The “Woking Gang”: Political Activities of British Muslims 1905-1920

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Honors Thesis Submitted to the Department of History, Georgetown University
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7 May 2018
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Acknowledgments

A village went into the writing of this thesis. First, I would like to thank Professors John Esposito and Tamara Sonn for exposing a young, curious underclassman to Islam, and inspiring me to go deeper into the study of World War I and its effects on the current state of the Middle East while at Oxford. I would also like to thank Professor Katherine Benton-Cohen for her support and guidance throughout the year, and Professor Mustafa Aksakal for being a source of knowledge on the Ottoman Empire, World War I, and steering me in the right direction the countless times I was stuck.

While at Oxford, Pembroke College supported all of my endeavors, and developed my knowledge of history as an academic discipline. I would like to especially thank Professor Adrian Gregory, who first pointed my attention to the state of religious lobbies in England during World War I. Without his guidance in the beginning stages of the process, I would not have had the opportunity to find the incredible primary sources I used from Oxford and The British Library. Finally, I would like to thank Bodleian librarian Athena Demetriou who helped me return to view documents this spring, and all my British friends who housed, fed, and supported me.

I do not think I would be so historically-minded if it were not for my father, a doctor who finds spare time to read about World War II, Soviet spies, and the American Revolution. Without the encouragement of my parents to study what I love and pursue a thesis, I would not be where I am today. Thank you. Also, a massive thanks to my friends who watched me go through this process, and especially Allie Little who was my support emotionally, grammatically, and more; she saw every single little moment that went into this thesis. Finally, I want to thank the Woking Muslim Mission for digitizing so many interesting articles, journal issues, and pictures, without which this thesis would not exist. I hope that my work is just a small contribution to what should be a deeper analysis of the intense political activities and networks throughout the Muslim world and the British Empire. I give permission to Lauinger Library to make this thesis available to the public.
Abbreviations, Glossary, and Important Dates

Abbreviations:
Anglo-Ottoman Society (AOS)
British Muslim Society (BMS)
Central Islamic Society (CIS)
Liverpool Muslim Institute (LMI)
Woking Muslim Mission (WMM)

Glossary: Key Names and Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadiyya Islam</td>
<td>A sect of Islam founded by Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1836-1908) in Punjab in the late nineteenth century and focused on what he saw as the original precepts of the early Muslim community. In 1914, it split into two groups, with Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din joining the minority Lahori Ahmadis who do not believe Ghulam Ahmad was a Messiah.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ameer Ali, Syed (1849-1928)</td>
<td>Barrister, poet, pan-Islamist, and author from India. He practiced an older strain of pan-Islamism that still supported the British Empire’s rule over Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali, Duse Mohamed (1866-1945)</td>
<td>A Sudanese pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist who belonged to the WMM, and published the <em>African Times and Orient Review</em>, a periodical that served as a forum for opponents to British imperialism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balfour Declaration (1917)</td>
<td>A letter sent from Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild affirming British support for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan Wars (1912-1913)</td>
<td>Conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states (Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro) that effectively stripped the Ottoman Empire of its remaining European territories in the First Balkan War.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caliphate</td>
<td>An idea, as well as at times physical institution, of a political-religious Islamic state ruled by a caliph who has both spiritual and temporal authority. Often idealized from the early days of Muslim history, the Ottoman Empire was the last “caliphate” of modern history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobbold, Lady Evelyn (1867-1963)</td>
<td>A woman of Scottish aristocracy who did not publically convert to Islam during World War I but was friends with other British converts and associated with the Woking Muslim Mission. She was the first British woman to perform the hajj in 1933.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Headley, Lord (1855-1935)</strong></td>
<td>Born Rolland George Allanson-Winn, he inherited a title in 1913 and shortly thereafter befriended Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din and converted to Islam. His high-profile conversion made news around the world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husayn-McMahon Correspondence (1915-1916)</strong></td>
<td>A series of letters exchanged between Sir Henry McMahon and Husayn ibn Ali, the emir of Mecca. It effectively promised British backing of an independent Arab state in exchange for Arab support against the Ottoman Empire. It was later contradicted by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Five Pillars of Islam</strong></td>
<td>Shahadah (faith), salat (prayer), zakat (charity), sawn (fasting during Ramadan), hajj (pilgrimage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kamal-ud-Din, Khwaja (1870-1932)</strong></td>
<td>Barrister from Lahore, India who converted to the Ahmadiyya sect of Islam, moved to London, and founded the Woking Muslim Mission in 1913.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kidwai, Mushir Hosain (1878-1957)</strong></td>
<td>Indian Muslim who leaned politically pan-Islamist and anti-imperialist; he was a head figure in the Central Islamic Society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kitchener, Lord (1850-1916)</strong></td>
<td>Proconsul of Egypt 1911-1914 before becoming secretary of state for war from 1914 until his death in 1916. While in Egypt, he initiated the Husayn-McMahon correspondence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liverpool Muslim Institute</strong></td>
<td>First mosque established in England in 1889 by William Henry Quilliam, a British convert to Islam. It fell out of use with his departure from Liverpool in 1908.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>McMahon, Sir Henry (1862-1949)</strong></td>
<td>The British high commissioner in Egypt from 1915-1916. He exchanged a series of letters to the emir of Mecca that became known as the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montefiore, Claude (1858-1938)</strong></td>
<td>President of the Anglo-Jewish Association from 1896-1921, he began in Liberal Judaism in England (denationalized and deritualized) and was anti-Zionist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pan-Africanism</strong></td>
<td>An idea that has taken many forms as a political or cultural movements throughout history, but in its base form envisions and celebrates the unity of all those of African descent. Duse Mohamed Ali was a pan-Africanist at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pan-Islamism</strong></td>
<td>Sociopolitical ideology that emerged in the late 19th century affirming solidarity among all Muslims. It was used by Ottoman supporters to argue against European imperialism and the necessity of keeping the empire intact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pickthall, Marmaduke (1875-1936)</strong></td>
<td>Upper middle-class British Christian who converted to Islam in 1917 and had an attachment to the Ottoman Empire, specifically the progressive Young Turks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Picot, François Georges (1870-1951) | French diplomat who created a wartime agreement outlining an amenable break-up of the Ottoman Empire with his British counterpart, Mark Sykes.

Quilliam, W.H. (Abdullah) (1856-1932) | British convert to Islam in 1889 who established the LMI.

Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) | Agreement made between British Mark Sykes and French Francis Georges Picot, with the assent of Russia, for an amenable postwar break-up of the Ottoman Empire. It directly conflicted the promise of an independent Arab State in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence.

Sykes, Mark (1879-1919) | British diplomat who served on the de Bunsen Committee and later negotiated the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916.

Turco-Italian War (1911-1912) | Also known as Italo-Turkish War. War undertaken by Italy to gain North African colonies, specifically modern Libya, a province, or vilayets, of the Ottoman Empire. Muslims were very upset that Great Britain did not intervene to protect the province from Italian imperial interests.

Ummah | Fundamental concept of Islam meaning the whole Muslim community; it implies the unity and equality of all Muslims.

Woking Muslim Mission | Mosque established in 1913 by Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din in Woking, Surrey. It was the only mosque in England during World War I and attracted a diverse group of Muslims in England.


Zionism | Jewish national movement in which the goal was the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine.

Note on spelling:

In order to keep the integrity of the original sources, this thesis keeps the original spellings. However, due to translation errors, and general British variety on how to spell “Muslim,” at the turn of the twentieth century, there are many different spellings throughout the primary sources. Any use of “Mahomedan,” “Mussulman,” “Mohammedan,” etc. are incorrect, have [sic] beside them to connote that, and all refer to what English-speakers would refer to as “Muslim,” a noun indicating an individual who practices the religion of Islam.
Introduction

In 1914, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, the imam of the Woking Muslim Mission, and a recent British convert to Islam, Lord Headley, took a photograph together. Kamal-ud-Din commented, “His Lordship had his photograph taken with me. He hopes that by publishing this photograph we can dispel Rudyard Kipling’s notion that ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,’ and show that the Prophet of Arabia has brought together the East and the West.”¹

(Figure 1) A 2013 Centenary Booklet created by The Shah Jahan Mosque, formerly the Woking Muslim Mission, featured this quote on the cover page. The modern mosque members who compiled this booklet have a historical self-consciousness, a realization that the significance and implications of Kamal-ud-Din’s quote at their tiny mosque in Surrey was revolutionary then, and still relevant today.

One hundred years later, a sense exists among the members of the Woking Muslim Mission that their predecessors were unique, not only in the Muslim world, but also in the budding analysis of imperial British history itself. That legacy continues to inform Woking identity today. Their predecessors defied stereotypes and categorization: many were white British Christians who converted to Islam, and attempted to be bridge-builders between Christianity and Islam, advocates for imperial citizens to London. The version of Islam they espouse reveal their complex identities: in 1961, fifty years between the founding of the mosque and the Centenary booklet, the Mission published a book named Islam Our Choice, filled with the testimonials of over 150 European and American converts to Islam. Their words contained

glowing appraisals of Islam’s “practicality,” and how it is, “the religion of common sense.”

(Figure 2)

This approach of characterizing Islam as a “common sense” faith was typical of the Muslim reformers of the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries at the time of the foundation of the Woking Muslim Mission. The Muslim missionaries coming from India in the early 1900s, converting Christians in England, explained Islam as “common sense” because of its seemingly apparent similarities to Christianity, and its lack of complex doctrine. Thus, a consistent theme in each convert’s testimonials was the connection of Islam to Christianity, and how, as a convert in Islam our Choice purports, “a Muslim is never considered a true votary of Islam within its pale if he does not believe in Moses, Jesus and the other prophets … Hence one can frankly say that the nearest religion to Christianity among all the religions in the world is Islam.”

Though written in 1961, these lines are almost verbatim what Lord Headley wrote after his 1913 conversion, that, “Islam is the religion of grand simplicity; it satisfies the noblest longings of the soul, and in no way contravenes the teachings of Moses or Christ.”

Most surprisingly to modern readers, on the last page of the book, the Woking Muslim Mission listed their guiding principles as, “Jesus as a Venerated Divine Teacher,” “Universal Human Rights,” “Equality of the Sexes,” and a “Democratic Way of Life,” among others. For those who hold stereotypes of Islam, ones that in Said’s Orientalist framework would include exoticism, lack of progress, and fanaticism, these acclamations would seem shocking and un-Islamic. Therefore, the rhetoric connecting Islam to Christianity that members of the WMM used

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3 Khulusi, Islam Our Choice, 68.
5 Lord Headley, “Lord Headley’s Experience of Mohhammadanism,” Muslim India and Islamic Review (December 1913), 406.
6 Khulusi, Islam Our Choice, 68.
in 1913 has been reiterated by the Woking Mission and Literary Trust over the past century as a testament to their distinct role in British history and as pioneers of Islam in the West. Yet the mosque’s members in 1961, and even in 2017, based their claims on the ideas that were fundamental to their founders in 1913.

This thesis focuses on eight individuals who were politically active Muslims residing in England during World War I, all of whom associated with the Woking Muslim Mission. World War I and globalization connected to the British Empire brought into contact British Muslims in London with elite British converts to Islam, creating a particular moment of British Muslim political identity that defied sectarian differences. The members of the Woking Muslim Mission were a disparate group consisting of British Christian converts, politically active South Asians, Africans, Ottomans, and seamen. In many ways, they were representative of the diversity of Muslims around the Empire. Yet, they strategically forsook these differences in order to create a distinct British Muslim identity. They used their social and political connections within England, networks facilitated by the British Empire, and colonial and democratic institutions to speak their mind. Therefore, in order to inject nuance into the typical narrative of the British wartime environment, one must listen to the wider social and religious groups within England, such as British Muslims. Their self-conscious rhetoric reflects the multitude of challenges to identity facing British citizens, including the meaning of British citizenship at the end of empire, race, religion, loyalty, and the status of the Muslim world.

**Incorporating British Muslim Identity into the Narrative**

This thesis arises from a desire to reorient the typical narrative of British World War I policy in the Middle East, which looks at the decisions of policymakers in isolation, towards the active participation of diverse religious groups in the British political system. Previous studies of the
period have focused on specific agreements and actors, such as the Sykes-Picot Agreement correspondence (1916), which agreed upon a preliminary division of the Ottoman Empire between Sir Mark Sykes, the Middle East advisor to the Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener (1850-1916), and his French counterpart François Georges-Picot; or the Balfour Declaration (1917), penned by the Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour (1848-1930), granting British backing of a Jewish “National Home.”

Scholars explained the rationale for wartime decisions by looking at “great men,” in office, or solely wartime contingencies; this method revealed a lack of consideration for the groups they affected. As an example, William Matthew attributed the Balfour Declaration to, “the concerns and personalities of the British politicians involved,” a typical claim of scholarship on the topic. Thus, the arguments around British wartime agreements have mainly been concerned with the most important motive behind the disparate British political decisions concerning the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world.

Starting with the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 and continuing throughout World War I, the British government across a variety of offices followed a policy that was at odds with pro-Ottoman supporters. The Ottoman Empire was the last-standing Islamic Caliphate as of 1900, religious in its authority; for this, both imperial heritage Muslims, or Muslim-born, and British Muslims, meaning those residing in domestic England, naturally concerned themselves with its fate.

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7 For more on British wartime agreements, see Nevzat Uyanik, Dismantling the Ottoman Empire: Britain, America and the Armenian Question (London; New York: Routledge, 2016); James Barr, A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011); Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956 (London: 1981).
9 The Treaty of Berlin was an 1878 agreement that forced the Ottoman Empire to cede European possessions to the Balkan States, displaying the weakness of the Ottoman Empire in comparison to the European states.
British wartime policy was not monolithic, and rather domestic and international groups contested it at every phase. In the last fifty years, scholarship rightly shifted to recognize the complexity of creating policy in wartime conditions, with scholars such as Leonard Stein recognizing that a multiplicity of factors went into agreements like the Balfour Declaration.\textsuperscript{10} However, these analyses still make broad-sweeping claims and use typical explanations. For example, Mark Levene tried to go against traditional thought that the Balfour Declaration was due to imperial interests, and rather assumed it was because of wartime contingencies, such as wanting to win over American Jewry and help the plight of Russian Jews. However, he has been criticized for assuming, “all Jews were part of a powerful collective entity,” a form of anti-Semitism according to James Renton.\textsuperscript{11} Most recently, James Renton has argued for a more comprehensive multi-causal framework for the Balfour Declaration, looking to competing and complementary motives including wartime contingencies, winning over American Jewry, and imperial considerations.\textsuperscript{12} However, the questions guiding these literatures, even if acknowledging the many causes, still overlooked the multitude of actors at work, including the domestic and foreign lobbies concerned with imperial policies. British government officials did not make decisions in isolation, but rather in the midst of an active dialogue between domestic religious and ethnic groups.

Specifically, British government policies towards the Muslim world increasingly frustrated British Muslims. The concept of the “Muslim world” developed in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century and conceptually included primarily the physical places of India and the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, the British Empire came to influence more of world’s Muslims, such as in India and

Egypt. Thus, two microcosms of this contesting, the Woking Muslim Mission outside London, and the assembly of Muslims from across the Empire, offers an insight into the debates surrounding British policy within one of these groups, that also include Zionists, Arabs, Armenians, to name a few. In the era of hyper-nationalism, religious groups rallied to engage on issues important to them; Muslims in Britain (and subsequently around the globe) were galvanized by their faith to protect the Ottoman Empire, while the British Jews underwent a similar flurry of activity regarding the Balfour Declaration. Though in the end the Muslims did not achieve their goals in shaping peacetime agreements and altering British policy, their activity raised a political consciousness in British Muslims and formulated a distinct period of British Muslim identity.

The main goal of this thesis is to return voice and autonomy back to the domestic British Muslim population as a group that aimed to be active participants in a government which attempted to dictate policies that affected their identities and loyalties through their exclusion. In this narrative, Muslims in Britain were active participants in the public sphere, many of whom realized that the best way to advocate for their interests was through the democratic process: speaking with government officials, disseminating pamphlets, and creating community. The history of Muslims in domestic Britain before and during World War I displays how they reconciled their “temporal and spiritual worlds.”

In sum, this thesis will argue that members of the Woking Mission Mosque were increasingly politically active throughout World War I due to their religious affiliations with Islam, which caused them to question their dual-identity as Muslim and British in light of the war against the Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic empire free from European control as of World

13 Azmi Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877-1924) (London: Brill, 1977), 205.
War I. This politicization caused an “odd set of bedfellows”\textsuperscript{14} to coalesce around key causes, including the British Government’s treatment of its Muslim subjects, its lack of intervention to protect Muslim populations around the world, and the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the heritage British Muslims of varying ideological backgrounds and purposes in London allied with elite British Christian converts to Islam, creating a distinct moment of British Muslim political identity that strategically attempted to influence foreign policy and defied sectarian differences. The Introduction places British Muslims in the greater context of the Muslim world during the beginning of the twentieth century, including modernist movements such as the Ahmadiyya Movement and pan-Islam. Chapter 1 will look at eight individual influential British Muslims – Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, Syed Ameer Ali, M.H. Kidwai, Duse Mohamed Ali, Lord Headley, Marmaduke Pickthall, Abdullah Quilliam, and Lady Evelyn Cobbold – and track their conversions to Islam through their contextualized backgrounds. Chapter 2 explores their transition to politics and attempts at political organization, as well as their differences that hindered effective cohesion once World War I began. Finally, Chapter 3 brings this background together to examine one of their most high profile attempts to change British foreign policy, the Balfour Declaration. In the end, British Muslims had many internal and external forces working against them; namely the newness and complexity of their British Muslim identity, in-fighting, negative public and governmental opinion, and British wartime aims that conflicted with their goals. However, in the years leading up to and during World War I, British Muslims developed a political consciousness that led to a previously unexplored period of cohesive British Muslim identity centered around religion, an identity not explicitly formulated again in England for decades.

