COORDINATING MASS PROTESTS IN TAHIRIR SQUARE:
A SOCIOLINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF ENGROUPMENT, MULTI-MODAL
INTERTEXTUALITY AND REVOLUTION

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By

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This dissertation poses three central questions about the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring:
1) What catalyzed and perpetuated Egypt’s 2011 ‘revolutionary interval’?
2) How effective were various messaging channels (vocal, gestural, ecological, technological) in initiating and coordinating newcomers into smaller protest formations and the larger revolutionary formation?
3) What processes were involved in ‘engrouping’ smaller protests into the mass ‘revolutionary formation’ of the 18 Days of Tahrir?

The problem I undertake is describing the oral and embodied channels that revolutionaries used to communicate about and initiative others into the revolution. These channels constitute the communicative vehicle that ordinary citizens could use to reach an empowered body politic identity. Indeed, those voices and identities of the 2011 Egyptian revolution came to topple the three-decades-old regime of Hosni Mubarak. While some argue Mubarak’s resignation was a short-lived victory given Egypt’s trajectory back toward authoritarian rule since then, I am more interested in how this intense period of popular revolution gave way to a political performative idiom, or what I call “voices” that enabled lay Egyptians to challenge the rules of Arab political discourse as revolutionaries who wielded political power. I explain the charged historical moment and the public spaces in which incumbent institutions and structures were challenged in the political idiom of the revolution in terms of ‘the revolutionary interval’ (i.e. ‘18 Days of Tahrir’). I discuss the disruption of the fragile institutional status quo through a framework that brings together approaches from multimodal interaction and intertextuality. I focus on how individuals and smaller protest groups combine into larger groups around shared goals, and ultimately into the formations captured in now-popular images of a seemingly-unified mass of Egyptians demanding Mubarak’s resignation. I discuss these processes in terms of distributed cognition, semiotics, and cybernetics theories. I conclude with a description of an experimental computational-sociolinguistic simulation of the methods of communication deployed in Tahrir Square. The simulation models the relative conversion efficiencies of five communicative channel types used to initiate newcomers and coordinate protesters into a revolutionary formation.
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PREFACE

Positionality - Relevance to Me

I became interested in multimodal interaction as a framework for interpreting communication and coordination in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution because, in the protest formations, chants, and scenes of massive encampments in Tahrir Square in downtown Egypt, I observed and felt that something new was taking place in Arabic political discourse.

Having studied Arabic in Egypt and conducted field research in Arabic dialectology and written about language and politics in the Arab region as an undergraduate and in graduate school, I watched the protests in 2011 and saw something different. As an Arab, of Lebanese descent, and half-Mexican, it was exciting to see the traditional rules and models for language use in Arab politics and society being challenged and reversed on the ground. New identities were being forged in the midst of a revolutionary fervor aimed at overturning an oppressive status quo. Individuals were reactively reconfiguring themselves and affecting change on the institutional level by governmental actors, but also in irreversible and fascinating ways on personal and intersubjective levels.

For a student of sociolinguistics and Arab politics, the "18 Days of Tahrir” was, and continues to be, a captivating time of intense, rapid cultural production where oral and physical communication played a significant role in stoking political opposition and solidarity building. Researching communication in the Arab Spring has proven to be an inexhaustible topic. This, then, is only the start of a lifetime of writing about the Arab revolutions and the brave people who continue to live it.
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همدلی از همزبانی بهترست

Not the ones speaking the same language,
But the ones sharing the same feeling
Understand each other.

-Jalaluddin Rumi
Chapter 1: The Wall of Fear, Orienting Questions, The Role of News Media

“Multimodal analysis is an inevitable empirical adjustment to contemporary conditions, and we are compelled to move from ‘language’ in the strict sense towards semiosis as our focus of inquiry, and from ‘linguistics’ towards a new sociolinguistically informed semiotics as our disciplinary space.”

Key Concept: In the introduction to Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu (1991:26) quotes John Thomas’s description of the role of language in political processes: "[t]hrough the production of slogans, programmes and commentaries of various kinds, agents in the political field are continuously engaged in a labour of representation by which they seek to construct and impose a particular vision of the social world, while at the same time seeking to mobilize the support of those upon whom their power ultimately depends.”

Figure 1.1: Protest Sign Used in Tahrir Square During the January 2011 Revolution. The sign is in English and emphasizes two messages: 1) Mubarak and his regime must abdicate and 2) the Egyptian people, ‘the people’, ‘have spoken’.

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1.1 “I Get It” (‘fhimtkum’): A Brief History of the Arab Spring

On December 17, 2010 in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, a twenty-five year old street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, was stopped by a municipal officer, Faida Hamdi, who insisted that Bouazizi required a permit to sell fruit on the street (Bamyeh 2011; Shilton 2013; Alianak 2014; Ghanem 2015; Esposito et al. 2016). When he could not produce one, she allegedly spat on his face, confiscated his electric scales, and pushed his cart over (Mccauley and Clark 2011). Other officers she was with then beat him and left him on the street. Indignant, Bouazizi rushed to the governor’s office and requested a meeting with the governor, which he was denied (Linn et al. 2014). He threatened to light himself on fire if the governor would not see him but he was still denied. Bouazizi then located a can of gasoline near the offices of the governor and poured its

Figure 1.2: Former President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. His final televised speech was addressed to “iš-ša’b it-tūnsī” (“the Tunisian people’). The speech is unscripted and delivered in Tunisian Colloquial Arabic - an historic act in itself - and in it he announces his resignation as president in response to the demands of “iš-ša’b” (“the people’). He explains simply that he has “understood” (‘fhimtkum’). Credit: YouTube.
contents onto himself in front of the building in the middle of traffic. He shouted “how do you expect me to make a living?” (Zaretsky 2013: 149; van Nieuwkerk et al 2016: 58) and then ignited the flame at approximately 11:30 in the morning, about one hour after his fruit cart was pushed over (Bendana and Kmar 2011; Gumbiner et al. 2012).

Tunisian and regional Arab media picked up on the story after eyewitnesses of the self-immolation began protesting in front of the governor’s office and Bouazizi was sent to hospital where doctors would attempt to resuscitate him for weeks (Zaretsky 2013). Then president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, visited Bouazizi at the intensive care unit in Ben Arous and lauded him while promising sweeping reforms in public speeches. Ben Ali told Bouazizi’s mother he would see to it that the youth be transferred to France for further treatment but this never happened. Eighteen days after Bouazizi’s immolation, he died while comatose on January 4th, 2011. A large funeral proceeded, but larger still were the ever growing protests that started in Sidi Bouzid that began hours after Bouazizi’s immolation and grew in intensity and spread throughout Tunisia on a daily basis. Finally, on January 14th, 2011, after being refused refuge in France, Ben Ali and his family accepted a conditional invitation to Saudi Arabia that stipulated he be barred from public office and media appearances for life (Heeman 2012). In an historic unscripted speech given in Tunisian Colloquial Arabic, Ben Ali proclaimed ‘I understood

you’ (“fhimtkum”) to the public and that he decided to resign after 23 years of consecutive authoritarian rule.⁸

One week before Egypt’s National Police Day - January 25th, 2011 (11 days after Ben Ali’s resignation as president of Tunisia) - Asmaa Mahfouz, a twenty-six year old Egyptian woman posted a video blog online to urge other Egyptians to descend on Tahrir Square on 1/25 to demand their rights as human beings and say “no” to the regime of Hosni Mubarak. The following is a set of my own translations of some of the key messages in Mahfouz’s blog⁹:

1. [s1:33] we need to go down [to Tahrir Square] on the 25th [of January 2011],

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⁸ Ben Ali’s speech in Tunisian Colloquial Arabic has been transcribed into Arabic script in its entirety but has not, to my knowledge, been systematically analyzed or been subjected to multi-modal interactional analysis. I intend to undertake this task in post-dissertation research on pivotal political speeches in the Arab Uprisings. Segments of the video are available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1rlFDv6mRnA.

⁹ Note “s” signifies the ‘start time’ of the speech act, and “e” indicates its ‘end time’. Asmaa Mahfouz’s video blog is available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgjIgMdsEuk
if we still have **dignity** [ECA: karāma], and if we still want to live like people [ka-'insān]

and like **human beings** [w ka-bennī ’ādmīn], in this country ,

we must go down [to Tahrir Square] on the 25th .

we will go down [to Tahrir Square] to demand our **right** as human beings ,

not even our political rights as members of the polity … [e1:49],

[s2:53] **talk** to your neighbors and your colleagues and friends and family

and **encourage** them to go down [to Tahrir Square] [e2:57] …

[s3:06] or if you’re sitting at home , keep up with the news on **Facebook** [e3:12] …

[s3:50] bring them [**people you know**] down [to Tahrir Square] ,

five of them or ten of them ,

or just **talk** to people in any random place ,

tell them ‘that’s enough’ ,

let’s do this instead of **setting ourselves on fire** [e3:59].

At 4:32 Mahfouz holds up a poster (see figure 1c above) she made that reads “I am going down on the 25th of January” and she comments that she will say “‘no’ to corruption, and ‘no’ to this regime [4:36]”.

Adel Iskander (2013:90) notes that Mahfouz was arrested on August 14th, 2011 for denouncing the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in a tweet. She wrote a message against a controversial new law that subjected civilians to military trials for publicly criticizing SCAF. Mahfouz was released four days later following protestations against her arrest.

While the numbers are disputed, by some accounts, nearly one million Egyptians converged on Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 (Amin 2014; Booth and Ken 2011; Gunning
and Baron 2014). Over the next 18 Days, the protest groups set up information tents, created encampments for their co-ideologues and disseminated cause-specific messaging under the guise of “is-sōwṛa” (‘the revolution’). Hosni Mubarak, the long-reigning authoritarian ruler of Egypt, became the symbol of the National Democratic Party’s regime and it was clear that the chants demanding the downfall of the government could only be met by Mubarak’s resignation.

Mubarak’s now-infamous last-ditch final address to the protestors in Tahrir on February 10, 2011 (see Projection) - one day before Vice President Omar Suleiman would announce Mubarak’s resignation - contains several clear instantiations of counter-revolutionary voicing. He deployed conventional regime conceptual metaphors to attempt to cast the revolution as a temporary disturbance akin to a child’s tantrum. Playing on the popular perception that the Egyptian uprising was a ‘youth revolution’, Mubarak sought to reassure the elites of the older generations that the situation was under control. He use NATION AS CHILDREN and RULER AS FATHER conceptual metaphors:

1. I am addressing the youth of Egypt today in Tahrir Square and across the country.
2. I am addressing you all from the heart,
3. a father's dialogue with his sons and daughters.
4. I am proud of you as the new Egyptian generation calling for a change to the better,
5. dreaming and making the future.
6. …I will hold those who persecuted our youth accountable
7. with the maximum deterrent sentences…
8. …My heart was in pain because of what happened to them,

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9. as much as it pained their hearts…
10. …I am telling you that as a president
11. I find no shame in listening to my country's youth
12. and interacting with them…
13. …My sons, the youth of Egypt, brother citizens…

The apparent strategy Mubarak employs is one of invoking sympathy through a type of argumentation, or “topos”, based on instilling nostalgia in the audience for a fictive yesteryear where Egypt was safe and stable, and Egyptian youth, the ‘sons and daughters’, were secure and well-behaved. Underlying that construal of this past irrealis is the implication that if the change

Figure 1.4: Hosni Mubarak’s Final Address as President on February 10, 2011. The speech was broadcasted live over Tahrir Square. He defied expectations of announcing his resignation. The energy in Tahrir spiked as more Egyptians joined the revolutionary formation overnight. Credit: Google Images.
in the behavior of the ‘children’ today were reversed, so too could the country return to a safe, 
stable, and secure status. In this metaphoric reasoning, the 2011 “revolution” is re-conceptualized 
as a disturbance in an otherwise presumably positive environment, and the revolutionaries are re- 
construed as troublesome, or misbehaving children whose parents, the government and its 
security apparatus, should reign them in. Needless to say, in retrospect, it is clear that the 
linguistic and conceptual strategy employed in this speech largely failed. Mubarak’s oratory and 
pragmatic performance did not persuade the protestors in Tahrir to return to their homes and 
proceed with business as usual. The intensity of the demonstrations crescendoed and within 
twenty-four hours, Hosni Mubarak would concede defeat and instruct his recently-appointed vice 
president to announce his resignation.

On February 11, 2011, then Vice President Omar Suleiman announced Mubarak had 
officially resigned and handed over power to the authority of the Supreme Council of the Armed 
Forces (SCAF). SCAF acted as interim government until elections were held in June 2012. Mohammed Morsi emerged as the candidate to represent the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
presidential elections and was declared the winner on June 24, 2012. Soon after, Morsi appointed 
a constitutional committee that drew a great deal of criticism for the disproportionately large 
share of seats allotted to Muslim Brotherhood members. The constitution created by the 
committee was widely viewed as having been rushed without sufficient time for the public to 
learn its contents.

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On November 22, 2012 President Morsi unilaterally passed a declaration granting immunity to his presidential decrees and sweeping powers to pass “any measures necessary to protect the revolution”. Large protest groups gathered once again in Tahrir Square chanting for the downfall of the regime. In response to the protestors in Tahrir, Morsi rescinded the declaration on December 8, 2012 but claimed that all “temporary results” thereof would still stand. This was interpreted by protesters as unduly vague and the anti-Morsi demonstrations developed into a self-described “rebellion” (‘tamarrod’).

Capitalizing on the public discontent with Morsi, on July 1, 2013 SCAF issued a public warning to Morsi that it would intervene within 48 hours if actions were not taken to meet the demands of the protestors. Prior to July 1, SCAF was at odds with Morsi after he instituted several controversial high-level cabinet reshuffles including the forced retirement of Field Marshal Mohammed Hossein Tantawi. In his place, Morsi promoted an unknown general, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi. On July 3, 2013, now Army Chief General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi met with President Morsi and informed him that he was discharged and to be placed under house arrest later that same day.

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21 Weaver, Matthew; McCarthy, Tom. 3 July 2013. "Egyptian army suspends constitution and removes President Morsi – as it happened". The Guardian. Retrieved 17 April 2014.
1.2 The Wall of Fear

In the days after Mubarak's ouster, major Arab regional newspapers and political analysts briefly discussed the impetus of the Arab Spring as being the fall of the "wall of fear" (Moubayed 2002) that had braced the inhabitants of countries governed by authoritarian regimes across Arab states.
The Arab Spring was, or is, a collective, societal conflagration responding to decades of misgovernment and abusive policies and statecraft designed to instill fear. Gunning and Baron (2014) discuss the transition from “fear to defiance” that many Egyptians had to make as they transformed into revolutionaries. Referencing Deborah Gould’s “emotion culture,” (2014:214) they argue that the combination of a) “moral shocks” (2014:220) - moments of collective indignation following reports of police brutality at peaceful protest sites - and b) the sense of hope that stemmed from Ben Ali’s resignation (2014:192), along with c) the protesters’ awareness that they were engaging in a “historic moment” (2014:233) that would require their utmost attention and commitment explains how previously fearful Egyptians took to the streets and faced down the state’s ominous security apparatus: “Once people believed this was a historic moment, calculations, interests and identities changed” (2014:231, 233, 238).

Gunning and Baron’s thesis is compelling and helps to explain an important piece of the puzzle that I too will examine in chapter 5. In that chapter, I describe the micro-interactions that led to the formation of small groups that then grew into larger protest formations.

The ‘breaking down’ of the wall of fear was the result of many thousands or millions of stress-line fractures caused by individual resistors in many fields, professions, and artistic media as well as collective political protest movements across the region. Each of those histories deserves to be told. This study, however, can only focus on a small handful of vignettes from the

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2011 revolution in Egypt that started on January 25th and lasted for eighteen days in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.

Prior to 2011, the "wall of fear" was a mosaic of violent security apparatuses with ubiquitous, or at least perceived as such, reach into the private lives of citizens. These security states were often understood as serving Western interests in the region (Mason and Robert 2014) and were buttressed by compelling narratives that drew on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the putative threat of radical Islamism (Youssef 2011; Massad 2013; Khatib and Lust 2014).

To engage in the study of systems of governance in Arab-majority states by operationalizing the term "authoritarianism" as the nondemocratic alternative, lends credence to reductionist arguments about the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa. Crystal (1994) argues that, "[t]o understand authoritarian outcomes… look to social actors, to the importance of organized social groups, to the role of state efforts to contain them in shaping political outcomes, and to the repressive institutions that sometimes arise from this process."23 If Arab states had been working to suppress democratic uprisings for decades, it follows that, for decades, while there were constant resistance movements, these regimes largely succeeded. The crumbling of the ‘wall of fear’, as a metaphor, suggests a historiography that recognizes the agency of Arab peoples who fought and died working against oppression and, bit by bit, brought down the wall that had maintained an undemocratic power arrangement. The Arab Spring was not, then, a shocking break from the past, but rather the culmination of years of collective and individual efforts to affect large-scale social, political, and economic change.

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23 Crystal, Jill. “Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World,” World Politics 46, no. 2 (January 1994) pp. 264, 289. It may be the case that intra-regional generalization has been and continues to be problematic, whereas inter-regional generalization may prove progressive and helpful not only in disseminating ideas but in demystifying the putative quandary of the persistence of authoritarianism in the "Arab world".
This dissertation reimagines the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, or ‘Uprising’ through the lens of multimodal sociolinguistic analysis. What I’m interested in is not the historical unfolding of the revolution, per se, but rather, the means, media, and strategies deployed on the ground by Egyptians to communicate and coordinate among one another that resulted in the toppling of Hosni Mubarak’s three decades of authoritarian rule over Egyptians, who constitute about one-third of the Arab region’s total population.

Political scientists and historians of the region have, for the better part of the 20th century, debated the underpinnings, impetuses, and attenuating circumstances under which various forms and levels of authoritarianism have perurred in most Arab states – that is not, however, the topic of this research. Still, my work can be read as a critique of the school of thought that places the burden of authoritarianism’s long life in the Arab region on the shoulders of “Arab culture”, “the Arab mind”, Islam, or a pseudo-psycho-analysis of the negative impacts of rentier economies resulting from some Arab states’ oil and natural gas wealth. That is, I put no stock in the above approaches, and rather, hope that my dissertation contributes, in some part,


25 Crystal, Jill. “Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World,” World Politics 46, no. 2 (January 1994) pp. 25-289. It may be the case that intra-regional generalization has been and continues to be problematic, whereas inter-regional generalization may prove progressive and helpful not only in disseminating ideas but in demystifying the putative quandary of the persistence of authoritarianism in the "Arab world".

to a re-reading of the recent history of the Arab region from the multi-scalar perspective of linguistic anthropology, and perhaps, a newly emergent, syncretic subfield thereof: the semiotic anthropology of revolution.\textsuperscript{27} I will discuss this potential subfield directly in my literature review (chapter 2) and again in my concluding remarks (chapter 6).

The “problem” I take on is therefore not one of history but more of historiography, and more specifically deconstructing the notion of a ‘mass protest’ to describe and interpret the many intersecting sub-events that combined to make up Egypt’s 2011 revolution in Tahrir Square. The revolution was the result of social and communicative work that took place between one person

to the next. These micro-events led to the collaboration of multiple protest groups on January 25th, 2011 and the 18 Days thereafter that, en toto, aligned and synchronized in such a manner as to disrupt the deeply engrained political institutions and identities of Hosni Mubarak’s regime. The problem, then, is that social and communicative work itself and describing it as well as contextualizing it to understand how it succeeded in doing what many prior protest movements in Egypt had failed to do before 2011, namely topple Mubarak.

I situate this problem within the framework of language and communication because, on a basic level, language is the stuff of interaction - it is a large component of, to put it simply, what makes things happen with and between multiple people (Austin 1962; Brekle 1989; Wodak 1989). Similarly, Gumperz (1968) discusses interactional strategies in culturally-bound speech communities in which the language of conversation is the target of analysis - he’s especially interested in “groups of any permanence, be they small bands bounded by face-to-face contact, modern nations divisible into smaller sub-regions, or even occupational associations or neighborhood gangs” where “linguistic peculiarities” can be described. The conversations that took place between Egyptians in Tahrir were strategic. The conversations and embodied interactions were the tools used to organize the many thousands of protestors in cities across Egypt and these small events comprise the chain reaction that fomented revolutionary activism and transformed a day of many disconnected demonstrations into the beginning of a mass movement with a common cause. These exchanges were political speech and acts - an oral-and-physical discourse, and so a sociolinguistic treatment of these interactions considers “what (sic) speakers did in public discourse… and how they did it with language” but I am also interested in how non-verbal communication played a role in forming (and became part of) this new
revolutionary public discourse (Dunne 2003). The hand-drawn signs, choreographed dances, gestures, and even the volume and voice qualities used to chant the slogans of the revolution are all intricate and integral parts of this discourse - perhaps even more so than the specific words on the signs and lyrics in the songs and cants. Oftentimes, given the sheer number of people in Tahrir Square during the 18 Days, an individual would only get an impression of a sign or a song, but did that did not impede the transfer and multiplication of the code and its objectives.

Revolutions, then, can be understood as recursively the product of and perpetuated by political speech events. To be sure, revolutions do not occur ex nihilo. Historically, it is well documented that the 2011 Egyptian revolution was in many ways the result of an overlapping of many smaller demonstrations in honor of the national holiday commemorating a prior Egyptian revolution (Bayat 2007, 2010a; Ghobashy 2011; Shokr 2011) - the 1952 Free Officers Movement (or ‘Officers’ Revolt’) led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Cook 2012). This is significant because it helps to set the stage. Thousands of people were out, in various groups dedicated to a wide array of social, economic, religious, and political issues - what strung these smaller groupings together was that they were out demonstrating at the same time (January 25, 2011), in the same geographic area (downtown Cairo), in honor of a popular uprising from the not-too-distant past (Blake et al. 1995; Gordon 1992; Books et al 2010; al-Dīn 1995; Vatikiotis 2013). What is arguably more important, however, is that on this particular Free Officer’s Day holiday, the disparate demonstrators marching through the tributary roads that lead to Tahrir did not fizzle out by day’s end. Instead, spurred by viral messaging over traditional and new social media channels (e.g. Asmaa Mahfouz’s YouTube exhortation) and a context of political economic strife, the smaller protest formations converged as they moved into Tahrir Square, a
central location in downtown Cairo (El Menawy 2012; Youssef 2011; Rushdy 2011; Khalil and Menna 2012; Nunns and Idle 2011; Taha et al. 2012). On one level, a single macroscopic cause emerged as the many disconnected groups neared Tahrir Square: toppling the regime. But below the surface, what united the various groupings of protestors who remained in the square until, less than three weeks later, the president of the country resigned, was multiple. Many microscopic causes were developed and performed in a constant recapitulation of messaging to instill and perpetuate the objectives and ideology of the revolutionary formation to be taken up and held onto by the individuals for, at least, the 18 Days of Tahrir. What was different about 2011’s Officer’s Day? And how did so many people, perhaps over a million, according to some reports, work together to perform this revolution? What became of the voices and identities of these revolutionaries after the fall of Mubarak and his wall of fear?

1.3 Why Study the 18 Days of Tahrir Using a Sociolinguistic Framework?

Revolutions, like other social events, and, in fact, even the most prototypical of interactions—arguably, a dyadic conversation—requires people working together in joint commitment to some degree (Clark 1996). These cooperative arrangements are worked out with communication. Underlying any cooperation there are spoken and unspoken agreements between the interactants to participate in accomplishing something together, whether that something is smalltalk, a handshake, or something more involved like a protest formation. Communication is therefore a) interactive and b) involves verbal and embodied channels and is c) performative (Sebanz et al. 2008; Prinz and Wolfgang 2008; Wachsmuth et al. 2008; Goodwin and LeBaron 2011; Lindblom 2015).
Voice recordings of conversations have been analyzed by linguists for decades (Erickson 2004; LeVine and Scollon 2004) - social scientists have also applied their tools to multiparty interactions between more than two individuals (Porder 1986: 38-39; Myers 1999; Cutting 1999). Approaches that use cameras rather than tape or digital recorders alone to account for multiple communicative channels involved in face-to-face situations (Erickson 2011) constituted the emergence of frameworks for multiple interactional modalities. *Multi-modal interaction analysis*, then, examines the words of an utterance but also variations in voicing (voice registers), concomitant or independent gesturing, eye gaze, nods, posture, formation (multiple people), and all of the potentially relevant, or ‘oriented-to’, affordances of the physical environment in which an interaction occurs (Erickson 1977, 1982). This emergent approach to linguistic research is aptly termed multimodal interactional analysis and has been defined in many ways but, this dissertation understands it as “… an inevitable empirical adjustment to contemporary conditions [whereby] we are compelled to move from ‘language’ in the strict sense towards *semiosis* as our focus of inquiry, and from ‘linguistics’ towards a new sociolinguistically informed *semiotics* as our disciplinary space” (Blommaert and Rampton, 2011:6, citing Scollon and Scollon 2003, 2004; Kress 2009). In other words, multimodal interaction analysis interprets *what is communicative* in an interaction in the broadest sense to encompass space and time as well as syntax, grammar, lexicon and register, inter alia. The possible channels of interaction are limited by the situation and what the interactants in it are orienting to, or consciously aware of and make use of to convey a message.

I pose several questions for this research that help to expand the perspective of the analysis beyond an attention to words, written or spoken, and toward the performative and
interactive embodied, situated, ecological and chronological experiences of ‘the 18 Days of Tahrir’:

1) What catalyzed and perpetuated Egypt’s 2011 ‘revolutionary interval’?

2) How effective were various messaging channels (vocal, gestural, ecological, technological) in initiating and coordinating newcomers?

3) What processes were involved in ‘engrouping’ smaller protests into the mass ‘revolutionary formation’ of the 18 Days of Tahrir?

The overarching ‘problem’ this dissertation addresses is describing how oral and embodied intertexts were conveyed across different channels to configure the revolutionary voices and identities that toppled Mubarak’s regime, if temporarily. I am also interested in how Arab political discourse has changed given the lasting sense of ‘people power’ that emerged through the revolutionary voices and identities forged in Tahrir (Pittam 1994; Cambanis 2015).

To respond to these questions, chapter 3 explores the revolutionary interval as the 'time and space' (i.e. the ’18 Days in Tahrir’ in Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo, Egypt) wherein opposing/alternative discourses challenged and contended with one another against the status quo.

Chapter 4 examines the multiple ‘mediums', or the 'voices', with which the (fragile) institutional status quo is disrupted but also with which the old guard reasserts itself in 2013 through the rebellion, ‘tamarrod’, or ‘second revolution’ led and orchestrated by El-Sisi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). These mediums were oral but also embodied and intertextually related, synchronically within the space-time of the 18 Days of Tahrir but also diachronically, over a larger expanse of the history and Tahrir Square, Egypt, and prior
revolutions. There is a ‘multimodal resonance’ (Sicoli, forthcoming) to these channels as well as the voiced and embodied performances that communicated the revolution.

Chapter 5 describes **engroupment** as one of the processes by which voices became identities, and specifically identities that formed part of a meta-systemic (protest) 'group' with the power and force to (non-violently) resist and bring down the Mubarak.

And in chapter 6 I offer reflections and final thoughts but also describe the beginnings of my post-dissertation work on a computer model that simulates what I am calling the relative conversion efficiencies of five types of communicative channels I identify as the main instruments of messing in Tahrir Square. These channels were used to initiate newcomers and coordinate protest and, ultimately gave rise to the revolutionary formation. I take up the question of future, experimental directions for modeling and interpreting the interworking of revolutionary uprisings.

This dissertation sets forth an analysis of multimodal interaction and distributed cognition in the Egyptian iteration of the Arab Uprisings of 2011 and examines certain elements of the counter-revolution as well as post-revolutionary Egypt. The focus throughout is on the orienting question of: how the idiom(s), or voices, and epistemologies, or identities, of ‘revolution’ were distributed and preserved from person to person and grouping to grouping via processes I call ‘engroupment’.

**1.4 Toward a Multimodal Anthropology of Revolution**

In the literature on the anthropology of revolution, revolutions are understood as multifaceted processes involving social interactions between hundreds of thousands and even millions of individuals who are negotiating and re-negotiating, making decisions using speech, gesture, eye
gaze, posture, and other coordinated bodily and contextual channels in synchronized
performances that constitute co-presence, joint commitment (Clark 1996), and, I argue, the
forming of groups (Taylor and Moghaddam 1987). It is possible to discuss a revolution at a
gestalt level, i.e. the whole ‘revolution’, as is quite often the case in political science (e.g. Hunt
1984; Gordon 1992; Davis 2013); but without accounting for the many constituent individuals
and the polycentricity of that presumed ‘whole’ wherein many interactants and shifting
engroupments thereof are performing in relation to one another in space and time, we lose a
deeper sense of the human, biological systematicity of the ‘form of a revolutionary social
movement’.

This research illustrates, among other things, how identities are co-produced in relation to
others but also in relation to environments that serve as communicative and historical settings, or
what some have called “ecologies” (Erickson 1977, Silverstein 1996a, Altheide 1994, Sicoli
2007, Miller 2007). Aboelezz’s (2014) paper on Tahrir Square as a semiotic space of symbolic
interaction, drawing on Blythe’s (2006) ‘symbolic objects’ and the idea of metaphor
argumentation, is an important start to this process of re-interpreting the events of the Arab
Spring from an interactional sociolinguistic and semiotic anthropological perspective (Mertz
2007, Duranti 2003). It makes sense to, as Talal Assad did once for Islam (2009), call for a
specific framing within anthropology of revolution as an important social phenomenon. To
understand the Arab Spring revolutionary movements requires an expansion of Thomassen’s
foundational work on the ‘anthropology of revolution’—which I will describe in chapter 2—to
include semiotics. The power of symbols, signs, indexes, and the people who interpret those
representamens must be accounted for.
This research undertakes to ‘zoom into’ the tessellated form of revolutionary processes to reveal and describe some of the many complex and shifting roles of the individual human beings and collectivities who took part in creating and re-creating a movement day in and day out during the 18 Days of Tahrir revolution. I will illustrate that revolutions may be better understood not as singular ‘events’ but rather as multiple series of simultaneous interactions re- and co-occurring over time in specific locations; they are chronological, fractal, situated and recursive communicative ecologies where language is multimodal and identities are shaped and reshaped to create and sustain the whole.

1.5 Mediating the Revolution

Orientalist Mediation of the Arab Spring

Amar and Prashad (2013), as I do, reject the perspective that the Egyptian revolution was more reactive than proactive. The premise of such claims is Orientalist in providence. The perspective holds that ‘Arab protestors’ are exceptional from those of other ethnic or genetic backgrounds. They are lesser, “mindless”, and incapable of noble purpose or coherent action. A 2012 article for The Middlebury Campus in response to a video of the violent September 11, 2012 attack of the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, articulates this view:

Reactionary. Obscene. Stupid. These terms apply to both the YouTube video that has sparked protests across the Arab world and the mindless retaliations themselves… Easily accessible and in Arabic, the video is a more direct and outrageous insult. It also ties in nicely with the Arab spring. Violence often takes place in those countries where young men have successfully conducted revolutions — countries where organized, pseudo-democratic institutions are still only embryonic. At first glance, this violence seems to suggest that it was a mistake to openly support violent youths and religious fanatics who wanted to overthrow faulty but stable governments.
The author characterizes the attackers as “young men” who, he imagines, went directly from leading revolutionary marches and protests in the name of liberalism, civil rights, social justice, and democracy to illiberal, irrational, armed mobs. The description suggests that these “violent youth” were and always would be “religious fanatics” who should never have gained the West’s trust. For George, the idea that these violent young men were ever part of a democratizing revolution was mistaken. The revolutionaries of the Arab Spring showed their true colors in Benghazi when they took up arms against a U.S. embassy. The support they enjoyed as revolutionaries gave them carte blanche to return to their innately belligerent, savage ways shortly thereafter: “The truth… is that this violence is a tragic but timeless side-effect of revolution. One does not give thousands of young men who happen to own guns and enjoy killing people the aspirations of an entire nation and then expect to be able to take this power away overnight.”

George’s view of the Arab Spring revolutionaries as wolves in sheep’s clothing is not unique. Despite the eventual finding that the attack in Benghazi was organized and carried out by members of multiple terrorist organizations, including local branches of Al-Qaeda, and various operatives who had no involvement in Arab Spring protest movements, many held onto the belief that the popular uprisings were “Islamist” ploys and not true revolutions. Totten’s 2012 article for
World Affairs exemplifies this type of Orientalist writing that demonizes Arab youth, particularly, males, and advances a Eurocentric definition of both revolution and democratization:

Most Tunisian women in the cities eschew the headscarf and dress like Europeans. Alcohol is widely available and consumed more by locals than tourists. The economy is almost as advanced as those of southern Europe, and large parts of the cities actually look like southern Europe. The Mediterranean is a recognizable place despite the civilizational boundary that separates its northern and southern shores. Tunis, on the coast, has more in common with Provence than with its own Saharan interior. And its vineyards produce wine that is almost as fine.

For Totten, Tunisians’ successes with democratization are directly proportional to their abandoning of the author’s stereotypical understanding of traditional Muslim and Arab lifeways and their concomitant adoption of European ones. His “civilizational boundary” is a pernicious fiction that excludes Arabs and Muslims from the capacity for civilized society, or even the struggle for democracy. Tunisia, he muses, is the closest to Europe and therefore the most able to grasp democracy, but it is still only “almost as fine” despite their best efforts to thwart the shackles of Islam (“eschew the headscarf”, “dress like Europeans”, and consume alcohol).

Egypt, for Totten, farther still from Europe than Tunisian society, could not have staged a successful revolution. The Egyptian revolution, he asserts, was a violent act by a violent people in keeping with their violent nature: “The revolution against Mubarak was hardly a revolution at all. It was a military coup d’etat against the palace. Though it had the support of the people,
that’s still what it was.” Using Tunisia as a dipstick for development and democracy, Totten describes Egypt in the following terms:

Egypt is, in so many ways, the anti-Tunisia. Almost every woman who goes out in public wears a headscarf. I see more men in just one single day with bruised foreheads—acquired by hitting their heads on the floor during prayer—than I have seen in all other Muslim-majority countries combined in almost a decade. The country is, as far as I can tell, the most Islamicized place in the world after Saudi Arabia. It used to be oriented more toward the Mediterranean, as Tunisia still is, but that was more than a half century ago. Cairo was once a must-see city like Paris and Rome and Vienna, but today it’s a crowded, polluted, and grinding third-world megacity animated by reactionary and authoritarian politics. Its liberal epoch is over.

Declaring Egypt’s capacity for liberalism, a shibboleth for democracy and civilized society, “over” and a thing of the past that was only ever attained in the Classical period, Totten sees Egypt as a Muslim ghetto. “Islamization” is, to him, a process toward complete dystopia. The choices an Egyptian woman makes with respect to her garb defines Egypt as either westerly-oriented, and therefore on the right path, or easterly, and therefore languishing.

Amar and Prashad’s collection of essays on the Arab Spring advance the present argument that the revolutionary movements were anti-authoritarian and pro-liberal democracy and human rights, but distinguishable from the preceding decades of unceasing protests in form, rather than content. It is a myth that only in 2010 did Arabs begin resisting their tyrannical governors and seek democratic governance in their stead. What did change in 2010 in Tunisia
and 2011 in Egypt, followed by a slew of other Arab states, was the strategy of protest. The revolutionary interval was transformed by the introduction of the novel tactic of *engroupment*.

Bady (2012) examines the mediating role of Western media’s coverage of the Arab Spring. An Arab politics expert I interviewed on the role of the media in the Egyptian revolution, redirected a question I posed about the revolutionaries’ performances when they knew they were being watched to one of Western media’s narratology about the events:

> ...how did the media, in anticipating a tectonic shift in Egyptian politics, adjust their reporting, their commentary, their framing, etc. to portray an historic moment and (perhaps) lead the public in one direction or another? This may not have been “revolutionary”… but simply more of a matter of jumping on a bandwagon, or knowing that the occasion was so large, so historic, so game-changing, that a narrative was crafted that communicated that, which in [a] cyclical nature, grew that precise feeling among the public.

The media told a story about a series of interconnected democratizing revolutions similar to those of the former Soviet satellite states in 1989. The impact of this was to create an expectation that a set of specific events had to follow for the Arab revolutions to be deemed successful. The Arab states would need to abandon their current forms of government and overthrow the specific potentates in each; democratic regimes would replace each of the authoritarian ones; and, Western Euro-American values and cultures would bloom out of the outmoded Islamic and Arab dirt that the people had been mired in for generations. The narrative identified Islam and Arab culture as parts of the despotism that oppressed Arab societies prior to 2011. Liberation, then, in
these contexts, was understood and spoken about as if it were synonymous with no longer being Muslim or Arab and instead becoming some new identity that fit under familiar Euro-American categories. When the revolutions and the revolutionaries inevitably failed to fit into these preconceived categories of liberation, according to this worldview, *the revolution* - *the Arab Spring* - itself had failed. The few remaining Arab liberals, according to the narrative, fled to the West to rebuild themselves and the Arab region from the ashes of what was left.

**Liberal Mediation of the Arab Spring**

A 2014 article in *Politico* asks “What happened to Arab liberalism?” It bemoans the falling out of the “audacious ideas and Twitter accounts” that underlaid the “first voices of protest” that were drowned out by, for the author, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and reemergence of incumbent regimes. Dickinson, the author, explains that those liberal voices had no spokesperson left and that “those ideals have languished”; Tahrir Square’s “ringleaders are more likely to be found in Manhattan.” Arab liberals, “dozens” of them only, are scattered “across the globe”. She celebrates the work of Ahmed Benchemsi, a Moroccan who runs the news site, *Free Arabs*, designed as a forum for “post-Arab Spring conversation.” Dickinson does not question the post-ness of the Arab Spring. It is a foregone conclusion that the revolutionary movements had failed. Against this backdrop, it becomes reasonable to then seek out and write about the few survivors
working on reigniting a revolutionary flame. She portrays the revolutionary spirit as a positively microcosmic phenomenon, or something of an endangered species. About Tunisian revolutionaries, she gives the impression that of the hundreds of thousands who participated in the 2010-2011 movement, that there are now “about 300 in total, scattered across the country and abroad… 10 or 20 were the most influential… ‘Everyone knew everyone. We were all friends.’” What happened to the hundreds of thousands, even millions, of Tunisians and Egyptians, let alone Arabs of other countries that experiences uprisings?

The disappearing and discounting of the Arab revolutionaries includes posthumously relabeling them not only “youth,” but also “liberals”. The protesters and activists I spoke to during my ethnographic work and in interviews for my research referred to themselves as “revolutionaries.” They did not assent to being called x- or former-revolutionaries. They were revolutionaries in the present and future tense. This personal truth, however, is denied them by non-Arab and Arab writers alike. Iranian born, Wall Street Journal editorial page writer, Sohrab Ahmari’s “The Failure of Arab Liberals,” from 2012, for Commentary Magazine, seems to criticize the halfhearted laments of Western analysts grieving over the “illiberal fruit of the Arab Spring,” while he himself also concedes that “Developments on the ground since the heady first days of the Arab Spring have indeed been dismaying.” If the first days were “heady,” it follows
that the rest of the days were somewhat mindless. He speaks of “omens” of the impending and inevitable failure of the Arab Spring. Among them was the appearance of Islamist activists with “Salafi-style beards and stern expressions” as opposed to the “smartphone-wielding young dissidents in Western outfits.” He contrasts the presence of Muslim scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Tahrir after Mubarak’s resignation with Wael Ghonim, the Google executive who “came to embody the revolution for Western audiences” during the 18 days. Ahmari too believes the revolution failed, but he blames it on the “region’s self-proclaimed liberals and democrats” who articulated an “Arab liberalism that is inchoate and incoherent and that betrays liberal first principles in the name of political expediency and opportunity.” Ahmari’s diatribe depicts the Arab liberal as a monolith - he constructs a familiar strawman whose downfall is his own scheming and traitorous nature. The Arabs need a savior, Ahmari argues, and that savior is America:

If there is any hope for reversing the Arab Spring’s current trajectory toward more stagnation, obscurantism, and demagoguery, these weaknesses must be systematically confronted and their root causes addressed—tasks that only engaged, combative, and even heavy-handed U.S. leadership in the region can help achieve.

Ahmari blames the would-be revolutionaries’ failure on their inability to properly understand or “appreciate liberalism as a complex, philosophical commitment to popular dignity and individual rights… If beneath the rage on the streets the Arab Spring contained a liberal
kernel, it was very much a liberalism of sentiments.” Ahmari’s article reads as a pathology of the mind of the Arab liberal and is reducible to this: Arabs wanted to be liberal, but theirs was emotional and not rational or intellectual enough and so it was doomed to fail. Ahmari singles out Mona Eltahawy, an Egyptian journalist, saying she failed her compatriots by criticizing the Americans who loudly celebrated on the streets when bin Laden was pronounced dead by President Obama in 2011. Arab liberals failed again when they did not see fit to stop the outpouring of criticism of Israel after Mubarak resigned - something that was repressed under him. For Ahmari, “No issue… tests Arab liberals’ commitment to liberal first principles more than Israel’s right to exist and live in security in its neighborhood.” Criticism of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians and its economic advantages in Egyptian trade deals is described by Ahmari as “anti-Semitism [exploding] out of post-Mubarak Egypt.” Arab liberals should, Ahmari asserts, intuitively agree that “Israel remains the region’s only genuine liberal state and a model for what a Mideast democracy should look like.” Without attempting to interview Arabs who participated in the 2011 revolutions, Ahmari has at once prescribed an unrelenting criteria for liberal legitimacy and written off “Arab liberals” as congenital failures. In this way, Ahmari parallels a 2016 article in the Hebrew-language paper, Mida, entitled “Arab liberals had no chance”. It argued that illiberalism runs so deeply in Arab society that even Islamic reformers seeking to
make change from within had faced rejectionism and violent repression from the religion’s very first reformers. Mazel regards the project of liberalizing Arab societies to be a “Sisyphean task” because it requires displacing Islam:

According to Islam, the concept of individual freedom contradicts the concept of the sultan, who is unlimited and whose powers are based on sharia, the divine law. . . . Today, it’s clear to [reformers] that religion will need to be separated from the state to implement democracy and its values, but only a few will say this out loud, as it is an attack on the foundations of Islam.

Of course, there is no such teaching in Islam about “the concept of a sultan” or the idea that democracy is antithetical to the faith. In Islam-expert Tariq Ramadan’s (2012) book on the Arab Spring, Ramadan expresses an appropriate uncertainty about the future of the revolutions and their relationships, if any, with traditional or novel forms of political Islam. Mazel, on the other hand, offers a facile, Islamophobic exposition, like its more subtle correlates in Hamid (2011, 2014), and others (Hassan 2015). Islamophobic writings like this, which hold little more intellectual water than an average diary entry might, are treated as argumentation and published because they use the language of theory and political science, but also because of their flair for the sensational. Mazel’s, Hamid’s, and Hassan’s, among others, are, however, little more than part of an Orientalism 2.0; a contemporary version of anti-Islam bigotry and anti-Arab racism
combined and applied, in this case, to the Arab Spring and all Arab revolutionaries from December 17, 2010 onward.

Hassan (2015), a journalist who covered the Egyptian revolution, wrote book, Media, Revolution and Politics in Egypt: The Story of an Uprising, in which he operationalizes the concept of a global jihad being waged by the Muslim Brotherhood (2015:40, 159, 162). Described as a “liberally minded writer” in the forward (2015:i), Hassan’s book is meant to demonstrate, among other things, that Egyptians preferred the “hard smack of control by army officers” rather than withstand the “soft jihadism of the Muslim Brotherhood” embodied by the presidency of Muhammad Morsi (2015:x). This anti-Arab essentialism is part of what Edward Said described as the Orientalist myth of “Oriental despotism,” or the natural state in which Arabs unquestioningly live under authoritarian (1978:296), despotic dictatorship (1978:102, 203).

The theme of Arabs’ inability to forge their own path to democracy was central in Western media portrayals of the Arab Spring in Egypt and other states. As early as October of 2011, Shadi Hamid, of The Brookings Doha Center, wrote “What Obama and American liberals don’t understand about the Arab Spring,” in which he explains that without American interference there would be no revolution and no democratic outcome. He quotes the self-
proclaimed liberal Egyptian activist, Hisham Kassem, as saying, “Eighty percent of political freedom in this country is the result of U.S. pressure.” Beyond studies that show interest in the U.S. position on the Arab Spring uprisings (Pollack 2011), Hamid credits George W. Bush’s Arab democratization policies, that were widely criticized at the time, for creating advances in political rights across the region. What American liberals need to understand, Hamid suggests, is that the Arab Spring was really the American Spring - a time of Western operations that pushed for democratic reforms in Arab states. Hamid’s article illustrates another form of the media’s erasure of Arab agency in the Arab Spring.

Hamid’s 2014 article for *The Atlantic*, “The Future of Democracy in the Middle East: Islamist and Illiberal” he reaffirms his position from the above-mentioned 2011 piece. In summary, he explains why the Arabs cannot democratize without Western intervention. He borrows the idea of waves of democratization. In this framework, developed by the noted Orientalist Samuel Huntington, Arabs missed both the first and second waves of democratization in world history. Huntington argues that what held the Arabs back was their culture and especially their religion, Islam. Hamid uses Huntington’s theory that civilizations democratize in waves to argue that the Arab Spring revolutions should be regarded as the “third wave” of democratization but that it will be a failed wave because these “third-wave democracies have
begun democratization backwards.” He cites Fareed Zakaria’s 2003 book, *The Future of Freedom*, which describes the phenomenon of “illiberal democracies,” to explain that Arabs may end up gaining procedural democracies through the uprisings, but that without “constitutional liberalism,” they will not achieve true freedom. The freedoms Arab liberals sought through the revolutions, Hamid argues, such as “free and fair elections but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property,” have “nothing intrinsically to do with democracy.” He quotes all the same people from his 2011 article and concludes that as long as Arabs are inextricably Muslim - an idea he calls “mildly frightening” - democratization would lead either to “a new conservative consensus or at an exclusionary politics that has little space for liberal dissent.” Others have also described the Arab Spring in terms of Huntington’s waves of democratization framework. Like Hamid, Howard and Hussain (2013), conclude that the Arabs missed the third wave and therefore examine the possibility of a “fourth wave”.

The Egyptian revolutionaries I talked to scorned the term “liberal” as a label that was meant to de-Arabize the movement and the individuals and groups involved in it. For many who deploy the term, liberals cannot be of Arab stock and so an “Arab liberal” is an oxymoron that reads as code for Western agent or co-conspirator (Hassan 2015). In Egyptian media, the early
analyses of the growing protest movement in Tahrir Square portrayed the activists as foreigners, fluent in English and trained in social media technologies, who were fed slogans to repeat in Egyptian Arabic and done up in Egyptian clothes who dyed their hair and skin in a mass effort to hoodwink and undermine the country. This conspiracy theory also advances the assumption that the revolution and its success or failure is judged by its impact on the macrocosmic level of the state. If the form of government and the political figures remain or reconstitute, then the movement was a failure.

Peter Hessler’s 2017 Letter from Cairo, “Egypt’s Failed Revolution” is written from a structural level too. “Revolutions are often started by the bold,” Hessler comments, “and then coöpted by those who are quiet and careful,” speaking about El-Sisi’s 2013 coup. For Hessler, the revolution was a series of events whereby Mubarak was ousted by the Muslim Brotherhood that was then dethroned by SCAF and El-Sisi. What made the Brotherhood’s Morsi vulnerable was his notorious temporary powers decree in December of 2012. That precipitated the Tamarrod rebellion against him and El-Sisi filled the void. El-Sisi’s fast descent into autocratic despotism is contrasted with his populism. It describes institutional corruption and Islamist terrorists as the scourges of his tenure. Egyptian people are characterized as children: “Citizens engage in politics in unpredictable and irrational ways, as if reacting to sudden spasms of pain.” In an interview
with an activist, Hessler explains, “In a non-state led by a non-politician, Bakr seemed like a kind of non-activist. He had never joined a political organization or issued a statement… His interrogations had been a farce of suspicion, fear, and confusion… he had spent six weeks as a political prisoner, an experience that seemed utterly senseless.” Hessler expresses surprise that Bakr tells him anything that seems coherent.

In Hessler’s piece, the revolution is judged on the basis of a rubric that does not reflect the experiences and voices of individuals who identify as revolutionaries who were in Tahrir during the 18 days; the criteria of changes on the level of state governance also obfuscate contributions by and developments in the lives of activists who worked for reform before the revolution and those who continue to do so in the period following the 18 days. For Hessler, the revolution “failed” because the government that came after it was still autocratic and illiberal, and no reporting of the experiences of revolution on an individual level was carried out, nor, for him, was such investigating needed, to substantiate this large claim about the movement.

**Alternative Mediation of the Arab Spring**

In contrast to the Orientalist and liberal critiques of the Arab Spring, Adel Iskander’s (2013) *Egypt in Flux*, a collection of essays, gathers voices from Egypt and analysts of the revolution to explore the ongoing tug of war between pro-revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. My
contacts in Egypt, as well as those who are expats in the United States, argue that the revolution never ended. Like Iskander’s book, and others who interviewed Egyptians to collect alternative historical accounts (Seigneurie 2012; Momani and Mohamed 2016), the historical and historiographical perspectives of my contacts were open-ended. The revolution was not only about affecting change at the macro-level of governance, but if it was, the participants in the interviews I conducted explain, “Mubarak is out. We succeeded, but our work isn’t over. It’s just beginning, really.” In other words, Egyptian activists did not regard the toppling of Mubarak as the apotheosis of the revolution. Rather, his resignation was a critical inflection point in an ongoing trajectory, or what Sakr (2013:75) calls a “groundswell”. The revolution was not, then, a single event. Mubarak’s leaving office was part of a much larger movement that is best detected and observed at the individual level from multiple vantage points, and not yet at the structural level of state or governmental power. Van De Sande (2013) highlights the pattern of studies that focus on the structural outcomes of the revolution. These “defeatist discourses” seem to only understand changes in governmental power as possible outcomes. This view relegates success to the formal organizations that take on institutional authority; it discounts the interpersonal outcomes and individual successes experienced by revolutionaries. The revolution was also, and continues to be, a subjective experience undergone in the daily lives of the Egyptians who
identify with it. In this respect, it is an infinite series of micro-events with no specific end in
sight. As my contacts argue in chapter 5, “today, even the way someone says ‘hi’ can tell you if
they’re revolutionaries or not.”

State Mediation of the Egyptian Revolution

Iskander and Haddad’s 2013 volume, *Mediating the Arab Uprisings*, provides an exhaustive
account of the interplay between Egyptian private and state media coverage of the revolution
during and after the 18 days. In Iskander’s overview of how the revolution was mediated, he
notes the manifold ways the military, after having taken interim control of the governmenting
after Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011, sought to control and censure the privately-
owned media outlets (Iskander and Haddad 2013:81):

By calling in to producers of shows to inquire about the day’s line up,
interfering in the way stories are told, and calling during broadcasts and
demanding to be put on air, they are able to send a clear message to the
private stations—that they are being monitored closely. Through a sinister
combination of compulsion and coercion, the military has both effectively
infiltrated most private networks, and has an array of options to ensure
compliance from station owners, staff, and media personalities.

Iskander also created a timeline that painstakingly details incidents of military overreach in both
government matters and attempts to regulate both private and state media (2013:85-118). One
such example is SCAF’s unilateral move on October 4, 2011 of appointing a military censor over
the whole of the Egyptian press (Iskander and Haddad 2013:91). The next day several prominent newspapers published blank columns in protest.

On a mezzo-scale, between micro and macro, a 2014 London School of Economics report on the Egyptian media suggests a perpetual cycle of inter-dependence between the elites in state-controlled media, privately-owned media, and the state:

The alliance between the Egyptian media elite and the regime is as organic as it is fundamental for the survival of the two parties... The leading media stars, mainly from the private sector, are bound to the regime by a complex system of clientelism, making them one of its most efficient components. The uprising did not lead to questioning this established identity of the journalist as guardian of the regime. On the contrary, the complexity of the political transition with its extraordinary developments consolidated this perception.

State media, el Issawi argues, require the approbation of the state to continue to function, while privately-owned media were largely founded by businessmen with direct ties to political elites. They are unwilling to jeopardize their relationships with the political powers that be and they play an active role in censoring the publications they own.

In Abouelnaga’s (2016) analysis, the revolution witnessed unprecedented displays of public dissent that complicated the homogeneity portrayed by state-run media of Egypt and Egyptians since the 1952 Free Officers’ Movement, which is also described as a revolution. Abouelnaga notes the “eruption of identities” that represented and transcended prior notions of “class, ideology, culture, and religion, long suppressed by state control.” Egyptian women played
both prominent leading and mundane roles as participants in the revolution that subverted
governmental-institutional forms of feminism. In the post-revolution period, women have
“discursively and visually,” through verbal and embodied action, recontested conceptions of pre-
revolution gender roles and ideas of womanhood.

Ghobrial and Wilkins (2015) explore how media inform narratives about political
events and describe news discourse approaches to the revolution from several Arab countries,
including Egypt in 2011. Their work emphasizes the constructed nature of the portrayals of the
political protests in the Egyptian uprising.

Iskander and Haddad (2013) convincingly demonstrate that if the protests during the
18 days of Tahrir were about government reform and the toppling of Mubarak’s regime, the year
following Mubarak’s resignation witnessed one protest movement after another dedicated to the
reform of the media, especially state-controlled outlets, and the toppling of SCAF. Appendix 10
illustrates the extent to which protest slogans targeted at SCAF used Field Marshal Tantawi as a
symbol of the council and the government security apparatus. On an individual level, as
Abouelnaga observes, the “eruption of identities” did not stop on February 11, 2011 when
Mubarak conceded defeat. Every year since the revolution began, Egyptians have continued to
form identities in relation to the revolution. These developments, however, are not captured by analyses of statecraft and governmental power alone.

**International Mediation of the Egyptian Revolution**

Cottle (2011) examines how regional media systems and local communication networks participated in shaping the uprisings and mediating the events to onlookers around the world through international news media. Alexander (2011) began speculating as to the potential international repercussions of the Egyptian revolution and the Arab Spring in the same year as the event. Nanabhay and Farmanfarmanian’s study (2011) also examines the internationalization of Tahrir Square and, with it, the Egyptian revolution. They find that the impact of global coverage was to re-energize the protesters on the ground. They describe a shift from a “spectacle” of dissent to, through international coverage, a “media spectacular”. Newsom and Lengel (2012), albeit with a view toward feminist activism among the revolutionaries, also explore the impacts of expanding a movement and its objectives beyond the initial scale of what they term a matter of “local knowledge”.

Alasuutari, Qadir, and Creutz’s 2013 article argues that certain Egyptian media covered the events of the 2011 revolution through the lens of foreign news outlets. Alasuutari et al term this phenomenon “domestication” and examine how British, Finnish, and Pakistani reporting
impacted Egyptian media’s coverage of events in Egypt. The article explores how perceptions of
the revolution and the revolutionaries in Egypt and other Arab countries may have been partially
shaped by external, etic, discourses. Seigneurie (2012) is also interested in local and international
discourses about the revolution that shed light on the ways revolutionaries re-motivated
themselves to perpetuate the movement from one day to the next, and beyond Mubarak’s
resignation.

Alasuutari et al collected data from The Times in Britain, Helsingin Sanomat (HS) in
Finland, and the Daily Times in Pakistan. They describe the social and political factors that make
domestication a systematic epiphenomenon rather than the decision of individual journalists.
Among their findings is the rather emotional nature of the foreign outlets’ coverage of the
Egyptian revolution. In fact, the Pakistani paper produced what the study considered to be the
most “hard news” approach to the events of the three sources. The difference, they propose, is
that The Times and HS sent reporters to Egypt to report the news and sought to convey the
experiential dimension of the revolution to its viewers. Notwithstanding the Pakistani paper’s
more straightforward approach, the news of the Egyptian revolution was politicized in the
country and used to tamp down potential uprisings within Pakistan. This reverse domestication
was of a political nature and was carried out by state actors rather than journalists.
Alasuutari et al’s study begs the question, what of the role of translation in international news media portrayals of the 2011 revolutions? Translation is a critical component of the construction of portrayals of the revolutions and the revolutionaries. Baker (2016) investigates the specific challenges of translating the slogans, chants, and written productions of Egyptian revolutionaries. Baker argues that translation decisions play a mediating role in conveying the voices of dissent from a protest movement.

*Citizen Mediation of the Egyptian Revolution*

Brym et al (2014) compare the online engagement of Egyptian demonstrators and sympathetic onlookers. Using a risk spectrum to evaluate different levels of activism, they challenge the narrative that social media activism alone (Campbell 2011; Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway 2014; Herrera 2014) could qualify someone as a revolutionary. Higher-risk activities need to be central to an individual’s engagement for that person to be considered a revolutionary; online activism, or citizen journalism (Faris 2012; El-Nawawy and Khamis 2013; Sakr 2013), is an important corollary to offline activism, but not a replacement. Sakr (2013:viii, 43, 92) predicts that the next age in Egyptian journalism will be one of “participatory cross-media networks.”

Chapter 2 explores how Tahrir Square became a transformative space for Egyptians forming revolutionary identities with revolutionary voices. Tahrir itself was redefined in the
context of the protest movement and played a direct role in mediating the revolution both for those promoting the toppling of the regime, and those seeking to protect it.

1.6 Methodology

My research in Egypt began in 2005. I traveled to Cairo on a scholarship from Kuwait to study at Arabic. As a sociology major, I knew I wanted to do my undergraduate thesis on how Arabic-speakers learning English perceived their identities when navigating the borders of these two languages. I had conducted several interviews with ESL students on campus at Seattle University and came to Egypt with a set of questions about identity formation, intersubjective reality, and linguistic relativism. My entree was going to be with Central Asian and East African students enrolled in Azhari programs for non-natives learning Arabic for higher Islamic studies. I would explore the other side of the English-Arabic cross-linguistic experience I hoped to describe in my thesis. I’d also be connected to several American friends of friends who spoke English and were studying Arabic in intensive summer programs.

Upon my arrival in Cairo, however, I realized that my research would take me in a different direction. An American friend, Lina, picked me up from the airport in a taxi and spent the 45 minute ride to her houseboat on the Nile explaining what was happening in Egyptian politics. I knew about the impending election; Hosni Mubarak was running in the first-ever
contested presidential election. The vote was two weeks away, scheduled for September 7th.

Lina laughed when I asked her who she thought would win. She repeated my question to the taxi driver in Arabic as if it were a very funny joke. Indeed, the driver laughed loud and hard. Lina explained that no Egyptians she’d encountered took the election seriously. Everyone knew the outcome would be Hosni Mubarak beating the Tomorrow Party’s Ayman Nour by a landslide. Everyone also knew that they weren't going to bother voting. The driver scoffed at the prospect of wasting his time showing up at a rigged balloting station. Later on, days before the election, my same questions would elicit a similar response from teachers and administrators in the Arabic program I enrolled in.

On September 10th, then-president, George W. Bush’s congratulatory statement to Mubarak was aired on Egyptian state news over and over again. The only American in my program, I was already being referred to as “al-’Amrīkī” (‘the American’) and Bush’s undue words of praise only added scorn to what was initially meant as a lighthearted nickname. I was frequently asked if I believed that Mubarak had actually won a fair election - it was a rhetorical question. “No,” I’d explain. “I don’t believe that.” But my answer was superfluous. In a place where my identity was cobbled together on the spot based upon a handful of readily-perceptible

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indicators, I was, to many, a Muslim with an Arab background whose master identity was American. Whether that configuration was due to my self-presentation or others’ need for someone who could personify U.S. foreign policy, is unclear to me but my suspicion is that a lot of the latter was at play. Nothing I could say about my liberal leaning and total anti-Bush politics weighed heavily in how I was regarded by most in the first several days after Mubarak’s election. I came to know what it felt like to not only be on the other side of a language barrier, but also what it was like to be reduced to an American stereotype, and that too was a new experience.

Growing up in the United States, I was accustomed to being stereotyped as a Mexican or as an Arab, or a Muslim. All of my identifiers carried negative associations among most Americans, so I learned to combat the stereotypes by telling my story of growing up in a mixed household. I negotiated my identity on a daily basis in the U.S. From deciding what language to order my food in at the cafeteria to how short to shave my facial hair in the morning. Every decision was meaningful - every word I chose projected something to those around me about which stereotypes I fell into.

I didn’t expect to experience something similar in Egypt. I didn’t know what to expect at all, really. But I quickly realized that I would be subjected to similar classifications in this society too. I decided that I would do all I could to fit in - to hide. I didn’t want to be noticed as different.
I wanted to know what it felt like to not stand out on the basis of anything surface level or incidental about me. I wanted people to feel they had to talk to me if they wanted to know me. So I worked on refining my colloquial Egyptian Arabic. I changed my gait, my style of dress, and my haircut. Within about 12 weeks, I noted in my journal, people stopped noticing me. If I made a reference to my life in the U.S., that would increasingly bring on looks of surprise and follow-up questions about my nationality. Before long, I felt I had blended in. That feeling was reassuring in some senses, but off-putting in others. I spent a lot of time reading, re-reading, and taking notes on Lila Abu-Lughod’s anthropological masterpiece, *Veiled Sentiments* (1986), in which Abu-Lughod describes her multi-year ethnographic research with the Awlad ‘Ali tribe in northwestern Egypt.

I soon realized that I wasn’t happy with people thinking I was Egyptian - believing me to be someone I wasn’t. That, in fact, was the essence of what I had felt in the U.S. People thought they knew me before speaking to me because of the way I look, my name, or religious identity as a Muslim post-9/11. In Egypt, I found myself pulling my blue American passport out of my bag at times to convince the person I was speaking to that I was from the United States. The truth was more complicated because I was born in Mexico, but I usually held off on sharing that part of my identity. I came to realize that I sought the in-between spaces. I grew up there - between
Latino and Arab, between Mexican and American, and American and Lebanese, Catholic and Muslim; I was multi-cultural and multi-lingual, but the “multi” part was not divisible. That was my culture and my language. All of those things in the particular elixir I grew up in. I was a product of that mixed ecosystem, but, as a native of that space, I didn’t experience it as mixed. I experienced it as a unicity. It was my home and my normal.

It took me traveling to Egypt by myself, living alone, and being in near complete isolation from anyone who was like me in terms of Americanness, Mexicanness, Lebaneseness, or even my Muslimness, let alone my mixedness, for me to realize what seem to me now to be the simple facts about myself. My interactions and participation, my many conversations and the hundreds of pages of observations I wrote down in my notebooks, all contributed to my growing curiosity in the development of identity and the heterogeneity of one’s voice and the codes a person speaks in and through.

After writing my undergraduate thesis in the effects on self-perception and presentation in the code switching and mixing of native Arabic speakers studying English in Seattle, I spent the next ten years studying the formation of political identities. My ethnographic studies took me to Egypt, Spain, Morocco, Princeton and Patterson, New Jersey, Syria, Palestine, Switzerland, France, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Washington, D.C. and back to Egypt virtually during and after
the Arab Spring. In all these places, I engaged in participant observation and conducted interviews on language, identity, and, increasingly, politics. As I became more and more interested in how perceptions of one’s government and one’s legal and societal freedoms and constraints factored into a person’s self-perception and intersubjective presentation, I asked deeper questions about the politics of my surroundings in each place. In Granada, Spain, I interviewed non-Arab and Arab Spaniards as well as Arab migrant workers from Syria, Lebanon, Morocco, and Egypt about anti-Arab sentiment, Spanish immigration policies, and Islamophobia. In Algeria in 2009 I asked about the already-aging and frail president Bouteflika, the declining role of the generals, the social standing of mujāhidīn (people who fought the French in the war of independence), and political Islam. During the Arab Spring, I interviewed my Algerian and Lebanese contacts by Skype, phone, and in-person about their perceptions of the revolutions in Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. I asked them why they thought their countrymen and women weren’t staging mass protests. I wrote about and transcribed these interviews in my master’s thesis in Arab Studies at Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies.

The methodology for this research can only fully be understood in relation to the work I began as an undergraduate thirteen years ago and wrote theses about in 2007 and 2013. Over this span, I interviewed nearly 150 people. My interviews could not always be recorded in real-time.
due to the sensitivity of certain topics and the comfort of participants. When I could not audio or video record, I wrote down my notes quickly after the sessions. My audio recordings outnumber my video recordings because of many people’s fears about having their images captured.

The background, discussion, and reflection sections of this research - primarily in chapters 1, 2, and 6, were informed by my ethnographic work and interviews. The case studies I take up in chapters 3, 4, and 5 predominantly rely on publicly-available data, mainly from social media platforms, namely Twitter and YouTube. Twitter data consist of text and, occasionally, still images. YouTube data are in the form of audio-visual recordings. I include insights from in-person, original interviews with 2011 revolutionaries in chapter 5.

In chapter 3, I introduce basic statistical methods to demonstrate the significance of the rise of the use of Egyptian Colloquial Arabic (ECA) in ratio to Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) in conventionally MSA domains in Egyptian media following the start of the January 25 revolution in Egypt.

For chapters 3 and 4, I used online data because, even if I could travel to Egypt, I had no direct access to Muhammad Morsí, Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, and Gamal Abdel-Nasser, all public political figures, one of whom, Abdel Nasser, had passed away in 1970, and the rest of whom were beyond the reach of any of the circles of friends and communities I had contacts in.
For chapter 5, I relied on public-access data because a) I could not obtain Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, despite seventeen some attempts and many unanswered e-mails over three years, and b) the data was readily available and in abundance due to the highly publicized and exhaustively covered nature of the events of the Egyptian Arab Spring uprising in January and February of 2011. As an adviser asked me once, “why re-invent the wheel of data if there’s already a ton of it online for free that you can analyze?” Indeed, the “wheel of data” was rich, but I would have preferred to be in Cairo during the first phase of the revolutionary interval and in the years after the 18 days of Tahrir. If I could have gone, I would have. Barring that possibility, I made contact with revolutionaries I read about online and interviewed them remotely over Skype, Facebook, and e-mail.

In chapter 6, to better understand the relative efficiencies of the different forms, or channels, of communication used to initiate people into protest groups and coordinate mass demonstrations around a set of shared goals, I used experimental sociolinguistic methods. Specifically, I worked with a computer scientist in Seattle to develop a computerized model of the 18 days of Tahrir.

To protect the identities of my interviewees, all personal details, including their names, have been altered throughout this research. All original files that contain my interviews have
been re-labeled with alphanumeric codes in place of names and other potentially identifying information. All interviews were conducted voluntarily by the participants with their full knowledge of the purposes and of the present study and of their rights and protections.
"Words are the great device for fetching speaker and hearer into the same focus of attention and into the same interpretation schema that applies to what is thus attended. But that words are the best means to this end does not mean that words are the only one or that the resulting social organization is intrinsically verbal in character."\textsuperscript{29}

**Key Concept:** In Arabic sociolinguistics, both Bassiouney and Suleiman have argued that “[s]peaking is associated [with] action,” and, for Suleiman, “in the Arabic grammatical tradition, speaking is also action.”\textsuperscript{30} Bassiouney refers to the Egyptian poet Jugh as a “protestor/poet” for taking a stance in opposition to Arabic media attacks against the identity of the Tahrir Square protestors. Similarly, Butler posits that “speech acts politically,” and speech acts are bodily acts with a performative force (Butler 2002:141). I trace relevant works in sociolinguistics and anthropology to argue for a multimodal framework for the analysis of revolutionary voices and identities.

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\textsuperscript{29} Goffman (1981:71).


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**Figure 2.1:** A Map of Tahrir Square During the 18 days in 2011. It is labeled much like a tourist site would be in a travel brochure; it conspicuously includes “tanks”, “campsite”, “wall of martyrs”, and multiple clinics. It calls into question how to define the space of Tahrir square during and after the revolution that occurred there. *Credit: Google Maps.*
2.1 Codes and Power

Revolutionary voices and identities in what Agar would call a “discourse ecology”, are both time-situated and spatial (Agar 1985:156). As Bassiouney put it in a 2013 article on the Arab Spring in Egypt, "[a]t times of political upheavals, language is of course always employed to leave the utmost effect possible on the masses" (2013:1). She explains that "codes are also drawn against each other, both carrying their own indexes; and at a time of conflict over political hegemony, there is a linguistic power struggle over who has access to the powerful code" (Bassiouney 2013:1). Like Colla in the “Poetry of Revolt”, Bassiouney argues that, “literally, by speaking up, Egyptians have already taken action” (2012:122).

This chapter sets out the “theory-scape” needed to describe the internal workings of protest groups as they coordinate to maintain their immediate coherence as a unit in a protest formation vis-a-vis a peripheral coherence as part of a larger whole: the revolutionary formation. Specifically, I take up the ways of knowing, the ways of communicating that knowing, how those ways are routinized into a ‘culture’ that links individuals and groups of individuals together for a common purpose, and the space(s) in which these combinations, or aggregations, of people
emerge within a certain interval of time. To do this, I discuss ‘space’ or ‘ecology’ of interaction, followed by a comportment with and application of distributed cognition (Hutchins 1995; Hoorn 2005; Hardy-Vallée and Payette 2009; Ludwig and Kirk 2015). I address multimodality, the production of ‘culture’ with respect to meta-system formation, and active reception as a key aspect of horizontal leadership, or heterarchy, that I argue brings together the three scales of small formations, emergent aggregations, and polycentric events.

Note that each chapter also includes a review of literature to situate the immediate application. Methodology is also broken down by chapter as each analysis takes a somewhat unique approach, albeit taken from the overarching framework of multimodal interaction analysis (MMI).

2.2 Defining Space and Place

In a paper on the ‘semantics of space’, de Certeau (1984) identifies several pioneers in re-imagining ‘territory’ as an active part of human social interactions rather than as an inert, inconsequential backdrop. Lyons (1977), he explains, introduced the idea of locative subjects and spatial expressions; Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) contributed the idea of localization to describe meaning in recursive interactions. Labov (1973, 1975), of course, richly described the places of his research, arguing that behaviors are partly organized by and within territories. Schegloff (1972) was interested in ‘indices of localization’ that help identify where and when interactions took place. De Certeau then begins his contribution to the literature with a discussion of ‘enunciative focalization’ (1984: 117), or the ‘indication of the body’ within discourses. De Certeau was interested in how human beings interact in different locations and the ways in which human beings experience a location influences the way that environment is interpreted in the
interaction. De Certeau then distinguishes ‘space’, *espace*, from *lieu*, where ‘place’ is related to the distribution of ‘elements’ such that two elements cannot be in the same place at once (1984: 118). There is a configuration of positions in a stable form (he compares the inertia of place to a graveyard). *Espace*, ‘space’, however, accounts for ‘vectors of direction’, velocity and movement in time intervals where elements are ‘mobile’ and intersecting. Space is then ‘actuated’ by ‘ensembles of elements’ configured within it. De Certeau further describes place as univocal while space is polyvocal. This conference of status, however, is not permanent – through storification, place can be transformed into space and vice versa; he also calls this ‘space actualization’. He compares the differences between place and space to Labov’s ‘tours and maps’ analogy where a tour is more multi-dimensional than a map (1984: 120) – tours instruct viewers not only on what they are seeing, but how to see and how to know and interpret what they are seeing. There is also a prioritization in a tour of a space that makes it polyvocal or ‘living’ while a map is a flatter representation of a place. Reading Merleau-Ponty, de Certeau notes there are “as many spaces as there are distinct spatial experiences” (1984: 117-118). I liken this to Blommaert’s conception of polycentricity and I imagine Tahrir Square during the 18 Days from January 25 to February 12, 2011 as a veritable multiverse with centers around every engroupment of individuals who share a common experience within a subset of the space of the square. For de Certeau, stories organize ‘the play of changing relationships’ from place to space as well as the actors in those locations who animate space through their experiences of it and the distribution of their experiences – through complex communication – *among others*. 
How Tahrir Square Thinks

I read Eduardo Kohn’s 2013 opus, *How Forests Think*, in the summer of 2015. I would re-read parts of it many times while working on this research. In April of 2017, while completing my revisions, I met Kohn at an anthropology conference at Georgetown University after he delivered the keynote speech about his ongoing work in the Amazon rainforest. In his presentation, he spoke about how “the forest [was thinking] itself through [him].” He had become a “novel locus of cause” and aimed to “amplify the spiritual and living nature of the forest.” Afterward, I spoke to him about my work on Tahrir Square and my reflections on whether Tahrir, like the parts of the Amazon Kohn has been exploring for decades, may also have thoughts. Not noetic thoughts but Peircean ones. That is, a thought as an interpretation of a sign and an object within a living sign system. If a phasmid insect is a sylvan thought in that it has evolved in such a way as to hide from its predators by appearing like a twig, then a chant in Tahrir Square, like ‘imšī (‘get lost’) is also an evolutionary form - a Tahriran thought. Like sylvan thinking that can only be experienced in the space-time of the Amazon with the people and living ecology of their placeness, revolutionary thinking is only possible in the revolutionary space-times of the Arab uprisings. Revolutionary thinking’s thoughts are voices and identities embodied, like Kohn’s spirits of the forest, by the people in the Square who achieved a state of readiness and receptivity to the revolutionary spirit; a spirit that “thinks itself through” the words and actions, the human and non-human bodies and engroupments of and in Tahrir Square.

The chants, like ‘imšī, are living responses that take an evolutionary form selected for out of the dense linguistic, social, and political history in Egypt that brought about these indexical rhematized oral and embodied signs for a very specialized purpose to fit in a space-time that has
passed, in a sense, but, in other ways, that we can study and re-experience as researchers of the Arab Spring in Egypt. These re-experiences often occurred in my research in conversations with the revolutionaries I met. Through them, I began to appreciate, as a Peircean secondness, their perduring sensorial experiences - what Peirce called qualita (see chapter 2, section 7). As I developed my own senses into the accounts of the revolution, I began to think of re-experience as a sentimental intertextuality reminiscent and related to my reading of Abu-Lughod’s (1986:173-4) conception of “image-traces” and “feeling-tones” that re-animated the poems of the Awlad ‘Ali and gave old words and melodies new meanings:

Individuals know so many poems that each new one undoubtedly evokes image-traces and feeling-tones from others with shared words, phrases, or themes. People are reminded of ‘sister’ songs, variations on a theme or poems used in similar occasions.

Sentimental intertextuality has a meaning beyond the homophoric and exophoric semantic resources that utterances and gestures draw upon to make meaning, or do the art of * languaging* (Becker 1994). That is to say, intertextuality can describe a feeling of the relatedness of multiple entities, and not just of oral or embodied signs. Intertextuality can help us understand felt connectivities between human and non-human persons, be they animal or object. A place, in this way, can become intertextual, as can a non-human entity like a dog, a street, a car, a city square, or a forest. Kohn’s April 2017 presentation discussed the ways humans form friendships with non-human inanimate object like stones, leaves, or sea shells, particularly for a young child. Kohn recounted his bond with a large boulder in his family’s front yard. Touching it, or sitting on it, would enliven what he called wordless thinking, or imagistic thoughts. I understand Kohn’s
wordless thinking through Abu-Lughod’s description of the image-tones that poems conjure in the minds and souls of interactants during a performance.

