A PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE APPROACH TO EMOTIONS

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By

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Being an emotional being is having a unique mode of access to certain sorts of evaluative facts, such as that a bear is scary. Fear is a way of accessing that fact. What I mean when I say that emotions are unique modes of access to such facts is that the way that I relate to the object I am afraid of is fundamentally different from the way I would relate to it if struck me in an unemotional way. This difference is analogous to the difference between accessing some fact, such as that Ed is very tall, by using different sensory modalities. If I see Ed in one case and try, with eyes closed, to pat him on the head in another, I become aware of the same fact, but the fact reveals itself to me in a different way.

Because emotions are modes of access to facts, and propositions have the structure of facts, e.g. that the cup is on the table, it is natural to think that emotions are mental states with propositional contents. And if anything is an attitude at all, emotions are among them. If I resent how I have been treated, I certainly have an attitude about it. I tend think and act in certain ways regarding my treatment. Thus, a natural view of emotions is that they are propositional attitudes.

Despite the initial plausibility of this approach, most who work on emotions do not endorse a propositional attitude view of emotions. However, because there are important strengths of the propositional attitude approach and because the typical arguments against
such an approach fail, we should continue to explore the propositional attitude approach.

Consequently, I explicate and defend a propositional attitude approach to the emotions by showing how propositional attitude views can avoid the typical worries and explaining how researchers can fill in the details of the propositional approach, allowing theorists to develop their own full-fledged views of emotions.
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Chapter 1

A Propositional Attitude Approach to the Emotions

1. Being an emotional being is having a unique mode of access to certain sorts of evaluative facts. The facts I have in mind include examples such as: that a bear is scary, that you have been treated unfairly, and that your friend has accomplished something special. Fear, indignation, and pride, respectively, are ways of acknowledging these facts. What I mean when I say that emotions are unique modes of access to such facts is that, e.g. when I am afraid of something, the way that I am related to the object I am afraid of is fundamentally different from the way I would be related to it if struck me in an unemotional way, if I merely saw it or coldly entertained the thought of it, for instance. This difference is analogous to the difference between accessing some fact, such as that Ed is very tall, by using different sensory modalities. If I see Ed in one case and try, with eyes closed, to pat him on the head in another, I become aware of the same fact, but the fact reveals itself to me in a different way.

Because emotions are modes of access to facts, and propositions have the structure of facts, e.g. that the cup is on the table, that the lion is running in one’s direction, it is natural to think that emotions are mental states with propositional contents. Moreover, if anything is an attitude at all, emotions are among them. If I resent how I have been treated, I certainly have an attitude about it. I tend think and act in certain ways regarding my treatment. Thus, a natural view of emotions is that they are propositional attitudes. They are attitudes about facts, states of affairs, etc. Despite the initial plausibility of this approach, most who work on
emotions do not endorse a propositional attitude view of emotions. In fact, there is a remarkable disconnect between standard approaches to propositional attitudes, which nonchalantly include emotions, along with beliefs, desires, wishes, etc., among the propositional attitudes, and the views of those whose focus is just emotions.

Because there are important strengths of the propositional attitude approach and because the typical arguments against such an approach fail, we should continue to explore the propositional attitude approach, or so I will argue in the following dissertation. I will explicate and defend a propositional attitude approach to the emotions by showing how propositional attitude views can avoid the typical worries and explaining how researchers can fill in the details of the propositional approach, allowing theorists to develop their own full-fledged views of emotions.

In this chapter, however, I will merely motivate the propositional attitude approach and orient readers not previously acquainted with the contemporary literature on emotions. More specifically, the chapter has three aims, to criticize contemporary views, to introduce the propositional attitude approach, and to briefly discuss how I plan to defend the propositional attitude approach in the rest of the dissertation. First, I will introduce three typical approaches to theorizing about emotions and discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of each. Readers already familiar with the contemporary literature on emotions should keep in mind that this is just an orientation. I will not provide thorough assaults on, or defenses of, any of the views discussed. Instead, I will discuss the typical problems and strengths of the most popular types of views. I will do so with little regard for the details of specific views defended by particular philosophers, possible responses to objections, etc. Secondly, I will introduce the
propositional attitude approach. Lastly, I will provide sketches of how the proponents of the propositional attitude approach can avoid the worries typically thought to plague propositional attitude views. The task of later chapters will be to fill in the details of these sketches.

2. I will now begin to make the case that the most popular alternatives to the propositional attitude approach face significant problems. Since I cannot hope to discuss every view of emotions, I will explain how three general strategies fare. Only the general strategies, and some of their more prominent proponents, will be discussed. The positions of many contemporary authors will be evaluated in more detail as they become relevant in later chapters.

The three general strategies are the feeling, judgmentalist, and perceptualist strategies. What unites these strategies is the attempt to assimilate emotions to some other type of state. In trying to do this, each strategy runs into serious trouble. More thorough discussion in later chapters will show that faced with this problem, theorists either try to massage the category to which they mean to assimilate emotions or they dig in their heels and flatly deny the apparent difficulty. For example, a judgmentalist may try to stretch the notion of a judgment, explaining that the concept of a judgment is far more permissive than one might suppose.\(^1\) Or faced with the problem that her view, e.g. rules out animal emotions, a theorist might just bite the bullet and accept that animals do not experience emotions. I plan to show that, given the plausibility

\(^1\) See Scarantino, “Insights and Blindspots of the Cognitivist Theory of Emotions.” for a good, critical discussion of this approach.
of the propositional attitude approach, such rejoinders are never as plausible as just giving up the assimilation approach for the propositional attitude approach.

Let’s begin by looking at the feeling strategy. According to the feeling strategy, notably defended by William James, emotions are to be assimilated to feelings of changes in the body that are a result of some mental state such as the perception of something dangerous.² When I see a bear, I feel my heart race and the urge to run. According to the feeling strategy, that feeling, and that felt urge are the only sorts of things that constitute an emotional state.

The great strength of this approach is its ability to preserve the intuition that what it is like to experience an emotion is an essential part of the phenomenon. There is certainly something right about William James's argument that if you take away all the feelings involved in an emotion, it is not clear what is left.

What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly

² James, “What Is an Emotion?”
cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations.³

Despite this initial plausibility, there are many difficulties with the assimilation of emotions to feelings of bodily changes. In fact, the view may well run afoul of empirical data that appears to show that persons with central nervous damage that prevents them from experiencing the feelings of changes in their body still experience emotions.⁴ I will focus on two other problems, however.

The first problem is that the feeling strategy looks to, at best, garble the intentionality of emotions. On most accounts of intentionality, bodily sensations like pain are not representations. For example, a feeling of tightness in the chest is the tightness in your chest and so cannot represent tightness in the chest. Representations need to be distinct from what they represent. Consequently, such sensations are, at best, symptomatic of the somatic states that are correlated with them.

Still, on some accounts sensations are representational.⁵ For example, on such an account, pain may represent damage to the body.⁶ Perhaps that sort of view could be applied to emotions. Even if that sort of account could be applied to the sensations that constitute emotions according to feeling views, though, emotions would turn out to be about states of the

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³ James, 193–94.
⁴ Cannon, “The James-Lange Theory of Emotions.”
⁵ Tye, “A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character.”
⁶ Tye. Pg. 228.
body and not the worldly objects they are typically about. Let's say that fear is partly constituted by the feeling of an increase in heart rate. The content of a fear episode would be (in addition to other states of one's body) that one's heart rate is increased. This is contrary to how we usually speak of emotions. A child's fear of a clown is of the clown (and its probable creepiness) and is not about the child's increased heat rate, though the heart rate may be a good indicator of the fear.

Secondly, feelings don't cut emotional states finely enough. Even if it is the case that emotions are constituted by bodily sensations, the sensations that are sufficient for one emotion are likely sufficient for other emotions. With respect to the bodily sensations of many emotions, they appear to differ from other emotions mostly in that their sensations are positive or negative, i.e. things that (other things being equal) we wish would continue or conclude. Pride is a feeling that is positive, and disdain is negative, no matter how irrationally we sometimes cultivate it. The feeling strategy has no problem distinguishing emotions such as these. However, among many emotions with the same valence, positive or negative, the feeling strategy has trouble distinguishing among them. Because they feel the same, or at least very similar, many unique emotions such as joy, hope, pride, gratitude must be lumped together as instances of the same phenomenon on the feeling view. For another example, the sensations constitutive of a mild or moderate anger and a case of resentment look the same according to the feeling strategy. One may feel, flushed, increased heart rate, and an urge to attack in both cases. To differentiate these emotions, we must introduce aspects of emotions that are not just

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7 Jesse Prinz’s sophisticated version of this view will be discussed in Chapter 3.
bodily feelings, the thoughts that accompany the feelings perhaps, so the feeling strategy cannot give us a complete view of emotions.

3. Moving on to the judgmentalist strategy, according to that approach, we should think that emotions are types of affect-laden judgments.\textsuperscript{8} Clarifying what she has in mind, judgmentalist Martha Nussbaum endorses the stoic view that “a judgment is assent to an appearance.” To be afraid of a bear is for the bear to appear dangerous to you and for you to assent to that appearance.\textsuperscript{9} This can strike some as counter-intuitive from the start. Emotions are intuitively feelings and feelings are ordinarily contrasted with cognitions such as judgments. Judgmentalists respond to these concerns by reminding us that many of our emotions, such as resentment, obviously involve judgments. One cannot resent without believing that one has been wronged, or, at least, in the normal case one does believe as much. Secondly, judgmentalists argue that those skeptical of the position may have too narrow a conception of judgment. Judgments do not always involve any sort of deliberation, for example. We can make snap judgments. Someone might, without any deliberation, strike me as the type of person I should not trust. According to the judgmentalist, simpler emotional reactions, such as many instances of fear, are instances of something like these snap judgments. A situation may just show up to a person as dangerous or scary without deliberation.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{9} Philosophers familiar with many accounts of judgment may assume a thinner notion. For example, Kant held that a judgment is subsuming a particular under a concept or the faculty of concepts, which does not require assent. For example, see Kukla, \textit{Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy}, 7, 13.
\textsuperscript{10} Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought}. Ch. 1 section viii goes even further to defend nonconscious judgments. A nonconscious fear of death, for instance, may be an important determiner of an agent’s actions.
A great strength of the judgmentalist approach, one it shares with the propositional attitude approach, is that it provides a ready explanation of emotional intentionality. If emotions are judgments, then their contents are like the contents of states such as beliefs and if the intentionality of beliefs is secure, then so it is for emotions.

The judgmentalist strategy has three important weakness, though. First, it doesn’t help provide a story about the felt nature of emotions. It’s just a fact that we pre-theoretically take judgments to be paradigmatically cognitive phenomena and emotions to be paradigmatically affective phenomena. The safest examples of judgments involve deliberation or explicit estimation. For example, one can judge an article to be worthy of publication by evaluating its merits or one can judge that one horse is taller than another by visual estimation. Neither of these states involve much, if any, feelings. The safest examples of emotions, on the other hand, do involve strong feelings. I’m angry at a person for how they treated me. I’m in love with Betty because she’s just so wonderful. As James’s argument correctly points out, if you strip the phenomenological features from emotions like these, it’s not obvious what is left.

While sometimes judgments are accompanied by phenomenological elements, what some have called “hot thoughts”, it is not plausible to suggest that the phenomenological features are central to the phenomenon. I may judge that I have been wronged and I may judge it in a manner that is particularly heated, but the heat is not part of the judgment because it would be the same judgment, that I had been wronged, if, for instance, I were severely

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11 It’s worth pointing out that if the judgmentalist thinks that judgments are propositional attitudes, then she is taking the propositional attitude approach. However, she is taking on more than that. Because ‘judgment’ is an ordinary term, her view should, if it is not to be misleading, approximate the use of the term by non-specialists. I do not think judgmentalists have succeeded in doing that.
12 Thagard and Kroon, Hot Thought.
depressed and unable to experience any significant affect. If we can so easily pry apart the phenomenological elements and the judgment, then the phenomenological elements are not a central aspect of the judgment. If phenomenological aspects are not central parts of judgments, then being told that emotions are judgments doesn't help provide an account of the felt nature of emotions. Judgements are not especially robust phenomenological states, so learning that a state is a judgement cannot hope to explain robust phenomenology. The judgmentalist must betray her view and introduce some new, non-judgmental aspect(s) of emotions, such as bodily feelings, to account for the phenomenology.

The second major difficulty with the judgmentalist strategy is that it mischaracterizes the attitude one has toward the contents of an emotion. A judgment is taking a stand on the truth of a proposition. I can judge that Jim's no good. I can judge that Kim is a good match for Karen. If I do these things, I take a stand on issues having to do with Jim's virtue and the possibility of Kim and Karen having an enjoyable relationship. While emotions certainly incline one to make judgments, e.g. that I am angry at someone will incline me to make negative judgments about him, having the emotion does not constitute a commitment. We know this because the conflict between being angry at a person for how they treated you and the belief that they did not actually do anything wrong differs greatly from the conflict between the judgment that someone treated you wrongly and the belief that they did not. In the former case there is certainly a tension, but it is not the kind of straightforward psychological contradiction involved in the latter. The contradiction is so strong in the latter case that many think it is not possible to judge that x and believe that not-x. Sadly, emotions imply judgments that all too often contradict the beliefs of the subject of those emotions.
The third difficulty with the judgmentalist strategy is that the judgmentalist cannot individuate emotions from non-emotional judgments correctly. That is, if emotions are judgments, then it is not immediately clear what separates them from non-emotional judgments with the same contents. For example, if anger is the judgment that someone has wronged me, given that I can also non-emotionally judge that someone has wronged me, what is the difference? If what was said above about the noncentrality of phenomenological elements to judgments was right, the judgmentalist cannot say that emotional judgments differ in that they are phenomenologically more robust. They must say that the difference is in the content of the two judgments. The judgment that something is dangerous, and fear of that same thing must be accounted for by reference to the different contents.

The judgmentalist’s suggestion that emotions are individuated purely by their contents is implausible, though. For the suggestion that emotions and corresponding non-emotional judgments to be an effective response to the initial question about the individuation of emotions from other mental states, there must be contents that are unique to emotions. If, for example, the judgmentalist claims that anger over an offense differs from the judgment that something was offensive in that the former has content that the latter lacks, then that content had better be something that the latter state necessarily lacks, otherwise the problem will show up again when a different judgment does have the content in question.

Perhaps the most obvious candidate for unique emotional contents are formal objects. The formal object of an emotion is the property which if instantiated in the actual object of the emotion would function to make the emotion an accurate representation. Theorists will differ about the formal objects of emotions, but such lists look something like: for fear, the scary; for
contempt, the contemptible; for love, the loveable, etc. To distinguish fear from a non-emotional judgment of dangerousness, the judgmentalist might say that non-emotional judgments involve properties like dangerousness, but emotions involve properties like scariness.

If formal properties exist, however, it is probable that one could make a judgment that involved them without thereby experiencing an emotion. Certainly, I may judge that a bear is scary owing to its size, teeth and general disposition. We need not think such judgments are masquerading as judgments about dangerousness merely because they are not emotions. *Prima facie*, without being afraid, I may judge that walking across a high suspension bridge is scary, i.e. I may be in a state with ‘scary’ as partial content. And I may at the same time judge that walking across the bridge is not actually dangerous, which implies that my former judgment really involved ‘scary’ and not ‘dangerousness.’

4. Moving on to the third general strategy, the perceptualist promises to retain the insights of feeling and judgmentalist views of emotions while avoiding the weaknesses I have been discussing. They do this by attempting to think of emotions as types of perceptions. According to this strategy, we should think of emotions as evaluative perceptions. To borrow an example from Gilbert Harman, if you were walking along and saw a group of children burning a cat for fun, you might directly perceive the wrongness.\(^{13}\) Adding to his example, the perceptualist might claim that we perceive the wrongness via disgust. In as much as exercises of other sense modalities, e.g. seeing, hearing or feeling, do not imply full-fledged judgments, so too when we

have an emotion according to the perceptualist. We do become aware of a purported fact, but we do not necessarily judge that fact to be the case. In the cat-burning case, we become aware of the purported fact that what the children is doing is wrong, morally disgusting. While we should also judge that it is wrong, it is not necessary to experience the disgust, however.

The perceptual strategy has at least two apparent strengths. First, it appears to put us in a good position to explain the phenomenology of emotions. While many think states like judgments have no phenomenal elements or if so, only very limited such elements, a central feature of perceptual experience is that there is something it is like to perceive. Consequently, while the judgmentalist must explain why we should think states that are obviously phenomenally robust are judgments, which we do not normally think are phenomenologically robust, there appears to be no such burden for the perceptualist. If emotions are perceptions, the explanation is much more straightforward. Perceptions are phenomenologically robust, too. What it is like to see, hear, etc. something is a central aspect of the phenomenon and so if emotions are perceptions, it is also unsurprising that a central aspect of emotional phenomena is what it is like to experience one. The second apparent strength of the perceptualist strategy is that perceptions are often of things in the external world. Consequently, if the perceptualist is right, then an account of the intentionality of emotions will be analogous to successful accounts of the intentionality of the other perceptual modalities.

There are at least two problems with the perceptualist strategy, however. The first is a result of the perceptualist's attempt to explain the felt nature of emotion. The perceptualist asserts that she is in a better position than the judgmentalist because emotions are perceptions and perceptions involve phenomenological elements in a way that judgments do not. However,
it is not clear that perceptions involve the right sort of phenomenological elements. The phenomenology of perception, at least with respect to sight, is “transparent” in a way that emotional phenomenology is not.\textsuperscript{14} When it is said that perception is transparent, what is meant is that when one describes the phenomenal features of one's perceptual experience, one just describes the aspects of what is seen and not how one's body feels. If I see a red box, I describe the red box experience in terms of what is seen, e.g. I'm having an experience as of a red box. The phenomenological elements are “seen through,” making the experience transparent. In contrast, when someone experiences an emotion, one can say a lot about how it feels in terms that are not just descriptions of the content of one's experience. If I am mad at Sally, I generally don't describe that in terms of the fact that Sally has wronged me, but instead in terms of things like my clenched muscles. I don't see through these elements and so the experience is said to be “opaque”. As a result, it looks like the perceptualist still has work to do with respect to giving a full account of the felt nature of emotions.

The second problem is that it is clear that some emotions are not perceptions. Emotions, like love or resentment, are persistent mental states that can last for the better part of a lifetime, but perceptions are relatively short-lived mental events. Thus, the perceptualist is, without some sort of supplemental account, unable to give an account of everything that intuitively falls into the category of the emotions.

\textsuperscript{14} de Sousa, \textit{The Rationality of Emotion}, 64.
5. I now want to provide a brief overview of the propositional attitude approach. As is perhaps most obvious about a propositional attitude approach, it begins with the relatively uncontroversial proposal that we should try to look at emotions as intentional phenomena.\(^{15}\) Intentional phenomena are phenomena that are about something. Paradigmatic cases of intentional phenomena are beliefs, desires, wishes, perceptions, utterances, sentences, pictures, etc. When I believe, I believe that something is the case. That is, if I believe that there are eight planets in the solar system, that belief is about something. The same goes for, e.g. my wish for a million dollars, or a picture of William Taft. Now consider a standard list of emotions: fear, envy, delight, anger, sadness, resentment, joy, embarrassment, shame, jealousy, remorse, nostalgia, pride, regret, admiration, compassion, disgust, amusement, indignation, hope. When one is the subject of one of these states, that state is, typically, about something else. When a person is angry, she is angry at someone. When a person is sad, he is sad about something. When a person is delighted, she is delighted in something.

While the suggestion that emotions are intentional may sound platitudinous to many theorists, there are cases that should cause concern. When I am startled by a loud noise, is that fear about that noise? It seems too much like a reflex to count as an intentional mental state. What are the affective instantiations of one’s generalized anxiety disorder about? One can walk around feeling anxious, but not about any specific thing. It can manifest as an uncomfortable feeling that does not involve thought about any worrisome event. To be sure, one is prone to start worrying when the occasion arises, but there isn’t always worry.

Cases such as these have spurred me to recommend a propositional attitude approach to the emotions, rather than a full-fledged account. The idea is to begin thinking about emotions as intentional phenomena because intentionality is so obviously a central part of the phenomena. Taking the approach I recommend does not necessarily involve an attempt to give a list of necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the concept emotion. In the hands of a particular theorist, she may decide to fill in the details of her account in a way that involves the defense of such a list. I wouldn't recommend such a course. I take it that the concept emotion is like most in that merely reflecting on it will not sort all cases easily. In fact, it is likely that there will always be borderline cases about which there will be room for thoughtful people to disagree. I will discuss such cases in what follows. My doing so will be motivated more by the aim to shed light on what we think is more, and what we think less, central to the phenomenon of emotion and motivated less by the aim to determine for all cases which fall under the concept emotion and which do not.

In addition to thinking about emotions as intentional phenomena, thinking of them as propositional attitudes allows the emotion theorist to borrow from a rich tradition of thinking about mental states. One very important aspect of this tradition that I will use to great effect is dividing questions we can ask about mental states into different levels. Consider the functionalist’s take on mental states. Mental states are functions, given certain inputs, they produce certain outputs. Mental states are determined by the role they play in the mental economy of the agent. We can ask lots of question about these inputs and outputs and the answers to those questions will provide fodder for discussion about how to classify the function. Is it a belief in God or a desire that God exist, for instance? We can ask an altogether different
question, though. We can ask about the mechanics of the function. What areas of the brain, for example, are activated to perform the function in question? These are not questions about function itself, but questions about the realizer of the function.\footnote{Lycan, \textit{Consciousness and Experience}.}

In semantics there is a similar, helpful distinction. It is the distinction between what a symbol means and how the symbol came to have that meaning. ‘Schnee ist weiss’ means that snow is white. It’s an altogether different question why ‘Schnee ist weiss’ has that meaning. This distinction is known as the distinction between a theory of meaning and a foundational theory of meaning.\footnote{Lewis, “General Semantics”; Almog et al., \textit{Themes from Kaplan}; Speaks, “Theories of Meaning.”} A theory of meaning explains the meanings of the things that are in its purview. A German-to-English translation manual, for instance, gives the meanings of German words in English. A foundational theory of meaning explains why they mean the things that they do. Saul Kripke famously gave the beginnings of a foundation theory of meaning for proper names. He argued that names mean what they do, their referents, because of a causal chain of usage that led back to a “initial baptism” in which the referent is given a name.\footnote{Kripke, \textit{Naming and Necessity}.}

My division of types of questions parallel’s these two, but is nearer to the semantic distinction. The distinction I have in mind is between attitudes with contents and, as I will call them, the vehicles of those attitudes. There are the propositional attitudes and there are the facts about the vehicle that support our ascriptions of those propositional attitudes. There are the attitudes with their contents and then there are the vehicles of those attitudes, the facts about the vehicle in light of which the attribution is a good one. Thus, we have three kinds of questions: questions about the nature of the attitude, questions about the content of the
attitude, and questions about what it is about the agent that makes it the case that she has the
attitude with the content in question. If I believe that socks with sandals is a fashion
catastrophe, then I have an attitude about wearing socks with sandals. We can ask what it is to
believe that. Perhaps a belief is taking up a stance in the space of reasons. Perhaps a belief is
having a representation in the belief box. We can also ask, though, what “wearing socks with
sandals” means. We might answer via ostention by waiting for the entrance of a coworker or
we might explain “wearing socks with sandals” in other terms. These sorts of question occur at
what I will call the attitude/content level. We can also ask, though, what sorts of things make it
legitimate to attribute the belief that socks with sandals is a fashion catastrophe to me. If I wear
socks with sandals on a regular basis, that fact does not support the attribution. If I scoff at the
aforementioned coworker’s appearance, avoid wearing socks with sandals myself, and blog
about the impropriety of the phenomenon, the attribution may be justified (unless “the lady
doth protest too much, methinks”). Questions about the facts that support good mental state
attributions are questions at the vehicle level. In a way, this distinction will be the thread that
ties the whole dissertation together. As I will explain shortly, invocation of this distinction is
critical to answering the most fundamental questions addressed in each chapter.

A final important feature of this approach is that while emotions often pick out facts,
they are like beliefs, desires, etc., in being non-factive. Non-factive mental states do not entail
the truth or falsity of their contents. Like a belief that a bear is dangerous, fear of a bear does
not necessarily mean that the bear is dangerous, though it may be. This makes emotions
distinct from states like knowledge or events like, on some accounts, perceptions. These are
said to be factive in that I can’t know that a bear is dangerous or see it’s dangerousness unless it
is in fact there to be known or seen. In contrast, one can have an emotional state that represents things that are not currently there, things that don't exist, and things that do exist and are before one but do not have the properties that one attributes to them via the emotional experience. I can be afraid of ghosts. I can fear my death long before it is immanent. I can fear the clown.

6. The first worry for the propositional attitude view has to do with the emotions of the cognitively unsophisticated, e.g. human infants, cognitively impaired human adults, such as Alzheimer patients and the alexithymic, and some of the higher non-human animals. Common experience and experimental data suggest that infants, cognitively impaired adults, and non-human animals experience at least some emotions. If a female baboon loses one of her offspring, for instance, she may return a week later to the place it disappeared. She will climb a tall tree to look for and call out to the lost child. She will do this repeatedly for weeks after the loss. The most natural explanation of such behavior is grief. Anyone familiar with infant behavioral can tell similar stories. An infant may play for hours with a new toy, motivating our attributions that she is delighted in it. Or she may cry whenever her mother leaves for work, leading us to think she is prone to sadness at seeing her mother go. Neurological data supports similar attributions. For example, rats display the outward signs of fear when their amygdala is stimulated electronically. Humans also report increases in anxiety during amygdala

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20 de Waal, “What Is an Animal Emotion?”
activation. While such considerations are not conclusive, it is surely enough to put the burden of proof on those who wish to deny the experience of emotions to infants, cognitively impaired adults, and non-human animals.

The propositional attitude approach accounts for the intentionality of emotions by claiming that they have propositional content. An experience of fear is, e.g. about the dangerousness of a wild boar, because it has the content that that boar is dangerous, or some similar proposition. It is this account of intentionality that many claim causes the trouble for the propositional attitude approach. On most views, propositions are structured linguistically. For this reason, it is natural to assume that to have a proposition in mind, one must possess the linguistic capacities, i.e. the concepts, needed to express the proposition. Since the organisms in question, i.e. infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals, lack these capacities, they cannot have propositional attitudes. Consequently, on the propositional attitude view, they cannot experience emotions. This is not a happy result. I will explain how we can avoid the result in Chapter 2. In short, I will claim that lack of language is a vehicle-level feature of individuals and does not entail anything at the attitude/content-level of description. Thus, the lack of linguistic ability in infants, cognitively impaired adults, and some non-human animals does not preclude the appearance of emotions in them.

A second explanatory project for the propositional attitude approach is accounting for the feelings that are so central to emotions. Emotions typically involve phenomenological

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21 de Waal, 193.
23 King, “Structured Propositions.” Possible world semantics is a notable counterexample, but since on such an account propositions are not structured linguistically, there is presumably less reason to assume having a proposition in mind entails linguistic competence. Consequently, I will not discuss that view of propositions.
events. There is usually something that it is like to be a subject of an emotion. Perhaps this is even more obvious than the intentionality of emotions. The most common pre-theoretical view of emotions is that they are feelings.\textsuperscript{24} It feels like something to be angry about the way you were treated by a friend. It feels like something to be happy about how a project is going. If someone claims that she is scared, but also claims that she doesn't feel the fear, that she feels no bodily agitations associated with raised blood pressure, no felt need to flee, no anxiety tinged images or thoughts of the object of her fear, we would be skeptical of her claim and may wonder about her grasp of the concept.\textsuperscript{25}

The reason that some think the phenomenology of emotions is problematic for the propositional attitude view is that on many accounts propositional attitudes are not intrinsically phenomenal states. Many suppose that beliefs, which are the paradigmatic propositional attitudes, need not feel like anything. I currently believe that I have two nieces, but the belief need not feel like anything according to this common supposition. Of course, there might be phenomenological properties that are concomitants of this belief. After all, I am quite fond of my nieces and thinking of them may cause me to have emotions. Or, if I begin to reflect on the belief, I may begin to have images of the two girls, images of where they live, etc., which may all involve phenomenological properties. Again, though, these phenomenological states are not part of the belief itself. Instead, they are a result of my reflecting on the belief. Given the non-intrinsicality of feelings for propositional attitudes, the propositional attitude theorist must tack

\textsuperscript{25} James, “What Is an Emotion?,” 193–94.
the feelings onto the emotion, which goes against the platitude that the feelings are central to emotions.26

In Chapter 3 I will address the phenomenological aspects of emotions. If we think of emotions as mental attitudes with contents, then we can draw lessons from similar views of beliefs, desires, perceptions, etc. For instance, the belief that there are eight planets in the solar system is a mental attitude with the content that there are eight planets in the solar system. Likewise, we may view my being delighted in my new job as an attitude with “that I have a new job” as content. If phenomenology is central to emotions, then we might learn something from propositional attitude views of perception, desire, etc. because these states are, according to common-sense, closely linked to their phenomenology.

I will choose to borrow from what are now referred to as intentionalist conceptions of perception. More specifically, I will recommend that the propositional attitude approach adopt weak intentionalism. Intentionalist theories of content acknowledge that the phenomenology of some intentional states, e.g. perceptual experiences, is important to their having the contents they do. To account for this connection between phenomenology and content, the intentionalist has, roughly, two options.27 The first option is strong intentionalism. Strong intentionalists hold that there is a necessary connection between a mental state's content and its phenomenology. All changes in phenomenology entail changes in content and vice versa on this view. The second option is weak intentionalism. By adopting this latter view, propositional attitude theorists deny that there is such a tight connection between content and

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26 Goldie, “Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way.”
27 This approach to talking about intentionalism is borrowed from William Fish’s Philosophy of Perception.
phenomenology. In Chapter 3 I will explain why it is important to take a weak, rather than a strong, intentionalist approach to emotions. Moreover, because weak intentionalism allows for changes in content without changes in phenomenology, and vice versa, we can safely locate the phenomenological properties of emotions at the vehicular level and not attitude/content level of description.

A third worry for the propositional attitude approach is a result of propositional attitude theorists’ commitment to conceptual analysis as a way of answering the component question about emotions.28 In some contexts, when we ask the question, what are emotions? the sort of answer we are after is a story about what is going on inside the subject of the emotions. We want to know what sorts of thoughts, feelings or other events add up to one having an emotion. Propositional attitude theorists have sometimes tried to address this question through pure conceptual analysis. Anthony Kenny, for example, argued that it makes no sense to attribute fear to a person if she does not believe she is in danger or behave in a way that is characteristic of fear.29 Thus, the appropriate beliefs and behaviors are constitutive of fear. Kenny did not argue this on empirical grounds, he merely considered the sensicality of the application of a concept. Some claim that, to its detriment, this commitment to conceptual analysis divorces the propositional attitude approach from more empirically-driven approaches.

It’s true that the propositional attitude approach has traditionally been defended by philosophers who often rely on conceptual analysis. And I certainly agree that it is important for a view of emotions to be relatable to empirical work. Moreover, any view should be

relatable to broader work in the philosophy of mind, whether or not that work is empirically driven. For this reason, in Chapter 4 I will provide a framework for thinking about the relationship between the propositional attitude approach and the most popular, more general, conceptions of the mind, such as functionalism, interpretationism, etc. I will argue that we should think of the component question as a vehicle-level question. It is a question about the sorts of things going on in the subject of an emotion that support proper attributions of emotion terms. This approach to the component question is compatible with many of the most popular general positions on mental states in the philosophy of mind. Moreover, there is no reason to think inquiry into the component question needs to be a purely conceptual affair. Surveys of non-specialist intuitions about the question are relevant. Scientific inquiry into what is going on inside a person who is experiencing an emotion is also relevant. Revealing the importance of context is critical too. There is no reason for the proponent of the propositional attitude view to reject these sorts of findings whether they come from empirical research or are a result of more traditional philosophical tools.

Building on the framework discussed in Chapter 4, in Chapter 5 I will discuss the relationship between the propositional attitude approach and the most influential empirically-driven views of psychologists, neurologists and philosophers. In short, because the propositional attitude approach is relatively silent about the vehicle-level facts that empirically-driven theorists are uncovering, propositional attitude views are very adaptable. Because the propositional attitude approach is primarily concerned with questions at the attitude/content level and empirically-driven approaches are primarily concerned with questions at the vehicle level, empirically-driven views and proponents of the propositional attitude views can be allies.
7. In summary, a popular approach to thinking about the emotions has been to assimilate them as much as possible to some other type of mental state, prominently, feelings, judgments or perceptions. In doing so, each of these approaches fails to do justice to the phenomena. The judgmentalist overintellectualizes emotions, leaving us without an account of their phenomenology. The feeling approach under-intellectualizes emotions, leaving us without an account of their intentionality. The perceptualist oversimplifies emotions, leaving us without an account of more complex, and perhaps most important, emotions such as love and hate.

The propositional attitude approach dispenses with the assimilation strategy. Because it is not concerned to fit the notion of an emotion to an ordinary language category with unwanted restrictions and connotations, it is more flexible. This allows it to avoid many of the problems that afflict these versions of the assimilation strategy. Moreover, the propositional attitude approach comfortably fits emotions in with a rich tradition of thinking about mental states and we can borrow insights from that tradition to address perceived problems with the propositional attitude approach.
Chapter 2

Intentional Content and the Emotions of Infants, Cognitively Impaired Adults, and Some Non-Human Animals

1. Before looking at the contents of emotions, I want to draw on some lessons about the contents of language and mind more broadly. Let us start with language. The sentence ‘Snow is white’ is about the color of snow, specifically that it is white. The sentence ‘Schnee ist Weiss’ is also about the color of snow and makes the same claim about it. What ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Schnee ist Weiss’ have in common is that they have the same meaning or, as I will say, they have the same content. I will also endorse the traditional view that propositions are the contents of such sentences. So, both sentences have the same contents because each one expresses the same proposition, i.e. that snow is white.

While the two sentences have the same content, express the same proposition, the facts in virtue of which they express that content are different. Strictly speaking, views about the facts in virtue of which things like sentences carry the semantic contents that they do are not views about semantics. Instead, they are more accurately characterized as metasemantic views. David Kaplan draws the distinction I have in mind when he says:

There are several interesting issues concerning what belongs to semantics. The fact that a word or phrase has a certain meaning clearly belongs to semantics. On the other hand, a claim about the basis for ascribing a certain meaning to a
word or phrase does not belong to semantics. “Ohsnay” means *snow* in Pig-Latin. That’s a semantic fact about Pig-Latin. The reason why “ohsnay” means *snow* is not a semantic fact; it is some kind of historical or sociological fact about Pig-Latin.\(^{30}\)

David Lewis has the same thing in mind when he says that:

My proposal will also not conform to the expectation of those who, in analyzing meaning, turn immediately to the psychology and sociology of language users: to intentions, sense-experience, and mental ideas, or to social rules, conventions, and regularities. I distinguish two topics: First, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics.\(^{31}\)

\(^{30}\) Almog et al., *Themes from Kaplan*, 573.

\(^{31}\) Lewis, “General Semantics,” 19.
Following these two theorists, I will draw a distinction between vehicle-level questions and content/attitude-level questions. For instance, the most obvious difference between ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Schnee ist Weiss’ is that one is written in English and the other German. We have two different vehicles with the same contents. The two sentences are written in different languages, but there are many other, less obvious, facts in virtue of which ‘Snow is white’ and ‘Schee ist Weis’ express the proposition that snow is white. Often these facts will be relational instead of intrinsic facts about the vehicles. Perhaps some of the facts on which the contents of these two vehicles depend are the histories and psychological states of speakers of English and German. While these facts are relational and so are not solely about the vehicle, they do involve the vehicle and so questions about these facts are still at the vehicle-level. I will not provide a detailed view of the sorts of things that determine the contents of vehicles such as sentences or mental states such as emotions and I will do my best to avoid making too many controversial assumptions about these things. What I will do relatively often, though, is invoke the distinction between attitude/content-level questions and vehicle-level questions to bring clarity to the issues discussed.

