FILLING THE DESERT: THE INDIGENOUS CONFEDERACIES OF THE PAMPAS AND NORTHERN PATAGONIA, 1840-1879

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By

Geraldine S. Davies Lenoble, M.A.

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This dissertation brings indigenous societies and frontiers to the forefront of South American history. By mid-19th century, indigenous societies with a segmental organization, based on units called cacicatos, formed two confederacies with nomadic pastoralist economies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia, and forced the Creoles in the Argentine provinces to negotiate and respond to their expansive power. By analyzing their internal dynamics and policies, this study shows that these confederacies were not the result of indigenous societies’ resistance to powerful expansive states. Instead, these polities emerged from the cacicatos’ adaptation to changing global and local contexts that also affected sedentary Creoles who were struggling to find their unity after independence. During the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the cacicatos took advantage of the increasing international demand for cattle products as well as the fragmentation of the Spanish Empire to build powerful economies and polities. Unlike the Argentine provinces, the indigenous confederacies found internal stability and prosperity by mid-century. By analyzing the inter-ethnic relationships developed in frontier regions, this study shows that caciques not only had power, but many times dominated the interaction with Creoles. The indigenous confederacies forced the Creoles to negotiate and respond to their expansive power, influencing the Argentine civil conflicts and the nation-state formation process. The caciques’ diplomatic policies, based on peace making and trade expansion, as well as the use of
raids as punishment tools forced the Argentine provinces to depend on inter-ethnic alliances as a means to resolve their civil struggles and to ensure their economic prosperity. Their nomadic pastoralist economies also contributed to the Pampas’ economic growth by bringing indigenous and creole migrants to these regions, thereby expanding their production, trade networks and exchanges. The indigenous confederacies contributed to turning the Pampas into one of the most important political and economic centers of the South Atlantic during the 19th century. This analysis emphasizes the importance of looking at kinship politics and nomadic pastoralist dynamics to better understand this phenomenon as well as to build future comparative studies. It also shows that acknowledging the inter-ethnic systems that ruled the Americas until the end of the 19th century will help to understand the development of contemporary societies.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation makes the case for including indigenous societies and frontier dynamics into the mainstream narratives of the Americas. I will offer a detailed analysis of the societies living in the Pampas and northern Patagonia, which is crucial for understanding the history of the southern cone of South America. By mid-19th century, indigenous societies with a segmental organization based on units called cacicatos formed two confederacies under nomadic pastoralist economies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia. These polities not only integrated themselves into the global markets of the Atlantic and Pacific, but also forced Creoles in the Argentine provinces to negotiate and respond to their expansive power. The Argentine provinces were the state units that emerged from the wars for independence (1810-1820) that, during the rest of the century, struggled to find political stability under confederate and republican projects.

Unlike the Argentine provinces, the indigenous confederacies found internal stability and

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1 Historians also name these units as cacicazgos. But, unlike the cacicazgos that we find in Mexico and the Andes, cacicatos in these southern lands had a segmental organization. They were based on a group of familial clans or lineages led by caciques. Alliances and divisions among cacicatos were established among “equals.” In the Araucanía, the lineage was called lof and the group of lofs formed a rewe. They also formed supra-rewe alliances called ayllarewes. Martha Bechis, Interethnic Relations During the Period of Nation-State formation in Chile and Argentina: From Sovereign to Ethnic (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1983), and “Los lideratos políticos en el área arauco-pampeana en el siglo XIX: ¿autoridad o poder?,” I Congreso Internacional de Et nohistoria, Buenos Aires, (Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1989); Louise Faron, “Araucanían Patri-Organization and the Omaha System,” American Anthropologist, vol. LVIII, no.3 (1956): 435-456; and Guillaume Boccara, Los Vencedores: Historia del pueblo mapuche en la época colonial (Santiago de Chile: Línea Editorial IIAM, 2007).

2 Nomadic pastoralists refer to societies which specialize in animal husbandry requiring periodic movements. The “nomad” component refers to their movement and “pastoralism” to the type of subsistence. This excludes: hunters and gatherers, as they do not domesticate animals, and shepherds, cowboys and gauchos, as it involves everyone – not just men - in the various aspects of production. Thomas Jefferson Barfield, The Nomadic Alternative (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Pearson College Division, 1993).

3 The term “Creole” originated in colonial times to designate the sons of Spaniards that were born in the Americas. After independence, it became the term used to speak generically about people living under the ex-colonies regardless of their ethnicity. Unlike in the Caribbean, the term did not necessarily refer to people of mixed race. I then use the term “Creole” to designate people living under the Argentine and Chilean provinces governed under state structures regardless of their ethnicity. I take into account that they were not a homogenous unity in terms of ethnicity, class and even, political identity. This complexity will show in chapter 6, where I address important class and political cleavages among the creole society.
economic prosperity by mid-century. They ended decades of warfare amongst the different cacicatos, and consolidated nomadic pastoralist economies that strongly contributed to the development of the Pampas as one of the most important economic centers in the South Atlantic. They participated in creole civil conflicts and forced the Argentine provinces to play by their own rules, based on the principle of reciprocity and kinship ties. In these southern lands, building inter-ethnic alliances continued to be crucial for defining political success.

By the mid-1870s, the Creoles reached political and economic stability under the new Argentine Republic and its agro-export economy. Like in Chile and other frontier regions in the continent, Argentine politicians, military officers and intellectuals decided to end the political system based on inter-ethnic alliances. They engaged in military enterprises to end with their regional economic, political and military competitors. Between 1879 and 1883, the Argentine government organized the “conquest of the desert”, a series of military campaigns whose objectives were to defeat all cacicatos and occupy their territories. The central Pampas and Patagonia regions became to be known as “deserts”, waiting to be filled with people of European descent. Although contemporary historians acknowledge the problematic use of this term, this concept became part of a general interpretation of Argentina’s history. Unlike the United States and Australia, Argentina appeared to be a failed case of frontier development; it could not make the most out of the conquered land, and most of it remained a “desert”. Argentina’s mainstream

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5 Fermín Rodríguez, *Un desierto para la nación: La escritura del vacío* (Buenos Aires: Eterna Cadencia, 2010), and Mónica Quijada, Carmen Bernard and Arhnd Schneider, comps., *Homogeneidad y Nación con un Estudio de caso: Argentina, siglos XIX y XX* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Centro de Humanidades, 2000).

6 See for example, Tulio Halperín Donghi and Roy Hora, *Una nación para el desierto argentino* (Argentina: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1982).
historical narratives continue marginalizing and many times even ignoring the role of indigenous people and frontiers in the history of the Southern Cone.\textsuperscript{7}

This problem replicates in most of the global histories that are centered on state organizations. Historians of Latin America continue using the term “Colonial History” to address the period between 1492 and 1820, and addressing all indigenous territories as “frontiers”, and centuries of political independence as “temporary” or “in the process of” subjugation by state structures. Although in North America scholars decided to re-name the period as the “Early Modern Period,” indigenous societies and frontiers continue to be marginalized from mainstream narratives. Historians Pekka Hämäläinen and Samuel Truett see the answer in research that can intertwine indigenous and transnational perspectives into larger open-ended narratives.\textsuperscript{8}

During the last decades, historians showed that the continent has been ruled by inter-ethnic relations and customs since the Spanish arrived in the Americas.\textsuperscript{9} While colonial empires needed to build their power by adapting their institutions and customs to those of large sedentary indigenous societies, nomadic indigenous societies maintained their independence and continued imposing their political and economic projects over frontier regions. Whether we look at sedentary colonies, frontier regions or indigenous lands, we will usually find that success came from processes of \textit{mestizaje} and adaptations to a polycentric global economy. The 19\textsuperscript{th} century remains as a key transitional moment. Erick Langer argues that the disintegration of the colonial

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empires and the liberalization of trade provided some independent indigenous people with an opportunity to achieve greater power over sedentary Creole societies in the Americas.\textsuperscript{10} The empowerment of the Chiriguanos in the Great Chaco, the Comanches in North America and cacicatos’ confederacies in the Southern Cone show indigenous societies’ capacity to transform and adapt to changing contexts.\textsuperscript{11} These cases were not the last development of the colonial world; they emerged exactly at the time of major global and local transformations.

Building on this historiography, this dissertation aims at “filling the desert” by narrating a part of the history of the people living in the central Pampas and northern Patagonia, and provide a different view of the history of these southern lands. I argue that, at least until the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, these lands were ruled by inter-ethnic alliances and sedentary and nomadic economies due to the empowerment of independent cacicatos. This system was naturalized by both creole and indigenous people. Argentine elites’ decision to turn this world into one dominated by a single political, ethnic and economic model only reached widespread consensus during the 1870s, when the global and local contexts presented new challenges and possibilities. But until that time, I argue that the indigenous confederacies not only brought stability and prosperity to indigenous people living in central Pampas and northern Patagonia, but also expanded their projects over Creoles living under unstable sedentary state structures. They defined creole civil struggles and the forms of doing politics, as well as the economic development of the Pampas. In some circumstances, they even ruled the diplomatic interaction.

In order to develop this argument, I follow three lines of analysis: first, I explore the link between local and global developments; second, I look at indigenous societies’ internal

\textsuperscript{10} Langer, “The Eastern Andean Frontier.”
\textsuperscript{11} For the Comanches, see: Pekka Hämaläinen, \textit{The Comanche Empire} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
transformations, and finally, I analyze their relationship with sedentary Creoles living in the Argentine Provinces. Although I incorporate the Araucanía and Chile in my analysis to explain trans-regional developments, I focus on cacicatos in central Pampas and Patagonia, and the Creoles in the Argentine provinces.

Regarding the first line of analysis, I will show that the indigenous confederacies emerged as a consequence of long-lasting adaptations and innovations in their contact with trans-regional and global technologies, markets, and cultures, which also shaped sedentary Creoles’ developments. Between the end of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century, the liberalization of trade and the increasing international demand for cattle products pushed many cacicatos to migrate into the Pampas in search of wild cattle and grassland for them and trans-regional markets to sell their livestock. In this process, they consolidated nomadic pastoralist economies and expanded trans-regional trade between the Araucanía and the Pampas. Meanwhile, Creoles expanded cattle-ranching production to the Pampas and the Litoral region, undermining the older colonial trade networks linked with the Andean region. Cacicatos’ transformations and migrations also generated intensive intra-ethnic competition and warfare, which intertwined with the Creole struggle for independence on both sides of the Andes Mountains. As a consequence, warfare, militarization, political instability and economic competition shaped these southern regions during the first decades of the 19th century.

However, this convulsive period was also a unique moment of political innovation. While Creole political factions organized Argentine provincial governments under unstable confederacies and republics, cacicatos constructed two stable multiethnic confederacies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia.
Figure 1. Regions, Indigenous Groups and Creole Settlements in the South, Mid-19th Century. Source: creation of Gabriel Giordanengo (INGEIS-CONICET) based on my instructions.
The Pampas Confederacy emerged in 1841 and was led by Cacique Juan Calfucurá from Llaima (Araucanía). Calfucurá permanently settled in Salinas Grandes (between modern Buenos Aires and La Pampa provinces), created alliances and led migrant and local cacicatos. He soon gained the alliance of the Ranqueles, living in Mamil Mapu, “el país del monte” (woodlands), and the Tapalqueros. As we can see in Fig 1, the permanent settlements and mobile tolderías (group of toldos)\(^{12}\) from this Confederacy together covered and controlled a large transregional area extending from Llaima in the west to the Buenos Aires’ frontier in the east. To the north they controlled as far as the frontier towns in the provinces of Córdoba and San Luis, which included the main E-W road from Buenos Aires to Mendoza and Santiago.

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy emerged during the 1850s and was led by the Huilliche-Tehuelche cousins, Caciques José María Bulnes Llanquirúz and Valentín Saygüeque. These caciques built permanent settlements in Manzanas (south of modern Neuquén province), and San Javier (north of modern Río Negro province) from where they centralized alliances with local and migrant cacicatos. They also allied southern Tehuelches and, with their mobile tolderías, also attained a trans-regional influence, from Manzanas in the west, then following the Río Negro till the Atlantic Ocean in the east and south to Valcheta. Both confederacies also allied circumstantially with cacicatos from the Araucanía and Pitrufquén (south of the Araucanía), as well as frontier posts close to their territories.

Building on local historians’ work and my own research, I show that the indigenous confederacies’ success in bringing political stability and relative economic prosperity to its members between 1840 and 1879 was partly based on the transformation of their segmental

\(^{12}\) Toldo was the family home or tent built by nomads since before the arrival of the Spaniards. It was built with branches and animal hides and was easy to transport. There were different types in the region and they changed over time, but they remained being homes adapted to seasonal migrations.
structure and economies. Cacicatos managed to avoid recurring political fragmentations and combined nomadic and sedentary strategies that allowed survival and prosperity to most of its members. On the one hand, they made kinship ties more flexible to incorporate and maintain multiethnic allies from distant territories. By controlling the access to trade networks and diplomacy, caciques manipulated the logic of reciprocity to increase subalterns’ subordination as well as allies’ dependency on the confederate leader. But consensus politics, local autonomy and reciprocal logic counterbalanced these centralizing and stratifying tendencies. Overall, kinship worked as their ideology of power, it was their language of inequality. These polities also exercised power over Creoles, who had their own kinship forms and languages of inequalities. Through persuasion, negotiation and selective use of violence, caciques forced creole governments in the region to work within the framework of their diplomatic policy. This policy was based on building peace through real and fictive kinship ties in order to enforce material and political reciprocal obligations. Until the 1870s, provincial and national governments largely became tributaries of the cacicato confederacies.

On the other hand, these confederacies developed prosperous nomadic pastoralist economies in a context of increasing international demand for agricultural and cattle products. By forming permanent and mobile tolderías, confederate cacicatos reached and controlled resources and people in widespread ecological zones, from the Araucanía on the Pacific to the Pampas and Patagonia on the Atlantic. They maintained subsistence economies at a domestic level, while specialized in breeding, herding and commercializing horses and cattle. This

organization allowed them to face environmental, political and trading challenges, sometimes even more successfully than sedentary Creoles. Overall, these nomadic pastoralist economies not only contributed to the agro-export expansion of the Pampas, but extended into northern Patagonia where creole presence was minimal. Their on-going customs of redistribution and cooperation also allowed the confederacies to attract labor and followers in regions with abundant natural resources and structural scarcity of labor.\(^{14}\)

Regarding the last line of analysis, I show that these indigenous confederacies shaped the important development of these southern lands. Cacicatos became active political and military allies of creole political factions, as well as the confederate projects that attempted to hold the Argentine provinces together until the 1870s.\(^{15}\) Caciques adapted their diplomacy to negotiate with frontier commanders, governors and presidents as equal partners. They had specialized writers, translators and readers in charge of writing and reading the official correspondence. They sent diplomatic commissions to the capital cities with specific protocols to meet governors and presidents in person, and many sent their sons to schools to learn how to read and write. Caciques also organized parliaments\(^{16}\) to discuss policies with Creole commissioners and allied caciques, institutions that also followed specific ceremonial and political protocols. Cacicatos incorporated military titles and hierarchies, and the men even dressed in military uniforms (see

\(^{14}\) In spite of the demographic growth of the Pampas during the 1830s, labor continued to be scarce. This labor tendency only changed after 1870, when European immigrants arrived to the region in massive numbers. Juan Carlos Garavaglia and Jorge Gelman, “Capitalismo agrario en la frontera. Buenos Aires y la región pampeana en el siglo XIX”, *Historia Agraria*, 29 (April, 2003):105-121, and Eduardo Míguez, “Mano de obra, población rural y mentalidades en la economía de tierras abiertas de la provincia de Buenos Aires,” *Anuario IEHS*, 12 (1997).

\(^{15}\) José Carlos Chiaramonte, *Ciudad, provincia, estados: Orígenes de la Nación Argentina (1800-1856)* (Buenos Aires: Ariel, 1997).

\(^{16}\) “Parlament” was the Spanish name used to categorize cacicatos’ diplomatic meetings formed to organize alliances and solve conflicts. Usually, several *parlas* (smaller meetings) preceded a big parliament. Luz María Méndez, “La organización de los parlamentos de indios en el siglo XVIII,” Sergio Villalobos, et. al., *Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía* (Chile: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1982). Also, see Carlos Lázaro Ávila, “Parlamentos de Paz en la Araucanía y las pampas: una visión comparativa (1604-1820),” *Memoria Americana, Cuadernos de Etnohistoria*, vol. 7 (1998): 29-60.
pictures in appendix E). Caciques treated Creole authorities as equal partners in their expansive web of reciprocal obligations. Regardless of whether all creole authorities saw them as equal partners or not, they had to negotiate with caciques and respect their forms and customs to achieve hegemonic control over the Creole society, especially in frontier regions. This was probably why, most of creole political projects of domination included alliances with caciques and policies of integration and assimilation until mid-1870s.\(^\text{17}\)

The indigenous confederacies actively intervened in the geopolitics of the southern lands. The Pampas Confederacy pressured Buenos Aires authorities to return to the Argentine Confederacy during the 1850s as well as to expand its tributary obligations with cacicatos. Through selective military actions and diplomacy, both indigenous confederacies contributed to the reunification of the Argentine provinces in 1861 without the military and economic cost of Creole governments.\(^\text{18}\) Instead, their intervention assured the continuity of Creoles’ tributary obligations to cacicatos and the expansion of trade. During the 1860s and 1870s, cacicatos intra-ethnic politics also shaped the civil conflicts between the federalists and the national government in the Cuyo region. Cacicatos from southern Cuyo, which had been diminished by the changing patterns in trade and the new Creole and indigenous centers of political power, participated in these confrontations and conflicts. The federalist* montoneras*\(^\text{19}\) organized in southern Cuyo were multi-ethnic and aimed at recovering local and regional power. The Pampas Confederacy’s main caciques and President Mitre faced this resistance in alliance and confrontation. Caciques’

\(^{17}\) Pedro Navarro Floria, “Continuidad y fin del trato pacífico con los indígenas de la Pampa y la Patagonia en el discurso político estatal argentino (1853-1879),” *Anuario IEHS*, 19 (2004): 517-537
\(^{18}\) Juan Carlos Garavaglia has shown that the battles of Caseros (1859) and Pavón (1861) left the provincial and national governments with great debts. Juan Carlos Garavaglia, *La disputa por la construcción nacional argentina* (Buenos Aires: Prometeo, 2015).
\(^{19}\) *Montoneras* were attacks and sieges of towns and cities by federalist leaders and *gauchos*. 
insistence to negotiate internal and external peace limited the violent solutions proposed by some Creole authorities and elites at that time.

In terms of economics, the indigenous confederacies also contributed to Buenos Aires’ increasing economic power. They gave Buenos Aires access to their commercial networks that linked the Pacific and Araucanía with the Pampas. Unlike Creoles living in Mendoza and San Juan, cacicatos controlled the lower passes that crossed the Andes Mountains as well as the trails along the Ríos Negro and Colorado. Exportable goods, such as hides, textiles and feathers, flowed to frontier posts in Buenos Aires as well as temporary and permanent labor. These resources and people strongly contributed to frontier towns’ subsistence and growth. On the down-side, this economic development contributed to Cuyo’s economic decline. In the long run, the indigenous confederacies’ economic expansion and power increased Creole authorities and elites interest in their lands, resources, trade networks and labor.

**Defining Territorial Domains**

In order to incorporate indigenous societies into mainstream narratives, we need to understand diverse forms of territorial and political domains, and go beyond “state hegemonic expansion” as the main frame of analysis. Only then can we insert cacicatos back into frontier experiences, but as autonomous subjects.

In the past decades, a rich historiography on frontiers introduced new concepts and perspectives to the colonial and modern history of the Americas. By defying Frederick Turner’s

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20 Cuyo is the region formed by the provinces of San Juan, San Luis and Mendoza. The Pehuenches and Ranqueles used to control the southern lands of modern San Luis and Mendoza. During colonial times, the region was closely tied with the cities and markets in Chile. See fig. 2 in Chapter I.
definition of frontier, concepts such as borderland\textsuperscript{21}, contact point and middle ground\textsuperscript{22} better describe the contested and negotiated aspect of frontier experiences and relationships.\textsuperscript{23} Nevertheless, we face a conceptual problem when trying to build comparative interpretations. Part of the historiography on North America insists on distinguishing frontiers from borderlands based on European polities’ actions in these lands.\textsuperscript{24} When considering all the polities and economies that interacted in frontiers in the Americas, the differentiation between borderland and frontier (understood as contested and common space between diverse societies) seems meaningless.\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, geographically speaking, I consider all spaces of encounter as frontiers, but I recognize that there were different frontier experiences according to the particular actors involved, contexts, and type of relationships established.


\textsuperscript{22} Richard White defined “middle ground” as a definite, comprehensible and common space where diverse groups interacted and adapted through creative and conflictive processes. This was the case of the Algonquians and French traders in the Great Lakes during colonial times. Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (United States: Cambridge University Press, 1991).


\textsuperscript{24} Many works followed Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron’s article on the subject. These historians defined frontier as a “meeting place of people in which geographic and cultural borders were not clearly defined.” Instead, borderlands were the territories where more than one colonial empire contested power, such as the Great Lakes, and they rarely replicated in the rest of the Americas. This interpretation is problematic not only because Latin America also had territories where different European empires and later nation-states contested power, such as the Guarani region, but also because it excludes non-state societies from the conceptualization of territorial domains. Aron and Adelman, “From Borderlands to Borders,” pp. 815-816.

\textsuperscript{25} The only relevant difference might be to differentiate a border understood as a fictional line that divides jurisdictions from frontiers. The use of the term borderland has also an unclear translation in Spanish as “la tierra fronteriza o limitrofe,” while frontier is easily translated as “la frontera.”
This understanding requires differentiating frontiers from other territorial domains. Nomadic societies challenge this task, as their territorial domains are sometimes scattered and temporary, more linked with the use than with the permanent occupation of land, and many times shared between different groups of people. 26 Territorial dominions might be better defined according to social relationships over the use of land than to fixed boundaries.

In the Pampas and northern Patagonia, different groups of cacicatos controlled specific territories and routes, while they shared others. They mixed more permanent *tolderías* in specific territories, such as Salinas Grandes, Leuvucó, Poitagüe, Tapalqué, Manzanas and San Javier, with mobile *tolderías*, frequently located in lands shared with others groups according to seasonal, hunting and trading patterns (see fig. 1). They also controlled specific traveling and trading routes, and demanded payment from anyone that wanted to cross through or use their domains. These transactions were understood under a reciprocal logic. As we can see in figure 1, the confederacies under study controlled specific passes in the Andes Mountains and most of the eastern sections of the trails along the Río Negro and Río Colorado that guaranteed trans-regional mobility and trade. But they shared the trails from Choelechoel Island to the Andes Mountains with Pehuenches and visitors from the west. The Choelechoel Island was one of the most important strategic places that linked the trails from the Andes to the Pampas and northern Patagonia, and offered a secure place to camp while traveling. Small parties or individuals

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guarded the control of strategic points that gave access to the *tolderías*, and visitors had to follow a specific protocol of salutation and respect to avoid conflicts with the ruling cacicatos.\(^{27}\)

Regarding the creole society, provincial governments controlled the urban centers under their jurisdiction which were usually, but not always, larger that the permanent *tolderías*. Nonetheless, they had limited power over rural spaces and frontier towns sparsely populated. Although most provinces had agreed to ally under a Federal Confederacy around 1835, the confederate government only held the right to declare war and exercise diplomacy.\(^{28}\) Hence, the Argentine Confederacy (1852-1861) and the Argentine Republic (after 1862) had even less direct control on provincial and local populations.

Unlike cacicatos, Creoles had formal institutions and bureaucracies that guaranteed some continuity and stability. Their finances basically depended on provincial and confederate customs income. During the period under study, creole governments had major difficulties in organizing the customs income as well as paying for their expenditures.\(^{29}\) They had to ask for foreign loans, and their debts quickly built up, especially after the civil battles of the 1850s and 1860s, and the Paraguayan War (1865-1870).

As a consequence, Creoles’ political organization was, in some way, also built of “segments.” Until 1880, the local, provincial and confederate state units were ruled by elites whose power depended on building and expanding patron-client relationships and loyalties at all

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\(^{27}\) Travelers described the series of procedures, warning and precautions that their guides took when moving through the Pampas and Patagonia. Delrio y Ramos, “Reunidos en Futa Trawun.” *Agencias políticas y alianzas identitarias desde los parlamentos mapuche-tehuelche,* VIII *Congreso Argentino de Antropología Social*, Salta, September 19-22, 2006.

\(^{28}\) In 1813, José Artigas proposed to form a Confederacy in a Constituent Assembly. Delegates of each province were supposed to form and participate in a Confederate Congress. But the Confederacy would not start working as the accepted political model until the federal Juan Manuel de Rosas government around 1835. Chiaramonte, *Ciudad, provincia, estados*, and “El federalismo argentino en la primer mitad del siglo XIX,” in M. Carmagnani, ed., *Federalismos latinoamericanos: México, Brasil, Argentina, México* (México: FCE, 1993).

\(^{29}\) Juan Carlos Garavaglia, *La disputa por la construcción nacional argentina.*
levels. Elections became contested armed battles to gain the resources and privileges that came with the control of the government. Controlling provincial and national customs income became one of the key issues of struggle between political factions and allowed for cross-class alliances, as subaltern sectors were also strongly affected by increasing regional disparity between the Northern provinces and Cuyo on the one hand, and Buenos Aires and the Litoral on the other. The political projects of the unitario and federalist parties were also about fighting this increasing regional disequilibrium. They disputed the type of union they would create—a federalist confederacy or a centralized union-, and the role of Buenos Aires—as the capital city of the union or as another autonomous province. These civil struggles and fights brought decades of violence, fragmentation and instability to the creole society until 1880. Hence, the effective rule of provincial elites over the cities, rural regions and frontier towns in their jurisdictions was fragmented and contested.

Cacicatos participated in creoles’ struggles and political alliances, especially by negotiating agreements, loyalties and business with frontier officers, ranchers and merchants. The frontier society was specialized in agriculture and cattle ranching activities for export. Creoles lived in rural towns, large estancias, and middle-size and small rancherías. Their economies were based on family scale production. By mid-century provincial and national

31 In 1880, Buenos Aires definitely became the economic center of the nation. But the national government, ruled by an alliance of provincial oligarchies, controlled the international customs revenue by making the City of Buenos Aires the capital of the nation. From then on, the national government achieved political stability but sometimes at the expense of provincial governments’ autonomy. Natalio Botana, El orden conservador: la política argentina entre 1880 y 1916 (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1977).
governments tried to control the areas closer to the towns by forcing the registration of private properties. Nevertheless, the organization of rural regions continued relying on local residents.\textsuperscript{33} Local creole elites maintained a strong control of municipalities and justice.\textsuperscript{34} The defense of these regions also rested on local militias and allied cacicatos, and sometimes received help from provincial militias and regular forces.\textsuperscript{35}

Although the Creoles entered the \textit{tolderías} and indigenous people accessed big cities, most indigenous people and the Creoles interacted in a porous frontier region composed of frontier towns and posts, mobile and permanent \textit{tolderías} and shared grazing and hunting grounds next to these towns. This physical space was a contested region where middle-ground dynamics could take place. For example, cacicatos and Creoles living in Buenos Aires’ frontier formalized political and economic agreements during the 1820s to confront migrant cacicatos and the royalist Pincheiras’ attacks as well as the scarce military and economic resources provided by the provincial government.\textsuperscript{36} Some of these groups became known as \textit{indios amigos} due to their close ties with creole at frontiers.\textsuperscript{37} Therefore, the geopolitics in the southern lands was defined by the power-relationships among and between cacicatos and creole parties. Alliances cross-cut ethnic divides and linked \textit{tolderías} with frontier towns, rural ranches and cities.


\textsuperscript{34} Ratto, \textit{Redes políticas en la frontera bonaerense (1836-1873). Crónicas de un final anunciado} (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes, 2015); Míguez, “La frontera sur de Buenos Aires y la consolidación del Estado liberal, 1852-1880,” and Bragoni and Míguez, eds., \textit{Un nuevo orden político}.


\textsuperscript{37} Ratto, “Indios amigos e indios aliados. Orígenes del negocio pacífico en la provincia de Buenos Aires (1829-1832),” \textit{Cuadernos del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani}, 5 (1994):5-34.
Most creole frontier towns and posts were settled during the colonial period from the Andes Mountains to Buenos Aires. Provincial governments’ expansion over the frontier region rested on settling new forts, towns and rural posts. Up to the 1870s, this expansion was restricted due to institutional, military and economic limitations as well as to the cacicatos’ power. Although Creoles increased their presence in frontiers and into cacicatos’ lands during the 19th century, this phenomenon cannot be simply seen as evidence of “state expansion.” Settlers moved in the search for grazing land, water and hunting grounds. This migration sometimes involved violence against cacicatos, but most times occurred when settlers negotiated with caciques to use their land. While in some cases, this pushed cacicatos south, most of the times creole migrants remained subject to cacicatos’ rules, control and expansive policies. Therefore, this phenomenon was also explained by cacicatos’ strategies of cooptation.

Cacicatos’ expansion over the frontier region was not based on permanently occupying land, but on accessing resources, trade and labor according to the needs of their nomadic pastoralist economies. By building kinship ties and settling economic agreements, they incorporated people of different ethnicities into their web of reciprocal obligations. In addition to trade, Creoles participated in cacicatos’ economies by “renting” their lands, providing “loans” in their commercial houses, engaging in gift-giving customs and social rituals, and working as messengers, soldiers and intermediaries. Through negotiation and selective violence, they also turned frontier settlements’ and provincial governments into tributaries. They forced creole

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38 As exceptions, Chilean settlers expanded beyond the Río Biobío pushing cacicatos south between 1840 and 1861. In Buenos Aires, creoles also expanded their settlements beyond the Río Salado between 1815 and 1830, but many of these new settlements had to retreat after the 1830s due to cacicatos’ power and provinces’ limitation. Pablo Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s Frontier Administration and the Origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859,” *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, vol. 25, no. 50 (2000): 131-167; Garavaglia and Gelman, “Capitalismo agrario en la frontera.”
governments to provide them with periodic delivery of goods, animals and cloth, which became to be known as *raciones*, under the threat of *malones*. From their perspective, friendship, territory and food were inseparable elements of political alliances. Finally, they also increased their labor through captivity. To avoid problems with Creoles who were under their web of reciprocal obligations, they usually captured and bought captives that were originally from distant frontier towns.

Therefore, until the 1870s, autonomous cacicatos and the creole society controlled the access to some territories while shared others, and met in porous frontier regions under cooperative and competitive dynamics. Inter-ethnic relationships shaped all political, economic and cultural developments in these southern regions.

*Segmental and Nomadic Pastoralist Organizations*

The use of the theoretical frameworks proposed by Marshall Sahlins, Pierre Clastres, and Pierre Bourdieu, among others, helped include societies with segmental and nomadic pastoralist organizations in world systems theory. Instead of following evolutionary scales where sedentary state societies appear as “more evolved” than nomadic tribes, Sahlins associates societies’ economic and environmental needs with the type of polity they created. He argues

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41 By analyzing the work and productivity of societies with “subsistence economies” in Africa and Australia, he showed that their organization was a product of their material and environmental needs that become institutionalized as a positive cultural fact, like the idea of “wealth as a burden.” Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics*, p.12.
that segmental societies are usually founded on an economic disconformity that lends itself to dispute. In the absence of “mechanisms for holding a growing community together,” these disputes many times result in fission.\textsuperscript{42} Clastres went beyond Sahlins’ analysis to argue that, in order to maintain their self-government, segmental societies conserve a perpetual state of war.\textsuperscript{43} As a consequence, they become “societies against the state.” These works helped local historians to explain the reasons and dynamics behind cacicatos’ fragmentation tendency.\textsuperscript{44}

Later, Ferguson and Whitehead contributed to understand segmental societies’ change in time. They proposed the idea of “tribalization” as the process by which indigenous tribes restructured their polities -forming new alliances, confederacies and chieftaincies- in the face of extreme changes produced by colonial states’ expansion, especially the spread of unknown diseases and warfare.\textsuperscript{45} New polities were formed to survive colonial intrusion and to participate in new trading networks. Local historians used this theoretical framework to understand cacicatos’ increasing militarization and political centralization by the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{46} In addition, they used the work of Clastres and Bourdieu to place segmental and state structures as contemporary competing polities. Local historians recognize that power did not rely on monopolizing the use of force. Power could emerge from different ways of influencing others,

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\textsuperscript{42} Ibid. p. 98
\textsuperscript{43} Clastres, \textit{Society Against the State}.
\textsuperscript{44} Bechis, \textit{Interethnic Relations during the Period of Nation-State formation in Chile and Argentina}.
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and leaders could accumulate economic, political and informational capitals to build their leaderships.\textsuperscript{47}

In spite of the important contribution of these frameworks, their application to our region of study also drives historians to interpret all indigenous societies’ changes as responses to “state expansion.” This interpretation contradicts historians’ acknowledgment of the limited coercive power of state units in the region and period of study.\textsuperscript{48} The indigenous confederacies did not emerge as a response to “state expansion,” but as a creative adaptation to regional and global contexts that were also shaping the neighboring sedentary society.

Historians also run the risk of inserting these polities back into the classic European-derived evolutionary schemes: from band to tribe to chiefdoms to agrarian states. Several local historians started characterizing the supra-cacicato alliances that emerged in the Pampas and northern Patagonia as \textit{jefaturas} (chiefdoms) following Elman Service and Carneiro’s definition.\textsuperscript{49} These studies argue in favor of the emergence of strong chiefs who established

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid. and Boccara, “Notas acerca de los dispositivos de poder en la sociedad colonial-fronteriza, la resistencia y la transculturación de los reche-mapuche del centro-sur de Chile (XVI-XVIII),” \textit{Revista de Indias}, vol. LVI, no. 28, (1996)

\textsuperscript{48} Some historians acknowledged governments’ coercive weakness and applied Michel Foucault’s concept of “state devices” to analyze states indirect and invisible ways of imposing power over autonomous’ cacicatos. Nevertheless, this interpretation continues implying the existence of a “state” power behind those devises, and obscures our understanding of cacicatos’ own innovations, forms of power and expansive policies. Some of these works are: Boccara, “Notas acerca de los dispositivos de poder en la sociedad colonial-fronteriza, la resistencia y la transculturación de los reche-mapuche del centro-sur de Chile (XVI-XVIII);” Ingrid de Jong, “Políticas indígenas y estatales en pampa y Patagonia (1850-1880),” \textit{Habitus, Giana}, vol. 5, no. 2 (jul/dez 2007): 301-331, and Langer, “The Eastern Andean Frontier.”

dynastic power and strengthened military hierarchies among followers and allied groups. This process would implicate what Clastres described as the end of self-government in primitive societies.\textsuperscript{50} Nonetheless, most historians recognize that self-government and consensus politics continued being respected political values even by the main caciques.\textsuperscript{51} The principal chiefs also attained ambiguous levels of centralization and institutionalization. While Vezub resolved this problem by calling Saygüeque’s leadership in northern Patagonia a “new type” of chiefdom, others continued categorizing these polities as segmental organizations incapable of overcoming their tendency to fragment.\textsuperscript{52}

I believe that fixed anthropological categories complicate understanding polities’ change and the particular contexts where these polities emerged. As de Jong argued, these categories also limit our understanding of the extension of indigenous ethnic, kinship and political ties.\textsuperscript{53} The use of the concept of chiefdom drives our attention to the central leadership when some of the most interesting aspects of this new polity were the diverse levels of obligations established among allies, as well as the delicate equilibrium achieved between segmental autonomy and political centralization. We also have to differentiate common transformations perceived by all

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\textsuperscript{50} Clastres, \textit{Archeology of Violence}.
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\textsuperscript{52} Vezub defines the “new type” of chiefdom as a “non-state society where power was the principal source of organization, constructed over already constituted bases, strengthened by a permanent pact with the emerging Nation-State, the militarization of kinship relationships, and the digitalization of specific forms of identity in a context of cultural hybridity.” Among the other historians, we find Bechis and, de Jong and Ratto. Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}; Bechis, “Los lideratos políticos en el área arauco-pampeana en el siglo XIX;” de Jong, “Políticas indígenas y estatales en pampa y Patagonia (1850-1880),” and de Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana.”
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\textsuperscript{53} De Jong, “Políticas indígenas y estatales en pampa y Patagonia (1850-1880).”
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cacicatos from the creation of these two unique types of alliances.\textsuperscript{54} While most cacicatos faced an increasing militarization of ranks and tried to form more stable alliances to rule over specific regions, only two major trans-regional alliances emerged in the Pampas and northern Patagonia. These two polities managed to contain many smaller and larger cacicatos.

Although we could consider using Mapuche terms and vocabulary to solve the conceptual problem, our sources and the hybrid aspect of the groups under study limit this possibility as well. We find political categories and practices in the letters written by secretaries and caciques to state authorities as well as from travelers’ accounts.\textsuperscript{55} But these documents were written mostly in Spanish, shaped by the writers and usually used creole categories. In addition, most of the ruling lineages and cacicatos in the regions under study, were the result of processes of ethnogenesis and alliance between Mapudungun speakers, whom migrated to the east, and local groups of Güü̯na-küne speakers known as Pampas and Tehuelches, among others.\textsuperscript{56} Supra-cacicato polities borrowed customs and institutions from diverse political traditions. They used Mapudungun speakers’ parliaments for internal and diplomatic decision-making in the Araucanía. Like the nomadic Pampas, they organized and moved their tolderías between shared hunting and grazing lands in response to seasonal and military challenges. Finally, caciques incorporated writing in diplomatic negotiations as well as the military paraphernalia of the creole

\textsuperscript{54} Point brought by Ratto and de Jong, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana.”
\textsuperscript{55} See Caciques’ letters in: Jorge Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, Siglo XIX (Santiago de Chile: CoLibris & Ocho Libros, 2008), and Marcela Tamaginin, ed., Cartas de Frontera. Los documentos del conflicto interétnico (Río Cuarto: Universidad Nacional de Río Cuarto, 2011).
society to mark internal hierarchies. Therefore, although the political culture of Mapudungun speakers strongly influenced the emergence of centralized alliances in the Pampas and northern Patagonia, these polities do not seem to exactly replicate the terms we find in the Araucanía. This was probably due to economic organizational differences. Only after the military campaigns of 1879-1883, most of the indigenous people on both sides of the Andes used Mapuche terminology and claimed a Mapuche identity as an act of solidarity and common resistance.

In order to find categories that explain these cases’ particularities while also allowing comparative studies, I find it important to highlight two aspects of cacicatos’ political innovation: their kinship politics and their nomadic pastoralist organization. The permanent alliances formed by cacicatos by mid-century were still based on kinship ties and a reciprocal logic. Migrant caciques turned people of diverse origins into relatives by extending the practice of polygamy (polygyny and polyandry), serial monogamy and compadrazgo to distant cacicatos. These relationships forced people to respect the reciprocal obligations expected from these kinship ties with their relatives. Caciques also framed diplomacy with state units through

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57 Although caciques incorporated writing in their diplomatic negotiations, it did not replace verbal negotiations and agreements. Caciques’ correspondence was also shaped by the secretaries, usually of mestizo or creole origin, whom wrote most of their letters. For an analysis on the subject, see: Julio Vezub, “Mapuche-Tehuelche Spanish writing and Argentinian-Chilean expansion during the 19th century,” Adrien Delmas and Nigel Penn, eds., Written Culture in a Colonial Context: Africa and the Americas 1500-1900 (Boston: Brill, 2012), pp. 215-242.

58 In the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains, the reyes were strongly linked to specific territories occupied by cacicatos with semi-sedentary organizations. This is also probably why migrants changed their rucas (Mapudungun speakers’ round big houses made of coligue (cane), wood and totora (thatch)) for toldos when they settled in the Pampas. José Bengoa, Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur: desde antes de la llegada de los españoles hasta las paces de Quilín (Santiago de Chile: Catalonia, 2003), and Boccara, Los vencedores.

59 Important exceptions are: Bechis, “Matrimonio y política en la génesis de dos parcialidades mapuche durante el siglo XIX,” Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, and Bello, Nampilwafe. There are also several works on cacicatos’ economies, but these are not framed as cases of nomadic pastoralists.

60 Martha Bechis found cases of polyandry in some lineages that migrated to the Pampas and used these institutions to build alliances with local groups. The practice known as compadrazgo was of Spanish origin and implied a relationship of protection and many times subordination - between adults and children. Cacicatos also built these types of ties which became even more common after the contact with the Spanish and the Catholic Church, which made these ties sacred as baptisms. Also, like Bello argues, some groups justified their appropriation of territories and resources by appealing to kinship rights. Ibid., and María Bjerg, “Vínculos Mestizos. Historias de amor y
kinship politics. Their letters show how the alliances were usually seen as alliances among “brothers,” and expected material and symbolic obligations from these ties. They even incorporated creole authorities into their ceremonial practice known as *lakutun*, which involved children or adults’ adoption of their prestigious god-parent or protectors’ names. 

This was the case, for example, of Caciques José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz, Mariano Rosas, and Manuel Baigorrita.

Therefore, kinship politics allowed indigenous and creole allies to maintain their autonomy while becoming part of supra-local alliances. But kinship also worked as caciques’ ideology of power. Their strategy implied turning reciprocal obligations among relatives into forms of domination.

Although confederate leaders used violence and coercion to build their leadership, they ended resting on diplomatic skills to gain internal stability. The creative aspect of kinship politics allowed the incorporation of some innovations, such as the material wealth and military prowess as sources of power to define lineages’ succession, without dismissing lineages as the main form of legalizing political power and territorial claims. 

They also solved the intrinsic competition of male brothers for the lineage’s succession by maintaining “equal power” among brothers, at

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61 Historically, the ceremony known as *lakutun* involved naming a child after his prestigious grandfather. It was usually practiced among caciques. In time, this practice became widespread and involved naming indigenous children, and sometimes adults, after their protectors or godparents. Andrea Aravea, “Los mapuches-warriache procesos migratorios e identidad mapuche urbana en el siglo XX,” Boccara, ed., Colonización, resistencia y mestizaje en las Américas, pp.359-382, p.379

62 In Chile, historians attribute most of these changes to Spanish intrusion on cacicato politics. Although I agree that the Spanish tried to modify cacicatos’ structures to their convenience, they had limited power over autonomous cacicatos. Bengoa, *Historia del pueblo Mapuche*; Boccara, *Vencedores*, and Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s Frontier Administration and the Origin of the Mapuche Revolt of 1859.”
least at a discursive level, and locating their *tolderías* in distant territories. This not only prevented competition, it also allowed lineages and allies to access distant regions and markets.

Regarding their economic specialization, the transformation of both sedentary and nomadic groups into nomadic pastoralists was a long and complex process that started when cattle and horses were introduced in the region. Indians prioritized horses from early times due to their economic and military advantage over warriors on foot. The incorporation of cattle was easily combined with breeding and raising horses. In these regions, both animals had few natural predators. Unlike the bison and horses among Comanches, cows and horses followed similar seasonal movements. These animals competed for the same grass and water, but could be raised together. Their grazing and water requirements demanded periodic movements. While migrant sedentary cacicatos left the *ruca* for the *toldo* to ease mobility, local cacicatos started to integrate permanent *tolderías* in strategic regions. Mobile *tolderías* required building and maintaining ties with people in different regions.

63 See the cases of Calfucurá and Reuquecurá in chapter two, and Llanquitrúz and Saygüeque in chapter four.
64 I agree with Palermo’s critique to the use of *equestrian complex* to understand complex socio-economic and political changes of indigenous polities. But understanding cacicatos’ economies as cases of nomadic pastoralists also can help understand their economic complexity and change over time as well as its relationship with political transformations. Miguel Ángel Palermo, “Reflexiones sobre el llamado ‘complejo ecuestre’ en la Argentina.” *Runa. Archivo para las Ciencias del Hombre*, XXII, (1986).
66 Their predators were pumas, cats and jaguars. Alioto explains that pumas only attacked the young, so they did not really impact their mortality rates, and were more common in dry areas and mountains. Jaguars were more threatening, but were usually in the woods or water basins, on river and lake shores such as the Chascomús Lake and Rincón del Tuyú. Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera*, p.52, footnote 99.
67 Hämäläinen explains that there was tension between pastoralism and bison hunting because they required contrasting nomadic behaviors. While pastoralism required frequent movements, hunting needed of “more sweeping migration punctuated with periods of immobility.” Mobility was key in this economy. Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*, p.246.
68 The *ruca* or *rukas* were Mapudungun speakers’ round big houses made of *coligue*, wood and *totora*. José Bengoa, *Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur*. 
Between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries, the liberalization of trade increased the demand for agricultural and cattle products in the region. Cacicatos responded to this demand by raising and stocking cattle almost exclusively for commercial purposes. In exchange, cacicatos obtained from sedentary societies resources they did not produce, such as weapons, tools, manufactures and luxury goods (such as alcohol, tobacco and yerba mate). Barfield explains that “pastoralists’ surplus animals are continually at risk” due to disease, drought, storms or theft. As a consequence, they have strong incentives “to exchange surplus animals for other goods or engage in regular patterns of slaughter to prevent waste.”

Therefore, nomadic pastoralists did not need large sedentary settlements to stock numerous surplus animals, but to assure continuous access and distribution of resources.

In order to gain economic stability and prosperity, cacicatos in our region of study had to assure subsistence from diversified domestic economies. In addition to raising and herding cattle and horses, they practiced some agriculture, hunted, gathered, and produced textiles. They also needed access to resources from different ecological zones, and maintained multiple markets.

Under these economic and military necessities, cacicatos had to preserve some level of political autonomy as well as to increase cooperation and expand their access to trade, resources and labor.

After considering the political and economic particularities of cacicatos’ alliances, I find that the term confederacy better categorizes the supra-segmental polities that emerged in the Pampas and northern Patagonia. A confederacy, as a union of people or associations,

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69 Barfield, The Nomadic Alternative.
particularizes allies beyond the main leader and highlights the associative aspect of the polity. Historians already used this term to categorize other indigenous segmental societies of the continent, such as the Chiriguanos, the Comanches and the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois). In this last case, historians argue that the Iroquois Confederacy allowed its member tribes to gain internal peace and stability for almost three centuries as well as to expand its territories and influence. This put limits to the French and English imperial presence in North America. On a small scale, the indigenous confederacies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia also ended decades of intra-ethnic violence, assuring stability and prosperity to its members. They expanded their influence to trans-regional levels and limited state units’ expansion in the region. In some way, these confederacies were a pact between cacicatos for internal peace and a project to expand indigenous political power. Although they also used violence as a form of expansion, diplomacy became their main way of gaining allies and increasing resources.

In addition, the term confederacy allows an easier integration of cacicatos into regional and global contexts. Confederacy was also the word used by Creoles to categorize their union of provinces between 1835 and 1862. Although after 1862 the union became to be known as the

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72 In the case of these matrilineal sedentary societies, their Confederacy reached an impressive level of institutionalization in the rule of its Councils, laws and diplomatic negotiations. It created its own Constitution during the 18th century. Neta Crawford even proposed to see the Iroquois League or Confederacy as an example of a successful security regime. Daniel Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse; Francis Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from Its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York: Norton & Company, 1984), and The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the six nations and their League (Syracuse N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995), and Crawford, “A Security Regime among Democracies: Cooperation among Iroquois Nations,” International Organization, vol. 47, no. 3 (Summer, 1994): 345-385.

73 In 1813, José Artigas proposed to form a Confederacy in a Constituent Assembly. Delegates of each province were supposed to form and participate in a Confederate Congress. But the Confederacy would not start working as the accepted political model until the federal Juan Manuel de Rosas government around 1835. Chiaramonte, Ciudad, 27
Argentine Republic, it maintained a federal structure in practice until 1880. During the time under study, the Creoles and cacicatos continuously conceived each other as potential allies and members of their own confederacies.

Therefore, applying the term confederacy to the polities under study allows comparisons among diverse societies while maintaining the specificities of cacicatos’ case. It also speaks of a world shaped by multi-ethnic alliances and the process of *mestizaje*.

**Particularities of Cacicatos’ Confederacies**

The Pampas and the Northern Patagonian Confederacies were formed by cacicatos that agreed to delegate some of their diplomatic rights to a confederate leader and his lineage. In theory, any cacicato could become independent or could choose a different leader. Nonetheless, these radical ruptures almost never happened in the period under study. Allies became increasingly dependent on the confederate leadership to hold internal peace, gain military support against others’ threats, and access to specific territories and trade networks to expand their economies. Due to cacicatos’ own political traditions, and the environmental, economic and political contexts, local autonomy was still present in most cacicatos. Consensus politics also remained the base of decision making processes. Therefore, cacicatos’ confederacies worked a delicate equilibrium between autonomy and dependency.

As argued, these dynamics worked through the reciprocal obligations established in kinship ties. Allies were expected to respect reciprocal obligations according to kinship and military ranks. Hence, a good way of understanding these alliances is to explore the different

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levels of allies’ dependence on the confederate leader. Levels varied according to allies’ own material and political power. In most cases, the closer cacicatos were to the main leader in terms of kinship and territorial location, the higher the levels of dependency they presented. These levels of dependency were not static; distant allies could become closer, and close caciques could try to remain independent. Hence, the level of dependency changed in time according to the allies’ own circumstances. The following chart shows the different levels of dependency that different allies held during the period under study.

**Table 1. Examples of Allies’ Diverging Levels of Dependency in the Pampas and Northern Patagonia.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels/ Confederate leaders</th>
<th>1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; level Immediate relatives, capitanejos, warriors and their families</th>
<th>2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt; level Subaltern cacicatos</th>
<th>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt; level Larger groups of autonomous cacicatos</th>
<th>3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;/4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; level Intermediary Cacicatos</th>
<th>4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;Circumstantial allies level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cacique Calfucurá</td>
<td>His wives, brothers and their wives, children, and his capitanejos and lanzas’ families.</td>
<td>Cacicatos lead by Cañumil, Quintrel and Guayquil</td>
<td>The Ranqueles, and cacicatos under Catriel</td>
<td><em>Indios Amigos</em> in Buenos Aires’ frontier</td>
<td>Cacicatos from the Araucanía and Pitrufquén, Pehuenches, Creoles at Tandil, 25 de Mayo, Bahía Blanca, Azul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caciques Llanquitirúz and Saygüeque</td>
<td>His wives, brothers and their wives, children, and his capitanejos and lanzas’ families.</td>
<td>Cacicatos lead by Maciel, Huacacabal and Chagallo</td>
<td>Southern Tehuelches, and Creoles at Carmen de Patagones</td>
<td>People under Miguel Linares after 1867</td>
<td>Cacicatos from the Araucanía, and Pitrufquén</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74 In his work on the Araucanía, Bengoa also classifies the complex relationships of power established between principal caciques of a specific region, called *ñidol lonkos* in Mapudungun, their direct relatives, capitanejos, caciquillos and other lonkos. He describes that the level of autonomy of each sector in relation to the principal lonko varied. In this case, the authority of the *ñidol lonko* was strongly tied to their territorial control. In the case of the Pampas and Northern Patagonian confederacies, allies in the third level of dependency could also be in distant regions and their dependency on the confederate leader relied more on the access to specific trails and frontier posts than to a permanent occupation of land. My table also includes circumstantial allies and frontier posts as part of the confederacies’ web of alliances and dependencies. Bengoa, *Historia del pueblo Mapuche*, p.67.
People on the first level were closely dependent on the main leaders, such as immediate relatives and *capitanejos* (captains), *lanzas* (warriors) and their families. On a second level were smaller and less powerful cacicatos who followed the confederate leader from a subordinated position. Except for some relatives, people in the first two levels lived in or close to the principal *tolderías*. On a third level were groups of cacicatos close to the confederate leader’s principal *toldería*, but with greater political and territorial independence. While strongly independent at the local level, this type of ally showed greater levels of dependence on the main leader on a confederate level. They increasingly relied on his permission to access trade networks outside their territorial range, military power to defend their territories and resources as well as economic assistance to overcome seasonal and political misfortunes.

The intermediary groups, between the third and fourth level, were cacicatos whose dependence on the confederate leadership was challenged by a parallel dependence on creole governments. This was usually the case of the *indios amigos* that lived in frontier regions. Their restricted movement cut down on nomadism, complicating their subsistence and political independence. Their existence relied on playing an intermediary role between cacicatos and creole confederacies.

On the fourth and most distant level of dependency, I placed circumstantial allies. These cacicatos joined the confederacies for specific military ventures and exchanges, but their location allowed them to maintain great political independence. Frontier towns also became part of this web of relationships of reciprocity and dependency. Their levels of dependence on the indigenous confederacies were shaped by creole governments’ policies, their ability to provide resources and particular historical and geographic contexts.
Another important particularity of the indigenous confederacies in the southern lands was their expansive strategies. For the Comanches and many other nomadic and semi-nomadic societies, historians find that part of the internal stability and power gained by these major polities was sustained by engaging in warfare with neighboring societies. This was also the case of the indigenous confederacies under study during their formative years. They both got involved in *weichán* (open war) with other groups to impose their leadership over the access to specific territories, trails, trade-networks and people, and continued using *malocas* and *malones* to raid frontier regions. Nevertheless, they developed a political alternative to the use of violence as an expansive strategy: forcing “others” to become allies and respect reciprocal obligations. As I mentioned before, when dealing with state units, their strategy involved expanding kinship ties as well as negotiating peace that would guarantee the respect of reciprocal obligations. Peace negotiations involved verbal agreements between caciques and Creoles in frontiers, and written treaties shaped by creole authorities’ diplomatic and military forms and logic. Unlike most works on the subject, I argue that peace treaties originated as state units’ response to cacicatos’ power, and that they were used by the indigenous confederacies as strategies of expansion and

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75 I defined *malocas* as the small attacks, usually headed by warriors or capitanejos, organized to gain individual prestige and resources. See discussion of concepts in chapter 1.

76 I defined *malones* as attacks that involved hundreds of warriors, were preceded by parliaments, organized by more than one cacique, and targeted multiple frontier estancias and military posts. Although they also had economic incentives, these attacks mostly had political and military objectives.


78 Florencia Roulet showed that, since colonial times, peace treaties with cacicatos required long verbal and written negotiations, gift-giving and other gestures of respect and hospitality, and real and fictive kinship ties between the parts as well as economic, political and social agreements. Roulet, “Con la pluma y la palabra. El lado oscuro de las negociaciones de paz entre españoles e indígenas”, *Revista de Indias*, vol. LXIV, no. 231 (2004): 313-348.
domination. These written agreements demanded Creoles’ periodic delivery of raciones, and free trade in frontier towns in exchange for peace. During the period under study, most malones headed by the indigenous confederacies were organized when these pacts were broken or threatened. Caciques continued tolerating malocas, but tried to direct them against frontier posts with which they had no treaty. Like creole cattle rustling, caciques and creole authorities could not banish these smaller attacks and thefts.

Although Creoles also used peace treaties to expand their influence over cacicato’ lands – by forcing allies to form sedentary settlements, serve their military and follow creole authorities’ orders-, this strategy was only relatively effective with cacicatos in vulnerable positions, such as some groups of indios amigos. Inter-ethnic verbal and written agreements ended up defining military, political and economic success among all parties in the region until the mid-1870s. By the end of the century, peace treaties also became the only guarantee of cacicatos’ autonomy.

_Cacicatos’ and Creole State Units’ Search for Political Stability, Security and Economic Success in an increasing Globalized World_

After defining the polities and economies under study, I will provide a short summary of the impact of cacicatos’ confederacies over the history of these southern lands. This will provide us with the main dynamics of a multi-ethnic world developed in the following chapters.

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79 This might have also been the case of the Iroquois League. See: Daniel Richter, _The Ordeal of the Longhouse_, and Jennings, _The history and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy_.

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In the mid-18th century, a series of global and local developments transformed global trade networks and polities. The grasslands and fertile areas in the Pampas and the Litoral started playing a new global role by expanding their agricultural and cattle production for export. Regional markets started turning towards this center, affecting older trade networks between northwestern Argentina, Potosí and Lima, as well as Cuyo (modern Mendoza, San Juan and San Luis Provinces), the Araucanía and Chile.

During the end of the 18th century, Mapudungun speakers in the Araucanía were experiencing significant demographic growth and saw an opportunity to expand nomadic pastoralist economies in the new economic trends. Some cacicatos migrated from the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains to the Pampas in large numbers in search of grassland, herds of wild cattle and horses, salt, and new markets. In alliance and competition with local cacicatos, they subdued frontier posts in the Cuyo region and Buenos Aires through malones and malocas, selling their booty later in these same frontier towns and in Chile. This phenomenon

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82 León Solís explains that although we do not have a demographic study on the 18th century, several testimonies speak of a significant population recovery. León Solís, *Maloqueros y conchavadores*, p. 25


84 Although León Solís argued that most of the booty was consumed by cacicatos or sold in Chile, Sebastián Alioto’s recently showed that it was also sold in Buenos Aires and Córdoba’s frontier posts. Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera*. 33
brought decades of intra-ethnic warfare, re-location and processes of ethnogenesis in the Andes Mountains, Pampas and northern Patagonia.\textsuperscript{85}

These developments and conflicts intertwined with the independence struggle faced by the Spanish colonies during the first decades of the 19th century.\textsuperscript{86} Most provinces of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata gained their independence in 1816, but continued to be involved in the independence struggles in Chile and the Andes to the north. Until the 1870s, the provinces also struggled with civil conflicts between the different political factions known as unitarios and federalists.\textsuperscript{87}

In the \textit{Capitanía General de Chile}, royalist resistance was stronger than in the La Plata region due to the support of the elites and merchants who received commercial benefits and privileges from the Spanish Crown as well as some cacicatos in the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains. While some caciques wanted to maintain their pacts with the Spanish Crown, others took advantage of these conflicts to resolve their own intra-ethnic conflicts.\textsuperscript{88} Chile declared independence in 1818, but royalist and allied cacicatos’ resistance continued in the south until 1832, a period known as “war to death” due to its violent and generalized character.\textsuperscript{89}

These decades of multiethnic warfare and increasing economic competition profoundly impacted both creole and indigenous societies. The two of them went through processes of

\textsuperscript{85} León Solís, \textit{Los señores de la cordillera y las pampas: Los pehuenches de Malalhue, 1770-1800} (Mendoza: Universidad de Congreso/Municipalidad de Malargüe, 2001), and Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra.”

\textsuperscript{86} Napoleon imprisoned King Ferdinand VII of Spain in 1808 and named his brother the provisional King of Spain. In 1812, a liberal constitution was proclaimed in Cadiz, but it denied equal representation to the colonies. Many colonies attempted to gain independency while proclaiming their adherence to Ferdinand VII. When the King returned in 1814 and abolished the constitution, most colonies were involved in independence wars. Jeremy Adelman, \textit{Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic} (Princeton University Press, 2006).

\textsuperscript{87} See: Chiaramonte. \textit{Ciudad, provincia, estados}.

\textsuperscript{88} Sergio Villalobos, et. al., \textit{Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía}; Villalobos and Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, eds., \textit{Araucanía. Temas de historia fronteriza} (Chile: Telstar, 1985); Bengoa, \textit{Historia del pueblo Mapuche}; León Solís, \textit{Maloqueros y conchavadores}, and Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra.”

\textsuperscript{89} Gabriel Salazar and Julio Pinto, \textit{Historia Contemporánea de Chile}, vol. 1 to 5 (Santiago de Chile: Lom Ediciones, 1999-2000); Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, \textit{La guerra a muerte} (Santiago: Imprenta Nacional, 1868).
militarization of leaderships and ranks, increasing local autonomy as well as economic specialization in agriculture to supply regional and international trade networks. Violence became a common way of exercising political rights and power. 90

These convulsive decades were also a unique moment of political innovation. Centralizing and stabilizing tendencies emerged in the region. While the Creoles attempted authoritarian options that soon revealed their weakness in guaranteeing internal peace, cacicatos in the Pampas and northern Patagonia developed long-lasting confederacies that ended decades of destructive internal warfare and vendettas. Cacicatos in the Araucanía found it harder to resolve intra-ethnic competition. 91

By 1833, patriots in Chile and their allied cacicatos had defeated the royalist Pincheira brothers and their Borogano allies. 92 Chilean provinces unified under a Republic with a strong centralist and conservative constitution. The presence of Diego Portales between 1833 and 1837 furthered an authoritarian form of politics. Ruling elites weakened provincial autonomy and strengthened the national government. Nevertheless, regional and political rebellions took place around elections, and cacicatos continued participating under their own motivations. 93

91 Cacicatos allied under ayllarewes, but could not solve a persistent intra-ethnic competition. They faced earlier challenges from Chilean centralized governments, and the expansion of agriculture for export. Although provincial units called butalmapu started appearing in the sources, historians discuss the origin and real use of those units; they seemed to work more as Chilean government’s attempts to fix lineages to specific territories. Boccara, “Notas acerca de los dispositivos de poder en la sociedad colonial-fronteriza, la resistencia y la transculturación de los reche-mapuche del centro-sur de Chile (XVI-XVIII);” Bello, Nampülkafe, and Boccara, Los vencedores.
93 See: Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
On the Atlantic side of the Andes Mountains, cacicatos also contributed to Buenos Aires’ increasing power. The province experienced important economic and demographic growth that included the expansion of ranching and agriculture beyond the Río Salado, and the construction of new forts between 1815 and 1830. This development was only possible due to local cacicatos’ vulnerability. The migration of the royalist Pincheira brothers and Boroganos to the Pampas during the late 1820s brought massive *malones* and *malocas* to frontier towns in Buenos Aires. Whether local cacicatos in Tandilia and the Buenos Aires frontier region joined or resisted these attacks, they were later hit by creole punitive expeditions. Creole settlers took advantage of this vulnerability to occupy part of their lands. Nevertheless, this also implied settling military and economic agreements with local cacicatos. This phenomenon also contributed to the expansion of frontier trade, as cacicatos usually traded their booty in other near frontier towns.

In this context, the federalist Juan Manuel de Rosas built his military prestige and popular support in Buenos Aires by leading expeditions into the frontier and building patron-client relationships with rural workers in his large *estancia*. In 1829, he defeated the *unitario* government in Buenos Aires, and was elected Governor and granted extraordinary faculties to lead over the rest of the provinces. This union now declared itself as the federalist Argentine Confederacy.

Rosas gave frontier relationships political priority and created the *negocio pacífico de indios*. This policy institutionalized old forms of frontier diplomacy by centralizing and

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94 They founded Fuerte Independencia in modern Tandil (1823), and Fortaleza Protectora Argentina in modern Bahía Blanca (1828).
95 Daniel Villar, eds., *Relaciones Interéticas en el Sur bonaerense, 1810-1830*.
96 Ratto, *La frontera bonaerense (1810-1828)*.
97 Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera*.
organizing the delivery of goods and gifts to allied cacicatos. In exchange, cacicatos maintained peace and provided military assistance against enemies. Rosas attempted to use these agreements to turn weak cacicatos into military auxiliaries and forced them to settle permanently under provincial jurisdiction. His policy was more successful among local cacicatos who became to be known as the *indios amigos*. Rosas also organized military campaigns in 1833 to defeat more powerful cacicatos. Nevertheless, his attempt at hegemonic power proved to be temporary. Rosas could not control the intra-ethnic conflict in the Pampas. By the 1830s, cacicatos’ *malones* and *malocas* forced the Creoles to retreat from many of the new settlements they had established south of Río Salado.

In this context, it was Cacique Juan Calfucurá who brought stability to cacicatos in the Pampas. He intervened in the internal conflicts that disintegrated the Boroganos living in the Pampas during the 1830s, and settled in Salinas Grandes with a coalition of 37 caciques in 1841. He incorporated some Boroganos and local Pampa cacicatos, and built alliances with the Ranqueles and Catriel. These alliances engendered the Pampas Confederacy with Cacique Calfucurá at the head. In addition, Calfucurá negotiated with Rosas and turned creole provinces into cacicatos’ tributaries in exchange for peace and trade. Rosas understood the importance of allying and respecting his obligations with the Pampas Confederacy, but did not discard the use of violence as a diplomatic policy. He continued to be interested in expanding creole presence over the frontier and wanted to use powerful cacicatos to attack opposing creole factions in Buenos Aires and recalcitrant provinces.

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99 Villar and Jiménez, eds., *Amigos, hermanos y parientes*. 37
Rosas’ authoritarian rule faced major resistance from *The Unitario League*, which was composed of most of the elites from Cuyo and northwestern provinces, as well as some federalists from the interior whom wanted greater autonomy for the rest of the provinces outside Buenos Aires. He also faced international conflicts; he fought and lost against the Peruvian and Bolivian Confederacy the control of Tarija, he supported the *Blanco* party during the civil war in the Banda Oriental (later, Uruguay), and fought against the French blockade of Buenos Aires port. Overall, the Rosas government (1829-1852) gained limited power beyond Buenos Aires and the provinces of the Litoral. Civil conflicts continued after his defeat in 1852.

Meanwhile, segmental societies were offering a flexible, long-lasting system that maintained unity among autonomous members. Nomadic pastoralist economies offered an advantage over sedentary ranching economies in militarized regions with a scarcity of labor. Nomadic pastoralists could move to protect their people, cattle, find the best grassland and water, and reach trans-regional and long-distant commercial centers in Buenos Aires and Chile. Cacicatos’ economic logic of redistribution and reciprocity also incentivized subalterns from different ethnicities to join their enterprises. Hence, while the Pampas and Northern Patagonian Confederacies gained stability and prosperity by mid-century, their sedentary neighbors were still fighting in intensive civil conflicts and organizing their economies.

After the fall of Rosas after the Battle of Caseros in 1852, the winning interior federalists under Justo José de Urquiza continued facing political instability. The province of Buenos Aires

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101 In spite of the demographic growth of the Pampas during the 1830s, labor continued to be scarce. This tendency only changed after 1870, when a large number of European immigrants arrived in the region. Garavaglia and Gelman, “Capitalismo agrario en la frontera,” and Miguez, “Mano de obra, población rural y mentalidades en la economía de tierras abiertas de la provincia de Buenos Aires.”
did not accept the new rule and expelled Urquiza’s occupation forces from the Province. In 1853, its government also rejected the Federal Constitution agreed on by the rest of the provinces. Consequently, the porteños maintained political autonomy until 1862.

During 1852 and 1862, the Pampas Confederacy actively participated in the conflicts between the Argentine Confederacy and Buenos Aires. By negotiating with both factions and imposing their diplomatic forms and interests, they contributed to force Buenos Aires back into the union. On the one hand, caciques’ negotiations with President Urquiza and their malones over Buenos Aires’ frontier posts limited porteños’ military success. Buenos Aires could neither confront both confederacies nor play one confederate member against the other. On the other hand, the diplomatic initiatives led by the Pampas Confederacy and the emerging Northern Patagonian Confederacy with porteños insisted on restoring the reciprocal obligations that the province used to have with them during Rosas’s times. Peace furthered trade and provided raciones to the caciques who contributed to political stability.

Cacicatos’ political and diplomatic logic made it impossible for creole factions to solve their civil conflicts without negotiating with them. The Argentine Confederacy and Buenos Aires clashed at the Battle of Cepeda in October, 1859. This confrontation proved that the indigenous confederacies could ally with different creole factions, but would always prioritize the internal security and stability of its members. While some caciques of the Pampas Confederacy marched with porteño forces, others helped Urquiza by raiding frontier towns in Buenos Aires.

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102 This Constitution undermined Buenos Aires political centrality by, for example, disposing the same amount of delegates for each province instead of basing representation on the number of inhabitants per province.
103 People living in Buenos Aires were usually called porteños due to the importance of their port.
104 While the members of the Pampas Confederacy would not confront each other due to their alliances with Urquiza, the Cacique Llanquitrúz refused to join an attack on Calfucurá in 1858-1859 in spite of having settled peace with Buenos Aires.
Nonetheless, cacicatos’ forces did not confront each other, and did not participate in the final battle of Cepeda. The cacicatos aimed at settling peace with Urquiza and Buenos Aires province to protect the Ranqueles in central Pampas and Catriel’s control over Tapalqué.

Buenos Aires militias again resisted Urquiza’s second occupation in 1859 and recovered the province. They responded to the Pampas Confederacy’s pressure and finally negotiated peace with Caciques Catriel and Calfucurá, and kept their peace with Cacique Llanquitrúz’s successor, Cacique Chingoleo, in northern Patagonia. Calfucurá continued a double diplomacy, which provided him with raciones from the Argentine Confederacy and Buenos Aires, and prevented his involvement in the next big civil fight: the Battle of Pavón in September, 1861. Bartolomé Mitre led the forces of Buenos Aires and won this battle by keeping the indigenous confederacies out of the battle and negotiating with Urquiza.105 Buenos Aires continued peace negotiations with caciques and started respecting reciprocal obligations by providing raciones.

After the battle of Pavón, Bartolomé Mitre was elected President of the now-called Argentine Republic. He had to continue respecting reciprocal obligations with the cacicatos. The Pampas Confederacy and Buenos Aires became the centers of economic exchange and diplomacy in the southeastern regions of the southern Cone. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy participated in these exchanges by expanding trade with Carmen de Patagones and southern Patagonia.

During the 1860s, these creole and indigenous hegemonic powers experienced challenges from regions peripheral to the new order: the Argentine North, the Cuyo region and the lands of the Pehuenches and Ranqueles. According to the Senator Nicolás Oroño, between 1862 and

105 Some few caciques like Coliquéo left the Pampas Confederacy, joined Mitre during this battle and settled under provincial jurisdiction.
In 1868, 107 rebellions and 90 battles took place in the provinces where 4,728 people died. Displaced leaders and popular sectors known as *gauchos* identified with the federalist cause organized themselves to fight against the Mitrista hegemony and tried to recover their power at the provincial and local levels. These mobilizations were also based on *gauchos*’ increasing economic limitations under the new patterns in trade. Cuyo was not only marginal to the Pampas’ commerce with the Atlantic, but was also affected by Chile’s relegation of trade in cattle products to regional markets while expanding wheat, oil and nitrate production for export. In addition, in 1865, federalists refused to participate in the Paraguayan War; the interior federalists sympathized with the Paraguayan President’s support of the *Blancos* in Uruguay. *Gauchos* were also against the mandatory recruitment laws.

These conflicts intertwined with increasing number of *malones* and *malocas*. These attacks almost tripled during 1860s, and strongly hit the southern frontier towns of Mendoza, San Luis, Córdoba and northwestern Buenos Aires. Groups of Pehuenches and Ranqueles used *malones* to overcome increasing economic limitations under the new patterns in trade as well as their caciques’ failure in guaranteeing their security. The Ranquel Cacique Rosas appropriated creole elites’ pejorative perception of Indians and *gauchos* as un-rulled and criminals and started calling any subaltern that threatened his authority regardless of their ethnicity: *indios gauchos*.

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107 Salazar and Pinto, *Historia Contemporánea de Chile*, vol. 1 to 5
109 In the documentation I consulted in provincial and national archives, I registered around 35 *malones* and *malocas* for the 1850s, and more than 100 for the 1860s. Between 1870 and 1878, I recorded around 86 *malones* and *malocas*. The Ranqueles Mariano Rosas and Manuel Baigorrita failed to negotiate and maintain peace agreements with frontier authorities –which could have meant providing stability and prosperity to their subalterns-. Pehuenche caciques in Malargüe, Barrancas and Varvarco continued finding difficulties to offer peace and stability to subalterns under the increasing political and economic challenges presented by the military campaigns on the western side of Andes Mountains.
These conflicts proved that resistance to the status quo was also based on inter-ethnic alliances. In southern Cuyo, Creoles and indigenous people joined in their fights for survival, security and political autonomy.

After two intensive cycles of attacks on frontier towns and provincial cities, the federalist montoneras managed to change some authorities at the provincial and local levels. However, they found it hard to achieve a unified political project.\textsuperscript{111} They lost their power of mobilization after Urquiza’s assassination in 1870 and Lopez Jordán’s defeat in Entre Ríos in 1873 and 1874. In the end, the opposition of gauchos and indios gauchos to porteños’ influence in the national government bore some fruits. The election of Domingo F. Sarmiento from San Juan in 1868 as President showed a slow process of displacement of porteño elites from the national government. This change became more evident under the Presidencies of Nicolás Avellaneda (1874-1880) and Julio Argentino Roca (1880-1886).\textsuperscript{112} An alliance of provincial elites continued ruling the national government, and the porteños ended up losing the revenues of its main city and port. The City of Buenos Aires became the national capital in 1880.

In cacicatos’ lands, mobilized groups of Pehuenches and Ranqueles complicated the Pampas Confederacy’s diplomatic policy. They tempted caciques, capitanejos and lanzas to participate in their malones and malocas, and pressured for greater political autonomy from the principal caciques. This pressure was exacerbated by the presence of cacicatos from the Araucanía in search of resources and support to confront the Chilean military campaigns organized since 1861.\textsuperscript{113} Similarly to southern Cuyo, Chilean federalists in the southern provinces allied with some cacicatos against President Manuel Montt’s conservative and

\textsuperscript{111} Bragoni and Míguez, eds., \textit{Un Nuevo orden político}, p.22.
\textsuperscript{112} Sábat, \textit{The Many and the Few}.
\textsuperscript{113} Navarro, \textit{Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía}.
centralist national government in 1851 and 1859. Cacicatos were fighting against Chilean’s expansion over the Biobío frontier, Montt’s diplomatic policies and an increasing economic challenge opened by the new patterns in trade. The national government responded to this challenge by limiting southern provinces political power and organizing military campaigns to end cacicatos independence. In 1859, the Chilean Congress approved a plan to advance over Malleco, appropriate cacicatos’ lands and spread immigrant colonies. Although the press discussed the project intensively, President Pérez (1861-1871) accepted this plan and the Congress approved the budget. The military started fortifying frontier posts, and closing passes to cross the Andes Mountains—in order to neutralize potential allies—. The campaigns were strongly resisted and were interrupted several times by the Chincha Islands War (1864-1866) and the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).

The Pampas Confederacy survived these challenges. It managed to avoid internal fragmentation by tolerating allies increasing independence to organize malones and respecting consensus politics. It also continued to receive raciones from the national government by negotiating additional peace treaties and accusing migrants and “un-ruled” subalterns for the malones over frontier towns. On the down side, the Pampas Confederacy could not guarantee peace to all subalterns and was increasingly seen by the national government as the reason of Creoles’ political instability.

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy faced less internal and external threats due to its distance from the Argentine and Chilean main frontier posts and cacicatos in peripheral regions. By maintaining a policy of peace and trade with Carmen de Patagones, an isolated settlement far

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114 Arreola, Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
south on the Río Negro, they experienced an economic boom.\textsuperscript{115} This polity became the symbol of successful inter-ethnic alliances based on kinship, peace and prosperity. It also furthered a commercial and demographic expansion in Patagonia by controlling creole and European migrants and businesses on their lands.

During the 1870s, Argentine ruling elites and intellectuals started sharing an ideology based on Liberalism, the search for “progress” and social Darwinism.\textsuperscript{116} They increasingly perceived the federalists montoneras, cacicatos and strong autonomous provincial governments as the obstacles for “progress,” previewed by Sarmiento’s Facundo (1845).\textsuperscript{117} The new view was antithetical to a world based on inter-ethnic alliances and confederacies. Cacicato political projects based on kinship alliances and reciprocity, and their trans-regional economies were threatened on all fronts: by an ideology that created a world of “civilized” Creoles and “primitive savages” on their way to extinction; by new military and communication technologies that allowed the settlement of a new line of forts in cacicatos’ lands, and by economic policies that restricted the Indians’ mobility and access to transregional ecological zones. It is during this decade that we can speak of a clear and swift shift in the balance of power to the detriment of autonomous cacicatos and in favor of an emerging nation-state.\textsuperscript{118}

Nevertheless, the national government’s attempts to defeat their powerful nomadic neighbors took the whole decade. Furthermore, the original plan only implied occupying the Pampas and pushing cacicatos south of the Río Negro.\textsuperscript{119} The Pampa Confederacy’s response to

\textsuperscript{115} Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
\textsuperscript{116} Quijada, Bernard and Schneider, eds., Homogeneidad y Nación con un estudio de caso.
\textsuperscript{117} Domingo F. Sarmiento, Facundo: civilización y barbarie (Buenos Aires: Editorial Claridad, 1845).
\textsuperscript{118} Langer, “The Eastern Andean Frontier.”
\textsuperscript{119} In 1867, the Congress approved the law 215 which instructed the government to occupy all the indigenous territory up to Río Neuquén and Río Negro by means of a military campaign. It implied the subjugation of indigenous people by force and the privation of their rights, and also granted the national government total
the new challenges was undermined by Calfucurá’s death in 1873. His successors were also limited by the persistent vulnerability of the Ranqueles to the west, the new line of forts built in their lands and the limits in trade with the Pacific due to Chilean military campaigns.120 When the “conquest of the desert” (1879-1883) hit the central Pampas, they found vulnerable confederate allies who were suddenly relatively easy to conquer.

In northern Patagonia, Cacique Saygüeque tried to maintain a policy of peace, but witnessed the defeat of his allies in the Araucanía, the demise of the Pampas Confederacy, and the national state’s increasing military force. It was during this time, when he presented the Creoles with a creative alternative to subjugation: “the Indigenous Governorship of Manzanas.” By turning the Confederacy into a Governorship, he attempted to become part of the Argentine Republic as an autonomous province based on indigenous norms and customs.

However, once the national government succeeded in the Pampas and then perceived an increasing threat from Chile’s potential expansion into Patagonia, they decided to extend the conquest to the south. The national government refused to incorporate an indigenous polity as part of its federal—though increasingly centralized—nation. Saygüeque and his allies fought for their autonomy and were the last of the indigenous groups to be defeated by the Argentine forces in 1883. Survivors continue fighting for their lands and rights under new contexts even in the present.121

jurisdiction over those territories. It contemplated “giving” a specific territory to the cacicatos that voluntarily accepted their subjugation to the nation-state and to expel those that resisted the military campaigns to the south of the Río Negro. The law was going to be executed once the Paraguayan War was over, but it was not until the mid-1870s that the national state started showing a real capacity to head towards this conquest. Pedro Navarro Floria, “Continuidad y fin del trato pacífico con los indígenas de la Pampa y la Patagonia.”

120 The new forts prevented cacicatos from reaching the main grasslands and water near the frontier area, which were key in the organization of malones.

121 See María Argeri, De guerreros a delincuentes: La desarticulación de las jefaturas indígenas y el poder judicial, Norpatagonia, 1880-1930 (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Instituto de Historia, 2005), and
Organization of the Dissertation

In order to unravel the complexity of indigenous polities and economies, and their relationship with state units and global contexts, I divide the dissertation into seven chapters. The first chapter explores the major transformations that cacicatos experienced during the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century; changes that gave way to the emergence of nomadic pastoralist confederacies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia. I address the main historiographical debates about these transformations and provide a detailed description of these societies and histories. The second and third chapters develop the history of the Pampas Confederacy during the 1840s and 1850s. I first describe the Confederacy’s political and economic organization, and then analyze its involvement with the civil conflicts between the Argentine Confederacy and Buenos Aires to meld traditional political history with that of the indigenous people.

The fourth and fifth chapters move to northern Patagonia to understand parallel developments among cacicatos in the region during the 1850s and 1860s, and highlight their similarities and differences. I first describe the emergence of the Northern Patagonian Confederacy during the 1850s, and the internal political and economic organization achieved during the 1860s. In chapter five, I analyze the particular relationship with Creoles in the town of Carmen de Patagones. This last chapter reveals a successful case of cacicatos’ incorporation of creole state units as confederate allies.

Susana Bandieri, eds., Cruzando la cordillera... La frontera argentino-chilena como espacio social (Argentina: Centro de Estudios de Historia Regional, CEHIR, Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad Nacional del Comahüe, 2001).
The sixth chapter deals with regional and political challenges faced by the Pampas Confederacy, Buenos Aires and, to a lesser extent, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy during the 1860s. I look at the link between the federalists’ *montoneras* and the uprisings of some Pehuenches and Ranqueles in Cuyo, a region increasingly relegated by new trade networks that centralized in the Pampas. This chapter not only shows the consequences of an increasing centralization of power under cacicatos and Creoles in the Pampas, but also the fact that they were both shaped by the same contexts.

The final chapter addresses the confederacies’ expansion policies between 1862 and 1874, and their responses to new challenges faced during the second half of the 1870s. Looking closely at both confederacies’ policies will help understand their diverging paths as well as their responses to an increasing militarization of frontier relationships.
CHAPTER I

Nomadic Pastoralist Cacicatos during the Liberalization of International Trade and South American Independences, 1770-1840

The confederacies of cacicatos in the Pampas and northern Patagonia were the result of long-term economic and political adaptations to changing contexts. Historians identified the period between 1770 and 1840 as the moment when critical contexts accelerated the evolution of unprecedented structural transformations. War, rebellion, the decline of silver production, and industrial concentration was turning a “polycentric global economy” into an industrial capitalism led by the British Empire. Colonial empires fragmented into multiple local state governments that started building their own forms of supra-local polities as confederacies, centralized unions, republics and, by the end of the century, nation-states. It was a time of opportunities, innovation and change not only for sedentary state societies. As the Comanches in North America, cacicatos in the Pampas and northern Patagonia found in their nomadic pastoralist economies and segmental political organization ways to gain greater power.

In this chapter, I analyze the nomadic pastoralist cacicatos’ changes during these major global political and economic trends, which also transformed their neighboring agricultural sedentary state structures. I look at the environment and polities in the region under study during the first three centuries of contact, the global and local transformations that took place between

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123 For the Comanches, see: Pekka Häniläinen, The Comanche Empire.
1770 and 1840, and the specific responses of cacicatos as they evolved towards their period of major power in the mid-19th century. As the study of these transformations requires theoretical and contextual analysis, I will also address the most relevant historiographical debates on the subject.

**Connecting Diverse Ecological Zones: the Araucanía, the Pampas and Patagonia in Continuous Transformation, 15th to 19th centuries**

As we can see below in fig. 2, the southern lands of the continent show a very diverse geography, both topographically as well as ecologically. The most conspicuous geographical element are the Andes Mountains, which run with a north south orientation, paralleling the Pacific coastline. This dominant geographical feature has a strong influence on all aspects of the territories which lie on either side of the mountain chain, whether they be topography, climate, hydrology, rainfall, ecological diversity, flora, fauna, human activity, etc. And, as we will notice throughout this dissertation, has certainly had an influence on the cultural and historical dynamics of the population.
Figure 2. Main Geographic Zones and Regions in the South of South America. Source: Creation of Gabriel Giordanengo (INGEIS-CONICET) based on my instructions.
The high snow-bound lands of the Andes Mountains continued downhill towards lower fertile valleys to the west and then arid lands towards the east of the divide. Towards the south, where the Andes Mountains were quite a bit lower, the land was covered by Araucaria forests (a pine tree on which piñones: (pine cones) grow, which provided a seed rich in protein consumed by the indigenous population), and crossed by fertile grassy valleys protected by rocky formations, which hosted a variety of small animals ideal for hunting. To the south west, lakes, rivers and rainfall favored the presence of the forests and narrow fertile lands that went up to the Pacific Coast. This region came to be known as the Araucanía. To the east of the Andes Mountains, the lower valleys were followed by an arid steppe in the central Pampas (modern La Pampa), Patagonia (south of Rios Colorado and Negro) to the south, and then the eastern humid and fertile Pampa lands that reached the Atlantic Ocean. This ecological diversity incentivized human transhumance and economic exchange in order to obtain enough resources for subsistence. It’s not surprising that ethnicities were named after groups’ locations and use of the land.\textsuperscript{124} Instead of a geographic limit, the high lands of the Andes Mountains worked as an area for communication and exchange between the different societies.

Before the arrival of the Spaniards, people living in these lands maintained diverse segmental organizations where identical units called “cacicatos” repeated themselves, and alliances, divisions and sub units were established among “equals.”\textsuperscript{125} Internal hierarchies and alliances were based on kinship and consensus politics. Although they all shared several cultural practices, cacicatos presented important organizational differences. People living in the higher


\textsuperscript{125} Bechis, “Los lideratos políticos en el área arauco-pampeana en el siglo XIX,” and Interethnic relations during the period of Nation-State formation in Chile and Argentina.
and lower lands of central and southern modern Chile, and modern Mendoza and Neuquén (Argentina) were organized in sedentary and semi-sedentary way and spoke a common language, Mapudungun. The Pehuenches, “people from Pehuen,” lived on either side of the divide, in the highlands of central Chile and towards the south as far as Villacurá, and in the east, in the area from Malargüe to Varvarco (southern modern Mendoza and northern Neuquén). Their Mapuche name responds to their economic activity; they gathered piñones from Pehuen trees, hunted guanacos, collected salt and traded with the Reche, “the real people,” who lived in central Chile and planted and harvested crops grown in the rich volcanic soil. The natural rains allowed for extensive agriculture, and the Reche worked metals and textiles. They also traded with the Picunches, “people from the north,” and the Huilliches, “people from the south.” The latter competed with Pehuenche groups for the cordillera lands, malales and passes to cross the Andes Mountains. Huilliches occupied the lower lands south of Río Totlén, the highlands of Villarica and the lower valleys to the east in southern Neuquén, a region later known as Manzanas due to their apple production.

