Relations Between FRANCE AND ITALY

By PATRICK J. WARD
and the Europe Committee

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TRUE INTERNATIONALISM THE WAY TO PEACE

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RELATIONS BETWEEN FRANCE AND ITALY*

The purpose of this report is to present an impartial and objective picture of the situation between France and Italy as it stands today. The report has been prepared keeping always in view that “to repress ambition and covetousness and envy—the chief instigators of war—nothing is more fitting than the Christian virtues and, in particular, the virtue of justice; for by its exercise, both the law of nations and the faith of treaties may be maintained inviolate and the bonds of brotherhood continue unbroken, if men are but convinced that justice exalteth a nation.”¹ Further that “every kind of peace is unstable, all treaties are inefficacious in spite of long and laborious negotiations of the authors and in spite of the sacred character of the seals, as long as a reconciliation inspired by mutual charity does not put an end to hatred and enmity.”²

The presentation would not be complete without sketching in as accurately as possible the historical background of the relations between the two countries here considered. The word complete is even used in a relative sense and it should be understood that important, very important, as is this phase of international affairs, yet it is but a corner of the full picture of the international problem.

So in considering this or any presentation of Franco-Italian relations there must be kept in mind the world situation, particularly the pivotal position of France around which revolve matters of the most vital concern, such as the future of Germany, the fate of Europe, the system of political alliances and balance of power, security and disarmament, peace and war, economic survival, and, in a sense, even the future of democratic institutions.

While the European problem may be said to center rather north of the Mediterranean, yet, in all the discussions of arms limitation up to the present, the Mediterranean impasse has stood in the way of their successful conclusion. In the General Disarmament Conference it probably will be found that naval reduction or limitation will again be an obstacle in the negotiations.

*See note on present situation, p. 47.
¹Leo XIII, Encyclical Praeclara Gratulationis Publicae.
²Benedict XV, Encyclical Pacem.
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The foreign policy of France colors the whole European scene. It is a determining factor in the relations not only between the countries of Europe but between Europe and Asia as well as between Europe and America. The key to the intricate problems of arms reduction lies largely in the keeping of France.

Modern Italy, up to the present, has played only a slightly less important rôle across the European stage. She too has a heavy responsibility in what has taken place in the past seventy years. Her foreign policy also has been potent in the trend of world affairs. In the various international conferences to promote peace through reduction of armaments, Italy has been a power to be reckoned with. Particularly, in her relations with France has Italy been a significant character in the European drama.

During France’s growth as a nation, in the expansion of her commerce, in the development of her foreign policy, Italy has occupied a peculiar place, first as a disorganized group of states and principalities at the mercy of internecine warfare as well as of French kingly ambitions, and then as a united nation facing France across the waters of the Mediterranean, challenging her as a colonial rival and a world power. Italy, almost surrounded by the great inner sea and hemmed in to the north by France and her alliances, has been a forceful antagonist of France in both pre-war and post-war diplomacy. Thus these two countries have become a sort of Gordian knot in the problem of reduction or limitation of national armaments.

For all of these reasons it is necessary to make an historical survey of the general relations which have existed between the two groups of peoples now comprised in the two nations. Even their earliest associations are positively and intimately identified with development in armed power.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FRANCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS

The growth of the two countries may be divided politically into two phases: First, that of continental expansion—the growing period in their histories, the rise of national consciousness, and the period of contiguous territorial acquisition and national consolidation; second, that of colonial ambition and extension.
—the mercantile era, the period of acquisition of near and far distant territory, the development and protection of trade routes, seeking of resources, and maintaining of markets.

The growth of land armament is intimately related to the former period; that of both land and naval armament is identified with the latter period. Throughout the development of both France and Italy the evolution of militarism in the two countries may be clearly traced, and much may be learned of the spirit and doctrines of that nationalism which is a dominant and controlling factor in international relations today.3

France's national consciousness dawned that day when Jeanne d'Arc told the vacillating Dauphin Charles, "Orleans shall I save, and put to flight the English . . . and this very summer shall you be crowned in Rheims." At the beginning of the sixteenth century the day of France's national existence and unity had cleared, and her career of expansion may be marked from that time. More characteristically still, in the confusion of Europe which followed the great Religious Revolt (generally misnamed the Reformation) stands the sinister figure of Richelieu, who more than any other man gave permanence to that political system in Europe to which may be traced directly the dreadful consequences which we see around us in our own time. "There resulted, above all," writes that eminent historian, Hilaire Belloc, "a highly organized modern nation in the midst of Europe, subject to one strong central monarchistic power, reaching rapidly to the very summits of creative art in letters, architecture, painting, sculpture and military science, and forming a model upon which the new ideal of Nationalism should frame itself. That new organized nation was France. The man who did all this was Richelieu."

The first movements of France at a distance from her frontiers were in the direction of Italy. As early as the middle of the thirteenth century, during the fateful struggles of the Empire with the Papacy, Charles of Anjou had moved against the imperial Hohenstaufen and entered Naples as "Liberator of Italy." Down to the Sack of Rome by Emperor Charles, France repeatedly, with arms, asserted a claim to Italian territory, a claim that was relinquished only temporarily when Italy passed to the control of the Hapsburgs.

In the modern era Italy again became an objective in the ambitious designs of Louis XIV, more especially of his minister Jean Baptiste Colbert, and later, in the imperial plans of Napoleon Bonaparte. While these schemes failed generally to materialize or have permanence, the movement and expansion of France in the direction of Italy and throughout the Mediterranean basin were not thereby arrested. They became concentrated and accordingly strengthened by the frustration and decline of colonial ambitions in the east and in the west. The background of history therefore serves to paint the modern picture in its proper colors and perspective.

For her part, Italy has never forgotten her own imperial traditions, and history dies hard. She is today as conscious of the thorny path of her national development as she is of lictors and fasces. Disunited for centuries, a prey to the struggle for power and territory of her own princes as well as to French ambitions, a new united Italy arose, in the erection of which France, curiously enough, played a definite if unwilling part.

Louis XIV’s great thought was to see France dominate, not diplomatically but actually, the greater part of the continent of Europe. Towards this end he desired to see France and Spain united under the Bourbons. In such a comprehensive scheme, Italy occupied an important place, bordering as she did the eastern side of the Middle Sea. Though interested primarily in “continental” expansion, Louis could not limit to the territorial continent of Europe the consequences of such an ambition.

One has only to look at a map of Europe to realize how inviting to a Frenchman, say of the mind of Colbert, was the prospect of a union of France, Spain and Italy, standing as it were, with its back towards Britain and with outstretched arms ready to receive all that fortune might offer in the way of trade or territory. And so, encouraged by the merchant-mind of Colbert, France reached down into the dark continent of Africa, and out to India and the rich trade of the East.

To Colbert a vast commercial empire was the measure of France’s future greatness. To gain a commanding position in the world’s trade seemed vital if France was to survive against the rapidly expanding commercial rivalries of the English and the Dutch. Colbert therefore created and subsidized a merchant marine, and to ensure its successful operation he saw the further need to create a “protecting navy.” What Colbert did for the
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merchant marine and the French navy, Louvois and Vauban did for the French army. But the imperial designs of Colbert failed of realization. In the fifty years following the reign of Louis XIV, France lost her American colonies and suffered defeat in India at the hands of England.

This set-back to France's expansion was followed by three important consequences. 1. The loss of India and of the American colonies eventually increased French incentive for the colonization of Africa; 2. England, to maintain communication with India, obtained a permanent stake in the Mediterranean; 3. The extension of France's colonial empire in Africa brought, in due course, international complications, not the least of which was that it whetted the colonial appetite of a new Italy a century later. There followed a conflict of interests in the Mediterranean and in Africa, which became a war provoking rivalry and an almost insurmountable obstacle to international peace.

These consequences were not immediately evident because momentous changes were about to occur in the political structure of France which would defer for the time being thoughts of colonial aggrandisement. But in the hundred years following the end of France's first colonial period events took place which had important bearing on Franco-Italian relations, on the development of military power in France and Italy, and on the general growth of imperialism and nationalism of which France and Italy have been characteristic exponents.

The French Revolution brought forth a new type of military organization, namely, the conscript army, which was later to become a characteristic institution in many countries in both eastern and western hemispheres. By the end of 1793, republican France possessed a conscript army of a million and a quarter men, a larger armed force than any of her kings had possessed at the zenith of his power.

Out of the Revolution came Napoleon Bonaparte. Under him the military machine, which had been built up first to defend, and then to extend, Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, be-

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5Of the 61 countries listed in the Armaments Year Book, 1933, 38 have compulsory military service in time of peace and 44 resort to it in time of war. Of the remaining countries, 9 have professional armies with terms of voluntary military service for long periods. Of 27 European countries, 20 have compulsory service; of 21 in North and South America, 16 have compulsory service. See also Foreign Policy Association Report, The Burden of Armaments.
came the powerful weapon of imperial ambition. Italy again became the victim of that ambition.

One of Emperor Napoleon’s first acts was to turn the surrounding republics, which had been set up under the Directory, into kingdoms—a veritable family as well as an imperial affair. The Cisalpine Republic, embracing Milan, Mantua, Modena, the Romagna which was part of the Papal States, and part of Venice, now became the Kingdom of Italy, the first time, it may be said, that such a kingdom existed, with Napoleon as its monarch. His brother Joseph he put on the throne of the Sicilies. Genoa and Piedmont became part of territorial France.

