A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS FACTIONS OF THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITATIVE GOVERNMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON A FUTURE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL

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By

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ABSTRACT

Although the PLO is the official government recognized by the international community to represent the Palestinian people, the political factions within the PLO differ deeply in ideology, philosophy and religiosity. This thesis will explore the history of the PLO and the various factions that make up the Palestinian National Authority Government (PNA). It will also explore each faction’s ideas and philosophy in relation to how they view Israel and the Zionist movement and how they relate or contrast to one another. This will include analyzing the religious composition of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, including the dwindling numbers of the Christian communities and what role they play in the Palestinian political governments. By using the Philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer i.e. Hermeneutics, the thesis will also pose the question: ‘How will these political and religious cleavages within the Palestinian government have an effect on the outcome of a future agreement while establishing a common ‘horizon’ with Israel?’ And, ‘Will a resolution, such as a three-state solution; with Gaza and the West Bank as separate sovereign states, help solve these cleavages by mediation and dialogue for the sake of the Palestinian people?’

The core of this thesis will explore the human rights to life and sovereignty as well as territorial integrity. This includes religious freedom, political and economic
equality and the historical legitimacy of accepting the rights to maintain the ancestral land. When shaped by religious convictions and identities, these humanistic values are correlated with the human conditions of society and ethnicity through law and politics. These factors can help determine what it means to be a Palestinian. My thesis will explore how these issues, regarding the PLO (PA), the PNA Government, and Hamas (the “black sheep” of the political parties), play against the larger picture of humanistic values.
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a qualitative analysis, which will draw from various primary and secondary sources of literature, articles and books. First, it will give a brief historical overview of Palestine; beginning with Palestine under the Ottoman Empire, then under the British Mandate (which will include the establishment of the Muslim-Christian Association), the Arab revolt and finally, the establishment of Israel and the conflicts that have ensued since then, which includes the 1948 War and the 1st and 2nd Intifadas.

Second, the thesis will also explore the background of Palestine’s political history, which will include a background history on the establishment of the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization), its bifurcation and the establishment of the PNA (Palestine National Authoritative) Government as well as the various factions that encompass the National Authority of the government. Although there are over 20, factions that currently exist. However, this thesis will only explore three of the largest parties and two minor sub-parties present in the PNA Government. The PFLP (The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and its sub-factions: the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the PFLP-GC (-General Command), the PLF (Palestinian Liberation Front), the PLM (Palestinian Liberation Movement) a.k.a Fatah and the IRM (Islamic Resistance Movement) a.k.a Hamas and Fatah’s arch opponent.

Third, this thesis will use the frameworks of the socio-psychological theory of the Protracted Social Conflict, also known as the Intractable Conflict, developed by Edward Azar. Since the Intractable Conflict Theory emanates from the socio-psychological perspective (as Edward Azar implied) this thesis will take an alternative approach, as it will draw from the context of a socio-political perspective. The foundations of the thesis
will also draw upon the socio-political theory of Cross-Cutting Cleavages by theorists Lipset & Rokkan concerning political and religious divisions. These theories will be used to explore the political and religious factions that divide the Palestinian National Authoritative Government. This will be a part of the central complexity of the Intractable Conflict Theory.

To conclude, this thesis will summarize and ask the following: specifically, where does this lead the de facto State of Palestine? Will these factions help the Palestinian state cause or hurt it? Can Hans Gadamer’s concepts of Hermeneutics help unify the PNG in attempts to have a successful, meaningful dialogue with Israel and ensure that their people (the People of Palestine, can live in sovereignty? Can the human nature aspect of hermeneutics (the meta-cultural perspective of hermeneutics in which intercultural dialogue is used to help people with differing cultures understand each other such as pain, hunger, suffering, etc.)\(^1\) help cultivate an understanding between factions even when their current ideologies seem irreconcilable? Is the breakdown of cooperation within the PNG the cause of negative prejudices (such as pre-judgements on false or negative judgements; misunderstandings) blocking the success of allowing a positive prejudice (pre-judgement that lead to understandings) to take place, thus enabling the promotion of a common horizon (fusion of horizon) to be established? How far will these negative prejudices go in allowing past judgments to determine the relationship between these political factions while not cultivating a legitimate understanding among them and therefore, coming up with a solution to bring the PNG closer together?

These questions will be broken down into three main issues: Issue #1: Whether the PNAG is feasible to be a sufficient entity, Issue #2: Whether Gaza could function as a third state in a three-state solution and Issue #3: A Commentary on Israel and how its past and present factors may affect future agreements with Palestine. Once this thesis establishes a thoughtful consideration of such issues through literary sources, this thesis will have a comprehensive analysis of how these political and religious identity developments shape and affect the political viewpoints and ideologies of the Palestinian conflict.
PART I

OVERVIEW OF PALESTINE
CHAPTER 1
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PALESTINE

Historic Geography & Terminology

Palestine is located in the eastern Mediterranean region of Western Asia between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Once known as Canaan in the ancient world, Palestine was home to the Canaanites (also known as Phoenicians by the Ancient Greeks) as well as the early Israelites in the second millennium BCE.¹ Later, the region was then called Judea; most of the Israelites occupied the hill-country side where the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah once lay. The hill-country side is a region in the Levant located within the Judean hills and a route that led to several cities such as Gezer. Most of the Israelites’ territory in ca. 900-600 BCE, spanned north and south of the region between the rival empires of Egypt and Assyria.² Furthermore, the Israelites’ hostile neighbors in a biblical sense (as this notion is debatable amongst scholars), the Philistines, also occupied a very small part of the region.

The word “Palestine” derives from the Greek word Philistia, which means ‘the Land of the Philistines.’³ The Romans later re-coined the word in the 2nd century CE as Syria Palaestina, named after the Judeans’ neighboring “adversaries” by Roman Emperor

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² Ibid.

³ Ibid.
Hadrian in the attempt to suppress Jewish nationalism during Roman rule. The term Palestine also made its way into Arabic terminology as Filasṭīn during the Islamic conquest in the 7th century CE. After World War I, the term Palestine was used differently after the Ottoman Empire’s rule where Great Britain then adopted the term as referring to the mandated territories of the West Bank, modern-day Israel and the territory east of the Jordan River (now known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan). Today, it is the name of the de facto state, which encompasses the West Bank between pre-1987 Israel and Jordan and the Gaza Strip, between Egypt and Israel. The issue of both the Israelis and the Palestinians refusing to acknowledge the other’s existence will be understood when this thesis delves further into the region’s complicated history that unequivocally intertwines both states.

Ancient 12th Century BCE Palestine to the Arab Conquest of the 7th Century CE

Dating back to ancient times, approximately 1194 BCE, the Philistines also known as the Sea Peoples according to Egyptian texts, were possibly from the island of Crete in the Aegean area, see Map 1.1, arrived on the southern coast of the Mediterranean region known as Canaan after Ramses II repulsed their invasion in Egypt. However, due to the complexity of their history, there are two main interpretations of the nature of the Philistine’s origins. The first interpretation is called the ‘maximalist’ interpretation which argues that Ramses III fought a coalition of Sea Peoples (Philistines, 

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

Sherden, Tjeker, Skekelesh, Denyen, Tresh and Weshesh) in both sea and land battles, defeated them and forced (or allowed) them to settle in the Palestinian coastal plain, around 1175 BCE.⁷

The second interpretation called the ‘minimalist’ interpretation argues that the nature of Pharaonic inscriptions needs to be taken into account. This means that either Ramses III would have perpetuated these claims as propaganda, created from a long literary tradition or a compilation building up a minor episode into an earth-shaking threat to Egypt from which divine Pharaoh delivered “her,” as was his [the Pharaoh’s] duty and function.⁸

Then by 1185 BCE, the Philistines permanently established settlements along the coast of Philistia (hence, their name).⁹ According to the Biblical narratives of the Hebrew Bible, the Philistines were a difficult adversary for the Israelites, and they would engage in countless wars with their kingdom. The Philistines suffered their first defeat by the Israelites under King David (c.1010-970 B.C.) of the tribe Judah. However, their defeat did not waver the tenacity of the Philistines as they still thrived and prospered along the coast while continuing to harass their neighbors.¹⁰

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⁷ Lester L. Grabbe, Ancient Israel: What Do We Know and How Do we Know It? (London-New York, T&T Clark, 2007), 89.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

After the death King Solomon (c. 970-930 B.C.) and the decline of the kingdom, the Israelites experienced a schism within the kingdom forging two separate monarchies from the original state. The people of the northern tribes broke away and established the new kingdom of Israel, which centered in Samaria (see Map 1.2). The strained relationship between the two kingdoms ultimately weakened Israel (the southern part of which was now called Judea or Judah) defenses against their rivaled enemies. However, the two kingdoms were able to survive for 200 years but their kingdoms eventually perished, and Northern Israel fell to the Neo-Assyrian Empire in 721 BCE.\textsuperscript{11} The Assyrians overwhelmed the region and the Philistines lost their autonomy as well and were completely subdued. In 604 BCE, the Philistines’ reign in Palestine ended when the

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
Assyrians assaulted the remaining cities and towns along with its culture.\textsuperscript{12} As a result, the Assyrians sold the remaining inhabitants into slavery and claimed the land as part of the Neo-Assyrian Empire.

\textbf{Map 1.2} Kingdom of Israel and Judah, Google Images, accessed Oct. 6, 2016

However, by 612 BCE, a coalition of Babylonians, Persians, Medes and Scythians (ancient Iranian peoples and nomads) ransacked and pillaged the capital city of Nineveh (Iraq) of the Neo-Assyrian Empire.\textsuperscript{13} The Babylonian Empire took over the Judean Kingdom and forced its inhabitants under the rule of Nebuchadnezzar, while

\begin{enumerate}
\item[12] Ibid.
\item[13] Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
Jerusalem was decimated, the Temple destroyed and the Judean people were taken into “captivity” to Babylon around 586 BCE. Following the Babylonian captivity, in 539 B.C. Cyrus the Great of the Persian Empire conquered Babylon and released the Judean exiles back to Judea as they rebuilt their Temple under the supervision of Judean leaders Nehemiah and Ezra (ca. 480–440 BCE). Both leaders were able to establish the religious autonomy of Judah so firmly that this continued with little change for several centuries (roughly three or four hundred years). Information regarding this time is scarce. The only other fact about the region was that the Persian Empire governed Judah and Samaria as provinces.

Judea was then liberated by Alexander the Great of Macedonia (21 July 356 BCE – 10 or 11 June 323 BCE), and then it became a Roman Province. By 63 BCE, Pompey (September 29, 106 BCE - 48 BCE) stormed Jerusalem during the Third Mithridatic War, and the area was never independent again, until the 20th century. After Constantine I converted to Christianity, Judea (now called Palestine) became a Christian province under the Eastern Empire of Rome, later known as the Byzantine Empire, from 63 BCE-638 CE.¹⁴

Palestine remained under Roman and Byzantine rule until the 7th century. When the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula conquered the region they were inspired by their Islamic faith, which was then, the third faith born in a Semitic country (today, it is the

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second largest faith behind Christianity, according to Pew Research). The Arabs are a Semitic people, ethnically and linguistically related to the tribes that included the Canaanites and the Hebrews. The term “Arab” first occurs in the Assyrian texts of the eighth century BCE, referring to camel herders of the desert. From 630-730 CE, the Arabs invaded and occupied Syria, Iraq, Persia, Egypt, the entire North African coast and lastly Spain. By 730 CE, Islamic territory expanded from the Pyrenees into southwestern Europe and beyond the Oxus River in Central Asia to the Indus River Basin in India. The expansion began with the first Caliph Abū Bakr (ca. 573-634 CE) and soon after, his successor the second Caliph ʿUmar I (ca. 581-644 CE). Followed by the Umayyad caliphate, under Muawiya (r. 661-680 CE) and its successors, the Abbasid caliphate, under Abu al-Abbas as-Saffah (749-54 CE) and his successors and later the Fatimid caliphate, Abu Muhammad (r. 909-934 CE) along with his successors until the fall in 1171 CE.

On August 20, 636 CE, the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (r. 610-641 CE) dispatched an army against the Arab Muslims led by one of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions Khālid ibn al-Walīd (585 –642 CE). The Byzantine army was defeated and almost annihilated as they retreated. Jerusalem and Caesarea (a town located midway

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17 Smith, Palestine in the Nineteenth Century, 5.

between Tel-Aviv and Haifa) were the only cities that were able to withstand the assault, until 638 when Jerusalem surrendered and Caesarea in October 640. Therefore, Palestine and all of Syria came under Muslim rule.

By this time, the entire Mediterranean seaboard, with much of its internal bent from the Pyrenees in the west to the Taurus in the east, fell and for three centuries remained under Arab rule. This event marked the golden age of the Arabs as they took the lead in civilization. They were also the pioneers of the sciences and arts as Medieval Europeans, who were still in the Dark Ages, attended Muslim universities. It was through Arabic translations that brought forward the classics of the Hellenic period, which eventually inspired the Renaissance Age of the 14th century.

In the larger scheme of things, the inhabitants of Palestine had only a minor role at this time. It was not until the Crusades (1097-1291) where European Christians sought to overthrow the region’s Islamic overlords, although the region of Palestine itself was also important to Islam. Along with Christianity and Judaism, Islam views Jerusalem is one of the holiest cities of the Islamic faith. Jerusalem was the first qiblah, or direction, where Muslims face during Salat, (prayers) before the Prophet Muhammad chose Mecca instead, and the third holiest city of Islam after Mecca and Medina. Jerusalem’s significance is predicated on the importance of the Temple Mount or as Muslims call it, the Haram esh Sharīf (“The Noble Sanctuary”). This is where ‘Umar and his fellow Arab conquerors established the Al-Aqṣā Mosque. Later, during the Umayyad Dynasty, the

19 United Kingdom, Palestine: Royal Commission, Report, Earl Peel (Chapter 1: The Historical Background: The Arabs in Palestine), 5.

20 Ibid.
Umayyad Caliph Abd al-Malik erected the *Dome of the Rock* (ca. 685-91) on the site of the Temple of Solomon (a holy site for the Jews). For Islam, this area is the place where Muhammad made his ascension into heaven on his Night Journey where he conversed with past prophets and toured the seven stages of heaven on the back of his noble steed in one night according to the Islamic *Hadiths* (Narratives of Muhammad).

Throughout the Islamic Era, the Arabs went through several phases of their Empire. From the *Rashidun* or the ‘Four Rightly Guided Caliphs’ (632-661 CE) to the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750 CE), from the Abbasid Dynasty (750-1258 CE) to the Fatimid Dynasty (996-1171 CE), the Arabs reigned in Palestine and most of the Near East and North African regions for nearly four hundred years. Over time, however, the Islamic stronghold began to weaken and disintegrate. Soon, outside forces conquered the Arabs in Palestine—like the Judeans and Byzantine Christians before them. By the 11th century, the Muslim Arabs engaged in warfare with Christian Western Europe during the First Crusades. At the same time, the Seljuq Turks pursued the region and established the Seljuq Empire in 1037-1194 CE. In 1250-1516/17 CE, the Mamluk Dynasty, followed by the establishment of Ottoman Empire in 1516-1918 CE, conquered the region.

**Palestine under the Ottoman Empire 1516-1918**

In the twelfth century, the Turkmen Oghuz nomads from Central Asia occupied Eastern and Central Anatolia. By 1300, Osman (the founder of the dynasty) ruled an area
stretching from Eskisehir to the plains of Iznik. His successor Orhan captured Uskurdar in 1338 and brought the growing empire to the doorsteps of Constantinople. From then on, the Ottomans entered a long phase of territorial expansion making the beginning of the Ottoman Empire as it retained its dominance for more than seven centuries.

In 1453 CE, the Ottoman Turks conquered Constantinople, ending the Byzantine Empire—Ottoman expansion continued into Europe and elsewhere in the 15th and 16th centuries. In 1516, the Ottomans invaded Palestine, which remained under Ottoman rule until 1918. Until the 16th century, Ottoman Palestine experienced prosperity through transnational trade and commerce. However, economic substantiality declined in the 17th century when Palestine experienced political instability.

During the 18th century, Palestine was under the indirect rule of the Ottoman Empire, and the Ottomans divided Palestine into districts called sanjaks. Sanjaks were administrative divisions of the Ottoman Empire and subsets of vilayets or provinces. In Palestine, sanjaks consisted of Gaza, Jerusalem, Nablus, Lajun, and Safad. These sanjaks also incorporated into the Greater Syria province and governed indirectly from Damascus since the 7th century. The Ottomans primarily relied on the leaders of Arab clans to govern locally. During the late 17th and 18th centuries, there was a number of

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23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


26 Smith, Palestine in the Nineteenth Century, 19.
prominent families that became tax collectors as well as “guardians of charitable endowments.” Among the prominent families were the Khalidis, Nusaybas, Alamis, Husaynis and the Nashashibis. In some places, one or two families would have political authority over the same area and in others, such as Nablus, there were eight or nine families vying for power.

Furthermore, in the countryside, villages were under coalitions run by various clan loyalties. Jerusalem however, had a different system in which notables did not have authority over land or taxes during this time. Instead, Jerusalem’s authority lay within the religious offices where the Ottoman Muslim hierarchy appointed government officials among Palestinian towns. In the mid-18th century, an autonomous Arab Sunni Muslim ruler named Dahir al-‘Umar a.k.a. Zahir al-‘Umar al-Zaydani (c. 1737-75), virtually dominated the political life of northern Palestine for nearly 40 years. Another ruler named Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (c. 1720-1804), a Bosnian by birth, was the Ottoman governor and ruler of Acre (1775-1804) (a city in the northern coastal plain region of Palestine; now the Northern District of Israel) after the Ottomans defeated Zahir. Both leaders ruled tightly over Palestine where growing trade with Europe and taxation among the citizens became prevalent. Also, there was a constant flow of revenue from pilgrims.

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27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

(mainly Christians) and additional taxes amongst the *dhimmīs*. With this revenue, these rulers were able to gain influence in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul which then gave them political autonomy locally and control of many areas outside Palestine (primarily further into Syria).

Ottoman sovereignty weakened through various treaties and, during the 16th century, the sultans of the Empire had granted several European states privileges that permitted their agents to trade within Ottoman lands under the protection of legal immunity. At first, negotiations among the European states posed no threat to the Ottoman authorities, until the 18th century when the balance of power shifted. The Treaty of Karlowitz (a.k.a. Peace of Karlowitz) in 1699 after the conclusion of the Austro-Ottoman War was the first treaty in which the Ottomans were forced to deal with Europeans as equals and conceded territory to them.