Now let us think about mental states. Probably because of their connection with knowledge, philosophers have thought a lot about beliefs. In short, philosophers have tended to think of beliefs as propositional attitudes. Beliefs are mental attitudes that involve taking something to be true. The something that is taken to be true when one has a belief is the same thing that sentences like ‘Snow is white’ express, i.e. a proposition.

While beliefs and sentences can have the same content, moving from a discussion of the contents of sentences to the contents of beliefs adds a wrinkle to the story about vehicles and
their contents. Subjects with beliefs are vehicles of contents, but when they are, they also have attitudes about those contents. In other words, thinking of beliefs in this way introduces a distinction we did not have when we talked about sentences - the distinction between the attitudes and the contents of those attitudes. The specification of the contents of a mental state determines what the attitude is about and the specification of the type of attitude tells us about the relationship in which the subject stands to that content. If one believes that snow is white, for instance, one thinks the proposition is true. Consequently, we now have three things to keep in mind when talking about mental states such as beliefs. First, we have the contents of the belief, i.e. the proposition thought of. Second, we have the attitude about that proposition, e.g. the regarding it as true. Third, we have the vehicle, i.e. the agent and the facts about her in virtue of which she counts as having the relevant propositional attitude.³²

2. The central question of this chapter will be, are the contents of emotions propositions? To begin to answer this, let us abstract from questions about vehicles for a moment and focus on questions about propositions and their attitudes. First, in addition to beliefs, there are many other mental attitudes. One can wish, doubt, imagine, entertain, judge, know, want, etc. We say things like that Blanca wishes that snow were pink or that Irma doubts that it will snow. Much of our language supports a propositional attitude analysis of many of these mental states.

³² Two things: First, it may be possible to break things down further. For instance, we may be able to discuss the vehicle of the attitude and the vehicle of the content separately. Second, I do not mean to say that there are no interesting entailment relationships between attitudes, vehicles and contents. Knowledge, for instance, may well be an attitude that one can have only toward true contents.
and emotions are one such state. We might say that Sheila hopes that she will get into a good school. She has an attitude about the prospect of her getting into a good school and this involves her looking favorably on a future that involves getting into that good school. Similar propositional attitude attributions are apparent in the following: Jerry fears that his partner will leave him. Miles hates that he did not get into MIT. Basil worries that Austin is up to his old tricks. Etc.

Not all our attributions of purported propositional attitudes involve that-clauses, however. For example, ‘Willard fears for his life’ or ‘Jesse loves Brunhilda.’ We have 3 primary options with regard to such attributions. First, we could just deny that these ordinary language constructions provide us with much of a reason to doubt the propositional attitude analysis of the states they pick out. We should not be too quick to take this route, though. At least part of the motivation for the propositional attitude analysis of mental states in the first place is its being anchored in our ordinary practices of attributing mental states.

A second option is to provide semantic analyses of attributions that do not involve that-clauses in terms of attributions that do involve them. This works well for some attributions, but not as well for others. For example, ‘Willard fears for his life,’ is analyzed correctly in at least some situations as ‘Willard fears that he will die.’ Other conversions are more controversial. For instance, ‘Lavern loves Billy.’ It might be that Lavern loves Billy for some reason, his good looks perhaps, in which case we can say that Lavern loves that Billy is handsome, but in cases where there is no particular reason, conversions are harder to come by.

A third option is to admit that some emotions are non-propositional attitudes. For the reasons just canvassed, we should accept this option. We can take this tack without fully giving
up on the propositionalist account of emotional content, though. So long as the intentionality
of non-propositional emotions depends on emotions or other mental states that are
propositional attitudes, we can preserve the strengths of the propositional account of contents.

We can do this by first noting that the attributions of emotional states that are most
resistant to propositional attitude analysis are ones that involve emotional dispositions such as
fear of snakes and sentiments like love and hate. The motley of states that we call emotions
can be divided into at least three relatively distinct categories: 1) emotional episodes, 2)
emotional dispositions and 3) sentiments. Paradigmatic emotional episodes are things such as
an experience of delight at one’s purchase of the rare musical instrument one has been
coveting. They are continuous, short-lived mental occurrences. Emotional dispositions are
longer-lived and discontinuous. They are dispositions to have a single type of emotional
episode. For instance, if one is envious of a neighbor, one will be disposed to experience
episodes of envy at, e.g. the thought of the neighbor’s prized pig. Sentiments are like emotional
dispositions, but they involve more types of emotional episodes. If I am in love with an
individual, this may manifest itself not only in amorous episodes, but also in joy at his successes,
sorrow at his defeats, and jealousy at a rival for his affections.

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33 Ben-Ze’ev, The Subtlety of Emotions, Ch. 4; Deonna and Teroni, The Emotions, 8. Often a fourth, related
affective state is mentioned, i.e. affective traits. Affective traits, like emotional dispositions, involve dispositions,
but the objects of such dispositions can vary more widely. For example, I might be a coward if I experience fear in
the wrong sorts of situations, some of which involve different objects like rooms with more than five people, being
on top of buildings of more than eight floors, etc. Since affective traits are not generally considered emotions, but
character traits, I won’t discuss them.
34 While using ‘sentiment’ to pick out the more complicated emotions has become standard usage, the term is
somewhat unfortunate since it is likely to bring to mind the moral sentimentalists like David Hume and Adam
Smith. Nonetheless, as the provided definition hopefully makes clear, I will use sentiment to pick out a smaller set
of things. The sentimentalists used ‘sentiment’ to refer to the whole swath of affective phenomena.
Since emotional dispositions and sentiments are dispositions to experience more basic emotional episodes, if these more basic emotional episodes have propositional contents that involve the object(s) of the sentiments, then the intentionality of the nonpropositional sentiments and dispositions can be explained in terms of the intentionality of the more basic episodes with propositional contents. For example, if ‘Lavern loves Billy’ is true, there need be no specific proposition that Lavern has in mind, but there must be more basic amorous episodes to which Lavern is susceptible and which involve Billy. These might be perceptual, imaginative, desirous, etc. She might see Billy in a particularly favorable light, i.e. see that he is quite fetching. She might desire that he do well. She might daydream about romantic interludes the contents of which are not appropriate for polite company. Whatever the particulars, so long as there are more basic states that are propositional attitudes, those states can perform the explanatory roles that states with propositional contents do so well. That is, the more basic states will explain why her love is about Billy, why it might be appropriate or inappropriate given facts about Billy, why some of the actions of Lavern make sense given her love of Billy, etc.

This conception of the intentionality of nonpropositional sentiments and emotional dispositions is like a suggestion often made about emotions in general. According to the suggestion I have in mind, sentiments and dispositions are not the only emotions that rely on some other state for their intentionality. Instead, we should think that the intentionality of every emotion, even the basic emotional episodes, is the result of the intentionality of some other state. Deonna and Teroni, for instance, say that the intentionality of emotions directed at the past are generally based on memories, the intentionality of emotions directed at the
present are generally based on perceptions, and the intentionality of emotions directed at the future are generally based on imagined expectations.\textsuperscript{35} They call the non-emotional psychological state responsible for the intentionality of emotions their “cognitive bases.”\textsuperscript{36}

Since according to the cognitive bases account all emotions are nonpropositional states with propositional states that are related to them in a way that explains the intentionality of the emotional states, the cognitive bases account of intentionality is not a propositionalist account of emotions. I don’t think the mere fact that emotions come out as nonpropositional on the cognitive bases account should give us much pause, though. There is no reason to be wedded to the propositional account of emotions \textit{per se}. A reason to favor a propositional attitude account of emotions is it fits into a traditional approach to the philosophy of mind. Insofar as the cognitive bases that explain the intentionality of emotions have propositional contents, that view also fits into that traditional approach.

Despite its consistency with the traditional approach I am recommending, there are still reasons to avoid the cognitive bases view. The main reason is that it is inconsistent with our everyday conception of emotions. While emotional episodes are often caused by the sorts of mental events that the cognitive base appeals to in order to explain the intentionality of emotions, it is far from clear that emotions rely on those mental events in the way that the cognitive base view claims. On the face of it, once an emotional episode is up and running, that episode is directed at its object in a way that is not mediated by non-emotional states such as memory. Martha Nussbaum gives us a striking case of such an emotional episode when she

\textsuperscript{35} Deonna and Teroni, \textit{The Emotions}, 5. Michael Tye defends a similar view in Tye, “The Experience of Emotion.”

\textsuperscript{36} Deonna and Teroni, \textit{The Emotions}. 
describes her sadness at her mother’s death. While I disagree with some aspects of Nussbaum’s view, this fact about emotions, i.e. that they can be directly related to their objects without a separate non-emotional cognitive base, she gets exactly right. Describing her sadness, an “upheaval of thought” on her view, she says:

When I grieve, I do not first of all coolly embrace the proposition, “My wonderful mother is dead,” and then set about grieving. No, the real, full recognition of that terrible event...is the upheaval...The appearance sits there...asking me what I am going to do with it...That is not preparation for the upheaval, that is the upheaval itself...Knowing can be violent, given the truths that are there to be known.  

The argument for treating sentiments and other emotional dispositions in this fashion is not just that it will help us preserve the propositional attitude account of content and that is something that we have independent reason to preserve. Additionally, it is hard to think of an episode of intentionality that does not involve representing something as a type of thing, and that involves predication, which means the state has content that is structured propositionally.  

This argument involves two claims that may be contentious and are worth further discussion.

37 Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 45.
First, the argument makes the claim that it is hard to imagine any mental episode with representational content that does not involve any sort of predication. Such conceivability arguments are prone to the objection that the argument reveals a lack of imagination on the part of the proponent instead of supporting the intended conclusion. For instance, episodes of surprise or moods like generalized anxiety may not involve the sort of predication needed to support the propositional analysis I am proposing. Such states are worth considering, but I will not pause to do so here. If the reader finds this conceivability premise plausible, as I do, then barring other difficulties she will find the propositional attitude account of the contents of emotions plausible. If the reader, on the other hand, finds the premise implausible, so long as the counter-examples to the premise are relatively small in number or involve peripheral cases, we can still hold that the propositional attitude account of the contents of emotion is an account designed to deal with the central cases.\(^{39}\) Noncentral cases will need some further account, but that does not mean that the propositional approach is without value.

Secondly, according to the argument we can conclude that a state has propositional content if it involves predication. This is the claim that predication is a sufficient, but perhaps not a necessary, condition for propositional content. Resistance to this claim is generally something like a linguistic disagreement. That is, some will want to save the attribution of propositional content for some more robustly cognitive states. For instance, in his book *Moral Perception*, Robert Audi draws a distinction between three types of seeing.\(^{40}\) For Audi seeing-that involve seeing that something is the case, which involves some registration of the fact of

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\(^{39}\) Here I am paraphrasing Searle, *Intentionality*, 35.

\(^{40}\) Audi, *Moral Perception*, 9–12.
what one has seen that goes beyond the mere predication of some property. Seeing involving only the predication of some property he calls seeing-as. Seeing-as is then distinguished from merely seeing an object.

I have made the case that we should be skeptical of states like the mere seeing of an object, an intentional state that involves no predication. Nevertheless, Audi is focusing on some relatively clear distinctions. We are all familiar with different visual perceptions that involve different levels of attention paid to what is seen. Some involve a more or less articulate judgment of what is seen. Some involve a sort of passive classification of what is seen as the type of thing it is. And sometimes objects merely show up in our visual field. Someone might propose a similar set of distinctions about emotions, suggesting that we save the attribution of propositional content for the most cognitively involved type.

Choosing to speak as Audi does is not so much wrong as misleading. The specification of the content of a mental state is primarily about saying what things are represented by that state. The relationship the agent is in with respect to that content is specified by the attitude attribution. Further psychological facts about the agent, like attention, motivational states, etc. are best kept separate by being discussed under the heading of the vehicle of the attitude/content. If I represent a tree in my peripheral field of vision, the representation is that a tree is over there. The attitude is seeing. Vehicle-level facts about the specific way in which I represent the tree, e.g. in my peripheral field, should not be features captured by the specification of the attitude and content.

What we have seen thus far is that the propositional attitude approach faces a difficulty. Many of our emotions are directed at objects and not facts or states of affairs that are picked
out by the propositions. I have urged that we should take this problem seriously, not brushing it aside as a mere ordinary language anomaly. One response to the problem is to analytically reduce each attribution that does not involve a that-clause to an attribution that does. I’m skeptical that such reductions are always possible. When I say that I am afraid of snakes, on the face of it, I am not always saying that I am afraid, e.g., that a snake will bite me. The way out of this difficulty is to acknowledge that nonpropositional emotions derive their intentionality from other states with propositional content. Often these states will be simpler emotional episodes to which one is liable, e.g. being afraid that I will be bitten. Often snakes are what I am afraid of because of nonemotional states such imaginings of being bitten, a desire that I not be near them, etc. If nonpropositional emotions have their intentionality in virtue of other states with propositional contents, then the propositions contained in those states can do the work that is normally done by the contents of propositional emotions and the propositional approach survives this critique.

3. The problem of accounting for attributions of emotions that do not involve that-clauses is not the only problem for the propositional attitude approach that is a result of its commitment to propositions as the contents of emotions. A second important problem for the view involves the contents of the emotions of human infants, human adults with cognitive impairment and some non-human animals. (For the sake of brevity, I will refer to this group as infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals.) Because of a nearly universal recognition that the more austere psychological tools, like classical conditioning, are unable to
explain all the behaviors of infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals, psychologists have come to freely attribute psychological states like beliefs, desires and emotions to infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals. Consequently, while it is certainly the case that infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals are not able to have all the complex emotions that we are blessed/cursed with, we would need a pretty good philosophical reason to go against this scientific trend and deny that infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals experience at least some emotions. In short, it is surely the case that these infants and animals can experience relatively simple episodes of emotions like joy, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust. Therefore, any account of the emotions must make room for this fact.

I must first reiterate that the issue I wish to discuss is about the contents of emotions in infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals and not about the attitudes involved in those emotions. Often theorists think that the problem of the emotions of infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals is thought to apply equally to judgmentalist views and propositional attitude views. That is clearly not the case. Because judgments involve an attitude of commitment to the truth of a proposition, they are much more robustly cognitive states and this robustness is a reason for thinking that such states do not appear in infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals. If it is the case, however, that it is the attitude of judging that infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-

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human animals cannot pull off, it may still be possible for them to have other propositional attitudes that do not involve judging.

So as not to argue against a straw man, let us begin discussion of this problem with a look at a couple of articulations of the problem.

John Deigh argues that:

[P]ropositional thought presupposes linguistic capacities, which are unique to human beings and, in fact, human beings who have grown past infancy. Consequently, if one represents the thought content of every intentional state as a proposition, one cannot account for primitive emotions...So cognitivist theories of emotion must give up taking the thoughts emotions contain as in every case a proposition. They must find a way to explain some of those thoughts as nonpropositional so as to avoid making the possession of linguistic capacities a condition of being liable to emotions.43

Jennifer Robinson’s statement of the problem is similar. She says:

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43 Deigh, “Primitive Emotions,” 10–11.
Because philosophers tend to talk about emotions as private conscious mental states directed towards propositions, they also tend to think of emotions as quintessentially human phenomena... Emotions are ways of evaluating the environment in terms of how it affects the organism, and this is just as true whether we are thinking of crayfish, frogs, cats, chimpanzees, or human beings. So for this reason alone I think it is wise to think of emotional states not as directed towards proposition... 44

The argument, then, appears to be the following:

P1) Infants, the cognitively impaired, and non-human animals without linguistic capacities experience simple emotions.

P2) Propositional content requires linguistic capacities.

C) Therefore, some simple emotions do not have propositional content.

The problem is that if we accept that infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals are liable to have emotions, then those states cannot have propositional contents because infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals cannot have

44 Robinson, Deeper than Reason, 18–19.
propositions in mind since they do not have linguistic capacities. Since the argument is valid, if
we are to retain the propositional attitude conception of emotions, we need to reject (1)
and/or (2). Opponents of the propositional attitude view assume that the committed
propositionalist must give up on (1). I will argue that the propositionalist may give up on (2).

Before moving on to ways of rejecting (2), let us quickly discuss the conclusion. There
are a couple of ways for the propositionalist to accept this conclusion. One way is to accept
that the emotions of infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals do not
have propositional content, but argue that for this reason they are not intentional states.
Instead, they are reactions to the environment that are not about anything and cannot
rationalize other mental states or actions. A second way to accept the conclusion would to be
to provide some nonpropositional account of their intentionality. The proponent of the
propositional attitude approach might choose either of these options.

The position that nonpropositional emotions are nonintentional is certainly less than
ideal. Many of the emotions of infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals
certainly appear to be directed at things. In addition, they appear to rationalize actions. A
patient with Alzheimer’s who cares deeply about his appearance may insist that his hair be
combed a specific way. This insistence makes sense given that he cares about his appearance.
If a female baboon loses one of her offspring, she may return a week later to the place it
disappeared. She will climb a tall tree to look for and call out to the lost child. She will do this
repeatedly for weeks after the loss.45 The most natural explanation of such behavior is that she
is grieving the loss of her child. Anyone familiar with infant behavior can tell similar stories. An

45 de Waal, “What Is an Animal Emotion?”
infant may play for hours with a new toy, motivating our attributions that she is delighted in it.

Alternatively, she may cry whenever her mother leaves for work, leading us to think she is prone to sadness at seeing her mother go. While such considerations are not conclusive, it is surely enough to put the burden of proof on those who wish to deny that such emotional states are directed at objects and function to make sense out of the actions to which they lead.

As I said, such considerations about that nature of the emotions of infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals, may lead one to adopt a nonpropositionalist view of those emotions and a nonpropositionalist account of their intentionality. I am skeptical of such accounts. I do not have an argument that such an account cannot work and, of course, I cannot provide arguments against each and every possible nonpropositionalist account of intentionality. Instead, my argument is, that there is a lot to recommend the propositional approach to content, so any alternative account has a lot to live up to.

Three main considerations recommend the propositional view of content. First, we have a pretty clear understanding of the inferential relationships between things that are structured like propositions. For instance, if it is true that if it is raining, then the streets will be wet and it is true that it is raining, it follows that the streets will be wet. Now if mental states have contents like that it is raining, then some of those mental states are poised to play the sorts of inferential roles we expect of them. For example, if a belief is taking a proposition to be true, then the belief that it is raining can play an analogous role to that played by the premise ‘that it is raining’ in the argument about the condition of the streets. The belief that it is raining can function to justify a further belief about the condition of the streets.
Secondly, we can say similar things about the role of mental states in the explanation of action. Given the assumption that persons tend to behave in a rational manner, we can explain the behaviors of persons by appealing to the contents of their mental states. If I believe that it is raining, I desire that I not get wet, and I believe that bringing an umbrella will prevent me from getting wet, then we have an explanation of my bringing an umbrella.

Third, thoughts need to be compositional in the same way as propositions. I can think that it is raining. I can think that it is not raining. I can think that it is raining and that it is cold. These thoughts have something in common, namely raining. Once I grasp whatever it is that is picked out by the subsentential part ‘raining,’ then that part can appear in many other thoughts and in many other ways. Consequently, the propositional view of the structure of mental contents puts us in a good position to explain the productivity of thought. Once a thinker grasps whatever is picked out by a large, but manageable, set of subsentential items, she can have an extremely large number of new propositions in mind by combining these parts. For instance, George Miller, Eric Margollis and Stephen Laurence point out that if we limit ourselves to just 20-word sentences and assume, conservatively, that on average each word could be replaced by 9 others, an agent can understand 10 to the twentieth 20-word sentences, roughly twice the number of neurons in the human brain.46

To reiterate, then, it is a lot to ask of a view to provide equally plausible explanations of each of these phenomena. Consequently, nonpropositional views of content have a lot to live up to. Moreover, since—as one can see from the Deigh’s and Robinson’s respective passages—the premise that propositional content requires linguistic capacities is a relatively unargued

46 Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, “The Ontology of Concepts—Abstract Objects or Mental Representations?”
assumption. We can do better by attacking that assumption than by accepting it and then trying to make room for the conclusion that some emotions do not have propositional contents, but are in some—yet to be specified way—intentional.

4. Now, to analyze the relationship between linguistic capacities and propositional contents, we are going to need a better understanding of contemporary conceptions of propositions. First, propositions certainly appear to be intimately connected to language, so the assumption that having a proposition in mind requires linguistic capacities is an excusable one. My own introduction of propositions was in the context of the meaning of sentences. Our contemporary conception of a proposition, moreover, has its roots in discussions of the Stoics who distinguished the act of saying something from what is said. What is said for the Stoics was a proposition and that proposition can be said, written, etc. Consequently, from the beginning there was a connection between language and propositions. What is also apparent, though, is that from the very beginning there was also a distinction between vehicle and content, a distinction between the saying and what was said. Despite the clarity of this distinction, to understand what a proposition is, one needs to understand some other phenomenon and often the phenomena appealed to are linguistic, such as utterances or sentences. That leads quite naturally to a linguistic conception of the nature of propositions themselves.

The history of twentieth century philosophy also supports the connection between propositions and language. Perhaps most important for understanding the presently available conceptions of propositions are the works in the philosophy of language by Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. Taking Frege first, while he did not use the term ‘proposition,’ his notion of a thought has been an important influence on thinking about propositions. For Frege, thoughts are abstract objects composed of senses. In an important paper, “On Sense and Reference,” Frege argues that the term ‘meaning’ is ambiguous. In one sense, the meaning of a linguistic item such as “the morning star” is the object it picks out, Venus, its referent. However, that cannot be the whole story. If it were, then the statement “The morning star is the same as the evening star” would not convey any information. The referent of both “the morning star” and “the evening star” is Venus. So, if the meaning of a term were just its referent, the meaning of “The morning star is the same as the evening star” would be the same as “Venus is Venus.”

To account for the information conveyed by nontrivial statements of identity, Frege argues, we must acknowledge that terms like ‘the morning star’ have a sense. A sense is a way in which an agent conceives of the referent of a term, what Frege also called a mode of presentation. Since the manner in which an agent refers to Venus when she utters “the morning star” is clearly different from the manner in which she does so when she utters “the evening star,” we can see that “the morning star is the same as the evening star” is informative. It lets us know that those two senses, or modes of presentation, pick out the same object.

What is important (for present purposes at least) is that Frege thought that thoughts were the senses of sentences and these thoughts were themselves composed of the senses of

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the subsentential parts of the relevant sentences. If I think that the morning star is the evening star, the semantic content of this act of thinking, its sense/thought, is composed in part by the senses expressed by ‘the morning star’ and ‘the evening star.’ This idea, along with the idea that discussions of meaning needed to capture the cognitive value of expressions in addition to referents, has been very influential. Contemporary Fregeans think of concepts and propositions roughly as Frege thought of senses and thoughts, respectively.

Frege’s choice of terminology, specifically his using ‘thoughts’ to refer to propositions and ‘senses’ or especially ‘modes of presentation’ to refer to concepts invites a psychologistic those terms. According to a psychologistic understanding of ‘mode of presentation,’ a mode of presentation is a psychological fact about a person, such as ideas about where a star appears in the sky and at what time. In my terminology, one might think that Frege was talking about the vehicles of contents and not the contents themselves. Nothing could be further from Frege’s intentions, though.

Frege’s antipsychologism is crucial to his view and his influence, so I will err on the side of belaboring the point. Frege took great pains to ward off psychologistic readings of his views about meaning. For instance, after introducing the notion of a sense, he says:

The [referent] and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If what a sign means is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions...Such an idea is often imbued with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates.
The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man’s idea is not that of the other...A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name ‘Bucephalus’. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and a sign’s sense, which may be the common property of many people, and so is not a part of a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.49

In other words, senses/concepts and the thoughts/propositions they compose are publicly accessible objects for Frege. They are not private mental particulars. The argument for this position, which he gestures at in the last sentence, is easy to miss. If one thinks that senses are private mental particulars, like ideas in the minds of individuals, the fact that mental particulars vary so much, both from individual to individual and from the same individual at different times, entails that individuals could not have the same thoughts as others, or earlier versions of themselves. Consequently, beliefs with the same content could not be passed down from one generation to the next.

Frege is consistent about his concern for the publicity of senses and thoughts and their needing to be distinguished from ideas. Elsewhere, he makes it clear that in addition to

49 Frege and Gabriel, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, 159–60.
thinking of thoughts and senses as publicly accessible, they must be thought of as abstract objects. For instance, in his essay “Thought,” he says:

So the result seems to be: thoughts are neither things in the external world nor ideas.

A third realm must be recognized. Anything belonging to this realm has it in common with ideas that it cannot be perceived by the sense, but has it in common with things that it does not need an owner so as to belong to the contents of his consciousness. Thus for example the thought we have expressed in the Pythagorean theorem is timelessly true, true independently of whether anyone take it to be true. It needs no owner.⁵⁰

Thoughts/propositions and the senses/concepts of which they are composed are, for Frege, abstract objects and not acts of thinking with “owners.”

Moving on to Russell’s early and influential view of propositions, what is perhaps most noteworthy about Russell’s view for our purposes is that he rejects Frege’s commitment to propositions as abstract objects at the level of sense. In correspondence with Frege, Russell explained his rejection of the notion of a sense. In response to Frege’s assertion that “Mont

Blanc with all its snowfields is not itself a component part of the thought that Mont Blanc is more than 4000 meters high,” Russell says:

I believe that in spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is a component part of what is actually asserted in the proposition ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4000 meters high’. (163) We do not assert the thought, for this is a private psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought, and this is, to my mind, a certain complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in which Mont Blanc is itself a component part. If we do not admit this, then we get the conclusion that we know nothing at all about Mont Blanc...In the case of a simple proper name like ‘Socrates’, I cannot distinguish between sense and meaning; I see only the idea, which is psychological, and the object. Or better: I do not admit the sense at all, but only the idea and the meaning.  

While Russell’s rejection of Frege’s notion of a sense is clear here, again the argument for that position comes quite quickly. The worry is that if persons are not directly acquainted with the objects of their thoughts, then their knowledge will not be of the objects themselves. For epistemological reasons we cannot place senses between our minds and the world. Consequently, for Russell, propositions, the contents of our thoughts (our acts of thinking) and

51 Frege and Gabriel, *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*, 169.
the meanings of our utterances, sentences, etc. are complexes of worldly objects.\textsuperscript{52} Though he does not make it clear here, those complexes can contain properties and relations in addition to objects like Mt. Blanc and its snowfields. Indeed, they must contain at least one or the other as something must be said about the object(s). For instance, that an object has a certain property or that multiple objects stand in some relation. Russell would have said, for example, that the proposition expressed by “Romeo loves Juliet” is a complex of two objects, Romeo and Juliet, and one relation, the loving relation.

Roughly speaking, contemporary theorists of propositions still divide over whether propositions are composed of worldly entities at the level of reference or are composed of some other sort of entity along the line of Fregean senses.\textsuperscript{53} Some assume that a Russelian conception of propositions allows one to avoid the position that linguistic capacities are required for propositional contents. If propositions are not composed of concepts, then having a proposition in mind does not require having concepts and if you need a language to have concepts, then there is no requirement that one have linguistic capacities to have a proposition in mind. As I will argue below, however, this line of thought is confused, so the different accounts of propositions is less relevant to the issue of the relationship between propositional content and the possession of linguistic capacities than many suppose. Consequently, rather than focusing on this difference, I want to focus on two other things that can be pulled out of my quick discussion of Frege’s and Russell’s respective views. First, both Frege and Russell are

\textsuperscript{52} Russell changed his mind about both the existence and composition of propositions multiple times over the years.

\textsuperscript{53} Influential Neo-Russellians include: Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle; Soames, What Is Meaning?; King, The Nature and Structure of Content.

Influential Neo-Fregeans include: Peacocke, A Study of Concepts; Zalta, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality.
very concerned to distinguish contents from the psychological entities involved in bearing those contents. In Lewis’s terminology, they are concerned to distinguish semantic questions from meta-semantic question. In my terminology, they are careful to distinguish the vehicles of semantic contents from the semantic contents themselves, i.e. the propositions. Second, according to both Frege and Russell, propositions are structured in a way that resembles that of assertions. That is, according to both Frege and Russell, propositions are structured linguistically. Propositions are like sentences in that they are composed of parts. Moreover, like sentences, the parts that make up a proposition are not a mere grouping. The proposition that Romeo loves Juliet is not a mere heap of three things, Romeo, Juliet and love; instead, a relation joins the two objects. The same goes for propositions such as that snow is white. There are not three independent items jumbled into a heap. We have a subject and a predicate joined by predication.

For reasons such as these, twentieth century analytic philosophy has taken the linguistic characterization of the contents of mental states very seriously. Perhaps it is this linguistic characterization of mental contents that has led theorists working in emotions to move so quickly from statements about semantic contents to conclusions about the vehicles of semantic contents, specifically that those vehicles must possess linguistic capacities. There is a trivial sense in which the fact that a vehicle must possess linguistic capacities does follow from the fact that a vehicle carries contents that are structured linguistically. That is, if linguistic

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54 There has been much debate, under the heading of “the unity of the proposition problem,” about what the real difference is between a heap of things like objects and properties on the one hand, and a structure of similar things that is a proposition on the other. I will not get side-tracked by this debate, though admittedly some of the views in it might bear what sorts of contents an agent may be able to have in mind.  
55 Naturally, as always, a vocal minority reject any such characterization of semantic contents.
capacities are defined in terms of being able to have such contents in mind, then there is a trivial move from the fact that a subject is in a mental state with such in such contents to the conclusion that that subject possesses the linguistic capacities associated with the specification of those contents. That sort of move, however, is not what theorists have in mind when discussing the emotions of infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals. What they mean by linguistic capacities is the ability to understand and/or use language. But because the conception of linguistic capacities referred to there is not obviously defined in terms of the mere ability to have mental contents, the move from mental contents to linguistic capacities is no longer trivial. To make such a jump without some sort of argument or story about the connection between mental contents and linguistic capacities (now construed more robustly) is to either confuse or conflate facts about contents with facts about vehicles.

My suggestion that we not conflate vehicles and contents does not imply the assertion that there is no connection between contents and vehicles. An account of the vehicles of semantic contents should have something to say about what it is about vehicles that allows them to carry the contents that they do. Since the contents carried by vehicles are what is to be explained by an account of the vehicles, facts about the contents to be explained will likely influence the explanation. For instance, Fregean propositions are individuated more finely than Russellian ones. According to the Russellian, the belief that Barak Obama has a good sense of humor has the same content as the belief that the 44th President of the United States has a good sense of humor. According to the Fregean, the contents of these two beliefs are different. Presumably, then, the Fregean will have to explain what is different about the subject when she has these two different beliefs. That is, it is reasonable to require the Fregean to say more
about the vehicles of these two contents than the Russelian. It is far from clear, though, that the Fregean must say that what separates the two states is that they each involve the use of different linguistic capacities. If we are to think that different linguistic capacities are what do the job, we need some sort of argument.

5. In the emotions literature, arguments to the effect that being the sort of thing that can have propositional mental contents entails being the sort of thing that has linguistic capacities are conspicuously scarce. Typically, as we saw with Robinson and Deigh, the connection is just assumed. For that reason, I will consider three arguments commonly discussed in the philosophy mind when the concern is not merely with emotions. The first argument is less of a straightforward argument than a broad, Sellarsian explanatory framework that can seem to support the move from the linguistic structure of contents to the requirement that the vehicles of semantic contents possess the linguistic capacities required to express the contents they carry. The second argument comes from Donald Davidson. He argues that the mental contents of creatures without linguistic capacities are too indeterminate to count as propositional contents. The last argument I will discuss pulls apart the claim that linguistic capacities are required for propositional content. Instead, the claims are (i) that propositional content requires conceptual capacities and (ii) that conceptual capacities require linguistic capacities.

Beginning with the broadly Sellarsian approach to mental states, in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Sellars attempts to shed light on mental states by thinking of them as
analogous to utterances.\textsuperscript{56} In a slogan, the idea is that thought is silent speech. If thought is just a type of silent speech, then it does follow that only those who can talk can also think. In addition, if by think here we mean the very broad notion of having any mental state with propositional content, then we have an argument that sets up a tight connection between propositional content and linguistic capacities.

The problem with this argument is that it takes the slogan form of the Sellarsian position too seriously by using it as a premise in an argument. To see this, consider the Cartesian view of thought that is often contrasted with the Sellarsian conception. According to the Cartesian conception, thoughts can be understood independently of language. The Sellarsian position is intended to be the contrast, i.e. the position that we must understand thought via our understanding of language. We need not take a side in this debate, however, because it is tangential to our concerns. Even if the contents of thoughts and other mental states such as emotions must be understood by analogy with language, this does not entail that those mental states require linguistic capacities of their subjects. That debate between the Sellarsians and the Cartesians is about how we should understand mental states and not about the constitution of the mental states themselves. In the context of the debate about how we should go about understanding mental states, the claim of the Sellarsians is that language comes first in what is sometimes called the order of understanding.\textsuperscript{57} That is, to understand mental states (not just your own, but others’ too) you must understand language. The Cartesian position is that we

\textsuperscript{56} It’s probably unfair to focus on Sellars and Sellarsians here. The attempt to address issues in the philosophy of mind, like providing a characterization of mental contents, by doing the philosophy of language was a central feature of analytic philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century and not just the Sellarsian form of it. Nevertheless, Sellars is a prominent and particularly clear example of a thinker who displays this tendency.  
\textsuperscript{57} Chauncey Maher explains this distinction in \textit{The Pittsburgh School of Philosophy}, 24. Sellars characterizes the distinction as one between the order of knowing and the order of being in “Mental Events,” 325–26.
can understand mental states without previously understanding language. In contrast to an
issue about the order of understanding, the issue we are concerned with has to do with what is
sometimes called the order of being. That is, can something without a language have mental
states or, on the other hand, do mental states require linguistic capacities?

Sellars is sometimes explicit about his position on the order of being question. In
*Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* he appears to think that linguistic capacities are
required for even the simplest of mental states. He says that he endorses,

> psychological nominalism, according to which all awareness of sorts,
> resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities – indeed, all
> awareness even of particulars – is a linguistic affair. According to it, not even the
> awareness of such sorts, resemblances, and facts as pertain to so-called
> immediate experience is presupposed by the process of acquiring the use of a
> language.58

Despite this seemly clear commitment to language being, if not prior, at least coeval in the
order of being, later in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* he clarifies what he means by
psychological nominalism.

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58 Sellars, Rorty, and Brandom, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 1997, 63.
Now, the friendly use I have been making of the phrase “psychological nominalism” may suggest that I am about to equate concepts with words, and thinking, in so far as it is episodic, with verbal episodes. I must now hasten to say that I shall do nothing of the sort, or, at least, that if I do do something of the sort, the view I shall shortly be developing is only in a relatively Pickwickian sense an equation of thinking with the use of language. I wish to emphasize, therefore, that as I am using the term, the primary connotation of “psychological nominalism” is the denial that there is any awareness of logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language.59

The distinction Sellars draws at the end of that paragraph is crucial for a clear understanding of the issues with which we are concerned—and, it would seem, for understanding Sellars’s own view. The distinction that is drawn is between a type of thinking that does require linguistic capacities and involves awareness of inferential connections between thoughts and a type of thinking that does not require language and does not involve awareness of inferential connections. Elsewhere Sellars says that some thoughts, thoughts of “propositional form,” do not require knowledge of the inferential connections of the thought.60 Consistent with my own characterization of propositional form, Sellars says that “To have propositional form, a basic representational state must represent an object and represent it as

59 Sellars, Rorty, and Brandom, 65–66. The emphasis in the last sentence is mine.
60 Sellars, “Mental Events,” 336.
of a certain character. A perception with the content that snow is white is propositional because it represents an object, snow, as having a certain character, whiteness. It is something over and above that to also represent the inferential connections that the proposition would support, to know that the representation justifies some further mental state or action.

