INTERTEXTUAL MEDIA REFERENCES AS RESOURCES FOR MANAGING FRAMES, EPISTEMICS, AND IDENTITY IN CONVERSATION AMONG FRIENDS

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By

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Gordon (2009) has demonstrated that intertextuality (e.g., Bakhtin 1981, 1986; Kristeva 1986; Becker 1994; Hamilton 1996; Tannen 2007) and framing (e.g., Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974; Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993) are intrinsically intertwined. This study builds on this work, merging the study of intertextuality and framing with Raymond and Heritage’s (2006) analysis of epistemics in social relations, and simultaneously contributing to the study of ‘intertextual identity construction’ (Hamilton 1996) and ‘epistemic discourse analysis’ (van Dijk 2013). I demonstrate how intertextual ties, specifically media references (to movies, TV shows, songs, videogames, and online memes), contribute to epistemic management and frame shifts, which is conducive to group identity construction in ‘epistemic ecologies’ (C. Goodwin 2013).

The analysis focuses on five conversations of seven hours among ten American friends in their mid-twenties. These data include 116 media references across the five interactions, where speakers use repeated words, phrases, and phonetic and paralinguistic features appropriated from media texts.

Expanding on Gumperz’s (1977, 1982) work on contextualization cues, I demonstrate how these speakers use vowel lengthening, loudness, pitch shifts, laughter, smile voice, regional and foreign accents, singing, and creaky voice to signal media references in talk. I also show that speakers primarily demonstrate recognition of media references through laughter and participating in play frames, and that repetition or explicit affirmation also occasionally demonstrate recognition. I argue that and demonstrate how
media references often serve to remedy epistemic imbalances and simultaneously manage frames, thereby negotiating interactional dilemmas (M. Goodwin 1996). Building on Gordon's (2009) understanding of what Goffman (1974) refers to as laminated frames, I show how two kinds of frame laminations are constructed and interrelated in play frames around media references: overlapping (two frames at once) and embedded (a specific frame within a more general frame). Through such play frames, speakers rekey, reframe (Tannen 2006), and re-adjust the epistemic territory of conversation and ultimately construct group identities as speakers with shared experiences. This study demonstrates how shared prior texts that are referenced by a group of people, such as media references, are used as a resource for managing epistemics, shifting frames, and identity construction.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

It was an early chilly autumn and I sat bundled by a dwindling fire in the wilderness of an isolated island in the Potomac River of Maryland when I first conceptualized the topic for this study. I had been recording conversations among my partner Dave, Dave’s housemates, and other friends in Virginia and Washington, DC for over a month, but on this weekend I left my digital audio recorder back on the mainland for a camping trip with Dave; two of his housemates, Lana and Todd (a couple); and a lifelong friend of Todd’s, Aaron. At the beginning of our adventure, I hit my head on a kayak, when Aaron had insisted on flipping me over in the kayak as practice for the potential possibility that it would capsize in the river. Thus from the outset, the trip was an amphibious calamity. But, as it happens, the trip not only marked the crystallization of my dissertation topic, but the disastrous misadventure would also become a popular topic itself in many of the conversations I would record afterwards.

Despite my minor head injury, we eventually paddled three stubborn kayaks and rafted a decrepit canoe a mile and a half through the rough river and over its rapids to safely disembark on the island. As the night wound down I sat by the campfire admiring the island’s clear view of the stars with Dave. I had been preoccupied with choosing a topic to write about as a final course paper for a seminar on intertextuality, and I started thinking about a paper we had just read in the class: Tovares’ (2012) work on how a TV show was used as an interactional resource in family conversations. As I gazed at the stars, I suddenly realized that while Dave and his housemates did not watch much TV back on the mainland, they frequently played videogames. I began to wonder if the videogames the housemates played made their way into their talk. I soon remembered a conversation that I
had recorded for the intertextuality seminar where Dave, his housemate Lana, and I had been talking about receiving our graduate student stipend checks late, and I joked, “We have been paid by ‘Arstotzka’.” Arstotzka is a fictitious dystopian country in a rather new videogame we had all played recently, called Papers, Please (Pope 2013). Dave’s housemate Fred, and Lana, both picked up on my reference to the videogame and began to repeat other words from it, making our real-life experience into a game. I would begin my analysis by examining how videogame references to Papers, Please emerged in our conversations as ‘shared prior texts’ (Becker 1994) (presented in Chapter Six and in Sierra 2016a).

Interestingly, another key example had its genesis on the trip. A few weeks after the camping trip, I recorded a conversation at an Arlington diner where Dave and I told Dave’s high school friend, Allen, the story of me hitting my head on a kayak. I told Allen how I had “hopped into a kayak first” and “hit my head” while smiling and laughing as I admitted that I “felt kind of dizzy.” At this, Allen laughingly cried out “Oh!” and commented, “Sounds like a bad Oregon Trail trip!” Allen, Dave, and I all remembered playing the videogame The Oregon Trail (Rawitsch, Heinemann, & Dillenberger 1985) in elementary school on Apple desktop computers. The player is a 19th century wagon leader guiding a party of settlers on the Oregon Trail, and river crossings and random injuries or illnesses are all part of the experience. Here, Allen’s childhood experience playing The Oregon Trail allowed him to become involved in a story years later about my experience of an injury on a camping trip that involved crossing a river. This would become the second part of my original analysis (also presented in Chapter Six and in Sierra 2016a).

I would eventually analyze another conversation where Fred, the only housemate of Dave’s who did not go on the camping trip, referenced a meme (an online multimodal sign in which images and texts are combined), saying, “Long hair don’t care” (presented in
Chapter Five) after Lana and I had expressed our astonishment at how Aaron, who wears his hair in a long ponytail, had shamelessly vomited in the tent that we were all sharing that night, after having insisted that we bring more beer than water with us in our canoe.

This legendary camping trip was the departure point for my fascination with how speakers use shared knowledge of media references to navigate shared unpleasant experiences in conversation, such as talk about a head injury during kayaking, getting paid late, and vomiting in a tent. In this study, I examine everyday interactions where American friends in their mid twenties make over 100 references to shared prior texts from media such as videogames, online memes, movies, TV shows, and songs, often using these references to carry out complex interactional work, reinforcing a group identity based on shared knowledge and experience. The examples of intertextual media references I analyze consist of instances where a speaker repeats words, phrases, or a phonetic quality that can be traced back to a specific popular culture media text.

I first draw from work on contextualization cues (Gumperz 1977, 1982), which can be defined as signaling mechanisms that occur with talk to provide information about how the message is to be understood, to show how speakers signal media references in talk so that they can be recognized by speakers as shared prior texts, or instances of intertextuality (e.g., Bakhtin 1981, 1986; Becker 1994; Hamilton 1996; Kristeva 1986). In the spirit of this study’s starting point, I argue that such shared prior texts can be thought of as ‘oars’ in the ‘river of talk’. I then show how people often use media references to construct play frames, or talk defined by playful, non-serious activity (e.g., Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974; Gordon 2008; Trester 2012). Tannen (2006) demonstrated how a family ‘rekeyed’, or changed the tone of, and ‘reframed’, or changed the activity of their talk by ‘recycling’ prior talk, and I demonstrate how speakers in my data use media reference-driven play frames to rekey and reframe talk when they are faced with unpleasant or
awkward moments in interaction. M. Goodwin (1996) showed how these ‘interactional dilemmas’ can be managed by ‘shifting frames’, and I apply her term here in order to analyze how media references serve as an intertextual resource for managing frames at such moments.

Gordon (2009) has shown that intertextuality and framing are intrinsically intertwined, and I build on her work, merging the study of these two topics with studies of epistemics, or knowledge management, in particular drawing from Raymond and Heritage’s (2006) analysis of the role of epistemics in constructing social relations. I show how media references can be analyzed as contributing to epistemic management during frame shifts. I call these connective conversational moves ‘epistemic frame shifts’: shifts in both the epistemic territory of talk as well as in the frame, or activity, of talk. I argue that these intertextual, epistemic, and frame processes are ultimately conducive to group involvement and group identity construction of ‘epistemic ecologies’, defined by C. Goodwin (2010) as specific knowledge distributions within a group as well as the dynamic relationships between participants that arise as a result of those distributions.

1.2 Brief introduction to the theoretical background and data for the study

Many scholars have described the interplay between old and new texts, which can refer to both written texts and speech. Bakhtin’s important concept of dialogicality describes how each word uttered is “half ours and half someone else’s” (1981:345), bringing previous utterances, experiences, and meanings with it. Kristeva writes that the process whereby speakers and hearers re-appropriate language creates what she terms ‘intertextuality,’ where each text is “a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (Kristeva 1986:37).
With his focus on repetition of shared prior texts, Becker (1994) uses the word ‘languaging’ to describe the active, repetitive process of language use, which is “context shaping... Languaging can be understood as taking old texts from memory and reshaping them into present contexts” (Becker 1994:166). Becker had also posited that, “apparently free conversation is a replay of remembered texts — from TV news, radio talk, The New York Times…” (cited in Tannen 1989/2007:55). Tovares (2006, 2007, 2012) has analyzed how repeated words from television function in everyday conversations. She writes, “family and friends creatively recycle television texts to create, test, and negotiate alignments, discuss private issues without getting personal, entertain one another, and reaffirm their relationships, values, and beliefs” (Tovares 2006:8). More broadly, Tannen (1989/2007) highlights how repetition is prominent both within and across individual conversations, also arguing that repetition creates connection between interlocutors in immediate interaction. This is related to Becker’s observation that “social groups seem to be bound primarily by a shared repertoire of prior texts” (1994:165).

As social groups reshape various prior texts in everyday conversation, they also create new frames. Bateson (1972) originally introduced the concept of frame to describe how people interpret what is going on in interaction (joking, arguing, commiserating, etc.). Goffman (1974) discussed the occurrence of laminated or layered frames to describe multiple activities being enacted at once. He also introduced the term ‘keying’ to characterize the tone of the interaction, which he saw as “a central concept in frame analysis” (1974:45), and described how keying could also be subject to rekeying—a change in tone.

Tannen and Wallat’s (1987/1993) analysis of a videotaped pediatric examination expanded on framing, outlining how participants manage frames in interaction moment-by-moment through linguistic and paralinguistic means. They define ‘interactive frame’ as
“a definition of what is going on in interaction, without which no utterance (or movement or gesture) could be interpreted” (Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993:59). They also describe ‘knowledge schemas’ as “participants’ expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the world” (60), which are based on prior experiences and shape the shifting between interactive frames in the encounter they analyze. Tannen and Wallat describe how a pediatrician continually shifts and balances multiple frames, signaling the shifting frames through pitch, lexical items, repetition, pacing, pausing, and tone—features that Gumperz (1982) calls ‘contextualization cues’. Such cues form the contextual ground for situated interpretation and affect how messages are understood (Gumperz 1982).

Addressing the details of framing, especially how frames are layered or what Goffman (1974) calls ‘laminated’ in discourse, Gordon (2002, 2008, 2009) argues that intertextuality and frames are fundamentally linked. Her (2009) analysis shows how intertextually reshaping a family member’s words enables speakers to laminate frames in two different ways, which she refers to as overlapping (two definitions of the interaction simultaneously co-exist) and embedded (a situation’s frame becomes more specific) (2009:116). Tannen (2006) analyzes how a couple’s arguments are recycled, reframed, and rekeyed in a single day of talk. Defining reframing as “a change in what the discussion is about,” she also builds on Goffman’s (1974) work on key and defines rekeying as “a change in the tone or tenor of an interaction” (Tannen 2006:601). Tannen finds that the couple ultimately recycles and reframes their argument in a humorous key, which restores harmony and reinforces the couples’ shared family identities (2006:597). Norrick and Spitz (2008) similarly explore humor as a resource for mitigating conflict in interaction.

Similar to the process of reframing and rekeying to restore harmony, M. Goodwin (1996) finds that shifting frames in conversation can solve interactional dilemmas, or awkward and unpleasant moments in interaction, such as when a gate supervisor at an
airport chides an agent for her hairstyle, for example, and the agent responds to the interactional dilemma by shifting her posture to a “military-like stance…resembling a cadet at attention anticipating an army officer’s inspection” (80). Importantly, Goodwin writes that “shifting frame[s] is not done capriciously, rupturing ongoing discourse; it occurs in orderly ways as practical solutions to interactional dilemmas, reshaping the speech event, or constructing distance from the tone of the activity in progress” (1996:71).

Many of the aforementioned studies on intertextuality recognize the role of specific knowledge in creating meanings and identities in interaction. In his work on constructing group identity via humor, Norrick (1989) describes the exact mechanism that makes intertextual jokes conducive to creating involvement and solidarity. He writes, “complementary exhibition of shared knowledge, particularly when it involves some specialized or arcane source, attests to common interests and encourages mutual involvement” (Norrick 1989:120). Knowledge management—or epistemics—is thus important in intertextuality. While the importance of knowledge itself has been recognized in studies of intertextuality and identity in interaction, none draw explicitly on contemporary theorizing on epistemics in discourse.

The fact that epistemics is frequently involved in identity construction has only recently begun to be explored by scholars. Raymond and Heritage (2006) show how two friends who are talking on the phone, Vera and Jenny, balance epistemic stances, or knowledge-based assessments, of Vera’s grand-children. Through negotiating epistemic stances, these women manage interactional identities regarding their rights to assess the epistemic territory (surrounding knowledge base) of the grandchildren.

Heeding van Dijk’s (2013) call for ‘epistemic discourse analysis’ — or “the systematic and explicit study of the ways knowledge is interactively ‘managed’ (activated, expressed, presupposed, implied, conveyed, construed, etc.) in the structures and
strategies of text and talk” (498) — I expand on what previous studies have mentioned regarding the importance of knowledge in intertextual processes and merge this area with work on epistemics. I develop a framework to show how intertextuality is not only interconnected with framing, but also can be understood as contributing to epistemic management. I argue that viewing intertextual and epistemic processes simultaneously allows us to better analyze relationships and identity construction that grow out of these processes.

The construction of group identity among friends is particularly fascinating because it relies on some form of consensus across individuals in a social group that they are similar, or that they have a shared identity based on ‘adequation,’ or similarity (Bucholtz & Hall 2005). Similar to how families may form a ‘familylect’ (Søndergaard 1991), or a family’s particular way of speaking, groups of friends also use shared prior texts, as Gordon (2009) has shown for families, to constitute a bound social group with its own culture. In fact, my partner Dave has referred to his housemates and himself, who make up a substantial part of the data I draw on in this study, as a ‘tribe’ on numerous occasions. I analyze media references in everyday conversation as a specific kind of shared prior text that friends can draw on to express their shared cultural knowledge and thereby reinforce their shared identity.

As I will describe in more detail in Chapter Three, the data for this study are five digitally recorded naturally-occurring conversations of varying lengths totaling approximately 7 hours among 9 of my friends and me (10 participants total). I selected these as out of a larger set of 40 conversations containing 45 hours and 24 minutes of everyday talk among 26 participants that I recorded across the span of one year. There is a long history of analyzing conversations in which analysts participated including Hamilton (1994/2005), Schiffrin (1987), Tannen (1984/2005), and they cite distinct advantages, such
as allowing the researcher to know as much as possible about the conversational setting and the participants’ relationships with each other. Using an unobtrusive digital recorder, or sometimes my cell phone, ensured that I could easily record long stretches of conversations in various settings. I recorded conversations at fairly frequent intervals, primarily on the weekends, and most often in conversations with friends of Dave. I mostly recorded Dave and his friends in Northern Virginia at his shared group house and in restaurants.

In addition to Dave’s housemates, I recorded conversations with other friends of Dave’s and mine, again at Dave’s shared house and at restaurants, as well as conversations with other friends of mine in the absence of Dave, which took place on the Georgetown University campus. These participants were mostly (but not all) white, working young professionals or graduate students in their mid to late twenties living in Northern Virginia or Washington, DC. The five conversations I focus on for this study were selected because they contained a substantial number of media references.

The main goal of this study is to examine how the intertextual repetition of shared prior media texts in everyday conversation serves as resources for framing, epistemics, and group identity construction. I show how intertextual media references are signaled in talk as epistemic resources with specific contextualization cues by speakers and how they are shown to be understood by listeners, as well as how this allows participants to engage in play frames, often as a way of dealing with an interactional dilemma that arises at least in part from an epistemic imbalance across members of the group. Ultimately, these intertextual, epistemic, and frame processes contribute to group involvement and identity construction. This study brings together work on frames theory and intertextuality with work on epistemics, providing for an integrated and fine-grained approach to knowledge
management in conversation that ultimately illuminates processes of group identity construction.

1.3 Preview of the chapters

Chapter Two synthesizes different linguistic approaches to knowledge and identity — the Interactional Sociolinguistic study of intertextuality in interaction and the Conversation Analytic study of epistemics (knowledge management) in interaction — finding that they share knowledge as their primary focus, and that both of these approaches can be integrated in order to study identity construction. I start by reviewing the concepts of dialogicality (Bakhtin 1981, 1984, 1986), intertextuality (Kristeva 1986), shared prior texts (Becker 1994), and repetition (Tannen 1989/2007) and how these notions have been applied to examine media texts in everyday interaction (Tovares 2006; 2007; 2012). I then give an overview of the concept of framing (Bateson 1972), as well as essential parts of framing, specifically the notions of keying (Goffman 1974) and knowledge schemas (Tannen & Wallat 1987/1995), describing how these have been applied to studies that also investigate intertextuality and identity construction. I also draw attention to specific mentions of the importance of knowledge in studies on intertextuality.


Chapter Three briefly describes the larger set of digitally-recorded conversational data of talk among friends from which the this study were drawn. It provides the methodology of this study and introduces the five conversations that are included in this analysis.

Chapters Four, Five, and Six are analysis chapters, which, combined, develop a framework for identifying and analyzing intertextual references in talk as a site for epistemic management, which ultimately illuminates identity construction.

Chapter Four focuses on the building blocks of this framework: how intertextual media references are signaled through prosodic, paralinguistic, and phonetic features in everyday conversation, building on Gumperz’s (1977, 1982) work on contextualization cues. I examine how 116 uses of media references are signaled through specific contextualization cues in everyday talk across five conversations. In these instances speakers are appropriating specific media texts and inserting them into their talk. I explain that the most common ways of signaling intertextual media references are vowel lengthening, loudness, intonation mimicry, and extreme shifts in pitch, and examine why this is the case. I also explore how the less frequent ways of signaling media references (smile voice, laughter, use of regional/foreign accents, singing, and creaky voice) are sex-class linked (Goffman 1977), or “more likely to be associated with members of the class of females or males” (Tannen 1996:197), have individual characteristics associated with the features, or are constrained by the source texts themselves.
Chapter Five moves from the signaling mechanism of intertextual media references to examining two other related processes: recognition of media references, and the construction of play frames (Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) through the references. First, I analyze the four different ways through which speakers demonstrate recognition and understanding of references when they hear them: laughter, participating in a play frame around the reference, repetition of a reference, and explicit affirmation of a reference. I demonstrate how engaging in a play frame based on a media reference is the most analytically reliable way that people show they have understood a reference. I then argue for treating intertextual ties, in this specific case, intertextual media references, as units of epistemics that allows for the creation of play frames as well as the simultaneous management of knowledge imbalances and resulting interactional dilemmas in conversation. I call these combinatorial conversational moves ‘epistemic frame shifts’: shifts in both the epistemic territory of talk as well as in the frame, or activity, of talk. I analyze two examples where speakers make references to online memes to carry out this conversational work.

Chapter Six investigates how speakers use media references as resources not only to manage interactional dilemmas based on epistemic imbalances, but also to construct shared group identity in interaction. Following Tannen (2006), I examine how rekeying and reframing of problematic talk occur; specifically I show how friends make references to videogames to do so. I expand on Gordon’s (2009) description of overlapping and embedded frames, demonstrating that embedded frames containing specific constructed dialogue strengthen the more general overlapping play frames constructed by the shared playful remembering. These epistemic frame shifts facilitate different group members’ involvement in conversation and assist them in being active in constructing their identities as individuals, friends, and members of a specific epistemic ecology. I also comment on
how individuals simultaneously negotiate their own identities within a group through their
deployment of media references.

Chapter Seven includes a brief summary and discussion of the key findings of this study and how they contribute to our understanding of knowledge and identity in everyday interaction. I synthesize the findings as they relate to contextualization cues, intertextuality, framing, epistemics, and identity construction in discourse. I comment on how this study has begun to show the connection between media consumption practices and everyday identity construction in interaction. I conclude that any type of shared prior texts that are referenced by a group of people could be analyzed using the framework I have developed in this study in order to understand the intertextual identity construction of a unique epistemic ecology.

This study builds on past work by Bakhtin, Goffman, Becker, Tannen, Gordon, Heritage, Tovares, and others, showing how intertextual media references are a site for managing both frames and epistemic territories, ultimately illuminating relationships and identity construction through highlighting the role of socially contextualized knowledge. In developing this cohesive framework, this study introduces an integration of knowledge and identity in everyday discourse that can be used in future studies on how people express their knowledge and themselves in social interaction.
CHAPTER TWO
LINGUISTIC APPROACHES TO KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I synthesize the theoretical background of the approach I take in this analysis. I first describe some of the main concepts that Interactional Sociolinguistic (IS) scholars have applied to the study of knowledge and identity in discourse in Section 2.2, reviewing the concepts of dialogicality (Bakhtin 1981, 1984, 1986), intertextuality (Kristeva 1986), prior texts (Becker 1994), and repetition (Tannen 1989/2007) and how these notions have been applied to examine media texts in everyday interaction (Tovares 2006; 2007; 2012). I then give an overview of the concept of framing (Bateson 1972), as well as essential parts of framing, namely keying (Goffman 1974) and knowledge schemas (Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993), and describing how these have been applied to studies that also illuminate connections between intertextuality and identity construction. I end that section by summarizing how studies on intertextuality in interaction have specifically approached the importance of knowledge. This is followed by an overview of other relevant linguistic approaches to knowledge in Section 2.3, including a review of evidentiality (Chafe 1972, 1986; Kärkkäinen 2003; Aikhenvald 2004; Mushin 2001), a particular focus on the Conversation Analysis (CA) work on epistemics in interaction (C. Goodwin 2010, 2013; Heritage 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c; Raymond & Heritage 2005, 2006; Stivers, Mondada & Steensig 2011), and what can be summarized as ‘discourse epistemics’ (van Dijk 2013; 2014). I end in Section 2.4 with a review of scholarship on identity construction and the role of knowledge in this process, covering Goffman’s notion of presentation of self (1959) and footing (Goffman 1981), variationist sociolinguistics approaches to identity (Eckert 2000; Eckert 2008; Eckert & Rickford

2.2 Key Interactional Sociolinguistic theories that address knowledge

Here I review work from the field of IS (and from related fields, such as anthropological linguistics) that has examined the issue of knowledge in interaction. I synthesize studies in intertextuality, framing, and identity construction. First, I review studies on intertextuality, many of which have incorporated framing as a way to understand knowledge, and some of which have additionally analyzed identity construction. Next, I also synthesize Tannen’s (1979/1993, 2006; also Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993) work on framing, schemas, and keying, topics that are particularly useful in researching knowledge. As Schiffrin (1994) writes, IS “provides an approach to discourse that focuses upon situated meaning” (133). In other words, this approach to discourse focuses on the relationship between language and context. Any focus on context in interaction necessitates a discussion on the prior knowledge, accumulated from experience, of the participants.

According to Schiffrin (1994), the analytical focus of IS draws from linguistics, anthropology and sociology, synthesizing the theoretical approaches of John Gumperz and Erving Goffman and examining audio and/or video recordings of naturally occurring interactions for their data.
2.2.1 Cultural expectations

Speakers with shared backgrounds may share expectations regarding how to use and interpret linguistic and paralinguistic features. Gumperz’s (1982) analyses of interethnic communication is some of the earliest work in IS, as Schiffrin (1994) writes, and is recognized as the foundation of this approach. Gumperz was interested in how speakers make conversational inferences, or interpretations, about what will come next in talk and how they interpret contextualization cues (including verbal and nonverbal signs, such as lexical choice) that signal what speakers mean to say and what speech activity they are participating in. When speakers do not share the same cultural norms, or accumulated knowledge, for communication, their differing interpretations of contextualization cues can result in misunderstandings. Tannen (1984/2005) extends cross-cultural communication to examine subcultural differences in a conversation among Americans, where speakers have developed differing norms for interaction based on their upbringing and experiences in unique speech communities that have their own expectations for communication. For example, Tannen finds that speakers in her study from New York City use a ‘high-involvement style’, where they expect involvement to be shown through fast pace of talk, directness, no space between conversational turns (preferring cooperative overlap), personal questions, and joint construction of stories. On the other hand, Tannen describes the speakers in her study from California and England as exhibiting a ‘high-considerate style’, where they expect politeness to be shown by use of a slower pace of talk, space between turns, avoidance of personal questions, and for turns to be taken one-at-a-time. Therefore, these cultural expectations regarding conversation consist of knowing how to use and interpret contextualization cues, along with how to use linguistic strategies such as those Tannen examines.
2.2.2 Dialogicality, intertextuality, prior texts, and repetition

Many IS scholars have taken up ‘intertextuality’ in recent years as an approach to interaction, applying the ideas of Bakhtin (1981, 1986) and Kristeva (1986); this approach necessarily entails the topic of knowledge in conversation. Bakhtin’s influential notion of dialogicality focuses on how every word spoken is “half ours and half someone else’s” (1981: 345) bringing previous usages, experiences, and connotations along with it. Thus every use of language is a kind of repetition (a perspective Becker 1994 also advances, as discussed below). For Bakhtin, a word “becomes ‘one’s own’ only when the speaker populates it with their own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention” (1981: 293). Bakhtin also discusses dialogue as ‘double-voiced’ discourse, which in his commentator Todorov’s (1984) explanation “…is characterized by the fact that not only is it represented [the discourse] but it also refers simultaneously to two contexts of enunciation: that of the present enunciation and that of a previous one” (71). In other words, words used in conversation necessarily involve prior usages and meanings as well as new meaning in the new context in which it is used. Bakhtin additionally distinguishes between active and passive double-voiced words; in active double-voiced words, the repeated words are active in working against the repeater’s usage, while in passive double-voiced words, the repeated words are passive and the repeater is in control of the new meaning (1984: 189). Kristeva expands upon Bakhtin and writes that the process he describes creates intertextuality, where each text is “a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another” (Kristeva 1986: 37).

This process through which speakers repeat things they have heard or seen before has already been taken up by a number of language scholars. With his focus on repetition of shared prior texts, Becker (1994) uses the word ‘languaging’ to describe the repetitive,
yet creative process of language use, which is “context shaping...Langaging can be understood as taking old texts from memory and reshaping them into present contexts” (Becker 1994: 166). Applying this idea to social interaction and theorizing on the functions of what had previously been described as dialogicality and intertextuality, Becker observed, “social groups seem to be bound primarily by a shared repertoire of prior texts” (1994:165). This observation makes shared prior knowledge crucial, and has implications for dynamic group identity construction. Furthermore, Becker’s idea of ‘prior texts’ captures the idea that all texts have a history that is necessarily invoked when they are used in new contexts, which relates with Bakhtin’s notion that all new dialogue brings with it the contexts of its prior usage.

Tannen (1989/2007) brings the work of Bakhtin, Kristeva, and Becker together in her investigation of forms and functions of repetition in a range of conversational and literary contexts. She examines what she calls ‘synchronic repetition’, or the recurrence of words, and collocations of words, within a conversation or text, as well as ‘diachronic repetition’, or the recurrence of words across conversations and texts, often evident in the representation of speech in discourse, which she terms ‘constructed dialogue’. This occurs when “a speaker repeats another’s words at a later time,” and Tannen argues that “this active participation in sensemaking contributes to the creation of involvement” (133). For Tannen, involvement is an internal and emotional connection individuals achieve in conversational interaction which binds them to other people, places, things, activities, ideas, memories, and words (27). Tannen also describes details as a kind of visual repetition, which convey meaning by association with previous experienced interactions. Tannen thus highlights how repetition is prominent both within and across not only literary works, but also in conversations. She also argues that repetition creates connection between interlocutors in immediate interaction, which relates to Becker’s (1994)
observation that social groups are held together mainly by shared prior texts. Shared access to previous language experiences helps create a social group.

Finally, Agha, an anthropological linguist, theorizes how distinct forms of language become socially recognized through the process of repetition in particular contexts, defining a ‘linguistic register’ as “a linguistic repertoire that is associated, culture-internally, with particular social practices and with persons who engage in such practices” (2004:24). Agha has since expanded on the concept of a register to develop the concept of enregisterment. According to Agha (2007), enregisterment refers to “processes and practices whereby performable signs become recognized (and regrouped) as belonging to distinct, differentially valorized semiotic registers by a population” (81). A register emerges when a number of indexical relationships begin to be seen as related; a particular linguistic form (or nonlinguistic sign) is enregistered when it becomes included in a register. This observation explains a variety of phenomena, such as how people come to know how to talk in particular social contexts, as well as how cultural stereotypes relating to language emerge. Agha also notes, “switching to the register may itself reconfigure the sense of occasion, indexically entailing or creating the perception that the social practice is now under way” (2004:25). In other words, speakers can use registers, consisting of prior languaging experiences, to switch frames, an IS concept that will be described in more detail shortly.

2.2.3 Prior media texts in everyday interaction

empirical data. Spitulnik (1997) examines the medium of radio in Zambia to study how phrases and discourse styles from radio broadcast are recycled and reanimated in everyday conversation. She argues that public accessibility of radio, detachability of media fragments, and people’s active engagement with radio allow public words “to have lives of their own yet also be fibers of connection across various social situations and contexts” (161), playing a major role in the creation and integration of communities (181).

Spitulnik’s analysis reveals the intertextual process through which public radio texts function as reference points for the circulation of discourse, providing insights into the intertextual relations between media texts and everyday talk.

Many investigations suggest that television texts in particular are part of the cultural repertoire (e.g., Bryce & Leichter 1983; Lull 1990; Spigel 1992, 2001; Bryant & Bryant 2001). Duff (2002) examines prevalent talk about pop culture, primarily relating to television, in a Canadian high school, and demonstrates how lack of knowledge about such texts can be a source of exclusion for ESL students in classroom discourse. Tovares (2006; 2007; 2012), on the other hand, has led the way in analyzing how television texts function in everyday interaction. Tovares (2006) examines conversations among family and friends where they discuss the television show *Who Wants to Marry a Multimillionaire?* after having watched it. She shows how conversations about the show function as gossip or a type of talk that Bakhtin (1975: 151) describes as ‘zhytejskaya germenevtika’, or what Tovares translates as ‘quotidian hermeneutics’, which captures the concept of the everyday nature of meaning-making in discourse (Tovares 2006:469). Tovares finds family and friends creatively use television texts to discuss private issues without getting personal, reinforce their friendships, affirm shared values, and entertain one another.

Tovares (2007) continues to demonstrate the interrelationship between the public and the private by focusing on interactions that occur when family members are actively
watching television. She examines how families respond to TV texts while simultaneously carrying out other actions, such as eating, talking to each other, calling friends (often in reaction to TV shows), looking through family photos or shopping catalogues, cleaning the house, and reading to each other. She also shows how by actively and creatively repeating television texts, family members educate their children, express their thoughts and feelings, and discuss their differences in attitudes and values.

Tovares (2012) analyzes how family members draw on the TV quiz show *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire* while watching it and in subsequent conversations to create family involvement, construct certain identities (as knowledgeable), create alignments, socialize their children, and provide entertainment. All of Tovares’ studies on TV talk in family interaction clearly demonstrate that repeating media texts is not a passive process, but rather is extremely active and creative, and can be used to serve a variety of functions within families.

Also examining family talk, Beers Fägersten (2012) examines what she calls ‘intertextual quotation’ of television, videos, and movies in a recorded interaction of a Swedish-American family. She finds that intertextual quotation is established by the parents of the family as a primarily playful act, ratified by repetition and laughter, and that it serves three functions: reflecting evaluative stance towards ongoing conversation, establishing interactive alignment, and strategically rekeying or reframing interaction for the purpose of conflict resolution (Beers Fägersten 2012:80). Thus this study also demonstrates that film texts are actively re-purposed by family members to serve specific functions, ultimately binding the members of a family together as a cohesive social group.

Spreckels (2012) analyzes interactions during media consumption. Specifically, she examines informal conversations among a group of German adolescent girls watching a televised music talent show, *Teenstar*. She shows how they mock the performance of the
girls on the show exposing them as ‘wannabe rock stars’ in jointly produced sequences. Even though the girls are captivated by the show, through their talk they express their stances towards the hypocrisy of the talent show business.

Following in the IS tradition and building on prior work regarding television and film texts, in Sierra (2016a) I examine how friends in their mid-twenties — the same participants as in this larger study — appropriate texts from videogames they have played to resolve knowledge-related problems in their interactions, which is ultimately conducive to group identity construction. Sierra (2016b) examines how friends verbally signal and show recognition of a variety of media references, not only to TV shows and videogames, but also to movies, YouTube videos, and online memes.

2.2.4 Intertextuality and framing

Gordon (2009) demonstrates how, as participants in everyday conversations actively reshape various prior texts, they also create new ‘frames.’ Bateson (1972) originally introduces the concept of frame to describe what people think is going on in interaction (playing or fighting, for example). He conceptualizes every frame as having an underlying ‘metamessage’ which conveys to participants how they should interpret the message. As Gordon (2015) writes, Goffman (1974) expands on frame analysis, conceptualizing frames as more social and interactional, while also observing that frames can be ‘laminated’ or ‘layered’ frames, meaning that multiple activities are happening at once. Leaving the door open for future research Goffman later writes, “Every possible kind of layering must be expected” (1974:157). He also introduces the term ‘keying’ to describe the tone of the interaction, which he is “a central concept in frame analysis” (1974:43). He describes how keying could also be subject to rekeying – a change in tone. He writes that “[no] obvious limit [can] be seen to the number of rekeyings to which a
particular strip of activity can be subject; clearly, multiple rekeyings are possible” (80). Goffman’s work was, for the most part, based on his own observations yet theoretical in nature, and he left the particulars to be worked out by future generations of interactional researchers.

Indeed, Goodwin (1996) notes that “while Goffman laid out a programmatic for looking at the phenomenon of footing, he did not analyze how shifts in footing are achieved in actual moment-to-moment talk” (72), and Gordon writes, “Goffman describes lamination (or layering) in quite general terms, noting that laminations occur through the transformation and rekeying of activities (1974:82) and observing that participants often keep multiple frames and footings in play” (1981:155-156, as cited in Gordon 2009:115-116).

Tannen (1979/1993) applies the concept of frames in a cognitive sense, with a focus on speaker’s ‘structures of expectation’ to an analysis of sixteen types of linguistic evidence for differing frames in narratives told by Americans and Greeks about a film they watched. Commenting on Tannen, Goffman (1981) comments that this work concerns very different types of framing from the frames that he and Bateson write about (67). Tannen and Wallat (1987/1993) later refer to the type of frame analyzed in Tannen (1979/1993) as ‘knowledge schemas’; these refer to “participants’ expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the world” (60). These expectations are based on prior experiences.

Tannen and Wallat (1987/1993) suggest the term ‘interactive framing’ for the type of frames Bateson and Goffman were writing about. The concept is taken up in their influential analysis of a videotaped pediatric examination, which outlines how participants manage frames in interaction moment-by-moment. They define ‘interactive frame’ as “a definition of what is going on in interaction, without which no utterance (or movement or gesture) could be interpreted” (Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993:59). They describe how a
pediatrician continually shifts and balances multiple frames: the social encounter frame (where the pediatrician interacts with a mother and child), the examination frame (where she examines the child and communicates her findings to pediatric residents who will later watch the videotaped examination), and the consultation frame (where she addresses the mother’s concerns). She signals the shifting frames through pitch, lexical items, repetition, pacing, pausing, and tone: features that Gumperz (1982) calls ‘contextualization cues,’ which affect how talk is interpreted. Tannen and Wallat also describe a ‘leaky frame’ in the interaction, where lexical items from the examination frame (“spleen” and “palpable”) leak into the activity of the social encounter frame, when the pediatrician, after having asked the child questions like “Any peanut butter and jelly in here?” in the social encounter frame while examining the child’s abdomen, asks, “Is your spleen palpable over there?” Tannen and Wallat’s work is instrumental in clarifying how Goffman’s frames function in conversation and in constructing an interactional, linguistic approach to framing.

Addressing the details of framing, Gordon (2002, 2008, 2009) argues that intertextuality and framing are fundamentally linked. Her 2009 analysis builds on Tannen’s (1989/2007) work on repetition in discourse and draws from a unique data set where families self-audio-recorded for about a week, as part of their participation in a family discourse study directed by Tannen & Kendall (see Tannen, Kendall, & Gordon 2007). Gordon shows how, in everyday family talk, intertextually reshaping a family member’s words enables speakers to laminate frames in two different ways, which she refers to as overlapping and embedded (2009:116). By overlapping frames, Gordon means “an utterance is situated in (at least) two frames at once” or that “the utterance refers simultaneously to two contexts of enunciation: that of the present enunciation and that of a previous one” (2009:116), following Todorov’s (1984) explanation of Bakhtin’s ‘double-voiced words’ concept. For example, when a wife teases her husband about being a
'superior subject' in the larger study from which Gordon’s data were drawn, this single utterance refers to a present moment as well as a previous one where the husband had jokingly referred to himself as ‘superior’ in terms of his compliance as a study participant. This instance illustrates how overlapping frames are anchored in the present moment while also invoking a previous utterance.