In 1740, the French and the Ottomans initiated a treaty where it granted France rights for Roman Catholics within the empire itself and the authority to represent their interests before the sultan. This included extending the influence of the French to allow the Maronite Christians of Lebanon to recognize the Pope and become a designated group within the Roman Catholic Church. Furthermore, in return, the Lebanese were able to maintain their language, customs and conduct their own mass. Thus, the treaty enabled

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33 Ibid., 13-14.
34 Ibid., 13.
French European power to grant protection among the *dhimmi* Christians within the Ottoman Empire, resulting in a special status among Christians at the expense of other minorities, while French priests also were able to acquire other privileges such as the right to build new churches in Palestine.\(^{35}\)

Equally significant was the treaty of Kachuk Kanarji of 1774, signed after the Russians had driven the Ottomans out of Crimea and gained access to the Black Sea.\(^{36}\) The treaty acknowledged Russian control of the north coast of the Black Sea and Russian rights of commercial navigation as well, but it also included clauses that affected other non-Muslim subjects of the Ottomans. Russian pilgrims gained greater access to Palestine, while Russian Orthodox clergy, like the French, gained possession of certain holy places in Palestine.\(^{37}\) Moreover, Russian pilgrims gained further access to Palestine, which would soon overlap the territories of the French clergy, resulting in an eventual clash between the two Christian sects.

Following the established treaties with the Ottoman Empire, clashes began between the Roman Catholic Church and the Russian Orthodox Church backed by their respective government sponsors, France and Russia. The clashes between the two Christian sects in Palestine became the catalyst for the Crimean War of 1853-1856, which caused a major Russian defeat at the hands of France and her ally Great Britain.\(^{38}\) Earlier,

\[\text{\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 14.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.}\]
the British had challenged the ambitions of the Ottomans’ governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, who, with French backing, took over Greater Syria, including Palestine, in 1831, threatening to overthrow the Ottoman Sultan.

In 1840, the British were successful, and Britain’s policy was described as what was called, “The Great Game in Asia” which was a contest against the Russians who posed a great threat to Britain due to expansion to the south that threatened the security of the frontiers of India. After the fall of Napoleon Bonaparte I, Britain’s success came from the establishment of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which reshaped the face of Europe; and encouraged by the British diplomats, the Ottomans made reforms of their own for the sake of European trade. These reforms include modernizing “government administration systems by attempting to emulate the European systems of civil and land laws, administration, education, and health services.” Though successful, the Ottomans went through a period of internal strife and uprisings in opposition to the reforms set by the British.

To fast forward, the Crimean War was primarily fought on the Crimean Peninsula between the Russians on the one hand, and the British, French and Ottoman Turks, together with the support of the Sardinia army (a.k.a. Piedmont-Sardinia, the historical Kingdom of Northwestern, Italy) in 1854-6. The war began due to Russian

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39 Ibid.

demands to the Ottoman Sultan of exercising the protection over Orthodox subjects.\textsuperscript{41} Within the larger Middle East, the dispute was between Russia and France over the privileges of The Russian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches in the holy places of Palestine, which paralleled this issue.\textsuperscript{42} Supported by the British, the Ottoman Turks firmly opposed the Russians, who occupied the Danubian principalities (modern Romania) on the Russo-Turkish border in 1853.\textsuperscript{43} The British fleet was ordered to Constantinople (Istanbul), and the Turks declared war on Russia and in the same month opened on the offensive against the Russians in the Danubian principalities. Unfortunately, for both sides, the Crimean War was managed and commanded very poorly. \textsuperscript{44}

Customary Muslim views of the world in which \textit{dhimmīs} remained in inferior positions befitting their status, began to shake.\textsuperscript{45} Ibrahim, the son of Muhammad Ali of Egypt, governed Syria, Palestine, and parts of Lebanon from 1831 to 1840. Faced with opposition from the area’s Muslim population, Ibrahim turned to \textit{dhimmīs}, usually Christians whom he placed in high administrative posts. As a part of these tactics, Ibrahim built intercommunal relations with Christian and Jews. He also granted them


\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} On a side note, the term \textit{dhimmi} refers to the people of the \textit{dhimma} or ‘the people of the book (or pact)’ which is a term for non-Muslim citizens that reside primarily in an Islamic State. The term literally means, “Protected Person.”
effective political and religious equality with Muslims while overturning the long maintained structure that withheld for centuries.  

After the conclusion of the Crimean War, Muslim animosity toward Ottoman Christians flared due to the Ottoman’s Hatti Humayoun (handwritten command), that proclaimed the equality of Ottoman dhimmīs with Muslims. This includes access to education, the administration of justice and freedom and openness of worship. As a result, explosive massacres and anti-Christian riots ensued in Aleppo (1850), Nablus (northern Palestine in 1856), and in Damascus (1860). The situation in Palestine remained relatively stable—more so than Syria and Lebanon—as did the Muslim attitudes toward Jews, until the appearance of Zionists, who claimed that Palestine was inherently Jewish and should revert to Jewish rule. The interrelationship of local sectarian rivalries and outside interference would take a new turn in Palestine once Arab Christians and Muslims joined in opposing European Jewish claims to the region.

Palestinians found opportunities to serve in the Ottoman Empire as Palestinian deputies sat in the Ottoman parliaments of 1877, 1908, 1912 and 1914. Palestine, like the rest of Syria, had felt the impact of Ottoman agreements that opened the Levant to European trade using local agents. The British-Ottoman Commercial Convention of

46 Smith, Palestine in the Nineteenth Century, 17-18.

47 Ibid., 18.

48 Ibid., 17.

49 Ibid.

1838, in particular, drew the region more directly into the world economy.\textsuperscript{51} During the 1870s between ten and twenty thousand pilgrims visited Jerusalem annually, the largest contingent coming from Russia. Other visitors to Palestine intended to establish a presence there. French Catholics participated in what they called “the peaceful crusade”\textsuperscript{52} and between 1895 and 1914. As a reflection of Zionist ideology that consists of non-religious secular notions, forty thousand Jews entered Palestine and established a base for the future restoration of Palestine as Israel. These settlers were more interested in establishing agricultural colonies than settling in cities.\textsuperscript{53}

In 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined Germany and Austria-Hungary against Britain and France in WWI, after the Central Powers had tried to persuade the Ottomans to remain neutral. British troops under Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Allenby (a.k.a. Edmund Henry Hynman, 1\textsuperscript{st} Viscount 1861-1936) a British Field Marshall and later High Commissioner of Egypt (1919-25) launched a successful offensive from Egypt into Palestine, breaking the stubborn Ottoman line of resistance at the Third Battle of Gaza. Allenby entered Jerusalem on December 11, 1917, and was the first Christian general to seize the city since the Crusades while capturing Syria.\textsuperscript{54} The following year, the Ottoman Empire imploded.

\textsuperscript{51} Smith, \textit{Palestine in the Nineteenth Century}, 20.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 24.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 25.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 51.
Turkish neutrality would have been necessary if the Straits of Tiran were to remain open to commercial shipping. The Entente countries, at a disadvantage in their persuasion of the Turks, stood by their long-standing policies regarding Ottoman territorial integrity. In 1919, Palestine —along with its holy places—was to become internationalized by the decision of the League of Nations, to avoid complications arising from great power competition and conflicting Christian claims to the area.55

**Husayn-McMahon Correspondence**

During WWI in 1915-16, Husayn ibn ‘Alī and the British high commissioner in Cairo, Sir Henry McMahon, corresponded in a series of letters called the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence regarding the desire for an independent Arab state. The correspondence illustrates an effective trade: support from the British for Arab independence in exchange for Arab military aid to the British against the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the British wanted to leave room for the French to have territorial claims after the war, which would later lead to secret discussions with the French that would become the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916.

In July 1915, Husayn, who claimed to be the arbiter of all Arabs, wrote to McMahon to ensure guaranteed sovereignty for the entire Arab lands as he states:

> The entire Arab nation without exception is determined to assert its right to live, gain its freedom and administer its own affairs in name and in fact…whereas the Arabs believed it to be in Great Britain’s interest to lend them assistance and support in the fulfillment of their steadfast and legitimate aims…For these reasons…with a request for the approval…of the following basic provisions:

55 Ibid., 54.
(1) Great Britain recognizes the independence of the countries...on the north, by the line Mersin-Adana to parallel 37° N. and thence along the long line Birejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat...Amadia to the Persian frontier; on the east, by the Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; on the South, by the Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden...); on the west by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin. (2) Great Britain will agree to the proclamation of an Arab Caliphate for Islam. (3) The Sharifian Arab Government undertakes, other things being equal, to grant Great Britain preference to all economic enterprises in the Arab countries...(5) Great Britain agrees to the abolition of Capitulations in the Arab countries and undertakes to assist the Sharifian Government in summoning an international congress to decree their abolition...56

In response, McMahon stated that certain of these areas fell within the French territories such as Mersina, Alexandretta, and land lying west of Damascus such as Homs, Hamah and Aleppo i.e. modern Lebanon. McMahon wrote, “The districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.”57 He also emphasized that British interest in Baghdad and Basra would “require special consideration.”58

Sykes-Picot Agreement & the Balfour Declaration

In May 1916, Foreign Office envoy Mark Sykes had drawn up with his French counterpart François Georges-Picot a plan to divide the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. Sykes knew that occupying Palestine would require tactful cooperation with the French and he hoped to amend the Sykes-Picot Agreement to gain Palestine for Great

56 Ibid., 88-89, Document 2.1.
57 Ibid., 90.
Britain. In 1917, Foreign British Secretary Arthur Balfour issued a series of statements and letters that would later be known as the famous Balfour Declaration; entails a post-war homeland to establish for the Jewish people in Palestine. Furthermore, Britain’s diplomats knew that the French had aspirations in Syria and Palestine and had discussed the matter informally with their French counterparts in the spring of 1915. After the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, which consisted of Palestine having its independence, while Britain obtained “preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries,” Britain’s Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, proposed to the French that they should appoint a representative to discuss the prospective partition of Ottoman lands on October 21, 1915.

The future of European Jewry was affected by the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 that promised a Jewish national home in Palestine. Although it did not meet all Zionist requirements, the declaration went a long way toward recognition of a future state in Palestine, and as such, those in London who supported the proclamation recognized this. The Balfour Declaration was the product of intense activity and lobbying by several leading Zionists in 1890, the most persuasive of whom was Chaim Weizmann, who later became the first president of the state of Israel. An ardent Zionist,

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59 Ibid., 60.


61 Smith, Palestine in the Nineteenth Century, 57.

62 Ibid., 60.

63 Ibid., 64.
Weizmann had been deeply involved in World Zionist Organization activities in Europe from the turn of the century. British willingness to issue the Belfour Declaration was largely due to Weizmann’s efforts.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{Arab Revolt 1916-1918}

In June 1916, Sharif Husayn, with the support of the British Government, declared an Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Turks in return for the promise of an independent Arab state. Heavily funded by the British, the Arab tribal armies quickly secured the coastal Hijaz and Mecca under the command of Husayn’s sons, however, the armies were organized by a select group of British advisors, notably T.E. Lawrence.\textsuperscript{65} The Arabs conquered Aqaba in July 1917, in efforts to divert and hold Turkish troops while disrupting the Hijaz Railway. The Arab tribal army’s true contributions lay within the campaign into Palestine and Syria, “when the army led by Faysal cut the supply lines, threatening the Ottoman/German eastern flanks.”\textsuperscript{66}

The reasons for the British interest in Husayn and the Hijaz was the belief that Husayn would inspire an Arab Revolt that could divert the Ottoman troops from positions that threatened the Suez Canal. Such a revolt might espouse a massive uprising throughout the Arab Middle East that would completely undermine Ottoman security in

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
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\textsuperscript{66} Smith, \textit{Palestine in the Nineteenth Century}, 70.
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the area. In return, Kitchener and Storrs promised British protection and the installation of the Caliphate in Mecca, with Husayn presumably as caliph.\textsuperscript{67}

British officials in Cairo, eager to spur Arab aspirations for freedom from Turkish rule, sought to take advantage of separatist sentiments among Arab officers in the Ottoman army and encouraged them to look to Britain for the fulfillment of their hopes. He then stated that if the Arabs rebelled and drove out the Turks, the British would recognize and help establish Arab independence “without any intervention in your [Palestinian Arabs] internal affairs.”\textsuperscript{68} The ambiguity of the British promise of granting Palestine a state of their own perpetuated a sense of self-contradiction in part of the British when they issued the “Balfour Declaration” in 1917.

\textit{Palestine under the British Mandate 1920-1948}

As a result, of the Pans Peace Conference at the end of WWI on November 11, 1918, Britain and France were awarded a number of mandate colonies under the auspices of the League of Nations. While France received control over Syria and Lebanon, Britain received the mandate territories of Palestine and Kuwait where Palestine became the responsibility of the Colonial Office in London while Kuwait (located at the mouth of the Mesopotamia delta, detached from Iraq) was declared “a direct British protectorate.” Two of the other mandated territories, Iraq and Transjordan, were distributed to the Hashemite

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
princes Faisal and Abdullah, respectively, as the British consolidated for the failure to creating a Pan-Arab state.\textsuperscript{69}

An alliance with British Zionism “provided a way to outmaneuver the French without breaking faith [sic], and a useful card at the future peace conference to play against any move by Germany to rally the German-oriented and Turcophile Jews to the buttress of her claim.”\textsuperscript{70} In July 1922, although in April 1920, the League of Nations awarded Britain mandate the Palestinian Mandate, however, they did not ratify it until July 1922. The Council of the League of Nations approved the British Mandate for Palestine, including its preamble integrating the Balfour Declaration and emphasizing the historic Jewish connection to Palestine.\textsuperscript{71}

On September 29, 1923, the mandate officially came into force. The British Mandate created problems and challenges for Palestinian Arabs and Zionists alike. Both communities realized that by the end of the mandate period, the size of population and ownership of land would determine the region’s future. Thus, the crucial issues throughout the mandate period were Jewish immigration, land purchases, the Jews’ attempts to increase both, while the Arabs sought to slow or halt both. Conflict over these issues often escalated into violence, which forced the British to take action. Nationalist


\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 65.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 100, Document 2.6.
feelings, both Zionist and Arab, stirred up permanently across the region as tempers flared with the widespread of aspirations for their own benefits.\textsuperscript{72}

Britain was committed to the stewardship of a Jewish national homeland in the mandate. However, it could not define the level of political autonomy that such a homeland would enjoy; Britain insisted that “the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities” be undisturbed.\textsuperscript{73} However, Jewish immigration quickly became the dominant issue. More than 100,000 Jewish immigrants arrived in Palestine from Europe during the 1920s, and there were large transfers of land ownership as these immigrants bought the property from absentee property owners displacing the Arab tenants who traditionally worked the fields and orchards. As the resentment of the Arab \textit{fellahin} (peasants and agricultural laborers) grew, the British authorities attempted to alleviate the tension by introducing immigration quotas. A Royal Commissioner of Inquiry under the aegis of Sir Walter Shaw attributed to the fact that the “Arabs have come to see Jewish immigration not only a menace to their livelihood but a possible overlord of the future.”\textsuperscript{74}

\textit{Palestinian Factions: Christians and the Muslim-Christian Association}

Christians have resided in Palestine for all of Christian history since Jesus was indeed a resident of Palestine. The region was almost entirely Christian until the Arab


\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.

conquests of the 600s, which eventually established a Muslim presence. There was a mixed Christian population in Palestine and, in 1914, the Christian population estimated to be about 81,000, was just over 11% of the region’s population.\textsuperscript{75} Due to the Christians’ fragmented denominations, they do not consider themselves as a single religious community.

Professor Noah Haiduc-Dale compiled statistical data on the Christian population from the 1931 census. At that time, the number of Arab Christians reached to about 92,000—remaining at the 11% overall population mark: “43% of that population were Greek Orthodox, 20% Latin (Roman Catholic), 14% Melkite, 5% Anglican and 4% Maronite.” (See Map 1.3) Other denominations that consisted of the remaining population included “Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Abyssinian, Coptic, Gregorian, Syrian Catholic and ‘unclassified’ Christians, which are ethnic non-Palestinian Christians.”\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75} Noah Haiduc-Dale, \textit{Arab Christians in British Mandate Palestine} (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press 2013), 7-8.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
Haiduc-Dale notes that conducting the analysis on the Christian Communities was difficult due to the different denominations that encompassed the Christian population. Often, in the British Mandate documents, the labeling of each denomination had been inconsistent due to several instances of grouping various denominations into a single Christian category, such as labeling Orthodox and Latin Christians as one category. While there is a variety of denominations within the Palestinian Christian population—more importantly—there were notably four Christian denominations that were heavily

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77 Ibid., 9.

78 Ibid., 8.
involved in the Arab Nationalist movement, while having a significant role in the historical events occurring within British Mandate Palestine. These four denominations were, Greek Orthodox (being the most important and largest of the Christian Population), Latin (Roman Catholic), Melkite (Greek Catholic) and Protestant (mostly Anglican at the time). Although the Maronites were about 4% of the population and would be a part of Palestine’s future history, they were not as active in national politics at this particular time.

The Greek Orthodox, on the other hand, were largely involved in national politics and had various views on the role of Palestinian Christians in Arab politics; so much, so that it is complicated to conceive. Strong Greek nationalism and extensive reformation by the late-Ottomans shaped the Greek Orthodox Christians in Palestine. Though the Church’s congregation was largely Arab, there is a distinction between the groups of Greeks and Arabs. It was widely understood that the term ‘Greek Orthodox’ is a “historical or theological term rather than…an ethnic or linguistic descriptor.” During Ottoman rule over several centuries, a small group of Greek monks formed the ‘Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulcher’ to regain their power from the Ottoman Turks. The Brotherhood appointed their own ranks of the hierarchy while appointing the Patriarch of Jerusalem and establishing strong ties with the hierarchy in Greece.

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79 Ibid.
80 Ibid., 11.
81 Ibid.
In the 1820s, the apparent distinction between the Greek and the Arab Orthodox Christians after the struggle for Greek independence as the church then identified with the nation. Even then, the Orthodox Arab Christians in Jerusalem lobbied for greater roles in the patriarchate in the later 19th century. In 1898, the Arabs were unsuccessful in achieving incentive support from their Palestinian congregation as they attempted to strive for an Arab Patriarchate through an election.