6. The second argument I would like to discuss comes from Donald Davidson. Davidson is skeptical of any account of the vehicles of propositional mental contents that does not involve linguistic capacities because he thinks that it will not be able to say what it is about a subject that can explain why she has one proposition in mind and not another. In his paper “Thought and Talk,” he says:

The general, and not very informative, reason is that without speech we cannot make the fine distinctions between thoughts that are essential to the explanations we can sometimes confidently supply. Our manner of attributing attitudes ensures that all the expressive power of language can be used to express such distinctions. One can believe that Scott is the not the author of *Waverly* while not doubting that Scott is Scott; one can want to be the discoverer of a creature with a heart without wanting to be the discoverer of a creature with a kidney. One can intend to bite into the apple in the hand without

\[61\] Sellars, 336.
intending to bite into the only apple with a worm in it; and so forth. The intensionality we make so much of in the attribution of thoughts is very hard to make much of when speech is not present. The dog, we say, knows that its master is at home. But does it know that Mr Smith (who is his master), or that the president of the bank (who is that same master) is home? We have no real idea how to settle, or make sense of, these questions.62

Davidson’s point here is that since what people say about what they are thinking or doing is such an important part of our practice of attributing intentional states to them, if we try to think of a situation in which a subject of such an attribution had nothing to say, we could not determine whether the attribution was the right one. It is important to see that this argument is not supposed to be pointing out an epistemological problem. It is not a problem about how we could come to know which attribution is the right one. The point is supposed to be an ontological one. The contents of mental states are supposed to supervene on vehicle-level facts. If there is a difference at the level of content, there should be a difference at the vehicle-level that explains it. Since contents are individuated linguistically, the most straightforward explanation appeals to a vehicle’s possession of linguistic capacities. The difference between the belief that the 44th President of the United States is funny and the belief that Barak Obama is funny are born out in what utterances and inferences (both practical and theoretical) that the subject of each belief is likely to perform. Since animals do not utter

62 Davidson, *Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation*, 164.
or infer (at least in the relevant sense\textsuperscript{63}), it makes no sense to attribute a propositional attitude to one of them.

The following argument captures Davidson’s worry.

(P1) Facts about vehicles should determine facts about contents.

(P2) Facts about vehicles without linguistic capacities cannot determine contents.

(C) Therefore, vehicles without linguistic capacities cannot have determinate contents.

Let’s start with (P1). I introduced ‘vehicle’ as a technical term for things that carry semantic contents. I also said that facts about vehicles explain the semantic facts. Since vehicles themselves are particulars, such as persons, utterances, or sentences, talk of vehicles may lead one to think that the only facts that matter about vehicles involve intrinsic properties of them. This is not the case, however. While, for instance, part of the facts about the vehicle ‘Snow is white’ are intrinsic, i.e. non-relational facts about the shapes and spacing of the letters involved, those alone are not enough to determine the semantic facts. To have the contents that they do, sentences need to have relational properties too, such as that the sentence would be interpreted in a specific way by a competent reader of English. The reason it is important to

\textsuperscript{63} The relevant sense being that they do not consciously infer in something like the way that we do when we talk, sometimes silently, our way through an issue.
point out that descriptions of vehicles are not limited to their intrinsic properties is that many will argue, including many Davidsonians, that there is no set of intrinsic properties that could determine the semantic contents of a vehicle, even when that vehicle is a person and not a sentence. Consequently, we should not saddle Davidson, who is very concerned about the relationships between persons, with the more restricted notion of vehicles according to which only their intrinsic properties matter. The position Davidson would like to support is that, whatever the other determinates are, some of them must be linguistic capacities. However, even given this more relaxed view about the determinants of contents, we have good reason to reject (P1) because if we accept a strong version of (P1) according to which semantic contents are just reducible to facts at the level of vehicles, then we are driven to skepticism about semantic contents.

As Saul Kripke, expanding on the work of Wittgenstein, has convincingly argued, there is no description at the level of vehicles that will fully determine the relevant semantic facts. While a full discussion of the Kripke/Wittgenstein argument would take us too far afield, a quick one should illustrate the sort of worry picked out by it. Wittgenstein has us wonder what it could be about an instructor’s direction that a student should add 2 that makes it the case that the instructor’s intention, the meaning of his instruction, rules out instances like 1000 + 2 = 1004. Surely it can’t be something that the instructor had in mind in the sense of consciously considered.64 The series of additions of 2 is infinite and so an instructor could not consider all of them.

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One relevantly obvious retort is that what determines what the instructor meant are the instructor’s dispositions. That is, the instructor need not have consciously considered every possible addition of 2; she need only have been in a state such that if she did she would have provided the answer consistent with the addition of 2. This is the strategy that is relevant for our present discussion. Davidson thinks that linguistic capacities are relevant to the determination of mental contents in something like this dispositionalist sense. He can’t, for example, think that what determines mental contents are explicit applications of linguistic capacities for we often have things in mind without ever consciously considering them. Thus, he must think that, for example, the difference between my thought about the sense of humor of the 44th President of the United States and my thought about the sense of humor of Barack Obama must be borne out by subjunctive conditionals like that if I were in conditions C I would assent to sentence S, i.e. that the 44th President of the United States is funny and in the other case I would not. Even if we agree with Davidson that such analyses work with thoughts involving things such as Barak Obama and his sense of humor, Davidson’s position runs into the previously discussed difficulties with mental states like intending that a student add 2. The content of that mental state, i.e. that the child should add 2, extends to an infinite number of situations, but the instructor’s linguistic dispositions are finite. For example, numbers so large that the instructor would die before she finished the calculation are circumstances in which the instructor has no linguistic disposition about adding 2. According to Davidson’s response, the content of the instructor’s mental state would consequently be indeterminate. It could mean add 2 or it could mean add 2 up to large numbers and then add 4, or eat lunch, or die, or etc.

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65 Kripke, 28–32.
If this all seems a little too abstract, looking at our ordinary practices involving the attribution of mental states reveals the same point. Modulating an example from Daniel Dennett, consider the assertion by a child that his mother is a doctor.\textsuperscript{66} In order for that assertion to really mean that his mother is a doctor and not that his mother is something like a doctor but not quite, what does the child need to be able to do? Does the child need to be able to separate doctors from imposters, quacks and unlicensed practitioners or need he only be able to rule out butchers, bakers and candlestick makers? If the attribution of the content that his mother is a doctor is legitimate, surely the child’s understanding must match our own to some degree, but there is necessarily some wiggle room. We cannot require complete isomorphism between the vehicle-level facts about the child and the vehicle-level facts about an adult with a more sophisticated understanding of what a doctor is. This was Frege’s point all along. Because everyone’s ideas are idiosyncratic, if we required isomorphism among ideas in order to share thought contents, there will be no sharing of semantic contents. The child case is especially instructive because the ideas that a child has about doctors are so obviously different than those of an average adult, but the point holds for adults too. I may be suspicious of doctors and you may put great faith in them, but we both have “doctor” thoughts.

Therefore, if, as Davidson seems to suppose, we can only legitimately ascribe semantic contents when there are some facts in virtue of which we can fully determine which contents to ascribe, we can never legitimately ascribe semantic contents. Skepticism about our attributions of semantic contents may ultimately be the right position, but we must keep in mind the current context. We are presently inquiring into whether infants, the cognitively impaired, and

\textsuperscript{66} Dennett, \textit{Content and Consciousness}, 183.
some non-human animals can be subjects of experiences with propositional contents. If it is the
case that no one—including humans—are subjects of experiences with propositional contents,
then the claim that infants, the cognitively impaired and some non-human animals are not
subjects of experiences with propositional content is trivially true. Nevertheless, that would be
a truly pyrrhic victory for the proponent of the Davidsonian argument.

This discussion of (P1) should inform our discussion of (P2). If we agree with the
Kripke/Wittgensteinian worries, then we must follow Davidson in accepting (P2). However, our
motivation for that is not the one Davidson wants us to have. He thinks we must accept (P2)
because linguistic capacities are the only things that are up to the task. On the
Kripke/Wittgenstein view, nothing, including linguistic capacities, is up to the task of
determining semantic contents. For this reason, unless we are willing to jettison the whole idea
of vehicles of semantic contents, it looks like we need to reject the claim that talk about
vehicles needs to give a full explanation of our attributions of semantic contents. That is, we
must reject (P1). We must claim that some weaker, only partially explanatory, relationship
obtains between vehicles and contents.

While many find these sorts of Kripkean/Wittgensteinian argument compelling, some
are not persuaded by these sorts of worries and continue to support (P1). It would take us too
far afield to discuss all the available options, but few of them side with Davidson on the issue of
the determinants of semantic properties. Instead, they tend to reject (P2) by offering some
nonlinguistic account of the determinants of contents.

While I have focused my discussion of propositions on views of propositions that do
take them to be structured linguistically, at least one common (but currently unfashionable)
view of propositions denies that propositions are structured linguistically. According to this view, propositions are functions from worlds to truth-values. Proponents of this possible worlds view of propositions generally also endorse a thin notion of what is required for being the bearer of semantic content and so their positions are consistent with the view that infants, the cognitively impaired and some non-human animals have propositions in mind. Robert Stalnaker’s view is representative. He says,

When we ascribe attitudes to the animal, what we presuppose is simply that it has some mechanism for representing and distinguishing between alternative situations. It may be a very crude one...But our language, with its complex structure and capacity to make more subtle discriminations and describe more distant possibilities, may be used to distinguish between the few alternative possibilities represented by the dog without thereby attributing our concepts to it. Because propositions do not mirror the structure of sentences that express them, it is possible to use sophisticated, semantically complex sentences to ascribe attitudes to creatures with very limited cognitive capacities.67

Even among those who agree that contents are structured linguistically, most do not agree that we must explain this by appeal to the linguistic capacities of subjects. Proponents of

67 Stalnaker, Inquiry, 63.
the language of thought hypothesis think, for instance, that intentionality is a result of a mental
language, the language of thought, that precedes and explains the more robust linguistic
capacities with which we are concerned. On the order of being question, they take the
Cartesian position. Mental language consists of a system of representations that are
instantiated in the brains of thinkers. These representations get combined in ways that are
analogous to the ways that words are combined into sentences. For this reason, the
proponents of the language of thought hypothesis believe that propositional attitudes are
attitudes about sentences in the language of thought and not actual sentences. Consequently,
there is no linguistic requirement on agents for those agents to have propositional attitudes.
Linguistic capacities may be a requirement for certain propositional attitudes such as attitudes
about stock market crashes, gas prices, etc. Proponents of the language of thought hypothesis,
like possible world semanticists, generally adopt a relatively thin account of the determinants of
semantic contents.

Perhaps the most prominent proponent of this view, Jerry Fodor, argues for a causal,
covariation account of the determinants of semantic contents for mental states. According to
that account, the contents of propositional attitudes are determined by the objects and
properties in the environment that reliably cause tokenings in the language of thought of the
constituents of the propositional attitude. The simplest episodes of such thoughts are simple
perceptual representations, e.g. That’s a cat. A perception with that is a cat as content has its
content, partly, in virtue of it being caused by the cat in question. That is what makes in about

68 Fodor, LOT 2.
69 Fodor, Ch. 7.
70 Fodor, 200.
that cat. The cat in question also needs to cause a cat representation in the perceiver, where a
cat representation is a mental/brain state that counts as a cat representation in virtue of being
reliably caused by cats. If such a theory of the determinants of contents can work, there will be
little for linguistic capacities to do, at least with respect to simpler attitudes like perceptions of
cats. Very likely the same would be true of simple episodes of fear that rely on the perception
of a feared object, say the perception of a feared snake. It would be of the snake in something
like the way just described in the cat case. Though there would also be a further property
represented, like dangerousness, which would be the representation it is in virtue of being
reliably caused by dangerous things.

7. Having discussed the Sellarsian and Davidsonian worries about the connection between
propositional contents and linguistic capacities, let us move on to a third argument. Jesse Prinz
argues that propositional attitude theorists are committed to what he calls the
“conceptualization hypothesis.”

If emotions are constituted, at least in part, by propositional attitudes, then
having an emotion requires possession of the concepts that would be used to
ascribe those propositional attitudes. If fear is a belief that danger looms, then
being afraid requires possession of the concept of danger and the concept of
looming. Thus, defenders of cognitive theories make an implicit commitment to the claim that emotions require concepts.\(^{71}\)

Here the claim is that propositional content requires that the subject possess *conceptual capacities*. That claim is different from the claim made in premise 2 of the Davidsonian argument. Premise 2 of the Davidsonian argument says that propositional content requires *linguistic capacities*. Prinz’s argument does not quite get us to the place we want to go. We want the best argument that propositional content requires linguistic capacities, not just that it requires conceptual capacities. Nevertheless, Prinz’s argument is important because it points us in the right direction. To turn Prinz’s argument into the one we are looking for we need an additional premise: conceptual capacities require linguistic capacities. That will lead us to the conclusion that propositional content requires linguistic capacities. Here is the argument that makes explicit the important issue of the connection between conceptual capacities and linguistic capacities.

\(^{71}\) Prinz, *Gut Reactions*, 23.
Premises (2*) and (3*) capture, in a way that the Davidsonian argument did not, the two substantial commitments that drive acceptance of the claim that propositional content requires linguistic capacities. Once this is clear, it also becomes even clearer that both claims are suspect. I will not argue that one or both should be rejected, however. Instead, I will argue that if a theorist accepts one of them, then she should reject the other, but it doesn’t really matter for our purposes which one ends up being rejected. Since the argument relies on the truth of both (2*) and (3*), showing that we must reject one of them, whichever one that is, will show that the argument is unsound.

My explication of contemporary conceptions of propositions was necessary because often acceptance of (2*) without an explanation of the connection between conceptual capacities and content is a result of failing to recognize and/or heed the distinction between vehicles and contents. Asserting that a mental state has propositional content is asserting that the content involves (in the simplest case) a predicate applied to a subject. As Frege and Russell made very clear, contents are not psychological entities. For Fregeans they are abstract objects and for Russellians they are complexes at the level of reference. What follows from the claim that someone has a proposition in mind is just that that someone is appropriately related to (depending on your view) an abstract object at the level of sense or a possible complex of things at the level of reference. Fregeanism and Russelleanism about contents are each, without further qualification, silent about the psychological facts in virtue of which one stands in the appropriate relationship to a proposition. Therefore, neither view implies that propositional content requires conceptual and/or linguistic capacities and neither view implies that one need
not have conceptual and/or linguistic capacities to have mental states with propositional content. To support either of those positions, we some sort of argument.

Nonetheless, a Fregean notion of propositions has misled some. On that conception, propositions are composed of concepts. It might strike one as trivial that one would need to have the concepts of which the proposition is composed to have the proposition in mind.

However, one will think the claim is trivial only if one is confused about the difference between semantic contents and the vehicles of those contents.

This same confusion has led some to claim that the appropriate solution to situations such as these (ones where we have independent reason to think that the content of a mental state is a proposition, but the subject of the state does not possess conceptual capacities) is to get rid of the Fregean notion of propositions in favor of a Russellian conception. If propositions are not composed of concepts, they think, there is no need to have concepts to have that sort of proposition in mind. Just as much as the Fregean conception of propositions does not force the position that propositional content require conceptual capacities, so too adopting a Russellian conception does not help us avoid it.

Suitably adjusted, some contemporary conceptions of concepts do support (2*). Some claim that concepts are abilities. In its most general formulation, to have a concept A is to be able to have mental states with A as a partial constituent of a proposition that one has in mind. If I can think that what is in front of me is an elm, then I possess the concept elm. Again, it

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72 Blackman, “Intentionality and Compound Accounts of the Emotions.”
74 This sort of conception of conceptual capacities appears to be assumed by the major players in the nonconceptual content literature. As a result, Speaks, “Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?” and Crowther, “Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism.” are wrong to say that there is no entailment relationship between contents and states.
does not matter whether the *property* elm (as on the Russellian view) or the *concept* elm (as on the Fregean view) is a constituent of the proposition. In each case, there must be the ability and so in each case there must be the conceptual capacity.

There are many different views of the exact nature of these abilities. For instance, on the least demanding account, one could think that concepts are merely discriminative capacities. If I have the concept cat, I can sort cats from non-cats. According to one popular view, concepts are mental representations on which thinkers may perform computations. If I have the concept cat, I can call to mind a representation of a cat that is physically realized in the brain and plays a role in explaining cognitive operations like inferring that the cat must be around because his food dish, which was full, is now empty. Others think that concepts are linguistic capacities. On this more demanding view, to have a concept is to have mastered the use of a word. That is, if one has the concept cat, then one must have mastered the use of ‘cat’ in English or ‘die Katze’ in German, or etc.

In so far as according to all these positions, concepts are both the constituents of propositions and properties of subjects and/or contexts in which those subjects are located. For this reason, these positions involve either a confusion or a conflation of contents and vehicles. To avoid conflating vehicles and contents, we should either understand these views as providing accounts of the conditions for the possession of conceptual capacities and not accounts of concepts themselves, or understand such views as providing an account of concepts themselves that involves the rejection of concepts as contents. If we choose the first.

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75 Cf. Fodor, *Psychosemantics*.
76 Kenny, “Concepts, Brains, and Behaviour.”
option, then we have a relatively principled support of (2*). Conceptual capacities are implied by propositional contents because conceptual capacities just are abilities to have propositional contents in mind.

If, on the other hand, we choose to reject the view that concepts are semantic constituents and hold instead that they are abilities of agents, then the support for (2*) is more complicated. If, for instance, we deny that contents are Fregean, so long as contents are still propositional, there must be something about the subject and/or the context that constitutes her counting as a vehicle of that proposition. If we take concepts to be the psychological facts in virtue of which she counts as a vehicle of the proposition, then we have support for the claim that propositional contents require concepts. And in so far as possessing a concept is the same as possessing conceptual capacities, then we have our support for (2*).

Now that we are clear about the sorts of positions that support (2*), we can move on to (3*). (3*) is the claim that conceptual capacities require linguistic capacities. Now the relevance of the specification of what counts as a conceptual capacity becomes apparent. If one thinks that conceptual capacities are displayed by mere discriminative behavior, then the claim that one needs linguistic capacities to have conceptual capacities, (3*), should strike one as implausible and the argument against the propositional content of emotions should look unsound. A female lion may be able to sort potential mates without the linguistic capacities to describe or understand what she is doing.

If on the other hand, one thinks that conceptual capacities are instantiated by some more robust capacity such as the ability to use words, then (3*) should strike one as obvious. If one takes conceptual capacities to entail linguistic abilities, then (3*) is trivially true. In the case
of the female lion, no concept is being deployed. However, for those who think that (3*) is obvious, we should ask, what motivates their conception of conceptual capacities? That is, what was it that motivated their acceptance of (2*)? They cannot just reply that conceptual capacities require language because appealing to (3*) to support (2*) and then appealing to (2*) in order to support (3*) is going in a pretty small circle.

Overall, the situation we find ourselves in can be stated clearly and succinctly. If one holds a somewhat minimalist view of conceptual capacities, then one should accept (2*) and (in lieu of some further argument) reject (3*). If one holds a robust account of conceptual capacities according to which they are tied to linguistic capacities, then one will accept (3*). However, then one needs to give a compelling argument for (2*). So, we need to ask ourselves, what sorts of arguments have been offered in favor of tying robustly construed conceptual capacities to propositional contents? As far as I can tell, there are none.77

8. In summary, I have shown both that some of the common worries about propositional attitude views of emotions are not convincing and that there are some reasons for preferring such views. If the contents of emotions are propositions, we can give an account of the rational relations between emotions and other mental states and actions. We can, moreover, avoid the two main obstacles for the propositional view. First, while it is the case that some emotions are not propositional attitudes, these emotions are composed of simpler emotional states, or other

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77 Speaks, “Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content?”; Crowther, “Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism.”
intentional states, that do have propositional content. Being afraid of snakes may not be a propositional attitude, but it is about snakes because of the disposition to have experiences of fear that involve attributing a property like scariness or dangerousness to snakes. Second, while some have supposed that the propositional attitude view entails that infants, the cognitively impaired and some non-human animals cannot have emotions, we saw that this problem is largely a result of a confusion or a conflation of facts about contents with facts about the vehicles of contents. That mistake leads one to suppose that facts about mental contents directly entail facts about the vehicles of those contents. Once the groundlessness of this assumption was exposed, no argument for a direct connection between propositional contents and linguistic capacities was available. Consequently, we are free (in lieu of some further argument) to think that the emotions of infants, the cognitively impaired and some non-human animals have propositional content.
Chapter 3

Feelings and Emotions

1. Surveys of folk intuitions about emotions repeatedly reveal that, for the folk, the felt aspect of emotions, i.e. what it is like to experience them, is the most central aspect of the phenomenon.\(^{78}\) Any approach to the emotions must have the tools to account for these aspects. For this reason, in this chapter I will explain how a proponent of the propositional attitude approach can account for the feelings associated with emotions.

A central feature of my approach will involve, again, respecting the distinction between semantic theories of meaning and foundational theories of meaning.\(^{79}\) Semantic theories of meaning provide an analysis of the actual contents of sentences, utterances, mental states, etc. An example of this in the case of emotions is Lazarus’s core relational theme analysis of the contents of emotions.\(^{80}\) Lazarus gives an analysis of fifteen emotions. To take one example, he says that anger involves an appraisal that there has been “a demeaning offense against me and mine.”\(^{81}\) Prinz’s embodied appraisal account of emotions adds to Lazarus’s semantic theory a sketch of a foundational theory, a theory that explains what determines the contents of a sentence, utterance, mental state, etc. Referring to the causal theories of mental content

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\(^{78}\) Ortony, Clore, and Foss, “The Referential Structure of the Affective Lexicon.” Panksepp, “Emotions as Natural Kinds within the Mammalian Brain.” Shweder, Thinking through Cultures.

\(^{79}\) Lewis, “General Semantics”; Almog et al., Themes from Kaplan; Speaks, “Theories of Meaning.”

\(^{80}\) Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation, Ch. 3.

\(^{81}\) Lazarus, 122.
developed by Ruth G. Millikan, Jerry Fodor and Fred Dretske, Prinz argues that we can account for the contents of emotions as long as the perceptions of the changes in the body, which are the constituents of emotions on his view, are both reliably caused by certain states of affairs and are designed by evolution to do so. According to Prinz’s view, anger picks out an offense against me and mine because it is reliably caused by offense against me and mine and was designed by evolution to do so.

I take the distinction between propositional attitudes and the vehicles of those attitudes to which I continually refer to be a corollary of the distinction between semantic theories of meaning and foundational theories of meaning. Talk about the vehicles of propositional attitudes is talk about what determines which attitude is correctly attributed to an individual. Talk at the level of attitudes and contents is just talk about which attitudes, with what contents, are the ones that are properly attributable to an individual. I will argue that the feelings associated with emotions are aspect of the vehicle of those emotions. Only confusion comes from trying to explain how they can be part of the content or the attitude.

I will begin addressing how the propositional attitude theorist can make room for the feelings, or as I will refer to them, the phenomenological properties involved in emotions, with an overview of why this problem has been thought to be especially pressing for propositional attitude views of emotions. Then I will introduce some theoretical machinery from more general discussions of phenomenology in the philosophy of mind. I will introduce pure

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82 Millikan, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.*
83 Fodor, *Psychosemantics.*
84 Dretske, *Knowledge & the Flow of Information.*
86 Prinz, *Gut Reactions.*
intentionalist, impure intentionalist and qualia views of phenomenological properties. I will introduce just these three positions because, while a full survey of the literature on phenomenological properties is outside of the scope of the present chapter, such a survey would reveal that these are the only live options for dealing with phenomenological properties. Next, I will cover the different sorts of phenomenological properties associated with emotions. Emotions not only involve changes in the body like raised blood pressure, they involve things like perceptions of saliences, motivational states and states of pleasure, all of which can involve phenomenological properties. Finally, I will determine whether, in each case, a type of phenomenological property is best handled in the way a pure intentionalist, an impure intentionalist, or a qualia theorist would suggest. In each case, I will rule out both intentionalist options, leaving only the qualia view available. I will also explain why the existence of these qualia are vehicle-level facts and are not literally part of the attitudes or contents that make up emotions. In short, in this chapter I will argue that the feelings that a propositional attitude view of emotions must account for are qualia at the level of the vehicles of emotional states.

2. The apparent problem confronting the propositional attitude theorist with respect to the phenomenological properties of emotions is the common supposition that propositional attitudes are intrinsically non-phenomenological states. I currently believe that I have two nieces, but the belief need not feel like anything according to this common supposition. There might be phenomenological properties that are concomitants of this belief. After all, I am quite fond of my nieces and thinking of them may cause me to have emotions. Or, if I begin to reflect
on the belief, I may begin to have images of the two girls, images of where they live, etc., which may all involve phenomenological properties. Again, though, these phenomenological states are not part of the belief itself. Instead, they are a result of my reflecting on the belief—or so the story goes for those who think beliefs are non-phenomenological.

Proponents of these non-phenomenological views of attitudes like beliefs and desires generally argue by counter-example. Michael Smith provides an interesting example.

Suppose each day on his way to work John buys a newspaper at a certain newspaper stand. However, he has to go out of his way to do so...Behind the counter of the stand where John buys his newspaper, there are mirrors so placed that anyone who buys a newspaper there cannot help but look at himself. Let’s suppose, however, that if it were suggested to John that the reason he buys his newspaper at that stand is that he wants to look at his own reflection, he would vehemently deny it. And it wouldn’t seem to John as if he were concealing anything in doing so. However, finally, let’s suppose that if the mirrors were removed from the stand, his preference for that stand would disappear.\(^{87}\)

Smith’s point in introducing this example is that if we suppose that John has a desire to see himself in the mirror and we suppose that phenomenological properties of mental states

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necessarily make themselves apparent to their subjects, then we must conclude that John’s desire is without phenomenological properties. After all, if John’s desire to see himself in the mirror felt like something, he would be aware of it. Consequently, any phenomenological properties that occur alongside a desire are inessential.

Jesse Prinz, introducing cognitivist theories of emotions, gives us a particularly strong statement of the view that propositional attitudes are fundamentally independent of whatever phenomenological properties that might be associated with them.

[A]ccording to all cognitive theories, the cognitive components bound to our emotions are not identical to bodily changes or internal states that register bodily changes. Some cognitive theorists maintain that emotions can occur without any somatic component...Other cognitive theorists admit that somatic components are necessary parts of emotions, while insisting that nonsomatic cognitive states are necessary as well...According to all cognitive theories, the somatic concomitants of emotions must be distinguished from the concomitant propositional attitudes or appraisals. The cognitive components bound to our emotions are something above and beyond the bodily changes or inner states

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88 This premise is questionable, and I certainly don’t endorse it. An individual might have a toothache and be distracted from the aching by her realization that she has just won the lottery. After her excitement fades her attention might be drawn back to her toothache. It might even seem to her that the ache had never really went away, that it was there the whole time, but she had just not been paying attention. Such a case would be a counter example to the claim that phenomenological elements necessarily make themselves apparent to their subjects. However, since I am currently trying to explain why a well-known and influential proponent of the view that all phenomenological elements that might be associated with propositional attitudes are, strictly speaking, separable from the attitudes themselves, I am provisionally granting his assumptions that support his view.
that register bodily changes. In a word, cognitive theorists are united in holding that the cognitive components bound to our emotions are disembodied. Call this the *disembodiment hypothesis*.⁸⁹

There is a lot going on in that paragraph that needs unpacking. First, Prinz’s aim is not to state his own views on the matter, but to state those that must be held by proponents of cognitivist theories of emotions. Since propositional attitude theories are a type of cognitivist theory (a particularly virulent strain according to Prinz) he intends the disembodied hypothesis and the problems it invites to attach to propositional attitude views. Second, while Prinz does not mention feelings or phenomenological properties explicitly, by “internal states that register bodily changes” he means the phenomenological properties that reveal apparent changes in the body. Third, and what makes this section relevant to our present concerns, is that since propositional attitude theorists deny that emotions are identical to phenomenological properties, they must think that phenomenological properties are either merely contingent accompaniments of the propositional attitudes, in the way that a headache might be an accompaniment of stress, or they are necessary, but separate, concomitants in the way that in order to have a sunburn, the burn must have been caused by the sun, but the sun is not a part of the burn. Lastly, Prinz’s assertion that the propositional attitude theorists are committed to the “disembodiment hypothesis” is a particularly clear statement of the assumption, made by

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propositional attitude theorists themselves according to Prinz, that propositional attitudes are non-phenomenological states.

The possible problem that such considerations make for the propositional attitude theorist of emotions is that any plausible view of the emotions must hold that phenomenological properties are much more intimately related to emotions than, as the foregoing examples suggest, phenomenological properties are related to, e.g., beliefs, desires, mere cognitions, etc. If that is right, either emotions are not propositional attitudes, or they are, and the propositional attitude theorist must explain what it is about these particular propositional attitudes that makes them so different from other propositional attitudes.

3. One way of addressing the problem is to hold that the phenomenal properties of emotions are separable from the cognitive properties and only the cognitive properties are accounted for by propositional attitude analysis. In other words, on this sort view there are cognitive components of emotions that are propositional attitudes and in addition to these cognitive components there are phenomenal components that are separable from them. Perhaps because of our practices of attributing emotions or evolutionary hard-wiring, the feelings are reliably associated with the cognitive components. But, strictly speaking, each part is separable component.

This sort of view has a venerable tradition. In philosophy, Aristotle defines emotions in ways that are certainly interpretable as an endorsement of this component approach. “Fear may be defined,” he says, “as a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or
painful evil in the future.”90 We imagine some future evil and it causes a painful feeling in us. There are two separate phenomena. The first phenomenon is the imagination, which we might give propositional attitude treatment. The second phenomenon is pain, a phenomenological property. Spinoza says that “Pleasure...accompanied by the idea of an external cause, is love.”91 One component is the idea and the other is the pleasure. According to Hume, emotions, which he calls passions, are sensations of pain or pleasure cause by an evaluative perception. He says that “the passions...are founded on pain and pleasure, and that in order to produce an affection of any kind, tis’ only requisite to present some good or evil.”92 One component is the perception of good or evil and the other is the pleasure or the pain.

In psychology, both proponents of the James/Lange view and early appraisal theorists thought of emotions in ways that separate the cognitive from the phenomenological. According to James, emotions are felt physiological responses to “perceptions of the exciting fact.”93 Here the perception is the cognitive component and the felt response is the phenomenological one. Or as Magda Arnold, the original appraisal theorist, would put it, emotions are felt tendencies toward anything appraised as good and felt tendencies away from anything appraised as bad.94 Here the cognitive components are appraisals and the phenomenological components are the feelings of approach or avoid tendencies.

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Peter Goldie has, quite influentially, criticized this type of view, calling it an “add-on” conception of emotion. Goldie (modulating Frank Jackson’s familiar example of Mary the color scientist) explains that the phenomenological aspects of emotions are not separable elements, but are inseparably “infused” in cognitive aspects.

Irene is an icy-cool ice-scientist. Being an ice-scientist, she knows all the properties of ice. In particular, she has complete knowledge of the dangers that can arise from walking on ice...Yet she is icy-cool, and has never felt fear...Nevertheless, in spite of this lack, she not only has a theoretical concept of dangerousness; she also has a theoretical concept of fear, as being a sort of state, that roughly, plays a causal role: people are typically afraid when they perceive dangerous things, and they respond to fear by behaving in certain typical ways. Then, one day, Irene goes out onto the ice, falls, and for the first time feels fear—fear towards the dangerous ice...When Irene now thinks of ice as dangerous, she can do so in a new way—in a fearful way: she can now think of it with fear.

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97 Goldie, “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.”
98 Goldie...
Goldie’s idea, and many join him is this,99 is that at least sometimes the way that individuals conceive of the objects of emotions is fundamentally different from the way that they conceive of them when it is done in a non-emotional manner. While in some cases emotions are triggered by non-emotional thoughts or perceptions, in other cases, like Irene's, the cognition itself is different. This difference—crucially—is not accounted for by merely adding phenomenological elements onto an independently specifiable, non-emotional cognitive state. The cognition itself is different—and different because it feels differently. These cognitions that are "infused" with phenomenological properties, Goldie calls "feelings toward."100

There is a better way to address the issue of the phenomenological aspects of emotions for the propositional attitude theorist than either the add-on view or Goldie's “feelings toward.” Let's begin developing this alternative by noting that the propositional attitudes used in the examples like Smith's that are meant to show that propositional attitudes do not necessarily involve phenomenological elements all involve dispositional states. But, that suggests that it may be the fact that they are dispositional states and not necessarily that they are propositional attitudes that explains why phenomenological properties are unnecessary. After all, there are occurrent, non-dispositional desires, imaginings, etc. about which it is harder to say that the associated phenomenological elements are merely incidental. A central feature of my fear of a spider that may be somewhere on my person after walking through its web is the way that it feels, the creepy feeling. Other mental states that have received propositional

100 Goldie, “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality.” 244-245.
attitude treatment are similar. Episodes of thinking generally involve imaginations, perceptions, felt inclinations toward other thoughts. Episodic desires notoriously involve phenomenological elements, motivational inclinations, perceptions of salience, etc.

Noting that non-phenomenological propositional attitudes typically manifest as dispositional states shows us that the real action, phenomenologically speaking, is in the occurrent episodes. If it is the case that only, e.g. dispositional beliefs, desires, etc., and not occurrent episodes can appear without phenomenological properties, then there are also similar examples of emotions. An individual may harbor resentment towards someone, which manifests itself in behaviors and thoughts, but not in feelings. Because of this, the individual may not be aware of the emotion in much the same way that John was not aware of his narcissistic desire in Smith’s example. So, examples like Smith’s fail to support the view that propositional attitudes are intrinsically non-phenomenological. The reason is that there are clear cases of occurrent, non-dispositional propositional attitudes such as desires, wishes, and emotions about which the most plausible position is that the way that they feel is inextricably part of the mental event.

In summary, some have thought that propositional attitudes are at best contingently related to the phenomenological properties that might co-occur with them. If this is true, then the propositional attitude theorist of emotions looks to be in a tight spot if she is also going to agree with Goldie and others that the phenomenological properties of emotions are sometimes inseparably intertwined with the contents of emotions. I have argued that the propositional attitude theorist of emotions isn’t in a unique situation. Many mental states that have received propositional attitude treatment, like imaginings, perceptions, and desires are also intimately
inextricably intertwined with their phenomenological properties. Since this is the case, the propositional attitude theorist of emotions can draw on contemporary discussions of the phenomenological properties of these states, e.g. perception, that are both committed to the inextricability thesis and are consistent with the propositional attitude view. That is exactly what I will do in the next section.

4. Contemporary discussions of the connection between the phenomenology of mental states and their content are typically structured as debates between qualia theorists and intentionalists and my attempt to bring these discussion to bear on our thinking about emotions I will follow suit. As a first approximation, qualia theorists are those that believe in qualitative properties of experiences, qualia, that cannot be explained solely in terms of the content of the relevant mental states. Intentionalists (or representationalists as they are sometimes called) are those who aim to reduce qualia to contents. The terms of the debate between intentionalists and qualia theorists have evolved over time and the distance between many qualia theories and some forms of intentionalism has shrunk considerably, so some initial clarifications are in order.

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102 The nature of the reduction is part of what separates various intentionalists. “Strong” intentionalists believe that contents are identical to phenomenal properties. “Weak” intentionalists hold the view that contents determine phenomenal properties and vice versa. Chalmers argues convincingly that the strong view is of dubious coherence. See, Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience,” 153–281. In my own terminology, to think that contents are literally identical to phenomenal properties is to forget about the distinction between contents and vehicles.
First, nearly everyone agrees that there is something that it is like to have certain experiences and so in some sense believe in qualia. If the keyboard of my computer were to suddenly become very hot, my experience of typing would feel differently. Presumably, I could focus my attention on the difference (how could I not?) and the difference on which I would be focusing is a quality of that experience, a quale, the singular of qualia. Such platitudinous observations, and some not so platitudinous,\(^\text{103}\) have led most philosophers to believe that there are qualia.

