agreements.

*Assessing Egyptian Favorability toward U.S. Global Leadership*

Egypt is a state that is not considered favorable to U.S. global leadership through most of the nuclear age. When the NPT opened for signature, Egypt was highly unfavorable toward the U.S.-led order, as it was within the Soviet sphere of influence. This changed in the mid-1970s,
with Anwar al-Sadat’s strategic turn toward the United States and away from the Soviet Union. The era of Egypt’s NPT ratification, in the early 1980s, is its period of highest favorability due to this strategic change. The United States had recently supported the successful Camp David Accords, and U.S. and Egyptian leaders had many high level communications in this period as a result of the talks. In speeches from this period, President Sadat is very positive toward President Carter and U.S. leadership. In a 1978 statement from the White House, Sadat stated, “no other nation is more qualified to play this role as a contributor to world stability and prosperity.”381 In a 1979 speech welcoming President Carter to Egypt, after offering a multitude of praise for President Carter and his role in the peace talks, Sadat stated, “The reception you were accorded today by our masses is a testimony of the affection they have for you and for every American. Let us vow to cement the bonds of friendship and cooperation between our nations.”382

Egypt’s favorability toward the U.S.-led order assessed through UNGA voting was at its highest in 1981, the year Cairo ratified the NPT. At this point Egypt was on par with the global average in this measure though it was below average in the surrounding years. Similar to Indonesia at this time, Egypt was positive about the U.S. leadership role in its region (i.e., the Camp David Accords), but Egypt did not align with the United States-led order on the majority of issues facing the UNGA. Thus based on the available indicators, Egypt is best characterized as a state exhibiting “moderate favorability” toward the U.S. global order during this period.

Egypt, the NPT and Hegemonic Leadership

As a state in the Soviet sphere, Egypt was not expected to be influenced by U.S. pleas for treaty ratification when the NPT first became open for signature. If any state had influence at this time it was the Soviet Union. In fact, the USSR successfully pressured the Egyptians to sign the NPT after Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser requested nuclear weapons from the Chinese and the Soviets following significant losses in the 1967 Six-Day War. Egypt signed the treaty in July 1968, the first day the treaty opened for signature. The Egyptians and the Soviets signed a formal defense pact a year later. During this period, Cairo’s relations with the United States were difficult due to Egypt’s ties to Moscow and its anti-Israeli and anti-West sentiment. The United States had little leverage on Egyptian leaders at this point, but this would soon change.

Two years after Egypt’s NPT signature, Nasser died and Anwar al-Sadat came to power. Sadat cut ties to the USSR, expelling Soviet advisors in 1972, and ending the defense pact in 1976. Sadat then oriented Egypt toward the United States and the West with an aim toward economic development. After ousting the Soviets, Sadat pursued a back-channel through his national security advisor Hafiz Ismail in February 1973 to encourage Nixon administration involvement in further peace talks with Israel. U.S. policy did not change, and despite warnings of impending war from other leaders in the region, Nixon, backed by the U.S.

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384 Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 110.
intelligence community, did not expect Egypt to go to war with Israel. Sadat sought a limited war against Israel in 1973 to regain lost territory in the Sinai and to compel U.S. involvement in the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Sadat’s goal in engaging the United States in its on-going rivalry finally succeeded. The 1973 conflict and its aftermath led to a long peace process between Egypt and Israel, culminating in the 1978-1979 Camp David Accords brokered by the Carter Administration.386

Egyptian leaders knew of the U.S. position on nuclear nonproliferation, with one former Egyptian official stating that Egypt’s non-nuclear status “was a tool, something we could give to the U.S. as a present.” But Egypt was hoping Israel would also seek a non-nuclear status. During the Camp David peace process Egypt tried unsuccessfully to pressure Israel to commit to abandoning its nuclear weapons program. Initially, the U.S. negotiating position sought commitments to the NPT from both sides. For example, a September 1978 proposal drafted by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, “A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” in preparation for a Camp David summit, read,

In all of the negotiations described above, they will arrange to guarantee the security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability and the political independence of each State negotiating peace through measures such as the following… (f) The adherence by all the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Parties undertake not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.388

387 Quoted in Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 117.
There were many draft frameworks over the course of the meeting, and the NPT appears
to have dropped out in subsequent versions. On September 12, 1978, the Egyptian and U.S.
diplomacys at Camp David discussed the current U.S. framework for the talks and the Egyptians
noted differences among the Egyptian and U.S. proposals. Osama el-Baz, Egypt’s Under
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, “commented that in the Egyptian paper, there had been the
proposal that all parties agree to the NPT. The Egyptians had assumed this would meet with
enthusiastic American approval.”389 Two months later in a letter to President Carter expressing a
lengthy list of frustrations with the Israelis over the Camp David negotiations, Sadat noted
among other disappointments, “The Israelis did not commit themselves to adhere to the treaty on
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”390 Sadat explained his willingness to move forward
despite this and other short-comings of the framework, “in the hope that these shortcomings will
be remedied in the future with the progressive development of peace, as I have believed and still
believe that the real peace process starts only after the signing.”391

In the final drafting of the Accords, neither Egypt nor Israel agreed to NPT ascension.
The Israelis had developed a nuclear weapons program by this time392 and the Egyptians would
be unlikely to commit to the treaty within the Accords framework, without Israel’s ratification.
Nonetheless, one former U.S. official familiar with the Egyptian ratification gives credit to the
Camp David process for bringing about Egypt’s decision to ratify the NPT. In an interview,
Dean Rust, retired from ACDA and State Department, stated,

389 Ibid., Document 44.
390 Ibid., Document 139.
391 Ibid.
general diplomacy aimed at fostering stability in volatile regions is one of the most important indirect tools you have to foster nonproliferation. I am fond of saying that the Camp David Accords were one of the biggest nonproliferation events in the Middle East, as it led to a negotiated peace between Egypt and Israel. And it led Sadat to join the NPT in 1981, thus breaking a major taboo among Arabs who had continued to resist the NPT while Israel was outside the Treaty.  

By this reading, it was Sadat’s goal of opening relations with the United States, and the U.S. involvement in negotiating a peace settlement, which set the stage for Sadat to view the NPT as consonant with his interests. This interpretation is consistent with that of Shai Feldman. He writes, “Having made the strategic decision to avoid the development of a military nuclear option and instead base Egypt’s well-being on economic development and close ties with the United States, President Sadat decided to ratify Egypt’s signature on the NPT in 1980.”  

A theory of regime commitment based on hegemonic leadership anticipates that Egypt’s favorable impression of U.S. global leadership after the conclusion of the Camp David Accords would make it more likely that the United States could persuade Egypt to join the NPT at this time. As expected, the United States continued its NPT diplomacy with Egypt after the Accords concluded. A July 1980 Government Accountability Office report stated, “the United States suspended its efforts to persuade those two countries [Israel and Egypt] to become parties to the Treaty; efforts were resumed in May 1979 with U.S. approaches to both Egypt and Israel on the question.”

In addition to renewed NPT diplomacy following the successful Camp David Accords, U.S. nonproliferation policy in the late 1970s also directly affected Egypt’s calculus on the NPT. Egypt continued to seek civilian nuclear energy during the 1970s and early 1980s, but was hampered in seeking technology from the United States by its non-NPT status, similar to the challenges faced by Indonesia in the same period. President Carter linked the sale of U.S. technology to the establishment of full-scope nuclear safeguards, a requirement of the NPT.396

With U.S. diplomats seeking Egypt’s NPT ratification and Egyptian leaders seeking nuclear power, in 1980 Sadat appointed a government commission to investigate the possibility of NPT ascension. A minority of commission members wanted Egypt to pursue nuclear weapons, either within or outside of the NPT, while the majority favored no nuclear weapons program and NPT ascension. Sadat announced in December 1980 that Egypt would indeed join the NPT. Cairo ratified soon after in 1981.

Egypt, the NPT and Hedging

The delay from Egypt’s 1968 NPT signature to its 1981 ratification could indicate a potential hedging strategy. After all, Egypt has long viewed nuclear weapons through the lens of its adversary Israel and the Israeli nuclear weapons program, and it did have a nascent nuclear program in the 1950s.

Egypt began its civilian nuclear program in the mid-1950s and left open the option for developing nuclear weapons. Nasser founded the Atomic Energy Authority in 1955 and the Center for Nuclear Research in 1957. The director of the research center, Nasser’s Cabinet

Secretary Ibrahim Hilmy Abdel Rahman, asked higher officials about the purpose of their nuclear research. He was told to focus on peaceful uses, but “the program should be organized in a way that would preserve a military option.”397 Rahman sought peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements from the Soviet Union in 1956 and 1958.398 These agreements provided for equipment, the training of Egyptian physicists, and a two megawatt nuclear reactor that went critical at Inchas in 1961. Egypt also sought nuclear reactors in the early 1960s, for what one official called “a plutonium route to nuclear weapons.”399 These projects were halted after Western banks refused to finance the project amid deteriorating relations with Egypt. The Soviets declined to provide reprocessing technology when asked by the Egyptians in 1964.400

With limited indigenous nuclear infrastructure and awareness of a developing nuclear program in neighboring Israel,401 Egypt requested nuclear weapons from both the USSR and China in the 1960s.402 These requests were denied. Despite some level of interest in nuclear weapons, Egyptian leadership never mobilized resources and committed to an indigenous nuclear program.403 Philipp Bleek calls the efforts to secure nuclear weapons by the Egyptians “half-hearted.”404 Jim Walsh concludes, “The historical record leaves little doubt that the government

398 Bleek, “Does proliferation Beget Proliferation?” 121.
399 Quoted in Bleek, “Does Proliferation Beget Proliferation?” 129. Originally found in Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 109.
401 When exactly the Egyptians knew about the Israeli nuclear weapon program is unclear, but there were rumors and reports on the topics through the 1950s and 1960s. Bleek concludes that there was near consensus among Egyptian leaders by the late 1960s, though they continued to promote ambiguity about the Israeli program in public to avoid the domestic pressure that certainty would create. Bleek, “Does Proliferation Beget Proliferation?” 117-118.
403 Ibid., 5.
repeatedly sought the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and yet it never made the kind of national commitment that would have made the bomb a reality. There was no equivalent to the Manhattan Project… Instead, there was drift, delay, and missed opportunities.”

The 1967 Six-Day War devastated Egypt’s economy: it lost oil revenues from lost territory and had to pay for rebuilding its conventional forces. Nasser again considered nuclear weapons, according to Walsh, but the cost of a program was prohibitive in light of the weakened economy.

Instead of hedging on the NPT, with the option to develop its own nuclear weapons program to counter its adversary, Egypt hoped that the NPT regime would put pressure on Israel. According to Gawdat Bahgat, Egypt signed the treaty in 1968 hoping that its adversary, Israel, would feel pressure to do the same and give up its weapons. Not all government officials agreed with this strategy however. As Bleek recounts,

Former key scientist Muhammad Izzat Abd-al-Aziz recalled in a 2004 interview that, “Before Egypt signed the treaty, I was one of those calling for not signing it. I confronted those who were opposed to the Egyptian nuclear program in the parliament, and the former electricity minister, Mahir Abazah, was present. Before the parliament adopted the decision to sign the treaty, I went to parliament as the head of a delegation from the atomic and nuclear energy organization and presented a statement to the MPs in which I explained the meaning of nuclear armaments and their necessity for preserving peace in the region and for confronting Israel, which had huge nuclear capabilities that threatened the security of the region. Unfortunately, the parliament agreed to ban the nuclear programs, and to sign the treaty.”

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406 Ibid., 202.
The available evidence indicates that any real consideration of an Egyptian nuclear weapons program ended by 1973. There were those in the government in 1980 who wanted Egypt to leave open the possibility of pursuing nuclear weapons, but this minority faction lost out to those who saw the NPT as consistent with their policy of close relations with the United States and those who wanted a secure supply of nuclear technology for civilian purposes. Moreover, the improved security environment resulting from the Camp David Accords likely mitigated calls by hard-liners who used the conflict with Israel to justify an Egyptian nuclear weapons program.

**Egypt, the NPT and Nuclear Energy**

Egypt’s desire for a civilian nuclear program in the 1970s and early 1980s played a role in Sadat’s 1980 decision that Egypt would move forward with NPT ratification as Egypt’s status as a non-member curtailed its ability to buy nuclear technology. After the 1973 war and the warming of relations with the United States, Egypt sought to develop a civilian nuclear power program. The 1973 oil crisis motivated many states around the globe to seek an alternative energy source. On a visit to Cairo in 1974, President Nixon offered to sell Egypt two 600-megawatt power reactors.\(^{409}\) A year later, Sadat initialed the deal in Washington.\(^{410}\) The sale languished amidst negotiations over nuclear safeguards on the reactors. The increased emphasis on nonproliferation in the Carter White House and within Congress in the late 1970s further delayed the deal as the Carter administration required safeguards on all U.S.-supplied reactors.\(^{411}\)

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\(^{410}\) Ibid., 59.

\(^{411}\) Ibid., 59.
In December 1980, Sadat announced that Egypt would ratify the NPT. Soon after, Egypt signed a deal to buy two reactors from the French. After ratification on February 16, 1981, Egypt began discussing a deal with the British and West Germans for reactors and sought to reopen the reactor deal with the United States. Seven years after Nixon’s offer and four months after Egypt’s NPT ratification, Washington signed a deal to supply two reactors in June 1981. The flurry of activity in seeking nuclear reactor deals right after NPT ratification suggests that Egypt’s ratification was affected as much by a desire for technology as its desire for positive relations with the United States.

Egypt, the NPT and Disarmament

There is no evidence from primary or secondary sources that Egypt’s reluctance to ratify the NPT was based upon concerns about a lack of disarmament progress by the five established nuclear states. Egypt attached a statement to its NPT ratification in which is expressed disappointment in the lack of disarmament progress by both the United States and the Soviet Union: “Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two super-Powers, because of their failure to take effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.” Nonetheless, this dissatisfaction did not keep Egypt from ratifying the treaty.

Egypt, the NPT and Regime Type

Egypt’s regime type appears to have little relevance to the timing and outcome of its deliberations over treaty ratification. Nasser and Sadat were both authoritarian rulers. It mattered more to NPT ratification that Sadat sought improved relations with the United States and the West and that he sought a civilian nuclear program in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Egypt and the NPT: Conclusion

As a state moderately favorable to U.S. global leadership in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it is expected that Egypt would have been amenable to NPT ratification based on U.S. diplomacy. In fact, a number of factors related to U.S. global leadership, including U.S. diplomacy, peace with Israel, and a desire for civilian technology, pushed Egyptian leaders in this direction. Egyptian leaders recognized the importance of the NPT to the United States, the successful U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords created a security environment more favorable to ratification, and, due to U.S. influence, nuclear technology suppliers were more amenable to Egypt as an NPT member. Thus theories of hegemonic leadership and nuclear energy find relevance in this case.

Conclusion

The United States played an important part in shaping the NPT calculations of each of the three states discussed above. For Japan, renewed U.S. prioritization of the treaty in the mid-1970s and security assurances were key factors in its decision-making. For Indonesia, President Carter’s personal interest in its ratification and U.S. nuclear trade restrictions encouraged Jakarta to join the treaty. For Egypt, U.S. NPT diplomacy, the Camp David Accords, and setting new conditions on the supply of nuclear technology led Sadat to seek ratification in the early 1980s.
Table O below summarizes the level of favorability toward U.S. global leadership for each state and the year of each state’s NPT ratification.

**Table O: Favorability to the U.S.-Led Order and NPT Ratification Outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favorability to U.S. Global Leadership</strong></td>
<td>High Favorability</td>
<td>Moderate Favorability</td>
<td>Moderate Favorability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NPT ratification</strong></td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In each of the three cases, the theory of regime commitment related to the provision of nuclear energy technology finds relevance as well. Japan delayed ratification until it was satisfied that its NPT safeguards agreement would not harm its nascent nuclear energy industry, and Indonesia and Egypt looked to the NPT to improve their ability to import nuclear technology.
### Table P: Summary of Competing Theories of Regime Commitment (NPT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories:</th>
<th>Cases:</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic Leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hegemon’s interest and assurances were necessary conditions</td>
<td>Hegemon’s interest and “changing the rules of the game” were necessary conditions</td>
<td>Hegemon’s NPT diplomacy and role in orchestrating peace talks were necessary conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td>Security concerns affected timing, not outcome</td>
<td></td>
<td>Camp David Accords undermined claim by small faction calling for Egyptian weapons and non-ratification of NPT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Achieving favorable IAEA safeguards for nuclear industry was a necessary condition</strong></td>
<td>Seeking civilian nuclear technology was a necessary condition</td>
<td>Seeking civilian nuclear technology was a necessary condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td>The democratic government responding to various domestic factions affected timing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bold text indicates most important factors)
CHAPTER SIX: THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT

In the spring of 1995, the members of the NPT faced an important decision about the future of the treaty. A provision in its text instructs members to decide upon the NPT’s extension twenty-five years after its entry into force. Entry into force occurred in 1970 so the every five-year Review Conference of the NPT in 1995 became the Review and Extension Conference. In the years leading up to the conference states expressed a number of differing views on the future of the treaty and whether it should be extended indefinitely or for shorter increments of time.

The United States favored unconditional, indefinite extension. Quantitative analysis presented in Chapter Four indicated that states’ positions on indefinite extension during polling in December 1994 were strongly correlated with their level of favorability toward U.S. global leadership. The more favorable the state, the more likely it supported indefinite extension at this time. The significant correlation indicates a relationship between favorability toward the hegemon and nonproliferation outcomes, but it does not provide information on the mechanisms connecting states’ deposition toward the United States and their opinions on the extension of the NPT. This chapter provides evidence on decision-making surrounding the NPT extension for three states: Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt, and explores how the evidence matches up with each of the theories of nuclear nonproliferation commitment presented in Chapter Two.

This case study provides strong qualitative evidence in support of a theory of hegemonic leadership for each of the three cases, as well as support for some of the alternate theories of regime commitment. The chapter begins by providing a brief history of the NPT extension
process, including the role of the United States in supporting extension, before moving to the country cases.

**1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: Brief Background**

When crafting draft NPT texts in the 1960s, the Soviet Union and the United States favored a treaty of indefinite duration, similar to previous arms control agreements. During negotiations, other states pushed back against this proposition, concerned about giving up their nuclear weapons option indefinitely. Some states advocated for a treaty duration as short as five years. The compromise position, reflected in NPT Article X, Section 2, states, “Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.”

