DIASPORA OUTREACH BY LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES

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ABSTRACT

How do parties in migrant-sending countries campaign abroad? This study explores transnational campaigning by political parties among diaspora communities, using a mixed methods approach, including a region-wide quantitative comparison using polling and a series of hierarchical models, documentation of party travel records, and interviews with 45 politicians, party officials, and campaign strategists in Mexico, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic. This study seeks to examine why and how parties in migrant-sending countries engage migrants as a matter of electoral strategy. What advantage do migrants lend parties in elections—particularly if, as evidence shows, their impact through direct voting is minimal—and how do parties seek to exploit and maximize this advantage? This study finds that two chief factors explain party outreach to diaspora communities: the partisan skew of the diaspora, and the infrastructure of the party in the diaspora. It also finds that parties believe diaspora campaigning pays off in votes in the home country due to the influence migrants are perceived to have over their relatives through remittances; however, models show this perceived influence to be exaggerated.
Thanks to my family and to my dissertation committee for the feedback and support.

Dedicated to my father, Don Paarlberg, Jr.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

In El Salvador’s presidential election of 2009, both candidates, ARENA’s Rodrigo Ávila and FMLN’s Mauricio Funes, visited the United States to campaign among Salvadoran communities there – this despite the fact that Salvadoran citizens residing abroad did not have the right to vote. Yet the two candidates, and their parties, went about seeking support differently, each looking to capitalize on this “electorate” in their own way. While ARENA’s activities were largely limited to closed door meetings with close supporters and international development officials, the FMLN mobilized its base committees in the U.S., organizing party militants among the Salvadoran diaspora to lobby Congress and the State Department for statements of neutrality, and to call family members in El Salvador to reassure them that an FMLN victory would not negatively impact relations with the U.S. or interrupt the flows of remittances. Funes won, in the FMLN’s first victory in a general election, thus ending a 20-year unbroken period of rule for the incumbent ARENA party.

Funes and Ávila are not alone. Many politicians and parties from migrant-sending countries campaign abroad, including many Latin American countries in the United States, among both voting and non-voting electorates. In the United States alone, within the past five years, candidates from Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guatemala, and Peru have visited and campaigned among diaspora communities residing in such cities as

Boston,7 Miami,8 Los Angeles,9 New York,10 Chicago,11 Providence,12 and Washington, DC.13 Many parties have designated representatives, in some cases permanent offices and extensive party base committee networks, in the U.S. and other countries. Diaspora campaigning is not limited to Latin America; candidates from countries as varied as Liberia14 and Taiwan15 have campaigned in the U.S. Nor is it limited to the U.S.: visits by Turkish politicians to Germany are regular features of Turkish electoral campaigns.16

And, as the 2009 Salvadoran presidential campaign demonstrates, diaspora campaigning is not limited to voting diasporas. Some of the most active diaspora campaigning continues to be carried out by parties from countries with no external voting rights, including Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, and Liberia.

In those countries which do offer citizens the right to vote from abroad, diaspora campaigning often predated diaspora enfranchisement. In Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN) courted the Mexican diaspora community in the U.S. both before and after the 2006 law

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granting diaspora Mexicans voting rights. In 2000, then-candidate, later president Vicente Fox visited Mexican neighborhoods in Los Angeles and Chicago and passed out phone cards, encouraging Mexicans there to call their relatives at home to support him. Fox’s victory ended seven decades of rule by the hegemonic PRI, a party strongly disfavored by U.S.-residing Mexicans. Mexican candidates campaigned in the U.S. when Mexicans residing abroad could not vote, and have continued after 2006, despite the fact that the turnout rate for Mexican voters in the U.S. is less than 1%, and campaigning abroad is prohibited by law.

Parties across migrant-sending countries engage in diaspora campaigning, despite the considerable expense of international travel and of maintaining offices and networks abroad, the fact that most of the potential diaspora electorate either cannot or does not vote, and – in some cases – explicit legal barriers to engaging in diaspora campaigning at all. Not all parties are the same, however, and there are a variety of ways and degrees to which they attempt to exploit the diaspora to win elections. The motivation of this study is to better understand how such diaspora campaigning occurs, given the relationship between parties and their respective diasporas. Thus the central research question of this study is: How do different political parties in migrant-sending countries in Latin America engage with diaspora communities in the United States, and what makes them choose to engage them in their respective ways?

This research project offers a unique perspective on a new but fast-growing phenomenon, the transnationalization of electoral campaigning. This itself follows another, relatively better studied but still new phenomenon of transnational citizenship, and the extension of enfranchisement by states to their citizens residing abroad. Much attention has been paid to diaspora engagement by states, whether sending or receiving, as a matter of policy, but much less is known about diaspora engagement by non-state actors such as parties as a matter of campaign

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strategy. Political behavior by states, citizens, and parties alike are less and less restricted by territorial boundaries. Elections, too are the next arena of transnational contestation, as potential electorates which have been excluded from homeland politics due to where they reside are finding themselves in increasingly critical roles. In many countries, future elections may hinge on diaspora electorates, and thus transnational campaigning will be increasingly visible and contentious.

This study looks at party-driven diaspora engagement, focused primarily within the context of electoral campaigns. What do parties do to seek the support of an overseas (and largely nonvoting) electorate, and why do they do what they do? This study finds that this campaign strategy is informed by two areas of variation among parties, the infrastructure they maintain in the diaspora, and the partisan skew – whether favorable or not – of the diaspora itself.

This engagement depends on both parties and migrants. Parties clearly believe winning the support of migrants pays off in some form of electoral advantage. This study finds that party officials universally believe migrants themselves have a direct impact on elections even without voting, by influencing the voting preferences of family members in the home country. Thus this observation raises a secondary question, from the perspective of migrants: What actual effect do migrants believe they have, seek to have, and actually have, on elections in their countries of origin?

There are thus two relationships to be studied: between parties and migrants (collectively, as a diaspora community) and between migrants and family members (individually, through interpersonal relationships and intra-familial communication). This study will seek to answer the central question of why parties engage with the diaspora in the way that they do, and thus better
understand the factors that explain variation in engagement. The central question of why parties engage in the way that they do explains variation in the relationship between parties and migrants. In this study, I develop and test the theory that party-diaspora engagement depends principally on two factors: infrastructure and skew.

Hypothesis: Party-diaspora engagement will be more extensive and grassroots oriented among parties 1) with a highly developed party infrastructure in the diaspora, typified by a mass party, typically hierarchical base committee model and 2) a favorable diaspora skew, in cases in which the diaspora strongly favors one party and/or disfavors another. Parties with either or both weak party infrastructure or an unfavorable skew will be more likely to have limited and shallow diaspora engagement.

These factors are not mutually exclusive. As this study of seven parties across three migrant-sending countries finds, one or both of these factors are more present in some cases than in others. The relationship between structure and skew can self-reinforcing: parties that have the favor of the diaspora are motivated to develop diaspora infrastructure to better exploit it, though parties without diaspora support may be motivated to build an overseas infrastructure as well to minimize their disadvantage. Taken together, they explain how parties engage diaspora citizens, and variation in the relative level of party-diaspora engagement across parties. Parties may mobilize party sympathizers and cadres on a grassroots level, whether for activities (such as lobbying) within the U.S. or mobilizing voters at home. Parties may use the diaspora as a rhetorical or symbolic tool in campaign propaganda. Parties may hold campaign rallies, attend cultural events. Parties may extend outreach to the broader community on a personal level, or limit their outreach to elites. Parties may operate independently or through nonpartisan institutions such as hometown associations. Parties may try to buy off diaspora support through
patronage. They may do some combination or all of those things. Parties may also do little to engage with migrants at all, even actively try to suppress their electoral participation.

These factors explain diaspora engagement strategies by parties, specifically in the context of electoral campaigns. It should be noted that both skew and structure can also reinforce one another: parties that campaign more extensively within the diaspora more are also motivated to build up their overseas infrastructure, and may also sway more migrants to their side. However, for the three countries on which this study is based, the origins of diaspora party infrastructure – or lack thereof – predate the rise of party-diaspora electoral engagement, indeed predate competitive elections entirely. Secondly, this study finds that efforts by parties to affect diaspora skew though greater engagement have a limited effect, as such skew also predates the era of competitive elections, and is largely solidified in the period of out-migration against the incumbent party of that period. Chapters 3 – 5 will detail variation in party-diaspora engagement strategy. These chapters will observe a variety of party activities in the diaspora including campaigning, mobilization, community visits, and clientelism among 7 parties in El Salvador, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. These types of engagement are not strictly ordinal, however generally, an overall greater degree of party-diaspora engagement can be observed among three parties which have both extensive base committee structures in the diaspora and the relative historic sympathy of the diaspora community, El Salvador’s FMLN and the Dominican Republic’s PRD and PLD. I find middling engagement among parties with diaspora sympathy but less overseas infrastructure, Mexico’s PAN and PRD, and one party that lacks diaspora sympathy but is building an overseas infrastructure, El Salvador’s ARENA. And I find the lowest level of engagement by Mexico’s PRI, a party that lacks either diaspora sympathy or an overseas infrastructure. These parties differ in many ways, such that parties that campaign in
certain fashions include right wing and left wing (but not the centrist) parties in Mexico, and rival parties in the Dominican Republic, but also differ significantly between rival parties in El Salvador.

Chapter 6 will shift the unit of analysis from parties to individuals, both migrants and their home country relatives, in order to check the assumptions by party officials which motivate their engagement with the diaspora in the first place, and explain migrant engagement with voters at home. This secondary question is raised by the puzzle of parties bothering to engage with a largely non-voting overseas electorate. The reason, family influence, is a universal assumption held by party officials interviewed and can be tested against polling data of migrants and their family members. I test this with a series of models based on polling data of Latin American voters. I find that migrants do indeed have an impact, but not in the way party officials believe: Latin American voters with relatives living in the U.S. do not exhibit any difference in voting behavior, measured by turnout and registration, than those without migrant relatives. But they do exhibit greater levels of more sophisticated political behavior typical of party militants: being members of a party or political organization, volunteering for a campaign, and convincing others to vote for a favored candidate. This underscores the resilience of partisan skew, suggesting skew extends to family members as well, as the most likely explanation is that migrants reinforce the existing partisan attitudes of their family members rather than changing them.

The following two sections will outline the literature on political transnationalism as it relates to party-diaspora engagement, detail the theory tested here, explain the case selection of the seven parties and provide comparative historical context. The chapters that follow will detail the variation in party-diaspora engagement across those parties, divided by country.
States, migrants, and parties

An expansion of diaspora voting rights can be observed throughout the world, with an explosive growth in the number of countries granting citizens abroad the right to vote, from just 17 in 1980 to the majority of countries, over 100, today (Lafleur 2013, Turcu and Urbatsch 2014). Existing scholarship on transnational political behavior has focused largely on questions of relative power between states and migrants: whether diaspora political activity allows states to control migrants, or gives migrants agency to engage in home country politics on their own terms (Chinchilla and Hamilton 1999, Landolt et al 1999, Itzighsohn 2000, Fox 2005, Mügge 2011).

For some (Moctezuma 2003, Sassen 2006), diaspora politics is a phenomenon of “globalization from below” and “denationalized citizenship” by which migrant communities exercise agency free from, and sometimes in opposition to, state control. Calderón Chelius 2004 presents a model of diaspora enfranchisement as a product of democratization and emigration. Moctezuma 2003 suggests migrants have greater relative agency compared to domestic citizens to engage with home country governments, or not, and to what degree. However official policies such as voting rights depend on state action, and state (and, by extension, party) interest in diaspora populations.

Diaspora enfranchisement, thus, is one avenue by which home country political actors can reach out to an independent and potentially powerful electorate. Fox 2007, Fitzgerald 2009, Kapur 2010, and Delano 2011 see diaspora enfranchisement for states as a means of reinforcing diaspora loyalty to home countries. Lieber 2010 suggests states beset by the negative impacts of out-migration choose to enfranchise citizens residing abroad as a means of mitigating those impacts, reestablishing ties, and reasserting state control. It is this pull between these two actors, states and migrants, which together set the ground rules by which migrants may engage in
elections, and to some degree by extension, how freely parties may take part in diaspora campaigning.

The shift by migrant-sending countries’ toward more accommodating policies toward their diaspora citizens – both by extending formal rights (e.g. voting rights and representation in government), and mobilizing migrants in service of state interests (e.g. lobbying receiving country governments and participating in public remittance-investment programs) – appear to accompany growing awareness of the importance of the diaspora as its size and economic activity increase. Increasing openness by states to engagement with diasporas can be seen in shifts in official rhetoric about migrants, from “traitors” to “heroes” (Smith and Bakker 2008), which tend to accompany policy shifts designed to increase transnational ties for the diaspora (Gamlen et al 2013).

Questions of political engagement are thus rooted in questions of broader transnational linkages between diaspora communities and home countries. Levitt 1998 provides a seminal framework of understanding these linkages as “social remittances,” the “ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities” (927), and often through families. These linkages can be a vector for remitting political ideas as well, and thus a potential area of political contestation. Home country political actors seek to activate a “diaspora channel of influence” between migrants and family members back home (Kapur 2010), as part of a general trend by sending countries to build closer ties to diaspora communities (Gamlen et al 2013). Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow (2010) and Kapur (2010) find a positive impact of having migrant relatives on democratic participation in home countries, while Bravo 2009 finds an impact on broader civic – not necessarily electoral – behavior. However migrants
themselves seek to become involved in home country communities, often through migrant-based institutions such as hometown associations (HTAs) (Orozco 2002).

As Parra 2005 notes, however, actual voter participation by migrants is mostly low among enfranchised diasporas. Evidence from migrant-sending states with low levels of diaspora electoral participation, mostly Mexico (Lafluer and Calderón Chelius 2011, Escobar et al 2014), strongly suggests there is more to diaspora politics than voting: migrants have a greater impact than their voting numbers would suggest. Goodman and Hiskey 2008 and Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010 observe migrants having an indirect impact on political participation in the communities from which they originate. Remittances stand out as a key motivating factor for diaspora engagement (Adida and Girod 2011, Germano 2013). There is also evidence that monetary remittances by migrants to relatives in home countries vary based on election cycles (O’Mahony 2013) and thus may be a vector for political persuasion. The framework of transnational linkages in this literature therefore suggests that diasporas win greater recognition from states as their numbers and transnational economic activities – particularly remittance flows – increase, and that this recognition translates into greater political clout back home.

Scholarship focusing on states looks largely at state policy in managing migration or rights of citizenship, whether sending states (Goldring 2002, Hollifield 2004, Fitzgerald 2009, Delano 2011) or receiving states (García y Griego and Verea 1988, Shain 1999, Macekura 2011). Less understood are the motivations of non-state political actors within sending countries to engage diaspora communities, their strategies for doing so. The still limited and recent scholarship on diaspora party relationships and transnational electoral campaigns points to general trends motivating both parties and migrants.
Migrant engagement with electoral politics in their home countries – and parties by extension – may be driven by several factors, and include crises which sparked massive out-migration, ethnic or sectarian identities which correlated with partisan identities, outreach efforts by parties, and the granting or withholding of political rights and social services by home country governments (Burgess 2014).

There is evidence that parties generally have been transforming to adapt to changing voter alignments throughout the world: by adopting a constant campaign level of activity (Dalton et al 2011) under more elite-driven party organizations (Mair et al 2004) running more “modern” professional campaigns involving targeted messaging, heavy use of media and social media, polling, and digital communication strategies (Poguntke and Webb 2005). The transnationalization of politics that accompanies migration means that such trends are less and less limited by national borders or by electoral cycles.

For transnational campaigning, party motivations to engage migrants depend on multiple factors. Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2013 describe a set of collectively necessary conditions for parties to seek diaspora support, which is made possible by institutional factors specific to both the home country (rules and competitiveness of the electoral system) and party (resources and organization), and informed by the profile of the diaspora population as well. Should an electoral system allow for both open and competitive elections in which migrants could play some role, should the party have the organizational capacity to seek support abroad, and should the profile of the diaspora be favorable to such engagement in terms of size, projected turnout, and politicization, parties will seek to build linkages with migrants in order to activate this diaspora channel.
Of these factors motivating the decision to engage at all, some that vary at the state level (electoral competitiveness) and are relatively independent from diaspora politics, while others (diaspora enfranchisement and openness to diaspora campaigning) are closely linked and themselves products of party politics in the diaspora. Other factors vary at the party level (organizational capacity) or affect different parties differently (the political profile of the diaspora community – whether they are more sympathetic to a party or not, informed in part by the conditions motivating migration). These factors suggest a framework for understanding diaspora engagement at the party level, not simply why parties choose to engage at all, but how, based on factors specific to parties: their organization and relative level of sympathy in the diaspora.

Just as diaspora enfranchisement has become the norm, so too increasingly is diaspora campaigning. As parties see migrants as vectors of influence, primarily through their remittances, affecting the ideas and behaviors of home country voters, they will seek to turn diasporas into an electoral advantage. Their ability to do so will be restricted by institutional realities of electoral law; however there is evidence that it will not be restricted by the (non-)voting behavior of migrants themselves. Their strategy for campaigning in the diaspora will be informed by the political profile of migrants, as well as party resources and organization, and increasingly as an extension of general strategies in modern, professional, and often constant campaigning.

The literature on transnationalism points to a need for greater research in three areas. First, an analysis of non-state political actors which engage migrants, in particular, political parties, and thereby examining sending country engagement beyond the realm of official state policy. Second, an analysis of political behavior which extends beyond voting, and rather treats
voting (and, from the side of sending countries, enfranchisement) as one part of a larger area of transnational political engagement, which include political campaigns. Third, an analysis that weds a case study approach with a region-wide, large N quantitative study, thus able to look for broader trends within migrant-sending countries and diaspora communities.

**Party-diaspora engagement**

What factors explain the ways in which parties campaign in the diaspora? The outcome this study will consider is different types and degrees by which parties engage with diaspora communities for support, based on observed characteristics of outreach by Dominican, Mexican, and Salvadoran parties to migrants in the U.S. Party-diaspora engagement is informed by characteristics of both parties and diasporas. Parties can engage in some or all of the following diaspora campaign activities:

- **Campaign visits:** Visits by candidates for office to diaspora communities are the most visible sign of party-diaspora engagement. As they do at home, candidates may visit neighborhoods of high concentration of home country migrants, meet with community leaders, hold rallies, host forums, give interviews to local media catering to the diaspora community, and seek endorsements by prominent migrants. International travel by candidates and party officials may also be made for reasons other than community engagement, such as official meetings with international institutions, particularly for incumbent candidates acting in capacities as state officials. Thus in the following chapters, campaign visits will be distinguished from non-campaign visits, and measured based on relative community engagement from travel records, news reports, or personal observation.
- **Mobilization**: Parties engaging with diaspora communities at high levels will seek to mobilize supporters abroad for the purposes of electoral advantage. These may include coordinated communications strategies connecting migrants with home country voters, lobbying on behalf of party interests in the receiving country, turning out supporters to rallies or other party events, as well as voter turnout.

- **Campaign ads and propaganda**: As migrants may be seen by parties as vectors of influence, parties may wish to exploit this in campaign advertising either by appealing to migrants directly, to their family members in the home country, or by raising issues of importance to migrants and their families, such as immigration law, remittances, or home country-US relations which affect migrants. Campaign ads can be done by migrants or with their endorsement, or simply reference the diaspora as a whole as a rhetorical symbol.

- **Regular presence in the diaspora community**: As per the increasing “constant campaign mode” norm, party diaspora engagement need not be limited to election years. More engaged parties may have a regular presence in the community, not only during elections, with sustained activity maintaining their visibility and thereby boosting party identity among supporters. Such parties, or their diaspora supporters, will sometimes engage in non-electoral activities such as home country-focused festivals and other cultural events, and coordinate with nonpartisan grassroots groups.

- **Patronage**: Parties can also seek to simply buy the votes of migrants, or at least of specific power brokers within the diaspora community, through such things as jobs in diplomatic posts, or favorable commercial deals facilitated by the home country government, targeted at influential diaspora community leaders.
This study will compare the seven parties based on variation in their diaspora engagement, taking into account their – and their diaspora supporters’ – participation in some or all of the activities above. It finds that parties which are most active in the diaspora engage in a wide range of activities; those with more limited diaspora engagement may restrict their activities to more symbolic campaign propaganda purposes, and their visits to elite-level or institutional meetings. I hypothesize that this variation will be explained largely by party infrastructure and diaspora partisan skew. Parties examined exhibit a range of diaspora engagement tactics, from those that operate extensive permanent networks of base committees, mobilizing supporters to engage in U.S. government institutions for the benefit of the party, and which send candidates at every level of office to campaign abroad, to those which are more reliant on non-party networks, limit engagement to campaign advertisements and elite-level visits, and/or resort primarily to clientelist tactics. Finally, it will check the validity of the underlying motivation by parties to engage with the diaspora as a means of exploiting intra-familial influence.

The following section will examine parties from the comparative, American, and transnational politics literature related to the two hypothesized variables explaining diaspora engagement, party infrastructure and partisan skew.

*Party infrastructure*

There is a rich literature on Latin American party institutionalization (Sartori 1976, Coppedge 2001, Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Jones 2005). In the domestic electoral context, institutionalized parties have an advantage in resource allocation in electoral campaigns: how much time, effort and money should be spent on which constituent groups in order to maximize chances of electoral success. Campaign pledges, whether to specific constituencies or the general electorate, may be seen as contractual agreements between
candidates and voters or donors – which can be especially tenuous in the “emerging markets” of newer democracies without a history of politicians being voted out or otherwise punished for non-fulfillment of pledges (Treisman 1998). Samuels 2001 proposes that parties and candidates in emerging democracies without established institutional guarantees have an incentive to cultivate a reputation of honoring contracts. Political networks allow voters and parties to trade information so that parties may know constituent demands and reliably estimate expected return of targeting specific pledges to certain constituencies.

Studies of domestic Latin American politics find that parties with established networks maximize their electoral returns by targeting core voters (i.e. voters already within the party network) rather than swing voters (those not already within the network), in order to mobilize supporters to maximize turnout and build voter loyalties that translate into long-term electoral gains. Parties without sufficient networks will be at an information disadvantage and choose to target swing voters in order to expand networks to encompass new constituencies (Cox 2009, Calvo and Murillo 2010).

Diaspora campaigns led by more institutionalized parties are predicted to place greater emphasis on building party networks. As this study theorizes, parties see diasporas as vectors of influence to reach the electorate at home, it is expected that parties which most effectively mobilize diaspora support do so through institutionalized diaspora party networks of offices and base committees.

Institutionalization describes “the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability” (Huntington 1968). For electoral and party systems, institutionalization refers to the long term viability of established rules and parties as a means to predictably organize and deliver voters’ interests through elections. The emphasis on stability features
prominently in the role of system institutionalization for democratic consolidation (Diamond 1988, Mainwaring 1999). Party institutionalization generally describes the value-acquisition and stability of individual parties, based on such factors as level of organization, coherence, and grassroots connections (Dix 1992, Mainwaring 1999, Basedau and Stroh 2008). In the diaspora context, the institutionalization of diaspora party networks thus describes party networks which are highly organized, have coherent programs and messages, and deep ties on the community level to the diaspora in which they operate. Traditionally, the types of parties that are able to sustain highly institutionalized party networks, whether at home or abroad, are traditional mass parties. In advanced democracies, mass parties have relied on such networks to build linkages between voters and parties (Calvo and Murillo 2013).

Mass parties and their grassroots structures historically allowed parties to raise money, turnout voters for elections, mobilize members for protests, instill internal party discipline, develop leaders and future candidates, promulgate party platforms and ideology, and have a broader impact on the national political culture through sponsorship of media, cultural, and athletic auxiliaries (Kitschelt et al. 2010). The mass membership party model is one institutional model that facilitates large scale grassroots mobilization efforts, but is also one which has been declining throughout the globe (Mair and van Biezen 2001). The model has remained resilient, however, in certain regions and, to a diminished degree compared to the past century, in Latin America. The “mass-class” model of membership-based parties emerged in the nineteenth century and by the mid-twentieth century became the norm in many Western parliamentary democracies. Aging and declining party membership rolls, and declines in prestige of historic parties due to corruption or stagnation resulted in the defeat of those parties by newer, personalist and/or clientelist parties in Latin America and elsewhere (variously termed “catch-all,” “new
politics,” or “cartel” parties – Katz and Mair 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Scarrow 2000, Van Biezen et al 2012, Wolinetz 2012), the transformation of the former to the latter (Levitsky 2003), and the transformation of social movements into parties (Van Cott 2005).

Nevertheless, as Scarrow 2014 notes, mass membership parties never completely disappeared, and in some countries remain a force for grassroots mobilization, even as they have become less institutionalized or ideologically-driven, and more open to clientelist practices (Warner 2001). The case of the Peronist party in Argentina demonstrates how party organization and structure can affect party behavior: while retaining a mass base, its adaptation from a rigid to fluid internal structure gave it the flexibility to adapt to political crises. In contrast, the steep decline in membership of formerly mass-based European parties has the effect that “parties in contemporary Europe are rapidly losing their capacity to engage citizens” (Mair and van Biezen 2001).

Not all parties are ideological, and declining mass-based parties in many regions including Latin America have given way to newer, “shallower,” personalist parties which have shed many of their institutional trappings and grassroots (Mainwaring 1999, Levitsky 2003). As such, party-diaspora engagement may be the product not so much of factors specific to the party itself but rather of certain charismatic politicians. Such figures may direct campaign strategy including in the diaspora independent of party institutions or interests, and may do so out of sheer personal preference, disregarding diaspora partisan skew. Personalist politics in Latin America are often typified by clientelism and corruption (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006); thus personalism as a determinant of diaspora engagement would be expected to rely not on party networks nor existing, historic sympathies but rather on buying support through patronage.
Should parties use clientelist means to reach out to migrants, this would be consistent with the literature on Latin American parties, which often appeal to voters – and theoretically by extension, those in the diaspora – through clientelist networks and with promises of patronage such as government jobs (Carey and Shugart 1995, Mainwaring 1999, Ames 2001, Shugart and Haggard 2001, Coppedge 2001). Party strength and levels of discipline should determine the degree to which either parties or candidates direct campaigns, including making the decision to engage diaspora voters at all. Magaloni 2006 notes that the central motivation for hegemonic parties (or those aspiring to hegemonic status) is to build as large a coalition as possible, not only by mobilizing core constituents but by co-opting (or buying off) other constituencies. The costs of maintaining such an oversized coalition in terms of handouts, however, rise over time and thus may not be sustainable in the long run. Stokes 2005 finds that parties engage in clientelistic behavior when parties are seen as ideologically similar, and tend to target poorer voters, and that those which are most successful in vote-buying are those which can monitor the voting behavior of their targets. While the strategy of co-opting an otherwise unsympathetic constituency abroad may be impractical for the ruling PSUV in Venezuela, it may be a viable strategy for countries with a less polarized, and poorer, diaspora open to such benefits as government (in the case of diaspora, diplomatic mission) jobs and preferential treatment for commercial dealings.

The comparative literature on Latin American campaign strategy envisions resource allocation within a clientelist framework in terms of excludable benefits such as handouts or pork (Magaloni 2006, Cox 2009, Calvo and Murillo 2010). Should diasporas conform to the clientelistic model, they would solicit and expect to receive certain benefits in exchange for their electoral support. Until now, however, specific benefits promised or granted to diaspora communities have been non-excludable, general political rights and voice in government. These
include the right to vote abroad, the right to hold dual citizenship, and permanent seats in the national legislature (as in the Dominican Republic’s congressional representative for Dominicans in the U.S.) or cabinet-level ministries (as in Haiti’s Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad). External voting rights, in particular, have become explicit campaign pledges by parties campaigning in the U.S. from Mexico (PAN in 2000) and El Salvador (FMLN in 2009).

The non-excludable nature of these campaign pledges suggest that diasporas should have a relatively less clientelistic relationship with parties. This suggests that diaspora interests are not primarily focused on their own benefit but that of family members residing in sending countries. As a result, diaspora campaigns involve a less direct exchange of votes (or support) for goods, as the expected payoff, even for relatively large diasporas, is relatively low.\(^\text{17}\) As the following chapters will show, this presumption holds for some parties more than others.

Should parties develop institutionalized, mass base structures in the diaspora, this will allow them to engage diaspora at a higher level and in a more sustained way than those lacking such structures. However clientelism may serve as a substitute or supplement to deep organizational capacity as a means to win support.

\textit{Diaspora skew}

Diaspora skew refers to the degree to which the diaspora community as a whole leans toward, or away from a particular party or set of parties. As Burgess 2014 notes, migrant motivation for political engagement is in part a product of preexisting partisan (and ethnic and sectarian) identities, and in part a product of the factors which motivated migration. A party may thus command residual loyalty from the diaspora should migrants’ pre-migration profile match a

\(^{17}\) Downs’ (1957) voter paradox is especially relevant for diaspora voters, for whom even greater costs for voting in comparison to domestic voters (registering months in advance, acquiring proper identification, sometimes traveling to an embassy or consulate) drive down turnout and should therefore lessen the appeal of diasporas to parties purely on the basis of votes.
demographic that traditionally favors that party, and/or should migrants’ decision to emigrate be negatively associated with a rival party.

Huckfeldt and Sprague (1992), analyzing party mobilization in the U.S., describe party efforts at mobilizing their electorate as a process of social diffusion. Partisan divisions within the electorate inform parties’ mobilizational strategies: parties can perceptions of voters’ loyalties through various sources, whether past electoral results, voter lists if party registration is public, and word-of-mouth. In many places, the skew of the electorate, whether a district is “red” or “blue,” is common knowledge. Diaspora electorates, too, may have widely known partisan sympathies despite lacking party registries or even voting records in cases of non-enfranchisement. Parties try to identify and engage supporters, distributing campaign literature and signs among them, and encouraging them to tell others to vote for them through “informal persuasion” (ibid). Such efforts are used to drive voter turnout and thus identifying partisan skew is crucial to turning out the right voters (Holbrook and McClurg 2005). Even in cases of largely nonvoting electorates, as most diaspora campaigns would include, engagement by parties for the purpose of informal persuasion depend on knowing the partisan orientation of the electorate and identifying supporters.

A favorable diaspora skew for a particular party may motivate greater overall levels of diaspora engagement, such as engaging in more than one of the types outlined above, e.g. campaign visits as well as presence in community events, or emphasizing migrant issues more in campaign propaganda. However as chapter 2 will show, parties which do not have a favorable diaspora skew may still campaign in the diaspora. Thus the effect of skew is more in the type of diaspora engagement: parties with a favorable skew will be more engaged at the grassroots level, while those with unfavorable skews will be more engaged at the elite level. Parties facing an
unfavorable diaspora skew will be less able to mobilize a mass base of diaspora supporters, and will thus utilize campaign visits and advertisements in a more instrumental manner, such as referring to diaspora-related symbolically in party rhetoric or at meetings with business or international elites. Where diasporas exhibit a strong skew in favor of one party, or against one, parties should be able to rely on this sympathy/antipathy to appeal to migrants based on party loyalty. In the absence of a strong diaspora skew within a diaspora, parties may have to rely on more clientelist methods to try to secure migrant support.

These factors point to a way party-diaspora engagement can be understood: first, its motivations by belief in diaspora influence through familial homeland linkages, and second, the factors that explain how such engagement varies by party, depending on both parties (their diaspora infrastructure) and migrants (their partisan skew).

Alternate explanations

This study considers diasporas’ potentially unique profile based on its partisan skew relative to the home country electorate, and that parties base their diaspora outreach activities on this skew and the infrastructure the parties maintain abroad. The null for the skew hypothesis would thus be that diasporas are not unique, relative to home country voters. Were this true, this study would find diaspora campaigning would simply be an extension of domestic campaigning, emphasizing the same issues and using the same tactics as at home. Indeed, as this study will show, many diaspora campaign tactics are similar to domestic campaigning: politicians hold campaign rallies, take out ads in local media, and migrants vote. Some party officials interviewed – particularly those in the Dominican Republic – affirmed that they believe the diaspora (today) largely mirrors the home country electorate. However, as this study will show, there are key differences which point to the unique nature of both parties as they operate in the
diaspora, and the diaspora electorate they target. A partisan skew, observed in voting patterns of the diaspora compared to the home country electorate, contradicts this: in all three countries examined, diaspora Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Dominicans tend to skew in a manner distinct from the home country electorate (the last to a lesser extent, but still distinct, as chapter 5 will demonstrate), reflected in their voting patterns, and informing party engagement efforts accordingly. Even in cases in which parties design their diaspora infrastructure based on domestic base committee models, there are differences which are products of generational lags between diaspora and domestic base committee members, as chapter 3 will detail.

An alternative hypothesis to that of infrastructure is that parties, and their infrastructure, do not matter in explaining outcomes in diaspora engagement. It may be that candidates, not parties, set the tone for diaspora campaigning, particularly in this era of personalist politics and the decline of mass based parties. As chapter 5 will show, the country which comes closest to this scenario is the Dominican Republic, for one case, the PLD, in which a lack of strong partisan skew in the diaspora as a whole coexists with a stronger skew for one particular figure among diaspora PLD supporters. Nevertheless, this study will show even in cases of strong migrant attachment to certain charismatic politicians (Mexico’s Vicente Fox, the DR’s Leonel Fernandez), this attachment continues to carry dividends for the party following that politician’s exit from office. A lack of party infrastructure, too, can be key in explaining more limited diaspora outreach, such as by Mexican parties, principally the PRI.

Secondary to the main findings, this study finds that party motivation for diaspora engagement varies very little, and is explained by a nearly universally held belief that migrants influence the voting choices of their family members in their home countries, buying clout with the remittances they send home. This belief is taken as a given; however it is possible that party
officials interviewed are wrong, and that migrants do not impact the voting behaviors of their home country relatives, that they do not seek to do so, or that their remittances are not the mechanism by which they do so. It may be plausible, in one scenario, that a niece in Mexico who receives remittances from her uncle in Chicago would take his advice seriously when he urges her to vote for a preferred candidate. It is also plausible, in a second scenario, that she rejects his advice, on the presumption that her uncle does not know as much as she does about politics in the country he left, and moreover will not be directly affected by the electoral results. Parties campaign in the diaspora taking the first scenario as a matter of faith. Thus their campaign activities are designed to leverage migrants as a vector of influence and to indirectly campaign for home country votes, even if the assumption underlying these activities is dubious, as chapter 6 will detail.

The hypothesis tested in chapter 6 is therefore a separate, secondary hypothesis, developed from interviews with party officials in all three countries and their uniform belief that diaspora influence buys votes, and thus diaspora campaigning can activate that influence on home country voters in a beneficial manner for parties. The alternative to this hypothesis is captured in scenario number 2 above, that diaspora influence is a myth, that migrants do not hold such great sway over relatives’ voting behavior through their remittances or otherwise. As chapter 6 will show, the parties’ hypothesis does not entirely hold, as migrant ties are found to have a limited effect on relatives’ political behavior, and one which does not appear to impact voting. Thus while I find that migrant influence is the principal factor motivating diaspora engagement by parties, I also find that this assumption of influence on the part of party officials is incorrect in three ways: migrants’ belief in their own influence, the tendency of migrants to change voting behavior among home country relatives, and the importance of remittances.
Organization of this study

The following chapters will examine the overall question of how and why parties and diaspora communities engage one another. This outcome, diaspora engagement, encompasses various aspects of electoral campaigning – visits, campaign ads, mobilization, patronage – as well as potentially more long term engagement in non-election years. Through case studies of seven parties across three migrant-sending countries, it will test the central hypothesis that party-diaspora engagement varies primarily according to party diaspora infrastructure and diaspora partisan skew.

Chapter 2 will provide an overview of diaspora electoral regimes across Latin America, and Latin American diaspora communities in the United States. It will also explain case selection of the seven parties examined in the following chapters: El Salvador’s ARENA and FMLN, Mexico’s PAN, PRD, and PRI, and the Dominican Republic’s PLD and PRD. These cases demonstrate variance in the relative levels of diaspora infrastructure across parties, and the relative level of partisan skew among diasporas across countries. Thus collectively, the parties examined represent cases of highly developed diaspora infrastructure and diaspora sympathy (FMLN, PLD and Dominican PRD), middling diaspora infrastructure and diaspora sympathy (PAN and, to a lesser extent, Mexican PRD), middling diaspora infrastructure without diaspora sympathy (ARENA), and underdeveloped diaspora infrastructure without diaspora sympathy (PRI), all explaining different degrees of party diaspora engagement for each. This provides the context for how parties examined in the country-specific chapters that follow fit within the frame of infrastructure and skew. These independent variables explain different types of diaspora engagement among these cases: with more grassroots-oriented engagement (extensive community-focused visits, mobilization of diaspora party militants, and a more permanent party
presence) among parties with favorable skews and/or strong diaspora infrastructure, more superficial engagement (fewer and more elite-focused visits and symbolic rhetorical references to the diaspora) among parties with unfavorable skews and/or weak diaspora infrastructure, and more clientelist engagement among parties lacking of a strong diaspora skew toward either party.

Chapter 3 will focus on El Salvador, which illustrates a skewed diaspora with uneven diaspora party infrastructure, comparing the cases of ARENA and FMLN, which vary by both infrastructure and diaspora partisan sympathy. It will illustrate the impact of overall party structure and diaspora infrastructure on diaspora engagement, through historical analysis of past elections and observations of the role of the diaspora in one presidential and one local election. It find sharp variation in diaspora engagement across the two parties, despite the fact that both campaign abroad, due to the FMLN’s more extensive base committee network and favorable skew of the diaspora: The FMLN, with a strongly favorable skew and extensive base committee network, mobilizes party militants in the U.S. and organizes campaign visits at both the national and local office level, while ARENA, facing an unfavorable skew and with a still young, limited diaspora infrastructure, limits diaspora engagement to more ad hoc campaign messaging.

Chapter 4 will focus on Mexico, which illustrates a skewed diaspora with weak diaspora party infrastructure, comparing the cases of the PAN, PRD and PRI. These parties vary more by partisan sympathy than by infrastructure, which is underdeveloped for all three, but principally for the PRI. It will analyze the effect on engagement with a comparative analysis of diaspora outreach based on travel records of Mexican political parties. It finds that in a country in which the diaspora skews heavily away from one party, that party with the unfavorable skew will take part only in perfunctory diaspora engagement while seeking to limit the impact of the diaspora through electoral design. And when parties do not invest in an institutionalized diaspora party
network, the diaspora engagement of even parties with a relatively positive diaspora skew will be restricted to visits by candidates and party officials, with limited community-level outreach, while non-party organizations such as hometown associations will take on the roles of grassroots mobilizing that parties do in other diaspora communities.

Chapter 5 will focus on the Dominican Republic, a country with a relatively unskewed diaspora and evenly high level of diaspora party infrastructure for both the PLD and PRD. It examines the effect on diaspora engagement between two largely similar parties, and the role of clientelism. In this country, the lack of a strong diaspora skew that favors one party over the other creates an open diaspora voting regime which allows for extensive engagement by all parties, and a recent convergence of domestic and diaspora campaign tactics primarily through the use of clientelist practices: a convergence of diaspora politics with domestic politics over a period of history when the two were not always so similar. Of the two Dominican cases, the PRD, demonstrates an evolution of diaspora engagement from a more traditional mass party model, appealing, like El Salvador’s FMLN, to a sympathetic diaspora on a partisan loyalty level, to a more patronage-oriented level as that diaspora skew came to disappear. All three country chapters draw on 45 semi-structured interviews with party officials conducted in all three countries.

Chapter 6 will examine the question of diaspora influence, focusing on the perspective of migrants and their home country relatives, using both a country-specific and a region-wide quantitative analysis. The first, an original survey of voting-age Dominican citizens residing in New York, examines how migrants view their own level of influence over their relatives’ voting behavior, and finds that migrants’ own political participation (or lack thereof) has the greatest impact on their attitudes about influence. The second builds a series of multi-level models from
individual survey and country-level data to test the effect that migrants actually have on the political behaviors of relatives in their home countries, as per assumptions to that effect by party officials interviewed. These models find migrant influence has a limited effect on their relatives, more akin to reinforcing existing partisan sympathies than changing voting behavior.

Chapter 7 concludes the study with an overall comparison of the seven parties, illustrating their position within a taxonomy of the factors of infrastructure and skew. It suggests general conclusions beyond the cases examined, and their limits, considers theoretical implications of party-diaspora engagement for democratic value transmission, national and global identities, and rights and responsibilities of citizenship in a transnational context. Finally, it proposes future areas of research in the area of diaspora politics.
Chapter 2. Case Selection

All parties in open electoral systems engage with electorates, although not all parties do so in the same way. When that electorate resides abroad, if it is politically significant enough, even what it is an electorate in only the loosest sense of the word – a largely or entirely nonvoting one – parties may undertake a variety of measures to try to capture their support: visiting their communities, holding rallies, advertising to them or their issues, offering their leaders jobs, and other types of outreach designed to best leverage the diaspora to an electoral advantage.

The parties analyzed in this study all come from countries with high rates of out-migration to the U.S., and all make some effort, extensive or perfunctory, to engage with citizens residing outside of the country. However the parties differ in important organizational ways in the diaspora. So too does the political profile of the diaspora communities they seek to engage. Together, these factors explain the different outcomes of the parties’ diaspora campaign behavior.

This chapter will explain the case selection of the specific parties of focus in this study – El Salvador’s ARENA and FMLN, Mexico’s PAN, PRD, and PRI, and the Dominican Republic’s PLD and PRD – based on party infrastructure and diaspora skew, and present a comparison of diaspora engagement among all seven of those parties as a result of these two factors, before giving an overview of the characteristics of the largest Latin American diaspora communities in the U.S., their home country electoral regimes covering enfranchisement, campaigning and fundraising laws.

The seven parties examined in this study together encompass most of the potential combined range of diaspora partisan skew – favorable, unfavorable, or neutral – and party
diaspora infrastructure – developed or underdeveloped. They are the major parties in the top three migrant-sending Latin American countries to the U.S. with open elections, measured by the diaspora-to-country population ratio (see Table 1). The combination of these factors together explain the different ways in which these parties campaign and engage with diaspora communities. The following chart summarizes the constellation of cases along the axes of skew and infrastructure.

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<th>Unfavorable skew</th>
<th>Neutral skew</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRD (DR)</td>
<td>FMLN (ES)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Underdeveloped</strong></td>
<td>ARENA (ES)</td>
<td>PRD (Mex)</td>
<td>PAN (Mex)</td>
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<td><strong>infrastructure</strong></td>
<td>PRI (Mex)</td>
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**Figure 1. Parties by Skew and Infrastructure**

Parties for whom the diaspora’s partisan skew most benefits them are El Salvador’s FMLN and Mexico’s PAN. Mexico’s PRD has moderate, but somewhat less sympathy in the diaspora, and thus is slightly to the right of neutral, but is nevertheless between the favorable skew for the PAN and the unfavorable skew against the PRI. Those for whom the diaspora as a whole skews away from them are El Salvador’s ARENA and Mexico’s PRI.