Kohn’s 2013 book underscores the importance of the idea that space is animated differently among others. The presence of not just one individual, or “self” alone, but many living selves changes the way space and time are experienced. A communicative ecology is space-time, rather than space and time. It is mediated by the many persons and the selves in that space-time in relation to one another. Togetherness in a space-time produces distinct, deictic ways of being, interacting, and thinking (Kohn 2013: 236). Each ‘self’ in a shared space offers a unique representation of that space, and the confluence of these selves’ distinctive sign systems constitutes the “semiotic quality” of a place that makes it a space-time. While Kohn interested in the amazon, I examine Tahrir Square through this framework. Tahrir is a place people, protesters,
inhabited for 18 days and, in that space-time, co-constructed an “intersubjective space” (2013: 148) between each person’s individual causes: “The worlds that selves represent are not just made of things. They are also, in large part, made up of other semiotic selves."

Tahrir is not just a public square, then, full of individuals pursuing their own ends, but, in its cohabitation by many thousands of Egyptians who re-inscribed it as a site of as many protests for 18 Days, Tahrir came to think revolution - the place was transformed and this “thinking” about revolution is “amplified in a dense ecology of selves and certain historically contingent… ways of attending to that ecology” (2013: 236). Just as selves are semiotic, the spaces they interact with, are semiotic ecologies and the other selves in the ecology are part of that ecology too (2013: 78) - “…because life is semiotic and semiosis is alive, it makes sense to treat both lives and thoughts as ‘living thoughts’.” Put differently, one might take the Egyptians out of Tahrir but one cannot so easily take Tahrir, and the revolution that happened there, out of the Egyptians.

![Figure 2.4: A Wall Near Tahrir Square Shortly after Mubarak’s Resignation. On the left side, an Arabic graffito reads: “we want revolutionary law” and below that, in a larger font: “our revolution is lasting”. On the righthand side, a translation of only the bottom segment of the Arabic on the left appears in English in the same color, viz.: “our Revolution is Lasting”. A street cleaner stands in front of the wall obscuring part of the sign. Credit: Google Images.](image)
Another analytic approach to interpreting political speech acts in the context of the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its aftermath is social movement theory. Aboelezz (2014) takes a qualitative geosemiotic approach to analyzing a 2,000-message corpus compiled from images taken of the space and and around Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt (Aboelezz, 2014:2). Aboelezz relies on Scollon’s definition of geosemiotics as “the study of the social meaning of the material placement of signs and discourses in the material world” (Scollon 2003:2 cited in Aboelezz, 2014:2). In this way, Aboelezz identifies six conceptual frames through which to relate the discourse produced in Tahrir to the space of Tahrir Square, namely: 1) symbolic, 2) central, 3) spiritual, 4) playful counter-space, 5) ‘Arab’, and 6) glocal (Aboelezz, 2014:3). This research takes up Aboelezz’s finding that in Tahrir Square and the broader conception of “Tahrir”, icons form “an integral part of the verbal message” be it in art, graffiti, or speech (Aboelezz, 2014:8). This dissertation also expands on Aboelezz’s more

31 However, this approach has largely focused on press coverage of protest events rather than offer descriptive analyses or heuristic frameworks for understanding the wider communicative ecology and the role of individual politicians in (re-)construing key events. Case in point, Fang (1994) writes about ‘riots’ in China, but limits his analysis to media coverage. Hackett and Zhou (1994) are interested in U.S. peace protests in opposition to the Gulf War but also scale down to only examine op-eds in the press rather than attempt a multi-modal cognitive analytic approach to describing the macro-strategies of individuals and groups in the protests themselves as they occur. They also overlook the responses of politicians to protest movements in political public speeches. Likewise, Lee and Craig (1992) analyze U.S. newspaper coverage of labor strikes in South Korea and Poland. Macleod and Hertog (1992) write about the manufacturing of public opinion by the press when covering protest groups. There is a pattern in linguistic research of limiting work on protest groups to more uni-modally, and newspaper-based analyzable data.
abstract symbolic sense of “Tahrir” as an ontology that spreads and is transposed over individuals and communities, including Egypt as a whole. Symbols like a Tahrir Square packed with protestors, the clenched ‘revolution’ fist that appears in a lot of graffiti in and around Tahrir, and emblematic slogan-chants such as “the people will the downfall of the regime”, are prime candidates for transfer beyond the physical borders of states.

Dal’s 2013 book, *Cairo: Images of Transition*, collects views from Egyptian writers and artists who participated as activists in the revolution on the use of images as communicative tools that also carry historical significance. For Dal, and others (Dickinson 2012; Lennon 2014; Kharroub and Bas 2016), images are a visuality that can be understood as agents of change. And these visual agents of change, more rapidly than people, words, or ideas, can travel wide and far.

2.3 Techniques

Social scientists have noted the many aspects of a communicative event and the seemingly innumerable instruments available to an interactant in the context of an expression, or what Becker (1994) calls ‘languaging’. Marcel Mauss (1950) describes the use of gestures and the body in interaction as a ‘technique’, which he defines as ‘un acte traditionnel efficace’, or an act that is both traditional and effective/efficacious; he stresses that ‘there is no technique’ or ‘transmission’ for that matter without tradition, especially (1950: 1-2). By tradition, he later explains, he is referring to a shared, cultural knowledge, or ‘reasoning’ that is understood by those actors in an interaction who recognize this ‘traditional act’ as something that has been repeated and is part of the repertoire of available habituses (Bourdieu 1990) of a social community.

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32 Aboelezz’s article seems to propose a more discreet version of a thesis presented by Foucault in *Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias* (1967). This Foucauldian framework may be a productive starting point for future research on communication in Tahrir Square. Her article is one of compilation of works on language and politics in public spaces that will be published in the forthcoming 2014 edition of the *Journal of Language and Politics* edited by Ruth Wodak and Luisa Martin-Rojo.
environment. Techniques are a widespread and crucial social process and social product that constitute a type of shared, commonly-recognized repertoire of gestures and embodied expressions that help to cohere a small formation of individuals and large social movements within and across multiple spaces over time as the repertoire is experienced by others in different locales. These techniques become part of the localized culture of what I call a member network within a larger gestaltist entity or formation.

Boecking, Hall, and Schneider’s 2015 study describes a corpus analysis of the metadata of 1.3 million tweets collected from Egypt between November 2009 and November 2013, a period overlapping the revolution. Using a machine classifier, Boecking et al tracked communication patterns throughout the data to configure algorithms that could detect and predict large-scale, collective unrest. Their user-centric approach results outperformed content-based methodologies, thereby demonstrating the importance of analyzing for social interaction and group formation (Korany and El-Mahdi 2012) over and above linguistic analyses of the content of the tweets alone. Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess (2013) also worked with Twitter data from Egypt and found that “networks of interaction” and identifying groups, rather than linguistic patterns, better helped to explain the spread of revolutionary messages.

2.4 Distributed Cognition

In Edwin Hutchins’s 1995 book, Cognition in the Wild, he explicates the key concept of distributed cognition, or what he previously referred to as ‘naturally situated cognition’. His contemporaries who were also interested in cognition in social interaction, whom he mentions in his book, include Pylyshyn (1984), Newell and Simon (1956, 1971, 1981), and Simon and Kaplan (1989)–however, they were more interested in ‘abstract’ intelligence than in Hutchins’s
stated curiosity about ‘how people go about knowing what they know’ and how the setting or environment they come to know what they know plays a role in accomplishing that situated, distributed knowledge. Rather than attempt to explain or locate ‘knowledge structures’ in the individual alone, he sought to describe how human cognition is situated in a ‘complex sociocultural world’ and how that situation then interacts with an individual’s knowledge to both transmit it (acquisition) and distribute it in joint tasks or joint communicative events. Hutchins writes several chapters about the distribution of labor, and thereby knowledge, in the running of a navy vessel (1995: 6-9, 17-18). No one person can store and interpret all of the information needed to carry out this complex, multifaceted task and so people work together in a larger aggregation that is synchronized, situated and shares in a set of goals that transform this configuration of individuals into a human cybernetic, or a meta-system with their environment in time and space. Cognition, or thinking that is required to carry out a task, is subdivided into smaller, easier parts that many individuals and machines, which are themselves the results of this sort of distribution, take part in executing (1995: 64):

“…it is possible to draw a great circle on a Mercator projection; it is just very difficult to compute where the points should go. On a Lambert conformal chart it is quite easy to draw a great circle, because on this projection a straight line so nearly approximates a great circle that it is more than adequate for navigational purposes. One can see the work that went into constructing a chart as part of every one of the computations that is performed on the chart in its lifetime. This computation is distributed in space and time. Those who make the chart and those who use it are not known to one another (perhaps they are not even contemporaries), yet they are joint participants in a computational event every time the chart is used.”

Hutchins uses the metaphor of ‘a bandwidth of communication’ to explain why and how knowledge is distributed, or divided, among individuals in a crew, or team (1995: 124). For

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33 Bateson (1935) wrote about ‘meta-systems’ and, like Pask, was interested in how the distribution of cognition, or knowledge, within a complex task-based setting, created an ecology wherein many organisms, in this case human beings, engaged in intricate forms of self-organization.
Hutchins, “The properties of language change with the register of the speech and with the
medium in which the utterances are carried” (1995: 232). In one very clear example, an engineer
on board the ship attempts to convey a set of instructions to a mechanic over an intercom that
creates a great deal of irrelevant static noise, or interference, in the signal - it is “almost
telegraphic” (1995: 232); the intercom has very ‘low bandwidth’. This is an example of a
mismatch between the bandwidth, akin to what Sicoli calls the ‘semiotic carrying capacity of a
channel’, and the ‘weight’ or ‘complexity’ of the transmission.

Commenting more generally on how different media externalize function “better than
others”, Hutchins explains that the existence of a gesture “that has both private and public
functions suggests that other communicative features may also have these two roles” - like
Sicoli’s voice registers and attention to the multiple lines of meaning available in prosody,
Hutchin’s description of gesture suggests the possibility of multiple layers of meaning that are
stacked onto physical movement. A gesture is embodied and has registers and habitus like an
utterance is voiced and has registers and prosody - both gestures and utterances are performed
and in those multimodal performances might have a “similar dual role”, as in Hutchins’s gesture
“in the production of verbal representations, helping the speaker to shape the allocation of his
own attention while simultaneously providing the listener with structure that can be used to
determine what the speaker is trying to accomplish” (1995: 236). When language is used to
organize noncognitive tasks, the structure of language is a mediating resource in organizing task
performance so language structures thought. When “cognitive activities are distributed across
social space, the… languages used by task performers to communicate are almost certain to
serve as structuring resources, and the structure of language will affect the cognitive properties of
the group even if they do not affect the cognitive properties of individuals in the group” (1995: 232).

In Hutchins’s low-bandwidth example of the intercom, the mechanic on one end could not understand the engineer due to interference from the device (a kind of distributed cognition) but also because of a mismatch in degree and type of knowledge. That is, the engineer used technical terms the mechanic was unfamiliar with. The mechanic converted the task into a series of basic, typically ‘yes or no’ questions to the engineer and thus broke down the communication into a question-answer format where the low bandwidth of the intercom did not impede the type and quality of the transmission. Hutchins explains that this conversion is not without a certain loss in translation – pointing, he argues, can convey the same information as a verbal description but it is a different kind of information and can ‘be put to work’ in a different way. As such, the ‘properties of language’ shift with the register and medium that ‘carry’ the utterance. Hutchins recognizes that these communicative behaviors are not typically consciously intended – like Goffman’s (1969) notion of expressions that are ‘given’ versus ‘given off’, Hutchins argues that a great deal of what people do in an interaction has a communicative function but lacks communicative intent (1995: 233). Once people are in a space, interactions can take on a metacognitive dimension where movements, or techniques, and utterances, are expressed in relation to the semiotic ecology and the other interactants within a physical range of epistemic relevance that advance ‘the whole’, or the engrouped individuals who now form a meta-system and are working together toward a set of shared goals. This is the highest-level, or the most macroscopic perspective on this event. This height of view is also understood as ‘etic

34 See also Sicoli’s (2016) work on repair organization in whistled speech: “Repair organization in Chinantec whistled speech” in Language 92(2).
summation’ whereby a large group of people can be described as ‘a revolution’. Their
ingroupment over time and in a particular space, along with their coordinated behavior and
language in relation to one another takes on a biological dimension. By that I mean that the
individuals and smaller groups that comprise the formation that is called ‘the revolution’ are
erased, forgotten, and reappropriated - they’re re-imagined and now seen as part and parcel of a
new irreducible hierarchy (Polanyi 1968). They’re not “they”, plural, subjects being or doing
anymore; rather, they are now viewed and talked about as an it: singular - object, nominalized
and static. The grammar of the ‘revolution’ consumes the lives, the voices, bodies, and identities
of revolutionaries, the spaces of Tahrir Square, and the time of the 18 Days and those who
struggled there too in times passed.

2.5 Multimodality and the (Social) Technology of Revolution

Drawing on insights from the above discussions on space and distributed cognition, I argue that
signs in a protest, but also slogans, and Maussian techniques are parts of a ‘technology of
revolution’. The use of this technology externalizes and distributes certain cognitive processes,
or tasks, across a more aptly-scaled whole of individuals to fit the perceived gravity and size of
the overall objectives of the movement, such as toppling a 30-year regime in the case of Egypt.
This helps explain the ‘emergent aggregation’ of social interactional processes involved in the
movement of information and ideologies (Eco 1970). Distributed cognition also portends an
important small, micro-level relevance to the individuals comprising the meta-system. That is,
for Hutchins, every social process in a distributed cognitive task has a ‘dual function’ that is
‘private and public’.
The habitus of a gesture, like the prosody in an utterance, both signals a message to others in the interaction while also influencing the ‘internal ecology’ of the communicator. In this way, individual and distributed cognition are intimately inter-related; the consequences to one’s internal ecology are determined, in part, by the configuration of the social formation in time and space in a “distributed interpretation formation” such as running a navy ship or engaging in revolution (1995: 241). In any large-scale social movement, like the milyōnīyyāt (demonstrations involves more than one million people) in Tahrir Square, there are localized ‘communities of networks’ working like sub-groups of starlings in a murmuration flying toward a common destination along a convoluted path in relation to one another. The set of goals are emergent and shared - such as a destination or a social-political objective in the case of the milyōnīyyāt. These objectives can give rise to a ‘culture’ (a la Goodenough 1957), or a ‘savoir faire’, that emerges within and between the and individuals and sub-groups of the social formation. Ideas spread in these connected communities of smaller networks and diffuse both heterophorically (inter-network) and homophorically (intra-network).

The smaller networks that comprise the larger social formation are ’member networks’ of a larger aggregation that, through the inter- and intra-network diffusions of ideas and messages, gradually becomes a more unified formation or, meta-system. This happens when an individual joins another individual, and then another, and another and through their interactions over time and space they develop a “group-ness”; they go from being a “they” that acknowledges each

35 In math, convolution is defined as: “an integral that expresses the amount of overlap of one function as it is shifted over another function . It therefore ‘blends’ one function with another” (Weisstein, Eric W. "Convolution." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Convolution.html); it is also defined by the Oxford dictionary (2010) as a “function derived from two given functions by integration that expresses how the shape of one is modified by the other (emphasis added).”
member of the whole, to an “it”, a “group” that is talked about and interacted with as a single unit. Similarly, this unit, or group, can, in the right circumstances, grow or shrink one individual at a time, or, can join with another such set of individuals who comprise a group - the units are made of up individuals who are en-grouped and formations of groups are made up of groups that are en-grouped. I call these processes and products individual and multiple engroupment, respectively.

2.6 Culture(s) of a Meta-System: Co-Performance and Active Reception in Distributed Leadership

An important element of these emergent aggregations is the maintenance of a certain ideological homogeneity or ‘purity’ of vision and knowledge (Bourdieu 1979); that is, it would be disruptive to ‘the revolution’ as a social movement bound in a particular space (Tahrir and the adjacent tributaries of streets) if the counter-revolutionary movement loyal to Mubarak had also colonized within Tahrir. Like de Certeau’s ‘lieu’, once a space is charged with a particular identitive force, or what Kohn might call ‘thought’, such as ‘revolution’, it repels heterotochthonous subjects, or dissimilar thought.

By way of analogy, in a crystallization process, the seed of the growing crystal, on a molecular level, deploys ‘capping agents’ that carry out the ‘first filtration’ task of keeping out potential rival nuclei that could compete with, subvert, or overtake that of the growing seed. I argue that this process, in many respects, provides a helpful metaphor for understanding the ‘growth’ and ‘maintenance’ of the revolutionary entity in Tahrir Square during and after ‘the 18 Days’. Growing crystals chemically interact with the ecology in which they grow and so if a crystal begins to germinate in a petri dish that contains elements of diamond or ruby, the
resulting crystal may become a blend and manifest that diversity by taking on certain mixed hues in its final state. Crystals, like social movements in bounded spaces and time, allow for a certain spectrum of heterogeneity that is not disruptive to the health of the growing seed at the center. When, however, a heterogeneous element, “an impurity”, arises within the crystallization process that could threaten the structure of the whole, rather than “intergrow” with it, a set of ‘surfactant agents’ attack the impurities and physically displace them outside the membrane. The only time new agents are able to enter the growing cell is when they possess the proper receptors. The resulting ‘crystal’, unlike a meta-systemic revolutionary formation, is a hardened stone-like substance. The metaphor ends there because a revolutionary engroupment is processual and fragile - the relationships between the people who make up the formation must be renewed constantly through social interaction. There is ample video and photographic evidence to illustrate the high levels of energy and work put toward beginning the engroupment in Tahrir and then recruiting participants, keeping/forcing out Mubarak loyalists or other species of anti-revolutionary engroupments and individuals, and maintaining the ‘heat’ of the momentum, or social cohesion, that would hold the colonization of

Figure 2.6: Photograph of a Segment of Protestors in Tahrir Square. They are in a circular formation around a pyre doubly illuminated by the fire itself and red lights; an optic parallel to the nucleic red-hot center of a crystallizing seed. Credit: Google Images.
Tahrir in place to avoid something of a ‘reverse effervescence’ whereby the revolutionary formation would breakdown and dissipate.

Without a super-network leadership, the duration and force of the revolutionary formation of co-participants in Tahrir presents an anomaly in the albeit sparse literature on the anthropology of revolution, but it is rendered more comprehensible from a cybernetic, meta-system perspective that uses the theoretical contributions of distributed cognition. “Leadership” in this veritable ‘navy ship’ I am calling a ‘revolutionary entity’ or ‘formation’ can be understood as localized across polycentric communities of member networks. These span a defined ideological spectrum that is recursively reinforced by engrouped individuals. They reinforce and recapitulate their ideological in-groupness through multimodal performances and interactions. Each reiteration of a performance, particularly when done jointly with other performers in the engroupment, contributes to the enregisterment of that activity as an ideological communicative event. The significance of these events is their repeatability by other engroupments - being able to reenact a recognized formation and choreography rather than having to improvise a novel performance, facilitates the ability for other engroupments to engage in the revolutionary event.

Having a word for a feeling or emotion makes it easier for individuals to identify with a sensation. When the terms are developed to talk about common experiences, those terms can more quickly and efficiently travel, be learned, and redeployed in other settings by other individuals to express related and comparable experiences. Non-verbal performances begin to take on this same quality in the midst of social upheavals where individuals form engroupments based on a newly-available set of ideological positions that may have been restricted prior to the revolutionary events that initiated this social opening.
When language - verbal or non-verbal - spreads across time, space, and social engroupments, the sentimentalities that were built into its utterances, or its embodied equivalent (what I call “performatives”), spread with it. An engroupment in Tahrir Square that picks up on the efficiency of the use of re-lyricized nursery rhyme and so decides to take the same song and apply its own words to it has taken advantage of a facilitated communicative process - and in their repetition of it, even with their amendments to the original engroupment’s rendition, they further facilitate the travel of the performance’s underlying sentiment. The performance can take on many iterations but what it generally represents remains consistent and is strengthened by each recapitulation. In this way, the consciousness of the original group that performed the re-lyricized song, verbally and non-verbally with their choreographed movements, becomes distributed across a larger population. Those engroupments, or member networks of the composite revolutionary formation, that choose to repeat the original group’s performance with elements of that group’s performativity, are expressing the same objectives of its original performers. And so they join them in a kind of enlarged inter-corporeity that pushes forward and magnifies the resistive power of all the performers who ever participated in its performance to the present moment.

Every repetition of the performance turns up the metaphorical volume of its content. Repetition is more than simply re-using a conveniently prepackaged set of sounds or gestures to convey a formulaic or established meaning. Repetition also extends the consciousness of the users - speakers and performers - into a super-conscious of linguistically engrouped individuals and networks. In the case of Tahrir Square, this effect was also bolstered by the physical presence of hundreds of thousands of individuals and networks engaging heterarchically in these
repetitions in rapid succession, over and over, by more and more people in larger and more integrated engroupments. The gestalt formation of all these engroupments is also referred to as “the 2011 Egyptian revolution”.

What was key about this revolutionary formation is that it was the result of a constantly regenerating set of individual and collective social processes. It was extremely fragile; at any point the formation could have broken down had the energy put into repeating the actions and sounds needed to reconstitute it every minute, hour and day of the eighteen days of Tahrir broken down or extinguished. The Mubarak regime attempted to locate and dismantle the energetic core - the beating heart - of this distributed consciousness and animus but it could not, in the end, identify it. The leaderless organization and heterarchical nature of the networks that formed the whole made it exceedingly difficult to stage a quick and impactful crackdown. What linked together the various member networks was not so much a common ideology, but rather a system of signs; a type of communication strategy that was multimodal and quickly evolving was key to the formation’s cohesion. More specifically, the repetition of verbal and non-verbal performances across engroupments may have made the difference between a successful revolutionary moment in history and another large protest that failed to collapse the Mubarak regime. Also, rather than the exact repetition of the same revolutionary chants and dances, posters and songs, the formation relied on performative vectors.

A performance could be edited by each member network to reflect the specific ideology of its engrouped individuals and still serve the purpose of the gestalt whole. It was not the particular words of the songs that made a performance fungible and transferrable, it was merely its overarching political directionality. That is, if it was anti-Mubarak and sought to bring down
the regime, it could be copied and altered and re-performed by other engroupments but maintain its resonance and, in fact, increase its circulatory efficiency (Miller 2007). These performances, of which there were many, comprise what I refer to as the revolutionary voices and identities of Tahrir Square.

2.7 Social Qualia: Iconocity is a Feeling

Ideophones are designed for an interpreter’s ‘active reception’ and should be understood as ‘poetic achievements’ (Sicoli 2014). Sicoli cites Benveniste (1971) and Jakobson (1960, 1965) who also describe the ‘commonality of icons’ and the ‘indices in human language’. There is another relevant trichotomy in Peirce’s (1955) theory of semiotics that Sicoli underscores: firstness (quality), secondness (spatial or temporal contiguity, adjacency) and thirdness (convention, habits, or rules). For ‘quality’, Sicoli mentions the idea of “felt iconicity” (Webster 2014) – typically, icons are understood as showing ‘formal resemblance’ to objects, but with this understanding, iconicity can be more subjective, or experiential, and thus more universal. In the case of the revolutionary formation in Tahrir, booing, cheering, chanting, and even the general din of singing and the hum of thousands of simultaneous conversations can be understood as ideophones; the repeated refrains in a chant by a choir of protestors singing and improvising together can function as an ideophonic chorus.

I examine a specific engroupment, whom I refer to as “the band”, that performs re-lyricized a capella music together in chapter 5. At the end of every second lyrical phrase, the band shouts ‘he’he:γ’ – the energy with which this joint refrain is infused indicates something about the experience the band members, or rhapsodists, have with the event they are participating in (e.g. fun, stress, etc.) or contemplating as they perform (e.g. excitement or determination to
see Mubarak resign, to see the revolutionary formation continue, etc). A response to a sign
(‘he’he:y’) may be a feeling, or what Peirce calls a ‘quality’, and can take the form of an
interjection (representational) or an action (energetic interpretant - see Kockelman 2005).

Rhemes are signs whose interpretants ‘represent them as being icons’ – this is based on
the ‘habit of sense making’ where a ‘sign-object’ is ‘taken as an icon’ – it lies beyond lexical
iconicity within a ‘fractal recursivity’ where sign-to-sign ‘mappings’ are not natural, but rather
are constructed through relational events and not ‘structural relationships’. Sicoli provides the
example of the Lachixio size metaphors for pitch; size metaphors are also used for describing
social hierarchical status; English uses a height metaphor which might also be tied to ideas and
evaluations about speakers who phonate in a certain octave (falsetto, baritone, etc). There is, in
any case, an affective experience of ‘sound impression’. Rhemes, then, are cultural products that
can be produced on the spot by an individual in interaction for a specific social purpose. Rhemes
part of the ‘technology of revolution’ in Tahrir and beyond – they help to express, and mediate, a
larger whole such as revolution but also help to coalesce people into effective engroupments.

Iconicity is felt - in transcription, it is marked with an exclamation mark “!” - and this
helps to explain the translation-transmission of “dégage!” from its French linguistic domain in
the Tunisian revolutionary event context into the standardized Arabic deontic
“’irḥāl!” (‘begone!’), which I depict with an exclamation mark to indicate its received
ideophonic function. That is, like a linguistic synesthesia, this lexeme was charged with a
particular event-specific energy in Tunisia at first that came to evoke an ideology or an identity-
and-voice (that of Arab Revolution, people power), rooted in a recognized sensory experience
(the toppling of Ben Ali) that came to index the ‘Arab Spring’ in Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen,
Qatar, and beyond in and outside of the region. In this way, the words, chants, protest-slogans, songs, and bodily discursive items/techniques, art works, and other oeuvres of the revolutionary events in Tahrir Square at once are re-constituted by and co-constitute the transregional ‘codes/languages of the Arab Spring’, or what I more broadly refer to as ‘revolutionary voices and identities’ as a new social semiotic deictic genre.

To understand how social purpose mediates large wholes, like the revolutionary formation in Tahrir, and the coalescence of effective groups therein, the semiotic rhematization processes by which revolutionary voices and identities were formed and reinforced over the 18 days, and beyond, are critical.

Austin’s (1961) ‘performative utterances’ involve the idea that ‘language acts’ in interactions. Miller’s (2007) conception of the ‘sensory experience of songs’ and the idea of ‘sonic cultures’ is an implication of this concept. “Apperception” is Miller’s term for the process by which an individual actively receives and responds to stimuli in an environment including language and music but also visual and spatial information.

2.8 Epistemic Access

Epistemic access is gradual and is also partial, or, episodic, or ‘in and out’ – Raymond and Heritage (2006) discuss this in terms of ‘an epistemic seesaw’. Imagined in a physical territory like Tahrir Square in downtown Egypt, it is important to consider the possible interferences to one’s bodily, sensory, sentimental, and cognitive paths to the epistemic site such as other pedestrians, cars, animals, phone calls, text messages, billboards, cars honking, beggars, impediments on the ground, security personnel, etc. Even when one is completely within the membrane of the networked engroupment and engaging in the co-production of the formation of
this revolutionary sub-ecology, it is possible to be distracted by other stimuli in the surrounding space, or from within (may need to depart Tahrir early due to hunger, fatigue, boredom, scheduling conflicts, an unexpected phone call or text message that distracts or actually demands one’s physical presence elsewhere, etc.).

The time-space dimensions of epistemic access are key to understanding and describing the experience of witnessing and potentially joining an organized demonstration. To analyze the content of each sign being held up or to audit the re-patterned lyrics onto familiar songs in isolation without considering spatial-temporal epistemic access would likely result in partial, inaccurate results. A framework of epistemic access takes into account a) what the ‘active recipients’ of the communicative agents had/have access to at the locale during a specific time interval, b) what these individuals were oriented to at each point in the interval, given (potentially) shifting location in relation to the sign/message over time, as well as c) the extent to which these individuals were oriented to the communicative event at the time and space of the performance or projection of the sign/message. As de Certeau argues, there are as many spaces as there are experiences of spaces and so to understand the 18 Days of Tahrir, it is important to ground any analysis in ethnographic research and/or interviews with participants on all, or as many accessible sides of the event, as possible to gain a fuller picture for sociolinguistic interpretation.

2.9 Anthropology of Revolution

Bucholtz (2002a, 2002b) critiques the study of youth in anthropology, pointing out that there is a preoccupation with associating youth with sex, violence, and change. In many ways, these associations are part of a general romanticism about youth that sweeps up researchers and
politicians alike. Thomassen’s 2012 article on the ‘anthropology of revolution’, or rather more precisely, the lack thereof, concisely ties together the literatures on youth studies, violence, collective action, social movements, ritualization in the public sphere, and what little there is written by anthropologists toward a theory of revolution in society.

Thomassen argues that a great deal is written by historians and politicians on the topic of revolutions without ever referencing or considering the great many relevant insights of anthropology and social sciences, writ large, on this topic. For Thomassen, this gap is due to anthropologists themselves not doing an effective job of compiling and relating the existing writing on revolution and social movements by anthropologists. Also, he admits that of the many relevant works, few were written by anthropologists in the field, describing events as they occurred in a war zone or in the midst of an uprising or revolution. Citing danger as the principle reason behind the difficulty of doing anthropology in the midst of active wars, Thomassen describes the work of Margaret Mead (2001) in Samoa as potentially relevant given the many large-scale shifts that took place in the society she was observing while she was there. However, Thomassen spends most of his time describing the contributions of Durkheim (1912), Mauss (1945, 1950, 1968a, 1968b, 1991, 1992), van Gennep (1961), Turner (1957, 1967, 1969, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988), and Bateson (1958) toward a potential anthropology of revolution, and, I would add, youth.

While Durkheim is often credited with, or accused of, having a direct ideological line to Lenin, the anthropology Mauss is, as Thomassen points out, a self-styled “historian” in the anti-Bolshevik camp. Thomassen argues that a good anthropological treatment of a revolution would likely be difficult to distinguish from a history of that revolution; indeed, Mauss (1992) calls his
writing on the Bolshevik revolution “history”. Mauss, a student of Durkheim, was critical of the Bolshevik revolution because, among other reasons, he saw it as a mis-appropriation of Durkheim’s conception of collective effervescence. For Mauss, Durkheim’s writings about social cohesion were not meant to be acted upon by a political force that would use Durkheim’s writings as a handbook on revolution and the consolidation of power. Thomassen explains, however, that Mauss’s attempts to wrest Durkheim away from the Bolsheviks led him to write about revolution in real time and thus makes him the father of the anthropology of revolution.

Mauss (1992) explains that a revolution begins with an “emotional stirring” that is felt by a large crowd in a public space. This stirring can then cause a feeling of ‘social unity’ and onemindedness that gives present members a feeling of equality that inverts social conventions – “making the high low, and the low exalted.” Thomassen then describes the contributions of Turner in reaction to Mauss and van Gennep (1961). Turner’s ‘communitas’ is likely born out of his contemplations of Mauss’s descriptions of the shared feelings and techniques of the body and communication in a social setting. Turner also responds to van Gennep’s important notion of

Figure 2.7: Young Protestor in Tahrir Square. This is during the 18 days holding a sign in English: “We Shall Over come”. It re-scales Egypt’s revolution from one of macro-politics to one of civil rights, and it compares the movement to that of the African-American civil rights movement. This sign could be stirring the emotions of Egyptians and Americans alike. Credit: Google Images.
‘rites of passage’, by both expanding the theory and applying it to collectivities rather than individuals alone. For Thomassen, the possibility of a rites of passage on a large scale, such that a population can undergo a change of state from one social status to another, constitutes a critical anthropological contribution to the understanding of revolution as a social phenomenon. Van Gennep’s rites of passage consisted of three stages: separation (from society, solitude), liminality (a period of being alone, waiting), and then re-incorporation (joining society again through a ritualized celebration of transition). Turner, with groups of people in mind, re-conceptualizes these stages as: breach (a break with the normal or routine of life in a public setting), crisis (the experience of realizing there was a breach and deciding how to respond collectively), redress (executing a decided-upon response as a society or collectivity), and then reintegration (re-constituting society with a shared, agreed-upon memory of what occurred and how society responded, thus normalizing and neutralizing the breach).

Thomassen ends his article with a discussion of the Arab Spring, arguing that while many would like to support the youth movements in Egypt and Tunisia, it is too soon to understand whether these are truly revolutionary movements; that is, we cannot know if these uprisings will result in systemic change (redress) and reintegration. It is quite possible that there could be a breakdown, à la Kloos, into cycles of violence (civil war) and a repetition of breach and crisis until a suitable redress is agreed upon and reintegration can then become possible (Schröder and Schmidt 2001). He addresses the revolutions or uprisings as ‘youth movements’ or, alternatively, ‘student movements’, although it is not clear that these terms connote different segments of the

36 Others in the field of Arab Studies have also questioned whether the Arab Spring ‘uprisings’ constitute revolutions in any of their iterations across the twenty-two Arab states that experienced such movements. Notably, see Asef Bayat, “Paradoxes of Arab Refo-lutions,” in Jadaliyya, March 3, 2011.
population; they are likely synonyms. By doing so, he is conjuring a long tradition in anthropological literature, which I have only scratched the surface of here, but Thomassen’s discussion of Mauss and Turner, in particular, I argue, complicate the use of ‘youth’ by introducing the notions of ‘rites of passage’, as a kind of micro- and macro-politics. Furthermore, his explanation of the evolution of social movements, sheds a great deal of light on the inner-workings of protest movements that become revolutions.

In his chapter on Sinhala Buddhists in Sri Lanka, Kloos concerns himself with describing the transition from civil struggle to civil war. He argues that there are six steps leading up to the “outbreak” moment of violence: 1) difference in culture, 2) difference in interest, 3) tension, 4) struggle, 5) irregular violence, 6) regular violence in civil war. Kloos calls this a “schism”, and cites the work on schismogenesis by Gregory Bateson, who describes the processes by which a metasystem, a large grouping of individuals, schisms or fractures in counter-distinction to what was once a cohesive gestalt whole. For Kloos, the period of civil struggle is typically quite protracted. Civil war, he argues, is the result of a ‘long gestation’. He concludes, however, that civil war, like revolution, must also end in order to fit his definition. At some point, people have to begin to negotiate and return to a non-violent mode of politics.

2.10 The Revolutionary Interval in Stages of Courage

The stages of the revolutionary interval (SRI), as a conceptual schema, draws on Mauss’s notion of emotional stirring, Van Gennep's and Turner’s respective rites of passage and Kloos’s six steps...
of schism toward the outbreak of society-wide violence, or civil war. The SRI schema is based on the events of the 2011 Egyptian revolution.\textsuperscript{37}

Each stage of SRI is suffused with something Mauss, Van Gennep, Turner, and Kloos all describe in different terms, namely \textit{courage}. Each of these stages is a progression along a spectrum from the inertia engendered by a generalized fear of a governmental regime and its security apparatus, to its opposite end: the collective activist spirit of courage embodied by a (re)new(ed) nation of people working jointly on differently-situated but connected vectors of resistance against a common foe. In the cause of Tahrir Square, that foe was ‘the people’s’ perception of an unjust status quo of power relations that enabled the three-decades-long regime of Hosni Mubarak. The revolutionary formation this spirit of protest, a kind of collectivized courage in action, challenged, contended with, counteracted, and attempted to displace and replace the Mubarak regime’s institutions of control. The Egyptian revolution railed against Mubarak’s totalitarian governmentality but also rallied around a future irrealis about a New Egypt.\textsuperscript{38}

With the idea of collectivized courage in mind, these are the ten stages of the SRI schema:

1) \textbf{Anti-Regime Discourse}: the emergence of independent discourses of dignity over oppression (online and offline)

2) \textbf{Anti-Institutional Discourse and Action}: the emergence of independent discourses (online and offline) and actions that represent a rejection of police violence against civilians

\textsuperscript{37} The SRI schema may be tested for generalizability to other Arab Spring revolutionary movements, as well as revolutions in other non-Arab localities. It is my intention that this schema contributes to the growing field of the anthropology of revolution.

\textsuperscript{38} I discuss “New Egypt” further in the discourses of revolutionaries and counter-revolutionary potentates in chapters 3, 4, and 5, and briefly in chapter 6 as well.
3) **Collective Emotional Stirring**: the emergence of coordinated discourses and collective activism in pre-determined public spaces, online and offline; in this stage, individuals become initiated members of independent protest groups

4) **Breach**: the emergence of a clear *distributed cause*, a shared objective, that unifies protesters and protest groups around a single agreed-upon rallying cry that disrupts the institutional reality of the oppressive regime, thus exposing its inherent *fragility* and emboldening networks of protesters; inchoate protest groups join ranks with other protest groups as they encounter one another in the physical and virtual public spaces of increasingly frequent protest events

5) **Institutional Failure**: a period of societal tension as the regime’s institutions are challenged by the growing momentum of the disobedient discourses and activisms of increasingly higher orders of engrouped protest networks (on- and offline) into mass-scale formations in key public locales; as the challenges to the regime are perceived to be succeeding in more definite terms, large groups of independent protesters and protest groups begin to cooperate as one, thusly forming *metasystems*

6) **Outbreak**: sensing its impending collapse, the incumbent regime ratchets up its use of physical violence against protesters while also increasing its use of drastic measures to curtail access to geographic and virtual public spaces; in this stage, the regime shuts internet access and attempts to disable social media networks; it also uses its military apparatus to physically monitor, block, arrest, and kill agents of the opposition; meanwhile, once strictly-pacifistic opposition forces dig their heels in and find symbolic and material ways to fight back in the face of threats and attacks from the regime; this is a stage in which the use of violence by state and non-/anti-state actors is regularized

7) **Institutional Competition**: a liminal stage during which, seeing the incumbent regime as imminently failing, opposition groups begin to contend replacement institutions that displace those of the collapsing regime; these new institutions are represented by institutional figures who perform in public drawing from a heteroglossic repertoire of voices, reflexes, and identities to embody the spirit of the revolution and gain popular support in her/his/their bid for governmental power

8) **Inflection Point**: an incontrovertible moment in which the incumbent regime, seen as the oppressor by the protest movement, undertakes a public action that represents its total failure and the victory of the engrouped oppositional forces; this may be in the form of an abdication or resignation from power of an individual figure head or actual head of state, or the dissolution of a governing party, as an organ or leading entity of the incumbent regime; this is also an inflection point for the opposition that, upon realizing its victory of dignity over oppression, experiences a crisis of power in which it must re-organize to address the pressures of newfound control over the nation state
9) **Discrepant Redress**: a second liminal stage during which the opposition refracts into disparate, sometimes contending, parties with unaligned, albeit alignable, interests and objectives; in this stage, multiple discourses of governance emerge in mainstream and off-stream media outlets, both on- and offline, as the nation state’s population discusses multiple futures irrealis for novel, yet embryonic, concepts of both possible forms of state and of nationhood; this is a period of critical re-alignments and great debates about shared values, acceptable and desirable forms of identity, and the articulation of political philosophies, ideologies, national myths, and historiographies as the events of the revolutionary interval, particularly stages 6-9, are historicized into words and narratives.

10) **Disintegration**: this final period is one of multiple re-constitutions and deconstruction as the society disagrees and differs about the meanings of the events that toppled the incumbent regime, or if that regime ever failed or was replaced to begin with. This is a stage of criticism, introspection, analysis, reflection. The permeability (Mehan and Wood 1975) of the new institutional reality, and, in fact, of all institutional orders, is at the forefront and, being in conscious awareness, invites continual challenges to the fledgling nation state. Persistent discrepancies about the correct path to national reconciliation, and redress, lead to the normalization of events that mimic or achieve some or all of the components of stages 1-4, but particularly breach. This stage is protracted and circuitously related to the previous stages. There may be period of relative calm in the years following, but the initial breach may never be neutralized in the minds of all the relevant parties, including both human and non-human persons, who were irrevocably transformed, in ways both internal and external.

More than, if at all, a timeline of the history of a particular revolution, the SRI schema is a non-linear recursive anatomy with innumerable faulty junctures where redundancies and breakdowns are possible, if not probable. In my fieldwork in Lebanon, Jordan, and Algeria, I intended to visit countries that conspicuously did not experience Arab Spring uprisings. I was curious as to how these states averted the fates of so many of their neighbors in the region. In Lebanon, in 2012, and Algeria, in 2016, I heard almost verbatim accounts of the same explanation: “we don’t want a revolution here. We had our war and everybody remembers it and doesn’t want it. Why revolt? Why do you want a revolution? For people to die and suffer? For schools to close, businesses to close, roads and airports to shut, and the country to be destroyed?”

Randa, an Algerian matriarch of a certain age, who had lived through the bloody civil war of the
1990s but also was old enough to remember the war of independence against the French, was emphatic in her intonation as she uttered her words of contempt for the Arab Spring.

Similarly, Umm Assi, a southern Lebanese homemaker, poet, and local intellectual, sat with me in her Beirut apartment and told me about the fifteen-year civil war that ended in 1990, from which the country is still reeling, socially, economically, and most-prominently in its harried political cycles of dysfunction, inertia, and renaissance. Umm Assi was insistent that “there is no such thing as the Arab Spring. It’s a western decoy for imperialism and neocolonialism. No Arabs want revolution! Only spies and Western agents support these things. The Arab Spring is a front for domination, another iteration of divide and conquer.”

Indeed, in Lebanon, Jordan, and Algeria, I observed - and wrote about in my master’s thesis in Arab Studies - the presence of stages 1-3 of the SRI schema, but an almost concerted avoidance of stage 4, namely. breach. It is difficult to account for the lingering sentimental intertexts of a past conflict. The memory of war is biting for the Algerians and Lebanese people I spoke to. Like courage, something that pervades every part of SRI, memory takes on a personhood and becomes a thought that thinks itself through the people who experienced the original sensorial event(s). The relationships people develop with their memories make it impossible to predict revolutions or, within a the throes of one, presage what is to come next. The purpose, then, of the SRI schema, is not to be predictive, but rather to be descriptive. It is my attempt to schematize, and in so doing lend additional meaning - academic significance - to the experiences of the revolutionaries with whom I spoke, and those whom I could only observe, read about, and engage with from afar through their public personae and published works.
Chapter 3: The Revolutionary Interval and Muhammad Morsi v. The Republic of Egypt

“A revolutionary movement with such qualities and characteristics may bend in the wind but will not break, because its roots reach the very depth of the nation and it draws on the nation's heritage and history and is inspired both from heaven and earth.”

Key Concept: To understand the travel of this regional “revolution” or series of “uprisings”, this analysis focuses on the case study of Egypt and the role of language, both standard (MSA) and colloquial variants of Egyptian Arabic (ECA), in explaining not only the spread of revolutionary sentiments and objectives, but the semiotic processes, herein dubbed “the revolutionary interval”, by which incumbent and emergent institutions competed with one another for legitimate governmental power, and authenticity to the revolution. These processes led to what this framework calls “en-, re-, and counter-registered voices of the revolution”, based on Agha’s enregisterment and Bakhtin’s heteroglossia.

3.1 Tweeting with the President

In this chapter I examine a series of social media exchanges from a weekly open Twitter forum that Muhammad Morsi participated in as president in 2012 wherein lay Egyptians could Tweet questions directly to the president and receive responses in real time. I then examine a court transcript and an accompanying audio track with a court artist’s renditions of key scenes produced by Al-Jazeera, from the first session of Morsi’s November 4, 2013 court hearing.

Figure 3.1: Muhammad Morsi in a Cage.
The Egyptian national courthouse on November 4, 2013. Credit: YouTube.

wherein he was being accused by the state of inciting violence and providing support to the posthumously-declared-terrorist Muslim Brotherhood organization, among other charges. The unit of analysis I seek to locate and describe through my transcriptions is what Agha (2003, 2005) calls ‘voicing contrasts’.

3.2 Background

In the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Muhammad Morsi set out to create a new, revolutionary, democratic Islamist governmental institution using religious, political, social, economic, and linguistic resources. The revolution began on January 25, 2011 and ‘ended’ in eighteen days, for some, when Egypt’s authoritarian ‘president’ Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011 after 30 years of uninterrupted rule.

The 18 Days of mass protests in Tahrir Square lent a voice to the previously voiceless Egyptian publics, and with that came the now-demonstrated power of the people to, for the first time in the country’s history, directly and immediately influence government. That historicity prompted the rise of a sense of politically empowered “peoplehood” summed up by the revolution’s neologistic use of the word “iš-ša‘b” (‘the people’) and “ša‘biyya” (‘people power’). However, hidden in these nouns formulated in the singular is a deep, polyphonous multiplicity of identities seeking acknowledgment, “dignity” (‘karāma’), greater freedoms, the righting of perceived injustices over the long reign of Mubarak’s rule, and, overwhelmingly, a modern, authentic, democratic government that would represent them, ‘the people’, with equality and respect while upholding and defending the human rights of all. ‘The people’ wanted checks and
balances and transparency, among other things. This partial list, however, is better read as an index of “change”, or an abstract declaration of principles and values born out of the experiences of the revolution. At no point did the revolutionaries collaborate to produce specific policy formulations—nor were they invited to do so by the Muslim Brotherhood or the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which were the two most powerful and popular organizations in the wake of the fall of Mubarak and his National Democratic Party (NDP).

This left the drafting, passing, and implementation of policies that sufficiently reflected these mixed and varied revolutionary values and sentiments to Morsi and the civilian transitional government he now headed. Morsi’s government, however, was itself inchoate and in the harried processes of self-organization and codification. It also regularly faced challenges to its authority from the very popular institutions of the powerful Egyptian Armed Forces from whence Egypt’s last three rulers had sprang and in whom was vested - as was widely believed at the time - the responsibility of overseeing a transition to democracy. This sacred duty was understood to have been bestowed upon SCAF by the revolutionaries themselves. In that way, SCAF had the ‘people power’ behind them, and Morsi and his government were charged with forming institutions and laws that would honor, embody and represent that power.40

The history of this complicated endeavor cannot be covered in the space of this analysis in great detail. I aim, rather, to establish a working framework for describing the transformations to Egyptian institutional governmental discourses, the production of revolutionary voices and identities in relation to social action. I addresses some of the relevant, complex roles of (modern)

40 Wael Ghonim’s 2012 memoire is a self-reflection on his role in challenging Mubarak during the Egyptian revolution. He also explores the idea of people power and posits that crowds have the ability to create change. Ghonim is the prominent Egyptian Google executive behind the “We’re all Khaled Said” social media campaign (see: https://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk/).
standardized Arabic (MSA) and Egyptian Colloquial Arabic (ECA) but this chapter is not primarily concerned with the role of diglossia.

3.3 New Political Standard Arabic and the Revolutionary Interval

I define the “the revolutionary interval” in the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring uprising, in part, as a period in which Egyptian political discourse experienced a marked and significant shift to a new form of *speaking and acting politically*. The new *spoken* form is an admixture I call ‘new political standard Arabic’ (npSA); its antecedent, and enduring counterpart, can be called ‘old political standard Arabic’ (opSA). I am not drawing a technically linguistic or dialectological distinction here, so much as a socio-linguistic one. The revolution did not spark a great transformation of Arabic phonetics, rather, it sparked a disruption of the traditional domain divisions of ECA and MSA as separate, but at times mixed, codes. Specifically, ECA was used more frequently in newspapers and in public political speeches - domains in which MSA has typically been the lingua franca. My contention is that npSA represents the difference in how lay, or non-elite, Egyptians began *speaking and acting politically* on and after January 25, 2011. This is in counter-distinction to how lay Egyptians *spoke and acted politically* before then.

Achcar’s 2013 *The People Want*, analyzes, among other things, the significance of a new collectivity of Egyptians who saw themselves as acting politically when they chanted “the people want to topple the regime” during the revolution. When the protestors articulated demands of the government, they did so using the first-person plural, “we”. For Achcar, this was the revolution. The underpinnings of this emergent “we” were not strictly political and cannot be reduced to cultural explanations or frameworks based on age, Islam, or gender. He points to economic decline and massive unemployment as key factors, but also suggests a dynamic of Foucauldian
power relations where a body politic formed specifically in opposition and contradistinction to
the corruption of the Mubarak regime (Achcar 2013:231).

The rise of the new political “we” that Achcar, and others whom I will address in chapter
5, responds to, coincides with the increased frequency of the use of Egyptian Colloquial Arabic
in predominantly Modern Standard Arabic domains, such as newspapers. In the next section I
will administer a corpus analysis to investigate the shift from a more traditional separation of
domains between MSA and ECA varieties to the revolutionary interval’s and post-revolutionary
state of affairs where code choice has become less restricted.

3.4 opSA-npSA Newspaper Corpus Analysis

To test the hypothesis that there was a significant increase in the use of colloquial Arabic (npSA)
in traditionally standard Arabic domains after the revolution, I conducted an experiment using
Google Newspaper Archive Search and ArabicCorpus. I selected a neutral, but unmistakably
colloquial and Egyptian lexical item, “‘āyez”, as the test term. The word means “I want,” and
was chosen to reflect Achcar’s new “we”. Unlike English, where a pronoun is required to clarify
the inflection of a verb (e.g. “I go” versus “we go”), Arabic verbs inflect person along with mood
and aspect.

I ran a search in unpointed Arabic script for the term as a lemma on a Google archive of
the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Masri Al-Yawm, from about five years before the revolution,
covering the period of 12/31/2004 through 12/31/2010. Using the term as a lemma, the corpus
search is able to capture multiple variations of it, including the plural “‘āyzīn” (‘we want’). This
test retrieved 47 results - or total articles - and an average word frequency of 1.75 usages of the
term per article. In a corpus of 23,500 words, based on an average of 500 words per article, the term occurred 82.25 times.

I then ran the same test only from slightly before the revolution began: December 31, 2010, through to the end of 2016, covering another period of about five years. This query returned considerably more results: 1390. Each result is an article that contains the search term at least once in either the title or the body. In this case, each article contained an average of 500 words. Based on a random sampling of the 1390 results, I determined an average of 2.75 instances of the term per article, or 3822.5 instances in the total corpus of approximately 695,000 words.

To compare these results, I normalized the corpora based on a coefficient of 29.57. The resulting pre-revolution rate of frequency of the ECA test term was .0035. The second test, which covered a five year period that included the revolution, yielded a frequency of .0055. This represents a 57% increase of the use of the ECA test term from the five-year period just prior to the revolution, and the five-year period encompassing it.

I repeated the test using Google’s newspaper archive of another prominent Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram. Al-Ahram is a state-run paper. Using the same pre-revolution period (12/31/2004-12/31/2010) and the same ECA test term, the query returned 70 results. A randomized test revealed an average frequency of the test term of 1.5 occurrences per article and 500 words per article. For this 35,000-word corpus, then, there were a total of 105 instances. The same test over the five-year period including the revolution (12/31/2010-12/31/2016) garnered 541 results with an average of 3.25 occurrences of the ECA term per article. There were a total of 1,758.25 occurrences of the term in this 270,500-word corpus.
I normalized the sizes of the corpora using a coefficient of 7.73. I calculated the pre-revolution frequency of the ECA term in the Al-Ahram dataset to be .003. The second test, including the revolution, turned up a frequency of .0065. This indicates a 116.66% increase in the frequency of ECA in the period encompassing the 2011 revolution.

I conducted the above experiments to compare the incidence of the ECA test term over two periods in four sets of corpora. While all results were part of the same survey, the test term was queried in two distinct newspaper archives - the privately-owned, Al-Masri Al-Yowm (MY), and the state-run, Al-Ahram (AH). The frequency of the test term in the MY corpora was calculated using the total number of words in each corpus as the denominator for the fraction (23,500 and 695,000 respectively). And the frequency of the test term in the AH corpora was similarly calculated using the total number of words in each corpus as the denominator (35,000 and 270,500 respectively). Since the denominators for the fractions represent different newspaper archives, a two-sample t-test between frequencies was appropriate.

The research question was then: Is there a significant difference between the proportion of articles containing the attribute (the ECA test term) for the corpora for the period prior to the revolution (opSA) and the proportion of articles containing the test term in the corpora for the period overlapping and extending beyond the revolution (npSA)?

3.5 Null Hypothesis

The null hypothesis was that there is no significant difference between the proportions of articles containing the attribute in the MY corpora and the proportion of articles with the attribute in the AH corpora:

\[ H_0: \mu_1 - \mu_2 = 0 \]
In the above, $u_1$ is the mean of the occurrences of the test term in the pre-revolution corpora and $u_2$ represents that of the mean of the corpora encompassing the revolution. If the difference is, in fact, zero that would signify that there is no difference between the frequencies of the test term, and therefore the use of ECA in a traditionally MSA medium, for the two sets of corpora, MY and AH.

3.6 T-Test Results

Using SocSciStatistics, I performed a two-tailed t-test between the above-described proportions to determine whether there is a significant difference between the pre-revolutionary period and the revolutionary period with respect to the frequencies of the attribute:

\[
t = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\left(\frac{(N_1 - 1)s_1^2 + (N_2 - 1)s_2^2}{N_1 + N_2 - 2}\right)\left(\frac{1}{N_1} + \frac{1}{N_2}\right)}}
\]

The t-statistic was significant at the .05 critical alpha level. The t-value was determined to be -4.92 and the p-value was .038. Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the difference between the frequencies in the pre- and overlapping revolutionary periods was indeed statistically significant at $p < .05$ (see appendix 1 for the t-test calculations).

The results suggest that the difference between the frequency of ECA in these newspaper archives in the five-year periods before and after the revolution can be explained by some factor other than random chance. My contention is that the 2011 revolution is the explanatory variable.
3.7 opSA-npSA Slogan-Chant Corpus Analysis

To test the contention that the revolutionaries used ECA at higher frequencies than MSA in the traditionally-MSA domain of political discourse, I analyzed a corpus of 100 of the slogan-chants used in Tahrir Square (see appendix 10). I collected these from 2011-2013 during the first two years after the revolution began and included them as part of a larger Arab Spring slogan-chant collection project I described in my master’s thesis, “’irHal!”: The Role of Language in the Arab Uprisings. The corpus reveals that the revolutionaries largely employed anti-military messaging and used mainly synecdochical figurative tropes (“O Tantawi, tomorrow will be your turn”, “Meena Danial, o child, your death liberates a country”). The name of an individual, like Tantawi (the former Egyptian Field Marshall or leader of the Egyptian military), was used in 73 of the chants to represent all of the individuals and institutions that make up the Egyptian military, and more specifically, SCAF. Similarly, Meena Danial, a female and Christian protester who was killed by soldiers, was referenced in a chant alongside Khaled Said and Alaa Sayf, males and Muslims, to project the diversity of the revolutionary movement. Synecdoche was used in 62 out of the 100 slogans. This trope was used to initiate newcomers and unify protestors under anti-government and anti-military banners. In the slogan-chants, the government was represented by Hosni Mubarak, in image and in name (3 use “Hosni”, 27 use “Mubarak”). His visage and name activated anti-government animus. Tantawi’s image and name were used to elicit anti-military sentiment.

Pro-revolutionary chants, used in 41 cases, also used synecdoche to inspire revolutionary fervor: “Mohla City has been called strong.. we won’t let our brothers and sisters be sacrificed.” Here, Mohla City, a place, is used to represent the people from that city and previous protest
events that took place there. “Brothers and sisters” are fictive kin terms used to express and encourage unity among the protestors.

I conducted a word density test to identify the ten most highly used meaningful terms in the slogan-chant corpus (see appendix 11). I then determined the code of each as either MSA or ECA. 38 of the terms, out of a corpus of 55, were in MSA and 12 were in ECA. The MSA frequency is .69 compared to only .22 for ECA, constituting a percent difference of 213.6% (MSA > ECA). While this might, on the face of it, suggest a contradiction to the contention that the revolution spurred an increase in the frequency of ECA, the results must be taken in context.

I ran a phrase density test on the slogan-chant corpus to contextualize the word density results (see appendix 12). This generated a phrase corpus of 205 items. I then coded each phrase as either MSA or ECA. The phrase analysis took underlying syntax and ECA-MSA phoneme ratios into account to determine if its overall categorization would be ECA or MSA. The existence of a single lexical item from MSA amid an otherwise-ECA phrase, would still earn the phrase a categorization of ECA if the MSA term appeared to be a loanword, and vice versa. A phrase would was also considered ECA if each of the component words in it were MSA but, in the composite, it was clear that the phraseology was ECA. Thus, in the phrase: المجلس لازم يمشي (il-magles le:zim yimšī, meaning ‘the Council must go’), a strictly componential analysis would correctly identify each of the words in this concatenation as MSA. However, the syntax in which the subject, il-magles (‘the Council’) appears at the beginning of the sentence violates the conventional VSO (verb, subject, object) structure of MSA. Poetic license might explain the novel word order, but the use of the verb “yimšī” (‘to walk’) to mean “go” strongly suggests that the phrase is, in fact, ECA.
Truly ambiguous phrases were not counted. For example, ‘daughter of Egypt’, which appears only as بنت مصر in unpointed writing, could be read as MSA (bint Miṣr) or as ECA (bint Maṣṣ). Nothing about the syntax of this possessive construction suggests one code over the other. It is likely that the phrase was uttered in ECA, given the setting (Tahrir) and the overwhelming prevalence of ECA over MSA in slogan-chants, songs, and artwork. However, MSA was also used for important messaging. Two of the most frequent and prominent slogan-chants were entirely in MSA: “‘irḥal” (‘begone’) and “‘iš-ša ‘b yurīd ’isqāṭ n-nīṯām” (‘the people want to topple the regime ’).

In the phrase corpus, the proportionate ECA-to-MSA densities were nearly the mirror opposite of the word density test. 47 out of the 205 phrases were in MSA, which computes a frequency of .23. 143 of the phrases were in ECA, with a frequency of .69. The preponderance of ECA over MSA, in percentage terms, was 204.36%.

These findings support the argument that the domain of ECA expanded to that of political discourse during the revolution. The large majority of slogan-chants were articulated in ECA at a frequency that was 204.36% higher than that of MSA. Each of the chapters prior to and following the corpus analyses in sections 3.4-7 instantiate the claim that ECA was the predominant code of the revolution and ushered in a period in which the domain of ECA expanded into customarily MSA domains, especially newspapers and public political discourse.

3.8 Polyvocality and Heteroglossia

I am interested in characterizing npSA as a “new” voice in the arenas of Arab politics in contrast to opSA, but, in this chapter, I am particularly focused on the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise and fall
in post-revolutionary\textsuperscript{41} Egypt. As such, I will argue that once in power as president, Muhammad Morsi began to speak in what Agha calls enregistered voices that were 1) \textit{modern}, 2) \textit{revolutionary}, 3) \textit{Islamist} and 4) \textit{institutional}, or governmental.

Specifically, these voices are \textit{new}, or modern, in their medium and accessibility; \textit{revolutionary} in their inversion of traditional register rules such that the revolution marked the use of dialectical Arabic on par with opSA in conventionally opSA-only contexts; \textit{Islamist} in its authoritative enregisterment marked by ‘strategic content avoidance’ (i.e. ambiguity) and classical Arabic grammar and morphemes; and \textit{institutional} or governmental in its attempt to simultaneously challenge and ultimately displace the incumbent regime of Hosni Mubarak and the National Democratic Party while creating an alternative Islamist democratically-elected government to replace it.

Spelling out these “voices” does not preclude the possibility of a speaker mixing across and in between them; indeed, speakers, as demonstrated in the transcripts of this analysis, switch and mix between these voices at the inter-sentential as well as inter-phonemic levels (Myers-Scotton 2002:2, Namba 2002:2).\textsuperscript{42} I analyzed the work of these code choices, or ‘voicing contrasts’, from the standpoints of the literature on institutional discourse analysis and language as social action.

\textsuperscript{41} Egypt has experienced multiple revolutions in its long history. For the purpose of this dissertation, unless otherwise specified, all references to “revolution” are with regard to the 2011 revolution.

Voices are used to communicate more than just basic meanings. A voice is able to express something about how the speaker wishes to present oneself in the communicative event. A voice also cannot be divorced from the speaker’s intended interlocutor(s). In the case of a public figure, like Morsi, giving a speech, voicing choices can be analyzed to determine which constituencies the speaker is addressing, or including, in the remarks.

The detectable voices in Morsi’s post-revolutionary public discourse markedly shift from when he was a candidate for presidency to after he won the office. Most notably, the amount of npSA voicing increased after he became president. To illustrate this transition, below is an excerpt from a public speech Morsi gave at Mansoura Stadium on April 22, 2012 as a candidate for the upcoming presidential election the following month. Bold font indicates a direct reference to a specific constituency, rather than an indirect allusion, which is marked by the lack of bold font. The coloration scheme identifies the following specific constituencies:

- Neutral/Phatic [black, regular font]
- **Egyptian males (in Egypt)**
- All Muslims (everywhere)
- Moderate Muslims (in Egypt)
- Muslims who are in the Muslim Brotherhood
- Egyptian Christians (Copts)
- All-inclusive 1st person plural (Egyptians, in/out Egypt)
- All-inclusive 1st person plural (Egyptian revolutionaries, in Egypt)

- Ambiguously Religious/Theistic (religiously pluralistic)
- **Egyptian revolutionaries in 2011 revolution**
- Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) [esp. leadership]
- All Arab revolutionaries of the Arab Uprisings (2010-present, everywhere)
The speech was aired on Al-Jazeera. Based on a close reading of his 4/22/2012 speech, Morsi’s campaign strategy for the presidency was three-pronged. He had to describe post-2011 Egypt in terms that proved his authenticity as a supporter of the revolution; he also needed to persuade the audience, and consumers of the news through other media, that he himself embodies the values of the revolution; and finally, he has to differentiate himself sufficiently from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its affiliate political party, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP):

1. …the **sons** of the **nation** (al-’umma).
2. **praise be to God** (alḥamdulillah).
3. the one who assembled the **sons** of Egypt”
4. **The shining sun of truth will rise**
5. **and the night and the afflictions**
6. **and evil will go [away] and**
7. **the nation** (’umma) **[will] wipe its tears…**
8. **We all** live for a dream **we** wanted to see come true.
9. **we** were **certain** (‘ala: yaqi:n) that God (Allah) will force out oppression, sadness, and despair
10. from this **nation** (’umma).
11. and **we are now certain** (‘ala: yaqi:n) and optimistic that God (Allah)
12. the creator of the creation.
13. who **nothing tires Him in the heavens or the earth**.
14. **if He willed something, he then says** “‘be’; so it is”.
15. He willed for **us goodness** (xayran) in **our revolution**…
16. today **we all see this good** (tayyib), **blessed** (muba:rak) assembly by which.
17. and I repeat. and by its example.
18. **the sun of truth will rise shinily**.

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Available: [http://youtu.be/qAFAPi-xemk](http://youtu.be/qAFAPi-xemk)
19. **the sun of truth will rise shinily**

20. **by the will of God** (bi-‘ira:dat_illeh).

Morsi’s 34-minute speech as a candidate does not make much use of npSA. The voices he deployed addressed a broader audience while projecting an optimistic outlook for post-revolutionary Egypt. The speech was overtly theistic without being exclusively Islamic. Morsi begins with a lengthy Islamic salutation and supplication-invocation in a recognizably Islamic and Muslim-moralistic style. Pragmatically, there is a great deal of awkward bodily negotiating taking place due to technical problems with the stands for the multiple microphones. Morsi decides to hold three microphones in his left hand, which hampers his ability to gesture with it. He manages to gesture consistently with his right hand. Prosodically, his volume is high and his facial expressions indicate that he is shouting. He adopts an Islamic didactic style of sermon-speech giving accompanied by a hybrid physical demeanor that resembles a Muslim preacher standing at a minbar at a Friday prayer.

Every line of his oration is phonated in the following stress pattern (underlined font indicates a light stress; bold font indicates a heavy stress; “+”s attach two half-syllables; “-“s attach across syllable units): a+b-a+b-a+b-A+B. The strategy garners him a great deal of audience participation in the form of loud applause, spontaneous musical interludes that interrupt his speech, and improvised slogan chants, including “insha’Allah Morsi kasbān” (‘Allah-willing Morsi will win’) and “‘aḥna koll l-maṣriyyīn” (ECA: ‘we are all the Egyptians’).
Overall, the speech is systematically inclusive and pluralistic in its lexicon and metaphors, even if many references to constituencies are nominal or awkward. He is consistent throughout the speech in including feminine singular and plural pronouns to unambiguously include female Egyptians in his addresses. He does, however, praise female Egyptians who “work hard in assistance to their husbands in the fields”, which is class-specific but also recapitulates a traditional trope and familiar socio-economic status framing. The effect is to include female Egyptians in his ontology of post-2011 Egypt (future irrealis idealization) within a firmly pre-2011 Egypt framing (past irrealis idealization).

Lines 4-7 (“The shining sun of truth will rise”, “and the night and the afflictions”, “and evil will go [away] and”, “the nation (‘umma) [will] wipe its tears”) and 18-19 (“the sun of truth will rise shinily”, “the sun of truth will rise shinily”) contain examples of Morsi’s macro-strategy of framing Egypt in as inclusive of terms as possible by using optimistic language that is not overly exclusive to Muslims or Muslim Brotherhood members. A month away from the election, Morsi uses the metaphor of the sun to reflect the emergent, shared Egyptian values of the general population. Still, the metaphor of a new, brighter day can also speak to young, left-leaning, secular revolutionaries while simultaneously deflecting negative associations between himself and the Muslim Brotherhood. This demonstrates the beginnings of a transition to a more overtly revolutionary way of speaking (and acting) politically in Morsi’s public addresses after he becomes president.
On October 6th, 2012, one hundred days into his presidency, Morsi finds himself once again speaking publicly before a large audience in a major Egyptian athletic arena. Speaking at the Cairo Stadium, President Morsi addresses a mixed cross-section of the public on a very popular national holiday. His speech is to commemorate the 39th anniversary of the ‘glorious October victory’ over Israel on October 6, 1973 when the Egyptian army under the leadership of President Anwar Sadat crossed the Suez Canal to re-capture the Bar Lev line and raise the Egyptian flag over the reclaimed territory. The crowd is audibly and visibly at a high level of energy.

Like the 4/22/2012 speech, on 10/6/2012 President Morsi aimed to be as inclusive as possible. The basic strategy he must semiotically perform is to convince and invoke in the audience, both those present in the stadium and those experiencing the speech event through other media, that at this first major juncture of his presidency, he and his government are upholding the values of the 2011 revolution. His objective, based on a close reading of the speech event’s multiple modalities, is to persuade Egyptians of the proposition that Egypt under President Morsi is true to the 2011 revolution (past irrealis) while also realizing the idealized projection of post-2011 Egypt in accordance with candidate Morsi’s campaign promises (future irrealis). Already looming over his event construals, however, is the rising voice of the anti-Morsi movement, which called itself the ‘Tamarrod Revolution’. It gained much more traction after Morsi’s November declaration of presidential powers.

The following is an excerpt from the one-hour and fifty-one-minute speech:

1. revolutionaries . free [people] . we will complete this mission
2. the Egyptian people , all of them present in this place and those standing
3. outside of this place
4. and those watching us in every home in Egypt.
5. the watchers who are Egyptian outside of Egypt.
6. and non-Egyptians.
7. the Great Egyptian people.
8. I salute you. I salute you all. I salute you all.
9. by the greeting of the one who created us all: peace be upon you[pl.] (as-sala:mu ‘alaykom).
10. today is the day of Egypt.
11. today is a day of mercy.
12. today is a day of remembering the slaughter.
13. today is the sixth of October and also Saturday.
14. you all remember that on the sixth of October.
15. the tenth of Ramadan.
16. in the year 1973[col.].
17. was a Saturday.
18. and today is also a Saturday.
19. we today celebrate and are proud before all the nations (’umam)
20. [showing] that Egypt is a people (ša’b)
21. and an army (gayš).
22. we are proud before the world (’umam)
23. [showing] that Egypt is a people (ša’b)
24. and an army (gayš).
25. and a leadership.
26. and a soldiery.
27. Egypt. with all her sons.
28. was hugely happy that day 39 years ago.
29. and the leaders and soldiers.
30. and behind them all the sons of Egypt.
31. cross the Suez Canal and …
32. and move into the land of Egypt to the Sinai.
33. that is the Egypt we want it to be.
34. for our sons and our grandchildren.
35. this is not impossible.
36. but it requires our effort.
37. and requires of us cooperation.
38. and requires of us energy.
39. and requires of us giving.
40. and requires of us love (ḥobb).
41. and requires of us cooperation.
42. and a necessary word to my family and brothers.
43. the Christians in Frafah.
44. who were worried about their security and they are right.
45. if someone scared them or attacked them.
46. aggression against them [Christians].
47. is aggression against every Egyptian.
48. it is aggression against me personally [col.].
49. this is unacceptable.
50. they have the right to protection (ḥima:ya) as any Egyptian.
51. security must be available.
52. and we expend every effort in that.
53. and we work day and night.
54. until things stabilize.
55. in every quarter of the nation (al-waṭan).
56. let us produce together.
57. let us each live from what we produce.
58. let us acquire (namtaliku) [grasp]
59. our will to return the good to its family.
the army.

and the people.

and the police.

and all sons of Egypt.

are one hand.

over the heart of one man.

to a better future.

with God’s permission (bi-’īdn_illah)

the Syrians were with us on the Syrian front…

the Syrians and the Egyptians are one body

Ontologically, in this speech Morsi directly and frequently makes statements that are inclusive of the 2011 revolutionaries, women, Christians, and SCAF. He also speaks about himself - he repeats the phrase “ataḥammalu l-mas’ūliyya kāmila” (‘I carry the entire responsibility’) in conjunction with a self-evaluation of his first 100 days in office. He explains that “in the time of 100 days… the 100 days I talked about before . and I talk about it with full clarity and frankness. I carry the full responsibility . with you … we together“ (ca. 39:00). In the first 38 minutes of the speech he has blended 10/6/1973 Egypt with present irrealis Egypt and thereby constructed a very positive alternative event, or ecology-ontology, of “Morsi’s post-2011 Egypt”. He only then circles back to assess his first 100 days as a resounding ‘success’ for which he is responsible, but shares that credit ‘with every Egyptian’.

The imperative of this speech was to invoke trust for Morsi and his government, and by extension, the Muslim Brotherhood. The use of npSA (indicated in the two hues of red to reflect either just pro-revolutionary Egyptians or pro-revolutionary Arabs writ large) signals a blending of Morsi’s political and social goals. In as much as Morsi is interested in advocating himself as a
legitimate, democratic leader for the country, he also needs to prove himself to be worthy of the revolutionaries’ support. With the fate of post-Tahrir Egypt teetering between the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF, and many Egyptians who did not align with either, this was no easy task for Morsi.

Morsi’s demeanor, physically, reflected the challenge he faced with this speech. He is less didactic than usual and more politically agentive - comparatively, he gestures more than Mubarak ever did, which projects a more everyman ontology. His stress pattern is similar to that of the 4/22/2012 speech but slightly truncated: a+b-a+b-a+B. Prosodically, his volume is comparably high, his pitch does not shift significantly, and his phonation is highly patterned in a re-crescendoing pattern that starts each phrase in a quieter, creaky, or modal voice (Sicoli, 2007), but then quickly rises in energy and, in turn, volume.

At around 48:00 Morsi begins to address the state of the economy and, with that transition, he chooses to speak in ECA until 52:11s, at which point he begins to increase the proportion of MSA in his speech style. The audience quiets down during this period and is re-energized by Morsi’s positive projections for the future of Egypt at 53:09s. Morsi’s conspicuous use of large gestures and deployment of ECA projects a highly relatable, possibly more credible, ontology. In post-revolutionary Egypt, sounding less like a politician and more like an ordinary, lay citizen, is likely a helpful tactic in demonstrating trustability and legitimacy.

Morsi is able to co-opt the complex of positive valuations he’s constructed to deliver what are essentially very difficult items of news concerning the reality of then present-day Egypt as it faced a severely wavering economy. He explained, for example, the need to take loans

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Haddad, Bsheer, and Abu-Rish (2012) investigate the political economy dimension of the Arab Spring uprisings across the region in relation to other impacts on culture.
from international lending banks like the “IMF”. This is a historically unpopular decision, as will be discussed further in chapter 4.

The person references and pronouns are meticulously inclusive (see 32:00-33:00), but there are long swathes of the speech that project a more exclusively Muslim, or Islamic moralistic ontology. At 11:30s he begins a collective Islamic call-and-response petitionary prayer that is a traditional structure in Friday sermons (i.e. *du’a* or supplication). At 33:30s he employs a highly inclusive macro-strategy of crediting “October 6” itself, abstractly, for providing Egypt with “this spirit” (*hāḏār-rūḥ*), which, even in context, is ambiguous but likely refers to the spirit of the 2011 revolution as well as the high energy of those in attendance at the stadium. He strategically connected the more distant memory of Egypt’s victory on October 6th, 1973 with the recent event of his historic victory as Egypt’s first democratically elected president following the revolution. If he managed to extend the positive public sentiment around the October 6 holiday to his presidency, that would mean a significant boost to his declining popularity. I discuss the strategy of linking past events to present realities as a method for improving public opinion in chapter 4. The success or failure of his speech hinges on several axes, but the linguistic cues he projected through the use of *npSA* should be understood as major elements of the effort to present himself as personable, credible, inclusive, democratic, and a legitimate son of the revolution.

Later in this chapter, I will examine another transcript of President Morsi interacting with the public but over social media rather than in a stadium. I will also investigate Morsi’s post-coup discourse with a transcription of a hearing record where he was officially charged for crimes by a chief Egyptian magistrate.
3.9 Islamist Discourse

In the analysis section of this chapter, I addressed the inherent tension in the overlap of Morsi’s post-Arab Spring idiolect, in which he attempts to speak in the range of voices described above (section 3.3), with a particular focus on the use of npSA. I compared this to the historicity of the pre-Arab Spring incumbent regime’s traditional governmental use of ‘old political Standard Arabic’ (opSA). I use the phrase ‘political standard Arabic’ or political SA rather than MSA, because I am interested in the ways standard Arabic is deployed for political purposes and how those uses have shaped a particular, identifiably “political” discursive type, or “figure” in Agha’s terms, before, during, and after the revolutionary interval in Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood, and specifically Muhammad Morsi, used language to create, or attempt to create, a new, revolutionary Islamist-democratic institutional order in Egypt while countering and undermining the regime discourse of Mubarak’s government. When violent means were not in use, language was largely the medium through which these institutional battles took place. Before answering the question of what constitutes an “Islamist discourse” in Egypt, however, I interrogated the process of the linguistic creation of institutional, and in this case socio-political, orders that are intended to displace incumbent institutional orders. My question was: how is language a factor in these revolutionary and counter-revolutionary interactions? In this context, by ‘revolutionary’, I specifically mean the undertaking of actions,

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45 Later in the chapter I explain what I mean by “Islamist” when specifically referring to this lexical item’s “work” or pragmatic force in the context of linguistic analysis. At this point, I need to explain that in place of “new, revolutionary Islamist-democratic institutional order”, I sometimes use “Islamist” as an abbreviation, albeit rather charged. I feel justified in doing so because in this chapter I have specified what I mean by it in the limited, narrow scope in which I comport with it in relation to other “voices”. In other contexts I have misgivings about the term “Islamism”, particularly in Arab studies literature where it is sometimes used synonymously with ‘terrorism’, ‘fundamentalism’, ‘radical/extreme Islam’, or with other pejorative, Islamophobic connotations. Others still seem to categorize any politician who is Muslim as an ‘Islamist’ and this is highly problematic.
social, political and linguistic, that are intended to challenge and ultimately displace an existing governmental institution and create a new institution to replace it. I use “and” rather than “while” or “then”, because the chronologies are mixed, dialogical, and not linear in either direction.