There are, however, many different accounts or senses of the term qualia that have been used. The least contentious account holds that qualia are just the phenomenological properties of experience.\(^\text{104}\) These are the properties in which nearly every philosopher believes. It is easy to believe in these qualia because on this conception they may be reduced in some manner to, or identified with, some more preferred (perhaps more naturalistic) category. That is, what an experience is like, the qualia involved in it, might be reduced to what it represents, to the abilities of agents, to functional properties, etc. I will never use ‘qualia’ in this sense in what follows. Instead, I will use ‘phenomenal character’ as the general term for the phenomenological properties of an experience.

In what follows, I will (following Peacocke\(^\text{105}\), Block\(^\text{106}\) and others) use the term qualia in its most popular contemporary sense, i.e. to refer to the intrinsic,\(^\text{107}\) non-representational

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\(^{104}\) Tye, “Qualia.”

\(^{105}\) Peacocke, Sense and Content.


\(^{107}\) Other views deny that qualia are intrinsic features of experiences. They are, instead, relational properties. An experience can only count as having a phenomenal property in virtue of its, e.g., being the sort of thing that is caused in normal perceivers by red objects in normal circumstances. Cf. Byrne and Tye, “Qualia Ain’t in the Head,” 241–55.; Brewer, Perception and Its Objects. Because of space restriction and the *prima facie* implausibility of the
properties of experience that make up the phenomenal character of those experiences. By “intrinsic” theorists supportive of this definition of qualia mean that qualia are not relational properties. Weight, for instance, is a relational property. It depends both on the mass of the object in question and the gravitational pull of the Earth. Mass on the other hand is an intrinsic property of an object, had in virtue of its resistance to acceleration. What exactly is meant by “non-representational” is more complicated in part because it invites the reading that these properties play no role in representation, which I will argue below is not the case. In any event, clearly part of what is meant is that these properties cannot be reduced to representational properties, which makes this conception of qualia more controversial than mere phenomenal character.

While this conception of qualia builds more into the definition of qualia than the first notion I introduced, i.e. mere phenomenal character, it is also more conservative than other views of qualia. Other views add more controversial elements to the notion of qualia. According to some views, qualia are properties of sense data, and/or are ineffable, and/or are infallibly given to their subjects. It is common to think that Wittgenstein argued successfully against the privacy of such properties and/or to think that Sellars has successfully argued against the infallible givenness of such properties. As a result, I will stick with the more moderate notion of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of experience. Nothing I claim that my molecule for molecule counterpart’s experience feels differently than my own, I will not consider such views.

Tye, “Qualia.”

Wittgenstein and Anscombe, Philosophical Investigations.

Sellars, Rorty, and Brandom, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, 1997.
will say rules out one of these more controversial notions, but the important point is that the qualia theorist is not committed to them.

This relatively standard definition of qualia, that they are intrinsic, non-representational properties of experience, makes clear why the debates about qualia are naturally characterized as ones between the qualia theorists and the intentionalists. To be an intentionalist about a category X is to think that all members of X (and all their aspects) are representational. So, for example, intentionalists about the mind all subscribe to a representationalist view of it. What is especially characteristic of the mind for them is that it represents things and, most importantly, in contrast to the qualia theorist, what is characteristic of having a mind is not that there is something that it is like to have one. Thus, unless she is willing to relax her view of what is characteristic of mental states, the intentionalist must give a representationalist account of all mental states and all mental aspects of them, including things like the experience of fear or the experience of seeing a cup on a table. In short, when the intentionalist gives an account of what it is like to, e.g., fear something or see it, she cannot appeal to intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of that state without, to some degree, giving up on intentionalism. As I will explain in what follows, some intentionalists do soften their view. These “impure intentionalists”¹¹¹ think that to explain phenomenological properties we must refer not just to the contents of a state, but also to the mode or manner by means of which

¹¹¹ There is no standardized terminology for these two intentionalist positions. Particularly, confusing is that some call impure intentionalism “weak” intentionalism, which according to the terminology I am borrowing from two prominent impure intentionalists David Chalmers and Tim Crane, has to do with the relationship between representational contents and phenomenal properties and not whether the manners of representation must be included in the explanation of the phenomenal properties. For more on impure intentionalism, see: Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience”; Crane, “Intentionalism.”
these contents are carried. This important variation on the “pure intentionalist account,” the one according to which all changes in phenomenology correspond to changes in content and vice versa, will be explained in more detail shortly.

Before discussing pure and impure intentionalism in more detail, let’s be clear that giving an intentionalist account of the phenomenal properties of a mental state or mental state type does not entail that one must also give a propositional attitude account of that mental state or mental state type. Nonetheless, the intentionalist view is going to be attractive to the propositional attitude theorist (and propositional attitude theorists of perception and emotions have tended to be intentionals). After all, if the phenomenological elements of a state can be explained by the attitude and/or contents of the state, then the propositional attitude theorist needs to add nothing like qualia, which are often regarded with suspicion, to her view. The phenomenological elements are fully explained by the contents and/or the attitude alone. Take, for instance, the perception of a tree in front of one. According to the pure intentionalist, the phenomenological properties of the experience are accounted for by the contents of that state, for instance, that it is a Douglass Furr, that it is located right “there,” etc. Despite the natural fit between intentionalism and propositional attitude accounts, most intentionalists are not thoroughgoing propositional attitude theorists. Intentionalists typically hold that in addition to propositional contents there are non-propositional contents and often claim that these non-propositional contents occur in the mental state types they discuss.

112 For representative examples of pure intentionalism, see: Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness; Byrne, “Intentionalism Defended.”
113 With respect to perception, see McDowell, Mind and World. With respect to emotions, see Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought.
114 Some of the reasons they give for this are the sorts of things I argued against in Chapter 2.
As I said, we must complicate this discussion somewhat, but returning to the most significant complication, i.e. the distinction between pure and impure intentionalism. In summary, the pure intentionalist aims to account for all phenomenological elements solely in terms of the contents of mental states. If there is a difference between my seeing that a ball is round and my feeling that it is round, there must be a difference in the contents of the two states.

The most obvious difficulty for the pure intentionalist is explaining the differences between states that appear to have the same contents, but different phenomenological profiles. The difference between seeing that a ball is round and feeling that it is round is a good example. These states feel differently, but if the content of each state is just that the ball is round, then the pure intentionalist has no way to explain the phenomenological difference. This problem is especially relevant to the present discussion because a version of this problem occurs with judgmentalist views of emotion. Some claim that judgmentalists cannot explain the difference between a cold judgment that a bear is scary and an emotion of fear directed at the bear that has the same content. Each state is a judgement and each state has the same content, so it appears that the judgmentalist must appeal to some further aspect of emotions, like non-intentional feelings or sensations. Judgmentalists tend to want to avoid including such non-intentionalist components in emotions, which, though they do not normally use the terminology, makes their commitment to intentionalism clear.

For problems such as these, the impure intentionalist aims, instead, to account for all the phenomenological properties of mental states by relying not just on the contents of mental states, but also (at least for the propositional attitude version of the view) relying on the
attitude involved. The way that something looks is not just a result of the content of the perception, but is also a result of the fact that it is an act of perceiving. On this view, the difference between seeing that a ball is round and feeling that it is round may well just be that in one case one sees it and in the other one feels it. Exercises of different sense modalities don’t necessarily need to be accounted for solely in terms of contents. This doesn’t automatically help the judgmentalist since the problematic cases involve the same attitudes, i.e. judgments, but let’s table that for a moment.

Tim Crane (a leading proponent of impure intentionalism) provides a characteristic explanation both of why impure intentionalism might be preferred to pure intentionalism and of the roles that the specification of contents and “modes,” which he prefers to “attitudes,” play for the impure intentionalist. As he puts it:

Saying what the intentional object of a state of mind is does not yet tell us what the state of mind itself is, since the same intentional object can be the object of many different states of mind. In order to fully characterize different states of mind, we need to make two further distinctions. One is that the same object can be the object of a desire, a thought, a hope and so on. This is what I call a difference in intentional mode. The other distinction is that the same object could be presented to the mind in different ways even when the mode is the same: my bottle of inexpensive champagne could also be thought of as a bottle of inexpensive famous sparkling wine from France. This kind of difference in the
way the intentional object is presented is what I call a difference in intentional content.\textsuperscript{115}

Crane goes on to explain how the distinction between content and mode can provide an explanation of differences in phenomenology that is often more natural than that open to the pure intentionalist. He considers the difference between seeing that one’s leg has been damaged and feeling that it has been damaged, i.e. having pain in one’s leg.\textsuperscript{116} Pure intentionalists must do some fancy footwork to explain the phenomenological differences in terms of the contents of these two states. However, the impure intentionalist can appeal to the differences in mode between the two states. The impure intentionalist can say, with common-sense, that the difference between seeing that one’s leg is damaged and feeling that one’s leg is damaged is that in one case one sees it and in the other one feels it. It is obvious that these two sensory modalities differ phenomenologically. Similar considerations will apply to all the sensory modalities. I might, for example, hear the bear in the woods or see the bear in the woods. The phenomenological difference for the impure intentionalist is in part a result of the functions of these two sensory modalities.

Intentionalist views of both stripes have been subject to two common types of objections. The proponents of these objections are typically qualia theorists hoping to motivate their own view of phenomenological properties. The first involves examples of changes in

\textsuperscript{115} Crane, “Intentionalism,” 5.
\textsuperscript{116} Crane, “Intentionalism.” 12.
content of a mental state type that do not appear to affect phenomenology. If any sort of semantic externalism (the view that semantic content relies on facts that are external to the subject) is true with respect to that mental state type and we suppose, quite plausibly, that phenomenological properties are determined solely by the internal states of the perceiver, then there will be cases where the contents of a perception change while the phenomenology and mode stays the same.

To make this point, consider Hilary Putnam’s well-known argument that semantic contents “just ain’t in the head.”117 In a now famous thought experiment, Putnam has us imagine that somewhere in the universe there is a planet that is qualitatively identical in every respect to Earth, including qualitatively identical inhabitants, but that instead of H2O in this planet, which he calls Twin Earth, it has a substance that is superficially identical to water, but has chemical structure XYZ.118 The interesting semantic question Putnam asks is whether or not by “water” the twin earthlings refer to H2O or XYZ. By hypothesis, the internal states of the twin earthlings are molecule for molecule identical to the internal states of earthlings. If it is the case that earthling utterances of “water” are directed at H2O and reference is determined by internal states alone, then twin earthlings also refer to H2O. But, that certainly seems odd, and a little planet-centric, given that twin earthlings’ dealings are with XYZ and not H2O. Putnam argues that the better response is to accept that the semantics of “water,” and presumably the mental states involving the corresponding concept, are determined by factors external to agents of utterances and subjects of mental states.

118 Ibid, 700-704.
Putnam’s Twin Earth example is rather easily modified to provide us with an example that involves changes in the mental contents of a single subject while holding phenomenal properties fixed. Proponent of a qualia view of perception (among other things), Ned Block does just that.

Often, when I see water I see it as water; that is, my visual experience represents it as water...I was born on Twin Earth and emigrated to Earth at age 18. When I was 15 and looked at the sea on Twin Earth, my visual experience represented the twin-water as twin-water... When I first got here, I saw water as twin-water, just as you, if you went to Twin Earth [you] would see the liquid in the oceans as water. Now, many years later, my practices of applying concepts are relevantly the same as yours: my practices show that I am committed to the concepts of my adopted home, Earth. Now when I look at...the sea of my adopted home, my visual experience represents the water as water just as yours does...So the representational content of my experience of looking at the sea has changed. But my visual experience is nonetheless indistinguishable from what it was.\(^{119}\)

In contrast to the problem of change of representational content without change in phenomenological properties, the second type of problem for intentionalists involves cases in

\(^{119}\) Block, “Mental Paint and Mental Latex,” 23–24.
which it appears that phenomenal properties can change while representational content remains the same. The classic example is the inverted spectrum hypothesis. It appears logically possible for what it is like for me to perceive red objects to be the same as what it is like for you to perceive blue objects and *vice versa*. That is, the phenomenological properties of our perceptual states when we both look at the same red object differ. Nonetheless, if these two ways of perceiving (my “bluely” and your “redly” way) pick out the same types of objects consistently, the proper response to this situation according to the qualia theorist is to say that the contents of both of our perceptions of the red object is the same. The content of each state is that that is a red object. We just happen to perceive those objects in different ways, in ways that differ phenomenally because of the different qualia involved.

For reasons such as these, qualia theory has continued to be a live option for dealing with issues of phenomenology in the philosophy of mind, but much work has been done by intentionalists to respond to these sorts of problems. While it would be outside the scope of this chapter to discuss the success of such attempts, both pure and impure intentionalism continue to be live options for dealing with phenomenological issues in the philosophy of mind. For this reason, in what follows I will treat these three positions, pure intentionalism, impure intentionalism and qualia theory, as the three possible approaches to accounting for the phenomenological properties associated with emotions. I will argue that pure and impure intentionalism are not viable options in the case of emotions. As a result, we must adopt a qualia theory.

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120 For a more detailed discussion of this possibility see Shoemaker, “The Inverted Spectrum.”
5. Before applying the theoretical machinery just surveyed to the phenomenological properties associated with emotions, we must narrow in on exactly which phenomenological properties are to be explained. It is typical of philosophers to lump all the sorts of phenomenological properties of emotions into a single category. As we saw earlier, Aristotle, Spinoza and Hume all thought that the phenomenological element of an emotion was either pain or pleasure. The thought or perception that causes the pain or pleasure may be without feeling, but the pain or pleasure accounts for the phenomenological element. Also, as we saw earlier, proponents of the James/Lange view typically focus on just the bodily feelings associated with emotions. And cognitive appraisal views, such as Magda Arnold’s, lump the phenomenological into a single category of affective-cum-behavioral effects of cognitive appraisals.

Goldie, in the process of criticizing these views (specifically their account of the separability of phenomenological properties from representational contents) also brings to our attention two different types of phenomenological properties associated with emotions. The first are the bodily feelings discussed so much by the James/Lange tradition. The second are the cognitive feelings, which Goldie calls “feelings towards.” Similarly, Michael Stocker argues that we must separate the bodily affects associated with emotions from the “psychic” affects. Defending his decision, he draws on a phenomenological observation of Descartes’. He says that his reason for placing “affectivity in the psyche and not, or not just, in the body is

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122 James, “What Is an Emotion?”
123 Arnold, Emotion and Personality.
124 Goldie, “Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality,” 235. The first line of the abstract states that he will argue that emotions “involve two kinds of feelings: bodily feeling and feeling toward.”
125 Stocker and Hegeman, Valuing Emotions, 18–19.
put nicely by Descartes. Talking of emotions or passions, Descartes writes, ‘we feel as though they were in the soul itself.’

We need to follow Stocker and Goldie’s lead, but take it further. Emotions involve many different types of phenomenological properties and because we may well need to account for these different types of phenomenological properties in different ways, we must first lay out the types to be explained. I will argue that there are four different types of phenomenological properties associated with emotions. As should be apparent, there are many philosophical, and more narrowly psychological, issues that any such list raises, but these will be dealt with after the list is on the table.

I will call the first type of phenomenological property associated with emotions somatic. These are the perceptions of bodily sensations, like the feeling of flushing in the face or increased breathing. I take these to be the least controversial phenomenological aspects of emotions.

I will call the second type of phenomenological property associated with emotions cognitive. These are the phenomenological properties that are most intimately connected with representation of the external world, rather than somatic phenomena. When someone fears an object, it looks different from how it would look if one did not fear it. There has recently been a lot of work done under the heading of “cognitive phenomenology.” I will not commit the propositional attitude approach to either side of the main issue debated under that

126 Stocker and Hegeman, 19.
127 The terminology for my four-part division of these properties is barrowed from Kriegel, The Varieties of Consciousness, Ch. 4. Other theorists are coming around to dividing up phenomenological properties is roughly this fashion. For example, see Solomon, True to Our Feelings, Ch. 20.
128 For an overview of the debate, see the articles in Bayne and Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology.
heading. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology in the context of that debate hold that there is a special, “proprietary” feeling associated with thoughts of various sorts that cannot be reduced to less controversial phenomenological episodes like percepts, images, silent speech, directing of attention, etc. 129 To take one example, according to the defender of a proprietary feeling intrinsic to understanding, if an individual comes to understand a word, she experiences something that cannot be reduced to things like mental associations or images of the things to which the word refers. All my examples of cognitive phenomenological properties will involve less controversial properties of the non-proprietary type, but I won’t rule out that there may be some proprietary phenomenological properties too. 130

I will call the third type of phenomenological property associated with emotions conative. These are the perceptions of motivational inclinations. Common-sense supports the association of emotions with motivations and many have claimed that emotions are, in some sense, just motivational states. 131 As a result, it is uncontroversial to claim that emotions are associated with motivational states. Moreover, motivational states often come with phenomenological properties. It feels like something, for example, to be inclined to jump for joy.

Lastly, algedonic phenomenological properties are a type of phenomenological property that is often associated with emotions. Theorists often hold that every emotion is either a positive emotion or a negative one. Sometimes theorists make this claim by saying that

129 Bayne and Montague, 12–13.
130 I do not, however, think that there are proprietary phenomenological properties for each emotion type, e.g. the feeling of being afraid. There is feeling afraid, but it is reducible to the four types of phenomenological properties I go on to explicate.
emotions are valenced.\textsuperscript{132} As I will explain below, the notion of valence is vague, but (as an initial pass) one way of spelling out what is meant by valence is saying that every emotion feels good or feels bad for the subject. The positive emotions, like joy, are the ones that feel good and the negative emotions, like sadness, are the ones that feel bad. Algedonic phenomenological properties are just these properties of feeling good and feeling bad.

The first major issue confronting this list of four types of phenomenological properties is whether it is too long. Perhaps certain members on the list can be reduced to others.\textsuperscript{133} I am less concerned about this issue than others. My goal is to do the most extensive treatment of the phenomenological properties associated with emotions that is possible in this context. If it turns out that the list is too long, then parts of my treatment will have been unnecessary and can be pushed aside. However, if the list I begin with is too short, then my treatment will turn out to have been thoughtlessly incomplete. Nonetheless, I will provide motivation for thinking that the four-part list is on the right track and that all members of the list stand in need of thorough discussion.

Let’s begin motivating a commitment to the full list by discussing the least controversial type of phenomenological property associated with emotions, their somatic phenomenological properties. Everyone agrees that typically emotions either manifest themselves in or are accompanied by felt bodily sensations. Anger, for example, is associated with the sensations of muscular tension, raised heart rate and blood pressure. Even the most committed cognitivist

\textsuperscript{132} Barrett, “Hedonic Tone, Perceived Arousal, and Item Desirability,” 47–68.

\textsuperscript{133} All phenomenological properties are probably somatic properties if we understand the somatic to include the brain, eye, inner ear, etc. All feelings are feelings of the workings of some physical system in the body, broadly construed. Nonetheless, there are good reasons to divide these feelings into the groups I have defined. Mostly importantly, these groups play different roles in supporting our attributions of attitudes and their contents.
will not deny that somatic phenomenological properties are associated with emotions in some sense, though she might think that they are strictly speaking disposable concomitants of emotions. That position, though, will still have to explain the nature and disposability of these phenomenological properties.

Common-sense also supports the view that over and above somatic phenomenological properties there are often cognitive phenomenological properties. Even the most committed feeling theorist recognizes that emotions are often accompanied by cognitive phenomena. While William James is often referenced when talking about the somatic phenomena involved with emotions, his recognition of more “cerebral emotions” is often forgotten. He says,

\[ T \]he moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings. Concors of sounds, of colours, of lines, logical consistencies, teleological fitnesses, affect us with a pleasure that \textit{seems ingrained in the very form of the representation itself, and to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from the parts below the brain}.\(^{136}\)

For James, in addition to this more “cerebral” aspect there must be some somatic component if we are to call the state a true emotion. Nevertheless, he rightly recognizes the relevant phenomenon, namely, cognitive phenomenology.

\(^{134}\) Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought}, 56–64.

\(^{135}\) James, “What Is an Emotion?,” 139.

Moreover, what is characteristic of cognitive phenomenological properties (in addition to their seeming to be separate from the somatic) is that these phenomenological properties play an especially central role in representing the external world rather than states of the body. Peter Goldie’s example of Irene the ice scientist motivates this idea. The way the cognition itself feels, apart from whatever somatic, conative, or algedonic feelings go along with it, plays a part in the new way that she thinks of ice.

In addition to somatic and cognitive phenomenology, emotions typically manifest themselves in or are accompanied by motivational states. Because these states often show up phenomenologically to their subjects, we must recognize conative phenomenological properties. Nico Frijda explains what I have in mind when he describes the “action tendencies” that are so central to his own view of emotions.137 He says:

Such inner states are conceived as those states of action readiness that prepare and guide actions for achieving a particular relation with the object that the emotion is about (relations such a proximity, being remote from, or opposing). Action tendencies, both as felt and as transpiring from behavior, are among the main features for assigning major emotion category labels to one’s own emotions and those of other people or animals.138

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137 Frijda, *The Emotions*; Frijda, “Action Tendencies.”
Someone might argue that these motivational states and their phenomenological properties are just a subset of somatic phenomenological properties and/or cognitive phenomenological properties. If I become angry, my muscles might tense in a way that poises me for attack. The motivational phenomenology is just the feeling of these muscles being primed to act in a certain way. Moreover, they might say, other aspects of motivational phenomenology can be explained by reference to cognitive phenomenological properties. Some aspects of an enraged person’s environment may stand out to her as potential weapons, which is something that might not occur if she were calm.

Even if all the motivational phenomenology associated with emotions can in some sense be reduced to the cognitive and the somatic, the category of the motivational still plays a unique role. On the face of it, these motivational elements are more closely connected to the intentionality of emotions than the more typical somatic phenomenological properties like the feeling of flushing in the face. An offensive object may be a distal cause of the raised blood pressure that may go along with such an episode, but this connection is much more indirect than the phenomenological properties characteristic of conative feelings. Sticking with the anger case, it is not just muscular tension that happens, such as might occur in the back of the neck. The anger inclines one toward the object of the anger, playing a role in picking it out as the intentional object.

Emotions typically feel pleasurable or painful in virtue of their algedonic properties. Following the views of Aristotle, Spinoza and Hume briefly discussed earlier, I take this to be

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As I argue later, even these indirect relationships may play a role in determining the attitude and contents of an emotional state, but their role is much less clear and direct than in the case of both cognitive and conative phenomenological properties.
obvious. Of course, there are subtle emotions, like interest, that may not feel pleasurable or
painful and there are emotions that have mixed algedonic properties. Righteous indignation
may feel both empowering and disturbing. But such cases don’t count against the claim that
sometimes emotions have algedonic properties. And as the common supposition that
emotions tend to be positive or negative suggests, algedonic properties are a central feature of
the phenomenon.

Again, there is the worry that such properties are just somatic, cognitive, or
motivational phenomenological properties—or some combination thereof. We can safely push
aside the equation of algedonic phenomenological properties with somatic phenomenological
properties. First, the phenomenological properties that are uncontroversially somatic often
appear without algedonic properties. Raised blood pressure, flushing of the face, etc. do not
always feel good or bad; they often just feel neutral. Moreover, there are cases of algedonic
phenomenological properties without somatic phenomenological properties. For example,
clinical research revealed a patient with brain lesions who responded to cutaneous laser
stimulation (which would normally cause an individual great pain) with no somatic
phenomenological properties worthy of being called pain.\textsuperscript{140} The patient could not describe the
nature, intensity or location of the pain in the arm that was being stimulated. Nevertheless, the
patient greatly disliked the stimulation. The best description he could come up with was that it
was very unpleasant.

There may, nonetheless, be some special combination of somatic phenomenological
properties that do entail algedonic phenomenological properties, but I think we should be

\textsuperscript{140} Grahek, \textit{Feeling Pain and Being in Pain}, 108–11.
surprised if that turned out to be the case. As far as somatic phenomenological properties that probably entail algedonic phenomenological properties go, pain is the one that is most likely to do so. Pain—we are extremely tempted to think—is a somatic phenomenological property that is necessarily bad. We are not nearly so tempted to say that in the case of somatic phenomenological properties associated with emotions, unless, of course, they involve pain. Even still, the separability of pain from suffering, the separability of the somatic phenomenological property from the negative algedonic phenomenological property, has been well documented. The most extreme disassociation of pain from suffering happens in patients with a rare condition called pain asymbolia, but dissociation is nearly as radical in patients who are partly lobotomized to treat chronic pain, and occurs to a lesser degree in patients who take morphine for pain. These patients show a normal ability to identify painful experiences, but show little or no signs of mental anguish when in pain. Rather remarkably, patients with pain asymbolia tend to chuckle when painful experiences are provoked in a clinical context, implying that not only is pain not necessarily connected with negative algedonic properties, pain can present with positive algedonic properties.

The reduction of algedonic phenomenological properties to conative phenomenological properties also does not look promising. First, we tend to think that algedonic properties lead to motivation and not that they are constituted by the perception of the motivational states themselves. Intuitively, the discomfort involved in being anxious about a job interview drives me to prepare; the discomfort is not identical to the feeling of being inclined to prepare.

141 Grahek, 108–11.
142 Grahek, 108–11.
143 Grahek, 166.
Secondly, the separability of conative phenomenological properties and algedonic phenomenological properties is, as in the case of somatic phenomenological properties, clear. If algedonic phenomenological properties are conative phenomenological properties, then the natural assumption is that the strongest algedonic properties should lead to the strongest motivation. However, this is not the case. For example, the ingestion of a sufficient amount of opiates leads to states with strong, positive algedonic properties, but results in severely diminished motivation. There are also more mundane examples like contentment. Contentment feels nice and by definition involves a lack of unmet desires and so, by implication, there are no motivations or inclinations of which one might become aware.

Those who are attracted to cognitivist views of emotions are often tempted to account for algedonic phenomenological properties of emotions in terms of cognitive states, such as judgments. And in so far as they allow that these judgements are partly comprised of feelings, they will equate algedonic phenomenological properties with cognitive phenomenological properties.

Martha Nussbaum, for example, says that we can account for the phenomenological properties of an emotion by noting the evaluation that makes up the content of the emotion. The evaluations, she points out, involve things that are important to us and so there is no surprise that they involve feelings, both pleasant and otherwise.\(^\text{144}\) We cannot, however, account for the algedonic phenomenological properties in this manner and so algedonic properties are not reducible to cognitive phenomenological properties. We know that this is the case because emotions that involve positive evaluations often feel bad and those that

\(^{144}\) Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought*, 78.
involve negative evaluations can feel good. Anger, which involves a negative evaluation, can be pleasurable. Fear involves the perception of some sort of danger and so involves a negative evaluation, but, as any horror movie aficionado knows, this does not make fear necessarily unpleasant.

Nussbaum would reply that at some level there must be a positive judgment responsible for the pleasant cognitive phenomenological properties in such cases. I think a *prima facie* more plausible explanation of why these negative emotions like anger and horror can be pleasurable is just that they both can be invigorating, and invigoration can feel good. Boredom and disappointment are like fear and anger in that they involve negative judgments, but boredom and disappointment also involve low levels of arousal. In contrast, the higher arousal levels common to horror and anger give those emotions a way of feeling pleasurable. This possibility is confirmed by many studies. That is not to say that higher arousal always feels good. Generalized anxiety disorder is a disorder partly because it is unpleasant. Nor is it the case that low arousal must always feel bad. In a recent article Emery Schubert reports that by a conservative estimate...25% of people report enjoyment of sadness and other negative emotions in response to music. And it must be emphasized that these participants claim to “feel” sad, not just observe it in the music.

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146 Schubert, “Enjoying Sad Music.”
At least one explanation of this phenomenon is that sadness can be comforting. This comports well with evolutionary explanations of sadness that hold that its effectiveness for survival is a result of, in part, its ability to foster resignation in hopeless situations.

In addition to questioning how many members belong on the list of types of phenomenological properties, some will want to know whether when a relevant instance of each type occurs, it is a constituent of the emotion or is just associated with it because of its common co-occurrence. I will return to this question in Chapter 4 after I have provided an account of the various types of phenomenological properties.

6. Now that we have the four types of phenomenological properties in view and the three different accounts of phenomenological properties (i.e. pure intentionalism, impure intentionalism, qualia theory) available, we can go through the four types to see which of the three accounts is appropriate for each. Each type will be treated independently. While it may be the case that one of the three accounts works for all four, it may turn out that we could, e.g., be pure intentionalists about cognitive phenomenological properties and qualia theorists about algedonic properties, etc.

Let’s begin with somatic phenomenological properties. The purely cognitivist approach typically explains somatic phenomenological properties by reference to the content of emotions alone. That is, the most thoroughgoing cognitivist will take the pure intentionalist

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148 Wolpert, Malignant Sadness, 110.
approach to somatic phenomenological properties. This is perhaps what Martha Nussbaum has in mind when she explains the “heat and urgency” of emotions by appealing to the fact that they “concern our most important goals and projects, the most urgent transactions we have with the world.”¹⁴⁹

As is typically the case with treatments of the phenomenological properties of emotions, Nussbaum does not slow down to separate the different types of phenomenological properties that may need to be accounted for. Since we are pulling apart the various sorts of phenomenological properties, it is important to note that the “heat and urgency” of which Nussbaum speaks is largely motivational and cognitive. She thinks that we recognize states of affairs that are relevant to our cares and feel compelled to attend to them. Despite her own focus on the cognitive and conative, let us consider her strategy as an attempt to account for the somatic phenomenological properties alone. Does, for instance, the content of one’s anger function as an explanation of the fact that one feels muscular tension, flushing of the face, etc.?

The first common complaint with proposals like Nussbaum’s¹⁵⁰ is that some states with contents that involve one’s most important goals and projects do not give rise to the “heat” of which Nussbaum speaks.¹⁵¹ I might know full well that publishing in a certain philosophy journal is great for my career, publish in that journal and, perhaps because of depression, feel none of the emotions like joy or pride that fit my success. Of course, if some philosopher experienced this success without any of the appropriate emotions, and there were no

¹⁴⁹ Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 78.
¹⁵¹ See Stocker and Hegeman, Valuing Emotions, 38–51.
nonstandard contributing factors like depression, we might reasonably wonder about the true nature of her goals, but it hardly seems impossible that she should in fact have the relevant goals without in every case experiencing the appropriate emotions.

The second common worry is that (in addition to appropriate cognitive states that do not constitute or result in the relevant emotional state) some states that do involve the sensations characteristic of an emotion do not involve the relevant cognitive state. One might, for instance, experience the somatic phenomenological properties of anger without any sort of judgment or impression that some state of affairs or object is offensive. This is the most straight-forward explanation of the findings of Schachter and Singers’ famous study.\textsuperscript{152} In the study, participants were injected with epinephrine, which causes general stimulation of the sympathetic nerve system and results in things like increased respiration, heart rate and blood pressure. Participants were placed in a waiting room with a confederate researcher. The confederate was instructed to act either euphoric or angry. The relevance of the study for the current topic is that participants who were injected and placed in the room with the euphoric confederate felt more joy and those placed in the room with the angry confederate felt more anger. This supports the position that the sensations associated with anger, increased respiration, heart rate, and blood pressure, are not sufficient for the cognitive states necessary for anger.

Nonetheless, if Nussbaum and those like her merely wish to provide an explanation of the felt nature of emotions, but do not intend to commit themselves to pure intentionalism, it is hardly an objection that the offered explanans does not entail the explanadum. No plausible

account of explanation requires that every type of explanation must involve pointing out an entailment relationship from the explanans to the explanadum. According to my reading of her view, the type of explanation that Nussbaum is angling for is a type of rational explanation. She thinks that experiences with certain phenomenological properties (which comprise judgments on her account) are reasonable responses to states of affairs that affect one’s concerns, especially when those concerns involve one’s most important goals and projects. To the question, why did you get so upset when your mother died? One may reasonably respond that she was an important person in your life and that you cannot imagine going on without her. With respect to rational explanations, the explanans typically fail to entail the explanadum. If, for example, I were asked why I answered “157” to the question “what is 57 plus 100?” I would likely appeal to some set of mathematical facts. However, these mathematical facts and my awareness of them does not entail that I answer correctly. I may make a mistake.

Even if that much is correct, more problematic for views like Nussbaum’s than the occurrence of the explanans without the explanandum, are occurrences of the explanandum without the explanans. The occurrence of emotional phenomenology without the contents that explain them is a violation of pure intentionalism that commits one to the appearance of qualia and for Nussbaum that would be an instance of an emotion that is not a judgment. Often intentionalists armed with a naturalistic account of intentionality, e.g. Dretske and Tye, aim to naturalize the phenomenal character of all mental states by identifying them with representational properties. For them, any violation of entailment from phenomenal character to representational properties ruins the identification and a fortiori the naturalization. However, theorists who are concerned specifically with the emotions and are attracted to pure
intentionalism, e.g. Nussbaum, Solomon, and Greenspan, are not typically motivated by the wish to naturalize phenomenal character. Instead they are worried about the rationality of emotions. They are afraid of qualia theory, in so far as they are, because they think that qualia are mere sensations or “unthinking movements” that cannot enter into rational relations with other mental states or with external states of affairs that might serve to justify them, or, at least, render them in/appropriate.¹⁵³ For this reason, it is not particularly bothersome for these latter theorists if there are representational properties without qualia. But, there is certainly a problem if there are qualia, i.e. phenomenological properties that are supposed to comprise judgments or quasi-judgments, without representational properties.

Perhaps the emotions theorist sympathetic to Nussbaum’s explanation will reply that he is concerned to rationalize emotions, not every phenomenological property that is associated with emotions. It is no skin off his nose, he might say, if some somatic phenomenological properties fail to have content. After all, common-sense sides with those who regard the somatic phenomena associated with emotions as separable parts caused by the emotion. Flushing of the face is not embarrassment, but is caused by it. Consequently, it might be argued by those sympathetic to Nussbaum's explanation, that they can admit that at least some of the somatic phenomenological properties associated with emotions do not entail representational properties, but also insist that in so far as these properties are not content-bearing, they are not, strictly speaking, part of emotions and so do not bear on the rationality of emotions.

Many will balk at the idea of pushing these feelings aside, however, and we surely shouldn't casually do so. It may well commit one to an either an add-on view or a view that cannot explain the phenomenological differences between an emotion and a judgment. Though he doesn’t use the language I have been using, the best way to understand Robert Solomon’s treatment of these issues in his later work is to classify him as an impure intentionalist. Solomon says that in his early work he generally regarded the bodily feelings associated with emotions as a secondary concern, secondary, that is, to the fact that emotions are judgments. He aimed in his later work to remedy this situation by amending his view to one according to which the phenomenological properties unaccounted for by his earlier view are now proper parts of emotional experiences, part of the judgments that emotions are.

Solomon explains that we should think of emotions as akin to “‘kinesthetic’ judgements.” He gives us the example of walking down a set of stairs. When we do that, we are constantly making judgements about distance, appropriate posture, etc., but these judgments are not normally “deliberate and considered.” Instead, they happen partly because of kinesthetic feelings. In other words, Solomon’s idea is that somatic phenomenological properties can function as “modes of awareness,” distinct from “deliberate and considered” judgmental modes, which Prinz might call “disembodied.” Of course, one could step more slowing, consciously focusing on one’s posture and foot placement, forming beliefs that one should proceed thus and so. Consequently, the kinesthetic

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155 Solomon, *True to Our Feelings*.
156 Solomon.
157 Solomon.
158 Solomon, 239.
judgments can have the same sorts of contents as judgments of the “disembodied” sort, but the modes of these two types of judgments differ. Just as one might perceive kinesthetically that one should move thus and so, so too, one might judge, in a non-bodily way, that one should move thus and so. Just as one might judge that an object is dangerous without feeling bodily sensations characteristic of fear, so too, one might judge that the same object is dangerous by merely feeling fear.