In 1805 that part of Venetia which was under Austrian control was brought into the Italian kingdom. Four years later all of the Papal States, including Rome itself, were absorbed into the Empire. Italy was now for the first time in total subjection to France. Also the Illyrian provinces on the eastern side of the Adriatic were ceded by Austria, so that the kingdom of Italy under France dominated the Adriatic.

After the downfall of Napoleon I, the mantle of imperialism was draped from other shoulders, those of the Austrian, Prince Clemens Metternich. The short-lived Napoleonic Italy passed to Austria. Venetia and Lombardy became part of the Austrian kingdom, while Tuscany, Parma, and Modena were ruled by Austrian princes. Sardinia and the Sicilies were dominated from Vienna.

During the next thirty years the whirling winds of so-called liberalism swept fitfully through Europe. They served to keep alive that very conception of power backed by military force and organization, which was at first liberalism’s great antagonist, but which later, with the triumph of “liberal” ideas, became its support and champion.

History has shown that the military idea survives and tends to become stronger as a people grows rich, attains better political organization, or reaches a sense of self-sufficiency and independence, though such two attributes cannot truly be claimed by any nation today. It thrives equally well at the hands of the autocrat, the imperialist, the liberal, or the revolutionary.⁶ The

⁶The Vinson bill introduced in the United States Congress in January, 1934, with the approval of the Administration, provides for a five-year naval program, building up to the London naval treaty limits and costing $380,000,000. Representative Ayres, chairman of the subcommittee which drew up the naval supply bill, stated, “Let the world know by unmistakable evidence that we mean to have a navy second
experience of liberal nationalism in the middle of the nineteenth century was much the same as that of Jacobin nationalism in the eighteenth century, namely, that “its logic and its fine intentions were not sufficient of themselves to insure its triumph. It must needs grasp the sword and slay its adversaries.”

Italy, like other countries of the Continent, played her part in the progress of the “liberal” revolution. It was not, however, the uprising of a people struggling to be free, but rather the successful arms of Garibaldi and the astute diplomacy of Cavour, which shaped at this critical time the destinies of the Italian nation. Side by side with her emancipation, there grew and persisted in Italy the idea that destiny demanded something more than merely casting off a foreign yoke. Rome, it was remembered, had once been the center of the civilized world.

Around the indomitable kingdom of Sardinia which had long occupied a place of leadership among the disorganized states, now gathered the forces which were to be built up into a united and independent Italy. But Cavour realized that Italy could not accomplish this end without outside support. With Italy dominated by Austria, he naturally sought the help of France. In this way he expected to throw off Austrian control, to involve France with her powerful neighbor, and to make a bold and, as it turned out, a successful stroke for Italy’s independence.

**Formation of the Modern Italian Kingdom**

Napoleon III’s diplomacy in Italy at this juncture soon landed him in a most unwelcome situation. Afraid of Austria, increasingly concerned over Prussia, unwilling to help in building a united Italy of perhaps imperial temper, he attempted an understanding first with Sardinia and then with Austria. Italian liberals were in too serious mood to be put off with such bargaining, and almost for the first time the voice of the Risorgimento was of marked effect in international politics. Cavour negotiated with Napoleon the treaty of Turin, and as a result the Romagna, Lombardy, Parma, Modena, and Tuscany became part of Sardinia. Shortly afterwards Garibaldi and his redshirts
took possession of the Sicilies and these too were turned over to Sardinia. In 1861 Italy was almost a united kingdom. Ten years later the entire States of the Church were in the hands of Victor Emmanuel, and for the first time in history the Italian peninsula, from the Alps to the Sicilies, was a unified, independent, national monarchy.

The feelings of France in helping to raise up a real rival to the south of her were not improved by the realization, gradually borne in upon her, that a decided threat to her security now came from Prussia. The Seven Weeks' War decided Prussia's leadership among the German states, a fateful decision for France in particular and the world in general. William of Prussia knew that to secure a united Germany he must have an efficient military organization, and every effort was bent to this end. In the words of Bismarck the future of Germany lay in a policy of "iron and blood."

The display of Prussian power in this short but decisive war was most disconcerting to the plans of Napoleon III. He was now in no way to demand compensations from Prussia. Foiled in his attempts thus to acquire for France either Belgium to the north or the Palatinate or Luxemburg to the south, and isolated diplomatically through the efforts of Bismarck, Napoleon, believing he could win the support of those German states Bavaria and Württemberg and the duchies of Hesse and Baden, which had stayed out of the German Confederation, finally decided to place his fortunes on the bold stroke of a test of arms with Germany.

The result of that fateful decision, for which the typical diplomacy of Bismarck was as responsible as the vain recklessness of Napoleon, is written everywhere over the face of the world today. The Franco-German war

more than any other single event . . . throughout the next forty years, gave complexion to international politics, saddled Europe with enormous crushing armaments and constituted the first link in that causal chain of circumstances that led straight to another and vaster European war.  

7Hayes, Carlton J. H., Political and Social History of Western Europe. Vol II, p. 203.
CHAPTER II
FRanco-ITALIAN RELATIONS AS AFFECTED
BY COLONIAL RIVALRIES

One of the first acts of the new Italy was the reorganization of her army and navy. Liberalism had learned the costly lesson that the "new freedom" required to be supported with arms. Between 1871 and 1913, the eve of the Great War, Italy's military expenditure grew from some 150,000,000 lira to about 425,000,000 lira, while her naval budget expanded from something over 22,000,000 lira to more than 250,000,000 lira. Thus while military expenses practically tripled, naval appropriations were multiplied more than tenfold. Italy both because of her strength in armed power and her strategic position in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of the World War was well worth the diplomatic battle which took place between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance for her support in 1914-1915.8

For twenty years after unification the imperial spirit guided Italy's foreign policy. Then, as now, the memories of ancient Rome colored her outlook at home and abroad. Those at the helm of state contemplated Italy becoming one of the world's great powers, and to further her fortunes towards that end they determined to acquire for her a colonial empire, regarded as one of the distinguishing marks of a virile nation.

It was inevitable that France and Italy should come into conflict in Africa. The direction of France's colonial development had already been determined by the course of historic events.9 The policy pursued in that development received classic expression when Jules Ferry wrote, that superior races had the duty of bringing the blessings of civilization to inferior races; that an industrial nation needed colonies for markets (though France has not become an industrial country in the same sense as England or the United States); and that coaling stations were necessary for a marine and naval power. Were France not to have a colonial empire, he averred, she "would descend from the first rank to the third or fourth."

France had taken the earliest opportunity after the first

9See above, page 6.
stormy period between the Revolution and the accession of Louis Philippe to plant her standard on the African shores. She took possession, ostensibly as a base whence to curb piracy, of what has become the richest, and the most important economically, of the French colonies, Algeria.

Having consolidated her position in Algeria, it was but a matter of time when France would turn her attention to the neighboring Tunis. There she came into conflict with Italy. That country, with lingering memories of the Scipios, had her imperial eye on Tunis also, when France seized the first flimsy opportunity which offered, namely, the trouble between the Bey and his creditors, to assert her interests therein.

England was willing to see France occupy Tunis in return for freedom to pursue her own imperial designs in the Mediterranean and the Near East. As for Germany it quite suited the plans of Bismarck that seeds of discord should grow between Italy and France.

France, rather disingenuously, warned that Italy could not "cherish dreams of conquest in Tunis without clashing against the will of France and risking conflict with her." The "will of France" was asserted in 1881 when 35,000 French troops entered Tunis and took possession of another valuable region.

Italy was not in a position to challenge France's action with force, but a year later she took other steps fraught with far more serious consequences to the future peace of the world. The French occupation of Tunis was the direct cause of Italy's entering, with Germany and Austria, the Triple Alliance, which lasted until May, 1915, when Italy, in consideration of promises then made, deserted it and joined the Triple Entente against her former allies. Today there are actually more Italians than French in this French colony and they retain their Italian nationality, an anomalous condition which, as one would expect, is a constant source of friction and ill-feeling.

A chief provision of this secret treaty, as renewed in 1887, was that if Italy or Germany were attacked by France "without reason" both would declare war upon France. The third article of the treaty stipulated:

If it were to happen that France should make a move to extend her occupation or even her protectorate or her sovereignty under

any form whatsoever in the North African territories . . . and that in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she must herself undertake action in the said North African territories, or even have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war which would thereby ensue between France and Italy would *ipso facto* constitute . . . the *casus foederis*.

But when Italy's attempt to seize Abyssinia in 1896 almost involved a joining of forces of France and Russia to prevent it, Germany hastily reminded Italy that the Triple Alliance was "a conservative pact and not an acquisitive company" and that "a naval war of Italy against Russia or France on account of Abyssinia would not be a *casus foederis* for the Triple Alliance." Germany was in no mind to back Italy as an aggressor.

In 1880 Italy occupied the town of Assab in south Eritrea near the mouth of the Red Sea and quickly set up other garrisons in that region. She had come to find it necessary, in addition to seeking colonial extension, to have some means of checkmating France in Africa. In this Italy had the encouragement of England, determined to frustrate French designs in the Sudan and Abyssinia.