On the issue of how to respond to British rule and the increasing number of Zionists, Arab nationalist activities had fragmented as tensions arose between clans, religious groups, city dwellers, and fellahīn. Moreover, traditional rivalries between the two old preeminent and ambitious Jerusalem families, the Husaynīs and the Nashāshībīs, whose members had held several government positions in the late Ottoman period, reserved the development of effective Arab leadership.82 Several Arab organizations in the 1920s opposed Jewish immigration, including the Palestine Arab Congress, the Arab Executive and the Muslim-Christian Association (MCA).

The strongly anti-British Husaynī family led most Arab groups, while the National Defense Party, founded 1934, was under the control of the more cooperative Nashāshībīs family.83 In 1921, the British high commissioner appointed Amīn al-Husaynī “to be the grand mufti of Jerusalem and made him president of the newly formed Supreme Muslim Council, which controlled the Muslim courts and schools.”84 With a

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
considerable portion of the funds raised by religious, charitable endowments, Amīn al-Husaynī used his religious position to transform himself into the most powerful political figure among the Arabs.  

Regarding the position of Palestinian Christians under the British Mandate, Britain denied Arab Christians nationalism as a form of a legitimate identity, according to Haiduc-Dale. From its colonial perspective, Haiduc-Dale notes, Arabs were tightly bound to their religious community in a way that Europeans were not. This means that since the late Ottoman Arab society underwent a transformation between the 1830s, and the 1860s, as well as the early 1900s, the Ottoman Empire sought “to recast imperial attachments along modern, nationalistic lines.” Therefore, in Palestine, the transformation of the nineteenth century triggered a rise in collective Arab nationalism that dominated the political discourse among the elite leadership at the beginning of the British Mandate.

In 1918, shortly after the British occupation of Jerusalem, Arab notables who had been powerful during Ottoman times conjoined in an effort to influence the political trajectory of their country and organized the Muslim-Christian Association (MCA), which was, for a few years at least, the most important Arab organization in British-ruled

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85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., 19.
87 Ibid., 20.
88 Ibid.
Palestine.\textsuperscript{89} The MCA’s goal was not secularization, but greater influence with their British rulers. Religious unity and equality were a by-product of that goal rather than the result of some ideological secularism. The MCA emerged within a complex political atmosphere created by the combination of late Ottoman reforms and constitutionalism. With the arrival of British rule in Palestine, the influences of foreign clergy on land, Christian populations and the arrival and early access of Zionists in the region, the Association presented interreligious unity.\textsuperscript{90} However, interreligious unity proved easier said than done because of the Association’s complex diversity. Interreligious unity seemed more like an ideal goal or a methodology rather than a reality.

Many tensions amongst the Association members were immediate at the time of its establishment, while in other cases, tensions surfaced behind the scenes where factions within the national movement began to fracture. At that time with the British Mandate taking its full effect in 1923, as well as the ongoing arrival of Zionist Jews, the MCA ultimately remained unified on pro-Arab nationalism and anti-Zionism as its platform. However, that unity soon changed as factionalism and disorganization succeeded in undermining the MCA. It is safe to assume that Palestinian notables from many different factions propelled themselves to join the MCA in the belief that they would prove the capabilities of Arab political unity and in the hope that it would turn the British away from the Balfour Declaration plan and move towards support of Arab autonomy.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
The MCA comprised of “older representatives of the Muslim and Christian communities.”\textsuperscript{91} Though short-lived, the MCA managed to unify the notable families of Palestine for a single cause. The MCA comprised of many branches of offices located in several parts of the region as each coordinated independently on a national level and had offices located in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza, Nablus, Tiberias, Tulkaram and Hebron.\textsuperscript{92} The Association’s functionality consisted of holding rallies in nearby communities and co-signing petitions.\textsuperscript{93}

The result of these efforts produced a significant outcome, as the MCA were able to hold the election of the Arab Executive (AE). The Arab Executive was a body of MCA members designated to represent the whole of the Arab population of Palestine and to petition the British Mandated government. Even though the AE had two congresses prior to the Congress, which viewed their legitimacy, the first legitimized Congress in Palestine was called, the ‘Third Arab Congress.’ This move was to “stress continuity with the first (1919) and second (1920) Arab nationalists congresses held in Damascus.”\textsuperscript{94} The difference between the third and the first two congresses was to support pan-Arab demands that also involved Arab Syria, which the Arab government overthrew the French in 1920. After the Third Arab Congress, the AE held additional Congresses,

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
which took place in London in May and August of 1922 and June of 1923. In spite of the AE and MCA’s claimed efforts to bring Arab independence to the Palestinian people, Haiduc-Dale emphasizes that both organizations were organized and governed by the same elite group, led by the Husayni family.

Furthermore, the MCA’s main goal was to convince the British government that a united Arab front can prove to be capable of leading an independent Palestinian state. Therefore, Muslim-Christian unity was a way intended to demand European attention. They also aimed to echo the values of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech which says, “a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims...determining all such questions of sovereignty the interest of the population is concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” Wilson’s speech validates the MCA’s claims to the right of having an independent sovereign state.

The League of Nations categorized Palestine as a Mandate, a class status that is, “not ready for independence yet, and requires a short period of Western tutelage” in which case fails to, offer an official timetable of its conclusion. Haiduc-Dale also notes that the League of Nations had disagreements on which European country would take permanent control over Palestine. Regarding European perspectives, the European

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95 Ibid., 40.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
(British) authority gave a description of disunity among the MCA to the general public of Western society to keep power over Palestine.

As one British official described the Jerusalem branch of the MCA, he said:

The Latins [Roman Catholics/Maronites] are pro-French; the Greeks are nearly all pro-British; the Muslims are out for independence, though if they cannot have it some prefer British and others America as the Mandatory power...But all Latin, Greek Orthodox and Muslim are equally opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration...In brief, practically all Muslims and Christian of any importance in Palestine are anti-Zionist, and bitterly so.98

Thus, the urgency of the MCA wanting the central European powers to recognize Palestine as a legitimate independent country was imminent. The MCA also wanted to establish itself as the only official body to represent the Palestinians in the national government—even going as far as claiming to be the controller of the masses. In this case, this gave warning to the British that their specific policies could drive the population out of MCA control and may lead to violence.

MCA support did not stop at the local and national level. They also sought to gain international support among the Christian communities as well, mostly in Britain and the U.S. Arab Christians wanted these international entities to join in solidarity and cooperate with co-religious efforts to oppose the “Zionist aggression.”99 These efforts tried to show that Palestinian Arab Christians had a cultural and religious connection to

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98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.
Christians internationally; such efforts included cultivating relations with the Archbishop of Canterbury, sending delegations to the Vatican and had a British Christian adviser.\(^{100}\)

There are three fundamental claims that the MCA pursued in its political agenda: (1) forbidding Jews from any sales to the land, (2) minimizing and/or ceasing Zionist immigration, and (3) the recognition of full Arab independence by either reunifying with Syria or on its own.\(^{101}\) While the MCA’s main goal was Arab independence, other MCA branches have also addressed other issues locally, such as trade and agricultural policies to name a few. However, these issues always had secondary status, as MCA’s main goal is to maintain a co-religious and political unity despite their disagreements.\(^ {102}\) Intercommunal and interreligious unity was a foreign concept to outside observers where interreligious unity should not be confused with secularism (a commonly understood concept among the western societies). The MCA strived to represent both communities as they claimed to speak on behalf of both religions.\(^ {103}\) Their members were composed of both Muslim and Christian religious communities. Ethnic identity was present as well, as both communities considered themselves as both Arab and Muslim or Christian since ethnic and religious identities coexisted.

Although religious coexistence rhetoric continued to play a major role, and Christians held 33% of the MCA body in the main branch in Jerusalem, it is difficult to

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\(^{100}\) Ibid.

\(^{101}\) Ibid., 41.

\(^{102}\) Ibid.

\(^{103}\) Ibid.
gauge how much influence the Christians had within the MCA. With pre-determined roles, there were five Latins, five Orthodox, and ten Muslims, not to mention the other ten village *mukhtars* (village leaders who appear to have all been Muslim, according to Haiduc-Dale). Nevertheless, Christians in Palestine comprise only 25% of the population within Jerusalem, where only 10% of Christians are present within the entire Palestinian population at the time.

However, Christians did apparently serve an important role in some of the leadership positions. Figures such as Michal Beiruti who held the position of temporary AE president in 1919. He and another Christian by the name of Khalil Sahimi were also elected officials in the Sixth Palestinian Arab Congress in 1923. Other important Christians held significant positions in the AE as well, such as ‘Isa Bandak, Ya’coub Farraj, Yusef al-‘Isa, ‘Isa al-‘Isa and Shukhri al-Karmi. Some of the Christian clergies were also affiliated with the MCA, such as Protestant Asad Mansur and Melkite Bishop Hajjar. These instances prove that Christians held respectable positions of authority within the MCA and AE and that the number of Christians was not large but rather, small Christian elite that espoused a single cause on behalf of a greater community.

In sum, the MCA was completely made up of elites who had once prospered in the times of the Ottoman Empire as they banded together to make it known that Palestine

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104 Ibid., 42.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
was worthy of independence from the British government and a strong will to oppose Zionist immigration. However, Zionist immigration continued as the MCA failed to achieve its goals due to the increased political tensions within the MCA authority. The MCA and the AE were an ideal vision of the intercommunal unity of interreligious coexistence, yet interestingly enough the main issue with the MCA authority was that Christians had a little too much control over the authority as some Muslims and Zionists complained.\textsuperscript{108}

Within the community and the society of Palestine, Christians and Muslims were held on equal terms. Ultimately, the disunity in political ideologies brought about the MCA’s failure. They were not organized as each religious group (Muslims and Christians) had its own factions and disagreements, which in the end, made the MCA fall apart. The fact that there were political opposition and an imbalance of power fractured the body of the MCA in the 1920s.

\textit{The Aliyah and Zionism}

The history of the Jews shifted away from the history of Palestine due to the Jewish Dispersion. With the final destruction of Jerusalem in 135 A.D., waves of Jewish immigrants increased the size of communities in Iraq and Egypt as well as in Syria, Yemen and across the Mediterranean into Greece and Italy. Within a few centuries, another wave of Jewish immigrants traveled along the northwest of Africa and into Spain.

At the expulsion from Spain in 1942, the Ottomans invited a certain number of Jews also resettled in Palestine. Within their new residences, Jews were able once again

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 51-52.
to prosper, free from persecution; they rose to higher positions in various courts, especially in the court of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{109} Even so, Jews were still considered as inferiors, a minority within the majority of their adopted country. In the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, there was another shift in the attitudes toward the Jewish communities among the European Christian nations, as England and France, who were once the leaders of the persecution were now the first to develop tolerance toward the Jews.

In the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century, however, sentiments of “Anti-Semitism” resurfaced as Germany began to define Jews as a race rather than a creed. The movement cultivated in 1880 Germany and spread throughout Central Europe.\textsuperscript{110} In France, the incitement of such attitudes presented itself in the Dreyfus Case where a Jew named Alfred Dreyfus was unjustly accused of spying for the Germans in 1894. He was sentenced to penal servitude for life even though the evidence suggested otherwise. Later on after many years of conflict within French society, he was acquitted in 1899 and was fully exonerated in 1906. Meanwhile, in Russia, old intolerance toward the Jewish community also surfaced beginning in 1881. The Jews in Russia were victims of a series of pogroms (Russian term for “riots” primarily against Jews in the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} centuries) as tens of thousands of Jews were murdered and some were destitute and homeless.\textsuperscript{111} A mass migration ensued

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 11.
into the west and three million Jews sought refuge in England, Canada, Australia, South Africa and mostly the United States.\textsuperscript{112}

Sentiments of returning to the Jewish homeland also began to develop. In 1881, there were approximately 25,000 Jews living in Palestine, adapted to the Arab lifestyle. By 1914, there were about over 80,000, where the bulk of the settlers settled in Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa and their suburbs. About 12,000 of the Jewish settlers were dispersed in forty-three “colonies” throughout the land. The Anglo-Jewish Association, an organization, founded in Britain in order to assist the persecuted Jews in 1871, developed the beginning stages of these “colonies,” between 1883 and 1900 by Baron Edmond de Rothschild. His goal was to establish pioneer colonies (seven at a time) and to fund the maintenance and the extension of the colonization process.\textsuperscript{113}

Anti-Semitism increased towards the late 19\textsuperscript{th} Century and Jews suffered immensely from its effects. While some Jewish leaders from Eastern Europe, attempted to counter the assault. Leo Pinsker, a physician and a renowned Zionist pioneer wrote a pamphlet entitled, \textit{The Self-Emancipation of the Jews} in 1882.\textsuperscript{114} He argued that Jews were always forced to work in finance or trade, while as a result, losing the respect of the working population. Pinsker also proposed that the Jews should take their destiny into their own hands by “colonizing” the lands and cultivating the earth. He then founded the

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 13.

Hovevei or Hibbat ‘Lovers of Zion’ in 1884.\textsuperscript{115} With the influence of his cause, the first Zionists from Romania immigrated to Palestine during the first large-scale Jewish migration known as the \textit{Aliyah}, which began in 1882. The first wave of Jewish settlers during the \textit{Aliyah} lived in harmony with the Arab population and while a French Zionist banker named Edmund de Rothschild, financed most of the financial support for these Jewish settlements.

European Jews began to differ in ideology by the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, which resulted in a split between two main groups. With both sides having different ideas in solving the Jewish issue, one group advocated for the assimilation of Jews within their respective societies. While the other group, the Zionists, wanted to colonize and establish a Jewish national home. Jews who advocated for assimilation wanted complete integration into the societies in which they lived while maintaining their religious traditions. With this in mind, many Jews had already assimilated into European society at the end of the 18\textsuperscript{th} century.\textsuperscript{116} In Eastern Europe however, this was not so much the case, since many Jews faced massacres such as pogroms, where it was prevalent in Poland and some areas of Russia.

Zionist ideology developed from the 19\textsuperscript{th} century rhetoric of racialism, where the belief that some races were inferior to others was a common idea. This idea correlated to the nationality identification of a Jew as well, hence their desire to seek a national

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 30.
homeland for the Jewish people. However, in response to this notion, Orthodox Jews had opposed the Zionists’ efforts for a national home. In a religious perspective, the Orthodox community opposed the idea of establishing a Jewish national home. This was because they believed that it was not up to the Jewish people to reestablish a national home, but instead, it was God’s will to provide the deliverance of the Jewish people from the centuries’ long diaspora. It is also good to note that the early Zionist leaders considered themselves Atheists and only identified as Jewish by way of heritage, or in this case, nationality and sometimes race.

Although, there are differences even amongst the Zionists regarding the idea of a Jewish national home. One Zionist group led by Israel Zangwill, followed in his slogan, “A land without people for a people without land,” as they wanted autonomous status for Jews no matter where they went. The other group, led by Viennese journalist Theodor Herzl, whose best-known work entitled, The Jewish State helped further shaped the idea of establishing a Jewish homeland.

Herzl, who is considered the founder of modern Zionism, rejected the notion of assimilation made by the other Jewish groups. As stated before, Herzl’s era was the age in which people classified as races of superior and inferior classes. Therefore, these

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117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., 31.
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid., 32.
121 Ibid.
ideologies also shaped Herzl’s perspective and had often led to internal tensions within
the Jewish and Zionist community as they argue who is more Jewish than the other. In
the end, as history dictates that Herzl’s perspective prevailed which led to many more
Jewish settlers migrating to Palestine leading up to the establishment of the state of Israel.

*Arab Revolt 1936-39*

In August 1929, Arab rioters murdered 67 Jews in Hebron, which led to the rapid
expansion of the paramilitary Jewish self-defense force known as the Haganah. The
British successfully increased their policy for keeping the peace, trying not to favor both
sides, yet ultimately alienating both. The Shaw Commission (a British inquiry into the
Arab riots), acknowledged that previous government statements about the future of the
mandate have been unhelpfully vague and contradictory, with politicians too eager to tell
each community what it wanted to hear.122

The 1930 Passfield White Paper could only suggest new and ineffectual
restrictions on future Jewish land purchases.123 As a result of Britain’s failed attempts to
reduce the influx of Jewish migration, a full-scale Arab revolt broke out across Palestine
in protest against continuing Jewish immigration and land purchase. During the revolt,

122 Spencer C. Tucker, et al, “United Kingdom, Middle East Policy,” in *The Encyclopedia of the
Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Political, Social and Military History*, 1021. The British Commission of Inquiry,
chaired by a distinguished jurist Sir Walter Shaw, consisted of three members of the British parliament, Sir
Henry Betterton (Conservative), R. Hopkin Morris (Liberal) and Henry Snell (Labor). Their report called
the Shaw Report, or officially known as the Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of
August 1929, and commonly known as the Shaw Commission, issued a call for limitation of Jewish
immigration for the sake of keeping the peace. It states that, “the political and economic grievances of the
Arabs, as explained to us in evidence, must be regarded as having been immediate causes of the
disturbances of August last. But even if this were not our view, we should have been bound to examine
those grievances in the light of the second part of our task since it is clear that recommendations, even
when most carefully considered and most thoroughly applied, could not, unless they went to the root of the
matter, succeed in avoiding a recurrence of the recent unfortunate disturbances.” Shaw Report, 91.

123 Ibid., The 1930 Passfield White Paper is a reiteration of the Shaw Report.
the remaining economic ties between the Arab and Jewish communities had mostly been severed, hampering the chance of any reconciliation between the two peoples.

1948 War

The first Arab-Israeli war started in November 1947, as an immediate response of the local Palestinians to the Partition Plan decided by the United Nations General Assembly, which partitions or separates Palestine into two geographically equal states. Aside from the fact that Jews at the time only made up 10% of the population before WWI and fluctuated between 20% and 30% by 1947, the Partition Plan consisted of about half of the territory of Palestine allocated to the prospective Jewish state. While 80% of the Arab population of Palestine who owned 90% of the land, received about half of the territory. The plan was unfair for both sides, and the Arabs argued that that the plan lacked legitimacy due to its violation of the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, a right preserved in the United National Charter and therefore, they violently oppose the Partition Plan.

This immediately developed into a civil war, which started in mid-May 1948 with the invasion of the Arab armies the next morning of Israel’s of the provisional government before a twenty-four member Provisional Council (later to become the Knesset). U.S. President Harry S. Truman “gave de facto recognition” of the state eleven

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minutes later. The Soviet Union quickly followed suit, while Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan on the other hand, responded by sending armies to Palestine.

Despite the limited numbers and the lack of military equipment, Israeli forces gained an early and decisive advantage in the war, with Arab military forces being comparatively disorganized and largely ineffective. By the end of the war, Israel held 23% more land than was allotted under the ’47 Partition Plan. Egypt and Jordan acquired the West Bank and East Jerusalem (See Map 1.4) and occupied the remainder of the Palestinian territory.

