THE PROLONGED RELIGIOUS WAVE OF TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

The religious wave of terrorism continues to dominate modern terrorism and pose transnational threats. The religious wave emerged in 1979 with the Iranian revolution, and David Rapoport has identified that if it follows the pattern of its three predecessors, the wave could disappear by 2025. This thesis analyzes the elements that are expected to prolong the wave of religious terrorism beginning with the evaluation of the history of international terrorism. Rapoport’s four main waves of modern terrorism serve as the backdrop for this thesis: first - the anarchist led movement; second - the anti-colonial movement; third - the new leftist movement; and fourth - the current religious wave with Islam at the heart. The five influential elements that determine the success of each wave are the terrorist organizations, diaspora population, states, sympathetic foreign publics, and super national organizations. The resiliency of the dominant terror organization in this wave, the Islamic State, plays a large role in the endurance of this wave. The Islamic State is evaluated against the four principles of the Aristotelian model of causality: material, formal, efficient, and final in order to assess them with a formalized model that adds rigor and completeness to the complex situation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER ONE
THE WAVES OF TERRORISM

Introduction

Terrorism is a cyclical, monolithic phenomenon that consumes many who have
dedicated their lives fighting it and whose lives have been taken through its violence.
The definition for terrorism has morphed over time, and agreement on a definition is as
challenging as developing a supported method of combating the threat. The definition
of terrorism has been contested over the years, but for this paper we will use the
Department of Defense’s definition because it contains the crucial elements required for
understanding terrorist motivations. Terrorism is “the calculated use of unlawful
violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies
in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives.”¹

International terrorism is a long-term threat that must be continuously studied
and examined amid its different forms across time and place. In this paper, David
Rapaport’s wave interpretation will provide the backdrop for evaluating the history of
international terrorism and the elements that have shaped the challenges we currently
face. Rapoport categorizes terrorism through international patterns and identifies four
main waves of modern terrorism led first by the anarchist movement; second - the anti-

¹ William J. Perry, DoD Combating Terrorism Program (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense),
colonial movement; third - by the new leftist movement; and fourth - the current religious wave with “Islam at the heart.”

The religious wave emerged in 1979 with the Iranian revolution and “if [it follows] the pattern of its three predecessors, [the wave] could disappear by 2025, at which time a new wave might emerge.” Islam is facing destructive levels of extremism, which had led to unprecedented levels of radicalization. From the unthinkable events of September 11, 2001 to the November 13, 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, the world has been devastated by the violence and atrocities which have occurred in this religious wave. We will examine key events that launched the fourth wave and have likely played a significant role in prolonging it; including the 1979 Iranian Revolution, new Islamic century, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Arab Spring.

The history of Al-Qeada and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) plays a significant role in our ability to understand the terrorist organizations. Their techniques, tactics and procedures have repeatedly taken the world by surprise through some of the most profound and barbaric international attacks. In 2015 the most deaths from terrorism were recorded since 2000, and half of all deaths occurred in the Organization

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3 Ibid.
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and were inspired or directed by ISIS.  

This paper will evaluate the key elements that account for the existence of ISIS by applying the four principles of the Aristotelian model of causality: material, formal, efficient, and final.  

ISIS declared a caliphate. It has attracted thousands of foreign fighters, and they are now among the most violent extremist groups whose rhetoric and propaganda appeal to radicalized Muslims and non-Muslims joining the path of martyrdom.

The evolutionary tactics displayed by ISIS go beyond the intrinsic features of the religious movement as established by Rapoport. The religious terrorist group’s ability to inspire, will likely be prolonged in the fourth wave. The religious wave of terrorism is still at the forefront of modern international challenges as evidenced by the recently signed “Executive Order [aimed at] Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist entry into the United States,” which imposed a “90-day suspension entry to the US, of nationals of

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certain designated countries; Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Iran, Somalia, Libya, and Yemen.”7 The religious wave must be re-examined using “the interactions of the five principal actors: terrorist organizations, diaspora population, states, sympathetic foreign publics, and super national organizations.”8

**First Wave: Anarchist Movement**

Modern terrorism is rooted in the global spread of ideals of rebellion and revolution through violent means. The essence of terrorism, which played a heavy hand in its manifestation, was embodied in democratic values in the aftermath of the French Revolution (1789–1799). Maximilien Robespierre, the architect of the French Revolution's Reign of Terror, declared that “only terror would produce true democratic dispositions.”9

The first modern wave of terrorism began in 1878 Russia with a woman named Vera Zasulich. She took a stand against injustice by wounding a “Russian police commander who abused political prisoners,” and proudly proclaimed herself to be a “terrorist, not a killer.”10 The ‘terrorist’ label embodied a noble cause; representing

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9 Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, Conflict, 2nd ed., s.v. “Glossary.” The concept of terrorism, as distinguished from the phenomenon, is a recent development, produced by the secular French Revolution. The term originated in 1795, meaning “government by intimidation” or “a (government) policy intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted.” “Terrorists' carried out those policies. The architects of the French Reign of Terror believed that they possessed a new purpose and method; when Robespierre proclaimed “either virtue or the terror,” he meant that only terror would produce true democratic dispositions.
those willing to stand in the face of injustice. The first wave of terrorism which is categorized as the anarchist movement by David Rapoport, largely drew its motivations from the “slow democratization process”\textsuperscript{11} of the time.

The assassination of Czar Alexander II embodies the movement that imposed terror and violence in opposition of political leaders and inspired mass rebellion.\textsuperscript{12} In 1861 Czar Alexander II emancipated Russia’s serfs and awarded back their land. Unfortunately, due to a lack of economic opportunities and the slow democratization process they were not able to quickly assimilate. Government reforms failed, and fueled the anarchists’ movement. Their violence backfired as the Russian government “reversed reformist tendencies, [which] prompted an expansion of police powers... official campaigns lashed out brutally at Jews and other national minorities.”\textsuperscript{13} The Russian state response further perpetuated existing turmoil “among intellectuals (many of whom were anarchists) and among workers and peasants.”\textsuperscript{14}

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{10} Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 50.
\item\textsuperscript{12} Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, Conflict, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., s.v. “Glossary.” Said “the Narodnaya Volya organization represented the ‘Will of the People’ in Russia between 1879–92 and proudly labeled themselves as a terrorist organization. They not only modernized the use of assassinations against high officials, but also were responsible for the assassination of Czar Alexander II in 1881.”
\item\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
The late nineteenth century served as a tumultuous time for many countries as the social, economic and political climate produced a breeding ground for the ‘Golden Age of Assassinations.’\textsuperscript{15} Significant global transformations occurred during this time frame including the second industrial revolution. New technology and transportation connected people through the “telegraph, daily mass newspaper, and railroads.”\textsuperscript{16} Nationalism was on the rise as people grappled with the new age of imperialism. The stability which Otto Von Bismarck had worked tirelessly to establish, began to unravel in the 1870s with the rise of nationalist aims, uprisings, and rebellions.

European stability began to collapse after the “Balkans exploded, as many groups found the boundaries of states recently torn out of the Ottoman Empire unsatisfactory.”\textsuperscript{17} This caused “Bismarck, anxious for peace, [to convene] the Berlin Congress in 1878 to win an acceptable compromise. The great loser at the Congress of Berlin was Russia, which left resentful that its enormous gains were nullified.”\textsuperscript{18} A new age of imperialism was paved as European nations began the land grab of many colonies for material resources. Italy, Germany, France and Britain were heavily involved in the scramble as they “sought empires to prove their status. Russia, the United States and

\textsuperscript{15} Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, Conflict, 2nd ed., s.v. “Glossary.”

\textsuperscript{16} Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 49.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 51.

Japan also joined the competition.”¹⁹ France built republics in a mandated Syria and Lebanon, and Britain formed monarchies in the majority the Middle East. Imperialism, motivated by the economic pursuit of natural resources to industrialize, created captive markets in the territories and was enforced through direct military and political dominance.

The geopolitical climate ushered in a new competitive nature that spurred massive changes. It was met with resistance as people responded to the first effects of globalization, the demands of industry,²⁰ and the ethics of imperialism that was heightened through advancement of communication and transportation of people and ideals. Through the movement of people and ideas the essential elements of these waves connected mass populations by their grievances and emboldened individuals to join the terror culture by taking violent action against ‘domestic’ issues. The anarchist wave spread from Russia and Eastern Europe to the United States, and the “high point of the wave’s international terrorist activity occurred in the 1890s, [deemed] the Golden Age of Assassinations.”²¹ The anarchist movement had widespread effects as assassinations struck “French President Marie Francois Sadi Carnot in 1894, Spain's
Prime Minister Antonio Canovas del Castillo in 1897, Austrian Empress Elisabeth in 1898, King Umberto I of Italy in 1900, and US President William McKinley in 1901. In response, President Theodore Roosevelt launched his efforts to deal with modern terrorism, and proclaimed “anarchy [as] a crime against the whole human race, and all mankind should band together against the Anarchist. His crimes should be made a crime against the law of nations . . . declared by treaties among all civilized powers.” Roosevelt’s “crusade [against the anarchist] lasted [only] four years largely because states found it politically difficult to sustain the same policy towards all terrorists regardless of their different causes. Ironically, the democratic states had the most misgivings about the crusade.” The reactive counterterrorism policies of the US and Europe failed after President McKinley’s assassination, as Julia Rose Kraut states:

Russia and Germany completely suppress[ed] all anarchist newspapers. Italian authorities renewed their anti-anarchist efforts, suppress[ed] anarchist meetings and arrested individual anarchists. France bann[ed] all anarchist literature, philosophical and otherwise, and Swiss authorities intended to pass more stringent anti anarchist laws. In Germany, imperial Chancellor Count von Bulow

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23 Ibid., 170. She said “the troubled Czolgosz claimed he was disciple of the notorious anarchist leader and lecturer Emma Goldman. Emma Goldman(1869-1940) immigrated to the United States from Lithuania in 1885. She became radicalized during the Haymarket Affair in 1886 and become an anarchist. She met anarchist Alexander Berkman and Johann Most, becoming Most’s protégé, and began lecturing on anarchism during the 1890s. By 1901 she had replaced Johann Most as the leader of the anarchist movement in America. She defined anarchism as “the philosophy of a new social order based on liberty unrestricted by man made law; the theory that a l forms of government rest on violence, and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as unnecessary.


announced that anarchists would be under constant surveillance, subject to arrest and deportation at any time if suspected of contributing to labor unrest or for their unruly behavior.\textsuperscript{26}

The United States response included the following:

\ldots exclusion, deportation, and the suppression of anarchist speech, [which ultimately] backfired and succeeded galvanizing anarchists and others in common recognition that such suppression threatened freedom of speech and transformed the public perceptions of anarchists’ from dangerous, violent criminals to free speech defenders.\textsuperscript{27}

The international community’s inability to deal with the spread of global terrorism led to “unintended consequences”- the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the beginning of World War I.\textsuperscript{28}

The interaction between the principal actors within the anarchist wave gave strength to the spread of terror culture through the unique roles of the terrorist organizations, diaspora populations, states, and sympathetic foreign publics. Terrorist operations were decentralized, and because there was no direct command structure, the mobilizing forces became foreign influences and sympathetic foreign publics. The


\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 172.

\textsuperscript{28} Henry Kissinger, \textit{Diplomacy} (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 100. He said, “the crisis over the Archduke’s assassination ran out of control because no leader was prepared to back down and every county was concerned above all with living up to formal treaty obligations rather than to an overall concept of a long-range common interest. What Europe lacked was some all-encompassing value system to bind the powers together, such as had existed in the Metternich system or the cold-blooded diplomatic flexibility of Bismarck’s Realpolitik. World War I started not because countries broke their treaties, but because they fulfilled them to the letter. Kissinger, Henry, 1923. 1994. diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster.”
West provided safe heavens to “Russian anarchists [that] fled and found refuge in Russian diaspora colonies.”

29 Russian anarchists brought the dominant terror doctrine of Sergei Nechaev who proclaimed the ‘science of destruction.’

30 Sympathetic foreign publics served as the constituency base for anarchists, as they were the ones responsible for conducting the terrorist attacks. The Russian anarchists not only sought to “[radically reconstruct Russia] but they also trained other groups [like] the Polish and the Armenians who sought more modest goals of national independence.”

31 The global transformation of the late nineteenth century cultivated an oppositional response that resonated with radical ideals. Foreign influences took root and inspired action within sympathetic groups.

The Russian Bakunin has often been called the father of Spanish anarchism. Johann Most, a German immigrant, was a major figure in developing terrorism in the US. Mostly, it was immigrants who organized terror attacks in the West. They belonged to ethnic networks sponsoring discussion groups focusing on issues of the day, and radical publications. Individuals normally made the attacks, but the basic unit was an autonomous cell consisting of several persons.


30 Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, Conflict, 2nd ed., s.v. “Glossary.” Said “Sergei Nechaev's Revolutionary Catechism (1868) proclaims a “science of destruction,” one in which individuals took lessons from friends and enemies alike, and successive generations participated in fresh efforts to alter the range and character of terrorist activity. Sergei Nechaev wrote the first “mini-manual” on the “science of destruction” or terrorism. It waived all moral limits to the struggle; terrorists had to understand themselves wholly as “instruments” of a cause. The Russian work visualized many ways to provoke government repression to generate uprisings.” Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, Conflict, 2nd ed., s.v. “Glossary.”

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.
State governments did not take the threats posed by the anarchists seriously; this had grave implications. The counterterrorism policies rolled out after President McKinley’s assassination were ineffective. States ignored the anarchists’ threats, and by the time they were taken seriously, the underpinnings of WWI dominated the political scene. WWI which was “precipitated in part by the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, encouraged reforms and revolution which depressed the incentives for anarchist terrorism.”

Towards the end of WWI the Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed between Britain and France, a secret agreement to colonize the Middle East after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. However, in the 1920’s Britain’s foreign policies and commitment to the Middle East shifted dramatically. After carving up the Middle East, western empires realized the draining long-term effects of imperial rule, and the second wave of anticolonial sentiments led to the dismantling of their occupation.

As empires relinquished direct control over territories, they often placed absolute rulers in power, generally from minority groups. Neo-Imperialism then sought to control access to natural resources, and to integrate national economies into the neo-liberal world order without direct territorial control. Many of the territories were left with factitious borders and were ripe for civil war, especially in the countries where tribal politics ran supreme.

The establishment of monarchies through imperial forces left many countries in the Middle East torn. Republics in the Middle East continue to face significant turmoil because of their question of legitimacy. Republics like Tunisia and Libya have struggled with legitimacy as leaders have been seen as backed by western powers serving foreign interests. The governments are seen as a sham because they were established from previous military occupation.