At the eastern foot of the Andes, indigenous groups in the Cuyo region led a more nomadic type of life as they were basically hunters and gatherers. The lower and more arid grasslands led to a region named by Mapudungun speakers Mamil Mapu, “el país del monte” (woodlands). The algarroba and caldén trees provided wood and seeds rich in protein. The

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126 For pre-colonial times see: José Bengoa, Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur; Guillaume Bocca, Los Vencedores; Kristine Jones, “The Southern Margins.”
127 Sergio Villalobos, Los pehuenches en la vida fronteriza (Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989).
128 Rocky formations used as natural refuges or corrales in Mapudungun.
129 Other important groups inhabiting the western side of the Andes on arrival of the Spaniards were the Costinos in the coastal valleys of central Chile who fished and practiced agriculture, and the Promaucaes north of the Río Maipo. These two groups and the Pichúnches were under Inka influence during the 16th century. Jones, “The Southern Margins.”
130 This area was between Cuyo and Río Neuquén. Álvaro Bello, Nampülkafe, p. 83.
forest had small animals, such as guanacos, hares, *rhea* (type of ostrich) and armadillos, and fruits to gather.\(^\text{131}\) This was a much less populated region and served as a refugee as well as a communicational region between Mapudungun speakers and semi-sedentary and nomadic groups living further to the east, in the humid Pampas or to the southeast in the dry Patagonia. These people spoke different languages, but shared some cultural practices. The Querandíes inhabited near the delta region of Río de la Plata and fished, hunted, gathered fruits and practiced horticulture. They also traded with and were influenced by the Guarani people upriver. Puelches and Serranos, on the other hand, were speakers of Günūna-küne and were in contact with Mapudungun speakers.\(^\text{132}\) They occupied the grazing lands south to the Río Negro and to the west of the Pampas. Serranos lived in the Sierras of Tandilia in southern modern Buenos Aires, and mostly relied on hunting guanacos and gathering tuberous plants. They also hunted seals on the Atlantic coast and traded fur, feathers and salt with the Querandíes, the Huilliches and Pehuenches and the northern Tehuelches (from the arid steppes of northern Patagonia). Northern Tehuelches hunted guanacos and *rhea*, gathered fruits and “spoke a language related to Pampa Indians.”\(^\text{133}\) They also traded skins, feathers and salt.

These ethnic identities were constantly constructed and changed through time.\(^\text{134}\) They did not correlate with political units, but with groups of people that share practices, experiences and locations. Some names expose power relationships and were created by the people who


\(^{133}\) Jones based on Casamiquela. Jones, “The Southern Margins.”

\(^{134}\) Lidia Nacuzzi argues that the ethnic labels used in Northern Patagonia during colonial times were mostly imposed by Spaniards and historians in the twentieth century. Although this is true for some cases, Indians were also part of creating those labels when communicating with Spaniards and other times re-appropriated these labels to their advantage. Lidia Nacuzzi, *Identidades impuestas: Tehuelches, Aucas y Pampas en el norte de la Patagonia* (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de antropología, 1998).
recorded them. For example, while Puelche and Tehuelche are words imposed by Mapudungun speakers and Querandí by Guarani speakers, Serranos is a Spanish word imposed by colonial bureaucrats to mark these groups’ location. Nevertheless, these names were many times re-appropriated by their members, blurring their subordination. Most groups were multilingual, and appealed to these identities for specific reasons, such as claiming territorial and political rights. New ethnic identities were also created, such as the Ranqueles in Mamil Mapu, and Mapuche for Mapudungun speakers.\textsuperscript{135} Therefore, ethnic labels were flexible and served to explore the links between groups of people and their locations, but they cannot be used to work political units. Lineages and kinship, on the other hand, were stronger marks to structure political identities. Using cacicatos’ histories is a way to delineate power relationships.

After the Europeans’ arrival, these regions went through several transformations that ended up strengthening the contact between often distant groups, and the integration of their regional economies. The strongest changes were not the consequences of direct state expansive policies, but of the introduction of new diseases, animals and plants. As in the rest of the continent, diseases devastated indigenous populations. José Bengoa states that a population of approximately 1,000,000 people in the Araucanía was reduced to 200,000 by the end of the 16\textsuperscript{th} century, and later stabilized around 150,000 until the 19\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{136} The population density in

\footnote{Boccara explains that the Mapuche ethnicity was the result of a process of ethnogenesis that the Reche and other groups went through during the 16\textsuperscript{th} and 17\textsuperscript{th} centuries. Only by the second half of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century did “Mapuche” start appearing in the records. During the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, it was generalized to include many more Mapudungun speaking groups. Guillaume Boccara, “Etnogénesis Mapuche: Resistencia y Restructuración entre los indígenas del centro-sur de Chile (Siglos XVI-XVIII), The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 79, no. 3 (Aug., 1999): 425-461.}{\textsuperscript{135}}

\footnote{Bengoa. Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur, and Historia del pueblo mapuche, siglos XIX y XX (Santiago: LOM, 2008).}{\textsuperscript{136}}
the Pampas and Patagonia was lower, but we still do not have precise demographic information. By the 19th century probably between 15,000 and 55,000 people inhabited the region.¹³⁷

The environment was also strongly affected by encounters with Eurasian plants and animals. Cattle, sheep, goats and horses invaded the landscape, affecting the fertility of the soil. Forests were cut down for wood and to plant crops. In the Araucanía, agricultural activities replaced maize with wheat as the main crop, and the Mapudungun speakers also moved south, far from European’s threat.¹³⁸ Groups living in the frontier region around the Río Biobío started turning into nomadic pastoralists for survival, military and economic reasons. The incorporation of horses and cattle provided them with technological advantages over warriors on foot to fight the Spanish. They also made their economies more flexible so that they could adapt to environmental changes and new types of warfare. In the Pampas, these new animals and crops also spread widely shaping nomads’ seasonal hunting and gathering.¹³⁹ Again, military reasons and the opportunity to breed, stock and commercialize new animals slowly turned nomads into nomadic pastoralists.

¹³⁷ For the Pampas and Patagonia, the pioneer work done by Mases on the aftermaths of the military campaigns, presents the official numbers of people imprisoned, killed and subjugated. These were 14,172 people for the period 1878-1879. But these records exclude the groups subjugated in the later campaigns 1880-1883, as well as others who allied or negotiated peace in frontier posts. For the 1850s, Caletti recently estimated an indigenous population of 53,200 in the Buenos Aires frontier, central Pampas (Salíneros, Ranqueles y Boroganos) and northeastern Patagonia (allies of Llanquirú) using the 1852 frontier reports by Pedro Rosas y Belgrano and José María Flores, and the local census. But they probably reached 55,000 people as we are missing evidence of groups in the Andean region (like Pehuenches), in central and southern Patagonia and in the frontier regions of Mendoza, San Luis, and Córdoba. Also, sources on indigenous population usually estimate three people per adult male soldier, which might undermine the real total number of people. Bengoa, Historia del pueblo mapuche, siglos XIX y XX; Bárbara Caletti García-Diego, La intervención del poblado rural en la lucha política en los comienzos del sitio de Hilario Lagos en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1852-1853: formas de movilización, liderazgos y motivaciones (B.A. Thesis, Departamento de Historia, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2007); Enrique Mases, Estado y cuestión indígena. El destino final de los indios sometidos en el sur del territorio (1878-1910) (Buenos Aires: Entrepasados/Prometeo Libros, 2002).

¹³⁸ Bengoa, Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur.

New technologies also shaped local economies and warfare. Metal tools eased agriculture, arts and crafts, and domestic activities. The introduction of new military technology, such as the creation of a cavalry equipped with lances, helped cacicatos to resist Spanish colonialism. Although the introduction of firearms sometimes resulted in a military advantage, they were expensive, defective and had a limited distribution until the end of the 19th century. Frontier warfare continued depending mainly on the use of lances, sables, knives, and a limited number of rifles and cannons usually used by creole forces. The character of war, called weichán by Mapudungun speakers, radically changed. “Ritual wars,” where the objective was to show power instead of exterminating or plundering the enemy, gave way to wars for survival and empowerment.

In addition to these transformations, the indigenous economy was shaped by their contact with a sedentary colonial society immersed in trans-oceanic trade. In early colonial times, the world economy was strongly shaped by silver and sugar markets. Europeans gained resources from the Americas and Africa in order to trade with Asia, the most profitable economy in the world at that time. In this world, the production of silver in Potosí shaped regional economies in South America. Chile and the northwestern part of modern Argentina provided livestock, mules and food to Potosí and Lima. Buenos Aires was peripheral to these trade networks, yet a major exporter of contraband silver to the Atlantic. As Carlos Assadourian Sempat showed, local

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141 Jiménez shows that the Mapuche resolved this problem by, for example, allying Spanish and creole forces and use their groups of riflemen in combination with their own lancers. The mix of warfare traditions and technologies gave some groups military superiority over others especially during the period known as War to death in the Araucanía, and the migration of some of these groups to the Pampas. Jiménez, “De malares y armas de fuego.” 142 Ibid., Bengoa, Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur, and León Solís, Maloqueros y conchavadores.”
143 Tutino, “The Americas in Rise of Industrial Capitalism”
and regional markets were closely tied to world markets, but had their own dynamics, and contributed to population and productive growth. Cacicatos in our region of study started participating in these commercial networks by providing textiles, feathers, salt, and hides in exchange for luxury goods (tobacco, yerba—a type of tea and alcohol), some grains, weapons and manufactures. They contributed to the demographic growth in Spanish cities and all frontier towns performing as producers, consumers, and providers of labor.

While these new colonial trade networks obstructed some of cacicatos older trails, such as the one between the Puelches and the Guarani along the Río Paraná, they fueled others, such as trade between the Araucanía and the Pampas. Cacicatos in the Pampas adopted agricultural, textile and metal work techniques from their neighbors in the Araucanía. They also started competing for similar resources and markets, especially when most of them became nomadic pastoralists and oriented their economies towards producing, stocking and commercializing cattle and horses during the 18th and 19th centuries.

To sum up, although the Spanish managed to occupy some of these southern territories, cacicatos survived the strong population decline of the 16th century and took advantage of new opportunities to remain as competitive expansive polities for three additional centuries. They stopped colonial expansion and established competition and negotiation relationships with the Spanish in frontier regions. After destroying seven Spanish towns south of the Río Biobío, on behalf of all the Mapudungun speakers, Cacique Loncopinchón settled peace with the Spaniards in Quilín in 1641. From then on, this river became the legally recognized boundary between

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144 Assadourian Sempat, *El sistema de la economía colonial*.
145 Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera*; Mandrini, ¿Sólo de caza vivían los indios?,” and Bengoa, *Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur*.
146 Bengoa, *Historia de los antiguos Mapuches del sur*.
the Spanish and Mapudungun speakers and both accepted each other’s autonomy. Frontier relationships started being based on peace negotiations, trade and sporadic military confrontations. But daily kinship, commercial and political ties between local cacicatos and settlers blurred the geographic limits agreed upon in Quilín, to give life to a typical frontier world.

In the Pampas, the Spanish also faced defeats during the 16th century and found it impossible to expand their settlements beyond the Río Salado in Buenos Aires (1580), and the main cities of Mendoza (1562), San Luis (1596), Córdoba (1573), and Rosario (1665). Frontier towns not so far from the capital cities emerged, but were constantly moved, abandoned and repopulated. By 1780, some frontier towns managed to survive and to stabilize their populations. From the Andes Mountains to Buenos Aires, the frontier towns of San Carlos (1772), Villa Mercedes (1752), Río Cuarto (1786), Pergamino (1626), Mercedes (1745) in Buenos Aires, and Guardia del Zanjón in modern Chascomús (1779) served as limits between the colonial and cacicatos’ jurisdictions as well as spaces of daily interaction. Like Valdivia south of the Araucanía, San Rafael (1805), Carmen de Patagones (1779), and later Fuerte Independencia in modern Tandil (1823) and Fortaleza Protectora Argentina in modern Bahía Blanca (1828) survived as islands of creole presence in cacicatos’ territory.147 As in the Biobío, cacicatos and local settlers built frontier regions as common spaces of interaction and competition.

Even though frontier posts in the Pampas were planned as agricultural colonies, most ended up specializing in cattle ranching and trade. Settlers needed tradable and exportable goods to overcome their dependence on government provisions from capital cities. Agriculture demanded higher investment in tools, labor, and irrigation, and harvests were constantly threatened by wild animals and cacicatos’ malones. Spanish in frontier posts soon found that specializing in cattle ranching demanded less labor; animals could be protected by moving them, their products (salted beef and hides) could be sold in the cities, and frontier settlers served as trading intermediaries between cacicatos and urban markets.

Between the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, global and local changes brought new challenges and opportunities to societies in the region. The sedentary colonial society struggled to adapt to new commercial networks and build coherent political unions in the light of independence and civil warfare. Meanwhile, cacicatos oriented their nomadic pastoralist economies and an increasing intra-segmental competition towards building powerful nomadic pastoralist confederacies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia by mid-19th century.

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Global Changes, Local Innovations: the Southern Lands under the Liberalization of International Trade and Independence

In the mid-18th century, a series of global and local developments transformed global trade networks and polities. War and rebellion in the Andes and the decline of silver production started disrupting trade networks between Potosí and northwestern Argentina. The Bourbon Reforms, which attempted to centralize control and make the administration of their colonies more efficient, liberalized trade in the Empire and gave Buenos Aires administrative importance by naming the city the new capital of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata.149 Although trade with other European powers was prohibited, Buenos Aires started facing an increasing British demand for cattle products (salted beef and leather) and agricultural products in the Atlantic. As the Argentine historiography has studied in depth, the grasslands and fertile areas in the Pampas and the Litoral started playing a new global role by expanding their agricultural and cattle production for export.150 Buenos Aires specialized in exporting leather, tallow and tasajo (dried beef) with an international orientation. Around 1815, Buenos Aires city’s population reached 50,000 people and 40,000 people in the rural areas due to natural growth and migration.151 Regional markets started turning towards Buenos Aires, especially the trade networks between northwestern Argentina and Potosí and Lima. Buenos Aires’ cabildo and military also gained

151 Garavaglia and Gelman, “Capitalismo agrario en la frontera.”
some autonomy when local troops managed to expel British invaders in 1806 and 1807.  

Therefore, when Napoleon imprisoned King Ferdinand VII of Spain in 1808 and named his brother the provisory King of Spain, Buenos Aires’ *cabildo* was one of the first in claiming their right to exercise local sovereignty in 1810.

Events in Europe intruded on local politics in the colonies and independence movements soon emerged everywhere in the Empire. The provinces of the Río de la Plata gained their independence in 1816, but continued to be involved in independence warfare until the 1820s. Civil conflicts also exploded. Political factions in the provinces disputed the type of governance they wanted to create—a confederacy or a centralized union- and the role of Buenos Aires as the capital city of the union or as another autonomous province. The emergence of Juan Manuel de Rosas’s government in 1829 strengthened the political and economic role of Buenos Aires, but still faced international and civil conflicts which finally led to his fall in 1852.

In Chile, the royalist forces gained stronger support among elites and merchants who received commercial benefits and privileges from the Spanish Empire. Although Chile declared independence in 1818, royalist resistance continued in the south until 1832, a period known as “war to death” due to its violent and generalized character. This independence warfare

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153 In 1812, a liberal constitution was proclaimed in Cadiz but it denied equal representation for the colonies. Conservatives in the colonies were also not pleased with losing their privileges. In 1814, Ferdinand VII returned to his throne and abolished the constitution, but was now rejected by the liberals in the colonies. Soon most colonies were involved in independence wars. Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton University Press, 2006).
154 See: Chiaramonte, *Ciudad, provincia, estados*.
155 Ricardo Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos*.
156 Gabriel Salazar and Julio Pinto, *Historia Contemporánea de Chile*, vol. 1 to 5.
intertwined with intra-ethnic competition for the hegemonic control of the Araucanía. Part of royalists’ strength relied precisely on their alliance with some cacicatos that wanted to maintain their pacts with the Spanish crown. The alliance between the royalist Pincheira brothers with some Boroganos (from Boroa, Araucanía) and some Pehuenches presented the strongest resistance to Chile’s independence. They also tried to reach further resources and allies by migrating to eastern Pehuenche lands and the Pampas during the 1820s. Nevertheless, they were defeated on all fronts by 1833. When the last Pincheria brother was imprisoned, the Boroganos and some Pehuenche caciques found difficulty in holding their control of Salinas Grandes in central Pampas.

At that time, Chile unified under a strong centralist and conservative constitution. Similar to Rosas in Buenos Aires, Diego Portales developed an authoritarian form of doing politics between 1833 and 1837. Although Chile constructed a stable national government and expanding economy by the 1830s, it continued facing regional and political rebellions usually around election times. Cacicatos continued to participate in these civil conflicts in order to solve their own rivalries and define frontier relationships.

Therefore, although most Spanish colonies were independent by 1820, most governments were bankrupt and consumed by civil war, unable to immediately construct stable political systems. It was a time of struggle, but of great experimentation for creoles as well as cacicatos.

As I mentioned for the Pincheira and Boroganos, cacicatos participated in the civil conflicts in

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158 The royalists Pincheira brothers allied with some Boroganos to defend Spanish sovereignty. After strong military defeats in the 1818, the allies migrated to the Pampas in search for new political and economic support. Pehuenche lands turn into a key spot for refuge. Carla Manara, “La frontera surandina,” and “Del orden virreinal a la República.”
159 See: Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
Chile and Argentina by negotiating military alliances, trade and territorial agreements. Nevertheless, these countries’ national mainstream narratives rarely connect the political and economic changes in these regions with cacicatos’ transformations and empowerment. In his study of the Eastern Andean frontier, Erick Langer drove our attention towards this link. He argued that independent indigenous groups became more “independent” during independence, and militarily superior between 1824 and the 1860s.\textsuperscript{160} They took advantage of Spanish and creole military abandonment of the frontiers to take back lost land as well as increase their role in world markets through trade and \textit{malones}. Studies on frontier regions also associate the independence warfare with the increasing militarization of cacicatos and the various migrations of groups from the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains to the Pampas.\textsuperscript{161} However, few discuss the relationships between the political and commercial changes of both state and segmental societies, how they both participated in each other’s politics and their impact on regional developments.\textsuperscript{162} By incorporating nomadic pastoralists’ economic changes into frontier and rural studies on both sides of the Andes Mountains, we can truly change our understanding of the Pampas’ and Chile’s economic and demographic growth. In fact, it can also explain labor patterns, cultural and political developments.\textsuperscript{163}

On the Pacific side of the Andes Mountains, changes in international commercial patterns impacted frontier economies. Chilean markets continued supplying Lima and Potosi, but now

\textsuperscript{160} Langer, “The Eastern Andean Frontier (Bolivia and Argentina) and Latin American Frontiers.”

\textsuperscript{161} Villar, eds. \textit{Relaciones Interétnicas en el sur bonaerense (1810-1830)}.

\textsuperscript{162} Papers on alliances between royalist and patriot forces with cacicatos from the Araucanía are an exception. León Solís, \textit{Maloqueros y conchavadores} and Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra”, among others.

\textsuperscript{163} For example, Bjerg studied the role of women in frontiers as nodes of multi-ethnic networks for people to migrate and survive. Argeri and my work analyzed Indian kinship practices adopted by creoles in Carmen de Patagones. María Bjerg, “Vínculos Mestizos. Historias de amor y parentesco en la campaña de Buenos Aires”, in \textit{Boletín del instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani}, 30, Argentina (2008): 73-99; Argeri, \textit{De guerreros a delincuentes}, and Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”
with wheat, wine and olive oil. They maintained strong links with the Cuyo region on the other side of the cordillera under the emerging Argentina, and the Bolivian markets.\textsuperscript{164} Frontier areas started expanding the growing of wheat in relegation of cattle ranching, which consequently decreased its position in exports, but maintained a stable local and regional demand. The Araucanía was a densely populated area and worked in both directions as demanders and suppliers of cattle and cattle products. They provided frontier settlers in the Biobío and cacicatos in the Pampas and Patagonia with beef, cattle and hides, exportable goods like textiles, and were consumers of manufactures, grains, cloth, cattle, horses and weapons, among others. When Chile decreased its beef exports between 1770 and 1830, frontier settlers actually sold cattle to cacicatos in the Araucanía.\textsuperscript{165}

During this context, cacicatos from the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains intensified their migrations to the Pampas. This economic process was part of what scholars called the “araucanization of the Pampas” due to the spread of Mapudungun speakers’ cultural practices in the region. Overcoming an essentialist view of cultures and ethnicities present in studies of the 1950s, historians concluded that this phenomenon was not the substitution of one culture for another, but a complex process better described with concepts like \textit{mestizaje} and ethnogenesis.\textsuperscript{166} Scholars also looked at the economic and political implication of this phenomenon and


\textsuperscript{165} Alioto, \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}.

\textsuperscript{166} While some aspects of the migrants’ culture reigned, such as the use of \textit{Mapudungun} as the main language for trade and diplomacy, groups selected which aspects to adopt and which to reject. New identities were created in the process, such as the Ranqueles in central Pampas. For the 1950s, see: Marcelo Bórmida, “Los Antiguos Patagones. Estudio de Craneología”, \textit{Runa. Archivo para las Ciencias del hombre}, vol. VI, part. 1-2; Buenos Aires (1953-54): 5-96. For the new interpretations, see: Mandrini and Ortelli, “Los “Araucanos” en las Pampas (C.1700-1850),” and Ortelli, “La “araucanización” de las pampas.”
recognized different stages of contact and change.\textsuperscript{167} Among the reasons behind these last numerous migrations, scholars highlight the effect of expansive state laws and policies over indigenous people, cacicatos’ economic motivations and intra-ethnic conflicts.\textsuperscript{168} While I also believe that cacicatos’ actions need to be understood in a particular context of political revolution, historians miss a unique phenomenon by insisting on the effect of state expansion over cacicatos’ developments: cacicatos managed to exploit the more arid zones in the region and integrate them into the growing Pacific and Atlantic markets.

The cacicatos that migrated to the Pampas had clear economic and political motivations. The population increase in the Araucanía, the growing trade, and the persistent state of warfare in Chile, intensified cacicatos’ competition for local resources as well as passes and trails that linked the region with the trade networks in the Pampas and Patagonia.\textsuperscript{169} Nomadic pastoralists migrated temporarily to the Pampas in search of extended grazing land, herds of wild cattle and horses, and expanding agro-export markets.\textsuperscript{170} As Bello has shown, the \textit{Puelmapu}, “the country of the east” for Mapudungun speakers, increasingly became a land of promise and

\textsuperscript{167} Indian groups in the Araucanía, modern Neuquén and La Pampa provinces related with each other from pre-colonial times through trade and kinship ties. Their interaction intensified after Spanish arrival due to the use of horses, the expansion of trade and warfare. Only by the first decades of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century migrations became more massive. Ibid., and León Solís, \textit{Maloqueros y conchavadores}.

\textsuperscript{168} See: Ibid., Bechis \textit{Interethnic relations during the period of Nation-State formation in Chile and Argentina}; Jorge Rojas Lagarde, \textit{Malones y comercio de ganado con Chile: siglo XIX} (Argentina: El Elefante Blanco, 2004); Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra”, and Alioto, \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}.

\textsuperscript{169} León Solís explains that although we do not have a demographic study on the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, several testimonies speak of a significant population recovery. Miguel Ascasubi, “Informe cronológico sobre las misiones del Reino de Chile hasta 1789”, in Claudio Gay, \textit{Documents} (2 vols., Paris, 1846), vol. 1, p.311; Jerónimo de Amberg, “Agricultra araucana,” RChHG, XX, no. 24 (Santiago, 1916), p.62. León Solís, \textit{Maloqueros y Conchavadores}, p.25

\textsuperscript{170} León Solís, \textit{Maloqueros y conchavadores}, p.24.
empowerment.\textsuperscript{171} This is probably why the Boroganos decided to migrate to the Pampas with the Pincheiras and then stayed in Salinas Grandes after their allies’ defeat.

As any migratory experience, the Araucanía’s pushing factors paralleled the Pampas’ pulling opportunities. The increasing economic importance of cattle ranching activities in Buenos Aires brought new creole and Indian settlers to the region, and fueled trade networks.\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Pulperías} (frontier commercial houses) rapidly spread in frontier regions, and Indian trade parties entered the towns.\textsuperscript{173} Although frontier trade was neither quantified nor regulated by creole governments, frontier correspondence has plenty of references on the role of these exchanges in the towns’ economic and social development. Furthermore, attempts to limit frontier trade were strongly resisted by creole settlers and cacicatos.\textsuperscript{174} In some cases, as with the isolated towns of Carmen de Patagones, San Rafael and Valdivia, frontier trade guaranteed basic survival resources for creoles like cattle and horses, and assured the negotiation of peace relationships.

These motivations brought numerous migrants to two resourceful regions: Mamil Mapu and Salinas Grandes. Some Huilliches, Llanistas, Pehuenches and local Puelches settled in Mamil Mapu and became known as the Ranqueles. This region not only offered wood, seeds rich in protein, small animals for hunting, water and pasture, its forests also worked as a sort of protection from western indigenous enemies and northern Creoles. The Ranqueles could also

\textsuperscript{171} As Bello has shown, the concept of the Puelmapu was a territorial ideology created by Mapudungun speakers to legitimize their presence in the eastern lands up to the Atlantic. Bello, \textit{Nampülkafe}, p.85

\textsuperscript{172} The Buenos aires rural areas were filled with small tenants and occupants without title until mid- 19th.-century, when large estancias started being the rule.

\textsuperscript{173} Villar and Ratto, \textit{Comercio, Ganado y tierras en la frontera de Bahía Blanca (1850-1870)}; Mayo, ed. \textit{Vivir en la frontera}.

\textsuperscript{174} As an example, in the 1770s, colonial restrictions resulted in massive malones attacking the frontier. Also, during Rosas’ era, the prohibition of buying cattle from Indians was strongly resisted by residents and settlers in Carmen de Patagones. Alioto, \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}.
easily access trade in southern Córdoba and northwestern Buenos Aires. In the case of Salinas Grandes, several Borogano caciques and their allies tried to impose their power over this region during the 1830s. As its name suggests, these lands contained a big salt lake. Salt was a highly demanded resource used to preserve meat and hides. These resources drove numerous cacicatos to the eastern lands since colonial times. People settled in Salinas Grandes during the 1830s could sell salt to travelers from the west as well as to the Creoles living in the frontier towns of Buenos Aires. East of the Salinas Grandes’ salt lake, a chain of connected lakes offered enough water and pasture for cattle and horses, and some agriculture. People could also move northwest towards Mamil Mapu’s woodlands in case of threat. During the 1830s, the Boroganos lost control over Salinas Grandes due to an internal crises and external threats. In 1841, the Llaimache (from Llaima) Cacique Calfucurá settled in the region and built his confederate leadership from this location. To understand this phenomenon, we also need to explore the political transformations in the region during the first decades of the nineteenth century.

The Bourbon Reforms and the independence wars brought decades of political change and a general militarization. The colonial administrative structure fragmented in the light of defying local power. Local leaders and popular sectors started claiming a major political role in shaping the supra-local forms of polities tried out by the provincial governments, and defied old elites, customs and rules. Regional interests strongly shaped the continuing civil warfare in Chile and Argentina, and the emergence of new leaderships known as caudillos. The persistent

175 Ratto, “La lucha por el poder en una agrupación indígena: el efímero apogeo de los boroganos en las pampas (primera mitad del siglo XIX).”
176 Caudillos were locally grounded leaders with large, and usually charismatic, popular support based on patron-client relations. But they also reached and maintained power in alliance with part of the local elites and used local bureaucracies and military forces. Goldman and Salvatore, Caudillismos Rioplatenses, nuevas miradas a un viejo problema (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1998), and de la Fuente, Children of Facundo. For the general context see: Chiaramonte, Ciudad, provincia, estados, and Salazar and Pinto, Historia Contemporánea de Chile.
warfare also made people’s perception of citizenship and representative rights closely linked with being armed.\textsuperscript{177}

For cacicatos living in the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains, warfare and the increasing economic opportunities also gave way to the emergence of new type of leaders, called \textit{ulmenes} by Mapudungun speakers. These new chiefs defied traditional political rules. They based their leadership on their military bravery as well as their access to wealth in the form of horses, cattle, manufactures and captives.\textsuperscript{178} The emergence of these leaders increased cacicatos political competition for the control of land, animals, commerce and diplomacy. Cacicatos identified as Llanistas, Huilliches, Pehuenches and Tehuelches, among others, experienced decades of extreme internal and external violence and conflict.\textsuperscript{179} In alliance with creole factions, they increasingly incorporated firearms to their war technology.\textsuperscript{180} Cycles of internal warfare and \textit{vendettas} (revenge for death, adultery or robbery) fragmented alliances, destroyed some linages’ power, but also created new identities and leaderships through the process of ethnogenesis, such as the Ranqueles in Mamil Mapu.

In the Pampas, cacicatos’ leaderships were also transformed in the light of the increasing general militarization as well as pressure exercised by migrant groups.\textsuperscript{181} Local cacicatos were usually forced to choose between allaying the migrant groups, allaying creoles by living more

\textsuperscript{177} In this respect, Hilda Sábato speaks of “\textit{ciudadano en armas}” (armed citizenship), were armed violence was perceived as a legitimate way of defending people’s political rights. Sábato, “El ciudadano en armas.”

\textsuperscript{178} León Solís, \textit{Maloqueros y conchavadores}, and Bengoa, \textit{Historia del Pueblo Mapuche}.

\textsuperscript{179} León Solís, \textit{Los señores de la cordillera y las pampas: Los pehuenches de Malahue, 1770-1800} (Mendoza: Universidad de Congreso/Municipalidad de Malargüe, 2001), and Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra.”

\textsuperscript{180} Jiménez analyzed the impact of war technology in these conflicts and showed, for example, that the use of malales (fortifications) started being generalized in the Araucanía and that they searched for creole allies in order to incorporate groups of riflemen to gain, in combination with their own forms of war, a military advantage over their enemies. Jiménez, “De malares y armas de fuego.”

\textsuperscript{181} Nacuzzi, \textit{Identidades Impuestas}; Mazzanti, “Control del ganado caballar a mediados del siglo XVIII en el territorio indio del sector oriental de las serranías de Tandilia”; Mandrini, "Desarrollo de una sociedad indígena pastoril en el área inter-serrana bonaerense," and “La agricultura indígena en la región pampeana y sus adyacentes (s XVIII y XIX)”, in \textit{Anuario IEHS}, Nº 1, Tandil (1986).
temporarily next to frontier posts–these were the groups named as *indios amigos*- or attempt to maintain some independence by playing in-between roles.

During these general processes of political transformation, alliances blurred ethnic divisions. To pursue political power, inter-ethnic alliances emerged everywhere, such as the royalists and the Boroganos in the Araucanía, the *unitario* Baigorria and the Ranqueles in central Pampas, and the Colonel Hilario Lagos and the *indios amigos* in Buenos Aires. Nevertheless, these processes of change and fragmentation saw the emergence of centralizing tendencies reinforced by technological and political innovations, warfare and the expansion of international trade. Tendencies to centralize power emerged in both political systems: from the provincial pacts to the federal state, and from cacicatos’ segmental alliances to the confederacies. In Chile, a centralized government emerged in the 1830s. In Argentina, Juan Manuel de Rosas attempted to impose greater centralized rule to the Confederacy of the Río de la Plata. In the Araucanía, cacicatos centralized their alliances in supra-local polities (from *rewes* to *ayllarewes*). Cacique Magnil lead the highland groups and became the most important cacique south of the Río Biobío. Provincial units called *butalmapu* started appearing in the sources, but historians discuss the origin and real use of these units; they seemed to work more as state attempts to fix lineages to

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183 For the state society see: Chitaramonte, *Ciudad, provincia, estados*; Halperín Donghi, *Revolución y guerra*; Oscar Oszlak, *La formación del Estado argentino*.

184 Boccara, “Notas acerca de los dispositivos de poder en la sociedad colonial-fronteriza, la resistencia y la transculturación de los reche-mapuche del centro-sur de Chile (XVI-XVIII).”
specific territories. In the Pampas, Cacique Calfurá ended the cycles of intra-ethnic violence by centralizing cacicatos’ alliances in the form of a confederacy during the 1840s. In northern Patagonia, the descendants of Caciques Chocorí and Cheuqueta constructed a similar supra-cacicato polity by the 1850s. In spite of these widespread centralizing projects, the creoles ended under authoritarian experiences, fragmentation and political instability by the mid-century. Meanwhile, the Pampas and northern Patagonia indigenous confederacies found internal political stability, relative peace and economic prosperity. Regarding the Araucanía, my preliminary research suggests that cacicatos faced greater economic and political challenges to replicate the levels of stability and diplomatic power of their eastern neighbors.

**Nomadic Pastoralists Path to Empowerment**

The transformation of sedentary and nomadic groups into nomadic pastoralists was a long and complex process that started when cattle and horses were introduced in the region and consolidated between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. The liberalization of trade increased the demand for agricultural and cattle products in the region, and pushed most cacicatos to raise and herd cattle exclusively for commercial purposes. They took advantage of an environment with extended grazing land and rivers, the increasing contact with regional and world markets, and the political circumstances of colonialism and independence.

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185 Bello, Nampulkafe, and Bocca, *Los vencedores*.
186 I agree with Miguel Angel Palermo’s critique to the use of *equestrian complex* to understand complex socio-economic and political changes of Indian polities. Understanding cacicatos’ economies as cases of nomadic pastoralists can help to understand their economic complexity and change over time as well as the relationship with political transformations. Miguel Ángel Palermo, “Reflexiones sobre el llamado ‘complejo ecuestre’ en la Argentina.” *Runa. Archivo para las Ciencias del Hombre*, Vol. XXII, 1986.
This economic specialization allowed cacicatos to reach trans-regional economic scales by mid-19th century. Confederacies’ economies assured survival and prosperity to its members as well as competitive and complementary economic systems to neighbor expanding sedentary agro-export societies on both sides of the Andes Mountains.

During the 16th and 17th centuries, Indians incorporated horses and cattle as a complement to their nomadic and semi-sedentary economies, but they soon increased their economic relevance. In a comparative analysis of nomadic pastoralists in Asia, Barfield argues that the first step of the process usually involved a specialization associated with the domestication of transport animals. In our case, horses played that role. They provided sedentary and nomad societies with a military and hunting advantage, a way of transporting families and cattle, and facilitating long-distant trade. They also became a source of protein. Unlike most Spaniards, Indians in this region preferred horsemeat to cattle. As Alioto explains, Indians prioritized horses from early times due to their mobility, resistance and speed, and rarely sold them to the Spanish. In addition to their economic and military advantage, they allowed cacicatos to sustain more permanent and strong political alliances at trans-regional levels and contributed to enhance internal hierarchies. Horses became part of Indians’ cultural and religious world, marking individual and groups’ economic and socio-political status. Although they were also important resources to Spaniards, they never gained such a prevalent role in their sedentary

188 Horse meat is rich in grease and nutrients, oleic acids, vitamins and minerals. Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera,* p56.
189 They did sell some to more isolated posts under Indians’ control, such as Carmen de Patagones. Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera,* p.56.
190 The amount of horses and people’s ability to horse-ride and run impacted people’s status. Horses also became part of their military and social rituals, such as parliaments, matrimonies and burials. Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera;* Mandrini, “¿Sólo de caza Vivían los indios?,” Luz Méndez, “La organización de los parlamentos de indios en el siglo XVIII,” in Sergio Villalobos, et. al., *Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía.*
economies. Furthermore, Spaniards considered the wild horse of the Pampas a threat to their domesticated cattle and cultivated fields.\textsuperscript{191}

The incorporation of cattle was easily combined with breeding and raising horses. Unlike the bison and horses among the Comanches, cows and horses followed similar seasonal movements.\textsuperscript{192} These animals compete for the same grass and water, but can be raised in conjunction. Their grazing and water requirements demand periodic movements. In this region, both had few natural predators which facilitated their natural survival and reproduction.\textsuperscript{193}

By the 18\textsuperscript{th} century, cattle started being almost exclusively raised and stocked by cacicatos for commercial purposes. Selling cattle and their products –like hides, milk, and salted meat– to creoles was more profitable than consuming it, especially after the liberalization of trade. In exchange, cacicatos could obtain resources they did not produce, such as weapons, tools, manufactures and luxury goods (such as alcohol, tobacco and \textit{yerba mate}). Thus, frontier settlers increasingly played an intermediary role between nomadic pastoralists’ trade networks and urban and international markets.

However, indigenous people and Creoles in frontier regions were both interested in raising, breeding and commercializing cattle and cattle products. While cacicatos exploited this activity as nomadic pastoralists, Creoles were sedentary cattle ranchers in frontier towns. As Barfield explains, the difference resides in that the latter occupies a specific group of labor –

\textsuperscript{191} See: Alioto. \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}.
\textsuperscript{192} Hämäläinen explains that pastoralism and bison hunting are activities difficult to combine because they require contrasting nomadic behaviors. Pastoralism requires frequent movements, and hunting “more sweeping migrations punctuated with periods of immobility.” Therefore, Comanches’ economic power depended on their organized, careful and planned seasonal movements. Hämäläinen, \textit{The Comanche Empire}, p.246.
\textsuperscript{193} Their predators were pumas, wild cats and jaguars. Alioto explains that pumas only attacked the breeds, so they did not much affect the mortality rates, and were more common in more dried areas and mountains. Jaguars were more threatening but were usually in the woods or water basins, in rivers and lake shores, such as the Chascomús Lake and Rincón del Tuyú. Alioto, \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}, p.52, footnote 99.
usually men- in this activity. In contrast, the former involves “everyone in the various aspects of production.”

Although in theory, sedentary societies produce more diverse resources and can access direct international trade, in the context of a frontier region, nomadic pastoralists seemed to have an advantage over sedentary people. They could move to protect the cattle, find the best grassland and water, and reach multiple and long-distant commercial centers. They managed to exploit the more arid land of central Pampas and northern Patagonia, and incorporate them into global trade networks. Moreover, creole ranchers and peons living in frontier towns in these regions, such as Carmen de Patagones and San Rafael, started getting involved in nomadic pastoralists’ economic practices to obtain greater profits. For example, they built reciprocal relationships with caciques to periodically access their grasslands and water, move to protect their cattle, and access distant trade.

Creole peons and soldiers also hunted and gathered to supplement the provincial government’s bad pay.

Indigenous people and Creoles’ common interest in cattle also brought violence, conflicts and environmental change. Creoles and Indians developed techniques to control animals in pasturelands and corrals, but the lack of fences, the flat terrain, droughts, thefts and military confrontations limited their control. Livestock *alzado* (‘rebel’, that escaped human control) and *cimarrón* (wild cattle) quickly spread in the Pampas, forming wild herds hunted by both Creoles and Indians. This common interest resulted, on the one hand, in a legal and conceptual controversy. As Alioto and Langer argue, Creoles claimed the cattle as their property,

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195 See chapter five and Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”
asserting that they were animals that had either escaped or been stolen by Indians. But Indians considered these animals wild, and part of shared hunting grounds, thus, they had the right to hunt and stock them. This controversy nourished an image of Indians as thieves and dependent on *malones* and consequently, was usually used by the military, politicians and settlers to justify creole violence and expansion over cacicato lands. On the other hand, this common interest threatened the wild cattle’s survival. While *cimarrón* cattle were almost extinct by the end of the 18th century, wild horse herds vanished by the first decades of the 19th century. Thereafter, nomadic pastoralists and cattle ranchers depended on their breeding, stocking and commercializing techniques.

What role did cacicatos’ *malones* have in the consolidation of nomadic pastoralist economies? Historians argue that the decline of *cimarrón* cattle in the Pampas increased cacicatos’ use of *malones* to obtain cattle from frontier towns. They showed that during the period when western cacicatos migrated to the Pampas (1770-1830), *malones* hit Buenos Aires, Córdoba, San Luis and Mendoza’s frontier towns and forts. León Solis argued that these attacks had strong economic motives and evolved initially from military ventures into a regular economic activity. In order to differentiate these attacks from the traditional *malones* and *weichán* (open war in Mapudungun), he named these ventures *malocas*. He also argued that most of the stock taken during these attacks was consumed by the cacicatos or sold in Chile.

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197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
200 Crivelli Montero and León Solis were some of the first ones to postulate this theory. For a state of the art see: Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera*.
201 León Solís, *Maloqueros y conchavadores*. 

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Although I agree that cacicatos’ attacks over frontier towns intensified and became more complex between 1770 and 1830, this interpretation suggests that towards the 19th century nomadic pastoralists increased their dependence on these attacks to obtain cattle. When considering the intra-ethnic conflicts and the particularities of nomadic pastoralist economies, I believe that the nature and characteristics of these attacks changed in response to the consolidation of nomadic pastoralist economies and the re-organization of cacicatos’ geopolitics in the region. The nomadic pastoralist confederacies that emerged by mid-century in the region did not depend on these forms of violence to survive; malones and malocas increasingly became tools for complex diplomatic policies, and internal organization.

First, we need to revise the conceptualization of the different types of organized violence, and their transformation. Villar and Jiménez described, with more detail, the difference between the malocas or malones, the weichán and the tautulun or vendettas mentioned by León Solis. While the weichán aimed at defending the territory and autonomy and involved the whole society, the malocas or malones were organized by a group of people, and aimed at appropriating resources and displaying warriors’ prestige. The vendettas were attacks that aimed at obtaining compensation for specific offenses and were performed by the victim’s relatives.

In spite of these clarifications, what Villar and Jiménez call malocas or malones include a wide variety of attacks. As I will show in the following chapters, frontier correspondence in the second half of the 19th century shows that attacks greatly varied in terms of scale: amount of warriors involved, violence used, number of locations attacked and perpetrators’ motives. Hence, we could adjust our vocabulary to reach a more precise understanding of cacicatos’ organized

violence and its change during the 19th century. I suggest using *malocas* to define small attacks performed by a small group of warriors headed by capitanejos, low-rank caciques and even creole leaders living among cacicatos. These attacks seemed to have had personal motives; they provided individual warriors with resources and prestige. On the other hand, we can define *malones* as those attacks which involved several caciques and hundreds of warriors, were preceded by parliaments, and usually targeted multiple frontier *estancias* and posts. These attacks had more clear political and military motives, such as punishing Creoles for violating peace agreements, but they were not as generalized as to define them as cases of *weichán*.

Many of the *malocas* analyzed by Leon Solis for the 18th century might have been probably both *malocas* and *malones* according to my definition. These attacks also had key political motivations and impacted cacicatos’ power-relationships in the Pampas. We need to consider that migrant raiders probably needed to ally –or compete with- local cacicatos to reach frontiers. These local allies had specific political reasons to join or reject participation in *malones*, having to take into account the possibility of Spanish reprisal. Historians León Solís and Crivelli Montero even recognize that some of the *malones* that hit Buenos Aires frontier posts during the 1770s were organized in response to colonial attempts to interrupt frontier commerce. For the migrant groups, these attacks also seemed to have long-term political motives, such as strengthening their presence in the *Puelmapu*. They increased migrants’ resources and prestige in the region while forcing local cacicatos to join or retreat to frontier

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204 The recent work of Alioto persuasively shows that the massive *malones* over Buenos Aires in late 18th century studied by León Solís were sporadic and followed specific reasons, such as the imprisonment of some caciques in Buenos Aires and the legal impediments to frontier trade.
regions. Therefore, the *malones* and *malocas* analyzed by Leon Solis were also political tools to define power-relationships among cacicatos and with Creoles at frontiers.

As in other frontier regions, *malones* were also part of nomads and semi-nomads’ expansive policies. In the case of the Comanches, Hämäläinen highlighted raids as part of the violent and expansive aspect of Comanches’ frontier policies. They aimed at turning frontier posts into imperial possessions.²⁰⁵ For the Chiriguanos, Langer also highlighted the use of raids and guerrilla tactics over the Bolivian and Argentine frontiers as ways to preserve power.²⁰⁶ In our case, the *malones* that took place on the eastern side of the Andes Mountains between 1770 and 1830 stopped the expansion of *estancias* and ranches into cacicatos’ territories, and impeded creole governments from limiting inter-ethnic frontier trade.²⁰⁷ These attacks and diplomatic negotiations also increasingly forced creole governments to formalize their dependence on allied cacicatos to maintain frontier peace and prosperity. Creoles registered the tribute—in the form of goods, clothes, animals, money and services—provided to allied cacicatos in their official budgets and diplomatic correspondence. As I will develop in the next chapters, the indigenous confederacies continued to prioritize conserving and expanding these agreements over using violence. Big *malones* were usually the consequence of Creoles’ violation of these agreements.

²⁰⁵ He argued that the Comanche Empire, “subdued, exploited, marginalized, co-opted and transformed near and distant colonial outposts, thus, reversing the conventional imperial trajectory in vast segments of North and Central America”. Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*, pp.3-5.

²⁰⁶ The Chiriguanos also had a long history of military power; they were actually the result of processes of ethnogenesis during the expansion of Guaraní groups to Chané’s lands during the Inca rule. Erick Langer, *Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree: Franciscan Missions on the Chiriguano Frontier in the Heart of South America, 1830–1949* (Duke University Press, 2009)

Leon Solis and other historians highlighted that these organized attacks had an important impact on the internal stratification of cacicatos. However, differentiating *malones* from *malocas* can help us to further understand the increasing centralization of alliances that led to the emergence of confederacies during second half of the nineteenth century. Warriors had important motives to participate in these ventures. Captives and goods were usually kept by the first men who captured them. Cattle and horses were redistributed among the participants by the leader chosen for the attack—whether it was a cacique or not. These resources marked men’s economic and political status and were used for all aspects of social life, such as marriages, burials and exchange. The bravery involved in the attack also marked men’s military prestige and masculinity. Therefore, caciques increased their prestige and resources during these attacks but confronted a dilemma: these practices were also key institutions for social mobility but could also disrupt diplomatic policies. In segmental societies, caciques could not simply prohibit these attacks, especially because they were linked with a family’s autonomy and subsistence. The generalized violence experienced by cacicatos between 1770 and 1830 attest this dilemma; warriors enhanced their power over some of their caciques, and caciques confronted each other. In the following period, caciques’ control of strategic and resourceful areas, such as Mamil Mapu and Salinas Grandes, frontier diplomacy and trade, and intra-ethnic alliances allowed them to dissuade their warriors from organizing and joining other’s attacks. Like in the case of the Comanches, caciques tolerated *malocas*. Cacique Namuncurá told Zeballos that these smaller attacks were practically uncontrollable and were tolerated by the main caciques even during

209 The Ranqueles, for example, divided the booty according to the horses provided by each attacker. Mandrini, “¿Sólo de caza vivían los indios?”
210 For the Comanches, Hämäläinen argued that leaders and councils allowed small attacks to prevent young men’s rebellion and defiance. Hämäläinen, *The Comanche Empire*
peace times.\textsuperscript{211} Caciques tried to direct these attacks to more distant frontier posts where political
ties were not so strong. After the 1830s, leaders’ success increasingly depended on maneuvering
within these constraints.

When considering the economic impact of these attacks in nomadic pastoralist
economies, as Alioto argues, the subsistence of autonomous societies could not depend
exclusively and predominantly “on an external resource for which regular acquisition depended
on poorly controlled political circumstances.”\textsuperscript{212} While \textit{malones} and \textit{malocas} might have
provided some leaders with immediate economic resources between 1770 and 1830, successful
leaders and groups did not sustain their power on these external resources. As other scholars
recently show, nomadic pastoralists had their own breeding and stocking techniques, and built
flexible economies that allowed adapting to environmental challenges and warfare conditions.
Their economic success depended on assuring access to diverse territories, trade networks and
labor. As I will show in this dissertation, this was especially the case of cacicatos controlling
Mamil Mapu, Salinas Grandes, Tandilia and Manzanas.

Finally, in the light of new evidence on frontier trade in the Pampas and northern
Patagonia, historians defied the widespread theory that argued that most cattle taken during raids
in the Pampas were then sold in Chile.\textsuperscript{213} By looking at primary and secondary sources in
Buenos Aires, Valdivia and Santiago, Alioto persuasively showed that Valdivia settlers might
have bought some cattle for subsistence purposes between 1770 and 1830, but they did not
export cattle products during this time period, and neither did they have suitable \textit{estancias} to

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\textsuperscript{212} Alioto, \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}
\textsuperscript{213} See: Alioto, \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}, and Gladys Varela and Carla Manara, “Particularidades de un
modelo económico de espacio fronterizo.”
\end{flushright}
stock and fatten up cattle that were herded over such long distances. The economy of the Biobío frontier posts was also stagnant between 1770-1829, when Chile was reorienting its economy to produce wheat, oil and wine for export. Cattle were mostly used for local markets. What is more, Alioto discovers that the reverse happened in the Biobío area; settlers sold cattle and horses to cacicatos in exchange for textiles, which were more valuable for export. Most raided cattle was therefore traded in near frontier posts in the Pampas, such as Carmen de Patagones or, as also stated by León Solís, consumed and traded among cacicatos. In addition, we need to consider that, as Barfield explains, “pastoralists’ surplus animals are continually at risk,” they had strong incentives “to exchange surplus animals for other goods or engage in regular patterns of slaughter to prevent waste.” Hence, nomadic pastoralists did not rely on stocking large numbers of surplus animals, but on assuring a continuous access and distribution of resources. Cacicatos’ production and exchange clearly participated in the expansion of trade and population in the Pampas.

Nevertheless, the orientation of cacicatos’ trade to Chilean markets should not be completely dismissed. Alioto focused on the Rios Colorado and Negro trails that reached Valdivia and Concepción, which Villarino followed and recorded in his diary. He did not analyze the trails between central Pampas, Cuyo and Concepción. Even though the passes to cross the cordillera are not as low as the passes south of Varvarco, studies on the Cuyo region show that stolen cattle in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe and Córdoba also ended up on these trails.

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214 As Alioto explains, Osorno was more suitable for cattle ranching, but it had been just refounded in 1794 and cattle came on hoof from the capital. Alioto, *Indios y ganado en la frontera.*
217 Alioto actually does not provide much information on trade relations in Concepcion during the 19th century. Manara and Varela showed the important link that Mendoza and the Pehuenches maintained with Chilean ranchers and traders from colonial times until the end of the nineteenth century. Mendoza’s frontier correspondence.
Furthermore, the independence struggles and migrations brought more Chilean ranchers and traders to the Cuyo region.\textsuperscript{218} Pehuenches allowed the Chileans’ use of their grazing lands, \textit{malales} and trade networks in winter in exchange for compensations. Mendoza’s government even recognized Pehuenches’ right to charge Chileans and Mendocinos for the use of their passes and territories (called \textit{derechos de talajes}) in treaties and frontier negotiations.\textsuperscript{219} Thus, evidence suggests that cacicatos’ trade networks were multidirectional. This allowed greater economic flexibility to deal with changes in regional and international markets and creole governments’ policies.

To sum up, between 1770 and 1830, cacicatos engaged in diverse forms of violence (\textit{malones, malocas, warfare} and \textit{vendettas}) obtaining economic rewards at the expense of political instability and unending violence. But these developments also defined power-relationships among cacicatos in the Pampas and northern Patagonia, and allowed some groups to control strategic and rich regions, such as Mamil Mapu and Salinas Grandes. In these regions, allied cacicatos consolidated their expansive nomadic pastoralist economies by mid-century. What might have started as an adventure for immediate resources and personal prestige ended up constituting a process of indigenous empowerment and domination. The indigenous

\footnotesize{frequently mentions these alternative connections. For example, in 1847 people under the Chilean \textit{Capitán de amigo} Salvo stayed among the Ranqueles and returned with 200 to 600 heads of cattle, gained from \textit{malones} and trade, to sell in Chile to ranchers and traders, some of whom were linked to President Bulnes. AHPM, \textit{Independencia}, Indios, f.123, n.13; Gladys Varela and Carla Manara, “Particularidades de un modelo económico de espacio fronterizo.”\textsuperscript{218} For example, in 1864, Mendoza’s officials indicate that 444 “\textit{Chileans}” and “\textit{Indians}” lived beyond the Rio Grande and possessed 30,000 heads of cattle (42.1\% of the total cattle in the frontier region), 20,000 horses (54.1\% of total horses in the frontier region), and 61,000 sheep and goats (60.94\% of the total sheep and goats in the frontier region). “Censos de la subdelegación de San Rafael del 1864,” in AHPM (Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Mendoza), \textit{Censos}, f.15, no.14.\textsuperscript{218} See sources mentioned later on: negotiations with Pedernera in 1852 and Cacique Traipán in 1857 in AHPM, \textit{Independencia}, “Indios,” f.123, and f.765.}
confederacies continued to use organized violence more selectively and usually against frontier settlements instead of other indigenous groups.

In addition to the use and control of organized forms of violence, attracting followers and assuring a labor force were also key aspects of these growing economies. Men were usually in charge of military activities, hunting, moving and commercializing big herds of cattle. The permeant trade and political competition among cacicatos and between cacicatos and the frontier society required an increasing number of followers. Women and children were also important economic actors. They were in charge of taking care of the herds of cattle, moving the *tolderías* whenever migration was necessary, providing and preparing food for the subsistence of the family group, and, in the case of women, weaving textiles.\(^{220}\) Due to their roles, women and children were usually in the more secure and protected *tolderías*, but could also travel to trade with allied frontier posts. The increasing militarization of cacicatos by the 19\(^{\text{th}}\) century seemed to limit women’s diplomatic and leadership roles.\(^{221}\) However, they continued performing religious roles, and defined kinship alliances.\(^{222}\)

Within this labor organization and requirements, captives progressively became a way to increase the labor force, especially for domestic and diplomatic activities.\(^{223}\)

\(^{220}\) Mandrini, “¿Sólo de caza Vivian los indios?” For women’s roles see: Palermo, “El revés de la trama.”
\(^{221}\) During colonial times, historians recognized women performing diplomatic roles and even leading groups of followers as cacicas. We do not see these cases for the 19th century. See: Videla and Castillo Bernal, Florencia Roulet, and Davies Lenoble. Liliana Videla and Maria Florencia del Castillo Bernal, “Reinas y guerreros. Sobre jefaturas indígenas en Patagonia meridional durante el siglo XIX,” IX Jornadas de Historia, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Argentina, 2003; Florencia Roulet, “Mujeres, rehenes y secretarios: Mediadores indígenas en la frontera sur del Río de la Plata durante el período hispánico,” Colonial Latin American Review, 18, No. 3 (2009):303-337; Davies Lenoble, “Relaciones inter-étnicas en Carmen de Patagones (1779-1810).”
\(^{222}\) Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.” and Bjerg, “Vínculos Mestizos.”
\(^{223}\) For a state of the art on captivity in the region see: Ratto, “¿Para qué quieren tener cautivas si no estamos en guerra? Las varias formas del cautiverio interétnico en Buenos Aires,” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani, 32 (ene./jun. 2010). Also see, Susan Socolow, “Spanish captives in Indian Societies: Cultural Contact along the Argentine Frontier, 1600-1835,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 72, no. 1 (Feb., 1992), pp.73-99.
prioritized women and children, and many times Indian women ended up in charge of captives. Captives were also used in diplomatic negotiations to exchange for Indian prisoners, to gain further resources, and to show peaceful intentions. But nomadic pastoralists also gained a labor force by providing political and economic security and opportunities to frontier subalterns of all ethnicities. Cacicatos’ economic logics of redistribution and reciprocity incentivized creole subalterns to join cacicatos’ families and enterprises. Towards the 19th century, it was common to see creole soldiers, ranchers and merchants living temporarily or permanently in cacicatos’ tolderías and participating in malones. For example, Mansilla’s description of Ranqueles’s tolderías in the 19th century indicates that each toldo usually hosted around ten people formed by at least two men with military responsibilities (lanzas), and one or two captives. They were also prepared to host small and big parties of visitors and traders. In conclusion, organizing mobility between permanent camps, temporary camps and frontier posts became an important expansive strategy for nomadic pastoralists’ economies.

Nomadic pastoralists created complex economic organizations that took advantage of: environmental opportunities, international commercial changes and the political context, to accumulate resources and expand their economies. Controlling access to trade networks,

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224 As an example see Kristine Jones, “Comparative Raiding Economies: North and South,” in Donna Guy and Thomas Sheridan, eds., *Contested Ground: Comparative Frontiers on the Northern and Southern Edges of the Spanish Empire* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998), and my previous work: Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”

225 For example, during malones, the participant warriors kept the captives and goods they personally captured. Animals were also redistributed according to each’s warrior military contribution. Raciones were also redistributed. An illustrative example was the case of four Chileans that reported to Captain Salvo in Chile. According to Cacique Cristiano, they migrated to Pehuenche lands, participated in the assassination of Cacique Gumané and were rewarded with eight heads of cattle from Gumané’s herd. These Chileans also stayed among the Ranqueles for a while and then returned to Chile with 200 or 600 heads of cattle. AHPM, *Independencia*, “Indios,” f.123, n.13

226 Ibid., and Vezub. *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas*

grasslands and water intensified competition among groups and resulted in decades of conflicts, migration, displacement and re-aggrupation of power between 1770 and 1830. Nomadic pastoralist economies changed the geopolitics of the southern lands. A space filled with multiple cacicatos in constant process of fragmentation and alliance became the land of the cacicatos’ confederacies, led by specific lineages that exercised their hegemony over trans-regional territorialities. Although some groups managed to maintain a greater level of autonomy by playing intermediary roles, such as the Pehuenches and Ranqueles, they were constantly affected by pressures from the main confederacies. Let’s explore next, some of the political transformations.

*Cacicatos’ Power-Relationships in the Pampas and Northern Patagonia, 1770-1840*

The confederacies that emerged in the Pampas and northern Patagonia by mid-19th century were not a unique phenomenon; they resulted from cacicatos’ general political transformations and power-relationships in the previous decades. Before the arrival of the Spaniards, historians describe that the segmental societies in the Araucanía, Pampas and Patagonia, were patrilocal, patrilineal, polygamous and had a fragmentation tendency. Men were the head of households, and women moved with their husbands and partners. Caciques married preferably with crossed cousins (daughter of the mothers’ brother) to expand the group, but maintain cohesion. The first son usually inherited his fathers’ leadership and wives. Chiefs

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were linked to common ancestors and formed lineages, which implied political and territorial rights. A subordinate chief could become independent from a principal chief, and allied caciques could separate from the group as well.

Cacicatos were a group of related households. They sometimes held dual-leaderships (a religious and a political leader for the Pampas, and a *lonko* and *toqui* for the Araucanía) and leaderships were many times temporary, especially war leaders. \(^{229}\) Men were usually the head of families and cacicatos, but some women have had leadership roles in northern Patagonia and religious roles in all of the regions. Lineages or *lofs* for the Araucanía included *cacicatos* that shared a grandparent or great-grandparent. This meant that lineages did not always have one principal cacique. In the Pampas, lineages did not form supra-lineages polities such as Araucanía’s *rewes* probably due to their different nomadic necessities and challenges.

During the 18\(^{th}\) century, cacicatos faced new challenges as well as opportunities for political innovation. For example, historians highlight that dual-leaderships seemed to disappear as well as the presence of cacicas in northern Patagonia in preference for single political and military male chiefs. \(^{230}\) As Vezub states, the hereditary rules, the accumulation of surplus and the concentration of leaders’ authoritative attributions were significantly different from cacicatos in the 17\(^{th}\) and 18\(^{th}\) centuries. \(^{231}\) Like the case of the *ulmenes* in Araucanía, military and diplomatic skills as well as the temporary accumulation of cattle and horses became key sources of

\(^{229}\) Nacuzzi, *Identidades Impuestas*.


\(^{231}\) Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.36
Reaching extended grazing land and water as well as multiple markets also pushed cacicatos to expand their territorialities at a trans-regional level.

This context brought structural transformations as well as changes in cacicatos and linages territorial domains. Although other sources of power broke some of the lineages’ succession rules (such as material wealth and military prowess) the creative aspect of kinship politics allowed the incorporation of this innovation without dismissing lineages as the main form of legalizing political power and territorial claims. Power-relationships were based and understood on kinship terms. Societies that base their organization on kinship and reciprocity are many times idealized as egalitarian. However, reciprocity did not mean equality; age, gender and rank strongly structured these societies. Like in other frontiers, kinship also had a diplomatic function; it was used, through marriages and *compadrazgos*, to incorporate others into supra-local alliances. Alliances were understood as alliances among “brothers,” where reciprocal obligations were expected. But this “ideal” was constantly blurred in practice. Alliances among “equal” partners usually included a permanent attempt to subordinate them. It was an ideology of power that allowed specific lineages to expand their territorialities and alliances and increase the

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232 In Chile, historians’ explanation of this transformation gives an important weight to Spanish intrusion. For example, the designation of some Caciques as Governors impacted power-relationships among hereditary cacicatos in the region. It favored some over others. Although I agree with the existence of Spanish policies to modify cacicatos’ politics at their convenience, I believe that they still had a very limited real power over autonomous cacicatos. Bengoa, *Historia del Pueblo Mapuche*, Boccara, *Los vencedores*, and Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”

internal hierarchies. Migrating groups to the Pampas used polygamy and polyandry marriages to achieve and justify their territorial expansion.

In spite of this increasing hierarchal structure and internal competition, consensus politics remained the base of the decision-making processes. Usually, several parlas (smaller meetings) preceded a big parliament. When the big meetings took place, each important cacique provided his point of view on the matter and the issue was discussed until they all reached general consensus. The consensus had to be unanimous. This is why parliaments could last several days. They were also ritualized with ceremonies, dances and big meals. Religious leaders participated in the discussion based on their divine attributes. According to Méndez, they were the pan-tribal response to problems that affected several lineages and required common action. Parliaments were also transformed by processes of mestizaje, adopting some of creole symbols and negotiation procedures. Cacicatos adopted the Spanish ethnic, military and administrative terminology, such as Indians, Captains, and Governors, to name their leaders and enhance their prestige when dealing with the Spanish, without abandoning Indian terms.

Political alliances also cross-cut ethnic divisions. Most frontier studies already emphasize how state political factions and cacicatos use frontier alliances to address internal political

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234 Bello, Nampülkafe, and Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”
236 According to Méndez, parlas or juntas were conversations between less hierarchal authorities, such as caciques and their capitanejos and followers. Parliaments were big meetings among important caciques and later Spanish authorities. Luz María Méndez, “La organización de los parlamentos de indios en el siglo XVII,” Sergio Villalobos, et. al., Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía.
237 Ibid., p.111
warfare. However, less attention has been paid to segmental societies’ strategies to bring state societies in as subordinate allies. Cacicatos also used peace agreements with state societies as a strategy for power and domination. Historically, Creoles’ responded to cacicatos’ negotiations by signing peace treaties. The Spanish crown had to negotiate with cacicatos in order to stop frontier warfare, evidencing their limited power over the southern regions. While cacicatos imposed parliaments as their diplomatic instance for negotiation, the Spanish crown started formalizing these agreements in written treaties. Since peace was agreed upon with cacicatos in the Araucanía in Quilín in 1647, these agreements also symbolized the guarantee of cacicatos’ independence. Whether parliaments resulted in written treaties or oral agreements, they continued being the main way of settling peace between cacicatos and the Spanish during colonial and republican times.

During the 19th century, written pacts continued being the result of larger negotiations and agreements at the local level. They required long verbal and written negotiations, gift-giving and other gestures of respect and hospitality, real and fictive kinship ties between the parts as well as economic, political and social agreements. Between 1770 and 1830, peace agreements were sometimes simple non-aggression truces. But they increasingly served cacicatos to incorporate frontier posts and provincial governments into their networks of allies under the condition of reciprocal obligations that many times turned Creoles into subordinates.

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239 See the case of the Chiriguanos in: Langer, Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree.
240 This might also be the case of the Iroquois League with the French and English. See: Daniel Richter, The ordeal of the longhouse, and Jennings, The history and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy.
242 See treaties in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera.
243 For example, some vulnerable frontier posts had to comply with cacicatos’ demands in order to maintain peace and survive. See the case of Carmen de Patagones in my previous work. Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”
policy was extended by the indigenous confederacies and allowed them to expand their power over Creoles without the need of violence.

In the process of polities’ transformation towards the 19th century, power relationships in the cacicatos’ territory redefined ethnic and lineage territorialities. As I mention, between 1770 and 1830 migrations to the Pampas and intra-ethnic conflicts intensified. Independence and civil warfare intertwined with intra-ethnic rivalries and cycles of vendettas, bringing violence and instability to cacicatos’ lands as well as generating intensive processes of ethnogenesis. Huilliches and Pehuenches disputed the Andes mountain trade routes and passes, and tried to expand over Mamil Mapu. These conflicts resulted in the Pehuenches’ relocation to Malargüe and Varvarco, and the emergence of the Ranqueles in Mamil Mapu.²⁴⁴

Also, the Boroganos from Boroa allied with the royalist Pincheira brothers and other cacicatos, migrated to the central Pampas by the 1820s, threatening local groups’ survival and territorial domains. The Puelches and Serranos in the bonaerense region were forced to either ally with the migrants or to adopt a more friendly policy towards creole authorities to gain protection and resources.²⁴⁵ The Buenos Aires’s government also took advantage of this opportunity to expand its presence beyond the Río Salado.²⁴⁶ By the 1830s, some cacicatos allied with Governor Rosas and became known as the “indios amigos.”²⁴⁷ From then on, they

²⁴⁴ Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra.”
²⁴⁶ They founded Fuerte Independencia in modern Tandil (1823), and Fortaleza Protectora Argentina in modern Bahía Blanca (1828)
²⁴⁷ This was a colonial practice that became institutionalized under Juan Manuel de Rosas’ government in Buenos Aires. His “Friendly business with the Indians” implied that cacicatos that wanted to ally the government had to settle in lands under provincial jurisdiction and defend creole posts in exchange for monthly provisions of cattle and
continued allying with successive Buenos Aires’ governments and participated in creole politics, but perceived their alliance as temporary. They also became participants of the emerging Pampas and Northern Patagonia Confederacies by the 1840s.

During the 1830s, Cacique Juan Calfucurá came from Llaima to the Pampas in two occasions to intervene in the intra-ethnic warfare and internal crises faced by the Boroganos, who were trying to impose their hegemonic control over central Pampas. This short-term objective slowly became a long-term political project. As Villar and Jimenez argue, he managed to overcome “the compulsive succession of revenges” and offer “more than war” to his potential allies. From Salinas Grandes, he started gaining alliances by offering internal peace and stability, and potential prosperity. In northern Patagonia, groups of Tehuelches also lost their control over parts of the trail along the Río Negro and the Choelechoel Island, in confrontation with Huilliche cacicatos, and their access to the bonaerense region in confrontation with the Boroganos-Pincheira alliance. By the end of the 1840s, like Calfucurá, the Tehuelche-Huilliche lineage of the brothers Chocorí and Cheuqueta started constructing a confederate leadership among local cacicatos.

Therefore, by mid-19th the intensive cycle of violence and intra-ethnic warfare gave way to more stable but hierarchical alliances that became centers of indigenous power. First, two goods. By 1832, this policy was settled with the cacicatos of Juan Catriel, Juan Manuel Cachul and Venancio Coñuepan –in Azul and Tapalqué–; Maica, Pety, Anteguan, Collinaro y Mellinao –near Fuerte Independencia in 1839 and later in Tepalque–; Canullán and Guayquil –later in 25 de Mayo- and Santiago Yanquelén o Lanqueles –in Fuerte Federación. However, these groups never lost their intermediary diplomatic role; they continued negotiating with other cacicatos independently from provincial control and always perceived their alliance as temporary. Ratto, "Una experiencia fronteriza exitosa,” “¿Finanzas públicas o negocios privados? El sistema de racionamiento del negocio pacífico en la época de Rosas," in Goldman and Salvatore, eds., Caudillismo rioplatenses, pp. 241-266; “Ni unitarios ni rosistas,” and “Indios amigos e indios aliados. Orígenes del Negocio Pacífico en la provincia de Buenos Aires (1829-1832),” Cuadernos del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani, No. 5 (1994):5-34, and María Laura Cutrera, Subordinarlos, someterlos y sujetarlos al orden. Villar and Jiménez, eds. Amigos, hermanos y parientes. Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra.”
confederacies emerged: the Pampas Confederacy centered in Salinas Grandes under Cacique Calfucurá and reaching Llaima, and the Northern Patagonian Confederacy led by Llanquitrúz and Saygüeque from Manzanas to Carmen de Patagones and south into Valcheta (see fig. 1 in the introduction). Second, small-scale alliances also responding to a central leadership: the Ranqueles in the system composed by the Rios Atuel-Chadileuvu-Salado-Curacó in southern Córdoba, the *indios amigos* of Caciques Catriel and Cachul in Tapalqué (southern Buenos Aires), and the Pehuenches of Varvarco and Malargüe. These small-scale alliances also presented processes of militarization and centralization, but did not turn into confederacies due to internal and external challenges and diverse political trajectories. The Ranqueles and the Catriel’s *indios amigos* became part of the Pampas Confederacy, but maintained an important degree of autonomy. The Pehuenche caciques in Varvarco attempted to gain a confederate leadership over all Pehuenches, but these projects were constantly limited by their active participation in trans-Andean conflicts. This diversity presents some of the different outcomes of major and long-term political and economic transformations in cacicato lands.

In conclusion, the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century were moments of transformation and empowerment, which implied struggle and opportunities. Sedentary state units and segmental societies adapted to these changes in complimentary and competitive ways without losing their autonomy. But only cacicatos managed to find political stability and internal peace by mid-19th century under two nomadic pastoralist confederacies.

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250 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
CHAPTER II

Conquering Salinas Grandes, Expanding Throughout the Pampas: The Confederacy led by Juan Calfucurá, 1841-1860

In this chapter, I will explore the internal dynamics achieved by the Pampas Confederacy during the 1850s. Since 1841, Cacique Juan Calfucurá permanently settled in Salinas Grandes and managed to impose his power over other migrant and local cacicatos as well as to form a confederate alliance with the Ranqueles from central Pampas, and people under Catriel from Tandilia. He put an end to the cycles of caciques’ vendettas and warfare, experienced during the period from 1780 to 1830, and built alliances through kinship ties and logic. By the 1850s, the respect for reciprocal obligations between allies provided them with internal peace and stability, and assured prosperity to their followers. These alliances were sophisticated; I recognize different levels of reciprocity and dependency on Calfucurá’s leadership based on allies own local power and resources. Allies’ permanent search for equilibrium, between maintaining political autonomy and subordinating to a confederate leader, gave life to this Confederacy. This polity was not about following Calfucurá’s military ventures, but about creating a common world of trust, security and prosperity in a militarized world.

The Pampas Confederacy consolidated a nomadic pastoralist economy. It assured subsistence at the family level and surplus from their collective work in breeding and herding horses, mares and cattle. They obtained luxury goods, tools and technologies through exchange. As a consequence, one of the key objectives of allied cacicatos was to assure access to resources
located in distant territories as well as expanding transregional trade networks. These economic particularities fueled cacicatos’ alliances in the region as well as their participation in frontier trade. Their economies were increasingly integrated into the expanding international commerce. Cacicatos’ provision of hides, animal products, and feathers continued being among the main products exported by the Argentine provinces, whose exports almost doubled during the 1850s and 1860s.\textsuperscript{251} Indigenous people were also consumers of imported sugar, alcohol, textiles and manufactures, among others.

Finally, the Pampas Confederacy had an expansive character. Caciques tried to bring creole frontier posts under their web of allies and turn them into dependents. During the 1850s, civil conflicts between the Argentine Confederacy, led by President Urquiza, and the autonomous province of Buenos Aires made frontier posts extremely vulnerable to cacicatos’ power. The Pampas Confederacy not only negotiated with and participated in the conflicts between these two major state units but also imposed its frontier diplomacy. Caciques pushed provincial governments to negotiate peace and engage in reciprocal obligations –materialized in the provision of \textit{raciones}- with allied cacicatos. Frontier posts became sources of tribute, as well as trade, exchange, and sociability. Major violence against specific frontier posts was usually the consequence of Creoles’ violation of reciprocal obligations to their allied cacicatos.

This chapter builds on previous works on the Pampas Confederacy and Calfucurá. Most have concentrated on the figure of the confederate leader. During the late nineteenth century, Estanislao Zeballos epitomized the contemporary widespread image of the Cacique seen as an

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{251} Carlos Newland calculated that exports went from 9,384,000 silver pesos in 1851-1855 to 17,141,000 silver pesos in 1856-1860. Again, in 1866-1870 exports grew from 19,843,000 (1861-1865) to 34,255,000 silver pesos. Newland, “Exports and Terms of Trade in Argentina, 1811-1870,” \textit{Bulletin of Latin American Research}, vol. 17, no.3 (1998): 409-416.}
authoritarian and savage emperor. This long-standing view started to be deconstructed in the past forty years. Kristine Jones detached her analysis from Zeballos’ pejorative interpretation, but agreed in characterizing Calfucurá as an emperor and a nation-builder. His empire was built on the centralization of political alliances and a better military organization to obtain cattle. She argues that it lasted from Juan Manuel de Rosas’ times up to Namuncurá’s (Calfucurá’s son) defeat in 1879.

The anthropologist Martha Bechis offered a radically different interpretation. She argued that cacicatos in these regions could build a confederacy, but not a centralized empire. In her view, segmental societies were not capable of centralizing power due to climatic and organizational limitations, as well as a permanent tendency towards fragmentation. Hence, the confederacy was also a limited phenomenon. Although Bechis’ argument seems deterministic, it pushed historians to continue exploring Calfucurá’s policies and alliances. Ingrid de Jong and Silvia Ratto highlighted the importance of differentiating Calfucurá’s cacicato, in which his hierarchical power was more visible and stable, from his confederate leadership, where his authority seemed more variable. After analyzing Calfucurá’s military alliances between 1841

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253 Jones, “Calfucurá and Namuncurá: Nation Builders of the Pampas.”
254 See the discussion on leaderships in chapter one. Bechis, “La vida social de las biografías: el caso de la biografía de Juan Calfucurá, “líder total” de una sociedad sin estado,” Ruth Sautú, comp., *El método biográfico: la reconstrucción de la sociedad a partir de los testimonios de los actores sociales* (Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano, Universidad de Belgrano, 1999).
and 1872, they concluded that he did not lead a stable and permanent confederacy; instead, he activated latent possibilities of alliance with different caciques to find actions in common.\textsuperscript{256}

Ratto, Daniel Villar, Juan Francisco Jiménez and Sebastián Alioto recently proposed a new interpretation of Calfucurá’s leadership that, I believe, points us back to consider its polity as a confederacy. Instead of focusing on military alliances, they analyzed the political and economic context that gave way to Calfucurá’s leadership during the 1840s and 1850s. Historians showed that part of Calfucurá’s success was based on his ability to become a peace-maker and a guarantor of prosperity among allied cacicatos.\textsuperscript{257} Villar and Jiménez showed how he manipulated traditional sources of power to increase his authority in the region and offered more than violent methods of leadership to his followers.\textsuperscript{258} According to the authors, some of his most important policies towards 1841 were: making more arbitrary and centralized decisions in order to calm intra ethnic conflicts and overcome the negative effects of vendettas; becoming a rich distributor of goods and raciones which favored further alliances; promoting conviabilidad\textsuperscript{259}; externalizing political actions by adding new allies and followers, and manipulating supernatural forces.\textsuperscript{260} This interpretation shows that the confederacy was much more than guaranteeing military alliances.

These historians also deconstructed Calfucurá’s image as a sanguinary leader dependent on malones, pillage and violence to survive.\textsuperscript{261} Most scholars now agree that malones were a way of accessing resources, attracting more allies, and allowing subalterns to gain personal resources

\textsuperscript{256} De Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana,” p.31.
\textsuperscript{257} See the works in: Villar and Jiménez, eds., Amigos, hermanos y parientes.
\textsuperscript{259} The authors define conviabilidad as a form of socialization based on passing positive messages to descendants and kin, and promoting interpersonal relationships through ceremonies, rituals and meetings.
\textsuperscript{260} Ibid., p.136.
\textsuperscript{261} See the works of Ratto and Alioto in Villar and Jiménez, eds., Amigos, hermanos y parientes.
and prestige. Nevertheless, Alioto’s work revealed that Salinas Grandes’ economy was much more diverse and flexible than imagined. Cacicatos adapted their activities to environmental and political changing contexts, and its subsistence did not depend predominantly on external resources obtained either through malones or creole government provision of raciones. Nevertheless, other historians insist that raciones increased Calfucurá’s dependency on these external resources to maintain alliances.262

These studies are important contributions to our understanding of segmental polities, leaderships and economies, by avoiding stereotypes and deterministic theories. We need more research on the political complexities of allied cacicatos, as well as their economies, to understand Calfucurá’s leadership. One of the most important principles of the cacicatos’ kinship politics was respecting local autonomy and the equality among members. The emergence of an authoritarian leader would have violated this principle. Therefore, if political centralization happened among cacicatos, it happened from within their own logic and ideology. As I will show, Calfucurá’s correspondence shows that he rarely wrote as a despotic leader. Instead, he emphasized a humble and conciliatory attitude, and displayed his power by describing his military forces and extended alliances.263 I believe that deconstructing the different levels of alliances and subordination inside and between cacicatos is as important as exploring Calfucurá’s personal policies. This analysis helps to understand what the confederacy was about and how it worked. Framing the confederacy’s economy as a case of nomadic pastoralism contributes to a deeper understanding of their spatial and social organization as well as their logic, policies and

263 See Omar Lobos, Juan Calfucurá. Correspondencia 1854-1873 (Buenos Aires: Colihue, 2015), and Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche.
power. This analysis supports Alioto’s argument on the role of raciones and malones. Moreover, these provisions and actions emerged from the confederacy’s expansive policies. Creoles were forced by peace negotiations, and malones as punishment tools, to become tributaries of the confederacy.

In this chapter, I will show that cacicatos in the Pampas formed a Confederacy which was not about following the orders of a supreme leader. The union provided allies with political predictability and stability, guaranteed their participation in confederate decisions through parliaments, and fueled economic cooperation and prosperity. It was also about accessing military power to confront threats, protect lineages’ territories and prestige. Cacicatos avoided military confrontation among themselves and forced creole governments to play within their rules. Violence was never absent; vendettas (revenge), malocas and malones were still political alternatives.264 But most conflicts between and within cacicatos found non-violent solutions. Calfucurá’s personal success was based on manipulating the tension present in reciprocal relationships from a privileged economic and political position in Salinas Grandes.265 He continued prioritizing the maintenance of internal peace and prosperity, while expanding his influence over the frontier. His diplomatic strategy involved negotiating peace with Creoles. For this purpose, he progressively incorporated the use of writing in lieu of verbal forms of negotiation. This tool allowed him to negotiate simultaneously with diverse creole provinces and frontier posts, as well as materialize his authority in Creoles’ eyes. While until 1854 Calfucurá had sent only a few letters to Creoles written by an anonymous writer, he later built a chancellery with official writers, such as the captive Elias Valdés Sánchez, the Frenchman Luis Foret, and

264 Regarding these distinctions see: Rolf Foerster and Julio Vezub, “Malón, ración y nación en las Pampas.”
265 For example, while he respected decisions taken in parliaments through consensus politics, he limited his allies’ access to Buenos Aires frontier posts.
Manuel Acosta and his nephew and brother-in-law Bernardo Namuncurá, as well as translators, such as Ciriaco Romero, Luis Gorosito and Pedro. He also sent his son Manuel Pastor Calfucurá (named after Governor Pastor Obligado) to study at a school in Buenos Aires during the 1850s. Writing became a key political tool to expand cacicatos’ power over creole provinces.

*Making Peace and Security among Allies: Kinship, Reciprocity and Dependency*

Juan Calfucurá was born in Llaima, a strategic region in the Araucanía next to passes that crossed the Andes to northern Patagonia. During his youth, he visited the Pampas in two opportunities with Cacique Toriano, his older brother Antonio Namuncurá and invited by groups of Boroganos. The Boroganos were occupying Salinas Grandes after their migration along with the royalist Pincheira brothers. In 1834, Calfucurá participated in Masallé, an episode where the principal Borogano Caciques Rondeau and Melin were killed by other Boroganos and allies. This revenge ended Boroganos’ hegemony over Salinas Grandes. While the Borogano Cacique Cañiquir tried to continue his authority in the region for some time, subaltern Borogano caciques and followers followed diverse paths. Some reached Buenos Aires frontier posts to become indios amigos, others moved north with the Ranqueles, and others joined Calfucurá. Cañiquir was attacked by creole forces from Bahía Blanca allied with some Borganos favorable with Rosas’ government and Cacique Venancio Coñuepan. By 1836, Cañiquir and his followers and families lost control over Salinas Grandes. A couple of months later, the Boroganos that

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267 De Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana.”
268 The Borogano Cacique Cañiquir started visiting more frequently the Ranqueles.
269 Coñuepan arrived in the Pampas during the 1830s to persecute the Pincheria brothers and his allies. He allied with Governor Rosas and became an indio amigo. He died in one of these confrontations.
attacked Cañiquir rebelled against Cacique Coñuepan and his allies near Bahía Blanca, and killed Coñuepan. Few people remained in Salinas Grandes by then.

In 1841, Calfucurá and Namuncurá arrived in the region with a coalition of 37 caciques. As Villar and Jiménez showed, there are different versions on Calfucurá’s arrival and settlement in Salinas Grandes. The “dynastic” version was narrated by Calfucurá’s son Manuel Namuncurá (who was named after his uncle Antonio) to Zeballos and describes Calfucurá as a warrior whom, after defeating the Borogano Huircán, gave up all the captives to Governor Rosas as an act of generosity. The version told by the released captive and intermediary Santiago Avendaño, presented the Cacique as an opportunist and usurper of Salinas Grandes. The documents from Governor Rosas’ secretary show an initial hostility between the Cacique and the Creoles in 1834, followed by a conciliatory attitude by Calfucurá’s participation in Rosas’ negocio pacífico de indios during the 1840s. Finally, frontier correspondence recently published by historian Omar Lobos contains letters that also show the importance of consensus politics, peace-making and transregional alliances in the emergence of Calfucurá as a confederate leader. In 1842, Calfucurá and Namuncurá sent some messengers to Commander Pedro Rosas y Belgrano to inform that several caciques had organized a big parliament in the Araucanía and had agreed upon peace. Calfucurá’s and Namuncurá’s representatives specifically made peace with their cousins, whom had been dissatisfied with their permanent settlement in Salinas Grandes. The messengers sent to Commander Rosas y Belgrano asked him to inform Cacique

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271 He was the unlegitimate child of Manuel Belgrano and Maria Josefa Ezcuarrra, Governor Rosas’ sister in law. He worked as a military in Azul and became close to Cacique Catriel. Omar Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, p.49, footnote, 19.
272 AGN, X, 20.10.2, in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, p.50.
Catriel and Buenos Aires’s government of this news as well as the coming opening of trade across the Andes Mountains.

These versions suggest that Calfucurá’s leadership emerged from within indigenous logic and actions, but the relations established with creole governments in the region strongly increased his prestige. They also suggest that part of his power was based on intertwining actions of coercive power with peace-making, and influence over both indigenous and creole worlds. The Pampas Confederacy emerged as trans-regional and inter-ethnic political and commercial project.

As Villar and Jiménez described, during the 1840s, Calfucurá continued increasing his prestige and leadership by becoming a peacemaker and a guarantor of prosperity. He knitted relationships with the remaining Boroganos, the Ranqueles and multi-ethnic caciques living on the Buenos Aires’s frontier, especially Cacique Catriel. Particular contexts and groups’ circumstances in the Pampas favored the continuity of these alliances and Calfucurá’s leadership. His elder brother’s death in 1844 placed Calfucurá at the top of his lineage. Calfucurá also continued negotiating peace with Buenos Aires’s Governor Rosas and received periodic delivery of raciones and gifts. Although frontier conflicts and violence continued, he increasingly monopolized the diplomatic negotiations with the province. As I sketched in the introduction, the closer cacicatos and followers became to Calfucurá in terms of territory and kinship, the higher the levels of dependency they manifested.

273 According to Pedro Rosas y Belgrano, Calfucurá informed him about his brother’s death through a messenger in June, 1844. AGN, X, 20.10.2, in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, p.52.
Figure 3. The Pampas Confederacy. Source: Creation of Gabriel Giordanengo (INGEIS-CONICET) based on my instructions.
The First and Second Level: Calfucurá’s Cacicato and Subordinated Caciques

Calfucurá’s cacicato was based on his family and aggregated families, most of whom followed him to Salinas Grandes. Family heads operated as Calfucurá’s subaltern caciques, *capitanejos* and *lanzas* (warriors). After centuries of contact with societies under state units and processes of *mestizaje*, ranks were increasingly framed with military and bureaucratic vocabulary, clothes and symbols. Caciques became commanders, governors and mayors, and were dressed with the finest military clothes and silver adornments (see pictures in appendix E). Indigenous ranks and symbols were not dismissed; ponchos and locally-produced silver adornments continued marking status. *Capitanejos* were also known as captains and generals, and used clothes and objects of distinction as well. Warriors remained known as *lanzas*, but started using military uniforms provided by state officials or bought in frontier commercial houses. Men’s position in each lineage defined their rank, but political and military skills and economic success also generated prestige and authority. Social mobility was usually possible.

It is worth noticing that Creoles’ social structure presented some similarities. Patriarchy and kinship also shaped the creole society at frontiers, and ranks were strongly shaped by military activities. However, the creole society did not frame their ranks with kinship logic. Bureaucratic institutions defined social structures as well, especially authorities’ trajectories. Caciques usually complained that Creoles’ persistent change of authorities – due to elections or civil war- attempted towards gaining political stability. Instead, Caciques kept their authority for life and transformed reciprocal relationships based on kinship into hierarchies that were also

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275 Bragoni and Míguez also highlight how patron-client relationships intertwined with bureaucratic procedures and institutions. Bragoni y Míguez, coord., *Un nuevo orden político.*
based on economic inequality, social prestige, and individual actions. Kinship worked as a
discursive tool to frame and justify power.

Going back to the Salineros, subaltern men and their families continuously joined the
cacique to benefit from his protection, and to access resources from cooperative production, the
redistribution of *raciones*, the sharing of merchandize and animals obtained from *malones*, and
exchange in multiple cacicato and frontier trade networks. For example, in 1854, Cacique
Pascual’s followers left el Sauce in Buenos Aires and joined Calfucurá after Pascual was
murdered.\textsuperscript{276} They looked for the Salinero’s protection in a context of increasing tension and
violence with Buenos Aires’s authorities during the 1850s.