\textsuperscript{14} Ansari, “Pickthall, Muslims of South Asia, and the British Muslim Community of the Early 1900s,” in Marmaduke Pickthall: Islam and the Modern World, ed. Geoffrey Nash (Brill: 2017), 23.
Color, Identity, and Perception

Before delving into this history, it is important to note that within academia, the perception of Muslims in Britain was radically different in 1913 than after World War II. Prior to WWII, immigration and migration studies was the main discipline looking at British Muslims. The migration patterns of Muslims to Britain accelerated in the mid-19th century due to British imperial expansion, and centered around port towns such as Cardiff, Liverpool, and South Shields.\(^\text{15}\) By 1919, there were approximately 1200 ‘coloured’ sailors in Cardiff, mostly Yemeni.\(^\text{16}\) The words for these migrants, other than “coloured,” were romanticized, such as “lascar” or “Levantine,” used to describe those from the Ottoman Empire at the time more generally.\(^\text{17}\) This nomenclature was still residual from Victorian-era conceptions of the Ottoman Empire and Far East, and it tells one little about how the emigrant Muslim community viewed themselves, both as a whole, and in relation to those around them.\(^\text{18}\)

Thus, just knowing on its own that someone was a “Muslim” in England revealed little about their identity at the turn of the twentieth century. Fred Halliday explains this phenomenon by noting that until the 1980s in Britain, the term “Muslim,” was not an identity term as used today.\(^\text{19}\) However, even Halliday in his work categorizes Muslim migration by ethnicity, such as Yemeni, Arab, etc. Similar to the original Yemeni sailor characterization in 1919, before 1980, Muslims in England were paired with the history of ‘coloured’ or ‘Black history’ in England. For example, in his studies of British immigration from 1815-1915, Panikos Panayi incorporated

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16 Halliday, *Britain’s First Muslims*, 18.
17 Halliday, *Britain’s First Muslims*, 18.; The word “lascar” referred to any sailor from the Asian, Indian, or Arab world, or Indian soldiers under British military officers. It originated from the Persian word Lashkar, meaning army. The British employed lascars on their ships using agreements that gave them power to retain or transfer them between ships.
18 For more on Victorian-era discourse on the Ottoman Empire, read N. C. Cicektakan, "Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire: British Discourses on the ‘Ottomans,’1860-1878” (PhD diss., University of Essex, 2014).
19 Halliday, *Britain’s First Muslims*, xv.
South Asians, Arabs, and others Muslim-majority groups into, “black subjects of the British Empire.” Humayun Ansari also confirmed that, “until the 1980s, Muslims were generally subsumed within ethnic categories and as part of the discussions of race relations.” Therefore, British Muslims were known as ‘blacks,’ and grouped by nationality.

The lascars, or sailors, are not the focus of this study, and were not especially politically active during this time period. However, they comprised the majority of the visible Muslim population in the early 1900s, and were considered “blacks,” in most literature. While the lascar population was small in comparison to the British population overall, their presence was socially significant, as shown by the backlash they faced in the Race Riots of 1919. The percentage of lascars employed as a percentage of the total employment on British ships grew from 12.3% in 1911 to 29.1% in 1921, fueled by the war and the need for cheap labor, causing unrest in these small port towns. In reaction, white British sailors rioted against “blacks” in all the major port towns directly after World War I. These riots constituted a white British reaction to unemployment following World War I, but also are an insight into group-consciousness at the time; or at the very least, the British sailors had begun to formulate and act on a projection domestically between themselves and the “others,” who were not yet seen as acculturated and worthy of similar citizenship rights. They also display how, though the lascars were Muslim, religious identity was not their primary classification. It was instead their ethnicity.

23 Halliday, Britain’s First Muslims, 21.
24 Halliday, Britain’s First Muslims, 24.
The South Asian community first began analyzing Muslims in their own right but by looking at Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian Muslims. In *South Asian Resistances in Britain, 1858–1947*, Ahmed and Mukherjee look at the South Asian community in London as viable members of the British community during this time period, migrating to attend university, for economic opportunities, and involving themselves in politics. However, even within increasing scholarship on South Asian migration and contributions to Great Britain, the focus has been on Sunni South Asian Muslims, and sects such as Sufis and Ahmadis have been neglected. The Ahmadis, a movement coming out of India in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1836-1908), were crucial in organizing Islam in England right before World War I, helping to create the distinct British Muslim identity mentioned above; they were later subsumed within larger South Asian migration after World War I. However, recently scholars such as Eric Germain and Ron Geaves have begun to look at the Ahmadi networks and their impact on British Islam in the pre-WWI and interwar periods.

**Developments in the Muslim World Pre-World War I**

Though academia may not have categorized Muslims in Britain before and during World War I as a religious entity, developments in the Muslim world at the time point to a Muslim self-awareness of their religion as a unifying factor against European imperialism; this resulted in the pan-Islamic movement. Cemil Aydin tackles this topic in his new work *The Idea of the Muslim World: A Global Intellectual History*, positing that 1914 was the peak of perceived Muslim

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The British Empire facilitated Muslim interconnectivity through the increase in global Muslim press and infrastructure such as steamships and telegraphs. Tracing the rise of pan-Islam from the 18th century, Aydin claims that Muslims did not imagine themselves as a global political unit until, “the peak of European hegemony in the late 19th century, when poor colonial conditions, Europeans discourses of Muslim racial inferiority, and Muslims’ theories of their own apparent decline,” formulated pan-Islamic solidarity. Out of this reactionary wave, the Ottoman Empire gained a new prominence in the Muslim world as the last great Islamic power in the midst of European expansion. From the 16th-18th centuries, three great Muslim powers – the Ottomans, the Mughals (India), and the Safavids (Iran) – ruled over large parts of the Muslim world; by 1900, the Ottoman Empire was the only one left. Most importantly and controversially, the Ottomans were also custodians of the holy places for all three monotheistic religions in Jerusalem, which is important context for Chapter 3’s analysis of religious reaction to the Balfour Declaration. However, the Ottoman Empire at this point faced a series of challenges to its borders in the Balkans and North Africa, increasing encroachment by European powers, and difficulties with reform at home.

The rise of the British Empire also heightened consciousness of a perceived decline of the Muslim world in comparison to Europe. By 1900, the British ruled over around half of the

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31 Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World, 3.
32 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 28.
33 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, 32.
34 Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World, 8.
world’s Muslims because of their presence in India.\textsuperscript{35} Ron Geaves supports this theory in his new book \textit{Islam and Britain: Muslim Mission in the Age of Empire}, arguing that reformist Ahmadiyya Islam, the strand that became popular in England during the lifetime of the individuals this thesis examines, came out of a desire for a unique branch of Indian Islam, in response to the loss of power felt by European imperial expansion in the Muslim world.\textsuperscript{36} As Geaves states, the Ahmadiyya Mission and its founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, were, “Indian Muslims attempting to define themselves as a distinct civilization but maintaining Islam in India as an authentic branch of the final monotheistic Abrahamic revelation to the Arabs.”\textsuperscript{37} Both Geaves and Aydin see Ahmadiyya Islam in India at its root reactionary to Christian missionaries and the racial inferiority rhetoric that went along with the expanse of the British Empire. In light of a fear of decline, reformers, such as the Ahmadiyya movement attempted to show Islam as compatible with modernity, and connected it with science, progress, and universality comparable to that of Christianity and the Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{38} Thus, the context for converts in England and Muslims from around the empire before World War I was one of modernism, reform, and a new consciousness of Muslim solidarity that transcended traditional borders, quite opposite of the European trend for defined-border nationalism.

Put together, Islam was in fact a point of unity for some Muslims before World War I, and as David Motadel similarly noted, “Islam could be used to overcome ethnic, social, and linguistic disunity.”\textsuperscript{39} Islam and thus pro-Ottoman sympathy was clearly the defining link at the Woking Muslim Mission, bringing together disparate individuals who ideologically and ethnically could

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{35} Aydin, \textit{The Idea of the Muslim World}, 82.
\textsuperscript{36} Geaves, \textit{Islam and Britain}, 5.
\textsuperscript{37} Geaves, \textit{Islam and Britain}, 31.
\textsuperscript{38} Aydin, \textit{The Idea of the Muslim World}, 73.
\end{footnotesize}
not be more different. In 1914, the British Muslim community was still small, and thus potentially riper for cohesion and identity building around their religion, especially in light of the existence of and threat to the Ottoman Caliphate. For this reason, the topic does not fall easily into Halliday’s or Panayi’s immigration and migration studies framework or the characterization of imperial Muslims in faraway lands: the Muslims in Britain who were acting to advance their interests were residents, citizens, and part of the social milieu of Britain in 1914.

Finally, Islam before World War I was associated with a declining empire in the East, very much exotic, fanatic, and in opposition to Western progress. Thus, this background necessitates an incorporation of Edward Said’s ever-relevant *Orientalism* since the perceptions of Muslims in Britain at the turn of the twentieth century were established in conceptions of the “Orient.” As Faisal Devji notes in his chapter on “Islam and British Imperial Thought,” “it has become impossible, even for those who disagree with him [Said], to discuss the mutual relations of Europeans and Asians or Africans, especially from the age of empire, without referring to his work.”

To Edward Said, the terms “East” and “West” were inherently political and rely on each other to make empire possible. Most importantly, “the Orient” is inherently inferior to the “the Occident,” and thus the basis of colonial exploitation in every sense of the term. In other words, it is, “the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient […] in short, Orientalism is a Western style for dominating, restricting, and having authority over the Orient.” However, oftentimes overlooked is that Said’s, “East,” and “West,” also represented a framework for the Christian conception of Islam, or the “Christian image of Islam.” For the most part, Christians in the

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41 Devji, "Islam and British Imperial Thought," 255.
42 Devji, "Islam and British Imperial Thought," 256.
early twentieth century saw Islam as degraded, backwards, and fanatical, very much harming the credibility and sensibilities of those converting to the religion.

Breaking away from this tradition of clear categories, the British Muslims were the “East” in the “West,” who blurred these lines, and had a voice and their own narrative. There is no doubt that British Christian conception of Islam tainted the way that the government officials understood and interacted with their citizens desires. However, most interestingly, Said does not have a good category for converts such as Marmaduke Pickthall, ones that backed the Ottoman Empire and argued for acceptance of Islam in Britain; he dismissed his writings as “exotic fiction,” composed of “picturesque characters.” Nor does he address the complexity in the photograph of Lord Headley and Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, bringing together, “the East and West.” These men attempted to break the stereotypes typical of Orientalist rhetoric in the West. Instead of looking at the apologetic nature and determinist view of British Empire decisions on the outcomes of Middle Eastern policy during World War I, one can look to the activism and voices of Muslims residing in Britain who were in conversation with each other and British society as a whole, attempting to build-bridges with their fellow citizens and break down the conceptions that hindered them.

In this history, Orientalism can be seen in the past literature in which Muslims have been portrayed extensively in their colonial contexts, such as David Motadel’s *Islam and European Empires*. In other words, Muslims have been studied in their contexts of being Indian or Egyptian in relation to Western events (such as World War I), rebellions, or grand intellectual movements. Thus, the study of Muslims mainly views them in relation to something else, whether that be to Great Britain, or intellectual movements, rather than as an entity in their own

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right. Looking at how Muslims within the nation, who were citizens and defied many stereotypes, reacted to their government, created networks, and connected to the greater Muslim movements around them is a new approach, and in the future should extend to more groups within British history. Thus, moving into the next section, the context of British perception of Muslims, the Ottoman Empire, and conversely, Muslim perception of themselves and European imperialism is key to understanding the trends of conversion and politics in England.

Chapter 1: Mosques, Members, and Converts

I feel happy to embrace the true, simple, sincere and natural faith of Islam. It is free from dogma. There is no intercession (priesthood) in it. Its broadmindedness and elasticity, with simple principles, appeal to my reason. – Jesse (Ameena) Davison, British convert to Islam in 1926

This chapter will elaborate on the trends of British conversion to Islam from 1890-1925. It will first outline a chronology regarding the only two mosques in England before World War I, the Liverpool Muslim Institute (LMI) and the Woking Muslim Mission (WMM), their members, and their leaders Abdullah Quilliam and Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din. It will then go on to look at conversion trends in England at the time, and explore some possible explanations for the increase in conversions to Islam. This time period was especially distinct for British conversion to Islam due to the number of upper-class British Christians converting. Further, conversion and missionaries influenced heavily the developing British Muslim identity at the time. Finally, this chapter will narrow in on four examples of elite converts to Islam, William Henry (Abdullah) Quilliam (1856-1932), Lord Headley (1855-1935), Marmaduke Pickthall (1875-1936), and Lady Evelyn Cobbold (1867-1963).

Most of the British and American public alike are hardly aware of Muslims in Britain before World War II, let alone Christian converts. This is especially surprising when noting that
in 1914, the British Empire had the largest population of Muslims in the world.\textsuperscript{45} The historiographic challenges highlighted above resulted in the only recent analysis of British conversion to Islam throughout the twentieth century, with British Muslims viewed as a distinct identity group outside of immigration or nationality mainly in the twenty first century. Since Muslims in England were paired with “coloured” or “South Asian” histories, ethnic categories subsumed Muslims and analyzed them vis-à-vis race relations, rather than through a religious lens.\textsuperscript{46} In light of the categorization of Muslims by ethnicity, the appearance of “white,” even upper-class, British Muslims at the turn of the twentieth century does not easily fit into commonly understood narratives of Muslim life in England. The conversion of British Christians before World War I is an anomaly, and thus attracted great interest in the last five years from scholars such as Jamie Gilham, Humayun Ansari, and Ron Geaves. Fortunately, many of the relevant individuals left behind political and personal writings that explain their motivations and conflicts. The rediscovery of the voices of the converts and their allies’ paints a picture of identity politics within Britain that clearly demonstrates that individuals were grappling with the questions of how to live as Muslims in Western culture during this era.

While still small, by 1924, there were around 10,000 Muslims residing in England, 1,000 of which were converts, while in the Empire at large some estimates point to over 100 million Muslims.\textsuperscript{47} The trend of British conversions in the first half of the twentieth century was the strongest from 1905-1925, petering out quite rapidly after that until increasing again after World War II. The question, then, is what forces led to an influx of British converts to Islam around World War I? Some possible explanations for the increase in conversion that this chapter

\textsuperscript{45} Aydin, The Idea of the Muslim World, 82.
\textsuperscript{46} Ansari, The Infidel Within, 9.
explores are disillusionment with the West during World War I, the influence of the Ahmadi missionary networks, desire for a new world order that was counter-cultural to Western European Christianity, and increased contact with Muslims through globalization and travel. This thesis cannot analyze every conversion and the undoubtedly complex personal motivations of conversion for the thousand men and women converted by 1924. The richest written sources remaining are from the British elites who converted to Islam at this time, namely Lord Headley (1855-1935), William Henry Quilliam (1856-1932), Marmaduke Pickthall (1875-1936), and Lady Evelyn Cobbold (1867-1963). Their source base gathered in England and through online databases includes pamphlets from their political societies, articles written to various newspapers and in the Islamic Review, published books, personal and public letters, and events, such as lectures and sermons. This thesis is especially concerned with these converts due to their engagement in political activity centered around the WMM during World War I. Further, the converts helped create a singular environment in the WMM, one that was elite-focused, non-sectarian, political, and practiced an upper-class “Christianized” Islam. The converts allied themselves in the mosque with an eclectic mix of Eastern sympathizers, Indian missionaries like Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, and pan-Islamists such as M.H. Kidwai. Further research could assess the lives of less privileges converts, as well as what Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, India, and Africa thought about these converts and the policies for which they advocated.

The Woking Muslim Mission propagated a progressive form of Islam and facilitated these conversions. In the 1880s, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din met and joined Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s Ahmadiyya movement in Lahore. The Ahmadiyya movement can be best understood as a reaction to the increased Christian proselytism in the Muslim world, combatting the “evangelical

48William Henry Quilliam went by many names throughout his life. He changed his name to Abdullah Quilliam after his conversion, and again to Henri de Léon when he returned to London from the Middle East in 1913. Abdullah Quilliam will be his most frequent name in this thesis.
Orientalism” exemplified in periodical such as *The Moslem World*. Therefore, according to Aydin it, “used evangelism, construed as nonviolent jihad, to disseminate a version of Islam they considered genuine and universal.” Ahmad died in 1908, and the Ahmadiyya movement split into two groups. The minority Lahori group – Kamal-ud-Din’s branch – decided to stay in the Sunni Orthodoxy and send missionaries abroad. Leaving his barrister practice, Kamal-ud-Din established the WMM in 1913 shortly after coming to Great Britain. The period of intense conversion activity coincided with Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din reinstating the WMM and attaining the support of a few high profile converts right before the start of the war. Kamal-ud-Din hoped that British Christians would be receptive to his portrayal of Islam as progressive, modern, tolerant, and non-sectarian. To some Christian converts, these aspects were especially appealing, as they were trying to escape what they were increasingly seeing as hypocritical and dogmatic Western Christianity, related to Victorian-era Britain and World War I. Therefore, the conversions were very much connected to developments in the Muslim world, such as pan-Islam, the Ahmadiyya movement, as well as London acting as a facilitator for the diverse strains of thought around the empire.

**First Mosques: The Liverpool Muslim Institute and the Woking Muslim Mission**

Before going into specific stories of converts and their politics, it is important to frame the state of Islam in England, namely the Liverpool Muslim Institute and the Woking Muslim Mission, their leaders, and members. The first and only two mosques in England before World War I were Liverpool Muslim Institute (LMI), established in 1891, and the Woking Mission.

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Mosque (WMM) in 1913. These two mosques did not overlap in time frame, but had similar members: British Christian converts, Muslim students from India and Africa studying in England, visitors, and lascars. The LMI dissolved by World War I, leaving WMM as the relevant center for Muslims in London, whether they were living, studying, or visiting. Hence, one of the key developments in this history was the singularity of the WMM as a religious center for British Muslims to pray, which caused Muslims from many different ethnic and ideological backgrounds to come into contact, facilitating the wartime British Muslim identity.