Monarchies like Saudi Arabia and Morocco, on the other hand, have withstood the revolutionary storm because they are relatively established by historical ties and respected through religious lenses. The history of these various countries gives context to the turmoil they face today. Countries in the Muslim world must be understood through the political, religious, and historical lens. The Fertile Crescent Arabs (in Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) are thought of as more liberal to new ideas and slightly more modern. In contrast, the Arabian Peninsula is home to the Bedouin tribes (Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates) who live in a more traditional way in the heart of the desert. Historic tensions in the Middle East have long seeded complexities. These complexities became a bit more problematic in the first wave, but have transcended to the present-day wave of religious terrorism with Islam at the center. The fall of the Ottoman Empire is compared to the 5th century fall of the Roman Empire. It took Europe 1500 years to recover and fully reorganize after the fall of the Roman Empire. We must remember the challenges involved in conquering a group of people who lived under strict rule. It has been less than a century since the end of imperialism in the Middle East and Northern Africa, and
many of these nations have not fully organized because they have historically lived under divided tribal rule.

**Second Wave: Anti-colonialism**

The terrorist activities of this time are categorized around the struggles between terrorist organizations or ‘freedom fighters’ against organized military and police forces represented in occupied territories.\(^{34}\) The anticolonial movement embodies the monolithic history of terrorism and is subjective in nature. Terrorists in the first wave demanded prosperity in a changing democratic and capitalist society, especially with the coming of the second industrial revolution and rise of nationalism. The first wave ended before WWI, but the essential elements which sparked the anarchist movement were very much alive and exacerbated by the polices enacted during the Treaty of Versailles.

Nationalism had spread globally through the first wave and materialized during the second as freedom fighters, who asserted their dominance through guerilla-like tactics. The motivations of this wave help to focus terrorist groups on their cause, which allowed for the rebranding of the ‘terrorist’ label. This created a structured, and in some

\(^{34}\) Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 53.
cases, a fruitful approach that led to the establishment of states like Israel, Ireland, Cyprus, and Algeria.  

The Treaty of Versailles that concluded WWI mandated the dismantling of the Central Powers empires. This accelerated the challenges of the anticolonial movement as terrorist tactics were used to bring down empires that were already fracturing. Notably, “the second wave [was] fought in territories where special political problems made withdrawal a less attractive option.”38 While the main motivations of this wave developed in response to the colonial rule, they were “not the only purpose of the struggle.”39 The second half of the struggle came once colonial powers withdrew. The Irgun was a terrorist organization that fought to protect and establish the state of Israel.

35 Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, Conflict, 2nd ed., s.v. “Glossary.” Said, the “Irish Republican Army: A second-wave separatist, largely Catholic, group that became the most durable modern terrorist organization whose strategy influenced second-wave groups enormously. Its initial campaign (1919–22) resulted in the Irish Free State (1922). But since the original objective was to gain the whole island, the IRA split, generating a civil war. Subsequent campaign to gain the mainly Protestant North occurred in 1939–40, 1955–62, and 1967–2007. In 1969, IRA split over tactics and Marxist influences created the Provisional IRA (Provos) which became the main body, Officials, and the INLA (Irish National Liberation Army). A 2007 agreement brought the IRA into the Northern Ireland government and may be the compromise that will end the struggle.”

36 Ibid. “EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Struggle for Union with Greece) eliminated British rule to gain a union with Greece. Instead, the state of Cyprus (1952) was established, the only entity that the frightened Turkish Cypriots would tolerate. But EOKA atrocities have made achievement of a single state for that island impossible so far, especially as Turkey refused to accept Turkish Cypriot refugees, and thus alter the ethnic character of the island.”

37 Ibid. “Front de Liberation National (FLN, 1954–62) is a second-wave Algerian group that carried on a long savage struggle for independence against France and Algerians opposed to FLN purposes. It created a secular socialist one-party state (1962), which provided sanctuaries to foreign left-wing terrorist groups. Since 1992, the FLN government has been the target of the Armed Islamic Movement’s ferocious uprising.”


39 Ibid.
In parallel, they opposed both the British Government and their occupation in the territory, as well as the Palestinians that threatened their existence.

Part of the success of the anticolonial movement was paved by the rebranding of the term ‘terrorist,’ by Menachem Begin, the head of the Irgun. He “described his people as ‘freedom fighters’ struggling against ‘government terror,’ [and set the impetus for using the] self-description.”40 The Irgun was a splinter group of the Haganah and was labeled as a paramilitary terrorist organization, which operated in Palestinian territory between 1931 and 1948. A turning point for the Irgun history came in 1929 when the British Government upheld the Ottoman ruling that the Western Wall was Muslim and Jews couldn't build anything around it. Following the decisions, massive riots and violence spread throughout Palestine, starting in Jerusalem. The Haganah was initially established to protect Jewish farmers in 1920 due to the inadequacy of the British government, but in 1929 the Haganah’s role changed dramatically as they became more militarized and organized. In 1931 many Haganah fighters did not agree with the policy of restraint (havlagah) and a splinter group, the Irgun, was formed. The members believed in more violent action in order to accomplish their goals. The fundamental motivations for the Irgun were to protect the Jewish people and create an Israel free state by constantly conducting operations against either the British or the Arabs.

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40 Ibid.
The conflict between the Irgun and the British government was exacerbated after the publication of the White Papers in 1939. These papers recommended a partition of Palestine for Jewish settlement and enraged the Irgun as it set a limit of 75,000 Jewish immigrations for a five-year period between 1940-44, during a time that Jews were facing an existential threat from Nazi Germany. Anticolonial operations conducted by the Irgun included the killings and hangings of British officers, raids on British police stations in Palestine and even the bombing of the British Embassy in Rome that destroyed half the building and injured three people. Fighting the British occupation was only one part of the struggle, as the Irgun also waged terror attacks against Arab civilians as they largely considered themselves at war.

The Irgun ceased operating as a terrorist organization on June 1, 1948, when they were absorbed into the Israel Defense Forces. This occurred after the United Nations General Assembly adopted the partition plan for Palestine on November 29, 1947 which established the creation of a Jewish State (and brought the British withdrawal from Palestine). The legitimacy awarded from the UN later allowed Begin, the former Irgun leader, to serve as Israel’s sixths Prime Minister.

The interaction between the principal actors within the anticolonial wave gave strength to the sentiments of the freedom fighters through the unique roles of the diaspora population states, sympathetic foreign publics, and supranational organizations. Identity played a major role in this wave. The terrorists who fought the colonial rule drew strength from national identity which in turn created a resilience factor that was crucial for dismantling imperialism. Diaspora groups fundamentally
changed the tactics, the techniques and the procedures employed by the freedom fighters by lobbying foreign publics to further their agenda abroad and provide money to fighters on the ground. Diaspora groups appealed to sympathetic foreign publics and governments to weigh in on international grievances. Ethnic groups sought support from “foreign states with kindred populations,”41 which varied from political support and aid to safe havens. The Jewish communities in the US implored the government to take an active role during the Holocaust.

The United States dominated the state influence within the wave and became “the major Western power, [which] pressed hardest for eliminating empires.”42 The US weighed into domestic matters of European courtiers and exerted “significant political influence on Britain to accept an Irish state.”43 The subjective nature of terrorism however, created huge divides among the various states. They largely operated under self-interest which brought significant inconsistencies in foreign engagement, as Rapoport states:

Jews and Arabs in Palestine, [they] had dramatically conflicting versions of what termination of British rule was supposed to mean. The considerable European population in Algeria did not want Paris to abandon its authority, and in Northern Ireland the majority wanted to remain in Britain. In Cyprus the Turkish community did not want to be put under Greek rule – the aim of EOKA – and Britain wanted to retain Cyprus as a base for Middle East operations.44

41 Ibid., 54.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., 55.
44 Ibid.
Sympathetic foreign publics were essential to emboldening the sentiments of the foreign fighters of the second wave.

The Arab states gave the Algerian FLN crucial political support and those adjacent to Algeria offered sanctuaries from which the group could stage attacks. Greece sponsored the Cypriot uprisings against the British and against Cyprus when it became a state. Frightened Turkish Cypriots, in turn, looked to Turkey for aid.\textsuperscript{45}

Supranational organizations such as the United Nations emerged in the second wave as a crucial “ingredient,” which had a profound impact in the successes and failures of freedom fighters.\textsuperscript{46} The formation of the Israeli state set the precedent for future nations, “all anticolonial terrorists [to seek] the UN interest in their struggles.”\textsuperscript{47} The UN provided the legitimate body that terrorist organizations needed.\textsuperscript{48}

After the world had been engulfed in WWII, “the ability of the European states to hang on to their empires [had decreased] and [had] hastened the disintegration of the remaining European empires. Consequently, this second wave of terrorism produced by nationalists and anti-colonial groups tapered off.”\textsuperscript{49} While the Soviet Union was seemingly absent from the anti-colonial period, the Marxist philosophy

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. He said, “after WWII, the UN inherited the League’s ultimate authority over the colonial mandates – territories that were scenes of extensive terrorist activity.”
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
embraced by the communist party of the Soviet Union played a heavy hand in the third wave.  

**Third Wave: New Left Wave**

Countering foreign presence was a major driver in the anticolonial movement. It permeated into the third wave categorized by the New Left movements. The Viet Cong’s ability to combat US presence was the catapult for the New Left movement. It challenged the status quo and gave hope to terrorist organizations; “American’s goliath modern technology was vulnerable.” The role of the Soviet Union emerged as a major state of influence during the third wave, and ignited revolutionary efforts to combat western ideology. Capitalism embodied the status quo and was represented by the states that were often seen as interfering in the affairs of Third World countries. The third world complexities were “attributed by radical as much to the ‘neocolonialist’ ethos and economic exploitation inherent in capitalism as to the interventionists foreign policy championed by the United States under the banner of fighting the spread of communism.”

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51 Ibid.

52 Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 75. He said, “the sharp contrast between the highest and lowest domestic levels of wealth and consumer consumption was further accentuated by the growing economic disparity between the developed world and the undeveloped world- as it came to be called.”

53 Ibid.
Cold war dynamics had severe effects on terror culture as it brought the importance of state recognition within a bipolar world order. Many Western groups—such as American Weather Underground, the West German Red Army Faction (RAF), the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, and the French Action Directe—saw themselves as vanguards of the Third World masses. The Soviet world encouraged the outbreaks and offered moral support, training, and weapons.\footnote{Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 56.}

Anti-government and anti-establishment sentiments in the third wave were similar to those of the first wave as evident in the revolutionary tendencies. Many of the American Weather Underground organizations members were student activists who wanted to overthrow the US government and drew support from the anti-Vietnam War movement. The RAF wanted a revolution and regime change into a Marxist system. They “encapsulated the revolutionary spirit and antiestablishment attitude typical of left-wing terrorists in other Western countries . . . emerged from the communes and student associations part of the ‘counterculture’ in the late 1960s.”\footnote{Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism,” 75.} The Vietnam War was a major rallying point of the New Left and when it “ended in 1975, the [Palestine Liberation Organization] (PLO) replaced the Viet Cong as the heroic model.”\footnote{Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 53.}

The PLO embodied second wave sentiments, but operated under third wave constructs. The era of antiestablishment movements enabled concessions that allowed for their formal recognition from the United Nations. The PLO was the largest terror
organization in the third wave and their success became one that subsequent terrorist organizations tried to emulate. The PLO “originated after the extraordinary collapse of three Arab armies in the six days of the 1967 Middle East war; its existence and persistence gave credibility to supporters who argued that only terror could remove Israel.” The Israeli and Palestinian conflict exemplified how foreign publics rationalized wars outside their borders. Terrorist organizations gained more when sympathetic foreign governments and supranational organizations became involved. International hijacking, hostage crises and assassinations dominated terror tactics. These tactics which became a fundamental source for spreading their message, demanded global attention. Terrorist groups sought leverage through their threats and carried out violent acts when demands were not met. In “1979, when the [Italian] government refused to negotiate [with the Red Brigades] who kidnapped [the] former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, [they brutally murdered him and dumped his body in the streets].” Terrorist also began to set targets internationally when “foreign lands [became easily] accessible.” The events of July 22, 1968 have been described as follows:

. . . three armed Palestinian terrorists, belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), one of the six groups that then constituted the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), hijacked an Israeli El AL commercial flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. . . . The first several hijackings arouse the consciousness of the world and awakened the media much more effectively than

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57 Ibid., 56.


59 Ibid.

60 Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism,” 63.
20 years of pleading at the United Nations, [as expressed by] the PLO’s chief observer at the United Nations.\textsuperscript{61}

Terror culture significantly changed after the El Al hijacking as terrorists set their scope to international targets, often civilians in relatively large numbers. Their ability to spread fear was “facilitated by the technological advances of the time that transformed the speed and ease of international travel... and the promptness with which footage could be broadcast around the globe.”\textsuperscript{62} The Munich Olympic Games represented the most significant example of how terrorists brought their grievances to the world stage, making it impossible to ignore. “The incident began on September 5, 1972, when eight terrorists belonging to the PLO’s Black September Organization (BS)” took eleven Israeli Olympic athletes hostage and killed them.\textsuperscript{63} The power of technology and communication enabled “an estimated 900 million people in at least a hundred different countries [to view] the crisis unfold on their television screens.”\textsuperscript{64} The dramatic and enduring struggle with the terrorists lasted hours and was captured on live television. People around the world were exposed to the government response of a terror crisis. It involved extensive negotiations, two get-away helicopters provided at the German air base, and ultimately the deployment of a hand grenade followed by a firefight that left all the Olympic hostages dead, along with a West German policeman. The level of

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 64.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 67.

\textsuperscript{64} Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism,” 63.
coverage brought a turning point as the world became less sympathetic to terrorist causes. Equally effective was the display of power, which gave credence to many radical Palestinians who rushed in the “thousands, to join the terrorist organization during the weeks that followed the incident.”

The paradox of the situation is that as the PLO conducted the well-publicized terror attacks on civilians causing public sentiment to shift away from terrorist grievances, it finally gained the international communities’ attention which increased terrorist credibility. The forceful way they asserted their presence paid off as the PLO’s leader Yasir Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly, and by the end of the 1970s the PLO had formal diplomatic relations with more countries than the actual established nation-state of Israel. The successes of the PLO had significant effects on subsequent groups as “ethnic groups decide whether to challenge based in part on whether governments [have] made concessions in the past, and whether government[s] can be expected to do so again in the future.”