By adopting this impure intentionalist view, Solomon appears to diffuse one sort of worry that plagues a pure intentionalist account. If he is right, content plus mode entails the phenomenological properties that the intentionalist hopes to explain. The other worry is still just as pressing, however. One might experience jitters that are phenomenologically identical to those present in fear, but fearless jitters, caused by medical intervention, perhaps, do not have the content that something is dangerous.

The qualia theorist appears to have the most natural account of somatic phenomenological properties. That emotions sometimes have somatic phenomenological properties is just a basic fact about them that stands in no need of explanation based on modes and/or contents. It is no surprise that it feels like something to have a body. Moreover, since the qualia theorist claims that there is no entailment relationship between representational properties and phenomenological ones, examples where there is slippage between the intentional and the phenomenological do not present a problem for her view.

Despite these two strengths, there are two problems (aside from the commitment to qualia, which some find untenable) with the qualia view. The first is the rationalist problem I discussed in connection with Nussbaum’s explanation of the "heat" of emotions. The way to
respond to this worry is to say that feelings, *qua* feelings, are nonrational, but they might be indirectly apt for rational evaluation in so far as they are components of, e.g., an instance of fear that is a propositional attitude. Consider the difference between the movement of one's arm and intentionally raising it. One is not responsible for the movement of one's arm *per se*, but as part of the intentional action of making it the case that one's arm goes up, one is responsible for it. Just as the movements of one's body become subject to rational assessment when they are part of an intentional action, so too the "movements" of one's senses if they are components of propositional attitudes. Anger at the fact that the patriarchy is preventing one from living a fulfilling life, where justified, justifies the phenomenological properties, the "heat", partly constitutive of the anger.

The second problem for the qualia theorist is the one that Goldie warned us about. That is, the phenomenological properties of an emotion cannot be disentangled from the contents. As Goldie puts it, "emotional feelings are inextricably intertwined with the world directed aspect of emotion." Consequently, "an adequate account of an emotion's intentionality...will at the same time capture an important aspect of its phenomenology." Representational contents and phenomenological properties are "inextricably linked."

There has been widespread confusion about the resources that the qualia theorist has with respect to accounting for this "inextricable link thesis." As I said earlier, it has become common to think of qualia as intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties. Calling them

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160 Goldie.
161 Goldie.
162 Lutz Lutz, “The Phenomenal Character of Emotional Experience.” In addition to (I believe) coining “inextricable link thesis,” Lutz argues that qualia theory cannot account for the thesis in a way that makes clear that she is confused about the representational properties of qualia in the way that I go on to explain.
nonrepresentational is misleading though. What has generally separated qualia theorists from intentionalists in debates about qualia are the possibility of inverted spectrum and Twin Earth type cases. These cases are offered by the qualia theorist in the hopes of showing that there are no entailments from phenomenological properties to contents or vice versa. If these counter-examples to intentionalism succeed, however, it does not show that phenomenological properties must play no role in determining contents. What it does show is that phenomenological properties do not solely determine contents in some cases (like the Twin Earth case) and that phenomenological properties are not solely determined by contents in some other cases (like the inverted spectrum case).

Consider Block’s Twin Earth case again. In that case, Block was born on Twin Earth where his perceptions of the stuff in Twin Earth’s lakes were perceptions of twin water. When Block migrated to Earth (after a little time for acclimation according to Block) his perceptions of the stuff in Earth’s lakes and streams became perceptions of water, not twin water. By hypothesis, water and twin water look the same and so there is no relevant phenomenological difference between Block’s perceptions on Earth of the stuff in Earth’s lakes and streams and his corresponding Twin Earth perceptions. Block’s point is that the content of his Twin Earth perceptions and some of his Earth perceptions differ in that the former represent twin water and the latter represent water. However (again by hypothesis) there is no change in phenomenology. Consequently, if we accept Block’s example we must accept that changes in contents do not necessarily entail changes in phenomenological properties. The point I want to add is that, whether or not we agree with Block, agreeing with him does not mean that we must think that phenomenology plays no role in determining representational content.
Presumably, when Block looks at twin water or water, part of what determines that it is water or twin water he is looking at, and not, say, a tree, is the phenomenal character of water and twin water experiences. And if we agree with Block that phenomenal character is a result of qualia, then we agree that qualia play a role in determining content, but it does not do it alone.\footnote{\textsuperscript{163}}

In short, while qualia theorists should reject the view that contents determine phenomenal properties, it is still open to them to claim that qualia play a role in determining the contents of mental states. Block (rather memorably) points out this fact when in the context of an article defending the idea that qualia can play a role determining the content of experience without themselves being contents, he says that they might in other cases play no role in representation at all, or as he puts it:

\begin{quote}
[A]ccording to me, the phenomenal character of the experience of an orgasm is partly non-representational... [I]f as I claim there are phenomenal properties of orgasm-experience that don’t represent anything (the ones that [one] most enjoys about orgasm experience), then those properties are non-representational. But there is also a weaker sense: the phenomenal character of color experience, for example, could be said to be non-representational \textit{in that}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{163} Similar observations apply to cases, like the inverted spectrum hypothesis, that purport to show there is no entailment from phenomenal properties to contents. However, so as to avoid belaboring the point, I leave it to the reader to apply these observations to these further cases.
the identity of that phenomenal character is not given by its representational content.\textsuperscript{164}

Since qualia theorists need not hold the position that phenomenological properties play no role in determining content, depending on how the inextricable link thesis is formulated, worries about the thesis for the qualia theorist are either overblown or unjustified. I say the worry is either overblown or unjustified because the inextricable link thesis can be understood in two different ways. On one account of the inextricable link thesis, the worry is overblown because the qualia theorist has the resources to address the connection between phenomenological properties and contents. According to a second understanding of the inextricable link thesis the worry is unjustified because the inextricable link thesis is false. Let’s look at these two understandings of the inextricable link thesis.

If the inextricable link thesis is formulated as the entailment thesis endorsed by intentionalists, then it is almost certainly false in the case of somatic phenomenological properties. We have already seen cases of somatic phenomenological properties that do not entail representational contents. The feeling of flushing in the face does not entail that one is embarrassed and so does not entail the contents common to instances of embarrassment.\textsuperscript{165}

\textsuperscript{164} Block, “Mental Paint and Mental Latex,” 28. My emphasis.
\textsuperscript{165} Of course, this doesn’t mean that an intentionalist cannot give an intentionalist account of the feeling of flushing of the face that appeals to non-emotional contents. Such an account might hold that that feeling represents increased blood flow to the face, for instance.
If, on the other hand, the inextricable link thesis is weakened to the claim that
treatment of either representational contents or phenomenological properties must involve
some talk of both, then there is no reason that to think that the qualia theorist is unable to give
such an account. In fact, there are readymade accounts, consistent with qualia theory, of how
somatic phenomenological properties can play a role in determining contents and how those
contents can require somatic phenomenological properties. Goldie, for instance, explains that
bodily feelings can provide you with information about your environment. He says that “a
feeling of the hairs going up on the back on one’s neck can give you prima facie reason to
believe that there is something dangerous about.” Prinz claims that somatic
phenomenological properties can play a role in determining the representational properties of
emotions themselves so long as: (1) there is a causal connection between the
phenomenological property and the thing it represents, and (2) it is the function of that
phenomenological property to represent the sort of thing it is causally connected to. If, for
instance, the feeling of increased blood pressure associated with fear is designed to pick out
dangerousness and is reliably connected to dangerous situations, then, on Prinz’s view, it
represents dangerousness.

7. Now that it has been shown that qualia theory is the correct approach to somatic
phenomenological properties, let us move on to cognitive phenomenological properties.

167 Prinz, Gut Reactions. 52-55.
Cognitive phenomenological properties are perhaps where the most interesting connections between phenomenological properties and contents occur in emotions and this gives us some reason to think that if the intentionalist strategy is to be preferred about any of the four types of phenomenological properties associated with emotions, it might be the cognitive ones. Especially important in this respect is the argument from transparency. The argument from transparency is mostly discussed in the literature on the phenomenology of perception. Proponents of the argument say that we see right through our perceptions.\textsuperscript{168} When I introspect my experience of my red coffee mug, I do not notice features of my experience. The things that I notice are just features of the world, like the redness of the cup. We do not see, as many have supposed, the intrinsic, nonrepresentational phenomenological properties of the perception. Perhaps things are the same with cognitive phenomenological properties associated with emotions. To focus on a feared object in the way that one does when one is afraid of it is not to notice intrinsic, nonrepresentational properties of one's experience, but just to notice the dangerousness of what one has picked out.

Ultimately the suggestion that transparency supports a pure intentionalist view of cognitive phenomenological properties fails for the same reasons that it fails in the case of non-emotional perception. Consider an example from David Chalmers:

To my mind, the most plausible potential cases of phenomenally distinct visual experiences with the same representational content involve differences in

attention. Shifts in attention clearly make a phenomenal difference to visual experiences. In typical cases, they also make a representational difference: for example, shifting attention to a word may lead one to represent the shapes of its letters with greater specificity. But there are cases that are less clear. For example, one might look at two red pinpoint lights against a black background, and shift attention from one to the other.\textsuperscript{169}

One of the most common cognitive phenomenological properties associated with emotional states are experiences of focusing on objects in the visual field. Often such focusing plays a role in determining the content of the emotional state; that one can’t help but focus on the snake is part of what makes it the case that one is afraid that one might be bitten by it. However, not every such change will result in a change of content. This is especially apparent in the differences between weak and strong emotions of the same type. If one is extremely afraid of a nearby snake, one’s focus makes the snake show up as especially vivid, but if one is merely worried about a nearby snake, one’s focus is less so. Nonetheless, these differences need not result in a difference of content. The content of both emotions might just be that one is afraid that one might be bitten. Consequently, the intentionalist will need to retreat to the impure intentionalist view.

\textsuperscript{169} Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience,” 161. See also Block, “Attention and Mental Paint1,” 23–63.
The most influential proponent of impure intentionalism about the cognitive phenomenological properties of emotions is Goldie. As we have already discovered in my discussion of Goldie's example of Irene the ice scientist, Goldie believes that a full account of the phenomenology of emotions must involve a discussion of cognitive phenomenological properties. Goldie goes on to say, however, that it is impossible to do so by just focusing on the contents of emotions. After explaining that a full account of the phenomenological aspects of emotions requires accounting for cognitive phenomenological properties, Goldie says that he will also, "try to show, the phenomenology is neither specifically an aspect of the attitude nor of the content: phenomenology infuses both attitude and content." 170

I must confess that I find Goldie's statement confusing. I'm not sure that I understand what it is for phenomenology to infuse an attitude and/or a content. However, we can make more sense out of Goldie's proposal that the contents and attitudes of emotions are infused with feeling, by characterizing it in terms of the debate between intentionalists and qualia theorists. The debate between intentionalists and qualia theorists is about whether the intentionality of a state determines the phenomenological properties of that state, and vice versa. We can take Goldie to be arguing for the position that the intentionality of emotions does determine how they feel and vice versa. Moreover, since, according to Goldie, phenomenological properties infuse both the attitude and the content, his view is a form of impure intentionalism. To account for the phenomenological properties associated with emotions, we must look both to the contents and to the attitudes involved and not just to the contents alone.

Even if this much is right about Goldie's position, it is also clear that Goldie's impure intentionalist view of emotions is somewhat more sophisticated than the standard version of that view we have dealt with up to now. The standard, impure intentionalist response to questions about the differences between thinking that a snake is dangerous and being afraid of the snake is to say that they both may involve the same content, but one is a case of feeling and one is a case of thinking. Goldie wants to say more than this. For Goldie, emotions are a type of attitude with representational contents, where the content itself in part accounts for the phenomenological properties of the state. Moreover, according to Goldie, the interesting philosophical action is mostly in the contents that “feelings toward” can carry. Somewhat surprisingly, he has very little to say about the attitude involved in “feelings toward”. Focusing on the content, he says that when one moves from a judgement that p, to feeling that p, there is a change of attitude, but more importantly (stepping away from standard impure intentionalism) he holds that there are also phenomenological changes as a result of changes in contents.

To explain the differences in content he has in mind, Goldie borrows the ideas of phenomenological and perceptual concepts from broader work in the philosophy of mind. These concepts will act as partial contents of emotional experiences and play the role of separating emotional “feelings toward” from non-emotional states with similar contents. Perceptual concepts are the concepts we use to pick out non-phenomenological features of ourselves and our environment. Phenomenological concepts are concepts of a type of sensory

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171 He draws explicitly on Papineau, *Thinking about Consciousness*. 

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or perceptual experience.\footnote{Stoljar, “Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts,” 469–94.} They allow us to pick out types of experiences, like seeings of redness, or more carefully, examples of having an experience as of redness. Consequently, for those who embrace phenomenological concepts, those concepts are how we become aware of the phenomenological properties of our experiences. Phenomenological concepts, Goldie emphasizes, also involve knowledge of what it is like to undergo an experience. Persons who have not experienced fear may be able to think about dangerous things and they may be able to think of them as dangerous, but the way that they do it is merely theoretically. An individual might think that a rabid dog is dangerous because she knows the capabilities of the dog and the effect that rabies can have on a dog’s disposition. The way that the fearful think of the dangerous dog is different on Goldie’s account, though. They can think of the dog and its dangerousness in a more direct way, by merely fearing it. Such states have, in addition to the content that the dog is dangerous, the phenomenological concept fear as an additional piece of the content. Moreover, this new phenomenological concept supports a new perceptual concept that is also part of the content of the state and that allows the agents to directly perceive the dangerousness. When discussing Irene the ice scientist, he says,

Irene, on coming to experience fear for the first time, gains a new phenomenal concept of fear, for she now knows what it is like to feel fear as well as what the causal role of fear is in persons. And Irene also gains a new perceptual concept
of danger; that is to say, she can now tell dangerous things by the way they look (or sound or smell).\footnote{Goldie, “Getting Feelings into Emotional Experience in the Right Way,” 234-235.}

When and individual such as Irene fears something she identifies what she is feeling as fear via a phenomenological concept. And she becomes, on Goldie’s account, able to see the object as dangerous via applying a perceptual concept. So, on his account, Irene the ice scientist acquires both types of concepts when she comes to fear ice. She can now become aware of her own fear based on its phenomenological properties and she can pick out dangerous things by the way that they look.

Phenomenal and perceptual concepts are now regularly evoked by philosophers trying to address cases like Irene’s,\footnote{Papineau, Thinking about Consciousness; Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness; Tye, “Qualia.”} so we must take Goldie’s suggestion seriously. However, the context in which those philosophers rely on phenomenological concepts is importantly different from Goldie’s. When physicalists, like Tye (in his earlier work) and Papineau, appeal to phenomenological concepts to explain features of Frank Jackson’s Mary case (which differs from Irene’s case in that, rather than never having experienced fear, Mary has never seen red) what they aim to explain is how Mary comes to know a fact about seeing red without relying on a nonphysical phenomenological property.\footnote{Tye, Consciousness Revisited, 42–44.} Some philosophers tried to avoid commitment to nonphysical phenomenological properties by denying that Mary comes to know anything. On their account, Mary comes to have an ability to pick out red things, but has no new
knowledge.\textsuperscript{176} Because, intuitively, Mary does learn something the first time she sees red, most theorists think that this approach is less plausible than the phenomenal concept strategy. According to the phenomenal concept strategy—and in line with common-sense—Mary does learn something new the first time she sees red. She acquires knowledge of what it is like to see red, which involves a concept she did not have before, the phenomenal concept of what it is like to see red. The strength of this approach is that we can preserve the appearance that Mary learns something new, but we can do so without committing ourselves to nonphysical properties because we need not think that her new phenomenal concept refers to a nonphysical phenomenological property of her experience.

A straightforward application of the phenomenological property strategy to Irene’s case allows the proponent of the phenomenal content strategy to explain how Irene comes to learn some new fact, what it is like to experience fear. That is, she now has knowledge that that is what it is like to experience fear. Note that that knowledge is a separate state from the fear itself, though. Consequently, the phenomenal concept is not part of the content of the fear, but is, at best, part of the content of the knowledge that is gained in virtue of the fear experience. Crucially, the phenomenal concept, instead of explaining the phenomenological properties associated with fear—which is what Goldie needs it to do—explains how Irene can have new knowledge. Thus, we cannot, as does Goldie, appeal to phenomenal concepts to account for the phenomenological properties associated with emotions. So, there is no reason to add them to the contents of emotional states.

Despite the popularity of Goldie's view, the standard, impure intentionalist answer looks simpler and more plausible. It is true that the phenomenological difference between believing that a state of affairs is dangerous and fearing it is not captured by the content. The content of both is that that state of affairs or thing is dangerous. According to the standard impure intentionalist, the difference is just the difference between believing and fearing. As Crane puts it,

We already know that sameness of content does not suffice for sameness of mental states in general; a belief and a hope might have the same content. So why should we expect that it suffices for sameness of phenomenal states, states which are distinguished by their phenomenal character? \(^\text{177}\)

There are two related problems for the standard, impure intentionalist account of the cognitive phenomenological properties that are associated with emotions, however. Attitudes do not divide finely enough to account for all the differences in phenomenological character. To see this, first consider how the impure intentionalist might characterize the attitude involved in the experience of an emotion. First, she might follow Patricia Greenspan and call the attitude involved “feeling”. \(^\text{178}\) If this is the tack taken, then she must rely more heavily on the

\(^{177}\) Crane, “Intentionalism.” 12.  
\(^{178}\) Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons. 3-9.
contents of emotions to account for the phenomenological features. After all, fear of walking over a bridge feels quite differently from pride at walking over one, though they are both feelings on this account. The natural thing to do here, pace Goldie, is to rely on standard aspects of the content. Fear involves dangerousness, but pride involves approval. The content combined with the attitude explains the differences between both emotions and nonemotional states and the differences between different types of emotions themselves. However, some cases reveal that this view does not sufficiently individuate the differences in cognitive phenomenological character. On the one hand, I might be afraid of a bridge I feel is dangerous or I might be excited by the bridge. These states both have the same content, but are different emotions and feel differently. Fear will likely involve more focus on bad outcomes and excitement will likely involve more focus on good ones.

The most plausible amendment to this view is to divide the attitudes more finely. Instead of thinking that all emotions involve the attitude of feeling, we can think that each emotion type is a unique attitude. Just as the attitude of wishing differs from the attitude of believing, though they are both cognitive states, so too fear differs from excitement in that it is an independent attitude type that belongs to a more general class of feeling states. On this account, the cognitive phenomenological differences between excitement and fear are explained by the characteristics of excitement and fear themselves. It is characteristic of excitement to look to positive outcomes and it is characteristic of fear to look to negative ones.

We still might wonder whether this account divides the cognitive phenomenological state finely enough, though. Different examples of excitement feel differently. For example, some excitements are more intense than others and at least sometimes the intensity is born
out in the cognitive phenomenology. If I am very excited about something, it will have a more thorough impact on my thoughts than a weaker excitement. In fact, this appears to happen during the very same emotion. I might be excited about a new love relationship, but become less excited as the relationship progresses and not necessarily because of worries I have about it, but just because the relationship is no longer new. The impure intentionalist does not have the resources to explain this phenomenon. The excitement in such cases has the same content and is the same attitude throughout its duration, but it comes to feel differently.

The second problem with the impure intentionalist position is that (as thus far stated) it fails to distinguish between attitudes and vehicles. Crane clearly confounds attitudes with vehicles when he equates his modes with what another impure intentionalist, David Chalmers, calls "manners." As we have seen, Crane prefers 'modes' to 'attitudes' when he talks about the types of things that beliefs, hopes and desires are. The reason he prefers 'modes' is that he does not think that all mental contents are propositions and talk of attitudes, he thinks, invites the reader to suppose he is talking about propositional attitudes. So, for Crane, my talk of attitudes is equivalent to Crane's talk of modes as long we don't take it to imply that all content is propositional content. However, both Crane and Chalmers assume that Crane's talk

\[\text{179 Martha Nussbaum's approach when addressing the same concern, Cicero's discussion of the "freshness" of emotions, is instructive. She does not say that the content of the judgment has changed when it becomes less fresh. Nor does she say that the judgment itself is different. The grief becomes a background (what I would call dispositional or sentimental) emotion and the cognitive connections to the emotion change. In her individual case, it no longer occurs to her to call her mother at the end of a busy day, for instance. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought, 80–86.}\]
\[\text{180 Chalmers, "The Representational Character of Experience," 4.}\]
\[\text{181 This is primarily because Crane believes in nonconceptual content and believes that propositional content must be conceptual.}\]
of modes is equivalent to Chalmers’ talk of manners, which is an equivalence that we should reject.

Consider how Chalmers introduces manners of representation:

There are many different manners of representation. For example, one can represent a content perceptually, and one can represent a content doxastically (in belief): these correspond to different manners of representation. At a more fine-grained level, one can represent a content visually or auditorily. Manners of representation may also involve functional characterizations of the representing state. For example, one can represent a certain content in such a way that the content either is or is not available for verbal report.¹⁸²

What Chalmers is discussing here are the different vehicles of content. Remember the discussion from the previous chapter. There are two different types of theories of content. A semantic theory tells us what the content of a state is. In contrast, a foundational theory tells us what it is about the vehicle of this content that allows it to carry the content it does. What Chalmers rightly points out is that we must acknowledge that there are different ways or "manners" of carrying contents. That is, a foundational theory of meaning must acknowledge

¹⁸² Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience.”
that contents are determined in different ways. Sometimes they are largely determined by one of the five senses. I may represent something by hearing it or seeing it, etc.

These manners (or vehicles in my terminology) should, however, be distinguished from taking up a stance with respect to a content. Believing, in the sense in which it is an attitude, is not merely representing in a certain (doxastic) manner in the way that exercising one of the five senses might be a manner, mode or vehicle of representation. Instead, believing is taking a certain stance on something, having an attitude about it. It may well be that representing something in a certain manner entails that one also takes a certain stance on that thing. Some have argued, for instance, that seeing is a type of believing and so entails it. But that position, if true, does not follow merely from the fact that seeing is a content-bearing mental event. Consequently, even when it is the case that there is an entailment from a manner of representation to an attitude, we should still recognize a distinction between the manner and the attitude which it constitutes.

In addition to these more abstract considerations, the distinction between vehicle and attitudes or contents provides us with the material to divide cognitive phenomenological properties just as finely as they need to be. Cognitive phenomenological properties are properties at the level of vehicle, which is a version of the qualia theory for cognitive phenomenological properties. According to this view, the cognitive phenomenological properties of emotions are just concrete features of those states that are in no need of explanation via abstractions like contents and/or attitudes. An instance of fear involves the

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direction of attention and having one’s attention directed can feel a certain way, i.e. it can have cognitive phenomenological properties. No further explanation is necessary.

Again, the main problem facing this view is the intertwinement thesis. As I said above, the only plausible version of this thesis requires that there be some account of why some phenomenological properties are so closely tied to contents. So, if the cognitive phenomenological properties of emotions are explained by qualia, the qualia theorist must give something of an account of the close relationship between qualia and contents. This problem is especially pressing in the case of cognitive phenomenological properties because, as Goldie has succeeded in pointing out, they are the properties most closely connected with the contents of emotions.

The central feature of a plausible response to Goldie’s intertwinement thesis for the qualia theorist highlights the fact that while qualia may not happen to entail contents, or *vice versa*, qualia can still play a role in determining those contents. If I fear crossing a high bridge, features of that fear might involve my attention being directed at the bridge, my imagining falling from it, etc. These features of my mental state function as partial determinants of the contents of that state. And in so far as these features involve phenomenological concomitants, then those features play a role in determining what my mental state is about too.

8. Now that I have shown that the qualia theory approach is appropriate for cognitive phenomenological properties, let us move on to conative phenomenological properties. Remember that these are the felt motivational inclinations associated with emotions. Conative
phenomenological properties, like cognitive phenomenological properties, play a central role in determining the contents of emotions. By inclining an agent toward features of her environment, the role that such inclinations play in determining contents is much like what we saw in the case of focus of attention, which is part of the typical cognitive phenomenology of emotions. Feeling a sort of nudge away from a feared object or a nudge toward the object of one’s amorous episode is certainly part of what makes the emotion about the object in question.

Should the propositional attitude theorist also take the qualia theory approach to these properties? I will argue that she should. One reason to think she should is that the argument from transparency in favor of pure intentionalism gets even less grip with respect to conative phenomenological properties. Since conative phenomenological properties, qua feelings of bodily inclinations, are closely connected to somatic phenomenological properties, these motivational inclinations are not transparent in the way some claim perceptual experiences are. When I introspect an emotional state that involves motivational inclinations, my mind is not necessarily just directed toward features of my environment. If I feel like jumping for joy my mind might be directed at the conative feeling and not just the object of my joy. Because of this, a pure intentionalist account of conative phenomenological properties is not well motivated.

Does an impure intentionalist account of these phenomenal properties make sense? Much of the same considerations apply here as did in the case of cognitive phenomenological properties. For instance, motivational inclinations that partially constitute an emotion may change in intensity over time. If it is the same emotion across this time, this change in intensity
cannot be accounted for in terms of its content or attitude. I might fear my neighbor’s pet snake, but over time the felt motivational inclinations for me to avoid the snake may lessen in severity. Nevertheless, the content of the fear is that the snake is dangerous and part of the reason that it is fear we are talking about, the fearing attitude, is that it involves motivation to withdraw from the snake. Again, phenomenological properties divide more finely than combinations of attitudes and contents.

If we accept the qualia view of conative phenomenological properties, we can again explain their connection to contents by noting the obvious connection between the objects of emotions and the targets of our motivations. As my reference to Frijda’s account of action tendencies made clear earlier, the felt inclinations that make up the conative phenomenological properties associated with emotions involve relationships to objects. Fear can often involve withdrawal from the feared object. Love can often involve approach tendencies. The fact that these inclinations and a fortiori the feelings of them, involve objects, should dispel any worries about cleaving the phenomenology from the content. These felt inclinations partly determine which objects are represented because they are dispositions to behave in relation to the objects relevant to the contents of the emotions. Consequently, any account of the content of the emotion must also acknowledge the motivational inclinations and the things those inclinations are responses to.

9. Last of the four types of properties we must discuss to have a full view of the phenomenology of emotions are the algedonic phenomenological properties. Just as I have
argued for a qualia theory approach to the other three types of phenomenological properties, so too I will argue for a qualia approach to algedonic phenomenological properties.

Remember that algedonic properties are the properties of feeling good or bad. These properties are especially central to many conceptions of emotion. As we saw earlier, philosophers have commonly defined emotions as cognitive events accompanied by pleasure or pain and this continues to have influence on contemporary thinkers. Patricia Greenspan, for instance, has a similar view. According to her, emotions are thoughts containing evaluative propositions accompanied by comfort or discomfort. It is important to account for these algedonic phenomenological properties and explain their relationship to the contents of emotions. Again, the way to proceed is to examine how the three available views, pure intentionalism, impure intentionalism, and qualia theory address these explanatory projects.

According to a pure intentionalist approach, negative algedonic phenomenological properties are explained by the valence of the representational contents. If an emotion feels bad, it is because of the negative evaluation it contains. Sadness according to Lazarus’s influential account of emotional contents, involves the recognition of an irrevocable loss, for instance. There are three central problems for the suggestion that the valence of evaluative contents can explain the valence of algedonic phenomenological properties: (1) some emotions with valenced contents have no algedonic properties. (2) The algedonic properties of some emotions are contrary to the valence of the evaluative content. (3) Algedonic properties are often mixed even if the valence of the evaluative content is not.

185 Greenspan, Emotions and Reasons, 4.
186 Lazarus, Emotion and Adaptation, Ch. 3.
First, the standard problem for the pure intentionalist approach is especially pressing in the case of algedonic phenomenological properties. That standard problem is that pure intentionalists have problems explaining the difference between states that are intuitively different, but appear to have the same contents, such as some judgements and some emotions. In the case of algedonic phenomenological properties, the problem is that not only are there judgements with contents X that do not come with algedonic phenomenological properties and emotions with contents X that do have algedonic phenomenological properties, there also may be emotions with contents X that come with no algedonic properties, making them that much harder to distinguish from non-emotional judgments for the pure intentionalist. I might wake up in the morning feeling anxious about the work that is to be done that day, but it’s not altogether clear whether the anxiety is or is not unpleasant. Thinking about the work merely makes me feel unsettled/energized, fostering my motivation to get the work done (or procrastinate).

In order to discuss cases of emotions where there is a mismatch between the valence of its contents and the valence of its algedonic phenomenological properties, we must be clear about the multiple senses of valence that are often used in the emotions literature.\textsuperscript{187} When I speak of the valence of algedonic phenomenological properties, I mean to speak about whether an emotion is pleasing or painful. When I need to be especially clear about this, I will refer to it as \textit{algedonic valence}.

There are at least two other ways of talking about the valence of emotions, though. One of these ways is hopefully already clear. Emotions typically involve some sort of evaluation

of an object or state of affairs separate from the emotion itself. Anger involves the evaluation of something as an offensive. Pride involves evaluating something appropriately related to oneself as good. Consequently, emotions are often valenced according to whether they involve a positive or negative evaluation. I will call this *evaluative valence*. The concept of algedonic valence is distinct from the concept of evaluative valence, but these two notions may be confused because they both come in good/bad or positive/negative varieties. Joy, typically, feels good. Sadness, typically, feels bad. However, the goodness or badness of the algedonic properties of an emotion involve the emotion itself and not a purported property of the intentional object of the emotion. That is not to say (yet) that the algedonic properties are not to be explained by the perceived properties of the intentional object, i.e. the content of the emotion. But, it is to say that the two notions are conceptually distinct.

A third notion of emotional valence is a result of the fact that emotions themselves are sometimes targets of evaluations made by the subject of the emotion. For short, I’ll call this *simpliciter valence*. Here the emotion itself is the state of affairs that is evaluated and not some state of affairs at which the emotion is directed. Often such evaluations will involve a judgment of appropriateness. One might judge one’s sadness at the death of a friend as inordinately severe and so the emotion is bad, or of negative *simpliciter* valence. Because emotions that feel good to the subject, i.e. emotions with positive algedonic valence, are often approved of and emotions that feel bad, i.e. with negative algedonic valence, are often disapproved of, *simpliciter* valence can also be conflated with algedonic valence. The two notions are distinct, though. Algedonic valence involves pleasure and pain and *simpliciter* valence involves a
judgment about the emotion (and both are distinct from evaluative valence because that has to
do with the content of an emotion).

Not only are these three notions conceptually distinct, there are changes in algedonic
valence that are not tracked by changes in either evaluative valence or simpliciter valence
making them distinct in actualization. This is important because pure intentionalism, which
needs to account for algedonic valence in terms of contents (whether they are the contents of
the emotion itself or a judgment about the emotion) fails if algedonic valence does not track
evaluative valence or simpliciter valence.

I deny that algedonic valence tracks evaluative or simpliciter valence for the following
reasons. First, the algedonic valence of some emotions is contrary to the valence of their
evaluative content. Anger, for instance, which involves a negative evaluation, can be
pleasurable. Retrieving my earlier examples, righteous indignation at my oppressor can feel
wonderful and the horror movie fan that is legitimately shaken by the experience of a film can
enjoy the experience. I have suggested that what both examples show is that stimulation can
feel good even if the root of the stimulation is a negative evaluation.

Second, alignment of algedonic properties with simpliciter valence is also not always the
case. If, for instance, an emotion that feels good to the agent is in some sense inappropriate,
then the subject may look negatively on her emotion. An individual may relish the sight of a
seriously injured member of an opposing hockey team, but she may think it immoral to feel this
way and so, though it feels good, she thinks it is a bad emotion she wishes she had not had.
Examples like these show that algedonic valence can vary independently of either evaluative
valence or simpliciter valence.
Lastly, algedonic properties are often mixed even though the evaluative content of a state is purely positive or negative. The adulterer may sincerely judge that what she is doing is wrong and this may make her feel guilty, which involves negative algedonic properties. However, the wrongness, which she acknowledges, may also make the experience perversely delicious and, so, of positive hedonic value. Of course, those similarly situated may be tempted to rationalize their behavior and, so, in some cases there is more than one evaluative judgment at work. Consequently, in some cases there may be an intentionalist explanation of the conflicting algedonic properties, but there is no reason to think that that must always be the case. Not only is it possible to feel guilt and pleasure at the same time, it is arguably a commonplace occurrence. “It’s fun because it’s wrong” is often uttered in a way that is both sincere and an attempt to convince oneself, to assuage one’s guilt.

If it is right that the pure intentionalist account cannot adequately account for algedonic phenomenological properties, it is not clear how the impure intentionalist strategy can fair better. The impure intentionalist strategy is mostly an attempt to address the standard problem with pure intentionalism. In the case of emotions, the problem is how to explain the phenomenological difference between emotions and non-emotional judgments that have the same contents. The answer the impure intentionalist gives is that emotions are different manners or modes than judgments and so it is no surprise that they feel differently. Without claiming that there is a different type of manner or mode for every difference in phenomenology, this strategy does not help with any of the three problems just canvased, though. Realizing this deficiency with the view while discussing it in the case of pain experience, Crane says:
Of course, there are many different ways in which something can hurt. So the term ‘hurt’ can pick out different intentional modes in different cases; in any particular case, the hurting will have a distinct intensity and phenomenal character. Hence the intensity of a pain should not be thought of so much as a property of pain, but rather as a determination of an intentional mode.\(^{188}\)

The case is the same for emotions. There will need to be a different mode for every change in “intensity and phenomenal character” that cannot be accounted for via content.\(^{189}\) That entails that the number of modes needed to do the job is immense. Every phenomenal difference that the qualia theorist will attribute to a quale or qualia, the impure intentionalist will account for by appeal to a unique mode. There are two problems with this approach. First, if the impure intentionalist wants to identify modes with attitudes (as I argued earlier they should not) there will turn out to be many more attitudes than we normally think, a new attitude for every change in phenomenal character not accounted for by representational contents. Given that emotional intensity falls along a spectrum, the number of such attitude would be, as I said, immense. Secondly, it is no longer clear that in this form the impure intentionalist position is substantially different from the qualia theorist’s position. Impure intentionalists appeal to numerous modes to explain changes in phenomenal character. Qualia theorists appeal to qualia to do the same work. Modes are modes or manners of


\(^{189}\) Crane, “Intentionalism.”
representation. But, if Block and I are correct, qualia are also parts of manners or modes since they too contribute to contents. So, the fact that manners or modes are vehicles of representation does not distinguish them from qualia.

The qualia view of algedonic properties takes the algedonic phenomenological properties of emotions to be brute facts about them that need no explanation in virtue of the representational properties of emotions. The main objection to the qualia view about algedonic phenomenological properties must again be the intertwinement thesis. It is true that algedonic phenomenological properties bear a special, though complicated, relationship to evaluative valence. But, typically emotions that involve negative evaluations also involve negative algedonic properties. Sadness typically feels unpleasant, for instance. For this reason, we may be able to treat the role of algedonic phenomenological properties in determining the contents of emotions in the same way that Prinz recommends we treat somatic phenomenological properties. If algedonic valence is reliably connected to evaluative valence or *simplicitor* valence and has been designed by evolution to do so, then algedonic valence can determine the valence of representational contents.

One concern about applying Prinz’s strategy to algedonic phenomenological properties is that, unlike somatic phenomenological properties, there are often normative relationships between the objects and/or contents of emotions and the algedonic properties of an emotion. Taking pleasure in someone's plain is, *ceteris paribus*, perverse, say. A version of the intertwinement worry appears here too, the qualia theorist cannot claim that the normative connection between contents and algedonic qualia is merely a matter of coincidence. Our practices of praise and blame are largely dependent on these sorts of connections.
Nevertheless, the connections between algedonic properties and emotional valence need not be as tight as the intentionalist requires for these practices to, as a matter of historical fact, get off the ground. So long as there is enough consistency across a population, norms can follow in the wake of these consistencies. In other words, part of the reason for these norms will have been the relatively reliable connection between algedonic phenomenological properties and our judgments of goodness and badness. In normal cases the fact that an emotion feels good will be a determining factor in our attitudes toward it. But none of this requires the identification of evaluative valence or simplicitor valence with algedonic valence.