Calfucurá’s followers also gained influence with neighboring cacicatos and Creoles in
frontier towns. These circumstances provided them and their families with the possibility of
reaching social mobility by establishing kinship ties with important indigenous and creole
families, participating and showing bravery in *malones*, and by serving as diplomatic
messengers. Although the increasing militarization of the indigenous and creole societies by the
19\textsuperscript{th} century seemed to limit women’s diplomatic and leadership roles, they appear in parish and
justice records building and controlling kinship ties. Women became the nodes of inter-ethnic
kinship networks that assured resources and protection in frontier regions.\textsuperscript{277} They could also
enhance their prestige and economic role by acquiring cloth and tools during trading and

\textsuperscript{276} AGN, X, 19.3.3, in Lobos, *Juan Calfucurá*, p. 86, footnote 48.
\textsuperscript{277} María Bjerg, “Vínculos Mestizos. Historias de amor y parentesco en la campaña de Buenos Aires”, in *Boletín del
instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana* Dr. Emilio Ravignani, 30, Argentina (2008): 73-99.
diplomatic visits to frontier towns.\textsuperscript{278} Frequently, Caciques requested creole authorities for goods demanded by their wives, daughters and female followers.\textsuperscript{279}

Calfucurá also kept tolerating \textit{malocas} so that men could gain resources and prestige. For example, in November 1857, Calfucurá told Commander Iturra from Bahía Blanca that some of his men, while taking captives to Azul, had decided to raid the area without his knowledge.\textsuperscript{280} In the same letter, he asked Iturra to protect his men while they traveled and hunted near the town, and also to send back one of his men whom had lost all his possessions by gambling. As we see, subordination was always framed and understood as a reciprocal relationship. Subalterns were expected to provide horses for military ventures, assist less fortunate families and participate in social events, such as marriages and feasts. This language of inequalities also framed their relationship with their death relatives; they organized ceremonies at the end of the year to connect with and honor the dead.\textsuperscript{281}

Subaltern men who became \textit{capitanejos} found unique benefits in following Calfucurá. Military ventures gave them preferential access to captives and objects that were not distributed, but stayed under the captor’s care.\textsuperscript{282} The common booty was distributed according to political rank and the number of horses and men provided by each raider. Redistribution was a respected social norm that assured continuous resources to followers and some level of internal autonomy.

\textsuperscript{278} For example, in the 1860s, we have a list of goods requested by the women from Baigorrita’s \textit{tolderías} to the Franciscan missioners in Rio Cuarto. AHCSF., box. 112, no., 560.
\textsuperscript{279} See Ranqueles correspondence in: Tamagnini, eds., \textit{Cartas de frontera}.
\textsuperscript{280} “Letter of Juan Calfucurá to Mayor Francisco Iturra, Salinas Grandes, November, 6th, 1857,” AHMSP, Bahía Blanca, in Pávez Ojeda, ed., \textit{Cartas Mapuche}, p.300. Calfucurá mentions that Blanquillo and Manuel led this \textit{malón}. A letter written on 1865, mentions that Blanco was Calfucurá’s son. However, all the documentation I found on Blanco did not mention this relationship. Instead, he appears as the “Blanco Indian.” During the 1860s, he appears leading small raids of 15 to 20 warriors against frontier posts in Buenos Aires. AM, \textit{General Emilio Mitre}, box. 5, no. 26.
\textsuperscript{281} Although we lack detailed evidence on these types of sources for Salinas Grandes, we can acces some descriptions for the Ranqueles in Hux, \textit{Usos y costumbres de los indios de la Pampa}.
\textsuperscript{282} Mandrini, “¿Sólo de caza y robo vivían los indios?”
Capitanejos also acquired gifts and provisions when they performed diplomatic activities. Calfucurá, in his letters, paid a lot of attention to the type of gifts and provisions that his people should get from frontier authorities. For example, when he negotiated peace with Buenos Aires, during May 1856, he asked Commander Iturra from Bahía Blanca to provide his son, Catricurá, and the eleven men who traveled with him, each with two shirts, two calzoncillos (pants), two jackets, a hat, a poncho, eight pesos and soap. He also asked for four silk shawls for Catricurá, two double cloth ponchos, a third poncho and a pair of boots for himself as a sign of peace. He also requested clothes for six “Chilean Indians” that were visiting his tolderías; some tobacco, sugar and yerba, a change of clothes for a capitanejo, plus another change of clothes and a poncho for his capitanejo and the latter’s son, Manuel Pastor. In September 1856, he also told Iturra that he had stopped sending messengers because they were not receiving gifts as they used to. He sent Lefi and six men and demanded that Iturra provide Lefi with 10 pesos and a hat, and some sugar, yerba, alcohol and tobacco for each of his companions. He also asked for 14 pesos and soap for himself. Similar to these detailed lists, treaties indicated specific and limited number of salaries, raciones and clothes for each rank.

In spite of the capitanejos’ increasing benefits by following Calfucurá, the Salinero increasingly limited their mobility and internal authority. Subaltermen controlled their families and, in theory, could always leave Calfucurá and join other groups. Nevertheless, once in Salinas Grandes, their survival and prosperity increasingly depended on Calfucurá, turning fission

283 I found this reference a couple of times; it probably means that when paper money was scarce, they used soap as an equivalent.
285 “Letter from Juan Calfucurá to the Commander Mayor Francisco Iturra, Salinas Grandes, September 26th, 1856,” in AHMSP, Bahía Blanca, in Pávez Ojeda, Cartas Mapuche, p.292.
286 To see some examples, see Levaggi, Paz en la frontera.
unlikely at this level. Based on Zeballos’ interviews with Calfucurá’s son Manuel Namuncurá, he explained that each capitanejo occupied land in accordance with his necessities, but with previous consent from their caciques.\textsuperscript{287} When they lacked water, grass or wood, they could move to another region, but only with the principal caciques’ consent.\textsuperscript{288} Calfucurá increasingly controlled subalterns’ access to Salinas Grandes’ salt lakes, water and grazing land as well as frontier diplomacy. For example, in January 1846, Calfucurá ordered that the Ranquel capitanejo Necul be imprisoned, and had him sent to Commander Rosas y Belgrano in Azul. His messengers informed the Commander that Necul was living in Salinas Grandes, but participated in malones against Salto and Luján and was reluctant to make peace with the Creoles. They also accused him of murdering a creole woman and eating her heart.\textsuperscript{289} Calfucurá asked the Commander to put him to death. However, Necul testified to the creole authorities that he never raided Buenos Aires or committed the atrocities that they accused him of. He had raid frontier towns, but in the province of Córdoba. Necul supposed that Calfucurá imprisoned him because he had decided to abandon Salinas Grandes and join Cacique Catriel after Calfucurá forbade him and his people to take salt from the Salinas Grandes’ salt flats.\textsuperscript{290} Necul indicated that Calfucurá expected him to pay for the salt.

This case shows some of Calfucurá’s strategies to manipulate cacicatos’ norms and customs to increase his power among caciques, capitanejos and lanzas in region. Capitanejos

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{287} Zeballos, \textit{Papeles}, fs. 34 and 35, in Villar and Jiménez, \textit{Amigos, hermanos y parientes}, pp.37-38.
  \item \textsuperscript{288} Bechis argued that in segmental societies caciques did not have the capacity and power to pin their followers to specific locations and avoid their relocation. Vezub, on the other hand, states that in the case of Saygüeque in Manzanas, the cacique had increasing authority over his allies and followers settlements. Calfucurá’s case also supports this idea. Allies could move, but allways with the consent of the principal cacique. Bechis. “Los lideratos políticos en el área araucano-pampeana en el siglo XIX”, and Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}, p.190
  \item \textsuperscript{289} AGN, X, 20.10.2, in Lobos, \textit{Juan Calfucurá}, p.52-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{290} “Necul’s testimony in Santos Lugares, January 29\textsuperscript{th}, 1846,” AGN, X, 20.10.2, in Lobos, \textit{Juan Calfucurá}, p.53-4.
\end{itemize}
were under cacicatos’ justice. When they committed an offense, they could be dispossessed of their animals temporarily and sometimes permanently.\textsuperscript{291} Nevertheless, they preserved mechanisms to counterbalance their dependency. They participated in parlas and parliaments, and had authority over common families.\textsuperscript{292} Hence, in order to avoid conflicts with other Ranqueles and resentment among his followers, Calfucurá accused Necul of raiding and not respecting peace agreements – agreed also under cacicatos’ parliaments- and transferred the responsibility to the creole authorities.\textsuperscript{293} In this specific case, creole authorities feared the Ranqueles’s revenge and, according to Calfucurá, they sent Necul to the City of Buenos Aires and later released him.\textsuperscript{294}

To sum up, capitanejos possessed several means which would allow them to increase their prestige, economic resources and authority, but were limited by Calfucurá’s recognition and permission, as well as the cacicatos’ and Creoles’ judicial and social customs.

Unlike capitanejos, subordinate caciques came from historic lineages and led groups of families and capitanejos. During Buenos Aires’s military expedition against Salinas Grandes in 1858, creole authorities mentioned some of the most important subordinate caciques’ location: Cacique Cañumil, who usually led 100 lanzas, had his tolderías on the coast of Carué lake, while Cacique Quintrel in Leofucó.\textsuperscript{295} Subordinated caciques increasingly depended on Calfucurá’s permission to move throughout the Pampas, trade and negotiate with others. Some even ended up

\textsuperscript{291} Zeballos, \textit{Papeles}, f.50, Villar and Jiménez, eds. \textit{Amigos, hermanos y parientes}, p.50.  
\textsuperscript{292} According to Zeballos, when common families were in conflict, they had to first contact the assigned capitanejo. While the capitanejo investigated the matter, the main cacique welcomed the families, witnesses and capitanejos into his toldería; he listened to all parts and resolved the problem. Zeballos, Papeles, f.50, Villar and Jiménez, eds. \textit{Amigos, hermanos y parientes}.  
\textsuperscript{293} Necul testified that he was a capitanejo of the Ranquel Cacique Painé’s tribe and had his toldos in Salinas Grandes. Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{295} Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá,” p.204. For Cañumil, see SHE., \textit{Frontera con los indios}, no. 1286.
performing functions typical of Calfucurá’s capitanejos, making it difficult to differentiate their ranks.\textsuperscript{296}

Caciques’ political autonomy depended on their access to military, economic and political resources. Subordination to Calfucurá resulted in a progressive loss of regional power and prestige. This was the case, for example, of some Boroganos who ended up joining Calfucurá after their internal crisis in the 1830s.\textsuperscript{297} The reverse could happen as well; subordinate caciques could relocate and increase their level of autonomy or join state forces and become indios amigos next to provincial authorities. For example, in 1850, Calfucurá informs that the Borogano capitanejos –probably caciques– “Meliguer, Reguinqueo and Quenpil” joined his tolderías.\textsuperscript{298} According to Ratto, Cacique Meliguer and his people had left Salinas Grandes after the battle of Masallé in 1834 to settle in Bahía Blanca as indios amigos.\textsuperscript{299} Hence, Calfucurá gained his subordination a decade later. In the case of Reguinqueo, probably Cacique Raninqueo, he was under the Salinero but ended up more permanently settled near Bolivar heading a group of indios amigos during the 1860s. During the 1870s, Calfucurá punished him for backing Cipriano Catrél’s (Juan Catrél’s son) attack on allied caciques.\textsuperscript{300} Finally, Quenpil, probably Cacique Quempil from the Picunches, seemed to return to the Andes Mountains but finally settled in Río Colorado during the early 1870s after negotiating with the Northern Patagonian Confederacy and the Argentine Government.\textsuperscript{301} Therefore, subordinated caciques kept some degree of autonomy and had political alternatives. They usually maintained their own tolderías

\textsuperscript{296} In Calfucurá’s letters, some people appear alternatively as caciques, caciquillos or capitanejos.
\textsuperscript{297} Ratto, “La lucha por el poder en una agrupación indígena: el efímero apogeo de los boroganos en las pampas (primera mitad del siglo XIX),” \textit{Anuario de Estudios Americanos}, vol. 62, no. 2 (Jul-Dic, 2005): 219-249.
\textsuperscript{298} AGN, X, 20.10.2, in Lobos, \textit{Juan Calfucura}, p.59.
\textsuperscript{299} Ratto, “¿Para qué quieren tener cautivas si no estamos en guerra?”
\textsuperscript{300} See chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{301} See chapter 5 and 6.
and followers, and participated in parliaments. Distance from Calfucurá’s tolderías meant greater autonomy. Nevertheless, they could rarely escape Calfucurá’s increasing hegemonic power. The internal tension between subordination and autonomy was permanent.

Finally, Calfucurá’s direct relatives were also in the second level of reciprocity and dependency. After his eldest brother Antonio Namuncurá died in 1844, he became the principal leader of his linage. His brothers maintained the right to lead their own cacicatos and participate as equal members in the lineage’s political decisions. Usually, the eldest brother was considered the principal leader and executed decisions taken by consensus politics, but younger brothers were permanently looking to enhance their authority as well. In a similar way, sons maintained a subordinate role to their fathers, usually performing as capitanejos until they could lead their own cacicato. Successful principal caciques, like Calfucurá, found ways to increase their authority and the level of dependency of his relatives within these customs.

We know that Calfucurá’s brothers maintained their leadership over their own cacicatos and participated in the lineage’s decisions with outsiders. They constantly ritualized their relationship by renewing fictive and real kinship ties. Some of Calfucurá’s sons were named after his brothers, like Manuel and Bernardo Namuncurá, and Juan Reuquecurá.302 Repeating important caciques’ names was common among Mapudungun speakers as well as adopting the names of their protectors or godfathers.303

302 From the sources consulted, some of his most important sons were Millacurá, Catricurá, Alimay, Alvarito Reumay, and Manuel Pastor Curá. Probably some of these names responded to the same person who changed names according to new circumstances, such as kinship ties. See Zeballos, Papeles, fs.4-6, in Amigos, hermanos y parientes, pp.15-17 and 55-57.

303 As mentioned in the introduction, the ceremony known as lakutun sealed ties between children and their protectors or godparents that could be assimilated to a relationship of compadrazgo. Andre Aravea, “Los mapuches-warriache procesos migratorios e identidad mapuche urbana en el siglo XX,” Boccara, ed., Colonización, resistencia y mestizaje en las Américas, pp.359-382, p.379.
Except for his brother Reuquecurá and his son Millacurá, most of Calfucurá’s brothers and sons performed subordinated roles until his death in 1872. They resided in Salinas Grandes and were usually sent on diplomatic missions. They represented his words and peaceful intentions. For example, in Calfucurá’s letters from 1856 to 1857, his sons Catricurá and Manuel Pastor were sent to frontier posts to negotiate peace. Manuel Pastor was also sent to Mendoza to visit the Picunches. The Confederate leader also planned to send his son Manuel Pastor and four or five sons of the most important caciques to study in Paraná.

Reuquecurá was probably the most “independent” brother. Similar to the Northern Patagonian Confederacy, locating brothers in strategic, though distant, regions eased the internal competition. According to Commander Pedro Rosas y Belgrano, in January 1850 Calfucurá informed him that he had sent Reuquecurá back to Llaima. He wanted him to take care of the “Chilean” caciques who usually visited Salinas Grandes to trade as well as to keep the relations with Pehuenche caciques on good terms. Reuquecurá’s settlement in Llaima became crucial for the Confederacy’s trans-regional networks. He controlled a key trade pass over the Andes, and negotiated with the caciques that held the passes to the north—the Pehuenches— and to the south—the Huilliche-Tehuelches. From this location, Reuquecurá also tried to incorporate allies into the Confederacy and frequently visited Salinas Grandes. During the 1860s, he attempted

304 Usually the oldest cacique or capitanejo led each commission.
305 Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche.
308 AGN, X, 20.10.2, in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, p.59
309 For example, in 1858 Cacique Llanquitrúz told the ex-Commander Fourmantín that Reuque was trying to get allies to organize a big malón against Buenos Aires frontier posts. Salinas Grandes was just attacked by the bonaerenses’ military forces and Calfucurá wanted revenge. He said that although Calfucurá was trying to get military support from caciques in Pitrufquén, two of Llanquitrúz’s own capitanejos had betrayed him and joined
to expand his alliances and control over the Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s allies, trails and territories. Nevertheless, Reuquecurá never did seriously challenge Calfucurá’s authority over their lineage, nor did he sustain a dual-leadership like Caciques Pichún and Calván did among the Ranqueles, or Cheuqueta and Chocorí among cacicatos in northern Patagonia. In comparison to the latter, Calfucurá’s lineage showed greater levels of centralization, but stronger autonomous allies at the third level of dependency.

Calfucurá’s greatest internal challenge came from his eldest son, Millacurá. By the end of the 1850s, Millacurá was leading his own cacicato and moved his permanent camp from Salinas Grandes to Azul, near Caciques Catriel and Cachul, and later to Bahía Blanca.310 We do not know if this was done with Calfucurá’s approval, but the relationship seemed tense. While Buenos Aires authorities started providing raciones to Millacurá, they sent military expeditions against his father.311 In 1859, Millacurá also offered military support to Buenos Aires against the Argentine Confederacy, when his father was apparently backing Urquiza.312 It’s difficult to know if this was a lineage’s strategy of double negotiation to increase resources or an act of rebellion. Ambivalent actions continued. Millacurá ended negotiating Calfucurá’s peace with Buenos Aires in 1860, but he did not return to Salinas Grandes.313 When Calfucurá died in 1872, Millacurá was supposed to succeed his father, but his brothers and allied caciques refused to follow this

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310 The military reports from 1857 to early 1858 analyzed by Alioto informed that Millacurá’s tolderías were in Guaminí. Buenos Aires correspondence indicates that when the province granted a truce to Calfucurá’s followers, Millacurá went to Azul with Catriel and Cachul to accept the truce. He also received raciones in Azul in December 1858. Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá,” p.204, and AGN. X., 20.2.2.
311 In February 1859, Cachul informed authorities in Buenos Aires that an Indian that had escaped from Calfucurá’s tolderías to Millacurá’s tolderías, confessed that Calfucurá was preparing a big malón against the province. Although we don’t know if Millacurá gave up this Indian or if their objective was to scare state authorities, this type of event suggests possible conflicts between father and son. AGN. X., 20.2.2.
312 AGN, X., 20.2.2.
313 Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, p.323
tradition. Instead, they created a triumvirate of three of his brothers to lead the lineage and Confederacy. This case does not only illustrate the persistent tension between autonomy and subordination among confederate cacicatos, but also exemplifies Calfucurá’s political priorities. He seemed to tolerate a certain level of autonomy and insubordination from his son in order to maintain internal peace.

Regarding Calfucurá’s wives and daughters, we have some evidence that reveal their important role as nodes of kinship and political alliances. Zeballos indicated that the Confederate leader had 14 wives.314 Villar and Jiménez doubt that these were Calfucurá’s or Namuncurá’s wives, but sources usually mention he had several wives from different origins.315 This diversity extended Calfucurá’s presence over several lineages and territories.316

Calfucurá’s wives also traveled with diplomatic and commercial commissions, representing a guarantee for peace. During the tense negotiations with Buenos Aires’s authorities during the 1850s, sources mention the presence of some of his wives in diplomatic commissions.317 An episode during with one of his wives suggests that Calfucurá prioritized the political and symbolic role of some of his wives over his personal relationship with them. In 1858, General Cornell told General Wenceslao Paunero that Manuela Queltruaque, one of

314 Zeballos, Papeles, f.6, in Villar and Jiménez, Amigos, hermanos y parientes, p.16.
315 By examining the names, they find that most names were the same as those of Namuncurá’s wives. This might indicate they were the wives of the latter or that he inherited Calfucurá’s wives. Villar and Jiménez, Amigos, hermanos y parientes, p. 56.
316 For example, the Pehuenche Cacique Cristiano claimed to be his brother in law. AHPM (Archivo Histórico de la Provincia de Mendoza), box.123, no. 13.
317 In 1854, Burgeois from Bahía Blanca informed the Ministry of War that Calfucurá sent two of his wives, Rosa and Rafaela, with the diplomatic commission that reached the town as a sign of peace. In 1857, Calfucurá again sent one of his wives with his commission to Bahía Blanca. AGN, X, 18.10.6, in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, pp.72-3, and “Letter from Juan Calfucurá to Francisco Iturra, Salinas Grandes, November 6th, 1857,” AHMSP, Bahía Blanca, in Pávez Ojeda, Cartas Mapuche, p.300
Calfucurá’s wives, had committed adultery with Mariano Maltrua. Calvucurá decided to take Mariano’s legitimate wife, Juana Pitrighene, and to give him his “adulterous” wife. In this decision, he prioritized restitution over revenge by death.

Most of the people in the first two levels had their permanent camps at Salinas Grandes. We can estimate their population from a careful study of different pieces of evidence. When Calfucurá settled in this location in 1841, state sources informed that he came with 37 caciques, 500 lanzas, 100 machetes and boleadoras (a hunting tool) and 100 young transporters. Probably some of these “caciques” were capitanejos. Other pieces of information from the 1850s and 1860s suggest that his caciques and capitanejos could be between 23 and 46.

Regarding the total population, we have different pieces of evidence. First, the information on his arrival in 1841 estimated a total of 738 military men. When Lucio Mansilla visited the Ranqueles, he described that each toldo had at least two soldiers. If this information is correct and applies to Salinas Grandes, it would give a population of 3,690 people including

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318 AM, Wenceslao Paunero, no. 4812.
319 As cacicatos did not leave detailed written evidence on their demographics, we have to rely on unprecise state sources. In military reports and lists, authorities usually speculated when they tried to calculate the number of family members per warrior. Their misunderstanding of cacicatos’ ranks and the frequent presence of allied guests from diverse locations in Calfucurá’s tolderías makes it more difficult to track and differentiate capitanejos from subordinate caciques and allied caciques. In addition, indigenous people frequently changed and added names to their birth names, which further complicates the research.
320 Hunting tool consisting of three rocks tied to three ropes used to hunt as well as warfare.
322 In the list of goods provided to Calfucurá in Bahía Blanca during 1851, frontier authorities recorded 28 capitanejos, 1 cacique, and 2 Indians picking up the raciones under his name. Unluckily, most of the names annotated for these capitanejos do not appear in other sources, which is probably due to misspellings and changes in names. In 1854, Calfucurá claimed to have 1,500 lanzas, which included allied huilliches, 140 captains and 2 mayors, and other allied caciques like Juan Manuel and Colleano (caciques of indios amigos from Mulitas and Federación). As these last numbers included more allies and Calfucurá usually mobilized 500 lanzas on his own, we could calculate 46 capitanejos per 500 lanzas. Finally, based on interviews with Namuncurá, Zeballos registered 23 caciques under Calfucurá. Therefore, although we do not have exact numbers and names of his capitanejos and subordinated caciques, these sources estimate between 23 and 46 capitanejos and subordinated caciques under Calfucurá. See: AGN., X., 20.10.4; “Juan Kallfukura to Cordoba’s Governor Alejo del Carmen Guzmán, Salinas Grandes, September 1854,” in Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, pp.264-265, and Villar and Jiménez, Amigos, hermanos y parientes, p.41.
women, children and old men. Second, the military reports from 1858 on Salinas Grandes analyzed by Alioto also mention the existence of 300 huts. Lucio Mansilla again estimated that huts usually held ten people. These two pieces of information therefore estimate a population of at least 3,000 people for Salinas Grandes. Third, frontier reports mention that Calfucurá could mobilize 500 lanzas on his own, which would imply a population of around 2,500 people. Finally, Commander Rosas y Belgrano’s report from 1852 analyzed by Caletti mentions that Calfucurá lead over a population of 3,200 people (he estimated three people per each of the 800 lanzas).

In conclusion, these pieces of information seem to indicate an approximate population of between 2,500 to 3,700 people for Salinas Grandes during the 1850s and 1860s. In addition, this location permanently hosted visitors and allies. Estimates of malones attributed to Calfucurá and his allies reached between 1,000 and 4,000 lanzas, which could mean a temporary population of 6,000 people with visitors, or even 20,000 including visitors’ family members.

Salinas Grandes presented an important demographic, political and economic center for the Confederacy. It not only housed local residents, but numerous commissions of visitors and allies. Nevertheless, the Pampas Confederacy’s expansive and hegemonic power was also based on reaching permanent alliances with the two other important demographic and economic centers: the lands of the Ranqueles and Catriel.

325 State correspondance mentions the arrival of between 1000 and 2000 people from the Araucanía to Salinas Grandes on several occasions. When reporting on malones, they usually identified the Ranqueles and groups of indios amigos allied with Calfucurá. As an example see: AGN., VII, Barros, no. 15, and SHE., *Frontera con los indios*, n. 6583.
At the third level of reciprocity and dependency, the Pampas Confederacy was the most visible. The Ranqueles and Catriel usually acted as autonomous allies. They conceived themselves as independent actors that could become part of major alliances for long distance trade as well as joint territorial, political and military activities without giving up their autonomy. They had subordinated caciques and capitanejos as well, becoming other examples of the increasing formation of hierarchies inside cacicatos. Nevertheless, unlike circumstantial alliances during colonial times, they presented a greater level of subordination to Calfucurá’s leadership. In addition to Calfucurá’s political intervention in the region during the 1830s and 1840s, the Ranqueles and Catriel started depending on his leadership for expansive and security purposes during the 1850s.326 The Salinero made it possible to trade outside their territorial range, he had the military power to defend their territories and resources from neighbors’ threats, and provided economic assistance when needed. For example, the Ranqueles could access the Araucanía through their western neighbors, the Pehuenches. This group of cacicatos controlled a number of passes over the Andes. Nevertheless, they also mediated western cacicatos’ visits to Salinas Grandes and were near Reuquecurá. The Ranqueles also increasingly depended on Calfucurá’s permission to reach Buenos Aires frontier posts (see fig. 3). It was therefore to the Ranqueles’s benefit to maintain good relations with Calfucurá. Another example was Catriel and his allies. Calfucurá had him boxed in their Tapalqué corner. These people could never access trans-regional trade networks on their own. They needed to cross Calfucurá’s dominions to access western markets. In moments of need, they always turned to Calfucurá.

326 Sources on the 1830s and 1840s show an active and fluid communication and trade between the Ranqueles, Catriel and the Salineros. They also participated together in military ventures. See sources in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá.
Calfucurá carefully exploited these weaknesses to gain a leadership over major military ventures, inter-cacicatos relationships, and most of the important negotiations with provincial governments. In order to guarantee a permanent alliance and avoid the emergence of other trans-regional leaders, Calfucurá worked through consensus politics, promoting the idea of relative autonomy among the members of the Confederacy. He tolerated independent negotiation with state authorities as long as they did not interfere with his territorial control and the reciprocal obligations amongst allies. Calfucurá’s leadership depended on maneuvering through the ambiguity that relationships of reciprocity and dependency presented in alliances based on kinship politics. Alliances were also strengthened by increasing contact between followers of these three groups of cacicatos. Kinship and trade integrated people under the Confederacy.\footnote{327}{In various sources it is quite common to find references to kinship ties among families from Calfucurá, the Ranqueles and Catriel.} Although it seems that religious ceremonies continued being celebrated independently, they always integrated visitors from other cacicatos.\footnote{328}{Avendaño’s description of parliaments held amongst the Ranqueles, shows increasing hierarchies in the organization and performance of religious ceremonies. Avendaño, Usos y costumbres de los indios de la Pampa.}

The alliance between the Ranqueles and Calfucurá was not a solid one from the beginning; it was slowly constructed and went through periods of minor and major tensions. Since the 1820s, the Ranqueles were located in the area between the Rivers Atuel, Chadileuvu, Salado and Curacó in central Pampas. Commander Rosas y Belgrano mentions that the Ranqueles and Boroganos were about 6,000 in 1852 (1,500 lanzas and 4,500 family members). But many of these Boroganos were probably under Calfucurá’s leadership rather than the Ranqueles. Sources on malones usually speak of between 400 and 600 lanzas for the Ranqueles, which could imply a population of between 2,000 and 3,000 people following the calculation of
2 *lanzas* per 10 persons.\(^{329}\) Nevertheless, sources analyzed by historian Alicia Haydeé Tapia, indicate a population of around 6,000 people by 1870.\(^{330}\) Probably, this includes all cacicatos in the region regardless of following the principal Ranquel caciques and might include Pehuenche and Salinero allies visiting the region. Nevertheless, the Ranqueles seemed to have a permanent population greater than that of Salinas Grandes.

During the 1840s, several Ranquel cacicatos came together as a small confederacy lead by two lineages: the descendants of Cacicues Yanquetruz and Paine Guor. Their sons, Cacicues Pichún Gualá and Calván, led the groups during the 1850s, and their grandsons, Manuel Baigorrita Gualá and Mariano Rosas (Panguitruz Guor), during the 1860s and 1870s.\(^{331}\) Like Calfucurá’s lineage, they experienced greater levels of centralization. Historians highlight the practice of suttee -the killing of the dead leaders’ wives- during Cacique Paine’s funeral as a symbol of this process.\(^{332}\) Thirty two women were killed to accompany the cacique in his afterlife. Pichún and Calván also enhanced their leaderships by extending diplomatic negotiations with creole governments. It is not surprising that Pichún’s son adopted the *unitario* Colonel Baigorria’s surname and Calván’s son Governor Rosas’s surname. Manuel Baigorrita was baptized and co-parented by Colonel Baigorria in his fathers’ *tolderías*.\(^{333}\) In the case of

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\(^{329}\) Some of the sources that indicate this amount of *lanzas* are: AHSL. (Archivo Histórico de San Luis), box. 159, no. 6651; box.162, no. 17408; box. 163, no.17724.


\(^{331}\) Yanquetruz’ sons were Pichún Guala, Yanquetruz Guzman and Manuel Baigorria. Paine’s sons were: Calván, Mariano Rosas and Empumer.

\(^{332}\) Little has been studied about this practice outside the case of the Ranqueles, which was documented in detail by the captive Santiago Avendaño. Historians found some references about the killing of animals, especially horses, during caciques’ funerals. Mandrini also found a description of a cacique’s grave in Santa CCruz during the eighteenth century that mentions the presence of women and animals buried next to the cacique. Rex González, “Las exequias de Painé Güor. El sutte entre los araucanos de la llanura,” and Mandrini, “El viaje de la fragata San Antonio, en 1745-1746.”

Mariano Rosas, he was captured around 1834 by the military when he was young. Governor Rosas baptized him and sent him to his estancia. He learnt how to read and write and, after six years, escaped with other prisoners. He kept his Christian name and Governor Rosas sent him gifts to honor their kinship ties.\textsuperscript{334}

Like Calfucurá, both lineages managed to lead subordinated caciques and capitanejos, achieved influence over groups of indios amigos in Córdoba and San Luis’s frontier posts, and strengthened their alliances with the Pehuenches.\textsuperscript{335} However, they sustained a dual leadership system and had conflicts with small cacicatos that attempted to act more independently.\textsuperscript{336} After Yanquetruz’s and Paine’s deaths, Pichún and Calván settled their permanent camps in different locations: Pichún in Poitagüe and Calván in Leuvucó. From these locations, they maintained “equal” authority and, in spite of some internal conflicts, they continued to be strongly tied at the diplomatic level when dealing with outsiders.\textsuperscript{337}

Before Calfucurá’s arrival in Salinas Grandes, the Ranqueles had a significant interest in extending their influence over the Pampas. During the 1820s and 1830s, they had allied with the Chileans under the Pincheira brothers and the Boroganos. Upon dissolution of this alliance and abandonment of the region, the Ranqueles could have claimed Salinas Grandes for themselves;

\textsuperscript{334} Ibid. and see sources in Lobos, \textit{Juan Calfucura}, p.48.
\textsuperscript{335} In Villa Mercedes, for example, there were around230 indios amigos. AHCSF., box. 112, no. 369.
\textsuperscript{336} See the conflicts with the “orilleros” in chapter 6.
\textsuperscript{337} Historians recognize some differences among these caciques. In his memories, Colonel Baigorria said that Cacique Pichún was above Calván as he was the eldest. Pérez Zavala identified some diplomatic differences among the caciques during 1852 and 1854. According to the author, while Calván was leading malones against Córdoba, Pichún was more favorable to set peace with the Confederate provinces and raided Buenos Aires instead. However, both caciques participated in the peace negotiations of 1854 with President Urquiza, and they rarely acted independently at the diplomatic level. Pérez Zavala, “La política interétnica de los Ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX,” \textit{Quinto Sol}, 11, Santa Rosa (jan./dez., 2007):61-89, and Baigorria, \textit{Memorias del Coronel Manuel Baigorria}.
they actually tried to attack Calfucurá when he arrived in 1841.\textsuperscript{338} However, the Ranqueles were just starting to recover from the demographic and economic crisis they faced during the mid-1830s, when environmental challenges and smallpox epidemics intertwined with devastating defeats against Rosas’s military expeditions.\textsuperscript{339} After failed frontier negotiations and the Ranqueles’s alliance with the unitario Colonel Baigorria in 1831, Rosas tried to literally wipe them out of the region.\textsuperscript{340} Between 1833 and 1836, he sent consecutive military expeditions formed by creoles, groups of \textit{indios amigos} and allied caciques against the Ranqueles’s \textit{tolderías} under the orders to kill all men in age for fighting.\textsuperscript{341} These attacks killed many people, captured women and children, burnt \textit{toldos} and stole thousands of animals.\textsuperscript{342} Rosas’s plan ended when the \textit{indios amigos} in Bahía Blanca rebelled and refused to attack the Ranqueles, and civil rebellions and conflicts with England and France diverted his military resources to these other fronts. According to Alioto and Jiménez, during the 1840s, the Ranqueles worked hard to recover their demography and economy by incorporating outsiders –such as Boroganos and creole refugees–, extending horticulture production in the Río Desaguadero and expanding the practice of reciprocity beyond “normal” ranges.\textsuperscript{343} This last phenomenon involved sharing all of their people’s food production to avoid anyone starving. In this context, it seemed a better option for the Ranqueles to avoid confrontation with the newcomer.

\textsuperscript{338} AGN, X., 20.10.2, and de Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana,”
\textsuperscript{339} Villar and Jiménez, \textit{Amigos, hermanos y parientes}, and Daniel Villar, \textit{Relaciones Interétnicas en el sur bonaerense (1810-1830)}.
\textsuperscript{340} Juan Francisco Jiménez and Sebastián Alioto, “Que ninguno muera de hambre”: agricultura, reciprocidad y reelaboración de identidades entre los ranqueles en la década de 1840,” \textit{Mundo Agrario}, vol. 8, no. 15.
\textsuperscript{341} Although the participation of cacicatos in these expeditions has not been studied in depth it was probably rooted in the intra-ethnic conflicts and warfare among migrant and local cacicatos during the late eighteenth century and the independence era.
\textsuperscript{342} For example, in December, 1835 an expedition against Cacique Yanquetréz imprisoned 263 women and took “fourty something” creole captives who were living among the Ranqueles. AGN, X, 25.1.4, in Ratto, “¿Para qué quieren tener cautivas si no estamos en guerra?”
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid.
After diplomatic and trade negotiations between the Ranqueles and Calfucurá in the early 1840s, they sealed an alliance though kinship ties. Calfucurá’s niece (Antonio Namuncurá’s daughter) married one of Cacique Pichún’s sons, Manuel Guichal. Calfucurá and Pichún started calling themselves *chezcui* (father in law). Further kinship ties, trade and political negotiations continued bringing the Ranqueles and the Salineros together under a Confederacy. Calfucurá incorporated Ranqueles in key positions in Salinas Grandes, such as the Ranquel Calluyi into his groups of subordinated caciques. Calván’s son also served as writer and secretary to Calfucurá.

The Ranqueles became key allies for the Salineros due to their strategical location. Through the Ranqueles, people in Salinas Grandes could access the Pehuenches’ trade networks in Cuyo and the Andes, and that of the Creoles in Córdoba and San Luis. The Ranqueles also gained access to Buenos Aires frontier towns to trade and raid, and intensified their participation in trans-regional trade and diplomatic networks by hosting visitors who wanted to reach Calfucurá. This alliance became strong enough to prevent military confrontations amongst themselves, to maintain fluid trade, social and diplomatic relationships, and to act in common *malones* and diplomacy with frontier authorities. All of Calfucurá’s big *malones* included the Ranqueles.

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344 According to Avendaño, Namuncura’s daughter’s husband was old and, since he rejected her, they needed to quickly remarry her. Pichún’s son only had to compensate her ex-husband. Hux, *Usos y costumbres de los indios de la Pampa*, pp.75-6, in Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá,” p.177

345 Although Manuel Guichal died during diplomatic negotiations in the 1840s, death did not break kin relations. Hux, *Usos y costumbres de los indios de la Pampa.*

346 Ibid. and AHPC, *Gobierno 1854,* “Correspondencia con los indios,” vol. 239, leg. 4., f. 119.

347 For example, Aveñano says that Calfucurá had ties with the Picunche Cacique Gudmane, who was killed by the Pehuenche Purran, the Chilean Salvo and Baigorria’s people in 1847. Hux, *Usos y costumbres de los indios de la Pampa,* p.41. Also, in the 1850s, a Pehuenche Cacique Cristiano, who claimed to be Calfucurá’s brother in law, traveled through the Ranqueles territory to reach Salinas Grandes. AHPM., box. 123, f.13.
Nevertheless, disagreements were common among these allies. They sometimes blamed each other when frontier officials asked about their participation in malones and attacks, and it became increasingly difficult for the Ranqueles to avoid Calfucurá’s intervention in their diplomatic matters. For example, Calfucurá protested to the Ranquel caciques for controlling creole traders that wanted to reach Salinas Grandes from Río Cuarto. In December 1857, Calfucurá also wrote to the Ranqueles’s intermediary, Colonel Baigorria, requesting to work towards keeping a strong alliance. He asked Colonel Baigorria to tell Cacique Coliquéo (a Borogano cacique who joined the Ranqueles) that: “if we are separated we will be mistreated by the people of Buenos Aires whom are trying to break off relations with us, but they will never achieve this if we are allied.”\(^348\) In another letter, he protested to President Urquiza for having provided more gifts to the Ranqueles than to him. Calfucurá took the opportunity to describe his past military victories over some of the Borogano caciques in the Pampas, and asked Urquiza to speak with the Ranquel Cacique Calván’s emissaries to tell them that: “I am the principal chief, who they all have to obey, and they should remember that I was the one that made them comfortable, and it’s because of me that they are now rich and in a good position.”\(^349\) During the 1860s, the opposite happened. The Ranquel caciques protested for receiving less raciones than Calfucurá, and were resentful of Calfucurá’s negotiations with Colonel Baigorria, who betrayed their trust when he supported Mitre’s forces and abandoned Ranquel lands in 1861.

As we see, the presence of the unitario Colonel Baigorria in the Ranqueles’s lands complicated their diplomatic negotiations since the 1830s. Although Creoles wanted to believe


that Baigorria ruled over the Ranqueles, his memoirs and archival sources reveal a different story.\textsuperscript{350} Baigorria could facilitate military alliances with creole factions as well as trade with provincial towns with the Ranqueles. He brought other political \textit{unitario} refugees and deserters to their lands and had commercial and political contacts with ranchers and politicians in Córdoba, San Luis, Mendoza, and Chile.\textsuperscript{351} In addition to this political capital, he established kinship ties with Pichún’s lineage to build prestige among the Ranqueles.\textsuperscript{352} Calván’s eldest son adopted the Colonel’s name. As a result, he was recognized by the Ranqueles as a leader, but not as a principal cacique and even less as an authority over Caciques Pichún and Calván. This strong and personal tie frustrated the Ranqueles’s negotiations with the federalist Governor Rosas until 1852.

Colonel Baigorria’s trajectory during the 1850s and 1860s continued complicating the Ranqueles’ relationship with creole governments and thus, the Pampas Confederacy’s diplomatic policies. This, however, did not break cacicatos’ alliances. After Rosas’s defeat, Colonel Baigorria returned to Río Cuarto’s frontier to lead the Cavalry Regiment No. 7, under the Argentine Confederacy.\textsuperscript{353} From this position, he continued exercising an intermediary role between President Urquiza and the Ranqueles, but could not maintain a stable force and received limited resources from the Argentine Confederacy.\textsuperscript{354} Due to these conflicts and lack of support, he changed sides during the battle of Pavón, favoring the province of Buenos Aires.\textsuperscript{355} These

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\item \textsuperscript{350} Baigorria, \textit{Memorias del Coronel Manuel Baigorria}.
\item \textsuperscript{351} Ibid., Also, Cacique Magnil mentioned, in his letter to Calfucurá, that Baigorria was his “\textit{malle}.” “Letter of Cacique Mangil Wenu to Juan Calfucurá, Dumo, May 1st, 1860,” \textit{El Meteoro}, Los Angeles, May 31st, 1969, no. 141, in Pávez Ojeda, ed., \textit{Cartas Mapuche}, p.315.
\item \textsuperscript{352} Baigorria, \textit{Memorias del Coronel Manuel Baigorria}.
\item \textsuperscript{353} See sources in AHPC.
\item \textsuperscript{354} See correspondence in: AHPC, \textit{Gobierno 1854}, “Correspondencia con los indios”, vol. 239, leg. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{355} In Córdoba, a revolution deposed the liberal government of Frigerio. Colonel Baigorria defended Frigerio, but Urquiza and Derqui (who had been just elected President), backed the rebels. They also ordered Baigorria to follow
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actions and the death of his protector Cacique Pichún in the late 1850s, diminished his authority among the Ranqueles who kept their alliance with the defeated federalists. This political alignment complicated Calfucurá’s peace negotiations with the national government under President Bartolomé Mitre during the 1860s. Meanwhile, Colonel Baigorria faced greater challenges to maintain his political authority among both, the Argentine national government and the Pampas Confederacy. The Borogano Cacique Coliquéo, who also joined Mitre during Pavón and left the Ranqueles to settle in frontier lands, faced similar problems. His son Justo ended up leaving his father and joining Calfucurá by 1867.\textsuperscript{356}

In spite of the persistent tensions between Calfucurá and the principal Ranquel Caciques, the Salineros and the Ranqueles maintained an economic and political cooperation that assured internal peace and prosperity. They also worked together in big military ventures and diplomatic negotiations. When the Argentine military campaigns reached cacicato lands in 1879, they found Ranqueles and Salineros planning common resistance and survival strategies.

The strategic alliance between Catriel and Calfucurá also started with kinship ties. According to the captive and secretary Avendaño, when caciques met other caciques for the first time, they immediately spoke about their lineages’ past and the kin ties among them.\textsuperscript{357} When Calfucurá and Catriel met, they “discovered” that they were relatives.\textsuperscript{358} Catriel’s mother used to call Calfucurá’s father her “brother,” inferring that they were cousins. This tie was “confirmed” by father Salvaire during his expedition to Salinas Grandes.\textsuperscript{359} Whether this tie was real or

\textsuperscript{356} She, “La política interétnica de los Ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.”
\textsuperscript{357} Hux, Usos y costumbres de los indios de la Pampa.
\textsuperscript{358} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{359} Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá,” p.176.
symbolic, claiming its existence was enough to legitimize alliances. Catriel was probably interested in gaining access to trans-regional trade networks and, more importantly, in avoiding conflicts with the increasingly powerful confederate leader. Calfucurá could not avoid Catriel when he wanted to negotiate with Buenos Aires’s authorities and trade with frontier posts in the province. The new ally also meant extending trade and ties with an important center of cacicatos’ power.

Commander Rosas y Belgrano indicated that Catriel’s cacicato and his allies in Tapalqué and Azul had 8,000 *lanzas* and 24,000 family members. This number is probably exaggerated or includes people who were part of other cacicatos. Azul’s 1854 census recorded 6,000 Indians. Other sources significantly varied the number of people under Catriel, probably due to the inclusion or exclusion of other groups of *indios amigos* and allies. For example, between 1867 and 1877, state authorities estimated 1,500 *lanzas* under Catriel’s leadership, which implied a population of 7,500 people following Mansilla’s calculation. Records on *raciones* between 1865 and 1871 estimated 2,282 *lanzas* for all groups of *indios amigos*, which includes people in Mulitas, Federación, and Bahía Blanca among others. But Rosas y Belgrano calculated in 1852 about 1,100 *lanzas* and 4,400 family members for *indios amigos* other than Catriel. Although these sources present varied numbers, they all seem to indicate that Catriel and the

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361 SHE., *Frontera con los indios*, no. 3949.
362 AGN., *Memorias de hacienda*.
363 He attributes 100 *lanzas* and 300 family members to Ancalao in Bahía Blanca; 400 *lanzas* and 1,200 family members to Llusquén in Bahía Blanca; 300 *lanzas* and 900 family members of Churiguiren; 150 *lanzas* and 450 family members to Unaiche; 150 *lanzas* and 450 family members to groups in Mulitas, Federación and Bragado. I did not find Caciques Llusquén, Churiguiren and Unaiche in other sources which could be due to Commander’s misspelling or an error in his calculation and identification. Regarding the population in Mulitas, Federación and Bragado, Caletti contrasted this information with other reports that indicate the presence of 233 lanzas. AGN., X., 18.4.7, in Caletti García Diego, “La intervención de la población rural en la lucha política en los comienzos del sitio de Hilario Lagos a la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1852-1853.”
groups of *indios amigos* in Buenos Aires had a larger population than the Salinas Grandes, and about the same as the Ranqueles.

During the 1840s, Calfucurá and Catriel visited each other as well as their followers, expanding kinship, trade and political ties.\(^{364}\) Their relationship was complex and changed over time.\(^{365}\) Catriel could not simply oppose Buenos Aires’s authorities in favor of Calfucurá, as his economic base was exposed and closely tied to their frontier posts’ life. Nevertheless, when Creoles threatened his autonomy during the 1850s, he asked for Calfucurá’s assistance and found refuge in Salinas Grandes. When peace with the province returned, he chose neutrality during military confrontations between Calfucurá and Buenos Aires, while furthering diplomatic and economic relationships with the confederate leader. Catriel never confronted Calfucurá despite the strong pressures he constantly received from Buenos Aires’ authorities. Moreover, when the Argentine national government threatened an invasion in the late 1870s, most of his cacicato and allies joined the Pampas Confederacy’s open military resistance.

*The Case of the Indios Amigos: In between Indigenous and Creole Confederacies*

The relationship between Calfucurá and other groups of *indios amigos* on the Buenos Aires’ frontier reveals the expansive character of the Pampas Confederacy. These groups of *indios amigos* were cacicatos from lineages with a long history in the region or migrant groups that ended up living close to frontier towns to survive the violent period between 1780 and 1830.\(^{366}\) Some indigenous groups close to the Buenos Aires’ frontier remained and settled in

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\(^{364}\) For example, Pascual from Tapalqué, went to Salinas Grandes to get salt and to visit his relative, capitanejo Caraman. Ibid., p. 176.

\(^{365}\) See de Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana.”

\(^{366}\) Villar and Jiménez, in *Relaciones Inter-etnicas en el sur bonaerense (1810-1830)*.
large numbers in the area, but became increasingly dependent on provincial and the Pampas Confederacy’s provisions and resources. Since colonial times, state authorities offered economic and political compensations to attract and turn small cacicatos into military auxiliaries and subordinates. Rosas’ frontier policy institutionalized this practice to confront the threat that the powerful Boroganos, Ranqueles and Pincheiras were imposing on frontier posts during the 1820s and 1830s. Once Rosas was gone, successor governments continued relying on this strategy to avoid losing these indigenous groups to the Pampas Confederacy.

Provincial authorities continued depending on the *indios amigos* to secure the frontier and prevent major *malones*.\(^{367}\) *Indios amigos* maintained a relatively fixed residence near frontier posts, which limited their economic and political autonomy. They had key access to Buenos Aires’s markets, but had limited resources and mobility. They needed the Pampas Confederacy’s permission to access their lands and participate in indigenous trade networks. Some groups ended up being incorporated as both provincial and confederate cacicatos’ subalterns, but most groups took an in-between option: performing as cattle ranchers, as seasonal labor and as paid soldiers for the province as well as diplomatic intermediaries, laborers, and warriors for the Pampas Confederacy. Their survival usually depended on negotiating with both polities as well as obscuring their alliances.\(^{368}\) For example, according to Colonel Cornell, when the province was preparing an expedition against Salinas Grandes, some caciques from the *indios amigos* wanted to secretly ally with the creoles against Calfucurá, but on the other hand a *capitanejo*

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\(^{368}\) For example, Wenceslao Paunero reported that the *indios amigos* were performing their “January ceremonies” in which they asked for an end to the drought and for good luck in their confrontation with Calfucurá. AM, *Wenceslao Paunero*, no. 4813.
under one of these same caciques escaped and joined Catriel, whom was under Calfucurá’s protection.\textsuperscript{369}

During the 1850s and 1860s, the groups of \textit{indios amigos} on the Buenos Aires’s frontier usually appealed to Calfucurá in moments of need.\textsuperscript{370} Like Catriel, they found refuge in Salinas Grandes, joined \textit{malones} and asked for his intermediation when negotiating with state authorities.\textsuperscript{371} There were also instances when Calfucurá displayed authority over these groups. In 1852, the government of Buenos Aires decided to stop providing \textit{raciones} to Calfucurá and his allies. Consequently, a coalition of 2,000 \textit{lanzas} raided Bahía Blanca and Sauce Grande.\textsuperscript{372} They took 15,000 animals, creole captives and the \textit{indios amigos} lead by Cacique Ancalao, established in Bahía Blanca since the 1830s. Calfucurá used this cacique and his people to negotiate peace and force the release of his own people. Historian Ingrid de Jong mentions that Calfucurá used the same technique with other groups of \textit{indios amigos}.\textsuperscript{373} For example, he kidnapped Cacique Raninqueo and his people during the 1870s in revenge for the capture of the \textit{indios amigos} under Caciques Manuel Grande and Chipitrúz by the national military.

In conclusion, \textit{indios amigos} were constantly attracted to the provincial governments’ power with the offer of military salaries, gifts and titles, but they also remained exposed to the Pampas Confederacy’s power. Their survival usually depended on maintaining their role as

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\item \textsuperscript{369} “Juan Cornell to Colonel Wenceslao Paunero, Bahía Blanca, January, 28th, 1858,” AM., \textit{Wenceslao Paunero}, no. 4812.
\item \textsuperscript{370} Ratto, “Tiempo de abundancia para Calfucurá.”
\item \textsuperscript{371} For example, in October 1856, Major Andres and Cristo rebelled and took the 25 de Mayo fort. The Buenos Aires military attacked them and took their families as prisoners. These cacicatos found refuge under Calfucurá and negotiated the release of their families through the Confederate leader. Catriel and Cachul also took refuge under Calfucurá in 1855, 1859 and 1875. Ibid.p.189 and AGN., X, 20.2.1. in Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.”
\item \textsuperscript{372} AGN, X, 18.5.8 and 18.4.8; de Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana,” and de Jong, “Armado y desarmado de una confederación.”
\item \textsuperscript{373} She mentions Caciques Rondeau, Melinao, Lorenzo Garay, Guayquil and Cristo. de Jong “Armado y desarmado de una confederación.”
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intermediaries. While their life was defined by frontier dynamics, they also forced creole governments and autonomous cacicatos to depend on inter-ethnic alliances to achieve economic and political success.

**Reaching Circumstantial Allies in the Araucanía, Pitrufquén and Creole Frontier Posts**

On the fourth level of reciprocity and dependency were autonomous cacicatos from the western side of the Andes and frontier posts. Alliances with these cacicatos were also framed by kinship ties and sustained through frequent visits to Salinas Grandes to socialize, exchange and organize common military ventures. Territorial distance from Salinas Grandes made the organization of actions in common more difficult and circumstantial. Nevertheless, Calfucurá’s leadership and prestige in the Pampas strongly depended on his power to convene these trans-regional allies. In the creole societies’ imaginary, he could bring the legendary powerful warriors from the Araucanía to “steal” thousands of cattle and captives from the Pampas to sell in Chile.374 For cacicatos in general, Calfucurá also represented a successful case of migration and expansion to the Pampas. Cacicatos from the Araucanía were encouraged to maintain ties with the cacicatos in the Pampas to solve internal conflicts as well as their struggle with the Chilean governments. It is not surprising that when Calfucurá died in 1873, between 1,500 and 2,000 people from the western side of the Andes travelled to participate in his funeral held in Salinas Grandes.375

But, who were these mysterious “Araucanos,” also identified as “Chileans” by Creoles, during the 19th century? Calfucurá’s ties with western cacicatos came from his lineage’s historic

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374 Alioto revised this constructed theory in his book: *Indios y ganado en la frontera.*
375 SHE., Frontera con los indios, no. 6583.
presence in Llaima as well as renewed kinship alliances and contacts. According to Bello, his lineage had historic ties with Cacique Mangil’s lineage from Malleco. Mangil came from a powerful lineage that negotiated peace with the Spanish crown during colonial times, and sided with the royalists during the period known as “war to death.” He later regrouped in the sub-Andean foothills and pressured the City of Santiago to address land problems on the Biobío frontier. By the 1840s, he was one of the most powerful caciques south of Río Biobío. His ties with cacicatos in the Pampas were renewed when he visited Puelmapu during his youth and lived with the Ranqueles for some time. Bello argued that his wives were probably Ranqueles, and that his sons and daughters grew up in a multiethnic environment. Since 1856, one of his sons was staying in the Pampas, and his sons Quilapán and Neculpán reached Calfucurá in Salinas Grandes by the late 1850s. During 1859 and 1860, Mangil tried to gain Calfucurá’s intermediation to reach President Urquiza and form a transregional and national alliance against Chilean military expeditions.

Calfucurá also maintained close relationships with cacicatos living in a more protected region south of Toltén River called Pitrufquén. This region had rich natural resources and abundant grassland for cattle; it was also one of the key passes to cross the Andes Mountains. People living in this region oriented their trade to the east as well as to Valdivia, an isolated Chilean frontier post strongly influenced by cacicatos’ politics and trade networks since colonial

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376 Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
377 Bello, Nampülkafe.
379 He participated in 1859 revolution. Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”

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times. In this region, Cacique Paillalef, who had kin ties with Calfucurá, led at least 200 lanzas by 1860. During the 1860s, this Cacique also tried to reach Argentine authorities through his alliance with Calfucurá. In 1864, Cacique Paillalef camped in Hachico with 150 Indians and sent two caciquillos to Bahía Blanca to make peace treaties.

In addition to Caciques Mangil and Paillalef, other western cacicatos reached Calfucurá through the intermediation of Reuquecurá, the Pehuenches and the Ranqueles. In 1858, for example, Reuquecurá was trying to get caciques from Pitrufquén and Boroganos to besiege Valdivia and raid Carmen de Patagones in revenge for Buenos Aires’ attack on Salinas Grandes. Other pieces of evidence mention the Pehuenche cacique Purrán helping a group of Moluches reach Calfucurá in the Pampas in 1851. Calfucurá’s son Manuel Pastor was also sent to Mendoza to negotiate with a group of Picunches. According to Ratto, Commander Rosas y Belgrano mentioned that 1,000 people from Cacique Colico and 1,000 people from Cacique Loncomay visited Salinas Grandes during the 1840s and 1850s.

During the whole period under study, western cacicatos participated in the Pampas Confederacy’s malones in large numbers, reaching at least 2,000 lanzas. During these

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380 Bello, Nampülkafe, p.131. For Valdivia see: Alioto, Indios y ganado en la frontera.
381 Ibid.
382 They were sent to the capital city by Commander Llano. SHE, Frontera con los indios, nos. 569, 570, 586 and 610.
383 “Letter from Jose Maria Yanquetruz to Colonel Don Francisco Fourmantin, Corral Daracho, March, 3rd, 1858,” AM., Wenceslao Paunero, box.7, no. 108. In 1871, Reuque also brought 2,000 “Chileans” to Salinas Grandes to trade. SHE., Frontera con los indios, nos. 6372 and 6372.
384 AHPM, box.763, f. 48. Also, Zeballos mentioned that the groups that usually visited Salinas Grandes from the Andes Mountains were Moluches. Zeballos, Papeles, f.15, in Villar and Jiménez, Amigos, hermanos y parientes, pp.19-20. Also, Rosas y Belgrano informed about Calfucurá’s contact with caciques arribeños: Aillal, Tori, Llancaguer and Colone. Aillal and Tori were Pehuenches from Varvarco. AGN., X., 20.10.2.
385 Péavez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche.
387 For example, in August 1860, authorities in Valdivia reported that between 1,000 and 1,500 Indians crossed the Andes Mountains, invited by Calfucurá, to raid the provinces. Cacique Raninququeo indicated that they were 3,500 and Calfucurá 6,000 lanzas. AGN, VII, Barros, f.155.
ventures, they risked their lives and resources, but they could also acquire large numbers of cattle and horses and avoid the backlash of Chilean military. Their participation was discussed in parliaments. Calfucurá could convince them not to raid in moments of peace by offering gifts and trade. In addition to military ventures, these caciques frequently visited Salinas Grandes to trade and socialize. The Araucanía’s growing population encouraged these visits. These cacicatos usually bought horses and cattle in exchange for textiles and silverware.

Finally, like Llanquitrúz in Northern Patagonia, Calfucurá attempted to turn creole governments and frontier posts into dependents. While civil conflicts made it difficult to stabilize the relationship with provincial and national governments, frontier posts were an easier target. Like other caciques, his strategy rested on exploiting frontier posts’ vulnerabilities to assure uninterrupted trade and political allies in vulnerable positions. The Ranqueles tried to settle these relationships with Creoles at Río Cuarto and Mercedes, and Calfucurá with Bahía Blanca and, to a lesser extent, with Azul and Tapalqué, where Catriel worked as an intermediary. Although I will show later that Calfucurá never reached the personal relationships that Llanquitrúz had with Carmen de Patagones’ residents, he did gain economic and political benefits from his ties with Bahía Blanca. This town organized most of the diplomatic negotiations with Calfucurá, provided raciones and maintained an uninterrupted trade even during violent periods. This frontier town was sometimes used to organize military expeditions against Salinas Grandes and Calfucurá hit

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388 In 1857, Calfucurá told the authorities that he gave all the provisions to the “Chileans” to avoid malones. “Letter from Juan Calfucurá to President Urquiza, Salinas Grandes, December 1st, 1857,” AGN., VII., Fondo Urquiza, vol.130, no. 1592, ff.137-8, in Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, pp.304-6.
389 Pinto Rodríguez calculated that between 1843 and 1854 the population in the Araucanía grew from 1,083,701 people to 1,439,129 people. Pinto Rodríguez, La población de la Araucanía en el siglo XX. Crecimiento y distribución espacial (Temuco, Chile: Ediciones Universidad de la frontera, 2009), p.51
390 Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá.”
the town several times. Yet, the threat of his military force usually obliged Bahía Blanca to respect reciprocal obligations.

In conclusion, the Pampas Confederacy was not a chiefdom led by Calfucurá, but a web of alliances mediated by Calfucurá that assured internal peace, security and prosperity to its members. It expected reciprocal obligations among allies, which created different levels of dependency on the confederate leader. While it respected cacicatos’ autonomy and was based on consensus politics achieved by the main caciques in parliaments, members depended on Calfucurá to reach trans-regional trade networks and alliances, and protection. This polity became a political and economic competitor to the Argentine Confederacy.

**Nomadic Pastoralist’s Prosperity in the Pampas: Horses, Cattle, Salt and Trade**

The Pampas Confederacy was also based on nomadic pastoralists’ economic necessities and ambitions. During the 1850s, the Confederacy consolidated its economy, which implied creating or maintaining permanent tolderías in areas with great resources that guaranteed subsistence to families and protection to their animals. It also settled mobile tolderías for herding horses and cattle, hunting, gathering and accessing trade in other cacicato’s huts and frontier towns. One of its major achievements was reaching economic cooperation between all allies. To understand this complexity, let’s analyze its dynamics.

Calfucurá’s permanent tolderías in Salinas Grandes were a crucial part of the Confederacy’s economic strength. This region had important environmental and strategic advantages as well as challenges. A big salt lake, which attracted migrant cacicatos to the region,
was followed to the east, by a chain of lakes with extended grazing lands and water able to hold large populations (see fig. 2 in chapter 1). To the northwest there were higher lands and Mamil Mapu, where woods covered much of the region. To the south, cacicatos reached the Colorado and Negro rivers, and the trails that reached the Andes Mountains. But the combination of droughts, fires, locusts’ epidemics and sickness were serious economic challenges to people living in this location, as the Boroganos learned during the 1830s. In the light of this experience, Calfucurá’s cacicato and allies maintained a diverse, flexible and expanding economy that assured enough resources for subsistence as well as enough surplus merchandize to sell in multiple markets.

In Salinas Grandes, caciques practiced horticulture of autochthonous and introduced vegetables, such as watermelons, squashes, melons; carob beans, which also served as food for cattle, chañar, and piquillín; bred and herded horses, mares, cattle and sheep, domesticated birds; small game and ostriches; salt, which they traded with different cacicatos as well as creoles at frontier posts. Cacicatos also produced textiles and silverware. Gender divisions organized production. Men worked as soldiers, hunters, and bred and herded horses and cattle. Women were in charge of the domestic economy, which included horticulture, gathering and bred some domestic animals for family consumption. They also took care of sheep and sheared their wool

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392 When the Boroganos occupied this region, the mix between these environmental challenges and internal political crises ended their domination over the region. Ratto, “Tiempo de abundancia para Calfucurá,” p.175.
393 Ratto explains that once Calfucurá did not let visitors take salt from the region as he intended to sell it to them. AGN., X, 20.10.2, in Ratto, “Tiempo de abundancia para Calfucurá,” p.178.
394 According to the military reports consulted by Alioto, in 1858 there were 300 horticulture plots in Salinas. They were small, only a few reached an acre of length approximately. Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá: economía y política del cacicato salinero (1853-1859).”
for producing textiles.\textsuperscript{396} Women were also in charge of packing and organizing their \textit{tolderías} when groups moved to new locations. The Salineros dedication to these activities followed seasons and political circumstances. For example, when the relationships with Buenos Aires’s frontier posts were tense in 1852, cacicatos dedicated more time to horticulture and raided frontier posts to force the province to provide gifts and \textit{raciones}\.\textsuperscript{397}

The \textit{tolderías} in Salinas Grandes covered an extension of 30 leagues approximately (150km according to Alioto).\textsuperscript{398} Each cacicato had a specific location for his family’s and followers’ \textit{toldos}, most of them on the shores of the rivers and lakes. According to military reports and travel narratives analyzed by Alioto, in 1857 Cacique Cañumil had 300 people living along the coast of the Carué River; Cacique Quintrel’s camp was in Leofucó; Cacique Millacurá (Calfucurá’s son) in Guaminí, and Calfucurás’ people were distributed from Carué to seven or eight leagues west of Salinas Grandes.\textsuperscript{399} Each \textit{toldo} contained a family of around 10 people and was surrounded by corrals and cultivation plots. They also wintered and fattened up horses, mares, and cattle in shared \textit{potreros} (specific areas of pastureland). Horses were separated into different herds: those used for food, for transport and for military purposes.\textsuperscript{400} Camp members also shared access to the woods and hunting lands.

This scattered distribution favored equal access to resources and cooperative work. A captive from Salinas Grandes described that caciques usually organized groups of 50 to 100


\textsuperscript{397} Alioto, "Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá.” For Ranqueles, see Hux, \textit{Usos y costumbres de los indios de la Pampa}.

\textsuperscript{398} Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá,” p.204.

\textsuperscript{399} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{400} Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá,” p.57.
people to herd the horses, mares and cattle every day. ⁴⁰¹ Trade was also done on a collective as well as on an individual scale. Individuals could exchange personal items, animals and captives, but trade commissions that reached other cacicatos and frontier towns were composed of men and women. The commissions fulfilled requests from many families.

The tolderías were also protected by guards placed along the principal access routes to Salinas Grandes and messengers sent to allied cacicatos in other locations. It is not surprising that military expeditions rarely reached the tolderías unexpectedly; they were almost always warned in advance.

As Vezub argued for Saygüeque's case in Manzanas and Tapia for the Ranqueles, the dispersed aspect of settlements was an economic strategy to access diverse resources as well as a political decision. ⁴⁰² On the one hand, this permanent camp offered security and stability to Calfucurá’s followers and his allies generating productive and demographic growth. It allowed allies to maintain a level of internal autonomy and secure mobility to access distant extended grazing lands, hunting grounds and trade. On the other hand, the organization of tolderías also increased allies’ dependency on Calfucurá’s decisions over land use and occupation. Moving about the territory required his permission. Hierarchies were also marked in space; Calfucurá’s toldo was separated from the rest, and his potrero was in Carué under care of the whole community.

It is worth asking how many animals did they hold in Salinas Grandes. As nomadic pastoralists, they could not keep surplus animals for long periods of time; it was more profitable to exchange them for goods not produced in their tolderías. We do not have precise information

⁴⁰¹“Declaration of the captive Leandro Silva, Azul fort, April 11th, 1858,” in AGN., X, 19.9.4, in Ibid., p.205.
⁴⁰²Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, pp.189-190, and Tapia, “Fusión y fisión de las tolderías ranquelinas como respuesta a las tácticas militares de la conquista del desierto.”
about the number of cattle pastured in this region, but we do have some evidence about the number of horses and mares. In 1858, a captive mentioned that this region had between 9,000 and 10,000 fat and unbranded horses, and “many more” mares closely bred.\footnote{“Declaration of the captive Leandro Silva, Azul fort, April 11th, 1858,” in AGN., X, 19.9.4, in Ibid., p.205.} If this information is correct, we may thus estimate three horses per person, and a larger number of mares per person (for a population of around 3,000 people). The Comanches in North America kept around four horses per person.\footnote{We need to consider that Comanches also needed horses to hunt bizons. Hämäläinen, \textit{The Comanche Empire}.} Long trips and expeditions required several horses per adult. Hence, it is not surprising that when General Paunero reached Salinas Grandes in 1858, Calfucurá and his allies took most of their horses and mares to the northern highlands and left behind 600 heads of cattle and 3,000 sheep.

In a powerful nomadic pastoralist economy, we should expect that most of the horses, mares and cattle were the product of their own breeding and herding activities instead of from raiding and creole governments’ provisions. The information on \textit{malones} and \textit{malocas} that I collected in the state archives in Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Mendoza, and San Luis for the period between 1850 to 1879 shows that big \textit{malones} were sporadic episodes while \textit{malocas} were more common and comparable to cases of creoles’ cattle rustling.\footnote{For cattle rustling in state justice see: Ricardo D. Salvatore, \textit{Subalternos, derechos y justicia penal: Ensayos de historia social y cultural argentina 1829-1940} (Argentina: Gedisa Editorial, 2013).} From the provincial archives and the bibliography consulted, I recorded 226 \textit{malones} and \textit{malocas}, and 107 alarms for possible attacks on these provinces’ frontier posts between 1850 and 1879, an average of 7.7 \textit{malones} and \textit{malocas} per year.\footnote{Although there were probably more \textit{malones} than I counted, it is unlikely that I could have missed any of the important ones as these attacks were immeditately reported by frontier authorities to warn other forts and receive backup.} Most of the records rarely mention the number of animals taken during the attacks. Among the documents that provided this information, few indicate more than 1,000

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403 “Declaration of the captive Leandro Silva, Azul fort, April 11th, 1858,” in AGN., X, 19.9.4, in Ibid., p.205.
404 We need to consider that Comanches also needed horses to hunt bizons. Hämäläinen, \textit{The Comanche Empire}.
406 Although there were probably more \textit{malones} than I counted, it is unlikely that I could have missed any of the important ones as these attacks were immeditately reported by frontier authorities to warn other forts and receive backup.
animals taken per *malón* or *maloca*. Also, Calfucurá was not the cacique mostly blamed for these attacks by the creole authorities. They made Calfucurá responsible for 37 *malones* and *malocas*, while they accused the Ranqueles and Baigorria for 53 attacks. Probably Calfucurá’s people were also involved in attacks where authorities did not identify specific leaders and just indicated that they were “Indians,” which account for 176 of the 226 attacks recorded. But the generic designation of “Indians” as culprits was generally referring only to *malocas*.

The big *malones* planned by Calfucurá and his allies over several frontier locations, like the ones in 1853 and 1872, took between 100,000 and 200,000 heads of cattle, horses and mares.\(^{407}\) These impressive herds were taken from several locations in consecutive attacks and were not kept in Salinas Grandes; they were distributed among the 2,000 and 4,000 participants according to their rank and resources provided for the attack. On one occasion, Calfucurá even chose to keep the captives instead of the animals when he arranged the distribution of the booty with Cacique Llanquitrúz in 1855.\(^{408}\) According to a captive, Calfucurá wanted the captives to exchange them for his people, who were imprisoned by the military.\(^{409}\) Instead, Llanquirúz wanted the animals to sell them to his Chilean merchant friends in Valdivia. Therefore, although *malones* were important ways of gaining an immediate economic surplus, the Pampas Confederacy could not sustain a growing economy during 30 years based solely on these external resources.

\(^{407}\) The 1853 *malón* over Buenos Aires’ frontier posts attributed to Calfucurá and his allies took 100,000 animals. AGN., *Fondo Urquiza*, vol.1522, no.51 and 84. Calfucurá’s attack over Bahía Blanca took 15,000 horses, mares and cattle. AGN. X, 18.4.7, Ratto, “Ni unitarios ni rosistas,” p.11. The joint attack of 1872 took around 200,000 animals, and Catriel’s revolt in Tapalqué in 1875 took 300,000 animals. De Jong, “Armado y desarmado de una confederación,” p.114 and 117.

\(^{408}\) Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá.”

Regarding creole government’s provisions to Calfucurá, these goods allowed him to expand and maintain alliances by guaranteeing the distribution of periodic salaries, raciones and clothes to his allies.\textsuperscript{410} Nevertheless, when looking in detail at the information on salaries, raciones, clothes and gifts in the long term, these resources seemed less significant for the Pampas Confederacy’s overall economic sustenance and allies’ subordination. I believe that malones and malocas, as well as creole governments’ provisions of raciones, fueled economic exchanges that already existed in the dynamic economy of the Confederacy.

As I developed in chapter 1, creole government’s provision of raciones and gifts originated as a state units’ response to cacicatos’ power. In the eyes of the cacicatos, when authorities made peace with them, they were building reciprocal obligations and compensating for the expansion of their cattle and people over their lands.\textsuperscript{411} Caciques accepted governments’ provisions as a material proof of their creole allies’ obligations to their Confederacy. In exchange, cacicatos tolerated creoles’ settlements in specific areas and visits to their tolderías as traders and allies. During a critical moment of frontier hostility in 1849, Calfucurá’s messengers informed Commander Rosas y Belgrano that the Cacique said that: “he did not have to thank [the creole government] for the raciones and gifts that he receives every month because they were the rental payment for the lands that they [Creoles] occupied.”\textsuperscript{412}

Although raciones did not originate as state units’ mechanisms of subjugation, creole authorities constantly tried to turn their contractual obligations to cacicatos into mechanisms of

\textsuperscript{410} de Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana.”\textsuperscript{411} Most studies see treaties and raciones as “state” attempts to coopt cacicatos. As an exception, Foerster and Vezub also state that Mapuches understood them as governability pacts and compensations for their lost territories. Foerster and Vezub, “Malón, ración y nación en las Pampas,” p. 25.\textsuperscript{412} “Commander Pedro Rosas y Belgrano to Antonio Reyes, Azul, April 30\textsuperscript{th}, 1849,” AGN. X, 20.10.2, in Lobos, \textit{Juan Calfucurá}, p.58.
cooptation. They framed these deliveries as compensations for military allies and attempted to place them under state military control. This is why, for example, they asked caciques to register in military lists to receive the *raciones* agreed on in the treaties. These attempts were more successful with vulnerable cacicatos such as *indios amigos*, but even these groups maintained important levels of internal autonomy. Therefore, autonomous cacicatos followed some of the rules set by the creole governments to receive *raciones*, but its distribution was organized by the logic of cacicatos’ reciprocal relations.

In practice, the amount, frequency and type of *raciones* greatly varied case by case. Government provisions could be goods, animals and money provided monthly, bi-annually or annually. According to the logic that provincial authorities wrote into peace treaties, *raciones* were monthly salaries, calculated according to state military ranks; monthly goods, such as *yerba mate*, flour, alcohol, tobacco, and paper, and annual or bi-annual amounts of mares, horses and cattle, and military uniforms, also defined according to people’s ranks. 413 Outside of these contractual arrangements, caciques usually received gifts and provisions when they visited frontier posts.

In the long run, most cacicatos rarely received animals. Instead, they received goods and salaries. This phenomenon was due to both, the nomadic pastoralists’ requests, as well as creole societies’ offers. On the one hand, cacicatos were dedicated to horse breeding and herding, and usually supplied frontier posts with these animals. On the other hand, transporting large numbers of animals from rural areas in the hinterland to frontier posts was very costly for provincial governments. To provide *raciones*, authorities usually bought goods and animals from frontier

413 See treaties in Levaggi, *Paz en la frontera*, and Ratto, “Estado y cuestión indígena en las fronteras de Chaco y La Pampa (1862-1880).”
residents. As cattle ranching economies, frontier towns had numerous cattle herds, but were usually short of horses and mares. Providing cattle to the province also implied frontier residents’ acceptance of state prices, which usually did not match market prices.\footnote{As an example of this conflict, see the municipal memories of Carmen de Patagones. MHRMFV, \textit{Juzgado de paz de Carmen de Patagones}.} Therefore, the lack of nomadic pastoralists’ long term necessity of receiving animals from the provinces as well as the logistical and economic problems faced by creole governments to acquire those animals restricted their delivery.

Unlike animals, provincial governments could easily provide luxury goods or goods for consumption. These were in high demand in the cacicatos’ lands due to the fact that they did not produce these items. Caciques’ letters to state authorities are filled with specific demands for clothes, alcohol, tobacco, yerba mate, flour, paper, and sometimes even weapons. In 1856, Calfucurá asked Buenos Aires authorities for a good handgun, gunpowder and some explosives.\footnote{“Letter from Calfucurá to Jose Benito Valdes (Valdebenito) of Montes Grandes, Salinas Grandes, September, 11th,1856,” AGN, X., 19.4.5, s/f., in Pávez Ojeda, ed., \textit{Cartas Mapuche}, p.289.} The same year Cacique Catriel informed frontier authorities that he had received the handgun and bullets he had asked for, but was waiting for the shotgun.\footnote{“Letter from Juan Catriel to Mayor Iturra, Sauce Grande, December, 21st, 1856,” AHMSP., Bahía Blanca, in Pávez Ojeda, \textit{Cartas Mapuche}, p.293.} In 1857, Calfucurá also asked Urquiza for 200 shotguns and 500 rifles to attack Buenos Aires, and complained about the “ordinary” saddle that he sent him last time.\footnote{“Letter from Juan Calfucurá to President Urquiza, Salinas Grandes, April 2nd, 1857,” AGN., VII., \textit{Fondo Urquiza}, vol.111, no. 1573, ff.61-62, in Pávez Ojeda, ed., \textit{Cartas Mapuche}, p. 294.} In spite of these requests, during this period, most military confrontations between creoles and indigenous people used weapons such as
lances, sables and only few fire arms. Cacicatos still depended on creoles to acquire large amounts of fire arms.\textsuperscript{418}

Calfucurá was the cacique who received the largest amount of \textit{raciones}, usually in the form of goods and salaries, but its delivery varied over time. During Rosas’ times, peace agreements with Calfucurá indicated that he should have received 500 mares and 500 cows per month. It is not clear if he actually received that number and most of the regular provisions he received were items such as cloth, flour, yerba, tobacco and alcohol.\textsuperscript{419} When Rosas was defeated in 1852, the government of Buenos Aires was unable to continue paying the agreed amounts and later decided to suspend the \textit{raciones}.\textsuperscript{420} As a consequence, Calfucurá and his allies raided frontier posts in Buenos Aires. A force of 2,000 \textit{lanzas} raided Bahía Blanca taking 15,000 head of cattle.\textsuperscript{421} He also started receiving some provisions from Córdoba during his negotiations with Urquiza in 1854.\textsuperscript{422} Later in the 1860s, the national government was forced to continue providing \textit{raciones}, but mostly in the form of goods and salaries.\textsuperscript{423}

The treaties specified very precisely to whom the provisions should go to. Only certain number of caciques, \textit{capitanejos} and around 80 warriors were supposed to receive \textit{raciones}.\textsuperscript{424}

To become part of these lists, indigenous subalterns had to gain Calfucurá’s confidence. They

\textsuperscript{418}In his letter, Calfucurá asked Urquiza to send creoles with the fire arms as his people did not know how to work them carefully. Also, Cacique Calván and some of his people died in 1857 due to an accident with firearms. For more information on the weapons used in military confrontations see: Villar and Jiménez in Villar, \textit{Relaciones Intercélticas en el sur bonaerense (1810-1830)}.
\textsuperscript{420}Ratto explains that, although the budget did not change, they received less mares due to an increase in price from 10 to 15 and then to 25 pesos per mare. AGN., X, 20.10.2, and 20.10.4; AGN., III, 12.6.4, in Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá,” pp.180-183.
\textsuperscript{421}AGN., X, 18.4.7, in Ratto, “Ni unitarios ni rosistas,” p.11, and “Indios amigos e indios aliados.”
\textsuperscript{422}In 1854, Cordoba had an annual Budget of 90,988 pesos for the frontiers, from which 6,000 pesos were for gifts to allied cacicatos. Later in 1858 to 1862, the Confederacy kept a special record for these expenses with an average of 45,000 pesos per year. Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá,” p.187.
\textsuperscript{423}AGN., \textit{Memorias de Hacienda}, and Ratto, “Estado y cuestión indígena en las fronteras de Chaco y La Pampa (1862-1880).”
\textsuperscript{424}AGN., \textit{Memorias de Hacienda}. 
gained prestige and resources, while demonstrating complete subordination to the main leader. However, the goods that entered as *raciones* to cacicatos lands were not necessarily kept by the initial beneficiary. They were subject to the logic of redistribution and cooperation, and often ended up in different hands.\(^{425}\)

Common men and women also accessed these luxury and consumable goods through *malones* and, more importantly, trade. Trade was a daily and widespread economic activity. People involved in diplomatic commissions were not only compensated with gifts and provisions, but also built personal businesses in frontier posts and *tolderías*. Women were involved in these businesses demanding cloth and tools for their domestic activities.\(^{426}\) For example, in 1857, Calfucurá sent his wife to Bahía Blanca to visit her friends and asked the Commander to give her: “two blankets, two metal dishes, one bucket, sugar, tobacco, yerba and alcohol.”\(^{427}\)

Finally, allies also accessed *raciones* and traded independently of Calfucurá. Confederate cacicatos’ autonomy legitimized these independent practices from the beginning. As a consequence, signing treaties with caciques under Calfucurá did not necessarily mean diminishing his authority. This resulted in the entry of more resources to the Pampas Confederacy. Catrriel’s cacicatos seemed more tied to Buenos Aires’ provision of *raciones* due to their closeness and a rather restricted location. Breaking peace negotiations with the province

\(^{425}\) For example, in 1850, Calfucurá distributed 250 animals for each of his dependent caciques and 125 for each captain. Ratto, “Tiempo de abundancia para Calfucurá.”

\(^{426}\) For example, in the 1860s, we have a list of goods requested by the women from Baigorrita’s *tolderías* to the Franciscan missionaries in Rio Cuarto. AHCSP., box. 112, no., 560.

was costly for his people's economy. Yet, his participation in the Pampas Confederacy allowed him to force the province to respect these ties during the 1850s.

In the case of the Ranqueles, they controlled a region more distant from creole frontier posts. They were in better conditions than Catriel to avoid or choose to engage in peace negotiations with provincial governments. But they were also usually strongly hit by droughts, diseases and, sometimes, even locusts. Their participation in the Confederacy assured assistance in moments of need and protection to their lands. They also seemed to allow –or have less control over- their subalterns to raid frontier posts more frequently than Calfucurá. Indeed, many groups of Ranqueles did not have peace agreements with provincial governments. They spread their *malones* and *malocas* over frontier posts in different provinces to avoid military reprisals. Their policies also followed a reciprocal logic. When they were negotiating peace with Córdoba through Río Cuarto during the 1850s, their *malones* hit Buenos Aires and Mendoza’s frontiers and avoided Córdoba. When peace negotiations failed with Córdoba and were reactivated in San Luis during the 1860s, they raided Córdoba’s frontier.

Under these economic circumstances, I believe that most of the animals found in Salinas Grandes depended on indigenous breeding and herding activities. *Malones* and *raciones* contributed to generate greater surpluses and overcome temporary environmental and military problems, but in an economy that was already rich. Access to *raciones* seemed restricted if one reads the treaties, but cacicatos ended redistributing the goods to maintain followers. *Malones* and *raciones* also had an important diplomatic role; they were used as control mechanisms over alliances with creole governments. In addition to trade, they contributed to widespread access to
resources not produced by their specialized economy that had no iron nor manufacturing beyond textiles.

The economic activities in Salinas Grandes do not explain, on their own, the Confederacy’s economic power. When considering the whole confederacy: Salinas Grandes, Mamil Mapu and Tapalqué, cacicatos’ potential economic growth seemed based on their access to trans-regional markets. From Salinas Grandes, cacicatos could access trade routes that followed the Colorado and Negro Rivers to Carmen de Patagones in the Atlantic, and the Araucanía and Valdivia to the west. Although merchants and small commissions were sent to trade through these routes, most of the sources usually mention that cacicatos from the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains were the ones that visited Salinas Grandes. Sources mention the arrival of numerous commissions of about 1,000 to 2,000 people.

These visits turned Salinas Grandes into a central spot for exchange and socialization. According to Zeballos’ papers, visitors from the Araucanía exclusively demanded animals in exchange for silver, and provided other items such as lances, blankets, their own textiles, corn flour, wheat and barley flour, and piñones. A “good” blanket could be exchanged for a “good” horse according to Zeballos. Their visit also involved gift exchanges, feasts and daily up keeping of the visiting commissions, which could result in high costs for Calfucurá. The Confederate leader sometimes diverted the cost to provincial authorities by asking for resources to avoid

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428 Zeballos mentioned, from his interviews with Namuncurá, that there were specialized traders, acting in representation of the families, that were sent to the cities to buy goods to re-sell. They also took people to carry the merchandize. Zeballos, Papeles, f.15, in Villar and Jiménez, Amigos, hermanos y parientes, pp.19-20.
429 For example, according to Ratto, Rosas y Belgrano mentioned that 1,000 people came from Cacique Colico and 1,000 from Loncomay to Salinas during the 1840s and 1850s. AGN. X. 20.10.2, in Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá,” p.178. In 1871, Calfucurá’s commission informed frontier authorities of the arrival of 2,000 “Chilean” Indians that came with Reuque to Salinas Grandes to trade. SHE, Frontera con el indio, no. 6372.
possible and uncontrollable malones on behalf of the visitors. In spite of their cost, these visits were also important ways of selling their animals in exchange for items that they did not produce, maintaining important military alliances, and increasing the Confederacy’s trans-regional prestige.

Confederate allies also traded among themselves. Caciques constantly comment in their letters, on the presence of Indians from other cacicatos in their tolderías. The Pehuenches and the Ranqueles frequently reached Salinas Grandes. Probably, these groups provided and exchanged similar goods, as they all had a nomadic pastoralist orientation and accessed similar frontier posts. The Ranqueles, though, seemed to practice horticulture more extensively than the Salineros, while the Pehuenches had greater access to goods produced in the Araucanía, and Catriel and other groups of indios amigos had immediate access to creoles’ commercial houses in Buenos Aires. All could bring goods highly demanded in Salinas Grandes.

Frontier trade was a key economic activity for both cacicatos and creole societies. Frontier correspondence shows how trade was one of the most important reasons for caciques in the Pampas Confederacy to write to frontier authorities. It was also the first and second clause in most peace treaties. People in Salinas Grandes usually traded directly with Bahía Blanca, Patagones, Azul, Tapalqué, 25 de Mayo and other forts in the province of Buenos Aires as well.

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431 Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá.”
432 Bello, Nampülkafe.
433 See: Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, and Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche.
434 Sources in San Luis mention the arrival of merchants from Azul and the Ranqueles’ lands. AHSL., box. 163, no. 17764.
435 Indian letters almost always include references to merchants that were going to the city to trade as well as creole merchants present in their tolderías. See: Pávez Ojeda, Cartas Mapuche, and Ranqueles letters in AHSL.
436 See: Levaggi, Paz en la frontera. For the Araucanía, see Bengoa, Historia del pueblo mapuche, siglos XIX y XX
as in the province of Córdoba. Through the Ranqueles’s intermediation, their trade could reach forts in the Cuyo region: the south of San Luis and Mendoza. According to Zeballos, the Salineros usually sold horses, mares, cattle, ostrich feathers, animal furs and textiles. As Alioto explained, the demand for horses and cattle was especially high in the more isolated posts of Buenos Aires’ frontier posts, such as Bahía Blanca, Azul and Patagones. These towns had a long history of resistance to government’s trading prohibitions with cacicatos, and continued trading during the most violent moments of frontier relationships. As ranching economies, they needed horses for military and transport purposes, and cattle to export hides and salted beef. In 1857, for example, Calfucurá asked the Bahía Blanca Commander to pay 80 pesos for each hide, the same price that they were being paid by the merchants in Azul.

In addition to regular trade, frontier dynamics opened another profitable market for the Confederate cacicatos: captive exchanges. Although this practice was a common and widespread activity since colonial times, the increasing militarization and frontier conflicts during the independence era limited these exchanges until the arrival of Rosas’s government. During his second period (1835-1852), the capture and distribution of creole and indigenous captivates

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437 Besides the information taken from all the consulted sources, see: Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá,” and Mandrini, “Sólo de caza y robo vivían los indios?”
440 In 1858, Calfucurá told Urquiza that he wanted peace with Buenos Aires as his people wanted to restore trade with their frontier posts. On this frontier trade, see: Ratto, “Allá lejos y hace tiempo,” and “La provisión de ganado y artículos de consumo en Bahía Blanca. ¿Los vecinos al servicio del estado o un estado al servicio de los vecinos?,” in Villar and Ratto, eds., Comercio, ganado y tierras en la frontera de Bahía Blanca (1850-1870) (Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Sur, 2006): 27-62, and Davies Lenoble “Haciéndonos parientes,” and “Relaciones interétnicas en Carmen de Patagones.”
441 For example, a soldier asked an Indian, who was picking up raciones, to exchange one of his thin cows for a piece of cloth, as he was interested in the hide. Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.” Also, Alioto explains that in Azul a creole resident paid 80 pesos for a hide in 1857. Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá,” p.207.
443 Silvia Ratto, “¿Para qué quieren tener cautivas si no estamos en guerra?”
became more systematized on the Buenos Aires’s frontier, especially in 25 de Mayo, San Miguel del Monte and Bahía Blanca. Rosas reinstated the custom of paying to recover creole captives, and the *indios amigos* intensively mediated these exchanges.