The RAND Terrorism Incident Database identified the following:

The number of organizations engaged in international terrorism grew from only 11% in 1968 to an astonishing 55% in 1978. Of this total, more than half (30% or 54%) were ethno-nationalist/separatist movements, all seeking to copy or capitalize on the PLO’s success. They ranged from large international communities of displaced persons with profound historical grievances such as the Armenian diaspora, to minuscule self-contained entities.

65 Ibid., 70.


The interaction between the principal actors within the new left wave strengthened the sentiments for PLO through the unique roles of the diaspora populations, states, sympathetic foreign publics and supranational organizations. Diaspora groups had one important element “in common, [the] burning sense of injustice and dispossession and a belief that through international terrorism they too could finally attract world-wide attention to themselves and their causes.”

The United States played an interesting role in this wave compared to the first two. In the first wave they tried to establish anarchist counterterrorism policies, and in the second they served as the pioneer for abolishing empires. In the third wave the United States represented the new capitalist and neocolonial world order, which the New Left terror groups rallied against. This led American targets to represent “one-third of the international attacks in the third wave [which was exacerbated as] the US supported most governments under terrorist siege.” America’s inconsistent policies towards terrorism created vulnerabilities for criticism and undercut international efforts to combat terrorism as “cold war concerns sometimes led the US to ignore its stated distaste for terror . . . and in Nicaragua, Angola, and elsewhere the US supported terrorist activity.”

68 Ibid., 71.


70 Ibid.
Sympathetic foreign publics fueled this wave, which eventually gave credence to the PLO sentiments. The power of the supranational United Nations organization, Rapoport stated:

. . . changed dramatically as ‘new states’—former colonial territories—found that terrorism threat their interests, and they particularly shunned nationalist movements” Major UN conventions from 1970 through 1999 made hijacking, hostage taking, attacks on senior government officials, ‘terrorist bombing’ of a foreign state’s facilities, and financing of international activities crimes. A change of language in some indication of the change attitude. ‘Freedom fighter’ was no longer a popular term in UN debates. Yet very serious ambiguities and conflicts within the UN remained, reflecting the ever-present fact that terror serves different ends— and some of those ends are prized. Ironically, the most important ambiguity concerned the third waves major organization: the PLO. It received official UN status and was recognized by more than 100 states that is entitled to receive a share of the Palestine Mandate.71

The inconsistencies of the United Nations, the United States, and the successes of the PLO left many ethnic groups fighting for second wave sentiments, which were eventually met with fourth wave constructs. Towards “the end of the Cold War the international community’s sustained resistance to these terrorist demands eventually led to the phasing out of this wave by the 1980s.”72

71 Ibid., 53.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FOURTH WAVE OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

In 1979 tensions in Iran and Afghanistan erupted, sparking the fourth wave of religious terrorism with Islam at the heart. Rapoport has identified three events in the Islamic world that provided the hope vital to launch the fourth wave: the 1979 Iranian Revolution, a new Islamic century, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But two subsequent events have undoubtedly prolonged this wave: the US war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the Arab Spring. This wave has subsequently been dominated by one religion, Islam, at the heart. The three previous waves embodied common global struggles which rallied support from individuals facing similar challenges. Identity played a key role in the second and third wave. Religion has served as a fundamental element in the construct of identity and cultural norms through secular aims. The role of religion has shifted from an ancillary motive to the primary driving force. It has become the glue that holds together radical terrorism to provide legitimacy through religious ideas rooted in scripture.

Moderate Islam

Religious conflicts are not new to human history and evolution. This rise of religious terrorism reverts to Islamic fundamental values and rejects Western globalization. However; Islam has a history of modernity and progressive ideas, stemming back to the twentieth century. Revered Islamic philosophers and theologians have stressed the importance of seeking questions and not answers in the Quran. Modern Islamic literature teaches us that reading the Quran in singularity - with blind
following and without intellectual questioning would lead to an alienated version of the sacred text. Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, a Harvard University history professor, said that religion alone cannot bring identity. Islamic philosophers and theologians like Ibn Khaldun, Nizam al-Mulk, and Mottahedeh have provided their understanding of truths in Islam which speak to moderate Islam, and could be used as a tool to fight radical Islam.

Ibn Khaldun, in the thirteenth century was a jurist and historian who wrote about the significance of morality and restraint as civilizations could not solely be products of religion. Khaldun recognized the cyclical nature of civilizations and foresaw Muslims being also susceptible to such patterns. He stressed that the successes of the first Muslims were attributed to their understanding of restraining influence, internal discipline and personal conviction. Human nature is fickle and he noted that generations removed from the original moral group could be easily coerced into moral convention. Their “restrain[ed] influence is something that comes from outside.”1 He defined the fourth generation as the destroyer, where groups think and natural inferiority would lead to ignorance and the demise of civilizations. The followers of Islam must go beyond the corporal promise of paradise land and be rooted in morality to prosper. Khaldun’s message was extremely significant during the thirteenth century because it provided hope during a time when there was a somber view of Islam. It was a time of cruel politics and nothing to be optimistic about. The resiliency of societies is rooted in the

pursuit of progressive, and challenging the current climate. He wrote that the outsider, the ones that live outside the center (of government, capital) would eventually come to power in the center and restore hope with greater moral vigor. Time has the ability to corrupt and polarize those in power; therefore, the status quo must always be challenged and the same goes for the Islamic world. Nizam al-Mulk, a twelfth century Persian scholar, also wrote about the importance of questioning the status quo. He focused on the importance for kings in the Islamic world to rule with justice. He identified the strategy to success through doctrine, enforced through historical references found in Persian literature.²

Mohammad Kamel Hussein, an Egyptian teacher and philosopher, who wrote the *City of Wrong* in 1954. His writings bring an element of western theological and philosophical ideas to deliver a neo-political message for the moderates. These messages are often the hardest for those that have been polarized and fallen victim to groups think. Hussein subtly highlights that doubt can serve as a functional stage of knowledge as skepticism can be revolutionary because knowledge cannot be fixed.

² Pamela Cerria, “Nizam al–Mulk on the Sultanate,” (Handout received in Great Books of Islam (LSHV 424) with Professor Paul L. Heck, Washington, D.C., September 2nd, 2015). Stated, “part I takes a micro level doctrinal approach to the rule of law and how to effectively rule on a magnitude of topics; justice, tax collection, division of land, court proceedings, intelligence collection, ensuring the security of all, matters concerning the stewards of the house hold, the treatment of ambassadors, and military organization. Part II takes macro political approach in advising and providing wisdom on the politics and diplomacy aspect of ruling; through ‘stories of the prophets, memories of the saints, and tales of just kings’ (28). Nizam al Mulk takes a very direct approach to Part II in providing advice on showing mercy, meritocracy, unemployment ethics, infidels, and the rebels. The message is that of survival and justice; survival for the King rooted in justice given to the people. God choses the ruler because will maintain natural order and justice. His rule will last if he’s not pious but if he’s unjust then power will be lost and as a King with ‘power and command over God’s creatures, his injustice will cast him into hell as he is, with his hands bound in chains.”
Hussein called for self-religion in the form of self-consciences and the overcoming of polarization. These works are aimed to go beyond scripture to identify that scripture and religion cannot stand alone. Roy Parviz Mottahedeh, the author of The Mantel of the Prophet, also stresses that religion alone cannot bring identity. What we are seeing in this wave of terrorism is the radicalization and polarization of Islam through the materialization of literal interpretation of the Quran – the very element historians, theologians and philosophers of the Islamic faith have cautioned against for hundreds of years.

**Arab Nationalism and Political Islam**

Muslimhood was strong up until the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the 1923. The essence of the Islamic community was then replaced with a sense of nationalism. Imported during the imperial rule in the 1920s, it allowed for the establishment of Arab secular nationalism. Pan-Arabism first emerged in the 1940s in the form of a top down approach. It was “the work of the most traditional and conservative Arab regimes, from Saudi Arabia to the monarchies of Jordan and Egypt.”[^3] Arab secular nationalism and secularism was strong for twenty years, predominately through the late 1950s to early 1970s. Pan Arabic nationalism began with the height of the Nasser movement. Arab nationalism was influential in the urban North especially in Egypt, Syria, and Iran. It was not as influential in tribal South where monarchies and Islam were more important. Countries attempted to become modernized politically and economically during the

height of Arab nationalism, but failed. The late 1960s – early 1970s saw significant fragmentation and modernization failures, which led to the “massive disillusionment with Nasserism... and Ba’thist pan-Arabism.”⁴ The lack of a common national bond and religious divides also contributed to the failure of modernization. Western support and ties to repressive regimes created significant divides and likely contributed to the decline of nationalism in the late 1960s. Pan-Arab “Ba’thism and Nasserism came very much from the top... and did little to promote individual political participation or democratization... [and] explains the decline of these last versions of pan-Arabism.”⁵

The failure of Pan-Arabism coincided with the rise of political Islamic movements. The inability to unite among secular lines enabled extremist forces to appeal to the masses desperate for a success story. Western institutions support for repressive regimes of artificial, sectarian countries, made them the target of grave opposition. Polarizing forces began to politicize Islam as it was the remaining glue. Sunni and Shiite polarization emerged in the form of fundamentalism. The spark was the Iranian revolution of January 1979, a revolution against the secular state of Iran. It marked the height and rise of political Islam as “religion had more political appeal than did the prevailing third-wave ethos.”⁶

⁴ Ibid.
⁵ Ibid.
The political sphere shifted towards non-secular nationalism and growing resentment toward western intervention, as noted below:

The revolution that transformed Iran into an Islamic republic in 1979 played a crucial role in the modern advent of religious terrorism. At the root of the Iranian-backed Islamic terrorist campaign was the aim of extending the fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law espoused in Iran to other Muslim countries. ‘We must strive to export our Revolution throughout the world,’ the Ayatollah Khomeini declared on the Iranian new year in March 1980, just over a year after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran. The Iranian revolution has been held up as an example to Muslims throughout the world, exhorting them to reassert the fundamental teachings of the Qur’an and to resist the intrusion of Western-particularly United States- influence into the Middle East.\(^7\)

Old Sunni fundamentalism expressed through the Muslim Brotherhood reemerged in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. On the opposite spectrum, Shiite fundamentalism, inspired by the Iran revolution propelled, as Rapoport stated:

Shiite terror movements particularly in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lebanon. In Lebanon, Shiites—influenced by the self-martyrdom tactics- introduced suicide bombing, with surprising results, ousting American and other foreign troops that had entered the country on a peace mission after the 1982 Israeli invasion.\(^8\)

1979: Sparking the Fourth Wave

The eruption of turmoil in 1979 was not surprising to most Muslims because that year represented “the beginning of a new Islamic century and Islamic tradition, holds

\(^7\) Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism,” 75.

\(^8\) Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 62.
that a redeemer will come with the start of a new century-an expectation that regularly sparked uprisings at the turn of earlier Muslim centuries.”

US-Iran relationship deteriorated significantly after Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was overthrown during the revolution, and Ayatollah Khomeini took power.10 On November 4, 1979, the US Embassy in Tehran was overrun by “militant Iranian students . . . with the support of Ayatollah Khomeini and 52 Americans were held hostage for 444 days.”11,12 April 7, 1980, marked the day the United States broke diplomatic relations with Iran.13 Ayatollah Khomeini ushered in a wave of unprecedented hate for America, calling the United States the “Great Satan.”14 The anti-American rhetoric would strengthen further after the US involvement in Afghanistan in opposition to Soviet power.

9 Ibid.
12 Lawrence A. Wolf, "America Held Hostage, The Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979-1981 and U.S.-Iranian Relations," Magazine of History, no. 3, (May 2016): 27-30. He said, “the causes of the revolution were deeply rooted in the practices of a repressive government that, in its attempts to reform, united the working class with the downtrodden masses. Fervor among religious people to protect the ‘old ways’ form the forces of modernism, together with the rise of modern media with its zeal for information, contributed to a mounting tide of revolution with the means to market its ideas widely. Ultimately, the taking of American hostages provided a unifying symbol of the Iranian revolution and a rallying cry for the people of Iran to vent their anger at the United States. The Iran Hostage Crisis generated angst against the West that has persisted to the present day.”
14 Hoffman, “Inside Terrorism,” 89.
In December 1979, the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan\textsuperscript{15}, “stabilize the government there, and achieve broad international recognition of the Communist regime in Kabul.”\textsuperscript{16} The war drew Afgani support by “volunteers from all over the Sunni world and subsidized by US. aid.”\textsuperscript{17} President Carter “signed a presidential finding that tasked the CIA with the organization of aid, including arms and military support, [to] Afghan fighters known to the world as mujahideen, in their resistance to the Soviet occupation.”\textsuperscript{18} The Soviet-Afghan War was waged until February 15, 1989, but the turmoil did not end there.

\textsuperscript{15} Milton Bearden, “Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires,” \textit{Council on Foreign Relations}. 80, no. 6 (Nov. – Dec., 2001): 21, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20050325 (accessed March 26, 2016). He said, “during the 1980s, the agency would deliver several hundred thousand tons of weapons and ordnance to Pakistan for distribution to the Afghan fighters known to the world as mujahideen, the soldiers of God. The coalition of countries supporting the resistance grew to an impressive collection that included the United States, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and China. By 1985, the Soviet 40th Army had grown from its original, limited expeditionary force to an occupation force of around 120,000 troops. By the mid-1980s the mujahideen had more than 250,000 full- or part-time fighters in the field, and though they and the civilian population had suffered horrendous losses, a million dead and 1.5 million injured, plus 6 million more driven into internal and external exile- the Soviet forces were also beginning to suffer. By 1985 Soviet air tactics had been refined, and the mujahideen suffered increasing casualties from the growing Soviet fleet of heavily armored MI-24D attack helicopters. The Afghans had nothing in their arsenal adequate to defend against this equipment and so, after a heated debate and heavy pressure from Congress, the White House decided to provide them with Stinger antiaircraft missiles. On April 14,1988, after agonized negotiations over such tortured concepts as "negative symmetry" in drawing down supplies to the combatants, the Geneva Accords ending Soviet involvement in Afghanistan were signed. The date for the final withdrawal of all Soviet forces was set at February 15,1989, a timetable that the commander of the Soviet 40th Army in Afghanistan, General Boris Gromov, choreographed to the last moment of the last day.”


\textsuperscript{17} Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 62.