That conference, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, convened from April 17 to May 12.

As predicted by the theory of regime commitment based on hegemonic leadership, the United States took the lead in promoting indefinite extension of the NPT. In a July 1992 National Security Directive on proliferation, NSD-70, President George H. W. Bush declared that “The United States will seek the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995,” but ACDA had been strategizing since 1990 for the 1995 Extension conference. One of its first efforts was seeking to move the 1995 meeting location from Geneva, Switzerland, where all previous Review Conferences had been held, to New York City. The logic in the United States pursuing this move

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was in the numbers. Due to the location of the United Nations, all NPT members, large and small, have representatives in New York City. If the meeting were held in Geneva, some smaller states—including many states favorable to the U.S.-led order or where U.S. leverage would be strong—may not have been able to send representatives to vote on extension. The United States wanted to have as many treaty members as possible present to vote and successfully convinced other treaty members to move the 1995 meeting to the UN Headquarters in New York.\footnote{Thomas Graham, \textit{Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 258.}

In the early 1990s, ACDA also began promoting indefinite extension in its bilateral and multilateral meetings. In a tactic employed throughout the NPT extension process (and with other nonproliferation efforts), U.S. leaders sought support by asking groups of states to make statements in favor of indefinite extension. Close U.S. allies were the first to publicly support indefinite extension, many of whom began their own campaigns in support of this goal. With these states on board, the United States moved to a long campaign of meeting leaders one-on-one to convince them of the value of treaty extension. The active part of the U.S. campaign for indefinite extension began when ACDA Director John Holum appointed Thomas Graham Jr. as the U.S. ambassador-designate to the NPT renewal process, offering him the job in July 1993.\footnote{Holum offered the job to Graham on July 2, 1993. He was confirmed in July 1994. Thomas Graham, \textit{Disarmament Sketches}, 228.} Graham created an entire office devoted to NPT extension, headed by Susan Burk. Consistent with expectations about the hegemon and its emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation, the United States was the only country with an office with multiple individuals devoted solely to the indefinite extension of the NPT. Together Graham and his team traveled around the globe for a
year and a half promoting indefinite extension of the NPT, seeking to persuade states that the treaty was in their long-term security interests.

This educational and diplomatic outreach was necessary, as Ambassador Graham’s team found that many other states did not prioritize nonproliferation or even know much about the treaty. As the Washington Post recounted: “…in many of these capitals, nuclear weapons seemed to be the least of the government's problems. Some officials Graham met had barely heard of the NPT, never mind having decided how they might vote. In a sense, the NPT regime had worked so well over its 25-year life that many nations now took it for granted.”

The United States engaged in a hard fought campaign for extension that eventually involved all levels of U.S. bureaucracy across many different agencies and departments, and included the hard work on the part of many U.S. allies, especially the British and the French, according to one former U.S. official. As former ACDA official Dean Rust recounts,

Secretary of State Warren Christopher made clear this was one of the President’s top foreign policy priorities and that a concerted diplomatic plan had to be undertaken. Weekly, then twice a week, then as we got closer, almost every day, representatives from all the State regional bureaus and the arms control agency got together to coordinate their diplomatic efforts to persuade all countries that this treaty should be extended indefinitely.

A key element of the U.S. strategy was ensuring that the non-aligned movement (NAM), with its 100-plus members, did not achieve a unified position in opposition to indefinite extension. The United States succeeded in this goal by convincing a few NAM members to

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support indefinite extension, and thus breaking unanimity in the consensus-only body. In particular, U.S. leaders persuaded South Africa to support extension, a diplomatic effort involving high level U.S. diplomacy and some not so subtle threats. Three weeks into the NPT Review and Extension Conference it was clear there was a majority in support of the U.S.-favored position and the treaty would be extended indefinitely.

**Japan and NPT Extension**

Japan was an early supporter of indefinite extension, declaring its commitment to this position in the fall of 1993 at the United Nations, a year and a half before the Review Conference. Japan’s support was not immediate and unequivocal, however, and came after its first change in government in the post-World War II period. In June 1993, before the new government assumed power, Japanese leaders sought a “watered down” G-7 statement in support of indefinite extension, causing concern in the United States and speculation in global media that Japan was reconsidering its commitment to remain a non-nuclear state. Once on board in the fall of 1993, Japan became a promoter of indefinite extension among other states.422

**Assessing Japanese Favorability toward U.S. Global Leadership**

All indicators suggest that Japan can be characterized as a state exhibiting “high favorability” toward U.S. global leadership during the period surrounding the NPT extension. Beyond its continued defense alliance with the United States, during the 1990s Japan scored well above the global average on favorability toward U.S. global leadership, based upon UNGA voting measures. In addition, there were a number of visits between U.S. and Japanese leaders


Based on all of these factors we would expect Japan to support indefinite extension early on, with little coercive effort required by the United States. The experience of nuclear weapons use in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the World War II and the difficulty in achieving NPT ratification in Japan in the 1970s, however, also suggest that nuclear weapons and issues of disarmament and nonproliferation would be highly relevant to the domestic population. Thus the regime type theory may also find relevance in this case. In addition, the North Korean nuclear program became a global concern in the early 1990s, so hedging may also be a plausible theory explaining Japan’s behavior.

**Japan, NPT Extension and Hegemonic Leadership**

Hegemonic leadership theory predicts the United States would lead the campaign to extend the NPT. It expects that those states most favorable to U.S. leadership would sign on to
support indefinite extension of the treaty relatively quickly after limited diplomatic pressure from the United States. In contrast, less favorable states would not join this position quickly and garnering their support would require U.S. and allied pressure in the form of stronger diplomacy, and perhaps threats and inducements.

As a highly favorable state, Japan would be expected to agree to indefinite extension early on, as this was a clear priority for the United States. Indeed, Japan was in the grouping of states to first agree to support NPT extension. In his memoirs of this early period of the campaign for indefinite extension, Ambassador Graham recalls, “first NATO, then the Group of Seven industrialized nations, and then CSCE (now OSCE) were persuaded to endorse group statements in support of indefinite extension of the NPT without conditions as the most desirable outcome for the 1995 conference.”425 Japan was part of the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized nations.

In 1992, Japan agreed to the G-7 statement: “We are firmly of the view that the indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference will be a key step in this [proliferation] problem.”426 The following year the Japanese government agreed to a “watered down” version of the same G-7 statement at a time when an acting government was awaiting national elections and thus Prime Minister Miyazawa was unable to garner consensus among the members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).427 At this time in the summer of 1993, a Japanese government

425 Graham, Disarmament Sketches, 259.
spokesperson even suggested that the treaty could again be extended for a fixed period, with the
decision of indefinite extension considered at a later date. A fixed period of extension was the
preference of some in the NAM and strongly opposed by the United States, and thus inconsistent
with the expectation that Japan would quickly and easily commit to supporting extension. Within
three days of this statement, however, the Japanese government stated clearly that it would
announce its support for indefinite extension as “early as the fall,” responding to pressure from
the United States and stating this decision was aimed as “dispelling concern among the United
States and Asian countries that Japan intends to possess nuclear weapons in the future.”
U.S. pressure was a key factor in this announcement.

At a speech before the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993, after the new
government was instated, Prime Minister Hosokawa officially announced Japanese support for
indefinite extension, stating “I wish to affirm that Japan supports the indefinite extension of that
treaty beyond 1995.” He also affirmed Japan’s commitment to disarmament and praised recent
U.S.-Russian nuclear reductions.

The Japanese promoted indefinite extension from that point in 1993 through the 1995
Review and Extension Conference. In international meetings, Japan called on other states to
support indefinite extension. On April 18, 1995, just ahead of the Conference, Secretary of

428 FBIS, “Spokesman: Tokyo Not Preserving Nuclear Option” OW1307114993 Tokyo KYODO in English, 1120
GMT 13 July 1993.
429 FBIS, “Tokyo to Support Indefinite NPT Extension,” OW1707120393 Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese
17 July 1993 Morning Edition p. 1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
431 FBIS, “Japan: Reportage on Hosokawa’s Activities at UN Session,” ‘Text’ on UN address, OW2709223993
Tokyo KYODO in English 2202 GMT, September 27, 1993.
432 For example see “Statement by H.E. Mr. Yoshitomo Tanaka, Representative of Japan” at the First Committee of
State Warren Christopher and Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono held a joint press conference in which they stated they were “working together to try to achieve indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because they both believe that it ‘is absolutely essential for a solid path to the future.’”

The Japanese case fits in with a theory of hegemonic leadership as Japan was a highly favorable state from which the United States sought and received commitment early in the indefinite extension campaign. In the summer of 1993, when Japan appeared to hesitate about its position as it was in the process of forming a new government, the United States put diplomatic pressure on the Japanese to announce a commitment to extension. By the fall of 1993, well in advance of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Japan was fully on board with indefinite extension and helped promote extension among other states.

Japan, NPT Extension and Hedging

The hedging theory predicts that states in difficult security environments, especially those with nuclear rivals, are less likely to ratify additional regime agreements. With North Korea’s developing nuclear program and its attempt to withdraw from the NPT in March 1993, this theory could find relevance in the Japanese case.

In the lead up to the G-7 meeting in Tokyo in June 1993, the seven states were unable to agree to a strong political statement supporting indefinite extension of the NPT “in deference to Japan.” A news report from the period explained, “The Japanese argued that in light of their internal political problems and concern over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, they could

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433 Jacquelyn S. Porth, “In Meetings, Christopher Urges Indefinite NPT Extension,” USIA, April 18, 1995.
not commit their Government to an indefinite extension of the treaty..."435 Japan also refused to allow the term “unconditional” to be used in describing the extension of the NPT.436 The final June 1993 G-7 political declaration read, “We reiterate the objectives of universal adherence to the NPT as well as the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995.”437 Japan was the primary reason this language was slightly watered down from the G-7’s 1992 statement on this topic.438 Japanese hesitancy was widely reported in the international media with some journalists speculating that North Korea’s growing nuclear capability meant Japanese leaders were considering a nuclear weapons option in response to the North Korean nuclear program.439 In fact, indefinite extension was challenged from all sides of the Japanese political spectrum, including a small group of hawkish Diet members—“the influential minority in the right wing of the LDP”440—who wanted Japan to have the option for a nuclear weapon program in the future. Their position could be considered one of hedging on the NPT. Furthermore, maintaining an ambiguous position on the NPT extension could provide Japan leverage against the DPRK as it claimed during 1993 that it would withdraw from the treaty.441

Ultimately this minority in the Diet failed to convince Japanese leaders to avoid committing to indefinite extension or backtracking on the government’s September 1993 pledge

435 Ibid.
to support indefinite extension. Though the desire by some to hedge likely influenced the
government’s reluctance in the spring of 1993 to sign on to a strong G-7 statement, it did not
stop Japan from fully supporting indefinite extension only months later. It certainly helped those
factions seeking to support indefinite extension that in 1994 and 1995 it appeared as though
progress was being made on the North Korean nuclear issue through the Agreed Framework.

Those seeking to hedge continued to influence Japanese decision-making in this period,
however. It was revealed in 1999 that in 1995, the same year Japan supported indefinite
extension of the NPT, the Japan Defense Agency conducted a secret review of a Japanese
nuclear weapons option in “A Report Concerning the Problems of the Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction.”442 This report explored whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella could be trusted
in the post-Cold War era. The report found that the nuclear option was “not favorable to Japan,”
and it would “support indefinite extension of the treaty.” On its security relationship with the
United States, the report concluded:

   …since the theory of nuclear deterrence remains effective, reliance
on the U.S. extended deterrent is the best choice. Based on such a
precondition, what is appropriate for Japan is to start a discussion on
the maintenance of the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent in
the security dialogues between Japan and the United States
beginning today, and to pursue measures to mitigate, in terms of
practice, the one-sided nature of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty,
which is the basis for it.443

(Unauthorized Translation). The unauthorized translation of this report can be found online:
2016).
443 Ibid., Final page.
By the time this report made the above conclusion, the Japanese government had already
publically supported the indefinite extension of the NPT for two years. Nonetheless, the 1995
Japan Defense Agency report does show the strong influence of those in government who
wanted to pursue nuclear weapons. The report supports indefinite extension, primarily because of
the importance of its relationship with the United States, and the security provided by the U.S.
nuclear umbrella. Thus while security factors can be said to have influenced Japanese thinking, it
was the powerful position of the United States and its security guarantee that convinced this
faction they could continue to support the NPT.

Japan, NPT Extension and Nuclear Energy

There is little evidence that the nuclear industry was involved or influential in the
decision-making process about indefinite extension.

Japan, NPT Extension and Disarmament

This theory posits that states dissatisfied over lack of disarmament progress and limits on
nuclear technology exports will be less likely to commit to the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
As the discussion of domestic politics and nuclear salience below will detail, there were many in
Japan who worried indefinite extension would hamper further nuclear disarmament efforts,\(^{444}\)
and thus appear to have been dissatisfied with the regime is fulfilling the bargain between
nuclear states and non-nuclear states. This faction did not ultimately influence politicians in
Japan to forgo support for the indefinite extension of the NPT, but they likely influenced the
short delay in Japanese support in the summer of 1993. Though the theory finds relevance to the

\(^{444}\) “Spokesman: Tokyo Not Preserving Nuclear Option,” OW1307114993 Tokyo KYODO in English 1120 GMT 13
July 1993, (FBIS).
decision-making process in Japan, it is limited in its ability to predict the final outcome of Japanese decision-making.

**Japan, NPT Extension and Regime Type**

Japan’s democratic government was forced to contend with a number of domestic factions when making the decision of whether to support indefinite extension in 1993. As the previous section on hedging recounts, there was a minority in the Diet who wanted to reject the treaty and preserve a nuclear option. There were others who opposed extension for a very different reason—they did not want to support indefinite extension without better assurances that the five nuclear weapons states in the treaty were pursuing nuclear disarmament. For example, in August 1993, the mayor of Hiroshima led a group that called for Japan not to support the U.S. position out of concern that it would hurt disarmament efforts. In addressing the global speculation that the watered down G-7 statement in 1993 was due to nuclear weapons considerations, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Masamichi Hanabusa stated in July 1993 that Japan would continue to adhere to the three nuclear principles and that “some political forces in Japan demand that the nuclear powers fulfill their obligations under the NPT before any indefinite extension. Article 6 of the treaty states that nuclear weapon states should strive for further nuclear disarmament.” The spokesperson went on, “Some people may justifiably raise the question as to what extent that objective has been met.” Somewhat surprisingly (and alarming to the United States), the spokesman then suggested rolling extensions, a proposal

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similar to the one some NAM states promoted. In September 1993, 150 prominent academics signed a petition asking Prime Minister Hosokawa not to support indefinite extension.

Japan’s hesitancy in taking a stand in favor of indefinite extension in the spring and summer of 1993 likely stemmed from wading through the various parliamentary and constituent positions, illustrating how a democratic system complicated the decision-making process. Conflicting positions were evident in the confusing government machinations regarding treaty NPT extension in the summer of 1993. In Japan’s national election on July 18, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost control of the Diet for the first time since 1955. Afterwards, then-LDP Foreign Minister Kabun Muto came out and announced that Japan would be ready to support indefinite extension of the NPT in the future, stating that because of the recent elections some procedural matters had to be taken care of. The United States quickly welcomed this position. The next day, the out-going Prime Minister Miyazawa declared that Muto had spoken out of turn and was only expressing his personal views. In August 1993, the new Vice Foreign Minister Kunihiko Saito told the press that Japan was still working out its stance on NPT extension. Japan’s decision-making process appears to indicate that the government was responding to and working through a contentious political issue in which constituencies were on different sides of the issue.

447 Ibid.
450 Ibid.
The evidence above indicates that Japan’s democratic government with its different constituent opinions was relevant to the process of determining whether to support or how to support the extension of the NPT. To support the theory that democracies are more likely to support nonproliferation because of specific characteristics of this system of government, however, evidence would have to show that the government’s decision was based on a majority of citizens supporting indefinite extension or that the country had a strong commitment to multilateral institutions because its democratic tradition and thus supported the treaty. The fact that Japan had a democratic form of government with leaders accountable to the population mattered to the timing of Japan’s decision, but the evidence is insufficient to indicate whether the decision was based on factors related to its democratic form of government.

The theory of domestic nuclear salience is also supported by the strong position of Japanese citizens and leaders who were concerned that allowing the treaty to be extended would weaken leverage for nuclear disarmament. Without the history of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, it is unlikely that this faction would be as widespread or as powerful in influencing the government.

Conclusion: Japan and NPT Extension

In the period leading up to the NPT Review and Extension Conference, there were those in Japan’s government who wanted to hedge and maintain a nuclear weapons option for Japan, as well as constituencies motivated by the historical experience in Hiroshima and Nagasaki who pushed the government not to support extension based on concerns about nuclear disarmament. As a democracy, the government had to at least consider the various factions advocating against supporting indefinite extension in the summer of 1993. Thus hedging and domestic theories are relevant to understanding the process of decision-making within Japan during this period. And
yet, the final outcome, supporting indefinite extension publicly in September 1993 and promoting the extension from then on, is consistent with the expectations of Hegemonic Influence Theory. The Japanese government weighed that its interests were best served in committing to the U.S.-favored position of seeking unconditional indefinite extension of the NPT. The combination of U.S. pressure, U.S. attempts to address the North Korean nuclear program, and Japanese interests in not harming its strong relationship with the United States resulted in the government providing early support for indefinite extension. As expected by Hegemonic Influence Theory, Japan would go on to advocate this position to other states in the international system.

**Indonesia and NPT Extension**

As a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Indonesia was an influential member of a grouping of states that were largely skeptical of indefinite extension. Indonesia favored a proposal for twenty-five year rolling extension of the treaty in order to preserve the leverage of the non-nuclear weapons states in the treaty. In this case, the United States repeatedly failed to garner Indonesia’s commitment. Instead, the United States focused its efforts on ensuring Indonesia did not have a unified NAM position going into the Review Conference. To do this, the United States focused on other NAM states, especially South Africa.

**Assessing Indonesian Favorability to the U.S.-led Order**

Based on a number of indicators, Indonesia is considered a state with “low favorability” to the U.S.-led order in the period leading up to the NPT extension decision. The favorability measure based on UN General Assembly voting data shows Indonesia to be on a sharp decline at this time with its nadir for the entire period of study in 1996. From 1992 to 1995, President
Suharto served as the Secretary-General of the NAM, a grouping that is often at odds with the United States and the U.S.-led order in this period. The United States was no longer focused on fighting communism in this era—a key element of successful U.S.-Indonesian relations during the Cold War—and became more concerned with Suharto’s human rights abuses, which in turn led to growing anti-Americanism within the Suharto regime. In this period, the United States limited military aid to Indonesia and led a resolution in the UN condemning human rights abuses in East Timor.