In the period under study, national and provincial archives show that the rich provinces of Córdoba, Santa Fe and Buenos Aires were actively involved in these purchases. Resources came from private institutions, such as the *Señoras de Beneficiencia*, missionaries and captives’ families, while state authorities were usually in charge of the negotiation. Since Rosas’s time, Calfucurá sold a large number of captives to the government during peace negotiations. Some were captured by the Salineros, but others came from allied groups. The commercial centrality of Salinas Grandes favored the reception of captives from multiple sources.

Due to the fact that selling or exchanging captives was seen by creole and indigenous authorities as a sign of peace, diplomatic negotiations were key moments to expand the political and economic profits of this activity. Caciques used captives as “gifts” to seal diplomatic agreements as well as to exchange them for their own prisoners. But they also increased the economic benefit of these exchanges during peace negotiations. Creole authorities did not only have to assure the payment to the captor —whether it came from the captives’ family or the government—, but also compensate caciques for the intermediation. For example, in 1842, Calfucurá payed two cows to one of his soldiers for the captive María Rincón. The Cacique sent

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444 For example Ratto accounts that, in January 1836, 50 creole captives and 7 indigenous children arrived to Bahia Blanca; in February, a military expedition took 51 creole captives from cacicatos, and in June 40 creole captives and 7 inidgenous children arrived to the fort as well. Ibid.
445 Based on the consulted sources, I found 72 cases for Buenos Aires and Santa Fe between 1863 and 1879. People in Santa Fe were also involved in rescues negotiated through Rio Cuarto. In Mendoza, I found 18 cases between 1850 and 1869, and in San Luis 37 between 1850 and 1867.
446 Ratto “¿Para qué quieren tener cautivas si no estamos en guerra?”
447 Ibid.
María back to the frontier and asked creole authorities to send 26 horses and other goods for him and his brother Namuncurá in exchange.\textsuperscript{448}

The caciques could not simply force their people to sell captives. According to cacicatos’ logics, captives stayed under the capturer’s family care. Principal caciques had to convince capturers to sell their captives in exchange for payment. As a consequence, these exchanges contributed to subaltern families’ economies as well as to the principal caciques’ authority and prestige. Caciques could arrange the sale without disrupting subalterns’ rights and customs.

In addition to Calfucurá and Catriel, the Ranqueles increasingly participated in this business, especially when the Franciscans arrived at Río Cuarto in the late 1860s. Between 1870 and 1879, the correspondence between the priests and the Ranqueles mention at least 454 negotiations for the release of captives in Río Cuarto.\textsuperscript{449}

In conclusion, the cacicatos’ expansive nomadic pastoralist economy contributed to the regional demographic and commercial growth of the Pampas during the period under study.\textsuperscript{450} On the one hand, cacicatos provided exportable goods, such as cattle –used for their hides and salted beef–, small animals’ furs, feathers and textiles to frontier economies. On the other hand, cacicatos became demanding consumers of imported cloth and clothes, alcohol, tobacco and luxury goods, as well as locally produced flour, yerba mate, alcohol, and silver ware. They also provided and demanded seasonal labor.

Therefore, cacicatos were far from being poor “primitives” living in a “desert”, they were fierce economic competitors of the creole sedentary society and offered alternative economic

\textsuperscript{448}“Commander Rosas y Belgrano to Governor Rosas, Azul, April 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1842,” AGN. X. 20.10.2, in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, pp.50-51.
\textsuperscript{449}See sources in AHCSF., and Marcela Tamagnini, ed., Cartas de frontera.
\textsuperscript{450}For papers on the economic expansion of frontier posts see: Villar and Ratto, eds., Comercio, ganado y tierras en la frontera de Bahía Blanca (1850-1870).
logic. This is why the Pampas Confederacy constantly attracted and integrated allies and followers as well as it constantly expanded its trade networks. It could provide economic prosperity for its members as well as assistance in moments of need. Only when subsistence was guaranteed, subalterns were expected to respect hierarchies and follow Calfucurá’s lead to gain further resources. The logic of reciprocity and redistribution worked against a centralized accumulation of resources. As any economic system, poverty and subordination existed. But poverty was not based on the lack of food and resources; it was based on the lack of social networks. For people living in the Pampas, joining the Pampas’ Confederacy was almost unavoidable.

After exploring the Confederate cacicatos of the Pampas’ internal political and economic organization we can better understand the failure of the Creoles’ expansive policies over their region during the 1850s. Creole authorities’ continuous misunderstanding of cacicatos’ logics and under estimation of their power worked against the success of frontier policies of cooptation and extermination. Creole governments’ only option ended up being respecting peace negotiations and reciprocal relationships with cacicatos.
CHAPTER III

Inter-ethnic Relationships during the 1850s:

Imposing the Cacicatos’ Diplomatic Logic on Creole Governments

During the 1850s, the Pampas Confederacy intervened in the civil conflicts between the province of Buenos Aires and the Argentine Confederacy under President Urquiza. This involvement responded to a policy of expansion over creole society as well as a form of maintaining internal union and stability. Exploring this development will help unfold the internal dynamics of the Pampas Confederacy and the major political and economic developments in the growing and multiethnic Pampas. The Pampas Confederacy’s diplomatic forms and terms of negotiation ended up prevailing after the battle of Pavón in 1862.

In February 1852, Juan Manuel de Rosas was defeated, and the provincial governments elected Justo José de Urquiza, from Entre Ríos, as the President of the Argentine Confederacy. A couple of months later, Buenos Aires’s elites and politicians rebelled and claimed autonomy. As historians highlight, these conflicts were not based on porteño elite’s will to remain independent, but on the type of confederate government the provinces wanted to create.451 Buenos Aires had become the richest province due to its port facing the Atlantic Ocean and its expanding ranching economy. Conflicts emerged over whom was to control the Buenos Aires’s customs and the navigation of internal rivers, whether to allow free trade or impose protected trade, and the

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451 Bragoni and Míguez, ed., Un nuevo orden político.
construction of a centralized or a federal union. Most provinces agreed to continue under a federal union and approved a Constitution in May, 1853. Instead, Buenos Aires remained autonomous for a decade and faced persistent internal and external political conflicts and warfare.

Meanwhile, the Pampas Confederacy tried to increase its dependents and resources by forcing both, Buenos Aires and the Argentine Confederacy, to expand the tributary agreements that had been settled with Governor Rosas. At first, both governments refused and tried to suspend Rosas’ policies towards the cacicatos, seen as corrupt and unsuccessful. While Urquiza took some time to negotiate peace with cacicatos, Buenos Aires reduced the amount of raciones and tried to expand into cacicato lands. The Pampas Confederacy responded with a series of malones on frontier towns and attacks on Creole expeditions, reaching an impressive military and diplomatic power. In addition to the Salineros, the Ranqueles, and the Catrileiros, these malones included allies from the west of the Andes and people under Cacique Llanquitrúz, who was building his leadership in northern Patagonia during these years. But these military actions were combined with intensive diplomatic negotiations with both of creole governments to reach peace agreements and enforce Creoles’ tributary role and reciprocal obligations. Although maintaining a policy of peace was also complicated by allied cacicatos’ autonomous actions, the Pampas Confederacy diplomatic correspondence and actions shows a strong

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452 Most politicians in Buenos Aires wanted to maintain provincial control of the Customs Office, restrict navigation of the internal rivers –as a way of guaranteeing its control on exports-, free commerce and a weak national state. The rest of the provinces, on the other hand, wanted Customs to be under national administration and to organize a strong centralized national state. Except for the provinces from the Litoral area –another expanding economic region-, they wanted a protection trade. Politicians from the Litoral area agreed with Buenos Aires on free trade policies, but fought for the free navigation of internal rivers. Julio Saguir, “Entre el conflicto y la organización institucional: los procesos constituyentes de Argentina (1810-1860) y Estados Unidos (1777-1787),” Agora, 8, (1998), p.127.

453 For a detailed study on Buenos Aires’s changing policies and debates, see: Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.”
compromise to make peace with creole governments. As consequence, the Pampas Confederacy succeeded in conserving internal stability and prosperity during these conflicts, while Creoles were subdued into a decade of internal violence and fragmentation.

President Urquiza soon learnt the need for maintaining the government’s tributary condition towards the cacicatos to assure peace on the frontiers and therefore be able to build a strong front against Buenos Aires. The Constitution of 1853 conceived furthering peace-relationships with cacicatos, securing frontier posts and promoting missions. Urquiza negotiated peace with the Ranqueles and Calfucurá in 1854 and started sending them raciones and gifts. The porteño government took longer to reach the same conclusion. Authorities thought they could fight both, the Argentine and the Pampas Confederacies. Cacicatos’ policies and experienced frontier officials soon showed the governing porteños that their plan was unrealistic. Buenos Aires’s authorities found that they constantly needed to ally with indios amigos and independent cacicatos to define military and political fights, and secure frontier towns’ trade and production. By the end of the decade, the province’s only option resulted in respecting peace negotiations and reciprocal obligations with all cacicatos.

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455 Allied cacicatos followed their own agendas and alliances cross-cut an Indian/creole binaries. For example, when Hilario Lagos rebelled in Buenos Aires during December 1852, in favor of integrating the province into Urquiza’s Confederacy. He was backed by the indios amigos of Federación and Mulitas, but confronted by Catriel and his allies. The latter backed Azul’s Commander Rosas y Belgrano in favor of Buenos Aires’s autonomous government. Both forces clashed in the battle of San Gregorio in January 1853. Rosas y Belgrano lost, Catriel and Cachul’s people went back to their tolderías raiding Creoles on their way home. Bustos maintained Lagos’ force in Azul, and Urquiza tried to pact with Calfucurá and the Ranqueles to attack Buenos Aires in February 1853. But in June, 1853 the siege concluded. Rosas y Belgrano returned to Azul. AGN, X, 18.4.8, in Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.” Also see: Ratto, “Ni unitarios ni rosistas,” Caletti García diego, “La intervención de la población rural en la lucha política en los comienzos del sitio de Hilario Lagos a la ciudad de Buenos Aires, 1852-1853,” and de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período de organización nacional.”
The Pampas Confederacy’s expansion policy also contributed to Buenos Aires’s reincorporation into the Argentine Confederacy. Successful negotiations with cacicatos in the early 1860s helped Buenos Aires maintain most of them neutral during the battle of Pavón in 1862, and consequently, win the battle. Most of the authorities finally understood the impossibility of living in a world isolated from cacicatos and the rest of the provinces in the region. The new President of the Argentine Republic, Bartolomé Mitre (1862-1868), tried to negotiate with the elites in all provinces, and accepted making peace treaties with cacicatos and to deliver raciones. Sporadic attempts to attack their tolderías and occupy their lands continued failing.

Regarding the Pampas Confederacy’s internal dynamics, Ratto argued that negotiating with both creole political factions strengthen Calfucurá’s leadership. He gained further resources out of diplomatic treaties and military attacks as well as greater prestige by becoming the undeniable leader of cacicatos in the Pampas. Nevertheless, in her work with de Jong, they also argue that the Pampas Confederacy started fragmenting by 1856, when Catriel signed the new peace treaty with the Province of Buenos Aires. According to the authors, the treaties that followed with diverse cacicatos of the Confederacy dissuaded them from supporting Calfucurá in his military ventures and thus, weakened his leadership. However, as I argued, Calfucurá’s leadership was not determined by cacicatos’ military support. He could not force caciques to join military ventures that could threaten their own subsistence. Sources show that Calfucurá was more dedicated to generating internal stability and security of his allies than to gain a centralized military power under his lead. Allies kept on strengthening their ties by the use of parliaments to

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456 Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá.”
457 de Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana.”
reach political consensus and through a continuous communication on the Creole’s military plans. They also maintained a fluid trade, exchange, and sociability. Individual treaties brought more resources to the Pampas Confederacy’s as a whole. Therefore, extending a policy of peace and reciprocity to both creole factions during the 1850s allowed the Pampas Confederacy to protect allies’ territories, increase resources, and avoid internal fragmentation.

**Peace Negotiations between the Pampas Confederacy and Creole Provinces in 1854**

Once Buenos Aires proclaimed its autonomy from the Argentine Confederacy in 1852, it started breaking their pacts with allied cacicatos. The province planned to move the creole town of Tapalqué into Catriel’s territory and decrease or suspend the provision of *raciones* to him and other allied cacicatos. These policies broke the reciprocal obligations that the province had with cacicatos in Tapalqué and, to some extent, with Calfucurá, who had been receiving *raciones* in Bahía Blanca until Rosas’s defeat. Apart from responding to these threats with *malones*, Calfucurá started negotiations with Urquiza, with the intention of forcing Buenos Aires back into reciprocal obligations as well as to please other confederate members: the Ranqueles.

The Ranqueles were not directly affected by Buenos Aires’ frontier policies, but were probably the most interested allies in moving the center of negotiations to Córdoba, a province closer to their lands. They could also benefit from changing their historical relationship of

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458 In October, 1854, Buenos Aires’s government approved moving Tapalqué. When frontier authorities tried to implement the law in 1855, cacicatos’ strongly resisted. For a detail analysis of these policies and events, see: Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.”
hostility and mistrust with creole governments during Rosas’s times.\textsuperscript{459} Hosting the \textit{unitario} Manuel Baigorria had complicated their relationships with Rosas. In 1852, the new Governor of Córdoba Alejo del Carmen Guzman started expanding provincial control over Ranquel lands.\textsuperscript{460} The Ranqueles and other confederate allies responded to this threat and Buenos Aires’ policies with \textit{malones}. These attacks hit Córdoba, San Luis and Buenos Aires’s frontiers.

President Urquiza’s military forces were too small and dispersed to confront these attacks and solve the conflict with Buenos Aires. The Argentine Confederacy still lacked a strong professional army; they relied on provincial militias and later on the National Guard, created in 1854, which continued strongly dependent on the provinces’ support.\textsuperscript{461} Urquiza needed the cacicatos’ support to sustain his power. He then ordered Governor Guzman to negotiate a peace treaty with the Ranqueles and Calfucurá.

Looking forward to restoring reciprocal obligations with the provinces, the principal Caciques replied positively. The Ranquel Caciques Calván and Pichún started sending messengers and letters to the frontier authorities manifesting their intentions to settle peace.\textsuperscript{462} Colonel Baigorria contributed to this political shift by deciding to ally with Urquiza and fight for the Argentine Confederacy.\textsuperscript{463} The Ranqueles tried to use these negotiations to increase their

\textsuperscript{459} Although they negotiated with Governor Manuel López during Rosas’s times, they were also usually targeted by Rosas’s military expeditions. Graciana Pérez Zavala, “Relaciones interétnicas asimétricas.” Also, in 1851, their negotiations with Córdoba failed. AHSL., no. \textsuperscript{11275}.

\textsuperscript{460} In 1853, Guzman founded Santa Catalina and San Fernando between the Rio Cuarto and Rio Quinto. By 1854, the latter had 200 people, 70 of which were military. Although the government continued giving property titles to local and foreign families over these lands, its real occupation depended on people’s ties with cacicatos. See: Pérez Zavala, “Relaciones interétnicas asimétricas.”

\textsuperscript{461} The 1853 Constitution dictated the creation of a national army. Nevertheless, Urquiza only managed to create a few regular troops due to the lack of resources, and provinces’ lack of support to mobilize men from militias to the national army. In 1854, Urquiza created the National Guard.

\textsuperscript{462} See correspondence in AHSL., boxes 127 to 151.

\textsuperscript{463} Baigorria, \textit{Memorias del Coronel Manuel Baigorria}. 155
prestige and autonomy in the Pampas Confederacy, but Calfucurá ended up playing a big role in defining their negotiations with creole provinces.

Historians Marcela Tamagnini and Graciana Pérez Zavala argue that the 1854 treaty was part of a series of treaties, military expeditions and colonizing projects that aimed at expanding state presence over the Ranqueles. This treaty legitimized new settlements that the province was trying to found in Ranqueles’s lands. However, a close examination of the diplomatic negotiations, the agreed articles and their application, reveal the lack of a unified and systematized expansion policy on behalf of the province, and contrary to the general belief, how these negotiations were strongly manipulated by cacicatos’ interests and their expansion policies over creole provinces.

When analyzing the correspondence between Guzman and the three caciques, we can recognize creole attempts to achieve a military truce as well as a progressive subordination of these cacicatos to the Argentine Confederacy. The treaty that Governor Guzman proposed to these cacicatos demanded that they do not invade the Argentine Confederacy (art.1) nor join its enemies (art.2). In exchange, no provincial governor could ally with the enemies of Caciques Pichún, Calván and Calfucurá (art.5). Indians and creoles would also be respected by both parties and, in order to guarantee free trade and labor, they would never be hurt nor their goods be damaged during their visits to the provinces and tolderías (art.3 and art.4). Caciques were to allow Indians to form reducciones located “in certain regions” and these would be governed by one of their capitanejos, but under the “direction and surveillance” of Colonel Don Manuel

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Baigorria (art.6). Finally, the treaty indicated that: “as a guarantee of their loyalty” to the treaty and the governors, caciques were expected to recognize Colonel Baigorria as the intermediary between themselves and President Urquiza (art.7). These clauses were influenced by Guzman’s perception of cacicatos as “uncivilized”, but able to become subordinates of the Argentine Confederacy. In his letters to the Minister of War, Guzman stated that they should provide cacicatos with agricultural tools, as he saw them in the best disposition to “acquire [civilized] habits” and adapt to “social life” as soon as religious missions could be formed on the frontier.

The letters that followed indicate that negotiations were moving forward. On September 27th, Guzman wrote to the Minster of War telling him that his clauses were approved by: a commission of 11 capitanejos who reached Río Cuarto; letters and emissaries of the three named Caciques, and Lieutenant Ramón Fernandez, who had been sent to the Ranqueles’s territory in representation of Guzman and the President. On October 11th, Guzman wrote again to the Minister of War and told him that the treaty had been accepted.

However, in this last letter, Guzman described a different treaty from the one he had proposed to the Ranqueles. We now find key modifications that, except for article 1, point to the caciques’ intervention and reveal some of the Pampas Confederacy’s interests. Article 1 now added that, if the Caciques’ Indians raided the provinces, they would have to punish them as well as return what had been stolen. This article followed the reciprocal logic of cacicatos’ justice

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466 AHPC., Gobierno 1854, “Correo de los indios”, vol.239, leg4., f.122.
467 Although the letter was not signed, the handwriting and tone matched Guzman’s previous letters, within the same document. AHPC., Gobierno 1854, “Correo de los indios,” vol. 239, leg4., f.122.
468 “The Governor of Córdoba to the Minister of War, Rosario, October 11th, 1854,” AHPC., Gobierno 1854, “Correo de los indios”, vol.239, leg4., f.127.
system, but was also based on provincial attempts to make caciques responsible for *malocas* on frontier posts. The new treaty also eliminated article 6 and 7, which dealt with the formation of *reducciones* and Colonel Baigorria’s authority over cacicatos. Instead, article 6 now asserted that Indians’ territorial rights would be respected, and that no Christian would enter the *tolderías* without the caciques’ permission.469 This last article was crossed out in the letter, but was included in article 4 of the official and final treaty sent by the Minister of War to the Governor of San Luis on November 2nd.470 This clause ended up expressing that the property of Indians’ land “would be guaranteed,” and that, in order to guarantee free trade and labor, Indians would never be hurt nor their goods be damaged.471

The final treaty shows that the caciques were able to modify some clauses.472 The agreement resulted in a truce; it prevented military confrontations, and furthered trade and daily contact with cacicatos. Unlike treaties in the 1860s, it did not explicitly mention mutual support in each other’s military ventures. But changes also seemed to respond to a major objective of the Pampas Confederacy: providing security to all allies. While most of the diplomatic negotiation was driven by the Ranqueles, who were close to Córdoba and more interested in the material benefits they could get out of this treaty, the last changes seemed to also come from Calfucurá’s side. The Ranqueles might have been involved in these changes as, according to Baigorria’s memoirs, Cacique Calván disagreed with the occupation of Río Quinto and putting Baigorria in

469 Other modifications were: article 5 became article 3 and was written in the margin; article 3 and 4 remained the same, but became articles 4 and 5.
470 “The Minister of War to the Governor of San Luis, Parana, November 2nd,” AHS L., box.136, no.12809.
471 The official document also modified article 1: It continued asking caciques to punish their followers if they stole from frontier posts, but did not clarify that the cattle had to be returned.
472 See: Florencia Roulet, “Con la pluma y la palabra.”

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charge of the *reducción*. But Baigorria also states that Calván ended up accepting the original treaty.

When looking at the frontier correspondence, we see that, until September 27th, they all agreed with Guzman’s initial propositions. But Guzman did not mention whether the agreement had been ratified by Benítes, the emissary that went to Calfucurá’s *tolderías* to obtain the Cacique’s consent. Based on the correspondence, we know that Benítes reached Calfucurá in September, but we know neither when he returned to Río Cuarto nor what happened to the commission that Calfucurá sent to negotiate directly with President Urquiza. Also, although Baigorria mentioned in his memoirs that he visited Calfucurá’s *tolderías* and gained his acceptance, it seems that this episode took place before the Ranqueles sent the first commission to Río Cuarto. Hence, it refers to a positive response from the Salinero even before Benítes reached his *tolderías*.

The treaty’s changes were probably made between September 27th and October 11th. This implies that Calfucurá intervened. Only on October 11th did Guzman mention Benítes’s return. Moreover, while these negotiations were occurring, Calfucurá and Catriel were dealing with Buenos Aires’s threatening policies. The decrease and suspension of *raciones* and gifts, the plan to move Catriel out of Tapalqué and some military expeditions against the *tolderías* were responded to with military attacks as well as diplomatic negotiations. For example, in 1854, Calfucurá threatened the Commander of Bahía Blanca, Francisco Iturra, with organizing a big

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474 Diplomatic commissions and letters went back and forth between them. Guzman also indicated on September 27th that they were all in agreement, including his emissary Fernandez who had just come back from Calván’s huts. AHPC, *Gobierno 1854*, “Correspondencia con los indios”, vol. 239, leg4.  
475 Guzman mentions the return of Fernandez, the emissary sent to the Ranqueles’s lands.  
malón with all his allies, including the thirteen Argentine provinces, if he did not return 150 horses that had been taken from his people.\(^{477}\) Calfucurá’s letter, written by an anonymous writer, calls for settling a general peace agreement. He says that: “I found it extremely strange that you do not follow the orders of General Urquiza.” It continues adding that he had agreed on peace with Urquiza and that his “deputy” had just returned from Río Cuarto, where Guzman was making peace on behalf of Urquiza. He finishes the letter demanding a list of goods and clothes for himself, his followers and intermediaries, including Urquiza’s representative Benítes.

Therefore, whether it was Calfucurá or the Ranqueles, the changes seem to point at guaranteeing security and protection to all confederate allies, and assuring that all provincial governments would respect reciprocal obligations with the cacicatos. Removing Colonel Baigorria from the treaty also revealed that caciques did not accept creole intervention to define their hierarchies. Instead, caciques used Baigorria only as an important political intermediary.\(^{478}\)

In addition, many of the new creole settlements created by the government of Córdoba between Río Cuarto and Río Quinto failed, especially after Colonel Baigorria left Ranqueles to join Urquiza’s military in Río Cuarto and later, Mitre. The ones that survived were under the Ranqueles’s dominion.\(^{479}\) This shows that the 1854 treaty did not serve creole authorities to justify their invasion over Ranqueles’s lands. During the early 1860s, Creoles living in these

\(^{477}\) Although this letter does not indicates the day and month in which it was written, it mentions the presence of Benítes in his toldería as well as the return of his representative from Río Cuarto. Hence, it was probably written between September and October. “Juan Calfucurá to Colonel Francisco Iturra, 1854,” AGN., X, 18.10.6, in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá, pp75-6.


\(^{479}\) Pérez Zavala recognized that many of these settlements failed. Pérez Zavala, “Relaciones interétnicas asimétricas.”
locations had to retreat to Río Cuarto due to Ranqueles’s coercive policies against Mitre’s government.

Cacicatos’ economic interests also drove the negotiations. In their letters, Caciques and *capitanejos* asked for gifts and protection for their traders. According to Guzman, he distributed 4,000 mares as gifts. In 1854, Córdoba spent 90,988 pesos on the frontier, of which 6,000 were earmarked for Indian matters. Numerous indigenous commissions reached Río Cuarto to trade. The Ranqueles also took advantage of the negotiation to obtain the release of some of their people imprisoned in the provinces. Cacique Calván tried to get his son returned, who had been kidnapped by two captives that had escaped from his *tolderías*. Apparently, his son ended up in Mendoza and provincial authorities could not find him. A witness reported that he had been “abused,” probably referring to an episode of sexual harassment. We do not know if Calván’s son was finally returned, but provincial authorities restituted some of the cattle taken by those captives and they exchanged prisoners. This conflict created resentment amongst the Ranqueles and fueled the growing tension with Urquiza after 1855.

In spite of provincial authorities’ attempts to frame the negotiation within the logic of state subordination, cacicatos in fact imposed their logic and customs and counterbalanced these attempts. Authorities had to negotiate with the three caciques as equal partners. In his letters, Governor Guzman mentions that the negotiation demanded receiving and speaking to all

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482 For example, when Pichún’s wife Jacinta went to Rio Cuarto, he asked Guzman to provide her with goods, such as yerba and sugar. Also, Naguel Chu sent his mother-in-law and the Indian Quincan, who was his nephew and the father-in-law of Calfuruca, to the town with a list of provisions. AHPC., *Gobierno 1854*, “Correspondencia con los indios,” vol.239, leg.4., fs. 130, 131, and 144.
483 AHPC., *Gobierno 1854*, “Correspondencia con los indios,” vol.239, leg.4, and AHSL., box. 139, no. 12949.
484 He mentioned that he was “estropeado” (ruined), probably meaning abused. AHSL., box.139, no. 12949.
commissions, as well as sending his emissaries to every *toldería*, as reciprocity for the visits he received in Río Cuarto and Córdoba. It also involved ritualizing the alliance through fictive kinship ties; one of Pichún’s brothers adopted Guzman’s surname. Kinship logic and discourse tinted the correspondence; in the letters, the cacique and provincial authorities constantly treated each other as brothers and relatives, and asked for the good health and wellbeing of their families. In Baigorria’s memoirs, he also described how kinship ties meant peace. Baigorria asked Cacique Calván:

“was not my son Gabriel born here? Is not Pichún the son of a daughter of the country [creole society]? And are not these guarantees enough for you? You also have children and they are also with mine, growing up together or seeing themselves frequently; they would not forget how their parents worked for them [in order to] to grow up in peace and live in tranquility”.  

When looking at the internal politics of the Pampas Confederacy, peace negotiations also show that while consensus politics continued being the base of decision-making processes, Calfucurá defined internal alliances and the diplomatic negotiations. The three allies negotiated as equal and autonomous partners. They formed parliaments and sent representatives of all caciques to reach consent as well as separate letters to provincial governments to differentiate their authority. No emissary or cacique could accept the treaty by himself. Gifts were distributed between the three Caciques, who later distributed goods among their followers. However, the correspondence also shows that Calfucurá had become first among equals. He carefully worked towards leading trans-regional and inter-ethnic alliances. In his letter to Guzman, he indicated that he distributed gifts among cacicatos that came from the Araucanía so as to prevent harm to

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485 In the correspondence between Guzman and the Ranqueles, we see that Pichún’s brother adopted Alejo Carmen Guzman’s name. This probably happened when he visited Río Cuarto in 1854. AHPC, *Gobierno 1854*, “Correspondencia con los indios,” vol.239, leg.4.
the provinces. He sent his son to contact and control the Huilliches who had just attacked Carmen de Patagones. He claimed that Cacique Benito and General Martín Collenao from Mulitas would support Urquiza, and he accused the Ranqueles of raiding Buenos Aires against his orders. 487 He finally indicated that he had 1,500 *lanzas*; 140 captains, 2 Mayors and soldiers from Huilliches, and 300 *lanzas* from Cacique Juan Manuel. As I mentioned, he also insisted on making peace with both Urquiza and Buenos Aires. Calfucurá had centralized trans-regional alliances and indicated to Urquiza what kind of relationship he could have with each of his allies.

Calfucurá’s words on the Ranqueles also reveal the complexity of alliances in the third level of dependency. These allies tried to maneuver through the persistent tension between equality and hierarchy in order to gain internal peace and economic prosperity. The 1854 treaty threatened the Ranqueles’s exclusive access to southern Córdoba’s trade. Calfucurá indicated in his letter that he was going to send people to trade in Río Cuarto. In December 1857, he complained to Colonel Baigorria that when creoles traveled to Salinas Grandes from the provinces to trade, the Ranqueles took everything from them. 488 Later, he also indicated that it was not his fault if the Ranqueles raided the Buenos Aires’s frontier, as he: “did not govern” them. Instead, he said that he: “governed” Catriel, Manquebues, Colinguer and Coliquéo “whom will not raid, as we are trying to make peace with a good heart.” 489

These accusations presented Calfucurá as the confederate peace maker and leader, in contrast to the violent and insubordinate Ranqueles. But this did not mean that he would attack

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or break his relationship with the Ranqueles. His allies were actually following the confederacy’s internal rights and logic, which indicated that they could raid independently from Calfucurá. Furthermore, they justified their *malones* over Buenos Aires by claiming that the province was not part of the treaty with the Argentine Confederacy. Nevertheless, Calfucurá knew that these cacicatos could not easily avoid his control over trade in Buenos Aires. Therefore, the Ranqueles and Calfucurá continued participating in most of their important military ventures and maintained a fluid contact and negotiation to avoid conflicts.

In addition to the 1854 treaty, the Pampas Confederacy tried to restore peace with Buenos Aires, whose authorities continued refusing to return to their tributary position with the confederacy. Frontier correspondence flipped the traditional image of Indians as violent savages and Creoles as civilized. Although both used violence against each other, the caciques, in their letters, insisted on making peace with the provincial authorities and ceasing to use violence. Buenos Aires authorities, on the other hand, threatened the caciques and continued refusing to make peace. By 1854, violence and hostility was reaching its peak. Commander Iturra continued refusing to release Calfucurá’s prisoners and send back the stolen animals. In February 1855, a *malón* hit Azul and Tapalqué, captured 150 people and 60,000 heads of cattle. In May, many of the *indios amigos* in Azul and Bahía Blanca rebelled, kidnapped the Justice of Peace of Azul and destroyed the new creole town of Tapalqué. People under Pascual also joined Calfucurá. By that time, the new provincial Minister of War, Bartolomé Mitre, had decided to move forward.

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491 See sources in Lobos, *Juan Calfucurá*.
492 Regarding *malones*, in February 1855, a *malón* hit Azul and Tapalqué, captured 150 people and 60,000 heads of cattle. AM, vol. XV, p.98, in Ratto, “Ni unitarios ni rosistas,” p.20.
with a plan to advance on Tapalqué. He ordered his brother Colonel Emilio Mitre and Laureano Diaz to occupy Tapalqué and Blanca Grande, and kill Cachul’s (Catréel’s second cacique) tribe.\footnote{494 AGN., X, 27.7.6, in Lobos, \textit{Juan Calfucurá}, p.85.}

Based on Emilio Mitre and Laureano Diaz’s reports on their expeditions against Cachul and Catréel’s \textit{tolderías}, the expedition failed due to the lack of support from most of the \textit{indios amigos}, the threat of greater attacks from Calfucurá and his transregional allies, limited military forces and resources, the “miscalculations” of the \textit{vaqueanos}\footnote{495 \textit{Vaqueanos} were guides. They were usually of indigenous or mestizo origin and had great knowledge on the geography, trails, resources and cacicatos in cacicato lands.}, and Indians’ successful military tactics. The plan consisted on Diaz’s attacking Cachul’s \textit{tolderías} and heading towards Sierras de Tapalqué, where Emilio Mitre would join him so as to attack Catréel’s \textit{tolderías} together. Laureano Diaz marched with 600 men, including 200 \textit{indios amigos} approximately.\footnote{496 \textquoteleft Laurelano Diaz to Mitre, Estancia del potrillo, June 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1855,	extquoteright AGN., X, 27.7.6, in Lobos \textit{Juan Calfcurua}, pp.92-3.} When they reached Cachul’s settlement, most people had moved to Catréel’s \textit{tolderías}. They only found 70 people, which they imprisoned, and some cattle, sheep and horses. Nevertheless, Calfucurá, Catréel and his allies followed the expedition closely and made some small attacks on Diaz. Diaz reports that the Indians formed and “came closer with flag requesting a parliament, asking to release the imprisoned families, and that they would retreat.”\footnote{497 Ibid, p.93} Diaz refused to negotiate because, he explains: “I had a large enough force to tear them apart.” But Diaz ended up retreating to a safe place and never joined Mitre’s forces. According to Emilio Mitre’s account, his expedition was formed by 700 men, including 60 \textit{indios amigos}.\footnote{498 \textquoteleft Coronel Emilio Mitre to Governor Pastor Obligado, Azul, June 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1855,	extquoteright AGN., X, 27.7.6, in Lobos, \textit{Juan Calfucura}, pp.86-91.} They were also closely followed by Indians. Indians sent warnings to each other with horns and cannon shots, and also
let the provincial forces know about their increasing military forces with the arrival of trans-regional allies, which was by then reaching 1,000 men according to Mitre, and scared the military by staying close, sending small attacks and yelling. The expedition reached a spot where they could not move forward. Indians stood firmly near them with, according to Mitre: “50,000 heads of cattle” peacefully herding at their back.499 Like Diaz, Mitre had to retreat. He left the fire on to make the Indians think that they were still there, and left 1,200 horses behind.

These failed expeditions showed that the Pampas Confederacy had more than enough military force and tactics to defeat Buenos Aires’ army, as well as an impressive control over their territory and resources. They continued defeating creole expeditions. In September, Cacique Llanquitrúz defeated Nicanor Otamendi’s forces in San Antonio de Iraola (modern Benito Juarez), killing 126 of the 128 soldiers, taking one captive and leaving one hurt.500 In October, Calfucurá and his allies defeated General Hornos. Again in December, allied cacicatos defeated the military force sent by Buenos Aires in Cristiano Muerto, and again on January 1st, in Sol de Mayo.501 In addition to the arrival of allies from the Andes and the Araucanía, Calfucurá tried to make Urquiza join him against Buenos Aires.502

Mitre and Diaz’s accounts of their expeditions also show that, in contrast to the porteño military, Calfucurá and his allies constantly showed their willingness to stop violence and negotiate. Even if they could obtain large numbers of animals and captives during these confrontations and malones, warfare cost them many deaths, prisoners, loss of resources and

499 Ibid. 90-91.
502 “Calfucura to Urquiza, 1855,” and “Calfucura to Excellence, Governor General Captain Justo Jose de Urquiza, Salinas Grandes, December 27th, 1855,” AGN., Archivo Urquiza, 1.1556, y. 94-f. 221 and 207, in Lobos, Juan Calfucura, pp.94-95, and 97.
obstructed trade with the province. It complicated the business and arrangements they had with frontier residents. For example, when planning a common attack, Calfucurá asked Urquiza to leave Bahía Blanca unaffected so that his people could leave their animals there.\textsuperscript{503} This willingness to settle for peace was more evident at a discursive level, where it could be seen as a strategy for power. For example, when Calfucurá requested Urquiza’s military support to attack Buenos Aires, he clarified to the President that his ultimate objective was to obtain peace with Buenos Aires.\textsuperscript{504} He claimed that violence and death –of Indians as well as Creoles- was the Governor of Buenos Aires’s fault. He accused \textit{porteño} authorities of being ruthless leaders with their creole soldiers as their victims. He was surprised that they wanted to continue warfare when their men were dying. Calfucurá also wrote to Buenos Aires’s Governor Obligado and accused him of breaking peace and of cruelty; he mentions that in one attack, creoles had killed women “as if they were sheep”. Therefore, Calfucurá legitimized his use of violence as “defensive” and re-appropriated Creoles’ discourse to present their authorities as savages. He also accused them of being incompetent leaders according to indigenous traditions; they were exposing their men to death when there were open options for negotiation. Calfucurá also acknowledge that the conflicts and confrontations were multi-ethnic. In his letter, Calfucurá asks Urquiza that if they attacked Buenos Aires together, he wanted to personally take care of Commander Valdevenito, and the Caciques \textit{amigos} Collinao, Ancalao and Maica, whom had supported \textit{porteños’} expeditions against their allies and were responsible for many deaths.

During these military confrontations and failed negotiations, Urquiza’s government was also trying to reach an agreement with Buenos Aires and perceived cacicatos’ increasing military

\textsuperscript{503} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{504} Ibid.
power as a threat to his project. Correspondence shows his wariness about the *malones* over Buenos Aires; he even asked the caciques to stop raiding. Colonel Baigorria intervened and traveled to the cacicatos’ lands to speak with the caciques. President Urquiza also ordered authorities in San Luis not to buy the stolen cattle available on the frontier. But Urquiza did not show wariness for Buenos Aires’s hostile policies against the cacicatos.

Nevertheless, Urquiza continued to respect his tribute to the Pampas Confederacy. Documents from San Luis indicate that this province provided *raciones*, at least between December 1856 and March 1857, on behalf of the Argentine Confederacy. President Urquiza’s government also created and kept an official register for *raciones* which, from 1858 to 1862, showed an average of 45,000 pesos spent per year, half of 1854s’ sum.

Therefore, peace with Urquiza did not imply Creoles’ control over the Pampas Confederacy. Instead, the agreement imposed cacicatos’ political strategies and forms of negotiation. It forced Urquiza to periodically deliver resources to cacicatos and restrain from punishing the *malones* that hit Buenos Aires because the province was not part of the treaty. It also ended forcing Buenos Aires to follow Urquiza’s diplomacy and negotiate with cacicatos.

As historian Belloni argued, Buenos Aires’s persistent defeats against Calfucurá and his allies, as well as its insufficient military resources, finally forced the government to negotiate

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505 In August 1856, the government asked the provinces to tell the caciques that they should prevent these raids AHPC, *Copiador de notas* 1856-57, fs.327-332
507 “Memo from the Presidency in Parana to the Governor of San Luis, October 20th, 1855,” AHS.L., box.140, no.13292.
508 “The Government of the Province of Mendoza to the Governor of San Luis, September 13th, 1855,” AHS.L, box. 144, no. 13735.
with the Pampas Confederacy. Peace negotiations started with Catriel in March 1856 in Bahía Blanca and in April with Calfucurá in 25 de Mayo and Bahía Blanca. With these negotiations, the Pampas Confederacy achieved some of their key goals: the return of Catriel to Tapalqué, the restoration of porteño’s reciprocal obligations to cacicatos with the provision of raciones, and frontier peace and stability to further trade. In December 1858, Catriel wrote to Manuel Escalada about their agreement and indicated that by the treaty with Buenos Aires: “the lands from the Sierra of Cura Malal up to Bayucurá are recognized as our legitimate property.” He indicated that Bayucurá was now the limit between cacicatos and Buenos Aires, and that nobody could trespass that limit except to trade. Regarding raciones, Buenos Aires’s budget for raciones returned to the amounts disbursed in Rosas’s times.

By May 1856, Calfucurá also reached an agreement with Buenos Aires through negotiations in Bahía Blanca. Although authorities did not sign a treaty, the confederate cacique wrote to Commander Iturra saying that from his perspective, peace was a fact. Once again, kinship framed the alliance. Calfucurá named one of his sons after the Buenos Aires Governor

510 In the last confrontation of 1855, General Hornos attacked them with 3,000 soldiers and 12 canon and still lost 250 men and many wounded. Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.” 511 José’ Noguera informed Bartolomé Mitre that he met Catriel and Cachul, offered a big banquet and a gift of 1,500 mares. They agreed to reestablish peace. “Letter from José Noguer to Bartolomé Mitre, March 24th, 1857,” AM, vol. XV, p.168, in Belloni “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur,” p.62. Also see: Levaggi, Paz en la Frontera, p. 291. 512 “The Principal Cacique of the Pampas Tribes, Juan Catriel and Juan Manuel Cachul to General Escalada, Sauce Grande, December 12th, 1858,” AGN., X, 27-7-6, s/f, Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, pp.310-311. 513 Based on Ratto, Belloni describes that the budget spent on raciones to cacicatos by Buenos Aires were: 419,661.7 pesos in 1852; 27,666 pesos in 1853; 93,725, pesos 1854 pesos; 57,636. pesos in 1855; 444,106 pesos in 1856 and 476,939 pesos plus the salaries paid to Indians (455,131 pesos) resulted in 932,070 pesos in 1857. In Rosas times, the government spent 315,000 pesos in 1833; 526,789 pesos in 1836; 244,014 in 1837, and 424,393 in 1839; 283,929 pesos in 1844; 473,627 pesos in 1851. AGN, III, Libros mayores de la tesorería de Buenos Aires, in Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur,” pp. 62-63. 514 “Letter for Mayor Francisco Iturra from Juan Clafucura, Salinas Grandes, May 6th, 1856”, AHMSP, Bahía Blanca, Pávez Ojeda, Cartas Mapuche, pp. 269-270.
Pastor Obligado. In his letters, he also spoke about the alliance as a pact between brothers. To restore reciprocal obligations, he asked for numerous gifts and goods for his subalterns and allies, and the exchange of captives. He also asked for the removal of General Hornos, who had led several expeditions against his allies.

In spite of these signs of peace, Buenos Aires’s authorities mistrusted Calfucurá. Their correspondence shows they still wanted to send troops to attack his tolderías and to expand their settlements over cacicato lands. Malocas were still hitting Buenos Aires, but frontier authorities rarely identified the leaders. Some mention they were “Chileans,” which could suggest the participation of some of Calfucurá’s allies and followers. Calfucurá mentioned the arrival of six people from Chile, and we know that around this time Cacique Mangil’s son was visiting Salinas Grandes. But these pieces of evidence were not enough to make him responsible for the attacks. Frontier authorities also did not accept that cacicatos’ customs allowed leaders to tolerate malocas for their followers to gain resources and prestige. In addition, Buenos Aires’ authorities mistrusted Calfucurá’s on-going negotiations with Urquiza. In 1856, the cacique had sent a commission to meet the president. Under this increasing tension, Buenos Aires’s authorities decided to organize military expeditions against Calfucurá and the Ranqueles.

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515 In his letters, Calfucurá named Manuel Pastor, thus, it could have been Manuel Namuncurá. Ibid.
516 Ibid. Regarding Hornos, see: Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.”
518 In May 1856, Baigorria informed Urquiza that Cacique Coliqueo and Calfucurá’s son arrived at Rio Cuarto to visit the presiden, with 60 indianst. AHPC., Gobierno 1856, vol. 243, leg. 13, f.171, and “Letter from Calfucurá to José Benito Valdes (Valdebenito) of Montes Grandes, Salinas Grandes, September, 11th,1856,” AGN, X., 19-4-5, s/f., Pávez Ojeda, Cartas Mapuche, p.289. An anonymous letter to Mitre informed that the commission finally met the President in August. AM, vol. XV, p. 210, in Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur,” p.60 The son was Namuncurá. We find a description of this meeting in Zeballos, Papeles, fs.48-49, Villar and Jiménez, Amigos, hermanos y parientes, p.48-49.
To sum up, Calfucurá’s policies suggest that he was more interested in settling peace with both Urquiza and Buenos Aires than to destroy either of them. His use of violence against Buenos Aires frontier posts came as a reaction to the province’s expansive policies, in favor of protecting his allies’ subsistence and of increasing Creoles’ tribute to cacicatos. As with their Indian allies, peace became his strategy for power.

Towards Caseros and Pavón: Internal Negotiation and Diplomatic Power

In later 1857, Buenos Aires planned to invade the Ranqueles’s lands in order to isolate them from helping Calfucurá, whose camp was going to be invaded in early 1858. They also expected support from Caciques Catriel and Llanquitrúz, whom had just signed peace treaties with the province. Llanquitrúz would attack Calfucurá in northern Patagonia if he tried to escape to the Andes Mountains.519 In February 1857, Wenceslao Paunero’s cousin recognized that: “without the cooperation of some caciques, I see it difficult that we could reach any important result over the savages due to our lack of regular forces.”520

In spite of these strategic military plans, the expedition failed to defeat the Pampas Confederacy. Once again, provincial authorities underestimated cacicatos’ military power, and misunderstood the Pampas Confederacy. Independent treaties between some caciques and the province did not invalidate the Pampas Confederacy. The expedition against the Ranqueles organized by Emilio Mitre got lost and never reached the Caciques’ main tolderías. It had an unplanned and unfortunate consequence. After provincial forces left their artillery abandoned in

519 AM, Wenceslao Paunero, nos. 2001, and 3887.  
520 AM, Wenceslao Paunero, no. 2001.
Italó, Cacique Calván and some of his people reached the spot and died in an unexpected blast.\textsuperscript{521} The expedition to Salinas Grandes was organized by Emilio Conesa and Wenseslao Paunero from Azul and Bahía Blanca. It was not backed by Catriel, and Calfucurá was warned.\textsuperscript{522} When the force reached Salinas Grandes, the region was empty. Instead of escaping to the south as authorities had assured, Calfucurá, his people and most of their animals found refuge in the northern higher lands.\textsuperscript{523} Cacique Llanquitrúz never intervened.

The expedition still hit Salinas Grandes’s economy. They took the cattle and sheep that were left and destroyed *tolderías* and plots. Calfucurá responded with big *malones* and strategic negotiations. On the one hand, he appealed to Urquiza to hit Buenos Aires and recover some of his losses. He asked him to support him on his *malones* against the province.\textsuperscript{524} Although Urquiza did not send immediate help, escalating conflicts with Buenos Aires pushed him to strengthen his alliance with the confederate leader.\textsuperscript{525} When Catricurá traveled to Entre Ríos to visit him, Urquiza sent Aide Olivencia and some people to stay in Salinas Grandes for six months.\textsuperscript{526} Urquiza also sent Rosas y Belgrano to stay with Catriel. In May 1859, a big *malón* of 1,500 *lanzas* headed by Caciques Calfucurá, Cañumil and the Ranquel Pichún, and with the participation of Aide Olivencia, hit Bahía Blanca and other frontier settlements in Buenos Aires.

\textsuperscript{522} In Calfurua’s letters to Mayor Iturra and President Urquiza, the Cacique constantly mentions his concern about a possible invasion from Buenos Aires. He even asked Urquiza to send 400 or 500 soldiers to attack the province. “Juan Calfucurá to the President of the Argentine Confederacy, Justo José de Urquiza, Salinas Grandes, December 1st, 1857,” AGN, VII., *Fondo Urquiza*, vol.130, no.1592, f.137-138, in Pávez Ojeda, *Cartas Mapuche*, pp.304-306.
\textsuperscript{523} Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá: economía y política del cacicato salinero (1853-1859).”
\textsuperscript{524} Ratto, “Tiempo de abundancia para Calfucura,” p.113.
\textsuperscript{525} The ex-Governor of San Juan Nazario Benavidez was murdered by local authorities that sympathized with Buenos Aires.
\textsuperscript{526} Ratto, “Tiempo de abundancia para Calfucura,” and Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.”
Bahía Blanca was not only the location from where the expedition against him had been planned, but also the town where Calfucurá used to receive raciones from.

On the other hand, Calfucurá restored some contact with Buenos Aires through his allies. He confessed to Urquiza that his people seek peace with Buenos Aires because they wanted to restore the commerce of salt and hides with the province.⁵²⁷ Catriel and other caciques and capitanejos in the frontier of Buenos Aires hosted Calfucurá’s emissaries, and sent information back and forward to Salinas Grandes.⁵²⁸ The province opened negotiations by granting “pardon” to the caciques who wanted peace. Some confederate caciques reached Azul and joined Catriel: among them was Calfucurá’s eldest son Millacurá.⁵²⁹ In December 1858, Catriel, Cachul and Millacurá were receiving raciones in Azul.⁵³⁰ Nevertheless, Buenos Aires authorities and Calfucurá still mistrusted each other.⁵³¹

These episodes also reveal some aspects of the internal dynamics among the different levels of confederate allies and how they maintained their alliance. Catriel’s policies during this context show that he prioritized the security of his own followers by deciding not to join the invasion on Salinas Grandes in 1858 nor Calfucurá’s malón over Bahía Blanca in 1859. However, military neutrality did not mean isolation. Information and emissaries went back and forward from Salinas Grandes to Tapalqué and other frontier posts. Buenos Aires frontier authorities suspected that Calfucurá knew about the military movements before the expedition. Colonel Cornell reported that the Indian Melinao had escaped from Bahía Blanca and he

⁵²⁷ Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucura,” p.113
⁵²⁸ In April 18528, for example, seven people from Calfucura reached Catriel. AM, Wenceslao Paunero, no. 3863.
⁵²⁹ AM, Wenceslao Paunero, box.7, no. 3861.
⁵³⁰ AGN, X., 20.2.2.
⁵³¹ In February 1859, an Indian from Millacura told Cacique Cachul, who later told Buenos Aires authorities, that Calfucurá was preparing an invasion AGN. X., 20.2.2.
believed that he had given forward notice to Calfucurá.\(^{532}\) In the same letter, he said that some caciques from the *indios amigos* wanted to secretly ally with Creoles against Calfucurá, but that a *capitanejo* of these same caciques had joined Catriel. Thanks to this information, Calfucurá managed to secure his people and most of his animals. Later, when he organized the *malón* against Bahía Blanca, the confederate cacique offered Catriel to either join the attack in exchange for twice the amount of *raciones* he received from Buenos Aires or to stay neutral and receive the same amount of *raciones*.\(^{533}\) Catriel chose the latter. The civil conflicts complicated Catriel and Calfucurá’s alliances, but both ended up prioritizing peace and stability over loyalty to any creole faction.

In 1859, the Argentine Confederacy’s Congress finally planned a military expedition to force Buenos Aires back into the union. Buenos Aires interpreted these laws as a declaration of war. Their forces finally clashed in Cepeda (between Santa Fe and Buenos Aires provinces) on October 23rd, 1859. By this time, confederate cacicatos found themselves backing different creole factions. In June 1859, Colonel Ignacio Rivas allied with Caciques Catriel, Cachul and Millacurá in Azul to fight against Urquiza.\(^{534}\) While Millacurá was going to lead the military forces, Catriel and Cachul would protect Azul. Rivas informed the Minister Pastor Obligado that these caciques agreed to participate in exchange for the following salaries: 80,000 pesos for Lucio –Millacurá’s religious leader–, 80,000 for Millacurá, 200 pesos per month for each capitanejo, and 80 pesos per month for each soldier. They were also to be provided meat and *raciones* for the soldiers and their families. Catriel and Cachul, as principal caciques of their

\(^{532}\)“Letter from Juan Cornell to Colonel Wenseslao Paunero, Bahía Blanca, 28/1/1858,” AM, Wenceslao Paunero, box. 7, no. 4812.

\(^{533}\)Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucura,” p.123.

\(^{534}\)AGN., X, 20.2.2.
Buenos Aires’s military was so dependent on their allied cacicatos that when these forces marched north, Cacique Catriel became the temporary Commander of Azul. On August 8th, Catriel informed Governor Alsina that the Juez de paz (local judge) and the vecinos had agreed to name him General Commander of Azul while the military forces were on campaign. In addition to protecting Azul, he promised to take care of the soldiers’ families as well as those who stayed in the town. Minister Obligado replied, accepting his appointment.

This episode is another example of the expansive aspect of cacicatos’ policies over creole frontier society. Catriel’s presence in Azul was so important to the provincial society that they had to depend on his forces to defend the province against the Argentine Confederacy as well as to administer and protect frontier towns. After decades of daily interaction in frontier regions, inter-ethnic alliances and interests were the rule. When Creoles accepted to be ruled temporarily by a cacique, the caciques accepted to join the province’s military forces. Although many Creoles probably wanted to finish with the cacicatos’ independence, others preferred peace negotiations to benefit from frontier trade and exchanges. It is not surprising that, as Belloni has shown, Jueces de paz in frontier towns constantly acted against the military re-organization and expansion policies ordered by Governor Mitre and Alsina during the 1850s. These local authorities understood that war with cacicatos could end their prosperity.

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535 Ibid.
536 Ibid.
537 Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.”
While this was going on, Calfucurá and the Ranqueles backed Urquiza. They hit northern and central Buenos Aires’s province. Colonel Baigorria and the Ranqueles raided in the north, and Coliqueo captured numerous horses, held in reserve by the Buenos Aires’s army, destined for the battle.\(^{538}\) Calfucurá and Olivencia attacked Bahía Blanca and 25 de Mayo. Olivencia warned the Commander of Bahía Blanca that he was coming with a force of 4,000 Indians and 500 Christians armed with shotguns and sabers.\(^{539}\) If he surrendered, he promised that cacicatos would not take their animals.

Did these divided alliances - Catriel and Millacurá with Buenos Aires, and Calfucurá and the Ranqueles with Urquiza- mean the disintegration of the Pampas Confederacy? The indigenous confederacy actually benefited from participating in creole civil conflicts while maintained internal peace. Catriel and Millacurá never clashed with Calfucurá. In September, Colonel Martínez told Minister Obligado that the forces of Millacurá, Catriel and Cachul had returned to their camps.\(^{540}\) The authorities were probably afraid of a possible military alliance between Catriel and Calfucurá.\(^{541}\) Calfucurá continued raiding near 25 de Mayo and Fortín Mercedes in September, but avoided hitting Azul, which was now under Catriel’s protection.\(^{542}\) Colonel Rivas reunited 2,000 militia soldiers and asked Catriel to provide him with 200 lanzas to hit Calfucurá.\(^{543}\) Catriel refused and returned to his tolderías in Tapalqué.\(^{544}\) In the north, the

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538 Ibid., and Ratto, “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá.”
539 AGN., X. 20.2.2.
541 A letter from Machado to the Minister in October 27th mentioned that they lied to Catriel fearing his response. They probably feared an alliance with Calfucurá. AGN, X. 20.2.2.
Ranqueles raided frontier posts and, instead of joining Urquiza’s forces for the battle of Cepeda, they returned to their *tolderías* as well. These events left the cacicatos with an important booty while avoiding the risk of their men and horses in confrontation with provincial forces. The Pampas Confederacy preserved their internal security.

The battle of Cepeda took place on November 11th, 1859; the Argentine Confederacy won over Buenos Aires. Their forces occupied the south of Buenos Aires helped, once more, by the cacicatos from the Pampas. Rosas y Belgrano occupied Azul with Calfucurá’s *capitanejo* Cristo. Catriel and his allies watched these events in neutrality from Tapalqué. The occupation forces – composed of Indians and creoles – raided and stole cattle from Azul. With a force of 100 creole soldiers and 400 *lanzas*, Juan Linares and *capitanejo* Cristo occupied Tandil on November 15th. They tried to force creole residents to use the red ribbon used in Rosas’s times as a sign of loyalty, and threatened to kill all the authorities. Linares declared *capitanejo* Cristo as the new *Juez de paz*. These events and policies made absolutely clear that if the authorities in Buenos Aires wanted their province back, they had to ally with the cacicatos and restore reciprocal obligations. Even if some frontier authorities wanted to attack the cacicatos, reality worked against them. They had to continue a policy of peace and negotiation.

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548 AGN, X. 20.2.2.
549 According to a soldier, Linares promised they would plunder the town, but when they encountered local resistance and Linares ordered not to raid, some of his men rebelled. AGN, X., 20.2.2.
550 For example, Belloni mentions that Colonel Rivas wanted to terminate with the “hostile” Indians and subjugate the allied cacicatos, but at the end he still had to negotiate with all caciques. Like Navarro Floria, Belloni also explained that in Congress some politicians supported policies of extermination, while others of peace and
During November and December, Buenos Aires Colonels Machado and Ocampo managed to recover Tandil and Azul. At this point, Catriel, Cachul and Millacurá were receiving raciones.\textsuperscript{552} Buenos Aires frontier authorities agreed to negotiate with cacicatos; they thus, recovered some captives and restored trade.\textsuperscript{553} While Pedro Melinao from Bragado traveled to meet Mitre, Rivas started peace negotiations with Calfucurá in April 1861. In consent with allied caciques, Calfucurá accepted the peace offers.\textsuperscript{554} In his letter to Rivas, he described that he had asked his allies the following question: “Is it not better to be in peace and bring yerba, sugar, tobacco and whatever we receive as gifts?”\textsuperscript{555} He demanded raciones, the restoration of trade, and sent a commission to the capital city. He excused his past actions saying that he was following President Urquiza’s orders and that he had to deal with internal divisions.\textsuperscript{556} As Ratto argued, Calfucurá played a double game; he also wrote to Urquiza to preserve his alliance.\textsuperscript{557}

This double diplomacy led Calfucurá to remain neutral when Buenos Aires and the Argentine Confederacy clashed again in the battle of Pavón in September, 1861. Buenos Aires had learned to keep their alliances with the cacicatos and won the battle. Mitre gained the support of Colonel Baigorria, Cacique Coliquéo and Melinao, whose rupture with the Ranqueles
meant leaving cacicatos lands and relocating to Bragado. This change started to distance the Ranqueles from Calfucurá’s policies, as they continued fighting against the Buenos Aires province which now held their “traitors.” However, as in the 1850s, the Pampas Confederacy managed to maintain a clear hegemonic power over the Pampas. It was made clear to Mitre, the new elected President of the Argentine Republic, that cacicatos had an impressive military force and would always fight to maintain state obligations to them. During this decade, it was also clear to everyone that Buenos Aires’s commercial and economic relevance became fundamental for economic prosperity. Both the Pampas Confederacy and Buenos Aires became the center of frontier diplomacy, and expanding exchange. During the 1860s, multiethnic alliances in the displaced regions and subalterns would resist these hegemonic tendencies.

In conclusion, the Pampas Confederacy was not the story of an authoritarian leader, but the story of a non-state political system that reached impressive power over state units. Its power was not about having a military organization greater than creole state units in the region, but about guaranteeing peace and stability to its allies and imposing their forms of frontier relationships. Their military power was enough so as to play on equal terms with creole factions. Calfucurá proved to be a successful leader by carefully maneuvering between the internal tension of autonomy and dependency among allies, and assuring his allies’ territories. The Confederacy also proved to be expansive in its character, as it incorporated more allies to extend its trade networks, reduce its environmental and technological limitations, and assured its military power.

558 In Córdoba, a revolution deposed the liberal government of Frigerio. Colonel Baigorría defended Frigerio, but Urquiza and Derqui (just elected President), supported the rebels. They also ordered Baigorría to follow the orders of Juan Saa, his old enemy. Under these circumstances, Baigorría decided to secretly join Mitre. Pérez Zavala, “La política interétnica de los Ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.”
In the next chapter, I will address another confederacy formed by cacicatos that reached similar power over a less populated area, but differed in some of their policies. These two polities were examples of possible results of long-lasting transformations and innovations that took place in cacicatos’ lands and in changing global contexts.
CHAPTER IV

Expanding Kinship Ties, Gaining Inter-Ethnic Power:

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy, 1850-1870

In this chapter, I will explore the political and economic developments of the Northern Patagonian Confederacy between 1850 and 1870, a period led by the successors of the lineages of Caciques Chocorí and Cheuqueta. During the 1850s, José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz (Cheuqueta’s son) tried to achieve maximal authority over the lineage by placing himself as the confederate leader of cacicatos in northern Patagonia. His cousin Valentín Saygüeque was young when he succeeded his father Chocorí in 1854. While Llanquitrúz managed to lead over cacicatos and creoles in northeastern Patagonia during the 1850s, Saygüeque gained authority over cacicatos in northwestern Patagonia from his permanent settlement in Manzanas. From these distant locations, these caciques maintained a dual leadership.559 Although Llanquitrúz attempted to expand his influence over the west, his project was interrupted by his early death in Bahía Blanca in 1859. His brother Benito Chingoleo Cheuqueta succeeded him and maintained a clearer western/eastern territorial dominion with his cousin Saygüeque. During the 1860s, Saygüeque increased his diplomatic authority by intervening both, in internal conflicts among allied cacicatos and in diplomatic negotiations with creole authorities. When Chingoleo died in 1867, Saygüeque remained as the single confederate leader.

559 For colonial times, Lidia Nacuzzi identified groups that had one leader for war and political issues and another leader for religious matters. In this case, I use the term dual-leaderships to speak about groups with two related leaders that lead their own cacicatos, but who shared a general leadership with the same political responsibilities. Nacuzzi, Identidades Impuestas.
Until recently, this polity received less attention from historians than those of the Pampas. Vezub’s outstanding work on Saygüeque’s “Indigenous Governorship of the Manzanas” placed this case, for the first time, in the center of historiographic discussions.\(^{560}\) By studying Saygüeque’s continuities and ruptures with previous leaderships, Vezub categorized this polity as a “new type” of Chiefdom. It increased cacicatos’ internal hierarchies and dependency on Saygüeque, and settled a pact with the Argentine society to assure peace in exchange for trade and *raciones*. As historians later argued in the case of Calfucurá, this polity guaranteed peace and stability to its allies. It especially ended the consecutive and destructive practice of *vendettas* and *tautulum* (revenge for the death of a person) when caciques died. The Indigenous Governorship of the Manzanas was the name chosen by Saygüeque for his polity in 1874. As this name reveals, this political project was also the product of on-going processes of *mestizaje*. Instead of furthering a particular ethnicity, Saygüeque proposed an inclusive ethnic model based on an “indigenous” identity. Vezub concluded that under this Governorship, indigenous people in northern Patagonia experienced an impressive demographic and economic growth, but also a potential subordination to the Argentine society. He explained that Saygüeque’s project presented a contradiction between claiming an independent sovereignty in the region while recognizing his membership to the Argentine nation-state.

Among some of Vezub’s many contributions, his work confirmed the presence of more centralized and hierarchical polities in cacicato lands, it highlighted caciques as creative political actors, and it placed Northern Patagonia as an economic and socio-political relevant region.

\(^{560}\) Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas*. 182
during the nineteenth century. Later, Vezub as well as Gladys Varela and Carla Manara studied how Cacique Llanquitrúz started the centralizing process under his lead during the 1850s. They showed that as the son of Cheuqueta and nephew of Chocorí, Llanquitrúz could claim rights over northern Patagonia and the Ventania region (in southern Buenos Aires). But it was through his coercive and diplomatic policies that he started building a confederate leadership. Vezub categorized his leadership as a “war machine,” and contrasted his government to Cacique Saygüeque’s more conciliatory rule during the 1860s.

Building on these important contributions, I propose to categorize Saygüeque’s polity as a confederacy. This term allows maintaining the specificities of this case while presenting major structural similarities with the Pampas and other confederacies. On the one hand, the Pampas and Northern Patagonian Confederacies’ economies were based on nomadic pastoralist organization and logic. Political alliances were based on kinship ties, reciprocal logic and ideology, as well as on an increasing hierarchical organization under a specific lineage. They developed different levels of internal centralization and diplomatic trajectories based on diverse environmental, economic and political challenges as well as personal ambitions. Northern Patagonia was more arid and less populated than the Pampas and distant from most of the sedentary economic centers linked to the Atlantic and Pacific trade networks. This distance influenced allies’ escalating dependency on the Northern Patagonia’s confederate leadership. It also contributed to cacicatos

561 This work also presented key methodological innovations in its use of Cacique’s correspondence as a key primary source.
563 Ibid.
564 This concept comes from the work of Deleuze and Guattari in their study on nomads’ strategies of war. Pilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Mil mesetas, capitalismo y esquizofrenia (Valencia: Pre-textos, 1988).
greater political and economic stability in these southern regions than in the Pampas. Nonetheless, consensus politics and the reciprocal logic continued framing the organization of this polity. Like the Pampas Confederacy, it was still perceived by its members as an alliance among equals.

On the other hand, I argue that the internal contradiction of this polity highlighted by Vezub only applies to the confederacy after 1874, when Saygüeque created the Governorship as a political alternative to a complete subjugation ordered by the Argentine national government. As I will show in the last chapter, this phenomenon took place under an increasing military inferiority of cacicatos during the mid-1870s. Nonetheless, during the 1850s and 1860s, the pact between the Northern Patagonian Confederacy and the creole governments did not imply their subjugation. Moreover, creole governments maintained their tributary role, and the frontier town of Carmen de Patagones was integrated into the indigenous confederacy. This frontier town performed as a subordinated ally to the leading lineage during the mid-1850s, when the province of Buenos Aires was fighting against the Argentine Confederacy. Inter-ethnic alliances were not only important for the creole residents to assure military success, but also to guarantee the towns’ survival and prosperity.

In this chapter, I will explore in detail the Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s political and economic structural changes and the leading lineages’ policies between 1850 and 1870. I will argue that, although the Confederacy maintained a dual leadership for a long period of time (between 1856 and 1867), allies showed greater levels of dependency on the leading lineages than in the case of the Pampas. This was the consequence of Northern Patagonia’s fewer and widespread resources and demography, its distance from most of the main sedentary creole
trens as well as leaders’ personal ambitions and trajectories. Most cacicatos in the region became allies in the first and second level of dependency; they did not constitute strong independent units such as the Ranqueles and Catriel in the Pampas. Only the Tehuelches and the frontier town of Carmen de Patagones seemed to maintain greater internal independence as confederate members of the third level. Like Calfucurá, cacicatos from the western side of the Andes Mountains played as circumstantial allies, and both confederacies occasionally allied for common ventures, but maintained independent political projects.

I will also argue that while Cacique Llanquitrúz selectively used coercive policies to impose his leadership in the region, he also built and maintained alliances based on kinship and reciprocity. He projected an expansive enterprise based on kinship as a practice and discourse of power to reach further resources as well as indigenous and creole people. He respected cacicatos’ and creoles’ autonomy in parliaments and diplomatic negotiations, while becoming the principal referent for Northern Patagonia. Saygüeque and Chingoleo relied on internal negotiation through consensus politics, but exercised an increasing hierarchical control of allies by controlling cacicatos’ access to the principal trade networks and diplomatic negotiations with the nearest frontier town, Carmen de Patagones. This Confederacy was more successful than the Pampas in imposing kinship and nomadic pastoralist logic on Creoles at frontiers.

Finally, the alliance between the Confederacy and Carmen de Patagones assured political stability during the 1860s, when the Pampas Confederacy and the Argentine Republic were dealing with major internal and external political challenges that I will analyze in chapter 6. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy avoided not only major internal conflict, but also military confrontations with Creoles. After the peace agreed in 1857 no major malón hit the town nor did
military expeditions hit the Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s *tolderías*. In addition, trans-regional trade networks fueled a commercial and demographic expansion in the region. Northern Patagonia increasingly became part of the agro-export expansion of the Pampas.

To sum up, both cacicatos’ confederacies show that cacicatos’ structures changed and adapted to new contexts offering diverse socio-political outcomes. During the 1850s and 1860s, they both offered peace, stability plus economic and political growth to their followers in the Pampas and northern Patagonia. Although they occasionally became circumstantial allies, their policies show that they prioritized protecting their own territories and alliances, and building parallel confederate leaderships.

*The Power of Kinship: Creating Dependents out of Reciprocal Alliances*

Cacique Llanquitrúz started building his leadership after he escaped from Chillán, Chile, during the late 1840s. He was apparently already leading a small group of followers and inherited his father’s cacicato when he died in 1850-1851. Historians also mention that he defeated a group of Tehuelches from southern Limay and incorporated them into his cacicato. In 1852, he appeared in Carmen de Patagones with his uncle Chochorí and mediated negotiations with 1,000 Tehuelches who came to trade in the town.

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565 Guillermo Cox, *Viaje a las regiones septentrionales de la Patagonia, 1862-1866* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Nacional, 1863).
566 Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas*, and “Llanquitrúz y la “máquina de guerra” Mapuche-Tehuelche”; and Varela and Manara, “La construcción de poderes indígenas frente a la expresión estatal.”
Figure 4. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy. Source: Creation of Gabriel Giordanengo (INGEIS-CONICET) based on my instructions.
He continued extending kinship ties with groups from Manzanas, San Javier, Valcheta, the Pampas and Creoles in Patagones (see figure 4). He inaugurated a confederate leadership and increased his military prestige when he led allies in *malones* over Buenos Aires frontier towns and the diplomatic negotiations that followed these attacks. In 1855, he participated in the attacks organized by Calfucurá and his allies, and he led his own allies on a *malón* over Carmen de Patagones in 1856. His central role in negotiating peace with this frontier town enhanced his diplomatic leadership as well as his role as distributor of resources by furthering trade and *raciones* in the town.

These actions and policies quickly gave him significant military power and prestige in the region. According to Carmen de Patagones’s authorities, by 1857 his force fluctuated between 400 and 900 *lanzas*, depending on alliances with regional cacicatos. Following Alioto’s calculations for Calfucurá, these numbers might indicate a population of between 2,000 and 4,500 people for the Northern Patagonian Confederacy. It was probably greater when it included allies of the third and fourth level. This population and military force was significantly superior to the Creoles in Carmen de Patagones. By 1854, the creole town’s force was formed by around 90 soldiers according to the census, and the total population of all men over 16 years old was 400 men.

During the 1860s and 1870s, Llanquitrúz’s cousin Saygüeque brought more allies from the Andes Mountains and Tehuelches from the south. In 1863, Commander Murga indicated

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568 In one of Llanquirú’s letters, the secretary wrote that the cacique had 500 *lanzas*, but corrected the number to 596. Murga indicated in the same letter that the Cacique had 500 *lanzas* and then 800 *lanzas*. In 1858, authorities indicated that he had 300 *lanzas* and Saygüeque 200. “José Maria Bulnes Llanquirú to Commander Benito Villar, May 1856”, AGN., 19.4.5, and “Colonel Commander of Patagones [Julián Murga] to the War and Navy Minister, Colonel Bartolome Mitre, Carmen de Patagones, June 23rd., 1855,” AGN., X, 19.3.3, and 27.7.6.

569 MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854.”

570 See the treaties in Levaggi, *Paz en la frontera*, and the local correspondence in MHRMFV.
to President Mitre that Caciques Saygüeque, Huinacabal and Chingoleo could mobilize 2,000 lanzas.\textsuperscript{571} If this number is correct, the estimated population could be of some 10,000 people under the Confederacy. In 1864, Commander Murga indicated that they usually received cacicatos in the town from distant regions such as the south of Buenos Aires, Río Negro, Neuquén (Manzanas region) and southern Patagonia.\textsuperscript{572}

These pieces of evidence suggest that the Northern Patagonian Confederacy had a permanent population of between 2,000 and 4,500 people, and could reach up to 10,000 people with circumstantial allies from southern and western regions. Although this population was smaller than the population of the permanent allies of the Pampas Confederacy (which included Salinas Grandes, the Ranqueles, Catriel and some indios amigos), it was still significant for these distant and arid territories.

\textit{Allies in the First and Second Level of Dependency: the Lineage, Capitanejos, and Subordinated Caciques}

In contrast to the Pampas Confederacy, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy presents a transformation from a dual to a single leadership, and greater levels of allies’ dependency on the leading lineage. In addition to structural and contextual explanations, this development was also the consequence of caciques’ policies and actions. Since the early nineteenth century, the brothers Caciques Cheuqueta and Chocorí had equal leadership over their related cacicatos. Although Vezub attributed different territories to these brothers, the former near Carmen de Patagones and the latter in Manzanas, I believe this difference was the consequence of

\textsuperscript{571} “Commander Colonel Murga, Patagones, June 26th, 1863,” AM, vol. XXIV, pp.105-107. Also see: Varela and Manara, “La construcción de poderes indígenas frente a la expresión estatal.”

\textsuperscript{572} AV, \textit{Frontera}, box. 1, no. 778 (copy of the original).
Llanquirúz’s policies and only became permanent and clear after his death in 1859. Llanquirúz showed interest in expanding his leadership over cacicatos in all northern Patagonia, but most of his actions and successful policies took place on the eastern side and in relation to Carmen de Patagones.

Both Chocorí and Cheuqueta tried to restore peace with Rosas’s government during the 1840s, when Calfucurá settled in Salinas Grandes. They visited Azul and Bahía Blanca and tried to make peace with local Commanders.573 During these visits, Cheuqueta agreed to make peace with Carmen de Patagones.574 The local correspondence mentions that during the late 1840s, Cheuqueta and the Commander García exchanged their sons Llanquirúz and Pedro García as a guaranty of peace.575 In the parish records, I found a baptism celebrated on February 1851 that could be Llanquirúz and it suggests that he adopted his godfather’s name José María.576

When Llanquirúz appeared in the town with his uncle Chocorí in 1852, he was baptized again probably to seal the alliance with the new authorities.577 He was god parented by the new Commander Francisco Fourmantín and his wife Feliciana Fontana.578 Fourmantín had replaced García after Rosas’s defeat in February 1852. The parish record registered Llanquirúz as a 30 year old Cacique who was camping in front of Churlaquín.579 They named him “Francisco

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573 See sources in Lobos, Juan Calfucurá.
574 Vezub also indicates that Chocorí settled for peace with Rosas in 1845. Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.118.
575 “Commander Benito Villar to the Ministre of War and Navy Colonel Don Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, June 4th, 1856,” AGN., X., 19.4.5.
576 “The record indicates that José María García “Indian of the huts placed in front of the parish, of 20 or 22 years old,” was baptized in the town and god parented by Commander García and Aurelia Crespo. MHRMFV., “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860,” no.7, p.15.
577 “Colonel Commander of Patagones [Francisco Fourmantin] to the Minister of War and Navy Colonel Castro Cáserses, Patagones, July, 9th, 1852,” AGN., X, 18. 4. 8.
579 Location near Patagones named after Cacique Chulilaquini who usually camped in the region during colonial times. Davies, “Relaciones inter-étnicas en Carmen de Patagones.”
Jacobo Yanquetru,” but he was usually referred to as Jose María Bulnes Llanquitrúz. Unlike his uncle Chocorí, he positioned himself as the intermediary for the Tehuelches and also helped frontier authorities in diplomatic matters. From then on, he tried to impose his leadership over northeastern Patagonia and the frontier town.

Nonetheless, he did not leave western Patagonia aside. He was ambiguous about his cousin Saygüeque’s rank and did not mark different territorial dominions. In a letter written by his secretary to Patagones’s Commander in 1856, “Saygüeque Chocorí” appears at the top of the list of nine caciques he placed “under his command,” separated with a line (Appendix A). Although historian Pávez Ojeda transcribed a question mark next to Saygüeque’s name in his edition of the caciques’ letters, I read the numbering “9th” in the original letter. Was Llanquitrúz recognizing his cousin as an equal authority or was he placing him as a subordinate cacique under his brother Manquilef who was numbered 8th? His actions were also ambiguous. During 1857 and 1858, he traveled to Manzanas and the Andes to expand his leadership over cacicatos in the region. When he described these trips to his godparent Fourmantín he surprisingly did not mention Saygüeque, although he later traveled with him to Patagones in March 1858. His attitude and his relationship with his followers and allies suggest that he

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580 He only uses “Francisco” in his last letter addressed to his godfather Francisco Fourmantín.
581 Fourmantín tried to make peace with Chocorí, but the cacique never went to the town to meet the Commander. He settled 19 leagues away from the town and sent small commissions to trade. In one of these commissions, Llanquitrúz made himself present in Patagones. “Colonel Commander of Patagones [Francisco Fourmantín] to the Minister of War and Navy Colonel Castro Cáseres, Patagones, July, 9th, 1852,” AGN., X, 18. 4. 8.
582 As we can see in the appendix, the complete list reads as: 9. C. Saygüeque Chocorí; id. 1 C. Llancaqir; 2. C. Guan; 3. C. Paillaqir; 4. C. Guircaleu; 5. C. Naipichun; 6. C. Coliguala; 7. C. Treiman. 8. C Manquilef, 2. C. Jo. Polinario García. The people that gave their faith were: Gallego; Puelman; Ma Rial; Chagayo Chico; Pinache; Cual; Cancha; Pancho; Cogo. “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, Potrero Chico, June 6th, 1856 (II),” AGN X, 19.4.56. For the version published by Pávez Ojeda, see: Cartas Mapuche, pp. 276-277.
583 “José María Yanquetruzá to Colonel don Francisco Fourmantín, Corral Daracho, March, 3rd, 1858,” AM, Wenceslao Paunero, box 7, no.108.
584 AGN., X, 27.7.6, February 2nd, 1858.
respected his cousin’s independency, but tried to position himself as the confederate leader of all cacicatos in northern Patagonia.

Moreover, Llanquitrúz’s attitude towards his eldest brother, Manquilef, who was also his successor, shows how he tried to mark ranks among his lineage and followers. When he was negotiating peace with Patagones in 1855, he chose his brother Benito Chingoleo Cheuqueta instead of his eldest brother Manquilef to be the guarantee for peace. This meant that Chingoleo would live permanently in San Javier (a location 30 km from the frontier town) and, therefore, enhanced his authority by maintaining close relationships with Creoles. During these peace negotiations, Chingoleo was baptized and adopted the name of his godparent Commander Benito Villar. Llanquitrúz’s actions enhanced Chingoleo’s prestige among allied cacicatos and creole authorities. He seemed to respect Manquilef’s independent lead, but manipulated his position in the lineage. As a result, when Llanquitrúz died in 1859, it was Chingoleo and not Manquilef who succeeded him.

Chingoleo showed different priorities and policies than those of his deceased brother, shaping the transition from a dual leadership to a single confederate leader. He focused on monopolizing the relationship with Creoles at Carmen de Patagones and left the regulation of internal alliances, and the relationships with people in the Araucanía and Chile to his cousin Saygüeque. He also prioritized internal peace over revenge. While Llanquitrúz had ordered the revenge for the death of his uncle Chocorí, Chingoleo did not call to revenge Llanquitrúz’s death

585 Llanquitrúz excused himself for not having a single brother to send as a guarantee of alliance, and decided to send his younger brother Chingoleo with his family. He also promised to send one of his sons in the future. “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, Potrero Chico, June 6th, 1856 (II),” AGN., X, 19.4.56, and Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, pp. 276-277.

586 In 1856, Llanquitrúz placed Manquilef in the 8th place of the list of caciques under his command. Manquilef also appears leading a group of 60 lanzas in 1857 independently from Llanquitrúz. “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, June 6th, 1856,” AGN., X, 19.4.5 and 27-7-6, August 7th, 1857.
or that of his eldest brother, Juan Manquilef. Llanquitrúz was killed as an act of revenge by the family of a creole soldier who had been killed in Bahía Blanca. Due to the escalating conflicts between Buenos Aires with the Argentine and Pampas Confederacies, the province could not afford additional warfare with the Northern Patagonian Confederacy. Its authorities immediately responded to Chingoleo and Saygüeque with gifts to prevent cacicatos’ revenge, and maintained its material obligations to the Confederacy established by treaty in 1857. The province renewed Llanquitrúz’s treaty with Cacique Chingoleo in May 1859, when it increased the amount of raciones, and included a salary and mares for Saygüeque. Chingoleo and Saygüeque accepted these compensations. In the case of Cacique Manquilef, he was later killed by a group of Tehuelches in Caleufú (in Manzanas) in June 1862. In May 1863, Chingoleo told Commander Murga that he was leading his brother Manquilef’s followers. In June, Calfucurá also told Mitre that he knew that “captain Juan,” probably Manquilef, died and that: “there would not be revenge (...) on this [Manquilef’s death] all are friends and live in peace.”

Therefore, Chingoleo prioritized internal and diplomatic peace by preventing the practice of tautulun among allied cacicatos and Creoles. While these policies limited the expansive and centralizing effects of his predecessor, they assured his dominion over northeastern Patagonia.

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587 Vezub analyzed the evidence regarding Chocorí’s death and argues that apparently, Llanquitrúz approved the revenge headed by Saygüeque and Chingoleo. Some creoles also participated in the revenge. They accused a woman and her huts of “witchcraft.” In the case of Manquilef, the military list of July 1st, 1862, indicates that Chingoleo reported that his brother had died in the field. Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.150, and AV., Revistas Militares, “Lista de Revista 1862.”

588 Guillermo Cox, Viaje en las regiones septentrionales de la Patagonia: 1862-1863, p.177.

589 See treaty in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, p. 311-312.

590 Ironically, Murga told Mitre that he “authorized” Chingoleo to lead the his brother’s group. “Commander Murga to the President of the Argentine Republic, Brigadier General don Bartolomé Mitre,” Patagones, May, 8th, 1863, AM., vol. XXIV, pp.49-50. Also see: AV, Revistas Militares, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.154.

591 “Calfucurá to Rivas,” June, 1863, AM., vol. XXIV.
Chingoleo concentrated on maintaining strong ties with Carmen de Patagones and controlling allied cacicatos’ access to the town.\footnote{After re-validating his brother’s treaty with the town in 1859, he headed all the military lists found for his period as a “Commander” (1861, twice in 1862, 1863, twice in 1864, 1865 and 1867). Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, p.310; MHRMFV, AGN, 1865, and AV., \textit{Revistas Militares}.}

On the western side of the Andes Mountains, his cousin Saygüeque was gaining more power and slowly marking his presence over eastern Patagonia. He had visited Carmen de Patagones in 1857 and creole authorities indulged him and his \textit{capitanejos} with fine clothes and other goods, as well as organized a dance, which cost 2,500 pesos.\footnote{AV., \textit{Frontera}, box. 1, no. 587, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.160.} They also indicated that he led 200 \textit{lanzas}. He then intervened in the decision to not seek revenge for Llanquirúz’s death, and was also incorporated into Chingoleo’s treaty in 1859. In 1863, Saygüeque surpassed Chingoleo’s confederate leadership despite creole authorities’ preference for the latter.

On the eve of President Mitre’s conflicts with the federalist \textit{montoneras} during the 1860s, frontier towns needed to assure alliances with powerful cacicatos to gain political stability and economic prosperity. In 1863, certain \textit{maloqueros} hit some estancias in Carmen de Patagones. Commander Orqueda sent a group of soldiers to persecute the robbers and ended up killing a group of Indians that were allied with Saygüeque.\footnote{Murga was removed from this position in 1856 because he failed to negotiate peace with Llanquirúz and maintain political stability. After spending more time in town, he learnt to respect creole residents’ politics and the cacicatos’ political culture. He built enough prestige to gain local support to return to his position. Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”} Caciques blamed Orqueda and wanted to revenge the Indians’ dead. Frontier authorities immediately tried to compensate the cacicatos and preserve reciprocal relationships. They relieved Orqueda of his rank, imprisoned the soldiers and reinstated Julián Murga as the Commander of the town.\footnote{In conjunction with the municipality,}
Murga sent letters to Saygüeque to preserve peace. The new Commander also wrote to President Mitre to assure the continuity of provisions to allied cacicatos. He propositioned Mitre to support an alliance between Caciques Saygüeque, Chingoleo and Huinacabal, which, in his view, would be more powerful than Catriel and Calfucurá together, and indicated that Chingoleo should lead this league.

Chingoleo worked to prevent revenge. He spoke with Murga and held parliaments with Saygüeque and his allies. Nevertheless, it was Saygüeque and Utraillán whom impeded cacicatos’ revenge over Carmen de Patagones. Like Cacique Llanquitrúz in 1856, Saygüeque enhanced his regional authority through his rhetoric and actions. His secretary wrote to Murga; he described his father’s ties with the town, remembering the times of Commander García and the un-revenged death of Llanquitrúz. He recommended the Commander to maintain good relationships with Cacique Chingoleo and reminded him that the town would not have a single ox nor horse if had not been for them. He said that they did not attack the town out of “pity” and because they were following their fathers’ advice. He also said that he did not want to destroy Patagones, but to do business with it.

Although creole authorities tried to place Cacique Chingoleo over Saygüeque by favoring him with more raciones and gifts, these policies of cooptation could not alter cacicatos’ internal

596 “Commander Julián Murga to Saygüeque, Patagones, April 28th, 1863,” AGN., VII, Leg. 723, Ángel Justiniano Carranza.
598 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.165.
599 Utraillán was an important Cacique from the Andes Mountains who took care of Saygüeque when he was young. Ibid.
Chingoleo maintained a strong dominion over the region next to Patagones and controlled allied cacicatos’ access to the town, but as we can see in his letter, Cacique Saygüeque became the main confederate leader. He projected an expansive diplomatic, military and economic role in all of northern Patagonia while he assured peace, stability and prosperity to his allies. His decision of not revenging these deaths was crucial for the success of his enterprise.

When Chingoleo died in 1867, his succession generated internal conflict and ended up benefitting Saygüeque’s confederate leadership and presence in northeastern Patagonia. None of Chingoleo’s brothers or sons appeared as powerful successors. Llanquitrúz’s son, Bartolomé Alfaro, was too young to lead the group. Chingoleo’s son, Faquico, had the same problem. During the parliament formed to discuss Chingoleo’s succession, Commander Murga intervened and designated the capitanejo Miguel Linares as the interim successor until Faquico was old enough to lead. The caciques and capitanejos whom had organized the parliament wrote to Saygüeque about what had happened.

Cacique Trenca protested about Murga’s intervention and argued that Linares lacked blood ties with the leading lineage.

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602 The treaties signed with Saygüeque, Huinacabal and Chagallo Chico in 1863 stated that they had to recognize Chingoleo as the “chief of all the land.” They also had to be recorded under Chingoleo who was named “Commander” while Saygüeque was registered as “captain.” Chingoleo also had the greatest salary assigned: 1,200 pesos while Saygüeque had to receive 600. Copies of these treaties can be found in: AV., Frontera, box. 1, no. 672-3648, and no. 677, and “CGE. DEH, ídem, box. 11, no.1.449 bis.,” in Levaggi, Paz en la Frontera, pp.139-140.

603 I believe he was the son of Llanquitrúz and Chilachila (Maciel). For his baptism in 1861, the record indicates that he was 15 years old and was the son of “Francisco Fourmantín, Pampa of 40 years old” (baptismal name of Llanquitrúz), and “Chilachila” (probably from Maciel and Chinchel lineages). Bartolomé apear as a capitanejo to Saygüeque in 1870. MHRMFV., “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1861,” and AV, Revistas Militares.