Whereas overlapping frames work along a time scale, embedded frames “refer to a situation in which a frame with a more specific metamessage is completely embedded in a frame with a more general metamessage” (Gordon 2009:141). For example, when a three-year-old child engaged in pretend play with her mother uses words that her mother used several days before, the pretend play frame becomes specified as a role-reversal reenactment. Gordon mentions the possibility of embedded frames within overlapping frames (2009: 154-155), but her emphasis is on how intertextuality is used to accomplish framing in family discourse, while also constructing the family as a social group with a shared set of prior texts. Her 2008 work describes how parents ‘blend’ work and play frames with their children. She defines ‘blending’ frames as “cases in which there are two simultaneous definitions of what is taking place” (2008: 320). Unlike overlapping frames, which are distinct because they combine a present moment with a past interaction, blended frames rely on two concurrent definitions of the interaction, such as in instances where work and play occur simultaneously.

Hoyle (1993) also examines play frames, analyzing two boys’ play talk where they reference real sports figures and arenas to give their ping-pong playing its character as a sportscasting event. She argues that these boys also embed play frames within one another, for example, embedding a ‘player interview’ frame within a ‘sportscaster play’ frame. Her work shows how frames are laminated within play frames, and, while Hoyle
does not use the term ‘intertextuality,’ her analysis does reveal how knowledge gleaned from previous experience is mobilized in creating play frames.

Play frames may serve for ‘phatic communion’, as described by Malinowski (1923/1936), which “serves to establish bonds of personal union between people brought together by the mere need of companionship and does not serve any purpose of communicating ideas” (316). Senf (1995) describes phatic communion as “utterances that are said to have exclusively social, bonding functions like establishing and maintaining a friendly and harmonious atmosphere in interpersonal relations” (3). Scholars have indeed found that the management of frames can work towards achieving phatic communion, or harmony, in discourse.

Like Gordon, and drawing on the same larger dataset, Tannen (2006) examines intertextuality in family discourse, analyzing how a couple’s arguments about domestic responsibilities are recycled, reframed, and rekeyed over the course of one day. She uses ‘recycling’ to refer to bits of previous conversational topics being re-introduced in later conversations. She defines reframing as “a change in what the discussion is about” and builds on Goffman’s (1974) work on ‘key’ to define rekeying as “a change in the tone or tenor of an interaction” (Tannen 2006: 601). Tannen finds that “restoring harmony was accomplished in part by reframing in a humorous key, and in ways that reinforced the speakers’ shared family identities” (2006:597). From this study, we can see that shared interactional knowledge is required to carry out these framing and keying processes which ultimately lead to group harmony and identity construction.

As mentioned earlier, Beers Fägersten (2012) finds that ‘intertextual quotation’ of film texts is also a way to rekey and reframe interaction, serving for conflict resolution in a family. Though they do not explicitly consider intertextuality, Norrick and Spitz (2010) similarly explore the use of humorous reframing and rekeying to restore harmony in
conversation, and they analyze humor as a resource used to mitigate conflict in talk. This can also be linked to M. Goodwin's (1996) finding that shifting frames worked to solve interactional dilemmas. Examining the function of framing in recorded everyday interactions (arguments, during stories, and in service encounters at airports) she uses the term ‘shifting frames’ in her analysis “to demonstrate some of the methodical procedures listeners in conversational interaction make use of in recasting a prior speaker’s talk to reshape meaning” (M. Goodwin 1996:72). Goodwin writes that shifting frames frequently involve a change in stance or footing, and that “shifting frame[s] is not done capriciously, rupturing ongoing discourse; it occurs in orderly ways as practical solutions to interactional dilemmas, reshaping the speech event, or constructing distance from the tone of the activity in progress” (1996:71). These empirically-based insights are helpful in understanding the question of “why frame?” and demonstrate, like Tannen and Wallat (1987/1993), that speakers must draw on pre-existing knowledge schemas (see also Tannen 1979/1995) in order to shift interactive frames so fluidly and purposefully. Goodwin’s work can also be connected with much of the IS work on intertextuality, with her focus on “recasting a prior speaker’s talk to reshape meaning” (1996:72).

2.2.5 Intertextuality, framing, and identity

Gordon (2009) considers the relationship between intertextuality, framing, and family identity construction, as I have already discussed. Trester (2012) also examines the relationship between intertextuality and framing. She analyzes how intertextual play functions in the creation of new performance frames in an improv comedy group’s backstage talk to serve community reaffirmation. Trester finds that ‘entextualization,’ “the process of rendering discourse extractable, of making a stretch of linguistic production into a unit - a text - that can be lifted out of its interactional setting” (Bauman & Briggs
1990: 73), serves as a framing device in her data; entextualization enacts a shift into a performance frame, where speakers engage in various intertextual, linguistic ‘games’ (2012:256). She applies Goffman’s (1961) work on ‘game moves’ that create the emergence of a particular kind of play frame - a ‘game world’. Game worlds must exist in the real world since they are constructed in conversation, but they are surrounded by a barrier that allows for some properties of the real world to be included, if they are relevant to the game (Trester 2012: 241). This study shows that these frame shifts require a good amount of shared contextual knowledge based on prior experience, or knowledge schemas.

2.2.6 Intertextuality, knowledge, and identity

While much of the IS research and work from related fields that study intertextuality in interaction has not focused on knowledge explicitly, in the previous sections I have attempted to highlight the role of knowledge in extant studies. In addition, some of the earlier, more theoretical work on intertextuality comments on the importance of knowledge in contributing to social identity construction. In his work on negotiating shared knowledge and constructing group identity via humor, Norrick (1989) states what the exact mechanism is that makes intertextual jokes (and I would also argue game moves and play frames) conducive to creating involvement and solidarity: “…complementary exhibition of shared knowledge, particularly when it involves some specialized or arcane source, attests to common interests and encourages mutual involvement” (Norrick 1989:120). In other words, when people use intertextuality, the more the obscure knowledge invoked, the better, as far as involvement and identity are concerned. Norrick also notes “telling jokes leads to solidarity precisely because passing the tests they pose show shared background knowledge and group membership” (1989:121). Here, jokes depend on recognition and comprehension of shared prior texts, which demonstrate
adequate knowledge to be part of the group. Also related to shared knowledge in intertextual processes, Bauman and Briggs (1990) explain that, “Competence, the knowledge and ability to carry out the decontextualization and recontextualization of performed discourse successfully and appropriately, may be locally conceived of as innate human capacity, learned skill, special gift, a correlate of one’s position in the life cycle, and so on” (1990: 77). Essentially, the competence required to perform intertextually can index various attributes of performative identity, such as intelligence, wit, accomplishment, talent, maturity, experience, etc.

In an important early study on intertextuality and identity construction in daily conversation, Hamilton (1996) shows how intertextuality serves as a resource for creating stable social identities. She makes the distinction between features of talk that are ‘intratextual’ (within the bounds of a single conversation – what Tannen 1989/2007 refers to as ‘synchronic repetition’) and ‘intertextual’ (across conversations – what Tannen 1989/2007 calls ‘diachronic repetition’) in her investigation of conversations she had with an individual with Alzheimer’s disease (Elsie). Hamilton examines how she positions Elsie as peer and patient (both in terms of mental and physical inabilities). She suggests that an intertextual history with people like Elsie not only influences the caregiver’s view of patients, but that the process is reciprocal: patients increasingly see themselves as defined by the characteristics to which their interlocutors orient. This process can be extended to a variety of daily contexts, with real implications for how identity is perceived.

Many of the aforementioned studies on intertextuality also recognize the role of knowledge in their data in creating meanings and identities in interaction. Gordon (2009) suggests that for frames to be successfully laminated in discourse, the speaker and the hearer both must recognize that some bit of language is being repeated. Tovares (2012) mentions how speakers used a TV show in their conversations to construct their identities
Knowledge management – also known as ‘epistemics’ – is important in intertextuality. While the importance of knowledge itself has been recognized in studies of intertextuality and identity in interaction, none draw explicitly on contemporary theorizing on epistemics in discourse.

2.3 Other linguistic approaches to knowledge

Here I review linguistic approaches outside of the IS field to epistemics, particularly focusing on the work of Chafe on evidentiality and epistemic modality, Conversation Analysis scholars on epistemics, and van Dijk on discourse epistemics. I trace the historical development of theorizing across these studies, summarize the key insights, and draw from the current literature to point towards future directions of research on epistemics.

2.3.1 Evidentiality

Chafe (1972; 1986) can be credited with some of the initial work on evidentiality and epistemic modality in discourse. Chafe (1986) focuses on the variety of linguistic resources used in spoken and written English to express attitudes towards the reliability of knowledge. He discusses four modes of knowing: belief, induction, hearsay, and deduction. He notes that each of these modes derive from a different source, such as
‘evidence’ in the case of induction, and ‘language’ in the case of hearsay. He also writes that in addition to modes of knowing, there exist degrees of reliability, which may be expressed with adverbs (*maybe, possibly, certainly*) or with modality (*may, might*).

While Chafe minimized the distinction between evidentiality and epistemics, focusing on a broad sense of evidentiality, more recent work has teased the two apart. Kärkkäinen (2003) sees “evidential distinctions as part of epistemic modality” and defines epistemicity as “different ways of showing commitment toward what one is saying, or...as different attitudes toward knowledge” (19). Evidentiality, on the other hand, focuses narrowly on the expression of the source of knowledge, and this approach has been taken up by language typologists interested in morphology (e.g., Aikhenvald 2004) and others studying English evidentiality at the word and phrase level (e.g., Bednarek 2006; Grund 2012; Viechnicki 2002).

Mushin (2001) provides a thorough overview of the uses of and taxonomies of the terms evidentiality and epistemology in English and other languages. Adopting Chafe’s broad sense of evidentiality, she describes epistemological stance: “In terms of conceptual structure, one can say that when verbally representing a piece of knowledge, speakers necessarily take a stand on how they acquired the information, how they know it. This stand is their epistemological stance towards the information” (Ibid: 52). Mushin’s (2001) model of epistemological stance types presents an opposition between subjective and objective. In a subjective stance, representations of information are presented as “the product of the conceptualizer’s direct and conscious perceptual experience,” in the most extreme case, “private states, like emotions and sensations” (59), for example “I’m exhausted!” (65). The most objective end of the continuum, consists of ‘world truths’ like “Two plus two equals four” (74).
2.3.2 Epistemics

Epistemics in interaction has been thoroughly studied in recent years within the field of Conversation Analysis (CA). As Heritage (2013b) writes, epistemics in CA “focuses on the knowledge claims that interactants assert, contest and defend in and through turns-at-talk and sequences of interaction” (370) and it draws from the fields of psychology, linguistics, and sociology. This field of study has taken off since Raymond and Heritage (2006) showed that epistemic claims enacted in turns-at-talk around assessments are central to management and maintenance of identity — which is interesting, because while this study seems to have launched the interest in epistemics, more recent work has not engaged with identity as much.

Raymond and Heritage show how two friends, Vera and Jenny, balance epistemic stances in assessments of Vera’s grandchildren in a phone conversation. For example, at one point Jenny makes an epistemic assessment: “They’re a lovely family now aren’t they.” This assessment is marked as downgraded with the tag question “aren’t they,” which invites Vera to give a response and evaluate her own family and grandchildren independently from Jenny. Vera responds, “Mm: They are: yes,” acknowledging her primary epistemic right to assess the family. Through negotiating epistemic stances, these women manage interactional identities regarding their rights to assess the epistemic territory of the grandchildren. Building on this work, Sierra and Botti (2014) show how two new acquaintances construct their identities as knowledgeable New York City residents through epistemic stances towards places in the city.

Leading up to the seminal Raymond and Heritage paper, Heritage had been examining the discourse marker “oh” in everyday conversation and its connection to sequence and knowledge (1984), then focusing in particularly on “oh” in the case of questions (1998) and assessments (2002). Schiffrin (1987) had also investigated “oh” in
the context of sociolinguistic interviews, which yielded different findings from Heritage (1984). Heritage (1998) explains that whereas Schiffrin found that “oh” was used when the receipt of an answer to a question ran contrary to the expectations encoded into the question’s design, he found that “oh” receipts are used even when the respondent confirms a statement-formatted request for information, and is not surprised (Heritage 1984: 307-12). It seems likely that both of these findings are valid and that their differences stem at least in part from the difference in the types of data analyzed.

Heritage’s ‘oh’ research provides the groundwork for Raymond and Heritage (2005; 2006). Heritage (2012) proposes that an ‘epistemic engine’ drives sequences of talk, so that any imbalance in ‘epistemic status’ among interlocutors, expressed through ‘epistemic stance’ in discourse, results in a sequence where speakers attempt to ‘equalize’ the imbalance. Epistemic stances can be described as being K+ or K- (indicating relative knowledge on a gradient scale). Work on epistemics has focused primarily on dyadic interactions, and Heritage (2015b) points to the need consider epistemic ecologies, or how individuals construct communities which have setting-specific epistemics. As van Dijk (2014) summarizes, “CA has more recently begun to explore which speakers may express what kind of knowledge to what kind of recipients, and how entitlements, responsibility, imbalances and norms influence such talk” (9) and “In CA...knowledge is now being studied in normative and moral terms of the epistemic access, primacy and responsibility of participants in interaction” (222).

Indeed, Stivers, Mondada and Steensig (2011) published an edited volume on knowledge and morality in conversation, in which they posit, “knowledge is a moral domain with important implications for managing social relationships” (19). In this volume, Heritage writes on the connection of epistemics to empathy. He points out that listeners have resources for displaying empathy when they do or do not share the same
epistemic status as the speaker, which is important because listeners are often compelled to convey empathy in conversation even when they do not have the same experience as the speaker. Heritage analyzes kinds of empathetic responses on a continuum, where asking ancillary questions is the least empathetic way a listener without the same experience can respond to their interlocutor’s telling of their experience, and non-lexical ‘response cries,’ defined by Goffman (1981) as “signs meant to be taken to index directly the state of the transmitter” (116), such as “Ohhh go:(d)” and “Ohhh ba:by,” are the most empathetic way a listener can respond in this kind of situation.

As a culmination, Enfield (2011) proposes a theoretical framework for understanding the negotiation of knowledge, responsibility and affiliation in interaction, building on four related concepts: enchrony, status, knowledge and agency (285). He defines enchrony as the “forward-feeding temporal, causal-conditional trajectory of relevance relations” (287) and status as “a set of publicly norm-guided expectations as to how a person will or should behave” (292). He sees enchrony as encompassing issues of sequence, and status as relating to the norms that govern sequence-driven talk, with the responsibilities and rights to express knowledge as central and carried out through animator-biased agency, which drives the need for restoring epistemic symmetry in interaction.

Heritage (2013b) reviews some of the most recent CA scholarship on epistemics, such as work on epistemics and action formation by Heritage (2012a) and Levinson (2013), which indicates, “the organization of social action itself is profoundly intertwined with epistemic considerations” (Heritage 2013b:386). Heritage (2013a) observes that congruency between epistemic status and stance is a fundamental and universally preferred process. In other words, interlocutors have a preference and expectation that speakers will take epistemic stances which match their epistemic status. Heritage (2013b)
also touches on epistemics and sequence organization, and suggests that the management of epistemic positions may drive talk forward, be involved in topic shift (which he notes is under-investigated), and be implicated in the closure of sequences, topics, and conversations.

Heritage (2013b) points to three other future directions for research in epistemics. The first of these is to move away from conceptualizing knowledge in a K-/K+ gradient model (Heritage 2010, 2012; Heritage & Raymond 2012) which implies that epistemics is a unidimensional phenomenon, and to instead consider the multidimensionality of epistemic status, captured by a ‘topographical map’ metaphor (Schütz 1946), which embraces complexity resulting from different epistemic resources and standpoints. He also notes that cross-cultural and cross-linguistic comparisons of epistemics are in their infancy, citing the work of Hayano (2011) on Japanese, and Sidnell and Enfield (2012), who examine three languages to compare the ways in which speakers of second assessments who have primary rights to assess go about asserting those rights from a ‘one-down’ second position. Finally, Heritage indicates the need to look beyond the individual by considering epistemic ecologies.

Heritage (2013a) extends the discussion of epistemic stance and status to deontics (having to do with desire) and benefactives (having to do with costs and benefits of desire), arguing that these elements can also be useful in understanding the process of action formation. Indeed both deontics and benefactives appear to be rapidly gaining attention, with a 2015 special issue of The Journal of Pragmatics on epistemics and deontics. In this issue, Clayman and Heritage (2015) explore benefactive status and stance in the management of offers and requests, concluding that there exists a hierarchy amongst epistemics, deontics, and benefactives: epistemics are universally applicable when speakers produce or understand statements or questions; deontics are only relevant when talk
represents future (and perhaps past) courses of action; and benefactives are a subset of
deontics in which costs and benefits are relevant. The newest work in the area of
epistemics in CA is focused on institutional settings, such as classroom interaction (e.g.,
Jakonen & Morton 2013; Siegel 2015) and medical interaction (e.g., Guzmán 2014;
Lindström & Weatherall 2015; Sert & Jacknick 2015).

2.3.3 Discourse epistemics

A very broad approach to epistemics is taken by van Dijk (2013; 2014), whosuggests that the multidisciplinary field of discourse epistemics is especially interesting “on
the one hand because most of human knowledge is acquired and shaped by discourse, and
on the other hand because language use, in general, and the production and understanding
of discourse, in particular, are impossible without the activation of massive amounts of
knowledge of the world” (2014: 5). Van Dijk is most interested in ‘social knowledge’ which
he defines as: “the shared beliefs of an epistemic community, justified by contextually,
historically and culturally variable (epistemic) criteria of reliability” (2014: 21). While he
focuses on written discourse, such as news texts, van Dijk’s broad view of knowledge and
discourse also acknowledges that there are many multimodal, or embodied signs that can
contribute to the expression of knowledge, such as gestures, facework, and body position,
as has been taken up recently by a few scholars in the CA tradition (e.g., Djordjilovic

2.3.4. Summary of evidentiality, epistemics, and discourse epistemics

By synthesizing the major findings of Chafe on evidentiality, the sequentially
detailed analyses of the CA scholars, and van Dijk’s more macro-level approach, I aim to
contribute to this relatively new and rapidly expanding field of work by conducting an
interactional sociolinguistic exploration of epistemics. I will carry forth the notion of the multidimensionality of knowledge and consider the epistemic ecologies in which speakers situate their epistemic management. In departing from the main focus of CA, while still drawing from its findings, I go beyond analysis of sequencing of questions and assessments by examining how epistemics are managed in everyday conversations among groups of friends, and take a more context-focused interactional sociolinguistic approach to the issue, by showing that intertextuality is crucial to epistemic and frame management. By analyzing intertextuality as a site at which epistemics and frames are managed, we can come to a more complete analysis of identity construction as driven by knowledge.

2.4 Identity construction and the role of knowledge

Previous work on how identity is socially constructed and practiced in interaction, especially where it relates to knowledge, serves as a framework for my own analysis. Here I will trace the intellectual trajectory of studies on identity construction in language, starting with the work of Goffman, then covering some of the influential variationist work on identity, studies of identity and knowledge that draw on theorizing on intertextuality, the application of ‘positioning’ and ‘stance’ (including epistemic stance) as approaches to identity, Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) framework for identity, and De Fina’s (2011) synthesis of identity and discourse.

2.4.1 Goffman and the presentation of self

Goffman (1959) saw the ‘presentation of self’ as the core of social interaction, and theorized that in interaction people are always concerned about preserving ‘face’ — the positive social value one constructs for oneself. Importantly, Goffman viewed face not as something internal to the individual, but a facet of social life that is constructed and
managed through taking up different kinds of footings, creating alignments to ourselves and others, as well as to utterances. This conceptualization of self as external has been influential in subsequent studies of identity, since such studies have evolved to view self as actively constructed through discourse, instead of as an a priori, internal phenomenon, or what De Fina (2011) refers to as a “Cartesian conception of self” –“defined by a fixed set of traits constituting [a person’s] personality…whose actions are the result of rational deliberation, as someone who strives for moral integrity and is well separated from [their] group” (265). This development has also been influenced by work outside of linguistics on symbolic interactionism (Mead 1934), social constructionism (Berger and Luckman 1967), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967), feminist theorizing about gender identity (Butler 1990), and the post-modern self within social theory (Bauman 2005; Giddens 1991). Such work has demonstrated that identity is actively constructed through everyday practices, which has influenced the linguistic understanding of identity as something that is constructed via discourse.

2.4.2 Variationist sociolinguistics work on identity

Work within the sociolinguistic variation tradition has made important contributions to understanding how identity is enacted in language. Labov (1966, 1972), in his classic studies of New York City English, shows that social categories such as class, gender, and age correlated with ‘r-dropping’; this is known as the ‘social stratification of language’. While this work has been very important in contributing to how we understand language variation in society, the tradition has also been criticized for the tendency of over-simplifying the correlations between language and identity (Coupland 2008: 268). Schilling (Schilling-Estes 2004), in a study of an interview interaction between two speakers notes that in recent years, “…there have been a number of successful efforts to
incorporate localized practice into quantitative investigations of language variation and change through combining quantitative methodology with various types of qualitative investigation…” (164). For example, Eckert (2000) draws on ethnography of local groups to complement quantitative measures; Dubois and Melançon (1997) and Dubois and Horvath (1999) use sociological surveys designed to yield insight into local meanings; Johnstone (1996) analyzes individual life histories; and Coupland 1985, Arnold et al. (1993), Kiesling (1998), and Bell (2001) study individual conversations and speech performances (as cited in Schilling-Estes 2004, 164). Studies such as these show an increasing awareness of the benefit of applying both quantitative methods and qualitative approaches to studying identity in language.

Schilling (2013) comments that variationist sociolinguists “should use complementary approaches and speech data as we seek subtle speaker-internal motivations for stylistic variation” (172). Podesva (2007) analyzes the variation of falsetto speech used by a single individual across three naturally occurring everyday events, and Coupland (2001) explores a naturally occurring mediated performance of a radio announcer. Schilling (2013) advocates for combining quantitative methods with qualitative ones, which “illuminate how variants are used as discourse unfolds” (173), and points to Nielsen (2010) as an example of a discourse-analytic perspective which uses positioning theory to inform the primarily variationist analysis.

De Fina (2011) explains that other post-Labovian studies that have followed have argued that using a particular language variety does not automatically imply identifying with the group who speak that variety (268). In fact, Rampton (1995; 1999) and Sweetland (2002) in studies of ‘crossing’ have demonstrated how speakers use codes associated with ethnic groups other than their own as a resource in shaping identities. Schilling (Schilling-Estes 2004) shows how ethnic identity is dynamic and a product of
unfolding talk: while two speakers whose discourse she analyzes in a sociolinguistic interview generally retain features correlated with relatively fixed categories in their speech (Lumbee and African American), they also adjust such features when talking about race relations (highlighting ethnic components of their identities and ethnic distance) vs. focusing on impersonal topics and topics that allow for more focus on their interpersonal connection.

Thus post-Labovian studies have considered how identity work can be done indirectly through meaning associations, often referred to as indexicality (Silverstein 1976), or the idea that symbols (sounds, words, expressions, styles) ‘index’ or point to elements of social context (qualities, ideas, situations, social representations, ideological systems), which in turn are related to social groups and categories which rest on accepted social meanings and also continuously modify them. Sociolinguists such as Eckert and Rickford (2001) have highlighted that style and stylization, created through consistent indexical associations, play an important role in identity construction, since they provide strategies for the presentation of different selves and voices in discourse (this also seems to relate well to intertextuality). Eckert (2000) has combined traditional variationist approaches with qualitative practices that illuminate the role of indexicality. Eckert (2008) expands on Silverstein’s (1976) work on indexicality to argue that the meanings of linguistic variables are not static or fixed but rather constitute an ‘indexical field’, or constellation of ideologically related meanings, any one of which can be activated in the use of a variable.

2.4.3 Positioning and stance

Biber (2004) points out that studies of personal expression have been conducted under many other labels: ‘evaluation’ (Hunston 1994; Hunston & Thompson 2000),
‘intensity’ (Labov 1984), ‘affect’ (Ochs 1989), ‘evidentiality’ (Chafe 1986; Chafe and Nichols 1986), ‘hedging’ (Holmes 1988; Hyland 1996), and ‘stance’ (Barton 1993; Beach & Anson 1992; Biber & Finegan 1988, 1989; Biber et al. 1999: Chapter 12; Conrad and Biber 2000; Precht 2000). Positioning, defined as “the discursive production of a diversity of selves” (Davies & Harré 1990:47) is another way that identity has been commonly approached, especially in narrative studies (e.g., Schiffrin 1996; Bamberg 1997; Bamberg & Georgakopoulou 2008; Moita-Lopes 2006). This conceptualization was proposed as an alternative to the static notion of role (Davies & Harré 1990; Van Langenhove & Harré 1999), and stresses that identities are plural and relational, and that through their speech acts, people continuously position themselves, are positioned by others, and position others along different ‘storylines’ which relate to social identity.

Stance, as originally described by Biber and Finegan (1989), has been one of the most productive approaches to examining how people enact their personal feelings and assessments in interaction, especially when it comes to the expression of knowledge. Ochs (1993) conducted one of the earliest and most influential studies on stance and identity construction. She describes social identity as a term that covers a “range of social personae, including social statuses, roles, positions, relationships, and institutional and other relevant community identities one may attempt to claim or assign in the course of social life” (p. 288). Social identity is rarely explicitly stated in discourse, but speakers encode their identities using various linguistic strategies. Ochs focuses on how speakers establish social identities through verbally performing social acts and stances. She defines a social act is “any socially recognized, goal-directed behavior (making a request, contradicting someone, interrupting),” and stance as “a social act that reveals one’s epistemic attitudes, such as how certain or uncertain a speaker is about something, and displays of affective attitudes, such as intensity of emotion or kind of emotion about some
referent or proposition” (p. 288). Based on one’s sense of the act and stance meanings encoded by linguistic constructions, we can examine a person’s social identity creation.

Another important point that Ochs makes is that there is no strict mapping of certain acts and stances into certain identities (similar to the idea of indexicality, which is the focus of her 1992 article “Indexing gender”) and that people may use different kinds of acts and stances to construct themselves variably within some particular social status or social relationship (1993:289). Thus Ochs encourages a social constructivist approach to identity, where researchers should ask, “What kind of social identity is a person attempting to construct in performing this kind of verbal act or in verbally expressing this kind of stance?” Ochs also stresses that people are agents in the production of their own and others’ identities (1993:186) and that “social identities evolve in the course of social interaction, transformed in response to the acts and stances of other interlocutors as well as to fluctuations in how a speaker decides to participate in the activity at hand” (1993:198). Many others have also used stance as a way to approach identity, including Jaffe (2009), Bucholtz (2009), Kärkkäinen (2006), Coupland and Coupland (2009), and Englebretson (2007).

Du Bois (2007) proposes the ‘Stance Triangle’, writing that positioning subsumes stance, so we can think of stance as a more precise way of applying positioning theory. Du Bois defines stance as:

a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means (language, gesture, and other symbolic forms), through which social actors simultaneously evaluate objects, position subjects (themselves and others), and align with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimension of value in the sociocultural field. (Du Bois 2007: 169)

Whereas Van Langenhove and Harré conceive of a mutually determining triad, where speech acts, position, and the storyline express identity (1999:18), in the Stance Triangle, the stancetaker (1) evaluates an object, (2) positions a subject (usually the self),
and (3) aligns with other subjects (Du Bois 2007: 169). Like Ochs (1993), Du Bois focuses on two types of stance: affective (regarding emotion) and epistemic (regarding knowledge).

Schiffrin (1996) analyzes the epistemic stances of speakers presenting a “mother” identity in narrative. In a related spirit, Gordon (2007) discusses how a mother constructs her maternal identity (in part) by displaying that she has knowledge about the details of her child’s life. As described earlier in the discussion of the CA work on epistemics, the exploration of epistemic stance in identity is also taken up by Raymond and Heritage (2006), who define the ‘epistemics of social relations’ as “methods for managing rights to identity-bound knowledge in self-other relations” (678). The argument is that through the negotiation of epistemic stances, speakers express differing epistemic statuses in regards to their rights to assess relevant epistemic territories, making relevant and managing self-other relationships and interactional identities. As also mentioned earlier, Sierra and Botti (2014) show how two new acquaintances use epistemic stances towards places in New York City to construct their identities as knowledgeable about the city.

2.4.4 A framework for identity

An influential framework integrating and building on previous research on identity is Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) five principles for examining identity construction in discourse. The emergence principle describes how identity is not an internal psychological phenomenon, but emerges in interaction. The positionality principle states that identities may consist of macro-level demographic categories, but also local and temporary roles. The third principle, indexicality, provides the ways through which indexical processes can construct identity. The partialness principle states that identity constantly shifts across interaction and contexts, and will always be partial. The “heart of the model” (587) is the
relationality principle, which describes how identities are “intersubjectively constructed through several, often overlapping, complementary relations” (598). This principle describes how identities can never be isolated on their own because they are always related to other identities.

Under the relationality principle, similarity/difference is one of the identity relations named by Bucholtz and Hall, which they also call adequation/distinction. Bamberg (2010) describes this identity relation as a ‘dilemma’ (10) that involves “the establishment of a synchronic connection between sameness and difference (between self and other)” (1). Another identity relation Bucholtz and Hall name is is authentication/denaturalization, which “works off the ideological perception of realness and artifice” (2004: 498). Authentication is a social process in which identities are verified in discourse: “the processes by which authenticity is claimed, imposed, or perceived” (2004: 465). Denaturalization “foregrounds untruth, pretense, and imposture” and is any process in which identity is constructed as “crafted, fragmented, problematic, or false” (2004: 498; 2005: 602). The third relation named considers the structural and institutional aspects of identity formation: authority/delegitimacy. Bucholtz and Hall (2005) write that authorization involves “the affirmation or imposition of an identity through structures of institutionalized power and ideology” while its counterpart, delegitimization, “addresses the ways in which identities are dismissed, censored, or simply ignored by these same structures” (603). Bucholtz and Hall (2004) stress that these are active processes that are interactionally achieved by speakers. Bucholtz and Hall (2005) acknowledge, “Identity in all its complexity can never be contained within a single analysis” (607).
2.4.5 Identity and discourse

Discussing the theoretical conceptualization of identity, De Fina (2011) observes that there are different kinds of identity that one may study. These types of identity may be considered as existing in the realm of Bucholtz and Hall’s (2005) *positionality* principle, which states that identity consists of many different positions, or categories. De Fina explains that there is first the difference between individual and collective identities: individual identities are the kind that we may construct for ourselves and be solely responsible for, such as we may present in a therapy session with a psychologist, while collective identities are those which involve the identity of the community we represent, usually in institutional settings or in any case where we are member of a group. In addition to the differences between individual and collective identities, De Fina explains that there are differences between personal and social identities. Personal identities contain moral and physical characteristics, as well as sets of membership categories, while social identities are larger categories such as race, gender, and political affiliation. The final kind of identity De Fina describes are situational identities, which are roles related to the specific situation where interaction occurs, such as teacher/student in a school setting, or doctor/patient in a medical setting. Despite all these possible distinctions, De Fina acknowledges that they may become blurred in discourse and are intricately interconnected, since identities are relational, and that while some identities are rather fixed and stable, such as national or religious collective identities, others are more fleeting and negotiable.

De Fina (2006; 2011) also argues that we should not ignore the important role of categorization in the study of identity. According to De Fina (2011), “identity categories used in discourse reflect not only the inventory of identities available in the situation at
hand, but also the kinds of identities more generally in use in a given society and historic moment” (274). She writes that this is the subject of a current debate in identity studies that revolves around the acceptance or rejection of a cognitive component to social categories and categorization processes. She also explains that conversation analysts are on one side of the debate, especially proponents of the Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) movement which is inspired by the work of Sacks (1992) ‘membership categorization devices’ in interaction (e.g., Hester and Eglin 1997; Antaki & Widdicombe 1998). These scholars have been opponents of ‘cognitivist’ explanations of categorization, and promote situating analyses firmly within the description of the local context and orientations of speakers in discursive constructions of identity (De Fina 2011: 275). Sacks was interested in rather macro-level categories such as sex, age, race, religion, and occupation, and how referring terms and other linguistic strategies are used to make such categories relevant in interaction. Sacks realized that identity is not formed in cohesive wholes and is always co-constructed in conversation. Scholars in the MCA movement see speakers creating and using ‘membership categories’ in interaction.

At the other end of the debate outlined by De Fina are Critical Discourse Analysts like van Dijk (1998; 2010) who argue that identities are not purely social but are also cognitive structures that are fixed and stable and actually do presuppose and precede their expression in interaction. These cognitive structures are mental models (see Tannen 1993 and Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993 on ‘knowledge schemas’) that include social identities, social knowledge, ideologies, norms and values. Within this view, people continuously put forth and modify their mental representations when they make identity claims. De Fina (2011) argues for a balanced, integrated approach where categorization rests on pre-existing social and mental knowledge, beliefs, ideologies, presuppositions, roles, etc., and is at the same time emergent, creative, and locally contextualized in discourse. She notes that
many interactional sociolinguists address the importance of finding out which categories people use for identification, in which contexts, how these are negotiated, and what they mean to people, more than they outright reject a cognitive basis for categories. Some of the variationist literature has also explored the connection between reified structures and speaker agency.

Categorization as it is used to index and discuss identities in narrative has been studied by many scholars (e.g., Schiffrin 1996; De Fina 2003, 2006; Georgakopoulou 2007) who understand narratives as important sites for identity construction. Narratives “are an opportunity for tellers to present themselves as actors in social worlds while at the same time negotiating their present self with other interactants” (De Fina 2011:275). Schiffrin (1996) showed that speakers may construct their identities through the use of epistemic and agentive positioning in narratives; that is, whether they report feelings and beliefs or actions. Her analysis suggested that “social identity is locally situated; who we are is, at least partially, a product of where we are and who we are with…” (1996, p. 198). This has implications for viewing identity in a context where interlocutors create their identities in relation to each other. De Fina (2006) examines group identity as it relates to categories in the narratives of Mexican undocumented immigrants to the United States. Her analysis shows how narrators’ local displays of identity in their narratives relate to more global categories about group membership.

In sum, identity construction has been shown to be analyzable in discourse. Processes of framing, footing, indexicality, style and stylization, local occasioning, positioning, and stance-taking have all been used as approaches to analyze this process. Furthermore, studies in intertextuality have highlighted the importance of shared knowledge in the discursive formation of identity. Gordon (2006), Hamilton (1996), and Tannen (2006) suggest the importance of examining identity construction as it occurs
across interactions, i.e., intertextually. Shared knowledge also plays an important role in relational identity processes, like adequation, dissimilation, authentication, and denaturalization. We have seen that a variety of types of identities may be the subject of analysis—individual, collective, personal, social, and situational, and that there is a current debate over the importance of categorization and the cognitive component of identity.

2.5 Summary

In sum, the field of IS has approached the topic of knowledge in conversation through a variety of inter-related theories and has shown how these are enacted in talk. In this study on knowledge management through the analysis of the use of media references in everyday interactions among friends, I will first take up the topics of contextualization cues and conversational inference in the meaning-making process of references in talk, before exploring aspects of framing with a focus on the references, including keying, knowledge schemas, and the role of frames in handling interactional dilemmas. The creation of game moves, game worlds, and the function of laughter and nonseriousness in interaction are also key to the analysis. The use of intertextuality in conversation is the meeting point for all of these concepts, and so instances of shared prior texts, specifically media references, are the focus of my analysis. I also describe the importance of shared experiential knowledge, management of such knowledge, and its role in group identity construction based on sameness, following Hamilton’s (1996) call for an intertextual analysis of identity construction. We have arrived at a point in the study of language and social life where an unnecessary chasm has arisen between the approaches to knowledge of IS and CA, which I hope to bridge by bringing together the IS work on intertextuality with the CA work on epistemics. This perspective will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of how knowledge itself underlies almost everything we do with language in
everyday talk, making it crucial for constructing various kinds of social identities for ourselves and each other.

Following Heritage’s (2013) call for work on epistemic ecologies, and heeding van Dijk’s (2013) call for epistemic discourse analysis, I expand on what previous studies have mentioned regarding the importance of knowledge in intertextual identity processes. I show how intertextuality not only creates overlapping and embedded frames of talk which create meaning, as Gordon (2009) has already demonstrated, but it can also be crucial in managing group epistemics and thereby fueling the epistemic engine (Heritage 2012) of talk, particularly in the face of epistemic imbalances and interactional dilemmas, resolving these issues and allowing for group involvement and identity construction.

In the next chapter, I briefly explain the larger project from which the data for this study were drawn, and describe the participants and their conversations that I analyze in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.
CHAPTER THREE

COLLECTING AND ANALYZING INTERTEXTUAL MEDIA REFERENCES IN EVERYDAY TALK

3.1 The data collection

The data for this study were drawn from a corpus of digital audio recordings of everyday talk. I created this corpus with the intention of drawing from it for this study. Here I briefly describe how the data were collected. Section 3.2 provides details about the five conversations from the larger data set that make up this study, and Section 3.3 reviews how these data were analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Lastly, I will discuss the advantages and possible disadvantages of these data and their analysis in section 3.4.

At the beginning of data collection, I did not have an objective in collecting a particular kind of talk. My broader interests were identity construction in everyday conversation, and the role that epistemics play in this process. I hoped to collect enough data to examine these theoretical interests in some fashion. In the fall of 2014, I began recording everyday conversations in which I was a participant, primarily with friends, and always with their prior consent to record. I continued recording into the fall of 2015, ending with a total of 40 digital recordings of 45 hours and 24 minutes of everyday talk among 26 participants.