Parties with the most developed diaspora infrastructure are El Salvador’s FMLN and the Dominican Republic’s PRD. The Dominican PLD too has a relatively developed diaspora infrastructure, though not quite as extensive as that of the PRD. El Salvador’s ARENA has a still underdeveloped diaspora infrastructure but is developing its diaspora wing, and with time would be expected to rise to the developed category. All three Mexican parties have relatively
underdeveloped diaspora infrastructures, with the PRI’s infrastructure as the least developed. The following section details these characteristics by party.

El Salvador

ARENA

The Republican Nationalist Alliance (ARENA) is the predominant right wing party in El Salvador. It was founded as a paramilitary organization soon after the beginning of El Salvador’s 1980-1992 civil war, by Roberto D’Aubuisson, a death squad leader-turned-politician. The trajectories of both major parties in El Salvador are closely intertwined with the war and its aftermath. D’Aubuisson had, the postwar United Nations Truth Commission determined, ordered the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, which was the impetus for the formal outbreak of the war, though lower-intensity insurgency and counterinsurgency had been prevalent through the late 1970s (Brockett 2005). D’Aubuisson challenged Christian Democrat candidate José Napoleón Duarte for president in the 1984 general elections and lost; however D’Aubuisson’s successor as party leader, Alfredo Cristiani, won the 1989 election, and ARENA overtook the Christian Democrats to become El Salvador’s dominant party, controlling the presidency for the next two decades.

ARENA’s legacy as the incumbent party during much of the Salvadoran civil war, as well as its violent paramilitary activity in the years leading to and during the war, means that the war still largely shapes the electorate’s attitudes toward the party, as it does for ARENA’s left wing rival, the FMLN. This is especially true for the Salvadoran diaspora: the first major wave of Salvadoran emigration was in the 1980s, largely made up of war refugees fleeing the violence. Thus the diaspora tends to skew away from ARENA, as the party which prosecuted the war and was in power for most of it, and thus were more likely to be held responsible for the conditions
which these first wave migrants left than was the FMLN. Facing a largely unsympathetic diaspora, ARENA had little motivation to try to make inroads with the diaspora, and long resisted efforts to grant diaspora enfranchisement in the Legislative Assembly.

ARENA’s long period of uninterrupted power also demotivated the creation of a grassroots infrastructure in the diaspora. Party officials interviewed in chapter 3 noted that the party treated embassies and consulates as their party base of operations, neglecting to build a parallel party structure abroad. The party’s own internal organization further complicated the creation of a base committee model, as the party’s sectoral structure does not provide for a single unified base within a party hierarchy. ARENA developed a formal diaspora wing, called Sector 8, in the early 2000s.18 The party has lagged behind its left-wing rival in both popularity and overall level of activity in the diaspora, though it sends candidates to campaign in the U.S., and cites issues relating to the diaspora in campaign propaganda during elections. Thus its diaspora outreach has been relatively limited compared to the FMLN, and has tended to focus visits by candidates and party officials at the more elite level (business leaders, government and international financial institution officials). Its engagement with diaspora issues has involved citing the diaspora symbolically in campaign ads, often as a scare tactic threatening home country voters with loss of remittances from relatives in the U.S.

FMLN

Like ARENA, the left-wing Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) has its roots as a combatant in the Salvadoran Civil War and transitioned postwar to a political party, as per the terms of the 1992 peace accords. Originally a loose coalition of five guerrilla armies which sought to overthrow the Salvadoran government, they came together with Cuban

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18 Interview with Margarita Escobar, February 2013
brokerage to form the FMLN under unified command. As a guerrilla movement, the FMLN fought both the Salvadoran government (both as a military junta and, following the 1984 elections, elected Christian Democrat and ARENA administrations) as well as nationalist paramilitaries, and began contesting elections beginning in 1994, when the constituent guerrilla groups were formally collapsed into a single party. The party lost to ARENA in each presidential election until 2009, and retained control of the presidency in 2014.

The FMLN has long relied on diaspora support, originally militarily as a source of funds and safe havens for fighters, and later as a base of electoral support. Salvadorans residing abroad have, on the whole, skewed toward the FMLN, as evinced by voting results in the 2014 elections, in which the newly enfranchised diaspora backed the FMLN by a higher percentage than any other geographic constituency (see chapter 3).

As a party with its origins as a coalition of constituent guerilla armies, most of them Marxist in orientation, unified out of wartime necessity, the party retains a classic Leninist structure with a clear hierarchy and a mass base model. Thus its diaspora support network parallels its domestic membership structure, which is a base committee model. The party has maintained base committees in several U.S. cities since the war, which allows them to mobilize large numbers of members for rallies, lobbying efforts, presence at Salvadoran community events, and visits by candidates. Campaign visits have focused at both the grassroots and elite level, has included candidates for local as well as national office, and the party has a more permanent presence in the diaspora at the community level, not only during elections.

El Salvador’s parties thus show a stark contrast both in terms of skew and infrastructure. The FMLN enjoys a favorable diaspora skew and has a well developed diaspora infrastructure, allowing for effective grassroots mobilization. ARENA is disadvantaged in both areas, with an
unfavorable diaspora skew and a still underdeveloped party infrastructure in the diaspora, though it is attempting to rectify the latter with the construction of its Sector 8 diaspora network.

**Mexico**

**PAN**

The National Action Party (PAN) is one of the three major parties in Mexico, and occupies the right side of the spectrum. Though founded in 1939, the party only began winning elections at the state and local level in the late 1980s, given the noncompetitive nature of national elections under the hegemonic rule of the longtime incumbent party, the PRI. The PAN was the first, and so far only party to unseat the PRI in a national election since the founding of the modern Mexican state: its presidential candidate Vicente Fox won in the historic 2000 elections. The PAN controlled the presidency until the PRI regained it in 2012.

The PAN’s legacy as the first party to beat the PRI has given the party stature in the diaspora which skews strongly against the PRI. Much of this legacy is tied up with the personal appeal of Vicente Fox, who campaigned in Mexican communities in the U.S. before Mexicans residing abroad had gained the right to vote. Fox pledged to secure voting rights for emigrants, and did: his successor, Felipe Calderón, and the PAN’s losing candidate in the 2012 elections Josefina Vázquez Mota both enjoyed strong support from diaspora voters (see chapter 4).

The party’s relative advantage in terms of diaspora sympathy does not translate into a deeply institutionalized diaspora infrastructure, however. The PAN does not adhere to a mass base model similar to that of the FMLN or the two major Dominican parties. Instead, the PAN (and the PRD and, to a lesser extent, the PRI) has a more ad hoc presence in the diaspora: its party infrastructure in the U.S. was organized under the initiative of migrants and not the party and is not structurally integrated with the party, its diaspora engagement is limited largely to
elections, and it rely more heavily on independent nonparty organizations, principally hometown associations, as vehicles for outreach. This underdeveloped infrastructure predates, but is also reinforced by the legal obstacles to diaspora outreach under the diaspora electoral regime established in 2005, which makes formal campaigning and fundraising outside of Mexico illegal. Nevertheless, the PAN, along with the PRD, is active in the diaspora, and sends candidates to campaign in the U.S. in violation of the spirit of the law, while conforming to its letter. Beyond election years, PAN officials have also made visits to the U.S. to promote government programs aimed at migrants.

**PRD**

The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) is the longtime left-wing opposition party in Mexico. Originally a breakaway faction of the ruling PRI, the faction contested the 1988 presidential election under the name Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), which the PRI won through electoral fraud. Following the loss, in 1989 the PRD formed as a formal party dedicated to moving Mexico away from one-party rule. It has contested elections since, and though it has gained representation in Congress and won gubernatorial elections in several states, it has never controlled the presidency. Since the mid-2000s, the party has been dominated by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, its two-time presidential candidate, who has since broken with the party to form a rival left-wing party called the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA). For the purposes of this study, as a newer offshoot, MORENA will be included in discussions of the PRD.

The PRD’s outreach and presence in the diaspora traces back to the 1988 insurgent campaign by PARM presidential candidate and PRD founder Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who campaigned in the U.S. as well as Mexico. The PRD was the first party to champion voting
rights for Mexicans residing abroad, and has generally positioned itself rhetorically as a defender of Mexican migrants, especially in debates about U.S. immigration policy. Interviews with PRD officials show the PRD believes it should be the chief beneficiary of diaspora support. However while the diaspora clearly skews away from the PRI, election results from 2009 and 2012 show that this skew favors the PAN more than the PRD, which interviewees attribute to the PAN’s prestige as the party that beat the PRI in 2000. The PRD’s infrastructure in the diaspora is, like the PAN’s, ad hoc in origin and subordinate to HTAs, and its activities are limited by electoral law prohibiting official campaigning abroad. However its diaspora infrastructure, while not originally designed by the party or well integrated with it, has since been coordinated with the party to a greater degree than either the PAN or PRI. The PRD has sent officials on some visits to protest U.S. immigration policy. Its longtime candidate López Obrador resisted party pressure to campaign in the U.S. in the 2006 election, but did so in the 2012 election.

**PRI**

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) ruled Mexico for an uninterrupted 70 year period characterized by authoritarian one party rule. The party’s hegemonic control gave it a close public association, which it cultivated, with the Mexican state (Goldring 2002). Government policy was party policy, and thus unpopular policies were blamed on the party leadership, which maintained strong discipline over elected officials, including presidents, through term limits and control over career options (Magaloni 2006). The party and state alike maintained an anti-emigrant stance through most of its period of hegemonic rule, ignoring migrant interests, deriding them as disloyal citizens, and resisting efforts to enfranchise migrants, whom they accurately suspected of being on the whole unsympathetic to the party.
In contrast to the 1980s wave of migration from El Salvador, migration from Mexico to the U.S. is older and has waxed and waned with changes in U.S. immigration law, temporary work programs, and the economic and political climates. While most Mexican migrants would thus not be characterized as political refugees, those who emigrated over the PRI’s 70 year period of rule were likely to blame the party for the conditions that spurred their emigration, given the self-conflation of the party with the state. Thus the Mexican diaspora in the U.S. is marked by a strong anti-PRI skew, which thus benefits whichever party can position itself as the most viable anti-PRI alternative.

Although the party, starting with the Salinas presidency in 1988, made some efforts to reach out to migrants with its acercamiento (closeness) program, its diaspora infrastructure is especially underdeveloped: while there are two groups of PRI-sympathizing migrants in the U.S., they lack official recognition by the party or voting rights for internal party affairs. The party was also behind the drafting of the bill which enfranchised emigrants – though passed under a PAN president, it was introduced by a PRI legislator and designed by PRI-appointed bureaucrats – which placed heavy restrictions on both voting by migrants and campaigning by parties. Of the parties examined in this study, the PRI has the least developed diaspora infrastructure, as well as the most unfavorable skew from the diaspora electorate. As a result, its diaspora engagement is severely limited, and party official visits to the U.S. have been coordinated with rival parties to take part in multi-party forums. Otherwise, PRI visits abroad have been limited to official outreach to government institutions and fraternal organizations, not the diaspora community.

While the three Mexican parties vary less in terms of infrastructure, with all three exhibiting weak infrastructure and the PRI’s the least developed of all, the strong skew of the diaspora away from the PRI creates opportunity for the PAN and PRD to capture this anti-PRI
electorate. Currently the PAN has an advantage over the PRD as the more prominent alternative to the PRI for diaspora Mexicans; both parties, however, can say they enjoy a favorable skew, the PRD to a slightly lesser extent. The PRI faces the least favorable conditions for diaspora engagement, with a strong skew against it and the least developed diaspora network of all parties examined here.

**Dominican Republic**

**PLD**

The Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) has been the dominant party in the Dominican Republic in the current era, controlling the presidency since 1996, with one interruption from 2000 to 2008. A centrist party which split from its centrist rival, the PRD, and founded by the same founder of the PRD, former president Juan Bosch, the PLD’s distinction from its rival has little to do with ideology or policy and is more often defined by the rival personalities of the two parties’ candidates. Personal rivalries within the party also create areas of contestation which relate to diaspora engagement. Former president and party leader Leonel Fernandez is an emigrant himself, having grown up for much of his life in New York City, home of the largest overseas concentration of Dominicans, and enjoyed broad support in the Dominican diaspora. Current president Danilo Medina, a rival whose candidacy Fernandez endorsed, but whose reelection he later opposed, has less support in the diaspora, based on diaspora election results (see chapter 5).

In contrast to the Mexican and Salvadoran cases, the Dominican parties are not characterized by a strong partisan skew by the diaspora. Given the lack of ideological distinction between the parties, highly volatile party platforms which change with each new candidate, and a
deeply entrenched political culture of patronage, Dominican electoral politics both at home and abroad operate on a more clientelist basis than Mexican or Salvadoran diaspora politics, according to interviews. A lack of skew thus informs diaspora engagement by parties as much as the presence of a skew does, as Dominican voters are perceived by party officials as an electorate that is up for grabs, rather than one that is a reliable base for one party or another.

Both Dominican parties, which trace their roots back to the same opposition leader who resisted the Balaguer authoritarian government, have significant party infrastructure in the diaspora, maintaining permanent party offices in large Dominican communities such as New York/New Jersey, Boston, and south Florida, and operating base committees (called secciones, sections) similar to El Salvador’s FMLN. Of the two, the PLD is younger and has a less developed base committee infrastructure, and as the longtime ruling party, has been slightly more reliant on clientelism for diaspora support, though the difference between the two is narrowing. As such, the PLD’s diaspora engagement involves grassroots mobilization of party militants, frequent visits and rallies by candidates, advertising in migrant media, as well as clientelist tactics of offering government jobs to prominent diaspora supporters.

PRD

The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) is the older of the two major Dominican parties by a decade, and historically occupies a position slightly to the left of center. However as noted above, both parties lack a fixed ideological orientation or long-term platform, party positions change with candidates, and the PRD has become increasingly centrist and indistinguishable from the PLD from a policy standpoint. The party was founded in the 1930s as a classic European social democratic class-based party with a mass membership model, which carries over into its diaspora network. The party shares with the PLD its founder Juan Bosch, and
has historically been defined by dominating personal leaders which commanded strong loyalty from its membership base, including longtime leader José Francisco Peña Gómez. However like Mexico’s PRI, the party maintained control over its leaders under a policy of no reelection, which its last elected president Hipólito Mejía, overturned, though he served just one term from 2000 to 2004; the chief beneficiary of this change in law has been the PLD’s Medina.

The PRD enjoyed strong support from the Dominican diaspora during the period of authoritarian government under Joaquín Balaguer, who was strongly opposed by the diaspora; the original wave of emigration to the U.S., in the mid 1960s, shortly followed the coup which installed Balaguer. Bosch and Peña Gomez organized opposition to the Balaguer government from the diaspora and the party built an extensive base committee network, with U.S. membership numbering in the tens of thousands, according to party accounts (Portes et al 2007). The PLD inherited the PRD’s base committee model and has about one-third the numbers of base committees as the PRD, according to interviews. And after Bosch’s split with the PRD, the upstart party gained from the goodwill Bosch had built in the diaspora, such that the anti-Balaguer skew of the diaspora ended up benefiting both parties equally, and providing neither with a strong comparative advantage in terms of sympathy. This has led to extensive diaspora outreach by both parties, both parties seeking to gain advantage over one another through clientelistic means. Like the PLD, the PRD combines a grassroots, mass mobilizational model of diaspora outreach that leverages its base committee infrastructure and its party militants – those to whom it appeals out of party loyalty tend to be older and more ideological – as well as clientelist tactics of jobs-based patronage.

This unique combination of grassroots mobilization and clientelist appeals by both major Dominican parties is the product of a lack of consistent diaspora skew and a developed diaspora
infrastructure by both parties. Thus both the PRD and PLD favor expanded diaspora voter participation, and use similar tactics to win over a diaspora electorate whose support is widely seen as up for grabs.

**Who makes up the diaspora electorate?**

Surveys of migrants from Mexico, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador on transnational linkages, through the Mexican Migration Project and the Comparative Immigrant Entrepreneur Project, finds that age, sex, education, marital status and duration in the U.S. are the greatest predictors of participation in some form of transnational political activity (Portes 2003). Specifically, older, married men (Jones-Correa 1998, Goldring 2001) who are high school or college educated (Burgess 2014) are more likely to be active in politics in their countries of origin. Perhaps counterintuitively, those who have remained in the U.S. longer, and those with U.S. citizenship, are also more likely to be politically active, but this is especially true for those who were politically active prior to emigrating (Guarnizo et al 2003).

The demographic profile of the most politically active migrants as those more stably situated in receiving countries raises an additional paradox regarding diaspora politics: If transnationally politically minded migrants are also more “Americanized” (at least in comparison to recent migrants), why should voters at home care about their preferences? Now outdated state attitudes of Mexican migrants as “traitors,” later called “heroes” by President Fox, nevertheless may linger in home countries among those who see migrants as having abandoned them, and resentment if they are perceived as buying political clout, without the personal investment or understanding that comes with living within the political system they wish to influence.

Polling suggests transnationally politically active migrants are not necessarily those who are most Americanized, though they may be seen that way at home, but rather those who have
settled comfortably into a transnational identity (Portes 2003). They are those who have achieved the financial security, family ties spanning both sending and receiving countries, and a regular pattern of travel which both motivates and allows them to pay attention to and seek to influence a country to which they still feel attached.

Transnationally politically active migrants are but one slice of the overall diaspora, one which is self-selecting and not necessarily representative of the community at large. It is thus possible that when speaking of diaspora campaigns, even among voting diasporas, candidates and parties are not targeting the diaspora as a whole but this narrow subset of politically motivated migrants. The skew that parties perceive this diaspora electorate as having, relative to that of the home country electorate as a whole, helps explain variation in engagement by party and by country, based on how sympathetic the diaspora may be. There are also other factors which set the boundaries of diaspora engagement: party systems, as well as the formal rules of diaspora electioneering, though as later chapters will show, these legal frameworks are very much the product of party politics, and parties’ perceptions of the diaspora, as well.

The following section will offer a regional comparison of three important factors which bound electoral outreach in the diaspora: 1) characteristics of the electorate – relative size and economic impact of the diaspora, 2) characteristics of the electoral system – formal voting and campaign finance laws; and 3) characteristics of the party system – party strength, institutionalization, and polarization. The chapter will conclude with a comparison of the parties to be examined, and an overview of their respective diaspora outreach.

1. Diaspora size and economic impact

A necessary preliminary condition for diaspora outreach by parties is the existence of a diaspora large enough to have an impact. In the United States, diaspora campaigning is carried
out principally (but not exclusively) by Latin American parties, given the large number of migrants from several Latin American countries. Of the twenty largest diaspora populations in the United States in total size, nine are from Latin America. However, in comparing diaspora communities to a domestic constituent group, it is important to consider their imagined impact relative to the overall electorate. Thus a better measure of the potential electoral importance of the diaspora than absolute diaspora size is diaspora population as a ratio to home country population. Many of the largest absolute diaspora populations are also among the largest in diaspora-to-home country-population ratio, including El Salvador (17%), Mexico (10%), and the Dominican Republic (8%). Two more are Caribbean countries that fall outside the category of Ibero-America: Jamaica (23%) and Haiti (5%).

A secondary measure of potential diaspora importance for parties is remittance levels. Remittances, cited in many interviews with party officials, offer one potential explanation as to what makes even non-voting diasporas attractive to political actors. The inflow of remittance cash has come to be of paramount importance to most Latin American and Caribbean countries with large diasporas. Remittances may account for as much as 22% of sending countries’ GDP, as in the case of Haiti, and serve as both a source of hard currency (in Mexico, the second largest source of foreign currency after petroleum exports) and a safety net for poverty alleviation. Through their remittances, migrants buttress both the personal incomes of their family members and the overall economy. As private transfers, however, they are also an untaxed form of revenue.19 And by bypassing public institutions, in contrast to other, state-provided sources of income such as social welfare benefits, remittances cannot be used by incumbents for explicitly clientelistic purposes. Several governments have attempted to harness remittances for public

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investment purposes, such as Mexico’s 3 por 1 program of matching any remittance donations that go toward public works projects, though in many cases remittances supplant state spending in utilities (Adida and Girod 2010). Two non-external voting countries, Haiti and El Salvador, rank among the highest in the region in terms of remittances as a percentage of GDP. Table 1 presents a list of the most potentially important (to parties) diasporas, ranking countries by their U.S. diaspora-to-home country populations and their remittances as a percentage of home country GDP. The higher the population and remittance ratios, the more likely the country will meet this preliminary condition for any degree of diaspora outreach by parties.

### Table 1. Diaspora Size and Remittance Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>U.S. Diaspora-to-Home country population ratio</th>
<th>Remittances as a percentage of GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
With the exception of Cuba, the largest diasporas relative to the overall electorate would represent the largest constituent group and thus could be the biggest “prize” for home country candidates and parties. Those countries which depend the most on remittances would be further motivated to court the diaspora vote – despite the fact that remittances are relatively insulated from politics and flow unimpeded by election results, they represent the overall economic importance of the diaspora, and can also serve to signal a potential source of campaign cash. The value of a relatively large diaspora as an electoral prize is somewhat diminished by electoral laws which either inhibit (as in Mexico) or prohibit diaspora electoral participation outright (Haiti and Guatemala, as well as all three countries of focus in this study prior to 2004); however as interviews show, the attractiveness of migrants to party officials may carry over through their perceived influence even when they do not vote.

2. External voting and campaign finance laws

Formal electoral rules most directly impact the degree to which diaspora communities may participate in the electoral process of their home countries, by voting or contributing funds for favored candidates and parties. These laws also bound parties, which may be restricted from certain activities such as fundraising or making official visits. Such rules do not exist independently of diaspora politics. They are the product of a legislative process reflecting the interests of parties, and party interests regarding rules of diaspora engagement are informed by parties’ perceptions of the partisan skew of the diaspora. Should a party see the diaspora as largely sympathetic, it will be motivated to set electoral rules making it easy for migrants to register and to vote abroad. Should a party see the diaspora as hostile, it will be motivated to restrict both voting rights for migrants and campaign activities for rival parties. Diaspora
electoral design is thus a vehicle by which skew bounds diaspora campaigning even before affecting how it is carried out.

Most Latin American countries today grant citizens residing abroad the right to vote, whether in person (typically at an embassy or consulate) or by mail. Currently only Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and countries in the non-Latin American Caribbean including Jamaica, do not enfranchise citizens residing abroad; the most recent country to extend voting rights to citizens residing abroad was Chile, in 2016.

External voting rights have been an election-year platform issue in Mexico (prior to establishing such rights in 2006), El Salvador (prior to 2014), and nonvoting Haiti and Guatemala, and support can span the political spectrum. Extending suffrage to citizens abroad was a campaign demand of Nicaragua’s losing conservative presidential candidate Eduardo Montealegre Rivas in 2006 as well as El Salvador’s winning leftist candidate Mauricio Funes in 2009. Table 2 shows which Latin American countries allow for diaspora voting, in what manner, and for how long. The three countries examined in this study all extended voting rights to migrants after 2000 and officially have open electoral systems; however later chapters will show that these systems can be more restricted in the manner of registration and window of voting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of election</th>
<th>Voting method</th>
<th>Year implemented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Presidential, legislative</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Presidential, legislative, referenda</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Presidential, legislative</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Presidential, legislative</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Presidential, referenda</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>No direct elections</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Presidential, diaspora reps</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Presidential, legislative, local</td>
<td>postal</td>
<td>2014, 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of election</th>
<th>Voting method</th>
<th>Year implemented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>postal</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Presidential, local (some states)</td>
<td>postal</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>personal</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ellis et al. 2007, updated by author

A general trend toward public financing of campaigns in Latin America has gradually lessened the reliance of candidates on private donors, though this trend is uneven. Currently all countries in the region have some form of state financing of campaigns, with the Dominican Republic as the last country to adopt the practice in its 1997 electoral law. Mexico provides for the greatest amount of public funding, 90% of which must come from the state (Posada-Carbó 2008). Both Mexico and the Dominican Republic provide funds regularly to parties; El Salvador and Haiti only finance parties in relation to campaigns. Mexico alone places limits on campaign expenditures (Castillo and Zovatto 1998), and even prevents Mexican citizens residing abroad to donate money to political campaigns. Further, candidates in Mexico may not receive direct contributions from any source; all campaign donations are required by law to go through the party, a vestige of an era of hegemonic one-party rule. El Salvador and the Dominican Republic have no limits on private campaign funding, and only Haiti limits only the amount individual donors can contribute to a candidate to 100,000 gourdes ($2,378).

Table 3 demonstrates how restrictive campaign finance laws can be written by parties which have little to gain from diaspora campaigning, while officially allowing for diaspora enfranchisement, Mexico being the key case: it has a complete ban on diaspora fundraising.
(justified by public financing of elections), and institutes limits on campaign spending by parties. These restrictions were designed by PRI legislators and bureaucrats in the Federal Elections Institute who understood diaspora campaigning would help other parties at the expense of their own. Mexico’s restrictive system contrasts with the open system of the Dominican Republic, a country where the diaspora displays no consistent skew toward any party, and thus lacks any party motivated to legally restrict diaspora campaigning.

Table 3. Campaign Finance Laws for Migrant-Sending Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Public Financing</th>
<th>Ban on diaspora donations</th>
<th>Contribution limits</th>
<th>Spending limits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Regularly and in election years</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Regularly and in election years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes, unenforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Regularly</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Election years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Election years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Election years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Election years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Regularly and in election years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Regularly and in election years</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Voting rights and campaign financing laws place specific restrictions on diaspora campaigning, though such laws do not have the finality that they may seem to have. Certainly in countries that do not offer external voting rights, the diaspora electorate will not be engaged for their direct votes, but as cases of campaigning among nonvoting diasporas show, they may be solicited for support all the same. Campaign finance laws may be circumvented, through either
entirely under-the-table donations or in-kind donations by supporters hosting campaign events and helping to defray costs.

Of the three countries examined in this study, Mexico is unique in having both extremely restrictive external voting procedures and an outright prohibition on diaspora campaigning and fundraising, both of which tamp down the overall level of diaspora campaign activity, by design due to the anti-PRI skew of Mexicans in the U.S. In any of the cases examined, there is no evidence of outright violation of electoral or campaign finance law by parties. Nevertheless, Mexican parties find ways to get around the law, which gives officially nondeclared candidates leeway to campaign abroad while avoiding saying or doing things which identify them as formal candidates.

3. Party system institutionalization and polarization

Parties are actors within large party systems, which can themselves affect campaign behavior and voter outreach both at home and abroad. In particular, institutionalization – both of parties and of party systems – impact the way parties operate and are organized, which can also be seen in the behavior and organization of parties in the diaspora.

Strongly institutionalized parties are well established, and have consistent and identifiable differences in policy, allowing for greater accountability to voters (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, Shugart and Mainwaring 1997, Mainwaring 1999). They have the financial resources, membership base and long-term interests in building party loyalty, all of which are important in outreach and building networks in the diaspora. Weakly institutionalized ("inchoate") parties are, in contrast, short-lived, ill-defined ideologically (though often populist), and may be either ad hoc personalize vehicles invented by candidates to run for office or “parties for rent” with no consistent platform from election to election.
Comparing migrant-sending countries according to institutionalization, I consider party age as a measure of stability and resources, and percentage of residents in the Americas Barometer public opinion survey who identify with a political party, as a measure of loyalty.

Another factor affecting party behavior is polarization. Highly polarized party systems can produce greater party loyalty, which can be beneficial to parties seeking to mobilize diaspora supporters at the grassroots level.

Following Mainwaring 1999, party age is calculated both by party and as an average of the age of all parties which won at least 10% of the vote share in the most recent elections for the lower legislative chamber (rather than based on presidential elections, where parties often run in coalitions). Average party age varies widely among Western Hemisphere countries with significant U.S. diasporas, ranging from over one hundred years for Honduras’ Liberal and National parties, to just two years for Haiti’s numerous and frequently disappearing parties.

**Table 4. Average Age of Major Parties for Migrant-Sending Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Vote share</th>
<th>Age as of 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>PN</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>JLP</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>DLP</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALN</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PLN</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. (cont.)

Country | Election Year | Parties | Vote share | Age as of 2017 |
---------|---------------|---------|------------|---------------|
Ecuador  | 2009          | PAIS    | 45.8%      | 11            |
         |               | PSP     | 14.9%      | 15            |
         |               | PSC     | 13.6%      | 66            |
Guatemala| 2011          | PP      | 26.6%      | 16            |
         |               | UNE/GANA| 22.6%      | 15            |
Haiti    | 2011          | INITE   | 33.7%      | 7             |
         |               | ALTERNATIV| 14.3%    | 7             |

Table 5. Party System Institutionalization and Polarization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Identification with a party</th>
<th>Average party age</th>
<th>Degree of Party Institutionalization</th>
<th>Partisan Polarization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>43.0%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Party institutionalization and polarization can have important implications for how parties operate in the diaspora. Older, continually operating parties are more likely to command the degree of loyalty among its membership base required to sustain cross-national ties following emigration, and more likely to have the resources and motivations to maintain transnational party networks to mobilize these migrants during elections. This is especially true in a highly polarized party system in which the diaspora skews strongly to one side. Both of those conditions are true in El Salvador.
Taken together, these three factors offer a framework within which parties operate in the diaspora and point to the two factors which explain diaspora outreach by parties. The first, party diaspora infrastructure, relates to party institutionalization: just as institutionalized parties are better able to mobilize voters at home, so too can parties institutionalized in the diaspora – with extensive grassroots networks – mobilize supporters in the diaspora. The second, polarization, when applied to the diaspora can create skew. If a highly polarized political climate coincided with migration, and migrants predominantly came from one side of that polarized spectrum.

*Regional comparison of diaspora campaign activity: Presidential candidate visits in recent elections*

A region-wide comparison of one aspect of the dependent variable, diaspora campaign visits by candidates for president or prime minister, is illustrative of how varied parties are which engage, or do not, with the diaspora. As subsequent chapters will show, visits are an inexact metric of comparison, as they can vary by duration, audience and purpose: they may include mass street rallies, fundraising dinners, and formal addresses to community institutions, policy advocacy groups and think tanks. Yet however imprecise, candidate visits do provide evidence that diasporas are considered to be important, and by which parties.

Without taking into account skew or infrastructure, a review of visits by candidates from ten major sending countries to the U.S. shows no clear pattern. Diaspora campaign activity occurs for both countries with and without external voting rights. Parties that engage in diaspora campaigns span the political spectrum and include both incumbent and opposition parties.
## Table 6. Campaign Visits to the U.S. by Parties in Major Sending Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Major candidates campaigning in US</th>
<th>External vote</th>
<th>Diaspora-to-population ratio</th>
<th>Most active parties campaigning in US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2 of 2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>FCN (opposition, right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0 of 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2 of 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>FMLN (incumbent, left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0 of 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0 of 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2 of 3*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>PAN (incumbent, right) and PRD (opposition, left) PLD (incumbent, center) and PRD (opposition, center) JLP (incumbent, right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2 of 2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1 of 2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>JLP (incumbent, right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0 of 3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>0 of 3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5 of 19</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>RDNP (opposition, right)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Officially pre-candidates; Mexican election law prohibits declared candidates from campaigning abroad

Source for candidate visits: News archive searches of candidate visits to U.S. in English and Spanish-language press

Parties which take part in diaspora campaign visits include parties of the left, right, and center, old and young parties alike. Those countries in which all major parties sent candidates to campaign abroad include the Dominican Republic (medium remittance-to-GDP ratio and medium diaspora-to-population ratio) and El Salvador (high and high). Those in which some but not all arranged candidate visits abroad are Mexico, (low and medium), Jamaica (high and high) and Haiti (high and low). Those with no diaspora campaigns are Guatemala (high and low), Honduras (high and low), Panama (low and low) and Ecuador (low and low). Peru, not listed here because it is not a major migrant-sending country to the U.S., has both low remittance-to-
GDP and diaspora-to-population ratios, a very weakly institutionalized and only moderately polarized party system (Jones 2005), all of which should create little incentive for candidates to campaign abroad, yet Peruvian candidates have made campaign stops in the U.S. – notably Keiko Fujimori, who visited a large Peruvian community in Paterson, New Jersey.

Those countries with the highest diaspora-to-population ratios include those in which all, only one, or no major party candidates campaigned abroad (El Salvador, Jamaica and Honduras, respectively). Remittances represent the smallest percentage of GDP for Mexico, with fairly active diaspora campaigns. Honduras, with one of the highest remittance-to-GDP ratios in the region, had no U.S. diaspora campaign in 2009, although that year’s general election took place under the cloud of the forced ouster of former President Zelaya, who called for a boycott.

Parties campaigning in the U.S. included those from Jamaica, Haiti, and Guatemala, all countries with no external voting rights, and in the case of Haiti, one with the lowest levels of party institutionalization in the region. And Mexico, despite having the highest level of public financing in the region, both a total ban on both diaspora campaigning and private diaspora donations, a medium-sized diaspora-to-population ratio, and an economy comparably less dependent on remittances, still saw two of three party candidates make diaspora visits in the last presidential election. Countries that saw no campaign visits include Nicaragua, which has no external voting,20 but also Honduras, Panama, and Ecuador, which do.

However, when looking at skew and infrastructure, candidate visits fit a more logical pattern. Countries in with both or all major candidates visited the U.S. either exhibit an

20 Nicaragua officially guarantees external voting rights under article 122 of Nicaragua’s Electoral Law; however external voting has never been implemented in practice by any government. Álvarez, Leonor. “¿Por qué los nicaragüenses no pueden votar en el exterior?” La Prensa 11 January 2016. http://www.laprensa.com.ni/2016/11/01/politica/2126678-nicaraguenses-voto-exterior
unkewed, or neutral diaspora not beholden to any party (Guatemala), a more developed party infrastructure (El Salvador), or both (the Dominican Republic). Candidates who did not come, such as the PRI’s Peña Nieto, faced either an unfavorable skew (Jamaica) or lacked a diaspora infrastructure to aid in campaigning (Ecuador), or both (Mexico). Countries in which no candidate came mostly did not meet the necessary precondition for campaigning, a sizeable enough U.S. diaspora population (Panama, Nicaragua), though there are exceptions, such as Honduras, a country with a sizeable U.S. diaspora, but whose first post-coup election in 2013 was marked by calls for boycotts and uncertainty and no candidate visits to the U.S.

Conclusions

The seven parties of focus in this study all come from countries with large diaspora communities and thus engage with the diaspora in some form to gain electoral advantage. However these parties show variation, within and across countries, in how they campaign abroad as well as the factors which predict their campaign behavior. Parties with the most extensive diaspora infrastructure are El Salvador’s FMLN and the Dominican Republic’s PRD (and, to a slightly lesser extent, the Dominican PLD and to an even lesser extent, El Salvador’s ARENA). The Mexican parties lack a significant diaspora infrastructure, with the least developed party in this regard being the PRI. In terms of relative diaspora sympathy, El Salvador’s FMLN and Mexico’s PAN (and, to a lesser extent, Mexico’s PRD) are the topmost recipients of a favorable diaspora skew, and El Salvador’s ARENA and Mexico’s PRI recipients of the most unfavorable skew. By country, we will see El Salvador as exhibiting a strong diaspora partisan skew with uneven party diaspora infrastructure, Mexico exhibiting a strong diaspora partisan skew with balanced and weak party diaspora infrastructure, and the Dominican Republic exhibiting a lack of diaspora partisan skew with a balanced and strong party diaspora infrastructure.
These factors together explain diaspora engagement, including the one aspect of diaspora campaigning considered in Table 6, campaign visits. Looking at skew and infrastructure, it can be seen that the parties which have a favorable skew and an established diaspora infrastructure will be most likely to undertake campaign visits, namely the FMLN and both Dominican parties. Parties which organize some campaign visits but to a comparably lesser degree, El Salvador’s ARENA and Mexico’s PAN and PRD, lack one of the two variables, either a favorable partisan skew or a diaspora infrastructure. The one party that sent no presidential candidate abroad, even having won the most recent election, lacks both a favorable skew and a diaspora infrastructure: Mexico’s PRI.

The following three chapters will detail how these parties engage with diaspora communities as a product of skew and diaspora. Interviews with party officials, electoral observation, party travel records, and polling data all illustrate a variety of ways parties have historically reached out to migrants, and to what degree, which even for a mostly nonvoting electorate, has implications for the parties’ ability to leverage this engagement into success at the polls.
Chapter 3. El Salvador: Skewed Support, Uneven Infrastructure

El Salvador, a country with a deeply ideologically polarized and entrenched party system, and an equally polarized electorate, both products of a still-recent civil war, presents a sharp contrast in diaspora engagement between its two major parties, ARENA and the FMLN. Superficially alike if mirror opposites – both former civil war combatants-turned-political parties, with loyal cadres of supporters, both parties also, superficially, appear to engage with diaspora communities in similar ways. Both parties send candidates to visit major Salvadoran population centers in the U.S., namely Southern California and the Washington, D.C. metropolitan region, and talk about issues of importance to migrants and their family members at home: legal migration status in the U.S., remittances, consular services, and find ways to talk about general election issues in ways tailored to migrants and their relatives.

Yet closer inspection of both parties’ diaspora activities shows one party, the FMLN, far more engaged on a grassroots level mobilizing diaspora supporters for campaign communication and lobbying purposes, demonstrating a long term, permanent diaspora presence that traces back to the civil war era, long before diaspora enfranchisement. Its rival, ARENA, has only superficial purchase with the diaspora as a whole. Its campaign visits by candidates are more limited, in terms of extent of travel, level of office, and types of visits, targeting elite level actors more than grassroots ones. Its presence in the diaspora is more temporal, focused on elections. And its communications strategy regarding diaspora issues is more an outgrowth of its traditional domestic campaign strategy, a “strategy of fear,” in which the diaspora and its issues are referenced, symbolically, in campaign messaging, but migrant supporters themselves are poorly coordinated with the campaign.
This divergence in diaspora engagement can be traced to two factors, each distinct between the two parties. The first, the relative sympathy each party receives from the diaspora as a whole, is a product of a strongly politically skewed diaspora, which leans far more to the left than the domestic Salvadoran electorate. The second, each party’s diaspora infrastructure, is far older and more built up, and organized along a hierarchical base committee model, for the FMLN, while newer, less extensive, and organized along a horizontal sectoral model for ARENA. These two factors present key advantages to the FMLN in its diaspora outreach, particularly in terms of mobilization, compared to ARENA, which struggles to mobilize diaspora support on a grassroots level, though it has found success leveraging diaspora issues in its campaign communications strategy. The following table summarizes differences by party in diaspora skew, party infrastructure, and outreach activities in the diaspora.

Table 7. Skew, Infrastructure, and Diaspora Outreach by Party, El Salvador

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Diaspora skew</th>
<th>Party infrastructure in diaspora</th>
<th>Diaspora outreach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>Underdeveloped: newer, small sectoral network</td>
<td>Limited, superficial: campaign visits, “scare tactic” advertising, poor grassroots coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>Developed: deeply rooted base committee network</td>
<td>Extensive, grassroots: campaign visits at national and local level, mobilizing, lobbying</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter will provide a historical analysis to examine the two parties’ respective organizational structures and consequent diaspora infrastructures, as well as the partisan skew of the Salvadoran diaspora. It will then show how these two factors affect campaigning for both parties as it relates to the diaspora in three presidential elections and one municipal election,
based on interviews with 14 party officials and direct observation of electoral activities in 2014 and 2015 in El Salvador and the United States. Interview subjects included campaign directors, members of the parties’ leadership committees, members of the Legislative Assembly, partisan strategists in think tanks and public relations, base committee coordinators in the U.S., as well as the directors of international affairs for the two major parties competing in the election, plus a third party, GANA/UNIDAD (see appendix).

Party structure and diaspora infrastructure for Salvadoran parties

The differences in diaspora infrastructure between the two major political parties in El Salvador, the left-wing FMLN and the right-wing ARENA, is rooted in their respective party structures, which can be traced back to the civil war in which both parties were combatants. The FMLN was a guerrilla army seeking to overthrow the military junta, and later ARENA-led government; ARENA evolved from paramilitary groups seeking to defeat the rebels and drew its support from government supporters. Smaller parties such as the National Conciliation Party (PNC) and Christian Democrats (PDC) are holdovers from the pre-civil war era and typically, but not always ally with ARENA in the Legislative Assembly. In 2010, a new party emerged, the Grand Alliance for National Unity (GANA), which established itself as the third largest party, ideologically identifying as center-right. It became the vehicle for ex-President Tony Saca’s presidential run in 2014, anchoring an ad hoc party coalition for his candidacy, UNIDAD.

The wartime origins of the two major parties gives them unique and distinct forms of party organization which help explain their diaspora infrastructure. Several studies in this literature have examined factors that contribute to successful transitions of combatant groups to political parties committed to nonviolent, electoral means of attaining power and a democratic political system (Shugart 1992, Ryan 1994, Deonandan et al 2007, Kovaks 2007, Allison 2010,
Dudouet 2012, Acosta 2014), of which El Salvador’s parties are generally upheld as successful examples. As former rebel groups-turned-parties become more institutionalized in democratic electoral systems, newer research has focused on factors that contribute to not only the end of violence but the electoral success of such parties, and diasporas can play a role in the consolidation of democratic norms (Koinova 2009). Party organization has implications for both questions. De Zeeuw 2007 proposes that the hierarchical, top-down structure of most rebel movements (particularly of Marxist orientation) can make the transition to a party model – one that would allow for more participatory and bottom-up decision-making processes – more difficult, and thus present a barrier to successful conflict resolution. And Manning 2007 theorizes that a rebel movement/nascent party’s electoral fortunes depends in large part on its group dynamics and, in particular, internal party cohesion. The FMLN provides an example of a post-transition, hierarchically structured party using its high degree of party cohesion and pre-transition network of base committees which impacts its campaigning in the diaspora.

FMLN party structure: base committees

FMLN’s structure reflects its origins as a Marxist guerrilla movement, one of the constituent groups of which was the Salvadoran Communist Party, organized according to classic Leninist party structure. Accordingly, the party is set up along a vertical hierarchy of leadership rooted in a mass base network, called base committees. Supreme authority rests in the party’s annual national convention, members of which are both appointed from existing party leadership bodies and directly by party members (party members are divided between militants and affiliates, the former having voting rights and responsibility of activity in local base committees), which articulates party positions to the party’s National Council, the chief
governing body. The National Council appoints members to the Political Commission, made up as well by coordinators of the party’s legislative body, mayors, women’s and youth wings, which oversees day-to-day leadership when the National Council is not convened; the Political Commission in turn appoints members to the National Executive Secretariat, which provides coordination among departmental and municipal party bodies. Members of the National Council are elected by directives which are established in each of the country’s 14 departments (states), whose leadership is voted on in annual department conventions. Members of each department’s conventions are in turn elected by party directives in each of the municipalities in the department, themselves voted on in municipal conventions, in turn voted on by base committees.

Base committees exist in every locality where there are a sufficient number of party members as determined by the National Council, with exceptions for overseas base committees where members may be spread out over larger geographies and thus organize base committees at the city or state level. Base committees, according to the party statute, have ten functions: 1. popular organizing; 2. keeping the party leadership informed of the needs and demands of the community; 3. collective political education of party members; 4. elevating the political consciousness of the community; 5. participating in the development of party platforms; 6. organizing community activities; 7. recruiting and developing new members; 8. promoting militant solidarity; 9. paying dues; and 10. general party development work. Base committees are the party’s primary conduit to the community and function as two-way conduits of information and mobilization. Base committee members are responsible for being the party’s

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22 FMLN Party Statute Section IV, Article 48.
23 FMLN Party Statute Section IV Article 49.
eyes and ears on the ground, transmitting community news and attitudes, as well as the base committee membership’s own political preferences, up the ranks to the party’s leadership. They also receive orders from the leadership regarding executing the party platform and organizing the community.