604 Murga indicated that Linares would command until Faquico had was old enough to lead his father’s cacicato. “Commander Murga to Saygüeque, March, 20th, 1867,” AGN., VII, Leg. 723, Ángel Justiniano Carranza, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.

605 “Cacique Trenca to Saygüeque, Patagonia, March 20th, 1867,” AGN., VII, Leg. 723, Ángel Justiniano Carranza.

606 Trenca said that several captains “do not want to lose the blood [succession] which is their law,” and asks him if “a Commander can take us our law.”
Miguel Linares was a young *capitanejo* with strong ties with Cacique Chingoleo and Creoles at Carmen de Patagones. He was the son of the captive Ignacio Linares and the indigenous women Lucía Rial. According to local sources, Ignacio was a “white” man originally from “Salto,” where he was captured when he was 13 years old. He ended under Llanquitrúz’s cacicato and had several children with the indigenous women Lucía Rial, who he married in 1847. Lucía was registered as “Christian china from Don José Rial’s house.” José Rial was a descendant of the first Spanish families that settled in the town, which built ties with local cacicatos since colonial times. José Rial acted as intermediary for Caciques Llanquitrúz and Saygüeque. Lucía was probably adopted or god-parented by Don José, but we do not know about her status in the indigenous world. Nevertheless, she seemed to legitimize her husband and sons’ increasing prestige among cacicatos and Creoles. In 1857, Ignacio appears in charge of Llanquitrúz’s animals and later as a *vaqueano* of the Commandership.

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607 Ignacio Linares was the son of a Spanish and Portuguese couple from Salto and was captured with his brother in a *malón* over the town on December 20th, 1820. His brother was rescued by Rosas’s government in 1833. The record of the rescued captives reads: “José María Linares, porteño from Salto, 17 years old, son of the Portuguese Rocha and Anita Linares. 14 years ago, he was taken from Salto by the Indian.” In Patagones’s 1854 census, Ignacio was registered as a man of 35 years old, but it was probably a mistake because his son Miguel was registered as being 20 years old and Ignacio himself declared to the judge of peace in 1857 that he was 51 years old. These other sources also confirmed that he was from Salto and was seen by creoles as “white.” Sources: “Relación de los cristianos salvados del cautiverio por la División Izquierda del Ejército Expedicionario contra los bárbaros al mando del Señor Brigadier General D. Juan Manuel de Rosas,” (1835) Ernesto J. Fitte and Julio Benencia, *Juan Manuel de Rosas y la redención de cautivos en su campaña al desierto (1833-1834)* (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de Historia, 1979), no.386, p.54; MHRMFV., *Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones*, box. 4, num 655, and “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854”; GSU., “Matrimonios de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen (1780-1884),” Film 1107622, p.169. I thank the Sociologist Raúl Linares who is reconstructing his genealogy for providing the information on Ignacio’s origin.

608 GSU., “Matrimonios de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen (1780-1884),” Film 1107622, p.169.

609 Josef Rial was part of the first Spanish families that settled in the town. Josef was married with Francisca Sanchez; they had several of the first Spanish children that adopted and baptized indigenous children. One of their children was named Josef María, who could be don José Rial. The name José was popular among the next Rial generations. “Estado que manifiestan las personas de ambos sexos y distintas clases que componen el Pueblo del Río Negro de la Costa Patagónica en 31 de diciembre de 1816: formado por don Francisco de León,” AGN. X. 9.6.4.

610 In 1854 census, Ignacio was registered as “white” and Lucía as “Indian”; indicating that he was an “hacendado”, possessed cattle and properties and had 6 children registered as “Indians:” Miguel, Manuel, Antonio, Mariano,
Ignacio and Lucía’s eldest son, Miguel, started displaying skills of military leadership and was registered as captain in Cacique Chingoleo’s lists for 1861 and 1864, and major in the lists for 1865 to 1867. Miguel not only worked for the cacique, but also extended kin ties with important allied lineages like the Maciels, whom also had ties with Cacique Llanquirúz. In 1853, Miguel married Paolina Feliciana Ureña, daughter of the indigenous Manuel Ureña and Chila chila Maciel.

The Linares family’s in-between position gave them a prominent role in frontier relationships, and Commander Murga prioritized Miguel over other indigenous people in diplomatic negotiations. He even registered Miguel as the Commander of the allied caciques headed by Saygüeque. Apparently in 1869, Linares also proposed to settle and head a pueblo and reducción near the town. In the treaties signed with Caciques Quempil from the Araucanía and Nancucheo in 1872, national authorities indicated that they had to recognize Linares as “Chief of all Patagones’ countryside.”

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Idelfonso and Paulina. MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” pp.93-94, and box. 4, 1855-1865, no.655, 1857, f. 8. His brothers also performed as captains and, like their sisters, extended ties with important creole families and caciques. They performed as Saygüeque’s intermediaries and possessed properties in the town. Manuel Linares married Joséfa Rial; Mariano married Casilda Crespo (daughter of “Chilachila”), and Antonio married Carmen Morón (daughter of Pablo Morón, a soldier who participated in the revenge for Chocorí’s death in 1854). Carmen Linares was born after 1854 and had children with “Capitán Giunta Indio.” In 1861, they baptized their son who was god-parented by Carmen’s brother, Miguel Linares. According to Harrington, another Linares, Maria, married Cacique Nancucheo who was under Saygüeque and was treated as “brother in law” by the Linares. In the census of 1866, Miguel Linares was one of the ranchers with more properties under his name, including cattle and horses. AV, Frontera, box. 1, no. 806 (copies of the original); AV, Revistas Militares. MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal”, and “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” and “Plano de los territorios poblados hasta 1865 en el valle inferior del Río Negro basado en las mesuras realizadas por los agrimensores Díaz y Heusser;” AGN, VII, Leg. 723 Ángel Justiniano Carranza, and Censo Nacional de 1869 para la República Argentina, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.149

611 His brothers also performed as captains and, like their sisters, extended ties with important creole families and caciques. They performed as Saygüeque’s intermediaries and possessed properties in the town. Manuel Linares married Joséfa Rial; Mariano married Casilda Crespo (daughter of “Chilachila”), and Antonio married Carmen Morón (daughter of Pablo Morón, a soldier who participated in the revenge for Chocorí’s death in 1854). Carmen Linares was born after 1854 and had children with “Capitán Giunta Indio.” In 1861, they baptized their son who was god-parented by Carmen’s brother, Miguel Linares. According to Harrington, another Linares, Maria, married Cacique Nancucheo who was under Saygüeque and was treated as “brother in law” by the Linares. In the census of 1866, Miguel Linares was one of the ranchers with more properties under his name, including cattle and horses. AV, Frontera, box. 1, no. 806 (copies of the original); AV, Revistas Militares. MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal”, and “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” and “Plano de los territorios poblados hasta 1865 en el valle inferior del Río Negro basado en las mesuras realizadas por los agrimensores Díaz y Heusser;” AGN, VII, Leg. 723 Ángel Justiniano Carranza, and Censo Nacional de 1869 para la República Argentina, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.149

612 GSU., Matrimonios de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen (1780-1884), Film 1107622, p.231.

613 AV., Revistas Militares.

614 Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 434-5.

615 “CGE. DEH, idem, no.1, 180 and 185, copies of the original,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp.450-2.
However, once again, creole authorities failed to place Miguel Linares as Chingoleo’s successor and confederate leader. Sources indicate that Linares only led a small group of people (no more than twenty) and did not create the proposed *pueblo*. Some of Chingoleo’s people followed him, but were a small number. Linares’s group could be considered as an emerging group of *indios amigos* by 1869. They had a restricted mobility and were strongly tied to creole authorities, but continued performing as messengers for Saygüeque, who treated them as friends and relatives. Most of Chingoleo’s followers ended up temporarily under Saygüeque until Faquico became old enough to lead. In 1874 and 1875 Cacique Chingoleo, probably Faquico, appears receiving *raciones* in Patagones. The confederate leadership, however, stayed under Saygüeque.

This case shows a possible variation resulting from the increasing hierarchal organization of lineages. Unlike Calfucurá’s lineage, conflict emerged between brothers and cousins instead of fathers and sons. But as the former leaders managed to overcome this permanent tension by favoring conciliation and negotiation over *tautulun* and warfare; the respect towards local authority favored peace at the confederate level.

This case also shows the importance of kinship ties to expand political alliances, and the role of women in these ventures. Apart from the role of Lucía Rial and Paolina Ureña in legitimizing the Linares’s indigenous identity and membership in the Confederacy, we know that Cacique Llanquitrúz had at least four wives recorded by state archives who furthered his trans-

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616 In 1871, authorities indicate that he led 20 Indians, and they mentioned him in the following years leading some Indians linked with the state. AV., *Frontera*, box. 2, and *Memorias Militares*.

617 Cacique Saygüeque claimed to be Miguel Linares’ uncle, which might indicate that Lucía was Saygüeque’s sister or that they were related by fictive or real kin ties. AGN., VII, *Leg. 723, Ángel Justiniano Carranza*. Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas*, p. 149

618 *MHRMFV.*, *Copiador del fuerte de Carmen de Patagones 1874-1876.*
regional presence. The parish record of Patagones indicates that they were from diverse locations: Mazal Chuiche from Manzanas and who lived in the “Pampas”; Pichichi Caljutruí from the “Pampa” who lived in San Javier, Machai from San Javier, and Chilachila Maciel from the “Pampa” who lived in San Javier. The last wife’s name also reveals the connection with Cacique Maciel. Maciel was brother to Cacique Negro whose territory, in colonial times, covered the area next to Carmen de Patagones and all the way up to the Ventania region. Llanquirúz’s link with this cacicato legitimized his claims over the region. Chilachila was probably one of his first wives, as they had a son in 1846 while his other sons (with other wives) were born during the mid-1850s, when Llanquirúz was already exercising the confederate leadership. These records also indicate that women could stay in different locations maintaining strong trans-regional ties. This phenomenon suggests some flexibility in cacicatos’ patri-local organization.

Llanquirúz’s brother Chingoleo also strengthened his trans-regional presence through his wives and fictive kinship ties. His wife Carmen Calaja was from Manzanas, but resided in San Javier. Their daughter was baptized in the town in 1860 and named after his godparent: “María Martina Entraigas o Chingoleo.” Chingoleo and the creole Leonarda Alfaro god parented the daughter of Apolinario Maciel (son of Cacique Maciel) and Mónica Cinchel (relative of Cacique Negro). Leonarda Alfaro was the daughter of Juan Alfaro and Brígida Silva, important settlers whom god parented several baptisms and marriages that involved indigenous people. Among

620 On this subject see: Martha Bechis, “Matrimonio y política en la génesis de dos parcialidades mapuche durante el siglo XIX.”
621 The record of a double surname suggests that the recorder wanted to clarify her link with the cacique and the creole family. MHRMFV., “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860.”
623 For example, in 1860, Juan Alfaro and Brígida Silva god-parented María Brígida Isabel Alfaro “natural” from “Azúl” of 40 years old and Anselmo García “sick Christian Indian since young, from the Manzanas” of 36 years old. Leonarda also god parented the son of the Indian José Pato and Chilachila Maciel with her partner in 1860.
these cases, we find the baptism of Bartolomé Alfaro, who was probably Llanquitríz’s son. Finally, Chingoleo and the creole Estefania Martínez god parented a son of Manuel Linares and Josefa Rial.

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy also differed from the Pampas Confederacy in the relationship established between the leading lineage and their capitanejos and allied caciques. While the context and process of subordination was similar, the former reveals greater levels of subordination. Like Calfucurá, Llanquitríz gained some followers through warfare, but most were incorporated through kinship and negotiation.

Regarding the life of capitanejos under the Northern Patagonian Confederacy, we have some information on them in Chingoleo’s lists of people who received raciones in Patagones between 1861 and 1867. These lists were produced by frontier authorities, received state military ranks and had administrative and control purposes. Cacique Saygüeque, for example, appears as “major” of “commander” Chingoleo, when they had a dual leadership and each had their own capitanejos, allied caciques and lanzas. He was included in these lists for the creole bureaucracy to know the amount of raciones that should be provided to him by treaty. Although we should not take these lists as objective and accurate evidence of their internal organization, they are indicative of some of the hierarchies that existed in these confederacies.

MHRMFV., Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” and “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal”; “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860”.

MHRMFV., “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1861.”

Ibid.

AV, Revistas Militares.

It is important to state that the list of Indians that received raciones in the town did not resemble the number of forces that each cacique had. These lists registered a limited number of people whom were usually the most favored by Llanquitríz and Chingoleo and that lived near Carmen de Patagones. When Saygüeque headed the lists, half of the names changed, showing his own favoritisms. AV, Revistas Militares.
The lists headed by Chingoleo between 1861 and 1867 have one Commander, between 2 and 3 majors, between 8 and 10 capitanejos, and between 73 and 78 soldiers. In most of these lists, the same people appear in the same ranks. Changes were consequence of diseases, promotions, absences and mistakes. With the exception of Miguel Linares, the registered majors were caciques, such as Cacique Manquilef, Cacique Saygüeque, and Cacique Apolinar Maciel. The registered capitanejos could be both, either Chingoleo’s capitanejos or allied caciques acting as subordinates. For example, Caciques Chagallo Chico (Chagallo’s son) and Incayal (Huinacabal’s son) appear in this category in the list for 1873.

Table 2. Selection of People Registered in the Military Lists of Carmen de Patagones.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of Names/year</th>
<th>01/03/1861</th>
<th>03/01/1863</th>
<th>01/01/1864</th>
<th>07/01/1864</th>
<th>05/1865</th>
<th>02/01/1867</th>
<th>4/1867</th>
<th>02/1873</th>
<th>05/01/1875</th>
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<td>Commander</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valentin Saygueque</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>Major</td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>Captain</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major</td>
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<td>Incayal</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Silas Hernandez</td>
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<td>Pedro Crespo</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

*I highlighted the changes in people’s ranks.

Source: This chart was based on my organization of the lists found at AV, Revistas Militares, box 8, f.1-18; box 7, f.6, 10, and box 5, f. 4-8

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According to information found in the parish records, capitanejos followed their caciques’ residence. It seems that most capitanejos under Caciques Llanquitrúz and Chingoleo resided in San Javier, while the ones who followed Saygüeque remained in Manzanas. Capitanejos in San Javier performed as messengers for Chingoleo and were increasingly associated with the most important families of Carmen de Patagones. Some adopted creole names, such as Bonifacio Rial (see list above). The case of the Linares brothers and Hernández (son of Cacique Maciel’s daughter and Commander Hernández) show that capitanejos whom performed intermediary positions could experience social mobility. They both ascended in rank among cacicatos and accessed resources in the frontier town, such as properties and trading business. Some Creoles also performed intermediary roles for caciques and gained prestige among cacicatos, such as Cornelio Mercado who participated in the revenge of Chocorí’s death. The soldier Cornelio Mercado in Chingoleo’s lists might be this same person or an indigenous person god parented by Mercado.

We have less information on capitanejos who resided in Manzanas. The appearance of new people with important ranks in Patagones’ sources indicates that social mobility also took place in cacicatos’ lands. Cacique Nancucheo, for example, gained a leading role in the Confederacy and only appears in Patagones’ sources as Saygüeque’s captain during the 1870s. According to Vezub, in Manzanas the tolderías were dispersed, but were all bound to the most

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628 See local correspondence, census and justice records in MHRMFV. and AV.
629 Mercado had kin ties with the confederate lineage. He god parented an adult Indian that I believe was Inacayal in June 1856, when Chingoleo was also baptized. MHRMFV., “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860;” Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal,” and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, pp.158-160.
630 AV, Revistas Militares; AGN, VII, Leg. 723 Ángel Justiniano Carranza, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.149.
This allowed Saygüeque to attract subalterns by respecting their local authority while subordinating them to his leadership. This argument differs radically from previous scholars who argued that capitanejos could freely choose where to settle, and shows a similar pattern to what historian Alioto described for Salinas Grandes.

Therefore, capitanejos seemed to have a similar life to the ones under the Pampas Confederacy in terms of residence, social mobility and political and military functions. They also participated in parliaments and exercised authority over their lanzas and families. Nevertheless, they could not organize malocas nor access multiple creole towns for trade and personal businesses. While Cacique Chingoleo monopolized their access to Carmen de Patagones, the Pampas Confederacy’s hegemony over the Pampas limited their access to other frontier towns in Buenos Aires. Capitanejos also depended on Saygüeque to access groups of Picunches and other cacicatos in the Andes, Araucanía and Chile. As a consequence, subalterns increasingly depended on the leading lineage to find economic prosperity. Rebelling and leaving the confederacy could be an option in segmental societies, but it meant isolation.

This increasing internal dependency was also evident in the relationship between the leading lineage and the allied cacicatos. While some cacicatos that had disputed the control of the region since colonial times seemed to end up fused to Llanquirúz’s cacicato, others were incorporated as confederate allies but in a clear subordinated position. For example, during colonial times, Caciques Churlaquín, and brothers Cinchel and Maciel disputed the Negro and

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631 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, pp.189-190.
632 Martha Bechis, “Los lideratos políticos en el área araucano-pampeana en el siglo XIX: ¿autoridad o poder?,” and “La vida social de las biografías.”
Colorado trails, and the Ventania region.\textsuperscript{633} Chingoleo and Saygüeque’s lists include people with these caciques’ surnames suggesting their incorporation to the confederacy. In the case of Cinchel and Maciel, their followers fused with Llanquirtrúz’s cacicato, but their leaders kept their local prestige and ranks. Cacique Maciel from the 1850s was either a brother or brother in law of Cacique Negro, both recognized as Pampas during colonial times.\textsuperscript{634} Negro apparently “sold” part of his land to the Spanish crown so that it could settle in Carmen de Patagones, and immediately established peace and trade relationships with its settlers.\textsuperscript{635} During the Rosas’s period (1829-1852), the daughter or grand-daughter of Cacique Maciel, Catalina Maciel, became the wife of José Hernandez, Commander of Patagones. Maciel’s descendants stayed near the town perpetuating their names among caciques and indigenous women. Cacique Maciel’s son or grandson José Apolinario Maciel/Cinchel/García seemed to have inherited his cacicato and established ties with Llanquitrúz. The use of several surnames in the sources responded to his ties with indigenous lineages and prominent families from Carmen de Patagones, like his relative Cacique Cinchel and the powerful García.\textsuperscript{636} The García held the authority of the town during Rosas’s times.

By extending kinship ties, José Apolinario was first incorporated into Llanquirtrúz’s Confederacy as an independent ally and later became fused into his cacicato. In 1856,

\textsuperscript{633} For cacicatos in the region during colonial times see: Nacuzzi, Identidades Impuestas, María Teresa Luiz, Relaciones fronterizas en Patagonia, and Davies Lenoble, “Relaciones inter-étnicas en Carmen de Patagones (1779-1810).”

\textsuperscript{634} In Patagones’ parish records, “Monica Cinchel” (Cinchel was the father of Negro) is registered as concubine of José Apolinario Maciel. They baptized several children together during the 1850s and 1860s. MHRMFV, “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860.”

\textsuperscript{635} This last Cacique descended from other crucial regional leaders, the Cacique Bravo and Cacique Chanyl. Negro also had links with the Andes Mountains. For an analysis on these caciques: see Nacuzzi, Identidades impuestas, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.

\textsuperscript{636} As we can see in local census and parish records, the García had kin ties with Indians, they were also among the families with most properties, cattle and political positions in the town. Davies Lenoble, “Haciendones parientes.”
Llanquitrúz included him, as José García, in the list of allied caciques he sent to frontier authorities. During the 1860s, he was also included in the state military lists headed by Chingoleo Cheuqueta. While in the list of 1861, he figured as a separate chief, ranked as major and with 16 soldiers, in the following lists he was mixed up with Chingoleo’s majors and soldiers. He was never autonomous; evidence suggests that he was incorporated into Llanquitrúz’s cacicato and received raciones under his command. The descendants of this lineage maintained a small group of followers and used this alliance as a way to conserve some authority and prestige while politically subordinating themselves to the confederate lineage.

Maciel’s daughters and great-grand daughters continued strengthening the ties and subordination to the confederate lineage. The son of Catalina Maciel and Commander Hernández, Francisco Juan José Hernández, married or became the common in-law husband of Cacique Llanquitrúz’s daughter Kalmachúm, and was god parented by the creole family that had god parented Llanquitrúz. Saygüeque called Hernández his “nephew” in his letters, but he was never identified as a Cacique. Instead, he was usually ranked as a capitanejo for both Llanquitrúz and Saygüeque, and worked as one of their most important messengers and diplomatic intermediaries. Another Maciel female, Chilachila Maciel, married or became the concubine of Apolinario Maciel’s soldier José Pato, and several Creoles of Patagones. They seemed involved in relationships of polyandry or consecutive monogamy. As Bechis argued for other

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638 According to Casamiquela, Harrington informed Vignati about these relationships. Claráz also indicated in his account that Francisco Hernandez’s father in law was a man called “Manzana,” which can indicate that Francisco had a second wife or that Llanquitrúz’s wife remarried with Manzana after his death. Casamiquela, “Introducción,” p.21; MHRMFV., “Libros de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860”, AGN, VII, Leg. 723, Ángel Justiniano Carranza, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.178.
639 Local parish records in MHRMFV.
cases, these relationships served caciques whom had migrated from the west as strategies to extend their territorial rights into the eastern Pampas.640 These women and men were actually recorded alternatively as being from Manzanas and San Javier, reinforcing the lineage’s rights over these regions. Some of these women seemed to stay in cacicatos’ territory regardless of their partners’ location, and preserved their prestige as daughters and wives of specific caciques.641

Therefore, Llanquitrúz’s real and fictive kinship ties with descendants of Caciques Maciel and Cinchel legitimized his political and territorial rights. Creole residents in Patagones recognized that tie in a letter they wrote to the cacique, and in the treaty signed in 1857.642 In the treaty, Llanquitrúz recognized that his ancestors sold the land from Patagones up to San Javier to the Spanish Crown, but he was also declared a legitimate possessor of all the territory from San Javier to the Pampas, extending Maciel’s and Cinchel’s territorial rights.643

Like the Maciels and Cinchels, other cacicatos were incorporated through kinship and negotiation into the Northern Patagonian Confederacy. Llanquitrúz first offered resources to allies by means of malones on frontier towns in 1855 and 1856. Later, his diplomatic skills guaranteed access to raciones and trade in Carmen de Patagones without risking people and resources in military ventures. He also offered peace and stability in northern Patagonia and south of Valcheta, which also increased commercial transactions. Although Llanquitrúz was recognized as guapo (brave) and a cuchillero (skilled with the knife), he respected the use of

640 Bechis, “Matrimonio y política en la génesis de dos parcialidades mapuche durante el siglo XIX”, and Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”
641 They were recorded under indigenous names and locations, which usually indicated their non-Catholic status (as being non-baptized women) as well as their association with indigenous ethnicities and lineages.
642 “Our beloved Yanquetrúz, Patagones June 5th, 1856,” copy of the original without signatures, AGN., X, 19.4.5.
parliaments and consensus politics to achieve and maintain these alliances. Like Calfucurá, he manipulated the tension present in alliances based on reciprocal obligations to become the leader of the confederacy at the same time that he placed subordinate leaders into an increasing hierarchical structure with him at the top.

Cacique Llanquitrúz showed himself to be a skillful negotiator in attracting more cacicatos from northwestern and southern Patagonia. While he was negotiating with Carmen de Patagones, he traveled west and south to reach other important caciques. In two letters written by his secretary to Patagones’ authorities, Llanquitrúz provided a list of caciques that were “under his command” (Appendix A). In the letter written from Potrero Chico, he named nine Caciques and added another nine “well-known people” that “give their faith.” As I mentioned, “Saygüeque Chocori” appears at the top of the list, separated by a line, but numbered 9th. Then, other caciques followed from one to eight, and Apolinario Maciel appears at the end, but as number two. Maciel was probably traveling with Llanquitrúz. Except for Chagallo Chico, the list of people “who gave their consent” seemed to be capitanejos, but six days after this letter, his secretary wrote from Cabeza de Buey indicating that other eight caciques were also under his command. Most of these caciques were from the south and probably Tehuelches, like “3. C. Bisente, 4. C. Bera, 7. C. San Cruz Chico.” This list also included caciques from Manzanas: “2. C. Guinca Hual (Huincahual)” and “1. C. Paillacán”, who were probably traveling with Llanquitrúz. Huinacabal had participated in the malón of 1856.

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644 He traveled west through the Río Negro to the locations known as Cubanea (near Patagones), Cabeza de Buey, and Paso de Chocorí, and to the southeast to Valcheta.
645 “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, Potrero Chico, June 6th, 1856 (II),” AGN X, 19.4.56. For the version published by Pávez Ojeda, see: Cartas Mapuche, pp. 276-277.
These extended lists of allies show the expansive character of Llanquitrúz’s emerging confederate leadership. It also shows how he used consensus politics to gain alliances while trying to impose internal hierarchies. In his letters to Carmen de Patagones’ authorities, his secretary wrote in his name that he had indicated to his allies not to fight or “commit treason” (meaning raiding) as “he was the principal head of all the Indians.”  

He added that he considered gifts important to prevent treason, and he carefully clarified the quality and quantity of the goods he wanted to receive from creole authorities. He asked that the clothes be of “good quality” because it was for his capitanejos and caciquillos; he also asked for “Dutch gin,” and “English ponchos” for “chiripás (a type of trouser).” Clothes and ornaments were a sign of distinction.

After Llanquitrúz’s death, parliaments continued working as institutions for conflict resolution and diplomatic politics. While Calfucurá found greater difficulty to achieve consensus and hold allies from raiding Buenos Aires during the 1860s, Chingoleo and Saygüeque increasingly imposed their opinion in parliaments in northern Patagonia. After Orqueda’s episode in 1863, Chingoleo organized a parliament, and Saygüeque and Utraillán convinced allies not to revenge the death of their people and to accept creole authorities’ compensations. In 1869 and 1870, Calfucurá invited the Northern Patagonian Confederacy to attack Buenos Aires frontier towns including Carmen Patagones in response to creole’s attack over some allies and attempts to invade cacicatos’ territory. Saygüeque and the Tehuelche Casimiro resolved in a parliament.

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647 Ibid.
648 “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, Potrero Chico, June 6th, 1856 (II),” AGN X, 19.4.56. For the version published by Pávez Ojeda, see: Cartas Mapuche, pp. 276-277.
649 Also, Saygüeque indicated that he had not traveled to Patagones before because he did not know who was the Commander. Now that he knew it was Murga, he would visit the town. Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.165.

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that they would defend Carmen de Patagones. Cacicatos usually protected creole towns with which they had negotiated peace and where they received raciones and access to trade. Finally, when caciques, capitanejos and Commander Murga discussed Chingoleo’s succession in parliament, Saygüeque’s intervention ended up fragmenting his cousins’ cacicatos and incorporating some of his followers to his own cacicato.

The trajectory of some allied caciques shows the increasing levels of dependency on the confederate leaders as well as the persistence of consensus politics for decisions-making processes and some levels of local autonomy. Cacique Huincahual, from Manzanas, joined Cacique Llanquitrúz in his malón on Patagones in 1856. They created kinship ties through Huinacabal’s son Inacayal, who claimed to be Chingoleo’s brother in law. During the malón, Huinacabal showed political independency as he continued raiding despite Llanquitrúz’s order to stop the assault. Nevertheless, when his son Inacayal was imprisoned by Commander Villar, his release depended exclusively on Llanquitrúz’s negotiations. Huinacabal continued participating in Llanquitrúz’s parliaments, and probably received raciones after the treaty in 1857. But internal tensions between the allies continued. In 1858, Huinacabal favored Reuquecurá over Llanquitrúz and, with Cacique Pailacán (probably Paillacán or his son Foyel), he poisoned one of Llanquitrúz’s favorite capitanejos. Llanquitrúz’s death prevented any revenge, but Huinacabal continued under Cacique Chingoleo’s lead. Although he signed his own

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651 “Inacayal to Commander Murga,” without date, but next to one from August 2nd, 1863, AM., vol. XXIV, p. 110.
652 “Commander Benito Villar to the Minister of War and Navy Coronel Don Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, June 4th, 1856,” AGN X, 19.4.5.
treaty in 1863, he had to register under Chingoleo’s list as a “captain” and recognize him as the “chief of all the land.”

Chingoleo and Saygüeque continued limiting Huinacabal and Inacayal’s territorial authority while maintaining his alliance. Inacayal did not stay near the town as Creoles had instructed to do in his father’s treaty. In a letter his secretary wrote to the Commander Murga, Inacayal argued that he had left because he could not depart from his land until his father died. But the real reason seemed more complex. Inacayal protested against Chingoleo’s restriction to visit Buenos Aires with Cacique Chagallo until he ordered. He rejected the type of raciones he received through Chingoleo. Inacayal said that he wanted to dress his 35 men as “paysanos instead of soldiers, and that he did not want to receive salaries, but raciones of yerba, wool, flour, tobacco, alcohol and fifty mares every month. He was clearly trying to differentiate his cacicato from the confederate leaders. According to Vezub, Saygüeque also had conflicts with Caciques Inacayal and Foyel (Paillacán’s son) for the control of commercial routes. These conflicts were resolved by their relocation south of the Río Limay. As we can see above in fig.4, this is probably why Cox indicated that Foyel and Inacayal’s tallerías were in Manzanas in 1863 while Musters indicated they were further south by 1870. Inacayal ended up appearing in Saygüeque’s military lists in 1874 and 1875 as a “major,” recognizing his autonomous leadership, but in a subordinate position.

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654 See copies of these treaties in: AV, Frontera, box. 1, nos. 672-3648, 677; “CGE. DEH, ídem., box. 11, no.1.449 bis.” in Levaggi, Paz en la Frontera, pp.139-140; “Commander Murga…”, Patagones, June 26th, 1863, AM., vol. XXIV, pp.105-107, and Varela and Manara, “La construcción de poderes indígenas frente a la expresión estatal.”

655 Some of his visits were registered in: “Isaías Crespo to the Governor of the friendly Indians of the south, Valentín Saygüeque, July 26th, 1879,” AGN, VII, Leg. 723 Ángel Justiniano Carranza.

656 “Inacayal to Commander Murga,” no date but next to one from August 2nd, 1863, AM., vol. XXIV, p. 110.

657 Ibid.

658 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.164.
Therefore, Huinacabal’s lineage became part of the Confederacy through kinship ties, negotiations and common interests. His son Inacayal gained prestige among Creoles, some raciones, and expanded their trade networks. Nonetheless, their membership limited their political and territorial independence. Chingoleo and Saygüeque controlled their access to Carmen de Patagones and passes to cross the Andes Mountains in Manzanas. Their cases also show that they could not simply abandon the confederacy. Furthermore, in the same letter Inacayal sent to Murga protesting about Chingoleo and the type of raciones he received, he clarified that he belonged to the confederacy in order to prevent conflicts with his allies. He then said:

“Saygüeque, Catrillán [probably Utraillán or Paillacán] and the Tehuelches, we are all one, and I also have relatives in San Gabriel [San Javier], Cinchel, Miguel and all the Linares, and Chincoleo my brother in law, and caciques Saygüeque and Catrillán gave me their word, for that reason I trust them and I trust more the Tehuelches because they will never steal, and [you should] know we are all calm as brothers of the Pampas.” 659

These lines also reveal how the confederacy might have been understood by its members; as one body composed by distinct parts and based on kinship ties and ideology. Inacayal distinguished his relationship with each member while referred to a general policy of peace projected by the confederacy.

A similar case was the cacicato lead by Cacique Chagallo, whose smaller number of warriors and families limited his political independence. According to Harrington, Cacique Utraillán was the father of Juan José Chagallo and took care of Saygüeque in Manzanas when he

659 “Inacayal to Commander Murga,” no date but next to one from August 2nd, 1863, AM, vol. XXIV, p. 110.
was young.\textsuperscript{660} In several sources we find a Cacique named Chagallo and another as Chagallo Chico, who was probably his son. Chagallo appears in 1851 receiving \textit{raciones} in Bahía Blanca next to Chocorí and the people of Calfucurá, and was identified as Tehuelche.\textsuperscript{661} He participated in the treaty with Llanquitrúz, and his son was listed as part of the people who “gave their consent” to Llanquitrúz, probably as \textit{capitanejo}. During the 1860s, Chagallo wanted to sign his own treaty by sending his son to Buenos Aires with Inacayal, who also went in representation of his father. Like Inacayal, Chagallo Chico had trouble with Chingoleo, who did not let them travel right away.\textsuperscript{662} The provisional Commander of Patagones, Mariano Ruiz, also reported that Chagallo complained because he received few gifts. Ruiz explained that it was true because gifts were calculated according to the number of followers, and Chagallo had few.\textsuperscript{663} In addition to Chagallo, several cacicatos who lived along the Río Negro and had less than 100 \textit{lanzas} were also pushed to become subordinate confederate members.\textsuperscript{664} As the Commander explained, they could not live in peace in their lands if they became Llanquitrúz’s and Saygüeque’s enemies.

Chagallo Chico finally traveled to Buenos Aires, and signed a treaty with President Mitre in September 1863.\textsuperscript{665} But like Inacayal, he had to recognize Chingoleo’s authority, and register under his list.\textsuperscript{666} He was assigned the same salary as the other caciques, but did not seem to gain further \textit{raciones}. He appears in Chingoleo’s military lists of 1864 and 1865, and later under Saygüeque in 1868.\textsuperscript{667} In 1865, he tried to increase his resources by playing an intermediate role in a treaty signed with cacicatos from further south, and appears as from 1868 individually as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}, pp.148-149.
\item AGN. X. 20.10.4.
\item "Inacayal to Commander D. Julián Murga, Pueblo de Mercedes, June 3rd, 1863," AM, vol. XXIV, pp.110-111.
\item AV., \textit{Frontera}, box. 1, no.689.
\item AGN, X. 27.7.6, March, 1858.
\item "CGE. DEH, idem, box. 11, n 1.449 bis.," copy of the original, in Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la Frontera}, pp.139-140.
\item Ibid.
\item AV. \textit{Revistas Militares}; SHE., \textit{Frontera con los indios}, no. 555, 2894 and 1148.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
one of the caciques who received salaries from the national government according to the
Memorias de Hacienda.668

In conclusion, a region contested by multiple lineages and cacicatos in colonial times
became dominated by the confederate authority of the lineage presided by Llanquitrúz,
Chingoleo and Saygüeque during the 1850s. Cacicatos’ alliances and subordination to the
confederate leaders provided tempting benefits such as trans-regional prestige and trade –from
Manzanas to Valdivia, to the Atlantic and south Valcheta-, raciones in Patagones, military force
to secure trade routes on the Negro and Colorado rivers, and general peace and stability in the
region. Like Calfucurá, allied caciques’ autonomy and participation was respected in the
continuous use of parliaments, territorial agreements and administration of their own cacicatos.
However, in this case, the confederate lineage increasingly limited political independence,
especially for smaller cacicatos. The Confederacy’s policy of maintaining peace and stability
with its most proximate frontier town and the monopoly of diplomatic relationships limited
subalterns and allied cacicatos’ independence. They could not use malones to further resources
and prestige of their warriors, nor could they access trade in other distant frontier towns. Not
joining the confederacy did not seem a real option for cacicatos in northern Patagonia. Maciel’s
cacicato ended fused with Llanquitrúz’s cacicato while Cacique Chagallo preserved his political
autonomy, but depended on the leading lineage to define his territory and access to creole towns
and resources. Other more important cacicatos, like the one led by Huinacabal (father of
Inacayal) and Paillacán (father of Foyel), also showed an increasing subordination to the

668 In July 1865, the state signed treaties with groups from the south headed by “Cacique Francés,” and the treaty
indicated they had to follow the orders of Cacique Chagallo chico. AV, Frontera, box. 1, nos., 826, 3743 and 1423.
Also see: AGN., Memorias de Hacienda.
confederate leadership, especially in terms of their access to specific territories, trade networks and creole towns.

Allies in the Third Level of Dependency: the Southern Tehuelches and Carmen de Patagones

In comparison to the Pampas Confederacy, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy had few allies on the third level of dependency, and limited access to Buenos Aires’ indios amigos, groups I placed between the third and fourth level. Indios amigos in Bahía Blanca were near, but access to the town was disputed by the Pampas Confederacy. Some indigenous people reached the Welsh colony founded in 1865 near contemporary Trelew. But this settlement was small and vulnerable until the 1870s. The same happened with Creole and immigrant presence in San Julián, and Chileans in Punta Arenas. Finally, Carmen de Patagones had small cacicatos performing as indios amigos during colonial times, but they did not maintain an autonomous identity by the period under study. Most of these people joined other cacicatos or were incorporated as subalterns of the town. Local records show the incorporation of indigenous people as servants, labor and family. Some gained properties and prestige, but became subject to creole rules and norms. The case of Miguel Linares’s band in 1867 could be considered as an emerging group of indios amigos. He reached an agreement with the national government,

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670 For example, Pedro Crespo was god-parented by the Spanish settlers Pedro Crespo and Ana Rial in 1804 and apparently stayed under their care. He married a “white” woman named Juana Centeno and had several children. These were first registered as “Indians” in 1854 census, but later registered as “white” with their mother’s surname in 1866 when Pedro passed away. The family had private property and cattle. SGU, “Matrimonios (1780-1884),” Film 1106463, no. 320; “Bautismos (1804-1839) de la Iglesia Nuestra Señora del Carmen,” Film 110646; MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854” and “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión Municipal don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal.”

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received *raciones* in exchange for his military service, and attempted to fix his residence near the town, while still working as Saygüeque’s intermediary.

Instead, Tehuelches who lived south of Valcheta and Chushamen were clearly allies on the third level of dependency during the 1850s and 1860s. We lack detailed evidence on these groups’ population and political organization. Having said that, in the state archives, we find general references to “Tehuelches visiting the town,” and some descriptions in travelers’ accounts. The link between southern Tehuelches and the Northern Patagonian Confederacy had kinship and historical origins. The lineage of brothers Chocorí and Cheuqueta were sometimes identified as Tehuelches. They used groups of Tehuelches in warfare and created kinship ties with them during colonial times and the early nineteenth century. When Llanquitrúz reached Patagones in 1852, he mediated groups of southern Tehuelches in their negotiation and trade with Creoles. In his lists of allies of 1856, he included some of these southern caciques, such as Bicente or Vicente, Bera or Vera and Santa Cruz Chico. Later in the 1860s, the Confederacy also worked as intermediary in the peace treaties signed between these groups and Patagones. Caciques Santa Cruz and Vicente signed a treaty in 1865 in conjunction with Caciques Frances, Antonio and Chiquichan. The confederacy also built strong ties with Cacique Casimiro, who was leading several southern cacicatos by the 1860s.

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672 Due to the kinship ties established between people identified with diverse ethnicities, Vezub categorized this lineage as being Tehuelche-Huilliche or Tehuelche-Mapuche. Evidence from Carmen de Patagones also shows that the caciques that reached the town from the Pampas, Northern and Southern Patagonia had kinship, political and economic ties since before colonial ties. Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas* and Davies, “Relaciones inter-étnicas en Carmen de Patagones.”

673 AV., *Frontera,* box.1, no.826, 3743 and 1423 (copies).

674 Musters, *Vida entre los Patagones* and Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.*
These southern allies were smaller and lived dispersed. They preserved their political independence and territorial control, but allied with the Confederacy to trade beyond their territories, access Carmen de Patagones, and maintain regional peace. The Confederacy gained political and material benefit by bringing more visitors to the town. They were compensated by the intermediation and they expanded their trade networks and political prestige.

During the 1870s, these southern allies became more active in the diplomatic negotiations with the Pampas Confederacy and the Argentine Republic. In 1869 and 1870, Musters described that Saygüeque, Foyel, Casimiro and their allied caciques formed parliaments to discuss their territorial control and their alliances with Calfucurá to hit Bahía Blanca and Carmen de Patagones. According to Musters, they decided not to join Calfucurá, but to defend Patagones; Saygüeque would do so from the northern side of the Río Negro and Casimiro from the south.

Southwestern groups identified with other ethnicities also reached the town through the confederate leaders. In 1865, Commander Murga informed that Cacique “Quiñiforo” from the “Quirquincho” Indians, who lived in Segunda Angostura and who had “a lot of influence,” wanted to sign a treaty with the town. Murga recommended accepting this request in order to prevent possible malones.

Finally, as I will develop next chapter, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy also incorporated Carmen de Patagones as an ally in a third level of dependency. Like Calfucurá, Caciques Llanquirúz and Saygüeque incorporated written correspondence to negotiate with multiple frontier and provincial authorities, and creole settlers. Llanquirúz used the Valdivian Francisco del Carmen Marques Bravo as his writer during the 1850s and most of his letters were

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676 Ibid., p.318
677 AV, *Frontera*, box. 1, no. 892 (copy).
written during the peace negotiations with Carmen de Patagones in the mid-1850s.\textsuperscript{678} The cacique also wrote a letter with his own blood reinforcing, according to Vezub, the ritual aspect of blood to seal pacts.\textsuperscript{679} Later, Cacique Saygüeque built a chancellery with an official writer, the indigenous José Antonio Loncochino, who learnt how to read and write in a mission in Valdivia. Since 1874, Saygüeque started heading his letters as coming from the “Indigenous Governorship of Manzanas,” and he carefully preserved his correspondence in his tolderías until the military stole them in 1880.\textsuperscript{680}

The incorporation of Carmen de Patagones into the Northern Patagonian Confederacy reveals the expansive and multiethnic character of cacicatos’ nomadic pastoralists’ confederacies. Hämäläinen’s work on the nomadic Comanches states that instead of establishing large-scale settlement colonies, the Comanche Empire created informal institutions “for cultural and strategic reasons” that “still created deeply hierarchical and integrated inter-social order.”\textsuperscript{681} The Empire preferred to have “formally autonomous, but economically subservient and dependent outposts that served as economic access points into the vast resources of the Spanish.” The Northern Patagonian Confederacy also built this type of relationship with Carmen de Patagones, but it was not maintained by the use of periodic coercion. The town became an independent ally in the third level of dependency through strong kinship, political and trading ties. During the creole civil conflicts of the mid-1850s, Carmen de Patagones increased its tributary condition and dependency on the indigenous confederacy to survive. Its distance from other Buenos Aires’ towns and its economic dependency on trade shaped their subordination.

\textsuperscript{678} Vezub, “Mapuche-Tehuelche Spanish writing and Argentinian-Chilean expansion during the 19th century.”
\textsuperscript{679} Vezub, “Llanquitruz y la “máquina de guerra” mapuche-Tehuelche.”
\textsuperscript{680} For an analysis on indigenous writing see ibid. and Pavez Ojeda, \textit{Cartas Mapuche}.
\textsuperscript{681} Hämäläinen, \textit{The Comanche Empire}, p.4.
These relationships never became a second level of dependency, as the town maintained its political independence through its ties with the provincial and national governments. Like other allies on the third level, their alliance to the confederacy guaranteed stability, peace and prosperity. Unlike all the other frontier towns in Buenos Aires, Carmen de Patagones was never hit by a big malón after its pact with Cacique Llanquirúz in 1856-1857. Small malocas and robberies continued hitting Creole estancias and tolderías, but most daily violence cross-cut ethnic identities.682

Circumstantial Allies: Cacicatos from the West, and the Pampas Confederacy

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s ties with the western side of the Andes Mountains dated from before Spanish arrival. The region of Manzanas was completely immersed in trade networks, kinship ties and political alliances with cacicatos on the western side of the Andes. As I explained in chapter 1, Llanquirúz’s cacicato emerged from a process of ethnogenesis between people known as Huilliche, Pehuenche, Tehuelche and Pampa. Kin ties linked him with several cacicatos in Araucanía and Valdivia as well as Chileans. Llanquirúz worked as a servant in Chillán when he was captured with his father during the late 1830s. He probably had some connection with President Bulnes (1841-1851), as he adopted the president’s name.683 His secretary and translator was also from Valdivia, Chile. Like Calfucurá, he built a confederate leadership by expanding through the east without leaving the west unattended.

682 Davies Lenoble, “El impacto de la política cacical en la frontera: las redes de parentesco y la estructura social de Carmen de Patagones, 1856-1879,” in Boletín del instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana Dr. Emilio Ravignani, 46, Argentina (2017), in press.
683 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
Llanquitrúz’s lists of allied caciques and followers gives us more clues on these ties and allies. Some caciques from the west appear in the lists he sent to Carmen de Patagones in 1856.\textsuperscript{684} Caciques Llancagir and Naipichún were probably the Picunches Llancamilla and Nahuipichún.\textsuperscript{685} In his correspondence, we also see that he reached caciques in Pitrufquén, Boroa and Valdivia. In 1858, he wrote to his godparent Fourmantín telling him Pitrufquén was “entirely under my command.”\textsuperscript{686} He said that Cacique Pichripán governed like him, but favored his alliance over Reuquecurá. He also named some Borogano friends, and one of them was his wife’s “uncle from blood.” In 1857 and 1858, he wrote to Chile’s President Pedro Montt and Valdivia’s Mayor explaining that he was at peace with Buenos Aires and that he wanted to extend that peace to Chile.\textsuperscript{687}

Cacique Saygüeque strengthened this transregional legacy.\textsuperscript{688} Although settlements in San Javier and Carmen de Patagones were still an important space for production, trade and diplomacy, Saygüeque reinforced the links with the Araucanía and Chile from his permanent tolderías in Caleufú (in Manzanas). The Confederate leader exchanged correspondence with several caciques and posts in these regions and Pitrufquén.\textsuperscript{689} He maintained important ties with groups of Picunches, who controlled access to passes through the Andes Mountains. These ties were crucial for the Confederacy’s economic expansion during the 1860s. It allowed them not to exclusively depend on Carmen de Patagones to sell their surplus animals. Most of these allies

\textsuperscript{684} “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, June 6th, 1856,” AGN., 19.4.5.
\textsuperscript{685} In 1874, Saygüeque names them as his allies. AGN, VII, Leg. 723, Ángel Justiniano Carranza, and “CGE.DEH.IDEM, box. 36, no.1.334, and 22-6821,” in Levaggi, 
\textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp.478-481.
\textsuperscript{686} AM, Wenceslao Paunero. 7, March 19th, 1858.
\textsuperscript{687} “Llanquitrúz to the President of the Republic of Chile, Manuel Montt, December 10th, 1857”, Pávez Ojeda, comp., 
\textit{Cartas Mapuche}, p.370.
\textsuperscript{688} Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la “gobernación Indígena de las Manzanas,” p.65
\textsuperscript{689} Ibid.
continued performing as circumstantial allies. They selectively participated in trade fares and parliaments, but maintained de facto independence.

The Pampas and Northern Patagonian Confederacies, at times, allied with each other as well. The relationship among these confederacies fluctuated between friendship and distance. Their leaders had kinship ties and assisted each other during Rosas’s military campaigns. Llanquitruúz found refuge in Calfucurá’s *tolderías* when he escaped from Chillán. They participated in common parliaments and raids during the 1840s. But when Llanquitruúz visited Patagones with his uncle Chocorí in 1852, they accused Calfucurá of heading *malones* over the town. Later in 1854, Caciques Calfucurá and Calván told creole authorities that the Huilliches (referring to Llanquitruúz and his people) had raided Patagones, but would be at peace under Calfucurá’s command. The Salinero had sent his son Alimay to “control them.” This *malón* had not taken place. Records in Carmen de Patagones only mention some *malocas* in 1854 and indicate that some Creoles participated as well. Local authorities suspected these people were linked with President Urquiza, who was negotiating peace with Calfucurá to hit Buenos Aires. Hence, Calfucurá was trying to show Creoles that Llanquitruúz and his allies were under his rule.

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690 Vezub says that apparently, Calfucurá and Cheuqueta were brothers in law. Ibid., p.118 Also see: Ratto, “Indios amigos e indios aliados” and “Tiempos de abundancia para Calfucurá: raciones, obsequios y malones en las décadas de 1840 y 1850.”
691 Guillermo Cox also says that they became enemies. Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la “gobernación Indígena de las Manzanas*. 
692 See sources in Lobos, *Juan Calfucurá*.
693 Chocorí accused Calfucurá and offered help to rescue the captives. “Commander Francisco Fourmantín to the Minister of War and Navy Colonel Castro Cáseres, Patagones, July 9th, 1852,” AGN., X, 18, 4, 8.
694 “Juan Calfucurá to Córdoba Governor Guzman, Salinas Grandes, 1854,” AHPC, *Gobierno 1854*, “Correspondencia con los indios”, vol. 239, leg. 4, f.125.
Llanquirúz actually allied Calfucurá to raid Buenos Aires frontier towns during 1855-1856, when the province broke their reciprocal obligations to cacicatos.\textsuperscript{696}

Based on this military alliance, de Jong and Ratto consider Llanquirúz part of Calfucurá’s Confederacy.\textsuperscript{697} But this subordination was never formalized. The Salinero’s attempts were frustrated by the independent political ambitions of his neighbor. Llanquirúz never became a permanent ally of the Pampas Confederacy. He participated in Calfucurá’s \textit{malones} as an occasional ally in 1855-1856. They raided different frontier towns and divided the booty.\textsuperscript{698} Their policies also show their strong independent ambitions. Llanquirúz decided to continue hitting Carmen de Patagones in May 1856, while Calfucurá and Catriel were negotiating peace with Buenos Aires in Bahía Blanca and 25 de Mayo in March and April. In early May, Calfucurá told the authorities that he thought that Llanquirúz was going to favor peace, but the southern Cacique only asked for peace after raiding Carmen de Patagones in late May.\textsuperscript{699} This last attack gave Llanquirúz an unquestionable military and political leadership in northern Patagonia.

While negotiating peace with Commander Villar, Llanquirúz informed that Calfucurá was going to invade Carmen de Patagones.\textsuperscript{700} He also wrote to Chilean authorities in 1857 saying that he was ready to attack Calfucurá, and later wrote to Calfucurá pushing him to sign a treaty

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{696} Calfucurá hit Azul and Llanquirúz the Estancia San Antonio de Iraola. De Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional.”

\textsuperscript{697} They also argue that Llanquirúz’s treaty in 1857 shows how Calfucurá lost this ally. De Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana.”

\textsuperscript{698} According to a released captive, Calfucurá kept the captives while Llanquirúz kept the cattle. “The Judge of Peace from Azul Ramón Viton to Bartolomé Mitre, September 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1855,” AM., vol. XV, p. 131, in Belloni, \textit{La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur}.

\textsuperscript{699} “Juan Calfucurá to Commander Iturra, Bahía Blanca, May 6th, 1856,” AHMSP, Bahía Blanca, Pávez Ojeda, Cartas Mapuche, pp. 269-270.

\textsuperscript{700} “Commander Benito Villar to the Minister of War and Navy Colonel Don Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, July 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1856,” AGN, X., 19.4.5.
\end{footnotesize}
with Buenos Aires’ authorities. In spite of an escalating rivalry between Llanquitrúz and Calfucurá, Llanquitrúz and his allies did not participate in the porteños’ invasions of Salinas Grandes in early 1858, nor did he back Calfucurá in his revenge against Bahía Blanca in 1859.

Major tensions between these powerful polities arose from their attempts to gain influence over each other’s territories and trade networks. In this respect, the presence of Reuquecurá in Llaima presented the main risk in possibly triggering off a confrontation. In 1858, Llanquitrúz indicated to his godfather, the ex-Commander Fourmantín, that he competed with Reuquecurá in gaining the alliance of caciques in Pitrufquén, Boroa and Manzanas. According to Llanquitrúz, Reuquecurá coopted two of his caciquillos, Paillacán and Huinacabal, whom had poisoned one of his best captains. Llanquitrúz’s death calmed things down, and these two subordinated caciques remained under Caciques Chingoleo and Saygüeque. During the 1860s, Reuquecurá’s attempts to trade and negotiate with Patagones were continuously limited by the leaders of northern Patagonia.

In spite of these tensions and conflicts, both confederacies’ trajectories reveal that they worked more towards assuring hegemonic power over separate territories and cacicatos than towards coopting or confronting each other. They showed some rapprochement when dealing with state authorities, but always ended up choosing different path. They often accused each

701 In his letter to Calfucurá, Llanquitrúz criticized Calfucurá’s “arrogance” and cursed him with “God’s punishment” if he did not come in peace. Kinship discourse only appears when he named creoles as “brothers” and good tributaries (by mentioning the gifts and raciones he was receiving). Although these three letters could be seen as Buenos Aires authorities’ use of Llanquitrúz to control Calfucurá, they can also be interpreted as the cacique’s strategy to reinforce his ties with the porteños and Chilean governments while increasing their dependency on his leadership to organize cacicatos’ power relations. He probably knew that these letters would end up with –or be seen by– creole authorities. He tried to involve Argentine and Chilean governments in his attempts, and continuously sent messages to Patagones warning of possible attacks by Calfucurá. He asked the authorities to be prepared to fight and said that he would defend Patagones. He was continuously appealing to the obligations that his creole relatives owed him to enhance his confederate leadership. “José María Bulnes Llangkitruf to Juan Kallfükura, Valcheta, August 3rd, 1857,” AGN, X, 27-7-6, published in Pávez Ojeda, comp., Cartas Mapuche, pp. 298-299, and “Llanquitrúz to the President of the Republic of Chile, Manuel Montt, December 10th, 1857”, Pávez Ojeda, comp., Cartas Mapuche, p.370.
other of heading *malones*, and the Northern Patagonian Confederacy refused to join Calfucurá’s calls for military attacks over Buenos Aires frontier in 1870; it prioritized protecting its stability and pacts with Carmen de Patagones. Looking at the economic aspects of the southern Confederacy will help us better understand the different trajectories.

*The Confederacy’s Economy: Reaching Trans-Regional Trade Networks and Resources*

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy settled permanent and mobile *tolderías* to take advantage of resources in diverse environments. Unlike Calfucurá, the leading lineage created two main temporary camps, Manzanas and San Javier. Manzanas was a region between the Limay and Collón Curá rivers and reaching, approximately, as far north as the Lanín volcano. It was the richest area in terms of access to water, grazing land and agricultural land. During the 1850s, Saygüeque managed to monopolize access to its resources. Its distance from creole frontier posts also guaranteed greater protection than San Javier. This second major settlement was placed on the Río Negro shores, 30 km approximately from Carmen de Patagones. The land was rather more arid, but within the Río Negro flood plain there were enough resources for cattle ranching and some horticulture. It was also located in a strategic spot from where access to Carmen de Patagones could be controlled. San Javier became a permanent settlement as a consequence of Cacique Llanquirúz’s expansive policies during the 1850s and Chingoleo’s decision to settle more permanently in that location during the 1860s. In comparison to the Pampas Confederacy, this polity managed more distant and arid territories with slower economic growth, but had better protection from expansive nomadic and sedentary state competitors.
Overall, Northern Patagonia offered diverse resources, but required detailed knowledge of the main trails, lakes and rivers, fertile and arid land, and the impact of seasonal changes on the environment (see fig. 2 in chapter 1). Manzanas was known by this name, at least since the 18th century, with which Indians and Creoles identified cacicatos’ local production of apples. It was seen as a sort of paradise. During the 1860s, the traveler Claráz described that when travelling from Choelechoel up the Río Negro valley, the landscape changed: “they say that the land is fertile and that the river is surrounded by conifers and, further up, on the hillsides of the Andes Mountains, there are forests of apple trees. It’s the region of the Manzanas [apples] that for the Indians, it seems, it’s a paradise.” Manzanas contained fertile land, small animals for hunting, fruits for gathering, abundant water and grazing land to feed cattle and horses. In 1880, Saygüeque told Linares: “I can eat well from the wild carnivorous animals that wander in my lands, and dress with the textiles produced by my women without the necessity of wishing others’ work.”

From Manzanas, people could also access three main trails that reached the Araucanía and Pitrufquén to the west, the Pampas to the northeast, and eastern Patagonia to the southeast. The first region had the typical Andes Mountains’ environment described in chapter one, and was accessed through specific passes and rivers. To the northeast, people followed downstream the Limay and Negro rivers to later reach the Río Colorado trails by land, and

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702 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.21.
703 My translation, Claráz, Diario de Viaje de Exploración al Chubut, 1865-1866, p.167, in Ibid.
706 Another rich area south of Manzanas was the region of the Lake Nahuel Huapi. People accessed this region from diverse small trails. The dense woods, terrain and reed-beds made the access of southern groups to Manzanas difficult. Ibid.
Valcheta (River, Valley or location in Mapudungun)\textsuperscript{707} and Carmen de Patagones downstream into the Atlantic. The shores and islands of the Río Negro offered enough resources for subsistence and protection during the journey, such as grazing land, woods and small animals to hunt. South of the river, land became more arid. The trail between the Río Limay and the Island of Choelechoel was shared with diverse cacicatos, such as the members of the Pampas Confederacy, who traveled from the Araucanía, Cuyo, Pampas and Southern Patagonia.\textsuperscript{708} From Choelechoel downstream the Río Negro trails reached Carmen de Patagones and the Atlantic, and by land through the trail known as “Bajada del Gualicho,”\textsuperscript{709} the region of Valcheta. Valcheta was a flat spot with grassland and water, and was the meeting point with Tehuelche groups. Between Choelechoel, Patagones and Valcheta were important salt lakes, small lakes and animals to hunt. The lands next to the river shores and islands also offered grazing land, agricultural land, hunting grounds, and some woods. The Atlantic coast gave people access to seals and sea lions’ skins, meat and grease.\textsuperscript{710}

Since before the Spanish arrival, all northern Patagonia was disputed by diverse Tehuelche, Huilliche, Moluche, Pehuenche, and Picunche groups. By the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, diverse lineages claimed rights over the region appealing to kinship, historic and warfare rights. Manzanas was claimed by Chocorí and Cheuqueta as well as the lineages led by Utraillán, Paillacán and Huinacabal. Chocorí and Cheuqueta used Manzanas as a refuge when Rosas’

\textsuperscript{707} Ibid., p.2.
\textsuperscript{708} From the Negro and Colorado rivers, people could reach by land the frontier town of Bahía Blanca, the Ventania Mountains’ Region, Salinas Grandes, Tandil Mountains and the frontier posts in the region up to the city of Buenos Aires. To the Northwest, trails could reach the Ranqueles and the Pehuenches’ lands.
\textsuperscript{709} According to indigenous beliefs, the Gualicho is a bad spirit. This trail required spending one day and a half without water until reaching Valcheta, where the Río Valcheta was located. There was another trail from Sauce Blanco (30 leagues from Patagones) to Valcheta called “Camino del Chancho.” Veniard, “Los caminos indígenas de Valcheta al Río Negro.”
\textsuperscript{710} For descriptions on this type of hunting see: D’Orbigny, \textit{Viaje por América Meridional}, vol. II.
government persecuted them during the military campaigns of 1833 and 1834, but also lived along the Río Negro and projected their influence north towards Buenos Aires. Their descendants claimed leadership over Manzanas during the 1850s. Saygüeque ended up dominating the region.

According to Vezub, Manzanas’s trade, production and demography boomed during Saygüeque’s leadership in the 1860s and 1870s. The Cacique placed his tolderías in Caleufú, a strategic place from where he could control trade and communication to both sides of the Andes Mountains. As nomadic pastoralists, his followers specialized in breeding and herding cattle and horses, but they also hunted small animals such as guanacos and ostrich, produced textiles, cultivated plants and fruits like apples, and traded. Like the Pehuenches, their strategic location also assured revenues from charging travelers and merchants a toll for accessing the routes and passes to cross the Andes, and for using their grazing land and corrals. Although we do not have detailed information on the production managed in Manzanas, sources indicate they had abundant resources. In 1870, the traveler George Musters was impressed by Saygüeque’s tolderías despite its distance from creole frontier towns. It had a large number of cattle, horses and distinction objects, such as military clothes and silverware.

Like in Salinas Grandes, tolderías were organized according to families and cacicatos, and had a dispersed pattern. Each cacicato had residential and grazing lands, and rights to shared

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711 Chocorí visited in Bahía Blanca on several occasions. Villar, Relaciones Inter-étnicas en el sur bonaerense (1810-1830), and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.195
712 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
713 Ibid., p. 65-78.
714 Ibid., p. 197-198.
715 Ibid., p. 213.
716 Ibid.
717 As Vezub argued, based on the traveler Musters’s observations, by 1870 Saygüeque accumulated greater amount of goods and objects of prestige than his followers, and other caciques from the south, such as Cacique Casimiro. Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p. 228.
trails. Saygüeque increasingly defined these locations and rights. He managed to re-locate Caciques Paillacán’s and Huinacabal’s permanent *tolderías* to south of the Río Limay to limit their control over some key trails. Caciques Paillacán and Foyel also complained to Saygüeque for his protection of groups of Picunches that were stealing their messengers. The Cacique continued protecting Picunches due to their control over important passes that reached Manzanas from the west. These trails and allies assured their access to the Araucanía and Chilean frontier posts while avoiding conflicts with Reuquecurá, who controlled Llaima and its passes north of Manzanas. As long as people under Saygüeque used their own passes and traveled east through the Río Limay to access the Río Negro, no conflict was generated with the Curás.

Unlike migrations to the Pampas, moving from Manzanas to the northeastern Patagonia did not necessarily seem a strategy to reach further extensive grazing land, but to control key trade routes linked with the Atlantic markets. Cacique Llanquitruúz tried to control the smaller cacicatos that disputed access to this region during the 1850s. With his brother Chingoleo, they managed to monopolize the trails and territories from Choelechoel in the Río Negro to Carmen de Patagones, and south to Valcheta (see fig. 4). But they had to continue sharing the trail between Chichinales and Choelechoel in the Río Negro with groups of Pehuenches and people under the Pampas Confederacy. Most of the trails along the Río Colorado, and the frontier posts in Buenos Aires remained under the hegemonic influence of Calfucurá.

The eastern lands dominated by Llanquitruúz and Chingoleo were arid steppes, but had grazing land for animals and agriculture, big salt lakes as well as woods and corrals located

718 Ibid., p. 194.
719 Ibid.
720 Musters, *Vida entre los Patagones*, p.316. Also stated by Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas*, p.164.
721 Ibid., p. 194.
along the river shores. Cacicatos were involved in creole’s agricultural activities in Carmen de Patagones, but cattle ranching, hunting, the extraction of salt and trade were the main activities in the region for both cacicatos and creole residents.\textsuperscript{722} Due to the particularities of this arid environment, cacicatos moved their animals according to the changing seasons.

As I will show with more detail in the next chapter, the incorporation of Carmen de Patagones into the Northern Patagonian Confederacy also gave cacicatos access to creole lands, resources, labor and commerce. The creole town was incorporated into an already dynamic trans-regional trade. To the west through the Río Negro, cattle and horses were sold by cacicatos in Pitrufquén and Araucanía, and could eventually end up at the Chilean frontier posts.\textsuperscript{723} To the south, trails from Sauce Grande and Segunda Angostura south to Valcheta provided horses to southern Tehuelches, who increasingly incorporated this animal to their economy.\textsuperscript{724} In return, Tehuelches provided ostrich feathers and animal hides.\textsuperscript{725} Finally, allied cacicatos sold animals, textiles and hides in Carmen de Patagones in exchange for goods that were not produced by them.

Carmen de Patagones also settled a tributary position under the Confederacy. By treaty, Cacique Llanquitrúz was to receive an important amount of salaries, animals, goods and clothes from the town, but he would be paid by the government of Buenos Aires. The Cacique’s salary was of 1,200 pesos per month. He also had to choose 8 caciques who received 100 pesos per month, and 80 soldiers who received 50 pesos per month.\textsuperscript{726} Every month, the town had to

\textsuperscript{722} For example, Chingoleo told Cacique Chagallo that he could travel after the harvest.
\textsuperscript{723} Alioto, \textit{Indios y ganado en la frontera}.
\textsuperscript{724} Their first contact with horses and cattle was probably due to their contact with Spanish posts established in San Julian and San José during the late 18th century. Ibid.; Davies, “Relaciones inter-étnicas en Carmen de Patagones,” and Luiz, \textit{Relaciones fronterizas en Patagonia}.
\textsuperscript{725} MHRMFV., \textit{Piedra Buena}.
\textsuperscript{726} AGN, X., 27.7.6.
provide 50 mares or 50 pesos per mare if they did not have these animals. These agreements implicated a budget of 8,500 pesos per month in salaries and mares. In addition, creoles had to provide every 6 month the following goods: 1/3 barrel of *yerba mate*, 1 barrel of sugar, 6 arrobas of flour, 1 roll of tobacco, and 160 paper booklets. Every year, each of Llanquitrúz’s eighty soldiers would receive: one hat, one undershirt, one chiripá, two shirts and two underpants. Finally, the government had to provide tools, plows, oxen and grains to sow in Guardia de Obligado, but this town was never created. These provisions started flowing to allied cacicatos in late 1858, when Llanquitrúz moved temporarily to Valcheta. During October and November of 1858, the province of Buenos Aires spent 32,840 pesos approximately per month on these *raciones*. They provided larger salaries than was established by the 1857 treaty. Every adult male Indian received the same salary as the naval soldiers (150 pesos each), and women and children were included in the budget, 126 pesos per women and 60 pesos per child.

The renewal of Llanquitrúz’s treaty under Chingoleo in 1859 increased the salaries and the number of animals, it arranged for delivery every 6 months, and clarified the type of clothes provided to each rank. The amount, frequency and type of salaries, goods and animals slightly changed in the treaties later signed with Saygüeque and other confederate members during the 1860s. The national government added a budget of 60,000 pesos per year for gifts in addition to

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727 The calculation of the total amount was 187,660 pesos, but the record indicated a total of 187.670 pesos. “Los suministros dados a la guarnición de Patagones e “indios amigos” por el proveedor Don Andrés Aguirre en los meses de octubre y noviembre del presente año, Novemeber 23th, 1858,” AGN., X, 9.4.5.

728 Chingoleo continued with a salary of 1,200 pesos per month, but his 8 capitanejos now received 200 pesos, and his soldiers 140 pesos. They also included a special salary for Saygüeque of 600 pesos. The 50 mares were still going to be distributed per month and Chingoleo could choose between receiving 50 pesos per mare or any type of goods if the town did not have the animals. The treaty added the provision of 50 mares every 6 months to Saygüeque. The same amounts of goods were going to be distributed but every 6 months. “CGE.EDH, Campaña… Frontera sur, box. 4, no. 556, and AM, vol. XXII, pp.83-85,” in Levaggi, *Paz en la frontera*, p.311.
the *raciones* agreed upon in the treaties.\textsuperscript{729} We do not know how much of these budgets were invested on *raciones* and delivered to the Northern Patagonian Confederacy, but the local correspondence frequently mentions the provisions of salaries, goods, clothes and some mares to cacicatos.

Historians highlight that, in both confederacies, leaders’ access and distribution of *raciones* strongly influenced an increasing hierarchical control and dependency on these external factors to maintain the alliances.\textsuperscript{730} Vezub and Madrazo argue that, while internal distribution ended up founding a hybrid form between capitalist forms of appropriating surplus and reciprocal forms of distribution based on kinship logic, asymmetric relationships were slowly strengthening inside cacicatos.\textsuperscript{731} Although I agree with this statement, these resources only fueled economic exchanges that were already dynamic and reached a wider range of followers. Caciques, specific *capitanejos*, authorities and merchants shaped the provisions and distribution of *raciones*.\textsuperscript{732} Salaries were usually exchanged for other goods and clothes needed by all indigenous people. Information on the administration of Saygüeque’s salaries also show that *raciones* ended up flowing to subalterns, and that they were part of other dynamic reciprocal exchanges such as trade, material and moral compensations.\textsuperscript{733} Furthermore, Saygüeque did not go in person to the town to receive his *raciones*.\textsuperscript{734} He sent capitanejos and intermediaries to pick

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{729} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{730} Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas*; Foerster and Vezub, “Malón, ración y nación en las Pampas”; de Jong and Ratto, “Redes políticas en el área Arauco-pampeana,” and Villar and Jiménez, *Amigos, hermanos y parientes*, and “La tempestad de la guerra.”
  \item \textsuperscript{731} Ibid. and Guillermo Madrazo, “Comercio interétnico y trueque recíproco equilibrado intraétnico. Su vigencia en la puna argentina y áreas próximas, desde la independencia nacional hasta mediados del siglo XIX,” *Desarrollo Económico*, vol. 21, no. 82 (1981).
  \item \textsuperscript{732} Ibid., p.221.
  \item \textsuperscript{733} AGN. VII, *Leg. 723 Ángel Justiniano Carranza*, and Vezub, *Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas*.
  \item \textsuperscript{734} See his correspondance: AGN, VII, *Leg. 723 Ángel Justiniano Carranza*.  
\end{itemize} 

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up and administer these provisions, and many times spent everything in paying intermediaries, friends and relatives, and his debts in creoles’ commercial houses as dictated by the reciprocal logic.\textsuperscript{735}

Also, caciques’ access and distribution of raciones does not explain by itself the confederacies’ different internal developments. While Calfucurá received greater number of raciones, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy shows greater levels of internal centralization and stratification. Allies’ subordination to the confederate leaders was not shaped by the amount of raciones that leaders received and distributed, but by leaders’ control over the access to specific territories, trade networks and reciprocal obligations, which included Creole governments’ provision of raciones. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s economy did not depend on these external provisions. Even if we have little quantitative information on the economic scale and productivity of its economy, qualitative evidence shows a general regional economic growth.

In conclusion, in comparison with the Pampas Confederacy, this case showed different economic policies and outcomes. The economic center of subsistence and production, Manzanas, was more protected from Creoles than Salinas Grandes. This gave the Northern Patagonian Confederacy more economic flexibility to expand trade and conduct diplomacy with creole governments through its control over Carmen de Patagones. In spite of these differences, both confederacies created successful strategies to impose hegemonic power over cacicatos and frontier posts on a trans-regional scale. They became key consumers of an expanding Pampas

\textsuperscript{735} Ibid. and Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.}
and Chilean export economies and accumulated resources in an increasingly capitalist world.\footnote{Before Vezub, Bandieri stated that the indigenous society of the nineteenth century played an intermediary role in the process of capitalist accumulation of Argentina and Chile. Part of this surplus was accumulated in Manzanas. Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.212; Susana Bandieri, “Frontera comercial, crisis ganadera y despoblamiento rural. Una aproximación al estudio del origen de la burguesía tradicional neuquina,” Desarrollo Económico, 122, IDES, and “Entre lo micro y lo macro: la historia regional. Síntesis de una experiencia,” Entrepasados, 11.}

Their trans-regional character was one of their key strategies to overcome ups and downs in the regional, Atlantic and Pacific trade networks. It also assured permanent military allies and political prestige to head inter-ethnic alliances; shaping the political, economic and social development of these southern regions. This southern Confederacy expanded trade, agricultural activities and population in Northern Patagonia where Creole presence was minimal. In the following chapter, I will show how Llanquirúz incorporated Carmen de Patagones into his Confederacy which impacted the political and economic development of creoles in the region.
CHAPTER V

The Expansion of the Northern Patagonian Confederacy over Creoles at Carmen de Patagones: Kinship, Trade and Mestizaje

The incorporation of Carmen de Patagones into the Northern Patagonian Confederacy during the 1850s reveals the expansive and multiethnic character of the indigenous confederacies. Since the town was founded in 1779, Creoles depended on establishing inter-ethnic ties, peace and trade to survive in this distant location. But during the 1850s, the town became tributary to the confederacy and assured itself two decades of inter-ethnic peace. Unlike Calfucurá’s ambivalent relationship with Bahía Blanca, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy never hit Carmen de Patagones with a big malón after they agreed to peace in 1856. Creoles in the town did not organize military expeditions against their allied cacicatos either. The southern Confederacy prioritized peace, trade and creole government’s delivery of raciones as their principal diplomatic policy. Indigenous kinship and reciprocity logic strongly shaped Carmen de Patagones’s political, economic and social development. During the 1860s, this regional stability and prosperity strongly contrasted with frontier negotiations in other Pampas’ frontier posts and the Cuyo region.

In addition to economic and political convenience, the origin of this difference was not based on ethnic or moral differences among cacicatos in the Pampas and Northern Patagonia, but on experiencing different geopolitical contexts. For southern cacicatos, raiding other frontier posts in Buenos Aires was highly costly due to territorial distance as well as to the hegemonic
presence of the Pampas Confederacy. This same distance limited Creoles’ military expeditions over their lands. The persistent vulnerability faced by Carmen de Patagones induced its authorities and residents to favor peace with cacicatos over military confrontation. In addition, they benefited from the provision of raciones and the trade established with their allies. These particular inter-ethnic political and economic ties inserted northern Patagonia into the agro-export expansion developed in the Pampas during the 19th century.

By looking in detail at the negotiation and relationships established between the Northern Patagonian Confederacy and Carmen de Patagones, we will appreciate cacicatos’ impact on sedentary societies at the micro-level. The detailed local sources of information preserved by this town allow us to explore individual experiences as well as people that are rarely present in the official correspondence, such as women, soldiers, peons and children. This micro-analysis also helps to have a better sense of how daily life evolved in a world ruled by inter-ethnic relationships and nomadic and sedentary economies.\footnote{The MHRMFV preserved the town’s parish and justice records, local censuses, official and personal correspondence and memoirs from its foundation in 1779.} I will first look at the frontier negotiations during the 1850s, and later explore the economic and social impact in the region during the 1860s.

\textit{The Power of Kinship in Carmen de Patagones}

In 1778, the Spanish Crown sent expeditions to settle towns on Patagonia’s coast to prevent other Europeans from occupying the region.\footnote{Luiz, \textit{Relaciones fronterizas en Patagonia.}} Only Carmen de Patagones survived
after negotiating peace and trade with cacicatos in the region. Groups identified as Pampas, Tehuelches and Aucas incorporated the town into their trade-networks and seasonal migrations. Spanish families from Europe arrived in the town along with peons, prisoners and slaves from Buenos Aires, and military and naval corps. Its relative isolation from other Spanish posts increased their vulnerability to cacicatos’ power, but also gave them strong local political and diplomatic autonomy from state officials. Since the very beginning, local authorities and settlers had to provide gifts to local cacicatos as reciprocal gestures of friendship; these gifts were usually financed by the Viceroyalty interested in securing Spanish presence in Patagonia.

After independence, Patagones became part of Buenos Aires’s jurisdiction and survived the budget cuts and the political instability of the first half of the nineteenth century. By the 1850s, residents and new settlers had organized a Municipality which, along with the Juez de Paz, strongly challenged the political role of the Commanders sent to the town by the Buenos Aires’ government. Commanders’ success usually depended on their ability to form social networks and patron-client relationships with residents, as well as with local cacicatos. The town’s survival and prosperity became intimately linked with the relationships established with cacicatos who shared rights to the region, and others who visited as allies and competitors.

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739 Davies, “Relaciones inter-éticas en Carmen de Patagones (1779-1810),” and Alioto, Indios y ganado en la frontera.
740 Nacuzzi, Identidades Impuestas
741 Fernando Enrique Barba, Pobladores y empleados de Carmen de Patagones. 1779-1810 (Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de la Historia, 1997), and Juan José Biedma, Crónica histórica del Río Negro de Carmen de Patagones: 1774-1834 (Buenos Aires: Canter, 1905).
744 Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”
Carmen de Patagones increased its population from 471 people in 1821 to 1,239 people by 1836, and reached 2,300 people in 1867. Detailed study of these censuses show that its rapid growth by the 1830s was due to the incorporation of merchants from Buenos Aires and other provinces, prisoners sent as a form of punishment, permanent and temporary military and naval personnel, slaves and freemen from cargos captured in the Atlantic and indigenous people. During the period of strong intra-ethnic violence between 1780 and 1830, settlers also incorporated indigenous children brought by cacicatos as captives or as relatives looking for protection. They integrated these children and some adults as servants, labor and sometimes, family. In the late 1850s and during the 1860s, European immigrants, such as Germans, Italians, and British, also arrived in the town.

This demographic growth spurred economic development during the 19th century; the town was integrated into cacicatos and Buenos Aires’ Atlantic trade networks. The main economic activities were cattle ranching, and local and export-oriented trade (in cattle products, salt, feathers, leather and grains). Alliances with cacicatos allowed settlers to secure their own cattle, access cacicatos’ trade networks and utilize governments’ budget to foster frontier relationships.

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745 “Padrón del Establecimiento del Fuerte del Carmen y su población en el Río Negro de la Costa Patagónica, Carmen de Patagones, 1821,” and “Padrón de los vecinos y habitantes que existen en el Partido de Patagones, 1836”, in AGN. X. 12.3.7, and 25.2.4; “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal” and “Registro Estadístico de Buenos Aires, año 1867, Vol. 1, Carmen de Patagones,” in MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones.


747 Davies, “Rescates o compras de indígenas en Carmen de Patagones (1795-1836), un fenómeno particular de mestizaje,” in Farberman and Ratto, eds., Historias mestizas, pp.115-14.

Daily inter-ethnic encounters also furthered processes of *mestizaje* over social customs and practices. Creoles and indigenous people were integrated through kinship ties. People from diverse ethnicities, gender and age increasingly appear in Carmen de Patagones’s parish records’ on baptisms and matrimonies as: baptized individuals, parents, godparents and witnesses. Historians of frontier regions usually argue that these Catholic ceremonies sanctioned hereditary patterns and social networks that formalized socio-economic status and patron-client relationships crossed sometimes by ethnic lines. Nonetheless, the presence of indigenous people and ethnicities in these records had broader and varied implications.

Creoles’ extended use of kinship ties was also a consequence of indigenous groups’ imposition of kinship as the way to sanction alliances and create dependency. Real and fictive kinship tied specific indigenous and creole families as trade partners and political allies. These ties sometimes had specific diplomatic purposes and did not imply baptized caciques’ submission to their creole godparents. As works on captivity have shown in other frontier regions, indigenous forms of matrimony and *compadrazgo* were commonly intertwined with catholic symbolism and did not necessarily implied indigenous people’s subjugation.

Furthermore, the Catholic Church in Carmen de Patagones had a weak authoritative presence. Priests frequently complained of the lack of settlers’ respect and religiosity, and asked to be relieved. Like Commanders, their success depended on alliances with settlers. Unlike

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750 Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”


Chile, Argentine provinces rarely established missions in frontier regions.\textsuperscript{753} Local cacicatos had a short experience with Jesuits in Buenos Aires during the 1750s, and had some contact with missions in the Araucanía.\textsuperscript{754} However, their more concrete contact with Catholicism came from frontier settler’s religiosity. The Church in Patagones became a space of sociability and organization, and it worked as an instrument for both Creoles and indigenous people to symbolically sanction social networks crossed by Creole and indigenous customs.\textsuperscript{755}

In spite of a having a long history of daily inter-ethnic relationships and alliances, Carmen de Patagones’s survival was threatened by the escalating violence in cacicato’s lands during the late 1820s and early 1830s. Authorities feared local cacicatos’ alliance with the migrant Boroganos and Pincheiras, whom had hit the town in 1829. Cacique Chocorí, who used to frequently visit the town, was also persecuted by Rosas’s military campaigns in 1833-1834.\textsuperscript{756} During the 1840s, things started to calm down when Chocorí and Cheuqueta agreed on peace with the town.\textsuperscript{757} In this context, the arrival of Llanquitrúz and Chocorí in 1852 was welcomed. They provided them with gifts and raciones, and furthered trade. But Llanquitrúz decided to use violence to build his prestige and impose his confederate leadership over the town during Buenos

\textsuperscript{753} The important exception were the Franciscan Missions in Rio Cuarto during the 1870s. For Chile see: Rolf Foerster, \textit{Introducción a la religiosidad Mapuche} (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria S.A., 1993); Jorge Pinto Rodríguez, et. al., \textit{Misioneros en la Araucanía, 1600-1900: un capítulo de historia fronteriza en Chile} (Colombia: Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, 1990).


\textsuperscript{755} José Mateo, \textit{Población, parentesco y red social en la frontera. Lobos (provincia de Buenos Aires) en el siglo XIX} (Mar del Plata: Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, GIHRR, 2001)

\textsuperscript{756} D’Orbigny, \textit{Viaje por América Meridional}, vol. II; Ratto, “Indios amigos e indios aliados”, and Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}.

\textsuperscript{757} In 1863, Saygüeque reminded Murga that his father was in peace with the town since García was the Commander. “Valentín Saygüeque to Commander D. Julián Murga, Rio Limay, April 30th, 1863,” AM., vol. XXIV, pp.107-109. Also see: “Commander Benito Villar to the Minister of War and Navy Colonel Don Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, June 4th, 1856,” AGN X, 194.5.
Aires secession from the Argentine Confederacy. Like Calfucurá, he was also confronting Buenos Aires’ suspension of raciones and attempts to advance over Catriel’s lands.

In 1855, Llanquitrúz joined Calfucurá in his malones over Buenos Aires and apparently participated in a big malón on Carmen de Patagones, but had warned creole residents to save their families. The residents and settlers in charge of the Municipality were fighting with the newly arrived Commander Julián Murga for the control of military resources and political jurisdictions, and knew that local forces could not confront cacicatos’ power. Hence, when the Commander blamed Cacique Llanquitrúz for the malón, the municipal authorities did not want to have the cacique blamed for what had happened. The correspondence and stories collected by travelers suggest that Llanquitrúz participated in the malón and, like the municipal authorities, wanted to overthrow Murga. This hypothesis is reinforced by the fact that Murga and the government broke reciprocal obligations with Llanquitrúz by cutting off the raciones and replacing the Cacique’s godparent (Commander Fourmantín) with a new bureaucrat who had neither kin ties with the local residents and caciques, nor felt any support from them.

Llanquitrúz’s actions ended up impacting creole government’s responses and procedures: the government of Buenos Aires deposed Murga and sent Commander Benito Villar as his

758 While the Salinero raided Azul, Llanquitrúz raided the Estancia San Antonio de Iraola. In June 1855, an alliance of caciques hit Patagones taking between 1,000 and 1,500 heads of cattle, which represented a 10% of the cattle registered in the census of 1854. The Commander that replaced Murga informed the Ministry of War and Navy that Llanquitrúz had warned families that he was going to raid in 1855. For Patagones, see: MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” and “Commander Benito Villar to the Minister of War and Navy Don Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, May 8th, 1856,” AGN X, 19.4.5. For the rest of Buenos Aires, see: de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional,” and Vezub, “Llanquitrúz y la “máquina de guerra” mapuche-Tehuelche.”

759 Llanquitrúz had between 400 and 900 lanzas and Patagones’ military force was around 90 soldiers according to the census, and the total population of all men over 16 years old was 400 men in 1854. “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” MHRMFV., Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones.


761 Claráz, Diario de Viaje de Exploración al Chubut, 1865-1866.
replacement. Murga stayed in the town and learnt to build social networks with creole residents and cacicatos, and was able then to recover the command in 1863, and remain in this position for almost a decade. He became close to some of the important families in the town: Rial, Ocampo, the surgeon Barajas and Andres Aguirre, a merchant from Buenos Aires. He god-parented Barajas’s daughter and married in second nuptials Antonia Rial in 1868. Murga also started getting close to Cacique Llanquitrúz’s people. Together with creole residents, he helped the new Commander Villar to negotiate with Llanquitrúz and his allies after another episode of violence:

In June 1856, once more Llanquitrúz used violence to impose his power and prestige on the town and among allied cacicatos. He led confederate allies in a *malón* over Patagones and headed to the headquarters asking Commander Villar to negotiate peace. According to Villar, the cacique expressed pride in his military conquests: “dressed with a rich but ridiculous uniform with spurs, a round beaver hat and a saber with silver decorations…” Highlighting his prestige, Llanquitrúz claimed his victories over Iraola, and asked for 10 cannon shots to let his people know that the *malón* was over. Surprisingly for the commander, “numerous people” in the

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762 Murga’s son Benjamin married Corina Ocampos, daughter of Eusebio Ocampos. Ocampos was a municipal authority and had many properties and animals in the town. MHRMFV, *Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal.*

763 Antonia was the daughter of Librada Paz and Alejos Rial, son of the first Spanish settlers Josef Rial and Francisca Sanchez who became one of the prominent families in the town, with one of the largest holdings of properties and animals, and were also involved in multiple kinship ties with cacicatos since colonial times. MHRMFV, “Libros de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen,” and *Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854,” and “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal.”

764 He also god-parented an indigenous person in 1854. MHRMFV, “Libros de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen,” books 1842-1860.

765 Vezub, “Llanquitruz y la “máquina de guerra” mapuche-Tehuelche” and Varela and Manara, "La construcción de poderes indígenas frente a la expresión estatal."

766 “Commander Benito Villar to the Minister of War and Navy Colonel Don Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, May 8th, 1856,” AGN X, 19.4.5.
town followed the cacique and received him with: “big demonstrations of joy.” Villar added that the Cacique: “recognized his friends, hugged them, cried, [and] said at every moment how happy he was to be surrounded again by friends.” Villar’s descriptions show that ties with creole residents transcended the use of violence, and that Llanquitrúz had gained an impressive regional prestige and power.

Llanquitrúz continued manipulating the peace negotiations to his convenience. Instead of following bureaucratic procedures and the commander’s demands, he stayed with his creole friends and relatives for several days, following the logics of reciprocity and gift-giving in parliaments and meetings. He also demanded to negotiate peace in person with people whom were his allies and kin, like the creoles Pedro García and José Rial. To interact with the commander, he used correspondence, wrote by his secretary, and intermediaries. According to Commander Villar, he made “pretentious” and “unreasonable” demands. He claimed gifts of specific amounts and types, and he positioned himself as the main negotiator of allied caciques. He even wrote a letter with his own blood reinforcing, according to Vezub, the ritual aspect of blood to seal pacts.