The Armistice Agreements of 1949 left Transjordan in control of the West Bank and “East Jerusalem,” and King Abdullah of Transjordan arranged for Palestinian elders to offer him leadership through a process called bai’a, a pledge of allegiance. As a result, he annexed the West Bank and what was known as “Arab Jerusalem” to Transjordan, transforming that state into the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This constituted the illegal annexation of what was the territory intended to be a Palestinian state. This was also accepted by Israel since they favored dealing with the Hashemite monarchs rather than with the Palestinians. Unfortunately, for the Palestinians, an independent Arab Palestinian state did not develop in the area, as envisioned by the partition plan. The same applied to the Gaza Strip. In both cases, residents of Gaza and the West Bank wanted to establish and identify themselves as Palestinians living in an autonomous state of Palestine, rather than becoming Egyptian and Jordanian citizens, respectively. In

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125 Ibid., 24.
126 Ibid., 25.
retrospect, Palestinians were left in a political no man’s land as they were also stuck in refugee camps, which persisted for decades.

**Palestinian Refugees**

During the first Arab-Israeli war, 700,000 displaced Arab Palestinians had reduced to refugee status. A debate to whether the Palestinians left on their own accord, were encouraged to leave by the states who were waging war with Israel and purposefully driven out by the Israelis or were simply fleeing violence, as is the case with most civilian populations caught in the midst of war. Many among the civilian population feared acts of extreme violence, as evidenced by the Deir Yassin Massacre in 1948, in which the LHY or “Lehi” Israeli freedom fighters (or terrorists, depending on the perspective) slaughtered approximately 256 Palestinians, men, women and children during the massacre. Whatever the reason of why the Palestinians left, they have, under International Law the right to return.

The Palestinian refugees of 1948, lived in the squalors of the Arab states of segregated ghettoized refugee camps were set up in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan as well as in the Gaza Strip, which Egypt controlled during this time. In these refugee camps, generations of Palestinians lived in the conditions of significant deprivation. As refugees, Palestinians recognized that their residence in these communities was temporary and that hope rested in returning to their homeland. Jordan was the only Arab state absorbed Palestinian refugees onto its population, many of whom are now second

127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
and third generation Jordanians. However, in 1970, Jordan feared the political and autonomy power of the refugee camps and the emergence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) under Yasser Arafat. In response to the growing political and military threat, the King of Jordan unleashed his army against his communities killing 3,000 to 15,000 Palestinians.\textsuperscript{130} This event is known as, “Black September,” I will discuss in detail in Chapter 3.

From 1949 until 1969, the United Nations defined all non-Israeli Palestinians as legal refugees. Characterization charged with General Assembly Resolution 2535 (1969), which recognized and established that Palestinians have a national identity and collective rights.\textsuperscript{131} The recognition of Palestinian national identity grew stronger in 1974 when the United Nations granted observer status to the PLO. The UN also invited Yasser Arafat to address the General Assembly as if he were a head of state on behalf of Palestine’s national authority.\textsuperscript{132} We will now jump ahead to the events of the first and second intifadas as these events are crucial to the developments of this thesis. The interim wars that occurred between these times, I will discuss in Chapter 3 under the establishment of the PLO.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
First & Second Intifada

The First Intifada in 1987 began when occupied Palestinians in the Jabalia refugee camp and Israeli citizens continued to have heated conflicts where both sides experienced violent attacks and deaths. This uprising was a matter of retaining a sense of pride among the Palestinians as they continued to push against the occupation, despite the received economic growth and stability through Israel’s open labor force. However, within this labor force, Palestinians had to do unskilled or semi-skilled labor work that Israeli citizens did not want to do, and only those 40% of Palestinians worked in Israel daily.\(^\text{133}\) Due to the growing birth rates among Palestinians, the confiscated land became overcrowded. Unemployment was also on the rise, including those who were college-educated. Only 1 in 8 college-educated Palestinians was able to find degree-oriented work.\(^\text{134}\)

To make matters more difficult for the Palestinians, Israel’s Defense Minister, Yitzhak Rabin from the Labor Party, established a deportation policy called the “Iron Fist” in 1985 where 50 deportations of Palestinians occurred during the course of 4 years to prevent developing ideas of Palestinian nationalism. Additionally, the assimilation of economies, as well as the increasing illegal Israeli settlers, who doubled from 35,000 to 64,000 between 1984 and 1988 and to 130,000 by the mid-90s in the West Bank alone,


\(^\text{134}\) Ibid.
was also a factor as well. According to Israeli Minister of Economics and Finance at the time, Gad Ya’acobi described the developments as, “a creeping process of de facto annexation” which primarily propelled the Intifada in the first place.

The causes that led up to the Intifada consisted of humiliation in all human aspects and such a cause by the occupation was “founded on brute force, repression and fear, collaboration and treachery, beatings and torture chambers, and daily intimidation, humiliation, and manipulation.” During the Intifada which spanned six years, the Israeli Army killed 1,162-1,204 Palestinians (241 being children) and arrested more than 120,000. In November of ’98, the UN General Assembly condemned Israel for their actions in the Intifada and demanded that they cease deportations through Security Council Resolutions 607 and 608.

Following the First Intifada was the Second Intifada, which began in September 2000 when Likud Party Prime Minister Candidate, Ariel Sharon made a visit to the Temple Mount, a highly sacred site for Muslims, Jews and Christians. Accompanied by


136 Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, eds., Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 32.


over 1,000 security guards, he stated, “The Temple Mount is in our hands and will remain in our hands. It is the holiest place in Judaism, and it is the right of every Jew to visit the Temple Mount.”\textsuperscript{140} This seemingly aggressive and provocative statement aroused a massive riot among the Palestinians who were also present at the Holy place.

The violent events that took place were in actuality, an accumulation of the failed Oslo Accords process in the early 90s and the Camp David peace talks in the summer of 2000; the two groups of talks mediated by former President Bill Clinton. Both talks ended with both sides blaming the other in disagreements with the issues of territory, Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, refugees, the right of return and various Israeli security concerns. There is much debate on the immediate trigger of the Second Intifada. However, in a general sense, “popular Palestinian discontent grew during the Oslo Peace process because the reality on the ground did not match the expectations created by the Peace Agreements.”\textsuperscript{141} Further frustration also came from continued Israeli settlements on the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

During the Second Intifada, Palestinian militias began to form and collaborate with other groups taking a more violent stance than during the previous Intifada. These collaborative groups included Hamas and other militant groups, authorized by Fatah. At the beginning of 2004, senior Hamas official Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi offered Israelis a 10-year truce, in other words, a \textit{hudna}, in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state


and the complete withdrawal of Israel from the territories captured during the Six Day war in 1967. Israel responded by immediately dismissing it as a cover up for military operations. Soon after, the leader of Hamas, Israeli airstrikes targeted and assassinated Ahmed Yassin in March 2004, while they assassinated his successor, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi in a similar airstrike a month later. By the end of the conflict, both sides suffered heavy losses. According to summary data statistics in the ten year span from the Second Intifada (September 29, 2000-2010),

> Israeli security forces killed 6371 Palestinians, of whom 1317 were minors
> An additional 248 were Palestinian police killed in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead, and 240 were targets of assassinations. ...and Palestinians killed 1083 Israelis in Israel and the Occupied Territories. 741 of the fatalities were civilians, of whom 124 were minors, and 342 were members of the security forces.\(^{142}\)

These events may have led to Hamas’ sweeping victory in the 2006 elections, which reflected a widespread discontent and opposition against Israel, and its allies, despite Hamas’ boycott of the Palestinian 2005 PA elections.\(^{143}\)

To conclude, it is difficult to find non-biased sources on the subject of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Since the conflict generates high emotional sentiments on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides, it provides a challenge for an objective observer to disseminate the available material on whether it is completely unbiased to one side. This challenge most scholars will face when researching intractable conflicts.


\(^{143}\) Details on Hamas in Chapters 4 and 5.
Timeline and Chronology of the Events in Palestine

**Stages of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1917-2002**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 2, 1917</td>
<td>The Balfour Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 24, 1922</td>
<td>The League of Nations’ Mandate for Palestine is approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 1948</td>
<td>The Declaration of the Establishment of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 24, 1950</td>
<td>Jordan annexes the West Bank and East Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 29, 1956</td>
<td>Israeli troops invade the Sinai Peninsula after Egypt nationalizes the Suez Canal. They withdrew after pressure from the U.S. &amp; the USSR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 28-29, 1964</td>
<td>The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 5-10, 1967</td>
<td>Israel launches preemptive attacks on neighbors capturing the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Sinai, the Golan Heights and Gaza in what will become known as the Occupied Territories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27, 1967</td>
<td>Protection of Holy Places Law: This law was implemented by The Minister of Religious Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1, 1967</td>
<td>The Khartoum Resolutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.1: Charted timeline of Israel’s current history. Politics and Government in Israel: The Maturation of a Modern State, Gregory S. Mahler, 2004
### Chronology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ca. 1300-900 BCE</td>
<td>Canaanites inhabited Palestine: West of the Jordan River, coastal Lebanon, and Southern Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca.1200–1100 BCE</td>
<td>Philistines and Israelites settled in the Palestine region of Canaan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 10th Cent. BCE</td>
<td>The Kingdom of Israel established in northern Palestine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>722 BCE</td>
<td>Assyrians conquered the Northern Kingdom of Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>586 BCE</td>
<td>Babylonian Empire conquers Judah; Temple destroyed and the Jewish “captivity.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>539-140 BCE</td>
<td>Persians conquered Babylon, permitted Jews to return to southern Palestine; the temple was rebuilt; Palestine ruled by Persian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 BCE-638 CE</td>
<td>Palestine comes under Roman/Byzantine Rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ca. 630-730 CE</td>
<td>Islamic Arab Conquest expanded throughout the regions stretching from Spain in the West across from North Africa and the Middle East to Central Asia and the borders of India in the east.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>638 CE</td>
<td>Jerusalem and Palestine incorporated into Islamic rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>661-750 CE</td>
<td>Umayyad caliphate ruled Islamic Empire from Damascus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750-1258 CE</td>
<td>Abbasid caliphate rules Islamic Empire from Bagdad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>909-1171 CE</td>
<td>Fatimid caliphate rules Islamic Empire from Tunisia and later in Cairo, Egypt in 969 CE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1037-1194 CE</td>
<td>Seljuk Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1096-1291 CE</td>
<td>Crusades in the Middle East and Crusader Control in Jerusalem, 1099-1187, 1229-1244 CE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250-1516/17 CE</td>
<td>Mamluk Dynasties, Centered in Damascus and Cairo, ruling Greater Syria, including Palestine and Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1517-1917 CE</td>
<td>Ottomans invaded and occupied Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919-1947 CE</td>
<td>British Mandated Palestine after the defeat of the Ottomans in WWI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.2 Charles D. Smith, *Palestine in the Nineteenth Century*, 8th ed. (Boston - New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2013), 10, 41, 84.
CHAPTER 2

CURRENT POPULATION & GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW

Population Demographics of the Gaza Strip & the West Bank

According to the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, there are an estimated 4,816,503 Palestinians in the Palestinian territories as of 2016, of whom 2,935,368 live in the West Bank and 1,881,135 in the Gaza Strip. The total figures include Palestinians in East Jerusalem.¹ This comprehensive statistical overview will give us a sense of the current demographics of the Palestinian territories in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The overall population of the Palestinians is 10 or 11 million people, separated by the state of Israel and combining the number of those who remain in the diaspora in neighboring countries such as Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt and Israel.² In some cases, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will share the same data, while in other cases, the data will differ. Note, that because of the political and violent strife between the two territories and Israel; some data have not been recorded in recent time.

The Gaza Strip

The Gaza Strip, (named for the largest city in the region, Gaza) is composed of settlements that trace back to at least the 15th century B.C.E. known as “Ghazzat.” The strategic strip of land along the “Mideast-North African trade routes has experienced an

¹ Note: The UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East), estimated the number of Palestinians in Jordan to be about 2.1 million. About 371,000 Israeli settlers live in the West Bank; approximately 211,640 Israeli settlers live in East Jerusalem (2014).

incredibly turbulent history; the town of Gaza itself has been besieged countless times over the millennia.” As of now, there are no Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip; the Gaza Strip settlements were evacuated in 2005. The population in the Gaza Strip speaks Arabic, Hebrew (many Palestinians but not all) and English (widely understood). The religious demographics are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religions</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (predominately Sunni)</td>
<td>98.0%-99.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians</td>
<td>&lt;1.0% (0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated/Unspecified</td>
<td>&lt;1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Age Structure in the Gaza differs by a small margin from that of the West Bank (see Figure 13.2) as shown here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14 yrs.</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>408,601</td>
<td>387,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 yrs.</td>
<td>21.21%</td>
<td>187,229</td>
<td>184,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-54 yrs.</td>
<td>27.56%</td>
<td>237,162</td>
<td>246,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 yrs.</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>30,575</td>
<td>27,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65^ yrs.</td>
<td>2.51%</td>
<td>22,613</td>
<td>21,327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.2. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.

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4 Ibid.
### Median Age

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18.4 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18.2 yrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>18.6 yrs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.3. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.

### Dependency Ratio

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Ratio</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>70.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elderly</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential Support</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.4. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.

### Mortality Rates

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birth Rate</td>
<td>31.11% births/1,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Rate</td>
<td>3.04 deaths/1,000 population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality</td>
<td>45 deaths/100,000 births</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant Mortality (live births)</td>
<td>14.94 deaths/1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>15.97 deaths 1,000 live births</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>13.86 deaths/1,000 live births</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.5. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. Note: data represents both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (2015 est.).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Literacy Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Literacy Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Life Expectancy (Primary to Tertiary Education)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Currently, in the Gaza Strip, many issues affect the environment due to the various circumstances of poverty, warfare and the lack of sustainability in the growth of resources. The following is a list of the current environment issues of the Gaza Strip:

- Desertification [the process of becoming desert due to mismanagement or climate change]; salination [treatment with salt or a salt solution] of fresh water; sewage treatment; water-borne disease; soil degradation; depletion and contamination of underground water resources [causes include warfare activity underground by Hamas and other militant groups].
- The drinking water source and the Sanitation facility access statistics are measured by how much it has improved and how much it has remained unimproved. The statistics go as follows:

---

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. Note: measured by the definition age of 15 and over who can read and write; data represents the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

10 Ibid.
### Drinking Water Source

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>50.7% of population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>81.5% of population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>58.4% of population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unimproved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>49.3% of population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>18.5% of population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>41.6% of population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.7. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.11

### Sanitation Facility Access

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Improved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>93% of the population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>20.2% of the population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>92.3% of the population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unimproved</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>7% of the population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>9.8% of the population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7.7% of the population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.8. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.12

---

11 Ibid. Note: data represents the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The security measure made by the Israeli government and the constant Israeli-Palestinian violence have degraded the economic conditions in the Gaza Strip. Israel imposed border controls and restrictions on the Gazan territory Hamas seized control of the territory in June 2007.\textsuperscript{13} As a result, Gaza has accumulated high unemployment with elevated poverty rates and a sharp decline in the private sector, which relied primarily on export markets.

Egypt’s crackdown on Hamas’ tunnel-based smuggling network within the Gaza Strip impaired the fuel economy, construction material and shortages in consumer goods.\textsuperscript{14} This is because Hamas used the resources that were meant to build infrastructures such as hospitals, schools, etc., to build weapons and tunnels to house them. The 51-day conflict of 2014 between Israel, Hamas and other Gaza-based militant groups, depressed the Gaza Strip’s already aid-dependent economy. The GDP’s official exchange rate is 2.938 billion (2014 est.), the real GDP growth rate follows -15.2\% (2014 estimate), 5.6\% (2013 estimate), and 7\% (2012). Not much data provided after this date.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. Note: data represents the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
The composition of the GDP by end use is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP—Composition, By End Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Consumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in Fixed Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in Inventories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of Goods and Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of Goods and Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.9. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.¹⁵

Thus, the statistics show that the GDP has improved slightly after it fell in 2014. This was due to the 2014 conflict between the Gaza and Israel that summer. Since then, the GDP remains at a slow but steady incline.

Gaza’s agriculture products include olives, fruit, vegetables, flowers, beef and dairy products. The industrial production growth rate is 3.1% while the labor force is 471,000.¹⁶ The labor force by occupation and the unemployment rate is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor Force by Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.10. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid. Note: data represents the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
### Unemployment Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013 est.</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 est.</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.11. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.\(^\text{18}\)

### Unemployment Rate of Youths Ages 15-24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.12. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.\(^\text{19}\)

**The West Bank**

The West Bank is located on the west of Jordan and to the east of Jerusalem. It is slightly smaller than the state of Delaware with a total size of 478 km (297.15 mi.). A landlocked Palestinian territory separated from the Gaza Strip by Israel, with about 381 Israeli settlements on site, including about 212 settlements and 134 small “outpost”

\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) Ibid.

\(^{19}\) Ibid. Note: data represents the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
communities as well as 35 sites in East Jerusalem as of 2014.\textsuperscript{20} The name refers to its location on the west bank of the Jordan River. It retained its name after the 1967 Six-Day War.\textsuperscript{21} Within the past two years, however, these numbers may have changed due to frequent International calls for the demolition of these “illegal” Israeli settlements (including by President Barack Obama) due to multiple violations of International Law and the Oslo Accords Agreement. This is according to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 446, adopted on 22 March 1979. In the Resolution, the Security Council determined "that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East."\textsuperscript{22}

Ethnically, the West Bank consists of 83% Palestinian Arab and 17% Jewish inhabitants (mainly due to the illegal Israeli settlements). Languages include Arabic, Hebrew, and English, which is widely understood. The religious status of the West Bank continues to have a steadily sustaining Muslim majority despite the creeping number of Jewish settlers. On the other hand, the Christian population percentage continues to decline primarily because of the perpetual growth of the Muslim population as well as


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

emigration from the region. The declining number of the Christian population may also be due to of the decline of birthrates as well.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religions</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim (predominately Sunni)</td>
<td>80%-85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>12-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christians (mainly Greek Orthodox)</td>
<td>1-2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated/Unspecified</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.13. Source: CIA World Factbook, “The West Bank,” 2016, accessed May 2016.24

As noted before, the West Bank’s Age structure differs slightly from that of Gaza; the percentage differences are shown in Figure 2.14:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Structure</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0-14 yrs.</td>
<td>33.09%</td>
<td>473,108</td>
<td>448,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-24 yrs.</td>
<td>21.52%</td>
<td>307,020</td>
<td>292,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-54 yrs.</td>
<td>36.96%</td>
<td>237,162</td>
<td>500,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55-64 yrs.</td>
<td>4.57%</td>
<td>64,093</td>
<td>63,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65^ yrs.</td>
<td>3.85%</td>
<td>45,303</td>
<td>62,007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.14. Source: CIA World Factbook, “Gaza Strip,” 2016, accessed May 2016.25

24 Ibid.
Data such as the dependency ratio, literacy ratio/school life expectancy, drinking water source, sanitation facility access, labor force occupation and an unemployment rate of youths related to the West Bank is in the data shown for the Gaza Strip. Data on demographics such as the median age, population growth rate (which is 1.95% as of 2015), mortality rate, birth rate, death rate, maternal mortality rate, infant mortality rate and life expectancy at birth, differ from the Gaza Strip as shown here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Median Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.15. Source: CIA World Factbook, “West Bank,” 2016, accessed May 2016.\(^{26}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mortality Rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birth Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Mortality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infant Mortality Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.16. Source: CIA World Factbook, “The West Bank,” 2016, accessed May 2016.\(^{27}\)

\(^{26}\) Ibid., 2015 est.