3.10 Emergent Analytical Concepts: Institutional Fragility and the Revolutionary Interval

Heller's contention that institutions are the result of discursive processes is critical to my approach to describing the creation of Islamist institutional order and governance, and the backlash against it in the specific case of post-2011 Egypt. According to Heller, "[w]hat institutions are supposed to do, what they really produce, what ideologies are relevant to making sense out of and legitimating their work, all emerge out of discursive processes, some more routinized than others, of course, and some more consequential than others" (Heller 2007: 645). This section will attempt to situate recursivity with respect to institutional fragility and failure within the concept of the ‘revolutionary interval’.

Goffman’s (1974) conceives of frames as constraining what the hearers believe to be socially and politically possible, or ‘speakable’ in Butler’s (2002) terms, and thereby play a definitive role in explaining the transnationalism of the Arab Spring. In the application section of this chapter I analyze data that illustrates how the language of the 'speakers' (those in power) is heard by the designated ‘hearers' (those out of power) who may be competing for political power, and then re-interpreted into social and socio-political action and identity.

Along the lines of structuration (Giddens 1984) in the emergence and maintenance of institutional discourses, the notion of recursivity, the continual reproduction of social, constructed systems through language and action, takes place at the individual as well as broader collective levels through institutional discourse and 'bodily discourse' in time and space.
Poedjosoedarmo, in “Javanese Speech Levels”, argues that, “every speaker of Javanese, regardless of his social status or geographical origin, uses all of the speech levels, each level in the appropriate situation depending upon whom he is addressing” (Poedjosoedarmo 1968:57). Similarly, in this chapter I investigate voicing contrasts in the structured utterances of representatives of Egyptian institutions as complex sets of choices made by individual speakers in response to co-textual effects as well as social, political, and in some cases religious, considerations. Along with voicing, this analysis describes and interprets the co-emergence of institutions alongside newly enregistered discourses designed to disrupt incumbent institutions while creating institutions and institutional identities. More specifically, in this examination of the Arab Spring, I am working toward a framework for interpreting how discourses contend or compete through language in the emergence of new institutions and the maintenance of incumbent institutions within specific historic intervals - in this case, the interval of the Egyptian 2011 revolution.

Agar’s (1985) ‘ecology of discourse’ and Searle's (2010) ‘wall into boundary' and conception of ‘authorization' to cross a boundary is salient to my understanding of the linguistic events, the speech acts, that constituted and reconstitute the Arab Spring uprisings, and particularly the Egyptian revolution in 2011. Specifically, I examine the successes and failures of various key players, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in national politics, within a period I term “the revolutionary interval”.

3.11 Language as Action

Goodwin’s insight about ‘action’ helps to ground this examination of its relationship to language: “it should be understood as encompassing this interactively organized process of public
recognition of meaningful events reflexively linked to the ongoing production of these same events through the use of appropriate semiotic resources within an unfolding temporal horizon" (Goodwin 2000:1492). In this way, there may be two ways of approaching the importance of the Arab Spring as a linguistic revolution. One way is as a series of events whereby the norms and frames of language use when encountering the government were subverted both in terms of diglossic constraints and the expression of criticism in large public gatherings. Another approach is to explore the argument that the 'uprisings' are comprised of smaller factions, sub-groups, and perhaps sub-'speech communities', that came to coalesce around an emergent, deictic genre of words, actions, and, to extend the dramaturgical metaphor, props such as signs, banners, ways of dress, effigies, and events like the milyônîya ('million+ person protests'). Language and action then converged into a large-scale 'activism' that disrupted status quo situations in nearly every Arab state - but to what extent was that ‘linguistic activism' across Arab states, which consisted of a particular revolutionary genre and commensurate actions/activities, the same? In other words, again, is there a 'language of the Arab Spring that is or co-produces social action, or are there language(s), varieties, argots, idioms, voices, etc.?

The above question is relatively new in Arabic sociolinguistics and analyses of regional political discourse and therefore few have attempted to address it, let alone with specific attention to the Arab Spring. Academic attention seems to be more concerned with Democracy promotion after the Arab Spring (Bauer 2016; van Hüllen 2015; Sadiki 2014; Taylor 2014; Boening 2014). Bassiouney, however, approaches political conflict as it relates to language use and identity in the Egyptian revolution through a linguistic analytical framework that treats
language as a "social resource" and is concerned with "access" to linguistic resources (Bassiouney 2013:2). In this way, access, or lack thereof, constitutes, for Bassiouney, an "exclusion-inclusion process" (Bassiouney 2013:2). Bassiouney also highlights the "ideological factors" underlying language as a social resource to interrogate the assumption that "Egyptians share the same indexes of codes" (Bassiouney 2013:2). Bassiouney argues that "when a group or individual claims to have access to a specific code, for example SA, this group or individual may be also attempting to achieve a position as legitimate, powerful, or both," and, she adds, especially during political conflicts, "linguistic ideologies... take over from linguistic reality and indexes of different codes are then of pivotal importance" (Bassiouney 2013:2).

I will return to the question of language as social action when discussing Agha’s approach to voicing and enregisterment. I have been careful to not overstate the "role" of language(s) in the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, but one assumption I make is that there is an essentially 'verbal' element to both the destruction of incumbent institutions and the construction of new institutions, particularly Islamist ones. As Bourdieu explains it, "[w]hat creates the power of words and slogans, a power capable of maintaining or subverting the social order, is the belief in the legitimacy of words and of those who utter them,” but, paradoxically, “words alone cannot create this belief" (Bourdieu 1991:170). In this way, action, or physical movement in space-time, must accompany words to create a meaningful vector with the requisite force to compel an interactant to form an ideological belief from the utterances. Oral production with physical performance, together, enable ideology. I will return to the relationship between oral and physical performance in chapter 4 when I discuss ‘expressive configurations’ (Sicoli 2007, 2016).
Along these lines, for Goffman, "[w]ords are the great device for fetching speaker and hearer into the same focus of attention and into the same interpretation schema that applies to what is thus attended. But that words are the best means to this end does not mean that words are the only one or that the resulting social organization is intrinsically verbal in character" (Goffman 1981:71). In the Arab Spring, words and language bring the speaker and hearer into the "same focus of attention," or frame of reference. The frame constrains what the hearers believe to be socially and politically possible. The language of Arab Spring protests, on signs and in chants, thereby plays an important role not just in conveying a message about a revolution but in producing a revolutionary perspective. This outlook, beyond words and solitary acts of protest, is transformative and gives rise to revolutionary voices and identities. This helps to explain the transnationalism of the Arab Spring and the lasting presence of revolutionary discourse and activism despite the seeming failures in countries like Egypt and Syria to produce institutional change. The revolutionary registers and genre forged in the Arab Spring is not so easily dismantled. Examining these sociolinguistic phenomena provides insights into emerging forms of national and regional identity.

In the examination of two transcripts in the data analysis section of this chapter I therefore argue that the language of the 'elite speakers', those in power (Morsi in transcript 1, the magistrate Yousef in transcript 2), is heard by the designated non-elite(s), or lay, 'hearers', those out of power, such as citizens (Tweeters in transcript 1), or those competing for political, institutional power (Morsi in transcript 2). The interactants’ speech acts are then re-registered discursively by the other interactant as historicized socio-political actions and bases for the formation of typified identity tropes, e.g. “terrorist protestors”, “Islamic extremist”, “military
dictator”, etc. These ‘revolutionary’ re-registerments are intended to either upend or sustain the status quo and so speech acts are re-registered in ways that are simultaneously self-constituting while aiming to destroy the institutionality of the other. A revolutionary communicative performance both seeks to en-register the voice or act of the speaker as revolutionary, legitimate, and governmentally, institutionally authoritative and attempts to de-register the voice or act of the incumbent power holder as anti-revolutionary, corrupt, and bereft of institutional authority. This concept of re-registerment that takes place in the revolutionary interval can be compared to Derrida’s understanding of “citation” (Derrida 1988:12):

in writing [or speaking], which is to say in the possibility of its functioning being cut off, at a certain point, from its ‘original’ desire-to-say-what-one-means and from its participation in a saturable and constraining context…every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written…can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable.

A revolutionary can put the words of a member of the ruling regime “between quotation marks” to “break” it out of its “given context” to “[engender]… new contexts” that at once reinforce revolutionary frames and destroy governmental ones.

3.12 Interpreting Language as Action

Action ascription is intimately influenced by the accompanying language that surrounds and contextualizes the activity and the situation; the discourse of those who hold political power sets the frame against which the action of the ruling bodies are judged. Sidnell's (2007) questions are especially relevant: "how on earth are actions reliably attributed, namely actually recognized?" and, "are we dealing with a mapping of action-to-utterance, or actually something much more complex like a reconstruction of the other's motives, with inevitable ineffability?" (Sidnell
This idea of action ascription along with Agar’s notion of ecology provide a framework for thinking about the constraints on the ‘speakable’ and the ‘doable’ in a given setting.

Below, I address the idea of ‘old political standard Arabic’ (opSA) as only unmarked, or ‘congruent’ (Agha 2005), in limited settings, including, traditionally, when speaking to representatives of government institutions. This research also countenances the implications of protestors using opSA in chants, documents, and social media. The Arab Uprisings subverted the norm of acquiescence to authoritarian governmental institutions in many ways, one of which was through ‘register inversion’ where colloquial forms of Arabic were used to speak politically to government potentates, thus inverting the status quo ante. Another linguistic subversion I call “counter-registerment” also occurred. Prior to 2011, regime claims were made in standard Arabic to propel a discourse centered on the notion that governments are in place to provide security and “stability” (‘istiqrār). The 2011 movements used that very register, opSA, to challenge the incumbent regimes claims as well as their institutional authority.

Register inversion broke the rule that lay citizens need to address those who hold political power in opSA - the rise of ‘people power’ brought with it the rise of the use of colloquial Arabic to speak politically to politicians. Counter-registerment broke a different rule. While it involves the use of opSA by lay citizens to address politicians, it reverses the directionality of the force of the communication. That is, opSA was used to subvert the government rather than to express deference to it. Counter-registerment occurred in Egypt’s 2011 revolutionary interval in chants and slogans, as well as printed documents and social media messaging, repeated on the streets and in traditional and new media by hundreds of thousands or millions of citizens at a time. In
the streets of Egyptian cities, people gathered in protest in public sites, oftentimes in front of
government buildings. Like linguistic counter-registerment, these public protests communicated
physically and with a distinct register and direction.

Choices about where to gather and what message to convey, whether it be pro- or anti-
government or revolution, were embodied and re-valorized sites that were indexical signs of
governmental institutional authority into revolutionary sites. The same buildings and spaces were
now being used against the regimes that they had once held up. The ecology of oppression was
converted into one of liberation where ordinary citizens could gather to learn the newly-minted
oral and physical language of revolt and thus enable a revolutionary identity formation. Words
and actions were re-registered as were physical sites.

Repetition over time multiplied the number of revolutionaries but also compounded the
power of revolutionary voices and identities in the face of the incumbent regime. The
revolutionary power fomented on the streets and in the words and acts of interactions across
Egypt in public squares both off- and online was essentially the power to choose to halt
institutionally recursive behavior. That is, people, individuals and groups, stopped toeing the line
in very basic ways that had major reverberations. Writing signs that challenged the government
in colloquial Arabic shook the institutionality of Mubarak’s regime. In a broader sense, the Arab
Spring revealed to, or perhaps simply reminded the world of the fundamental fragility of all
institutions. I will return the concept of institutional fragility and institutional failure later in this
chapter in the section on heteroglossia.

To reiterate, some of the questions involved in interpreting the co-texts within which
institutions fail, or are destroyed, and created are: What happens to an institution when discourse
recursivity abruptly ends? That is, in the Arab Spring, when there is a ‘revolution’ and the clients, or lay public of an ‘institutional reality’, to use the words of John Searle, refuse to perform the recursive identities and registers that perpetuate the institutions of government? how much longer can the institution survive? In the case of Egypt, the thirty-year government of Hosni Mubarak collapsed in only 18 Days.

Related to the latter question of institutional fragility and discourse recursivity is the matter of how code choice in the Arab Spring itself acted (symbolically) to indicate the ‘end of the regime’ using the very register and lexicon of the regime’s institutional discourse (i.e. register inversion). That is, the principal chant of the Arab Spring is cast into a different light when considering that its designated recipients were members governing regimes. The chant, which is in opSA, ironically challenges the regime using the very idiom of the regime (counter-registerment) at once to a) establish ‘the people’ as a new political entity against the incumbent regime, and b) announce the people’s desire to topple the regime. In the terms that Heritage and Drew (1993) use, the uprisings violated the constraints that emerged from the regime’s institutional goals over time.

Some have argued that the protestors’ use of opSA in their chants undermines them and their putative cause(s) in the Egyptian context. A critical leg of Mubarak’s regime’s power was its ability to recursively maintain its “institutionality” through discourse, including register and directionality, and the mundane social actions involved in the normal bureaucratic interactions between citizens and institutional employees and representatives that reinforce incumbent power relations. The unquestioned day-to-day-ness of these institutional lay-functionary relationships and processes served, in part, to perpetuate authoritarian regimes in nearly all 22 Arab states for
decades until the Arab Spring. In a February 2011 article in *Foreign Policy*, Rashid Khalidi suggests that the Tunisian chant, *aš-ša ‘b yurīd isqāṭ an-niDām* (‘the people want to topple the regime’), which featured prominently in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and other locales, refers to all Arab peoples’ collective desire for region-wide democratization of the prevailing militocratic ancien régimes (Khalidi 2011, Rashid 2011).

Another important example of a central chant of the Arab Uprisings is the redeployed term: “‘irḥal”. “‘irḥal” is a translation of the Tunisian French speech-act-turned-slogan, ‘dégage!’ (‘leave!’, ‘get out!’), used in and around Tunis to ouster Ben Ali in early January of 2011 (Marzouki 2011). It is significant that the initial expression of the sentiment was articulated in French because it was translated only once it was evident that the Tunisian uprising had captured the attention of the wider Arab region (Raman 2012). The French chant needed to be reiterated in MSA for reasons of mutual comprehensibility, Tunisian Arab identity, and to successfully export the revolution. In this way, the regionally prevalent cant, *aš-ša ‘b yurīd isqāṭ an-niDām*, arguably the catchphrase of the Arab Uprisings, has been developed and re-appropriated in MSA and local dialects across the Middle East and North Africa (Ziadan 2011).

### 3.13 Standard Arabic Versus Egyptian Colloquial Arabic

In her 2013 article, “Language and Revolution in Egypt,” Bassiouney describes Standard Arabic (SA) as the language of "formal domains" that is "not spoken as the native language of Egyptians," unlike ECA, which is "used for informal everyday interactions" as the native language of Egyptians" (Bassiouney 2013:2). She adds that in Egypt, "[t]aking control of one's political fate is closely related to controlling one or two linguistic codes" (Bassiouney 2013:2). Bassiouney argues that "[b]y favoring one code over the other, for example SA, one excludes a
group of Egyptians and favors another, and may also find a justification for political elitism" (Bassiouney 2013:2).

Whereas this research is principally concerned with identifying and describing the en-, re-, and counter-registered voices of the various factions of the Arab Spring and the social change enabled, or disabled, by each, Bassiouney is concerned with “how language is related directly to political conflicts” (Bassiouney 2013:2). In this way, Bassiouney posits that language, identity and conflict are closely related: "Politics and language have never been more intertwined than at the time of the Egyptian revolution" (Bassiouney 2013:2).

Bassiouney adopts Heller's theory of language as "both a social process and a social practice" to analyze political conflict in the Egyptian revolution as related to language and identity and "the practice of linguistic choices" as "one and the same system" (Bassiouney 2013:2; Heller, 2007). She further characterizes SA as an "exclusive code mastered only by few intellectuals and not by the mass populations in the Arab world, simply because it is not a spoken language and it is significantly different from the colloquials of Arab countries" (Bassiouney 2013:3). She contends that the linguistic situation in Arab states, including Egypt, "reflects, rather than creates, political tension" (Bassiouney 2013:3).

I intentionally titled the section provocatively, knowing that pitting MSA against any colloquial variety conjures memories of colonialism and activates anti-‘divide and conquer’ attitudes for some. Bassiouney puts it bluntly: "Blaming SA and promoting ECA is always like stirring up a hornet's nest" (Bassiouney 2013:5-6). She also cites the work of Niloofar Haeri who argues that the diglossic situation in Egypt causes uneasiness in identity formation because of the sense of dispossession from politics and nationalism born out of Egyptians' inability to "master"
SA (Haeri, 2003:152). However, Bassiouney concedes that "what is also important to note is the fact that ECA is being employed politically to reflect opposition, honesty, freshness, and, in a sense, innovation" (Bassiouney 2013:6). That is, in her view, SA is not the singular language of successful and full engagement in Egyptian citizenship.

Bassiouney notes that "[s]ome politicians can and do use a patronizing tone when speaking to the masses because they believe that the masses have a limited knowledge of SA" (Bassiouney 2013:6). More importantly, perhaps, "[t]hey use their expertise in SA to legitimize their political system, almost in the same way that priests in ancient Egypt monopolized certain aspects of knowledge to empower themselves" (Bassiouney 2013:6). Bassiouney does well to point out that "SA does not necessarily carry only positive indexes" despite politicians likely using it for its "positive indexes only" (Bassiouney 2013:7).

Bassiouney seems to underestimate the extent to which SA is associated with the “official” language of the state. Discussing French, Bourdieu cites Thomas’s description: "regional and purely oral dialects were relegated to the status of patois, defined negatively and pejoratively by opposition to the official language" (Bourdieu 1991:6). This tension is exactly present in Arabic speaking societies, where 'amīyya (colloquial Arabic) is relegated to 'non-language' status in contrast and opposition to modern standard Arabic, 'the pure' or the 'real Arabic', and the language of the nation-state(s). The uprisings of 2011 did not sweep MSA aside or officially instate colloquial variants as legitimate, recognized, state languages, but they did, in many cases, crack the wall that so rigidly divided the language of the nation-state from the language(s) of /aš-ša‘b/ (‘the people’). MSA is deeply engrained as the state language as well as
the language of Arabism - Bourdieu's discussion of official languages is apt in the heteroglossic situation of Arab societies (Bourdieu 1991:45):

The official language is bound up with the state, both in its genesis and in its social uses. It is in the process of state formation that the conditions are created for the constitution of a unified linguistic market, dominated by the official language. Obligatory on official occasions and in official places (schools, public administrations, political institutions, etc.), this state language becomes the theoretical norm against which all linguistic practices are objectively measured.

Bassiouney cites an article published by the state-owned newspaper, *Al-Ahram*, on March 10, 2010, ten months before the revolution, written by the former speaker of parliament, Fathi Surur, as a propaganda piece for Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party, as an example of "institutional discourse" (Bassiouney 2013:7). The article is titled "The Arabic Language in the Constitution" (Surur, 2010). She finds in Surur's claim that "[t]he standard language is the foundation of legal rulings, and the basis for legal thought in general," about the importance of SA for legislators, an implicit logic that "authority, sovereignty, and legitimacy are all indexes of SA" (Bassiouney 2013:10). I concur with Bassiouney that Egyptians' perceived lack of participation in political life before the 2011 revolution was not primarily due to diglossia but rather something far more systematic and insidious; she refers to a "stale political system", but I would posit that a paralyzing fear of the state's security apparatus backed by external forces combined with a concerted effort by the Mubarak regime to alienate non-elite Egyptians from the decision-making processes of the state is to blame.46

Bassiouney is also right to complicate the perception that Egyptians are entirely illiterate and unable to understand SA: "the average Egyptian has no problem understanding modern

spoken SA (as found in news broadcasts or translated TV series, for example)” (Bassiouny 2013:13). In this way, one possible challenge to the argument about inversion presented in this research is the occasional use of SA by protestors during the Egyptian revolution (Dempsey 2009:165). Bassiouney, however, explains that in response to popular claims in the state-owned media that the protestors were foreign mercenaries sent to stir up problems in Egypt and that they were chosen because of their skin color and ability to mimic ECA, "[p]ro-democracy groups fought back by using songs and poetry in SA, which were widely distributed on YouTube to counterattack the claims of state media. SA was used as a resource to add weight and legitimacy to their demands" that were originally articulated in ECA (Bassiouny 2013:14). The protestors then chose to translate from ECA, the language of the revolution, into political standard Arabic as a strategic act of self-preservation and to counter the prevalent claims on state media. This move was likely more effective in proving the protestors' authenticity and legitimacy to non-Egyptian Arabs watching the events of the revolution unfolding via satellite television than it was within Egypt. Egyptians were sharply divided between the pro-revolutionaries and the counter- or anti-revolutionaries; both sides were less likely to be swayed by media analyses than they were to become more deeply entrenched in their attitudes by following the coverage of like-minded media outlets.

Bassiouney argues that one of the results of the Egyptian revolution is that "Egyptians have regained their national language [SA] in a natural and unpretentious way," and she cites an article by Fārūq Shūshah, which proposes that the Egyptian protestors "will also create a new linguistic environment suitable for the new Egypt" (Bassiouny 2013:16). In this "new linguistic environment", Bassiouney sees that SA has been "reclaimed" and that the diglossic "crisis" of
pre-revolutionary Egypt "is now over" (Bassiouney 2013:16). Egyptians have reappropriated SA and "with it, their identity," which had both "been stolen by the National Party" of Hosni Mubarak (Bassiouney 2013:16). Her conclusions are problematic, however, in light of the evidence that ECA was a dominant form of language, both in speaking and writing, throughout the 18 Days of Tahrir and beyond Mubarak’s ouster. Bassiouney may be overstating the role of SA over that of ECA. As Suleiman has argued, MSA “acts as a site of loyalty for Arabic speakers as a linguistic community” interested in emphasizing “Arab-ness”, whereas dialects of Arabic serve as “sites of loyalty for speech communities” and underscore local identity and belonging.47 Bassiouney's work on Shūsha's article demonstrates that there is a fundamental disagreement among Egyptian intellectuals, and perhaps Arabic linguists concerned with politics, as to the positions, or valorizations, of SA and ECA in relation to the revolution. Shūsha argues that "ECA was in fact used by the National Party, not the revolutionaries" (Bassiouney 2013:17).

For Bassiouney, when the Mubarak regime used ECA in public, it "underestimated Egyptians and their capabilities. The National Party patronized Egyptians rather than respecting them" (Bassiouney 2013:18). I will discuss this in chapter 4 in the analysis of Egyptian presidential discourse in public speeches.

Bassiouney returns to the topic of the code choices of the protestors and argues that they "used 'all languages and codes available to them" including SA, ECA, English, and French in "parallel to the Tunisian ones" (Bassiouney 2013:20). She discusses the popularity of the chant "irhal" ('leave'), which was in SA prior to Mubarak's January 28 speech wherein he declared his

intention to stay on as president (Bassiouney 2013:20). She points out that after the January 28
speech, a new chant started: “‘Begone!’ means ‘Go!’ / you who doesn’t understand” (‘irḥal ya‘nī
‘imšī / yallī ma-b-itifhemšī). This chant translates SA into ECA and is composed entirely of
ECA with the exception of the term "’irḥal!" (‘be gone’ or ‘depart’). Rather than merely
"accusing Mubarak... of not mastering SA," this also exemplifies the semiotic process I am
concerned with in this chapter, namely that of re-registerment whereby an H-L inversion takes
place while also reconfiguring the prior linguistic norms and ideologies (Bassiouney 2013:20).
Bassiouney and I reach similar conclusions in so far as the notion that "[a]ll linguistic means
were used to put pressure on Mubarak to leave" (Bassiouney 2013:20).

Bassiouney (2009) cites Gumperz (1982) who argued, “people may mark a change in the
role they are playing (or wish to be perceived as playing) by using a different code.” To add a
level of complexity, Bassiouney identified several factors that indicate a change of role that are
independent of code choice (Bassiouney 2009:173): a) paralinguistic factors, which include
speed of delivery, b) the nature of the message; is it personal, objective, etc. and has the speaker
defined her/his capacity beforehand? c) the use of pronouns, which can denote the speaker’s
perceived level of privacy or intimacy vis-à-vis the interlocutor.

Involvement is a choice that occurs during a certain stage, or liminal phase, in a speaker’s
discernment of illocutionary aim—after the speaker determines a communicative aim (stage 1),
s/he then opts for or against involvement (liminal), and then decides upon a ‘method of
ideation’ (stage 2), and finally arrives at a code choice with regard for the audience’s “likely or

48 Bassiouney’s transcription in the article: ئیرحال یا‌نی یمِی / یالِی مَب‌یَتیف‌مِی.
49 See Bassiouney (2009), pp. 171. Similar to Goffman (1981)—speakers play different roles using code choice to
indicate new roles.
known education” (stage 3) (Bassiouney 2009:227, 230). Bassiouney summarizes this process: “involvement is a psycho-social aim, and ideation is the translation of this aim into different types of discourse” (Bassiouney 2009:171). In this way, Bassiouney counters Ferguson’s claims (1972:236) that situation and subject matter determine the diglossic situation, or the speaker’s code choice. In fact, for Bassiouney, “subject matter, as an independent factor, impinges at stages 2 and 3 [see above],” and is decidedly not, then, primary or predominant in determining code choice.50 This, of course, runs counter to her argument that SA is the language of “legitimate and true Egyptians” (Bassiouney 2013:25).

Bassiouney closes the piece with a reference to a poignant poem by Iman Bakry, a well-known satirical poet, whose poem "The Description of Egypt's New President 2012" is entirely in ECA and demands a president whose code, in Bassiouney's own translation, is "'inclusive' for all of those who master ECA and not just for those who master SA or a foreign language" (Bassiouney 2013:26). Bassiouney’s work on SA in the 2011 Egyptian revolution and its aftermath is important and necessitates further research but she may have overlooked the role of ECA in Egypt’s iteration of the Arab Spring, and the role of colloquial varieties in the Arab region as a whole in carrying the sentiments and activist objectives of the Arab Spring across borders and isoglosses.

3.14 Heteroglossia: The Re-Registered Voices of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood

Bakhtinian dialogicality and heteroglossia have yet to influence research on language in the Arab Spring. I argue that enregisterment is a key aspect of the revolutionary interval and I therefore use Agha’s framework of voicing contrasts to analyze the transcripts in the data section of this

chapter. Bakhtin's (1981) explication of heteroglossia is complex and captures several facets of recursivity, as well as 'context', or 'co-text' as Agha puts it, environment/domain, and the term I have chosen to connote the sequential temporal aspect of the Arab Spring, namely “interval”, and institutional as well as total institutional discourse. Polyvocality and 'dialect' add depth to the project of explaining how a discourse of revolution, or uprising, was socialized, or socially institutionalized, into a genre and set of en-, re-, and counter-registered voices, which I call ‘revolutionary registers’. These registers co-occur with an accompanying emergent mode of identity, or trope of a voice, I term 'oppositionism'.

Building on Bakhtin’s work, Agha’s 2003 paper, “The social life of cultural value”, discusses the theory of “enregisterment” and defines it as the “processes through which a linguistic repertoire becomes differentiable within a language as a socially recognized register of forms.” (Agha 2003). Then, in a 2005 paper Agha defines enregisterment as "processes whereby distinct forms of speech come to be socially recognized (or enregistered) as indexical of speaker attributes by a population of language users... registers are not static facts about a language but reflexive models of language use that are disseminated along identifiable trajectories in social space through communicative processes" (Agha, 2005:38). Using Agha’s work on enregisterment and voicing, the words, chants, and phrases that make up the lexicon, meter, and syntactics of revolutionary registers can be understood as a ‘discursive and semiotic genre’

51 Bakhtin's attention to text, however, and principally novels, leads him to further insights about un-uttered speech, or 'inner speech': "through inner speech, all consciousness is social in its formulation" (Stewart 1983: 273). This implies that we are no less free of the invisible, social constraints that mediate outer speech and action when articulating, limning, our thoughts 'in' our minds. I cannot expand on these ideas in this chapter, which is focused on outer speech and therefore takes up Agha’s framework for typification and voicing rather than continuing more deeply into Bakhtin’s theoretical contributions to text and heteroglossia. Without Agha’s elaborations of voice for analyses of speech acts, Bakhtin's work may be too text-based for certain realms of modern linguistics, including Arabic dialectology and political discourse analysis. In regard to inner voices, it is challenging to imagine how a sociolinguist would examine or capture data.
whose specific tokens travel and act as memetic transporters of the sentiments and terms of the Arab Spring as well as event-catalysts that motivate revolutionary activism such as protests and mass gatherings (Agha 2005:39; Bakhtin 1984:185).

It is then important to establish "contrastive patterns of register" that “use index distinct speaking personae in events of performance" (Agha, 2005:38). For Agha, "in the course of any process of social dissemination, register models undergo various forms of revalorization, retypification, and change" (Agha, 2005:38). This is partly what I am referring to as the “revolutionary interval” wherein voices are en-, re-, and counter-registered around a set of values and attitudes about a sign, specifically the Arab Spring and the 2011 Egyptian revolution as an iteration of that regional movement.

For Agha, "macro-level changes in registers" require an analysis of the "micro-level processes of register use in interaction" (Agha, 2005:38). Agha contends that "encounters with registers are not merely encounters with voices (or characterological figures and personae) but encounters in which individuals establish forms of footing and alignment with voices indexed by speech and thus with social types of persons, real or imagined, whose voices they take them to be" (Agha, 2005:38). This process of typification has been partially explored by Bassiouney (2012) as stance taking. Agha, however, elaborates footing and alignment in relation to enregisterment further in his description of the two senses of "voice" in the Bakhtinian conception (Bakhtin 1981, 1984). Bakhtin's "voices" describe "the ways in which utterances index typifiable speaking personae; similarly many registers index social attributes of speaker such as gender, class, caste, and profession" (Agha, 2005:39). Agha goes on to explain that "Bakhtin uses the term voice for speech forms that index widely recognized register distinctions
which he terms social speech types or social voices; his examples include the speech of particular classes and professionals, slangs, trade jargons) but also for speech that indexes event-specific, potentially unique images of personhood (which he calls individual voices)” (Agha, 2005:39). Agha offers that "[t]he typifiability of voices (whether as 'individual' or 'social') presupposes the perceivability of voicing contrasts, or the differentiability of one voice from another" (Agha 2005:39).

To account for both linguistic and non-linguistic semiotic processes involved in enregisterment, Agha replaces the term "voice" with "figures of personhood" when referring to "indexical images of speaker-actor in general terms," and "discursive figure" or "figure performed through speech" when discussing linguistic semiosis (Agha, 2005:39). Agha redeems the term "voice" when examining the social types of the Bakhtinian dichotomy; for Agha, "social voices are discursive figures that permit characterization through a metadiscourse of social types of person or persona attributes" (Agha 2005:39). Social voices that are linked to registers can then be called "enregistered voices" (Agha 2005:39). Enregistered voices "index stereotypic social personae" but can also be "troped upon to yield hybrid personae" and therefore "every register has a social range... of figures performable through its use" (Agha 2005:39). This is an especially relevant concept when considering the multiple and overlapping indexicals of MSA in the Egyptian iteration of the Arab Spring.

Beyond social range, Agha also discusses the "social domain" of every register--"every register also has a social domain, a group of persons acquainted with - minimally, capable of recognizing - the figures performable through use (Agha 2005:40). Agha seeks to substantiate the argument that "registers are living social formations, susceptible to society-internal variation and
change through the activities of persons attuned to alignments with figures performed in use, and that macrosocial regularities of enregisterment - facts of demographic growth or decline (changes in social domain) or of value maintenance or counter-valorization (changes in social range) - are large-scale effects of alignments that unfold one communicative event at a time” (Agha 2005:40). Related to this, Agha explains that encounters with registers are "events in which interlocutors establish some footing or alignment with figures performed through speech, and hence with each other," which he calls "role alignment" (Agha 2005:40).

Agha also discusses entextualization and entextualized contrasts with respect to "the likeness or unlikeness of co-occurring chunks of text," which lead to "evaluations of sameness or difference of speaker" (Agha 2005:40). The concepts of entextualization and enregisterment are comparable despite taking place through different media of semiosis. In my analysis of Morsi's 'voices', I examine both prior texts, namely his Twitter sessions with lay Egyptians, and contrast his discursive figures in those interactions to his interactions with chief magistrate Yousef on November 4, 2013. In my analysis of the written and spoken interactions of the same person, Morsi, I will examine footing and framing (Agha 2005:41) as well as zero point or the origo of deictic reckoning in his interactions with Yousef (Agha 2005:42); Agha explains that when these zero points are not shared, "this implies that two distinct speech centers, or occasions of speaking, are at issue" (Agha 2005:42).

Agha describes voices not as "attributes of persons" but rather as "entextualized figures of personhood whose recognition depends on distinct metasemiotic processes" (Agha 2005:43). Agha explains that voicing contrast "can be diagrammed by any metrical or poetic organization of text that delineates contrastive textual zones as unlike each other and where such likeness/
unlikeness of text segments motivates the construal of likeness/unlikeness of the default variable of co(n)text, namely speaker" (Agha 2005:43).

Agha describes three parts of voice typification (Agha 2005:44): (a) contrastive individuation whereby one recognizes that metrical contrasts in a text implies a difference of speaker, (b) biographic identification wherein an individual voice is located as the speech of a specific person using person deixis, and (c) social characterization, where an individual voice is assigned a stereotypic "social character", or trope. Of the three parts of Agha’s segmentation and typification of voices, I am most concerned with part (c), social characterization, or the *troping* of a voice from a specific, unique token phenomenon to a general, imitable type phenomenon. This is the sort of voicing contrast that is most applicable to identifying the various institutional discourses in competition with each other in the Morsi trial transcript. Parts (a) and (b) may be more applicable to textual analyses than to spoken interactions.

Agha too argues that type (c) takes up the "repertoire of forms... regularly treated as indexical of a social type by a given social domain of persons" and is therefore recognizable to specific social subsets of a population (i.e. social-demographic classification) (Agha 2005:45). These forms of interaction are what Agha considers "registers". 52

In the court transcript I examine, the presence of pro-Morsi protestors in the courthouse who intermittently disrupt the proceedings to chant in support of Morsi, serves to substantiate Morsi’s defiance as a recognized activity within a social regularity, namely that of opposition to

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52 For Agha, "[e]ncounters with registers are encounters with characterological figures stereotypically linked to speech repertoires (and associated signs) by a population of users" (Agha 2005:45). Agha explains that "[l]anguage users typify such figures in social-characterological terms when they say that a particular form of speech marks the speaker as masculine or feminine, as high- or low-caste, as a lawyer, doctor, priest, shaman, and so on" (Agha 2005:45). Registers, for Agha, are social regularities; "A single individual’s metapragmatic activity does not suffice to establish the social existence of the register unless confirmed in some way by the evaluative activities of others (Agha 2005:46)."
what the Muslim Brotherhood and its supports have termed an illegal coup d’état by the Egyptian armed forces and insistence on his release from confinement so that he may execute what he perceives as his rightful office as president of the Egyptian Republic.

The revolutionary registers I have previously referred to meet Agha’s definition of a register as a "model of language use that links a semiotic repertoire of some describable characteristics... to a range of stereotypic social-indexical effects, its social range" (Agha 2005:46). Furthermore, it must "involve a social domain of persons who recognize it as a model enactable through speech" (Agha 2005:46). I argue that the transnational travel of the revolutionary registers are a result of protestors in multiple Arab countries, who themselves form a new social domain of persons, recognizing pro- and counter- "Arab Spring Speak" as an enactable model and then deploying it through the slogan-chants, songs, banners, documents, and other media of the revolutionary iteration in their respective localities within Arab countries.53

Returning to the concept of the fragility of institutions, Agha explains that "[r]egisters have a social existence only insofar as - and as long as - the metapragmatic stereotypes associated with their repertoires continue to be recognized by a criterial population of users, that is, continue to have a social domain" (Agha 2005:46). In other words, like all forms of institutions, the institutional discourse must be continually perpetuated through repeated performances, or what Giddens (1979) calls the “recursivity of structuration”; this is the fragility of institutionality and, in the case of the Arab Spring in Egypt, the revolution is a type of institution in that it has social existence by way of its being recognized by a criteria of a

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53 See footnote 49 for suggested parallel to the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States; also Dron (2012).
population of users and is understood to be associated with a repertoire and model of language use.

The success of the creation of an institution is detectable through the perpetuation, or recursivity, of its type of discourse. Agha posits that "[i]nstitutional processes of various kinds frequently seek to stabilize features of registers - their repertoires, indexical stereotypes, social domain of users - by codifying their normative values or restricting access to them" (Agha 2005:47). That is not to say that once an institutional discourse, or a register, is created and perpetuated, that it will perdure indefinitely and immutably. Agha explains that "[t]he assumption of contextual invariance is false for the simple reason that enregistered voices are encountered in social life only as fragments of entextualized voicing effects, and the two voicing effects may or may not be congruent" (Agha 2005:47).

Agha expands further that "[w]e call a register's usage 'appropriate to context' when co-occurring signs are congruent with, or satisfy, the model of context indexed by the register token. We perceive a usage as tropic when co-occurring signs have noncongruent indexical effects" (Agha 2005:48). By this, Agha means that a register can be considered appropriate so long as it is being used by the expected people and in the expected location and ways; in the case of Morsi's trial, political SA would be the enregistered voice considered appropriate to the context because all of the co-occurring signs - namely aspects such as formal attire, formal organized seating schemas, a recognized model of language use and established rules of turn-taking, inter alia - are congruent with the model of context, that of a courtroom, indexed by the register token (political SA). When, however, Morsi or Yousef choose to perform a different discursive figure, such as Islamic or Islamist registers, this runs counter, or in noncongruence, to
the indexical effects of the co-text of the courtroom and thus that type of language use is considered 'tropic'; Agha would describe Yousef's Islamic invocation at the beginning of the hearing as a ‘trope of voicing’, or "entextualized voicing effect" (Agha 2005:48). Similarly, Morsi’s use of revolutionary register challenges the ontology and institutionality of the court and is noncongruent with the co-occurring voicing effects of the setting and broader co-text of his being deposed, arrested, and put on trial.

Another helpful element of Agha’s framework is what he calls a speech chain, which occurs when "[a]ny two voicing effects [are] linked together"; they can thereby be "compared by criteria of congruence or lack thereof" and these patterns across interactional turns are referred to as "patterns of role alignment" (Agha 2005:49). In my analysis of the two transcripts in the data section of this chapter, I identify several speech chains where Morsi or his interlocutors respond to one another in congruence.

Agha refers to recursivity as "replication of register stereotypes over segments of the population" (Agha 2005:51). He adds that "[w]hen effective, such methods may result in the growth or rise of a register formation by extending a more or less uniform competence in its use over relatively large segments of the population" (Agha 2005:51). This is, in effect, what the Muslim Brotherhood and, by extension, Muhammad Morsi, attempted to reinforce among their constituents and other voting Egyptians through discourse—this is an effort to create a new governmental institutional order. The co-occurring aim of their public interactions, alongside institutional creation, was the displacement of the incumbent regime through the destruction of its discourse type.

Finally, Agha's conception of role alignment also encompasses the idea of "the acquisition
of register competence in empirically consequential ways" (Agha 2005:55). In some instances, I argue, as in the case of the chief magistrate Yousef, and, according to some, former Egyptian president Morsi, the capacity of either of these two individuals to acquire power, or legitimize their positions in government, requisites their successful acquisition of the appropriate register; Agha explains that "[t]he register is itself a form of semiotic capital that advances certain rights and privileges. And to be able to speak the register is to be able to perform an image of social personhood as one's own image and to perform it in a register-dependent way" (Agha 2005:55). The point of ambiguity in the case of Egypt is in defining what the appropriate register is in the post-revolutionary period. Bassiouney seems to argue that SA is the language of what she calls “New Egypt”, while other evidence suggests that ECA is the language of the revolution and SA is the language of the incumbent regime.

3.15 Re-Registerment: Identifying and Evaluating Political Voices

The ‘revolutionary interval’ is a semiotic process that takes place when an incumbent governmental institution is challenged by an alternate inchoate institution on the level of discourse, and then competes with it, and as a result either fails and is destroyed and replaced, as in the Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, or, in the case of the Nahda Party in Tunisia, succeeds, relatively speaking, and is perpetuated as part of the governing process, or at least not violently deposed and oppressed. Given the focus on Egypt, this analysis elaborates the processual path of failure and destruction. In Egypt, the protests began in Tahrir Square on January 25th 2011 and what followed was a discursive competition with Mubarak’s regime for 18 Days whereby the contending institution’s speakers (revolutionaries in various factions) sought to destroy the incumbent institution (Mubarak’s regime) through various means, but on the level
of language, I am calling the consolidation of a revolutionary, transnational genre, “re-
registerment”. Re-registerment, based on Agha’s concept of enregisterment, describes the
process of register inversion whereby, in Egypt, Egyptian Colloquial Arabic (ECA), traditionally
described as the “L”, or low, variety, became re-registered and interpellated as the language of
the revolution, and Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), traditionally marked as the “H”, high,
variety, was counter-registered and interpellated, also through semiotic processes, as the
language of the regime. These parallel semiotic processes constituted an H-L inversion that
resulted in the privileging of ECA over MSA as the language of the Arab Spring and the
Egyptian revolution and thereby the unmarked form of speaking, i.e. a new discourse, that
perpetuates the revolution and thereby recursively performs it as a type of social-cultural and de
facto political institution of the people. This was the conclusion of a competitive interlocution
that situated ECA against MSA in a ‘war of words’. The incumbent regime’s use of MSA, in
Egypt (not the case in Tunisia), in the midst of the revolution, to interpellate the revolutionaries
and the revolution as illegitimate, foreign, and motivated by religious extremism and terrorism,
served to counter-register MSA, or old political standard Arabic (opSA), among the protestors
and their sympathizers around the world, as the code and register of the regime.

This ‘revolutionary interval’, with its complex moving parts, is detectable in the coded
speech acts of Islamist revolutionaries, ‘secular’ revolutionaries, and pro-regime loyalists in a
manner that is “[i]ntense and strange yet deceptively simple and familiar” (Harding 1987:174).
This form of speaking is accompanied by an emergent identity formation, which I term
‘revolutionary identities’ that encompasses both pro- and counter-configurations, or what Agha
The revolutionary moment is key precisely because it is so complex in its work on both the would-be dominators, or individuals who embody and project institutional identities, and the dominated who experience a transition from one form of governmental institutional hegemony to another. The transitional moments are, like a conversation, “accomplished” together. For this reason, I view recursivity as going hand in hand with fragility, which I discuss further under the next sub-heading. There is a power inherent in institutional discourse because of its ability to involve its inmates, in the case of total institutions, or its clients, constituents or citizens, in the continual process of reconstituting the very constraints and systematicities that dominate them. However, undermining that power at every point is the ability of those lay people to be swayed by the force of another, more compelling institutional narrative and set of performances, and to then abandon and repudiate the incumbent institution in favor of something with the promise of difference and the allure of potentially increased freedom from domination.

3.16 Recursivity, Institutional Fragility and Institutional Failure

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) ascended to power in Egypt, they then struggled and hesitated and erred in their attempts to implant a new organic strata of Islamist intellectuals in the form of politicians, economists, and military leaders. For Gramsci it is critical that "[e]very social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields" (Gramsci 1971:5).

The post-revolution transition in Egypt from Mubarak’s old guard strata, and with it what I term ‘old political standard Arabic’ (opSA), to the new guard, with the emergence of the ‘new
political standard Arabic’ (npSA) of the post-revolutionary Muslim Brotherhood, among others, was harried and shrouded in widespread doubts over the MB's ability to govern and secure the rights of all Egyptians, as opposed to only the close-knit networks of Islamist clients who were closest to the top brass in the organization. That was, after all, the modus operandi of Mubarak's regime and virtually every other Arab Republic, Islamist or not. Gramsci explains that "[o]ne of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer 'ideologically' the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own organic intellectuals" (Gramsci 1971:10). Gramsci’s pairing of assimilation and elaboration is a productive theoretical approach to the question of counter-revolutionary registers in the incumbent regime's responses to the uprising in Egypt, and elsewhere, and the ascending Islamist institutions and intellectuals, but also to the question of the rapid subsequent failures of Islamist governments in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and perhaps Syria.

The fragility, and failure, of institutions is closely related to recursivity – or the continual perpetuation of an institutional reality through its everyday reconstitution on the level of conversations between institutional members, or professionals, and lay people. Recursivity, then, also includes the ability of an institution to self-repair, or “self-seal” so as to maintain a semblance of internal cohesion in the face of daily challenges, breaches, taboos, faux pas, and other threats in conversation or behavior to the sets of constraints and ideologies that underpin institutional realities. We all have a sense of frames; of how things should be when we go to school, the hospital, an office, etc. There is a sense of task that needs to be accomplished; across
groups, within, or between professionals and lay people that becomes second nature, and therein lays both the lasting power and innate destructibility of all institutions. Language is critical to institutions, or rather discourse is, because it is an important measure of either its ongoing salience and resiliency, or imminent decline.

In a very real sense, the longevity of an institution is both a sign of its success and its impending failure; the inertia of dominated identities creates a space for alternate institutions to be imagined and, in revolutionary intervals, to be reified in language and, at times, temporally and physically as in Egypt, Syria, and other Arab states. The Arab Spring, arguably, inspired popular movements in non-Arab states as well (Filiu 2011; Greene and Kuswa 2012; Hatem 2012; Berger and Dan 2012; Dron 2012; Acemoglu et al. 2014; Heath et al. 2013; Mason and Robert; Davis 2013; Welty 2014). The Occupy and 99% movements in the United States (Mitchell 2012), the so-called ‘yogurt sit-ins’ in Israel, the anti-austerity riots in Greece and Spain, and human rights protests in Russia, China, and Tibet (Haas and Lesch 2012; Kellner 2012) – all tied together by an affinity with and sympathy toward the protestors of the Arab region who stood up to the status quo and chose to break with the traditional roles of citizenship that perpetuated the violent authoritarian regimes that ruled them for decades (Govrin 2014).55 Indeed, the Arab Spring itself must be contextualized within the history of popular democratization movements (Hirschkind and Charles 2012; Mamdani and Mahmood 2011; Cherkaoui 2016).

This discussion of the theoretical framework of the revolutionary interval, which encompasses en-, re-, and counter-registered voices, recursivity, and institutional fragility and failure is continued in the following analytical sections of the chapter. Two transcripts in the data section of the chapter are used as springboards for further elaboration of the ideas and approaches gleaned from the relevant literature. The Twitter transcript (transcript 1) features Morsi’s language as acting president of Egypt in two interactions, while the court transcript (transcript 2) demonstrates Morsi’s speech choices before chief magistrate Yousef on November 4, 2013, approximately four months after Morsi was deposed by the Egyptian military. Register shift as well as identity politics are discussed in the analytical sections that follow the transcripts.

3.17 Two Data Sets: President Morsi’s Twitter Sessions and Deposed Morsi on Trial

Prior to the Arab Spring, the assumption was that the language of Arab governments is MSA and the appropriate, unmarked register in which to address government officials for those not in governmental power, or non-elites, is MSA, without exception. Charles Ferguson’s watershed 1959 book on diglossia helped to establish the traditional dichotomy – the theory of diglossia – in Arabic linguistics and dialectology between a so-called “L”, or low form, also known as colloquial Arabic, used in everyday settings by lay Arabic speakers, and an “H”, or high variety understood as ‘Classical Arabic’ used in formal settings such as government functions, schools, the news, radio, etc. by politicians, professors, and other institutional officials. Classical Arabic was later subdivided along a cline of formality and later the category of ‘public or institutional Arabic’ became referred to more commonly as Modern Standard Arabic.56 Since Ferguson, there

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has been a great deal of scholarly progress on Arabic diglossia, particularly as described by Bassiouney (2006); Bassiouney affirms but re-analyzes Ferguson’s more stark dichotomy (viz. H-L), by treating ‘High’ and ‘Low’ as “two poles”, or “levels” between which exists several intermediary levels that can be understood as a heteroglossic range rather than a strict binary.  

Bassiouney also challenges Myers-Scotton’s (1983) theory of markedness, which was used as a rule of thumb for explaining diglossic code switching among native Arabic speakers. Bassiouney’s understanding of markedness is when a speaker “[uses] a code which [that] is not expected by the audience,” but rather when the speaker “deliberately [uses] a code with a discourse function and a motivation in mind” (Bassiouney 2006:210). Bassiouney also discusses code choice in terms of intentional and non-intentional ‘involvement’ of the audience—for Bassiouney, involvement “can be achieved whatever code the speaker uses; there is no direct relation between involvement and code choice” (Bassiouney 2006:211). Instead, the speaker’s perception of role and ideational approach influences her/his code choice (Bassiouney 2006:211). Bassiouney finds that while there is a “tendency for ECA to be related to intimacy and involvement more than MSA,” MSA can and is used to create a “dramatic atmosphere and add an aura of significance and seriousness to a topic,” as in political speech (Bassiouney 2006:3, 221).

What follows are two transcripts I created to demonstrate the applicability of what I call

57 Bassiouney (2006), pp. 13, 14-15; “It may be that ‘pure H’ or ‘pure L’ does not occur very often, and that there are usually elements of both varieties in any stretch of normal speech, but still one has to consider a hypothetical pure H or L in order to presuppose that there are elements that occur from one or the other in a stretch of discourse,” a point Bassiouney explains that Ferguson himself (1996) conceded (13). Still, Bassiouney explores the levels of Arabic further in her discussions of Educated Spoken Arabic (ESA) (see pp. 16-17), and “prestige” as a concept that helps better categorize and explain decisions of colloquial versus formal Arabic code-mixing throughout a stretch of discourse. Bassiouney provides extensive tests to demonstrate the explanatory power and resonance of the concept of prestige (21-25).
en-, re-, and counter-registerment in post-revolutionary Egypt. I first investigate two Twitter interactions between President Muhammad Morsi and lay Egyptian citizens in terms of Agha’s concept of enregisterment and as a source of ‘prior text’ for the second transcript. To illustrate the semiotic process of enregisterment, I use black for opSA, teal for npSA, purple for the (pro-)revolutionary enregistered voice, green for the Islamist enregistered voice, red for ECA, and purple for the revolutionary register. I greyed the gloss lines below the original Arabic to foreground the enregistered voices of the original Arabic. Idiomatic translations are provided at the end of each interaction, rather than with each turn, once again to emphasize the coloration of the voices. I match the font color of the words in the idiomatic translations to those in the original Arabic line based on my approximation of equivalent translations of the original Arabic. Because the Tweets are texts, I have chosen to assume that if any ECA morphemes are present in a lexical item, then the entire lexical item is ECA. This would not necessarily be the case in spoken interactions.

I use color and other typographical cues to highlight voicing contrasts in line with Bakhtin and Agha’s description of heteroglossia and identified several distinct voices in a reconstructed court transcript of deposed president Morsi’s November 4, 2013 hearing – the first in a trial mandated by the then-interim military government led by then-Defense Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi shortly after Morsi was ousted on July 3, 2013 (El-Bendary, 2013). Because the reconstructed transcript, courtesy of a leaked voice recording by Al-Jazeera, is available online as a dramatized verbal re-enactment of the content of the transcript, I was able to detect heteroglossic code mixing at the morphemic level, which enables me to color code

58 Not all voices, particularly Islamist, are present in the Twitter interactions, which is conspicuous and requires further analysis.
individual letters and epenthetic as well as anaptyctic vowels.

Given the complexity of the coding schema I had to devise for depicting both SA and ECA as well as a line of coding for corrected SA, glossing, and idiomatic translation, I have chosen to portray voicing contrasts by coloration. Green indicates an Islamist voicing, red conveys a marked use of ECA, blue stands for unmarked use of ECA, purple represents the revolutionary register, orange marks switches to English, teal marks what I call new political standard Arabic, grey is simply used to background the corrected SA and glossing lines, and black is for SA, or what I refer to as the unmarked old political standard Arabic that is the traditional domain of the courtroom.\textsuperscript{59}

3.18 Enregisterment (Transcript 1): Morsi Tweets as Prior Text

The first interaction I take up is between President Morsi, @MuhammadMorsi, and @a7md3bdelbary, a lay Egyptian who poses an initial question to Morsi about how ‘you all’, likely a gloss for ‘the government’, will end the frequent power outages over the summer months. In the second conversation, Morsi replies to a question by @Arapawy2020 concerning Morsi’s own personal safety and perceived decline in public support. Morsi then leaves the interaction. This left the conversation open to tertiary evaluators. In fact, a third Tweeter provides an evaluation in a critical, oppositionist re-registered voice that sparks an iterative Twitter protest against Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood by dint of improvised written Tweet-chants. The Tweets in both interactions are composed in the Arabic script, but the enregistered voices and code choices of the Tweeters shifts in accordance with Agha’s concept of voicing effects and congruence as well as, to a certain extent, what Bassiouney describes as the “stance-taking”

\textsuperscript{59} Bassiouney too contends that "courtrooms are the domain for SA. Their [magistrates] SA is supposed to be impeccable" (Bassiouney 2013:25).
process, whereby “people employ linguistic resources, discourse resources and structural resources,” such as associations and indexes inherent to opSA, npSA, and ECA to “take a stance and by doing so give themselves a specific identity and impose on others a different one” (2012: 107, 109).

Interaction #1: @MuhammadMorsi, @a7md3bdelbary

1) @a7md3bdelbary: ma: hiyya xuṭṭatukum li-ḥall ‘azmat inqiṭā’ al-kahrūbā’??
   what are plans-your(pl.) for-solution (of) (the) crisis outage the-electricity??

2) @a7md3bdelbary: ma: hiyya xuṭṭatukum li-ḥall ‘azmat is- sōlār,
   what is plan-your(pl.) for-solution (of) (the) crisis (of) the-diesel,

3) @a7md3bdelbary: mata yabda’ mašrū’ tanmiyat qanāt as-suways??
   when begins (the) project (of) development (of) (the) canal the-Suez??

What are your plans for resolving the crisis of the electricity outages? What is your plan for resolving the diesel crisis, when does the Suez canal development project begin?

4) Morsi: hunāk mağmū’ a wizāriyya ta’mal <layla nahār>
   there (is) (a) group ministerial works <night_day>(idiom)

5) Morsi: li-tafādī al- inqiṭā’ al-mutakarrar fī ṣuhūr aš-ṣayf
   for-avoidance (of) the-outage the-repeated in months (of) the-summer

6) Morsi: w- tanmiyat al-qanā <‘ala wašk al-bad’>
   and-development (of) the-canal (is) <about to begin>(idiom)

There is a ministerial committee working ‘day and night’ to avoid the repeated outages over the summer months and development projects on the canal ‘are about to begin’.

7) @a7md3bdelbary: nashkurukum ‘ala al-ihtimā:m
   we-thank-you(pl.=hon.) on the-attention

8) @a7md3bdelbary: lākin kunna natamanna iḡāba wāḍiḥa
   but we-were we-hope (for) answer clear

9) @a7md3bdelbary: maqrū:na bi-xuṭṭa zamaniyya
   coupled with-plan time(adj.)

10) @a7md3bdelbary: ‘aw tawḍīḥ li-misār al-‘amal.
    or clarification for-course the-work.

Thank you(pl.) for your attention but we were hoping for a clear answer coupled with a work schedule or a clarification of the course of action.
3.19 Discussion

The interaction begins with @a7md3bdelbary directly posing a three-part question to Morsi in uninterrupted MSA (code) in the revolutionary register (lines 1-3). The choice of MSA projects a footing of deference but there is an element of newfound people power in the use of the plural first person forms of the verbs (line 7: nashkurukum [we-thank-you(pl.=hon.)]; line 8: kunna natamanna [we-were we-hope]). There is also egalitarianism on the part of @a7md3bdelbary in relation to Morsi, a metonym for the new, post-revolution government. @a7md3bdelbary’s use of MSA also, perhaps inadvertently, resuscitates and perpetuates the institutionality of MSA as the official language of the new revolutionary Islamist-democratic Egyptian government. By choosing to address Morsi in the expected code of standard Arabic and referring to Morsi in the plural (line 7), which is a mostly antiquated practice in MSA, as well as opSA, with a marked religious undertone, @a7md3bdelbary projects a tropic pre-revolution ‘Egyptian citizen’ figure of personhood, but also indicates his high level of education, which is interpretable as a post-revolutionary footing.

By performing the code of the official language so consistently to express identifiably post-revolutionary messaging (revolutionary register; lines 1-3, 8-10), excepting single ECA lexemes in lines 2 and 8 only, @a7md3bdelbary projects himself as a representative of the post-revolutionary ‘new’ Egyptian people and further substantiates this post-revolution role alignment by asking specific, direct questions meant to ascertain accountability about government projects for which only Morsi would, presumably as president of the Republic, have credible answers. @a7md3bdelbary’s use of traditional citizen-to-regime MSA coding is discernible as post-revolutionary in its register, which is characterized by it’s a) directness, b) parsimony, c) implicit
egalitarianism, and d) the assumption of government accountability to ‘the people’ (/aš-ša‘b/), as well as e) the use of colloquial Arabic in terms of semantics, syntactics, metrical balance, or the informal punctuation in line 3 (“??”) and the aforementioned loans in lines 2 and 8. The use of the “??” connotes an urgency to the question that upgrades its interrogative force from the level of a question to a more deontic demand for answers. While this is written text, there is an orality (Johnstone 1990) in the duplication of the sign that resembles a voicing contrast to the new revolutionary register, which indexes distinct co-occurring co-texts, namely that of the January 25, 2011 revolution, the events of Tahrir Square, and the values or ideology of the revolution such as challenging the government and speaking to the government on equal grounds in the new revolutionary code of ‘the people’. This code consists of voices that at times use ECA and at other times can be new political SA, or, perhaps more often than not, a mixture of each. It is the use of these voices, and not any one voice by itself, by lay Egyptians in interlocution with Egyptians who execute a political office, or perform governmental institutional identities, that marks the distinctly post-revolution inversion of the pre-revolution expectations and de facto and pro forma rules of Arabic political discourse, or forced narratives.

Morsi’s response to @a7md3bdelbary’s questions in lines 4-6 demonstrates his adoption of the enregistered voice of government, or specifically, a particular form of MSA for political co(n)texts that I call new political standard Arabic. In doing so he also forms a speech chain with @a7md3bdelbary whereby they align to one another’s roles by speaking in appropriate-to-context registers in congruence with the voicing effects of the forum and co-text of a direct dialogue with the president of Egypt. The features of Morsi’s re-registered voice, which I call new political SA, are a) verb avoidance (lines 5-6), b) parsimony in direct interactions (lines
4-6), but long-windedness in indirect general addresses or speeches, to achieve c): strategic ambiguity (lines 4-6, especially the idiomatic phrases in line 4 and line 6). There is, however, a marked difference between Morsi’s political SA and that of Mubarak’s. Morsi’s new political SA differs from the old political SA of Mubarak in the ‘new’, and ‘revolutionary’ post-Arab Spring fourth feature of political SA, namely d) intentional avoidance of paternalistic language and insincere(-sounding) honorifics, which were often deployed pre-Arab Spring by Egyptian politicians when addressing non-elites and the poor (Bassiouny 2012, 2013).

Further evidence of the fourth feature, d), is in Morsi’s decision to not secure the final word in his Twitter interactions. In this way, Morsi allows, or cedes to @a7md3bdelbary, the (epistemic) right to take the third turn in I-R-E, namely evaluation; in doing so Morsi symbolically cedes the last, evaluative, situation-defining, say to Egyptian citizens and thereby connotes a newfound ‘revolutionary’ egalitarianism between the governed and governors in congruence with the emergent voicing effects of post-revolutionary Egypt state-citizenry relations. @a7md3bdelbary’s evaluation is, arguably, negative. Despite that, while he uses uninterrupted MSA to thank President Morsi for his “attention” and, once again, chooses to address Morsi in the plural, @a7md3bdelbary also presents himself in the plural (line 7-8).

The next interaction further exemplifies what is meant by the new political SA and its four distinct register features and voicing contrasts.

**Interaction #2: @MuhammadMorsi, @Arapawy2020, @Piratejacksparo**

1) ‘as’al_ar-ra‘i:s Morsi
   #I-ask_the-President_Morsi

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60 The I-R-E (‘Initiation-Response-Evaluation’) instrument is particularly useful in demonstrating the constant reconstitution of institutions through language, or ‘recursivity’ in the sequencing of turns demonstrated by Twitter exchanges in the first transcript (Heller 2007:651-2); this is comparable to what Searle calls the 'logico-linguistic operation' (Searle 2010:201).
2) @Arapawy2020: ṭammīnā yārāyes reassure-us(imp.) oh-president(ECA dim.)

3) @Arapawy2020: hal al-muxābarāt ta‘mal are(interrog.) the-secret-services works

4) @Arapawy2020: ‘am ‘annak wahdak yārāyes or that-you alone-your oh-president(ECA dim.) ?(interrog.)

5) @Arapawy2020: ma‘īlā mahādāš ‘æ:raɛ mīn warā il-baltāɡēyyāreasonable(ECA) (that) no-one(ECA) knowing(ECA) who(ECA) behind(ambig.) the-thugs(ECA)

6) @Arapawy2020: fi: š-shawāra‘ kollī gom’a ? in the-streets(ECA) every(ECA) Friday(ECA) ?(interrog., polite.)

# I-ask_the-President_Morsi reassure us oh (dear) president(dim.), are the intelligence workers working or are you alone oh (dear) president(?) is it reasonable that no one knows who is behind the thugs who are in the streets every Friday ?

7) Morsi: ana miš ɪlwaḥdfī I not(ECA) for-myself(ECA)

8) Morsi: ma‘āyā koll il-maṣriyyīn ʃa‘ban with-me(ECA) all(ECA) the-Egyptians (as a) people(adj.)

9) Morsi: w- aghizatan w- mu’assasāt and-apparatuses and-institutions

I am not alone; with me are all the Egyptians as a people and the apparatuses and institutions [of government].

10) @Piratejacksparo: rabbina ‘in wæ-il-‘āyla our-lord(ECA) if(ECA) and-the-family(ECA)

11) @Piratejacksparo: miš ma‘ēk batātan not(ECA) with-you(sing.) (ECA) at-all(MSA)

Neither God nor the (Egyptian) family is with you at all.

Morsi chooses to respond in ECA in lines 7-8 with the exception of the final lexeme in line 8, thus performing egalitarianism and forming a speech chain with @Arapawy2020. The surface grammar of the last half of line 8 and all of line 9 may be MSA, but the majority of the morphemes in line 8 are ECA, with the exception of the last word, /ʃa‘ban/ (‘people’), and its case ending (underlined): /ʃa‘ban/. Line 9 is a full reprisal of new political SA in semantics, syntax, and grammar. Morsi’s choice to use ECA in lines 7-8, however, does not signify a
departure from the four features of new political SA. By using ECA Morsi reflects a position of egalitarianism and a self-perception of speaking in the revolutionary register, the re-registered voice of the (lay) people.

Still present, however, are a) verb avoidance (no verbs in lines 7, 8, or 9), b) parsimony in direct interactions (his whole response consists of 9 words as compared to the 18 words of the original questions posed by the Tweeter), c) strategic ambiguity; rather than naming specific people who support him, Morsi simply states that he is “not alone” (line 7), and in lines 8 and 9 he claims “all Egyptians” are with him and then employs an awkward, rather unclear phrasing and grammar to suggest that what he means by “all Egyptians” is that they are “with” him “in terms of the people, state apparatuses, and government institutions”.61 Furthermore, Morsi avoids the use of any determiners. This signals ambiguity as no specific subjects are referenced other than a vague mention of (underlined) /il-maṣriyyīn/ (‘the Egyptians’). And, finally d) intentional avoidance of paternalistic language and empty honorifics; Morsi is blunt, almost terse (lines 7-9), and once again, in an identifiably post-Arab Spring egalitarian fashion, allows the lay Tweeter to have the final word in evaluating the exchange with the president. In fact, @Arapawy2020 does not respond to Morsi – rather, a third user, @Piratejacksparo, enters the interaction and poses a challenge to Morsi in the re-registered voice of the revolution (lines 10-11). The last word in line 11, /batātan/ (‘at all’), seems to satirically match Morsi’s awkward, ambiguous, phrasing and antiquated use of case endings. It is a highly formal word and includes a germinated accusative case ending (underlined): /batātan/, which mimics the last and first lexemes in lines 8 and 9 of

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61 Twitter constrains the length of each Tweet to 140 characters in Arabic as well. With that, Morsi’s Tweet in line 7 consists of 12 characters, or 8.6% of the allowable space. Line 8 and 9 were one Tweet, with a total of 38 characters, or 27% of the allowable space for his turn.
Morsi’s response Tweets. While perhaps intended to be derisive, @Piratejacksparo forms a speech chain with Morsi at the end of his Tweet, which affirms the characteristic implicit egalitarianism (feature (c) above) of post-revolutionary Egyptian state-citizenry relations, and citizen-to-regime, governmental institution, coding.

3.20 Re-registerment (Transcript 2): Muhammad Morsi v. The Republic of Egypt

I created the second transcript (see below) based on putatively ‘leaked’ segments published by Al-Jazeera in Arabic script in the days following the November 4, 2013 hearing. Given that the court transcript was reenacted by voice actors and accompanied by drawings sketched in the courtroom during the trial, I was able to configure a more complex system for marking voicing contrasts and identifying post-, or ‘new’, and pre-, or ‘old’, revolution enregistered voices. A description of the systems of coding and coloration is provided before the transcript begins in the next sub-section.

Methodology: 4 Lines of Coding and Coloration

Each segment of the interactant’s turn is numbered. The first line is a transliteration of the original spoken Arabic. The second line displays a ‘corrected standard Arabic’, which demonstrates the appropriate register, namely political SA, for the courtroom setting. The corrected SA line is intended to help non-Arabic speakers perceive the effects of choice switching on the phonological, morphemic level. The third line is a more literal, in-line glossing and translation. The fourth line is an idiomatic interpretation of the segment. Bolded text in the original Arabic and gloss lines marks Egyptian Colloquial Arabic (ECA).

The colors in the original Arabic and idiomatic translation lines are intended to identify voicing contrasts in the interaction (coloration occurs in the gloss line only when a voicing contrast cannot be depicted in the translation line due to a lack of an approximate morphemeic equivalency). Green marks Islamic or Islamist re-registered voices; purple marks the revolutionary register, or ‘protest language’ born out of the 2011 Arab Spring and Egyptian revolution; red depicts marked uses of ECA; blue is used for unmarked switches to ECA; the corrected SA and glossing lines are greyed to background them in relation to the original Arabic and idiomatic translation lines. Orange is used for code switches into English. Lastly, black text connotes the use of the appropriate or unmarked register, namely old political SA and teal represents new political SA. Parentheticals in the original Arabic line (first line of coding in each turn) indicate places where I chose to recover parts of words that were either garbled due to momentary disfluency on the part of the speaker or inaudibility.

The Interactants:

Yousef – Chief Magistrate Ahmad Sabri Yousef; the Judiciary of the Republic of Egypt
Morsi – Ousted Egyptian President Muhammad Morsi; chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood)
Morsi Supporters – Egyptian citizens who support Morsi allowed to observe the trial; ‘lay’

(1) **Yousef**: b-ismIllah ar-rahmān ar-rahīm
b-ismlllah ar-raḥmān ar-raḥīm
by-the name of God the-most-merciful the-most-compassionate
In the name of God, the most-merciful, the most-compassionate

(2) nabda’ il- galsa []…
nabda’ al- ġalsa []…
we-begin the- hearing []…
Let us begin the hearing (‘the court is in session’).
Morsi: ‘ana ‘arba’ b-l-qadā’ il-mišrī ‘an yakūn ġitā’ li-hāda
‘ana ‘arba’ b-l-qadā’ al-mišrī ‘an yakūn ġitā’ li-hāda
I despise the judicial-system the-Egyptian that is pretext for this
I despise that the Egyptian judicial system would be used as a pretext for what is

l-inqilāb l-‘askarī.
l-inqilāb l-‘askarī.
a military coup.

‘ana _doktōr Muhammād Morsi ra‘īs il-gomhūriyya ḥatta l-‘ān.
‘ana ad-duktūr Muhammād Morsi ra‘īs al-ġumhūriyya ḥatta l-‘ān.
I (am) doctor Muhammād Morsi, president of the-republic until now.
I am doctor Muhammad Morsi, the current President of the Republic.

‘ana mōgūd fī hāda l-makān b-l-qāṣr [w-b-l-qūwwa]…
‘ana mawgūd fī hāda l-makān b-l-qāṣr [w-b-l-qqwwa]…
I (am) present in this the-place in-the-palace [and-by-the-főrce]…
I am present in this place in the courthouse under duress.

Yousef: [b-ismIllah ar-raḥmān ar]-raḥīm
[by-the name of God the-most-merciful the]-most-compassionate
In the name of God, the most-merciful, the most-compassionate

w-‘inna l-ḥukm , w-‘inna li-Illah.
and-verily the-judgment , and-verily (it) (is) for God.
Let us recall that, surely, judgment is the domain of God alone.

al-muttaham Maḥammad Morsi Ṣassa [al-‘Ayyāṭ]
al-muttaham Maḥammad Morsi Ṣassa [al-‘Ayyāṭ]
the-accused Maḥammad Morsi Ṣassa [al-‘Ayyāṭ]
The accused, “Maḥammad” Morsi Ṣassa al-‘Ayyat

[‘aqūlu lak], ‘ana ad-duktūr Muhammād Morsi ir- ra‘īs al-ġumhūri.
[I say to-y]ou, I (am) doctor Muhammād Morsi (the-) president the-republican.
I say to you that I am doctor Muhammad Morsi, the President of the Republic
and the court carries the responsibility that it did not allow and this court is liable for obstructing.

and this court is liable for obstructing for the president (of) the republic by the exiting and practicing (of) powers his the President of the Republic from exiting this courthouse and executing his office.

in accordance with the constitution

the hearing is adjourned

Do you grant the power of attorney to doctor Muhammad Sileem Al-'Awa

Do you grant the power of attorney to doctor Muhammad Sileem Al-'Awa.

to serve for the defense of

This is not a trial for the President of the Republic.

This is not a trial for the President of the Republic.
There is a military coup and its leaders must be brought in.

(20) lā-î- muḥakma [...] li- l- muḥākama [...] for-the-trial [...] for trial

(21) Yousef:
… 'as’aluka su’āl muḥaddad, hal tu[wakkil]…
… 'as’aluka su’āl muḥaddad, hal tu[wakkil]…
… (I) ask-you question limited, do you-[grant-power-of-attorney]…
I am asking you a simple question. Do you grant power of attorney

(22) Morsi: [‘isma‘nī], ‘ana ra’īs il- ghumhūr[iyya]…
‘istama‘ illayya, ‘ana ra’īs al- ghumhūr[iyya]… [hear-me], I (am) president (of) the- pub[Ift(*)]…
Listen to me! I am the President of the Republic

(23) Yousef: [rufi‘at al-]galsa
[rufi‘at al-]galsa
[adjourned the-]hearing
the hearing is adjourned

(24) Morsi Supporters (repeatedly): yāsqūṭ yāsqūṭ ḥokm il-‘askar
yasqūṭ yasqūṭ ḥukm il-‘askar
it-falls it-falls rule (of) the-military
Down, down with military rule!

3.21 Discussion

Unlike the Twitter transcript, the court interaction featured no speech chains between Morsi and Yousef. Yousef’s voicing alternated between old political SA, the Islamist register, and ECA. Old political SA is characterized by four features: a) verb avoidance, b) parsimony in direct interactions, c) intentional ambiguity, and d) paternalistic tones and insincere or derisive honorifics. Yousef’s speech demonstrated a) in lines 1, 7-9, and 17, which also overlap with Islamist voicing; this “overlap” may be a type of what Bakhtin refers to as ‘double
voice’ (Bakhtin 2002:429). Yousef is parsimonious in lines 1, 14, and 23, which each constitute complete turns – I omitted instances where he was interrupted (lines 2, 9, 17, 21) or continued speaking after a short pause (lines 7-9, 14, 16-17, and 23). Yousef demonstrates c) in line 2 when he begins the hearing without any explanation of the charges or introduction to the proceedings; in line 8 Yousef is especially cryptic and overlaps with Islamist voicing in making an avoidance statement whereby he places the responsibility of judgment in God’s jurisdiction alone; in lines 14 and 23 he moves to adjourn the hearing but after line 14 he reconvenes, which makes his utterance in that line ambiguous. After line 23 it was announced that the trial would be postponed until January 8, 2014 – yet, his wording in lines 14 and 23 were exactly the same, which illustrates Yousef’s availing himself of his rights and high level of power, as well as legitimacy, as chief magistrate to conceal certain messages in the interaction and thus speak ambiguously through indexical, expected or congruent, institutional phrases that are only speakable by a chief magistrate and sayable in the national Egyptian high court. Lastly, d) is present in his Islamist invocations in lines 1 and 7 where he takes it upon himself to represent Islam and God in the courtroom by quoting the Quran.  