Italy had gained also a foothold in Somaliland. Since neither Somali nor Eritrea were of much commercial value the logical aim for Italy was the acquisition of the richer Abyssinia lying in between. A treaty was negotiated between the Italians and the King of Kings, the Lion of the Tribe of Juda, the King of Abyssinia. On the other hand conventions were signed between Italy and England settling their respective "spheres of influence" in Abyssinia.

Then the elaborate scheme fell through. When Menelik discovered that he was expected to "consent" rather than "be at liberty" to select Italy to treat on his behalf with other powers on matters of mutual concern, he promptly repudiated the treaty.

France began to realize the extent of England's colonial plans and saw the end of her own dreams of an African empire from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. She now understood the full import of agreements with Italy and Belgium which had for their purpose the furthering of England's Cape-to-Cairo ambitions.

12 Article 1 of the secret Franco-Russian Alliance, January 4, 1894, stated: "If France is attacked by Germany or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall employ all her available forces to fight Germany." See Fay, Vol. I, pp. 118, 121.
To offset England's objectives France sought the favor of the disgruntled King of Abyssinia, to use him against England and Italy, as England had used Italy against France. Italy was not long in sending troops into Abyssinia and she kept them there despite the king's repudiation of the treaty. Menelik gave battle and completely routed the Italians, which caused political changes at Rome and drew from Di Rudini, Crispi's successor in office, the sour remark about Italian colonies being the objective of ambitious officers and that "military expeditions to Africa were not only ruining Italian finances but disorganizing the Italian army."

Italy's interest in Abyssinia has not waned, however, in the intervening years. Under the terms of the London treaty of 1915, she has vainly tried to acquire Djibouti, the French port on the Gulf of Aden, and to get control of the French railway therefrom to the Abyssinian capital. She has sought arrangements with Great Britain to obtain a railway concession through Abyssinia from Eritrea to Italian Somaliland. These interests Italy has sought under the Franco-Italian-British agreement of 1906. Abyssinia has, in the League of Nations, constantly resisted this pressure. In 1928 agreements were signed between Italy and Abyssinia for the construction of a road from Assab to Dessie, and for the formation of a transportation company. By this means Italy hopes to offset to some extent the French advantage in having control of the Djibouti—Addis-Ababa railway.

Colonial rivalries in northern Africa, in which France and Italy have been principal actors, have been a tinder ready to set off a train of war on many occasions. "Nowhere," says Professor Parker T. Moon,

was the game of world politics played with greater abandon or more vicious international consequences than in the African lands north of the tropic of Cancer. Here France and England grimly played for Egyptian stakes; here Italy found reason to join, then later to desert, the Triple Alliance; here Germany and France bid desperately against each other for Morocco until Europe was brought within a hair's breadth of war.

One of the provisions of the Triple Alliance was that Italy should have the support of Germany to keep France out of both Morocco and Tripolitania. Secret negotiations on the other

13 Foreign Policy Association Report, France and Italy in the Mediterranean.
14 Moon. Parker T., Imperialism and World Politics, p. 188.
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Hand between France and Italy led to the understanding that Italy, being assured that France would not descend upon Tripoli, would not interfere with France "in the exercise and safeguarding of the rights which are the results for her (France) of the proximity of her territory (Algeria) with that empire (Morocco)."

In other words, the agreement was that Italy would have no objection to France's taking Morocco, if France would not interfere with Italy's seizure of Tripoli and Cyrenaica. A further understanding was reached that each would remain neutral should the other either be attacked or declare war. This understanding, arrived at in 1902, and the ambitious promises made to Italy in the Treaty of London in 1915 account for Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance when war had broken out between the Central Powers and the Allies.  

But it did not turn out so simple a matter for France to take over Morocco, because in making bargains with Italy, England and Spain, she had not reckoned sufficiently with Germany. Germany, on her part, had strong objections to this increase in French colonial territory and appealed to the United States, which had joined in the Madrid Convention of 1880, for assistance to protect Morocco. Germany urged action to prevent French domination of the Mediterranean trade routes both to the Near East and the Far East. She demanded an international conference, which did not suit Delcassé, French foreign minister, after the many secret negotiations he had brought to fruition. But over Delcassé's objection France agreed to a conference which met at Algeciras in 1906.

As was disclosed eight years later the Moroccan affair nearly brought on a war which would certainly have involved France, Germany, and England. Possibly Italy's agreement with France to maintain neutrality might not have been able to stand the strain then any more than her obligations to the Triple Alliance did later. Under the Algeciras Act a nominal international control of Morocco was set up, but as a matter of fact, France's penetration continued, and before long, to help quell Moroccan internal disorders, she sent in approximately 13,000 troops.

16Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 156. 185.
17Moon, Parker T., p. 283.
France's control of Morocco became more secure aided by French troops. The territory became virtually a French protectorate in 1912. The World War wiped out Germany's treaty rights in Morocco, but France's difficulties there have by no means diminished. To maintain hold of that territory it has been necessary for France to have a sizable army of occupation, and by the end of 1925 the lives of 12,000 French troops were part of the price paid. According to a recent memorandum to the League of Nations the responsibilities of the mandate over Morocco require France to maintain there today 138,000 armed men.18

The secret provision in the treaty of the Triple Alliance that Germany should assist Italy to keep France out of Morocco, was quite offset by the concurrent agreement between France and Italy. In addition to her understanding with France, Italy reached further secret agreements with Austria-Hungary and Russia. Being sure also of England's approval, to prevent the Mediterranean from "becoming a French lake," as Lord Salisbury once expressed it, Italy began her peaceful penetration of Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

Italy took advantage of the strained relations between France and Germany in 1911 to inform the Powers it was her purpose to put down disorders in Tripoli wherein there was considerable Italian investment.19 An ultimatum was handed to Turkey to the effect that "the Italian Government . . . finding itself forced to think of the guardianship of its dignity and its interests, has decided to proceed to the military occupation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica."

Italy had her military preparations well made.20 Invading the Turkish territory, her forces took the city of Tripoli. They occupied twelve of the Ægean Islands (the Dodekanese) and attacked the Dardanelles. Taking advantage of Turkey's embroilment with Italy, the Balkan states of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro made war on Turkey over Macedonia. This induced Turkey to conclude peace with Italy resulting in the latter's annexation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

Italy regards the conditions laid down in the Treaty of London in 1915, under which she agreed to renounce the Triple

19Giolitti, Giovanni, Memoirs, pp. 249, et seq.
20Ibid., p. 270.
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Alliance, as unfulfilled. Article 13 of that treaty stipulated that in case France and England increased their African colonies at the expense of Germany, Italy might claim equitable compensation relative to the frontiers of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya. By further agreements in 1917 and 1920 she was to get southern Anatolia from Smyrna to Adana.

France denies even to this day Italy’s claim to the Libyan hinterland around Lake Tchad. Italy, in her secret arrangements with France in 1900, knew of the Franco-British agreement of 1899 which gave to France the regions Tibesti, Borcu, and Ennedi, as well as access to Lake Tchad. France considers Italy’s compensation under the London Treaty as paid by the Bonin-Pichon agreement of 1919 which rectified the northwestern boundary of Libya. Italy refuses to accept this as final, holding that the agreements of 1900 and 1902 did not refer to definite boundaries but to zones of influence. England under the Treaty of London in 1915 ceded Jubaland to Italy, and about 30,000 square miles of unproductive land along the Juba river were added to Italian Somaliland.  

CHAPTER III

PRESENT STATUS OF FRANCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS

A further promise to Italy in the London agreement of 1915 was that she might have part of Dalmatia, the Dalmatian Islands and Albania. Italy’s intentions have been, and, despite the fact that she is no match for powerful France, are still, to secure a commanding position in the Mediterranean.

In 1809 Napoleonic Italy dominated the Adriatic. One hundred years later a nationally united Italy has sought to make the Adriatic an “Italian lake”—mare nostro—and gain possession of its entire coastline. To this end Italy has endeavored to obtain a secure foothold in the Balkans and to dominate Albania. In these designs she has come into conflict with Yugoslavia.

But Italy has been the loser in her political efforts in the Balkan states. Her territorial gains there as well as throughout the whole Mediterranean area since the World War have been

21Foreign Policy Association Report, France and Italy in the Mediterranean.
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of comparatively little value. She has called, unsuccessfully so far, for fulfillment of the “secret” treaties of 1915 and 1917. She demanded in 1919 the port of Fiume which, having been denied her, was seized in the filibustering expedition of D’Annunzio.

An agreement, unsatisfactory from the Italian viewpoint, was reached in the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920, by which Italy was given Istria and a very small piece of the Dalmatian coast between Istria and Fiume to connect the port with Italy. Fiume was made a free port. The remainder of the eastern Adriatic coast went to Yugoslavia. The Treaty of Rome in 1923 annexed Fiume to Italy, gave her some special rights on the Dalmatian littoral, and placed the town of Zara under Italian sovereignty.

Italy’s failure to gain possession of the Dalmatian coast has rendered more acrimonious her dispute with Yugoslavia concerning Albania. Italy, assuming the rôle of protector of Albania, has proceeded with its militarization while Yugoslavia has carried out the militarization of her side of the frontier. A treaty between Italy and Albania was signed in 1926, and a year later there was drawn up between them a twenty-year military convention. In addition, in spite of her own unsatisfactory financial condition, Italy has a firm financial hold on that country. France, on the other hand, made a military alliance with Yugoslavia in 1927, while Italy’s treaties of 1924 with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were allowed to lapse in 1929.