The Liverpool Muslim Institute was established in 1891 by William Henry Quilliam, a solicitor from the Isle of Man who converted to Islam in Morocco in 1887, subsequently changing his name to Abdullah Quilliam. (Figure 3) Quilliam was Methodist by upbringing, a criminal lawyer, liberal, and had an appetite for public crusades. After returning from Morocco, he set up a mosque in Liverpool along with two periodicals he personally edited, *The Crescent* and *The Islamic World*. Quilliam’s main goal was to engage with the British public, with the ultimate aim of converting the British nation to Islam. Viewing himself as a missionary, as inferred through his lectures, and well-aware that most Britons were Christians, Quilliam knew to succeed he needed to appeal to both their preexisting ideologies as well as change their negative conceptions of Islam. To do this, he often lectured in the LMI or wrote in his two periodicals, the main two types of existing sources for Quilliam.

Similar to the Ahmadi missionaries that came after him, Quilliam attempted to contextualize the history of Islam for his listeners and readers, outlining the expanse of Muslim contributions

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54 Ansari, *The Infidel Within*, 84.
in science and literature, as well as paralleling the similar roots of Christianity and Islam. For example, in 1890, a few years after his conversion, he published an espousal of faith outlining his beliefs. For what would become indicative of his rhetoric over the next decades, Quilliam described Islam as, “not an anti-Christian faith, but a half-Christian faith.” These ideas were radical to Victorian-era Britain, where the majority of people held deep prejudices against Muslims as fanatics, backwards, and against Enlightenment principles. By trying to reframe the public’s understanding and explaining the tenets and history of Islam, mostly in relation to Christianity, Quilliam hoped to bring the public to Islam and a “new and improved” version of Christianity in an age of increasing cynicism. In this way, a native-born British convert in the late nineteenth century made the missionary arguments that Islamic reformers were also developing in the Muslim world, and offered, “that this the brotherhood to which we now invite our countrymen in England, this is the faith we offer for their acceptance.”

The LMI was comprehensive in nature, serving as an orphanage, mosque, a museum, a hostel, and a school for young children. Though the number of converts attributed to Quilliam is debated, in 1896 the Sunday Telegraph reported that he had converted 182 Englishmen and women to Islam. Other estimates are around 600 by the time he left Liverpool in 1908. However, Quilliam faced suspicion and scandal on many fronts, and ultimately went to Constantinople in 1908 after being found guilty of fabricating evidence for a divorce case. The

57 Quilliam, The Faith of Islam, 47.
58 “Liverpool Mosque and Muslim Institute,” Making Britain Database. The LMI did social work, such as the Medina Home for Children and housing students and seafarers. These activities helped them attain acceptance in Liverpool.
60 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 75.
LMI slowly disintegrated without his leadership. Therefore, by December 1913, the status of Islam in England according to the newly founded periodical *Muslim India and Islamic Review* was that, “The chief centres of Mohammedanism [sic] are in London, Manchester, and Liverpool. In the last city, there is a Mohammedan [sic] community of about 200, but they are most unostentatious people, and hold their meetings very quietly. At one time, there was a Mosque in Liverpool, but that has now been done away with.” Quilliam’s abandonment of his operations in Liverpool around 1908 left a gaping hole for British Muslim activity centered around a mosque. Once Quilliam moved back to London in 1913, he went by the alias Professor de Léon, because of the reputation he garnered in Liverpool and the unresolved divorce case; he was still involved with the British Muslim community, but in a deflated role. In the end, Quilliam prefaced the next wave of prominent converts from the WMM, and set precedent for the model Kamal-ud-Din used.

The WMM existed in some form before Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din officially established it in 1913; Gottlieb Leitner, a Jewish Hungarian who studied Islam in Constantinople and taught in Lahore, India began what was then called the “Oriental Nobility Institute” in Woking to allow visiting dignitaries a place to pray and stay. (Figure 4) Leitner realized that it was striking that by 1881, the capital of the British Empire still had no official place for Muslim colonial visitors to pray. Even during Leitner’s life, the mosque was only opened for special visits and events, and

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61 Geaves, “Abdullah Quilliam and Marmaduke Pickthall,” 72.; Geaves mentions that two likely reasons why Quilliam left was after a contentious divorce case left this reputation as a solicitor tarnished, coupled with the prejudice he faced as a Muslim in Liverpool.
62 “Emissary of Islam,” *Manchester Dispatch*, November 18, 1913, reprinted in the *Muslim India and Islamic Review* 1, no. 11 (December 1913), 405.
did not take on the same active quotidian role that it did after 1913. In a letter to the *Pall Mall Gazette* in 1893, Leitner also made a concerted effort to explain that his institute was not a place of conversion, propaganda, or to facilitate interreligious marriages. In the early 1900s The Oriental Nobility Institute fell out of use with the death of Leitner.

Here, the influence of Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din and Ahmadi missionaries on the trajectory of British Muslim identity and organization is clear. Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din instituted what became the Woking Muslim Mission, the main hub of British Muslim activity during World War I. Kamal-ud-Din was an eminent lawyer and Islamic scholar from Punjab, who had converted to the Ahmadiyya sect of Islam, a reformists and progressive strand originating in India in the 1880s. Once he moved to London, he immediately saw the need for a Muslim center closer to the city and subsequently purchased the land rights from Leitner’s son in 1913. This initiative had the backing of an Indian donor, Shah Jahan, and was renamed the Woking Muslim Mission just in time for the beginning of the World War I. In 1913, similar to the LMI’s *The Crescent* and *The Islamic World*, Kamal-ud-Din started the *Muslim India and Islamic Review*, renamed the *Islamic Review* in 1914. This periodical was influential in reaching an audience of British Christians that had little understanding of Islam.

The leadership of Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, associated with Ahmadiyya Islam, heavily affected the trajectory of the mosque. Though he apparently did not come to England explicitly as an Ahmadi missionary, the *Muslim India and Islamic Review* reported in December 1913 that, “Mr.

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67 Ahmadiyya Isha’at Islam Lahore, “The Woking Muslim Mission.”
70 Aziz, *Woking Muslim Mission Centenary*, 3; Wartime censorship necessitated the renaming of the periodical to not include India.
71 Germain, “The First Muslim Mission on a European Scale,” 93.
Kamal-ud-Din landed in England thirteen months ago to convert as many Englishmen he can to his faith.”\textsuperscript{72} Since a mosque in London was not officially operating until 1941, the WMM located 23 miles southwest of London, became the basis of activity for Muslims in England from around the Empire and country.\textsuperscript{73}

Regarding the shift in British Muslim identity from the LMI to the WMM, a key difference between the LMI and the converts in the WMM were their elite status; the LMI congregation was dominated by middle class converts in Liverpool.\textsuperscript{74} Additionally, in Liverpool, the majority of members were “lascars,” as well as visitors coming through the major imperial port that was Liverpool at the beginning of the twentieth century. On the opposite side, the WMM attracted more elites from London, India, and dignitaries than lascars. Finally, the LMI had stronger Ottoman influences due to Quilliam’s relationship with the sultan, while the WMM had stronger South Asian contacts due to the missionaries.\textsuperscript{75} These had an impact on the connections and politics of the WMM. While the LMI set the stage for conversion in England, the WMM brought together elite heritage Muslims, defined here in contrast to those who converted to Islam, from around the empire along with the converts.

\textbf{Allies: Colonial Subjects, Heritage Muslims}

Because of the key connection of India to British policy interests until 1947, South Asians were a natural point of contact and source of inspiration for British Muslims. Many resided in England, taking advantage of colonial links to promote their causes, work, and be

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{72} “Emissary of Islam,” 404.
\textsuperscript{74} “Liverpool Mosque and Muslim Institute,” Making Britain Database.
\textsuperscript{75} Geaves, \textit{Islam and Britain}, 68.
\end{footnotes}
educated. Thus, a few of the founding and most important members of the mosque were not English-born at all.

To provide context on the other important members of the WMM, this section will introduce four politically active heritage (non-convert) Muslims, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din (1870-1932), Syed Ameer Ali (1849-1928), Duse Mohamed Ali (1866-1945), and Mushir Hosain Kidwai (1878-1957). The British Empire connected Muslims around the world; it provided the infrastructure for their interactions. To those in London, the WMM was the only viable mosque before World War I in which they could be involved. This fact brought together diverse Muslims who had to strategically forsake their differences in light of the paucity of Muslim organization in London; at the WMM those from all strands of Islam (for example Sunni, Shia, Ahmadi, Sufi) were welcome.

As previously mentioned, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, a lawyer from India who immigrated to London in 1913 and set up the WMM proved instrumental to the involvement of the other three Muslims from different ethnic and religious traditions. Kamal-ud-Din was able to make the WMM non-sectarian in the Muslim world through preaching his Ahmadi version of Islam that stressed unity over division in the Muslim world. Similar to Kamal-ud-Din, Syed Ameer Ali (1849 – 1928) was a Calcutta-born barrister, member of the Indian Judicial Committee, and Shi’a pan-Islamist. As a typical elite heritage Muslim, Ameer Ali belonged to the WMM. Ameer Ali travelled between London and India throughout his life, but officially moved to England in 1904 after marrying Isabella Kostnam, a British woman. Interracial marriages, which were still quite controversial, became more common as contact between parts of the Empire and England

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increased. Ameer Ali was politically active years earlier, setting up some of the first Muslim organizations in London in the 1890s. Since he knew Persian, Arabic, and English, British peers admired Ameer Ali as a scholar of Islamic law who could study texts in their original. Ameer Ali is a good example of a colonial migrant who, apart from taking the educational and economic opportunities while in Britain, also fit Ahmed and Mukherjee’s characterization of a new South Asian that was, “involved in political activities, campaigning for people other than themselves, frequently in collaboration with the British.” Most notably, Ameer Ali was appointed to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of appeals for many areas of the Empire, as the first Indian member. This appointment gave him a status similar to Lord Headley in his access to the British elite; according to years of the Court Circular section of The Times, Ameer Ali attended many dinners and events with government officials as important as Home Secretary McKenna. Thus, Ameer Ali pioneered the tactics used by the younger, more-agitated colonial Muslims, such as M.H. Kidwai and Duse Mohamed Ali, and by the First World War seemed extremely Empire-loyal and complacent in comparison to the others.

Mushir Hosain Kidwai and Duse Mohamed Ali are the two younger heritage Muslims involved in this narrative are. (Figure 5) Although there is little biographical information about Kidwai, he was a pan-Islamist, barrister, poet, and author. In a departure from Ameer Ali, he was firmly against European rule over India and the Muslim world. However, his lectures and writings make him a valuable source, as he was Honorary Secretary of the important Central Islamic Society in London, and authored as well as lectured extensively on his views of pan-

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79 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 45.
81 Ahmed and Mukherjee, introduction, xiii.
Islam, anti-imperialism, the Ottoman Empire, and the relationship between Christianity and Islam.

Finally, Duse Mohamed Ali was a Pan-Africanist, anti-imperialist, and an important member of the WMM. Born in Egypt, he was the child of an Egyptian army officer and a Sudanese woman.\(^{83}\) As he was involved in many social and political issues covering European imperialism, Duse Mohamed Ali allied with Indian Muslims, Egyptian nationalists, pan-Islamists, and Ottoman supporters. For this reason, the British government found Mohamed Ali particularly suspect within the British Muslim community for fear of him organizing a conspiratorial network. Once the war broke out, he was forced to register as a Turkish enemy agent with the government.\(^{84}\) Their suspicion had rationale: he did not just write and lecture, but also took action, such as raising and sending money for arms to Tripoli during the Turco-Italian War.\(^{85}\) In 1912 he started a journal called the *African Times and Orient Review*, that gained attention of authorities and intellectual circles due to its inclusion of issues surrounding one theme: criticism of imperialism in the Afro-Asian world.\(^{86}\) For example, an issue of the journal focused on lynching in the United States. When it was first published, Sir George Fiddled of the Colonial Office said regarding the journal, “His paper is a notorious disseminator of sedition and lies mainly circulated among Mohammedans [sic].”\(^{87}\) Duse Mohamed Ali was a master of underground politics, and consolidating issue areas; for example, he befriended upper-class men


\(^{84}\) Duffield, “Duse Mohamed Ali,” 128.


\(^{86}\) Duffield, “Duse Mohamed Ali,” 130.; His journal had to cease publication with the start of the war in 1914, but came back from 1917-1920.

\(^{87}\) Duffield, “Duse Mohamed Ali,” 128.
and politicians to serve as front-men and advocate his harmlessness to the British government. 88

In 1913, Duse Mohamed Ali strategically befriended Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din by helping him organize “non-sectarian” Muslim prayers (not pertaining to one tradition, such as Sunni, Shiite, or Ahmadi) in London before Kamal-ud-Din had opened the WMM. By keeping contact with an ideologically diverse group, he attempted to broaden pan-Islamism by connecting it to imperialism, Afro-Asian freedom for Europe as a whole, and African-American civil rights in the U.S. In this way, Ali was a key actor in London who realized that these grand problems the British Muslims were attempting to take on needed a global alliance. 89

In the end, these heritage Muslims associated with the WMM were extremely diverse, yet at the outbreak of the war, had a shared religion, mosque, and varying levels of sympathy to the Ottoman empire that brought them into concert. Since no “pre-established Muslim community” existed in England outside of the WMM before World War I, Muslims coming to London from around the Empire joined together and created a unique British Muslim cultural identity. 90 These four men and their backgrounds are important to the narrative of a political WMM during the war. They served as influencers to the British converts perceptions of the Muslim world and intermediaries to their new religious community abroad. Thus, the relationship between members of the WMM, both the converts and the heritage Muslim allies was mutually beneficial, both using their contacts and elite status successfully to express their political ideas.

88 Duffield, “Duse Mohamed Ali,” 132.; These included people such as Lords Mowbray, Newton and Lamington, as well as Conservative MP Aubrey Herbert.
Conversion Trends in England and Possible Explanations

With the context of the status of Islam in Britain from 1891-1913, starting with the establishment of the Liverpool Muslim Institute by Abdullah Quilliam, and moving into the establishment of the Woking Muslim Mission with Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, an Ahmadi Muslim missionary, at its head, it is now possible to examine the societal conditions that made the environment ripe for the conversion of elite British Christians. These include the destructive force of World War I, contact with the progressive form of Ahmadiyya Islam, and the circulation of periodicals such as the Islamic Review that could reach a wider audience who had little prior contact with Islam.

First, the influence of World War I strongly increased the trend of cynicism of the Western world. Looking at the general numbers, as reported in the Islamic Review, the written journal associated with the WMM, conversions peaked between 1915 and 1925. According to Ron Geaves, before 1915 the majority of converts were women because of female marriage to Muslim travelers and lascars, who were primarily male.91 The WMM had four women converts by 1914, but by 1916, the number was up to 22 conversions, 16 of which were men.92 (Figure 6) While it is impossible to know the exact nature of their decision to convert, the coincidence of the dates of the war (1914-1919) with the number of male converts suggests the involvement of World War I. For British soldiers, it is possible that the direct experience of serving moved them to a riper position to convert. Furthermore, while the reasons for each conversion are not clear in the published material, the WMM sometimes made the connection to WWI explicit; for example, the Islamic Review in 1916 highlighted three, “Brave English Soldiers Who Have Joined the Colours of Islam,” along with their new Muslim names: Gunner F. Leadon (Azeez), Pte.

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91 Geaves, Islam and Britain, 70.
92 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 147.; Violet Ebrahim, daughter of a British Army colonel, was Kamal-ud-Din’s first convert.
Ballard (Mubarak), and Gunner H. Camp (Basheer). Additionally, the war was an imperial effort that facilitated contact: British colonial forces drawn from India and Africa, many of whom were Muslim, fought alongside their English counterparts. The war only accelerated the process of increased globalization and contact that occurred in the British Empire in the early twentieth century. In 1914, nearly 140,000 Indians served on the Western front. While British government officials moved them in 1915 to prevent, “pitting non-whites against white Europeans in battle,” an undeniable effect of the war was the increased encounter and interaction everyday British soldiers had with Muslims, potentially exposing them to a new and appealing religion.

Further, contact with pan-Islam and Indian missionaries, most specifically the WMM imam Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din and his progressive Ahmadiyya strain of Islam, had a profound impact on the type modern and progressive Islam promoted in England. However, though the WMM propagated Ahmadiyya Islam, and the converts followed that strain of progressive Islam, most converts were not aware of the Ahmadi roots and thought themselves as a part a general strain of Sunni Hanafi Islam. Along with revitalizing the mosque, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din started the *Muslim India and Islamic Review* the journal of the mosque, that ultimately ran from 1913 – 1967. The role of the *Muslim India and Islamic Review* (its title until 1914 when it became the *Islamic Review*) cannot be undervalued; it was a subscription-based paper, the mouthpiece of the mosque, spreading an idealized version of Islam, conversion, and the status of the Muslim world. The periodical was in English, another differentiating and influential factor that let it reach a

95 Gilham, “Marmaduke Pickthall and the British Muslim Convert Community,” 57.
96 Khawaja Kamal-ud-Din was involved with the Islamic Review even after he ceased being imam of WMM until his death in December 1932.
wider European audience, since most press about Islam and the Muslim-world was in Arabic and Hindu at the time. One of the journal’s main purposes in Kamal-ud-Din’s eyes was to challenge misrepresentation of Islam by showing the compatibility of the religion with British life. He did this in a manner reminiscent of Quilliam by connecting Islam and Christianity, and attempting to break down prejudices. In this way, Kamal-ud-Din hoped to make a name for himself as a skilled and moderate defender of Islam. Converts themselves even admitted the periodical influenced their conversion. For example, convert Charles Buchanan-Hamilton, a Deputy Surgeon-General in the Royal Navy, purportedly wrote right before his death, “I have read the article ‘Islam My Only Choice,’ and I have decided to join your faith.”

What, then, was said in the *Islamic Review* that proved so convincing that it could cause grown men, born and raised with British Christian values and notions that were seemingly antithetical to Islam and “the East,” to convert to an exotic faith? The particular aspects of the Woking Muslim Mission and Ahmadiyya Islam help shed light on this matter. The *Islamic Review* tried to display Islam as rationalistic, showed both the continuities and criticisms of Islam and Christianity, and focused on practice and unity over theology and sectarianism. This appealed to converts who became attracted to the perceived simplicity and practicality of Islam. A good example, indicative of many other converts at this time, is Khalida Buchanan-Hamilton, wife of the Royal Navy General Charles William Buchanan Hamilton. She converted after reading the *Islamic Review* and published a short book entitled *My Belief*, where she spoke to her

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views on the superfluity of the saints and Prophets in Christianity; rather, “It is only the power at the source that should be called God, and not the agencies that are subordinate to it.”