FMLN-oriented organizations in the U.S. sprung up within a vacuum vacated by the wartime Salvadoran government, which regarded the diaspora as rebel sympathizers (Macekura 2011). These organizations served two purposes: to provide services to migrants and raise money for community development in hometowns, and also to give political voice to unique diaspora interests. These included lobbying the U.S. government and politicians with regard to immigration policy and U.S. military and economic policy toward El Salvador. As a result, the FMLN built a party network in the U.S. which included local offices and representatives, as well as supporting a non-party specific network of migrant organizations (the Salvadoran-American National Network), and an international solidarity wing (CISPES). Much of this work has been at the instigation of party militants residing in the U.S., although many diaspora residents who are not aligned with any party express disinterest or mistrust toward Salvadoran politics (Landolt et al 1999).

U.S. FMLN base committees now exist for Washington, D.C., Maryland, Virginia, New Jersey, Houston, several in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Berkeley, Oakland, Santa Rosa, and Richmond, California. As of 2005, the FMLN party statute has provided for representation at the national party convention by party members living abroad, and explicitly state party members living abroad enjoy full and equal rights as those living in El Salvador. Only dues-paying (between $1 per month for regular citizens to $750 per month for the highest elected officials)
party members can vote, but party affiliates can participate in campaigns, attend rallies, and engage in election monitoring for the party.\textsuperscript{24}

In interviews, FMLN officials emphasized the constant work of diaspora base committees, not just during elections, activities which include political education, community work, advocacy on behalf of migrants, and as the incumbent party, publicizing the accomplishments of the government within the broader Salvadoran migrant community, and not only in election years.\textsuperscript{25} They cultivate candidates for office both in the U.S. and in El Salvador, host visiting politicians, and have a visible presence at Salvadoran community events. Diaspora base committees thus follow the same structure, and have the same rights and responsibilities, as those in El Salvador, with some differences. The first is geographic division: in the D.C. metro area, committees exist for Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia, rather than at the neighborhood level with jurisdiction calculated by population. The second is the continued identification of base committee members with constituent guerrilla groups from the civil war (PCS, FPL, ERP, PRTC, and RN); in the D.C. area base committees, at least, members demand equal representation for former members of each in base committee functions. This does not occur in El Salvador, where such constituent guerrilla group identities are no longer relevant, and contributes, according to one interviewee, to an attitude among FMLN members in El Salvador that their counterparts in the U.S. are “stuck in the past.”\textsuperscript{26} This rootedness in the past, however, underscores the entrenched nature of the FMLN’s diaspora base committee network, which has operated continually and been nurtured by the party and by U.S.-based militants since the civil war era.

\textsuperscript{24} Interview with Blanca Flor Bonilla, November 2013  
\textsuperscript{25} Interview with Karina Sosa, November 2013  
\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Ana Virginia, November 2014
**ARENA party structure: sectors**

Like the FMLN, the overall party structure of ARENA informs the organization and functioning of its diaspora infrastructure. ARENA’s system of leadership is more horizontally structured, owing to its distinction from the FMLN as being based on a sectoral rather than base committee model. While leadership appointment is more top-down rather than the FMLN’s bottom-up system of voting, party members or sympathizers have more direct access to higher levels of leadership without mediation of several layers of party bureaucracy. As with the FMLN, ARENA’s supreme authority rests with an annual convention, the party General Assembly, which appoints its chief governing body, the National Executive Council (commonly COENA).\(^{27}\) COENA appoints leaders to the party’s 14 department directives, which each appoint leaders to their constituent municipal directives, which each appoint leaders to their constituent neighborhood directives. In contrast to the FMLN, however, the primary body for individual membership is one of eight Nationalist Sectors, organized according to social groupings: workers, business, agriculture, peasants, youth, women, professionals, and the newest sector, known as Sector 8, for *areneros* in the diaspora.\(^{28}\) Each sector is represented at every level of the party structure, with seats reserved for sectoral representatives, thus allowing members more direct input to the highest level of party leadership. Sectors have many of the same responsibilities as the FMLN’s base committees, including promoting the party platform set by COENA within their constituencies, organizing and paying dues, as well as disciplinary functions of sanctioning party members for infractions.\(^{29}\) Geographically, sectors are to be organized by neighborhood, and like their FMLN counterparts, this geographic turf is flexible for

\(^{27}\) ARENA Party Statute Article 16  
\(^{28}\) ARENA Party Statute Article 88  
\(^{29}\) ARENA Party Statute Article 93
diaspora areneros, organized by larger areas such as states, as appropriate based on concentration of the Salvadoran population.

Sector 8, the sector for areneros living abroad, is the newest sector, having been founded in the early 2000s. During and in the years following the war, as long as ARENA controlled the government, its efforts to build an independent party base in the U.S. were negligible. Its indifference toward Salvadoran Americans gradually thawed with growing recognition of migrants’ economic clout through remittances, and thus the government began extending outreach programs which sought to bolster among migrants Salvadoran national identity and guarantee remittance flows (Guarnizo 1998), and displace FMLN-linked community organizations in provision of legal services to migrants (Itzigsohn 2000). Sector 8 founder and ARENA legislator Margarita Escobar described the three primary functions of Section 8 as: 1) providing social networks for dissemination of party information/propaganda; 2) organizing campaign activities such as candidate visits, and 3) organizing cultural events, such as Salvadoran Independence Day marches. Sector 8 groups exist in the San Francisco, Los Angeles, Houston, and Washington, D.C. areas.

The distinction between FMLN’s base committees and ARENA’s sections are not as much in scope nor function as where they fit within the overall party structure. As base committees are located at the literal base of the FMLN’s hierarchy, and connected only within this rank to the next organism up the rank, the party’s municipal directive/convention (an exception is when base committee members vote directly on members of the party convention). Information about the community and member opinions are transmitted upward from base committees to the corresponding municipal directive, then department directive, then national

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30 Interview with Margarita Escobar, February 2014
council, and orders from the national party leadership are transmitted downward in the same manner. In contrast, ARENA’s sections, being represented at every level of the party’s hierarchy, have direct access to neighborhood, municipal, departmental, and national directives, and can thus transmit and receive messages directly from the top. ARENA party officials interviewed attribute this model to the party’s free-market, business-oriented ideological bent which encourages competition and individual initiative among party members, but which at the same time makes coordination and enforcing party discipline more difficult.³¹

³¹ Interview with Gerardo Muyschondt, March 2014

Figure 2. FMLN Party Structure³²
El Salvador’s skewed diaspora

The second variable explaining variation in diaspora outreach by parties is diaspora partisan skew. El Salvador’s diaspora is large and skews strongly to the left. Among Latin American countries with populations over 2 million, El Salvador has the largest U.S.-based diaspora measured as a ratio of diaspora-to-home country population, at 17%; only non-Latin

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Figure 3. ARENA Party Structure

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Caribbean states’ diaspora-to-home population ratio are higher.\textsuperscript{34} Remittances account for over 15\% of the country’s GDP,\textsuperscript{35} illustrating the economic clout of the diaspora.\textsuperscript{36}

Scholarship on migrant-home country ties points to the existence of strong transnational social networks between migrants and family members at home (Jones-Correa 1998, Levitt 2011, Burgess 2014), and the persistence of state policies to try to benefit from such networks (Hollifield 2004, Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008, Pedroza 2010, Lafleur 2013, Pearlman 2014, Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). Political parties, too, seek to take advantage of such networks to gain an electoral advantage (Burgess 2014).

El Salvador’s diaspora is the most recent of those in the countries examined in this study to have been granted voting rights in presidential elections, in 2014 (and as of 2017, the second most recent in Latin America, after Chile). In 2016, the country extended voting rights for local level elections as well, a relative rarity among Latin American countries and migrant-sending countries generally.\textsuperscript{37} Both parties have, however engaged with the diaspora for electoral purposes since before diaspora enfranchisement, and in the case of the FMLN, before the end of the war. Nevertheless, it is the FMLN which has the greatest advantage for outreach, enjoying the sympathy of the majority of Salvadoran emigrants which, combined with a deeply rooted diaspora infrastructure, allows for grassroots mobilizing of the party’s diaspora supporters.

\textsuperscript{34} Diaspora to population ratio: Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2010; US Census Bureau, 2006-2009 American Community Surveys (ACS), Table B05006 “Place of Birth for the Foreign-Born Population”; Decennial Census 2000, Summary File 3, Table QT-P15. “Region and Country or Area of Birth of the Foreign-Born Population: 2000.” Excludes countries with populations smaller than 2 million.


\textsuperscript{36} A comparative study of remittances to El Salvador vs. Nicaragua (Funkhouser 1995) finds Salvadoran migrants remit relatively larger amounts of money, further augmenting migrants’ perceived clout.

\textsuperscript{37} Some states in Mexico such as Zacatecas, Michoacan, and the Federal District allow for diaspora voting, but such rights are conferred by states legislatures on a state-by-state basis.
A relatively recently established diaspora in the United States, the Salvadoran migrant community first grew rapidly as a result of the war in the 1980s. While illegal accompanied legal migration, Cold War-era U.S. foreign policy interests granted a large number of Salvadoran migrants who migrated prior to 1999 de facto legal residency under Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a program that falls short of permanent legal residency insofar as it requires regular U.S. government review every 18 months, but which nonetheless offers a certain degree of protection and rights (to seek legal employment, obtain driver’s licenses) not enjoyed by undocumented migrants.

The first generation Salvadoran diaspora is thus one which migrated at a time of extreme political polarization and violence, and included a number of combatants from both sides of the war. It is unsurprising, then, that the same polarization of political identity carries over to the Salvadoran diaspora to a greater degree than what one might find among a population of purely economically motivated migrants.38 The two urban centers with the greatest concentrations of Salvadoran migrants are the Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. metropolitan areas. Other major migration destinations are Texas (particularly Houston) and the New York area. Smaller Salvadoran diaspora communities exist in Mexico, Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and Australia.

Though Salvadoran citizens residing outside of El Salvador did not enjoy external voting rights prior to 2013, they have exerted influence over Salvadoran politics (and, indirectly, U.S. policy toward El Salvador) from the very beginning of large scale migration to the U.S. The very origins of TPS, the special granting of non-permanent residency to Salvadoran refugees, lie in a reversal of U.S. Cold War-era immigration and refugee policy driven in large part by remittances. As U.S. refugee policy has long reflected foreign policy objectives, Salvadoran...

38 For a discussion of the scholarly debate over Salvadoran-Americans as political and/or economic migrants, see Menjívar 2000.
migrants fleeing war violence were long denied refugee amnesty or any kind of special protection under the Reagan administration’s interpretation of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) conferring refugee status protection to those with reasonable fear or persecution on the basis of membership in a particular social group. As the U.S. government did not consider those fleeing countries with U.S.-allied governments to be at risk of persecution (thus Nicaraguans fleeing the Sandinista government could be awarded refugee status, but Salvadorans fleeing the JRG military regime could not), the Reagan White House and State Department resisted efforts by Joe Moakley and other Democrats in Congress to extend protection from deportation to Salvadoran refugees. The passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 granted legal status to Salvadorans who had arrived prior to 1982 but raised the possibility of deportation for the hundreds of thousands who arrived after. In an April 1987 letter and subsequent visit to the White House, Salvadoran president Napoleon Duarte lobbied for a reversal of White House and State Department opposition to refugee protection for Salvadorans in the U.S., emphasizing the degree to which the Salvadoran economy was dependent on their remittances, as well as his view that Salvadoran migrants included a large number of communist rebels whom he did not wish to see return to El Salvador. Duarte’s pressure successfully removed Reagan’s veto threat and a revised version of Moakley’s bill, first conferring TPS to Salvadorans, passed in 1990 (Macekura 2011).

Only with the end of the civil war in 1992 did competitive electoral politics emerge, and former combatants began establishing party networks and reaching out to neglected constituencies abroad. The election of Mauricio Funes of the FMLN to the presidency in 2009 left ARENA without its network of consulates and thus at a competitive disadvantage in terms of both party sympathy and networks within the U.S.-based diaspora.
The pro-FMLN skew of the diaspora had long been a roadblock to enfranchisement as long as ARENA controlled the government. However with the advent of the first FMLN government, the new Funes administration pushed for the extension of voting rights to Salvadoran migrants abroad. ARENA legislators were cool to the proposal, but it eventually passed in 2013, such that the 2014 presidential election in which FMLN candidate and vice president Salvador Sánchez Cerén defeated ARENA’s Norman Quijano was the first in which Salvadorans could vote from abroad. External voting currently only applies to presidential elections, though diaspora campaigning occurs at all levels of government.

*Diaspora skew*

Official perception that the Salvadoran diaspora sympathizes in large part with the FMLN traces back to the civil war and is reflected in then-President Duarte’s statements to President Reagan about communist exiles (Macekura 2011), and persisted through the subsequent ARENA administrations. Electoral evidence of this skew can be seen in the results of the 2014 presidential election, the first in which Salvadorans could vote from abroad, in which the diaspora ("the exterior") was treated by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal as a 15th department (state). The diaspora supported FMLN candidate Salvador Sánchez Cerén to a greater degree than any other department, with Sánchez Cerén winning 63% of the diaspora vote (the second highest vote share for Sánchez Cerén, 59%, was the department of San Miguel, the top migrant-sending department in the country relative to population).39

Interviews with party officials reflect a rough consensus that the Salvadoran diaspora favors the FMLN, and in fact makes up the left wing of the left wing party. Joaquin Samaoya, a former FMLN guerrilla, and currently a centrist critic of the party, viewed migrants as a unique

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constituent group, one which was farther to the left than the domestic Salvadoran population due to their relative isolation from the political process: “They have the luxury of radicalism in the abstract,” according to Samayoa, due to their migration during the civil war and tendency to still think of politics back home in wartime terms, an attitude reflected by current FMLN legislator Karina Sosa, who said Washington and Los Angeles Salvadorans are “more political,” but others have “an 80s mentality, they’re still at war.”

Samaoya maintained that the FMLN’s choosing Sánchez Cerén as the party’s 2014 nominee was a gift to the party’s radical wing, of which the diaspora made up a key part. The radical wing had been disappointed in 2009 by the party’s choosing Mauricio Funes as their candidate; though he had won, he was a party outsider, relative moderate and a non-combatant, and did not inspire the confidence that his then running mate Sánchez Cerén, a former guerrilla commander, did among the party’s war veterans. In 2014, the party had the option of putting another non-combatant moderate, Oscar Ortiz, at the top of the ticket, but instead named Ortiz as the running mate to Sánchez Cerén, in a concession that this year it was the party’s radical wing’s “turn.” “He’s a very bad candidate, no charisma, problematic past,” said Samayoa, “but he consolidated his base of support, who sent a clear message to the party: we want an ‘internal’ candidate.”

Of the eight FMLN officials interviewed, six expressed belief that the Salvadoran diaspora favored the FMLN, with two saying it was a swing vote. Of the five ARENA officials interviewed only one expressed belief that the diaspora favored ARENA, and the remaining four said it was a swing vote. Many ARENA officials pointed that the profile of Salvadoran migrants in the U.S. should favor ARENA more: many migrants are small business owners, whose community life centers around church activities, and who have become more “Americanized,”
which for ARENA officials should mean more conservative. “They’re a mirror image of El Salvador,” said ARENA Vice President and Director of Section 8 Amalia Espinal, but “they’re more critical” the longer they stay abroad, saying they become richer, more used to democratic norms, less loyal to parties, and thus more demanding on the parties back home. “We don’t talk to them any differently than we talk to voters at home, said Santamaría of ARENA, adding that there is a loyal vote for both parties, and “there aren’t that many undecided voters.” The extreme polarization of the civil war, which has been frozen in place for the civil war generation of Salvadoran emigrants, results in a uniquely strong skew for the FMLN on which the party capitalizes in its campaigning, as the following section illustrates.

**Diaspora campaigning, 2004 – 2014**

The combination of a diaspora with a strong partisan skew, and unevenness in the institutionalization and organization of the parties’ diaspora infrastructure, can be seen to impact the types of diaspora outreach ARENA and the FMLN have carried out in recent elections: the FMLN’s grassroots mobilization permitting lobbying and rapid-response propaganda inoculation, and ARENA’s more elite-level campaigning paired with symbolic references to the diaspora in campaign propaganda. This section will present an overview of ARENA and FMLN campaign tactics over three presidential elections regarding the diaspora, and which focused in large part on the issue of remittances.

**2004: Politicization of remittances by ARENA**

Until now, remittances have proven to be an imperfect point of political leverage for the diaspora. The dependence of home country economies on remittances is increasingly apparent and officially recognized, giving migrants a higher profile in home countries (Germano 2013,

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40 In addition to matching programs such as 3 por 1, an example is the Mexican central bank’s *Directo a México* initiative partnering with U.S.-based financial institutions to lower remittance transfer fees.
O’Mahony 2013). However as remittances are private transfers which circumvent government programs, and because family members continue to send remittances without regard to state policy, there has never been an organized, credible threat to withhold remittances as a way to pressure governments to pursue policies in the interest of remittance-senders.

Nevertheless, remittances can be a political issue in electoral campaigns, when policies of remittance-sending countries threaten to interfere with their receipt by households. In the months before El Salvador’s 2004 presidential elections, U.S. congressmen Tom Tancredo of Colorado and Dan Burton of Indiana, who viewed the FMLN as hostile to U.S. interests, made public statements that should the FMLN candidate Schafik Handal win, the U.S. would review its remittance and immigration policy toward El Salvador (Coutin 2007). In a speech on the floor of U.S. House of Representatives, Tancredo stated, “Under an FMLN Presidency, the United States government would not have a reliable counterpart to satisfy legitimate national security concerns. Therefore, if the FMLN takes control of the government in El Salvador, it may be necessary for the United States authorities to examine closely and possibly apply special controls to the flow of 2 billion dollars in remittances from the United States to El Salvador.”41 Burton described the FMLN as a “pro-terrorist party” and called for the revocation of TPS should its candidate win. Bush administration officials, including Roger Noriega, then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, Special Envoy to the Western Hemisphere, and Ambassador to El Salvador Rose Likins all made more vague allusions to reviewing policy toward El Salvador without mentioning remittances directly, but similarly made clear the U.S. government’s preference for ARENA candidate Tony Saca, who subsequently won.

ARENA, for its part, made these statements a central focus of their campaign, directly quoting U.S. officials in print, radio and TV ads and telling voters that their continued access to remittances depended on their voting for Saca.\textsuperscript{42} The text for one of ARENA’s print advertisements read “Only Tony Saca can guarantee the security of your remittances” (Wade 2016). ARENA also took out an advertisement in the\textit{Houston Chronicle} asking Salvadorans to tell family members back home to vote for Saca so they could continue to send remittances.

Though Salvadoran election law requires a moratorium on campaigning two weeks before election day, the statements by U.S. officials (including an interview with Ambassador Likins in El Salvador’s\textit{La Prensa Gráfica} in which she said the FMLN’s discourse is “cause to worry” for the U.S.) were reported as news in the major right-leaning newspapers\textit{La Prensa Gráfica} and\textit{El Diario de Hoy} in the week preceding election day (Ibid).

\textit{2009: Inoculation campaign by the left}

Prior to El Salvador’s 2009 presidential elections, similar statements about reevaluating remittance and immigration policy based on election results were made again by U.S. representatives Burton, and Trent Franks of Arizona. Then-presidential candidate Barack Obama’s advisor on Latin America, Dan Represto stated in an interview that Obama was worried about “the anti-American agenda…and the failed policies of Hugo Chavez, be those in Venezuela…El Salvador, or other places.”\textsuperscript{43} ARENA ran ads in El Salvador featuring the Represto quote and again warned remittances may be interrupted should Funes win.\textsuperscript{44} This time, the FMLN redoubled its efforts to convince voters that their access to remittances would be unaffected by the election of their candidate Mauricio Funes. The party’s campaign strategy

\textsuperscript{42} Interview Sonia Umanzor, January 2014


centered on broadening its base of support beyond its insular core of ex-guerrillas, seeking ties with business owners and choosing as its nominee a party outsider, Funes, a journalist who was neither a former combatant nor someone who identified with the FMLN’s historic Marxist ideology, though he was generally aligned with the party’s policy positions.

FMLN base committees in the U.S. mobilized through regular party affiliates such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), non-party migrant community organizations the Salvadoran American National Association (SANA) and Salvadoran Humanitarian Assistance and Research (SHARE) Foundation, and non-migrant organizations including the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) to pressure the incoming Obama administration to clarify U.S. policy toward El Salvador. SANA organized a 50 person delegation to lobby the State Department, Organization of American States, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee over three days, which resulted in a statement by committee chair Howard Berman and a joint letter by 33 members of Congress, both reaffirming that “neither TPS nor the right to receive remittances from family in the United States will be affected by the outcome of the election, despite what some of my colleagues in Congress have said.” Two days before the election, Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon stated “We are committed to free and fair elections in El Salvador. And we’ve also made it clear that we will work with whomever the Salvadoran people elect.” The FMLN publicized these statements in El Salvador in campaign propaganda, and FMLN base committee members in the U.S. were encouraged to call family members in El Salvador to reassure them that their remittances would not be jeopardized.

45 Ibid.
46 Interview with Sonia Umanzor, January 2014.
The 2004 and 2009 campaigns demonstrate the capacity for remittances to become a political issue for both migrants and the broader electorate in major migrant-sending countries. Notably, the salience of the remittance issue is not necessarily based on actual policy or the likelihood of policy. Although the U.S. Congress could in theory block remittances or use immigration policy to punish a government perceived as hostile, it would be unprecedented. However the very perception that Salvadoran migrants may cause family members to shift votes prompted a shift in strategy for both parties in the two elections: for ARENA, leveraging that perception for its media messaging, both in El Salvador and in the U.S., and for the FMLN, mobilizing its base committees for rapid response including organizing a broader network of non-party auxiliary groups for lobbying of U.S. officials. This effort aimed at countering the dominant rhetoric in El Salvador on the U.S. and remittance and migration policy, set by ARENA and major newspapers 2004, using grassroots organizing in the diaspora to both change official U.S. rhetoric and then propagate that change in El Salvador, through both campaign ads and interpersonal networks. These efforts arguably contributed to Funes, and the FMLN’s historic victory in 2009.

The FMLN’s well established and disciplined base committee network in the U.S. allowed for a rapid response in coordination with the party and the Funes campaign, according to Washington base committee leader Sonia Umanzor. The party’s ability to build a lobbying coalition beyond its own base committees with non-party organizations such as business owners and U.S. labor unions with Salvadoran membership was facilitated by the overall skew of the Salvadoran diaspora in the party’s favor. ARENA, for its part, did not mobilize other non-party organizations in the diaspora (it is notable that the FMLN had a prominent business group, Empresarios por el Cambio – Business Owners for Change – conducting outreach to diaspora
business owners in 2009, while ARENA, the pro-business party, did not), instead relied to major newspapers in El Salvador traditionally allied with the party to propagate its campaign messaging.

2014: Advent of diaspora voting

The halting extension of voting rights to diaspora voters reflects both parties’ read of the Salvadoran diaspora’s skew, with ARENA opposing enfranchisement until it was no longer politically feasible, and then creating barriers to registration and voting.

The 2014 election pitted FMLN candidate and Funes’ vice president Salvador Sánchez Cerén, a former minister of education and guerrilla leader, against ARENA candidate Norman Quijano, then mayor of San Salvador. Ex-president Tony Saca ran as a third party candidate under the centrist umbrella coalition UNIDAD, of which his new party GANA was a part, after Saca’s expulsion from ARENA on corruption allegations while in office. Saca was eliminated in the first round of elections in February with just 11% of the vote. Sánchez Cerén nearly won an outright majority in the first round, with 49%, but was ultimately forced into a runoff with Quijano in March, which Sánchez Cerén won in the closest election on record.

Following the passage of the overseas voting bill in 2013, Salvadorans living abroad could register and vote from outside the country. Previously, Salvadorans abroad could only vote if they flew home for elections, which small numbers did; interviews with ARENA officials confirm that ARENA had organized flights of supporters to fly home to vote in previous elections.47 Overseas voter turnout in 2014 was ultimately extremely low: just 2,334 votes, the result of a delayed legislative process in passing the external voting law which left an extremely narrow window of time for overseas voter registration, as well as problems with the registration

47 Interviews with Amalia Espinal, December 2013 and Margarita Escobar, February 2014
process: potential voters had to register in person at an embassy or consulate, which for many outside the Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles metro areas was prohibitively far, and applicants had to show proof of residency in the U.S., which was treated as a new voting district; those more recent and undocumented migrants who only had residency in El Salvador kept their voting district at home and legally could only vote if they flew back to their home district. Additionally, there was considerable confusion for how to vote by mail: ballots had to be placed within one ballot envelope which then had to be placed within a second, mailing envelope. Many voters only used one envelope or switched the two, and thus had their ballots nullified.48

Given these challenges and a first ever experience in overseas balloting, achieving even 2,000 votes might be considered an accomplishment, but given the size of the Salvadoran diaspora, it was considered low by the Salvadoran media and taken as evidence that Salvadorans outside the country are not interested in voting – a disappointment which parallels the excitement leading up to, and disappointment following, Mexico’s conferring voting rights to Mexicans living abroad in 2006. Nevertheless, given the extremely tight election results in which the election was decided by a margin of just 6,364 votes, and the fact that the two regions which voted most strongly for the FMLN were the diaspora (63%, or 1,157 votes, for the FMLN) and the department of San Miguel (58%, or 106,882 votes for the FMLN), one of the top migrant-sending regions in the country (second only to San Salvador as the top region receiving remittances49), it can be reasonably inferred that the FMLN owes its victory in large part to the diaspora, not primarily by direct vote but by indirect influence over voters in migrant-sending regions.50 The vote results provide evidence of the diaspora’s unique political profile relative to

48 Interview with Pedro Monterrosa, November 2013
50 This is a similar case to that of Mexico in 2006. See Chapter 4.
home country voters, who voted nearly 50-50 for each party, and thus contradict the alternative explanation of diaspora voters mirroring the domestic electorate.

Notably, the advent of diaspora voting did not mark a fundamental change in campaign strategy for either party, which maintained much the same messaging and respective tactics as they had from prior elections, though both parties devoted personnel and resources to facilitate voting. Both parties directed staff to coordinate campaigns and get-out-the-vote drives abroad, principally in the U.S. In the Washington, D.C. area, Sector 8 representative Oscar Amaya reported ARENA had a staff of 60 tasked with diaspora outreach and voter registration, headed by former consul general for the Salvadoran consulates in D.C. and Woodbridge, Virginia, Margarita Chávez. The FMLN, for its part, reported 70 paid staff working on logistics for the election, but its D.C. area campaign coordinator Francisco Pereira said he had hundreds of volunteers drawn from their party militants, evidence of a more established diaspora infrastructure network.51

An additional measure of the development of the FMLN’s diaspora infrastructure is the relative power diaspora base committees have with the party. Diaspora Salvadorans exerted pressure even on the candidate selection process. All internal party decisions made at the national party convention, including candidate selection, are based on input from lower-level party groups beginning with base committees, as stipulated by FMLN party statutes. Overseas base committees receive equal representation with national base committees, and diaspora FMLN base committee members are generally viewed as favoring the party’s radical wing, according to ex-FMLN party official Joaquin Samaoya, D.C.-based FMLN activist Alex Nuñez, and L.A.-based Salvadoran community organizer Salvador Sanabria.

As in previous elections, both candidates made campaign visits to Salvadoran population centers in the U.S. In June 2013, Salvador Sánchez Cerén made a 3 day visit to the Washington, D.C. region, meeting with an interdenominational group of church members at El Calvario Baptist Church and with residents at a community center in Virginia, where he presented his administrative platform, Diálogo País. In August, he made a four day visit to Los Angeles and other cities in California. Vice presidential candidate Oscar Ortiz visited Washington, D.C. in March 2013 and Los Angeles in August for the city’s Salvadoran Day, where he discussed his ticket’s platform for immigration and crime.

ARENA candidate Norman Quijano traveled to Los Angeles, Oakland, and Sacramento, California in August 2012, where he met with city officials and promoted a municipal partnership initiative between Oakland and San Salvador. In May 2013, he traveled to Washington, D.C. to meet with the International Republican Institute, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and Congressman Joe Garcia of Florida. In September 2013, he traveled to Los Angeles, where he met with Mayor Eric Garcetti. Press accounts of all three visits also mention meetings with local supporters in the Salvadoran community; however they presented the meetings with elected officials and institutional organizations as the highlights and primary objectives of the visits. At various events and in interviews, Quijano criticized the Funes

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government for allegedly brokering a truce between the two largest gangs in El Salvador, MS-13 and Barrio 18, and presented his administrative Plan de País. While in Washington, he promised as president to lobby the U.S. Congress for permanent legal residency for all Salvadorans currently under TPS protection, echoing a similar pledge made by Oscar Ortiz in Los Angeles.

Evidence against the alternative explanation that candidates rather than parties set diaspora campaign strategy can be seen in additional visits by proxies whom ARENA set to campaign on Quijano’s behalf. Quijano’s daughter Liss Quijano visited Washington, D.C. for four days in November 2013 to campaign for her father, and attended Salvadoran community events as well as meetings with international organizations and the local Spanish-language press.57 More notably, in February 2014, Legislative Assembly member Roberto D’Aubuisson (son of ARENA founder of the same name, who boasts greater name recognition and is a possible rival to Quijano for party leadership) visited the Washington, D.C. region and met with members of ARENA’s Sector 8 at an event in a restaurant in Arlington, Virginia; by D’Aubuisson’s admission, the community meeting was a last minute change after a meeting with U.S. Congressional representatives fell through.58 The focus on elite level meetings is indicative of the party’s comparable lack of diaspora sympathy and of a more established network.

While the level of diaspora campaigning remained high as in previous years, the types of campaign events in 2013 – 2014 came to more closely resemble typical domestic campaign events, particularly for the FMLN candidate. In the run-up to the 2009 presidential election, both FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes and ARENA candidate Rodrigo Ávila made multiple trips to Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., however both candidates placed relatively greater emphasis

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on closed-door meetings with businesses and official organizations. Ávila traveled to Los Angeles and San Francisco in April 2008, where he held an invitation-only fundraising dinner hosted by the owner of the Liborio Markets grocery chain, and met with members of the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.\(^{59}\) In July 2008, he visited Washington, where he had private meetings with officials at the World Bank and with members of Congress and U.S. immigration officials before holding a “citizens’ consultation” with members of the community.\(^{60}\) Funes also traveled to Washington in December 2008 and met with OAS, World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank officials, following a trip to Mexico City to meet with Carlos Slim (whose subsidiary, El Salvador Telecom, is the largest landline phone company in the country) and Ricardo Salinas of Grupo Salinas, trips meant to reassure foreign investors of a stable business climate under an FMLN administration. A rare public event at Wesley United Methodist Church was billed as a meeting with “investors, business leaders and intellectuals” to discuss immigration policy.\(^{61}\) In contrast, the 2013-2014 round of diaspora visits by Sánchez Cerén and Ortiz focused in greater part on open dialogue aimed at the broader local Salvadoran community. Quijano, as well as other ARENA officials, also took part in a greater number of overall visits than previous ARENA tickets, though the primary focus of most of these visits were official meetings with U.S. politicians and international institutions. The greater overall level of diaspora campaigning for both parties reflects the new overseas voting law. For ARENA, it also represents an acknowledgement that the party needs to build a base in the diaspora. For the


FMLN, a shift to more community visits signals a diminished need to reassure investors and international financial institutions as the now incumbent party.

Nevertheless, the distinction in diaspora campaign activities between ARENA and the FMLN are notable. ARENA candidate visits have focused primarily on official meetings with U.S. politicians and representatives of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, the International Republican Institute, and associated organizations. Such meetings are evidence of the nature of the diaspora as a distinct constituency which parties treat differently than voters at home: for ARENA, as a tool to convey presidential stature, and signal to voters at home a candidate’s ability to negotiate on behalf of the country with foreign governments and institutions whose relationships are important for El Salvador, principally the U.S. Community meetings are secondary aims, often private events with party members only, and in one reported case, only occurred due to a cancellation of an official meeting.

While previous FMLN candidate visits have also involved meetings with business and financial institution officials, visits in the 2014 election were more community-oriented than those of their rival party. On several occasions both Funes and Sánchez Cerén held meetings at local churches, and other events centered around community festivals. The party was also able to count on the volunteer efforts of its base committee members to augment its paid personnel in voter registration and voter mobilization in the U.S. This traces to the party’s advantage in the diaspora regarding broader diaspora support and its long history of building a base committee network of militants who could be put into action whenever the party needs.

**Diaspora-party non-coordination: the ARENA billboard campaign**

An analysis of an ad campaign by ARENA in the 2014 election provides an illustration of the limits of diaspora engagement with a sectoral diaspora infrastructure with poor coordination
with the party, and an unfavorable diaspora partisan skew. As in the 2004 and 2009 elections, ARENA’s diaspora campaign strategy focused on rhetoric relating to remittances, using the diaspora as a symbolic prop to convey a similar, if subtler scare message to voters in El Salvador that a victory for their rivals would put their remittances at risk. This emphasis on the diaspora as a reference in political messaging rather than a target of mobilization is consistent with past elections, and reflects the party’s disadvantage relative to the FMLN in terms of both diaspora support and infrastructure. The party’s difficulty coordinating this messaging between the campaign and diaspora supporters is also a structural issue for the party, reflecting the design of its Sector 8 diaspora network.

In contrast to the more rigidly disciplined FMLN, ARENA’s more, in the words of one ARENA campaign director, “open, democratic, entrepreneurial” nature offered greater incentives for outside input to the campaign but, consequently, had greater problems reconciling diaspora initiative with a unified strategy than did the FMLN.62 Interviews with ARENA officials, as well as the director of a private political public relations firm contracted by ARENA to coordinate its electoral advertising campaign, point to breakdowns in coordination among ARENA militants, party officials, and campaign strategists. This section outlines the conditions which led to a shift in strategy for ARENA in the 2014 election, the role the diaspora played in this new strategy, and how ARENA’s party structure limits coordination between campaign strategists and diaspora party activists.

Following a weak showing in the first round elections, the Quijano campaign in the second round was set by a new chief campaign strategist, Venezuelan pollster Juan José Rendón, who replaced ex-president Francisco Flores, who had become subject to a corruption

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62 Interview with Gerardo Muyschondt, March 2014
investigation. Rendón adopted a more aggressive approach for the second round, favoring the use of negative attack ads that played on lingering civil war-era fears of leftist radicalism by making implicit comparisons between Sánchez Cerén and Hugo Chávez. ARENA ads thus highlighted the former’s past as a guerrilla (the FMLN, for its part, downplayed this history and referred to him as a teacher, an allusion to his profession prior to becoming a guerrilla as well as his tenure as Minister of Education under Funes) and reputation as an ideological hardliner, to sharpen the perceived difference between Sánchez Cerén and the moderate Funes, a more popular figure than Sánchez Cerén. The Quijano campaign’s new literature maintained its focus on key issues, principally gangs and crime, and portrayed Sánchez Cerén administration as a break with Funes and a sharp turn to the left. Ads thus warned of shortages and social unrest similar to that seen in Venezuela under a Sánchez Cerén administration. One Quijano campaign ad, shared widely in social media, urged voters to vote for Quijano if they wished to “continue to eat pizza, pupusas, and chicken.” Sánchez Cerén supporters shared and mocked the ad, thus increasing its visibility, as a cartoonish scare tactic typical of previous heavy handed propaganda campaigns by ARENA against perennial FMLN candidate Schafik Handal, when ARENA campaign material warned an FMLN administration would expropriate private property, burn Bibles, indoctrinate children in schools, and turn senior citizens into soap. The “pizza, pupusas and chicken” ad proved more effective, however, as it made implicit reference to food shortages reported in Venezuela which was then in the midst of mass protests against President Nicolás Maduro, which were being covered closely by news outlets throughout Latin America including in El Salvador.
Diaspora involvement in the new campaign

In many ways, this shift in campaign strategy was a throwback to that of previous campaigns, one which even one analyst for an ARENA-supportive think tank referred to as the party’s “strategy of fear.” Consequently the diaspora role in ARENA’s second round campaign reflected its role in the 2009 election: rather than drawing on a network of supporters, it focused on sharpening fears among voters of negative repercussions should the FMLN win – repercussions for voters at home, and specifically their own relatives, rather than for the migrants themselves. By 2014, relations with the U.S. had improved under Funes – the Sánchez Cerén campaign repeatedly highlighted President Obama’s selection of El Salvador as a stop on his 2011 Latin America tour, as well as El Salvador’s inclusion in a $200 million U.S. security partnership and a Millennium Challenge Compact – and thus the blocking of remittances by the U.S. government could not be credibly wielded as a threat. Instead, the Quijano campaign focused its diaspora messaging focused on the issue of crime above all.

The Quijano campaign had hired Publicidad Comercial, a private public relations firm, to oversee much of its advertising. After the first round, a group of ARENA supporters (areneros) in Washington, D.C., Houston, and Los Angeles approached the party with an interest in buying advertising for the campaign. The party connected them with Publicidad Comercial. According to its creative director Gerardo Muyschondt, the U.S.-based areneros had wished to design the advertisements themselves as well as their placement, which were to be billboards set up in specific areas the country where the U.S. areneros believed would maximize impact, areas with high rates of out-migration to the U.S. The designs they had sent to Publicidad Comercial initially clashed with that of the rest of the campaign: they did not use the same color scheme and

63 Interview with Sofia Flores, December 2013
font as Quijano campaign materials, and they originally proposed including a U.S. flag in each. Publicidad Comercial negotiated a redesign with the group to make the billboard design more consistent with other campaign ads, but the backers were still able to pick the exact locations of each of the billboards.

The billboards emphasized the Quijano campaign’s anti-gang platform through the lens of remittances. Each featured a picture of Salvadoran migrants in different parts of the U.S. and a quote alluding to the crime situation in the country. The three designs were placed strategically in parts of the country with high rates of out-migration to those cities and states featured: the “Salvadorans in Washington” billboards could be seen in San Miguel, while the “Salvadorans in New York / California” billboards could be seen in areas closer to San Salvador.\(^{54}\)

![Billboard](image)

**Figure 4. Billboard: Salvadorans in Washington**

“I want to return to a country without gangs”

\(^{54}\) All photos by the author.
Figure 5. Billboard: Salvadorans in New York

“Our remittances won’t pay for ransoms”
The billboards mark a continuation of ARENA’s strategy from past years of using the Salvadoran diaspora as a tool to generate anxiety over issues of insecurity for those with family members living abroad: in 2004 and 2009, financial insecurity (dependence on remittances) and in 2014, both financial (remittances) and personal security (crime). But they also mark a greater degree of nuance in the deployment of what could be more bluntly described in past elections as scare tactics: here, the use of positive imagery to reinforce existing negative campaign messaging, the Quijano campaign’s overall emphasis on crime and the gang truce in particular. Unlike in previous years, there is no overt threat (that the U.S. government would deport relatives or block remittances), but a reminder that relatives in the U.S. are acutely aware of the
security situation in El Salvador, with the implicit threat that they may be scared to send remittances if they believe the money will be stolen, or make their family members targets for kidnappings (there are many documented cases of gangs targeting families whom they know to have relatives in the U.S. for extortion). The scare tactic in this case is subtler and also more credible than earlier versions of this message, all the more so because it speaks to an experience shared by many affected by gang activity.

Muyschondt, the campaign director, maintains the billboards were not as effective as they might have been, owing to general confusion and lack of coordination within the Quijano campaign, which had divided publicity duties among three different private agencies, believing competition among the three would encourage better work. Despite successful social media metrics – Quijano is the first Latin American presidential candidate with more Twitter followers, Facebook fans, and Google hits than his opponent to lose an election – the three agencies couldn’t agree on a common strategy, and self-organized individuals such as the U.S.-based areneros stepped into the void. Thus the billboard campaign was never vetted and designed to coordinate with the broader campaign and were deployed too late to make any difference in the polls, even though the general theme – using pictures of ordinary Salvadorans rather than Quijano himself, who was seen as having a personality deficit – was aligned with the direction campaign strategists such as Muyschondt believe Quijano should have adopted before the first round.

However the billboard campaign was hobbled by an additional disadvantage suffered by ARENA, the lack of a large scale base in the U.S. to mobilize to contact family members directly. The billboard campaign thus is a continuation of other press-focused tactics such as newspaper ads in previous elections that made reference to the diaspora without evidence that the
attitudes expressed actually reflect attitudes widely held in the diaspora. Without a grassroots mobilization strategy to supplement a P.R. campaign, any claims made on behalf of the diaspora lacked credibility, and were thus able to be dispelled by mass mobilizational tactics deployed by FMLN base committees in the U.S.: organizing phone campaigns to reassure Salvadorans at home and lobbying efforts of U.S. officials to dispel such tactics. As the more institutionalized party in the diaspora with greater diaspora support, the FMLN could react quickly and organize its members abroad to push a unified message. As a party whose structure, and diaspora infrastructure, emphasizes competition and openness, and rewards small numbers of motivated members with access to campaign leadership, ARENA suffered in coordination efforts, and its use of the diaspora was limited to an indirect, publicity capacity.

**Diaspora campaigning in Washington, D.C. by a San Miguel mayoral candidate**

A contrast to ARENA’s ad-focused diaspora campaign strategy can be seen in the FMLN’s grassroots, community-focused approach in one local race for mayor of a municipality with strong diaspora ties. The electoral victory of an FMLN candidate for mayor of San Miguel who made a 2014 campaign visit to the Washington, D.C. area illustrates several dynamics of diaspora campaigning with a mass base infrastructure and a sympathetic, if non-voting electorate: party investment in international travel for candidates despite likely low turnout (in this case, almost certainly no turnout, except for those who flew back home to vote), a focus on community outreach over official events, a high degree of national party-local base committee coordination, local base tapping deep party structures in the diaspora, and active participation by the party sympathizers and base militants including input in crafting a policy platform. Typical of diaspora campaigning generally, attendees were asked to donate money, but in contrast to less

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65 The 2013 external voting law only applies to presidential elections. In 2016, however, the Legislative Assembly passed a law allowing for external voting for local elections as well.
institutionalized party diaspora campaigns, the focus of the events was on mobilizing the party base, including ongoing events following the visit and explicit appeals for attendees to call relatives in El Salvador and convince them to vote for the candidate.

