THE POPULIST SYNDROME: CRITICAL JUNCTURES AND PARALLEL PATHS IN LATIN AMERICA AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

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By

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Recent waves of populism raise urgent questions about political stability across the world. Why are populists more electorally viable in some liberal democracies than in others, and why do only some electorally successful populists manage to establish long-term domination over political systems? This dissertation offers answers by applying a critical juncture approach in a novel way linking agency and structure into a probabilistic explanation of divergent outcomes in Latin America and post-communist Europe. I argue that political agency during critical junctures of market reform shaped ensuing opportunity structures by conditioning the ideological positioning and variable electoral performance of “traditional” center-left political actors. In turn, variable opportunity structures were either resources for or constraints on the electoral viability of subsequent populists driven by incentives to maximize anti-establishment legitimacy and endowed with unique organizational capacities for adaptation. Put simply, where critical juncture dynamics led to center-left decline, populist electoral power was more likely in both regions.

Part I deals with conceptualization, measurement, and theory. Having measured populism empirically based on an original family resemblance conceptualization and having identified variation across both regions, I advance a historically contingent theory of institutional development. Part II examines the theory quantitatively – by disaggregating party systems into center-left and center-right pillars, by analyzing developments in thirty-three democracies, and by testing the hypothesized causal relationships against rival
explanations focused solely on structural, rational, cultural, institutional, or international relations factors. Part III employs paired comparisons to uncover variable mechanisms linking critical junctures and populist outcomes. By identifying parallel paths – towards long-term populist domination in Ecuador and Slovakia and towards secondary-role populism in Peru and Poland – I demonstrate similar processes regardless of contextual peculiarities and engage in theory-building about how critical junctures shape divergent social coalitions and populist outcomes.

Overall, this dissertation employs a mixed-methods strategy to argue for a renewed focus on societies as arenas that reflect complex interactions between agency, structure, and institutions. It uses an array of quantitative and qualitative data, including original datasets on populist attributes, economic liberalization, electoral volatility, and party nationalization, as well as 100 interviews from fieldwork in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia.
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As my dissertation project benefited from research trips to four countries on two continents, I am grateful for the support that a number of individuals provided during my fieldwork travels. In Poland, Maria Kapiszewska and Michał Kotnarowski helped with contacts and ideas, Alicja Majczak and Justyna Duda assisted with interpretation, and Boyana Spasova and Ivan Borimechko gave important logistical support. My fieldwork in Slovakia was aided by Kevin Deegan-Krause and Dalibor Rohac, both of whom helped with suggestions and contacts. Segundo Enrique Cabrera and Marlon Armando Espinoza facilitated my work in Peru, while Luigina Fossati accommodated me in Ecuador. Back in the United States, the following individuals provided valuable aid during various stages of the dissertation process: Marios Antoniou, Todd Blose, Besir Ceka, Ariya Hagh, Shannon Kelleher, Jaclyn Kerr, Chris Mauer, Josh Miller, Zacc Ritter, Crystal Shackleford, Leo Valentine, and, of course, Mr. Smith.

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INTRODUCTION:
PATHS TO POPULISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

“The differences are indeed more obvious, but they are also more superficial, whereas the similarities are more profound, and at least as striking as the differences. With time, in fact, the similarities grow increasingly more striking, and infinitely more exciting because they reinforce our feelings about a single united human race.”

Leonard Bernstein

When the great 20th century American conductor Leonard Bernstein described “the Beethovenian impulse,” he was making an intriguing parallel between linguistic and musical structures. Of course, such similarities are not unique to language and music, and if the Beethovenian impulse is well-guided – and a united human race indeed exists – it is evolving social structures that define its experience as much as language and art. It is my theme that, with the help of human agents, social structural similarities can, too, assert themselves over time, thus revealing “striking and infinitely exciting” parallels in political development, despite superficial contextual peculiarities.

Less than two decades after Bernstein’s remarks, humanity did, in fact, come a step closer to unity with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Ever optimistic, the famed conductor saluted the occasion by turning Friedrich Schiller’s “Ode to Joy” (an die Freude) into an “Ode to Freedom” (an die Freiheit) in his rendition of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony in a unified Berlin. Yet if the end of European communism – on the heels of Latin American democratization – inspired artistic optimism, others were less sanguine about what this new freedom might bring. Not even two years after Bernstein’s celebratory concert, Adam Przeworski, an astute observer of politics across regions, concluded his analysis of the recent transition to democracy and the market on a more minor note. If we “forget geography for a

moment and put Poland in place of Argentina, Hungary in place of Uruguay,” Przeworski wrote, we will see “populist movements of doubtful commitment to democratic institutions.”

1.1. The Populist Syndrome in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

Przeworski’s provocative intuition seems to have passed the test of time. In the years after the initial push towards market reforms, populism came to dominate politics in many countries across both Latin America and post-communist Europe. Admittedly, populism’s main incarnations have been a diverse set – from Bolivarian revolutionaries in Latin America to conservative reactionaries in Central Europe. Nevertheless, they have also exhibited a remarkable set of similarities – most importantly, the articulation of common anti-liberal indictments of the political and economic order and the high degree of popular support behind their political projects. And yet the populist syndrome has been uneven in both regions, with some countries experiencing it more intensely than others. Moreover, even where populists generally succeeded at the ballot box, only in some cases did they manage to establish long-term hegemonic domination over political systems.

Indeed, populists in Latin America and post-communist Europe share a “family resemblance” due to a number of typical commonalities – their general anti-establishment appeal, criticism of free markets, frequent nationalist rhetoric, and recognizable personalistic leaders. Whether they are Latin American “leftists” or Eastern European “conservatives,” populists often combine nationalism and economic statism, as Gino Germani incisively observed in his classical analysis of national populism in 20th century Argentina. From a broader conceptual perspective, therefore, it is possible that the populist stories of Latin America and post-communist Europe are surprisingly similar. In both regions, for example, populism has been highly salient, with a number of anti-establishment forces rising to

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2 Przeworski 1991: 191
3 Germani 1978
challenge liberal orders on behalf of “the people.” Whether the recent experiences of countries like Venezuela and Hungary are reminders of populism’s totalitarian proclivities or of popular majorities’ neglected rights, the populist syndrome is a “mirror of democracy” exposing liberal blind spots in both Latin America and post-communist Europe. If, as Fukuyama argues, liberal democracy must meet societal demands in order to avoid political decay, the study of modern populism is important particularly with reference to the societies it claims to represent.

From a societal perspective, however, the populist syndrome has spread unevenly as it has enjoyed variable levels of electoral support. First, the populist vote has afflicted some liberal democracies more than others. For example, soaring from the ballot box, populism defined early 21st century politics in Venezuela, Ecuador, Hungary, and Poland, but was much less viable in Colombia, Panama, the Czech Republic, and Latvia. Second, even in countries where populists generally prospered in elections, patterns of electoral coalitions varied. In some countries, such as Ecuador and Slovakia, populists appealed to broad societal coalitions and then established decade-long hegemonies over the executive branch. In other countries, such as Peru and Poland, electorally successful populists attracted more circumscribed constituencies and played less dominant roles in political arenas.

Of course, in addition to the obvious variations, such patterns also suggest potentially intriguing similarities between Latin America and post-communist Europe. Is it possible that the uneven rise of populism in both regions is symptomatic of analogous problems of democratic representation? Has the redefinition of the relationship between states and markets after the fall of dictatorships produced similar effects for Latin American and post-communist societies? Are variable patterns of populism indicative of parallel paths of

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4 Panizza 2005: 29
5 Worsley 1969
6 Panizza 2005: 25
7 Fukuyama 2014
political development despite obvious contextual differences? These are the central questions this dissertation seeks to answer. As the populist syndrome has been particularly pertinent in these two otherwise distant – and distinct – world regions, this project explores the conditions and patterns in which the Latin American and post-communist European “people” – understood as citizens who exercise their political right to vote – support populist projects critical of the liberal order.

1.2. Situating the Arguments

Prevailing Explanations and Approaches

Because of its undeniable significance for liberal democratic regimes, the rise of populism has attracted much attention, especially from students of Latin America and post-communist Europe. In general terms, explanations of why populism is electorally viable can be included in one of five broad categories, of which three emphasize “demand” and two stress “supply” in politics. On the demand side, explanations within the first category – typically derived from the structuralism associated with modernization or dependency theories – focus on societies experiencing developmental gaps and large-scale changes in material circumstances, such as those associated with the transition towards market liberalism. Accounts within the second category – those emphasizing some type of a proximate demand – underscore rationality on the part of electorates dissatisfied with perceived inefficiencies, such as lagging economies, inadequate resource allocation, or political corruption. Explanations within the third category – revolving around cultural factors – prioritize the significance of civil societies and democratic values.

Although demand-side arguments are generally correct in highlighting populism as a product of societal needs and aspirations, they all face problems. For instance, arguments based on structural theories fail to explain why large-scale economic change leads to populist

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8 See Chapter 4 for a detailed literature review, which is the basis of the following sketch.
outcomes in some contexts but not in others, or why populists have succeeded in countries that are far from peripheral in the global economy. Likewise, rationality-based accounts focused on short-term economic crises or rent-seeking do not explain the rise of populism in resource-poor contexts in economic growth, while those focused on corruption cannot account for the center-left economic positions of populist actors. Finally, cultural theories cannot tell us how only incremental value change can lead to rapid populist upsurge and neither do they explain the absence of populism in many post-communist countries with weak civil societies.

Other explanations have attempted to overcome such limitations by shifting the analytical focus to the supply side of politics – either within countries or within the international system. Supply-side accounts usefully point attention to how permissive opportunity structures relate to populism, but they also fall short. The fourth category of arguments is generally focused on institutional dynamics, such as parties’ internal organizations, the party systems within which they operate, or the formal rules or the political game. However, such accounts either fail to explain populist success in restrictive institutional environments or lack in specificity regarding populist positions on important questions such as the relationship between politics and markets. Finally, analysts prioritizing the importance of international politics focus either on the conditionality of international institutions and regimes or on possible populist contagions within world regions. Yet the relationship between external conditionality and populism has remained unclear and neither is it evident why populist dominos skip countries they should not have.

Finally, scholarship has not engaged explicitly with the question of what explains populist hegemonies in some countries but not in others. For example, even where societal needs and opportunity structures permit populism’s viability at the ballot box, over time populist projects can become more or less attractive to wide popular coalitions. For instance,
with the support of a geographically broad electoral coalition, populists dominated political arenas for over a decade after critical market reforms in Ecuador and Slovakia. By contrast, the Peruvian and Polish experiences of failure to establish long-term political domination corresponded to populists’ general inability to overcome regionally-defined electoral divides. In more implicit analyses that do not necessarily focus on populism, regional specialists have invoked competitive authoritarianism or the distribution or rents as factors underlying hegemonic populists’ broad coalitions in Latin America, as well as the long-term historical legacies behind more circumscribed populist electoral coalitions in countries like Poland and Ukraine. However, scholars have not engaged with such questions from a cross-regional perspective focused on populism and highlighting not only common explanatory factors but also similar mechanisms that link political agency, societal reactions, and political outcomes more generally.

In other words, none of the prevailing approaches is individually reliable to provide a general explanation of the populist syndrome as a complex phenomenon afflicting different political landscapes across world regions. The main reason for this is that most standard arguments highlight structure, agency, or institutions without linking the three into a unified theory of populism and without transcending within-regional analysis. This does not mean, however, that such explanations ought to be dismissed. Indeed, they have enriched our understanding of the multidimensionality of populism and have called attention to the importance of both societal needs (underscored by demand-side approaches) and opportunity structures (highlighted by supply-side approaches). What is missing is an approach that links the various factors underlying modern populist phenomena from a perspective that is historically sensitive and more general at once.
Core and Secondary Arguments

Two intriguing features of modern populism are that it afflicts countries across regions and that it embodies a critique of globalization as a historically relevant phenomenon. Based on these simple observations, my argument seeks to overcome contextual peculiarities and ahistorical interpretations by providing an account that relates societal demands and opportunity structures within relevant historical contexts. In particular, I draw attention to fascinating historical parallels that link dynamic structures, agency, and institutions in Latin America and post-communist Europe. It is only through such a combination of factors – the very coalescence of which can only arise from historical contingency – that the populist syndrome can be understood as the multidimensional phenomenon it is.

Core Argument

Following important work by Kenneth Roberts on Latin American party systems, I identify as critical junctures in both regions the shared historical experiences with transition away from state-centric and undemocratic models of economic and political development and towards economic liberalism and multi-party democracy. Like Roberts, I focus on the political dynamics associated with these theoretically consequential moments – or what two prominent analysts of post-communism identify as “the centrality of political and technocratic elites… for shaping capitalist orders.”10 Political agency, I first argue, was equally important for defining neoliberal critical juncture experiences of countries in both Latin America and post-communist Europe.

Second, I go a step beyond Roberts’ work by emphasizing the key role specifically of those political agents that campaigned as neoliberal opponents on the eve of the critical juncture. Whereas Roberts is concerned with the stability of entire party systems – itself a

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9 Roberts 2014
10 Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 26
product of the choices of political agents on both the center-left and center-right during the critical juncture – I prioritize attention to the center-left pillars of party systems. While the “traditional” center-left has been diverse – represented by labor-mobilizing populist parties or anti-oligarchic social democratic parties in Latin America, and typically by ex-communist parties in eastern Europe – its historical significance in both regions was defined by its traditional opposition to liberal approaches to economic development.

Their traditional resistance to economic liberalism, however, did not necessarily stop neoliberal critics from themselves engaging in bait-and-switch politics during the critical juncture. Constrained by the prerogatives of the Washington Consensus, many traditional critics of neoliberalism were, in fact, at the forefront of market reform-making in both regions. Where the center-left found itself in executive power during the critical juncture, it frequently led economic reforms, thereby producing an overall pattern of programmatic de-alignment. By contrast, where the center-left found itself in political opposition during the critical juncture, it usually resisted such reforms, facilitating an overall pattern of programmatic alignment. Overall, having closely considered Roberts’ main argument and the unique historical significance of the “traditional” center-left in both regions, I refine the analytical focus and expand the geographical scope of the critical juncture approach.

Third, after focusing on the center-left pillar of party systems, I argue that political positions during the critical juncture produced important path dependencies thereafter. In particular, these political positions either increased or decreased uncertainty, thereby prompting potential crises in party brands and variable patterns of voter exit from or loyalty to the center-left. While center-left path dependencies originated in the critical juncture, subsequent incentives for ideological consistency and differentiation defined the center-left’s ideological persistence which, in turn, translated into divergent reactive sequences of either relative electoral strength of decline. Put simply, where the center-left had opposed market
reforms during the critical juncture, incentives for persistent skepticism of neoliberal reforms led to overall electoral strength. By contrast, where the center-left had led market reforms during the critical juncture, its economic positions persisted on a center-right path towards overall electoral decline.

Fourth, these divergences in the aftermath of the critical juncture constituted environmental resources and constraints that defined opportunity structures for anti-establishment actors with unique incentives and organizational capacities. Driven by the incentive to maximize anti-establishment legitimacy and endowed with leadership autonomy facilitating ideological flexibility, anti-establishment actors adjusted to the environmental conditions by choosing those economic positions that were most likely to maximize anti-establishment legitimacy. As the structural persistence of center-left parties’ economic positions and their electoral performance were a mutually related environmental legacy of the critical juncture, populists were more electorally viable after programmatic de-alignment and considerably less so after programmatic alignment.

My core argument, therefore, is that the degree of electoral success of populists – anti-establishment political actors critical of market reforms – is an important legacy of the political positions that those who had campaigned as neoliberal skeptics on the eve of the critical juncture actually took during the most crucial moments of market reform. Where political forces promising relief from neoliberalism had been, in fact, instrumental for the implementation of decisive market reforms, populism was more electorally viable in the aftermath period. It is this sequential experience that defined parallels between developments in post-communist Hungary and Poland and Latin American Venezuela and Ecuador after key market reforms. Put simply, I argue that political agency during critical junctures can lead to subsequent structurally persistent divergences that culminate in specific institutional outcomes (such as the rise of populist parties) and that are strikingly parallel across regions.
Secondary Argument

If my core argument draws cross-regionally parallel arrows between causes in critical junctures and effects in the aftermath period, my secondary argument substantiates these relationships and posits an even more precise link between causes associated with political agency and subsequent outcomes. Based on 2x2 paired comparisons of countries that experienced programmatic de-alignment, my secondary argument distinguishes between two types of structural path dependencies based on the characteristics of the political agency in charge of key economic reforms. While this argument is illustrated in Table 1.1 in the section on paired comparison below, here I note its main idea.

In particular, I argue that where de-aligning critical junctures featured specifically social democratic leadership, broad electoral coalitions eventually became available for subsequent populist mobilization, thereby facilitating long-lasting populist hegemonies in Ecuador and Slovakia. By contrast, where key market reforms featured a more unique type of leadership – embodied by the neoliberal populism of Alberto Fujimori and Lech Wałęsa – distinctive patterns of politicization associated with the critical junctures activated long-standing regional cleavages in Peru and Poland. While the regional constituencies originally politicized by these leaders would present a resource to be successfully exploited by future populists echoing Fujimori’s and Wałęsa’s rhetoric, the regional polarization that was first politically activated on the eve of, and then economically sustained during, the critical juncture would also constrain subsequent populists to secondary roles in political arenas.

In sum, my secondary argument is that these two divergent paths – towards populist hegemony in Ecuador and Slovakia versus regional polarization in Peru and Poland – are legacies of different modes of programmatic de-alignment dating back to the critical juncture. Importantly, this secondary argument substantiates the core argument while also offering

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\[11\] In particular, I argue that having activated regionally-based constituencies for electoral gain, Fujimori and Wałęsa then sustained economic policies that hurt disproportionately the very same principals whose agents they had pledged to be during the presidential campaigns of 1990 (see Chapter 11).
new insight about the mechanisms linking causes and outcomes.

**Synopsis**

Whether it distinguishes between general types of critical junctures or more specific sub-types within de-aligning critical junctures, this dissertation develops a general argument that is straightforward. The type of political agency leading market reform during critical junctures conditions parallel paths leading to similar outcomes in the modern political development of Latin America and post-communist Europe. By analyzing agency, structures and institutions from a comparative historical perspective, this argument overcomes some of the problems associated with existing theories, which treat relevant factors as if they were independent from one another. Importantly, my argument combines obvious elements of agency and structure. Because structures are both constraints and resources that political agents can “appropriate and potentially transform… in a self-conscious, reflexive manner,” as Mahoney and Snyder write, mine is not a deterministic argument but a probabilistic one. In sum, this is an argument about the likely choices political agents make in structurally conditioned environments across Latin America and post-communist Europe.

1.3. A Cross-regional Comparative Perspective

As the above discussion has made clear, this study uses cross-regional perspectives for the purpose of comparing historical developments with reference to modern populism. Although underutilized, this is indeed not a new perspective. Just a decade into the post-communist transition, Kurt Weyland provided an astute analysis of important analogies between “neoliberal populism” and its sources in Latin America and Eastern Europe. As intriguing parallels persisted more than two decades after the neoliberal revolution in both regions, a cross-regional perspective focused on analogous neoliberal critical junctures is a

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12 Mahoney and Snyder 1999: 24  
13 Weyland 1999
useful analytical approach for the comparative analysis of political developments.

The Advantage of Studying Populism Across Regions

Despite populism’s high salience and the similar patterns observable across world regions, the analysis of populist phenomena has mostly remained focused on intra-regional comparisons. For example, students of Latin America have discussed at length “the crisis of democratic representation” featuring unstable electoral competition\(^\text{14}\) and the rise of personalistic anti-establishment outsiders,\(^\text{15}\) some of whom attacked the liberal-democratic consensus.\(^\text{16}\) Seasoned observers of post-communist politics have likewise lamented east-central Europe’s transition from “democracy fatigue to populist backlash,”\(^\text{17}\) a “shift from moderate to radical politics,”\(^\text{18}\) and even “the strange death of the liberal consensus.”\(^\text{19}\)

To be sure, intra-regional perspectives are valuable as they have contributed to the understanding of regional trends, such as Latin America’s “left turn”\(^\text{20}\) or the populist radical right in Europe.\(^\text{21}\) Such perspectives, however, can be less helpful for analyzing the general nature and causes of populism, which is inherently neither left- nor right-wing, but combines elements of both.\(^\text{22}\) While more ambitious cross-regional work that considers populism’s highly intricate ideological nature does exist, such work is either outdated\(^\text{23}\) or limited to edited volumes,\(^\text{24}\) individual articles,\(^\text{25}\) and journal editions.\(^\text{26}\)

And yet a cross-regional perspective highlights interesting theoretical problems and points to empirical puzzles with normative implications for modern democracies across the

\(^{14}\) Roberts 2013
\(^{15}\) Levitsky and Loxton 2013
\(^{16}\) Roberts 2014
\(^{17}\) Rupnik 2007
\(^{18}\) Greskovits 2007
\(^{19}\) Krastev 2007
\(^{20}\) Levitsky and Roberts 2011
\(^{21}\) Mudde 2007
\(^{22}\) Germani 1978
\(^{23}\) Weyland 1999; 2001
\(^{24}\) Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012
\(^{25}\) Acemoglu et al. 2013; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013; Pappas 2012
\(^{26}\) Plattner 2007; Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016
world. In particular, such a perspective can illuminate why and how various developing democracies experience populist crises, such as the democratic “backsliding” prevalent especially in the Andes\textsuperscript{27} and Central Europe.\textsuperscript{28} To analyze populism across regions is to study the general conditions under which modern liberal democracies are challenged and to uncover the mechanisms that lead to such challenges. Only such an approach can identify both similar pathologies in radically different context and – even more importantly – the general processes that distort liberal democracies. For these reasons, a cross-regional perspective on populism is necessary if we are to make better sense of general political phenomena such as democracy, democratization, and economic liberalization.

**Comparing Latin America and Post-communist Europe**

In general terms, Latin America and post-communist Europe are two broadly comparable world regions that, although very different from one another, have experienced similar challenges related to relatively recent historical waves of economic and political liberalization.\textsuperscript{29} In particular, the impressive rise and staying power of populist forces in many post-communist European countries presents an excellent opportunity for comparisons with Latin America – the traditional hotbed of populism.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, a comparison between cases in these two regions opens the door for analysis of differences and similarities among a variety of countries that democratized their polities and liberalized their economies in roughly the same period and under similar conditions.

To begin, Latin America and post-communist Europe are distinguished by obvious structural, cultural, historical, and institutional differences. For example, the post-communist region’s “return to Europe” under external conditionality,\textsuperscript{31} its more equitable income

\textsuperscript{27} Mainwaring, Bejarano, Leongómez 2006; Madrid 2012; Levitsky and Loxton 2013
\textsuperscript{28} Plattner 2007; Mesežnikov et al. 2008
\textsuperscript{29} Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996
\textsuperscript{30} Conniff 1999, 2012; de la Torre 2010
\textsuperscript{31} Vachudova 2005
distribution, and weaker pressures for redistribution at the expense of the export sector\textsuperscript{32} signal a different type of geo-political positioning and socio-economic development relative to the Latin American region. In comparison to Latin America’s legacy of (mostly right-wing) authoritarianism, the communist legacy of (left-wing) totalitarianism conditioned weaker civil societies\textsuperscript{33} and a great deal of public skepticism of center-left political alternatives. Differently from Latin America, where states and nations have been relatively well-defined since their emergence from colonial rule in the early 19\textsuperscript{th} century, many post-communist countries recently experienced explicit problems of state- and nation-building. Post-communist countries are parliamentary republics while Latin America’s republics are presidential systems. These surely are differences that account for cross-regional variations with regard to general ideological proclivities, relative coherence of party organizations, and degrees of executive-legislative conflicts.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite these undeniable distinctions, Latin America and post-communist Europe share a number of intriguing general similarities that point to some fascinating parallels in terms of general political and economic developments. Most obviously, both regions are part of the third-wave of democratization,\textsuperscript{35} a process that was mostly driven by elites.\textsuperscript{36} In both contexts, it is the more prosperous countries that have more structured and institutionalized party systems, with the rest featuring party systems that are less stable and coherent than the Western standard\textsuperscript{37} as well as political landscapes that are more personalized.\textsuperscript{38} Moreover, the lack of historically entrenched parties in post-communist Europe is analogous to Latin America’s general absence of mass-bureaucratic parties with stable links to social movements and trade

\textsuperscript{32} Greskovits 1998: 103
\textsuperscript{33} Howard 2003
\textsuperscript{34} Shugart and Carey 1992
\textsuperscript{35} Huntington 1991
\textsuperscript{36} Przeworski 1991; Bunce 2003
\textsuperscript{37} Mainwaring and Torcal 2005
\textsuperscript{38} Tismaneanu 1996
unions. In post-communist Europe, such party weakness allowed the heirs of former patrimonial communists to (re-)establish parties with solid patronage networks of corruption and clientelism, a phenomenon similar in terms of both reasons and functions to what regional observers have called Latin America’s clientelistic populist machines. As a result of such behavior on the part of political elites, publics in both regions have been highly distrustful of liberal democratic institutions, such as parties and legislatures.

In addition to the political equivalences, there also are important similarities in terms of building markets. Most importantly, both regions transitioned from state-led forms of economic development that featured appeals to organized labor, import-substitution, deficit spending, and pro-urban/anti-rural policies into a neoliberal period of decisive economic reforms under the supervision of international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, the initial push towards free markets was far more decisive in some countries, such as Peru and Poland, than in others, such as Ecuador and Slovakia. As I will show, such general similarities in terms of political and economic dynamics conditioned countries in these otherwise very different systems to generally parallel paths of development, especially with regard to populist outcomes after market reforms.

Finally, as emphasized throughout this project, although contemporary post-communist populism is not necessarily “a leftist revolt of the masses” against neoliberalism, it shares important path-dependent sources with Latin America’s Bolivarian populist wave. In particular, the self-reinforcing sequences produced by the political dynamics of market reform implementation during critical junctures culminated in the rise of populist actors that

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39 Levitsky 2001
40 March 2011: 142-4
41 O’Dwyer 2006; Grzymała-Busse 2008
42 Levitsky and Roberts 2011
43 Mishler and Rose 2001; Doyle 2011
44 Greskovits 1998: 106
45 Pop-Eleches 2009
46 Smilov and Krastev 2008: 10
took up economic positions critical of neoliberal reforms in both regions. Because they
tended to appropriate the economic positions of the traditional center-left, successful
populists also shared an important functional role in terms of subsequent party system re-
alignment. The extent to which the causal factors and mechanisms behind such developments
are also similar – regardless of structural, historical, cultural, and institutional peculiarities – is
a question for empirical investigation through the comparative study of Latin American and
post-communist European cases.

1.4. Critical Junctures and Parallel Paths

As already noted, this study adopts a *critical juncture* approach in order to explain
contemporary political developments, such as the uneven rise of populist actors as well as
their varied electoral coalitions. However, specifically because of its cross-regional scope and
its probabilistic argument – developed with both qualitative and quantitative methods – this
study is different both from other analyses of populist outcomes *and* from other studies
invoking critical junctures. Before turning to a discussion of the logic and methods used in
the analysis, next I briefly explain *why* and *how* this study applies the critical juncture
approach in novel ways.

**Why Should We Study Critical Junctures from a Cross-regional Perspective?**

An interesting observation about the study of critical junctures is their pronounced
regional focus. For example, in their influential article on the subject, Slater and Simmons
cite 13 fundamental studies using the critical juncture approach,\(^ {47}\) eleven of which involve
the analysis of a single region or country.\(^ {48}\) Yet, as demonstrated by the two cross-regional

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\(^{47}\) Slater and Simmons 2010

\(^{48}\) The eleven studies that are limited to a single region are McAdam 1982 (United States), Grzymała-Busse
2002 (post-communist Europe), Charrad 2001 (North Africa), Collier and Collier 1991 (Latin America),
Luebbert 1991 (interwar Europe), Kalyvas 1996 (Western Europe), Yashar 1997 and Mahoney 2001 (Central
studies cited in the same article, there can be good theoretical reasons to expand the geographical scope of analysis. A larger geographical scope means greater ability to draw generalizable inferences about the relations between causes in the critical junctures and their effects thereafter.

As already noted, this is not the first study of the effects neoliberal critical junctures create for subsequent outcomes; Roberts has already provided a convincing account for the Latin American context. However, this is the first study to advance an argument about critical junctures and parallel paths in Latin America and post-communist Europe. This extension of analytical scope is directly motivated by three unanswered questions that arise from Roberts’ original study. By answering these questions, this project seeks to contribute to the study of critical junctures both empirically and theoretically.

First, is Roberts’ critical junctures argument applicable to contexts beyond Latin America, and if so, under what conditions? By extending an argument about political developments in Latin America to the post-communist context, the present study provides a broader view of the varying consequences of the Washington Consensus, the leading doctrine for economic development that shaped economic reform efforts in both regions. As I show, just like the political dynamics during critical market reforms created opportunity structures for the rise of populists in Venezuela, Peru, and Ecuador, but not in Brazil, Chile, and the Dominican Republic, similar political dynamics also created an opening for the ascent of populists in Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, but not in many other post-communist countries.

Second, can the critical juncture argument be further specified and tested against rival hypotheses? While Roberts argues that de-aligning critical junctures condition party system volatility and the subsequent rise of populism in Latin America, it remains unclear exactly what elements of party systems become most destabilized in the process leading up to

49 The two studies using a cross-regional perspective – Marx 1998 and Lieberman 2003 – involve comparisons of Brazil and South Africa.
populist success. As I discuss in Chapter 4, there are good theoretical reasons to expect programmatic de-alignment to be associated with higher instability specifically within center-left pillars relative to center-right pillars of party systems. In turn, and as I demonstrate empirically, dynamics of instability within center-left pillars of party systems contribute to the rise of populism more than relative dynamics associated with party systems’ center-right pillars. Additionally, while Roberts’ argument is elegant and convincing, it has not been empirically tested against competing accounts. After further specifying the critical juncture argument, I expand the universe of cases to test its key propositions against many rival explanations about the electoral rise of populism, thereby enhancing the reliability of inferences.

Third, concretely how does political agency during critical junctures matter for subsequent populist outcomes? Whereas Roberts does not specifically explore potentially intriguing distinctions within the de-aligning critical juncture, there are good reasons to suspect that the generally different political dynamics by which programmatic de-alignment may arise can subsequently lead to dissimilar processes and patterns. In the third part of this project, I provide a cross-regional comparative perspective on what I identify as parallel processes. Emanating from two subtypes of programmatic de-alignment – “social-democratic” and “neoliberal-populist” – these parallel processes lead to either populist hegemonies (in Ecuador and Slovakia) or regional polarization (in Peru and Poland), respectively. By pairing cases for cross-regional comparison, I trace the processes that define critical juncture legacies and engage in theory-building.

Therefore, by explicitly comparing critical junctures and parallel paths in two world regions, this project offers both empirical and theoretical contributions. A cross-regional perspective is useful for further specifying and then testing the main argument by expanding the universe of cases as well as for identifying parallel processes of theoretical significance.
In sum, such an analysis tests the general theoretical premises of the critical juncture approach while also offering a more nuanced understanding of how general processes relate causally concrete political dynamics to subsequent outcomes in political development. As the following discussion notes, because the conceptual building blocks of critical junctures are reflected in sufficiently similar empirical developments in Latin America and post-communist Europe, this analytical framework is indeed appropriate for the accumulation of knowledge from a cross-regional perspective.

**How Does This Study Approach Critical Junctures?**

Since the analysis employed in this project is primarily guided by the principles of the critical juncture approach, it is useful to understand how this approach actually works and what problems it poses. Most importantly, debates within critical juncture studies revolve around two key questions – (1) the importance of structure versus agency as a main cause and (2) the pre-determined versus probable nature of outcomes. My work contributes to such debates by combining elements of both agency and structure into a probabilistic explanation from a cross-regional perspective.

To begin, what do critical junctures entail? The concept has been defined somewhat differently by various authors depending on the aspects they wish to emphasize. For Collier and Collier, critical junctures are periods of “significant change” that typically takes place “in distinct ways in different cases” and that is hypothesized to produce distinct consequences. For Mahoney, they are key choice points “in history when the range of possible outcomes is substantially narrowed.”

For Capoccia and Kelemen, critical junctures are “rare events” – relatively short periods of time defined by conditions of uncertainly or contingency “during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the

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50 See Collier and Munck 2017.
51 Collier and Collier 1991: 30
52 Mahoney 2001: 113-4
outcome of interest.\textsuperscript{53} While their definitions vary, most authors seem to identify critical junctures as

important moments of (prospective) change\textsuperscript{54} during which political actors in contingent contexts make consequential decisions that are based on limited options and that likely have long-term consequences.