Once World War I began, with the Ottoman Empire as enemy, British Christians began to view Muslims with renewed suspicion, but Kamal-ud-Din was still convinced that, “no other book but the Quran, therefore, will meet the demand of our time.” In this vein, he believed that if he presented Islam in its true state, the public would be sympathetic to it and desire to convert. His goal, according to Jamie Gilham, was to, “present Islam as a secure, progressive, tolerant moral force in the face of increasing materialism and secularity,” in British society.

One can clearly see where this rhetoric appealed to somewhat disenfranchised and searching souls of Cobbold, Headley, and others. However, Kamal-ud-Din’s portrayal of Islam in this manner did not occur in a vacuum, but must be viewed in the context of the Muslim reformers out of India at the time, a fact Gilham overlooks.

Further, by adapting Islam to a British upper-middle class lifestyle, Kamal-ud-Din sought to make the transition easy for converts. Kamal-ud-Din attempted to make Islam more amenable to potential converts and greater British society by adapting the activities of the mosque, almost “Christianizing” them. Kamal-ud-Din, with a missionary’s training, knew that he had to make converts comfortable, even organizing morning and evening prayers on Sunday, similar to the Christian tradition. For example, just like how the *Islamic Review* was in English, most of the Mission’s business was conducted in English with a staff who wore familiar, Western

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clothing. They also replaced words central to Islam to ones that were inherently Christian, such as referring to the Quran as an “Islamic Bible,” or the mosque as a “Muslim Church.” These converts also formulated the first mosques in their tradition, and ‘Christianized,’ or ‘Anglicized,’ them in a way that would be amenable to their preexisting habits as well as more easily palatable to the British Christian community.

Pictures of the converts and their gatherings at the mosque, as well as press coverage of the activities of the mosque provide visual evidence for the Christianized phenomenon of the WMM. In an image of the Eid-ul-Adha prayers from October 8, 1916, one can see how unorthodox the WMM was in comparison to usual perceptions of Muslim prayer. (Figure 9) Half of the front row of men wore suits, with no head coverings whatsoever, and were standing rather than prostrating. In a description of Friday prayers in the December 6, 1913 issue of the Daily Mirror, they similarly describe how, “the worshippers, many of whom did not wear a fez, covered their heads with pocket-handkerchiefs, and touched the ground with their fore-heads as they said their devotions.” Lord Headley, the article noted, “did not remove his boots for the service.” In Islam, it is practice to remove shoes before entering the mosque for cleanliness and respect. In other words, they packaged Islam so that it was appealing to the British middle class and contained certain continuities with Protestant themes. However, these practices were controversial; the Central Islamic Society in London attempted to raise funds to create an alternate mosque, and in Chapter 2 this thesis will explore the loss of credibility that the WMM fostered among both the British governmental and Muslim world as a true intermediary. (Figure 8)

106 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 129.
107 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 129.
The Converts: Their Stories and Formation Processes

To give greater context to the trends of British conversion, it is helpful to narrow this analysis to specific individuals. This section will analyze the processes of conversion of Lord Headley and Marmaduke Pickthall, the two most influential converts associated with the WMM, and briefly touch on the conversions of Abdullah Quilliam and Lady Evelyn Cobbold, the two other converts addressed in the thesis. Lord Headley and Marmaduke Pickthall reveal the social costs and level of protracted personal conflict that occurred in conversion, while Cobbold and Quilliam are two examples of counter-cultural Brits who converted. In his work on modern British converts to Islam, Ali Köse looks at how, “a conversion experience does not just happen. It is the result of a complex process.”109 With this in mind, it is difficult to create one overarching process or rationale for why these specific British Christians converted at the time. However, some similar themes in the writings on Lady Evelyn Cobbold, Marmaduke Pickthall, and Lord Headley arise, such as the influence of the WMM, travel and fascination in the East, and a desire for a new world order that was counter-cultural to Western European Christianity.

The converts had the influence of the WMM in common, but also, all fall under one of Ali Köse’s six motifs of conversion: intellectual, mystical, experimental, affectional, revivalist, and coercive. Upon analysis, these four elites share the “intellectual” and “affectional” conversion motifs outlined by Ali, which are preceded by periods of emotional confusion, concern with social, moral, and religious issues, and protracted conversion.110 These two motifs are interrelated: the intellectual motif to Ali is, “acquainted with alternative ideologies and way of life by individual, private investigation, like reading books,” while the affectional motif is

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“personal attachments or strong liking for practicing believer,” as the central motivation for a usually prolonged conversion process. This context will frame the individual analyses.

Moving into specific stories, Lord Headley was the WMM’s most elite convert, and very much embodied the intellectual and affectional motifs. Rowland George Allanson-Winn (Headley’s English name) succeeded his cousin in the peerage of Ireland in 1913, becoming Lord Headley. Because Allanson-Winn inherited this position, he officially became the fifth Baron Headley and assumed the status of a British elite for the rest of his life. This status ensured that he enjoyed a level of access to his peers and that his words held legitimacy. At the time, he became Lord Headley on January 1, 1913, The Times was clear to mention qualities that made him an acceptable new member of the British elite: namely, that Allanson-Winn was educated at Cambridge, and was a “notable sportsman.” Shortly after he assumed the title, The Times reported in the Court Circular section that, “At a meeting of the Islamic Society held in London on Saturday evening, it was announced that Lord Headley had become a convert to the Mahomedan [sic] faith.” He adopted the Muslim name Al-Farooq. The appearance of the announcement in the Court Circular, a section of the paper that monitored the movements and activities of the upper levels of society, signaled Headley’s position, an inescapable fact no matter what disapproval his conversion fostered.

Lord Headley helped bring publicity to the WMM and its mission, with his conversion occurring in 1913, the same year of its founding. Headley’s writing on Islam and how to be a Muslim in a non-Muslim country were widely circulated and read in England and the rest of the Muslim world through the Islamic Review. While he was by no means an expert on his newly

adopted religion, Headley was granted an automatically elevated status due to his elite background, and quickly became a mouthpiece for the WMM, advantageous to the missionaries to reach a wider audience. Headley seemed to be a pioneer in this regard, and his documentation of the journey reveals much about British public opinion on Islam, Muslims, and his own ideology. Therefore, Headley assuming a title and converting to Islam within the same year was incredibly advantageous and impactful to the new Woking Muslim Mission and the new South Asian missionary whom he befriended, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din.

Returning to his process, Lord Headley was raised Protestant, explored Roman Catholicism, but found both unsatisfactory and slowly moved toward Unitarianism.\textsuperscript{115} In his own life, tragedies such as the death of his third son as an infant, and separately lifelong depression, led him to search for solace in religion.\textsuperscript{116} He hints at this motivation when writing idealistically in the \textit{Islamic Review} shortly after his conversion, “It is wonderful how absolute faith and trust in God banish all fear and make the most dreadful conditions and circumstances not only bearable but even beautiful.”\textsuperscript{117} However, travel was incredible impactful on Headley and the other converts, and though \textit{The Times} accurately described his adept boxing and sporting skills, Headley’s real success came as a civil engineer. This occupation led him to India in the 1890s, where he most likely encountered Islam for the first time.\textsuperscript{118} Here one can posit that the connection he established in India led him down the affectional motif, which usually coincides with a prolonged conversion journey. Beneficially for Headley, it was not necessary for him to return to India to converse with Muslims; by 1913, many of the influential South Asians that will

\textsuperscript{115} Gilham, “British Muslim Baron,” 472.; Unitarians believe that God is one entity, as opposed to the Trinity, which includes three persons in one being: The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This belief is closer to the most important tenet of Islam, the belief in tawhid, or the “oneness” of God.

\textsuperscript{116} Gilham, \textit{Loyal Enemies}, 130.

\textsuperscript{117} Lord Headley, “Why I became a Mohammaden,” \textit{Muslim India and Islamic Review}, 1 no. 11 (December 1913), 416.

\textsuperscript{118} Headley, “Why I became a Mohammaden,” 416.
be explored below were in London as students and lawyers, and the Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din had already secured the grounds that would soon become the WMM.119

In a short anonymous book that Headley published before his conversion, but later made public, Thoughts for the Future, Headley gave insights into his rationale that hint that after becoming acquainted with Muslims in India, he was instigated to learn more on his own and was won over by the religion intellectually. The Islamic Review published excerpts from this book under the title, “How to be Free from Fear and Grief,” by “A.W.” In it, Headley explained that the rationality of Islam, for example that to be a good Muslim one must only follow five tenets (The Five Pillars of Islam), appealed deeply to him, and conversely pushed him away from what he saw as contradictory and complex dogmas in Christianity. To Headley, the idea of praying and personal relationship with God was natural, and that, “what is taught in the Quran demands no mutilation of reason. Believe and observe the law under Divine guidance and you are saved is a truism and cannot be denied.”120 In Headley’s case, his writing in Thoughts for the Future, shows that his disillusionment with “Western religion,” affected his desire to convert.121

Headley struggled with religion for years before his conversion, and in later writings said, “I feel myself like a man emerging from a tunnel, charged with mephitic and sulphurous gases, into the fresh clean air…”122 However, Headley made clear that these poisonous gases were a metaphor for the “bigotry and superstition” of “the religion of the West,”; a religion, in his view, that was, “a relic, indeed, of the Dark Ages, and not having much in sympathy with the teachings of Moses or Christ.”123 This line of logic led to his most controversial statement associated with

119 Gilham, “British Muslim Baron,” 474.
120 A[llanson]. W[inn], “How to be Free from Grief,” Muslim India and Islamic Review, vol 1, no. 9 (October 1913), 357.
121 A[llanson]. W[inn], “How to be Free from Grief,” 357.
122 Lord Headley, “Growth of Modern Christianity,” Muslim India and Islamic Review, 1 no. 11 (December 1913), 413.
123 Headley, “Growth of Modern Christianity,” 413.
his conversion, that he stated in his conversion announcement in 1913: that by converting to Islam, he in reality became a better Christian, more charitable and closer to God. The press and public truly did not know how to reconcile that statement. Because of his title, the England public and Muslim world felt the import of his conversion. The Muslim India and Islamic Review did not overlook this fact, saying shortly thereafter, “A few more conversions in the House of Lords and the House of Commons … would be the best thing for our rule in India that could possibly happen.” Headley as a prominent convert was key to acting as an intermediary to British Christians and Islam.

Next, Marmaduke Pickthall was another important British convert who made less of an impression on the British public, but a stronger one amongst government officials and the British Muslim community. According to his biographer Peter Clark, Pickthall came from a, “solidly professional middle class” family, and his goal was to get into the Foreign Service by learning eastern languages, but repeatedly failed the test. Feeling on the brink of failure at the mere age of seventeen, Pickthall accepted a trip with a clergyman to the Levant. There, he met “happy people” on his journeys in the Levant, in contrast with Europe, again pointing to the affectional motif of conversion. The correlation between travel and conversion suggest Pickthall and Headley's idealism of the exotic nature of “the East,” and the subsequent adoption of the religion that was so formative and pervasive to the region. For example, upon Pickthall’s arrival in Cairo

124 “Muslim Peer,” Muslim India and Islamic Review, 1 no. 11 (December 1913), 401.
125 “Emissary of Islam,” 404.
128 Clark, Marmaduke Pickthall, 7.
in 1894, he was so intrigued with the culture and individuals that he wrote, “the European ceased to interest me.”

Pickthall’s conversion also reveals his gradual disillusionment with the West. For example, in a 1919 book called *War and Religion*, he criticized what he saw as savage Christian warfare, and reflected, “if Al-Islam spread to other Christian nations, destroying that aggressive nationality … in highly civilized communities like those of Europe, wars would cease.” At the time, the British Muslim community saw nationalism as un-Islamic, seeing that the *umma* and the religion of Islam usurped nationality and created a universal brotherhood. On top of the unhappiness and lack of meaning Pickthall found at home in comparison to his travels through the East, his affection for the Ottomans galvanized his conversion.

Raised as a Conservative, Pickthall believed in “Monarchy, empire, and ‘one-nation conservatism,’” and that British rule was beneficial for Muslims overall. Publishing a series of novels on his travels, Pickthall idealized the people he met abroad, while also fiercely defending them and attempting to assimilate to their practices. His conversion was protracted; according to Anne Freemantle, Pickthall’s first biographer, Pickthall converted in 1914, while according to the *Islamic Review* and press, he converted in 1917. This protracted conversion was most likely connected to fear of social repercussions. However, from his political writings, the disintegration of British-Ottoman relations throughout World War I necessitated Pickthall to

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130 Geaves, “Abdullah Quilliam and Marmaduke Pickthall,” 75.
combine his politics and religion and ultimately publically convert, at the cost of his political standing in England.

Lastly, Pickthall exemplifies well the social cost of conversion at the time; his choices made him quite isolated. From the beginnings of his travels throughout Syria, he felt a separation from the other Englishmen, with whom he claimed did not have similar ideas regarding “Orientals.” He felt as though he was living a “double life.”135 While these sentiments definitely contributed to his conversion and lobbying on behalf of the Ottoman Empire, Pickthall found in London a group of people, both Muslims and non-Muslims who had varying degrees of alienation towards British foreign policy and interest in the East, with whom he connected. Thus, though scholars such as Peter Clark and Geoffrey Nash believe that Pickthall was part of no movement and rather was an individualist thinker, they miss the many overlapping issue points Pickthall found with networks in London.136 In reality, Pickthall is but one prominent example of the struggles of converts, who faced similar processes and came together at the WMM in community.

Finally, the conversions of the counter-cultural Lady Evelyn Cobbold and W.H. Quilliam display a similar process of contact through travel to the East; however, Lady Evelyn Cobbold very much hid her religious leaning due to her status as Scottish aristocracy, though was clear on her support for Ottoman sympathizers. Lady Evelyn Cobbold and Marmaduke Pickthall were good friends; she even encouraged him to publicly convert during one of their coffee chats at Claridge’s hotel in 1915. Like Pickthall, Cobbold started off writing about her Eastern travels, publishing *Wayfarers in the Libyan Desert* in 1912. A bit different than the other figures, Cobbold never had a formal conversion announcement during the war and she was only

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associated with WMM not a regular attendee of prayers. However, she attended talks, communicated with other converts, and had her funeral at the mosque in 1963. Her most important and public contribution to the British Muslim community came after the war in 1933, when she was the first British woman to perform the hajj, and subsequently detailed her experience in a book called Pilgrimage to Mecca. (Figure 10) In the introduction to her book, Cobbold provided hints toward the exact timing of her conversion and her motivations. She wrote that she when met the Pope in Rome as a young woman, he asked her if she was Catholic, and Cobbold replied she was a Muslim. To Cobbold, Islam was a natural, rational religion, and she stated that, “It seems that I have always been a Muslim. This is not so strange when one remembers that Islam is the natural religion that a child left to himself would develop.”

Further, at a speech she gave to the British Muslim Society in 1934 regarding her trip, she alluded to her support for Islam as an alternate model after World War I when encouraging the members that, “holding to our Faith … who knows that one day Islam may help to heal the wounds of humanity.” Lastly, Cobbold wrote in her account of the hajj that Islam was, “most calculated to solve the world’s many perplexing problems, and to bring humanity peace and happiness.” Cobbold, then, might be more typical of converts at the time who were less public than Pickthall and Headley, struggled to reconcile their faith-leaning with their existing lives,
was counter-cultural to some extent, and privately supported the Ottoman Empire against the overarching public opinion.

Similarly, Abdullah Quilliam, the founder of the LMI, was an extremely eclectic and counter-cultural man. He converted in 1888 after a trip to Morocco.\textsuperscript{143} Though he was brought up in a staunch Methodist family, social, moral, and religious issue concerned him throughout his life, and were further instigated by affection for those he met in Morocco. Thus, to conclude with some overarching trends, while conversion is deeply personal, overall the testimony of the converts shows a fascination with the East and a desire for a new model in contrast with a perceived British, Western, and Christian one. Interaction and contact with Muslims abroad and at home led the converts to learn more about the new faith, and ultimately convert, combining Köse’s affectional and intellectual conversion motifs. As a final note, all of the prominent converts this thesis examines were born and raised in Victorian-era England, influenced by widely-held beliefs regarding the fanaticism of Muslims and the exoticism of Islam.\textsuperscript{144} Turning to their writings paints a picture of the affectional motif of Köse, which was closely linked to Orientalism and exoticism that Edward Said lambasted sixty years later. Each of the elite converts traveled to a Muslim-majority country before their conversion, suggest in their writings that years of traveling and interacting with Muslims moved them towards conversion. For example, Lady Evelyn Cobbold travelled widely in North Africa and the Middle East and had a lifelong fascination with “the East,” while Headley worked as an engineer in India before his conversion, and Pickthall traveled through the Levant to prime himself for Foreign Office service.\textsuperscript{145} Just from this brief discussion, the converts display how their processes embody

\textsuperscript{143} Geaves, “Abdullah Quilliam and Marmaduke Pickthall,” 72.
\textsuperscript{144} Lord Headley was born 1855, Lady Evelyn Cobbold in 1867, Quilliam 1856, Pickthall 1875.
themes occurring in the British Empire at the time, including Orientalism, loyalty, exposure to Muslim networks, reaction to Christian proselytism, cynicism, and more. Many of these links have not been explored, and are gaps in this thesis, but also in British history.

Thus, the East for these elites was a possible new option as a way to order their lives and solve the misery they saw around them. In contrast to the confined British world, Islam provided a rational religion, and perhaps a level of exoticism and escape from the constraints of Victorian English upbringings. In the end, Geoffrey Nash describes the converts as, “a few rich, mostly well-educated Europeans who adopted Islam as a new faith as a result of their search for spiritual pathways beyond their original culture and beliefs.”\textsuperscript{146} While this is one part of their conversion, as seen in the next chapter, the converts also took their new faith as a serious lifestyle and political change, one fraught with conflict and confusion of what it meant to be Muslim in England in 1914.