**Indonesia, NPT Extension, and Hegemonic Leadership Theory**

As anticipated by Indonesia’s unfavorable position toward U.S global leadership, Indonesia was reluctant to extend the NPT, and the United States was thus required to engage in targeted diplomatic actions to attempt to bring about their support. Indonesia’s support mattered because it was a key leader in the NAM. A unified NAM position, with 111 members on board against indefinite extension, would be a major blow to the prospects of indefinite extension. Thus, as a number of former officials confirm, the United States and its allies had the goal of preventing the NAM states from developing a consensus position against indefinite extension at the Review and Extension Conference. For Indonesia, U.S. diplomatic efforts failed and, U.S. leaders, convinced that Indonesia was not going to change its position, shifted focus to winning the support of other NAM states.

Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. visited Jakarta in February 1995. He recalls that the Indonesians were “unmovable.” They told him that if the United States insisted on indefinite

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extension, “it would be a difficult conference.”

Graham had a letter for President Suharto penned by President Clinton requesting support for NPT extension that included an inducement for the Indonesians. The “United States would look ‘positively’ on a Southeast Asian nuclear-weapon free zone—long desired by Indonesia…” if they would support indefinite extension.

The Indonesians refused Graham admittance to the President, though they did accept the letter. The U.S. offer regarding the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone did not appear to influence Indonesia’s leadership, and they continued to maintain the rolling extension proposal.

The multi-week NPT Review and Extension Conference commenced April 17 in New York City. The United States avoided a potential last-minute setback to indefinite extension when a NAM conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, April 27-29, was unable to come to a last-minute consensus position on how to approach the issue of NPT extension. First, the group could not agree on a call for voting by secret ballot at the NPT Extension Conference, a position supported by Indonesia in order for non-nuclear weapons states to resist pressure of the nuclear powers, especially the United States. The United States was strongly against the secret ballot.

Second and more significantly, the NAM also failed at Bandung to agree on promoting Indonesia’s proposal of rolling 25-year extensions of the NPT as an alternative to the indefinite extension sought by the United States and many of its allies. Rolling extensions was the position Indonesia and some like-minded NAM states would champion at the Review Conference. The

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454 Graham, *Disarmament Sketches*, 301.
455 Ibid.
456 Originally scheduled to be held in Geneva, the United States lobbied for a change of venue for this important extension conference, arguing that not all states would be able to have representatives in Geneva, but most states already had a presence in New York because of the United Nations.
lack of a single unified bargaining position behind Indonesia’s proposal weakened NAM’s leverage.

With serious complaints about the NPT, why was Indonesia unable to lead the NAM in coming together at the Bandung Conference in opposing the U.S.-backed position on indefinite extension? Unable to sway Indonesia, the U.S. strategy was to break consensus within the NAM. To do this, the position of another NAM state was key: South Africa. NAM disunity stemmed in large part from the South African position and strong U.S. pressure exerted on South Africa. In 1995, South Africa was a relatively new, but powerful, member of the NAM, with strong nonproliferation credentials as a state that had recently given up its nuclear weapons program. South Africa blocked consensus at the NAM’s Bandung Conference in April saying it would not support the NAM position if it did not include the term “indefinite extension.” Once South Africa’s Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo made a speech at the NPT Review and Extension Conference, on May 9, calling for indefinite extension of the treaty, Western leaders knew alternative proposals had little hope—they had achieved their goal of indefinite extension. The import of the South African position was clear, when after Nzo’s speech some observers witnessed that “[a]n unfortunate mood of ‘triumphalism’ was displayed by some Western delegations confident of the unassailable majority they had gathered.” The inability of the NAM to reach a consensus position was a “turning point” in the conference according to Mexican diplomat Miguel Marin-Bosch. He noted that before the NAM’s Bandung Conference ended, Canada did not have a sufficient number of co-sponsors for the indefinite extension

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resolution (Canada had offered to collect the list of states in favor of extension). After Bandung, approximately thirty NAM states joined as co-sponsors for the Canadian resolution giving it a clear majority. If Indonesia and the NAM had been able to come to a single position, it is unlikely all thirty of these states would have defected to join the indefinite extension position.

Many smaller NAM states did support indefinite extension, but the most important factor in the lack of unity in the consensus-based NAM was South Africa’s dissent. According to Ambassador Graham, the decision to support indefinite extension had been made by South African Vice President Thabo Mbeki “after a long internal debate about whether South Africa’s national interest lay in supporting indefinite extension or the NAM position.” The United States did what it could to shape South Africa’s perceptions about where its interests resided. According to one news report at the time, the United States had lobbied South Africa in the months before the NAM’s Bandung Conference telling South Africa that its tentative support for rolling 25-year NPT extensions “called into question its ‘nonproliferation credentials’ and its right to gain membership in an exclusive nuclear exporters trade group [the Nuclear Suppliers Group].” Another news report indicated the United States had engaged in two years of lobbying South African leaders over indefinite extension, including a letter sent to Nelson Mandela from General Colin Powell requesting support. Vice President Al Gore had developed a close relationship with Mbeki, after they served together on a special inter-

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460 Graham, *Disarmament Sketches*, 267.
governmental commission. Gore personally asked for Mbeki’s support, according to former U.S officials.\textsuperscript{463} NPT Review Conference chair Jayantha Dhanapala confirmed the importance of this interpersonal relationship: “A special link on key [NPT Review and Extension Conference] issues is said to have been established between U.S. Vice President Al Gore…and South African Vice President Thabo Mbeki, ensuring South Africa’s support for an indefinite extension of the NPT. This was an undoubted diplomatic triumph, especially as South Africa had proposed another 25-year extension during the Preparatory Committee stage.”\textsuperscript{464} By splitting off a key NAM member with strong nonproliferation bona fides, the United States was able to ensure that the NAM remained divided and the Indonesians had little chance in gaining strong support for their alternative proposal of rolling extensions.

The United States and its allies also put significant diplomatic pressure on other prominent NAM states to support indefinite extension. In January 1995, the United States had helped bailout Mexico from its peso crisis, providing billions of dollars from a U.S. stabilization fund and organizing INF loans. U.S. leaders were stunned when in the same month Mexico’s Foreign Minister said Mexico supported indefinite extension of the NPT on the condition that CTBT negotiations were concluded.\textsuperscript{465} Publicly, ACDA Director Holum did not support linking aid to the NPT vote but he did promise, “This is not one we’ll forget about.”\textsuperscript{466} Venezuela and Mexico in particular apparently felt pressure to abandon the cause of rolling extensions once at

\textsuperscript{463} Author interview with former U.S. official, Arlington VA, April 14, 2015; Author interview with former U.S. official, Washington DC, February 5, 2014.


the Review and Extension Conference. \footnote{467} Venezuelan Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat resigned from head of the Venezuelan delegation after his country, from the capital, switched its position on indefinite extension and decided to support the Canadian resolution at the last minute. When asked why his country changed its position from 25-year rolling extension to indefinite extension he replied, “My only answer is that there had been too much pressure...applied in all directions.”\footnote{468}

Over the course of the conference support for Indonesia’s position waned. By May 9, \textit{The New York Times} reported, “Indonesia, which began the conference as head of a large group of nations opposed to indefinite extension, was by Friday able to get only a handful of support for its formal proposal calling for perpetual renewals every 25 years.”\footnote{469} Indonesia’s supporters included Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.” At the conference, eight states made speeches exhibiting some level of dissent against indefinite extension, including Syria, Jordan, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Egypt, Malaysia, and Nigeria.\footnote{470} Notably, the group of states aligned with Indonesia’s position represents some of states least favorable to the U.S.-led order according to the UNGA data.

The Indonesian position lost any remaining steam during the conference, after South Africa began developing a compromise proposal with the nuclear states. This proposal was similar to one put forth by Mexico, but most importantly, it included a \textit{non-binding} statement of

principles (“Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament”) for the nuclear weapons states. The Principles called for the nuclear weapons states to commit to a CTBT, a Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT), and systematic and progressive efforts toward disarmament. These principles were not legally binding, making this compromise position much more appealing to the nuclear weapons states who sought unconditional extension. The compromise also included a commitment to strengthen the review process of the treaty (“the Strengthening of the Review Process of the Treaty”), by adding regular Preparatory Commission meetings in the three years before each five-year Review Conference.

Randal Rydell and Jayantha Dhanapala, in their recounting of the 1995 extension conference, note that a key contribution to the emerging consensus toward indefinite extension was provided by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who arrived in New York after the NAM Bandung Conference disbanded. Alatas proposed a more explicit linkage between the documents on the “Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament” and the “Strengthening of the Review Process of the Treaty” and the proposal for indefinite extension. As a result, three parallel decisions were then presented to the entire membership “with built-in linkages although it was acknowledged that while the extension decision was legally binding the other two were politically binding.”471

U.S. Ambassador Graham had initially wavered when considering the Indonesian’s linkage proposal. As he was thinking about what the U.S. position should be, the Indonesian Ambassador to the IAEA, recognizing that they were getting very little for agreeing to allow the

471 Rydell and Dhanapala, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT, 9.
indefinite extension proposal to move forward, said, “Oh come on, Tom, give us a crumb.” Graham then agreed. Indonesia, leading the opposition against indefinite extension, would ultimately not oppose the compromise outcome. In Essis Essoh’s study of the 1995 NPT Conference she concludes, “Indonesia…agreed not to oppose consensus when it became clear not only that there were a majority for indefinite extension, but also that it was impossible to get more non-aligned states to support a rolling 25-year extension.” In other words, Indonesia knew that it had lost, and chose not to oppose the final outcome.

In an interview after the fact, the Indonesian ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti bemoaned the approach used by the United States to bring about the indefinite extension:

What I feel as very disturbing is how they have reached the majority for indefinite extension. It is simply by the use of pressure tactics against smaller countries. Not all of them were being pressured. There are those that already had positions in favor of indefinite extension, but many countries complained to us about pressure with conditionalities and other types of pressures. This might lead to a bad precedent and this should be avoided in the future.

Later in the same interview Wisnumurti states:

There were other countries—members of the European Union—working in their own sphere of influence, lobbying and in some cases putting pressures on various countries. I even heard complaints from Western countries, “smaller guys” in the Western group, that felt the pressure was too hard. This kind of arm twisting is unacceptable. This is very undemocratic.

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475 Ibid., 6.
In other interviews after the conference, a number of participants indicated that pressure had been used to coerce smaller powers, with few specific examples of this pressure cited.\textsuperscript{476} U.S. officials who were working in the U.S. government at the time indicate that some states did ask for favors in exchange for their vote, but these former officials were unwilling to provide specific details.\textsuperscript{477}

Though U.S. attempts at influencing Indonesia were not successful in changing Indonesia’s position on extension, hegemonic pressure is the best explanation for both Indonesia’s capitulation and the final outcome of the conference. As Mexican Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch put it after the Conference, the reason the non-nuclear weapons states were not able to get more from the nuclear weapons states was twofold, “a) the divided non-aligned…b) the situation we are living everyday… It is a unipolar 1946 world—there is only one superpower.”\textsuperscript{478}

\textbf{Indonesia, NPT Extension and Hedging}

There is no evidence to indicate that Indonesia was motivated to oppose indefinite extension because a desire to hedge on a nuclear weapons program in the future. When examining the states that opposed indefinite extension the strongest, however, we see there may be some truth to this theory for states aligned with Indonesia at the Review Conference. Opposing indefinite extension of the NPT was a vote both for making the treaty contingent on future decisions, and arguably for weakening the treaty regime. At the time many analysts

\textsuperscript{476} Ibid.\textsuperscript{477} Author interview with former U.S. official, Washington DC, July 22, 2014; Author interview with former U.S. official, Arlington, VA, April 14, 2015;\textsuperscript{478} Welsh, “Delegate Perspectives,” 7.
considered that anything but indefinite extension would be a blow to the treaty. The supporters for Indonesia’s alternative proposal, those who wanted to avoid enshrining the NPT indefinitely, included Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Three of these states, North Korea, Myanmar, and Iran, would later have or be suspected of having nuclear weapons ambitions. Perhaps they preferred a world in which they could proliferate within a weaker nonproliferation regime. But for Indonesia and many of the other states, there is little evidence that they were motivated to weaken the regime out of a desire to hedge.

**Indonesia, NPT Extension and Nuclear Energy**

Indonesia has long had ambitions toward nuclear power, as discussed in the previous chapter, and it did have a nuclear regulatory agency at this time. U.S. and Indonesian officials report the nuclear regulatory agency in Indonesia supported indefinite extension of the NPT outright to avoid any the disruption to nuclear supply. When U.S. Ambassador Graham visited Jakarta in February 1995 to deliver the letter from President Clinton he also met with BATAN, Indonesia’s nuclear agency. He found that they were in favor of indefinite extension because of nuclear supply concerns, but they had little leverage with the more powerful Indonesian Foreign Ministry.\(^{479}\) Thus the intuition that the desire for continued nuclear trade results in commitment applies to this case, but those seeking to commitment to indefinite extension were not powerful enough within the Indonesian government to have their preferences set policy.

**Indonesia, NPT Extension and Disarmament**

\(^{479}\) Graham, *Disarmament Sketches*, 272.
The disarmament theory is relevant to this case, as Indonesia’s position supporting 25-year rolling NPT extensions does appear to stem from the desire to pressure the five NWS to agree to greater nuclear disarmament progress. Indonesia led a group of states that wanted security guarantees and promises of specific disarmament steps in exchange for their support to extend the treaty. These states earned some disarmament concessions at the 1995 Conference, though the concessions were largely non-binding.

Leading up to the 1995 Conference, Indonesia and the NAM made clear they sought concrete progress on disarmament in exchange for extending the NPT indefinitely. At the March 1994 NPT Preparatory Committee meeting, Indonesia submitted the NAM’s position on the treaty to the conference chairman. The letter noted that there were “fundamental shortcomings” in the NPT and that the success of the 1995 Review Conference would be aided by improvements on nuclear disarmament, NWS cooperation with nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ), progress on the CTBT, security assurances for NNWS, progress on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, and fewer “unjust” limitations on nuclear technology.480 Many non-nuclear weapons states, especially in the NAM, recognized the 1995 Review Conference as a rare opportunity to exert leverage over the nuclear weapons states because they represented a majority of NPT parties.

In the end, concessions to Indonesia and its like-minded partners included promising progress on the CTBT, adding the non-binding “Principles” document at the Review Conference, and supporting a spring 1995 UNGA vote on security guarantees for non-nuclear weapons states. In the end whether these limited actions were sufficient for Indonesia not to block consensus, or

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whether it had few options once it was evident the majority favored indefinite extension, is unclear. The non-nuclear states received no legally binding commitments from the nuclear weapons states in exchange for indefinite extension of the treaty. Former Mexican ambassador Marin-Bosch who attended the Conference wrote afterwards “…in exchange for the indefinite extension of the NPT (which all five nuclear-weapon states favored strongly) the non-nuclear states got almost nothing.”

Did Indonesia gain anything else from its position? No available evidence suggests that Indonesia attempted to use this opportunity to receive non-nuclear-related inducements from the United States; it appears their focus was on problems with the regime. Indonesia gained attention on the international stage and bolstered its reputation as a leader in the NAM and in issues of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament through this process. However, the United States and its like-minded partners ensured the outcome of the extension conference did not hinge on Indonesia’s position. Nonetheless, the theory related to stalled nuclear disarmament progress does help explain Indonesia’s behavior in the lead up to the Review and Extension Conference.

Indonesia, NPT Extension and Regime Type

There is little indication that regime type was relevant in this case. Indonesia was an autocracy, and there is little evidence that nuclear issues were highly salient to the domestic population at this time.

Indonesia and NPT Extension: Conclusion

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As a state unfavorable to the U.S.-led order at this time, Indonesia could not be persuaded to go along with indefinite extension of the treaty. But Indonesia’s position on NPT extension stemmed largely from a desire to maintain leverage on the nuclear weapons states to pursue disarmament through 25-year extensions of the treaty instead of the U.S. position of indefinite extension. Indonesia steadfastly held to this position through the NPT Review and Extension Conference. For this reason, the disarmament theory is most applicable to Indonesia’s decision-making surrounding indefinite extension. It was the U.S. strategy of pursuing commitment from South Africa, however, that divided the NAM and weakened Indonesia’s alternative proposal. Though the United States was unable to influence or coerce Indonesia, U.S. pressure and influence explains Indonesia’s inability to successfully promote its rolling extension proposal, through the strategy of dividing the NAM. Thus the Hegemonic Leadership Theory is relevant to the outcome in which Indonesia was unable to garner support for its rolling extension proposal.

**Egypt and NPT Extension**

Egypt was an extremely challenging case for the United States during the campaign to achieve indefinite extension of the NPT. Not only was Egypt against the U.S. position—Egyptian Ambassador Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker explicitly stated after the conference, “We were not in favor of an indefinite extension”[^482]—the United States had to actively work to keep Egypt from undermining U.S. diplomacy among other Arab states. Egypt used the NPT extension conference to focus attention on Israel’s undeclared nuclear program, succeeding in side-lining the conference for a period while NPT parties addressed the issue of Israel.

**Assessing U.S. Favorability toward the U.S.-led Order**

[^482]: Welsh, “Delegate Perspectives,”11.
U.S.-Egyptian relations were complex during this period, with Egyptian favorability toward the United States lower than the period surrounding the Camp David Accords, but not nearly as low as it is at present. The 1990s began positively as Egypt supported the United States in the 1991 Gulf War. As a result of this support, the United States lobbied for debt forgiveness for billions of dollars in Egyptian debt.\footnote{Steven Greenhouse, “Half of Egypt's $20.2 Billion Debt Being forgiven by U.S. and Allies,” \textit{The New York Times}, May 27, 1991.} Moreover, the United States continued to provide Egypt with over a billion dollars in annual aid as part of the Camp David Accords.\footnote{“Perry, in Egypt, Vows U.S. Will Not Cut Aid,” \textit{Los Angeles Times}, January 8, 1995.} Based on the UN General Assembly voting measure, however, Egypt was quite unfavorable to the U.S.-led order and on a downward slope, though not as negative as Indonesia during this period. President Mubarak faced a difficult balancing act when it came to relations with the United States. On the one hand, Egypt received billions in aid and the Egyptian military collaborated with the U.S. military. On the other, the United States was linked to Israel, and Mubarak continued to focus diplomatic attention on Israel and its position outside of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Therefore Egypt is assessed as having “Low to Moderate Favorability” during this period.