In general, scholars using this approach distinguish among several “building blocks” of critical junctures.\textsuperscript{55} Each of these conceptual building blocks corresponds to key empirical developments in the two regions under analysis. Although countries within each region did not necessarily experience each of these developments at the same time, each country under analysis experienced all of them. In chronological order, these conceptual building blocks and their relevant empirical equivalents in Latin America and post-communist Europe are:

(1) the \textit{antecedent conditions} representing a structural “base line against which the critical juncture and the legacy are assessed”\textsuperscript{56} – corresponded to the periods before the fall of dictatorships, typically associated with state-led forms of economic development;

(2) the subsequent \textit{cleavage or crisis} arising out of these conditions\textsuperscript{57} – corresponded to the periods of escalating economic crisis, specifically during the transition from ISI (in Latin America) and communism (in post-communist Europe) to economic liberalism in both regions;

(3) the \textit{critical juncture} resolving the crisis – corresponded to the periods of most intense structural adjustment during which political dynamics were crucial; and

(4) the \textit{legacy} of the critical juncture characterized by mechanisms of production and reproduction\textsuperscript{58} – corresponded to the “post-neoliberal” period\textsuperscript{59} during which populist reactions materialized in some countries but not in others.

\textsuperscript{53} Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348, 368. For these authors, not all junctures are equally critical. The greater the probability that choice affects outcomes and the shorter the juncture, the more critical it is (2007: 360-1).
\textsuperscript{54} For Capoccia and Kelemen, change is not a necessary element of critical junctures and can only be a potentiality (2007: 348). In this, they differ from Collier and Collier who emphasized the importance of change in their seminal work on critical junctures in Latin America (1991).
\textsuperscript{55} Collier and Collier 1991: 30
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{58} Collier and Collier 1991: 30; Collier and Munck 2017
\textsuperscript{59} For post-neoliberalism in Latin America, see Leiva 2008, Macdonald and Rucker 2009, Burdick, Oxhorn, and Roberts 2009, and Panizza 2009. For post-neoliberalism in Central Eastern Europe, see Boschi and Santana 2013.
Overall, the critical juncture approach entails important elements of historical structure (in the first two steps), agency (in the third step), and outcome (in the final step). Its temporal sequence makes it evident that to study critical junctures means to study the relationship between causes, which can be driven by either structure or agency, and subsequent outcomes, which can be either pre-determined or probabilistic.

**Agency and Structure**

Many scholars disagree with regard to the epistemological status of antecedent conditions vis-à-vis contingent factors inherent in subsequent critical juncture. At its core, this question about the causal weight of what happens before and during critical junctures embodies the familiar debate about structure versus agency in social science.\(^{\text{60}}\) In particular, are critical junctures a matter of divergence that is structurally-based or agency-based?\(^{\text{61}}\) On one side in this debate are scholars – such as Faletti, Lynch, Slater, and Simmons – who posit that what is actually “critical” are underlying structures prior to agency. Emphasizing “causal factors preceding a critical juncture,”\(^{\text{62}}\) such scholars argue against voluntarism because they see the choices political agents make during critical junctures as heavily conditioned by critical antecedents.\(^{\text{63}}\) Scholars in the opposite camp – such as Kalyvas, Yashar, Mahoney, Roberts, Capoccia, and Kelemen – underscore the criticalness of the juncture during which political agents’ choices create causal effects.\(^{\text{64}}\) By emphasizing “short-term perturbations”\(^{\text{65}}\) and contingencies rather than historical antecedents, these authors prioritize the primacy of

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\(^{\text{60}}\) Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997

\(^{\text{61}}\) Capoccia 2015.

\(^{\text{62}}\) Slater and Simmons 2010: 889, 911. Also, see Capoccia (2015) who clarifies that although not all of Slater and Simmon’s examples or critical antecedents can be considered structural, these authors explicitly seek “deeper structural forces” and “long-term causal factors.”

\(^{\text{63}}\) Faletti and Lynch 2009. These authors posit that the most classic works on critical junctures – such as those of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Collier and Collier (1991) – “embed critical junctures in a richly detailed context” (2009: 1155). Slater and Simmons argue that antecedent conditions are in fact critical antecedents that heavily influence political agency during critical junctures, which are defined as periods of marked divergence with causes that are found in structural factors (2010: 889).

\(^{\text{64}}\) Roberts 2017: 13

agents’ choices for subsequent institutional development.\(^{66}\)

Rather than settle such a vibrant (and unresolvable) debate,\(^ {67}\) my study contributes to it by underscoring the strikingly similar ways in which structure and agency interact to condition political development in radically different contexts. For example, in the second part of this project, where I use intermediate-N and large-N analyses, I find evidence that the agency implicated in political dynamics during critical junctures is equally important in Latin America and post-communist Europe. For instance, center-left leadership of market reforms conditioned high probabilities of subsequent populist electoral success in both regions. However, from the more focused paired comparisons in the third part of the project, I also find evidence linking antecedent conditions before the critical juncture to agents’ choices during it. For instance, in Peru and Poland, the historical antecedent of labor mobilization resulted in high-intensity hyperinflationary crises that were resolved via critical junctures featuring neoliberal-populist leadership in contexts of center-left de-legitimation. By contrast, in Ecuador and Slovakia, the historical antecedent of labor de-mobilization conditioned lower-intensity economic crises that were resolved via critical junctures defined by the leadership of (still-legitimate) social democratic actors.

In sum, I show how analogous historical antecedents culminate in parallel crises that, in turn, trigger similar critical junctures in dissimilar contexts. Yet as I also analyze the historical contingencies inherent in the critical junctures of Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia, I do not advance a deterministic argument. Instead, I concur with scholars who believe that antecedent conditions can, at best, provide insight into – rather a determination of


\(^{67}\) See the 2017 “Symposium on Critical Junctures and Historical Legacies” in Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, Vol. 15, No. 1
– political dynamics\textsuperscript{68} and that critical junctures likely combine elements of both structure and agency.\textsuperscript{69} Overall, I study critical junctures by prioritizing agency but without ignoring how agency and structure interact to shape parallel paths in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

\textit{Probability, Not Determinism}

Critical junctures define historical developments because they are followed by path dependent processes during which their legacies become solidified and stabilized.\textsuperscript{70} Featuring both mechanisms of production and reproduction, these legacies reflect the structural persistence of institutional outcomes through reactive sequences.\textsuperscript{71} These reactive sequences can feature “temporal separations” between short-term causes during the critical juncture and eventual outcomes thereafter.\textsuperscript{72} Importantly, while the legacies of the critical juncture may or may not crystalize immediately, there develops a high probability of what Pierson calls “increasing returns.”\textsuperscript{73} In Mahoney’s words, “once a particular option is selected [during the critical juncture] it becomes progressively more difficult [although not impossible] to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available.”\textsuperscript{74}

Critical junctures, therefore, define history by restricting subsequent choice. At the same time, however, if Max Weber is correct and historical events are “inevitably of a specifically unique and individual character,”\textsuperscript{75} then \textit{all history is inherently contingent}. It is for this reason that critical junctures can only condition, rather than strictly determine, agents’

\textsuperscript{68} Collier and Munck 2017: 5. Even though Slater and Simmons (2010: 896-8) cite Collier and Collier’s \textit{Shaping the Political Arena} as an example where antecedent conditions do most of the causal work, the position of the authors of the book is more nuanced.
\textsuperscript{69} See Soifer, who argues that critical junctures feature historically determined “productive conditions” and necessary but insufficient “permissive conditions” that are shaped by exogenous (and contingent) factors. The combination of these two types of conditions is necessary and sufficient for explaining divergence as a product of critical junctures (2012: 1575-6).
\textsuperscript{70} Mahoney 2000
\textsuperscript{71} Collier and Collier 1991: 30-1
\textsuperscript{72} Pierson 2004
\textsuperscript{73} Pierson 2000
\textsuperscript{74} Mahoney 2000: 513. My addition in parentheses for emphasis of probabilism.
\textsuperscript{75} Weber 1930 (1992): 14
choices – both during and after critical junctures. Indeed, as discussed by Collier and Munck, “it is possible that the legacy of critical junctures entails causal patterns that are strong enough to yield substantial interval of persistence, yet are not fully deterministic.76

As I show in this project, critical junctures conditioned paths towards varied probabilities of populism’s subsequent electoral success and constituency patterns. As these parallel paths are not deterministic, it is likely that equivalent political dynamics during critical junctures define subsequent outcomes. By combining agency and structure into a historically contingent theory of institutional development (Chapter 4), I argue that similar political choices matter for shaping parallel historical paths in radically different contexts. To do so, I develop an analytical approach that avoids what Dunning calls the “inevitability framework” typically associated with qualitative research77 and instead emphasizes probabilistic causality.

1.5. Research Design, Methods, and Data

To effectively analyze the relationship between critical junctures and a complex phenomenon like populism from a cross-regional perspective including many cases requires a variety of research approaches and techniques. Overall, this analysis mixes qualitative and quantitative methods in a framework that consistently combines “most similar” and “most different” systems78 and uses an array of data sources, including over 100 interviews in four countries on two continents. Together, these methods and approaches to inquiry provide considerable leverage for understanding variable causes, effects, and processes associated with critical junctures across world regions.

76 Collier and Munck 2017: 8
77 Dunning 2017: 41
78 Przeworski and Teune 1970. Because I combine these two types of systems, I essentially use an overall logic of inquiry that is similar in spirit (although different in overall geographical coverage) to the one adopted by Collier and Collier (1991) in their landmark study of critical junctures in 20th century Latin America.
Logic of Inquiry

This study’s logic of inquiry involves six key steps. Having (1) conceptualized populism and (2) identified patterns of variation in the dependent variable (electoral support for populist actors), (3) I develop a theory that I then subject to (4) large-N empirical testing as well as to (5) further empirical verification and (6) theoretical refinement through process-tracing in paired comparisons. As a result of this obviously iterative process of inquiry adopted for Latin American and post-communist European developments analyzed separately and together, I engage in both theory-testing and theory-building. Specifically, by using different logics of empirical inquiry in the second and third parts of the project, I seek to facilitate analytical complementarity and rigor.

The probabilistic theory that I develop (in Chapter 4) involves three steps. In the first step, I hypothesize that the main independent variable (type of critical juncture) conditions a key intervening variable (center-left electoral performance, which is theoretically related to prior center-left economic positioning during and after critical junctures). In the second step, I hypothesize that the key intervening variable, which is theoretically prior to the dependent variable, inversely affects electoral support for populists in both regions. Put simply, types of critical junctures are hypothesized to condition the subsequent likelihood of center-left electoral success, which, in turn, is hypothesized to condition the subsequent likelihood of electoral support for populist actors in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

I test empirically both steps of this core probabilistic theory by utilizing intermediate-N (Chapter 5) and large-N (Chapter 6) quantitative analyses of results from democratic elections (the unit of analysis) in both regions conceptualized as two distinct sets of “most similar” systems.79 For elections to be included in the analysis as cases, they must have been democratic – a reason why I exclude elections held during periods when populist incumbents

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79 To clarify, countries within Latin America belong to one set while countries within post-communist Europe belong to another set of “most similar” systems.
could have potentially consolidated (competitive) authoritarian rule.\footnote{In other words, I am interested in the rise of populism in both regions, not in populists’ capacity to potentially abuse executive power. For a discussion of operationalizations and a list of relevant cases included in the analysis, see Chapter 6 and the accompanying Appendix J.} Additionally, I analyze elections held within states that were independent for at least 10 years prior to 2015, which is considered as the last year of the analyzed post-critical juncture period. Because the year 2015 is associated with important new developments in Latin America and post-communist Europe,\footnote{Namely, the end of the commodities boom thought to have facilitated pink-wave populists in Latin America and the beginning of the refuge crisis that could be conceptualized as a new critical juncture in Europe.} this analysis assumes that by the end of 2015 the aftermath of the neoliberal critical juncture had run its course in both regions. Overall, for the relevant post-critical juncture period, the resulting universe of cases includes a total of 153 democratic national-level elections – 83 presidential in Latin America and 70 parliamentary in post-communist Europe\footnote{Analyzing different types of national elections for the two regions is appropriate due to difference of overall systems. See Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, who likewise analyze presidential leaders in Latin America’s presidential systems and parties in Europe’s parliamentary republics (2013: 156-7).} – in the aftermath of critical junctures in 33 countries in both regions\footnote{For the end of critical juncture in each country, see Appendix D.} (18 in Latin America; 15 in post-communist Europe).

Overall, in the second part of the project, I test the hypothesized relationships between the variables of interest by using a sufficiently large number of (election) cases while holding region-specific factors constant. While I find strong correlations between temporarily prior explanatory variables and the subsequent dependent variable, I also make initial sense of the general processes that link causes and effects in Latin America and post-communist Europe as two very different systems.

Having eliminated competing explanatory variables in the second part of the project, I next turn to an assessment of causal complexities and temporal reactive sequences. In particular, in the third part of the project, I use a 2x2 \textit{strategy for qualitative comparison}\footnote{For an excellent example of the 2x2 comparative strategy, see Thelen 2004.}. This strategy of “dual process tracing” embodies a combination of “most similar” and “most different” systems designs geared towards analyzing causal mechanisms within and across
regions.\textsuperscript{85} By tracing historical processes that diverge in relatively similar systems but converge in radically different systems, the paired comparisons offer concrete empirical and theoretical contributions. First, they allow me uncover similar mechanisms linking hypothesized variables of interest in different regions, thereby further validating the core theory. Second, the paired comparisons facilitate the development of a more specific theory about how variable political dynamics (i.e., causes) within otherwise similarly de-aligning critical junctures can result in divergent outcomes regarding the electoral coalitions of populist actors that are otherwise comparably successful in national elections. Above all, because they elaborate mechanisms via which analogous outcomes are explained by similar factors despite the great differences between Latin American and post-communist European settings, the paired comparisons provide critical support for this study’s central insight about parallel paths in dissimilar contexts.

**Paired Comparisons**

The selection of countries for paired comparisons is based on an intriguing but unexplored variation in the main explanatory variable\textsuperscript{86} – the critical juncture itself. While Roberts has already provided a cogent comparative-historical analysis linking programmatically aligning and de-aligning critical junctures to divergent outcomes in Latin America, variations in terms of political agency in charge of reforms specifically within de-aligning critical junctures have not been explored.\textsuperscript{87} Yet there are good theoretical and normative reasons why such (more intricate) variations in the main independent variable are worth studying. First, because the critical juncture analysis prioritizes the role of agency, it is

\textsuperscript{85} For an elaboration of the advantages of paired comparisons and “dual process tracing” in terms of assessing causal inference and theory-building, see Tarrow 2010.  
\textsuperscript{86} See King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 115-49) and Geddes (2003) for discussions of how selection on the independent variable minimizes bias.  
\textsuperscript{87} In all of the countries for which Roberts (2014) studies path dependencies after de-aligning critical junctures, it was either social democratic or traditional populist parties that implemented crucial reforms. He does not trace processes related to the unique case of Peru, which experienced a “neoliberal-populist” de-aligning critical juncture.
theoretically possible that differences in terms of agency – even during otherwise similar de-aligning junctures – would produce somewhat variable outcomes. Indeed, such a finding would lend further support to the main general theory linking political agency and subsequent developments. Second, dynamics within specifically de-aligning critical junctures are of potential normative significance as they are hypothesized to lead to especially acute crises of democratic representation.

From a methodological perspective, I select countries for paired comparisons based on matching patterns that allow me the verify if the empirical record validates the proposed causal mechanisms.\(^88\) Empirically, because the Andes and Central Europe have been particularly afflicted by populism\(^89\) in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures, countries within these sub-regions are excellent candidates for paired comparisons with a view to uncovering causal mechanisms. I select Peru and Ecuador in the Andes and Poland and Slovakia in Central Europe as two pairs of “most similar” systems. Indeed, countries within each regional pair are neighbors featuring comparable economic development, (predominantly Catholic) culture, institutional frameworks, and international status. While Poland and Slovakia additionally share histories of national-accommodative communism and relative liberalization before its fall,\(^90\) Peru and Ecuador also share comparably sized indigenous populations, traditions of economic inequality, histories of political instability, somewhat uniquely “leftist” military dictatorships before democratization, and comparatively “late” post-ISI reforms.\(^91\)

\(^{88}\) Seawright and Gerring 2008; Goertz 2008


\(^{90}\) For relevant similarities between Poland and Slovakia, see Kitschelt et al. 1999, Grzymala-Busse 2002, Bohle and Greskovits 2012, and Chapter 8 in this work.

\(^{91}\) For relevant similarities between Peru and Ecuador, see Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005, Kitschelt et al. 2010: 335-6, Madrid 2012, and Chapter 7 in this work.
These countries also experienced the political ascendance of broadly similar populist actors that initially rose to comparable national prominence at roughly similar times (the middle of the first decade of the 21st century) – presidential candidates Rafael Correa and Ollanta Humala in Ecuador and Peru, respectively, and the populist parties Law and Justice (PiS) and Direction (SMER), in Poland and Slovakia, respectively. Before rising to executive power, these authentic populist actors exhibited striking similarities that distinguish them from populist actors in other countries within the Andes and Central Europe. They all began as political outsiders (in the Andes) or mavericks (in Central Europe) that built brand new personalistic organizations and attacked both the political and economic establishments. They all did so by positioning themselves on the economic left and socio-cultural right as well as by embracing nationalist rhetoric. Due to such commonalities, populists in the four countries are particularly interesting to study together.

Although these similar populist actors also performed similarly in national elections, they varied in terms of the relative breath of their electoral coalitions. Whereas populists in Ecuador and Slovakia overcame regional cleavages and were consistently supported by broader (i.e., highly nationalized) constituencies, populists in Peru and Poland were more limited by persistent patterns of regional polarization according to which their constituencies were more geographically circumscribed. This nuance is important as the outcomes in these four countries can be interpreted as both “similar” and “different.” From a perspective focused on overall performance in national elections, the outcomes are similar – all four populist actors achieved comparable results at the ballot box. From a perspective focused on their electoral coalitions, however, the outcomes within each regional pair are very different.

92 I.e., these populist actors share more with one another than with other relevant populist actors in other countries within the Andean and Central European sub-regions. In the Andes, Venezuela’s (extensively studied) case of Chávez marked the initiation of the “pink-populist” wave (and therefore differs from following cases in terms of international context) while Bolivia’s case of Morales/MAS began as a social, rather than personalistic, movement. In Central Europe, the Hungarian case of Fidesz was not a “new” party in the way PiS and SMER were.

93 See Chapter 10 for Ecuador and Slovakia and Chapter 11 for Peru and Poland.
My 2x2 framework for paired comparisons allows me to explore the processes associated with these outcome similarities and differences. With an eye towards the similarity, my approach allows me to uncover the mechanisms hypothesized in the core argument of the project. With an eye towards the difference, the comparative framework allows me to identify parallel processes leading to outcomes that diverge within regions but converge across regions after de-aligning critical junctures. I engage in comparative historical analysis in two steps. First, I compare the antecedent conditions of intra-regional “most similar” systems and show that key market reforms during otherwise similarly de-aligning critical junctures can, for historical reasons, be led by either social democrats (in Ecuador and Slovakia) or neoliberal populists (in Peru and Poland). Second, by analyzing developments in cross-regional “most different” systems (first, of Ecuador and Slovakia, and second, of Peru and Poland), I show strikingly parallel paths and legacies emanating from variable political dynamics during peak market reforms. These parallel paths are sketched below in Figure 1.1, which summarizes this project’s core and secondary arguments by relating historical developments in the four countries to the conceptual building blocks of critical juncture analysis.

**Figure 1.1. Paired comparisons: causes, processes, and outcomes**
In sum, by pairing “most similar” and “most different” systems at sequential stages of the comparative analysis, I illuminate the complex temporal mechanisms linking antecedent conditions, critical junctures, and institutional legacies. As suggested in the figure, the comparisons also offer insights about Collier and Munck’s “intervals of persistence” and Pierson’s “temporal separations” between causes and effects. Overall, while these path dependent trajectories seem to be related to intriguingly equivalent historical antecedents regarding labor (de-)mobilization, the causal weight belongs to the political agency that resolved variable types of crises during critical junctures. It is the 2x2 comparative strategy that allows me to uncover parallel processes across regional contexts and to refine the core theory linking political agency and subsequent path dependencies.

**Research and Data**

At every step of the analysis, this project makes extensive use of a wide variety of empirical data sources encompassing three main categories: (1) secondary sources including readily available quantitative data; (2) quantitative data created by the author; and (3) primary fieldwork featuring 100 interviews.

First, I draw from the secondary literature on populism, economic reform and political developments in both regions as well as on the domestic politics and histories of the four countries selected for paired comparisons. Based on my critical reading of this literature, I develop an original conceptualization of populism, ground my categorizations of relevant political actors, understand theoretical debates, and inform myself about the historical developments I analyze.

**Available Quantitative Data**

Throughout the project, I make use of a wide variety of quantitative data. Two important types are *national election data* for all countries under analysis, which I draw from

For the quantitative analysis, I also constructed a rich dataset by systematically collecting data on economic, political, societal, institutional, and international relations variables, as well as public opinion data from Latinobarómetro, the World Values Survey (WVS), and the European Social Survey (ESS). All data sources used in the statistical analysis are too many to list here; they are available in the footnotes in Chapter 6. For the case studies, I use data from national institutions – Ecuador’s Central Bank (BCE), Peru’s National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI), Poland’s Central Statistical Office (CSOP), and Slovakia’s Statistical Office (SOSR). Where necessary, I triangulated such data with data from other sources, such as the more “conservative” Heritage Foundation and the World Inequality Database (WID) led by “progressive” economist Thomas Piketty.

**Original Quantitative Data**

To facilitate the analysis, I created four new datasets. First, my “populism index” measures the dependent variable by scoring “populist” attributes in anti-establishment actors based on expert surveys and the secondary literature (Chapter 3). Second, my “liberalization index,” based on data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), is used to identify critical junctures by measuring speed and depth of market reforms in 15 post-communist countries (Chapter 5). I also use this index in the case studies, along with comparable indices that are available for Latin America (Chapters 7-9). Third, my “volatility dataset” – measuring electoral instability in post-communist countries (by distinguishing
between extra- and intra-systemic types of electoral volatility) – is instrumental for the study of party system after critical junctures (Chapter 5).

Finally, my “party nationalization dataset” is the base for measuring the breadth of electoral coalitions, which I discuss in the final three chapters and especially in the conclusion. To create this data, I followed Bochsler’s (2010) mathematical method for deriving weighted Party Nationalization Scores (wPNSs), which is extensively discussed in Appendix Q. My wPNS dataset includes over 1,300 observations calculated with subnational-level election data for all candidates and parties in all presidential and congressional elections in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia during the relevant period of study. To construct this dataset, I used input from eight main sources. For Ecuador, I utilized data from the National Election Council (CNE), Polga-Hecimovich (2014), and Mustillo’s (2012) dataset in the Latin American Electronic Data Archive (LEADA). For Peru, I primarily took data from the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) and Tuesda Soldevilla’s “Data Política” collection. For Slovakia, I used data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR), while for Poland I mostly relied on data sent to me by officials at the National Election Commission (PKW). Where necessary, I supplemented with data from the Constituency-Level Election Archive (CLEA) of the University of Michigan.

**Qualitative Data from Fieldwork**

To really make sense of developmental paths to populism in radically different contexts, in 2015 and 2016 I conducted research trips to the four countries included in the paired comparisons. More specifically, I spent spring 2015 in Poland and Slovakia, fall 2015 in Peru, and summer 2016 in Ecuador. Throughout this fieldwork, I collected a plethora of qualitative data by conducting over 100 interviews with individuals who helped me understand political developments in each country. The interviews were open-ended, taped where permitted, and anywhere from half an hour to well over three hours in length.
Because of the nature of populism, which pits elites versus “the people,” I interviewed individuals that can be included in both of these categories. Some of them were political elites – such as parliamentarian Krzysztof Szczereski and former senator Peter Boron in Poland, deputy speaker of parliament Miroslav Čiž and former minister of education and mayor of Bratislava Milan Ftáčník in Slovakia, left-leaning congressman Sergio Tejada and (subsequent candidate for mayor of Lima) Luis Enrique Gálvez in Peru, and former presidential candidates Diego Delgado Jara and Martha Roldós (also daughter of former president Jaime Roldós) in Ecuador. Another category of elites I interviewed were experts, such as academics, journalists, and political analysts and consultants. Among “the people,” I also interviewed two types of individuals: populist party functionaries – activists, district-level organizers, and youth leaders, and regular citizens – voters with strong views in favor or against the populist phenomena I studied in their countries.

Listed chronologically in Appendix A, the interviews with these individuals were aimed at understanding how both elites and regular citizens make sense of links between historical developments and contemporary realities in Poland, Slovakia, Peru, and Ecuador. Together, these individuals gave me hundreds or hours during which they shared with me memories, experiences, and interpretations about the political paths of their countries. Finally, I also attended several party meetings and events organized by Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland as well as by APRA and the Peruvian Nationalist Party in Peru. Because they allowed me to gain a better understanding of the populist syndrome across regions, the fieldwork interviews and experiences inform all stages of my analysis.

In short, this project combines a variety of analytical approaches as well as quantitative and qualitative data from a wide range of sources. By combining different approaches, methods, and data, I develop, test, and elaborate the core arguments of my work.

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94 See the appendix for more details and for information regarding confidentiality.
Most importantly, I do so by incorporating a number of analytical perspectives with the perspectives of both elites and “the people” that I interviewed – individual citizens who may be very different, but who have been similarly touched by the populist syndrome.

1.6. The Path Ahead

The project is organized in three main parts following the main logic of inquiry. In Part I, I define populism as a family resemblance concept suitable for cross-regional analysis (Chapter 2), based on which I then derive empirical measures and identify variation in Latin American and post-communist European countries (Chapter 3). Having defined and measured the populist syndrome, in Chapter 4 I develop a theory to explain variable patterns in both regions. In Part II, I take a macro-comparative perspective that analyses developments in 33 countries in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Specifically, I study the hypothesized links between critical junctures and subsequent party system developments in Chapter 5, and then test the main theory with methods for quantitative analysis in Chapter 6. The results from the empirical analysis in Part II support the project’s core argument developed in Part I.

In Part III, I uncover variable mechanisms through paired comparisons. Chapters 7 and 8 analyze antecedent conditions and crises in “most similar” systems in the Andes and Central Europe. Chapter 9 locates and discusses “social-democratic” critical junctures in Ecuador and Slovakia and “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures” in Peru and Poland, while also examining historical contingencies in all four countries. Based on these generally similar types of critical junctures, I next analyze parallel paths in “most different” systems across regions. Chapter 10 studies parallel paths leading to broad electoral coalitions and populist hegemonies in Ecuador and Slovakia. Chapter 11 explores parallel paths towards regional polarization and populist phenomena in secondary roles in Peru and Poland. Finally, Chapter 12 summarizes my findings and elaborates the importance of societal coalitions (rather than
institutional factors) for the divergent legacies of success versus failure to establish long-term populist domination after de-aligning critical junctures (in the aftermath of which populists are otherwise similarly viable at the ballot box). I conclude by highlighting this work’s implications for the study of populism and critical junctures in comparative perspective.

Overall, then, this is a project about critical junctures and parallel paths in different context. In it, I hope to show that as historical events define “striking and infinitely exciting” parallel paths of political development, societies react in comparable ways. If the populist syndrome is a truly global phenomenon, then “the people” it claims to represent can, and often do, share similar experiences. It is indeed such experiences that reinforce our shared impulses as humans who define evolving realities and are, in turn, defined by them.
2.
POPOPULISM AS A CONCEPT: RECOGNIZING FAMILY RESEMBLANCE

2.1. Introduction

Populism is once again in view on the world stage, and thus critical as ever to the study of comparative politics. Political actors referred to as “populists” routinely gain ground throughout Latin American and post-communist European countries.¹ In some countries – such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Hungary, and Poland – populists dominate executive power and undermine horizontal accountability by attacking independent media and the judiciary, all while choosing unmediated forms of communication with their followers.

While populism’s authoritarian tendencies provoke intense interest in this ever-elusive phenomenon, the comparative study of populism remains a contentious intellectual enterprise in which there rarely is consensus even on fundamental definitional issues. Faced with conceptual discord, scholars have raced towards ever more minimal definitions in their quest to capture the essence of a complex political phenomenon. In their studies, they routinely select cases for comparisons based on vaguely defined definitional attributes – such as “anti-establishment” appeals or “thin-centered” ideology – assumed to be not only necessary and sufficient criteria, but also empirically harmonious. As a result, scholars routinely either make subjective calls regarding what phenomena qualify as “populist” or fail to capture what is most typical of populist phenomena worthy of the name – their multidimensional and internally incongruent nature.

This chapter takes a different approach to the conceptualization of populism. It recognizes that in empirical reality as well as in scholarly work, the word populism is actually used in many, and often contradictory, ways. Contrary to standard approaches emphasizing

¹ By “political actor” I mean both organizations, such as parties, and individual politicians, such as candidates, presidents, or prime ministers. This approach is similar to the one used by Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2013).
necessary conditions, I argue that it is possible to approach populism as sufficiently adaptable, but not overly general, conceptual construct while also accounting for the variegated nature of the actual phenomena the concept describes. Furthermore, I contend that analytical discipline can be imposed and meaningful comparisons can be made if authors use flexible and empirically realistic concepts that focus on similarities of populism’s disaggregated attributes as identified through family resemblance. Thus, in addition to a re-conceptualization of populism as a phenomenon featuring dissimilar elements, in this chapter, I lay the conceptual groundwork for the selection of cases and measurement procedures developed in the following Chapter 3.

I begin by discussing the pitfalls of leading definitions which, I argue, tend to prioritize various conceptual attributes based on scholars’ subjective understandings of populism as an illiberal threat. Second, I construct a non-hierarchical and multidimensional family resemblance concept based on the three most common approaches to the study of populism – discourse, ideology, and organization. I examine these three approaches to identify relevant family resemblance attributes which, although not necessary conditions, are nevertheless useful for the recognition of real-world phenomena typically referred to as “populist.” Third, I note some important – and frequently conflicting – relationships among definitional attributes and discuss how populism is best understood as a highly incongruent phenomenon that cannot be accommodated by definitions based on necessary and sufficient conditions. Fourth, by surveying dominant categories of anti-establishment actors, I distinguish a set of core attributes that are most typically associated with what is called “populism.” Based on some of these core attributes, in the following chapter, I develop procedures for case selection and measurement based on empirical data.

Critically, to re-conceptualize populism as a multidimensional and incongruent analytical category, as this chapter does, is not the same as to simply offer another definition.
Rather than defining populism in exclusively discursive, ideological, or organizational terms, the proposed conceptual framework seeks to identify and integrate attributes from various distinctive domains, thus placing an emphasis on “recognizing” rather than strictly “defining” in minimalistic terms. Indeed, most populist phenomena feature discursive, ideological, and organizational attributes, all of which can weigh prominently in empirical reality. To elaborate the conceptual framework, I follow Wittgenstein's logic for recognizing family resemblance and specifically conform to Collier and Mahon's guidelines for conceptual development. Overall, I contend that when employing contested concepts such as populism, instead of seeking minimal definitions that assume internal conceptual consistency, a more fruitful procedure is to identify empirically relevant family resemblance attributes by which cases can be meaningfully compared based on recognizable aggregations of overlapping attributes. In turn, such a recognition can be usefully employed for the analysis of relevant populist phenomena in otherwise distinct spatial or temporal contexts, such as those found in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

2.2. Problematizing Definitions of Populism Based on Necessary and Sufficient Conditions

In line with fashionable minimalistic conceptualizations of liberal democracy, leading scholars of Latin American populism have moved away from richer cumulative concepts and towards more minimal definitions of populism as a political strategy deployed for the purposes of acquiring or maintaining “control of government, policy and core values.” In this view, populist strategies usually include the instrumental use of rhetoric holding in low esteem the existing institutions of representative democracy, support from large numbers of voters, and the presence of a personalistic leader. Differently from previous cumulative and economistic

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2 Collier and Mahon 1993
3 Przeworski et al. 2000
4 Roberts (1995), Weyland (2001), and Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) provide adequate criticism of historical definitions, which I will not repeat here.
5 Hawkins 2009: 1042
concepts, definitions of populism as a political strategy do not depend on ideological correlates *a priori*, but leave them open to empirical investigation.\(^6\) Such re-formulations of populism as a political strategy have enriched our understanding of a highly flexible phenomenon which can be combined with various ideologies in order to ultimately undermine liberal democracy,\(^7\) the dominant post-Cold War paradigm.