10. What we have repeatedly seen throughout this survey of the four types of phenomenological properties associated with emotions is that these properties are qualia. It was important to discuss each individually because it might not have turned out that a different view of each was preferable, but the qualia view turns out to be the best view in each case.

   Goldie was right to highlight the special connection that phenomenological properties have to contents. Feelings are not merely add-ons. They are not merely things we have come to associate with separable cognitive states of organisms and now require their appearance when we correctly attribute an emotional state. Instead, feelings play a role in determining contents.

   The individual discussion of each of the four types of phenomenological properties also shed light on the roles that these qualia play in determining the contents of emotions. We saw

\footnote{Of course, this is not the place to attempt a full-scale explanation of how normativity gets off the ground.}
that somatic phenomenological properties might\textsuperscript{191} play a role in determining the evaluative property, e.g. dangerousness, attributed by an emotion. Cognitive phenomenological properties, like the felt direction of attention, were shown to play a special role in determining the object of the emotion. Fear of walking over the bridge is partly about the bridge because my attention is drawn to it. Conative phenomenological properties play a similar role in that they involve dispositions to act relative to an object or state of affairs. Finally, we saw that the connections between algedonic phenomenological properties and contents are complicated, but may well be accounted for in the same way that we can account for the contribution of somatic phenomenological properties.

Even though feelings are partial determinants of the contents of emotions, we should not, as Goldie has done, think that the feelings are literally part of the contents. To do so is to fall into the psychologism about which Frege warned us. Propositional attitudes are publically shareable states. My feelings are unique to me, or nearly so. If representational contents and \textit{a fortiori} the propositional attitudes of which they are an aspect are identified with their qualia, sharing attitudes becomes nearly impossible. Influenced by this warning, I along with others, have committed to distinguishing levels of discourse and the types of questions that arise at each level. Just as semantic theories of meaning are distinct from foundational theories of meaning, so too talk of propositional attitudes and their contents is distinct from talk of the vehicles that support our attributions of those attitudes and contents. Qualia, as determinants of contents instead of contents themselves, are at the level of vehicles. To suppose that

\textsuperscript{191} I say “might” here because it depends on the causal theory of reference to which Prinz and others appeal.
feelings are literally part of the attitude or content is to confuse discussion of vehicles with
discussion of attitudes and their contents and to court the disaster of which Frege warned us.
Chapter 4
The Components of Emotions: The Philosophical Approach

1. The purpose of this chapter is to answer the question, what are the components of
domotions? The simple question, is X a component of an emotion or not? is too vague to answer
before parsing exactly what is meant by the question, and, consequently, what could count as a
good answer. For this reason, I will begin by clarifying the question.

A bad view that might give the component question a clear sense is essentialism about
domotions. If there are essential features of emotions, then it makes sense to ask of any feature
commonly associated with an emotion, whether that feature is an essential component of an
demotion or just a contingent concomitant. Is raised blood pressure part of a fear episode or is it
just a feature of the subject of an emotion that commonly comes along with fear episodes? In
philosophy, essentialism about X usually manifests as a requirement for a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for X. Jerry Fodor memorably addressed the success of such analyses
when he said, “the number of concepts whose analyses have thus far been determined
continues to hover stubbornly around none.”¹⁹² I agree with Fodor that philosophers have
generally failed to make good on providing accounts of the necessary and sufficient conditions
for any interesting and controversial X. Since emotions are such an X, I assume we won’t
provide necessary and sufficient conditions for them either. Psychologists and neuroscientists

¹⁹² Fodor, Hume Variations, 6.
have also failed to converge on a theory, let alone one that involves an essentialist view of the emotions, so similar skepticism is warranted in those sectors.

Even if the proponent of a propositional attitude view of emotions rejects essentialism, she can still make sense of the component question. There are two senses the proponent of the propositional attitude approach can make of the component question, the first of which I will reject. In that first sense, emotions do have parts or components, namely, contents and attitudes. Because, e.g., qualia are not attitudes or contents, they are not components of emotions. The difficulty with understanding the component question in a way that makes this a good answer to it is that it either fails to match up with the intuitive understanding of the component question or in invites a confusion of attitudes and their contents with the vehicles of those attitudes and contents. These problems are related. Intuitively, the component question is after the parts that constitute emotional states. Attitudes and contents are not components in this intuitive sense. That is, they are not discrete elements of a subject that combine to make up an emotion. Rather than being discrete elements of a subject, attitudes and contents are different aspects of a subject’s unified mental state.

Let me explain: Propositional attitudes are attitudes with representational contents. Believing that it is Thursday is a propositional attitude. However, you cannot pry the content from the attitude and still have the attitude on the one hand and the content on the other. If a belief somehow lost its content, it would cease to be a belief at all. It would not continue to be a belief, a “gappy” sort of belief waiting to be filled with content. To think that attitudes and contents are literally separate features of an agent that get combined into a single state is to confuse propositional attitudes with the features of an agent that warrant those ascriptions, to
confuse attitudes and their contents with facts about the vehicles of those attitudes and contents. For instance, one of the features of an agent that contributes to a correct attribution of the belief that it is Thursday might be that the agent has mental images of a calendar she recently viewed. When we consider this feature along with other features, like a disposition to assent to “that it is Thursday,” we may be warranted in ascribing the relevant propositional attitude to her. Of course, it is possible that the features, i.e. these dispositions and mental images, might occur independently of one another, but that would not be a case of the content and the attitude appearing independently of one another. Rather, such cases would be ones in which we had less reason to attribute the belief that it is Thursday to the relevant subject. If enough of these features are absent, so is the belief.

On the second understanding of the component question available to the propositional attitude theorist, the components are the vehicle-level phenomena that warrant attitude and content ascriptions. Just as mental images and dispositions to assent to propositions might be considered components of the belief that it is Thursday, so too a quale might be considered a component of an emotion. As was argued in the previous chapter, qualia are features of vehicles: they are the sorts of things that can determine what attitude is appropriate to attribute to a person. As a result, we may hold that some qualia are components of emotions because these qualia are conceptually connected to emotions in that they contribute to the correct attribution of them. It would be misleading to say that they are merely contingent concomitants. The way that a feared object shows up to you when you are afraid is part of what makes an attribution of fear to you a good one. So, the way it shows up is part of the emotion.
This second understanding of the components of emotions is not without problems, though. Because the determinants of an appropriate attitude attribution are so varied, it can be misleading to call all facts at the level of vehicles components of emotions. For example, it is extremely likely that the determinants of appropriate emotional attitude attributions sometimes involve things that are outside of the subject of that attribution’s skin and it is very counter-intuitive to say that emotions are constituted in any ordinary sense by such things. Remember the content externalism discussed in the last chapter. Part of what makes your beliefs about the stuff in our lakes and streams beliefs about water is the fact that it is water in the lakes and streams and not something that merely appears to be water. Similarly, part of what makes an aquaphobic’s fear of water about water is the fact that it is water with which she has been in contact. Does this mean that on the understanding of the component question we are currently considering, the aquaphobic’s fear is partly composed of extracutaneous water? The intuitive answer is, no.

Even though this second understanding of the component question, one according to which answers will involve pointing out facts about the vehicles of emotions, leads to some counter-intuitive answers, this is the proper path for the propositional attitude theorist. We can do justice to common-sense by focusing on the vehicle-level facts that are internal to the

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193 Some of these counter-intuitive implications can be circumvented by noting that the specification of the internal states of the subject imply facts about the subject’s environment. If a subject fears water, then we know that it is water that she has and will interact with or avoid. Perhaps, all of the counter-intuitive implications could be handled in this manner, but I don’t want to take on the burden of proving that that is the case.  
194 Of course, someone might convincingly defend this counter-intuitive view. For example, see Krueger and Szanto, “Extended Emotions.” My view can easily accommodate the conclusion that emotions are literally made of things outside the skin of the subject of the emotion. In fact, my view that talk about components of emotions is talk about the vehicle-level phenomena that warrant attributions of emotional states is a natural fit for such a view. However, in the present context I do not want to saddle myself with the burden of defending such a counter-intuitive view.
individuals in question. So long as we keep in mind that this is not the whole story, that there are features external to individuals that also play a role, we will not be derailed by common-sense into an inappropriately internalist/individualist view of the vehicles of emotion. In other words, we can address the constitution question by focusing on some of the determinants of emotions, ones that are both internal to individuals and play a direct role in the correct attribution of emotions. Specifically, I will discuss the role somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions play in determining the type of emotion that it is appropriate to attribute to a subject. Emotional episodes are the result of such reactions along with contextual features the discussion of which I am tabling. Emotions that are not merely episodes, like emotional dispositions and sentiments, are the result of dispositions to have these somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions rather than simply having occurrent somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions.

To give you some idea of what I have in mind in saying that somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions make up emotions, let us look at typical features of an episode of fear. The experience of fear often involves somatic reactions like increased heart rate and blood pressure. Fear typically involves focusing one’s attention on the feared object or event. One will also typically consider plans of action. How will one avoid the feared object or cope with the feared event? These are cognitive reactions. If one is fearful, one might run away from the feared object, one might merely prepare the body for flight, or one might freeze in place. These are all conative reactions. Many of these reactions are also phenomenological, i.e. they feel like something. As one’s body prepares to flee, one feels that tension in the
muscles, the change in posture, etc. Thoughts of a feared event may cause a sinking feeling in one’s stomach.

There are three benefits to approaching emotions in this way. First, these reactions are internal to agents in the way that it is intuitive to say that emotions are and, so, questions involving these reactions remain closely related to the original, common-sense question about components. With the relevant qualifications about essentialism and externalism in mind, this will allow us to say that emotional episodes are composed of somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions. Emotional dispositions and sentiments are composed of these reactions and their corresponding dispositions. Second, as I will go on to show, thinking of emotions in this way is compatible with many different, more general, approaches to mental states by philosophers of mind. Consequently, it is not beholden to one of those views turning out correct and we need not get embroiled in the debates about which one is correct to support this approach to emotions. Third, this way of viewing emotions fits well with the most promising approaches to emotions in psychology and neuroscience, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

As a quick summary, there is a very natural, ordinary question about the components of emotions. Skeptical that there is an essentialist answer to this question, I proposed that the propositional attitude approach provides us with two ways of understanding the question. One way of understanding the question takes it to ask what emotions are. The answer to that question according to the propositional attitude approach is, trivially, that they are propositional attitudes. If we understand the question in that way, however, we can be led to think that emotions are made up of attitudes and contents and that is at best misleading. A
better way to understand the component question for the proponent of the propositional attitude approach is to think it is about the vehicle-level phenomena that warrant the relevant propositional attitude ascriptions, among which are somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions. The only problem with understanding the question this way is that the vehicle-level phenomena that warrant the relevant attributions are often facts that involve things outside of the skin of the individuals in question. Consequently, this approach can lead us to claim that things like external circumstances are literally part of the emotion. To address this problem, I suggested that when confronted with the component question, we restrict our answer to the vehicle-level phenomena that are internal to the agent. If we keep in mind that there are also contextual factors that go into determining which emotion is properly attributable to an agent, then we can avoid confusion.

3. Moving on to the second benefit of this account of the components of emotions, it is compatible with many different approaches to mental states in the philosophy of mind because it requires only what Mark Johnston in “Reasons and Reductionism” has,

labeled ‘Minimalism’—the view that metaphysical pictures of the justificatory undergirdings of our practices do not represent the crucial conditions of the justification of those practices...Practices that endure and spread are typically justifiable in nonmetaphysical terms. To this the Minimalist adds that we can do
better in holding out against various sorts of skepticism and unwarranted revision when we correctly represent ordinary practice as having given no crucial hostages to metaphysical fortune.\textsuperscript{195}

In “Reasons and Reductionism” Johnston is applying the minimalist view to our practices surrounding attributions of free will and personal identity. The worry for such practices is that beliefs in the “superlative further facts” that are often thought to justify those practices are false.\textsuperscript{196} There are no Cartesian egos or agents that are uncaused initiators of their actions, for instance. The situation is similar for the practices surrounding the attribution propositional attitudes. With respect to propositional attitude attribution, the central worry is not typically that such attributions rely on the existence of some “superlative further facts” that do not exist. Instead, the worry is that propositional attitudes will not correspond to any internal states revealed by empirical inquiry. In other words, much as those who are skeptical of free will and personal identity are motivated by the lack of the “superlative further facts” that are (in the skeptics’ minds) required for free will and personal identity, so too those skeptical of the legitimacy of propositional attitude attributions are often motivated by the failure of empirical inquiry to reveal the relevant internal states.

Minimalists about propositional attitudes, free will, personal identity, etc. think this sort of skepticism rests on a mistake. The mistake is tying the legitimacy of these practices to the

\textsuperscript{195} Johnston, “Reasons and Reductionism,” 590.
\textsuperscript{196} Johnston, “Reasons and Reductionism,” 591.
wrong issues, such as metaphysical assumptions about “superlative further facts.” In the case of propositional attitudes, skepticism about them is not typically a result of the failure of superlative further facts. With respect to propositional attitude, the problem is scientism. Scientism is the view that the only things that exist are revealed by scientific enquiry. The worry is that propositional attitude attributions will not correspond to scientifically respectable facts such as neurological facts. The minimalist retains a healthy respect for empirical inquiry. A healthy respect for science involves, firstly, the view that our ontological commitments should not contradict well-established scientific findings. Secondly, it involves a commitment to explain the relationship between facts not revealed by scientific enquiry those that are revealed by scientific enquiry. However, the minimalist sees no reason to require a straight-forward reduction of propositional attitudes to, e.g., neurological states.

Many theorists have explicitly taken on Johnston’s minimalism to insulate folk psychological attributions from falsification by scientific inquiry and, as I will explain below, many other theorists espouse views that are comparable to Johnston’s minimalism. These theorists can give us an idea of what the minimalist thinks are the right sorts of facts to support a practice like the attribution of propositional attitudes. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit provide one helpful example. In the process of defending folk psychology from eliminativists about beliefs and desires, Jackson and Pettit say:

There exist beliefs and desires if there exist creatures with states truly describable as states of believing that such-and-such or desiring that so-and-so. Our question, then can be divided into two questions. First, what is it for a state to be truly describable as a belief or as a desire; what that is, needs to be the case according to our folk concept of belief and desire for a state to be a belief or a desire? And, second, is what needs to be...in fact the case?¹⁹⁸

As Jackson and Petit point out, the crucial part is filling in what needs to be the case for something to count as a belief or a desire, where this does not hang their appearance in us on how the neuroscientific facts turn out.

In contrast, according to eliminativists such as Paul Churchland,

[W]e must evaluate FP [folk psychology] with regard to its coherence and continuity with fertile and well-established theories in adjacent and overlapping domains—with evolutionary theory, biology, and neuroscience, for example—because active coherence with the rest of what we presume to know is perhaps the final measure of any hypothesis.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” 73.
This appears to be a nice expression of what I am calling a healthy respect for science.

Whatever philosophers say about mental states had better cohere with what science tells us because, quite honestly, much of what science tells us is better off epistemically than much of what philosophers or the folk tell us. Elsewhere, though, Churchland expresses commitment to a much stronger requirement, which is presumably a result of what he takes continuity, and not just coherence, with science to mean in this context. He says,

[N]euroscience is unlikely to find “sentences in the head,” or anything else that answers to the structure of individual beliefs and desires. On the strength of this shared assumption, I am willing to infer that folk psychology is false.\(^{200}\)

In other words, whether our practice of attributing propositional attitudes is legitimate turns on whether it is continuous with what science tells us about our internal states, where that means that propositional attitudes must be structurally analogous to some neuroscientific fact such as independently specifiable areas of the brain such as the limbic system. This is what I am calling scientism. That is the view that all our ontological commitments had better be visible from, and justifiable via, scientific practice.

\(^{200}\) Churchland, 65.
Jackson and Pettit’s minimalist response to the question about the sufficiency conditions for legitimate folk psychological attributions is that “It is sufficient for having beliefs and desires that one be in states which satisfy the folk roles.” Whether this is a good response clearly depends on what is meant by folk roles. To explain what they mean by these folk roles, Jackson and Pettit quote approvingly (ironically enough) Churchland, who says,

...the average person is able to explain, and even predict, the behavior of other persons with a facility and success that is remarkable. Such explanations standardly make reference to the desires, beliefs, fears...to which agents are presumed subject.

...Each of us understand others, as well as we do, because we share a tacit command of an integrated body of lore concerning the law-like relations holding among external circumstances, internal states, and overt behavior.

The critical points here are a result of the fact that the folk are very good at understanding the behavior of others based on a “tacit command” of the sorts of situations and internal states that lead to behaviors. First, the mere fact that the practice is successful is a reason to support the continuation of it. The second critical point is that the command that the

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202 Jackson and Pettit, 33.
folk have of propositional attitude attributions is largely tacit, like the average English speaker’s grasp of the grammar of English. Because the command is tacit, members of the folk may not be able to articulate indefeasible or even very reliable accounts of the generalizations that hold between circumstances, internal states, and behaviors. Put in my favored terminology, they may not be able to produce descriptions at the level of vehicles that have the form if P1...Pn, then attribute emotion X, where P1...Pn is a set of descriptions sufficient for the presence of X. Nonetheless, even without the ability to make the criteria by which they attribute psychological states explicit, the folk can understand the behavior of others via attribution of these psychological states. The best explanation of that success is a type of working knowledge of what it is, e.g., to believe, to want, to fear, etc. Because of this working knowledge, the requirement that propositional attitudes also correspond to brain states that are structurally analogous to the propositional attitudes is not well motivated.

4. In addition to those who explicitly take on Johnston’s minimalism, there are many theorists who endorse views that can be classified as minimalist in Johnston’s sense. For convenience, we can divide these theorists into functionalists, interpretationists and dispositionalists—a typology, I might add, that covers most of the relevant positions in the philosophy of mind. Because the propositional attitude approach’s wide compatibility is theoretically favorable, I will cover these compatibilities.

Beginning with functionalism, to give a functionalist characterization of an attitude is to explicate the attitude via a specification of the role that the attitude plays in the mental
economy of which it is a part. Functionalism is the most popular contemporary view of mental states. Predictably, there are many versions of functionalism, but none of them hold that any scientifically specifiable internal state of an organism is necessary for counting as the mental state in question. How the state is realized is a secondary concern to that of the role the state plays in the organism’s mental economy. Because of this, functionalist views count as minimalist in Johnston’s sense. The legitimacy of a mental state attribution hinges on the role the mental state plays in the subjects mental and behavioral economy, and not whether the structure of the mental state in question is reflected in the structure of the body/brain states that instantiate it.

Another central feature of functionalism is the correction it makes to behaviorism. Behaviorists wanted to analyze mental states purely in terms of the behavioral responses of an organism. Minimalists and functionalists are more permissive about what sorts of responses can be involved in the characterization of a mental state. They allow other mental states to be part of the responses that determine which sort of mental state is instantiated. Fear, for example, not only results in certain avoidance behaviors according to the functionalist, but also gives rise to thoughts, beliefs, desires, etc.

Fear of an upcoming physician’s exam involves the perception of a situation as potentially dangerous. To fear an upcoming exam is to do things like entertain thoughts of the invasive procedures performed during the exam, to think about the diseases that might be revealed by it. One might notice, in a way that one normally would not, things having to do

\[\text{203 For a representative sample, see: Lewis, “How to Define Theoretical Terms”; Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics.}\]
with hospitals, like ambulances or blue signs with an H on them. One might also think of ways to avoid the exam or put it off and one might be motivated to put plans in action to make sure that it is avoided or put off. Thinking these anxious thoughts might result in muscular tension, headaches or a general feeling of unease. As the day of the procedure approaches there will likely be physiological responses characteristic of fear, like perspiration, increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, and pallor. These experiential inputs, cognitive, conative, and somatic tendencies might figure in a functional description of fear, but how the function is realized in the brain is a question that does not necessarily need an answer to describe the mental state.

Moving on to interpretationism, the two most prominent theorists are Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson. According to Dennett, “to be a true believer...is to be a system whose behavior is reliably and voluminously predictable via the intentional strategy.” The intentional strategy involves treating the system in question as one with beliefs and desires with respect to which the system tends to act rationally. While Dennett restricts his discussion to beliefs and desires, the view is extendable to other types of mental states. Wishes, intentions, emotions and all the rest of folk psychology might be included in the predictive framework. In line with Dennett, so long as attributing such states to individuals allows us to “reliably and voluminously” predict the behavior of the individual in question, then that is just what it is to count as having the mental state(s) in question. There is no requirement that there is some sort of correspondence between mental states and the goings on inside the individual with which the attribution is concerned.

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204 Dennett, The Intentional Stance, 15.
Just as Dennett explains propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires in terms of our practices of attributing those states, so too Davidson relies on folk psychological practices. Davidson’s discussion of the nature of these practices is somewhat different, however. Following in the footsteps of his mentor W. V. O. Quine, Davidson’s discussions of mental state attributions involve situations of “radical translation,” though Davidson prefers “interpretation” to “translation.” In such cases, an interpreter is confronted with an agent who speaks a completely unfamiliar language. According to Davidson, we ascribe states like beliefs and desires to agents to interpret their linguistic and nonlinguistic behavior. That is, based on observation of the agent’s behavior, which includes its linguistic behavior in response to its environment (which may include our own promptings and attempts at communication), the interpreter attributes the mental states that maximize the agent’s rationality. When interpreting an agent, one begins by assuming that most of what the agent believes is true. One then works to create an interpretation that maximizes consistency among the agent’s mental states, actions, and the interpreter’s own beliefs. According to Davidson, being an agent with propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires is just being the sort of thing whose behaviors are interpretable via propositional attitude attribution. Just as is the case with Dennett, the correct attribution of a mental state does not require a correspondence between that mental state and an independently specifiable internal state of the individual to which we attribute the state.

Taking dispositionalism next, one cannot discuss that view without discussing Gilbert Ryle. One might even say that, for the minimalist, the beginning of wisdom in the philosophy of

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205 Davidson, “Radical Interpretation”; Davidson, *Inquiries Into Truth and Interpretation*. 

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mind is Ryle’s *The Concept of Mind*. In *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle argues that to attribute intentional states to anything other than a whole person is a “category-mistake.”\(^{206}\) He begins explaining what he means by providing examples of the kind of mistake he has in mind. In one such example, he has us imagine a person who is unfamiliar with the game cricket.\(^ {207}\) We can imagine such a person learning all there is to know about the rules and the roles of the various players on the field. We can also imagine that after learning these things the person in question asks us whose job it is to contribute team spirit. Such a question betrays the fact that the individual does not understand the role of team spirit. It is, after all, not a contribution made by a person on the field but a property of the team when they play and interact in certain ways.

Though he does not mention Leibniz, it is clear that when Ryle considers such examples his aim is to respond to classic arguments like Leibniz’s mental mill. Leibniz argues that:

> One is obliged to admit that *perception* and what depends upon it is *inexplicable on mechanical principles*, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and

\(^{206}\) Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*.
\(^{207}\) Ryle, 6–7.
not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.\footnote{Kulstad and Carlin, “Leibniz’s Philosophy of Mind.”}

The upshot of this thought, according to Leibniz, is that we must accept that there is some non-physical substance which fulfills the explanatory task, a “superlative further fact.” Ryle thinks that following Leibniz in thinking that we must posit some special sort of fact to explain mindedness is to make the same mistake as one who requires that some individual on the field explain the team's team spirit.

Examples like Leibniz’s are seductive and, consequently, we have trouble avoiding conclusions like Leibniz’s. Ryle claims that this is the case because in such examples it is not immediately obvious that there is a misunderstanding of a concept like mindedness. In contrast, in the case of the person who was ignorant of cricket, it is clear that he just does not know what “team spirit” means. In cases like Leibniz's, we fail to see the conceptual mistake. We are tempted to assume that there must be something, a discrete entity, that accounts for a thing's mental faculties.

The seductive train of thought goes something like this: We cannot explain mental faculties mechanically, as Leibniz's mental mill shows, so we must explain mental faculties by something non-mechanical. That is, there must be some non-physical stuff that explains mental faculties. Crucially, it is then assumed that these explanations will take the same form as physical explanations, i.e. substances with causal powers that constitute the faculties. This
“causal hypothesis” about the mental is where the conceptual mistake lies, according to Ryle, and it is what gives rise to philosophical problems.\textsuperscript{209} If the criteria for counting as possessing some mental faculty is some internal state that is observable only by the agent herself, then we have the problem of other minds. If the mental causes the physical body to move and the mind is non-physical, then we have the interaction problem. Ryle holds that we can avoid such worries by doing away with the conceptual mistake that mental explanations must take the same form as physical explanations. In short, mental explanations should not posit substances with causal properties.\textsuperscript{210}

In the place of bogus explanations that appeal to non-physical substances with causal powers, Ryle argues that we can clarify mental phenomena by carefully describing the behavior that are the criteria for the attribution of mental states. Consequently, according to Ryle, there is a conceptual relationship between mental state vocabulary and the actions of persons. He says that,

[W]hen we describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are referring to those overt acts and utterances themselves.\textsuperscript{211}

\textsuperscript{209} Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 11.
\textsuperscript{210} No doubt this view is in tension with the common refrain of functionalists, among others, that mental explanations are causal. However, careful functionalists hold that functional properties, of which mental states are a type, figure in causal explanations, but do not actually have causal powers. The brittleness of a glass in part explains why it broke, but the brittleness was not the cause. The event that led to the breaking was, e.g. the striking of it. Cf. Jackson, Pettit, and Smith, Mind, Morality, and Explanation.
\textsuperscript{211} Ryle, The Concept of Mind, 11.
In other words, to say that a person desires some object is to say, in part, that they are disposed to perform certain actions in certain situations. Commensurate with minimalism, no part of the logic of this discourse entails that there is some internal state of the person that is the truth-maker for such ascriptions.

This rejection of the connection between mental states and internal states is why Ryle's arguments have contemporary relevance. While today few hold that our mental state attributions refer to things like non-physical mental substances, thinking that mental state attributions refer to internal physical states of the subject of the ascription is still prevalent. While such views do not share all the problems of their dualist counterparts, e.g. the interaction problem, they still make the same conceptual mistake that Ryle diagnosed. That move is the assumption that we must explain the mental by the same logic that governs physical explanations, i.e. causal explanation. Whether the internal state is a non-physical psychic state or an internal physical state, if Ryle is right, both views make the same category-mistake.212

With this critical project completed, Ryle continues to construct a dispositionalist account of mental states to put in place of the now defunct non-minimalist views against which he has argued. About beliefs he says, for instance, that:

Certainly to believe that the ice is dangerously thin is to be unhesitant in telling oneself and others that it is thin, in acquiescing in other people’s assertions to that effect, in objecting to statement to the contrary, in drawing consequences

212 Tanney, "Gilbert Ryle."
from the original proposition, and so forth. It is a propensity not only to make
certain theoretical moves but also to make certain executive and imaginative
moves, as well as have certain feelings.\textsuperscript{213}

Ryle devotes a whole chapter of \textit{The Concept of Mind} to emotions. Unfortunately, we
do not get such a clear statement of the dispositional profile of a standard emotion. Ryle’s goal
in that chapter is to provide a typology of affective phenomena. He discusses feelings, moods,
agitations, inclinations, enjoying and wantings. Ryle’s discussion of agitations is perhaps the
most relevant to the sense of emotion typically assumed in contemporary discussions of the
phenomenon.\textsuperscript{214} Though he does not give it a name, he provides a thorough description of the
dispositional profile of a person’s resentment of a personal criticism.

To say that a person has for days or weeks been vexed by someone’s criticisms
of him is not to say that at every moment of that time he has been in the mood
to do pettish things, think resentful thoughts or register feelings of
dudgeon...What it does mean is that he is prone to relapse into this mood; he
keeps on getting into the frame of mind in which he cannot help harping on the
injustice which he has suffered; cannot help intermittently daydreaming of self-

\textsuperscript{213} Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind}, 25.
\textsuperscript{214} Stout, “Ryle’s Conceptions of Emotional Behaviour,” 97.
vindications and retaliations; cannot even seriously try to impute creditable motives to his critic, or to recognize any substance in his criticisms.  

In other words, to resent in this instance is to be disposed to act, think, and feel (all of which are somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions) in certain ways characteristic of resentment.

Eric Schwitzgebel’s view of attitudes gives us a more contemporary example of a view, (influenced by Ryle) that is both dispositionalist and minimalist. The perspective on attitudes that Schwitzgebel wishes to insulate common-sense attitude attributions from is a certain strain of representationalism about the mind. On that view, attitudes are a “matter of possessing some particular internally stored representational content, a content perhaps poised to play some specific set of cognitive roles depending on the attitude type.” Much as Churchland’s view holds the legitimacy of common-sense attitude attributions hostage to findings in the sciences and Leibniz ties the explanation of mental faculties to a non-physical substance, so too these representationalists hold the legitimacy of such attributions hostage to the existence of these internally stored representations.

The central plank of Schwitzgebel’s view is that “to have an attitude is, primarily, to have a dispositional profile that matches, to an appropriate degree and in appropriate respects, the

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216 Schwitzgebel, “A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes,” 75. Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories; Fodor, Psychosemantics; Dretske, Knowledge & the Flow of Information. are examples of works that involve defenses of the type of position Schwitzgebel wishes to attack.
folk-psychological stereotype for that attitude.”\footnote{Schwitzgebel, “A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes,” 78.} On his view, a folk-psychological stereotype is a “cluster of other properties that would be regarded as characteristic of something that possesses” the attitude in question.\footnote{Schwitzgebel, 79.} If it turns out that the dispositional profiles that support our common-sense attributions are partly a result of internally stored representations, then great. Figuring that out is epistemological progress. Nonetheless, according to the widely shared minimalist view, the legitimacy of our common-sense attributions does not rest on such findings.

Rather than calling his view minimalist, Schwitzgebel has called it a “superficial” view of propositional attitudes. A superficial account of a propositional attitude, according to Schwitzgebel, involves identification of the possession of that propositional attitude with “surface phenomena.”\footnote{Schwitzgebel, 77–78.} A superficial account of water would identify being water with being a relatively odorless, tasteless liquid that is commonly found in lakes and streams. A similarly superficial account of an emotion, such as the fear of an upcoming medical examination I discussed with respect to functionalism, would enumerate the surface phenomena: the somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions associated with cases of fear. Fear involves obsessive thoughts, flight behavior, etc.

In contrast to a superficial account, a “deep” account of a propositional attitude on Schwitzgebel’s view identifies having that attitude with phenomena below the “surface.”\footnote{Schwitzgebel, “A Dispositional Approach to Attitudes.”} A deep account of water would identify water with, for example, H2O. Similarly, a deep account
of fear would identify some property or set of properties below the surface, like neurological states or psychological postulates like core affects, internal representations, or affect programs. If it turns out that the surface phenomena constitutive of fear reliably correspond to some type of phenomenon at the deep level, then that is something worth knowing. Nevertheless, the existence of such a connection is not necessary for the legitimacy of attributions of fear.

I should say that there is nothing particularly wrong with a theorist working within the propositional attitude approach taking on a deep account of those attitudes she is interested in. In fact, I will explain how we can develop a deeper account of emotions once the superficial view is in place. However, like Schwitzgebel, I wish to point out that the availability of the minimalist view—a view that I have shown is the majority position in the philosophy of mind—confirms that a deep account is not required to support the legitimacy of our folk attributions.

5. While, according to the minimalist view, our ordinary attributions of mental states are secure in so far as there are states of organisms that play the folk roles we assign to them, we can and should say more about these folk roles. In this section, I will explain how we can start with relatively “superficial” statements of what is characteristic of emotions and begin to move toward “deeper” characterizations of them.

Functionalists like Lewis and Jackson, and dispositionalists like Ryle and Schwitzgebel, have done the most to show us how to take the first steps in making explicit what is implicit in our practices of attitude attribution. We can begin the process of rendering the folk roles more explicit by offering relatively thorough and commonsensical descriptions of what goes on when
one is the subject of a mental state. For instance, to be infatuated with a prospective lover is to do things like make plans to be around them. When one thinks of the person, one’s heart might flutter. The love interest may appear in one’s dreams. Feeling sick and being unable to eat is common. One will likely become jealous of prospective rivals for the affections of the beloved and may connive to prevent the beloved from finding him or herself in situations where the rival might begin to build or deepen the rival relationship. These are the sorts of reactions and dispositions out of which emotions are made. They, along with the situations in which they occur and the actions that are the result of the dispositions, are the things that lead us to attribute emotional states to individuals and they are the things that justify those attributions.

It should be noted that these descriptions are, according to my favored terminology, all at the level of vehicles. Talk of levels can easily invite misunderstanding, that the position is reductive, eliminative, or an identity theory. None of those is the case. First, facts at the level of vehicles can be full-blown intentional states. An individual’s infatuation may involve believing certain things about her beloved. Therefore, the sort of explication of folk roles I have in mind need involve no attempt to immediately reduce the intentional to the non-intentional. Vehicle-level facts might involve neurophysiological states in addition to intentional states and everything in between. Vehicle-level facts are just those things that play a role in determining which attitudes are properly attributable to an agent. Because of the broad array of things that may count as vehicle-level phenomena, whether something counts as

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221 However, as I will explain in the next chapter, Dennett style homuncular functionalism does provide the resources for a gradual type of reduction.
a vehicle-level fact in the explication of a mental state will be relative to the state ascribed. For example, as we have seen, with respect to an emotion, a thought, which is a full-blown intentional state itself, may function as part of the vehicle of the emotion. As an intentional state itself, that thought will also have vehicular elements that justify ascription of the thought. If my infatuation involves thoughts about a rival, those thoughts will be composed of further reactions and dispositions that may be somatic, cognitive, conative, and/or phenomenological. There is also no suggestion that there really are no emotions. Instead, the suggestion is that we examine the vehicle-level facts that lead us to apply emotion terms to individuals. The position is still minimalist. The analysis I am proposing also implies no sort of type identity theory between emotions and “superficial” or “deep” features of emotions. There may be features at the level of vehicles that often partly instantiate a type of emotion. These might be features of the agent such as linguistic abilities, more basic cognitive reactions, neurophysiological facts, contextual features, etc. Anger may often involve raised blood pressure, for instance, but as my rejection of essentialism implies, there are no vehicle-level facts that are necessary and sufficient for an emotion type. Consequently, we cannot identify emotion types with types of vehicle-level phenomena.

With these misunderstandings to one side, thinking in levels keeps us from having to settle for the sorts of armchair descriptions of emotions such as Ryle offered of resentment and I offered of fear and infatuation. Empirical research can provide us with more information about the way that individuals who do no specialize in emotions research apply emotion terms. This is important. Emotions are an ordinary phenomenon that we want to illuminate. Armchair descriptions like the ones I just gave of infatuation often reflect the idiosyncrasies of the
author, whether they are a result of explicit theoretical commitments, sociological pressures, narrow-mindedness, or just plain lack of imagination. If we are guided by these influences alone, we may well fail to target the phenomena we wish to illuminate.