**Chapter 2: Development of a Political Consciousness 1905-1915**

Where the Moslems perhaps shed one man’s blood in the zeal and earnestness of their convictions, the European followers of Jesus have sucked the life-blood of a whole race through the recognized channels of the modern civilization. -Sayyid Rauf Ali, “Islam and European Christianity,” December 8, 1911

This chapter will trace a separate chronology from that of conversions and the development of Islam in Britain, and will instead reexamine the WMM and its members in terms of political development. The process of politicization began in earnest with the beginning of the Turco-Italian War (1911-12), continuing through the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), moving into World War I (1914-1919). First, this chapter will analyze how the converts’ newfound connection to the *ummah* created a budding British Muslim identity that was political in nature.

\textsuperscript{146} Nash, “Introduction,” 13.
and how their elite social status targeted the British upper-class. It will then trace the political societies they formed, how they first mobilized before WWI to respond to the Turco-Italian War of 1912-1913, and then the ultimate result of their activities during the war. Finally, this section will analyze the differences that ultimately divided the British Muslim community into individuals pursuing their own personal goals, and the public prejudices that affected their work.

Though the converts and imperial heritage Muslims in the WMM did not come together in a united front until at least 1913, the Turco-Italian War, Balkan Wars, and ultimately World War I provided the opportunity for practice in crafting the arguments they later used to prevent the break-up of the Ottoman Empire; namely, the compatibility and superiority of Islam as a universal way of life, Islams’ rejection of nationalism, and a rebuttal to what they saw as the discrimination the Ottoman Empire received solely on religious and racial terms. They strategically banded together to create community in a vacuum and built a budding but fragile British Muslim identity by organizing around political societies and the WMM; however, their period of unity was brief, with the tensions in the community exacerbated by World War I. Their foreign delegations, pamphlets, opinion articles, meetings with government officials, and their specific adaptation of Islam to be amenable within the British climate focused on elite networks in England. The elite networks were at times sympathetic to their arguments, but became less inclined to support the British Muslims as suspicion of Muslims increased during WWI. Finally, by not having one clear leader, British Muslims faced problems with leadership and organizational unity that became more apparent and as their goals failed as the war went on.

In *South Asian Resistances in Britain 1858 – 1947*, Ahmed and Mukherjee acknowledge that during this period in Great Britain, acts of resistance often brought together, “diverse groups
united by a common cause.” London was especially vital to bringing together diverse strands of thought throughout the empire, and though prejudices were widespread, Europe was not a place of unyielding racism; Muslims could and did find intellectual allies from across religious and ideological groups in metropolitan life. Though British Muslims were few in 1914, the intense political activity of their members and the distinct characterization of their “Christianized” Islam warrants an acknowledgement of a completely distinct phase of British Muslim identity, one that was politically active during the war and interwar years, but did not fully develop again until the 1980s.

For the sake of clarity, the ideologies of the eight British Muslims can be characterized distinctly into varying levels of loyalty to both the British and Ottoman Empires. While both M.H. Kidwai and Syed Ameer Ali were pan-Islamists, hoping to unify the Muslim world, Kidwai was very much anti-European and pro-Indian nationalism, while the older Ameer Ali ultimately collaborated with the British establishment. Instead of trying to throw off the British, Ameer Ali’s pan-Islam attempted to turn the British Empire into a Muslim-friendly realm. Finally, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din tried to stay out of politics, focusing on religion instead, but signed himself onto memorials, similar to petitions, to the British government regarding the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire, and attended lectures organized by the Central Islamic Society regarding the importance of the Ottoman Empire to Muslims. Importantly, Duse Mohamed Ali did not share this same allegiance as an imperial, pan-African, and heritage Muslim, and instead hoped to unify the African world against white oppressors through a strong anti-imperialist sentiment.

147 Ahmed and Mukherjee, Introduction, xiii.
It was difficult and complex to be a Muslim in Britain at the time. On the British convert side, all four previously discussed converts were Empire-loyalists, seeking to influence policy within the framework of the empire. Abdullah Quilliam (at this point Henri de Léon) and Lady Evelyn Cobbold have the least political writings during the war, due to Cobbold purposefully avoiding public politics and Quilliam being under an alias; therefore, they will be examined less than Headley and Pickthall. Further, the converts differed on what they thought was the best policy for the empire, and how far their loyalty would extend. Lord Headley believed that loyalty to England was demanded first and foremost, while Marmaduke Pickthall thought that British rule was best for the Muslim world, with the exception being in the Ottoman Empire where the Young Turk reforms meant that Turkey would be a progressive ally to the British Empire. Associating with the anti-imperial ideas of Kidwai and Mohamed ended up hindering the credibility and increased suspicion against the converts. Ultimately, the Foreign Office coined Pickthall and Mohamed Ali part of a “Woking Gang,” a supposed conspiratorial network centered around the WMM. Though for the most part the British Muslims attempted to show their loyalty to the British cause, the converts could not be loyal citizens to the war cause while also advocating for an unpopular policy that they genuinely believed would be beneficial for England without seeming suspicious. These tensions ended up hindering their unity and their abilities to reach their policy objectives.

**Connecting to the ummah and the British Elite**

One could question why the British converts became devoted to the future of lands and peoples that many of them had only visited once or twice. Evidenced in their passionate writings and political lobbying on behalf of the Muslim world, British converts appeared to opt into the

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149 Ansari, *The Infidel Within*, 84.
Muslim concept of the *ummah*, or community of believers. For British converts, as analyzed above, their conversion was not just solely to another religion, but a different way of life and above all to a new community that transcended national borders. Making that distinct decision instigated them to relate strongly to their newly-adopted brethren around the world. This tendency was strengthened since they did not join an existing ethnic community in England, which as shown in the Introduction, usually superseded religion in this period.

Again, converts such as Abdullah Quilliam and Marmaduke Pickthall appreciated the universality and brotherhood of Islam. In *The Faith of Islam*, Quilliam pointed to the, “practical brotherhood” of Islam, while Pickthall repeatedly focused on the theme of Islam as a “supranationality” in his lectures and sermons.\(^\text{150}\) The strong emphasis on unity most likely facilitated the level of cohesion in the WMM amongst the disparate members. Their conception could at times appear idealized, with Pickthall and Quilliam both purporting in lectures on Islam that while Christianity has class and racial prejudices, Islam had distinctions between groups but no ultimate distinctions at all.\(^\text{151}\) In a sermon in 1919, Pickthall claimed that, “A Muslim of India is the brother of a Muslim of Egypt or West Africa: if any one of another religion asked him of his nationality, he would not say ‘I am an Indian,’ but, ‘I am a Mussulman [sic].’”\(^\text{152}\)

For the heritage Muslims, reflective of the converts, the trend of pan-Islam was a driving force in their association and concern with Muslims across the globe. However, past scholarship on the converts has not acknowledged fully the extent of the influence of Muslim intellectual networks and movements on the British Muslims. Regarding pan-Islam in the British Empire, Aydin notes in conjunction with Ameer and Pickthall that instead of fostering a rebellion in


\(^{152}\) Pickthall, “Fraternity,” 42.
response to European imperialism, British Muslims instead, “tried to transform the British Empire into a Muslim-friendly realm,” arguing for a strategic allegiance between the two great “Muslim empires of the time,” the Caliph and the Crown.\textsuperscript{153} While this idealization of Islam shows a deeper understanding of the converts’ conceptions of their new religion, it is also important to understanding their fervent interest thousands of miles away in keeping the Ottoman Empire intact. Thus, the conception of the \textit{ummah} was particularly influential in driving the British Muslims to lobby on behalf of their Muslim brethren in the Ottoman Empire.

Over time, the tension between the British Muslims’ lofty support of the \textit{ummah}, and the reality of their activities and associations became clear. The activities of the political societies they formed, and especially the WMM, had a distinct upper-class bias. Apart from the religious aspects of the WMM, which catered to upper-middle class British Christians by “Christianizing” Islam, the WMM had an elite-bias in its political activities that was at times out of touch with their Muslim brethren in colonial contexts. Further, the group was more inclined to have an elite-tilt in England since Kamal-ud-Din practiced Ahmadiyya Islam, which though not an elitist movement itself, presented itself as progressive and familiar and thus appealed to converts who were educated upper or middle class.\textsuperscript{154}

Looking at the individuals, Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, Duse Mohamed Ali, Syed Ameer Ali, M.H. Kidwai, Lord Headley, Marmaduke Pickthall, and Lady Cobbold all moved in elite circles in England. Even Quilliam, who was solidly middle-class and pseudo-exiled from Liverpool had connections and a special status within the British Muslims for his relationship with the sultan and work at the LMI. Further, Lord Headley’s title affected the legitimacy and weight of his

\textsuperscript{153} Aydin, \textit{The Idea of the Muslim World}, 85.
\textsuperscript{154} It is clear through the converts writings that they supported this version of Islam, even though they did not necessarily intentionally convert to the Ahmadiyya but rather general Sunni Hanafi Islam.
comments, as well as shaped his activism to be much less radical in comparison to his peers. From the outset, Lord Headley’s title gave him credibility and special treatment by both the British public and the Muslim community at large. Though Lord Headley never sat in the House of Lords, his title of Peer gave him access, credibility, and even importance in the Muslim community. As coverage in *The Times* showed, Headley headed and participated in many societies, such as conferences of science and education, dramatic arts, self-defense, and obviously, Islam.155 The Court Circular section documented these activities. When Lord Headley traveled abroad, he was treated according to a higher status than other Muslims, even though he in reality was limited in his knowledge of Islam as new convert.156 For Lady Evelyn Cobbold, her position as Scottish aristocracy along with her delayed public conversion until the 1930s hints that her status meant that she did not feel comfortable publically coming out with her conversion; she limited her activism to behind-closed-doors meetings and being an Ottoman sympathizer.

Similarly, the South Asian Muslims - Kamal-ud-Din, Ameer Ali, and Kidwai - were all members of the Indian upper middle landed classes based in London, and therefore adopted the British social lifestyle in order to move in elite social circles.157 Ron Geaves appraised Kamal-ud-Din’s social status by noting, “Kamal-ud-Din was not born in Britain, but arguably he was bred there.”158 Eric Germain interpreted the Indian Muslims position and behavior of the elite Indian diaspora communities as, “in search of recognition of their religious specificity but also for their ‘Britishness’ a colonial citizenship meaning equal rights and opportunities with white

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156 Shearmur, “The Woking Mosque Muslims,” 168.; In 1923 Headley and Kamal-ud-Din performed the hajj together. They had a reception in Egypt where Lord Allenby, The British High Commissioner, wrote to the Foreign Office that Headley made explicit his visit was for religious purposes only (Aziz, *Woking Muslim Mission Centenary*, 13).
157 Ansari, “Pickthall, Muslims of South Asia,” 34.
settlers in the Crown’s Colonies.” This elitist tilt of the politically active British Muslims had important implications for the manner in which they conducted their activism, attempting to stay within the existing British social establishment while advocating for extremely controversial arguments. For example, the British converts strongly embraced the equality and brotherhood promoted in Islam. However, this became increasingly ironic to all parties as it became clear as elites they were far from equal with their Muslim brethren in India or the Ottoman Empire. In this way, they were never truly accepted as being completely trustworthy by either the British establishment, or the Muslim world.

Syed Ameer Ali is a good example in this respect, who by 1915 had lost the confidence of both the British establishment and his root community, the South Asian Muslims. Ameer Ali, being a member of the Privy Council and “in” with the British establishment, was still an Empire loyalist. An interpretation of Islam that attempted to justify and legitimate British rule in India deeply influenced his childhood and teen years, given that his family collaborated with the government. He did not completely abandon Indian interests, and in the late nineteenth century he strongly supported reforms that would help Indian Muslims, and was against the dismantling of the British Empire. Ameer Ali did achieve some political success due to his status when he became a central figure in the 1909 discussion about political reforms in India with the Secretary of State for India Lord Morley. Similarly mentioned in the Court Circular, Ameer Ali attended dinners fairly frequently throughout his career with the Secretaries of State for

159 Germain, “Southern Hemisphere Diasporic Communities,” 126.
India, Cabinet Members, and Indian elites. In 1910, he emphasized in a speech to the All-India Muslim League the importance of the permanence of British rule in India, since the British will peacefully maintain the civilized world. Therefore, he urged them, “to cooperate in all totality of spirit with the servants of the Crown to promote the country’s welfare, and to put aside any wild and visionary dreams about India’s sudden emergence to independence.” His loyalty to the Crown only stretched so far, however, and during the Turco-Italian War he spoke out, saying in letters to The Times that the Italians tried to give a religious turn to the war that was making the Muslim world upset, and that, “as a British subject who has worked for many years past in strengthening the bonds of sympathy between the East and West, I feel that it is of the utmost important to England,” that they intervene. However, his seemingly fickle views made him appear untrustworthy to both sides, and by World War I he no longer possessed confidence with any group, seeming too elitist, yet too disloyal. Ameer Ali had to reluctantly pass the role of being a true intermediary of the Indian Muslims to the British government onto the younger and more anti-imperialist M.H. Kidwai.

The converts’ elite bias contributed to their feeling of responsibility to the rest of the Muslim world to be bridge-builders between Christianity and Islam, which in turn led to their focus on British Christian audiences rather than other Muslims in their writings. With Lord Headley’s belief that “there are thousands of men – and women too, I believe – who are at heart Muslims,” and a goal shared by Quilliam, Kamal-ud-Din and Headley to turn England into a

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Muslim nation, their actions can be better understood. Converts such as Marmaduke Pickthall did attempt to make meaningful connections between British and Islamic norms, and, “tried to disturb cultural practices as little as possible by a deliberate building of bridge,” an example being through lectures, such as Ameer Ali’s 1911 one entitled, “The Legal Position of the Women of Moslem Countries.” Further, though the WMM attempted to reach the British public at large, and were relatively successful in doing so through newspaper articles, public lectures, and the number of converts they were able to achieve, most of their activities targeted elites. For example, Ameer Ali often held breakfasts at fancy hotels in London, or had meetings and sent letters to government officials. Therefore, the elite bent among the converts and the heritage Muslims part of the WMM meant that their political activities focused on the British upper and middle class, and their legitimacy as a voice for the rest of the Muslim world was questionable.

Thus, a key unifying factor for British Muslim identity at the time was its elite status. Pickthall, Headley, and other converts gravitated toward their colonial Muslim allies precisely because of the commonalities in social norms, such as dress and education, as well as the purported similarities they saw between modernist Islam and the Christianity they left behind. However, in the end, this effort to be both counter-cultural and yet within the establishment proved to be very hard. The difficulty was on both sides: both not fitting into the British establishment, while also not truly being accepted as understanding the struggles of Muslims throughout the Empire.

169 Ansari, “Pickthall, Muslims of South Asia,” 34.
Political Societies

Going with the trend of the “age of associations,” British Muslims formed and belonged to overlapping societies that consolidated interest groups. The four political societies this thesis analyzes reflects the distinct politics of Duse Mohamed Ali, M.H. Kidwai, Lord Headley, and Syed Ameer Ali respectively; though the WMM was their main point of unity, they all had side political projects. The differences between these societies display the tensions within the British Muslim community and their allies when it came to political issues. A few of the most influential ones were the Anglo-Ottoman Society, the Central Islamic Society, the All-India Muslim League, and the British Muslim Society, which was associated with the WMM and was more religious than political.\(^\text{171}\)

In 1913, Duse Mohamed Ali had a meeting in Caxton Hall in London on the subject of the Turkish retention of Adrianople, held at the time by “Balkan enemies.”\(^\text{172}\) From this meeting came the creation of The Ottoman Committee, that stood in direct opposition to the anti-Turkish Balkan Committee, seeking complete Ottoman expulsion in Europe.\(^\text{173}\) The Ottoman Committee was short lived and full of in-fighting, as members finally purged Mohamed Ali, the only non-English member, by restricting membership to “British subjects of European descent.”\(^\text{174}\) In response, Mohamed Ali mobilized a coalition for the Anglo-Ottoman Society that came to include the British Ambassador to Constantinople, Sir Louis Mallet; Conservative MP Aubrey

\(^{170}\) For more on the trends toward political associations in this era see Andrew Arsan, “This is the Age of Association: Committees, Petitions, and the Roots of Interwar Middle Eastern Internationalism,” *Journal of Global History* 7 no. 4 (June 2012): 166-188, accessed October 1, 2017, doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1740022812000022.


\(^{174}\) Duffield, “Duse Mohamed Ali,” 133.
Herbert; Cambridge Professor EG Brown; Abdullah Quilliam; and Marmaduke Pickthall.175 These internal conflicts reveal the differing motivations of those pursuing pro-Ottoman policies at the time, while it was easier to mobilize around enmity toward the Ottomans.

Next, the Central Islamic Society, with Kidwai as the Honorable Secretary, had objectives that were more connected to Islam than the Ottoman Empire. They focused on raising money for a mosque in London (to oppose what they saw as WMM’s controversial practices), and, “to remove misconceptions prevailing about Islam.” 176 The CIS feared that, “When they [British public} come to know that such and such a movement or periodical is missionary in its objects they become absolutely indifferent to it.”177 Ironically, the CIS was concerned that the WMM’s association with missionaries gave Muslims in Britain a bad stereotype that furthered negative prejudices.178 The leaders in London as of 1916 consisted of M.H. Kidwai as the head, Duse Mohamed Ali as Vice President and MH Kidwai as the Honorable Secretary, displaying the mix of members and their politics.

Next, the British Muslim Society (BMS), with its president Lord Headley, attempted to put religious over political, aligning with Headley’s desire to be a loyal citizen. The Central Islamic Society and the British Muslim Society had overlap, but also key differences, mainly due to the disagreements between M.H. Kidwai and Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din over Ahmadiyya Islam. Also, the BMS focused on religion over the politics of the CIS. Their objectives were much more political than the BMS associated with the WMM, reflective of Headley and Kamal-ud-Din’s desire to appear as loyal, trusted, bridge-builders between Christianity and Islam.