\textbf{Egypt, NPT Extension and Hegemonic Leadership}

As Egypt was relatively unfavorable to U.S. leadership in the period of NPT extension, the theory based on hegemonic leadership would predict that it would be difficult for the United States to easily garner commitment from this state. As the source of hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Egypt, however, the United States did have significant means of leverage.

Most of the U.S. efforts vis-à-vis Egypt during the lead-up to the extension conference were more in line with damage control related to Egypt’s intense focus on Israel, rather than
attempts to convince Egypt of the merits of indefinite extension. Throughout the 1980s and early
1990s, Egyptian leaders had used international fora to call on Israel to join the NPT. Egypt led a
boycott of Arab states against joining the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which entered
into force in 1993, until Israel committed to the NPT. The Egyptians took this position despite
President George H.W. Bush’s interest in the CWC and “clear signs of displeasure from—and an
interest in maintaining close ties with—Washington.”\(^{485}\) Thus as in the case of the CWC, for
NPT extension, concerns for Israel trumped relations with the United States.

In the years before the April 1995 NPT Extension Conference, Egyptian leader Hosni
Mubarak claimed he would only support NPT extension if Israel joined the treaty, and at times
he sought to have other Middle East leaders join his position. Egypt’s potential to harm U.S.
efforts to gain the support from as many states as possible meant Egypt received a great deal of
high level U.S. attention in this period, and at times, implicit and explicit threats. Ambassador
Graham visited Cairo and Tel Aviv in December 1994, seeking to persuade Egypt that indefinite
extension would make it more likely that Israel would eventually join the treaty.\(^{486}\) Towards the
end of January, Egyptian leaders again announced that they would not support indefinite
extension unless Israel joined the NPT, raising tensions with the United States.\(^{487}\) Cairo seemed
to be able to persuade some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia, to waver in their support of
indefinite extension. In response, the United States sent Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau to Egypt. He allegedly told Egyptian leaders, in a not so subtle

\(^{485}\) Shai Feldman, Extending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: The Middle East Debate,” Research
\(^{486}\) Graham, Disarmament Sketches, 269.
threat, that some in Congress were thinking about reconsidering the $2.2 billion in annual aid provided by the United States due to Egyptian threats to complicate the NPT extension process.\(^{488}\) (Senator John McCain had recently said something to this effect in a Congressional hearing related to nuclear nonproliferation.\(^{489}\)) A former U.S. government official serving at the time of this visit indicated that Pelletreau’s statement about aid was not an insignificant threat and would have been carefully vetted within the U.S. government.\(^{490}\) In a similar threat, one unnamed official is quoted in the press at this time saying said that Mexico and Egypt could be persuaded to support the U.S. position on the NPT if their enormous U.S aid packages were “held in the balance.”\(^{491}\) How much these threats mattered is unclear—surely the United States did not want to weaken Mubarak’s regime and would have been unlikely to follow through on this threat, but that does not mean the U.S. Congress would not have considered it or that it would not have affected Mubarak’s considerations. Feldman writes that although Pelletreau’s visit “did not induce Egyptian leaders to alter their position on the indefinite extension of the NPT, it seems to have contributed to the softening of their rhetoric on that issue”.\(^{492}\)

Egypt continued to receive a great deal of U.S. attention in the months before the NPT extension conference. In early March, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher visited Egypt to discuss its position on Israel and the indefinite extension. After Christopher’s visit, Egypt’s position softened and Egypt announced it would not block indefinite extension while it continued

\(^{488}\) Ibid., 21.  
\(^{489}\) Graham, Disarmament Sketches, 271.  
\(^{490}\) Author interview with former U.S. official, Arlington VA, April 14, 2015.  
\(^{491}\) Opall, “U.S. Turns of Diplomatic Heat for NPT Votes.”  
\(^{492}\) Feldman, “Extending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” 12.
to pressure Israel to join the NPT. Nonetheless, later the same month at a specially-called Arab League meeting, Egypt attempted to persuade eight other Arab states to sign on to a document declaring they would not support indefinite extension unless Israel joined the NPT. Vice President Al Gore then arrived in Cairo to have a “blunt” discussion with Egypt and members of the Arab League. Gore met with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to try “soften his position.” President Mubarak then visited Washington in early April where President Clinton sought to convince him to support indefinite extension. Mubarak reportedly promised not to block consensus or try to convince other states to object to indefinite extension. Mubarak appeared to have kept this promise at the Conference.

**Egypt, NPT Extension, and Hedging**

With a nuclear-armed adversary on its border, Egypt may not have wanted to further strengthen a treaty that was constraining its own nuclear options and thus rejected the extension of a treaty that was not serving its security interests. Furthermore, pointing a finger at this adversary provided a reasonable justification as to why Egypt would not support indefinite extension. There is little evidence, however, that Egypt was considering its own nuclear weapons program at this time. The historical record, as discussed below, suggests Mubarak’s campaign about Israel was more in line with considerations of domestic and regional power than national security.

494 Steinberg, “Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision,” 22.
Egypt, NPT Extension and Nuclear Energy

There is little evidence to suggest that a desire for an expanded civilian nuclear program motivated Mubarak’s actions on NPT extension. The civilian nuclear program had been cancelled after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, and was not revived for another ten years.

Egypt, NPT Extension and Disarmament

Egypt joined other states at the conference seeking greater disarmament concessions in exchange for support of NPT extension. And while Egypt has consistently called for greater disarmament progress, it appears that in this case, Egyptian leadership was primarily motivated by the regional and domestic benefits of seeking the disarmament of one state in particular: Israel.

Egypt, NPT Extension and Regime Type

There is little evidence to suggest that regime type was relevant to Mubarak’s actions on NPT extension, but the salience of nuclear weapons, particularly Israel’s weapons, to the domestic (and regional) population was significant. Mubarak appeared to have been motivated to use the issue of Israel’s status as a non-NPT state to bring himself greater domestic and regional power. This was only possible as a tactic because the issue of nuclear weapons, specifically Israel’s presumed nuclear weapons, was salient to the domestic and regional populations Mubarak sought to court. Because of the relevance of these weapons in Egypt and the broader Middle East, Mubarak was able to use the purported Israeli arsenal and the NPT Review Conference for his own benefit.

In August 1994, Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Mousa made his first official visit to Israel in which he said his primary goal was to encourage the Israelis to ratify the NPT. This visit marked a new level of conflict between the two neighbors, one that resulted in numerous high-level meetings in fall of 1994 and spring of 1995.\textsuperscript{498} After Mousa’s visit, President Mubarak announced that Egypt would withdraw from the treaty if the issue of Israel’s nuclear status was not covered in the NPT Review and Extension Conference.\textsuperscript{499} With the issue threatening both the on-going Middle East peace process and the NPT Review and Extension Conference, the United States began pressuring Egypt to back off its position. Some U.S. consideration was given to pressuring Israel to shut-down its Dimona reactor or provide Egypt with a lesser gesture, such as indicating its intention to sign the NPT at some point in the future,\textsuperscript{500} but it became clear that Israel was not going to capitulate. In fact, the Israelis assumed the Egyptian bluster was intended for domestic audiences and thus it would not necessarily help if the Israelis did respond. From 1994 through the spring 1995 Conference, relations between Israel and Egypt would be dominated by the nuclear issue.\textsuperscript{501}

Domestically, politicians and analysts at the time assumed that Mubarak’s campaign for Israel and the NPT was in part based on a desire “to mollify his domestic opposition.”\textsuperscript{502} During this period Mubarak was facing an Islamic insurgency. The intense focus on the Israeli nuclear issue provided a distraction through a popular issue. Mubarak’s stance also allowed him to receive a great deal of attention for the highest levels of the U.S. government, and at times he

\textsuperscript{498} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{499} Quoted in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{501} Steinberg, “Middle East Peace and the NPT Extension Decision,”19.
\textsuperscript{502} David Makovsky, “Peres Plans Meet with Mubarak Over NPT Crisis,” \textit{The Jerusalem Post}, February 20, 1995.
was able to gain in popularity through a showing of his lack of cooperation with the United States. He would not be bullied. In the broader Middle East, Mubarak’s intense focus on Israel allowed Egypt to reclaim leadership at a period when its traditional regional leadership was slipping.\textsuperscript{503} These tactics appear to have worked. As Shai Feldman concludes:

\begin{quote}
Egypt’s tough position also made Cairo a central address for appeals for indefinite extension of the NPT. Thus, Egypt’s militant position may have been intended to compensate for its domestic troubles and diminished standing in regional affairs. This became increasingly evident as the NPT campaign evolved; Egypt’s position evoked strong nationalist sentiments, increasing domestic support for the Mubarak government.\textsuperscript{504}
\end{quote}

In addition, pointing the finger at Israel allowed Mubarak to reclaim regional leadership at a period in time when it was diminishing. The United States was mediating peace between Israel and Syria and negotiating between Israel and the Palestinians, leaving Egypt out of both processes.\textsuperscript{505} Egypt was also being marginalized by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the United States in its efforts to secure the border between Kuwait and Iraq in October 1994.\textsuperscript{506}

Even after the United States and its allies had secured a majority of states in favor of indefinite extension at the April 1995 Review Conference, the issue of Egypt and Israel stymied progress as Egypt continued to focus on naming Israel as a non-NPT state in the official conference documents. The compromise on indefinite extension had to be delayed one day while

\textsuperscript{503} Former Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy recently wrote, “Regrettably, Egypt has shrunk to the periphery of regional relations, exchanging the leadership and vision of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat for a far less ambitious foreign policy. Though Hosni Mubarak’s policies were initially successful in ensuring stability and security and reconciling Egypt with the Arab world, this early proactive phase was followed by a long period of political dormancy and stagnation.” “Egypt in the World,” \textit{Cairo Review of Global Affairs} (undated). http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=222 (accessed June 25, 2015).

\textsuperscript{504} Cited in Rublee’s \textit{Nonproliferation Norms}; Shai Feldman, \textit{Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control}, 221.

\textsuperscript{505} Feldman, “Extending the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” 7.

\textsuperscript{506} Ibid.
the United States, Egypt, and a small group of states worked feverishly on a Middle East Resolution. Egypt wanted to name Israel specifically; the United States rejected this position. Concerned this development would undermine the treaty extension, President Clinton became involved from his travels in Moscow.\textsuperscript{507} In the end the resolution referred to all states in the Middle East region outside of the treaty and to unsafeguarded technology in the region. Changes in language meant that Egypt did not want to sponsor the resolution and the United States, Great Britain and Russia became the official sponsors of the Middle East Resolution. Egypt had partly achieved its goal through the resolution, but the press surrounding the conference delay made it very clear that Israel was the reason.

Egypt’s strategy of holding out on agreeing to the NPT’s extension for as long as possible allowed it to put a global spotlight on Israel’s treaty status for months. This is a prime example of a state using the nuclear nonproliferation regime to its advantage, and in this case it provided Egypt both domestic and regional benefits, but only because nuclear weapons were salient to the domestic populations at home and in the region. Though Egypt’s specific regime type did not matter for this mechanism, it is consistent with a domestic theory of regime behavior.

Egypt and NPT Extension: Conclusion

As anticipated by Hegemonic Leadership Theory, Egypt, a state exhibiting low to moderate favorability to the U.S.-led order, was not quick to commit to NPT extension. The United States exerted a great deal of pressure on Egypt to convince Mubarak to curtail his attempts to undermine the indefinite extension outcome through his influence on other states in

the region. The highest levels of U.S. government leadership engaged with Mubarak, which had some effect on mitigating his behavior but also helped Mubarak’s standing at home and in the region. Because of the relevance of nuclear weapons on Egypt’s border, Mubarak was able to use the regime to his advantage domestically and regionally. As a NAM state, U.S. efforts described in the Indonesian case to divide the NAM were also relevant to explaining why Egypt was unable to promote an alternative to indefinite extension.

**Conclusion**

The above evidence indicates support for a theory of hegemonic leadership in explaining variation in state decision-making surrounding the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the final outcome of the conference. As expected, Japan signed on early to support indefinite extension, though the process was not without its challenges due to the change in the Japanese government in the summer of 1993. As states less favorable to U.S. global leadership in this period, both Indonesia and Egypt were against indefinite extension. For Indonesia, U.S. pressure was not successful in bringing Indonesia around to the U.S.-favored position, but U.S. diplomatic engagement with South Africa meant the NAM would not have a unified position behind the Indonesian proposal. U.S. pressure mainly served to keep the Egyptians from hampering U.S. efforts in achieving extension.

**Table Q: Assessment of Favorability to U.S. Global Leadership & NPT Extension Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Favorability to U.S.</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>Global Leadership</strong></td>
<td>High Favorability</td>
<td>Low Favorability</td>
<td>Low-Moderate Favorability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position on 1995</strong>&lt;br&gt;<strong>NPT indefinite extension</strong></td>
<td>In favor</td>
<td>Against</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In addition to hegemonic leadership theory, all other theories except that related to civilian nuclear energy find some relevance to the decision-making process of the three states as shown in the table below.

**Table R: Summary of Competing Theories of Regime Commitment (1995 NPT Extension)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories:</th>
<th>Cases:</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic Leadership</td>
<td>In favor in 1992</td>
<td>Hegemon’s diplomacy was a necessary condition</td>
<td>Hegemon failed to persuade Indonesia, but succeeded in breaking NAM consensus favored by Indonesia</td>
<td>Hegemonic pressure failed to persuade Egypt, but succeeded in stopping Egyptian obstruction at conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging Theory</td>
<td>Concern of some factions contributed to complicating Japan’s process of supporting extension in 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Theory</td>
<td>Concern of some factions contributed to complicating Japan’s process of supporting extension in 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament Theory</td>
<td>Concern of some factions contributed to complicating Japan’s process of supporting extension in 1993</td>
<td>Perceptions of failed bargain led to Indonesia’s refusal to support indefinite extension</td>
<td>Disarmament concerns focused on Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Theory</td>
<td>Democratic process contributed to complicating Japan’s process of supporting extension in 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Salience of nuclear weapons to the domestic population encouraged Mubarak’s uncooperative stance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bold text indicates most important factors)
For Japan, concerns about North Korea’s nuclear program caused some in the government to reject extension and study a Japanese nuclear option. On the other side of the political spectrum, those seeking global disarmament were concerned that indefinite extension would not put enough pressure on nuclear states to disarm. These factions within the government and the population, along with Japan’s change in government in 1993, served to complicate Japan’s support for a short period of time in the summer of 1993.

Indonesia’s position appears to have been motivated by a concern about a lack of disarmament progress by the NPT nuclear weapon states, while Egypt primarily used the extension conference and the domestic salience of Israel’s non-NPT status.

This case illustrated that when the nonproliferation stakes are high, the hegemon uses all of its tools of persuasion—educational outreach, diplomatic pressure, inducements, and threats—to achieve its desired outcome. Though U.S. leaders failed to persuade Indonesia and were consistently frustrated by the Egyptians, in the end, the outcome of the conference—extension of the NPT in perpetuity—is best explained by a multi-year diplomatic effort led by the United States and support of states favorable to U.S. leadership.
In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, inspectors were surprised to learn of Iraq’s extensive nuclear weapons program. Despite visits by IAEA inspectors twice a year for a decade, Iraq managed to build a clandestine program adjacent to inspected locations. This discovery illustrated the weakness in IAEA safeguards: inspectors would only visit sites declared by the state. The IAEA had the legal authority to undertake “special inspections,” but in practice it had never carried one out. If a state set out to cheat, as the Iraqis had done, it simply did not declare all of their nuclear sites. As a result of this discovery, the United States, other allies, and IAEA inspectors began promoting a strengthened safeguards mechanism within the IAEA. Lack of North Korean cooperation with the IAEA in 1993 further bolstered calls for improvements to IAEA safeguards.

In 1993, the IAEA Board of Governors mandated that the IAEA Secretariat propose means for strengthening safeguards. This effort proceeded along two tracks. First, the IAEA set about strengthening safeguard agreements based on rights they already possessed but had not put into practice (e.g., conducting special inspections, environmental sampling). Second, it developed a new more stringent safeguards model protocol agreement to attach to states’ Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements.

The Model Additional Protocol (AP) was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors in May 1997. From this point, states were encouraged by the IAEA to conclude their own bilateral treaties with the IAEA adding an AP to their extant safeguard agreements. The Model AP includes a number of provisions to increase inspector access, including inspections across all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle from mines to waste facilities, short-notice inspections, quicker visa processing for inspectors, and environmental sampling.

The conclusion of an AP agreement with the IAEA has not been a high profile event within most states, in contrast to the highly visible and politicized 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference discussed in the previous chapter. The decision to ratify an AP appears to involve fewer political actors and instead is focused on the foreign ministry and bureaucrats within the nuclear regulatory and technological agencies, as well as within the state’s nuclear industry, if it exists. Though lower in profile, U.S. administration officials have prioritized the universalization of the AP as it significantly improves the IAEA’s ability to detect clandestine nuclear weapons programs. We would thus expect the theory of hegemonic leadership to find relevance in states’ AP ratification decisions.

This chapter provides qualitative evidence on the importance of U.S. leadership in promoting the nuclear nonproliferation regime, first, by recounting the U.S. role in the Model AP’s development, and, second, by process-tracing decision-making about the AP within Japan, Indonesia, and Egypt. The results indicate support for Hegemonic Leadership Theory in the cases of Japan and Egypt. Japan was quick to ratify and Egypt is still without an AP. Indonesia was quicker to conclude an AP than its favorability toward U.S. global leadership would predict,

509 Ibid.
although relations with the United States were improving at this time, Indonesian domestic politics were ripe for early adoption, and its leaders were strongly influenced by a key U.S. ally.