Italy seems to aim at some kind of an understanding between herself, Hungary and Albania to try to offset the influence of France in the Little Entente. The red-hot embers of the Italo-Yugoslavian dispute flamed up again early in 1933 when Yugoslavia vigorously protested the formation of an Italo-Albanian customs union, as did France in the case of the proposed Austro-German customs union in 1931. France is deeply concerned in this situation, not economically but politically.

Albania, on the other hand, has been making efforts to try to free herself from Italian dictation. To this end King Zog drastically reduced military and government expenditures. Albania has also been moving towards friendlier relations with Yugoslavia and Greece. While this cooperation may assist Al-

bania somewhat towards a financial and economic rehabilitation it will not serve to remove elements of discord between Italy and the Balkans which have not been improved by the terms of the treaty of mutual assistance signed in February, 1934, between Yugoslavia, Rumania, Greece and Turkey.

It has been said that Italy is seeking some rapprochement with France along the lines of a division of power in the Mediterranean—France-North Africa; Italy-the Balkans. All of which serves as a reminder that the Mediterranean area is a powder magazine, from which a conflagration might spread far up into the continent of Europe.23

As this report is going to press deep tragedy has again threatened the peace of Europe in the assassination, on French soil, of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and M. Louis Barthou, French foreign minister, at the very moment when France was seeking some basis of accord between Italy and Yugoslavia, again directing world attention to the vital consequences of disturbed conditions in the Mediterranean basin.

It is difficult to express in a few words the situation in southern Europe as it exists today. It is briefly this: The Yugoslav situation has taken on a new importance as has also the position of Austria, in which developments in Germany during 1934 played an important part. While German policy revolved around revision of the World War treaties, Italy, herself aggrieved under those treaties, was a sympathetic listener and even an outspoken commentator. When tragedy struck Austria in the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, Italy was immediately alert and quickly informed Germany that Italian sympathies, which had already become somewhat strained, had reached their limits, and that it was Italy’s intention to preserve at all costs Austria’s independence. At least in this, for the time being, Italy, France and England are of one mind. It has been the openly expressed desire of the National Socialists of Germany to reforge the links of racial sympathy with Austria, even though anschluss is, for the moment, out of the question. As far as one can read the political currents of Europe today, Italy, in preserving Austrian independence (which Austria holds sharply in the face of Italy as she does of Germany), seeks to create and strengthen a bond of mutual interest with that country as well as with Hungary, and so endeavor to offset to

some extent the influence of the Little Entente, of which Yugoslavia is a member and in which France has been the guiding influence.

Should Italy, with a friendly Austria and Hungary to the north, be able to deflect the interests of Yugoslavia southward and reach an understanding with that country, a long step would be taken towards easing the present tension in the Adriatic. The Little Entente’s value to France would be lessened accordingly. France, no doubt, had this possibility in mind in welcoming to her shores King Alexander, slain with such startling and tragic suddenness.

**French and Italian Interests in Central Europe: Economic and Financial**

France’s influence in the Little Entente, with the three members of which she has defensive alliances, is still dominant. To try to offset the effects of these agreements Italy concluded treaties with Hungary in 1927, with Greece in 1928, and with Rumania in 1930. The treaties with Greece and Rumania have in turn been neutralized by the Balkan Four-Power Pact.

In the case of Hungary an alliance with Yugoslavia seemed the more logical thing to expect. But there, as elsewhere, financial conditions have operated in favor of French rather than Italian diplomacy. Following the advent of Premier Karolyi to power, a French loan to Hungary in 1931 of some 350 million francs, with French conditions attached, considerably weakened Italian influence. In Central Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic the dominating factor is French foreign policy.

That political interests override all urgent economic considerations is evident from the results of the two Danubian Conferences held at London and Stresa respectively. These conferences were called to try to lift the five Danubian states—Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia—out of the economic chaos into which they have fallen. They failed because of the antagonism of the political interests of the chief Powers taking part, aside from the conflicting interests of the Succession States themselves. While trade requirements and the desperate need for meeting them have pointed in one direction, political considerations have succeeded in heading off satisfactory agreements essential to sound economic recovery.
At London in the spring of 1932, Italy, hoping to retain influence in the Balkans, was really unwilling to lend support to any economic union which might be dominated by the financial and political power of France and which she considered might injure whatever favorable balance of trade she had in the Danubian region. The Italian Government, in a note of March 7, 1932, in reply to the French Government, pointed out that Italy also considered herself one of the successor countries to Austria-Hungary, and that by the possession of Trieste and Fiume she controlled the natural outlets of the foreign trade of the Danubian states. She contested the preëminent right of France to fix policies of economic reorganization in the central and eastern countries of Europe.

Throughout 1933, Italy aimed at bringing about an economic accord among the Danubian states through bilateral agreements, and drew up a memorandum to this effect. France raised no objection to Italy’s plans but has intimated she will support no plan which might, for example, bring Austria and Hungary politically closer together.

On February 15, 1933, the three countries of the Little Entente formed themselves into a permanent political union drawing more sharply the line of division between the Entente and Italy. Italy must deal with the Entente as a whole. She must deal with it as a political entity and not through individual agreements. Dr. Edouard Benes, speaking in the latter part of 1933, drew attention to this union and that “its members cannot conclude with third parties any trade treaties that could have political significance without first informing each other and agreeing.” Further, Czechoslovakia could not accept that “artificial aid should be offered in Central Europe to an individual state or individual groups of states at the cost of others. We would like to see Central European trade organized on natural and enduring, not artificial lines.”

Yugoslavia and Rumania are the largest importers of Italian goods in this region. Seventeen per cent of Yugoslavian total imports came from Italy in 1932 as compared with four per cent from France. Twenty-five per cent of that country’s exports

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goes to Italy and only three per cent to France. But menacing the normal flow of these trade interests are the political barriers and rivalries between Italy and Yugoslavia. The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovines looks to France for political support and protection.

Another example of how political bitterness and entanglements stand in the way of economic rehabilitation is the trade relation between Czechoslovakia and Germany. Twenty-three per cent of Czechoslovakia’s imports come from Germany and only four per cent from France. Her exports to Germany are almost one-fourth of her total exports, while but one per cent of her total outgoing trade goes to France. But the political domination of France in the Little Entente together with a nationalistic bitterness between Czechoslovakia and Germany, evidenced, for example, at the time of the proposed Austro-German customs union in 1931, prevent that coöperation which would be most beneficial economically to the two countries.

The financial activities of France in central and southeastern Europe are more extensive and much more important than her commercial interests have been. From the middle of the nineteenth century until the outbreak of the World War, France exercised every effort to make financial control a chief element in her foreign policy. It played an important part in the building up of her colonial empire. Since 1918, while these financial operations have not been nearly so extensive, they nevertheless have exercised a certain control in the system of alliances which France has erected encircling the one-time central powers.27

From the consolidation of the Italian kingdom until Italy’s joining the Triple Alliance, French investment supplied the main external financial support of that kingdom. In 1884 France owned about 80 per cent of the Italian consolidated debt. Her investment in Italian securities amounted to around two billion dollars. England owned approximately 17 per cent of the Italian debt while Germany owned 3 per cent.

The renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1887 and France’s knowledge that Italy’s purpose was to restrain French extension in North Africa, brought about an official ban by the French

27In the Stresa Conference of September, 1932, the French delegate, M. Coulondre, indicated that further loans would not be made to central European countries. France, however, agreed to contribute about one-third of a new loan of $43,000,000 to Austria. See New York Times, December 30, 1932.
Relations Between France and Italy

Government on the further issue of Italian securities. In this action and in the tariff war which followed between the two countries, Italy was the sufferer, Italian finances reaching such a chaotic condition as to excite to war fever Italian feeling towards France. German financiers quickly seized the opportunity and extended to Italy the financial support denied by France.

Previous to the Franco-Prussian War France’s financial efforts had succeeded in making her an extensive and substantial lender throughout Europe. By 1870 her foreign investments had amounted to twelve billion francs. In 1914 at the outbreak of the World War, French foreign loans and investments had reached 45,000,000,000 francs, bringing in an annual return of 2,000,000,000 francs or about 6 per cent of the total national income.

Of this pre-war investment over 11,000,000,000 francs were invested in Russia, more than 3,000,000,000 francs in Turkey, and 2,300,000,000 francs in Italy. Four billion francs were invested in the African colonies of Algeria, Tunis and Morocco. Of the 45,000,000,000 francs more than one-half consisted of loans to foreign governments. Of these loans the greater part was devoted by the various governments to such economic purposes as building of railways, working of mines, power development, founding of banks. A substantial portion was devoted to armaments.