Background: The Washington, D.C. region San Miguel diaspora

Approximately a quarter million Salvadorans reside in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan region, the third largest Salvadoran diaspora population in the U.S. after California and Texas. Polls of remittance transmissions indicate the majority come from San Miguel, a department in the east which is known as among country’s top migrant-sending regions: a 2013 survey of Salvadoran migrants in the U.S. conducted by the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants and Technological University of El Salvador showed San Miguel as just behind San Salvador and La Libertad as a top department of origin in absolute numbers (10.8%, 11.3% and 11.7% of respondents, respectively), though as a percentage of population, the much smaller San Miguel has a higher rate of out-migration than San Salvador or La Libertad.66 The Washington, D.C. region is known as a destination for Salvadoran migrants from eastern departments and especially San Miguel, in contrast to the Los Angeles metropolitan area which attracts more migrants from central departments including San Salvador and La Libertad. Since 2009, San Miguel has been an official sister city of Arlington County, Virginia, and the Virginia-based Arlington-San Miguel Sister Cities Committee hosts festivals, beauty pageants and fundraisers for San Miguel, raising $25,000 in 2014 for public schools and the construction of a senior center in the department; the winning beauty queen, Miss Sister Cities Arlington, is sent by the Committee to the department’s capital, San Miguel, to represent the Washington community in

the city’s annual Carnaval. Several prominent DC-area business owners are from San Miguel, including restaurateur Luis Reyes, owner of Lauriol Plaza and a local FMLN power broker.

Washington area FMLN officials maintain their party has majority support in the Washington-area Salvadoran community which traces back to the war. During the war, of the five constituent guerrilla armies making up the FMLN, the ERP was most active in the department of San Miguel, and many Washington-area FMLN militants to this day identify with the ERP, including demanding ERP-affiliated militants be sufficiently represented in FMLN base committee meetings and decisions. This attitude contrasts with that of FMLN militants in El Salvador, where such distinctions between constituent armies became irrelevant following a 1995 party decision by those constituent groups to dissolve themselves – the conclusion of a process begun during the war, when Cuban government support was stipulated on the condition of better coordination and an end to rivalries among the constituent groups.

The more rural, eastern departments were not, however, historical strongholds of the left, with local government dominated by parties of the right in the recent past. The principal political figure of the region in the postwar era has been Wilfredo “Will” Salgado, longtime incumbent mayor of the municipality of San Miguel, currently affiliated with GANA but who in previous years has affiliated with the PDC, ARENA, and PCN; Salgado switched to GANA on the condition that the party make his sister a candidate for the Legislative Assembly, which it did. Salgado has held the mayoralty since 2000 following a career in the military, in which he served in an infantry battalion during the civil war and led the Sombra Negra death squad, for which he

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68 Interviews with Francisco Pereira, Funes 2009 campaign coordinator for Washington, D.C., and Alex Nuñez, FMLN general secretary for Washington, D.C., April 2012.
69 Interview with Ana Virginia, Salvadoran Embassy press officer, November 2014
70 “Will Salgado pide por él y su hermana.” La Prensa Gráfica 4 March 2014.
was charged with murder and other illegal activities before being absolved in 1996.71 As per the classical populist cacique model, Salgado has maintained power throughout shifting party support through lavish social spending, particularly for San Miguel’s famous annual Carnaval, for which the municipality regularly pays much more than any other concert promoter in the country and attracts top international pop music stars to perform, such as Marc Anthony in 2013. Salgado’s name (both his and that of his sister, since her entry into electoral politics) is visible on public monuments and public works in San Miguel. Salgado has widely alleged ties to drug trafficking organizations – the Perrones cartel operates in the region, and the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) controls much of San Miguel, engaging in street-level dealing, extortion and protection rackets – and it is through Salgado’s connections to many legal and illegal businesses in the region that he maintains his high levels of spending and public support.

Figure 7. Public Garbage Bin, San Miguel

“Courtesy of Will Salgado”

71 In a 2007 profile by the Washington Post, Salgado was quoted saying he had a collection of children’s skulls at his home from the civil war which he used as candleholders; he later demanded a retraction from the newspaper, unsuccessfully, claiming he had been misquoted. “Former Salvadoran Foes Share Doubts on War.” The Washington Post January 29, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/28/AR2007012801353.html
Salgado has faced the challenge of governing as a right-wing populist in a department that has been increasingly swinging left. In the 2004 presidential election, ARENA candidate Tony Saca had won San Miguel by 57% to FMLN candidate Schafik Handal’s 37%, roughly consistent with results in El Salvador as a whole. By 2009, the parties’ respective vote shares in San Miguel had reversed: the FMLN’s Funes beat ARENA’s Ávila 58% to 42%. In the 2014 presidential election, San Miguel voted 59% for the FMLN’s Sánchez Cerén in the first round of the election, the highest percentage the party won in any department, and just 9% for UNIDAD, the coalition to which Salgado’s GANA is a part, the second lowest percentage in the country. San Miguel ultimately voted 58% for Sánchez Cerén in the second round, losing barely a percentage point to ARENA once the right vote had consolidated, suggesting that a significant number of UNIDAD supporters – nominally Salgado’s base – threw their second round vote to the FMLN, a trend opposite of that of UNIDAD supporters in the rest of the country who overwhelmingly voted with ARENA.72

*Miguel Pereira campaign visit to Washington*

It is within this transnational political context – an observable shift from right to left in a migrant-sending department key to the FMLN’s narrow 2014 victory, and the existence of a large, well organized diaspora from that department which skews strongly in favor of the left – that the mobilizational capacity of a party with strong diaspora infrastructure and support can be seen in a local election.

It was a few months after the FMLN’s 2014 election victory that the party sent its candidate for mayor of San Miguel, Miguel Pereira, to the Washington, D.C. region to campaign. Pereira, a 31-year-old attorney and former director of the National Youth Institute (INJUVE)

72 Salgado’s alliance with GANA and thus with UNIDAD in the 2014 election was a marriage of convenience; Salgado thus had little ideological or personal connection with the party or with Tony Saca’s campaign.
under the Funes administration, additionally reflects a trend within the party that extends to the 2004 election, a strategy of recruiting younger candidates for higher office, who are not former combatants and perceived as moderates if not party outsiders: the model for which being Mauricio Funes. In the same round of mayoral elections, the FMLN won control of San Salvador, a seat formerly held by Quijano, with another young man with a business background, Nayib Bukele, who has been widely pegged by the press as a rising star and new face of the party.73

In December 2014, Pereira held two campaign events in the D.C. metro region, in addition to holding private meetings with a group of D.C.-area Salvadoran business owners. On the evening of December 27, he held an event at St. Stephen’s Church in Washington, D.C., attended by approximately 300 people, and on the afternoon of December 28, he held a similar event at an Elks lodge in Fairfax, Virginia, attended by approximately 150. Both were billed as “events to present and listen to proposals” by FMLN flyers rather than party rallies, though nearly all who attended were, based on their party hats, shirts and regalia, FMLN militants.

The Virginia event which I attended was tightly staged but did adhere to the dialogue format promised by the party flyers. Pereira gave a 30 minute speech before taking questions, outlining his vision for governing San Miguel, emphasizing infrastructure and social services – roads, schools, and clinics – issues to which diaspora Salvadorans in the audience likely heard about directly from family members at home and over which they felt some ownership, being the types of improvement projects which diaspora residents can and have raised funds to support in

73 Speculation about a future presidential run by Bukele has been a frequent topic in the Salvadoran media, and has been boosted by calls for his candidacy by prominent members of the Salvadoran diaspora such as Washington’s Luis Reyes. See, e.g. Castillo, Heidi. “Nayib Bukele: No quiero ser presidente por ‘mover la cola,’ sino por mis principios.” La Página 28 November 2016. http://www.lapagina.com.sv/nacionales/123576/2016/11/28/Nayib-Bukele-No-quiero-ser-presidente-por-%E2%80%9Cmover-la-cola%E2%80%9D-sino-por-mis-principios-
the past. Pereira’s engagement with the audience was thus specifically targeted at it on the community level, both in San Miguel and in Washington: even before Pereira spoke, he passed out trophies to local children who had won a D.C.-area soccer tournament named Copa Alba Petroleos. Before the event, party organizers hung flags of the San Miguel soccer team, the Águilas, along with the flags of El Salvador and the FMLN. Many more in the audience posed for pictures with the team flag than the candidate himself.

Pereira’s engagement with the D.C. Salvadoran community was not without its bumps. In his speech, Pereira chastised those Salvadorans who are “stuck in the 1980s” and need to recognize that El Salvador is a democracy now – a swipe aimed at his opponent and reference to Salgado’s death squad past, echoing frequent FMLN language about their ARENA opponents. However the reference could also apply to those in the audience who left the country in the 1980s, and the line did not get a warm response. During the question and answer period, Pereira faced some pointed questions, including one who demanded to know what Pereira would do about gang infiltration of local government; Pereira dodged the question and reiterated his main points. Both events concluded with a call for support by a supporter who had traveled with Pereira, Oscar Parada, a former ARENA candidate who had left the party to form a group called Movimiento 10,000, which he described as a new non-party political movement of small business owners, but explicitly organized to help Pereira win office (the 10,000 refers to the number of additional votes Pereira would supposedly need to defeat Salgado). In spite of his pro-business rhetoric, his testimony of his defection from ARENA won the most enthusiastic response at the Virginia event, and was taken as a signal of shifting allegiances among constituencies historically wed to the right. At the end of the event, a local FMLN base
committee official asked the audience for donations, and a hat was passed, but also asked everyone present to call their relatives in San Miguel and tell them to vote for Pereira.

Pereira ultimately won the 2015 mayoral race in an election that was marked by confusion and considerable delay by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal in announcing the results. Upon announcement of preliminary results showing Pereira having won, Salgado initially conceded defeat, then withdrew his concession, claiming election fraud, and ultimately withdrew following meetings with international election observers. In a post-election interview, Pereira announced an agenda focused on public works projects designed “to make the city the most connected in Central America,” including a small airport and a 22 kilometer highway in the towns of Quelepa and Moncagua. Pereira explained that the public works agenda came about from proposals by Migueleños living abroad.

The Pereira visit was not the first campaign visit either by a candidate for local office or sitting mayor or assembly member from El Salvador. It does, however, illustrate both longstanding and new trends in diaspora campaigning. First and centrally, the use of party infrastructure to take advantage of a favorable diaspora skew: The event was organized at every level by the party, with the FMLN in El Salvador providing the resources for the visit – not only for Pereira but for Parada and others involved in the campaign – and the D.C. area FMLN base committees reserving the locales, mobilizing turnout, hosting and catering the events. The

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74 Mayoral elections were held along with those of members of the Legislative Assembly and the Central American Parliament on March 1, 2015, under a new voting system mandated by the Supreme Court of El Salvador. Voting districts for the Legislative Assembly are multi-member districts with size determined by census figures, and party share per district determined on a closed party list, proportionally representative basis. For the 2015 election, the Supreme Court mandated that voters have a choice between a closed list and an open list system, such that voters could choose whether to vote by party, as before, and allow the parties to send members to the Assembly based on their ranked list of candidates, or to vote by candidate (e.g. voters in San Salvador could choose 24 among over 100 candidates). This led to a great deal of confusion among voters, according to press and OAS election observation reports.

FMLN party anthem opened the events, and the base committee emcee emphasized to a perhaps skeptical audience how Pereira, a relative unknown to those of the civil war generation in the audience, was good not only for San Miguel but for the future of the party – demonstrating the importance of the party, rather than candidate, in directing diaspora campaigning. Second, the audience-specific message crafting, a unique appeal to migrants as migrants: understanding their chief interest being the material well-being of relatives they left behind, an understanding – voiced by Pereira – that they are kept abreast about conditions in their hometowns by their relatives, and an emphasis on projects to which migrants can collectively contribute such as school and road construction. Third, the reinforcement of transnational linkages on a community-to-community level: here, through soccer, but in other cases through religious or cultural events, such as Salvadoran Independence Day and the annual Fiesta D.C. pan-Latino street festival and parade which features bands, dance, and beauty pageants sponsored by local Salvadoran civic groups; most such events are officially nonpartisan but exhibit some party presence whether through official literature or simply self-identification of party supporters. The FMLN and, to a lesser extent, ARENA typically place kiosks at large scale community events. Finally, in the appeal for audience members to call their relatives, the acknowledgement that direct familial communication remains the primary mechanism for diaspora political influence over the electoral process back home.

Alternative explanations

As explained in chapter 1, two possible alternative explanations exist: that the diaspora does not have a unique political profile which informs diaspora campaign strategy, and that the

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76 On March 28, 2015, a friendly soccer match between the national teams of El Salvador and Argentina at Maryland’s FedEx Field drew approximately 54,000 fans, nearly all of them from the Salvadoran diaspora across the U.S. including a sizeable contingent from Houston. While there was no official party presence at the event, FMLN flags were visible among attendees at the tailgate.
party itself does not set such strategy. Several observations about the two parties’ campaign activities contradict both explanations.

First, regarding the diaspora’s political profile, a strong skew is observable in the departmental results of the 2014 election, the only race so far in which the diaspora could vote. That election was the narrowest on record, with the FMLN winning by a margin or just over 6,000 votes, a 50.1% to 49.9% difference in the final round. The diaspora as a whole was treated as its own department, and voted more heavily for the FMLN candidate than any other department, 63%, in the final round.

The diaspora’s reputation for not merely sympathy with the left party but left radicalism within that party is reflected in interviews with party officials. Ex-FMLN official Joaquin Samayoa maintained diaspora Salvadoran’s relative radicalism stems from the fact that so many migrated in the midst of the 1980 civil war, and have not lived through the democratic changes that took place in El Salvador since then. “They have the luxury of radicalism over there,” said Samayoa, who added “they are still fighting the civil war in their heads.” At the 2014 post-election victory rally by FMLN in the Escalon neighborhood of San Salvador, many FMLN supporters could be seen waving U.S. flags, alongside Salvadoran, Cuban, and Venezuelan flags.

Further evidence of the unique profile of the Salvadoran diaspora compared to the home country electorate is in the demands made on the parties. According to ARENA and FMLN officials interviewed, the most common issue of concern for diaspora Salvadorans is better consular services. Other, very specific migrant demands came up; one common complaint exclusively raised by FMLN officials, reflecting an issue in Sánchez Cerén’s platform, was the high cost of airfare for diaspora Salvadorans. Sánchez Cerén had pledged to encourage more competition for flights from the U.S. to El Salvador and bring down ticket prices. Another was
the dollarization of the economy, which the FMLN criticizes, saying it increased costs for Salvadorans and thus for those in the diaspora supporting them. “Since dollarization, [diaspora Salvadorans] had to double remittances,” said Blanca Flor Bonilla, FMLN’s international director, who said reversing dollarization was a demand of their diaspora base.

ARENAs officials, in contrast, tended to downplay this left profile of the Salvadoran diaspora. Several ARENA officials interviewed pointed that the profile of Salvadoran migrants in the U.S. should favor ARENA more: many migrants are small business owners, whose community life centers around church activities, and who have become more “Americanized,” which for ARENA officials should mean more conservative. “They’re a mirror image of El Salvador,” said ARENA Vice President and Director of Section 8 Amalia Espinal, but “they’re more critical” the longer they stay abroad, saying they become richer, more used to democratic norms, less loyal to parties, and thus more demanding on the parties back home. Oscar Santamaría, international director of ARENA gave the strongest statement in favor of the alternative: “We don’t talk to them any differently than we talk to voters at home,” adding that there is a loyal vote for both parties, and “there aren’t that many undecided voters.” Nevertheless, both parties’ behavior in the diaspora suggests otherwise: their use of targeted diaspora issues of remittances and immigration, Pereira’s direct appeals for diaspora input and for migrants to call their relatives at home, the tendency of ARENA (and, prior to 2014, FMLN) candidates to use diaspora visits to signal presidential stature in favoring official meetings over community meetings, and above all the existence of diaspora campaigning even in elections in which migrants cannot vote point to party belief in the importance of diaspora issues as a unique set of concerns, and the diaspora as a unique constituency whose power is wielded through intra-familial relationships rather than their vote.
There is little evidence either for the second alternative explanation, that parties are not in charge, and that candidates set diaspora campaign strategy. Both parties are highly disciplined, particularly the FMLN, whose hierarchical model sets a clear chain of command. Candidates for both are chosen by party directorates, rather than primary elections: the FMLN’s National Committee, and ARENA’s National Council, COENA, both with input from the party’s membership base – including its diaspora base, which was key in selecting Sánchez Cerén as the 2014 candidate. A prohibition on consecutive reelection limits the agency of individual politicians allows parties to maintain control over their political careers, as in Mexico. As such, El Salvador, while seen as part of the “pink tide” of leftist presidents in Latin America, indeed of the radical left wing of that trend, has not been subject to the domination of a single strongman personality as in countries with which the FMLN government is often characterized such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (Castañeda 2006, Schamis 2006, Levitsky and Roberts 2011).

An example of the party overturning a candidate’s wishes can be seen in the 2014 race when ARENA sacked Norman Quijano’s campaign director Francisco Flores: according to party president Jorge Velado, Quijano had wanted to keep Flores on despite the corruption probe, but the National Council deemed him too much of a liability and brought in Rendón as his replacement. ARENA also sent other party officials to campaign on behalf of Quijano in the 2014 election, notably D’Aubuisson, whose name recognition outshines that of Quijano for the older generation of ARENA supporters. Further evidence of the primacy of the party could be observed in the Pereira campaign event, when his introduction by a party base committee official emphasized the candidate being good for the party, not only the municipality: a necessary
endorsement to an audience with a strong partisan identity and which reacted skeptically to an unknown candidate from the postwar generation.

Conclusions

The two major Salvadoran parties contrast sharply in both diaspora favor and diaspora infrastructure. Consequently, two very different sets of diaspora outreach behavior can be seen between the FMLN and ARENA, the former party being far better positioned to mobilize grassroots support and counter scare campaign tactics by the latter.

Additionally, the notion suggested by diaspora Salvadoran activists and party outsiders that Salvadoran migrants have a unique political profile and set of motivations apart from those of domestic voters – one motivated by their families at home, not themselves – points to a dynamic distinct from the typical party-voter relationship. Salvadoran parties have trended toward populist tactics for winning votes, left and right parties alike.77 The appeal to migrants is still personal but indirectly: parties do not expect migrants to ask for many direct benefits for themselves (subjects only mentioned two potential direct benefits parties could sell to migrants: voting rights and better services at embassies and consulates) but rather for their relatives at home. Parties assume frequent communication allows for both migrants influencing relatives’ voting preferences, but also relatives informing migrants’ understanding of the situation on the ground – particularly, how policies are affecting the material well-being of the family, a point underscored in the Pereira visit by a question-and-answer session by audience members quizzing their candidate on specific issues in San Miguel.

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77 As president, Tony Saca inaugurated in 2005 a conditional cash transfer program called Red Solidaria which the FMLN opposition then denounced as a vote-buying measure. President Funes implemented a subsidy for gas in 2011, which both Saca and Quijano, as candidates in 2013, pledged to maintain. In 2009, Quijano was elected mayor of San Salvador on a platform that included a broad range of municipal subsidies for families including for housing and food, and as a presidential candidate proposed to create a new cabinet-level ministry responsible for administering all subsidy programs in the country.
The diaspora campaign messaging by ARENA in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections underscores the diaspora’s unique role as well: all three campaigns referred to a prominent diaspora issue, remittances. There is no evidence that migrants make remittances conditional on the voting behavior of their recipients, or threaten not to send remittances if their relatives vote the wrong way. However one subject, El Salvador Embassy in the U.S. official and FMLN base committee leader Sonia Umanzor noted having heard, anecdotally, cases of Salvadorans in the U.S. sending extra money home in remittances during election times.

The distinction between the FMLN’s and ARENA’s styles of diaspora engagement highlights how two parties that both campaign abroad can do so from very different sets of resources. The FMLN’s grassroots-mobilizational approach reflects the historical sympathies of the civil war-era Salvadoran diaspora, and the party’s well institutionalized network of base committees set up out of necessity during its long period in the opposition. That these base committees are organized in such a way as to be well integrated into the overall party structure gives the FMLN the ability to turn out large numbers of members for lobbying, calling home country voters, volunteering for get-out-the-vote and registration drives, and building alliances with non-party diaspora constituencies such as business and labor groups.

Their rivals, ARENA, can be observed to use the diaspora in a rhetorical sense, citing it in campaign advertising, but having trouble coordinating diaspora supporters with the campaign or mobilizing large numbers of them, facing a mostly unsympathetic diaspora and having a still young diaspora infrastructure network. It can be predicted that any future diaspora engagement by ARENA’s nascent Sector 8 will face an uphill battle to match that of the FMLN, even if the party recognizes the necessity of doing so. The limits of the party’s traditional scare rhetoric in leveraging diaspora issues (principally remittances) for electoral advantage are apparent in the
party’s two consecutive losses in 2009 and 2014. There are opportunities for the party to
overcome its deficit in both skew and infrastructure in the future, with greater investment in the
latter, and with generational shifts mitigating the former, as the civil war generation eventually
dies out and migration becomes driven more by economic rather than political or security
concerns.
Chapter 4. Mexico: Skewed Support, Weak Infrastructure

Mexicans represent the largest immigrant population in the United States, with a long and continuous history of migration that predates the existence of the present-day U.S.-Mexico border. An estimated 12 million Mexicans reside outside of Mexico, roughly one in ten of all Mexicans, 98% of them in the United States, making the Mexican diaspora a large and potentially consequential electoral constituency in Mexico.78 Mexican parties do reach out to Mexicans residing in the U.S., as do parties in many other migrant-sending countries. Yet in contrast to parties in countries with smaller diaspora populations (in absolute terms), Mexican parties’ diaspora outreach efforts are relatively limited, ranging from moderate to virtually non-existent, consisting of unofficial campaign visits by non-declared candidates and limited community-level engagement by party officials. These limits are a reflection of a strong diaspora skew against one party, the PRI, which was incentivized to create a highly restrictive diaspora voting and campaign law.

What party investment in diaspora outreach there is exists despite the fact that diaspora voter turnout is uniformly low: in Mexico’s 2012 presidential election, only 40,737 out of an estimated 4.2 million eligible Mexican voters residing abroad voted, a turnout rate of less than 1%.79 Prior to 2006, Mexicans residing outside of Mexico had no right to vote at all. Overseas absentee voting rights have since been extended unevenly on a state level, beginning with Michoacan in 2006, today including such migrant-sending states as Aguascalientes, Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Colima, Baja California Sur for gubernatorial elections, as well as the Federal District for the head of government, and in Chiapas, both for governor and a migrant representative to the state legislature. Overseas voter turnout in gubernatorial elections is also extremely low; in the

79 Mexican Federal Election Institute, *District Voting by Mexican Citizens Residing Abroad*, 2012
first gubernatorial election in which Mexicans overseas could participate, Michoacan in 2007, only 349 ballots were cast. Mexican media outlets routinely lambast the public expense of overseas absentee voting; a typical headline analyzing the diaspora vote in the 2012 presidential elections was “Each vote from abroad cost close to 5,000 pesos” (US$375 at the time).

Party diaspora outreach – despite the high cost, and tiny-to-nonexistent electoral payoff in terms of direct votes from abroad – is uneven and limited, reflecting the partisan skew of the Mexican diaspora, and relative underdevelopment of a diaspora party network by the three major Mexican parties, the PAN, PRD, and PRI. Of these, the PAN followed by the PRD have seen relatively greater levels of overall diaspora engagement, with a greater frequency and more community focus of diaspora visits, while the PRI has been virtually inactive. A summary of the three parties’ favor by the diaspora, diaspora infrastructure, and diaspora outreach is below.

**Table 8. Skew, Infrastructure, and Diaspora Outreach by Party, Mexico**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Diaspora skew</th>
<th>Party infrastructure in diaspora</th>
<th>Diaspora outreach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
<td>Moderate: unofficial campaign visits, little long term presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Neutral-to-favorable</td>
<td>Underdeveloped</td>
<td>Moderate: few unofficial campaign visits, little long term presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>Very underdeveloped, lacking official status</td>
<td>Extremely limited: no campaign visits, mostly elite level meetings</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In contrast to El Salvador, the Mexican diaspora can be seen to have an overall skew to the right party. This is largely a vote against the longtime incumbent PRI, one which the PAN has been better positioned to capitalize on as the most electorally viable PRI rival, compared to the PRD. Also in contrast to the Salvadoran parties, the Mexican parties have far less developed diaspora infrastructures, consisting of ad hoc self-organized committees which to varying degrees lack coordination with the party, and their more limited activity in the diaspora reflects this fact. This underdeveloped diaspora infrastructure for all three has been kept underdeveloped, ironically, by the anti-PRI skew of the diaspora which led to the highly restricted enfranchisement of diaspora Mexicans and legal limits to diaspora campaign activity.

Nevertheless, variation can be observed in diaspora engagement among the three parties, particularly in the extent and types of visits by party officials and candidates.

This chapter will examine the three Mexican parties’ lack of infrastructure in the U.S., and the nature of the Mexican diaspora’s partisan skew favoring the PAN and disfavoring the PRI. It will then present a historical analysis of the parties’ diaspora campaigning over three presidential elections, both before and after the passage of the 2005 diaspora voting law. Finally, it will present evidence of variation in party outreach among PAN, PRD, and PRI officials, based on international travel records of the three parties in the years between the two most recent presidential elections, 2006 and 2012.

**Underdeveloped infrastructure**

In contrast to their Salvadoran and Dominican counterparts, Mexican parties lack a well institutionalized or coordinated permanent presence in the diaspora. Their diaspora infrastructure marked by their ad hoc, voluntarist nature and their secondary status in terms of clout within the diaspora community to non-party institutions, specifically hometown associations.
Structurally, the three parties have lacked a model for an organized grassroots membership base in the diaspora. Of the three parties, the PRD’s partisan activity in the diaspora traces back the furthest, to the Cárdenas campaign in the 1988 election, during which he campaigned in Mexican communities in California and Chicago, at the invitation of local hometown associations and chambers of commerce. Ad hoc groups of supporters formed in the diaspora for his visits, which later developed into informal organizations after Cárdenas returned to the U.S. in 1989 to thank his supporters following the election. By the 1990s, the PRD amended its party statutes to allow migrants to be full party members. However the party has lacked a strategy for diaspora membership growth, being largely (and belatedly) reactive to migrant initiatives. In the aftermath of the 1988 election, groups of PRD sympathizers had formed spontaneously in California, Illinois, Texas, and New York, but were not granted official recognition by the party for over a decade (Sandoval Ramírez 2005). Today, the PRD’s national committee in the U.S. is granted the same status as a party state committee in Mexico (Fox 2005). The PRD’s internal organization responsible for diaspora outreach has historically been its Department of International Relations, an organization also tasked with maintaining relationships with fraternal parties in other countries, and thus treating the diaspora as a foreign party rather than as fellow citizens on equal terms with those at home. The PRD later organized a Migrant Secretariat, an office which primarily liaises with U.S.-based HTAs.

Similar organizations exist for the PRI, but they are mostly unofficial, ad hoc, and unintegrated into the party structure. Two PRI support groups formed in the 1990s in Chicago: one, Friends of the PRI, was an initiative by the Mexican Consulate in Chicago designed as a

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temporary welcoming committee for a visiting PRI politician, and meant to be a counterpoint to similar welcoming committees that were formed in Chicago and California during Cárdenas’s campaigning in 1988 (Schütze 2016). A second group was formed by reform-minded PRI supporters active in HTAs in Chicago, called Migrant Vanguard, who intended it to be a vehicle for democratization of the party. Both groups competed for support in the Chicago diaspora, one with official party backing, but never intended to be a permanent organization, another with aspirations for permanence but facing hostility from the party establishment. In the end, both organizations persisted, but neither were granted official status or structurally integrated into the party, and currently migrants cannot be full party members, according to PRI official statutes (ibid).

The PAN, for its part, granted migrants voting rights for internal party elections in 2005 (Del Real 2005), but does not maintain any state committees in the U.S. Like its rivals, it has diaspora support committees which were ad hoc in origin, formed to welcome Vicente Fox when he campaigned in California and Chicago in 2000. The PAN tasks diaspora outreach to its Department of Organization Abroad, which thus at least nominally treats migrants as targets of organizing rather than diplomacy.

The ad hoc nature of these party sympathizer groups – all formed mostly spontaneously to welcome visiting politicians, then becoming more permanent groups later granted some limited recognition and rights – or in the case of the PRI, none at all – by the party, underscores the fact that Mexican parties, in contrast to Salvadoran parties, never made a conscious decision to invest in building a long-term membership base in the U.S. (Fox 2005). This weak infrastructure, along with legal barriers produced by an anti-PRI skew, leads to relatively superficial outreach by Mexican parties to Mexicans in the U.S.
**Hometown associations**

The underdeveloped infrastructures and legal barriers tracing to partisan skew hamstring Mexican parties in the diaspora and leave them dependent on other, nonpartisan diaspora organizations which enjoy far more developed networks and no legal barriers. In place of more permanent and structurally integrated party membership organizations such as base committees, hometown associations serve as the principal vehicle for migrant transnational activity in the Mexican diaspora. Tracing back to the mid-20th century, what started as mutual aid societies assisting recent migrants grew with the post-1965 immigration boom to permanent, deeply institutionalized organizations in every city with a significant Mexican migrant presence. As of the late 2000s, there were over 800 hometown associations officially registered with Mexican consulates in the U.S., 80% of which were concentrated in Southern California and Northern Illinois (Bada 2006), though estimates including nonregistered HTAs range up to 2,000, with collective total membership perhaps as high as 500,000 nationwide (Fox 2005). HTAs are usually self-denominated as clubs, nonprofit organizations set up by municipality or neighborhood, with membership ranging from the dozens to hundreds, and are organized collectively by region under umbrella federations grouped by state of origin, such as the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California, one of the largest and most institutionalized HTA federations in the U.S. (Moctezuma 2005). HTAs organize community events and patron saint days, and set up transnational projects such as sister cities and education exchanges between hometown and receiving communities. They often have a charity component, offering scholarships to students and sponsoring sports leagues. They are not typically political, though they have mobilized members for political issues affecting their members, such as the fight against California Proposition 187 in the 1990s, and the push for immigration reform in the
2000s. Their involvement in Mexican politics, too, can be seen in the extension of Mexico’s collective remittance program “3 x 1” to include matching funds from federal level in 2002, after successful lobbying by several U.S.-based HTAs.

Mexican parties seeking support in the U.S. are largely subordinate to these much more well established HTAs. One PRI official interviewed expressed frustration at the party’s lack of control over hometown associations, saying: “We have to go to them and ask them for favors. And they come to us with demands and tell us what to do. That’s not how it works in Mexico.”

As in El Salvador, Mexican migrants frequently return home to run for office; however in contrast to El Salvador, where party diaspora base committees and sectors groom candidates for office, for Mexican migrants, HTAs fill this role, with particular success in Michoacan electing migrant leaders to state office. Additionally, their nonpartisan nature limits their usefulness for parties. HTAs, nevertheless, are less-than-ideal proxies for parties in the promotion of transnational political engagement. They focus by design on local and not national issues, do not have institutional counterparts in Mexico, and often are informal and volunteer-run, limiting their mobilizational capacity. Additionally, their nonpartisan nature limits their usefulness for parties. Thus while HTAs provide an ideal venue for hosting candidates, as they did for Cárdenas in 1998, to avoid favoritism, HTAs may sponsor multi-party events with invited candidates or officials from all parties, as in a 2010 Chicago forum hosted by the HTA-sponsored organization for migrant political rights, MIMEXPOL, described below.

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83 Interview with Ruben Olmos, October 2015.
84 Interview with Lázaro Cárdenas, August 2013.
All three parties lack comparative prestige and presence in the diaspora in comparison to HTAs, which have a far greater permanence and membership base than party diaspora committees. Of these committees, the PRI’s lack any official recognition by the party at all or integration into the party’s organization, and the PAN’s and PRD’s have by now achieved party recognition and voting rights for members in party elections, but lack a coordination into the overall party structure and internal decision-making processes.

**Mexico’s skewed diaspora**

In the two presidential elections since voting rights were extended abroad, one party, the PAN, has been the chief beneficiary of the diaspora vote, and the most active in the diaspora. The current ruling and historically hegemonic party, the PRI, has been the least favorite among Mexican diaspora voters, both to a disproportionate degree in comparison to the domestic vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Diaspora vote</th>
<th>Total Mexico vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Calderón</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>López Obrador</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Madrazo</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Diaspora vote</th>
<th>Total Mexico vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>Vázquez Mota</td>
<td>42.2%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>López Obrador</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Peña Nieto</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Electoral Institute, District Voting by Mexican Citizens Residing Abroad

Results show a clear preference for the PAN candidate compared to Mexican voters as a whole, and an even starker disfavor for the PRI candidate. Analyses in the domestic Mexican media seeking to explain diaspora voting patterns generally conclude that the Mexican diaspora, particularly in the U.S., is more conservative than the Mexican population as a whole. Among the speculative reasons given are that those Mexican voters in the U.S. are more integrated into
U.S. society (those who have, according to the traditional pejorative “pocho” stereotype of Mexican migrants, lost their roots, and are “more American than Mexican”), and also historically largely from conservative states such as Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Nuevo León.85

There are several reasons to be skeptical of this narrative. The view that the Mexican diaspora is more “Americanized” dovetails with traditional nationalist dismissals of the Mexican diaspora as “traitors” by past PRI governments prior to the rise of competitive elections – those who could not be trusted to vote because they would be agents of U.S. intervention in Mexican politics, an attitude that has been largely discarded—including, at least in official rhetoric, by today’s PRI (Fitzgerald 2008). Secondly, the areas from which Mexican migrants come have shifted, from more conservative northern states to southern states such as Oaxaca and Chiapas, where the PAN does not have a strong base (Massey et al 2010). Third, Mexican Americans who vote in U.S. elections tend to heavily disfavor Republicans: a 2014 Pew Hispanic poll found 36.7% of Mexican Americans identified as Democrats, 35.9% as independents, and 12.1% as Republicans.86 Though Mexican American U.S. citizens are not directly comparable to U.S.-residing Mexican citizens, this suggests that narrative that the more “Americanized” Mexican migrants and their descendants get, the more conservative they become, is a dubious one, and at the very least, casts doubt on the portrayal in Mexican media of U.S.-residing Mexicans as appearing—demographically, socially, economically, and geographically—as stereotypical PAN base voters. Nevertheless, voting patterns show that, of the tiny minority of U.S.-residing Mexicans who do vote in Mexican elections, the vast majority indeed support the PAN, a distinct skew, opposite that of Salvadorans.

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86 Pew Hispanic 2014 National Survey of Latinos
However, the Mexican diaspora vote appears not to be primarily a pro-PAN vote so much as an anti-PRI vote, as can be seen by the greater difference between the diaspora vs. overall electorate vote shares for the PRI than for the PAN in both the 2006 and 2012 elections: using the total vote as a baseline, a higher percentage of diaspora voters voted PAN, but a much lower percentage voted PRI.

This anti-PRI sentiment is likely informed by migrants’ motivations for migration and the PRI’s history of resistance to extending civil rights to Mexicans abroad. Policy toward Mexican emigrants under successive PRI governments during the hegemonic era alternated between indifference and hostility (Délano 2011). These administrations saw migrants as a political liability, a constituency that could only have negative consequences to diplomatic and trade relations with the U.S., and thus avoided having an active migration policy, which García y Griego and Verea 1988 term Mexico’s (and the PRI’s) “policy of no policy.” The earliest PRI governments sought to stem the large-scale out-migration of Mexicans escaping the chaos and instability in the aftermath of the Revolution and subsequent Cristeros War, which provoked a labor shortage, seeking to block emigration altogether by refusing to issue travel documents. However these efforts, and efforts to encourage repatriation were unsuccessful largely due to lack of interest in cooperation by U.S. authorities, and later shifted to negotiating with the U.S. over regularizing and institutionalizing the flow of Mexican migrants, culminating in the 1946 Bracero program.

Official rhetoric discouraging emigration cast migrants as traitors betraying their country for a hostile neighbor to the north, with migration seen by the government not as a personal decision but a humiliation of the Mexican nation by both migrants and the U.S. government (Fitzgerald 2005). Migrants were branded in official rhetoric as “traitors” (Castillo Flores 2010).
Later PRI governments looked more favorably toward emigration as a tool for ridding the country of surplus unemployed laborers and otherwise unwanted citizens (García y Griego 1983), and only in the 1970s and 1980s, under the Echeverría and Salinas administrations, did PRI governments make any effort to reach out to migrants as such with community investment programs. Throughout the seven decade period of PRI rule, however, migrants were treated as instrumental tools for state development and foreign policy, whose migration was alternately blocked or encouraged as it suited the larger policy concerns of the state and the party. This both reflected and reinforced a strong anti-PRI skew by diaspora Mexicans which continues to this day.

*Diaspora partisan skew informing a restrictive diaspora electoral regime*

Among countries allowing diaspora voting, Mexico’s diaspora electoral regime is famously restrictive. Prior to 2016, citizens could not register to vote outside of Mexico, so they would have to travel back to Mexico for a process that takes several weeks, and thus unable to resolve during the short trips migrants typically make for holidays and family occasions. 87 For those applying for a new voter identification, they are required to show proof of citizenship such as a passport or birth certificate, which many migrants may not have. 88 These restrictions are a deliberate design of the 2005 enfranchisement law, crafted in large part by the PRI in order to mitigate an unfavorable diaspora skew toward their party.

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87 New rules issued by the Mexican Electoral Institute (INE) in 2015 now allow Mexican citizens abroad to apply for voting credentials at Mexican consulates without having to travel back to Mexico; however applicants must still provide passports, birth certificates, or other documentation as proof of citizenship.

88 Under Mexico’s 2005 law granting voting rights to Mexicans residing abroad, citizens must have a voting card issued by the Federal Elections Institute to request an absentee ballot. In order to obtain a voting card, citizens must apply in person in their hometown in Mexico and provide an official proof of citizenship such as a birth certificate or passport. Critics of the process have noted many Mexican citizens residing abroad do not have the required proof of citizenship, especially migrants who are undocumented, and undocumented migrants are even less likely to risk traveling back to Mexico in order to obtain proper documentation to vote (Gris Legorreta 2014).
Mexico’s enfranchisement of its diaspora citizens was a largely bureaucratic, administrative process, developed by political elites within the Foreign Ministry. Although the final law was passed under a PAN administration, the bill was crafted largely by PRI-appointed ministry officials with minimal outside input, though ultimate pressure, from diaspora groups in the U.S., and introduced by a PRI legislator. Thus the 2005 law reflected the PRI’s historic “policy of no policy” of demobilization and containment of the Mexican diaspora, which it viewed as a potential threat, originally to the party’s hegemonic rule, and later to its electoral fortunes in the post-PRI era, as well as national sovereignty (historically territorially delineated) and independence of the Mexican government from foreign (chiefly U.S.) influence (Parra 2005).

The first efforts at extending voting rights abroad began under PRI administrations, at a time when the one-party era was coming to a close. In an atmosphere of increasing demands for democratization and transparency throughout Latin America, lingering outrage at what many Mexicans viewed as a stolen election in 1988, and a growing prominence of diaspora groups through hometown associations and remittance flows, the Salinas and Zedillo governments concluded they little afford to fully ignore demands for diaspora enfranchisement (Goldring 2002). Instead, the PRI government and its party-aligned bureaucrats within the Foreign Ministry developed a highly restrictive system of absentee balloting which, while nominally extending suffrage and thereby engaging with the powerful diaspora community, kept that community contained and its influence on elections minimal. Extremely low diaspora voter turnout in the subsequent 2006 and 2012 elections also served the party’s interest by reinforcing the notion that Mexican migrants are uninterested in participating in elections, are “Americanized” and thus safely kept at the margins of Mexican politics.
A series of constitutional reforms (1990, 1994, 1996) under the Salinas and Zedillo administrations led to incremental steps toward diaspora enfranchisement, resulting in a study by the elections board (then IFE, now INE) in 1988 on the logistics of a system allowing for voting from abroad. The final bill passed under the subsequent Fox administration in 2005, thus the PAN could take credit for the final implementation of diaspora voting. However the PRI, after having blocked 19 previous bills when the party controlled the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, was the party to bring the final, successful bill to a vote, introduced by PRI representative Laura Maria Elena Rivera; thus it can be plausibly concluded that, had the PRI retained the presidency in 2000, the 2005 diaspora voting law would have passed in much the same, i.e. restrictive form.

The 2005 diaspora enfranchisement law coupled a highly complicated and costly system of voter registration with a highly restrictive set of electoral rules regarding diaspora campaigning. The law specified postal ballots that must be requested six months prior to the election, at a cost of $9. Most notably, the registration process required prior to requesting the ballot disallowed registering from abroad, instead requiring applicants to travel back to their hometowns in Mexico and apply in person. The registration process typically took three or more weeks, and thus even those migrants able to travel back home, typically for the holidays, were largely unable to take the time off needed to successfully register. Additionally, documents required for registration included forms of documentation which many migrants—especially those with irregular immigration status—did not have, such as a passport or birth certificate.

The second part of the 2005 bill explicitly prohibited any forms of campaigning or fundraising outside of Mexico, thus barring the kind of campaigning Cárdenas and Fox had carried out openly in the U.S. The bill did not, however, effectively stop diaspora campaigning,
as PAN and PRD candidates found ways to campaign in unofficial manners. Nevertheless, a low voter turnout benefits the PRI chiefly, as diaspora election results from 2006 and 2012 demonstrate.

The 2005 diaspora voting bill was a compromise between the PAN and PRI that was politically advantageous to both parties, at the expense of diaspora voter participation – and to the PRD, according to party officials, who uniformly maintained that easing voting restrictions and expanding the diaspora vote would principally benefit their party. The PAN could take credit for fulfilling a campaign pledge by Fox to the diaspora whose support the party could continue to count on. The PRI could design the law to effectively restrict the vote as well as campaign activity by their more active rival parties in the diaspora, and thereby mitigate the damage of an anti-PRI diaspora vote. The position of both parties reflected the diaspora skew of the diaspora – favoring the PAN and disfavoring the PRI – and came to be validated by the results of the two subsequent elections in the diaspora. There has since been some changes aimed at lifting some of the onerous diaspora voting restrictions, with a 2016 reform allowing voter registration from abroad for the first time. Nevertheless, neither the PAN nor the PRI have much incentive to fundamentally reform diaspora voting in a manner similar to the Dominican Republic’s external voting law (see chapter 5), as the status quo benefits both: for the PRI, the demobilization of an unfriendly electorate, for the PAN, restrictions which only the more resourceful (primarily wealthier and professional) Mexican migrants are likely to overcome, a voter profile which favors the PAN and thus reinforces the pro-PAN diaspora skew.

89 Interviews with Augustin Barrio Gomez, Lázaro Cárdenas, Carlos Heredia, and G. Farfan Mares, June – August 2013.
Diaspora campaigning by Mexican parties, 2000 - 2012

Variation in party outreach activity reflects historic distrust between migrants and the hegemonic PRI state, and the PAN’s early efforts in corraling this distrust. The story of party-diaspora relations is deeply intertwined with that of Mexican state-diaspora relations, particularly for the PRI, which kept its diaspora at arms length for most of its original period of rule. The interest of the long-ruling PRI in a period of single party dominance was to maintain an overwhelming show of hegemonic control (Magaloni, 2006), which engaging a largely anti-PRI U.S.-residing diaspora would undermine. Thus despite the long history of Mexican-U.S. migration and deep transnational ties on the community level, diaspora campaigning by Mexican parties is a relatively recent, and limited phenomenon. The eventual granting of voting rights to diaspora Mexicans under a highly restricted diaspora voting law, itself informed by diaspora skew, further limits diaspora outreach, formally banning diaspora campaigning outright, though parties find ways around this ban.