Infuriated by Llanquitrúz’s display of power, Villar imprisoned some of his messengers. Nonetheless, creole residents immediately intervened to prevent the cacique’s revenge. They wrote a letter to Llanquitrúz where they clearly submitted themselves to his will and logic. They apologized for Villar’s actions, and praised his regional leadership by comparing him with

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767 The Rials were another important family in the town; they had extended properties, cattle, political posts and kinship ties with indigenous people. See: Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos hermanos,” p.62.
768 “Commander Benito Villar to the Minister of War and Navy Colonel Don Bartolomé Mitre, Patagones, May 8th, 1856,” AGN X, 19.4.5
769 Vezub, “Llanquitrúz y la “máquina de guerra” mapuche-Tehuelche.”
770 “Our beloved Yanquetruz, Patagones June 5th, 1856” (copy of the original without signatures), AGN X, 19.4.5.
Calfucurá’s negotiation with Bahía Blanca. They praised Llanquitrúz’s historic kin ties with Cacique Negro to legitimize his power in the region as well as to clarify the legitimacy of the town. Negro was the cacique that apparently “sold” part of his land to the Spanish crown so that it could settle Carmen de Patagones.\textsuperscript{771} In this letter, Creoles posed the following question to Llanquitrúz: “and, descending you from the blood of those noble Indians and generous friends, could you be our enemy for more time? We do not think so.” They also refused to accept the restitution of the stolen cattle; they knew that Llanquitrúz could not force his allies to give back the stolen cattle. Furthermore, Creoles subordinated themselves to a position of dependent tributaries by requesting the cacique to sell, in the town, the stolen and any other cattle, leather or anything they had in the future. They also sent him a gift of 5,000 pesos. Finally, Creoles framed their alliance with kinship logic. They ended the letter saying that they were looking forward to the day in which they: “would hug again as brothers [and] your families return to live with ours (...) and all useful men would help in our work and become part of our benefit.” These exclamations were clearly pointing at a long history of mutual beneficial economic relationships and kin ties where the ambiguity between the equality and subordination among “brothers,” like in labor relationships, was also present.

After this letter, Commander Villar surrendered. He ended up releasing the prisoners and started using the language of kinship politics. The following correspondence between the cacique and Villar presents an alliance between men where the hug expressed friendship and peace. Gift-giving and restitution of some stolen cattle took place and kinship practices were extended as well. Llanquitrúz sent his brother Chingoleo to the town as a guarantee of permanent peace. To

\textsuperscript{771}This last Cacique descended from other crucial regional leaders, the Cacique Bravo and Cacique Chanyl. Negro also had links with the Andes Mountains. For an analysis on these caciques: see Nacuzzi, \textit{Identidades impuestas}, and Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}.  

further future family ties, Chingoleo took his family with him. Llanquitrúz’s son joined later, and
the cacique asked the Commander to take care of him as if he were his own. Chingoleo was
baptized and god-parented by Commander Villar and his wife, and adopted the Commander’s
name.\textsuperscript{772} In the following years, Benito Chingoleo Villar and Llanquitrúz baptized several of
their children and god-parented other indigenous and creole couples’ children in the town.\textsuperscript{773}

Although peace was set through oral means and reciprocal gestures, Llanquitrúz accepted
signing a written treaty with the government of Buenos Aires on March 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1857.\textsuperscript{774} This
document was produced by creole authorities and it presents an ambiguous perception on
Llanquitrúz’s land rights and independent authority.\textsuperscript{775} On the one hand, it recognized him as a
legitimate possessor of all the territory from San Javier to the Pampas. It declared him:
“Commander in Chief of all the territory of the Pampas adjacent to Patagones and where he is
now” (art.5). It also mentions that Llanquitrúz acknowledged that his ancestors had sold the land
from Patagones up to San Javier to the Spanish Crown (art.2). These two clauses present a clear
territorial division of two sovereign polities. Using the title of commander in chief also made
Llanquitrúz an equal to frontier commanders. Nonetheless, other articles accentuated the
provincial government’s expansive intentions. Article 6 required the cacique’s military service if
the government decided to settle along the Negro River. Article 3 demanded the cacique make

\textsuperscript{772} MHRMFV, “Libro de Bautismos de la Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860.”
\textsuperscript{773} For example, with Mazal Chuichete, Llanquitruz baptized their 3 year old daughter María Dolores Delfina in June
27\textsuperscript{th}, 1858. With Pichichi Caljuitrui, he baptized their daughter Aniceta on July 6\textsuperscript{th}, 1858. With Machai, they
baptized their 5 year old son Francisco Fourmantín in February 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1859, who was godparented by the ex-
Commander Fourmatíns son and his wife. Llanquitruz also god-parented Eduardo Gutierrez’s and Rufina
Martínez’s daughter in 1858. Chingoleo and his wife Carmen Calaja baptized their daughter in 1860. She was god
parented by the Entraigas and León families. The Cacique then god-parented a daughter of Cacique Apolinar
Maciel and Mónica Cinchel, and a son of Manuel Linares and Josefa Rial. MHRMFV, “Libro de Bautismos de la
Parroquia Nuestra Señora del Carmen, 1842-1860.”
\textsuperscript{774} AGN, X. 27.7.6, Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la Frontera}, pp. 289-291.
\textsuperscript{775} Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}, p.134.
available to the government 13 leagues of land on the northern shores of the Río Negro from San Javier north into the Pampas in order to form a town called Guardia de Obligado. The treaty indicated that the cacique was going to govern the town but, in article 7, it stated that he had to permanently settle in Valcheta (55 leagues south of Carmen de Patagones) with 80 soldiers and 8 caciques. This treaty shows the persistent contradiction present in creole authorities’ policies, either recognizing cacicatos as sovereign polities with equal power or seeing them as potential subordinates of the province. It also obscured its tributary condition as a provider of raciones to cacicatos by presenting them as “salaries” and “gifts” to people under state military structure.

After the treaty was signed, the clauses that aimed at subordinating cacicatos were not applied. Guardia de Obligado was never established and Llanquirúz and his allies continued living under their own rules and customs. Peace and free trade were respected, and the province of Buenos Aires ended subordinating itself to a tributary condition despite persistent tensions with Llanquirúz. In July 1857, Villar complained that the cacique was always drunk and had not settled in Valcheta as the treaty required. Apparently, Llanquirúz had claimed that it was hard to bring his people all the way from Manzanas during winter. Villar told provincial authorities that he would not give the cacique his salaries and raciones until he settled in Valcheta. He also asked for soldiers and horses in case he had to attack Llanquirúz. As Buenos Aires’ authorities were dealing with the Argentine Confederacy’s pressures and the Pampas Confederacy’s malones they did not comply with Villar’s demand. They asked him to continue on good terms with Llanquirúz. Once again, Llanquirúz’s relatives intervened. In August, the ex-commander and Llanquirúz’s godparent Fourmantín wrote to provincial authorities saying that the cacique

776 AGN. 27.7.6, July, 20th, 1857.
was respecting the agreement. He indicated that Llanquitrúz had gone with his weapons and two soldiers to fetch his people and left 13 Indians, all his clothes, ornaments, mares and animals in the town as a guarantee of peace. Fourmantín added that part of the cacique’s people were in Valcheta living in peace; so the government should send the salaries and raciones. He also mentioned that some important Tehuelche caciques had come to the town called by Llanquitrúz, and he had provided them with abundant gifts to reach peace agreements with them too. Llanquitrúz was extending creoles’ tributary condition to his allied Tehuelches.

Although Llanquitrúz did not end up permanently settling in Valcheta, the province of Buenos Aires started financing the raciones and gifts provided by the town to the cacique and his allies. A record from 1857 shows that during October and November, raciones represented 35% of the military budget of Carmen de Patagones. Other sources indicate the continuing provisions made to Llanquitrúz and his allies in 1858. Probably, Buenos Aires’s government agreed to spend these important sums and respect its material obligations with the Northern Patagonian Confederacy due to their plans to attack Salinas Grandes in 1858. Furthermore, they were expecting Llanquitrúz to stop Calfucurá from moving west. However, Llanquitrúz never attacked nor stopped Calfucurá. The creole government had to continue under a tributary position even after Llanquitrúz’s death in 1859 and the unification of the provinces under the Argentine Republic in 1862. During the 1860s and 1870s, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy kept bringing more allies to the town and demanding more treaties and raciones.

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777 AGN. 27.7.6, August, 7th, 1857.
778 Correspondence shows that Llanquiruiz traveled to Manzanas and Pitrufquén in 1858 and to Bahía Blanca in 1859, where he was killed. His successor Chingoleo did not settle in Valcheta, but in San Javier.
779 “Nota para el Ministro de Hacienda sobre “los suministros dados a la guarnición de Patagones e “indios amigos” por el proveedor Don Andrés Aguirre en los meses de octubre y noviembre del presente año, 23 de Noviembre de 1858,” in AGN X, 9.4.5.
780 In February 1858, Villar told the provincial authorities that he had spent 2,500 pesos in gifts for Saygüeque and Llanquiruiz. AGN., X., 27.7.6, February, 3rd, 1858.
Although kinship ties already shaped creole and indigenous people’s lives in the region, the pact between Llanquitrúz and the town fueled the use of marriages, baptisms and compadrazgos to structure the town’s social life and hierarchies. While the higher ranks among cacicatos and creole elites used these ties to increase their political and economic power, subaltern creoles and indigenous people worked through these ties to achieve social mobility. For example, the Rial and Crespo families built kinship ties with Llanquitrúz’s lineage and followers, and worked as intermediaries for the most important caciques. Some indigenous subalterns adopted these families’ surnames to seal symbolic and reciprocal relationships. These links contributed to strengthen the Rial and Crespo’s political and military local power during their conflicts with commanders and other local families. As I have already mentioned, caciques and capitanejos’ ties with creole families also increased their political prestige and access to further resources and trade.

Subaltern people in general also gained creole and indigenous authorities’ protection by building kinship ties. It is important to mention that censuses show that indigenous people were not incorporated to the creole society on a massive scale. Cacicatos offered economic, political

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781 Davies Lenoble, “El impacto de la política cacical en la frontera.”
782 For example, ten out of the 94 people registered in 1866 under Crespo, were identified as “indios, chinas or trigueños.” Seventeen were identified as “negros” and eight as “pardos.” In addition to indigenous people, the Crespo family who had come to the town from Spain since colonial times, integrated several free-men from the slave ships captured in the Atlantic near Patagones during the first decades of the 19th century. Finally, the lists of indigenous people under the allied caciques also show their adoption of creoles surnames. MHRMFV, “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal;” “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz al Comandante de Carmen de Patagones Benito Villar, Potrero Chico, June 6th, 1856 (II),” AGN., X, 19.4.56, in Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, pp. 276-277; and “Lista de los indios amigos (…) al Cacique Benito Chingoleo, 1862,” AV, Revistas Militares.
783 For example, Benito Crespo became an important intermediary of the lineage, and administered their raciones. He managed to remain as the Judge of Peace for several years in spite of permanent confrontations with Commander Murga. The Rial family also covered some of the most important positions in the Municipality, military and local police. Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes,” and Francisco Pita, Remembranzas.
784 See the example of Lucho, the son of Pato from Cacique Maciel’s followers and other cases in: “Fontana, Francisco por robo,” and “Rial, Florentino por robo,” in MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, nos. 733 and 707.
and social prosperity and attracted multi-ethnic subalterns as well.\footnote{Justice records and official correspondence frequently mention creoles living or staying in cacicatos’ tolderías, participating in malones and trading. For examples on creole desertors, see: “Desertores que pasaron a los indios, February 28th, 1856,” AGN., X, 19-4-5, and MHRMFV, Copiador del fuerte de Carmen de Patagones 1874-1876.} Local justice records show how kinship ties shaped judges’ treatment and rulings over the accused and the victim. Sentences and rulings took into account both indigenous and creole norms and practices.\footnote{Ratto showed that the justice system in the Pampas’ frontier region worked between indigenous and creole judicial practices, and its procedures and sentences were shaped by the state of the inter-ethnic relationships at that time. In Patagones, sentences also involved material and symbolical restitution, imprisonment and military and community services. Ratto, “Los caminos de la Justicia. Negociaciones y penalización en los conflictos interétnicos en la campaña bonaerense (primera mitad del siglo XIX),” Farberman and Ratto, Historias mestizas, pp.145-168, and MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones.} God-parents also defended their god-sons and payed for their release.\footnote{For other frontier regions, see: Bjerg, “Vínculos mestizos,” and José Mateo, Población, parentesco y red social en la frontera. Lobos (provincia de Buenos Aires) en el siglo XIX (Mar del Plata, Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, GIHRR, 2001).} In addition, these ties also guaranteed subalterns’ access to cacicato and creole resources, labor, family and sociability.

Inter-ethnic kinship ties also challenged ethnicity as the main mechanism to create identities in Carmen de Patagones. Kinship ties became more important markers than ethnic labels to define people’s identities and social hierarchies. This phenomenon also challenged catholic kinship practices as forms of “civilizing” societies. In contrast to the colonial period and other rural and frontier populations in our time period, sources in Carmen de Patagones show that local authorities did not try to prohibit or condemn inter-ethnic relationships that did not follow the catholic model, such as polygamy, cohabitation and casual sex. Instead, they tried to regulate these ties according to creole and indigenous practices and customs.\footnote{Indigenous people in this region of study had two ways of celebrating matrimonies. The first, involved an arrangement between families, the fiancé’s payment of a dowry to the future father in law, and gift-giving and celebration between the families and the community. The second was the “kidnaping” of a woman by a man. Although sometimes this practice was performed without the women’s consent, in most cases it was done with previous agreement but was implemented as if it were a kidnap. It was usually used by men with not enough resources to pay a dowry or men disliked by the women’s family. Nevertheless, the couple needed the family and}
polygamous (polyandry and polygyny) relationships and serial monogamy. These practices were registered in local parish records. In addition to creole men having relationships and children with diverse creole and indigenous women, Cacique Maciel’s women had ties with multiple creole and indigenous men. His sister or daughter had at least two daughters, Catalina and Paolina, with Manuel Ureña. Manuel was an indigenous person adopted and raised by the important Spanish settlers Blas Ureña and María Román as their legitimate son. While he was having children with Chilachila Maciel, Manuel was married to the Spanish Rosa Velazco since 1832 and had nine children. He owned a house in the town and built prestige among Creoles.

Catalina Ureña had children with the Creoles José Silveira, José Desalivello and Juan Oga during the 1850s. Although these multiple relationships could be casual, these indigenous women had an important status among cacicatos and lived under their command. These relationships built strong ties with important indigenous people and creole families and, as it was argued for other regions, could be cases of polyandry or serial monogamy.

Caciques and capitanes with their wives and daughters also intervened in the creation, maintenance and rupture of Creoles’ matrimonies and cohabitations. For example, the capitanes Manuel Linares (Miguel’s brother) sheltered in his torderías the fifteen year old Isabel Sosa, brought there by his creole father Loreto Sosa and Manuel’s brother Ildefonso Linares. Loreto Sosa wanted Isabel to break her cohabitation arrangement with Carmelo Márquez, who had community’s final acceptance to continue with the relationship. Tomás Guevara, Costumbres Judiciales. Enseñanzas de los Araucanos (Santiago de Chile, Imprenta Cervantes Bandera 50, 1904); Argeri, De guerreros a delincuentes.

790 See: Davies Lenoble, “El impacto de la política cacical en la frontera.”
791 SGU, “Índice de Bautismos (1808-1950) de la Iglesia Nuestra Señora del Carmen,” Film 1107621.
792 SGU, “Matrimonios (1780-1884),” Film 1106463, No. 233.
793 SGU, “Índice de Bautismos (1808-1950) de la Iglesia Nuestra Señora del Carmen,” Film 1107621.
794 “Paz Hilario por homicidio,” MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, no. 658.
795 Bechis, “Matrimonio y política en la génesis de dos parcialidades mapuche durante el siglo XIX.”
already payed Sosa 500 pesos, and unite her instead to Cayetano Roche. Roche was going to pay Sosa five *fanegas* of wheat and indicated that he wanted her “forever.” Although we do not know Isabel’s preference, the record indicates that the capitanejo Manuel Linares questioned Sosa for not following Isabel’s consent. From another side, the *Juez de paz* was more interested in sentencing Sosa’s violation of the agreements he had settled with these men, rather than the type of relationship established between Isabel and creole men. Nonetheless, he finally accused him of “degradation treatments” and took away Sosa and his wife’s custody over their remaining daughters.

This case also provides some clues of the ways in which women tried to challenge creole and indigenous patriarchal structures. The record mentions that another daughter, Emilia, decided to cohabitate with Juan Celarrayán instead of a man chosen by her parents because of his wealth. We also find other cases in which women of different ethnicities intervened in kinship relationships. For example, a woman dissolved her matrimony because her husband did not provide for her household. Later, she denounced her new partner for mistreating her. The indigenous women Petrona Rial also used her kinship ties with Cacique Inacayal to avoid creole justice. Petrona was accused of killing her husband Manuel Ledesma in 1862, who was registered in the 1854 census as a white soldier from Santiago de Chile. Inacayal wrote to

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796 “Sosa, Loreto y otros por pelea,” MHRMFV, *Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones*, no. 737
797 “Ruperto Ciríaco por asesinato,” MHRMFV, *Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones*, no. 705.
798 MHRMFV., “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854.”
President Mitre to avoid Petrona’s imprisonment.\textsuperscript{799} She remained free, living in the town and, in 1871, denounced the creole Pascual Crespo for hurting one of her sons, Cirilo, during a dance.\textsuperscript{800}

Therefore, women could participate in the creation, maintenance and rupture of kinship ties and appeal to cacicatos’ and creoles’ norms and authorities in order to improve their life condition. Although the number of women with properties, animals and cultivation plots was always much lower than the number of men. Women of different ethnicities appear in the local censuses as owners of these resources.\textsuperscript{801} Moreover, among the landowners registered in 1854 there were some servants and laundry women.

Finally, the impact of kinship ties over Carmen de Patagones’s social structure also contributed to maintaining the frontier peace attained since 1857. The increasing integration of Creoles into cacicatos’ kinship pushed everyone in northern Patagonia to study carefully their actions in relationship with the “other.” Cacicatos’ attacks and Creoles’ military expeditions would mean betraying relatives, violating reciprocal obligations and endangering the maintenance of people’s privileges and businesses that had been gained through these ties. Daily acts of violence were usually the consequence of conflicts that kinship relationships engendered.\textsuperscript{802}

In conclusion, Carmen de Patagones’s level of dependence on cacicatos in northern Patagonia became formalized by the incorporation of the town into the Confederacy led consecutively by the Caciques Llanquitrúz, Chingoleo and Saygüeque. Allies were expected to

\textsuperscript{799} Although her case was not found in Patagones’ criminal records, it was mentioned in the civil records and in Mitre’s correspondance. MHRMFV., \textit{Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones}, “Cuestiones civiles,” September 16th, 1862, no. 4600; “Inacayal to Mitre, Patagones, August 2nd, 1863,” AM., vol. XXIV, p.111, and “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal”.

\textsuperscript{800} “Crespo, Pascual por heridas,” MHRMFV., \textit{Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones}, box 6, no. 748, (1871).

\textsuperscript{801} MHRMFV., “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854” and “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión Municipal don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal.”

\textsuperscript{802} See the local justice records: MHRMFV, \textit{Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones.}
further trade, military and diplomatic assistance, social and kin ties. In moments of vulnerability, such as the 1850s, Creoles had to accept the Confederacy’s rules and power. When peace became threatened, such as when Llanquirúz was assassinated in Bahía Blanca in 1859 or when Commander Orqueda’s force attacked Saygüeque’s small group of allies in 1863, local authorities and caciques negotiated in parliaments and agreed on material compensations to avoid military confrontations. Tensions were always present, but no major military confrontation or malón took place after 1856. Unlike most frontier towns in Buenos Aires, Carmen de Patagones had entered the stability and peaceful era assured by the Northern Patagonian Confederacy.

Incorporating Sedentary Cattle Ranchers and Traders into a Nomadic Pastoralist Economy

The incorporation of Carmen de Patagones into the indigenous Confederacy also had economic implications. Political stability furthered economic transactions and expanded trans-regional trade networks. Northern Patagonia started participating in the demographic, commercial and productive expansion of the Pampas. Creole settlers incorporated some of the nomadic pastoralists’ logic into their sedentary ranching economy. Cacicatos’ economies were also shaped by this close contact; indigenous people accessed Creoles’ resources and protection by appealing to state laws when it was convenient. The Confederacy’s major economic success by incorporating Patagones into its polity was the expansion of trade in the region.

After Llanquirúz, Chingoleo settled his principal tolderías in San Javier (30km from Patagones) and forced creole authorities to recognize cacicatos’ control over land. Although we
do not have a detailed description of his *tolderías*, parish records identify the spot as the residence of many indigenous people who participated in baptisms and marriages in town.\textsuperscript{803} The national government also recognized the caciques’ jurisdictions that were agreed upon in the treaty of 1857.\textsuperscript{804} Following a capitalist conceptualization of private property, the Surveyor Díaz y Heusser registered certain plots of land between San Javier and Sauce Blanco (up the Río Negro) under Cacique Chingoleo, Miguel Linares and Manuel Linares in 1865 (Appendix B).

According to the cacicatos’ logic, caciques and *capitanejos* did not own land, but organized the access and use of communal lands according to lineages’ historical rights. Close relationships with Creoles and confederate leaders’ ambitions started transforming some of these norms. Díaz y Heusser’s map indicates that some plots were sold by Chingoleo to the commercial house owned by Commander Murga’s brother and Aguirre. The surveyor also registered “Italian Families” on other plots. According to the municipal authorities, Chingoleo had sold some land to the commercial firm “Murga and Aguirre” and rented part of his lands to creole and Italian settlers, who had migrated to the region during the 1860s.\textsuperscript{805} However, these sales and rentals did not only lack legality under creole rules and norms, but were also temporary.\textsuperscript{806} Sources seem to indicate that Chingoleo negotiated the access to his cacicatos’

\textsuperscript{803} See parish records in AHRMFV.
\textsuperscript{804} AGN, X. 27.7.6.
\textsuperscript{806} The municipals asked the Buenos Aires’ authorities if the cacique could rent and sell lands that were not his legal property, but had been given to his cacicato by treaties. As I described in the 1857 treaty, this problem was the consequence of creole authorities’ lack of consensus and coherence regarding accepting cacicatos’ territorial dominions. For similar problems with *indios amigos* in Buenos Aires, see: Victoria Pedrotta, Sol Lanteri and Laura Duguine, “En busca de la tierra prometida. Modelos de colonización estatal en la frontera sur bonaerense durante el siglo XIX,” *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos*, on-line 5 de octubre del 2012. URL: http://nuevomundo.revues.org/64168.
lands with these families in exchange for material and symbolic compensations. Following the cacicatos’ logic, the rent had to be redistributed amongst Chingoleo’s followers. We do not know if this norm was respected by the cacique. Nevertheless, in a context of increasing hierarchical control, he probably played between the capitalist and reciprocal logic to enhance his power. This example also shows that cacicatos gained more economic benefits and dependents out of renting than out of permanently occupying land.

Cacicatos also started accessing lands and resources in areas under provincial jurisdiction. Near Carmen de Patagones, Llanquirúz owned a corral. It was taken care of by the Linares family and protected by the town’s authorities. In this spot he stocked the cattle he received as raciones. Chingoleo also had a house in the town. In 1863, Commander Murga indicated to President Mitre that he ordered workers to construct a house on the southern shores of the river and that had to be: “comfortable enough for him [Chingoleo] to live in and host friendly caciques who would come to trade.” One of Chingoleo’s wives, Carmen, ended up claiming the legal title of this house during the 1870s in order to sell it and buy a smaller one and pay for the treatment of her illness. Finally, indigenous subalterns also acquired resources by selling animal hides and ostrich feathers, which were exported by the town’s commercial houses, and worked as agricultural laborers or ranchers in creole estancias.

As I mentioned, creole residents and new settlers expanded their ranches and commercial houses between Carmen de Patagones and Segunda Angostura under cacicatos’ permission and

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807 A judicial document of November 25th, 1857 indicates that Linares was taking care of Llanquirúz’s mares. “Paz, Benito y otros por cuatrería,” MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, no. 655.
809 MHRMFV, HCD, num.327
810 See the local census and correspondence in MHRMFV and AV.
personal agreements to temporary use their lands. As dependent allies, Creoles could access these areas if they engaged in reciprocal obligations with cacicatos, made concrete by gifts, favors, labor and intermediation with creole authorities. The most successful creole merchants and ranchers who accessed these lands along the Río Negro, such as Crespo, Rial, and García, had a long history of kinship ties with caciques. To some extent, economic prosperity and social mobility in Patagones started depending, like nomadic pastoralists, on kinship, seasonal residences and shared lands.

Moreover, patron-client relationships between powerful creole families and subalterns were also increasingly framed with kinship ties and symbols. Some of creole ranchers’ labor adopted their patron-godparents’ surnames. Justice records also show that creole subalterns alternated their residence between the town, estancias and tolderías. They hunted and worked as messengers, carriers and lanzas for the allied cacicatos as well.

The incorporation of Carmen de Patagones into the Northern Patagonian Confederacy also brought a significant expansion of all types of economic exchanges benefiting both Creoles and indigenous people. From colonial times, settlers bought horses and cattle from cacicatos in the region. Their permanent scarcity was evident in Llanquitrúz’s treaty of 1857, which stated that if the town could not provide the cacique with 50 mares per month, they would need to substitute 50 pesos per mare. Cacicatos also provided horses especially trained for horse racing.

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811 Descalzi’s map of the Río Negro in 1833 shows how some settlers claimed rights to corrals, islands and lands along the river up to Segunda Angostura. It also shows some of the cacicatos’ toldos and corrals from that time, such as Cayupán. “Plan diario de la exploración del Río Negro de Patagones levantado por don Nicolas Descalzi por orden del Brigadier General don Juan Manuel de Rosas y segundado por el piloto de la nave “encarnación” don Edmundo Elsegood, año 1833,” Departamento de Estudios Historicos de la Secretaria de Marina, copy provided to the MHREN, 1964.
812 Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”
813 MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones.
814 Alioto, Indios y ganado en la frontera; Davies, “Relaciones inter-étnicas en Carmen de Patagones;” Luiz, Relaciones fronterizas en Patagonia, and Bustos, “Indios y blancos, sal y ganado más allá de la frontera.”
as well as animal hides, textiles, salt and ostrich feathers, which were exported. In return, indigenous people received goods such as alcohol, yerba mate, tobacco, fancy clothes, silver bits and objects, as well as flour and cotton cloth. Judicial and municipal sources from the town reveal that indigenous people frequently visited merchant stores to sell their goods, ask for loans, and even bet in card games and horse racing.

Under these conditions, it was not surprising that when Llanquitrúz raided the town in 1856, creole residents asked the cacique not only to keep the stolen animals, but also to sell them back to them as with any other product they could bring to the town. Free trade was usually the topic of the first clause in the treaties signed with confederate cacicatos during the 1860s. According to Murga, during 1864, between six and seven caciques accompanied by a minimum of 50 Indians came to trade in the town and receive gifts. He explained to the War Minster: “the feathers and quillangos [small animal hides], exportable goods, which we brought this year, have the value of approximately 1,000,000 pesos.” He also clarified that, unlike other frontiers, the cacicatos that visited Patagones did not bring animals taken during malones thus, their trade was all “legal.” Trade was also extended to southern Patagonia by Tehuelches visiting the town as well as by the Navy Commander Piedrabuena’s visit and negotiations with Tehuenches in the south. In association with Isaias Crespo’s business, Piedrabuena bought salt and ostrich feathers from these southern groups to take to Buenos Aires and export them.

816 MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones.
817 “Our beloved Yanquetrúz, Patagones June 5th, 1856” (copy of the original without signatures), AGN., X, 19.4.5.
818 AV., Frontera, box. 1, no. 778 (copy).
819 MHRMFV, Piedra Buena.
The expansion of frontier exchanges also included the business of *raciones* and gifts. The provincial and national governments assigned specific budgets for the provision of *raciones* and gifts, which were usually bought from local residents and settlers. The provincial and national governments accepted high expenditures probably to prevent the Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s alliance with Calfucurá, and the destruction of Carmen de Patagones. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, during the 1860s, the budget for gifts in Patagones was around 60,000 pesos per year, and the treaties signed with Caciques Saygüéque, Huinacabal and Chagallo cost the national government a minimum of 115,101 pesos per year. In addition, Cacique Chingoleo received *raciones* agreed on in his 1859 treaty, and groups of Tehuelches started receiving their own after signing their own treaties in the late 1860s.

Taking these important budgets into account, it is not surprising that local authorities and some creole ranchers and merchants insistently tried to preserve these agreements, increase the budgets, set high prices and become involved in the provision of *raciones*. As I will show in chapter 7, Commander Murga was involved in treaty negotiations during the 1860s, and tried to change Reuquecurá’s supply location from Bahía Blanca to Carmen de Patagones. His brother’s commercial firm “Murga y Aguirre” was in charge of part of these provisions during the 1850s and 1860s. When Murga became the provisionary Commander of the Southern Coast, Bahía Blanca and Patagones in 1870, he also tried to negotiate peace with Calfucurá and administer the provisions of his *raciones*.

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820 During the 1850s, Buenos Aires costs for *raciones* was approximately of 394,080 pesos per year. Belloni, “La política indígena del estado de Buenos Aires en la frontera sur.”

821 See my analysis of these budgets in chapter 7.

822 For example, as I mentioned before, the ex-commander Fourmantín wrote to Buenos Aires authorities demanding the provision of *raciones* to Llanquirú. Also, municipal records inform that residents and settlers refused to sell their cattle to the headquarters until higher prices were settled. MHRMFV, “Libro de actas de las sesiones de la Comisión Municipal Provisoria de Patagones.”

823 AV, *Frontera*, box 2, and SHE, *Frontera con los indios*, nos. 454, 555, 1148, 2371 and 5770.
Although the Northern Patagonian Confederacy did not receive the exact amounts settled by treaty every year, local correspondence frequently mentions the provision of salaries, mares, raciones and clothes to the allied caciques. Military archives preserved at least eight military inspection lists between 1861 and 1867, which probably indicate the date in which the local authorities provided the raciones. In 1865, the budget and distribution of these provisions was formally registered in the Memorias de Hacienda, but with many imprecisions. For salaries, the “company of Patagones” received between 2,500 and 7,000 pesos between 1865 and 1873. These salaries were much lower than what was indicated by treaty, but we must consider that the currency changed during the 1860s. Other allied caciques also appear under a general category of “raciones for the friendly tribes,” next to Calfucurá, the Ranqueles and other cacicatos, without specifying the amounts received per year. The expenditures included goods, animals and clothes. In 1866 and 1867, expenditures were 78,904 and 84,636 pesos respectively. In 1869 and 1870, allied cacicatos from the south started appearing in this category such as Chagallo, Huinacabal, Saygüeque and the Tehuelches. Costs increased to approximately 96,900 pesos and 127,787 pesos for those years. Allied cacicatos also received gifts, mares, goods, and clothes that might have been categorized under “Indians’ clothes.”

Raciones fueled dynamic and growing regional exchanges. Their provision and distribution involved multiple exchanges framed within capitalist and reciprocal logic.

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824 AV., Revistas Militares, years 1861, 1862 (two), 1863, 1864 (two), 1865 and 1867.
825 The Memorias de Hacienda does not categorize the different cacicatos in the same way every year and it does not indicate the exact expenditure for each group per year. These memoires also do not seem to include some of the expenditures in gifts, animals, goods and clothes.
826 The years 1868 and 1874-1877 did not specify the amount spent in Patagones.
827 AV., Frontera, box. 1, no. 892 (copy).
828 In the section “clothing,” the memories indicate a budget for 800 outfits for “Indians” at 28 pesos each per year. This would imply a total of 22,400 pesos spent in cacicatos’ outfits per year. Also, Commander Murga indicated that Patagones had a Budget of 60,000 pesos per year for gifts (independent from raciones). AGN., Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda, años 1865-1875, and AV., Frontera, box. 1, no. 778 (copy of the original).
Capitanejos and caciques’ intermediaries collected these goods, animals and currency. These resources were distributed among subalterns, used to pay for the intermediation and allies’ favors as well as for paying cacique’s debts to creole commercial houses. For example, Cacique Saygüeque asked Cacique Chingoleo, Miguel Linares and the important rancher and merchant Benito Crespo to administer his salaries. He used this money to pay them for this task as well as to pay off his debts for clothes and a variety of goods that he had bought in merchant houses owned by Alejo García, José and Federico Rial, and Benito Crespo. These merchants and ranchers usually wrote to Saygüeque as their “friends” and “brothers,” and had kinship ties with many indigenous people. These debts were a mix in the logic of capitalist and reciprocal exchanges. In a reciprocal gesture, José Rial sent clothes to Saygüeque and asked him as a favor to send him some horses. However, he later demanded the payment for the clothes he had sent to Saygüeque’s sons.

Indigenous and creole subalterns involved in the business of raciones sometimes exchanged these resources outside of cacique and creole authorities’ control. For example, in 1860, the soldier Patule and an indigenous lanza exchanged a skinny cow, from the raciones that had been collected by the indigenous commission, for a silk handkerchief. Patule was interested in the cows’ hide while the lanza preferred a piece of fine cloth. In another case, creole soldiers billeted at the local headquarters, were selling their military uniforms.
These exchanges furthered indigenous people and creoles’ common life and sociability under cacicatos and creole norms and rules. People from diverse origins socialized in the pulperías, ranches and tolderías. 835 They consumed similar types of food, used similar clothes and weapons, and engaged in similar economic and social activities, such as breeding and herding cattle, hunting, drinking, dancing and playing games. Ethnic identities could not be easily defined by race, looks or behavior. Creoles’ common perception of “Indians” being “thieves” was strongly challenged. We find several cases where Creoles confused other Creoles with “Indian thieves” based on their looks and behavior. In 1855, Murga described a common problem they faced at the headquarters. When two creole men saw each other out in the open field, they usually thought they were in the presence of an “Indian,” and reported to the headquarters the possibility of malones.836 A revealing case was the misunderstanding faced by Ignacio Linares, his mestizo son and the Indian Casusha in 1857. They informed creole authorities that a group of “Indians” were trying to steal Llanquitrúz’s cattle. 837 They identified them as “Indians” based on their looks and behavior. The suspects escaped when they saw Linares’ group following them. When the judge found the suspects, they resulted to be three creole peons that were looking for a creole rancher’s lost horse. They told the judge that, when they had seen Linares’s people riding towards them with lanzas, they thought they were “Indians” and escaped to inform the headquarters of possible malones. Having been a misunderstanding, the case was closed, but it revealed how the successful alliances between

835 For example, in 1869, the Indian Alejandro Collanao tried to sell a pampa blanket in the Diaco Hotel, but the owner did not want to pay for what he considered a high price. For cases in other places of the Pampas’ frontier see Villar and Jiménez and Virgili. “Collao, Alejandro por heridas,” MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, no. 729; Villar and Jiménez, “Convites. Comida, bebida, poder y política en las sociedades de Pampas y Araucanía,” and Daniel Virgili, “Las esquinas de la pampa. Puleros y pulperías en la frontera bonaerense (1788-1865),” Carlos Mayo, ed., Vivir en la frontera.
837 “Paz, Benito y otros por cuatrería,” MHRMFV., Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, no. 655.
cacicatos and creoles blurred ethnic labels and stereotypes and prioritized kinship as marks of identity. In the testimonies taken by the Judge, people involved in this episode identified each other according to their family ties with creole families and cacicatos.

Justice records also mention creoles and indigenous people playing cards, participating in dances and ceremonies, such as funerals.³³⁸ Men of different status and ethnicities challenged their honor by betting great sums to sponsor horse riders or by racing themselves. Among the people involved in horse racing, we find a nephew of the Indian Manuel Ureña; an intermediary of Saygüéque, Pablo Vera, and the powerful merchants and ranchers Benito Crespo and Eusebio García.³³⁹ During Chingoleo and Murga’s negotiations to prevent cacicatos revenge for Orqueda’s killing in 1863, Chingoleo told Murga to defy Aguirre to a horse race with a horse he was going to send from the west.³⁴⁰ Commander Murga and other ranchers and merchants usually asked Saygüéque for good horses to race.³⁴¹

Finally, even if we have little quantitative information on the economic scale and productivity of the southern nomadic pastoralist economy, qualitative evidence shows a general regional economic growth with the permanence of peace. Local agricultural and demographic censuses testify part of this growth.³⁴² In addition to the increase of small and medium sized productive units, the 1854 and 1866 censuses register new big commercial firms and estancias

³³⁸ MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, nos. 707, 708, and 713.
³³⁹ “Vera, Pablo contra Cueto, Sixto por cobro de pesos,” MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, box 6, no. 750.
³⁴¹ AGN., VII, Leg. 726, Ángel Justiniano Carranza, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüéque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
³⁴² “Padrón del establecimiento del Fuerte del Carmen y su población en el Río Negro de la Costa Patagónica, Carmen de Patagones, 1821” and “Padrón de los vecinos y habitantes que existen en el Partido de Patagones, 1836”, in AGN. X. 12.3.7, and 25.2.4; MHRMFV, Juzgado de Paz de Carmen de Patagones, “Padrón General de Patagones en el año 1854”; “Cuadro estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal” and “Registro Estadístico de Buenos Aires, año 1867, vol. 1, Carmen de Patagones.”
that held numerous peons, and managed large numbers of cattle and sheep.\textsuperscript{843} Like with the rest of the Pampas, breeding sheep and commercializing wool increasingly became one of the most important economic activities by the 1870s.\textsuperscript{844} Most of the owners of these firms were people linked to cacicatos, such as Murga, the Crespo and García families.\textsuperscript{845} People of diverse ethnicities and of both genders also possessed properties and animals. The percentage of people identified as “negro/a,” “pardo/a,” “indio/a” and “trigueño/a” that obtained properties was larger than the people identified as “blanco/a.”\textsuperscript{846} Part of the explanation resides in that most of the newcomers were identified as “white” and it took some time for them to obtain properties and build ties with cacicatos. But this phenomenon is also explained by the fact that, in this world, ethnic identities did not always mark subaltern status. Furthermore, usually, the non-white people integrated into the creole society in a subaltern position were progressively “whitened” in the records.\textsuperscript{847}

In conclusion, Caciques Llanquitrúz, Chingoleo and Saygüeque expanded trade and power by favoring peace and exchange with local cacicatos as well as with the frontier town of Patagones. This policy assured more access to rationes and trade. When conflict with creoles threatened peace, they negotiated reciprocal compensations and avoided major military

\textsuperscript{843} MHRMFV., “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal.”
\textsuperscript{844} Hilda Sábato, \textit{Agrarian Capitalism and the World Market}.
\textsuperscript{845} MHRMFV., “Cuadro Estadístico de Patagones, 1866, Comisión de los Srs. Municipales don Vicente Dasso y don María Larrazabal.
\textsuperscript{846} For example, a 15.38\% of the people registered as “negro/a” in 1854 had properties, and 24.7\% animals. In the same record, a 14.7\% of the people registered as “blanco/a” had properties, but only a 19.6\% animals. I find similar differences in 1866. While only a 4.81\% of the people identified as “blanco/a” had properties, a 22.85\% and 21.62\% of the people identified as “negro/a” and “pardo/a” had properties, and a 17.92\% of the people identified as “indio/a” and “trigueño/a” had properties. I calculated these percentages based on the people whose ethnicity was registered in the agricultural censuses of Carmen de Patagones.
\textsuperscript{847} For more details on the ethnic and socio-economic structure of the town, see: Davies Lenoble, “El impacto de la política cacical en la frontera.”
confrontations. Their policy of peace was also favored by the provincial and national governments’ limited presence and power over northern Patagonia.

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy managed to integrate sedentary state and nomadic non-state populations and economies that contributed to regional economic prosperity and political stability. Although this order was challenged by the mid-1870s, the impact of cacicatos’ norms and customs on the creole society remained shaping the population in the region even after the military campaigns. Argeri and Bandieri have shown how cacicatos’ kinship forms and practices, and trans-regional trade networks and logic continued shaping Patagonia during the twentieth century.848 In the next chapter, I will explain the challenges that limited the Pampas Confederacy from reaching a similar outcome in frontier relationships during the 1860s and 1870s.

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848 Argeri, *De guerreros a delincuentes*, and Bandieri, *Cruzando la cordillera*. 263
CHAPTER VI

Resisting the Eastern Pampas’ Hegemony: Federalist Montoneras and the Indios Gauchos in Southern Cuyo during the 1860s

By 1862, inter-ethnic political and economic projects held hegemonic power on the southern lands of the continent. Two indigenous confederacies governed over many small cacicatos and controlled resources and trade networks under nomadic pastoralist economies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia. They also built political alliances with the Argentine Republic, whose national government was under porteño hands since 1862. President Bartolomé Mitre (1862-1868) tried to organize a more centralized system of government than the past Argentine Confederacies. He also increased Buenos Aires’s economic influence over the rest of the creole provinces challenging the alternative regional trade networks to the Atlantic. Although conflicts emerged between the indigenous confederacies and the Argentine Republic, inter-ethnic alliances, agreements and business continued defining political success and economic prosperity in the region.

During the 1860s, these hegemonic projects were tested. According to Senator Nicacio Oroño, between 1862 and 1868, 107 rebellions and 90 battles took place in the Argentine provinces in which 4,728 people died.849 In northern Argentina and Cuyo, displaced local leaders and popular sectors organized themselves to fight for a more federalist project at the national and provincial levels, and to resist increasing economic limitations. Rural workers and soldiers,

849 Oszlak, La formación del estado argentino, p.107
usually identified as *gauchos*, and their families also mobilized to overcome their increasing poverty and marginalization from political rule. Federalist leaders and *gauchos* organized attacks and sieges on towns and cities, known as *montoneras*, which managed to replace some local and provincial authorities. Through transregional alliances, they also challenged the national government’s rule. *Gauchos* and their families gained some resources, political prestige and participation, but were exposed to escalating violence and repression.

In addition to the cross-class character of these rebellions and projects, historians have highlighted the multi-ethnic aspects of the *montoneras* organized in northern Argentina and northern Cuyo. These regions had a long history of struggle between the colonial society and both sedentary indigenous communities that were subject to *encomiendas* and *repartimientos*, and African slaves and free-men whom had been brought as labor. Some people under these relegated social sectors joined the federalist *montoneras* to fight for their subsistence, to recover some land and to gain political participation.

As I will show in this chapter, in southern Cuyo, the *montoneras* not only had a multi-ethnic character, but were crossed by inter-ethnic alliances with independent cacicatos. Sources show that the *malones* and *malocas* against frontier settlements almost tripled during the 1860s (see Appendix D). Some of these attacks were organized by indigenous people under the Pehuenches and Ranqueles in alliance with federalist *gauchos* and leaders. *Malones* and

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850 *Gauchos* were creole rural workers and soldiers pejoratively seen by elites as lazy and savages due to their resistance to labor obligations and mandatory military recruitment. This is why most of the *montoneros* were identified as *gauchos*. Jorge Gelman, "El gacho que supimos construir. Determinismo y conflictos en la historia argentina", *Entrepasados*, 9, (1995).

851 Ariel de la Fuente was one of the first historians in describing the multi-ethnic aspect of *montoneras* in La Rioja. Later, Diego Escolar showed that the *montoneras* organized in northern Cuyo (northern Mendoza and southern San Juan) were also a consequence of indigenous (Huarpes) and creole subalterns’ reactions to long-term encroachments. Ariel de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo*; Escolar, *Los dones étnicos de la Nación: Identidades huarpe y modos de producción de soberanía en Argentina* (Prometeo Libros editorial, 2007).
montoneras strongly hit the frontier towns in the provinces of Mendoza, San Luis, Córdoba and northwestern Buenos Aires. In this chapter, I will argue that these mobilizations and alliances were challenging the centralizing effect of the Pampa and Northern Patagonian Confederacies among cacicatos at two levels: regionally, by cacicatos distant from the most dynamic and expanding trade networks in the eastern Pampas, such as the Pehuenches and the Ranqueles, and politically: by subalterns who contested their main caciques’ power in their search for greater access to the resources of their leaders. Therefore, like in northern Argentina and Cuyo, the participation of groups of Ranqueles and Pehuenches in the montoneras was also based on Indian subalterns’ defiance to the status quo in cacicatos lands and frontiers.

In addition, I will show that the conflicts between the Chileans and cacicatos on the western side of the Andes Mountains shaped this multi-ethnic and inter-ethnic resistance to the hegemonic polities in the Pampas. During the 1850s and 1860s, Chile’s economic specialization in the export of wheat, oil and nitrates strengthened the economic and political power of central and northern Chile. The southern regions participated in the agricultural expansion, but continued mostly involved in cattle ranching activities, which were relegated to local and regional markets. President Manuel Montt’s (1851-1861) conservative rule faced two rebellions in 1851 and 1859 by southern liberals and federalists who wanted to hold their political and economic power. Some cacicatos from the Araucanía joined the uprisings in order to fight against Chileans’ occupation of their lands in the Río Biobío and against the diplomatic policies furthered by the Chilean national government. As a consequence, Presidents Montt (1851-1861)

852 In the documentation I consulted in provincial and national archives, I registered around 35 raids during the 1850s, and more than 100 for the 1860s. Between 1870 and 1878, I recorded around 86 raids.
853 For Northern Argentina, see: Ariel de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo.*
and Pedro Pérez (1861-1871) tried to diminish provincial and local autonomies, finish with cacicatos’ independence and occupy their lands through military expeditions.

Therefore, while during the 1860s, inter-ethnic alliances were still the basis of power and resistance movements on the eastern side of the Andes, a state/cacicato binary was becoming the main cleavage to define power and subjugation in Chile and the Araucanía. In order to confront the Chilean military campaigns that started in 1861, some cacicatos traveled to the Pampas and northern Patagonia in search of resources and military support. While they negotiated with both indigenous confederacies, they also allied the inter-ethnic resistance organized in southern Cuyo.

Regarding the historiography, we find few worked that mention the participation of cacicatos in federalists’ montoneras. Marcela Tamagnini made one of the first important contributions to the southern Cuyo region.\textsuperscript{854} She showed that the inter-ethnic frontier conflicts and the federalist montoneras were interrelated problems that limited the Argentine national government’s consolidation of power. As a consequence, it planned military and political strategies to eliminate both, montoneras and the Ranqueles’s political autonomy. Following this interpretation, Graciana Pérez Zavala argued that the civil conflicts during the 1850s and 1860s allowed the Ranqueles to maintain their autonomy by negotiating with the different creole factions and alternating negotiation with violence.\textsuperscript{855} When the national government became the only possible diplomatic player during the 1870s, the Ranqueles could not find the same political alternatives and increasingly lost their autonomy to the expanding Argentine nation-state.


These studies are crucial to follow the alliances between the *montoneras* and the Ranqueles, and the national governments’ response to this organized resistance. However, a state/cacicato binary limits our understanding of the origin of these inter-ethnic alliances in southern Cuyo. The work done by Silvia Ratto and Ingrid de Jong for the Buenos Aires frontier showed that cacicatos long-term transformations are crucial to understanding their alliances with creole political factions during the nineteenth century.\(^{856}\) The centralization and militarization of political power among cacicatos was also resisted by caciques’ autonomous rights and Indian subalterns, who found specific reasons to join or confront creole factions and governments.\(^{857}\) In Mendoza, historians Carla Manara and Gladys Varela did not specifically address in detail the link between the local *montoneras* and the Pehuenches, but showed that the economies of cacicatos and Creoles in the southern frontier depended on populations of diverse ethnic origins and trans-regional trade and business networks.\(^{858}\) Pehuenche settlements hosted Chilean traders and ranchers that rented their lands and had kin and economic ties. The “economic model” they described for the Andes Mountains ran across national and ethnic boundaries.

Building on these contributions, this chapter shows the importance of an analysis that transcends segmental/state and nomadic pastoralist/sedentary binaries to be able to understand frontier developments. The multi-ethnic and inter-ethnic mobilizations that took place in southern Cuyo during the 1860s can only be understood in detail by acknowledging the economic and political challenges faced by the Pehuenches and Ranqueles as well as the impact

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\(^{857}\) Ibid.

of general economic and political trends for both Creoles and cacicatos on both sides of the Andes.

On the one hand, Creoles and indigenous people living in southern Cuyo were being relegated by creole and indigenous hegemonic projects in the eastern Pampas. Calfucurá had controlled the Pehuenches’ and Ranqueles’s access to frontier trade, grazing lands and water. Although the Ranqueles were part of the Pampa polity, their access to the eastern Pampas and their political weight in the confederacy were limited by Calfucurá. Unlike other caciques, the Ranqueles’s personal rivalry with the porteños also conditioned reaching peace agreements with the national government. These circumstances pushed the Ranquel caciques and subalterns to organize malones and occasionally join federalist montoneras. In the Pehuenches’ case, they were also challenged by trade limitations to the west of the Andes Mountains due to Chile’s economic developments as well as their military campaigns against cacicatos in the Araucanía. This circumstance also pushed some Pehuenches to organize and participate in multi-ethnic mobilizations.

On the other hand, inter-ethnic malones and montoneras were sometimes organized by subaltern capitanejos and lanzas outside the control of the principal Pehuenche and Ranquel caciques. These mobilizations challenged internal hierarchies. In these regions, caciques could not offer the same level of stability and prosperity that subalterns had held in the eastern Pampas and northern Patagonia during the past decades. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy had become the most successful example. The level of integration achieved with Creoles at Carmen de Patagones allowed indigenous and creole subalterns to achieve social mobility without the need of engaging in warfare or strongly defying their elites. Unlike people living in the Pampas,
distance from other frontier posts and dynamic economic centers probably restrained capitanejos, lanzas and their families from finding alternative options and opportunities to the ones negotiated by their elites. In Cuyo’s southern frontier we see the opposite outcome. Elites in the provinces of Mendoza, San Luis, Córdoba, and Pehuenche caciques, and to a lesser extent the Ranqueles, not only failed in generating internal stability, but also in building inter-ethnic frontier alliances with provincial governments that could have assured protection and prosperity. Therefore, in southern Cuyo, creole and indigenous subalterns formed inter-ethnic alliances to defy local power. It is not surprising that the Ranquel Cacique Rosas started calling them the unruled “indios gauchos.” Like the Linares in Patagonia, Cacique Rosas appropriated creole elites’ pejorative perception of Indians as robbers, to apply the term to any subaltern that threatened his authority and resources, regardless of their ethnicity.

As I will develop, the montoneras and malones integrated people with a multiplicity of goals that were not always compatible which made alliances sometimes circumstantial. In the case of the montoneras, historians Míguez and Bragoni argue that they could not achieve a unified political project capable of competing with the personal leaderships that they represented.859 Their common identities worked effectively to rebel or protest, but lost their strength when trying to reach and maintain consensus beyond local leaders.860 The last montoneras were defeated in 1874. Similarly, most Pehuenches and Ranqueles ended up holding peace agreements, negotiated by their main caciques during the 1870s and continued subject to the Pampas Confederacy’s hegemony. Finally, the montoneras and malones could not change their increasing economic regional encroachment under the on-going commercial trends.

859 Bragoni and Míguez, eds., Un Nuevo orden político, p.22.
860 See Ariel de la Fuente, Children of Facundo.
However, as I will develop further in the next chapter, this inter-ethnic resistance impacted the political development of the Argentine Republic and the indigenous confederacies. Buenos Aires’s elites could not hold their control of the national government after Mitre’s Presidency. An alliance of provincial elites continued ruling the national government, and the Buenos Aires’s elites ended up losing the revenues of its main city and port as the city of Buenos Aires became the national capital in 1880. Buenos Aires continued as the richest province, but had to share its commercial revenues with the nation.

The montoneras ended up shaping institutions and forms of doing politics. The cycles of rebellion and repression included negotiations between federalist leaders and provincial and national authorities. These processes increasingly institutionalized informal ways of representation and organization, and centralized political, economic and military administration.

In the case of the cacicatos, these mobilizations also shaped the internal organization of the Pampas Confederacy. In order to overcome the internal challenge, the confederacy had to enhance consensus politics as the basis for decision-making. Unlike the Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s leaders, Calfucurá also had to respect allies’ increasing level of independence and tolerate their decisions to organize malones.

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862 Bragoni and Míguez, eds., *Un Nuevo orden político.*
Figure 5. Southern Cuyo and the Lands of Pehuenches and Ranqueles, 1860-1879. Source: Creation of Gabriel Giordanengo (INGEIS-CONICET) based on my instructions.
In order to understand the inter-ethnic alliances that defied the indigenous confederacies and Buenos Aires’s rule over the national government in the Pampas, we must explore the context that originated these mobilizations. During the 1840s and 1850s, the Chilean economy reached stability through exporting foodstuffs, especially wheat, to the California Gold Rush and Australia. Availability of arable land in the Chilean central valley was quite limited, so residents of the southern regions tried to benefit from this boom by expanding their activities into cacicatos’ lands. This expansion sometimes included cacicatos’ sale of portions of their lands, but also military expeditions. Although most of the frontier settlements continued exploiting predominantly cattle ranching for the local and regional markets, their territorial and agricultural expansion started challenging cacicatos’ economies. In 1850, 14,000 settlers lived between the Río Biobío and Malleco, and produced more than 250,000 fanegas of cereal and 8,000 quintales of wool for export.

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863 Sergio Villalobos explains that between 1840 and 1850 high prices in Europe fueled this boom as well as the decrease in maritime sailing costs. Exports increased from 1,705,000 pesos between 1846 and 1850 to 5,283,000 pesos between 1861 and 1865, and 13,241,000 pesos between 1871 and 1875. Villalobos, et. al., Relaciones Fronterizas en la Araucanía (Chile: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1982), p.54. Also see Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche, siglos XIX y XX (Santiago: LOM, 2008), chap. 5.
864 Ibid., and Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
865 Frontier settlers continued sending cattle, wool and some wood to Concepción for export. But agriculture slowly spread in the region during the 1850s and 1860s. Rossignol explains that during the 1850s only Talcahuano and Tome had flour mills, and some wheat was grown in Los Angeles and Nacimiento. Jacques Rossignol, Chilenos y Mapuches a mediados del siglo XIX. Una situación colonial (Chile: Ediciones Universidad del Biobío, 2007).
866 Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche, p.21.
Chile’s agricultural production boomed in 1865, thanks to an increase in the price of wheat, local production and demographic growth. State revenues also increased with the development of silver mines and copper mines in the north, the extraction of coal, the exploitation of guano, the increase of saltpeter mining in Tarapacá and Atacama (in Peru and Bolivia), and the export of nitrates after the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) from territories won from Bolivia and Peru. These developments strengthened the northern and central Chilean economies, and limited options for the southern frontier and the Araucanía. Even if cacicatos could start prioritizing agriculture, they faced parallel political challenges that limited these adaptations.

During the 1830s, the Chilean provinces had organized themselves under a centralist national government, but continued facing civil conflicts till the mid-century. In 1851, the recently elected government of Manuel Montt (1851-1861) faced a rebellion of federalist and liberal factions in the south. After holding off the movement with the help of the ex-President Manuel Bulnes, Montt’s government aimed at strengthening national institutions and its bureaucracy at the expense of southern regions’ interests and power. Unlike previous governments, he could finance his policies with the revenues generated from the economic boom.

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867 According to Villalobos, the price of wheat went from 2.72 per fanega in 1851 to 3.92 per fanega in 1880, and the price of cattle from 10.2 to 30.50. The production of cereals for export in Concepción and Maule only took place in 1865 with the opening of the English market. The Chilean population also grew from 700,000 registered people in 1810 to 1,819,000 in 1865. Villalobos, et. al., _Relaciones Fronterizas en la Araucanía_, p.55.
869 Villalobos explains that the provinces of Maule, Nuble, Concepción and Valdivia experienced more economic pressure. Villalobos, et. al., _Relaciones fronterizas en la Araucanía_.
870 The first rebellion was headed by the ex-Mayor of Concepción (1846-1851) General José María de la Cruz after losing the Presidential election against Manuel Montt in 1851. Pablo Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859” _Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies_, vol. 25, no. 50 (2000): 131-167.
871 Ibid.
President Montt’s political administration started limiting the southern regions political power as well as cacicatos’ diplomatic negotiations with the national government during the 1850s. He first replaced frontier authorities from Concepción with officials from outside the province. He tried to dissolve the corps of “Capitanes de Amigos and Comisarios de Naciones,” which symbolized a long-standing policy of diplomacy and patronage. These officials were usually mestizos who lived among cacicatos and had personal, kin and commercial ties with them. They were involved in cacicatos’ internal and diplomatic politics. Montt did not trust these officials and perceived them as corrupt. As Arreola describes, instead of abolishing their posts to avoid conflict, he did little to sustain them. Without the government’s economic and political assistance, few Capitanes de Amigos remained by 1859. This policy eliminated the most direct communication and negotiation medium with cacicatos.

President Montt also tried to control the spontaneous expansion of settlers over cacicatos’ lands. In 1852, he created the Province of Arauco, claiming for the state, cacicatos’ territory between Río Biobío and Río Totlén. This symbolic territorial appropriation was combined with integrationist policies, such as the spread of missions among independent cacicatos, and exclusionist policies, such as the settlement of German and Chilean colonies in indigenous lands. Montt prohibited officials to buy or lease lands on the frontier. Nevertheless, Chileans continued expanding into cacicatos’ lands spontaneously and through private deals. By 1854 more than

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872 Montt tried to reform frontier administration, which was in the hands of powerful regional elites known as penquistas based in Concepción. Ibid.
873 These positions were official intermediaries that negotiated with cacicatos.
874 Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
875 Ibid.
877 Between 1836 and 1844, the Chilean population on the frontier doubled from 73,878 in 1836 to 153,757 in 1844.
24,000 Chileans resided in the frontier while the cacicatos were pushed south. The mayor of Arauco, in 1856, estimated that fewer than 4,400 Mapuches resided near the Río Biobío.  

These policies and economic developments originated another inter-ethnic rebellion against Montt’s administration in 1859. Anti-Montt rebels and some cacicatos attacked posts on the Río Biobío, among them was the mayor Saávedra’s hacienda at Picoltué. By December, a general revolt spread throughout the region and lasted until 1861. The Arribano Cacique Magnil explicitly argued that he had joined the civil conflict to remove illegal settlements from his land, but that he preferred peace. Although he reached a truce with national authorities, the ruling Chilean elites then reached a significant consensus whereby they would limit southern provinces’ power and finish cacicatos’ independence by military warfare and conquest.

Inspired by contemporary U.S., Canadian and Australian expansion policies, Commander Cornelio Saávedra presented a plan to conquer the Araucanía. His plan envisioned a military advance over Malleco, the appropriation of cacicatos’ lands and then the settling of immigrant colonies. The project was intensively discussed in the press. When President Pérez was elected in 1861, he accepted Saávedra’s plan and gained financial support from Congress. The army started fortifying frontier posts, and closing off the trails that crossed the Andes in order to neutralize potential allied support for the cacicatos. National authorities began calling cacicatos to attend

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878 Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
879 Ibid.
880 According to the military narratives, malones of between 600 and 15,000 lanzas hit Arauco, Nacimiento, and Negrete. Some caciques amigos, such as Nerriam, and Lebul, contributed to persecute Caciques Quilapán and Mienques. Costino groups also negotiated with the government and formed four governorships lead by: Juan Hueramanque, Juan Mariñanco, Juan Polma, and Ignacio Lepiñanco. Navarro, Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía, pp.45-7.
881 Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
882 The military campaigns received both state and private financial resources. Bengoa, Historia del pueblo Mapuche, siglos XIX y XX, p.172, and Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
parliaments, but caciques often refused to participate. Their decision depended on their own internal rivalries, and economic circumstances. Some reached an agreement where they subjugated themselves to the Chilean state in exchange for military titles, resources and survival. But the most important caciques of the Araucanía and the south resisted. Cacique Quilapán (Magnil’s sons) tried to gain local and external allies’ support to protect their independence through military and diplomatic means. Although the Pampas Confederacy apparently did not send forces to the Araucanía, it hosted, traded and joined malones over the Pampas frontier with their trans-regional allies.

In 1865 and 1866, Chilean military campaigns were interrupted by the Chincha Islands War. The second series of campaigns then took place between 1867 and 1869 and, once more, involved warfare with the Arribanos from Quilapán, and parliaments with Abajinos. In 1869, independent cacicatos undertook an uprising and later ended up settling a general truce with the Chilean government. Military campaigns continued after 1879 in combination with Argentina’s military campaigns.

Therefore, the 1860s were difficult times in the Araucanía, but cacicatos were still not defeated. On the eastern side of the Andes, they became potential allies of federalists and groups of Pehuenches and Ranqueles whom were already organized to fight the status quo and overcome their political and economic displacement. This eastern population was also affected by the economic transformations in Chile and the Araucanía.

During the 1860s, the Argentine Republic had a long-term commercial growth. Most provinces maintained a multiplicity of local and regional markets oriented towards the Pacific

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883 See Magnil’s letters to Calfucurá and President Urquiza in Pávez Ojeda, eds., Cartas Mapuche.
884 Ibid.
ports, Bolivian markets, the Cuyo, the northwestern regions and the Atlantic. Nonetheless, the expanding agro-export economy in the eastern Pampas challenged the alternative markets. Especially in the Cuyo region, cattle trade to Chile was affected by its economic changes and the military campaigns that closed off some of the main trails that crossed over the Andes Mountains. These economic trends were exacerbated by Buenos Aires’s elites control of the national government. Historian Garavaglia has recently showed that, while during the 1850s the confederate provinces represented a 42.5% of the national income and Buenos Aires a 57.5%, in 1865 the percentages were of 16% and 84% respectively. In addition, the national government spent most of its income in Buenos Aires and in maintaining its military and political control over all provinces.

The national government in the hands of Buenos Aires’s elites not only prioritized the development of Buenos Aires and the eastern Pampas, but also started strengthening the national state’s administrative, institutional and political power, inaugurating the period known as “the consolidation of Argentina’s nation-state.” Unlike old interpretations on the subject, historians today recognize that this did not mean an immediate supremacy of the national government and Buenos Aires over the provinces. The 1860s developed as a decade of intense civil conflicts among political factions that aimed at defining the type of union they would create, and also resisting Buenos Aires’s hegemony. It was still a world of strong local power and weak, but increasing, national governance.

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886 Garavaglia, La disputa por la construcción nacional argentina.
887 For classic works on the subject see: Oszlak, La formación del Estado argentino; Halperín Donghi, Proyecto y construcción de una nación (1846-1880), and José Luis Romero, Las ideas políticas en la argentina (México: Fondo de cultura económica, 1948).
888 Bragoni and Míguez, eds., Un nuevo orden político.
In the political arena, President Mitre (1862-1868) found it more difficult than the federalist confederacies under Justo José de Urquiza (1854-1860) and Santiago Derqui (1860-1861) to coopt federalist caudillos, and provincial elites. This was not a conflict solely between national officials and rebel caudillos that organized montoneras to oppose the consolidation of a nation-state; it was a much more complex political phenomenon. The federalist montoneras were strongly rooted in patron-client relationships between local territorial leaders and subalterns who pursued their own political projects, which included a national model based on federalism and individual rewards. During the 1860s, these movements aimed at restoring federalist elites and local leaders in government, as well as opposing some of the national policies that threatened their survival, like the mandatory recruitment for the Paraguayan War (1865-1870). Bartolomé Mitre’s decision to join the war was extremely unpopular among federalists. Federalists sympathized with the Paraguayan President, who supported the Blancos’ party in Uruguay. Caudillos were also not simple outlaw leaders; they usually worked with and within provincial bureaucracies and military structures. Most of the leaders of the montoneras were ex-generals, officials, commanders, and even ex-governors, like the Saá from San Luis. Many of their followers were also part of the National Guard, the symbol of provincial military autonomy.

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889 Ibid.
890 For early works on the subject, see John Lynch, *Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-1850* (Oxford University Press, 1992), and Oszlack, *La formación del estado argentino*. For some of the newest interpretations on the subject see: Ariel de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo*; Salvatore and Goldman, *Caudillismos rioplatenses*, and Bragoni and Míguez, eds., *Un nuevo orden político*.
891 Ariel de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo*; Bragoni and Míguez, *Un nuevo orden político*, p.23
893 The National Guard was mobilized by the national government, but financed by each province. Therefore, they were strongly involved in provincial politics. Ernesto Olmedo, “Fuertes, ejercito y planes militares, 1852-1876,” Ana Rocchietti and Marcela Tamagnini, eds., *Arqueología de la frontera*.
In addition, armed violence was perceived at the time as a legitimate way of exercising citizenship. As Sábado has shown, the “armed citizen” was a generalized and an accepted form of representation. Elections were a time for balloting and physical fights. This interpretation probably applies to the civil conflicts in Chile as well. Civil struggles on both sides of the Andes Mountains were not “delaying” the emergence of nation-states, but constructing and defining the type of supra-polity that would govern, and the relationship between rulers and subalterns on both sides of the Andes Mountains. Violence was perceived as a legitimate way of making politics. As I will show next, cacicatos participated and shaped these processes from their own contexts and interests.

**Inter-ethnic Resistance in Southern Cuyo during the 1860s**

Although *montoneras* and *malones* repetitively hit southern Cuyo during all of the 1860s, we can differentiate two major cycles of conflicts. The first consisted on the period right after the battle of Pavón until the end of 1863, when defeated federalists and displaced caciques and Indian subalterns found common ground to fight their return to power. The second cycle took place between 1866 and 1868, and involved federalists’ widespread rebellion called “the red rebellion (the color used by the federalists’)” against the Mitrista hegemony, and strong conflicts between the principal Ranquel and Pehuenche caciques and their subaltern caciques, *capitanejos* and *lanzas*. The principal Ranquel and Pehuenche caciques failed to negotiate and maintain peace agreements with frontier authorities—which could have meant providing stability and prosperity to their *capitanejos*, *lanzas* and their families.
The first cycle of inter-ethnic conflicts: 1861-1863

During the first cycle, federalists organized *montoneras* to resist the new liberal provincial and national government under President Mitre. In La Rioja, General Angel Vicente Peñaloza managed to maintain a federalist government and participated in a rebellion against Córdoba’s *unitario* government in 1863.\(^{894}\) In Mendoza, federalist elites tried to re-gain power in 1862, and were followed by a more cross-class series of uprisings led by local officials and Colonel Francisco Claveros, who had returned from exile in Chile to liberate his imprisoned sons in San Carlos.\(^{895}\) Claveros gained the support of soldiers and officials from the National Guard as well as from cattle ranchers, merchants and peons affected by the depression in trade with Chile. Claveros could have been stopped, but Mendoza’s government was compelled to offer a general pardon to all rebels in order to maintain peace.

Ranqueles and Pehuenches participated in these rebellions based on their own interests and challenges. The leading lineages and cacicatos in the region had emerged from the intensive fights for the control of trade passes in the Andes Mountains and the independence fights between 1780 and 1830. These polities experienced processes of centralization and militarization of power like the rest of the cacicatos in the region. While the Ranqueles emerged as an ethnic group after processes of ethnogenesis between migrant groups of Huilliches, Pehuenches and

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\(^{894}\) Peñaloza was a supporter of Facundo Quiroga, who organized several rebellions against Juan Manuel de Rosas. After Rosas’s defeat, he was the Commander of La Rioja’s militias and was put in charge of the intervention of San Juan’s government after the assassination of the federalist Governor Benavidez by the liberals who sympathized with autonomous Buenos Aires. He confronted Mitre’s forces in 1861 and 1862, and continued resisting the national government under Mitre. In June 1863, he invaded Córdoba, but was defeated by Colonel Pablo Izraabul and returned to San Juan. He later returned to La Rioja and rebelled against the military junta that had been ruling the province since his departure. On November 1863, he was defeated and assassinated by Izraabul. De la Fuente, *Children of Facundo*.

\(^{895}\) Claveros was a federalist colonel who had fought in the wars of Independence. He supported Manuel Dorrego and worked on the frontier for the Rosas government. After the battle of Caseros 1852 he joined Hilario Lagos’s rebellion in Buenos Aires and worked for the Confederate Military under Urquiza. After fighting in Cepeda 1859 and Pavón 1861, he was exiled in Chile. Bragoni, “Cuyo después de Pavón: consenso, rebelión y orden político, 1861-1874,” Bragoni and Míguez, eds., *Un nuevo orden político*, pp.29-60.
other local groups in the region during the first decades of the 19th century, the Pehuenches of southern Cuyo descended from groups with the same ethnicity that re-claimed control over Malargüé and Varvarco after the 1830s.\textsuperscript{896} By mid-century, specific lineages tried to form and lead indigenous confederacies, but only the Ranqueles formed some kind of small confederacy led by two specific lineages, which also became part of the Pampas Confederacy. The Pehuenches’ persistent involvement in political conflicts on both sides of the Andes Mountains limited long-lasting confederate projects.\textsuperscript{897} No specific indigenous lineage sustained a long-term confederate leadership in this region up to the 1870s.

As explained in the previous chapters, the Ranqueles were key members of the Pampas Confederacy, and negotiated peace with creole governments in conjunction with Calfucurá during the 1850s. Around the time of Pavón, however, they faced particular challenges that distanced – but did not break- their diplomatic policies from the confederate leader. First, the Ranqueles were affected by the changing markets in Cuyo and Chile. Their access to the expanding markets in the eastern Pampas depended on Calfucurá’s permission. Second, the Ranqueles principal Caciques, Calván and Pichún, had died by the end of the 1850s; their sons Mariano Rosas and Manuel Baigorrita inherited their leaderships and found it harder to generate

\textsuperscript{896} Since the Spanish arrival, Pehuenches’ jurisdiction included territories on both sides of the Andes Mountains, from the Malargüé region in the north to Varvarco (northern Neuquén) in the south and west of the Andes Mountains into Villacurá. Although some Pehuenche groups continued acting on the western side of the Andes, specific lineages claimed control of Malargüé and Varvarco by the mid-nineteenth century. Sergio Villalobos, \textit{Los pehuenches en la vida fronteriza} (Chile: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1989); Leonardo León Solís, \textit{Los señores de la cordillera y las pampas: los Pehuenches de Malalhue 1700-1800} (Mendoza. Ed. Universidad de Congreso, 2001); Villar and Jiménez, “La tempestad de la guerra.”

\textsuperscript{897} For example, in 1851 Varvarco Cacique Yaupi attempted to make himself the main representative of the Pehuenches in the region. However, once he secured his alliances with caciques in Barrancas and Malargüé, and Creoles on Mendoza’s frontier, he got involved in trans-regional ventures in Chile. He participated in Cruz’s rebellion against Manuel Montt in 1851. After 1852, Yaupi ceased to appear in the sources as the main leader of the cacicatos of Varvarco. We do not know if he died during this last episode or stayed in the Araucanía. For Yaupi’s case see: “Letter of Yaupi Lauquen to Mr. Don Manuel Pedernera, Neuquén, August 27th, 1851”, in AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 763, no. 48; \textit{Indios}, box 123, no.17, and Arreola, “Reorganization of Chile’s frontier administration and the origin of the Mapuche revolt of 1859.”
internal consensus among subalern caciques, capitanejos and lanzas. Major challenges came from people living north of Mariano Rosas’ *tolderías* in Leuvucó and Manuel Baigorrita’s *tolderías* in Poitagüe. Small groups located in Quinto (40 leagues from Leuvucó) and Cuero (50 leagues from Poitagüe) started challenging the principal caciques’ authority (see fig. 5). They were sometimes identified as “orilleros” due to their proximity to the Bagual and Cuero lakes also at the entrance to Ranqueles’s lands. Cacique Mariano Rosas started calling them “*indios gauchos*” due to their alliance with federalist gauchos. Sources usually identify Cacique Ramón and the Indio Blanco as some of their main leaders. These groups also gained temporary support from some of Caciques Rosas’ and Baigorrita’s subalerns.

In addition, the Ranqueles faced the betrayal of their intermediaries Colonel Baigorria and one of their subalern Caciques, Ignacio Coliquéo, during the battle of Pavón. These men not only joined Mitre’s side, but also participated in an expedition against Ranqueles’s lands towards the end of 1862. This type of treason demanded revenge or, at least, some sort of compensation according to cacicatos’ customs.

These circumstances challenged the Ranqueles’s internal consensus and stability throughout the decade. Although negotiation was usually the caciques’ preferable policy, caciques, capitanejos and followers used violence to assure access to resources, revenge the traitors and support the federalists until the end of 1863. In time, they not only thought

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898 Tamagnini and Pérez Zavala, *El fondo de la tierra: Destinos errantes en la Frontera Sur* (Universidad Nacional de Río Cuarto, 2010), p.54. Also see, Tamagnini, eds., *Cartas de frontera.*
899 Ibid.
900 Colonel Baigorria and Colonel Vedia with 700 soldiers from Bragado attacked the land of the Ranqueles all the way to Nahuel Mapu. The Ranqueles were notified about this threat and most had left before the expeditionary force reached them. Nevertheless, the military burned some of their *tolderías* and stole animals. Victor Barrionuevo Imposti, *Historia de Río Cuarto*, Vol. 1-3 (Río Cuarto: TIPENC, 1988).
901 The sources collected on malones and malocas between 1862 and 1863 show that they included small attacks of 10 to 70 people (malocas) and big alliances of 400 and 600 people. The booty also varied from a couple of animals
themselves as part of the federalist alliance, but the federalists themselves considered the Ranqueles key forces to regain power. In March 1863, the chief of the federalists’ military operations, Tiburcio José Rodríguez, wrote to the federalist Lescano about their military strategies and plans.\(^{902}\) He estimated that both Catamarca and La Rioja were already under Peñaloza’s control, and that the unitario government in Córdoba would eventually fall into the hands of the federalists. He also thought Urquiza would limit porteños’ access to Córdoba from Entre Ríos and that their forces would win Mendoza and Rosario (in Santa Fé). Finally he indicated that “the Indian Cristo, Pepe López and Mariano [Rosas] would also hit these spots.” Some months before, Cacique Rosas had sent a letter to the Governor of San Luis José Barbeito informing him that if he did not separate from the porteños and joined Urquiza, they would never be in peace. Rosas explained that he knew that the porteños wanted to “end our tribes, but they will never be able to [do it].”\(^{903}\) He indicated that all his force would follow Urquiza, which was composed of 600 lanzas, allies from the Araucanía who had already arrived at his tenderías, and many officers and chiefs from the federalist forces whom had acted under Juan Saá and had arrived in the Pampas from Chile, and others from La Rioja.

In a nutshell, the strategy followed by the federalists to regain power in 1863 included forming alliances that crossed provincial, class and ethnic boundaries. For the Ranqueles in general, this alliance was an opportunity to stop invasions into their territories as well as assuring immediate resources. Malones over the eastern Pampas’ frontier guaranteed access to resources as well as some support from Calfucurá’s followers. Federalist success also guaranteed a

\(^{902}\) AHSL., box 161, no. 17100.
\(^{903}\) AHSL., box 159, no. 16651.

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privileged role for the Ranqueles in diplomatic negotiations with the national government and peace agreements, which would enhance the principal caciques’ prestige in the Pampas Confederacy. Ranqueles and federalists common campaigns brought malones and montoneras into Córdoba, San Luis, Mendoza and western Buenos Aires frontier towns during 1862 and 1863. For example, in July 1863, 600 Indians and Creoles attacked Achiras. In September, 400 Indians and Creoles hit Villa Mercedes in San Luis.904

These attacks ended forcing Córdoba’s government to leave their forts on the Río Quinto—previously having been guarded by Colonel Baigorria—and to retreat to Río Cuarto.905 The Ranqueles’s combined force also started challenging Calfucurá’s confederate leadership.906 Calfucurá was sponsoring a policy of peace with the national government, as it was now ruled by Buenos Aires’ elites and authorities. This pact assured a continuous flow of raciones and the protection over his trade and lands in the eastern Pampas, together with those of Catriel and his more distant allies. The Ranqueles’s mobilizations and the participation of some of Calfucurá’s capitanejos and lanzas in these attacks challenged his diplomatic policy.907 Did these developments tear the Pampas Confederacy apart?

Tension between Calfucurá and the Ranquel caciques started escalating. In early 1862, Calfucurá told national authorities that he continuously advised the Ranqueles to settle for peace, but they constantly refused and wanted to continue raiding. He asserted that he had told them that he: “would not protect them because I am tired of advising them to be good, and now I am

904 SHE., Frontera con los indios, no. 2271, and AHSL., box 162, nos. 17408, 17549 and 17719.
905 Pérez Zavala, “La política interétnica de los Ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.”
906 Ibid.
907 For example, in August 1862, Commander Vedia from Bragado reported that the visitors from the Araucanía, some Ranqueles and some of Calfucurá’s capitanejos, such as Catricurá, Blanco and Colocal wanted to raid the frontier. AM., Emilio Mitre, box 5, no. 26, August 5th, 1862.
displeased. And they do not want to obey me on any terms, and then the chief of the Christians blames me for everything." 908 Calfucurá was showing the national government that he was not involved in the Ranqueles’s *malones* and alliances with the federalists. Nevertheless, he also revealed his interests in maintaining communication with the Ranqueles. These cacicatos were still crucial intermediaries for the Pampas Confederacy’s trans-regional trade networks. They hosted allies from the Araucanía and assured the maintenance of internal peace and stability for followers who shared kinship, personal and economic ties. 909 Moreover, cacicatos’ political tradition allowed allies and subalterns to meet in parliaments to decide on the organization of *malones* and *malocas*. 910 If most participants agreed, the principal caciques had to comply. They could, however, abstain from participating in the attack.

As I will show in more detail in the next chapter, Calfucurá managed to maintain his ties with the Ranqueles by accepting consensus politics as the basis for decisions-making while, at the same time, keeping peace treaties with the national government. According to a French traveler, Calfucurá even warned Cacique Rosas that the government was preparing a military campaign against his *tolderías*. 911

The Ranqueles’s general plans were frustrated by the federalists’ defeat in late 1863. The federalists failed in deposing Córdoba’s government, lost important battles and Peñaloza was betrayed and assassinated. 912 Numerous federalists took refuge in the Ranqueles’s *tolderías*.

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908 “Juan Calfucurá to Commander Domingo Sanchez Boado, March 28th, 1862,” AM., Bartolomé Mitre.
909 For example, in May 1862, authorities informed the arrival of caciques from the Araucanía to Calfucurá’s *tolderías* – who crossed through the Ranqueles lands.
910 For example, Commander Llano informed that one of Calfucurá capitanejos, Yancubil, joined the Ranqueles. SHE., *Frontera con los indios*, no. 138, May 26th, 1862.
911 SHE., *Frontera con los indios*, no. 161, July 8th, 1862.
912 In June, a rebellion tried to depose Córdoba’s government, but failed and therefore weekend Chacho Peñaloza’s plans. In August, 1862, Peñaloza made peace with the national government, but was betrayed and assassinated by Pablo Irrazabal. AHSL., box. 162, no. 17392; box 163, nos. 17678, and 17355; box. 159, nos. 16703, and 16725.
creating greater challenges for them.\textsuperscript{913} The Ranqueles had to provide for their allies and were increasingly identified by the ruling creole authorities as enemies. Meanwhile, Calfucurá kept pressuring the Ranqueles to make peace, and bragged about the numerous \textit{raciones} he received from the national government thanks to successful peace treaties.\textsuperscript{914}

Under pressure, Cacique Mariano Rosas decided to work towards establishing peace with the national government. Nevertheless, the persistent presence of federalists in his lands allied with some of his subalterns and \textit{indios gauchos}, plus the national government’s ambiguous actions towards establishing peace or invading their lands, conditioned these negotiations. Cacique Rosas’ personal conflicts with Cacique Coliquéo and Colonel Baigorria also limited reaching an arrangement with President Mitre. Rosas even called the porteños \textit{“gualicho”} (spirit of evil) in one of his letters.\textsuperscript{915} He chose provincial governments that he thought could be somewhat sympathetic with the federalists cause, but more importantly, that could assure stable trade with at least some frontier towns, such as San Luis.\textsuperscript{916}

In October 25\textsuperscript{th}, 1863 Cacique Rosas wrote to Governor Barbeito of San Luis as his friend and brother, and asked for bits, spurs and clothes, and to send a silversmith.\textsuperscript{917} But in December 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1863, Rosas expressed his anger about the government’s accusations of his involvement with the federalist leader Costa during the previous \textit{malones}.\textsuperscript{918} Rosas explained to Barbeito that Costa did not hold authority over him. The Cacique found the government’s lack of

\textsuperscript{913} AHSL., box. 163; no. 17657 and 17681.
\textsuperscript{914} In 1866, Cacique Rosas indicated to San Luis authorities that Calfucurá and Catriel made fun of him because of the poor number and quality of goods he received after the 1865 peace treaty. AHSL., box 171, no. 19127.
\textsuperscript{915} “Mariano Rosas to Colonel Iseas, Leubucó, December 24th, 1863,” AHSL., box 163, no. 17765
\textsuperscript{916} On October 1861, for example, he was trying to reach Coliqueo and Baigorria. In 1864, he again told Governor Barbeito that he went to war because of Coliqueo and Baigorria who “came to trample my lands.” He sent forces to San Luis, Córdoba and Buenos Aires to find Coliqueo. AHSL., nos. 16322, and 18159.
\textsuperscript{917} “Mariano Rosas to Governor Barbeito, Luebucó, October 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1863,” AHSL., box 163, no. 17629.
\textsuperscript{918} “Mariano Rosas to Governor Barbeito, Leubucó, December, 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1863,” AHSL., box 163, no. 17719.
interest in negotiating the release of more captives rather suspicious, and also that it did not send any message with the commissions he had sent nor the gifts he had requested. The Cacique clarified that he wanted peace, and it depended on them to seal it. On December 8th, Colonel Iseas wrote to Governor Barbeito saying that the men whom had gone to Cacique Rosas’s tolderías had returned only with one captive baby and that the Cacique was sending his last messenger to settle peace. If peace was not settled, he would prepare for war. These envoys also informed him that Calfucurá participated in the Ranqueles’s past malones and that they were now preparing 2,000 lanzas from Salinas Grandes, 1,000 from Cacique Rosas, and many excellent horses to raid Bragado.

Although we cannot blindly believe the veracity of these testimonies; they reveal a continuous communication between Calfucurá and the Ranqueles, their important military force and the Ranqueles’s increasing internal conflicts. The negotiation remained troublesome due to the government’s parallel intentions to invade Ranquel lands. Cacique Rosas was not only aware of these plans, but also demanded that the government limit frontier settlements. He demanded that Governor Barbeito make settlers keep all their animals in the “center” of the province. These negotiations ended in a peace treaty in 1865, which only lasted for a couple of months.

The Pehuenches also became involved in the first cycle of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Cuyo region. But in their case, the internal conflicts between the principal caciques and subaltern caciques, capitanejos and lanzas shaped the conflicts from the beginning. During the 1850s,

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919 The same day, he sent a letter to Commander Iseas in Villa Mercedes complaining for similar offenses in addition to the killing of some indios amigos. “Mariano Rosas to Colonel Iseas, Leubucó, December 4th, 1863,” AHSIL, box 163, no. 17720.

920 “Colonel José Iseas to Governor Barbeito, Villa Mercedes, December 8th, 1863,” AHSIL, box 163, no. 17724.

921 In his letters, Cacique Rosas mentioned his knowledge about these plans and blamed Colonel Baigorria and Cacique Coliqueo as the origin of all the conflict. “Mariano Rosas to Governor Barbeito, Leubucó, May 31st, 1864,” AHSIL, box 165, no. 18159.
specific lineages imposed their control over the regions of Malargüe, Barrancas and Varvarco. They reached a general agreement with Mendoza’s frontier authorities to receive *raciones* in exchange for peace, legalize some of their territorial rights, known as *derechos de talajes*, and assure access to trade in the frontier town of San Rafael. They reached a general agreement with Mendoza’s frontier authorities to receive *raciones* in exchange for peace, legalize some of their territorial rights, known as *derechos de talajes*, and assure access to trade in the frontier town of San Rafael. The *derechos de talajes* included cacicatos’ rights to charge Chileans and Mendocinos for the use of their lands, resources and mountain passes. According to San Rafael’s Subdelegate Tomás Irusta, Cacique Juan Agustín from Barrancas, earned around 10,000 pesos per year from these tolls. The presence of Chileans in Mendoza and Pehuenche lands was a daily phenomenon since colonial times. During the 1840s and 1850s, many Chileans migrated temporarily or permanently to Pehuenche’s lands to graze their animals in winter and engage in trade. Cacicatos rented and charged for the use of their lands as well as for the passage through their passes and trails. Mendoza authorities frequently tried to regulate these contacts and to gain some economic benefit from these migrants. But Chilean settlers lived under cacicatos’ jurisdiction. In addition, some groups of Pehuenches had settled near the frontier posts of San Rafael and La Paz (in the southeast frontier and next to San Luis) and cacicatos’ lands in Malargüe. They negotiated with frontier authorities agreements similar to those of the *indios amigos* in Buenos Aires. In time, they built close relationships with creole ranchers, merchants, and *gaucho*

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922 According to military sources and correspondence in Mendoza, these caciques negotiated several treaties during the 1840s and 1850s. They also agreed with the provincial government that they had right to charge Indians, Creoles and Chileans for the use of their lands, resources and passes to cross through the Andes Mountains. They had been receiving these revenues, perceived as reciprocal obligations in their logic, since colonial times but it was now formalized and recognized by provincial authorities as it involved and sometimes generated conflicts with creole settlers and Chileans. Many Chilean merchants and ranchers crossed into Pehuenche lands to graze their animals during the winter and return to Chile during the spring. AHPM., *Fronteras Interiores*, and Manara, “La frontera surandina: centro de la confrontación política a principios del siglo XIX”, *Mundo Agrario*, vol.5, no.10, La Plata (ene./jun. 2005), on-line versión ISSN 1515-5994.
923 In Mendoza, local authorities were named Subdelegates.
AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box 765, no. 78.
924 Manara, “La frontera surandina,” and Varela and Manara, "Particularidades de un modelo económico en un espacio fronterizo nordpatagónico.”
San Rafael became the main town for frontier diplomacy and exchange between independent Pehuenches and Mendoza authorities. It’s defense relied on the indios amigos, and a regular force of grenadiers and infantry headed by people tied to the caciques, such as the sub-lieutenant Simón Vallejos. Vallejos was apparently raised by one of Varvarco Cacique Caepe’s capitanejos, and Caepe treated him like a son.