**Additional Protocol Background**

As expected by a theory predicated on the strong role of the hegemon in developing and promoting the nuclear nonproliferation regime, U.S. leadership was key to the successful Model AP negotiations within the IAEA. Theodore Hirsh writes that the United States was “instrumental” to the AP’s acceptance by the IAEA.\(^{510}\) Houck et al. in their history of the AP negotiations concluded that the success of the IAEA committee that negotiated the Model AP was in part based upon “U.S. leadership and support from the highest levels of the USG.”\(^{511}\) A multivolume history of the development of the AP captures all of the ways in which the United States influenced the process:

> It is important to note the important role played by the U.S. throughout the process of the development of safeguards strengthening measures and the negotiation of the Model Additional Protocol. Led by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and with strong support from an interagency team, especially the Departments of Energy and State, the U.S. supported the effort to strengthen the safeguards system from start to finish. In addition to numerous consultations with the IAEA, the U.S. regularly consulted with friends and allies. Numerous diplomatic messages were sent to capitals to help reinforce U.S. positions. The U.S. also had the benefit of being able to take advantage of support from the senior-most levels of the U.S. government, including the White House. This support played a pivotal role in the negotiations within Committee 24.\(^{512}\)

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The U.S. strategy to bring about a stronger IAEA safeguards agreement was to focus first on discussing the AP with Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and occasionally with China. According to a former U.S. official familiar with the history of the AP, U.S. delegations met with these states because the majority of concerns with the new safeguard agreement came from states with significant civilian nuclear infrastructure—these states faced the burden of additional requirements more than other states.\textsuperscript{513} In order to establish an AP, it was important for the United States to get these states on board early in the process of developing the new safeguards text.

In 1996, the IAEA established Committee 24, made up of the IAEA Board of Governors, to draft a new safeguards protocol. At the first Committee 24 meeting very few developing nations showed up, except Nigeria, indicating the low priority of these issues for many states, especially those without significant nuclear technology.\textsuperscript{514} Committee 24 met during the period from July 1996 to April 1997. Once the IAEA finalized the Model AP (INFCIRC/540) on May 16, 1997, states were able to negotiate their own bilateral AP with the IAEA based on the model text.

A delay in its own conclusion of an AP affected the ability of the United States to strongly promote the AP abroad early on. Similar to other international treaties, states join the AP in a two-step process of signing before ratifying or “concluding” it. Australia was the first state to sign the AP, in September 1997. President Clinton signed the AP on June 12, 1998, but the AP was not submitted to the U.S. Senate for ratification until 2004 during the George W.

\textsuperscript{513} Phone Interview with former U.S. official, December 5, 2014.  
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid.
Bush administration. What accounts for this pause in submitting an agreement that was promoted so strongly by the United States? First, the additional IAEA inspections allowed under the AP were an obstacle within the U.S. interagency. After the 1987 U.S.-Soviet Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF) and its unprecedented on-site verification protocol, many U.S. agencies were hesitant about new rigorous inspections. The Department of Energy’s security department was especially wary.515 Second, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was enveloped into the State Department during this period and key members of the former AP delegation at the IAEA were given other responsibilities as they moved over to State or retired as a result of the merger. Those who continued on with responsibility for the AP wanted to make sure they got the implementing legislation right before submitting it to Congress, an effort that took on greater importance after the Senate rejected the CTBT in November 1999.

According to one former U.S. official, the United States made some overtures to other states about concluding AP agreements in the late 1990s and early 2000s, but there was never a serious push until the United States took steps to conclude its own AP with the IAEA.516 One early effort occurred at the 1998 G-8 summit. The Foreign Ministers’ statement from that meeting reads, “we urge all countries to conclude additional safeguards protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency at the earliest possible date and, recognising the Agency's efforts to make the system more efficient, to ensure that it has the resources necessary to implement this dramatic non-proliferation accomplishment.”517 The 1999 and 2000 G-8

515 Author interview with former U.S. official, Arlington, VA, April 14, 2015
516 Ibid.
statements did not mention the AP, except for calling on Iran to conclude one in 2000. The AP reappeared again in the 2001 G-8 statement: “We call on all States who have not already done so to conclude appropriate safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).”

A 2000 report by Mark Hibbs is illustrative of the challenge the U.S. leaders faced in promoting the AP without U.S. ratification:

The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry and its disarmament bureaucracy have raised serious questions about the Additional Protocol. They objected this month that the nuclear weapons states and, in particular, the U.S., which is most strongly advocating international adherence to the protocol, are not compelled to have IAEA safeguards on their nuclear activities and that, in the view of Hanoi officials, the Additional Protocol is likewise ‘not universal’ in its scope and application.

By the end of the Clinton administration, the U.S. push for the AP had lost steam, in part due to the aforementioned bureaucratic shake-up resulting from merging ACDA into the State Department in 1997 and ACDA’s ultimate disbanding in 1999. During the tail end of the Clinton administration, however, close U.S. allies continued to press for universalization of the AP. As Hibbs recounted at the time, “Sensing that the effort to implement the IAEA's bold post-Iraq plan for ‘enhanced safeguards’ was losing steam internationally, last April a handful of states, led by Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, pressed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference in New York to make the Additional Protocol binding on all NPT parties. The move was opposed by a

majority of NPT states.” A U.S. official familiar with this period explained that the United States supported this effort at the 2000 Review Conference by its allies, but was not involved in part because promotion for the AP would be more effective coming from states that had already ratified the Additional Protocol.

For the George W. Bush administration, nuclear nonproliferation became a top priority, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. According to U.S. officials who served at this time, nuclear nonproliferation was a White House-led effort and the AP became one of the key areas of focus. In May 2002, President Bush sent the AP to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. In his letter of transmittal, President Bush stated that “universal adoption” of the AP was “a central goal of nonproliferation policy.” The term “universalization” in reference to the AP was not commonly used until the Bush administration started the U.S. ratification process.

Once the United States began its AP ratification process, the U.S. campaign for AP universalization began in earnest. In this effort the United States engaged in a number of mechanisms of hegemonic persuasion including changing the rules of the regime, diplomatic pressure, and educational outreach.

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522 Phone interview with former U.S. official, December 5, 2014.
In late 2003, members of the Bush national security staff came up with a list of near-term steps on nuclear nonproliferation including a major speech by the topic. In February 2004, President Bush delivered this speech at the National Defense University. He announced a “change in the rules” of the regime by linking the supply of U.S. nuclear technology to adoption of the AP, similar to the way the Carter administration had limited supply to those with full-scope safeguards in the 1970s. Bush stated:

It is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover banned nuclear activity around the world and report those violations to the U.N. Security Council. We must ensure that the IAEA has all the tools it needs to fulfill its essential mandate. America and other nations support what is called the Additional Protocol, which requires states to declare a broad range of nuclear activities and facilities and allows the IAEA to inspect those facilities. As a fifth step, I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civilian nuclear programs. Nations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol.  

As one of the major suppliers of civilian nuclear technology, the United States declaring that it would only supply states with nuclear technology if they concluded an AP agreement would have an impact on the decision calculus of many states. This rule change was especially useful for nonproliferation because of the increased interest in nuclear power around the world during this period in the early 2000s.

The United States sought to extend this rule change further by making it multilateral and convincing members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to condition supply of civilian technology

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on conclusion of an AP. During the Bush administration and continuing with the Obama administration, the United States pressed members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to make this change, finally finding partial success in 2011, with a new rule establishing that states must have concluded an AP or have a “regional” inspection regime in order to receive supply of technology for enrichment or reprocessing.

President Bush sought to push for AP universality through every possible channel available to the United States. Statements within the final documents of international ministerial meetings and conferences were one of the means by which the Bush administration promoted the AP multilaterally. A few months after Bush’s NDU speech, the United States encouraged the June 2004 G8 meeting to make a statement on nonproliferation. The “G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation” from this meeting reads in part,

We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify and implement these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in outreach efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary support. The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the end of 2005.

527 The “regional inspection regime” provision was a compromise with Brazil and Argentina who have publicly opposed the AP, to address their unique bilateral nuclear inspection institution, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).
528 Author interview with former U.S. official, Washington, DC, August 7, 2014.
Later the same month at the US-EU summit, leaders made a similar declaration on nonproliferation reaffirming the statement made at the G8 statement, including emphasizing the importance of the Additional Protocol.530

Having secured support for the AP in Europe, the Bush administration moved its focus to Asia. According to officials at the time, the Bush administration tried to push ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to have stronger nonproliferation agenda.531 The Bush administration was successful in securing AP language in the final ministerial document of the 2004 APEC forum.532 The ministerial document set a deadline for states to conclude the AP. It read:

Ministers also recognized that all APEC economies are implementing, have concluded, or aim to conclude an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency by the end of 2005, reflecting their determination not to allow illicit nuclear activities in our region through their collective commitment to expanded transparency on nuclear-related activities.533

After the 2004 APEC meeting, members of the administration followed up with the countries involved to remind them of their commitment to conclude an AP by the end of 2005. Thailand’s signature in September 2005 is directly attributable to this deadline and related U.S. pressures according to one former U.S. official.534

531 Author interview with former U.S. official, Washington, DC, August 7, 2014.
532 Ibid. Also, author interview with former U.S. official, Washington, DC, November 25, 2014.
534 Author interview with former U.S. official, Washington, DC, August 7, 2014.
When engaging bilaterally with foreign governments, Bush administration officials made clear that the AP was “something responsible countries did.” They knew that this was a means of garnering positive relations with the United States and thus concluding an AP was advantageous to any state trying to improve relations.

Beyond changing the rules of the regime and engaging in diplomatic pressure, the United States has sought to help train and educate nuclear authorities in other nations about safeguards. One of the most important U.S. educational outreach efforts has occurred through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and its “International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program,” founded in 2008. The mission of this program is to “collaborate with partners to strengthen domestic and international safeguards at all stages of nuclear development.” In this program, U.S. experts engage with the technical community to help develop safeguards practices and to teach what is required to fulfill safeguards obligations with the IAEA.

The United States also uses its financial resources to support international safeguards. The United States is a major funder of the voluntary or “extrabudgetary” funds required for the IAEA safeguards budget. For example, of the IAEA extrabudgetary funds of approximately $57 million in 2006, the United States donated over $22 million.

535 Ibid.
537 Mary Alice Hayward, “Establishing the International Framework to Deter Development of Weapons Technology Amidst the Global Nuclear Renaissance” (remarks at Exchange Monitor Conference, Washington, DC, December 3, 2008).
Japan and the Model Additional Protocol

Japan was engaged in the discussions over the text of the AP throughout the negotiations in the 1990s. As a state with one of the largest civilian nuclear programs in the world, Japan was concerned with how its nuclear industry would be affected by the new safeguards agreement. Japan joined a group of similarly concerned states in negotiating with the United States. In general, the United States was pushing for a more intrusive agreement while the group of states with nuclear energy programs was in favor of the new safeguards, but wanted to minimize the impact on industry. The United States was largely successful in achieving its goals in the negotiations. After the Model AP text was finalized, Japan was the first state with major nuclear infrastructure to conclude an Additional Protocol.

Assessing Japanese Favorability toward U.S. Global Leadership

In the late 1990s, Japan continued to be a state favorable to U.S. leadership, despite some bumps in the relationship related to economic policy. High level visits between Japanese leaders and U.S. leaders continued. The Prime Minister of Japan visited Washington at least once each year between 1996 and 1999. On the favorability measure based on UN General Assembly voting, Japan is still significantly above the global average, albeit on a slight downward trajectory. Though there are disagreements in this period between the two states over trade, and especially related to the steel industry, the two states reaffirmed their security relationship during the Clinton administration and cooperated on addressing the growing North Korea missile threat. In 1998, the Japanese Foreign Ministry wrote that “the Japan-U.S. relationship provides an
indispensable foundation for peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region,” reaffirming the importance of U.S. leadership.538

Japan, the AP and Hegemonic Leadership

In this period Japan continued to be favorable to U.S. global leadership and thus we would expect Japan to conclude an AP early on, with only minimal effort required by the United States.

Japan was engaged in AP negotiations early in the process. Two primary groups negotiated the Model AP. The first group, NPT nuclear weapons states France, the United Kingdom, and the United States with support from Australia, were considered “the most active” states in the process. The second group, a coalition of non-nuclear weapons states with significant nuclear industry, included Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and South Korea.539

A German diplomat, Reinhard Loesch, became the leader of a coalition of this second group of states. Between the first and second Committee 24 meetings, the United States conducted two rounds of bilateral negotiations with the Germans, with the Germans representing the concerns of the other coalition states in the meetings. The other states, including Japan, were assumed to prefer this unified method of negotiating with the United States because it kept the U.S. delegation from being able to “divide and conquer” by engaging bilaterally with each individual state.540 The U.S. delegation developed a close working relationship with the Germans

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540 Author’s personal correspondence with former U.S. official, November 13, 2015.
to hammer out differences, and then both countries “worked with others in their respective camps to persuade them to accept the products of that work.”

After the second Committee 24 meeting, the Germans continued to have concerns about the new proposed safeguards agreement. The U.S. delegation lobbied the National Security Council to secure a letter drafted from President Clinton to the Germans on the importance of the AP, which was ultimately sent as a “Tech Cable” in the president’s name. After the Clinton letter was sent to the Germans, Reinhard Loesch and his team came to the United States and spent a full Saturday with members of the U.S. team hammering out all of the remaining hurdles. After this meeting Loesch was confident he could sell the agreement to other states, including Japan. After the Clinton letter was sent to the Germans, Reinhard Loesch and his team came to the United States and spent a full Saturday with members of the U.S. team hammering out all of the remaining hurdles. After this meeting Loesch was confident he could sell the agreement to other states, including Japan.542 According to one U.S. official, the United States “got virtually everything [it] wanted” in the final document.543

Any challenge getting the Japanese onboard with the AP occurred during negotiations over the text. Once the text was official, Japan was the first state with significant nuclear infrastructure to conclude an AP.544 Japan signed in December 1998. According to one former Japanese official, there was little opposition to the AP once the Model AP had been developed.545 One Japanese nuclear expert said there was no public debate about the AP.546 Most of the discussion was limited to those in the nuclear industry and nuclear regulators. Debates were largely technical, such as disagreements over how many man-hours the new inspection regime

542 Phone interview with former U.S. official, December 5, 2014.
543 Ibid.
would require.\textsuperscript{547} There was also a debate in Japan at this time over Japanese nuclear supply to other states and some thought the AP should be a condition of supply. It could not make this policy, it was thought, without having the AP itself.\textsuperscript{548} After finalizing the necessary domestic legislation, Japan brought the AP into force in December 1999.

Once the AP was established, the Japanese joined the United States in becoming one of the lead promoters of the new safeguards agreement in both its rhetoric and resources. In international fora Japanese leaders regularly call for universalizing of the AP.\textsuperscript{549} In 2000, at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Japan proposed a “Plan of Action” to promote the AP as the universal safeguards standard.\textsuperscript{550} In 2001, the IAEA began a more formalized process of promoting the AP which has been aided by “extrabudgetary contributions by Japan and the United States.”\textsuperscript{551} According to the IAEA, “a number of States are actively involved in efforts to promote wider adherence to the additional protocol. The most vocal proponent is Japan, which was also the first country with a major nuclear cycle to bring into force an additional protocol.”\textsuperscript{552} Japan has held a number of conferences to help other states learn more about the domestic requirements for being able to conclude an AP. According to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in the early 2000s, Japan launched an informal “Friends of the Additional Protocol,”

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{547} Author interview with former Japanese official, New York, New York, May 6, 2015.
\item \textsuperscript{548} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{549} Masatoshi Shimbo (Statement at First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Cluster II, Vienna, May 9, 2007), \texttt{http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/Statements/070509-2NPT.htm} (accessed March 3, 2016).
\item \textsuperscript{551} Houck, et al., “Creation of the Model Additional Protocol,” 7.
\item \textsuperscript{552} Ibid., 7.
\end{itemize}
through its mission in Vienna. In 2005, Japan, along with New Zealand and the European Union, called for the AP to be a requirement of any supply of nuclear material and technology.

For a single state, the funds and bureaucratic resources Japan has devoted to the AP are comparable only to the United States. Japan has become a very helpful state in promoting the nonproliferation regime, and has taken on an educational and outreach mission for the AP, that is analogous to the educational outreach mechanism traditionally undertaken by the hegemon. This effort benefits both Japan and the United States. AP promotion by a fellow non-nuclear state may be more palatable to some states than outreach by the United States, and the Japanese help promote the extant nuclear order from which they benefit.

**Japan, the AP and Hedging**

Though Japan is often referred to as having a “virtual” nuclear arsenal because of its technical infrastructure and expertise, considerations of hedging do not appear to have influenced Japan’s decision surrounding the conclusion of the AP. In fact, the conclusion of an AP was meant to signal the opposite intention. One former Japanese official explained that his state ratified the AP so quickly because of its enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. The AP would be a confidence-building measure ensuring other states would not have second thoughts about Japanese nuclear intentions.

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555 Author interview with former Japanese official, New York City, May 6, 2015.
Japan, the AP and Nuclear Energy

A key factor in Japan’s swift conclusion of an AP was the support of the Japanese nuclear industry. For one, the AP was supposed to relax safeguards on non-sensitive facilities, and focus more attention on sensitive facilities. Thus for most civilian nuclear sites in Japan, the safeguards burden was expected to lessen as a result of adopting the AP. As a result, there was little opposition from Japanese civilian industry.\textsuperscript{556} In reality, the civilian nuclear sector did not see this savings in budgets or manpower initially because of the preparations required for more stringent, short-notice safeguards.\textsuperscript{557}

Many of the Japanese inputs during the negotiations over the AP the 1990s related to making the new safeguards agreement less burdensome to its private nuclear industry. For example, Japan proposed that additional short-notice access be limited to “instances of inconsistencies” found by inspectors\textsuperscript{558} and that these visits should allow 24-hour advanced notice.\textsuperscript{559}

Japan’s civilian nuclear infrastructure was a primary factor in its conclusion of the AP, though the mechanism is different than the one anticipated in the energy hypothesis for this project. Instead of seeking the AP to ensure the continued supply of nuclear technology, the powerful civilian nuclear industry saw the AP as a way to save money and to help ensure that states seeking to import its technology would not be proliferation risks.

\textsuperscript{556} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{557} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{559} Ibid., 65.
Japan, the AP and Disarmament

There is little evidence from Japan’s AP decision-making process that it was concerned with progress on nuclear disarmament, but Japan was concerned about fairness. In the negotiation process over the AP, Japan wanted to ensure that the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States, would conclude an AP. In AP meetings before the Model Additional Protocol came into force, Japan repeated that it expected “a certain degree of parallelism” from the NWS in concluding the AP.\textsuperscript{560}

Japan, the AP and Regime Type

In Japan, the AP was not a major issue discussed in popular media in the way the NPT indefinite extension was a few years prior; thus, public sentiment and historical experience with nuclear weapons appeared to have had little relevance in this advanced democracy. The AP was a topic discussed largely among professionals in the Foreign Ministry, nuclear regulatory agency, and nuclear industry.