Variation in diaspora outreach can be observed among the three parties due to differences in skew among all three, and infrastructure between the PRI and its two chief rivals. As the party with the least developed diaspora infrastructure and least sympathy from the diaspora, the PRI can be seen to disengage from all but the most official forms of diaspora outreach. Of the two parties with a favorable skew, the PAN has been best able to position itself as the anti-PRI party and build a slightly more developed diaspora infrastructure, and undertake a greater number of community visits than their rival party on the left, the PRD.

Diaspora outreach during the transition from hegemonic PRI rule

Diaspora outreach was limited prior to the period of competitive elections in Mexico. PRI governments generally ignored expatriate Mexicans under a policy of nonintervention in what
was seen as U.S. affairs. It was the internal division of the PRI which provoked the first competitive elections in Mexico in 1988, and the opposition candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, spurred the first real efforts to mobilize the Mexican diaspora for a political campaign, visiting Mexican communities in California and Chicago and promising to advocate on their behalf. For this reason, PRD officials interviewed expressed frustration about the PAN’s success in winning the greatest diaspora support, as they saw themselves as the first to reach out to the diaspora and therefore the rightful champions of diaspora interests.\textsuperscript{90} Carlos Salinas, the winner of the disputed 1988 election in the face of heavy diaspora support for his opponent, initiated in 1990 the most comprehensive migrant outreach program of any PRI administration, dubbed \textit{acercamiento} (“closeness”) (Goldring 2002, Smith 2008). Taking off on the 1986 amnesty by Reagan, the Salinas administration sought to push the U.S. for further legalization of undocumented migrants, to establish a Mexican American lobby that could work on behalf of Mexican state interests (in particular, for what would become the North American Free Trade Agreement), and to assure the continued flow of remittances to the country. Thus the Salinas administration inaugurated the Programa Paisano to facilitate family travel, and the creation of State Offices Attending to Migrants (OFAMS) to build contacts with Mexicans in the U.S.

At the same time, PRI attitudes toward migrants remained wary. At best, subsequent governments continued to see outmigration as a both economic and political safety valve, in which the exit of dissatisfied Mexicans would bring greater stability—and fewer challenges to PRI rule—at home.\textsuperscript{91} However the party feared extending voting rights to such dissatisfied Mexicans would be empowering their political opponents and thus weaken in the party hegemony. Informed by an understanding of the diaspora’s anti-PRI skew, the subsequent, and

\textsuperscript{90} Interview with Lázaro Cárdenas, August 2013.  
\textsuperscript{91} Interview with Luis Carlos Ugalde, July 2013.
last PRI government of the hegemonic era, largely maintained the reactive and hands-off “policy of no policy,” but was pressured by the PRD and PAN opposition into including measures paving the way for enfranchisement of Mexicans abroad, beginning with the Nación Mexicana program and constitutional reform of 1996, which guaranteed for the first time migrants would not lose their Mexican nationality upon leaving the country.

*Diaspora outreach in competitive elections, 2000 - 2012*

The post-PRI period saw the effective positioning of the PAN as the most favored party of the diaspora and, if not quite building a deep diaspora network, making more effort than its rivals to reach out to Mexicans in the U.S. on a community level. In the 2000 presidential election, both the PAN and PRD made extending voting rights part of their campaign platforms. PAN candidate Vicente Fox, like Cárdenas before him, campaigned in the U.S., visiting Mexican communities in Los Angeles and riding a horse through the streets of La Villita in Chicago. 92

While in the U.S., Fox famously passed out phone cards, telling supporters to call their relatives and tell them to vote for him. 93 Mexican migrants in California and Illinois held mock elections in conjunction with the 2000 elections, favoring Fox by wide margins (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003). As the first post-PRI president, Fox retained widespread support of the Mexican diaspora, made frequent trips to Mexican American communities, and referred to migrants in a 2001 visit to Los Angeles as “heroes of Mexico,” a remarkable rhetorical change from the “traitors” slur of the PRI era. The Fox administration established an office within the Foreign Ministry, the Institute for Mexicans Abroad (IME), sought, unsuccessfully, to lobby the U.S. Congress for a comprehensive immigration reform bill, and made good on its promise to extend voting rights

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http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2000/05/21/mas-batalla.html
for Mexicans abroad, while under watchful pressure of migrant groups such as the Coalition for the Political Rights of Mexicans Abroad (CDPME), which mobilized to stop a delay in implementation of the bill threatened by then-Secretary of Governance Santiago Creel. In the subsequent two presidential elections, 2006 and 2012, PAN candidates retained the overwhelming support of the Mexican diaspora.

Passage of the diaspora voting law in 2005 had a negative impact on overall level of diaspora campaigning, which was virtually nonexistent in the 2006 election. No candidate campaigned personally in the diaspora. To evade the ban on explicit overseas campaigning, the PAN sent then-candidate Felipe Calderón’s campaign director, Ricardo Pascoe to campaign on his behalf in the U.S.; Pascoe, held a series of meeting and interviews with diaspora community and business leaders in Los Angeles in June. The meetings, held at the Wells Fargo Tower, were sponsored by Los Angeles entrepreneur and radio show host Daniel Gutierrez, invited local business and community leaders, and were billed as a “discussion on the impact the Mexican presidential elections this year will have on U.S. businesses.” Neither PRI candidate Madrazo nor PRD candidate López Obrador, their parties or campaigns, engaged in diaspora outreach.

The 2012 elections saw a shift toward some hesitant diaspora outreach on the part of the PAN and PRD. Both candidates made unofficial visits to migrant communities the U.S. López Obrador, who had shunned the Mexican diaspora in his 2006 run, visited Los Angeles in June 2011, before becoming the official PRD candidate, holding an event establishing a branch of his then-nascent MORENA movement, at a time when he was fending off rival for the party nomination, Mexico City mayor Marcelo Ebrard. López Obrador’s message to supporters was

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less campaign focused and more oriented toward movement-building: he called on each person in the meeting to “commit to convince five other people to join this movement and create a force of voters for the 2012 election.”

He also later visited Chicago, giving a speech at a high school in a largely Mexican neighborhood in Pilsen. In his campaign speeches, he promised to pressure the U.S. government to legalize undocumented immigrants, and to improve services at Mexican consulates (Schütze 2016).

Josefina Vázquez Mota of the PAN also visited New York prior to officially announcing her candidacy, and later made a two day visit to California in March 2012, holding a closed door meeting with 100 community leaders in Santa Ana, another meeting with the group Hispanics Organized for Political Equality (HOPE), and an open event at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Los Angeles. She later also traveled to Chicago and spoke at the Instituto del Progreso Latino. As her California and Chicago visits were after her official nomination as PAN candidate, she avoided mentioning anything explicitly related to the campaign, but called for “unity” in the midst of a party leadership crisis involving PAN president Gustavo Madero, and a challenge from a rival candidate of her own, Senator Santiago Creel. Like López Obrador, in her speeches she emphasized the issue of U.S. immigration reform, migrant security, collective remittance programs, and consular services, all reflecting demands of the diaspora.

Both candidates also appeared together at a forum in Chicago in October 2011. Vázquez Mota promised to reform the 2005 law to ease voting from abroad. López Obrador’s speech used similar rhetoric to Fox’s, also referring to migrants as “heroes” and emphasizing his policy

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would be to resolve issues at home which motivate Mexicans to migrate.\textsuperscript{98} According to López Obrador’s former campaign adviser who had advised him, unsuccessfully, to reach out to the Mexican diaspora in 2006, his narrow loss in that election convinced him that diaspora outreach was worth the effort; others within the party had urged the candidate in 2006 to undertake a massive voter registration drive among likely voters in the U.S., but this never came to fruition due to López Obrador’s unwillingness to travel outside of Mexico, which he had never done.\textsuperscript{99}

Only PRI candidate and eventual winner Enrique Peña Nieto eschewed any visits to Mexican communities abroad during or prior to his campaign, though the candidate did participate in a video promotion of the diaspora vote organized by Federal Elections Institute in which all candidates participated.\textsuperscript{100}

Thus despite both negligible voter turnout and legal prohibition on diaspora campaigning, two of the three major parties campaigned in the diaspora in the 2012 election, and an upward trajectory in diaspora campaign activity can be observed since the 2006 election, when diaspora outreach was near zero; lower even than in years prior to diaspora enfranchisement, when two candidates, Fox and Cárdenas, campaigned in the U.S. Nevertheless, these visits were the extent of national level campaigning by Mexican parties, reflecting the obstacles set by the 2005 diaspora voting law. No party held rallies or community events, engaged in open fundraising, voter registration or election day get-out-the-vote efforts, nor bought campaign ads aimed at diaspora voters or their relatives. And no party mobilized diaspora supporters to lobby on their behalf or counter rival party campaigns. What instrumental value diaspora campaigning had was more for candidates consolidating their own bids for party nomination against those of rivals.

\textsuperscript{99} Interview with G. Farfan Mares, February 2014.
\textsuperscript{100} Interview with Luis Carlos Ugalde, July 2013.
The PAN and PRD have shown an ability to adjust campaign rhetoric to appeal to migrants: both sounding similar notes regarding U.S. immigration reform and consular services; Vázquez Mota responding to demands for electoral reform unique to migrant voters, and López Obrador borrowing migrant-flattering language from Fox. The PRI, however, remains uninterested and unwilling to engage with the diaspora at the national level. In both elections, the PRI is the only party never to have a presidential (pre-)candidate visit Mexican diaspora communities.

At the state level, however, the party has sent candidates to visit diaspora communities in the U.S. This is most common in states where the PAN is weak and the PRI competes primarily with the PRD, such as Guerrero and Zacatecas. Former PRI governor of Nuevo Leon, Natividad Gonzalez Paras, reports having campaigned in Texas. Diaspora voting in gubernatorial elections succeeded the 2005 national law, but efforts to extend suffrage in certain migrant-sending states preceded the law, often under pressure from U.S.-based HTAs and their powerful state-wide federations. In 2003, Zacatecas passed a state law, recognizing binational residency, allowing Zacatecans residing abroad to run for state and local office, and setting aside two seats in the state legislature for migrant representatives, reforms which were pushed by the Los Angeles-based Zacatecan Civic Front. The same year in Michoacan, then-governor Lázaro Cárdenas Batel signed a law recognizing migrants’ right to suffrage, paving the way for the state’s 2006 external voting rights law. Both Cárdenas Batel and then-Governor Ricardo Monreal

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102 Interview with Natividad Gonzalez Paras, July 2013.
Ávila of Zacatecas were members of the PRD at the time. Thus both the PRD and the PRI have reacted to a comparably more favorable diaspora skew in certain states with greater state-level outreach efforts.

**Party travel documentation from Mexico’s National Elections Institute**

In addition to campaign visits by candidates, party officials can be seen to take part in diaspora engagement in non-election years. A comparison of travel records by party officials between the last two (migrant voting) elections shows considerable variation in extent and purpose among the PAN, PRD, and PRI, reflecting both a diaspora skew – favorable to the PAN and strongly unfavorable to the PRI – and party infrastructure – underdeveloped for all three, especially for the PRI. From these records we can see a greater emphasis on community-oriented visits by the PAN and PRD, with an absolute greater number of such visits by the PAN, and a greater emphasis on non-community, elite and institutional visits by the PRI.

A public records request from Mexico’s National Elections Institute (INE; formerly the Federal Elections Institute, IFE) of international travel itineraries of party officials reported by all Mexican parties to INE between the 2006 and 2012 general elections yielded records of 197 international visits by officials from PAN, PRD, PRI, as well as smaller parties, the Green Party (PVEM), Nueva Alianza (PANAL), and the Workers Party (PT). As per the 2005 ban on any campaigning or fundraising outside of Mexico, no explicit electoral campaign activity was reported. Because such activity, of a more informal nature (visits by public officeholders in official capacities, or for national or local holidays), has been documented in Mexican and U.S. media, it is safe to assume that many such visits go unreported, although a number of them—those which can provide some official, non-campaign cover to meet with diaspora

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103 PVEM is in coalition with the PRI; however none of its reported international travel occurred in the U.S. nor could be coded as community-focused. PANAL and PT similarly reported no community-focused travel.
communities—are included in the public records request. So it is a safe assumption that the 197 reported visits do not represent the full scope of international travel by party officials, campaign-related or otherwise. However they serve as a useful comparison of international activity among parties, demonstrating variation in type, frequency and geographic focus of activity.

All international travel reports are listed here by party official and party, date, location, and activity. As 98% of the Mexican diaspora lives in the United States, visits to the U.S. are the most likely opportunities for diaspora community engagement; however many such visits are for non-community-focused events such as trainings and seminars, meetings with international diplomatic or financial organizations, or other elite-level meetings. Each visit is thus coded for likely diaspora community engagement or not based on reported activity, with the caveat that non-community-related visits may still provide officials with opportunities to campaign unofficially, in order to evade the 2005 ban. This analysis of the travel documentation errs on the side of caution, and does not code a visit as a community visit unless reported as such to INE.

Unsurprisingly, the party most active in the diaspora, the PAN, reports the greatest number of U.S. visits as well as the highest level of community engagement. The years included in the report largely overlap with the Calderón administration, however, and being the party in power likely opens more doors to skirting transnational campaign ban by providing cover through official capacities. Nevertheless, the visits recorded here were reported to INE as party-specific activities.

PAN

Of 47 total international visits, the PAN reported travel to the U.S. between 2006 and 2012 consisted of 25 visits, all in either 2007 or 2010 (see appendix). Neither year reported was a general election year, and many were by different PAN officials for the same event, or tour
organized around the same theme. Of the 25 visits, 15 could be coded as community-focused visits. These include meetings with Mexicans living in Dallas, Chicago, San Diego, Los Angeles, and New York. Several visits involved promoting the Paisano Program, the Mexican government initiative founded under PRI rule designed to facilitate travel for Mexicans living in the U.S. and visiting family members in Mexico. Under Fox and later Calderón, the Mexican government expanded the program, setting up hundreds of booths at airports and bus stations in major travel centers in the U.S. and Mexico to distribute information regarding customs and immigration, in an effort to reassure migrants who were wary of corruption, bribery and theft in the course of international travel. Accordingly, PAN officials traveling in 2007 could do so in an official capacity promoting a government program, however the tour was reported to INE as party activity and reported to involve meetings between the PAN and local communities. The PAN-Paisano tour was succeeded two months later by a visit by then-party president Manuel Espino to Los Angeles, which Espino declared was intended to build closer ties to the migrant community. Espino then sought to redefine the as a party of “lower-middle-class people from the countryside,” as opposed to its reputation as “an elitist party, of the rich, of business, close to the Church,” and stressed the party’s advocacy on behalf of migrants in favor of comprehensive immigration reform.104

The most significant series of visits in the time period reported was a 2010 tour by the party’s Committee for the Integration and Development of Migrants (COPADIM) to Boston, Chicago, and Washington, DC, including then-party president César Nava Vázquez, committee director Germán Tena Fernández, and Congressional deputy Benigno Quezada Naranjo, an advocate of Mexican migrant rights, joined in Chicago by Mike González, the PAN

104 “Defiende Espino honorabilidad de Fox, pero no mete las manos por nadie.” Chronica 10 October 2007.
representative for the United States, and Salvador Pedrosa, PAN representative for Illinois, along with local leaders César Rea and Rosendo Gurciaga. Chicago was chosen due to the large population from Michoacan, which would hold state and local elections the following year. In meetings with local members of the HTA umbrella group Federation of Clubs of Migrants from Michoacan, PAN officials stressed again the party’s advocacy of U.S. immigration reform and improving communication between residents and Mexican officials including official channels for petitions. Those which were not coded as community visits consisted largely of seminars and trainings on electoral strategies and public relations in Miami and Washington, DC.

PRD

The PRD reported 42 international visits by party officials from 2006 to 2012, but the fewest visits of all parties to the U.S.: only 3 in that time period. And while all three could be coded as community visits, the number of visits reported to INE do not correspond to the relatively high level of party activity of the party in the Mexican diaspora, approaching if not quite equal to that of the PAN. In 2010, the PRD’s then secretary of International Relations Saul Escobar traveled to Arizona to protest the state’s proposed anti-immigrant bill SB 1070. Escobar affirmed to Arizona’s Mexican community the PRD’s opposition to the bill and the party’s position of pressuring the Mexican government to “do everything possible—through its consulates—to defend migrants from our country, strengthen actions in their defense, and implement policies to better the lives of those migrants who return to our country with this wave of deportations.” Escobar’s visit coincided with a rhetorical campaign by the PRD to criticize then-president Calderón of failing to do enough to protect Mexican migrants in the face of deportations and anti-immigrant legislation, coordinated by Escobar and deputy Jorge Calderón.

105 “Panistas en gira por Chicago.” Agencia Infomania 8 November 2010.
Salazar. The other visits were by then-PRD President Jesus Zambrano and then-Secretary of International Relations of the PRD José Iran Moreno Santos, to a 2012 community event in Chicago on “Perspectives of the vote of Mexicans abroad.”

PRI

Of all parties, the PRI reported the greatest number of international visits by far in the 2006 – 2012 period, 91 in total, but only 21 of those were to the U.S. Of those, only 2 could be coded as community visits, both in April 2010, in which members of the PRI’s National Executive Committee (CEN) and PRI members of the Chamber of Deputies met in Chicago with 200 representatives of MIMEXPOL, the Coalition of Mexican Migrants for Political Rights to discuss proposals to facilitate absentee voting and diaspora input in Mexican politics. The meetings were held in conjunction with PAN representatives, including future presidential candidate Josefina Vázquez Mota, then acting as party coordinator for the Chamber of Deputies. She was joined by PAN Commissioner on Population, Borders, and Migrant Issues Norma Salazar, and legislators Noemi Reynoso and Carlos Pérez. Legislators Jorge Arana and Javier Guerrero represented the PRI.107

At the initial meeting, MIMEXPOL representatives expressed their doubts about the PAN’s legislative agenda regarding diaspora rights and their proposal to reform the federal electoral code (Cofipe), demanding better guarantees of easing absentee voting including allowing for overseas voter registration; migrant leaders also demanded some form of permanent representation of migrants in both chambers of Congress. They expressed greater support for a PRI proposal by deputies Francisco Rojas Gutiérrez and Emilio Chuayffet to amend the Constitution to create a new electoral circumscription, the geographic division of the country into

five electoral zones determining proportional representation, with a sixth zone representing the Mexican diaspora. The proposal did not advance in Congress.

All remaining U.S. visits reported by the PRI were political or academic delegations, such as meetings of the Socialist International of which the PRI is a member party, forums at the UN and the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, DC.

Of the three major parties (as well as the minor parties, none of which reported travel that could be coded as diaspora community-focused), the PAN reported the most significant diaspora-focused campaign travel in the period between the two most recent general elections. Even accounting for (perhaps severe) underreporting due to the overseas campaign ban, the travel records are at least indicative of the international activity each party is willing to report to the INE. For the PRI, that activity is quite extensive but also by and large has little to do with diaspora engagement; its most significant diaspora outreach as a party in that period was in coordination with the PAN. For the PRD, diaspora activity was limited, but what visits existed were community focused and aimed at cultivating the party’s self-image as defenders of migrants’ rights in the face of harsh U.S. immigration policy.

**Alternative explanations**

Of the possible alternative explanations, there is far less evidence for the hypothesis that skew does not matter, and that Mexican parties instead treat the Mexican diaspora simply as an extension of the Mexican electorate as a whole. First is the clearly observable skew in 2006 and 2012 election results, in which diaspora Mexican voters disfavored the PRI by a 20 point greater margin than the Mexican electorate as a whole. Second is the 2005 diaspora voting law which placed uniquely onerous restrictions on the Mexican diaspora, drafted by a PRI legislator and

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implemented by PRI-appointed elections institute officials. Third is the unique migrant-focused issues raised by parties when engaging in (unofficial) diaspora campaigning, such as pressuring the U.S. on immigration reform, delivering better consular services, upholding matching collective remittance programs, and – particularly for the PRD – easing diaspora voting restrictions.

Given the relative lack of party diaspora infrastructure, there is some evidence to lend credence to the second alternative hypothesis, that party infrastructure does not matter as much as individual candidates. Nevertheless, I believe this to be false. In support of this hypothesis, it can be observed that the earliest diaspora campaigning, by Cárdenas in 1988, took part before the formal founding of the PRD, and both his and Fox’s visits to California and Chicago were largely candidate-focused. Subsequent party-focused diaspora networks built on ad hoc welcoming committees organized around candidate visits. The decision by one candidate, López Obrador, in 2006 not to campaign in the U.S. was a personal decision, according to his campaign adviser, and made against the advice of his campaign and the party. And both his and his PAN rival Vázquez Mota’s campaign visits to the U.S. in 2012 occurred at moments when both were fending off nomination bids by intra-party rivals.

However, there is evidence of differences in diaspora outreach reflecting party initiative (or lack thereof) independent of candidates. The party travel records examined show dozens of visits by non-candidates and party officials to the U.S. during non-election years, including community-focused events hosted by HTAs. Variation in diaspora outreach reflects variation in (lack of) diaspora infrastructure by parties, with relatively greater and more community-focused visits by PAN and PRD officials compared to PRI officials, corresponding to a lack of an official and coordinated diaspora network for the latter party. This lack of outreach on the national level
contrasts, however, with relatively greater activity on the state level in states where the PRI is stronger, and thus local hometown associations are more likely to be receptive to PRI candidates, itself a reflection of the parties’ dependence on HTAs for diaspora networking. Finally, comparing diaspora outreach by Mexican parties to Salvadoran parties, particularly the FMLN, demonstrates the hindrances that a poorly institutionalized diaspora infrastructure can have on diaspora outreach. Mexican parties’ diaspora outreach is limited almost exclusively to visits by officials and candidates, and does not include the broader range of activities undertaken by Salvadoran parties such as lobbying, coalition building, candidate development, and having a party presence at community events; indeed many of these functions are outsourced to HTAs. Thus the very lack of variety in diaspora outreach activity is evidence of the importance of infrastructure, which Mexican parties in the diaspora lack.

Conclusions

Diaspora outreach by the PAN, PRD and PRI in the U.S. reflect a diaspora strongly skewed against one party, the PRI, and an uneven and overall underdeveloped diaspora infrastructure by all three parties, especially the PRI. It is bounded by a unique obstacle, the restrictive 2005 diaspora enfranchisement law, which is itself a product of diaspora anti-PRI skew, and a legislative compromise between the PAN and PRI reflecting the interests of both parties in response to that skew. The result is a moderate level of diaspora engagement for the PAN and PRD, limited largely to visits by candidates and party officials, only some of which are community focused, but without the kind of long term party building, grassroots mobilization, or lobbying by parties which can be seen by their Salvadoran counterparts. For the PRI, the lack of both diaspora sympathy and a diaspora party network that has official standing and rights in the
party explains the lack of nearly any diaspora outreach at the national level, with no visits by presidential candidates and nearly no community-focused visits by PRI officials.

From the PRI’s perspective, then, its diaspora strategy, though not one that can be characterized as outreach per se, has been relatively successful. It has succeeded in demobilizing a very large and potentially electorally consequential diaspora that, were diaspora voter participation to become widespread, would surely strongly disadvantage the PRI. Gradual changes in this demobilization strategy, itself a continuation of the PRI’s historic “policy of no policy” of indifference to Mexican migrants, can be seen in the 2016 electoral law reform, which suggests greater confidence that the party can overcome historical antipathies in the diaspora, or perhaps simply confidence that voter participation rates rising from such a low baseline of just 40,000 votes nationally would be unlikely to do the party much damage.

Restrictive diaspora voting also benefits the PAN by restricting effective enfranchisement to the most PAN-friendly demographic of Mexican migrants, those with the means to go through a lengthy and complicated registration process. But the party still receives political dividends in the diaspora as the only party to have defeated the PRI, and thus continues to engage with the diaspora through candidate and official visits – even in violation of the (spirit of) the law, where its candidates, notably Vázquez Mota, receive a comparably friendly reception than they might in Mexico.

The PRD, which has since its inception has positioned itself as champion of Mexican migrants, stands to gain the most from greater diaspora engagement as well as a lifting of diaspora vote restrictions. Its outreach has been limited, however, by being unable to capitalize on the anti-PRI diaspora skew due to the PAN’s prestige as the winning party in 2000. It is also hampered, along with the PAN, by a still underdeveloped diaspora infrastructure, which only
gained official party recognition in the last decade, and is still largely ad hoc in function, and is poorly integrated with the party structure. It remains to be seen if López Orbador’s breakaway party, MORENA, achieves what the other parties have been unable (or unwilling) to build, an institutionalized diaspora party network capable of grassroots mass mobilization. All three parties’ diaspora outreach is hobbled by the fact that the default vehicle for migrant transnational organization remains non-party organizations, hometown associations, which are much older, larger, more extensive and more active than party networks.

Interviews with party officials indicate a growing consensus among all parties that the diaspora matters and cannot be ignored. Due to the clout parties perceive migrants to have at home, the historic PRI “policy of no policy” and strategy of containment is no longer viable or desirable, even for the PRI. The anti-PRI vote is still not much of a vote, and it has not precluded PRI inroads into migrant federations on a state level. And while the anti-PRI leanings of the Mexican diaspora has so far chiefly benefitted one party, there is reason to expect, given the geographically and socioeconomically diverse profile of the Mexican diaspora as a whole, that an expansion of the diaspora vote will over time benefit other parties, chiefly the PRD or its offshoot MORENA. And the continued legal prohibitions on diaspora campaigning will not stop such campaigning from taking place, most likely at an increasing level in both national and state elections.
Chapter 5. Dominican Republic: Unskewed Support, Strong Infrastructure

Few countries boast as energetic a diaspora politics as the Dominican Republic, where emigrants have enjoyed voting rights, and the courting of all parties, longer than those from El Salvador or Mexico. An unrestricted diaspora voting regime and highly permissive campaign finance laws are the product of a comparably unskewed diaspora, which leads to a higher level of overall diaspora activity among Dominican parties than for Salvadoran or Mexican parties. This lack of a strong skew, along with extensive party infrastructure, creates the conditions which lead both major parties to engage in a wide range of grassroots activities to appeal to an electorate which they see as an especially valuable prize.

The two principal Dominican parties demonstrate the greatest degree of similarity among rival parties within the three countries examined in this study: both have developed diaspora base committee networks, and neither suffers the disadvantage of a strong diaspora skew away from them. Their similarities can be traced back in part to their founding by the same person, Juan Bosch, a charismatic figure popular in the diaspora. Both in terms of base committee structure and a favorable skew, they most closely resemble El Salvador’s FMLN rather than any of the Mexican parties, in terms of their diaspora outreach: with a grassroots orientation to their activities in the U.S. and a comprehensive approach to campaigning, which includes frequent candidate and party official visits, advertising, endorsements, cultivation of diaspora candidates for office in the home country, and a permanent community presence during non-election years.

Nevertheless, variation can be observed between the PRD and PLD in matters of degree, which has narrowed over time. While both maintain base committees, the PRD’s base committee network is more institutionalized and more extensive. And while neither has the disfavor of the diaspora as a whole, the PRD benefits from the sympathy of an older generation of Dominican
migrants, those who are more ideologically motivated, according to interviews with officials of both parties. Thus the PRD’s diaspora outreach has historically been both more active overall and more ideological in appeal than its upstart rival party, the PLD. However as this older generation has died off and faded in importance, differences in outreach activity have become less obvious.

The PLD, for its part, has an active though not as extensive base committee network, being the newer party. This comparably less institutionalized infrastructure, along with a neutral diaspora partisan skew, has led the PLD to win support through a combination of traditional mass grassroots campaigning as well as clientelist practices targeting influential diaspora community leaders, and taking advantage of its current period of electoral dominance to distribute patronage to diaspora supporters. This strategy has allowed the PLD to catch up to its older rival in the diaspora, though its support is thus more precarious as its rival adopts similar tactics. The following table summarizes the effects of (non-)skew and infrastructure on the two parties’ outreach.

**Table 10. Skew, Infrastructure, and Diaspora Outreach by Party, DR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Diaspora skew</th>
<th>Party infrastructure in diaspora</th>
<th>Diaspora outreach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Newer, smaller base committee network</td>
<td>Extensive, clientelist: frequent campaign visits, rallies, ads, endorsements, and patronage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Neutral (historically favorable)</td>
<td>Large, well established base committee network</td>
<td>Extensive, historically ideological, recently clientelist: frequent campaign visits, rallies, ads, and patronage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Of the cases examined in this study, the Dominican parties appear the closest to the alternative explanations of party diaspora outreach: that candidates matter more than parties, and that the diaspora are not a unique constituency at all. Evidence in favor of the first hypothesis is the historical attachment of the diaspora to certain politicians like Bosch and José Francisco Peña Gómez, or in the modern era, to Leonel Fernández, a Dominican migrant himself. Evidence in favor of the second is the affirmation by interview subjects that party diaspora campaign activity has historically been converging on domestic campaign activity, as well as overall representation of the diaspora in Dominican politics, up to reserved seats in the national legislature for diaspora representatives.

Nevertheless, there is evidence contradicting these alternative explanations. First, the primacy of the party remains clear when considering the totality of diaspora activity, beyond simply candidate visits, and the importance of the party as the vector of grassroots mobilization including in non-election years. Second, the uniqueness of the diaspora is apparent in election results, showing the relative lack of skew of the diaspora compared to the home country electorate: more balanced results among diaspora voters compared to all voters in past presidential elections demonstrate a slight advantage in the diaspora the PRD has enjoyed historically still has staying power, and blunts in the diaspora what has become hegemonic support for the PLD in the Dominican Republic. Additionally, interviews show an acute awareness by party officials to issues specific to the diaspora, and an attempt to cater to them.

This chapter will analyze the impact of a relatively unskewed diaspora and a strong party infrastructure on diaspora campaigning by Dominican parties. It will look at the history of Dominican migration and how parties have engaged over the years with the growing Dominican diaspora in the U.S. It will also look at the creation and functioning of the diaspora electoral
regime, the openness of which contrasts sharply with the restrictive nature of Mexico’s diaspora electoral regime. It will show that this openness is a product of an unskewed diaspora, just as Mexico’s restrictiveness is a product of a skewed diaspora, and thus illustrates how skew can affect party behavior through the creation of legal boundaries. The chapter relies on interviews conducted with 17 Dominican party officials to demonstrate the unskewed nature of the Dominican diaspora and the parties’ base committee infrastructure has affected the evolution of diaspora outreach for both parties, particularly with regard to the use of clientelism.

**Strong infrastructure, deep roots**

It is only a slight exaggeration to say the two major Dominican parties were born in the diaspora. But their existence has been closely tied to the diaspora community in the U.S. since their founding, and the diaspora itself has been intertwined with Dominican politics from the beginning of large-scale emigration to the U.S. Both parties developed strong diaspora infrastructures from which they draw their support today, with the PLD’s infrastructure modeled after that of its older rival, the PRD. Thus between the two parties, the difference in diaspora infrastructure is not (as in El Salvador) in organizational structure, nor (as in Mexico) in their subordination to nonpartisan hometown associations. Rather, it is a matter of degree: as the older party, the PRD’s base committee network is more institutionalized and extensive, compared to the younger PLD’s smaller network.

The shared origins of the PRD and PLD trace back to the opposition movement to the authoritarian rule of longtime Dominican president Joaquín Balaguer (1960-62, 66-78, 86-96). Both were founded by Juan Bosch, the longtime opposition figure prior to and during the Balaguer administrations. Bosch’s original party, the PRD, operated largely in exile following the 1965 coup and invasion by the U.S. until it won the 1978 election, the first contested
elections since 1966, only to lose it again to Balaguer in 1986. The second party founded by Bosch, the PLD, failed to unseat Balaguer in the 1990 elections marked by widespread election fraud, as did the PRD again in 1994. A transition from Balaguer’s rule was negotiated between his government and the opposition parties and resulted in the first sustained period of true multi-party elections, beginning in 1996. These negotiations led to constitutional changes which included dual citizenship for Dominicans residing abroad. Thus a new era of truly competitive elections benefitting both longtime opposition parties coincided with a newly empowered and economically active diaspora which could be tapped for support.

Party primacy in diaspora politics is reflected as well in the makeup of Dominican diaspora organizations. In comparison to other migrant organizations surveyed by Portes et al 2007, most of which were politically nonpartisan hometown associations, other civic associations, and service agencies, among Dominican migrant organizations, the parties dominate. In contrast to Mexican migrant organizations, which tend to be nonpartisan, service-oriented, focused on hometown roots, and more often supported financially by the Mexican government, Dominican migrant organizations are often explicitly partisan and dependent not on the Dominican government but on parties. In this sense they more closely resemble the party structure of the Salvadoran diaspora, specifically that of the FMLN base committees.

Both parties maintain a U.S. network of base committees, called sections, a holdover of the PRD’s opposition organizing from abroad during the Balaguer era, and later carried over to the PLD after Bosch’s split. Historically, the PRD, founded by exiles in Cuba in 1939, has had decades of diaspora organizing over the PLD, founded in 1973 as a breakaway faction of the former. The PRD has the historical advantage of being the default opposition party to Balaguer,

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109 In the case of Mexican political organizations, “Relative to the reference category (Dominicans), the odds of an organization being a hometown committee are forty-six-to-one if it happens to be Mexican.” Portes et al, 264.
who was unpopular in the diaspora, and drew its support from a large number of political exiles who began to arrive to the U.S. en masse following the coup and U.S. occupation, as well as U.S. immigration reform, starting in the mid-1960s.

Thus the PRD’s diaspora network is both older and larger than the PLD’s, centered on the eastern seaboard of the U.S. and particularly in New York. The PRD maintains a self-reported party membership in the New York City area of 23,000, according to the Comparative Immigrant Transnational Project; the PLD of Boston, the next largest Dominican political group surveyed, reported a membership of 1,500 (Portes et al 2007). A PRD official interviewed reported his party maintaining 22 sections abroad; a PLD official said his party maintains 6. Party sections have elected presidents, secretary generals, and other officers, hold weekly meetings and potlucks, host political education classes to instill party ideology, hold cultural events, maintain youth wings, sports leagues, are involved in all aspects of fundraising and campaigning, and coordinating visits by candidates and party officials. They also act as service organizations, offering members help with consular services, personal loans, paying for food or medical care for indigent members, arranging for legal representation for those with criminal issues, and facilitating transfers of property between the US and the DR through consulates. They pay for visits to the DR by diaspora leaders (and, prior to 2004, voters), groom future candidates for public office in the Dominican Republic and are a vehicle for placement in patronage jobs in consulates and other overseas government posts. Party sections provide two-way communication between party leaders and their membership base in the diaspora: in the run up to the diaspora enfranchisement law, and prior to its implementation, section members used visits by candidates as opportunities to question them about their commitment to securing their voting rights (Ibid).

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110 Interviews with Modesto Reynoso and Alfonso Ureña, October 2013
111 Interviews with Janet Camilo, Rafael Castro, and Modesto Reynoso, September and October 2013
This role of the parties as the primacy vehicle of diaspora political activity contrasts with the Mexican diaspora, where nonpartisan hometown associations play this central role.

Nonpartisan Dominican political organizations exist as well, such as Dominicanos USA, but it is an organization focused primarily on US, not Dominican politics, mobilizing Dominican Americans to register to vote in local (New York) and national elections. Other nonpartisan, nonpolitical diaspora organizations are more service oriented and often focus on eldercare, poverty and disaster relief, including the Alianza Dominicana, Hermanas Mirabal, and Asociación de Jimanenses de Massachusetts. For activity oriented around Dominican elections, it is the parties which organize rallies, put out ads, and turn out votes.

Less skew in the diaspora than at home

The time period for large-scale Dominican migration to the U.S. falls between that for Mexico—historically ongoing and predating the existence of modern-day national borders—and El Salvador—beginning largely in the 1980s. Major migration from the Dominican Republic to the U.S. followed passage of the Hart-Celler Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Thus for the “pull” side of push-pull dynamics motivating migration, the political context for Dominican-U.S. immigration more generally resembles those of other non-European countries which saw their immigration numbers increase with the lifting of the restrictive National Origins quotas.

As for the “push” side, the passage of the Hart-Celler Act which made large-scale U.S. immigration possible came at the end of a turbulent period of political instability in the Dominican Republic following the downfall of the 31-year Rafael Trujillo dictatorship. Trujillo’s assassination in 1961 resulted in a short-lived leftist government led by Juan Bosch, overthrown by a military coup, followed by another period of military rule, a popular revolt, and a military intervention by the U.S. in 1965. Supervised elections in 1966 ushered in another period of
hegemonic rule under U.S.-friendly strongman Joaquín Balaguer. Early migration, prior to the mid-1970s, was politically rather than economically motivated: Balaguer suppressed dissent and sent political opponents into exile in the U.S., principally the New York metropolitan area, exiles facilitated by the Johnson and Nixon administrations as a safety valve measure to prop up the stability of the Balaguer government (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). As the principal opposition part in this period, the PRD drew its support from these exiles.

The first concerted opposition to Balaguer, the 1978 election, coincided with a period of rapid increase in both Dominican migration to the U.S. and diaspora remittances to the Dominican Republic. Total net out-migration from the Dominican Republic increased from 56,000 per year in 1967 to 87,000 a decade later and 150,000 in 1997, the year of the first post-Balaguer government, but has remained relatively constant since the 1980s. Remittances, in contrast, have grown exponentially despite flat migration rates. Prior to the mid-1970s, remittances had been around $25 million annually, by 1976 topped $100 million for the first time and $200 million by 1984. By 1997 they topped $1 billion and accounted for 6% of the Dominican Republic’s GDP, reaching a high of nearly 12% of GDP in 2004. Today remittances stand at over $5 billion dollars a year.\footnote{World Development Indicators, last updated August 10, 2016}
Diaspora voting patterns in the period following diaspora enfranchisement show a comparable lack of a consistent skew toward either party. This period has been marked by control of the presidency by the PLD for 16 of the past 20 years, which has enjoyed a clear electoral advantage at home but less clear advantage in the diaspora. A key figure in Dominican
politics generally and diaspora politics particularly is the PLD’s Leonel Fernández, who grew up in New York and had a U.S. green card. His administration established both the enfranchisement of the diaspora and the consolidation of the PLD’s electoral dominance that continues to this day. The first Fernández administration also saw close collaboration between the government and U.S.-based Dominican migrant organizations which encouraged greater political engagement of the Dominican diaspora. In addition to the constitutional reforms granting dual citizenship, the Dominican congress passed the first bill granting—in principle—external voting rights in 1997, though such rights would not be implemented until 2004.

The first elections in which Dominicans abroad could vote saw Hipólito Mejía of the PRD, elected president in 2000, running for a second term after pushing through constitutional reforms allowing for one consecutive reelection. Dominicans in the diaspora voted largely for his opponent, ex-president Fernández, 74% to 20%, reflecting both diaspora identification with fellow migrant Fernández and their distrust of Mejía’s attempts to extend his term in office, reminiscent of Balaguer. This diaspora vote trended in the same direction as that of the Dominican electorate as a whole, but was more exaggerated: overall, Fernández defeated Mejía by a margin of 57% to 34%, indicating greater support for the PRD at home, and a more pro-PLD tilt abroad. In his second term, Fernández established a presidential Consultative Council of Dominicans in the Exterior, and the JCE established its Offices for Overseas Electoral Registry, allowing Dominicans to obtain voter identification from outside of the country, and greatly expanding diaspora voter registration. Subsequent elections have solidified the PLD’s hold on the presidency, with Fernández winning again in 2008, and Danilo Medina winning in 2012 and 2016, the latter an election in which the main opposition PRD was split.
Turnout was low in 2004, the first year of diaspora voting. The Dominican elections board, the Junta Central Electoral, counted just 52,440 migrants registered in 2004, just over 42,000 in the U.S., making up just 1% of the total Dominican vote though Dominican migrants represent approximately 10% of the Dominican home country population (JCE; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). However diaspora voter registration increased dramatically in the 2008 election, to 164,789, again to 328,649 in 2012, and 384,522 in 2016; in 2016, registered voters in the diaspora totaled 5.7% of all Dominican voters. This near doubling of voter registration between elections reflected a major push by the JCE, which prior to the 2008 election sent 153,336 letters to potential overseas voters informing them of their voting rights, set up a call center operating 6 to 7 hours a day, and a system, Verificate, for voters to check their registration and voting site in person, staffed by JCE officials overseas. Additionally, registered voters expanded to two new areas in the U.S.—Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C.—as well as beyond—Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Panama, Curacao, and St. Martin—for the first time in 2008.

Valid votes cast from abroad totaled 34,550 in 2004, 76,13 in 2008, 147,479 in 2012, and 184,819 in 2016. The diaspora, like the overall Dominican electorate, favored the PLD in 2004, 2008, and 2016. However in 2012, the diaspora vote went the opposite direction of the overall vote, favoring the PRD, which lost the election. A closer look at the differences in vote shares between the diaspora and overall electorates even in years in which they favored the same party show more nuance than simply a pro-PLD vote.

Table 11. Dominican Diaspora Vote vs. Total Vote, 2004 - 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Diaspora vote</th>
<th>Total DR vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>Fernández</td>
<td>72.5%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Mejía</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>Estrella</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>Fernández</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Vargas</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Mejía</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>Medina</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Abinader</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: JCE

The comparably less skewed diaspora contrasts with a clear pro-PLD skew of the overall Dominican electorate. There are significant differences between the diaspora and overall Dominican electorate in the 2004, 2008, and 2016 elections, curiously, in opposite directions regarding the PLD candidate. In 2004 and 2008, diaspora voters heavily favored PLD candidate and eventual winner Leonel Fernández. In subsequent elections, however diaspora attitudes toward the PLD candidate flipped; with Danilo Medina as the party’s candidate, diaspora voters voted in lower numbers for the party relative to the population. In 2012, they favored his opponent, former president Hipólito Mejía, whom the diaspora voted largely against when he ran against Fernández in 2004. In 2016, where the difference between the diaspora and overall vote is starkest since 2004, a plurality of the diaspora electorate voted for Medina, but over ten percentage points lower than the overall electorate. Given Medina’s absorption of the rump faction of the PRD, the PLD’s historic rival, leaving his chief opponent, Luis Abinader, the
candidate of a new, breakaway party, the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM), the 2016 election was a landslide victory for Medina. However, in the diaspora, a sizeable minority favored Abinader and the PRM, a much greater percentage than that of the overall electorate. Nevertheless, the PLD also won 5 of the 7 ultramar Congressional seats reserved for representatives of the diaspora in 2016.