One way to avoid these sorts of biases is to survey non-specialists. We have already seen some important work in this area by Ortony, Clore and Foss showing that, according to non-specialists, the phenomenological aspects of emotions are what is most central to them.\footnote{Ortony, Clore, and Foss, “The Referential Structure of the Affective Lexicon.”} Another set of studies of non-specialist views of emotions is especially worthy of discussion. Beverley Fehr and James A. Russell did a series of surveys meant to reveal (i) what sorts of mental states non-specialists take to count as emotions, (ii) which of these states are the best examples of emotions, (iii) and what the prototypical features of these states are.\footnote{Fehr and Russell, “Concept of Emotion Viewed from a Prototype Perspective.”} All of Fehr and Russell’s studies involved undergraduate students at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver who volunteered to participate in the studies. In their first study, Fehr and Russell asked two hundred students to list twenty items that count as emotions or, if they could not list twenty, to stop listing them after about one minute. The following is the list of emotion words Fehr and Russell received as responses at least two times. Next to the emotion word, in parentheses, is the number of responses that included that emotion.
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<th>Bliss (3)</th>
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<td>Cheerful (7)</td>
<td>Hostility (4)</td>
<td>Wonder (3)</td>
<td>Sentimental (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upset (19)</td>
<td>Distress (7)</td>
<td>Humor (4)</td>
<td>Admiration (2)</td>
<td>Softness (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry (19)</td>
<td>Frightened (7)</td>
<td>Loyalty (4)</td>
<td>Alert (2)</td>
<td>State (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (18)</td>
<td>Hopelessness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Amazement (2)</td>
<td>Stubbornness (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confusion (17)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>Miserable (4)</td>
<td>Appreciation</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surprise (17)</td>
<td>Irritation (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Needs (4)</td>
<td>Successful (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Despair (16)</td>
<td>Kindness (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pensive (4)</td>
<td>Tiredness (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurt (16)</td>
<td>Longing (7)</td>
<td>Remorse (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turbulent (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liking (16)</td>
<td>Melancholy (7)</td>
<td>Serenity (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Uncertainty (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lonely (16)</td>
<td>Pleased (7)</td>
<td>Shame (4)</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy (16)</td>
<td>Rage (7)</td>
<td>Sharing (4)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassion (14)</td>
<td>Relief (7)</td>
<td>Stress (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecstasy (14)</td>
<td>Scared (7)</td>
<td>Thrilled (4)</td>
<td>Complacent (2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envy (14)</td>
<td>Sensitive (7)</td>
<td>Unhappy (4)</td>
<td>Contempt (2)</td>
<td>Unstable (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grief (14)</td>
<td>Sex (6)</td>
<td>Violence (4)</td>
<td>Criticism (2)</td>
<td>Uptight (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mad (14)</td>
<td>Shyness (6)</td>
<td>Devotion (2)</td>
<td>Cynical (2)</td>
<td>Wanting (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorrow (14)</td>
<td>Sincerity (6)</td>
<td>Distrust (2)</td>
<td>Devotion (2)</td>
<td>Weak (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warmth (14)</td>
<td>Strong (6)</td>
<td>Ambivalence</td>
<td>Disturbed (2)</td>
<td>Withdrawn (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afraid (5)</td>
<td>Attraction (3)</td>
<td>Dread (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure I. Non-Specialist List of Emotion Terms**
Cursory examination of the list shows that the list is very top-heavy. The most often mentioned state, happiness, is mentioned 152 times. The eighth member on the list is mentioned just one third as often. Closer examination of this list reveals that we very quickly arrive at controversial examples. Near the bottom of the first column, one finds pain, smiling, tears, and pleasure, none of which are uncontroversial cases of emotions. Sure that at least the first ten most mentioned responses were good examples of emotions, Fehr and Russell took them, along with ten other prospective emotion terms from the list that were spread across the spectrum of likely responses. These twenty “target” prospective emotion terms were used in further studies.

In one further study, they asked fifty-five students to rate each of the twenty target terms on a scale of 1-6 according to how good an example of an emotion the target term picked out, (1) being the worst sort of example and (6) being the best sort. To avoid aberrations, each student performed the exercise twice. The students performed the exercise a second time, five months after the first. The following table reveals the results.

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224 Fehr and Russell, 467.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Mean Rating</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Mean Rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Love</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sadness</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depression</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excitement</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.58</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embarrassment</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anxiety</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Envy</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worry</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgust</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awe</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pride</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calmness</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boredom</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure II. Non-Specialist List of the Best Examples of Emotions

These results show that the students judged that the first ten prospective emotion terms from the previous study picked out the best examples of emotions. Not only are these examples the ones that come to mind more often for the non-specialist, as was shown by the first study, they are also the most paradigmatic examples according to non-specialists.
In a third study, Fehr and Russell asked forty participants to list attributes commonly associated with the twenty target emotions selected from the previous studies. They received six hundred and forty-three distinct responses of which three hundred and sixteen were mentioned more than once. They then weighted these three hundred and sixteen responses according to how many times they were mentioned. Unfortunately, Fehr and Russell chose not to publish all three hundred and sixteen responses. They did provide us with the top five most often mentioned attributes, however.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attribute</th>
<th>Number of target emotions for which the attribute was mentioned at least twice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heart-rate increases</td>
<td>16/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perspiration-sweat</td>
<td>10/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obsessive concern with a situation</td>
<td>10/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tears/crying</td>
<td>9/20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyes open wider</td>
<td>9/20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure III. Non-Specialist List of Emotional Attributes**

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225 Fehr and Russell, 477.
In so far as one is aiming to theorize about the emotions—i.e., the things that are ordinarily referred to in the thoughts and conversations of non-specialists—these sorts of results are critical. If one’s theory of emotion rules love out as a typical emotion, as many do, one will need a very good explanation of why this is the case and why one’s theory is still a theory of the emotions instead of some artificial theoretical category.\footnote{Notice that my own example of infatuation does not appear on any of Fehr and Russell’s lists. One might account for this by saying that infatuation is a type of love, but Fehr’s further research shows that non-specialists do not categorize infatuation as a type of love.}

The conceptions of non-specialists need not rule inquiry, though. As the clearly bad examples, e.g. smiling, that show up often in the first study demonstrate, the data received from studies of the folk is often misleading. Consequently, other types of empirical research and traditional philosophical arguments can be used to (1) disregard, (2) expand on, and (3) analyze non-specialist conceptions. I will now provide examples of each of these three ways of dealing with non-specialist conceptions.

I have already provided arguments meant to direct the reader toward an approach to the emotions that disregards some of the data collected by Fehr and Russell. While I have not argued that every emotion is an intentional state, a propositional attitude theorist might do so. However, many of the states listed in Fehr and Russell’s first study are not obviously intentional states. One might argue that emotions are intentional states based on an induction from examples. It is easy to provide a massive list of instances of emotions that are intentional
states. This gives us a reason, albeit a non-conclusive one, to think that all are. Another sort of argument is an appeal to experts. Most specialists think that emotions are intentional states.\(^{227}\)

If ordinary users of emotion terms agreed that emotion terms refer to non-intentional states, then such arguments may not be convincing. However, Fehr and Russell’s data does not support the claim that there is agreement about the application of emotions terms to non-intentional states. The best examples of emotions according to Fehr and Russell are all, at least arguably, intentional states. Moreover, states that might not be intentional were mentioned in the first study as many times or fewer than words that clearly refer to things that are not emotions, e.g. crying, giving us more reason to disregard some of the purportedly non-intentional examples. Any residual worries about affective states, such as depression, that some think are not intentional might be resolved by either digging in one’s heals and claiming that such states do have intentional content, typically of a particularly diffuse type, or categorizing such states as contentless moods instead of emotions.\(^{228}\) Of course, this second proposal is in some sense just a semantic one, but it is not simply *ad hoc*. The proposal is also supported by ordinary usage, such as, “he’s just in a mood” often said to point out that he is in a state for no reason. That is, there was no state of affairs involving an intentional object that explains the affective state. Therefore, the propositional attitude theorist might argue that the

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\(^{228}\) A notational variant of the first, heal-digging strategy holds that, like emotions, moods such as depression have intentional contents, but that their intentional contents are just particularly diffuse. Depression for example is about no particular thing, but has to do with the state of the world and/or how one’s life is going. For a defense of this position see Fish, “Emotions, Moods, and Intentionality.”
proposed distinction between moods and emotions is a nice regimentation of language that marks an important and ordinarily invoked distinction between affective states.

Fehr and Russell’s studies also revealed that a typical aspect of many emotions is obsessive concern with a situation. This is an example of empirical research used to expand our understanding of relatively ordinary facts about emotions. I have mentioned several times that there is a connection between emotions and the direction of attention. As Fehr and Russell have shown, sometimes this direction involves the repeated thoughts characteristic of obsessive concern. Empirical research can shed even more light on the nature of these vehicle-level features. For example, psychologists and philosophers concerned with the effect of emotions on perception often refer to a study by Gasper and Clore on the changes in attention that are characteristic of negative emotions.229

In Gasper and Clore’s study, participants that were experiencing positive, negative, or neutral emotions were asked which of the two bottom pictures most resembled the top picture.230 Participants experiencing a negative emotion overwhelmingly chose to associate the top picture with the picture on the bottom left, while those experiencing either a neutral emotion or a positive emotion tended to associate the top picture with the picture on the bottom right. These findings support the view that the most salient fact about the top picture for those experiencing negative emotions is that it is composed of triangles, like the picture on the bottom left, and that the most salient fact about the top picture for those not experiencing

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229 Ortony, “Affect and Emotions in Intelligent Agents.”
a negative emotion is that the shape of the three objects taken together is triangular, like the bottom right picture. Negative emotions are characterized by a tendency to focus more on details and neutral or positive emotions tend to involve focus on more general facts.

Figure IV. Visual Associations For Negative Emotional States

In short, this sort of research is a good example of specifying in more exact terms the more commonsensical determinants of emotions. Introspection and studies of the concepts of non-specialists reveal that states like anger often involve direction of attention toward objects of anger, but Gasper and Clore’s research tells us more about the nature of the attention that is characteristic of states such as anger. Moreover, Gasper and Clore’s research breaks a quite
general, complex feature of emotion, the direction of attention, into a more specific process, providing us with a more basic analysis of this complex feature of emotions.

6. In summary, the propositional attitude theorist about emotions should give what I hope is a fairly trivial answer to the component question. Emotions are composed of somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions, and dispositions for those reactions. What else could they be? She should not, however, take this answer to be the end of inquiry into the question. There is plenty of work to do in trying to specify which reactions and dispositions are characteristic of which emotions. This process should not rely on the traditional tools of philosophy alone, e.g. careful phenomenological analysis and testing intuitions against thought experiments. Experimental data, such as that gathered by Fehr and Russell, has a place too. It’s important to attempt to capture and systematize, in so far as it is possible, conceptions of emotions from non-specialists.

Empirical research can perform other important functions too. The reactions and dispositions that compose emotions have non-obvious features and are also composed of more basic processes and states. We have seen that work like Ortony and Clore’s can shed light on the features of emotions that can help inform more traditional philosophical analyses. Moreover, because the reactions and dispositions that occur at the relatively superficial level are composed of more basic processes and states, the answer the propositional attitude theorist gives to the component question does not give us the ultimate, most basic, components of emotions—nor should it. The search for the more basic components of
emotions is an empirical research program that the propositional attitude theorist, if she is a philosopher, might monitor, or collaborate with, but has little or no business leading. In the next chapter, I will explain in more detail how homuncular-functionalism allows the propositional attitude theorist to connect her view to the most promising views about these more basic components of emotions coming from those equipped to conduct empirical research into these more basic components.
1. In the last chapter I defended the view that emotions are composed of somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions and dispositions for those reactions. In this chapter I want to show that the propositional attitude approach coheres with the most influential empirically-driven approaches to uncovering the more basic components of emotions. I will do this by canvassing some of the most plausible accounts of the components of emotions given by psychologists, neurologists and some more empirically-minded philosophers. Specifically, I will discuss: appraisal, basic emotion, constructivist, and neo-Jamesian approaches to emotions. In some cases, I will show how homuncular functionalism, roughly the view that intentional states can be explained by positing collections of simpler mental or brain processes, can connect the propositional attitude approach’s account of the components of emotions to the accounts given by psychologists, neurologists, and more empirically-minded philosophers. Homuncular functionalism does not render the propositional attitude account consistent with every influential view of the more basic components of emotions, however. I will argue that this does not present a problem, though, because in such cases the incompatible views are either not real competitors of the propositional attitude approach or that the parts of those views that are inconsistent with the propositional attitude approach are unmotivated and expendable.
There is an important epistemic advantage in connecting one’s relatively armchair view of emotions to the more concrete data coming from other disciplines. As I said in the last chapter when discussing minimalism about propositional attitude attributions, one’s view of those attitudes had better cohere with the best, empirically-driven accounts. Ensuring that coherence is just a healthy respect for the epistemic status of science. Luckily, homuncular functionalism gives us a good framework for doing that. And (at least presently) where there is real inconsistency between the propositional attitude approach and some influential empirically-driven approach, the incoherence can be rooted out relatively easily.

In this chapter I also want to address a worry. Propositional attitude views of emotions are often considered, and often derisively, a “philosophers’ view” of emotions. When this is meant derisively, the implication is that propositional attitude views are not appropriately responsive to empirical findings and, for that reason, should be discounted. While, sociologically speaking, it may be the case that proponents of the propositional attitude approach have been philosophers, there is no reason to think the view is a weak, empirically uniformed, competitor of views offered by psychologists, neuroscientists, and more empirically-minded philosophers. The propositional attitude approach, as I have presented it, is neither empirically uniformed, nor a competitor of more empirically informed views. In many cases, in fact, homuncular functionalism makes it an ally of good empirical research.

2. Since homuncular functionalism will be a big part of explaining the propositional attitude approach’s connection to views of the more basic components of emotions, I will begin
with an explication of homuncular functionalism. Homuncular functionalism, developed by Daniel Dennett and others,\(^{231}\) can provide us with a framework for thinking about the relationship between full-blown intentional states, of which emotions are a species according to the propositional attitude theorist, and more basic psychological states and processes. After an explication of the framework developed by Dennett, I will explain how the framework can allow the propositional attitude theorist to explain the connections between different levels of description, i.e. “surface” level descriptions common among the folk, the more basic psychological processes, typically discussed by psychologists, that collectively instantiate the states picked out by these folk descriptions, and the brain networks, typically uncovered by neurologists, that instantiate these psychological processes.

In developing homuncular functionalism Dennett wants to supply a method for connecting these levels of description, but he wants to do it in a way that respects the good Rylean insights I canvassed in the previous chapter. About the attributions of intentional terms, which is the business of folk psychology, Dennett says that:

> [F]olk psychology can best be viewed as a sort of logical behaviorism: what it means to say that someone believes that \(p\), is that that person is disposed to behave in certain ways under certain conditions.\(^{232}\)

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\(^{231}\) While my exposition will focus on Dennett, Lycan, *Consciousness and Experience*; Fodor, “The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation.” are important sources.

\(^{232}\) Dennett, “Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology,” 50.
To begin the process of explaining folk psychology, in accordance with his Rylean conception of it, Dennett introduces four different stances that we can take when we are trying to understand the behavior of what he likes to call an “intentional system,” a being with beliefs and desires. These four stances are: the personal stance, the intentional stance, the design stance, and the physical stance. All four apply to most adult humans, but all four may not apply to every system in question. For example, one of Dennett’s favorite examples is the computer. Contemporary computers cannot be the targets of the personal stance, because, according to Dennett, the personal stance involves the attribution of responsibility and contemporary computers don’t warrant such attributions. Nevertheless, we can view them from the intentional, design, and physical stances.

When we aim to explain the actions of a system in question by studying the physical structure of it to see what causal forces are in play, we are taking the physical stance toward it. To stick with one of Dennett's favorite examples, consider a chess-playing computer. We can understand why a computer makes the moves that it does by analyzing the hardware of the computer and noticing how it affects the way that the computer makes its moves. Importantly, according to Dennett, we can thereby come to predict how the computer will behave in specified circumstances.

233 Dennett, 58.
If we instead take the design stance toward the computer, we take note of the intentions of the designer of the computer. In order to take the design stance, we need to know the programs installed by the designer and what they are meant to allow the computer to do. If we know that the computer is programmed to get its knights out as soon as possible, then in a situation in which it has the choice of getting one of its knights out or its queen, then (given other aspects of its programming don't intervene) it will get the knight out.

From the intentional stance, we ascribe beliefs and desires that the computer ought to have and explain and/or predict its actions on that basis. For example, if we were again trying to predict or explain the computer's moving its knight out, we could cite that the computer believes that it would be a legal move to get its knight out, that it believes that this is a strategy for increasing the likelihood of victory, and that the computer desires to win. Provided the machine is mostly rational, i.e., it tends to act in ways that are consistent with its beliefs and desires, the intentional explanation will typically be successful.

The final stance, the personal stance, is where we regard the system intentionally, but with the added requirement that the system be treated as a moral agent. From this stance, the system is worthy of moral respect. This makes the system an apt target of “reactive attitudes” like gratitude and resentment, indignation, guilt, shame, pride, forgiveness, and love. Because computers (or at least the chess-playing computers of current technology) are not apt targets for such attitudes, we should not view them from the personal stance.

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235 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.”
One reason Dennett's adoption of the different stances is a way of respecting Ryle's minimalist insights is that the different stances are logically distinct. That is, descriptions of a system according to one stance do not immediately entail any specific descriptions from another stance. Dennett does not hold that an intentional attribution is some sort of shorthand for physical attributions that we will fill in later via empirical investigation; e.g., they are not attributions of internal states of the computer. Making this point, he has us consider a Martian invasion. In such a situation, the constitution of the creatures would not determine whether they can truly be said to have beliefs and desires. Instead, the fact that their behavior in response to their environment is like ours, if it is, makes it the case that they have beliefs and desires. In short, the legitimacy of intentional attributions is solely a behavioral affair and, so, their legitimacy is not dependent on the physical constitution of the agents of the predication to any greater degree than that the physical facts must make the behaviors in question possible.

Some may object to the proponent of the propositional attitude approach to emotions adopting homuncular functionalism because homuncular functionalism is less than completely minimalist, an aspect of the propositional attitude approach that in the last chapter I explained is central. It is true that Dennett's conception of the four different stances is less than completely minimalist. Consider Dennett's willingness to take the intentional stance toward objects that are not persons. Dennett is careful to specify that the stances he describes apply

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236 This does not mean that there is no influence between levels. With respect to top-down influence, complex intentional attributions should make us expect complex homuncular decompositions. With respect to bottom-up influence, simple, isolated mechanisms will not typically support complex intentional attributions.

237 Dennett, “Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology,” 60.
to systems. The point of this is that the stances are not limited to humans or organisms. Anything capable of the relevant behaviors is an apt target of a specific stance or multiple stances. As I have said, one of his favorite examples is a chess-playing computer. This willingness to apply the intentional stance to many different sorts of systems can certainly appear to be a step away from pure minimalism. Dennett’s willingness to attribute intentional states to the brain and its parts is especially relevant. One might hold that talk of brain states is no part of folk psychology, i.e. there are no folk roles that such talk plays. So, how can the propositional attitude theorist hoping to co-opt Dennett’s view square such talk with minimalism?

One might reply to this objection by denying that attributions of intentional states to computers and brains is no part of folk psychology. It is probably the case that individuals who are not specialists apply intentional terminology to brains and computers in ways that are not merely *façons de parler*. I do not want to adjudicate such a debate, however. Consequently, I will rely on a different response. I will argue that Dennett’s plan for a deeper explanation of mental faculties is both well motivated and consistent with minimalism. We can see how it is consistent with minimalism by looking more closely at the type of explanations Dennett proposes for connecting the intentional and the neurophysiological. Perhaps for the staunch minimalist, delimiting the ordinary conditions for the correct application of mental state terms is the only explanation of mental states we need. Dennett thinks we can go further without running into the problems pointed out by Ryle, though, and if that is the case, we have a reason to add this explanatory project onto the project of delimiting the ordinary conditions for the correct application of mental state terms.
What will decide whether the minimalist should object to Dennett’s project is whether the details of the project stray from Ryle’s path. They do not. In addition to purely minimalist explanations, Dennett provides us with his own brand of quasi-reductive explanation. The way he avoids any of the pitfalls pointed out by Ryle and minimalists is to take note of two types of explanation, the conceptual and the causal, so as not to confuse them. For example, the neurological correlates of beliefs and desires are not going to replace behavior as their criteria. That would be to confuse causal explanation with conceptual explanation. The criteria for the application of psychological predicates are conceptually connected to the concepts in question. Thus, the neurological correlates of concepts like belief and desire are not their criteria.\(^{238}\)

Describing his project, he says:

> First we will answer the question “What do all believers that-\(\neg p\) have in common?” the first way, the “conceptual” way, and then see if we can go on to “reduce” the theory that emerges in our first answer to something else—neurophysiology most likely.\(^{239}\)

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\(^{238}\) We may, nonetheless, decide to make the causal underpinnings the criteria, but it wouldn’t be the mere fact that they are the causal underpinnings that would justify the decision.

\(^{239}\) Dennett, “Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology,” 45.
Implied here is that the conceptual investigation is going to rely on folk psychology and will result in analyses of more everyday facts about, e.g., emoters, such as the “surface” features of emotions I have mentioned. We must rely on folk psychology because it is our only way of taking a first stab at gathering up all the things that count as an emoter. Then we ask ourselves about the commonalities among these emoters. Since the theory at which we arrive will be reduced to less superficial features of emoters, we must understand the intitial theory as constructed of the most superficial of features. We start with what is most obvious/superficial and move deeper.

Dennett explains his proposal for connecting the superficial features of intentional states to their neurological correlates by describing a process by which engineers design systems. Again, he takes the design of computers to be instructive. When designing a computer, the engineers start with an intelligent ability that they want the computer to have. To stick with an example, say we want a computer that plays chess. To play chess, the computer must know the rules, make decisions about when to make moves, etc. The designers then decide what simpler functions, which when combined, allow the computer to possess the ability in question, e.g. moving pawns according to the rules of chess. They continue this process of narrowing down the functions of the computer to simpler and simpler functions until the functions can be instantiated by simple on/off switches. Lastly, we create a physical manifestation of these simple functions that collectively manifest the complex function we set out to design.

The relevance of system design for understanding intentional states, according to Dennett, is that we should be able to engineer ourselves in such a manner, although in reverse
since we already exist. This will provide us with a new sort of explanation of those states, one that is neither mere conceptual analysis of, nor mere causal explanation. Instead, we get a sort of teleological, engineering explanation. About this, Dennett says:

The idea is that, when we engineer a complex system (or reverse engineering a biological system like a person or a person’s brain), we can make progress by breaking down the whole wonderful person into subpersons of sorts, agentlike systems that have part of the prowess of a person, and then these homunculi can be broken down further into still simpler, less personlike agents, and so forth—a finite, not infinite, regress that bottoms out when we reach agents so stupid that they can be replaced by a machine.²⁴⁰

We start with a person with, e.g. beliefs. Dennett holds that the folk psychological concept of a belief entails that beliefs are information bearing states that involve a judgment by their subjects that the informational content of the state is correct.²⁴¹ Implicated in this, according to Dennett, is the thought that something must explain this ability to judge. There is a temptation to explain the ability by positing some entity, historically a “superlative further fact” maligned by the minimalist, such as a Cartesian ego. While the belief in Cartesian egos

²⁴⁰ Dennett, “Putting Consciousness Back in the Brain: Reply to Bennett and Hacker,” 88.
has fallen on hard times, the contemporary temptation is to assume that the thing that does the judging is an independently specifiable area of the brain. The assumption that there is some discrete entity that does the judging is what Dennett, following Anthony Kenny, calls the “homunculus fallacy” and is a pitfall he wants to avoid every bit as much as the positing of “superlative further facts.”

Dennett’s position here is delicate. He holds that the assumption that, for example, there is some discrete entity that explains the ability of a person to judge is a fallacy. Nevertheless, he sees a need for a more robust explanation than merely enumerating the ordinary features of the agent that warrant the ascription of the mental state in question. Dennett’s suggestion is that we meet this explanatory demand by offering a completely different sort of explanation than is typically proposed, an engineering explanation. The reason this suggestion must be handled delicately is that it involves provisionally succumbing to the temptation to posit a sort of homunculus. What we do, on Dennett’s account, is attribute the ability that needs explanation to multiple homunculi. We must use multiple homunculi because it is critical that each of the homunculi perform a function that is simpler than the function of the mental state explained. The process of explaining homunculi by positing multiple, simpler homunculi is then iterated until we reach homunculi whose functions are so simple that they can be perform by simple on/off switches.

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242 Kenny, “The Homunculus Fallacy.”
Let’s consider a sketch of how such a homuncular-functional reduction would go.\footnote{For more detailed sketches, see Dennett, “Why You Can’t Make a Computer That Feels Pain”; Dennett, “Toward a Cognitive Theory of Consciousness.”} I’ll use the example of relevance detection from Clore and Ortony’s work on the influence of negative emotional states. Remember that Clore and Ortony’s study showed that those currently in negative emotional states tended to group objects by more specific details than those in neutral or positive emotional states. Those experiencing negative emotions tended to group the top picture with the picture on the bottom left and those in neutral or positive emotional states tended to group the top picture with the bottom right picture.

![Figure IV. Visual Associations For Negative Emotional States](image)

The mental state to be explained is associating two sets of shapes from three sets of shapes. The erroneous homuncular explanation would merely posit some entity that is responsible for such associations. According to Dennett-style homuncular-functionalism, we posit multiple entities capable of simpler functions that in combination explain the associative
ability. If one is to associate sets of shapes, then one needs a shape detector. One also needs a mechanism for appropriately grouping shapes. Call it the grouper. In this case, the grouper is grouping according to the shapes of the individual items and their proximity. So, the shape detector will feed into the grouper, which will also draw information from a device for judging proximity. Finally, at least for this rough sketch of a homuncular decomposition, we need some mechanism for associating the sets of shapes. Since we already have a grouping mechanism, perhaps the associative mechanism will just be the grouping mechanism, but this time performing a sort of meta-grouping. These associations are again partly in terms of shapes and proximity, so those mechanisms will again feed the operations of the grouping mechanism. According to the research of Clore and Ortony, however, there is a new influence on the grouping mechanism at this level. Emotional states also provide input to the grouper, partly determining which sets of objects are associated, i.e. seen as falling into the same group.

In a full decomposition, each of the posited mechanisms would be decomposed further. The shape detector might be broken into a color, shade and line detector. There would also need to be some mechanism for applying concepts to the outputs of these simple detectors. Such decompositions would continue until they could be implemented by simple on/off switches such as the firing, or not, of neurons. Admittably, the process of completing a full decomposition would be extremely complex and time-consuming, perhaps so much so that one will never be completed. Nevertheless, this practical fact does not prevent Dennett-style homuncular functionalism from giving us a framework for understanding how our most complex abilities are connected to our simplest ones.
There are at least four features of Dennett’s view that are helpful for the propositional attitude theorist giving an answer to the component question with which we began the last chapter. First, we give common-sense its due by holding that there is something internal to the person that is responsible for the intentional state (in this case an emotion) in which we are interested. We do this by positing intelligent homunculi. Second, we avoid the conceptual mistake Ryle pointed out by not plumbing around in the brain determined to find a discrete entity doing the relevant task. Crudely put, we do not go around looking for the part of the brain that does the anger, for instance. Instead, we ultimately discover parts of the brain that when functioning as a system can explain the ability in question. Third, we avoid an infinite regress of homunculi because the process stops when we get to processes performed by simple on/off mechanisms. Fourth, and most importantly for present purposes, homuncular functionalism gives us a framework for understanding the connections between our attributions of emotions at the ordinary level, in which philosophers and especially propositional attitude theorists have been most interested, and the attributions made by scientists working at more basic levels.

3. With Dennett-style homuncular functionalism in view, I will move on to discussing the propositional attitude approach’s relationship to the views of psychologists, neurologists and empirically-inclined philosophers. Let us begin with the appraisal view of emotions. One might be excused for assuming that the propositional attitude approach is most easily allied with
appraisal views of emotions. According to many propositional attitude approaches,\footnote{As discussed earlier, other approaches use the attitude to explain the evaluative aspect of emotions rather than the contents.} the contents of emotions involve evaluations of states of affairs. Similarly, appraisal views of emotions take emotions to involve evaluative appraisals of the situation in which the appraising organism finds itself. Judgmentalists, which often defend a species of the propositional attitude approach, typically invite, or explicitly endorse, the correlation of their views with appraisal views. For instance, Martha Nussbaum takes her view of emotions as evaluative judgements to be buttressed by “the ascendancy” of appraisal views in psychology.\footnote{Nussbaum, \textit{Upheavals of Thought}. 23. Of course Nussbaum doesn’t endorse a propositional attitude view of emotions, because she mistakenly thinks such a view cannot account for the emotions of infants and non-human animals. Nonetheless, her position is indicative the prevalent thought that appraisal views share an affinity with cognitivist views of which a propositional attitude view must be a type.} Robert Solomon, in the process of explicating his own view that “emotions have intelligence,” says that:

To say that emotions have intelligence, in short, is to insist that they involve concepts and conceptualization, values and evaluation, what many psychologists call “cognition” and “appraisal” respectively (although the relationship between these is not always clear).\footnote{Solomon, \textit{True to Our Feelings}, 161–62.}

The similarities, whatever they may be, between judgmentalist and/or propositional attitude views of emotions in philosophy and appraisal views in psychology, glosses over
important differences there may be between these sorts of views. For many appraisal theorists, the appraisals involved in emotions are proximate causes of the emotions. That is not typically the case for judgmentalists and propositional attitude theorists. Regarding my own way of developing the propositional attitude approach, the evaluative content of an emotion is exactly not the sort of thing that could cause an emotion. First, on many accounts, contents are not physical objects or events and so cannot cause anything.247 Secondly, the evaluative content is not an entity independent of the emotion it characterizes and so it is not clear how it could cause the emotion. Having the specific content that it does is constitutive of being the emotion that it is. The content is not a causal precursor. According to the standard account of causation, if an event A causes an event B, A and B must be distinct events.248

Despite these possible differences, there are two ways in which the propositional attitude approach can be naturally allied with an appraisal approach. First, and most simply, not all appraisal views hold that appraisals are causal precursors of emotions. Ortony and Clore’s OCC view of emotions, for instance, denies that appraisals must be causes of emotions.249 The compatibility of their view with the propositional attitude approach is clear.

Consider their analysis of what they call the behavior manifestations of anger:

247 For neo-Russellians, contents do involve material objects and properties. This might make the job of showing the connection between the propositional attitude approach and the appraisal approach easier for the propositional attitude theorist who is also a neo-Russellian. However, there is still a difference between appraisals and neo-Russellian contents. Appraisals theorists think of appraisals as internal states of an emoter and not external objects and properties to which the emoter is responding.
248 Schaffer, “The Metaphysics of Causation.”
249 Ortony and Clore, “Can an Appraisal Model Be Compatible with Psychological Constructionism?,” 314.
This chart is an explication in more detail of the somatic, cognitive and conative (here called motivational) phenomena that, along with the phenomenological elements that often accompany these reactions, make up the vehicle-level elements that constitute anger. A truncated description of the components typical of anger would mention somatic reactions like reddening of the face and muscular tension, both of which appear on Ortony and Clore’s chart, respectively, as flushing and body tension. Cognitive reactions characteristic of anger involve, among other things, thoughts about some offense, which can easily become, as Ortony and Clore point out, ruminating about an event. Ortony and Clore include many things under cognitive reactions that I would prefer to file under conative reactions, e.g. throwing, banging, hitting. However, this is merely a notational difference. They also fail to mention the
phenomenological reactions, but that is likely because the phenomenological properties are the feelings associated with the listed cognitive, motivational and somatic reactions. Flushing of the face, trivially, feels like something and so they may feel that it need not be mentioned.

The second way that we can ally the propositional attitude approach with appraisal views, specifically those that attribute a causal role to appraisals, is to properly categorize the findings of these appraisal theorists. What these theorists are doing is describing mechanisms and processes at the level of vehicles. Just as we needed to posit a shape detector to explain the grouping behavior in Ortony and Clore’s research on the behavior of those experiencing negative emotions, so too appraisal theorists hold that we must posit appraisals whose function is the detection of emotionally relevant features of a subject’s environment. On this reading of their view, they posit the appraisals to explain other features of emotions, such as those listed by Ortony and Clore in the table above. Appraising something as an offense, e.g., is meant to explain other features of anger, like obsessive rumination.

Often appraisal theorists do not stop with merely positing the existence of appraisals, though. They typically go on to break appraisals down into more basic parts. In such cases, we can use homuncular functionalism to connect these more basic parts to the surface-level, in this case cognitive, reactions they compose. Let us use Klaus Scherer’s influential component process model (CPM) of emotion as an example of how these homuncular decompositions might proceed. According to Scherer,
[T]he CPM is based on the assumption that emotions are elicited and differentiated by the results of the individual’s evaluation of events according to a set of appraisal criteria or stimulus evaluation checks (SECs).²⁵⁰

Scherer’s use of “elicit” here makes it clear that his view is a causal version of the appraisal view. These stimulus evaluation checks take place at four different levels, according to Scherer, and different neural structures implement each of these levels.²⁵¹ At their simplest, SECs occur at the sensory-motor level implemented by an unconscious pattern-matching mechanism. Other SECs occur at a schematic level “based on memory traces from social learning processes,” which are, nevertheless, unconscious and largely automatic.²⁵² At a more complicated level, SECs are made by associative mechanisms that may or may not be conscious. Finally, at the most complicated, conceptual level, SECs involve “propositional knowledge and underlying cultural meaning systems, requiring consciousness and effortful calculations in prefrontal cortical areas.”²⁵³

Scherer’s exposition of the different types and levels of SECs fits naturally with the homuncular decomposition picture of emotional explanation. Since, according to Scherer, emotions are “differentiated” by SECs, and vehicle-level phenomena are what determine which sort of emotion is attributable to an agent, SECs are vehicle-level phenomena.²⁵⁴ According to

²⁵¹ Scherer, 151.
²⁵² Scherer, 151.
²⁵³ Scherer, 151.
²⁵⁴ Scherer, “The Nature and Dynamics of Relevance and Valence Appraisals.”
the propositional attitude approach, Scherer is doing important work explicating these vehicle-
level facts. However, because he is working at the vehicle-level, he is not explicating a view
that is a competitor of the propositional attitude approach. Instead, if he is successful, he will
have expanded our knowledge of the more basic components of emotions, i.e. the things that
make up the somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions out of which
emotions are composed.

We can examine Scherer’s possible contribution to our knowledge of the more basic
building blocks of emotions by looking at SEC’s in more detail. In addition to occurring at
different levels, SECs are divided into four categories: relevance, implications/consequences,
coping potential, and norm compatibility. Appraisals are implemented by SEC’s of four
different types. In homuncular decomposition talk, appraisals are implemented by four
different mechanisms: One mechanism checks for relevance. Another mechanism considers
implications and consequences. A third mechanism examines coping potential. And the fourth
mechanism evaluates norm compatibility.

It would take us too far afield to delve into each one of these mechanisms, but let’s look
at the first one so we can see an example of how it is further decomposed. The category of
relevance is broken into three more basic types, novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, and goal/need
pertinence. Again, we have multiple mechanisms that implement the more complicated
judgements of relevance. Let us discuss the novelty detector. A novel event is one that is
sudden, unfamiliar, and/or unpredictable. Further decomposition would posit mechanisms for
detection of the sudden, unfamiliar, and/or unpredictable. We need not keep going down this
rabbit hole, though. The moral of the story is clear. What Scherer is doing is breaking emotions
into more basic parts. These more basic parts explain the more superficial features of emotions. Judging that a situation is unfamiliar explains the judgment that it is novel, which explains the judgment that it is relevant, which explains an agent’s attention being drawn to it, which is a superficial feature of, e.g. anger. Since these are all sub-personal mechanisms, they are not identical to the content of an emotion. No sub-personal mechanism, qua vehicle-level fact, is identical with the content of an emotion. Nonetheless, according to a propositional attitude theorist who aims to incorporate the research of psychologists like Scherer, performing these sub-personal decompositions aids us in an important explanatory task. It shows how person-level propositional states are built up out of these simpler components.