Japan and the Additional Protocol: Conclusion

As expected by a theory of hegemonic leadership, Japan quickly concluded an AP and has gone on to support other states in developing their own APs. In addition to strongly articulated U.S. interest in the AP during negotiations and the period leading up to Japanese approval of the AP, a second key factor was the favorable position taken on the AP by the Japanese nuclear industry. The industry expected to save money by concluding the AP because IAEA inspections would focus more on sensitive facilities, reducing the burden on other facilities.

\textsuperscript{560} Ibid., 20.
Indonesia and the Additional Protocol

Indonesia voted to conclude an Additional Protocol in September 1999, making it an early adopter of the AP, especially relative to its region. The domestic context for Indonesia’s ratification of the new safeguards agreement was one of great upheaval. The late 1990s were a tumultuous period in the state, as the Asian financial crisis led to economic disaster in 1997 and 1998. The Indonesian economy contracted by 15% in 1998, reducing many of the gains of President Suharto’s 30-year reign and bringing the economy back to 1970s levels.561 Suharto resisted conditions set by a $43 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout.562 In an echo of the Carter presidency two decades before, President Clinton sent former Vice President Walter Mondale to Jakarta in March 1998 to encourage Suharto to comply with the IMF conditions.563 Suharto defied political pressure and announced he would run for a seventh term with B.J. Habibie, a politician disfavored in the West, as his vice president. The crisis worsened with students rioting across the country and calling for his resignation. Economic panic led to a rise in prices across the country. With few options, Suharto resigned in May 1998.564 Following the end of the three-decade Suharto regime, Habibie became president and sought widespread political and economic reforms.565 It was in this period of reform in which the Indonesian Parliament ratified the AP.

Assessing Indonesian Favorability Toward U.S. Leadership

Levels of favorability toward U.S. global leadership varied during this tumultuous period in Indonesia. The Asian financial crisis and the stringent requirements for assistance from the IMF led to Indonesian opposition toward the “Washington Consensus” in 1997 and 1998. As the United States pressured the Suharto regime to comply with IMF terms in the spring of 1998, anti-Americanism was rife in the Indonesian press and among its leaders.\(^{566}\) In 1998, after Suharto resigned and the reformist era began under President Habibie, relations with the United States improved. The Habibie administration undertook U.S. and IMF-supported political reforms, securing IMF loans for the beleaguered nation.\(^{567}\) The United States restricted aid after the bloodshed in East Timor in 1999 following the East Timorese referendum but this occurred as Indonesia was ratifying the AP.\(^{568}\) In terms of the UNGA measure of favorability, 1996 is the low point for Indonesian favorability, and then there is an uptick in 1997 and 1998, but Indonesia is still significantly below average on this favorability measure. In this period Indonesia’s favorability to the U.S.-led order is assessed as “Low Favorability But Trending Up.”

Indonesia, the AP and Hegemonic Leadership

Based on the expectations of Hegemonic Leadership Theory, we would expect Indonesia to be slow to conclude an AP, though Indonesian favorability was on an upward trend due to the Indonesian change in leadership. Contrary to expectations of this theory, Indonesia swiftly ratified the AP during the new administration.

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The United States re-engaged with Indonesia in 1998 as a result of President Habibie’s democratizing reforms, gaining influence within the state in the process. After succeeding Suharto, Habibie loosened restrictions on the press, freed political prisoners, and announced a plan for national elections. In June 1999, the United States aided parliamentary elections across the island nation by supporting the election commission and finding election monitors.

After the election, a busy period followed for the legislature. The People’s Consultative Assembly (MRP)—now a much more representative body of 700—adopted a number of constitutional changes and new laws. During this period, on September 29, 1999, Indonesia ratified the AP. The United States and other partners, including Australia, had been pressing states to ratify the AP since 1997 when it was formalized by the IAEA. Why this timing of Indonesia’s conclusion of the AP? According to the one Indonesian diplomat who works on nuclear nonproliferation issues, Indonesia’s democratizing led the West, and especially the United States, to perceive an opening to increase pressure on Indonesia to ratify the Additional Protocol. But not everyone familiar with this period agrees with this assessment about the role of U.S. pressure.

Instead, in the case of the Indonesian AP, influence may have stemmed from a different Western state, Australia. Australia played an important and influential role in the negotiations of the AP within the IAEA. Indonesia participated in the IAEA’s Committee 24 meetings, but was not a major player. During the IAEA meetings, Australian safeguards expert John Carlson grew friendly with the chairman of Indonesia’s nuclear regulatory agency, Dr. Mohamad Ridwan, who

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570 Personal correspondence with Indonesian official, Washington DC, March 31, 2014.
would sometimes come to the meetings as an advisor to members of the Indonesian Foreign
Ministry. Dr. Ridwan had worked for Habibie when the President had previously served as
Indonesia’s Technology Minister. As the chairman of BAPETEN, the Indonesian nuclear
regulatory agency, Dr. Ridwan reported directly to President Habibie, a known nuclear
enthusiast (see Chapter Five on the NPT). With Ridwan, Carlson discussed the value of the AP
for Indonesia for securing cooperation in the field of nuclear technology. Dr. Ridwan then
advocated the AP to President Habibie. By this understanding of events, U.S. pressure was
less relevant to the timing of the Indonesian AP than having encouragement from a neighbor—
albeit a strong U.S. ally—and a receptive leader.

Indonesia, the Additional Protocol and Hedging

The hedging theory appears finds little evidence in this case. Though there were concerns
by some during the Suharto regime that Indonesia may have sought a nuclear weapons program
eventually, there is little evidence of this, and it is unlikely that Indonesia had been hedging prior
to its AP ratification.

Indonesia, the Additional Protocol and Nuclear Energy

Because President Habibie was a technology promoter, with an interest in civilian nuclear
technology—he holds a Ph.D. in engineering from the Technical University of Aachen in
Germany—the theory that nuclear nonproliferation commitment stems from a desire for more
civilian nuclear technology finds support in this case. When Indonesia was seeking nuclear
energy in the 1980s under President Suharto, Habibie led the proponents of this position as the

572 Ibid.
573 Ibid.
Cabinet minister in charge of research and technology. Habibie had a close relationship with Dr. Mohamad Ridwan at this time. One former Australian official familiar with this time period speculates that it would have been easy for Dr. Ridwan to convince President Habibie of the value of the AP as they both shared an interest in promoting nuclear energy in Indonesia.

As the previous chapter recounted, BAPETEN’s leaders had also supported the indefinite extension of the NPT because they thought it would be a positive step for securing nuclear supply, but they were overruled by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry. With Habibie as president, BAPETEN’s stature was likely elevated within the government, and he was able to overrule reservations stemming for the Foreign Ministry.

Indonesia, the Additional Protocol and Disarmament

Nuclear expert Mark Hibbs explains that the United States and the IAEA had been pressing Indonesia, as well as other states in Southeast Asia seeking civilian nuclear programs, to ratify the AP since 1997. He reports that these states objected based on lack of disarmament progress by the nuclear states, as well as to the AP’s import and export requirements and the potential these requirements could have on foreign intelligence collection. Some Indonesian leaders were especially miffed by the outcome of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, as detailed in Chapter Five, in which the nuclear powers were able to promote the indefinite extension of the treaty, while making few meaningful concessions. Thus, this disarmament theory appears to find some support initially in this case, but it is undermined,

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575 Personal correspondence with former Australian official, March 10, 2016.
however, by the fact that United States did not make major arms reductions in this period and Indonesia ratified despite these concerns about disarmament. The key factor is the difference between the Suharto and Habibie regimes. Under Suharto, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held sway over nuclear nonproliferation policy and apparently did connect its nonproliferation commitments to disarmament progress by the nuclear weapons states. Under Habibie, the civilian nuclear regulatory agency appears to have gained influence, and perceived the AP to be in its interest in terms of nuclear supply. This is not to argue these were not real concerns about lack of disarmament progress, but they do not seem to be determinative for Indonesian nonproliferation regime behavior in this case.

Indonesia, the Additional Protocol and Regime Type

The fact that AP ratification followed after a period of democratization suggests that regime type may explain the timing of Indonesia’s ratification. The evidence does indicate that the newly elected representatives of the MRP undertook a busy legislative session in the year following elections, taking up new issues that had been ignored under the Suharto regime. One Indonesian diplomat confirmed this, explaining that many items of legislation were brought forward in this post-Suharto period including the AP. By President Habibie’s own estimate his government passed an average of 1.3 laws per day during his short tenure as president. But it is not just that Habibie led a more democratic government than Suharto. Habibie was keenly interested in developing technology, including nuclear technology. That he was at the helm of

the government and close friends with the head of the nuclear agency was more relevant than Indonesia’s regime type. Under Suharto the Foreign Ministry had politicized nuclear nonproliferation issues and their perspective mattered most. Under Habibie it appears that the interests of the nuclear agency mattered more.

Indonesia and the Additional Protocol: Conclusion

The available evidence is inconclusive about the reasons behind Indonesian AP ratification in September 1999. This was a period in which there had been slightly higher favorability for U.S. global leadership, as President Habibie had undertaken U.S.-backed reforms and the United States had funded the first free and fair elections in Indonesia. The United States has been pressuring Indonesia to ratify the AP, which it did under President Habibie and not under the increasingly anti-American leadership of Suharto. In addition, a close relationship between an Australian safeguards representative and the leader of Indonesia’s nuclear agency also likely played a role in convincing the nuclear agency that an AP would help with nuclear supply. Based on the available evidence it appears that a newly democratic government more favorable nuclear technology and the role played by Australian safeguards colleagues were the factors that explain Indonesian conclusion of an AP in September 1999.

Egypt and the Additional Protocol

Egypt has not concluded an AP safeguards agreement. It is one of a handful of countries that resists the call for the AP to become the universal nuclear safeguards standard and it does not believe the AP should be a requirement for nuclear supply. Its rhetoric about the AP points to Israel’s status outside of the NPT, as well as lack of disarmament progress among the nuclear

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578 Maggie Michael, “Egypt refuses to sign UN nuclear watchdog protocols for stricter inspections,”
It has also said concluding an AP would cause Egypt to be too reliant on other powers for its nuclear power requirements. The United States has engaged with Egypt on this issue, but has had little success.

Assessing Egyptian Favorability toward U.S. Leadership

Because Egypt has not yet concluded an AP, the period covered by this case is 1997, when the AP first became available, to the present day. During this period Egypt went from Mubarak’s leadership where Egypt measured as relatively unfavorable to the United States, to the lowest point in U.S.-Egyptian relations since the Nasser era. The UNGA data show a steady downward trajectory through the period, indicating very low favorability to U.S. global leadership. Egypt is now one of the most unfavorable states toward the U.S.-led order in the international system. In the past ten years that Pew has polled Egyptians on favorability toward the United States, low favorability measures have become even lower. The high point in favorability, in 2006, saw 30% of Egyptians saying they were favorable to the United States. In 2014, that number was 10%, the lowest measure of all 43 states in which Pew conducted polling. In this poll, 53% of Egyptians said they were “very unfavorable toward the United States. According to one analyst, in Egypt today, “anti-Americanism—always latent in

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582 Ibid.

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Egyptian society, media, and politics—has exploded beyond its traditional boundaries to become a core feature of political discourse and official propaganda in Egypt.⁵⁸³ The current Egyptian government is becoming increasingly close to the Russian government,⁵⁸⁴ another state where anti-Americanism is rife.

Egypt, the AP and Hegemonic Leadership

As a state considered very unfavorable toward the U.S.-led order in recent years, Egypt is expected to be slow in committing to the AP if it does so at all. To date, Egypt has refused to conclude an AP despite reported attempts by the United States to sway Egyptian leaders. Unfortunately, there is limited data available on particular U.S. efforts to persuade the Egyptians to conclude an AP. The sensitivity of this topic means fewer former and current U.S. officials are willing to discuss any previous or current negotiations with the Egyptians. The data available mainly stem from media reports and rhetoric from Egyptian leaders. Based on these reports, it appears that the main leverage used by the United States is the supply of civilian nuclear technology. It is also possible, however, that the limited evidence of U.S. persuasion is indicative of U.S. leaders realizing that Egypt is so negatively inclined toward U.S. leadership that there is little that will sway the Egyptians on this issue. Indeed, what little evidence exists is from the Mubarak period, when Egyptian leadership was somewhat more amenable to the United States than it is today under the al-Sisi regime.

In 2007, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit declared in a speech that his country would not conclude an AP. The Foreign Minister argued, “Egypt will not accept any additional obligations in this matter.” He went on to state, “the protocol remains in reality a voluntary instrument that cannot be imposed.” 585 Though the specific outreach effort by U.S. leaders at this time is unknown, it appears that the Foreign Minister’s statement was in response to pressure by the United States and other nuclear suppliers for Egypt to conclude the AP and promise not to develop enrichment or reprocessing technologies—the technologies for developing fissile material for nuclear weapons. 586

In January 2008, a Muslim Brotherhood website reported that Egypt was facing great pressure from the United States and other nuclear technology suppliers to conclude an Additional Protocol in order to receive additional civilian nuclear technology. According to a BBC article on the Muslim Brotherhood report:

> The pressure is being used at a time when Egypt is facing obstacles in the way of its ambitious plan to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It is noteworthy that the United States, Canada, France and other European countries have made their support of Egypt conditional to its signing of the Additional Protocol, which Egypt earlier refused to sign. 587

According to Mark Hibbs, Egypt is one of the states the “IAEA and some member states have tried at length” to convince to conclude an AP because of its extant nuclear technology. 588

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586 Ibid.
587 “Egypt pressured by USA, France to sign additional nuclear protocol – website,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, January 16, 2008 [Text of report by Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood website Amlalommah on January 16, 2008.]
588 Hibbs, “The Unspectacular Future of the IAEA Additional Protocol.”
Relative to the rest of its region, Egypt has significant nuclear infrastructure. Though it has no power-generating nuclear reactors, Egypt possesses two research reactors, facilities for mining, milling, fuel fabrication, waste management, and a limited reprocessing capability. In addition, it has a regulatory agency and universities that can provide training in nuclear research.

Egypt has been able to resist this pressure and still pursue its nuclear energy plans in part because Russia and China have signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Cairo. In November 2007, Egyptian media declared that “Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak expressed approval of Egypt's nuclear energy ambitions and pledged to provide Cairo with assistance in reaching them.”\(^589\) In March 2008, the two states signed a nuclear deal, which allowed Russia to bid on Egypt’s first large nuclear reactor.\(^590\)

Despite the 2008 nuclear deal, Egypt’s nuclear energy plans have not moved along swiftly. As of 2016, they have not begun to build any reactors, though Egypt continues to seek help from Russia and China. In February 2005, Cairo penned a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Russia for construction of a nuclear reactor project. In May 2015, the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation and the Egyptian Nuclear Power Plant Authority signed an MOU allowing China to become one of the key partners in establishing Egypt’s nuclear energy program.\(^591\)


As expected by a theory of hegemonic leadership, the United States and its closest allies have sought to persuade Egypt to conclude an AP using the carrot of nuclear supply. Thus far this gambit has been unsuccessful, in part because Egypt is securing nuclear cooperation from Russia and China. Moreover, as Egypt has become more and more anti-American in recent years, it is unlikely that Egyptian leaders will agree to conclude an AP, when it associates the nonproliferation regime with a U.S.-led order.

**Egypt, the AP and Hedging**

During the Mubarak regime there was little evidence Egypt was seeking a nuclear weapons program. Mubarak reportedly rejected an offer of nuclear material and technology offered by individuals from a former Soviet state in the late 1990s.\(^{592}\)

The IAEA did discover that between 2004 and 2006 Egyptian physicists engaged in nuclear material processing activities that should have been reported to the IAEA, but without an AP, the IAEA could not make further conclusions. The IAEA has said these activities “were permissible” but should have been reported.\(^{593}\) This revelation was a result of the strengthened implementation of extant IAEA safeguards that occurred after the discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.

When Mohamed Morsi was elected in 2012 there was greater reason for concern about Egyptian nuclear weapons intentions due to Morsi’s membership in the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood used the lack of progress on an Egyptian nuclear energy program as a means to criticize the Mubarak regime.\(^{594}\) Some leaders within the group also made statements about the

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\(^{592}\) Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 142.


\(^{594}\) Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, 127.
desirability of an Egyptian nuclear deterrent. For example, in 2006, a Muslim Brotherhood spokesperson reportedly stated, “We [Egyptians] are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear weapon that will represent a real deterrent and will be decisive in the Arab-Israeli conflict.” MB leaders also spoke favorably of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Today, some analysts suspect that Russia may allow the al-Sisi government to enrich uranium as part of the nuclear cooperation between the two. If the Egyptians were to receive enrichment technology from Russia and use that path as a means to develop nuclear weapons, it would be less likely to conclude an AP. The IAEA’s revelations about Egypt’s undeclared activity in the mid-2000s may mean that Egyptian leaders realize that the IAEA would likely discover a clandestine program under even more stringent safeguards. Any discussion of enrichment technology is speculation, however, and there is no evidence today that the current Egyptian government is hedging within the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Egypt, the AP and Nuclear Energy

As discussed above, Egypt is again seeking to develop a civilian nuclear power program. A desire for nuclear power was a factor in Egypt’s ascension to the NPT in 1981, but the proposals never materialized. The plans for one reactor, at El Dabaa, was aborted following the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. In 2006, Egyptian leaders announced that they were again pursuing a nuclear energy program. Egypt has one of the most developed nuclear infrastructures in the

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596 Ibid.
region with a regulatory agency and a number of nuclear-related sites, mainly used for medical and research purposes.\(^{599}\) Egypt has signed nuclear cooperation pacts with Russia and China.\(^{600}\) In recent years, Egypt’s al-Sisi has continued the drive for an Egyptian nuclear energy program.

**Egypt, the AP and Disarmament**

Among the three commonly cited reasons Egyptian leaders provide for not adhering to the AP, one is the lack of disarmament progress by nuclear weapons states (including Israel). It has provided this reasoning for not ratifying other international arms control treaties as well, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, the CTBT, and the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.\(^{601}\)

Egypt has long prioritized nuclear disarmament, and it is possible this does play some role in its decision-making about the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Egypt is a member of a grouping of states known at the New Agenda Coalition, which seeks to promote nonproliferation and disarmament.\(^{602}\) The disarmament rhetoric is also, however, a way for Egyptian leaders to rally against Israel and the United States.