France’s post-war loans to foreign governments are relatively small in value as compared with those made prior to the World War. They are also mostly of short-term character. Loans have been made to Austria (170,000,000 frs. in 1923), Belgium (400,000,000 frs. 1923), Bulgaria (44,360,000 frs. 1925; 130,000,000 frs. 1928), Chile (173,000,000 frs. 1930), Czechoslovakia (600,000,000 frs. 1932), Finland (300,000,000 frs. 1930), Germany (257,307,700 frs. Dawes plan, 1924; 2,515,000,000 frs. Young plan, 1930), Great Britain (2,500,000,000 frs. 1931), Hungary (354,000,000 frs. 1931), Poland (51,000,000 frs. 1927; 25,000,000 frs. 1930; 400,000,000 frs. 1931; 213,000,000 frs. 1931), Rumania (561,638,000 frs. 1929; 575,000,000 frs. 1931) and Yugoslavia (three loans aggregating 1,188,000,000 frs. 1931). There are in addition a number of refunded loans to China, Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Tur-

28Feis, Herbert, Europe: the World’s Banker, 1870-1914.
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key. The above loans amount to more than 10½ billion francs, 3 billion of which is to the countries of the Little Entente, nearly 700 million to Poland, and 400 million to Belgium.29

Italy has been a borrowing rather than a lending nation, though loans were made to Czechoslovakia, Poland and Rumania just after the war, and relief credits were extended to Austria.30 She has also made loans to Albania which she seeks to dominate because of its strategic position in the Adriatic.31 Italy also proposed to take part with five other countries in a new loan to Austria in 1932.32

Her foreign borrowing in the war and post-war periods has been almost entirely in England and the United States. In 1926 the debt to England, with interest, was about $3,000,000,000 and to the United States something over $2,000,000,000.

In 1925 Italy's foreign debt amounted to about 25,000,000,000 gold lira and her domestic debt to around 18,000,000,000 gold lira, a total public debt of 43,000,000,000 gold lira. In 1914 the Italian public debt had been entirely a domestic one.

At the outbreak of the war Italy's total national wealth amounted to around 115,000,000,000 gold lira and her total public (domestic) debt to 18,700,000,000 gold lira. In 1925 her total national wealth in gold equivalent had declined slightly while the total public debt had increased as above stated.

Thus in 1914 the public debt was about 16 per cent of the total national wealth, while in 1925 it was 40 per cent of the national wealth. Of Italy's public debt in 1914 almost all of it was owed to her own nationals, while in 1925 nearly 60 per cent was due to foreign governments. In addition to the debt to England and the United States, France also claims against Italy a sum of 350,000,000 francs for the maintenance of an Italian army in northern France during the war.33

Italy's financial situation and her political isolation, as against France's financial status and system of political alliances, would seem to push Italy as a serious rival entirely into the background. Yet, despite the great disparity in finances and economic resources and the difference in political status, Italy,

29See The Economist (London), March 5, 1932; Foreign Affairs, July, 1932, p. 610; Foreign Policy Association Report, French Financial Policy, December, 1932.
31Foreign Policy Association Report, Italy's Financial Stake in Albania.
33McGuire, C. E., Italy's International Economic Position, pp. 125, 131, 140, 520.
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chiefly because of the Mediterranean situation, has been and can still be a serious contender in armed strength, a challenge to France and her alliances, and a power to be reckoned with in all negotiations.

Italy's economic wealth and resources must be taken into account in considering her relations with France. She is hemmed in by the Mediterranean across which she has to keep open her lines of supply and communication. Her dominion "lies within a body of water for the most part dominated by powers whose interests, rightly or wrongly, are conceived by themselves, and by many Italians, to be substantially irreconcilable with those of Italy."

The Italian colonies have been and are today more of a liability than an asset. They have been of little value as an outlet for Italy's population. They contain few natural resources needful for Italy's economic life.

It is for political rather than economic reasons therefore that Italy finds it necessary to maintain communication with her colonies in Africa. Were she to give up these colonies or allow herself to be deprived of them, Italy's position as a first-rate power would be immediately jeopardized and the balance of power in Europe would undergo considerable change. Here again one realizes the interdependability of the whole problem in which Franco-Italian relations play a most vital part.

On the other hand, a commanding position in the Mediterranean is of vital importance since Italy must have freedom of access to sources of supply of both foodstuffs and raw materials. She cannot produce food in sufficient quantity for her population. Her imports, including manufactured goods, will probably continue to overbalance exports, and, if her industrial life is to survive, the way must be kept open for importations of raw materials, such as coal, iron, copper, oil, and lumber needed for her basic industries. This is what lies behind Italy's demand for naval parity with France in the Mediterranean. In so far as the material life and well-being of her people depends almost entirely on access to world markets and freedom of movement in the Mediterranean, the demand would seem a reasonable one, so long as nations hold the view that such primary rights as life and the general welfare of peoples can be secured only by means of armed force.

34Ibid., p. 255.
If the reasonableness of the Italian claim is admitted on these grounds, it is clear that France too can make out a strong case for her international policy, the pivot of which is national security and protection from invasion. France points to her inland frontier, with Germany on the other side of it. She has nearly 19,000 miles of coast line to defend, including her colonies. After the British Commonwealth of Nations, France has the largest and most far-flung empire, between all parts of which stretch lines of communication, the most vital of which lead through the Mediterranean. While France is not so highly industrialized as is England, and not so completely dependent, as England or Italy, upon free access to sources of supply, nevertheless, in the present scheme of world economics her national well-being is contingent upon her import and export trade and upon resources outside her national boundaries. These are facts which must be taken into account in judging France.

But if international relations are to continue to rest only upon these material considerations, with little regard to moral principles; if there is to persist a conception of the State as something independent of the laws of God or man; if the inalienable rights of peoples are to be considered of less importance than the interests of bankers, corporations, cartels, or concessionaires; and if, in the ordinary relations between nations, armed preparedness against possible aggression and the meeting of force with force is to be the norm of national feeling and outlook—then it would look as if the end of our civilization were at hand. Only a strong faith leads one to hope that from its ashes might arise a new and better civilization which would more fully accept, and be more securely built upon, principles of charity, justice and morality which alone can bring "the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ," a civilization in which peoples and governments will more generally acknowledge and cooperate with the Church of Christ, alone adapted "to safeguard the sanctity of the law of nations."\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{35}Pius XI, Encyclical, \textit{Ubi Arcano}. 
CHAPTER IV

EFFORTS FOR AGREEMENT AND REASONS FOR THEIR FAILURE

Italy contends that the principle of naval parity with France was conceded in the Washington Conference in 1922, wherein the same ratio in capital ships was fixed for France and Italy. The claim was renewed by Italy in the London Naval Conference of 1930. It was rejected by France. It is the view of France that while parity may be admitted in the naval needs of the two countries in the Mediterranean, it cannot be applied to the two navies as a whole because of the extra-Mediterranean requirements of the French Republic. In support of this France points to her colonial empire.

Did the naval problem in the Mediterranean concern only France and Italy, it is possible that a solution might be more quickly reached. But since the Mediterranean is a thoroughfare vital to British communications, Great Britain demands a naval power equal to the combined power of France and Italy. A two-power standard was actually set up by the Treaty of London in 1930 under what is known as the "escalator" clause in Article 21. In that part of the treaty, the contracting parties of which are Great Britain, the United States and Japan, it was agreed that if one of these three should feel its security affected by increased construction on the part of any power other than these three (as for example on the part of France or Italy), that party should be entitled to make proportionate increases in the category concerned.

In the Geneva Conference of 1927 called to limit auxiliary tonnage (cruisers, destroyers, submarines, airplanes), England had made clear that in any question of these classes of armaments the naval needs of her colonial empire would constitute a governing factor. France and Italy declined America's invitation to partipate in the Conference, France ostensibly on the


38 Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, Geneva, 1927; Senate Document No. 55, Seventieth Congress, First Session.
ground that preparations were in progress for the General Disarmament Conference under the League of Nations, and that arms reduction would have to apply to all categories and not merely to naval armament.

France showed in this action that while she was very conscious of her security as affected by naval conditions both in and out of the Mediterranean, she felt nevertheless that security had a much wider meaning in the whole continental situation. Thus the matter is stated by the French delegate to the Naval Conference of 1927:

As for the French Government which, in the question of limitation of armaments, is concerned only from a defensive standpoint—and which, in this regard, must look to the protection of its coasts and the safeguarding of its maritime communications, its delegates at Geneva (i.e., in the League) have defended and obtained the acceptance, by the technical committees, of two general principles: that on the one hand the limitation of naval armaments cannot be undertaken without taking into consideration the manner in which the problems of the limitation of land and air armaments are proposed to be met; and that on the other hand, from a naval standpoint particularly, the limitation of armaments can not be realized without the allotment to each Power of global tonnage which it shall be free to distribute according to its necessities.39

The French Government further pointed out that it disagreed with the American viewpoint “that without separating the problems of disarmament there can be no hope for any practical results in the near future.”40 Against this it placed its belief and hope in the outcome of the General Disarmament Conference, preparations for which were then well under way.

The Italian refusal to participate was based also on the ground of an “undeniable interdependence of every type of armament,” and it felt limitation should be universal. But as concerned Italy more specifically, the Italian Government believed that it could invoke the same geographical reasons referred to by President Coolidge.

If the United States by reason of their geographical position have been unable to reduce land armament to the minimum, Italy, by reason of its unfavorable geographical position cannot expose itself without grave risks to a binding limitation of its maritime armaments. . . . Italy has in fact only three lines of communica-

39Ibid., p. 8—Italics are the writer's.
40Ibid., p. 9—Italics are the writer's.
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The Geneva Conference failed therefore because of the refusal of France and Italy to take part in it; because it was felt that the question of disarmament could not be confined to the chief naval powers; because there was strong disagreement on the feasibility of separating the problems of disarmament; and because England, whose colonial system and interests through the Mediterranean were of paramount importance, rejected the principle of global tonnage limitation in order that she might have the decided advantage in cruiser tonnage, a desire which is bound to be an almost insuperable obstacle in solving the Mediterranean problem. Also despite the fact that Italy agreed with France on the interdependence of all classes of armaments, she made clear that her colonial situation was a governing factor implying that in the naval situation was the key to the larger problem.