The threat of well-trained militia fighters has long served as post war concerns, and the Soviet-Afghan war was no different. “Trained and confident Afghan veterans were major participants in the new and ongoing [Islamic] conflicts.”¹⁹ State involvement was extensive in the war, especially as “Arab-Afghan [volunteers were] supported by conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia [and the] Riyadh-backed Islamic Front was established to provide financial, logistical, and training support for Yemeni volunteers.”²⁰ The rise of political Islam bled into the form of state sponsored terrorism. This became a concern for the West and Western allies, especially with “the Iranian-backed and Syrian-support [for] Hezbollah.”²¹,²²

State sponsored terror attacks threatened the west as “the number of terrorist groups declined dramatically [which created] large organizations, and bin Laden’s al-Qaeda was the largest. Al-Qaeda regarded America as its chief antagonist immediately after the Soviet Union was defeated.”²³ Their initial motivation was to force US military presence out of the Middle East, and the terrorist organization began the terror campaign in the 1990’s. The US military were confronted with al-Qaeda forces and

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²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid. He said, “Hezbollah pioneered the use of suicide bombers in the Middle East, and was linked to the 1983 bombing and subsequent deaths of 241 U.S. marines in Beirut, Lebanon, as well as multiple kidnappings of U.S. and Western civilians and government officials. Hezbollah remains a key trainer of secular, Shia, and Sunni movements.”

“troops were driven out of Lebanon and forced to abandon a humanitarian mission in Somalia.” The 1993 Trade Center bombing which killed six people served to be a test run for September 11, 2001. The ambush during the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993 was among the first on-the-ground battles where US military forces encountered the al-Qaeda threat. The 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers American barracks in Saudi Arabia, the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemeni Harbor, and many more, all led to the most devastating attacks, on 9/11.

The US responded with the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Although al-Qaeda’s attacks transformed “bin Laden from a marginal figure in

24 Ibid.

25 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “FBI 100 First Strike: Global Terror in America,” https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2008/february/tradebom_022608 (accessed March 26, 2017). The FBI stated, that on “Friday, February 26, 1993, Middle Eastern terrorism had arrived on American soil— a thunderous explosion rocked lower Manhattan. The epicenter was the parking garage beneath the World Trade Center, where a massive eruption carved out a nearly 100-foot crater several stories deep and several more high. Six people were killed almost instantly. More than a thousand people were hurt in some way, some badly, with crushed limbs. An Islamic fundamentalist named Mohammad Salameh had rented the vehicle, and on March 4, an FBI SWAT team arrested him as he tried in vain to get his $400 deposit back. The FBI later had in custody three more suspects—Nidal Ayyad, Mahmoud Abouhalima, and Ahmed Ajaj. All four men were tried, convicted, and sentenced to life. The mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing—Ramzi Yousef—was captured in Pakistan in February 1995, returned to America, and convicted. The attack turned out to be something of a deadly dress rehearsal for 9/11; with the help of Yousef’s uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, al Qaeda would later return to realize Yousef’s nightmarish vision. FBI Archives 1993 Trade Center Bombing.”

the Muslim world to a global celebrity,” he embodied an ideology which has become the most proliferating force in the battle against terrorism. The US has still not fully developed a strategy for battling an ideology. David Rapoport falls short in claiming al-Qaeda “violated a cardinal rule for terrorist organizations, which is to stay underground always.” Al-Qaeda emerged from underground networks and conducted mass terror attacks that grabbed the world’s attention. The attacks of 9/11 gave credence to al-Qaeda and the unprecedented response in Afghanistan and Iraq left a fertile land for further exploitation, this time for the Islamic State (IS). The US wars with Afghanistan and Iraq have not proven any more fruitful than the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which has served as a significant factor in prolonging this wave of religious terrorism with Islam at the center.

There are very stark similarities and differences between the US and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The circumstances which drew the Soviet Union and the US into Afghanistan were very different. The Soviets wanted to cement their interest in the Afghani political system during the cold war. The United States on the other hand, was responding to the 9/11 attacks and declared a War on Terrorism. The US military would target the Taliban government in Afghanistan, which served as the operational hub for al-Qaeda. There is a history in Afghanistan which has repeated itself in various ways. The fall of Soviet-backed Afghani President Mohammad Najibullah, “marked [a] brutal


28 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 64.
conflict amongst warring factions who were aided and abetted by various international sponsors, [and] gave rise to the Taliban [who took] control in 1996.”

The Soviet-Afghan war left the country in much worse off shape than prior to the intervention. The failed government created a power vacuum which was exploited. Additionally, the failed war left behind trained forces with military grade equipment and a greater resentment for foreign involvement.

On February 25, 2016, fifteen years after the US military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Director of National Intelligence, James R. Clapper testified on the Worldwide Threat Assessments of the US Intelligence Community. His briefing was not one of assurance or progress, but rather of the somber realities of the increased resiliency of Sunni violent extremists’ threats. While Al-Qaeda (AQ) presences has been


30 Ibid. He stated, “perhaps Moscow's greatest frustration with Afghan leader Babrak Karmal, who was installed as leader after the Soviet intervention and the murder of former President Amin, was his failure to promote a national political reconciliation. His successor Mohammad Najibullah, who assumed power in 1986, did make greater efforts in this regard, but he too was not very successful—and certainly the increasing desire of Moscow to withdraw from Afghanistan to focus more on domestic reform weakened Najibullah's hand in these efforts. In fact, the challenges faced by the Karzai government and his international supporters (remember that Karmal and Najibullah had virtually no other international supporters aside from Moscow) look eerily similar to those of Soviet-supported Afghan leaders in the 1980s.”

31 Alicia P.Q. Wittmeyer, “What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?” Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/04/what-went-wrong-in-afghanistan/ (accessed March 26, 2017). She stated, “Afghanistan is not hopeless. Forty years ago, it was a country at peace with itself and with its neighbors. Kabul, as Nancy Dupree’s classic travel guide to Afghanistan in the 1970s so evocatively put it, was a fast-growing city where tall modern buildings nuzzle against bustling bazaars and wide avenues fill with brilliant flowing turbans, gaily striped chapans, mini-skirted schoolgirls, a multitude of handsome faces and streams of whizzing traffic.”
“largely degraded in Afghanistan and Pakistan ... [AQ] affiliates have proven resilient and are positioned to make gains in 2016.”32 The “Sunni violent extremism [like AQ] has been on an upward trajectory since the late 1970s and has more groups, members, and safe havens than at any other point in history.”33 The predominant AQ splinter group, the Islamic State, has “become the preeminent terrorist threat,” as it continues to draw in thousands of foreign fighters and inspire lone wolf terrorists around the world in attempt to establish the Islamic caliphate. Across the Middle East “terrorists and insurgent groups will continue to exploit weak governance, insecurity, and economic and political fragility to expand their areas of influence and provide safe havens for extremists, particularly in conflict zones.”34

David Petraeus, who served as a four-star general and US Forces Afghanistan, Commander, said “I wish we had more Foreign Service officers, aid professionals and other kinds of non-military specialists.”35 Petraeus noted “[that the heart of the problem the United States was facing in Iraq,] was a deep sectarian divide between Shiite and


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

Sunni, Arab and Kurd.”[^36] He noted that America “need[s] help on those issues. Otherwise, we’re relying on 22-year-old sergeants to handle them. Now, they are great kids, but they really don’t know the history, the language, the politics.”[^37]

Policies of intervention and counterterrorism must be dealt with caution in the Middle East, especially in Muslim sectarian countries that are significantly divided and volatile. The stability in governments across the Arab and Muslim world vastly differ. Foreign engagement in the volatile countries has seemingly exacerbated the tensions which are already bursting at the seams. Turmoil erupted in the Middle East during the 2012 Arab spring. The role of the United States was challenged once again, and the US foreign policy was called into question. America’s inconsistent policies created vulnerabilities for criticism and undercut efforts to combat terrorism and support the spread of democracy. The volatile nature of the region not only sparked a domino effect but also had many world leaders nervous - if public uprisings and demonstrations would challenge them next.

**The Arab Spring**

The Arab world exploded after Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian man, set himself ablaze, on December 18, 2010.[^38] A year later, three longstanding dictators—Zine El

[^36]: Ibid.

[^37]: Ibid.

[^38]: Michael J. Totten, “Arab Spring or Islamist Winter?” *World Affairs* 174, no. 5, (January/February 2012):23-42. He stated, “Mohamed Bouazizi, a twenty-six-year-old street vendor, is given credit for touching off the Arab Spring by setting himself on fire to protest the arrogance and corruption of the Tunisian government.”
Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar el-Gaddafi of Libya—have been ousted. The climate in the Arab world was ripe for a revolution and number of events could have allowed for the eruption of buildup tension and frustration. The events that unfolded with Bouazizi were (and often still are) symbolic of the political and social climate. The revolutions across Northern Africa and the Middle East were very sympathetic to his situation because it represented the living conditions of the majority. Mohamed Bouazizi, an educated “university graduate who had been reduced to selling vegetables on the street in order to make a living, set himself on fire.” This seemingly benign event represents the humiliation many individuals face across the region, under the rule of oppressive regimes.

There are four underlying factors which explain the Arab Revolution. They include: economic stagnation, social inequality, lack of political freedom and the Arab

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40 Jack Brown. "Algeria’s Midwinter Uproar," Middle East Report http://www.merip.org/mero/mero012011 (accessed March 26, 2017). He stated, “a group of policemen confiscated the wares of one Mohamed Bouazizi, a university graduate who had been reduced to selling vegetables on the street in order to make a living. Bouazizi set himself on fire in protest; his suicide was the spark that ignited the enormous stores of resentment toward the regime in the poorest parts of the country.”

41 Mohammad Al-Momani, “The Arab “Youth quake”: Implications on democratization and stability,” Middle East Law and Governance 3. no. 1-2 (2011): 159-70, http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/journals/10.1163/187633711x591521 (accessed March 26, 2017). He sated, “the actions of Bouazizi prompted nationwide protests that forced longtime Tunisian leader, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, to flee the country on January 14, 2011. The success of the “Tunisian Revolution” subsequently triggered a wave of demonstrations and political unrest, which have affected almost every authoritarian regime in the Arab World. Massive protests in Egypt were successful in bringing down the 30-year presidency of Hosni Mubarak, and other governments have been put under enormous pressure to reform due to the demands of demonstrators.”
demography. The first three are structural causes, rooted in foundational layer and representative of the broken Arab system. The lack of economic opportunities and jobs made it very difficult for people to feed their families, and experience the freedom that comes from economic independence. Social inequality was exacerbated through high levels of corruption, which forced people to be agreeable with repressive policies to get ahead. Repressive political regimes drew power and legitimacy through people fearing the government and cultivated a lack of political freedom. The conditions of unemployment and lack of social and political freedom were especially damaging against the Arab youth bulge. In 2011, 60% of the population was under the age of 30.

Barry Mirkin, “Arab Spring: Demographics in a region in transition,” United Nations Development Programme, Regional Bureau for Arab States, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9647/5cb5a26d490a9ff1ce112705839d4e5507d3.pdf (accessed March 26, 2017). He stated, “in the wake of the Arab Spring, youth unemployment rose sharply and is almost three times higher than total unemployment. Twelve million additional jobs need to be created by 2025 in the Arab Region to prevent youth unemployment, currently at almost 30 per cent in the region, from increasing even further. For young women, unemployment is higher and labour force participation lower than for young men. Lack of economic opportunity for young people cannot be separated from the wave of social unrest sweeping the region.”

“The economics of the Arab Spring: Open for business?” The Economist, January 23, 2011, 18, http://www.economist.com/node/18867047 (accessed March 26, 2017). It stated, “all Arab countries (those with oil wealth and those without) have capitalist economies, in which prices and private enterprise play a big role. Yet it is a distorted, patriarchal capitalism, characterized by a dominant state, kleptocratic monopolies, heavy regulation and massive subsidies. This has fueled corruption, stunted growth and left millions without jobs.”

Ibid. 

“The Arab Awakening: Revolution spinning in the wind,” The Economist, July 16, 2011, 47, http://www.economist.com/node/18958237 (accessed March 26, 2017). It stated, “many Arab countries also face burdensome administrative legacies. Years of unaccountable rule have left hugely swollen, often venal bureaucracies, creaky courts, nasty security services spoiled by privilege, and publics addicted to unsustainable subsidies for such things as food and energy.”
The youth was able and willing to materialize on their sentiments easier than generations before through the advent of social media.\textsuperscript{46}

These elements came to a head with the telecommunication revolution which empowered the individual. Strangers in the Arab world could connect based on shared grievances which emboldened their revolutionary desires. The telecommunications revolution began in the 1990s and businesses were among the first groups to adopt the use of personal computers (PC). But in 2010 a technological penetration occurred and 20% of households had access to the internet.\textsuperscript{47} This allowed individuals to unite on the internet and shatter the isolation imposed by many governments. Individuals could then see, the dramatically different lifestyles of thriving and developed countries. The image of Bouazizi went viral to include the main television stations of the Arab world. The Arab Revolution may not have occurred when it did without the technology boom in the Middle East.

Through such social media use, protesters not only shaped when, where, and how the protests occurred, but also shaped their own and the outside world’s understanding of the events. Widespread mobile phone use facilitated these

\textsuperscript{46} Pew Research Center; Forum on Religion & Public Life. The future of the global Muslim population: Projections for 2010-2030, Pew- Templeton Global Religious Futures Project, http://www.pewforum.org/files/2011/01/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf (accessed March 26, 2017). It stated that “in 1990, more than two-thirds of the total population of Muslim-majority countries was under age 30. Today [2011], people under 30 make up about 60% of the population of these countries, and by 2030 they are projected to fall to about 50%.”

\textsuperscript{47} Statista, “Average Annual Growth in the Number of Mobile Connections in Selected Regions Worldwide from 2002 to 2012,” https://www.statista.com/statistics/272168/average-worldwide-growth-of-mobile-connections/ (accessed March 26, 2017). “In the Sub-Saharan region, mobile connections from 2002 to 2012 saw the highest average annual growth during this time period at over 35 percent. The Arab states follow with more than 30 percent average growth, and in third place came the Asia Pacific region with an average growth of more than 20 percent. Western Europe observed the lowest average growth in mobile connections with only 6 percent-GSMA.”
phenomena, and satellite television served as another means of disseminating information throughout the region.\textsuperscript{48}

Thomas Friedman has categorized the power of communication as the “democratization of technology . . . and has made it possible for people to get connected and exchange information, money, [and etc] in a cost effective way.”\textsuperscript{49}

Due to the democratization of information, governments cannot isolate their people from understanding what life is like beyond their borders. Life outside cannot be made to look worse than it is. And life inside can’t be made to look better than it is. Thanks to the democratization of information, people of a country increasingly know how people of another country live - no matter how geographically isolated they may be.\textsuperscript{50}

The US and the EU anxiously advocated revolutions for western values such as democracy and individual rights, as many of the Arab regime’s that have been toppled during the Arab Spring were western-backed. Second and third wave complexities concerning ‘territories of special political problems,’ re-immerged.\textsuperscript{51}

There is no doubting that rulers such as Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia have been key western allies. In the classic formulation of the cold war, they were ‘our sons-of-bitches’ . . . [and] ‘Mr. Mubarak may have been a tinpot dictator, but he supported America.’\textsuperscript{52}


\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{51} Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 53.