By the 1860s, these long-standing frontier agreements, and the economic regional challenges increased the indios amigos’ and creole soldiers’ economic vulnerability. A disruption of these agreements, due to the new pro-Mitrista provincial government, affected even further the lanzas’ and gauchos’ prosperity.

In early May of 1862, Subdelegate Irusta had secretly agreed with the principal cacique of Malargüe, Traipán, to send a force to Malargüe to imprison creole and Indian people whom had stolen some animals. In response, two hundred Creoles and Indians from San Rafael and Malargüe, under the leadership of the Capitanejo Manuel Páez and the sub-lieutenant Simón Vallejos attacked the troops. Cacique Traipán’s intervention prevented the assassination of all the men in the expedition. The “rebels” took between 2,500 and 3,000 horses, mares and cattle from local Chilean, Mendocinos and Indian ranchers and escaped to Barrancas. Subdelegate Irusta indicated that they were armed with rifles and sables and that the Caciques from Barrancas

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926 See their lists in San Rafael and La Paz, and references to Traipán in AHPM., Indios, box 123.
927 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 765, no. 88.
928 “Commander Irusta to the Governor, San Rafael, April 25th, 1862;” “Cacique Manuel Traipán to Commander Irusta, Malargüe, April 23rd, 1862,” and “Commander Irusta to the Governor, San Rafael, May 5th, 1862,” in AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 765, nos. 74 and 76.
929 “Colonel Irusta to the Governor of Mendoza, San Rafael, May 14th, 1862,” AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box. 765, no. 78.
apparently provided 60 more lanzas. He also feared their possible alliance with federalists’ leaders, such as Claveros, who was in Chile at the time.

This rebellion challenged the Indian and provincial authorities’ status quo. It established an alliance between creole and Indian subalterns seeking for survival and empowerment. On the one hand, Vallejos had long-standing problems with frontier authorities who wanted to reduce his influence over the local soldiers, ranchers and cacicatos. Since the times of the Pincheiras, he had been building strong ties with the local population, especially frontier soldiers under his command. These forces were badly paid and included people sent to the frontier as a form of punishment for crimes or desertions committed in other regions. In 1863, officer Capdeville told Mendoza’s Minister that rebellions were likely to happen at the frontier because of: “the poverty of the soldier who lacks everything, and [they] have already gone two days without the provisions necessary for their subsistence.” They did not even have enough horses to defend the town; Subdelegate Irusta had to use ranchers’ mules to guard San Rafael after the rebellion.

Budget problems were common in frontier towns, but Mendoza’s economy was particularly bad. In 1861, a strong earthquake had hit the province, destroying half of the main city. The periodic obstruction of trade networks with Chile, and the conflicts between local federalists and unitarios limited the provincial funds further. Unlike Buenos Aires, Mendoza’s government had no Atlantic access. It had difficulty in convincing local ranchers to provide the

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930 Ibid., and “Colonel Irusta to the Governor of Mendoza, San Rafael, May 5th and 12th 1862,” AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 765, nos. 76 and 77.
931 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 764.
932 Local correspondence shows that the lack of resources and salaries for the regular military and the indios amigos was frequent. AHPM., Fronteras interiores.
933 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, no. 68.
934 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 765, no. 77.
animals necessary for the raciones, both for the military as well as the indios amigos, as it could not match market prices. In this context, the survival of frontier soldiers, gauchos and their families, depended on building patron-client relationships with local leaders, ranchers and merchants, as well as caciques. In this specific case, creole subalterns found a common ground with displaced federalist at the local, provincial and national levels. After they had attacked the troops sent by Irusta in May 1862, Vallejos and the Capitanejo Páez continued mobilizing forces in adherence to: the federalist Claveros who was in Chile, the ex-governor Saá and his brothers from San Luis, and also backed Chacho Peñaloza in La Rioja.

Many indios amigos shared similar material and political interests with gauchos. The Capitanejo Páez had been leading some of the indios amigos since at least 1847. He also worked as intermediary for the main caciques in Malargüe, Barrancas and Varvarco. Nevertheless, the in-between character of the indios amigos did not seem to bear fruit in Mendoza. Local authorities and independent caciques usually blamed each other for the indios amigos’ poverty and lack of resources. Although not all of the indios amigos joined the rebellion, the movement showed lanzas’ and gauchos’ discontent with their authorities and the status quo.

Local sources show how personal ties with local authorities guaranteed access to resources and support for both subalterns and authorities appointed by the province whom generally were outsiders. The Sublegate Pedernera, for example, ended up dismissed from his position due to conflicts with cacicatos and creole settlers, among them, Simón Vallejos. AHPM., Fronteras interiores.

It is worth noting that montoneras were financed by local residents and settlers, whether they participated in the military attacks or not. In Mendoza, for example, authorities, in October 1863, reported that in the departments of San Martin and Junin people were buying cattle from montoneros in San Luis and La Rioja in order to cross them over to Chile. AHSL., box 163, no. 17611.

See lists of lanceros and census in: AHPM., Independencia, Census, and Fronteras interiores, box 763, no. 48; box 765, no. 73. Correspondence between 1852 and 1859 also show that the province provided raciones to indios amigos. AHPM., Independencia, San Rafael, box. 592, no. 30; box. 765, no.5; boxes 763, 764, and 765.

For example, in 1851, caciques in Varvarco intervened in a conflict between the indios amigos and the province to guarantee their provisions and lands. AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 763, no.12.

For example, Capitanejo Lemos helped provincial authorities to negotiation peace with the rebels.
In addition to economic limitations, some of the rebels were facing serious conflicts with Cacique Traipán from Malargüe. In February 1857, a group of Indians protested against Traipán’s administration of their land revenues. Apparently, he was not distributing the revenue received from the derechos de talaje. Traipán’s followers requested that the Mendoza government ratify their right to use these lands or rent them to Jacinto Urrutia or any other settlers, rights that had been recognized by the provincial authority in December 1856. They threatened to leave for Chile if this was not resolved. Although lands in Malargüe were under the cacicatos’ jurisdiction, settlers, merchants and gauchos who paid the cacicatos for these rights were from the Mendoza and Chilean governments and thus, the conflict demanded some sort of creole regulation. Although I found no sources referring to the outcome of this conflict, it probably continued pushing lanzas and their families to follow Capitanejo Páez and the rebels in 1862. Furthermore, rebels ended up forcing Cacique Traipán to follow them to Barrancas.

Unlike the Pampas and Northern Patagonian Confederacies, the ruling Pehuenche lineages did not succeed in guaranteeing stability and prosperity to most of their followers. The political conflicts at the local and provincial levels provided lanzas and capitanejos with an opportunity to join forces with creole gauchos and local leaders and defy all authorities. The inter-ethnic character of this force was such that, like in Carmen de Patagones, frontier authorities could not distinguish participants’ identities during robberies, malocas and malones. For example, in November 1863, officer Capdeville told Mendoza’s Minister of War that it was very hard to maintain provincial authority in San Rafael. He indicated that a creole resident had

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940 Cacique Traipán descended from the Cacique Traipán that had ruled the region during the 1840s. Sources have several references to the links between his followers and the indios amigos. In 1862, for example, Cacique Traipán indicated that one of his soldiers was a nephew of Capitanejo Lemos, from the indios amigos of San Rafael. AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 765, no. 73.

941 AHPM., Independencia, box 765, no. 27.
reported that “Indians” were raiding, but when he sent a force to stop them, they realized they were *gauchos* who “in order to steal they dressed up in Indian costumes.” Like in Patagones, processes of *mestizaje* among creole and Indian subalterns did away with or blurred ethnic stereotypes.

Indian and creole authorities understood that any resolution demanded inter-ethnic negotiation. However, elites faced several difficulties to be able to reach any agreement, mainly due to their misunderstanding of each other’s political logic, the continuing challenges coming from their subalterns and the regional context. While the Creole and Indian rebels were on the cacicatos’ lands, negotiations went back and forth with provincial authorities, but stained by a strong and mutual mistrust. At first, Subdelegate Irusta blamed all Pehuenche caciques for what had happened, and wanted to attack the people in Barrancas under Cacique Juan Agustín to conveniently occupy their lands and take the revenues obtained from their *derechos de talajes*. But Irusta had limited military resources and local support, and Mendoza’s government refused to support an expedition against independent Pehuenches. Furthermore, the government offered a pardon to all the “rebels” from the Indian *tolderías*, and accepted the caciques’ offer of peace.

Although the principal caciques in Barrancas and Varvarco prioritized peace, they faced a difficult internal challenge. They had long-standing personal ties with the rebels. Cacique Traipán even tried to prevent Vallejos from being imprisoned by Irusta before his agreement

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942 AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box 766, no. 68.  
943 AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box 765, nos. 77, 78 and 80.  
944 He even stated that settlers deserved what had happened because they knew what was going on and they never sent him a report. Ibid.  
945 AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box. 765, nos. 81 and 82.  
946 Vallejos was raised by one of Varvarco Cacique Caepe’s *capitanejos*, and Caepe treated him like a son. AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box 765, no. 88.

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with the Subdelegate.\textsuperscript{947} The \textit{indios amigos} were also relatives and allies of caciques in Barrancas and Varvarco.

As a consequence, it is worth asking why these caciques did not simply join the rebellion like the Ranqueles did in the central Pampas. Pehuenche caciques’ adherence could have clearly threatened their authority, territorial control and long-standing agreements with provincial authorities. People in Barrancas already had had to face Irusta’s repression after the rebellion in Malargüe.\textsuperscript{948} The principal caciques decided to make peace with frontier authorities at the expense of their creole allies. Correspondence between Subdelegate Irusta and Caciques Traipán, Juan Agustín and Caepe show that they reached some sort of agreement. Caciques would only give up Vallejos and his rebels and return the stolen cattle and arms if, in exchange, Indian rebels were to remain unpunished and continue receiving gifts as reciprocal compensations.\textsuperscript{949} They also demanded to negotiate the final agreement in a parliament. Interestingly, these caciques were placing themselves as representatives of all Pehuenches, and intermediates for the federalist \textit{montoneras}.\textsuperscript{950}

As with the Ranqueles, mutual mistrust strained the negotiations. Caciques did not go to Malargüe to meet Irusta because they were warned of a possible ambush. We do not know if the frontier authorities were planning to trick the caciques, but one month after the last letter was received, Subdelegate Irusta asked Mendoza’s Ministry to assemble forces in San Carlos and

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947. “Manuel Traipán to Irusta, Malargüe, April 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1862,” AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 765, no. 63.
948. “Cacique Juan Agustín Terrada to Commander Irusta, July 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1862,” AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 765, no. 87.
949. “Commander Irusta to the Ministry, San Rafael, June 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1862,” AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 765, no. 82.
950. For example, Cacique Juan Agustín told Irusta in August that the “Malalguinos” followed his advice. Caciques were also in charge of informing the federalists that the province gave them a pardon, and negotiating their way back to the frontier. Ibid., and “Cacique Juan Fernando Caepe to Commander Irusta, Cuel Leuvo, July 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1862;” “Juan Agustín Terrada to Irusta, Ranquilco, August 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1862;” and “Juan Agustín Terrada to Irusta, Río Basan, July 17\textsuperscript{th}, 1862;” in AHPM., \textit{Fronteras Interiores}, box 765, nos., 84, 87 and 98.
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attack Juan Agustín’s *tolderías*; this attack never took place.951 Meanwhile, Cacique Juan Agustín proposed to Irusta that they meet in a safe place, in secret and, according to Irusta, that he would give up Vallejos.952 This meeting never took place, and negotiations continued through written correspondence and messengers.

As we see, the negotiations between caciques and Mendoza’s authorities were constantly disrupted by persistent mistrust. On the one hand, the main caciques had to consider that the federalists were getting stronger in early 1863 and Claveros was planning to cross over from Chile into Pehuenche lands.953 Pehuenches were not only involved with Claveros’s local supporters, but also had to consider the fact that the federalists could return to rule over Mendoza’s government. Pehuenches also continued receiving information on porteños’ plans to attack their lands.954 On the other hand, Chilean military expeditions threatened the Pehuenches’ presence on the western side of the Andes. By the end of 1862, the military had occupied Angol and Lebu and had held parliaments with some cacicatos while others, such as indigenous groups in Arauco, refused to appear.955 One of the remaining *Capitanes de indios*, Palacios, even tried to advise Pehuenches to make peace and release Vallejos.956 However, this letter never reached its destiny because the emissary, his son Ramón who was living in Malargüe, was threatened by the *indios amigos* due to his participation in the expedition sent to capture Vallejos and Páez in

951 “Irusta to the Minster, San Rafael, August 14\textsuperscript{th}, 1862,” AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box. 765, no. 93.
952 “Juan Agustín Terrada to Irusta, Ranquilco, August 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1862, AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box. 765, no. 98.
953 Irusta also said that they were in contact with the Chileans Gonzalez and Bernardo Urrutia, son of Colonel Urrutia from Chile, who were “spies” for the Indians. “Irusta to the Minster, San Rafael, August 14\textsuperscript{th}, 1862,” AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box 765, no. 93.
954 According to Palacios, Vallejos told the caciques that the porteños wanted to kill them all and take their lands. “Don Manuel Palacios to Caepe and Juan Agustín, Linares, May 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1862,” AHPM., *Indios*, box 123, no. 22.
955 Navarro, *Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía*.
956 “Don Manuel Palacios to Caepe and Juan Agustín, Linares, May 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1862,” AHPM., *Indios*, box 123, no. 22.
1862. Ramón escaped to Chile and abandoned his animals in Pehuenche lands. Caciques’ letters also show that they closely followed all movements in Chile and Araucanía, where they held political, kin and economic ties. Documentation on malones and malocas also reveal that some cacicatos were crossing the Andes Mountains to Salinas Grandes through Pehuenche lands, and participated in malones with Ranqueles and people under Calfucurá.

Due to all of these complexities, Pehuenche caciques and provincial authorities did not reach a formal agreement by mid-1863, when Mendoza was again the scene of political and military agitation. Francisco Claveros besieged San Rafael and San Carlos to liberate his sons. He occupied the headquarters, imprisoned and replaced the Subdelegate. Claveros escaped, but the province continued under political chaos during the 1860s.

Although there are no explicit references to the participation of indigenous people in Claveros’s attacks, sources indicate their continuing alliances. First, Claveros and other federalist leaders such as Pedro Pérez, the Videlas and the Saá needed the caciques’ permission to cross from Chile. Second, frontier authorities started reporting the movement of around 300 Creoles and Indians —among them Capitanejo Páez— from San Rafael to La Paz. In August 1863, between 200 and 300 Indians and Creoles invaded La Paz. They took eight “herds of cattle” and sixteen “herds of horses.” They captured a whole family and some children, and wounded a

957 “Commander Irusta to the Governor, Malargüe, July 23rd, 1862,” and “Irusta to the Minster, San Rafael, August 14th, 1862,” in AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box. 765, nos. 88 and 93.
958 For example, Cacique Caepe explained to Irusta in April 1862 that the Moluches were now at peace. He also mentioned that the Chilean ex-President Manuel Bulnes, always advised him like a “father.” See the letters of Traipán and Juan Agustín in: AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 765, nos. 63 and 84.
959 “Vicente Ortiz to the Governor of Mendoza, San Carlos, April 4th, 1863,” AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, no. 16.
960 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, no. 28.
961 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, no. 19.
962 “Narvajo to the Minister, Villa La Paz, August 8th and 14th, 1863,” AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, nos. 49 and 52.
man. The raiders told local ranchers and merchants that 300 more people were waiting for them in the area, and that they had more than 2,000 mares and cattle. Creoles later asserted that most attackers were Indians from “Chile” and some from “Barrancas.” After this *malón*, creole families massively started escaping from La Paz. Authorities reported that the frontier town did not have a single horse available to send correspondence.

These episodes strongly impacted the stability of Mendoza’s frontier. Although some groups of Indians kept working as militia for Mendoza, the force of *indios amigos* -which officially registered 182 *lanzas* in 1847 and around 65 between 1852 and 1854- disappeared from the military register of San Rafael. Sources provide a few references on some “docile Indians” in Malargüe, and people of Traipán’s lineage. During the 1860s, the census did not register people as *indios amigos*. Instead, it indicated the presence of some “Indians” in Malargüe and Barrancas referring to the independent cacicatos at those locations. These pieces of evidence indicate that the people identified previously as *indios amigos* took diverse paths: few stayed working under the Mendoza’s military, others continued in multi-ethnic mobilizations while most remained under the principal caciques of Barrancas and Varvarco. This circumstance also forced the province to send more military forces to the frontier and rely on their negotiations with the independent Pehuenche caciques to maintain frontier peace.

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964 Ibid.
965 Based on censuses and lists of *lancers* found in AHPM., *Independencia, Census* and *Fronteras interiores*.
966 In June 1866, Calderón told Commander Irrazabal that 20 Indians were taking horses from el Chacay and Agua Blanca and he thought it could be a rebellion of the: “the rest of the docile Indians that remained in Malargüe.” In 1865, provincial documents refer to the delivery of some *raciones* to Indians in Malargüe. AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box 767, no. 25; and *Indios*, box 123, no. 29
967 AHPM., *Fronteras interiores*, box 763, no.103; box 765, num 76; box 766, no.159, and box 767, no. 27.
968 Ibid. This also happened in La Paz. AHPM., *Census*, box.15.
Like Córdoba, Mendoza lost its military force and control over its southern frontier towns (San Rafael and La Paz), risking the towns’ survival and providing cacicatos an opportunity to expand their territories. The principal Pehuenche caciques also failed to maintain their authority over Malargüe and San Rafael. Descendants and followers of Cacique Traipán continued having trouble with their cacique in Malargüe. Caciques in Barrancas and Varvarco continued participating in the inter-ethnic conflicts in Chile.

To sum up, during the first cycle of inter-ethnic conflicts in southern Cuyo, the federalist cause gained strength and had a real opportunity to restore their rule over several provinces thanks to the Ranqueles and the Pehuenches. Nevertheless, they experienced devastating defeats in all provinces towards the end of 1863. Chacho Peñaloza was assassinated, and Governor Urquiza restrained from joining the rebellions.\textsuperscript{969} The provinces of Mendoza, San Luis and Córdoba lost military power in frontier regions and continued facing unstable governments and economies.

Both Ranqueles and Pehuenches in general managed to maintain their lands and political strength. The Ranqueles gained an important opportunity to enhance their prestige and resources, and challenged Calfucurá’s leadership. But, like their allied federalists, they faced defeats and internal conflicts that limited their political project. Southern Cuyo’s frontier regions, passes and routes became spaces contested by multiethnic bands. It was hard for frontier authorities to differentiate allies and enemies.\textsuperscript{970} While this generated escalating violence, it also provided

\textsuperscript{969} Bragoni, "Cuyo después de Pavón."
\textsuperscript{970} For example, in February 1867 Buenos Aires frontier authorities report that “\textit{gauchos}” took advantage of the \textit{malones} to steal. In Córdoba, during 1867, authorities reported that routes were full of “\textit{Indians and gauchos}” waiting to attack.
subalterns with opportunities to gain resources and political influence independently of the creole and indigenous centers of power.

*The second cycle of conflicts: 1866-1869*

The federalists organized various and widespread rebellions against the Mitrista hegemony between 1866 and 1867, which were known as “the rebellions of the reds.” Federalists were not only looking to restore their rule in their respective provinces, but also to oppose Argentina’s participation in the Paraguayan War. In addition to their support of the Paraguayan president, creole subalterns also fought against the mandatory recruitment laws.\(^{971}\)

The first federalist movements started in Mendoza, where the Colonel Carlos Rodriguez revolted while in prison, managing to set 80 prisoners free. Part of the National Guard, which was ready to march to war, popular sectors and legislators, also joined the rebellion. They relieved the former governor and replaced him with Manuel Aries.\(^{972}\) The rebellion quickly spread to San Juan, where the federalist Juan de Dios Videla then became the governor. In San Luis, after three failed attempts, the brothers Juan and Felipe Saá finally deposed Governor Justo Daract in January, 1867. Peñaloza’s successor, Felipe Varela, returned from Chile and occupied the western side of La Rioja. The La Riojan National Guard also rebelled and joined the federalist cause. There was also some support in Catamarca, Córdoba, Entre Ríos (people under Lopez Jordán), Santa Fé, Corrientes and even some *Blancos* from Uruguay. All these movements

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\(^{971}\) Ariel de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo*, and Salvatore, *Wandering Paysanos.*

\(^{972}\) Bragoni, “Cuyo después de Pavón.”
were waiting for Governor Urquiza’s from Entre Rios to start taking actions to depose President Mitre.  

The national government appointed Generals José Miguel Arredondo and Wenseslao Paunero to suppress the rebellions. Between 1866 and 1867, national authorities replaced the provincial governments of La Rioja, Catamarca, Mendoza, Santa Fe, Córdoba and Tucumán. Due to the persistent limitations of military resources and the lack of popular support, national authorities had to negotiate with the rebels as well as to ally with local and provincial leaders to contain the uprisings. They, for example, offered pardons for any rebel who demobilized.

Once more, the red rebellion intertwined with cacicatos’ own conflicts and on-growing problematic frontier negotiations. During the first cycle of conflicts, the principal Ranquel caciques and subalterns found common interests in joining the federalist montoneras. During the second cycle, they behaved differently. While the principal caciques tried to make peace with provincial and national authorities, the indios gauchos continued organizing malones and malocas against the frontier towns in alliance with the federalists. The presence of federalists among the Ranqueles challenged the caciques’ policies; they even suffered from attacks and robberies from indios gauchos in their own tolderías. As I will show in this section, the diplomatic failure, the national government’s lack of a unified and coherent frontier policy, and subalterns’ pressure between 1864 and 1866 pushed the Ranquel caciques to continue being involved in malones during the rebellion of the red (1866-1867) and till the end of the decade.

In Pehuenche lands, alliances between capitanejos, lanzas and federalists continued and challenged Mendoza’s authorities and caciques’ control of San Rafael and the Malargüe region.

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973 Urquiza maintained his provincial power in exchange for his neutrality during these events. But he started facing internal challenges from his officer López Jordán who backed a more beligerant policy to bring the federalists back into power.
The principal caciques of Barrancas and Varvarco restrained from acting in these regions, probably to control their own territories threatened by the military campaigns on the western side of the Andes. Pehuenche’s in Malargüe experienced political crises and continued under increasing economic limitations and frontier violence. Although Mendoza’s authorities tried to expand their control over Pehuenches, Mendocinos and Chileans living in Malargüe, multi-ethnic *malones* and *montoneras* limited their power. San Rafael and Malargüe became contested grounds until the end of the 1870s.

The Ranquel caciques and national authorities tried to negotiate peace in order to hold their subalterns from defying their authority. But diplomatic negotiations continued stained with mistrust. After negotiations failed with Governor Barbeito in early 1864, the national government commissioned the ex-governor of San Luis, Justo Daract (from Urquiza’s times), and the new Governor of San Luis, Rufino Lucero, to continue negotiations with the Ranqueles. Cacique Rosas agreed to negotiate with his old friend and returned some more captives as a sign of peace in June 1864.\(^974\) He was trying to reach internal consensus and, for the first time, Cacique Baigorrita participated in the negotiations.

Like Cacique Rosas, Baigorrita displayed his military power, showed great mistrust and imposed important demands as conditions for peace, which included the periodic provision of *raciones* and mares as reciprocal obligations. According to the *montonero* Melchor Costa, Cacique Baigorrita was angry because authorities were only negotiating with Cacique Rosas.\(^975\) On July 25\(^{th}\), Baigorrita sent a letter to Daract indicating that he led 2,000 people in addition to Cacique Rosas’ followers and included all the caciques and *capitanejos* that came from Chile to

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\(^{974}\) “Mariano Rosas to Governor Delgado, Leuvuco, June 6\(^{th}\), 1864,” AHS., box 165, no. 18163.

\(^{975}\) “Melchor Costa to don José Daract and Rufino Lucero, Leuvuco, July 28\(^{th}\),” AHS., box 165, no. 18231.

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revenge his uncle’s death. 976 He promised to contain them until they made peace. He complained about the quality of the ponchos and tobacco sent to his fellow Rosas by telling him that: “although we are Indians, we know what is good and what is useless.” 977 He indicated that he preferred to receive less goods, but of better quality. He reminded authorities that during Urquiza’s times, they had received good clothes and they never broke the peace agreements. He also said that: “Even if Mitre says that Urquiza and Saá did not have enough to send us, they did, and we never lacked anything. So you can send twice what they gave us.” 978 He continued displaying his mistrust: “For several years you were looking to make peace with us, to have us off-guard, because you strongly wish to finish us, but we’ll never live unguarded.” 979 The letter ended indicating the he now trusted the peace offer, and that he would agree with the treaty.

Negotiations continued during 1864 in part due to disagreements on their policies towards the federalists living among Ranqueles. The national government tried to force caciques to give them in as a condition for peace. They also offered a pardon to all “rebels” whom returned to the province; but the federalists mistrusted this offer and continued on cacicato lands planning new attacks.980 They were also not all under the Ranqueles’s jurisdiction. Melchor Costa explained to the national authorities that only Camilo Aranda and tenant Pedro Pérez were among the Ranqueles. Others went to Chile, Mendoza and near Vallejos.981 But the government kept misunderstanding the complexity of these inter-ethnic alliances.

977 Ibid.
978 Ibid.
979 Ibid.
981 “Melchor Costa to the National Commissioner, Leuvucó, July 28th,” AHSL., box 165, no. 18232.
Usually, the main caciques and federalist leaders negotiated the terms of their alliance, and subalterns were expected to follow their leaders’ arrangements. Federalist leaders’ importance and resources—in terms of followers, arms, animals and goods—determined the level of autonomy they were able to maintain in the caciques’ lands. They had to respect Indian rules and customs, and many relied on them to negotiate with state authorities. Melchor Costa, for example, did not seem to have many resources, but was entrusted with a role as an intermediary. He told authorities that he could not travel with the diplomatic commission to the province as Cacique Rosas required him to stay. He also explained that when he showed too much interest in helping the caciques make peace with the province, they complained about him working in favor of their enemies. Hence, he begged the government to send a commission to negotiate directly with the caciques. Melchor Costa also sent people to fetch alcohol from his house in the province, and also requested permission to bring his sister in law’s trade business to the Ranqueles’s lands in order to fulfill his obligations with the caciques. He needed more resources to compensate caciques for hosting him in their tolderías.

In spite of their personal ties and potential rewards in sustaining an alliance, federalists became a burden for the Ranquel caciques after 1863. They challenged the caciques’ authority by offering the indios gauchos and their own lanzas and capitanejos ways to gain resources and prestige by joining attacks against frontier towns. Like the derechos de talajes among Pehuenches, access to frontier trade and mobility were key sources of economic prosperity for all Ranquel lanzas, capitanejos and their families. In addition, the allies that came from the Araucanía to Ranquel lands also pushed subalterns to join malones and malocas to overcome their economic grievances. In 1864, Cacique Quilapán and others from the Araucanía were in

central Pampas, totaling some 1,300 lanzas ready to attack Córdoba or San Luis. Cacique Rosas also informed authorities in San Luis that caciques from the Araucanía might raid San Rafael, and asked for mares to prevent his Indians from joining these raids. The national government ordered San Luis to provide the expected mares.

However, the collection and delivery of the promised raciones, salaries and mares was delayed. In September, ex-Governors Barbeito and Daract informed the caciques that they would not send mares and raciones until Caciques Rosas, Baigorrita and Yanqutruz (Baigorrita’s brother) sent a commission of one or two of the most respected caciques to sign a formal peace treaty in San Luis. They also asked Cacique Rosas to send his brother Epumer or some other cacique to Buenos Aires to meet President Mitre. They sent the caciques some gifts of alcohol, sugar, yerba, maize, and hosted their messengers in San Luis, but authorities did not send the promised mares.

As a consequence, on September 21st, 1864, 300 lanzas and 60 federalists headed by Melchor Costa invaded La Carlota (south of Córdoba). Local authorities persecuted the raiders and managed to recover 1,000 animals and 8 military uniforms. In November, malones hit southern Córdoba again. Cacique Rosas explained in his letters that these attacks were done

983 “Statement of Juan Briones, Río Cuarto, September 3rd, 1864,” AHS L., box 166, no. 18293.
984 The same day, Melchor Costa confirmed that “Chilean Indians” were feeding their animals to prepare a malón over La Paz or San Rafael. “Mariano Rosas to commissioner Justo Daract, August 20th, 1864,” and “Melchor Costa to the national commissioner Justo Daract, Leuvucó, August 20th, 1864,” AHS L., box 166, nums.18262 and 18263.
985 The government also sent the lists of raciones and salaries provided to Caciques Coliquéo and Raninqueo to make the same offer to Mariano Rosas. “Buenos Aires authorities to the Governor of San Luis, August 31st, 1864,” AHS L., box 166, no. 18282.
986 “Juan Barbeito and Justo Daract to the General don Mariano Rosas, San Luis, September 6th, 1864,” AHS L., box 166, no. 18298.
987 A document in the SHE. states there were 2,000 people. AHS L., box. 166, 18314; SHE., Frontera con los indios, no.772.
988 AHS L., box 166, nos. 18314 and 18316.
without his consent, and were organized by *gauchos*. He argued that some of these raiders even stole some of his brother’s animals. Nevertheless, he later recognized that some of his followers had participated in the attacks, and blamed the government for not having sent the promised mares in order to appease his Indians. In a later letter, he explained: “you know that in these lands, we do not pay *capitanejos* and soldiers, that is why I cannot hold Indians [from raiding]... If you send mares and *raciones*, I can make them remain in peace.” Committed to making peace, Cacique Rosas indicated that he was collecting the stolen animals to send them back to the province, but also demanded that the province send what the federalists Concha and Muñoz had stolen from his brother. Some days later, Cacique Rosas demanded other animals stolen by other raiders led by the federalist Pedro Pérez.

Cacique Rosas continued offering peace during 1865, but mistrusted provincial and national authorities’ intentions. He complained about the building of new forts in western Buenos Aires, and the governments’ study of cacicatos’ lands by official surveyors. He also complained about the government’s lack of reciprocal peace gestures. Although Cacique Rosas had sent stolen animals back to their owners, Colonel Iseas did not reciprocate the actions. In February 18658, Cacique Rosas warned Colonel Iseas: “You will lose the peace agreement over

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989 “Mariano Rosas to Juan Barbeito, Luebucó, November 14th, 1864,” AHSL., box 166, no. 18360.
990 November, 29th, 1864, AHSL., box 166, no. 18374.
991 “Mariano Rosas to Juan Barbeito, Luebucó, November 14th, 1864,” AHSL., box 166, no. 18360.
992 November, 29th, 1864, AHSL., box 166, no. 18374.
993 In November 1864, Cacique Rosas complained: “It seems that you send me messages of peace only to settle new forts, like Plumerito and Cantón Barea; after that, you stopped writing to me, so I mistrust your word.” In February, 1865, he said that Cacique Coliqueo sent a message informing that Mitre sent General Paunero to all the provinces to register their lands, water supplies, and *estancias* and wanted to force him to settle in Guaminí next to Calfucurá, and to order Mendoza and San Luis to attack his territory. Rosas thought that Coliqueo was providing this information in order to gain their trust and allow his return, but believed in the information provided. My translation, November, 29th, 1864, and “Mariano Rosas to Colonel Iseas, Luebucó, February, 1st, 1865”, AHSL., box 166, no. 18374, and box 168, no. 18494.
994 According to provincial laws, all animals and captives from the “inner lands” (cacicatos’ lands) should remain as property of the province. “Mariano Rosas to Colonel Iseas, Luebucó, February, 8th, 1865”, AHSL., box 168, no. 18502.
a couple of horses." He added that even if Emilio Mitre brought 600 mares to him, he would not accept peace. He explained that during Juan Manuel de Rosas’s times, Ranqueles had received 1,500 mares and raciones as well as when Manuel López governed Córdoba. If Iseas was negotiating in the name of all the provinces, he should send 5,000 mares plus raciones. To some extent, Cacique Rosas was demanding that the Creoles create a unified and coherent national frontier policy, and the treatment of cacicatos as equal partners.

After these strong complaints and demands, Cacique Rosas received some gifts in March and decided to write to Colonel Iseas accepting the peace propositions. He still demanded his conditions, such as limiting creole settlements in indigenous lands. Two days after this letter, Colonel Iseas imprisoned ten Ranqueles in Villa Mercedes and wanted to hold them until Cacique Rosas released some federalists. Iseas was planning to invade the Ranqueles’s lands. However, the national government became involved in the Paraguayan War and state priorities changed. In April, 1865 the San Luis’ government ordered the mobilization of all the National Guards for the war, leaving the frontier unguarded. Emilio Mitre ordered Iseas to free the Indians and to accept peace negotiations with the Ranqueles.

In May, 1865, the Ranquel capitanejo Curuan in representation of Caciques Rosas and Baigorrita, and the General Commander of Córdoba’s frontier, Baigorria, finally agreed on peace.

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995 Ibid.
996 “Mariano Rosas to Colonel Iseas, Luebucó, March 1st, 1865,” AHSL., box 168, no. 18530.
997 He argued that: “I told you, Justo Daract and the provincial government that, from this side of the river the territory is ours.” He also threatened of possible raids if he saw estancias on their lakes or lands.
998 AHSL., box 168, no. 18541.
999 AHSL., box 168, no. 18595.
1000 Pérez Zavala argues that the Paraguayan War forced the national government to pact with cacicatos. Important regional sectors represented by Felipe Varela, Juan Saá and López Jordán proclaimed themselves against the war and the centralization of political and economic power from Buenos Aires. In addition, frontier military forces had to march to the war as well. Pérez Zavala, “La política interétnica de los Ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.”
1001 AHSL., box 168, no. 18586.
1002 AHSL., box 168, no. 18595.
conditions in Río Cuarto. Cacique Rosas approved this treaty in Leuvucó and Baigorrita in Poitagüé on June 18th, 1865. Emilio Mitre also provided a pardon to all deserters in July.

The treaty indicated that the pact would be done “in the name of God,” and that Cacique Rosas would accept that the government did not want to exterminate them, but to: “incorporate them into the Argentine *pueblo* with kindness and persuasion.” This pact was shaped by the particular context of the Cuyo region and diverges from other contemporary treaties. Instead of prioritizing free trade and contact between indigenous people and Creoles in cacicatos and provincial lands, it tried to control the circulation of people, trade and animals in all the territories. It stated that Cacique Rosas should take care of his lands and trails and give up all the deserters, thieves, stolen animals and the captives that “spontaneously wanted to leave the *tolderías*” in exchange for 50 pesos each. Indians would need permission to reach the frontier to sell animals; and the pact limited the number of diplomatic commissions that could reach frontier towns and Buenos Aires city every year. It restored state tributary conditions as it stipulated titles, salaries and *raciones* for the cacique and 25 of his followers. Cacique Rosas was named “Lieutnant Colonel” with a salary of 60 pesos per month. This treaty looked like an alliance between the main Ranquel caciques and the national and provincial authorities to oppress the multi-ethnic rebellions and creole and Indian subalterns.

Soon, caciques and authorities showed their commitment to sustaining this agreement. San Luis started providing *raciones* to the Ranqueles. Cacique Rosas received some goods in

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1004 “CGE. DEH, idem, no. 3015,” in Levaggi, *Paz en la frontera*.
1005 Several documents from San Luis’ bureaucracy registered the expenditure of the province in gifts and *raciones* for the Ranqueles. AHSL., box 168, nos. 18747, 18775, and 18776.
Villa Mercedes and Baigorrita in Río Cuarto. In August, Rosas stopped Baigorrita’s Indians attempts to steal from a creole rancher in Río Cuarto. He promised to stop his Indians from raiding until he received the first quarterly delivery of raciones. The ex-Governor Daract also ordered Colonel Iseas to liberate the detained Indians, but asked Cacique Rosas to return the stolen animals.

Nevertheless, these friendly attitudes were again obstructed by the lack of the caciques’ and authorities’ ability to provide enough economic and political incentives to prevent subalterns from using violence. The creole authorities also failed to provide all the promised raciones. The federalists were gaining strength and continued allying with subaltern caciques, capitanejos and lanzas. Federalists organized montoneras against San Juan Morro and La Paz in September 1865, and Juan Saá escaped from prison. Apparently, the Ranquel orillero cacique Indio Blanco participated with his indios gauchos in the invasion of San Juan Morro. In January 1866, Mariano Rosas explained that he had nothing to do with these episodes, and that they were a consequence of the government’s failure to fulfill their promises. He indicated that Calfucurá and Catriel made fun of him because of the number and quality of goods he had received. He only received 270 mares out of the promised 600. He did not receive the salaries that were promised, for which his capitanejos were complaining. This is why, he argued: “My Indians organized montoneras, stole and captured [people].” He blamed Colonel Iseas who

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1006 AHSL., box 168, no. 1878.
1007 AHSL., box 168, no. 18814.
1008 AHSL., box 168, nos. 18894 and 18898.
1009 AHSL., box 168, no. 19038.
1010 AHSL., box 171, no. 19127.
1011 Ibid.
apparently had told his people that if the mares they were receiving under the treaty were skinny, they: “should steal in other provinces.”

By 1866, while Caciques Calfucurá and Reuquecurá were signing new treaties with the national authorities, peace was over for the Ranqueles. According to historian Pérez Zavala, the alliance between the Ranqueles and the federalists reached its peak during this year.\textsuperscript{1012} The Ranqueles strongly contributed to the initial success of the “rebellion of the red.” While the federalists revolted in Mendoza in November, 500 Ranqueles invaded Córdoba reaching Barrancas, five leagues north of Río Cuarto. National forces that fought them back took 10,000 animals and 70 captives. Some of Calfucurá’s followers joined these attacks in spite of them being prohibited from doing so under their treaty. In 1867, attacks continued under the leadership of the federalist Pedro Pérez and included Pehuenches under Vallejos and cacicatos from the Araucanía.

Like in the case of Calfucurá, Caciques Rosas and Baigorrita apparently did not lead these attacks. Authorities indicated the presence of Cacique Rosas’s brother Epumer and the Indio Blanco as leaders of the \textit{malones}.\textsuperscript{1013} Rosas was apparently sick and mourning over his wife’s death. He restrained from diplomatic negotiations for a while.\textsuperscript{1014} According to a French traveler, he wanted peace while his brother Epumer kept leading \textit{malones}. Pérez Zavala also mentions differences between Rosas and Baigorrita, who also maintained a diplomatic silence during these years. Whether they led \textit{malones} or not, many of their caciques, \textit{capitanejos} and \textit{lanzas} continued allying with federalists and using violence to gain resources, prestige and defy their authority. Only in 1870 do the principal Ranquel caciques reappear on the scene to try to

\textsuperscript{1012} Pérez Zavala, “La política interétnica de los Ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX,” p.18.  
\textsuperscript{1013} AHSL., box 168, no. 19016.  
\textsuperscript{1014} AHSL., box 171, no. 19127.
unify Ranqueles under their leadership and to stop the national government’s military invasion of their lands.

In the case of the Pehuenches, the principal caciques of Barrancas and Varvarco also restrained from leading malones and engaging in diplomatic negotiations. They probably concentrated on strengthening their presence and growing their economy in Barrancas and Varvarco. By 1864 their economy and multi-ethnic society was thriving. Mendoza’s 1864 census indicates that 444 “Chileans” and “Indians” lived beyond the Río Grande (limit between Malargüe and Barrancas) and possessed 30,000 heads of cattle (42.1% of the total cattle in the frontier region), 20,000 horses (54.1% of total horses in the frontier region), and 61,000 sheep and goats (60.94% of the total sheep and goats in the frontier region). In October 1872, San Rafael authorities reported that south of Malargüe everyone was Chilean and tenants of Pehuenche Indians.

However, Pehuenche’s rule over Malargüe was threatened by internal conflicts with Cacique Traipán’s followers and frontier authorities’ attempts to coopt these forces under their command. In January 1865, the Commander of the Southern Mendoza’s Frontier, Pablo Irrazabal, reported from San Rafael that Cacique Traipán had died. His followers voted on two candidates and the Capitanejo Antonio Acullanao was elected as the successor. In February, Acullanao protested because some authorities were not obliging creoles to pay him the derechos de talaje for his lands between Río Malargüe, Río Grande and Agua Buena. The government

1015 “Censos de la subdelegación de San Rafael del 1864,” in AHPM., Censos, box 15, no.14.
1016 AHPM., San Rafael, box 593, no. 55.
1017 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, no. 121.
1018 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, no. 128.
ratified these rights in May.\textsuperscript{1019} But creole settlers in Malargüe protested on local Pehuenches’ behavior; they complained that these Pehuenches did not respect the civil authorities in that location and stole animals.\textsuperscript{1020} Commander Irrazabal asked the government for permission to punish the Pehuenches.\textsuperscript{1021} Instead, the government named a commissioner to control creole and Chilean settlers and provided gifts and \textit{raciones} to the Indians in May and September 1865.\textsuperscript{1022} This conflict shows that Creoles were trying to exercise authority over cacicato’s lands in Malargüe. They also wanted to control the Andes passes to stop exiled federalists in Chile from crossing and allying with Pehuenches and Ranqueles.

The conflict continued. In January 1866, Malargüe’s commissioner reported that the local \textit{capitanejos} and \textit{lanzas} were unhappy with Cacique Acullanao, who treated them and the Chilean settlers in a despotic manner.\textsuperscript{1023} He stated that the Cacique was violent with his followers and did not distribute the harvest. He proposed to change their cacique. In March 1866, Commander Irrazabal reported that he had attempted to bring Acullanao to San Rafael, but he had had escaped to Chile with his brother.\textsuperscript{1024} Irrazabal took advantage of this conflict and the absence of Barrancas and Varvarco to force at least three \textit{capitanejos} and thirty six \textit{lanzas} from Malargüe to become National Guards and fight the \textit{montoneras} in La Rioja.\textsuperscript{1025} From the sources it is not very clear what the level of force and persuasion used by Irrazabal was, but frontier authorities feared a response from the rest of Pehuenches.\textsuperscript{1026} Small \textit{malocas} and attacks formed by Pehuenches,
local federalists, Chileans and Mendocinos hit the frontier. In February 1866, Cacique Juan Agustín from Barrancas tried to intervene in Malargüe, but with the intention of appropriating the territorial rights of Traipán’s lineage. He traveled to Malargüe to charge the derechos de talaje, captured two families and forced others to leave. In July, 1866 Commander Irrazabal was back in San Rafael and continued trying to coopt Indian forces.

This conflict also shows that frontier authorities were interested in both cacicato lands and cacicatos’ military forces to control Mendocino and Chilean settlers, and prevent alliances between federalists and Indians. They usually complained about the difficulty in forcing the Chilean settlers to pay for the use of lands and resources in Mendoza, and not being able to force them to join the military forces due to their nationality. Official Calderón indicated in 1866 that the National Guard in San Rafael was formed by no more than 30 people because the remaining settlers were Chileans.

Provincial authorities’ intervention in Malargüe failed. Federalist montoneras continued taking provincial governments during the “rebellion of the red,” and allying with some Indian forces. Pehuenche caciques maintained their presence in Malargüe and San Rafael, and their rule over Barrancas and Varvarco. The federalists took Mendoza’s government in November, 1866. General Paunero managed to take the government back, but urban elites continued to dispute its control. In July, 1867, the federalist Pedro Pérez and about 650 people, including Indians,

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1027 In July 1866, authorities reported the presence of Vallejos and some Indians near San Rafael, AHPM.
1028 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box. 767, no. 36.
1029 He reported that one capitanejo, eight Indians and four “vecinos” had escaped from the raiders and were now with him. He said that he needed more resources because Indians were “costly.” AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 767, nos. 27 and 29.
1030 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 766, no. 13020, and box 767, no. 20; San Rafael, box 592, no. 79.
1031 AHPM., box 173., no. 19580, December 18th, 1866.
besieged San Rafael during two days.\textsuperscript{1032} More than twelve people died, the \textit{montoneros} burned three houses, stole all the army horses and some from the settlers, and took from the Sub Delegations offices: the government stamp, the electoral law, the civil code and the justice administration rules.\textsuperscript{1033} These actions support historians’ interpretation that violence in elections interrelated with other ways of exercising citizenship in the period under study, and that the \textit{montoneras} aimed at restoring their control of state institutions. Local authorities also informed that many settlers were collaborating with Pérez.\textsuperscript{1034} Probably, the main Pehuenche caciques participated or tolerated these attacks. Frontier authorities usually accused Ranqueles, people from the Araucanía, and people under Vallejos, which included Pehuenches.\textsuperscript{1035} Irrazabal’s actions over Pehuenches in Malargüe probably pushed some of these people into the \textit{montoneras}. Attacks continued hitting La Paz in southeastern Mendoza, and reached Renca in northern San Luis (see fig. 5).\textsuperscript{1036} In this last attack, multiethnic allies managed to cross San Juan Morro and other provincial towns without being noticed.\textsuperscript{1037}

In this context, the new Commander of Mendoza’s southern frontier Ignacio Segovia started planning an attack on Pehuenche lands in March, 1868. He had a force of 700 soldiers and incorporated another 100 soldiers in San Carlos and San Rafael. But he indicated to the provincial authorities that he needed a minimum of three horses per man to succeed, so he did not start actions.\textsuperscript{1038} In September, Commander Segovia confronted Pérez in San Rafael.\textsuperscript{1039}

\textsuperscript{1032} AHPM., \textit{Indios}, box 123, no. 33.
\textsuperscript{1033} AHPM., \textit{San Rafael}, box 592, nos. 100 and 101.
\textsuperscript{1034} AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 767, no. 60.
\textsuperscript{1035} AHSL., box 173., no. 19514; AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 767, nos. 37-39, and \textit{San Rafael}, box 592, no. 100.
\textsuperscript{1036} AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 767, nos. 41-44, and AHSL., box 176, no. 20075.
\textsuperscript{1037} AHSL., box 176, nos. 20077 and 20080.
\textsuperscript{1038} AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 767, no. 54.
\textsuperscript{1039} AHPM., \textit{Fronteras interiores}, box 767, no. 66.
Segovia reported that he first fought against 350 and 400 people, while “Indians” attacked him from behind. The “invaders” also besieged some of the houses, but could not take animals. Fifteen of Pérez’s followers died -among them one cacique- and many were hurt. Segovia’s casualties were only two dead and three injured soldiers.

Segovia did not indicate the identity of the Indians involved, but many were probably Pehuenches. Confrontations continued in Villa Mercedes and La Paz, where the Ranqueles participated more actively. The leadership of the attack on La Paz was formed by one “Cacique,” the montonero Camargo, and some Videlas from San Luis with 500 Indians; there were many deaths and seventy-four captives were taken. Creole families started fleeing La Paz; they even had to suspend school for the children as the teacher was one of the captives.

These episodes left people living in Malargüe, and the frontier towns of San Rafael and La Paz in extremely vulnerable conditions during the 1870s. Although cacicatos’ rule over Malargüe was seriously challenged, Mendoza’s authorities also held weak control of the southern frontier towns of San Rafael and La Paz (see fig. 5). Settlers from different ethnicities tried to survive and prosper in these regions under the typical frontier dynamics, and by negotiating with caciques and creole authorities. As I will show in the following chapter, provincial authorities and the principal Pehuenche caciques of Barrancas and Varvarco tried to exercise greater power over these regions by negotiating peace treaties during the 1870s. Nevertheless, this region continued to be a contested space until the military campaigns ended cacicatos’ independence in 1879.

1040 AHPM., Fronteras interiores, box 767, nos. 66, 67 and 80.
1041 AHPM., Indios, box 123, nos. 36, 38 and 39.
In conclusion, the detailed history of Pehuenches and Ranqueles during the 1860s show that cacicatos were part of major regional and global developments. The increasing economic and political power of the sedentary society and the nomadic pastoralists in the eastern Pampas was contested by Creoles and Indians in the most vulnerable regions, such as southern Cuyo. This analysis has shown the limitations that those interpretations that only look at Creoles’ state-formation process to understand the violence and conflicts in the Cuyo region have. Cacicatos were part of those conflicts as well as their solution. Multiethnic frontier groups challenged provincial and caciques’ authority during the whole decade. The provincial and national governments’ attempts to expand over cacicatos’ lands as well as diplomatic failures to make peace added violence to an already unstable and vulnerable frontier population. On many occasions, the national government misunderstood the complexity of frontier relations and generalized cacicatos’ adherence to montoneras. But the principal Ranquel and Pehuenche caciques also failed in reaching an agreement with their own subalterns and allies, and in proposing viable conditions for peace.

During the 1870s, the federalist montoneras lost their power to mobilize forces after Urquiza’s assassination and López Jordán’s defeat in Entre Ríos in 1873 and 1874. Nevertheless, after Mitre’s presidency, an alliance of provincial elites continued ruling the national government. In cacicatos’ lands, military defeats in 1868 and 1869 left the Pehuenches and Ranqueles with numerous mobilized subalterns trying to survive. But they had forced the main caciques to take into account their independent goals and interests to reach political stability and tolerate violence as a form of reaching resources. As I will show in the next chapter, Calfucurá managed to continue generating prosperity for his direct followers and some allies by
maintaining transregional markets and signing new peace treaties with the national government until the mid-1870s.
CHAPTER VII

Confederacies’ Diverging Paths between 1862 and 1879:

Peace Treaties, *Malones* and Trade

Between 1862 and 1879, the indigenous confederacies were challenged by the political instability in the Cuyo region and the Araucanía, as well as the Argentine national government’s expansive policies on cacicato’s lands. Unlike most studies on this period, I will show that the indigenous confederacies continued expanding their economies and political influence in the Pampas and Northern Patagonia until the mid-1870s. While peace treaties are seen by most historians as tools of state expansion, I will show that they actually strengthened the indigenous confederacies’ political and economic power and guaranteed their independence. Cacicatos pressured creole governments to seal these agreements and increase Creoles’ tribute to the confederacies. Confederate leaders used the political and trade arrangements, and the resources that resulted from the peace treaties, to guarantee peace and prosperity for their followers and allies. Peace treaties also guaranteed the Creoles’ recognition of cacicatos’ independence and the continuity of a world shaped by inter-ethnic alliances and logic, as well as nomadic and sedentary economies.

I will also show that, while the Pampas and Northern Patagonian Confederacies tried to hold peace and free trade with the Creoles at frontier regions during the 1860s, they developed diverging diplomatic policies in response to different geographical, political and economic contexts. The Pampas Confederacy found it extremely difficult to maintain peace with the
Creoles at the frontiers. As I described last chapter, groups of Ranqueles, federalists and cacicatos from the Araucanía pressured caciques and lanzas in the Pampas to participate in malones and montoneras. In addition, the Argentine national government responded to these circumstances with punitive expeditions, and tried to construct new military forts in Buenos Aires and southern Córdoaba’s frontiers. As a consequence, Calfucurá continued negotiating peace agreements with the national government and receiving raciones, but found it hard to hold his allies from joining malones and malocas. He managed to maintain his confederate leadership, but had to tolerate allies’ increasing level of independence and the strengthening of consensus politics as the base for decision-making. Therefore, until mid-1870s, the Pampas Confederacy prospered under joint policies for peace, trade, and malones. It confronted Creoles’ coercive frontier policies and continued forcing them to negotiate and depend on inter-ethnic alliances to find political and economic prosperity.

In contrast, as described in chapters 4 and 5, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy managed to maintain peace and trade with Creoles at frontiers, and continued centralizing government under Cacique Saygüeque. Its distance from Cuyo and the Pampas frontier regions and its influence over Carmen de Patagones contributed to its success. It also took longer for the Chilean military to control the more southern Andean passes that linked this Confederacy with Pitrufquén and the Araucanía. Saygüeque managed to incorporate some of the western cacicatos into his Confederacy by settling peace treaties with the Argentine national government. Therefore, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy prospered under a policy of peace and trade with Creoles and did not answer to Calfucurá’s calls to raid Buenos Aires’ frontier towns.
Finally, I will argue that only in the second half of the 1870s did the Argentine military expansion seriously challenged the indigenous confederacies’ independence. Technological innovations plus economic and political stability gave Creoles an increasing military advantage over the cacicatos. Creole authorities’ negotiations and assimilation policies used to coexist with projects to defeat cacicatos by military means. However, during the 1870s, elites, politicians and the military agreed that the system based on inter-ethnic alliances and interrelated nomadic pastoralist and sedentary economies had to end. Both indigenous confederacies tried to negotiate peace and present creole authorities with alternatives to stop military confrontations, but found the national government’s aggression to be unnegotiable. The Pampas Confederacy faced stunning defeats, economic chaos and territorial displacement even before the final military campaigns reached Salinas Grandes and the Ranqueles’s lands in 1879. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy held off the army longer and proposed a creative response to preserve political independence through a permanent pact with the Argentine Republic. Nevertheless, the Argentine national government refused to negotiate. By 1880, they forced Saygüeque, the cacique who managed to hold inter-ethnic peace for more than three decades, into warfare.

This chapter aims at understanding indigenous confederacies’ hegemonic power in the region between 1862 and the mid-1870s, as well as their diverging political paths and developments towards the end of the decade. Only by understanding their power can we understand their military defeat, and strategies for survival.

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Peace Treaties: Confederacies’ Expansion and Challenges between 1862 and 1876

During the 1860s, Calfucurá and Saygüeque continued with their policy of peace and trade with the sedentary societies established in frontier settlements. Although most historians whom have analyzed these peace agreements take into account the cacicatos’ participation, they usually interpret them as a result of state policies for cooptation. Ingrid de Jong argues that, due to the governments’ military and administrative limitations to effectively subjugate cacicatos during the Paraguayan War (1865-1870) and the civil conflicts with the federalist montoneras (1862-1874), they used peace treaties to “entertain peace” while planning to invade after the war. \(^\text{1043}\) She also argues that signing peace treaties became a more systematic policy under Mitre’s presidency (1862-1868) and functioned as a device of state power. They were used to fragment confederate alliances, support the caciques that were sympathetic to frontier authorities as well as control and demarcate cacicatos’ territories. \(^\text{1044}\) De Jong and Ratto argue that the treaties signed with Calfucurá’s allies during the 1860s served to fragment the Pampas Confederacy and increasingly isolate the confederate leader. \(^\text{1045}\)

Studies on the Pehuenches and Ranqueles arrive at a similar conclusion regarding the effect of peace treaties on these indigenous groups during the 1870s. Marcela Tamagnini and Graciana Pérez Zavala interpret that, the treaties signed with the Ranqueles since the 1850s were


\(^{1044}\) Ibid.

part of advancement policies that included military expeditions and colonizing projects.\textsuperscript{1046} Treaties attempted to stop Ranqueles’s *malones* as well as to legitimize state territorial advancement. Pérez Zavala argues that these policies ended up cornering the Ranqueles. The treaty signed in 1872 included clauses that limited indigenous territories and forced the Ranqueles to become subjects of the Argentine Republic. It constrained their alliance with Namuncurá (Calfucurá’s successor) and generated conflict between the principal caciques, Mariano Rosas and Manuel Baigorrita.\textsuperscript{1047} For Cuyo, Carla Manara and Gladys Varela highlight that the treaty signed with the Pehuenche Cacique Purrán in 1873 aimed at preventing his alliance with the Chilean government.\textsuperscript{1048} It also limited his territory and demanded them to become Argentine subjects. In Chile, historians argue that the treaties and parliaments were used in conjunction with military campaigns to isolate those caciques whom presented a strong resistance.\textsuperscript{1049}

The Northern Patagonian Confederacy reveals a different outcome. Based on Vezub’s work on Saygüeque, de Jong recognized that while treaties fragmented the Pampas Confederacy, they favored peace and trade between the Northern Patagonian Confederacy and the Argentine


\textsuperscript{1047} Ibid. and “Relaciones interétnicas asimétricas: consideraciones sobre el proceso de arrinconamiento territorial y político de los ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX,” Rocchietti and Tamagnini, eds., *Arqueología de la Frontera*, pp. 131-184.


\textsuperscript{1049} José Bengoa, *Historia del pueblo mapuche, siglos XIX y XX* (Santiago: LOM, 2008).
Republic. Foerster and Vezub also argue that Creoles’ delivery of raciones accentuated Saygüeque’s role as redistributor, but made him more dependent on external resources to maintain his allies, which brought about his subsequent defeat.

These interpretations reveal that Creoles tried to use peace treaties to control cacicatos. However, these studies do not fully take into account that inter-ethnic alliances shaped Creoles’ and indigenous politics at least until the mid-1870s. Since the first encounters in the Americas, state societies have been using treaties to negotiate with powerful independent indigenous societies, such as the Iroquois. Indigenous people not only shaped the negotiations and the clauses of these treaties, but also continuously forced state societies to rely on these agreements to negotiate with them as independent sovereignties. In our case study, on the one hand, there was no consensus among creole authorities and elites on ending cacicatos’ independence and attempting to occupy their territory until mid-1870s. Furthermore, the national government did not have a coherent policy to plan, administer and execute treaties. Most treaties were the product of long negotiations shaped by inter-ethnic alliances at the frontier level

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1052 Although Foerster and Vezub recognize that Mapuches understood treaties and raciones as governability pacts and as compensations for the occupation of their territory, they also argue that these documents habilitated state formation processes in the provinces and the national government since Rosas times. Foerster y Vezub, “Malón, ración y nación en las Pampas.”
1054 Navarro Floria, “Continuidad y fin del trato pacifico con los indígenas de la Pampa y la Patagonia en el discurso político estatal argentino (1853-1879),” and Ratto, “Estado y cuestión indígena en las fronteras de Chaco y La Pampa (1862-1880).”
that aimed at achieving common goals, such as controlling either *gauchos* and *lanzas* in Cuyo or trade on the frontiers.\textsuperscript{1055} The negotiations and agreements went beyond the written paper.\textsuperscript{1056}

On the other hand, as I mentioned in chapter 1, these agreements originated as Spanish responses to the cacicatos’ power. In the period under study, the indigenous confederacies used peace negotiations to integrate creole frontier towns into their web of reciprocal obligations and to make creole governments their tributaries. What the treaties show is that creole authorities attempted to flip their tributary condition with allied cacicatos into a policy of cooptation. They conceptualized their tribute as “salaries” and “raciones” provided to indigenous soldiers, captains, mayors and commanders. Nonetheless, when the national government decided to subjugate independent cacicatos in 1879, it did not use peace treaties, but military campaigns. Therefore, when looking at the negotiations, the treaties and their execution in the Pampas and Patagonia during the 1860s, these agreements did not work to obtain creole power over the cacicatos, with the exception of some vulnerable groups of *indios amigos*.

In this section, I first argue that, in terms of the written document, treaties showed significant divergences suggesting the lack of centralized national planning. The treaties showed the ambivalence between considering cacicatos as independent polities or subjects of creole governments. Next, I argue that the indigenous confederacies used peace negotiations and treaties to expand their power over Creoles. They increased creole governments’ material and political obligations to the cacicatos, fueled frontier exchanges and empowered the principal caciques’ role of redistributor among allies and subalterns. I also address the different diplomatic

\textsuperscript{1055} Pérez Zavala recognized that the peace treaty signed between Urquiza, the Ranqueles and Calfucurá in 1854, perceived cacicatos as confederate allies. Pérez Zavala, “La política interétnica de los ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.”

\textsuperscript{1056} Florencia Roulet, “Con la pluma y la palabra.”
policies of Calfucurá and Saygüeque, and argue that their difference was not based on the effect of treaties on cacicatos, but on the different contexts and challenges they experienced. While both confederate leaders continued to promote peace treaties and trade, the Pampas Confederacy continued using *malones* as tools of cooptation and resistance, whereas the Northern Patagonian Confederacy did not. Finally, I show that the increasing power of the national government over cacicatos’ territories during the 1870s was not a consequence of treaties. Treaties reflected and sometimes reinforced the new power advantage of the national government over cacicatos and provinces. But these agreements also became the ephemeral guarantee of cacicatos’ continuing independence, and of a world based on inter-ethnic alliances and logic.

*The Making Process of Treaties: Local Guidance, National Improvisation*

Since the first years of his government, President Mitre (1862-1868) wanted to expand state presence over cacicato lands. But like Buenos Aires’s authorities during the 1850s, he faced cacicatos’ resistance and internal administrative, political and military limitations even before the Paraguayan War (1865-1870). Cacicatos’ persistent power continued making inter-ethnic alliances the key to maintaining political stability and prosperity for all sides.

Caciques challenged creole governments’ use of coercive policies at frontiers as well as the settlement of new forts by hitting frontiers with *malones* and forcing governments to negotiate peace. Caciques Calfucurá, Chingoleo and Saygüeque renewed their treaties in the early 1860s and brought or accepted some of their allies to sign individual treaties with the national government. Between 1862 and 1866, Creoles signed at least sixteen treaties with

1057 In 1863, he sent General Olascoaga to study the frontier line between Melincué and San Rafael. He also planned to advance over cacicatos’ lands in Tapalqué. AHSL, March 9th, 1863, and SHE., *Frontera con los indios.*
members and allies of the indigenous confederacies. Signing cacicatos gained a periodic delivery of *raciones*, while many continued involved in *malones* and *malocas*. These actions stopped the new line of forts being established in Buenos Aires from Melincué (in modern Santa Fé) to Las Tunas in the early 1860s from constituting a real advancement of creole governments over cacicatos’ lands (see fig. 6). These military posts were small, had a limited number of soldiers (sometimes two or three) and resources, and were usually the scene of desertions, popular uprisings in support of the federalist *montoneras*, and were hit by numerous *malones* and *malocas.*

In addition to Buenos Aires, Ranqueles’s peace negotiations and their *malones* also stopped the province of Córdoba from occupying Río Quinto. In 1865, General Paunero, in charge of the Cuyo region, thought that: “there was no hope in reducing the Indians.” Finally, Caciques Catriel and Cachul also limited Colonel Rivas’ attempts to relocate their *tolderías* and occupy their territory. In this case, the caciques maintained their 1856 peace treaty, and abstained from joining their confederate allies’ *malones* as well as creole expeditions.

We recognize creole elites’ increasing support of policies that aimed at ending with the cacicatos’ independence. In 1867, the Congress approved Law 215 authorizing the government to invade cacicato lands in the Pampas. The Law 215 dictated the incorporation of the indigenous territory up to Río Neuquén and Río Negro into the Argentine Republic. It decreed the subjugation of indigenous people by force and the privation of their rights. However, this law

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1060 Ibid.
1061 Ibid.
1062 Ibid.
was not immediately executed due to the Paraguayan War (1865-1870), the persistent federalist montoneras (until 1874), and the lack of consensus in the Congress to finance such an expensive military enterprise. The law also showed that many Creoles still intended integrating cacicatos into the Creole society as well as tolerating that some of them could keep their independence in Patagonia. The Law 215 contemplated giving a specific territory to the cacicatos that voluntarily accepted their integration into the Republic and to push south of the Río Negro those who resisted the military campaign. Even if temporary, this meant the continuity of cacicatos’ ruling south of the Río Negro. It was not until the Argentine Military defeated the Pampas Confederacy in 1879-1880, that the national government thought it was viable to end all the cacicatos independence and occupy the Patagonia.

Hence, inter-ethnic relationships continued under the typical frontier dynamics of competition and accommodation until the mid-1870s. If we accept historian de Jong’s argument that signing peace treaties became “systematized” as a frontier policy during the 1860s, I believe it was only in the sense that creole governments formalized their historical diplomatic response to cacicatos’ power. The national authorities tried to centralize and organize the provision of salaries and raciones to cacicatos following military hierarchies. Treaties included similar topics, such as requiring free trade, prohibiting military confrontation, and the organization and delivery of raciones. However, the agreements signed during the 1860s lacked national planning. The clauses of each treaty varied according to the negotiations between cacicatos and local

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1063 Only under President Sarmiento (1868-1874) did the province of Córdoba managed to advance their position to the Río Quinto. Navarro Floria, “Continuidad y fin del trato pacífico con los indígenas de la Pampa y la Patagonia en el discurso político estatal argentino (1853-1879).”

1064 Even though national authorities usually asked commanders to follow the example of previous treaties, they did not maintain the same clauses and order. Many times, they were written by local authorities, such as commanders, and later legalized at the national level. Sometimes they were arranged and signed in frontier posts while other times in the capital city. There were no precise and generalized instructions on the clauses they should include.
frontier authorities. The only treaties that formalized creole government’s increasing dominance over cacicatos were treaties signed with vulnerable groups of *indios amigos* in Buenos Aires.

A brief analysis of some of these treaties reveals their varied character. Treaties signed with allies of the Northern Patagonian Confederacy were similar because they were negotiated by-and many times written by-local authorities at Carmen de Patagones. The settlers’ and cacicatos’ strong interest in free trade made it the first point of agreement in all treaties. They also recognized the cacicatos’ territorial jurisdiction. For example, the pacts signed with Saygüeque, Huinacabal and Chagallo Chico in 1863 indicated that these caciques recognized Chingoleo as “Chief of all the land” beyond Carmen de Patagones, as it had been stipulated by the previous treaties signed with Llanquitrúz and Chingoleo. These three treaties also demanded that Creoles and indigenous people would protect each other from their enemies.

These three documents also showed the Patagones authorities’ increasing interest in occupying part of the cacicatos lands. In spite of recognizing the legal existence of indigenous territories, Commander Julián Murga intentionally did not include in these treaties the same details as the 1857 treaty signed with Llanquitrúz had. These new treaties indicated that if the government wanted to explore the Río Negro region or attack “enemies,” the cacicatos had to collaborate. In the case of Cacique Huinacabal, his treaty also stipulated that he had to leave his son and six Indians in Carmen de Patagones. Nevertheless, these expeditions did not take place until the 1870s, and cacicatos continued ruling their lands.

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1065 Although they follow the example of the treaty signed with Llanquitrúz, Commander Murga got involved in these treaties. The treaty with Chagallo was signed in Buenos Aires with Mitre, but it followed the model of the one signed with Saygüeque and his predecessors at the local level.


1068 See Murga’s letters next to Huinacabal treaty in: AV, *Frontera*, box 1, no. 677.
As I mentioned in Chapter Four, frontier authorities in Carmen de Patagones also signed pacts with caciques from further south, such as Cacique Francés, Antonio, Chiquichán, and Casimiro in 1865 and 1866. In these cases, national authorities added clauses that, unlike the three treaties just analyzed, explicitly aimed at subjugating these cacicatos under the Argentine Republic. The Welsh colony, settled in 1865, requested the government to sign a treaty with Cacique Frances. Cacique Chagallo (part of the Northern Patagonian Confederacy) worked as the mediator in these negotiations, and the national Commissioner for Indians, Juan Cornell, drafted it in Buenos Aires. Cornell wanted these caciques to give up some territory to the colony and become Argentine subjects. For the treaty with Cacique Casimiro, it was the naval officer Piedrabuena (1833-1883), originally born in Carmen de Patagones, that requested it, but here again, it was also written by national authorities. It aimed at forming a colony of Tehuelches called San Gregorio on the shores of the Magellan straights to stop the Chilean occupation of Patagonia between Chubut and Magallanes. It stipulated that indigenous allies had to become Argentine subjects and reject the Chilean colony of Punta Arenas (art. 1 to 3 and 5). They also had to engage in agriculture, and school their children.

These two agreements show that national authorities tried to impose unrealistic policies of subjugation over cacicatos, with whom they had little contact and were far from their reach. Creole presence beyond the Río Negro was minimal. The signing caciques had little to do with the writing process. The national government probably expected a total failure. The only clauses

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1069 AV., Frontera, box.1, nos. 826, 890, 3743 and 1423 (copies). Also see: “CGE.DEH, Idem, box 19, no. 188,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 353-55.
that ended up being implemented were the delivery of raciones to cacicatos, and a pact of non-aggression between these cacicatos and Carmen de Patagones.\textsuperscript{1070}

In the Pampas, the treaties signed with cacicatos show a great divergence. While some had clauses that aimed at subjugating cacicatos to creole rule, such as the treaties with Cacique Naupichún and Cañumil in Bahía Blanca, others intended to avoid military confrontation, such as the treaty signed with the Ranqueles in Villa Mercedes in 1865, and Calfucurá and Reuquecurá in 1866.\textsuperscript{1071} These last treaties were strongly shaped by the persistent conflict between the national government and the federalist montoneras. As mentioned in Chapter Six, the treaty with the Ranqueles went through a complicated negotiation: it was first negotiated by Córdoba’s authorities and Colonel Manuel Baigorria, later agreed to by Emilio Mitre (commissioned by the national government for this task) in Río Cuarto, and finally signed by Mariano Rosas in his toldería at Leuvuco.\textsuperscript{1072} Most of its clauses aimed at securing the passes and commerce south of Córdoba, and limiting inter-ethnic alliances between gauchos and indios gauchos. This agreement looked like a pact between elites to control their subalterns. Therefore, in contrast to treaties signed with southern Tehuelches, this treaty shows that even when the national authorities intervened in the negotiation, they did not use treaties systematically to try and subjugate cacicatos by the written law. National authorities were strongly guided by local contexts and inter-ethnic alliances.

\textsuperscript{1070} Ibid. Casimiro and the Tehuelches appear in the Hacienda report receiving raciones in 1868 and 1869. Casimiro appears in 1870 and 1871. AGN., Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda, years 1865-1875.

\textsuperscript{1071} The treaties agreed with Naupichún and Cañumil did not mention trade agreements, but stipulated that these caciques would settle near Bahía Blanca. While it stipulated that Naupichún had to respond to the Commander’s orders, Cañumil had to subordinate himself to the Cacique amigo Ancalao. “CGE.DEH. Idem box 14, no. 791, and box 17, no. 833,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 336-337.

\textsuperscript{1072} “CGE. DHE., Campaña, frontera sur, box 16, no. 811,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 341-3.
The treaties signed with Calfucurá and his brother Reuquecurá in 1866 were negotiated in Azul by Commander Alvaro Barros and signed in the city of Buenos Aires with Calfucurá’s son, Bernardo Namuncurá. These treaties had only some common topics with the ones signed with the Ranqueles and cacicatos in Northern Patagonia.\textsuperscript{1073} Like the treaty with the Ranqueles, they aimed at securing peace. As with Northern Patagonia, local interests were present in the points that aimed at conserving a fluid commercial exchange between the signing cacicatos and the Buenos Aires’s southern frontier posts (Azul, Tandil and Bahía Blanca). However, they also stipulated clearer jurisdictions in order to avoid conflicts between Calfucurá and Creoles of these frontier posts, as well as with Cacique Catriel.\textsuperscript{1074} Settled in Tapalqué, Catriel used to have exclusive access to Creoles in Azul and Tandil. But as a member of the Pampas Confederacy, he had to allow Calfucurá and his subaltern caciques and capitanejos to access his territories and frontier towns.\textsuperscript{1075} Hence, it was not surprising that the new treaty signed with Calfucurá and Reuquecurá in 1866 stipulated that they should respect Catriel’s hunting grounds.\textsuperscript{1076} This clause probably resulted from a negotiation between Calfucurá, Catriel and local settlers. The latter were probably interested in maintaining their pacts with Catriel and signing new ones with Calfucurá’s allies to expand their trade and the administration of raciones.\textsuperscript{1077} Colonel Barros argued that if the government prohibited the purchase of hides from cacicatos in Azul, its commerce would be ruined.\textsuperscript{1078} Frontier authorities and some merchants charged the national


\textsuperscript{1074} It limited their boleadas (hunting) to their territories and out of public property as well as Catriel’s lands.

\textsuperscript{1075} De Jong mentions that between the people that received raciones under Catriel, she found several caciques and capitanejos from Calfucurá’s tolderia, such as his son Millacurá, Chipitrúz, Calfuquir, Manuel Grande, and Guiliner. SHE., box 17, no. 882 in de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio liminal.”

\textsuperscript{1076} “CGE.DEH, Idem, box 20, nums. 896 and 897,” in Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp., 361-3


government very high prices for the *raciones* they sold, while they bought cheaper animals and hides from cacicatos. By 1870, the Economic Society of Azul wanted to fight this “corrupt” business by providing Indians with cattle brands, individual plots for their families and by ending the administration of *raciones*.\(^{1079}\) They saw Indians as “more prepared for civilization” than creole rural workers.

In addition to these treaties, local authorities used treaties to limit Catriel’s power by fueling internal competition with his subaltern caciques. Colonel Rivas reached an agreement with subaltern caciques, Lucio, and his son Chipitrúz. In 1863, Chipitrúz attacked one of Catriel’s capitanejos, Millaluán, and Bartolome Mitre told Rivas that he would back them if they resolved to attack Calfucurá.\(^{1080}\) This attack never took place, but Chipitrúz continued backing the government. Since 1865, Chipitrúz and Lucio appear as receiving *raciones* independently from Catriel.\(^{1081}\) During the Paraguayan War, Chipitrúz offered assistance to the national government, but the offer was refused. Although Catriel lost authority over Chipitrúz, he maintained his territorial dominion and political authority over most subaltern cacicatos and capitanejos until his death in 1866.

Treaties with other groups of *indios amigos* in Buenos Aires follow a similar pattern to that of Chipitrúz. During the 1860s, their treaties stipulated the delivery of regular *raciones*, incorporated caciques into the military structure and demanded that indigenous people settled into towns under state jurisdiction and, preferably, as farmers.\(^{1082}\) Nevertheless, most *indios*

\(^{1079}\) De Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio limital.”
\(^{1080}\) AM, Emilio Mitre, no. 55, and de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio limital.”
\(^{1081}\) AGN., *Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda*, years 1865-1875.
\(^{1082}\) People under Caciques Rondeau and Raylef were incorporated into the army with state military ranks. SHE., box 15, no. 892, de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio limital.”
amigos kept their role as intermediaries between creole authorities and the Pampas Confederacy until the 1870s.

In addition to the locally-guided aspect of peace negotiations and treaties, their execution was also shaped by caciques’ and creole authorities’ politics at the local level. Cacicatos from the Northern Patagonian Confederacy did not assist Creoles in any military expedition. Only in 1869 did Linares back Commander Murga’s failed expedition to occupy the Choelechoel Island. These cacicatos also kept their territories. Creole access to their lands was subject to indigenous control and permission. Cacicatos south of Chubut did not form agricultural colonies nor did they become citizens of Argentina during the 1860s and 1870s.

In the case of the Pampas, I found no evidence on the fate of Cacique Naupichún. But sources on Cacique Cañumil indicate that he continued under the Pampas Confederacy and might have temporarily moved his tolderías near Bahía Blanca in 1870. The Ranqueles and Calfucurá found it difficult to hold peace and their people continued to be involved in malones. The national government did not gain any power over their territories through these treaties during the 1860s; it kept on providing raciones in spite of suffering from malones and malocas.

Unlike the Ranqueles, Cacique Catriel maintained peace and neutrality during military confrontations between the government and Calfucurá in spite of his treaty obligations to defend Creoles at the frontier. This allowed him to protect his lands and people. Although he did not receive legal titles for his lands like other indios amigos did, his territories were usually

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1083 AV., Fronteras interiores, 1, no. 806.
1084 AGN., VII, Museo Histórico, no. 5127, and SHE., Frontera con los indios, no. 1286.
1085 The Ranqueles received raciones after the treaty, but these provisions were interrupted by the persistent violence. Later in 1868, the Ranqueles appear in the Hacienda report as receiving raciones.
respected. Like Cacique Chingoleo, he had a house in the town.\textsuperscript{1086} Calfucurá seemed to tolerate Catriel’s neutrality because he did not want to do away with the habit of consensus politics and he was interested in keeping his ally’s lands and trade networks intact. Catriel also continued engaged in the confederacy. Some of his followers participated in \textit{malones} and frontier authorities were always suspicious of Cacique Catriel’s neutrality. The Commissioner of Indians, Juan Cornell, thought that if a major military confrontation were to happen, Catriel would definitely join Calfucurá.\textsuperscript{1087} Both caciques continued communicating with each other concerning possible attacks.\textsuperscript{1088}

Other groups of \textit{indios amigos} showed greater integration within the creole society. Nevertheless, I believe this was not a consequence of peace treaties, but the result of long-lasting inter-ethnic relationships at frontiers. This was the case of groups located in the Buenos Aires’ western frontier, such as people under the Caciques Martín and Francisco Rondeau in 25 de Mayo, José María Raylef and Pedro Melinao in Bragado, and Coliqueo in 9 de Julio. Several of these caciques used to be part of Rosas’s \textit{negocio pacífico de indios} and were related through kinship.\textsuperscript{1089} Coliqueo had been part of the Pampas Confederacy as a subaltern cacique of the Ranqueles until 1862.\textsuperscript{1090} In the southern frontier, we also find a few caciques that developed a similar pattern, such as Caciques Chipitrúz and Maica in Azul, Ancalao in Bahía Blanca and, during the 1870s, Mayor Linares in Carmen de Patagones.

\textsuperscript{1086} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1087} de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio liminal.”
\textsuperscript{1088} Hux mentions that people from Calfucurá and Catriel participated in Ranqueles’s \textit{malones} in late 1865 over central and southern Buenos Aires. In Tapalqué, they took 30,000 animals on one occasion. AGN., VII, Álvaro Barros, no. 167, and de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio liminal.”
\textsuperscript{1089} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1090} Although historians sometimes mention that he was under Calfucurá, sources usually associate him with the Ranqueles.
These groups’ limited mobility transformed their residence patterns, economies and internal politics. Historians argue that they became more agricultural, engaged in cattle ranching, and worked as laborers for creole estancias.\textsuperscript{1091} The surveyor Octavio Pico indicated in 1869, that Indians from Coliquéó were dedicated more to agriculture than to cattle ranching. They farmed significantly more maize and wheat than Creoles in the area. People under Cacique Maica in Villa Fidelidad also dedicated themselves to textile production. Coliquéó sent his sons to study at the Colegio Catedral Norte. By 1872, his son Simón requested the national government to construct a chapel and a school for his people. Matilde Rondeau, daughter of Cacique Rondeau, also became a teacher in a school for Indians in the town of 25 de Mayo.

As historian de Jong argues, these cases reveal that not all cacicatos were resisting creole governments’ penetration; some worked towards integrating their people and allies into the emerging nation-state.\textsuperscript{1092} These groups also gained state legal recognition for some of their properties. Between 1865 and 1869 the provincial government of Buenos Aires gave land rights to Caciques Raylef and Melinao in Bragado, Coliqueo near 9 de Julio, Raninqueo near Bolivar, Rondeau (Raninqueo’s brother) in 25 de Mayo, Ancalao and his people in Bahía Blanca and Maica in Azul.\textsuperscript{1093} Ironically, these cases also show that the world was still framed by inter-ethnic alliances. As Lantieri and Pedrotta argue, creole governments had to deal with the coexistence of indigenous territories and creole small, mid-size and large estancias in Buenos Aires.

\textsuperscript{1092} de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio liminal.”
\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid.
Legalizing *indios amigos*’ territories became a condition imposed by them to sign peace treaties.

In addition, the Pampas and Northern Patagonian Confederacies’ influence over the *indios amigos* also allowed them to maintain some autonomy. Creoles always suspected *indios amigos*’ possible alliance with the indigenous confederacies, and many times used them as diplomatic intermediaries. The Pampas Confederacy tolerated the *indios amigos*’ autonomy, but punished them when their actions affected the confederacy. Most *malones* and *malocas* during the 1860s and 1870s hit Buenos Aires’ western frontier region where *indios amigos* whom favored creole authorities resided. While some *indios amigos* tried to protect frontier settlements from these attacks, they rarely counter-attacked the Pampas Confederacy. Moreover, many *indios amigos* appeared to be on the autonomous cacicatos’ side; they joined *malones* and *malocas*, informed caciques of Creoles’ military attacks and continued building kinship and commercial ties with autonomous cacicatos. For example, Coliquéo’s son, Justo, left his father and joined Calfucurá by 1867. Hence, until mid-1870s, *indios amigos* did not define their subjugation to Creole or indigenous centers of power.

*Indios amigos* in other provinces had different experiences. As developed in the previous chapter, some groups living in San Rafael and Malargüe ended up abandoning frontier authorities and joining independent caciques in Barrancas and Varvarco. Very few remained in San Rafael and Villa La Paz by 1870. As a consequence, these frontier posts became extremely vulnerable and many Creoles abandoned the towns as well. During the 1870s, the indigenous

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1094 Victoria Pedrotta, Sol Lanteri and Laura Duguine, “En busca de la tierra prometida.”
1095 Some of these exceptions were Cacique Ancalao in November 1865, who took 300 horses from cacicatos’ stock after a *malón*, and Miguel Linares who persecuted Cacique Lemunao with Commander Murga. SHE., *Frontera con los indios*, no. 733.
1096 SHE., *Frontera con los indios*, no. 934.
territory in Malargüe became part of the frontier region, but not precisely as a consequence of Mendoza’s treaties and military expansion. The civil conflicts with federalist montoneras and the disintegration of the Pehuenche Cacique Traipán’s cacicato left the region with Pehuenche, Mendocino and Chilean ranchers, merchants, peons and their families exposed to ongoing violence.

During the 1870s, the autonomous Pehuenche Caciques from Barrancas and Varvarco, and Mendoza’s authorities tried negotiate peace in order to exercise greater power over Malargüe and San Rafael. Between 1870 and 1873, the Commander of Mendoza’s southern frontier, Colonel Ignacio Segovia, negotiated a peace treaty with Cacique Caepe and all the Pehuenches in Río Grande, Barrancas and Varvarco. Historian Levaggi discovered three documents on this agreement that reveal that both, Segovia and the caciques discussed the amount of raciones as well as the control of the frontier region between Malargüe and San Rafael. One of these documents agreed to leave this region as a “neutral land” governed by both creole and Indian authorities. Like in the case of the Ranqueles, Caciques and creole authorities were trying to ally in order to control alliances between gauchos and indios gauchos in the frontier region. These documents have several clauses regarding the control of subalterns’ movements, labor and punishment for their crimes and robberies. In spite of this treaty, Pehuenches, Mendocinos and Chileans continued living in this region under frontier dynamics until the end of the 1870s.

In southern Córdoba and San Luis the opposite happened. During the 1870s, groups of diverse ethnic origins started settling permanently near Villa Mercedes (San Luis) and Sarmiento (Córdoba) under the Franciscan missions to overcome the escalating violence and an increasing

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1098 Levaggi, _Paz en la frontera_; SHE, _Frontera con los indios_, no. 1182, and AHPM, _Indios_, box 123, nos. 43, 44 and 45.
economic encroachment. These groups of indios amigos experienced greater oppression from provincial authorities and did not sign peace treaties; they negotiated their residence and alliance with provincial and national military authorities through the Franciscans. In the case of Villa Mercedes, many were Ranquel groups or prisoners forced by creole authorities to settle in this location. On the other hand, most people whom had settled in Sarmiento, arrived voluntarily to overcome the internal political crises in Ranqueles’s lands and the increasing violence faced by the federalist montoneras, malones and provincial repression. They also faced increasing economic vulnerability after the smallpox epidemic in 1874.

The Franciscans had arrived in southern Córdoba during the 1850s and then founded a school in Río Cuarto in the late 1860s. Nevertheless, they only started having some influence over cacicatos during the 1870s. Taking into account the persistent failure of missions in the Pampas since colonial times and Ranqueles’s refusal to accept missions in their lands, it is not surprising that Franciscans’ increasing importance in the frontier region coincided with Ranqueles’s increasing vulnerability. Like Franciscans in the Chaco, economic encroachment, intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic conflicts usually explain who joined or visited

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1100 The first groups negotiated with General Arredondo to settle in Totorita after the failed expedition to Ranqueles’s tolderías in 1872. Fray Marcos Donati tried to create a mission among them.
1101 Cacique Rosas indicated that 100 people died in his lands by March 1874. In May, Cacique Villarreal settled in Sarmiento with 64 people and the Indian Santos with 14 families. AHCSF., nos. 394 and 415.
1102 See documents in AHCSF., and Tamagnini, eds., Cartas de frontera.
1103 In December, 1868, Presidents Sarmiento and Avellaneda agreed to keep peace and promote Indians’ conversion to Catholicism by establishing mission in Río Cuarto. They assigned a subvention of 40 pesos per month to the missionaries. AHCSF., box 2, nos. 116a, and 117.
1104 Although Caciques Rosas and Baigorrita accepted the missionaries as intermediaries, they systematically refused to allow missions to be established in their own lands. See the treaties of 1865 and 1872 in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, and Fray Donati’s letter in AHCF, no. 259. For previous missions’ failure in the region, see the case of the Jesuits in southern Buenos Aires. Eugenia Néspolo, “Las misiones jesuíticas bonaerenses del siglo XVII, ¿una estrategia político-económica indígena?”, Tefros, vol. 5, no. 1, (Invierno, 2007): 1-47.
missions whether by voluntary or forced means. Unlike the Chaco, missions had a short life among the Ranqueles; Franciscans could not gain enough resources to guarantee these people’s subsistence, and did not even provide them with land titles. But these missions ended with a similar outcome to the ones in the Chaco: integrating some indigenous people into the nation as an oppressed labor force. Many were forced to participate in the military campaigns in 1879 against independent cacicatos and were later sent to different provinces as labor, similar to most of the prisoners from the campaign. Hence, provincial authorities in San Luis and Córdoba exercised a lot of power over these indios amigos without the need of peace treaties.

In conclusion, when analyzing peace negotiations during the 1860s, we see that local inter-ethnic interests and dynamics strongly shaped the negotiation, the written treaties and their outcomes. Moreover, treaties negotiated during the early 1870s also showed the persistence of cacicato autonomy and the importance of inter-ethnic alliances to shape frontiers’ developments. The most concrete effects of treaties on cacicatos were agreements to not engage in warfare, maintaining free trade, releasing captives, and organizing creole governments’ delivery of raciones. Treaties perpetuated creole governments’ delivery of tribute to the indigenous confederacies. In the case of the indios amigos, treaties also provided these vulnerable groups with an opportunity to negotiate their political and territorial rights with creole authorities. It is not surprising that the groups that experienced greater subjugation from creole authorities, such as people in Río Cuarto and Villa Mercedes, did not negotiate any treaties.