In line 2, Yousef’s use of the first person plural form of the verb ‘to begin’ seems particularly loaded or charged given whom he is addressing. Morsi was deposed by a military coup d'état. He had no choice in coup nor can he object to the current hearing. The morphology of the verb with the proclitic /na-/ is, strictly-speaking, ambiguous, but I argue that Yousef’s choice of ambiguous morphology (as opposed to the more common passivization: “l-maḥkamatu

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63 If the co(n)text, or voicing effects, were religious or any setting other than an official political one, such as a sermon in a mosque, or even the start of a lesson at a school, I would not have identified the invocation (b-ismIḷlah ar-raḥmān ar-raḥīm; ‘In the name of God, the most-merciful, the most-compassionate’)as “Islamist”. I would leave it at “Islamic”. I reserve “Islamist” for a specific register type, which I characterize on page 44.
mun’aqida”, ‘court is in session’) in that turn is motivated by an element of retribution. Morsi had angered the national court with a presidential decree earlier in the year that had immunized him and all of his fiats from judicial review. Yousef’s ambiguity sounds paternalistic — he is re-asserting his constitutional powers and (epistemic) rights as chief magistrate and now ‘legitimate’ representative of the ‘legitimate’ Egyptian government over Morsi who has lost legitimacy in his being deposed and lost his powers in being forced to appear in court that day. Morsi affirms his coerced presence in court in lines 6 and 11-12, which are ignored by Yousef who, in line 7, repeats the Islamic invocation from line 1, and, in line 14, moves to adjourn. The pragmatic force of transcript 2 is, I argue, to obscure, or erase, the fact of the military coup d’état that deposed Morsi and began a violent crackdown on the MB leadership, i.e. institutional destruction, while simultaneously establishing the legitimacy of the post-Morsi military government, i.e. institutional creation, or in this case, “re-emergence” given that prior to Morsi’s victory in the 2012 Egyptian presidential elections the military had controlled the post-Mubarak ‘interim government’). In an especially patronizing speech act in line 9, Yousef may be openly mocking Morsi by emphasizing the final syllable of part of his name, /l-‘Ayyāṭ/, which in ECA literally means ‘he who cries a lot’, or a ‘crybaby’. Morsi counters in line 10: “I say to you, I am doctor Muhammad Morsi, the president of the republic!”

Morsi’s range of re-registered voices is wider than Yousef’s. Morsi uses both old and new political SA, the revolutionary register, the Islamist register, marked and unmarked ECA, and some minor, yet conspicuous, English syntax. When I use the term Islamist register, I refer to Islamic content or style items that are brought into a clearly political co-text where the voicing

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64 The only apparent pragmatic force of Yousef’s locution seems to be to add insult to injury.
effects indicate that any enregistered voice other than old political SA would be noncongruent. By Islamic content or style items, I mean a) any overt intertextual uses of or references to Islam, the Quran, the Hadith; and b) otherwise recognizably Muslim or Islamic direct or paraphrased quotations and allusions; as well as styles like c) metrical mimicking of familiar Islamic prosodic styles that conjure Quranic or Hadith recitation, or preaching, and d) pronouncing of classical grammatical case endings while speaking in standard, or classical, Arabic; and e) using a restricted, specifically religious or religious-sounding lexicon. Of these, Yousef performs a) in lines 1 and 7, and c) in line 8. Morsi uses c) in line 3 when he chooses to make use of a little-known verb, ‘/ana ‘arba’ b-‘ (‘I detest that’), which sounds like an allusion to Islamic or Quranic Arabic. Overall, Morsi uses the Islamist register quantitatively less than Yousef does. Besides line 8, Morsi uses d) in lines 10 and 19 where he pronounces final diacritics that are typically elided in old and new political SA.

Finally, the revolutionary register must be characterized. In this framework, the register is defined by its perlocutionary content, that is its messaging, over and above its lexical or syntactic makeup or style per se. It is noteworthy that in all but two segments of Morsi’s turns, namely lines 4 and 11 wherein he maintains the npSA code in performing the enregistered voice of the revolution, Morsi code switches and, in so doing, affects multiple re-registered voices that are identifiable across the various codes he employs. As Bakhtin explains, “at any given moment, languages [or voices] of various epochs and periods of socio-ideological life cohabit with one another” (Bakhtin 1981:291). The revolutionary register is thus recognizable not by a specific
code choice, but rather when a speaker 65 is a) directly, baldly expressing dissatisfaction with governmental institutions or individuals (as in lines 3-4, and 10); b) expressing disobedience or defying the status quo ante of institutional linguistic norms, e.g. H-L inversion, voice volume, style, diction (lines 6, 11, and 22 are especially clear examples of defiance); c) grievance-listing whereby a problem or complaint is expressed without an attached specific demand to resolve it (lines 6, 11-12); and d) demanding systemic change either as an individual or in a group of two or more people (lines 15 and 24 are performed by the pro-Morsi protestors in the courthouse; lines 19-20 are clear examples of a request by Morsi that the perpetrators of the coup d’état that ousted him be tried in court by the legitimate government, as he perceives it, of which he is the president).

In Goodwin’s well-known study of the language of school girls on the playground, she explains that at times a dialectical phrase, such as “Gimme some sugah”, can be used to elicit group support in the form of a physical sign, like a “celebratory handclap”, or a “matching move” wherein a “slightly different version of the same phrase” is uttered to indicate a “congruent stance” (Goodwin 2000:204-5). It would be absurd, arguably, for Morsi to have expected chief magistrate Yousef to produce matching moves in response to his uses of ECA. It would be unexpected for Yousef and Morsi to have formed any speech chains given their clearly opposing roles in the courtroom co-text. However, Morsi’s consistent (lines 5, 10, 12, 18, 22) colloquial pronunciation of “the Republic”, /il-gomhūriyya/, appears to be an implicit appeal for [65 On page 36, I explained @a7md3bdelbar’s use of traditional citizen-to-regime MSA coding is discernible as “post-revolutionary” in its enregistered voicing, and characterized this ‘revolutionary voice’ as spoken by a lay Egyptian. Morsi may not be fully “lay”, as he is inscribed and interpellated by the Egyptian military government and it’s a) directness, b) parsimony, c) implicit egalitarianism, and d) the assumption of government accountability to ‘the people’ (/aš-ša’b/), as well as e) the use of colloquial Arabic in terms of semantics, syntactics, metrical balance, or style]
support directed at the segment of the Egyptian population who would appropriately pronounce
the word in this manner, namely the MB, and Morsi’s own core constituency among the more
peasant, rural parts of Egypt, such as the Sharqia governorate north of Cairo and Zaqaziq, the
neighborhood he grew up in. There are several ‘scales of audience’ present to the hearing: those
in the courtroom and those who heard the recorded playback via media broadcasts. To many,
Morsi’s use of ECA would have been received as the use of the new, revolutionary code.
However, the significance of Morsi’s alignment with the 2011 revolution might be outweighed
by the many ironically anti-democratic blunders of his short-lived term as the first
democratically-elected president of Egypt.

The usefulness of this type of rallying cry is contestable given his situation as a prisoner
of the military government, but his ability to perform the voice of the peasant region north of
Cairo where he himself was born seems to have been successful at provoking strong responses
from Yousef. The first time Morsi uses the word “Republic” in line 5, Yousef reacts by re-
asserting his power to use Islam by uttering the Islamic invocation in line 7. After Morsi uses
“Republic” twice in lines 10 and 12, Yousef, frustrated, asserts his official, institutional judicial
power to adjourn the hearing in line 14, which can be interpreted as more of an ambiguous threat
to adjourn than an actual dismissal of court given that in line 16 he signals that the hearing is
reconvened, or was never truly adjourned, by advancing the court proceedings with a question

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66 Just as MSA, which I treat as a code type, is an idealized end, or ‘pole’, along a cline of standardized Arabic
registers, so to is ECA a code type that encompasses a huge array of local dialect forms. The red color code I use
is definitely a collapsing of this rich diversity, which means that I am erasing many of the linguistic details within
this code type. However, I do this for reasons of practicality due to lack of space, as well as a certain degree of
uncertainty regarding methodology. Without extensive field work, a more elaborated color coding scheme that
could account for the range of dialects that fits under ECA, would rely on level of speculation that I would not be
comfortable with and that would unnecessarily complicate the analysis. Still, in another article, I would gladly
take the opportunity to attempt to represent a fuller range of dialects in spoken interactions.
directed at Morsi. Again, in reaction to Morsi’s use of “Republic” in line 18, Yousef asserts his power in line 21 as chief magistrate to ignore Morsi and then patronize him by continuing the proceedings and speaking down to Morsi in saying, “I am asking you a simple question.” Finally, after Morsi repeats his use of the word “Republic” in the pronunciation style of typified peasant ECA (line 22), Yousef asserts his institutional power as chief magistrate to adjourn the court in line 23 and postpones the hearing until January 8, 2014.

3.22 Irrealis Time

Hart’s (2013:401) “alternative event-construals” are a useful tool for describing how Morsi “invokes”, or ‘constructs’, specific versions of past and future events for specific political ends (Hart, 2013:404). The linguistic and pragmatic production of these alternate histories, which I refer to as ‘irrealis’ aspects, contribute to the (re-)configuration of certain ontologies of self, of the 2011 revolution, of pro- and anti-revolution Egyptians, and the 2013 Tamarod revolution and military coup. In this way, alternative event construal both ‘reflects’ and ‘reproduces’ ideologies (Hart, 2013:404). Duranti, in fact, describes the discursive strategy of representing “the present as a natural extension of the past” as a means used by politicians to project to the audience a sense of ‘existential coherence’ through continuity (Duranti, 2006:486).

3.23 Building Morsi’s Governmental Institution through Polyvocal Discourse

The two transcripts in this study trace the genealogy, through language, of the creation of a new institution, namely Morsi’s presidency and the newly-elected MB Islamist plurality that won and held control of the Egyptian government for approximately one year. The new, revolutionary

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67 Hart weaves together an interdisciplinary framework that combines the Cognitive Linguistic Approach (CLA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the field of critical metaphor studies (Hart 2013:400). In this, Hart responds to the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) on conceptual metaphor theory, which is covered by multiple researchers in the field of political discourse in linguistic research (Charteris-Black 2004; Goatly 2007; Koller 2004; Musolff 2004; Santa Ana 2002; cited in Hart 2013:400).
Islamist-democratic government of Egypt maintained and perpetuated its institutional reality through – among other factors, resources, and instruments – discourse, including written texts. In so doing, the MB and Morsi succeeded, for a time, at displacing the existing social-political orders of two previous governmental institutions, namely those of Mubarak’s regime and, to a certain extent, that of the interim military government that eventually re-emerged, deposed Morsi, and systematically has worked to reverse the revolutionary interval by releasing Mubarak from prison, acquitting those figures who were arrested for their criminal activities under Mubarak’s regime, and outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood.

In the Twitter transcript there is a concerted effort by Morsi to normalize the newness of his presidency while also perpetuating an image of his revolutionary social personhood by engaging in the modern medium of Twitter to communicate directly with, presumably, Egypt’s youth, who are the social domain whose support he needs to galvanize to recursively perpetuate his individual character as ‘President of the Republic’ as well as the social character of the newly founded Islamist-democratic institutions of the post-revolutionary government he and MB created. There is a tension in the heart of this creation in that, to successfully normalize his re-registered voice and accompanying social and individual personhood figures, Morsi must displace the previous relationship of the Tweeters in the first transcript, and ostensibly the magistrates as well as the television viewing audience in the second transcript, to typified Islamist-democratic politics and the token Muslim Brotherhood government he formed after his election. In other words, Morsi had to a) establish that Islamism can constitute a post-Arab
Spring governmental institution, which is co-created with the Muslim Brotherhood as a new institution reality that must appeal to and gain the support and buy-in of the social domain of the segment(s) of the Egyptian population that self-identifies as revolutionaries; b) displace the previous governmental institutions of both the incumbent Mubarak regime and the more popular interim military government that installed itself after Mubarak’s ouster in 2011 under the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi. Both Mubarak’s and Tantawi’s governments can be interpreted as tokens of anti-Islamist, authoritarian governmental institutional reality; Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood must then build up the legitimacy of Islamist-democratic-revolutionary-politics while simultaneously identifying the pitfalls, fallacies, inferiorities, and foibles of these non-Islamist status quo ante rivals; c) Morsi had to himself demonstrate, consolidate, and perpetuate an Islamist-democratic-revolutionary-political individual identity that is able to appropriately speak the language of post-revolutionary democratic political Islamism and index the stereotypic social persona of an authentic revolutionary. Beyond reinforcing the authenticity and legitimacy of his individual identity, Morsi’s performance had to also continually reconstitute Islamism as authentic to the 2011 revolution and a legitimately democratic form of political identity and statecraft. The Muslim Brotherhood’s attempts to run in the post-revolution elections was met with a great deal of skepticism from all non-Islamist political factions in Egypt before and after the 2012 elections. The Muslim Brotherhood had to, largely through Morsi after he became president, reinforce its

68 A great deal is indexed by the phrase “Arab Spring” including, but not limited to many terms that are also highly indexical: notions of “people power” (aš-ša’biyya), democracy, human rights, transparency of government, modernity, which includes modern technology and modalities like social media, social justice, dignity, governance, eradication of corruption, egalitarianism / anti-elitism, etc. I cannot produce an exhaustive list here but I will say that there are loosely defined, highly contested concepts of “the Egyptian revolution” and, in turn, “New Egypt” that require further research and analysis from a political theory perspective as well in the fields of institutional discourse analysis, language as social action, and multi-modal interaction in linguistics.
status as an authentic and legitimate governmental institution by re-registering its voice within the polyvocality of post-revolutionary Egypt.

As Thomas relates in the introduction to *Language and Symbolic Power*: "[d]ominated individuals are not passive bodies to which symbolic power is applied, as it were, like a scalpel to a corpse. Rather, symbolic power requires, as a condition of its success, that those subjected to it believe in the legitimacy of power and the legitimacy of those who wield it" (Thomas 1991:23). In the Egyptian case, arguably, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), despite being legitimately elected into pluralities in the parliament, failed to substantiate its symbolic power and perform in manners that both built a new governmental institution, repudiated and completed the destruction of the incumbent institution, and all the while demonstrated respect for the discourse and ideology of the Arab Spring. It was not an easy task, but this complex 'will of the people' might have been expected in the wake of such a harried movement against the deeply entrenched Mubarak regime.

These processual sets of activities I have described comprise the ‘revolutionary interval’ wherein an incumbent institution is displaced through denigration and competition with an alternative institution that rivals its claims of legitimacy and counter-registers its voices. This is the flip side of polyvocal discourse, namely *competition*. The alternative institution is at once creating itself while continually, through discourse, re-constituting itself as a viable, authentic, legitimate, and typifiable replacement institution for the one it is destroying. A more specific term for this adversarial discursive-pragmatic process of transition is *institutional competition*. Either phrasing would require an understanding of a key assumption of this interval, namely the fragility of institutions, which is born out of an institution’s need to be continually, recursively
perpetuated by lay people. In the case of governmental institutions, the people who are being
governed, must always be re-enabling their governors through discourse and social action,
otherwise, if that recursivity were to end, the institutions themselves would unravel, as they did
quite rapidly during the first three years of the ‘Arab Spring’.

The analysis of the two transcripts illustrates the resonance of the revolutionary interval
and institutional competition as productive and related concepts within a multimodal analytical
framework. Like a racetrack, in a sense, the revolutionary interval in Egypt set governmental
pre-Arab Spring institutions into competition with revolutionary post-Arab Spring institutions
seeking to become replacement revolutionary governmental institutions. During this interval in
Egypt, the incumbent institution (Mubarak’s regime) was challenged, meaning that the alternate
institution (Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood against the backdrop of the revolution) attempted
to disrupt its recursivity and, at once, present a viable institutional replacement (political Islam +
revolutionary Islamist democracy). To do this, the alternate institution employed a series of
methods to discredit and do damage to the incumbent, which included re-casting its previously
enregistered voice as “the government” into that of a counter-register, namely “enemies of the
revolution”, which frames all regime discourse as anti-revolutionary and thereby regressive,
oppressive, and conservative, or anti-modern. The ‘damage’ to the incumbent institution is done
discursively by the contending institution and its individual personhood figures, like Morsi, who
repeatedly challenge and denigrate the incumbent’s long-standing discourse and all of what
Morsi termed its “remnants” (/fülül/), both in terms of its content (narrative) and its form
(Modern Standard Arabic, or old political standard Arabic) (Hendawi 2012).
The ‘damage’ described above was partly carried out by speaking in re-registered post-revolutionary voices, among other strategies. In the Egyptian case, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s experiment with institution creation through discourse ultimately failed on July 3, 2013. To ensure its total destruction, the transitional military government ordered that Morsi be deposed and placed under arrest, while thousands of pro-Morsi supporters were arrested. Muslim Brotherhood members and supporters who chose to protest against what they believed to be a military coup d’état were killed on the streets by the hundreds or thousands. The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood was arrested or killed or subjected to house arrest, e.g. Mohammed Badie, the Supreme Leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, or, as in the case of Morsi, put on trial for allegedly inciting violence during his presidency.69

The question remains as to what, if anything, the Morsi government could have done to avoid the coup? The answer may not be related to linguistic or semiotic processes, but, with that, the transitional military government is violently cracking down on any signs of disobedience, including holding up four fingers in memory of the victims of the Rab’a Al-‘Adawiyya Mosque massacre wherein 638 people were killed, nearly all civilians, and some 3,994 injured.70 This indicates an intense concern within the interim government leadership over control of the signs and speech acts, in effect, the en-, re-, counter- registered and entextualized voices of the revolution. When the revolutionaries demanded changes from the Mubarak regime and launched


accusations, during the 18 Days of Tahrir between the start of the revolution on January 25th, 2011 and the announcement of Mubarak’s stepping down from the presidency on February 11, 2011, Mubarak’s regime eventually admitted to some wrong doing, instituted cosmetic reforms to the constitution, and attempted to mimic the revolutionary register of the protestors, in an attempt to avoid having to really reform and change its institutional behavior. Bassiouney calls the sudden register shifts in public a resort to insincere, or “vulgar ECA”. This was also the case in Ben Ali’s ‘linguistic breaking point’ on national Tunisian television when he gave his farewell speech entirely in Tunisian Arabic, the re-registered ‘language of the revolution’. The military interim Egyptian regime, as of the time of this research, seems less interested in affecting registers and appeasing protestors by aligning with them through discourse than it does in brutally silencing any inklings of a repeat of the 18 Days of Tahrir or the so-called “Islamist Winter” period leading up to July 3, 2013.

In this same vein, de Certeau's work articulates the importance of constructing a discourse that is believable before it can be acted upon - however, this process is not linear. There is a tension that inheres in the overlap of simultaneously making a discourse believable and inculcating a people to act in accordance with the emerging, inchoate (institutional) discourse: "The credibility of a discourse is what first makes believers act in accord with it. It produces practitioners. To make people believe is to make them act. But by a curious circularity, the ability to make people act - to write and to machine bodies - is precisely what makes people believe" (de Certeau 1984:148).

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See chapter 1 for a partial transcription and discussion.
While abstract, de Certeau may have inadvertently explained the very signpost of the turning point in the Arab Spring uprisings, namely that moment wherein discourse is 'historicee' or 'story-fied' (made into a story); "And the tool ensures precisely the passage from discourse to the story through the interventions that incarnate the law by making bodies conform to it and thus make it appear to be recited by reality itself" (cf. de Certeau 1984:149). I posit that the Arab Spring has not yet been completely transformed into mythos and story - it is alive in language and in action and it is violent, polyvocal, and incomplete. De Certeau, however, offers an insightful prognostication, of sorts, for the Egyptian revolution in that it is not perhaps until the 'flesh', or literal bodies and physical events of the Arab Spring, are inscribed into words, and thereby made quotable by and for others, that a real paradigmatic shift in society, like a “revolution”, can be said to have occurred. For sociolinguists to be able to more fully interpret the Egyptian revolution and the roles and efficiencies of different channels of communication and coordination in the Arab Spring, the uprisings will have "[t]o finally pass from this opaque and dispersed flesh,” or the vicissitudes of war and conflict, into “the limpidness of a word [and] become a fragment of language, a single name, that can be read and quoted by others" (de Certeau 1984:149). In other words, for the revolution to have truly occurred and had an impact, it must be properly identified, observed, analyzed, studied and written about. It must pass into the realm of signs, of language and words.

72 Bassam Haddad, editor of Jadaliyya.com, regularly uses the avenue of his academic website that focuses on all things related to Arab Studies to stress the importance of not allowing academic treatments of the Arab Spring to anesthetize researchers from the reality that these ‘uprisings’ are not sterile, benign sites of study for the subjects living in the Arab region. From Syria to Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon, Egypt, and even Tunisia, hundreds of thousands of people, mostly civilians and some estimate that over half are children, have been killed. Millions – no exaggeration – have been displaced from their homes and countries. I hope that my research on language and social action in the Arab Spring contributes to ending the violence by highlighting just how much can be accomplished with words. May this piece inspire researchers who have not explored Arabic speaking societies as to some of the complexities of the heteroglossic situation of Arab societies and motivate others to conduct further fieldwork in this vibrant and complicated yet understudied region.
Chapter 4: El-Sisi Echoing and Mirroring Abdel Nasser: Tracing Oral and Physical Intertexts in Two Egyptian Colloquial Arabic Presidential Speeches

“Imagine a dialogue of two persons in which the statements of the second speaker are omitted, but in such a way that the general sense is not all violated. The second speaker is present invisibly, his words are not there, but deep traces left by these words have a determining effect on the present and visible worlds of the first speaker. We sense that this is a conversation, although only one person is speaking, and it is a conversation of the most intense kind, for each present uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another person.”

Key concept: This chapter draws on the literature on intertextuality in interactional sociolinguistics to examine the oral and physical intertextual relations between a speech delivered by former president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1965, and a speech on a related theme delivered by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2014. Using what I call multimodal intertextual analysis I argue that in El-Sisi’s performance there is evidence that he draws on elements of Abdel Nasser’s 1965 speech performance to boost his own popularity and the legitimacy of his post-revolutionary regime. Like Nasser in his time as president, El-Sisi needs to honor the revolution while also ensuring that it has come to an end.

4.1 The Revolutionary Interval: Institutional Competition

Competition is a critical stage of the revolutionary interval (see chapter 2 section 10). The interval begins when an institution’s recursive hold over a population is challenged. If the competing party’s attempt to disrupt the incumbent’s institutionality is thwarted, then the incumbent endures or re-emerges. If the competitor succeeds in displacing the incumbent then the incumbent institution has failed and will be transitioned out; the challenging party must then

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73 Bakhtin 1984: 197.
establish its institutionality as a legitimate, trustworthy and appropriate replacement. If it
succeeds, it will preside for a period (until it is challenged and displaced). If it were to fail to
establish itself, then it too would be displaced and replaced. Its discourses would be counter-
registered by a competing institutional order and its embodied practices too would be re-
registered in an attempt to subvert its institutionality to make way for the competitor’s.

In 2014, El-Sisi had displaced Morsi’s institutional order with that of SCAF and its
networks of allies. El-Sisi’s had become the incumbent institutional order. He was in his first
year in power and still at the stage of institutional competition wherein he and his administration
needed to prove themselves to the Egyptian people as legitimate, trustworthy, and appropriate
replacements for Morsi’s recently ousted governmental institution. In the face of overwhelmingly
negative public opinion, El-Sisi and his administration needed a strategy to turn the tide and win
over the Egyptians who participated in the 2011 revolution who already proved themselves
capable of returning to Tahrir Square in protest of government overreach or violence. El-Sisi lost
much of the support he had during his candidacy for president as further analyses became public
that suggested that he and SCAF may have colluded against Morsi. The slaying and arbitrary
arrest of thousands of Egyptians on suspicion of their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood
also earned El-Sisi the title of Mubarak reincarnate in some circles.

For his institutional order to survive the rising oppositional force against it, El-Sisi and
his administration needed to throw off the accusation of having returned to Mubarak-era

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governing practices. El-Sisi and his team seem to have chosen to conjure the memory of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a well-regarded former Egyptian president, and juxtapose El-Sisi to his image to boost El-Sisi’s public opinion numbers by suggesting - through multimodal intertextual cues - that he is Abdel Nasser’s heir to the office of the presidency.

4.2 Toward a Multimodal Intertextuality

In this analysis I examine the oral and physical intertextual relations between a speech delivered by former president of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser on December 21, 1965, and a speech on a related theme delivered by Egypt’s current president as of the time of this research, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on August 5, 2014. I argue that in El-Sisi’s performance there is evidence that he draws on elements of Abdel Nasser’s 1965 speech performance to constitute resources for constructing his identity as, like Abdel Nasser was before him, a (successful and popular) post-revolutionary president of Egypt. El-Sisi must reshape Abdel Nasser’s utterances and performatives to do the dual work of both conjuring Abdel Nasser while also advancing the messagings of his immediate, present context. In El-Sisi’s ‘interperformance’, then, he must determine when and where and how often to conjure Abdel Nasser while trying to stay relevant to the situation, and he must also not accidentally push forward aspects of Abdel Nasser’s time as president that would run counter to his present purposes.

Unlike El-Sisi, Abdel Nasser was a socialist who despised Western influence and stood against foreign investors into Egypt’s economy; in the four pairs of excerpts I discuss in the data and findings sections, it is clear that El-Sisi struggles to deliver a message that is vari-directional with, or what I call *anechoic* of, Abdel Nasser’s firm position against foreign investment. Abdel Nasser is also remembered for having resigned when Egypt suffered a military defeat to Israel.
under his watch. For El-Sisi, taking responsibility for his actions could spell political suicide. El-Sisi oversaw the Egyptian defense forces’ attacks on thousands of Egyptian civilians following the coup that deposed former president Morsi and brought El-Sisi into power. El-Sisi’s reputation is deeply scarred by the Raba’ al-‘Adawyiyyya massacre of over 1,400 peaceful protestors who had gathered in support of Morsi after he was placed under house arrest by the military under El-Sisi’s command on July 3, 2013.\textsuperscript{76} El-Sisi himself personally announced the news to president Morsi of his impending arrest.

El-Sisi seemed to need to pool as many resources as possible to boost his popularity in the first year of his presidency. He needed to make people forget the massacre of civilians during the first days of his effective control of Egypt as leader of the ministry of defense and then as president. Abdel Nasser, another young military officer who had risen through the ranks over five decades earlier to stage a coup and arrest the president managed to win the support of the Egyptian, and Arab, people despite his violent crackdown upon the Muslim Brotherhood. It would seem, then, that El-Sisi, or his campaign team, decided that Abdel Nasser’s image was an appropriate fit and a needed overlay to increase El-Sisi’s popularity. Abdel Nasser’s memory may also have been understood as potentially able to help El-Sisi’s administration avoid having to take professional accountability for their violent actions against Egyptian civilians.

This partiality, or selectivism in El-Sisi’s imitations of Abdel Nasser is a reminder of the very humanness of communication, and intertextuality specifically. The working definition of intertextuality I use in this chapter draws on Bakhtin and Sclafani’s descriptions, which focus on

human interaction and how the relationality in and between texts suggests that there is a polyvocality to all utterances; I’m also interested in how intertextuality can be strategically deployed to (co-)construct identities in specific situations, such as in a publicly televised political speech. Bauman, citing Bakhtin, explains that “behind the contact between texts that establishes relationships of intertextuality ‘is a contact of personalities and not of things’” (Bakhtin 1986:162 cited in Bauman 2004:6). Sclafani, referring to ‘echoes’, posits that intertextuality is “the idea that all utterances are imbued with echoes of prior texts and that they anticipate future texts, as in a dialogue. Intertextuality also emphasizes the idea that all utterances are polyphonic; that is, they contain several ‘voices’, reminiscent of particular characters, social groups, or styles” (Sclafani 2008:511). Intertextuality is about the multimodal conversation of myriad voices and gestures over time from which arises a single, albeit always composite, communicative sign. The sign itself also becomes a resource that contributes synchronically to the immediate interactive ecology as well as diachronically to the polyvocal conversation - a heteroglossic and embodied discourse reservoir - in which it was forged and from which it emerged.

The intertextuality between El-Sisi and Abdel Nasser has its limits, and some of them seem intentional given the surgical precision with which mostly only convenient images, words, and memories of Abdel Nasser are pushed forward, while others are left behind. Intertextuality is therefore also a tool to both construct and destroy identities, and institutions, in interactions such as presidential speeches.

After a short discussion of the relevant background to the two speeches I have selected to analyze, I synthesized the relevant contributions of the literature on oral and physical
intertextuality as well as multimodal interactional analysis. I then suggest a combined framework of analysis that I subsequently applied in the data analysis and findings sections of this chapter.

4.3 Background

Muhammad Morsi, whom I discussed at length in chapter 3, a prominent and politically active member of the Muslim Brotherhood for decades, became the first democratically elected president of Egypt after the January 2011 Arab Spring revolution that saw the resignation of Hosni Mubarak who had ruled the country since 1981. Morsi’s presidency may have been doomed from the start given the high hopes of the revolutionaries and the very fragile state of the economic and security sectors in the aftermath of the uprising. One year after he was sworn into office, on June 30, 2013, a massive anti-Morsi protest in the country’s central Tahrir Square district broke out under the auspices of the “Tamarrod movement”. Tamarrod is the Arabic word for ‘rebellion’. The protests were dubbed “the June 30 Revolution” by SCAF - a name that mimics the syntax of the popular name used in social media for the 2011 uprising: the January 25 Revolution with the highly-used Twitter hashtag #jan25 - the Tamarrod protests used #june30.77

It is unclear just how spontaneous the protests were - some participants of the 2011 revolution believe the June 30 revolution was orchestrated by SCAF in large part.78

Responding to the demands of the protestors, on July 1, 2013 President Morsi was issued an ultimatum by El-Sisi on behalf of SCAF: “If you have not obeyed the people after 48 hours, it will be our … duty to put forward a road map for the future instead.”79 Morsi’s response was

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79 “Timeline: What’s happened since Egypt’s revolution?” PBS Frontline.
incredulous: “I will not allow anyone to dispute my legitimacy. This is unacceptable. Unacceptable! Unacceptable!” However, two days later, on July 3, 2013, President Morsi was placed under house arrest and effectively deposed by the Egyptian military, and specifically by the man he had personally appointed to serve his administration as the Minister of Defense: Abdel Fattah El-Sisi. Three to six-hundred other members of Morsi’s administration, including appointed governors, were also arrested on the same day.

Following Morsi’s arrest, El-Sisi was quickly groomed by the interim government of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and then installed as Egypt’s new president on June 8, 2014 following what many critiqued as a perfunctory election riddled with allegations of fraud. The Muslim Brotherhood, the party of the former president, and its supporters were barred from participation in the 2014 election. To overcome the damning accusation of having orchestrated a regressive military coup, which would have negative financial repercussions as well as cause internal turmoil, El-Sisi was marketed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and his supporters as ‘the savior of New Egypt’; he was popularly perceived as a vanguard against the unpopular Muslim Brotherhood and its political branch, the Freedom and Justice Party. Furthermore, his image was systematically plastered around Egypt in juxtaposition to Egypt’s late president of the 1950s and ‘60s, Gamal Abdel Nasser.

80 “Timeline: What’s happened since Egypt’s revolution?” PBS Frontline.
Despite the unpopularity of the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated Freedom and Justice Party, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ action to depose Morsi and the crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood leadership and supporters thereafter was criticized as an “inqilāb” (‘coup d’état’) across Egypt and around the world, and widely perceived as a return to Mubarak-era authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{84} In the months after Morsi was deposed, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the state-run media produced an array of messaging campaigns designed to refute the idea of a staged coup and to reframe the event as a “tamarrod” (‘rebellion’) and a second “sōwra” (‘revolution’).\textsuperscript{85} El-Sisi ultimately became president but had to, and is currently still, working to change the perception of himself as a military strongman á la Mubarak. El-Sisi and his administration and supporters appear to be attempting to recast him as, or associate him closely with, arguably, Egypt’s historically most-popular president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Abdel Nasser served as president from 1956 to 1970 and oversaw a remarkably successful tenure that garnered him unprecedented regional support as well as the adoration of many Egyptians, with the notable exception of the Muslim Brotherhood and its acolytes.

4.4 Imitating Gamal Abdel Nasser

It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine exactly why Abdel Nasser was chosen by El-Sisi’s campaign team as the predecessor to whom they would compare him. Intentionality continues to be an elusively high bar to meet in linguistic analyses. It is not my objective in this research to prove or even argue that this comparison was motivated for specific reasons beyond El-Sisi’s


apparent unpopularity and Abdel Nasser’s legendary level of popularity inside and around Egypt. However, it only took a little scratching at the surface to reveal a number of historical and biographical parallels between these men that may have contributed to the reasoning behind the campaign team’s decision. There seemed to be a best-fit line connecting Abdel Nasser in 1965 to Tahrir Square in 2011 (Cook 2012). Whether or not it was decided due to the parallels below is immaterial to the analysis. I point these similarities out to provide further relevant context for the data and analysis sections and to demonstrate a possible rationale for the attempt, both in El-Sisi’s campaign, and in his speeches after becoming president, to conjure the specter of Abdel Nasser in photographic and artistic images (see appendix 5), as well as in certain elements of El-
Sisi’s presidential speech and performance styles, or what I am calling oral and physical intertexts. The chart in Figure 4.1 also notes where the two men’s storylines depart.

I initially investigated the similarities being drawn in the political campaign to elect El-Sisi as president as part of my research on Muhammad Morsí’s presidency and his downfall. I collected a large number of images, of which I have selected a few and placed in the appendix, that depicted El-Sisi alongside Abdel Nasser. As an Arab myself who grew up hearing about Abdel Nasser as a hero figure from my father and grandfather and in numerous references in conversations during my time living and studying in Egypt in 2005-2006, it struck me as odd that El-Sisi would be compared to Abdel Nasser and not, what to seemed to be the more obvious choices of either Anwar Sadat or Hosni Mubarak (for a discussion of ‘why not Sadat, Mubarak or Morsí’, see appendix 5). El-Sisi has been struggling to legitimize his reign while Abdel Nasser came into power with an outpouring of support that he sustained even after he had resigned in 1967 following a military defeat to Israel. In fact, as the above chart illustrates, he was re-instated in 1968 after large, prolonged protests demanding his return. To that end, I began looking into basic timelines of these two men’s lives and rather quickly found several compelling parallels that I summarized in figure 4.3 (above).

To test my perception against other researchers from or of the region, I discussed my findings and showed many of the images designed by the El-Sisi for president campaign with six individuals, men and women, who were each native speakers of Arabic from various Arab countries, including Egypt. I essentially asked them if they believed, after seeing the ‘rhymed histories’ and the images, that it was tenable, in fact, to compare these two figures; in other words, did they see what I saw when I started re-watching videos of El-Sisi speeches after
conducting this investigation into the parallels between him and Abdel Nasser? Did they also perceive attempts by El-Sisi’s administration to ‘adequate’ him, in Hodge’s (2010) words, to Abdel Nasser? Simply put; did El-Sisi appear to be imitating aspects of Abdel Nasser’s distinctive performance style? All six participants agreed that there was, indeed, some element of ‘imitation’. Four of the six also commented to the effect that the imitation seemed intentional or that El-Sisi appears to have been coached to invoke Abdel Nasser’s memory by speaking in a certain way and re-enacting bodily movements and gestures that could be associated with Abdel Nasser.

I took these results as sufficient grounds to proceed in conducting a multimodal intertextual analysis of El-Sisi’s speech performance as president in a 2014 event announcing the “New Suez Canal”, wherein he seems to have drawn heavily from a 1965 speech by Abdel Nasser commemorating the nationalization of the original Suez Canal that was completed in 1869. It was nationalized on July 26, 1956 by President Abdel Nasser. In the following section I examine the relevant literature in the two approaches to intertextuality that I seek to relate and synthesize, namely physical and oral intertextuality. Afterward, I succinctly describe ‘my approach’ toward a framework of multimodal intertextual analysis before addressing the data in the subsequent sections.

4.5 Why Not Sadat, Mubarak, or… Morsi?

Because it lies outside the focus of this chapter, I cannot address the question of whether El-Sisi is also drawing from leaders of Egypt previous to Abdel Nasser or from other Arab and non-Arab leaders, non-leaders, or genres of presidential discourse—that would likely require the space of a book or series of articles. That is not to say that he does not pull from such sources; he
undoubtedly must borrow and reshape countless oral and physical intertexts, or lines and gestures from public discourse that have been said and done before by many others, in order to communicate at all. For this analysis, I chose to focus on the ways El-Sisi imitates Abdel Nasser and the aspects of the work of these imitations that are relevant to the broader framework of this dissertation. I do, however, in this overview, although very briefly, discuss my rationale for homing in on Abdel Nasser and not any of the successor Egyptian presidents after him.

In September 2014, at the start of my research, for comparative purposes, I began critically watching speeches by Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt from 1970 to 1981, and Hosni Mubarak, who was president from 1981 to 2011, as well as Muhammad Morsi who served as president from June 30, 2012 until he was deposed by El-Sisi’s coup on July 3, 2013. Each of these presidents responds to, amends, and imitates Gamal Abdel Nasser’s iconic style in different ways. In my viewings of their publicly available speeches, however, I chose to focus on only the following four characteristics: a) approximate ratio of colloquial to standard Arabic, b) style dress, c) staging of public speech events, and d) basic elements of speech structure, including ways of breaking up strings of information and providing some entertainment value or interacting with the audience.

To begin, Abdel Nasser was a secularist and a pan-Arabist; he dressed in a western-style and his suit consisted of a pressed, long-sleeve white collared shirt, a jacket, tie, and slacks. He had a thin mustache and never grew a beard or removed the mustache. His public speeches were conducted in large auditoriums usually brimming with government officials and members of the public. He always stood behind a podium and had a written prepared speech from which he read intermittently in between long bouts of colloquial Egyptian Arabic. He interacted with the
audience throughout his speeches; he told countless jokes, asked non-rhetorical questions and listened to answers, and pointed to individuals he was addressing in the crowd.

As a staunch secularist, Abdel Nasser fought the Muslim Brotherhood and made a point of not invoking Islam and therefore did not use Islamic formulaic expressions for beginning, punctuating, or closing his speeches. He did, however, switch between speaking in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic and Modern Standard Arabic. Specifically, Abdel Nasser used written texts as what can be thought of as a cinematographic framing device whereby the audience is given some reprieve from the main narrative through, in movies or television, a second, subsidiary, storyline that is related to the main plot and moves the story along. It mainly breaks up the flow of information and changes the perspective from which the audience learns about the principle story; the two plots are contrasting but related and co-create ‘entertainment value’ as well as open up natural spaces for the insertion of dramatic or humorous ‘sidebar’, or ‘out-of-frame’ remarks. Abdel Nasser was famed for addressing the public in Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, which was a marked register for the genre of presidential public speeches in the Arab region. Arab presidents then and now speak to the people rarely and, when they do, they use Quranic and Modern Standard Arabic and do not take questions from or interact with the audience. In contrast, Abdel Nasser used standard Arabic only when breaking up the main narrative of the speech which was always in colloquial Arabic. He would signal that he was about to read from the standard Arabic text by physically looking down at the text and pausing for prolonged periods of time to read silently before either reading out loud in standard Arabic, or explaining the text in colloquial Arabic. The majority of Abdel Nasser speeches were done in colloquial Arabic. Abdel Nasser starts this style of performance in his speeches in the ‘50s and maintains it
up until his last public speech; and, after his death, it became ritualized as the structure of an Egyptian presidential speech - namely, western-style dress, a mustache or no facial hair, the presence of a podium with a written prepared speech atop it, and the use of colloquial Arabic to address the crowd while reading out loud in standard Arabic. Presidents following Abdel Nasser also all welcomed members of the public into government auditoriums to witness speeches, told jokes to the audience, entertained shouted remarks by audience members, and directly addressed, sometimes by physically pointing to, officials and other individuals who came up in the course of the speech.

When Sadat became president in 1970 after Abdel Nasser’s death, he made one critical amendment to his predecessor’s speech style: While maintaining the structure of conspicuously (looks down at a text wearing glasses) reading in standard Arabic and making side comments, typically short jokes, in colloquial Egyptian Arabic, Sadat does away with what I call narrative Egyptian Arabic. That is, Abdel Nasser would look down to read out loud in standard Arabic but then looked up again and explained what he read in colloquial Arabic; he would also expand and continue through important, informative points all in colloquial Arabic. He would return to the text between episodes in the narrative, which could be understood as frames (Goffman 1974). By ‘episode’ I specifically mean a topic in the given, ‘formal’, written prepared text of the speech. In discussing the importance of regaining the Suez Canal, for example, Abdel Nasser introduced the topic of challenging American and European demands of Egypt by reading in standard Arabic but then continued and finished the topic in colloquial Arabic. Sadat, however, spent almost the entire time of the speech looking down, wearing glasses, and reading out loud and very slowly in formal standard Arabic; he also projected his voice in a way that produced a booming effect in
the microphone and intoned his reading in highly aestheticized ways. Abdel Nasser, by contrast, used to speak standard Arabic in roughly the same voice quality and rate as he spoke in his urban dialect of Egyptian Arabic.

Abdel Nasser would keep his head up and gaze at the audience while extemporizing much of his speech; he paused periodically to return to the text, which he signaled by looking down. Sadat did the inverse of this - his head was down most of the time and he would pause infrequently to look up and make a humorous remark in colloquial Arabic and in his normal voice quality. In both cases, the pausing and code switching serve to give the audience a sense of continuity and progress, as well as a semblance of structure and, therefore, formality. The allotments of time devoted to each kind of performance, i.e. reading versus extemporizing, within a speech event were different, but the same components were nonetheless present, if reshaped. Those components of Abdel Nasser’s performance style, no matter how rejiggered they may have become in subsequent presidents’ configurations, comprise what it is to do giving a speech as the president of Egypt as a troped figure consisting of voicing, voice register, and embodiment as well as habitus.

Abdel Nasser’s reading from a prepared text in standard Arabic does the work of “being the president of Egypt”. Sadat did not challenge the indexicality of the written text, then, but he did displace narrative Egyptian Arabic. He chose to instead maintain standard Arabic throughout his speeches with very rapid, shortened, switches to colloquial Arabic to throw in a joke, typically when finishing a major theme in the written text. Mubarak inherited this speech-giving structure and style basically en toto from Sadat with the amendment of adding formulaic Islamic invocations at the beginnings and closings of his speeches—many analysts argue that he did this
to co-opt rising support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak mostly seems to completely
preserve Sadat’s speech-giving style including the marked shift in voice quality to Sadat’s same
booming effect and aestheticized intonation pattern; this may be because Mubarak, historically,
served as Sadat’s vice president and only became president after Sadat was assassinated. The
mimicked style may have been a living homage to Sadat - it is impossible to tell. However, what
is important from an intertextual analysis prospective, is the continuity created across three
presidencies spanning six consecutive decades.

When Muhammad Morsi became president following the 2011 revolution, he too
maintained the same basic visual cues started by Abdel Nasser (western suit and tie, podium,
prepared written speech at hand) and adopted the colloquial-standard proportions of Sadat and
Mubarak. Morsi differed in his wearing of glasses at all times, his full beard, and his more
prolonged Islamic invocations at beginnings and ends of speeches; he also switched frequently
into an Islamist register whereby he quoted the Quran and other recognized Islamic textual
sources, and, at times, would, in the style of an Imam, lead the audience in collective Islamic
petitionary prayers. It is likely that he isolated many non-Muslim or less adherent Muslims with
his performance style.

Before El-Sisi became president, he rarely, if ever, spoke in public. When he did, he
would mainly use standard Arabic and read from a teleprompter. After becoming president,
however, there is a marked shift to Abdel Nasser’s iconic performance style - from the type of
dress, to the use of a podium, the use of a written speech (on paper) as a framing device, and,

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86 Sadat was assassinated in a public ceremony on a main street in Egypt in 1981 by an Egyptian who cited his
motivation as being Sadat’s signing of the peace treaty with Israel. Egyptian state media labeled the assassin a
“religious extremist” and blamed his actions on the Muslim Brotherhood.
critically, the return of narrative Egyptian Colloquial Arabic and extended interactions with the audience, or at least a perceptible attempt to do so. That is, El-Sisi seems to react against his immediate predecessor, Morsi, and Mubarak and Sadat before him, by reversing the proportions of colloquial to standard Arabic and thereby, seemingly intentionally, returning to Abdel Nasser’s original configuration. El-Sisi also reduces the length of Islamic invocations to a bear minimum and only uses them at the beginnings of speeches. Of course, El-Sisi has, like Abdel Nasser did, chosen to crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood, but with very different reception both nationally and internationally. Abdel Nasser was hailed as a hero and El-Sisi is condemned for ordering acts that amount to violations of human and civil rights. While there is some significant overlap between these two men’s careers and rises to power, there are many differences as well. I do not argue that El-Sisi seeks or intends to perfectly imitate Abdel Nasser, nor can he even if he so wished. Rather, they share a ‘rhymed’ history and El-Sisi’s imitations of Abdel Nasser similarly create a rhyming effect, rather than a carbon copy.

4.6 Physical Intertextuality

In the interpretation of movements of the body, facial expressions, and gestures as aspects of communication, Ray Birdwhistell (1952) was concerned with recording the possible meanings of physical movements, which he termed “kinemes”, in much the same way that spoken language is analyzed in terms of “utterances”. Ekman and Friesen (1971) were interested in describing cross-cultural or universal non-verbal forms of communication. Building on the work of Birdwhistell, Ekman and Friesen, Haring (1988, 1992) coined the term “interperformance” to describe “that relation of inclusion which connects” specific performance events “to the various types of discourse which engender them” (1992:192). Haring (2007:166) explains that, in his research on
storytelling in Madagascar, “the African contribution to island storytelling is a case of intertextuality,” and Haring goes on to propose that this particular form of intertextuality “might more properly be called ‘interperformance’.” Taking Bakhtin, Bauman, and Kristeva’s respective works on dialogicality and intertextuality as a foundation, Haring ascribes “linguistic energy” to the performances of stories in tribal parts of Madagascar and defines interperformance explicitly as “simply the relation of one performance of a tale or proverb or riddle to other performances” (2007:166). Haring’s important work on parallel folktale performances of related and similar stories being ‘transposed’ from African contexts on to and within Southwest Indian Ocean contexts expands intertextuality beyond what Bakhtin conceived of as the “chain or network of texts in dialogue with each other” where texts are “oral or written” to encompass physical or embodied ‘(inter)texts’.

Merleau-Ponty, albeit more philosophical, works on the body in interaction are not mentioned in Haring’s books and articles but Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “intercorporeity” (alternatively ‘intercorporeality’) is also an important contribution to the idea that communication is embodied. Csordas (2008) summarizes Merleau-Ponty’s (1962) concept of “intercorporeality” saying that it is a “mode of collective presence in the World” (Csordas 2006:117; italics added). In other words, Merleau-Ponty argued that our embodied ways of communicating are representative and imitative of a shared repertoire of what I call physical, or embodied, intertexts.

Merleau-Ponty’s main interest as a philosopher was not directly in intertextuality but rather in the role of the body itself as a non-conscious perceiving agent, both in the context of interactions with people and with respect to its relations with and responses to physical
environments. Marratto (2012:142) adumbrates Merleau-Ponty's recognition that the body makes certain “'tacit decisions'” in its movements, which, he argues, are motivated by forces in the situational contexts—what he refers to as “the ‘call’ of the sensible”—in addition to his own decision-making. Merleau-Ponty explains that “my sentient body, in its presence to me, as my own body, attests to what can never be present to me,” which suggests that embodied communication operates in highly non-conscious or automatic ways (Marratto quoting Merleau-Ponty, 2012:142).

For Merleau-Ponty, each person’s embodiment contains within it “non-self-identity”, which entails a “kind of opening to the presence of others” (2012:142). Merleau-Ponty sees that the body’s movements are re-enactments, comparable again to Bakhtin’s ‘chain of texts’, that are combined and reshaped by the individual in new contexts, thus constituting an ‘expressive style’ that is a gestalt, or an intertextual production: “The my-own-ness, so to speak, of my body is enacted in the form of an expressive style that is reflective of my being-with-others and subtends my understanding of the behavior of others” (2012:143; italics added). Style, or ‘unity of style’, Merleau-Ponty (2012:144) explains, takes place at the “intersection of a singularity and a generality,” which I understand to be similar to, in the literature on intertextuality, Tannen’s (1987:236) definition of ‘prepatterning’: “Through prepatterning, the individual speaks through the group, and the group speaks through the individual.” The individual, in Tannen’s writing, is equivalent to what Merleau-Ponty calls “a singularity”, and ‘the group’ for Tannen, lines up with Merleau-Ponty’s ‘generality’. Just as all texts are considered to be in ‘dialogic relations’ with one another, Merleau-Ponty (2012:144) explains that all bodies are in constant dialogic relation too in a “mutual involvement of bodies”: “he and I are like organs of one single intercorporeity,”
which, Merleau-Ponty differentiates from intersubjectivity because the latter concerns relations “between (conscious) subjects” and in incorporeity, “my body is already bound up with the other’s body before there can be any relation between conscious subjects.” Also related to Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of incorporeity is his cogent remark that “the ‘I’ is… a result rather than an origin” (2012:145). It cannot be presumed, in other words, that one’s individuality precedes one’s intersubjectivity, or mutual involvement with the bodies, voices and identities of others both present and past.

Synthesizing Birdwhistell, Bakhtin, Tannen, and Merleau-Ponty, then, an intertext, be it oral/written in the former or embodied in the latter, is the product of prior embodied communicative performances (kinemes or ‘performatives’) from a cultural or general repertoire that can be partly enacted non-consciously and the individual’s conscious decision-making in a new context as to how and when to combine certain performatives (‘style’) in an effort to convey a message. To the extent that certain performatives are non-conscious responses to a situation, context, or ‘frame’ (Goffman 1974), we can think of them as interactional reflexes. Other performatives, however, that are chosen by the individual in interaction can be thought of simply as performatives or mirrorings.

Like Merleau-Ponty, although without direct reference to him, Weiss (1999) argues that the body plays an important role in social interactions; for Weiss, embodiment is continually ‘mediated’ by and in relation to other human beings (Sakr 2013 citing Weiss 1999:5). Also related is Bourdieu’s (1977) conception of habitus and hexis. Habitus refers to physical, bodily ‘dispositions’ that are regularized to the point of habituation such that individuals are unaware of why exactly they are moving and performing as they are—this is very similar to the idea of
‘reflexes’ that I use in my analysis; I prefer the term ‘reflex’ because, unlike disposition, or kineme, it conveys the sense that a bodily movement can be non-conscious and reactive to a context or frame. For Bourdieu, such movements, or dispositions, thus become “preconscious” habits. The idea of hexis, or bodily hexis, then, posits that the body is a “mnemonic device” wherein fundamental cultural principles regarding “dress, bearing, physical and verbal manners” are inscribed.

Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s incorporeity has in mind the dialogic relations between one’s body and other bodies, for Bourdieu, hexis is where the individual’s agency meets social structures, or ‘culture’. This addressing of social structure and culture as part of the relevant context of an interaction, or what Erickson (1982) calls “the communicative environment”, in Bourdieu’s concept of hexis is an important contribution to a multimodal understanding of intertextuality. Bourdieu and Merleau-Ponty, Haring, see embodied communication, or performances, as combinations of past performatives and present contexts; in fact, Phil Hine (2010) describes Bourdieu’s theory of the body as being a “site of incorporated history.”

The idea that two, or more, performances can be linked across time in both non-conscious, or unintended, and conscious/intended ways is key to the present analysis of Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s mirroring of elements of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s performance style. Merleau-Ponty (2012:143) described the dual nature of (inter)performance quite eloquently: “…the body proper is a premonition of the other person… and echo of my incarnation.” While it can never be known incontrovertibly whether or not a performance consciously mirrors another, their inter-relatability is significant in itself because of the complex ways in which physical intertextuality jointly constructs meaning alongside other forms of intertextuality (spoken, written, etc) in the
moment for each of the interactants who recognize the relationships between intertextual performatives. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, a “flash of meaning… makes them substitutable in the absolute presence of origins” (2012:143). There is, perhaps, universal meaning in the overlap of embodied intertexts, whether or not the imitation is intended.

Expanding further on the ways in which a performative is mirroring or reflexive, I am interested in what Bazerman (2004:88) calls “intentional intertextuality”. Bazerman does not, however, describe or define this beyond stating that it refers to a spoken utterance that is meant to imitate something said by specific other person. Merleau-Ponty would categorize this type of intertextuality as conscious and therefore intersubjective rather than intercorporeal; However, M.C. Dillon interprets Merleau-Ponty’s description of intersubjectivity as a “‘transfer of corporeal schema’” (Marratto 2012: 146). I take corporal schema to be comparable to a ‘repertoire of prior texts’ and, in this way, a performer can constitute a type of identity for her/himself in an interval of interaction that makes use of another person’s recognizable performance style, which is part of a corporeal schema that is ‘shared’ by the other interactants, including, in a presidential speech event, the audience.

A performative element of another person’s performance style can be intentionally mirrored or unintentionally reflexed but there is not always a clear-cut division between these types of intertextuality; Merleau-Ponty offers a nuanced description of what I call intentional mirroring in his definition of “introjection”: “I shall never in all strictness be able to think the other person’s thought. I can think that he thinks; I can construct, behind this mannequin, a presence to self model on my own; but it is still my self that I put in it, and it is then that there really is ‘introjection’” (2012:145). This also relates to what Bakhtin (1981:341) calls “fit”: “…
there is always a gap between our own intentions and the words—which are always someone else’s words—we speak to articulate them. The gap may be greater or smaller, however, depending on the ‘fit’ between what we believe and what we are saying.” In the ‘gap’ between intentions, words, performatives, and thoughts, which are always inter-related, an identity can be constructed in an interaction that is the product of these various kinds of intertexts, and that combined product may appear to be more or less authentic or original but it is a representation of the performer in a given context nonetheless. In a presidential speech, a skilled performer is able to manipulate the size of the ‘gap’ throughout a performance and thereby project a carefully crafted identity that conjures other performers while maintaining her/his ownership over the presented content and the overall performance event.

Merleau-Ponty provides several important insights for the work on expanding definitions of intertextuality to encompass multimodal communication. Merleau-Ponty’s (2012:144) richly complex notion of ‘unity of style’ and his coincident term for the process of unifying ‘the singular’ and ‘the general’, namely ‘styling’ in an interval of interaction in a specific context, is a critical antecedent for what I call physical intertextuality. In the next section I discuss oral, or spoken intertextuality and conclude with an argument for a combined definition of intertextuality that encompasses physical and the oral intertextual analysis toward a framework of multimodal intertextuality.

4.7 Oral Intertextuality

Deborah Tannen’s article (1987), "Repetition in Conversation as Spontaneous Formulaicity,” uses data taken from speeches, observed speech events, and dinner table conversations to explore further the notion of repetition as a “pervasive type of spontaneous pre patterning in
conversation” (215). Tannen argues that language is “relatively prepatterned, repetitious and imitative” (216). Tannen emphasizes the contextual, or situated, nature of speaking in conversation. That is, people speaking in a conversation readily (re)create, draw from, and alter spoken routines, paradigms, or ‘prefabs’, that are culturally widespread, pre-established in the same conversation, or formulated on the spot based on an unknown(able) storehouse, or repertoire, of ‘prior texts’ that consist of readymade phrasings, idioms, and maxims available in the language environment. My research into the speech performance of El-Sisi takes Tannen’s notions of repetition and formulaicity as a working definition of intertextuality and as the basis of my intertextual analysis of two presidential speeches. Elsewhere Tannen (2006:598) defines intertextuality as the “…repetition of words and topics (hence ‘intertextuality’) as a conflict is recycled, reframed, and rekeyed.” This definition of intertextuality dovetails smoothly with related theories of intertextuality that address voicing and frame shifting (Bakhtin 1981, Agha 2005, Miller 2007, Sicoli 2007), imitation and identity construction (Tannen 1987a, Tannen 1987b, Fairclough 1992, Becker 1994, Hodges 2010, Tovares 2012), and dialogicality (Kristeva 1980, Bakhtin 1981, Tannen 2007, Tannen 2010).

Opposing the idea that a view of language as repetitious and imitative somehow dehumanizes speakers, Tannen cites Oliver Sack’s work on neuroanatomy to clarify that repetition is actually central to the process of self-definition. Human beings, much like the brain, rely on repetition to understand, develop, and ultimately become creative individuals. For Tannen, there is a “pleasure associated with the familiar, the repetitious” that also attracts people to certain kinds of writing, like newspaper headlines. Tannen’s article is key to an understanding of language as meaning-making in context, or contextualizing and is an invaluable foundation
upon which to develop the related notions of echoicity and reflexivity/mirroring I elaborate in this analysis. Tannen’s work on formulaicity and intertextuality in conversations advances notions of human interaction as ‘joint’ and partial in that a conversation - or in the case of a political speech not a conversation but a speech performance - is a constant co-production not only of the individuals involved, but of the countless words, phrases, and other texts (oral and physical) and utterances alive and present in the cultural ether of every frame, footing, and positioning that people shift in and out of incessantly while communicating orally and with their bodies. The texts that people draw from in interactions can be thought of as ‘prepatterned’; in Tannen’s words: “linguistic prepatterning is a means by which speakers create worlds that listeners can recreate in their own imaginations, recognizing the outlines of the prepatterning.” (1987:236; emphasis added).

This study applies much of Tannen’s work on spontaneous formulaicity and takes prepatterning as a framework for assessing and describing the ways in which intertextuality is performed both orally and physically. That is, intertextuality is both verbal/oral and embodied; just as there is a rich repertoire of oral utterances available to a communicator/performer that echo more or less loudly from which an individual can choose in relation to one’s frame and footing within a given situation or communicative environment, so too is there an intimately related and rich repertoire of prior performatives that can be chosen (mirrorings) or non-consciously embodied (reflexes) as intertexts that are readily available to a communicator-performer and can be recognized by other interactants.

A given performance, which I use to mean the embodied mode of a communication or interaction, and more specifically a performative (unit/element) within an interval of a
performance, can then be more or less \textit{mirrored} or \textit{reflexive}, or have a higher or lower level of ‘reflexivity’, in relation to the perception of the performer’s consciousness in her/his imitation of a physical prior text. Performatives, like their oral equivalents (echoes), are intertexts that can be re-combined, reshaped, and recontextualized as an intertextual production; this idea that communication in interaction is achieved by both physical and oral intertexts is part and parcel of the argument for \textit{expressive configurations} (Sicoli 2007, 2016) as the basic units of multimodal interaction. I will discuss expressive configurations further in the next section.

Echoes are the utterances available in a shared repertoire of oral prior texts; a prior oral text is more or less \textit{echoic}, or has a higher or lower level of ‘echoicity’, in relation to a specific interval in an interaction - the level of echoicity can be the result of the topic in the flow of a speech or conversation/interaction, or it can be relative to an orientation toward a frame shift in a speech or interaction. My interest in ‘echoes’ and echoicity arose from Bakhtin’s (1986:89) concept of ‘the expressiveness of individual words’ and his own use of the word ‘echo’ in the description thereof: “the expressiveness of individual words is not inherent in the words themselves as units of language, nor does it issue directly from the meaning of these words: it is either typical generic expression or it is an \textit{echo} of another’s individual expression, which makes the word, as it were representative of another’s whole utterance from a particular evaluative position.” This is a sense of ‘echo’ that I apply to my analysis where I identify echoes, and anechoes (‘vari-directional’ echoes; discussed below), in El-Sisi’s (inter)performative speech by the frames the echoes elicit that harken back to Abdel Nasser’s speech performance in terms of both concepts and topics taken up, as well as elements of Abdel Nasser’s ‘performance style’.
Intertextuality has been analyzed in the context of political communication and speeches as well as newspaper discourses by Hodges (2010:85) in terms of texts that reoccur “across multiple, overlapping contexts”; Hodges draws on Agha’s definition of a “speech chain” as “a historical series of speech events linked together by the permutation of individuals across speech-act roles” (Agha 2003:247 cited in Hodges 2010:84). Hodges adds to the idea of intertextuality the notion that in the medium of political communication, repetition can signal veracity: when a particular representation is repeated sufficiently, it may come to be accepted as fact” (2011:87). Politicians can thereby be understood to be co-constructing Foucauldian “regimes of truth” through intertextual repetition to create “officially ratified representations of the world” (2011:93). Hodges also builds on Bourdieu’s (1991:107) idea that repetition itself is not sufficient to convince a person of something; the person her/himself must be willing to believe the utterance: “For those words or stories to be accepted, they require the right ‘social conditions in which [the] words are employed” (Bourdieu 1991 cited in Hodges 2010:98).

Hamilton (1996) introduced the idea that an individual can repeat her/his own utterance intertextually across different conversations and intratextually within the same conversation to recall and re-construct an existing identity, such as patient, caregiver, or researcher. I relate this concept of intertextuality and identity to Rickford and Rickford’s (2001) concept of “trademarks” in their analysis of black sermons as a genre. Just as a specific person’s identity, or type of identity, can be re-conjured through intertextual repetition, so too can a genre, such as black sermon, or an Egyptian presidential speech for that matter, be called up in the minds of interactants, or a congregation or an audience, through “unmistakable” intertextual references (2001:40).
Beyond recalling a certain identity or genre, this kind of intertextuality can also serve to “engross” (Clark and Gerrig 1990) interactants, or various groupings of people (congregation, audience, etc). Bakhtin addresses different types of intended intertextual references in his discussion of ‘assimilating during transmission’ (1981:341). I discussed Bakhtin’s notion of “fit” in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s “introjection” previously, however here the relevance of ‘fit’ in oral intertextuality is in relation to Bakhtin’s interest in the compatibility, or “fit”, between our intentions and the words we choose to achieve them in during interaction. The words chosen by an interactant can be uni-directional with the intention of the imagined original speaker, and therefore be used in agreement and toward the same or similar purposes; the words can also be vari-directional, or at odds, with the intention(s) of the imagined original speaker. I have chosen to call a vari-directional echoing an “anecho” in my analysis of the ways El-Sisi orally and physically intertextually imitates Abdel Nasser (below). Similar to Bakhtin’s vari-directionality, Watt (2012:484), in an analysis of religious discourse, observes that “Religious discourse often involves participants whose surroundings differ from the system that birthed their faith”; he is interested, then, in how a discourse from “one social setting” can be grafted onto “different and diverse loci in other places.” With that, a set of oral and physical intertexts can be ‘pushed forward’ (Becker 1994) by very different individuals interacting in starkly disparate contexts with intentions that differ widely from the original text; these differences, however, can be interpreted along with the intertexts themselves as part of what collectively constructs meaning in the interaction or performance event.

In the next section I briefly discuss the concept of an “expressive configuration” as a complex unit of multimodal intertextual analysis. These ‘complex units’ consist of physical and
oral prior texts that can also be subdivided into performatives, reflexes, mirrorings, echoes and anechoes, which are differentiated by the level of perceived intentionality ascribed to each as well as whether the utterances and performatives agree with the intentions (as evidenced by historical context and the transcription of the prior text event) of the original performer who is being physically and orally intertextually imitated.

4.8 Multimodal Intertextuality

Sicoli (2007:12) argues that in communication information does not transfer along a “single line of information structure,” but rather along “configurations of several lines of information structure performed in simultaneity.” These lines of information include elements such as pitch and voice quality (“tono”), which were traditionally treated as “paralinguistic” and therefore different and separate from “language”. Sicoli proposes a combined view wherein communication occurs in “expressive configurations” that include paralinguistic items such as “oral gestures” to be addressed “in systematic association with language” (Sicoli 2007, citing Birdwhistell 1961:52; Sicoli 2016).

In Sicoli’s (2015) article “Voice Registers”, he discusses “semiotic configurations” whereby “voice quality frames [a] word or phrase.” This is especially evident among young children who may utter single word like, in Sicoli’s own example, “dog” but voiced it in such a way that parents understand whether the child feels joy or fear as well as whether the “object of focus is desired or despised.” Sicoli also examines the multimodal dimension and includes the added meaning of a gesture in the use of a “one-word utterance” like “dog”. He argues that many “so-called one-word utterances are rather propositions in which predicate and argument are distributed across modalities.” When a child points to a dog, Sicoli argues, “a falsetto shriek”
would index a different “emotional predication” than would a “harsh-breathy voice” or a “whining voice” for that matter. Sicoli identifies at least three dimensions in a communication: the lexical, the voice quality (which he calls ‘tono’, 2007), and the physical. These dimensions function in unison as a single enactment in a performance in interaction. For analytical purposes, it is necessary to treat these threads as separate elements but, Sicoli posits, they should be understood as a single “expressive configuration”. I take up Sicoli’s proposition and thereby locate complex units of expressive configuration in my analysis of the transcripts in the data section of this chapter.

In line with Sicoli’s (2007, 2015) framework, my approach to the analysis of my transcripts takes oral as well as physical ‘gestures’ as functions that are enacted in concert as related modalities of communication that form parts of an “expressive configuration” and should therefore be understood en toto as a ‘complex unit’ of interactional sociolinguistic analysis. I thereby identify echoes, anechoes, performatives, mirrorings, and reflexes as, in Fairclough’s terms (1992:279), types of traces, or triggers that recall, conjure, and project identities, genres, and contexts that are used as resources for creating meaning in performance events. I analytically identify these traces in the transcripts in my analysis of the two performance events I am investigating as individual components but then later, in the findings section, recombine them in my interpretation of these traces as elements of performance styles that recursively co-produce intertextual expressive configurations.

4.9 Description of Texts to be Analyzed

To demonstrate the traces of former president Abdel Nasser’s performance style and demeanor in current president El-Sisi’s, I compared multiple video-recorded speech events by both El-Sisi
and Abdel Nasser available publicly on YouTube. I focused especially, however, on a speech by
Abdel Nasser on the anniversary of the “Port Said Victory” whereby the Suez Canal was
nationalized delivered on December 21, 1965,\textsuperscript{87} and a speech event from August 5, 2014 wherein
El-Sisi publicly presents a plan called “The New Suez Canal,” which would largely affect the
surrounding city of Port Said.\textsuperscript{88}

The Abdel Nasser text is in black and white and the camera is focused on him standing
behind a podium with multiple microphones bent toward the center of the podium. Behind him is
a long curtain and as the video progresses, several individuals enter in and out of the background
- on one occasion a man emerges next to Abdel Nasser to deliver a note, which Abdel Nasser
quickly scans. Abdel Nasser is dressed in a dark suit with a bright white shirt; the jacket has large
shoulder pads that give him a box-framed appearance. The upper corners of the front of the collar
of the shirt meet at near 90-degree angels above where the tie knots. Periodically, the camera
frame will shift to a panning shot of the large audience in the auditorium where the speech is
being delivered.

I chose this text of Abdel Nasser because it is long enough (41m:31s) to allow me to see a
broad range of Abdel Nasser’s postures and gestures and how they align with his locutions in
both Modern Standard Arabic - which are mostly read from a document on the podium - and his
native Egyptian Colloquial Arabic, in which he narrates most of the speech. Furthermore, in this
performance, Abdel Nasser is in a celebratory mood as he reflects on and commemorates his
victory over the British in regaining control of the coveted Suez Canal in 1956. As such, he
speaks at ease and nearly the entirety of his speech is extemporized and in colloquial Arabic. He

\textsuperscript{87} Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hSwfsBOH3H4.
\textsuperscript{88} Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V5DvZAG-DZE.
oftentimes jokes with the audience and shifts physically from side to side in a distinctively informal manner. These are the very characteristics of a Gamal Abdel Nasser speech that endeared him to, or ‘engrossed’ (Clark and Gerrig 1990), the majority of Egyptian people during his presidency and it is my contention that these are the types of iconic performance traits that Abdel Fattah El-Sisi aims to echo and imitate in his own public performances as he constructs his persona as president through speaking and embodying ‘being the president of Egypt’.

The El-Sisi text I selected is on the occasion of the public announcement of a new canal way to be dug alongside the existing Suez Canal; the large-scale undertaking is intended to boost the struggling post-revolution and post-coup Egyptian economy and create many well-paying jobs. In this situation, El-Sisi is in a celebratory mood - he begins the speech in standard Arabic by directing the mixed audience (high profile and Port Said locals) to observe a moment of silence for the Egyptians who died during the construction of the original Suez Canal in the late 19th century. He then decidedly shifts the context to one of presentation and celebration by switching into colloquial Arabic and crediting Gamal Abdel Nasser by name with repatriating the Suez Canal in 1956 and successfully defending it militarily thereafter. El-Sisi is wearing a suit that is a medium hue of gray with a white shirt and tie. Like Abdel Nasser’s from the video I selected, El-Sisi’s suit jacket has prominent shoulder pads and the collar of the shirt is worn in the same way along with a tightly knotted tie. The camera angle is essentially the same: focused on El-Sisi in the center standing behind a large wooden podium decorated in microphones pointed toward the center. El-Sisi speaks mainly in colloquial Arabic and occasionally reads from a prepared written speech composed in standard Arabic. As in the Abdel Nasser video, the
camera frame occasionally shifts to a panning shot of the audience - El-Sisi’s audience is admittedly much smaller and the auditorium is also considerably more compact.

In terms of the styles and registers of Arabic, without doing a formal morphemic analysis, my impression from listening to each speech many times over the last three months was that Abdel Nasser and El-Sisi’s colloquial to standard Arabic ratio is comparable in the two texts. In both events, the presidents only speak in standard Arabic when reading from the prepared script out loud; otherwise, they are both extemporizing in colloquial Arabic. They are also very physically animated in both of the selected texts. In fact, as I re-viewed and more and more carefully compared the speeches, I sensed that El-Sisi had modeled his performance at the announcement of “The New Suez Canal” on the very speech event I had selected wherein Abdel Nasser commemorates the anniversary of his repatriation of the original Suez Canal. El-Sisi does not directly quote Abdel Nasser but his style of speech, prosody, pacing of talk, demeanor, garb, and gestures and poses are echoic of, mirror, and reflex identifiable, iconic performatives associated with Abdel Nasser. The intertextual dimensions of the “new” versus “old/original” Suez Canal projects and the roles of two presidents who, respectively, recently came to power by way of ‘rebellion’, or a coup that involved arresting the sitting president, seems to invite an imitability that also connects the two speech events in quite conspicuous ways as parallel moments of Egyptian political history.

The ‘traces’ I identify and discuss in the following examples are occasions in which both oral and physical intertexts align in the two performances; I have selected samples of both uni- and vari-directional relationships between the original, or prior text, and the imitative, or ‘palimpsest’ text (Vasquez, forthcoming).
I identify the oral and physical traces in about a 2-minute span of El-Sisi’s speech performance that index iconic oral and physical aspects of an equally short segment of Abdel Nasser’s speech performance at an event with a related theme. The unit of analysis, namely traces of oral and physical intertextuality, was not difficult identify between the two texts that I chose, but I quickly realized that these traces were endemic and some, like code choice and dress, were so ubiquitous that I had to leave them out of the transcriptions.

What follows is a) a tri-lineal transcription of a short segment from the above-mentioned Abdel Nasser speech, which is treated as the ‘original’ or prior text (Becker 1994); b) a tri-lineal transcription of a short segment from a speech by El-Sisi that features several performatives, including echoes, anechoes, mirrorings, and reflexes of the Abdel Nasser prior text - I refer to El-Sisi’s ‘post’-text as a ‘palimpsest’ text, borrowing Vasquez’s apt phrase (forthcoming), to underscore the close, but not exact, tracing of El-Sisi’s performance on Abdel Nasser’s. I link the imitated texts from Abdel Nasser’s speech to the imitative texts in El-Sisi’s speech by bolding the former and italicizing the latter. I also indicate the type of intertextuality as either oral or physical/embodied by writing “[echo]”, “[anecho]”, “[mirroring]” or “[reflex]”, respectively. I also categorize the echoes and reflexes in the texts into frames related to theme and expressions of attitudes about those themes; I identify seven oral intertextual frames and ten physical intertextual frames in all and therefore provide numeric designations alongside each oral and physical intertext label.

As a whole, El-Sisi’s choosing to speak in colloquial Arabic is the most telling and conspicuous trace of his imitation of Abdel Nasser and it is ubiquitous. Rather than mark every single word of the transcripts, then, I am highlighting this fact here and discuss it in more depth
in the findings section (it is also discussed at length in the background section). Physically, El-Sisi is also dressed like Abdel Nasser, which is a phenomenon I discussed in the description of the texts above. This is a ubiquitous embodied form of intertextuality that would be cumbersome and distracting to indicate in the already-complex examples that follow and so I am mentioning this factor here and will take it up again in the findings section.

4.10 Data and Analytical Discussion

I understand much of El-Sisi’s imitative work vis-a-vis Abdel Nasser as motivated by his historical context that parallels many of the critical aspects of Abdel Nasser's 1965 performance context. El-Sisi, then, conjures not only the presidency and likable personality of Abdel Nasser, but also the zeitgeist of Egypt at the time of Abdel Nasser’s speech event. Namely, a time of excitement most immediately at the commemoration of the re-patriotiating of the Suez Canal; and, more peripherally, the lingering elation in the wake of the officer’s rebellion that deposed and ended monarchy in Egypt thereby introducing, at least in name, democracy and democratic institutions, and emphatically reasserting Egypt as a major player in the Arab region and on the world stage. El-Sisi imitatively re-performs (re-contextualizes) features of Abdel Nasser’s performance style. He speaks in the language of Abdel Nasser (colloquial Egyptian Arabic), in this particular speech he even dresses like Abdel Nasser, and also emulates his penchant for joke-telling by, at one point, re-telling a version of a joke Abdel Nasser presented in his 1965 speech; El-Sisi, like Abdel Nasser, directly speaks to members of the audience, reserves standard Arabic only for when he is looking down and conspicuously reading from a prepared text, and re-enacts iconic physical gestures reminiscent of Abdel Nasser.
I examine eight excerpts, four from the Abdel Nasser prior text performance event, and four from El-Sisi’s palimpsest text, which I have combined into four pairs that match one imitated Abdel Nasser oral text and one physical text to corresponding imitative El-Sisi oral and physical texts. I use tri-lineal transcriptions with arrows on the right side of the Abdel Nasser texts and on the left side of the El-Sisi texts to indicate the ‘pushing forward' and reshaping of prior texts into new contexts—I also set the paired texts side-by-side to illustrate their relatedness and facilitate the viewing of the reshaping of the prior text, side ‘a’ in each excerpt, into the palimpsest text, or side ‘b’ in each excerpt. I visually demarcate the two sides by placing a gray, faint dotted line between the two sides of each excerpt pairing. Physical intertexts are depicted through the use of still images captured from the original videos of the speech events and are placed above the transcriptions they correspond to.