\textsuperscript{52} Gideon Rachman, “It's 1989, but we are the Russians,” The Financial Times, April 4, 2011, https://www.ft.com/ content/202b56b0-5eea-11e0-a2d7-00144feab49a (accessed March 26, 2017).
US relation with repressive dictators in the Arab world became strained (including with Saudi Arabia) as political and moral responsibilities of the United States were at odds, and the unwillingness of the US to fully back an extreme monarchy while the international world anticipated a democratic response. The US supported protests within Egypt and the toppling of Mubarak, which enraged Saudi Arabia because Mubarak was a strong ally of Saudi Arabia. The United States promotes democracy, but not at the expense of the Middle East collapse. The US is promoting a more relaxed approach in order to let protests take their own course and leave this imperialist black cloud. The challenge on intervention hasn’t been more difficult for the West and the United States as it has with Syria. Syria has been a sectarian country, facing significant religious divides and March 2011 marked the begging of the of the civil unrest in Damascus. The greatest atrocity of the Syrian conflict occurred on March 19, 2013, when the Assad regime used chemical weapons against the civilian population. The world witnessed hundreds of innocent men, women, and children twitching and foaming at the mouth from the use of poisonous gas and chemical bombs. President Obama’s failure to enforce America’s red lines ultimately threatened American credibility and allowed the Assad regime to push the boundaries of authoritarian rule.

Former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said, it “sent a mixed message, not only to Assad, not only to the Syrians, but [also] to the world. And that is something you do not want to establish in the world, [to create] an issue with regard to the credibility of the
As we’ve seen in the previous three waves, the role of the state, sympathetic foreign publics, and supranational organizations are significant in dealing with terrorist organizations. The actions or inactions of nations states, especially the hegemony resonates with terrorist organizations. Just as ethnic groups base decisions to secede on previous state concessions, terrorist organizations also pay great attention to the policy decisions of the West, and especially those whom they consider the enemy. The decision not to enforce America’s red lines sent a message that allowed Syria to serve as an open battlefield. It not only damaged credibility but allowed the adversaries insight into US intent in the region. In this wave of terrorism, the adversaries seem to be learning more and more about the role of the state and the willingness to confront terrorist threats. Information is power, and this information is undoubtedly being used against counter terrorism efforts. If the adversary understands the West and the US are no longer willing to dispense military forces to dismantle terrorist organizations, they could play the long game, or take siege of lawless territories.

In 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on Worldwide Threat Assessments from the US Intelligence Community began by noting “the most notable development since last year’s hearing [was] Syria, which ha[d] become a

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magnet for foreign fighters and for terrorist activity.” Syria not only provided a safe haven for “independent or al-Qaida-aligned groups to recruit, train and equip a growing number of extremists,” but also for the new terrorist organization; the Islamic State to flourish.  


55 Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE

AL-QAEDA AND THE RISE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

The threat of the Islamic State is imperative to understand because as Central Intelligence Agency Director, John O. Brennan, said at the 9/11 Memorial on September 26, 2016, that the Islamic State had eclipsed al-Qa’ida in shaping the direction of global terrorism and is unlike any extremist group, mostly in terms of its global reach and pretentions of being a state.

The Islamic State was able to thrive as a terror organization after the 2011 power vacuum created by the withdrawal of US troops in Iraq, and the 2012 Arab spring movement. Since the number of terrorist groups had declined dramatically in the fourth wave\(^1\), we will focus on the most advanced and growing transnational terrorist organization, the Islamic State. The 2016 Global Terrorism Index stated:

> The Islamic State expanded activities . . . in other countries [which] is posing new threats in other parts of the world. [IS] and its affiliates undertook attacks in 28 countries in 2015, up from 13 countries in 2014 . . . [the terrorist organization has shifted its tactics] to transnational terrorism, not just to other parts of the Middle East but to Europe as well.\(^2\)

The increased number of IS-affiliated groups that have conducted terror attacks is reflected in “the most devastating [attacks] in the history” of Paris, Brussels, and Turkey.\(^3\) This activity shows a “disturbing return of the transnational group-based

\(^1\) Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 63.

\(^2\) Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016.

\(^3\) Ibid.
terrorism more associated with al-Qa‘ida before and immediately after September 11.⁴⁻⁵ The Aristotelian causality model will be used to assess the threats of the Islamic States by applying the four principles of material, formal, efficient, and final causes. Causes of all four sorts are necessary elements in any adequate account of the existence and nature of the thing.⁶ The material causes are the physical elements that allow for the military style terrorist organization to carry out its mission to include weapons, vehicles, armory, and etc. The formal cause is the pattern or essence in conformity with which these materials are assembled; the techniques, tactics and procedures serve as the blueprint for how IS operates. The efficient cause is the agent or force immediately responsible for bringing this matter and that form together in the production of the mission: the terrorists, foreign fighters and lone wolves who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Lastly, the final cause is the end or purpose for which a thing exists, making the final cause of the Islamic State the goal to establish a caliphate. This is part of the explanation of the terrorist organizations existence because it would never have been founded unless Sunni extremists would seek to establish an Islamic State.

Assessing the four causes with a formalized model adds rigor and completeness to a complex situation. Breaking down the four causes will help evaluate the Islamic States

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⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

capabilities as a terrorist organization to assess how the threat, rooted in religious motivations, will prolong the religious wave of terrorism. The Islamic States intent has been unwavering, but their capabilities and strength are susceptible to change, as nation states commit to defeating the terrorist organization.

Rise of the Islamic State

Bin Laden wanted to restore the “pan-Islamic caliphate that [was] idealized as it is venerated. The caliphate, which disappeared with the demise of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in 1924, is recalled by Muslims as the ‘golden age of Islam.’” While the initial motivation of AQ was to force US military presence out of the Middle East, “[another objective later developed,] a single Islamic state under the Sharia.” Bin Landed grew the terror organization by providing supported to Sunni groups around the world. But after the US committed Special Operations Forces to dismantling the AQ network, the terror organization became decentralized and eventually allowed for the splinter group, the Islamic State to rise.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi played a heavy hand in establishing the ultra-violent AQ offshoot that we have now come to know as the Islamic State. In 2003 “the U.S. government banned Baath Party members from the Iraqi government and disbanded the military, giving Zarqawi trained allies who supported his cause against American

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8 Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism,” 64.
forces.” Zarqawi eventually formed the AQ offshoot in Iraq by 2004, after pledging allegiance to Bin Laden. Zarqawi’s also wanted to “foment a civil war,” against the Shia Muslims. He believed that by creating a “sectarian war, it [would] become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis.” He was the new wave of AQ violence which showed beheadings and extreme violence in many videos that have gone viral. Bin Laden and his deputy Zawahiri warned against the use of extremism images as it “would appall ordinary Muslims.” Zarqawi’s desire to declare the Islamic State in Iraq “dates back to 2004, [although] AQ’s supreme command disagreed.” In 2006 Zarqawi was killed by a US drone strike “but his renegade followers nevertheless went on to declare the Islamic State of Iraq in October 2006, without consulting al-Qaeda leaders.” A few of Zarqawi’s followers later sized an opportunity to organize in 2009, Camp Bucca. The US detention facilities allowed them to use the prisons as recruiting grounds among “religious Sunni detainees [who were] former members of Saddam’s Baath Party, and

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11 Ibid.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.
[thus] the nucleus of a reborn movement took shape.”¹⁵ Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan identify in “ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror” how US run prisons in Baghdad were referred to as ‘jihadist universities,’ and individuals infiltrated Camp Bucca to cultivate new recruits.¹⁶ There was no better place to build an army than inside a prison where, not only; food, health care, and shelter was provided but also a safe haven under the US protection- and only a few hundred meters away from the entire al Qaeda leadership.

In the years after Maliki’s 2010 “re-election,” the Islamic State engaged in a ruthless campaign of assassination against Sunni tribal leaders and the remnants of the Awakening movement in Iraq’s Anbar province. Between 2009 and 2013, the Islamic State killed 1,345 Awakening members, according to doctoral research by the former U.S. Army officer Craig Whiteside. The assassination campaign weakened Sunni resistance, helping IS seize Mosul in 2014.¹⁷,¹⁸


¹⁶ Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: Regan Arts, 2016), 15.


¹⁸ Counter Terrorism Guide, “Islamic State Of Iraq And The Levant (ISIL),” National Counterterrorism Center, https://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/isil.html (accessed March 26, 2017). According to National Counterterrorist Center, “the group suffered a series of setbacks starting in 2007—resulting from the combination of Sunni civilian resistance and a surge in Coalition and Iraqi Government operations against the group—before rebounding in late 2011 after Coalition forces withdrew, amid growing Sunni discontent with the Shia-dominated Iraqi Government. While gaining strength in Iraq, ISIL also expanded its presence in Syria and established al-Nusrah Front as a cover for its activities there. Disputes over the group’s strategic direction in Syria led to conflict and ultimately ISIL’s disavowal by al-Qa’ida in February 2014, setting the stage for ISIL’s subsequent challenge to al-Qa’ida for leadership of the global extremist movement.”
June 2014 was pivotal in the Islamic State as the terror organization “declared the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate and called on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to the group,” and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, its Caliph.\\(^{19}\)

The terror organization has drawn thousands of foreign fighters globally and is among the most violent and extremist groups whose rhetoric and propaganda appeals to the masses. Evaluating the drivers who replenish and fortify the groups resilience will help us assess the threats posed by the Islamic State, and highlight the specific drivers that play the most significant role in prolonging this wave of religious terrorism.

Terrorism can be opportunistic in nature. The Islamic State operates in broken political spaces which breed safe havens. They were able to materialize the power vacuum in Syria and sectarian divide in Iraq. Terrorist life cycle theory points at terrorist organizations ability to survive only after it has taken root in its constituency, and IS has found the ability to continuously inspire new foreign fighters through the limitless presence on the internet. The resilience of the Islamic State comes from their refined use of information operations to inspire and build a network of foreign fighters.

**Material Cause**

The Islamic State is a military style terrorist organization with ample amounts of military grade weapons, which have been captured from the Syrian and Iraqi military. The terrorist organizations primary weapon of choice is the use of explosives. The use of military style weaponry (between 2013-2015) was disproportionate to firearms and

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.
incendiaries in comparison to terrorist attacks worldwide. “The vast majority (80%) of weapons used in ISIL’s attacks were explosives, compared to 58% of weapons used worldwide,” indicative of the highly capable organization.\textsuperscript{20} IS has “significant ground military capabilities [with weapons like the] Russian T-55, T-72, and U.S. M-1 tanks (captured from Iraq), a variety of MANPADs and ATGMs, artillery, and Russian ZU-23-2 antiaircraft guns and Grad BM-21 multiple rocket launchers.”\textsuperscript{21} The amount of weapons introduced to the area is constantly increasing as nation states equip opposition forces to defeat IS. This creates more opportunities for IS to infiltrate those supply routes, and capture more weapons upon the defeat of opposition forces. In June 2016, reports stated:

The Islamic State beat back an assault by U.S.-backed Syrian rebels who tried to retake a critical border crossing with Iraq. It wasn’t just a rare battlefield win for the militants: it also allowed them to get their hands on crates of American ammunition, U.S. mortars, a Toyota Hilux pickup adapted to carry a heavy machine gun, and new body armor.\textsuperscript{22}

Their successes are published online as a display of force and legitimacy. After the June 2016 capture of weapons, IS “released a video that also showed machine guns and M-16 rifles that most likely originated in the United States, as well as at least 2,000 rounds of


ammunition that definitively came from American manufacturers.” Russian military support for the Assad regime has also increased the flow of military weapons in Syria. Russia has “reportedly provided Syria with T-90 tanks, and Russian SA-17 advanced air defense systems are deployed in Syria.” These challenges are proving to be significant because, as the New York Times states:

... the group occupies the downstream position in a vast arms watershed, with tributaries extending to distant corners of the world. The group’s diversions include ammunition that Iran most likely provided to Iraqi or Syrian security forces; weapons formerly used in wars in Libya, East Africa and the Balkans; and equipment intended for the Syrian opposition fighting President Bashar al-Assad (or even for fighting the militants themselves) but that had been sold, traded or captured from unreliable rebels.

The Islamic State military style capability and access to weapons has not only been self-sustaining but, most alarmingly has been increasing. In December 2016, “Islamic State militants [were] producing weapons on a scale and sophistication which matches national military forces and have standardized production across their self-styled caliphate.” IS has leveraged a “robust supply chain of raw materials from Turkey, and

23 Ibid.


the technical precision of its work meant that it could not be described as ‘improvised’ weapons production.”\footnote{28} The knowledge, skills, and abilities of IS has allowed for the operability for “production facilities that employ a range of non-standard materials and chemical explosive precursors.”\footnote{29} The supply networks in Turkey provide IS the “consistency in the supply of source materials,” which serves as a major point of vulnerability but also introduces another layer of contention.\footnote{30} Turkey is a sovereign country whose role in combating IS has been complicated at best. The transnational complexities grow as the terror organization struggles to maintain their strong hold over Syria and Iraq, especially when it comes to the use of chemical weapons.

The Islamic State has been cited as having used “chemical weapons, including chlorine and sulfur mustard agents, at least 52 times on the battlefield in Syria and Iraq since it swept to power in 2014.”\footnote{31} US led air strikes in late 2016 bombed production facilities “where chemical ordnance is manufactured . . . [and] allied warplanes attacked a converted pharmaceutical factory in northern Iraq thought to have been a chemical


\footnote{28}Ibid.

\footnote{29}Ibid.