When the London Conference of the five major powers, the United States, England, Japan, France, and Italy, took place in 1930, the viewpoint from one angle, and a vitally important one, had changed. France, though she still held to the principle that the reduction of land, sea, and air armaments was one problem, openly admitted that the naval problem was of paramount importance.

Speaking at the first meeting in January, 1930, M. Tardieu stated that the solution of the naval problem would be "a decisive experiment in the organization of peace," and that the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament at Geneva (in which France placed such confidence), had some months previously "recognized that it was impossible for them to make further

41 Ibid., p. 11.
progress in their work before a preliminary agreement between
the naval powers had been achieved.42

The Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference stated that only when the obstacle which impeded its progress in 1929 had been removed by the London Conference in 1930, was it able to resume its work.43 Whether that obstacle was removed is a question. No naval agreement was reached then between France and Italy and none has been effected since, so that one of the main obstacles was not removed.

The situation following the London Conference as expressed in the report of the Preparatory Commission was that "subject to a general reservation an agreement has been reached between the Naval powers—on a method of limitation," namely, recognition of the principle of limitation of naval armament by classes with transfers in certain cases from one class to another. This was a compromise between limitation by categories as desired by Britain and global limitation as favored by France and Italy. It permitted limited transfer of tonnage between cruisers of 6-inch guns, or less, and destroyers. It applied only to three powers, the United States, Great Britain and Japan. Italy, as will be seen later, at the General Disarmament Conference while accepting the quantitative and qualitative principle of the Preparatory Commission made sweeping proposals in qualitative limitation calling for total abolition of certain classes of armament.44

In his opening address, as the London Conference got to work, M. Tardieu devoted his entire attention to the colonial question. He stated:

The existence of this empire, the necessity of insuring the adequate defense of the great groups which form it, the numerous connections, political and economic, uniting these great groups with one another, the necessity of protecting the integrity and the economic life of the latter, the mission of watching over the safety of more than thirty thousand kilometers of coastline, creates duties for the French Navy which the Government of the Republic could not ignore.45

Thus security was phrased in terms of the needs and duties of a navy—to ensure integrity and safety of coast line, to con-

42Proceedings of the London Naval Conference, 1930, U. S. Department of State, p. 34—Italics are the writer's.
44Infra, p. 34.
nect colonies with France, and to guarantee lines of communication.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald stressed that England

"can not supply its own market . . . can not maintain its own population and . . . therefore it must have access to the whole world without limitation . . . The world must be open to us for food and for life."46

Signor Grandi said:

"security can not be determined absolutely and in the abstract, . . . to obtain absolute security would lead not to disarmament, but to progressive increase in armaments. Therefore we must consider security from the relative and reciprocal point of view. . . . For these reasons our delegation can not state Italian requirements in absolute figures, for they are determined by the armaments of other countries."47

Here again is emphasized the conditional and triangular nature of the naval problem. France demanded a navy commensurate with her coast line and colonial responsibilities. England insisted on a two-power standard to ensure her access to the world "without limitation," a demand which was conditionally granted. Italy stated security and armaments are relative and that her armaments would be determined by that of other countries.

The outcome of such requirements on the part of these three powers can only mean a two-power standard all round. But Italy is not in an economic position to enforce such a demand, or build a navy up to the two-power standard. For this reason, Italy proposed a "naval holiday" as a way out of a dangerous and difficult situation. Obviously this could not be a solution either of naval or of general disarmament. It is a symptom of the tendency to postpone the situation, to play for time, wait for developments, instead of openly and honestly to grapple with it. Italy realizes the enormous handicaps under which she labors, but is unwilling to accept any conditions which would relegate her to a level below that of a first-rate power.

The Italian proposal for a one-year cessation of armaments in all categories made in the latter part of 1931 was accepted by practically all of the sixty-three nations addressed by the

46Ibid., p. 53.
47Ibid., p. 55.
League of Nations. It was to come to an end on the last day of October, 1932, but its extension for a further four months from that date was agreed to before adjournment of the Disarmament Conference. As a token of Italy’s sincerity and goodwill Premier Mussolini ordered that the naval construction budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1932, should not be presented to the Italian parliament. In August, 1932, Italy went a step further and decided to reduce its naval program by some 130,000 tons. Under this program she proposed to retire, but not to dismantle, two of her battleships, and she proposed to retire also several of her older cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. At the same time Italy intends to retain her newer ships of the fast cruiser class with squadron bases at Spezia to the north and Taranto to the south.

Premier Mussolini was careful to point out that Italy’s suggestion of a “naval holiday” and the indications she had given of her willingness to fall in line with the general march towards disarmament, must not be misunderstood because “Fascist Italy has not given up and will not give up any part of its nationalistic program.” This must be kept in mind, without impugning her intentions, when weighing the possibilities of Italy’s further movements for reduction.

The truce was entered into in the hope that some agreement might be reached in the General Disarmament Conference to make possible substantial reduction in all categories. Italy sincerely desires reduction because of the enormous financial burdens involved. The more cynical claim to believe that the truce was entered into by other powers with the conviction that no serious change would result from the Conference. Premier Mussolini himself, in an important address at Milan in October, 1934, spoke most disparagingly of all these efforts, which, he said, “will not succeed in any manner in resurrecting the cadavers of the Disarmament Conference, which is profoundly buried under a weight of cannon and warships”!

The Italian delegation proposed to the Disarmament Conference the simultaneous abolition of capital ships and submarines, of aircraft carriers, of heavy artillery of all kinds, of bombing aircraft, and of chemical weapons of aggression. While Italy agrees to the quantitative limitation indicated in the Draft Convention as a basis for discussion, she has declared her disagree-

ment with the Draft Convention’s proposals for the retention of the above classes of armaments.\(^{49}\)

In the Preparatory Commission Italy made a general reservation that she could not finally agree to any specific method of naval limitation before all the Powers had agreed on the proportions and the levels of maximum tonnage.\(^{50}\) That is certainly a wide reservation when it is considered that in fifteen years little progress has been made towards fixing such proportions and levels.

Italy today is prepared to agree to almost any scheme of reduction and limitation of arms, provided the principle of parity which she considers vital to herself, is left undisturbed.\(^{51}\) She now finds herself on the horns of a dilemma: one, by curtailment of military and naval expenditures to lighten the enormous economic burden pressing down upon her; the other, to preserve her national prestige and to rank as a first-class power. This demands an equality of arms with France, particularly in naval forces, which she considers necessary for her national existence.

Italy is entitled to credit in whatever efforts she has made or will make to bring a measure of peace, a breathing spell, to help to build up the world’s shattered fortunes. Early in 1933 Premier Mussolini advanced a proposal seeking a pact between the four powers, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, to guarantee the peace of Europe for ten years. Received at first somewhat cautiously and with many objections, particularly on the part of France, which felt therein a danger to the principle of the League of Nations and to the various agreements which have developed under the ægis of that body, negotiations continued and a preliminary agreement was reached between the four powers.

The agreement, it is generally acknowledged, is a step forward in the way of international understanding and coopération and of peace. The chief factors in this agreement are the undertaking by the four powers concerned to refrain from force in the settlement of disputes; the opening of a way, somewhat uncertain it is true, but along paths cleared by the League, for the

\(^{49}\text{Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, League of Nations, Conf. D. 99.}\)

\(^{50}\text{Report of the Preparatory Commission, Par. 18.}\)

\(^{51}\text{Italy was one of the first to acclaim President Hoover’s proposal to the Disarmament Conference in 1932, and to accede to the request for a one-third cut in armaments.}\)
revision of the war treaties which contain, as they are, imminent dangers of further war; the undertaking to work seriously for the reduction of armaments in which Germany’s just claim for equality is recognized.\footnote{See U. S. Dept. of State, Treaty Information Bulletin, Nos. 45 and 46, 1933.}

The outcome of Franco-Italian rivalry in naval armaments is most vital to the whole disarmament problem, since the French and Italian view is that in any plan of reduction of armaments, land, sea, and air forces must be considered as a whole. The relation of these two countries in the Mediterranean and the conditions in the Mediterranean which govern the naval factor, thus take on an importance far beyond the national interests of the countries directly concerned.

In a memorandum to the League of Nations on July 15, 1931,\footnote{Particulars With Regard to the Position of Armaments: Communication from the French Government, 1931.} prepared for the information of the then forthcoming Disarmament Conference, France clearly stated her requirements. After calling attention to her needs for national defense the memorandum went on to say that “In addition France is called upon to maintain order in an overseas empire peopled by 60,000,000 inhabitants covering an area equal to twenty-three times that of the home country.” It continued, “In close conjunction with national defense on land, the protection of the sea coasts both at home and overseas requires cooperation of a navy sufficiently powerful to relieve the Government of the Republic from the necessity of maintaining in every part of their empire forces sufficient to cope alone with domestic disturbances which might conceivably coincide with a foreign aggression. The level therefore of the naval forces of France directly affects that of her land as well as that of her air forces. . . .\footnote{Italics are the writer’s.}

“This interdependence of the three great categories of armaments is therefore extremely important for France; she must constantly consider them in combination with each other if she is properly to estimate the consequences which a measure adopted for the one might have on the others.”