175 Seddon, “Pickthall’s Anti-Ottoman Dissent,” 95.
Finally, the *All-India Muslim League* was first and foremost concerned with British rule in India, and creating an outlet for Indian Muslims to express their views to the British. Syed Ameer Ali was highly involved in this group until 1903. His first political mission was attaining Muslim representation on British Indian councils; he won his battle in 1909, getting a separate electorate for Indian Muslims.\(^{179}\) After seeing the trend of negative attitudes towards Muslims in the Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars, he started the *London Muslim League*, as he saw the “necessity of cohesion and solidarity,” among Muslims. Strikingly, Ameer Ali articulated a working knowledge of the power of lobbying and interest groups, stating that this meeting was the, “first gathering of the King’s Mussulmann [sic] subjects in the metropolis of the British Empire to ensure corporate action for their advancement.”\(^{180}\) The *London Muslim League* held dinners and lunches with groups they hoped to bring together. For example, the League met at the Westminster Palace Hotel, with the purpose of bringing political leaders into communication with Indian Muslims.\(^{181}\) Ameer Ali ended up resigning the *League* in 1913 because he thought it was too extreme, reflecting his ultimate Empire-loyalism which caused him to only support Indian independence to a certain extent.\(^{182}\)

**Roots of Politicization from 1905-1913**

Now that this thesis has covered the state of Islam in England and the Empire, introduced the relevant figures associated with the Woking Muslim Mission, and given a context on the political societies they formed, it will now chronologically outline their political activities from

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179 Muhamad, Introduction, viii.
1905-1920. The Turco-Italian War (1911-12) was the first major opportunity for the British Muslims examined in this thesis to formulate arguments in favor of the Ottoman Empire on a religious basis. Syed Ameer Ali, Abdullah Quilliam, and Marmaduke Pickthall found the prevalence of salacious news and false claims about Islam particularly dangerous and disturbing, which prompted their campaigns to educate the public and leaders on Islam.

The imperialist Italian invasion of the Ottoman province of Tripoli was the moment of reckoning for Muslims throughout the Empire on the lack of British support for the Ottoman Empire. Pickthall summed up the general sentiments of Muslims: the conflict revealed that, “Muslim blood may be shed more lightly [than Christian].”183 Ameer Ali was sufficiently upset by the reaction in the British press in support of the Italians on religious grounds that he wrote to The Times, “in European countries men who fight for their independence and refuse to be subjugated by aliens are usually called heroes; but it seems that Mussulmans [sic] in a similar condition are not entitled to be called anything but fanatics.”184 The Turco-Italian War seemed to be the tip of the iceberg for the break between the Ottoman and British Empires, worrisome for the pro-Ottoman British Muslims, but also was a moral dilemma. As Ameer Ali put it in moral terms, it, “will be regarded as an exception in the history of an age which prides itself on its humanity and moral progress.”

Ameer Ali also began writing letters to the editor of The Times that refuted information in the paper that he thought was biased, untrue, or needed to be qualified. For example, he appealed, “to every lover of peace and good will on earth to protest with all his power, before it

183 Clark, Marmaduke Pickthall, 20.; Pickthall published a series of articles regarding the Balkan Wars in New Age in 1912, that he then combined to form the book With the Turk in War Time.
is too late, against this flagrant breach of all canons of International morality on the part of a nominally Christian country.” ¹⁸⁶ Later, in December, Ameer Ali wrote to the Editor again, joining the general condemnation of the “Tripolitan Arabs” for mutilating Italian soldiers, but wanted to prove a distinction between Islam, and the actions of soldiers in Tripoli who happened to also be Muslim. In other words, Ameer Ali attempted to show how Islam itself prohibits the mutilation of soldiers, and how any actions of some soldiers in Tripoli who happen to be Muslim does not mean the whole faith is fanatical. ¹⁸⁷

More than just feeling indignant at the religious-tilt of the conflict and the moral issues, British Muslims saw that Italy’s supposed grievances for invading Tripoli were “too flimsy” to be justified, yet the British did nothing to stop the invasion. ¹⁸⁸ Much of his indignation was based on the apparent betrayal of loyal citizens by their Empire, revealing a sense of citizenship and level of responsibility imperial Muslims felt was their due. This was especially true for Ameer Ali who had argued fervently that Indian Muslims should stay loyal to the Crown, yet:

The Mahomedan [sic] subjects of the King who have given their whole-hearted loyalty to the Throne of England have a right to expect that their feelings and sentiments relating to their most cherished transitions should receive consideration in the general policy of the Empire, especially when those feelings and interests coincide with the demands of justice, humanity, and international obligations. ¹⁸⁹

Finally, Duse Mohamed Ali also used the war to advocate that Africa and Asia needed to be unified, declaring that, “Europe stretched out her hands on every side to squeeze the darker races to her advantage, because she knows the people of Africa and the people of Asia to be

divided.” This moment was beneficial to Mohammed Ali, who wanted to unify and mobilize the Afro-Asian world against imperialism as much as possible.

Regarding the converts, fittingly, the first prominent British convert, Abdullah Quilliam, was also the first to set the groundwork for the politicization of British Muslims during the conflicts bubbling in the Balkans in the early 1900s. Quilliam cultivated a close personal and official relationship with Ottoman Sultan Abd al-Hamid II (r. 1876-1909), who named him the Sheikh-al-Islam of the British Isles in 1894. In a controversial move, in 1903 Quilliam showed up to a town hall in Liverpool about “The Trouble in the Balkans.” He wanted to add an amendment condemning the killing of Russian Jews, the Belgians colonial cruelty in the Congo, and lynching in the United States, reasoning that the government in the U.S. was just as responsible for carrying out lynching as the Turkish government was for matters occurring in the Balkans. Understandably, the Liverpool town hall responded with outrage, asking how his radical claims were even related to the topic at hand. Sarcastically, Quilliam told the meeting that he decided to open the scope of the topic in response to the Bishop’s earlier comment saying it was the duty of England as a Christian nation to help humanity in every part of the globe. If this were really true, the Bishop should be taking up these causes as well. In contrast, according to Quilliam, Islam assisted every oppressed person, no matter the creed.

Finally, the Turco-Italian War formatively sparked Marmaduke Pickthall’s politicization, and instigated his first explicitly political writings. In 1913 Pickthall traveled to Turkey and published a series of articles that eventually became his book, *With the Turk in Wartime*. From there, he became more public about his religious and political leanings. Pickthall was truly

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disturbed by the blatant racism that he saw in the English press and public; in his own words, it, “broke the heart of an Englishman who loved the East.”\(^{194}\) His great pain was that, “The English press and public had, in this twentieth century, responded with fanaticism to the cry of a Crusade against the Turks raised by some cunning Balkan rulers.”\(^{195}\) The hypocrisy was greater than just England betraying their Empire, he saw Christianity as a whole degraded by the international Western support of the Italians. Most likely contributing to his conversion a few years later, Pickthall experienced what he viewed as two Christianities, one that was only benevolent to Christians, and another that was hypocritical in its action against the rest of the world.\(^{196}\)

**World War I: Tactics and Tensions**

The Turco-Italian War, and thereafter the Balkan Wars, were just precursors to the arguments the British Muslims made regarding a much more high-stake issue: the potential dismantling of the Ottoman Empire once Great Britain declared war in November 1914. When this happened, the societies created before the war by the British Muslims and Ottoman sympathizers mobilized; however, the war also exacerbated tensions within the community, and hindered unity. This section will first go through British Muslim attempts to sway public and governmental opinion regarding the Ottoman Empire during the war, then move into points of contention that hindered their unity and ultimately determined their failure to achieve their foreign policy goals. While after 1919 Muslims around the Empire became involved in the peace process and formation of the current Middle East, this thesis stops before the conclusion of the Paris Peace Conference, examining their arguments supporting the Ottoman Empire while there was still potential hope for it remaining intact.

\(^{194}\) Marmaduke Pickthall, *With the Turk in Wartime* (London: Lond. &c, 1914), x.

\(^{195}\) Pickthall, *With the Turk in Wartime*, x.

\(^{196}\) Pickthall, *With the Turk in Wartime*, x.
During the war, the primary form of activism the societies undertook was educating the British public and government through debates, lectures, pamphlets, and their periodicals. They taught Islam as a complete alternate system to the West, yet full of similarities and historical parallels with Christianity, as well as portraying Islam as universal, non-sectarian, and anti-nationalist. These arguments all reflected the Ahmadi tactics Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din used to gain converts. More than the other converts, Quilliam and Pickthall imagined an *ummah* with Ottoman Turkey at its head.\textsuperscript{197} Therefore, Islam, with the Ottoman Empire physically embodying the caliphate, was not only a religion but a complete political and social system. As Aydin purports, the goal of Muslim modernists was elevating the status of Islam to one that was universal, and therefore comparable, to Christianity.\textsuperscript{198} In this vein, Pickthall lectured in 1927, Islam could be conceptualized, “as an alternative to socialism, Fascism, syndicalism, bolshevism, and all the other ‘isms.’”\textsuperscript{199}

As shown earlier in the chapter, the converts felt a close connection to the *ummah*, because as a British convert to Islam without a specific “nationality,” the existing Muslim community was appealing. Once the war began, Pickthall especially tried to mobilize the British Muslims and promote unity within the larger Muslim community. For example, when advocating for acting together with their Muslim brothers in a sermon, Pickthall said, “Our effort must begin at once, and here in London.”\textsuperscript{200} In a very compelling anecdote, Pickthall then compared the WMM to the early Muslims in Mecca, who others thought were weak and unimportant, but in reality, “we, the little band of English Muslims, have a most important part to play”: dispelling

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\textsuperscript{197} Nash, “Abdullah Pickthall, Marmaduke Pickthall, and the Politics of Christendom,” 89.

\textsuperscript{198} Aydin, *The Idea of the Muslim World*, 73.


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prejudices and false notions prevalent among English Christians. Thus, he optimistically thought that in the tolerant and enlightened world of 1913, England was ripe and ready to accept Islamic teaching and, “In Christendom to-day and particularly here in England, there are hosts of men and women who realize, in the face of this great world-calamity, that something has been wrong in the religion and thought of Europe.”

In his book, *Islam and Britain: Muslim Mission in the Age of Empire*, Ron Geaves purports that sectarian divisions were played down by both British converts and foreign Muslims in London so that the small bank of people could, “fraternize and provide support to each other.” While this strategic necessity was true in some sense, for example in organizing the WMM, ultimately many of the divisions between the British Muslims became more like fault lines during the war, hindering their goals. Their divisions were based on lack of a strong leaders, questions over extent of loyalty to the Empire and whether the Ottoman Empire was the best hope for the Muslim world. While the WMM was a meeting point for these individuals, and the war brought those with varying degrees of Ottoman-sympathy together, in the end discrepancies and infighting within the British Muslims inhibited their cohesion. The British Muslims were all affiliated with the WMM, but Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din was in no way the only authoritative leader of the British Muslim community. The multiplicity of societies, background, and ideas show the diversity of thought that existed.

First, conflicts arose within the British Muslim community on which part of the Muslim world to support, and to what extent the British Empire should be involved. Here, Pickthall

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provides an insight into the varying allegiances one who was pro-Ottoman could have at the time. Pickthall’s travel accounts, which is how his writings became widely popular, revealed his royalism and conservatism. For example, in his 1922 book, *As Others See Us*, published in 1922 about his experience with the Kefr Ammeh incident in Egypt, he spoke of Egypt fondly, but ultimately purported his support of British rule in Egypt. Instead, he ultimately desired to return to former Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli’s model of realpolitik, keeping Russians out of Mediterranean and away from Egypt, instead allying with the Ottomans. Thus Great Britain should go back to, “the old, solid, Oriental policy built up by our great statesmen of the past on the principle of the integrity of Turkey.”

Thus, Nash calls Pickthall’s Orientalism “Ottoman Orientalism,” distinct from, for example, individuals such as Lawrence of Arabia’s espousal of the ‘desert kingdoms’ of Arabia. When it came to the Ottoman Empire, Pickthall believed that it would be most advantageous to the British Empire to have a strong ally in the Ottomans, and saw the way forward through supporting the Young Turk movement. After visiting Constantinople, he decided they were progressive, tolerant, and in line with Great Britain’s own liberal ideals. He saw them as inspired by the English, and that it would be, “unreason near to madness,” if the British did not support them, since, “a hundred mad fanatic heads would rise instead of it.”

One can hypothesize from his activism and writings that he believed the Turks were smart, progressive, and perhaps more “white,” than the Egyptians. His established British thinking on

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204 Pickthall, *As Others See Us* (London: Collins, 1922).; Ansari, *The Infidel Within*, 86
206 “The Heavy Handicap,” *Islamic Review*, vol 11 no. 2 (February 1914), 63.
208 Ansari, “Pickthall, Muslims of South Asia, 27.
209 Pickthall, *With the Turk in War Time*, xiii.
race and hierarchy could have influenced his thinking on hierarchies in the Muslim world, which directly conflicted with his espousal of a universal brotherhood of Muslims. For example, in his 1914 book *With the Turk in Wartime* he stated that he saw the Turks as a “white race,” that, “have a natural precedence over the many coloured races of the Muslim world.”\(^{210}\) For this reason, he supported the Young Turk movement forcefully and believed that the Turks should remain in charge of the Muslim world; as a Turkish woman, he spoke to on his travels said, “The Turks are different; our people are not so apathetic as your Arabs.”\(^{211}\) His love for the Turks over others in the Muslim world caused him to be the most forceful convert for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; for example, Pickthall attempted to be loyal and said that during the war he would fight, as long as he did not have to fight Turks.\(^{212}\) Thus, as Nash conceptualized, Pickthall tried to hold a “triangulation,” which was 1. Britain and Ottoman Turkey are great Muslim powers; 2. British Muslims owe loyalty to both; 3. Britain is now trying to undermine Ottoman Turkey in the war.\(^{213}\) It was nearly impossible to stay true to all three.

In this vein, loyalty to the empire was a sticking point; they all tried it to some capacity; Pickthall, was always careful to exemplify his patriotism, and would often throw into his sermons lines such as, “As an Englishman, and, I hope, a patriotic Englishman…”\(^{214}\) Kidwai similarly told his fellow Indian Muslims that, “It is therefore essential for us … to cooperate in all loyalty of spirit with the servants of the Crown to promote the country’s welfare, and to put aside any wild and visionary dreams about India’s sudden emergence to independence.”\(^{215}\) In these ways, the men attempted to be Empire-loyalists, and show their agenda was in line with the

\(^{210}\) Pickthall, *With the Turk in Wartime*, 198.
\(^{211}\) Pickthall, *With the Turk in Wartime*, 204.
\(^{214}\) Pickthall, “Muslim Conception of Righteousness,” 20.
\(^{215}\) Ameer Ali, “Presidential Address to the Third Session of the All-India Muslim League in 1910,” 205.
interests of the British foreign policy overall. Headley and Quilliam framed their support for the Ottomans as being more religious than political. Between Headley and Pickthall, though Pickthall claimed to be a loyal, patriotic citizen, in reality Headley was much more aggressive in his patriotism, even claiming that anyone against World War I in any capacity was a traitor. Quilliam took a similar stance. Once Quilliam returned to England in 1913, he was concerned about demonstrating his loyalty to the Crown, and went back on his earlier rhetoric claiming religion took precedence over patriotism saying, “there was only one way to achieve this unity of the Muslim world, which was for all Sunni Muslims to come together and progress loyalty to the successors of the historic caliphate that had been established after the death of the Prophet.”

Due to his relationship with the former sultan, he did not support or like the Young Turks who deposed him, and was able to claim that his spiritual support for the caliphate ended with the coup. He was able to use this justification to more easily divorce himself from supporting the Ottoman Empire once the war broke out, and even left the Anglo-Ottoman Society from 1914-1919 based on this point.

Finally, the colonial Muslims, M.H. Kidwai, Kamal-ud-Din, Syed Ameer Ali, and Duse Mohamed Ali, were by no means completely unified. Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din had a split on multiple levels: from the British Muslim community, Indian Muslims, and the Ahmadiyya movement of which he was a part of the minority Lahore Ahmadis. He also tried to stay out of politics explicitly, like Lord Headley, and Kamal-ud-Din wrote a report to Lahore August 1914 in Urdu about war: “I think that the will of God has joined our destiny with that of Great Britain.

216 Ansari, “Pickthall, Muslims of South Asia,” 31.
218 Gilham, “Marmaduke Pickthall and the British Muslim Convert Community,” 50.
219 Gilham, “Marmaduke Pickthall and the British Muslim Convert Community,” 84.
220 Ahmadiyya Isha’at Islam Lahore, “The Woking Muslim Mission.”
It is our duty to support this state. It is important we provide practical proof of our loyalty.”

Though the WMM was connected to the Lahore Ahmadis for a time, and tried to also build a bridge with the British Christians, what Kamal-ud-Din thought would be a progressive moderate stance over time separated from both British Christians and Indian Muslims, who thought his venture in England was “doomed to failure.”

M.H. Kidwai, in contrast to Syed Ameer Ali’s desire for a Muslim-friendly British Empire, saw promoting pan-Islam as an international way for the independence of Muslims from European rule. Meanwhile, when resigning from the All-India Muslim League in 1913, because of his, “inability to join headlong in this affair you have chosen to send me an insulting letter containing contemptible insinuations,” he stated that:

It is my settled conviction repeatedly declared in public that the Musulmans [sic] of India, whilst claiming a full recognition of their legitimate interests and due consideration of their feeling and susceptibilities, should cultivate a sense of proportion and work in harmony and a true spirit of accord with each other and the Government.