At the same time, because they tend to me minimal, most post-Cold War definitions of populism usually rely on necessary and sufficient conditions based on which cases are counted as populist or not. This is the case both for classical concepts, which demand a set of such attributes, and for radial concepts, which, although not minimal, require the identification of at least one such attribute\(^8\) for the purposes of concept formation. For example, in his advocacy of classical concepts, Weyland defines populism as an opportunistic political strategy with two necessary and sufficient criteria: uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of people and personalistic leadership. Based on this definition, Weyland, distinguishes between two subtypes of populism – (1) the neopopulism of the 1990s relying on unorganized mass support and appeals towards the whole citizenry and (2) the classical populism of mid-century Latin America relying on appeals to a multi-class coalition featuring most prominently the working classes.\(^9\) Having made this distinction, Weyland argues that the neopopulism of the 1990s is even “more populist” than classical populism due to its lower level of institutionalization.\(^10\) Intriguingly, such an argument would also amount to the dubious proposition that because the movement led by Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) was less organized than the one led by Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (1998-2013),\(^11\) the former was more populist than the latter. Furthermore, Weyland’s focus on personalism has also been criticized due to its

\(^{6}\) Weyland 2001  
\(^{7}\) Krastev 2007; Pappas 2016  
\(^{8}\) The one necessary and sufficient attribute required for radial concepts is what Collier and Mahon refer to as the “central subcategory” (1993: 848-50)  
\(^{9}\) Weyland 2001  
\(^{10}\) Ibid.: 16  
\(^{11}\) Roberts 2006
emphasis on “great man theorizing” to the detriment of other aspects of equal importance in populist politics.\textsuperscript{12}

More recently, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser have advanced an even more minimal and abstract conceptualization of populism as a \textit{thin-centered ideology} which depicts society as separated between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite and argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people.”\textsuperscript{13} While correcting for Weyland’s emphasis on personalist leadership, their definition encounters other problems, both operational and logical. First, Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser criticize Laclau’s discursive approach but do not distinguish between their definition of populism as ideology and anti-establishment discourse that makes similar Manichaean arguments and moralistic claims. How do we distinguish ideology from discourse, if, as pointed out by Kriesi and Pappas, “populism as an ideology manifests itself in specific discursive patterns”?\textsuperscript{14} Second, it appears that for Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, anyone who uses populist ideology is a legitimate populist. Yet, as others have discussed, this is not necessarily the case; there needs to be a distinction between those who make Manichaean arguments legitimately and those who do not.\textsuperscript{15} Third, considering Sartori’s requirement that \textit{highly abstract concepts are best defined through negation},\textsuperscript{16} it remains unclear how populism, which has not one but two opposites – elitism and pluralism,\textsuperscript{17} is to be negated in a logical and systematic sense. Overall, defining populism minimally as a classical concept is theoretically problematic because this strategy prioritizes specific dimensions, such as level of organization or type of ideology, without consideration of other attributes, such as discourse, that may be equally relevant.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 10
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 8
\item \textsuperscript{14} Kriesi and Pappas 2015
\item \textsuperscript{15} Barr 2009
\item \textsuperscript{16} For Sartori, to define by negation, or \textit{ex adverso}, is to say what a concept is not (1970: 1043).
\item \textsuperscript{17} Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 3
\end{itemize}
An alternative to classical concepts of populism are radial concepts, which underscore the multidimensional nature of populism. As a rule, radial concepts identify prototypical cases sharing core properties, only some of which are necessary and sufficient criteria, as well as secondary cases (or subtypes), which do not share all the core properties of the prototypical concept.\(^{18}\) However, because they also feature at least one necessary and sufficient criterion, radial definitions face their own challenges. First, it remains unclear how the central core properties that anchor the populist category are to be identified. For example, in their study of populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes, Levitsky and Loxton view populism “as a semi-radial category” in which anti-establishment appeals are the central attribute present in all cases of populism.\(^{19}\) Yet the central attribute could also have been personalism or even outsider status, both of which other scholars consider to be core properties of populism.\(^{20}\) A second problem of radial concepts is that they unjustifiably create a hierarchy of populisms based on properties present in some cases but absent in others.\(^{21}\) For instance, Latin American populism can be taken as an example of full-instance populism due to personalistic and paternalistic patterns of leadership that are more likely to emerge in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems. As a result, populism in parliamentary systems might unjustifiably be denigrated to a subtype of the Latin American prototypical variety. Thus, although radical concepts problematize one-dimensional understandings of populism, they have their own problems. Like classical concepts, radical concepts are often based on the subjective selection of anchor attributes, which can, in turn, privilege some cases as “more populist” than others.

Overall, while standard conceptualizations of populism recognize the flexibility of a complex empirical phenomenon, the necessary and sufficient conditions that both classical and radial concepts require pose a considerable problem for the empirical study of phenomena.

\(^{18}\) Roberts 1995; Levitsky and Loxton 2013
\(^{19}\) Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 110
\(^{20}\) See Weyland (2001) for personalism and Barr (2009) for outsider status.
\(^{21}\) Weyland 2001
understood as “populist.” As such definitions are based on authors’ individual preferences for some core attributes over others, authors often construct universes of populist cases based on disputable prioritization of criteria. Especially when such criteria are defined in broad and abstract terms, as in the case of populism as a thin-centered ideology, any political actor can be defined as populist – or non-populist – based on subjective understandings regarding what constitutes the populist ideology, itself usually analyzed as some sort of illiberalism. As a result of their efforts to arrive at ever more minimal definitions of populism, many scholars often identify as “populist” those cases that their individual judgment deems illiberal.

**Defining per Genus et Differentiam**

If diverse instances of populism are equally valid, a procedure for categorizing cases as “populist” must recognize the multidimensional and non-hierarchical nature of their empirical characteristics. By contrast, failure to recognize conceptual multidimensionality can lead to problems of “concept misformation,” an example of which are highly abstract concepts that can undermine meaningful comparative analysis. To overcome such problems, Sartori argued for “bring[ing] together assimilation and differentiation, relatively high explanatory power and a relatively precise descriptive content, macro-theory and empirical testing,” and recommended a focus on middle level categories, definitions by analysis (i.e., *per genus et differentiam*), and a balance of denotation with connotation.

The *genus et differentiam* procedure recommended by Sartori is important because, as Weyland notes, it situates a concept by reference to related concepts. While Weyland’s classical definition is based on such a procedure, it is not the only possible *genus et differentiam* procedure. Indeed, according to Collier and Mahon, family resemblance categories problematize what frequently mis-formed classical concepts falsely assume to be clear.

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22 Pappas 2016
23 Sartori 1970: 1053
24 Ibid.: 1044
25 Weyland 2001: 3
boundaries and defining attributes. The genus of such concepts is the recognition of observable attributes that are theoretically important and that category members share to varying degrees. As a result, while a number of cases may fit reasonably well in a category, on close examination it becomes clear that for most cases the fit is not perfect and that there may be a variation in the component parts of the concept.\textsuperscript{26} This variation can reflect the fact that (1) not all cases share the exact same attributes, although they share many (e.g., a given populist case shares many relevant attributes with other cases under analysis, except for charisma, which is also theorized to be a relevant attribute), (2) that cases share attributes, but in different intensities (e.g., populist cases under analysis share the same relevant attributes, including charisma, but some are more charismatic than others), or (3) both of the above. Still, the category captures a set of commonalities considered by the researcher to be analytically important.

The use of family resemblance is especially appropriate when studying populism because it is not a simple concept whose attributes are easily defined. Instead, populism is one of those concepts that Wittgenstein sees as having “blurred edges.”\textsuperscript{27} For Wittgenstein, such abstract concepts are plagued by definitional confusion because they are not represented by real-world objects. Unlike simple concepts, which are learned mechanistically by reference to representations of real-world objects, abstract concepts are learned by speaking the words and responding to speech in the context of their use.\textsuperscript{28} Abstract concept learning is a matter of process or practice based on linguistic experiences, not based on mechanistic reference to tangible objects.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} Collier and Mahon 1993
\textsuperscript{27} Wittgenstein 1958: 34
\textsuperscript{28} Wedeen 2004: 280–81
\textsuperscript{29} To illustrate this, Wedeen quotes Wittgenstein: “What “determining length” means is not learned by learning what length and what determining are; the meaning of the word “length” is learned by learning, among other things, what it is to determine length” (Ibid.: 280-1).
In other words, abstract concepts, such as populism, are learned by speaking them and by reacting to their patterns. Once a pattern is identified, we might then think of its “family resemblance” to other words. In the case of populism, there are many such words that come to mind: charismatic or personalistic leadership, anti-establishment discourse, popular mobilization, nationalist rhetoric, economic interventionism, etc.

The point here is that whatever their core properties, family resemblance concepts are recognizable and used in both ordinary and scholarly language. This is so because members of the conceptual family share a sufficiently high number of common attributes as to be recognizable as a group and to be spoken of by means of ordinary language. For Wedeen, Wittgensteinian ordinary language analysis can be used to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions and to overcome the conceptual puzzlement inherent in apparently irreconcilable attributes – such as, for example, the seemingly contradictory use of anti-establishment rhetoric by political insiders. While classical concepts of populism – for example, defined as anti-establishment appeals from outsider location – cannot deal with such an apparent contradiction, a family resemblance concept not only allows for such a conflictual relationship between definitional attributes, but also opens the analysis of this relationship to empirical investigation.

Overall, a family resemblance approach constitutes a good-faith and more nuanced application of the genus et differentium procedure according to which a concept is situated by reference to related concepts. The approach is good-faith, because unlike classical approaches that rely on the within-concept harmony of definitional attributes, it recognizes that the relationship between definitional attributes within the concept in question can be internally unharmonious or even contradictory. An example of this problem as it relates to classical concepts is Mudde and Rovira Kaltwassers’s criticism of Weyland’s classical concept of

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30 Ibid.: 281
31 Barr 2009
32 Wedeen 2004: 303
populism. Assuming internally harmonious relationships among attributes, they remain “unconvinced of the exact status” of the relationship between Weyland’s two attributes of populism – personalist leadership and popular mobilization. Consequentially, they discard Weyland’s minimal concept in favor of their own classical conceptualization – which, as noted above, is equally problematic. Their approach, meant to guard against within-concept disharmony, produces an even more minimal and abstract definition. This, however, represents a race to the top of Sartori’s ladder of abstraction against which Sartori himself warned.

Instead of resolving the conflict between such attributes within the concept, family resemblance allows us to think of them dialectically and by means of synthesis. Accordingly, various attributes are included without stifling internal tensions or denying their seeming incompatibilities. Moreover, family resemblance concepts reflect tensions between ideal standards and their practical realization. Translated in Weber’s language, adopting family resemblance implies the self-conscious use of constructs, which are partial approximations of reality – what we call ideal types.

In sum, family resemblance concepts are identifiable by the presence of a number of shared attributes and not by their quality or individual quantities, both of which can be variable. They are different from both radial and classical concepts. Unlike radial concept, family resemblance concepts do not presume a hierarchy between strong and weak categories. Unlike classical concepts, they do not assert a perfect description of each case or demand the presence of pre-determined attributes as necessary. Unlike both radial and classical concepts, family resemblance concepts do not avoid conceptual stretching by removing or

33 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 9
34 Sartori 1970
35 Wedeen 2004: 283
36 Although Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser write that “the radial categorization follows Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblance” (2012: 7), these two types of categories are clearly distinct from one another (Collier and Mahon 1993). While the first requires at least one necessary and sufficient condition that anchors the concept, the second does not.
37 Collier and Mahon 1993: 846–47
adding adjectives. Indeed, a strict application of Sartori’s ladder of generality in order to extend concepts based on family resemblance to additional cases would eliminate potentially useful concepts entirely or modify them inappropriately. It is for this reason that family resemblance can be assessed by identifying attributes that are present to *varying degrees in particular cases*, rather than simply being present or absent.\(^{38}\) The questions are: How can the attributes of populism be identified and how can disciplined comparisons be achieved based on them? The rest of this chapter addresses these two questions in turn.

### 2.3. Defining Populism as a Family Resemblance Concept

Identifying the properties of populism as a family resemblance concept involves several related procedures. First, a researcher might investigate the ways in which the word has been used over time in ordinary language, in scholarly texts, or both.\(^{39}\) Second, according to Collier and Mahon, it is essential to explore the underlying analytical relationship among the attributes that constitute the family resemblance, thereby establishing the justification for retaining the concept. Third, once concept formation has been theoretically elaborated, quantification can be undertaken. Techniques such as scaling can be adopted, which specify underlying dimensions for comparing cases but do not depend on the assumption that members of a category share a full set of defining attributes.\(^{40}\) Finally, I propose a framework for comparing cases of populism across contexts.

Turning to Wittgenstein’s question “On what occasions, for what purpose, do we say this? What kinds of actions accompany these words?”\(^{41}\) scholarship has identified a flexible core of definitional attributes for populism. Indeed, influential examples in the conceptual literature on populism have striven to emphasize commonalities in terms of definitional attributes. On the radial conceptual side, Roberts has identified five core attributes: (1)
personalist leadership, (2) a heterogeneous coalition centered on subaltern social sectors, (3) top-down mobilization, (4) anti-establishment and amorphous ideology, and (5) a redistributive or clientelistic economic project to foster material support. For Levitsky and Loxton, populism is a semi-radial category, according to which anti-establishment appeals can be channeled either through a personalist top-down leadership or through a bottom-up movement.

On the classical conceptual side, Weyland’s proposed attributes are personalist leadership and popular mobilization. In a more recent re-conceptualization, Jansen focuses on two necessary attributes of populism as “a political project”: anti-elite nationalist rhetoric by the leadership and popular mobilization. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser’s minimal ideological concept, while eschewing the “great man” theory, identifies both political entrepreneurship and social groups as key. Their definition “takes into account both the supply-side and demand-side of the populism phenomenon, since it assumes that the formation, propagation and transformation of the populist ideology depends on skillful political entrepreneurs and social groups, who have emotional and rational motives for adhering to the populist ideology.”

Additionally, Barr has defined populism as “a mass movement led by an outsider seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages.” His definition emphasizes the same attributes as the influential definition developed by Kitschelt and McGann in their pioneering study of the populist radical right:

“In political terms, populism signifies the effort to destroy established institutions of interest intermediation and elite control, and to put in their place some kind of ‘direct’ voice of the people, embodied in the leader of a populist party.”

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42 Roberts 1995: 89
43 Levitsky and Loxton 2013
44 Weyland 2001
45 Jansen 2011
46 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; my italics.
47 Barr 2009: 44
48 Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 160
Populism as a Conceptual Abstraction

The above definitions clearly vary in terms of their focus. While some authors prioritize the strategic dimension of populism, others prefer its ideological or anti-establishment dimensions. As discussed below, these are all recognizable and valid dimensions of populism. Yet, as Roberts has argued, “there are no clear theoretical or empirical grounds” for adopting definitional essentialism that prioritizes any specific dimension.49 While Roberts’ definition is a multidimensional one, it is, as discussed above, still based on a hierarchical understanding of prototypes and subtypes. In contrast, a multidimensional definition that is not hierarchical would identify a core of attributes that can define populism as a family resemblance category. Recognizing its various dimensions, I define populism in sociological and functional terms, which combine discursive, ideational, and organizational factors:

Populism is a mode of mobilizing of “the people” through recognizable – yet contextually particular – combinations of discursive, ideological, or organizational means. It is a symptom discernible to some degree in any political actor, collective (parties, movements) and/or individual.

With regard to the sociological aspect, to speak of populism is to speak of an impulse to mobilize “the people.”50 Populism claims to represent the majority, which embodies the will of “the people,” and thus has a strong sociological component usually referred to as “popular mobilization,” “subaltern social sectors,” “social groups,” or “mass movement,” as noted above. This element is, in fact, so important that following in the tradition of Germani – who defined populism as a multi-class heterogeneous movement around a charismatic leader51 –

49 Roberts 1995: 88
50 The majoritarian emphasis of populism is obvious from its name – in Latin, populus means “the people.”
51 Germani’s idea follows the tradition of Lipset, who identified Latin American populism as a movement of the lower classes (1960). The idea of the lower classes is also reflected in Roberts’ use of the term “subaltern” to describe the sectors of society populism claims to represent. Importantly, what is interpreted as “subaltern” is entirely dependent on context – it can be the working classes, the peasantry, and/or those employed in the informal sector. The subaltern sector of society is loosely understood here as those social groups that are predominantly preoccupied with materialist concerns (Inglehart 1997), such as employment and security.
many scholars have even identified popular mobilization as a defining attribute of populism.\textsuperscript{52} Such sociologically grounded conceptualizations identify popular mobilization as “concentrated in subaltern sectors of society.”\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, populism involves just one \textit{mode} of social mobilizing. Equating populism with all popular mobilization would be a mistake for two reasons.

First, popular mobilization can assume many organizational forms – spontaneous, electoral, top-down, or bottom-up.\textsuperscript{54} For Tilly, popular mobilization is a “process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life.”\textsuperscript{55} Since such a process can unfold in a variety of ways, the question then becomes one of \textit{organization}. Second, empirically identifying what precisely constitutes successful popular mobilization – as opposed to failure to achieve popular mobilization – is nearly impossible. Even following Tilly’s definition above, it is not clear, for example, whether and when voting turns individuals into active participants in public life. Overall then, defining populism as popular mobilization is less compelling than identifying it as \textit{a recognizable mode of social mobilizing}. The latter approach recognizes that some modes are more successful than others and that various modes of social mobilizing are organized and expressed differently.

Regarding the second aspect of populism, to mobilize popular constituencies populists use ideational and organizational means in a functional way. Whether or not it is explicitly recognized, nearly all scholarship on populism considers the functional question ‘\textit{How are the people mobilized?}’ Whether populism is a type of discourse, organization, or ideology, it seeks – and sometimes manages – to achieve the mobilization of the people. As such, populism \textit{is} a mode of social mobilizing that usually involves discursive, ideological, and organizational elements. Yet the abstract nature of these elements militates against understanding them as

\textsuperscript{52} Collier and Collier 1991; Conniff 1999; Drake 1978; Oxhorn 1998
\textsuperscript{53} Roberts 1995: 88. This idea follows
\textsuperscript{54} Roberts 2007
\textsuperscript{55} Tilly 1978: 69
necessary attributes that can be obviously grounded and identified in empirical reality. Despite this conceptual difficulty, it is nevertheless possible to identify a set of recognizable attributes common to the general populist phenomenon. As many political phenomena share the generally recognizable attributes that, when loosely combined in the world, are usually referred to as “populism,” I disaggregate these highly abstract dimensions – discourse, illiberal ideology, and organization – into less abstract attributes. Such an exercise is beneficial for empirically grounding the categories in order to identify comparable cases and what precisely is comparable about them. Next, I examine the set of attributes, which although not necessary conditions, make up the family of empirically recognized populist phenomena.

**Anti-establishment Discourse**

Anti-establishment positions are often referred to as at the *sine non qua* of populism\(^{56}\) because typically populism’s anti-establishment appeal best channels the majoritarian, anti-liberal spirit of the concept. Following Canovan,\(^ {57}\) there are two types of anti-establishment discourse – anti-political-establishment and anti-economic-establishment.

**Anti-political-establishment Appeals**

Issued by many populists,\(^ {58}\) anti-political-establishment appeals are neither simply anti-incumbent nor are they anti-democratic. Portraying all establishment parties – be they in government or opposition – as essentially the same,\(^ {59}\) such appeals claim that the power elites are unable to represent ordinary citizens. While anti-political-establishment appeals tend to be voiced by new formations that can portray themselves as legitimate outsiders relative to the political system, in rare cases even those in power can define themselves against the political

\(^{56}\) Schedler 1996; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; de la Torre 2000; Roberts 2007; Barr 2009; Hawkins 2010; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012

\(^{57}\) Canovan 1981

\(^{58}\) Laclau 1977; Canovan 1981; de la Torre 2000; Taggart 2000

\(^{59}\) Abedi 2004: 12
establishment. As anti-political-establishment appeals can be used by a variety of political actors, not just by populists, on their own they cannot define populism.

Often, actors using anti-political-establishment appeals portray the entire political establishment as corrupt and, therefore, claim to be crusaders against corruption. A case in point is the proliferation of many “new/centrist populist” parties in post-communist Europe. They are “non-ideological anti-political formations” that often campaign for mainstream reformism: commitment to the improvement of liberal democracy by “fighting corruption, replacing incompetent elites with energetic and competent ones, or tackling overlooked policy areas.” Overall, anti-political establishment appeals can arise from across the ideological spectrum, even in the absence of strong anti-economic establishment appeals. What is important is that in all cases anti-political-establishment appeals assault established structures of political power.

**Anti-economic-establishment Appeals**

Populism has traditionally been identified with attacks against “the economic elite which is described as “capitalist,” “oligarchic,” or “imperialist.” Especially within contexts of high inequality (e.g., Latin America) or transitions towards capitalism (e.g., post-communist Europe), anti-economic establishment appeals are often state-interventionist and against

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60 A case in point is Chávez’s rule from 1998 to 2000. During this period, Chávez maintained rhetoric and took actions against the political establishment. Once he consolidated power after a referendum in 2000, Chávez became the political establishment. At this point, his anti-political establishment appeals could no longer be seen as credible.

61 Barr 2009: 31–32

62 Pop-Eleches 2010: 231

63 Hanley and Sikk 2016

64 Schedler 1996

65 Canovan 1999

66 Schedler 1996. It is worth noting that members of the political establishment can make anti-economic establishment appeals. Thus, although Chávez’s anti-political establishment appeals ceased being legitimate with his solidification of political power in 2000, he continued railing against Venezuela’s economic establishment until his death in 2013.
economic globalization, naturally “drawing on support from socio-economic discontent found among the losers of economic transitions,” or what Roberts calls “subaltern” social sectors.

Yet anti-economic-establishment appeals are not necessarily left-wing or state-interventionist; they “can have different content – either economically liberal or protectionist – depending on the type of economic establishment against which they are used.” For Roberts, “the specifics of macroeconomic policy are variable… they may be market or state-oriented, open or closed to international competition, fiscally lax or disciplined, and progressive or regressive in their overall distributive effect.” What is important in all cases of anti-economic-establishment appeals is the assault of established structures of economic power, such as dominant economic ideas and values.

Importantly, the emphasis here is on anti-economic-establishment appeals and not on macroeconomic policy. While conceptualizing populism as a macro-economic policy project has been disputed elsewhere, it is worth underscoring that none of the currently dominant conceptualization of populism – as rhetoric, organization, or ideology – analyzes it as a set of economic policies. There are two reasons for this. First, as only populism in power can implement actual economic policies, defining it as a macroeconomic project constitutes selection on the dependent variable – only successful cases of populism would qualify. It also suggests that actors can only be populist once they are in power, which is contrary to most conceptualizations of populism. Second, as discussed by Roberts, “a neoliberal project at the

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67 Kuzio 2010: 3
68 Roberts 1995
69 Canovan 1999: 4
70 Roberts 1995: 89
71 Canovan 1999
72 Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001
73 Gidron and Bonikowski 2013
74 While Roberts’ criticism of populism as a state-oriented macro-economic project is convincing, one of the core properties he identifies is “an economic project that utilizes widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to create a material foundation for popular sector support” (1995: 89). This presumes that populists have access to redistributive methods, which is only possible if they are in power.
macro level may be compatible not only with populist-style political leadership, but also with populist [that is, redistributionist] economic measures at the micro level.”

Overall, the abstract category of anti-establishment discourse can be disaggregated into two conceptually different sub-categories that can either combine or manifest themselves separately – anti-political-establishment appeals and anti-economic establishment appeals. Further down the ladder of generality, anti-economic establishment appeals can be either anti-economic globalization or anti-social welfare (pro-market). While these discursive attributes – none of which is a necessary condition of populism – are conceptually distinct, in reality they frequently overlap, as shown in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1. Anti-establishment appeals

Illiberal Ideology: Nationalism and Sociocultural Conservatism

Scholars of populism have long recognized that there is an affinity between anti-establishment appeals and ideology, with some even referring to populist discourse as an “ideological appeal.” The reason for this is straightforward: to appear as legitimately critical

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75 Roberts 1995: 91
76 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Roxborough 1984. Despite this affinity, there is much disagreement between scholars emphasizing populism as discourse and as ideology (Gidron and Bonikowski 2013).
77 Roxborough 1984: 10
of the dominant liberal establishment, populism often, although not always, has a “core ideological” aspect substantiating the Manichean relationship between “the people” and “the elite” that is usually depicted in anti-establishment appeals. For Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, for example, populism is an ideology that portrays society as divided between the people and the elite. For Roberts, one of populism’s aspects is an “amorphous or eclectic ideology, characterized by a discourse that exalts subaltern sectors or is anti-elitist.”

No ideology expresses the will of the people more robustly than nationalism — the “doctrine that strives for the congruence of the cultural and political unit, i.e., the nation and the state, respectively.” Overall, nationalism gives the people” a sense of “national solidarity” — and thus of coherence and majoritarianism. Depending on the context, nationalism as an ideology is malleable — it can take the form either of economic nationalism, thus substantiating economically interventionist discourse, or of exclusivist ethnic nationalism. Both types of nationalism can be characterized by varying intensities. For instance, nativism — typical of the populist radical right — emphasizes the horizontal opposition between the domestic elite and outsider ‘others’ to a greater degree than moderate ethnic nationalism. Yet moderate ethnic nationalism can also be mobilized to set up a “solidary national ‘people’ as existing in antagonistic vertical relationship to some other kind of anti-popular ‘elite’ (often identified as an economic or political ‘oligarchy’).” The point is that nationalism provides ideological support for majoritarianism, based on which populists usually make anti-establishment appeals and frequently attack minorities’ rights.

78 The establishment is liberal especially in the period after the Cold War, which is normally associated with the triumph of liberal democracy (Fukuyama 1992) and the latest phase of globalization (Stiglitz 2002) in the realms of both culture and economics.
79 Mudde 2007
80 Hawkins 2010; Pauwels 2011; Pappas 2012.
81 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012
82 Roberts 1995: 89
83 Mudde 2007: 16
84 Brubaker 1996: 18–22
85 Mudde 2007: 16–20
86 Jansen 2011: 84
Especially when expressed in ethnic terms, nationalism is often part of a broader ideological agenda of sociocultural conservatism. This is so because sociocultural conservatism is a post-materialist reaction to libertarianism and multiculturalism,\(^{87}\) both of which are generally understood as constitutive elements of modern liberal ideology. As such, sociocultural conservatism features both ethnic nationalism (either moderate or fervent) and authoritarianism – the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which “infringements of authority are to be punished severely” and according to principles of “law and order and punitive conventional moralism.”\(^ {88}\) Overall, sociocultural conservatism is expressed via authoritarian-value traditionalist appeals (such as law-and-order, anti-LGBTQ and anti-abortion appeals) and/or via ethno-nationalist appeals (concerned with immigration and/or racial minorities), an extreme version of which is nativism.

Finally, as many populist actors are ideologically eclectic\(^ {89}\) and can have core and secondary ideologies\(^ {90}\) – which are not necessarily illiberal – illiberal ideology is not a necessary condition for identifying populists.\(^ {91}\) As long as other attributes, such as anti-political establishment (anti-corruption) appeals or personalist leadership are recognizable, ordinary and scholarly language can and does identify populists.

**Strategic Organization: Linkage and Location**

In addition to discourse and ideology, there is a crucial organizational element to populist mobilization – populist movements normally result in political parties.\(^ {92}\) Scholars who analyze populism as a form of organization usually focus on the strategic use\(^ {93}\) of linkage

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\(^{87}\) Kitschelt and McGann 1995

\(^{88}\) Mudde 2007, 23 citing Smith 1967: vi

\(^{89}\) Roberts 1995

\(^{90}\) Mudde 2007: 48

\(^{91}\) This is true for many of the populist varieties discussed by Pop-Eleches (2010), March (2011), and Mudde (2007). In all these cases, nationalist rhetoric may be present, but it is neither nativist/extreme nor central to the core ideology.

\(^{92}\) Taggart 2000

\(^{93}\) Gidron and Bonikowski 2013
within democratic institutions, such as political parties, and of location relative to party systems.

**Personalist Linkage as an Organizational Principle**

The literature on populism usually recognizes a strong *personalist linkage*[^94] — a single leader on whom party organizations rely to represent “the direct voice of the people”[^95] thus circumventing parties and other forms of institutional mediation[^96] by means of an “amorphous or eclectic ideology.”[^97] The personalist linkage, which is a combination between the electoral and directive linkages[^98], is different from clientelistic, charismatic, and participatory linkages.

First, populists can use clientelism — the awarding of selective benefits for targeted groups[^99] — especially if they gain power and in order to create a material foundation for popular sector support.[^100] However, as noted by Kitschelt, clientelism is conceptually distinct from, and can be empirically hostile to, personalism.[^101] As discussed by Weyland, it is the uninstitutionalized and fluid personalist linkage, not the clientelistic one, that is predominant for populists.[^102] Second, to compensate for the lack of institutionalization, populists are often charismatic.[^103] Yet, even if an individual leader is widely perceived as uncharismatic — as Peru’s Alberto Fujimori seems to have been — he or she can still be taken as a prototypical example of populism due to what Ansell and Fish called the *non-charismatic personalist*.

[^94]: Schedler 1996; Barr 2009; Levitsky and Loxton 2013. This linkage is also referred to as “direct” (Roberts 1995) or “plebiscitarian” (Barney and Laycock 1999). Following Levitsky and Loxton (2013), for brevity I use the term “personalist linkage.” Personalism does not mean personal loyalty gained through patronage, personal ambition, or necessarily charisma (see below). Personalism is used here in the sense of lack of organizational intermediation, direct personal ties between leaders and followers, and endowing a single, indispensable, individual with great levels of responsibility (Barr 2009).
[^95]: Barr 2009; Kitschelt and McGann 1995
[^96]: Levitsky and Loxton 2013
[^97]: Roberts 1995: 88
[^98]: Lawson 1988
[^99]: Mouzelis 1985; Kitschelt 2000; de la Torre 2000
[^100]: Roberts 1995
[^101]: Kitschelt 2000
[^102]: As Weyland argues, if clientelism becomes the predominant linkage, populism loses its character (2001: 14).
[^103]: Ibid.: 13–14
style of leadership.\textsuperscript{104} Third, the personalist linkage is not participatory. The populist reliance on unusual personalist leaders and plebiscitarian structures is not necessarily an appeal for, or a signal of, the prioritization of more participatory or representative government; rather, it is a call for better governance.\textsuperscript{105} For this reason, plebiscites, referenda, mass demonstrations, and references to public opinion polls are typical expressions of the personalist linkage, which is majoritarian by nature. While such instruments provide popular legitimacy for a leader’s authority, they can also undermine the autonomy of bottom-up social movements.\textsuperscript{106}

Finally, even the personalist linkage is not necessary for the identification of populism. Less commonly, populists can represent a \textit{bottom-up movement} motivated by heavier reliance on ideology. Such movements are characterized by programmatic, rather than personalistic, linkages as they emphasize “programmatic conflict resolution and organizational infrastructure.”\textsuperscript{107} As Levitsky and Loxton specify, “anti-establishment outsiders [such as Bolivia’s Movimiento as Socialismo led by Evo Morales] who emerge from social movements and maintain grassroots, rather than personalistic, linkages can be called movement populists.” As these authors explain further, such a conceptual compromise resolves the debate between scholars focusing on Morales’s strong anti-establishment discourse and those emphasizing “the bottom-up participatory nature of the social movement.”\textsuperscript{108} At the same time, even scholars emphasizing the importance of a bottom-up social movement have recognized the \textit{dynamic transformation} of MAS from an organization relying on autonomous bottom-up organization into a less autonomous organization that has progressively increased its reliance on Morales’ personalism.\textsuperscript{109}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{104} Ansell and Fish 1999
\item \textsuperscript{105} Barr 2009: 36 citing Taggart 2002: 67
\item \textsuperscript{106} di Tella 1965
\item \textsuperscript{107} Kitschelt 2000: 850.
\item \textsuperscript{108} For example, Mayorga (2006) and Hawkins (2010) focus on discourse while Roberts (2007) and Doyle (2011) emphasize organization. See Levitsky and Loxton (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{109} Levitsky and Roberts 2011
\end{itemize}
Location Relative to Party Systems

Lastly, in their strategies to credibly challenges the institutional status quo, populists must use anti-establishment appeals that are legitimate. Such appeals usually originate from a location outside of the established political party system. Overall, two types of functional outsiders can make legitimate anti-establishment claims – (1) new outsiders who manage to become prominent outside of an established party and (2) mavericks who rise to prominence either through an established party but abandon it or work to reform their respective parties from a position of leadership, as maverick populists Ted Cruz and Bernie Sanders did in the United States during the 2016 presidential election cycle.