Thus interdependence is clearly stated. Consideration of one class cannot proceed to a satisfactory solution without that of the others. Without naval limitation, and that is the same as saying without Franco-Italian accord, general reduction of armament is going to be faced with an almost insurmountable
obstacle. This obstacle may be circumvented in one way or another. But there will be no solution of the whole problem and no removal of the crushing burden of armaments.

In the memorandum referred to, France has shown she is conscious of this. She stated therein: “It was not without a feeling of regret that the Government of the Republic found it impossible to adhere completely to the system of limitation of the Naval Treaty of London. They expect the decisions made at the conference of 1932 to lead to a complete solution of the problem and they still hope that, by that time, a suitable arrangement will enable France and Italy, in full agreement with the British Commonwealth to set forth their intentions in the matter of construction for the next few years in a temporary modus vivendi of a nature to facilitate the work of that conference.” Up to the present such a modus vivendi has not appeared.

There has been little change in the trend of French foreign policy. M. Paul Boncour, when foreign minister, averred that change of party will not necessarily “cause appreciable changes of French foreign policy” which, he holds, “depends on constants which may be defined as geographical position, history and tradition. Even revolutions do not alter these things.” Looking back over the pages of this study one finds ample support for his statement.

“France,” he further states, “in the depths of her spirit—is convinced that, in conformity with the principles of the protocol, only through the organization of international security by mutual assistance and by international force will it be possible for the individual nations of Europe to undertake the big scale reduction of armaments which public opinion in various countries somewhat imprudently expects to result from our meetings.”

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CHAPTER V

INTERNATIONALISM: BY ARMED FORCE OR MORAL SUASION?

Certain modifications of French foreign policy, notwithstanding the constants of geography, history and tradition, may result from the present condition of world economic distress from which France, like all other countries, is now suffering. There were indications shortly after the Herriot government took office in 1932 of a desire to reach some rapprochement with Germany, but recent developments in the latter country have strengthened rather than modified the French claim of the interdependence of security and armament.

To students of European politics it has been merely a question of time when a resuscitated Germany might successfully demand revision of the Versailles Treaty and equality in armaments. When these demands were made by Germany two years ago Premier Mussolini declared them to be "fully justified." Following an historic interview with the Italian premier in 1933 Herr Goering said: "Both Chancellor Hitler and I regard a close understanding between Italy and Germany as one of the basic principles of German policy." Despite the fact that Premier Mussolini has since that time apparently modified his approval of German policy, chiefly because of that country's threat to Austrian independence and his own intentions in southeastern Europe, he has not changed his purpose to continue to urge revision of the peace treaties, an even greater threat to world peace than was the Congress of Vienna to the "concert of Europe" a little more than a hundred years ago. It is Mussolini's desire to remove from the League of Nations the stigma arising from its association with the Treaty of Versailles. France on the other hand insists that the League is an integral part of the Versailles Treaty and that the League and the various treaties cannot be disassociated without knocking the bottom out of the whole scheme of alliances built up since the war. The treaties have been a thorn in the side of Italy. Mussolini's Four-Power Pact has for its real purpose the getting round of this difficulty. France dominates the

57 Ibid., April 14, 1933.
League through the treaties. The Pact, as expressed in the German view, "creates over and above the cumbersome Council of the League of Nations a super-Council of the four big powers that will be able to conduct the business of Europe with greater dispatch and authority." Again according to the Germans, "contrary to the French interpretation the pact by no means inhibits Germany's efforts to revise the Treaty of Versailles in general, and her borders in particular, for it explicitly acknowledges her right to revision."

Premier Mussolini addressing the Italian Senate on the occasion of the signing of the Four-Power Pact stated: "France is an essential element to peace and progress. By adhering to the pact she has given an example of collaboration whose importance must not be disregarded. All Italo-French problems assume, in the light of the pact, a totally new appearance and their solution becomes very much easier."

The demand for equality of armaments by Germany brings to a head the question as to whether armaments are to be scaled up or scaled down. Germany has declared her willingness to forego re-arming on the condition "that other countries reduce their armaments to a level that, with consideration for each country's particular situation, would correspond in the end to the measure of armament imposed on us by the Treaty of Versailles." Chancellor Hitler has declared on many occasions that the German people seek peace and amity and the lessening of the weight of armament. Despite these sentiments no formula has yet been found to reconcile security and disarmament.

France has advanced the proposal for an international police, of which she has been the more or less constant champion. There were laid before the General Disarmament Conference two French proposals for such an international force under the League of Nations—one by the Tardieu government in February, 1932, but withdrawn four months later, the other by the Herriot government in November, 1932. These have met with little sympathy or success. In 1910 the Congress of the United States envisioned such a force in the way of an international navy and passed a joint resolution asking "that a commission of five members be appointed by the President of the United States..."

58 New York Times, June 8, 1933.
59 Ibid., October 22, 1932.
States to consider the expediency . . . of constituting the combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of universal peace, and to consider and report any other means to diminish the expenditures of governments for military purposes and to lessen the probabilities of war." A sum not to exceed $10,000 was voted with the proviso that the commission report within two years.60

In the present state of international affairs in which international cooperation is frustrated at every turn by nationalist thinking, the mind and temper of nations are not ripe for such a scheme. Nations, especially the Great Powers, are not ready willingly to divest themselves of, and place in the hands of an extra-national authority, any part of that which has been the source, and is now the support, of many jealously guarded prerogatives—their armed forces. This assumes a humility in nations which they do not yet have. There is, too, the not unreasonable fear on the part of smaller nations that an international police would be dominated by the larger powers and manipulated for the ends of those powers.61

The efficacy and success of an international police to preserve the peace and secure justice, and, when required, to restrain or punish an aggressor, assume a cooperation with, a respect for, and a sanction in the League of Nations which is unfortunately lacking among the nations of the world today. This was painfully evident in the situation in the Far East when Japan seized Manchuria.

This is simply a statement of fact and not a reflection upon either the idea of a league or association of nations or upon the marvelous organization of that name which has worked prodigies during the fifteen years of its existence, marked by rampant nationalism, by a heritage of the gravest injustices arising out of one of the world's most bitter wars, and by a smoldering, and at times even flagrant desire for redress and revenge.

It would be a disastrous thing for the present and future peace of the world were the League of Nations to be dissolved, but evidently it will not be able to fulfill its principal mission of preserving peace and preventing war until all nations, large and small, shall acknowledge sincerely its jurisdiction. Neither will

60Congressional Record, 1910, Vol. 45, pp. 8545-8548.
it be possible to fulfill this mission unless small nations and disorganized countries, which have been the prey of imperialism and the victims of other nations in the struggle for balance of power, can feel reasonably sure that such an organism will not be used merely to serve the interests or preserve the status quo of the larger powers.

There will be necessary also an international tribunal of justice free from national restraints, with a sanction to make binding its decisions and with a police power of an effective kind to enforce its decisions when necessary. A court, the function of which is to render little more than advisory opinions will never be able to administer international justice. Finally, nations are groups of moral beings, and the moral law is as binding on the group as on the individual. Until this principle is fully acknowledged within nations and between nations, leagues to preserve peace or courts to enforce it must ignominiously fail.

**True Internationalism the Way to Peace**

The greatest dividing and disintegrating force in the world today is nationalism. The history of the past fifteen years might be likened to that of a death struggle between the baser passions of men, which are the roots of exaggerated nationalism, and their better and nobler natures which, encouraged and sustained by Christian teaching and ideals, seek to establish a real brotherhood, a communion, and a charity among men and nations.

Nations cannot find a permanent foundation for international peace and concord so long as nationalism usurps the place of patriotism, with "hatred and envy in place of mutual desire for good, distrust and suspicion in place of confidence of brothers, competition and struggle in place of willing cooperation, ambition for hegemony and mastery in place of respect and care for the rights of all."62

Italy and France have been characteristically identified with the growth and development of nationalism. Machiavelli crystallized those principles which were to serve as an authority and an apologia for that utter disregard of moral standards which has been most characteristic in the conduct of nations. National unity and independence, in those terms, were paramount, to be attained if necessary through military despotism.

62 *Allocution by Pope Pius XI to the College of Cardinals, December 24, 1930.*
Out of the French Revolution came modern nationalism and the concept of "nations in arms" fighting for liberty, equality and fraternity, with homes turned into barracks, public squares into workshops, and cellars into factories of gunpowder, to use the lurid words of Bertrand Barère. Charles Maurras, perhaps the most outstanding French exponent of modern nationalism, defines it as "the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity, and the steady increase of national power—for a nation declines when it loses military might."  

Italy is today one of the foremost of western nations wherein integral nationalism is officially honored and practiced. As Dr. Carlton Hayes points out, the French models, Barrès, Maurras, and Sorel have been religiously studied by the Fascists. Italian nationalists since the turn of the century have, to quote Benedetto Croce, "approved of the ideas of war and dictatorship... they were ready to make mock of the Revolution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and democracy." Mussolini has declared that liberty, for which so many nations have been drenched in blood, is not an end but a means which involves "the inexorable use of force... physical, armed force."