The first excerpt is short and demonstrates the common theme of ‘people power' and solidarity with the people in Abdel Nasser’s performance style; El-Sisi draws on this through oral intertextuality while also mirroring an explaining gesture that is common in Abdel Nasser’s repertoire of performatives. In excerpt two I examine a joke told originally by Abdel Nasser that El-Sisi retells in his 2014 speech; El-Sisi also mimics several key physical performatives that Abdel Nasser enacted in his delivery of the joke. In excerpt three I discuss a moment of anechoicity where El-Sisi addresses a central theme in Abdel Nasser's 1965 speech, foreign influence on the Egyptian economy, but does so vari-directionally in relation to Abdel Nasser's treatment of the subject in his context. Lastly, in excerpt four, I describe the intertextual relationship in two longer stretches of speech that parallel one another orally and physically in conveying people power but also relegating the power of the president to the will of the people.
4.11 Excerpt 1: El-Sisi and Nasser “For all the People”

About 15 minutes into his speech in honor of the anniversary of his successful nationalization of the Suez Canal, Abdel Nasser transitions from his discussion of having defeated the British and French militarily to the need to resist Western capitalism. To discredit capitalism he explains that if Egypt were to adopt a capitalist economic system it would produce a class-based society of haves and have-nots. In contrast, he describes socialism as a way of producing and maintaining an egalitarian system that would ensure the rights of all Egyptians and secure them a high standard of living. He frequently uses an explaining gesture (depicted above the prior text on the left, below).

El-Sisi’s speech marks the occasion of the start of a far-reaching project to dig an 18-km long “New Suez Canal” alongside the original. This would allow for ships to travel north and south at all times, and would thereby solve the existing problem of limited lanes that move in only one direction at a time—this causes significant wait times for cargo ships traveling the opposite way. At 11 minutes, after commemorating the Egyptians who died building the first
canal in the 19th century and thanking Abdel Nasser for re-patriotating the Suez Canal from the British and French in 1956, El-Sisi begins to describe the social and economic benefits of the New Suez Canal project. He is careful to characterize the economic consequences as entirely positive and, more importantly, as beneficial to all Egyptians. He, like Abdel Nasser, uses an explaining gesture that involves moving his clenched right hand up and down (depicted in the image on the right above the corresponding palimpsest text):

Abdel Nasser paints a bleak picture of Western-style capitalism and then inveighs against it by extolling socialism. He argues that only under socialism will Egypt remain a country for all Egyptians (“…It must be for all the people”). For “people”, Abdel Nasser uses the word ša‘b, which connotes ‘nation’ or ‘public’ - it is the basis of the political term ša‘bīyya (‘people power’), which originated in . El-Sisi, in his own right, paints a rather rosy picture of the New Suez Canal project and describes it as a panacea for Egypt’s ailing economy in the wake of the 2011 revolution and the 2013 coup that he spearheaded.

Abdel Nasser presents his rejection of Western capitalism and support for socialism as a pseudo-formal argument wherein he himself debates both sides; he systematically represents capitalism as an inhumane alternative that would leave many Egyptians to starve and would subject Egypt’s economy to the will and whim of Western institutions in which Egypt has no membership or say. Multimodally, he adumbrates both sides of the debate with a somber tone at a slow methodical rate; he also frequently raises his left hand in a fist with his thumb resting on top of his folded index finger. He then raises and lowers his hand vertically causing his elbow to bend in a range of about a 45 to 90-degree angle. This is an iconic gesture (see Figure 4.4) widely associated with presenting a rational explanation, and it is also emblematic of Abdel
Nasser’s personal performance style. It is significant because it is not used by his successors, Sadat, Mubarak, and Morsi, but it is reprised by president El-Sisi (see Figure 4.5). Sadat, Mubarak, and Morsi, like most other Arab leaders, tended to refrain from large or frequent hand gestures. Morsi was more animated at times but his performatives did not mirror those of Abdel Nasser.

At this juncture in El-Sisi’s speech, talking about the economic advantages of the Suez Canal, he chooses to relate the project to the needs of *all* Egyptians (“…for all the people of Egypt”). In doing so, El-Sisi re-contextualizes this large-scale project as a way of directly helping every individual Egyptian and thus emphasizes the import and power of “the people of Egypt”. This notion of ‘people power’ is an oral frame that dates back to Abdel Nasser’s performance style, which encompasses a set of oral and physical frames that he uses as resources for persuading, explaining, and engrossing interactants, and particularly large audiences. El-Sisi uses one of Abdel Nasser’s iconic oral frames at a time in Egypt’s history that also rhymes with the moment in which Abdel Nasser’s speech took place in December of 1965. That is, both men are attempting to kickstart a failing economy in response to internal political instability and external pressure for Western countries to respond to human rights and economic concerns. El-Sisi, however, is far less popular among Egyptians than Abdel Nasser was in his related time. To blur the lines, then, El-Sisi, couples his use of Abdel Nasser’s ‘people power’ frame with one of Abdel Nasser’s performance reflexes, which in context comprises what I call a ‘physical frame’ used, in this case, for explaining a serious subject.
4.12 Excerpt 2: El-Sisi Failing to Land Nasser’s Joke

Nearing the midpoint of his 42 minute speech, Abdel-Nasser is discussing a hypothetical scenario whereby a capitalist-turned Egyptian government is attempting to extract resources from average Egyptians. Speaking about the city of Port Said, he imagines a typical, low-income, subsistence farmer being approached by a tax collector. The impoverished man is unable to afford any form of payment. At this point, perhaps responding to the quiet but audible laughter that ripples throughout the audience, Abdel Nasser re-tells the scenario orally and physically in the key, tempo, and embodied style of a joke.

In El-Sisi’s speech, he is also at about the midpoint of his performance, when he begins talking about the uncomfortable subject of foreign investors, without whom the New Suez Canal project would not be possible. Perhaps sensing tension at this point when the audience becomes particularly quiet, El-Sisi begins making long, frequent pauses and starts to introduce some of the Egyptian investors who are in the audience. He scans the room for them, moving his head right...
and left while smiling, and points to them with both hands when he finds them. El-Sisi then begins chuckling and switches voice and body registers as he shifts into an oral and physical joke frame (see images 4.6 and 4.7):

Abdel Nasser’s original joke spans a period of about two minutes during which he repeats the punch line, “the man doesn't have it (money) at home”, four times. His voice register shifts to a higher pitch and he speaks at a faster rate while smiling and playfully gesturing more rapidly and more often; he tilts his head back and forth to the left, shrugs his shoulders, and raises both hands with outstretched palms facing the audience (see figure 4f above). Abdel Nasser had stumbled into the joke frame after having been speaking in the first person about a hypothetical subsistence farmer being shaken down for money by a counterfactual Egyptian capitalist government official - speaking as the farmer, he thus originally says “I don't have anything (to give)”. Perhaps noticing some laughter in the audience, Abdel Nasser repositions himself as a narrator who speaks about the resource-strapped farmer. In this second telling, Abdel Nasser adds further humor by naming the economic minister in jest and pointing to him in the audience. Abdel Nasser is then told by an assistant who whispers audibly in his ear that the economic minister is not present. He then uses the imaginary farmer as a resource to transition into a more serious discussion of the perils of capitalism and the need to resist Western pressure to desocialize the economy. He has, however, effectively lightened the mood and thereby softened the blow of the next segment of his speech wherein he explains some of the negative consequences of digging his heels in against Western pressure to liberalize the Egyptian economy.

El-Sisi’s reshaped version of Abdel Nasser’s joke is much more condensed and does not spur as big of a reaction in the audience. After locating the Egyptian CEOs who have invested in
the New Suez Canal project, he switches voice registers in much the same way as Abdel Nasser had; El-Sisi speaks in a higher pitch, speeds up his rate of talk with less pausing, and uses a ‘smiling’ or ‘laughing voice’ while also mirroring Abdel Nasser’s joke-telling reflexes (see figure 4.7 above). He directs his echo of Abdel Nasser’s joke to the CEOs; unlike Abdel Nasser who appeared to have organically come across the opportunity to deliver his joke, El-Sisi’s version seems contrived and pre-planned. El-Sisi does not tell a less-humorous first-person version of the joke, as Abdel Nasser did before launching into a third-person, intended and therefore more elaborate joke-telling. Rather, El-Sisi’s joke is told in the third person with no setup. He finds the CEOs and then says “there’s no moooney”, which he repeats twice while chuckling deeply and lifting and lowering his open hands (see figure 4.7).

In Figure 4.6, I have captured two versions of an iconic Abdel Nasser joke-telling reflex. In the top image (figure 4.6) he shrugs, tilts his head, and raises and lowers both of his hands slightly, bending his elbows toward his waste while furling and and furling his eyebrows as he lowers the corners of his mouth to index, en toto, playfulness and a certain level of disconnect, as if ‘saying’ with this body and face, “there’s nothing I can give you, I simply don’t have any money”. The lower image in Figure 4.6 is then of a more pronounced version of the embodied message above it. He shrugs more deeply, raises and lowers his hands more quickly and to higher and lower zeniths and nadirs, and tilts his head back even farther while putting on an even larger, more toothy, smile. His smiling voice register becomes a laughing voice register and he repeats the punch line four times to emphasize, dwell in, and prolong the ‘shared hilarity’ (Chafe 2001).

El-Sisi’s performatives in Figure 4.7 almost-exactly mirror Abdel Nasser’s in 4.6. In the lower image in Figure 4.7 when El-Sisi introduces the joke, he tilts his head to the right slightly,
while raising his hands with open palms facing the audience and has his elbows bent at his sides. He is smirking and appears to be projecting with his body that he is about to tell a joke. The still in the lower image of Figure 4.7 captures El-Sisi’s more energetic version of the same mirroring seen in the top image in Figure 4.7 - at this point El-Sisi is re-telling the punchline for the second time and he punctuates it with his body by flailing his arms more widely and more quickly while, like Abdel Nasser in Figure 4.6, shrugging more deeply and laughing more loudly.

4.13 Excerpt 3: El-Sisi Contradicting Nasser on Foreign Banks

Well into the second half of his speech, Abdel Nasser takes up the issue of adopting capitalism head on. Right before the transcribed lines in Excerpt 3 (below), Abdel Nasser matter-of-factly presents a hypothetical scenario under a capitalist regime wherein an Egyptian man goes hungry. In capitalism, Abdel Nasser posits, every person is solely responsible for her/himself and so if one finds oneself starving, that person has no one to blame but her/himself. Furthermore, the capitalist government would not concern itself with providing food to this starving man - officials would assume that if he were truly starving, he would eat anything he could find. If he does not find anything to sustain him, then he simply would die. If he finds food, however, the government is no more or less affected - its position would be to let him have his fill. Abdel Nasser speaks as the hypothetical capitalist government in his presentation of this dystopic Egypt. He embodies nonchalance and voices the unfeeling government with careless-sounding rising intonations pronounced in a voice register that is deeper than his usual speaking octave.

After describing the untimely death of this neglected Egyptian man who is left to starve, Abdel Nasser turns to a more general, semi-philosophical discussion of any society that agrees to adopt capitalism. He phrases this adoption, however, in plainly pejorative terms in lines 1-3 (“So
is the society, the class-based society, the society in a feudalist alliance with capitalism”). His facial expression throughout this diatribe (see top image in figure 4.8) is stern and unlike his more animated expressions both before and after this interval of the performance; he is frowning deeply, his head his jutting forward, his eyebrows are slightly raised, and his eyes go from squinting to being wide open. His brow remains unfurled, leaving his forehead unwrinkled, which gives him the appearance of being somewhat angry and very serious. It is this set of facial expressions that I define as ‘physical frame 1 (serious)’ in in the lower image in Figure 4.8.

In El-Sisi’s speech, he is also just over the halfway mark when he starts to explain the role of foreign financial institutions in funding the New Suez Canal project. With Egypt’s economy still in a deep recession, he explains just before the transcribed lines in 4.9, the government is unable to fund this important venture and so needed to look elsewhere for support. Here, El-Sisi begins making long pauses and frequently using fillers; he speaks disfluently, frequently making false starts, and then begins trying to kill a fly that has been visibly circling his head and shoulders for the last few minutes. All of this distracts from what he is about to say, which is vari-directional, or anechoic, of Abdel Nasser’s warning against involving Western financiers in Egypt’s economy. El-Sisi announces that he sought and secured “foreign”, Western, investors for the New Suez Canal project. His facial expression, although for a different but closely related reason, mirrors that of Abdel Nasser during a similar moment in his speech. Where Abdel Nasser was mere upset at the prospect of Western financial institutions having undue influence on Egypt’s banks and economy, El-Sisi is, through his embodied intertextual mirroring of Abdel Nasser’s stern face, projecting that he understands the gravity and risk
involved in allowing Western investors to infiltrate Egypt’s economy, and especially with respect to such an expensive and symbolic project:

Excerpt 3 marks the beginning of the climax of Abdel Nasser's speech (Figure 4.8). After the transcribed lines (above), he repeats a short version of the parable of the starving Egyptian under a capitalist government who is left to die. He then shifts voice registers into a louder exclamatory decibel, and preaches forcefully about the pitfalls of capitalism - he equates capitalism to feudalism, (line 2, “il-’iqāṭa’”). Abdel Nasser then speaks for the Egyptian people and shouts that they reject capitalism completely. The audience begins cheering boisterously and Abdel Nasser stays on point about protecting an Egyptian society for all the people, all the while
strongly remaining within the oral frame of ‘people power’. His physical register, or performance style, shifts away from quiet, solemn, and angry, as in Figure 4.8, and into that of a charismatic, impassioned firebrand - his head is up, his back is straight, his arms and hands are fully visible as he grasps the front part of the sides of the top of the podium, and he rotates his head to countenance everyone in the auditorium.

After uttering the words “foreign banks”, El-Sisi launches into a defensive apology and explanation of his decisions - he addresses the Egyptian people but speaks as if Abdel Nasser himself is angrily peering down at him. In the intercorporeity of this moment in El-Sisi’s speech, Abdel Nasser is not just peering down at him, but peering out from him onto an audience that also embodies Abdel Nasser in their history. El-Sisi’s discomfort at animating Abdel Nasser while performing a discordant message to the principal of its voice is perceptible. He explains that he knows that the issue of foreign investments is a sensitive matter to the Egyptians and then, addressing the Egyptian people, reassures them that he has created affordable micro-shares especially described for low-income students to participate in financing the New Suez Canal project. At ten Egyptian pounds (approximately two U.S. dollars), El-Sisi argues that all Egyptians can partake in investing and feel like the principle owners of the project. However, he does not disclose the percentage that these shares would represent. Nonetheless, El-Sisi does not have the momentum or opportunity to deliver the type of soaring, didactic rhetoric that Abdel Nasser had following his different but related discussion of foreign investors. Speaking against, or anechoically of, Abdel Nasser’s message of condemning and avoiding Western banking institutions, El-Sisi’s physical register is an anti-mirroring of Abdel Nasser’s; El-Sisi’s performance style during this interval following the transcription in Figure 4.9 conveys
insecurity and a perceptible nervousness. He swats at a fly, visibly sweats and blushes, and speaks at a markedly slow pace while making long, frequent pauses, and speaking disfluently.

4.14 Excerpt 4: El-Sisi and Nasser’s Deflection As People Power

Coming down from having spoken rather passionately about the need for Egyptians as a society to resist the pressure to adopt capitalism, Abdel Nasser again uses the ‘people power’ frame to associate criticisms of Egypt’s growing population with the evils of Western economic influence. For Abdel Nasser, the future of Egypt would be under the total control of Western foreigners if the country adopts capitalism. These Western institutions would have not Egyptians' best interest in mind, but instead would prioritize the health of the economy above all else. To Abdel Nasser, this would mean that, among other things, Egypt might succumb to the pressure to put into effect measures that would incentivize having smaller families. He rejects this premise on the face of it and then argues that Egyptians themselves are the only ones who can decide how large the population will become. Abdel Nasser speaks within two oral frames, shifting between condemning Western cultural influence, and underscoring the power of the Egyptian people to overcome all challenges. In doing this, he repeatedly reflexes an up-and-down gesture with his left hand to index the inconsequential nature of Western exigencies about the economy and Egypt’s population.

El-Sisi is, at this point, transitioning from his anechoic messaging that goes at odds with Abdel Nasser’s well-known position against foreign investors. El-Sisi then shifts into Abdel Nasser's 'people power' oral frame and emphasizes that he is powerless as president because it is only the Egyptian people who can decide the fate of the New Suez Canal. By repeating the fact
that shares have been set aside for Egyptians to purchase and thereby invest in the project, El-Sisi is highlighting that the Egyptian people will be the legitimate managers to whom the CEOs and the foreign investors will have to answer directly. None of the foreign CEOs are present in the auditorium when he says this, but he directs his message of being powerless to the Egyptian investors he identified earlier when he delivered his version of Abdel Nasser’s joke. As he does this, he mirrors Abdel Nasser’s large gesture with his right hand raised to his eye level and then bobbing up and down for several seconds:

Figure 4.10: Abdel Nasser (1965) Denies Any Overpopulation Problem; emphasizing people power. Credit: Google Images.

Figure 4.11: El-Sisi (2014) Feigns Powerlessness; indirectly stressing people power. Credit: Google Images.
Abdel Nasser’s performance of the message that Egyptians alone are in charge of the population’s size and rate of growth is in the oral frame of ‘people power’ and the physical frame of disconnect, conveying his inability and lack of desire to counteract the will of the people - furthermore, he displays himself as indifferent and unmoved by the concerns of Western institutions of Egypt’s economy and its population density. He exclaims that the Egyptians can and should increase the population if they want to (“If the population wants to increase, then they increase it!). He goes beyond that to say, using a common colloquial expression, that in general, the Egyptian people can do as they please (“in accordance with what they want”). Abdel Nasser then returns to the idea that Egyptian society will never adopt capitalism. He closes the speech repeating refrains about Egypt having to remain a country for all Egyptians and never becoming class-based like other capitalist-feudalist states under the thumb of Western hegemony.

El-Sisi, echoing and mirroring Abdel Nasser, asserts to the investors in the New Suez Canal project that any questions about the management of this venture ought to be answered by the Egyptians because he is not in control (“Well how? I’m not the one ordering you. I don’t know (I’m powerless). I don’t know (I’m powerless)”). He argues that if and when problems should arise with the project or its financing, it is the Egyptian people who will know how to handle the situation (“That's something for the Egyptians to say”). These oral intertexts are echoes of Abdel Nasser’s prior statements about the population itself determining not only what to identify as a problem to begin with, but then how to resolve any problems that they perceive. Both men raise their hands at these parallel moments to signal that they have no authority in these matters, nor can they be held responsible. They symbolically, with their bodies and words, relegate all power to the Egyptian people. Abdel Nasser uses a familiar colloquialism (“in
accordance with what they want”, or “as they please”) to do part of the work of relegating power to the people. Similarly, El-Sisi, uses the double entendre colloquialism, “mā ‘arafṣī”, to communicate both, that he does not know how to solve potential problems with the canal project, and that he is powerless, even if he did know what to do. El-Sisi closes his speech repeating different versions of the last line of the utterance in Figure 4.11 (“That’s something for the Egyptians to say/decide”), and adding that the only solutions are with the Egyptian people.

4.15 Pre-Patterning of Orality and Physicality in El-Sisi’s Performance

The prior texts and palimpsest texts reveal a prevalent pre-patterning, or formulaicity, about several oral and physical aspects of El-Sisi’s speech performance on August 5, 2014. El-Sisi’s performative style demonstrates a loud echoic relationship to that of Abdel Nasser, particularly with respect to Abdel Nasser’s iconic December 21, 1965 speech on the related theme of the Suez Canal and the surrounding city of Port Said. El-Sisi’s performativity also bears a striking visual resemblance to that of Abdel Nasser’s. El-Sisi’s physicality and dress closely mirror Abdel Nasser’s demeanor and several elements of his well-established performance style.

In all, based on the full transcriptions beyond the four excerpts in the analysis, I identified seven oral/echoic frames that originated in Abdel Nasser’s 1965 speech that were repeatedly re-articulated in the palimpsest text along with ten physical/reflexive frames that are re-embodied, or mirrored, throughout El-Sisi’s 2014 performance:

**Echoic (oral) Intertextual Frames**

1) people power, solidarity with all Egyptian people

2) warning about Egyptian economic failures

3) refuting authoritarianism accusations
4) warning about Egyptian economic extortionists

5) warning about western/foreign economic extortionists

6) warning about western/foreign socio-political hegemony

7) telling a joke

Reflexive (physical) Intertextual Frames

1) facial grimace indexing gravity

2) head turns downward, looking down indexing reading standard Arabic prepared text

3) eye brow raises, shrugs, hand-opening gestures indexing nonchalance

4) deep breaths, silent stares into the audience, long pauses indexing pensiveness

5) gaze and head turn left indexing attentiveness to chants or shouted comments from the audience

6) sudden hand raises that mime throwing things over one’s shoulder, indexing apathy

7) quick shrugs, pursing fingertips with hand swaying, smirks, winks indexing ”that's all there is to it” attitude

8) quick, repeated up and down, right to left, diagonal hand gesturing indexing passion and high energy

9) smiles, smirks, hard audible laughs and chuckles, lowering head and gaze while laughing, long shrugs, broad two-armed, elbows-in, open-handed, palm-up gestures indexing joking, light-heartedness

10) hand up, fingers pursed together, corresponding elbow bends, moving between 45 and 90 degrees, indexing somberness, explaining an idea with sincerity
The above oral and physical intertextual frames, as well as the multimodal performatives themselves that constitute both types of frames are used as resources by El-Sisi that “engross” (Clark and Gerrig 1990:793) his audience by ‘rhyming’, or resonating, his performance style with that of Abdel Nasser. El-Sisi conjures Abdel Nasser through his echoic and mirrored interperformances of aspects of Abdel Nasser’s iconic public speech performance style to produce a perception of continuity between himself and the late, arguably legendary figure of, Abdel Nasser. El-Sisi’s uphill struggle to regain the confidence and support of Egyptians in the wake of the coup against Muhammad Morsi and especially after the Raba‘ al-‘Adawiyya massacre, taken together with the rhymed historical moment of his ascent to power with that of Abdel Nasser’s, combine to help establish the grounds upon which this multimodal intertextual analysis demonstrates the ways in which El-Sisi’s body and words do and speak being the president of Egypt in the iconic style of Abdel Nasser.

El-Sisi is not speaking as if he is in a conversation with Abdel Nasser as he echoes and imitates Abdel Nasser’s oral and physical gestures; rather, his interperforming of elements of Abdel Nasser’s 1965 performance and general performance style give off (Goffman 1957), whether this is intended or not, the impression that the audience members are, in fact, watching Abdel Nasser. El-Sisi is suffering from a lack of popularity among several segments of the population who are unhappy with his handling of the coup against Morsi and the subsequent arrests and killings of Morsi supporters. He is in the precarious position, then, of trying to a) paradoxically, represent the 2011 revolution that he effectively undermined by staging a coup of Morsi, b) re-cast the 2013 coup against Morsi as a ‘second revolution’ despite his having used it as a method of self-empowerment, which is decidedly anti-democratic and therefore undermines
the ‘second revolution’ argument and suggests, instead, a return to the status quo ante, c) run the state of Egypt and fulfill his campaign promises to transition to democratic governance, repair the economy, and provide internal political stability and security. Morsi was unpopular because he was seen as relatively ineffectual so El-Sisi came into power promising to do everything Morsi did not, or could not, such as fixing the economy, healing divides between various religious groups, and creating transparent, accountable, democratic institutions of government. It is almost inevitable then that El-Sisi would be seen as failing to live up to the inflated expectations he helped create.

El-Sisi looks back to Abdel Nasser who enjoyed unprecedented national and regional support and wants to conjure Abdel Nasser to a certain extent and so he interperforms aspects of Abdel Nasser’s performance style to create a perceived overlap and draw a line of continuation between Abdel Nasser’s presidency and his own. El-Sisi gives speeches in Egyptian Arabic rather than standard Arabic, like Abdel Nasser. He dresses like Abdel Nasser, and jokes like Abdel Nasser; moves like him, and frames the problems of Egypt under his reign today as the problems of Egypt under Nasser’s, namely how to extract more money from the Suez Canal, how to frame and handle international pressure/interference, responding to claims of human and civil rights violations to do with the Muslim Brotherhood, mitigating national economic stress, honoring the idea and ideals of a post-revolutionary government, and appearing to respect and abide by the principles of democratic governance. Moreover, El-Sisi’s colloquial code, while mimicking Abdel Nasser, may also be motivated by a desire to speak the language of the revolution to give the impression that he, and his government, embodies the spirit of its continuation.
My discussion of the data in the previous section corroborate the argument that El-Sisi appears to, at times, strategically echo and mirror Abdel Nasser to index and construct a blurred or hybridic identity that reappropriates the positive associations with Abdel Nasser’s personality and presidency, as well as Abdel Nasser’s Egypt-then for El-Sisi and his Egypt-now. El-Sisi, like Morsi in chapter 3, achieves his performance by voicing a figure (Agha 2005) - in this case, Gamal Abdel Nasser. El-Sisi imitations of Abdel Nasser motivate a perception of El-Sisi as at once an extension of Abdel Nasser but also as someone who is able to tactically retrieve and reiterate elements of Abdel Nasser’s popular personal style of speech performance and the successes associated with his presidency. El-Sisi, however, is not a carbon copy of Abdel Nasser, nor should he necessarily aim to be.

The risk to El-Sisi in imitating Abdel Nasser is that El-Sisi’s rhyming with or conjuring Abdel Nasser in his 2014 speech on the ‘New Suez Canal’ potentially demonstrates El-Sisi’s shortcomings in his reproduction of Abdel Nasser’s speech performance style. The stakes for El-Sisi are high because he is already unpopular and if he mis-manages his conjuring of Abdel Nasser by inadvertently highlighting his own shortcomings, El-Sisi could lose further support and destabilize his tenuous hold on the government as public discontent increases. Conjuring Abdel Nasser poorly may simply hold up an impossible paragon that emphasizes his failures and how different he is from Abdel Nasser, rather than shoring up support by attempting to ‘adequate’ himself to Nasser.

I interpret El-Sisi’s drawing from Abdel Nasser as a type of intertextual (en- or re-)framing of oral and physical frames as well as styles of performativity. Rather than present a style of performance that is continuing the tradition of Sadat, Mubarak, and, in fact, Morsi, (all
three of whom share very similar performance styles, see appendix 5), that could restrict the epistemic access to the content of El-Sisi’s speeches, he draws from Abdel Nasser who has become, arguably, a universally revered figure in Egyptian history. That is, especially Mubarak and Morsi, have garnered negative attitudes from many Egyptians who have criticized their disconnected, loquacious, complex, overly-formal speeches and registers. It therefore is less surprising that El-Sisi would attempt to bring together different Egyptian constituencies by pushing forward Abdel’s Nasser’s generally famed and acclaimed performance style. In doing this, El-Sisi creates a bigger tent, so to speak, or a potentially more-inclusive ‘shared world’ by drawing on what he is banking on as being ‘shared knowledge’, or a ‘recognized repertoire of resources’ in the figure of Abdel Nasser and his performance style.

I have discussed how El-Sisi pushes prior texts from Abdel Nasser forward into present-day settings and with it an overlay of Abdel Nasser’s persona as well as Abdel Nasser’s Egypt; this ‘engrosses’ audiences but also constitutes a way of ‘doing being the president of Egypt’, or at least doing delivering a speech as the president of Egypt. It is important for El-Sisi to constitute a new performance style as the president of Egypt because presidential speeches are rare moments in which the president ‘interacts’ with the public. After a popular uprising in 2011, and a rebellion in 2013, and in the midst of a failing economy as well as an internal battle with the Muslim Brotherhood, El-Sisi has to prove that he is significantly different from his predecessors. He demonstrates this partly in his way of speaking and performing during presidential speech events. In this way, El-Sisi relies on and strategically anticipates the “pleasure” associated with his drawing heavily on Abdel Nasser’s memorable oral and physical styles in configuring his own expressive performativity for public speechmaking.
My analysis of the intertextual dimension of the overt and more subtle attempts to recast as and associate, or ‘adequate’ (Hodges 2010), El-Sisi with the widely lauded former president Abdel Nasser draws on and aims to make a small contribution to the sociolinguistic literature on intertextuality and multimodal analysis toward a combinatorial framework. In the analysis section I identified the traces or “triggers” (Fairclough 1992:279) in an August 2014 speech by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi that index a speech on a related theme by late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser from December 1965. These triggers take the form of both verbal and embodied intertexts, or what I distinguish as ‘echoes’ and ‘mirrorings’, respectively, for analytical purposes, but interpret together as complex units that I call *intertextual expressive configurations*.

El-Sisi’s echoes and mirrorings of Abdel Nasser conjure a time in the 1960s when the Egyptian president enjoyed high levels of national and regional support - in short, a more ‘positive’ set of sentiments prevailed. El-Sisi’s performativity re-creates the world in which he is speaking by pushing forward Abdel Nasser’s world to overlap with and blur the lines between it and present-day Egypt. That El-Sisi’s post-revolutionary Egypt and his rapid ascent to power closely *rhymes* with the history of Abdel Nasser’s post-revolutionary Egypt and his eerily similar ascent to power strengthens the premise of my analysis that El-Sisi's imitative performance of Abdel Nasser in his August 5, 2014 speech possibly serves to bolster El-Sisi’s public image. More broadly, my discussion of these texts illustrates the potential analytical expedience of multimodal intertextuality.

The Egyptian case study also illustrates that a competitor institutional order does not need to be another organized political entity. It can, in fact, be ša’bīya (lit. ‘people-ness’ or ’people
power’); that is, it can be popular sentiment in opposition of the institutional order. It was that popular force at play in Tahrir Square in 2011 that toppled Mubarak’s regime. SCAF may have had a hand in organizing the 2013 Tamarrod movement against Morsi to artificially mobilize this people-powered competitive force. In 2014, absent the presence of hundreds of thousands of people occupying public spaces in direct protest of El-Sisi, his administration felt the mounting pressure nonetheless. Social and traditional media outlets as well as attempted protest movements signaled to the administration that El-Sisi’s image needed to be restored. Shortly after El-Sisi became president, he criminalized public gatherings, making them punishable by jail time and significant fines.\(^{89}\) This meant that it would be more difficult for lay Egyptians to express their disapproval with the government but it was not impossible. Institutional competition from the public at large played a role in El-Sisi’s advisors decision to draw comparisons between him and Abdel Nasser.

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Chapter 5: Three Heights of Focus on Egypt’s 2011 “sūwra” (‘Revolution’): a Multimodal Analysis of Engroupment in Tahrir Square

“When someone switches in speaking and/or writing into a different style or register, it is essential to consider more than the literal meaning of what they are saying. The style, register or code they have moved into is itself likely to carry associations that are some how relevant to the specific activities and social relations in play, and this can ‘serve as the rallying point for interest group sharing’, ‘act[ing] as a powerful instrument... of persuasion in everyday communicative situations for participants who share [the] values [that are thereby indexed].’”

Key concept: This chapter examines group formation, or ‘engroupment’ from three heights of focus (Pike, 1967). Namely, 1) the microscopic participant focus on the individual’s joining of a second or higher order engroupment of co-ideologues; 2) the macroscopic predominant focus on second or higher order engroupments joining engroupments that are of comparable scale and ideological homogeneity or greater; and 3) what I call the “micro-biological” height of focus. The ground I examine is Tahrir Square in January of 2011 and the 18 Days that followed. I discuss how smaller engroupments formed larger meta-systems that embodied and performed “the revolution”.

5.1 Being in Tahrir Square

I met Khaled in the fall of 2015 in Washington, D.C. A young man between the ages of 25 and 30, he was in town on business. I attended his presentation and noted the way he spoke about his work’s objectives. While Khaled worked for a video production company in Cairo that had

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several international clients, including US-based firms, he frequently framed his production company’s vision and mission in terms of the January 2011 revolution. He introduced himself as a revolutionary and his PowerPoint presentation included the popular twitter hashtag, #jan25, which referred to the beginning of the 2011 revolution on Officer’s Day: January 25th. He also used the adjective “revolutionary” fairly consistently in place of “good”, “great”, “amazing”, etc. Khaled characterized their use of bright pastel colors, all lowercase letters, and tessellated interlocking triangles as “symbolic of Tahrir”. He likened the triangles to Egypt’s famous pyramids.

After Khaled’s presentation, I introduced myself and expressed interest in interviewing him and some of his coworkers for my dissertation. We communicated by e-mail for several months before connecting over Skype for a live interview. In the interim, he had advised me on social media accounts, articles, blog sites, and twitter accounts to follow. He also answered questions about some of his public statements. One of his coworkers, Luay, keeps a popular blog that I regularly read and e-mailed him about.

In December of 2016, I had my first Skype interview with one of Khaled’s colleagues, Rayan, at his company. Rayan identified himself by e-mail as a revolutionary - as all of the other employees of this company do in the About section of their website. Rayan, like Khaled, is a young man in the 25-30 age range. He completed college in Egypt but prior to that he was raised and educated in Kuwait. He learned English in Kuwaiti school. The interview was conducted in Arabic and English. Khaled’s English is inflected with a subtle British accent that becomes especially noticeable when he pronounces long open vowels like /a/ and /o/ (e.g. “all” is sometimes pronounced with a rounded aperture, i.e. “oːːll”).
Rayan began by prefacing that while he does not consider himself to be an “activist”, he was “involved” in the revolution from the beginning. He described several friends of his who he did believe to be activists. He explained how he got caught up in the revolution:

1. Rayan: I’ve ... ah::: been involved in the revolution since the beginning.

2. Ah::::: ba:::: prior to that:::t , I’ve been ah::: try- I mean . I’ve been posting about eh:::::

(2.0)

3. About the polit- political , eh , situation in E:::gypt , ah:::::

4. I’ve been against the the, the regi:::me

5. Maybe::: ah::: since two-thóusand and ni:::ne ? o:::r te:::n %%

6. Ah::: I’ve , I’ve blogged about that:::, of ah::: ah:::: I’ve talked to activists

7. I’ve been , ah::: been meeting with people ah:::: who::: ar::::e

(2.0)

8. Who:: who:::: you- who- (%) who might be considered áctivists
9. Ah:: m:: ah:: so:: but I mea::n I was . em . I wasn- em I:: ah:: I won’t call myself activist

10. Ah::: what else , so::: ts’ that’s basically::: eh::: ah inst- I mea:::n um:::

11. Actually , the revolú:::tion , was::: ah::: my- I mean when I- when I::: were- ah:::

12. In- in (a-) li::ke ah::: how do I describe it ? ah:::

13. The revolútion actually wa::s ah::: my first con-fur- con-fur-ta::tion [confrontation]

14. With the , the regi:::me

(2.0) [sound of door closing in the background on Rayan’s end]

15. Me: |mhm

16. Rayan: |Um::: and it was by cónfidence I mean I didn’t pla:::n it eh::: at a:::ll

17. ah::: %::: ah::: I’ve been::: ah::: like I mean I went to-

18. I was- in- in do::wn to::wn eh::: when ev- when- when I saw the pro::test háppening

19. I was going out with my frie::nds , a:::nd eh:::

20. and I thought . maybe I should go:: to Tahri::r Square::: see::: what’s háppening
Rayan explained that he and his friends were not planning to spend much time in Tahrir Square on January 25th. They called each other in the early evening and planned to watch a movie. They discussed whether to go to Tahrir before or after watching the movie. They ultimately decided to go to Tahrir first. None of them expected to see so much protesters in Tahrir or that they would encounter the beginnings of a movement, let alone that they would feel compelled to join it. When they arrived at a coffee shop in Tahrir Square, the Square was quickly filling with protesters. The sight of so many people gathering in public and “speaking freely about the regime… about the whole political system” drew Khaled and his friends out of the cafe and into the square. When they saw the police’s attempts to remove protesters from the square using violence, Rayan realized “I was going to stay in Tahrir the whole time”.

Rayan recalls the police blockade of Tahrir on the night of the 25th. He had to run through an opening he found and was chased all the way back to his car. He was able to escape that night. He returned to Tahrir on January 28th after Friday prayers. He joined a protest movement from Manyal Island in central Cairo in the downtown area. The protest was led by
two women. The roads to Tahrir were blocked so they couldn’t access it. Rayan was on the front line, only a few feet from the line of police officers. One officer tried to pull him toward the military side of the road, away from the other protesters. Rayan remembers a woman pulling him out of the police officer’s grip. It would take them another ten hours of jostling with security forces before they were able to get past them. Rayan was shot with rubber bullets multiple times. The police also launched tear gas at the protesters.

They eventually accessed Tahrir through Seyyeda Zainab Square, which also had a heavy police presence. Rumors were circulating that police that let prisoners out of their cells and offered them pay to prevent the protesters from reaching Tahrir. It was an odd sight, Rayan recalls, watching police officers side-by-side with people in prison uniforms or civilian clothing armed with knives and other impromptu weapons. These confrontations, Rayan realized, marked something very different from anything he’d experienced before: “the Jan 25 process was not a regular protest… it was a revolution… not like the other protests we get to have in ah:: Cairo.”

Rayan would spend the majority of his days and nights in Tahrir throughout the 18 days. He often spent the night in tents that were set up for protesters. These tents were neutral spaces; they were not designated for particular groups or parties.

Rayan, his friends, Twitter contacts, and friends he made in Tahrir formed a network in Tahrir. Like concentric circles, Rayan’s closest friends from before the revolution formed the core of his home base in Tahrir. They were the first people he would call when coordinating his return to Tahrir each day. As Rayan got closer to Tahrir, he contacted friends and people he was connected to through social media to meet him at various locations on the way to the Square to help secure him safe passage. Many of Rayan’s friends and groups he joined in Tahrir were
targeted by police with a variety of weapons. One man who stood in front of him in a protest formation lost his eyes after police shot him in the face with BB gun. Seeing the man’s bloodied face impacted Rayan deeply: “That made me more determined to to::: to stay in Tahrir . Square… And that’s when I decided I’m not leaving this until Mubarak… leaves and we have… a democratic election in Egypt.” Hardship bound Rayan to the others in Tahrir Square and connected him to the placeness of the Square too. Upon witnessing the harm that his fellow protesters had incurred for the crime of positions their bodies where the state did not want them to be, Rayan became more deeply entrenched in his commitment to the revolution. The causes that brought him into Tahrir were not, however, the causes that kept him there. The sense of unity he cultivated with others as they survived one brutal attack after another quickly transformed into a sense of duty to those he had met in Tahrir and to those who had been hurt, arrested, injured, or even killed merely for being where government potentates did not want them.

**Group Formations**

I spoke with Rayan again in early 2017. Like last time, I both video and audio recorded our Skype session. I wanted to know more about what it was like being in Tahrir and being with the other protesters. I asked Rayan questions about modes of communication, the role of music and chanting, and whether both the form and the content of the messages they conveyed in their protests helped to unite them, or if one outweighed the other.

For Rayan, the principal experience in his memory of the 18 days was talking to people. Music was an important of how protesters communicated with people outside of the Tahrir. The chanting was for the cameras and onlookers. At any given time, Rayan recalled that he would move in relation to between 10 and 15 people. During the course of a day, he’d typically
converse with about that many people as well and they’d form impromptu networks that were made, unmade, and remade very quickly multiple times in a day. Sometimes Rayan’s immediate daily network would consist of no more than one or two other people.

Generally, Rayan recounted, a day in Tahrir meant “going with few friends, close friends, and meeting (new) friends and (through them) connecting with smaller groups,” that then grew. On average a Tahrir protester would feel connected to four people at any given time in the Square. It was not uncommon for immediate networks to encounter one another in the Square and join ranks. This typically happened, according to Rayan, when an individual member of an immediate network met one a member of another network and, after getting to know one another, suggested that the two groups blended. This blending was not articulated as such, but rather explained in terms of socialization:

1. Rayan: normally I would meet… friends there . in Tahrir . then I would meet with others

2. I didn’t know . after a while . I would get introduced to his friends . then .

![Figure 5.4: Rayan Squares His Torso and Gaze with the Laptop Camera. His shoulders are raised indicating an attitude that his account of engroupment with friends and people he met in Tahrir is predictable. The narrower aperture of his mouth and plane facial expression also suggests disinterest in his own story.](image)
3. I would introduce him to my friends

Phatic communion would turn to specific discussions about security circumstances, logistics, and politics, and then to coordination and *engroupment*, or the processes by which smaller immediate, independent networks join ranks to form larger metasystemic networks; these metasystems would also combine into higher orders, eventually creating the highest hypostatic station of unicity, what I call: the revolutionary formation.

The formerly independent networks still maintained closer ties between its individual constituents and so preserve a recognizable group identity within the larger engroupment. These joined networks on their own can be understood as “member networks”. The individuality of its constituents is distributed into the member network’s quiddity, and so that member network is more likely to be referred to in the singular as a whole entity and part of a greater gestalt entity known as the metasystem.

Below is an illustration of the ten stages of engroupment leading from an uninitiated individual’s encounter with others to their forming of an independent immediate network and then that engroupment’s joining of larger hypostatic metasystemic networks (HMN):
The diagram above (Figure 5.5) portrays the stages of engroupment based on interview data and publicly-available online video data (see chapter 1 methodology section). The stages above are the results of six specific types of interaction:

1. **Encounter**: when an individual or a group of individuals (see stage 2 above) meets an individual from another group, also of the type in stage 2 (above); if successful, they may begin to engage in *transmission*.

2. **Transmission**: when two groups of individuals are connected, oftentimes after two individuals (one from each group) encounter one another and begin to have conversations and share experiences that reveal common interests or objectives; if successful, they may agree to work together and become *engrouped* and thus form what is called an independent immediate network.

3. **Engroupment**: when a group of individuals begin to behave as a unit (stage 3) based on similar interests, objectives, or other commonalities; in a revolutionary interval when other such groups are forming in proximity to one another, a low-level
engroupment may join a higher-level engroupment, and thereby become part of a structured movement.

4. **Structuration:** when several independent immediate networks of the type in stage 3 encounter one another and join ranks to form a larger engroupment. Oftentimes one of the independent networks initiates the idea to combine and persuades the others; if successful, they now form a new higher-order, or hypostatic unit called a member network.

5. **Hypostasis:** when several independent networks comprised of smaller engroupments who’ve agreed to work together on the basis of a set of common objectives join ranks as a new unit acting together toward a shared goal known as a distributed cause; if successful, this new, higher-level engroupment of multiple member networks forms a hypostatic metasystem that is perpetuated by the work it does to achieve its goals, which also includes the continuity of the metasystem.

6. **Perpetuation:** when several member networks in a defined space coordinate themselves to share that space and work together toward a (set of) distributed social, political, and economic objective(s), they become a metasystem in a revolutionary formation. An important part of this formation’s activities is the perpetuation of itself and doing so requires the ongoing participation of each of the entities of the lower levels of engroupment on down to the initiated individuals. Oftentimes, the work of self-perpetuation is achieved through a type of distributed cognition known as heterarchy whereby many individuals take on leadership roles. The more individuals behave as leaders working to keep everyone in the formation, the longer the formation lasts. An important part of the work of heterarchical leaders is the initiation of newcomers into the space of the formation.

**Occupying Tahrir**

Khaled and Rayan, in separate interviews, explained that being in Tahrir did not solely consist of prolonged conventional protest activities like chanting, singing, or marching. Much of the day was spent “just occupying Tahrir all day,” as Khaled put it. They would chant but also “talk, interact, and share our thoughts” (i.e. what I call “transmission”). Rayan corroborated these descriptions. Given how much time was spent talking about politics, I asked Rayan if he had ever met someone in Tahrir Square with whom he felt he disagreed on a particular political issue:
Rayan began his response to my question about disagreement by dissenting (“I didn’t meet people I… disagreed with”). He claimed he had not met anyone with whom he disagreed. He seemed to contradict his statement, however, when he then went on to characterize certain people in Tahrir as “extremists” (line 2) on either side of a given political issue. Disagreement, for Rayan, therefore includes not only the basic idea of two people with differing views on an issue, but two people who also align themselves against one another as a result of that difference. In this case, Rayan noticed when someone he was speaking to held a different opinion but, he explains, “we were demanding the same things,” and “we had a single cause.” In other words, they could have different opinions on a specific issue but still be aligned with one another toward a higher objective.
The two parts of the activity of disagreement that are often conflated in Anglo-American English comprise distinct and not necessarily related postures in Rayan’s schematic. He may have heard opinions that he did not himself hold being espoused by someone with whom he conversed, but that difference of opinion was not made into grounds for a mutually combative stance-taking with respect to one another. The word “disagreement”, then, could not apply to the pre-Mubarak resignation phase of the Tahrir revolution. The word did, however, apply to the phase following Mubarak’s announcement on February 11th (“after Mubarak . resigned . then people… started to disagree again”). It appears, then, that the shared goals of the period of the 18 days within the early part of the revolutionary interval in Egypt markedly ended after the highest objective, topping Mubarak, was perceived to have been accomplished.

*The Iconism of Tahrir Square*

Rayan went on to characterize the atmosphere in Tahrir after Mubarak’s abdication as one in which questions arose as to the authenticity of the positions taken and argued by people in the Square. He repeatedly used the words “organic” and “structured” to differentiate those he perceived to be in Tahrir on their own accord for causes they genuinely subscribed to, and those thought to have been brought into Tahrir to inject an element of ideological disarray and disorientation. The presence of “structured” protests that consisted of people Rayan believed to be bussed in from Upper Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood disrupted the spirit in the Square that had compelled revolutionaries to stay there throughout the prior 18 days. It was Rayan’s distinct impression that the Muslim Brotherhood brought people there to “take over,” and after they arrived, things were “nothing really like Tahrir Square.” That Rayan could say that Tahrir Square, a physical place on a map that had not changed in its material composition or geographic
location, was no longer the same due to the arrival of people who seemed to want to co-opt the revolutionary movement to advance their own political aims, is significant. Like de Certeau’s idea that a place becomes a space when events transpire that alter the historicity of that location, Tahrir had been transformed during the 18 days. It was no longer just a central junction where multiple roadways crisscrossed around an inner traffic circle. It was, as it had been in the two prior revolutions of the early and mid-20th century, a revolutionary space where ordinary people became revolutionaries by forming relationships with one another and with Tahrir Square itself: the ground, the traffic lights, metro signs, grassy knolls, gravel, dust, smells, sounds, and buildings. All of these parts of the ecology of the Square became relatable presences, like spirits in Kohn’s thinking forests of the Amazon. That is to say, the elevated embankments where Rayan and Khaled sat and talked, met people, rested, prayed, slept, ate, and chanted, were not just parts of a memory. The human beings in that space developed relationships with these features of Tahrir Square. The features of the Square had personhoods and the time the protesters spent there led to their bonding with those non-human persons who too joined in the revolution day in and day out.

The time in the Square and the events that unfolded in that period intermeshed with the Square’s many persons and gave rise to personal relationships; bonds that were felt by the occupants of that place, which they remember, mourn the loss of, and yearn to relocate today. Like the bond of friendship that forms between human beings after spending time together in co-presence, embodied and oral conversation, and co-activity, the bonds between the human beings in the place of Tahrir Square and the many entities that make up the Square, became relational and personal after spending time together in co-presence, conversation, and co-activity.
Rayan, Khaled, Luay, Abu Safi, Hana, and Lina, all Egyptians who occupied Tahrir before, during, and after the 18 days with whom I spoke, expressed a longing to return there - to a placeless space that was only there when they were there and when the revolution was there. Like a rhyme of place, the Tahrir Square they remembered has a Peircean firstness that only they could fully understand. The iconism of their Tahrir Square is inaccessible to those who only understand Tahrir Square as an index for a place or set of events.

When I, with an intentional naïveté, pointed out that it would be very easy to simply catch a bus or taxi to Tahrir today, Abu Safi laughed exasperatedly and, seeming genuinely annoyed, fired back,

Of course it’s not the same now. Tahrir is Tahrir, yes, it’s there, but it’s completely different now. The government under Sisi made it illegal to gather in Tahrir. There’s police there and they filled, they covered up, the

Figure 5.7: Tahrir Square Made Inaccessible. An image demonstrating what Abu Safi explained to me in an interview about the ways El-Sisi has changed Tahrir Square to keep the people out. Photo by Mark Minkjam for City Breaths, taken on April 8, 2015. Credit: Google Images.
center of the square. The place that people used to stand, the circle that cars
drove around, it’s impossible to stand there now. They filled it with bushes
and plants and in the middle of it they put a huge flag pole with the flag of
Egypt. They say it’s for commemorating the revolution.

Indeed, El-Sisi’s government sought to end future gatherings in Tahrir Square and, so, blocked
access to the central node of the space. The circular grassy knoll, the exact center of Tahrir,
which I refer to as the “nucleus” in later sections, is now inaccessible. And, in fact, a large
flagpole was erected there as part of a policy that one architectural blog calls “defensive
landscaping.”

**The Unfailing Revolution**

In my last conversation with Rayan, I asked him if he still identifies as a revolutionary or if he
sees it as a thing of the past, or even a failure. He balked at the contention that the revolution was
over or that it had failed as if I had personally insulted him.

1. Rayan: It’s not over. it’s définément no::t ó::ver . I still ca::ll myself a revolu::tionary .

2. definitely and so do my friends and the people here (where I work) . In fact . we are a

3. revolutionary company . That means tha:::t we do:::n’t have a traditional structure

4. internally , because we are all the owners , we are all the boss here with equal

5. responsibilities . and the wo::rk we do is focused on the themes of the revolu::tion .

6. like, life . and freedom dignity so::cial jústice

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I was curious as to why Rayan related the lack of a “traditional structure” (line 3) with being a “revolutionary company” (line 3). He explained that the revolution in Tahrir was a time when “everybody was contributing.” For Rayan, that was the defining spirit of the Square. In many ways, the centrality of Tahrir as a place of gathering and a space where all of the entities there contribute to some greater function, is part and parcel of Tahrir’s anatomy. Its body is shaped to cradle large populations and direct all attention to a central locus point. In its placeness, Tahrir is not only central, then, but centralizing. The aerial image below from *Bricoleurbanism* illustrates how downtown Cairo’s roadways are designed to circumambulate the round patch of grass in the center of the Square.92 In my year living in Egypt, taxi and mini-bus drivers joked about the need to go through Tahrir Square to get to anywhere in the city. It was such a foregone conclusion, due to the way the roads are arranged, that one will always go through Tahrir to get just about anywhere.

Rayan recalled a large-scale international conference his company had organized in the winter of 2016. He called it “global” and said that it “mainly started with Jan 25 participants.” When I asked him to explain further, he told me that many of those who attended were students.

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sessions that showcased various tech-related products the company hoped would innovate the way Egyptian businesses operate. Rayan estimated some six thousand people were in attendance from fifty countries but that 60% of them were Egyptian. He described the purpose of the summit as “innovation and to help startups and youth empowerment.” He went on to say that “it felt like Tahrir Square.” When I asked him why it did, he returned to the refrain he made about the 18 days: “everyone’s contributing.” But, also, he emphasized, “it was near Tahrir Square.” When I asked him to provide more details about the location, he went back and forth between saying it was “completely inside Tahrir Square” to saying it was “near”, “close”, or “neighboring” it. For Rayan, part of the reason that he too personally still feels like a revolutionary is that he goes to Tahrir “a lot.” He concedes that “it’s not the same because the government is changing it so people don’t relate [to it].”

Figure 5.9: Image Taken from a Bricoleurbanism Blog Post. Tahrir Square, Cairo, Egypt before the 2011 revolution. Credit: Google Maps.
Rayan explained that El-Sisi ordered that the renovation of all of the buildings around Tahrir and the constant noise and bustle of the construction makes it far less appealing to visit than it was before. For Rayan and his friends, this is part of a plan by the government to keep people out of Tahrir. He described a brick wall that was built in the very middle around the circular grassy knoll that served as the physical center of the Square but also the central and centralizing hub of the protests in 2011. He described the huge flagpole installed in the centroid of the circle as a “huge flag giving protesters the finger.” To him, it’s the government’s way of saying “this is ours now” and because it’s an Egyptian flag, if it were desecrated, “people will be upset.” Rayan is sure that it’s “not just beautifying (as they say), it’s blocking the middle.” Access to the middle of Tahrir Square is important because, on one level, it used to be the only area where people could stand and not be vulnerable to cars driving in the roundabout. On another level, the middle of the circle is where the January 25 protests that grew into the 18-day revolution began. It’s also where the protesters’ occupation of the square was the most dense. Rayan and many others I spoke to described the center of the circle as having a kind of gravitational pull. It’s where protesters felt naturally drawn to on any given day of the revolution. In fact, people felt like they spent the whole day trying to get to the center and that they would meet other protesters in a disposition of being “in passing”. The shared goal of trying to get to the center of the square was the physical analogue of the hypostatic cognitive abstract activity, or in Kohn’s terms “thought”, of achieving the shared, distributed goals of toppling the Mubarak regime.

I asked Rayan if part of what made the summit his company organized feel like Tahrir Square was the age of the people. Many were young and I wanted to further test the mettle of the
notion that Tahrir was a ‘youth revolution’. Rayan recoiled at the suggestion that the 2011 revolution was a youth movement:

1. Rayan: I can’t say that (it was a youth movement), there were lots of people from upper
   middle or middle class, and they were 24 to 38 years old or older. Including lots of
2.   moms females, shockingly older people and women. Felt safe there too a lot were
3.   there because people felt it was a genuine protest all united on a single cause.
4.   they wanted to be part of this great event.
5.   it (female protesters) wasn’t weak as perceived
6.   

Youth was not a marker of the revolution or of events following the revolution that reminded revolutionaries of their time in Tahrir. Seeing large gatherings of college student-aged
people did not elicit memories of the 18 days. Encountering strong women, hearing people speak openly and critically about their political opinions and about the government, these were all stronger reminders of the experience of being in Tahrir Square when it was the Tahrir Square of the 18 days. When I asked Rayan how he and his fellow colleagues in the company he works for let others know they identity as revolutionaries, he said Facebook and Twitter are how people know. They can see, through his posts, that he “still believes and supports” the revolution. While his work, he explained, “isn’t politicized,” he told me that it’s “part of how I identify as a revolutionary or revolutionist. Most at (the company) were revolutionists,” so the identity is part of the office atmosphere. Above all, however, Rayan told me that the “sign of a revolutionary” is “hope.” Sensing a rhematic use of the word “hope,” I asked him to expand on that:

1. Rayan: Hope^(!). you:: can tell from, the type of conversation … (how) things are expressed.

2. things now are expensive, laws are changing, medicine prices are up and subsidies

3. are down … so if someone is complaining hopelessly,(!) they are one of those

4. who don’t believe in the revolution anymore, . some people did quit and lose hope,(!)

5. most I would say didn’t. we have, hope^(!), it will get better.

Figure 5.12: Rayan Contorts the Right Side of His Torso out toward the Camera. He leaves his left side in a reclined posture. His right hand holds the laptop and left hand is resting lazily on his head. His head is back; he’s gazing down and left, not at the camera. His mouth is very narrow, he’s hardly moving his lips. His expressions are plane as he explains what is obvious to him: the revolution was, and still is about a feeling of hope more than anything else.
I appreciated Rayan’s insightfulness about relating the feeling of being a revolution to hope. In fact, he didn’t just relate the two - he equated them. In chapter 1, I wrote about the “wall of fear” metaphor that was prevalent before Ben Ali stepped down as president of Tunisia.

Rayan’s account reaffirms the idea that what changed in Egypt in 2011 was that the fear was replaced with hope. My next question for him was about the future of El-Sisi’s tenure as president.

6. Rayan: there will be another revolution(!) against Sisi. everyone is predicting another

7. revolution^(!), he’s losing supporters ...

8. laws he created gave the army and police permission to use:

9. violence, the risk of getting killed is, more-than-eighty-percent,(!). you will get

10. arrest(ed) or (they will) use water cannons (on you) ... there is more^ fear, not just

11. that the feeling of getting killed for nothing or without accomplishing the cause …

12. Mubarak was more cautious but now they’re (El-Sisi’s government) more like the

13. Israelis, governing Palestine. they, don’t, care

(2.0)
My conversations with Rayan were especially illuminating. His thoughtful reflections helped me to connect with the experience of maintaining a revolutionary identity in the years following Mubarak’s resignation. His vivid retelling of events he experienced during the 18 days were critical to my understanding of the revolutionary interval and the processes of engroupment.

In the next section, I work with publicly available video data and examine the spatial epistemics of being in Tahrir. The sections after that explore the processes involved in initiation, joining protest groups, and the ways protest groups become networks and networks become metasystems that comprise the revolutionary formation.

**5.2 Return to Tahrir Square**

In chapter three I examined the development of npSA, or “new political Standard Arabic” as a code used during the 2011 revolution to disrupt Mubarak’s institutional order and thusly initiate institutional competition in the context of the revolutionary interval. Integral to that code is the person using it and whom s/he is addressing. I discussed the use of Egyptian Colloquial Arabic by lay citizens to *speak and act politically* in addressing incumbent politicians, particularly to
challenge the governing regime and its representatives’ institutionality. The use of this code is part of the linguistic activism of the 2011 revolution.

Chapter four examined the ways in which post-revolutionary Egyptian presidential discourse, both oral and embodied, reappropriated the revolutionary code of the 1950s and that of the 2011 Tahrir revolution. In the 1950s, Gamal Abdel Nasser, like Muhammad Morsi in 2012 and Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in 2013, used multimodal intertexts associated with the revolution to legitimate himself as president as well as his ruling institutional, governmental order. Revolutionary intertextual choices like the use of ECA over strict adherence to MSA, and a less formal habitus in public speeches, were emblematic of Abdel Nasser’s institutional identity as president. These were repeated by El-Sisi to invoke Abdel Nasser’s likeness and in so doing, recapture some of the historic success of his tenure in office.

Chapter five illustrates how the revolutionary code forged during the 18 Days of Tahrir was used to re-populate, or re-crystallize, the square and thus perpetuate the revolutionary interval by reinvigorating revolutionary voices and identities among uninitiated Egyptian citizens. The concern of many Egyptians who were engaged in the work of reigniting the revolutionary sentiments that created the 2011 revolutionary interval was that Mubarak’s government folded but would resurface if continual popular pressure was not sustained. The people who were initiated into the 2011 revolution, and new initiates, were needed to extend the revolutionary interval beyond Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011. So, these post-revolutionary institutional competitors (‘post-revolutionaries’ for short) took to the streets once again in the summer of 2011 and attempted to rally the masses back into Tahrir Square.
Some of these post-revolutionaries worried about the rising profile and influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and that of the more conservative salafi Nour Party that had emerged during the 18 Days. Nearly all who had partaken in the revolutionary formation of 2011 feared that leaving Tahrir would mean ceding the space of the revolution, and with it, the vectors of the revolution. In other words, exiting the square could be tantamount to forfeiting the right to ever return. Tahrir is understood locally as the public space in Egypt where revolutions occur and politics can be changed. Leaving Tahrir, particularly after having staged a revolution there that successfully ousted a president, could have meant losing the right to return to Tahrir. Before El-Sisi entered the scene of Egyptian politics or all but banned the right to protest in Tahrir Square after taking office, the Tahrir revolutionaries had a sense that the 2011 revolution could very well have been the last mass protest of its kind. Losing the right to protest in Tahrir would mean - in a very real sense - losing the “people power” that was born there.

Tahrir was no longer just a *lieu*, or place, it had become an *espace*, a space where identities and voices, bodies and words, combined and recombined in a rhythmic repetition over time that invited and initiated passersby, private individuals, into a sociopolitical amalgam with a cooperative, competitive energy that could change longstanding institutional realities. The 2011 revolution was not just the words of chants or even

**Figure 5.15: An Aerial View of Tahrir Square in Downtown Cairo, Egypt.** No activity related to the Arab Spring or the 2011 revolution is present. **Credit:** Google Maps (yellow overlay added).
the rhythmic patterns of songs; it was not gestures or coordinated movements, or nesting formations alone; it was not merely a color scheme or set of images that were posted on publicly accessible walls on- and offline. It was not even just a set of shared ideas, distributed causes, or objectives. The revolution in Egypt was Tahrir Square - a gestalt territoriality that included time and space. It was hundreds of thousands of people, together, at the same time, in that specific space, animating that space, performing in unicity in the bodies, habituses, and voices of the multimodal intertextual revolutionary code. In this way, Bakhtin argued, “at any given moment, languages of various epochs and periods of socio-ideological life cohabit with one another… one could say that today’s and yesterday’s socio-ideological and political ‘day’ do not… share the same language; every day represents another socio-ideological semantic ‘state of affairs,’ another vocabulary, another accentual system, with its own slogans, its own ways of assigning blame and praise” (1981: 291). Without the presence of a preponderance of Egyptian citizens demanding human and civil rights and protesting for democracy and liberal values, at the same time and in Tahrir Square, there would have been no revolutionary interval or the ensuring phase of institutional competition and transition that, together, created the 2011 revolution.

5.3 Initiation into Engroupment: A Vignette

To the right is an image (Figure 5.16) from a video taken by a group of seven males who appear to range in age from twenty to forty. At the center is the leader of the group - I call him “Black Shirt”. He dons reflective

Figure 5.16: A Group of Seven Core Members, All Male, Gathered in Tahrir Square. July of 2011; the group encourages Egyptians to return to Tahrir. Credit: YouTube.
sunglasses whose lenses, when I zoom in, reveal the seventh core member of the group who is holding a cell phone that he is using to record their performance in Tahrir Square. This group has gathered in July, several months after Mubarak’s toppling on February 11, 2011. They are singing in a call-and-response synchronicity, and dancing in unison, using improvised lyrics that encourage Egyptians to continue the revolution by returning to Tahrir Square.

This first-degree engroupment performs seven short political rhapsodies in a period of approximately three minutes and fifteen seconds. The group manages to draw in ten onlookers at different intervals of the performance (see appendices 5, 7); these would-be passersby either entered the formation or were pulled into the orbit of the group and began observing and partially participating in the performance by clapping occasionally, mouthing some of the more audible lyrics or just the choral responses after more complex calling sequences. Rather than walk by, they engaged in satelliting, or standing in proximity around the core engroupment facing it. These individuals would have merely passed the rhapsody group by were it not for, I argue, the techniques the engroupment jointly deployed to tractor beam them in.

I use the term “initiation” to describe this process of 1) getting someone’s attention from afar 2) piquing one’s interest 3) drawing one physically closer to the engroupment (some stop here and satellite, only partially engaging in the performance) 4) accommodating, or nesting, one’s body into the existing formation and 5) training one as an interactant-performer in the spectacle (some enter the formation and only partially learn the choreography and lyrics); 6) if the newly-accommodated (‘colonized’) individual is sufficiently engrossed, s/he may become an integral member of the core engroupment - the person would then be considered engrouped, or an endosymbiont.
More concretely, from afar, one might only see that there is a gathering of individuals; figure 5q shows an individual whom I have highlighted in blue and will refer to as “Blue” who had been looking down at his cell phone but then, when the tempo of the rhapsody group’s performance picked up and a loud call-and-response sequence began, he turned his gaze toward them.

Soon after, Blue turns his entire torso toward the engroupment and moves toward the gathering (figure 5.18); it becomes clearer to him that the individuals he is looking at and faintly hearing are not standing randomly close to one another, but rather are part of an intentional formation with a social, or political, purpose (given that Tahrir Square is a highly charged location) but that is yet unclear. Taking note of the space, i.e. Tahrir Square, and the rest of the surrounding ecology, it might be possible to conjecture that the group is likely there for political reasons and even that they are probably pro-revolution given the other props and artifacts in Tahrir at the time (anti-Mubarak, pro-revolution signs, people at tables, pamphlets, etc); as the din of the square becomes more decipherable in the form of conversations of individuals and groups passing by or standing in a location, it is clear that those in the square
are pro-revolution. Getting closer still to the rhapsody group in question (figure 5.19), it is now perceptible that they are moving in some kind of unison, or rhythmic organization (Scollon 1982; see also intercorporeality, in Merleau-Ponty 1962; and interperformance in Harring 1988). Closer still (figure 5.20), and now there is an audible coordinated group chanting of songs that sound completely familiar but the words are not clear – there is a pleasure associated with recognized, shared sensory experience/sonic culture (Chafe 2001 on ‘shared hilarity’, Norrick 2001 on ‘running jokes’ and sharing intertextual references with friends; Tannen 1987 on ‘sister language’). Within a few feet of the engroupment (figure 5.21), it is notable that they are looking around (light-housing) as they sing in a call-and-response pattern and that they have altered the lyrics of the original song even if the words are not completely audible yet/ever - Blue looks around, perhaps waiting for a group member to ratify his presence and issue an ocular invitation for him to join the formation.

At last, Blue receives the ocular
invitation he had been seeking - a man in the group I call “Turban”, who is the second-in-command, and wearing a traditional male fellāhī (‘peasant’) headdress, gives Blue the nod to enter (figure 5.22). Blue arrives at the perimeter/membrane of the network/engroupment and can now choose to depart or learn, acquire, the habitus and voice (multimodal code) and initiative from step 5 to step 6, thus becoming a core member. To initiate into step 5 he must mimic their bodily discourse techniques (e.g. gestalt clapping), and participate in the call-and-response (gestalt chorus); in this case, Blue chooses to remain in stage 5 for a short period, signaling his partial engroupment by standing just outside the circle at the perimeter (figure 5.23) and bobbing up and down with the core members while clapping in ‘kairos time’ (Erickson 2007) and thereby engaging, for a brief interval, in the dialogic emergence of the culture of that network (Mannheim 1995).
5.4 (Con)joining The Revolution

In this chapter I analyze group formation, or ‘engroupment’ through a framework Pike (1967) referred to as the three heights of focus for social analysis. The three heights I use are: 1) the microscopic participant focus on the individual’s joining of a first or higher order engroupment of co-ideologues; 2) the macroscopic predominant focus on second or higher order engroupments conjoining engroupments that are of comparable scale and ideological homogeneity or greater; and 3) what I call the “micro-biological” height of focus. The three heights analytical approach I take involves a process of analogically applying concepts I extrapolate from the natural sciences to underscore the living systematicity of engroupments in protest and revolutionary formations. I specifically draw from current models concerning cellular endosymbiosis and crystallization to describe how identity in relation to social activism was formed in and around Tahrir Square in Cairo, Egypt on the levels of both individual and multiple engroupment.

From a group formation vantage point, I interpret the processes involved in the unification of the many reportedly disconnected and distinct protest events, and the engroupments and individual ideologues who attended, embodied, and spoke these events, on during the 18 Days of Tahrir. As these engroupments and individual ideologues physically converged onto a discreet geographical space - Tahrir Square - the smaller, independent events they were parts of rapidly transformed into a complex metasystem event that came to dub itself “sōwrat yenāyer” (‘the January Revolution’).93 Likewise, the participants of this eventual

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93 Egyptian Colloquial Arabic (ECA), as opposed to Modern Standard Arabic (MSA), or other colloquial variants of Arabic (CA), etc.
movement saw themselves as “sōwwār” (‘revolutionaries’) rather than merely protestors or people gathering in ‘Tahrir Square’.94

I am interested in how the objectives and sentiments, as well as the chants and slogans (linguistic components), of the ‘Arab Spring’ traveled into Egypt from Tunisia, but in this chapter I focus instead on the individual experiences of joining the movement that was becoming a revolution in Tahrir Square and the emergence of an ideological and ontological unicity among the many hundreds of thousands of individuals and groups occupying the space of Tahrir Square during the 18 Days. This unicity is perhaps captured best by the now-differently charged Egyptian Colloquial Arabic (ECA) word “iš-ša‘b” (‘the people’), which, post-January 25, 2011, activates the sensory experience of the many iterations of Arab Spring uprisings from Tunisia to Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and beyond - this term has become an event-catalyst, or vehicle of revolutionary sentiment.

I investigate the emergence and transformation of the concept of ša‘b (‘people’) through two foci I call individual and multiple engroupment. To do this I use a micro- and macro-telescopic theoretical framework that relies on a multi-modal interactional approach (MMI). The framework I constructed and applied in this analysis was built on three sets of theories based on the three heights of focus I take in my research on Tahrir Square: 1) the macroscopic, or metasystemic level, 2) microscopic, or individual ideological initiation into engroupments, and 3) the micro-biological, which examines the internal contexts and ecologies of engroupments and the ecological context of MMI in Tahrir Square.

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94 In Arabic, the space is called “maydān t-Tahrīr”, where “maydān” is often translated as “square”. Literally, and in other contexts, maydān is used to mean “field”, as in ‘fieldwork’ or ‘working in the field’. Its stem does not imply any geometrical shape per se.
The first height of focus is informed by the literature on what is, in essence, metasystems analysis, or interpretations of how previously independent whole entities become the dependent constituent parts of a larger system. Valentin Turchin, a cybernetician, may have initiated the discourse in academia on ‘metasystem transition’ with his book, *The Phenomenon of Science* (1970). The main researchers I draw on for this section of the relevant theory, however, are Pike, and particularly his theory of hypostasis (1967), Fauconnier and Turner’s concepts of blending and emergence (2002), Giddens’s structure-agent approach (1984), Goffman’s work on framing (1967), Durkheim’s collective effervescence and charged symbols (1912), as well as Bateson, for his notion of schismogenesis (1935), Polanyi’s “from-at” knowledge, boundary conditions, and irreducibility (1968), and Erickson’s ‘contexting’ (1981) as well as the idea of an ‘ecology of communication’, which he later borrowed from Altheide (1994).

**Figure 5.25: Summary of the Theoretical Grounding.** I rely on these approaches along with the most relevant concepts, in bold, from each scholar in the figure. These contribute to the semiotic analytical framework of chapter 5. *Credit (‘tacit knowledge’ chart within my SAI taxonomy): Google Images.*
The second height of focus utilizes the theories and analytical tools of linguistic anthropologists who are concerned with the spread of and perpetuation of group identity through and in MMI. For this area, I mainly relied on Sicoli and Miller. Sicoli (2007) developed concepts of pitch, phonation, and “tono” (‘intonation’) in his dissertation on voice qualities among speakers of Zapotec languages in Mexico. Miller (2007) described “circulatory efficiency” in the circulation and resonance of ‘linguistic units’ that emerged through audiocassette recordings of poetry among Arabic-speakers in Yemen. I will modify Miller’s terminology in my discussion of ‘conversion efficiency’ in describing initiation, or the multimodal social work of acquiring new members into a protest formation as participants both performatively and ideologically.

The third height of focus does not draw on particular biologists, but rather joins the tradition of other linguistic researchers who have taken seriously several of the affordances of both micro- and macrobiology. I specifically examine the micro-biological processes of endosymbiosis and crystallization in detail, but make reference to the macro-biological, or ethological, epiphenomenon of starling murmurations as a way of illustrating the relevance of biological and ethological interactional contexts to human interactional contexts (see figure 5.25, figure 5.27

Figure 5.26: Stills of a Starling Murmuration. Taken from a video by Sophie Windsor Clive and Liberty Smith posted online by IslandsAndRivers on December 2, 2011. It is available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iRNqhi2ka9k. Credit: YouTube.
After a brief discussion of the unique MMI methodological approach of this chapter, I provide a directed overview of the relevant literatures which I mentioned above. In the second part of the chapter, I introduce the research on MMI in Tahrir Square with a brief history of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, and then, in the analysis apply the three heights of focus in a)

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Figure 5.27: Definitions of Key Terms. Pike’s conception of hypostasis is highlighted alongside a four-stage diagram of crystallization to underscore the “repeating of a unit” parallel between the former and latter. Moerman’s description of the pragmatic (multimodal) approach to sociolinguistics includes the socially constructed nature of ‘meaning’, ‘roles’, etc and emphasizes the importance of interaction. Finally, Peirce’s notion of pragmatism as relational and dynamic sheds further light on the semiotic nature of the present framework of multimodal interactional analysis.

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95 I am not myself a biologist, and therefore owe much of my understanding of endosymbiosis, crystallization, and other biological processes referred to herein to a friend and colleague at Las Cruces University in New Mexico, Maitham Naeemi. Maitham is a biochemical engineer currently researching neuroplasticity. I owe him a special thanks for his many helpful insights on my application of this productive metaphor to my inquiries regarding group formation and metasystems. Special thanks to my advisor, Dr. Mark Sicoli, for suggesting the starling murmuration as an apt metaphor for MMI in Tahrir Square.
Figure 5.28: Examples of Multimodal Channels. Each image is descriptively labeled to highlight a situated symbol and its multimodal channel. Credit: Google Images.
examining the hypostasis (see Definitions above) of revolution in Tahrir Square and b) discussing gesture and ‘tono’ in the initiation strategies of a seven-person rhapsody group within Tahrir Square.

5.5 Multi-Modal Interaction Analysis, Methods

Using an MMI approach presents certain challenges for traditional publication formats. In traditional approaches to linguistic research, an article can focus on dialogical exchanges or other forms of ‘talk in interaction’ and rely heavily or solely on a transcription of the utterances in an interaction. The MMI approach, however, requires an analysis of the whole ecology of communication, or the ‘ecology of MMI’. Methodologically, that means there is a preference for video rather than audio recordings, and a preference for viewing an entire scene rather than only examining still shots or other forms of graphical representation. To do this, I created a supplementary repository that consists of videos, images and schematic figures that I refer to intermittently throughout this chapter. I also extract relevant still images from the videos for inclusion in the text of this chapter to allow the chapter to stand alone. The webpage consists of embedded videos downloaded from YouTube using ClipGrab, pictures downloaded from Google, Maps produced on Google Earth, figures and diagrams created on Keynote, and original animation created using an online freeware application. The animation portrays an idealized murmuration pattern in Tahrir Square to help the reader visualize individual and multiple engroupment. Each Figure is meticulously labeled to demonstrate the applicability of the three heights of focus as an analytical framework.

96 Special thanks to Osman “Ozzie” Harb, my brother and an artist from Seattle, Washington, for his assistance with the animation.
This chapter includes still images taken from video recordings, as well as selected excerpts from a transcription of an interaction among a seven-person rhapsody group in Tahrir Square (section 5.2 above). The transcription was prepared using ELAN and includes pitch tracks generated by Praat.

Ideally, a paper that employs multi-modal analysis would be able to include video and other necessary graphics and sounds in-line with the text, but since that is not yet possible, the presentation of this research has to also be ‘multi-modal’. With all its complexities, however, Moerman (1988:1) argues that theories that do not take face-to-face interaction, or MMI, into account are simply “wrong”:

While there are certainly other legitimate concerns for social science, face-to-face interaction is the constitutive substrate of social phenomena. Every thing that matters socially: meanings, class, roles, emotions, guilt, aggression, and so forth and so on is socially constructed. Theories about how such things are learned and experienced, and about how to study them, which are not built to the specifications that interaction requires are wrong. The theories may be elegant, erudite, morally uplifting, or politically useful. But they are, in the first and critical instance, wrong.