As Tannen (1984/2005) writes, “recording a conversation among friends that would have taken place anyway makes available for study patterns of language use that do not emerge among strangers, such as playful routines, irony and allusion, reference to familiar jokes, and unstated assumptions” (43-44). In particular, the occurrence of playful routines, irony and allusion, and reference to familiar jokes became a primary focus of my analysis through the examination of intertextual media references; the unstated assumptions of the speakers relate to their knowledge management; these ultimately contribute to their shared
group identity construction based on similarity in interaction. Furthermore, the fact that these friends were a relatively homogenous group means that in large part they had similar habits of media consumption (such as viewing YouTube videos and spending time online, being exposed to online memes) and similar epistemic access to prior media texts (such as having seen the same movies and played the same videogames as children); thus their conversations make for a good study of intertextual media references and how the deployment of these interactional resources contributed to identity construction.

Following in the tradition of Interactional Sociolinguists such as Hamilton (1994/2005), Schiffrin (1987), and Tannen (1984/2005), my participation in the conversations I recorded had distinct advantages, such as allowing me to know as much as possible about the conversational setting and the participants’ relationships with each other. If I had questions about the participants or some stretch of talk, I could ask my friends for their insights, in a kind of ‘playback’ (e.g., as conducted by Labov & Fanshel 1977 and Tannen 1984/2005) or through follow up emails during my analysis.

Using a small unobtrusive digital recorder most of the time, or sometimes my cell phone, ensured that I could easily capture long stretches of conversations in various settings. I recorded conversations at fairly frequent intervals, primarily on the weekends, and most often in conversations with friends of my partner Dave, who significantly expanded my social circle, giving me opportunities to record a variety of multi-party group conversations. I mostly recorded Dave and his friends in Northern Virginia at his shared group house, in restaurants, and while traveling in cars. At his shared group house he lived with three friends: Todd, a roommate from college; Fred, Todd’s co-worker; and Lana, Todd’s partner and a graduate student in the same program as Dave and me. These housemates were participants in the bulk of the conversations I recorded.
In addition to Dave’s housemates, I recorded conversations with other friends of Dave’s and mine, again at Dave’s shared house, restaurants, in cars, and during meals on my apartment rooftop in Washington, DC. Throughout the year, I also captured recordings of conversations with other friends of mine in the absence of Dave, which took place on the Georgetown University campus. These participants were mostly (but not all) white, working young professionals or graduate students in their mid to late twenties living in Northern Virginia or Washington, DC.

I ceased recording once I had started conducting playback interviews and realized that to some extent, the participants and therefore the data were somewhat ‘tainted’, since they became aware at this point of my research interests, which had developed to include how the study of intertextuality — or more specifically, media references in everyday talk — could illuminate my original interests in epistemics and identity construction. Therefore, in some of the later conversations I recorded, which I do not use in this study, participants sometimes would say things like, “this would be great for your research” or “that’s a reference,” and I even caught myself asking things like “Is that a reference to something?”

3.2 The five conversations featured in this study

As I mentioned, at the beginning of data collection, I did not have an objective in collecting a particular kind of talk. However, Tovares’ (2012) analysis of how TV shows served as intertextual resources in family conversations inspired my noticing how Dave’s housemates frequently used videogames as intertextual resources in their conversations.

One recorded conversation of one hour and nine minutes of casual talk amongst Dave, his housemates, and me in their kitchen/dining room on a September 13th, 2014, a Saturday night, stood out for its rich use of references to the videogame Papers, Please; I
analyzed an excerpt of that conversation (which I refer to in this work as Conversation 1: Papers, Please) first in Sierra (2016a), and other excerpts are presented in Chapters Four, Five, and Six. I then began to notice when the housemates used videogame references when I was not recording, so I started to supplement my recorded data with notes about conversations where videogame texts seemed to function the same way as the initial instance I had recorded, checking with Dave to maintain accuracy in recalling the details, and some of these notes also appear in Sierra (2016a) and Chapter 6.

On October 10th 2014, I recorded a one hour and 34 minute conversation between Dave and his close friend from high school, Allen (who I had only met once at a party previously) and me eating dinner at a diner in Northern Virginia. About fifty minutes into this conversation, when Dave and I began to tell Allen about our recent disastrous camping trip, Allen and Dave made references to the videogame The Oregon Trail, which is the second excerpt analyzed in Sierra (2016a) and in Chapter 6 (I refer to this as Conversation 3: The Oregon Trail as it was the 3rd conversation in the chronology of the five conversations).

After the initial analysis of excerpts from Conversation 1: Papers, Please and Conversation 3: The Oregon Trail, which focused on the larger theoretical issues of media (specifically, videogame) intertextuality, framing, epistemics, and group identity construction (see Chapter 6), I became interested in media intertextuality in conversation more generally, such as media references to books, songs, TV shows, movies, videogames, and online memes. A question that I had only partially begun to answer in my original, more theoretically-oriented analysis, emerged that seemed to be important in demonstrating how intertextual processes work in talk more generally: How do speakers signal that they are making an intertextual reference in talk, and how do listeners show that they have recognized or understood such intertextual references? In order to explore
this next phase of the study, I needed to draw on much more data than the two examples I had analyzed from Conversation 1: Papers, Please and Conversation 3: The Oregon Trail, and I ultimately chose five conversations (see Table 1) of approximately 7 hours of talk among 9 of my friends and me (10 participants total). I selected these five conversations due to the relatively high concentration of media references they contained and named each after the most prominent media reference it contained. I would identify media references as words, phrases, or phonetic qualities that could be traced back to a specific media text.

In order to identify and organize media reference examples, I first went back to Conversation 1: Papers, Please, which I had drawn on for my original analysis of videogame references among Dave, his housemates, and I in their kitchen/dining room on a Saturday night. I transferred the 1 hour and 8 minute audio file to ELAN (Wittenburg et al. 2006), software that allows for time-aligned transcription and annotation. I listened to the conversation again to determine if there were additional intertextual media references that I could analyze for signaling and understanding mechanisms; to my delight, I identified 12 other media references to TV shows, movies, a book, and an online meme. I annotated these in ELAN, making them searchable, and then I transcribed all of them in ELAN and began to compile the references in an Excel spreadsheet. In the spreadsheet I included the file name, the minutes and seconds at which the intertextual reference appeared, the stretch of talk containing the reference, the speaker, their gender, the type of reference (film, TV, videogame, etc) and the exact media source text.

I coded for gender as this seemed to be the most salient categorical difference among participants. All participants were college educated, of similar socio-economic status, and were in the mid to late twenties, except for Myriam, who was in her mid-thirties. Melanie is the only African American, Allen is a 2nd generation Chinese-
American, John is a 2nd generation Japanese-American, and Myriam is a 2nd generation Iraqi-American and her family is Jewish. All other participants are European-American, and of those, I am also a quarter Hispanic while Fred also has Egyptian heritage. In retrospect, I could have coded for cultural or ethnic heritage, but throughout the data collection these details never seemed relevant, especially since all the participants grew up in the United States and thus consumed or at least were aware of similar media.

Next, I worked through a 34 minute conversation among the housemates, Dave, and me, again in the kitchen/dining room of their house on October 4th, another weekend evening, which I refer to as Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic (having occurred sequentially after Conversation 1: Papers Please and before Conversation 3: The Oregon Trail). I went back to this conversation because I recalled it as containing a lively extended sequence where Dave and his housemates referenced the song “Belle” from the 1991 Disney film Beauty and the Beast with new lyrics about Lana drinking gin and tonic. To my surprise, this conversation was a ‘treasure trove’ of media references, containing about two references every minute, for a total of 66 references that I annotated, transcribed, and added to the spreadsheet.

The fourth conversation I worked through in this manner (which I refer to as Conversation 5: Rat Day, since it occurred last in the sequence of conversations in the data set) was chosen for a similar reason to Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic; I had marked it as containing an extended sequence, specifically during part of the conversation when Fred brought his new girlfriend Dee over, and Dave’s housemates and a friend of Todd’s began to reference some related online memes, which is used in the second half of the analysis in Chapter Five. Focusing specifically on that sequence, I annotated, transcribed, and added 5 references to online memes to the spreadsheet. I did not annotate or transcribe the rest of
the conversation since the majority of it contained Todd and his friend quietly painting miniatures while watching and occasionally commenting on a YouTube video.

Finally, after reviewing the examples I had in my spreadsheet so far, I realized that the conversations I had been working with did not strike a gender balance; the overwhelming majority of the media references were made by men, but I sensed from my own experience and observation that women were just as likely to make media references as men in conversation. One possible explanation for women making fewer media references in the conversations I had recorded is that more than half of the participants were always men, which may have caused the women to talk less over all. Therefore, I decided to include a one hour and eleven minute conversation among three other women PhD students and myself, which took place in the Georgetown linguistics graduate student lounge on February 27th, 2015, a Friday afternoon. The participants in this conversation are Holly, one of my closest friends at the time; Myriam, and briefly Melanie, both of whom Holly and I were not close to but were still on friendly terms with (I also do not think Myriam and Melanie knew each other very well). I refer to this conversation in this study as Conversation 4: Groundhog Day, since Holly and I make six references to the film *Groundhog Day* in the conversation, which we had just watched together recently. I annotated, transcribed, and added those six and four other examples of media references made by these women and myself to the spreadsheet. In the end, this gave me 63 media references made by men and 53 made by women, for a total of 116 media references\(^1\). The counts of media references depended on my ability to recognize them as a participant and analyst, and playback interviews were also very useful in that other speakers occasionally pointed out a reference had not recognized.

\(^1\) See the appendix for a complete table of the 116 media references
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Length of Recording</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Discourse Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers, Please</td>
<td>September 15th, 2014</td>
<td>1 hour, 9 minutes</td>
<td>Fred, Lana, Dave, Sylvia</td>
<td>Chatting in the housemates’ dining room/kitchen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Gin and Tonic</td>
<td>October 4th, 2014</td>
<td>34 minutes</td>
<td>Todd, Fred, Lana, Dave, Sylvia</td>
<td>Chatting in the housemates’ dining room/kitchen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: The Oregon Trail</td>
<td>October 10th, 2014</td>
<td>1 hour, 34 minutes</td>
<td>Allen, Dave, Sylvia</td>
<td>Having dinner at a diner in Arlington, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>February 27th, 2015</td>
<td>1 hour, 11 minutes</td>
<td>Holly, Myriam, Melanie, Sylvia</td>
<td>Chatting in the graduate student lounge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Rat Day</td>
<td>June 27th, 2015</td>
<td>2 hours, 24 minutes</td>
<td>John, Dee, Todd, Fred, Lana, Dave, Sylvia</td>
<td>Chatting in the housemates’ dining room/kitchen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. The five conversations

3.3 The analysis

The analysis of conversational data can be explained as occurring in two stages. The first stage consisted of close qualitative discourse analysis, where I identified double-voiced intertextual media references made in conversation and examined intertextual and framing processes (drawing heavily from Gordon’s 2009 analysis) as part of epistemic management (following Heritage & Raymond 2006) ultimately contributing to identity construction (building on Bucholtz & Hall’s 2005 framework). Specifically, I focused on the detailed analysis of videogame references in talk among friends as seen in Sierra (2016a) and in Chapter Six. I analyzed the videogame references as they appear sequentially in what Du Bois et al. (1992) and Chafe (1994) describe as ‘intonation units,’ or “a stretch of speech uttered under a single coherent intonation contour” (Du Bois 1992 et al.: 17), and applied methods and theories from Conversation Analysis (specifically, analysis of turn sequencing and epistemics) as well as from Interactional Sociolinguistic studies of frame analysis and intertextuality.
Once I had completed a close analysis of those two examples, and supplemented them with my own field notes of similar examples, I became relatively certain that the same processes I observed occurring in the initial two examples were also prevalent in the majority of the extended sequences of intertextual media reference use in everyday talk that I had recorded or observed. Specifically, I observed the resolution of epistemic imbalances and interactional dilemmas through the use of intertextual media references to construct humorously keyed play frames, which ultimately contribute to group identity construction.

Therefore, as mentioned earlier, my focus shifted to the minute details of signaling and recognition of the intertextual references themselves; these mechanisms ultimately allow for the ‘macro-processes’ of interactional, epistemic, and identity management to occur. However, these more micro-level signaling and recognition mechanisms had not been fully explored and therefore, fully understood by other scholars who had worked on intertextuality in everyday conversation.

This second phase of analysis began with the selection of examples for my study, as described in the previous section, and was necessarily quantitative at first. I first populated a spreadsheet with the data and meta-data about the 116 media references I had collected (file name, time of the recording when the reference occurred, speaker pseudonym, speaker gender, the reference itself). I then determined information about the prior text being referenced: the type of media referenced (e.g., TV, videogame, song, etc.) and the exact media source (e.g., Seinfeld, The Oregon Trail), which I identified either through my own knowledge or through playback.

I then needed to identify the relevant signaling and recognition mechanisms that speakers and listeners employed in their use of double-voiced intertextual media references in everyday talk. This was an iterative process that evolved through my quantitative
In order to effectively code for the signaling and recognition mechanisms, I developed a coding scheme (see Table 2) based on the scheme developed for other-initiated conversational repair (Dingemanse, Kendrick & Enfield 2016), which I had been using as a research assistant for a project on repair and was able to adapt for this project since features for signaling repair and for signaling intertextuality can both be coded as “yes” or “no” across multiple categories of possibilities. The first categories that I added to the spreadsheet after a preliminary analysis and as I began to code the conversations for signaling mechanisms of intertextual media references were: vowel lengthening, loudness, smile voice, laughter, singing, and creaky voice. As I began to code the data I observed a few other signaling mechanisms and began to code for these as well: intonation mimicry (described in detail in Chapter 4), higher or lower pitch shift, and use of a regional or foreign accent with the media reference. I coded all of these features with either “Y” for “yes” or “N” for “no.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data and meta-data</th>
<th>Sound file name, time of recording at which media reference occurred, speaker, speaker gender, content of the media reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior text</td>
<td>Type of media referenced (e.g., TV, videogame, song, etc.) and exact media source (e.g., Seinfeld, The Oregon Trail)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signaling mechanisms</td>
<td>Vowel lengthening, loudness, intonation mimicry, pitch shift, smile voice, laughter, singing, regional or foreign accent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sequential processes</td>
<td>Attempt number, overlap, self-repetition, other-repetition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forms of intertextuality signaled</td>
<td>Phrasal, phonetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recognition mechanisms</td>
<td>Laughter, participating in a play frame around a media reference, repetition of a reference, explicit affirmation of a reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-processes</td>
<td>Extended sequence, interactional dilemma, epistemic imbalance, metacommentary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Coding categories for media references

I also coded for what can be described as sequential processes. These began with coding for ‘attempt number,’ after observing that sometimes a speaker would attempt
multiple times to make the same reference (often due to overlap at the initial attempt). Most of the time this category was populated with “1” for the first attempt, but the number of attempts went as high as 4 (an example of Fred’s persistence, which will be seen throughout the examples in the analysis chapters). Coding for attempts at making references also led me to code for overlap during the signaling of a reference, since overlap seemed to usually be the reason that a speaker would repeat themselves in making a media reference more than once, as well as self-repetition and other-repetition, which were coded for “P” for ‘partial repetition,’ as when speakers repeated only a part of the reference but made some modification, as well as “Y” for when speakers repeated the exact words or prosody, or “N” for a first-time or unique occurrence.

Eventually, I added two categories for ‘phrasal’ and ‘phonetic,’ after I determined that intertextual references could be signaled on a phrasal level, that is, through the repetition of words or phrases, and/or through the phonetic level (such as singing a popular song but replacing all of the words with new ones to fit the current context, or by using a known person’s or character’s accent but with words they have never spoken). Phrasal also seems to correlate more with text-based media, such as many videogames and online memes, while phonetic intertextuality is more possible when referencing songs, TV shows, and movies.

Turning to the recognition mechanisms used by speakers upon hearing intertextual media references, I observed and coded four categories: listener laughter, listener participation in a play frame around the reference, listener repetition (coded as partial repetition, full repetition, or no repetition), and explicit affirmation of the reference from the listener (such as “yeah,” “yes,” or “exactly”).

I lastly coded each reference for what can be called ‘macro-processes’ – processes that occur “above” the level of the utterance containing the intertextual media reference.
itself. For example, I coded for whether or not each reference was part of an extended sequence of talk (versus a fleeting reference that was not acknowledged or went unnoticed, or at least did not appear to meaningfully affect the rest of the talk after it). I then coded for whether or not there was, at the time of the reference, evidence of an interactional dilemma, or an unpleasant or awkward moment of talk, and whether or not there was evidence of an epistemic imbalance among the participants at the appearance of the reference. Coding for these last two categories was the most difficult part of the coding process, due to the trouble in identifying fleeting epistemic imbalances or interactional dilemmas in specific words or phrases of talk, especially considering that such imbalances or dilemmas shift constantly in interaction, and it can also be hard to know with certainty if there actually was an imbalance or dilemma for certain participants. It was often the case that an initial media reference occurred at a place where there was evidence of an epistemic or interactional dilemma (so I would code “Y” for yes), but then in cases where an extended play frame developed with more references, the following references would occur after the initial dilemma had been alleviated (so I would code “N” for “no”). Occasionally I also coded “M” for “maybe” for references where it was difficult to make a judgment as to whether there actually was an epistemic imbalance or interactional dilemma. I also coded for ‘metacommentary’, where a speaker or a listener made an explicit remark about the nature of the reference (e.g., “like that movie...” or “like that song...”). Finally, I had a column for notes, where I documented any interesting observations or questions for playback interviews or workshop sessions.

While the coding process was extensive and rigorous, it must be acknowledged that there could have been contextualization cues that I ‘missed’. I only coded for contextualization cues that were perceptible via my own auditory perception as a native English speaker and as a trained sociolinguist. The analysis could without doubt benefit
from acoustic analysis in a phonetic software package like Praat (Boersma & Weenink, 2016). Another further improvement in the analysis, which would require a larger research team, would be to closely transcribe and code all of the conversational data surrounding the intertextual media references. This would ensure, for example, that vowel lengthening and loudness occur substantially more with intertextual media references, and not just as a regularly occurring feature of talk in general or of phenomena such as topic change that happens to coincide sometimes with media references.

After populating all of the spreadsheet’s columns and rows, I was able to do basic computations in Excel to view how many references each speaker made, how many were made by men and women, how many first, second, third, and fourth attempts at the same reference were made, and how many instances of each type of media reference occurred. I also computed for the total number of each demonstrated use of all of the signaling and recognition mechanism I had observed, ultimately allowing me to know the percentages out of the total for the most common and least common forms of signaling and reacting to intertextual media references, which are presented in Chapters Four and Five.

Finally, I used R (R Core Team, 2015), an open-source software tool for statistical analyses and graphics, to run Pearson’s chi-squared tests and generate graphics on my spreadsheet data, allowing me to determine statistical significance relationships with accuracy. In sum, through combining fine-grained discourse analysis of everyday interactions with a rigorous quantitative analysis of everyday conversations, drawing on some of the best tools available for this kind of work (ELAN and R), I have assured a thorough analysis of the data in this study. This type of analysis should be able to be replicated in other studies, which would determine how generalizable the findings I present here may be.
3.4 Discussion of the data collection and analysis

As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, one of the biggest advantages of the data collection for this study was my own participation in the conversations I recorded, as has been found by other Interactional Sociolinguists before me. My participation allowed me to know as much as possible not only about the sequencing and structure of the talk, but also about the conversational setting, the participants’ backgrounds, and their relationships with each other. If I had questions about the participants or some stretch of talk, I could ask my friends for their insights during playback interviews or through follow up emails during my analysis. In addition to this basic advantage, the conversations I recorded originally among my friends and me which eventually became my primary source of data turned out to be a rich source of data for studying my primary research interests: knowledge management and identity construction.

A question that has been raised by some audience members at talks and workshops on this study has been about the role of the Observer’s Paradox (Labov 1972) in my data collection. That is, how did the fact that the conversations were being recorded, and that I was in my role as a ‘researcher’ along with my role as ‘friend’, affect the participants’ behavior? My general answer to this question is that speakers usually seemed to ‘be themselves’ even with the recorder on, especially after a few minutes of engaging in conversation with each other. While this was generally the case, I do have the sense that Dave’s housemates, Fred and Lana, in particular, may have taken on more performative behavior than they would have otherwise. It is difficult to say this with certainty, however, because the two of them are always quick with jokes and laughter, both having been trained in improv comedy, but it is possible that they ‘dialed it up’ even a little more than usual when they knew the recorder was on. The primary evidence that Fred in particular was in more of a ‘performative manner’ (Schilling 2013) was his frequent references to the
recorder itself throughout my data collection, saying things like “Let the record show…” or addressing the recorder as “Recorder,” or saying things like “This is for science.” As Schilling (2013) acknowledges, “the data are always potentially subject to effects of the research situation….as for example with a participant who talks into the audio recorder in an obviously performative manner” (127). Gordon (2013) has shown that the effect of the Observer’s Paradox need not be viewed as a problem per se, and she analyzes how speakers use a tape recorder as a resource for identity construction. In my data, Fred’s frequent playful remarks about the presence of the recorder can similarly be seen as relevant to his own identity display.

Finally, an interesting phenomenon occurred within myself as a participant-observer, where, after the second conversation I decided to analyze, I became aware and even hypersensitive of the occurrence of media references in conversation, and this possibly affected my spoken behavior when they occurred. This is most noticeable to me in the last three recordings of this study where I simply laugh or do not say anything during speaker’s intertextual media references, instead of taking a more active participation role (although my participation in such references had never been as active as that of speakers like Fred and Lana). However, I do not think that my limited active participation hindered my friends from engaging in extended intertextual media reference play in their conversations, as should be clearly evident in the analysis presented in the following chapters.

The five recordings I analyze in this study captured friends making a variety of playful double-voiced intertextual media references, including allusions to TV shows and movies, appropriations of popular songs or their melodies, references to new media such as online memes, and laminations of videogame playing experiences to real-life situations. While many of these references are made just for the fun of it, over half of the references
occur at points where knowledge about the topic at hand is not shared evenly among speakers. These moments are sometimes awkward, and speakers often ease the tension by making media references. The analysis that follows examines how speakers make, respond to, and use media references as resources for remedying knowledge imbalances, managing frames, and ultimately constructing shared group identity in their conversations.
4.1 Introduction

This chapter demonstrates how double-voiced intertextuality, in this specific case, shared prior media texts, are signaled in five everyday conversations among friends. Gumperz (1982) identifies a range of prosodic and paralinguistic signaling strategies that indicate how people mean what they say; yet to date there has been no specific work on how utterances are marked phonetically as having meaningful intertextual connections to prior shared media texts. This analysis focuses on texts that are appropriated from popular cultural media and used by friends in their talk to do conversational and relational work. This chapter lays out the building blocks of the use of media references in talk by describing the prosodic and paralinguistic features that accompany their use.

The examples of intertextual media references I analyze here consist of instances where a speaker repeats words, phrases, or a phonetic quality that can be traced back in most cases to a specific popular culture media text, such as a book, movie, TV show, song, videogame, or meme. This use of intertextuality can be considered ‘double-voiced’, following Bakhtin and as explained by Morson & Emerson (1990) and Todorov (1984); in these instances speakers are appropriating specific media texts and inserting them into their talk, thus making their use double-voiced, referring to a prior context of use as well as a current one. This appropriation of media texts is also ‘diachronic’ in that speakers are “repeating words from a discourse distant in time” (Tannen 1989/2007:98).

In the next section, I briefly review Gumperz’s work on contextualization cues and discuss how this can be applied to analyze how double-voiced intertextual media references are signaled in talk. Section 4.3 examines the uses of intertextual media
references among friends and illustrates how these uses are signaled in the speech stream. The implications of my analyses of these data for intertextual processes are discussed in Section 4.4, where I argue that these examples show that intertextual contextualization cues are oars in the river of talk, in the sense that the signaling of such shared prior knowledge allows speakers to recognize them, build on them, and through doing so, actively participate in and construct extended intertextual play frames, which contribute to epistemic management underlying identity construction.

4.2 Contextualization Cues

In uses of double-voiced intertextual media references in my data, the strongest signaling mechanism overall is what I coded as ‘phrasal’ repetition, or lexical repetition, which occurs in 91% of the examples. While this kind of repetition can in itself serve as “enough” to signal intertextual media references, it is often accompanied by other cues, such as laughter, for example, and sometimes intertextual references are made without repetition of words but rather by repetition of a melody, which I coded as ‘phonetic’ repetition, which occurs in 67% of the examples. Speakers use a variety of such cues to indicate to their interlocutors that they are referencing a media text, in what Gumperz terms a ‘meta-signaling system’ (1977:192). These signals can be understood as what Gumperz calls ‘contextualization cues’: “any aspect of the surface form of utterances which, when mapped onto message content, can be shown to be functional in the signaling of interpretative frames” (1977:199). Gumperz primarily focuses on what he describes as prosodic and paralinguistic contextualization cues. He defines prosody as a function of intonation and stress, and paralinguistics as features such as pitch, register, rhythm and loudness.

Gumperz actually briefly analyzes a sequence of talk that includes what could be
considered an intertextual reference, finding some of the more common contextualization cues that I will analyze in my own data. He describes an interaction on an airplane where a man walks down the aisle, passes by two women and says, “Tickets, please! Tickets, please!” Gumperz explains how this was recognizable as a joke, referencing “an announcement, or…a stock phrase associated with travel situations,” due to the combination of “higher than normal pitch, more than usual loudness, and staccato rhythm” (1977:198). When one of the women responds by addressing her friend about the man, “I TOLD you to leave him at home,” Gumperz mentions that the stress on ‘told’ marks her statement as another stock utterance. The man’s next statement, “Step to the rear of the bus, please” is also said in “announcement pitch, loudness, and intonation” (1977:198). Thus, early work on contextualization cues hints at their relevance for signaling intertextuality. In addition, Gumperz also acknowledges that “other signaling mechanisms can function as contextualization cues, including lexical or phonological choice; use of idiomatic or formulaic expressions such as greetings, openers, interjections, or frozen sequences; or code-switching” (1977:199).

Contextualization cues such as those just described are crucial in talk because they are what allow for what Gumperz calls ‘conversational inference’: “the ‘situated’ or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in a conversation assess others’ intentions, and on which they based their responses” (1977:191). Gumperz sees his work and the work of the early ethnomethodologists as basic to the study of conversational inference, stating, “if a speaker is to make himself or herself understood, it is necessary to establish through talk the contextual condition that makes the desired interpretation possible” (1977:196).

Straehle (1993) also analyzes voice qualities and other prosodic features as framing teasing in talk, such as intonation, lengthened vowels (stress), high-pitched voice, and
nasality (1993:215). Tannen and Wallat (1987/1993) show that high-pitched voice indicates a playful frame, and Gordon (2002; 2008; 2009) finds that high-pitched voice signals play and non-literal meanings in family discourse. Tannen also shows how multiple voices are incorporated into a single speech event (1989/2007), perhaps most specifically in her analysis of a narrative told by a young man named Billy, where he animates at least five different voices, marked by breathy voice, distinct intonation patterns, loudness, and other paralinguistic features. In her plenary address at the 2010 Linguistic Society of America Tannen referred to this practice as the ‘taking on of voices,’ where speakers use prosodic and morphosyntactic shifts to frame their utterances as dialogue; in other words, to indicate that they are speaking in the voice of another person or even a nonverbal child or pet (see also Tannen 1989/2007). Günthner (1999) also examines prosody in what she alternately calls ‘reported dialogues’ or ‘reported speech’, showing that loudness, pitch, pausing, duration, and other elements of voice quality are used to represent the speech of others. In sum, numerous scholars have identified how various linguistic and paralinguistic features accomplish framing in interaction in particular to animate others’ speech and to play. I extend this work by focusing on how investigating these specific features in more detail as they are used to signal intertextual media references.

In the sections that follow, I first show how media references are signaled in conversation through lexical repetition, metadiscourse, and through a variety of prosodic, paralinguistic, and phonetic contextualization cues, including loudness, lengthened vowels, pitch, and intonation as described above by Gumperz (1977). I discuss why these cues and others, such as smile voice, laughter, using a foreign or regional accent, singing, and creaky voice, are crucial for interlocutors to ‘get’ intertextual references (make conversational inferences) and participate in intertextual play frames, while simultaneously shifting the epistemic territories of talk and constructing identities.
4.3 Signaling media references in conversation

Thus far, scholars have primarily focused on the macro-level theoretical and interactional importance of intertextuality in doing relationship and identity work in conversation (e.g., Goodwin 1996; Gordon 2002, 2006, 2008, 2009; Hamilton 1996; Tannen 2006, 1989/2007; Tovares 2006, 2007, 2012; Trester 2012), but have not zoomed in on how people signal intertextuality in the speech stream. Yet there clearly must be some signaling mechanism involved for people to “get” intertextual references and jokes. While I am also interested the theoretical and interactional phenomena, I believe scholarship could also benefit from understanding the signaling and interpretation mechanisms.

In this section, I provide qualitative explanations for quantitative results of the analysis of the 116 instances of media references for all signaling cues that I observed across the five conversations. The prosodic, paralinguistic, and phonetic signaling cues I observed and coded for based on my own auditory perception were: vowel lengthening in or preceding the intertextual tie, intonation mimicry (or the repetition of a specific intonation pattern present in the source text), relative loudness, significant pitch shift (higher or lower), smile voice (acoustically perceptible due to increase in F2 and amplitude as well as lip retraction and mouth widening, see Tartter & Braun, 1994), laughter, use of a foreign or regional accent, singing, and creaky voice.

The quantitative results show that vowel lengthening, loudness, pitch shifts, and intonation mimicry are the most common prosodic and phonetic features that signal media references. I argue that vowel lengthening and loudness are features of stress, since they occur together more often than not, and this kind of stress highlights the media reference for the listener, acting as a contextualization cue for intertextuality. Similarly, pitch shifts
and intonation mimicry act as contextualization cues and highlight for the listener that something about the utterance is marked as originating from elsewhere. In some instances, though to a lesser extent overall, smile voice, laughter (and presumably smiling\(^2\)), regional and foreign accents, singing, and creaky voice are also used to signal media references in conversation.

\(^2\) Data for this study were only digitally audio-recorded, not video-recorded.
Table 3. Signaling mechanisms of media references

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signaling mechanism</th>
<th>Instances</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vowel lengthening</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>“It’s been poisoned, sta:bbed, mai:med” – Holly referencing Bill Murray in the movie <em>Groundhog Day</em>, Conversation 3: Groundhog Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intonation mimicry</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>“Not that there’s anything ^WRO:NG with that.” – Fred referencing the TV show <em>Seinfeld</em>, Conversation 1: Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudness</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>“You NEVER SKIP ^RAT day.” – John referencing the Skipping Leg Day Meme, Conversation 5: Rat Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smile voice</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>“Thar sh(h)e blo:ws.” – Lana referencing the book <em>Moby Dick</em>, Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laughter</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>“Sounds like a bad Oregon Trail trip. Hahaha.” – Allen referencing the videogame <em>The Oregon Trail</em>, Conversation 5: The Oregon Trail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accent</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>“You’re tearing me apa:rt, Lisa!” (low pitch, Polish accent) – Fred referencing Tommy Wiseau in the movie <em>The Room</em>, Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>“That so:ng ♫ Backstreet's back alright ♫” – Melanie referencing the song “Everybody (Backstreet’s back)” by The Backstreet Boys, Conversation 3: Groundhog Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creaky voice</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>&quot;You are too weak:&quot; – Fred referencing Emperor Palpatine in the film series <em>Star Wars</em>, Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For each media reference, I also counted how many prosodic, paralinguistic, and phonetic signaling mechanisms were used, and then counted how many references in total made use of zero to eight of the signaling mechanisms at once (see Figure 1 below). The results show that it is unusual for a reference to not be signaled at all, since only four references had no non-lexical signaling mechanisms. In two of these cases, the initial use of
the reference did not succeed in garnering any listener response, but when the reference was repeated by the same speaker at later time with at least one signaling mechanism, the listeners did recognize the references and respond to them. This provides strong evidence that signaling mechanisms do extra work to highlight the media reference for listeners.

![Graph](image)

**Figure 1.** Occurrence of media reference signaling mechanisms. The x-axis shows the number of signaling mechanisms used in a single instance, and the y-axis shows the counts of how many media references used the indicated number (n) of signaling mechanisms.

Further examining these findings reveals that it is still unusual to only use one prosodic, paralinguistic, or phonetic signaling mechanism when making a media reference, and this only happened on three occasions, where speakers used only used lexical repetition with vowel lengthening to signal their reference (these references were still recognized by listeners). It is much more common for speakers to combine two to five signaling mechanisms when they make media references, as they did on 96 occasions. Interestingly, however, there is a jump between the use of two and three signaling mechanisms (which occur 19 and 17 times, respectively) and the use of four signaling mechanisms simultaneously (38 instances). Sorting the references by the count of signaling mechanisms shows that purely textual media, such as online memes or text-based videogames, are more likely to be referenced with what I had coded as ‘phrasal
intertextuality’, using only two or three signaling mechanisms to signal that the phrase used is referencing a videogame or a meme. On the other hand, TV shows, movies, and songs from these are more likely to use both phonetic and phrasal intertextuality, using mostly four, five (in 22 cases) or sometimes up to eight signaling mechanisms simultaneously. This split makes sense if we consider that in textual media, there is no certain pitch of voice, accent, or song present in the media that speakers can use as a resource to help them signal the reference, and instead they must rely on features like vowel lengthening and loudness to signal their reference⁵. However, with songs from movies, for example, speakers can use foreign accents, different pitches, singing, and potentially all the other signaling available to them, although it still becomes increasingly unlikely for speakers to combine six, seven, or eight signaling mechanisms at once (with six, five, and one occurrences, respectively).

While I have briefly touched on some of the possible reasons for the distribution in Figure 1, the reasons are undoubtedly influenced by many variables, including the speaker, their own conversational style, and the type of reference being made and how this conditions the signaling mechanisms. These would be fascinating to further explore in future research. For now, it is safe to say that speakers often use 2 or more signaling mechanisms simultaneously when making media references, which help the listener to recognize them as such.

In the rest of this chapter, I examine how each prosodic, paralinguistic, and phonetic signaling mechanism ‘works’ for signaling media intertextuality in talk, and I show examples of how these mechanisms are used; while I am focusing on one strategy at

⁵ Although there are intriguing exceptions – such as when speakers mimic the perceived intonation of the text-based sentences in a videogame in Conversation 3: The Oregon Trail, and where speakers mimic the perceived accents associated with the text-based place names and character dialogue in a different videogame in Conversation 1: Papers, Please.
a time, it should be kept in mind that these strategies are often combined as just explained. The examples presented to illuminate each signaling strategy are primarily references to audio-video materials such as movies, TV shows, and YouTube videos, since these types of references had the tendency to be fleeting, as opposed to media references to online memes and videogames, which often led to extended intertextual play frames which function to manage group epistemics and interactional dilemmas, and which will be the focus of Chapters Five and Six.

4.3.1 Vowel lengthening and loudness signal media references through stress

Vowel lengthening is by far the most common way that speakers in my data phonetically signal media references. 95 out of 116 instances of media references, or 82% of the total number of references, were signaled with vowel lengthening within the tonal nucleus of the media reference itself or in a word preceding the media reference. I was initially surprised by this result – why would people lengthen a vowel to signal a media reference? It may be enlightening to now turn to an example from the data to understand what is going on. In the following excerpt (from Conversation 1: Papers, Please), three friends have been talking in the kitchen of Lana, Fred, and Dave’s shared group house. At the time of the recording, Lana and Dave were in my graduate program, Fred was their housemate, and I was over for a usual visit. Lana and I had been discussing the difficulty in defining ‘intertextuality’, since I was taking a seminar on the topic at the time, and she was writing a paper for a class that involved the concept. I have placed arrows in the transcript to highlight lines that indicate the media reference, and quotation marks around the reference itself.

(1)
In line 6, I make a reference to a line from a film when I say, “You keep using that \textit{word}, I don't think you know what it means.” I am referencing the dialogue of the Spanish character Inigo Montoya in the 1987 movie \textit{The Princess Bride}, when another character, Vizzini looks over a cliff and sees that the character Westley, who they are trying to outrun, is clinging to the cliffside. Vizzini says, “He didn’t fall?! Inconceivable!” and Inigo comments on Vizzini’s repetitive use of the word “inconceivable,” saying, “You keep using that \textit{word}. I do not think it \textit{means} what you think it \textit{means}.” The only mechanism I use to signal this reference is the lengthening of the tonal nucleus of the phrase in “\textit{word},” which places emphatic stress on it. This effectively signals my use of the reference to Fred, although I was actually misquoting the film. Nonetheless he is able to ‘get’ the reference as is demonstrated when he builds on my reference in line 9, saying, “I don't think it \textit{means} what you think it \textit{means}.” The fact that he uses an accent as part of his the reference will be discussed in section 4.3.5, on using regional and foreign accents to signal media references.

This example shows how the use of vowel lengthening can be understood as a feature of stress which highlights the media reference for the listener. It may be the case that often, the vowel lengthening actually matches the original text being quoted. In the source text, Inigo places slight stress on “\textit{word}” and both instances of “\textit{means},” although
he does not elongate the tonal nuclei there to the extent that Fred and I do when we quote this line. We can assume, then, that Fred and I both lengthened the vowel of different words in the quote to give an exaggerated stress pattern to the phrase, highlighting the intertextual work we were doing, and basing this somewhat on actual stress that Inigo had placed on the words.

Loudness was also a very common way of signaling intertextual media references, occurring in 68 out of 116 instances, or 59% of the time, and in fact vowel lengthening and loudness reached significance when I ran a Pearson’s chi-squared test (p < 0.001). This means that vowel lengthening and loudness were more likely to occur simultaneously than not. This finding supports my interpretation that vowel lengthening is serving to add exaggerated stress to a media reference, especially when it occurs with loudness. Indeed, Zsiga (2012) writes:

Stress is unlike other phonological features in that it does not have just one, invariant phonetic realization. A syllable may be made prominent, made to stand out from other syllables, in a number of different ways. A stressed vowel may be longer or louder than other syllables; it may have higher pitch, and its consonants and vowels may be more clearly articulated. (454)

So in many of the cases in my data, stressed vowels within media references are often longer and louder than the syllables around them, and these phonetic features combined result in exaggerated stress that acts as a contextualization cue that signals the use of media references to listeners. I will present one example where both vowel lengthening and loudness function together to create exaggerated stress as a contextualization cue for a media reference.