Nationalism can only be restrained and modified, first, by nations realizing that they, as groups of moral beings are in turn subject to the moral law; and, second, by the substitution of a wise and genuine internationalism.

An internationalism which is only a humanitarianism cannot succeed in curing deep-seated evils. An internationalism looking to the creation of a world-state contains in itself the seeds of its own ruin. Neither will a solution be found in an internationalism calling itself communism, in reality a state absolutism, which would swallow up the personality, character, and rights of individuals and nations in a world revolution.

Where then can be found an internationalism which respects in fullest measure the autonomy of states and the legitimate God-given rights of their citizens? The Church stands through the ages as the model of a truly universal and perfect society. It is national and at the same time above all nations. The Church is today the living example of the international organization of society with the widest autonomy and the fullest recognition.
tion of difference in race, nationality, traditions and culture. “Because of her very make-up and the constitution which she possesses, by reason of her age old traditions and her great prestige, which has not lessened but has been greatly increased since the close of the War, she cannot but succeed in such a venture (to safeguard the sanctity of the law of nations) where others assuredly will fail.”

Italy has recognized before the world the sovereignty and territorial independence of the Church-State. The Church, because of this independence, is in a position where she may extend more freely and efficaciously her peace-bearing influence over the temporal as well as the spiritual world. The Holy See has sought and concluded this historic pact with Italy, not only for the welfare of Italy and the Church, but to be an inspiration and an example to all temporal governments.

Italy, the heart of which is Rome, the soul of which is the Holy See, has truly an obligation which cannot be overshadowed by her history or her imperial memories. She owes a great responsibility to the Church. Making allowance for their extreme nationalistic sentiment, there is food for thought nevertheless in the words of Gioberti—“the centre of the civilizing process is where the centre of Catholicism is . . . since Italy is the centre of the latter it follows that Italy is the true head of civilization, and Rome is the ideal metropolis of the world.” The more accurate expression would be—the “spiritual metropolis” of the world.

France, with her place of leadership among nations, has, too, a decisive duty in the work of their moral regeneration. As Italy is justly proud, within reason, of her part in the building up of Western civilization, so, too, France may not forget that she once sprang to the defense of the Church and of peace, earning for herself the proud title, “Gallia Ecclesiae Primogenita Filia.” May she again become conscious of that history.

On the solemn occasion of the signing of the treaty and concordat between the Holy See and Italy, the dean of the Diplomatic Corps, representing most of the nations of the world, addressing the Holy Father, uttered these words which are, for reasons above given, of peculiar significance in the relations between France and Italy today:

65Pius XI, Encyclical Ubi Arcano.
Every act of reconciliation in the international sphere merits our cordial welcome because it is a factor and pledge of general peace. Many scorn this idea of general peace as if it were a childish dream. We indeed do not conceal from ourselves its many difficulties. Yet our sincere efforts must tend in that direction, unless we are willing for Him, Who judges individuals and peoples, to reproach us for the name of Christian, that we bear as a mark of deceit and hypocrisy.66


**APPENDIX I**

**TABLE OF MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF FRANCE AND ITALY AND OTHER POWERS**

(From Armaments Year-Book, 1933)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Naval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FRANCE</strong></td>
<td>593,040 (a)</td>
<td>39,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BELGIUM</strong></td>
<td>64,456 (c)</td>
<td>2,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LITTLE ENTENTE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>138,788</td>
<td>6,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roumania</td>
<td>240,501</td>
<td>11,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>112,610</td>
<td>8,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLAND</strong></td>
<td>266,015</td>
<td>7,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ITALY</strong></td>
<td>494,936 (f)</td>
<td>24,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUNGARY</strong></td>
<td>34,993 (o)</td>
<td>(non-military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GREECE</strong></td>
<td>53,043</td>
<td>(part of army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALBANIA</strong></td>
<td>12,629 (p)</td>
<td>(part of army)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relations Between France and Italy

TOTAL MILITARY EFFECTIVES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Military Effectives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRANCE</td>
<td>688,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELGIUM</td>
<td>73,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHOSLOVAKIA</td>
<td>176,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUMANIA</td>
<td>316,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUGOSLAVIA</td>
<td>151,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>338,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>609,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>34,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREECE</td>
<td>53,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUMANIA</td>
<td>316,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBANIA</td>
<td>12,629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Of these 211,837 are in overseas territories. In addition, about 70,000 of mobile home forces may be drawn upon for overseas defense.
(b) "Irregulars" provided for in a "pour memoire" in budget of Ministry of War.
(c) There are, in addition, 13,500 effectives in the Belgian Congo.
(d) Not stated if on a military basis.
(e) Considered part of army only as concerns organization and discipline. Would retain peace functions in event of mobilization.
(f) Of these 29,889 are in overseas territories. Of the carabinieri, etc., 4,961 are overseas. The 90,159 comprise the Royal Carabinieri, Royal Revenue Guard and the volunteer militia. (Armaments Year Book, 1933.)
(g) Belgian navy abolished 1928.
(h) From Armaments Year Book, 1930-1931, p. 966.
(i) Includes 13,570 tons (torpedo boats, mine layers, etc.) exempt under Draft Convention of Disarmament Conference. Had authorized in 1931 building of 100,000 tons.
(k) Includes 19,944 metric tons exempt under Draft Convention.
(m) Includes 12,456 in sea formations organized on a military basis.
(n) Includes 176,095 tons exempt and other tonnage of 12,165.
(o) 1931.
(p) 1931.

APPENDIX II

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Relations Between France and Italy


Note: As this Report is published two important events have occurred. 1. France and Italy, on January 7, 1935, signed agreements adjusting their differences in Africa, guaranteeing Austrian independence, and undertaking to seek a pact of non-intervention in central Europe; 2. Japan, on December 29, 1934, denounced the Washington Treaty. The African concessions to Italy are of minor importance (pp. 12-17 of this Report). A small portion of French Somaliland, excluding the port of Obok, is added to Eritrea; Italy is given a share in the Djibouti—Addis-Ababa railway; an adjustment has been made in the Libyan boundary, with France retaining territory north of Lake Tchad; in Tunis, Italians retain their Italian citizenship for a period of ten years, after which there will be a relinquishment extending to 1965. The Franco-Italian agreements do not touch the graver question of the naval situation in the Mediterranean. A careful study of this situation (pp. 27-37) shows how British-French-Italian interests may vitally affect the United States. The denunciation of the Washington Treaty by Japan and France throws wide open to the whole naval question with all its implications.
THE Catholic Association for International Peace has grown out of a series of meetings during 1926-1927. Following the Eucharistic Congress in Chicago in 1926, representatives of a dozen nations met with Americans for discussion. In October of the same year a meeting was held in Cleveland where a temporary organization called The Catholic Committee on International Relations was formed. The permanent name, The Catholic Association for International Peace, was adopted at a two-day Conference in Washington in 1927. Annual Conferences were held in the same city in 1928, 1929, 1930, 1933 and 1934; in New York City, 1931; and in Cleveland, 1932. All-day regional Conferences took place in Chicago on Armistice Day, 1930, in St. Louis on Washington's Birthday, 1932; at the University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, on November 19, 1933, and at Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on November 25, 1934. It is a membership organization. Its objects and purposes are:

To study, disseminate and apply the principles of natural law and Christian charity to international problems of the day;
To consider the moral and legal aspects of any action which may be proposed or advocated in the international sphere;
To examine and consider issues which bear upon international goodwill;
To encourage the formation of conferences, lectures and study circles;
To issue reports on questions of international importance;
To further, in cooperation with similar Catholic organizations in other countries, in accord with the teachings of the Church, the object and purposes of world peace and happiness.

The ultimate purpose is to promote, in conformity with the mind of the Church, "the Peace of Christ in the Kingdom of Christ."

The Association works through the preparation of committee reports. Following careful preparation, these are discussed both publicly and privately in order to secure able revision and they are then published by the organization. Additional committees will be created from time to time. The Association solicits the membership and cooperation of Catholics of like mind. It is seeking especially the membership and cooperation of those whose experience and studies are such that they can take part in the preparation of committee reports.

The Committees on Ethics, Law and Organization, and Economic Relations serve as a guiding committee on the particular questions for all other committees. Questions involving moral judgments must be submitted to the Committee on Ethics.
Publications of The Catholic Association for International Peace

Pamphlet Series—

No. 1—International Ethics.
No. 2—Latin America and the United States.
No. 3—Causes of War, and Security, Old and New.
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No. 6—American Agriculture and International Affairs.
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No. 10—National Attitudes in Children.
No. 11—Tariffs and World Peace.
No. 12—Manchuria—The Problem in the Far East.
No. 13—International Economic Life.
No. 14—The Church and Peace Efforts.
No. 15—War and Peace in St. Augustine’s De Civitate Dei.
No. 16—Peace Education in Catholic Schools.
No. 17—League of Nations and Catholic Action.
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Appeals for Peace of Pope Benedict XV and Pope Pius XI.
Peace Trends.
Syllabus on International Relations.
Argentina—Land of the Eucharistic Congress, 1934.

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Nationalism.
Is War Justifiable Today?
Disarmament and Catholic Doctrine.
The World Court.
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So-called “Over-Population.”
Catholicism—the Keynote of Pan-Americanism.
World Coöperation—Symposium.

N. C. W. C. Joint Committee on Peace—
Peace Statements of Recent Popes.