\footnote{30}Ibid.

weapons production facility.” Defense officials are concerned, “U.S. troops in Iraq are facing the threat of more chemical weapons attacks as Islamic State militants,” lose ground around Mosul. The chemical weapons could become more lethal if IS figures out how to turn the “mustard agent . . . in a gas state.” These opportunities to degrade their access to weapons with greater impact capability are few and far in-between. Although “chemicals comprised less than 1 percent of the weapons used in attacks by ISIL between 2013 and 2015,” reports from 2016 “indicate that ISIL’s use of chemical weapons became more common.” Strategic action must be taken to degrade their access to weapons in order to affect their overall attack capability, especially if the US military is so concerned of the chemical weapon threat that led the department to

32 Ibid.


34 Ibid.


provide “more than 50,000 kits of personal protective gear for Iraqi and Kurdish forces.”\(^{37,38}\)

The Islamic States criminal supply network in Turkey is not only allowing for the movement of “thousands of smuggled weapons [but also] thousands of fighters and illicit oil.”\(^{39}\) The Islamic State’s financial capital is unsurmountable and serves as the cornerstone of their success. IS makes its money from oil sales from oil fields in western Iraq and eastern Syria. As of late 2015, “Daniel Glaser, a U.S. Treasury official, estimated IS oil revenues [were] around $500 million a year, based on evidence they made around $40 million in one month,” early that year.\(^{40}\) Regarding oil sold from the Islamic State, \(\textit{Time Magazine}\) stated:

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\ldots \text{it is being imported to Turkey} \ldots \text{[and] illicit criminal networks and middlemen are moving oil generated in ISIS-held territories not only across the border to Turkish buyers, but also to Iraqi Kurdistan, to rival rebel groups in Syria and Jordan, and even to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.}
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\(^{38}\) Belkis Wille, “ISIS Accused of Unleashing Chemical Weapons in Mosul,” \textit{Human Rights Watch}, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/06/isis-accused-unleashing-chemical-weapons-mosul (accessed March 26, 2017). He stated, “the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said in a statement that ‘about twelve people, including women and children, were being treated for possible exposure to chemical weapons in a hospital in Erbil.’ While the ICRC stressed tests had not yet proved conclusive, it found the symptoms of the hospitalized patients suggested that they had been exposed to mustard agent. Iraqi authorities have said that ISIS was behind the attack.”


[Because IS] sells to anyone, it’s not about ideology... They deal with the Kurds, Syrian regime, Islamist rivals. It’s just business.  

As of earlier this year, the oil revenue sold to the Assad regime now serves as the largest source of funding for the Islamic State, according to Amos Hochstein, a U.S State Department official. The organization has proven resilient in the shifting their tactics, techniques, and producers. The sale of oil to the Assad regime ensures their sustainability even if oil smuggling routes are degraded. Their operability is “harder to hit in Syria because the pockets of territory it controls are smaller.” The question becomes ‘How can the Islamic State’s access to oil fields, and ultimately their financial capital be disrupted?’

Late 2015 airstrikes against IS oil was geared at disrupting the extraction process, and by January 2016 “IS lost its first oil field since it seized much of Eastern Syria in 2014.” However, more recently, and perhaps due to the “local civilians . . . [worried about their] own economic survival, which is now entangled with that of IS finances . . .


43 Ibid.

[airstrikes have] targeted the oil extraction process, rather than refineries or oil markets."\(^{45}\) This strategy could yield slower results if the group continues to “bring in equipment and technical experts from abroad to keep the industry running,”\(^ {46}\) and if collateral damage becomes a greater risk.\(^ {47}\) In addition to oil revenues, IS also gets money from extortion and taxing people under occupied territories.\(^ {48}\) The Islamic State is extremely well funded and has to be in order to maintain all their financial commitments. “It pays fighters around $400 a month, which is more than Syrian rebel groups or the Iraqi government offer . . . and it runs services (even if not always successfully) paying schoolteachers and providing for the poor and widowed.”\(^ {49}\) Destroying funding streams would effectively take a massive toll on the way they operate as a terror organization. Crippling their ability to sell oil to replenish funding is at the center of the cause.

\(^{45}\) Ibid.


\(^{48}\) Ibid.

Formal Cause- Techniques, Tactics, Procedures

The tactics, techniques and procedures which have served as a successful blueprint for IS operations, include hybrid warfare and Information Warfare & Psychological Operations (PSYOP) through cyber technological means. The Islamic States conducts a hybrid of true insurgency and terrorist tactics through a two-pronged strategy- carrying out territory-based activity in parallel to conducting transnational terrorism. “Hybridized warfare gives ISIS resilience and flexibility to adapt and evade defeat. ISIS’s strategy is to outlast its enemies by remaining in Iraq and Syria and expanding beyond those areas.” Their cyber capabilities have allowed the organization to leverage secure messaging for internal and external communications, in addition to leveraging their cyber presence for information operations and recruitment purposes. They were able to grow their cyber capabilities through the “recruitment of cyber experts and . . . investments in the tools and infrastructure needed for these experts to work.”

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According to the Aristotelian model of causality, the formal cause is the pattern or essence in conformity with which materials are used; in this case it’s the techniques, tactics, and procedures that serves as the blueprint for how IS operates. But IS’s TTPs are resilient and flexible, with unlimited reach. IS has lowered the barrier to entry for terrorists and lone wolves alike. They encourage people, especially those who have pledged allegiance to the organization, to use anything from crockpots to cars to wage violence and commit atrocities. Islamic State has empowered its followers abroad who do not have access to the military grade weaponry captured from Iraq and Syria, to weaponize house hold items.

National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) has classified the Islamic State terrorist attacks in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into four related categories; (1) IS predecessor: attacks by organizations that were part of the ISIL lineage prior to adoption of the IS name in 2013 (2) IS core: attacks by operatives of the “core” of the organization, based in and primarily active in Iraq and Syria (3) IS-affiliate: attacks by organizations that have declared allegiance to IS (4) IS-inspired: attacks by individuals who have indicated that they were motivated by allegiance to IS, and (5) IS-related: any of the above. 

For the scope of this paper, we

outfit Ghost Security Group claims ISIS has built its own Android-based, encrypted messaging app that circumvents conventional messaging apps like WhatsApp that are easier for the F.B.I. to monitor.”

will only be evaluating IS core and IS-inspired attacks as evaluating the TTPs of IS predecessors (AQ) and IS- affiliated (Boko Haram and etc) will not help in assessing how the Islamic State operates.

**The Islamic State’s Core TTPs**

The Islamic States strategy is based in “its use of light, decentralized detachments to fashion a creative, bold and mobile force.”  

Many of IS-Core is comprised of former Ba’athist military members who provide crucial conventional wisdom that is key to its military success, according to Barak Barfi, a research fellow at the New America Foundation. He compared the Islamic State’s battle style to that of the Ba’athist to better understand how the military doctrine has merged. The hybrid warfare strategy was created between “lessons learned from the Iraqi insurgency and tactics imported by Chechen jihadist [that] has influenced the Islamic State’s military posture and tactics.”

The former Ba’athist members possess the knowledge and ability to “think in military terms and lead large numbers of fighters. Their understanding of clandestine tradecraft, such as organizational compartmentalization, operational secrecy, and counterintelligence,” has also given this terrorist organization an advantage.

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55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.
the Ba’athist techniques just as quickly as rejecting certain aspects, as described in the following:

The conscription of Ba’athists brought the organization valuable military experience, but instead of a wholesale embrace of these teachings, a continually developing Islamic State has selected, adapted, and at times even rejected these techniques. Ba’athist influence can be seen clearly—for example, in its use of SVBIEDs as early overwhelming firepower. But from morale to tactical command, the organization is not saddled with the Ba’athists’ liabilities. The Islamic State’s expert use of forward agents and sleeper cells to gather intelligence is in direct contrast to the Ba’athists’ utter lack of pre-battle reconnaissance. [Ultimately] its members’ disparate experiences [have transformed] an insurgent force into a formidable army that can shift from acting like a guerilla militia to a conventional army, all while fighting on multiple fronts hundreds of miles away from its logistical bases. 57

The Islamic States primary targets, in sequential order, are private citizens, military, police, terrorists/non-state militia, businesses, and government targets according to START. The greatest number of deaths occurred in 2014. Terrorists “abducted more than 1,600 Iraqi Air Force recruits [in June 2014] at Camp Speicher in Tikrit and ultimately killed most... [and] earlier that month, ISIL operatives killed more than 600 Shia prisoners at Badush prison in Nineveh.” 58 START found that between April 2013 and the end of 2015 “attacks primarily target[ed at] private citizens resulted in more than 6,100 people held hostage or kidnapped.” 59

57 Ibid.


59 Ibid.
In late 2016 a shift likely occurred in IS strategy in their use of tunnels to conceal weapons and their movements at night to place IEDs along battle frontlines. A Peshmerga Sergeant said IS had “slowed Iraqi advances not with direct fighting, but with dozens of truck and car bombs, networks of mines, mortars, snipers, and suicide attackers.”  

Iraqi commander Jamal al Amenki highlighted the shift in TTPS, as over the past two years’ Iraqi forces had intelligence on IS plans and locations, but in late 2016 IS forces catch Iraqi fighters off guard through the increased use or bombs and use of tunnels. The tunnels also provide IS with underground facilities and “intricate networks of tunnels with rooms, toilets, medical facilities and enough food to sustain a long fight.”  

A former IS fighter noted that morale is very high among IS affiliates and they are willing to “stay underground for a long time since the tunnels are deep and provide the means of life.” Their will to fight continues to be seemingly unwavering as well as IS inspired loyalists abroad.

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61 Ibid.


63 Ibid.
Islamic States- Inspired Attackers TTPs

The tactics, techniques, and procedures deployed by Islamic State inspired attacks are completely different than the direct attacks. The inspired or lone wolves attacks are usually organized and conducted by individuals with no formal training or support. The attacks do not require large financial capital to conduct, and the Islamic State has embraced and encouraged the tactics in hopes it will “inspire copycats . . . and although lone wolves usually kill few people, they have an outsize political impact.”

The START database identified the following about IS-inspired perpetrators:

A key distinction of the attacks by ISIL-inspired perpetrators, all of which occurred in 2014 and 2015, is that they took place in locations where terrorist attacks were relatively rare compared to where ISIL and ISIL affiliates were typically active. Eight of the ISIL-inspired attacks took place in the United States, six in France, four in Australia, two in Denmark, two in Canada; the Gaza Strip, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines each experienced one ISIL-inspired attack.

The lone wolf attackers could represent a greater threat because they operate alone, and are harder to track. Law enforcement and government officials responsible for countering violent extremism and counterterrorism task forces work to locate and monitor IS communications in order to disrupt terror plots. Lone terrorists who are not

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communicating with outside entities can be more difficult to track, therefore making their plots harder to discover and disrupt. In addition, the Islamic State can claim responsibility for any of the lone wolf attacks that appear similar in nature to ones highlighted in their propaganda manuscripts and manuals. The connection between the attackers and the terrorist organization can be very difficult to establish as in the case of Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel. He weaponized a truck, not by strapping a bomb to it or to himself, but by driving the truck through the Bastille Day celebration in Nice on July 14, 2016 and killed 86 people. Bouhlel was to known to local police for various criminal acts, but not for Islamic extremist ideology. French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve said Bouhlel had been “radicalized very quickly.” The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack even though “there was no evidence that he had pledged allegiance to any radical groups or had contact with known Islamists.”

The most dangerous thing about the lone wolf attacks is their ability to easily kill people with a variety of sources without a network of support. The Orlando and San Bernardino IS-inspired attackers were “sympathizers who have no direct links to the group.” Omar Mateen killed 49 people on June 12, 2016 at a nightclub in Orlando,


67 Ibid.

Florida using an assault rifle and a pistol. Mateen called 911 claiming allegiance to the
Islamic State. Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik killed 14 people during a
Christmas party in 2015 in San Bernardino using guns and explosives. The Institute for
The Study of War stated:

This attack was the first al Qaeda- or ISIS-related in the U.S. by a skilled shooter team
using both guns and explosives, a technique that both groups used in the attacks in
Mumbai of November 2008; on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya in September
2013; on the Paris offices of Charlie Hebdo in January 2015; and on several targets in
Paris on November 13, 2015.69

The fundamental element of the self-radicalization process is access to the polarizing
literature of the Islamic State and the websites that enable attackers with the
knowledge to conduct murder.

**Cyber & Technology**

Every terrorist organization dies out when it stops inspiring its constituency; for
the Islamic State, their ability to reach widespread audiences is foundational to their
resiliency. The manner in which the Islamic State has appealed to individuals around the
world plays largely on their sophisticated propaganda and social media campaigns
through their use of technological tools. As the shift in recruiting has gone from “direct
contact in mosques to now 90% being recruited online,” we must place greater

69 Institute for the Study of War, *San Bernardino Shooting a Terrorist Attack with Al-Qaeda and
emphasis on the recruitment conducted within the religious wave of terrorism.\textsuperscript{70} The levels of accessible and impersonal contact established over the internet, has left thousands of individuals vulnerable to the strategic and well-crafted recruiting camping’s of the Islamic State.

The beheadings, immolations and other spectacles are employed both to menace Western adversaries and to appeal to disenfranchised Muslim males weighing a leap into the Islamist fray . . . a masked, knife-wielding militant with a British accent known as “Jihadi John” — slit the throats of Western hostages, including Americans James Foley and Steve Sotloff...and the burning of a caged Jordanian fighter pilot — [are] shown over and over,[to influence] long after their audiences beyond the caliphate dissipated.\textsuperscript{71}

The Islamic State has devoted an extraordinary level of detail to perfecting social media images that are ensured to leave long lasting impressions on the masses. Every action conducted in the Islamic State’s videos carries strategic significance. They often reference Qur’anic scriptures in order to establish legitimacy.

The democratization of technology and information empowers everyone; it knows no boundaries. The Islamic State’s cyber capabilities have led to a strong external and internal communication strategy. The terrorist organization’s propaganda and social medial operations have “cultivated influence methodically through what the U.S.


\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
military calls Information Operations.” Information Operations (IO) is defined by the Department of Defense as “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.” Through information operations, propaganda and social media, IS can disseminate literature favorable to the organization in order to influence its constituency and to recruit new sympathizers. Their use of military style images and display of killings through beheadings, fire, and etc. are meant to have an emotional effect for viewers. The emotional effect can achieve an array of objectives from making the Islamic State appear as a united and sophisticated organization to appealing to the radical Islamist who see beheadings as sacred ritual, a representation of their religious conviction. Psychological Operations “convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals.” The Islamic State use of encrypted apps has served as significant portion


of their communication strategy— all of which render them highly sophisticated but also more vulnerable.

Information Warfare (IO) & Psychological Operations (PSYOP):

The Institute for the Study of War has broken down the Islamic States Military Information Operation Framework into four main parts (1) controlled terrain, (2) areas of expansion, (3) international terror campaign and (4) online recruitment. These four areas highlight the ways in which their information warfare, which is waged online, attempts at yielding the organization physical results.  