**Egypt, the AP and Regime Type**

Autocrat Hosnei Mubarak was the leader of Egypt during most of this period. In February 2011, he was disposed in a revolution that brought Mohamad Morsi to power through national

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elections in 2012. A year later, Morsi was disposed by General al-Sisi. All three leaders have maintained a position against conclusion of an AP, regardless of regime type, suggesting this factor is not relevant.

Though the type of regime is not relevant, the salience of (Israeli) nuclear weapons within Egypt’s population continues to matter greatly in Egypt’s consideration of the AP and additional nonproliferation commitments. Israel’s status outside of the NPT is one of the reasons Egypt’s leaders provide for not joining additional nonproliferation agreements. Egyptian leaders have faced domestic criticism for Egypt’s position in the NPT, while Israel remains outside of the treaty. According to Jim Walsh, in numerous interviews with Egyptian and Arab leaders he was told “Egypt and other MENA countries would refuse to adopt the AP until they saw movement on the question of Israel’s nuclear weapons.” Based on over twenty years of voicing anger and taking action over Israel’s status outside of the NPT, it seems likely that the salience of Israel’s nuclear weapons drive Egypt’s position on the NPT.

**Egypt and the Additional Protocol: Conclusion**

The available evidence on Egypt and the Additional Protocol do not allow for adjudication among all competing explanations for its lack of commitment. It is clear that Egypt is growing increasingly unfavorable to U.S. leadership at a time when it is refusing to conclude or AP as well as many other multilateral arms control measures. U.S. efforts have not been successful in garnering Egyptian commitment to the AP. Egypt is seeking nuclear technology for

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604 Ibid., 267.
nuclear energy, but its partnership with Russia—a state that is also unfavorable to U.S. global leadership—has meant that Egypt need not conclude an AP in order to import civilian nuclear technology. Some speculate Egypt could be hedging, leaving the option open for a nuclear weapons program in the future. If so, this is a long-term vision, as ground has not yet broken on the new nuclear facilities.

**Conclusion**

Both the short amount of time since of the adoption of the Model AP and the low salience of the safeguards agreement outside of the nuclear nonproliferation world mean there is less available information about states’ decision-making about the AP. Key documents remain classified and U.S. efforts to convince states to conclude AP are often still too sensitive to discuss on the record. As a result, the conclusions about the AP are tentative. The global leadership of the United States appears to be a factor in all three cases, but the link is sometimes murky.

**Table S: Assessment of Favorability to U.S. Global Leadership & Conclusion of AP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion of AP</strong></td>
<td>High Favorability</td>
<td>Low Favorability But Trending Up</td>
<td>Low Favorability Trending Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conclusion of Model Additional Protocol</strong></td>
<td>YES: 1999</td>
<td>YES: 1999</td>
<td>NO: 1997-present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected based on its favorability toward U.S. global leadership, Japan was an early adopter of the AP. Through the AP negotiation process, the United States made clear that it prioritized the AP, but the role of Japan’s nuclear industry was also important in this case.
Indonesia ratified the AP during a period of transition when a leader more favorable to U.S. leadership and to nuclear technology came to power. Evidence indicates the United States had pressured Jakarta to join the AP previously, but it was more likely that it was a U.S. ally, Australia, that persuaded Jakarta to join when it did. As in Japan, those in favor of Indonesian nuclear power also likely played an important part of bringing about ratification. Finally, Egypt has resisted AP ratification for close to twenty years as its leadership has become increasing anti-American. Whereas concerns about disarmament and more intrusive inspections may have played a role in decision-making during the Mubarak regime, the rampant anti-Americanism and rejection of U.S. hegemony now appears to be sufficient for Egypt’s disinterest in joining the AP.
Table T: Summary of Competing Theories of Regime Commitment (Additional Protocol)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Testing Theories of Commitment to the Additional Protocol: Summary</th>
<th>Cases:</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theories:</td>
<td></td>
<td>Concluded in 1999</td>
<td>Concluded in 1999</td>
<td>No AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic Leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. diplomacy a factor in ratification</td>
<td>President Habibie more favorable to U.S. leadership than previous regime</td>
<td>High levels of anti-Americanism and rejection of U.S. global leadership—especially related to support of Israel—likely cause reluctance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hedging Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potential explanation of resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td>Support of civilian nuclear sector a factor in quick ratification</td>
<td>Influential leader of civilian nuclear agency likely a factor in ratification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Potential explanation of resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type Theory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New more democratic regime likely a necessary condition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Bold text indicates most important factors)
CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION

This project sought to answer a simple question: what explains variation in NPT states’ commitment to additional nuclear nonproliferation agreements? Its answer lies in a theory that revolves around states’ favorability toward the regime’s primary advocate: the global hegemon. The logic of this theory is straightforward. First, due to its global interests, a hegemonic power has the greatest strategic interest in preventing additional states from becoming nuclear weapons-capable. Second, the hegemon uses its position of leadership to promote nonproliferation and thus all other states associate multilateral nuclear nonproliferation institutions with the hegemon’s broader global leadership. Finally, variation in states’ willingness to commit to new nonproliferation agreements is directly tied to their overall favorability toward the hegemon’s global leadership. More favorable states commit more quickly and less favorable states take longer or do not commit at all. In the nuclear age thus far, the United States has been this hegemonic power. Since 1945, it has led the international community in developing multilateral institutions to promote nuclear nonproliferation.

This contention is tested statistically in Chapter Four, where I build an original dataset of regime commitment indicators for all non-nuclear NPT members. Multiple empirical tests support my theory. To more thoroughly evaluate the theory’s causal mechanisms, I rely on three cases—Japan, Indonesia and Egypt—which represent varying levels of favorability to U.S. global leadership. Across the case studies, which include data from U.S. national and presidential archives and over 35 interviews with U.S. and foreign officials, I find support for my hypothesized mechanisms, as well as some support for competing theories.
The results of this work have important implications for international security and research on multilateral institutions. The balance of this chapter describes a number of those implications. It then turns to recent trends that could undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime, before concluding with specific policy recommendations.

**Implications for International Security**

**The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and Global Power Distribution**

This research has shown the importance of the hegemon in establishing, augmenting, and promoting the nuclear nonproliferation regime. During the 1960s, many states in the international system were concerned with the threat of nuclear proliferation, but it required the United States, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, to establish the NPT, and to encourage all other states to join. In this effort the two great powers were quite successful, as only five states remain outside of the NPT today. Since the NPT was established, the United States has played the key leadership role in the creation of new elements of the regime, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the AP, the CTBT, UNSC Resolution 1540, and in the effort to extend the NPT indefinitely in 1995.

Thus, a key implication of this research is that the nuclear nonproliferation regime will be affected by changes in the distribution of global power. The regime has thrived and survived under U.S. hegemony. Potential alternative global power arrangements could adversely affect the regime. First, a period without a clear hegemon could endanger the regime as it would lack a state powerful enough to address regime weaknesses, encourage participation, and organize the international community to address cheating. This implies that the decline of the United States would negatively impact the regime if a rising power, such as China, does not take on the role of
regime underwriter. Even a gap between hegemons could undermine the regime. In a truly multipolar system without a hegemonic power, it may be difficult to coordinate action among members of the regime (such as was required to address the Iranian nuclear program), even if all of the great powers agree on the value of nuclear nonproliferation. In sum, the nuclear nonproliferation regime appears to have benefited from the global distribution of power during the nuclear age. In the future, different power configurations may not lend themselves to successful continuation of the regime, thus undermining international security if states pursue proliferation.

The Importance of Nuclear Energy for Nonproliferation Regime Commitment

The NPT promises that in exchange for giving up the option to develop nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons states will have access to peaceful nuclear technology. This research has shown that the promise of peaceful nuclear technology has been a key nonproliferation tool of the hegemon, and thus continued global interest in nuclear energy is positive for the regime. For Indonesia, in the late 1970s and the late 1990s, securing foreign supply of nuclear technology drove regime commitment decisions. In both periods, the domestic factions favoring nuclear technology development prevailed over other factions who may have wanted to avoid regime commitment for political reasons. A desire for a civilian nuclear energy program also influenced Anwar al-Sadat’s decision to ratify the NPT in 1981. Once Egypt ratified the treaty, it quickly signed on to nuclear cooperation agreements with a number of states.

The United States was fortunate that periods of interest in nuclear energy, such as the late 1970s and early 2000s, coincided with periods in which U.S. administrations were attempting to promote greater commitments to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Fortunately, the desire for
nuclear energy remains strong in many states around the world. The “nuclear renaissance” has not materialized as anticipated in part due to the enormous costs associated with building nuclear facilities and the relatively low cost of fossil fuels, but approximately 45 states are still planning new nuclear power programs.\footnote{“Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” World Nuclear Association, (February 2016), \url{http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx} (accessed March 3, 2016).}

Negative perceptions about nuclear safety is one way in which this nonproliferation tool may be undermined. Some states’ domestic populations, including those in Indonesia and Germany, have rejected nuclear power because of the risks they associate with it. The March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster reinforced this potential danger, just as the Chernobyl disaster curtailed many nuclear energy programs 25 years before. These incidents highlight the critical importance of nuclear safety and security as nuclear programs spread. Nuclear energy and nuclear nonproliferation are symbiotic. If civilian nuclear energy programs become undesirable, then nonproliferation regime leaders lose a key tool in promoting nuclear nonproliferation.

**The Role of Nuclear Disarmament for Regime Success**

Based on the findings in this project, there appears to be no direct connection between the five NPT nuclear states pursuing disarmament and the timing of NPT states’ commitments to the regime. Nonetheless, many practitioners and nonproliferation advocates posit that this link between disarmament and nonproliferation exists. It is after all a logical extension of the NPT conceptualized as a bargain: the nuclear states keep their nuclear monopoly for an undefined period and the non-nuclear states are provided the opportunity to secure peaceful nuclear technology and the promise that all states will pursue negotiations toward disarmament. It
follows that if one side perceives that the other is not fulfilling the treaty bargain than that side will be less willing to take on additional burdens. And yet the evidence from this project provides little direct support for this position. Many foreign leaders complain about stalled disarmament progress in speeches, but then many of those same leaders then take on additional regime commitments without related disarmament progress.

In trying to research this claim for this project, many former U.S. officials with backgrounds in arms control were pressed for examples of how disarmament progress or lack of progress affected nonproliferation decision-making. One often cited example was the U.S. promise, in the lead up to the decision on indefinite extension of the NPT, to conclude CTBT negotiations by 1996. This was the “price” of extension according to one official.606 And yet it is hard to find examples of where this CTBT promise caused specific states to support indefinite extension. This study did not do an exhaustive study of all NPT states, so it is of course possible this promise was the defining decision for some, but so far the evidence is limited. It should be noted, however, that this is a difficult causal relationship to uncover, as many states unfavorable to U.S. leadership sought multiple concessions from the nuclear weapons states in the lead up to the extension conference. So even if some states were more likely to support indefinite extension after the CTBT compromise, they were likely to “pocket” the CTBT agreement and ask for additional concessions, without publicly acknowledging their change in position.

As a second example, some former U.S. officials suggested President Obama’s 2009 Prague speech and his commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons had a salutatory effect on

606 Author interview with former U.S. official, Washington, DC, June 18, 2015.
the nuclear nonproliferation regime. For example, the 2010 NPT Review Conference had improved “atmospherics” over the 2005 Conference according to many former officials. Whereas the 2005 NPT Conference ended without a consensus final document, in 2010 the members were able to agree on a final document with specific action plans for disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

In a third example, one former official stated that President Obama was able to garner global cooperation on sanctioning the Iranian nuclear program because of his perceived commitment to nuclear disarmament. This former official suggested it would have been almost impossible for President George W. Bush to so successfully corral states in pressuring Iran in the way Obama did.

The interpretations of these former officials may be accurate, but for the cases examined within this project, it was U.S. influence and not U.S. nuclear disarmament that best explains nuclear nonproliferation regime commitment. Indeed, if a theory of hegemonic leadership is accurate, then many nonproliferation regime decisions are not going to be related to the regime’s disarmament-nonproliferation bargain, but to U.S. diplomatic influence and sometimes U.S. coercion. Thus even when a state is dissatisfied with disarmament progress, there are likely going to be ways by which the United States can shape the interests of the state to bring about commitment.

Rejecting a strong empirical connection between regime commitment and disarmament progress, however, in no way denies the fact there is significant dissatisfaction with the

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607 Author interview with former U.S. official, Arlington, VA, April 14, 2015; Author correspondence with former U.S. official, August 5, 2015.
608 Author Interview with former U.S. official, Arlington, VA, April 14, 2015.
perceived lack of disarmament progress and that this is negative for the health of the regime. This frustration was evident at the 2015 NPT Review Conference and among the 125-plus states that have signed on to the “Humanitarian Pledge” to pursue a nuclear weapons ban outside of the NPT framework. If this frustration begins to affect states’ overall favorability toward U.S. global leadership, or causes states to threaten to withdraw from the regime, it may mean the United States has to rely more on costly carrots and sticks to bring about regime commitment in the future.

*Theoretical Implications for the Study of Multilateral Institutions*

**Domestic Politics vs. Hegemony**

This project illustrated how commitment patterns within the nuclear nonproliferation regime differ from other multilateral treaty regimes. In the extant academic literature, domestic political factors are widely reported as the key variables for explaining variation in commitment for many treaty regimes, including those related to human rights, trade, and the environment. In contrast, for the nuclear nonproliferation regime the role of the hegemon is paramount for explaining commitment. The hegemon is the key factor in explaining how this regime works for three interrelated reasons: the regime was established by and continues to be promoted by the hegemon, the hegemon has a greater strategic interest in the regime’s success than all other states, and the regime is global.

The first reason why this regime may be different than others is the fact that the hegemon established the regime initially and continues to have deep involvement in its perpetuation. Because of the hegemon’s role within the regime, all other states associate the regime with the hegemon’s leadership. This contrasts with other institutions in which a less powerful state or
grouping of states established the treaty or regime. If the institutions are not founded by the hegemon, they are less likely to be perceived as part of the hegemonic global order and the mechanisms of hegemonic leadership are unlikely to apply. Other factors, such as domestic politics or regime type, would likely explain variation in commitment in these cases.

The second reason the hegemon matters to explaining variation in commitment with this regime is because of the difference in interests among the parties involved. The hegemon has a much greater strategic interest than other states in preventing additional nuclear weapons states around the globe and thus prioritizes this issue, as illustrated by the history of the regime. Moreover, the hundreds of federal workers at the U.S. State Department, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, Department of Commerce, and across the Intelligence Community, tasked in some way with addressing global proliferation illustrate this commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Many other states in the international system do not prioritize this issue on a global scale, and certainly not with commensurate resources to that of the United States. These states thus do not immediately seek to join new elements of the regime, and as a result, the hegemon must work to persuade them to commit. If all states cared about global nuclear nonproliferation as much as the hegemon, there would not be such variation in commitment and the hegemon would not need carrots and sticks to garner commitment. Though the majority of states do reap absolute gains (versus relative gains) from the success of the nonproliferation regime, the value of those absolute gains are not equal—they are much greater for the hegemon. In other institutions where states’ gains are more equal, other factors, especially those at the domestic level, are likely to explain variation in commitment.
The final reason why the mechanisms of commitment are different in this regime is because the hegemon seeks a truly global regime. Proliferation anywhere potentially weakens the aspirations of the hegemon. In regional institutions, the hegemon may be completely absent and then other factors would explain variation in states’ commitment. Interests are also less likely to be as divergent in regional institutions as they are in a global regime. For example, many regions around the globe now have Nuclear Weapons Free Zones, negotiated among the states in a particular geographic area. Because these institutions exist at the regional level, states are likely to perceive them as more relevant to their regional security than the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, and mechanisms of commitment will be less likely to stem from the hegemon than regional and domestic influences.

**Neo-Liberal Institutionalism and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime**

The findings of this research indicate that the nuclear nonproliferation regime does not fit seamlessly with neo-liberal institutionalist theory. The nuclear nonproliferation regime does offer many of the benefits of institutions as emphasized by institutionalist theory: reducing uncertainly among states, helping states overcome collective action problems, enhancing the provision of information, facilitating issue linkages, and creating focal points for action.609

In significant ways, however, the means by which the regime has operated since its inception are not captured well by NLI. First, it appears unlikely that this regime would survive “after hegemony.” Robert O. Keohane, in his seminal 1984 book, describes how regimes in the realm of political economy could endure beyond the existence of their hegemonic creator. He

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argues that requirements for maintaining existing regimes are less arduous than those for creating them. But the nuclear nonproliferation regime is different in that it has required major revisions since its inception. While states do have some shared interest in nuclear nonproliferation—a necessary condition for cooperation, for most states the global promotion of nonproliferation is not a high policy priority, and certainly not a day-to-day priority on par with their economic policy. The hegemon does prioritize the issue and has therefore spent resources bolstering the regime on a consistent basis, advocating for regime improvements, encouraging states to participate, and bringing states together to punish cheaters. The hegemon has been integral to promoting stronger safeguards through the AP—an agreement that is costly to states in the form of resources and new legislation, and also requires them to give up some sovereignty by permitting regular inspections from foreign nationals. The United States engaged in years of challenging negotiations for the AP to exist, before it began the task of persuading states to join. Without a powerful state coordinating the international community in this way, it appears unlikely that the regime would continue indefinitely. If cheating is not punished and weaknesses are not addressed, NPT members will likely lose faith in the regime over time and it will be unable to remain a strong bulwark against additional nuclear weapons proliferation.

NLI would also expect that membership within this regime would change the preferences of states so they would become more committed to nuclear nonproliferation over time. This project has shown that with each new element of the regime, the hegemon has had to encourage most other states in the system to join. Many states resist. If they are positively inclined toward the hegemon they join; if they are negatively inclined, they resist. With the nuclear

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610 Keohane, After Hegemony.
nonproliferation regime, the association many states make between the hegemon and the regime outweighs their preferences toward nonproliferation.

Where Else Could This Theory Apply?

This theory is likely to find relevance whenever a hegemon establishes a multilateral regime in which its interests significantly outweigh those of other states. Because states will then associate that institution or set of institutions with the hegemon, their favorability to that hegemon’s overall leadership will affect their calculations about participating. The hegemon will have to work harder to achieve the participation of those states that do not perceive it favorably. Though this theory has been applied here to a security regime, there is no reason that it is limited to security regimes, as long as the hegemon establishes the regime and has significantly more interest in the outcome than other participating states.