5.6 A Multi-Scalar Analytical Approach

The three heights of analysis in this chapter were inspired by Pike’s interpretation of overlapping hierarchies at a football game, which he treated as an analogy for metasystems, or gestalts, in general. The metaphor of the football game he observes speaks to the fact that different types of reasoning occur whether people involved in the event are aware of it or not. The internal monologue of a vendor in the stadium is likely to differ in significant ways from that of the quarterback on the field, the coach at the sideline, the spectator in the stands, or the parking attendant managing the car lot.
Individuals in more-or-less comparable positions within the situation may share certain types of perception and meta-cognition due to the type of role they are embodying. They can be seen as parts of an ensemble, or what I call an “engroupment”. The boundaries of an ensemble are ‘soft’ or permeable and within them occurs a complex, overlapping, polyphonic matrix of relations involving multiple human interactants in a time-situated, communicative ecology. Hierarchies of emic events, or sets within sets, are constantly shifting and constituting and re-constituting each contingent layer of the interactions within a given ecology (see appendix 8).97

To interpret the sensory experiences of interactants at the individual, group, and mass crowd levels in Tahrir Square during the 18 Days of revolution, requires a multi-level analytical approach. This chapter takes up three “heights” (by section): 5.6. macroscopic; 5.7. microscopic; 5.8. micro-biological. Each of these three heights of analytical focus has been utilized ably by linguistic researchers in the past (see Figure 5ai below for one such example). My aim, then, is to make a small contribution by suggesting a particular configuration of these levels within a MMI framework and applying it to the events of the 18 Days of Tahrir. What follows is a brief discussion of each of the three heights of focus and a review of the corresponding literature for each of the analytical foci.

5.7 Macroscopic

Pask refers to what Pike calls “the macroscopic height of focus” as the “macroscopic point of view” from which the “self-organizing” properties of a metasystem could be observed and

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interpreted (Pask, 1962: 253). He called this level of analysis “meta-language”, and was interested in “self-replicating system[s]” (Pask, 1962:244). Images 5l-s telescope in (micro) and out (macro) of engroupment orders. The macroscopic height of focus reveals the complexities of the internal organization of an engroupment, be it second order or higher. Pike’s analysis of hierarchies of composites in a setting (1967:117) provides a way of describing these self-organizing processes, or miscellaneous overlapping hierarchies (Pike, 1967:101). Pike’s descriptions of the levels of activity in and around a football game help to explain the internal processes of a microsystem wherein constituent groups, such as the rhapsody group interaction I analyze below, co-participate in initiating, reconstituting, and developing both the first order engroupment - the immediate context - and, simultaneously, the higher orders in which their

![Figure 5.29: Deacon’s (2003:8) Schema. Deacon’s “hierarchical compositional relationships between iconic, indexical, and symbolic relationships” that is analogous to the three heights of focus applied in this chapter.](image-url)
engroupment is contextualized (see Figure 5.28). This work involves ‘focusing processes’ (Pike, 1967:112) that can be understood through ‘wide and narrow’ types of focus (Pike, 1967:114) and as part of a complex of recursive fractal composites in a discreet setting (Pike, 1967:117). Figure 5.e illustrates, from a participant focus, a process of engroupment I call ‘initiation’ (Pike, 1967:107).

To a lesser extent, I rely on the work of Fauconnier and Turner (2002) on conceptual blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:279) and emergence (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002:44) to describe the effects of elicitation and mutual-influencing in MMIs on ideological stances when individuals and groups encounter one another on the way to or within Tahrir Square (Appendix 9). Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration and the ‘duality of structure’ in structure-agent relations (Giddens, 1984: 16, 376) adumbrates a dualistic or dialectal relationship I think of as ‘ecology-ontology’ and see as integral to the microscopic height of participant focus. In essence, the individuals who enter Tahrir Square and become revolutionaries do so through a gradual process of becoming. Each step a person takes closer to the space of Tahrir, a place now charged with political significance (where one goes to do revolution), s/he interacts with others and takes in the charge of the reshaped territoriality of Tahrir (Figure 5a-ah above). The individuals who participated in protests on January 25, 2011 and those who joined in as extemporaneous activists created the 2011 revolution through their words but also with each footstep, each handshake, peace-sign gesture, repeated chant, hand-written and -held sign, graffito, smile, nod, and welcoming look at a bystander.98

98 Golson et al (2014) studied expression during the Egyptian revolution. The volume inspected both written and oral communication with a view toward changing perceptions of identity among Egyptians throughout the uprising. The study finds that the experience of the revolution strengthened, rather than diminished, Egyptians’ self-perceptions.
The revolution was spoken and embodied, performed, into existence through countless interactions repeated over and over again as thousands of people walked from one end of Cairo down its long streets and winding alleys to Cairo’s social and political center - a living place, enlivened by its remembered history and the felt importance only thinly veiled by its concrete roads and old smog-covered architecture. This veritable heart is Tahrir Square and once it filled with tens of sounds of revolutionaries its remembered significance fed into and heightened the meaning, and stakes, of the presence of so many activists and their calls for regime change. The evolution of January 25th’s (a significant time) occurs through the coordinated movement of bodies and the distribution of a single idea (revolution against Mubarak’s regime) over multiple channels of communication - the physically, geographically closer those bodies became to Tahrir Square (a significant place, lieu), those bodies became unified into a movement, and as each individual and group filled that space, s/he and they (con)joined a formation and became a revolution. Their lines of communication distributed with their words, bodies, songs, and art, became the code of the revolution and the place of Tahrir Square became the space of the revolution. Tahrir Square is important because Egyptians know that it’s where Khedive Ismail decided to expand Cairo to the Nile in the 19th century (Douin 1933). It’s where the 1919 revolution took place against the British occupation that won Egypt its independence - this is the occasion, in fact, that led to the square being renamed meydān t-tahrīr (‘liberation square’) (Berridge 2011). Most immediately relevant for the January 25 protestors in 2011, was the fact that Tahrir Square was the site of the 1952 Officer’s Revolution that toppled Egypt’s monarchy and replaced it with the present-day republic. Tahrir is where people in modern Egypt have gone to end regimes and make political systems change. That knowledge about the history that place,
Tahrir Square, infused the actions of the people going and arriving there with an added energy and sense of efficacy. At the same time, their very repetition of Tahrir’s history of hosting revolutionary movements reinforces that territoriality, or what de Certeau calls the “storification” of a space (see chapter 4).

In this way, Giddens’s duality of structure (whereby individual action is informed by and simultaneously recapitulates social structures), meets de Certeau’s conceptualization of how a place is transformed by the meaning people give it through their collective actions there into a space that is alive with ineffable vectors, directions, that linger and impute thereafter to those who enter it. Giddens’s notion of structures may then be analogous to de Certeau’s “vectors of direction”.

Giddens’s structuration describes the mutually reinforcing relationship between individual action, or ‘human agency’, and social force, or ‘structures’ such as customs, traditions, mores, norms, etc. Structures influence and restrain how people behave but those structures also emerge and are reproduced by individuals who perpetuate them by reenacting them. In this way: “Society only has form, and that form only has effects on people, in so far as structure is produced and reproduced in what people do” (Giddens and Pierson, 1998: 77). Structure also refers to the “structuring properties allowing the ‘binding’ of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them ‘systemic’ form” (Giddens 1984: 17). In this conception, “social systems” are understood as “reproduced social practices”; the ‘duality of

structure’, then, describes the close connection between “subject and social object” (1984: 16). The central aspect of this duality is that the “rules and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the same time the means of system reproduction” (1984: 19).

In this way, Goffman's dramaturgical perspective (Goffman, 1967:4) helped in identifying the various roles of the interactants. The diagrams in this chapter depict types of processes, or ways of socially organizing experience, and for that, framing theory was essential (Goffman, 1974:247). I also rely on Goffman’s definition of an encounter. In Fun in Games (1961:18), Goffman argues that "encounters involve (1) a single visual and cognitive focus of attention, (2) a mutual and preferential openness to verbal communication, (3) a heightened mutual relevance of acts, and (4) an eye-to-eye ecological huddle that maximizes each participant's opportunity to perceive the other participant's opportunity to perceive the other participants' monitoring of him" (Goffman, 1961:6-7).

Individual engroupment, or what I define as a reflexive process of becoming a member of a collectivity of others in relation to a known and shared, or distributed cause, is, of course a permutation of the Durkheimian process of collective effervescence (Durkheim, 1912: 245). Along with the cause-based emic structure of an engroupment, engrouped individuals will oftentimes produce or manipulate certain accoutrements, or situationally-charged symbols (Durkheim, 1912: 264).

Also writing in the first part of the 20th century, Bateson discussed “progressive differentiation or schismogenesis” as complex ways in which individuals maintain their separate, but ‘engrouped’, ontologies within higher order collectivities, and mutatis mutandis for lower
order engroupments in relation to the higher orders with which they overlap (1935:3, 5). Bateson was also interested in systems, or what are now referred to as metasystems, as analogies for human interaction and hierarchical organization (1935:5).

Polanyi, who himself was interested in the affordances of both micro- and macro-biology for understanding human interactions, coined the term “boundary conditions” in a wider discussion of what he referred to as the irreducibility of higher levels (1968:1310): “The theory of boundary conditions recognizes the higher levels of life as forming a hierarchy, each level of which relies for its workings on the principles of the levels below it, even while it itself is irreducible to these lower principles”. The “height” metaphor in Polanyi’s theory of boundary conditions and irreducibility is like “height of focus” for Pike. Height, situation, or point of view, was key to understanding knowledge for Polanyi; his theory of “from-at” knowledge holds that “the reader of a text has a from-at knowledge of the words’ meaning, while he has only a from awareness of the words he is reading. Should he be able to shift his attention fully toward the words, these would lose their linguistic meaning for him” (Polanyi, 1968:1311). This tension in from-at knowledge is present in the cycles of reconstitution, development, and lead transference in the Tahrir rhapsody group examined below.

In an important sense, engroupment, initiation, and reconstitution are all types or modes of contextualization. In Erickson and Schultz's 1977 article, “When is a context?”, they explains that “contexts are constituted by what people are doing and where and when they are doing it” (Erickson and Schultz, 1977:22). They go on to cite McDermott, in saying “people in interaction become environments for each other” (1977:22). The individuals in the Tahrir rhapsody group each contribute to the bounded environment of the activity system visible in the
figures accompanying the analyses of the rhapsodic episodes following section 5.10 below. The contexts in the ecology of MMI are “mutually shared” (Mehan et al, 1976 cited in Erickson, 1977:22). As mentioned earlier, Erickson and Schultz borrow Altheide’s “ecology of communication” terminology (Altheide, 1994:665), and in this chapter I alter it still and discuss semiotic ecology as well as ontology-ecology to underscore the multi-modality and interactive quality of communication, a relationship also developed by Adam Kendon (1990).

More recently, systems intelligence approaches to “human intellect in action” are related back to connections with other agents in an environment that is changing (Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2007:3). Saarinen and Hämäläinen have written two papers on “intelligent behaviour in the context of complex systems” and discuss how “interaction and feedback” are involved in these systems. They explain that “[a] subject acting with Systems Intelligence engages successfully and productively with the holistic feedback mechanisms of her environment. She perceives herself as part of a whole, the influence of the whole upon herself as well as her own influence upon the whole. By observing her own interdependence in the feedback intensive environment, she is able to act intelligently” (Saarinen and Hämäläinen, 2004:3). This understanding of the ecology-ontology dialectic is critical to all three heights of focus applied in the analysis of 1st and higher order ‘revolution’ engroupments leading up to and continuing in Tahrir Square during the revolution.

Also, “emergence” (Michaels, 2011:1), “collective emotions” (Michaels, 2011:1), “elicitation” (Michaels, 2011:4), and “emotional contagion” (Collins, 1975:58; Durkheim, 1912; Fish, 2005 cited in Michaels, 2011:9) have become part of the discourse among linguistic researchers interested in metasystems and MMI.
5.8 Microscopic

The microscopic height of focus is at the level of individuals and 1st order engroupments. This height’s affordances are in the ability to observe complex MMIs that, in Tahrir Square, are indexical of a cause-based emic structure. In this case, the vector of revolution is ubiquitous in the interactions throughout Tahrir - that is, people are perpetually reconstituting the performance of revolution at all metasytematic orders.

Similarly, van Vleet’s work in the Andes region examines the various modes of enacting ‘nation’, which is a type of metasystem, in Quechua-speaking communities, or what I am calling ‘engroupments’, in the Andes through dance and song, vectorized MMIs, individually and in groups (van Vleet, 2003). Mannheim and van Vleet’s work on the same communities of Quechua speakers in the late 90s finds that interactants in storytelling events mark speaker roles and epistemic rights by “shadowing” the events in the narrative (Mannheim and van Vleet, 1998:340). Interactants are sensitive to and index “the layering of voices, discursive frames, and narrative lines” (Mannheim and van Vleet, 1998:340). Engrouped events reproduce vectors of the revolution, and similarly involve ‘shadowing’/imitation activities that mark the roles of the individuals in the ecology of MMI. The shadowing is detectable in the prosody as well as the pragmatic, or embodied, modalities of the interactants.

For my analysis of the Tahrir rhapsody group I borrow Sicoli’s analytical tools of pitch (Sicoli, 2007:8), phonation (Sicoli, 2007:6), and ‘tono’ (Sicoli, 2007:4). Sicoli describes ‘tono’ as

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101 Coincidentally, the engroupment I examine in this chapter consists of seven core members. The analogy to starling murmurations made earlier in the chapter may extend further here. In 2013, a team of researchers at the University of Rome, led by the theoretical physicist Giorgio Parisi, published a study on starling murmurations and found that within the flocks, individual starlings responded to the seven nearest birds to them to determine the next movement. The study is available in full here: Young GF, Scardovi L, Cavagna A, Giardina I, Leonard NE (2013) Starling Flock Networks Manage Uncertainty in Consensus at Low Cost. PLoS Comput Biol 9(1): e1002894. doi: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002894
an “apt metaphor for language because, much like language, it exists partly in the individual and partly in the world of social action, convention, and history,” and for Zapotec speakers ‘tono’ is used to discuss both intonation and voice quality. Given the cultural specificity of this term, I have chosen to append the Arabic equivalent, ‘lakna’, which is oftentimes associated with qualities akin to prosody, intonation, accent, dialect, and regional lexicon. The syncretism of tono-lakna produces a particular affordance that is critical to my analysis of Tahrir Square as a complex ecology of MMI and the concomitant and coterminous interaction of the rhapsody engroupment therein. Namely, tono-lakna describes how volume, pitch, and syllabic stress patterns in the phonation of the improvised lyrics produced in the rhapsody by its lead singers trigger call-and-response structures and impact the circulatory efficiency of the engroupment’s ideological messaging as well as its success, or failure, in initiating new ideologue-activists. In essence, call-and-response patterns are easy for satelliting onlookers to take up and join with - there is also the important dimension, then, of the feeling of being in a group and knowing how to participate when the performance is predictable or readily learnable and repeatable. Call-and-response patterns have a high level of repeatability and so the epistemic barriers to entry are very low, especially for members of the same society who share a language, a sonic culture, and are aware of the relevant co(n)texts. Onlookers feel invited, if not compelled, to perform and by choosing to participate with their bodies and voices, they are re-performing the words and actions of engrouped individuals for whom those performatives carry corporeal and phonetic qualities with ideological weight. The onlooker becomes a performer and thereby embodies and speaks ideological messages, thus, through repetition over time and space, becoming a revolutionary.
Like Sicoli, I found that, for the rhapsody group, “[i]n the co-performance of prosody and segmental structure, phonation and pitch emerge as domains of linguistic coding expressive of the affect, attitude, and ideologies speakers hold regarding the content of their speech” (Sicoli, 2007:xvi). The figures and images in this chapter depict how, in this rhapsody group, performer-interactants "construct meaning in the patterned configuration between a prosodic line of information structure and a propositional line of information structure" (Sicoli, 2007:xvi). The visual transcriptions featuring Black Shirt and Turban, in particular, demonstrate Sicoli’s “voice

Figure 5.30: A Schema Demonstrating the Ground for the Crystallization Metaphor. I use this to describe engroupment processes. The top left diagram is re-labeled to trace the path from uninitiated individual to initiated activist, then to member of an uninitiated protest formation. The next level begins with uninitiated protest formations as the basic unit, which then is initiated and enters into the revolutionary formation (a meta-system). The bottom left and right images depict chemical crystallization whereby a ‘seed’ or high-heat nucleus catalyzes a crystallization process that results in a crystal with radiating concentric circles of gradually hotter cells from the center spanning out until reaching a natural barrier - the shape, or ecology, which impacts the final composition, purity and strength of the whole. I parallel this process to engroupment from individuals into protest groups, and finally, under the right conditions, a revolutionary formation.
modes" (Sicoli, 2007:8) as they exchange lead and rotate roles. The analysis of the rhapsody group is essentially a “study of voice,” as it is for Sicoli’s work with Zapotec speakers (Sicoli, 2007:9). Sicoli argues that studying voice also involves “an examination of subjectivity, where speakers contribute metapragmatic commentaries to their speech through changing perspectives during performance” (Sicoli, 2007:9).

Sicoli argues that voice qualities "function as a layer of meaning on top of words that communicates the affective evaluation a speaker holds toward the words and propositions reproduced at a particular moment of dialogue" (Sicoli, 2007:xvi). Furthermore, he finds that the "co-performance of prosody and segmental structure, phonation and pitch emerge as domains of linguistic coding expressive of the affect, attitude, and ideologies speakers hold regarding the content of their speech" (Sicoli, 2007:xvi). Building on Sicoli's findings, I therefore argue that voice qualities and co-performance are relevant aspects of the Egyptian Arabic rhapsodies constructed and performed extemporaneously in Tahrir Square during the 18 Days of the 2011 revolution to ouster ex-President Hosni Mubarak. In my analysis, rhapsody is a key modality through which, among others, what I call the process of 'engroupment' takes place with a vector of revolution. As in Sicoli's work with Zapotec, my examination of communication in multi-modal interactions in Tahrir Square from January 25 to February 11, 2011 demonstrates how "language, culture, and society are semiotically intertwined" in the performance, en-registerment, and perpetuation of sōrā (ECA: 'revolution').

For my analysis of pitch in a Tahrir rhapsody group, I rely on Sicoli's definitions of pitch and phonation, whereby the former is "a measurement of the fundamental frequency of vocal cord vibration," and the latter is "a variety of settings for the larynx that produce different
Biological metaphor: *applied*

elicitation*, anti-Mubarak wall art

Tahrir (lit. 'liberation') metaphor: freedom is a place

dec Certeau: there are as many *spaces* as there are

*experiences* of spaces

'membrane', border

'capping' - filtering, defending borders

'surfactants' - gatekeeping Tahrir

'colonization', encampment in Tahrir

elic summation of events: "protest" -> "revolution"

Figure 5.31: Mass Protest as Crystallization. These images illustrate parallels with a biological process related to crystallization; a visual analogy for engroupment into the revolutionary formation. *Credit: Google Images.*
voice qualities” (Sicoli, 2007:1). As space is limited, I have largely underscored how Sicoli’s voice modes analysis is applicable to the rhapsody group, but further research is needed to develop a theory of voice qualities in the 2011 revolution.

Also relevant to the analysis of the rhapsody group is Miller’s work on Arabic poetry in Yemen (2007). I borrow Miller’s concepts of circulation and resonance (Miller, 2007:24), as well as the idea of a “sensory experience of song” (Miller, 2007:24), and the standardization of linguistic units or “verbal formulas” (Miller, 2007:163-4) that, in Miller’s work emerge from the circulation of audiocassettes of Arabic poetry. His analysis of “convergences of local sonic culture” is also relevant to the ecology of Tahrir and helps explain both the emergence and success of the rhapsody engroupment I analyze in this chapter but, in general, that of poetry, music, and slogan-chants in the 2011 revolution (Miller, 2007:35). Miller’s theory of apperception, or appropriation of novel situations or knowledge into previously existing knowledge, is useful in interpreting the repeated iterations of mass protests in Tahrir Square in the three years since the 2011 revolution (Miller, 2007:135).

Apperception is important to the success of the Tahrir rhapsody group because it relies on known music in the local, and trans-national, cultures pique interest in passersby who could potentially become initiated. The first rhapsody in the video recording I analyze is a parody of a well-known nursery rhyme called “ḏahab l-laylu, ṭala’ l-fagru” (‘the night departed, the morning arose’) by the famous Egyptian singer Mohamed Fawzy. The parody begins with the famous opening line, which is the title of the song, and goes on to mimic the rhythm or what Miller calls the ‘sensory experience’ of the Fawzy’s original rendition with Black Shirt’s vectorized lyrics intended to initiate newcomers to the distributed cause, the revolution, and simultaneously
I combine Sicoli’s ‘tono’ and Miller’s ‘apperception’ to explain what I call the ‘re-crystallization’ of revolution. Miller’s description of ‘call and response’, or ‘bid wa-jiwāb’ in

reconstitute the engroupment and its ecology-ontology within the ‘miscellaneous overlapping hierarchies’ of Tahrir Square (appendix 8: transcript lines 1-14).

Figure 5.32: Depiction of Endosymbiosis. Single-celled organisms, like a novice, engulf or phagocytizes bacteria it encounters (endophagocytosis) and scans it for receptors on its surface that would indicate its incorporability into its internal ecology. Upon locating an appropriate receptor it incorporates it through its cellular membrane (endocytosis) and the bacterium becomes an endosymbiont. If the host cell fails to digest it and the endosymbiont provides an increase of energy due to its own normal functionality, the host will abstain from exocytosing, or expelling, the bacterium. The endosymbiont can either ‘specialize’, whereby it becomes co-dependent on the host and is then known as an ‘organelle’, or it can maintain its independence but persist within the host’s cytoplasm in a state of mutual endosymbiosis. In the former case, a single-cell organism has become multi-cellular and cannot be re-separated into its constituent parts, or rather it would not because to do so would result in a lower energy state. In the latter situation, a ‘colonial organism’ is formed, which can re-separate into its constituent parts and survive, but also would not likely do so due to net energy losses. Credit: Google Images (arrows, labels, descriptions added).
Yemeni Colloquial Arabic, is critical to my analysis of the internal structuration of the rhapsody engroupment and its sonic re-production (Miller, 2007:137). Like Miller’s work on the audiocassettes that physically distributed, or circulated, knowledge of poetic improvisations, the Tahrir rhapsody engroupment must consider, and strike a balance between, both “circulatory efficiency” and “originality” to persist as an engroupment and to succeed at initiating newcomers (Miller, 2007:367) - these processes feed back into each other dialectically as well.

5.9 Micro-biological

This last, and most granular height of focus is also not without precedent or other advocates in linguistic research. To name only a few, Pask, discussed earlier, also saw value in the affordances of the biological metaphor (Pask, 1962:243). Kockelman too discusses micro-biological phenomena as windows into human organization and interaction (Kockelman, 2011:711, 715). Finally, Polanyi’s “biological hierarchies” are an important part of his theory of boundary conditions (Polanyi, 1968:1310). Pike’s hypostasis (1967:107) is related to ‘scale space’ theories in physics and biology and, more contemporarily, has applications in computer science for image processing.

The micro-biological metaphor is particularly appealing because of its affordances in describing highly complex, seemingly indescribable large-scale social movements like that of the 2011 Egyptian revolution (see Figure 5.30). Political science researchers interested in large movements of people for political purposes might benefit from a framework that examines how individual motives can be abstracted to fit or sublimate a shared, distributed, cause. Fang (1994), for example, writes about ‘riots’ in China, but limits his analysis to media coverage without discussing the anatomy of the engroupments - this reflects a singular interest in how language is
Figure 5.33: Major junctures in ‘swarming’ Tahrir Square. January 25, 2011. The images depict revolutionary vectorization whereby individuals and protest formations take up revolutionary ideology and become initiated into revolutionary formation. Like crystal formation in a discreet space, network inter growth is delimited by the geographical contours of Tahrir Square and its artillery roads. Credit: Google Earth, Google (color overlays added).
used by journalists to portray and interpret the collective actions of many individuals behaving politically in public spaces. This type of analysis could be enhanced by accounting for the evolution of the protest movements. Hackett and Zhou (1994), are interested in U.S. peace protests in opposition to the Gulf War, but only examine op-eds in the press rather than attempt a MMI analysis of the individuals and engroupments in the protests themselves as they occurred. Again, this demonstrates a pattern of linguistic analysis of political events that involve mass movements whereby researchers ignore the complex ways that language is used to create and maintain the formations they study as taken-for-granted ‘riots’, ‘protests’, or ‘revolutions’. Likewise, Lee and Craig (1992) analyze U.S. newspaper coverage of labor strikes in South Korea and Poland, and Macleod and Hertog (1992) write about the manufacturing of public opinion by the press when covering protest groups. Linguistic research of engroupments of people doing political work in public spaces have been limited to uni-modally analyzable data.

Arguably, the aforementioned researchers may have found a lacuna in the available methodologies of linguistic research at the time for countenancing complex social realities and the dialectics of engroupment. Micro-biologists, however, have been comporting with complex, multi-party engroupments, hierarchies, initiation events, rapid crystallizations, and re-crystallizations, for decades and have developed models for interpreting these events and ecologies that are readily available as rich analogical resources for linguistic research into social movements like mass protests and revolutions.

These processes related to endosymbiosis are productive analogs for interpreting the processes of engroupment with a vector of revolution in Tahrir Square. Individuals, like bacteria, encounter lower and higher order engroupments within a complex social environment in a given
space, like the streets of Cairo on January 25, 2011, which may attempt to initiate them; in this way, cells and bacteria encounter lower and higher order organisms that may attempt to engulf them - both realities are dialectical. The engroupments in Cairo may benefit both the individual and the protest engroupment, just as the engulfing cell and the bacterium each seek more efficient energy formations. Social formations among human interactants and cellular formations among microscopic organisms are directly comparable. However, there are, of course, limitations to the affordances of this metaphor. To more fully account for the processes of higher order engroupments that led to the populating of Tahrir Square (Figure 5.33), endosymbiosis in microbiology can be supplemented by crystallization theory:

In crystallization (Figure 5.30), a seed, which can be uni- or multi-nucleic, begins to germinate, or develop and grow by encompassing other cells, proteins, and bacteria in its ecosystem (Figure 5.32). The seed is understood to have a certain initial level of heat energy that determines the resulting size of the crystal as well as the speed of the crystallization. The physical environment surrounding the crystallization process also shapes the composition and structure of the final product. As the seed germinates, certain surfactants, or capping agents, block potential impurities that could damage the integrity of the crystallization process; similarly, in the self-assembly of the crystallization process, certain impurities may self-filter at various stages, while agents with appropriate receptors may be engulfed by the crystallizing seed and influence the final coloration and quality of the crystal (e.g. quartz, diamond, ruby, emerald, etc). Diffusion across interacting agents in crystallization assures a high level of blending that reinforces and disseminates a common appearance and composition across the components of the crystal. The crystallization process will end once heat energy is depleted and/or once the
structure has contoured to the edges of its given environment. Re-crystallization takes place when new agents are germinated and provide additional energy to the seed, and/or when a change in the environment allows for additional growths. Figure 5.34 is a diagram modeling zero-degree engroupment, where someone has not yet been engrouped (‘seed’); and then individual engroupment, or first-degree engroupment, and, finally second-degree engroupment where groups conjoin as member networks into the larger beginnings of a revolutionary formation:

**Figure 5.34: First- and Second-Degree Engroupment.** Individual (first degree) engroupment is portrayed in the top third. The bottom two-thirds model second-degree, or multiple engroupment. Microscopic social dynamics are constantly at play doing the work of coordinating, choreographing, initiating and re-initiating individuals and disparate protest groups into the large scale revolutionary formation that often obscures the complex levels of interaction beneath it.
At the end of the chapter I propose a diagram as a model demonstrating the theoretical contributions of all three heights of focus in interpreting the various stages of the processes of individual and multiple engroupment in the 2011 revolution. Below, however, is a simpler collection that features images from Tahrir Square during the January revolution that demonstrate the aptness of crystallization and re-crystallization as productive analogs for describing the social processes of engroupment. An individual ideologue, or a small 1st order engroupment, may act as a seed that encounters other lower and higher order engroupments, including individuals, and then interacts in complex ways to initiate or block those entities from joining the developing formation. As the engroupment germinates along the path to Tahrir - the bounded environment that will co-participate in shaping the ‘revolution’ (the crystal) - it may be itself engulfed into a higher-energy crystallization, but each component of the germination affects the resulting shape, size, integrity, hue and quality of the crystal. At various stages in engroupment, an individual ideologue may respond in different ways to the proprioception (sensory experience of interacting within an engroupment), and find that s/he is a mismatch, or is otherwise uncomfortable; in micro-biological terms, that person may represent an ‘impurity’ in the ideological ecology-ontology of the engroupment and decide to exit (self-filter) and either join another engroupment process via (self-)initiation, or disengage and exit the ecosystem (Tahrir Square or its tributary streets).

Like cellular ecosystems, social movements compete with one another schismogenetically and may attempt to engulf lesser, or higher, order engroupments to construct a larger, higher energy, formation. In a revolution, a critical mass of citizens may attempt to
overthrow the powerful, armed institutions of a government to, in turn, replace it by re-crystallizing and thus forming a new government entity in place of the incumbent. As in crystallization and re-crystallization, the shape and quality of the previous regime maintains a certain influence, or ‘incumbency’ (Enfield 2013:8), on any formations that proceed. In microbiology the highest, stable energy formation wins out; in sociopolitical engroupments, ideological factors may complicate matters and result in less efficient formations over certain intervals, but with time, those structures will give way to competing vectorized engroupments seeking, essentially, greater efficiency in the given ecosystem. In fact, this type of process took place in Egypt relatively soon after the 2011 revolution. The re-crystallization, or so-called “second revolution”, took place on July 3, 2013, a year after Muhammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood was elected as the first democratically president of Egypt. Many regard the events of July 3, 2013 not as a ‘revolution’ but as a military coup d’état designed to replace Morsi with El-Sisi.102 It did not help Morsi’s case, however, that he had become quite unpopular in his first, and last, year as president. SCAF used the public antagonism toward Morsi to orchestrate a large-scale demonstration as a pretext for ousting the president and reclaiming control of the government. Mubarak and his wife and sons were acquitted of all wrong doing soon after, while Morsi was forcibly taken to court on multiple charges (see chapter 3).

5.10 Multimodal Three-Height Analytical Framework (MM3)

To summarize, the approach I take in this chapter is to describe two processes, individual and multiple engroupment, from three distinct heights of focus: macroscopic, or ecological;
microscopic, or participant level; and micro-biologic, which implies an analogical analysis based on endosymbiosis and crystallization processes at the cellular level. Moreover, unlike other large gatherings of people, for example at a Friday market in Algeria or a Saturday market in other countries, MM3 accounts for distributed cognition for collective socio-political action. Unlike a highly-crowded market, a site of revolution is populated in a particular shape: a formation. The formation is based on engroupments of individuals along an ideological spectrum. What’s critical here in distinguishing any large crowd from a revolutionary formation is precisely the presence and the spread of an ideology. In the 2011 Egyptian revolution, there was a distributed cause that united many otherwise disparate groups of protestors and individual activists: topping Mubarak.

A distributed cause requires a mass of people to achieve a common goal. Individuals and groups of people attending a crowded market together may all share a similar goal that is very broad and diffuse like ‘shopping’, ‘looking around’, or looking for specific items to purchase, but in this situation, the presence of many others with similar goals does not advance the objectives of any individual or group therein. In fact, the more people the less likely it is that any one person will be able to find and purchase each item s/he is seeking. This type of crowd has similar, but not shared goals; it has individual, not distributed causes. The people in this space are working at odds, or despite, one another’s co-presence.

A political engroupment that is enacting a revolution will arrange and coordinate each person’s presence in the space to create an efficient, accommodating schematic of bodies to optimize the impact of each person’s co-presence as everyone benefits from each other’s being in the space of the revolution: presence is participation. While this arrangement of bodies in time and space to create revolution is what is meant by the revolutionary formation - like a starling
murmuration, it moves, it changes constantly but it is coordinated by an embedded heterarchy that emerges from the ideology of the distributed cause. That is, because people have implicitly agreed to partake in achieving a single objective, toppling Mubarak, they enter into a highly distributed joint commitment (Clark 1996) and look for and to individuals within the space to coordinate them into formation. Crowded markets have no leadership models, heterarchical or otherwise - they are guided by social structures, vectors, that people are socialized into following for ‘how to be in X’ public space. But those vectors are individually performed.

In application, the MM3 framework applies analytical tools that are commensurate in their level of granularity to the granularity of the height of focus. For the macroscopic height of focus, I apply a suite of descriptive theories drawing largely on Pike, Goffman, and Durkheim. At the microscopic level, I borrow tools from Sicoli and Miller. For the micro-biological height, I use widely accepted models of cellular biology to understand how multiple organisms interact in an ecosystem toward a common goal, namely energy efficiency, or in the case of Tahrir: perpetuating the revolution. The vessels that carry information and instructions about the revolution, what I term the ‘vectors of revolution’, are multi-modal in nature. Knowledge about the revolution is carried, stored, expressed, and transmitted by linguistic, as well as pragmatic, and structural vectors.

Ultimately, the emic structures of the revolution in Tahrir are cause-based and develop analogously to crystallization. Protest groups act as multi-nucleic seeds that spur the development and spread or revolutionary vectors to initiate, or germinate, thus reinforcing the revolution, the crystal, and constantly working to increase energy, or collective effervescence, to reconstitute and perpetuate individual and multiple engroupments at once. The etic, aerial view
of the individuals in Tahrir and the physical movements of those people strongly resemble the
ethological murmurations of starlings and other herd, or swarm organisms.

To understand the participant height of focus in my analysis of the Tahrir rhapsody first
order engroupment, I provide a condensed genealogy of the 2011 revolution. What proceeds that
is the analysis section, which focuses on a first order group of six engrouped Egyptian adolescent
males who perform a rhapsody together. The analysis of this engroupment treats the revolution
and Tahrir Square, as well as higher order engroupments as rich ecological-ontological contexts
within which encounters and a complex array of interactions unfold and overlap. The analysis
section is followed by concluding remarks, insights, and queries for continued research.

5.11 MM3 Analysis of a Rhapsody Engroupment in Tahrir Square

I chose the term ‘rhapsody’ as a translation of the Arabic word “ṭarīfa”, which is used in the title
of the video recording I downloaded from YouTube featuring this particular engroupment. The
word ṭarīfa itself is something of a boundary object in that it straddles the line between modern
standard and Egyptian Colloquial Arabic - it can be used in either lexicon and means essentially
the same thing in both varieties. It connotes a kind of humorous, bewildering phenomenon. In the
context of this video recording, it is meant to praise the creativity of the improvisations of this
engroupment. Rhapsody, in musicology, “is a one-movement work that is episodic yet integrated,
free-flowing in structure, featuring a range of highly contrasted moods, colour and tonality. An
air of spontaneous inspiration and a sense of improvisation make it freer in form than a set of
variations.”103

103 I did not seek a technical musicological equivalent of ‘ṭarīfa’; I found this definition of “rhapsody” on Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhapsody_(music). This definition comes up over 1400 times on Google search so it
appears to be sufficiently wide-spread and accepted for the purposes of this examination.

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The rhapsody engroupment in the video consists of seven male members who appear to range in age from adolescence to mid-twenties - these seven members engage in phonation and follow the pitch patterns of the call-and-response structure. In total, however, seventeen individuals are within the frame of interaction throughout the video (see co-participants list in appendix 8). The rhapsody that the seven core members co-perform is episodic and extemporized. In the seven episodes, Black Shirt has the lead in each episode except 3 and 4. 3 and 4 are led by Turban who plays an active role throughout the interaction - he has a secondary leading position as head responder to Black Shirt’s calls. As such, he is consistently audible throughout the interaction. He also demonstrates his leadership role through his pragmatic initiation gestures. Like Black Shirt, he regularly directs his gaze (“air traffic control gazing” or just ATC) and contorts his torso and face externally to direct onlookers or passersby to join the engroupment - a phenomenon I call “light-housing”. In fact, this lighthouse-like performativity is embodied by each of the seven core interactants, “the band”, who stay in the interaction throughout the video, but is more marked in the postures of Black Shirt and Turban (Butler, 1993).

While the task of performing and voicing each episode of the anti-Mubarak, pro-revolutionary rhapsody is distributed in the circular F-formation they take on, there are two levels of leadership (Kendon 1990). There is a sense of distributed leadership in that each of the seven core members of this engroupment is engaged in recruiting strategies or techniques (e.g. ‘light housing’ with torsos, ‘air traffic controlling’ with gazework, etc), including the choreographed bodily and verbal performance of the songs (e.g. call-and-response structure).

104 It is unclear why the male participant in the right front corner is wearing a turban on his head - he may have fellahi (‘peasant’) ties or be mimicking the headdress of ancient pharaohs as a parody to mock Mubarak.
There is also, however, a distinct leader, Black Shirt, coincidentally self-located at the very center of the circle of the core rhapsodists. Black Shirt’s gestures, particularly with his right arm, coordinate the gaze and torso formations of the engroupment – Black Shirt typically begins each call-and-response sequence and also brings episodes of the rhapsody to an end as well as inaugurates the next episode. This is, I argue, a glimpse at one ‘member network’ within the meta-system. There is no vertical or overarching hierarchy of leadership – rather, there is a ‘horizontal’, heterarchical model of leadership that is scaled and localized, individuated, within each ‘member network’ of the whole. These leaders are integral to maintaining the ecology of the revolutionary formation as a ‘revolutionary space’ within the ‘revolutionary interval’ in the face of the enormous amounts of energy that were constantly and ubiquitously exerted by the Mubarak regime and anti-revolutionary loyalist factions, themselves a community of networks, to undermine and disaggregate the revolution in Tahrir (and other squares across Egypt – and in other country contexts in and outside of the Arab region).

5.12 Episode 1: Exploiting Local Sonic Culture

The first episode is a parody of a nationally and trans-regionally well-known Arabic nursery rhyme by Mohamed Fawzy. The initiation strategy of the engroupment is to cast a broad net by intoning an immediately recognizable rhythm and, in fact, articulating the first four words of the original song unaltered, which has the effect of captivating uninitiated bystanders who may falsely assume the rhapsody group is nonpartisan and therefore functioning as an entertainment group rather than a polemicized engroupment seeking to engulf potential co-ideologues. The bolded word segments are stressed in the performance, in keeping with the melodic shape of the

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105 The original song by Fawzy, “ḏahab l-laylo, ṭela’ l-fagro” is available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3yssUed8ZcY
original song. These word segments are further punctuated by choral clapping, which I transcribe using brackets - the exclamation mark transcribes both the idiophonic dimension of the performance and the raised pitch of the phonation:

   the night's departed, the morning’s arisen, and Mubarak's out

An added effect of maintaining the rhythm and first four words of the original lyrics is to conjure the sensory experience of a song that is deeply rooted in the local sonic culture of Cairene Egyptians (Miller 2007:35).

Opening with the first words of the original song triggers an apperceptive response that is likely to instill a strategic, albeit deceptive, first impression of the rhapsody engroupment as essentially apolitical. Still, while the pitch of the original song is reproduced rather faithfully in this parody, the phonation, or voice quality, is markedly different. In Fawzy’s original rendition, he is dubbing the voices of cartoon chicks, kittens, and ducklings and so his phonation is designed for infant and toddler recipients - it is therefore in the falsetto range, and exudes a high level of affect and childlike excitement. The Tahrir rhapsody performers’ phonation is notably lower energy, in a significantly deeper, or alto to tenor, octave range, and lacking any affect - it is rather thick with sarcasm. The attitude of the Tahrir performers toward the original song, and, in turn, their parody of it, might be characterized by facetiousness, self-awareness, and utilitarianism.

Figure 5.35: 8-12s.
Pitch track produced by Praat software depicts the pitch range from 0-500mHz of the sound in the interval on the video from 00:08-00:12 seconds.
The pitch track (above) illustrates the parodying of the original pitch pattern of Fawzy’s classic song, which starts at a mid to low falsetto and crescendos up in rapid repetition in nearly each bar of the music. The Tahrir rhapsodic version of the song starts at a lower octave but still climbs and peaks consistently throughout the episode. The highest frequency in the pitch track for this interval is on the phrase “and Mubarak’s out”, which is bordered in yellow. This emphatic phonation follows a pause in the rhythm, which mirrors the original song, and is reflected in the pitch; it suggests that this lyric is of particular importance to the performers. Lexically, it conveys the main objective, and with it a high level of sentiment, of the revolution. It can therefore be understood as a vectorizing phrase intended in its illocution to have the (perlocutionary) effect of initiating a newcomer by instilling important information. Rather than speaking the message, writing it down, or play a musical rendition of it over a loudspeaker, the group chose a complex of channels, or an expressive configuration (chapter 4), including an embodied element, as well as a culturally recognized, apolitical and available rhythmic ground (a famous 1950s nursery rhyme) upon which to overlay their new, political lyrics.

Rather than use sheet music, however, they re-pattern their lyrics onto the nursery rhyme impressionistically. The repetition of the underlying rhythmic pattern, however, is nearly perfect. While the octave is significantly lower, the shape of the melody is consistent. Here is a visualization of the shape of the melody underlying the first line of the original song:

The re-patterned lyrics of the Tahrir group, match the melodic shape above:
In fact, the opening words of the Tahrir group’s version of the song are the same, with the minor exception of an allophonic substitution where the voiced /z/ sibilant pronunciation used by Fawzy in the original song is pronounced as a palatal /d/ by the Tahrir group. Both variants are colloquial renditions of the Standard Arabic voiced interdental /d/ (/ذ/).

The rest of the first line of the song is also lyrically and melodically identical, while differing in pitch octave, or, because it is a vocal phonation, what would be called “register” in musicology. This is a visualization of the second hemistich of the first line of lyrics from the original song:

As with the first hemistich, the re-patterned version of the song remains faithful in lyrics and melodic shape:

The second stanza is where the lyrics of the Tahrir group’s re-patterning of the song begin to depart. Where the original song tells a story about a quarrel between a kitten and a chick, the Tahrir group’s rendition speaks of the disquiet of the Egyptian people toward the ancien régime of Hosni Mubarak.

The original stanza repeats the melodic shape of the first and second hemistitches of the opening stanza, which I’ve visualized above. However, the second stanza is longer and introduces a new phrase in the melodic shape (highlighted in orange, below). It also ends with a crescendoing coda following a brief pause (in pink):
The Tahrir group’s version of this stanza celebrates the toppling of Mubarak. It also re-purposes the musical coda of the original song, replacing the Arabic onomatopoeia for the chirping of a bird, with an easily-imitable exclamation, or, arguably, vocative “hey, héy!”:

1. Black Shirt:  
   deheb l-leylo ṭele’ l-fegro w-mM:bārak barra:  
   the night's withdrawn, the morning's arisen, and Mubarak's out

2. Band:  
   he^ he::::::::y^

The visualization of the first hemistich of the second stanza and its coda, the choral repetition in line 2 described above, demonstrates the faithfulness of the melodic shape to the original song:

The response in line 2 is also high energy, albeit at a lower pitch than the “and Mubarak's out” hemistich at the end of line 1. The phonation reflects an attitude of excitement and affiliation with the sentiment of celebrating the reality of Mubarak’s having resigned monthly earlier. Lines 3-4 continue the call-and-response. Line 6, and the response in line 7, reprise the intertextual allusion to Fawzy’s original lyrics that are sung, in the music video, by a cartoon chick (ECA: ṣūṣ, Eng: ‘chick’) - this is a visualization of the lyrics and melodic shape of the original line 3:
The mimicked melodic shape—regardless of the words, which would be challenging to make out in the loud din of Cairo’s busiest public square that also doubles as a traffic turnabout—underlying the re-patterned lyrics triggers the apperception of the listener to recognize and recall the positive sensory experience of Fawzy’s song. The rhapsody group’s version constructs a humorous, feel-good, moment on the ground of the sentiments associated with Fawzy’s song—this is very much like what El-Sisi does with Abdel Nasser’s performatives in chapter 4. Fawzy’s original version of the song, like Abdel Nasser’s version of the speech El-Sisi reprises, is not only a palimpsest for future imitative performances, but rather both are taken up as intersubjective resources intended to invoke a latent sentiment set that the performer(s) aspire(s) to themselves re-embodify and thereby re-elicit in the new co(n)text in which they find themselves with their audience. El-Sisi found himself in a similar historical moment as Abdel Nasser - both were speaking on the heels of a popular revolution that brought other men into power as president; El-Sisi and Abdel Nasser both led coups soon after and took the reigns of government by arresting the sitting president who had been a former ally. Both men then faced dire economic disparity, and then made a decision as newly self-appointed presidents to look to the Suez canal for salvation. El-Sisi then paints his New Egypt over the still-visible palimpsest traces of Abdel Nasser’s then-also-new Egypt.

The Tahrir rhapsody group patterns their lyrics on the familiar semiotic resources of Fawzy’s beloved classic. From the convergence of this parodic rendition with the known music of the local sonic culture comes the potential for the successful initiation of would-be passersby into the six stages of engroupment described earlier in section 5.2. Here is a visualization of the re-patterned version of line 3, which is improvised to fit the call-and-response technique; it is
The Tahrir group’s version of the line follows the original melodic shape, but only to a certain point. Where Fawzy extends the phrase in line 3 to include an onomatopoeic cat sound (“nō nō::”), highlighted in red and purple blocks, the Tahrir group chose to substitute the extended melody with a response unit and then return to the original melody at the coda, with the choral repetition (“hey, he::y!”). This demonstrates that the Tahrir group is much less interested in a high-fidelity reenactment of Fawzy’s hit song than it is in deploying its initiation techniques to draw in and coordinate newcomers. They readily depart from Fawzy’s melodic structure in favor of the simpler, and therefore more imitable, interactive call-and-response pattern that is more likely to call attention (step 1), pique interest (step 2), and then tractor beam passersby into their orbit (step 3), where they could potentially become satellites who join the formation (step 4), learn the performance and partially engage (step 5), after which they could become fully initiated members of the engroupment (step 6).

Below is a lexical transcription focused on only the oral performance of lines 3-5; it is accompanied by a photographic account of this same interval enhanced with visual transcriptions overplayed onto the images in a Figure that highlights the strategy of the embodied element of the simultaneous performative dimension. While the lyrics (somewhat) and
melody (more so) do the work of drawing in passersby through the use of recognized rhythmic patterns, the interactant-performers use their bodies in synchronicity to perform initiation techniques, namely gazework whereby they turn their heads and scan with their eyes to meet the glances, or stares, of onlookers and issue *ocular invitations* to join the formation by tilting their heads chin-first in a downward pattern to delineate an imaginary path the onlooker could walk to join the formation, or at least come closer and satellite about the group in a manner that communicates partial, or peripheral, *zero-degree* engagement. The pragmatic, or embodied, dimension of episode 1 of the rhapsody is transcribed below line 5 of this lexical account of lines 3-5:

Figure 5.36: ATC Gazing. Two frames that portray multiple members of the protest formation performing the initiation technique of ATC gazing.
3. **Black Shirt**: xāsri:: ūa:::’bo ++fi-+++t-tahrī:::r ++++-a::mallō:: ~so::::::wra::::::^ he lost his people in Tahrir, they undertook a revolution

4. **Band**: xāsri:: ūa:::’bo ++fi-+++t-tahrī:::r ++++-a::mallō:: ~so::::::wra::::::^ he lost his people in Tahrir, they undertook a revolution

5. **Striped Polo**: -%he^ he:::y%^ Line 6 of the original song introduces a longer lyrical phrase than the previous stanzas contained; here, a more complex plot line in the story told in the song is presented building on to the shape of the melody established beforehand but is slightly more idiosyncratic, and therefore less predictable:

The patterned version of this line, as with line 3, breaks with the original but after completing the full phrase. Rather than follow Fawzy’s composition, Black Shirt calls line 6 and then the entire group responds by repeating it (line 7) - they do, however, remain faithful to the shape of Fawzy’s melody for this stanza:

In terms of the story that the rhapsody group tells, it plays off of Fawzy’s song in somewhat unpredictable ways. While, Fawzy’s story includes a baby chick and her mother, who speaks in
line 6 of the original song, Black Shirt’s rendition substitutes the mother character, māmā, in the line with the baby chick, ṣūṣ. In chapter 1, I explained the frustration many Egyptians felt at Mubarak’s perceptibly patronizing tone and language when addressing the nation in the wake of the Tahrir revolution’s inception and again the day before his resignation was eventually announced. In this light, it is intriguing to consider that the parental figure in Fawzy’s song is cut out of the script. In fact, in the original song, māmā tells ṣūṣ not to fight with the cat that had been bullying him at school. In the Tahrir group’s version, ṣūṣ tells Mubarak to leave the revolution alone - the implication being, taking both songs into account intertextually, that Mubarak, in his self-assumed parental role, is being told by his fictive child, to not interfere. The rhapsody group’s storyline is told in a present irrealis tense - it speaks in the present tense about the future, but is, in fact, a posthumous retelling of a not-too-distant past.

Fawzy’s song was directed toward children, but by cutting the parent out and dropping the pitch, as well as replacing the friendly, happy animal sounds with a more brusque “hey”, and empowering ṣūṣ as a symbol of the revolutionaries, the Tahrir group recasts Fawzy’s storyline as one of a child successfully rebelling against his parent:

   the chick told him [Mubarak] to leave the revolution to itself

7. Band: ṣūṣ ’e:litlo sīb s-sōra w xallīha: fi ḥālīha
   the chick told him [Mubarak] to leave the revolution to itself

   (0.9)
5.13 Episode 2: Call-and-Response, Re-constitution of Lead

In episode 2 Black Shirt recedes to brainstorm lyrics for the new rhythm after transitioning to the Egyptian nationalistic song, “My Country”:

Black Shirt’s stepping back and seeming to disengage from the performativity of the role of band leader makes him susceptible to other social interactions, at which point Messenger Bag, who was to Black Shirt’s right, steps in and engages him in a side bar:

Meanwhile, the band continues the song “My Country” at a lower energy, softer pitch, with a quieter volume level, and a more detached, apathetic phonation without Black Shirt’s leadership (lines 1-6) - brackets indicate where gestalt claps overlap with word segments:

1. Band: [be:]le:::::[di]:::::
   my country
2. Striped Polo: [%ˇbe::le::::::::::[di]::::::::::%]
   my country

3. Black Shirt: (MB speaks to BS - see Figure above for Side Bar - )

4. Band: [b-r]-ra[xīš] [mit]b[ā]:::::'a
   it was sold cheap

5. Band: [be:]le::::::[di] [iṣ]+++[ḥō]:::::+[yā]:+ga[mā]:'a
   my country, awaken oh people

6. Band: [be:]le::::::[di], [sa]mma[ḥom] [yā]: gab[bā]:r: , [be:]le::::::[di]::::::
   my country, let them (go) oh strongman, my country

Figure 5.38: Engaging Newcomer. Black Shirt recedes from the lead role after transferring to Turban. He then contorts toward and turns his gaze to a newcomer. Credit for source images: YouTube.
In line 7 Black Shirt steps back into the center position after breaking the side bar formation and reconstitutes the episode and the engroupment by injecting energy through both phonation and pragmatics, or non-verbal gestures:

Figure 5.39: Re-Start. After re-starting the episode, Black Shirt articulates the lyrics with large arm gestures that perpetuate the present riff. He simultaneously uses ‘air traffic control gazing’ to initiate satellitizing passersby and observers. *Credit for source images: YouTube.*

In the visual transcription of the above figure (figure 5.39), we see frames from 40.0-42.0s wherein Black Shirt raises his right arm, with hand extended, fingers outspreading to signal that the band should stop and go silent. At 42.0s, Black shirt partially closes his right hand, and then extends his index finger upward to signal the re-start of the episode together. This is the lexical-focused transcription of the same interval (brackets indicate gestalt clapping):
At 44.0s Black Shirt transitions to big clapping motions and at 45.0s he extends his right arm upward, making a partial fist, with his index finger extended upward - he is re-initiating the episode with a stronger, lead-centered, call-and-response pattern. At 46.0s he returns to the big clapping motion and at 47.0s his right arm and corresponding index finger are extended. At 48.0s he repeats the big clapping motion and at 50.0s he moves his right arm upward, putting his left hand to his mouth with index finger over his lips signaling a pianissimo before initiating the next crescendo in the rhapsody:

Figure 5.40: 41-47s. Pitch track for episode 2, lines 10-11 (lines 24-25 in full transcription); time interval: 00:41s-00:47s.
In lines 10-11 Black Shirt re-constitutes the rhapsody based on the original nationalistic song, “My Country”, and receives an appropriate response from the band in a lower pitch. Black Shirt’s higher pitch triggers the call-and-response structure, and the band’s lower pitch (after the red dotted line in Figure 5.39) is also following the anticipated call-and-response structure:

![Multi-modally (re-)constituting call and response](image)

**Figure 5.41: Call and Response.** Seven frames from the source video analyzed in this chapter that depict the “call-and-response” rhythmic initiation performance technique. The performance involves embodied and oral dimensions that are synchronized and choreographed. This combination of channels increases conversion efficiency and works to initiate onlookers. *Credit for source images: YouTube.*

Within the greater context of Tahrir, episode 2 draws in an interactant, Messenger Bag, who is in the Figure above that shows him engaging Black Shirt in a brief side bar after episode
1 of the rhapsody. The engroupment’s decision to rhapsodize a known nationalistic song helps cast a broader net for initiation by not revealing their political bent at the level of rhythm or song choice. The lyrics clarify the polemic position of the engroupment, however.

These decisions about how to layer a performance (e.g. put the political message in the lyrics only, no signs or posters, or obvious displays on clothing) may be motivated by the simultaneous desire to increase circulatory efficiency while also demonstrating originality. By choosing familiar, nonpartisan songs - music whose tono-lakna is immediately recognizable - the engroupment maintains high circularity efficiency; that is, the familiar rhythms ease the embodiment of the ideological content of the lyrics and choreography. However, parodying the lyrics allow the engroupment to display its musical and cultural originality. Each of these strategies reinforces the engroupment and serves as an initiation tool that uses a lyrical device embedded in a culturally recognized sound, accompanied by pragmatic, embodied techniques that open up a readily-accessibly channel of engagement for skeptical onlookers (e.g. occasionally clapping).

5.14 Episode 3: Lead Transfer, Apperception

At the outside of episode 3, Black Shirt once again recedes, perhaps to brainstorm new lyrics. Before doing this, he transfers the lead to Turban:
The transfer is negotiated non-verbally using both gesture- and gazework in coordination. In frame 1 of the above Figure, Black Shirt turns his torso toward Turban and then clasps his hands together in front of his sternum like the tip of an arrow pointing to Turban. Black Shirt also turns his face to look at Turban’s face; in frame 2, Black Shirt smiles and does an open-handed point with his right index finger toward Turban’s face. Watching the video multiple times, Black Shirt’s right index finger appears to be pointing directly at Turban’s mouth, as if to gesturally say: “your mouth should sing now”.

**Figure 5.42: Lead Transference Mid-Episode.** Two frames capturing the multimodal process of lead transference mid-episode during the anti-Mubarak, pro-revolutionary rhapsody. *Credit for source images: YouTube.*
Turban accepts Black Shirt’s cue for him to take over. On the lexical level, lines 1-2 of episode 3 of the rhapsody he specifically alludes to the sale of Egypt’s diesel fuel to Israel for less than market value as part of the 1977 peace treaty signed by Anwar Sadat (lines 77-78 in the full transcription; see appendix 8). By conjuring both events, Turban draws from and builds on the latent sentiment sets of these collectively known realities and thus commandeers the Egyptian sympathies for Bouazizi and the deep discontent with their national government to rekindle an emotive case for the return to Tahrir Square and the reigniting of the January 2011 revolution:

1. **Turban**: șō::::::::::ft is-::::::::sō::l:::::::::ā::r:::
   I saw the diesel

2. **Band**: be::::::::::::::le:::::::::d::::::::::::::
   my country

Lines 3-7 also highlight the frame of economic disparity and the effects of the global recession on daily life in Egypt. This is an effective initiation strategy in that it brings to mind a set of events and experiences that is difficult to refute and elicit strong, anti-government sentiments. The theme of economic strife holds high circulatory efficiency while also showcasing the lead’s creativity, timeliness, and authenticity. Over the non-verbal communicative channel, the ease of the predictable gestalt pulse claps open the engroupment to potential newcomers, which also strengthens the circulatory efficiency of their messaging. On another level, Turban’s headdress resembles a traditional aspect of Egyptian peasant class garb,
which gives him, and perhaps the rest of the group by association, an added degree of authenticity:

3. Turban:  bē::::::::b id++dō::::::la::::::::r::
            door to the dollar

4. White Shirt:  - :la::::::::::::::r:::::
               (do)-llar

5. Band:  be::::::::le::::::::di::::::::
          my country

6. Turban:  šo::::::::ft il-+++aş::::::::a::::::::r:::::
            I saw the prices

7. Band:  be::::::::le::::::::d::::::::
          my country

Lines 8-10 intertextually reference the experience of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia while simultaneously relating to Egyptians’ immediate environment. As was detailed in chapter 1, Bouazizi’s action began the protests in Tunisia that traveled to Egypt and spread across all 22 Arab states. The effect of Turban’s allusion to his self-immolation is to re-activate a timeline of the series of events that led to the 2011 Egyptian revolution in Tahrir. Mentioning setting oneself on fire is now synonymous with Bouazizi and the Arab Spring. The reference has the potential to renew bystanders’ sense of collective indignation at the national government and pride at the accomplishments and courage to-date of ‘the Egyptian people’, or just “the people” (iš-ša’b). Turban’s phonation reflects a high level of energy and perhaps a strong affinity with the messaging of the lyrics:

106 It is important to note here, as was mentioned in chapter 3 in my discussion of Bassiouney’s treatments of revolutionary codes and identities, that the people protesting in Tahrir were often accused of being inauthentic. In fact, a conspiracy had spread that they were all Europeans wearing makeup to look Egyptian who had been taught chants in ECA to repeat ad nauseam to destabilize Egypt as part of a foreign, Western plot to recolonize the country.
8. Turban:  b-t++wa:::ll:::a'::::: nā:~~~~~~~:r:::::
   they set us on fire

9. White Shirt:  b-t++wa:::ll:::a'::::: nā:~~~~~~~:r:::::
   they set us on fire

10. Band:  be:~~~~~~~~e:~~~~~~:d:~~~~~~:
   my country

   The pitch track of lines 6-10 shows a rapid lowering that leads into a crescendo in volume
   and raising of pitch at the end of Turban’s call phrase; the high pitch is raised even higher in the
   band’s response, which suggests an affiliative attitude toward the messaging of Turban’s
   phrasing:

   Figure 5.43: 1m:11-1m:20s. Pitch track for episode 3, lines 6-10 (lines 59-63 in full transcription); time
   interval: 01m:11s-01m:20s.

   The figure below shows Turban as lead, and Black Shirt who has a secondary role during
   episode 3, engaged in what I call external-internal focusing, or gazework. This is a pragmatic
   initiation technique involving gaze and head tilt, as well as simultaneous phonation - note that,
   without the verbal, sung element, this type of gazework in an F-formation in a busy public square
   would likely detract rather than draw in passersby and would likely be interpreted as highly odd
   anti-social behavior. The same may not be true of a group of individuals standing in a circle
   facing one another and singing without doing external-internal gazework or torso light-housing
   to initiate and invite others into the formation:
The raised volume, audible affiliative tono-lakna and exuberant response from the band coincide to increase the circulatory efficiency of the songs and bolster the probability of initiation success for the engroupment. This simultaneously reinforces the engroupment itself (ecology-ontology) within its setting relative to both lower and higher orders of engroupment in Tahrir.

**Figure 5.44: Lighthousing.** A labeled still shot from the source video used in the analytical sections of this chapter (ix-xi). These frames demonstrate the embodied techniques performed in an engroupment in Tahrir Square of seven core individuals. This first degree engroupment sings popular nursery rhymes with politicized lyrics and basic choreography to draw attention from uninitiated passersby with the purpose of initiating them into the distributed cause of maintaining the revolutionary formation in Tahrir. These three frames exhibit “lighthousing”, a hybrid technique that uses torso contortion and external-to-internal gaze focusing to ‘land’ observers satelliting the group. *Credit for source images:*
5.15 Episode 5: Transition and Re-Initiation

At 2:13 there is a lull in the rhapsody during a transition between music sets - episode 5 is ending (see appendix 8) - wherein Striped Polo Shirt attempts to exit the formation. He is drawn back in by Black Shirt with the cooperation of the rest of the formation. Rather than using a spoken invitation, Striped Polo Shirt is re-initiated through a joint energetic embodied reprisal of the performance. On the vocal channel, Black Shirt reconstitutes the call-and-response pattern with a direct affront to Hosni Mubarak, punctuated by large arm gestures on the embodied channel:

Figure 5.45: Lead Assumption. The rhapsody group’s leader, Black Shirt, uses a hand gesture to restart the rhythmic initiation performance. These frame captures the start of a call-and-response pattern that uses coordinated physical shadowing and oral imitation to affect a revolutionary ‘tono-lakna’ that results in landing satelliting observers. *Credit for source image: YouTube.*

[s2:13]

(1.4)

11. Striped Polo: *b-a'ol_lak 'ēh , ene te'ebit ba'*
    I need to say, I’m all tired out
12. Turban: b-ism_ ill::::::::e::::::::h  ir-raḥmā::::::::n
in the name of God, the most-Merciful

[s2:15]: call-and-response is re-initiated with Black Shirt assuming lead, raising and lowering right arm

13. Black Shirt: yā::::::mM::::::::bā::::::::r:::ak  yā:: 'ibn-il-'a:..................bī:................;ţ
O Mubarak, you son of a fool

14. Band: yā:: mM::bā::::::::r:::ak  yā:: 'ibn-il-'a:..................bī:................;ţ
O Mubarak, you son of a fool

15. Black Shirt: mīş +++ḥe-nsī::::::::ba::k lemm:::a:::_t++bī:.........;Ď
we won't leave you alone once you clean up your act
raises and lowers right arm in sync with the beat of the song (see image below)

Figure 5.46: Introducing Lyrics. Five frames from the source video that capture the air traffic control (ATC) gazing performative initiation technique. Unlike light-housing, which is used to meet gaze with onlookers, ATC gazing is used to draw onlookers into the protest formation after successful light-housing. Credit for source images: YouTube.
In this liminal stage between episodes 5 and 6, as the energy of the engroupment was waining, Black Shirt needed to re-energize the performance. On the verge of losing Striped Polo Shirt, he vigorously reignites the vocal and physical channels and manages to preserve the formation. On the vocal channel, he raises his voice considerably but also mounts a direct attack on Mubarak and uses his name: “O Mubarak, you son of a fool”. Black Shirt insults Mubarak and then ups the ante further by issuing a threat: “we won't leave you alone once you clean up your act”. The lyric does not give Mubarak any outs. Even if he consents to the demands of “the Egyptian people” - references as such throughout the narrative of the rhapsody - Mubarak will be pursued relentlessly, presumably to account for his misdeeds as president.

While the rest of the band is faithful repeating back every lyric that Black Shirt performs, they are asked to considerably increase the volume of their response calls: “raise and raise and raise the voice”. They loudly repeat the order back to Black Shirt but also match the perceived energy of Black Shirt’s upward right-arm thrusts in the motion and strength of the gestalt claps. The clapping is not just marking the rhythmic beat of the rhapsody. It is also an
outlet for demonstrating what can be understood as their joint commitment energy. The level of energy put into a joint action (Clark 1996; Gilbert 2014) is a dimension of commitment that is especially relevant in intercorporeal performance formations, as demonstrated in this chapter.

The level of energy that is felt by each of the participants in the performance event in this episode cannot be known precisely. By ‘energy’ what is meant is the perceptible rises and drops in the engroupment’s cohesion on the level of their embodied performance, the audible volume of their voices in unison, and the varied and subtle signals they give off with their bodies, pitch, and tone that express their enthusiasm for the activity they are engaged in and their integrity as a formation. Engroupments, too, are fragile institutions. Had Striped Polo Shirt been allowed to depart, it could have threatened the integrity of the rest of the engroupment - other members could have exited the formation or the level of joint commitment energy could have further diminished, eventually reaching a point of fragility where the slightest provocation might lead to the disintegration of the engroupment. Such institutional failure, as was seen on a much larger scale with respect to the Egyptian government after the toppling of Mubarak’s regime, leaves a space open for ambiguity - a kind of chaos of power relations - wherein institution building by new actors or re-constitution by incumbents can take place.

In this transitional moment right before the beginning of episode 6, the Tahrir rhapsody engroupment was able to re-energize and avoid disintegration. The last line in the above excerpt (“the revolution of the Egyptian will not die”) is a threat to Mubarak within the narrative of the episode, but can also be interpreted as a promise to the participants in the engroupment and those satelliting around it within epistemic earshot for whom the lyrics are audible.
For Mubarak, the prospect of an never-ending revolution by a large contingent of Egyptians portends the end of his hold over the Egyptian government and the people. His regime’s institutionality would fail in the face of unending popular revolution. All institutions depend on the continuity of both complacent discourse and performance that conform with the narratives, values, registers and habituses of the institution’s figures and paradigms.

For the participants in the formation, the idea of an everlasting revolution is energizing. Revolution, in this lyric, is anthropomorphized and given the attribute of life - if it “will not die” then it is something that is currently living. The participants, through their joint performances, are the lifeblood of the revolutionary figure. This lyric illustrates the super-consciousness of the participants in each of the member networks that comprise the revolutionary formation. Every individual has a sense or her or his own importance to the integrity of the whole. That sense of one’s importance is generated at the level of the engrouped member network. Like a fractal, the revolutionary formation is reconstituted at progressively microscopic scales in smaller network formations, down to the individual.

5.16 Episode 7: Circulation and Resonance

In episode 7 of the rhapsody, Black Shirt has retaken the lead from Turban. In lines 11-15, the song addresses the spiritual guide, Mohammed Badie, of the Muslim Brotherhood - the largest political opposition group to Mubarak in Egypt before the revolution and the most highly organized and influential group in post-Mubarak Egypt, aside from SCAF and the military establishment. Many Egyptians were skeptical of the Muslim Brotherhood’s intentions in the aftermath of the January revolution, during which the Brotherhood had been uncharacteristically quiet.
The messaging of episode 7 indicates a belief that Mubarak - sarcastically referred to as “the Bey”\textsuperscript{107} - and Badie were in communication and Mubarak advised Badie to, in lines 16-19, kill and beat the revolutionaries, and the “free people of Egypt”. The phonation of these lyrics is almost angry, and perhaps even accusatory in its intonation. On the lexical level, there is an allegation that the Muslim Brotherhood has secret ties to Mubarak, and furthermore that they are capable of following Mubarak’s example in putting down protests if or when they are in power:

21. Black Shirt: yā::: mo:::Š:ǐ:::r 'el:::lak +ē::::::h
   oh guide, what did he tell you?

22. unknown: yā gamā:::'a:::
   hey everyone

23. Band: yā::: mo:::Š:ǐ:::r ++'el:::lak +ē::::::h
   oh guide, what did he tell you?

24. Black Shirt: 'ebli_mā:: yemši sē::'a:::t il:::-bē::::::
   before the Bey's time to leave goes by

25. Band: 'ebli_mā:: yemši sē::'a:::t il:::-bē::::::
   before the Bey's time to leave goes by

26. Black Shirt: 'el:::-lak 'a::::::ttil ++f-s-s:::u:ww:::ā::::::r
   he told you to kill the revolutionaries

27. Band ECA: 'el:::-lak +'a::::::ttil ++f-s-s:::u:ww:::ē::::::r
   he told you to kill the revolutionaries

28. Black Shirt ECA: 'ell:::_lak +iḍ+rab +f::::::-il-'āhrā:::::::r
   he told you to beat the free people

29. Band ECA: 'ell:::_lak +iḍ+rab +f::::::-il-'āḥ+rā:::::::r
   he told you to beat the free people

\textsuperscript{107} “Bey” is a Turkish word meaning “master” or “sir” that is commonly understood and used in ECA. It has historical roots in the Ottoman empire and therefore usually is used sarcastically toward individuals believed to be putting on airs or for other reasons are perceived as elitist.
After alleging a conspiratorial relationship between Mubarak and Badie, Black Shirt presents a lyrical ultimatum to Badie who seems to serve as a metonymical figurehead for the Muslim Brotherhood (lines 20-23): *either decide in favor of the revolutionaries or be toppled like Mubarak*. The threat is clear, but the formulation is ambiguous - the following phrases (lines 139-142 in the full transcription, see appendix 8) are no clearer. They offer that Badie can choose the side of the killers of the revolutionaries, i.e. Mubarak, or he can choose the revolution and thereby side with the Egyptian people:

30. Black Shirt: \( yā:: +mo::šī::r ++xod ++qa:::::rā::::ra::k \)
   oh guide, make your decision

31. Band: \( yā:: +mo::šī::r ++xod ++qa:::::rā::::ra::k \)
   oh guide, make your decision

32. Black Shirt: \( 'aḥ::se:n: +tib++'a::::: zeyy:: mM:bā::ra::k \)
   it's best you go the way of Mubarak

33. Band: \( 'aḥse:n: +tib++'a:: zeyy: mMbā::ra:k \)
   it's best you go the way of Mubarak

The pitch track in Capture 5:4 depicts lines 20-23 and confirms the impression made by the low octave and drawn out articulation of the phonation of this peformative segment. Specifically, the pitch tracks show a mid- to low-ranging initial pitch by Black Shirt, the lead, which is then lowered further by the band in the response phrases:

![Pitch track for episode 7, lines 20-23 (lines 136-138 in full transcription); time interval: 2m:47s-2m:54s.](image)

**Figure 5.47: 2m:47s-2m:54s.** Pitch track for episode 7, lines 20-23 (lines 136-138 in full transcription); time interval: 2m:47s-2m:54s.
The long, unclear articulations appear as intermittently choppy in the last third of the pitch tracks. At this point in the video, the rhapsody is winding down - this is indicated pragmatically in the following Figure, wherein the interactants embody an internal focus, and the two leads, Black Shirt and Turban meet gaze and exchange smiles, and thus indicate joy at the success of the performance and its impending closure:

With respect to the ecological context of Tahrir Square, as I have mentioned before, the lyrics of this episode, and the others before it, may have been less consequential than the underlying shape of the melodies and the embodied performances. As for the ontology of the engroupment itself, the opportunity to perform their ideology seems to have helped strengthen their cohesion and resolve to continue the revolution.108

5.17 Insights and Queries for Continued Research

MM3, or multi-modal interactional analysis informed by the three heights of focus (macroscopic, microscopic, micro-biological), is a productive framework for relating otherwise complex and seemingly disparate levels of interactions. Each height of focus lends specific theoretical and

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108 Due to the video ending after episode 7, it is not possible to determine with any certainty what the exact effects of this final song were on the prospects for the engroupment’s further development.
practical insights as to the functions and organization of the other heights. In this way, the three heights can be understood as semiotically and recursively related.

The ecology of MMI in the rhapsody engroupment highlights the emergence of particularly charged lexical items as a result of the culture of slogan-chanting that developed in Tahrir Square during the 18 Days of revolution. Terms such as: ša'b (people), sōwra (revolution), šāhwā (awakening), and ḥorrīyya (freedom) feature prominently, if in different derivative forms such as imperatives (e.g. 'iṣḥō, ‘awaken’) or personal nouns (‘aḥrār, ‘free people’), in the episodes of the rhapsody group.109

Sicoli’s analysis of ‘tono’ in Zapotec proved to be directly applicable to and illuminating of the resonance of lakna in describing the high-low pitch inversions in call-and-response patterns in the rhapsody engroupment. This concept is helpful in analyzing distributed cognition in the re-appropriation of known music, or slogan-chant rhyming schemes, for perpetuating - through rhapsodic strategies - revolutionary sentiment, or what I call re-crystallization. The rhapsody group’s multimodal techniques to engage newcomers in the six stages of initiation are specifically:

a) external-to-internal focusing, ‘air traffic control gazing’, gazework
b) torso light-housing,
c) energetic phonation, and
d) pitch lowering and raising
e) lyrical re-patterning onto familiar melodic shapes from popular music

Within the engroupment I examined in the analysis section, the micro-biological rule of internal mutual symbiosis held true for determining the failure or success of the particular lyrical

109 Miller’s theory of the standardization of linguistic units and circulatory efficiency may provide a productive grounding theory for beginning an analysis of lexical items as vectors of revolution that help to describe the travel and life of the ‘Arab Uprisings’ across 22 states in the Middle East and North Africa.
and pragmatic components of the seven episodes in the video. It follows that rhapsody groups in Tahrir Square function as sites of re-crystallization where repetition and elaboration of revolutionary language take place along with the use of tono-lakna to introduce ideological messaging through familiar music. Embodied initiation techniques paired with the performance of slogan-chanting, also through tono-lakna, perpetuate the overarching activity of ‘revolution’.

Crystallization, as described in the literature review section, and applied in the accompanying repository as well as the analysis section, is an apt metaphor to describe the travel and emergence of ‘revolutionary’ cognitivity and activism at the dialectically related heights of focus I identify as individual and multiple engroupment. The three heights of focus are instrumental in illuminating the social processes by which the revolutionizing of urban Egyptian culture and society took place within multi-modal communicative interactions. Such interactions in and around Tahrir Square fostered a cognitive mode, which I term “vectors of revolution”, that distribute knowledge to individuals thereby involving them in many orders of engroupment within a complex metasystem whose nature and shape are structurally informed by its constituent members as well as the ecology within which it crystallizes and can then be more easily re-crystallized given that the pathways have been created and exist in recent memory. The following figure summarizes these processes:
The engroupment in this chapter chose a popular, politically neutral, nursery rhyme from 1955 to politicize with re-patterend lyrics and perform in public to vectorize individuals against the Mubarak regime. In the nearly 4 minutes of their performance they drew in ten individuals who could be seen in the perspective of the man operating the cellphone camera. Having selected an overtly polemical song without amendment might not have been as successful a strategy. The code of a political song would have a different, lesser, accessibility to uninitiated passersby who
have not decided on a position in relation to the post-revolutionary fate of the Mubarak regime and Egypt, and so the interpretative framework of an observer would likely end at “they’re singing a political song, they’re against Mubarak”. That would be a very different ideophonic effect than amending the lyrics of a famous, politically impartial song. Fawzy’s nursery rhyme has an iconic relationship to a classic oldie, and therefore the potential pique-value of the song is higher and the epistemic access is greater. In other words, a passerby can appreciate the source, type, sound, and ‘feeling’ the non-lyrical aspect, or the underlying melodic shape, of the song elicits without having to know anything about the group. That increases the potential that the group’s performance will call the attention of an uninitiated passerby. That individual might then undergo some or all of the six steps of initiation outlined at the beginning of this chapter and thus embody the cause and related objectives contained in and promoted by the re-patterned lyrics built on the ground of the original song. These processes of distributed cognition and vectorization are related and occurred over and over again in and around Tahrir both during and after the January 2011 revolution. The following figure provides a theoretical model using simple notation methods to demonstrate the most common path(s) to distribution, or what I call “germination” (using a biological metaphor) whereby an uninitiated individual encounters politicizing messaging and is initiated into a protest or revolutionary formation:
On the semiotic level where the thematic work of Fawzy’s nursery rhyme is negatively re-charged through lyrical re-patterning against the Mubarak regime, one would need to engage multiple channels to determine her/his stance with respect to the interactants performing the song. Listening to the lyrics might not be possible in a densely-crowded open-air space with lots of competing, interfering noise. If someone could acquire every word of the lyrics, a stance could be fairly quickly determined on that basis. However, barring that possibility, one would need to draw closer to the group and observe the behavioral, pragmatic

Figure 5.50: Engroupment Video Analysis. A schematic demonstrating a microscopic (top left) engroupment/crystallization processes into a protest formation along a ‘revolutionary vector’, or coordinated movement into a revolutionary formation; the bottom right is a still taken from a time-lapse video of individual activists and protest groups convening on Tahrir Square on 1/25/2011. Engroupment is also modeled symbolically in the top right and bottom left quadrants. Credit for source images: YouTube (arrows and descriptions added).
dimensions of their performance, including larger gestalt patterns in the music of the phonation, style of dress, embodied interaction techniques like dance, clapping, gazework, and torso light housing. An analytic device would not be improvised to judge the intentions of the gathering and make assessment about their projected and true identities and whether or not the listener would then choose to walk away or ignore them, versus join them to some degree. Clearly, anyone leaning toward Mubarak could reject the group’s invitations to join the formation outright on the basis of the spacetime dimension given the symbolism of Tahrir Square after January 2011 and the newly-assigned meanings and values associated with gatherings in Tahrir Square, particular to engage in chanting, singing, or, in this case, nesting and coordinated collective action.