1105 For Franciscans in Chaco, see: Langer, Expecting Pears from and Elm Tree. For missions in the 19th century see: Langer and Robert Jackson, eds., The new Latin American mission history (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).
1106 In 1875, Capitanejo Simón told Arredondo that they did not want to assist him militarily and that the: “Indians from the inner land make fun of us, of our poverty, and that is why others do not subjugate.” AHCSF., no. 552.
1107 Tamagnini, Pérez Zavala, Olmedo, “Los Ranqueles reducidos en la frontera del Río Quinto durante la década de 1870: su incorporación al ejército nacional.”
Treaties as Indigenous Confederacies’ Expansive Tools

The increasing use of treaties as diplomatic tools in frontier negotiations also responded to cacicatos’ greater capacity to engage in formal negotiations. These agreements increased allies’ resources and incorporated frontier posts into a web of reciprocal obligations that could not be easily broken. Caciques’ correspondence show their persistent intention to negotiate and settle peace with provincial and national governments in order to further trade, offer stability to their followers, increase their authority, and incorporate frontier settlements as allies. In many cases, caciques were the ones asking Creoles to sign treaties with their indigenous allies. They also brought groups with little previous contact into contact with creole society.

In the case of Northern Patagonia, treaties increased confederate allies’ resources and Saygüeque’s authority. Before 1863, Cacique Chingoleo had to distribute a limited amount of raciones to his allies. Through the 1863 treaties, Caciques Saygüeque, Huinacabal and Chagallo started receiving their own raciones in Carmen de Patagones without changing the quantity delivered to Chingoleo. These allies also extended Creoles’ tributary condition towards cacicatos in the third and fourth level of dependency. In 1865, Cacique Chagallo and the settler Federico Rial worked as intermediaries between the national government and the Cacique Francés and representatives of Caciques Antonio, Chiquichán, Santa Cruz and Vicente Sakes.\textsuperscript{1108} This treaty also indicated that these Caciques should try to bring others from the “inner lands” like “Vera (Cacique principal), Patricio, Gunel, Cuatreña, Inchel, Sacas, Comoguiá, Crisné, Coyéden, Puelca and others.” In 1866, Cacique Casimiro Bigua signed his own treaty in representation of southern groups (from Chubut to Magallanes).\textsuperscript{1109}

\textsuperscript{1108} AV., Frontera, box 1, July, 1865, nos. 826, 3743 and 1423 (copies).
\textsuperscript{1109} AV., Frontera, box 1, no. 890 (copy), and AGN., Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda, years, 1865-1875.
The Northern Patagonian Confederacy also incorporated groups from the Andes into their diplomatic strategy of peace and trade. Cacique Quíniforo from the Quirquincho Indians located in Segunda Angostura arrived at Carmen de Patagones to sign a treaty in 1866.\textsuperscript{1110} During the 1870s, Saygüeque used peace treaties to incorporate allies that were being persecuted in Chile. Between 1874 and 1876, Saygüeque arranged the settlement of 293 Picunche people led by Caciques Quenpumil, Iancamil and Quempil at Río Colorado, with periodic provisions of raciones by the Argentine national government.\textsuperscript{1111} According to Vezub, these caciques used to negotiate with the Pehuenches in San Rafael. Saygüeque managed to bring their negotiations and business to Carmen de Patagones.\textsuperscript{1112}

Cacique Saygüeque and Chingoleo also attempted to expand their influence to Bahía Blanca during the 1860s. In 1866, Saygüeque reached the city demanding more raciones and salaries in the eve of the government’s negotiations with Calfucurá and Reuquecurá.\textsuperscript{1113} But Chingoleo’s death in 1867, limited the Northern Patagonian Confederacy’s eastern expansion. Saygüeque remained mainly in Manzanas and the contact with frontier towns in the east relied on several intermediaries, especially Mayor Miguel Linares. Although Linares frequently visited Bahía Blanca, he did not seem to aim at expanding Saygüeque influence over the east, but to enhance his own authority among Creoles. In addition, Calfucurá’s persistent pressure on the region limited Saygüeque’s control of frontier posts beyond Carmen de Patagones during the 1870s.

\textsuperscript{1110} AV., Frontera, box 1, no.892 (copy)
\textsuperscript{1111} Miguel Linares and Benito Crespo also acted as intermediaries of these treaties.
\textsuperscript{1112} Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}, pp. 231-233.
\textsuperscript{1113} In 1866, Barros informed that Cacique Saygüeque demanded to receive raciones every quarter as Reuquecurá had requested in his treaty. He also asked for 250 mares and traveled to Salinas Grandes. SHE., box 20, no. 3588.
Nevertheless, as developed in Chapters Four and Five, during the 1860s and mid-1870s, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy expanded its trade networks, allies and resources by respecting peace treaties and increasing Saygüeque’s authority over his subalterm. As Vezub also argued, the cacique’s correspondence for this period included important ranchers and merchants of Patagones, and usually dealt with trade transactions, raciones and personal exchanges and favors. They greeted each other’s families and treated each other as brothers and friends. Like in Azul, the provision of raciones also became a profitable business for Patagones; residents and authorities constantly tried to increase their budgets for providing goods to indigenous people. Saygüeque also extended his trade business with Valdivia’s residents and cacicatos from the Araucanía and the Andes Mountains. By 1870, the adventurer George Musters was impressed by Saygüeque’s wealth in Manzanas. He had a large number of cattle, horses and luxury goods, such as military clothes and silverware.

In the case of the Pampas Confederacy, Calfucurá continued pushing the national government to respect the reciprocal obligations after the battle of Pavón. The highlight of his success can be seen in the treaties of 1861 and 1866. Frontier correspondence indicates that he received raciones, and he was included in the Hacienda report since 1866. Like in Northern Patagonia, treaties signed between the national government and Calfucurá’s allies gave them access to more raciones while fortifying Calfucurá’s role as redistributor. His allies accessed raciones through separate treaties, but they depended on Calfucurá’s diplomatic intervention to sign and maintain these agreements. They also required his permission to go to Buenos Aires’s

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1114 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
1115 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p. 228.
1116 In 1866, they reached a verbal agreement, but historians have not found a written treaty yet. Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 322-5.
frontier posts to receive raciones.1117 These treaties reinforced the Pampas Confederacy’s dominance over the expanding trade of southern Buenos Aires.

Allies from the third level of dependency also negotiated their own treaties, and kept their alliance with Calfucurá. Caciques Catriel and Cachul continued receiving raciones under the treaty of 1856, and their subalterns Lucio and Chipitrúz started receiving individual raciones from 1866 onwards. The Ranqueles signed their own treaties in 1865, 1870 and 1872, and appeared in the Hacienda report in 1868.1118

Calfucurá also used raciones to host and engage in gift-giving with allies coming from the west of the Andes. We already mentioned that Cacique Magnil sent his son Quilapán to negotiate with Calfucurá and Urquiza in the early 1860s. His people and other caciques continued acting east of the Andes. For example, in August 1862, Calfucurá’s brother in law informed authorities in Azul that the Chilean Caciques Yampi, Sucomil, Guechauiqueo, Lemunao and his sons Niguitreo, Guayque and Puchiquitreo were in Salinas Grandes and wanted to attack Tres Arroyos and el Mataco (in west and central Buenos Aires).1119 Quilapán’s ally Cacique Lemunao continued appearing in the Pampas negotiating with Calfucurá and Carmen de Patagones.1120 He was also helping the Frenchman Orelie-Antonie de Tounens I to travel through Patagonia. Orelie I was a French aristocrat that tried to create a Kingdom in the Araucanía and

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1117 Calfucurá’s son Millacurá received raciones in Azul and appears in the Hacienda report next to Catriel and Cachul since 1866. Cacique Cañumil signed a treaty in Bahía Blanca in 1865 and appears in the Hacienda report since 1868 as well as Reuquecurá who signed his own treaty in 1866.
1118 See treaties and budgets in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, and AGN., Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda, years, 1865-1875.
1119 Calfucurá sons’ Catricurá and Blanco decided to join the visitors. AM, Emilio Mitre, vol. 5, no. 26, August, 5th, 1862.
1120 In April 1865, Commander Murga informed that the Chilean Cacique Lemunao was in Salinas Grandes, having left his horses in Choelechoel, to plan a malón. In 1868, Murga negotiated with Lemunao the cacique’s settlement in Chichinales in order to limit Calfucurá’s mobility. In February 1869, Barros mentioned that Lemunao was with Calfucurá. AV., Fronteras interiores 1, no. 806; Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 427; AV., Fronteras interiores 1, no. 1050, and Leandro Navarro, Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía: desde el año 1859 hasta su completa incorporación al territorio nacional (Chile: Pehuén Editores, 2008).
Patagonia with himself designated as the King.\textsuperscript{1121} Again in 1864, Quilapán, Caucapán and Welreyán arrived in Salinas Grandes with 1,300 lanzas.\textsuperscript{1122}

Calfucurá usually informed frontier authorities about these visits in order to receive greater gifts and avoid Creoles associating his people with malones. He frequently informed creole authorities that he was trying to hold his allies from raiding. Frontier reports on malones and malocas usually blamed these attacks on “Chilean Indians,” Ranqueles and Calfucurá’s followers.\textsuperscript{1123} Whether it was intentional or not, Calfucurá managed to receive more gifts for his allies in spite of the participation of some of his people in these malones.

Therefore, both indigenous confederacies kept on forcing the national government to continue paying tribute as a form of reciprocal obligations to allied cacicatos. The Hacienda report registered the budget assigned and delivered, under “Relationships with the Indians” (Appendix C).\textsuperscript{1124} Although these records are not standardized and do not always specify the amount assigned for each group, they offer important evidence of the cost that the confederacies were within the national government’s overall expenditures on frontiers. Each year, in raciones and salaries to cacicatos, both confederacies received around the 80% of the total expenditures. They were registered under a general category of “raciones for tribus amigas,” and some of the main caciques and groups names appear. In 1872, the record does not individualize groups and

\textsuperscript{1121} Orelie-Antonie was a French lawyer who tried to convince cacicatos to form the Kingdom of Araucanía and Patagonia and designate him as their King. Although we do not know the real support he received from cacicatos, the Chilean and Argentine governments perceived the idea of an indigenous state containing the Araucanía and the Patagonia, as well as French possible interests in the region, a serious threat and tried to capture him. Navarro, \textit{Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía}.

\textsuperscript{1122} AHSL., box 166, no. 18293.

\textsuperscript{1123} SHE., \textit{Frontera con los indios}, nos. 2728 and 787, in de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período de organización nacional,” p.106.

\textsuperscript{1124} AGN., \textit{Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda}, years, 1865-1875.
has a general category of “raciones and pacific relationships” and another category for “tribes that [we] want to subjugate.”

We cannot know from these records exactly how much was given to each ally. But except for Coliqueo and Raninqueo, and later Maica and the Pehuenches, the rest of the names include allies in the second and third level of dependency of the Pampas and Northern Patagonian confederacies. The latter also received an allocation registered separately as “compañía de Patagones.” This difference implies that the government spent more resources negotiating with independent cacicatos than with groups of indios amigos.\(^{1125}\)

The amount of raciones and salaries registered in these Hacienda reports are lower than the amounts agreed upon in the treaties. But it is not clear if these reports record all expenditures. As mentioned, the real cost of the treaties signed with Caciques Saygüeque, Chingoleo and Huinacabal implied a budget of at least 115,101 pesos per year. But in the Hacienda report, these caciques were part of “raciones for the tribus amigas” since 1866, a category that had registered expenditures from 61,848.93 in 1868 to 223,109.7 in 1875. In addition, the “compañía de Patagones” received between 2,500 and 7,000 pesos between 1865 and 1873. In the case of Calfucurá, Levaggi cites a report that indicated that in 1867 the expenditure on Calfucurá, Catriel and Maica was of 215,000 pesos per quarter.\(^{1126}\) It is difficult to know if the Hacienda reports missed expenditures or if the budget spent on raciones was significantly lower than the amount agreed upon in the peace treaties. Nevertheless, these pieces of evidence show that the confederacies still received an important amount of tribute from the national government, which

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\(^{1125}\) The indios amigos were also registered under diverse categories, such as “Companies of Patagones and Bahía Blanca” and “Melinao’s tribe.” AGN., Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda, years, 1865-1875.

\(^{1126}\) It also indicates that the expenditure on Caciques Coliqueo and Raninqueo was 49,000 pesos; that of Caciques Chingoleo and Huinacabal was 5,929 pesos, and that of Cacique Reuquecurá was 103,700 pesos.
contributed to the dynamics in frontier exchanges and expanded the confederacies’ economic power.

**Indigenous Confederacies Diverging Paths between 1862 and 1870**

In spite of both confederacies’ successful economic and political expansion during the 1860s, they did so by following diverging policies. Both aimed at bringing peace, trade and prosperity to their followers, and greater authority to their lineages. Both signed treaties and received salaries and *raciones*. However, only the Northern Patagonian Confederacy maintained internal and external peace and trade. The Pampas Confederacy continued to be involved in *malones, malocas* and military confrontations with Creoles. These polities also experienced different internal processes. While the Northern Patagonian Confederacy developed greater centralization under the Cacique Saygüeque, the Pampas Confederacy strengthened consensus politics as the basis for decision-making and provided for more political independence of its allies. Finally, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy sustained its autonomy until 1880, while its northern neighbor started to fall apart by 1876.

The Pampas Confederacy was more exposed to creole civil conflicts, the arrival of cacicatos from the Araucanía in the search of resources, and national and provincial governments’ attempts to expand their control beyond the Buenos Aires frontier region. These external challenges intertwined with internal conflicts. As developed in the previous chapter, the Ranqueles faced a struggle between some subaltern caciques, *capitanejos* and *lanzas* with the principal caciques. They continued being involved in *malones* and *malocas* that also hit Buenos
Aires and attracted subalterns under Calfucurá. Caciques Mariano Rosas’s and Manuel Baigorrita’s failure to provide internal peace and stability to their own allies and subalterns made it extremely difficult to hold them to their peace treaties.

Catriel and Cachul were probably the allies most interested in maintaining peace due to their location next to Buenos Aires’ frontier posts and Calfucurá. Although some of their subalterns joined malones and malocas on the Buenos Aires frontier, the principal caciques prioritized their own security and tried to maintain neutrality during military confrontations. They restrained from joining Creoles against allied cacicatos, but maintained a fluid communication with Calfucurá to warn him of possible attacks.

Finally, cacicatos from the Araucanía exercised more pressure on Calfucurá than on Saygüeque. The Salinero’s long-standing prestige and his proximity to Buenos Aires and Córdoba’s large haciendas and markets was a more attractive option for malones, trade and negotiations. This favorable location continued being an economic advantage as well as a political challenge. As a consequence, some allies in the first and second level of dependence in Calfucurá’s confederacy joined the malones and malocas to gain greater resources and prestige. Frontier authorities mentioned that in some instances, Calfucurá’s relatives disagreed with him during parliaments and supported groups of Ranqueles and cacicatos from the Araucanía in organizing malones against frontier posts.\footnote{For example, in August 1862, Calfucurá was not sure if he would join the attacks. Instead, his sons Catricurá and Blanco and the subaltern Cacique Colocal wanted to invade with the visitors. In December 20th, 1863, Pancho, brother to Ignacio (probably Coliqué), told Official Machado that two of Calfucurá’s sons did not obey their fathers’ orders and were planning to invade Tres Arroyos with 500 warriors. AM., Emilio Mitre, box 5, no. 26, August 5th, 1862, and SHE., Frontera con los indios, 513.} In Calfucurá’s letters, he sometimes mentioned that he could not control all of his caciques, capitanejos and lanzas.\footnote{For example, in 1865, Officer Frias said that Calfucurá informed him that some of his caciques and capitanejos did not follow his orders and would attack, along with the Ranqueles, estancias near Mataco. AM., Emilio Mitre, no. 1128} This increasing internal
competition was not necessarily the product of subalterns’ economic necessity, but of opportunism. Relatives and subaltern caciques and capitanejos tried to increase their resources and prestige challenging Calfucurá’s authority.

Calfucurá tried to overcome this internal competition by permitting his subaltern caciques and capitanejos to sign their own treaties, by maintaining consensus politics, and by tolerating his followers’ involvement in malones and malocas. When Calfucurá disagreed with the decision reached in parliaments, he sent messages to frontier authorities warning of possible attacks, but without specifying the leaders and the targeted towns.\footnote{These actions allowed him to maintain an appearance of peace relations with creole governments, while tolerating his subalterns’ attacks on frontier settlements. Hence, Calfucurá succeeded in holding allies under his umbrella by increasing his allies’ independence. Exploring one of these cases will help us understand this complexity.}

Cacique Cañumil was a Borogano who became Calfucurá’s brother in law and joined the settlements at Salinas Grandes as a subaltern cacique.\footnote{Military records from the 1950s usually accounted him with a force of 100 lanzas and indicated that his tolderías were along the coast of lake Carué.}

In 1862, Cañumil worked as an intermediator between Calfucurá and the Commander of Bahía Blanca, Llano.\footnote{Lieutenant Juan Cornell also indicated in 1863 that this cacique had influenced the confederate leader to agree to peace with the national government.}

\footnote{AGN., VII, Muséo Histórico, no. 5127.}

\footnote{Alioto, “Las yeguas y las chacras de Calfucurá,” p.204. For Cañumil, see: SHE., Frontera con los indios, no. 1286.}

\footnote{July 8th, 1862, SHE., Frontera con los indios, no. 161.}
after the battle of Pavón in 1861.\textsuperscript{1133} In a letter to the Minister of War on November 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1863, Cornell indicated that Cañumil and Guayquil, a cacique or capitatejo under his leadership, wanted to separate from Calfucurá and settle in Arroyo Frias as subjects of the national government.\textsuperscript{1134} As Calfucurá already had a treaty, Cornell thought they should not alter this treaty, but sign a separate one with these caciques. Cornell indicated that the government should provide raciones to them only after they had settled in Arroyo Frias and left Calfucurá. He also believed that more caciques would follow this example. Although expenses would be high, Cornell asserted that they should “entertain peace while conquering the land necessary to form pueblos, thus enlarging the wealth of the country.”\textsuperscript{1135} Probably, Coliqueo’s and other indios amigos’ example inspired the Lieutenant.

Nevertheless, Cornell was probably expressing his political ambitions instead of the caciques’ real intentions. In November 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1863, Cornell indicated that, according to the intermediary Luis Gorosito who visited the caciques, Calfucurá did not want to divide his raciones with Cañumil.\textsuperscript{1136} Instead, he wanted Cañumil to have his own raciones, and requested the specific amount and quality of goods he should receive. Therefore, Cañumil was not trying to leave Calfucurá, but to increase his prestige under the Pampas Confederacy. Calfucurá knew about this and intervened in Cañumil’s diplomatic negotiations.

Cañumil and Guayquil signed the final treaty in September 1866.\textsuperscript{1137} The treaty included some of Cornell’s suggestions; it indicated that these caciques had to settle near Bahía Blanca

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\textsuperscript{1133} “Juan Cornell to Minister of War and Marine Gelly y Obes, Buenos Aires, Novembebr 10\textsuperscript{th}, 1863,” SHE., Frontera con los indios, no. 699.
\textsuperscript{1134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1135} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1136} “Lieutenant Cornell to the Minister Gelly y Obes, Buenos Aires, November 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1864, in CGE.DEH, idem, box 14, no. 84,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, p. 347.
\textsuperscript{1137} “CGE., DEH, idem, box 17, no. 833,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 348-9.
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with their people, remain at peace with Cacique Ancalao – cacique amigo of Bahía Blanca –, and engage in agriculture. Nevertheless, this treaty did not mention that the location should be Arroyo Frias nor that Cañumil had to separate from Calfucurá. Four months later, the government signed new treaties with Calfucurá and Reuquecurá in Azul, and Cañumil participated in the negotiation. Therefore, this subaltern cacique gained a major diplomatic role and prestige and received his own raciones and salaries, while he kept his alliance with Calfucurá. He did not settle near Bahía Blanca until 1869-1870, and continued performing diplomatic roles for the Pampas Confederacy.1138

In March 1870, Commander Llano accused Cañumil of participating in malones and decided to attack his tolderías in Bahía Blanca,1139 killing seventy lanzas and holding the cacique prisoner.1140 Calfucurá insisted on his release and protested about the delay in the delivery of his raciones. Cañumil was probably freed, as he wrote a letter from Salinas Grandes to Colonel Francisco Elias in November 1870.1141 In this letter, he explained that the malones were performed by capitanejos who did not follow his orders and that he was working for the release of the captives. In October 1871, Commander Murga reported from Bahía Blanca that 500 lanzas from Calfucurá, 100 from Cañumil and some lanzas from Tapalqué were near the frontier town.1142 Like Catriel, Cañumil displayed diplomatic independence in times of peace, but needed Calfucurá to confront the creole government’s violence. The Salinero had enough military power in the Pampas to continue offering protection and stability to his allies. By the end of the 1870s, no cacicato could survive military confrontation with the Confederacy.

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1138 SHE., Frontera con los indios, nos. 748, 797, and 832.
1139 It is not clear if Cañumil’s tolderías near Bahía Blanca were a permanent or a temporary settlement.
1140 de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período de organización nacional,” p.112.
1141 AGN. VII, Museo Histórico, no. 5127.
1142 SHE., Frontera con los indios, no. 1286.
Therefore, the Pampas Confederacy managed to maintain its internal web of reciprocal obligations and peace in spite of allies’ increasing political independence. But this change in internal independence seriously constrained the diplomatic policy of peace and trade with Creoles at frontiers. Calfucurá and the main caciques managed to push most *malones* towards Córdoba and Northern Buenos Aires, and protect southern Buenos Aires. When these southern posts were hit by big *malones*, it was usually as a response to Creoles’ violation of reciprocal obligations. The evidence gathered on *malones* and *malocas* suggests that cacicatos from the Araucanía joined the Ranqueles in major attacks on southern Córdoba and western Buenos Aires more than on southern Buenos Aires.

In contrast, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy extended peace while increasing allies’ subordination to Saygüeque during the 1860s. Northern Patagonia was more arid and less populated than the Pampas and distant from the main frontier regions of the Atlantic and the Pacific. This distance limited Saygüeque’s allies independent search for prestige and economic resources. It also protected them from Creole civil conflicts and military expeditions. As I explained in previous chapters, Caciques Saygüeque and Chingoleo’s monopoly over Carmen de Patagones increased their indigenous allies’ commercial and diplomatic dependency on their leadership and facilitated maintaining peace with Creoles.

This diplomatic success forced Creoles to continue relying on inter-ethnic ties to access resources and people in all of Patagonia. It also limited creole governments’ justification for military expeditions over these territories. It is not surprising that Law 215 from 1867 contemplated the conquest of cacicatos’ territories up to Río Negro. As developed in Chapter Five, if demographic, cattle ranching and trade expansion took place in the region, it was under
the Confederacy’s control with Carmen de Patagones playing a key intermediary role. While local and national authorities tried to place new forts next to Carmen de Patagones, such as Guardia Mitre (1862) and Conesa (1869), these did not become permanent military posts until the 1880s.  
1143 Like the Italian families under Chingoleo, these locations were also populated by indigenous people and Creoles under the cacicatos’ rules and norms. 

In 1869, the national government tried to occupy Choelechoel -the strategic island on the Río Negro- a node that linked trails from the Andes Mountains to the Pampas. The failure of this attempt shows how Creoles still relied on cacicatos’ norms and agreements to move around Northern Patagonia. President Mitre ordered the occupation of the island in 1868. When the news arrived at Calfucurá’s tolderías, the Cacique started calling his trans-regional allies, and he was therefore able to recruit 3,500 lanzas. 
1145 He threatened to bring Cacique Quilapán and others from the Araucanía. These allies had recently defeated the Chilean military in a battle.  

Meanwhile, Commander Murga tried to organize the expedition from Carmen de Patagones. He tried to co-opt Saygüeque’s intermediaries: Mayor Linares and his brothers, whom had gained greater diplomatic relevance after Cacique Chingoleo’s death in 1867. Mayor Linares maintained an ambiguous attitude. He traveled with Murga to Buenos Aires in early 1869 where military arrangements were settled between President Domingo Sarmiento and the Commander. In his

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1143 Emma Nozzi, “Carmen de Patagones y la Fundación de Fortín Conesa, 1869-14 de octubre-1969” and “Carmen de Patagones y la Guardia General Mitre, 1862-diciembre-1962.”

1144 The first post faced prisoners’ uprisings in 1863 and took Creoles several years to gain a real control over this new spot. For Conesa, Juan Raone argued that this fort was settled after Murga’s failed expedition to Choelechoel in 1869. However, I found no evidence in the local and national archives on Carmen de Patagones, on the effective occupation date of this new fort until 1879, when Creoles and indigenous people are reported to be living at this location. General Julio Argentino Roca reported in June 1879, that Conesa had approximately 200 families of “Indians and settlers from Patagones” under the local Commander. Some of these people were linked to Reuquecurá and Miguel Linares. Ibid., p. 36., Juan Mario Raone, Fortines del desierto: mojones de civilización (Argentina: Ed. Lito., 1969), and Davies Lenoble, “Haciéndonos parientes.”

1145 For this episode, see: De Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional.”

1146 Between 1867 and 1869, a second series of campaigns in Chile attacked the Arribanos of Quilapán and negotiated with the Abajinos. Navarro, Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía.
letters, Linares did not inform Saygüeque about these plans nor about his agreement with the national government to form a town, under his governance, integrated into the Argentine Republic. Commander Murga also took care of maintaining good relationships with Saygüeque. He informed the cacique that the new President Sarmiento wanted peace, and that he appreciated him the most. Sarmiento sent him a gift of 200 mares and promised 800 more after the winter.

In May, 1869, the Municipality of Patagones approved the provision of 50 horses for the “expedition against Choelechoel to interview Reuquecurá” and “study this Cacique’s mood on the possibility of populating the island.” This information suggests that Murga did not only want to occupy the island without Saygüeque’s permission, but also ally with Reuquecurá. In July, Murga marched to Choelechoel and told Saygüeque that his intention was to kick out some “foreigners” who were robbing along the frontier. The presence of the French Orelie-Antonie I in Patagonia became Murga’s perfect excuse for stepping on cacicatos’ lands. Orelie-Antonie I was escaping Chilean persecution and traveling in the region with Cacique Lemunao. In order to maintain peace, Murga also told Saygüeque that he had met with some of his allies, and sent him gifts.

1147 “Linares to Commander Murga, Carmen de Patagones, April, 1869, in CGE., DEH., Campaña, frontera sur, box 27, no. 4885,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp. 433-4.
1149 Ibid.
1150 In 1870, the Chilean General Saavedra and Cacique Quilapán found out that Lemunao was helping Orelie I to travel along the Pampas. Navarro, Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía, p.86.
1151 He said that he met with Quinquiel Naguel, who he knew was from his people. He sent greetings, and a nice blanket for Nancucheo. “Commander Murga to Valentín Saygüeque, Choelechoel, July, 1869,” AGN, VII, Leg. 723 Ángel Justiniano Carranza. Also see: Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, pp.179-180.

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Nevertheless, Murga could not sustain his position in Choelechoel without generating conflict with both confederacies and President Sarmiento ended up ordering the troops to return home.\textsuperscript{1152} Saygüeque’s suspicion of Murga’s real intentions increased when the Commander of Bahía Blanca, Llano, attacked Calfucurá’s ally Cacique Cañumil’s \textit{tolderías} in 1870. These two episodes could have generated a military alliance between both confederacies. Saygüeque and Calfucurá started organizing parliaments among their allies and sending messages to each other to organize \textit{malones} against frontier towns in Buenos Aires province, including Carmen de Patagones.

However, both leaders and their allies prioritized securing their own people and territories. Saygüeque also suspected that Calfucurá wanted to expand his influence into Carmen de Patagones. Therefore, the Northern Patagonian Confederacy refused to join Calfucurá and decided to protect Carmen de Patagones.\textsuperscript{1153} Their allies and territory had not been seriously threatened by Creoles like the Pampas Confederacy, and they didn’t have enough political and economic reasons to push their followers into warfare.

In the case of the Pampas Confederacy, Calfucurá suffered major pressure from his followers due to the attack on Cañumil’s \textit{tolderías} and the delay and insufficient provision of \textit{raciones}. The cacicatos from the Araucanía were also pressuring him for more resources.\textsuperscript{1154} Hence, \textit{malones} and \textit{malocas} continued hitting southern Buenos Aires while Calfucurá tried to

\textsuperscript{1152} Raone, \textit{Fortines del desierto}, and Nozzi, “Carmen de Patagones y la Fundación de Fortín Conesa.”

\textsuperscript{1153} According to Musters, they resolved that Saygüeque would protect the north of the Río Negro while Casimiro would protect the south. Musters, \textit{Vida entre los Patagones}, p.186, 288 and 318, and Delrio y Ramos, “Reunidos en Futa Trawun,” p.14.

\textsuperscript{1154} In February 1870, Calfucurá informed creole authorities about possible \textit{malones} on Tres Arroyos. After this warning, \textit{malones} hit this town and local authorities blamed the Salineros. SHE, \textit{Frontera con los indios}, nos. 5696 and 5700, and de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período de organización nacional.”
negotiate peace.\textsuperscript{1155} Like his fellow Cacique Rosas, he blamed \textit{gauchos} for these attacks.\textsuperscript{1156} He succeeded in getting Commander Llano removed from Bahía Blanca, and continued negotiating peace with Commander Murga, and Commander Boer on the western frontier.\textsuperscript{1157}

These conflicts inaugurated a decade in which the Pampas Confederacy’s diplomatic policies started failing in the light of Creoles’ consensus for invading indigenous territory. Instead, Saygüeque tried to preserve his polity’s autonomy by fortifying his agreement with the national government.

\textit{Breaking Peace Treaties to Create a Desert, 1870-1879}

The end of the Paraguayan War in 1870 renewed some politicians and military authorities’ intentions to apply the Law 215.\textsuperscript{1158} Newspapers also showed an increasing popular discontent with peace treaties as effective tools to stop \textit{malones} and violence at frontiers.\textsuperscript{1159} The persistent eruption of \textit{malones} and \textit{malocas}, and the multi-ethnic aspect of the federalist \textit{montoneras} fueled national authorities, elites and military to think of all cacicatos as “rebels” and military confrontation as the only way for reaching political stability. The military incorporated new technologies such as the telegraph, which eased the communication between the Minister of War and Navy, Gainza, and frontier commanders such as Murga, Rivas and

\textsuperscript{1155} Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp.438-439
\textsuperscript{1158} Navarro Floria, “Continuidad y fin del trato pacifico con los indígenas de la Pampa y la Patagonia en el discurso político estatal argentino (1853-1879).”
\textsuperscript{1159} Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp. 440
Boer. This made it possible for Gainza to plan and execute military campaigns on different fronts so as to limit cacicatos’ mobility. The importation of repeating rifles during the 1870s, and then the Remington rifle in 1879 started providing Creoles with a huge military advantage over the cacicatos’ lances, sables, knifes and a limited number of firearms.

But the organization of military expeditions was delayed until 1876 due to President Sarmiento’s fight against the last federalist montoneras in Entre Ríos, and President Avellaneda’s struggle with the Mitristas whom were opposed to his presidency. These civil conflicts also brought frequent changes in frontier authorities and policies that limited the negotiation of peace with cacicatos. Raciones kept flowing to cacicatos’ lands, but with periodic delays. During the first half of the 1870s, frontier negotiations were crossed by cacicatos’ greater mistrust of creole government’s intentions. But most caciques saw these diplomatic tools as the guarantee of their independence.

The Pehuenches and Ranqueles signed treaties during the first years of the decade. After the agreement reached between Mendoza’s authorities and Caciques from Varvarco and Barrancas in 1873, the provincial government tried to settle peace with Cacique Feliciano Purrán. By signing a peace treaty with Chilean authorities in 1873, Purrán had increased his prestige among Pehuenches. Mendoza’s authorities perceived this alliance as a threat; they

1160 De Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio liminal,” and documents on the 1870s in AGN, VII, Museo Histórico.
1161 de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio liminal.”
1162 For example, the Commander of Córdoba’s frontier Lucio Mansilla gained caciques’ trust when he traveled to their lands, but was replaced by Antonio Baigorria, who lacked these personal ties. Baigorria tried to make the principal Caciques fight, a strategy backed by the Commander of the Interior Frontiers, José María Arredondo. Arredondo sent a commission to negotiate peace in April 1871, but in June decided to attack Rosas’ tolderías speculating that Cacique Baigorrita would support the attack on his relative. Baigorrita did not back the expedition. The creole government was forced to renew peace negotiations with Rosas’ Ratto, “El discreto encanto de la mediación.”
1163 AGN., Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda, years, 1865-1875; Levaggi, Paz en la frontera and de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional.”
feared that Chileans would use their allied cacicatos to proclaim sovereignty over the eastern side of the Andes. Hence, they negotiated peace with Purrán and his allies Caciques Llancaqueo and Ayllal. This treaty delimited jurisdictions, the control of subalterns, mutual help, free trade and raciones, and proposed the education of Indians in provincial schools. Nevertheless, Purrán continued negotiating with both governments. Through this double diplomacy, he managed to maintain his autonomy and the control over Varvarco during the 1870s. Unlike Malargüe, this region continued to be an area where indigenous people, Chileans and Mendocinos grazed their cattle, traded and lived together under cacicatos’ rules. Purrán continued controlling key passes that crossed the Andes Mountains and routes that reached the Pampas. The military were surprised by the power that Purrán exercised over this community of diverse ethnic origins and trans-regional markets.

In the Ranquel lands, peace negotiations continued to find mutual mistrust and conflicts. General Lucio Mansilla and Fray Burela (from Mendoza, commissioned to release captives) negotiated peace with the Ranqueles in 1870. In October 1872, Franciscans Moises Alvarez and Tomás María Gallo led peace negotiations with the Ranqueles. In both cases, parties reached an agreement that did not result in permanent peace. Although the Argentine President approved

1164 Varela and Manara, “Particularidades de un modelo económico en un espacio fronterizo Nord patagónico.”
1165 AHPM, Indios, box. 123, nos. 45 and 61.
1167 Ibid. and Varela and Manara, “Particularidades de un modelo económico en un espacio fronterizo Nord patagónico.”
these treaties, Congress did not approve increasing the budget assigned to peace treaties.\textsuperscript{1170} The national government sent \textit{raciones} to the main caciques, but never in the amount and quality agreed.\textsuperscript{1171} These actions did not comply with the Ranqueles’s conditions for peace. Expeditions also invaded Ranqueles’s lands.\textsuperscript{1172}

As a result, the principal Ranquel caciques continued mistrusting the provincial and national governments’ diplomatic intentions. During these peace negotiations, they maintained their guard over their territories, and sometimes supported or tolerated \textit{malones} and \textit{malocas} organized by their subalterns against frontier towns. These failed negotiations fueled conflicts among the main Ranquel caciques and the \textit{indios gauchos}. The frontier groups of diverse ethnic origins sometimes even raided the principal \textit{torderías} of the Ranqueles.\textsuperscript{1173}

Pérez Zavala argues that the national government and the Ranqueles reached a kind of “truce” between the 1872 and 1878 treaties, as no major frontier confrontation took place.\textsuperscript{1174} But this “truce” was not due to the government’s success in imposing conditions that implied subjugating caciques to the nation. The “truce” was a time of Ranquel internal re-organization, negotiation and attempts to address their increasing vulnerability. Moreover, they continued negotiating with Calfucurá and backed \textit{malones} when negotiations failed. According to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1170} Ratto, “El discreto encanto de la mediación,” and “Estado y cuestión indígena en las fronteras de Chaco y La Pampa (1862-1880).”
\item \textsuperscript{1171} In addition to Ratto’s analysis, the official records on \textit{raciones} do not individualized the groups that received these resources after 1872. AGN., \textit{Memorias de hacienda}.
\item \textsuperscript{1172} In 1869, Mansilla ordered the occupation of Río Quinto. Arredondo attacked Rosas’ \textit{torderías} in June 1871 and Roca in May 1872. Ratto, “El discreto encanto de la mediación.”
\item \textsuperscript{1173} For example, when Fathers Alvarez and Gallo traveled to the Ranqueles’s lands, Alvarez narrated that a group of Indians stopped them when they were near Cacique Rosas’ \textit{torderías}, and took many of the goods they were taking to the caciques. \textit{Eco de Córdoba}, November 12th, 1872, year 9, no. 2882, in AHCSF, box 2, nos. 262, and 310190.
\item \textsuperscript{1174} Pérez Zavala, “La política interétnica de los Ranqueles durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIX.”
\end{itemize}
Namuncurá, the Ranqueles sent him between 300 and 400 warriors to join these attacks and military resistance between 1872 and 1878.\footnote{1175}

Calfucurá also negotiated peace with Commanders Murga and Boer between 1870 and 1871.\footnote{1176} On both fronts, Calfucurá reached verbal agreements. But, as with the Ranqueles, national authorities wanted to reduce the amount of tribute payed to cacicatos. The government continued providing some \textit{raciones}, but not in the amount agreed upon in these verbal agreements. In addition to this escalating conflict, the Pampas Confederacy was hit by Cacique Catriel’s son’s attempt to hold greater power over his subalterns and Calfucurá. Frontier authorities’ intervention in this conflict limited peace with Calfucurá even further.

When Cacique Catriel died in 1866, his son Cipriano inherited his leadership. In 1871, Cipriano tried to enhance his authority over Calfucurá’s subaltern caciques and other \textit{indios amigos} in the region in alliance with local frontier authorities.\footnote{1177} He probably wanted to stop sharing with confederate allies the access to the growing frontier trade in southern Buenos Aires. Cipriano had close relationships with Creoles in Azul and Tandil and even had his own cattle brand. In 1871, he agreed with Commander Francisco de Elias from Azul to be named as “the superior cacique of all the Indians,” and to consider as “rebels” either caciques or their followers who did not subject themselves to this cacique.\footnote{1178} According to this document, Calfucurá’s subaltern caciques Manuel Grande and Ramón López, and Caciques Cachu and Chipitrúz, had


\footnote{1176} See: Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp. 433

\footnote{1177} According to Meinardo Hux, Cipriano Catriel bragged of being a “truthful Argentine,” de Jong, “Funcionarios de dos mundos en un espacio liminal,” p.177


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to subjugate themselves under Cipriano Catriel’s command. It also stipulated that Cipriano could form a force together with the frontier military to suppress these caciques if they stole or hosted deserters and thieves. According to Commander Elias, Cipriano Catriel formed a parliament to inform his people about the pact, and then attacked the *tolderías* of Caciques Manuel Grande and Ramón López. In a second parliament where Commander Elias participated, Cipriano Catriel apparently disarmed his followers and ordered the presence of a military force in his *tolderías* to avoid robberies.\footnote{\textit{Indios in Azul}, \textit{Diario La Nación}, Buenos Aires, October 19th, 1870, in Ibid., pp.55-56.} Catriel again attacked Caciques Manuel Grande, Ramón López, Quentriel and Cachul whom apparently wanted to remain in their position of *indios amigos*, but refused to be under Cipriano Catriel’s command.\footnote{\textit{SHE., Frontera con los indios}, nos. 1276, 6364, and 6380; AGN, VII, Vinter, no. 1141; \textit{“AGN, Memoria de Guerra, 1871,”} in Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp. 246-248, and de Jong, \textit{“Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional,”} p.114.}

Cipriano Catriel’s actions not only broke the consensus politics within his cacicato, but also acted against the Pampas Confederacy.\footnote{\textit{SHE., Frontera con los indios}, nos. 1276, 6364, and 6380; AGN, VII, Vinter, no. 1141.} Meanwhile, national authorities continued denying Calfucurá’s proposition of formalizing their verbal agreement into a written treaty; they limited the number of *raciones*, and again ordered the occupation of Choelechoel.\footnote{\textit{Calfucurá complained for not receiving a written treaty to sign. He also expressed he wanted to extend peace to his “brothers,” Caciques Mariano Rosas and Manuel Baigorrita. “Juan Calfucurá to Minister Gainza, Buenos Aires, September 6th, 1872,” AGN., X., \textit{Archivo Rivas}, 2-2-2, in Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp. 440. Also, see de Jong, \textit{“Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional.”} \textit{Cacique Raninqueo had received part of the mares taken by the Military from the people that rebelled against Cacique Cipriano Catriel. Frontera con los indios}, nos. 1276, 6364, and 6380; AGN, VII, Vinter, no. 1141, and de Jong, \textit{“Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional.”}} In retaliation of these events, the Pampas Confederacy decided to exercise coercion on a confederate scale. First, Calfucurá punished Cacique Raninqueo (a second cacique to Coliqueo) for supporting Cipriano Catriel and Commander Elias in their attack on his subaltern caciques.\footnote{\textit{Cacique Raninqueo to Minister Gainza, Buenos Aires, September 6th, 1872,” AGN., X., \textit{Archivo Rivas}, 2-2-2, in Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp. 440. Also, see de Jong, \textit{“Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional.”}} The Salinero occupied Raninqueo’s lands with 3,500 *lanzas* and imprisoned the
cacique and his people. He then proposed to the Chief of the Western Frontier Boer, that he would release all of his people in exchange for Raninqueo. This agreement was not settled, and Calfucurá forced Raninqueo to participate in his second action.

In March 1872, the Pampas Confederacy organized massive attacks with 3,500 lanzas composed by Salineros, Reuquecurá followers, groups of Ranqueles, allies from the Araucanía, and the indios amigos of Raninqueo and Tripailao. These forces hit the Buenos Aires frontier posts of Alvear, 25 de Mayo and 9 de Julio. In these series of attacks, known as the battle of San Carlos, the Confederacy took around 200,000 heads of cattle and horses, and captured 500 captives. It was not surprising that they targeted the western frontier; this was where most of the indios amigos who were allied with the creole governments lived, and Coliquéo’s lands. The frontier military as well as Coliqueo with 200 lanzas, Cipriano Catrīel with 800 warriors, and some other lanzas from Caciques Manuel Grande and Chipitrúz’s groups, defended themselves against these attacks. Manuel Grande and Chipitrúz participated after renegotiating their position as indios amigos with Buenos Aires’s Governor Emilio Castro. They avoided their subjugation to Cipriano Catriel’s command, but had to respond to creole military authorities and avoid Calfucurá. In the case of Cipriano Catriel, he had to use Commander Rivas’s soldiers to force all his lanzas to fight in this battle under the threat of death.

This attack and the successive battles brought a definitive change to the frontier’s diplomacy. The increasing use of the national government’s military machine over the cacicatos

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1185 “Cacique Andrés Raninqueo to Commander in Chief of the Western Frontier, Colonel Juan Boer, La Verde, March, 5th, 1872,” and “Juan Calfucurá to Colonel Juan Boer, La Verde, March, 5th, 1872,” AGN, VII, Álvaro Barros, no. 155.
1186 de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período de organización nacional.”
1187 Ibid.
1188 Ibid. and AGN., X, 43.7.3.
exacerbated the Pampas Confederacy’s internal crisis. After these attacks, Calfucurá insisted on negotiating peace with creole authorities, especially in the light of Chile’s advance against his allies in the Araucanía.\textsuperscript{1188} He convoked a trans-regional parliament that included Cacique Quilapán.\textsuperscript{1189} But Calfucurá died in early 1873. More than 160 caciques and capitanes from the Araucanía, Pampas and Northern Patagonia participated in his funeral in Salinas Grandes.\textsuperscript{1190} As I mentioned, his main caciques and capitanes reunited in a parliament and decided to form a triumvirate formed by Calfucurá’s sons Manuel Namuncurá and Alvarito Reumay, and his nephew and secretary Bernardo Namuncurá. They rejected Cacique Millacurá’s right to succeed Calfucurá as the eldest son.\textsuperscript{1191} Manuel Namuncurá increasingly became the leading voice and followed his father’s legacy by trying to keep peace with the national government and stop Creoles military plans to advance over Choelechoel and Carhue.\textsuperscript{1192}

Inter-ethnic alliances continued shifting. After Cipriano Catriel got involved in the Mitrista rebellion in 1874, the government offered him a new treaty in 1875. This treaty ordered Catriel to move all his people from Azul to a new line of forts and to defend the frontier as National Guards.\textsuperscript{1193} Catriel apparently accepted the agreement, but an uprising occurred, sparked by the general discontent. Cipriano Catriel’s brother, Juan José Catriel, killed him and

\textsuperscript{1188}By 1871, many indigenous people had subjugated to the Chilean Military and the frontier region moved to Malleco. The national state started selling cacicatos’ lands. In 1878, the Military advanced over Traiquén. In 1880, they advance over Cautín (Temuco) and was confronted by a general indigenous uprising. Navarro, \textit{Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía}.

\textsuperscript{1189}Calfucurá asked Reuquecurá to bring Cacique Quilapán and Qhilahueque. Hux, 1991, in De Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el período de organización nacional.”

\textsuperscript{1190}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1191}Mellicurá moved south to Río Negro with 180 lanzas and their families. He received raciones in Patagones in 1875. We do not know if he stayed there or joined the Pampas Confederacy’s malones over Buenos Aires frontiers in 1876. MHRMFV, \textit{Copiador del fuerte de Carmen de Patagones 1874-1876}, and “Libro de actas de las sesiones de la Comisión Municipal Provisoria de Patagones,” June 24th, 1875; AGN, \textit{Memorias del Departamento de Hacienda}, years 1865-1875.

\textsuperscript{1192}For the Confederacy’s peace negotiations see: Levaggi, \textit{Paz en la frontera}, pp.298-306.

\textsuperscript{1193}Ibid.
most of his followers abandoned Azul to join Namuncurá in Salinas Grandes. This uprising left many dead and included *malones* that killed and captured many Creoles on the frontier and took 300,000 heads of cattle.\footnote{Hux, 1991 in Levaggi, *Paz en la frontera*.}

These developments increased the economic pressure on Salinas Grandes. The Pampas’ Confederacy was losing control over one of its main economic and demographic centers while experiencing Ranqueles’s increasing encroachment and blockades in the trade-networks with the Araucanía. The Ranqueles tried to adapt to the changing regional economic trends by incorporating sheep raising, engaging more in agriculture, and increasing their involvement in the selling of captives. Releasing and exchanging captives was always part of peace negotiations, but the correspondence between the Ranqueles and the Franciscan missionaries shows that this transaction became a regular business for the Ranqueles.\footnote{Tamagnini, eds., *Cartas de frontera*.} Between 1871 and 1881, these sources registered at least 477 negotiations for the release of captives.\footnote{Estimation based on the sources found at the AHCSF and Tamagnini, eds., *Cartas de frontera*.} The increasing violence in the region assured Ranqueles a large number of captives, but the exchange was growing so fast that they started bringing captives from other groups to sell through the Franciscans. Franciscans’ devotion and involvement in this business was not only due to religious and moral interests, but because it helped them legitimize their presence in the region and gain government and private financial help.\footnote{They started receiving important sums from the *Sociedad de Beneficiencia* in Rosario (Santa Fé), and captives’ families. See the sources in Tamagnini, eds., *Cartas de frontera*.} For Ranqueles, this business assured immediate economic revenues, easing followers’ immediate necessities, and was used to exchange some of their own prisoners. The negotiations usually involved the caciques, captives’
holders, missionaries, frontier authorities and captives’ families. From the sources we know that the price was usually set in currency; it fluctuated between 100 and 300 pesos bolivianos, and other requirements such as the typical goods received as raciones, cloth, and sometimes, mares. On the down side, this business enhanced Ranqueles’s image as savages and thieves, and decreased the amount of domestic labor available to them. Overall, selling captives was not enough to overcome the Ranqueles’s increasing economic and political constraints, especially after the smallpox epidemic in 1874, and Creoles increasing punitive expeditions over their lands.

President Avellaneda (1874-1880) and the new Ministry of War and Navy Valentín Alsina organized an expedition to Salinas Grande and occupied Caruhé in 1876. By March, they had founded new forts in Puan, Guaminí and Trenque Lauquen (see fig. 6). They occupied Caruhe and constructed Alsina’s famous trench. This trench aimed at stopping indigenous cavalry from entering creole estancias and towns in frontier regions. They also settled new forts south of Córdoba and Santa Fe, threatening the Ranqueles’s territories.

Captives worked for and remained under the capturers or their wives, and their release demanded a compensation for the economic loss. Caciques needed to convince their followers to exchange their captives. Considering that the treaty of 1865 set a price of 50 silver pesos per captive and that the salary assigned for the principal caciques in the treaties of 1872 and 1878 was of 150 pesos bolivianos per month, the exchange of captives seemed to give a significant profit to their “holders” and families. See the treaties in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp.520-521, and Tamagnini, eds., Cartas de frontera.

The project aimed at integrating 56,000 km2 of cacicatos’ lands to be farmed by Creoles, under the jurisdiction of the Province of Buenos Aires. de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional,” pp.116-7.

Ibid.

Alfred Ébelot, Adolfo Alsina y la ocupación del desierto: relatos de la frontera (El elefante blanco, 2008).
Under these circumstances, Manuel Namuncurá and his allies responded with violence. The Pampas Confederacy attacked the new forts as well as the *indios amigos* who favored the
national government. Nonetheless, their military disadvantage was becoming evident. They lost many battles and were hit by expeditions in their own lands. Creole forces also recovered a large number of animals that had been taken during the malones and malocas. In addition to the loss of Catriel’s territories, the new line of forts hindered nomadic pastoralist economies. Cacicatos could not reach the main grasslands and water near the frontier in Buenos Aires, which was a key factor in organizing malones. Military defeats in Chile also obstructed trade networks to the west and limited forming military trans-regional alliances. In addition, the government reduced the amount of raciones in 1875 and 1876. By 1877, the government only provided salaries to the principal leaders. The stability and prosperity maintained by the Pampas Confederacy during more than thirty years, was on the wane.

In 1878, the Minister of War and Navy Alsina died and was replaced by Julio Argentino Roca. The Congress agreed to finance military campaigns to end with cacicatos’ independence. During 1879 and 1884, the Argentine military engaged in the “conquest of the desert.” This plan involved a series of military expeditions into cacicatos’ lands, departing from several points: General Roca advanced from Carhue to Choelechoel Island; Nicolás Levalle marched from Carhue to Ranqueles’ lands in La Pampa; Eduardo Racedo hit the Ranqueles’ lands from Villa Mercedes; Napoleón Uriburu advanced from San Rafael to Pehuenches’ lands, and finally,

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1203 Raone indicates that the Military and the indios amigos managed to recover a big part of the stolen booty. Raone, *Fortines del desierto*, p. 117.
1204 “Engineer José Cetz report to the Minister of War and Navy, January 5th, 1870,” SHE., *Frontera con los indios*, box 31, nos. 18, and 5620. Also, see de Jong, “Las alianzas políticas indígenas en el periodo de organización nacional.”
1205 Since 1869, the General and Engineer Olascoaga planned with the Chilean General Saavedra how to obstruct cacicatos’ communication through the Andes Mountains. Both governments used this strategy during their military campaigns. Also, by 1872 the frontier was resettled in Malleco, and the Chilean Military moved to Traiquén in 1878 and Cautín in 1880. Navarro, *Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía*.
Hilario Lagos marched from Trenque Lauquen to Salinas Grandes. In 1881, a second series of campaigns targeted the Northern Patagonian Confederacy. Three army formations departed from Carmen de Patagones west to Manzanas and south to Valcheta. In 1882, another three army formations persecuted the survivors resisting in the Andes.\footnote{1207}

In order to organize these campaigns, the national government had to coopt some cacicatos to participate in the campaigns as soldiers and guides. These were the cases of some of the 
\textit{indios amigos} under the Franciscan missions in San Luis and Mendoza, and the \textit{indios amigos} of Raninqueo, Tripailao, Quentriel, and Manuel Grande in Buenos Aires. This last groups’ participation required the national government’s acceptance of their rights over certain territories.\footnote{1208} On the opposite side, the principal Ranquel Caciques Manuel Baigorrita and Epumer Rosas (who succeeded his brother Mariano in 1877) joined Namuncurá’s resistance.\footnote{1209} The letters between the Ranquel Caciques and the Franciscans during the expeditions that hit central Pampas between 1879 and 1881, also reveal a persistent vulnerability and resistance of creole and indigenous subalterns on the Cuyo frontier.\footnote{1210} Creole and indigenous army soldiers frequently deserted, stole animals and \textit{raciones} from the expeditions, and warned the principal caciques about the military’s movements.\footnote{1211}

When these campaigns reached the Pampas Confederacy’s main \textit{tolderías} during 1879 and 1881, they were already in a vulnerable position. Expeditions against the Ranqueles found

\footnote{1207 Enrique Mases, \textit{Estado y cuestión indígena. El destino final de los indios sometidos en el sur del territorio (1878-1910)} (Buenos Aires: Entrepasados/Prometeo Libros, 2002), and Raone, \textit{Fortines del desierto: mojones de civilización}.}

\footnote{1208 By 1874, Cacique Raninqueo was settled in Bahía Blanca next to Caciques Ancalao and Linares. SHE., \textit{Frontera con los indios}, nos. 6726, 6813, and 1464.}


\footnote{1210 See: Tamagnini, eds., \textit{Cartas de frontera}.}

\footnote{1211 Official records on \textit{raciones} indicate a budget for “piquetes de indios” in Córdoba, and San Luis from 1876. AGN, \textit{Memorias de hacienda}.}
that many followers had already escaped to San Luis and Córdoba’s frontiers, and the principal Caciques had moved to Neuquén. By 1878, General Roca reported that Namuncurá only had 100 lanzas in Maraco Grande, while Pincén had 100 warriors in Laguna Maldico.\textsuperscript{1212} The principal leaders of the Salineros, Ranqueles and Pehuenches resisted the military occupation by fighting and moving towards the Andes Mountains. While the Ranqueles saw some of their people involved in the expedition, most Pehuenche caciques resisted the occupation under the leadership of Feliciano Purrán. In 1879, Cacique Manuel Baigorrita was killed in Neuquén while Epumer and Pincén were imprisoned and sent to the Martín García Island in the Río de la Plata. In 1880, Cacique Purrán was killed. Cacique Namuncurá ended up surrendering in Neuquén in 1884.

In Northern Patagonia, Saygüeque perceived the changing frontier dynamics and acted accordingly. Although his confederacy tried to maintain a policy of peace during the 1870s, he started witnessing the defeat of his allies in the Araucanía, the fragmentation of the Pampas Confederacy, and the Argentine government’s increasing military force.\textsuperscript{1213} He proposed an original political response to these challenges: the creation of the “Indigenous Governorship of Manzanas.” Although he was already the head of his polity, he started referring to it as his “Governorship” in the letters written by his secretaries from Manzanas since 1874.\textsuperscript{1214} This conceptualization was linked to a long-standing colonial tradition of naming Caciques who made a pact with the colonial state as Governors.\textsuperscript{1215} The Chilean government used that strategy from 1861 onwards to co-opt some cacicatos into state jurisdiction and prevent their alliances with the

\textsuperscript{1212} Raone, \textit{Fortines del desierto: mojones de civilización}, p. 140
\textsuperscript{1213} They even signed more treaties with individual allies, such as Nancuche in 1872. Vezub, \textit{Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas}.
\textsuperscript{1214} The first letter I’ve seen addressed from “The Indigenous Governorship of Manzanas” was written on July 29th, 1874. AGN., VII, Leg. 723, \textit{Ángel Justiniano Carranza}.
\textsuperscript{1215} For example, among the Pehuenches, see: AHPM, \textit{Independencia}, f.763, no.145; “Indios,” f.123, no.16, February 26th, 1851.
cacicatos that were resisting their military campaigns. But as Boccara and Vezub argue, caciques in the Araucanía adopted the name to refer to their ayllarewes, their own forms of supra-local alliances. Hence, Saygüeque was building a creative response to the new context from multi-ethnic political traditions.

As Vezub described in detail, instead of basing his power on his ethnic group, Saygüeque proposed an inclusive ethnic model based on an “indigenous” identity. Saygüeque was trying to maintain his political independence while creating a permanent pact with the Argentine nation-state. As Vezub argues, he did not seem to think himself as an Argentine governor, but as an indigenous authority of a polity that could relate to the Argentine and Chilean nation-states. His letters and actions from the mid-1870s to 1880 reveal that his intention was to conserve political and economic autonomy in exchange for peace and military support to protect Patagonia from foreigner intrusion. The Argentine government was increasingly suspicious of Chile’s interest in expanding into Patagonia.

Saygüeque presented his project in 1874, when he requested a new pact with the Argentine government to increase his raciones, and create the position of Governor in the context of the seemingly unstoppable military expansion over cacicatos’ lands. He also demanded 4,500 cows per year, specific amounts of raciones, military clothes and salaries for

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1216 Navarro, Crónica militar de la conquista y pacificación de la Araucanía, and Bengoa, Historia del pueblo mapuche, siglos XIX y XX.
1217 Boccara, Guerre et ethnogenèse mapuche dans le Chili colonial, and Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
1218 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas.
1219 “Bajada Valcheta, September 16th, 1874, CGE., DEH., Idem., box 36, nums.1.333, 22-6821,” in Levaggi, Paz en la frontera, pp.478-481. According to Vezub, this was his first sign of resignation to his autonomy. Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.261.
himself, his secretary, ten captains and one hundred soldiers. Furthermore, he indicated his conditions: 1. That he would defend Carmen de Patagones, Bahía Blanca, Azul, el Colorado and Tandil and the “Argentine flag,” and force others to respect the “sons of the country” and “foreigners” who lived in his territories. In this, he was attempting to expand his influence into the Pampas Confederacy. 2. That Caciques Naguipichun, Quempumilla and Llancamilla would accept “civilization” and settle in Bahía Blanca and el Colorado. 3. He would respect and protect the cattle and horses and businesses of Christians who reached his tolderías. 4. He would register all his allied “nations” (referring to cacicatos) with the Argentine army. 5 He would obey Creole authorities if any “enemy” tried to invade. Finally, he closes his letter saying that all the indigenous people in these territories agreed to these clauses and that, unlike Christians, they were “private owners of these territories.”

As we see in this letter, Saygüeque’s project was a political and economic challenge. Saygüeque was interested in conserving his transregional trade networks when the Argentine and Chilean military campaigns were forcing cacicatos to divide and disappear into two “nation-states” and restrict their trans-regional trade networks to favor Buenos Aires and central Chile. In 1880, Saygüeque complained about the military occupation of Choelechoel, arguing that it affected his business with Argentine traders and the trade of hides and ostrich feathers with Carmen de Patagones. He also claimed that the army tried to stop indigenous people who wanted to cross the Andes Mountains to trade in the Araucanía and Chile. The Argentine government also tried to force cacicatos to settle and become farmers, seen as the path for

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1220 Levaggi, *Paz en la frontera.*
1221 Bandieri, *Cruzando la cordillera...*
1222 “Judge of Peace Isaís Crespo to Governor Barros, September 27th and 30th, 1879,” AGN., VII, no. 155.
“civilization.” In this context, Saygüeque even ended renouncing to government’s delivery of raciones in exchange for maintaining peace and trade networks with Carmen de Patagones. The long-standing commercial and personal link with the town strongly influenced his decision to negotiate with Argentina over Chile.

Northern Patagonia’s economic and political developments complicated Saygüeque’s project. He appealed to an indigenous identity that linked his people with other cacicatos on both sides of the Andes, and maintained a fluid communication with the Pampas Confederacy’s leaders. At this time, they started writing to each other as relatives. However, Saygüeque ended up prioritizing the political and economic viability and security of his polity over ethnic military alliances. While the Pampas Confederacy was being destroyed by the Argentine military invasion, Saygüeque denied military support to these cacicatos and insisted on negotiating with the national government. This decision might have come from a strategy of survival or from the desire to weaken cacicatos that had been economic and political competitors. He actually mentioned to Manuel Namuncurá in 1874 that he held them resentment for trying to expand over his territories.

Saygüeque’s political strategy was not welcome by the Argentine government. In 1878, they had created the Governorship of the Patagonia, but named Colonel Alvaro Barros as its governor in 1879 and Carmen de Patagones as the capital city. Once the Argentine Military realized that conquering the Pampas was viable, they decided to extend their campaign into

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1223 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.216.
1225 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, p.208.
Northern Patagonia. The Argentine government refused to incorporate an indigenous polity as part of a federalist nation, and forced Saygüeque to resist by military means.

By the end of 1879 and during 1880, Carmen de Patagones stopped sending raciones to Saygüeque. They also captured members of one of his diplomatic commissions, and attacked allied tolderías near Manzanas. Governor Alvaro Barros (1879-1882) told Saygüeque that he and his people had to take up sedentary farming and create towns, providing land to immigrant colonies, and stop their trans-regional trade. They would receive financial support for one year to settle in a town and start their activities. This project broke with traditional reciprocal relationships and meant the end of the indigenous governorship’s autonomy. In March 1881, the army invaded Caleufú. While some allied caciques decided to submit to the invaders and become vagueanos (guides), others escaped and continued fighting. Saygüeque finally surrendered in January 1885 with 3,000 men. He was imprisoned, taken to Buenos Aires, and finally sent to Chichinales (in the Río Negro) with some of his people. The national government provided them with title to some arid lands in Chubut in 1896. Saygüeque died on September, 1903.

Most of the indigenous survivors of the “conquest of the desert” were sent to different provinces to work as force labor, forced to join Salesian missions in Río Negro or allowed to stay in Patagonia under the Argentine Republic rules and norms. Franciscans participated in the release of captives and -as Salesians in the south- in the fragmentation of families and their distribution as forced labor in Córdoba and San Luis. After years of military and legal resistance,

1227 Vezub, Valentín Saygüeque y la Gobernación indígena de las Manzanas, chapter 7.
1228 Mases, Estado y cuestión indígena.
few groups ended up receiving titles to land, generally over arid land and far away from their historic territories.\textsuperscript{1229}

In conclusion, up to the mid-1870s, both indigenous confederacies used peace treaties as effective policies of expansion over the creole society. Inter-ethnic alliances and norms continued shaping the political, economic and cultural developments in these southern lands. Their nomadic pastoralist economies also competed and complemented neighboring sedentary economies. When Creoles found military and technological advantage over the Pampas Confederacy, they took advantage of its internal crises and ended its autonomy. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy came next, and its defeat sealed the end to peace treaties and systems based on inter-ethnic logic.

\textsuperscript{1229} Delrio, \textit{Memorias de expropiación}. 373
CONCLUSION

This dissertation included indigenous societies and frontiers into mainstream narratives of the Americas. I showed that nomadic pastoralist cacicatos in the Southern Cone not only created powerful independent polities and economies in their own lands, but also participated in the productive and commercial expansion of the South Atlantic as well as in the political re-organization of creole sedentary state structures. At least until the end of the 19th century, the indigenous confederacies created a world where inter-ethnic alliances defined political success and survival, and a combination of nomadic and sedentary economies granted people subsistence and, at times, prosperity. These alliances were created in frontier regions and shaped by processes of mestizaje. I expect this analysis to contribute to our understanding of the general history on the Americas, the development of the southern lands during the 19th century, as well as the internal dynamics of all segmental and nomadic pastoralist societies.

My analysis was built on a growing historiography based on indigenous societies and frontiers in the Americas, which has shown that, since the Spanish arrived in the Americas, the continent had been ruled by inter-ethnic relations and customs. Whether we look at sedentary colonies, frontier regions or indigenous lands, we will usually find that success came from processes of mestizaje and adaptations to a polycentric global economy. These interpretations strongly question the persistent use of the term “Colonial History” to address the period between 1492 and 1820, and make the 19th century a key transitional period. Multiple inter-ethnic developments attempted to rule the Americas under new economic and political opportunities and challenges.
As I have developed in this dissertation, nomadic pastoralist cacicatos in the southern lands of the continent found a unique economic opportunity in the increasing demand for primary resources by the emerging industrial powers. To participate in these expanding markets, they started adapting their reciprocal logic and customs to capitalist norms. They also incorporated state vocabulary, symbols and ranks while conserving kinship politics and reciprocity as the base of their political structure and policies. Like their creole partners, they were creating polities able to balance local autonomy with political centralization, which was necessary to engage in international diplomacy and trade. In addition, the southern indigenous confederacies also participated in creole political projects and economies as partners and competitors.

The case under study suggests that it was independent indigenous societies’ power that created and allowed the continuity of a system reigned by inter-ethnic alliances and customs in the southern lands until late 19th century. This interpretation also provides us with a better understanding of both, the indigenous and creole political and economic developments in the region. The indigenous confederacies were not the result of indigenous resistance to powerful “expansive states.” As I developed in chapter one, these polities emerged from global and local contexts that also affected sedentary Creoles at state units. As John Tutino argues, during the last decades of the 18th century and beginning of the 19th century, war, rebellion, the decline of silver production, and industrial concentration was turning a polycentric global economy into an industrial capitalism led by the British Empire. The liberalization of trade increased the international demand for agricultural and cattle products in this region. The Argentine provinces’ maintained a multiplicity of local and regional markets oriented towards the Pacific ports,
Bolivian markets, the Cuyo, the northwestern regions, and the Atlantic, to overcome market crises and warfare. Nevertheless, they slowly evolved to prioritize the Pampas and the Atlantic markets. Nomadic pastoralist cacicatos in the Araucanía also migrated to the Pampas to participate in this economic expansion and overcome local political and economic pressures. It was during these general economic processes that Salinas Grandes and Buenos Aires became key economic centers in the region. The nomadic pastoralist and the sedentary economies respectively under the Pampas Confederacy and Buenos Aires contributed to a regional economic growth by bringing indigenous and creole migrants to these regions, thereby expanding their production, trade networks and exchanges.

In the political sphere, the fragmentation of the Spanish empire left multiple local state governments under conflict. Argentine provincial governments increased their political autonomy and tried to form supra-local polities alternatively in federalist confederacies and centralized republics. But creole political factions found it extremely difficult to balance local autonomy with a centralized power. Between 1829 and 1852, Rosas achieved some stability by building a federalist confederacy governed from Buenos Aires. But his rule turned into an authoritarian one and found resistance from the unitarios as well as from interior federalists. Next, President Urquiza (1854-1860) gained support from most provinces, but had to deal with the Buenos Aires secession. In the case of cacicatos, their segmental character and kinship politics helped them better adapt to the context, overcoming decades of intra-ethnic warfare (1770-1830). By mid-century, they built polities that successfully balanced allies’ autonomy with their subordination to a confederate leader. Cacique Calfucurá centralized alliances in Salinas Grandes and found political stability during the 1840s. In northern Patagonia, Caciques
Llanquirúz, Chingoleo and Saygüeque created a confederacy among cacicatos in the region that found stability in the late 1850s.

As I developed in the successive chapters, both indigenous and creole centralizing political projects strengthened through inter-ethnic alliances and logic. After centuries of contact between the Spanish and the indigenous people in the region, independent cacicatos imposed a diplomacy based on building reciprocal relationships, under the logic of kinship politics, to enforce obligations among allies. These obligations included a variety of material and symbolic exchanges, such as gift-giving, allowing free trade and people’s mobility throughout their territories, political intermediation and military assistance. Spanish and later creole governments formalized these obligations under verbal and written treaties with caciques, pacts that indicated the delivery of specific amounts and types of raciones for cacicatos as well as trading, territorial and military agreements. Both cacicatos and creole governments tried to manipulate these agreements to their advantage. During mid-19th century, indigenous confederacies’ increasing power and Creoles’ vulnerability under civil conflicts pushed the provincial and republican governments to become tributaries to the cacicatos under these agreements. They also had to respect their territories and play within these inter-ethnic rules.

As I developed in chapter three, during the 1850s, the creole center of political power was divided between President Urquiza in Entre Ríos and authorities in Buenos Aires. Cacique Calfucurá took advantage of this context and sustained a double diplomacy that brought more tribute and prestige to his allies and followers. He also stopped Córdoba and Buenos Aires governments’ attempts to invade cacicato lands. President Urquiza soon understood that political success rested on building inter-ethnic alliances with powerful cacicatos. Like his predecessor
Rosas, Urquiza became the Pampas Confederacy’s tributary. In exchange, the indigenous confederacy organized several *malones* against Buenos Aires’s frontier region, weakening the provinces’ military and economic power. However, I have shown that these *malones* were not only the product of the alliance with Urquiza, but also of the Pampas Confederacy’s interest in protecting its allies and subjugating Creoles at Buenos Aires under its web of reciprocal obligations. Buenos Aires’s government had decreased the amount of *raciones* provided to cacicatos since Rosas’ times, and had invaded Cacique Catriel’s lands. In a nutshell, the Pampas Confederacy’s diplomatic objectives strongly shaped Creole’s civil conflicts. Calfucurá did not want to destroy Buenos Aires, but to subjugate all creole provinces to tributary positions as well as to protect his allies’ territories and business. Catriel’s prosperity and all confederate allies’ access to Atlantic trade depended on establishing peace and trade with Creoles at Buenos Aires.

The Pampas Confederacy’s policies and actions ended up shaping the resolution of Creoles’ civil conflicts and continued to enforce inter-ethnic alliances as the basis for political success. After losing the battle of Cepeda in 1859, Buenos Aires ended up negotiating peace with most cacicatos. This guaranteed their neutrality during the battle of Pavón in 1861. Calfucurá maintained negotiations with both political factions to protect his allies and gain more *raciones* through his double diplomacy. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy emerged during this decade, and so did its alliance with Creoles at Carmen de Patagones, whom were under Buenos Aires’s government. This confederacy also forced the government of Buenos Aires to provide them with *raciones*.

As I developed in chapters six and seven, after the battle of Pavón, Mitre became president of the new Argentine Republic. His government and the following national
administrations had to maintain and expand reciprocal obligations with cacicatos until mid-1870s. Treaties formalized these reciprocal agreements, and malones kept being used by cacicatos as punishment tools.

Chapter six showed that, in this inter-ethnic system, resistance also came in the form of inter-ethnic alliances. During the 1860s, the federalist resistance to porteños’ control of the national government and to the increasing economic relegation of the northern and Cuyo regions from the new patterns in trade, intertwined with internal conflicts in cacicato lands. The increasing displacement of trade in cattle products to regional markets in Chile as well as the Pampas Confederacy’s monopolization of trade-networks towards the Atlantic limited many Pehuenches and Ranqueles economic prosperity. Unlike most of the historiography on the federalist montoneras, I showed that inter-ethnic alliances defined the conflicts, mobilizations and outcomes in southern Cuyo. The series of montoneras and malones challenged indigenous and creole authorities, forced political change and provided resources and prestige to some gauchos and indios gauchos. Although the federalists were defeated in 1874, porteños could not hold the national government and a coalition of provincial elites ended up defining the presidential elections after Mitre’s presidency. Buenos Aires province also ended up losing their control over the customs revenues when its main city became the capital of the nation in 1880. In the case of cacicatos, the indios gauchos did not replace the main caciques nor created a strong polity, but they forced the Ranquel Caciques and Calfucurá to respect their local autonomy, strengthen consensus politics as the base for decision-making, redistribute raciones and tolerate some malones and malocas.
On the down side, these inter-ethnic mobilizations and resistance could not change the structural economic transformations that were diminishing northern Argentina, Cuyo as well as Pehuenche and Ranquel economies. Moreover, these conflicts left many people un-protected under an increasing economic vulnerability. The frontier regions south of Mendoza, San Luis and Córdoba provinces became extremely violent and impoverished. Indigenous people in the most vulnerable positions ended up choosing between moving under more autonomous cacicatos, such as the indios amigos did in southern Mendoza, or moving to creole frontier towns, such as some Ranqueles did by joining the Franciscan missions in southern Córdoba and San Luis. In addition, this context fueled a growing perception among creole elites that all gauchos and Indians were un-ruled savages whom obstructed the nation’s “progress” and “civilization.”

On the west of the Andes, the relegation of trade in cattle to regional markets, the continuity of intra-ethnic conflicts, and the Chilean centralist and conservative governments challenged the system ruled by inter-ethnic alliances by mid-century. Cacicatos managed to resist Chilean military invasions into their lands during the 1860s by fighting under military alliances, searching for allies and resources in the Pampas, and negotiating with Chilean authorities. Nevertheless, their independence and territory was seriously threatened by the end of the decade.

As I argued throughout this dissertation, the indigenous confederacies in the Pampas and northern Patagonia were not seriously challenged until mid-1870s. It was only at that time, that Argentine authorities and elites considered that it was viable to defeat one of their major regional competitors and allies and, with them, the ruling inter-ethnic system. Wide spreading new
ideological paradigms, such as Nationalism and Social Darwinism proposed a world incompatible with inter-ethnic alliances and economic diversity. Creoles also gained increasing technological, economic and military advantages over cacicatos and monopolized access to Atlantic commerce, which was now prioritizing the export of wool to the industrial powers. Inspired by the Chilean military campaigns against cacicatos during the 1860s, and by similar experiences in the United States and Africa, the Argentine government planned to execute Law 215 and therefore “conquer the desert.” While the Argentine army defeated nomadic pastoralist confederacies, politicians, journalists and intellectuals made their history disappear. They created the desert. However, surviving indigenous communities and contemporary historians continue to “fill the desert,” and reveal how the Pampas and northern Patagonia are still shaped by the legacy of this multi-ethnic world.

Finally, it is hoped that this dissertation has also contributed to historians’ debates and analysis on indigenous polities and economies. I have emphasized the importance of looking at kinship politics and nomadic pastoralist dynamics to understand cacicatos’ internal structures and policies, and to build future comparative studies. In chapters one, two and four, I have shown that supra-cacicato polities provided political stability and economic prosperity to its allies and followers by centralizing alliances and increasing internal hierarchies within the logic of kinship politics. By extending kinship ties among allies, confederate leaders turned reciprocal relationships into different levels of dependency. Caciques’ monopoly over the access to trade networks, territories and negotiations with Creoles shaped the allies level of dependency. The indigenous confederacies’ trans-regional character was one of their key factors in overcoming ups and downs in the regional, Atlantic and Pacific markets. It also assured permanent military
allies and political prestige to head inter-ethnic alliances; shaping the political, economic and social development of these southern regions.

I also show throughout the dissertation that these indigenous confederacies developed different power strategies under particular geographic, economic and political contexts as well as leaders’ political projects. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy developed major levels of internal subordination to the confederate leaders, and maintained peace and trade with Creoles at Carmen de Patagones. Instead, the Pampas Confederacy strengthened consensus politics as the base for decision-making and allies’ political independence to avoid fragmentation during the 1860s. It also alternated peace negotiations and trade with creole governments with malones as punishment tools and as activities that allowed the confederacy to absorb internal competition. This difference relied on the fact that northern Patagonia was more arid and less populated than the Pampas as well as distanced from sedentary dynamic economic centers linked with the Atlantic and Pacific trade networks. It was also particularly marginal to the Creoles’ civil conflicts, which resulted in many indigenous people in the Cuyo region being armed and becoming violent during the 1860s. These circumstances influenced allies’ escalating dependency on the northern Patagonian confederate leaderships as well as the permanent peace and economic stability generated by this Confederacy.

As I described in the last chapter, these different developments ended up shaping the indigenous confederacies response to Creoles’ invasions during the 1870s. Both confederacies insisted on resolving conflicts with the Argentine national government by re-negotiating the terms of their agreements. By the mid-1870s, the Pampas Confederacy had resisted Creoles’ coercive polices with malones and diplomatic negotiations. Nonetheless, national authorities’
decision to invade cacicatos’ lands became unnegotiable by 1876. The increasing economic weakness of the Ranqueles and the internal political crises among the Catrileros seriously challenged the Pampas Confederacy’s ability to confront the Argentine Military. Although most of the main caciques and subalterns fought for their independence and survival, they were defeated by a series of military expeditions organized between 1879 and 1880. Instead, Cacique Saygüeque refused to take up arms with Namuncurá (Calfucurá’s successor) until the very end. He seemed to have confidence in that, his policy of peace and trade with Creoles, would give no excuses to the national government to invade his land. He then proposed to the national government to maintain peace by integrating his Indigenous Governorship of Manzanas into the Argentine nation. Although his project aimed at conserving an important level of political and economic autonomy, it showed a creative response to adapt to the changing context. Nevertheless, the Argentine government refused to continue living under a system ruled by inter-ethnic relationships and alliances. It created a fictional creole governorship of Patagonia and stopped providing raciones to Saygüeque and his allies. The Northern Patagonian Confederacy fought against the Argentine military invasion until 1883. Saygüeque’s defeat did not only mark the end of indigenous autonomy in the region, it diminished a system based on inter-ethnic relationships. Indians were persecuted, imprisoned in camps and became a synonym of poverty and backwardness. Next, the national government applied the same military and ideological strategy with the autonomous indigenous societies of the Great Chaco.

However, indigenous people kept on adapting to these contexts in their new subaltern position and, in time, gained some rights and lands on both sides of the Andes. These southern lands did not become suddenly ruled by an Argentine nation-state and a capitalist economy. This
dissertation has shown that cacicatos’ impact on Creole society transcended their political independence. My micro-level analysis on Carmen de Patagones in chapter four revealed that Creoles incorporated indigenous customs and practices since their early contacts. Political, economic and social developments in the regions that cacicatos used to rule and frontiers continued to be shaped by indigenous and nomadic norms and practices. Moreover, as Susana Bandieri revealed, Creoles and indigenous people kept the trans-regional trade networks that linked the Araucanía with the Pampas and northern Patagonia active until at least the mid-20th century. Therefore, incorporating indigenous societies into main stream narratives of the Americas not only helps understanding the inter-ethnic system that ruled up to the end of the 19th century, but also the development of contemporary societies in the continent.
GLOSSARY

Araucaria/Pehuen: An autochthonous conifer from the area of Neuquén and Chile. The seeds contained in the piñones (pine cones) are rich in proteins and were an important part of the local diet.

Ayllarewes: Mapudungun word for a group of rewes. See definition of rewe and lof.

Boleadora: Hunting tool consisting of three rocks tied to three ropes used to hunt as well as warfare.

Boleada: Hunting with boleadoras.

Butalmapu: Mapudungun word for the provincial units of the Araucanía.

Cabildo: Town council.

Cacicato: Also known as cacicazgo. Familial clans or lineages led by caciques. Unlike the cacicazgos that we find in Mexico and the Andes, cacicatos in these southern lands had a segmental organization.

Cacique: Chief of a cacicato.

Caciquillo: A low-rank cacique. It was also used to designate young caciques.

Capitanejo: Also known as captains. High-rank warrior men. Their rank was based on their skills and kinship ties.

Caudillo: Local creole large landowner and territorial leader.

Chañar: Bean tree.

Chezcui: Mapudungun word for father in law.

China: Spaniards designation of indigenous women, later also used to designate women of rural origin regardless of their ethnicity.

Chiripá: A type of loose trouser.

Compadrazgo: A fictive kinship relationship between two people, usually adults and children, which usually involves a common commitment of protection and caregiving.

Cuchillero: Skilled with the cuchillo (knife).

Derecho de talaje: tolling right charged by Pehuenche caciques to Indians and Creoles for passing across their trails or using their lands.

Estancia: Large rural land holding.

Fanega: Spanish bushel. Old Spanish measure for volume used for grains. In Castile, equivalent to 55.5 liters, but in Aragon, 22.4 liters.

Ganado alzado: runaway cattle.

Ganado cimarrón: wild cattle.

Gaucho: Creole rural worker and soldier.

Gualicho: Mapudungun word for evil spirit.

Guapo: brave.

Indios Amigos: Indian groups that lived next to frontier posts and were more integrated than independent cacicatos with the creole population. The term was first applied to the Indians from displaced tribes whom allied with the Rosas government as a form of protection from other cacicatos.

Juez de Paz: Justice of the Peace.

Lanzas: Literally translates as “spears,” but it refers to Indian warriors under cacicatos.
Litoral: the eastern area of present day Argentina which lies between the Paraná and Uruguay rivers.
Lof: Mapudungun word for lineage.
Lonko: Mapudungun word for head, chief of tribe or cacique.
Malal: Mapudungun word for a corral or a natural refuge.
Maloca: Small scale Indian attacks on frontier settlers performed by a small group of warriors, headed many times by capitanejos, low-rank caciques or creole popular leaders.
Malón: Larger scale Indian attack against frontier settlements. These attacks were preceded by parliaments, involved more than one cacique and hundreds of warriors, and usually targeted multiple frontier estancias and posts.
Mamil Mapu: A region between the Río Desaguadero and Salinas Grandes. Its Mapudungun name could be translated as “The country of the woods.”
Mestizaje: Process of cultural, ethnic, political or economic hybridization.
Montonera: Federalist attacks and sieges of creole towns and cities.
Parla/junta: conversations between caciques and capitanejos before big parliaments.
Parlamento: Big political meetings of caciques organized to resolve conflicts, negotiate and make arrangements. They usually lasted several days and had formal protocols.
Piñones: Pine cone from the Pehuen/Araucaria. Their seeds are rich in proteins and were an important part of the local diet.
Porteño: Relative to puerto (port). Name given to the people living at the City of Buenos Aires.
Pueblo: town.
Pulperia: Rural commercial house.
Quillango: small animal’s hide.
Quintal: Old Spanish measure of weight equivalent to 46 kilograms. Today, the metric “quintal” is equivalent to 100 kilograms.
Raciones: Rations. Goods, animals and salaries provided by creole governments to cacicatos on a periodic base in exchange for their peace and alliance.
Reducción: Aggrupation and settlement of Indians in a specific location under the authority of Spanish or Creole authorities.
Rewes: group of lofs in Mapudungun.
Ruca/ Ruka: Mapudungun speakers’ round big house made of coligue (cane), wood and totora (reeds).
Tasajo: dried or salted beef.
Tautulun: Mapudungun word for revenge, vendetta. Indian attacks for specific offenses that aimed at gaining compensation and were performed by the victim’s relatives.
Toqui: Mapudungun word for war leader.
Toldo: Family home or tent usually built with branches and animal hides.
Toldería: a group of toldos usually grouping several families and led by a cacique.
Ulmen: A Mapudungun word for leader, who based his leadership on his military bravery as well as his access to wealth in the form of horses, cattle, manufactures and captives. These leaders generally defied traditional political rules.
Unitarios: People who followed the Unitario Party in Argentina. This party was identified as liberal and fought to obtain a centralized form of government among the Argentine provinces.
**Vaqueano**: scout, knowledgeable about the trails and lay of the land.
**Yerba mate**: autochthonous tea from the Guarani and Chaco regions.
**Weichan**: Mapundung word for open warfare.
APPENDICES

Appendix A. Cacique Llanquitrúz’s List of Allies

Page 1.
Figure 7. Cacique Llanquitrúz’s List of Allies sent to Commander Villar, June 6th, 1856. Source: “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, Potrero Chico, June 6th, 1856 (II),” AGN X, 19.4.56.
Figure 8. Cacique Llanquitrúz’s Second List of Allies sent to Commander Villar, June 12th, 1856. Source: “José María Bulnes Llanquitrúz to Commander Benito Villar, Cabeza de Buey, June 12th, 1856,” in AGN X, 19.4.5.
Appendix B. Land Ownership in the Rio Negro

Figure 9. Díaz y Heusser’s Survey on Land Ownership in the Río Negro, 1865. Source: “Plano de los territorios poblados hasta 1865 en el valle inferior del Río Negro basado en las mesuras realizadas por los agrimensores Díaz y Heusser” in H.D. Rey, et. al., Historia del Valle inferior del Río Negro: El nuevo distrito federal (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra), p.91.
Appendix C. Raciones for Cacicatos

Table 3. Approximation of the Argentine National Budgets and Expenditures on Raciones for Cacicatos, by Silvia Ratto.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Año</th>
<th>Presupuestado</th>
<th>Efectivamente invertido</th>
<th>Porcentaje gastado de lo presupuestado</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>138.320</td>
<td>123.272</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866</td>
<td>162.524</td>
<td>89.112</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>169.182</td>
<td>106.549</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>230.157</td>
<td>131.878</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>212.906</td>
<td>144.453</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>216.023</td>
<td>167.518</td>
<td>77.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>216.828</td>
<td>189.905</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>223.580</td>
<td>202.589</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>223.556</td>
<td>206.689</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>223.556</td>
<td>222.032</td>
<td>99.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>223.556</td>
<td>223.109</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876</td>
<td>223.556</td>
<td>206.544</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1877</td>
<td>145.800</td>
<td>145.800</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>140.400</td>
<td>137.043</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>146.400</td>
<td>126.352</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>96.000</td>
<td>20.466</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix D. Alarms, *Malones* and *Malocas* over Frontier Towns

Table 4. Approximation of the Alarms and *Malones* and *Malocas* against Frontier Towns, 1850-1878.*

*This numbers are an approximation based on the documentation I consulted in provincial and national archives. It does not indicate the exact number of attacks.*

Table 5. Provinces Warned and Attacked, 1850-1878.

Source: AGN, AM, SHE, AHPM, AHSL, AHPC.
Appendix E. Caciques of the Pampas and Patagonia

Figure 10. Valentín Saygüeque, Buenos Aires, 1885. Source: AGN., in Jorge Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, Siglo XIX (Santiago de Chile: CoLibris & Ocho Libros, 2008), figure V.
Figure 11. Manuel Namuncurá, Buenos Aires, circa 1884. Source: AGN., in Jorge Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, Siglo XIX (Santiago de Chile: CoLibris & Ocho Libros, 2008), figure VI.
Figure 12. Manuel Namuncurá’s Family, Buenos Aires, circa 1884. Description: first row: his son Juan Quintanas. Second row: Manuel Namuncurá (sitting); his wife Rosario Burgos, his sister Kanayllankatukura, Ignacia, un-known boy. Last row: his brother Vicente Millakura, his nephew Juan José Lefikura, his brother Kurünmañekekura; his interpreter Regino Islas.
Source: AGN., in Jorge Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, Siglo XIX (Santiago de Chile: CoLibris & Ocho Libros, 2008), figure IX.
Figure 13. Juan Manuel Katrüel (Catriel), no date. Source: AGN., in Jorge Pávez Ojeda, ed., *Cartas Mapuche, Siglo XIX* (Santiago de Chile: CoLibris & Ocho Libros, 2008), figure III.
Figure 14. Antonio Modesto Inacayal, Cuarteles del Tigre, Buenos Aires, circa 1885.
Source: Jorge Pávez Ojeda, ed., Cartas Mapuche, Siglo XIX (Santiago de Chile: CoLibris & Ocho Libros, 2008), figure XVI.
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