The distributed disinformation regarding their successes in governing controlled territories makes it appealing for foreign fighters to join a newly found utopia. The distributed disinformation regarding their on-the-ground strength is meant to “confuse military forces acting against IS and . . . convey a narrative of constant expansion.” Online propaganda about the Islamic State and the caliphate builds the international terror campaign and draws in new recruits. The group must also maintains a strong media presence within the caliphate to appear strong and in control.

The group organized public screenings of a video showing the February 2015 immolation of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kassassbeh in areas under its control in Iraq and Syria in order to intimidate potential dissidents and demonstrate the organization’s strength over foreign militaries and alleged ‘disbelievers.’


76 Ibid.
The Islamic State’s use of various multimedia outlets: online social media platforms, apps, magazines (hard and soft copy) and radio have enabled the group to conduct successful Information Warfare & Psychological Operations. IS regulates internet access to those who live under their control and requires IS fighters to “relinquish their personal cellphones upon joining the group in order to ensure the militants did not post unapproved content about ISIS’s activities.” The terror organization has its own radio station, al-Bayan, broadcasting “from central Libya to eastern Iraq, with programs ranging from news bulletins and ‘history lessons’ to on-air fatwas and call-in medical clinics.”

The formerly-annual al-Naba’ newsletter has metamorphosed into a weekly newspaper issued on Saturdays, complete with exclusive interviews, opinion pieces, and infographics. The al-Himma Library’s [an IS publishing house] theological tracts are delivered to fighters and civilians alike by hand, and photographic and video reports are more ubiquitous than ever.

The Islamic State uses apps like Facebook, What’s App, Twitter, Telegram, and Tumblr to wage its information operations. These apps do not discriminate; any user can create a new profile. The lifespan of that account is a different matter, especially as officials are diligently tracking the users online and shutting them down. Terrorist social media analysts J. M. Berger and Heather Perez found that IS’ Twitter presence of new and


79 Ibid.
returning English-speaking accounts dramatically dropped in late September 2015 and has remained at a flat level of activity because of Twitter’s suspension of activity. New challenges will arise for officials as the group shifts TTPs in the cyber realm. The Islamic State was thought to have “built its own Android-based, encrypted messaging apps,” and using apps which are non-US based, and harder to disrupt.

ISIS members used Telegram—a secure messaging app created by a Russian developer now living in Germany—to ultimately download another app called Amaq Agency. That app, run by a group of the same name with ties to ISIS, provided users with a stream of news and videos filled with ISIS propaganda messages including executions, battlefield footage, and speeches.82

Their use of information operations is decentralized which makes it difficult to destroy or disrupt. The internet is an infinite repository of data and it’s impossible to delete all the Islamic State’s content. “Individual fighters in ISIL have both the ideological tools and the technological means to recruit, radicalize, and incite followers. . . . No other Violent Extremist Groups rival ISIL in their capacity for exploiting cyber technologies.”83 Counterterrorism officials should continue to pursue companies like


82 Ibid.

Facebook and Twitter to delete IS accounts but it must be a two-pronged approach with the Countering Violent Extremist (CVE) programs. These initiatives will be crucial in countering the violent extremist and disrupting the radicalization process, because even as the Islamic States online presence is diminished, the internet is impossible to fully censor, and content can continuously be shared and spread globally. It’s crucial to remember that the successes of a ruthless and deadly terrorist organization all stem from the effectiveness of its organization. The Islamic State is meticulous in its structure including the leadership chain. The structured and “centralized approach allowed IS to direct its media forces with the speed and discipline of military forces. ISIS’s media apparatus behaved synergistically with ISIS’s religious and military organs.”

Efficient Cause

The efficient cause represents the agents responsible for the production of the mission; the terrorists, foreign fighters, and lone wolves who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State are the responsible agents for helping in the creation and the establishment of the caliphate. The State Department estimated that by the end of 2014 the number of IS fighters were between 20,000 and 31,500. The Islamic State’s ability to establish its inner network has been able to replenish itself through the thousands of agents


foreign fighters pouring into Syria and Iraq from around the world. US and coalition forces are constantly targeting IS leadership making the organizational structure of the terror organization the most important element. Senior counterterrorism, as of early April 2017, indicated the leader of IS, al-Baghdadi had once again unexpectedly changed location “and no one is certain where al-Baghdadi has gone or when he left.” Iraqi forces thought they had al-Baghdadi in February 2017 when airstrikes were conducted against a house where he was thought to be meeting other commanders. Although “thirteen Islamic State commanders were killed . . . al-Baghdadi” was not.

Coalition air assets have conducted more than 19,000 strikes on ISIS targets, removing tens of thousands ISIS fighters from the battlefield and killing over 180 senior to mid-level ISIS leaders, including nearly all of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's deputies, his so-called ministers of war, information, finance, oil and gas, and his chief of external operations. Beyond fighters, these precision airstrikes are targeting ISIS external attack plotters, military commanders, administrative officials, facilitators, and communicators, as well as its energy assets, command and control facilities, and bulk cash storage facilities.

The structure of the IS organization is crucial, especially as key leaders are killed by coalition forces.

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Islamic State Organizational Structure

IS has a highly centralized military and governmental structure with several cabinets and divisions all under the central leadership of the Caliph. Under the Caliph are two deputies, currently who supervise operations in Iraq and Syria respectively. Operations are then organized under six councils, the Military Council, the Defense, Security, and Intelligence Council, the Judicial Council, the Shura Council, the Fiscal Council, and the Media Council, each with chairmen and members charged with overseeing matters within their jurisdiction. As IS has gained territories and set up government entities, the Caliph has appointed governors to oversee specific towns and areas.89

The six councils have their own organizational structure and include financial, legal, fighters’ assistance, intelligence, and media councils.90 Their well-structured organization includes malicious details for each council. The manager of the foreign fighters, Abdullah Ahmed al-Meshedani, handles guesthouses for them, and transports suicide bombers on behalf of IS, according to the State Department.91 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani also ensures IS strength is well publicized as new groups pledge their allegiance to al-Baghdadi and he appoints emirs of IS regional groups.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant – Caucasus Province (ISIL-CP) became ISIL’s newest regional group on June 23, 2015 when the spokesman for ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio recording accepting the sworn allegiance of the fighters of four Caucasus regions – Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria. The statement also appointed Rustam

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As elderov as the emir of the new ISIL-CP. On September 2, 2015, ISIL-CP claimed responsibility for an attack on a Russian military base in Magaramkent, southern Dagestan, which resulted in the deaths and injuries of a number of Russian citizens.\textsuperscript{92}

The members in academia at the University of Maryland, Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) conducted a six year longitudinal study of IS and other violent extremist organizations to identify the organizational profile of the Islamic. They have concluded the following:

IS has developed an organizational structure that may be resilient to leadership decapitation, given the power sharing style of al-Baghdadi, the strength and structure of the Shura Council, and the military prowess of the two Deputies. The Shura Council will select the next Caliph; the group will be loyal to that person. The current, leadership structure is incredibly strong and resilient.\textsuperscript{93}

Their assessment was based on three fundamental findings. First, the Islamic state receives moderate-to-support from within the caliphate. The support IS receives on the ground has been attributed to their financial success in paying the fighters and maintaining critical infrastructure. IS gains millions of dollars in oil revenue, and attempts to disrupt their financial streams have serious limits. Second, the terror organizations’ effective leadership structure has fortified their ability to appeal to more recruits. In addition to “the participative, pragmatic leadership style embodied by al-


Baghdad and his close follower is a style commonly exhibited by successful state-level leaders, but is rare among violent extremist organizational leaders.”\textsuperscript{94} If institutional success is not centered around key figures, it can help ensure the longevity of an organization if the processes are adequately cemented. The third, and perhaps the most significant is that “the broader Umma and international support is currently moderate-to-low, suggesting that the [IS] focus is on establishing themselves as an independent, self-sustaining organization.”\textsuperscript{95} Our understanding of this last element plays a big role in how we assess the strength of sympathetic foreign publics, or lack thereof. Sympathetic foreign publics have played one of five crucial roles in assessing the durability of each wave of terrorism. Whether “foreign governments are hesitant to endorse IS . . . [or if the Islamic State] is avoiding partnerships with entities stronger than themselves to preserve their brand,” their ability to preserve without their support is paramount.\textsuperscript{96}

**Islamic State Forces**

The Islamic State’s forces, “jihadist ideologues say are 90 percent Iraqi and 70 percent Syrian in its two main strongholds, where they have about 40,000 fighters and 60,000 supporters.”\textsuperscript{97} The former Iraqi army has a definite presence with the terrorist

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
organization, and former Ba’athist officers hold many leadership roles within the Islamic States military styled organization. The same, “ex-Baathist army officers who were nearly all U.S. prisoners in Bucca jail, which became a sort of IS university.” The events that transpired at Camp Bucca inspired cascading effects against Iraqi prisons. The role of Camp Bucca was not only significant for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who grew his network among Sunni extremists but also served as the cornerstone for what would be as crucial recruiting ground for IS. The Iraqi prisons were used as “its training camps, building trust, operations security, and a passionate hatred for the Shiite-led government in Baghdad.” Several thousands of IS fighters were added to the terror organization after the ‘Breaking the Walls’ campaign between July 2012 and July 2013 that liberated prisoners. The Islamic State has recruited men and young boys to train into guerrilla style soldiers. If the men weren’t forced into joining the ranks, IS also lured recruits by offering “amnesty to families who turned over their sons to the Islamic State to fight.”

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98 Ibid.


100 Ibid.
Foreign Fighters

As coalition airstrikes have killed more than 19,000 extremists, “new foreign fighters replace them almost as quickly as they are killed." The number of foreign fighters in Syria was over 30,000 in September 2015, according to US intelligence estimates. They represented fighters from over 100 countries, and understanding the motives of these individuals has been a significant challenge since “the flow is neither uniform by region nor by country, regardless of the pool of residents who may be susceptible to the Islamic State’s appeal.” While the majority of IS foreign fighters are from the Middle East and the Arab world, many are also from Western nations. The Soufan Group (2015) identified that the majority are coming from Tunisia (6,000), Saudi Arabia (2,500), Russia (2,400), Turkey (2,100), and Jordan (2,000). The western countries also had a significant number of foreign fighters with France as the highest (1,700), followed by Germany (760), the UK (760), and Belgium (470). The United States official foreign fighter count was 150 with a non-official number of over 250.


103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.
The motivation for foreign fighters varies as some join for more personal than political reasons, which could be attributed to their information operations that is geared toward appealing to alienated individuals. The propaganda that called on fighters to the utopia of the Islamic State for a sense of “belonging, purpose, adventure and friendship,” continues to appear to remain the main reason for people to join the Islamic State.”  

Recruitment has also taken on a word of mouth campaign, as “clusters of friends and neighbors persuade each other to travel separately or together to join the Islamic State.” Criminals have also been identified as a force multiplier for the Islamic State, as individuals who were criminals first, were then introduced to Islam, often in prisons. However, the most terrifying and unique characteristic of this religious terror organization is its ability to reach populations and individuals with no common identity. There is no religious, nationalist, democratic prerequisite for appealing to or joining the terrorist movements within the religious wave.

There is no single pathway, no common socioeconomic background, not even a common religious upbringing among individuals attracted to foreign fighting in general or jihadist fighting in particular. Western volunteers are often ‘immigrants, students, between jobs or girlfriends . . . looking for new families of friends and fellow travelers [and for] the most part they have no traditional religious education [who] are ‘born again’ into a radical religious vocation through the appeal of militant jihad.”

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106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.

The Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel by the Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives had 32 key findings, some of the most notable include the following:

- Despite concerted efforts to stem the flow, we have largely failed to stop Americans from traveling overseas to join jihadists. Of the hundreds of Americans who have sought to travel to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq, authorities have only interdicted a fraction of them. Several dozen have also managed to make it back into America.

- The U.S. Government lacks a National strategy for combating terrorist travel and has not produced one in nearly a decade.

- The unprecedented speed at which Americans are being radicalized by violent extremists is straining Federal law enforcement’s ability to monitor and intercept suspects.

- Jihadist recruiters are increasingly using secure websites and apps to communicate with Americans, making it harder for law enforcement to disrupt plots and terrorist travel.\(^{109}\)

Foreign Fighters are arriving to the Islamic State in the thousands by exploiting security and border countermeasures. Europe has served as a “jihadi superhighway” for foreign fighters traveling to the Islamic State.\(^{110}\) Turkey has served as the primary entry and exit point into Syria as the countries’ border presents a huge challenge to secure. The Islamic States recruiters have produced and distributed multi language “manuals providing


plain, advice on getting to the safe haven. In February 2015, ISIS published Hijrah to the Islamic State, a how-to guide for dealing with border security, planning travel routes, and deciding what to pack.”

FBI Assistant Director Michael Steinbach said in hearing, in the same month, disrupting the support foreign fighters receive prior to their departure from their home countries has been extremely difficult.

Foreign Fighters have been using methods to obfuscate officials by following IS guidance to “to buy airline tickets to holiday destinations that don’t look suspicious and, once there, book onward travel to Turkey.” Foreign Fighters are also using popular methods like “hidden city ticketing” booking. As in the case of US citizen, Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, after purchasing a flight to Greece, he got off at his connecting location of Istanbul and continued to IS.