Results of the four elections in the diaspora demonstrate the lack of a consistent party skew in the diaspora compared to the overall electorate. Neither the PLD nor the PRD (or its successor, the PRM) can count on the diaspora as a reliably loyal base of support. Diaspora voters have alternated voting for or against the PLD in successive elections, despite that party winning all four of the previous elections. Whatever skew that does exist appears to favor one particular candidate: the diaspora voted overwhelmingly for the PLD in 2004 and 2008 because its candidate was Fernández, a favorite son of the large New York Dominican community. It voted for the PRD candidate in 2012, and at a higher rate for the PRM candidate in 2016, because the PLD’s candidate was Danilo Medina, who was not favored by the diaspora. Indeed, the controversial methods by which Medina set up his landslide reelection, first by pushing a 2015 constitutional reform through Congress to allow consecutive reelection once again (which had been banned under a 2010 reform), and second by dividing the opposition and allegedly buying off the support of major PRD figures, received critical coverage in major U.S. Spanish language media such as Univision. Diaspora voters similarly disfavored the PRD in 2004 soon after its candidate, Mejía, had pushed through constitutional reforms to allow for his own consecutive reelection; Dominicans who migrated during the Balaguer era were particularly

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sensitive to electoral fraud, and opposed to political machinations by politicians seeking to perpetuate their rule (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008).

Also prior to the 2016 election, two other scandals involving PLD officials in the U.S. also received coverage: in 2015, Danilo Díaz, a PLD congressman, was investigated for real estate fraud by the New York State attorney general;\(^{116}\) and Julio Álvarez, a Dominican businessman residing in New Jersey and the general coordinator of the Medina reelection campaign abroad, was reported to be under investigation by the FBI for involvement in a vehicle fraud ring just two months before the election.\(^ {117}\) These cases were highlighted by the Abinader campaign, and his relatively high exterior vote total indicates these scandals hurt Medina among diaspora voters.

Most notable for the diaspora’s shift in attitudes toward the PLD’s candidate, however, is the rivalry between Leonel Fernández and Danilo Medina. Fernández and Medina had developed a fierce rivalry for control of the PLD, beginning when Medina, who had served under Fernández’s administration as Minister of the Presidency, challenged Fernández’s nomination as the PLD’s candidate in the 2008 election, losing in the party’s primary in 2007 by a wide margin, but later going on to be a critic of the last Fernández administration within the party.\(^ {118}\) Following a constitutional reform banning consecutive reelection in 2010, Fernández supported Medina’s bid for the presidency in 2012, after which Fernández retained the presidency of the PLD, control of the party’s Central Committee and significant influence over PLD legislators and appointees. But their relationship turned sour once again when Fernández publicly opposed

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Medina’s bid for reelection, causing a rift within the party. His break with Medina over the 2015 reform once again allowing consecutive reelection was widely speculated in the Dominican press as being due to his expectation to be the PLD’s nominee once again in the 2016 election. The rift was reflected in rival PLD candidates running against one another for local offices, and at one point erupted into violence between the rival camps.

Dominican parties thus cannot count on the diaspora as a reliable base of support. The Dominican diaspora electorate has shown its willingness to go against trends of the domestic electorate, either by voting for the opposite party, or voting for the winning party but at a lesser degree. This pattern appears to be driven in part by personality-driven rifts within the dominant PLD, and the diaspora’s favoring a candidate who they perceive to be one of their own, Fernández, and his faction. This offers some support for the alternative explanation that diaspora outreach is candidate rather than party-driven; however evidence below points to the parties’ central role in both securing voting rights and conducting diaspora outreach. The following sections will explain how the lack of a consistent diaspora partisan skew led to the party-led creation of a permissive model of diaspora campaigning, and how that campaigning is highly competitive and grassroots in nature, due to the lack of skew and well established diaspora party infrastructure.

**Party design of an open diaspora electoral regime**

In contrast to more restrictive overseas voting systems set up in countries exhibiting a diaspora partisan skew such as Mexico and El Salvador, the Dominican Republic’s electoral regime is among the most liberal among countries guaranteeing external voting rights to diaspora

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citizens. The Dominican Republic was one of the early adopters in the region, granting overseas voting rights in presidential elections beginning in 2004, and has since had three more elections in which diaspora Dominicans have taken part. Overseas voters can both register to vote and vote from abroad, unlike Mexican diaspora citizens who, prior to 2016, were required to travel back to Mexico to register. Dominican campaign finance law is among the loosest in the region, with no limits to either campaign donations or spending, and there are no special restrictions for campaigning outside of the country (Castillo and Zovato 1998, Posada-Carbó 2008).

This open electoral regime is the vehicle by which non-skew leads to an overall high level of party diaspora activity. The lack of a party veto actor results in the Dominican Republic’s voting and campaigning laws encouraging, rather than discouraging, participation by diaspora citizens and outreach by parties. In countries where diaspora populations have a unique political profile, one shaped by large scale out-migration during periods of effective one party rule, resulting in a polarized diaspora that skews heavily against that party (PRI for Mexican migrants; ARENA for Salvadoran migrants), one party will be incentivized to block the expansion of diaspora voting rights. In the Dominican Republic, politicians interviewed voice a consensus that diaspora Dominicans do not heavily favor one party. Thus, both major parties (prior to the 2016 election, the PLD and PRD) as well as smaller parties (such as the PRSC, which ceased to be a viable third party in presidential elections after the 2008 election and subsequently allied with one of the major parties) have all been incentivized to seek votes among Dominicans abroad, primarily in the United States and especially in the New York metropolitan region.

Additionally, the Dominican Republic is among the few countries guaranteeing diaspora legislative representation, with designated *ultramar* legislators in Congress representing
Dominicans residing abroad (in Latin America, only Colombia and Ecuador have similar designated diaspora legislators). Diaspora campaigns by Dominican parties and candidates are less regulated, and consequently more varied in types of outreach and more focused on voter turnout and fundraising, and enjoy higher voter participation and high levels of campaigning across all parties, in contrast to the Mexican and Salvadoran cases.

*The push for diaspora voting rights*

The relative lack of dominance by a single party paved the way for external voting rights and a relatively open overseas voting regime, lacking campaign laws which might encumber voting or campaigning. The uniquely unskewed nature of the Dominican diaspora produced a uniquely permissive electoral system, which sets far fewer boundaries on diaspora voting and campaigning than the Salvadoran and especially Mexican diaspora electoral regimes. This permissive electoral regime thus allows for highly competitive and active diaspora campaigning by all parties. This section offers a historical overview of diaspora enfranchisement in the Dominican Republic, and the bipartisan nature of the process.

Dominican migrants—largely small business owners in the New York area who did business with the Dominican Republic—had been actively advocating for dual citizenship since the 1970s (Guarnizo 1998). These advocates couched their efforts to expand migrant political rights as ways to improve ease of doing business across borders. Others organized through PRD and later PLD sections in the U.S., for which the push for dual citizenship dovetailed with opposition efforts against the Balaguer government, anchored by networks for politically active, left-wing exiles. Diaspora groups held conferences and organized petitions to press the government for reforms. Beginning with Leonel Fernández, the post-1996 period of contested elections brought regular candidate visits to the U.S. Nevertheless, with external voting rights
having been passed but stalled, diaspora groups organized to demand implementation, but were unable to form an effective lobby.

Diaspora enfranchisement is a party rather than government-led story. In contrast to Mexico, where the IFE/INE took a leading role in designing the external voting system, the equivalent Dominican electoral authority, the JCE, had relatively weak control over the process. The JCE is a bicameral body with one chamber of responsible for dispute resolution and a second chamber responsible for administration, which creates conflict and confusion among its constituent judges and overseeing trustees, who are appointed by the parties. In 1998, the first Fernández administration tasked the JCE with studying diaspora enfranchisement and created a planning commission within the party headed by an attorney, Luis Arias, four years later named president of the JCE. The process was delayed until after the end of the Fernández administration, missed several deadlines, and was finally implemented under the Mejía administration, during which PRD-appointed trustees oversaw the process including voter registration at embassies, a process which was chaotic, confusing to voters, and resulted in extremely low rates of registration in the first year: just 55,000 total in the first year of external voting, representing just over 1% of the total national registry. Later PLD administrations tasked the JCE with increasing diaspora voter registration and participation, mandating the creation of the Office of the External Vote (Later Office of Overseas Voter Registration, OPREE), its permanent voter registration and voter ID issuance body, which itself came to be a valuable site of patronage jobs. In contrast to Mexico’s IFE/INE, for example, Dominican party officials report the Dominican JCE has long lacked a large, stable career civil service workforce, bureaucratic capacity, or independence from the partisan mandates of presidents.
Diaspora enfranchisement has pushed primarily by the PLD, as the party in office for most of the contemporary period, however it has received support from the PRD and third parties as well. The popularity of PLD president Leonel Fernández among the diaspora has given that party greater motivation to push for more electoral participation within a diaspora that has historically been seen to favor their rivals. A diaspora PLD militant, Fernandez was a follower of Bosch, and having grown up largely in New York, made diaspora engagement a centerpiece of his 1996 campaign, despite overseas Dominicans’ non-voting status. The PLD appealed to relatively prosperous, more established migrants in New York and especially the Dominican business elite, which had long chafed at a government which under Balaguer had been seen as corrupt, won elections through fraud, and targeted migrants in particular for bribes. Upon his election, Fernández followed through with his promises to better integrate the diaspora into domestic politics, naming a Secretary of Dominicans Abroad, and in 1997 signed into law bill 295-97 formally enfranchising citizens residing abroad. Nevertheless, external voting took years between legislative passage and implementation. The law came about following the 1994 constitutional reforms which established dual citizenship and, in principle, overseas voting rights, but full voting rights were implemented by a PRD president, Mejía.

The reforms came about following Balaguer’s disputed last election in 1994, widely seen as fraudulent, which led to a Pact for Democracy between the PRD and PLD who together pushed through a slate of electoral reforms aimed at broader enfranchisement, including for migrants; their united opposition to Balaguer created a bipartisan consensus for diaspora voting rights. In 2006, during his second term, Fernandez established the Presidential Consultative Councils of Dominicans Abroad, and in 2009, during his third term, the Dominican Congress
passed new constitutional reforms reserving seats in Congress for representatives of Dominican diaspora voters, which were supported by both the PRD and PLD.

It was not until the 2000 – 2004 administration of Fernández’s PRD rival, Hipólito Mejía, that the JCE established its OPREE and set up the process through which external voting was finally put in place. Like Medina after him, Mejía had pushed through a constitutional amendment to allow for his own consecutive reelection, and presented himself as candidate in 2004, which he lost to Fernández. But the PRD had long draw on diaspora support, and thus the party supported diaspora enfranchisement. Interview subjects across parties referred to the influence of Peña Gómez in inspiring diaspora support for the PRD among the Balaguer-era generation of Dominican migrants: it was the PRD under Peña Gómez which first pushed for a constitutional amendment to allow for dual citizenship. The PLD has since cemented its dominance, controlling the presidency for 16 of the last 20 years, but as late as 2012, the Dominican diaspora voted for Mejía and the PRD over the winner, Medina.

The resulting external voting system is among the most permissive in the world. Voters can obtain voter IDs, register to vote, and vote from abroad. And while diaspora voter registration and participation are low in comparison to the overall population, the Dominican Republic enjoys much higher rates of diaspora voting than other countries studied. In Mexico, by contrast, candidates are prohibited from campaigning or raising any funds outside the country at all, and until 2016, Mexican citizens residing abroad had to return to Mexico to register to vote, a process that takes weeks. And in the most recent elections, 40,737 diaspora Mexicans voted, compared to 184,819 diaspora Dominicans, despite the fact that the diaspora population of Mexico is more than 5 times greater than that of the Dominican Republic.
The open and permissive nature of the Dominican Republic’s diaspora elections, which feature an easy process for voter registration and voting, and a lack of restrictions or oversight on party campaign activities, is the direct result of an unskewed diaspora. Though the diaspora, like the rest of the country, voted for the PLD for most but not all of the elections that party won, it did so in lower numbers and more inconsistently, demonstrating that the diaspora is beholden to no party. This creates a lack of veto players among parties for blocking diaspora electoral participation, as all parties see the diaspora as a potential pool for growth, and thus intense competition for diaspora support. Party direction over the voting rights process in the Dominican Republic is further enabled by a weak bureaucracy with high turnover within the civil service in general and Dominican electoral board in particular, in contrast to a deeply entrenched elections board bureaucracy in Mexico. And with well established diaspora infrastructure, the parties, through their diaspora sections, engage in a large number of activities aimed at the community in general, party militants, and business leaders.

**Dominican party diaspora outreach: Broad and contentious**

The result of an unskewed diaspora and deep diaspora infrastructure by both parties creates a highly contentious diaspora political climate, with both parties engaging in a wide range of activities to win diaspora support. What can be observed is a gradual convergence of both parties toward a clientelist model more associated with the younger party, the PLD, by the PRD (or the PRM in 2016), which had historically relied on more ideological appeals to its base, comparable to El Salvador’s FMLN.

The 2016 general election, in which incumbent president Danilo Medina of the PLD won in a landslide against a new breakaway faction of the PRD, the Modern Revolutionary Party (PRM) and its candidate Luis Abinader, points to a wide range of areas of diaspora outreach that
parties engage in, including direct vote-getting and fundraising, two areas of comparably less focus for Salvadoran and Mexican parties operating in the diaspora, as well as more universal activities such as candidate visits. An additional aspect, clientelism, is a uniquely strong part of Dominican party diaspora outreach. The wide variety of these outreach tactics point to the interaction between an unskewed diaspora, creating both a diaspora electorate that is up for grabs and a lack of legal restrictions to campaigning, and a deep party infrastructure which coordinates all types of activities through party sections.

**Voter turnout**

Party sections have a permanent presence in the community and do not simply operate during elections. Nevertheless, voter mobilization is a major part of section activity, and to a greater degree than Mexican and Salvadoran parties, even for their closest party of comparison, the FMLN. Compared to the Mexican and Salvadoran diaspora, the Dominican diaspora has a higher level of voter turnout during presidential elections and has been voting the longest; additionally, the concentration of large numbers of Dominicans in certain east coast metropolitan areas creates more incentive for parties to focus on get-out-the-vote activities. Prior to 2004, both parties subsidized flights for Dominicans in the US to go home to vote during elections. With diaspora participation in the 2004 elections and since, parties have mobilized their sections in major cities to bring Dominicans to consulates to register and to vote. There is some ambivalence as to the impact of the direct diaspora vote on elections in the Dominican Republic. Some party officials interviewed allowed that Dominican migrants don’t yet vote in the numbers necessary to swing elections, but expressed belief that they would one day. Eduardo Estrella, president of Dominicans for Change and former PRSC presidential candidate, said “At the moment, their vote doesn’t decide elections. But at some point, they could be the deciding vote.”
PLD youth director Jorge Feliz Pacheco said, “Votes [from abroad] don’t add up to much, it’s mostly a matter of perception.” With one exception: New York. “There are more voters in New York than in Santiago,” the second largest city in the Dominican Republic, Pacheco noted. “A candidate who doesn’t visit New York will lose all of their votes.”

Particularly after the 2004 elections which saw low turnout, sections have focused in large part on registering new voters, with the PLD’s efforts aided by their status as incumbent party for most of this period and control of the consulates and their JCE and OPREE offices. Section militants will accompany potential voters to consulates and help them get paperwork in order, and will also provide voters with transportation to consulates on election day. There is variance in the role of party sections in primary elections, however, as PRD (PRM) diaspora section members also vote in party primary elections to determine who will be the party’s candidates for the national assembly seats representing the diaspora.121 PLD section members in have input into the party’s candidate selection process, but follow the party leadership’s command. This distinction traces back to the PRD’s roots as a more ideologically self-identifying party, and is reflective of its ability to mobilize large numbers of its own militants for internal party activities.

**Fundraising**

Fundraising features more prominently in Dominican diaspora party activities, though this has waned over the decades compared to when the PRD (and, later PLD) was the opposition party-in-exile and reliant entirely on volunteer support. Under the current diaspora electoral regime, there are no restrictions to overseas campaigning nor to campaign finance for Dominican parties abroad; there are neither spending nor fundraising limits. Parties have no reporting

requirements to the elections board, and are partly privately financed, though they also receive public financing through the JCE. Thus it is impossible to measure the amount of funds raised by Dominican parties in the diaspora, but Graham 1997 estimates that approximately 15% of all funds raised by Dominican political parties are raised abroad (101).

One nonpartisan interviewee, Dr. Freddy Angel Castro of the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, noted that parties first began to raise large sums of money from abroad in the 1980s, when the first, post-1965 wave of migrants had been established long enough to start profitable businesses. Parties, he said, could raise between $30,000 to $50,000 in one US visit, in addition to in kind donations such as computers, fax machines, audio systems for campaigns, and even ambulances for home districts. Presidential campaigns today cost as much as 4 billion pesos ($85 million), and parties have historically turned to the diaspora, and especially party sections, to raise campaign cash. Some third party candidates interviewed accused the major parties of using the diaspora as a source of campaign financing but ignoring their demands. According to Fidel Santana, former presidential candidate of the Frente Amplio, “Traditional parties historically saw them as sources of money. Not us.”

However this motivation has become, according to interviewees, less central over time, both due to generational shifts within the Dominican diaspora and campaign finance law. Janet Camilo, Vice President of the PRD, noted “Before parties began to receive public financing in 1996, fundraising from sympathizers was the most important reason to go abroad. Now, the exterior is a source of votes, not [financial] resources.” As diaspora section activity has grown, the direction of money flows has reversed: diaspora sections are expected to raise their own money, but are dependent on the parties in the Dominican Republic for support. This was underscored when incumbent president Danilo Medina met with PLD section chiefs in New
York during a campaign visit there. News reports state that New York PLD leaders told Medina that they needed “hundreds of thousands of dollars to run a strong campaign and be able to win elections here.” They also demanded the party at home give more seats to PLD militants from the diaspora. Medina refused their requests, saying “There’s no money for you, look for dollars there, with your friends and business owners, and fundraise.”

He also rejected their requests to name more diaspora officials to party posts.

Diaspora fundraising thus increasingly covers diaspora activity as much if not more so than subsidizing domestic party activity. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Dominican parties incorporate fundraising into their diaspora activity to a much greater extent than Mexican parties, where it is officially banned, and Salvadoran parties, which report little fundraising apart from in-kind donations to cover candidate visits. Of the two parties, the PRD has a longer history of relying on its diaspora sections for financial support, but both parties engage in fundraising.

Visits

Campaign visits by Dominican candidates to cities in the U.S. are frequent and occur at all levels of office. Dominican presidential candidates have visited U.S. constituents in every election and their activities include rallies, dinners, meet-and-greets with diaspora business leaders, and baseball games (throwing out first pitches at games for New York teams is a ceremonial rite of passage for Dominican presidential candidates). Many Dominican politicians, such as Fernández, have spent significant time in the diaspora community, and parties draw candidates from the diaspora as well: as with the FMLN’s base committees, the development of future candidates is another focus of the PRD and PLD’s sections. One can observe, however, a

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divergence between the more community-focused events of the PRD/PRM candidate Luis Abinader and the more elite-level, official, and party insider-focused visits of PLD candidate and president Danilo Medina.

The May 2016 general election illustrates the range of activities candidates undertake on diaspora visits. Visits began early; ex-president Hipólito Mejía made a full east coast tour even before announcing his candidacy, visiting Miami, New York, New Jersey, and Boston in January 2015, before dropping out of the race and endorsing Luis Abinader.¹²３ Winner Danilo Medina, as incumbent president, had many opportunities to visit the diaspora in official duties, but also as a candidate, blurring the lines between the two in a September 2015 trip to New York coinciding with a campaign visit by his chief rival Abinader. Officially, Medina came to meet Pope Francis at the United Nations and give speeches there about gender equality and the UN’s Post 2015 Development Agenda. However the trip included community events with the New York Dominican diaspora.¹²４ These events were coordinated through either the Dominican consulate or the party (or through the PLD’s think tank, FUNGLODE); Medina attended a graduation ceremony in the Bronx, for a community education program run by the New York consulate, had a breakfast meeting at the New York section of the PLD’s office, and met with representatives of a New York Dominican business association and a taxicab association. Accompanying Medina was ex-president Fernández, who held a community meet-and-greet at New York City College and attended a basketball tournament organized by a Dominican athletics organization. Further blurring between government and party functions could be seen in the Medina campaign’s naming then-ambassador Tomás Pérez as campaign chair for the U.S. and Canada, and then-

consul general Eduardo Selman as coordinator for the states of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania.

Medina’s meeting with PLD section members in New York attracted an estimated 500 people and was contentious, with section members demanding resources and representation from the national party, threatening to dispute to the country’s electoral tribunal the PLD’s list of candidates for diaspora members of Congress. The Dominican press reported this meeting creating distress in the Medina campaign over losing the New York vote, which it did in the previous election. Medina followed up the September visit with an explicit campaign tour covering New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania in April 2016, just a month before the election. Medina met with PLD section leaders and business leaders, attended a private gala dinner, met with New York state senator Rubén Díaz and with the Organization of Hispanic Ministers of New York, and held an open community event at a school in Washington Heights. Medina’s diaspora visits continued after his reelection; the following October, he traveled to Boston to participate in the Boston Red Sox’s farewell game for Dominican David Ortiz, and also met with consulate officials and PLD section leaders to promote his administration’s social and educational programs.

Abinader, the main opposition candidate running with the breakaway PRD faction PRM, visited New York for two days at the end of September 2015, doing neighborhood canvasses in Washington Heights and on Junction Boulevard in Queens, participating in a teleconference with PRM overseas section members, joining a book fair and parade organized by a local school, and

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visiting the offices of the JCE there. He had private meetings at the homes of diaspora leaders, and presented certificates of thanks to section leaders at a gathering in New Jersey which included section delegates from Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Philadelphia, the Washington, D.C. area, Georgia, and Canada.\(^{128}\) He also held a community meet-and-greet at the Church of the Immaculate Conception in the Bronx.\(^{129}\) He was accompanied by PRM congressional candidates, party international and financial officers, and leaders of the PRM’s diaspora sections including coordinators of those sections’ communications, women’s, and religious committees. Abinader met with a members of a Dominican business association as well as the Dominican Association of Supermarket Owners.

Abinader made an east coast tour in March 2016, visiting Miami, Tampa, and Orlando, Boston and Lawrence, Massachusetts, and again New York and New Jersey. The Florida events included closed door meetings and dinners with section and business leaders and open door meetings with community members, as well as interviews with local Spanish language media. In New Jersey there was also a parade and rally at the party section office in Passaic.\(^{130}\)

Abinader’s diaspora support suffered a blow, however, after approximately 100 members of the PRM’s New York and Boston diaspora sections defected in support of Medina, joining the rump PRD which had done so previously. These section leaders, reforming a PRD faction called La Maquinaria and headed by an ex campaign coordinator for Hipólito Mejía in 2012, announced at a press conference held at a restaurant in upper Manhattan that they had were upset about being excluded from the new PRM’s leadership appointments, and complaining about


general mistreatment from the Abinader campaign team. This faction coordinated with Medina campaign to produce TV, social media and other digital ads along with flyers throughout New York. After losing in 2016, Abinader has been preparing for a second presidential bid in 2020. His party, the PRM, maintains a long term organization of support for his candidacy abroad, the Consejo de Campaña en Ultramar, which has both an overall diaspora and state-specific offices.

Local level candidates also make frequent visits to the diaspora. In 2016, René Polanco, the PLD candidate for mayor of North Santo Domingo visited New York, holding two events at South Beach restaurant in Washington Heights before a self-reported audience of several hundred Dominicans in New York. He spoke about municipal issues such as road improvement and building baseball fields. Like other candidates before him, Polanco “urged New York residents to contact their relatives and friends immediately through phone calls, email, facebook, and other means to tell them to vote Sunday the 15th for their friend and brother René, who knows the problems that affect their city.” He also exhorted the audiences to vote for his party’s candidate for president, Medina. Polanco was accompanied by a number of party officials including the PLD’s vice president and a member of its central committee, and was endorsed by local business owner Franklin Reyes.

Another visit by a PRM candidate for mayor of Tamboril, Francisco Álvarez in April 2016 involved similar activities. He held an open community meet-and-greet in New Jersey, followed by an event at a sports club in Haverstraw, Rockland County, which has a high concentration of Tamboril natives. He also visited the houses of those formed the PRM.

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coordinating committee for his visit. At these events, he was also accompanied by other party officials and a local business owner.  

From these visits, one can observe several common activities: an emphasis on events targeting party militants and the broader diaspora community, the former in private areas such as homes and restaurants, the latter in larger community centers such as churches and recreation centers. The coordination between diaspora sections and the party is also apparent in the entourage accompanying the candidate, made up often of other politicians from home and members of the local sections.

The endorsement of local business owners is also critical, as candidates are often flanked by a prominent business owner who can vouch for them to the community. These endorsements are highly prized by candidates; in 2016, an association of Dominican taxicab drivers endorsed Medina, and announced their support at a restaurant in Brooklyn, promising that the taxi drivers would deliver a “multiplier effect” in the diaspora vote by using cab rides to proselytize for Medina to Dominican passengers. U.S.-based Dominican business associations, and especially taxi associations, take out ads in Dominican newspapers announcing their support for particular candidates during elections. Of the two candidates, Medina had the advantage in attracting both business endorsements and breakaway factions of the rival campaign, aided by clientelist practices which help the PLD catch up to the PRD’s more established diaspora network.

Clientelism

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The fact that the diaspora electorate voted against the ruling PLD in 2012, and for it but in much lower numbers in 2016, might suggest voters abroad are somewhat insulated from the clientelistic practices which typify elections in the Dominican Republic: most notably the offer of public sector jobs (often no show jobs, called *botellas* – empty bottles – in Dominican political slang) in exchange for votes. Nevertheless, interview subjects maintained that clientelist practices do occur abroad, targeted at elite diaspora community leaders believed by parties to have sway over diaspora voters, with the offer of both state jobs for themselves in cities such as New York, and for family members in the Dominican Republic.\(^\text{135}\) And in other countries, particularly the U.S., Dominican consulates and other overseas state offices (including those promoting tourism and foreign investment, and the JCE itself) are prime sources of *botellas* offered to diaspora Dominicans who support the ruling party during elections: the Dominican Republic maintains more consular offices throughout the world than much larger countries including Mexico, Brazil, and India.\(^\text{136}\)

Like the JCE, the Dominican Ministry of Foreign Affairs is highly dependent on political parties, with the vast majority of foreign affairs jobs being political appointees which change with each administration.\(^\text{137}\) Thus the ministry’s payroll is a prime site of patronage; its building was referred to by one interview subject as “the bottle container” for its reputation for a plethora of no show patronage jobs.\(^\text{138}\) This carries over to the reputation of consulates as bottle containers as well.

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\(^{135}\) Interview with Minou Tavárez Mirabal, September 2013  
\(^{136}\) Interview with Pedro Catrain, September 2013  
\(^{137}\) Interview with Dr. Freddy Angel Castro, Vice Dean, Autonomous University of Santo Domingo, September 2013  
\(^{138}\) Interview with Kelvin Martir Cuevas, October 2013
One campaign strategist for the PRD, the director of the party’s overseas commission for Hipólito Mejía’s 2012 campaign claimed that the payroll of the Dominican consulate in New York is larger than those of all Dominican embassies and consulates in Latin America, combined. He claimed also that the vast majority of those on payroll do not actually work at the consulate. He also said that his career ambition, and that of other campaign staffers who work for political candidates, was to be named to a diplomatic post. Alfonso Ureña, a campaign director for Danilo Medina, confirmed the use of diplomatic missions as patronage, saying that after an election, “party militants are named to political posts; overseas, the only such posts are embassies and consulates.” Marcos Villaman, director of the PLD-affiliated think tank FUNGLODE, said “The state is the first source of employment. Second is informality, and third is the private sector. Dominicans in the US as well as the DR need jobs, and they look for the right candidate to help them.” As the party in power for most of the contemporary era, the PLD has had far more access to government jobs to be used for patronage, and from interviews, appears to use the distribution of such jobs to prominent community leaders as a cornerstone of its diaspora outreach strategy.

Consular services

A unique form of diaspora outreach reported by Dominican parties is direct assistance for migrants to access services at Dominican consulates. Consulates have a reputation for partisan bias and poor constituent services. Notably, Dominican consular offices raise large portions of their own budgets through services such as the transportation of commercial goods and repatriation of bodies of deceased Dominican citizens to the DR. Consulates charge registration fees to diaspora businesses to export goods from the US to the DR—particularly automobiles, a

139 Interview with Kelvin Martir Cuevas, October 2013
major source of consulate income. Income raised through these activities remains in the consulate and is spent at the pleasure of the consul general. This discretionary income is widely regarded as a slush fund for political allies and additional resource for patronage and clientelism (Vega 2002). In one instance, the Dominican consulate in Philadelphia was closed by the Foreign Ministry after it determined accusations of partisan-motivated voter registration fraud was being carried out by the JCE office in that consulate, and the U.S. government has successfully petitioned to have consul generals recalled in three Dominican consulates (in San Juan, Miami, and New York) for naming U.S. citizens who already resided in those cities to those posts, presumably as political favors to connected diaspora community leaders, prohibited under international law.

Interview subjects Janet Camilo, Modesto Reynoso, and Feliz Pacheco reported high costs charged by consulates for services as a major complaint among migrants. Party sections help migrants navigate this system when migrants seek to use these services. This is especially the case for the transfer or personal property as well as cadavers for burial in the Dominican Republic, which many interview subjects across parties brought up. Pacheco, director of the PLD’s youth wing, said the most common complaint from abroad are the high car importation fees consulates charge. According to the PRD’s Camilo, often migrants distrust the consulate staff and find the process bewildering, and particularly if they are party militants (particularly of a non-incumbent party), will trust their party sections more to guide them through consular processes. This is evidence of parties taking on duties normally reserved for government offices, reflecting as well the strong role of the parties (and weak role of the state bureaucracy, unlike in Mexico) in designing the diaspora electoral regime. Of the two parties, the PRD appears to stress

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140 Interview with José Morel, October 2013
its role in aiding constituents with consular services more, being in the opposition and attracting more people suspicious of the incumbent party’s control of the diplomatic apparatus.

The range of diaspora activities taken on by the PLD and PRD (and, in 2016, its successor, the PRM) are the consequence of the uniquely unskewed nature of the Dominican diaspora and those parties’ deep diaspora infrastructure. The lack of partisan skew means that no party can write off the diaspora, and must compete for its support using every means available, including patronage. It also creates the permissive conditions allowing parties to undertake any activities without state restriction or reporting requirements, and be confident of a more direct payoff in terms of a sizeable vote in major metropolitan areas, principally New York.

The parties’ deep infrastructure makes this range of activities possible. Party sections turn out voters, assist them in registering and in non-electoral services as well such as simply navigating Dominican consular services. They host candidate visits and turn out large audiences to greet them. They also press candidates and their own parties for greater voice and representation, and threaten to defect if they don’t, and occasionally do. The differences observed in diaspora outreach between the two parties is more a matter of degree, with the PRD engaging in somewhat more traditional mass base outreach, and the PLD engaging more in clientelist behavior, though the PRD and its breakaway faction are quick to adopt such tactics when they hold office, according to interviews. The power of diaspora party sections to make demands underscores to parties the importance of catering to their diaspora base given the knowledge that diaspora voters are less beholden to any single party.

**Alternate explanations**

Due to the strong personalities of individual candidates, and the way in which the Dominican diaspora is integrated into Dominican politics to a degree unseen in El Salvador or in
Mexico, the Dominican Republic comes closest to the alternate explanations for diaspora outreach set forth in chapter 1. Specifically, there is some evidence to suggest that neither parties nor the diaspora matter as much as in Mexico or in El Salvador: perhaps that Dominican candidates, rather than parties, determine diaspora outreach strategy and tactics, and that the Dominican diaspora has no special profile apart from that of the Dominican electorate as a whole.

Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to conclude either the non-primacy of parties nor the unimportance of the diaspora as such. Parties, not candidates, set the terms of overall diaspora outreach. And while acting formally as an extension of the Dominican domestic electorate in many ways, the Dominican diaspora has a unique profile to which parties attempt to specially cater, including with clientelistic tactics.

The primacy of parties is apparent in the functioning of party sections abroad. They provide candidates with a valuable network to utilize: this fact is underscored by the Abinader campaign in 2016, which created a new party out of an intra-party dispute within the PRD. Normally a party running a first time election would have no network to draw on, but Abinader and the PRM was able to draw away certain factions of the PRD’s extensive section network. Nevertheless, certain ex-PRD sections chose to join Medina’s campaign. During the same election, PLM section leaders clashed with Medina and made demands of him during a meeting, pointing to the independence and authority party sections feel they have over candidates: they are not simply support vehicles for whichever candidate visits, but must be won over.

Party sections additionally perform officials functions such as helping voters with consular services, while diplomatic officials up to serving ambassadors are called upon to carry out explicitly partisan functions, serving as campaign coordinators during elections.
Additionally, consulates are at the center of clientelist practices, used by parties as a reward of no-show jobs to prominent diaspora supporters. The blurring of partisan and official duties, with the party in the dominant role, further underscores the degree to which parties shape campaign strategy.

The uniqueness of the diaspora as an electorate is less clear for Dominican parties compared to Salvadoran and Mexican parties, as the Dominican electorate votes in greater numbers and is to some degree a source of funds, as with the domestic electorate. Nevertheless, there is ambivalence about the extent of the diaspora’s impact by direct vote, with several interviewees asserting that the diaspora’s vote may only become impactful in the future. The importance of New York is clear in terms of size, and no candidate can afford not to visit. However this appears to be a threat more than an opportunity: according to a PLD official, any candidate who does not visit will certainly lose the New York vote, but it is unlikely any candidate will win all of it, given the lack of a partisan skew.

Many party officials interviewed suggested that the Dominican voter profile used to be more unique than it is now, during the Balaguer era, while emphasizing that Dominican diaspora voters were not beholden to any party. “Before, in the 60s, they were different from voters back home,” said ex-PLD and 2016 third party presidential candidate Minou Tavárez Mirabal, referencing the Trujillo era during which migration which was more politically motivated. “Now their votes reflect the vote in the DR.” This last statement is not, in fact, true, as vote results in the previous section show. However there is an attitude, voiced by PLD officials (or, in the case of Tavárez, ex-PLD) that the diaspora used to be more ideologically motivated, being centered around certain political exiles, and the PRD reaped dividends from this constituent base;
however as memories of the Balaguer era fade, the PLD has erased that advantage through aggressive diaspora outreach and being pro-diaspora enfranchisement.

Speeches by visiting candidates usually appeal to diaspora voters as a unique constituency using specific language about family and remittances. The comments of PRM congressional candidate for Santiago province, Ulises Rodríguez, during a visit to New York in April 2016, are typical, saying “It’s time that we recognize the role that Dominicans abroad play…and listen to them…we need to recognize the great support they give to the country. They help to stabilize the national economy.”

Conclusions

The two major parties in the Dominican Republic, the PLD and the PRD (and, if the breakaway faction replaces it, the PRM), are more similar in diaspora outreach activities than parties in Mexico and El Salvador, where the diaspora has a clear partisan skew. This lack of a skew in the Dominican diaspora creates the both the party incentives and the legal electoral framework for an open, freewheeling, and contentious diaspora politics. Additionally, both parties’ shared origins in exile during the Balaguer era, having developed a deep diaspora infrastructure over the decades, translates those incentives and lack of restrictions into a high degree of diaspora party activity, run principally through both parties’ networks of sections. Diaspora outreach happens at every level of office, from president to mayor, targets elites but has a strong grassroots component, and encompasses candidate visits but also elements not seen as much by Salvadoran and Mexican parties such as fundraising, seeking endorsements of local business associations, and clientelism.

141 “Candidato a Diputado del PRM por Santiago visita New York. Youtube 4 April 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OyiYm6M6FYw
The difference between the two parties is a matter of scope and history. The PRD, as the older party, has the larger diaspora network of dozens of sections with self-reported membership numbering in the tens of thousands. Historically, it has appealed to older diaspora Dominicans on an ideological level and citing an anti-authoritarian legacy. With the passing of the PRD’s charismatic historical leaders like Peña Gómez, as well as both parties’ Juan Bosch, and the party’s evolution away from left-wing politics, the PRD is no longer able to count on its *voto duro* of older ideological diaspora militants. Instead, it has been moving closer to the PLD both in platform and use of clientelism and is increasingly indistinguishable from its rival, which made it easier for the PLD to buy off a large part of the party to support Medina in 2016.

The PLD, as a relative upstart but one which has dominated Dominican politics in the current era, has by now built a smaller but well functioning network of sections and is able to mobilize its diaspora network effectively for candidate visits, rallies, and voter turnout. The lack of a partisan skew, particularly for the post-60s generations of migrants, gave the smaller and less established party the opportunity to grow largely through the distribution of patronage, which compounded the party’s advantage the longer it remained in office and has controlled the government apparatus that serves as its clientelist vehicle. Nevertheless, the PLD cannot count on diaspora support. Election results show it is much more precarious in the diaspora than at home. And the willingness of diaspora sections to make demands of the party and its candidates shows the strength of the diaspora, which sees itself as a valid and independent player in Dominican politics.
Chapter 5. What is Diaspora Influence? Evidence from Polling

A separate set of questions comes up related to party activities which seek to leverage diaspora influence over home country voters: does this influence exist? And if so, what kind of behaviors do migrants really influence, or seek to? Interviews with party elites in El Salvador, Mexico and the Dominican Republic point to a near-universal belief among politicians in migrant-sending countries that migrants wield considerable sway in their home countries and their families. This assumption motivates the very undertaking of diaspora outreach by parties, who are convinced they can win votes at home indirectly by campaigning among relatives abroad. In politics, perception is everything, and as the previous chapters have shown, mere belief in this dynamic is sufficient to motivate parties to embark on costly diaspora campaign activity: undertaking international travel, organizing rallies, taking out ads, and paying staff. But just as skeptical media question the wisdom of governments spending so much on diaspora enfranchisement for so few votes, parties may ask themselves the same thing: is the payoff likely to be worth it?

Party officials interviewed in El Salvador, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic were all asked why their party engages in diaspora campaigning, especially considering the number of votes from the diaspora electorate is extremely low. Of the 45 party officials interviewed, 44 independently stated it was due to family influence, and added that migrants buy this influence with the remittances they send home.142 When pressed for evidence however, whether from party research or independent polling, that such influence exists, or of its magnitude, none could cite any existing study, only affirming this belief as a matter of faith.

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142 The one official who offered a differing opinion, Oscar Santamaria, director of foreign relations for El Salvador’s ARENA, suggested campaign contributions as the chief reason for diaspora outreach, but also stated his belief that family influence is a key motivation.
Thus it would be of interest to such parties if this perception is grounded in reality – or if, on the other hand, such activity is a waste of time and money for them (and, in countries with public financing of parties, taxpayers). This question dovetails with ongoing debates within those countries’ media over the value of extending voting rights to diaspora citizens at all, given the cost of registering voters, and mailing ballots or setting up voting centers abroad, and the low rates of participation among diaspora voters.

There are alternative narratives to the one presented by party officials: either that migrants, having left their home countries and become more integrated with politics in the receiving country, lose interest in home country politics, and neither participate in, pay attention to, nor seek to influence the political behaviors of their home country relatives. Should this scenario hold true, migrants should show relative disinterest and disengagement in home country politics, and make little attempt to influence the political behaviors of their relatives. A second scenario is that, though migrants do seek to influence their relatives, this influence is ineffectual, as relatives discount the advice of those who left the country and no longer deal with the day to day effects of home country politics. Should this be the case, voting-age citizens in home countries who have migrant relatives should show no more inclination to certain forms of political engagement than home country citizens without migrant relatives.

This chapter tests this set of underlying assumptions by parties motivating their diaspora campaign activities: first, that migrants seek to influence the votes of their home country relatives; second, that they believe that this influence exists; and third, if this influence does exist and over what areas of political behavior. The first two questions, from the perspective of migrants, are tested with an original survey of Dominican migrants in New York City ahead of the 2016 Dominican presidential election. I hypothesize that Dominican migrants are engaged in
home country politics, do seek to influence the votes of their relatives in the Dominican Republic, and that they believe they have such influence.

For the third, I hypothesize that migrants do indeed have some influence over the preferences and behaviors of family members at home. However this influence may affect some political activities more than others: because, as Mexican Congressman Agustin Barrios Gomez stated, “families vote in blocs,” because diasporas frequently skew toward or away from one party, and because there is usually a common party sympathy shared among family members that predates migration, this influence may not manifest itself in basic questions over whether and for whom to vote. Thus migrants are less likely to have much effect on basic behavior such as voting, but have more effect on higher-level behaviors typical of party militants.

I conduct a series of multi-level tests using a dataset created from polling data supplemented with country-specific socioeconomic data in order to control for both individual and country-level variables. These models test whether both basic (such as registering to vote and voting) and higher-level political behaviors (such as being active in a political party and proselytizing for candidates) vary based on if respondents report communicating with a close family member residing outside the country. The results indicate that Latin American migrants in the U.S. do in fact have positive and significant influence over the political behaviors of their relatives in their home countries – however primarily to higher level partisan political activity typified by party militants. Further, migrants do not simply buy this influence through their remittances, as remittances are not conditioned on votes. Rather, it is communication with relatives in the diaspora that exerts an influence over family political behavior, even in the absence of remittances.
As a whole, the results of these two sets of tests suggests parties are only partly correct in their assessment of diaspora influence. Migrants – particularly those who participate in home country elections directly – do seek to influence their relatives at home, but are dubious as to whether they wield much influence at all. And diaspora influence is real, however it does not appear to affect voting behavior, but rather other forms of more militant partisan behavior. This suggests diaspora campaigning has an impact, but an even more indirect one than parties imagine, likely by reinforcing existing partisan sympathies within families rather than winning new votes, and motivating those who are already predisposed to partisan activity.

**How does diaspora influence work?**

In American politics, there is a longstanding literature on family (and other peer group) influence on voters’ political behavior (McClosky and Dahlgren 1959), which finds family ties and communication important both in terms of political socialization (Davies 1965, Langston 1967, Niemi and Sobieszek 1977) and persuasion (Huckfeldt 1995, Chong 2000).

As party officials affirm, families frequently vote in blocs, and the identity of the decider of family votes, if one exists, would be of crucial interest to parties. Should parties presume a traditionally patriarchal model of voting, they are likely to assume the family’s chief breadwinner has a strong influence of the votes of other family members. This model could extend to the diaspora, including to cases in which the breadwinner no longer lives within the household or indeed the same country, but on whose monetary support the family is reliant.

The importance of interpersonal networks and family ties in influencing voter behavior has long been observed by behavioral American political scientists (Lazarsfeld et al 1948, Glaser 1959, McClosky and Dahlgren 1959, Campbell et al 1960). Apart from socialization of political values through parentage (Niemi and Sobieszek 1977), voter behavior is continually shaped by
personal networks in adulthood, of which family networks are typically the most influential. Campbell and other early behavioralists theorized that personal and familial linkages work as a self-reinforcing mechanism to cause party identification to grow stronger with age. Personal networks tend to produce a homogenizing effect on overall political behavior – people who interact regularly tend to vote the same way – but in so doing, can change voter behavior as well: according to Lazarsfeld, “personal influence, with all its overtones of personal affection and loyalty, can bring to the polls votes that would otherwise not be cast or would be cast for the opposing party” (157). More recent scholarship has examined a cascading effect of personal influence on voter turnout for successive members of an individual’s personal network (Fowler, in Zuckerman 2005).