**5.19 Operationalizing Shared Sonic Culture: Re-patterning of Lyrics onto Familiar Music**

Derrida (1985) explains syntagmatic relations in his discussion of signature event contexts. The concept of a syntagma is used by Derrida to describe the relationship between forms and words in a series, within a context and how that set of relationships can then be lifted from its original chain and inscribed or grafted onto other contexts – I relate this notion of the transposition of relationships, and with that, experiences of the world, and especially sensory experiences with a certain ‘sonic culture’, to Erickson’s idea of ‘speech as situating’ (2007). An example of a syntagma, then, is the pairing of the exclamation “home run!” as an ideophone, with the situation of being at a baseball game, presumably enjoying oneself to a large extent. Erickson, however, more specifically addresses the idea of what I called ‘transposition’ as ‘re-patternings of syllabic projection’. The seven protestors examined in this chapter changed the lyrics of a well-known nursery rhyme while maintaining the underlying patterning of syllabic projection, or
the music(ality). It is an effective method for calling one’s attention and piquing initial interest in a bystander (stages 1 and 2 in my mapping in section 5.2) who may share in the sonic culture – their group size more than doubled across the seven episodes of their rhapsody. Without this common culture, the music would not have been recognized and the strategy would likely prove to be entirely ineffectual as an initiation technique. They chose songs from the 1950s and ‘60s and the national anthem, bele:di (‘my country’), in order to cast the widest possible net. Similarly, satellitizing bystanders who may be less ideologically informed or committed, may find themselves only temporarily moved or perhaps confused by the overlay of songs that they identify with onto a space in which they assumed they would be exposed to explicitly prosaic political messaging. As such, popular songs can be effectively reappropriated into a political communicative channel.

I’ve mentioned the problem, however, of imperfect conveyance, or staggered, gradual epistemic access due to the realities of a complex, living urban ecology that of downtown Cairo and particularly Tahrir Square. In the vignette I provide in 5.2, Blue approaches the rhapsody group partly because his interest is piqued but also because he is not able to hear or see them well from afar; so, he physically approaches the gathering. While his initial movement toward the engroupment may be based on curiosity due precisely to his inability to make out what they’re singing and doing in Tahrir Square, Blue is eventually drawn in. He satellites and attempts to participate. However, his participation is partial and gradual - his access to the specific lyrics is limited by his distance from Black Shirt, his relative position to the center of the engroupment as someone on the periphery, and also by the complexity and intricacy of the re-patterned lyrics themselves. The use of a familiar underlying melody certainly lightens a portion
of the cognitive load of the performance, but not entirely. The song, like the medium of music, too has a limited *carrying capacity* with respect to the message it can connote to an uninitiated individual or someone who’s wholly new to the ideology.

The semiotic weight of the performance is, however, lessened by some of the performative elements. For someone just entering the engroupment, the prospect of acquiring every word and note of the lyrics would be daunting, if not impossible. But, to engage in the group, does not require total and complete absorption of the ideology, let alone of the particulars of their songs and choreography. I use the metaphor of “blocks” to describe what I think of as some of the shortcuts to engagement in a political, protest, or revolutionary formation. Presence, to begin with, is a *major* block used to build one’s credibility to claim an identity as a revolutionary, or simply a member of a protest group. There is a fundamental paradox at the heart of revolutions, and that is that they at once need as many people as possible to advance the cause and succeed, but, as they grow, it becomes more difficult to educate and train newcomers all of the intricate details of the motivating ideology. What happens, then, is the ideology is diluted for the purpose of initiating more performers into the formation - it is distilled into smaller *epistemic blocks* that are more to do with the *how* of being a revolutionary than the *what* or *who* or *why*. In other words, even in the small rhapsody group observed in this chapter, Black Shirt and Turban were far more interested in having newcomers participate in the choral chanting of the exclamatory responses to each call, e.g. “hey he:::y!”, and in the rhythmic clapping along with the beat of the underlying melody, than they were with stopping to explain the lyrics to every passerby. The larger the engroupment, the smaller the epistemic blocks are. The lessons in each block are more to do with correct action, than correct thought.
The lyrics of the seven episodes of the rhapsody mean something to the organizers and to the core members - to them, they lyrics contain or reflect the orienting ideology that they hope to convey to others, ultimately. However, the more urgent task at hand is to collect more followers and so the lyrics yield to the call-and-response pattern, and to the gestalt pulses where people are expected simply clap their hands, bob up and down, and, in between, look around and try to non-verbally encourage others to come closer and potentially join the dance. The ideology is collapsed into the basic movements of the intercorporeity and phonation of the musical, choreographed performance. The revolution becomes the gestures and the melodies. The revolutionaries are the dancers and singers. The politics are in the ether and somewhere in the metaphorical mortar that holds the blocks together, but it is the blocks that get people’s attention and that are more successfully passed along.

To illustrate this point, I have created the following Figure that lowlights the lyrics on the left, in small yellow font, and highlights the call-and-response blocks as well as the choral repetitions:
5.20 Listener’s Embodied Experience: Spatial Epistemics

A key aspect of the experience of perceiving the re-patterning of lyrics onto familiar music is the *enclitic timing relationship* that is activated when a listener knows instinctively what the next part of the underlying syllabic projection, or the music, is going to be; when they feel the coming terminus to the underlying music, it can serve as a distraction (Chafe 2001) from the words/lyrics.
and pull the listener into a ‘shared’ frame of interaction that can give off the meta-message that
the listener, regardless of her/his ideological position or epistemic stance (Ochs 1993, Raymond
and Heritage 2006, Schiffrin 2000), is being entertained and thereby drawn in. The inter-personal
engagement that is made possible when an uninitiated newcomer comes physically closer toward
the protest formation and can look members in the eyes and interact with them, is key. This is
made possible by the use of channels like music with oral and embodied performative elements
that can pique a person’s interest. Below is a Figure with a still image from the rhapsody group’s
video - in the frame, a newcomer is engaged in a visual exchange with Black Shirt. Black Shirt is
now close enough to be able to smile at the person and orient him more deeply into the
formation:

![Figure 5.52: A Still Taken from the Source Video](color overlays and descriptions added)

Figure 5.52: A Still Taken from the Source Video; it illustrates the multimodal performance of
initiating newcomers to the protest formation. Torso contortion and gaze overlapping convey the
invitation and welcome to join. Black Shirt is leading the episode and cannot also talk while he is
singing. This is an example of the role of embodied initiation techniques. *Credit for source image: YouTube* (color overlays and descriptions added).
The ability of the rhapsody engroupment in Tahrir to re-pattern revolutionary lyrics onto familiar, regionally recognized nursery rhymes was key to their overall social purpose, as gleaned from careful observation and analysis of the video, of ideological, embodied, recruitment techniques. The re-patterning specifically helps to pull lay satelliting onlookers and passersby into the ‘territory of knowledge’ of the social interaction being produced by the rhapsodists. Even within Tahrir Square, proximity to the centers of ideological production, of where there were many, is an important factor for initiation. The closer to the center of the Tahrir one became, the credible was one’s claim to having participated in the revolution and having been a revolutionary. The *epistemic blocks* model I described above in relation to becoming a member of the rhapsody group, is relevant to the experience of (con)joining the revolutionary formation during the 18 Days of Tahrir.

Drawing people in, closer to the center of a first or second order engroupment, or even into that of the larger revolutionary formation can be understood as a recruitment-participation strategy; that is, for the rhapsody group, the familiar music in each episode is used to call attention to themselves by cueing the shared sonic culture with onlookers, whom the rhapsodists regard as uninitiated but potential participants. Re-patterning lyrics, however, can present real challenges to a newcomer who may only have partial access to the specific words and may therefore get caught up in the music of the performance without understanding the underlying political meaning associated with engaging it. I describe these problems, or opportunities, in terms of *spatial epistemics*, or the space-time dimensions that constrain epistemic access. From the potential participant perspective, the familiar music along with the visual perception of an engroupment of individuals engaged in an easy-to-follow/imitable bodily discourse
(choreographed dance, or in the rhapsody case study, what I call torso light housing and air traffic control gazing) allows for the individual to embody and begin to phonate the techniques and sounds of the target engroupment in stepwise fashion via what I term gradual epistemic access. That is, as someone physically draws nearer to the rhapsody group, s/he can choose which channels to engage in, if any. Not knowing the words is not necessarily the end of the line. There is an inverse correlation between her/his distance to the engroupment and her/his access to that engroupment’s ‘revolutionary identity-and-voice’. In the following Figure, Black Shirt uses both gazework and torso light-housing and air traffic control gesturing in coordination to invite a newcomer into the rhapsody group’s formation:

![Germination sequence](image)

**Figure 5.53: Germination.** Five frames demonstrating the key junctures in a light-housing sequence used to initiative satelliting observers. *Credit for source images: YouTube* (color overlays and descriptions added).
5.21 Revolutionary Identity

Becoming a revolutionary is as much about being in the right place and the right time as it is about doing some of the right things at the right times with the right other people. A revolutionary is then more of a processual, state of being - a dependent variable - than a standalone identity, per se. The processes involved in entering into a revolutionary state of being can lead to the formation of an identity through the acquisition of habitus and linguistic codes as well as the development of real-life and virtual social networks, along with the adoption of a politically activist lifestyle. This partial list includes some of the accoutrements of being a Tahrir revolutionary, with various levels of credibility to that claim depending. More importantly for this chapter, however, is that the 2011 Egyptian revolutionary has become a paradigm, or an Aghaian figure - a ‘type of person’ in the repertoire of potential identities an Egyptian can select from and, in fact, the revolutionary figure has been drawn upon multiple times to foment protest in public spaces since 2011 - most recently, an article in The Telegraph described a large-scale gathering in Cairo following El-Sisi’s announcement that he would be “returning” two islands to Saudi Arabia as part of a broader economic deal with the Gulf kingdom (emphasis added):\textsuperscript{110}

Egyptian police fired tear gas at protesters in the Egyptian capital who defied government warnings and held a rally calling for the "downfall" of the regime, quickly scattering them and making arrests.

The Tahrir revolutionary was troped and could be emulated because of the clarity and universality of the original cause (toppling Mubarak), the already-charged and recognized

historical significance of the space (Tahrir Square), the timing (Officer’s Day on January 25, 2011 until Mubarak resigned), and finally, the multimodal code (the oral chants, slogans; the embodied gestures, nesting formations, etc), a piece of which is found in the above excerpt from *The Telegraph*.

Just as the time and space dimensions of protest movements are critical for the formation of a revolution, so too are the other people involved. Revolutionaries performed a multimodal code involving the corporeity of their bodies and voice registers, as well as language produced in writing, through art, graffiti and, of course with their vocal tracts. The performances, however, also need to be in formations with a preponderance of other performers. While an individual can claim revolutionary identity, the event of revolution, to be recognized as such from an etic perspective, must be performed by a sufficiently large number of jointly-committed individuals and engroupments, who self-coordinate into a *revolutionary formation*. Each individual in a first- or second-degree engroupment must, to a certain extent (and this varies, to be sure), embody, voice, and cognitively participate in the revolutionary paradigm created in a specific spacetime, like Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011 toward advancing a shared, distributed cause (e.g. toppling Mubarak). This ecological-epistemological-chronological-ontological (EECO) set of parameters is similar to what Foucault described as an *épistème* (1980). That is, a set of related, distributed cognitive stances: a shared, collective epistemology. The difference, perhaps, is that a revolutionary *épistème* is constrained in spacetime intervals and, while it can be atomized such that an individual can claim revolutionary identity beyond the event of the revolution s/he partook in, once the revolutionary event loses its territoriality, chronology, and meta-systematicity, and the EECO parameters are not all present, it ceases to be of the same quality.
To summarize the theoretics of this chapter, I have created the following Figure, called “Revolutionary Formation”. It brings together the predominant height of focus, which illustrates the transitionary processes from zero- to first- to second-degree engroupment, with the microbiological height of focus, which helps to describe the complex interworking of what is referred to macroscopically as “a revolution”. Like a cell, there is an extremely complex internal life within the membrane that seems to contain it all and becomes the whole. We often talk about dynamic systems that consist of millions of dependent and independent parts that are alive, moving, constantly doing work to survive and perpetuate a particular arrangement in a given ecology for a period of time in relation to other living beings as one simple, lifeless object. My hope is that this model helps to enliven our understanding and uncover new questions that can enrich our understanding of what happened in Tahrir Square in January of 2011 and how human beings make revolutions happen:
Figure 5.54: Comprehensive Map of The Revolutionary Formation. A mapping of revolutionary formation with the relevant sociolinguistic theories and parallel biological analogies. The different represent, in a grossly reductionist manner, the diversity of activist causes or ideological positions taken by the various individuals and protest formations in Tahrir during the 18 Days. The color red is used to connote revolutionary ideology. The Arabic at the center of the red square in the lower half, which represents Tahrir, is the synecdochical slogan-chant of the Arab Spring: “the people want to topple the regime” - the other Arabic labels around Tahrir contain this same slogan-chant. I take this Arabic chant to be paradigmatic of the revolutionary code of the Arab Spring that indexes revolutionary ideology and activism. The gradation of color represents the gradual processes in which uninitiated individuals and protest formations took up the unifying, shared goals, the distributed causes, of the meta-systemic revolutionary formation. The arrows are figurative and, to a certain extent, indicative of the movement of people through the adjoining streets of Cairo toward the central location of Tahrir Square. As people approach the ‘high-heat’ center, the crystal’s nucleus, ideological starting positions give way to the revolutionary ideology. I describe this process in this chapter as ‘spatial epistemics’. Credit (‘Tahrir Square’ street sign image in my Revolutionary Formation chart): Google Images.
5.22 Applications

This analysis has potential implications for how linguistic, anthropological, and political researchers interpret, analyze, and describe the events of January 25, 2011 and the 18 Days of the Egyptian Revolution. Multi-modal analysis should be taken seriously and applied systematically to future research concerning protest movements in general, and different iterations of the Arab Uprisings, especially. Further work can be done on large-scale nesting in Tahrir Square, such as in prayer formations, concerts, and cooperative events where a mood, such as celebration, disappointment, rage, or fear is distributed and embodied rapidly. In these types of events overlapping hierarchies and heights of focus are critical legs upon which to construct an interpretive framework from whence to solicit generalizable and testable findings about multi-modal interaction in human metasystems.
Chapter 6: Revolutionary Voices and Identities

"Wir mussen eigentlich so viele Sprachen unterscheiden als es Individuen gibt."
'We must in fact distinguish as many languages as there are individuals'.

6.1 Introduction

This dissertation posed three central questions about the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring at the outset:

1) What catalyzed and perpetuated Egypt’s 2011 ‘revolutionary interval’?

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Figure 6.1: Elderly Woman and “ṯōwra”. An older Egyptian woman wearing a dark-colored hijab and tunic, holding a red plastic grocery bag up walks in front of a stenciled graffito of the face of a woman in hijab shouting. Juxtaposed is the word the drawn woman is passionately screaming: تورة /ṯōwra/ (‘revolution’) - it is written in red. People have scrawled various messages in red ink over the white negative space within the black-colored outline that contrastively defines the image. The word حريّة/ ḥorrīyya/ (‘freedom’) is visible in multiple places, as well as ‘revolution’. On the drawn woman’s teeth is written the ideophonic interjection: آه آه آه /āh āh āh/ (‘oh! oh! oh!’) - an expression of pain. Credit: AFP.

6.1 Introduction

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111 Lightfoot 2015, Chomsky (1986) citing von Humbolt (1836) [1880]: 31. I thank Professor Heidi Hamilton for everything she taught me about intertextuality in her eponymous graduate seminar, and for sharing this quote with us on the last day of class.
2) How effective, and in what ways, were various messaging channels (vocal, gestural, ecological, technological) involved in initiating and coordinating newcomers?

3) What processes were involved in ‘engrouping’ smaller protests into the mass ‘revolutionary formation’ of the 18 Days of Tahrir?

In this chapter, I provide reflections on the three analytical chapters (3-5) with specific reference to the above questions. The chapter 3 reflections address question one by discussing the revolutionary interval in terms of the SRI schema (chapter 2 section 10), institutional fragility and the rise of revolutionary discourses. The January 25, 2011 Officer’s Day protests were preceded by an influx of language about a) dignity over oppression (anti-regime), b) rejection of police violence (anti-institution) c) courage to gather in Tahrir (emotional stirring), and d) demanding the toppling of the regime, a.k.a institutional failure (via a rallying cry, which is a vehicle of distributed cause). With these stages in occurrence, Tahrir Square became the space of a new ecology, epistemology, chronology, and ontology (EESCO), and the basic genetic strands of a revolutionary movement began to transcribe the bodies, voices, and identities of the transient protesters, transforming them into lifelong revolutionaries.

My chapter 4 reflections address question 2 within a broader comportment with multimodal performativity, voicing contrasts and registers, and hybridity, or expressive composites/configurations. The 2011 revolutionary movement faced the 2011 counter-revolutionary movement. The incumbent powers tapped their elite networks to activate a powerful response designed to quash the uprising and abort the notion of people power. Messaging channels were key - El-Sisi did not simply communicate his newfound authority through the suspension of the constitution and implementation of marshal law. Rather,
acknowledging that Egyptians had staged a revolution and were apt to return the streets, he attempted to win them over by conjuring the memory of Abdel Nasser and the popularity of his administration and its policies to bolster his own shaky claims to legitimacy after ousting Morsi. El-Sisi did this using oral and physical *intertextual performatives*. He was not, then, only giving a speech about the “New Egypt” and its “New Suez Canal”; El-Sisi was also building his institutional identity as president of post-revolutionary Egypt. He was building a new government and needed the popular support of the people lest he repeat the mistakes of Mubarak and Morsi. This work was done on the level of communication as much as it was through policy.

My reflections on chapter 5 take up question 3 within a review of the key concepts of voices, codes, repetition (or recursivity and structuration), and heights of focus.

Before concluding, I discuss the potential for a computerized model to capture the relative efficiencies of major channels of communication used to convey messages during the 18 Days of Tahrir. In some ways, this is a continuation of the research in chapter 5. The computer model helps to visualize qualitative observations about multimodal communicative strategies and initiation techniques. To do this, I take up the concept of channel capacity, or what Sicoli (2014) calls ‘semiotic carrying capacity’, which is built on Gibson’s concept of affordance (1979) and is related to capacitance and saturation in biology.

In the preceding chapters I investigated and applied language as social action theory, intertextuality, multimodal analysis, and anthropological frameworks for understanding social movements and revolution. I argued that the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in Tahrir Square was a site of re-registerment and counter-registerment where new, people-power-based forms of politics and political identity were forged through semiotic processes that constituted social-
linguistic political actions that brought down the Mubarak regime and its institutions, if only for a year. I also explored the "production of discourse”, which is built on recursivity, alongside what I propose as its corollary: fragility. Fragility, I argued, operates as an anti-structuration principle. These ideas were key elements to the overall framework for interpreting ‘revolution’ as both activist ‘language’, or voices, and ‘identity’. Heller's conception of a genealogy, quite similar to Foucault’s (1972) 'archaeology', compelled me to question and broaden the definition of an institution to encompass the idea of a revolutionary formation. Revolutions entail destabilizing, even erasing the incumbent institutions, which creates a space that can potentially give way to a new order. I therefore also delved more deeply into how institutions are socially and linguistically formed, destroyed, and reconstructed (Heller 2007:137).
6.2 Reflections on Chapter 3

_Institutional Fragility and Failure: Visual Evidence_

Institutions are inherently fragile because they depend heavily on the recursivity, or routinization, of their associated (routinized) practices, discourses and discourse styles (Heller 2007). So, if patients were to refuse to wait in waiting rooms one day and instead chose to storm the hospital’s supplies directly for medicines, the institution of the hospital - in its current form - would fail if this behavior were to continue and spread. Similarly, on the level of identity, if patients were to talk past doctors and challenge their prescriptions and diagnoses, the _institutional figure_ of the doctor would fail, which would destabilizing consequences for the institution of ‘the hospital’. If prison inmates were to collectively disobey the guards and management of the prison and force their way out across many prisons for a sustained period of time, the institution of the prison could fail if the governing potentates were unable to reconstitute the institution of the prison - in its pre-revolutionary form - in the face of widespread, consistent disobedience. Revolution, in other words, can begin in a moment of collective self-recognition if it sparks the will to collectively disobey.

January 25, 2011 was a day in which protestors became revolutionaries. When the incumbent regime attempted to quash the growing protests by closing off streets that fed into Tahrir Square, enough protestors persisted for hours, or days, until they reached it. The shared goal of physically reaching Tahrir Square and overcoming the government’s attempts to prevent access to it, united people behind a common cause. Reaching Tahrir and then remaining there was a significant part of how people performed the revolution. It was tantamount to bypassing procedures and storming a hospital’s medical supplies. The sight and presence of over a million
people, according to some news sources, collectively rejecting the discourses, voice registers, and narratives of the government of Hosni Mubarak, while disobeying the police and military, challenged Mubarak’s institutions of governmental authority and created a space for the formation of a new governmental order.

**Techniques**

Foucault defines ‘techniques’ as the essential craft of the state whereby it instills citizens with a *self-managing will*. When people freely obey laws without coercive force, the government benefits. For the anthropologist Mauss, ‘techniques’ refer to something quite different. Mauss described techniques as ‘bodily discourses’, or non-verbal strategies of communication. In the case of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, both versions of ‘technique’ are salient. The Mubarak regime’s Foucauldian techniques failed when the protestors persistently disobeyed the security forces and publicly demanded that Mubarak resign. While verbal communication strategies were powerful elements of the revolution, the revolutionaries’ Maussian techniques helped to turn individuals into engroupments of people who joined higher and higher levels of engroupment behind a set of shared goals (e.g. toppling Mubarak).

In biology, at the cellular level, the symbiotic combinations of smaller living entities into larger ones has a name: endophagocytosis. Another term for this phenomenon is *colonization*. Images of Tahrir Square’s encampments illustrate both a literal and figurative colonization. The improvised tents and other temporary structures that enabled people to occupy the square continually for 18 days and nights is a literal colonization. However, the rise of a sense of political *peoplehood* points to a figurative colonization process analogous to the microbiological process described above.
Resistance to Mubarak long predates January 25, 2011. Repeated year-round smaller-scale protests along with a consistent flow of artistic and intellectual production, and direct political challenges within the government itself by the Muslim Brotherhood, Wafd, and other minority parties in the Egyptian parliament precipitated Mubarak’s resignation on Feb. 12, 2011.

Repeated gestures that were established before 2011, like the re-semiotized clenched fist of the April 6th Youth Movement that adapted it before that from anti-soviet groups in the Ukraine and Russia during the Cold War, abounded in and around Tahrir. Similarly, hands grasping one another painted in different Arab flags symbolized regional unity, Arabism, and Arab identity before 2011 too. After the January 25 revolution, Morsi’s refusal to sit down and speak opSA in his December 4 hearing presided over by the chief magistrate Yousef became another form of embodied dissent that entered the revolutionary repertoire. Soon after El-Sisi’s coup and his election as president, it became illegal for anyone to hold up four fingers with the thumb depressed toward the palm because it became synonymous with the Rabi’a al-Adawiyya massacre of Muslim Brotherhood supporters. Years later, a hand with four fingers raised continues to symbolize dissent. The historical repertoire of non-verbal performatives was taken up as part of the initial language of the 2011 revolution but was dynamically expanded upon and enriched by the anti-government groups and individuals who partook in it.

In an extended analogy about the development of discretion, Bourdieu refers to the ability to perceive, and therefore appreciate, each level of meaning in a work of art as “purity of vision”. Similarly, the ability to appreciate the flavors and techniques that a master chef puts into a dish is commonly known as “taste”. For Bourdieu, each type of expertise has its connoisseurs who
exhibit an “artistic parti pri”, or ‘bias’ they’ve developed that enables them to perceive what the
taste-less cannot. Those who have taste can speak to one another, critique, and communicate with
the artist or creator in the same language with the most appropriate, field-specific, terms and
intertexts. Those without are less able to engage and may miss dimensions. As such, they lack
the fullest measure of perception that is possible and will not be able to communicate in the same
language as the artists and connoisseurs.

In the context of the 2011 revolution, a revolutionary is someone who participated in the
production of and developed an understanding of the symbolic nature of the interactions in Tahrir
Square as well as the meanings of the graffiti, thousands of signs, songs, protest slogan-chants,
and bodily discourses making up the communicative ecology of the ‘sites of revolution’, both
physical and virtual. These individuals formed revolutionary voices and identities.

That said, revolutionary voices and identities are not fixed quantities. Being a
revolutionary requires consistent engagement in cultivating and informing each to keep them
“warm”. By this I mean what Bakhtin described as the difficulty of interpreting a “living
discourse” that is “still warm from… struggle and hostility” (Bakhtin 1981: 331):

The prose art presumes a deliberate feeling for the historical concrete and social
concreteness of living discourse, as well as its relativity, a feeling for its participation in
historical becoming and in social struggle; it deals with discourse that is still warm from
that struggle and hostility, as yet unresolved and still fraught with hostile intentions and
accents; prose art finds discourse in this state and subjects it to the dynamic-unity of its
own style.

In chapter three, the court transcript presented certain challenges because it was a
reenactment of a two-minute track from a “leaked” transcript that was part of a longer exchange
(approx. 30 minutes). Egyptian news media was not allowed to record or broadcast the court
proceedings but a reporter captured the exchange on a hidden voice recorder. This partialness meant that I may not have had the full co(n)text, or all the layers of the interaction. Still, the part of the interaction between Morsi and Yousef that I acquired is rich and illustrates Agha’s voicing contrasts with significant implications for the broader questions of defining Muslim Brotherhood Islamist discourse in Egypt after the 2011 revolution as well as the role of ECA and new political SA in the Egyptian revolution.

**Social Media Channels of Communication**

The ‘social media revolution’ thesis has been taken up by many researchers (e.g. Wang and Fei-Yue 2011; Castells 2012; Hill 2013; Salvatore 2013; Adi 2014; Franceschini et al. 2014; Johns et al. 2014; Müller and Celina 2014; Rousselin 2014; Lowrance and Sherry 2016). Barrons (2012) rejects the proposition that social media acted as a catalyst of the revolution. For many analysts of the Arab Spring, social media was a tool that helped protesters organize and transmit their messages and images of the movement to onlookers in the country and around the world (Mansour 2012; Bebawi and Bossio 2014; McGarty et al 2014).

This study is written from the perspective that the agentive power of the revolutions derived from the activists themselves who were motivated by a vast array of socio-economic and political factors and objectives. Social media platforms were tools, means, and not themselves
the impetuses or drivers of revolutionary movements in Egypt or other Arab states. To describe Facebook or Twitter as having played a larger role than that of channels with certain communicative capacities and efficiencies obscures or even diminishes the stories, voices, identities and experiences of the human beings who risked their lives in the many movements that comprise the Arab Uprisings that came to a head in 2011 but were themselves the culmination of decades of work. Standage (2013) discusses social media as a digitalization of an otherwise millennia-old form of people organizing themselves into (analog) social networks.

To be sure, social media constitute new arenas for inter- and intra-dialectical interaction and contact, which has given rise to new language forms, especially in the field of written communication. Dialects that were unwritten for generations, now have de facto, semi-codified orthographies (Elhij’a 2012) that can be catalogued and used to develop teaching materials, enable machine translation, and access narratives that were previously imperceptible to non-native speakers.

The Counter-Revolution

SCAF and El-Sisi cleverly negotiated with the Muslim Brotherhood after the fall of Mubarak to create a joint governing authority in order to maintain a foothold within institutional power, or what Searle calls the ‘wall into boundary’ that gave them the “authorization to cross”. Gramsci (1971) argues that for dominance to be established, one needs to ideologically conquer the traditional intellectuals (assimilation) and produce its own intellectuals (elaboration) - SCAF’s

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bringing in of religious clerics and grooming of one of Morsi’s own cabinet members, namely El-Sisi, demonstrates this impeccably.

Heritage and Drew (1993) similarly discuss social constraints in interactions and with respect to institutional goals. SCAF and El-Sisi understood the importance of maintaining an Islamic reference while challenging and ultimately overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi. Along these lines, De Certeau argues that a discourse must be believable prior to becoming actionable. This helps to explain SCAF’s embrace of the “tamarrod” or “second revolution” (lit. ‘rebellion’) of Egyptians who were frustrated with Morsi after his sweeping reforms to the judiciary and the constitution within months of taking office in 2012. By either fomenting or at least allowing for an anti-Morsi discourse and movement to flourish and grow, SCAF paved the way for their own ascension that could be perceived as authentic and emergent from within the revolutionary movement.

To understand the use of authority in the revolutionary interval more deeply will require a longer period of observation than was possible for this research. De Certeau explains that a discourse is truly formed when it becomes historicée / storified - that is, once an event has fully passed into written history. Derrida also argues that when an event is written down in words that people can quote and cite, those words can be used to mobilize others into action. Similarly, Bakhtin writes about the problem of distinguishing voices from the motives and intentions within it while those voices are still in use. Like Butler’s (2002) concept of speakability, quotability in Derrida and de Certeau help to explain the realm of the doable. We must begin, then, with examining carefully what is ‘speakable’ and how. Colla argues that the Egyptian Revolution is still in a state where poetry speaks louder than prose because the identities formed during the
revolution are still contested. Communication about the revolution, let alone revolutionary
discourse itself, both embodied and uttered, is still punishable by law in Egypt. The events of
2011 cannot yet be freely quoted and so action is restricted. The revolution is not over and so,
findings based on researching this era of Egypt’s history can only be tentative.

**Revolutionary Interval**

The ‘revolutionary interval’, like Thomassen’s (2012) discussion of ‘revolutionary moments’,
drawing on Turner and Mauss in anthropology, describes a period of social and political, but also
semiotic, upheaval. In this interval, the incumbent institutions of government are challenged,
denigrated, and negatively re-valorized by a competing social institutional entity, or by multiple
competing entities representing collectivities. During this interval, the incumbent institutions
either a) fail to re-constitute themselves in the face of competition from a would-be replacement
institutional entity, and are therefore destroyed and erased, or b) succeed in re-capitulating their
institutional authority through the re-assertion and perpetuation of the dominant discourses,
practices, and identities associated with them (the incumbent institutions).

In the event of the former (i.e. scenario “a”), the competing institutions, or institutional
actors, replace the incumbents physically, ideologically, and, I argue, semiotically. Semiotic
replacement means that different enregistered voices are deployed and the previous voices are
disparaged, vilified, silenced, and/or inverted. By inversion, I mean re-registered from being the
institutional voice of the government into the illegitimate voice of the oppressor, or the enemy.
Register inversion involves persuading citizens of the malice of the institutional voices of the
incumbent power holders. Mubarak’s regime was known for its master narrative centered on
‘stability’ ("stiqrār"), and his presidential discourses about stability and progress (Dunne 2003),
along with his style of discourse, namely what I call ‘old’ (as in ‘old guard’) political Standard Arabic (opSA). Re-valorizing an enregistered voice entails casting it as false, defective, harmful, and outmoded. In its place are the discourses of human rights, dignity, democracy, and social justice promoted by the revolutionaries - they are the new guard and bring with them a ‘new style’ of governmental institutional discourse, which I term ‘new political Standard Arabic’ (npSA). The style of npSA involves a reversal of traditional diglossic High-Low discursive practices whereby the government speaks opSA, an elevated form of ‘textbook’ Standardized Arabic, and the public speaks Egyptian Colloquial varieties of Arabic (ECA), along a scale from more to less formal (Badawi 1973). In npSA, however, the new socio-political argot is part-ECA, part-SA. It is more polyvocal than the pre-2011 era political register (Harb 2013). Moreover, in the Arab Spring, the discourses and discourse styles, along with many of the specific lexical and phraseological items of specific iterations of protests become part and parcel of a ‘deictic genre’ that I refer to as ‘revolutionary voices’, or ‘the language of the Arab Spring’. Items become rich indexes of revolutionary identity and of specific revolutionary events, such as the veritable slogan of the Arab Spring uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt, “aš-šā’b yurīd ’isqāṭ n-niZām” (‘the people will the toppling of the regime’); iconic versions of this slogan have appeared in different local dialects, or with slight variations to reflect the political circumstances of the country context (e.g. in Lebanon it was, “the people will the toppling of the confessional system”, in reference to the religious-ethnic division and quota system of each aspect of the Lebanese government).113

Where the incumbents overtake the competitors, the would-be replacement institutional personae and their associated discourses and styles of discourse are themselves destroyed or

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erased - their accounts of history, their memories, claims to authority and power, their arguments for legitimation are disproven, disregarded, undermined, denigrated, and, as we have seen across the Arab region in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Morocco, typically severely punished by imprisonment, death sentences, torture, exile, and blacklisting. The incumbent and the institutions of government over which they wield power and authority counter-register the discourses of the competitor institutionalities to portray them as ‘terrorists’, violent gangs, thugs, and foreigners themselves or traitors from within with ‘foreign-wrought’ interests.

6.3 Reflections on Chapter 4

I was very interested in how Abdel Nasser’s performativity had been imitated in El-Sisi’s to show how communication, be it oral or physical, is used to bypass actual government reform. In other words, the unwitting, or witting, assumption of El-Sisi’s conjuring of Abdel Nasser seemed to me to be: 

*if I can get people to see me as Abdel Nasser, at least in part, then they’ll approve of me and I’ll be legitimated as president.* This thinking is strikingly manipulative and different from: 

*if I can instate certain critical reforms to the way the economy is conducted and secure the rights of all Egyptians regardless of religious identity, I could get society, the government, and the economy back on track and make Egypt into a model for the region; or even: people don’t like me but they loved Nasser - what did he do as president that I can take as an example for my*
own presidency? In these three models, language is critical - but, in politics, research on the Arab Spring seems to show us time and again, that language, while powerful, is not a sufficient replacement for real change and progress. El-Sisi has become increasingly unpopular and has faced protests demanding the “toppling of the regime”.

In post-dissertation work, I would like to investigate several other speeches by El-Sisi and Abdel Nasser in which they refer to or directly take up the topic of the ‘revolutions’ they are each historically associated with, as well as how they represent, (re)interpret, and (re)deploy notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘people power’ in dialogical juxtaposition to ‘revolution’ - I would take the approach I developed in chapter 4 and apply it to other texts that are thematically related to revolutionary identities and voices in the Arab Spring. I began the research for this chapter looking for oral intertextual traces of ‘revolutionary discourse’ but became more interested in finding multimodal intertexts. In future research I am interested in describing and situating “echoicity” and “mirroring” in Arab leaders’ oral and physical political discourse during and after Arab Spring uprisings within the framework of multimodal intertextual analysis and with a view toward advancing the sociolinguistic research on revolutionary identities and voices.

Voicing Contrasts

Agha builds on Bakhtin’s conception of the voice, dialogicality, and heteroglossia, in his discussion of the semiotic processes by which an individual’s, a group’s, or an institution’s voice can be recognized by a segment of a population or a ‘social domain’. The ability to identify a voice as uniquely that of a specific person, group, or institution makes the voice socially relevant.

and replicable. Once a voice can be imitated, it becomes a resource in building an identity. The more a particular voice becomes part of the performance of a person’s identity, the more the two - the voice and the person - become associated with one another. When someone hears that voice, they begin to think of the person who they heard oftentimes using it, and vice versa. That interrelationship between the voice that helps a person build an identity and the person who chooses to use a specific voice as a resource to build her identity, is a type of recursivity.

A voicing contrast is, then, akin to Bourdieu’s (1979) notion of écrats or ‘deviations’, that make styles - or in the above example, voices - identifiable. Bourdieu was, however, interested in a broader distinction between the mundane and the artistic. With respect to distinct voices, these often belong to a particular institutional entity, like the ‘voice’ of a teacher in a school, or a judge in a courtroom; like frames (Bateson 1935, Goffman 1974, Tannen 1987c, Gordon 2009), people have certain expectations of what they will encounter in a particular setting/frame, or what Agha calls a ‘co-text’. Agha terms the processes by which that ‘voice’ becomes an unmarked (Myers-Scotton 1983), or ‘congruent’ (Agha 2005), communicative mode of a particular ‘discourse ecology’ (Agar 1985), “enregisterment”. In other words: the creation and perpetuation, through its repeated performance by individuals, of a specific register. That register can be associated with an institutional discourse (‘president speak’, ‘doctor speak’) or a publicly known individual with an institutional identity (Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Barack Obama, Martin Luther King, Gandhi, etc). Importantly, Agha argues that an enregistered voice can be changed - voices are changed, however, not by an institution or the individual voicer; rather, the process is bottom-up and begins at the micro-interactional level among the lay constituents, inmates (Foucault 1977), or naive ‘mondains’ (Bourdieu 1979), of a society or institutional context. Voices can change, be
revalorized, or retypified, and, indeed, this happens quite often, particularly in politically charged situations.

For Agha, voice and identity are tightly interdependent and mutually constituting of one another. Agha moves away from the bias among some linguists to focus their analysis on the spoken word alone, or a written text prior to that. Agha’s work moves toward a multimodal conception of communication, in what he refers to as ‘discursive figures’ and ‘personhood figures’. Rather than ‘utterance’, which is seemingly limited to a concern for verbal production, a *figure* combines both the commonly associated registers of an individual with her/his commonly associated public identities. A discursive figure is a speech act that encompasses what Mark Sicoli (2015) calls ‘voice registers’. A voice register accounts not only for the content of an utterance but also for the features and qualities of its physiological phonation. Sicoli demonstrates how the same lexical item can be phonated in various voice registers, such as falsetto, creak, breathy, nasalized, or whispered, along with alterations in volubility, and intonation. Intonation involves qualities such as melody, rhythm, and pace. Erickson (2014) goes beyond an interest in intonation qualities and describes what he calls ‘periodicity’ and ‘gestalt shapes’ in this discussion of the co-production of meaning with a given ecology. For Sicoli, a voice register can turn a single word into a ‘full sentence’, or a complete logical idea, where the subject and predicate are distributed over multiple channels, or modalities, of communication. This is to say nothing of non-verbal pragmatic channels’ ‘semiotic carrying capacity’ (Sicoli 2014), or the meanings that can be conveyed through body language.

Returning to Agha, his ‘personhood figures’ refer to communicative acts — or ‘expressive configurations’ (Sicoli 2007, 2016). This concept is built on what Enfield calls
‘expressive composites’ or ‘composite utterances’ (2009), which are perhaps related to Durkheim’s (1982) ‘settings of composites’ that specifically identify the interactant among a subset of the population. Agha calls this identifying process the social domain wherein a figure is relevant and recognized. Agha goes on to explain that an enregistered voice can be ‘troped upon’, that is it becomes ‘tropic’ (2005:48); this means that another person, presumably a member of the public, can take up the voice as a social-semiotic resource (Ochs 1993, Bassiouney 2012: 107, 109) to spawn her/his own “hybrid personae” based on the constructed persona of the original voicer (Agha 2005:39). In other words, an enregistered voice can be imitated for social and political ends.

6.4 Reflections on Chapter 5

**Voices and Codes of the Arab Spring**

A ‘voice’ is itself always a heteroglossic product-in-the-making; it is never complete or solipsistic - voices are re-combinations of other voicings that came before or exist simultaneously (Pujolar 2001; Wiltshire 1994; Madsen 2013; Elwood 2002). They constantly borrow and recombine to create distinctive but recognizable figures. Voices are part of the ‘deictic genre’ of revolutionary, and counter-revolutionary, discourses. That is, post-2011, there are recognizable ‘codes of the Arab Spring’. In fact, there are inter-related ‘revolutionary identities and voices’ that are knowable as such by their paradigmatic relations to one another as co-signifiers of the Arab Spring and their syntagmatic relations as catalysts, carriers, and byproducts of Arab Spring uprisings (McGill 2008: 33). Revolutionary identities and voices are recursively linked. Recursivity entails co-producing, co-textualizing, and feedback loops that

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117 Consider Hamilton’s (1996) article in which she explores recognized and unrecognized inter/intra-textuality in conversations between Alzheimers patients and their caregivers
mutually reinforce. The recursivity of revolutionary identities and voices requires some unpacking.

Goodwin explains that actions and words interact in time and space and are intricately linked and constitute one another (Duranti and Goodwin 1992) - this is also a form of recursivity (Eksner 2006; Ahearn 2011). Giddens, refers to this intricate linking as structuration (1984: 376), and Agha uses the term ‘replication’ (2005: 51). In essence, however, each of these concepts stem back to Saussure’s concept of langue and parole. That basic distinction between language as it is presented in grammar books and language as it is actually spoken gave rise to the structuralist movement of which Jakobson was a major figure (Jakobson 1971; Saussure et al. 2008; Barbet et al. 2012; Saussure 2012). Jakobson combined structure with C.S. Peirce’s semiotics and cybernetics (Jakobson 1977, 1985; Liszka 1982; Peirce 1955; Bopry and Jeanette 2007) and would influence his student Michael Silverstein (2016) as well as the structuralist Levi-Strauss (1971; 1986; 1978) and Dell Hymes, known for his work on the ethnography of communication (1978; 1985). Silverstein became a very important anthropologist in the United States after earning his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1972. He pioneered the concept of language ideologies and, a student of Whorf, has contributed to debates on linguistic relativity (Silverstein 2015).

Underlying the theory of language ideologies - taken up by Bassiouney (2013) in the field of Arabic sociolinguistics - is the idea that the way a speaker perceives one’s linguistic resources, including code choice, influences that speaker’s decisions with respect to self-presentation and intersubjective communication (Rahman 2002; Suleiman 2013; Irvine 2012). This is, like Agha’s
‘self images’ (Agha 2007), an important contribution to the question of the recursive relationship between language and identity.

Simply put, the way someone chooses to communicate reflects something about how that person wishes to be perceived by others and how that person sees herself in that situation. Similarly, the way a person wishes to be perceived at a certain time and place and among certain people, influences the choices that person will make as to how she will choose to communicate. That interconnection between self-image, projected self, and communication choices, is what is referred to as recursivity, as well as several other related terms described above.

Repetition and Focus

Another important element of recursivity is repetition. In Pike’s 1967 article examining a football game, he describes two interrelated ‘heights of focus’, namely the predominant and the participant focus. These foci exist in a hierarchical relationship based on a height metaphor in the title of the theory. The predominant height of focus is ‘higher’ up. It would therefore encompass larger things like, in Pike’s description, the whole football field. In contrast, the participant focus is much ‘lower down’ - as the name suggests, it is the point of view of one of the people in a given setting. It provides only the perspective of, for example, the coach of one of the teams, that of a quarterback, or a concession stand worker in the stadium among the audience. Pike argues that there is a redundancy in the two heights of focus. He calls it a “hypostasis”. It refers to the fact that both heights of focus allow the viewer to watch the same events unfold. The only difference is the distance from which one is seeing the football game, in this case. This repetition helps to bring attention to a specific unit or object, like the position of a football on the field during a game. The football is relevant from both an aerial view of the stadium and the
perspective of one of the quarterbacks. While there is only one predominant view, there are as many participant views as there are entities capable of having a perspective on the events in the space where the communication takes place. Of course, the quarterback’s perspective on the football is quite different from that of a popcorn vendor in the stands, or even that of a lineman or coach, let alone that of the parking lot attendant. Within the participant perspectives there are degrees of similarity and difference. The quarterback’s relationship to the football is different than the coach’s to be sure, but it is more similar than the relationship to the the football of the parking lot attendant. Pike is responding to and building on an older anthropological theory of social or cultural *mimesis*. Mimesis describes the processes by which ideas, practices, myths, and the other elements that co-produce cultures are repeated, recursively, and thus establish themselves as legitimate, authentic ‘cultural practices’, ‘traditions’, or ‘mythologies’. Each time these customs or rituals are repeated, they reinforce the belief in those practices, discourses, and traditions. Related sets of rituals can be understood as cultural or societal institutions. A game of football is an practice but the game of football can be interpreted as an institution. There are various levels of involvement in these practice and institutions and those levels are what Pike concerns himself with.

In chapter 5, I examined engroupment from three heights of focus. I described zero-, first-, and second-degree engroupment, six stages of initiation and multimodal techniques, embodied and oral performativity, vectorization, protest formation, and revolutionary formation. I also mentioned the idea of channel capacity but did not expand further. It is my sense that the complexity of this notion requires a degree of quantification and the assistance of a computerized model. Below, I discuss an experimental project in computerized semiotic modeling.
In addition to approaches based on ethnography, linguistic anthropology, sociolinguistic frameworks, and multimodal analysis, which I have used in chapters 3-5, there is much to be learned from an interdisciplinary, collaborative project using experimental methods that build on insights of computerized modeling, artificial intelligence, and machine learning to explore the actuation of ideology through human social networks, across a range of major communicative channel types, which, in this case, I have mined from the context of the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

**Engroupment**

![Engroupment Diagram](image)

**Figure 6.4: Crystallization.** This diagram of the crystallization process is re-labeled to trace the path from uninitiated individual to initiated activist and member of an uninitiated protest formation. The next level begins with uninitiated protest formations as the basic unit, which become initiated and enter into the revolutionary formation (a meta-system). *Credit for source image (overlaid labels relating crystallization processes to revolutionary formations, color scheme are my own): Google Images (color overlays and descriptions added)*.

Engroupment takes place on three levels:

1. The zero degree is an *uninitiated individual* who is open to encountering an initiated engroupment;
2. First-degree engroupment is an individual encountering an engroupment and joining it;

3. Second-degree engroupment involves a first-degree engroupment becoming a member network of a larger set of engrouped member networks.

To illustrate these three basic levels of engroupment, I have reproduced a section of figure 5aj. (above). The portion of the caption that describes this process using the crystallization metaphor, explains that the diagram has been re-labeled to trace the path from uninitiated individual to initiated activist; then to member of an uninitiated protest formation. The next level begins with uninitiated protest formations as the basic unit, which then becomes initiated and enters into the revolutionary formation, which is a meta-system end state.

There are three degrees of engroupment, along with eight stages for going from pre- or non-revolutionary individual to a person who has formed an identity as a revolutionary:

1) Seed/individual

2) An uninitiated individual

3) An individual undergoing initiation

4) A member of a first-degree protest formation (uninitiated into a larger multiple engroupment with other member networks

5) A protest formation undergoing multiple engroupment

6) An initiated protest formation, part of a revolutionary formation

7) A member network in revolutionary formation undergoing training, or learning the distributed cause(s) and associated codes for performing the cause

8) A member network in a revolutionary formation that is trained and performing the revolution
Engroupments in Tahrir, during and after the 2011 revolution, worked to initiate new members into their protest formations. There are six stages of initiation into engroupment:

1) Calling one’s attention

2) Piquing interest

3) Drawing the person physically into the closer proximity

4) Bringing the person into the existing formation and

5) Training one in the basic ideology and, more importantly, performative aspects of the engroupment

6) If the individual acquires the basic building blocks of membership, s/he may be considered both initiated and *engrouped*

### 6.5 Simulating Channel Conversion Efficiencies in Tahrir Square Protests

Inspired by the ongoing work of Gareth Roberts in the field of experimental semiotics in language change studies (Roberts et al. 2015; Roberts and Gareth 2012; Galantucci et al. 2012), I worked with a graduate student in electrical engineering at the University of Washington, Maitham Naeemi, to develop a computerized model that simulates several of the most prevalent communicative channels used in Tahrir. Using Java-based Eclipse,

![Figure 6.5: Computer Modeled Dots.](image)

Snapshot of the computer model of the 2011 Egyptian revolution in Tahrir Square. Red dots represent revolutionaries, black dots are counter-revolutionaries, and yellow dots are uninitiated, pre-engroupment individuals.
the model automates the relative ‘conversion efficiencies’ of several prevalent communicative channels used in initiating newcomers and coordinating Tahrir protests.

**Modeling Interactions in Tahrir**

The simulation operates on a fixed set of assumptions and numeric relationships that represent those parameters. Based on the available evidence, my ethnographic notes, and interview data, the model assigns certain values to online and offline channels of communication. The offline channels consist of the following four enumerated communicative channels: 1) oral or primarily uttered, phonated 2) traditional broadcast (print, TV, radio), 3) embodied or gestural, and 4) artistic or primarily visual. The online dimension is reduced to a single channel that is predominantly built to mimic the behavioral data available for Twitter. In the offline dimension, the model is designed to function on the following assumptions:

![Figure 6.6: Values Chart](image)

**Figure 6.6: Values Chart.** This chart contains the exact values and ratios programmed into the Revolutionary Interval model. The ratios, fractions, were converted to decimals in the coding phase. The ratios represent the relative difficulty of persuading a revolutionary (red) or a counter-revolutionary (black) to adopt the opposite position. Comparatively, people who are undecided (yellow) can be more easily persuaded. This basic proportionality holds both offline and online. The whole integers, Transitions Per Turn (TPT), represent the speed with which the corresponding channel is able to transmit its message to the members of its nodal network. Online communications exhibit the fastest speed, but is relatively low-impact per transmission.
In the chart, efficiency refers to a representation of each channel's ability to change the color of one of three types of dots. Changing the color of a dot is akin to persuasion. The more turns a channel requires, the less efficient it is at persuasion. Speeds, such as "slow" or "fast", pertain to how quickly a dot communicating through a particular channel is able to reach, or communicate with, neighboring dots in its network. The other dots, or nodes, an individual dot is connected to by lines, comprises its immediate network. Every channel type is assigned a certain number of turns to represent its relative persuasive efficiency. Every x number of turns, a channel's respective type of message is communicated to its nodal network. Depending on the receiving node's color (red, yellow, or black), that communicated message, represented by a small sprite that moves between networked dots connected by lines, impacts its recipient more or less. Each dot type is assigned a weight that corresponds to its randomly generated color. The weights represent how easy or difficult it is to persuade members of that color group. Red represents revolutionaries and black represents anti-revolutionaries - these two groups tend to have their minds made up, so their weights are lower than those of yellow dots. Yellow represents people who remain uninitiated and somewhat neutral; red and black dots, to win, must persuade the most number of dots of its political directionality.

The online dimension is portrayed in its own viewing window in the app. Its behavior is markedly different from that of the offline channels so, to observe outcomes in online communications, a separate viewer was programmed. Online communication was reduced to a single channel due to the proximate similarity of the efficiency and speed of each of the online social media platforms for which data is available. The online channel is characterized as fast and inefficient. While there is near instantaneous reception of a transmitted message by the entire
network connected to the emitting dot, receiving dots require significantly more transmissions - as compared to any of the offline channels - to convert from yellow to red or black, or from red to black, or black to red. This mimics reports by interviewees who recalled that they received or were aware of a lot of social media posts relevant to the protests in Tahrir, but were less oriented to the specific content of each than they were to articles or stories they came across in traditional media, or by word of mouth. Individuals were more influenced by the behaviors they observed and conversations they had in person than by anything in print, tv, radio, or online.

**Representing Channels of Offline Communication**

Various channels were involved in messaging to and in the initiation of newcomers into what I call ‘protest formations’ and eventually, through engroupment processes, into the larger-scale revolutionary formation. Different channels were also deployed for coordinating the formations throughout the many levels and stages of engroupment that resulted in the meta-system observed during the 18 Days of Tahrir. That mass protest system motivated a neologism that is now part of the transnational lexicon of the revolution - specifically, the word in Arabic for this epiphenomenon is *milyônīyya*. It is based on the Arabized Latinate loanword “milyôn” (‘million’) and ostensibly refers to the speculated number of protesters in Tahrir during the 18 Days, particularly by pro-revolutionary sources. My argument is that the individuals who make up the sub-groups, member networks of protest formations, and the overarching revolutionary formation were coordinated by self-organizing intergroup principles best understood in terms of distributed cognition.

The simulation was developed in a Java-based programming environment called Eclipse. An animation engine was installed from an available Java API library called Processing and
coupled with GraphStream to build much of the geometry needed to model the sociolinguistic ecology described in the prior chapters of this dissertation, specifically chapter 6. The simulation begins when a number of individuals, represented by nodes (‘dots’) is selected to appear in the feature space. A randomizer is then used to determine connections, which are represented by straight lines, between a certain number of neighboring dots (‘independents’). This results in a series of differently sized sub-networks, or what I refer to as protest formations, as opposed to a meta-systemic revolutionary formation.

Ideological purpose is portrayed using a basic color scale: red for revolutionary; black for counter-revolutionary; and yellow for persuadable. A random number of dots are selected by the program to begin the first ‘day’ of the simulated revolutionary interval as red. Red dots are ‘revolutionary’ and by that it is meant that they are poised to integrate smaller sub-networks with the shared goal of toppling the Mubarak regime. Some dots are randomly pre-selected to begin as black to represent the counter- or anti-revolutionaries also present in and around Tahrir.

When the app beings to run a revolutionary interval, a large number of dots begin as yellow to represent relative neutrality. These dots are more susceptible to initiation than red or black dots. Different channels of communication are represented visually by programmable ‘sprites’ that emanate from nodes and travel throughout interconnected networks. Upon populating the feature space, the program also randomly assigns communicative channel types to each node. Sprites represent basic messages like “anti-Mubarak” and “pro-Mubarak” and the different channels through which these messages can propagate are accounted for in the model through a system of mathematical ‘conversion ratios’ associated with each medium/type:
A. **Online or social media** (fast, inefficient): Online messaging can mean near-instantaneous reception of a message by the entire network connected to the emitting node. But, to account for the relatively weaker ability to initiate someone into becoming an activist protester, messages distributed through this channel require twice as many (8) transmissions to convert a yellow dot to red or black. Significantly more transmissions, or interactions, would be needed to sway an initiated revolutionary or counter-revolutionary to the other side of the spectrum. Namely, 32 sprites emanating from black nodes to convert a red dot to black; similarly, 32 sprites of red descent are needed to convert black to red.

B. **Word of mouth** (slow, efficient): In-person interaction means that a sprite can only travel in one direction from one person to the next. However, because a personal interaction can be more convincing, a conversion from yellow to red or black only requires 4 sprite transmissions. 16 are needed to convert red to black or vice versa.

C. **Print and traditional media**, including radio and television (medium speed, normal efficiency): To account for the relative popularity of online news sources in the Arab Spring and a relative turn away from traditional media, a message conveyed through this channel only reaches half the dots in the networks it’s connected to at once. Sprites over this channel can convert yellow dots to red or black with only 2 transmissions. 8 are required to convert red to black or vice versa. Messages conveyed over this channel can ‘go viral’ (i.e. change channels from type III to type I) if the sprite representing the message happens to travel consecutively between seven online-channel dots.

D. **Public signs or art**, posters, effigies, etc. (slow, inefficient): Visual protests can be encountered by multiple people at once. Specifically, a public-sign node simultaneously emits 7
sprites at a time to 7 nearest nodes to it. These sprites convert yellow to red or black with 9 transmissions. It requires 36 transmission to convert red to black or vice versa. However, these sprites become more efficient if they ‘go viral’. Messages conveyed over this channel can ‘go viral’ if the sprite representing the message happens to travel consecutively between seven online-channel dots.

E. **Gesture, embodied performance** (slow, efficient): Physical protests can also be engaged in by multiple uninitiated individuals at once. Therefore, gesture-channel nodes can emit 7 sprites to the 7 nearest nodes to it at once. These sprites convert yellow to red or black with only 2 transmissions. It requires 8 sprite transmissions of this type to convert red to black or vice versa. To account for the ‘momentum effect’ when seeing many individuals engaged in the same physical activity, a weight is introduced when 5 or more nodes in the same network communicate through this channel type. Specifically, the conversion efficiency increases so that only 1 transmission can convert yellow to red or black. With the weight, 4 transmissions can convert red to black or vice versa. As would occur frequently throughout the Arab Spring, an event during a protest can be recorded on a cell phone and distributed online and then go viral. To account for this, these gesture-channel sprites can also become more efficient if they ‘go viral’. Messages conveyed over this channel can ‘go viral’ if the sprite representing the message happens to travel consecutively between seven online-channel dots.

*How the Program Tahrir Revolution Works*

Presently, once the user opens the initial application, the user can either a) change certain starting conditions and then click setup, and run, or b) simply use the defaults and click setup and run.
For the starting conditions, the user can change the upper and lower limits for the starting number of nodes/dots and shift the proportions of pro-revolution (red dots) to anti-revolution factions (black dots). The remaining dots will become neutral (yellow) and can be initiated by red and black dots in accordance with a coded system of frequencies and weights that define the communicative channels and comprise the relative conversion efficiencies of each. The simulation is based on an 18-day period which can be compressed into any number of minutes (or fractions of a minute) the user chooses.

The user then clicks "Setup" and three windows will appear stacked on top of each other (a problem that will be resolve later on - eventually the applet will contain three viewers within it). The purpose of the 'setup' button is to allow the user time to rearrange and resize the three viewers on the screen. One can also see the randomly generated numbers in the applet and look at the animated rendering of the starting conditions.

Lastly, by clicking "Run Revolution", the three viewers, which are labeled to describe the different environments they represent, begin the simulation in accordance with the coded rules of each. The three viewers portray five different channels of communication:

"Online": 1) social media, primarily - any digital medium [one viewer]
"Offline": 2) verbal, 3) non-verbal / gestural, 4) artistic, 5) print. [two viewers: 'offline' and 'offline+', which adds the strategy of engroupment to the simulation space].

In the applet window, the number of days ticks up and the user can monitor the relative states of nodes/dots (i.e. people in Tahrir) in the three environments (online, offline without engroupment, and offline with engroupment).

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Once the 18 days are up, the applet displays "Results" - there are enough randomized factors, along with weights and frequencies, such that the program generates non-predictable results each time, even if it selects the same starting conditions.

**Basic Assumptions**

The simulation portrays a set of relationships built on assumptions that are coded into the program. Before programming ever began, the following elements needed to be determined:

1) How starting conditions relate to outcome?
2) What starting conditions to set as defaults (and which ones could be modified)?
3) What are the possible types of outcomes?

The essential behavior of the red, yellow, and black dots was also pre-determined. Red and black dots, for example, engage in both transmission and reception of messages (known as sprites in coding). Yellow dots absorb messages but do not emit messages until they become red or black.

Communicative channels had to be interpreted into mathematical frequencies (transmissions per “day” where a day is defined as twenty turns in the coding) and conversion efficiencies. In other words, if a dot was randomly assigned to use the online channel of communication, the program needs to be coded with a specific number of times that dot communicates per “day” and how many of its “messages” are required to convert a yellow dot to its “cause” (represented by red or black, or pro- and anti-revolution, respectively). Each channel needs to be unique - if two channels have the same frequency and efficiency, the program would not recognize them as distinct.
Monte Carlo Function for Time

Each round of the simulation consists of eighteen days, where a ‘day’ is defined by default, using a Monte Carlo timer, as one minute. This approach also means that the program saves the positions of all of the nodes and sprites and the conditions of the various networks that develop and shift during a round at the end of each round. Those saved positions become the starting positions of the next day. This helps account for time without artificially resetting the simulation. Overnight attrition was not accounted for at this juncture but could be included in later iterations.

Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary Dots

Red nodes emit red sprites symbolizing pro-revolutionary communication or messaging. Red nodes that receive black sprites can be converted to black in accordance with the channel rules above. However, until a conversion is made, when a red node receives a black sprite, it changes that sprite from black to red. Similarly, black nodes emit black sprites that symbolize anti-revolutionary messages and can be converted to red pursuant to the above channel rules. Until it is converted, however, black nodes change red sprites to black after an encounter.

The Peer-Pressure Effect

Disconnected yellow nodes change colors after receiving a certain number of sprites depending on the channel type of the transmissions (types A-E above). However, to better approximate ‘peer pressure’ effects, a weighting system was introduced that makes it easier for a yellow dot to be converted to red or black based on the number of red and black nodes in its network. In future versions, weights, and the number of dots, will become dynamic rather than static after initially being determined at the setup stage. For example, if 40% of the other dots in the yellow dot’s network are red, it'd be 4 times easier for it to become red. Therefore if this hypothetical yellow
dot commented by word-of-mouth in a network that is 40% red, rather than requiring four sprites to convert to red, it could do so with only one sprite transmission.

**Engroupment**

When an entire network of any size changes to red or black, it can join another network of the same color (all yellow networks do not engroup). This can occur multiple times until, possibly, the whole population turns red or black and is one connected whole. Alternatively, a part can turn all red and the other part can turn all black with no yellow, uninitiated dots remaining.

**Ending the Revolution**

The present version of the program ends with a “Results” tabulation of the final state of the dots in the simulation at the end of 18 Days (i.e. 360 turns, in coding terms). Under the three environments (“online”, “offline” and “offline+”), it is possible for three different results to occur - in all cases, there will either be a red or black majority. A simple majority currently constitutes a “win”.

Future versions of the simulation can set different parameters for determining the outcome of the revolution. For example, the 'revolution' could end when 1% or less of the population is yellow. If, at that time, the majority is red, the large purple Mubarak node turns into a "?" in a box representing prison. If the majority is black at the end of the revolution, then the Mubarak node stays purple and prison boxes appear around the remaining red dots.

**Post-Revolution Effects to be Built into Future Versions of the Simulation**

*Government Agents Dots*
Future iterations of the simulation will randomly assign certain dots to be gray and represent government agents who notoriously were hired to dissuade, sometimes by force, anti-regime protestors from gathering or chanting against Mubarak in Tahrir.

**Gray government-agent nodes will conduct the following interactions:**

1. *Censor:* one gray sprite turns yellow or red nodes black for a randomly-assigned number of days between 0 and 18. When a once-red node turns red again, this is called “rebelling”. While black, these nodes are called “traitors”.

2. *Arrest:* when a rebel dot receives a grey sprite the second time, and every time thereafter, a box appears around it representing a prison cell. The box lasts for a randomly-assigned number of days during which the node can't emit sprites. It can only receive black sprites. However, when a red node is arrested, it causes all of the yellow nodes in it's network to turn red and black nodes turn yellow.

3. *Kill:* a random # of rebel nodes “die” rather than become imprisoned when receiving a grey dot after changing back to red. When this happens the node turns into a red "X" and does not change colors. It continues to emit red sprites but those sprites convert yellow dots to red with one transmission and black to yellow with one transmission.

*The Mubarak Dot*

Later version of the simulation will represent Mubarak’s regime with a large single purple dot. This dot emits black and gray sprites that convert dots with a single transmission from any color to either black or gray, respectively.

*The Muslim Brotherhood Effect*
When the 'revolution' ends, a randomized number of nodes (no more than 15% of the total population including red, black, and yellow dots) turn green. Dots that turn green can change the outcome of the revolution. If, after the ‘Muslim Brotherhood effect’, there are now more dots of the previously-losing color, that color now wins the revolution.

The Nour Party Effect

When the 'revolution' ends, a randomized number of nodes (no more than 2% of the total population) turns dark green. Dots that turn dark green can change the outcome of the revolution. If, after the ‘Nour Party effect’, there are now more dots of the previously-losing color, that color now wins the revolution.

Interpreting the Simulation

This computer simulation is intended to model the idea that there are differences in the relative ‘conversion efficiencies’ of different channels used to communicate the range of messages that were in the air, so to speak, during the 18 Days of Tahrir in 2011. Beyond that basic point, this simulation cannot be said to accurately portray anything like actual, fixed ratios of the conversion efficiencies of all of the possible channels of communication that were available in this period. Each of the five types of channels in the model is a gross simplification of its category - to take one example, type A, ‘online’ or social media, is a vast space with an exponentially growing number of platforms. Comparing the arguably two largest platforms in this space, Facebook and Twitter, one would need to take into account how many Egyptians in Tahrir Square on each of the 18 Days had either or both account(s). Were both platforms used equally? Was one used for certain types of messages and the other for a different sort? How quickly is a status update on Facebook disseminated to in- and out-of network individuals based
on the topic of the status versus on a Tweet that can use a hashtag to propagate a message to anyone following the hashtag as opposed to the specific person sending the Tweet?

These are intriguing questions for a different study or model or perhaps a later interaction of this model. The current iteration of the model only endeavors to demonstrate the possible outcomes of a simulated revolutionary interval based only on shifts in day 0 starting conditions and predetermined channel conversion efficiencies.

Other Questions to be Addressed in Future Versions of the Simulation

In the real-world situation of Tahrir Square during the 2011 revolution, how willing were people be to change their engroupment networks? There were factors at play in determining these potentialities. If a smaller member network was surrounded by an ideologically distinct and larger member network, would the smaller network succumb? Would it feel like a captive audience or would it find means to access people and engroupments closer to them on the ideological spectrum?

Presently, if a yellow dot is surrounded by an uneven number of red versus black dots, it will more quickly change color to the one with the higher quantity in its vicinity - this is a spatial conversion effect. Spatially, what matters in the network is the neighbors - proximity is significant. Online channels of communication are able to transcend spatial epistemics - this, however, presents a challenge for coding because it requires combining the online and offline environments and recalibrating the frequencies and efficiencies but also account for a much larger number of people involved in interactions, or initiation attempts.

Engroupment is currently part of a distribution function so dots currently engroup at random. The channels are also randomly distributed and dynamic. That is, depending on the
given turn and the operating parameters during that interval, a dot’s communication channel will shift to conform with the available frequency and efficiency level. All the dots therefore can partake in any of the communicative channels. In an 18-day period, each of the dots will have used all five channels, including the yellow dots that change colors. So long as they're yellow, however, yellow dots participate by absorbing messages but they do not emit. Would it make more sense for yellow dots to ‘repeat’ whatever messages they receive until they convert to red or black?

It is useful to be able to measure the impact of the basic assumptions of application in relation to each other. By adjusting the model using real-world data to approximate historical behavior, one can get a better sense of how the basic assumptions work in relation to one another and how they each effect the outcome.

For a statistically significant view of how this simulation is operating, a future version will allow the user to turn off the animated windows, speed up the simulation run time, and automate the extraction of the results into structured spreadsheets that adumbrate them numerically. This way, the revolution can be simulated thousands of times in seconds and the results can be mathematically analyzed to pinpoint patterns of behavior and make determinations about the effects of each assumption built into the model. This is also where machine learning could play a role. A computer could modify the weights in relation to the numbers of people involved in the real-world events as well as their accounts of issues of relative conversion efficiencies, channel types, and engroupment dynamics. With a machine learning model, the simulation could be automatically modified until it generated results that are statistically significantly more similar to historical happenings and thereby visualize the theoretical
frameworks and findings of sociolinguistic and linguistic anthropological studies conducted in the field.

6.6 Main Findings: Revolutionary Voices and Identities

I have defined revolutionary and counter-revolutionary discourse where ‘discourse’ is understood as a type of social ‘action’. Both of these types of discourse do related (adversarially) work in their respective settings. Bakhtin’s conception of ‘polyvocality’ and 'dialect' adds depth to the project of explaining how a discourse of revolution, or uprising, was socialized, or socially institutionalized, how it is defined in its opposition as a genre and is thus polyvocal itself and a mode of identity, which I interpreted in terms of what I call 'oppositionism'. Butler’s rules of ‘speakability’ helped to frame “revolutionary discourse” as a breach of the status quo ante of the enregisterment of Arabic (Butler 2002:133); the revolutionaries spoke Egyptian Colloquial Arabic to government authorities to establish a voice of the people while, at once, railing against and, in effect, destroying the institutionality of the incumbent regime through language.

Revolutionary discourse then constitutes a ‘new speakability’ established by the revolutionaries against the rules of the ‘old speakability’, its opposite. Indeed, the pre-Arab Spring terms of "forced narratives" were displaced and transcended by the language of revolution. Butler explains that “[t]he question is not what it is I will be able to say, but what will constitute the domain of the sayable within which I begin to speak at all” (Butler 2002:133).

The 2011 Egyptian revolution, from the vantage point of language and action theory, was realized, in part, through semiotic processes of re-registerment and counter-registerment where new, more popularized, forms of politics and political identity were forged. These new communicative forms facilitated the consolidation of revolutionary identities and the
coordination of thousands upon thousands of individuals and smaller engroupments of protestors into larger revolutionary formations that, in the right place, Tahrir Square, repeated over a consecutive period of time, the eighteen days, brought down the Mubarak regime after three decades of authoritarian rule. Multimodality, channel conversion efficiency (CCE), and the "production of discourse" are key conceptual elements of this theoretics. They comprise the framework through which an anthropology of revolution could be extrapolated for the micro-events examined in this dissertation as part of the 2011 Egyptian Arab Spring revolutionary uprising. I demonstrated how forms of activism during the eighteen days of Tahrir were not temporary states but, rather, contributed to the rhematization of revolutionary voices and identities that could, and indeed have, outlast the short-lived institutional victories the Egyptian revolution wrought after Mubarak’s resignation on the 11th of February, 2011. These findings, this linguistic anthropology of revolution, along with Heller's conception of a genealogy, quite similar to Foucault's (1972) 'archaeology', compel me to persist in my ongoing curiosity as to how institutions and institutional identities are socially and linguistically formed, destroyed, and reformed (Heller 2007:137).

6.7 Emergence of “The People” ('aš-ša‘b)

Related to Khalifa’s aphorism about revolutions as never ending for the individuals who participated, is the phenomenon that in post-2011 Egypt there is a collective identity, a newly formed meta-system (Bateson 1935) that was forged in the experiences of the individuals interacting in the public sphere (Habermas 1962) to both deliberate together and, as Fraser argues, “contest” together. That perception of being united, of sharing an identity with a set of symbols and a perception of collectivity, or gestalt, gave rise to the principle slogan-chant of the
revolutionary movements across the region and, with it, to an irreversible “new Arab public” (Lynch 2006): aš-ša’b yuri:d ’isqaːt an-niḏaːm (‘the people will the toppling of the regime’), where ‘people’ is the operative term. Merleau-Ponty’s conception of ‘corporeity’, and later his development of inter-corporeity, is illustrated in the coming together of thousands of individuals and groups to form larger, more complex, horizontal hierarchies in a defined, public space to communicate a single message, be it “get out”, “reform the government”, “change,” “freedom”, “human rights,” or “dignity”. Like Merleau-Ponty’s ‘etre au monde’ (being in the world), there is something about ‘being in protest’ that re-defines, as Thomassen suggests, the old lines of what makes a revolution tick – leadership, a cognitive and epistemic state or stance (Foucault 1980, Chafe 1986), in Tahrir Square was distributed rather than concentrated as millions of people participated in different kinds and levels of activism to contribute in joint commitment (Clark 1996; Gilbert 2014) to the (re-)production of ‘revolution’.

Oberschall’s (1992) description of social movement theory, an overview, discusses Le Bon’s defining contribution to the field. For Le Bon, social movements are born out of uncertainty in a crowded public space and in a moment of leaderlessness (Ross 2011), a chaotic, primordial ‘herd instinct’ overtakes the masses and they huddle and form a mob with a shared, alarmist, destructive mentality. Le Bon, in other words, was re-articulating a Hobbesian worldview of human nature. That is where social movement theory, arguably began, but that has given way to more complex perspectives over time. Some have argued that the American revolution was spurred by a Lockean worldview whereby human nature is essentially good but must be governed and kept in check so as not to overrun minorities and the weak; still more optimistic would be Rousseau’s view of freedom wherein, if truly left to our own devices,
without government or structure, human beings would flourish in peaceful, equitable societies. In many ways, the clashes in the literature over how to define ‘youth’ and what youth means in the context of public violence, civil unrest, and revolution, redraw the classical debates in philosophy about human nature itself. In the context of this debate, the youth often take the place of human nature’s capacity for evil if left unchecked by a higher authority. The analogy almost demands the role of a parental figure to reign in the wily, dangerous children.

6.8 Youth Revolution?

The Egypt described by the French historian, Jacques Berque, who wrote in 1960 about Egypt in the 1920s and ‘30s is not all that distinct from the portrayal of 2011 Egypt with regard to the role of youth. Albert Hourani’s forward to the book describes Berque’s understanding of Egypt and the region as ‘masterful’. In the long tome, Berque devotes an entire chapter to “the rise of the youth” and relates this ascension to the revolution of 1919 as well as the wide-reaching reforms of the 1920s and ‘30s, and sees its logical bookend as the ‘aggressive socialist revolution’, or “bloodless coup”, of the 1952 officer’s movement that brought Gamal Abdel-Nasser into power after he overthrew Egypt’s first revolutionary president.

For Berque, the energy of Egypt’s youth against the British occupiers and their frustration with the monarchy was explainable by all the usual suspects of the pre-Saidian, and indeed pre-Hymesian anthropology of youth, namely: sexual frustration, lack of jobs, over-education, general malaise with respect to religion and traditional culture, and fiery charismatic leaders promising change and improvement. While this analysis is more arm-chair theorizing than rigorous, ethnographic attention to ‘the particular’ and what Levi-Strauss called the “micropolitics of macropolitics”, it does tell us something about how the category of “youth”
was conceived of by respected scholarly authorities and helps to explain why such views perdure(d). Berque’s description of Ali Mahir Pasha’s—prime minister of Egypt in 1936, 1939-1940, and twice more in 1952 up until the Officers’ Revolt led by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser—attempts to quash the revolutionary spirit among Egypt’s youth has, however, proved to be less dated. Like post-2011 Egypt, post-1919 Egyptian society was rearing for major shifts in politics and Egypt’s economic standing. This led the government to seek changes that were more symbolic than practical to quell this desire. The prime minister gave many speeches about the need to serve Egypt by going back to work and going indoors and leaving the public squares. Advice that would be echoed by Egyptian authorities during and after the 18 Days of Tahrir.