In the following example (from Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic), Dave and I had been reminiscing to Lana about a recording that we remembered having to listen to for a course in graduate school on phonetics and phonology, where our professor, Lisa Zsiga, had recorded audio files of herself saying the phrases “Did Maddy win the medal?” and
“Maddy won the medal” with different intonation contours, which we had to download and transcribe. Here, Dave mimics the recording in an increasingly ridiculous manner, which results in Lana making a media reference to something else entirely, using both vowel lengthening and loudness to do so.

(2)

1     Dave    We had to transcribe that!
2  And it was like,
3       \hight "Did ^Maddy have the medal?"
4       \hight "M.^Maddy had the ^medal!"
5    Sylvia   Haha!
6     Lana     Hahahaha!
7    Dave     Maddy mad mad maddy mad mad mumuhuhmuhmuh
8     [madmadmadadaamamama!]
9     Lana     [muhmuhuhmuh [hahaHA!
10  Sylvia   [and we just had to listen to [Lisa over and over again
11  Lana    →  [(h) "PORK CHOP -
12          \hight SA:NDWICHES!"
13  Dave     Ha yeah.

I learned through playback that line 11 is a reference to a YouTube video that is a parody of a 1980’s GI Joe cartoon public service announcement about fire safety. In the parody video, all the voices are dubbed over. The video opens with two children cooking in a kitchen which starts to catch on fire, and the child who was cooking stands immobilized and is dubbed saying “muhmuhuhmuhmuh” when a man enters the kitchen and yells, “Pork chop sandwiches!” before he saves them. So in this excerpt of the conversation I recorded, Dave’s mockery of the recording, “Maddy had mad maddy mad mad mumuhuhmuhmuh madmadmadadaamamama” (lines 7-8) reminded Lana of the GI Joe parody where the two children say “muhmuhuhmuh,” and she signals her reference to it, “PORK CHOP ^SA:NDWICHES!” (line 11) by yelling loudly and elongating the vowel in “SA:NDWICHES.” Dave demonstrates that he understood the reference in line 13, where he laughs and says “yeah.” It should be noted that in the source text, the character being quoted was yelling, which may be why Lana yelled the quote so loudly.
There are many other examples, however, where the source text was not particularly loud but the speaker still signals the media reference with loudness.

In sum, in this section I have indicated that vowel lengthening is the most common way that speakers phonetically signal double-voiced intertextual media references. In showing how the cue functions, I have also noted that it often co-occurs with relative loudness to function as exaggerated stress that highlights the media reference as significant for the listener.

4.3.2 Intonation mimicry signals media references

Throughout coding for signaling mechanisms, one feature I observed over and over again was what I came to call ‘intonation mimicry’. This was initially very difficult to pinpoint, but I had a sense that ‘something’ was happening with intonation, so I coded these instances as having an ‘intonation’ feature. As I coded more of these kinds of examples, I realized that what I had picked up on was that speakers seemed to be mimicking the exact intonation contour of the original media source that they were quoting in their talk. 73 out of the 116 media references featured intonation mimicry, or 63% of the total examples. This made intonation mimicry the second most common way of signaling media references, after vowel lengthening.

The explanation for why speakers would mimic specific intonation contours makes sense if we consider that they are attempting to accurately depict the original media source being appropriated. In addition, Zsiga (2012) notes that intonation can be used to bring a referent into focus, and in many of the examples where I observed intonation mimicry, there was something unique about the original intonation contour of the media source which made it marked. In other words, many of the media references themselves made use of a specific intonation contour to bring a referent into focus, and then speakers attempted
to reproduce this in their references. I present an example below to demonstrate exactly what I mean by intonation mimicry, and why it functions so well for particular media references.

The following excerpt (from Conversation 1: Papers, Please) continued after example (1) presented earlier, where Lana and I had been discussing the difficulty in defining ‘intertextuality’, which then led to wordplay around the word itself. In this example, Fred makes a media reference and signals it through intonation mimicry – replicating (at least in my perception) the intonation contour of the original source text.

(3)

1  Lana     Hey, I have nothing against intertextuals.
2  Ok?
3  Dave    [Ha.                                           H^o                     L%]
4  Fred   →["Not [that [there's anything ^WRO:NG with that.”
5  Sylvia [Hahahaha
6  Lana                        [They're just ^people. They're ^ju:st people.
7  Fred     Mhm.

Lana makes a pun using the word “intertextual” as a stand-in for something like “intersexuals” when she says, “Hey, I have nothing against intertextuals. Ok?” (lines 1-2) Fred responds to Lana’s joke by saying “Not that there’s anything ^WRO:NG with that.” Vowel lengthening and loudness are both present in this media reference, but they actually function in this case to repeat the exact intonation contour of the media being referenced – the TV show Seinfeld. In Season 4, episode 17, a running joke begins where a newspaper journalist, and then others, are mistakenly led to believe that the characters Jerry and George are a gay couple. Jerry responds to the mistake initially by saying, “We’re not ^GA:Y?! Not that there’s anything ^WRO:NG with that.” After this, the phrase “Not that there’s anything ^wro:ng with that” is used multiple times throughout the show by different characters. Since the emphasis is on the word “wrong” in the phrase, the phrase itself takes on an intonation contour (following Pierrehumbert’s 1980 proposal of bitonal
pitch accents) made of a high pitch accent (H*) followed by a low falling tone (L%). This is precisely the intonation contour that Fred uses when he quotes the TV show in this example, and all of the other examples I coded for intonation mimicry use it in a similar way, mimicking the intonation contour of the source text, and this imitation signals speakers’ use of media intertextuality.

### 4.3.3 Pitch shifts signal media references

Shifting to a markedly higher or lower pitch than the speaker’s usual pitch is also a very common way that speakers in my data signal double-voiced intertextual media references. 62 out of the 116 examples of media references, or 53% of the total amount, made use of a shift in pitch. It is important to note that pitch shift operates independently in my data; unlike vowel lengthening and loudness, which are more likely to occur together, pitch shift does not show a significant interaction with any other signaling variable, although as Zsiga (2012) notes, stressed vowels may have a higher pitch. Therefore it needs to be made clear at the outset that these pitch shifts are not simply working as a function of exaggerated stress, along with vowel lengthening and loudness (although they may coincide with other signaling mechanisms such as these), but rather pitch shift, in my data, is its own signaling mechanism that functions in over half of the examples to signal a media reference.

At least part of the reason that pitch shift is most likely used so often by speakers in my data is because it is frequently used when speakers are voicing characters from movies, TV shows, memes, and videogames who have a noticeably higher or lower pitch than the speaker who is referencing the source text. There are also cases where a speaker is singing a song or a tune from a song where the original singer sang in a higher or lower pitch range than the speaker. A singing example is presented in section 4.3.6 on singing, where
this phenomenon can be seen, and here I show an example where a speaker is voicing a character with a noticeably different pitch from the usual pitch of the speaker.

In following example (from Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic, preceding example 2, above), Dave had been discussing a paper by formal semanticist Angelika Kratzer on negation, which prompted me to recall an activity that Lisa had us do in our phonetics and phonology course on intonation contours. I was trying to recall what the exact phrase was that Lisa had recorded herself saying for the activity. Dave switches to a very high pitch to imitate Lisa’s voice and provide the correct reference for which I am searching.

(4)

1 Sylvia No, Lisa did those recordings that were like-
2 Lana What were they, like-
3 Dave “^Ma:ddy bought [the medal.”
4 Sylvia [“What is Mar- ^Mary gonna-”
5 Dave No:-
6 Sylvia =What the fu(h)ck wa(h)s-
7 Dave It wasn’t the- [She wasn’t lookin at the se^mantics.
8 Lana [Wha(h)t?
9 Sylvia No:!
10 Dave→ (high pitch) “^MA:DDY GOT THE MEDAL.”
11 Sylvia YEAH, ^THA:T!
12 Lana When we were in phonol- [yeah-
13 Dave (high pitch) [“^MADDY HAS THE ^ME:DAL.”

This example shows how important the shift to a higher pitch is in signaling a media reference. At first, Dave provides the phrase that I am searching for, with “^Ma:ddy bought the medal” (line 4) but in his own pitch. I do not register that he is supplying the reference, however, possibly due to the combination of Lana overlapping with Dave, asking “Which one-” (line 3), Dave still using his own pitch, and the fact that I was still searching my own memory for the right phrase. It is apparent that I do not recognize that he is supplying the right reference because I still attempt to come up with the phrase myself, saying “What is Mar- ^Mary gonna-” (line 5), which prompts Dave to give an
exasperated “No:” (line 6) and I laughingly begin to ask “What the fu(h)ck wa(h)s-” still not having recalled nor recognized the phrase.

Finally, Dave says the phrase again, changing from “bought” to “got,” but this time he says it very loudly and with a noticeably higher pitch: “^MA:DDY GOT THE MEDAL” (line 11). Dave’s timing (with no overlap), loudness, and much higher pitch draw attention to the phrase and effectively signal it as the reference I had been searching for, and I respond accordingly, “YEAH, ^THA:T! When we were in phonol- yeah-” (lines 12-13). In sum, this example shows how a noticeable shift to a higher or lower pitch can be used to effectively signal a media reference, albeit a very in-group one, to listeners.

4.3.4 Smile voice and laughter sometimes coincide with media references

Although it is not possible to know every time when someone might have been smiling in my data, I coded for smile voice, which is acoustically perceptible due to an increase in F2 and amplitude that is associated with lip retraction and mouth widening (Tartter & Braun, 1994). I also coded for laughter, which often (but not always) coincided with smile voice. It makes sense that people may smile more often than they actually produce laughter, and I found that 47 out of the 116 media references I coded, or 41%, involved a speaker using smile voice as they made the reference, and 35 out of 116, or 30% of the references, occurred with speaker laughter.

While coding for smile voice and laughter, I became aware of an impression that women in my data seemed to use smile voice and laughter to signal media references more often than the men. This was part of the reason I chose to include Conversation 3: Groundhog Day as one of the five conversations, because it consisted entirely of women friends speaking, and I had also become aware that my data up to that point had more men than women making media references, but I did not believe that this was necessarily
representative of the actual everyday conversation dynamics where both men and women
draw from shared prior media texts in their talk, although it might be representative of
conversations when women are with men.

Once all of the data was coded, I decided to test Goffman’s (1976) observation that
“it appears that in cross-sexed encounters in American society, women smile more, and
more expansively, then men” (48) and Tannen’s (1996) assertion that “…in our culture,
smiling is a sex-class linked behavior; in other words, women tend to smile more than
men” (216). After running Pearson’s chi-squared tests on gender, laughter, and smile voice, it was confirmed that women in my data set laugh (and probably smile) significantly
more than men when signaling media intertextuality (gender and laughter reach
significance at p < 0.05; gender and smile approach significance at p = 0.056). Tannen’s
explanation for the reason that smiling is a sex-class linked behavior is that women are
expected to smile more than men. Expanding on this explanation, she writes, “women are
seen as severe and lacking in humor if they rarely smile, whereas men who do not smile
often are far less likely to meet with negative reactions” (1996:217). It is not entirely clear
if Goffman and Tannen would have hypothesized that the phenomena of women smiling
more than men could be extended to laughter, but my data indicates that it does, since
women both audibly smiled and laughed more than men did in the conversations when
they were making intertextual media references.

Goffman and Tannen focused on ‘cross-sex’ communication in their discussion of
women smiling, or men and women communicating with each other. Most of my data is
also in cross-sex settings, but Conversation 3: Groundhog Day is the one conversation I
decided to include in my data that consists of solely women speaking with each other. In
the following example (from Conversation 3: Groundhog Day), three women graduate
students in the linguistics program at Georgetown had been sitting and chatting in the
graduate student lounge: Holly, Marian, and me. Prior to this excerpt, Holly and I had been discussing the Institutional Review Board (IRB) application for doing research with human subjects, and I had mentioned how the questions in the application seemed inappropriate for my research because they were meant for medical studies, and asked questions such as, “do you anticipate harm to the subjects?” Here, Holly mocks this specific IRB question while I am telling her about a survey for which Dave and I had to get IRB approval. She then references the film *Groundhog Day*. In this movie, a weatherman named Phil (Bill Murray) is covering the annual emergence of the groundhog from its hole in Pennsylvania, but gets caught in a blizzard and is trapped in a time warp where he relives the same day over and over again. Holly and I had watched this movie together recently. Holly laughs as she makes a reference to *Groundhog Day*, and I also participate in referencing the movie, and do so by elongating the vowels in the phrase I am quoting, mimicking the intonation of the actor Bill Murray, and also by laughing throughout my contribution.

(5)

1 Sylvia It’s for-
2 the thing they-
3 we- we had to do one for?
4 was an online survey we did...
5 Holly Did you harm anyone?
6 Sylvia because real people, you know, took it.
7 Holly→We:re any groundhogs harmed.
8 Sylvia Haha=
9 Holly =Haha!
10 Sylvia (h)...
11 Holly (????)
12 Sylvia→“I’ve been sta:bbed, [mai(h):me(h)d?”
13 Holly [Hahahaha!

Holly jokingly asks me “Did you harm anyone?” (line 4) but I continue to explain to her why Dave and I had to get an IRB, “because real people, you know, took it” (line 5). Then, Holly makes a reference to the film *Groundhog Day*, when she says “We:re any
groundhogs harmed” (line 6). Holly likely made this particular joke because one of our favorite scenes in the film, which Holly often likens to my mental state when I work too hard, is when Bill Murray steals a truck with Punxsutawney Phil, the groundhog of Punxsutawney, Pennsylvania, and drives off a cliff of a gravel pit, killing himself and the innocent groundhog. I laugh at Holly’s reference (line 7), and then Holly laughs loudly (line 8). Although Holly made her reference without smile voice and without laughing immediately, I coded this example as involving speaker laughter, since she laughs almost immediately after her reference. Then, I attempt to quote an actual line from *Groundhog Day*, where Bill Murray’s character is trying to convince his love interest that he is a god because he has died so many times, saying “I’ve been run over, drowned, crushed, stabbed, shot, electrocuted, poisoned, frozen, burned, and asphyxiated.” I was likely reminded of this line because I related it with our talk of “harm” in the context of the IRB, and I construct the dialogue imperfectly, saying “I’ve been stab:bed, mai(h):me(h)d?” using vowel lengthening, intonation mimicry, and also laughing during my reference to the film.

My own intuition as a speaker who was using laughter while signaling a media reference in this example is that I was laughing because I found the reference, or my use of it, funny and enjoyable. It could be that women are expected to smile and laugh more than men in interaction, as Tannen asserts. Another interpretation is that Holly and I used laughter to express rapport related to our shared knowledge of a film we both watched together that we could later both draw from in conversation.

Therefore, it seems likely that smiling and laughing while making a media reference do not occur solely for the purpose of signaling the media reference, especially because, as we can see in example 5, the reference was also signaled by vowel lengthening, intonation mimicry, and through the semantic content of the reference as well. Instead, it seems that speakers smile and laugh while making media references for a variety of other potential
reasons related to a cluster of gender expectations, solidarity, supportive alignment (Gordon 2003), rapport, and overall enjoyment of the conversation. Future research should use video-recording in order to more precisely study embodied behavior such as smiling, and other possible embodied signaling of double-voiced media intertextuality (such as eyebrow flashes or head nods, for example).

4.3.5 Regional and foreign accents can signal media references

Use of marked regional and foreign accents (different from the speakers’ own accents) occurred in 25 out of 116 media references coded, or in 22% of the total amount of media references in my data. The reason for both the relatively low occurrence of this signaling mechanism and for its occurrence at all is relatively straight-forward. Speakers use regional or foreign accents when the source text they are referencing involved an accent noticeably different from the speaker’s accent, and this only happens occasionally, especially considering that the speakers in my data generally consume media that is spoken in their native language and in most cases, in a ‘standard’ or ‘mainstream’ American English accent. However, there are 22 notable examples in my data where speakers use ‘depictive delivery’ (Clark & Gerrig 1990), delivering specific vocal attributes to depict, or voice, characters from films, TV shows, and videogames who have particular regional or foreign accents, and there are even three examples where speakers sing the tune of a song where the singer of the original song had a regional English accent (two of these examples were with a British English accent, and one was with a Southern American English accent).

Another interesting fact to point out is that the vast majority of the examples in my data that I coded for accent were made by one speaker — Fred (Dave, Lana, and Todd’s housemate). Fred made 18 out of the 25 of the media references coded for accent, or 72%
of the total amount of media references coded for accents. 18 out of 36, or 50%, of his total count of media references included an accent. Lana, in comparison, only made six out of 25 of these media references with a foreign or regional accent, or 24% of the total amount of media references coded for accent, and only six out of 30, or 20%, of her total amount of media references. I only made two, or 8%, of the total examples that were coded for foreign or regional accent, and only two out of 15, or 13% of my total amount of media references. This points to interesting individual differences in talk, since this is clearly not a sex-class linked phenomena in my data, as was the case with smile voice and laughter.

Rather, Fred as an individual is, in the first place, the most prolific media reference-maker in my data set (contributing 36 out of the 116 media references, or 31%) and also half of his media references include the use of regional or foreign accents.

We have already seen Fred out-perform me by using a Spanish accent to quote Inigo Montoya in *The Princess Bride* in example 1, in section 4.3.1, and in Chapter 5 we will see him take on French and British accents when he sings to the tune of the song “Belle” from Disney’s *Beauty and the Beast*, and then in Chapter 6 he will use a Russian accent to voice Sasha Baron Cohen’s character in the film *Borat*. Why does Fred make so many media references with the use of accents? Dave explained in playback, “He’s better at accents,” and also told me that Fred once took an improv acting class. I also emailed Fred and asked for his insights on why he uses so many accents in his everyday talk. He gave three possible reasons, which I will keep in his own words, in first-person:

1) Grew up with a socialized awareness of my kind of “unconventional” ethnicity relative to (most) other kids - in a way, drove me to understand ethnicity and language from an early age, if only through general stereotypes of the kind that produce recognizable "characters." Learning foreign languages is hard, though I think I may have a certain talent for it, but imitations of stereotypical foreigners in heavily accented English is easier. 2) Grew up in Washington DC, already a multicultural city, among other children of diplomats and expatriates from foreign nations - my dad also speaks 6 languages, so had a lot of exposure to foreign languages and accents. 3) You mention people say I’m “better” at doing accents, so I'll take a stab at explaining why I might be. I've always suffered from a certain
amount of social awkwardness, driving me to be the class clown to win approval from my schoolmates through humor rather than direct interaction. You tend to quickly learn what makes people laugh, and what you're good at. Accents, imitations and impressions tended to be a hit. In my “adult” life, the improv class Dave mentioned was definitely a factor in honing that raw material.

Fred’s answers can be considered as another type of evidence that can shed light on possible reasons for why he, as an individual, produces so many accents in his media references. Overall, it seems that as Fred (who is Egyptian and Lebanese on his father’s side, and whose mother is an American of German, Irish, and Czech descent) grew up in Washington, D.C., he may have developed a more sensitive awareness of various kinds of accents, for the reasons he mentioned related to his ethnicity, his upbringing in D.C., and his exposure to many foreign languages and their English accents. It also seems feasible that he realized at an early age that performing accents made others laugh, and that this became an incentive for performing various accents. Gordon (2009) similarly found that the actor couple Steve and Janet used accents for play.

The excerpt I present below is from Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic, and follows example 2 from section 4.3.1, where Dave and I had been reminiscing about the recording that Lisa had us listen to and transcribe in order to learn about intonation contours in her phonetics/phonology course. Here, Fred becomes involved in the talk by making a reference to the 2003 film The Room, voicing Polish actor Tommy Wiseau’s character, doing so with vowel lengthening, intonation mimicry, lowered pitch, and the use of a Polish accent. This is actually the third time in the conversation that Fred has attempted to make this exact same reference, but I present the following excerpt because here his contribution is finally acknowledged by the group, likely due to the ‘good timing’ of the reference.
My mention of how “we just had to listen to Lisa over and over again” (line 4), referring to the phonetics and phonology professor Lana, Dave and I had, provides an opportunity for Fred to make a reference to a scene in The Room where Tommy Wiseau dramatically yells at his fiancé, also named Lisa, “You are tearing me apart, Lisa!” Fred signals the reference with vowel lengthening, intonation mimicry, lowered pitch, and the use of an ostensibly Polish accent, saying "You're breaking my hea:rt Lisa:!” (line 10) (Tommy Wiseau is thought to be from Poland, although his origins are somewhat of a mystery and are speculated about on the internet). Whereas the previous two times Fred had made this reference, and none of us had responded or acknowledged his contribution to the conversation, this time, everyone laughs (lines 11-13).

Instead of ending there, next Fred self-repairs the quote, in his ‘own’ voice, saying “You’re tearing me apart, Lisa” (line 14), replacing ‘breaking my heart’ with ‘tearing me apart,’ which is what Tommy Wiseau actually says in the movie. I overlap him, repeating Fred’s reference and perhaps ‘savoring’ (Tannen, 1989/2007: 72) the reference by using
vowel lengthening, intonation mimicry, lowered pitch, and accented speech with “You’re tearing me aPA:RT!” (line 15). Not to be out-done, Fred then repeats the reference, again with the accent, but this time with “tearing me apart” instead of “breaking my heart,” so that the result is: "You're tearing me apa:rt, Lisa!:" (line 17). The excerpt ends with Lana laughing and then orienting back to the Maddy recording.

In sum, in this section I have explained the occurrence of regional and foreign accents as an extra layer of contextualization cues for signaling intertextuality, when the occasion calls for it (e.g., when the character or singer being voiced has an accent markedly different from the speaker’s voice). Delving into the quantitative findings, I revealed how Fred made use of accents much more than any other speaker, and attempted to elucidate some possible reasons as to why this is the case. Although use of accent as a signaling mechanism is mostly used by one speaker, and therefore provides an interesting study into an individual’s unique style of using media intertextuality and accents in talk, it is also feasible that accents, in part, serve a function of signaling other ‘voices’ in general, especially in the context of voicing specific characters or character archetypes in cultural media. Additional evidence for this is provided by the fact that Lana and I also use accents on occasion, albeit to a lesser extent than Fred.

4.3.6 Singing can signal media references

Similar to the limited use of accent as a contextualization cue to signal double-voiced intertextual media references, singing only occasionally served as a device for signaling a media reference. Singing itself is somewhat marked in conversation, and so when it does appear, it often references a song known to other participants in the conversation. Singing occurred when speakers invoked the melody and/or words of a song, either from a film, TV show, or from a stand-alone song (e.g., a song produced by a
musician or group for radio play, etc., but not as part of a film or TV show). 20 out of 116 intertextual media references, or 17% of the total number of examples, involved obvious use of singing. I say ‘obvious’ because there are a few cases where speakers were quoting a song, but this was not necessarily evident in the manner they referenced it in. In other words, I only coded media references as being sung if the speaker demonstrated evidence of attempting to reproduce the original melody of the song. For instance, Holly, in Conversation 3: Groundhog Day (presented in Chapter 5, example 9) says, “And..then I got :high:” (line 3) referencing the song “Because I got High” by musician Joseph Edgar Foreman, better known by his stage name, Afroman. While I knew that this was a media reference to a song, I did not code it as “singing” because in her talk there is no evidence that she was attempting to replicate the melody of the song.

Also similar to the use of accent to signal media references is the possibility that the use of referencing songs, or singing during everyday talk, may be a more prominent feature for certain individuals. In the conversations, Lana sang the most (seven examples out of 30 media references), followed by Fred (six out of 37 media references) and Dave (five out of 19), whereas I only sang once out of 15 media references (in Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic, which had more instances of singing than any other conversation), and Melanie sang in one of her two media references (in Conversation 3: Groundhog Day). My own intuition is that Lana, Fred, and Dave seem quite self-confident in their singing abilities, whereas I can say for myself that I am rather self-conscious about singing. I cannot make any such statement about Melanie, since she was only present briefly in Conversation 3: Groundhog Day and I am not as close to her as I am with many of the other speakers in my data set.

In the example below (from Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic), one of Lana and Todd’s bengal kittens, Gaia, has just leapt to the top of the fridge in the kitchen, where we
were all talking. By the time of this recording, Gaia jumping to the top of the fridge had become rather expected and not unusual, although it was still relatively new, which is demonstrated by how I comment on it below. My comment is done with somewhat of a sing-song intonation (which I have attempted to indicate by showing the intonation contour), and this leads to Fred, Lana, and me singing about the event, referencing the song “There She Goes” by The La’s.

(7)

I comment on Gaia’s jump onto the fridge, saying, “There she goes” (line 1) in somewhat of a ‘sing-song’ intonation, with a high pitch accent (H°) followed by a low falling tone (L%) over the word “goes” (not a reference to anything). Lana builds on my contribution after a slight pause when she references the 1851 book *Moby Dick* by Herman Melville, which tells the tale of a whaler captain’s quest for a white whale. Lana laughingly says, “Tha:r sh(h)e [blo:ws]” (line 2), which commonly refers to sighting a whale. Fred is the first one to reference the song “There She Goes” by The La’s, saying, “There she go( )es again” with a slight musical quality to it. Then I reproduce the song, mimicking the melody of it by singing it with vowel lengthening in each word, and increasing in pitch with each word: “The:re she: go:es” (line 5). Lana joins in laughingly with “go(h):es” (line 7), and continues
with “There she go(h)es” (line 9), but I then change the original lyrics of the song to “Climbing on the fridge” (line 8), causing Lana to break into laughter (line 9) (the original lyrics of the song alternate in the verses between “Racing through’ my brain/Pulsing through my vein/Chasing down my lane”). Then Lana collaborates with creating new lyrics for the song with “On the fridge again” (replacing the original lyrics of “There she goes again”), and then just repeats the melody and fades out with “da da da: da da:” (line 12).

Even though I mentioned earlier that I am self-conscious about singing, here I felt comfortable singing because my younger brother and I used to sing this song quite frequently growing up to poke fun at my stepfather in his comings and goings. So that explains why I sing here, though as I mentioned Lana and Fred sing much more in general, as we will definitely see in Chapter Five.

In sum, singing is a similar contextualization cue to the use of regional and foreign accents in the sense that it can be used to signal media intertextuality (particularly when a song is being referenced), but it seems to have an individual component to it, in the sense that certain individuals are more or less comfortable with incorporating accents and singing into their conversational styles. Both of these factors explain why we see accent and singing occurring much less than laughter and smile voice as contextualization cues to media intertextuality. Whereas laughter and smile voice are sex-class linked, the use of accents and singing seem likely to be more individual attributes, and accents and singing also occur less because only a subset of media references require them. All of these features ostensibly could be used more often to signal certain media references, but the sex-class linked indexicality associated with laughter and smile voice, and the individual traits associated with accents and singing (like openness, being skilled and funny) make them occur less frequently overall.
4.3.7 Creaky voice can signal use of a media reference when speakers are voicing a character who speaks with creaky voice

The final contextualization cue that I observed as a signaling mechanism of media intertextuality is creaky voice, also known more commonly as ‘vocal fry’. Creaky voice is a phonation type which consists of strong adductive tension, medial compression, and low airflow, resulting in a low-frequency tapping sound (Laver 1980:126). Mendoza-Denton (1997) describes creaky voice as a way for teenage girls to show their gang persona in a central California high school. More recently, Lefkowitz and Sicoli (2007) analyzed creaky voice in the construction of gender and authority in American English. This indexical link between creaky voice and authority (also analyzed by Eckert 2014 in young women reporters’ speech on National Public Radio) is what originally led me to believe that creaky voice could be a potential signaling mechanism for media intertextuality, where speakers are conveying in some sense their authority on the media sources that they are appropriating in talk.

However, I was surprised to find that only 13 out of 116, or 11%, of the examples of media intertextuality made use of creaky voice. Running a Pearson’s chi-square test indicated that men and women act the same in terms of creak in my data, but when I looked more closely at the data, I saw that only one man was coded for creak: Fred. He used creaky voice in 8 of the examples I coded, across two conversations, whereas I used creaky voice in 3 examples across three conversations, and Lana and Holly each used creaky voice once in two separate conversations. It is possible that Fred uses more creaky voice than other men in general, regardless of whether or not he is making an intertextual media reference. It seems likely that I also use a lot of creaky voice, since I used it in three different conversations, and I can say, from listening to a lot of recordings where I was a participant, I was surprised at how often I use creaky voice, especially in situations where
I am talking about things that I know, or things over which I have some authority. It seems possible that Lana and Holly might both use less creaky voice in general, due to their age (both are two years older than me, and it is possible that they just missed the new wave of creaky voice as an indexical feature of authority amongst young women), although when I asked her, Holly told me she feels that she does use creaky voice frequently, and would use it a lot more if she had never become aware of her use through studying linguistics. Thus, similar to accent and singing, which shed light on individual characteristics of style, it seems likely that there is some individual factor in using creaky voice to signal media intertextuality as well.

In addition to this individual aspect, it also seems that creaky voice is similar to accent and singing since the source text itself seems to condition its usage. Taking a closer look at the examples where Fred uses creaky voice in making media references, it is apparent that 4 of the 8 instances coded for creaky voice occur when Fred is voicing a specific character, and it seems reasonable that he would use creaky voice because the characters themselves had creaky voice in the original source text. The first 2 instances are in Conversation 1: Papers Please when he is quoting the character Borat from the film *Borat*, and says, “:Ye:s. Ye:s;” and shortly later, “:Ye:s. It's nice.;” I found some YouTube clips of *Borat*, and the character Borat does seem to use creaky voice, especially when he says, “It’s nice.” The third example is when Fred voices the evil Emperor Palpatine in the film *Star Wars*, saying “:You are too weak;” (in Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic); the character of Emperor Palpatine does have a distinctive creaky voice. The fourth example is where Fred voices a specific character who has creaky voice in the original source text is when he says “:Timma:y;” (later on in Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic) voicing the character Timmy in the TV show *South Park*, who is known for yelling his name with distinctive creaky voice. There is another example where Fred references a comedy sketch
by the Indian-American comedian Russell Peters when he is voicing his father. Fred voices Russell Peters, with an Indian accent and creaky voice (which I indicate here with a colon on each end of the intonation unit), saying, “:What the hell did you just say to me? Do I look like Brian's mom?:” When I went back to the original source text, I could not perceive any creaky voice in Russell Peter’s saying of those two questions, and this was confirmed by three other linguists who also listened to the relevant piece of the sketch. Therefore, it is not clear why Fred voices Russell Peters with creaky voice, but it could have to do with his depictive delivery of the character in trying to represent his use of an Indian accent.

In sum, it seems that creaky voice is probably only useful in signaling media intertextuality when a speaker is voicing a character who can be recognized by their use of creaky voice (such as in the instances of Fred voicing Borat in Borat, Emperor Palpatine in Star Wars, and Timmy in South Park).

4.3.8 Summary: Signaling media references

In this chapter, I have examined how 116 uses of double-voiced intertextuality, or media references in this specific case, are signaled through specific contextualization cues in everyday talk across five conversations among friends. Vowel lengthening and loudness, working together to result in exaggerated stress, along with intonation mimicry and extreme shifts in pitch, were shown to be the most common ways to signal media references. The features that I coded as occurring with less than half of the 116 examples (smile voice, laughter, use of regional/foreign accents, singing, and creaky voice) indicate that these features could be used more frequently to signal certain instances of media intertextuality, but there are sex-class linked (in the case of smile voice and laughter) and individual characteristics associated with the features (accents and singing), along with
characteristics of the source texts themselves (in the case of accents, singing, and it seems, creaky voice) which constrain whether these less common contextualization cues are likely to occur. In the following discussion, I consider the larger relevance of these findings, while also showing that this analysis has furthered what we know about intertextual processes and human behavior in everyday interaction.

4.4 Discussion

This chapter has demonstrated how double-voiced intertextual media references are signaled to interlocutors in everyday conversation. Building on Gumperz’s (1977, 1982) and others’ (e.g., Gordon 2002, 2008, 2009; Günthner 1999; Straehle 1993; Tannen 1989/2007; Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993) work on contextualization cues and related phenomena, this analysis has shown how intertextuality is not only signaled by lexical choice itself, but it is also marked in the speech stream, through prosodic, paralinguistic, and phonetic cues that have meaningful intertextual connections to prior shared media texts. I have demonstrated that how media references are effectively signaled to interlocutors, which allows them to engage with the references and participate in extended intertextual play frames and manage intertextual references as epistemic resources, which will be the topic of Chapter Five.

While the data set exceeds 100 examples that were taken from five different conversations, it must be acknowledged that this data set is still only a glimpse of human interaction, among specific friends within a limited age range with particular media consumption practices, all of which affect their talk and constrain the generalizability of the findings to some extent. However, it is probably that the more common contextualization cues found to signal intertextual media references (stress, consisting of vowel lengthening and loudness, pitch shifts, and intonation mimicry) are more likely to be
found as signaling mechanisms of intertextuality in other instances of everyday interaction due to their high frequency in the data. And while smile voice, laughter, accents, singing and creaky voice occur less frequently as contextualization cues for signaling intertextual media references, they nonetheless provide interesting insights into possibly sex-class linked behavior (in the case of smile voice and laughter) and individual behavior in everyday conversation, as well as illuminate the constraints and affordances that certain types of media (e.g., movies or TV portraying characters with marked regional or foreign accents, songs, or characters who use creaky voice) place on their insertion into everyday talk.

Furthermore, it is possible, as I mentioned in Chapter Three, that there are contextualization cues that I ‘missed’. As an independent researcher, I was only able to account for contextualization cues that were readily apparent through my own auditory perception, and the analysis would benefit from an acoustic analysis in a phonetic software package like Praat. Another further improvement in the analysis would be to closely transcribe and code all of the conversational data surrounding the intertextual media references. Despite the possible constraints on the analysis, however, this chapter does provide a starting point in understanding some of the mechanisms through which double-voiced intertextual media references are signaled in everyday talk.

In the excerpts I analyzed in this chapter, friends introduce prior shared media texts into new contexts of everyday talk, creating intertextuality, which might be considered ‘successful’ when other friends are able to ‘get’ the references. In order for listeners to pick up on the references, speakers must signal their presence in some way. In other words, they must use contextualization cues to signal what stands out in the ongoing stream of talk, making such cues act as metaphorical oars in the stream of talk that
interlocutors can then use in order to participate in intertextual processes of epistemic management and identity construction, which are the topics of the next two chapters.

In sum, this chapter has examined the prosodic, paralinguistic, and phonetic contextualization cues which accompany double-voiced media reference intertextuality in everyday talk. Through a quantitative analysis of 116 media references across five conversations, I have shown how speakers rely primarily on contrastive stress (through vowel lengthening and loudness), marked pitch shifts, and specific intonation mimicry to signal their use of media references in talk. I have also shown how women tend to use smile voice (and presumably smiling) and laughter occasionally, and more frequently than men, to signal their use of humorous media references. Finally, a closer qualitative and interpretive analysis, drawing from conversational examples, playback responses from speakers, and my own intuitions as a participant in the conversations, has shown how certain individuals may be more inclined to use regional or foreign accents, sing songs, or use very specific vocal modalities such as creaky voice, to invoke media texts that made use in the first place of accents, musicality, or creaky voice. Thus this chapter builds on previous work on contextualization cues by applying their study to the yet uncharted territory of how media references are signaled in talk beyond lexical repetition. At the same time it illuminates our understanding of intertextual processes in talk.

In conclusion, media references cannot be interpreted by listeners if they do not have access to the shared prior text, but even then, listeners cannot necessarily interpret a media reference by its content alone if it is not skillfully signaled in the speech stream by the speaker. The wealth of media references that my friends and I provided in the five conversations I drew from for this study allowed me to uncover the specific contextualization cues that speakers generally use when they are signaling media references. In the next chapter, I move from focusing on the signaling of double-voiced
intertextual media references to examining how listeners show that they have interpreted
the media references, and how they then use the intertextual media references as epistemic
resources with which they can construct extended intertextual play frames. These play
frames often occur at interactional dilemmas and work to simultaneously rekey and
reframe the talk while also managing the epistemic territory of the conversation.
5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter focused on the signaling mechanisms speakers use to indicate to their interlocutors that they are making intertextual media references. In this chapter, I move from analyzing how references to shared prior texts are signaled in the stream of talk to examining two other related processes. First, I examine how speakers respond to and demonstrate recognition of intertextual media references in talk. While laughter is the most common way that speakers respond upon hearing a media reference, I show how this does not always necessarily mean that they understood the reference. Instead, I show that engaging in a play frame based on an intertextual media reference is the most analytically reliable way that people show they have recognized and understood a reference. I thus argue for treating shared prior texts, in this specific case, intertextual media references, as a key site for the creation of play frames in conversation. Media references are sometimes used just for fun, but I show how they are often used in creating play frames at knowledge imbalances and interactional dilemmas in talk.

Recent Interactional Sociolinguistic work on intertextuality in conversation has mentioned the importance of knowledge, but there is room to combine this area of research with Conversation Analysts’ contemporary theory and studies of epistemics, or the intricate management of knowledge in conversation. Therefore, in this chapter I argue that the best way to incorporate the study of both intertextuality and epistemics is to view intertextual references as units of knowledge that speakers can actively use to shift both frames and knowledge territories in talk. I thus refer to these combinatorial conversational
moves as producing ‘epistemic frame shifts’: shifts in both the epistemic territory of talk as well as in the frame, or activity, of talk. I further engage with this relationship between intertextuality, framing, and epistemics on a theoretical level, based on examples from the conversations I analyze. I advance what previous studies have mentioned in terms of the importance of knowledge in intertextual processes, and show how intertextual media references work to develop play frames and manage group epistemics.