As with all other family resemblance attributes of populism, functional outsider status, although common, cannot be a defining characteristic of populism for two reasons. First, it presupposes the existence of an institutionalized party system relative to which outsiders and mavericks locate themselves strategically. However, in many cases, and especially in contexts known for the prevalence of populism, institutionalized party systems have simply not materialized. If no clear party system exists, identifying outsiders relative to it becomes logically impossible. Second, even populist outsiders can sometimes evolve into establishment insiders while at the same time preserving other distinctive populist attributes. It is perhaps for this reason that classical conceptualizations of Latin American populism never identified outsider status as a defining characteristic of populism.

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110 The legitimacy of anti-establishment appeal is, of course, contextually bound and to a large extent dependent on the analyst’s choices regarding units and levels of analysis.
111 Schedler 1996; Barr 2009; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Roberts 2014
112 Outsider location depends strictly on a party’s relationship with the established party system, which can be defined in terms of the effective number of parties. Although outsiders are often new or newly competitive actors, long-standing but marginal and small parties are de facto outsiders as long as they are not among the nation’s effective parties (Barr 2009: 33).
113 Barr’s idea of “reform the party from a position of leadership” implies success in reforming. Alternatively, the notion of “work to reform the party from a position of leadership” captures cases of influential politicians who are not necessarily successful reformers.
114 For “party non-systems,” see Sanchez (2009).
2.4. Relationships Among Attributes of Populism as a Family Resemblance Concept

The above discussion has shown that although none of populism’s definitional attributes can be a necessary condition, these attributes are common enough and thus can be incorporated into a family resemblance concept. Next, I explore the underlying analytic relationships among these attributes. As discussed by Collier and Mahon, this is an important aspect of conceptual development because it is a necessary step towards establishing a justification for retaining a given concept as useful.\textsuperscript{115} As the above discussion illustrates, populism is a complex mix of conceptually distinctive and abstract dimensions – appeals, ideology, and organization – which overlap in empirical reality. In other words, all populists organize strategically and use some type of anti-establishment appeals, which often, although not always, also channel their ideological leanings. Figure 1.2 is a visual representation of a hypothetical populist space. This figure shows how the disaggregated attributes derived from the discursive, ideological, and organizational dimensions of populism can be conceptualized as falling into a framework of populism conceptualized as a family resemblance category.\textsuperscript{116} Importantly, not all attributes constituting the family resemblance – that is, the populist space – can be simultaneously present in a given populist case. Thus, different empirical cases conceptualized as “populist” will include a number of these attributes, the combination of which is recognizable as family resemblance.

\textsuperscript{115} Collier and Mahon 1993

\textsuperscript{116} For greater precision, the figure differentiates between conceptual types (solid lines) and aspects (dotted lines). The differentiation is for descriptive purposes only and it is not methodologically consequential.
Beginning from the bottom left, there are two types of anti-establishment discourse – anti-political and anti-economic establishment. While anti-corruption appeals are an aspect of the first, anti-welfare appeals and anti-economic globalization appeals are two types of anti-economic establishment discourse. Moving to the bottom right, there are two types of illiberal ideology – economic illiberalism and sociocultural conservatism. Anti-economic globalization appeals are an aspect of economic illiberalism. Ethno-nationalist appeals and authoritarian-value appeals are aspects of sociocultural conservatism. Third, moving to the top of the figure, there are two aspects of political organization – linkage and location. Populists typically use the personalist top-down type of linkage, which has two sub-types – charismatic personalism and non-charismatic personalism. Less commonly, some populists use programmatic linkages,
which usually result in organic bottom-up movements. Finally, there are two types of location relative to the party system – an insider or a legitimate outsider. The latter has two sub-types – new outsider or maverick.

Crucially, the attributes derived from populism’s distinctive discursive, ideological, and organizational aspects are theoretically interrelated. For example, anti-political establishment discourse is both a type of anti-establishment discourse and an aspect of legitimate outsider location. Additionally, state-interventionist anti-economic globalization appeals are at the intersection between discourse and ideology because they are both a type of anti-economic establishment discourse and an aspect of economic illiberalism. Finally, top-down personalism is both a type of linkage and an aspect of authoritarian values. Indeed, as elaborated by Kitschelt and McGann, the authoritarian aspect of sociocultural conservatism features “authoritarian visions of collective decision making” that are naturally embodied in a personalist leader.

Overall, the populist space includes a number of attributes that are typically observable in, but none of which is a necessary condition for, the empirical identification of populist cases. Indeed, cases identified in the literature as “populist” routinely exhibit a variety of attributes from the populist space. Scholars utilizing minimalist definitions have tended to prioritize some attributes over others, but such analytical decisions are usually made without accounting for the complex relationships among attributes that are considered incongruent. To bypass such complexities, scholars frequently resort to analyzing varieties of populist actors. Yet as discussed below, such approaches are usually regional in their focus and, as such, can provide

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118 Anti-economic globalization appeals are an example of conceptual overlap between anti-establishment discourse and illiberal ideology. This overlap, however, does not mean that illiberal ideology is a necessary condition. For instance, in post-communist Europe, there are many examples of purely anti-political establishment populism that is both economically and socioculturally liberal.
119 Kitschelt and McGann 1995, 7. Furthermore, authoritarianism and personalism share an affinity because of the “general disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical towards authoritative figures of the in-group and to take an attitude of punishing out-group figures in the name of some moral authority” (Adorno et al. 1969: 228, cited in Mudde 2007: 22).
only a limited perspective with regard to the general study of populism. Nevertheless, by exploring populist varieties we can identify a set of core attributes by which populism can be fruitfully compared across spatial and temporal contexts.

**Populist Attributes in the “Usual Suspects”**

In part, the conceptual confusion surrounding populism is a matter of semantics. For example, it is confusing that while all populist actors voice anti-establishment appeals, not all anti-establishment actors are described as “populist.” The literature commonly identifies several categories of political actors as anti-establishment – those that are “radical left,” “left-populist,” “social-populist,” “extreme nationalist” (or “extremist-fascist”), “national populist,” “neoliberal populist,” and “new/centrist populist.”¹²⁰ If we take seriously all of these categories as anti-establishment, but not necessarily “populist,” it follows that there must be something more to populism than the anti-establishment appeal. Yet, it remains unclear what this attribute(s) would be. Considering that anti-establishment rhetoric is often based on illiberal ideological platforms, as discussed above, tracing the roots of populism as a semantic construct, which can be based either in ideas or in rhetoric, becomes especially challenging.

While not all anti-establishment ideal party types are recognized as populist, they share many attributes with those that are recognized as such. For example, welfare chauvinist parties are not referred to as “populist” while populist radical right parties obviously are. Both of these party types embrace nativist and anti-political establishment appeals. What is different is their economic ideology – while welfare chauvinists tend to be against the liberal economic establishment, the populist radical right is (typically) pro-market.¹²¹ Accordingly, although they are not formally referred to as “populist,” welfare chauvinist parties can be as populist as the populist radical right.

¹²⁰ March and Mudde 2005; Mudde 2007; Pop-Eleches 2010; Gamble, Brett, and Tomkiewicz 2014
¹²¹ Kitschelt and McGann 1995
As a result of such semantic issues, scholarly disagreement on how to categorize different cases is all too common.\textsuperscript{122} As explained above, categorizations have tended to focus on necessary and sufficient attributes that define different varieties of anti-establishment parties, some of which are often referred to as “populist.” Based on the literature,\textsuperscript{123} Table 2.1 identifies the most common ideal-typical categories of anti-establishment parties and the status of populism’s conceptual attributes that were discussed above.\textsuperscript{124}

**Table 2.1. Varieties of anti-establishment actors and their populist attributes in theory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common varieties of anti-establishment political actors</th>
<th>Anti-establishment discourse</th>
<th>Illiberal ideology</th>
<th>Political Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-political establishment</td>
<td>Economic liberalism</td>
<td>Socio-cultural conservatism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anti-social welfare, pro-market appeals</td>
<td>Anti-economic globalization appeals</td>
<td>Exclusivist ethno-nationalist appeals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme left / communist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/left populist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National populist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare chauvinist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical right populist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neoliberal populist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New/centrist populist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extreme right / fascist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: an attribute is present {✓}, present in high intensity {✓ ✓}, tends to be present {(✓)}, is absent {○}, or is either fluid or not specified as typical by the relevant literature {-}.

To assign values for the attributes typical of anti-establishment categories, I employ Mudde’s distinction between core (here identified with two checks) and secondary ideologies (identified with one check). For instance, while extreme left/communist and social (left-) populist actors are distinguished by a strong emphasis on anti-economic globalization appeals, neoliberal populists are known for the intensity of their pro-market appeals. Welfare chauvinist, radical right populist, and extreme right/fascist actors are distinguished by their reliance on

\textsuperscript{122} For example, the Bulgarian Business Bloc of the 1990s was categorized as “neoliberal populist” by Mudde (2007) and as “new/centrist populist” by Pop-Eleches (2010). Slovakia’s Direction (SMER) is classified as “national populist” by Gyárfašová (2008) and Mesežnikov (2008), and as “new/centrist populist” by Pop-Eleches (2010).

\textsuperscript{123} I mostly rely on the work of Kitschelt and McGann (1995), Mudde (2007), Pop-Eleches (2010), and March (2011).

\textsuperscript{124} Here, I do not include outsider location because it is not identified as necessary for any of the varieties of anti-establishment actors.
appeals based on sociocultural conservatism expressed via nativist and authoritarian-value appeals. Differently, national populists incorporate somewhat gentler culturally conservative appeals and tend to include anti-economic globalization appeals, which often supplement a more diffusive and non-extreme ideological core. Finally, new/centrist populists tend to be least ideological, relying to a large degree on the personality of their leaders. Overall, Table 1.1 shows whether and to what extent the definitional attributes of populism as a family resemblance concept tend to be present in the various types of anti-establishment actors as discussed in the literature.

**Primary and Secondary Attributes of Populism**

Importantly, not all conceptual attributes are equally prevalent across anti-establishment categories. A vertical look at Table 2.1 reveals that five attributes are *common to at least half of the eight categories of anti-establishment actors*. These attributes are (1) anti-corruption appeals, (2) anti-economic globalization appeals, (3) exclusive ethno-nationalism, (4) culturally conservative authoritarian values, and (5) personalist top-down linkages. Because at least one, and usually more, of these five features appears in all categories of anti-establishment actors and because at least half of the categories share all these five attributes, these traits are the most recognizable in the family of anti-establishment political phenomena. As Figure 2.3 depicts, however, these five core family resemblance attributes are in a dynamic relationship with what we call “populist” cases and none of them necessarily characterizes various populist actors at any given time or to the same degree. Consistent with the family resemblance conceptualization of populism, definitional attributes are not necessary conditions in terms of either presence or intensity. While these core attributes are most common, and thus primary, their exact status is not set for any given “populist” case at any given time.

125 Pop-Eleches 2010
The final two attributes – pro-market appeals and programmatic linkages – are secondary because they are relatively less common across ideal-typical anti-establishment categories. In fact, while observable in some populist varieties, pro-market appeals and programmatic linkages are rather characteristic of the liberal establishment against which anti-establishment actors normally position themselves. While these secondary attributes have been usefully employed to analyze populist actors\textsuperscript{126} and can be helpful to study populist evolution,\textsuperscript{127} they are not dominant or essential in the family resemblance of populism.

\textsuperscript{126} Weyland 1999; Levitsky and Loxton 2013
\textsuperscript{127} For example, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori relied on pro-market appeals and policies after he won the presidency as a populist critical of neoliberal solutions in 1990 (Roberts 1995).
Accommodating Incongruence

As much of the literature on populism has established, populism tends to thrive in weakly institutionalized political environments where personalist leaders are relatively unconstrained in their *opportunist use of political rhetoric, ideology, and strategy*. It is for this reason that incongruence and dynamism, rather than harmony and stability, is what distinguishes many real-world populist phenomena. Indeed, populists often are anti-establishment insiders, ideologically progressive *and* conservative at the same time. Such incongruence presents challenges for students of populism who focus on a strict core of definitional attributes to identify and classify populist actors.

Populism’s internal heterogeneity has, of course, much to do with evolution over time. Indeed, populism’s definitional attributes can be incongruent, both in terms of *evolving status* and *ideology*. An example of *evolving status* is the transition from opposition to executive power which is typically accompanied by *both* a switch from outsider/maverick to insider location *and* a switch from credible anti-establishment appeals to the absence of such credibility.128 Thus, while many scholars of populism accept outsider status and credible anti-political establishment appeals as necessary conditions of populism, they nevertheless routinely treat as “populist” both Alberto Fujimori (president of Peru between 1990 and 2000) and Hugo Chávez (president of Venezuela between 1998 and 2013) long after these leaders became the ultimate insiders and, as such, could not have possibly continued voicing credible establishment appeals. Thus, if such leaders continued being populist, it remains unclear what exactly qualified them as such. Much of the literature using necessary and sufficient conditions remains vague regarding the relationship between conflicting attributes, such as credible anti-establishment appeals and insider status. As a result, although scholars define populism in

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128 Barr 2009
binary terms (a phenomenon is either populist or not), they cannot specify when a populist ceases being a populist or if this is at all possible.

Second, when comparing populist actors, scholars usually categorize them under populist varieties, such as those presented in Table 2.1 above. To do so, authors make subjective judgments regarding what constitutes the *core ideology* – for example, anti-economic globalization appeals in the case of actors considered as “populist left” or sociocultural conservatism in the case of actors considered as “populist right.” And yet, because programmatic heterogeneity is typical of many populists – who combine appeals from across the ideological spectrum – it can be difficult to tell what the core ideology is. For example, Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa (2007-17), Hungary’s Fidesz, and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) have all combined statist economic rhetoric *and* heavy sociocultural conservatism. Focusing on the high intensity of different ideological attributes as a necessary condition, most authors place these political actors under separate populist varieties. Thus, while the Ecuadorian case is routinely classified as “left” due to the high intensity of economically nationalist rhetoric, the post-communist cases are usually classified as “conservative” due to the high intensity of their cultural conservatism.\(^{129}\) Yet, populists with highly heterogeneous ideological attributes – featuring both “left” and “right” characteristics – are routinely found in both regional contexts. In fact, such heterogeneity may be what is most typical of populism.

In sum, minimal definitions of populism assume definitional attributes that coexist in harmony with one another or are, at the very minimum, consistently high in intensity. By contrast, as argued above, family resemblance definitions recognize the heterogeneous nature of conceptual attributes, which can even coexist in tension with each other and which are not equally or consistently high in intensity. Such concepts focus on the substantive changes that

\(^{129}\) For an alternative approach, see Inglehart and Norris (2016) who categorize Fidesz and PiS as “populist left.”
political subjects undergo over time as well as on the complex and dynamic relationships that conceptual attributes can exhibit among themselves. In line with Collier and Mahon’s description of definitional taxonomies, a family resemblance approach is theoretically valid, because according to both ordinary and scholarly language, when a recognizable set of the primary attributes identified in Figure 2.3 is present, the word “populism” is usually chosen to describe the phenomenological configuration. As populist phenomena are internally incongruent, the set of primary attributes that define them is necessarily flexible yet common enough as to recognize family resemblance.

2.5. Conclusion

Populism is a special and intriguing concept precisely due to its multidimensional, chameleonic nature, which makes categorization a challenging task. Thus, problems of definition and case selection are common in the study of populism, a reason why it remains a contested concept. To study populism as the universal phenomenon that it is, many scholars usually resort to definitions based on subjective understandings of what constitutes a liberal threat as well as on necessary conditions that assume harmony among definitional attributes. Such approaches typically fail to account for what is most interesting about populism – an unstable political phenomenon with inherently dynamic and heterogeneous definitional attributes.

In this chapter, I have proposed an alternative strategy for dealing with populism’s conceptual difficulties by considering it as a family resemblance category that can be useful for the disciplined study of an elusive phenomenon. Contrary to previous efforts that resort to minimal definitions, I have argued for studying populism by recognizing and disaggregating its constituent attributes, many of which are typical for populist phenomena across the world. The proposed method recognizes that while many cases of populism share attributes to various

130 Collier and Mahon 1993
degrees, none of these attributes can be a necessary condition for populism in an absolute sense. Overall, how populism’s heterogeneous attributes evolve and interact over time must be open to empirical research rather than assumed by definition.

I began the chapter by problematizing minimal definitions of populism based on necessary and sufficient conditions and by justifying the use of family resemblance as a conceptual alternative. Second, I disaggregated family resemblance attributes along discursive, ideological, and organizational domains. Next, I identified relationships among these attributes to demonstrate that populism typically involves attributes that can be in conflicting relationships with one another. While such inherent instability may be the real *sine qua non* of populism, it presents unsurmountable difficulties for scholars using minimal definitions that assume congruence of conceptual attributes and require stable relationships among them. Having identified a *family resemblance core* of attributes, I concluded with a call for accommodating conceptual instability and incongruence in the study of populism.

Two conclusions emerge from the above analysis of populism as a social science concept. First, because populism is often associated with opportunism and flexibility, definitions simply based on necessary conditions are antithetical to the phenomenon’s typically dynamic nature. Therefore, a realistic conceptualization must reflect the complex interaction among its constitutive attributes as well as their frequently inconsonant empirical nature. It is only through such analytical flexibility that we can scrutinize populism as the dynamic and elusive phenomenon that it is. Such an approach involves a shift from *a priori* assumptions about the static or homogenous nature of definitional attributes to concrete strategies for measurement based on empirical analysis of relevant definitional attributes. Second, populism can be compared across otherwise dissimilar context *if* relevant attributes within the family resemblance are recognized as comparable. In this view, empirical issues of case selection and measurement across contexts can be addressed on the basis of comparability of aggregate
values for relevant attributes based on which family resemblance is recognized. In the following chapter, I address issues of case selection and measurement for the purposes of a disciplined analysis of populism for the Latin American and post-communist contexts.
3.
POPULISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: IDENTIFYING VARIABLE PATTERNS IN LATIN AMERICA AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

3.1. Introduction

As the previous chapter has made clear, populism is a concept used to describe a broad variety of empirical phenomena. While I have proposed a conceptualization based on family resemblance, critics of such conceptualizations have argued that “it is hard to reach a consensus on the defining attributes of populism in order to build a family resemblance.”¹ Contrary to such criticism, in this chapter I offer a procedure for case selection based on which it is possible to measure and study populism as a family resemblance concept in a disciplined manner. Based on this procedure, which I apply to both the Latin American and post-communist European contexts, I identify significant patterns of variation that are observable across both regions.

Overall, I anchor my analysis on what Acemoglu and his co-authors call the “left of the median” aspect of populism.² Because Latin America and post-communist Europe are societies distinguished by relatively high levels of inequality, a focus on center-left economic positions can provide substantial comparative insight in terms of important political phenomena commonly recognized as “populist” in both regions. As I make clear, while this aspect of populism is not a necessary condition in an absolute sense – due to its variable and fluctuating nature – it is a theoretically and empirically important anchor based on which a universe of cases can be identified and measurement can be undertaken for the comparative analysis of populism both within and across geographical contexts.

¹ Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 7-8
² Acemoglu et al. 2013
Rather than make *a priori* assumptions about populists as *unsavory illiberals* – as many other students of populism all too often do – I adopt a strictly empirical approach to case selection for the analysis of populism during the period *after* democratization in Latin America and post-communist Europe. In particular, I use several of the *dynamic dimensions* discussed in the previous chapter – ideological positioning, location relative to party systems, and personalism – to identify a number of political parties of potential relevance for comparative analysis. For both regions, I primarily rely on available datasets based on expert surveys in order to analyze the ideological positioning of candidates that participated in Latin American presidential elections between 1993 and 2015 as well as of parties that participated in post-communist legislative elections between 1998 and 2015. Combined with an analysis of dynamic location relative to party systems and level of personalism, this procedure results in the identification of 100 political actors – 47 in Latin America and 53 in post-communist Europe – as belonging to what I call the “extended left-populist” party family for the respective periods in the two regions. Having identified relevant parties, *all of which originated after democratization*, I next develop a precise scoring procedure that considers empirical data for pertinent attributes *over time*. The procedure allows me to score each of the relevant 100 parties’ level of overall populism, based on which I categorize parties as “high-degree,” “medium-degree,” or “low-degree” populist for any given election cycle.

Importantly, while I base my case selection on an analysis of ideological positions, location relative to party systems, and personalism, these dynamic attributes are *not* strictly necessary conditions for the scoring of parties as “populist” over time. For example, while I only consider as “potentially populist” parties that defended identifiably “left-of-the-medium” economic positions on at least one occasion, in many cases parties’ positions changed over time. To what extent such changes affected the overall categorization of parties at any given time also depends on how the
other empirical attributes of any given party may evolve over time. As argued in the previous chapter, such a flexible conceptualization based on the Wittgensteinian logic of family resemblance is preferable to alternatives due to the varying nature of empirical attributes which can qualify phenomena as relatively more or less populist at different points in time.

Having categorized relevant parties with reference to temporality, I then delimit the universe of cases by excluding potentially irrelevant observations of “low-degree” populism and I develop two measures of populism at the national level for each electoral cycle. These measures are (1) populism “at minimum,” a stricter metric aggregating vote shares only of parties exhibiting a “high-degree” populism at the time of a given election, and (2) populism “at maximum,” a more expansive measure aggregating vote shares of parties exhibiting both “high-degree” and “medium-degree” of populism at the time of a given election. Significantly, these two measures exhibit a very high degree of correlation ($r = 0.93$), implying that they are similarly valid metrics for the comparative analysis of populism. Based on these two measures, I conclude the chapter with a presentation of clear patterns of variation in terms of the electoral support for populist actors in Latin America and post-communist Europe after democratization. As the final section of the chapter shows, in 16 of the 33 countries in both regions, left-populist actors gained, on average, more than 10% of the national vote share. Interestingly, post-communist countries, such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, exhibited relatively high levels of populism during the analyzed period, ranking alongside Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Costa Rica. What makes the experience of such countries – in which the “populist syndrome” has been relatively more prevalent – different from the experience of many others in both regions is an intriguing empirical question to which I dedicate the rest of the project.
By developing specific measures of populism as a flexible family resemblance category, this chapter provides a concrete and useful empirical baseline for the comparative analysis of populism within and across regional contexts. As the chapter demonstrates, using family resemblance concepts is not necessarily problematic – as long as disciplined procedures are undertaken for the selection of cases and measurement is based on attributes that are both typical of populism and empirically flexible. Indeed, as the chapter identifies as populist many “usual suspects” in both regions, my measures based on family resemblance appear to be valid. While populism will remain a disputed concept well into the future, an empirical approach to measuring a highly relevant phenomenon in two very different regional contexts can shed much needed light in terms of variable patterns that are intriguingly similar in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

3.2. The “Left of the Median” Aspect of Populism

As discussed in Chapter 2, scholars of populism have long distinguished between relatively pro-liberal and relatively anti-liberal economic positions. In line with this tradition, Inglehart and Norris have recently noted that some political actors – identified as populist-left – tend to advocate policies of redistribution and social protection while others – identified as populist-right – tend to oppose such policies. While populism can be found across the entire ideological spectrum, such a distinction based on economic ideology can be a useful focal point for concretizing the empirical analysis of populism, thereby assuaging some of the concerns of critics of family resemblance concepts.

A focus on political actors with predominantly center-left economic positions is of particular theoretical interest for the Latin American and post-communist European contexts, which feature

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3 Schedler 1996, Canovan 1999
4 Inglehart and Norris 2016
key structural commonalities, as outlined in Chapter 1. As explained by Acemoglu and his co-authors, “given the high levels of inequality” in Latin American societies, “political platforms built on redistribution are not surprising.”5 And while post-communist Europe tends to be less unequal than Latin America, inequality in this region remains a persistent problem mostly because the well-known European social model rooted in the historical compromise between capital and labor “has not traveled to the East.”6 As in Latin America, many populist parties in Eastern Europe “are located on the economic Left” because they “advocate policies of redistribution and economic protection.”7 Overall, from the classical work of Dornbusch and Edwards to the more recent work of Acemoglu et al. and Inglehart and Norris, scholars have recognized that “populist rhetoric and policies are frequently to the left of the median voter’s preferences”8 specifically in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

In addition to the theoretical relevance, there are also good empirical reasons for anchoring an analysis of populism in these two regions on center-left economic positions. First, because the most recent populist wave in Latin America has been dominated by “left-populists,” such as presidents Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, the center-left aspect of recent populist phenomena has already been broadly perceived as salient in much of the literature for the Latin American context. By contrast, scholars of post-communism have preferred to label the region’s most prominent populist actors – such as Hungary’s Fidesz, led by Viktor Orbán, or Poland’s PiS, led by Jarosław Kaczyński – as “conservative.” Yet in many cases, these populists’ social conservatism is part and parcel with center-left economic positions, as

5 Acemoglu et al. 2013: 772. By “these societies” the authors mean “several developing countries, particularly in Latin America” (2013: 771).
6 Bohle and Greskovits 2004
7 Norris and Inglehard 2016: 8-9
8 Acemoglu et al. cite the work of Dornbusch and Edwards (1991) to underscore the salience of redistributive economic platforms associated with populism (2013: 772).
discussed by Bakker et al.\textsuperscript{9} and as recently documented by Inglehart and Norris who prefer to categorize many such “conservative” actors as “populist-left” due to their empirically observable center-left economic positions.\textsuperscript{10} Overall, many prominent political actors in both regions that tend to be identified as “populist” share important tendencies in terms of positioning to the left of the economic median. Such center-left economic positions are a useful conceptual bridge relating contemporary populist patterns in post-communist Europe to corresponding patterns in Latin America.

To ground the current study of populism in center-left economic positions does not mean that such positions are a necessary condition in an absolute sense, however. There are two reasons for this. First, the center-left economic positions of some populist actors are significantly to the left of those adopted by other populist actors. For example, while both the United Socialist Party of Venezuela, founded by Hugo Chávez, and the Front for Victory, founded by Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, are typically analyzed as part of the same “populist left” in Latin America,\textsuperscript{11} the economic positions of the first are significantly to the left of the economic positions of the latter, as reported by Baker and Greene.\textsuperscript{12} Second, while center-left economic positions are a useful “anchor” for case selection, political actors naturally adopt variable economic positions over time. While such actors can experience associated gains or losses in terms of their overall degree of populism, as long as they exhibit in great quantities other theoretically relevant attributes associated with populism, such actors remain populist across time at least to some extent. As an example, both Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s PiS adopted increasingly protectionist positions associated with the economic left

\textsuperscript{9} Bakker et al. show that differently from the Western European context, many “left-wing parties in the East tend to be right-wing on the social (or TAN) dimension” (2015: 148).
\textsuperscript{10} Inglehart and Norris 2016
\textsuperscript{11} Castañeda 2006
\textsuperscript{12} Baker and Greene 2011
throughout the 2000s, as reported in the Chapel Hill expert surveys. While such parties can be considered as relatively more populist in the late 2000s, even in the early 2000s both Fidesz and PiS exhibited overall degrees of populism that were high enough – due to the other relevant attributes – as to not entirely disqualify them from the populist label.

In sum, what Acemoglu et al. call the “left of the median” aspect of populism is a pertinent foundation for the identification of important populist actors in Latin America and post-communist Europe. While this aspect of populism is not a necessary condition in an absolutely sense – that is, it is not present to an equal extent or even inevitably present over time in all actors once identified as potentially populist – it is a theoretically and empirically relevant anchor based on which measurement can be undertaken and cases selected for the purposes of measurement and disciplined comparative analysis in both regional contexts. Although such a case selection strategy does not include each and every populist actor identified as such by all scholars of populism, it is a valid approach because it does recognize as populist a great number of the “usual suspects” in both regions.

A Brief Note on Semantics

Following the above discussion and keeping in mind the persistent debate regarding the meaning of populism, a note on the use of the word “populism” in the present study is appropriate. Overall, while the political actors discussed below can be classified as “left-populist,” I choose the less cumbersome “populist” label for the rest of this study. Below, I only use “left-populist” in reference to the party families to which such parties belong – in order to be specific that these are not parties tending to hold economic positions typically understood as “right wing” or “liberal.” Generally, the “left of the median” aspect of populism – usually expressing protectionist, and/or

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13 Polk et al. 2017
14 Acemoglu et al. 2013: 772
redistributionist, and/or economically nationalist proclivities (depending on the context) – is a highly relevant aspect that has been frequently invoked or assumed in influential historical and contemporary discussions of populism.¹⁵

Of course, this is not to say that left-populism is the only kind of populism in Latin America and post-communist Europe and neither does it suggest that all actors analyzed here as “populist” are equally “leftist.” While at some time or another all relevant actors exhibited the “left of the median” aspect of populism, according to the empirical data sources I use, their “leftism” was variable both across cases and over time. This is an important reason for using family resemblance categories that – and differently from concepts based on necessary conditions – do not make assumptions about the invariability of conceptual attributes, as discussed in Chapter 2. Additionally, the “left-populist” label may be less intuitive for readers used to identifying some relevant actors in post-communist Europe as “conservative.” Thus, to avoid both cumbersomeness in expression and semantic confusion, for the rest of the study I simply use the term “populist” when referring to the political actors discussed in this chapter. Next, I present my empirical strategy for case selection and measurement.

### 3.3. Scoring Populist Dimensions: An Empirical Approach

As discussed by Collier and Mahon, in family resemblance concepts, “attributes are present to varying degrees in particular cases.”¹⁶ For this reason, it is helpful to think of populism’s primary definitional attributes as continuous variables whose values can be derived empirically from available sources. In turn, by combining values for relevant subsets of populist attributes in relevant

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¹⁵ E.g., Dornbusch and Edwards 1991
¹⁶ Collier and Mahon 1993: 848
political actors, we can analyze overall patterns of populist evolution from a comparative perspective – across both space and time.

Following this intuition, my empirical approach to scoring populism for both Latin America and post-communist Europe uses similar procedures that are predominantly based on empirical data from several expert surveys. Overall, based on this empirical data I identify Latin American and post-communist “extended left-populist” party families, which I then categorize in terms of “degrees of populism” for the purposes of scoring of populist magnitude in both regions. I rely primarily on expert surveys because of the many advantage they offer in terms of measuring policy positions in a variety of countries. In particular, triangulating between expert surveys, as I do, can be useful for obtaining empirical information regarding parties’ ideological and organizational characteristics as well as for cross-validating relevant information. Moreover, as scholars of European politics have noted, expert surveys “allow researchers to obtain positions for a large number of parties irrespective of their size, parliamentary status, whether they have a manifesto or not, and independent from the electoral cycle.”

17 Scholars of Latin American politics agree that expert surveys “have been shown to provide accurate and reliable measures of party positions on policy, and validated against a variety of benchmarks. On the practical side, expert surveys provide information on party policy positions free from many of the data problems or resource demands faced by alternative approaches, such as elite surveys, mass surveys, the analysis of legislative roll call votes, or test analysis.”