67
Life Expectancy at Birth

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>75.91 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>73.79 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>78.17 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.17. Source: CIA World Factbook, “The West Bank,” 2016, accessed May 2016.28

In the West Bank, the total fertility rate is 2.76 children born to every woman as of the 2015 estimate. Contraceptives are also prevalent in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip at the rate of 52.5%.29 The economic status of the West Bank has intensifying challenges due to the Israeli-Palestinian violence since 2015. As a result, increased security restrictions, political instability (which slowed economic productivity), Israel withholding taxes for four months as well as additional fees that they collect from the PA (Palestinian Authority).

This caused the PA to have salary payments delayed to their employees, are all underlying causes of business productivity and consumer demand.30 Due to its fragile and unstable infrastructure, the PA continues to rely heavily on donor aid and may continue in the future. The West Bank, disrupted by Israeli’s closure policies, had limited imports, exports, industrial capacity in the territory, trade flows and private sector development. The following will show the GDP status of the West Bank.

27 Ibid. Note: represents both Gaza and West Bank.
28 Ibid. Note: represents both Gaza and West Bank.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP-Real Growth Rate</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>2014 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2013 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2012 est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP-Per Capita (PPP)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$4,300</td>
<td>2014 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,400</td>
<td>2013 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,600</td>
<td>2012 est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross National Saving</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.8% of GDP</td>
<td>2014 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.5% of GDP</td>
<td>2013 est.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% of GDP</td>
<td>2012 est.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.18. Source: CIA World Factbook, “West Bank,” 2016, accessed May 2016.\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\) Ibid.
### GDP—Composition, By End Use

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household Consumption</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Consumption</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in Fixed Capital</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in Inventories</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports of Goods and Services</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports of Goods and Services</td>
<td>-60.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### GDP—Composition, by Sector of Origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.20. Source: CIA World Factbook, “West Bank,” 2016, accessed May 2016.

32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
### Unemployment Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013 est.</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 est.</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 est.</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 est.</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.21. Source: CIA World Factbook, “West Bank,” 2016, accessed May 2016, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

### Exports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013 est.</td>
<td>$900,618 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 est.</td>
<td>$943,717 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 est.</td>
<td>$957,811 million (includes Gaza Strip, excludes Jerusalem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 est.</td>
<td>$600.9 million First and Second Quarter (includes Gaza Strip, excludes Jerusalem: includes first and second quarter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid. Export commodities include stone, olives, fruit, vegetables and limestone.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013 est.</td>
<td>$5.163 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 est.</td>
<td>$5.683 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 est.</td>
<td>$5.225 million (includes Gaza Strip, excludes Jerusalem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 est.</td>
<td>$3.308 million (includes Gaza Strip, excludes Jerusalem: includes First and Second Quarter)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.23. Source: CIA World Factbook, “West Bank,” 2016, accessed Oct 2016; Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics

The status of the West Bank predates on the Israel-Palestinian Interim Agreement, which determines permanent status through further negotiations. Disputes between the West Bank and Israel continue to rise due to perpetual illegal Israeli settlements and the construction of the “seam line” wall, which separates the West Bank from Israeli territory (the Green Line), leaving agriculture, livestock, water and other necessary resources detached from the Palestinian people. Recently, there have been many reports of stabbings of Israeli citizens by West Bank Palestinians because of their frustration with the Israeli government and their progress of achieving stability and permanent status of independence from Israel.

Overall, the demographic and statistic data show that in both cases, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have differences between the two territories regarding population growth, religious demographics and economic status, naming a few. Within each territory, the gaps vary, especially in the cases of their economy. As the data

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36 Ibid. Import commodities include food, consumer goods, construction materials, petroleum and chemicals.

37 Ibid.
illustrate, economic growth in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank have stagnated, but have slowly progressed over the past few years. This is possibly due to the embargos, tariffs and economic policies of the Israeli government and as a result, not only the general population has suffered from the economic strife, but also the youth is what suffers the most.

The school expectancy rate is low, while the youth unemployment rate is relatively high. Some of the factors may be due to the parents’ inability to afford the basic needs for their children to attend school, and therefore cannot have their children remain in school. Thus, the youth have to find work in order to support their families. Due to the youths’ circumstances within the conflict, they continue to live in times of war, conflict and struggle. These circumstances often produce a hopeless mentality; this can lead to violence and youths joining various militant groups that involve committing terrorist acts because of their frustration. These are some of the many factors in an intractable conflict. A more detailed discussion of what makes the issue of Palestine an intractable conflict follows in the next chapter.
PART II

THE INTRACTABLE CONFLICT AMONG THE POLITICAL FACTIONS OF PALESTINE
CHAPTER 3

AN INTRACTABLE CONFLICT:
SOCIAL CLEAVAGES WITHIN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURES OF PALESTINE

The Intractable Conflict: What It Is & How Does it Correlate with the Political Factions of Palestine?

Intractable Conflicts go by many names, such as the Protracted Social Conflicts or the Identity Related Conflicts. These are long conflicts that are self-sustaining, deep-rooted and the product of long-lasting hatreds and wars; since WWII, which has made international politics unpredictable and unstable.\(^1\) Most of these prolonged conflicts (not all) have had international interventions or have involved superpowers that have made efforts to end the conflict through diplomatic, mediatory, peacekeeping, humanitarian development assistance and in extreme cases, military intervention means. However, some of these conflicts have resisted any kind of settlement and/or resolution, which can complicate the situation further.\(^2\)

The intractable conflicts or the protracted social conflicts have various unique components such as religious, cultural, or ethnic communal identities; they may be functioning of the fundamental needs of security, communal recognition, and distributive justice.\(^3\) Most contemporary conflicts consist of necessities to express cultural values, human rights and security. They are not easy to suppress, and their practitioners may continue to pursue theirs by acquiring destructive weapons.


\(^2\) Ibid.

There also lie imperative risks if these intractable conflicts continued unchecked. As a result, conflicts can lead to the development of hot zones that are home to insurgent groups as well as other political movements. Global networks can grow in order to project groups’ power and influence. Some groups choose local targets against which to initiate their violence.\(^4\) Terrorism and other forms of low-integrity warfare (such as the bombings of public buildings and the recent stabbings conducted by West Bank Palestinians on Israelis) would continue to surge. This behavior then increases regression within the community, external intervention and the manipulation of local grievances by leaders. In the end, unmet psycho-political and socio-economic needs can lead to “dysfunctional cognitive and behavioral patterns, which does not resolve easily by ordinary methods of diplomacy or the use of force.”\(^5\)

Some scholars have devoted their time to study these intractable conflicts’ origins, causes and consequences. Analysts as well as consultants from the U.S. Institute of Peace, during their periodic discussions between 2001 and 2003, have tried to define this complex phenomenon.\(^6\) Rather than defining it as “one that resists resolution” (its original definition), scholarly experts and consultants have recognized that the term “intractable” is commonly understood as a conflict that is unresolvable.\(^7\) However, this can raise concerns within the group since it introduced a sense of inevitability and hopelessness regarding the conflict. Therefore, negative attitudes affect the perceptions of

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Ibid.


\(^7\) Ibid.
those involved, including third-party peacemakers. In the end, the group settled on a broad definition of an intractable conflict as follows: Intractable Conflicts are conflicts that have persisted over time and refused to yield to efforts—through either direct negotiations by the parties or mediation with third-party assistance—to arrive at a political settlement.8

Intractable conflicts share a common characteristic: They defy settlement because leaders believe their objectives are permanently irreconcilable and parties have more interest in the hot war or cold stalemate than in any known alternate state of being.9 Those who are involved locally, (meaning that they are directly involved in the conflict and have a personal bias) often make the decision to resist and hinder any opportunity for a political emergence that may aid in settling their differences. This is because these parties view their struggle as a “zero-sum” game: what their opponent gains, they lose.10

There are also varying degrees of violence that are involved in an intractable conflict. It could lead to a potential escalation of military hostilities depending on the circumstances of the conflict during that time. For instance, the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East illustrates that the various degrees of violence could escalate, de-escalate and re-escalate over the lifetime of the conflict. Most intractable conflicts last up to at least 25 years and longer, depending on the conflict.11 To understand intractable conflicts, one must recognize that the origins of intractability and the original causes of the conflict

8 Ibid., 5.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
may not be the same. This means that no matter the conflict’s fundamental issues, other elements will increase or replace the original disputes. Over time, wars create new problems and systems that did not exist at the beginning of the conflict, including the two side’s behavior toward each other.

Notions of identity are also a product of an intractable conflict. These notions can be polarized and garner a zero-sum mentality as mentioned before. Prolonged conflicts can also accumulate objections to each side’s version of history as both sides view themselves as the victim. Each group reinterprets key cultural and religious symbols that can perpetuate attitudes of resentment within the conflict itself.

The causes of intractability result in several elements where the institutionalization of the conflict and persistent violence becomes the norm, as groups become devoted to logic and culture of violence and revenge. The outcome of this perpetual cycle affects the younger generations as well—they grow up in a conflict, which is a part of their way of life. Another cause of the intractable conflict is the role of domestic politics and the involved parties’ lack of understanding, which can then escalate the intractability of the conflict, especially within democracies.

Political actors can use the conflict as part of their campaign promises and slogans where political considerations create difficulties in making a concession. This is the case with Palestine and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the Likud Party under the current Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2015, and Hamas (who took over the majority of the Palestinian National Authority in 2006; lead by Ismail Haniyeh) did in their respective elections. Violent reciprocity normalizes, while cooperation does not, owing to the domestic politics of each side (such as the PNAG and the Knesset), which
blocks any possibility to cooperate. Shilbey Telhami notes that among the public, “there is an insidious belief on each side that not acting is worse than acting; that if one does not respond, the other side will, therefore, be the target of more violence.”\textsuperscript{12} This idea is reflected in the case of Hamas and the Israeli government during the Gaza conflict of 2014.

There are three types of Intractable Conflicts, and they are Type 1: Interstate and Intrastate Conflicts such as the conflict of Kashmir and Korea; Type 2: Active Intractable Conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict; and Type 3: Abeyant Intractable Conflicts such as the Cyprus conflict.\textsuperscript{13} Since this thesis only discusses the intractable conflict of Palestine within the Arab-Israeli conflict, it will discuss only Type 2. However, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict relates closely to the other types of conflict as well. Which I will discuss briefly. The Active Intractable Conflict involves a high level of violence and the persistence of fighting throughout the conflict. The Israel-Palestinian conflict is considered a “hot conflict zone” where violence is more or less a permanent feature, even though the actual level of violence may be intermittent, sporadic or seasonal (for example, dry seasons are good for landing conventional military offensives against insurgents).

Inactive intractable conflicts, the groups involved also view themselves as “fighting a war of attrition” or a “stamina war,” in which the goal is not only to score points against the opponent but also to score points with one’s own domestic constituents without alienating key allies and sources of international support. Active Intractable

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
Conflicts are durable and usually recognized as such by those involved in the conflict themselves, even though they may underestimate the potential escalation of violent acts in retribution. The conflict in Palestine has persisted—sometimes like an autonomous bilateral contest, sometimes linked to regional interstate struggles involving Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—for almost five decades.

The conflict of Palestine, categorized by its main complex category, falls into the Interstate Conflict category where the conflict is an abeyant interstate conflict; because it shares a common characteristic with active intractable conflicts, as they have not developed. As a result, the parties themselves have not experienced the full and direct costs of a mutually destructive stalemate. The primary factors of the effects of the intractability are the deep-rooted communal or ethnic cleavages contributing to the “winner-take-all” mentality. Regarding analyzing political factions of Palestine, one has to look at the Faction Traction Problem. The two-level game has had difficulty gaining traction and the number of factions and shifting alliance increases, reflecting a large number of ethnic or communal groups (in this case communal) that reside within the borders of given country. As different groups within the conflict compete for power, certain influences and the search to expand their political bases, different coalitions and alliances will form. However, as some forces shift for that power, some coalitions will crumble, while new ones rise and take their place, such as the PLO transitioning into the PNAG. A related problem that correlates with the Faction-Traction problem is the Delivering Dilemma.

\footnote{In which the relationship between elites and their constituents as well as the in-depth political support they may or may not have, once they decide to commit to talking to the enemy, are critical to the prospect of establishing negotiations.}
The Delivering Dilemma is a prevalent weakness of leaders who felt trapped and unable to deliver their own political constituency at the negotiating table. This is when negotiating positions, and peace agreements appear to be within their reach. Government parties with a weak or eroding power base are forced into strategies that treat successive bargaining encounters as conflictual opposition rather than cooperative exercises.

For example, during the Oslo Peace process in 1993, Yasir Arafat’s obstinacy and refusal to make concessions in the negotiations linked to unstable foundations of domestic political support. The growing challenge that he faced came from the “extremist” Hamas faction—which was (and still is) carrying out its own terrorist attacks against Israel. The fact of the matter is that in the end, Arafat’s own “divide-and-rule” approach had left his own people increasingly divided and dysfunctional, as this thesis will explore in depth in the next chapter.

According to Daniel Bar-Tal, the definitions of Intractable Conflicts recognize that at least some aspects of a conflict involve psychological processes. In his analysis, conflicts begin in our heads. The perception that attainment of a goal by one party precludes the achievement of a goal by one party precludes the achievement of a goal by another party is a subjective evaluation with which individuals may differ. One of the parties may not even identify a certain situation as a conflict, or may see it as less significant than other parties may. In such a situation, the nature of the developed relations between the parties depends more on the party that perceives itself to be in conflict.

Bar-Tal also notes that intractable conflicts are “total,” meaning that the characteristic of totality refers to the goals of a conflict—their nature and their level of
contradiction. The intractable conflicts are viewed as existential from the point view of the participating parties. They are perceived as being about essentials and basic goals, needs or values that are regarded as indispensable for the group’s existence or survival. They usually corner territory, self-determination, autonomy, statehood, resources, economic equality, cultural freedom, free religious practice and other central values. Because goals of the other party stand in direct contradiction to its goals of the in-group, the level of the perceived contradiction is immense.

Arab state power is very compromised and divided as a result of the ineffective coordination among the key powers of Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia in making their Beirut Summit initiative an effective instrument of international diplomatic influence. However, the Palestinian intragroup conflict is raging again and within, only continued struggle is dominant.\(^\text{16}\)

Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, even the PLO itself, have lost their vaunted role as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people due to the growing influence of Hamas, the stalemate over the control of the Palestinian Authority, which suffered after Arafat lost full control of the movement, and showed an increasing inability to make decisions. What had once been the assertion of Palestinian independence of decision has deteriorated into a Palestinian right to indecision.\(^\text{17}\)


\(^{17}\) Ibid.
According to Stephen Cohen, the intractability of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stems from three sources:

(1) The multi-level nature of the conflict; (2) the prolonged duration of the conflict, which also permitted the conflict to penetrate the political culture of the peoples of the region to the extent that to become an Arab or a Jew is to be inculcated in a conflict-maintenance national narrative of the conflict; and (3) the persistent failure in successive resolution attempts to recognize the other dimensions of the conflict, including the intraparty dimensions.¹⁸

Religion is also an added dimension to the conflict as this conflict is not only a strategic, national and intercommunal conflict but also a conflict among myths; myths that have a deep resonance in the cultures of monotheism. The Palestinian conflict’s intractability is worsened by the subtext of religion based on historical perceptions of theological or quasi-theological judgments and aspirations as well as popular myths cast about the relationship between Judaism, Christianity and Islam. This level of the conflict cannot dismiss or papered by piously declaring fellowship of man and humankind or by invoking the all-important yet, heavily violated belief that we are all children of God. Practices and justifications in the name of God can be the most terrible violations of basic humanity.

*The Cross-Cutting Cleavage Theory & Its Application to the Political Factions within the PNAG*

Cleavages are the criteria that divide the members of a community or a sub-community into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those that divide members into

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¹⁸ Ibid., 335.
groups with important political differences at specific times and places.\textsuperscript{19} These cleavages fall into three general classes: (1) ascriptive or “trait” cleavages such as race or caste; (2) attitudinal or “option” cleavages such as ideology or, less grandly, preferences; and (3) behavioral or “act” cleavages such as those elicited through voting and organizational membership. Cleavage by traits determines the “heterogeneity” or “homogeneity” of a community. Cleavage by attitude determines the extent of “dissensus” or “consensus” in a community. Cleavage also goes by behavior and determines the “fractionalization” or “cohesion” of a community.\textsuperscript{20}

A cleavage can divide a community into religious groups, opinion groups, or voting groups, for example. The simplest and most central attribute of a political cleavage is the extent to which it fragments a community by setting its members apart from one another. Where no cleavage produces any fragmentation, then the politics of a community are in an important sense trivial.\textsuperscript{21}

Cross-cutting cleavages are said to reduce the intensity of conflict in the community. The cross-pressured individual, with memberships in several groups, which pull him in different political directions, may reduce the intensity of his political commitment; his identification with a political party may become less intense. Although the intensity of group membership and the intensity of conflict are empirically related,


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 22.
they are quite distinct variables. The intensity of conflict depends on both the intensities of group memberships and the amount of cross-cutting.\textsuperscript{22}

The Democratic political organization is a fragile arrangement, which seems to work only in certain kinds of social settings. “Democratic political organizations,” usually means “political regimes, which resolve the problem of succession using regular, open, and usually partisan elections, and which therefore legitimate the right of opposition.”\textsuperscript{23} By far the largest number of theories locates the conditions of democratic organization in the admittedly vast domain of social structure. From Marx to Lipset, these theorists have called attention to society’s system of cleavages or one of its aspects. Cross-cutting cleavages conduce to lasting democratic political organization, whereas re-enforcing systems of cleavage tend to undermine it. There is no precise theoretical definition of cross-cutting cleavages. Roughly, Cross-cutting cleavages assure that those persons who are divided by one cleavage (such as race) will be brought together by another (say, religion) and vice versa.\textsuperscript{24}

The argument runs to the effect that this pattern produces conflicts so intractable that they undermine the legitimacy of opposition, and that this, in turn, leads to the destruction of the democratic political organization.\textsuperscript{25} All cleavages analysis has an important historical dimension. Alignments such as sociocultural criteria as region, class,

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 112.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 12.