The only thing about Scherer’s view that should give the propositional attitude theorist pause is Scherer’s belief that propositional content is, in some (unspecified) sense, closely connected to effortful and conscious deliberation. We regularly attribute beliefs and desires to those who have never explicitly contemplated the contents of those beliefs and desires. I know that the Eiffel Tower is not in Alpha Centauri and have known it for quite some time. If I have known it, then I must have believed it. But I have never considered the proposition before now. Consequently, if such states have propositional content, then there is not a necessary connection between propositional content and conscious deliberation. Therefore, without citing some unique feature of emotions and what makes them contentful, we should not believe that conscious deliberation is a necessary condition for having the contents they do, even if it is the case that emotions are propositional attitudes. In any event, this is an expendable part of Scherer’s view. No part of Scherer’s useful decompositions depend on his view that effortful and conscious deliberation is a requirement for propositional content.
Now that we have seen the coherence of the propositional attitude approach with cognitive appraisal approaches, let us move on to basic emotions approaches. Many take propositional attitude approaches to be inconsistent with basic emotions approaches. This is not the case, however. The basic emotions approach is a version of the appraisal view, one according to which emotions are "affect programs" caused by (typically unconscious) appraisals. Affect programs “are short-term, stereotypical responses involving facial expression, autonomic nervous system arousal, and other elements." As a form of the causal version of the appraisal view, the second way of allying the propositional attitude view with the appraisal view, the one according to which appraisal theorists are shining a light on the vehicle-level phenomena that constitute emotions, should work with respect to the basic emotions approach. Even so, the popularity of the basic emotions approach and the, often explicit, hostility that some basic emotions theorists have for the propositional attitude approach makes this version of the appraisal view warrant special consideration.

Given that the basic emotions approach is a type of appraisal view and that many ally appraisal approaches with the propositional attitude approach, it is no wonder that proponents of the basic emotions approach are sometimes so concerned to contrast their view with a propositional attitude approach. Philosopher Paul Griffiths has done the most to perpetuate the misconception that the basic emotions approach is inconsistent with the propositional attitude approach. He does not offer a straightforward argument that the two are inconsistent. Instead, much of his major work involves an attack on the propositional attitude approach.

followed by a presentation of his version of the basic emotions approach as an alternative, implying that the two approaches are distinct and inconsistent. It would take too long to look at all the objections that Griffiths raises about the propositional attitude approach and many of his objections were dealt with either directly or indirectly in Chapter 3. Consequently, I will focus on just those aspects of the propositional attitude approach that are especially characteristic of it according to Griffiths.

Griffiths puts special emphasis on one aspect of the propositional attitude approach that he takes to be the central distinction between it and the basic emotions approach. That feature is that the propositional attitude approach typically involves mostly conceptual analysis and little or no empirical work. I cannot deny that proponents of propositional attitude views have relied mostly on conceptual analysis. So, if the proponents of basic emotion views have relied mostly on empirical work, then this does make the two approaches distinct. That by itself does not make them inconsistent, though. It may well be the case that both conceptual analysis and empirical data support two distinct, but compatible views. Or it may be the case that both conceptual analysis and empirical findings support the same view. Since two views that are the same can hardly be inconsistent, the fact that many argue for the propositional attitude view on conceptual grounds hardly implies that it is inconsistent with the basic emotions approach.

A more substantial claim on Griffiths’s part is that the conceptual analysis characteristic of the propositional attitude approach leads proponents of propositional attitude views to
disregard the aspects of emotions typically uncovered by scientific inquiry. As an example, he gives Anthony Kenny’s relegation of the physiological aspects of emotions to merely contingent concomitants of emotions. Kenny argues that it makes no sense to attribute, e.g. fear, to a person if she does not believe she is in danger or behave in a way that is characteristic of fear. In contrast, according to Kenny, it might make sense to attribute fear to someone even if they do not instantiate the physiological states empirical research has uncovered are associated with fear. Consequently, argues Kenny, those physiological states discovered by empirical research are only contingently related to fear. The physiological states are merely symptomatic of fear, but they are not criteria.

If it is the case that basic emotions theorists take the relevant physiological states to be criterial of fear and it is the case that propositional attitude theorists deny that claim, then we really do have two inconsistent approaches. It is far from clear that either party is committed to either claim though. The propositional attitude theorist is not committed to a distinction between criteria and symptoms, especially as Griffiths thinks of that distinction. The issue turns on Griffiths’s account of conceptual analysis. According to Griffiths, a concept for the propositional attitude theorist “is entirely constituted by what is currently believed about its referent.” However, this is hardly a charitable interpretation of what “Kenny and his followers” are up to. The propositional attitude theorist does not typically think of conceptual analysis as mere anthroplogy. When done thoroughly, that is part of it (and is why

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256 Griffiths, 8.
257 Griffiths, 8; Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will, 51.
I included Fehr and Russell’s surveys of folk beliefs about emotions in the previous chapter) but only one aspect. In Griffiths’s own example, Kenny does not rely on anthropological findings. He relies on his own understanding of the use and implications of emotional terminology. Of course, we could understand that as anecdotal anthropological evidence, but that is clearly a mistake. According to a proper understanding of conceptual analysis, Kenny, through extensive study, has arrived at a particularly acute understanding of emotions and the attribution of emotion terms. So, we should understand his conceptual analysis as an exercise of his special understanding of emotions via thought experiments, making his understanding of them explicit, and not the mere reporting of what ordinary people believe about emotions.

Griffiths claims that what is particularly problematic about the anthropological understanding of pure conceptual analysis is that it does not allow for conceptual change as we learn about the thing or set of things the concept picks out. Our concept of water, according to Griffiths, should have changed when we discovered that water refers to H2O. However, according to Griffiths’s characterization of pure conceptual analysis, the content of a concept is given by the current beliefs about the concept had by those competent with it and so, if we are tied to that understanding of conceptual analysis, the concept cannot change. In other words, according to Griffiths, pure conceptual analysis yields a conception of concepts and our inquiry into them that is static and implausible. On that account, the content of the concept of water before we discovered that it is H2O involved things like that it is a relatively odorless and tasteless liquid found in lakes and streams. The discovery that the stuff in lakes and streams is

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260 Griffiths, 24.
H2O is not a discovery about water, on this account, it’s the introduction of a new homonym, ‘water’ and a new concept.

Griffiths is right that this understanding of concepts and conceptual inquiry is faulty, but he is wrong to hold the propositional attitude theorist to it. The understanding of conceptual analysis by the propositional attitude theorist need not rule out conceptual evolution or surprising conceptual discoveries. Wittgenstein, who Griffiths rightly takes as a paragon of the type of conceptual analysis Griffiths wants to criticize, was explicit about the need to leave room for conceptual evolution. The understanding of conceptual analysis with which Griffiths wants to saddle Wittgenstein and his followers (like Kenny) may fit with Wittgenstein’s views during a middle/transitional period of his work that occurred after the *Tractatus*, but before he began to put together what would later become *Philosophical Investigations*.261 During this time, conceptual analysis involved the purely descriptive examination and specification of the concepts and/or rules that constituted some system, whether that system be mathematics, folk psychology, or something else. The specifications of these concepts and/or rules according to Wittgenstein’s view at that time were “entirely constituted by what is currently believed about” them.262 What Griffiths, correctly, finds objectionable about such a project is the static conception of concepts that it implies and the amendment he wants to make is just the one that should be made. Griffiths says:

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261 Gerrard, “Wittgenstein’s Philosophies of Mathematics.”
In fact, a concept can embody an ongoing project of discovery. The referent towards which this project is directed is picked out by the use of concrete examples and by the goal of forging an epistemically useful concept, as well as by current beliefs about the referent. These other factors allow a concept to change as discoveries are made about its referent.263

The mature Wittgenstein agrees and so should we. Conceptual analysis does not provide us with a set of concepts which are static and constitutive of the system in question, including the folk psychology of which emotional attributions are a part. To make this point Steve Gerrard, discussing Wittgenstein’s evolution from his middle to late period understanding of conceptual analysis, uses the simple and illustrative example of the development of chess.264 In the early development of chess, pawns could only move a single space on their first move. Because this made the opening game-play too slow, players decided that we should allow pawns to move two spaces on their first move. This new version of chess is a better game and so our collective understanding of chess changed. According to the static conception of rules and concepts, chess before the new rule is a wholly different system than chess with the new rule. If chess is constituted by what people currently believe about it, then early chess is not the same game as later chess. Wittgenstein came to see this as an unhappy result.

263 Griffiths, 24.
In his mature philosophy, Wittgenstein believed that the results of conceptual analysis, or grammatical investigation as he would prefer to call it, are always open to revision and some of these revisions do not entail the creation of a new system of rules that are incompatible with a previous, distinct one. Below I will address some theorists who do want to create new practices, with new concepts, alongside our folk psychological practices surrounding emotions and emotion concepts. But, we need not think that all adjustments to a practice, or system of rules, amounts to the creation of a sibling practice with new concepts. Instead, some changes in beliefs about a concept are the result of the discovery of something we did not know before or a recognition that it makes sense to adjust our beliefs about a concept given the goals of the practice in which the concept is embedded. In short, Griffiths both misunderstands the history of conceptual analysis and misconstrues the understandings of conceptual analysis available to the contemporary propositional attitude theorist. Proponents of conceptual analysis have not been committed to a static conception of concepts and contemporary theorists need not be committed to a static conception either. Thus, even if it is the case that propositional attitude approaches are methodologically committed to conceptual analysis, that is no reason to find fault with them. It is also no reason to hold that the propositional attitude approach is committed to a static conception of concepts which is incompatible with the basic emotions approach.

In addition to the failure of basic emotions theorists such as Griffiths to provide good grounds for the claim that their view is incompatible with the propositional attitude approach, many basic emotions theorists have explicitly stated that their view is not a competitor of approaches like the propositional attitude approach. For example, neuroscientist Jaak
Panksepp and his co-author Douglas Watt draw distinctions between three levels of emotional phenomena: primary-process, secondary-process and tertiary-process affects. Primary-process “affects arise from ancient subcortical processes.”265 Secondary-process affects “arise from Pavlovian/classical conditioning and instrumental/operant learning principles.”266 Tertiary-process emotions involve “complex cognitive-affective amalgams.”267 According to Panksepp and Watt, failing to note the level about which a theorist means to make claims has led to confusion.268 One such confusion is taking Panksepp and Watt’s view to be an opponent of views like propositional attitude views in philosophy and constructivist views in psychology, which both operate at the tertiary level. Panksepp and Watt are, in contrast, concerned with the primary-process level. To avoid such confusions, Panksepp and Watt introduce technical, basic emotion terms for the states that their research concerns. These terms are SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC/GRIEF, and PLAY.269 While these terms are syntactically like ordinary emotion terms, these technical terms refer to primary-process brain states only. In the language I have been using, Panksepp and Watt are creating a new practice, a sibling of folk psychology with new concepts.

While it is important to recognize the difference between Panksepp and Watt’s technical terms and the emotion words used by the folk, e.g. the difference between FEAR and fear, it would be a mistake to forget that there is some connection. This mistake can lead one to think that Panksepp and Watt’s research has no hope of shedding light on regular emotions.

266 Panksepp and Watt, 387.
267 Panksepp and Watt, 387.
268 Panksepp and Watt, 393.
269 Panksepp and Watt, 388.
Since FEAR and fear are different concepts, findings about FEAR do not automatically entail anything about fear, but that does not mean that those interested in ordinary fear should ignore Panksepp and Watt’s research. Most of Panksepp and Watt’s research is done on simpler mammals such as rats. Because of their simpler brains, and less pressing ethical concerns, it is easier to locate the primary-process, subcortical realizers of rat FEAR. It is not a coincidence that subcortical realizers of FEAR are present in rats that exhibit fear behavior, however. FEAR and fear are not coextensive concepts, but they are related by similar behavioral profiles. Because they are related, this leaves open the possibility that research revealing the subcortical realizers of FEAR can shed light on regular emotions and their realizers.

Davis et al. examine the relevance of rat studies on the conception and treatment of fear and anxiety in humans.\textsuperscript{270} According to Davis et al., fear is a response that is “activated when physical contact with [a] predator is made or is imminent.”\textsuperscript{271} In rats this response is a result of sensory input that triggers the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala. The basolateral nucleus of the amygdala then activates the central nucleus of the amygdala, which triggers the hypothalamus and the brainstem to produce fear behavior. Anxiety, on the other hand, is a reaction that is a result of either a perception of an environment where a predator has been or a perception of a predator at a distance. Anxiety is also realized by activation of the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala. However, it also involves activation of the paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus and the cortex, which triggers the lateral division of the central

\textsuperscript{270} Davis et al., “Phasic vs Sustained Fear in Rats and Humans.”
\textsuperscript{271} Davis et al., 105.
nucleus of the amygdala. The amygdala releases a peptide that, again, triggers the hypothalmus and the brainstem to produce fear behavior.\textsuperscript{272}

Studies on humans and rodents reveal that anti-anxiety medications are effective against anxiety in both humans and rodents, but are not effective against fear in either. Davis et al. hypothesize that this is because the differences between human fear and anxiety at the neurological level are analogous to the differences in rats. There is no reason for us to automatically reject such hypotheses. The concepts that Davis et al. are using are specialized. They involve very specific descriptions of the sorts of envioronmental conditions required for what they call fear and anxiety, making their fear and anxiety like Panksepp and Watt’s FEAR, SEEKING, etc. The corresponding folk concepts do not involve such narrow specifications. Nonetheless, the concepts are related. The behaviors exhibited by the rats are fear behaviors. The rats are afraid and/or anxious in both Davis et al.’s technical senses and in the ordinary senses. It should come as no surprise if the structures of the brain that realize emotional states in our mammalian cousins are similar to our own.

These findings fit easily with the homuncular decomposition picture of the connection between emotions and their realizers. From the intentional stance, we will discuss the rat’s perceptions, behaviors, desires, etc. From the design stance, we have systems designed by evolution to detect predators, environments where predators are likely, mechanisms that prepare organisms for action or inaction, and devices that pick out these appropriate

\textsuperscript{272} Davis et al., 119.
responses. From the physical stance, we have the regions of the brain, described so well by Davis et al., that perform these functions.

Philosopher, and defender of the basic emotions approach, Andrea Scarantino suggests something similar to Panksepp and Watt’s proposal. He says that the basic emotions approach should give up the attempt to account for everything referred to by ordinary emotion terms. Instead, basic emotions theorists should aim to characterize subcategories of emotions. Rather than trying to characterize fear, for example, they should attempt to characterize “basic fear.” The aim of such characterizations is different from characterizations at the ordinary, folk level. The aim of the basic emotions theorist is more traditionally scientific, i.e. to locate natural kinds. A natural kind, according to Scarantino, “is (roughly) a theoretically homogenous class of items about which a great many explanatory and predictive generalizations can be formulated.”

There is no reason for the propositional attitude theorist to be hostile to this explanatory project, or vice versa. To insist that every emotion term pick out a natural kind may well be inconsistent with the minimalism that the propositional attitude approach assumes on my account. It would imply that even if a state filled the folk role of, say, resentment, but was not “theoretically homogenous” with a set of other states that collectively support robust “explanatory and predictive generalizations,” then it would not count at resentment. However, since, on Scarantino’s account, it is only a subset of emotions, those labelled basic,

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274 Scarantino, 356.
275 Scarantino, 356.
that must meet this scientific requirement, emotions that do not meet the requirement, but do meet the folk psychological requirements, are still correctly labelled emotions by those working with the ordinary concepts. As a result, the propositional attitude theorist is free to develop her account of non-basic, ordinary emotions.

10. The propositional attitude approach, as I have explained it, is most easily allied with the constructionist approach to emotions. According to constructionists, emotions are not discrete or basic mental states that are the result of dedicated emotional mechanisms triggered by environmental factors or appraisals of those factors. Instead, emotion terms refer to folk psychological categories realized by somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions and dispositions. This aspect of emotions does not distinguish them from other mental states like thoughts, beliefs, perceptions, etc., that are also realized by the same sorts of reactions and dispositions. In short, according to the constructivist, emotions are constructed from more basic mental and physiological events that are not unique to emotions.276

The affinity with my own presentation of the propositional attitude approach should be clear. The vehicle-level phenomena that warrant ascriptions of emotion terms to individuals are the same as those that combine to create emotions according to the constructivist. Constructivists do not typically rest satisfied with this sketch of their view, though. As psychologists, neuroscientists and empirically-minded philosophers, they want to provide

characterizations of the more basic psychological processes and brain networks responsible for the somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological events that combine to create emotions. I will examine some specific developments of this constructivist approach in order to remove any suspicion that the details of how these views are developed might render them inconsistent with the propositional attitude approach I have described.

While constructivist accounts of these more basic psychological processes and brain networks differ, there are some relatively stable features of most of these constructivist decompositions. Although contemporary constructivists have moved beyond the famous study of Schacter and Singer that initially moved many towards constructivism, their views still retain the central elements of Schacter and Singer’s “two factor” view of emotions. According to the two factor view, emotions are constructed from felt arousal and cognitive labeling. If a subject, for example, feels aroused and attributes the arousal to some dangerous object or state of affairs, then she will label her experience “fear”.

Cognitive labeling may, admittedly, cause problems for a propositional attitude theorist who wishes to ally her view with constructivism. Applying an emotion term to an experience requires linguistic capacities, which means that on the two-factor view, infants, the cognitively impaired, and non-human animals cannot experience emotions. If the propositional attitude theorist wishes to avoid the objection discussed in Chapter 2, she cannot take on elements of a constructivist view that rule out the appearance of emotions in infants, the cognitively impaired, and non-human animals.

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277 Constructivists also do a lot of work on the contextual and especially sociological features that are responsible for the construction of emotions. But, as I explained earlier, I am tabling issues that deal with the vehicle-level phenomena that occur outside the skin of subjects of emotions.

278 Schacter and Singer, “Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State.”
impaired, and some non-human animals. After presenting two standard constructivist positions, I will argue that this does not really present a problem because the cognitive component in contemporary constructivist views either does not, or need not, require linguistic labelling.

In what has become a paradigmatic statement of the constructivist position, James Russell argues that emotions are constructed of: core affect, affective quality, attributed affect, affect regulation, and object. After presenting two standard constructivist positions, I will argue that this does not really present a problem because the cognitive component in contemporary constructivist views either does not, or need not, require linguistic labelling.

In what has become a paradigmatic statement of the constructivist position, James Russell argues that emotions are constructed of: core affect, affective quality, attributed affect, affect regulation, and object. Again, discussing all of these components would bog us down, so let us focus on just core affect, affective quality, and attributed affect, which are the aspects relevant to determining whether labelling a la Schacter and Singer is part of Russell’s view.

Core affect, i.e. the feeling of arousal, largely accounts for the felt nature of emotions according to Schacter and Singer. Russell, however, complicates the story somewhat by arguing that core affect is a combination of both arousal and hedonic tone, and most constructivists have followed suit. Arousal is the feeling of being energized and hedonic tone is determined by whether or not that energized feeling is pleasant. Anxiety involves high arousal, but may not feel pleasurable, for instance. “Perception of affective quality” is Russell’s phrase for the central cognitive component of an emotion. It is the perception of the, e.g. dangerousness, delightfulness, offensiveness, etc. Affective quality is the property of one’s environment that can affect core affect. Dangerous objects in one’s environment, such as rabid dogs or irrate motorists, can influence one’s core affect. Perception of affective quality involves a change in

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279 Russell, “Core Affect and the Psychological Construction of Emotion.”
280 Russell, 149.
281 Russell, 149–50.
core affect in the normal case. \textsuperscript{282} Lastly, “attributed affect” is the process of connecting a change in core affect to a possible cause. \textsuperscript{283} If one notices the phenomenological changes in one’s core affect, one will typically scan the environment for the likely cause, e.g. an irrate motorist or a rabid dog.

The process of connecting a change in core affect to a environmental cause is the feature of Russell’s view that most closely resembles the linguistic labelling of Schacter and Singer. Russell acknowledges, rightly, that his view does not rule out the emotions of infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals, though. \textsuperscript{284} The sorts of organisms to which we are most tempted to attribute emotions are also ones that most likely have the capacity for core affect and perception of affective quality. All that those require is a sort of symbiotic relationship between the phenomenological element of an organism’s experiences and its perceptions of the features of its environment. Attributing a causal role to a feature of one’s environment is a more complicated cognitive achievement. But, we should keep in mind that in describing the components of emotions, Russell is not attempting to describe self-conscious, articulate processes which are obviously absent in infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals. As Russell puts it:

\textsuperscript{282} Russell, 149. Russell says that perception of affective quality does not necessarily lead to a change in core affect. He gives the example of a depressed person who sees that a sunset is beautiful, but is not moved by it. \textsuperscript{283} Russell, 149. \textsuperscript{284} Russell, “Emotion, Core Affect, and Psychological Construction,” 1263.
Despite [its] complex definition, attributed affect is, phenomenologically, simple and very common: afraid of the bear, feeling sad at a loss, liking a new tune, feeling uncomfortable from the heat, feeling sympathetic to a friend’s woes, and on and on. Put more generally, attributed affect covers many topics, including those called affective reactions, liking, displeasure motives, and empathy.\(^{285}\)

The claim that non-human animals are unable to do things like feel uncomfortable from a heat source isn’t plausible. If to experience such discomfort an organism must be able to perform affective attributions, then affective attributions are something that some infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals can do. There is no reason to think that other sorts of attributions involved in things such as feeling sad at a loss or fear of a bear are disanalogous in a way that bars infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals from performing the attributions. Of course, there are certain things about which infants, the cognitively impaired, and non-human animals must fail to make the appropriate attributions. They cannot fear calm verbal threats or stock market crashes, but, according to Russell and common-sense, there are many dangerous things, e.g. falling from a great height, they can fear.

According to another prominent constructivist position, the conceptual act theory, developed chiefly by Lisa Feldman Barrett, core affect is transformed into an emotion by conceptualization.\(^{286}\) Conceptualization of core affect on this account “is the process by which


\(^{286}\) Barrett, “Solving the Emotion Paradox.”
stored representations of prior experiences (i.e., memories, knowledge) are used” to make undifferentiated core affect, i.e. the mere perception of arousal and hedonic tone, into a meaningful experience for the individual.287 On this view, the brain forms a hypothesis about the cause of the core affect on the basis of these stored representations. Based on this hypothesis about the cause of the emotion, the subject applies an emotion term to the experience, which furthers the categorization process necessary to construct an emotional experience according to proponents of conceptual act theory.

The conceptual act theory clearly follows Schacter and Singer’s lead in taking emotions to involve the type of labeling of an experience that requires linguistic capacities. It is far from clear, however, that the propositional attitude theorist who is sympathetic to the conceptual act theory needs to take on that element of the conceptual act view. She may accept the conceptual act theory’s analysis of core affect and the view that core affect is made meaningful via conceptualization, i.e. the application of stored representations of prior experiences, without accepting that a necessary feature of anything worth calling an emotion must involve the subject applying an emotion term to it. Accepting that some emotions involve labelling and some do not means that some of the emotions of linguistically competent humans are different from the emotions of their non-linguistically competent human and non-human animal counterparts, but that is no reason for concern. That is just what we should expect. Even among linguistically competent humans, there are variations in emotions. The emotions of those with sophisticated labelling abilities may well differ from those with more limited

abilities, but even if they do, that is not yet reason enough to support denying that those with more limited capacities do not experience emotions of the same type. As Agnieszka Jaworska has pointed out, young children and Alzheimer patients who cannot label their own emotional states, regularly act in ways that justify the judgement that they care about others, i.e. that they are emotionally attached to the well-being of others.\textsuperscript{288} If we downgrade the mental states and actions of these individuals, we run the risk of disregarding the moral importance of their mental states and the actions that spring from them. We would need very strong evidence, indeed, to take on that moral hazard.\textsuperscript{289}

Appreciation of the moral hazard of denying emotionality to the linguistically incompetent gives us enough reason to be skeptical of the full-blown conceptual act theory. In addition to those unfortunate consequences of the view, though, the full-blown position is insufficiently motivated. Those who are sympathetic to constructivism, and for that reason skeptical of the appearance of emotions in the linguistically incompetent, are, often led to their skepticism by faulty reasoning. For instance, Jennifer Fugate says that:

\begin{quote}
Rather than asking whether an animal (or person) has an emotion, we should first ask: What are the elemental building blocks of emotion, and how do they come together in different ways depending on the cognitive architecture and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{288} Jaworska, “Caring and Internality.”
\textsuperscript{289} Scarantino raises similar worries in “Basic Emotions, Psychological Construction, and the Problem of Variability,” 353–54.
environmental conditions of the organism? Only once we have identified what is necessary for the creation of a psychological construct that is ontologically subjective might we begin to ask whether other species have these abilities and whether the end product, an emotion, is the same as it is for humans.\textsuperscript{290}

The central mistake made in this passage is conflating the question of whether a non-human animal has an emotion with the question of whether a non-human animal has a state that is identical to one that is found in humans. As constructionists are fond of pointing out, emotions, even those that belong to the same category, vary greatly in the states and processes that realize them. Merely pointing out that an animal that seems to be experiencing fear does not experience it in the same way as a human does constitute a strong case for holding that attributing fear to the animal is illegitimate. What we need to hear is whether this difference is significant enough to warrant the withdrawal of the attribution to the animal. An answer to this significance question is never given by the constructivist who is skeptical of the emotions of the linguistically incompetent.

A second mistake made in, or at least a misleading impression given by, this passage is that the question about the mechanisms required for emotion can be answered independently of the question about who experiences emotions. In order to know what is going on in the individuals who fall into a category, we first need to know who falls in the category. Our

pretheoretical grip on who experiences emotions must tell us which organisms to inspect. The analysis must start at the folk level. How do the folk apply emotion terms? I am confident that the folk have no qualms about applying some emotions terms, e.g. fear, to infants, the cognitively impaired, and some non-human animals in at least some circumstances. That means that if it turns out that these organisms are incapable of labeling the relevant mental states, then, ceteris paribus, labeling is not a necessary condition for some emotions. The fact that a subset of humans typically do label their emotions and that this alters their experiences should only move one off of the intuitive position that some linguistically incompetent organisms also experience emotions if it is also the case that this subset of humans has some special claim to delimiting the category. Such a position is not only counter-intuitive, but smacks of chauvinism. Even worse, it may well be immoral—as was just discussed in reference to small children and Alzheimer patients.

Eminent neurologist Joseph LeDoux now defends a position like these costructivists, with similar implications for those without linguistic capacities. In his momentous The Emotional Brain LeDoux argued that in order to understand the neural basis of emotions (LeDoux focused on fear, but he took the lessons learned about fear to be instructive for emotions generally) we must keep in mind that emotions develop by both “low roads” and by “high roads.” Low road emotions involve only the activation of evolutionally older circuits that are quicker and more direct. In the case of fear, an emotional stimulus, say a car speeding in your direction, feeds into the thalamus, which passes information to the amygdala, which

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immediately results in an emotional reaction, in this case, hopefully, jumping out of the way of the approaching vehicle. High road emotions involve these low road circuits, but also involve the sensory cortex. In addition to feeding information directly to the amygdala, the thalamus sends information to the sensory cortex, which processes the information more thoroughly, and more slowly, than the thalamus alone. The sensory cortex then sends this more thoroughly processed information to the amygdala, which leads to emotional reactions. The extra processing done by the sensory cortex can lead to more appropriate emotional responses. Adults do not lash out at all objects at which they are angry. They can evaluate the appropriateness of lashing out and modulate their behavior. While the high road has this advantage, the speed of the low road is evolutionarily advantageous and, for that reason, has been preserved.

In recent work, LeDoux has rejected the position that we should think that activation of low road circuits are emotions. 292 LeDoux’s position is now that consciousness is a necessary feature of emotion. Since low road circuits do not involve the neurological correlates of consciousness, activation of a low road circuit alone does not result in an emotion. In his older terminology, emotions require activation of the high road too. LeDoux suggests that we find other non-emotional vocabulary to describe low road circuits. Low road emotions are no longer properly so called. With respect to what was previously low road fear, for instance, we have a “defensive survival circuit.” 293 Similarly, the reactions that are the result of low road

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293 LeDoux, Anxious, 45.
circuits that were previously classified using emotion terms should be reclassified. With respect to fear reactions, he suggests the phrase “defensive reactions.”

The reason that LeDoux’s position may cause problems for the propositional attitude theorist is that, given LeDoux’s conception of consciousness, which I will explain shortly, consciousness is not something available to animals. In response, the propositional attitude theorist might immediately reject LeDoux’s insistence that emotions are necessarily conscious. In fact, Ledoux’s arguments for this position are less than convincing. He takes two factors to support the position. First, the common person’s understanding of emotions is one according to which emotions are necessarily conscious. Second, he holds that there is widespread support for the position among emotions researchers. He cites William James, Sigmund Freud, Nico Frijda, Lisa Barrett, James Russell, Andrew Ortony, and Gerald Clore as proponents of the position.

While it is certainly the case that both ordinary and expert conceptions of emotions typically take feelings to be an important aspect of them, it is less certain that according to ordinary and expert conceptions, emotions must be conscious. Even if unconscious emotions have not always been part of the ordinary conceptions of them, Freud’s work on unconscious emotions has long since become part of the ordinary conception of emotions and is typically endorsed by experts. Even less controversially, emotional dispositions and sentiments, for

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294 LeDoux, 45.
295 LeDoux, 18–19.
296 It is certainly odd that LeDoux counts Freud as an ally and does so without explanation.
example, exist without being conscious. One doesn’t fall out of love every time that one temporarily stops being conscious of it.

Perhaps, though, LeDoux has good reason to reject Freudian unconscious emotions and means to focus on emotional episodes instead of emotional dispositions and sentiments such as love. Even still, it is far from clear that emotional episodes require consciousness in the sense that LeDoux means. LeDoux, rightly, draws a distinction between consciousness in the sense of being awake and reactive to stimuli and what he calls state consciousness. He does not deny that animals are conscious in the first sense. The type of consciousness his position concerns, state consciousness, is the awareness of having a certain mental state and the awareness that it is you that is having it. According to LeDoux, neuroscientific research has determined that consciousness in this sense involves the activation of “general networks of cognition (GNC)” that animals lack.\textsuperscript{297} The problem with LeDoux’s position is that even if it is the case that the ordinary conception of emotions and the expert conceptions of emotions he cites endorse the position that emotions must be conscious, those conception do not require state consciousness.

In addition to the two types of consciousness that LeDoux acknowledges, there is at least one other type of consciousness that is relevant. I’ll call this type of consciousness, qualitative consciousness. What is required for qualitative consciousness is that one is in a state such that there is something it is like to be in that state, some qualitative aspect of it. We have all experienced this type of consciousness and sometimes it occurs while not currently

experiencing state consciousness. You might be walking down a hallway having a particularly engaging thought. Because of your diverted attention, you run into some stationary object, a chair, say. Immediately upon running into the chair, you realize that you saw the chair all along, but that that aspect your experience did not show up to you in the more robust sense required of state consciousness. That is, you were not aware that you were having an experience of a chair in your path. Nevertheless, the experience was there all along.

If there is qualitative consciousness, it is surely only this less demanding sense of consciousness that ordinary and expert conceptions of emotions require. After all, the ordinary intuition that LeDoux appeals to is that feelings, not state consciousness, are central to emotions. Similarly, the expert conceptions on which LeDoux relies only endorse the centrality of feelings, not state consciousness. Qualitative consciousness captures much more accurately what the intuition concerns and the experts have in mind. Thus, LeDoux’s position that emotions require state consciousness is unmotivated and presents no problem for the propositional attitude theorist.

11. Finally, we have the neo-Jamesian approach to emotions. While its central proponent, Jesse Prinz, is a philosopher, his approach is very empirically informed and so worth considering in this context. Very briefly, Prinz’s view is that emotions are perceptions of bodily changes that signal something of evaluative significance in the subject’s environment. Prinz, as I

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Prinz, Gut Reactions.
pointed out in Chapter 2, takes his view to be a competitor of all cognitivist approaches to emotions, which on his view includes the propositional attitude approach. According to Prinz, “[w]hat sets cognitive theorists apart is the claim that emotions contain cognitive elements essentially.”

This definition of the cognitivism already implies a misunderstanding if it is meant to apply to the propositional attitude approach as I have described it. Since the attitudes and contents are the emotions, the emotions do not contain them. Thinking that there must be some cognitive component of the emotion that counts as the cognitive part, and explains why it is cognitive, is exactly the category mistake against which Ryle rightly warned us.

What makes the propositional attitude approach a cognitivist approach, if it is one, is either that emotions are attitudes of a cognitive type or that since every state with propositional contents counts as cognitive, emotions are cognitive states. There is some reason to prefer the first option. Propositional attitude accounts of desires, which are very common, would be cognitivist views on the second account, but desires are supposed to be the prototypical non-cognitive states. Despite this, Prinz appears to think that propositional attitudes are cognitive because of their contents, which he prefers to call thoughts. Thoughts on his account are “mental representations that contain concepts.” Prinz may well think that not every mental representation that contains concepts is structured propositionally, but propositions are definitely thoughts on his account. So, since emotions contain thoughts, which contain concepts, infants, the cognitively impaired, and non-human animals without concepts

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300 Prinz, 56.
cannot have emotions on the propositional attitude view. This is the argument I criticized in Chapter 2. So, Prinz can draw no distinction between his own view and the propositional attitude view by claiming one allows for emotions in the linguistically incompetent and one does not. They can both recognize the presence of emotions in the linguistically incompetent.

Prinz’s next argument that thoughts cannot be necessary for emotions is more empirically based, but still serves as no grounds for drawing a distinction between his view and the propositional attitude view. According to Prinz, “LeDoux...has shown that a visual stimulus can trigger an emotional response before the involvement of the neocortex.” Since, according to Prinz, the neocortex is the part of the brain that contains concepts, and thoughts require concepts, there are emotions without thoughts, without propositional contents.

It should be obvious by now that I reject the idea that semantic entities like concepts or propositions are contained in a part of the brain. Prinz may use the terms ‘concept’ and ‘proposition’ how he chooses, but according to his psychologistic use of them, they are merely homonyms of ‘concept’ and ‘proposition’ as I have used them in developing the propositional attitude approach. So, necessarily, any deductive argument proceeding from Prinz’s psychologistic usage to the propositional attitude approach’s semantic usage must involve an equivocation.

Perhaps Prinz’s argument is inductive rather than deductive. Accordingly:

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301 LeDoux, The Emotional Brain.
302 Prinz, The Emotional Construction of Morals, 57.
303 Of course, equivocations are no better in inductive arguments, but I hope it is clear that the way I have formulated the inductive argument on Prinz’s behalf involves no equivocation.
P1) All previously analyzed propositional attitudes are realized, in part, by the neocortex.

C1) So, probably, all propositional attitudes are realized, in part, by the neocortex.

P2) Some emotions are not realized, even in part, by the neocortex.

C2) Therefore, some emotions are probably not propositional attitudes.

For us to have a reason to accept the claim that all previously analyzed propositional attitudes are realized, in part, by the neocortex, i.e. (P1), we must have already concluded that the emotions not realized in the neocortex are not propositional attitudes. But to conclude, without argument, that emotions not realized in the neocortex are not propositional attitudes is to beg the question against the propositional attitude approach. Again, without a defense of the view that some emotions are not propositional attitudes because of lack of involvement on the part of the neocortex, the propositional attitude theorist can agree with the neo-Jamesians that the purportedly non-cognitive mental states in question are emotions.

12. I have argued that the vehicle-level features that compose emotions are somatic, cognitive, conative, and phenomenological reactions and dispositions to have those reactions. That emotions involve these sorts of reactions is revealed by a relatively commensensical
examination of the process of emotional experience. I have also argued that this view of the
components of emotions makes room for a more scientifically informed view of emotions,
specifically, of the states and processes that realize the somatic, cognitive, conative, and
phenomenological reactions out of which emotions are made. The critical point is that the
propositional attitude approach takes on a minimalist view of mental state attributions implied
by most positions on the attribution of mental states in the philosophy of mind. That is, the
propositional attitude view is silent about the actual processes and states that realize the
reactions out of which emotions are made, so we have a quite ecumenical position on the more
basic components. As a result, far from being a competitor of views in psychology and
neuroscience, the propositional attitude approach is compatible, admitably with some small
amount of tweaking, with many of the most promising approaches to emotions in those
sectors.