5.2 The role of joint construction of meaning in intertextuality

Gumperz (1982) noted the importance of both speaking and listening in producing meaning, writing that “the signaling of speech activities is not a matter of unilateral action but rather of speaker-listener coordination involving rhythmic interchange of both verbal and nonverbal signs” (167). While Gumperz studied the signaling mechanisms of meaning in talk (recall the discussion in Chapter 4, section 4.2) and his concept of conversational inference depends on the idea that language demands active interpretation based on prior linguistic experience, he did not fully examine the precise ‘listening mechanisms’, or how listeners indicate that they have understood or interpreted their interlocutor’s meaning. This will be my objective in section 5.3 – to show how listeners indicate that they have recognized and understood intertextual media references that have been signaled by their interlocutors. Hamilton (1996) writes that, “…any investigation of intertextuality in face-to-face conversations where utterances are designed for particular interactional partners, must look at the degree of match between a speaker’s use of intertextual ties and a listener’s recognition of these ties as he or she works to understand the speaker’s meaning” (64).

The idea that meaning in conversation is jointly produced, by both speakers and listeners, has been explored by many other scholars. Bakhtin (1986) recognized that
listening is a form of active participation. He writes, “The fact is that when the listener perceives and understand the meaning...of speech, he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it” (Bakhtin 1986: 68). Erickson (1986) describes “the influence of listeners’ communicative behavior upon the communicative behavior of speakers” (294) using the metaphor that “talking with another person . . . is like climbing a tree that climbs back” (316). Furthermore, the ‘interactional achievement’ of meaning in interaction is made evident in the CA work by Sacks and by Schegloff and others who have followed in their program of research (e.g., Schegloff 1982, 1988; Goodwin 1981, 1986).

While Gumperz focused primarily on signaling mechanisms, he did put forth that “…in conversation, choice of lexical and grammatical forms triggers ‘structures of expectation’ (Tannen 1977) which are integrated into culturally specific notions of what lines of argument or thematic progressions are possible” (1982:195). Tannen, as I reviewed in Chapter 2, continued Bateson’s (1972) and Goffman’s (1974) interest in framing, and expanded the theory greatly by applying it to interactional data (Tannen 1993; Tannen 2006, Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993), which also relied on an analysis of how knowledge schemas that people have regarding talk and topics of talk are key to framing. As we will see in the following analysis, play frames in particular are of key importance in understanding how intertextual media references are often used in conversation after they have been signaled and understood by interlocutors. The section that follows examines the recognition of media references in conversation, which is vital to the construction of play frames around the references, which will be picked up again as a central focus of analysis in section 5.5.
5.3 Recognizing media references in conversation

While signaling intertextual references is important for speakers, the recognition of such references by listeners is perhaps even more important for the conversation. However, as was the case in the unexplored territory of the contextualization cues that signal intertextual references, scholars have not yet engaged specifically with how listeners show that they recognize such references, although in many cases they have made the implicit assumption that speakers show understanding of intertextual jokes when they play along, laugh, or repeat (e.g., Gordon 2002 on role-reversal play examples & Beers Fägersten 2012 on playful intertextual quotation ratified by laughter and repetition). In order to fully comprehend the intertextual process of infusing talk with prior shared texts, in this specific case, media texts, the precise mechanisms of recognition must also be fully explored.

In this section, I provide qualitative explanations, examining specific examples, for quantitative results of the analysis of 116 examples of media references that were signaled by speakers in the five conversations, focusing now on the ways in which listeners demonstrated that they recognized and understood the media references. The recognition cues I observed and coded for were: laughter (which presumably entail smiling), participation in an extended humorous play frame of talk (following Bateson 1972 and Goffman 1974) regarding the shared knowledge, repetition (both partial and full) of the shared prior text, and explicit affirmation of the listener’s recognition of the reference (such as “yeah,” “yes,” “exactly”).
The quantitative results show that laughter is the most common way that participants responded to a speaker’s use of a media reference in talk. I argue in section 5.3.1 that this response can be understood by applying Chafe’s (2001) work on laughter; he argues that people laugh when they are faced with encountering either a real or imagined ‘pseudo-plausible world’ that triggers a feeling of ‘nonseriousness.’ I argue that in my data, speakers likely smile and laugh when they recognize intertextual media references due to the imagination of a pseudo-plausible world, which combines elements of real life with prior media texts. In section 5.3.2 I show that participation in an extended humorous play frame is the second most common way to show recognition of a media

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<thead>
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<th>Recognition mechanism</th>
<th>Instances</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation in an extended play frame</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>Sylvia: Are ^you: gonna buy the chicken? Lana: ARE ^YOU: GONNA BUY THE CHICKEN? Fred: Are you going to ^bu:y the chicken. Lana: ARE YOU GOING TO BUY THE ^CHICKEN? (Referencing Lisa’s recording and earlier talk about it, Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Fred: ♬“There she goes again”♬ Sylvia: ♬“There she: goes”♬ (Referencing the song “There she goes” by The La’s, Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit affirmation</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Lana: “PORK CHOP ^SA:NDWICHES!” Dave: Ha yeah. (Referencing GI Joe PSA YouTube video, Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Recognizing media references
reference in talk, and more clearly demonstrates that interlocutors have understood the reference and can act on it accordingly. Section 5.3.3 examines how full or partial repetitions of the media reference itself are less likely to occur overall, although they do occur sometimes. Finally, in section 5.3.4 I explain why explicit affirmation (such as “yes,” “yeah,” “exactly”) is the least common way to demonstrate recognition and understanding of an intertextual media reference (and such affirmation might just signal “I get the point,” not “I get the reference”).

Similar to how speakers deploy differing combinations of signaling mechanisms when they make media references, listeners also vary in whether they use 0-4 of the listening mechanisms I coded for (see Figure 2 below). In 17 instances listeners did not use any of the listening mechanisms, which could be evidence that they did not hear the media reference (due to overlap in many cases), did not recognize it, chose not to acknowledge it, or, it is possible that a listener responded simply with a smile, head nod, or some other embodied action that I did not capture with the audio recording. It was much more common, however, that listeners did audibly respond to media references, with 36 of the references being responded to with 1 listening mechanism, 38 being responded to with 2 listening mechanisms, and 23 being responded to with 3 listening mechanisms. This provides strong evidence that knowledge of the majority of the media references were shared by the speakers. Finally, it was very uncommon for speakers to use all 4 listening mechanisms at once, as this only happened on 2 occasions.

4 There is one case, for example, at the end of Conversation 1: Papers Please where Dave put new words to the tune of the theme song of the Lego Movie which we both knew, singing about his housemates’ cat, “♫ Flynn is really cute ♫ He’s got his pillow fort and it’s made of cardboard ♫” but I did not respond in an audible way (I might have smiled).
Figure 2. Occurrence of media reference recognition mechanisms. The x-axis shows the number of recognition mechanisms used in a single instance, and the y-axis shows the counts of how many media references were responded to with the indicated number (n) of recognition mechanisms.

More than with signaling mechanisms, the listening mechanisms fall in a Gaussian distribution, or bell curve-shape, showing that their occurrence is somewhat random and is potentially not rule-governed. There may be no single clear reason for why speakers use 1 vs. 2 listening mechanisms, but there are a variety of factors that influence whether a listener laughs at a media reference, participates in a play frame based on the reference, repeats part or all of the reference, makes an explicit affirmation that they have recognized the reference, or uses some combination of these to respond. Each of these listening behaviors, their reasons, and what they mean for conversation are explored in the following section.

5.3.1 Laughing when recognizing (or pretending to recognize) media references

Laughter is the most common way that speakers in my data respond after a speaker has made a reference to media. 78 out of the 116 instances of media references, or 67% of the total examples, were coded for laughter on the part of the listener(s). While I did not
code for listeners’ smile voice, it is probably safe to assume that when speakers laughed, they were also smiling. As Chafe (2001) observes, “Laughing typically is accompanied by the adjustment of facial muscles that we call smiling. It is unnatural to laugh without smiling at the same time” (39).

Why do people smile and laugh when they hear a media reference? Chafe (2001) writes, laughter conveys ‘nonseriousness’, which is triggered by “either imagining or actually encountering a world that is judged to be inappropriate to act on…a world that has some kind of pseudo-plausibility” (42). Consider that when speakers insert a line from a movie, or a melody from a popular song, into their daily talk, they are proposing a pseudo-plausible world by melding a component of pop culture with everyday life. Then Chafe’s observation that laughter results from a feeling of nonseriousness brought on by the pseudo-plausible world explains this phenomenon well.

Furthermore, Chafe posits that laughter and the feeling of nonseriousness that it expresses contain a property of contagiousness, which contributes to ‘shared hilarity’, where people laugh together (Chafe 2001:40). Chafe does not speak to the function of shared hilarity, but in drawing from Tannen’s work on interpersonal relationships and the need to demonstrate closeness and involvement, or solidarity, with each other, and Norrick’s work on the function of intertextual jokes, it seems likely that shared hilarity has the benefit of constructing group accord and harmony in the conversations, which, after all, consist of friends talking with each other. If the reader recalls examples from Chapter Four, it is apparent how pervasive laughter is present across many of the examples I presented there. I want to now return to present one of those examples (example 6 in Chapter Four, from Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic) where Dave, Lana, and I had been talking about our professor, Lisa, and one of the recordings she assigned us to transcribe as homework in her class. Here, Fred (not a graduate student) becomes involved in the
conversation when he references Tommy Wiseau’s character in the film *The Room*,
shouting “You’re tearing me apart, Lisa!” Dave, Lana, and I all laugh at his contribution at
this point, using laughter and shared hilarity as a response to an intertextual media
reference.

(1)

1 Sylvia [And it was like “no:!”
2 Fred →[“You’re breaking my heart, Lisa:!” *(low-pitch, Polish accent)*
3 Sylvia→Ha[ha!
4 Dave → [Haha[ha!
5 Lana → [Haha[ha!
6 Fred [“You’re tearing me apart, [Lisa.”
7 Sylvia *(low-pitch, Polish accent)*[“You’re tearing me aPA:RT!” ha.
8 Lana →Haha.

Fred references actor Tommy Wiseau’s line in *The Room*, saying “You’re breaking my
heart Lisa:!” with a lowered pitch and with a Polish accent, mimicking Wiseau. Dave,
Lana, and I all laugh enthusiastically (lines 3-5) following Fred’s contribution, and both
Fred and I repeat parts of the phrase again (lines 6-7) (repetition of a media reference will
be examined more closely in section 5.3.3). Lastly, Lana laughs again (line 8), presumably
in response to Fred’s and my repetition of the line. Dave’s, Lana’s, and my laughter (lines
4-6) at Fred’s reference demonstrates the shared hilarity that we experience in that
moment, and contribute to the ongoing play frame of talk.

One acknowledgement must be made about the laughter response of the
participants upon hearing media references in examples such as the one just presented.
The reason I have called laughter a ‘response’, and not ‘recognition’, is because it became
clear throughout listening to the conversations, reflecting on which media I intuited that
certain speakers had epistemic access to, and then confirmed in playback, that sometimes
speakers laughed not because they necessarily recognized the reference, but for other
reasons. For example, in reference to example 1 above, Lana confirmed in a playback
follow-up email that she had never seen *The Room* and clarified, “I think I might have been laughing at the general goofiness of the comment…even without knowing the reference, in addition to the Maddy stuff.” There are at least two other examples where it was revealed in playback that while a speaker was laughing at a media reference, they did not actually have epistemic access to the source text. Lana’s statement highlights two interesting things about the laughter I coded as listeners’ response to media references. First, speakers may not always be laughing because they recognize a reference, but because they pick up on an attempt at humor, perhaps sensing that *something* is being referenced without knowing exactly what. Secondly, speakers laughing at a reference may be laughing due to the contagiousness of laughter, which Chafe (2001) describes, or due to a previous, possibly unrelated utterance that produced laughter, since, as Chafe proposes, laughter and the feeling of nonseriousness is ‘slow fading’; that is, it “affects our experience over relatively long intervals” (40). It also makes sense that speakers might “fake” their recognition or understanding of a media reference, rather than not react at all, or rather than interrupt the flow of talk with questions like, “What are you talking about?” or “What is that from?”

In sum, smiling and laughter are the most common ways that listeners responded to the signaling of media references in my data. Chafe’s observations on laughter are helpful in understanding why laughter was so common, and many of the examples in the five conversations lend credence to his notion that people laugh at the imagining of a pseudo-plausible world. However, as we have seen, it is not always the case that laughter necessarily demonstrates recognition of a media reference. Sometimes, people laugh at a media reference for a variety of other reasons, such as the contagiousness of laughter, its

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5 These kinds of questions can be observed happening occasionally in everyday talk, and towards the end of my data collection, I began to ask such questions, as I became more aware of media references signaled that I did not understand.
property of being slow-fading, and other possibilities that people understand that someone is trying to be funny, or that something is being referenced, and although they are not sure what exactly, they laugh rather than creating an awkward moment in talk by remaining silent or by asking what the reference is. Whatever the case may be for the laughter response to media references in everyday conversation, the shared hilarity that it often produces contributes to involvement in the conversation, mutual construction of play frames, and a feeling of camaraderie among the speakers. This feature of laughter will be invoked again in Chapter Six, where I examine how speakers use media references to construct group involvement and shared group identity.

5.3.2 Participating in a play frame demonstrates recognition of a media reference

Actively participating in a play frame building on the original media reference is the second most common way that speakers respond to a media reference, and unlike smiling and laughter, this response can undoubtedly be considered a sign that listeners actually recognized and understood the media reference being signaled. 63 out of the 116 examples, or 54% of the total, were coded as involving at least one listener participating in a play frame, whether brief or extended, involving the original media reference. Extended play frames around media references were my original site of focus in this line of research on media references (Sierra 2016a) and are the focus of section 5.4 of this chapter as well as in Chapter 6.

Here, I first examine a shorter instance of a play frame as an example of how listeners can demonstrate their recognition of a media reference. In this case, the media reference occurred in Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic and is referencing the recording of phonetics and phonology professor Lisa saying “Did Maddy win the medal?” and “Maddy won the medal” with different intonation contours, which itself has served already for
examples 2, 4, and the beginning of 6 in Chapter 4. However, this time, the example occurs about two minutes after the examples presented in Chapter 4, when Dave and I were about to leave the house to drive to the store to buy chicken to cook for dinner. Here, the reference to the recording is simultaneously intertextual and intratextual, following Hamilton’s (1996) distinction, since it refers to the recording itself which was heard many months ago, and to the current conversation, just a couple of minutes back, where Dave and I had been referencing the recording. In the example below (line 4), I perform the reference through intonation mimicry and it is purely phonetic, drawing on the exaggerated intonation contours that Lisa had used in her recording but not repeating any of her specific words; Lana and Fred demonstrate recognition of the reference through their repetition and participation in a play frame around the reference. This example also begins to show how play frames, drawing on epistemic access to shared media references, can remedy epistemic imbalances and interactional dilemmas (this will be expanded on in the second half of this chapter).

(2)

1 Sylvia Should I bring my wallet or anything or are you gonna buy the chicken?
2 Dave ^I'll buy the chicken.
3 Lana                  [Ha! Hahaha(h)
4 Sylvia→Are ^you: gonna buy the chicken?
5 Lana→ARE ^YOU: GONNA BUY THE CHICKEN?
6 Fred→Are you going to ^buy the chicken.
7 Lana→ARE YOU GOING TO BUY THE ^CHICKEN?
8 Sylvia Ha.
9 Fred→ARE YOU GOING TO ^BUY THE CHICKEN?
10 Lana→ARE ^NOT YOU GOING TO BUY THE CHICKEN?=
11 Dave                 =I wanna die ->
12                          [dot JPEG.
13 Lana                  [Hahahaha!
14 Fred                   Hahaha!

Dave’s response, “^I’ll buy the chicken” (line 2) to my question “Should I bring my wallet or anything or are you gonna buy the chicken” (line 1) probably unintentionally reminds both Lana and me of the preceding “^Maddy won the medal” sequence that had occurred
just a few minutes earlier. This is evidenced by Lana’s laughter (line 3) and by my own intonation mimicry and otherwise unnecessary repetition of the question, with “Are ^you: gonna buy the chicken?” (line 4) (mimicking “Did ^Maddy win the medal?”). Thus line 4 can be considered the double-voiced media reference, and the following utterances by Lana and Fred are the listener’s responses to it. First, Lana participates in the play frame by repeating my question, but more loudly (line 5), and then Fred says, “Are you going to ^buy the chicken” (line 6), also showing his recognition of the reference and contributing to the play frame, or perhaps more specifically in this case, making a ‘game move’ to participate in a ‘game world’, following Goffman (1961). Lana again speaks loudly, saying, “ARE YOU GOING TO BUY THE ^CHICKEN?” (line 7) and Fred increases his volume as well, repeating his previous question, “ARE YOU GOING TO ^BUY THE CHICKEN?” (line 9). The sequence ends with Lana contributing the ungrammatical “ARE ^NOT YOU GOING TO BUY THE CHICKEN?” (line 10), and she is latched by Dave, making yet another media reference with, “I wanna die dot JPEG” (lines 11-12), quoting an online JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group), or image, of a dolphin leaping out of the sea with a rainbow behind it with the text “I wanna die” in comic sans font. Lana and Fred respond with laughter (lines 13-14).

Whereas example 2 demonstrates a relatively fleeting play frame, example 3 below is an instance of an extended play frame. This example also shows how listeners can demonstrate their recognition of a media reference through participation in a play frame, and how such play frames, drawing on epistemic access to shared media references, can remedy interactional dilemmas (again, this will be expanded on in the second half of this chapter). This example occurred towards the end of Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic, which took place in Dave, Fred, Todd’s, and Lana’s dining room. Here, speakers reference a scene and song from the 1991 Disney film Beauty and the Beast. The example below, which I
will present in pieces due to its length, begins after a lull in the conversation after Lana and Dave had been playing with one of Lana’s kittens.

(3)

1 Lana You know what time it is?
2 Dave [Gin and tonic :time:
3Dave [Gin and tonic time?
4 Sylvia [Gin and tonic! (high-pitch)
5 Lana [???
6 Dave [You gonna be drunk by the time we get back.
7 Fred [Oh I ^love gin and tonic time!
8 Lana [Hahaha
9 Sylvia Gin and tonic! (high-pitch)
10 Lana Hahaha[ahaha can som-
11 Dave ♬ [Gin and tonic party time gin and tonic party time yeah ♬
12 Sylvia Gin and tonic! (high-pitch)
13 Lana Can someone make sure the floor is clean [for me haha (?)

After Lana announces that it is “gin and tonic time” (lines 1, 2), meaning that she is going to make herself a gin and tonic to drink, Dave, Fred and I all react in various ways to her statement. Dave initially repeats her and asks “Gin and tonic time?” (line 3) and says, “You gonna be drunk by the time we get back” (line 6), while I say with a higher pitch “Gin and tonic!” (lines 4, 9, 12). Dave even makes a reference to a popular online song, “It’s Peanut Butter Jelly Time!!!” in line 11. In playback with Lana, she explained that when she said, “Can someone make sure the floor is clean for me” (line 13), she was referring to a previous time she had drunk gin and tonic and laid down on the floor of the dining room. In the same playback session, Fred explained that he had said “Oh I ^love gin and tonic time!” (line 7) because he found it humorous when Lana got tipsy and did things like that. This moment in the conversation was perhaps a bit awkward since no one at the moment in the house was drinking alcohol, yet Lana announces that she will drink, alone, and the speakers’ various reactions to her announcement could be interpreted as seeking a way to deal with this subtle awkwardness, or interactional dilemma. Fred is the first to reference Beauty and the Beast, and Lana and Dave demonstrate recognition of the
reference through their repetition and participation in a play frame around the reference, which ameliorates the awkwardness of the situation.

(4)

14 Fred → [This is where everyone PO:PS ou(h)t, Gi(h)n and-
15     Like- like- like that [Beauty and the Beast song,
17   Ha (high pitch, British accent) Gin and tonic? Gin and tonic!
18 Fred they’re like “BON^jo(h)ur!” (French accent)
19 Lana Gin and tonic!
20 Fred Gin and tonic!

Presumably everyone shouting and singing after Lana’s announcement ‘triggers’ (Jefferson 1978) Fred’s semi-active conscious (Chafe 1994), and he is reminded of a scene and song in Beauty and the Beast, where townsfolk pop out of windows, a chimney, and a pillory, and call “Bonjour!” to the main character, Belle. His semi-active conscious could also be triggered by the fact that in the song, Belle addresses that the people do the same thing every day, and “gin and tonic time” implies a daily activity. Fred compares the current real-life situation to the film scene, beginning a play frame of ‘we’re in this movie’ with “This is where everyone PO:PS ou(h)t, “Gi(h)n and-” Like- like- like that Beauty and the Beast song” (lines 14-16). Lana recognizes Fred’s reference almost immediately, as she overlaps him, laughing and repeating his earlier “Gi(h)n and-” (15) with “Gin and tonic!” (17). Fred continues elaborating on which scene he is referring to “they’re like ‘BON^jo(h)ur!’” (18), and Lana laughs again as she and Fred repeat “Gin and tonic!” (lines 19,20) with intonation mimicry of “Bonjour” in the film. Lana’s laughter and repetition of Fred’s words demonstrate that she recognizes the film reference. In the next excerpt she and Fred appropriate further lines and melody from the song to engage in an extended play frame based on the imagination of this pseudo-plausible world.
21 Lana There goes she-
22 Sylvia [Ha.
23 Fred [getting shit-faced ha
24 Lana Ha! haha (h) Just getting shit-faced.
25 Dave (??) ONCE AGAIN! [from his room]
26 Lana Hahahaha (h)(h) o:h.
27 Dave Haha.
28 Fred Haha.

Here Lana and Fred launch into a full play frame, as Lana laughs and replaces the original words from the song in Beauty and the Beast, “There goes the baker with his tray, like always” with “There she go(h)es she’s drinking lo:ts [o:f liquo:r” (lines 21,22) and Fred overlaps Lana with “getting shit-faced” (i.e., drunk, line 24). Lana laughs and savors (Tannen, 1989/2007: 72) Fred’s contribution, “Ju:st getting shit-faced”, and this repetition contributes to the construction of the collaborative play frame. A few moments later Dave chimes in from his room with “ONCE AGAIN!” (line 26), joining in the shared play frame and causing Lana and Fred to laugh in shared hilarity.

In the next lines, Fred continues the play frame by making up new lyrics to humorously fit the current situation to the tune of the song.

29 Fred GIN AND TONIC ARE HER TWO: MAIN FO:D GROU:PS heh
30 Lana Hahahaha!
31 Fred Heh heh.
32 Dave Haha.
33 Fred SHE’S HAD NOTHING ELSE TO EA:T
34 Lana (h)
35 Fred EVERY MORNING JUST THE SA:ME
36 Lana Hahahaha (h)
37 Fred WITH EYES [A-]
38 Dave [THE HANGOVER’S GONE AW[A:Y
39 Lana [Hahahaha!
40 Fred WITH EYES AS RED AS FLAME
41 Dave Haha.
42 Fred SHE’S OFF TO FIND ANOTHER (??) heh, I dunno.
43 Lana Haha[ahaha!
Fred begins singing loudly and with a lowered pitch, “GIN AND TONIC ARE HER TWO: MAIN FOO:D GROU:PS” (line 29), laughing afterwards and also causing Lana and Dave to laugh (lines 20, 32). He continues singing, “SHE’S HAD NOTHING ELSE TO EA:T” (line 33). While these lines are just sung to the tune of the song but do not lift any words from the song, his next line is actually an exact repetition of one of the lyrics from the film’s song, “EVERY MORNING JUST THE SA:ME” (line 35). Fred attempts to continue the play frame, “WITH EYES A-” (line 37) but Dave cuts him off with his own play frame contribution of new lyrics to the tune of the song, “THE HANGOVER’S GONE AWA:Y” (line 38). Fred continues his original attempt “WITH EYES AS RED AS FLAME” and attempts to add one final line before giving up (lines 40-42). This excerpt ends with Lana, Dave and Fred laughing, and it might seem like the end of the play frame, but the speakers manage to continue the play frame in the following lines.

(7)

44 Dave [Haha.
45 Fred Haha.
46 Dave DRANK DRA:NK!
47 Fred Heh Belle’s like the town drunk.
48 Dave AHHHHH
49 Fred (LOOK WHAT I GOT) BLAGHHHHH

Dave yells, “DRANK DRA:NK!” (line 46), which seems like it could be a reference to something but playback did not yield any leads on whether or not this was a reference.

Fred actually laughs and steps out of the play frame, saying, “Belle’s like the town drunk” (line 47), and then both Dave and Fred voice this hypothetical character of “town drunk Belle” with “AHHHH” (line 48) and “(LOOK WHAT I GOT) BLAGHHHHH” (line 49). This is an interesting shift because whereas before the play frame seemed to involve placing Lana as Belle within the film, now they seem to be imagining the character Belle and taking up her role as the town drunk in the film itself. However, Lana goes back to the
song they were singing and re-incorporates the topic of gin and tonic in the play frame, as she voices her own ‘character’ within the frame.

(8)

50 Lana ♪ CUZ I'LL NEVER GET MALARIA: CUZ OF ALL THE QUI:NINE ->
51 IN THE: DRI:NK ♪
52 Dave Ha.
53 ♪ SO WHEN MOSQUITOS COME AROUND ♪
54 Lana Hahahaha.
55 Dave ♪ EVERYONE ELSE (HAS) HIT THE GROUND ♪
56 Lana Haha.
57 Dave ♪ EXCEPT FOR QUININE I HAVE INSIDE [ME: ♪
58 Lana [Hahahaha(h)(h)hahaha!
59 Fred Ha.

Lana continues the song and thus the play frame by connecting tonic water with quinine and malaria, singing, “CUZ I'LL NEVER GET MALARIA: CUZ OF ALL THE QUI:NINE IN THE: DRI:NK” (lines 50, 51) to the tune of the part of the song where Belle sings, “Oh, isn't this amazing? It's my favorite part because, you'll see.” Here Lana is voicing a specific character, and as we see in Dave’s following lines, she and Dave are moving even further away from the topic of drinking gin and tonic. Dave laughs (line 52) and then picks up the topic of malaria by singing, still to the tune of the song, “ SO WHEN MOSQUITOS COME AROUND, EVERYONE ELSE (HAS) HIT THE GROUND, EXCEPT FOR QUININE I HAVE INSIDE ME:” (lines 53, 55, 57) while Lana laughs after each of Dave’s lines of the song (lines 54, 56, 58), and Fred laughs at the end (59). This is the end of the play frame, and in the next lines we see Lana orient back to the “real world.”

(9)

60 Lana (h)O:h.
61 But really alcohol is a problem people. Haha.
62 Dave Depends on your definition of pro[blem.
63 Lana [I concur...]
64 (clears throat)
65 [silence, then the toilet flushes in the background and topic goes back to the kittens]
Lana inhales and sighs, “O:h” (line 60) and then orients away from the play frame and back towards real life, saying, “But really alcohol is a problem people” and laughing (line 61). This statement seems to act as a buffer between the play frame the speakers had just been involved in, where drinking alcohol was taken lightly and seen as a humorous topic, and real life, where Lana somewhat sarcastically says, “But really alcohol is a problem people,” poking fun at their previous play frame, and perhaps saving face, since this play frame could be interpreted as threatening to her positive face (Brown & Levinson 1987), or desire to be liked, as it pokes fun at her drinking habits. Dave also orients back to a real-life frame, and shows alignment with Lana and possibly with her drinking habits by taking the stance, “Depends on your definition of problem” (line 62), and Lana overlaps and aligns with him, with “I concur” (line 63). She clears her throat, and the room is silent until the sound of a toilet flushing in the background is heard, and then the topic turns to one of the kittens’ reactions to the sound.

In sum, I have used two examples, one brief and one extended, to show how speakers can demonstrate recognition of a media reference by actively participating in a play frame relying on knowledge of the reference and its source text. Unsurprisingly, these play frames often are marked by laughter, and they also feature repetition, which is the topic of the next section. I will come back to the importance of making media references to shift from awkward or serious frames to play frames in section 5.4 of this chapter, and will also continue to explore how play frames form in Chapter 6, along with how these kinds of epistemic frame shifts promote group identity construction based on shared knowledge and experience.
5.3.3 Repetition of a media reference usually demonstrates recognition

Tannen (1989/2007) argues that the over-arching function of repetition is to show and create interpersonal involvement in conversation, and that “The pattern of repeated and varied sounds, words, phrases, sentences, and longer discourse sequences gives the impression, indeed the reality, of a shared universe of discourse” (62). As I briefly mentioned in the preceding two examples, repetition of a media reference occurs occasionally in the conversations and demonstrates recognition and epistemic access to the source text, which clearly contributes to the idea that the speakers have a “shared universe of discourse.”

This shared universe of discourse can be seen in example 1 (also example 6 of Chapter 4), after Fred references actor Tommy Wiseau in The Room, saying “You’re breaking my heart, Lisa!” and “You’re tearing me apart, Lisa,” and I repeat the reference with the same intonation contour, saying “You're tearing me a\textsc{PA:RT}!” I had also seen the film The Room, and so I was able to recognize the reference and demonstrated my recognition and enjoyment, or ‘savoring’ (Tannen, 1989/2007: 72) of its appropriation in conversation by repeating it. In example 2, Lana repeats, “\textsc{AREN'T YOU: GONNA BUY THE CHICKEN}?” after me, showing that she recognizes my repetition of the earlier intonation contour that we had used to reference Lisa’s recordings, and even Fred shows recognition of the reference to our earlier jokes about the recordings (although he does not know Lisa or the recordings) when he says, “\textsc{Are you going to buy the chicken}.” In example 4, Lana repeats, “Gin and tonic!” after Fred, with the same intonation contour, as a way of showing that she recognizes his reference to the film Beauty and the Beast.

Full or partial repetition of an intertextual media reference was used as an indication that a listener understood a reference in 48 out of the 116 examples, or 41% of
the time. It makes sense that repetition would be used less frequently overall as a strategy to demonstrate recognition of a media reference, because while some repetition, especially with new twists, can be appreciated in a conversation, too much repetition would mean that nothing new is being contributed to the talk, and no one wants to sound like a parrot, simply repeating what someone else has already said. As Norrick (1994) writes, when speakers use repetition, “On the one hand, the repeat borrows recognizable elements from its original, but on the other hand, it differs from that original, if only through reference to it and contextual separation from it” (15). If we look at example 1, where Fred references the actor Tommy Wiseau in the film *The Room* shouting at his girlfriend Lisa, we can see that even though Fred and I repeated the media reference, we did not do so verbatim. When I repeated Fred in example 1, I did not repeat him word for word or with the same stress or loudness. While he said “You’re breaking my heart, Lisa!” (line 2) with a lowered pitch and a Polish accent, and then “You’re tearing me apart, Lisa” (line 6) in his usual tone of voice, I said, “You’re tearing me aPart!” (line 7), mimicking the lowered pitch and Polish accent, but leaving off “Lisa” at the end of the phrase and becoming louder in “aPart” while drawing out the second vowel.

Other examples of modified repetition of media references can also be observed in two of the examples in Chapter 4. First, in example 1 of Chapter 4, when I quote Inigo Montoya in the film *The Princess Bride*, saying, “You keep using that word, I don’t think you know what it means” (line 6) Fred repeats (and repairs) the reference with a Spanish accent, saying, “I don’t think it means what you think it means” (line 9) In example 7 of Chapter 4, Fred references the song “There She Goes” by The La’s, singing, “There she goes again” (line 4), and I repeat him with lengthened vowels in each word, singing, “There she: goes” (line 5), while Lana latches with laughter particles, “go(h):es” (line 7),
and “There she go(h)es” (line 9). In all of these examples, then, repetition is recognizable, but it is never exactly like the original.

While these examples show that repetition indicates recognition and perhaps savoring of media references, especially in the way that listeners repeat the reference in a new and altered way, further demonstrating their familiarity with the reference, this is not always the case. Similar to how sometimes speakers laughed even when they did not recognize a reference, there was at least one case I identified where a speaker repeated a media reference when she did not recognize it. This example comes from Conversation 3: Groundhog Day, which took place on a Friday afternoon in the graduate student lounge of the linguistics department at Georgetown University. Holly, Miriam, Melanie, and I were sitting around the room talking, and in the excerpt I present below, Holly makes a media reference, which is received with laughter by Miriam and me, but then Miriam repeats the reference with rising question intonation. Here, Miriam does not repeat the reference to demonstrate understanding, but rather to indicate that she has not recognized the reference.

(10)

1 Sylvia I was gonna go to the gym and now I’m all demotivated.
2 Holly I was gonna work on my dissertation,
3 →and..[“then I got high.”]
4 Sylvia [and-
5 Got-
6 Ha[ha.
7 Holly [Ha[haha.
8 Miriam [Hahaha!
9 →Then I got high?
10 Holly =Yes I did! I [got really high]♭♭
11 Melanie [♭♭“Then I got high”♭♭
12 Holly Haha.

After I complain that “I was gonna go to the gym and now I’m all demotivated” (line 1), Holly responds by combining her own words with those of a song, first saying, “I was gonna work on my dissertation, and..then I got high” (line 2) referring to her dissertation as her
“diss.” She then references the popular 2000 song “Because I Got High” by the rapper Afroman when she says, “and..then I got hi:gh” (line 3). Afroman’s song consists of him relating things he meant to do, but failed to do, with a chorus of “Cause I got high/Because I got high.” Holly, Miriam, and I laugh (line 6-8), demonstrating possible recognition of the intertextual media reference, but then Miriam asks, with rising question intonation, “Then I got high?” (line 9). I coded this as listener repetition, which until this point I had assumed meant recognition of a reference. However, in going back to the example, I realized that the rising intonation in Miriam’s utterance indicated that it was entirely possible that Miriam did not recognize the reference, and instead was repeating the reference in an attempt to seek clarification (which was not provided; instead, Holly and Melanie continue to sing the song in lines 10-11).

Rather than assume that Miriam did not recognize the reference, I decided to email her, explaining the piece of discourse I was examining, and ask her if she had heard the song at the time of the recording, or thought that she might have recognized the reference. Her response confirmed my initial intuition that she indeed did not recognize the reference: “I don’t know this reference and still don’t. I don’t watch tv or movies or the internet so I’m always THAT person who never gets anything. So I was being serious in my request for clarification - not knowing that it was a reference to a song- when I said "I got high?" I haven't heard that song (maybe I have but I wouldn't be able to tell you that I knew who sang it).” This example and Miriam’s insights about it demonstrate that repetition of a media reference is not always an indication of recognition. A speaker could repeat a media reference to savor it, but it is likely a demonstration of lack of understanding when the repetition is voiced with rising intonation as a question, as is the case in example 3. However, Miriam’s exact repetition of the reference demonstrates that she likely realized that something was being signaled that was out of the ordinary, because otherwise, if she
thought Holly was not making a reference and was being ‘serious’, she could have asked Holly something like, “You got high?” instead of repeating “And then I got high?.” Finally, this example shows that it is not always the case that speakers “get” the reference, even though they are friends, and that some individuals are less likely to use or participate in reference-making (Miriam does not make any media references in Conversation 3: Groundhog Day). Future work could examine the strategies that speakers use when they do not recognize insider group references, and how sometimes references can be exclusionary rather than inclusive (see also Norrick 1989’s discussion of inside jokes).

In sum, while partial or full recognition of a media reference is usually an indication that listeners have recognized and understood the reference, this may not always be the case. Other indicators, such as participation in a play frame around the reference, or more varied repetition of the reference, combined with novel words or phrases, may be better evidence that listeners have understood media references that speakers have signaled.

5.3.4 Explicit affirmation of a media reference may demonstrate recognition

Finally, explicit affirmation of a media reference, such as saying “yeah,” “yes” or “exactly” (as opposed to implicit affirmation, like laughter or repetition), or in some cases repeating the reference with a ‘tone of affirmation’ (see example 12, below), may demonstrate recognition of the reference (or it may demonstrate “I get it” without knowing the exact reference). However, such explicit affirmation was the least common way that speakers indicated recognition. Only 15 out of the 116 examples, or 13% of the total, were coded as exhibiting explicit affirmation on the part of the listener. Example 2 of Chapter 4 contained one such example, when Lana shouted out “PORK CHOP^SA:NDWICHES!” (line 9) in reference to the YouTube GI Joe parody video of the
same name, and Dave responded, “Ha yeah” (line 10), demonstrating his recognition of the intertextual media reference.

While explicit affirmation like “yeah,” “yes,” or “exactly,” made up some of these examples, others contained what I referred to above as repeating the reference with a tone of affirmation. I will demonstrate how this works in the example below, which occurred early on in Conversation 2: Gin and Tonic, where Fred, Lana, Todd, Dave and I were all sitting or standing around in their dining room and kitchen talking. This excerpt follows our narrative of an incident where Todd’s lifelong best friend, Aaron, had vomited in the middle of the night in a tent that Lana, Todd, Dave, and I were all sharing on the camping trip that I described in Chapter 1.

I will split the transcript into two parts (11, 12) for the ease of following how the conversation unfolds. In the first part of this example (11), Fred (who did not go on the camping trip) attempts to become involved in the narrative by referencing the phrase, “Long hair don’t care,” which originated in the late 1960s (according to urbandictionary.com) and has since become text for a variety of internet memes. At first, no one responds to Fred’s reference, probably because Lana and I overlap him.