\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 13-14.
and religious denomination, but also the alignments of strictly political criteria of membership in “we” versus “they,” groups.\textsuperscript{26}

\textbf{Conclusion}

The complications for the Palestinians have had historic and prolonged challenges in their conflict with Israel. This primarily is due to the notion that the Palestinians are divided, internally within the governing authority and their debate on how to effectively deal with Israel. In chapter 4, we will discuss these political factions that shape the Palestinian government that has dictated whether the Palestinians would accept Israel as a legitimate state or outwardly deny it. The continued tension between the governing factions and its citizens, continue to shape the perspective identity of a Palestinian state.

CHAPTER 4

THE PLO & THE PNA GOVERNMENT

Overview

Defined by heterogeneity and ideological pluralism, Palestinian politics gave rise to a variety of unique political perspectives in its development in the Arab world. To analyze the developments of these political factions, one scholar, Michael Brörning, defined these developments in three phases. The first phase was the development of the Pan-Arab nationalist movements such as the Movement of the Arab Nationalists after the establishment of the states of Israel in 1948.¹

The second phase is defined by the dominant role of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah). The secular organization founded in 1959, rapidly expanded after 1968 to represent an independent Palestinian approach to realizing national aspirations.² Fatah would then dominate the political landscape for the better part of three decades. Fatah also competed with other secular factions as well, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). These factions were ultimately under the PLO, a political umbrella that is recognized “as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” by the United Nations in 1974, and by the United States and Israel in 1993.³

² Ibid., 2.
³ Ibid.
These PLO factions have progressively confronted the rise of alternative groups, which started in the 1980s; this marks the third phase.\(^4\) The challenge from the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and other militant groups, such as Islamic Jihad, which conceived in the wake of failure under secular Palestinian nationalism. Most factions continued to define political life in the Palestinian territories.\(^5\) Until now, they have avoided the label, political party and instead, the Palestinians have chosen to identify their political life as “movements,” or “liberal fronts.”\(^6\)

The transformation of Palestinian political organizations from movements to clearly defined political parties, remains incomplete. This shows that the role of political organizations in the (PNA) has not officially been regulated within a legal framework.\(^7\) Most Palestinian factions have opted for ambiguity after a long period of their development. In various degrees, the factions have maintained the idea of political organizations as being political movements, which therefore exceeds the limits dictated by the PNA.\(^8\)

While political organizations have also embraced the functions of political parties within the confines of the Oslo Accords, this consists of “[…]gathering public support for their position by engaging in activities comparable to that of an opposition party in functioning democratic systems: establishing formulated political platforms, running for

\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^6\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid., 2-3.
\(^8\) Ibid., 3.
public office and attempting to influence government behavior."\(^9\) Palestinian movements, while adopting certain roles of political parties, became essential players on the domestic level of the PNA, where they have channeled political aspirations into the realm of institutionalized electoral politics.\(^{10}\)

In 1996, Fatah had a sweeping victory in the first election held by the PNA Government, in which other parties had boycotted the vote. Consequently, the newly established Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) was largely controlled by Fatah. This caused a regression in the role of political parties in Palestinian politics.\(^{11}\) After the 2006 election and the growing opposition against the Fatah party, Hamas gained its victory in Gaza. A year after Hamas’ victory, violent clashes between Fatah and Hamas had effectively divided the PNA into two competing powers. Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip while Fatah struggled to retain its hegemonic position in the West Bank.\(^{12}\) More on the Fatah and Hamas rivalry in Chapter 5.

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\(^{9}\) Ibid.

\(^{10}\) Ibid.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 4.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 3-4.
The Palestinian Liberation Movement (PLM) a.k.a Fatah (translated in reverse acronym meaning opening or conquest), is the largest faction of the PLO and the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” For many Palestinians, Fatah is the embodiment of secular Palestinian nationalism and would become “the icon” of their national aspirations. Since the PNA, Fatah dominated political life in the Palestinian Territories as the de facto party of the state. Most Arab regimes reluctantly recognized Fatah as the most credible Palestinian group, despite the fact that Fatah and the Arab regimes have either quarreled or clashed with one another.

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13 Ibid., 58.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Fatah’s policies are a mixture of both “armed resistance” and peaceful negotiations with Israel. In its 1964 Constitution, Fatah stated that their goal was “the complete liberation of Palestine and the eradication of Zionist political military, and cultural existence.” Its strategy of armed struggle was captured as the motivation and the imagination of young and disillusioned Palestinians who refused to accept the camp and diaspora as their reality.

The founding fathers of Fatah were Yasir Arafat, Khalil al-Wasir, Salah Khalaf, Faruq al-Qaddumi and Khalid al-Hasan. They were Palestinian Graduates of Cairo University and founded Fatah in Kuwait in 1959. Although, there were notable splits among the founding fathers within the divisions of Fatah however, none of the splits were formal breaks. Despite the frequent infighting, Fatah represents the central power, the authority within the PLO and the Palestinian resistance movement.

However, before 1967 during Fatah’s early stages, Fatah had refused to consider the PLO as a framework for Palestinian unity. By 1969, Fatah promoted the PLO as an umbrella structure of the legitimate framework for organization and unification.

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 59.
18 Ibid.
19 Nigel Parsons, The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa (Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, New York, 2005), 325.
20 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
Fatah’s representative Yasir Arafat became PLO chairman at the fifth Palestinian National Council held in Cairo in February of that same year.\textsuperscript{23} Since then, Fatah has controled the PLO’s main institutions and staffs as well as its diplomatic posts abroad. The dominate faction established much of the infrastructure to serve the Palestinian communities throughout the Arab world.

Fatah has more fighters, more money and a broader range of support among Palestinians, Arab states and the international community than all other PLO groups combined. Fatah’s success derives from a combination of factions: “its size, ideology, leadership and strategy.”\textsuperscript{24} Fatah’s key leaders are all Sunni Muslims and Palestinian Arabs by birth. Fatah’s Palestinian nationalism but non-ideological (secular) agenda led Fatah on a broad appeal to the Palestinian communities and allowed it to become the most popular faction.\textsuperscript{25}

Fatah has several weaknesses in its campaign to unite and coordinate PLO political and military strategies. Not only does it suffer from its own internal divisions, but also from different factions that have emerged with conflicting views on the best way to advance Palestinian goals.\textsuperscript{26} The PFLP and its sub-factions DFLP and PFLP-GC are some of the few factions that diverged from Fatah. An ostensibly left-wing party, Fatah is a full member of the Socialist International or SI; it is the global organization of social

\textsuperscript{23} Nigel Parsons, \textit{The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa}, 325.

\textsuperscript{24} Aaron David Miller, \textit{The PLO and the Politics of Survival}, 43.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
democratic, socialist and labor parties. Fatah (and later the PLO under Fatah’s leadership), worked to gain financial and political independence from Arab regimes by creating networks of wealthy Palestinian donors in the Diaspora. This allowed Fatah to finance the training of guerrilla fighters for its military wing, such as \textit{al-Assifa} a.k.a. the Storm.

\textbf{The Establishment of the PLO}

Established in 1964, the PLO or the Palestinian Liberation Organization, through the Arab League Summit in Cairo, Egypt, initiated its purpose to “liberate Palestine” through means of armed struggle. According to its Charter (revised in 1968) “Palestine, with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit” and that “it attempts to repel the Zionist and imperialist aggression against the Arab homeland, and aims at the elimination of Zionism in Palestine.” The PLO’s legislature, the Palestine National Council (PNC), was composed of members from the civilian

\textsuperscript{27} Michael Brörning, \textit{Political Parties in Palestine: Leadership and Thought}, 58.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., Article 15.
population of various Palestinian communities, and its charter the Palestine National Charter, or Covenant.\textsuperscript{32}

In 1959, Yasser Arafat had founded what some may call the central part of the PLO. Working as an engineer, he and a small group of friends founded a Palestinian liberation group called \textit{al-Fatah}, which means “the opening” or “conquest”.\textsuperscript{33} Later, Arafat would become the third PLO’s chairman succeeding Ahmad Shukeiri (1964-1967) and Yahya Hammuda (1967-1969) as he would remain in that position until 2004. In 1968, other liberation/guerrilla factions had emerged within the PLO and had gained representation within the PNC. These include the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), and the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command).\textsuperscript{34}

Since then, the PLO’s influence became more militant as more guerrilla factions began to join. There were also foreign factions that have heavily influenced outside elements and had infiltrated the PLO. Factions such as \textit{Al-Ṣāʾiqah} (“the Thunderbolt”) is a Palestinian extension of the Ba’ath Party, created by Syria in 1968. The ALF (Arab Liberation Front), created by Iraq, was supposed to counter the Syrian faction in efforts to influence a pan-Arab identity rather than being strictly Palestinian.\textsuperscript{35} Each group came with a different ideology along with their own agendas; and often times, they were

\textsuperscript{32} Aaron David Miller, \textit{The PLO and the Politics of Survival} (New York: Praeger Publishes, 1983) 22.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
competing and rivaling one another, vying for power and dominance. For example, the PFLP+ faction is the primary rival of the *al-Fatah* faction.\(^{36}\)

After the defeat of the Arab states by Israel in the Six-Day War of June 1967, the PLO became widely recognized as the representative of the Palestinians. The defeat discredited the Arab states, while the Palestinians sought to achieve greater autonomy in their struggle with Israel.\(^{37}\) This means that the Arab nations were not prepared to continue to sacrifice their national interests for the Palestinian cause and therefore, the Palestinians took extensive and uncontrollable military measures against Israel, while furthering concerns with some Arab nations such as Egypt and being encouraged by others such as Syria.\(^{38}\)

**Black September & the Lebanese Civil War**

After the defeat of the Arab states in the 1967 Six-Day War, the Arab states retreated and began to focus more on their own interests rather than the interests of Palestinian sovereignty. This shift also included the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Syria and Iraq still had a hand in Palestinian politics due to their influence of their respective parties (*Al-Ṣāʿiqah* & ALM). The Jordanian Palestinian confrontation, known as Black September (or the Jordanian Civil War) in 1970, profoundly influenced the future of the resistance movement. Black September was the bloodiest longstanding rivalry between the Hashemites and the Palestinian national movement. In 1964, King Hussein reluctantly accepted the idea of the PLO and could not

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\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival*, 21.

\(^{38}\) Ibid.
tolerate the presence of the radical Palestinian movement that sought to claim the West Bank and the loyalties of his large Palestinian population. He also had a running feud with the Palestinian authority and was determined to claim the West Bank from Jordan. The rise of the newly organized Fedayeen after 1967 created new sources of tension as the Palestinian movement began to develop an economic, political and military infrastructure within the refugee camps and outside in Jordan (since the West Bank was now in Israeli hands). By October 1968, the first series of clashes had erupted between the PLO and Jordanian authorities. While many in the Fatah faction sought to avoid a confrontation with Jordan, yet some believed the balance of power was in favor of the resistance.\(^39\) The PFLP and the DFLP were pursuing a more militant line and espousing the establishment of a popular nationalist government to replace Hussein. To them, Hussein was a weak and a reactionary Arab leader who had a close, allied relationship to the “imperialist” U.S. and had a too moderate attitude towards Israel.\(^40\)

Arafat was then named commander and chief of Palestinian forces as the resistance movement called for the overthrow of the Jordanian regime. For nine days, the Jordanian army attacked Fedayeen bases and refugee camps with mortars and artillery. The events of Black September ultimately radicalized the relatively moderate Fatah regime as they established their militant group, the BSO or the Black September Organization.\(^41\) By the summer of 1971, Hussein’s forces eliminated the Palestinian

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 28-29.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 29.

\(^{41}\) Ibid., 30.
military resistance in Jordan and forced them to flee, establishing operations in southern Lebanon. This event sets the stage of another brewing conflict—the Lebanese Civil War.

The Civil War broke out in April 1975 from fights between the Palestinian PLO guerillas and the Phalange (a Lebanese Christian Party also known as the Kataeb Party) in the streets of Beirut. The first phase of the war continued in the course of eighteen months killing hundreds of civilians on both sides, while others were taken hostage. In the midst of the war, there was absolute chaos in Lebanon. With complex factions and shifting alliances among Lebanese’ Christians, Muslims, Druze and Palestinians; the Lebanese government became completely fractured and the central military deeply divided. Demographics rapidly changed within the multi-religious nation with the increased influx of Palestinian refugees along with the Palestinian-Israeli outbreaks in the south, were some of the main causes of the civil war.

In 1976, Syria became diplomatically involved out of fear of losing commercial access to Lebanon’s port of Beirut and the PLO domination of Lebanon jeopardizes its rule over the Sunni majority in Syria, they agreed to support the Lebanese Christian dominated government and sent 30,000 troops within Lebanon. With Syrian troops put in place in the majority of the country, the LF (Lebanese Front), the PLO, the Druze, and the pro-Israeli Free Lebanon Army established themselves in different parts of the country. After a series of diplomatic failures, in late July 1976, Syria decided to switch

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43 Ibid.
sides and support the PLO. By 1980, Syria withdrew completely from their areas of Beirut and Sidon and handed them over to the PLO.44

The Lebanese Front also overrun and leveled Karantina in a Palestinian Muslim quarter in East Beirut, killing 1,000-1,500 people. Known as the Karantina Massacre, the result of the massacre brought the main forces of the PLO and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), into battle.45 The PLO military strength was largely stationed in multiple areas of Beirut, Damour, Sidon and Tyre. The number of Palestinians in these particular camps was probably not more than 100,000; the largest Palestinian presence was in Tyre with about 40,000 Palestinians. However, a staggering number—1.7 million Palestiniansfractioned in three major camps—was camped in the southern Beirut area.46

Once the war ended, Lebanese government officials conducted several elections, while most militant factions were either weakened or disbanded with the exception of Hezbollah, which continues to fight Israel in south Lebanon. The Ta’if Agreement was signed by the surviving Lebanese parliamentarians and crystallized the ethos of “no victor and no vanquished,” amending the constitution but not dismantling confessionalism in 1989.47 According to the Ta’if agreement, the Syrian and Lebanese


47 Ibid.
Governments were to agree in September 1992 to the redeployment of Syrian troops in greater Beirut.\textsuperscript{48} In 1983, the representatives of Lebanon, Israel, and the United States signed the May 17 Accord that provided for Israeli withdrawal.\textsuperscript{49}

Meanwhile, the PLO relocated itself to Tunisia, resulting in the deterioration of Israeli-Tunisian relations, where Tunisia had been previously neutral. This resulted in another frontal assault by the Israelis called “Operation Wooden Leg” on PLO headquarters near Tunis, Tunisia in 1985.\textsuperscript{50} Unfortunately, despite the bloodshed, the PLO’s efforts may have been in vain. In spite of the warfare waged throughout the years with the PLO and these Arab states, the people who need salvation most are still the ones left to suffer.

\textit{Bifurcation of the PLO}

New tactical ideological and organizational differences reinforced the lack of authority and unity that continued to divide the resistance movement. The proliferation of the new Fedayeen groups after 1967 increased these divisions and hampered the emergence of a single center of authority capable of imposing its own will on the entire movement.\textsuperscript{51} All of these factors posed enormous problems for Palestinian political leaders seeking to create legitimate and disciplined resistance groups or, in this case of Fatah, to establish a unified national movement.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{51} Aaron David Miller, \textit{The PLO and the Politics of Survival}, 41-42.
The smaller groups, particularly the PFLP, devoted much of their time to strengthening their organizations, creating new bonds among their supporters strong enough to compete with the traditional relationships the bound Palestinian society, and coping with serious internal divisions. These groups zealously guarded their independence and together with these Palestinian groups controlled by the Arab states, tried to resist Fatah’s attempts to dominate the movement. For Fatah, this diffusion of authority and power presented the greatest challenge.

The Ten Point Program

In 1974, the PLO issued the Ten Point Program, which stipulated the establishment of an “independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated.” The PNC and PLO accepted this plan. Through the program, the liberation of Palestine, although can still emphasize armed means, would mostly consist of engaging diplomacy and other compromises conducted by the Palestinian leadership. As a result, the Ten Point Program was met with immense opposition among the hardline PNA factions. Some of these hardline factions include the PFLP, which aimed to eliminate Israel and the PFLP-GC, to name a few.

This opposition then formed the Rejectionist Front, which was an independent faction that would act as a separate entity from the PLO. Member factions of the

52 Ibid., 42.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
Rejectionist Front opposed the Ten Point Program for fears of it potentially turning into a peace agreement between the Palestinian Leadership and the State of Israel.\textsuperscript{56} However, even the state of Israel was wary of this program. Israel viewed the program as a very dangerous policy aimed to exploit future Israeli territorial compromises.

\textbf{Factions within the PNA Government}

\textit{PFLP: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine}

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<td><strong>Official Name</strong></td>
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<td><strong>PLC Members 1996</strong></td>
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<td><strong>PLC Members 2006</strong></td>
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Figure 4.2, “PFLP at a Glance,” \textit{Political Parties in Palestine: Leadership and Thought} by Michael Bröning, 2013, 98.