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Specifically, I ground my measurement strategy on four datasets based on comprehensive expert surveys conducted with reference to Latin America and post-communist Europe. For Latin America, I rely on (1) the Baker and Greene dataset (B-G 2011) which provides up-to-date and time-
series ideological scores for nearly all vote-receiving parties and candidates in Latin America beginning with 1993, (2) the Wiesehomeier and Benoit expert surveys (W-B 2009) which score Latin American parties and presidents on a number of ideological dimensions, and (3) the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP), led by Herbert Kitschelt, which offers expert survey scores on a number of ideological and organizational dimensions for 94 political parties in Latin America. For post-communist Europe, I rely on (1) six Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES), including four separate waves (2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014) plus two additional waves for EU candidate countries (2007 and 2014) and (2) the DALP expert survey. While the CHES expert surveys provide time-series data on a number of ideological dimensions, the DALP expert survey provides scores on important ideological and organizational characteristics for 96 political parties in the fifteen post-communist countries under study.19

**Latin America: Ideology, Location, and Personalism**

To facilitate the measurement of populism in Latin America, I triangulate by using electoral data on three dimensions – ideology, personalism, and location relative to party systems. While Latin America’s most recent wave of populism has been primarily identified with left-wing ideological positions, location relative to party systems and the extent to which linkages between leaders and constituents are personalistic are likewise invoked in studies of populist politics, such as the one carried out by Levitsky and Loxton with reference to the Andean region.20 Because I rely on electoral data in my measurement of populism, I only consider as relevant those actors that have received at least 2% in at least one presidential election in Latin America.21 I focus on presidential elections in

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19 For the B-G dataset, see Baker and Greene 2011; for the W-B dataset, see Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009; for the DALP dataset, see Kitschelt et al. 2009; for the CHES datasets, see Polk et al. 2017 and Bakker et al. 2015.
20 Levitsky and Loxton 2013
21 The 2% rule is a common and convenient cut-off point in the analysis of electoral data, as explained by Powell and Tucker (2014).
this region because populist politics has most explicitly been associated with the rise of presidential candidates, such as Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa. Additionally, I begin with the year 1993 because systematic data on ideological positions is available beginning with this year. Fortunately, this is also a convenient starting point from a historical perspective because the early 1990s immediately follow what Remmer calls Latin America’s “longest and deepest wave of democratization” associated with the 1980s.\(^{22}\) I end with the year 2015 – which is roughly the end of the commodities boom thought to have sustained in power several populist government in Latin America and towards the end of which year key populist governments experienced electoral losses in Argentina and Venezuela.\(^{23}\)

Because I ground my measurement strategy in the assessment of economic ideology, I begin my case selection by identifying *potentially relevant populist actors’* ideological positioning based on the Baker and Greene (B-G) dataset. The B-G dataset is a superior starting point than alternatives – such as the Wiesehomeier and Benoit (W-B) or DALP datasets – for two reasons. First, it is more comprehensive, covering nearly all presidential candidates for the period, and second, it actually complements the W-B expert survey dataset by furnishing it with an important temporal dimension\(^{24}\) that allows for the tracing of potential ideological evolution over time. While I rely primarily on results from the B-G dataset, where possible I cross-validate the data by consulting the DALP expert survey.

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\(^{22}\) Remmer 1992

\(^{23}\) These electoral losses came with the general election on October 25, 2015 in Argentina and the parliamentary election on December 6, 2015 in Venezuela. Soon thereafter, in February 2016, Bolivian president Evo Morales lost a referendum that would have allowed him to run for a third consecutive term under the 2009 constitution.

\(^{24}\) The ideology scores in the B-G dataset are primarily based on the expert surveys conducted by Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009). For a minority of cases (less than 10% of the presidential elections vote and less than 20% of the legislative elections vote), Baker and Greene use data from Pop-Eleches (2009) and Coppedge (1998). For more information regarding the scoring procedure used by these authors, see Baker and Greene 2011: 47n12.
I use the B-G dataset to identify actors whose ideological positions are to the “left of the median.” Since there are two empirical medians – one at the regional and one at the country level – I calculate the regional median for Latin America as well as 18 medians at the country level and analyze how political actors are positioned at any given point of time relative to both medians. This is an important procedure because while country medians are helpful for the identification of center-left actors at the national level, using the regional median endows the process of case selection with an important degree of external validity. Having identified country and regional medians, I next assign scores ranging from 0 (zero) to 3 (three) aimed to differentiate among degrees of ideological leftism. Actors located to the right of both the country and regional medians are identified as “center-right” and receive a score of 0 while actors found to the left of one median but to the right of the other median are identified as “potentially left” and receive a score of 1. In turn, actors located to the left of both the country and regional medians are “center left,” thus receiving a score of 2. Finally, actors whose scores are found to be more than one standard deviation to the left of the regional mean receive a score of 3 because of their “decisively left” positioning. The scoring rules for Latin American political actors are included in Table 4.1 below. All parties included in my dataset for measuring populism have on at least one occasion received a score of 2 or 3 on this dimension.

It is certainly possible to consider other ideological attributes of populism, such as degrees of nationalism and socio-cultural conservatism, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, such attributes are less relevant for the scoring of populism in the Latin American context. To begin, Latin American nationalism is predominantly economic and inclusive rather than targeted towards excluding ethnic

\[25\] A third median would be at the election level for each country. However, I prefer the country median because of the larger number of observations upon which it is based.

\[26\] For the purpose of clarity and consistency, I converted the 1-20 scale used in the B-G dataset into a 0-10 scale and reversed the direction so that 0 corresponds to the extreme economic left while 10 corresponds to the extreme economic right.
minorities. As discussed at length by Madrid, ethnic appeals in Latin America have tended to be inclusive, rather than exclusionary, due to the historical experience of “widespread mestizaje or ethnic/racial mixing, which has profoundly shaped ethnic relations in the region” since the colonial era by “softening the boundaries between members of different ethnic groups.”

Rather than target ethnic exclusion, nationalist rhetoric and policies in Latin America “emphasize anti-imperialism” and tend to be synonymous with economic state interventionism understood as a bulwark against the forces of economic globalization. Because Latin American nationalism is of predominantly economic, anti-globalization nature, it is best captured via actors’ positions regarding globalizations, such as those available in the Wiesehomeier and Benoit expert survey. Yet, according to the W-B dataset, positions regarding globalization are very highly correlated with overall economic ideology ($r = 0.89$). For this reason, economic nationalism in Latin America is highly correlated with, and even subsumed in, the ideological positions of political actors as captured by Baker and Greene’s scores (themselves based on the W-B dataset).

Additionally, it is possible to construct an index of sociocultural conservatism by considering Latin American parties’ positions regarding the role of religious principles in politics, questions regarding abortion, homosexuality and divorce, and attitudes regarding law and order relative to civil liberties. While such variables are included in the W-B dataset, due to the lack of cross-temporal dimension these data are not available for many of the parties included in the B-G dataset. Yet this limitation does not pose a significant difficulty in terms of measuring populism in the Latin American context. As discussed in Chapter 2, sociocultural conservatism and ethnic/exclusionary nationalism

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27 Madrid 2012: 20
28 Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 168
29 See Kaufman 2007 and Madrid 2012. Kaufman analyzes “the return of statism and economic nationalism” (2007: 25) while Madrid groups “nationalist and state interventionist rhetoric and policies” under the same distinguishing characteristic used to identify different types of populism (2012: 8).
30 This correlation coefficient is based on data for 164 political actors (parties and presidents) included in the W-B dataset.
usually correlate within broader agendas of what Inglehart and Norris call a “cultural backlash against post-materialist values.”\textsuperscript{31} Such a cultural backlash may be relatively salient in “Western societies,” such as those analyzed by Inglehart and Norris, but it is less salient in the Latin American context.\textsuperscript{32} While it is true that some Latin American leaders that are frequently labeled as “populist” – such as Ecuador’s president Rafael Correa (2007-17) – have at times exhibited culturally conservative tendencies,\textsuperscript{33} other Latin American actors labeled as “populist” – for example, Argentina’s president Cristina Kirchner (2007-15) – are socioculturally progressive. Overall, sociocultural conservatism is not usually invoked as a dominant feature of Latin American populism.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{31} Inglehart and Norris 2016: 22
\textsuperscript{32} Nationalism and traditional values are included in the definition of populism used by Inglehart and Norris. These authors analyze Western societies and do not include Latin America in their study. To the extent that they mention Latin America, it is with reference to “populist leaders on the economic left of the political spectrum” (2016: 6).
\textsuperscript{33} As reported in a March 2014 article in the \textit{Washington Post}, Correa was “staunchly opposed to abortion, even in cases of rape, and has called gay marriage a ‘barbarity’” (Miroff 2014). This was confirmed in a conversation with LGBTQ activist Pamela Troya (author’s interview in Quito, August 15, 2016).
\textsuperscript{34} For example, this dimension is missing from recent comparative studies by Madrid (2012) and Levitsky and Loxton (2013).
Table 3.1. Scoring relevant dimensions of populism in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Ideology (based on B-G dataset)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>&quot;Center-right&quot; - to the right of both country and regional medians</td>
<td>&quot;Incumbent&quot; - in power, completing full constitutional term as executive</td>
<td>&quot;Non-personalist&quot; - under both the regional and country medians in DALP survey - different candidates in subsequent presidential elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>&quot;Potentially left&quot; - to the left of one median (either country or regional) but to the right of the other median</td>
<td>&quot;Insider&quot; - has participated in electoral politics for 10 years or more - currently in opposition, but having governed previously - in power, but does not complete full constitutional term as executive before new (early) elections</td>
<td>&quot;Modestly personalist&quot; - above one median (either country or regional) but below the other median in DALP survey - transitioning between “non-personalist” and “relatively personalist” or vice-versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>&quot;Center-left&quot; - to the left of both country and regional medians</td>
<td>&quot;Relative outsider&quot; - in opposition and having participated in electoral politics for fewer than 10 years since last considered &quot;outsider&quot; or &quot;maverick&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;Relatively Personalist&quot; - above both country and regional medians in DALP survey - same candidate in subsequent presidential elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>&quot;Decisively left&quot; - more than one standard deviation to the left of the regional mean</td>
<td>&quot;Outsider&quot; or &quot;Maverick&quot; - organizationally new to electoral politics - too marginal (outside of the effective number of parties), i.e., de facto outsider - having abandoned one party to form or lead a new (or previously marginal) one or having transformed a previously marginal party</td>
<td>&quot;Highly personalist&quot; - more than one standard deviation above the regional mean in DALP survey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, having scored the ideological positioning of political actors in Latin America, I next assign scores based on location relative to party systems. As discussed by Barr, location relative to party systems has direct relevance in terms of the legitimacy with which political actors can afford to make anti-establishment appeals.\textsuperscript{35} Accordingly, new outsiders and mavericks, as defined in Chapter 2, are better positioned to make credible anti-establishment appeals than political insiders and much better positioned to voice such appeals than incumbents. To distinguish among different categories of location relative to the party system, I use a modified version of the 10-year rule proposed by Levitsky and Loxton, according to which “politicians cease to be outsiders if they have governed previously, served as long-term governing ministers, or participated in national elections

\textsuperscript{35} Barr 2009
for 10 years or more.”\textsuperscript{36} More specifically, I follow Barr who argues that, because mavericks alter the status quo, they have “some basis” “to make the same claims as outsiders often make,”\textsuperscript{37} and I identify Latin American outsiders and mavericks based the work of Carreras who identified outsiders and mavericks during the 1980-2010 period. I complement Carreras’ work by assigning my own scores for the 2011-2015.

Overall, I assign a score of 3 for outsiders and mavericks, as defined in the previous chapter and Table 4.1 above. Actors who begin as either outsiders or mavericks \textit{and} remain in opposition while participating in election for fewer than 10 years since they were last outsiders or mavericks are considered “relative outsiders” and receive a score of 2. Importantly, I differentiate “relative outsiders” from “insiders” to whom I assign a score of 1. “Insiders” are actors who have participated in electoral politics for 10 years or more, are in opposition but have governed previously, or are incumbents that have governed for less than a full constitutional term before new (early) elections. While the latter category of insiders are indeed incumbents, in many cases such actors have either failed to consolidate, or have not yet consolidated, the full power normally associated with incumbency. Indeed, such “insiders” are differentiated from “incumbents” who – as political actors in power that complete their full constitutional term – receive a score of 0.

Third, I assign scores based on degrees of personalism, which is another frequently invoked dimension in the study of populism in Latin America.\textsuperscript{38} To begin, these scores are based on the DALP expert survey data where such data are available. In particular, experts were asked, “To what extent do parties seek to mobilize electoral support by featuring a party leader’s charismatic personality?”\textsuperscript{39} As discussed in the previous chapter, charismatic personalism is a reliable proxy for

\textsuperscript{36} Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 115
\textsuperscript{37} Barr 2009: 34
\textsuperscript{38} For instance, Levitsky and Loxton 2013.
\textsuperscript{39} Kitschelt et al. 2009
personalism in political organizations. As with the B-G survey, I rescale the DALP scoring for each of the 94 political parties included in the Latin American portion of the survey to a 0-10 scale and calculate the regional median and mean as well as 18 country medians. I assign scores of 0 in “non-personalist” cases whose DALP scores were under both the regional and country medians; 1 for “modestly personalist” cases whose DALP scores were above one median but below the other; 2 for “relatively personalist cases” whose DALP scores were above both the country and regional medians; and 3 for “highly personalist” cases whose DALP scores were more than one standard deviation above the regional mean.

Because DALP data are not available for all relevant actors, for actors that are missing from the DALP data I rely on my own research and followed two procedures. First, for many of the Andean cases I use the work of Levitsky and Loxton who score “politicians as personalistic if they run for president with parties that they founded and dominated.” For the rest of the cases, I follow a scoring system based on whether or not a party runs the same candidate in consecutive elections. Accordingly, I assign a score of 2 if a party ran the same candidate in subsequent elections and a score of 0 if a party ran different candidates. For example, if a brand-new party ran the same candidate in two consecutive elections after the party was created, I assume a “relatively personalist” style leadership and assign a score of 2 on both occasions. If, however, a party transitioned from “non-personalist” leadership in a first election to a “relatively personalist leadership” featuring another candidate who ran in the following two elections, I assign scores of 0, 1, and 2 for each of the three moments in time in order to account for the transition that the party might have experienced in terms of degrees of personalism during this period.

40 Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 115
In sum, I have scored relevant political actors in Latin America based on three dimensions – ideology, location relative to party systems, and personalism. Because I anchor the case selection in center-left ideology, I limit the universe of cases to actors that have exhibited on at least one occasion “center-left” or “decisively left” ideological proclivities (that is, scores of either 2 or 3), as identified in the B-G dataset. Because I am particularly interested in new forms of populism after Latin America’s democratization, I exclude from the universe of relevant parties those more traditionally associated with center-left politics, such as labor-based parties or long-standing parties that had been associated with Latin America’s center-left before the period of democratization.  

Thus, I exclude Nicaragua’s Sandanista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and Mexico’s Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), both of which were founded before these countries’ democratization and have even since defined the center-left pillar of political systems. While these two parties have also been important channels of populism in Nicaragua and Mexico, they are different from relevant parties under analysis in important ways and are, therefore, excluded from the current study of new forms of populism after democratization.  

For similar reasons, I also exclude parties, such as Chile’s Communist Party and the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) that were founded in the 1920s and 1940s, respectively. Finally, I exclude as “insufficiently populist” single-issue parties, such as the Brazilian, Chilean and Colombian green parties, all of which are “center-left,” according to the B-G dataset, but none of which has been

\[41\] For a discussion of such parties, see Chapter 5.  
\[42\] According to Levitsky and Roberts, Nicaragua’s FSLN, led by Daniel Ortega, is best characterized as a “populist machine” more similar to Argentina’s Partido Justicialista (PJ) under the leadership of Nestor Kirchner (2011: 14-5). Unlike PJ under Kirchner, however, FSLN did not experience a change in leadership associated with a significant new direction to the economic left. Regarding Mexico’s PRD, while the leadership of Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) is conventionally understood as populist, AMLO’s position in the party has been described as “tenuous” and lacking in autonomy from party institutions (Bruhn 2012: 105). Thus, AMLO is in important ways similar to non-populist leaders who, as explained by Levitsky and Roberts, tend to “emerge from and remain accountable to” “institutionalized bases of partisan support” (2011: 7). These peculiarities notwithstanding, FSLN and PRD are excluded from the analysis because they were founded and participated in electoral competition before democratization.
associated with the broad anti-establishment appeals typical of populism. As a result, I have identified 47 political parties that are directly relevant for the measurement of populism after democratization in Latin America and that have cleared on at least one occasion the 2% electoral standard. A full list of these 47 parties of the “extended left-populist” party family in Latin America is available in Appendix B.

Post-communist Europe: Economic and Social Positions, Location, and Personalism

To measure populism in post-communist Europe, I follow procedures similar to the ones developed for the Latin American context and I score key dimensions associated with populism. Three of the key dimensions of interest for this region are similar – economic positions, location relative to party systems, and degree of personalism. An important difference, however, is that the degree of socio-cultural conservatism is a salient feature typically associated with populism in this region. For this reason, for the post-communist region, I score positions on both the economic and socio-cultural dimensions. As for the Latin American context, I only consider as relevant those post-communist actors that received at least 2% in at least one parliamentary election. For the post-communist context, I start with the year 1998 because systematic data on policy positions is available beginning with this election year. This is a convenient starting point from a historical perspective as well – because even countries that had not fully democratized immediately after the collapse of communism, such as Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia, experienced relative democratization by the late 1990s. In other words, if the 1980s were the period of deepest

43 I cover the 1998-2015 period even though the CHES data begin with the year 2000. Due to the temporal proximity of elections not long before the first CHES wave for the post-communist region, I use CHES results to score parties that competed in four legislative elections held in the Czech Republic (1998), Hungary (1998), Slovakia (1998), and Estonia (1999). While there are no relevant parties that competed in the 1998 elections in Latvia and Macedonia, for the 1998 elections held in Moldova and Ukraine I score parties consistently with subsequent scores. These include the uncontroversial “high-degree” populist cases of Ukraine’s PSPU (March 2011: 42) and Freedom, which Pop-Eleches (2010) classifies as “extremist,” as well as the “medium degree” case of Moldova’s PSD.
democratization in Latin America, the 1990s constituted the relevant corresponding period for the post-communist European context. Similarly, I end the scoring procedure with the year 2015 – by the end of which the political effects of the refugee crisis had begun to be felt across Europe, thus significantly reshaping key dimensions in European politics.

Utilizing a strategy similar to the one used for the Latin American context, I begin my case selection by identifying potentially relevant populist actors. I do so by primarily relying on two sources – (1) the CHES expert surveys and (2) Pop-Eleches’ categorization of “unorthodox” parties in fourteen of the fifteen post-communist European countries under investigation.44 For the only exception, Ukraine, I identify unorthodox parties primarily based on Taras Kuzio’s study of populism in Ukraine in comparative perspective.45 For the most recent period beyond these studies’ coverage, I rely on additional sources, such as March’s study of leftist parties in Europe, Hanley and Sikk’s study of anti-establishment reform parties in Eastern Europe,46 as well as on relevant news sources for the most up-to-date developments. Notably, all unorthodox parties tend to be “anti-establishment” or “populist” in at least some sense – because such parties typically feature economically protectionist and/or highly ethno-nationalist platforms and, to varying degrees, personalist leaders, as explained by Pop-Eleches.47 As for the Latin American context, all relevant parties in post-communist Europe originated in the period after democratization.

Having identified a set of unorthodox parties in post-communist Europe, I next adhere to the approach adopted by Inglehart and Norris and study of all of these parties’ economic positions

45 Kuzio 2010
46 March 2011; Hanley and Sikk 2016
47 Pop-Eleches distinguishes among new/centrist populists, national populists, extreme nationalists, and the radical left (2010: 227-32). While the first two of these categories directly feature the word “populism” – due to their personalist and nationalist tendencies, respectively – many parties within the latter two categories are frequently considered as “populist” by researchers of the populist radical right (e.g., Mudde 2007) or of left-populism (e.g., March 2011).
systematically by consulting the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES). These expert surveys are a rich source of empirical information on nearly all relevant political parties in post-communist Europe because of the time-series quality of the dataset, which is updated every four years and which covers a variety of economic and socio-cultural positions beginning with elections in 2000. As for the Latin American region, where possible I use scores from the DALP expert survey to cross-validate the obtained CHES scores. For two countries – Moldova and Ukraine – I primarily rely on results from the DALP expert survey because the CHES dataset entirely excludes Moldova as well as Ukraine before the 2014 revolution. Finally, whether they are used as the primary data source or for the purposes of cross-validation, all DALP scores are rescaled on a 0-10 scale for the purposes of comparability with the CHES dataset, which uses such a scale.

Overall, I utilize the above expert surveys to identify actors whose economic positions are to the “left of the median” for any given election included in the datasets. Using a procedure identical to the one employed for the Latin American context, I assign scores of 0 (“center-right”) for expert survey positions that fall to the right of both the country and regional medians and 1 (“potentially left”) for economic positions falling between the two medians. By contrast, positions located to the left of both the regional and country means receive a score of 2 (“center-left”) while those located more than one standard deviation to the left of the regional mean receive the highest score of 3 (“decisively left”). As for the Latin American context, I include in my dataset parties that have received a score of 2 or 3 on at least one occasion.

Second, while social issues – such as ethnic nationalism and cultural traditionalism – are less salient in terms of Latin American populism, such issues are highly relevant for the study of

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48 To obtain data on economic positions, I use the CHES variable Economic Left-Right (lrecon). This is a similar approach to the one deployed by Inglehart and Norris (2016) who also use the CHES dataset.
49 For economic positions obtained from the DALP expert survey, I calculated an average score based on the three questions about social spending (d1), state role in the economy (d2), and public spending (d3).
European populism, which frequently features exclusionary ethno-nationalist appeals.\(^{50}\) In a context lacking a historical equivalent of Latin America’s *mestizaje* (discussed above), post-communist nationalism makes a far more common use of what Mudde and Rovira Kaltwsasser characterize as a “xenophobic version of nationalism, according to which the state should be inhabited only by members of the native group, and non-native (alien) people and values are perceived as threatening to the nation-state.”\(^{51}\) Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, such exclusionary ethno-nationalist appeals often correlate with highly traditional and authoritarian positions – a reason why scholars of European politics have analyzed the combination of such positions as one pole of what Hooghe et al. call the GAL-TAN dimension of European politics, where TAN stands for “traditional–authoritarian–nationalist.”\(^{52}\) Notably, parties high in TAN “value order tradition and stability, and believe that government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues.”\(^{53}\)

To score this relevant social dimension of populism in post-communist European parties, I rely on the CHES dataset, which provides time-series data on the GAL-TAN positions of nearly all political parties competing in post-communist legislative elections since 2000. Using an already familiar procedure, I calculate a regional median and mean as well as fifteen country medians and assign the following scores: 0 (“GAL”) when a position is under both the regional and country medians and can, therefore, be characterized as relatively “green–alternative–libertarian;” 1 (“Modestly TAN”) when a position is above one median but below the other; 2 (“Relatively TAN”) when a position is above both country and regional medians; and 3 (“Highly TAN”) when a position

\(^{50}\) Mudde and Rovira Kaltwsasser 2013: 168

\(^{51}\) Ibid.


\(^{53}\) Bakker et al. 2015: 144
is more than one standard deviation above the regional mean. As in the case with economic positions, this procedure differentiates among degrees of socio-cultural conservatism in relevant post-communist parties.

**Table 3.2. Scoring relevant dimension of populism in post-communist Europe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Economic Position (based on CHES)</th>
<th>Social Position (based on CHES)</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Personalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>“Center-right” - to the right of both country and regional medians</td>
<td>“GAL” - under both the regional and country medians</td>
<td>“Incumbent” - in power, completing full constitutional term as executive</td>
<td>“Non-personalist” - under both the regional and country medians in DALP survey - joint or collective leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>“Potentially left” - to the left of one median (either country or regional) but to the right of the other median</td>
<td>“Modestly TAN” - above one median (either country or regional) but below the other median</td>
<td>“Insider” - has participated in electoral politics for 10 years or more - currently in opposition, but having governed previously - in power, but does not complete full constitutional term as executive before new (early) elections</td>
<td>“Modestly personalist” - above one median (either country or regional) but below the other median in DALP survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>“Center-left” - to the left of both country and regional medians</td>
<td>“Relatively TAN” - above both country and regional medians</td>
<td>“Relative outsider” - in opposition and having participated in electoral politics for fewer than 10 years since last considered “outsider” or “maverick”</td>
<td>“Relatively Personalist” - above both country and regional medians in DALP survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>“Decisively left” - more than one standard deviation to the left of the regional mean</td>
<td>“Highly TAN” - more than one standard deviation above the regional mean</td>
<td>“Outsider” or “Maverick” - organizationally new to electoral politics - too marginal (outside of the effective number of parties), i.e., de facto outsider - having abandoned one party to form or lead a new (or previously marginal) one or having transformed a previously marginal party</td>
<td>“Highly personalist” - more than one standard deviation above the regional mean in DALP survey - party bears leader’s name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2 above summarizes the system for scoring dimension of populism in post-communist Europe. As the table shows, in addition to the economic and social dimensions discussed above, there are two final dimensions for scoring populism in post-communist Europe, both of which are identical to the ones used for Latin America. The third dimension in Table 3.2 – location relative to party systems – is scored based on several sources. Having considered Pop-Eleches’ categorization of new/centrist parties, all of which were either outsiders or mavericks in the initial election after their foundation, I also use Alan Sikk’s categorization of “genuinely new” parties in
Eastern Europe, which is further developed in the later work of Hanley and Sikk. Additionally, I use my own database of political parties and parties in government and opposition for the entire post-communist period in order to make determinations regarding the scoring of relevant parties over time. As for the Latin American context (and as defined in Table 3.2 above), while incumbents and insiders receive scores of 0 and 1, respectively, relative outsiders gain a score of 2 while outsiders and mavericks are assigned a score of 3.

The fourth and final populist dimension that I assess is personalism. As for the Latin American context, I base my scoring on the original DALP expert survey charisma scores for those parties for which such scores are available. For many of the remaining cases, I utilize Pop-Eleches’ categorization of new/centrist populist parties which tend to rely on “the strong presence of their prominent leaders who create the parties as vehicles for their personal political ambitions usually just prior to elections.” Additionally, I conducted my own research and assigned scores based on the following criteria. If a relevant organization bears its founder’s name – as Romania’s People’s Party – Dan Diaconescu, Moldova’s Braghiș Alliance, Poland’s Palikot Movement or Slovenia’s Positive Slovenia (which began as the Zoran Janković List) and Alliance of Alenka Bratušek – I assign a “highly personalist” score of 3. If, by contrast, a party is distinguished by joint or collective leadership – as Bulgaria’s LIDER and Slovenia’s United Left – or by frequent leadership changes – as Estonia’s People’s Union – I assign a “non-personalist” score of 0. The few remaining cases are given scores of either 0 (“non-personalist”) or 2 (“relatively personalist”) based on my own data on the histories of relevant parties in post-communist Europe.

In sum, I have scored relevant political actors in post-communist Europe on four dimensions – economic and social positions, location relative to party systems, and personalism – by

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54 Sikk 2005; Hanley and Sikk 2016  
55 Pop-Eleches 2010: 231
triangulating from a variety of sources. As for the Latin American context, I anchor the case selection in center-left ideology, limiting the universe of cases to parties that have exhibited on at least one occasion either “center-left” or “decisively left” economic positions (that is, scores of 2 or 3) as identified in the CHES dataset. As I am interested in forms of populism after the period of democratization, I exclude from the universe of relevant cases ex-communist successor parties\(^{56}\) as well as single-issue parties, such as those specifically defending ethnic minority interests, pensioners’ interests, or those self-identified as green parties. While there are many such parties in post-communist Europe, their single-issue focus is far from the more comprehensive anti-establishment appeals typically associated with populism. Overall, I have identified 53 political parties that are directly relevant for the measurement of populism in post-communist Europe and that have on at least one occasion cleared the 2% electoral standard. A full list of these 53 parties of the “extended left-populist” party family in post-communist Europe is available in Appendix B.

### 3.4. Patterns of Populist Variation in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

According to Collier and Mahon, if identifying conceptual attributes and the relationships among them justifies the utility of a concept, scaling and selecting cases across contexts directly inform procedures for comparative analysis.\(^{57}\) With regard to scaling, Wittgenstein noted that “the strength of the fibre does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole body, but in the overlapping of many fibres.”\(^{58}\) Translated in Sartori’s language, this means that the level of intensity of a given attribute of an abstract concept can both vary and interact with other definitional attributes. While due to their varying nature, levels of intensity cannot be useful as strictly necessary

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\(^{56}\) For a discussion of communist successor parties, see Chapter 5.

\(^{57}\) Collier and Mahon 1993: 848

\(^{58}\) Wittgenstein 1958: 32
conditions for the identification of populists, they can nevertheless be helpful for comparing cases of populist phenomena.

Having identified all relevant political actors with center-left economic positions – that is, all potentially populist actors – in Latin America and post-communist Europe, I use levels of intensity of attributes to develop overall measures for comparing populism in the two regions. I do so by following a two-step process. First, I incorporate the scoring procedures discussed above into family resemblance categorizations in order to identify degrees of populism in all relevant parties over time – i.e., whether such parties exhibited high, medium, or low degrees of populism at the time of a given election.

Second, having identified degrees of populism in relevant parties over time, I develop two measures of populism for each relevant election in my dataset. The first measure – “populism at minimum” – aggregates vote shares for parties exhibiting high degrees of populism only. The second measure – “populism at maximum” – aggregates vote shares for parties exhibiting high and medium degrees of populism. Finally, I use these two measures of populism to identify tendencies in populist variation across Latin Americana and post-communist Europe. While the “at minimum” and “at maximum” measures can be used as two separate metrics for evaluating magnitude of populism, these measures are, in fact, very highly correlated (r = 0.93). As such, they are reliable metrics for assessing varying levels of populism in both regions.

Identifying Degrees of Populism in Relevant Parties

Based on the scoring procedures developed in the previous section, I have identified 47 relevant parties featuring center-left economic positions on at least one occasion in Latin America between 1993 and 2015 and 53 such parties in post-communist Europe between 1998 and 2015. As already noted, these periods correspond to the availability of expert survey data measuring
ideological positions based on which the overall scoring procedure is based. For each of these parties within the universe of possible center-left populist parties, I have assigned scores for the relevant dimensions discussed above. The sum of these scores results in a total score reflecting each party’s degree of populism with reference to each election over the respective period.

\[
\text{Degree of populism for a given relevant Party } X \text{ at a time } t = \sum \text{scores on relevant dimensions for Party } X \text{ at a time } t
\]

Having developed overall scores to measure degrees of populism for each relevant party in each election year, I use specific rules to distinguish between high, medium, and low degrees of populism that can characterize each individual party from the populist family at any given time. Such a distinction is necessary in order to develop the two measures of populism – “at minimum” and “at maximum” – at the final step of the measurement procedure. In terms of scoring procedure, I identify degrees of populism in political parties with reference to relevant elections. This choice is motivated by the fact that the datasets on which I rely for the determination of ideological positions – that is, the B-G dataset for Latin America and the CHES expert surveys for post-communist Europe – assign scores with reference to election years. Additionally, in the final step of measuring populism I also rely on electoral data, in line with prominent studies on the subject. Next, I present the Latin American and post-communist European “left-populist families” based on the scoring procedures developed above and I identify degrees of populism in relevant parties in the two regions.

**Degrees of Populism in Latin America’s “Extended Left-Populist” Party Family**

Given that I have scored Latin American parties on three dimensions – ideological positioning, location, and personalism – each of which carries a maximum of three points, the maximum possible populism score that any party can receive at any given point in time is 9 (nine).
For the period under consideration, there are a total of 94 observations (party-election) for the 1993-2015 period for the 47 relevant parties that gained a minimum of 2% of the vote share in at least one presidential election. The scoring for each of these observations is available in Appendix C (Table A.1). To distinguish among overall degrees of populism for each observation, I employ the following rules.

First, as the mean value for the 94 observations is 6.0, observations with a total score above this value tend to be distinguished by higher degrees of populism than the average for the Latin American region. Based on this statistic, I identify a “high degree” of populism for observations with a total score above the regional mean (that is, with overall scores of 7, 8, and 9). Included in this category are parties such as Argentina’s Front for Victory (FpV) in 2003, Bolivia’s CONDEPA in 1993 and 1997, and many familiar populist actors such as Hugo Chávez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela, Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism (MAS) led by Evo Morales, and Ecuador’s Alianza PAIS led by Rafael Correa. Notably, I include in the category of “high-degree” populism observations with an overall score of 6 but with three points on both the ideological and personalism dimensions. This move allows for the inclusions of incumbents (with a location score of 0) who continue exhibiting features associated with high degrees of populism, such as leftist ideology and personalism. The move differentiates between, on the one hand, cases such as Chávez, Morales, and Correa – all of whom remained highly ideological and personalistic as incumbent presidents, and, on the other hand, Argentina’s “medium-degree” populist incumbent Christina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015) who was both less ideological and less personalistic in comparative perspective.

59 The median value is 6.0.
Second, I identify a “medium-degree” of populism for all other observations with an overall score of 6 as well as for observations with a score of 5. This category includes political actors – such as Brazil’s Democratic Labor Party (PDT) and Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL) – that are not as frequently cited as “populists” yet exhibit some prominent features typically associated with populism. I also identify as “medium-degree” of populism observations with total scores of 4 if actors receive a minimum of two points on at least two of the three dimensions of populism. Such examples include Venezuela’s Radical Cause between 1993 and 2000 and the Free Bolivia Movement (MBL) in 1993.

Third, I include in the rest of the observations in the final category of “low degree” populism. Included in this group are observations with a score of 4 but lacking a minimum of two points on at least two of the three dimensions as well observations with a total score of 3. Examples of parties in this category are Ecuador’s Democratic People’s Movement (MPD) and Ethics and Democracy Network (RED). Despite the total score of 4 for Ecuador’s RED (in 2009), this party is classified as being comparatively less populist than Brazil’s PDT (also with a total score of 4 but included in the “medium” category) due to the absence of personalist leadership in comparative perspective.