(11)

1 Sylvia I love though how like the whole next day we were just,
2 →making fun of hi:m and like,
3 →l- and he like didn't ca(h)re ha
4 Lana He's v- [I was thinking the same thing he's very stoic.
5 Todd • [He- he does NO:T-
6 →He does ^not care.
7 Lana He's just like,
8 Fred →[Long hair don't care.
9 Lana [he was just- [he's just like,
10 Sylvia [He's just like "Yep, this happened."
11 Lana o:wns it he's like,
12 "Yea:h, psh.=
13 Dave =Yeah.
14 Lana "You KNO:W it!"=
15 Todd [=(??)
16 Dave [=Ha[ha.

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Here, I describe Aaron’s nonchalance about the vomiting incident, saying, “I love though how like the whole next day we were just, making fun of hi:m and like, l- and he like didn’t ca(h)re” (lines 1-3). Todd repeats and reinforces my point that Aaron didn’t care, saying, “He- he does NO:T- He does ^not care” (lines 5-6). Fred picks up on our use of the word “care,” and, as Aaron happens to have very long hair which he ties in a ponytail, Fred attempts to become involved in the narrative, saying, “Long hair don’t care” (line 8), referencing the common phrase which has been appropriated for a slew of online memes. However, Fred is overlapped first by Lana and then by me, as we both voice Aaron’s nonchalance (line 9-18), and no one acknowledges his reference (yet).

As we have seen previously, Fred exhibits persistence (Tannen 1984/2005) in his conversational style, repeating references when they are not acknowledged by other speakers (see the discussion leading up to example 6 in Chapter 4, where he repeated a reference 3 times before it was acknowledged by his audience). Here again, in excerpt 11 (line 23) Fred repeats his reference to “Long hair don’t care” at a transition relevance place (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974), which means that this time he is clearly heard, and in lines 24 and 26 both Lana and Todd repeat the reference in tones of affirmation, rather than with Fred’s original intonation contour, demonstrating that they have recognized and understood his reference.
Fred’s repetition of “Long hair don’t care” (line 23), this time with a lengthened vowel in “lo:ng,” perhaps also drawing more attention to the fact that this is a reference, is acknowledged and laughingly repeated first by Lana, but who instead stresses the word “don’t” in the phrase, creating a tone of affirmation by implying that indeed, Aaron “^do(h)’n’t” care (line 24). I also laugh, showing recognition and appreciation of the reference (line 25), and Todd then does a partial repetition of Fred’s reference, now including Aaron’s name, and stressing “is,” indicating with this tone of affirmation that Fred’s characterization of Aaron is correct: “Aaron ^i:s long hair don’t care” (line 26).

Finally, some of the examples of media references coded for explicit affirmation on the part of the listener contained meta-discourse on the part of the signaler of the media reference, where the speaker drew attention to the fact that they were signaling a reference with additional lexical signaling, for example by saying “that song” or “that conversation” preceding the media reference itself, which could explain why explicit affirmation occurred in such examples. Example 4 of Chapter 4 contained an example of explicit affirmation following meta-discourse, when I was trying to remember the phrase that Lisa repeated with different intonation contours in her voice recordings, and Dave said, with raised pitch, “^MA:DDY GOT THE MEDAL” (line 11) and I shouted in recognition, “YEAH, ^THA:T!” (line 12).

In sum, explicit affirmation of media references is the least common way that speakers respond to hearing intertextual media references in the five conversations. This makes sense considering that making references is a subtle display of knowledge that indicates insider group membership (Norrick 1989), and explicit affirmation of such conversational moves in some sense ‘undoes’ the sense of enjoyment, or the rapport benefit
of indirectness (Tannen 1984/2005) that speakers may get from signaling and understanding the references without any explicit language to indicate their doing so. However, when speakers did make explicit affirmations, they tended to fall into two categories: i) an explicit word or phrase like “yeah,” “yes,” “exactly,” or “oh yeah,” which often (but not always) was preceded by the signaler of the media reference making a metacomment about the reference before the reference itself, like “that song” or ii) a partial or full repetition of the reference with a tone of affirmation, as demonstrated in example 12 above.

5.3.5 Summary: Recognizing media references

In this section, I have examined how 116 double-voiced intertextual media references in five conversations among friends are responded to by listeners, who in most cases indicate recognition or understanding of the reference. Laughter, and presumably smiling, is by far the most common way that listeners respond in my data when hearing intertextual media references. Applying Chafe’s (2001) work on laughter in conversation to the quantitative findings, I argued that when speakers smile and laugh when they recognize intertextual media references it is likely because they are faced with a pseudo-plausible world that triggers a feeling of nonseriousness, resulting in laughter. I also argued that the contagiousness and shared hilarity that Chafe argues characterizes laughter are conducive to signaling a shift to a play frame, and indeed, participation in an extended play frame around the intertextual media reference was the second most common way that speakers respond when hearing intertextual media references, and in this case provides evidence that they actually recognize the reference and thoroughly understand how to further manipulate it in conversation. These play frames also frequently involve partial or full repetition of the original media reference, although overall, repetition is a
less common form of recognition of an intertextual media reference, and in at least one case, repetition with rising question intonation demonstrates that a speaker does not understand the original media reference. Finally, I showed that explicit affirmation of a media reference is occasionally, albeit rarely, used to indicate recognition of a media reference, and I explained its rarity as a strategy by virtue of it having a dulling effect on the rapport function of indirectness in ‘getting’ a reference without having to explicitly register it. In the following discussion, I consider the larger relevance of these findings, while also showing that this analysis has furthered what we know about intertextual processes and human behavior in everyday interaction.

5.3.6 Discussion

This section has demonstrated how double-voiced intertextual media references are reacted to, recognized, and shown to be understood in everyday conversation. Building on the importance of the joint construction of meaning (e.g., Erickson 1986; Garfinkel 1967, 1972; Gumperz 1977; Schegloff 1982, 1988; Goodwin 1981; 1986) and its importance in intertextual processes (e.g., Gordon 2002, 2008, 2009; Tannen 1989/2005, 2006) this analysis has shown how speakers indicate they have recognized an intertextual media reference through laughter (and presumably smiling), participation in play frames, partial or full repetition of the original reference, and explicit affirmation that they have understood the reference.

It is important to keep in mind that it is not always the case that people use some of these cues (like laughter and repetition) because they necessarily recognize and understand the media references. As I showed, people may laugh or repeat a reference, but this does not always indicate that they in fact recognize the reference, as was the case with Lana’s laughter (in example 2, line 12) and Miriam’s repetition (in example 3, line 9). This
finding should be further researched because it could have important implications for group dynamics, including involvement and regarding exclusion.

In sum, through analyzing the linguistic and paralinguistic behaviors through which speakers indicate their understanding of intertextual media references, I have demonstrated that participation in play frames is the most common and analytically reliable way that speakers show thorough understanding of intertextual media references. This ability to participate in play frames around a shared prior text is also instrumental in shifting the epistemic territory of the conversation. The next section will examine the co-occurrence of shifting to a play frame with shifting of epistemic territory, in what I call ‘epistemic frame shifts’.

The same caveats that I made in the discussion about the analysis of speaker signaling of intertextual media references in Chapter 4 also hold for this analysis of speaker uptake — the five conversations is a limited slice of human interaction and it is possible that I missed some indicators of listening devices, especially considering that the interactions only recorded audio, and any embodied indications of listening are unfortunately unknowable. In addition, sometimes, people do not respond at all to intertextual media references. 17 examples out of the total of 116 examples of media references, or about 15%, were coded as not including any of the four categories of uptake I observed.

There are a few possible explanations for why people did not react or demonstrate any uptake of intertextual media references. One explanation, which I observed in some of the examples, is that at least one other speaker overlapped with a speaker who made a media reference, making it possible that the speaker making the reference was not heard (such as in example 6 in Chapter 4 ["You’re breaking my heart, Lisa!"]], and example 11 in this chapter ["Long hair don’t care"], where Fred is overlapped when he makes
references). Another possibility is that while a speaker signaled a media reference, their audience did not know the source and simply remained silent rather than pretend they did, laugh along, or ask what the reference was. Yet another possibility is that the media reference was recognized, but the listener did not demonstrate uptake because they were tired, bored, or for whatever other reason did not feel like showing their recognition. Finally, participants in the conversations could have been smiling or nodding in recognition of a media reference, but since I only audio-recorded the conversations, I have no way of knowing.

While the instances where speakers do not demonstrate uptake of the media references are interesting in their own right, in some sense they are also ‘dead-ends’ in terms of examining conversational involvement (although, as I mentioned earlier, they would be very interesting to examine for looking at how certain members of groups are possibly excluded in talk). Instead, I chose in this analysis to focus on how speakers did show uptake because it is crucial for understanding how intertextual references are used as units of knowledge in the processes of constructing play frames and managing epistemics, which is the topic of the next section and will be expanded on in Chapter Six to address the topic of identity construction, as well.

5.4 Intertextuality, play frames, and epistemics

As people in everyday conversation signal and respond in conversation to intertextual media references, they often also create new play frames, as we have seen. According to Goffman, speakers ‘laminate’ or ‘embed’ frames within one another all the time in talk. He writes, “In truth, in talk it seems routine that, while firmly standing on two feet, we jump up and down on another” (1981:155). This speaks to the fact that people can engage in two activities simultaneously in conversation, and in this section, I show how
speakers in everyday conversation use intertextual media references to online memes as shared units of knowledge to construct laminated play frames which refer to the memes as well as the current activity at hand.

Addressing the details of frame lamination, Gordon (2002, 2008, 2009) argues that intertextuality and frames are fundamentally linked, and in particular her research has focused on play frames. Bateson (1972) posits that play is inherently paradoxical. Observing monkeys at play in the zoo, he writes “The playful nip denotes the bite, but it does not denote what would be denoted by the bite” (Bateson 1972:180). The bite is “not real,” but is also not “not real” (Bateson 1972; see also Shore 1996). Since play amongst monkeys and humans alike is ‘labile’ (Bateson 1972:182), or unstable, a serious frame can rapidly change into a play frame and vice versa.

Much of the work on play frames has been carried out in the context of friend and family interaction. Hoyle (1993) examines play frames in two boys’ play talk (one of the boys is her son), where they reference real sports figures and arenas to construct play frames to give their ping-pong and basketball playing its character as a sportscasting event. Gordon’s (2002) work analyzes mother-child discourse involving play frames that make use of prior texts. She shows how frames are embedded within one another through uses of pitch, terms of address, and certain speech styles, and repetition of shared prior text. Sirota (2002) examines how play and work frames in the interactions of two middle-class American families “shade almost imperceptibly into one another” (1). She finds that speakers laminate play frames over housework through using pitch, gesture, laughter, and intertextual repetition as contextualization cues. Gordon (2008) builds on Sirota’s study and describes how parents blend work and play frames with their children, and Gordon (2009) describes how family members use intertextuality to create overlapping and embedded frames. Tannen (2006) also examines intertextuality and framing in family
discourse, analyzing how a couple’s arguments about domestic responsibilities are rekeyed and reframed over the course of one day. She found that “restoring harmony was accomplished in part by reframing in a humorous key, and in ways that reinforced the speakers’ shared family identities” (2006:597). The use of humorous reframing and rekeying to restore harmony in conversation can be linked to M. Goodwin’s (1996) finding that shifting frames works to solve interactional dilemmas.

Trester (2012) examines how intertextual play functions in the creation of new performance frames in an improv comedy group back stage to serve community reaffirmation. Trester applies Goffman’s (1961) work on ‘game moves’ as footing shifts that frame the emergence of a particular kind of play frame—a ‘game world’. This observation is also made by Bateson (1972), who writes that play “…usually communicates about something which does not exist” (182). These thoughts on play frames can also be connected with Chafe’s ‘pseudo-plausible worlds’ that cause people to laugh when they encounter them in interaction.

Many of the aforementioned studies recognize the role of knowledge in their data in creating meaning in interaction. For example, Tannen and Wallat (1987/1993) discuss ‘knowledge schemas’ (also the focus of Tannen 1979/1993) to refer to “participants’ expectations about people, objects, events and settings in the world” (60). Knowledge schemas shape behaviors and interpretations and Gordon (2015) summarizes that “in framing, [intertextuality] surfaces through participants’ knowledge schemas about how particular frames generally unfold” (2015:340). Gordon (2009) suggests that for frames to be successfully laminated in discourse, the speaker and the hearer both must recognize that some bit of language is being repeated; in other words, they must have knowledge about the prior text. Knowledge management—or epistemics—is important in intertextuality and framing.
Heritage (2012) has proposed that an ‘epistemic engine’ drives sequences of talk, so that any epistemic imbalance results in a sequence where speakers attempt to ‘equalize’ the imbalance. Raymond and Heritage (2006) show how epistemic stances are managed by two speakers in order to construct identities. CA scholars’ work on epistemics has focused primarily on dyadic interactions, and Heritage (2013b) points to the need consider epistemic ecologies. In the next section and in the next chapter, I will expand on what previous studies of intertextuality in interaction have mentioned in terms of the importance of knowledge in intertextual processes, and will show how speakers use intertextual media references to create of play frames in discourse while simultaneously managing group epistemics relevant to their specific epistemic ecologies, particularly when faced with interactional and epistemic dilemmas.

5.5 Intertextual media references can shift frame and epistemic territory

In the first half of this chapter, I showed how speakers participating in play frames around an intertextual media reference is the surest sign that they have thoroughly recognized and understood the reference — that it is indeed a shared prior text for the speakers involved. In this section, I will conduct an analysis of a longer example where speakers use media references to online memes to engage in play frames as a way to deal with an epistemic imbalance which drives an interactional dilemma. These shifts to play frames also coincide with epistemic shifts; in other words, speakers shift the knowledge territory, or epistemic territory (Heritage 2012; also see ‘epistemic domain’ in Stivers & Rossano, 2010) of the talk, which may also be considered part of the interactional dilemma itself. The main objective of this section is to show that these shifts, which occur both in the activity of the talk (the frame) and in the epistemic territory of the talk, can be considered as inter-related shifts that depend fundamentally on the shared prior text being
signaled and recognized by the speakers involved. Therefore, a key part of the argument is that shared prior texts, in this particular case, intertextual media references, are discursive units of epistemics that can be signaled, recognized, and picked up on by speakers and incorporated into what I am calling epistemic frame shifts, accomplishing complex interactional and epistemic work.

5.5.1 Online meme references in everyday face-to-face conversation

In this section, I analyze two examples from two separate conversations where friends reference different inter-related online memes. Varis and Blommaert (2015) define ‘memes’ as “often multimodal signs in which images and texts are combined” (8) and state that memes are “signs that have gone viral on the Internet” (1). Shifman (2012), in a relatively early study on YouTube memes, traces the word ‘meme’ to Richard Dawkin’s book *The Selfish Gene* (1976), where he makes an analogy with ‘gene’ as “small cultural units of transmission (...) which are spread by copying or imitation” (188). Since Shifman’s study, the topic of online memes has been explored increasingly by new media scholars (e.g., Bayerl & Stoynov 2014; Gal, Shifman, & Kampf 2015; Gonzalez-Polledo & Tarr 2014; Kligler-Vilenchik & Thorson 2015; Miltner 2014; Schifman 2014; Segev et al. 2014; Wiggins & Bowers 2015). While these studies situate their focus on the development and viral spread of online memes on the internet, no studies have yet begun to analyze how online memes can be appropriated as interactional resources in everyday conversations offline.

5.5.2 Strong independent black woman meme

The memes that speakers reference in the first conversation I analyze relate to the concept of the “sassy black woman” stock character frequently portrayed in films and TV shows. According to knowyourmeme.com, which at the time of writing is the best way to
glean information about the development of online memes, a Facebook page called “Being an independent black woman who don’t need no man” was launched on June 11th, 2011, gaining over 47,000 likes in the following three years. On August 6th, a Body Building Forums member created a thread with ASCII art (a graphic design technique that consists of pictures pieced together from printable computer characters) “strong black woman” copypasta (characters that can be copy and pasted on a computer). YouTuber Liz Charles uploaded a video on October 4th of a young white man saying, “I’m a strong black woman I don’t need no man,” which at the time of writing has over 58,000 views. On February 8th, 2012, Redditor karmanaut posted the ASCII copypasta to the circlejerk subreddit, receiving more than 3,200 up votes and 145 comments before being archived. On May 25th, a Quickmeme page titled “Strong Independent Black Woman” was created with an image of a black woman wagging her finger (see Figure 3 below). It is likely that this is the image speakers in my data are referring to in the example I analyze below (based on a playback interview) and as I will show, they use this reference to briefly shift the frame and epistemic territory of their talk.

![Image](https://quickmeme.com/)

**Figure 3.** “Strong independent black woman” meme, from quickmeme.com
5.5.2.1 Setting up the space for an epistemic frame shift

This excerpt is from a conversation that took place on a Friday night in the dining room at Dave’s house. Previous to this excerpt, Dave’s housemate Fred had told a story about one of Lana’s and Todd’s fierce Bengal kittens, Gaia, leaping onto him and knocking him over, which led to him and Lana joking about hypothetical scenarios where Gaia and their other Bengal kitten, Flynn, would kill the housemates. Dave had then switched to a more serious frame by commenting on how the aggressive kittens still needed the housemates in order to get into the basement of the house, which is continued in this excerpt, and opens up a space for an epistemic frame shift:

(13)

1  Fred  As long as we're useful to them, they let us live.
2  Sylvia Yeah.
3  Dave  Yep. Well, Flynn needs lovin'.
4  Lana  He [does. (high pitch)]
5  Dave  [Gaia on the other hand don't give a shit.

The frame in this excerpt is not as light-hearted, compared to the previous talk, which is apparent by the lack of laughter that had been prevalent preceding this excerpt. The touch of irony present when Fred says, “As long as we're useful to them, they let us live” (1) and my nonchalant “Yeah” (2) relate to Goffman’s (1974) observation that “…when activity that is untransformed is occurring, definitions in terms of frame suggest alienation, irony, and distance” (46). In this excerpt, the frame is ‘untransformed’, and the ‘irony’ creates a very subtle interactional dilemma that opens up space for a frame shift.

Dave, whether intentionally or not, opens up the potential for a frame shift with “Yep. Well, Flynn needs lovin’” (3), noticeably dropping the “g” in “loving,” which is a classic non-standard indexical marker of tough masculinity (e.g., Fischer 1958). Dave follows this up with a non-standard syntactic construction in “Gaia on the other hand don't
give a shit” (5), using “don’t” in place of “doesn’t,” which is also carries connotations of “toughness” and could possibly be associated with African American English (AAE) (although the construction itself is not actually a feature of AAE). His use of the specific swear word, “shit,” is another indexical marker of toughness or masculinity (Sierra & Simonson 2014). These subtle phonetic and syntactic choices are in all likelihood what trigger Lana in the next excerpt to reference the Strong Independent Black Woman meme in connection to describing the kitten Gaia, and the topic attrition due to no new information being exchanged results in a very brief epistemic play frame shift relating to the meme.

5.5.2.2 Creating an epistemic frame shift

Possibly ‘triggered’ (Jefferson 1978) by Dave’s use of non-standard syntax, Lana references the Strong Independent Black Woman meme, which constructs a very brief play frame, as well as a shift in epistemic territory, which simultaneously serve for group identity construction based on shared knowledge of the meme.

(14)

6  Fred  [Gaia knows only-
7  Lana⇒[Sh- hey, she’s “a strog independent..African woman.”
8  Sylvia  mh!
9  Dave  [Damn right she is.
10 Lana⇒[ (“She don’t need no man”)
11 Fred⇒[ (“Who don’t need no man”)

As Fred begins to take a turn at talk about the kitten Gaia (6), Lana overlaps him with “Sh- hey, she’s a strog independent..African woman” (7), haltingly referencing the Strong Independent Black Woman meme in relation to Gaia, but replacing the meme’s typical use of “black” with “African,” perhaps due to some discomfort in saying the word “black,” or in an attempt to be “politically correct” and reach instead for “African-American.” The meme is recognized by the group, and along with the shift in epistemics
required to “get” the joke, it also creates a fleeting play frame of ‘Gaia the cat is a strong independent black woman,’ as I laugh uncomfortably in recognition (8), Dave contributes, “Damn right she is” (9), and both Lana and Fred say something like “She don’t need no man” which is difficult to hear due to overlap of the three speakers and their laughter particles within their talk. This brief epistemic play frame shift may serve as ‘phatic communion’ (Malinowski 1923/1936), or for social bonding. In other words, this epistemic play frame shift serves functions of interpersonal involvement (Tannen 1984/2005) and solidarity (Tannen 1993), ultimately constructing a group identity based on adequation, or similarity (Bucholtz & Hall 2005). This similarity is defined in part by being people who can reference online memes due to their Internet savvy, and also as people who playfully mock (but thereby also subtly reinforce) stereotypes of African American toughness by drawing on this particular meme to bond through mocking their kittens.

5.5.2.3 Breaking the play frame

The newly overlapped play frame requiring a shift in epistemic orientation is broken as Fred re-orient back to the real-life situation with an ironic tone, similar to how excerpt 1 began:

(15)

12 Lana (h) [(??)]
13 Fred [(She u:h..]
14 She knows only sarcasm and loathing.
15 Dave (yawww)
16 Lana Yeah.
17 Fred And mu:rd...r.
18 Lana Yeah...
19 Flynn needs only snuggles.

Fred had actually begun, presumably, to say “Gaia knows only sarcasm and loathing” in line 6 of excerpt 14, but he was overlapped with Lana and cut himself off, allowing the brief play frame and epistemic shift to occur with Lana’s meme reference. Here, he
demonstrates persistence, a feature of high-involvement conversational style (Tannen 1984/2005) taking his turn again: “She knows only sarcasm and loathing” (14)… “and mu:rd:er” (17). With this, the frame again returns to a detached one, with Dave yawning (15), Lana saying “Yeah” (16, 18) and after a long pause, “Flynn needs only snuggles” (19).

In sum, in analyzing this short example, I have shown how a group of friends briefly laminate a play frame over their talk, by referencing shared prior text from an online meme which simultaneously shifts the epistemic territory of the talk. This epistemic frame shift is brief because the interactional dilemma was subtle, and it did not grow out of an epistemic imbalance that would warrant an extended epistemic play frame shift (cf. Sierra 2016a and Chapter Six for epistemic imbalances and extended play frames). The next example I analyze, however, is evidence of a deeper epistemic imbalance underlying an interactional dilemma which also features topic attrition, and as such it results in an extended epistemic play frame shift, providing additional evidence that such a shift can be effective in resolving interactional dilemmas that occur due to epistemic imbalances in talk.

5.5.3 Skipping leg day memes

The memes speakers reference in the second conversation I analyze relate to the concepts of masculinity (more specifically, ‘bro culture’, or ‘curl-bro’ culture), weight-lifting, and ‘leg day’, or a day dedicated to lower body exercises in strength-building workout routines. According to knowyourmeme.com, discussions about “leg day” began in the early 2000s in online discussion forums on exercise. A Body Building Forums member uploaded a photo on July 22nd, 2012, of a man at the gym who appeared to have a bulky upper body but very thin legs with the caption “Friends don’t let friends skip leg day” (see Figure 4, below). The thread received 300 replies in the next two years. The caption made
use of the phrasal template “Friends Don’t Let Friends,” which is often used to discourage undesirable behaviors and is inspired by the 1983 anti-drunk driving public service announcement slogan “Friends don’t let friends drive drunk.” On January 3rd, 2013, College Humor published a set of photographs showing men with large upper bodies and thin legs in a post titled “6 People Who Skipped Leg Day.” On May 4th, 2013 the “Don’t Skip Leg Day” Facebook page was created, securing at least 37,000 likes in the following 10 months. On July 18th, 2013, a YouTube channel called BroScienceLife uploaded a video called “How to Skip Leg Day,” where host Dom Mazzetti goes through excuses often used to avoid leg workouts at the gym. The video gained over 1.7 million views and 1,800 comments in the first eight months it was online. This background information on the ‘skipping leg day meme’ is meant to demonstrate how this meme was produced online, circulated, and made its way to millions of internet users around the world, explaining how it gained such currency that it can be fluidly appropriated to instantiate an epistemic play frame shift a face-to-face conversation amongst friends in their mid to late 20s who could all be considered ‘digital natives’ (Tapscott 2009).
5.5.3.1 Setting up the need for an epistemic frame shift

The second excerpt I analyze occurred in a conversation on a Saturday at the shared group house of Dave, Fred, Lana, and Todd. I was over for a typical visit, and during this excerpt Dee, who was Fred’s new girlfriend at the time, also came to the house. I show how speakers signal and demonstrate recognition of intertextual media references to online memes here and use them to laminate a play frame on the conversation. This play frame lamination relies on simultaneously shifting the talk from a restricted epistemic territory with which only Todd and John can relate to a shared epistemic territory of online memes, allowing Fred and Lana to become actively involved in the conversation, while Dave, Dee, and I laugh at the humorous playful talk.
Prior to the beginning of this excerpt, Todd and his friend John are sitting at the dining room table painting miniature model rats for the board game “Myth,” while simultaneously commenting on a YouTube video they are watching on Todd’s laptop; in the video YouTuber Robbaz is playing the videogame “Kerbal Space Program” and flying an unusual cube-shaped spaceship that he made in the game. Lana, Dave, and I are also present at the table, when Fred and his new girlfriend Dee walked into the house — this is where the excerpt begins. It is relevant to the analysis to mention that Dee was still relatively unknown to the group at this time, and it is possible she had never even met John, since he did not live at the house like Dave, Fred, Lana, and Todd. I had met Dee on at least one other occasion but our encounter had been brief, as I assume was also the case for Dave, Lana, and Todd, although there is evidence in the following excerpt that Lana and Dee had some basic familiarity with each other, still only having met once or twice previously, probably very recently. Therefore, I argue that the following excerpt contains an epistemic imbalance and interactional dilemma, since when Fred and Dee walk into the house, Fred’s housemate Todd and his friend John are engaged in the peculiar and conspicuous activity of painting of miniature model rats while simultaneously commenting on a YouTube video being watched on a laptop, both of which are epistemically limiting to Fred and Dee (they are less so to Lana, Dave and me, as we had been sitting at the table for some time and were familiar with the context of both activities). Here, I analyze the talk of the interaction to show how it contains an epistemic and interactional dilemma with a disagreed upon frame which begs for a frame shift.
This excerpt is rather unusual and may be considered “awkward” in many ways. First, when Fred enters the dining room and says, “Oh hello” (line 1) his “Oh” indicates recognition that there are a group of people in the dining room and also perhaps surprise (see Schiffrin 1987 for analysis of “oh” as a discourse marker). The only person who greets Fred immediately is John, with the minimal and rhetorical “sup?” (line 2) while Lana meows (lines 4-5), mimicking her cat, Flynn, who had been meowing while hearing people at the door a few moments earlier. Then Lana switches her attention and greets either Fred or Dee, or possibly both, with “Hello” (line 6) and is latched by Dee with “Hello ag(h)ain!” (line 7), implying that perhaps the two had just seen each other earlier. Lana attempts to be friendly by asking Dee “How’s it going?” (line 10) but Dee never responds, and meanwhile Flynn’s paw gets caught in Lana’s hair and she makes sounds of pain (line 12).

Finally, Todd comments on the pair’s arrival by announcing in a playful formal tone with a lowered pitch “You have returned” (line 14), again providing evidence that Fred and Dee had been at the house earlier, probably before I arrived. In playback, Todd
told me he enjoys making dramatic announcements of this nature. However, then Todd and John both orient back to the Youtube video they are watching on the laptop (lines 15-18), which can be considered as epistemically isolating to the rest of the group, especially considering that the laptop was oriented towards Todd and John but away from most of the rest of the group. In this excerpt, the frame is ‘untransformed’; in other words, it is not clearly defined and has not yet shifted to a play frame, and I argue that the epistemic isolation and its resulting awkwardness is precisely what is driving the interactional dilemma which begs for a frame shift.

5.5.3.2 Creating a play frame with an epistemic shift

Fred confirmed in playback that he sensed the interactional dilemma here (I will expand more on this playback session in the discussion), and he begins to create a play frame trajectory in the following lines, by questioning and commenting playfully on the model rat-painting activity, invoking prior shared texts as he does so.

19 Fred → Painting all the miniatures?
20 Todd [How is it-
21 [We’re painting ^ra:ts today.
22 Sylvia [Rats!
23 Fred Ah(h)!
24 Todd We’re painting ^ra:ts today.
25 Fred→Today is ^ra: day.
26 Dave Hehheh[hehheh.
27 Fred→ [I forGO:T today [was ^ra: day.
28 Lana [It-

Fred indicates an epistemic imbalance as he attempts to enter into the epistemic ecology by asking Todd and John with a touch of irony (still in an untransformed frame), “Painting all the miniatures?” (line 19). In fact, this phrase itself is an intertextual media reference, although it is unlikely that the reference is ‘intentional’. The media it could be referring to is a popular image from the webcomic and blog Hyperbole and a Half, where the artist
Allie Brosh depicts herself excitedly shouting, "CLEAN ALL THE THINGS!" at the peak of her enthusiasm for doing chores. The reason the intentionality of the connection is unclear is because at the time of writing the phrase “(verb) all the (noun)” has become rather ubiquitous in everyday talk, as also evidenced in a recent undergraduate student’s transcript of a conversation where a participant said “You're the one, 'we can chi::ll? Let's smoke all the things?''' (used with permission from the student).

Todd begins commenting on the video again as Fred questions him, but cuts himself off (line 20) to answer Fred’s question, addressing the epistemic imbalance, with “We’re painting ^rats today” (line 21) and I also chime in with “Rats!” (line 22). Fred responds with “Ah(h)!" (line 23) showing a change of state (K- -> K+) with ab-receipt that acknowledges his relative lack of information (see Heritage 1984 & Schiffrin 1987 on ob) and amusement with his laughter token, and Todd repeats his response (line 24).

Although the initial epistemic imbalance has been somewhat resolved, the talk continues in a play frame that refers to the current situation as well as the leg day meme as the speakers continue to talk for the purpose of ‘phatic communion’. Fred has already begun to construct a play frame with his ironic tone (line 19) and laughter particle (line 25), and now he continues in that direction, creating phatic communion, by appropriating Todd’s answer and joking “Today is ^rat day” (line 25) and “I forGO:T today was ^rat day” (line 27). Fred explained in playback that he was eliciting a trope of “today is x day,” for example, as in “today is laundry day,” implying humorously that “rat day” is a normal part of the household’s weekly activities. Dave showed recognition of this trope with his laughter (line 26).

In this excerpt then, Fred is shifting the epistemic territory of the talk, by entering into the epistemically isolating activity that is taking place (painting rats). While in regards to this activity he has relatively little knowledge, he is able to appropriate talk about it and
combine it with other epistemic territories by invoking prior shared texts of well-known memes and tropes, which also begin develop a play frame in the interaction. The shift to this play frame includes what Schiffrin (1993) observed as a possible characteristic of frame shifts, that is, “radically different topic structures and participant orientations” (251). Whereas in excerpt 12 (lines 15-18) and again in excerpt 13 (line 20), Todd and John had been oriented towards the video they were watching and their topic of talk related to it, Fred’s shift of frame in excerpt 13 introduces a new topic structure regarding the miniature model rats, and now Fred, Dave, Todd, and I, and as we will see next, Lana, all orient towards this new topic. The fact that more speakers become involved also shows that the epistemic territory is shifting along with the frame.

Now that a play frame trajectory has been established by Fred, Lana joins in the phatic communion, using a specific media reference which assumes shared epistemic access to online memes regarding the importance of ‘leg day’, or lower body workouts.

(18)

29 Lana→It’s LIKE [“LE:G DAY.”
30 Dave [YOU SHOULD’VA KNOWN, FRE:D!
31 Fred I’m ^SO:rry!
32 →[I forgot rat day.
33 John→[You ^NE:VER skip ^RA:T day,
34 what are you doi:ng.
35 Fred <Ne(H)ver skip r- >
36 Dee Ha.
37 Fred→FRIENDS don’t LE(h)T [FRIE:NDS [skip rat day.
38 Dee [Ha!
39 Lana→ [skip rat [day.
40 Dave [heh][heh][haha
41 Sylvia [hehheh
42 Lana [Exactly.

Building on Fred’s jokes about “rat day” (Excerpt 7; lines 25,27) Lana now participates in the play frame of ‘today is “rat day”,’ drawing on her knowledge schema about play frames to make a connection to an online meme with, “It’s LIKE ^ ‘LE:G DAY’” (line 29), producing the utterance loudly and lengthening the vowel in “LE:G” to draw attention to
this intertextual media reference. In playback, Lana said that she had recently run into Fred as he was preparing to go to the gym, and he had told her about ‘leg day’ and its associated memes, which explains her exuberance at the chance to introduce the shared prior text here. While Dave overlaps Lana with “YOU SHOULD’A KNOWN, FRE:D” (line 30), Fred responds, “I’m ^SO:rry! I forgot rat” day (line 31-32), mock-apologizing and repeating part of his earlier joke “I forgot today was rat day” (excerpt 7; line 27) in a new format, acknowledging Lana and Dave’s contributions to the epistemic play frame shift and continuing to engage in it, perhaps as a sort of role play where he is guilty of skipping “rat day,” similar to how the online meme places guilt on those who skip ‘leg day’.

Next, John becomes involved in the newly created play frame. He clearly demonstrates understanding of the intertextual media reference that Lana appropriated, “It’s LIKE ^ ‘LE:G DAY” (line 29), and drawing from his knowledge schema about the leg day meme, shows competence in the epistemic territory with the loudly spoken admonition to Fred, “You ^NE:VER skip ^RA:T da: y, what are you doi:ng” (lines 33-34), lengthening the vowels in “NE:VER” and “RA:T da:y” to signal yet another component of the online ‘leg day’ meme. Fred begins to repeat John laughingly, “Ne(H)ver skip r-” (line 35), but cuts himself off as Dee laughs (line 36). Fred begins again loudly, drawing from his knowledge about this specific online meme with “FRIENDS don’t LE(h)T FRIE:NDS skip rat day” (line 37), which could be considered an other-initiated other-repair (Schegloff, Jefferson, and Sacks 1974) of John (line 33). Fred’s turn is overlapped with Dee’s laughter (line 38) and by Lana, who also fills in the formula with “skip rat day” (line 39). This reference elicits laughter as a sign of recognition and understanding of the intertextual media reference from Dave and I (lines 40,41), and Lana affirms the reference with “Exactly” (line 42). In this excerpt, Fred, Lana, and John have successfully created a
humorous play frame of ‘today is “rat day”’ that resolved an epistemic imbalance and interactional dilemma.

5.5.3.3 Breaking the play frame

Perhaps lacking the epistemic status to participate in the ‘skipping leg day’ meme talk, Todd attempts to turn the conversation back to the topic of the miniature model rats themselves, but Fred interrupts with a final meme reference (in line 45).

(19)

43 Todd Sylvia was over here being like,
44 "To:dd, (why don't you let me) paint some rats"
45 Fred→ [BRO:, do you even p[aint.
46 Dee [Haha][haha.
47 Dave [HA!
48 Lana→ (low pitch, quietly)Bro: do you [even pai:nt.
49 Video [(??)
50 Fred What is making that noise.
   [Conversation turns to the video playing on the laptop]

Todd orients away from the play frame and back towards the real-life situation of sitting at the table with the miniature model rats, making fun of my previously expressed disgust at the rats by teasing “Sylvia was over here being like, ‘To:dd, (why don’t you let me) paint some rats’” (lines 43, 44). However, Fred has thought of another intertextual media reference to make and ignores Todd, interrupting him, and attempting to continue the play frame with “BRO:, do you even paint” (line 45). According the knowyourmeme.com, the rhetorical question “Do You Even Lift?” is a “condescending expression used on body building and fitness forums to question the legitimacy of someone’s fitness expertise or weight lifting routine.” Its spread as an online meme follows a similar path to the ‘skipping leg day’ meme I described earlier. In excerpt 19, Fred begins this expression with “Bro,” which is also common online (a Google Image Search of the phrase provides a plethora of examples) and replaces “lift” with “paint,” referring to painting the rats, and extending the
play frame, which laminates online meme culture over an everyday activity. Dee shows recognition, or at least appreciation, of this reference, laughing more than she has previously (line 46) and Dave bursts into a single loud “HA!” (line 47). Lana demonstrates recognition by repeating Fred quietly, and perhaps ‘savoring’ (Tannen 1989/2007:72) his words with a lowered pitch (as if imitating a man’s, or a ‘bro’s’ voice) (line 48). The play frame abruptly ends when Fred hears the video that Todd and John have been watching (lines 49, 50) and asks “What is making that noise” (line 51); the conversation turns to Todd explaining the video to Fred.

An interesting aspect of this excerpt that deserves more attention is the fact that Dee was relatively new to the group, which played a role in the awkward beginning of the interaction, and was then resolved by the epistemic frame shift. Perhaps even more interesting is that during playback, Fred provided some evidence that he was somewhat aware of using his conversational moves to do phatic-interactional and epistemic work to make things less awkward. After listening to the excerpt and discussing it at some length, Fred said, “I guess what I was going for was a way to make it a humorous situation in which everyone could participate and be put at ease.” Fred’s reference to a “humorous situation” can be interpreted as the play frame I analyzed, and his desire that “everyone could participate” speaks to the shared epistemic territory drawn upon for the intertextual media references. Finally, his claim that he wanted everyone to “be put at ease” speaks to the fact that there was indeed an interactional dilemma that Fred was attempting to resolve through his phatic contributions to the conversation.

While Fred seems to have been successful in putting himself, Lana, and John at ease, as they were the speakers who most actively contributed to the epistemic frame shift, there is less evidence that Dee recognized or understood the intertextual media references, which means she may have lacked epistemic access to fully appreciate the play frame.
When I asked Fred in playback if Dee knew about the “skipping leg day meme,” he told me he was not sure, and he said he had never talked with her about it previous to this interaction.