The PFLP, or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, is Fatah’s archrival within the PLO and has a different ideological and organizational approach in achieving Palestinian goals.\textsuperscript{57} Founded in late 1967, the PFLP’s foundation lay within the

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{57} Aaron David Miller, \textit{The PLO and the Politics of Survival}, 47.
Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). Its main founders were George Habash and Wadi Haddad, both from Greek Orthodox Christian backgrounds.\textsuperscript{58} The Arab Nationalist Movement had a particular attraction to Christians, who saw a secular ideology based on Arab unity as a way to equalize their otherwise minority status in a predominantly Muslim world. They also sought to fashion themselves a place within the Palestinian resistance movement.\textsuperscript{59}

The PFLP adopted a Marxist-based approach, as it believed to be better suited to the social and economic conditions of the area. The June 1967 defeat of the Six Day War shattered any remaining faith the PFLP founders had in a conventional Arab unity. It confirmed its belief when Arab weakness resulted from the “petty bourgeois” tendencies in the “progressive” Arab states such as Egypt and Syria.\textsuperscript{60} As its name suggests, the Popular Front adopted an alliance between the Arab masses and truly progressive regimes against Zionism, imperialism and the forces of Arab reaction. Habash’s adoption of a Marxist-Leninist framework could possibly be more of a strategical move in order to outmaneuver radicals than establishing a true orthodox Soviet communist ideology.\textsuperscript{61}

Influenced by some of Fatah’s tactics, the PFLP followed a different method from Fatah’s conservative armed tactic to the Palestinian struggle. The PFLP viewed the world in which, “the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction sought to liquidate the

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
Palestinian and popular mass struggle.”\textsuperscript{62} The degree in which the PFLP’s commitment to change Arab society is however, unclear. Although, it did wish to overthrow the “reactionary” (conservative) Arab states as an end to further Palestinian liberation goals.\textsuperscript{63} The PFLP’s uncompromising position on Israel regressed to using any kind of tactic in order to advance its case. Habash’s leadership had a major influence among the younger generation and it was popular for them to believe that Arafat was a sell-out to Palestinian goals.

Today, the PFLP lacks a strong leadership and has split into a number of other factions. One of which considers a diplomatic strategical approach. This faction is known as the DFLP or the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which will be covered in the next section. The other faction is irreversibly committed to the armed struggle approach. This faction is called the PFLP-GC or its parent faction’s namesake with a hyphenated clause entitled, General Command and it will also be covered in the next section.

\textbf{Sub PFLP Factions:}
\textit{DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine & PFLP-GC: General Command}

After seceding from the PLFP over doctrinal differences, the DFLP was established in 1969. It was originally called the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) until 1974 when the seceded faction changed its name to the DFLP. Nayif Hanatama, a Jordanian Christian founded the DFLP and continues to

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
maintain a steady following in Palestine. Like the PFLP, the DFLP views the Palestinian struggle in terms of class. Unlike the PFLP however, the DFLP promotes an Orthodox Christian thought, which takes the Marxism-Leninism very seriously however, the DFLP is by no means a Soviet entity.

Nayif Hanatama, a young Jordanian Greek Orthodox Christian from a working class background, did not agree with Habash’s strict conservativism of the PFLP. Hanatama recognized the weakness of the Arab identity as it lacked of true sense of class and revolutionary consciousness. He argued that it was essential to remove moderate elements from the resistance movement before the struggle for Palestine could begin. The DFLP saw itself as the leader of this movement and criticized the PFLP’s involvement in international terrorism, instead devoting its resources to developing an organization that mobilized the masses and confronted the “reactionary and pro-imperialist” Arab regimes.

Despite the DFLP’s extreme Marxist-Leninist views, it emphasized action, which gave it flexibility to an assessable strategy that was freer to engage in diplomatic tactics than any other PLO group except Fatah. The DFLP relates with the rejectionist organizations however, it has cooperated closely with Fatah on key issues. It has

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64 Nigel Parsons, *The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa*, 326.

65 Aaron David Miller, *The PLO and the Politics of Survival*, 50.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.
supported Fatah’s “phased political strategy,” also known as the Tem Point Program in 1974, and has taken the lead in arguing the importance of establishing diplomatic agreements with the Israeli Left along with Communist parties. 70

The DFLP however, distanced itself from Fatah over Arafat’s efforts to avoid “a complete break” with Egypt during Sadat’s peace initiatives. It has also criticized Arafat’s efforts to move closer to Jordan. 71 Nonetheless, the DFLP maintains a working relationship with Fatah and recognizes that the advancement of PLO goals may depend on continued cooperation. The DFLP’s major difficulty in this area will not be working out a modus vivendi with Arafat but establishing a relationship with King Hussein—traditionally the DFLP’s bitterest enemy.

The DFLP’s dissidents argued for a parallel approach to “armed resistance,” popular struggle and diplomacy. The aim (as stated in more recent party documents) was “involving itself in the national solution to the Palestinian question that included adopting a labor class ideology.” The conflict between the two factions included serious harassment of DFLP members by their former comrades. Like the PFLP, the Democratic Front over time distanced itself from Fatah’s autocratic leadership of the PLO. Against the background of public attempts to once again merge PFLP and DFLP, the latter also briefly joined the camp opposing Yasir Arafat.

As part of the government, the DFLP has been highly critical of the repeated postponement of elections and has remained a staunch opponent of negotiations with Israel prior to the cessation of settlement oppressions. In this sense, the DFLP has a

70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
relevant intra-Palestinian discussion on the scenarios of accepting the Two-State Solution and still enjoys relevant support within the Palestinian diaspora.\textsuperscript{72}

The PFLP-GC, resembling the DFLP is a branch of the original PFLP.\textsuperscript{73} Ahmad Jabril, a young Palestinian who was trained in the Syrian army, led the General Command split from Habash’s group in late 1968 because of the PFLP’s differences with Syria.\textsuperscript{74} According to Aaron David Miller, “Jabril had close ties to Damascus and opposed Habash’s activities against Syrian influenced faction, Al-Sa’iqa. Following Habash’s arrest and imprisonment in 1968, Jabril began to distance himself from both Habash and Hawatmeh, while pushing an independent line.”\textsuperscript{75}

Miller also notes that the PFLP-GC “had never been particularly comfortable with the PFLP’s ideology.”\textsuperscript{76} It had adopted the PFLP’s revolutionary rhetoric but believed that the real focus of the Palestinian struggle should be on military rather than political action. The General Command quickly developed an ideology based on militarism and believed that Zionist and Israeli interests must be attacked at any time—a philosophy that led to a number of terrorist attacks. The PFLP-GC has also played an important role in launching cross-border raids into Israel. The PFLP-GC has received its primary support from Libya and Syria has sought to maintain its independence.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., 50-51.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., 51.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
It has also clashed with Fatah on major issues:

… siding with the Syrians during the Lebanese civil war and attacking what is believed to be to compromise on Palestinian goals. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the PFLP-GC was involved in the Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon and launched a number of attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians.\(^7\)

Since the late 1980s, the GC faction has been largely inactive, but during the Syrian Civil war in 2011, it began fighting on the side of the Syrian government after Syrian rebels attacked and took over the Palestinian camp in Damascus.

**IRM: Islamic Resistance Movement a.k.a. Hamas**

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\(^7\) Ibid.

In analyzing the political frameworks of Hamas and the Resistance Movement in a religious Islamic context, Hamas is a representation of an internal transformation of the
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhoods that took shape in the late 1980s. Its structure seeks to aim for the ideals from the original Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt where their main goal is the Islamitization of a society or in other words, to establish an Islamic state. It demonstrates how the movement’s core principles are centered in the form of Muslim Revivalism in an individual and a societal spectrum. According to Milton-Edwards, Hamas’s reformist interpretation of Islamic principles, coupled with political radicalism. The outcome of this process has been Hamas’s ability to use strategies such as tactics of violence and armed resistance where the evidence lies within the Islamist identity. Hamas’s identity also follows the form of a protest movement, in response to the degradation of “Palestinian discourses of empowerment through the practice of autonomy under the framework of the corruption, the incompetence, and the inability to serve the needs of domestic populations by local regimes…”\textsuperscript{78}

Furthermore, in the case of Hamas according to Milton-Edwards, there is a duality in this “resistance” as well it reforms local platforms both externally and internally.\textsuperscript{79} In the external sense, Hamas resists Israel as they deem the Israeli state as a foreign occupier of Palestine land, as well as being the “handmaiden of neo-imperialist ambitions.”\textsuperscript{80} On the internal sense, Hamas reshapes views of the previously dominated PA before the


\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
2006 election as it continually criticized the PLO’s failure to make the basic needs, including human security of the Palestinian West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.81

Hamas’s political framework is surprisingly not founded in the principles of its Charter developed and published in 1988 months after its formation. The absence of this crucial element is known to be, in hindsight, an embarrassment for the Hamas group due to its current prominence in the political spectrum. In fact, the Charter is one of the first documents published in introducing the new resistance group and demonstrate its objectives and goals. Its’ main point is to implement that the Palestinian land is imbedded in the Arab and Muslim identity and must be liberated from the “Zionist” dominations and their Western supporters.82 All chapters of the Charter were “infused with Qur’anic verses, Hadiths, quotations from prominent religious people and ancient and contemporary, and sometime classical Arab poetry.

On the other hand, according to Menachem Klein in his article, Hamas in Power, Hamas also produced various political texts such party platforms, main leaders’ interviews, texts of discussions in agreements with Fatah, etc. which “…most of them are pragmatic and action directed, rather than theological and ideological.” Klein also says, “They address means and ends, stages, and the needs of the hour. This contrasts with the Charter and with the extremists who do not distinguish between tactics and strategy or between politics and theology.”83 Hamas leaders are also unwilling to impose on their prime position with fears that is would enter a confrontation with their society. Instead,

81 Ibid.
83 Menachem Klein, "Hamas in Power," Middle East Journal 61, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 453.
they acquire the ability to adjust themselves within the society and influence it from within.\textsuperscript{84}

There is also a question of whether the political framework of Hamas is genuinely democratic. The answer to this question is that it hard to judge, given that nearly all Arab countries within the region have a history of inexperience with democratic systems. With this comes the additional lack of evidence to give this consideration the benefit of the doubt. According to Khaled Hroub, democracy in the regional area itself has been in short supply since in the post-colonial era; almost none of the states are full-fledged democracies. In various Arab republics, nationalists and socialists parties have either come to power through elections or military coups. Neither have they’ve been peaceful relinquishment of power.\textsuperscript{85} While in Arab monarchies, the thought of a democracy is out of the question. Therefore, Hamas being a genuine democratic government is just as in any other inexperienced political party in the Arab region.

Despite this, the Palestinian polity within the ‘post-Arafat’ era is also greatly against any kind of authoritarian rule. The immense diversity of the Palestinian community in higher education and the general envy of the neighboring ‘Israeli democracy’ shows a very small window of having a democratic government on the part of Hamas. Additionally, secularist leftists in the Palestinian government have already historically instilled their influence on the Palestinian society, including the powerful Palestinian Christian community that is highly active in the political realm.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
Hamas’s victory in the 2006 elections was not only a shock to the opposition but also a shock to Hamas as well. Hamas’s aim in the elections was only to strive for a fraction of the seats (40-45%) in order for them to be a legitimate party within the PA. By doing so, they wanted to only deal with the protection of Palestinian rights and not having to deal with the ultimate responsibilities of the government, while letting Fatah take the most of the grunt work as usual. Of course, the outcome was different than expected, ending with a 60% landslide on Hamas’s behalf.

In actuality, the question states, why did the Palestinians vote for Hamas other than because of the apparent incompetence and corruption that Fatah displayed in recent years? According to Hroub, there were many other reasons why the Palestinians voted for Hamas. One of the reasons was the movement’s hard work in the Palestinian community, which gained the popularity for it. Further, the multiple failed peace attempts with Israel followed by Israeli brutality towards the Palestinians led them no longer to have faith in the peace process and the frustration with the initial ‘peace talks’ took its toll.

Another interesting factor in Hamas’s victory the absence of clear religious issues. In fact, their ability to gather supporters on the Christian and secular side, was by far a feat in itself. During the elections, Hamas members were also able to support Christian candidates and won them seats in the PA parliament. They even appointed a Christian to its cabinet as the minister of tourism. The diversity of voters clearly showed that it was

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87 Ibid., 136-150.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
Hamas’s identity as a nationalist liberation movement promotes a change and reform in all aspects. It is also good to note that this sort of development is inconsistent with Hamas’ initial strict Islamic platform and they seem to have contradicted themselves due to their openness of Christian supporters.

Andrea Nüsse suggests that Hamas is identified with Islamic Fundamentalism, in which she takes in agreement with the interpretation of Sami Zubaida’s general definition of the term which is the, “modern political movements and ideas, mostly oppositional, which seeks to establish, in one sense or another, an Islamic state.”90 In this particular sense, in Nüsse’s case, Islam becomes a narrowed political doctrine that references politics and society.91

The Islamic Fundamentalist ideology originated from the development of the Islamic thought of the 20th century where it links to the history of Western colonial expansion and Western dominance of the late 19th century. Islamic Fundamentalist thinker Muhammad Abdul of Egypt (1849-1905), once assessed that the archaic scholastic, magical and saint worshiping practices of Islam had in fact weakened the importance of Islam in politics and society. Thus, his reforms based on the “rational understanding and presentation of Islamic truth, remain entirely within Islamic tradition.”92 He then later insists on the need to return to some form of an original Islam


91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.
and to emphasize more on education, although, in contrast to later fundamentalists, his thought lacked the principles of an Islamic state and government.

Therefore, Abduh’s lack in this particular thought gave way to the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which influenced the politicization of Islam and called for an Islamic state. The Muslim Brotherhood has currently been the most prominent fundamentalist movement of Sunni Islam in the Arab-Muslim world. It was once a movement for education in an alignment with Abduh’s ideology, but it had soon developed a political dimension, which it felt the need to establish an Islamic state based on Islamic law (i.e. *Shari‘a*). The Islamic thinker who out the Muslim Brotherhood on the forefront of their development was Sayyid Qutb whose methods and development a highly important element to current fundamentalist groups. Qutb suggests that the principles of Islam guarantee social justice, which originates from the Islamic principle of the equality of men. This includes the eradication of oppression that no “man-made system such as communism or capitalism can avoid.”

Furthermore, the main goal of Hamas is to also liberate Palestine from the occupation of what they call the “Zionist enemy”. Therefore, the recognition of the Jewish state is deemed as *kufr*, or in other words infidelity or unbelief. Moreover, Palestine is said to be a special place within the Islamic creed due to the importance of Jerusalem as the first direction of prayer for Muslims and the Al-Aqṣā mosque is considered the third sacred place of Islam. Since these places are very central to Islam as

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93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., 47.
well as the other Abrahamic faiths, it is no wonder that these religious groups had often clashed throughout history.

The means, by which Hamas carries out their goals, is through the Islamic principle *Jihād* in the form of the *Intifāda*. In accordance with Hamas, *Jihād* is the only means to liberate Palestine and reestablish its’ glory to the Islamic *Umma*. The *Intifāda* is said to be the only way to win back Palestine. Some sources suggests that Hamas claimed the start of the uprising within the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip, which had members spread the *Intifāda* to the West Bank in 1987.\(^95\) In Hamas’s favor, “the masses chose Islam as a program for change” and it was the Palestinian Islamists who applied the fundamentalist ideology of that Islam is the solution for all Muslim problems in the modern era.\(^96\) The Qur’anic interpretation of the movement during the *Intifāda* in a sense, revived the faith and brought people closer to God as well as returned the people of Islam to their “true nature and identity”\(^97\)

The term *Jihād* is in actuality an often misused term and one that can be confused in its’ arbitrary and vague Arabic definition. The term is often misused to express only war which in Arabic, refers to as *qitāl* (fighting). This is not the case; the term *Jihād* (meaning “struggle”) has a broader implication, which includes striving towards God’s cause.

In Hamas’s circumstance, *Jihād* was the fundamentalist interpretation, which involves the “struggles” through education and writing. However, when Hamas since

\(^{95}\) Ibid., 67-78.

\(^{96}\) Ibid.

\(^{97}\) Ibid., 75.
abandoned its’ fundamentalist “spiritual heritage,” the Resistance Movement now justifies the armed struggle in retaliation to the Israeli occupation.\textsuperscript{98} To support this position, in reference to the Mīthāq (Covenant), it states, “The expulsion from the homeland (\textit{waṭan}) is a kind of killing.” Therefore, Hamas’s interpretation of Jihād relates closely to the apologetic modernist’s interpretation, which only promotes defensive war rather than the fundamentalist expansionist war that is to spread the Islamic da’wa.

The “real nature” of Hamas is the longing for a democratic government for the Muslim people. Whereas, Islam is part of the “true nature” of Muslims where there is greater participation within the population that will lead to the Islamitization of state affairs. This perspective lies closely with the “classical theory” in which contemporary Muslim fundamentalists states that Islamic value must be gained from the soul of Muslims and then will grow from “a growing nucleus of believers” to a transforming governing society and state.\textsuperscript{99}

Hamas’s view and relationship with the religious minority, primarily Palestinian Christians, shows tremendous sensitivity and tolerance and has established a cordial relationship with the Christian community. Although, some tensions do arise from time to time as Christians hold secular ideals however, this does not reflect any particular divergence. Rather, it is more of a disagreement in the relationship of government. Hamas’s view of Christians is nothing but positive as they describe Palestinian Christians as a “protected minority” who are never treated as “citizens of second, third or fourth

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
This view reflects the Islamic teachings of respecting and protecting *dhimmīs* or “Peoples of the Book” which include Christians and Jews as well as any non-Muslims possessing a scripture.\(^{101}\)

**Conclusion**

In addition to the factions that have been discussed, there are other factions worth mentioning as well. The PLF (Palestinian Liberation Front): a minor standalone faction that merged with the PFLP for a time; the PAF (Palestinian Arab Front) is a minor sub faction to the ALF (Arab Liberation Front); while the ALF (a representation of the Iraqi Ba'th Party) and the Al-Sa'iqa (established by the Syrian Ba'th Party) are both influenced by outside entities and have a main interest in the these Palestinian factions. There are also the communist PPP (the Palestinian People’s Party) faction that opposes the PNA, the PNI (Palestinian National Initiative), a newer faction formed in 2006 that opposes Fatah and Hamas, which values a non-violent approach; and the Islamic Jihad, an extremist faction that is also an offspring of the Muslim Brotherhood. All of these political factions play into the complexity of the Palestinian national identity dilemma.


\(^{101}\) Ibid., 91-92.
PART III

CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY

Specifically, Where Does this Lead to the State of Palestine?

Issue #1: Whether the PNA Government is Feasible to be a Sufficient Entity

To determine the feasibility of the PNA Government as a sufficient entity to represent the Palestinian people would be “premature” according to Michael Bröring. He notes that in spite of the major factors having control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the main desire of establishing a full autonomy state remains an unfinished goal. In response, outside observers would casually dismiss the PNA’s current establishment as “a failed national movement.”¹ This notion is, however, a rather pessimistic view as well as a blatant cold shoulder towards Palestinians' struggle to achieve an entirely sovereign state.