Table 3.3 below presents the members of Latin America’s “populist family” and the scoring of the 94 observations for all parties. This table is based on Appendix C (Table A.1) which includes the detailed scoring for each of the three dimensions for these parties at the election level (94 observations). Table 3.3 features the 47 relevant parties included in the analysis, their leaders (or presidential candidates), and the scoring of degrees of populism that each of these parties receives for the presidential elections in which it participated between 1993 and 2015. I have included party leaders because leaders and parties “are deeply interlinked”\(^\text{60}\) especially in the context of populism.

\(^{60}\) Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 156
Table 3.3. Degree of populism in 47 relevant parties in Latin American presidential elections, 1993-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relevant Party</th>
<th>Leader(s) / Presidential Candidate(s)</th>
<th>DEGREE OF POPULISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Relevant Party</td>
<td>Leader(s) / Presidential Candidate(s)</td>
<td>DEGREE OF POPULISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MNP</td>
<td>Freddy Ehlers</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MUPP-NP</td>
<td>Freddy Ehlers, Luis Macas</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Lucio Gutiérrez</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>León Roldós Aguilera</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PAIS</td>
<td>Rafael Correa</td>
<td>2006, 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RED</td>
<td>Martha Roldós</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Rubén Ignacio Zamora Rivas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UD</td>
<td>José Luis Chea Urruela, Manuel Eduardo Conde Orellana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>FDNG</td>
<td>Jorge Luis Gonzalez del Valle, Ana Catalina Soberanis Reyes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PLP</td>
<td>Acisclo Valladares Molina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CASA</td>
<td>Jose Eduardo Suger Cofiño</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIBRE</td>
<td>Manuel Zelaya, Xiomara Castro de Zelaya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Cecilia Soto González</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PASC</td>
<td>Patricia Mercado Castro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MRS</td>
<td>Edmundo Jarquín</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Fernando Lugo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FG</td>
<td>Aníbal Carrillo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Marrio Ferreiro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>Javier Pérez de Cuéllar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Ollanta Humala Tasso</td>
<td>2006, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NE</td>
<td>Rafael Michelin Dellepiane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the table makes clear, political actors exhibiting high and medium degrees of populism are frequently found across Latin American countries. Additionally, in some cases actors can vacillate between degrees of populism from one election cycle to the next. Such variation is, of course, logical given that values vary over time along the different dimensions used to measure overall degree of populism. While such shifts are especially prominent in cases of incumbency – such as in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador – they are also observable in non-incumbent cases, such as Bolivia’s Solidarity Civil Unity (UCS), which transitioned from a high to medium level of populism by 2002 due to a loss of points on the location dimension, or Chile’s Humanist Party (PH), which transitioned from a medium to a low degree of populism by 2013 due to a loss of points on the personalism dimension. By contrast, Costa Rica’s Democratic Force (FD) moved from a medium degree of populism in 1998 to a high degree in 2002 due to gaining points on the personalism dimensions, before moving back to a medium degree in 2006 due to a loss of points in terms of location.

*Degrees of Populism in Post-communist Europe’s “Extended Left-Populist” Party Family*

Because post-communist parties are scored on four dimensions – economic positions, social positions, location, and personalism – each of which carries a maximum of three points, the maximum possible score that any part can receive at any given point in time is 12 (twelve). There are a total of 134 observations (party-election) for the 1998-2015 period for the 53 relevant parties that gained at least 2% of the vote share in at least one legislative election. The detailed scoring for each of these observations is available in Appendix C (Table A.2). To distinguish between overall degrees of populism for each observation, I use the following criteria.
First, because the mean value for the set of 134 observations is 7.4, observations with a total score above this value tend to exhibit higher degrees of populism than the average for the post-communist region. Since I am interested specifically in economic positioning to the left of the median, I assign a “high degree” of populism to all observations with total score of 8 or above and a minimum of two points on economic positioning. This category of parties includes many prominent examples, such as Bulgaria’s Ataka, Hungary’s Fidesz after 2002, and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) after 2001.

Second, I assign into the “medium degree” category observations featuring values above zero on at least three of the four dimensions and one of two additional criteria: (1) a total score higher than 7, but with just one point on the economy, or (2) a total score of 5, 6 or 7. While Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) in 2001 and Lithuania’s Order and Justice (TT) in 2012 are examples of observations in the first sub-group, Slovenia’s ZARES in 2008, Estonia’s Center Party (EK) in 2003 and 2007, and the National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria are examples of observations in the second sub-group.

Third, I identify as “low degree” of populism observations that do not conform to the above criteria. Included in this category are (1) observations that do not feature values above zero on at least three of the four dimensions, as in Slovenia’s United Left (ZL) or Lithuania’s Labor Party (DP) in 2008, (2) observations assigned zero points on the economic dimension, as the Slovenian National Party (SNS) after it began adopting explicitly center-right economic positions after 2004, and (3) observations with a total score of 4 and below, as for Lithuania’s New Union (NS) in 2008.

Table 3.4 below presents the members of post-communist Europe’s “populist family” and the scoring for all 134 observations for all parties. Similar to the preceding table for the Latin

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61 The median value is 8.0.
American context, this table features the 53 relevant parties in post-communist Europe, their leaders, and the scoring of degrees of populism that each relevant party receives for the legislative elections in which it participated between 2000 and 2015. The table is based on Appendix C (Table A.2), which includes the detailed scoring for each party at the election level (134 observations).
Table 3.4. Degree of populism in 53 relevant parties in post-communist European legislative elections, 1998-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relevant Party</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
<th>DEGREE OF POPULISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ATAKA</td>
<td>Volen Siderov</td>
<td>2005, 2009, 2013,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>RZS</td>
<td>Yane Yanev</td>
<td>2009, 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIDER</td>
<td>Krassimira Kovachka, Stefan Kenov</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NFSB</td>
<td>Valeri Simeonov</td>
<td>2013, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VMRO-BND</td>
<td>Krassimir Karakachanov</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BBT</td>
<td>Nikolay Barekov</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>ABV</td>
<td>Georgi Parvanov</td>
<td>2000, 2003, 2007,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>Dobroslav Paraga, Anto Dapić, Daniel Srb</td>
<td>2011, 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HSP-AS</td>
<td>Ruža Tomašić</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HL-SR</td>
<td>Dragustin Lesar</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>Viktor Orbán</td>
<td>2006, 2010, 2014,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JOBBIK</td>
<td>Gábor Vona</td>
<td>2010, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>Andráš Schiffer</td>
<td>2010, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>(various)</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LVP</td>
<td>(various)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Artūras Paulauskas</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Rolandas Paksas</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Viktor Uspaskich</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRONTEAS</td>
<td>Algirdas Paleckis</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Jonas Varkala</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>NSDP</td>
<td>Tito Petkovski</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GROM</td>
<td>Stevo Čakimovski</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>(various)</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEAB</td>
<td>Dumitru Braghiș</td>
<td>2005, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSM/P / PSRM</td>
<td>Veronica Abramciuc &amp; Eduard Smirnov, Igor Dodon</td>
<td>2005, 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4. (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relevant Party</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
<th>DEGREE OF POPULISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PP-DD</td>
<td>Dan Diaconescu</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNPR</td>
<td>Valeriu Steriu</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSNS</td>
<td>Ján Slota</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HZD</td>
<td>Ivan Gašparovič, Josef Grapa</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Franci Kek</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Zoran Janković</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZaAB</td>
<td>Alenka Bratušek</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ZL</td>
<td>Matjaž Hanžek (TRS) &amp; Luka Mesec (IDS)</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Like the previous table for Latin America, Table 3.4 for post-communist Europe locates relevant parties within three categories reflecting varying degrees of overall populism based on dimensions that change over time. Because of the time-sensitive nature of the dimensions considered for the scoring, the shift that relevant parties – such as Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) – have experienced from more medium to higher degrees of populism over time is captured by the categorizations. In both these cases, shifts between overall degrees of populism are
partly a function of these parties’ adoption of center-left economic positions over time. Other parties, such as Lithuania’s Order and Justice (TT) and Labor Party (DP), experienced a decrease in their overall degree of populism for the period – mostly due to economic positions shifting to the right in the first case and mostly due to both shifting economic positions and location relative to the party system in the second case. Such examples underscore the changing nature of populist degrees in post-communist Europe.

Overall, then, for each of the two regions, I have used family resemblance categorizations to identify degrees of populism found in relevant parties and how such degrees may be subject to continuity or change over time. Based on scores for the underlying dimensions used to measure overall degree of populism at any given electoral cycle, a relevant party exhibits high, medium, or low degree of populism. To which of these three categories a relevant party belongs at any given moment of time is a function of the interaction among factors regarding ideological positioning, location relative to party systems, and degree of personalism.

The analytical procedure undertaken above is preferable to alternatives because it is both valid and empirically realistic. It is valid because it identifies as highly populist many examples usually cited as “populist” in both regions, such as prominent cases in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. However, rather than isolating such examples as the only exponents of populism, the procedure locates them into a family resemblance categorization that also includes other, albeit less prominent, members. Importantly, this categorization does not eliminate the very realistic possibility of fluctuating degrees of populism, which rival conceptualizations fail to capture. Most importantly, defining populism as a family resemblance concept facilitates both a degree of flexibility necessary to identify patterns of continuity and change and the ability to develop disciplined categorizations.
3.5. Measuring Populism in Comparative Perspective

Having identified degrees of populism in relevant parties, I next measure the magnitude of populism during electoral cycles by aggregating election results. While populism can be measured in a variety of ways, the analysis of electoral support is fruitful because it considers both demand and supply factors in the political system. While important recent work focuses on leadership rhetoric or public opinion attitudes, the analysis of electoral performance is a reasonable approach to measuring populism because it accounts for the interaction between such factors. Moreover, an approach relying on aggregated election results is in line with most empirical work on populism and anti-establishment or outsider politics in both regions.

Overall, for each region, I use the three categorizations distinguished in the previous section to develop two measures of populism at the national election level – “at minimum” and “at maximum.” To develop these measures, I first delimit the universe of cases by excluding potentially irrelevant observations for which members of the “extended left-populist” family exhibit “low-degree” populism at any given time. I do this in order to achieve a more “realistic” measure of populism by only including in my measures observations for which relevant political actors exhibit populist attributes of sufficiently high number and/or intensity. Having focused on “high-degree” and “medium-degree” populists, I then develop the following two measures.

First, populism “at minimum” is the sum of the vote shares of those political actors exhibiting high degrees of populism. This measure captures the electoral performance of only those parties identified as highly populist, thus excluding other possible members of the broader “left-populist family” that exhibit somewhat lower degrees of populism. Because such highly

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62 Hawkins 2010
63 Akkerman, Mudde, Zaslove 2014
populist parties usually define the specter of populism in both regions, the first measure is an approximation of the minimum degree of populism observable at any given election cycle.

Second, populism “at maximum” is the sum of vote shares of political actors exhibiting high and medium degrees of populism. This is a more “expansive” measure because it captures the electoral performance of parties that score relatively high on some key dimensions, yet exhibit somewhat lower degree of overall populism at any given time. While such “medium-degree” cases are more debatably “populist” than the “high-degree” observations, they nevertheless exhibit a medium degree of center-left populism and are, therefore, potentially valid populist actors. Moreover, this alternative measurement “at maximum” is a useful sensitivity test in terms of the validity of the first measure of populism. A relatively high correlation between the two measures would mean that whether populism is measured “at minimum” or “at maximum” should make little difference in terms of explaining overall patterns of variation.

Importantly, both measures of populism rely on two factors that are independent from one another – (1) observable degree of populism based on which vote shares are either included or excluded in the two measure and (2) actual electoral performance. While a party may exhibit a high degree of populism, if its electoral performance is poor, such a party contributes little to the overall magnitude of populism at any given time. By contrast, relatively strong electoral performances of parties that exhibit sufficiently high degrees of populism, as to be included in the “at minimum” or “at maximum” measures, contribute to the overall magnitude of populism for any given electoral cycle.

Figure 3.1 shows the average total populist vote share per country in Latin America and post-communist Europe. As discussed above, the time frame for the Latin American region (1993-2015) is five years longer than the time frame for post-communist Europe (1998-2015) due the
availability of data based on which relevant parties were categorized. This difference notwithstanding, the respective periods for which data are available begin roughly about a decade into the third wave of democratization for each region, thereby representing appropriate time frames for comparative analysis. While Figure 3.1 does not show the temporal dimension of the fluctuating nature of the populist vote for each of the 33 countries included in the analysis, it provides a useful comparative perspective based on the aggregated vote shares of members of the populist party families for each country for the respective periods.

As the figure shows, the average total vote share for populists includes both the average aggregated vote share for “high-degree” populists (in blue) and the average aggregated vote share for “medium-degree” populism (in gray). Overall, the blue bars represent the measure of populism “at minimum” – that is, the average vote share for “high-degree” populists only. By contrast, the entire bars represent the measure of populism “at maximum” – that is, the average vote share for “high-degree” and “medium-degree” populists combined. Importantly, the correlation between the two measures – total populist vote share “at minimum” (blue bars) and “at maximum” (full bars) – is very high (r = 0.93). This is an important finding in terms of evaluating the comparable validity of the proposed measures. Such a high correlation implies that the phenomenon under study can be validly analyzed regardless of which of these two measures of populism – “at minimum” or “at maximum” – is utilized.65

65 See Chapter 6 for statistical analyses using both measures.
Figure 3.1. Average total populist vote share per country: Latin America (1993-2015) and post-communist Europe (1998-2015)
Based on Figure 3.1, it is possible to distinguish among several types of countries in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Focusing on the blue bars (representing the populist vote “at minimum”), we observe that Venezuela and Bolivia rank at the top, with populists surpassing 40% of the average vote share. This finding is not surprising in light of the highly successful populist movements led by Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales in these two countries. Another Latin American country associated with the populist wave is Ecuador – here ranked at fifth place – in which a wave of populists, most prominently including those supported by the Pachakutik Indian movement, preceded the rise of populist Rafael Correa in 2006.

Whereas such examples are unsurprisingly located at the top of the chart, the placement of several post-communist countries near the top is more intriguing. While these countries are often associated with the more “conservative” varieties of populism typical of parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz and Jobbik, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS), Self-Defense (SRP), and League of Polish Families (LP), and Slovakia’s Direction – Social Democracy (SMER), these parties’ social conservatism is clearly supplemented by left economic positions, a reason why Inglehart and Norris actually identify them as “populist-left.” As the figure shows, the aggregated electoral performance of such parties was impressive – averaging above 30% in Hungary and Poland and above 20% in Slovakia. In Lithuania, too, parties such as New Union (in 2000), Labor Party, and Order and Justice (in 2004) advocated leftist economic positions and scored impressive electoral performances, thus contributing to an average populist vote share of above 20%. Indeed, such performances rank post-communist countries such as Slovakia and Lithuania on par with Latin American countries such as Peru and Costa Rica. In the latter two countries, Ollanta Humala (in Peru) and Ottón Solís and Luis

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66 Inglehart and Norris 2016
67 These parties subsequently adopted more centrist and even center-right positions on the economy, as the scoring in Appendix C (Table A.2) betrays, and are thus excluded from the “high-degree” populist category for subsequent elections, as Table 3.4 above reflects.
Guillermo Solís (in Costa Rica) headed two electorally successful populist projects – the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) and the Citizens’ Action Party (PAC). Peru and Costa Rica rank slightly higher than Ukraine, where the combined average vote share of “high-degree” and “medium-degree” populists surpasses 20%. In this country, the relatively weak electoral performances of Natalya Vitrenko’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSPU) were followed by stronger electoral results of the less extreme, yet still populist, Fatherland led by Yulia Tymoschenko.

This first tier of countries with relatively high populism scores is followed by a second tier, where populists received, on average, between 10 and 15% of the vote share. Included in this group are six countries – Romania, Argentina, Paraguay, Estonia, Bulgaria, and Slovenia. Some of these countries – Romania and Paraguay – are distinguished by sporadic patterns of populist electoral ascendancy – for instance, the electoral successes of the extremist Greater Romania Party (PRM) in the early 2000s and Fernando Lugo’s 2008 electoral victory in Paraguay. Other countries – Slovenia and Bulgaria – are distinguished by a great multitude of relatively less electorally successful populist parties. The final two countries – Argentina and Estonia – are the only two in which the average vote share for “medium-degree” populists surpasses the vote share for “high-degree” populists. The reason for this in both cases lies in the diminished degrees of populism associated with incumbency. Once in power, the Argentinian Front for Victory (FvP) – never as ideologically leftist as other members of the Latin American “pink wave,” such as the parties led by Chávez and Morales – transitioned from “high-degree” to “medium-degree” of populism. In Estonia, the constant vacillation of the major populist actor – Edgar Savisaar’s Center Party (EK) – between roles in government and opposition results in placements under the “high-degree” and “medium-degree” categories at different points in time.
Finally, the bottom part of Figure 3.1 includes 17 countries in which populism was relatively less electorally successful, gaining, on average, less than 10% of the vote share, if at all. In some of these countries – Moldova, Croatia, Chile, Uruguay and Guatemala – “high-degree” populists competed in elections but were relatively unsuccessful. In other countries – Albania, Honduras, Brazil, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, and Macedonia – only “medium-degree” populists participated in elections and were, likewise, relatively unsuccessful. As already discussed above, a caveat is that in the cases of Nicaragua and Mexico I have not categorized the Sandanista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), respectively, as populist due to these parties’ participation in democratic elections prior to the period of democratization.68 Finally, for the analyzed periods no populists competed in elections in five countries – the Czech Republic, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Latvia, and Panama.

From a more general perspective, Table 3.1 demonstrates three important findings. First, variation of patterns of populist electoral performance is clearly observable within both Latin America and post-communist Europe for the respective periods under analysis. In both regions, there are countries in which populism was highly successful at the ballot box as well as countries in which populism was either relatively less successful or entirely absent. Second, because the average total vote share for “high-degree” populists is very highly correlated with the average total vote share for “high-degree” and “medium-degree” populists, as reported above, the “at minimum” and “at maximum” measures of populism are similarly valid. Third, according to both of these measures, divergent patterns of populist electoral success are similar across regions. For example, of the “top

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68 While this is an important caveat, Nicaragua and Mexico are the only two of the 33 countries whose potentially relevant parties are excluded from the analysis. Specifically, I exclude these two parties’ electoral performance from the dependent variable and I use it in the main independent variable in this study. For a further discussion of this question, see Chapters 5 and 6.
ten” countries where populism was relatively successful for the analyzed periods, half are located in Latin America and half are found in post-communist Europe.

Overall, variations in terms of the electoral performance of populist actors were prominent in Latin America and post-communist Europe. In some Latin American countries – such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Costa Rica – populism was more electorally successful than in many other countries during the 1993-2015 period. In a similar fashion, populism was relatively more electorally successful in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine than elsewhere in the post-communist region during the 1998-2015 period. It can be concluded, therefore, that despite important differences between the two regions, a recognizable family of populist actors defended economically leftist positions, tending to succeed at the ballot box in some countries in both regions. From a comparative perspective, such countries were notably different from others – such as the 17 countries at the bottom of Figure 3.1, where populist actors either registered relatively poor electoral performances or did not compete at all in the period after democratization. Whether populism is measured “at minimum” or “at maximum,” as demonstrated in Figure 3.2, variations in its magnitude clearly seem to have defined the democratic experiences of countries in both Latin America and post-communist Europe.

3.6. Conclusion: Comparing Populism Across Regional Contexts

While it is generally recognized that populism is a universal phenomenon, few studies venture into systematic cross-regional comparative analysis.69 By contrast, in this chapter I have identified intriguingly similar patterns of variation that are clearly observable across regions. The identification of these variable patterns is based on the Wittgensteinian logic of family resemblance,

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69 Notable exceptions include Ionescu and Gellner 1969; Canovan 1981; Weyland 1999; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013. However, with the exception of Canovan’s work, which is rather historical in nature, most cross-regional scholarship is either in the form of single articles or edited volumes.
according to which selected cases share overlapping attributes\textsuperscript{70} that are comparable in nature. As a result, I have made the case for the comparative analysis of populist expressions that, although usually considered as distinct varieties of populism – e.g., “Bolivarian” populism in Latin America and “conservative” populism in post-communist Europe – in fact have much in common.

My approach to identifying variation is largely based on the “left of the median” aspect of populism, which, as noted by prominent observers, is theoretically and empirically important for two world regions with relatively high degrees of social inequality. While this kind of populism has more typically been associated with the Latin American context, important “conservative” populists with economic positions to the left of the median have also dominated politics in some post-communist countries, as documented in Inglehart and Norris’ recent research. Following the theoretically grounded intuition that the “left of the median” aspect is an important facet of contemporary populist phenomena, I use this aspect in concert with others – location relative to party systems and personalism – to ultimately derive measures of populism across time and space.

Importantly, because my approach is strictly empirical, unlike many other authors on populism, I make no \textit{a priori} assumptions about the potentially illiberal nature of such phenomena. Instead, I use existing datasets based on prominent expert surveys to analyze parties’ ideological positions and to identify actors exhibiting “left of the median” tendencies on at least one occasion – but not necessarily on all occasions – during the analyzed periods after democratization in both regions. Having identified 100 possibly populist parties – 47 in Latin America and 53 in post-communist Europe – all of which originated in the period after democratization, I assign empirically derived scores for important dimensions – ideological positioning, location relative to party systems

\textsuperscript{70} For Wittgenstein, the different expressions of a concept have “no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all – but they are related to one another in many different ways.” While there is “no underlying essence,” and therefore no necessary conditions, “something runs through the whole thread” – namely, continuous overlapping of fibres (1958: 31-2).
and personalism – that are subject to empirical dynamism in terms of temporality. In turn, for each electoral cycle in which it participated, every party in the “extended left-populist” party family receives an overall score, based on which it is classified as “high-degree,” “medium-degree,” or “low-degree” populist for the given election. I then delimit the universe of cases by excluding potentially irrelevant observations of “low-degree” populism and I use the categorizations to obtain two measures of populism at the national level for each election during the analyzed period. These measures are (1) populism “at minimum,” using only vote shares for actors qualifying as “high-degree” populists at the time of the election, and (2) populism “at maximum,” combining vote shares for “high-degree” and “medium-degree” populists. As the two measures are highly correlated (r = 0.93), they are similarly useful for the comparative analysis of populism.

Finally, based on these two measures, I have identified significant variation in the electoral support for populist actors across Latin America and post-communist Europe. As the observed variation conforms with scholarly knowledge about populist politics in both regions, the measures used to identify it are valid metrics for comparative analysis. Intriguingly, post-communist countries such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania, and Ukraine rank high in terms of average populist electoral support, alongside with Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Costa Rica. The democratic experiences of such countries, where the “populist syndrome” has been prominent during the analyzed periods, diverge from those of many other countries, where populism has been comparatively less successful.

Overall, then, this chapter has identified significant patterns of variation by measuring populism empirically based on an alternative conceptual framework and on systematic data. Having disaggregated and scored populist attributes in many relevant actors across time, I have derived overall scores useful for explicit categorization, which, in turn, was incorporated into a replicable
procedure for measurement. Moreover, while my method of measurement is regionally “sensitive” – because it accounts for regional peculiarities, such as the socio-cultural conservatism more relevant for the analysis of populism in post-communist Europe than in Latin America – it demonstrates that many actors from these two regions tend to share relatively high overall degrees of populism based on a dynamic set of theoretically relevant attributes, such as center-left economic positions, outsider or maverick location relative to party systems, and high degrees of personalism. Having identified variation based on such actors’ aggregate electoral performance over time, I next turn to theorizing the sources of this variation.
4.
THEORIZING POPULISM ACROSS REGIONS

4.1. Introduction

As the previous chapter demonstrated, populism as a conceptual construct can be usefully employed for the identification of important empirical variation in Latin America and post-communist Europe. As populist parties are more likely to emerge and succeed in some countries but not in others, I seek to find the sources of this variation. In this chapter, I engage with the variation identified at the end of the previous chapter from a theoretical perspective. I proceed in two steps – the first focused on reviewing leading theories from the rich literature on the subject, the second focused on developing my own theory. I begin by surveying a number of key arguments about the rise of populism. Specifically, I consider five standard lines of argumentation that focus on structural demand, proximate demand, cultural demand, institutional supply, and international relations. By reviewing these arguments, I accomplish two goals. First, I derive a set of testable hypotheses that I will systematically evaluate against my own theory in Chapter 6. Second, I assess their strengths, which have enriched scholarly understanding of populist phenomena, as well as their weaknesses, which undermine these theories’ potential for explaining the patterns of variation in both regions that I identified in the previous chapter.

Next, to overcome the problems of these theories, I turn to the two regions’ recent history and adopt a critical juncture approach that is inspired by relevant work on political developments in Latin America. Specifically, I focus on a moment in the recent histories of both Latin American and post-communist countries that was both shared by the two regions and crucial for their subsequent development – the adoption of market reforms in the aftermath of the collapse of state-centric models of economic development. In particular, I focus on Kenneth Roberts’ work on programmatic alignments and de-alignments during key
moments of market reform, which links the role of political agency during critical junctures to subsequent variations in party system stability and the rise of Bolivarian populists in some Latin American countries. Having argued that post-communist Europe experienced similar neoliberal critical junctures, I next focus on the path dependent logic that links political agency during critical junctures to subsequent outcomes in both regions.

While I draw insights from Roberts’ argument, I reevaluate and refine this argument in order to develop my own theory of historical contingency, which aims to explain variation of populist electoral performance in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Differently from Roberts, who underscored the degree of stability of entire party systems as the central legacy of critical junctures, I emphasize the post-critical juncture performance specifically of center-left parties whose origins can be traced back to the period before the end of critical junctures. I argue that in both regions central-left parties associated with the pre-neoliberal era not only played particularly important roles during critical junctures, but also were uniquely impacted by these roles in the subsequent period. Because center-left parties faced potent incentives to continue taking economic positions that were heavily conditioned by their political roles during critical junctures, critical junctures had powerful path dependent effects on these parties’ brands and subsequent electoral performance, which either tended to improve as a result of voter loyalty or to decline as a result of voter exit in the aftermath period. In turn, populist actors – uniquely positioned to opportunistically adopt a range of economic positions due to their anti-establishment prerogatives and typically personalist organizations – faced variable opportunity structures for success. Where traditional center-left parties tended to sustain or improve their electoral fortunes – as a lasting legacy of their opposition to neoliberal market reforms during the critical junctures – populists’ opportunities to exploit the center-left ideological space were more limited. By contrast, where traditional center-left parties tended to face electoral decline – a persistent legacy of
their leading roles in neoliberal reforms during *de-aligning critical junctures* – populists tended to succeed by exploiting opportunities on the center-left.

By refining the critical juncture theory originally developed by Roberts and by applying it to a context beyond Latin America, this chapter offers two contributions to the theoretical literature on populism. First, by focusing on center-left performance as a critical intervening variable, it elaborates a theoretical specification of a feasible mechanism that links critical junctures to electoral support for populists. This mechanism – which focuses on center-left performance as a critical intervening variable – links political agency during critical junctures to subsequent economic positions and electoral performance, which constitute, respectively, the structural persistence and reactive sequence that are key historical legacies of critical junctures. By linking factors of both structure and agency, I combine elements from existing explanations into a new *probabilistic* theory of historical contingency that is applicable to both regions. Second, by applying the theory to two geographical contexts, the chapter offers an extension of the generalizing power of the critical juncture explanation. While such a generalization is contingent on a specific historical factor – the most critical period of market liberalization in each country – it can nevertheless be helpful for understanding political developments in various world regions.

4.2. Existing Explanations of Populism

As noted in Chapter 1, Latin America and post-communist Europe share a number of theoretically important similarities, such as their recent history of political and economic transition, weak civil societies and party systems, and peripheral status regarding hemispheric powers, such as the United States and the EU bureaucracy. Additionally, Latin America and post-communist Europe differ from Western Europe in an important respect. While in Western Europe populist actors have been more explicitly associated with the socio-cultural dimensions
more typical of the far right\textsuperscript{1} and less successful in electoral terms,\textsuperscript{2} “in the very different world of Central and Eastern European politics,”\textsuperscript{3} as in Latin America, populists holding center-left economic positions have been much more successful, managing to reach executive power in a number of countries. Due to such important similarities, making comparisons regarding the sources of populism in these two regions is more appropriate than comparisons with Western Europe or the United States, where populist ascent has been driven by a different set of factors that are more explicitly associated with the post-materialist cultural backlash.\textsuperscript{4}

Overall, accounts about the rise of populism can be separated into demand-side explanations focusing on socio-economic and political grievances of voters and supply-side explanations considering institutional and organizational contexts. Additionally, I distinguish among factors reflecting (1) structural demands, (2) proximate demands, (3) cultural demands, as well as factors reflecting (4) institutional supply and (5) theories of international relations.

**Structural Demand**

The standard structuralist theories of modernization and dependency dominated the literature on economic development in Latin America during the latter half of the twentieth century and prior to the third wave of democratization.\textsuperscript{5} While populism may not have been central to either of these two theories, much of this scholarship portrayed populism as a political by-product of the transient and unstable stage of development between traditional oligarchic rule and the modern incorporation of publics in the political process.\textsuperscript{6} Influenced by

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\textsuperscript{1} Betz 1994; Mudde 2007
\textsuperscript{2} Mudde 2013
\textsuperscript{3} Kriesi 2014: 372-3
\textsuperscript{4} Inglehart and Norris 2016
\textsuperscript{5} During this period, Eastern European countries were under totalitarian rule. Under communism, there were virtually no democratic or quasi-democratic interruptions during which populists could have had an opening. The opposite is true for Latin America, where there is a legacy of classical populism throughout the twentieth century. It is for this reason that structural theories, in particular, were developed with Latin America in mind. However, structural explanations faced problems of narrow extension (Sartori 1984: 47), because they defined populism as a spatially and temporally bounded concept (Roberts 1995; Weyland 2001) within the limits of Latin America’s model of import substituting industrialization (ISI).
\textsuperscript{6} di Tella 1965
these leading theories, mid-twentieth century political sociologists focusing on Latin America understood populism in structural-functionalist terms: as a top-down political movement in the service of certain political leaders, known as populists, who aimed to garner the support of multi-class coalitions between urban, labor, middle-class sectors, and domestic industrialists in order to advance the nationalist and statist path of development chosen for the “easy” stages of import substitution industrialization (ISI). Overall, classical populism became associated with the mass movements under the charismatic and personalist leadership of figures such as Argentina’s Juan Perón (1946-55, 1973-4), Brazil’s Getulio Vargas (1930-45, 1951-4), Mexico’s Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40), and Brazil’s Leonel Brizola (governor of Porto Allegre and Rio Grande do Sur in the late 1950s/early 1960s). While there admittedly was variation even among these “classical” populists, both modernization and dependency theories posited that their political rise was conditional on underdevelopment within the socioeconomic structure.