Therefore, while my analysis has focused primarily on group dynamics, there is some evidence here that Fred was creating a play frame more as a solution to his own awkward dilemma of introducing a girlfriend to a group of his nerd friends, rather than as an effective resolution to the group’s wider interactional dilemma. Yet another way of interpreting this interaction is that Fred, John, and Lana made ‘game moves’ to enter into a performative ‘game world’ (Goffman 1961) to serve for their own community reaffirmation (Trester 2012), or group identity construction as people who know the same online memes and mock (but also thereby, subtly reinforce) certain ideologies of masculinity as reflected in the memes (in this sense, this interaction could actually be analyzed as one that unintentionally excluded Dee).

5.6 Summary: Intertextual media references and epistemic frame shifts

In this section, I have begun to incorporate my findings on how uses of intertextual media references are signaled by speakers and shown to be understood by interlocutors in an instance where participants signal references and use them as a way to build an epistemic play frame shift to resolve an epistemic imbalance underlying an interactional dilemma. I showed how two awkward interactions without clear frames, the latter one involving an epistemic imbalance that created an interactional dilemma for speakers, opened up opportunities for epistemic frame shifts, and how these shifts relied heavily on the signaling and recognition of intertextual media references to online memes. In these examples, speakers primarily signal their intertextual media references through exaggerated loudness and vowel lengthening, while laughter, repetition, and explicit
affirmation are all in evidence of recognition and understanding of the references, along with some of the speaker’s participation in play frames around the references. These light-hearted play frames diffuse the tension of the original situation, and their transformation is dependent on the intertextual references themselves which allow the epistemic territory of the talk to change to a topic to which at least most of the speakers have epistemic access, and in turn which contributes to their shared group identity construction as people who know the same online memes and mock certain social stereotypes that are built into the memes. In sum, I have expanded on what previous studies of intertextuality in interaction have mentioned regarding knowledge of speakers in intertextual processes, and I have shown how speakers use intertextual media references as epistemic units to create play frames when they are faced with interactional dilemmas, a conversational move I have called epistemic frame shifts, while they simultaneously manage group epistemics.

5.7 Discussion

This section has demonstrated how double-voiced intertextual media references can be used to engage in play frames which do both interactional and epistemic work. Building on frames theory (Bateson 1972, Goffman 1974, Goodwin 1996, Gordon 2002, 2008, 2009, Tannen 1989/2007, Tannen 2006, Tannen & Wallat 1987/1993), and specifically work on play frames (Hoyle 1993, Sirota 2002, Gordon 2002, 2008, Trester 2012), I have brought frames, as well as interactional sociolinguistic work on intertextuality, in dialogue with the conversation analytic work on epistemics. Drawing from Raymond and Heritage’s (2006) analysis of the epistemics of social relations, heeding both Heritage’s (2013b) call for work on epistemic ecologies and van Dijk’s (2012) call for an epistemic discourse analysis, I have shown how a close analysis of discourse which engages frames theory, intertextuality, and epistemics illuminates that intertextual references are a unit of knowledge.
management which are signaled, responded to, and called upon as resources in laminating frames and managing group epistemics.

I lastly want to make a note about what this analysis may demonstrate about the identities of the participants when it comes to their internet savvy. Through my research on the online memes that they invoked in this conversation, I became aware that these memes reached their peak popularity in 2013. Yet this conversation took place in 2015. This indicates that these speakers, who are in their mid to late twenties, could actually be a bit “behind the curve” when it comes to popular online memes, although I had described them earlier as ‘digital natives’. While I still think that they can be classified as digital natives, since they grew up with the internet, it is interesting to observe that they were probably using slightly out-dated memes in this conversation because they are not people who spend a lot of time in online discussion forums, where these memes were originally generated and circulated. Therefore, these participants can be considered as people who became aware of these memes “second-hand,” probably through images posted on Facebook, Buzzfeed, or similar websites, and in Lana’s case, through Fred in a prior face-to-face conversation. Still, their knowledge of these memes does contribute to their unique epistemic ecology as people who can almost effortlessly infuse their talk with such intertextual online media references, and these references also indicate a group mockery or dismissal of stereotypical portrayals of African American femininity along with curlbro culture and its macho ideology. The group identity of these friends is further explored in the next chapter, where I examine how they construct their epistemic ecology through intertextual media references to videogames, again doing both interactional and epistemic work through the lamination of play frames on their talk.
6.1 Introduction

In Chapter Four I focused on the contextualization cues that signal intertextual references to media, and in Chapter Five I showed how such references are responded to or shown to be understood by listeners, developing a framework for conceptualizing intertextual references as resources that can be used to make epistemic frame shifts, especially when speakers are faced with knowledge imbalances and often related interactional dilemmas. In this chapter, I investigate how speakers use media references as epistemic resources in play frames to manage group identity construction in interaction. I examine how the group of American friends in their mid-twenties use what Becker (1994) calls a ‘shared repertoire of prior texts’ from videogames to ‘play out loud’ in their everyday conversations (cf. Tovares 2012 on ‘watching out loud’), balancing their differing epistemic territories, while simultaneously shifting frame. Heeding Hamilton’s (1996) call for an intertextual analysis of identity construction and van Dijk’s (2013) call for an epistemic discourse analysis, I draw on Tannen’s (2006) analysis of reframing and rekeying, Gordon’s (2009) analysis of overlapping and embedded frames, and Raymond and Heritage’s (2006) analysis of epistemics in identity construction, demonstrating how intertextual references in talk can be resources used for epistemic frame shifts that are conducive to group identity construction.

I demonstrate how speakers use shared videogame references for epistemic management while simultaneously rekeying serious talk about ‘real-life’ issues (such as work and money) to lighter, humorous talk which reframes such issues as being part of a lived videogame experience. Specifically investigating how the reframing occurs, I
elaborate on Gordon’s (2009) descriptions of overlapping and embedded frames. I argue that when speakers shift talk from restricted epistemic territories about individual life experiences to shared epistemic territories relating to videogames, they simultaneously create overlapping play frames, which are strengthened by embedded frames containing constructed dialogue. This allows different group members to be involved in conversation as well as active in constructing their identities as individuals, friends, and members of a specific ‘epistemic ecology’.

In this chapter, I start by giving a brief overview of how intertextuality has been applied to examine media texts, primarily from television, in everyday interaction. In Section 6.3, I provide background information on the videogame Papers, Please (Pope 2013), then analyze conversations where speakers draw upon texts from this videogame. This is followed by background on the videogame The Oregon Trail (Rawitsch, Heinemann, & Dillenberger 1985) in Section 6.4, along with analysis of a conversation where speakers appropriate texts from this game as intertextual resources to manage frames, epistemics, and group identity as ‘nerds’ (see also Bucholtz 1999 on a group of a ‘nerd girls’) who enjoy playing videogames and referencing them in their talk. I lastly discuss in Section 6.5 the main contributions of this chapter: showing how intertextual references can be used to make epistemic frame shifts when speakers encounter epistemic imbalances and interactional dilemmas, which is ultimately conducive to group identity construction.

### 6.2 Media texts in everyday conversation

Since Becker made the observation that conversation is a ‘replay’ of remembered media texts (cited in Tannen 1989/2007:55), many investigations have suggested that television texts are part of the cultural repertoire (e.g., Bryce & Leichter 1983; Lull 1990; Spigel 1992, 2001; Bryant & Bryant 2001). Tovares (2006; 2007; 2012) has analyzed how
television texts function in everyday conversations. She writes, “family and friends creatively recycle television texts to create, test, and negotiate alignments, discuss private issues without getting personal, entertain one another, and reaffirm their relationships, values, and beliefs” (Tovares, 2006: 8). Tovares (2012) analyzes how adult members of two families draw on the show *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire* to create family involvement, construct certain identities (as knowledgeable), create alignments, socialize their children, and provide entertainment.

Linguistic research on videogames has so far focused on issues such as the gendered cultural discourses of the games (e.g., Thornborrow 1997), how children talk about videogames in classroom settings (e.g., Lacasa, Martinez, & Mendez. 2008) and whether game play contributes to literacy (e.g., Apperley 2010; Berger & McDougall 2013), especially in a second language-learning environment (e.g., Lim & Holt 2011; Hitosugi, Schmidt, & Hayasi 2014). A few studies examine the actual game form and how players interact with the games and each other while playing (e.g., Mondada 2012; Piirainen-Marsh 2012; Varenne, Andrews, Hung, & Wessler 2013). A notable gap exists in the literature pertaining to everyday conversations where speakers are not playing videogames, but where the talk is nonetheless infused with videogame references.

### 6.3 *Papers, Please* in conversation

As I have mentioned, at the beginning of data collection for this study, I did not have an objective in collecting a particular kind of talk. However, Tovares’ (2012) work on how a TV show served as an intertextual resource in family conversations inspired my noticing of how Dave’s housemates frequently used videogames as intertextual resources in their conversations. As we glimpsed in Chapter Five when Todd and his friend John were painting miniature figurine rats for *Myth* , Todd had a distinct passion for
boardgames, which Fred, Lana, and Dave also partook in occasionally, but in addition, the housemates were all avid videogame players. Fred, Todd, and Lana frequently played games with each other on their phones, while Todd and Lana also played games on the PlayStation and Wii in the basement. In addition, Fred, Todd and Dave played videogames at their personal computers in their respective bedrooms. In the front sitting room, Lana had painted a mural on the wall facing the entrance to the house depicting all the housemates, as well as Lana and Todd’s two kittens, as videogame characters (see Figure 5). Arguably then, these housemates can be characterized, in part, by their love for playing videogames, which contributes to a shared ‘nerd’ identity also constructed via their discourse with one another as members of this unique epistemic ecology.

![Figure 5. Mural of the housemates as videogame characters, painted by Lana](image)

One recorded conversation amongst the housemates and me stood out for its rich use of videogame references; that conversation is the first one analyzed in this chapter (Conversation 1: Papers, Please). I then began to notice when the housemates used videogame references when I was not recording, so I started to supplement my recorded data with notes about conversations where videogame texts seemed to function the same
way as the initial instance I had recorded, consulting with Dave to maintain accuracy in recalling the details. Eventually, I recorded another conversation between Dave and his close friend from high school, Allen (not a housemate), and me with videogame references, which is the second excerpt I analyze in this chapter (Conversation 3: The Oregon Trail).

6.3.1 Background on *Papers, Please*

*Papers, Please* is a videogame released in 2013. It focuses on the psychological toll of working as an immigration officer in the fictional dystopian country of Arstotzka. The player is assigned the job of immigration officer through a job lottery, and the main task is to inspect arrivals’ documents at a checkpoint booth, similar to the checkpoints separating East and West Berlin during the Cold War. If the player discovers discrepancies in the documents, the applicant must be interrogated, and may be arrested when the player hits the ‘detain’ button, which triggers a shutter at the checkpoint booth to slam shut. If this happens, “Prostet” is heard and a speech bubble on the screen from the guards’ mouths translates this to ‘Out’. A second speech bubble coming from the player’s mouth says, “You should not have come.” At times, applicants, like the character “Jorji,” notorious for forging false documents (see Figure 6, below), may attempt to bribe the player. If the player makes few mistakes, they may receive a plaque for ‘sufficiency’, which they can hang on their wall. Mistakes made and number of people processed in a given amount of real time representing a single day in the game affect the player’s pay in ‘credits’. The player has to make decisions about how to cover basic expenses like rent, heat, and food for the family, as well as medical bills and birthday presents. The player is often faced with moral dilemmas about whom to let in the country, whether or not to accept bribes, and how to spend their credits. The workdays become more stressful as relations between Arstotzka and nearby countries deteriorate, and increasingly complicated guidelines are
given for document inspections. The game has become popular since its release and has won many awards, being praised for its sense of immersion and the intense emotional reaction it creates. The game’s immersive emotional experience may lend itself to being used as a resource drawn upon for managing social relations in the conversations I have collected, especially considering the shared experience that Dave, Todd, Fred, another friend, Todd’s brother, and I had playing the game together in the basement of the shared house a few weeks before I began recording.

![Screenshot of Papers Please videogame. Here the player must deny or approve Jorji Costava’s fake passport.](image)

6.3.2 Papers, Please references in audio-recorded conversation

In this section, I describe instances of talk where speakers reference the videogame Papers, Please in their everyday conversations. The first excerpt I analyze is from a lively conversation on a Saturday night at the shared group house, in the dining room (Conversation 1: Papers, Please). The participants were Dave, Lana, and Fred (housemates); I was also present. I argue that speakers make references to Papers, Please here to rekey serious talk about money to a humorous key by adding an overlapping frame
of a real-life videogame experience. This rekeying and reframing relies on shifting the talk from a restricted epistemic territory with which only the Ph.D. students can relate (all present except Fred), to the shared epistemic territory of the videogame experience, allowing Fred to be involved in the conversation as well. This equalizing of epistemic status is conducive to group involvement and identity construction.

6.3.3 Setting up the need for an epistemic frame shift

Previous to this excerpt, we had been joking about the word ‘intertextuality’, since Lana and I had both been reading up on it (she for a paper, I for a seminar in the topic). I had commented that in my seminar, my professor had proposed an activity called ‘Intertextuality in the wild’ where students could discuss events related to intertextuality outside of the classroom, but that I didn’t think she saw it “going this far” (meaning that we would be joking about the word itself to such an extent). The excerpt starts with me saying “Intertextuality ^gone wi:ld,” making a reference to the adult entertainment commercials for Girls Gone Wild. Soon the conversation (in line 3) turns to the Ph.D. students’ receipt of their payment stipends.

(1)

1 Sylvia  Intertextuality : “^gone wi:ld”:..
2 Dave    WO[OO! REFERENCES! Woo!
3 Lana    [hahaha speaking of gone wild, we got ^PAI:D!
4 Sylvia  [Oh yeah, ^finally:!
5 Dave    [Yeah, I know, right?

After my reference to the commercials (line 1), Dave imitates them and calls attention to the topic of intertextuality, yelling loudly, “WOOO! REFERENCES! Woo!” (line 2) (the commercials often featured girls yelling “Wooo!”). Then, Lana, after laughing and perhaps relating ‘going wild’ with having money, says, “speaking of gone wild, we got ^PAI:D!” (line 3), referring to the fact that our first stipend checks of the academic year had been
deposited earlier that day. Here, Lana changes the frame from joking about the word ‘intertextuality’ to the frame of talking about being recently paid. Her loudness on “PAI:D” along with the elongation of the tonal nucleus effectively elicit the other two students’ responses to this topic. I respond “Oh yeah, finally:!” (line 4), showing a change of mental state with “oh” (following Schiffrin’s 1987 of “oh” as a discourse marker), orienting myself to this new topic, aligning with Lana’s excitement, and implying that this payment was overdue with “^finally:.” Dave overlaps with me, saying, “Yeah, I know, right?” (line 5). Both Dave’s and my “yeahs” align with Lana and show evidence of our equal epistemic statuses relating to this topic. Raymond & Heritage (2006) write that a tag question indicates a downgraded epistemic stance, and Dave’s “I know, right?” also demonstrates alignment and solidarity with Lana.

Having received these responses from Dave and me, Lana takes another turn, continuing the frame change and also rekeying the conversation to be more serious.

(2)

Lana God, I can pay my fucking rent.
Sylvia That [first check always seems so delayed.
Lana [The- our (stipends came late?)

Lana’s “God, I can pay my fucking rent” (line 6) stood out to me at the time of recording, as it does now, as relatively marked; its serious and tense tone, as well as notable lack of overlap stands out in what had been a very light-hearted conversation filled with laughter and simultaneous talk. In playback, Lana told me that at the time, she was running out of her summer job money and was hoping to avoid asking her parents for money. Lana’s utterance here abruptly rekeys the previously playful frame (making fun of the term ‘intertextuality’) and furthers the serious frame of talking about money. She accomplishes this through various contextualization cues: the tone of voice, the exasperated oath “God,” the expletive “fucking,” and the semantic content of the statement itself, which relays that
the reason Lana was so enthusiastic about being paid was because she needed to pay rent.

I take up this serious key, aligning with Lana by commenting that the first check “always seems so delayed” (line 7). Then Lana explains to Fred that our stipends came late (line 8).

The fact that only the three graduate students (Lana, Dave, and I) could participate in the more serious talk regarding the epistemic territory of graduate stipend checks clearly demonstrates that there is a knowledge imbalance among the three of us and Fred, and the resulting interactional dilemma in this sequence of talk opens up a space for an epistemic frame shift which would allow Fred to participate in the conversation.

### 6.3.4 Creating an overlapping play frame with an epistemic shift

Next, Fred responds to Laura’s explanation that the stipends arrive late (line 8) with ‘Borat’ voicing, perhaps attempting to rekey the serious conversation back to its original playful tone (Fred confirmed in playback that he was referencing Sacha Baron Cohen’s character, Borat Sagdiyev, a fictitious Kazakh journalist, in the 2006 mockumentary comedy film *Borat*):

(3)

9 Fred (Borat voice)Ye:s. Ye:s.
10 Lana (Borat voice)Yes. Yes. Hahaha.
11 Fred (Borat voice)Ye:s. It’s nice.

The rekeying arguably begins with the Borat voice used by Fred “Ye:s. Ye:s” (line 9), and Lana “Yes. Yes. hahaha.” (line 10) and then Fred again “Ye:s. It’s nice.” (line 11). The Borat voice leads into references to the videogame *Papers, Please*, simultaneously initiating an epistemic shift and an overlapping play frame with the metamessage of ‘we are living a videogame we have played.’
‘Triggered’ by the Borat voice Lana and Fred had just been using, I was reminded of the videogame *Papers, Please*, which draws heavily from life in the Soviet Union and East Germany. Perhaps responding to the interactional dilemma of the key and frame becoming so serious around money, I say, “We have been paid by ‘Arsto:tzka’” (line 12), referring to the fictional country in *Papers, Please* and making an implicit comparison between our academic department and Arstotzka’s bureaucratic government. This game move introduces a game world, and the hypothetical narrative develops an overlapping frame of ‘we are living a videogame that we have all played’ over the frame of ‘we are talking about real life’. Following Gordon (2009), I suggest that the intertextual references to the videogame create overlapping frames – two simultaneous definitions of the situation: the participants are engaged in talking about getting paid in real life, but in using intertextual references to discuss this, they are also simultaneously playing that they are living a videogame they have played in the past.

After a short but perceptible silence, perhaps trying to understand the connection, both Fred and Lana laugh (lines 13,14). Whereas Fred had been silent while the three students discussed stipend checks (only participating with his Borat voice after Lana’s explanation of the topic), now Fred becomes much more involved in the conversation, presumably since the epistemic territory has been shifted to discourse about *Papers, Please*, of which Fred has knowledge. Fred draws from his knowledge schema on play frames and on the videogame itself, and makes a game move to begin a ‘role play’ (see also Gordon 2002; 2009 on role plays), saying “You received some ‘credits’ for processing the language”
(line 13). In this way, he elaborates on the overlapping play frame by referring to our payment as ‘credits’, the monetary unit used in Papers, Please, and jokingly describing our work as linguists as “processing the language,” an overly formal, ‘newspeak’ way of describing our work, reminiscent of how jobs are described in the videogame (for example, the border control agent’s job is ‘processing people’), causing both Lana and me to laugh (lines 14, 15).

The laughter in these lines signals that the conversation has been rekeyed, “indicat[ing] a change of emotional stance” (Tannen 2006: 601). As Chafe (2001: 42) writes, laughter conveys non-seriousness. Here reference to this game world contributes to ‘shared hilarity’ (Chafe 2001), where all participants find the game world funny. With the overlapping play frame, the conversation has been rekeyed from serious, even frustrated, to light-hearted and funny. Fred continues this overlapping and rekeyed play frame with, “You’re lucky you drew this jo:b in the la:bor lottery” (line 16), referring to how, in Papers Please, the player is assigned their job as a border control agent via a labor lottery. Notice how words like “credits” (line 13), “jo:b” (line 16), and “la:bor” (line 16) still contain remnants of the real-life frame about being paid, and these contribute to both the overlapping play frame while still anchoring the talk in the real-life frame about money and work.

6.3.5 Creating an embedded frame in an overlapping frame with a more specific epistemic shift

Lana participates in the overlapping play frame by introducing an embedded frame, which strengthens the overlapping play frame as it moves the speakers further into the game world and further away from the original real-life frame. She constructs an embedded frame with a more specific metamessage by moving into an even more specific
epistemic territory of the videogame, referring to a particular character, Jorji, in *Papers, Please*, joking that the credits came from him, and then voicing him.

(5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Speech</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>THEY ALL CAME FROM JORJI. JORJI'S LIKE “HE:Y!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>Yeah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>“He:Y.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>[So-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>“I MAKE A PASSAPO:RT[A:]!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>[Hahahaha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lana contributes a game move, saying, “THEY [the credits] ALL CAME FROM JORJI” (line 17). Jorji is the disheveled elderly man shown in Figure 6 who is known for appearing throughout the game at the checkpoint with false documents, like a passport, for example (line 21). With this specification of the epistemic orientation towards the game world, the ‘remnants’ of the real life frame about being paid, which were present up to this point in the overlapping frame, start to fall away — the only anchor to the real life frame is in “they all came from Jorji” (line 17), where *they* refers to the ‘credits’, but after this no other ties link back to the real life frame about being paid. Further epistemic orientation towards the game world is accelerated when Lana introduces an embedded frame by constructing a voice for Jorji, with “HE:Y!” (line 17) “I MAKE A PASSAPO:RTA:!” (line 21). This constructed dialogue (Tannen 1989/2007) evokes Jorji specifically because of the choice of phonetic detail, which contributes to ‘depictive delivery’ (Clark & Gerrig 1990) of the character. The loudness of “HE:Y!” (line 17), perhaps portraying the overly friendly attitude of Jorji, as well as the inserted and elongated vowels in “PASSAPO:RTA:” (line 21), adds a sense of ‘foreign-ness’ to his voice. All of this requires very specific epistemic access to a single character in the game, and constructs an embedded frame with a metamessage of ‘I am playing Jorji.’ Embedded within the overlapping play frame, Lana (and briefly, Dave) enact Jorji’s character — so they are living the role of Jorji for that fleeting moment. Also note that making a passport is
completely unrelated to the original frame about being paid. In sum, this embedded frame of ‘Jorji is present in our life as a videogame’, with its very specific epistemic orientation, brings the conversation even further into the overlapping play frame of ‘we are living a videogame’, with very little remnants of the original real life frame.

Note that while Dave repeats “He:y” (line 19), he is relatively uninvolved throughout the construction of the play frame. In playback he said, “I don’t shift into those other frames a lot” and “I’m focused on getting real shit done” (i.e., focused on important practical issues in the ‘real world’). This suggests that willingness to participate in play frames may be linked to an individual’s conversational style (as described by Tannen 1984/2005), and we’ll see evidence of this again through Dave’s behavior in The Oregon Trail excerpt I analyze later.

6.3.6 Metacommentary and an epistemic shift breaks the overlapping play frame

Next Fred assigns specific character roles to all of us, using his epistemic access to the videogame to metacomment on the overlapping play frame.

(6)

23 Fred→So- Todd is your wi:fe and-
24 Lana  Haha
25 Sylvia  Hahaha
26 Fred→Dave is your mo:ther-in-la:w
27 Dave  Ha.
28 Sylvia  Hahaha.
29 Fred→And Sylvia is your so:n,
30 →and [I’m your..u:ncle or something.
31 Lana→ [Haha and you drew me a pictu:re hahaha.

Fred assigns Lana’s real-life partner, Todd, the role of Lana’s ‘wife’, (line 23); Dave is assigned the role of Lana’s “mo:ther-in-la:w” (line 26), I am Lana’s “so:n” (line 29), and Fred is “your..u:ncle or something” (line 30). These character roles are not chosen at random; in the game the player is always assumed to be male, and has a wife, a mother-in-
law, and a grandfather. In this portion of the conversation, then, Fred assigns us all salient familial roles from the game in relation to Lana, who is assigned to be the male player in this play frame. Dave, Lana and I laugh throughout this stretch of the conversation, maintaining the non-serious key and participating in the shared hilarity of the play frame. Interestingly, in assigning roles, Fred is not actually in the play frame, but he is commenting from outside of it (see Gordon 2002 for more on commenting from outside of play frames). Lana then builds on the family roles and acts within the play frame, again drawing on very specific knowledge about the game, when she says, “and you drew me a picture” (lines 31, 33), referring to part of the game where if the player makes enough money, they can buy a crayon set for their son, who then draws a picture, which the player can choose to hang up on the wall at the immigration office.

While Lana’s turns regarding the picture are voiced from within the play frame, I break the frame when I make a metacomment about our role-playing, drawing on epistemic access to the real world.

(7)

32 Sylvia I [love how-
33 Lana [You drew me a :picture(h):
34 Sylvia →We- we all have like opposite gender ro(h)les in thi(h)s haha
35 Fred Yeah! Ha.
36 Sylvia Ha|haha.
37 Lana [It is-
38 Fred I didn’t really= =It’s very ^:i:nterte(h)xtual [hahaha
39 Lana [I didn’t really think to-..
40 Fred ^Now we’re just using that word for ^everything!

My metacomment on how we all have “opposite gender ro(h)les in thi(h)s” (line 34) redirects our epistemic orientation towards our ‘real-life’ situation of enacting specific gender roles that do not match the game gender roles Fred has assigned. This turn, in effect, names the play frame and ruptures it (see Tannen 1984/2005 on how naming a
frame breaks it). The group returns to the previous frame that was active at the beginning of this excerpt, making fun of the word “intertextual” (lines 39, 41) for two solid minutes.

To sum up this example, all the speakers had originally participated in a play frame as they joked about the word “intertextuality,” but then abruptly shifted to a serious real-life frame, where the three students complained about their checks and rent. This left Fred out, but the frame was quickly transformed with speakers drawing on their knowledge schemas to create a humorous overlapping play frame, which defined the situation as, ‘we are living a videogame we have all played.’ This epistemic frame shift allowed Fred to become actively involved in the conversation. When Lana acted out Jorji’s role, the embedded frame that conveyed, ‘Jorji is present in this world’ further strengthened the overlapping play frame and kept the conversation moving in a playful and non-serious direction. The serious (and epistemically isolating) real-life talk of checks and rent was completely dropped, and speakers instead drew on their equal epistemic access to participate in a play frame, which also discursively constructed their shared group identity as friends bound by a shared previous experience and knowledge of shared prior texts.

6.3.7 Papers, Please references in other conversations

The same process can be seen in other similar examples of discourse, which I did not have the opportunity to audio record, but which I observed and then reconstructed in my notes. These examples provide evidence that this phenomenon of reframing interactional dilemmas and shifting epistemic floor with videogame texts, reinforcing group identity, is prevalent in this group of friends.

The first example occurred at a restaurant one Sunday afternoon and involved Dave, Fred, Todd and me. We had been remarking on how nice the restaurant was when Todd and Fred began to talk about a dicey situation at work. Todd is Fred’s supervisor,
and Fred and Todd recalled that they had conducted Fred’s performance review at this very restaurant; this led to a rekeying and reframing of the conversation. After the potentially uncomfortable topic of the hierarchical work relationship between Fred and Todd, and the specific recent performance review of Fred, Fred made a game move. He constructed an overlapping play frame, still anchored in the real life frame, saying, “I needed my plaque of sufficiency — I’ll go hang it on my wall.” These are references to Papers, Please, where the player receives a “plaque of sufficience” for their work, and has the option to hang it on their wall. This recycling of shared prior videogame text functioned to reframe and rekey the conversation from serious work matters between Fred and Todd (talk about the performance review), to a non-serious, fun videogame experience which elicited laughter from Dave and me (outsiders to Fred and Todd’s shared work experience), since we had played Papers, Please and had equal epistemic access to it. Recycling, reframing and rekeying in this instance shifted the conversation to a lighter key through creating an overlapping play frame. The reframing depended on correcting an epistemic imbalance in the conversation, which reinforced the shared group identity of the friends.

A few weeks after this example, I observed an awkward instance where Dave attempted to recycle the exact same reference in conversation, possibly trying to spark a play frame for me to analyze. In a conversation in the dining room, where there was no epistemic or interactional dilemma, Dave randomly asked Fred if he ever received his “plaque of sufficience” at work (note that it is also possible that Dave did not use any of the signaling mechanisms I observed in Chapter Four). Fred seemed caught off guard and gave a minimal response of “yeah.” He did not engage in the new play frame as is typical in the other examples. This failed attempt to introduce a play frame provides evidence that these videogame references occur at specific points in conversation where interactional
dilemmas exist, often driven by epistemic imbalances. They serve particular functions of managing group epistemics, as well as rekeying and reframing unpleasant conversations, which ultimately serve for group identity affirmation.

The next example occurred on a Sunday evening in the shared group house, in Dave’s room. Dave was sitting at his desk; I was sitting on a couch, while Fred and Todd were standing at the door. Dave, who takes responsibility for the house finances and collects everyone’s rent checks each month, had just told Fred that his rent check was rejected at the bank because the date on the check was wrong. To negotiate this awkward interactional dilemma, Fred made a game move to rekey, reframe, and adjust the epistemic territory of the conversation. He suggested that the bank acted as the videogame officer, saying, “I just imagine that you gave them the check and they went into ‘inspection mode’ and were like ‘date discrepancy’ and hit the ‘detain button’.” To rekey and reframe the serious conversation about his rent check, Fred used this game move to initiate an overlapping, imaginary frame that this mistake was dealt with in a game world, where the bank went into ‘inspection mode’. He clearly shifted to a play frame, and he then embedded a frame within the overlapping play frame, using ‘choral dialogue,’ or as Tannen 1989/2007 writes, dialogue that represents a group of people, to represent the bank, which he voices saying “Date discrepancy,” another shared prior text lifted from the game, and hitting the ‘detain button’, yet another prior text. In this single utterance Fred effectively reframed and rekeyed the previously serious conversation to a play frame, which was achieved by making a game move that signaled ‘we are living a videogame’ which overlapped with the real life frame, and even created an embedded frame with specific prior texts from the game.

This reframing also facilitated Todd’s involvement. Previous to this, Todd had not been involved in the conversation, but had been listening in and playing a game on his
phone while standing in the doorway. This is understandable, since the rent check issue involved Dave, who managed household finances, and Fred, who committed the rent check error. With the new reframing however, which appealed to the shared prior knowledge that all three share about Papers, Please, Todd was now able to participate. He quoted speech from the inspector in the game, “Maybe you should not have come,” briefly constructing an embedded frame within the overlapping play frame. Then Dave made a game move: “Wait! I can explain!” also contributing to the specific embedded frame of character speech, quoting the denied applicant in the game as they are detained. This segment then ended with the three housemates laughing, signaling that the previously serious frame about a problematic rent check has been successfully reframed through game moves consisting of Papers, Please references. These recycled prior texts constructed overlapping play frames and embedded frames marked by constructed dialogue, and rekeyed the talk to a light-hearted and fun play frame, which all three speakers could participate in since they had equal epistemic access to it. The friends had transformed this conversation to reinforce their bond as a social group, authenticating their group identity as nerdy housemates with shared experiences.

In sum, I have shown how words, concepts, and characters from Papers, Please were recycled in conversation, rekeying and ultimately reframing the conversation towards a non-serious game world. This rekeying and reframing occurred through game moves, which created overlapping play frames and embedded frames containing constructed dialogue. This process functioned not only to rekey and reframe the conversation to light-hearted, but very importantly, to re-adjust the epistemic territory to one that all speakers have access to, allowing for group involvement and group identity affirmation.
6.4 The Oregon Trail in conversation

In this section I present analysis of the use of intertextual ties to the videogame The Oregon Trail. After recording the previous example analyzed in section 6.3, I was fortunate enough to record another conversation at a local diner between Dave and his close friend from high school, Allen (not a housemate), and me where references to this videogame were used. I demonstrate that speakers make references to The Oregon Trail here to rekey serious talk about injuries to a humorous key by adding an overlapping play frame of a real-life videogame experience. This rekeying and reframing relies on shifting the talk from a restricted epistemic territory with which only two of the speakers can relate, to the shared epistemic territory of the videogame experience, allowing Allen to be involved in the conversation as well. This equalizing of epistemic status is shown to be conducive to group identity construction.

6.4.1 Background on The Oregon Trail

The videogame The Oregon Trail is a computer game originally developed in 1974, designed to teach school children about 19th century pioneer life on the Oregon Trail. In the game, the player is a wagon leader guiding their party of settlers from Missouri to Oregon in a covered wagon in 1848. The player “experiences” various events along the trail, based on actual historical narratives. These experiences range from facing illnesses, such as dysentery, suffering injuries like a broken arm, to making choices relating to the trail, such as whether to attempt to cross a river or not (see Figure 7, below). The player faces potentially life or death consequences for choices made. In this way The Oregon Trail is similar to Papers, Please because it also provides a somewhat psychologically immersive experience. The Oregon Trail was also extremely successful, selling over 65 million copies, and it was popular among North American elementary school students in the mid 1980s to
late 1990s, as many students in the U.S. and Canada had access to the game at school. The popularity of this game for school children during the 1990s in the U.S. means that many Americans who attended school then remember playing the game, and this shared childhood experience is why references to this game can be used as a conversational resource the next excerpt I will analyze.

![The Oregon Trail videogame screenshot](image)

Figure 7. Screenshot of The Oregon Trail videogame. Here the player enters Y (for yes) or N (for no)

### 6.4.2 The Oregon Trail references in audio-recorded conversation

The second excerpt I analyze in this chapter is from the diner conversation with Dave, Dave’s friend Allen, and me on a Friday night. This was my second time meeting Allen. In the analysis, I will demonstrate how, similar to the previous excerpt, videogame texts are recycled to rekey and reframe the conversation, as well as to shift the epistemic territory, allowing for group involvement and group identity construction. Again, we will see the emergence of an overlapping ‘life is a videogame’ frame in the construction of a
game world, which also includes embedded frames. However, this conversation is different in many ways from the previous recorded excerpt that I analyzed — most notably, the overlapping and embedded frames do not completely reframe the conversation. Instead, Dave forcefully brings the conversation back to the original, serious ‘real-life’ frame.

6.4.3 Setting up the need for an epistemic frame shift

Previous to excerpt (8) below, Dave and Allen had been talking about skiing, and I was bored, since I have no experience skiing. After Allen comments about skiing with “if you know what you’re doing, it doesn’t matter” (line 1) and Dave latches with “Yeah” (line 2), I begin to tell Allen about the calamitous amphibious camping trip that Dave, Todd, Lana, Aaron, and I had recently experienced (described in the beginning of Chapter One), which is epistemically advantageous for Dave and me, but leaves fewer ways for Allen to participate, which will eventually create the space for an epistemic frame shift.

(8)

1 Allen But once again, if you know what you’re doing, it doesn’t matter=
2 Dave =Yeah
3 Sylvia =[Um-
4 We went-
5 I went kayaking and canoeing for the first time like two weeks ago.

I initiate a turn with “Um-” (line 3), which Scheglof (2010) describes as a turn-preface when launching a new course of action. I thus seize the opportunity to change the topic to something still related to outdoor sports, but related to my own experience, with “We went- I went kayaking and canoeing for the first time like two weeks ago” (lines 4–5). Allen demonstrates uptake of my statement and Dave and I begin to tell Allen about our camping trip, which epistemically limits his opportunities to contribute to the conversation, setting up an occasion for an epistemic frame shift.
Allen  How’d you like that?
Dave  We [went- ^camping and kayaking.
Sylvia  [u:h, (I didn’t-)
Dave  So we packed all our shit into a canoe,
and we hopped into kayaks,
she hopped into a canoe.
[And with-
Sylvia  [I hopped into a kayak first.
Dave  Bumped your head on it.
Sylvia  Then I hit my head,
→felt kind of dizz(h)y.
Allen  Oh(h)(h)(h)(h)!

Dave and I launch into a shared ‘couple’s story’ (see Mandelbaum 1987 for more on this phenomenon) to which we have primary epistemic access. We explain that I “hit my head” (line 15) on the kayak and I confess that I “felt kind of dizz(h)y” (line 16). The laughter token in “dizz(h)y” is interesting — so far this conversation has been in a frame of telling a real-life story, and here we are talking about an injury that could have been serious, yet I laugh. Potter and Hepburn (2010) call this kind of laughter that is produced mid-word “interpolated particles of aspiration,” and find that it serves to modulate the strength of an action, marking some kind of trouble in the talk. Thus, this self-conscious laughter could signal to Allen that my injury was not very serious and that laughing about this incident is acceptable, and indeed he responds with “Oh(h)(h)(h)(h)” (line 17), which, according to Schiffrin (1987) demonstrates uptake of news and change of knowledge state, and here it also indicates non-seriousness. So here we see a contrast with the talk that had been serious up to this point — now the key has already been slightly changed with our laughter, and as Chafe (2001) has remarked, laughter is ‘slow fading’ so we see it carry into the following lines.
6.4.4 Creating an overlapping play frame with an epistemic shift

With the key already shifting to be more light-hearted, Allen makes his first game move by recycling a videogame text, which initiates an epistemic shift and an overlapping play frame that allows him to participate in a more engaged way.

(10)

18 Sylvia Deci(h)ded to go(h) in the cano(h)e.
19 Allen → Sounds like a BA:D “Oregon Trail” trip. [Hahaha
20 Sylvia [And then-
21 Dave Something [li(h)ke tha(h)t.