On the other hand, one could observe that the status of the PNA can also pose a challenge to the appeal of legitimizing the political establishment of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While taking into account of the global trend of voter dealignment voters no longer align themselves with a political party, it is understandable to consider that the future roles of the established political factions are a cause for concern. According to a recent poll in September 2016 conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) with a margin of error of 3%, 58% of the population in the West Bank

¹ Michael Bröring, Political Parties in Palestine: Leadership and Thought, 5.
want President Abbas to resign, while in the Gaza Strip, it is 65%. The Palestinian population as a whole consider the PA as corrupt which stands at 79% and 47% believe that the PA is a burden while 46% view the PA as "an asset." Whereas in 2012, Palestinians felt that neither Hamas nor Fatah was working in the "national interest."³

Brörning also suggests that because there is a distrust among the people and the PNA government; the government should not be dismissed entirely as a failure. He provides several reasons of why this is. The first being the PNA’s election law is to safeguard the future role of political movements that are at risk of complete dissolution. This is because the law consists of a majority system that requires a strong component of proportional representation and thus strengthening the role of the political factions within the PNA Government.⁴ The second can be argued that established factions may have been sidestepped at first, but they would at least emerge from not only free elections but also the influence of the Arab Springs.⁵

Therefore, there have been several attempts to break from the bipolar political that has stagnated the election processes. For example, in 2006 former PA minister Salam Fayyad and legislator Hanan Ashrawi established a movement that would give voters an alternative “Third Way” party list.⁶ This centrist establishment could be a start in moving away from the traditional polarized institution, which would instead, offer a more

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³ Michael Brörning, Political Parties in Palestine: Leadership and Thought, 5.

⁴ Ibid., 5-6.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., 6.
balanced option for the Palestinian population’s representation. Although the centrist party only gained two seats in the Parliament at the time, it was still considered a step forward in a positive direction despite its perceived failure. For now, the established parties will continue to remain. Whether these factions will bridge the gap, is yet to be seen.

_Hamas and Fatah Rivalry_

As the leading secular sector of the multi-party PLO, Fatah has a complicated and fragile relationship with Hamas since Hamas' victory in the 2006 elections, which resulted in sporadic factional fighting. The fight escalated when both Fatah and Hamas could come to an agreement on how to share their power in 2007, ending with Hamas gaining control of the Gaza. Since then, the Palestinian Authority has split into two polities as both parties see themselves as the true representation of the Palestinian people with Fatah ruling over the West Bank and Hamas rules over the Gaza Strip. During the course of the split, there have been many attempts of a reconciliation process among the parties, which failed in 2008-2010. However, another reconciliation has been initiated in the summer of 2014 after the battle in the Gaza. There was no word on their progress as of October 2014, until 2016 when it was announced that Hamas and Fatah's agreement fell through once again.

The Palestinian leadership along with accurate figures such as Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, accused of corruption; gave Hamas an edge over the election in 2006 and trust among the Palestinians toward Fatah and the former PLO faded. The transition to Palestinian self-government in Gaza and the West Bank while affected by charges of patronage, nepotism, and corruption. Ever since the international community first
pledged some $2.4 billion in international financial support for Palestinian self-governance in October 1993, relations between donor countries and the Palestinian authority have been marred by the former’s concern over Palestinian transparency and accountability in the use of aid funds.

Within the territories, the Jericho municipal council resigned en masse in February 1995, citing corruption as one of its reasons for doing so. In March, the issue also surfaced at a stormy meeting of the Fatah Central Council, with Arafat accused of protecting corrupt aides and directly siphoning international aid. In a recent poll in Gaza, 57 percent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Palestinian Authority (PA), 69 percent complained of the lack of democracy, and 90 percent expressed the view that positions in the PA filled unfairly.\(^7\)

There is also an underlying factor of the alleged corruption founded in the Palestinian Authority leadership, which includes both Fatah and the former PLO. According to American author and scholar the Middle East Jonathan Schanzer, “Under Arafat, the PA had funded untold amounts of international donor funding to a select group of insiders and did little to forge economic solutions that would create new jobs and opportunities for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.”\(^8\) As a result, there was little confidence in the PA among the Palestinian people.

This gave rise to the efforts of creating a functional system that benefits the financial needs of the Palestinian people. In the formation of a more transparent financial

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system, Finance Minister, Salam Fayyad inspired the creation of the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF), which promotes a sovereign wealth fund that helps enrich and empower the Palestinian people.\textsuperscript{9} However, this effort comes to an abrupt halt at the untimely death of Arafat in 2004 and the rise of Abbas in 2005. Schanzer also explicates that Arafat's rise to power is due in large part to U.S. President George W. Bush's support of Abbas in hopes that he would lead the Palestinians towards peace with Israel. However, this too was short lived. Soon after his rise to power, Abbas proved to be not only incompetent but also a repeated of the characterized Arafat era, which consists of nepotism and political patronage that became the norm. He even undermined some of the PA’s own laws while systematically denied Fayyad and other political competitors’ power as he weakened institutions that promoted any transparencies and accountability towards the people.\textsuperscript{10}

Fatah's corruption became more prevalent when the U.S. and other allies in the West, furthered Abbas’s power after the Palestinian civil war in 2007. When Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip and government power within the PA, the allies feared a complete takeover of both the Palestinian territories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The West provided Abbas with arms, intelligence, and money to "stay in power at all costs, and don’t let Hamas take over."\textsuperscript{11} The primary focus of having Abbas as a pillar for peace was quickly abandoned by the International Western community. It was no longer about reconciling with Israel and having a two-state solution. Rather, it was about

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
fighting Hamas and make sure that they do not take over the West Bank. It was also clear that the Palestinian's strive for political stability and transparency was failing.

Tensions between Fatah and Hamas began after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 and intensified after the 2006 election victory of Hamas as the International community pressured against the PA to have them dismissed which later resulted in a civil war in 2007. Their main disagreements stem from Fatah's renunciation of violence and hope to form agreements with Israel and peacefully end the occupation in order to establish an independent state. Hamas on the other hand opposed to having any negotiations with Israel and refused to recognize Israel as a legitimate state while holding their position to continue to use violent means to achieve their goals if necessary.

Ideologically, the lack of common ground was what made Hamas and Fatah’s relationship inadequate. According to Khaled Hroub, Fatah along with other factions of the Palestinian left rejected the ‘religious content’ of Hamas and continued to press for a more secular emphasis in its approach against Israel. The overall breakdown of Hamas and Fatah’s relationship is a product of the lack of trust and the ideological differences that “overrode the common cause and pragmatism.”

Since the 2006 fall out between Fatah and Hamas, there have been multiple attempts to bridge the gap between the two factions in a series of agreements. The first two in agreements were in 2007 in Mecca and the other in Yemen. There were followed by the Cairo Agreement in December 2011, the Doha agreement in February 2012 and


13 Ibid., 29-33.
finally the Beach Refugee Camp Agreement in April 2014, all of which have failed.\textsuperscript{14} Despite being officially sponsored by Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Qatar, Fatah and Hamas are both clinging to their positions and refuse to make the necessary concessions in order to reach common ground.\textsuperscript{15}

The root of these failures can be recognized in the fact that both Hamas and Fatah are only concerned with their own interests instead of the interests of the Palestinian people. Both factions are afraid of losing power in their respective territories, and neither faction would risk jeopardizing that power its position. For example, Fatah insists that Hamas should relinquish some of its power in the Gaza Strip, by handing over the Rafah Crossing (the only crossing point between Egypt and Gaza Strip) while Hamas insists that Fatah should recognize the recent events of corruption that occurred since 2007, including the salary crisis for government employees in Gaza.\textsuperscript{16} In this case, nothing will change unless outside donors can link their financial aid with a formidable incentive for having free and democratic elections on a consistent basis.

\textit{Issue #2: Failed Peace Negotiations - From the Oslo Accord to the French Initiative}

The Oslo Accord was a "Declaration of Principles" in "Interim Self-Government Arrangements" and was hosted by Bill Clinton at the White House. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Mahmoud Abbas of the PLO signed the Accord on September 13,


\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
1993, which ended the First Intifada.\textsuperscript{17} The Accord allowed Israel to accept the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians and ensured that both sides would agree that the PA would hold governing responsibilities within the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories over a five-year span, which in turn, renounced its terrorist status. While this was established, the PLO also recognized Israel’s right to exist as a legitimate state in peace.\textsuperscript{18}

At first, it seemed like a promising step forward towards peace. However, this would soon fall apart when the issues of borders, violence, refugees and Jerusalem took place. The issue of who got control of Jerusalem was the final straw that rendered the Oslo Accord a failure as neither side wanted to give up control of the Holy Place. Negotiations broke down near the end of President Bill Clinton's term, and the peace talks failed in the late 1990s. More violence soon followed marking the second Intifada in 2000.\textsuperscript{19}

The failure of the Oslo Accord can be most attributed to the fact that Yitzhak Rabin and Mahmoud Abbas as mentioned before, could not agree on the Israel and Palestine borders, Israeli settlements in the West Bank (and Gaza Strip at the time), Israeli military presence in the remaining territories, who gets Jerusalem and the Palestinian’s right to return. Therefore, both sides’ interests were completely ignored. Another factor was that President George W. Bush refused to host another agreement

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\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
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plan at the White House after announcing his “Roadmap for Peace,” in 2002 amid the events of the Second Intifada in 2003.

Recently, the U.S. seemed to have taken a step back from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process after another failed peace talks in 2014 when Secretary John Kerry “threw in the towel” after nine months talks reaching an impasse since Fatah and Hamas signed an agreement to reconcile.\textsuperscript{20} This ended the U.S.’s involvement in the conflict for the time being. Therefore, France has initially stepped in in response to the recent terrorist threats brought by disillusioned young refugee males, including Palestinians within Europe. Thus, it was only natural for France to take the initiative in resolving the conflict. In 2015, what has become to be known, as the French Initiative, was first proposed by the Hollande administration. The Initiative consisted of the drafted United Nations Security Council resolution, which acted a foundation along with other components involving a timeline for achieving them.\textsuperscript{21} However, this too failed due to opposition from the U.S. and Israel.

\textit{Issue #3: Gaza as a Third State in a Three-State Solution}

As Hamas and Fatah continue to struggle for power, it is clear that resolving the Israeli-Palestinian issue is essential to restoring the stability in the Middle East region, as U.S. President Obama acknowledged in his Cairo speech in 2009 and again in 2011 in his remarks on the Middle East and North Africa.\textsuperscript{22} However, with an eminent terrorist

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
organization controlling the Gaza, Fatah’s apparent corruption within the PNA and Israel’s continued construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, illustrates a bleak future for any chance of a two-state solution peace agreement. But if global leaders in the U.S. President consider to look past a “two-state solution” but instead take into account a possible “three-state solution” as a potential successful solution for resolving the Israel-Palestinian conflict as Georgetown University Professor Ori Z. Soltes and recent University of Pittsburg PhD candidate Colin P. Clarke suggests.23

The “Three-State Solution” can be a better option since it was implemented to resolve the bloody conflicts between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In this case, the conflict revolving India and Pakistan was a religious sectarian strife between Hindus and Muslims who fought each other in a years’ long protracted conflict after the establishment of the Republic of India in 1947. In 1971, Pakistan fought a gruesome civil war between the East and West regions of the country; in the Western part, resided the ethnic Bengals whereas in the East, lay the ethnic majorities of Punjabis and Pashtuns.

In order to resolve these conflicts respectively, each region within Southeast Asia’s peninsula was divided into three separate states, where each region has its own identity and autonomy. Even the geographical layout of these states are similar (if not almost identical) to the West Bank, Israel and the Gaza Strip. With this said, the situation


in the West Bank, Israel and the Gaza Strip is also similar to India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Both regions have a hostile country in between their territories, vying for self-determination from the dominating state in the middle.²⁴

If the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were to become separate entities, it would be easier for Israel to distinguish both a working relationship with the West Bank, while managing security measures with the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.²⁵ It would also be beneficial for both the West Bank and Israel to continue to have a steady economic relationship as the West Bank and the Israeli Left (for the most part) has already established such a relationship. Although there is still conflict between India and Pakistan, at least the situation is more controlled as now their conflict is between sovereign states instead of unstable regions. To conclude this segment; a three-state solution has so far had success within the region of Southeast Asia, why not the Middle East?

_The Common Horizon as A Human Value: Would These Factions Help the Palestinian State Cause, while Establishing a ‘Common Horizon’ with Israel & Among Themselves?_

The human experience of understanding is a fundamental way of the human existence. The factions within the Palestinian National Authoritative Government, as well as Hamas, can be analyzed as the challenge to have an effective communication and mutual understanding with each faction. This constitutes a challenge for them as they continue to forgo negotiations and opportunities to work together in order to achieve their

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goal of establishing Palestine as a full-fledged sovereign state. The problem is that each political factions’ idea of how the state of Palestine should be, constantly conflicts with the views of other factions.

As these factions are generally identified as either secular or religious, they too have a sense of culture within their nature. We can also say that the nature of their conflict is a culture war between the secular and the religious factions of the PNA Government. With this said; reaching a common ground of understanding must be established. Therefore, the human philosophy of hermeneutics can be used to analyze how the Palestinian political factions can advance through these challenges and succeed.

Initially, the concept of hermeneutics is traditionally the study of written text through language and the transfer between cultures, as M. Heidegger implemented in his analysis of translating or interpreting religious and historical texts. Therefore, hermeneutics as a basis for methodological research in “cross-cultural communications” did not occur due to this difference, as using hermeneutics in this form mostly focuses on “face to face communication,” rather than text interpretation. However, over time, hermeneutics began to evolve as philosophers like Hans Gadamer, reshaped the discipline into what can be used in cultural and international studies. Gadamer used hermeneutics to analyze and interpret the “living language.” This technical to philosophical discipline is a universal method to all humanities according to W. Dilthey in his unfinished work *Critique of Historical Reason* and it is used to help validate the human existence.

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27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.
An element in hermeneutics, according to Hans-Georg Gadamer in his work *Truth and Method*, consists of the concept horizon, which is used to assess the concept of “situation.”\(^{29}\) The concept of situation represents the limitations of our vision of the present. This means, the idea of horizon allows us to perceive with a range of vision that includes seeing everything through a "particular vantage point."\(^{30}\) To apply this, we tend to see the narrow horizon by our prejudices, instead of a possible expansion of horizon in order to see things from another's perspective. We can think of this as "expanding our horizons." "To have a horizon," means that should not be limited to what is close to them but the ability to see beyond it.\(^{31}\)

This also requires us to “transpose ourselves” into a situation by putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes in order for us to understand the other. Then we become aware of the other by putting ourselves in the other’s position. This process is not necessarily empathy, but “a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but also that of the other.”\(^{32}\) This process of understanding involves the *fusion of these horizons*, where true understanding from one to another truly occurs.\(^{33}\)

Within the multicultural perspective, according to S. Yachin in his article *Intercultural Hermeneutics in Metacultural Perspective*, intercultural hermeneutics

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\(^{30}\) Ibid.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 302.

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 304.
maintains the ideas of unity through human nature. This helps people of different cultures understand each other as we humans can relate to the human experiences of “love, hunger, the ability to feel pain, play, work, etc. no matter the culture.” These fundamental human experiences are what binds us all to a common identity, human. To understand what it means to be human can help stimulate a conversation with Palestinian factions as all members of these factions to share a national identity, ethnicity and a common cause to achieve an autonomous state of their own. If these factions can come together in these efforts, then they may have a chance of success in showing the world that the Palestinian National Authoritative Government is a cohesive government capable of standing on their own and function as a working democracy.

Before the civil war erupted in Syria, an estimated 560,000 Palestinian refugees lived in the country. When the conflict intensified in 2015, Palestinian refugees, in particular, were vulnerable and disproportionately affected by the violence of the conflict. According to the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency, UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East), an estimated 450,000 of the 560,000 Palestinian refugees registered with the agency in Syria and remain inside the country.\(^{35}\) Over two-thirds (280,000 people) are internally displaced and an estimated 95\% (430,000) rely on the UNRWA for humanitarian assistance according to UNRWA’s 2016 Syria Emergency Appeal.\(^{36}\) Of those Palestinians who were forced again into exile within the region, around 420,000 have fled to Lebanon and more than 17,000 to Jordan.\(^{37}\)

With more than 110,000 Syrian-born Palestinians have fled Syria since the start of the conflict, UNRWA estimates that at least 60,000 have fled the region that is outside


the agency’s jurisdiction (Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine) and a good portion of those have fled to Europe.\textsuperscript{38} Due to the deteriorating conditions in Syria and the increase of instability in the Middle East region, it seems that Palestinians no longer feel safe in the region, “They are the most vulnerable of the vulnerable,” and so, “they are braving the life threatening journey to Europe,” according to UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness.\textsuperscript{39}

In Iraq, when ISIL/IS (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant/Syria) took over the city of Mosul in early June of 2014, over 300 Palestinians have fled the city. In the Baharka Camp currently houses 1,120 internally displaced families who have fled the violence between the ISIL/IS coalition forces in 2015.\textsuperscript{40} While the camp was created for Iraqi IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), 18 Palestinian families also reside in Baharka Camp under refugee status. This constitutes a problematic situation for the Palestinian refugees, as they are not considered as full-fledged Iraqi citizens according to the Iraqi government. According to Nazumi Hazouri, a consul general for Palestine in Iraqi Kurdistan, “This constant upheaval of Palestinian refugees in Iraq has become the norm,” and that, “They always have to move according to their situation, and now [because of


\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Sheren Khalil and Matthew Vickery, “ISIL Forces Iraq's Palestinians to Flee Again Having No Other Choice but to be on the Move, Palestinian Refugees Feel Like there is no End to the Constant Upheaval,” Feb 26, 2015, accessed October 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com.
ISIL/IS] we have a completely new situation for them. Baharka Camp is not for Palestinians, it’s for Iraqi IDPs….“

Amid the refugee crisis in Europe, this phenomenon poses further complications as European countries receiving refugees, such as Germany, are perplexed when confronted with a Palestinian of Syrian or Iraqi origin. Some Palestinians do not have passports but possess travel documents instead. Although, if they do have passports, it is of Palestine, not Iraq or Syria. Thus, some Palestinians said that they were treated very differently from the Iraqi/Syrian nationals, as if they were of second-class status and have to wait longer for them to be admitted into country. However, the situation remains vague as it depends on whether a Palestinian refugee is from Syria or Iraq, since their laws concerning Palestinians vary, and which European country they relocate to, as their laws concerning refugees also vary. Nonetheless, the statuses of a refugee among the Palestinians of Iraq and Syria have unfortunately become the fabric of their identity.

41 Ibid.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