In the future, this theory may find relevance in the security realm when the hegemon is especially vulnerable to new weapon systems or tactics. In both space and cyber, for example, the most powerful states are more vulnerable to attack than other states due to their overwhelming reliance on these capabilities, and therefore they have a greater strategic interest in setting global rules and norms about these issues. At this time, the key stake-holders in such an agreement, Russia, China and the United States, are becoming more adversarial to one another and so a treaty regime appears unlikely until all three states can cooperate on setting the terms of the agreement. It also matters that the potentially devastating consequences of a massive attack in space or cyber have not been demonstrated. If there were massive power outages or a large dam were opened due to cyber, then parties be galvanized to seek out an agreement. If such an agreement were to develop, the same mechanisms are likely to be exhibited.
The nuclear nonproliferation regime has been relatively successful when considering that 27 nations have sought nuclear weapons programs and only nine states have nuclear weapons today. In the early nuclear age it was anticipated that all technologically capable nuclear states would develop nuclear weapons. President Kennedy famously warned in 1963 of a future world in which 15, 20 or even 25 states possessed nuclear weapons. However, success cannot just be measured in the number of nuclear states, but also by the ways in which the regime creates a focal point for states to come together to address regime cheaters and other problems related to nuclear proliferation and security. The multilateral effort to address the Iranian nuclear problem is a good example of what the regime can do to coordinate states. This project has illustrated how U.S. leadership has been one of the most important factors in creating the institutions that allow for this global coordination. But there are reasons to question whether this record of success will continue. A number of trends may undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime in the future.

The first trend that will serve to undermine future nuclear nonproliferation efforts is the declining relative power of the United States and the increasingly fragmented and multipolar world. The United States has been able to influence reluctant adherents to the regime through its diplomatic influence, the provision of military and economic aid, and occasionally through threats. Though the United States is predicted to remain a powerful state well into the twenty-first century, it will continue to become less economically dominant over time as other states in the system grow in power. The number of states subject to influence by U.S. mechanisms of

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power will likely shrink over time. Moreover, as the global system becomes increasingly multipolar, states may be able to play powerful states against one another and secure aid and other benefits from non-U.S. sources with fewer string attached. One current indicator of possible influence, trade relationships, already indicates how U.S. power is weakening. For example, in 2006, the United States was the largest trading partner for 127 states, while China was the largest partner for 70 states. In 2012, China was the top partner for 124 states, while the United States dropped to 76.\textsuperscript{612} As U.S. hegemony weakens, it is likely that its global leadership in the nuclear nonproliferation regime will weaken as well. The regime is not static with all members locked in; history has shown that the regime has had to be malleable, adjusting and growing deeper as new challenges arise. In each of these cases, the United States has provided leadership to establish new elements of the regime. Waning U.S. influence means it will be more difficult to both create and promote new regime agreements.

A second trend is the growing salience of nuclear weapons, a trend that may have non-nuclear states reconsidering the value of these weapons. Modernization of nuclear weapons and platforms, changes to nuclear doctrine, and incendiary nuclear rhetoric all serve to illustrate the continued value that nuclear states place on these weapons.

Most nuclear states, both in and out of the NPT, are modernizing their nuclear arsenals. The United States is currently planning to replace all three platforms of its nuclear triad, with new bombers, a Minuteman replacement, and an Ohio-class submarine replacement. The U.S. Air Force is considering mobile options for its Minuteman replacement, a major change in its

\textsuperscript{612} Youkyung Lee and Joe McDonald, “China overtakes U.S. as trading partner,” \textit{The Seattle Times}, December 2, 2012.
The Russian Federation is modernizing all aspects of its arsenal, building a new rail-based missile system, developing a new stealth bomber, and adding to its stock of MIRV’ed ICBMs. Moscow is also modernizing its sea leg with plans for eight new Borei-class submarines. In late 2015, the Russian military released an image, perhaps unintentionally, of a new tactical nuclear weapon: an unarmed underwater nuclear drone that would be used to attack adversaries’ coastal areas. Pakistan has the world’s fastest growing nuclear weapons program and recently added a maneuverable, short-range, sub-kiloton battlefield nuclear missile to its arsenal. India is currently developing ICBMs and SLBMs. Beyond hardware, some global leaders, including those in Russia, China, Pakistan, and North Korea, are increasingly making nuclear threats.

The growing salience of nuclear weapons sends the message to non-nuclear weapons states that these weapons are useful and remain relevant—they are not Cold War relics. The five official nuclear weapons states say they are committed to nuclear disarmament, but the pace is not sufficient for many non-nuclear states and nuclear disarmament advocates. At the 2015 NPT

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615 Ibid., 79.
616 “Russia’s new underwater nuclear drone should raise alarm bells,” The Washington Post, December 27, 2015. Robert Joseph, Franklin Miller and Keith Payne argue that this was a deliberate leak in “The Real Significance of That Russian Nuclear Torpedo—Was Putin’s briefing inadvertently leaked? Or was it a deliberate threat?” National Review, December 10, 2015.
Review Conference, these five states maintained unity on the talking point of pursuing a “step-by-step” process of nuclear disarmament without articulating what this means. As non-nuclear weapons states continue to see how useful the nuclear states find these weapons, they may begin to reconsider their own non-nuclear status and their assumptions that the regime can bring about eventual disarmament.

A final trend that could undermine the current regime is a growing global disarmament movement that some see as an alternate framework to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This movement has coalesced around the idea that the humanitarian consequences of any nuclear use are so devastating that no possession of nuclear weapons is justified. The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference referred the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear explosion, stating, “The Conference expresses its deep concern at the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons.”619 In 2011, the International Committee of the Red Cross called on all of its affiliates to wage an educational campaign on the humanitarian effects of nuclear warfare highlighting the inability of the Red Cross to address the humanitarian consequences.620 Since then, an ever growing group of states has presented statements on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons (HINW) at NPT preparatory meetings, NPT Review Conferences, and UN First Committee meetings. The first HINW conference was held in Norway in March 2013 with 127 states in attendance, followed by

similar conferences in Mexico in February 2014 with 146 states, and in Austria in December 2014 with 158 states. At the end of the Austrian meeting, Austrian leaders made a public pledge that included a commitment to pursue a global ban on nuclear weapons. This pledge, now largely referred to as the “Humanitarian Pledge” has 127 state signatories as of spring 2016.

The nuclear states have largely avoided engaging with this community, though the United States and the United Kingdom sent representatives to the December 2014 conference. U.S. leaders take the position that they are aware of the devastating consequences of nuclear weapons and that they do seek eventual nuclear disarmament consistent with their NPT Article VI commitment. U.S. leaders, however, argue that disarmament requires that certain security conditions be met and that states remain committed to the NPT.

The HINW movement has influenced the Vatican, which has recently revised its former position on nuclear weapons and deterrence. During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence was deemed moral in the 1983 Catholic Bishops Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, though nuclear use was not. In 2014 the Vatican wrote a new policy declaring:

The political and military officials of nuclear possessing states assume the responsibility to use these weapons if deterrence fails. But since what is intended is mass destruction—with extensive and lasting collateral damage, inhumane suffering, and the risk of

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The system of nuclear deterrence can no longer be deemed a policy that stands firmly on moral ground. The enthusiasm surrounding the HINW movement could undermine the current nonproliferation regime by providing an alternate forum in which to engage on nuclear disarmament issues, a forum in which the United States has little involvement. With a focus on disarmament, this framework does not provide for nonproliferation safeguards as the NPT does. The HINW movement has promoted working groups outside of the NPT organization to explore the creation of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. For example, the “UN Open Ended Working Group on Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations” was established by a UN General Assembly resolution in the fall of 2015 and is scheduled to meet three times in 2016. This movement has galvanized domestic populations in some states, including states favorable to U.S. global leadership, making it difficult for their leaders to avoid participation even as the United States argues for keeping these discussions within the NPT framework. For example, Japanese and Australian leaders have been torn between their allegiance to the United States and the pull of the HINW. If U.S. allies increasingly face domestic pressure to join a group working outside of the NPT to ban nuclear weapons, the extant regime may weaken and the United States may lose some of the benefit of having the support of favorable states.

Policy Recommendations

Given the findings of this research and trends identified above, what can U.S. policy-makers do to promote the health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime? This section outlines four policy recommendations: lock-in the regime across as many states as possible; find new ways to work with China on nonproliferation; engage with the Humanitarian Consequences Initiative; and bolster the U.S. nuclear energy industry.

First, based on the prospect of decreased influence as the world grows increasingly multipolar and fragmented, U.S. leaders should act with some urgency in attempting to lock-in elements of the regime with as many states as possible in the near term. There is power in the almost universal nature of the regime, but not all of the elements are near-universal. The AP safeguards agreement is the most significant agreement that is far from universal. Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Syria, and Egypt are significant hold-outs. Attention from the highest levels of U.S. leadership and novel issue-linkages will likely be required to persuade these reluctant states.

Second, the United States must find ways to creatively engage with China. Though China is a rising regional power, and a potential global power, thus far it has not taken on a significant leadership role in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. This is perhaps not surprising considering its very pressing domestic priorities. Nonetheless, China has demonstrated a growing concern for nonproliferation and the regime over time, a trend that should be encouraged by U.S. leaders. From the 1950s to the 1980s, China sided with developing nations in regard to the NPT, considering it an inherently discriminatory treaty and refusing to join. After the Cold War ended, the Chinese view began to change, culminating with China joining the NPT in 1992. Since then,
the Chinese have joined most nonproliferation agreements and have become more cooperative in P-5 collaboration. Recent progress includes the P-5 effort to develop a glossary of nuclear terms in all four languages, an effort that should bolster cooperation if these states seek to negotiate new arms control agreements. Chinese leaders are rhetorically supportive of the regime, but in practice U.S. leaders are still trying to get the Chinese to become more deeply engaged in the practice of nonproliferation. U.S. diplomats have been making attempts at engagement, but thus far the Chinese are far from being the partners in nonproliferation that the Soviets were during the Cold War. Possible avenues for U.S.-Chinese engagement beyond high-level officials include meetings among members of nuclear industry to discuss safeguarding nuclear facilities and material; collaboration among physicists; and conferences that encourage engagement among younger members of each state’s nonproliferation bureaucracy.

Third, the United States should engage with the growing HINW movement. The U.S. shares some goals of the movement, including lowering the salience and role of nuclear weapons globally. The pursuit of a global convention banning nuclear weapons use and possession will not be successful without the five NWS, but if the momentum of this group continues to grow it will end up leading to great pressure on the United States, similar to what occurred with the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, the treaty banning land mines. The United States had little involvement in the conception or drafting of the landmine ban treaty, but since its entry into force, the Obama administration has faced great pressure to comply and has taken steps to reduce U.S. use of

landmines. If a similar effort brought about a nuclear ban treaty (the disarmament groups explicitly see the Ottawa Treaty as a model), dealing with pressure to comply could become a distraction from other nuclear nonproliferation activities. Furthermore, the pressure to comply could cause major splits among U.S. alliance partners, and could even affect nuclear basing agreements.

How can the United States engage with this community? First, the U.S. should work through these issues with all of its allies. Some anti-nuclear actors will not be swayed despite U.S. engagement, but there are U.S. allies among the states that have signed on to the Humanitarian Pledge seeking a nuclear ban, and the United States should seek to understand their concerns and the domestic pressures they face. Second, the United States should consider sending representatives to all relevant meetings to communicate the U.S. vision for disarmament. The United States and the UK attended the 2014 Vienna HINW conference, one positive step in engagement with this community. In communicating about its own nuclear weapons, the United States should attempt to be less reactive. Instead of responding to attacks by this umbrella group about its nuclear arsenal, it should instead take proactive steps to explain the purpose of these weapons and means by which the U.S. secures its weapons. The United States should communicate to allies and partners regarding the rationale behind U.S. nuclear posture, the characteristics of the force that reduce nuclear risk, and the conditions under which the U.S. could consider further nuclear reductions. The HINW movement is especially focused on the role of nuclear risk in the form of accidents, including miscalculated or accidental launch. The United

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States is concerned about this too, especially in nuclear states with weaker security measures and less robust command and control systems. Lowering nuclear risk is one area where interests align. Indeed, the United States should engage with other states on substantive issues. It was well-received when the U.S. delegation held a side event explaining U.S. alert posture at the 2015 NPT Review Conference. U.S. leaders should make similar engagements across nuclear issue areas.

Finally, the United States should seek to have a competitive nuclear industry, so it can remain a preferred supplier of nuclear technology. The qualitative evidence in this project illustrated how the United States has been able to use the provision of nuclear technology as an inducement to make states join the nuclear nonproliferation regime. When U.S. technology is perceived as desirable, the nonproliferation regime benefits. Indonesia and Egypt both joined the NPT in part to receive nuclear technology. Today the Indonesian program is stalled and Egypt is purchasing its nuclear technology from Russia. If other states have better technology or offer more favorable deals than the United States and do not hold the importing states to high nonproliferation standards, the nuclear nonproliferation regime will be weakened. Unfortunately, the U.S. nuclear industry has stagnated for a number of reasons, including cheaper fossil fuels, high operating costs, the persistent problem of waste disposal, and a complicated export process. Though the United States operates more domestic power plants than any other country in the world, the reactor fleet is aging, and there are few new plants in the pipeline. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s International Energy Agency, writing on the U.S. nuclear industry in 2014: “The domestic nuclear industry is therefore at a critical juncture as a consequence of its declining economic competitiveness, and existing market
mechanisms do not favour investment in high capital-intensive nuclear technology.”

A stagnating domestic industry hurts innovation in the long-term and could undermine U.S. nuclear exports. Those knowledgeable of the U.S. nuclear industry have a number of suggestions for increasing American competitiveness including improving financing for nuclear projects and reforming and streamlining export regulations. Evaluating those proposals is beyond the scope of this project, but this research has shown that exporting civilian technology has been a beneficial nuclear nonproliferation tool for the United States. As the case of Egypt illustrated, Russia is a major competitor in supplying nuclear energy technology, and may not require the same safeguards standards as the United States.

At present, Russia is focused on building its nuclear export business and is building or is slated to build 29 reactors globally in a number of countries. Russia’s Rosatom firm provides favorable financing and has less government oversight than comparable Western suppliers. U.S. companies are limited to selling reactors in the 46 states where it has nuclear cooperation agreements, agreements that support U.S. nonproliferation goals. Russia has no such restrictions.

Russia’s current dominance in the nuclear supply market is particularly worrisome as Russia is now behaving as a state highly unfavorable toward the U.S.-led order and is becoming less cooperative in nonproliferation, especially since its annexation of Crimea.


reactors in foreign states is a complicated and complex business, but the United States is in a better position to promote strong nuclear safeguards if it has a competitive nuclear export industry.

The nuclear nonproliferation regime is not perfect; the regime has seen its share of failures, and yet it has contributed to lessening the dangers of nuclear proliferation for almost half a century. Much of this success can be attributed to the nonproliferation leadership of the hegemon, the United States. Prognosticating about the impending failure of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime is an activity almost as old as the regime itself. Nevertheless, it does appear as though a number of trends, including changes in the distribution of global power, renewed salience of nuclear weapons, actors seeking alternatives to the NPT framework, and the stagnation of the U.S. nuclear industry, may serve to undermine the regime. Mitigating all of these trends may not be possible, but surely reducing nuclear danger is worth the effort.
## APPENDICES

### Chapter Four Tables

### Appendix Table U: Alternative U.S. Affinity Measure

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</tr>
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<td>0.285*** (0.0714)</td>
<td>0.397*** (0.120)</td>
<td>0.275*** (0.0800)</td>
<td>0.274 (0.142)</td>
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<td>0.0187 (0.0617)</td>
<td>2.669*** (0.500)</td>
<td>2.095*** (0.389)</td>
<td>0.000795 (0.527)</td>
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<td>-0.000934 (0.00361)</td>
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<td>-0.281*** (0.0619)</td>
<td>0.0925 (0.0940)</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Appendix Table V: Substituting LIBERALIZATION for Key IV

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<td>4.362**</td>
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Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
## Appendix Table W: Models with Alternative Democracy Measure

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Standard Errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Appendix Table X: Pool of Nuclear-Relevant States

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<tr>
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<td>-0.431</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.365)</td>
<td>(0.374)</td>
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<td>Logged GDP pc</td>
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<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.622*</td>
<td>0.768**</td>
<td>0.403</td>
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<td>(0.210)</td>
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<td>Years to DV</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>2.553***</td>
<td>2.482***</td>
<td>0.399</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.151)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.573)</td>
<td>(0.544)</td>
<td>(0.571)</td>
<td>(0.528)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years to DV~2</td>
<td>-0.0128</td>
<td>-0.0115</td>
<td>-0.278***</td>
<td>-0.298***</td>
<td>0.0186</td>
<td>0.0531</td>
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<td>(0.0108)</td>
<td>(0.0106)</td>
<td>(0.0767)</td>
<td>(0.0752)</td>
<td>(0.0855)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Years to DV~3</td>
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<td>0.000258</td>
<td>0.00910**</td>
<td>0.0107***</td>
<td>-0.00193</td>
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<td>(0.000204)</td>
<td>(0.000202)</td>
<td>(0.00307)</td>
<td>(0.00311)</td>
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<td>(1.901)</td>
<td>(1.485)</td>
<td>(3.359)</td>
<td>(3.005)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>636</td>
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Standard Errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Appendix Table Y: NPT Models

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<td>Bivariate Model</td>
<td>Simple Model</td>
<td>Complex Model</td>
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<td>Favorability to U.S. Order</td>
<td>0.384*** (0.116)</td>
<td>0.473** (0.156)</td>
<td>0.603* (0.255)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>-1.364*** (0.198)</td>
<td>-1.694*** (0.132)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rivalry</td>
<td>-0.347 (0.198)</td>
<td>-0.529 (0.2710)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity2</td>
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<td>0.000861 (0.0243)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy Imports</td>
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<td>0.000515 (0.000593)</td>
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<td>Logged GDP pc</td>
<td>-0.132 (0.0858)</td>
<td>-0.181 (0.132)</td>
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<td>Years to DV</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.0738)</td>
<td>0.0375 (0.0763)</td>
<td>0.103 (0.145)</td>
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<td>Years to DV~2</td>
<td>-0.00444 (0.00663)</td>
<td>-0.00650 (0.00618)</td>
<td>-0.00704 (0.0104)</td>
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<td>Years to DV~3</td>
<td>0.000227 (0.179)</td>
<td>0.000192 (0.000129)</td>
<td>0.000145 (0.000203)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.542 (0.655)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>1092</td>
<td>579</td>
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</table>

Standard Errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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