Public opinion and government backlash also affected their cohesion and exacerbated their differences. Once the war broke out senior British officials shifted their biases forcefully against British Muslims. For example, in December 1914 the government raided the offices of the CIS and AOS. The Ottoman entry, subsequently, created a swift and inevitable anti-Islamic backlash in British society at large. Those that attempted the ‘Empire loyalist’ path found themselves disjointed with both the British establishment and their own Muslim

222 Aziz, Woking Muslim Mission Centenary, 3.
225 “The All-India Moslem League.” Times.
226 Seddon, “Pickthall’s Anti-Ottoman Dissent,” 97.
227 Gilham, Loyal Enemies, 216.
community in light of the war. Although loyalty to Britain was demanded, for some converts, such as Pickthall, it was emotionally impossible for them oppose the Ottoman Caliphate, the most important symbol of the worldwide Muslim community.\textsuperscript{228} However, as seen above, some tried to do both. Even those that seemed safe were tainted by their status as Muslim, such as Syed Ameer Ali who the Foreign Office surveillance deemed a “fanatic.”\textsuperscript{229}

In the end, Pickthall was, as Aubrey Herbert coined him, “England’s most loyal enemy.”\textsuperscript{230} Pickthall truly thought he was acting in the best interest of the British Empire by supporting their wartime enemy. Perhaps Pickthall should not have allied himself with the more radical members of the group. When he joined the Islamic Information Bureau (IIB) towards the end of the war, Marmaduke Pickthall, Duse Mohamed Ali, and another pan-Islamist Hasim Ispahani were placed on surveillance and labelled the “Woking Gang,” by officials.\textsuperscript{231} Though many similarities remained between Quilliam, Headley, and Pickthall as converts, their difficulties navigating the social and political science and having a united front demonstrated the difficulties of having allegiance to Islam during the war, and the complexity of the position regarding the Ottoman Empire. Pickthall finally left England to live in India in 1920.\textsuperscript{232}

Although Pickthall was a collaborator with South Asian Muslims, their ultimate goals and temperaments differed enough that they had difficulty sustaining effective organization.\textsuperscript{233}

In the end, because of the lack of ethnic association among new British converts to Islam, and the Ahmadiyya connection of the Woking Mosque, members of the mosque were more

\textsuperscript{228} Ansari, \textit{The Infidel Within}, 127.  
\textsuperscript{230} Gilham, “Marmaduke Pickthall and the British Muslim Convert Community,” 52.  
\textsuperscript{231} Gilham, “Marmaduke Pickthall and the British Muslim Convert Community,” 87.; The Islamic Information Bureau published \textit{The Muslim Outlook} and other pro-Islam propaganda.  
\textsuperscript{232} Gilham, “Marmaduke Pickthall and the British Muslim Convert Community,” 87.  
\textsuperscript{233} Ansari, “Pickthall, Muslims of South Asia,” 42.
likely to identify with the greater Muslims *umma* and pan-Islamism, and thus be politically active supporting the Ottoman Empire. The position of new British converts, who did not have a foreign ethnicity to identify with, meant that they identified strongly as British, but also strongly to their new community of coreligionists, seen in Islam as the *umma*. Politically, their newfound faith was often connected to experience with and in the Ottoman Empire, which led them to be sympathetic to the Turks. However, though the war did, as Ameer Ali said, cause the “tightening of the bonds that unite the followers of Islam … an important defense factor—the only defense Islam can offer—against the destruction of the remaining autonomous Moslem States advocated by the fanatics of other creeds,” it also exacerbated disunity among the diverse British Muslims, putting them under increased pressure publically and internally.

**Chapter 3: Case Study of The Balfour Declaration**

His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. – 2 November 1917, The Balfour Declaration

At this point, it will be helpful to look at an example of the efforts of the British Muslims, lobbying as a religious group on behalf of a political issue. This chapter will first review the chronology of British wartime policy in the Middle East, focusing on the Balfour Declaration of 1917. It will then examine Anglo-Jewish responses and activism against the declaration, as well as the British Muslim efforts, ultimately displaying their ineffectiveness against British wartime decisions to dismantle the Ottoman Empire in the event of an Allied victory.

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While the British government made many policy decisions regarding the Muslim world from 1910-1920, English converts and British Muslims made their greatest efforts to prevent the Balfour Declaration and keep Palestine part of the Ottoman Empire. The Balfour Declaration was a statement published by the British government in 1917 in support of a “national home for the Jewish people.” 235 It was a foreign policy decision distinctly involved with religion; one cannot escape the religious significance of the Holy Land to Muslims, Christians, and Jews alike, especially since the Ottomans were custodians of the holy places at the time. For this reason, it was an issue around which religious lobbies within England mobilized. The case study reveals the practical challenges British Muslims faced in coordination as well as the structural barriers against them, such as strong wartime contingencies placing British foreign policy against their goals.

The Balfour Declaration is distinct in British wartime policy as on the surface, it explicitly connected to religion and had religious arguments for and against, an area of argument in which the British Muslims were well-versed. Thus, British Muslim efforts stand in stark contrast to another British group organized around religion that did attain their goal, the British Jewish community. Though it is difficult to imagine that the cohort of Muslim could have overcome the odds stacked against them, British Muslims came up with convincing arguments for public and government officials. These structural barriers included previous British wartime promises to France and the Arabs, British desire to win over American Jews, and prejudices against their wartime adversary the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Balfour Declaration in 1917 crystallized the ineffectiveness of the British Muslims in shaping the break-up of the Middle East, and prefaced their lack of voice in the Peace Conferences after 1919.

In previous scholarship concerning the events and actors involved in the creation and release of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, the focus has mainly been on explaining the wartime contingencies and the actions of specific influential Zionists, such as Chaim Weizmann, or policymakers, such as David Lloyd George. It leaves out the responses and opinions of religious groups making religious arguments on behalf or against the policy. However, it would be false to assume that Christians, Jews, and Muslims in Britain each had a solidified stance on the Holy Land. No homogenous backing within each religious group either behind or against the Balfour Declaration existed; instead those within each religious group were able to formulate arguments that appealed to history and religion to advocate their position. British Muslims, Jews, and Christians alike had a diverse set of opinions on the declaration and its wider implications. Even more specifically, within the Anglo-Jewish community, there was a wide discrepancy in views between lay leaders, rabbis, the general public, and Jewish religious leaders such as Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz and the Sephardic Rabbi Moses Gaster. British Christians were similarly divided, or ambivalent. In contrast, the British Muslims were solidified on their policy toward Palestine: they wanted it to remain under Ottoman, and thus Muslim, control. This position directly complemented their wish to ensure protection of the existing the Ottoman Empire after the war. Though British government officials thought an Arab caliphate would counter the Ottoman threat, in reality the British-backed 1916 Arab Revolt against the Ottomans made many Indian Muslims angry, who then thought Hussein a traitor or puppet of British. In the words of Pickthall, “It never seemed to have occurred to the inventors [of the Arab scheme] that the

237 Ansari, “Pickthall, Muslims of South Asia,” 36.
majority of Muslims might resent the removal of their centre from the most progressive Muslim country in close touch with Europe, to one of the most backward countries of the world.”

State of British Foreign Policy towards the Middle East in 1917

To give a brief background on the relevant British wartime foreign policy towards the Middle East, by 1917 the British had already committed to a number of wartime agreements, including promising the Arabs a large state in the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. As promising a large Arab state meant advocating for the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of an alternate Muslim power under stronger British influence, it conflicted with British Muslim pro-Ottoman policy goals. Further, these agreements were done in coordination with their French and Russian allies, so in this regard, Great Britain did not have complete freedom of decision in regard to the future of the Ottoman Empire. Because of these structural forces, much of the activism of both British Jews and Muslims did not move British foreign policy to the extent they wished. British aims for the Ottoman Empire’s dismantlement stayed relatively static throughout the war, though their actual wartime promises and diplomacy have been accused as hypocritical. Even if the substance of British Muslims and anti-Zionist Jews could have changed the minds of policymakers, the structural forces, not the substance of their arguments, were what mattered to British officials when creating policy. Looking at the progression of British policy occurring at the same time of British Muslim conversion and political development reveals how much of the Muslim lobbying was futile, and much of British wartime policy was opportunistic.

While looking deeper into these structural forces and dissecting previous British wartime agreements, one can see that British foreign policy towards the Middle East was hardly

monolithic and very much shaped by changing wartimes exigencies. When it served the British well to be forthright on their main position, they came out strongly, such as in the Balfour Declaration; when it suited them to be vague, they were evasive, as in the specifics of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. The British diplomatic documents from 1915-1919 were often vague and contradictory because they were largely formed and adapted in response to changing conditions in regard to World War I and had the input of many different British actors; by 1919 many agreements were even potentially undesirable to British post war goals. The opportunities that the Great War afforded to British Middle Eastern aims led to shifts in the intensity of focus in the region, but no substantial shifts in their overall war aims of protecting the British position in the Persian Gulf, ensuring access to India via land route, and dividing the Ottoman Empire in a non-threatening manner for the Allied powers.

British Middle Eastern policy began in 1915, when Prime Minister Asquith commissioned a “Committee on Asiatic Turkey,” to “consider the nature of British desiderata in Turkey in Asia in the event of successful conclusion of the war.” Mark Sykes, future author of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, was the youngest member of the group. The de Bunsen Committee, as it came to be called, laid the groundwork for British foreign policy. The goals that the de Bunsen Committee compiled can be used as a benchmark to follow the consistency of wartime aims. These aims included solidifying the existing British Empire, creating zones of interest in the Middle East, keeping an open port in the south of Syria, and maintaining their position in the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia. In the end, the committee decided that, “the best way forward was to carve up the vanquished [Ottoman] empire into provinces that Britain

241 “de Bunsen Committee Report,” Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, doc 12.
would seek to influence, rather than control directly.”

Thus, even by 1915 many of the political goals of the British Muslims faced bureaucratic opposition: the Ottoman Empire should be dismantled.

Moving forward, much has been written on the contradictions between the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration, the three hallmark British wartime agreements. The Husayn-McMahon correspondence was a series of letters from 1914-1915 between Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt, and the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn ibn ‘Ali Al ‘Abadula Al ‘Awn. In the correspondence, Husayn asked McMahon if Great Britain will recognize the independence of Arab peoples against the Ottoman Empire after the war. At the time, Husayn was a logical ally for the British, who hoped to undermine the Ottoman sultan’s call to Holy War against the Allies by helping to establish another Arab and Muslim challenging authority, as well as make sure that the Arabs did not side with the sultan and join the Gallipoli front. Sharif Husayn, as a direct descendant of the Prophet and keeper of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as a promising (in their eyes) Arab nationalist, was a good pick. Therefore, Lord Kitchener and the British Arab Bureau moved to open up relations with Husayn, through a correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon. Though McMahon was vague on contentious policy issues, such as Palestine, he was very clear on the fact that, “Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif of Mecca.”

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244 Barr, Line in the Sand, 23.
meant that the incentive to retain another Muslim foothold in the region, the Ottoman Empire, was low.

During the same period, Charles François Georges-Picot, a former general counsel of Beirut for France, and Sir Mark Sykes, the Middle East Advisor to Lord Kitchener, met and drew up the Sykes-Picot Agreement.\textsuperscript{246} This formal diplomatic agreement between Great Britain and France had many discrepancies with the Husayn-McMahon. For one, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence failed to fully address the tension of conflicting goals in the Middle East with allies such as France. For example, The British did oppose the French having all of Syria because they desired the Haifa-Acre Port for an outlet of Iraq to the Mediterranean, as well did not want any other great power near the Suez Canal to ensure their control of Egypt and pathway to India.\textsuperscript{247} However, when addressing the issue with the Arabs, the British clearly evaded commitment to either party. Sharif Husayn showed consistency with the claim that identity was based on ethnicity rather than religion at the time when stating, “The two vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut and their seacoasts are purely Arab vilayets, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab: they are both descendants of one forefather.”\textsuperscript{248} In response, McMahon replied, “the Government of Great Britain have fully understood and take careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our ally, France, are involved in them both, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.”\textsuperscript{249} McMahon successfully evaded the issue, while hinting at the existence of French and British ongoing diplomatic discussions. Then, in the Sykes-Picot, the British and


\textsuperscript{248} “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,” \textit{Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East}, vol 2, doc 13.; \textit{Vilayets} is an Ottoman term referring to the different provinces in the Ottoman Empire, all of which had differing levels of autonomy and administration.

\textsuperscript{249} “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,” \textit{Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East}, vol 2, doc 13.
French agreed upon the Holy Lands to be ruled by some sort of international administration, again, an evasion of true British aims.\textsuperscript{250} However, to British and Empire Muslim’s knowledge, the issue of the Holy Land was still up in the air in 1917, so they fought for it. Before the Balfour Declaration, they were right. Vagueness may therefore have been a way for the British to keep their diplomatic policy consistent rather than a straightforward hypocrisy, especially on an issue such as Palestine that was controversial to the French, Jews, Indians, Arabs, and English alike. McMahon himself even said regarding the correspondence with Husayn, “I had necessarily to be vague, as on the one hand HMG disliked being committed to definite future action, and on the other any detailed definition of our demands would have frightened off the Arab.”\textsuperscript{251} Therefore, wartime exigencies completely shaped the terms and timing of the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, and, “where clarity would prove counterproductive, Sir Henry McMahon opted for obscurity.”\textsuperscript{252}

For most of the war, the British believed in the end there would be some form of negotiated settlement, “in which all promises and agreements would merely constitute claims to be presented at a peace conference.”\textsuperscript{253} They viewed their wartime agreements separately, not as one cohesive policy, as they were, “not intended to be an agreement [Husayn-McMahon] but a declaration of intent contingent upon various uncertain factors and made at a particular stage in a long correspondence.\textsuperscript{254} Most importantly, all of the diplomatic documents were contingent on the key statement of, “the successful conclusion of the war.”\textsuperscript{255} The outlined plans were written during the war, not after its conclusion, and would only be applicable in the case of an Allied

\textsuperscript{250} “The Husayn-McMahon Correspondence,” \textit{Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East}, vol 2, doc 13.
\textsuperscript{251} Barr, \textit{Line in the Sand}, 26.
\textsuperscript{254} Yapp, \textit{The Making of the Modern Middle East}, 284.
\textsuperscript{255} “de Bunsen Committee Report,” \textit{Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East}, doc 12.
victory in the war. The agreements show how throughout the war statements and individual diplomacy was adapted by the British to fit their changing needs and incorporate their agreements with many different actors, including the French. By 1915 however, the British recognized this and one British minister noted, “It seems to me that we are rather in the position of hunter who divided up the skin of the bear before they had killed it.”256 Thus, policy was contested, dynamic, and unclear at all times during the war, though a clear theme of Ottoman dismantlement and British influence in the Middle East is clear.

Moving finally to the Balfour Declaration, by 1917 British policy shifted regarding the manner in which they claimed to hold jurisdiction over Palestine, as well as a more general realization of the “physical” control of the Middle East being more important than diplomatic documents.257 By 1917, Lord Kitchener had died in a shipwreck, and David Lloyd George was Prime Minister of Great Britain. Lloyd George’s main belief was that the Great War as well as postwar objectives could be won in the Middle East, and that the enormity of the war itself required physical annexation on an enormous scale.258 As Antonius notes, “Now that Turkey was in the War, a host of pent-up desires began to sniff their way towards gratification … Great Britain was beginning to feel the need of an overland route to the East and whatever else might be necessary to neutralize France and Russia’s gain.”259 Therefore, Lloyd George centralized war policy, and created a small inner circle Imperial War Cabinet that assumed responsibility for policy making.260

256 Barr, Line in the Sand, 32.
257 David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), 499.
258 Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, 263.
259 Antonius, Arab Awakening, 242.
260 Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information, “The Balfour Declaration.”
In this context, Lord Balfour penned the Balfour Declaration of 1917, an apparent deviation from the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Husayn-McMahon correspondence which stated, “His Majesty’s Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object …“261 Ultimately, the Balfour Declaration was a political move that was a mutually beneficial partnership between Zionists and the British government, who could put up a front of national self-determination for the Jews while also preventing the French or Ottoman control of Palestine.262 To the British, the declaration won over Zionists in Germany and Austria, Jews in Russia and America, and helped circumvent the impasse on southern Lebanon with the French.263 In this way, the Zionists had a mutually beneficial partnership with the British government solving the issue of Palestine together. With the hindsight of larger British wartime policy towards the Middle East, it is easy to be deterministic. However, the arguments and efforts of British Muslims and Jews for and against the Balfour Declaration are worth noting, if only for their recognition of diverse thoughts and debates occurring within Great Britain and around the world. The anti-Zionists within the British Jewish community explicitly parallel the political work done by the British Muslim, providing another example of a counter-narrative to British wartime policy formation, and that there was uncontested, homogenous Jewish support in England for the Balfour.

261 Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information, “The Balfour Declaration.”
263 Barr, Line in the Sand, 32.
Anglo-Jewish Divisions and Activism

This section will first trace the organization and divisions within another minority religious group in England, the Anglo-Jewish community. Within this community were distinct camps who very forcefully stated their positions regarding a Jewish National Home in the period of 1914-1919. In this way, different strains of Zionism existed within the Jewish community, as well as different conceptions of Judaism; hardly a homogenous group behind the foreign policy position that the Balfour Declaration espoused. The camps differed on their answer to the Jewish Question, whether it could be defeated by reason and tolerance, or nationalism and unity. In a parallel way, how to live as a Jew in a Western country was conceptually quite similar to the conflicts facing the British Muslim community. Further, the debate at its core was one framed by whether Judaism was a race, nation, or religion, and the humanitarian plight of Jews in Eastern Europe. Their internal discord, however, was not a deciding factor in the Zionists achieving their outcomes. In the end, the British Jews in favor of the Balfour Declaration had the advantage of the Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz being in favor of the proposed Jewish homeland and the British government’s desire to find a spokesperson for a policy that was beneficial to their interests in the Middle East either way.

Among the lay Jewish leaders, Claude Montefiore was the standout opposition to Zionism in Great Britain. Montefiore was a Jewish elite, promoter of Liberal Judaism and the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association. Interestingly, Montefiore’s strongest argument against Zionism was the very trend that caused it to gain sympathy and influence: nationalism.

264 The Jewish Question was a 19th-20th century debate on the status, assimilation, and treatment of Jews socially, politically, and legally in Europe.
266 Montefiore began the Liberal Judaism movement in England, which was heavily based off Reform Judaism, that at its base level promoted de-ritualization and assimilation.
Montefiore took issue with the Zionist conception of a nation, one that he saw as very different to the concept of race or religion; a nation was usually formed by more than one race, and completely distinct from religion. 267 If anything, he saw religion being depressed when nationality was exalted, due to Jews identifying more with national identity than a religious one. 268 Though he acknowledged that historically Jews were a nation at one time, he believed that since the Diaspora that time had passed and most Jews looked at themselves in terms of their religion, rather than race or nation. 269 Montefiore and others, including Lucien Wolf, a British journalist and colleague of Montefiore, recognized Zionism in the context of the rise of nationalism globally, coupled with the knowledge of the treatment of Jews in Romania and Russia. 270 When writing on the “Jewish National Movement” in 1917, Wolf said, “their [Jewish] national life in Palestine was only a phase, a social expedient, of their great history as a Church.” 271

While Montefiore and Wolf were not against alleviating the plight of Jews around the world, the two men believed that a Jewish National Home was not the only possible and effective solution for the Jews and would instead create more prejudice and separation. 272 Therefore, with religion being the central focus of the Jewish faith, their opposition to Zionism was multi-layered, resting on an opposition to the nationalist mentality, desire for a Jewish religious revival, and a fear of further anti-Semitism as a result of this policy. The dilemma as Montefiore saw it is that Jews must be either a religious group or a nation, but not both. 273

However, while religion, race, and patriotism were his focus, he had a larger, grander goal, “that Judaism may one day become something much greater and larger than the religion of a single race, that the houses of Jewish worship may, indeed, become everywhere houses of prayer for all nations.”