For classical modernization theorists, such as Lipset, Di Tella, and Germani, populist politics filled the gap between new popular identities and rising material expectations, on the one hand, and the long-term inability of late industrializing countries to meet these

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7 Germani 1968; Ianni 1975; O’Donnell 1973
8 Cardoso and Faletto 1979
9 As explained by Weyland (2001), theorists in the structuralist traditions of modernization and dependency theories defined populism as a cumulative concept, meaning that to be included in the “populist” category, a case must meet a number of criteria which are linked through a logical “and.” Structuralists, in other words, assumed a priori a logical unity among the need for a multi-class coalition, the economic policy of ISI, and personalistic leadership. For criticism of such definitions, see Roxborough 1984, Roberts 1995, and Weyland 2001.
10 Such variations had to do with contextual peculiarities. For example, Ecuador’s prototypical populist – five-time president Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra (1934-5, 1944-6, 1952-6; 1960-1; 1968-72) – was different from Perón, Vargas, Cardenas, and Brizola in important respects. Velasco’s populist coalition was more conservative and less inclusive of labor, and he did not champion expansionary economic policies associated with ISI (Weyland 2001: 7). In Mexico, Cardenas mobilized labor to a lesser extent than Perón, Vargas, and Brizola (the latter of whom never even became president).
11 For both modernization and dependency theories, politics was not autonomous from socioeconomic developments. Such theories of political development were subsequently attacked by the “autonomy” literature (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, eds. 1985; Krasner 1984). As a result of this theoretical shift from the historicist and socio-economically grounded structural theories towards the autonomy of politics, procedural and minimalist definitions replaced cumulative ones for many concepts (Weyland 2001: 8), including for democracy (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Przeworski 1991) and populism (for a discussion, see Chapter 2).
12 Lipset 1960; Di Tella 1965; Germani 1978
expectations, on the other. It was within the context of such a developmental gap that populist leaders celebrated the working classes as full citizens and championed development and the creation of jobs through ISI.\(^\text{13}\) For such scholars, populism signaled the insufficient economic development of much of the Third World in comparison to modern countries that had industrialized earlier.\(^\text{14}\)

While the end of the Cold War blurred the boundaries between the First, Second, and Third Worlds, problems of socio-economic underdevelopment and insufficient modernization have certainly continued plaguing many Latin American and post-communist countries. Newer structuralist approaches have adapted to such developments by explaining the rise of populism as a function of structural problems of underdevelopment in a new, globalizing world.\(^\text{15}\) Such arguments are reminiscent of the old modernization theory emphasizing the gap between modern identities and socioeconomic change. Particularly in Latin America and the post-communist world, as countries exited the stage of state-led industrialization and faced the new challenges of globalization, problems or underdevelopment became particularly pronounced. Under the pressures of international integration and foreign competition, which has increasingly challenged domestically-owned production,\(^\text{16}\) labor has become progressively weakened. As neoliberalism “caused the sociopolitical exclusion of the popular sectors,” “exclusion was intensely resisted by social movements mobilizing the popular sector,” thereby “contributing to the resurgence of the left.”\(^\text{17}\) In such a context of newly “dis-incorporated” popular sectors, populist appeals promising to provide a counterweight to the dislocating impacts of globalization by nationalist means can become increasingly attractive. Overall, this globalization hypothesis expects support for populists to be most prevalent in context where

\(^{13}\) Hawkins 2009: 142  
^{14}\) Di Tella 1965  
^{15}\) Hawkins 2009: 142  
^{16}\) Roberts 1995; Oxhorn 1998  
^{17}\) Rossi 2015: 2
liberalization and globalization have caused the most dislocating impacts\(^{18}\) and economic insecurities, visible in increasing unemployment, poverty and inequality rates.

It is worth noting that in order to explain the rise of classical populists, modernization theory emphasized not only rapid socioeconomic change, but also a context of severe economic crisis, such as the one that exacerbated the crisis of political and economic participation during and after the Great Depression.\(^ {19}\) This is so because prolonged crises can deepen the developmental gap emphasized by modernization theory. Within the more recent context of Latin America and post-communist Europe, rapid socioeconomic change is a given – it occurred with what were mostly elite-driven transitions from dictatorship\(^ {20}\) and state-led forms of economic development\(^ {21}\) throughout the 1980s and 1990s. According to this *structural crisis hypothesis*, prolonged economic transitions – such as those experienced during Latin Americas “lost decade” of the 1980s\(^ {22}\) and post-communist Europe’s problems of inflation and unemployment throughout the 1990s – marginalized the urban poor, making them victims of plebiscitarian neopopulist appeals.\(^ {23}\)

A final offshoot of modernization theory focuses on Lipset’s social requisites of democracy – urbanization, education, and the media.\(^ {24}\) Originating in LeBon’s and Freud’s suspicion of the modern potential for group hysteria, theories of mass society posit that as societies became urbanized, poorly educated citizens could fall prey to opportunistic charismatic politicians, especially if widespread media exposure was available to channel the personalistic and emotional appeals that are typical of populists\(^ {25}\) whose strategies emphasizing an unmediated connection with the people. Translated into its modern version, this *mass society*

\(^{18}\) Sachs 1989, Stokes 2009

\(^{19}\) Coniff 1999

\(^{20}\) Przeworski 1991, Linz and Stepan 1996

\(^{21}\) Greskovits 1998: 106

\(^{22}\) Weyland 2003: 1099

\(^{23}\) Doyle 2011: 1450

\(^{24}\) Lipset 1959

\(^{25}\) Hawkins 2010: 137; Conniff 1999: 9-10
hypothesis attributes the rise of populism either directly to the impact of technology (e.g., television or the internet) and modern media sensationalism buttressing the appeal of anti-establishment politicians,\textsuperscript{26} or to the combination of poorly educated citizens\textsuperscript{27} and media exposure.\textsuperscript{28}

The second structuralist theory is dependency – the paradigm ascribing peripheral underdevelopment to dependency on commodity exports to developed countries.\textsuperscript{29} Overall, scholars critical of Latin American dependency on commodity exports viewed the ISI model of development with skepticism. While acknowledging that ISI mobilized the working classes, O’Donnell, for example, emphasizes the fragility of the populist coalition; as soon as the ISI model started becoming exhausted in the late 1950s, populist coalitions fell victim to authoritarian rule.\textsuperscript{30} Overall, dependistas argued that the underdevelopment resulting from incorporating the periphery into the global economy encouraged the emergence of unstable populist movements instead of a stable ruling hegemonic class.\textsuperscript{31} The dependency hypothesis, then, posits that populism emerges in contexts where countries engage in trade reinforcing economic underdevelopment, “especially commodity trade controlled by multinational firms.”\textsuperscript{32}

**Proximate Demand**

It is also possible that the rise of populism is caused by more immediate factors, such as short-term popular dissatisfaction with the economy, raw material rents for patronage politics, or widespread popular perceptions of corruption or institutional distrust. Unlike structural demand theories, which tend to portray those who support populist actors as unverting victims

\textsuperscript{26} Kriesi 2014: 365-7  
\textsuperscript{27} Seligson 2007: 92  
\textsuperscript{28} Hawkins 2009: 137-8  
\textsuperscript{29} Frank 1967  
\textsuperscript{30} O’Donnell 1979  
\textsuperscript{31} Ianni 1975, Cardoso and Faletto 1979, O’Donnell 1979  
\textsuperscript{32} Hawkins 2009: 146
of underdevelopment, proximate-demand theories tend to assume relatively rational behavior on the part of both citizens and populist politicians. On the one hand, citizens vote for populists to achieve their political ends (e.g., alleviation of short-term economic problems or material rents) at the lowest possible price – simply showing up to vote. On the other hand, in their efforts to gain political office populists pay the low cost of simply proclaiming themselves against the establishment rather than develop more elaborate programmatic linkages, a campaign strategy that would be costlier.

Above, I referred to the structural crisis hypothesis associated with modernization theory. Of course, crises are neither necessarily long-term nor exclusively economic in nature. First, governments can fail to meet the material expectations of their citizens in the short term too. In this view, lousy economic performance – as reflected by declining GDP per capita and relatively high inflation or unemployment levels – weakens the advantage of incumbents and increases the electoral support for populist alternatives. While students of both post-communist Europe and Latin America have shown that the rise of populists is not necessarily related to economic voting, actual economic crises may present a special opportunity structure for populists as voters are likely to become more risk accepting. For example, Kurt Weyland demonstrated how in both Latin American and post-communist countries, high inflationary pressures in the late 1980s and early 1990s triggered the political rise of populists who saw economic crises as opportunities to “save their countries, even at great risk,” by proving their charisma and “extraordinary capacities.” Overall, the economic crisis hypothesis expects anti-establishment actors to gain electoral strength in contexts of notable economic downturn, such as the economic crisis that hit post-communist Europe in 2008-2009.

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33 On the distinction among charismatic, clientelistic, and programmatic linkages, see Kitschelt 2000.
34 Jackman and Volpert 1996
35 See Tucker 2005; Pop-Eleches 2010: 222; 240-1; Hawkins 2010
36 Weyland 2003: 837
37 Weyland 1999: 385
38 Krastev 2013; Kriesi and Pappas 2015
Second, like economic crises, political crises can also lead to increased popular support for populists. As explained by Kriesi and Pappas, “a political crisis is the result of poor governance in general, not just of economic performance.”\textsuperscript{39} Political crises are often triggered by “large-scale scandals,”\textsuperscript{40} such as the one provoked by Hungary’s prime minister admitting that he “lied in the morning and in the evening” in 2006,\textsuperscript{41} but can also be more chronic, such as the one in Ecuador before the rise of Rafael Correa.\textsuperscript{42} Importantly, poor governance can lead to voting for populists. As shown by Pop-Eleches, who focuses on “third-generation elections,” voting in protest of poor governance benefited new/centrist populists throughout post-communist Europe.\textsuperscript{43} More generally, arguments focusing on political crises and poor governance highlight that the overall crisis of confidence in conventional politics is linked to perceptions of corruption.\textsuperscript{44} Indeed, scholars of both Latin America and post-communist Europe have highlighted how corruption can lead voters to turn away from incumbent parties and towards new parties.\textsuperscript{45} The basic logic of such arguments is that while citizens aim to punish corrupt politicians whose actions they perceive as causing chronic injustice and inequality,\textsuperscript{46} populist politicians respond by employing a Manichaean discourse, depicting themselves as champions of the pure people specifically against the corrupt elite.\textsuperscript{47} Overall, the \textit{perceived corruption hypothesis} expect the rise of populist actors – especially those who offer anti-corruption solutions – to be linked to perceptions of corruption and the politicization of corruption in post-communist Europe,\textsuperscript{48} Latin America, and beyond.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{39} Kriesi and Pappas, eds., 2016
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{42} de la Torre 2006
\textsuperscript{43} Pop-Eleches 2010
\textsuperscript{44} Zizek 2013; Kriesi and Pappas, eds., 2016
\textsuperscript{45} Seawright 2006; Klasnja, Deegan-Krause, and Tucker 2016
\textsuperscript{46} de la Torre 2000
\textsuperscript{47} Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012: 8
\textsuperscript{48} Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015
The third proximate-demand argument has to do with citizens’ gradual erosion of trust in the efficacy and legitimacy of the traditional institutions of liberal democracy, a process that can happen independently from economic and political crises. According to this view, the crisis of political marginalization is magnified by the perceived failures specifically of institutional representation. More concretely, across Latin America and post-communist Europe, liberalizing economic reforms and the de-regulation of labor markets were accompanied by the de-politization of social and economic policy, processes oftentimes initiated and implemented by what used to be traditional labor-based parties. As previously important linkages among social groups, labor unions, and political parties were destroyed, citizens perceive formal political institutions, such as political parties, as non-representative – because parties cannot handle pertinent problems of poverty and inequality, which are further exacerbated by inflation, debt crises, and fiscal austerity. In turn, populist politicians capitalize upon such popular distrust in the institutions of liberal democracy by presenting themselves as legitimate outsiders. Extending the institutional distrust hypothesis beyond simply political parties, Doyle has argued that the “erosion of public confidence in formal institutions” leads to electoral support for populists. Notably, the disillusionment with formal politics and institutions is generally expected in contexts of informal clientelistic traditions, such as those of both Latin America and post-communist Europe.

The final proximate-demand argument posits that resource-rich countries are more likely to see the rise of populists, especially during times of increased commodity demand on

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49 Hawkins 2010. In his cross-regional research on populist discourse, Hawkins shows the corruption hypothesis to hold, especially when accompanied by economic policy failure, but due to his smallness of his dataset (35 cases), his conclusions rest on correlations rather than on multivariate regressions (2010: 151).
50 Seligson 2007
51 Doyle 2011
53 Burgess and Levitsky 2003
54 Roberts 2007
55 Doyle 2011
56 Navia and Walker 2008
57 Kitschelt 2000
the international market. As argued by Weyland, populations are more likely to vote for radical
left actors in resource-rich countries in Latin America, especially during periods of high
commodity prices. The reason for this is that “the larger the volume of resource rents in a
particular country, the greater the propensity for risk taking among the electorate in the hope of
some form of mass clientelism and consequently the greater the support for populist outsider
candidates.” As discussed by Mazzuca, particularly in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia,
“rentier populism” incorporated much of the informal sector into “a new type of political
coalition” “funded by gains from exports from natural resources.” Although the rentier state
hypothesis has been specifically advanced to explain the rise of Latin America’s radical Left,
since much of that Left is populist, this hypothesis can be extended to Latin American
populism more generally.

Cultural Demand

A third strand of the literature focuses on cultural factors as an explanation for the rise
of populism. For example, the cultural backlash thesis has recently gained currency in
explaining voting for populist candidates in the increasingly diverse societies of Western
Europe and the United States. For the Latin American and post-communist contexts, cultural
demand explanations are more related to the health of civil societies and to post-materialist
values supportive of democratic norms, although not necessarily of liberal democratic
institutions. The first cultural demand argument focuses on the weakness of civil societies.
While this argument should be especially relevant for post-communist European countries,
where civil societies have been exceptionally weak, it has also been applied to Latin

58 Weyland 2009
59 Doyle 2011: 1451
60 Mazzuca 2013
61 Levitsky and Roberts 2011
62 Inglehart and Norris 2016
63 Inglehart 1997
64 Howard 2003
American countries. As noted by Roberts, “populist mobilization is unlikely to emerge where civil society is strong and densely organized” because the citizenry of such societies “can mobilize politically from the bottom-up and is unlikely to sacrifice its political autonomy or transfer its political voice to an autocratic figure with top-down visions of political organization, however charismatic of messianic such a figure might be.” The obvious corollary is that weak civil societies are more predisposed to the top-down mobilization typical of populist movements. The civil society weakness hypothesis, therefore, expects that in countries with weak civil societies, for example those characterized by low associational membership, citizens are more likely to support populist actors at the ballot box.

The second cultural-demand argument focuses on significant aggregate shifts in the pro-democratic values of populations in otherwise weak or new democracies. According to this argument, as societies transition from traditional to post-materialist values, popular demands for participatory democracy grow. While such transitions in value systems are admittedly slow processes, the argument is relevant particularly for the post-communist context for two reasons. First, as many post-communist countries were rapidly incorporated in the European Union with predominantly liberal socio-cultural values (particularly at the elite level) they have had unprecedented access to post-materialist values. Second, such publics may be influenced by relevant debates about the EU’s “democratic deficit” that became particularly exacerbated in the context of the European economic crisis. As populists during electoral campaigns nearly always call for more direct democracy without the mediation of political institutions, it is expected that with growing democratic demands populist appeals become

65 Roberts 2006
66 For a conceptualization and measurement of the weakness of civil society, see Howard 2003.
67 Inglehart 1990; Offe 1985
68 Howard 2009
69 Majone 1998; Moravesik 2002; Hix and Follesdal 2006
70 Varoufakis 2012
increasingly irresistible.\textsuperscript{71} While this argument may sound counterintuitive, especially when considering populism’s illiberal bent,\textsuperscript{72} it is worth noting that demands for greater democracy feature general democratic demands and not necessarily demands for more liberal democracy.\textsuperscript{73} Indeed, when in opposition, populism can be a useful corrective to liberal democracy – in both consolidated and unconsolidated democracies – because “it spells out painful but real problems” in the “procedures and results of liberal democracies.”\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, demands for (participatory) democracy can be independent from low trust in the institutions of liberal (and thus representative) democracy that were featured in the institutional distrust hypothesis described above. Overall, the democratic demand hypothesis is more relevant to the post-communist context, where a number of countries experienced a rapid transition from communism to EU membership. In line with this hypothesis, populism is expected to be more prevalent in settings with higher levels of post-materialist values,\textsuperscript{75} such as demands for greater participatory democracy and transparency, that are more likely to be found in the “advanced” post-communist countries that are members of the EU.

\textbf{Institutional Supply}

A fourth line of argumentation stresses the importance of political institutions, such as the populist parties themselves, the overall party system, and the institutional rules of the political game. While party organizations are important in terms of electoral persistence\textsuperscript{76} as

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Hawkins2009} Hawkins 2009
\bibitem{Pappas2014} Pappas 2014
\bibitem{MenySurel2002} While the relationship between populism in democracy is very complex (see Meny and Surel 2002), pro-democratic demands and populism can be said to be positively related from a historical point of view. Considering the Latin American experience throughout the twentieth century, “radical populist movements” incorporated into the political process the previously excluded working classes and peasantry of both Mexico and Venezuela, while “labor populist” movements incorporated the urban sectors of Argentina and Peru (Collier and Collier 1991). Having thus acted as democrats, the populists of Argentina and Peru, in particular, were subsequently repressed by openly authoritarian military dictatorships. Thus, while populist movements tend to feature autocratic elements, such as concentrated leadership structures, the historical experience also supports the claim that broader democratic demands can naturally lead to support for populism.
\bibitem{MuddeKaltwasser2012} Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser: 2012: 25; 209
\bibitem{Hawkins2010} Hawkins 2010: 99-100; 134. While Hawkins includes this hypothesis in his case study of Venezuela, he excludes it from the large-N analysis.
\bibitem{MuddeTavits2007} Mudde 2007; Tavits 2013
\end{thebibliography}
well as policy adoption and implementation,\textsuperscript{77} they are less important in the democratic elections stage, before populist actors reach, and potentially consolidate, political power.\textsuperscript{78} Indeed, in most cases, such parties even distinguish themselves from the establishment against which they compete precisely because, unlike other parties, they lack coherent organizational structures. For example, in 2006, Rafael Correa took this principle to the extreme when he won the Ecuadorian presidential election without a political party. Even when populist leaders build party organizations, these organizations most typically remain personalist, and therefore weak, throughout their existence.\textsuperscript{79} Additionally, because party organizations are considered less important during the electoral breakthrough stage, which all “successful” populist parties must pass, I focus on the institutional “supply,” that is, the institutional context provided by existent party systems and institutional rules.

Going back to the classical work of Huntington,\textsuperscript{80} scholars consider the degree of party system institutionalization as a predictor of the degree of political stability\textsuperscript{81} and the quality of democratic governance.\textsuperscript{82} As weak party systems lack programmatic discipline connecting party elites and electorates in a meaningful way, they provide opportunities for politicians who are less attached to party structures and less willing to follow programmatic party appeals emphasizing the substance of policy content and the clarity of partisan policy divides.\textsuperscript{83} In short, where the system of political parties is unstable, voting publics are more likely to reward populist outsiders. Importantly, Mainwaring and Scully’s is a supply-side argument because the level of party system stability is prior to – and thus affecting – subsequent voter choice.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{77} Levitsky 2003; Burgess and Levitsky 2003
\textsuperscript{78} Mudde 2007
\textsuperscript{79} Weyland 1999: 381n14
\textsuperscript{80} Huntington 1968
\textsuperscript{81} Kaufman and Stallings 1991; Roberts 2007
\textsuperscript{82} Mainwaring and Scully, eds. 1995
\textsuperscript{83} Kitschel 2003
\textsuperscript{84} Kaufman and Stallings 1991; Mainwaring and Scully, eds. 1995; Roberts 2007. For a critique of this hypothesis, see Weyland (2009: 157), who questions whether the collapse of party systems precedes populism or is endogenous to it. See also Pappas 2014 and Enyedi 2016 for the opposite argument – that high degrees of party system institutionalization can cause, rather than prevent, populism in Greece and Hungary, respectively.
Overall, the *weak party system hypothesis* expects that poorly institutionalized party systems—such as those exhibiting high levels of volatility, fractionalization, and polarization\(^85\)—provide opportunities for populist outsiders to succeed in elections."\(^86\) While this general idea about weakly institutionalized party systems is inspired by the work of scholars specializing on Latin American politics, it is equally relevant to post-communist Europe, where parties have chronically suffered from low levels of identification and poor organization.\(^87\) As a result of such institutional weakness, the constant supply of new parties—known as flash parties—conditions voters to develop anti-establishment preferences in the future, thus creating vicious circles that further destabilize party systems.\(^88\)

Other institutional supply arguments focus on the formal rules of the political game. They consider the “mechanical and psychological” effects of Duverger’s Law and propose that plurality electoral systems discourage “vote wasting” in favor of new parties,\(^89\) many of which are organized around populist leaders, and that high electoral thresholds diminish the chances of populist challengers.\(^90\) A more recent institutionalist proposition advanced with regard to Latin America posits that the rise of outsiders is conditional on (1) non-concurrent elections that lead to the weakening of traditional parties, (2) the absence of presidential reelections that encourages anti-incumbent candidates, and (3) compulsory voting rules that only make already angry electorates even angrier with the establishment.\(^91\) For post-communist Europe, authors have emphasized how institutional arrangements, such as (1) high district magnitude in proportional representations systems\(^92\) and (2) direct presidential elections,\(^93\) can contribute to

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\(^85\) Mainwaring and Torcal 2005  
\(^86\) Doyle 2011: 1450  
\(^87\) Tavits 2013  
\(^88\) Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009  
\(^89\) Riker 1982  
\(^90\) Jackman and Volpert 1996  
\(^91\) Carreras 2012  
\(^92\) Tavits 2005  
\(^93\) Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 1999
the rise of anti-establishment parties. Overall, the *institutional design hypothesis* expects populist actors – who typically originate as political outsiders – to be more likely to rise in political systems with more permissive institutional rules.

**International Relations**

Within the field of international relations, constructivists have made the case for Western conditionality – that is, “reinforcement by reward” featuring persuasion, incentives for learning, and socialization as a bulwark against populism. Within the European context, for example, the EU conditionality literature has advanced the argument that incentives to enter the EU streamlined post-communist political discourse in a way leaving little maneuvering space to politicians. Thus, prior to joining the EU, elites tended to be pro-EU and therefore less anti-establishment, employing a moderate electoral discourse that matched hopeful popular attitudes for Western-led regional integration. The logical corollary of this argument is that countries that have either already joined the EU or have no prospects of joining are more likely to see the rise of anti-establishment populists than candidate countries on “good behavior” due to the constraints of EU conditionality. Although this argument was developed with the European periphery in mind, if we extend Levitsky and Way’s argument about Western leverage to the electoral arena, it is certainly applicable to Latin America in terms of its relationship with the United States and the international financial institutions (such as the IMF) headquartered in Washington. In a sense, this constructivist theory makes a claim opposite to

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94 For criticism of this approach, see Pop-Eleches (2010: 222n9) who emphasizes the stability of electoral institutions in Eastern Europe and how electoral changes – such as raising electoral thresholds in Poland and Romania – have actually disadvantaged smaller parties.
95 Barr 2009
96 Schmmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 670
97 Innes 2002
98 Vachudova 2008
99 Pridham 2002
100 Pop-Eleches 2010
101 Levitsky and Way 2010
102 As Pop-Eleches has shown, populists – such as Peru’s president Alan García (1985-90) – can be highly resistant to the conditionality of international financial institutions. Failures to comply with such conditionality can result
that of the dependency hypothesis. Overall, the weak Western leverage hypothesis predicts that
the less Western leverage is a factor in domestic politics, the more likely it is for politicians to
benefit electorally from the use of unrestrained populist discourse.

Finally, according to the “falling domino principle,” international diffusion effects can
influence the quality of democracies. Following Kopstein and Reilly’s idea that geographic
diffusion mattered for the transformation of the post-communist world, Levitsky and Way
have argued that geographic linkage can make democracy contagious by heightening the
salience of governmental abusive practices, increasing the probability of international response,
and creating domestic pro-democratic constituencies. While such a theory has never been
applied to the cross-regional study of populism, it has been used to explain the rise of left-wing
populism in Latin America as well as the rise of extreme right-wing populism in Western
Europe. Indeed, as a “mirror of democracy,” populism can certainly follow a domino logic
familiar from the years of the Cold War. As shown by Brinks and Coppedge, “diffusion is no
illusion” and countries “tend to change their regimes” to match those of “their contiguous
neighbors.” According to this logic, voting publics can become influenced by the electoral
“successes” of leading regional populist figures, such as Chávez in Venezuela and Orbán in
Hungary, thus choosing to support similar domestic actors. According to the populist contagion
hypothesis, then, the electoral success of populist actors in the region, and especially in
neighboring countries, is likely to increase the chances for electoral success of “home-grown”
populists.

“in international economic isolation and high economic costs” (Pop-Eleches 2009: 1), thereby providing an
opening for the success of populists such as Alberto Fujimori (Roberts 1995).

103 Leeson and Deen 2009
104 Kopstein and Reilly 2000
105 Levitsky and Way 2005: 23
106 Corrales 2007
107 Rydgren 2005
108 Panizza 2005
109 Brinks and Coppedge 2006
4.3. Problems with Existing Explanations

Overall, existing explanations of populism have improved our understanding of this complex phenomenon. Yet all of these explanations face difficulties that undermine their explanatory power for both Latin America and post-communist Europe, particularly as countries in both regions emerged from a historically important stage of development – the implementation of key market reforms.

First, explanations inspired by the structuralist theories of modernization and dependency focus the analytical attention on materialist factors. If populism features economic positions that are to the left of the median, as argued in the previous chapter, such positions are likely in response to popular grievances regarding large scale changes of material circumstances. Indeed, as societies in both regions experienced a dramatic transition from state-led to market-oriented models of economic development, disaffected popular segments are likely to voice grievances by embracing center-left economic positions offered by populist actors.

However, because modernization and dependency theories are general theories of development and not theories particularly of populism, they are limited in their explanatory potential. For example, modernization theory does not explain why rising inequality, poverty, or unemployment are more likely to produce populist success in some countries, such as Bolivia and Ukraine, but not in others, such as Guatemala and Albania. And if the 1980s and 1990s, respectively, were periods of severe economic crisis in Latin America and post-communist Europe, modernization theory does not explain exactly what it is about such crises that might result in populist outcomes well after the end of these periods. Additionally, because modern urbanization has more to do with cultural liberalism than with the labor-mobilizing populist politics of 1930s Latin America, today’s mass societies are not necessarily impressed by center-left economic positions. Indeed, prominent populist actors,
like Peru’s Ollanta Humala and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, have tended to draw support from the countryside rather than from cities. Finally, even if both Latin America and post-communist Europe are relatively peripheral to the global economy, dependency theory cannot explain why populist movements emerge in contexts that are relatively less peripheral and highly developed, such as Hungary.

Second, theories of proximate demand have provided valuable insight in terms of emphasizing short-term interests and rational political behavior. Indeed, in the analysis of populism, rationality is likely an important factor on the part of both citizens and politicians – particularly because populism is opportunistic in nature. Nevertheless, theories that are purely based on rationality do not provide a sufficient explanation of populism. As Levitsky and Loxton have discussed, prominent cases of populist success can be associated not only with economic crisis but also with economic growth, as in Bolivia and Ecuador. Similarly, these authors have discussed how populism can rise when commodity prices are low, as in Peru during the 1990s. Rationality-based explanations face even greater difficulties if applied to the post-communist region, where no country has significant mineral resources and where populists have won elections in the context of economic growth. For example, in 2015, Poland elected a populist government – its first majority government after the fall of communism – soon after mostly avoiding the global economic crisis. Likewise, Slovakia’s populists have been consistently successful during times of economic growth. Additionally, while popular perceptions of corruption and the general erosion of trust in political institutions may be correlated with the rise of anti-establishment politics, they do not necessarily explain the rise of populists holding particularly center-left economic positions.

Third, theories of cultural demand have enriched our understanding of populism as a response to societal problems, such as weak civil societies and insufficiently democratic

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110 Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 109
polities. By emphasizing such general and slow-moving societal symptoms, however, cultural explanations do not offer the specificity needed for explaining variation across countries and time. Thus, theories of civil society cannot explain why populism surged much more prominently in a strong civil society, such as Venezuela’s, but not in weaker civil societies, such as Estonia’s and Bulgaria’s.\footnote{See Howard 2003: 63-70.} Additionally, as discussed by Hawkins, pro-democratic values associated with post-materialism were not particularly prominent in Venezuela and neither was Venezuelans’ support for participatory institutions before the meteoric rise of populism in this country.\footnote{Hawkins 2010: 99-100} Overall, as shifts in civil society and value systems can only be incremental over time, they cannot account for the significant variation of populist success relatively soon after the transition to democracy in both regions.

Fourth, institutional explanations, particularly those focused on party system weakness, have added a critically important dimension for understanding populism’s rise. They helpfully underscore the links between weak institutions that do not provide satisfactory channels for popular demands and the politicization of political grievances typically associated with populists. Yet theories focused on the entirety of party systems do not highlight a mechanism that explains the subsequent rise of populists particularly with center-left economic positions and neither do they explain the reasons for variation of party system stability. As it is theoretically possible that such factors are mutually related, explanations that simply highlight patterns of party system instability are, therefore, not specific enough.

Other institutional theories face even more obvious challenges. While permissive institutional rules may explain the rise of Latin American outsiders, these outsiders are not necessarily populist, as Carreras has observed.\footnote{Carreras 2012} And in post-communist Europe, institutional rules are
unhelpful for making sense of the recent success of populists in contexts where such rules are either restrictive, as in Hungary, or have become increasingly restrictive, as in Poland.\footnote{Pop-Eleches 2010: 222n9}

Fifth and finally, explanations derived from the field of international relations highlight the importance of external factors on domestic outcomes, thereby usefully problematizing the fact that political processes do not unfold in domestic vacuums. However, neither theories of Western leverage nor explanations emphasizing domino effects can, on their own, explain variation in terms of populist outcomes. For example, weakened Western leverage in the aftermath of post-communist accession to the EU has not translated into populist outcomes in countries such as Estonia and Latvia. On the other hand, high Western leverage did not stop the impressive electoral performances of Peru’s populist Ollanta Humala in the presidential elections of 2006\footnote{See Levitsky and Way 2010: 170, 178} and 2011. And if there is a contagion effect based on geography, it is not clear why the populist dominos skip countries, such as the Czech Republic and Colombia, that are located in the heart of the Central Europe and the Andes – two regions where populism has otherwise been particularly successful.

In sum, none of the five lines of existing explanations can alone explain the variation of populist outcomes identified at the end of Chapter 3. Nevertheless, these explanations have enriched the study of populism by highlighting the importance of evolving material realities, strategic behavior, institutional and international factors. Next, I turn to a more historically grounded understanding of the puzzle of populism in Latin America and post-communist Europe and develop a theory that places elements from some of the above explanations in a common framework. Particularly, I combine elements of both structure and agency into a theory of historical contingency applicable to both regions.
4.4. Towards a Theory of Historical Contingency

While most studies of populism have been dominated by ahistorical theories, historically informed approaches have provided valuable insight for understanding important variations of party system development in both regions under analysis. Because party system weakness is usually invoked in discussions of populism, such historical arguments are particularly intriguing. Most prominently, Herbert Kitschelt has worked with two sets of scholars in order to develop historical explanations of party system variation, first in post-communist Europe\textsuperscript{116} and second in Latin America.\textsuperscript{117} Both of these pioneering studies led by Kitschelt share a common theme – that political experiences from the beginning of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century shape historical legacies whose path-dependent effects condition post-communist and Latin American party systems many decades later.

In terms of Eastern Europe, Kitschelt and co-authors distinguish between two types of pre-communist rule – clientelistic or formal-rational states. Whereas pre-communist clientelism translated into patrimonial communism (e.g., Bulgaria), formal-rationalism translated into either national-accommodative communism that tended to use co-optation (e.g., Poland) or in bureaucratic-authoritarian communism that preferred more repressive methods (e.g., Czechoslovakia). In turn, these communist varieties weighed heavily on post-communist party systems structuration. Specifically, since ex-communists had already reformed themselves during national-accommodative communism, they could legitimately implement market reforms, thus restricting partisan competition on economic issues and, instead, promoting competition along socio-cultural lines.\textsuperscript{118} It is for this reason that national-accommodative communism was followed by party system structuration along socio-cultural cleavages in countries such as Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania.\textsuperscript{119} By contrast, where ex-

\textsuperscript{116} Kitschelt et al. 1999
\textsuperscript{117} Kitschelt et al. 2010
\textsuperscript{118} Kitschelt et al. 1999
\textsuperscript{119} Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009
communists were less reformed, as in the aftermath of bureaucratic-authoritarian and patrimonial communism, socio-economic cleavages played a more important role in subsequent party system structuration. Overall, Kitschelt and his Eastern European co-authors argued that pre-communist state structures shape subsequent types of communist rule, which, in turn, condition types of party system structuration in post-communism.

The historical argument for Latin America follows a similar, if less complex, logic. Here, too, the legacies of early 20th century developments condition party systems almost a century later. In countries, such as Chile, that had an early start in terms of economic development, experienced longer periods of democratic rule, and adopted relatively generous welfare during the ISI period, subsequent party systems were relatively well programmatically structured. By contrast, where economic development came later, authoritarian rule persisted longer, and welfare was less generous, as in Ecuador and Peru, party systems were less programmatic and more clientelistic in nature. As in post-communist Europe, the type of modern programmatic competition in Latin America is a product of historical developments that took place much earlier.  