The classic model of interpersonal influence is Lazarsfeld’s two-step flow hypothesis explaining an apparent disconnect in media influence over voters. Through a series of panel surveys, Lazarsfeld et al found that ideas are disseminated to the general public in an indirect manner: from media first to opinion leaders, and then from those leaders to the “less active segments of the population.” Leaders within these personal networks – most directly those made up of friends and family members – thus play an elite mediating role for those more passive members within their networks. The theory raises the question as to who counts as an opinion leader, which is generally understood to be distinguished from the general population either by their higher social status (itself a combination of class, “life cycle” maturity, and sociability), greater interest in politics, or both (Robinson 1976). Such leaders, it has been found (and confirmed by several subsequent surveys) tend to be more socially active and at the center of their personal networks, better informed, recognized as experts by other network members, and self-aware of their influential status.
Insofar as diasporas are perceived by parties to fulfill this role, they would be expected to attract special attention from parties who wish to court their indirect influence over other voters apart from their direct votes or monetary donations. In order to play such a role, such actors would similarly have to play an active and central role in transnational personal networks with family members and friends in their countries of origin, continue to be politically informed, and command respect from others within their network for their expertise and social status. Winning their support would thus be seen as politically advantageous by parties and thus motivate parties’ diaspora outreach.

Parties thus campaign in the diaspora in order to take advantage of these transnational personal networks, targeting the agents of influence, the migrant, based largely on the perception that sending remittances awards the migrant with head of household status, conferring on the migrant the ability to decide how the family as a whole will vote. The assumptions underlying this belief, and motivating diaspora campaigning by parties, can be tested against the alternatives that, first, migrants do not seek to influence, or believe they can influence, their home country relatives, and second, that even if they do, that this influence is ineffective in changing their relatives’ voting or other political behaviors.

**Do migrants seek to influence relatives? Evidence from a survey of diaspora Dominicans**

The first assumption behind the family influence motivation for diaspora campaigning is that migrants believe they have such influence over their relatives, and seek to use it. Parties believe that migrants whom they win over through diaspora outreach will call their relatives in the home country and tell them to vote for the party they support. This may not be true: whether because such influence is ineffective, as the next section will test, or whether such migrants do not seek to deploy this influence at all.
The following section details the findings of a survey conducted to measure Dominican diaspora attitudes regarding transnational electoral participation, in order to test the presumption of migrants’ motivations to influence relatives’ voting behavior. I designed a web-based anonymous survey aimed at voting-age Dominican citizens residing in the New York City metropolitan area, which represents the largest concentration of the Dominican diaspora in the world, and administered it at the time of the May 2016 Dominican presidential elections. The survey used the online platform SurveyGizmo.com, and consisted of 37 questions, with respondents given the option of completing the survey in English or in Spanish. Questions focused on measures of electoral participation (if the respondent registered to vote, if s/he voted in the 2016 or previous elections, if s/he was exposed to Dominican political propaganda or attended rallies, and party/candidate preference), how rooted respondents are in the U.S. and the Dominican Republic (if s/he plans, or previously planned to return to the Dominican Republic, how often s/he travels to the Dominican Republic, if s/he has family in the Dominican Republic), communication (how frequently respondents speak to their family members and about what, including U.S. politics, Dominican politics, or sports), remittances (how often, and how much the respondent sends home), and influence (if respondents encourage family members to vote, or to vote for a favored candidate, and if they believe they have influence over relatives’ voting preferences), as well as standard control questions (age, sex, education, income). The survey asked whether prospective survey participants were Dominican citizens, and automatically disqualified those who were not citizens of voting age (18 or older).

Participants were solicited using three methods: email, text messages, and social media. Email addresses and phone numbers were obtained through partnership with Dominicanos USA, the largest Dominican American community organization in the New York City area.
Dominicanos USA shared a database of individuals contacted in past get-out-the-vote campaigns for New York elections. From this database, I sent invitations to take the online survey to 5,481 emails on May 10 and June 7, 2016, and to 4,829 cell phone numbers on June 11 and June 22, 2016. Click through rates for the email invitations was 8% and 4%, respectively, and 4% for both text message invitations. Additionally, I took out a Facebook ad soliciting survey takers which ran from June 14 to June 29, 2016, targeted at New York City zip codes with the highest concentrations of Dominican residents. The survey incentivized participation by including a prize of one $100 Visa gift card, with the winner chosen at random from among respondents who chose to provide email addresses.

Respondents were asked a series of questions related to their level of transnational political engagement in the 2016 and previous elections, attitudes toward Dominican parties and politics, migration history and remittances, and degree and type of communication with friends and family in the Dominican Republic. Number of responses varied by question, as survey participants had the option not to answer any question and to end the survey at any moment, but responses ranged from 106 to 254, with most questions receiving around 200 responses.

Questions for key dependent and independent variables of interest are as follows:

**Table 12. Response Count for Key Dependent Variables**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you try to convince your relatives in the DR to vote?</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe you have influence over whether your relatives in the DR vote?</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you try to convince your relatives in the DR to support the candidates you support?</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe you have influence over who your relatives in the DR vote for?</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

143 Survey ads targeted zip codes representing top Dominican neighborhoods in Manhattan: Washington Heights (10032 and 10033), Hamilton Heights (10031), Inwood (10034 and 10040); the Bronx: Highbridge (10452 and 10456), Crotona (10457), Mt. Hope/Morris Heights (10453) Fordham Heights/University Heights (10468); Brooklyn: East New York/Highland Park (11208), Sunset Park (11220 and 11232), Bushwick (11206 and 11237), Bedford-Stuyvesant (11221); and Queens: Corona (11368), Jackson Heights (11372).
Responses to control questions indicate the survey was roughly balanced by gender (50.4% women), age, income (median income between $25,000 - $50,000), and civil status (50% married). Additional questions regarded presence of family members back home, travel to and communication with the DR, participation in past elections, exposure to diaspora campaign events (attending party rallies, seeing a visiting candidate, receiving or seeing electoral propaganda), and which 2016 candidate they supported. The last question shows that politically, the sample had a lower rate of support for winner Danilo Medina, and a higher rate of support for closest challenger Luis Abinader, than the diaspora electorate as a whole; however, the preference for Abinader among survey participants does reflect the diaspora electorate’s relative lack of support for Medina compared to the Dominican electorate as a whole. An additional question asked participants which party they generally support; a slight plurality reported supporting the PLD, though nearly as many supported no party at all. Notably, the PRD had just 11% support, less than third party APD. This may superficially give credence to interview subjects’ claims that the PRD has been losing diaspora support to the PLD in recent years, although this lack of support may reflect the PRD’s split and marginalization in the 2016 election, and with a low response rate, the sample is less than likely to be very representative.

Table 14. Which Candidate Do You Support in the 2016 Election?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danilo Medina</td>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luis Abinader</td>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>32.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guillermo Moreno</td>
<td>ALPAIS</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minou Tavárez Mirabal</td>
<td>APD</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Which Party Do You Generally Support?

N = 130

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PLD</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNP</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the key dependent variables of interest, questions regarding family communication and influence survey show participants are in close contact with family members in the Dominican Republic but have mixed ideas of the influence they have. Only 6 out of 232 respondents reported having no close family members in the DR: 120 reported having siblings, 77 parents, 47 children, and 19 spouses still in the DR, with the remainder reporting “other family.” Nearly half of all participants (93 of 199) reported talking to family members in the DR every day, and an additional 30% reported talking every week. In order to measure political vs. other kinds of communication, survey participants were asked how often they talk to family members about Dominican politics, US politics, and sports. Three-quarters of participants reported speaking about Dominican politics at some point with relatives, just under two-thirds reported speaking about US politics, and just over half reported speaking about sports.
Participants were also asked about frequency of travel to the DR; the median number of times in the past year participants reported traveling to the DR was 3, and in the past five years, 8.

**Table 16. Frequency of Family Communication and Subject Matter**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Talk to relatives</th>
<th>Talk about DR politics</th>
<th>Talk about US politics</th>
<th>Talk about sports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>46.7%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>30.8%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>41.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to measure perceptions of influence, participants were asked if they try to convince family members in the DR to vote and for whom, and if they believe they influence whether and for whom their relatives vote. A declining number of participants responded affirmatively to these questions in this order, with more participants responding that they attempt to influence their relatives’ behavior than reporting confidence that they actually have this influence. An additional question asked participants if their relatives in the DR share the same political views that they do, and 58% responded that they do.

**Table 17. Efforts and Perception of Influence Over Relatives in the DR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you…</th>
<th>Percentage responding Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Try to convince your relatives to vote?</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Try to convince your relatives to vote for a specific candidate?</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe you have influence over whether your relatives vote?</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Believe you have influence over for whom your relatives vote?</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent variables of interest include tenure in the US, remittances, and electoral participation. The median number of years participants reported having lived in the US was 23.
A majority (57%) reported that they planned to move back to the DR eventually, though those responding affirmatively to if they planned to move back when they arrived (81%) was higher.

Notable for parties’ belief in the importance of remittances in reinforcing influence, participants reported high rates of remittance sending: 92% of participants reported having sent back some money at least once in the past year. Most frequently, participants reported sending remittances monthly, also the median response, though some sent money back as often as twice a week. The median amount of money sent back in the last year was between $750 to $1,000, though the most frequent amount was between $2,000 and $3,000, and many reported sending back more than $5,000. In order to see if migrants might be consciously be using remittances as a way to influence votes at home, participants were asked as well if they send more in remittances close to elections; 34% of participants said that they did.

In terms of electoral participation, 58.9% of respondents said they planned to vote in the 2016 election (or had voted, for those who took the survey after May 15). Participants were asked what kinds of diaspora campaign tactics they had witnessed both in the 2016 election and in past elections. The most common means of diaspora voter outreach by Dominican parties was television ads, followed by newspaper ads. Roughly one in five reported having attended a rally or other campaign event for a Dominican candidate visiting New York.

Table 18. Exposure to Diaspora Campaign Tactics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2016 election</th>
<th>Previous elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Received campaign propaganda by mail</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw campaign ad on TV</td>
<td>57.8%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saw campaign ad in newspaper</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate visited home or workplace</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended a rally of a visiting candidate</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Causal relationships between variables are difficult to determine due to the low response rate; most questions have around 200 responses, and many have fewer than 150. Nevertheless, I ran four logistic regression models to determine the best predictors as to whether or not a diaspora Dominican would try to influence the vote of a relative in the DR, or believe that s/he has such influence. Independent variables of interest were the number of years s/he had lived in the U.S., frequency of sending remittances, and whether s/he reported planning to vote (or had already voted) in the 2016 election. Given responses from interviews with party officials, a likely hypothesis is that migrants who send remittances back will expect to have influence over family members. It could also be hypothesized that those who have been in the U.S. longer would have fewer ties and thus less influence, and that electoral participation on the part of the diaspora voter would motivate greater interest in the votes of relatives. Standard SES variables are included in the models as controls.
Table 19. Logistic Regressions of Influence over Relatives’ Voting Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Try to convince relative to vote</th>
<th>Try to convince relative to vote for candidate</th>
<th>Believe have influence whether relative votes</th>
<th>Believe have influence whether relative votes for candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years in US</td>
<td>-0.021 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.009 (0.010)</td>
<td>-0.022* (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.012 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>0.026 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.020 (0.019)</td>
<td>0.005 (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in 2016</td>
<td>1.122** (0.342)</td>
<td>0.703** (0.323)</td>
<td>1.053** (0.345)</td>
<td>1.164** (0.368)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.030* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.016 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.646 (0.357)</td>
<td>-0.074 (0.323)</td>
<td>-0.535 (0.333)</td>
<td>-0.544 (0.348)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.029 (0.174)</td>
<td>-0.023 (0.016)</td>
<td>-0.110 (0.165)</td>
<td>-0.240 (0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.045 (0.114)</td>
<td>0.084 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.090 (0.114)</td>
<td>0.093 (0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.052 (0.742)</td>
<td>-0.359 (0.689)</td>
<td>0.171 (0.716)</td>
<td>-0.052 (0.740)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 186 184 187 184

* p ≤ 0.05  **p ≤ 0.01  ***p ≤ 0.001

Unsurprisingly, with an N smaller than 200, very few covariates across the four models had any degree of statistical significance. The only variable that was consistently significant was whether the survey participant voted in the 2016 election: if so, the participant was more likely to both try to convince his or her relatives to vote and vote for his or her favored candidate, and more likely to believe s/he can influence those relatives’ voting behavior. Frequency of remittances was insignificant in all four models, casting doubt on the assertion by party officials that migrants (think they can) buy votes with their remittances. Years spent in the U.S. had a negative predictive effect on diaspora influence, significantly in at least one model, if the participant believes s/he can influence whether his or her relative votes or not, which lends some
credence to the scenario that migrants lose influence and interest the longer they have been living outside of the home country.

In sum, the survey results point to uncertainty on the part of diaspora Dominicans as to whether they really wield influence over relatives’ voting behavior, though many try, and nearly all maintain close ties to the homeland, with frequent visits and communication (including about Dominican politics). Nearly all have close relatives still living in the DR, most plan to return someday, and most at least self report participating in transnational politics, whether by voting or being exposed to, or taking part in, diaspora campaign activities. Given the low response rate, a larger survey, likely involving in person canvassing and/or phone interviews, would have to be administered before more robust relationships could be drawn.

*Analysis: Participation, intention, but mixed expectations by migrants*

Dominican party officials, like their Salvadoran and Mexican counterparts, uniformly stated their motivations for campaigning in the diaspora to be to leverage diaspora family influence over the voting decisions of their relatives in the DR. The underlying assumptions to this belief that this survey seeks to test is that, first, diaspora Dominicans seek to influence the votes of their relatives and, second, that they believe they have such influence at all.

Additionally, the survey finds broad participation in diaspora campaign activities by New York Dominicans. Party officials are thus acting on their belief by engaging with the diaspora, and this engagement is largely successful in terms of reaching diaspora Dominicans, whether through rallies, community and workplace visits, or (most visibly) campaign ads. New York Dominicans are, based on the survey, for the most part exposed to the Dominican parties’ outreach efforts to them, and they display a high degree of interest in Dominican politics. They also speak to their relatives in the DR, including about Dominican politics, on a regular basis, all
confirmations of the strategies of Dominican parties seeking to leverage this interest and communication into votes at home.

A key presumption by parties, however, does not entirely hold. In addition to being exposed to party activity, interested in Dominican politics, and communicating about the subject with relatives at home, migrants should also believe they can influence the votes of those relatives and seek to do so. The last part of this narrative is less certain. A majority of respondents in this survey do report encouraging family members to vote. But a minority report encouraging them to vote for a particular candidate, and fewer still believe their voice carries any weight either way. The only factor found to have a consistently positive effect on belief and intention of family influence is the migrant’s own political participation: migrants who vote themselves in Dominican elections are more likely to seek to influence the votes of their relatives.

The alternative to the party officials’ scenario, that diaspora influence is a mirage, that by virtue of living outside of the home country, migrants either lose interest in home country politics or clout over their relatives’ political decisions, cannot be completely dismissed, as illustrated by the negative and significant effect of years living in the U.S. on perceptions of influence in one model. The idea of migrants losing interest in home country politics does not appear to be true: respondents report maintaining interest in Dominican politics, and communicating that interest with relatives, by a wide margin. The idea of migrants losing clout, however, is more probable, at least more probable than party officials are willing to consider. From migrants’ perspectives at least, their sway over the votes of their relatives is limited, though not due to any apathy on the part of migrants.
Thus the survey suggests Dominican party officials are half right: they are correct to observe that Dominican migrants maintain close ties to the homeland, communicate regularly with relatives, pay attention to Dominican politics, and nearly universally send remittances to those relatives. Many of them report trying to influence the voting behavior of their relatives, and some even appear to consciously use remittances to buy influence. Nevertheless, diaspora Dominicans are uncertain about the actual degree of this influence, and statistical models with a limited sample show little that can predict attitudes and intentions of influence, except in showing that diaspora Dominicans who are themselves politically active are more likely to intend to influence the voting behavior of their relatives. More survey work of diaspora communities, specifically on political transnationalism, is needed to draw more causal connections.

**What kinds of behaviors does the diaspora influence?**

A second question is best answered from the perspective of family members of migrants: what is the actual effect of diaspora influence on home country relatives’ political behavior? Migration scholarship has largely framed diaspora politics as the politics of migration, and the legal norms, policy restrictions, and constitutional rights that arise in response to migration, mostly but not exclusively in receiving countries: a question of political integration into the receiving country’s polity rather than transnational political activity (Martiniello and Lafleur 2008). As the scholarship has evolved in a more transnational direction, reflecting greater migrant agency in defining their own political identities without regard to national borders, research has examined the development of those identities (Lyons and Mandaville 2010, Boccagni 2014) and the political spaces in which they are exercised (Koopmans and Stathman 2001, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Newland 2010).

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However, the actual impact of migrants on the politics of their home countries remains, as Boccagni et al 2015 note, “understudied.” Existing scholarship on transnational politics from the perspective of sending countries has focused in large part on sending country governments, both the extension of voting and other legal rights (Guarnizo et al 2003), or in the case of authoritarian governments with hostile diasporas, efforts to neutralize their influence (Collyer 2014). Yet aside from official state responses to large-scale migration, and the transnational identities and political activities that accompany it, the impact of diasporas can be felt at a more basic level, that of the political preferences and behaviors of citizens in sending countries – which is, after all, the primary motivating factor behind transnational campaigning by sending country parties.

It is understandable that diaspora political impact on the grassroots level remains understudied, given that that migrants from most major migrant-sending countries in Latin America did not, until recently, have external voting rights, and even in those that do, voter turnout has been exceedingly low. Within sending states, there is evidence of relatively greater impacts on the local level by both migrants (Adida and Girod 2010) and family members (Goodman and Hiskey 2008, Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2009) that contrast with low levels of participation in official state channels, suggesting direct voting paints an incomplete picture of the impact migration may have on sending country politics.

This section considers the impact of the diaspora on electoral politics in sending countries through the political activities of those family members migrants “left behind.” Research on migrant politics demonstrates migrants often gain both motivation and capacity to affect politics in their home countries. There is evidence that exposure to receiving countries’ political processes impacts migrants’ political attitudes (Camp 2003, de la Garza and Yetim 2003), which
motivate discussions with family members and friends (Careja and Emmenegger 2012). Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2009 detail the transmission of migrants’ political attitudes to home countries through three channels: migrant returns, family communication, and diaspora networks; Levitt 1998 describes the diffusion of political values from migrants to their relatives as “social remittances” parallel to monetary remittances migrants send home.

Much scholarship on diaspora value transmission focuses on the diffusion of democratic values and its benefit for migrant-sending countries with weak democratic institutions (Diamond 1994, Shain 1999). However there exists a variety of political activities which may be impacted by diaspora value transmissions that go beyond basic level democratic behaviors such as voting, and a variety of home country political actors that stand benefit from such transmissions for motives beyond democratic consolidation. The studies in this section consider a range of activities associated with electoral participation, both voting and non-voting behaviors. Comparing the former and the latter would help to disaggregate and pinpoint the impact of diaspora influence, should the implications from the literature – that migrants exert influence, but that voting behavior by itself does not tell the full story.

### Potential political activities impacted by diaspora

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting behavior</th>
<th>Non-voting behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Registering to vote</td>
<td>Paying attention to politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting</td>
<td>Involvement with a political party or organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persuading others to vote for a favored candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteering for a campaign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Should migrants be communicating with their relatives about politics back home and seeking to influence their behavior, as politicians believe and the first section of this chapter finds, what might they be asking them to do? Simply communicating about politics may have an
effect of raising awareness among relatives, regardless of whether their voting preferences align with those of their relatives. Consequently, by broaching the subject, family members may be reminded to register and to vote on election day, again regardless of voting preferences.

One theory is that voting is not only a self-interested action but also a civic duty; thus the decision to vote or not is influenced in part by social pressures that enforce the norm favoring participation. Knack 1995 describes these pressures as deriving from “the strength of duty of one’s family, friends, and other associates, and of the frequency and quality of interaction with these potential enforcers” (145). Powell 1986 frames voter participation in a comparative context as both voting and “other forms of political activity:” “discussion,” “persuasion,” and “party work” – respectively, communicating about political issues with others, persuading others to support a preferred candidate, and working on behalf of a political party during an election. It is expected that the incidence of voting as well as these other activities should trend in the same direction with influences – including family and other personal linkages – that positively affect voting. Thus, individual-level factors associated with increased voting – being older, being male, having attained post-secondary education (Powell 1986) and having higher incomes (Rosenstone 1982) – should also increase higher-level political behaviors.

Migration may, however, have a negative impact on voter participation if, as Jones-Correa 1998 describes, “in-between identities” can divide migrants’ loyalties and attention and thus cause them to become less engaged in both sending and receiving country politics. If so, and if migrants act as enforcers of civic duties for relatives in sending countries, transnational communication with diaspora relatives may demotivate either basic level or higher level political activities among voters at home, contrary to the assumptions stated by Mexican, Dominican, and Salvadoran party officials. A corollary to this alternative scenario is that relatives in the home
country would give the opinions of their diaspora relatives less weight than that of a relative living at home, because they do not live in the home country anymore, and do not live with the direct consequences of elections at home.

A theory of how diasporas impact elections at home

Though the interest by parties in diaspora engagement, and interest by migrants in home country politics, are clear, the extent of migrant influence is unclear, as is how this influence may work: whether migrants affect their relatives’ voting behavior, if they motivate their family members in other ways, through activities that go beyond voting. I propose that this second scenario is most likely. Thus politicians are not wasting their efforts in reaching out to diaspora citizens, but how those diaspora citizens help them is not the manner which they imagine: Diaspora citizens do not make relatives who are nonvoters into voters, or relatives who are opponents into sympathizers. Rather, they make relatives who are already sympathizers into more active sympathizers; in other words, they turn nonmilitants into militants.

I make three arguments about diaspora influence over the political behavior of relatives in home countries:

1. The diaspora has more influence over some electoral activities than others. In some Latin American countries, voting is mandatory, and nonvoters – including citizens residing outside of the country – must pay a fine. It is thus not as likely that the influence of migrant family members over their relatives at home would manifest itself in higher voter participation rates: most citizens vote, and most likely make up their minds as to whether they will or not independent of the expressed wishes of their relatives. Other decisions, over the degree to which one might choose to participate in the political process beyond voting, are more uncertain. Political activities with greater variation in participation among citizens are more likely to be
able to be influenced by others, and those with clout are more likely to convince those who look up to them to engage in higher level political behavior than basic behavior that they are wont to do anyway, such as voting.

2. *The diaspora doesn’t swing votes, but it can motivate others to swing votes.* Though politicians believe it to be true that migrants swing the votes of their relatives, it is impossible to tell how an individual reached a private decision for whom to vote, and whether that would have changed without the presence of any single factor, such as a conversation with a relative. Families may have a party loyalty that is unchanging and predates any family member’s migration. And in countries where diaspora support disproportionately skews against one party – usually the party in government during the greatest period of migration – as in Mexico and El Salvador, the scenario of a family switching their votes from one party to another from election to election is less likely. A more plausible scenario is that families that are more likely to vote in blocs are already on the same page politically, and thus there is little convincing that needs to be done. Rather, if there is any debate, it is less likely over which party to support but other activities leading up to an election: should they get more involved in a campaign they already support, and do more to help their favored party or candidate win. If this is the case, diaspora influence is less a matter of proselytizing and more a matter of motivation: to convince relatives to do at home what the migrant cannot do from afar.

3. *Diaspora influence works through remittances but is not dependent on them.* Politicians also uniformly volunteered remittances as the mechanism by which migrant family members influence relatives: migrants send money home to support their families; they are therefore the breadwinners and respected members of the family and their opinion carries weight because of this. However the importance of remittances is on its face counterintuitive since remittances are
an imperfect instrument for voter persuasion, given that they are seen as unconditional and thus
devoid of an enforcement mechanism: migrants continue send money back to their families
irrespective of who wins elections. Further, family members may conceal how they voted to one
another. I came across no case, nor did any politician propose such a scenario, of migrants
“punishing” family members for voting the “wrong way” by withholding remittances. (It is,
however, possible for remittances to serve as a reward; one Salvadoran embassy official said that
Salvadoran migrants are known to include extra money in remittances to relatives before
elections, an illustration of political remittance cycles observed in O’Mahony 2013.)

Remittances are thus more of a magnifying force than a quid pro quo: rather than buy votes
or other specific behavior, they buy something more general, a position of status that will make
the migrant’s voice carry weight. This weight is less likely to change opinions entirely than it is
to reinforce or augment existing family political preferences. Thus the migrant is not calling
home in order to make specific demands, political or otherwise, and threatening to withhold
money if they do not do what he or she wants. Rather, families communicate in order to keep one
another informed, to discuss ongoing family issues and interests, including those relating to
politics. This has the effect of reinforcing familial identities and ideas, reminding relatives in
both countries the ideas they hold in common, and thereby motivating each other –
subconsciously rather than explicitly and under conditions – to focus more on those common
identities and ideas. When those identities and ideas are rooted in politics, diaspora influence has
a greater likelihood of inflaming existing partisan biases and exciting further action – such as
becoming more active in support of a cause of candidate to which both the migrant and the home
family is already sympathetic. Thus while money facilitates this relationship, the key factor in
diaspora influence is the migrants themselves and their communication with relatives back home.
Should this theory hold, communication with migrant relatives should be perceived as having a significant effect on the political behaviors of voters back home; this effect should be independent of that of remittances. Further, the effect should vary among different types of political activities, having a greater impact on higher level activities that reflect the reinforcement of shared, preexisting party sympathies. If not, the significance of family communication should fall out when controlling for remittances.

The dataset

For the purposes of this project, I focus on a series of political activities of voting age adults in all available Latin American and Caribbean countries, as self-reported by respondents of the AmericasBarometer poll conducted by Vanderbilt University’s Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) for 2008 and 2010, the years available for the key independent variable of interest, family communication. The polls are not panel data; samples were weighted according to each country’s census to reflect geographic distribution of population, and surveys were administered in person, in household visits. I have added to this dataset additional, country-level variables: GDP per capita from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), a democratic governance score from the Polity IV survey, and migration inflow data to the United States by country from the Migration Policy Institute. These control for country levels of political and economic development as well as the impact of migration flows on the country as a whole.

Dependent variables

I test the effect of communicating with close relatives living in the United States on seven measures of political activity, as reported by LAPOP poll respondents. Consistent with LAPOP

---

coding, three are ordinal variables and four are dummies. Variables are chosen to represent both voting and non-voting behavior, which I term basic and higher-level political activities.

Table 20. Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voting/basic activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter</td>
<td>&quot;Are you registered to vote?&quot;</td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>66,882</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Did you vote in the last presidential/PM elections?&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>64,854</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-voting/Higher level activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>&quot;How interested are you in politics?&quot;</td>
<td>Ordinal (0 - 3)</td>
<td>66,350</td>
<td>1.043</td>
<td>0.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>none/little/some/a lot</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade</td>
<td>&quot;How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate?&quot;</td>
<td>Ordinal (0 - 3)</td>
<td>66,040</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>&quot;How often do you attend meetings of a party or political movement?&quot;</td>
<td>Ordinal (0 - 3)</td>
<td>66,263</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID</td>
<td>&quot;At this moment, do you sympathize with a political party?&quot;</td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>65,657</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>&quot;Did you work for a party or candidate in the last presidential/PM election?&quot;</td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>65,799</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent variables

I created a dichotomous variable, Family Communicate, based on two questions in the LAPOP survey. One question asks respondents whether they have close relatives, who used to live in the household, now living in the U.S. A second question, which appears only in the 2008 and 2010 survey, asks, for those who indicated that they do, how often the communicate with them, if at all. The Family Communicate variable is coded as yes if the respondent answered yes
to having a close relative in the U.S., and indicates some (non-zero) degree of communication with that relative.

A second independent variable of interest is Remit, a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent received remittances. This variable serves as a second independent variable of interest, to compare with the explanatory power of communicating with a diaspora relative independent of whether that relative sends money. The competing dynamics represented by including both measures can be thought of as whether citizen behavior is affected by migrant relatives primarily through communication (simply having a relative outside the country with whom one is presumably in close contact), or through remuneration (that relative supporting one’s household and thus commanding greater voice in political matters). Both individual-level and country-level variables were added as controls. For country-level variables, it would be expected that richer countries with established democratic traditions would have higher rates of political involvement, as more prosperous citizens are generally more politically engaged, and citizens would be more likely to exercise their political rights in systems where those rights are guaranteed and the electorate has faith that elections are clean.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family Communicate</td>
<td>&quot;Do you have a close family member who used to live in the household and now live in the U.S., and do you communicate with him or her?&quot;</td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>67,113</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Respondent is female</td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>67,113</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>&quot;How old are you?&quot;</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>66,914</td>
<td>38.746</td>
<td>15.728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>&quot;What was the last year of education you completed?&quot;</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>66,592</td>
<td>8.977</td>
<td>4.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>&quot;In which of the following monthly income ranges do you fall?&quot;</td>
<td>Ordinal (0-10)</td>
<td>57,588</td>
<td>3.878</td>
<td>2.213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St. Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>&quot;How left or right wing are you?&quot; 1 - 10. 10 farthest right</td>
<td>Ordinal (1-10)</td>
<td>50,336</td>
<td>5.644</td>
<td>2.482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Respondent lives in an urban area</td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>67,113</td>
<td>0.624</td>
<td>0.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remit</td>
<td>&quot;Do you or someone in your household receive remittances from abroad?&quot;</td>
<td>Dummy (0/1)</td>
<td>66,406</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>Country's Polity IV Score</td>
<td>Ordinal (5-10)</td>
<td>62,305</td>
<td>7.748</td>
<td>1.518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPpc</td>
<td>Country's GDP per capita</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>64,110</td>
<td>3,178.556</td>
<td>2,394.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants to US</td>
<td>Country's annual migration outflow to the U.S.</td>
<td>Integer</td>
<td>67,113</td>
<td>19,455.620</td>
<td>36,481.750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selected characteristics of respondents with close relatives in the U.S.

Respondents who most frequently reported communicating with relatives in the U.S. are highest in Caribbean and Central American countries. They are, compared to the population as a whole, slightly more male, slightly older, earn slightly more, have attained a higher level of education, and are less likely to live in an urban area. Overall, however, the sample is roughly comparable to the population as a whole, as Table 23 shows.

Table 22. Respondents Communicating with Relatives in the U.S., by Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Respondents with Family Communicate</th>
<th>Total respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of total respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td>36.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>3,288</td>
<td>36.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>1,413</td>
<td>4,054</td>
<td>34.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>3,099</td>
<td>31.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>25.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>24.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>3,056</td>
<td>21.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>3,122</td>
<td>20.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>3,007</td>
<td>19.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>3,080</td>
<td>19.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>3,072</td>
<td>12.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>12.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>9.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>6.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 22. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Respondents with Family Communicate</th>
<th>Total respondents</th>
<th>Percentage of total respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>3,009</td>
<td>5.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td>4.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>4.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1,527</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3,979</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>1.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,881</td>
<td>67,113</td>
<td>16.21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23. Respondents with Family Communicate Compared to Overall Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Communicate with relatives in U.S.</th>
<th>Overall population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>percentage female</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>50.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average income level (0 - 10)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average age</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average education level</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right-leaning ideology</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>percentage urban dwelling</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two controls, one individual-level (Remit) and one country-level (Migrants to U.S.) are closely related to the primary independent variable of interest, Family Communicate. Though risking some degree of multicollinearity in the final model, particularly between Family Communicate and Remit, I include both to determine whether communication with relatives living in the U.S. has a unique effect on an individual’s political behavior, independent of (on the individual level) receiving remittances from them, and (on the country level) migration being an issue impacting politics in general.

Test: Hierarchical model using GLLAMM
The variables of interest present two challenges to OLS regression analysis: the dependent variables are dichotomous or four category ordinal, and the covariates vary at both the individual and country level, as well as by a time dimension. Normally the first condition would necessitate an ordered logit or probit test, and the second condition would necessitate a two way fixed effects model. However there is currently no Stata program for an ordered logit/probit model that allows for fixed effects. The shortcomings of a two way fixed effects OLS regression are considerable for the purposes of analysis: treating dichotomous variables as continuous variables creates an imperfect fit, country-level variables cannot be included, and covariates with a high degree of collinearity must be dropped from the model. The latter is a particular challenge for this study, as I wish to compare two independent variables of interest which are moderately correlated with one another, Family in U.S. and Remit, and determine if they have an effect independent of one another.

An ordered logit/probit model provides for a better fit, and while one cannot be run with fixed effects, some estimator programs exist that approximate such a model. Rather than hold country-level effects fixed at the same level, hierarchical models allow for individual-level covariates to vary nested within variation at the country level. The Stata program GLLAMM (Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models) allows for models meeting both of desired conditions: estimates for responses of mixed type including dichotomous and ordered categorical responses and multilevel factors, in which latent, or unobserved, variables are assumed to be discrete or have a multivariate normal distribution. Such variables can be interpreted as random effects or common factors specific to each country, as lower-level units (here, individuals) are nested within higher-level units (here, countries). It is also understood that individual-level

For a two-level linear model, the level-1 model for individual $i$ within country $j$ has the form:

$$y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} x_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where $x_{ij}$ is the individual-level covariate and $\eta_{0j} + \eta_{1j}$ are the intercept and slope for the $j$th country. These coefficients are regressed on level-2 (country-level) covariates. The level-2 model, which shows the variance of the intercept and slope between countries, has the form:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \omega_j + \zeta_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} \omega_j + \zeta_{1j}$$

For a two-level logistic model, the level-1 model has the form:

$$\text{logit}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} x_{ij}$$

while the level-2 model has the form:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} \omega_j + \zeta_{0j}$$

$$\zeta_{0j} \sim N(0, \tau_{00})$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10}$$

I ran seven GLLAMM tests, one for each of my measures of individual political behavior, for all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, with individual-level variation nested within the country level. The results are as follows:
Table 24. GLLAMM Tests for Voting/Basic Level Political Behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Registered to vote</th>
<th>Voted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communicate with family</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.087</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.061***</td>
<td>0.061***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.091***</td>
<td>0.076***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-leaning ideology</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residence</td>
<td>-0.133**</td>
<td>-0.112***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive remittances</td>
<td>-0.116</td>
<td>-0.189***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.059)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Polity score</td>
<td>-0.137***</td>
<td>-0.170***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per capita (x1000)</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.007***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Migration to US (x1000)</td>
<td>0.002**</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>39,679</td>
<td>38,195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 25. GLLAMM Tests for Nonvoting/Higher Level Political Behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political interest</th>
<th>Persuade</th>
<th>Attend meetings</th>
<th>Identify with party</th>
<th>Volunteer for campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communicate with</td>
<td>0.083***</td>
<td>0.222***</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>0.145**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.345***</td>
<td>-0.254***</td>
<td>-0.311***</td>
<td>-0.191***</td>
<td>-0.356***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.019***</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0.066***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.055***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>-0.034***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-leaning</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.020**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ideology</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residence</td>
<td>-0.113***</td>
<td>-0.090***</td>
<td>-0.350***</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.107**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive remittances</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td>0.180***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.160)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Polity score</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.115***</td>
<td>0.043***</td>
<td>0.160***</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>-0.005***</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capita (x1000)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Migration to</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>-0.002***</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US (x1000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant 1</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>2.112</td>
<td>3.094</td>
<td>3.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant 2</td>
<td>1.955</td>
<td>1.297</td>
<td>4.153</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant 3</td>
<td>3.392</td>
<td>2.543</td>
<td>4.553</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>39,495</td>
<td>39,395</td>
<td>39,375</td>
<td>39,261</td>
<td>39,236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tests show a significant, positive effect of communicating with family members living in the U.S. on some measures of political behavior by voting-age Latin American citizens. Notably, those activities for which having U.S.-residing relatives has a significant effect are all non-voting, higher level activities: paying attention to politics, persuading others to vote for a favored candidate, identifying with a political party, attending meetings of a political organization, and volunteering for a political campaign. In contrast, the basic types of
participation related to voting – registering to vote and voting – communicating with a U.S.-residing relative fails to have a statistically significant result at a level of p<0.05 for a two-tailed test.

The non-significance of family communication on basic level participation suggests migrants are unlikely to affect the voting behavior of their relatives at home. It is apparent that there is no pattern of whether voting-age Latin American citizens register or vote that differs among those with migrant relatives with whom they communicate and those without. This may be because U.S. residing relatives make no effort to convince family members in their home countries to be engaged in elections, a result of the in-between tensions in migrant political identities observed by Jones-Correa 1998; or if they do, that their opinion on these matters has no impact either way: Latin American citizens make up their minds about basic-level political participation irrespective of the family migration experience. A lack of a pattern of variance between families with migrant relatives and families without seems likely, as is the likelihood of the question of whether to vote being a moot question not worth discussing, particularly in those countries with mandatory voting laws.

These three variables – political interest, registering, and voting – contrast with the remaining four – identifying with a party, convincing others to support a favored candidate, attending political organization meetings, and volunteering for an electoral campaign. Mean responses for these variables is significantly lower. Though 89% reported registering to vote and 74% reported voting, only 11% reported volunteering for a campaign. And while the mean response to “how interested are you in politics” is between “a little” and “somewhat,” though closer to “a little,” the mean responses to “how often do you try to persuade others to vote for your preferred candidate,” “how often do you attend meetings of a political organization,” and
“how much do you identify with a party” all fall between “a little” and “none at all.” Thus a clear minority answered in the affirmative for each of the higher level political behaviors, allowing for greater likelihood of patterns of variance between migrant-relative and non-migrant-relative families.

For those higher level political behaviors, the tests show a significant, positive effect of communicating with relatives in the U.S. on relatives at home. Those communicating with U.S.-residing relatives are more likely to pay attention to politics, identify with and be active in a party, political organization, or campaign, and to try to convince others to vote for their preferred candidate: they are, in other words, more likely to engage in political persuasion typified by party militants. Although coefficient estimates produced by GLLAMM, essentially the same as those for logistic regressions, make it difficult to quantify the estimated impact of each independent on each dependent variable in a comparable manner, one can observe a positive, significant impact of having a U.S.-residing relative on all four higher level activities.

As for the controls, standard SES variables generally had significant estimates in the directions predicted by correlations, with the exception of Urban: all else equal, urban dwellers were, surprisingly, less likely to engage in the selected political behaviors than citizens residing in rural areas. Ideology had no almost discernible effect; it can be assumed left-leaning and right-leaning citizens are roughly equally predisposed to being politically active. Also notable is that Polity scores, when significant, had a negative coefficient estimate for voting behavior and for persuasion: having less well established democratic institutions actually appears to slightly encourage political participation. Though it should be considered that Latin America and the Caribbean today, having gone through a wave of democratization a generation ago, has much less variation with regards to democratic rule; Polity IV’s scale goes from -10 to 10, but in the
countries included in the LAPOP survey, their Polity scores vary only between 5 and 10. As predicted, the remaining country-level covariates, GDP per capita and rate of out-migration to the U.S., had mostly positive, significant effects on political behavior.

Finally, Remit is included in this model to test whether party officials’ narrative, that remittances buy influence over relatives’ political preferences, is true, and if remittances have a unique effect apart from communication: the two variables are not highly correlated, at 0.48, indicating not all Latin American voters with close relatives in the U.S. receive remittances from them. According to this theory, those migrants who do send remittances should buy them a status of respect within the family and thus gives their political opinion added weight. Should this be true, I would expect to see receiving remittances to have a positive, significant effect apart from family communication.

The impact of remittances is less consistent than that of family communication. Variation across models was greater for Remit than for Family Communicate: coefficient estimates were negative and significant a 95% level for a two-tailed test for voting, and positive and significant for identifying with a party and volunteering for a campaign, but insignificant for all other political behaviors. This last model suggests an interesting possibility: that citizens receiving remittances from abroad have a stronger sense of party loyalty, perhaps due in some part to political motivations by those relatives who left for leaving; for example, the large number of Central Americans who fled during the civil wars. However this theory is problematic due to the inclusion of Family Communicate in the model; one would assume the exile experience would be captured by the presence of close relatives. The lack of a consistent and unidirectional pattern for Remit in comparison to Family Communicate may be evidence that the bulk of the impact of
migration on political behavior is taken up by Family Communicate, leaving little power for Remit independent of Family Communicate.

*Is it a family or remittance effect? Testing for multicollinearity*

An additional possibility is that multicollinearity between family communication and remittances may be skewing coefficient estimates. To test, I ran the same tests, dropping Remit from the model, to see the difference in coefficient estimates for Family Communicate.

**Table 26. Estimates for Family Communicate Including vs. Excluding Remit**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>with Remit</th>
<th>without Remit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.060)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>0.083**</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuade</td>
<td>0.222***</td>
<td>0.239***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend meetings</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>0.191***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.414)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify with party</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
<td>0.292***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>0.145***</td>
<td>0.221***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By excluding Remit from the models, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates for Family Communicate increases, however it does not change the direction or significance of Family Communicate for any of the dependent variables. It can thus be seen that the effect of receiving remittances is taking up some of the explanatory power of family communication, likely because the two variables are moderately correlated, however intrafamilial communication can be seen to have a significant, independent effect on political behavior apart from remittances.
Does family influence exist without remittances? Testing with interactions

Should communicating with diaspora relatives have the power to sway voter behavior that is independent of remittances, we should still be able to see an effect of migrant relatives even when remittance levels are zero. To isolate the diaspora family effect on the observed behaviors, I include a series of interactions between the Family Communicate and Remit variables.

**Table 27. GLLAMM Tests for Basic Level Political Behaviors with Interactions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Register to vote</th>
<th>Voted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communicate with family</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.062***</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.091***</td>
<td>0.072***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.034***</td>
<td>0.027***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-leaning ideology</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residence</td>
<td>-0.133***</td>
<td>-0.143***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive remittances</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>-0.288***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Polity score</td>
<td>-0.136***</td>
<td>-0.104***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per capita (x1000)</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.004***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Migration to US (x1000)</td>
<td>0.002***</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate*Remit</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.207**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
<td>0.782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>39,679</td>
<td>38,195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 28. GLLAMM Tests for Higher Level Political Behaviors with Interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political interest</th>
<th>Persuade</th>
<th>Attend meetings</th>
<th>Identify with party</th>
<th>Volunteer for campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communicate with family</td>
<td>0.092*</td>
<td>0.252***</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
<td>0.141***</td>
<td>0.223***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.341***</td>
<td>-0.251***</td>
<td>-0.312***</td>
<td>-0.191***</td>
<td>-0.357***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
<td>0.012***</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.028***</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
<td>0.023***</td>
<td>0.064***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.068***</td>
<td>0.063***</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-leaning ideology</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.023***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban residence</td>
<td>-0.119***</td>
<td>-0.129***</td>
<td>-0.350***</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.112**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive remittances</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.229***</td>
<td>0.213***</td>
<td>0.261***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.048)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Polity score</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.100***</td>
<td>0.042***</td>
<td>0.160***</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country GDP per capita (x1000)</td>
<td>-0.001*</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>-0.005***</td>
<td>0.006***</td>
<td>-0.009***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Migration to US (x1000)</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate*Remit</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>-0.297***</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>-0.196*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constant 1 0.305 0.530 2.106 3.097 3.523
Constant 2 1.942 1.386 3.147
Constant 3 3.376 2.633 4.548
Observations 39,495 39,395 39,375 39,261 39,236

The independent impact of family presence in the diaspora on higher level behaviors is clearer when interactions are included. The estimated effect of family communication on relatives’ basic level activities – registration and voting – is statistically insignificant. For all five higher level behaviors – political interest, persuasion, attending meetings, identifying with a
party, and campaigning – the estimated effect is positive and significant. Thus even when family members receive no remittances from them, the unique effect of communicating with relatives in the US is positive for higher level behaviors only.¹⁴⁶

The result partly contradicts a stated belief by politicians and party officials in the three countries I visited: that the diaspora sways votes at home purely through the power of the purse. Rather, it is communication with family members in the U.S., irrespective of the money they send home, that is sufficient to have an impact on the behavior of voters at home: to make them more active and militant than they would otherwise be.