His dream of Judaism as a universal religion, meaning one that was not based on nation or ethnicity, could not be achieved if Judaism was a national religion, because, “no national religion can hope to influence the world.”

This anti-nationalist argument similarly matched the British Muslim arguments against Western nationalism, and their hope to promote a new order based on Islam instead. British Muslims thought they could reconcile the issues between race, nation, and religion with Islam, the universal brotherhood. A common thread through British Muslim rhetoric at the time was the transcendental nature of Islam, especially during what they saw as a crisis of Western civilization. In a sermon in 1913 Pickthall declared that soon enough the West will be looking for a, “new order of things: like Islam … Europe is in revolt against it [Christianity] for it stunts and starves the soul.”

The solution to fixing the woes of Western Europe was Islam, and in contrast, “Nationality, as we understand it – aggressive nationality – abolished by Islam; and patriotism as we understand – “my country is right or wrong” – is denounced as a crime.” On a larger level, they were arguing for an end to nationalism and patriotism and reiterated over and over was the idea that, “A Muslim, in whatever country he may be born, is a citizen of the world.” Both the Jewish anti-Zionist camp and the British Muslims coalesced around religion in reaction to the hyper-nationalism they saw harming Western civilization.

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In this way, the British Muslims had lofty goals, similar to Montefiore’s, that in light of the war their religion would transcend and ultimately supersede the destructive ways of Europe. Possibly Montefiore and British Muslims such as Kidwai were too idealistic to break through the pragmatic British wartime policies. Either way, their hope was energetic; as M.H. Kidwai appealed to a crowd of all three monotheistic faiths at a meeting of the Central Islamic Society, “our Islamic Society is the best medium you have to unite the East and the West, the best agency in these islands to remove the innate prejudices of colour and race and country.”

**British Muslim Efforts**

In the British Muslim community, Marmaduke Pickthall and M.H. Kidwai were the loudest voices on this issue. They spoke freely on the strength of the Muslim allegiance to the Ottoman Empire, and how supporting a Jewish state separate from the Ottoman Empire – especially where the holy places resided – would cause an immense uproar in the entire Muslim world. More specifically, Pickthall addressed Zionism in 1917, warning that he, “should regard it as a world-disaster if that country [Palestine] should be taken from Muslim government.” As early as 1913, Pickthall, Duse Mohamed Ali, and a non-Muslim colleague Arthur Field established an Ottoman Committee to defend Turkish interests and were loudly outspoken in domestic and international press. Though the British Muslims were concerned with supporting the caliphate religiously, their primary concern was the government’s plan to create a Jewish State that was directly under Christian power.

The primary example of their arguments and logic can be found in Kidwai’s book *The Future of the Muslim Empire* published in 1919. In the preface, Pickthall says that the purpose of

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the book is to publicize Muslims’ views before the British public. Kidwai posited in his writings, “In England, Islam is not even a recognized religion … in Turkey the Christian and Jewish Sabbath’s recognized.”282 He went on to say, “England, which is more an Asiatic than a European Power, which has more “coloured” citizens than “discoloured” ones, which has more non-Christians under her than Christians, is far more arrogant, prejudiced and bigoted than Muslim Turkey,” revealing that their real concern was the prejudice of Christianity and Judaism to Islam would limit Muslim access to the holy sites and cause great tension.

In his alternative proposal outlined in the book, the Ottoman Empire would remain a confederation of states, in which the Jews participate, as long as it was under Ottoman suzerainty. In arguing against the Palestine mandate, the proposal suggested that the Jews may be allowed to form a state in Palestine as a member of the Ottoman confederation, just as the Armenians or Kurds would be entitled to do and said:

In Islam, there is no question of race. The League of Nations should not encourage its creation by separating the Arabs and the Turks. So far Palestine is open to the Jews, and these people are treated all over the Ottoman Empire with great friendship. Nothing should be done to create a new bone of contention in the Near Eastern politics by creating a Jewish state independent of the parent empire – the Ottoman Empire. If Palestine is taken away from the Muslims it will be a greater mistake than when Bismarck or Moltke took away Alsace-Lorraine from France.283

Both British Muslims and Jews alike struggled with reconciling their religion and country, a debate that originated earlier but was intensified by the war. Montefiore warned that the primary interest of English Jews should be England.284 For example, regarding Emancipation in England, a trend in Europe in which states made equal legally, Montefiore was adamant that, “There is no lay profession in which a Jew cannot rise to eminence; there is no honorable method

282 Kidwai, Future of the Muslim Empire, 24.
283 Kidwai, Future of Muslim Empire, 36.
284 Montefiore, Race, Nation, Religion, 28.
of serving his country in which he cannot serve her.”

Because of what he saw as the special nature of the Jewish position in England, he was concerned that a campaign to differentiate themselves and leave England would look like they were even more unpatriotic than they were already assumed to be. Following this strain of thought, if the Jewish people had their own nation elsewhere, the majority of Jews, “most of whom could not live there even if they would, just as I believe that most of them would not wish to live there even if they could,” would then become cast even more as outsiders. What, then, would stop those in other countries who dislike Jews to say “Just go to Palestine then!”

Thus, to an emancipated and prosperous Jew in the seemingly progressive nation of Great Britain, Montefiore strove to connect the religious aspect of Judaism with the national patriotism of the home country, because, “far more interested than in the future of Palestine, must we English Jews be in the future of England.”

Even his placement of “English” before “Jews” had a profound meaning, with his slogan being “an Englishman of Jewish faith.”

Similar to the complexity of being a Muslim in Britain, the Jews faced tensions on being Jewish and British. While many more voices contributed to this debate, the level of discussion and difference in the British Jewish community points to reactions to the prospect of a Jewish National Home that were not homogenous, relevant in contrast to British Muslim opinion who unilaterally opposed it despite their disunity regarding other issues outlined in Chapter 2.

Both groups had biases and contradictions in their arguments, using religion as a justification when useful, and avoiding it when it would fall on deaf ears. For example, at a meeting that Kidwai organized at Caxton Hall in London called “Muslim Interests in Palestine,” Kidwai tried to appeal to Jewish and Christian ears when stating that Pickthall had no sympathy.

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285 Montefiore, Race, Nation, Religion, 14.
286 Montefiore, Race, Nation, Religion, 25.
287 Montefiore, Race, Nation, Religion, 28.
288 Kessler, An English Jew, 141.
to a single, “race, country, or colour,” a seemingly conflicting statement in light of the title the lecture. In direct conflict to that statement, Kidwai later promoted Islam over Judaism and Christianity saying, “Would it not therefore be a piece of injustice to an all-tolerant community like Muslim to take away the guardianship of sacred places from their hands and give them up to the Jewish community, who, to say the least of it, have never been tolerant? Would it not be an injustice to religion itself?”

It was thus unclear at times whether the British Muslims wished to make the argument that Palestine was a religious issue or not. At times Kidwai stated that, “It can be of no service to the British Empire to introduce in this terrible war religious questions in any form or state.” Later, in 1919 he later said that, “My interest, like that of other Muslims, in the Ottoman Empire, is religious.” Further, throughout the peace process Kamal-ud-Din, Kidwai, Pickthall, Headley, and others wrote a series of six memorials in 1919 to Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour regarding their aims for Palestine and the Ottoman Empire. Though this was after the Balfour Declaration, the arguments are similar to their pre-1917 ones. However, by 1919 The British Muslims acknowledged their ultimate powerlessness, even saying in a letter, “we venture to take the only constitutional course left to us for acquainting His Majesty’s Government and the Allied and Associated Powers without views, viz., to submit those views in the Memorial.” As Ansari posited, during the war when Muslims were under increased suspicion for being connected to the Ottomans, an active war

290 Hashim Ispahani, Muslim Interests in Palestine, Central Islamic Society Series (London, 1917), 23.
291 Kidwai, introduction, 5.
292 Kidwai, Future of Muslim Empire, 8.
enemy, the British establishment did not feel comfortable allowing Muslims a central policy-making role. This seemed to be true during the peace talks as well. Pickthall’s speech on “Muslim Interests in Palestine,” at Caxton Hall left Dr. Chaim Weizmann to ask the Assistance Secretary of the War Cabinet William Ormsby-Gore to leave Pickthall out of the peace process. Though Pickthall tried to be open about his activities, unlike Duse Mohamed Ali, he still received backlash from the government and lost out on job opportunities. For example, Sir Mark Sykes told him, “I do not consider that it is proper that you should assume absolute friendship to an enemy state”; shortly thereafter, he was denied a job with the Arab Bureau in Cairo, that instead went to T.E. Lawrence.

In the end, the Chief Rabbi in Great Britain, Joseph Hertz, was a Zionist and his voice won out in the British government over Montefiore’s clan, culminating in Lord Balfour penning and releasing the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz was the most prominent voice in British Judaism, and he was also a Zionist. He believed in the view of the worldwide Jewish community as a nation, a view he shared with the prominent American Rabbi and first president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, Judah Magnes. His ideology proved to be the most influential for these reasons, and the British government used him as an opportunistic ally over the dissent of Montefiore. In a sermon to a New York synagogue in 1912, Hertz first began to develop his ideology, combining the separation of religion and nation that British Muslim and anti-Zionist Jews propagated, instead saying, “religion is a social phenomenon, an ethnic force…” In contrast to Montefiore, who believed that nationalism was the wrong response to the turbulent times, Hertz saw them as an opportunity to consolidate a religious, Jewish state. In

295 Ansari, The Infidel Within, 86.
296 Clark, Marmaduke Pickthall, 30.
297 Clark, Marmaduke Pickthall, 31.
a sermon a year later, his ideas were more profoundly developed stating, “Only a religious Israel is invincible. Only a religious Israel is a great dynamic power for personal holiness, social righteousness, and humanitarian endeavor.” Thus, instead of spreading anti-Semitism, Zionism would give Jews, especially in Russia, a safe haven against the “wild beast.” Therefore, Hertz was able to push his views, along with the help of Moses Gaster, onto prominent politicians and within periodicals such as *The Jewish Chronicle* and *The Times*.

Montefiore was not completely disregarded and before the publishing of the Balfour Declaration, he was one of six Jewish leaders to whom the draft of the declaration was sent for approval. Due to his objections, the wording was changed from, “the national home for the Jewish people,” to, “a national home for the Jewish people.” He made it abundantly clear that he was not opposed to settlement in Palestine in general, but rather an explicit Jewish nationalism that was exclusive in nature. In contrast, for Hertz the national home was the only way to safeguard and consolidate Jewish religiously and nationally.

Finally, though the Zionists succeeded, looking at where British Muslim and Jewish anti-Zionists arguments coincided shows a missed opportunity. In an article in *The Times* in May 1917, Montefiore and David Alexander, Vice President of the Anglo-Jewish Association, wrote that they believed the formation of a Jewish state in the Middle East, “might involve them in the bitterest feuds with their neighbours of other races and religions.” They also mentioned they were not opposed to Palestine as a Jewish cultural center that provided Jews with religious liberty and equal rights, but rather the manner in which a Jewish state was being created under

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the auspices of the Jews as an entirely “homeless nationality.” Similarly, predicting future discord in the Muslim world (mainly India) was the primary argument for the British Muslims to prevent the Balfour Declaration, and again during the Peace Conferences. Kidwai did predict the discord and said, “If Palestine is taken away from the Muslim it will be a greater mistake than when Bismarck or Moltke took away Alsace-Lorraine from France. The Muslim nation will never be satisfied until it retakes it.” For England, they were risking being seen as the “enemy of Islam,” around the globe.

Upon reflection, the two religious lobbies, the British Muslims and Jewish anti-Zionists, missed an opportunity to work together on a shared issue area. There in fact were proposals by the British Muslims to work with the British Jews, but were never acted upon. Kidwai offered the possibility at the Caxton Hall meeting that both Jews and Muslims were oppressed by Christians in the past, and thus there could be an “entente cordiale” between the Muslim and Jewish nations. However, there is no evidence of that cooperation extending beyond rhetoric. While it seems clear that the British Muslims could not have prevented the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire, as a small group under suspicion and attack during the war, they could have capitalized on overlapping interest points with the British anti-Zionists to prevent the Balfour Declaration, a smaller portion of policy.

In some ways, the goals of the British Muslims as well as anti-Zionist British Jews were more far-reaching and loftier than the targeted goal of a national home for the Jews in the Middle East. Chief Rabbi Joseph Hertz and Dr. Weizmann argued for policies that the British government was already inclined due to previous wartime agreements, and it was easier to get

304 Kidwai, *Future of Muslim Empire,* 37.
305 Kidwai, *Future of Muslim Empire,* 40.
306 Kidwai, introduction, 6.
behind an argument for a Jewish state than a complete reordering of Western society based on Islam. In the end, once the war broke out, the work British Muslims in combating the Balfour and retaining the Holy Land under the Ottoman Empire, such as exemplified by those associated with the WMM, was rendered meaningless by wartime biases and contingencies. However, they tried to make their voices heard, and developed a political consciousness surrounding Islam. As Ansari notes, “that such a small group of Muslims could make its voice heard at the highest political level says much for their understanding of the workings of British society and its institutions.”

They were very much aware and active in the debate of the Jewish State, and although they were in the end ignored, their contribution and concerns should be legitimately explored further. The Balfour Declaration example crystallizes the ineffectiveness of the British Muslims and how their results were due to both the substance of their arguments and their connections (or lack thereof). Thus, maybe the British Muslims had no real political victories, but succeeded in raising a British Muslim political consciousness at a unique point of British history.

**Conclusion**

The results of the peace conferences on the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of Israel and the modern Middle East are well-known history. Though their disastrous consequences and connection to modern events are undeniable, Muslims were not helpless or voiceless to the actions of European powers. Instead, they contested policy at every phase, using their networks and connections. The British Muslims specifically used their elite

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status and proximity to government in London to lobby on behalf of the Ottoman Empire for their Muslim brethren.

Ultimately all of the individuals examined except for Lord Headley either moved away from London or detached themselves from the Woking Muslim Mission to some extent after the conclusion of World War I. The cohesion and excitement of a new British Muslim cohort had been diminished through prejudice and policy failures. However, all morale was not lost. Before Pickthall left England for India in 1920, he gave a series of sermons at the WMM. In consolation to their exclusion from the peace conferences, he declared that, “Those people there at Paris think themselves the rulers, but Allah is the real ruler.”308 Even in the midst of British rule in India, division in the Arab world, and the dismantlement of the last Islamic caliphate, the ever-idealist Pickthall declared, “When I think of all the dangers and temptations of the past four years, of the furious way in which the Muslim world has been assailed with threats … it is with a glow of pride that I look round upon the Muslim world today and see that it stands firm.”309

This thesis focused on eight individuals who were politically active Muslims residing in England during World War I, all of whom associated with the Woking Muslim Mission. Through examining the stories and politics of Khwaja Kamal-ud-Din, Abdullah Quilliam, Lord Headley, Lady Evelyn Cobbold, Syed Ameer Ali, M.H. Kidwai, Duse Mohamed Ali, and Marmaduke Pickthall, this thesis delved into the self-conscious rhetoric that reflected the multitude of challenges to identity facing British citizens, including the meaning of British citizenship at the end of empire, race, religion, loyalty, and the status of the Muslim world. In many ways, they were representative of the diversity of Muslims around the Empire. They used their social and political connections within England, networks facilitated by the British Empire, and colonial

and democratic institutions to speak their mind, as clearly seen in their efforts to prevent the Balfour Declaration. Networks created by the expanding British Empire increased European contact with Islam, and from 1915-1925 there was an uptick in British conversion to Islam connected World War I and disillusionment with the West, creating a particular moment of British Muslim political identity that defied sectarian differences. While they ultimately did not achieve their policy goals, they succeed in developing a political consciousness during the war.

The history of these converts, their allies, and the mosque is truly fascinating. In the end, Lord Headley wrote to the Islamic Review shortly after Kamal-ud-Din’s death regarding the historical importance of the Woking Muslim Mission. His assessment was that, “The final verdict must lie with the future historian. But I am inclined to feel that Woking is not a thing of a century. It is a landmark in history.”\(^310\) In the end, the Woking Muslim Mission displays the possibility for contested, counter-cultural, and overlapping identities, and the prospect for inter-religious and inter-cultural understanding. Even at a time during World War I when the fabric of society was torn apart, the members of the Woking Muslim Mission came together, defied all categorization and stereotypes, and reached out to prejudice with open arms.

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Appendix

Figure 1: Headley and Kamal-ud-Din, c. 1913
Figure 2: Example conversion statement featured in the *Islamic Review*

“I feel happy to embrace the true, simple, sincere and natural faith of Islam. It is free from dogma. There is no intercession (priesthood) in it. Its broadmindedness and elasticity, with simple principles, appeal to my reason.”

*Jessie (Ameena) Davidson.*
Figure 3: Abdullah Quilliam, c. 1890

Figure 4: Oriental Nobility Institute (prior to Woking Muslim Mission), c. 1905
Figure 5: Syed Ameer Ali (left) and Duse Mohamed Ali (right)

Figure 6: Graph of British conversion to Islam 1913-1953
Figure 7: Conversion of British Soldiers in the *Islamic Review*
Figure 8: British Muslim convert family
Figure 9: Id-ul-Adha at Woking Muslim Mission

Figure 10: Lady Evelyn Cobbold c. 1915, and as featured on her 1934 hajj
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