James Comey, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) said in July 2016 that “at some point, there is going to be a terrorist diaspora out of Syria like we’ve never seen before. . . not all of the Islamic State killers are going to die on the battlefield.”\(^{115}\) Foreign fighters “represent a three-fold threat to the United States and the international community.”\(^{116}\) The foreign fighters serve as a force multiplier for the IS and bolster the efficient cause within the caliphate. They also threaten, like the fighters in Afghanistan during the Soviet Union conflict, to disperse with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to conduct attacks, embolden the radicalization phenomena, and build transnational terror networks. The intelligence community judged in June 2016 that the Islamic State “is probably exploring a variety of means for infiltrating operatives into the West, including refugee flows, smuggling routes, and legitimate methods of travel.”\(^{117}\) Lastly, they can build the Islamic States online and cyber presence via “remote radicalization,” if they don’t return home.\(^{118}\)


\(^{118}\) Ibid.
The call for foreign fighters could continue or increase as IS “gradually [cultivates] its global network of branches into a more interconnected organization,” as stated by Director of the CIA, John Brennan in June 2016.\textsuperscript{119} As the terror organization looks to expand its operations it “can help preserve its capacity for terrorism regardless of events in Iraq and Syria. . . [and] in fact as the pressure mounts on IS, it will intensify its global terror campaign to maintain its dominance of the global terrorism agenda.”\textsuperscript{120} The Islamic State’s Sinai branch should be closely monitored as tension could proliferate as the “branch has established itself as the most active and capable terrorist group in Egypt. Other branches, while also a concern, have struggled to gain traction.”\textsuperscript{121} The Islamic State “recruiters on social media have called for followers to travel to these locations if they cannot make it to Syria and Iraq, and it appears many have heeded the call.”\textsuperscript{122}

\textbf{Final Cause}

The final cause represents the goals of the Islamic State; the motive to establish a global caliphate secured through a global war. The end goal encapsulates the spirit of

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\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.

the fourth wave which Rapoport identified as explicitly antidemocratic because the
democratic idea is inconceivable without a significant measure of secularism. This
element is probably the most simple to understand of the Islamic State. Their goals are
well stated and well publicized; the way in which the message is received is a completely
different issue. Alice Pontallier has stated the following:

Unlike the Western coalition, IS fighters have a clear vision: fight a battle that
will lead to a global Caliphate or governance. Not only does the group have
clarity, but they are even willing to die to accomplish their goal — this makes
them hard to conquer. Even though [the Islamic State] is not a state, it has
attracted people from around the world to believe in their vision and fight their
battle.\textsuperscript{123}

The Islamic State is a religious Islamist Sunni Salafist Jihadist terror organization, with
non secular statehood goals, however, they have been characterized more by extreme
violence than institution building.\textsuperscript{124} A study at the Center for Risk and Economic
Analysis of Terrorism Events was conducted to evaluate the objectives of the Islamic
state. The finds of the study accurately portray the key strategic objectives of the Islamic
State: establish a caliphate, control and govern the caliphate, expand Islam and Sharia
law worldwide, and recreate the power and glory of Sunni Islam. The Islamic State is
structured to accomplish these objectives by highlighting their deriving legitimacy as the
descendants of Mohammed and their organizational structure, especially through the

\textsuperscript{123} Alice Pontailler, \textit{ISIS: The First Transnational Insurgency}, Lexington Institute,

\textsuperscript{124} Zachary Laub and Jonathan Masters, “Backgrounder: The Islamic State,” \textit{Council on Foreign
Shura council, and to enable the caliph to be recognized as the leader of the jihad. Their reluctance to seek support from nation states is likely rooted in the need to create their version of a pure and stick version of Islam and “take over other Islamic movements.”

The apocalyptic message of the Islamic State, as it makes no secret, is also rooted in encouraging members to join the last jihadist group that will usher in the caliphate. They believe they are the real Muslims whose role is to purify Islam and kill the infidels. The Islamic literature is used to manipulate and spread fear. IS works towards coursing individuals into believing that if they don’t join the Islamic State, the will not be on the right side of history. Their ultimate version of jihad is geared toward replacing existing, man-made borders, in order to establish the caliphate.

CONCLUSION

The Prolonged Religious Wave of Terrorism

The drivers that are prolonging this wave beyond 2025 are well defined under the contexts of Rapoport’s five principal actors: terrorist organizations, diaspora population, states, sympathetic foreign publics, and super national organizations.

Terrorist Organizations

The motives of terrorist organizations in preceding waves were secular in nature and motives; terrorist organization sentiments were either accomplished or filtered into the next wave. The non secular nature of the current religious wave of terrorism has made it very difficult to foresee a future in which the goals of the Islamic State come to fruition. While many religious terrorist organizations exist beyond just the Islamic State, i.e. Boko Haram, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Shabab etc, IS has become the most resilient terrorist organization with statehood ideals that is currently occupying territory in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State however, is significant because of their ability to materialize their ideals. This terror organization is representative of this wave strength. The Islamic State has capitalized on many of the elements created from other religious extremist terror originations. Al-Qa’ida used religious text to build legitimacy and prophesies about the caliphate, but the Islamic State declared it. Al-Shaab first used social media outlets like Twitter to build their constituency, but the Islamic State militarized the use of information operations and psychological warfare to maximize their cyber presence and capabilities. Anwar al-
awlaki and AQAP established the ground work for reaching English speaking sympathizers with Inspire magazine. The Islamic State on the other hand, was able to refine, militarize, and weaponize their propaganda operations to create an apocalyptic utopia for jihadism. The military and guerilla framework of their operations have made this terrorist organization extremely durable and ensured the message will live on beyond the figurehead that stands today. Their ability to increase their capabilities and shift tactics, techniques and procedures with agility serves as a strong indication of their durability. When a terror organization ceases inspiring its followers, the energy of the wave fizzles out, but if the number of foreign fighters and lone wave attacks are any indication of this organization’s ability to inspire, this wave of religious terrorism will probably be prolonged beyond 2025. Most importantly the evaluation of the Islamic States operability has highlighted the deeper issues ravaging the Middle East that are far beyond the Islamic State. The destabilizing elements which enabled the eruption of the Arab Spring still occur today throughout the Middle East and most of the Arab world. The sectarian conflicts alone will perpetuate the existing turmoil which has allowed the Islamic State to exploit and thrive. The definition of religious terrorism could become further complicated as sectarian groups look to establish new governance in lawless regions.

**Diaspora Population**

Directory Comey warned about terrorist diaspora threats as the Islamic State’s appeal permeates globally. The influence and impact of the diaspora groups in this wave
has far surpassed their effects in previous waves. Diaspora populations served a crucial role during the anarchist wave as they served as a mechanism for the spread of anarchist ideals. Figureheads of the anarchist were paramount to recruiting and inspiring anarchist acts. Emma Goldman, the notorious anarchist leader, who immigrated from Lithuania was an insurmountable influence on Leon Czolgosz, who assassinated President McKinley during the golden age of anarchism. Diaspora populations in this wave have come in the form of lone wolf terrorists. The second and third generation US citizens that have been radicalized, have murdered civilians in the name of Islam. The link between terrorist organizations and diaspora populations has been harnessed in a new and extremely transparent manner. AQ enabled individuals to wage jihad at home through the dissemination of material from bomb making to ideological resiliency. Diaspora population will continue to serve as a fundamental force that prolongs this wave of terrorism, especially as the Islamic State loses territory abroad and looks to re-establish influence and power by waging transnational terrorist attacks.

Since the beginning of the religious wave terrorism in 1979, the perpetual conflicts in the Middle East and the Arab world have fueled a vicious cycle of displacement. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US Iraq & Afghanistan wars, the uprisings of the Arab Spring, the toppling of ruthless dictators, and the recent spread of IS terror in Iraq and Syria have specifically contributed to the highest record of migrants worldwide - it reached 244 million in 2015. The movement of people and ideas has
recently reached a peak which could have significant impacts in the long term by increasing the diaspora’s terrorist ability to prolong the wave of religious terrorism. The role of diaspora groups was fundamentally different during the anti-colonial and new left movements. Diaspora groups lobbied foreign publics to further their agenda abroad, and provide money to fighters on the ground. The Jewish communities in the US implored the government to take an active role during the Holocaust. The Countering Violent Extremist (CVE) programs within the United States could help second and third generation US citizens who have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, de-radicalize and help shift the message toward ending extremists. However, until that shift occurs within the diaspora populations, globally, the group will continue to serve a force that perpetuates this wave of terrorism.

States

The role of states has dramatically changed this wave, especially American involvement in fighting religious terrorism after 9/11. The US failed to establish counterterrorism policies during the anarchist movement and the US pioneered the abolition of empires during the anti-colonial movement by weighing into domestic matters of European countries, especially when it came to encouraging the Britain government to accept an Irish state. The US embodied one of the main targets of the third wave: capitalism and neocolonialism. The Vietnam and Cold War drew most of the US attention during the New Left wave and the limited counterterrorism polices put in place were inconsistent. They ultimately undercut international efforts to combat
terrorism. It was exacerbated as the US supported most governments under terrorist siege. The uprisings of the Arab Spring truly challenged the luxuries authoritarian dictators enjoyed from the western world. These complexities remain muddled as the new administration is setting forth foreign policies. Inconsistencies in foreign and counterterrorism polices will have a larger effect on the longevity of the terrorist wave more so now because the democratization of the internet and technology has empowered individuals to watch, scrutinize and act on the perceived inconsistencies which shape global norms - as the United States is at the helms of the coalition forces against religious terrorism.

The United States scrapped the deterrence doctrine and adopted a preemptive model. The Bush preemptive model was overturned by the Obama reluctant deterrence model, categorized by the light footprint strategy. There is no doubt the new administration will have to work closely with coalition partners in order to roll back the successes of the Islamic State. While the United States was to work with the British government concerning IRA issues, the complexities of terrorism have become more difficult to unravel as religious and sectarian tensions which have been bubbling under the surface will likely further erupt in the near future. The transnational issues initiated by this wave will require the unprecedented cooperation of stakeholders. The key stakeholders fundamentally disagree with the strategies implanted for defeating the terrorist organization. Terrorism is as elusive to define as it is to defeat, and the role of the state, as highlighted in Turkey, Russia, Iran and the United States, has become more
complicated as the capabilities of the Islamic State advance and remain resilient. The tension between the stakeholders will prolong the states abilities to unify on a counterterrorism policy which will undercut any efforts to roll back the strength of the Islamic State and extremist terrorist organizations. Sectarian divides in Iraq and Syria will hinder the ability for coalition forces to defeat the Islamic State, and build trust within IS rescued communities. The Iraqi government has been rendered useless, and Shia militias that are fighting IS forces have become more powerful than the government. Recent reporting has indicated that Shia led militia forces, to include the Badr and Hezbollah Brigades, which are Iranian-backed, are putting Sunni civilians through worse conditions than the Islamic State. Sectarian tensions among Sunni and Shia can be expected to fuel religious terrorism even after the Islamic State. The instable regions that the Islamic State is seeking to expand such as Libya, Egypt and Afghanistan, could also follow the same fate as Iraq and Syria.

The rebellion against the authoritarian Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, has led to continued bloodshed. The turmoil has further erupted as Russians provided support to the Assad regime, and as the Islamic State has fully exploited the volatile situation. The United States and Russian continued inability to stand on the right side of history where the Assad regime is concerned, even after reports in early April 2017 highlighted the continued use of chemical weapons against civilian populations, will almost certainly allow the Islamic State to continue to exploit the explosive situation.
Sympathetic Foreign Publics

Sympathetic foreign publics served as the constituency base for anarchists’ movement, as they were the ones responsible for conducting the terrorist attacks. In the second and third waves, sympathetic foreign publics were essential to emboldening the sentiments of the foreign fighters of the second wave, and gave credence to the PLO sentiments in the third wave. Sympathetic foreign publics played relatively significant roles to ending the waves of terrorism which preceded this one. Their role has become dramatically magnified as thousands of sympathetic foreign fighters have flocked to the Islamic State to replenish the ranks of the members who are being targeted in air strikes. The Islamic State’s ability to inspire their constituency is evident in the foreign fighters’ numbers. Their information operations and psychological warfare have targeted the emotional and ideological factors within their followers.

Throughout the second wave, the Arab state gave terrorist organizations like the Algerian FLN crucial political support, and those adjacent to Algeria offered sanctuaries from which the group could stage attacks. Sympathetic forging publics are not lobbying states to provide support to the Islamic State. They have been empowered to act alone, whether it be to travel and fight for the Islamic State or conduct lone wolf attacks at home. The secular transnational movement has not received public state sponsorship or support, and the terror organizations likely prefer it that way. The Islamic State is in competition with Muslim factions, and they serve to represent the caliphate. The Islamic State aims to create friction between citizens and their home state in order to demonize
the infidels. They use images and videos of Western leaders to smear western ideology, and destroy democratic legitimacy. We are in an era that demands pragmatic policies and messaging, anything less could lead to detrimental unintended consequences. Political correctness is important now more than ever as the words of Western leaders are susceptible to manipulation and the use of IS recruitment material. In a time when populism is on the rise and nationalism is surging, we must not forget about our policies towards terrorism, human rights values, and refugees.

**Supranational Organizations**

The role the supranational organizations such as the United Nations emerged in the second wave as a crucial ingredient, which had a profound impact in the successes and failures of freedom fighters. The UN resolution which established the formation of the Israeli state, set the precedent for future nations, and all anti-colonial terrorists sought the UN interest in their struggles. However, this last ‘essential’ element no longer holds the same level of impact and as nation states disagree on counterterrorism policies.

The United Nations has passed a few resolutions which have called on states to fight against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq through unanimous votes. The November 2015 United Nations Security Council Resolution called on states to take the necessary steps to suppress the terrorist acts of the Islamic State. The role of the supranational organization seems to mainly provide a benchmark for consensus, censuses against the terror organization. In the terrorism arena that can be difficult on its own, but this
element has had and will probably continue to have marginal effects on this wave of terrorism or against the Islamic State.

Finale

Terrorism has come a long way from representing the ideals of virtue and democracy, and in fact now explicitly represents antidemocratic aims. The evolutionary tactics displayed by the Islamic State go beyond the intrinsic features of the religious movement as established by Rapoport. The essence of the religious wave of terrorism is embodied by the ultimate act of rebellion against the modern world —and helps apocalyptic sympathizers find an ideology that can fulfill radical desires.

Pragmatic and enduring solutions must include information campaigns against IS ideology which must be waged globally. The sectarian divides within the Arab world must be addressed before the Muslim community can internally eradicate radical Islamic prophecy. The elements which enabled the Arab spring still exist today, and fuel the hotbeds of IS foreign fighters. Disrupting the support and the allure of the Islamic State will conduct the most devastating blow, as in essence it would be cutting off their main regenerating source of existence. The resilient threat the Islamic States poses in its ability to draw unprecedented numbers of foreign fighters, use encrypted communication outlets, conduct strong and strategic propaganda campaigns, and their ability to hold territory will prolong the religious wave of terrorism beyond 2025.

The functionality and the role of leading terrorist organizations in each wave, symbolizes the greater sentiments of that era. The functionality and the role of leading
terrorist organizations in each wave symbolize the greater sentiments of that era. The sentiments often have spillover effects made evident in the three preceding waves. The sentiments which have produced the Islamic States constituency base tell us more about the durability of this wave as those sentiments will continue to result in regional disability. The ideology behind the terrorist organization can convey a more compelling story about the gaps which are being exploited. Whether previous movements failed or succeeded, terrorism was the method used to draw power and create change. Terrorism represents the means not the end; it is a method and not a tangible element that can be destroyed, it can only be temporarily disrupted.