I continue the narrative, “Dec(h)ided to go(h) in the cano(h)e” (line 18), again with laughter tokens in my statement, but I omit the fact that I took Todd’s spot in the canoe (this will become relevant later). Allen participates by making a game move, drawing from his epistemic repertoire with, “Sounds like a BA:D Oregon Trail trip,” and laughing (line 19), reframing the event as part of The Oregon Trail videogame. I initiate another narrative clause, “And then-” (line 20), but cut myself off, either due to being overlapped by Allen’s laughter or perhaps because I just got the joke. Dave laughingly says “Something li(h)ke tha(h)t” (line 21), showing recognition of Allen’s reference to The Oregon Trail. In playback, I asked Allen why he brought up the videogame here, and he told me that our story ‘reminded’ him of the game, which he had spent so much time in childhood playing. In other words, our camping trip story involving my injury and crossing a river ‘triggered’ his semi-active consciousness (Chafe 1994) in recalling this childhood game, where river crossings and random injuries were common. His game move facilitated his participation in the conversation by using an intertextual videogame reference that he has knowledge about, which shifted the epistemic territory of the conversation and simultaneously created an overlapping play frame of ‘life is like a videogame we played when we were children.’
6.4.5 Creating an embedded frame in an overlapping frame with a more specific epistemic shift

Next, the speakers swiftly move into the overlapping play frame, talking about real life as a videogame, where everyone can draw on their knowledge schemas about play frames and knowledge about the videogame, thus participating with equal epistemic access, reinforcing their shared group identity as friends with shared generational experience playing *The Oregon Trail*. The overlapping play frame is again propelled by constructed dialogue in an embedded frame, with more specific epistemic orientation towards intertextual links to the videogame.

(11)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Allen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>“SY:lvia knocked [her head-”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Dave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Sylvia (laughing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Allen “She will be-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>→She will be unable to collect food [for the rest of the trip,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Dave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Allen → &gt;so you can only carry 100 pounds less” &lt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>(everyone laughs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here Allen and Dave recycle texts from *The Oregon Trail*, where the computer screen tells the player that someone in the game is injured or sick (see Figure 8 for an example), when Allen says “SY:lvia knocked her head-” (line 23) and Dave repeats this structure with “SY:LVIA:...has a conCU:ssion” (line 24). These game moves of constructed dialogue involve a slightly louder voice quality and vowel lengthening, which serve as contextualization cues, signaling dialogue from the game. It is also evident that the text of the game is being referenced since the speakers are talking about me in third person, even though I am present. I laugh (line 25), showing that I also ‘get’ the jokes being made, and that I am going along with this new rekeyed play frame. Allen further recycles text from the game in the embedded frame with the metamessage of ‘Sylvia is a character in *The
Oregon Trail’, saying “She will be- She will be unable to collect food for the rest of the trip, so you can only carry 100 pounds less,” (lines 27, 30). Carrying ‘pounds’ of food is always an issue in The Oregon Trail (see Figure 9) and when someone is injured or sick in the game this affects how much food the player is able to carry. Everyone laughs (line 31) at this, showing the nonseriousness that imagining this game world has triggered.

Figure 8. Screenshot 2 of The Oregon Trail

The constructed dialogue in this conversation, similar to the constructed dialogue of Jorji in the Papers, Please excerpt, again shows that an embedded frame, referring to specific texts of the videogame with the metamessage of ‘I am speaking as the game’s narrator,’ strengthens the overlapping play frame and allows speakers to participate in a fun and equally epistemically accessible frame that discursively constructs their group identity as nerdy friends with enjoyable childhood memories of playing The Oregon Trail.
Note that again, the embedded frame propels the overlapping play frame further away from the original topic of talk. Now instead of talking about bumping my head in a kayak in the real-life frame, we are talking about carrying pounds of food in the overlapping play frame.

Figure 9. Screenshot 3 of *The Oregon Trail*

6.4.6 Metacommentary and an epistemic shift breaks the overlapping play frame

As the conversation continues, the speakers make some metacommments on the play frame, and as we saw in the *Papers, Please* example, ‘naming the frame’ breaks it:

(12)

32 Dave That’s absolutely correct…
33 Allen → Real life was an “Oregon Trail” game.
34 Sylvia [Yeah and then-
35 Allen → “Oh you broke your leg, you only made fifty dollars less today.”
36 Sylvia Haha
37 Dave Well I was pissed because I realized the reason Todd didn’t wanna-
38 you know, instead of like,
39 volunteering to kayak ’cause it sucks?
40 Sylvia Mhm?
41 Allen It takes more energy too, right?
Dave’s metacomment “That’s absolutely correct…” (line 32) is reminiscent of his earlier metacomment, “Something li(h)ke tha(h)t” (line 21), where he is affirming Allen’s contributions to the conversation and evaluating from outside the frame, but is not as involved as he could be in maintaining the overlapping play frame. As I mentioned in the discussion of the previous conversation analyzed, Dave told me that he feels he is not good at participating in play frames — that he is more serious in conversation. This is extremely relevant for how this overlapping play frame will abruptly come to an end, instead of continuing and reframing the talk, as was the case in the first conversation analyzed. Note that I also do not participate in the overlapping play frame, but I am laughing throughout this excerpt. I was the butt of the joke in this instance and was simply enjoying the playful teasing, but also I had become aware during this talk that this was precisely what I was looking for in my data, and it is possible that my awareness of it prevented me from becoming more involved.

Allen next makes a metacomment “Real life was an ‘Oregon Trail’ ga(h)me..” (line 33). Here Allen explicitly names the frame, commenting from outside the play frame about the frame itself. Perhaps interpreting his turn here as breaking the play frame, I again initiate a narrative clause with, “Yeah and then-“ (line 34) but cut myself short when Allen makes yet another game move with “Oh you broke your leg, you only made fifty dollars less today” (line 35). Here Allen attempts to continue the overlapping play frame of ‘we are living a videogame’ with another embedded frame of ‘I am the game’s narrator’, marked by constructed dialogue recycled from *The Oregon Trail*.

Yet while I laugh (line 36), Dave abruptly breaks out of the overlapping play frame, moving back to the serious, real life frame of talking about our camping experience, saying “Well I was pissed because I realized the reason Todd didn’t wanna- you know, instead of like, volunteering to kayak ’cause it sucks?” (lines 37-39). Dave’s statement starts with
“well” which marks a departure from expectations in the discourse that is about to come (Schiffrin 1987). Both Allen and I re-orient to Dave’s epistemic shift and serious rekeying (marked by his shift in emotional stance — “I was pissed”) and reframing, with “mhm?” (line 40) and “It takes more energy, right?” (line 41). The conversation continues in this serious key and frame as we discuss how Dave sensed that Todd did not originally want to kayak, and was possibly annoyed when he had to kayak after I hit my head and took his spot in the canoe.

In sum, I have shown how intertextual references to The Oregon Trail are recycled in this conversation, rekeying epistemically limiting and serious talk by creating an equally epistemically accessible, non-serious overlapping play frame containing embedded frames that are marked by constructed dialogue. However, different from the first conversation I analyzed, the overlapping play frame in this conversation does not result in ultimately reframing the conversation. Instead, two of the speakers, Dave and I, did not fully engage in the overlapping play frame. We made several attempts, finally succeeding, in returning to the serious key and epistemically limiting frame of conversation that Allen was attempting to shift away from. Even so, the recycling of the videogame texts, and the use of overlapping and embedded frames to create a game world in this excerpt still functioned to temporarily re-adjust the epistemic territory of the conversation, rekeying and reframing it to allow Allen to participate more. Overall then, this moment of overlapping play frames containing embedded frames of constructed dialogue, relying on shared videogame texts, allowed for group identity construction as people with shared experience playing The Oregon Trail as children.
6.5 Discussion

This chapter has shown how friends use videogame texts as intertextual resources in their everyday conversations, for two main functions that are interrelated: (i) negotiating interactional dilemmas, by rekeying serious talk about real life issues to humorous play frames that construct such events as part of a lived videogame experience, and (ii) shifting the epistemic access required to participate in the conversation, so that different speakers can talk and demonstrate solidarity and shared ‘nerd’ group identity.

Reframing has been analyzed to show how game moves, made by recycling various bits of videogame texts, construct play frames which overlap with the real life frames, allowing the participants to engage with talk about relatively serious issues (money, an injury) in a more playful way. This chapter also adds to what we know about overlapping and embedded frames in conversation. The overlapping play frames are accelerated and strengthened by embedded frames that contain constructed dialogue of characters or the game text itself. Embedded frames within overlapping frames launch the speakers even further into the overlapping play frame and further away from the original real life frame, using even more specific epistemic orientations. This process resulted in the complete reframing of the conversation in the Papers, Please example, but in The Oregon Trail example unwilling speakers cut off the videogame reframing process to return to a more serious real-life frame. The two different outcomes show how speakers demonstrate varying levels of active participation in either going along with reframing, or in resisting it.

This chapter, then, has further developed how speakers are agentive in using intertextuality to manage frames. This analysis underscores the agency of speakers and the cognitive abilities they balance as they use intertextual resources to construct, overlap, embed, maintain, and switch frames. This chapter also contributes more broadly to our
understanding of the complexity of framing in discourse as demonstrated by scholars such as Tannen and Wallat (1987/1993), M. Goodwin (1996), and Gordon (2009).

Furthermore, I have shown how epistemics play a crucial role in intertextuality, framing, and identity construction. Prior experiences of playing videogames were drawn upon as epistemic resources, as videogame texts were infused into conversation as an equalizing epistemic force. The epistemic shift allowed different group members to frame shift, showing off their knowledge and participating in conversation, since they shared epistemic access to videogames. In turn, this discursive work constructed their group identity as nerds in this epistemic ecology. Gordon (2009) showed that framing and intertextuality are fundamentally interconnected, and now I have shown that epistemics plays an understudied but important role in these processes.

Following Raymond and Heritage (2006), this chapter highlights the role of epistemic management in framing as well as in group identity construction, further developing the field of epistemic discourse analysis. It is apparent in the examples that a shared group identity, based on shared previous experience and knowledge of shared prior texts, is being constructed—that of play frames that value linking videogames to real life experiences. In addition, individuals are simultaneously negotiating their own identities within the group. For example, Dave does not participate as actively or as frequently as some other members of his friend group in the construction of game worlds, and this constructs, at these conversational moments, his identity as someone more focused on “the real world.” On the other hand, friends like Fred and Lana show particular skill in constructing game worlds, and I have observed throughout my data collection that Fred is the most active of all the friends in initiating game moves to resolve interactional dilemmas, and Lana participates actively in such game worlds. So individual differences are involved,
which may relate to aspects of conversational style (Tannen 1984/2005) and should be explored further.

In this chapter, I have added to the field of work that draws on the concept of intertextuality to examine interaction of a social group, with a particular focus on shared videogame texts. A videogame played by a group of friends in their basement resurfaces in conversations that take place in their dining room upstairs, and a videogame played by children in elementary school can years later be recycled as an interactional resource in a diner. The connections between real life and these videogames may be feasible precisely because the social realities that occur in real life, such as making long-term decisions that have lasting and undoable consequences, are reflected and reproduced in the games, and in turn this makes the games readily available resources to draw upon when interactional dilemmas arise. In sum, while playing videogames is a pastime often denigrated as being a “waste of time,” this chapter has shown how a group of friends use intertextual references to the shared experiences of playing videogames to achieve remarkable cognitive flexibility and creativity in their conversations when confronted with interactional dilemmas. It brings together previous work on intertextuality, framing, epistemics, and identity by showing how double-voiced intertextual media references are used as resources in epistemic and frame management, which ultimately contribute to group identity construction.
In this chapter, I summarize the findings of this study and discuss how they contribute to our understanding of knowledge and identity in everyday conversation. Section 7.1 covers the findings as related to further developing an Interactional Sociolinguistic (IS) approach to knowledge in discourse, including contextualization cues, intertextuality, and framing. Section 7.2 reviews the findings as related to the merging of intertextuality and epistemics, and section 7.3 discusses the findings as related to how epistemic and frame management relying on intertextual ties contributes to group identity construction in discourse. It also considers individual identity as displayed through the use of media references in this study.

7.1 An interactional sociolinguistic approach to knowledge

This study has situated itself primarily in the IS framework, which views context as central to analyzing naturally occurring discourse, and to that end has examined contextualization cues, intertextuality, and framing. Building on previous IS work, I have drawn on Gumperz’s (1977, 1982) and others’ work on contextualization cues, which Gumperz defines as “any aspect of the surface form of utterances which, when mapped onto message content, can be shown to be functional in the signaling of interpretative frames” (1977:199). Specifically, I illustrate how prior shared texts (Becker 1994), in this case intertextual media references, are signaled in everyday conversation amongst friends via contextualization cues. Thus I applied the study of contextualization cues to the territory of how intertextuality (Bakhtin 1981, 1984, 1986; Kristeva 1986) or repetition
(Tannen 1989/2007), is signaled in talk, working towards the goal of better understanding intertextual processes in talk.

I identified and examined how 116 double-voiced intertextual media references are signaled through contextualization cues in everyday talk across five conversations among friends. I showed that these contextualization cues usually occur simultaneously, with most media references involving 2-5 signaling mechanisms. Vowel lengthening and loudness, usually working together to result in exaggerated stress, along with intonation mimicry and extreme shifts in pitch, were shown to be the most common ways to signal media references. Vowel lengthening and loudness tend to be relied upon more as a resource for speakers when they are referencing text-based videogames or online memes, while a wider variety of contextualization cues tend to be drawn upon for signaling references to movies, TV shows, and songs from these.

The features that I coded as occurring in less than half of the 116 examples (smile voice, laughter, use of regional/foreign accents, singing, and creaky voice) indicate that these features may be sex-class linked (in the case of smile voice and laughter), may have individual characteristics associated with the features of accents and singing, and may be influenced by characteristics of the source texts themselves (in the case of accents, singing, and creaky voice) which constrain whether these less common contextualization cues are likely to occur.

As I mentioned in Chapter Four, future analysis of the signaling mechanisms used with media references would undoubtedly benefit from acoustic analysis in a phonetic software package like Praat. Another further development of the analysis would be to closely transcribe and code all of the conversational data surrounding the intertextual media references. This would ensure, for example, that vowel lengthening and loudness are more likely to occur with intertextual media references, and not simply as a more general feature
of talk that happens to coincide frequently with media references. Contextualization cues are crucial in talk because they are what assist in ‘conversational inference’: “the ‘situated’ or context-bound process of interpretation, by means of which participants in a conversation assess others’ intentions, and on which they based their responses” (Gumperz 1977:191). I suggest that to identify and interpret media references, participants may rely on such cues, not only on the words spoken.

By understanding the contextualization cues of intertextuality and how they allow for conversational inference in discourse involving intertextual media references, we come away with a better understanding of intertextual processes. This includes another heretofore unexplored phenomenon: how people demonstrate recognition or a deeper understanding of the intertextual media references they have heard in conversation. Thus I also examined how the same 116 double-voiced intertextual media references were responded to by listeners, mostly indicating recognition or understanding of the reference.

While listeners occasionally did not use audible listening behavior upon hearing a reference, they more often used 1-3 listening mechanisms. Laughter, and presumably smiling, was by far the most common way that speakers reacted to hearing intertextual media references, and occasionally speakers laughed even when they did not recognize the specific media reference being made. As I mentioned in Chapter Four, future research should use video-recording in order to be able to more precisely study embodied behavior such as smiling. I applied Chafe’s (2001) work on laughter to argue that speakers likely smile and laugh when they recognize intertextual media references because they are faced with a pseudo-plausible world that triggers a feeling of nonseriousness. I also argued that the contagiousness and shared hilarity that Chafe found characterizes laughter are conducive to signaling a shift to a play frame, and indeed, participation in an extended play frame around the intertextual media reference was the second most common way that
speakers reacted to hearing intertextual media references, and in this case provided evidence that they actually recognized the reference and thoroughly understood how to further manipulate it in conversation. These play frames also frequently involved partial or full repetition of the original media reference, although overall, repetition was a less common form of recognition of an intertextual media reference, as was explicit affirmation of recognizing a reference. Speakers sometimes repeated references even when they did not recognize them, similar to how speakers sometimes laughed at a reference even if they did not understand it.

Future work could examine the strategies listeners use when they do not recognize references, and how sometimes references can be exclusionary rather than inclusive, following up on Duff’s (2002) examination of exclusion of ESL students in a high school classroom. Such research could have important implications for group dynamics, involvement, exclusion, etc. Future work could also address the differences between such extended play frames and more ‘fleeting’ uses of media intertextuality; it is likely, based on the findings in this study, that extended play frames feature much more smiling, laughter, and repetition than fleeting uses of references, for example.

Since play frames were determined to be the most analytically reliable evidence that speakers understood intertextual media references, I expanded upon my findings on the signaling and recognition of intertextual media references by examining instances where participants used references as a way to construct overlapping and embedded play frames, engaging with the details of frame lamination as laid out in Gordon’s (2002, 2008, 2009) work, where she argues that intertextuality and frames are fundamentally linked. Through engaging with Gordon’s (2009) concepts of overlapping and embedded frames, I discovered that in my data, embedded frames (where speakers voice specific characters) within overlapping frames (two frames that refer simultaneously to a prior context and the
current context) relied on more specific knowledge about the meme or videogame being referenced and therefore strengthened the overlapping play frames. I also expanded on Tannen and Wallat’s (1987/1993) discussion of knowledge schemas, by demonstrating that specific knowledge schemas about media are precisely what drive these kinds of play frame sequences.

7.2 Intertextuality and epistemics

While IS scholars have mentioned the importance of knowledge in framing and intertextual processes (e.g., Gordon 2009; Tannen & Wallat 1987/1995; Trester 2012), none have engaged with the contemporary conceptualization of epistemics, or knowledge management in discourse, as it has been put forth in the related approach to discourse of Conversation Analysis. Therefore, a major goal of this study has been to show how the study of intertextuality and framing can also be successfully and meaningfully merged with the study of epistemics.

Heeding van Dijk’s (2013) call for an epistemic discourse analysis, I have shown how a close analysis of discourse which engages with frames theory, intertextuality, and epistemics illuminates how intertextual references can be analyzed as units of epistemics. Intertextual ties, in the specific case of my study, media references, are signaled, responded to, and called upon as resources during epistemic imbalances underlying interactional dilemmas. These intertextual references create overlapping and embedded play frames while simultaneously managing group epistemics, which is ultimately conducive to group identity construction. I have referred to these processes as epistemic frame shifts, which captures both the epistemic and frame components of these interactions; the fact the epistemic component consists of intertextual references to prior texts is elucidated through the analysis itself.
With this analysis, I have also confirmed Heritage’s (2012) idea that the epistemic engine does indeed drive much of talk, since the epistemic imbalances in conversation is what drives many interactional dilemmas. Media references then add fuel to the epistemic engine and reorient talk in a meaningful way to the participants. This can also be discussed as ‘enchrony’ in Enfield’s (2011) conceptualization of sequencing as driven by epistemics, responsibility, and affiliation, which ultimately drive the need for restoring epistemic symmetry in interaction. Heritage (2013b) also touches on epistemics and sequence organization, suggesting that the management of epistemics may propel talk forward, is involved in topic shifts, and is implicated in the closure of sequences and topics, and these suggestions have been confirmed in my analysis.

Following Heritage (2013b), I have also moved beyond conceptualizing knowledge in a K-/K+ gradient model (Heritage 2010, 2012; Heritage & Raymond 2012) since it implies that epistemics is a unidimensional phenomenon. Instead I have considered the multidimensionality of epistemic status, embracing the complexity in frame processes that results from different epistemic resources, or intertextual media references in this case. I have answered Heritage’s (2013b) call for work on epistemic ecologies, by analyzing the discourse of specific groups of friends with common epistemic territories showing how they draw on these territories to contribute to their shared group identity. In turn, I have also demonstrated how the study of epistemics can benefit from engaging with intertextuality, since I have found that shared prior texts can be a crucial resource for the creation and maintenance of epistemic ecologies and contribute to their unique shared identities.
7.3 Intertextuality, epistemics, and identity construction

In this study, I have investigated how speakers use intertextual media references as epistemic resources to manage identity construction in interaction, heeding Hamilton’s (1996) call for an intertextual analysis of how people construct relatively stable social identities. The main finding concerning the relationship between intertextuality, frames, epistemics, and their role in identity construction can be distilled to the understanding that when faced with epistemic imbalances underlying interactional dilemmas, speakers used shared prior texts to create play frames. These play frames draw from a shared epistemic territory of talk. This balancing of the ‘epistemic seesaw’ (Heritage 2012) is what promotes group identity construction, by promoting similarity, or ‘adequation’ (Bucholtz & Hall 2005) amongst the speakers. As Norrick (1989) states, “…complementary exhibition of shared knowledge, particularly when it involves some specialized or arcane source, attests to common interests and encourages mutual involvement” (120). In the conversations, the use of specific shared prior media texts as units of epistemics attests to the common interests of the speakers, especially in cases where they reference videogames and online memes. These references encourage mutual involvement as well as group identity construction.

The analysis of media references in this study has illuminated a distinct and observable site for the construction of specific kinds of shared group identities (of ‘nerds’ and of a particular generation of people who are internet savvy). In turn, the analysis begins to make clear the interplay between media consumption practices and everyday interaction, including how cultural stereotypes, or ‘phantasms’ (Harrell 2013), present in media make their way into everyday conversation via the process of enregisterment (Agha 2007). Whether someone is voicing a vaguely ‘soviet’ stereotype, or referencing a meme that draws on a stereotype of African Americans, they are drawing on phantasms present
in the specific kind of media they consume and infusing these stereotypes into their talk, thereby reinforcing them, whether or not the intent is to mock or reject them; I would argue that this phenomenon merits further exploration. At the same time, my analysis, which integrates frames theory and epistemics, provides a link between the cognitive component of identity as stored in knowledge schemas and the categorization of identities as emergent, creative, and locally conceived of in everyday talk.

While my primary focus of the analysis of identity construction has been shared group identities through the use of shared media references, it has also been impossible to ignore the fact that individual identity and style are also constructed through the use of media references in everyday talk. It is possible to comment on the constructed individual identities of Dave, his housemates, and me, since these are the speakers for which I have the most conversational data. Recall how I mentioned in Chapter Three that I sensed that the participants Fred and Lana were possibly more performative in their talk when I recorded conversations where they were present. This may have had something to do with their frequent deployment of media references that often included singing or ‘taking on voices’ (Tannen 1989/2007), or more specifically, accents, when the recorder was running. Recall also how Fred frequently addressed the digital recorder as “Recorder” or mentioned it throughout my data collection, which supports this intuition. Regarding individual differences as they presented themselves through the analysis of media references, Fred is the most prolific media reference-maker in the five conversations, making 37 media references, while Lana comes in a close second with 30 references. Not only does Fred make the most references, but he also demonstrates his high-involvement style by demonstrating persistence in repeating media references when they are not heard or responded to the first time. Fred also uses far more creaky voice than anyone in the five conversations and many more regional and foreign accents than any other speakers, while
Lana sings more than anyone else when making references, and she also laughs more than other speakers. Fred had explained to me how he had been positioned as a “class clown” in his youth, and that his exposure to the world of improv comedy may have influenced his frequent use of accents in the conversations. Lana had also been in an improv comedy group and had performed stand-up comedy in college – so it seems sensible that both Fred and Lana used the occasions of me recording their talk to practice their skills in humor. At the same time, their uses of accents and singing may simply be part of their own acquired individual styles.

We could compare Fred and Lana to their housemates Dave and Todd. Dave makes 19 media references, but in Chapter Six I analyzed how Dave resists an extended play frame around references to The Oregon Trail, and in playback he told me that he did not think he was good at doing accents or participating in play frames. Based on my own observations as well as some of the references that Dave makes, Dave also tends to make more obscure references that people do not necessarily recognize.

Todd only makes one original media reference in the data set, but this actually came as a surprise to me, as well as to Lana (his partner) and him when I told them about this. While Todd is more reserved in general than Lana, Fred, and Dave, we still thought it was unusual that only one instance of him making a unique reference appeared in the data set, since in general he seems to make a lot of references. After talking with Todd a little bit about this, we concluded that on the one hand, it is likely that his high considerateness conversational style, especially in contexts where Fred, Lana, and Dave were more performative and high-involvement, kept him from participating as actively in the conversations as he might have otherwise. To this effect, Todd related, “I guess I feel I have trouble keeping up in those situations.”
On the other hand, Todd said, “I do make a lot of references. However, I would say I often do not expect others to pick up on them… I don’t speak them in a tone that suggests I am referring to something. My favorite is when quotes can be fit into normal conversation with no strain. And I just say them and see if the other notices. Occasionally if I’m really proud of it I will say it was a reference afterwards.” I found Todd’s insight on his use of references fascinating, especially since his use seems so different from the way other speakers in my data used references. I asked him “What is the pay-off in making references at all if you don’t signal them?” To this, he responded, “Mainly I think I do it for my own amusement. It’s fun to be able to speak the words.” Todd’s insights provide even more evidence that looking at different individual’s varying usage of media references would be extremely interesting to focus on in future research.

As for me, I make 15 references throughout the conversations. It is possible that in everyday conversation I might make more media references than it would seem based on the data set, but recall how I was self-conscious about references after I decided they would be the focus of my study, and this consciousness probably caused me to pull back a little in making references starting after the second conversation.

Based on my own observations outside of the data set that I focus on in this study, all of the processes I uncovered through my analysis can also be seen in younger and older speakers’ talk as well as in different ethnicities, at least in the U.S. and in Mexico, which are the two places I have the most experience in observing conversation. Still, future research examining the use of media references in different groups of people would of course be the most thorough way to make comparisons and see if the processes I described in this study also apply more generally.

While the analysis of media references in this study has provided a clear focus as well as precise evidence for the construction of specific kinds of individual as well as
shared group identities, it is important to point out that at the same time, media references are a means to an end. I chose to study them in order to have a clear site for examining the complex interaction of intertextual, epistemic, and frame-related phenomena that contribute to identity construction. However, it is crucial to understand that *any type of shared prior texts* that are referenced by a group of people could be analyzed using the framework I have developed in this study in order to understand the intertextual identity construction of a unique epistemic ecology.

In this study, I have shown how 116 intertextual media references in five everyday conversations among American friends in their mid-twenties in Northern Virginia and Washington, D.C. were used as resources for managing frames, epistemics, and identity, particularly at knowledge imbalances and interactional dilemmas in talk. I began by examining the specific contextualization cues that accompanied media references, demonstrating how vowel lengthening, intonation, loudness, pitch shift, and to a lesser extent, smile voice, laughter, regional or foreign accent, singing, and creaky voice functioned to signal the references to listeners. I then analyzed how listeners demonstrated recognition of media references through laughter, repetition, and occasionally explicit affirmation of a reference, finding that the active contribution to a play frame based on a reference was the most analytically reliable way to be sure that listeners understood the original reference. Finally, I demonstrated how media references and the resulting play frames often occurred when there were epistemic imbalances in the conversation, which drove awkward interactional dilemmas. I showed how media references thus served to manage both group epistemics and frames of talk, functioning as a resource for what I call epistemic frame shifts, and how these shifts ultimately contributed to group identity construction based on shared experience and knowledge. By analyzing intertextual references as central to both epistemic and frame management, this study offers a new
framework for understanding the formation of relationships and identity construction in discourse through highlighting the role of socially contextualized knowledge in everyday life.
APPENDIX A: TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Punctuation reflects intonation, not grammar.
? indicates rising intonation at the end of a unit
. indicates falling intonation.
.. two dots indicate a noticeable pause
… three dots indicate a significant pause
= Equal sign indicates latching (second voice begins without perceptible pause)
[ Brackets indicate overlap (two voices heard at the same time)
(??) indicates inaudible utterance
(h) indicates laughter during a word
(w) indicates uncertain transcription
(sound) gives details about speech or non-speech sounds
[detail] gives details for clarification
^ indicates emphatic stress
>fast< indicates the speaker is accelerating
CAPS indicates speech spoken loudly
: colon following a vowel indicates elongated vowel sound
:word: indicates creaky voice
- indicates an abrupt stop in speech; a truncated word or syllable
→ significant line of transcript
-> line continues
## APPENDIX B: THE 116 MEDIA REFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversation</th>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Media reference</th>
<th>Referent</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>♫ Making pumpkin pancakes ♫</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Adventure Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Haha ♫ MAKING- Making pumpkin pancakes</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Adventure Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Haha (h) ♫ MAKING turkey bacon put it in a pancake ♫ hahahaha</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Adventure Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>You keep using that word, I don't think you know what it means. (Spanish accent)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Princess Bride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>I don't think it <em>means</em> what you think it means.</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Princess Bride</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Not that there's anything <em>WRONG</em> with that.</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Seinfeld</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>WOOOO! REFERENCES! Woo!</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Girls Gone Wild</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Yea. Yea. (Borat voice)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Borat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Yes. Yes. (Borat voice) hahaha.</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Borat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>We have been paid by ‘Arsztroztka’.</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>hahaha You received some ‘CRE:dit’ for processing the language</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>You’re lucky you drew this <em>JO:B</em> in the ‘la:bor lottery’</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>THEY ALL CAME FROM JORJI. JORJI’S LIKE “HE:Y!”</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>“I make a passaportal!”</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>So- Todd is your wi:fe and-</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Dave is your mother-in-law</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>and Sylvia is your son</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>and I’m your..U:Ncle or somethi(h)ng</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>hahahaha and you drew me a picture hahahaha</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>You drew me a <em>Pictrue</em></td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>Papers, Please</td>
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<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>I’m a- sweet intertextual. (low pitch).</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Rocky Horror Picture Show</td>
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<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>You shall not pass! (low pitch)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Lord of The Rings</td>
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<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>He sta(h)red into the de:(h)phths/ It stared back hahaha</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td>Beyond Good and Evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>And it stared back at him. (low pitch)</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td>Beyond Good and Evil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>She’s an independent woman. who don’t need no man.</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Strong black woman meme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Papers Please</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>Flynn is really cute. ♫ He’s got his pillow fort and its made of cardboard ♫</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Lego Movie</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>You’re breaking- you’re tearing me apart, Lisa:!</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>You are too weak.</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Star Wars</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Todd</td>
<td>One of us</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Adventure Time, Futurama or The Simpsons</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Long hair don’t care</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Long Hair Don’t Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Fred</td>
<td>Long hair don’t care</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Long Hair Don’t Care</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Isn’t their motto &quot;always BE: PREPARED&quot;? (low pitch)</td>
<td>Motto</td>
<td>Motto: Boy Scouts</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>“BE PREPARED!”</td>
<td>Motto</td>
<td>Motto: Boy Scouts</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Thar sh(h)e blows.</td>
<td>Book</td>
<td>Moby Dick</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>🎼 There she goes 🎼</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td>&quot;There she goes&quot; by The Las</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>🎼 &quot;There she goes&quot; Climbing on the fridge 🎼</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td>&quot;There she goes&quot; by The Las</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>🎼 &quot;No one knows what its like..to be the kitty&quot; 🎼</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td>&quot;There she goes&quot; by The Las</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>🎼 Spam spam spam spam spam 🎼</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Monty Python sketch</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>What the hell did you just say to me? / Do I look like Brian's mom?</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Russell Peters sketch</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>She's a strong independent African woman.</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Strong black woman</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Who's texting us? Who(h)'s te(h)xing u(h)as. hah ha</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Overly attached girlfriend meme</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>I have no desire to be snuggled (Whorf voice)</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Star Trek - Whorf</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Again the humans drive us from our ancestral lands</td>
<td>Stereotype</td>
<td>Native Americans (ostensibly from film)</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>It's like &quot;They are natural enemies.&quot; (Scottish accent)</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>The Simpsons</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Timmacy (creaky voice)</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>SouthPark</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Why'd the chicken cross the road?</td>
<td>Joke</td>
<td>Why did the chicken cross the road?</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>Why'd the chicken cross the road?</td>
<td>Joke</td>
<td>&quot;Can't Nobody Hold Me Down&quot; by Sean &quot;Puff Daddy&quot; Combs</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>🎼 Can't nobody break my stride 🎼</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td>&quot;Can't Nobody Hold Me Down&quot; by Sean &quot;Puff Daddy&quot; Combs</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>🎼 Gin and tonic butter time gin and tonic butter time yeah 🎼</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td>Peanut Butter Jelly Time song</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>This is where everyone PO:PS ou(h)ts.. (Gl(h)N and-)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Gin and tonic!</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Like- like- like that Beauty and the Beast song, they're like &quot;BON+jot(h)ur!&quot;</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Ha GIN and tonic! GIN and tonic! (high pitch)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Gin and tonic! (high pitch)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>🎼 There goes she- hah ha there she go(h)es she(h)'s drinking lots of liquor 🎼</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>🎼 Getting shit-faced ha 🎼</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>🎼 ONCE AGAIN! 🎼</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>🎼 GIN AND TONIC ARE HER TWO: MAIN FOO:D GROU:PS (low pitch) 🎼 beh ..</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>🎼 THE HANGOVER'S GONE AWAY 🎼</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>🎼 (CUZ) I'LL NEVER GET MALARIA: CUZ OF ALL THE QUE:NE:NE EN THE DRLINK 🎼</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>🎼 SO WHEN MOSQUITOS COME AROUND 🎼 EVERYONE ELSE (IS) HIT THE GROUND 🎼</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>🎼 The gin an' 🎼 (?) the gin to drink 🎼 (quietly) 🎼 (???) the gin. 🎼 (quietly)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>WHY WOULD JERRY &quot;BRING ANYTHING?</td>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Seinfeld</td>
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<td>You’re breaking my heart, Lisa:! (low pitch)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>^Maddy bought the medal</td>
<td>Recording</td>
<td>Lisa’s Pho/pho class</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>^MADDDY GOT THE MEDAL (high pitch)</td>
<td>Recording</td>
<td>Lisa’s Pho/pho class</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>Me(h)da(h)l(h)</td>
<td>Recording</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>^MEDAL uhuh ^MADDY uh MEDAL</td>
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<td>Does Maddy have the medal? (high pitch)</td>
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<td>Dave</td>
<td>Does Maddy have the medalion? (high pitch)</td>
<td>Recording</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>muhmuhuhuhahahaha! (h) PORKCHOP SA:NDWICHES!</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>GI Joe - Pork Chop Sandwiches Youtube video</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>&quot;You’re breaking my heart Lisa:!&quot; (low-pitch)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Room</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>You're tearing me apart! (low pitch)</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>The Room</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Dave</td>
<td>Oh yea(h)! The(h)re was that one too. Medallion (creaky voice).</td>
<td>Recording</td>
<td>Lisa’s Pho/pho class</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>Maddy has the &quot;medallion! (high pitch) Medallion the Maddy has. (high pitch)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>There goes this (?!) with her gin and tonic ♫</td>
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<td>Beauty and the Beast</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>Are &quot;you gonna buy the chicken?</td>
<td>Recording</td>
<td>Lisa’s Pho/pho class</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>ARE (growl) ^YOU GONNA BUY THE CHICKEN?</td>
<td>Recording</td>
<td>Lisa’s Pho/pho class</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>Are you going to &quot;buy the chicken.</td>
<td>Recording</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>ARE YOU GOING TO BUY THE CHICKEN? … ARE ^NOT YOU GOING TO BUY THE CHICKEN? ♫</td>
<td>Recording</td>
<td>Lisa’s Pho/pho class</td>
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<tr>
<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>I wanna die dot jpeg.</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>I wanna die dot jpeg</td>
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<td>2: Gin &amp; Tonic</td>
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<td>Meme</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Fred</td>
<td>DO YOU WANT TO ^DIE? … Do you ^WANT to die?</td>
<td>Recording</td>
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<td>^WANT TO DIE.</td>
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<td>Dave</td>
<td>Ha. &quot;$! want to di(h)e</td>
<td>Recording</td>
<td>Lisa’s Pho/pho class</td>
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<tr>
<td>3: The Oregon Trail</td>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>Sounds like a BAD Oregon Trail trip. Hahaha</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>The Oregon Trail</td>
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<tr>
<td>3: The Oregon Trail</td>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>SY:LVIA:...has a concUSSION</td>
<td>Videogame</td>
<td>The Oregon Trail</td>
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<tr>
<td>3: The Oregon</td>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>She will be. She will be unable to collect food [for the rest of the trip, so you can only carry 100 pounds less</td>
<td>Video game</td>
<td>The Oregon Trail</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3: The Oregon</td>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>Real life was an Oregon Trail ga(h)me..</td>
<td>Video game</td>
<td>The Oregon Trail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trail</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: The Oregon</td>
<td>Allen</td>
<td>Oh you broke your leg, you only made fifty dollars less today.</td>
<td>Video game</td>
<td>The Oregon Trail</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trail</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Holly</td>
<td>We're any groundhogs harmed. Haha!</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Groundhog Day</td>
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<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>I've been stabbed, ma(h):me(h):d?</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Groundhog Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Holly</td>
<td>I’m not ‘the God, but I am &quot;a God.</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Groundhog Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Sylvia</td>
<td>Why are you telling me this?</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Groundhog Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Holly</td>
<td>It's been poisoned, stab:bed, mai:med haha</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Groundhog Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Holly</td>
<td>Diabe^etous friendly.</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Holly</td>
<td>And...then I got :high:</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td>&quot;Cuz I got high&quot; by Afroman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>Like, repeating that conversation that those little girls had? Like &quot;my baby-sitter called Amber also has contacts?&quot;</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Deborah Tannen film on conversational rituals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>That song Backstreet's back ♫ alright ♫ (high pitch)</td>
<td>Song</td>
<td>&quot;Everybody (Backstreet's Back)&quot; by The Backstreet Boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Groundhog Day</td>
<td>Holly</td>
<td>We’ve been through a lot to get here. We’ve been, maimed. Poisoned. Stabbed.</td>
<td>Film</td>
<td>Groundhog Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Rat Day</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>It - it's LIKE ^LEG DAY.</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Skipping Leg Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Rat Day</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>You NEVER SKIP ^RAT day. What are you doing.</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Skipping Leg Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Rat Day</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>FRIENDS DON'T LE(h)T FRIENDS skip rat day.</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Skipping Leg Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Rat Day</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>BRO, do you even paint?</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Skipping Leg Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Rat Day</td>
<td>Lana</td>
<td>Bro do you even paint (low pitch)</td>
<td>Meme</td>
<td>Skipping Leg Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
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