Alexander, Bassiouny, and Sroka-Miller (2014) challenge the notion that Egyptian youth were largely responsible for the revolution, or that they played a leading role in the occupation of Tahrir. Alexander et al examines the role of trade unions and organized workers groups in leading collective action campaigns against the Mubarak regime in the years prior to the revolution. The trade unionists and labor rights groups played critical roles in organizing people in Tahrir Square and remained active in opposing overreach by Mohammed Morsi and current president Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi. Alexander et al’s findings are based on ten years of research on Egyptian labor groups and labor rights movements. Their analysis resonates with Sakr’s (2013:49, 74) examination of unionists’ roles in the revolution, as well as my ethnographic research in Cairo in 2005-2006, which began weeks before the presidential election in early September 2005. During that first phase of my time in Egypt, I observed daily protests numbering from hundreds to thousands in front of and near the Egyptian national court. These
demonstrations were organized by workers’ rights groups who had prepared professional-looking banners and rehearsed slogan chants in advance.

Furthermore, a poll conducted in Tunisia and Egypt in 2013 called The Arab Barometer found that while Tunisian protesters were “disproportionately young,” with 35% below the age of 24, Egyptians were not. 59% of the Egyptian revolutionaries were working age, ranging from 25 to 44 years old.

6.9 Revolution is an Energy: “Demonstrations Just Don't Stop”

I spoke with a long-time activist about her experiences in large protests in the United States and Europe. She asked to remain anonymous. We talked about several protests she had participated in and what her motivations were. She described the feeling she experienced at these events:

When I feel drained or down I'll go to a gathering to protest anything because it gives me something. It wakes me up again. It's the very energy that governments seek to control. We feel it individually on a smaller scale when we understand or deconstruct something. In gatherings with others, we also feel protected. In Egypt, there was no fear of police officers or tanks or tear gas. Everyone had one message, "we want freedom".

That feeling of engroupment under a common cause, with a shared slogan and a physical direction toward which to march together, emboldened the protesters and, in turn, shook the foundations of government institutions. The actual power of the state that is granted to representatives in democracies and authoritarians in autocracies and militocracies can be understood through this framework as the ability to control the energy that is generated by people acting in unison:

It's a feeling we're not often allowed to experience. Besides at church, temple, or mosque, or in sports gatherings, we're rarely permitted to feel connected with others in a shared space at the same time with a set of common goals.
There are rules and laws that regulate when and how people can gather in nearly every country. In Egypt, in November of 2013, months after the military-backed coup that deposed Muhammad Morsi, it became illegal for people to gather in public in any public spaces in groups larger than ten without government approval. Government authorities must be notified at least three days in advance and the law specifically prohibits demonstrations at places of worship. Traditionally, the mosques are where the largest and most impactful Egyptian protests have originated, following Friday prayers. The law is designed to assure that only the government has the power to unite people in large numbers behind a specific goal.

The law allows secret police to determine whether a gathering poses a threat to "public order" and to, therefore, order it to end or preemptively prohibit it from ever taking place. Such gatherings can include "political campaign meetings", thus giving authorities the ability to obstruct political organizing at virtually all levels. While citizens can appeal such a decision in court, the law does not specify a deadline for rulings on these cases, which makes it possible for protracted delays that can push decisions and permits to points in time sufficiently after the momentum behind an issue has faded.

Hazem El-Beblawi, the Prime Minister at the time, announced that this new law would not be a complete ban on protesting but that, rather, it was a form of regulation:

The starting point for this law is that the right to protest is a human right and must be given full care and attention... It is just that practicing this right must be met with a sense of responsibility so it won’t damage security or terrorize or assault establishments.118

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The punishments for breaking the ban on street protests are severe. If a protester is found to have acted violently in any way, the penalty carries a seven-year prison sentence. Protesters who cover their faces, obstructing identifying features or to protect themselves from the effects of tear gas, can incur up to one year of imprisonment. The punishment for protesting outside a place of worship is also a year in jail. Attending or participating in an unauthorized demonstration can lead to $1,500 in fines - more than many Egyptians who have jobs make in several months.\footnote{Mackey, Robert. Nov. 25, 2013. "Egyptians Vow to Fight New Protest Ban." The New York Times. Accessed April 5, 2017. Available: https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/25/egyptians-vow-to-fight-new-protest-ban/?action=click&contentCollection=Middle%20East&module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article}

The irony of SCAF revoking the right to protest after coming to power on the back of a movement they worked so hard to portray as a "second revolution" was not lost on Egyptian online activists:

\begin{verbatim}
The Big Pharaoh
@TheBigPharaoh

Definition of irony: a government that reached power after huge protests decided to pass a protest law that actually curbs protests.
6:23 PM - 24 Nov 2013

Samer Al-Atrush
@SameralAtrush

Banning protests in Egypt is like banning lex n other countries, considering how presidents and governments are brought in here
7:22 AM - 25 Nov 2013
\end{verbatim}
For an Egyptian human rights observer in Cairo in 2013, Karim Medhat, it was clear that the SCAF perceives protests as:

[Crimes] in the making and a misuse of public space, and every single one of these draft proposals [of the protest ban] was an attempt to control public space and - as much as power dynamics allowed - to criminalise protest.

Despite SCAF's attempts to use the law to intimidate and prevent people from protesting, activists are not convinced of the government's ability to implement a complete ban:

This government might have been able to consolidate its power in a way its predecessors were never able to, but I don't think that's going to last very long. This law is still unimplementable (in a comprehensive rather than a selective manner) unless they decide to spend all state resources on chasing demonstrators all day because demonstrations just don't stop.

In fact, the day the protest ban was passed there were already protesters demonstrating in the streets of Cairo. One journalist, Kareem Fahim, tweeted images of the protesters who chose to immediately disobey the law:

![Image of protesters demonstrating](image-url)
Another activist, Aaron Rose, tweeted an image of Egyptians specifically violating the rule against protesting at mosques - they gathered at Al-Azhar, which is both a major mosque and a historic university:

An activist who only identifies by the Twitter handle @kikhote posted an image of Tahrir Square shortly after the law was passed. It did not take long for SCAF to execute a complete military blockade of the square, even from vehicular traffic:
Only days after the passage of the law against protesting, reports detailed the beating and imprisonment of human rights activists who publicly demonstrated in opposition.\(^\text{120}\) Despite strong state efforts to curtail demonstrations and block access to Tahrir Square, protestors have devised methods of resistance and employed facultative improvisations to maintain their connection to the revolutionary space and its identity-giving spirit.

A 2016 *New Yorker* article about the Positive Lexicography Project examines emotion words in various languages that describe types of happiness that may not exist in all languages. One term, *Heimat*, struck me as particularly relevant to the post-Mubarak experience of Egyptian revolutionaries who have maintained their identities as revolutionaries in the face of governmental challenges to such claims and narratives. 121 “Heimat” is a German term that the author defined as a “deep-rooted fondness towards a place to which one has a strong feeling of belonging.” This notion of the spirit of a place and the relationships people develop with those places, along with the Yagán word, *mamihlapinatapehi*, for “a look between people that expresses unspoken but mutual desire” begins to encapsulate the revolutionary energy, or ša‘bīyya, that keeps Egyptian revolutionaries interconnected under the counter-revolutionary military regime of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

Anthes’s article also notes that in Arabic a word exists, *tarab*, that connotes “musically induced ecstasy or enchantment.” This is a positive experience that is shared by a collectivity, such as in a concert, or a protest in which music is incorporated for messaging. The use of music, as was demonstrated in chapter 5, facilitates the production and distribution of polemical messaging, and, in addition, impels identify formation and configuration processes that can bind individuals together into gestalt political bodies.

### 6.10 The Future for Tahrir Revolutionaries: “Springs Come Again and Again and Again”

In May of 2017, I attended a conference in Washington, D.C. where an Egyptian parliamentarian of the Muslim Brotherhood’s post-Mubarak political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, was

an invited speaker. At his request, I have omitted his name and changed several of the facts to protect his identity. I will refer to him only as “MP” (‘member of parliament’). A fluent English speaker, he mostly used English in his conversation with me about the 2011 revolution. He had a subtle British influence in his pronunciation of most words. He consistently popped his /t/, emphasized and trilled his /r/, with few notable exceptions of rhoticity (line 58: Tahrir means liberation). He elongated and diphthongized inter-consonantal vowels (e.g. ‘again’ is /aːɡaɪn/, ‘fail’ is /faːjɪl/, etc). I chose to maintain conventional spellings, however, for clarity and because my analysis of this exchange is more about the content of the message than its form. He regularly pronounced “Egypt” with a heavy stress on the first vowel and elided the rest of the word as if it were an enclitic: /Éːɡp/. Again, I chose to maintain a more readily legible orthography for this tract.

My questions centered around the ways in which the Muslim Brotherhood, and Egyptians in general, continue to identify with the Tahrir revolution. I provided far more backchannel cues than I typically do in sociolinguistic interviews such as this because of the very social setting we were in and partly to keep his attention given the competition for it at the time.

In response to my first question about whether the revolution failed, he twice exclaimed “no” and then proffered a more in-depth exposition on the unending longevity of the Arab Spring:

1. Me: did it fail?
2. MP: no, !.
3. Me: Is the revolution over?
4. MP: no, !.

[Several short exchanges omitted]
no. it did- they:- Arab Spring: . did not fai::l . it cannot fail
springs come agai::n and agai::n and agai::n
ah:: the Arab Spring is a representa::tion of the wishes and ho:pes of the people
who have been oppress::ed for decá::des ,

(2.0)

if- . o:only when human be::ings in the Arab world disappear .
the Arab Spring will disappear
eh: and as long as human beings are still there . they will be demanding the full:: idéas
of the Arab Spring . They wanted (the) change , . they wanted fréedom , .
they wanted social justice and they wanted human dignity .
and o:only on these you can build economic prosperity ^

Me: mhm

(2.0)

MP: and the:y:: ^ these are legitimate rights ^ . this- these are the rights no::w ^
Me: mhm
MP: people in the Arab world , . especially in Egypt ta::sted the taste of freedom ,
Me: %ri:ght%
MP: so they’re not gonna give it up , . yes there is a fear state now ,
yes there is a police state
in Egypt now . but people are resist:ing , . this resistance can be military resistance
intellectual resistance media resistance
street protests are still going on until today ^ after four years ^.
we have sixty thousands political prisoners are in jail and the number is increa:sing ^
but people are not stopping . yes it is becoming a police state ,
it kills people in the streets ^
Me: %yes%
MP: many people get dis-appeared . but is still people resisting
there is- . we were able to make a parliament outside of Egypt ^.
Me: %mhm%
MP: we were- we're fo:rming now into political opposition . outside of Egypt
we’re having . a goo::d con-versa::tion ,

[Interruption]

eh:: we- . in Istanbul:1 . in many other different parts
and ahh . we are coming with a national assembly
all those who are hu:rt and éve-ryone is hu:rt by the mili-tary %re- regime in Egypt% , .
so the . (tsk) the myth: ^ that . the Arab Spring is o::ver
I was, and continue to be, interested in the Egyptian Arab Spring revolutionary movement, the subsequent ascension of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi to the presidency in June of 2012 (Azab and Lamiss 2012), and the Brotherhood’s decision to separate its political activities from its social and religious spheres by creating the Freedom and Justice Party - the party to which the MP I spoke to currently belongs.

Morsi was ousted after only one year, in 2013, by the man he had promoted to minister of defense, Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi (Brownlee et al. 2015; Torelli 2015). At the time, many claims were made in the Arab media both for and against the move by El-Sisi to depose Morsi; those in favor of the coup argued that the Muslim Brotherhood had overstepped its bounds when Morsi hurriedly formed a constitutional committee that was largely staffed by Muslim Brothers. The committee was perceived to have rushed out a document without input
from Egypt’s other political parties and major social contingents, including secular Wafdist, women in general, and Coptic Christians, but also the more conservative Salafi Muslims of the Nour party, among others (Hassan 2015; Khalifa 2015; Ninet and Tushnet 2015; Arjomand 2015). Furthermore, in December of 2012, Morsi used a presidential fiat to strip the judiciary - which has traditionally enjoyed a high level of popular support - of its power to review presidential decrees and, eo ipso, of its ability to overturn aspects or articles of the new constitution, along with Morsi’s many political appointments, and other potential unilateral moves he could make in the future (El-Bastawissy and Hesham 2009; Hazri 2013; Sprusansky 2013).

Those against El-Sisi and SCAF’s coup, however, argued that Morsi, while he was incontrovertibly flawed, was the legitimately-elected democratic president of Egypt for a four-year term and that it was anti-democratic, and, in fact, regressive to support, in effect, a military coup d’état that overthrew a civilian president, placed him under house arrest, and seized control of the government for an ‘interim period’ under martial law (Smith 2013). Another basic question for further study that remains is: Given Morsi’s, arguably, egregious political actions as president, did his discursive practices add insult to injury, so to speak, or, rather, mitigate the effects on Egypt’s publics of his peremptory policymaking style? In other words, how effective of a communicator was Morsi in his public addresses? With that, do Egyptians feel that his public oratory helped or hindered him as a political figure?

Egypt’s revolution toppled Mubarak in eighteen days but has yet to establish a durable democratic order. With El-Sisi—and therefore SCAF and elements of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party—in power (again), Tahrir’s revolutionaries’ work may not yet be over.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1: T-Test Calculations

*via SocSciStatistics

Significance Level:

☐ .01
☒ .05
☐ .10

One-tailed or two-tailed hypothesis?:

☐ One-tailed
☒ Two-tailed

Difference Scores Calculations

Treatment 1

\[ N_1: 2 \]
\[ df_1 = N - 1 = 2 - 1 = 1 \]
\[ M_1: 0 \]
\[ SS_1: 0 \]
\[ s^2_{1} = SS_1/(N - 1) = 0/(2-1) = 0 \]

Treatment 2

\[ N_2: 2 \]
\[ df_2 = N - 1 = 2 - 1 = 1 \]
\[ M_2: 0.01 \]
\[ SS_2: 0 \]
\[ s^2_{2} = SS_2/(N - 1) = 0/(2-1) = 0 \]

T-value Calculation

\[ s^2_{p} = ((df_1/(df_1 + df_2)) * s^2_{1}) + ((df_2/(df_2 + df_2)) * s^2_{2}) = ((1/2) * 0) + ((1/2) * 0) = 0 \]
\[ s^2_{M_1} = s^2_{p}/N_1 = 0/2 = 0 \]
\[ s^2_{M_2} = s^2_{p}/N_2 = 0/2 = 0 \]
\[ t = (M_1 - M_2)/\sqrt{(s^2_{M_1} + s^2_{M_2})} = 0/\sqrt{0} = -4.92 \]

The \( t \)-value is \(-4.91935\). The \( p \)-value is \( .038926\). The result is significant at \( p < .05\).
Appendix 2: Gamal Abdel Nasser Speech Transcription

Prior Text: Abdel Nasser (17m:55s-20m:07s):

1. lā’ l-(i)š- ša’b kollo
   no. for-the-people all-(of)-him
   No. It must be for all the people [echo1]

(2.0)

2. mā fiš in-nôṣṣī fi-l-mîya .
   not there-isn’t the-half percent .
   There is no such thing as 50% only

3. mā fiš it-ṭabaq il-mustağilla il: eh kānet
   not there-isn’t the-class the-extorter the:(filler) eh(filler) was-she
   There is no such thing as the extortionist class that would [echo2]

4. tamlik sarawât w tamlik il-mašānī’ w tæ̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̇̈
there the-banks the-foreign:gn: in-the-accounts.
in foreign bank accounts [echo2,5]

10. is-sirīya fi-(s)-swīrār. hôwa da_ l-iddixār.
the-secret in-Switzerland. he_ this_the-savings
secretly in Switzerland; this is what is meant by savings [echo2,5]

11. lākin miš ḏarūrī ‘aban yikūn (il)-iddixār ‘ala śān ‘istīsmā:r.
but not necessary ever to he-is (the)-savings for investment.
However, it is not at all necessary that these savings be for investment purposes [echo2,5]

and no he-faces problems the-excess in-the-inhabitants.
and Egyptian Society does not face the problems of overpopulation

13. ’izā ’arād is-sukkān ’inna_hom yizīdō , yizō:do: !
if he-wanted the-inhabitants that-they increase, they-increase: !
If the population (lit. ‘the inhabitants’) wants to increase, then it will increase!
[anecho5,6, echo1]

[ closes eyes, tilts head back to jut chin, raises right hand palm up indexing nonchalance with /yizīdō/ and /yizō:do/ (‘so they increase’)] [reflex3]

(2.0)

14. zēy mā homma ‘āyīn.
same what they they-want(pl.)
in accordance with what they want (‘as they please’) [echo1]

[ repeats the ‘increasing’ gesture, makes a grimace culturally indexing cold-heartedness] [reflex3]

[reads] [reflex2]
15. w yaklō . 'izā lāʾū ḏakla , yaklō: muzámaṣla
and they-eat . if they-found(pl.) food , they-eat-it: (out of a) muzamaṣla
and they’ll eat, but only if they find food will they do so. If they do, they’ll eat their fill
[echo1,6]

16. w w_mišš yaklō gō::w‘ ḏayaklō ḏēyya ḥāga .
and and_not they-eat(pl.) hu:::nger ḏayaklō any thing .
and what if they don’t eat? they go hungry then. They’d eat anything

(4.0) [reflex4]

[man in audience shouts something inaudible; Abdel Nasser’s gaze turns left - reflex 5]

17. we:lā ya‘išo baṣal , .
or-else they-live onion , .
or live off of onions [echo1,6]

[holds up right hand, fingertips pursed, then opens fingers, lowers hand; indexing apathy - r6]

18. da_ l-mogtama‘ mogtama‘ ṣi-tābaqa
this_the-society society the-class
So is the society known as the class-based society

19. mogtama‘ tahālof il-‘iqtā’ ma‘ ra’s il-māliya .
society alliance the-feudalism with capitalism .
This is the fate of the society that allies with, and adopts, the feudalism that comes with capitalism [anecho1, echo6]

[shrugs shoulders, indexing a ‘that’s all there is to it’ attitude - reflex7]

20. ’izā mā-lā’ōš ḏēyya ḥāga . ’izā mā-lā’ōš il-‘iš w_il-baṣal , yidfino !
if not-they-find any thing . if not-they-find the-life and_the-onion , they-are-buried !
In capitalism, if someone doesn’t find anything to eat, or anything to live off, or even an onion, then let that person die! [echo6]

[makes a serious facial expression, indexing gravity; see above image at19m:10s] [reflex1]

(2.0)
This! This is the philosophy, the attitude, of those who adopt and ally with the feudalism of capitalism! [anecho1, echo6]

But the Egyptian people reject this categorically [echo1]

[crowd in audience interrupts, chanting loudly, incomprehensibly]

The Egyptian people [echo1]

July 23, 1952

(The Egyptian people, in fact) eradicated this form of society completely

and became determined to give rise to a society based on the power of the working people
society the-hundred percent!
(based on) the society of the 100%!

30. mogtama’ iš-ša‘b kollo!
society the-people all-of-him!
(based on) the society of all the people!

[clenches fist, holding it in a vertical pose with thumb on top of bent index finger, quick pumping gesture with each syllable starting from /hadam hāda il-mogtama’ kollo/; reflex 1,8]
Appendix 3: Abdel Fattah El-Sisi Speech Transcription

“Palimpsest” Text: El-Sisi (10:27s - 12:09s):

1. ‘æhnāː ḏennisraḥ il- kalām da l- nnās kollāḥā
   weː ḏennisraḥ il- kalām da l- nnās kollāḥā
   We are explaining this issue carefully for all the people of Egypt [echo1]

2. ‘ašān tib’ā l- umūr wādha.
   because she-becomes the-issues clear.
   so all the related issues are understood clearly [echo1]

3. w mā ba’ās fīː ehhha
   and not remain thereː ehhha(filler)
   and not be-

4. šakl b-‘aškālː leh ya’nī (il-‘ān) w l- ’amr wādīḥ tamāman.
   type of-typesː for he-means (right-now) and the-issue clear completely
   one of those issues-, I mean-, now… the issue is actually totally straightforward

5. fa-l-‘amr, dahː il- ‘amn w il- qōm
   so-the-issue thisː the-security and the-nation
   For the matter at hand is that of security and the people of the nation of Egypt [echo1]

6. yitamm murā’ato b-šaklː kāmil.
   he-is-undertaken overseeing-his(obj.) in-way complete
   The people are, in fact, being taken care of perfectly

7. il-‘amr dā ḥa-yatimm taḥtī (l-) ’iṣrāf
   the-issue this will-be-completed under (the-) supervision (of)
   This matter (the new Suez Canal project) will be supervised by

8. il-quwwāt l-musallaḥaː il-quwwāt l-musallaḥaː il-quwwāt l-musallaḥaː il-quwwāt l-musallaḥaː il-quwwāt l-musallaḥaː il-quwwāt l-musallaḥaː il-quwwāt l-musallaḥaː
   the-forces the-armed or by
   the Egyptian Armed Forces or by

9. šarikāt miṣriya. w enā il-mu‘awwi. il- aːː
   companies Egyptian. and I the-planne. the- aːː(filler).
   Egyptian companies, and the princip…

10. [turns head left; r5] il-mu‘awwiln w ḏaḥāb ḏiṣ-šarikāt enā w ḏatmann
    the-heads and owners (of) the-companies I and I-hope
    The principals and CEOs (and) I, I hope
11. ennanā ’așūfhom innahārda ’asnā’ il- eh:::
we see-them today through the- eh::(filler)
that we will see them today during this…

12. . mowgūdīn (2.0) . ’așḥāb aș-šarikāt fēyn?
. present(pl.) (2.0) . owners the-companies where?
they are present… where are the CEOs?

(3.0) [reflex4]

13. El-Sisi: mā fiš flū::s
not there money
I don’t have enough money [*echo1,7]
[item 3 in E-R Chart; reflex9]

14. mā fiš flū::s! @@@@@@@@@
not there money! @@@@@@@@@
I don’t have enough money (laughs) [*echo1,7]

[audience laughter]

15. faḍḍallo
please(2p. pl. imp.)
At ease

(1.0)

16. ’eh::
’eh::(filler)

(2.0)

17. fa:::
fa:::(filler).

(2.0)

18. šarikāt madanīya šahīḥ.
companies civil true
Yes, the companies are civilian-owned, true
[see item 5 in E-R chart; reflex3,7]

19. lākin taḥt ʾišrāf l-quwwāt l-musallaḥa w ṣīr goz ʾl(lī) l-quwwāt
but under supervision the-forces the-armed and is part of the-armed
However, they will operate under the supervision of the Egyptian Armed Forces and part of the Armed Forces

20. l-musallaḥa ḫa-taʾmilō .
the-armed she-will-do-it
will do the work

(1.0)

21. # nigī l-nnoʾta it-tānīya ḫāḍritak eh:: ʾolt ʾinn niḥnā .
# we come to-the-point the-second sir eh:: I-said that we .
We now arrive at the second point… I said earlier that we

22. it-tamwil hinā ah:: binūk
the-financing here . ah::(filler) . banks
the financing here will come from banks [anecho1, echo2,5,6]

23. ʾagnabīya w ah::
foreign and ah::(filler)
(will come from) foreign (banks) and… [anecho1, echo2,5,6]

[image 2 (above): corresponds with mention of “foreign banks” - reflex1]

[swats at a fly with his right hand above his head] [reflex8]

24. eh:: yaʾnī . w mustasmīrūn ʾagānīb.
eh:: he-means . and investors foreigners
I mean, and foreign investors too [anecho1, echo2,5,6]
25. *enā ‘ārif ‘ann il-mašrīyīn ‘anduhom ḥas(ā)sīya min il-mowdō’.*

I know that the-Egyptians they-have sensitivity from the-topic.

*I know Egyptians are sensitive about the subject (of foreign financing)* [echo1, 2, 3, 5, 6]

26. *fa-s_s mah li. howwa il-mašrīyīn.*

So-allow me. he the-Egyptians

*So let me say, that’s just the Egyptian people (in general)* [anecho6, echo1]

[gestures with both hands in front of him with elbows out, open palms facing the audience, fingers together, fanning out from the center in consecutive waves] [reflex6, 7, 8, 9]

27. *hom l-mašrīyīn. mā enā ḥa-‘ōl le-hadrītak.*

That’s the Egyptian people, and I’ll tell you all [anecho4, 6, echo1]


I speaking on the-part that specialized in-digging the-canal

and I’m now addressing the segment of the population that will work on the digging of the canal

(1.0)

29. *dah (.5) enā ba’ōl l-il-mašrīyīn. koll il-mašrīyīn.*

this I say for-the-Egyptians. all the-Egyptians

*I say this for the Egyptian people, to all the Egyptian people* [anecho4, echo1]

(2.0)

30. *[winks; smiling; reflex3,9] yib‘ā sahm w sanad l- il- mašrīyīn.*

he-becomes (a) share and (a) support. for-the-Egyptians.

*There will be an opportunity for Egyptians* [anecho4, 5, 6, echo1] to have shares and support the project

31. *[raises eye brows; reflex3,7,9] sahm w sanad l-il mašrīyīn.*

share and support for-the-Egyptians

shares and a way of supporting the project (specially)

*for Egyptians* [anecho4, 5, 6, echo1]

32. $# homma ‘illī. hom ‘illī yedfa’o dah. w tithaṭṭ il-ḍawābiṭ.*

They will pay for this undertaking and they will call the shots [anecho4, 5, 6, echo1]

[# represents an audible breath, or sigh; reflex1, 4]
33. 'illī ʾitxallet is-sahmī dah.
   who left the-share this.
   They will take on the stocks of this project that were set aside for them [anecho4,5,6, echo1]

34. mā-nūš ḥall ġēr maʾl-maṣriyīn. yaʾnī il-mālīya
   we-don’t-have solution other with the-Egyptians. he-means the-financial
   There is no other solution other than with the Egyptian people [echo1], I mean,
   (control) the financial aspect [anecho4,5,6]

35. w it-ṭātīṭ.
   and the-planning
   and control the planning [anecho4,5,6]

[audience applause; El-Sisi looks down, reading, waves right hand downward to signal the
audience should stop clapping] [reflex2,4,6,8]

36. yibʾā howwa mā-lūš ḥall ġēr maʾl-maṣriyīn.
   he-becomes him he-doesn’t-have solution other with the-Egyptians
   There is no other solution than (doing this) with the Egyptian people [anecho6, echo1]
## Appendix 4: Echoic/Echoed-Reflex/Mirrored Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Utterance(s)</th>
<th>Reflex(s)</th>
<th>E/M?</th>
<th>Utterance(s)</th>
<th>Mirroring(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Abdel Nasser (12/21/1965)</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ištartak (10:31s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Echo, Mirrored</td>
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<tr>
<td>'I participated'</td>
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<tr>
<td>zby mā homma ṣaydin</td>
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<td>Echo, Mirrored</td>
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<td>in accordance with what they want ('as they please') [echo1]</td>
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<tr>
<td>mā ‘andūs ir-rāgil fi-l-bayt</td>
<td></td>
<td>Echo, Mirrored</td>
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<tr>
<td>the man doesn’t have it (the money) at home [echo1.7]</td>
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<tr>
<td>izā ‘arād is-sukkān</td>
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<td>Echo, Mirrored</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘inna_hom yizīdo , yiz[l]:do: !</td>
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<tr>
<td>If 'the inhabitants' want to increase, then they increase [anecho5,6, echo1]</td>
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<td>fi il-bunûk</td>
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<td>Anecho, Mirrored</td>
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<tr>
<td>il-lagnablî:u: . fi-l-ḥisâbât .</td>
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<td>in foreign bank accounts</td>
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</table>

### Abdel Nasser (12/21/1965) Utterance(s)
- ištartak (10:31s)
- 'I participated'

### El-Sisi (8/5/2014) Utterance(s)
- il-mu’awwilîn w ‘aṣḥāb ‘iš-šarîkât enâ w ‘atmanna
  - The principals and CEOs (and) I, I hope
- ne’melûhom sahm b-‘a’sra ginnê::y (12:40) [echo1]
  - I don’t have enough money [re-contextualizing joke, echo1.7]
  - well how? I’m not the one telling you. I don’t know. I don’t know. That’s something for the Egyptians to say
- it-tamwil hinâ . ah:: . bnûk
  - the financing here will come from banks

### Echoidity (E) and Reflexivity (R): “E-R” Chart

- **Echoidity (E)**: Presence of an echoic ormirrored response
- **Reflexivity (R)**: Presence of a reflexive response

### Reflex(s)
- Reflexes are indicated by the term 'Reflex(s)'.

### Utterance(s)
- Utterances are indicated by the term 'Utterance(s)'.

### Mirroring(s)
- Mirroring is indicated by the term 'Mirroring(s)'.

### Echoic/Echoed-Reflex/Mirrored Chart

* (*Echoidity (E)) and Reflexivity (R): “E-R” Chart*
Appendix 5: Campaign Images that Compare/Juxtapose El-Sisi and Abdel Nasser
Appendix 6: Tahrir Rhapsody Group Co-Participants, Satellites

Co-Participants And Satellites In The Interaction (*=Core, **=Leader):

0 - *CM [holding cellphone camera] - camera man, *not pictured*
1 - *BS* [back, center]- “Black Shirt”, sunglasses
2 - *BB* [front, right]- blue and black shirt, “Turban”
3 - *WS* [front, left]- white t-shirt, straight line sideburns
4 - MB [back left]- messenger bag, tall, khaki pants, blue button-up shirt, exits at 2:40
5 - *WB* [back, right] - white and blue shirt, collar turned up
6 - *SP* [middle right]- striped polo, older, mustache
7 - TS [behind BS right]- turquoise shirt, young boy, joins at 1:38
8 - LG [behind BS left]- light green shirt, young boy, joins at 1:38
9 - *GS* [between MB and WB, left edge]- forest green shirt
10 - SBw [behind MB, left] - sunglasses, beard, joins at 1:50
11 - SH [front of GB, right corner]- short-haired boy, joins at 2:05
12 - WSBCw [behind LG]- white shirt, black collar, joins at 2:16
13 - GSw [behind MB <= center]- gray shirt, watcher joints at 2:23, exits at 3:05
14 - Bw [behind MB]- boy onlooker, joins at 2:23
15 - BYw [behind TS/LG]- blue and yellow striped shirt, joins at 2:35, exits at 3:22
16 - TC [front of WT, left corner]- tan colored baseball cap, enters at 2:58, visible at 3:15
Appendix 7: Tahrir Rhapsody Group Transcription

Episode 1

34. Black Shirt ECA:  [d]eheb l-leylo ṭele’ l-fegro w-mM:bara: ra:  
34.1. Black Shirt Eng: the night's withdrawn, the morning's arisen, and Mubarak's out  
35. Band ECA: he^ he:::y^  
35.1. Band Eng: hey! hey!  
36. Black Shirt ECA: xāsri::: :ša:::bo ++fi-+++t-taḥrī:::r +++++’a::mallō::::::  
36.1. Black Shirt Eng: he lost his people in Tahrir, they undertook a revolution  
37. Band ECA: xāsri::: :ša:::bo ++fi-+++t-taḥrī:::r +++++’a::mallō::::::  
37.1. Band Eng: he lost his people in Tahrir, they undertook a revolution  
38. Striped Polo ECA: -%he^ he:::y^%  
39. Black Shirt ECA: šūṣ ’e:litlo sīb s-sōra w xalliha: ḥālha  
39.1. Black Shirt Eng: the chick told him to leave the revolution to itself  
40. Band ECA: šūṣ ’e:litlo sīb s-sōra w xalliha: ḥālha  
41. Band Eng: the chick told him to leave the revolution to itself  
(0.9)  
42. Black Shirt ECA: lemma sa’to: ’amn d-do:la w ‘āgab yiš+kar+ha”  
42.1. Black Shirt Eng: when they brought down the state security force, he came by to thank it  
43. Band ECA: lemma sa’to: ’amn d-do:la w ‘āgab yiš+kar+ha”  
43.1. Band Eng: when they brought down the state security force, he came by to thank it  
(0.4)  
44. Black Shirt ECA: w-bede:t +s-sō:::ra::: ++mqaṛṛa: ḥālo::: w [xxxx] f-il+bilā::: :::::d  
44.1. Black Shirt Eng: the revolution began, he decided himself to [inaudible] in the land  
45. Band ECA: w-bede:t +s-sō:::ra::: ++mqaṛṛa: ḥālo::: w [xxxx] f-il+bilā::: :::::d  
45.1. Band Eng: the revolution began, he decided himself to [inaudible] in the land  
(0.4)
46. Band ECA: w-'ebel_mā sā:::::::::::fir bil- 'insā:...............:'šir:...........++kellimōh iš-śa:..........:'b:
   46.1.Band Eng: before he traveled on the 12th, the people spoke to him
47. Black Shirt ECA: w-'ebel_mā sā:::::::::::fir bil- 'insā:...............:'šir:...........++kellimōh iš-śa:..........:'b:
   47.1.Black Shirt Eng: before he traveled on the 12th, the people spoke to him

(0.9)

Episode 2

48. Band ECA: be:le:;;;;:di:;;;;:
   48.1.Band Eng: my country
49. Striped Polo ECA: %ˇbe:::le:;;;;;;;;:di:;;;;;;;;:’%
   49.1.Striped Polo Eng: my country
50. Black Shirt ECA: (MB speaks to BS - inaudible - )
51. Band ECA: b-r-raxa mitbā:;;;;’a
   51.1.Band Eng: it was sold cheap
52. Band ECA: be:le:;;;;:di iš+++ḥō:;;;;:+yā:+gamā:’a
   52.1.Band Eng: my country, awaken oh people
53. Band ECA: be:le:;;;;:di , sammaḥom yā: gabā:;;;;: , be:le:;;;;:di:;;;;:
   53.1.Band Eng: my country, let them (go) oh strongman, my country
54. Black Shirt ECA: là mn-'ōl mn ‘awwel naṣṣ
   54.1.Black Shirt Eng: no, from the first, from the first word
55. Turban ECA: b-yiżma: il- kill+lo:;;;;:
   55.1.Turban Eng: brings everyone together
56. Band ECA: be:le:di:;;;;:
   56.1.Band Eng: my country
57. Black Shirt ECA: be:::l:;;;;;;;;:di:;;;;;;;;:the:;;;;;;;;:h#
   57.1.Black Shirt Eng: my country
58. Band ECA: be:le:;;;;:di:;;;;:
   58.1.Band Eng: my country
59. Black Shirt ECA: be:led il:::-ḥaḍārā:………………….t

59.1. Black Shirt Eng: the country of civilizations

60. Band ECA: bele:…………:di:…………:

60.1. Band Eng: my country

61. Black Shirt ECA: w-l’ah:…………rā:…………mā………………:%=t%

61.1. Black Shirt Eng: and the pyramids

62. Band ECA: be:::le:…………:di:…………:

62.1. Band Eng: my country

63. Black Shirt ECA: be:le:dak b-tbē:…………:'a#h#

63.1. Black Shirt Eng: your country is being sold

64. Turban ECA: be:le:dak b-tbē:…………:'a

64.1. Turban Eng: your country is being sold

65. Band ECA: be:::le:…………:di:…………:

65.1. Band Eng: my country

66. Black Shirt ECA: ʾiṣḥō::: yā: gamā:::'a#h#

66.1. Black Shirt Eng: awaken oh people

67. Turban ECA: ʾiṣḥō::: yā: gamā:::'a

67.1. Turban Eng: awaken oh people

68. Band ECA: be:::le:…………:di:…………:

68.1. Band Eng: my country

69. Black Shirt ECA: b-tbēya:…………:ʾal:…………(a) mī:…………n:…………:

69.1. Black Shirt Eng: it's being sold to whom?

70. Band ECA: be:::le:…………:di:…………:

70.1. Band Eng: my country

71. Black Shirt ECA: ʾiṣḥō:: yā:: nē::ymī:::…………n:…………:

71.1. Black Shirt Eng: awaken oh sleeping people

72. Turban ECA: ʾiṣḥō:: yā:: nē::ymī:::…………n:…………:
72.1. Turban Eng: awaken oh sleeping people

73. Band ECA: be::le:................:di:................

73.1. Band Eng: my country

74. Black Shirt ECA: b-t++++bē::'a: (i)b-kē::::::::m:::

74.1. Black Shirt Eng: it's being sold for how much?

75. Striped Polo ECA: b-t++++bē::'a: (i)b-kē::::::::m:::

76. Striped Polo Eng: it's being sold for how much?

77. Band ECA: be:::le:................:di:................

77.1. Band Eng: my country

78. Black Shirt ECA: ^se:lēmā::t yā:::::: 'anṣā:...............r:::::::

78.1. Black Shirt Eng: greetings to the supporters

79. Turban ECA: ^se:lēmā::t yā:::::: 'anṣā:...............r:::::::

79.1. Turban Eng: greetings to the supporters

80. Band ECA: be:::le:................:di:................

80.1. Band Eng: my country

81. Black Shirt ECA: b-t+++bē:........'aṟ-ṝ:........xī::ṣa::

81.1. Black Shirt Eng: it's being sold on the cheap

82. Band ECA: be:::le:................:di:................

82.1. Band Eng: my country

83. Black Shirt ECA: bē::::::'a::: f:::-ta::f++nī::::::sa::

83.1. Black Shirt Eng: sold in bullshit

84. Turban ECA: bē::::::'a::: f:::-ta::f++nī::::::sa::

84.1. Turban Eng: sold in bullshit

85. White Shirt ECA: bē::::::'a::: f:::-ta::f++nī::::::sa::

85.1. White Shirt Eng: sold in bullshit

86. Band ECA: be:::le:................:di:................

86.1. Band Eng: my country
Episode 3

87. Turban ECA: ṣō:::ft is-++++sō::l::::::ā::r::
   87.1. Turban Eng: I saw the diesel
88. Band ECA: be:::::::::le:.........d:::::::::::
   88.1. Band Eng: my country
89. Turban ECA: bē::::::::b id++dō::::::la::::::::r::
   89.1. Turban Eng: (regarding) the dollar
90. White Shirt ECA: :la:................r:::
91. Band ECA: be::::::le:...............d:::::::
   91.1. Band Eng: my country
92. Turban ECA: ṣo::::::ft il-++++aš:::::'a:................r:::::
   92.1. Turban Eng: I saw the prices
93. Band ECA: be::::::le:...............d:::::::
   93.1. Band Eng: my country
94. Turban ECA: b-t++wa:::ll:........a':::::: nā:................r:::::::
   94.1. Turban Eng: they set us on fire
95. White Shirt ECA: b-t++wa:::ll:........a':::::: nā:................r:::::::
   95.1. White Shirt Eng: they set us on fire
96. Band ECA: be:::::::le:...............d:::::::
   96.1. Band Eng: my country
97. Turban ECA: ṣō:::ft il:......be:........zī::::::i::n::
   97.1. Turban Eng: I saw the benzene
98. Band ECA: be:::::::le:...............d:::::::
   98.1. Band Eng: my country
99. Turban ECA: qā::::::m il:......-melā:...yī:................n:::
   99.1. Turban Eng: the millions (of people) arose
100. Band ECA: be:::::::le:...............d:::::::
100.1. Band Eng: my country

101. Turban ECA: šo:ft il:bū:†:rū:ō:il::

101.1. Turban Eng: I saw the petroleum

102. Band ECA: be:::le:::d::

102.1. Band Eng: my country

103. Turban ECA: ba:z:ey:ri'tō:

103.1. Turban Eng: "I'm taking advantage", say (it)

104. Band ECA: be:::le:::d::

104.1. Band Eng: my country

Episode 4

105. Turban ECA: o:: ba:ō: ir-ramla:: o: ba:ō: il-gā:z::

105.1. Turban Eng: either sell the sand or sell the gas

106. Band ECA: ba:ō: ir-ramla o:: ba:ō: il-gā:z::

106.1. Band Eng: sell the sand or sell the gas

107. Black Shirt ECA: wel:ā'yō:yzī::n (i)n:ha::r: gā:z::

107.1. Black Shirt Eng: we do not want to go to war on gas

108. Turban ECA: wel:ā'yō:yzī::n (i)n:ha::r: gā:z::

108.1. Turban Eng: we do not want to go to war on gas

109. Band ECA: welā'yō:yzī::n (i)n:ha::r: gā:z::

109.1. Band Eng: we do not want to go to war on gas

110. Turban ECA: w:: ǧa::znā:: rā::yiḥ:: Te::l A::bī::

110.1. Turban Eng: and our gas is going to Tel Aviv

111. Band ECA: ǧa::znā:: rā::yiḥ:: Te::l A::bī::

111.1. Band Eng: our gas is going to Tel Aviv

112. Turban ECA: 'a::n+dina 'az:::ma:: fi-l::'anā::bī::

112.1. Turban Eng: we have a crisis in the pipelines

113. White Shirt ECA: 'a::n+dina 'az:::ma:: fi-l::'anā::bī::
113.1. White Shirt Eng: we have a crisis in the pipelines

114. Band ECA: 'a::n+dina 'az:::ma::: fi-l-:-'anā:::bī:..........b

114.1. Band Eng: we have a crisis in the pipelines

115. Turban ECA: w:::: liss::a:::za:::h++ma::: l-l-(i)f:::++rā:.........t

115.1. Turban Eng: and still a crowded mess on the Euphrates

116. Band ECA: liss::a:::za:::h++ma::: l-l-(i)f:::++rā:.........t

116.1. Band Eng: and still a crowded mess on the Euphrates

117. Turban ECA: w iš:::ā:::'b %w%e'f 'ā:::o:::d 'a:::qa:.........r%f%

117.1. Turban Eng: the people have stood up, go sit on the sideline

118. Band ECA: [w iš:::ā:::'b %w%e'f'ā:::o:::d 'a:::qa:.........r%f%]

118.1. Band Eng: the people have stood up, go sit on the sideline

Episode 5

119. Black Shirt ECA: y:::ā:.........y:::ā:.........#h#

119.1. Black Shirt Eng: yo! ya!

120. Band ECA: y:::ā:.........y:::ā:.........#h#

120.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

121. Black Shirt ECA: y:::ā:.........y:::ā:.........#h#

121.1. Black Shirt Eng: yo! ya!

122. Band ECA: y:::ā:.........y:::ā:.........#h#

122.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

123. Black Shirt ECA: bid+nā:.........qa:.........nā:.........bil

123.1. Black Shirt Eng: we want bombs

124. Band ECA: y:::ā:.........y:::ā:.........

124.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

125. Black Shirt ECA: ḥukkā::m ta:::nā:.........bil

125.1. Black Shirt Eng: governors'll meet them

126. Band ECA: y:::ā:.........y:::ā:.........
126.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

127. Black Shirt ECA: bidnā: rusšā:sss:

127.1. Black Shirt Eng: we want bullets


128.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

129. Black Shirt ECA: ḥosni_l'ā:ssss:

129.1. Black Shirt Eng: Hosni is the papyrus


130.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!


131.1. Black Shirt Eng: we want dynamite


132.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

133. Black Shirt ECA: ḥosni_l'a: bī:ssss:

133.1. Black Shirt Eng: Hosni is the fool


134.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!


135.1. Turban Eng: know in your head


136.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

137. Turban ECA: ta:ra: xa:ša:k

137.1. Turban Eng: you know your end


138.1. White Shirt Eng: you know your end


139.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!
140. Turban ECA: xa:ːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

140.1. Turban Eng: what's your end?

141. White Shirt ECA: xa:ːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

141.1. White Shirt Eng: what's your end?

142. Band ECA: yːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

142.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

143. Band ECA: is-sowraːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

143.1. Band Eng: the revolution, Bey!

144. Striped Polo ECA: is-sowraːːːːːː部副

144.1. Striped Polo Eng: the revolution, Bey!

145. Turban ECA: is-sowraːːːːːː部副

145.1. Turban Eng: the revolution, Bey!

146. White Shirt ECA: is-sowraːːːːː部副

146.1. White Shirt Eng: the revolution, Bey!

147. Band ECA: yːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

147.1. Band Eng: yo! ya!

148. Unknown ECA: yːːːːːːːːːː部副

148.1. Unknown Eng: yo! ya!

**Transition**

149. Striped Polo ECA: b-aːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

149.1. Striped Polo Eng: I need to say, I'm all tired out

150. Turban ECA: b-ism_ːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

150.1. Turban Eng: in the name of God, the most-Merciful

**Episode 6**

151. Black Shirt ECA: yːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副

151.1. Black Shirt Eng: Oh Mubarak, you son of a fool
152. Band ECA: yāː mM::bāːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunction: 152. Band Eng: Oh Mubarak, you son of a fool

153. Black Shirt ECA: miš +++ḥe-nsī::ːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 153. Black Shirt Eng: we won't leave you alone once you clean up your act

154. Band ECA: miš +ḥe-nsī::ːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 154. Band Eng: we won't leave you alone once you clean up your act

155. Black Shirt ECA: 'all::ːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 155. Black Shirt Eng: raise and raise and raise the voice

156. Band ECA: 'all::ːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 156. Band Eng: raise and raise and raise the voice


Episode 7

159. Black Shirt ECA: yāːːːː mO::ːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 159. Black Shirt Eng: oh guide, what did he tell you?

160. Unknown ECA: yāː gamāːːːːaːː;

161. Unknown Eng: hey everyone

162. Black Shirt ECA: 'ebli māːː yemšī sēːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 162. Black Shirt Eng: before the Bey's time to leave goes by

163. Band ECA: 'ebli māːː yemšī sēːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 163. Band Eng: before the Bey's time to leave goes by

164. Black Shirt ECA: 'elːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːːː部副ordinating conjunct: 164. Black Shirt Eng: he told you to kill the revolutionaries
165. Band ECA: 'el::-lak+'a::-til++f-s::-u:ww:ā::-r
165.1. Band Eng: he told you to kill the revolutionaries

166. Black Shirt ECA: 'ell::-lak++iḍ+rab+f::-i-l-'aḥrā::-r
166.1. Black Shirt Eng: he told you to beat the free people

167. Band ECA: 'ell::-lak++iḍ+rab+f::-i-l-'aḥ+rā::-r
167.1. Band Eng: he told you to beat the free people

168. Black Shirt ECA: yā::-+mo:šī::-r++xod++qa::-rā::-ra::k
168.1. Black Shirt Eng: oh guide, make your decision

169. Band ECA: yā::-+mo:šī::-r++xod++qa::-rā::-ra::k
169.1. Band Eng: oh guide, make your decision

170. Black Shirt ECA: 'aḥ:se:n++++tib++a::- zeyy::- mM:bā::-ra::k
170.1. Black Shirt Eng: it's best you go the way of Mubarak

171. Band ECA: 'aḥse:n++++tib++a::- zeyy::- mMbā::-ra::k
171.1. Band Eng: it's best you go the way of Mubarak

172. Black Shirt ECA: yā::- mo:šī::rā::-++lē:zim-tax::tā::-r::-r::
172.1. Black Shirt Eng: oh guide (of ours), you must choose

173. Band ECA: yā::- +mo:šī::r+nā::- lē:zim-yex::tā::-r::-r::
173.1. Band Eng: oh guide (of ours), you must choose

174. Black Shirt ECA: bē::-n il-qūt+ala:: w_(i)s-so::wwā::-r::-r:
174.1. Black Shirt Eng: between the killers or the revolutionaries

175. Band ECA: bē::-n il-qūt+ala:: w_(i)s-so::wwā::-r::-r::
175.1. Band Eng: between the killers or the revolutionaries

176. Black Shirt ECA: ya::ll::i::: sā::-kit, sā::-kit++lī::-r::-r::-r::
176.1. Black Shirt Eng: he who's quiet, why's he quiet?

177. Band ECA: ya::ll::i::: sā::-kit, sā::-kit++lī::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::
177.1. Band Eng: he who's quiet, why's he quiet?

178. Black Shirt ECA: 'ē::-h f-da:: ḥa:'-'ak+wel:lā::- 'ē::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r::-r:-
178.1. Black Shirt Eng: so is this your right, or what?

179. Band ECA:  ḥa tela yel  ā:ē:::::

179.1. Band Eng: so is this your right, or what?

180. Black Shirt ECA:  ḥosnī: lī:: f:::-iš-šerem iš-š::ē:::::

180.1. Black Shirt Eng: why is Hosni in Sharm El-Sheikh?

181. Band ECA:  ḥosnī:: lī:: f:::-iš-šerem iš-š::ē:::::

181.1. Band Eng: why is Hosni in Sharm El-Sheikh?

182. Black Shirt ECA:  ḥosnī:::: lī:: f:::-iš-šerem iš-š::ē:::::

182.1. Black Shirt Eng: why is Hosni in Sharm El-Sheikh?

183. Band ECA:  ḥosnī:::: lī:: f:::-iš-šerem iš-š::ē:::::

183.1. Band Eng: why is Hosni in Sharm El-Sheikh?

184. Black Shirt ECA:  šaram iš-šē::x +a'rāfi:::: mašrī::ya:::

184.1. Black Shirt Eng: Sharm El-Sheikh is Egyptian land

185. Band ECA:  šaram iš-šē::x a::rāfi:::: maš+rī::ya:::

185.1. Band Eng: Sharm El-Sheikh is Egyptian land

186. Black Shirt ECA:  miš mal+gā' +l-l+ḥa:::rā:::mī::ya:::

186.1. Black Shirt Eng: not a sanctuary for criminals

187. Band ECA:  miš mal+gā' +l-l+ḥa:::rā:::mī::ya:::

187.1. Band Eng: not a sanctuary for criminals

188. Black Shirt ECA:  šaram iš-šē::x +xo::sā:::ra::: f:::::#h#

188.1. Black Shirt Eng: it's too bad about Sharm El-Sheikh

189. Band ECA:  šaram iš-šē::x xo::sā:::ra::: f:::#h#

189.1. Band Eng: it's too bad about Sharm El-Sheikh

190. Black Shirt ECA: sign +e:::t-ṭo:::ra::: 'aw lā:giyī::n

190.1. Black Shirt Eng: Tora Prison or (becoming) refugees

191. Band ECA: sign +e:::t-ṭo:::ra::: 'aw lā:giyī::n

191.1. Band Eng: Tora Prison or (becoming) refugees
192.

Turban ECA: ḥā::::ū:':'a:::lē:::::::nā::::::: 'ā:::::::::::::::lū:::::::"

192.1. Turban Eng: they argued to us, they told... (incomplete)

193.

Black Shirt ECA: @@

193.1. Black Shirt Eng: @@

END
Appendix 8: Initiation Paths to Engroupment
Engroupment Vignette 4

Engroupment Vignette 5
Appendix 9: Cognitive Blending and Emic (versus Etic) Event Summation Diagram

Example of cognitive blending for the expression form: “Long time, no X”. This is based on a diagram in Fauconnier and Turner (2002) with added notes to highlight aspects of the cognitive blending framework I find relevant to the Tahrir engroupments described in this chapter. Namely: generic and input spaces, construal, blending, emergent structure, abstraction, and emic event summation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</th>
<th>Translation of slogans</th>
<th>Directionality</th>
<th>Operative Terms</th>
<th>Figurative Trope, Metaphor Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>غاز وحواوشي..</td>
<td>tear gas and burgers.. the military and al-Ganzoury [Mubarak’s former prime minister] must walk</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>walking</td>
<td>body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>اضرب واسجن في الثوار.. دورك جائِر يا مجلس عاد</td>
<td>beat and imprison in [it] the revolutionaries.. your turn coming o shameful council</td>
<td>anti-gov’t (council)</td>
<td>striking/hitting</td>
<td>body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مجلس عسكر يا عنيد، كلنا خالد سعيد</td>
<td>O stubborn SCAF, we’re all Khaled Saeed</td>
<td>anti-military council (SCAF)</td>
<td>“…we’re all Khaled Saeed”</td>
<td>synecdochical, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوي يا حبيب حسني هاتئى ميه دبابة تدوسني</td>
<td>O dear Tantawi, Hosni gave me a hundred tanks to trample me</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>tanks “step” on me - body</td>
<td>body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خدعوا بالكم من الداخلية دي وزارة بلطجبة</td>
<td>Beware of the Interior, this ministry is thuggery</td>
<td>anti-gov’t (ministry of the interior)</td>
<td>“take mind” ('take heed') - noetic, body</td>
<td>noetic, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عسكر عسكر ليه..</td>
<td>military, military, why? is it (Egypt) an almshouse or something?</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>Egypt as almshouse, army as hungry wayfarer</td>
<td>structural, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يسقط حكم العسكر.. فكه حريه وناس يتفكر</td>
<td>[may] the military regime fall.. there’s freedom and people are thinking</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military ‘falling’</td>
<td>body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا مشير قول لعنان.. التورة لسه في الميدان</td>
<td>O Field Marshall [Tantawi], tell Anan [SCAF second in command], the revolution is still in the Square (Tahrir)</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>Tantawi is the military, revolution is personified,</td>
<td>synecdochical, metonymical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ماتعيناش.. ثورة كاملة إما بلاش</td>
<td>we haven’t tired.. a complete revolution or nothing</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>revolution, “or” (ultimatum)</td>
<td>path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عرض أختي غالي علي.. مش هنيبه للحرامية</td>
<td>my sister’s honor is invaluable to me.. I won’t forget it for thievery</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>sister’s honor (reference to woman stripped by soldier)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>المحلة قالتها قوية.. مش هنيسبب إخوتنا ضحية</td>
<td>Mohla City has been called strong.. we won’t let our brothers and sisters be sacrificed</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>Mohla as a person</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مش هجيب حق اللي مات.. برلمان أو انتخابات</td>
<td>It [democracy] won’t bring justice to one who has died, not a parliament or elections</td>
<td>anti-democracy, anti-revolution</td>
<td>democracy ‘bringing’ (or not)</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الثورات مش بلطجية ليه نتحكم عسكريا واكتب على حيطه الزنزانة &quot;حكم العسكر عار وخيران&quot; ويسقط يسقط حكم العسكر</td>
<td>The revolutionaries aren’t thugs, why are we governed militarily? and write on the cell wall “military rule is shameful and betrayal” and [may] military rule fall, [may it] fall</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military rule “falls”</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا عسكرى قول الحق البنت انضابيت ولا لأ وعسكر عسكر ليه.. إخنا صهاينة ولا لأ و&quot;المصرية متتعارش يا مجلس الأوابش&quot; ويسقط حكم العسكر.. بنى مصر الخط الأحم.. و&quot;ارفعي راسك ارفعي راسك.. رجلك أشرف من اللي داسك</td>
<td>O soldier, tell the truth, the girl was beaten, or not? and military, military, why.. are we Zionists or not? and an Egyptian woman will not be stripped, o [military] Council of scum, and [may] military rule fall, [may it] fall.. Egypt's daughter is the red line, and lift your head, lift your head [o daughter of Egypt]... your foot is more honorable than the one who stepped on you</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military rule &quot;falls&quot;</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا عسكر يا أوابش بنى مصر ماتتعارش</td>
<td>O military, o scum, a daughter of Egypt is not to be stripped</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military (institution) substitute for the people who comprise it</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سامع أم الشهيد ينداي مين ههيم حق أوالدى ويانجيجي حفهم يانموت زيهم</td>
<td>[do you] hear the mother of a martyr calling out who will bring justice to my children. We either bring them justice or we die like them.</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>mother of a martyr (genus); ‘bringing' justice</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أُهِلْهُ بِبَيْقَل أَهْلِهِ وَنَاسِهِ يُقِي عُمْلَهُ مِن سَاسَةِ لَرَاسِهِ</td>
<td>The one who kills his family members and his people is an agent from head to toe</td>
<td>anti-government</td>
<td>killing one's family; head to toe</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym; body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوي قول الحق حسن قاتل ولا لَا &quot;أ&quot;</td>
<td>O Tantawi, tell the truth, Hosni's a killer, is he not?</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak); anti-Mubarak, anti-government</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council, Mubarak for government</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا ميشير جري أيه غيرت شهادتك تاني ليه</td>
<td>O Field Marshall [Tantawi], what happened? why did you change your story [testimony] again?</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council, reference to his covering for Mubarak</td>
<td>metonymy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أنا مش جبان أنا مش جبان&quot;</td>
<td>I am not a coward, I am not a coward</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>&quot;I&quot; for every revolutionary (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أنا ميت ميت في الميدان&quot;</td>
<td>I am dead dead in the Square [Tahrir]</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>&quot;I&quot; for every revolutionary (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>هم معاهم مليارات و احنا سلاحنا الهنافات&quot;</td>
<td>they have billions, and us, our weapons are the chants</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>weapons are chants</td>
<td>ontological metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الرجالة في الميدان&quot;</td>
<td>the men are in the Square [Tahrir]</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>men as all revolutionaries; revolution in Tahrir Square</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym; structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>المخلوع ببحاكم مدني</td>
<td>the deposed one (Mubarak) will be tried in a civil court</td>
<td>anti-Mubarak, anti-government</td>
<td>Mubarak for government</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والعسكرى ببحاكم ابنى</td>
<td>and the military soldier will rule my son</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military for people who comprise it; my son for all Egyptians</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym; body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوى قول لعنان</td>
<td>O Tantawi tell Anan [SCAF second in command]</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi</td>
<td>Tantawi for military, Anan, for government</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لن يحكمها رئيس اركان</td>
<td>It will not be ruled by a Chief of Staff</td>
<td>anti-government, anti-military</td>
<td>Tantawi for military, Anan, for government</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوى غور غور</td>
<td>O Tantawi, go to hell, go to hell</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>فليس سقط حكم العسكر</td>
<td>military rule will definitely fall</td>
<td>anti-military, pro-revolution</td>
<td>military rule “falls”</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>اقتل خالد اقتل مينا</td>
<td>Kill Khaled [dead Muslim activist], kill Meena [dead Christian activist]</td>
<td>pro-revolution, pro-pluralism</td>
<td>Khaled for all Muslims, Meena for all Christians (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كل رصاصا بتفينا</td>
<td>Every bullet makes us stronger</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>bullet strengthens</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كذدوا علينا وقالوا حمينا الثورة</td>
<td>They lied to us and told us “we protected the revolution”</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>revolution for people who comprise it</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لكن طلعت دى مؤامرة</td>
<td>but this one turned out to be a conspiracy</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military for people who comprise it; ‘lying’</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كذدوا علينا وقالوا حمينا الثورة</td>
<td>They lied to us and told us “we protected the revolution”</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military for people who comprise it</td>
<td>metonym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</td>
<td>Translation of slogans</td>
<td>Directionality</td>
<td>Operative Terms</td>
<td>Figurative Trope, Metaphor Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ولما بنطلب بينلونا</td>
<td>and when we make requests, they demean us</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military for people who comprise it (genus); “us” for revolution (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical hyponym, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ولما بنفته سحلونا</td>
<td>and when we chant, they pushed us to the ground</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military for people who comprise it (genus); “us” for revolution (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical hyponym, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا مشير غور غور</td>
<td>O Field Marshall [Tantawi], go to hell, go to hell</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council (species)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ارحل ارحل يا مشير</td>
<td>Begone begone, o Field Marshall [Tantawi]</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council (species)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دا الشعب خطير</td>
<td>This people is dangerous</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>People for revolution</td>
<td>metonymy, ontological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ارحل ارحل يا عنان</td>
<td>Begone begone, o Anan [SCAF second in command]</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>Anan for military council, governing body (species)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دا اشئع انها</td>
<td>This people was insulted</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>People for revolution</td>
<td>metonymy, ontological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عيش حرية كرامة انسانية</td>
<td>bread, freedom, dignity, humanity</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>bread for life, freedom, dignity, humanity as objectives (part for whole)</td>
<td>synecdochical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عيش حرية عدالة اجتماعية</td>
<td>bread, freedom, social justice</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>part for whole</td>
<td>synecdochical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>البلد دى بلدنا</td>
<td>this country is our country</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>“our” for all Egyptians (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والشهداء دول أخواتنا</td>
<td>and those martyrs are our brothers</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>strangers as family, fictive kinship; martyrdom for death</td>
<td>family metaphor, structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</td>
<td>Translation of slogans</td>
<td>Directionality</td>
<td>Operative Terms</td>
<td>Figurative Trope, Metaphor Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوي ألم أتم</td>
<td>O Tantawi, behave behave</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لنخلبها بركة دم</td>
<td>we will fight to the death</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>blood as blessing</td>
<td>structural, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سامع ام شهيد بنتاني</td>
<td>do you hear the martyr’s mother calling?</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>mother of a martyr (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مين هيجيب حق ولادي</td>
<td>who will bring justice to my children?</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>mother of a martyr (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا أبو ديرة ونشر وكاب</td>
<td>O bearer of stars, eagle, and cap [references to police officers]</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>parts of uniform reference for officers</td>
<td>synecdochical, part for whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>احنا اخواتك مش ارهاب</td>
<td>We’re your brothers, not terrorists</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>strangers as family, fictive kinship</td>
<td>family metaphor, structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ايوه لينا اجندات</td>
<td>Yes we have agendas</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>“we” for all revolutionaries (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أولها حق اللي مات</td>
<td>the first item [on our agenda] is justice for those who died</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>dead as living</td>
<td>structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد سعيد يا ولد</td>
<td>Khaled Saeed, o child</td>
<td>pro-revolution, pro-pluralism</td>
<td>person for all members of a religion (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>موتك ببحر بلط</td>
<td>your death liberates a country</td>
<td>pro-revolution, pro-pluralism</td>
<td>person for all members of a religion (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مينا دنيال يا ولد</td>
<td>Meena Danial, o child</td>
<td>pro-revolution, pro-pluralism</td>
<td>person for all members of a religion (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>موتك ببحر بلط</td>
<td>your death liberates a country</td>
<td>pro-revolution, pro-pluralism</td>
<td>person for all members of a religion (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>علاء سيف يا ولد</td>
<td>Alaa Sayf, o child</td>
<td>pro-revolution, pro-pluralism</td>
<td>person for all members of a religion (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</td>
<td>Translation of slogans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سجنك بيحرر بلد</td>
<td>your imprisonment liberates a country</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>person for all members of a religion (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دالثوار دول مش بلطجية</td>
<td>These here revolutionaries aren’t thugs</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>these (deictic) for all revolutionaries (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ليه نتحاكم عسكرية</td>
<td>why are we tried militarily</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>“we” for all revolutionaries (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>قتلوا الشيخ والدكتور</td>
<td>they killed the religious leader and the medical doctor</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>person for all members of a religion or profession (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بكرة يجي عليك الدور</td>
<td>tomorrow your turn will come</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوى بكرة عليك الدور</td>
<td>O Tantawi tomorrow will be your turn</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ثورة نادية طالعه تنادى</td>
<td>Another revolution is out and calling</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>revolution for people who comprise it, “calling”</td>
<td>metonymy, body; whole for part (synecdoche)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سجن العسكر مش لولادى</td>
<td>military prison isn't for my kids</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>“my kids” for all Egyptians (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حكم العسكر مش لبلادى</td>
<td>military prison is not for my country</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>“my” Egypt for that of all Egyptians</td>
<td>part for whole (synecdoche)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ثورة ثورة حتى النصر</td>
<td>revolution revolution until victory</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>revolution as a way to victory (place for event)</td>
<td>path metaphor, metonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ثورة ثورة في كل شوارع مصر</td>
<td>revolution revolution in every street of Egypt</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>revolution for people who comprise it; revolution as entities in streets</td>
<td>metonymy (institution for people); body metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</td>
<td>Translation of slogans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>كل المشير كاذب (This Field Marshall [Tantawi] is a liar)</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>&quot;Field Marshall&quot; for Tantawi, Tantawi for military council</td>
<td>metonymy, synecdoche (hyponym)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>راح محكمة وشهد زور (going to the court, testify and falsify [reference to Tantawi lying for Mubarak])</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak)</td>
<td>&quot;Field Marshall&quot; for Tantawi, Tantawi for military council</td>
<td>metonymy, synecdoche (hyponym)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ضد العسكر بلا غور (Against the military, come on, go to hell)</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military for people who comprise it (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym, body</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دول عاملين علينا أسود (those working for us are lions [brave, strong])</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>fellow protestors are lions</td>
<td>zoological metaphor, connotative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وبيتسحلوا على الحدود (and they [our supporters] push to the borders)</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>borders for country (viz. Israel)</td>
<td>metonymy (substance for form)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والمجلس حرامية (and the [military] Council are crooks)</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military for people who comprise it (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يبرططع في تكة (a roaming ass in an almshouse)</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>wild ass (animal) for military council; almshouse for Egypt</td>
<td>zoological metaphor, connotative; structural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وعلى الحدود عامل ولية (and on the border [with Israel], he acts like a helpless woman [Tantawi])</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>border as reference to Israel; helpless woman as military</td>
<td>structural, ontological</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لوراجل اضرب على الحدود (If you're a real man, fight on the border [reference to Egypt's border with Israel; ‘fight the Israelis, not fellow Egyptians])</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>military as fighting for government; border as reference to Israel</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym, body; metonymy (substance for form)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دول عاملين عالينا رجالة (those working with us are real men)</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>&quot;us&quot;, &quot;real men&quot; (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hyponym</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</td>
<td>Translation of slogans</td>
<td>Directionality</td>
<td>Operative Terms</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وبيرمونا في الزبالة</td>
<td>and they throw us in the garbage</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>“us” as garbage</td>
<td>metaphor, connotative, material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والدم المصري مش ببلاش</td>
<td>and Egyptian blood does not come free</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>Egyptian blood (genus); blood as commodity</td>
<td>synecdochal, hyponym; structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والمرامية متتعارش</td>
<td>and Egyptian women cannot be stripped</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>Egyptian women (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochal, hyponym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا مشير قول لعنان الثورة لسة في الميدان</td>
<td>O Field Marshall [Tantawi] tell Anan [SCAF second in command], the revolution is still in the Square [Tahrir]</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak); pro-revolution</td>
<td>Tantawi for military council (species); revolution as entities in a space</td>
<td>synecdochal, hypernym; body metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا مشير يا مشير الشرعية من التحرير</td>
<td>O Field Marshall [Tantawi], o Field Marshall, legitimacy is in Tahrir [the Square, but also, literally: 'liberation']</td>
<td>anti-Tantawi (former minister of defense under Mubarak); pro-revolution</td>
<td>“Field Marshall” for Tantawi, Tantawi for military council; legitimacy as an entity from Tahrir Square</td>
<td>metonymy, synecdoche (hypernym); structural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ومصر دولة مش معسكر</td>
<td>and Egypt is a state not a military encampment</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>Egypt “is”</td>
<td>structural metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>فيه حرية وناس بتكير</td>
<td>there is freedom and people are thinking</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>people for all Egyptians (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochal, hyponym, body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ومعتصمين معتصمين</td>
<td>and they’re [the protesters] sitting in, sitting in</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>nebulous “they” are sitting in</td>
<td>body metaphor; synecdoche (hypernym)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>قاعدين فيها مش ماشيين</td>
<td>they’re sitting in it, not walking away</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>nebulous “they” are sitting in</td>
<td>body metaphor; synecdoche (hypernym)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ضد حكومة يتحدثنا</td>
<td>against a government that attacks/opposes us</td>
<td>anti-government</td>
<td>government for people who comprise it, &quot;us&quot; for all Egyptians</td>
<td>metonymy (institution for people); synecdoche (hypernym)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Revolutionary Slogan-Chant</td>
<td>Translation of slogans</td>
<td>Directionality</td>
<td>Operative Terms</td>
<td>Figurative Trope, Metaphor Source</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>جنزوري ما جنزورى</td>
<td>Ganzoury [Mubarak’s former Prime Minister, interim governor] or no Ganzoury</td>
<td>anti-government</td>
<td>persons for all members of government offices (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كلم الثورة لازم يمشى</td>
<td>The words of the revolution must be the way [literally ‘must walk’]</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>revolution has words; words as ‘way’</td>
<td>personification metaphor; path metaphor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لنا مطالب</td>
<td>We have demands</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>“we” for all revolutionaries (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أولها المجلس لازم يمشى</td>
<td>the first [of our demands] is that the [military] Council must go</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>military (institution) substitute for the people who comprise it (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والداخلية متتبلطشى</td>
<td>and the Ministry of the Interior mustn’t thug around at all</td>
<td>anti-government</td>
<td>government ministry for whole government, both for people who comprise them</td>
<td>synecdochical, part for whole</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وحسني ما تحاكمشى</td>
<td>and Hosni can’t govern at all</td>
<td>anti-Mubarak</td>
<td>Mubarak for government (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>والعنلي ما تدعمشى</td>
<td>and Adly [Habib al-Adly, former Minister of Interior] wasn’t given the death penalty [how]?</td>
<td>anti-government</td>
<td>persons for all members of government offices (species)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>قوم يا شعب كفاية سكات</td>
<td>Rise, o People, enough being silent</td>
<td>pro-revolution</td>
<td>people for all Egyptians (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>د بيخلعوا في البنات</td>
<td>they strip girls</td>
<td>anti-military</td>
<td>third person form of verb “to strip”, deictic reference to military council; “girls” for the one woman who was stripped, captured by video (genus)</td>
<td>synecdochical, hypernym; hyponym</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 11: Slogan-Chant ECA:MSA Word Density Analysis

*Arabic word count tool: CountWordsFree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th># of Occurrences</th>
<th>Word Density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 MSA</td>
<td>العسكري/the military</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 ECA</td>
<td>مشير/guide</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 name</td>
<td>طنطاوى/Tantawi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 MSA</td>
<td>الثورة/revolution</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 MSA</td>
<td>الثورة/the revolution</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 MSA</td>
<td>العسكر/military</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 MSA</td>
<td>ارحل/begone</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 MSA</td>
<td>لازم/necessary</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 MSA</td>
<td>حرية/freedom</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 ECA</td>
<td>يمشى/walk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MSA: 38 (freq: .69)
ECA: 12 (freq: .22)
Total: 55
Result: MSA > ECA by 213.6%
Appendix 12: Slogan-Chant ECA:MSA Phrase Density Analysis

*Arabic word count tool: CountWordsFree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phrase Density ( =&gt;2 )</th>
<th>Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>military regime</td>
<td>6 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ايا طنطاوى</td>
<td>5 name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O Guide</td>
<td>5 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>لازم يمشى</td>
<td>4 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military regime falls</td>
<td>3 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regime falls</td>
<td>3 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>تELL Anan</td>
<td>3 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>will bring truth</td>
<td>3 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ولا لا</td>
<td>3 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عليك الدور يا طنطاوى بكثرة عليك الدور</td>
<td>6 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tantawi tomorrow it’s your turn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>they lied to us and said “we protected the revolution”</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O child your death liberates a country</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>it’s your turn, o Tantawi, tomorrow</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>your turn, o Tantawi, tomorrow it will be</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrase Density (&gt;=2)</td>
<td>Entries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوى بكرة علیک الدور/O Tantawi, tomorrow it's your turn</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا مشیئر قول لننان/O Guide, tell Anan</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بتنداei مین هیچب حق/You call out “who’ll bring truth”</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كدبوا علینا وقالوا حمینا/they lied to us and said “we protected”</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>علینا وقالوا حمینا الثورة/to us, and they told us, “we protected the revolution”</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا ولد موتك بیحرر/O child, your death liberates</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ولد موتك بیحرر بلد/Child, your death liberates a country</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>علیک الدور يا طنطاوى/it’s your turn O Tantawi</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الدور يا طنطاوى بكرة /[your] turn, o Tantawi, tomorrow</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوى بكرة علیک/O Tantawi, tomorrow it’s yours</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>طنطاوى بكرة علیک الدور/Tantawi, tomorrow it’s your turn</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد سعید يا/Khaled Saeed, O</td>
<td>2 name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عسكر عسكر لیه/military military why</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrase Density ( &gt;=2 )</td>
<td>Entries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حررية وناس بتفكك / freedom and people think</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا مشير قول / O guide, say</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مشير قول لعنان / Guide, say to Anan</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حق اللي مات / truth is the one [thing] that died</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مش بلطجية ليه / Not thugs why</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يتنادي مين هيجيب / it calls “who’ll bring”</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مين هيجيب حق / who’ll bring truth</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>المجلس لازم يمشى / the council must go</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>أنا مش جبان / I am not a coward</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كدبوا علينا وقالوا / they lied to us and said</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>علينا وقالوا حمينا / to us and they said “we protected”</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وقالوا حمينا الثورة / and they said “we protected the revolution”</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ارحل ارحل يا / begone begone, o</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا ولد موتك / O child, your death</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ولد موتك ببحر / Child, your death liberates</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>موتك ببحر بلد / your death liberates a country</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phrase Density ( &gt;=2 )</td>
<td>Entries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا عليك الدور يا/it's your turn, o</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا عليك طنطاوى/your turn, o Tantawi</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا طنطاوى بكرة/O Tantawi, tomorrow</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>طنطاوى بكرة عليك/Tantawi, tomorrow it’s yours</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا عليك الكرة/tomorrow it’s your turn</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>يا مجلس/O council</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عسكر يا/military, o</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>خالد سعيد/Khaled Saeed</td>
<td>2 name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>سعيد يا/Saeed, o</td>
<td>2 name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عسكر عسكر/military military</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عسكر ليه/military why</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حرية وناس/freedom and people</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>وناس يتفكر/and people think</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مشير قول/Guide, say</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>في الميدان/in the square</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>حق اللئ/the one that</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الى متى/the one that died</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>مش بلطجية/not thugs</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ليه بلطجية

قول الحق

مستعراش يا

مبت مصر/daughter of Egypt

الحق قول

يا متتعراش

مصر بنت/
dughter of Egypt

رافعى راسك/raise your head (imp. s. f.)

يتنادى مين/you call on whom

منه هيجيب

المجلس لازم/the council must

انا مش/I'm not

مش جبان/not a coward

في الميدان/in the square

غور غور/get the hell out get the hell out

كدبوا علينا/they lied to us

علينا وقابوا/to us and they said

وقابوا حمينا/and they said “we protected”

حمينا الثورة/we protected the revolution

ارحل ارحل/begone begone

ارحل يا/begone o

عيش حرية/bread freedom
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phrase Density ( &gt;=2 )</th>
<th>Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>يا ولد/O child</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ولد موتوك/child, your death</td>
<td>2 ambig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>موتوك بيحير/your death liberates</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بيحير بلد/liberates, your death [does]</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>عليك الدور/it’s your turn</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>الدور يا/your turn, o</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>طنطاوى بكرة/Tantawi, tomorrow</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>بكرة عليك/tomorrow, it’s yours</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>العسكر مش/the military isn’t</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ثورة ثورة/revolution revolution</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>دول عاملين/those [who are] doing</td>
<td>2 ECA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>على الحدود/at the borders</td>
<td>2 MSA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MSA: 47 (freq: .23)  
ECA: 143 (freq: .69)  
Total: 205  
Result: ECA > MSA by 204.36%
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