From interviews with party strategists in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, a consensus opinion emerges that migrants wield political power through their family members, and to sway a migrant to one’s corner – particularly one in a richer country like the U.S., especially one who supports their family monetarily – is to sway an entire family. Were this true, one would expect to see a positive and significant effect on voting behavior, both registering to vote and voting. This would be consistent with the findings from the New York Dominican survey that a majority of survey respondents report encouraging their family members to vote.

The alternate scenario, never expressed by interview subjects, is that family members living in the diaspora are less likely to have an effect on the political behavior of their relatives at home: by virtue of living abroad, and not being directly affected by political changes in their home country, their opinions would carry less weight in their home country. Additionally, those who migrate may simply pay less attention to politics in their home countries, as per the historical stereotype of diaspora Mexicans, detailed in chapter 4, of having been

¹⁴⁶ The coefficient estimates for Remit are largely meaningless, because in the interacted model, they would represent the effect of receiving remittances without having any family in the U.S., an unlikely scenario.
“Americanized.” Were this true, family communication would have no significant effect on any political behaviors, voting or otherwise.

The results of these models suggest that party officials are half right: engaging in transnational campaigning does have a payoff, but it is more indirect than they believe. By reaching out to migrants, they are not winning new votes from their relatives at home (who likely, in cases of strong diaspora skew, already favor the same party: see e.g. strong support for the FMLN in both the Salvadoran diaspora and in San Miguel, the diaspora’s principal department of origin). However communication with diaspora relatives does have a positive and significant effect on behaviors more typical of already engaged political militants: Latin American voters who communicate with relatives in the U.S. are more likely to be involved in politics in such a way as to help their preferred parties through proselytizing and campaigning. If at all, diaspora campaigning could help parties win votes from other voters at home who may in turn be convinced by those relatives. Especially in countries with skewed diasporas, diaspora outreach by parties is more a matter of turning out the base than winning over swing voters, and parties who stand to gain the greatest payoff from diaspora engagement will engage in base-strengthening strategies abroad, getting their core militants to become more involved in politics at home and thus engage this spillover effect on other home country voters.

Conclusions

This chapter seeks to understand, first, whether migrants seek to influence relatives in their home countries, and what kinds of behaviors they may actually influence. The tests in this chapter call to question some of the underlying premises motivating diaspora outreach by parties, communicated by party officials in the three countries of focus.
As party officials see it, by campaigning abroad they are winning votes at home: “If we get one Salvadoran in Washington to support us, that gives us five votes in El Salvador,” according to FMLN base committee leader Alex Nuñez. This is due to the influence they believe migrants have over their relatives at home: “Families vote in blocs, and the head of the household influences the rest,” according to Dominican PRD official Olaya Dotel. And this influence is bought by money they send home to relatives: “Because they send remittances, their opinion is important,” according to Carlos Morales of the Dominican PRSC.

This scenario presumes, first, that migrants seek to influence the votes of their relatives, and believe they have such influence in order to try. Secondly, it presumes that this influence does affect voting behavior of their relatives, and that this influences works through remittances. As this chapter finds, the truth is more nuanced.

From the survey of Dominican citizens in New York, it is found that Dominican migrants do seek to affect their relatives’ voting behavior, to some degree. An overwhelming majority of respondents report speaking to relatives in the DR regularly, nearly half daily, and more than three-quarters report talking to their relatives about Dominican politics. Most also have exposure to, or participate directly in diaspora campaigning by Dominican parties. A majority try to convince their relatives to vote. However less than half try to convince relatives to vote for a candidate they favor, and a smaller percentage still believes they have such influence at all. Of the traits predicted to have an effect on both attempts to influence and belief in influence, only the respondent’s own political participation had a consistently positive and significant effect on their own perceptions on influence: diaspora Dominicans who voted in the most recent Dominican election were more likely to both believe in their influence and try to use it. This
suggests the influence dynamic works best for those migrants who are already politically engaged.

As for the second question, about what the diaspora really influences, the multi-level models built from LAPOP surveys and other sources show that this influence does exist, just not necessarily in the way parties believe it does. Communication with family members abroad does not seem to have an effect on voting behavior. And remittances, independent of communication, do not have a consistently significant impact on home country voter behavior. Rather, communication with family members appears to be the key vector of influence, but it only works for certain political activities. These are higher level activities which go beyond basic participation of voting: paying attention to politics, joining a political party, attending meetings, and campaigning for candidates. Thus because migrants have little apparent impact on relatives’ political behaviors that correspond largely to those of the rest of society and which are matters of civic duty (whether socially or legally enforced), family communication is unlikely to convince a non-participant from becoming a participant in the electoral process. Among those citizens who have already reached a basic level of electoral participation, communication with migrant relatives may convince them to move from being a passive to an active participant, by reinforcing political identities and motivating those relatives to become more involved in partisan activities.

This tendency fits with the partisan skew hypothesis of this study: that diaspora-residing citizens often have a distinct political profile in comparison to their home countries characterized by a strong political identity that clearly favors one party and rejects another, often the party in office at the time they emigrated: in the case of Salvadoran migrants who left during the civil war, favoring the FMLN and rejecting ARENA; in the case of Mexican migrants who left under
the first period of PRI rule, favoring the PAN (and to a lesser extent, the PRD) and rejecting the PRI. These diaspora partisan identities often become frozen in the moment of emigration, given a relative insulation from whatever political changes take place in their home countries, and tendency to view politics at home through the lens of the past: as Joaquín Samayoa, the centrist former rebel complained, diaspora Salvadorans “have the luxury of radicalism” from their perch outside of the country.

Communication with migrant family members has a significant and positive impact on behavior typical of a party militant. Militancy is a crucial factor in any race: although militants are rarer than regular voters and less susceptible to changing their minds about politics, they can change the minds of others, they can contribute money and volunteer labor, and can make a difference in election day turnout. If Latin American citizens with transnational family ties are indeed more engaged, and more partisan, citizens, winning over their migrant relatives is indeed a smart strategy on the part of politicians, even when those relatives don’t – or can’t – vote. Their family members may not be as amenable to being swayed to switch sides, but they may be more amenable to get involved in such a way as to sway others.
Chapter 7. Conclusion

This research project considers the diaspora as an important arena of political contestation for parties from migrant-sending countries, and seeks to explain why parties act the way they do in seeking diaspora support. The answer, diaspora skew and party infrastructure, tells us why parties reach out in different ways. They may employ a limited or wide range of tactics, from candidate visits to campaign ads to mobilizing supporters to lobbying to patronage politics. They may focus their attention on grassroots or elite level diaspora actors. They may cultivate future politicians from within their diaspora networks. They may encourage or try to restrict diaspora voter participation. They may be powerful and independent, or weak and subordinate to other diaspora actors. Above all, they seek the influence they believe migrants to have over family members at home, but may also seek migrants’ own votes, their money.

This study adds to existing literature on political transnationalism and opens discussion to newer areas of focus. Transnationalism is a cross-disciplinary field, and is thus not strictly political in focus; political transnationalism is still relatively young as a research agenda. Much of the literature on diaspora politics has until recently focused largely on state policy in managing migration or rights of citizenship, whether sending states (Goldring 2002, Hollifield 2004, Fitzgerald 2009, Delano 2011) or receiving states (García y Griego and Verea 1988, Shain 1999, Macekura 2011). Looking at migrants, the point of focus has been voting: when and why migrant sending states enfranchise diaspora populations (Moctezuma Longoria 2003, Lafleur 2013), and how diaspora voting takes place (Brand 2014). Evidence from the countries considered here, though, shows that voter turnout in diaspora elections is quite low and unlikely to have a crucial effect by itself on election results, only arousing politicians’ interest for one diaspora, and even then only in one city, Dominicans in New York.
Nevertheless, a great and varied amount of campaigning takes place in the diaspora by parties, a still understudied phenomenon, with some recent exceptions (Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2013, Burgess 2014). I argue that party activity in the diaspora is an interesting and consequential phenomenon in itself, even if migrants mostly do not vote. Parties set state policy with regard to diasporas and diaspora voting, and can serve as the vehicle by which migrants make political demands. And as migrants grow in (perceived) clout, and campaigning becomes increasingly transnational, it will be impossible to understand electoral politics in migrant-sending countries by only looking within those countries’ territorial borders.

Summary: skew and infrastructure

Parties may exhibit any number of the factors or tactics mentioned above to seek diaspora support or otherwise use the diaspora in electoral campaigns. What they do may be different for different parties, countries, and elections. Among the variables that affect party diaspora activity, this study identifies two of particular importance: diaspora partisan skew and party diaspora infrastructure.

Partisan skew

In two of the countries in this study, Mexico and El Salvador, the diaspora has a noticeable, and strong, partisan skew. More specifically, it has a strong skew away from one party in particular, rather than in favor of another – this is especially true in Mexico. Thus the diaspora isn’t quite a reliable base vote for one party – though it approaches this with the FMLN in the Salvadoran diaspora – but rather a reliable anti-vote against one party: the PRI in Mexico, and ARENA in El Salvador. Not coincidentally, both parties were in power during periods of high out-migration and political repression or instability, which many migrants, if not political migrants per se, largely blamed those parties for the conditions under which they left. Thus in the
case of Mexico’s three party system, the contest for diaspora support has been between the PRD and PAN, with each seeking to establish themselves as the most credible alternative to the PRI. In the contemporary period, with the figure of Vicente Fox who was popular in the diaspora, and the internal turmoil which has divided the PRD, the chief beneficiary of anti-PRI sentiment in the diaspora has been the PAN.

In contrast, the two major parties in the Dominican Republic, the PRD and PLD, both trace their roots back to the opposition to the Balaguer government which was in power during the first wave of migration, starting in 1965, when a coup coincided with U.S. immigration reform. Both parties were, in fact, founded by the same figure, Juan Bosch. Thus neither party suffers the same bad reputation in the Dominican diaspora that the PRI or ARENA do in the Mexican and Salvadoran diasporas, and as such, the Dominican diaspora does not exhibit a strong anti-party skew that benefits one party disproportionately.

The presence or lack of a partisan skew among the diaspora affects diaspora outreach in both degree and type of activity. The limits of outreach are also bounded by the electoral laws governing diaspora enfranchisement and campaigning, both of which are also direct products of diaspora skew. First, the presence of a skew strongly disincentivizes the unpopular party from supporting expanded voter rights to the diaspora, as they would be empowering a reliable vote against them. Thus the party that stands to lose the most will put up roadblocks to diaspora enfranchisement, holding up external voting laws in the legislature, raising questions of fraud, and when it becomes politically infeasible to outright oppose diaspora enfranchisement, design a system of voting and registration that is so onerous that it will keep diaspora voting to a minimum. This is the case in Mexico, where the PAN could take credit for enfranchising the diaspora, but under a law drafted by the PRI and implemented by the federal elections board,
with a large politically self-interested bureaucracy held over from the period of hegemonic PRI rule which was also lukewarm to diaspora enfranchisement. Thus the diaspora electoral regime created by the Mexican government was among the most restrictive in the world, prohibiting open campaigning and fundraising abroad, and until recently requiring voter registration in person, in Mexico, an onerous process which would take several weeks. The Salvadoran diaspora voting system is not quite as restrictive, but ARENA raised doubts about fraud regarding the issuance of voter IDs in Salvadoran consulates, and ultimately the window for registration prior to the 2014 election was extremely narrow, and the postal voting method was confusing and resulted in many null ballots. Extremely low voter turnout in both the Mexican and Salvadoran diasporas were thus a deliberate design feature of the voting regime, and serves to reinforce arguments by the PRI and ARENA that extending or easing voting rights for citizens abroad is a wasteful expense.

In the Dominican diaspora, in contrast, the diaspora shows no clear pattern of anti-party skew. Election results, as well as the online survey, indicate slight anti-incumbent leanings among diaspora Dominicans relative to the Dominican electorate as a whole. But those results also show the diaspora’s willingness to favor one party and then disfavor the same party in successive elections. The Dominican parties also contrast with their Mexican and Salvadoran counterparts in expressing a belief that, while the diaspora has a historically distinct, pro-PRD political profile, that identity is dying off with the oldest generation of migrants. It is possible that a similar dynamic will happen in the future with the Salvadoran diaspora, as the civil war generation dies off, and could open the door to ARENA or some other party making inroads with a less ideological diaspora.
This lack of a partisan skew creates a bipartisan consensus in the Dominican Republic for the expansion of diaspora voting rights, such that diaspora Dominicans gained the right to vote before Mexico or El Salvador, and their voting system is far more open and unregulated, and the DR consequently sees a much higher rate of diaspora voter participation than the other two countries. The DR is also one of the few countries in the world to offer emigrants direct representation in Congress, with seven ultramar representatives whose districts are the diaspora.

Thus the electoral regime is the vehicle by which diaspora skew sets the bounds of diaspora campaigning. However it also affects the ways parties campaign, by shaping the perceptions and expectations parties have of diasporas. Parties predisposed to see the diaspora as hostile to them, notably ARENA and the PRI, will have limited, often symbolic, and elite-level engagement; those that view the diaspora as neutral-to-supportive will engage with the diaspora on a grassroots level, if they have the infrastructure to do so. Thus the FMLN, with a more extensive base committee network, can engage with a friendly diaspora to a greater degree than Mexico’s PAN or PRD, which have a weak diaspora infrastructure. Dominican party officials view the diaspora as a swing vote that is extremely politically active and interested in politics; several described the way Dominicans, both at home and abroad, follow politics as similar to the way they follow baseball. Dominican parties see in the diaspora a great, largely untapped source of support which is up for grabs, creating a more contentious diaspora politics and greater incentives for clientelist measures.

*Party infrastructure*

As chapter 3 shows, rival parties may have different structures which carry over into their presence in the diaspora, and are more or less effective in mobilizing diaspora support. The base committee organizational model undergirds the FMLN in El Salvador and both major parties in
the Dominican Republic, though in the diaspora, the PRD has a larger and older network. These party structures are hierarchical, with a clear chain of leadership and communication, which allows both input from base committees to be transmitted to the top and strategies from the top to be passed down to be implemented at the base. With sufficient membership, base committees or sections are able to do more to build party presence in the diaspora, and not only during elections. They create a parallel structure to the state when the party is in the opposition, and can challenge government institutions as representatives of the community, and offer many of the same services or more, such as legal and financial assistance. They have regular activities for members, serve as linkages to the home country by arranging visits and collective investment projects, and instill party loyalty which can be passed down through generations. They also can tap the next generation of party leaders and candidates, both in the sending and receiving country (Salvadoran Americans allied with the FMLN have been elected to the Maryland General Assembly, the Central American Parliament, and local offices in El Salvador; the most famous diaspora politician in the Dominican Republic is former president Leonel Fernández).

The base committee structure also allows for greater coordination with the diaspora during campaigns, such that migrants can be mobilized into rapid response teams to counter propaganda from rival parties. The FMLN successfully countered a scare campaign tactic from ARENA which had worked in 2004, when the latter party warned Salvadoran voters that their remittances would be at risk if the FMLN won due to bad relations with the U.S. government. When the same tactic was deployed in 2009, the FMLN mobilized its base in the diaspora to lobby the U.S. Congress and the State Department to issue pledges of neutrality, and made calls to relatives reassuring them that their remittances were not at risk. The FMLN went on to win
that election, and as the warnings of blocked remittances and TPS by the U.S. government failed to materialize, ARENA ceased to use the same blunt tactic in the subsequent election.

Party structure can affect how parties seek to integrate diasporas into their campaigns. In contrast to the FMLN, ARENA has a horizontal, sectoral model, in which migrants are but one of many constituent groups (women, peasants, students, similar to the original PRI model), all of which have equal access to every level of leadership in the party. They can, if they wish, go straight to the top with input, and if they have the drive and resources, can take much greater independent initiative. This is what happened in the 2014 election, when a group of Salvadoran Texans chose to design their own billboard ad campaign, which was not coordinated with the rest of the Quijano campaign.

In contrast to the FMLN’s mass mobilization efforts, the billboard campaign failed to have much impact, as it invoked diaspora issues but did not have the appearance of a grassroots effort (ironically, because it was), but rather a cynical attempt by ARENA to use the diaspora as a reference in another of its scare campaigns. The fact that ARENA does not have a mass base of support in the diaspora, both due to its general disfavor by the Salvadoran diaspora, and its failure to build an independent party network abroad during its years in power, when it relied on consulates and other offices, put it at a steep disadvantage relative to the FMLN, and thus unable to mobilize the kind of mass networks to implement their strategies on the ground. The weakest of all diaspora party structures are those of the Mexican parties, which do not have a mass membership base, are legally constrained in their foreign activities, and are subordinate to nonpartisan migrant community organizations in terms of political mobilization. Despite having the largest immigrant population in the U.S. to draw from, Mexican parties make temporary and tepid attempts at outreach during elections, but are overshadowed by HTAs in terms of mass
membership and grassroots work, and by the Mexican government in terms of services and outreach to the diaspora.

The range of diaspora campaign activities undertaken by parties are varied and not easily comparable or quantifiable. All parties studied engage in some form of engagement, the most common being visits by candidates to the U.S., as well as in some cases advertising, fundraising, mobilizing, seeking endorsements, meeting with officials, party militants, and/or the broader community. All parties engage with the diaspora in some way, even if mostly symbolically, as with ARENA, or in very limited, official capacities, as with the PRI.

For the sake of comparison, however, a rubric can be constructed mapping parties relative to one another in terms of ability to more effectively utilize the diaspora as a political asset. The assumption here is that grassroots mobilization of large numbers of diaspora supporters is more effective than elite-focused outreach or purely symbolic appeals: namely, if every party could do what the FMLN does with its diaspora support base, it would. If a party has a diaspora that skews in its favor, and an institutionalized, base committee structure, it will be able to mobilize a loyal diaspora base of support on a grassroots level over a long term and fully integrate it into campaigns. The FMLN fits this model.

If there is no skew but the party does not have the disfavor of the diaspora, with a base committee model it can also have a high degree of diaspora party activity, but may not be able to count on party loyalty to mobilize support. It will be able to mobilize militants on the grassroots level and undertake a broad range of diaspora campaign activities, but will have to rely on clientelistic means to solidify support when ideological conviction is lacking. The Dominican PRD/PRM and, to a lesser extent due to its relative youth, PLD fit this model.
If there is a skew and the party has the favor of the diaspora but has weak party infrastructure in the diaspora, its diaspora party activity will be effective only in relation to the disfavored party, but will not be able to mobilize much long-term support beyond elections. The PAN and Mexican PRD fit this model.

The least effective parties in the diaspora will be those which have both the disfavor of the diaspora in a skewed environment, and no independent party infrastructure in the diaspora. The PRI fit this model; ARENA does slightly better with its recently created, but still weakly institutionalized, Section 8 diaspora sector.

Of the seven parties across three countries studied, El Salvador’s FMLN has the most effective model of diaspora engagement and mobilization. Its advantage over its rival, ARENA, is both in terms of relative sympathy of the Salvadoran diaspora as well as the institutionalization of its diaspora infrastructure. A party might overcome a deficit in one by focusing on another, as ARENA’s attempts to build a new membership-based diaspora sector may eventually make up for its relative lack of support. In this case, the Dominican PLD may be a hopeful model; a party which, though it did not suffer from the strong disfavor of the diaspora, started at a disadvantage compared to the older and more established PRD, which counted on a hard ideological base of support and a massive network of party members abroad. The PLD caught up to the PRD by copying its base committee model – something ARENA has not quite done with its Section 8 – and through clientelism, which was possible through generational shifts in the Dominican diaspora, as the first generation of political exiles gave way to more pragmatic, non-ideological migrants.
As the Salvadoran diaspora is the youngest of the three diasporas studied, this same generational shift may yet come to pass, and provide a window of opportunity to ARENA or another party willing to copy best practices and engage in vote-buying. Currently, the loyalty the FMLN commands in the Salvadoran diaspora is still strong, as its base committees engage in political education and instill a sense of partisan identity and ownership over the party within even the U.S.-born generation. But as memories of the civil war fade, just as memories of the Balaguer regime faded for diaspora Dominicans, the Salvadoran diaspora will likely become up for grabs.

Mexican parties as well could stand to gain from the enormous potential diaspora electorate in the U.S. However due to the strongest anti-party skew of all diasporas studied, they
are hamstrung by restrictive campaign laws, prevented from openly campaigning abroad, and lack any effective party infrastructure. Compared to the difference between the Salvadoran parties, the relative advantage that the PAN and, to a lesser extent, the PRD have over the PRI in the diaspora is nearly entirely based on diaspora hostility to the PRI. This is another generational question, which will cease in importance as the PRI’s seven decades of hegemonic rule fades into history. No party has a strong advantage over the other in terms of diaspora infrastructure, and thus a party which invests in building permanent party offices and membership committees. This would require a change in the law, however, which would also lift some of the barriers Mexicans face in registering and voting from abroad, and which would in turn further incentivize greater party diaspora outreach. The 2016 change in the law which allowed Mexican migrants to register to vote from abroad for the first time I evidence that such changes are possible.

Is diaspora influence real?

A secondary set of questions of this study is whether diaspora influence really exists, and whether it works the way parties which engage in diaspora campaigning believe it does. This study finds that the answer to the first question is yes, and to the second question, no.

Party officials interviewed were presented with two scenarios: one in which a voter in the sending country receives a call from her uncle in Los Angeles, who sends her family regular remittances, who tells her he wants her to vote for candidate X in an upcoming election. In one scenario, the niece says “well, I was going to vote for candidate Y, but my uncle is successful and is supporting the family, he must know what he’s talking about, I’ll vote for the candidate he likes.” In another scenario, the niece says “my uncle left this country years ago, does not live the day to day life I do, and isn’t personally affected by the policies that will be enacted following this election. Why should I take his opinion seriously?” Officials were asked why they are so
sure the first scenario is what really happens and not the second scenario. None offered a compelling argument as to why the first scenario must be true, except that they believe remittances trump any resentment on the part of those the migrant tries to convince.

In fact, it appears most likely that neither is true. Rather, the statistical models in chapter 6 point to a different way in which diaspora influence operates: that it does not affect basic electoral behavior such as voting, but does affect higher-level behavior among those already politically active, behavior typical of party militants. Family members abroad probably do not change their relatives’ votes, because family members often already have shared political sympathies. This was reflected in the survey of New York Dominicans, a majority of whom said their family members share the same politics that they do. Regular travel and communication keep migrants up to speed with political developments at home, and on the same page with their relatives beyond election cycles. Additionally, the reasons for migration in the first place likely have weight on both the migrant and his relatives’ political attitudes: even if migration was not for explicit political reasons, migrants will often blame the economic situation which precipitated a move on the party in office at the time, which explains the strong antipathy for the PRI among Mexican migrants, who had 70 years to blame the party for their, and their family’s, economic situation. It is highly likely that their relatives in the sending country would feel the same way; they are, after all, the beneficiaries of the remittances, the necessity of which may have prompted the migration.

Communication between migrants and their relatives likely does not change votes so much as reinforce existing partisan sympathies within families. The results of the hierarchical models of individual-level polls and country-level indicators are consistent with this theory. For Latin American voters, having a family member in the U.S. makes one no more likely to pay
attention to politics, to register to vote, or to vote, than one who has no relative living abroad. However someone with a relative abroad is significantly more likely to engage in behavior typical of party militants – that is, someone who already has a strong opinion about politics: a voter is more likely to identify with a party, try to persuade other voters to vote for their favored candidate, to attend party meetings, and volunteer for a campaign. Notably, when interactions are included with remittances, the results show that this family influence effect remains positive and significant even when remittances are zero. Simply having a relative abroad is sufficient to change voters’ behavior. But it is behavior typical of someone who already has her mind made up for whom to vote, likely because she already agrees with her relative abroad. Transnational inter-familial political communication makes those at home who are already motivated about politics more motivated – enough to become a party militant, to proselytize and convince others to vote. But if those at home are not already motivated, it will do little to turn a nonvoter into a voter.

Thus when parties engage in diaspora campaigning, it is not a wasted effort. It simply doesn’t pay off to them as they believe it does. Party officials across all three countries overwhelmingly believed that by campaigning abroad, they are winning the votes of relatives back home, even with a multiplier effect: “five votes in El Salvador for every one in Washington,” according to the FMLN official in DC. They see diaspora campaigning as an indirect way of winning votes. In fact, it is even more indirect than they believe. The relative back home was probably going to already vote for the party whose uncle in DC supports the FMLN; they are probably an FMLN militant family, and always have been. Rather, holding a campaign rally in DC motivates the uncle to motivate his niece at home to win votes from other
voters at home. The electoral payoff is two steps removed from the migrant who was originally targeted, but the payoff exists.

Further applications

The cases examined in this study are limited to one region, with cases drawn from three countries. As the top region of origin for migration to the United States, Latin America dominates the discussion of migration issues in this country and sets the framework for how Americans view the issue. Other studies, however, indicate similar dynamics in other regions. The importance of institutionalized transnational networks have been noted for Turkish and Kurdish diasporas in Germany (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003), the Armenian diaspora in Greece (Sökefeld and Schwalgin 2000), and the Russian diaspora in Israel (Khanin 2002). The importance of skew for the relative openness or restrictiveness of the diaspora electoral regime can be seen in cases such as Uganda, Ghana, and Zimbabwe, where diaspora voting is restricted by incumbent governments which do not have diaspora support; in Zimbabwe, only diaspora voting is restricted to military and consular officers abroad. The Romanian case is instructive in how much skew can matter: despite low voter turnout, the Romanian diaspora swung the 2009 presidential election from predicted winner Mircea Geoana to incumbent president Traian Basescu, due to a heavy skew by the diaspora, which largely left in the communist era, away from Geoana’s left party, the Social Democrats (Burean 2011). If migration flows increase globally, parties with a favorable diaspora skew and the infrastructure to mobilize it will be well positioned to capitalize on the transnationalization of elections throughout the world.

The two variables explaining variation in party diaspora outreach have additional implications beyond home country elections. This study focuses just on their impact on politics – specifically electoral politics – in sending countries. However two other areas of impact include
domestic politics (or foreign policy) in receiving countries, and nonelectoral politics in sending countries. This section will consider how diaspora skew and infrastructure might travel with regard to diaspora ethnic lobbies, and overseas support networks for civil conflict groups.

Diaspora ethnic lobbies

The issue of skew ties this study of electoral politics in sending countries to diaspora ethnic lobbies in receiving countries. Partisan skew is especially apparent in cases of politically-motivated mass migration, in which the diaspora population identifies with an officially persecuted opposition movement; in the U.S., the Cuban American lobby, and in Europe, the Romanian diaspora (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015), are famous examples. The Cuban American and Armenian American lobbies in the U.S. demonstrate the power of migrant groups, skewed to one side by a collectively shared sense of trauma or persecution, can impact U.S. policy toward the sending country in a skewed way as well: the U.S. embargo on Cuba, a Cold War vestige long proven ineffective in achieving its goals, remains in place against widespread global opposition and domestic unpopularity due to the importance of the issue for a single well-organized diaspora group. On the other hand, the Armenian American community’s single-minded focus, so far unsuccessful, on U.S. recognition of the Armenian genocide masks its successes at achieving a great deal of community benefits and recognition at the local level.

More recently, diaspora mobilization in the U.S. has shown to complicate U.S. foreign policy, even for purely symbolic issues. In Virginia, the large Vietnamese community, founded by exiles of the now Socialist Republic of Vietnam, lobbied the state legislature to pass a law replacing all flags of that government in all public buildings such as schools with the flag of the former country of South Vietnam; the effort failed when then-secretary of state Colin Powell protested, telling the Virginia statehouse that such a law would violate U.S. policy. Soon after,
the state’s even larger Korean community, 80,000 strong, succeeded in lobbying the legislature to pass a bill to include the name “East Sea,” Koreans’ preferred name for the body of water between the Korean peninsula and Japan, alongside the officially recognized name “Sea of Japan” in all school textbooks and atlases. This too contradicted U.S. policy, and prompted protests from the Japanese government, but was passed and signed into law by Governor Terry McAuliffe in 2014.\textsuperscript{147}

Both variables, skew and infrastructure, play vital roles in diaspora lobbying in migrant-receiving countries just as they do in elections in migrant-sending countries. The success of such lobbies depends on will and organization, as well as a lack of organized will on the opposite side. The Cuban American lobby’s deep roots in Florida politics, institutionalized in the form of the Cuban American National Foundation and the Cuban Liberty Council, among other community and business associations, and its ability to turn out one issue voters on U.S. relations toward Cuba, gives the lobby tremendous clout with politicians wary of alienating a large and consequential voting bloc in a swing state. The Virginia Korean community, while not skewing toward one party over another, skews strongly on the singular issue of Japanese colonialist legacy, and thus was ripe for mobilization. Nevertheless, efforts to do so failed until the many Korean community organizations coalesced around a single lobby and mobilized thousands of voters around a single piece of legislation.

The flipside to this phenomenon is the failure of other potential diaspora ethnic lobbies. Virginia’s Japanese community, despite official support from the Japanese government and embassy, failed to mobilize to oppose the bill, lacking the numbers but also the community infrastructure or, likely, the will or skew, as issues of colonial legacy are far less potent in Japan


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than they are in South Korea. Other Latin American migrant groups complain about special
treatment for Cuban migrants, which included the “wet foot dry foot” policy, until the Obama
administration overturned it. However such other groups such as Haitian Americans have so far
lacked the infrastructure that Cuban Americans have had to mobilize their communities around
singular issues to the point of changing national policy. While a recipe for success, a strong skew
toward one issue and an institutionalized diaspora infrastructure can also arouse suspicion within
migrant receiving countries of non-assimilation and exaggerate perceptions of immigrant groups
pushing for special interests which do not comport with the interests of the majority, hints of
which could be seen in the Virginia East Sea bill, which was opposed by some Democratic
lawmakers under the pretext that it did not extend similar privileges to other minority groups.

Support for combatant groups

A second topic of relevance for diaspora skew and infrastructure is when diaspora groups
aim to impact politics in home countries through nonelectoral means, either because there are no
open elections, or due to a sense of the futility of electoral means or the illegitimacy of the
electoral rules governing the country. There is a significant body of research on diaspora support
for combatant groups in Northern Ireland (Guelke 1996), Sri Lanka (Cochrane et al 2009), India
(Fair 2005), Iran (Clark 2007), Somalia (Vidino et al 2010), and Russia (Koinova 2011), among
other countries. Separatist or rebel groups in these and other areas have often relied on diaspora
networks for support, primarily financial, but also propaganda related and in some cases for
fighters. These cases share much in common with the civil war state of diaspora politics in El
Salvador, when the principal parties were still combatant groups, and one, the FMLN, received
financial and political support from exile Salvadorans in the U.S. as well as more friendly
countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua.
In these cases, the conflict can have a galvanizing effect on the diaspora, and in many instances, be the cause of the growth of the diaspora itself. Political conflict-driven out-migration makes diaspora skew more likely and long lasting. It can also increase the likelihood of the creation of a diaspora support network out of necessity for both combatant groups and refugees fleeing conflict zones under desperate circumstances.

As in electoral diaspora politics, the distinct skew of the diaspora relative to that of the home country electorate can create a unique set of interests which, if paired with an effective support infrastructure, can have the effect of prolonging the conflict (Wayland 2004). In Northern Ireland’s Troubles, the Irish American community’s support for the Provisional Irish Republican Army, institutionalized as a U.S.-based fundraising vehicle, Irish Northern Aid (NORAIM), was a subject of protest by the United Kingdom and a source of friction between the U.S. and U.K. It also elicited resentment from many in Ireland, where the government, and the majority of the population, regarded the IRA as a terrorist group. A similar dynamic can be seen in the Tamil Tigers’ reliance on support from the Tamil diaspora in India, the U.K., and North America (Demmers 2007), and the Khalistan movement for Punjabi separatism in India, enjoying relatively more support in the Sikh community abroad than in India, and has a highly organized militant support network abroad (Fair 2005).

Extending the impact of diaspora skew and infrastructure to nonelectoral politics would involve a different set of outcomes, related to the functioning and longevity of the movements which they would support. However, in measuring overall levels of activity, it is plausible that the same patterns would hold with diaspora electoral politics, with both a positive diaspora skew and a well-established diaspora infrastructure would both be critical to the ability of militant
movements to carry out a range of activities such as fundraising, recruiting, weapons acquisition, and propaganda.

Future research on diaspora politics would be best served by a broader comparative approach, one that is not limited by region or elections. Diaspora politics are global, and interact in multiple ways, as diaspora ethnic lobbies can affect receiving country foreign policy toward sending countries, which can in turn affect sending country politics and impact migration flows, as in the Cuban American lobby’s inadvertent precipitation of the Mariel boatlift. Multiple diaspora groups may also interact or conflict within receiving countries, with historical grievances between Korean migrants and the Japanese government playing out in state legislative politics thousands of miles away from their root causes. And the role diasporas play as non-state actors in nonelectoral politics is of increasing importance with the transnationalization not only of elections but also of crime, terrorism, and civil conflict.

More than just votes

Those who dismiss the impact of the diaspora on home country elections – especially parties with the disfavor of the diaspora or news outlets partisan to them – tend to look only at the diaspora voter turnout numbers, which are exceedingly low: just 2,334 votes from abroad in El Salvador’s 2014 election, 32,632 votes in Mexico’s 2006 election, and 34,550 in the Dominican Republic’s 2004 election, all the first year of external voting. Yet in two of those elections, El Salvador and Mexico, the winning party won the election by the narrowest of margins (or fraud, according to the losing parties). In both of those elections, the diaspora favored the winning party at a higher rate than any other geographic constituency: 63% for the FMLN for diaspora Salvadoran voters, 57% for the PAN (in a three-way race) for Mexican diaspora voters. Undoubtedly most of those voters, and those who did not vote, spoke to their
relatives at home about the election. And when counting the votes in areas from which those
migrants left, also states in which the winning party won, it is likely diaspora Salvadorans and
Mexicans did play a crucial role. In El Salvador, the department which voted for the winning
party at the second highest rate, San Miguel, is the top per capita migrant sending state in the
country. Migueleños make up a huge part of the Salvadoran diaspora, and if there is any area in
which their influence would have results, it would be in that department, one which was
historically dominated by the right but has trended more to the left in recent elections – a trend
underscored by the defeat of a longtime strongman mayor of the capital of that department, by an
inexperienced FMLN candidate who campaigned in Washington and drew support from
Migueleños there.

Parties which wish to capitalize on diaspora influence would do well to focus on the most
motivated and committed militants, or do the necessary work to build a loyal mass base and the
infrastructure necessary to mobilize them. Global trends point to a steady movement toward full
diaspora enfranchisement throughout the world. As migration flows increase and citizenship
becomes an increasingly transnational concept, electoral battlegrounds will become less and less
constrained by national borders. Many countries already have an enormous potential electorate
living abroad, but their impact can have a multiplier effect on elections in their home countries.
Parties, candidates, governments, organizations and movements – electoral or otherwise – which
thrive in a world of transnational politics will be those who are able to tap their respective
diasporas source of support.
### Appendix 1. Interview Subjects

<table>
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<th>Name</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<td>Natividad Gonzalez Paras</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Ex Governor of Nuevo Leon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augustin Barrios Gomez</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>Member of Chamber of Deputies</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luis Carlos Ugalde</td>
<td>appointment</td>
<td>Ex Director of Federal Election Institute</td>
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<td>Lorena Buzon</td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>Office of the Presidency</td>
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<td>Juan Rebolledo</td>
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<td>Dalia Moreno</td>
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<td>Carlos Heredia</td>
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<td>Alejandro Reynoso</td>
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<td>Melvin Manon</td>
<td>DxC</td>
<td>Member of party executive committee</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Olaya Dotel</td>
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<td>Pedro Catrain</td>
<td>DxC</td>
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<td>Janet Camilo</td>
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<td>Guillermo Moreno</td>
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<td>Fidel Santana</td>
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<td>Marcos Villaman</td>
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<td>Director, FUNGLODE</td>
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<td>Eduardo Estrella</td>
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<td>Rafael Castro Matos</td>
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<td>Modesto Reynoso</td>
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<td>Jose Angel Aquino</td>
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<td>Jorge Feliz Pacheco</td>
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<td>Director, PLD youth wing</td>
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<td>Gustavo Estrella</td>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>Director, PRSC youth wing</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Carlos Morales</td>
<td>PRSC</td>
<td>Ex VP and Ex president of PRSC</td>
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<td>Jose Morel</td>
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<td>Minou Tavárez Mirabal</td>
<td>now APD</td>
<td>Presidential Candidate</td>
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<td>Gerardo Muyshondt</td>
<td>ARENA</td>
<td>Campaign strategist and publicist</td>
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<td>Joaquin Samayoa</td>
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<td>Political analyst</td>
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<td>Rafael Alfaro</td>
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<td>Director of International Affairs</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Margarita Escobar</td>
<td>ARENA</td>
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<td>Jaime Edgardo Juarez</td>
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<td>Karina Sosa</td>
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<td>Sofia Flores</td>
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<td>Pedro Monterroza</td>
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<td>Ana Roque</td>
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<td>Sonia Umanzor</td>
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<td>Alex Nunez</td>
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<td>Agustin Arevalo</td>
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<td>Base committee activist</td>
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Appendix 2. International Travel Records for Mexican Parties, 2006 - 2012

PAN visits to U.S.

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<tr>
<td>Arturo Lavin Salazar</td>
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<td>Antonio Alvarado Briones</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>3/15/2007</td>
<td>Course in political marketing</td>
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<td>Jacobo Barrera Perez</td>
<td>Miami, FL</td>
<td>5/21/2007</td>
<td>&quot;Meeting with Mexicans for local celebrations&quot;</td>
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<tr>
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<td>New York, NY</td>
<td>5/31/2007</td>
<td>Course in electoral campaigns</td>
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<td>Hector Enrique Muñoz Moreno</td>
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<td>Various</td>
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<td>7/20/2007</td>
<td>&quot;Structural meetings of PAN in the US&quot;</td>
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<td>Juan Carlos Luna</td>
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<td>7/21/2007</td>
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<td>Jesus Ramirez Rangel</td>
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### PRD visits to U.S.

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<td>Saul Escobar</td>
<td>Tucson, AZ</td>
<td>4/30/2010</td>
<td>Protest Arizona SB 1070</td>
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<td>Jose de Jesus Zambrano</td>
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<td>1/15/2012</td>
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<td>Jose Iran Moreno Santos</td>
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### PRI visits to U.S.

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<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>12/31/2007</td>
<td>&quot;Women in the Americas: Path to Political Power&quot;</td>
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<td>Sebastian Pelayo</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>5/13/2008</td>
<td>InterAmerican Dialogue: Sol Ilinowitz Forum</td>
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<td>Irma Soto</td>
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<td>Mario Alvarez Basilio</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>10/24/2008</td>
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<td>Edgar Alfredo Monroy Torres</td>
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<td>10/24/2008</td>
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<td>Fausto Zapata</td>
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<td>8/21/2009</td>
<td>&quot;Academic meeting of the office of international student services&quot;</td>
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<td>Agustin Trujillo</td>
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<td>9/15/2009</td>
<td>UN Conference on Climate Change</td>
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<td>Manuel Ignacio Acosta</td>
<td>New York, NY</td>
<td>9/18/2009</td>
<td>64th General Assembly of the Socialist International</td>
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<td>Beatriz Paredes Rangel</td>
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<td>&quot;Petition of the new leadership of the Confederation of Mexican Federations&quot;</td>
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<td>&quot;Women and Politics&quot; forum</td>
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</table>
Jorge Alberto Mendez
Meeting of the presidium of the Socialist International

Sergio Tovar  New York, NY  11/30/2012  Meeting of the presidium of the Socialist International

Source: National Electoral Institute records request, May 2014
Appendix 3. Glossary of Abbreviations

APD: Partido Alianza por la Democracia, Alliance for Democracy (DR)

ARENA: Alianza Nacionalista Republicana, Nationalist Republican Alliance (ES)

CISPES: Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (US/ES)

COENA: Consejo Ejecutivo Nacional, National Executive Council of ARENA (ES)

DxC: Dominicanos por el Cambio, Dominicans for Change (DR)

ERP: Ejército Revolucionario Popular, People’s Revolutionary Army (ES)

FA: Frente Amplio, Broad Front (DR)

FMLN: Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (ES)

FPL: Fuerzas Populares de Liberación, Popular Liberation Forces (ES)

FUNGLODE: Fundación Global Democracia y Desarrollo, Global Democracy and Development Foundation (DR)

FUSADES: Fundación Salvadoreña para el Desarrollo Económico y Social, Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development (ES)

GANA: Gran Alianza por la Unidad Nacional, Grand Alliance for National Unity (ES)

GLLAMM: Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Model

HTA: Hometown Association

IFE: Instituto Federal Electoral, Mexican Elections Board (old name)

INE: Instituto Nacional Electoral, Mexican Elections Board (new name)

JCE: Junta Central Electoral, Dominican Elections Board

LAPOP: Latin American Public Opinion Project

MORENA: Movimiento Regeneración Nacional, National Regeneration Movement (Mexico)

MIMEXPOL: Migrantes Mexicanos por los Derechos Políticos, Mexican Migrants for Political Rights (US/Mexico)
OPREE: Oficina de Registro para Votantes en el Exterior, Office for Overseas Voter Registration (DR)

PAN: Partido Acción Nacional, National Action Party (Mexico)

PCN: Partido de Concertación Nacional, National Coalition Party (ES)

PCS: Partido Comunista Salvadoreño, Salvadoran Communist Party (ES)

PDC: Partido Demócrata Cristiano, Christian Democrat Party (ES)

PLD: Partido de la Liberación Dominicana, Dominican Liberation Party (DR)

PRD: Partido de la Revolución Democrática, Party of the Democratic Revolution (Mexico)

PRD: Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, Dominican Revolutionary Party (DR)

PRI: Partido Revolucionario Institucional, Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico)

PRM: Partido de la Revolución Moderna, Modern Revolutionary Party (DR)

PRSC: Partido Reformista Social Cristiano, Social Christian Reformist Party (DR)

PRTC: Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos, Central American Workers’ Revolutionary Party (ES)

RN: Resistencia Nacional, National Resistance (ES)

SANA: Salvadoran American National Association (US/ES)

SHARE: Salvadoran Humanitarian and Research Foundation (US/ES)

TSE: Tribunal Supremo Electoral, Salvadoran Elections Board