While Kitschelt’s work highlights undeniably important structural factors, such factors cannot explain shorter term variations in party system stability in Latin America, as Roberts has argued.  Neither can overall patterns of programmatic competition explain the programmatic re-structuring of party systems, such as Ecuador’s, where populist alternatives realigned party systems in the 21st century. The long-term historical approach is similarly probabilistic when explaining populism in post-communist Europe. There, national-accommodative communism may have structured partisan competition along socio-cultural cleavages in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Lithuania, but it is precisely in these countries that populists tended to succeed by positioning themselves to the left of the economic median. While the theory

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120 Kitschelt et al. 2010
121 Roberts 2014
122 Roberts 2013: 1428
advanced by Kitschelt and collaborators may be correct, and socio-cultural cleavages may still be primary in many of these countries, the fact that populist parties pursue center-left economic positions particularly in party systems structured along socio-cultural lines is not explained by Kitschelt’s historical legacies approach.

Alternatively, the legacies approach can provide a better, although incomplete, insight if the center-left positions adopted by populist actors are understood as a political strategy rather than a cleavage structuring party systems. As I argue below, such a political strategy is a consequence of a particular type of consensus – referred to by Roberts as the “technocratic consensus”\(^\text{123}\) – that materialized in several Latin American countries as well as in many post-communist countries that shared a legacy of national-accommodative communism. Indeed, the regime-opposition consensus reached in late national-accommodative communism meant a general political agreement on the need for economic reform after 1989.\(^\text{124}\) Overall, this consensus highlights the political logic of economic transition\(^\text{125}\) according to which important labor-based parties in Latin America and many communist successor parties in post-communist Europe “social-democratized”\(^\text{126}\) and even implemented key structural reforms.\(^\text{127}\)

Overall, therefore, while distant historical legacies matter for the long-term structuration of party systems in both regions, structuration can be modified by shared historical contingencies that are more recent. Indeed, the early political consensus reached soon after the fall of dictatorships shaped comparable dynamics within both regions because of the similar historical experience with transition away from state-centric models of economic

\(^{123}\) Roberts 2013: 1428, 1433, 1445
\(^{124}\) Kitschell et al. 1999
\(^{125}\) Bohle and Greskovits 2012
\(^{126}\) I use this term deliberately in order to highlight these parties’ turn away from statism and towards more market-friendly policies. Similar turns, associated with bait-and-switching of parties associated with the traditional center-left, were also seen in Spain under socialist prime-minister Felipe González (1982-1996), in the United States under Democratic president Bill Clinton (1992-2000), in Great Britain under Labor prime-minister Tony Blair (1997-2007), and in Germany under social democratic prime minister Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005).
development and towards neoliberalism and multi-party democracy. The relatively recent historical experiences in both regions were broadly similar – a decade of economic recovery followed an initial decade of crisis during which “ad hoc and temporary damage control measures dominated” economic policy agendas under the guidance of international financial institutions. Although to a lesser degree than in Latin America, in post-communist Europe, too, the post-crisis period was characterized by riots, mass demonstrations and exit of citizenry from formal politics, as well as the general rise of illiberal populism and anti-establishment politics. As demonstrated at the end of Chapter 3, the degree of success of populist actors’s electoral success in post-communist Europe varied across countries in the post-crisis period, a type of variation that scholars have also observed across Latin America.

**Lessons from Latin America**

To analyze the rise of anti-neoliberal populists in Latin America, Kenneth Roberts has underscored the path-dependent effects that political agency during peak moments of economic reforms can have for subsequent party system development. Roberts distinguishes between two general modes of reform implementation – contested liberalism and neoliberal convergence – based on the types of political actors in power and opposition during critical junctures of market reform that took place after the historical period of import substituting industrialization (ISI). Contested liberalism is a more intuitive outcome where the leading economic reformers were conservative while parliamentary opposition to the reforms was articulated by the traditional center-left. Such a dynamic programmatically aligned and stabilized party systems in the aftermath of market reforms. By contrast, where market reforms entailed significant policy switching by traditional labor-based, populist, or center-left parties that had campaigned against structural adjustment policies, de-aligning critical junctures created “uncertainty about

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128 Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Greskovits 1998
129 Bohle and Greskovits 2012
130 Ibid.: 5-6
the policy effects of electoral outcomes.” Such uncertainty weakened voters’ attachments to established parties,” 131 undermined programmatic structuration, and led to the demise of traditional labor-based parties and associated higher degrees of party system instability. 132

Central to Roberts’ argument is the idea of popular uncertainty in what Noam Lupu calls established party brands. 133 In Lupu’s argument, the degree to which party brand loyalties are reproduced within the electorate matters for party breakdown or persistence. 134 At the same time, voters’ degree of certainty regarding party brands declines as “vulnerability to exogenous economic shocks forces parties to renege on their programmatic commitments.” 135 Overall, since voters have a reasonable expectation of policy consistency as parties transition from campaign to office, bait-and-switch tactics can sever the relationship between voters and more traditional parties to the electoral benefit of anti-establishment outsiders. In the Latin American context, it is such bait-and-switching during the critical juncture period that led to powerful “reactive sequences,” which featured both party brands in crisis 136 and “societal opposition to the technocratic expansion of market liberalization.” 137 The path dependent effect of the critical juncture ultimately culminated with the rise of powerful anti-establishment outsiders who ran on statist and nationalist platforms and channeled societal discontent with neoliberal orthodoxy in countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. 138

Importantly, Roberts’ critical juncture framework consists of a path-dependent sequence with three identifiable steps: (1) the moment, or critical juncture, of key market reforms, which conditions (2) variations of party system stability, which, in turn, lead to (3) variations in the relative success of populists – more successful where party systems are

131 Roberts 2013: 1446
132 Ibid.: 1434-35
133 Lupu 2016
134 Ibid.
135 Roberts 2013: 1446
136 Lupu 2016
137 Roberts 2013: 1469
138 Roberts 2014
unstable and less so in contexts of party system stability. In short, this is a story originating with historically contingent political dynamics at a crucial point – the critical juncture of market reforms – whose effects are path dependent over time.

While post-communist Europe did not experience analogously massive protests or the rise of openly anti-neoliberal leftists, the critical juncture approach is nevertheless relevant to the study of political developments under post-communism. First, Roberts’ focus on political dynamics during critical moments of economic reforms in Latin America echoes Bohle and Greskovits’ emphasis on “the centrality of political and technocratic elites and state-society relations for shaping capitalist orders” in post-communist Europe.139 Both approaches stress the importance of political dynamics that have the potential to shape more distant historical legacies,140 such as those of labor-mobilizing or elitist party systems in Latin America141 or national-accommodative communism in eastern Europe.142 Within the context of post-communist Europe, a focus on such relatively recent political dynamics extends beyond Kitschelt’s long-term historical endowments to explain why not all countries with a national-accommodative legacy experienced similar outcomes in terms of populism in the 21st century.143

Focus on the Center-Left Pillar of Party Systems

According to Kenneth Roberts, the most important legacy of Latin America’s critical junctures is the degree of subsequent overall party system (in)stability, which is mostly a function of the performance of both center-left and center-right political actors.144 While Roberts’ assertion is theoretically sound and empirically correct, there are two good reasons

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139 Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 26
140 Slater and Simmons 2008: 8 cited in Roberts 2013: 1431
141 Roberts 2013: 1431
142 Kitschelt et al. 1999
143 E.g., Croatia, Estonia and Latvia did not see the rise of populists with center-left economic positions – unlike Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania.
144 Roberts 2014: 89-110
for taking a further step towards an analysis focused specifically on center-left electoral performance.

First, in both Latin America and post-communist Europe, variation in center-left performance is likely to be positively correlated with variation in party system instability. As empirical research on both regions has shown, major center-left parties – which have traditionally occupied the center-left ideological space of party systems – have been historically important political players. In Latin America, the traditional center-left is comprised of parties that either “played a leading role in the mobilization and political incorporation of the working classes”\textsuperscript{145} in “labor-mobilizing party systems” or served as major opponents of dominant conservative forces in “elitist party systems,” where labor mobilization was historically weaker.\textsuperscript{146} In post-communist Europe, the traditional center-left is mostly comprised by ex-communist parties which mobilized labor during communism.

Before Latin America’s critical junctures of market reform, such parties usually gathered large portions of the vote in national elections, as shown by Burgess and Levitsky.\textsuperscript{147} Yet after the critical junctures, “the resurgence of the Latin American left” was only partially associated with continued electoral support for traditional center-left parties, as discussed by Levitsky and Roberts.\textsuperscript{148} In post-communist Europe, too, the traditional center-left has usually claimed a significant share of the post-communist vote, as discussed by both Grzymała-Busse and Tavits.\textsuperscript{149} In sum, in both regions, the center-left that had emerged before critical junctures has been historically relevant in electoral terms. Because the center-left tended to be a historically relevant political actor that typically captured significant shares of the vote, its electoral fortunes matter in terms of temporal variations of overall party system stability. Because a substantial deterioration of center-left electoral performance

\textsuperscript{145} Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 888
\textsuperscript{146} Roberts 2014
\textsuperscript{147} Burgess and Levitsky 2003
\textsuperscript{148} Levitsky and Roberts 2011
\textsuperscript{149} Grzymała-Busse 2002; Tavits 2005
would be associated with higher degrees of electoral volatility, the performance of the center-left can be reasonably expected to affect the overall stability of party systems over time.

Second, while Roberts’ analytical framework emphasizes the relative stability of entire party systems, the logic behind this argument – which underscores uncertainty – actually concerns the center-left in particular. This nuance becomes more obvious when considering the distinctions between three key and related concepts used by Roberts – (1) the difference between what he calls contested liberalism and neoliberal convergence, on the one hand, and (2) the distinction between neoliberal convergence and de-aligning critical junctures, on the other hand. However, while Roberts focuses on the distinction between contested liberalism, which reduces uncertainty, and neoliberal convergence, the latter phenomenon does not necessarily increase uncertainty.

To begin, contested liberalism produces aligning critical junctures. Under this scenario, there is a clear programmatic difference between major parties, with the center-left articulating a systematic contestation of neoliberal reforms that are implemented by the center-right that is in power. As a result, uncertainty is low because political actors act consistently with their party brands – the center-right implements market reforms while the center-left is in opposition.

Neoliberal convergence, on the other hand, can produce either neutral or de-aligning critical junctures. Under neutral critical junctures, uncertainty is not much higher than it is under aligning critical junctures. Under this scenario, the center-right implements reforms consistent with the conservative brand while the center-left is either absent or too weak to articulate meaningful opposition to the reforms. Notably, if the center-left was absent from institutional politics – as in Guatemala – it could not have acted inconsistently with its own brand. If the center-left was weak – as in Colombia – as a minor opposition party, it actually acted consistently with its own brand. Therefore, in contexts where the center-right
implemented major market reforms – as in Roberts’ aligning and neutral critical junctures – uncertainty was relatively low and party brands were not necessarily abandoned. Indeed, in such contexts, there are good theoretical reasons to expect that center-left actors will be rewarded, rather than punished, at the ballot box as societal opposition to market reforms matures.

*De-aligning critical junctures* are the key to understanding how the critical juncture argument pertains *specifically to the center-left*. Under this counter-intuitive scenario, the center-left implements market reforms while the center-right is in opposition. Yet, what defines the programmatic de-alignment is *not* the opposition from the center-right, but rather “the policies adopted by a party in public office,”¹⁵⁰ as Roberts explains. Indeed, it is the governing party – in this case from the center-left – whose programmatic inconsistency undermines voters’ confidence “that platforms provide at least a basic policy or philosophical orientation to guide a party’s response to changing conditions.”¹⁵¹ It is, thus, the bait-and-switch tactics specifically of the actor responsible for the content of public policy that create high levels of political uncertainty. For this reason, the center-left is likely to experience electoral decline in the aftermath specifically of de-aligning critical junctures.

Therefore, and differently from Roberts, I emphasize the distinction between overall programmatic alignment, on the one hand, and de-aligning critical junctures, on the other hand. In Latin America, programmatic alignment is associated with both aligning and neutral critical junctures, as specified above. In post-communist Europe, programmatic alignment is associated with critical junctures that are either aligning or re-aligning, as I show in the beginning of the following chapter. Overall, the shift of analytical focus is dictated by the particular emphasis on the center-left. Importantly, however, this theoretical elaboration does not contradict Roberts’ argument. Variation of party system stability still *is* the central legacy

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¹⁵⁰ Roberts 2013: 1432
¹⁵¹ Ibid.: 1432-3
of critical junctures. Indeed, as explained above, while the degree of overall party system stability – typically measured in terms of electoral volatility – can be conditional on various factors, it is directly related to the performance of the center-left whose historical significance in electoral terms tends to either be undermined or sustained in the aftermath of neoliberal critical junctures. Where the center-left either strengthens or sustains its electoral performance – more likely after aligning and neutral critical junctures – party systems are less likely to experience instability.

**Critical Junctures, the Center-Left, and Populism**

**Critical Junctures and Center-Left Path Dependencies**

Overall, the historical legacies of critical junctures of market reform are strongly transmitted specifically through the center-left pillars of party systems. The main reason for this is that, once adopted during the critical juncture, the economic positions of political actors – in this case, of center-left parties – are expected to reproduce themselves beyond the temporal boundaries of individual countries’ most decisive economic reform periods. In Paul Pierson’s words, as critical junctures give rise to path dependent processes of *increasing returns*, “actors have strong incentives… to continue down a specific path once initial steps are taken in that direction.”

In Latin America and post-communist Europe, powerful incentives for relative consistency in positions in the aftermath of critical junctures generally arose as a consequence of the political positions in which key political actors found themselves *during* critical junctures. In Latin America, major parties on the center-left had to find ways to *adapt* by embracing “far-reaching programmatic and coalitional change” if they were to survive in the neoliberal era. And in post-communist Europe, “in the context of the dual transition to

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152 Pierson 2000: 254
153 Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 907
democracy and to a market economy,” ex-communist parties in power “had strong incentives to implement fiscal austerity because they needed to prove their dissociation from socialism and their ability to operate in a democracy and market economy.” Endowed with loyal voters and strong organizations, some center-left parties proved newly reformist credentials by implementing “tough economic reforms, including tightening budgets” during the critical juncture. Indeed, it was such experiences that defined de-aligning critical junctures in countries as diverse as Argentina, Bolivia, Hungary, and Slovakia.

Crucially, incentives for economic policy consistency continued well after the end of critical junctures. An important reason for this is that decisive reforms in line with the requirements of international financial institutions were seen as both successful and beneficial, as Pop-Eleches shows in his discussion of Argentina’s Austral Plan, Brazil’s Cruzado Plan, or Bulgaria’s cooperation with the IMF in the late 1990s. Such reforms had taken successful countries out of the economic swamp of the 1980s (in Latin America) and the 1990s (in post-communist Europe), resulting in beneficial trade and investment flows from the West. As discussed by Levitsky and Way, such economic linkages, in turn, create domestic stakeholders in democracy, thus reinforcing virtuous cycles of positive returns. As such policies were clearly rewarded by the international community – for example, via EU membership for many post-communist countries – even center-left reformers, such as Hungary’s and Poland’s ex-communists, had strong incentives to continue, rather than resist, on a neoliberal path. This was especially true in the context of subsequent economic crisis during which center-left parties, such as Slovenia’s and Lithuania’s rebranded ex-communists, continued to adhere to strict financial discipline after returning to power in 2008 and 2012, respectively – more than a decade after the end of these countries’ critical

154 Tavits and Letki 2009: 555
155 Ibid.: 556
156 Pop-Eleches 2009
157 Levitsky and Way 2005: 24
junctures. And while “mechanisms of linkages and leverage in the Americas were far less institutionalized” than in Europe, improving international trade by means of following IMF conditionality was seen as sufficiently beneficial from the perspective of many Latin American governments whose expansionary policies depended heavily on debt-financing.\footnote{158}

Finally, if incumbents implementing the policies of the Washington consensus had incentives for long-term adherence to such policies, so did their opponents. Thus, once associated with opposition to neoliberal deepening, many center-left actors had incentives to continue positioning themselves on the economic center-left. After all, in cases of overall programmatic alignment, the mantle of neoliberal orthodoxy had been claimed by center-right actors, leaving the center-left space available for political actors eager to differentiate themselves as skeptics of neoliberal acceleration. As explained by Lupu, as ideological divergence strengthens partisanship, parties have incentives to distinguish their brands from those of political competitors in order to “maximize their partisan ranks.”\footnote{160} As such brand differentiation is electorally beneficial, center-left parties \textit{in opposition during the critical juncture} were more likely to continue positioning themselves against conservative reformers, that is, to the left of the economic median. Overall, whether center-left parties found themselves in government or in opposition during the critical juncture, there are good theoretical reasons to expect that the economic positions they took during the critical juncture would be likely reproduced in the aftermath period due to the incentives discussed above.

The reproduction of economic positions is, of course, precisely what defines the critical juncture legacies of programmatic alignment or de-alignment. As explained above, programmatic alignment is expected to be associated with relative electoral success of center-left parties while programmatic de-alignment is expected to be associated with relative electoral decline of such parties. Of course, the economic positions and electoral performance

\footnote{158}Ibid.: 28 \footnote{159}Eichengreen and Fishlow 1998 cited in Pop-Eleches 2008: 16 \footnote{160}Lupu 2013: 61
of center-left parties after critical junctures will not be necessarily correlated in all cases.\textsuperscript{161} However, since the path dependent logic outlined above emphasizes levels of uncertainty based on popular expectation about policy consistency, center-left economic positions and center-left electoral performance are expected to be highly correlated. To use Hirschman’s concepts of exit and loyalty,\textsuperscript{162} voters are more likely to stay loyal to parties whose brands remain relatively consistent, that is, center-left parties whose economic positions are persistently and reliably located to the center-left, as shown by Lupu for the Latin American context. Alternatively, voters are more likely to exit center-left parties whose brands are in crisis,\textsuperscript{163} that is, center-left parties whose economic positions exhibit more neoliberal tendencies, thereby causing programmatic de-alignment. In sum, the economic positions and electoral performance of center-left parties are two mutually related legacies of critical junctures of market reform.

\textit{Maximizing Anti-establishment Legitimacy: Populist Capacities and Incentives in a New Age}

Because the economic positions and electoral performance of center-left parties constitute the environmental legacies of critical junctures, these factors have powerful conditioning effects on opportunity structures for populist actors in Latin America and post-communist Europe. One reason for this is that, as explained above, the economic positions and electoral performance of center-left parties tend to be mutually related. In particular, while center-left electoral upsurge limits opportunities for populists, center-left electoral decline enhances opportunities. Overall, legacies of critical juncture generate variable environmental resources and constraints within which populist parties pursue strategies based on unique institutional capacities and incentives to maximize anti-establishment legitimacy.

\textsuperscript{161} See the final section (“Combining Structure and Agency”) of this chapter for a discussion of the probabilistic, rather than deterministic, logic of the argument.

\textsuperscript{162} Hirschman 1970

\textsuperscript{163} Lupu 2016
First, the legacies of critical junctures heavily condition anti-establishment actors’ strategic choices of economic positions that such actors are free to pursue due to their unique organizational capacities. The point about environmental factors and organizational capacities is not new – Burgess and Levitsky conceptualized these two variables as independent from one another in order to explain populist party adaptation during Latin America’s neoliberal critical juncture.\(^{164}\) However, whereas leadership autonomy in some traditional populist parties analyzed by these scholars was relatively constrained by party organizations and labor unions\(^{165}\) – as in Venezuela’s Acción Democrática (AD) – this is not the case with more modern populist parties in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

Indeed, modern populist parties that broke through in the aftermath of critical junctures in both regions are very different from Latin America’s traditional populist parties. Modern populist parties are usually entirely new institutions lacking the decades-long connection to organized labor, which had been typical of traditional populist parties, and operating in media environments heavily focused on their leaders.\(^{166}\) Because they are heavily dominated by personalistic leadership, such parties are relatively unconstrained by programmatic linkages.\(^{167}\) Their decision-making processes are concentrated at the leadership level and are, therefore, highly autonomous from the rest of the party. This principle explains why modern populist parties that may be more or less institutionalized\(^{168}\) have great flexibility in terms of the policy positions they choose. For example, the poorly institutionalized Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) eventually moved to the economic right, while populist parties Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS), both of which are comparatively

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\(^{164}\) Burgess and Levitsky 2003

\(^{165}\) Burgess and Levitsky distinguish between leadership autonomy from the party and from unions (2003: 899). As unions have declined drastically in both Latin America and post-communist Europe, they are less relevant for the present discussion

\(^{166}\) Mudde distinguishes between external (charismatic) and internal (organizational) types of charismatic leadership (2007: 260–4). In both cases, however, populist parties tend to be characterized by strong personalistic leadership.

\(^{167}\) Kitschelt 2000

\(^{168}\) As explained by Mudde, institutionalization and charisma – which, as discussed in Chapter 2, is one type of personalism – are not necessarily contradictory (2007: 264).
more institutionalized, moved to the economic left in Hungary and Poland, respectively. Overall, high leadership autonomy is a unique organizational capacity that endows modern populist organizations with sufficient leeway to choose positions strategically.

Second, the actual choice of positions is guided by such actors’ unique strategic incentives to \textit{maximize anti-establishment legitimacy}. As discussed in Chapter 2, modern populist actors are distinguished by their anti-establishment nature – against the political establishment, against the economic establishment, or against both – which, of course, conditions strategies that tend to be shaped by incentives for differentiation from the establishment. Of course, anti-establishment legitimacy can only be maximized within given environmental contexts that combine both resources and constraints.\textsuperscript{169} Such environmental contexts constitute the chief historical legacy of critical junctures. Figure 4.1 shows the path dependent relationship between critical junctures, subsequent environmental legacies, and strategic choices of economic positions driven by anti-establishment parties’ unique capacities and incentives.

![Figure 4.1. Strategic choices of economic positions in a new era of populism](image)

\textsuperscript{169} The idea that legacies of critical junctures include both resources \textit{and} constraints comes from Mahoney and Snyder (1999: 24). For a further discussion, see this chapter’s last section (“Combining Structure and Agency”).
As argued above, the environmental legacies of critical junctures are best reproduced in the center-left pillar of party systems. Particularly, a relatively strong center-left fills the ideological space to the left of the economic median while a relatively weak center-left vacates much of that space. This path dependent legacy has direct implications for anti-establishment actors in the aftermath of critical junctures. Particularly in contexts where center-left parties took a neoliberal turn, populists strategically maximize anti-establishment legitimacy by exploiting ideological spaces located to the left of the economic median. Such a strategy is beneficial for the maximization of anti-establishment legitimacy particularly in contexts where both pillars of the establishment – the center-left and the center-right – have converged towards similar economic positions. As explained by Mair, when parties converge by becoming increasingly similar in terms of policy positions, “citizens… retreat into more specialized and often ad hoc forms of representation,”170 such as those offered by populism. It is in such contexts of convergence that anti-establishment actors tend to voice appeals not only against the political but also against the economic establishment. Put simply, where traditional center-left parties do not speak out against the economic establishment associated with neoliberal reforms by clearly positioning themselves to the left of the economic median, populists will.

As discussed above, the availability of exploitable spaces on the center-left is conditional on traditional center-left parties’ electoral performance, which is theoretically subsequent to these parties’ path dependent economic positions in the aftermath of critical junctures. If center-left actors are relatively successful in electoral terms, especially by “claiming” their traditional economic positions on the center-left, opportunity structures for anti-establishment actors to exploit the center-left space of political systems are more constrained. By contrast, where traditional center-left parties distance themselves from the

170 Mair 2006: 33
economic left, their electoral performance tends to decline, thereby enhancing opportunity structures for anti-establishment actors to exploit the center-left space of party systems by turning to populism, thereby (also) challenging the economic establishment. In short, depending on the environmental legacies left by critical junctures, anti-establishment actors operate in variable institutional contexts, only some of which facilitate populism.

A Path Dependent Logic to Populism in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

Overall, the argument developed so far specifies the path dependent effects of critical junctures of market reform on subsequent developments in terms of traditional center-left parties and populist actors in the aftermath of critical junctures. This argument, applicable to both the Latin American and post-communist contexts, is sketched in Figure 3.2 below. The figure uses several concepts from James Mahoney’s analytical framework on critical junctures of liberal reform in Central America. With its emphasis on “how actor choices create institutions and structures, which in turn shape subsequent actor behaviors, which in turn lead to the development of new institutional and structural patterns,”171 Mahoney’s analytical framework is highly relevant to the present analysis. In a similar vein, my argument aims to “go beyond voluntaristic and structural approaches”172 by emphasizing the role of actor choice within structural contexts of medium-term development.173

171 Mahoney 2001: 11
172 Ibid.
173 While Mahoney’s work spans two centuries, the period in which I am interested covers about a quarter of a century in both regions. See the last section of this chapter (“Combining Structure and Agency”) for a further discussion of this issue.
Figure 4.2. Divergent historical legacies of critical junctures of market reform in Latin America and post-communist Europe
Overall, my study hypothesizes that the period of market reforms in Latin America and post-communist Europe constituted a critical juncture with similar consequences in both regions. First, this critical juncture occurred after the period of state-led development most associated with import substituting industrialization in Latin America and state socialism in Eastern Europe. Regardless of the different antecedent conditions, during critical junctures of market reform traditional center-left parties in both regions found themselves in various political roles – either as opponents skeptical of neoliberal deepening or as incumbents supporting the implementation of the most crucial market reforms. Where center-left parties were in opposition, critical junctures were *programmatically aligning*; where such parties were responsible for reforms, critical junctures were *programmatically de-aligning*.

Second, these early political positions during key moments of market reforms shaped subsequent environmental legacies. In the aftermath period, center-left parties had powerful incentives to persist in terms of positioning themselves relatively consistently with their political positions during the critical juncture – either to the left of the economic median or towards the center. Such divergent structural persistence was followed by a similarly divergent reactive sequence – where center-left parties persisted in terms of positioning themselves to the center-left, they tended to be electorally more resilient; where such parties tended to position themselves towards the center, they were also more likely to experience electoral weakening associated with party brands in crisis. Together, the economic positioning and electoral performance of center-left parties after critical junctures constituted environmental resources *and* constraints, which are the most immediate historical legacy of market reforms.

Third, different environmental legacies meant different opportunity structures for political actors with unique incentives to maximize anti-establishment legitimacy and with personalistic organizations facilitating great flexibility in terms of choosing economic
positions. Where the environmental legacies of critical junctures presented more restrictive opportunity structures – due to the electoral resilience of center-left parties – populists either did not emerge or were relatively weak in electoral terms. By contrast, where the environmental legacies of critical junctures presented more permissive opportunity structures – due to the electoral decline of center-left parties – populists not only tended to emerge, but were also relatively strong in electoral terms. Importantly, as inter-related legacies of critical junctures both the economic positions and electoral performance of center-left parties conditioned environmental resources and constraints in political arenas. If center-left brand consistency and subsequent voter loyalty limited opportunity structures for populists, center-left brands in crisis and subsequent voter exit enhanced opportunities for populists to exploit. It is because of this path dependent historical legacy that populist actors, that is, anti-establishment actors with center-left economic positions, tended to succeed at the ballot box where they emerged – in contexts after de-aligning critical junctures in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

**Combining Structure and Agency into a Historically Contingent Theory of Institutional Development**

The theory presented above combines in a common framework elements from structural, rationalistic, and institutional explanations discussed in the first part of this chapter. First, as a theory of institutional development, it overcomes the lack of precision typically associated with explanations highlighting general patterns of party system instability. My explanation not only specifies a viable logic that focuses on economic positions and electoral performance, but also analyzes from a comparative perspective the reasons behind variable patterns of party system instability. Because it offers a feasible and specific mechanism that links observable outcomes to critical junctures in two world regions,
the proposed explanation is both more precise and more general than previous institutional explanations.

Second, because populist outcomes are ultimately conditioned by the historical contingencies associated with critical junctures, the theory presented above is ultimately one of historical contingency. As such, it emphasizes what Kathleen Thelen calls “moments of institutional innovation in which agency, choice, and contingency figure prominently.”\textsuperscript{174} Such theories have a well-established lineage in social thought. For example, in \textit{The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism}, Max Weber writes,

“historical concepts… attempt for their methodological purposes not to grasp historical reality in abstract general formulae, but in concrete genetic set of relations which are inevitably of a specifically unique and individual character.”\textsuperscript{175}

It is due to such “philosophical sensitivity to the complexities and contingencies inherent in historical processes” that Weber “avoids the historical determinism that plagues Marxism.”\textsuperscript{176} Importantly, an emphasis on historical contingency means that the theory proposed above is \textit{not} historically deterministic. This key point must be emphasized because the above explanation, sketched in Figure 3.2, clearly features an element of \textit{structural persistence} in the aftermath of critical junctures. Such structural persistence, however, does not necessarily qualify the theory as a strictly deterministic one. While it is true that path dependent explanations can be biased towards “institutional determinism that strips from post-juncture actors the ability to alter inherited institutional structures,” as Mahoney and Snyder explain, this does not necessarily have to be the case with all path dependent explanations.\textsuperscript{177} As these authors suggest, structures can be conceptualized not only as \textit{constraints} but also as \textit{resources} that political actors can “appropriate and potentially
transform... in a self-conscious, reflexive manner.”\textsuperscript{178} A good example of such appropriation is the programmatic re-alignment associated with the “left turn” of many Latin American party systems that had been previously de-aligned.\textsuperscript{179} Overall, although the structural consequences of critical junctures have powerful conditioning effects on subsequent political developments, this is an argument \textit{not} about historical determinism, but about historical contingency.

Indeed, and as noted by Cappocia, approaches featuring structural factors are \textit{not necessarily deterministic} – “it is perfectly possible to build probabilistic arguments showing a robust correlation between structural conditions and institutional outcomes in a sufficiently large number of cases.”\textsuperscript{180} According to such a probabilistic notion of path dependency, “what has happened at an earlier point will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events” because “contingent, unexpected, and inherently unpredictable events... can undo or alter the most apparently durable trends in history.”\textsuperscript{181} Such contingencies are especially possible for path dependent explanations – such as the one proposed here – that do \textit{not} cover very long historical periods. As “the importance of strategy and choice recedes”\textsuperscript{182} [over time], a relatively limited time horizon means that structural factors are unlikely to become fully solidified within a relatively short time horizon.

In other words, as the present study covers about a quarter of a century in the aftermath of critical junctures, the structural persistence of center-left parties’ economic positions can be only conditioned, rather than heavily determined, by critical junctures. In turn, the effects of critical junctures on reactive sequences and outcomes can only be probabilistic. Overall, this means that the argument presented above will not explain all outcomes in all countries under investigation. Rather, the argument is designed to explain

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{178}Ibid.: 24
\bibitem{179}Roberts 2013: 1428
\bibitem{180}Capoccia 2015
\bibitem{182}Thelen 2003: 212
\end{thebibliography}
central tendencies in outcomes for a sufficiently large number of cases across both regions. As sketched in Table 4.2, variation in such outcomes is expected to be mostly related to center-left pillars of party systems which are, in turn, conditioned by critical junctures of market reform in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

4.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have begun to engage with the reasons behind relative populist success in Latin America and post-communist Europe. I have done so explicitly from a theoretical perspective that has led me to elaborate an original and historically contingent explanation of divergent outcomes in both regions. This explanation focuses on the legacies of critical junctures of market reform and specifically on path dependent developments associated with the center-left pillars of party systems. The proposed explanation features elements of both structure and political agency because it highlights how strategic choices and the likelihood of populist electoral success are contingent on developments shaped by critical moments in countries’ relatively recent histories.

The chapter began with an extended review of existing explanations highlighting structural, proximate-demand, cultural, institutional, and international relations factors. While such explanations have contributed to scholarly understanding of populist phenomena, none of them provides, by itself, a sufficiently satisfactory explanation of developments in both Latin America and post-communist Europe. For this reason, I next turned to more historically grounded explanations. While long-term historical factors also fail to account for the variation highlighted in Chapter 3, more recent historical experiences with economic reforms underscore intriguing similarities between the two regions. Having outlined such similarities, according to which the centrality of political elites was of key importance during the “technocratic consensus” associated with key market reforms, I specifically focused on Kenneth Roberts’ work on critical junctures of market reform in Latin America.
While Roberts’ work focuses on divergent patterns of party system stability, a closer examination of his argument and a consideration of the historical significance of center-left parties in both regions led me to restrict the analytical focus to the center-left pillar of party systems. Indeed, the traditional center-left’s behavior during critical junctures tended to either increase or decrease uncertainty, thereby prompting potential crises of party brands and variable patterns of voter exit from or loyalty to parties traditionally associated with the center-left. Importantly, center-left path dependencies featured divergent patterns both in terms of positioning on economic issues and in terms of electoral performance. While such parties’ economic positions originated in critical junctures, subsequent incentives for consistency defined their structural persistence, which then translated into divergent reactive sequences of either relative electoral strength or decline. In turn, such divergences in the aftermath of critical junctures constituted environmental resources and constraints that defined opportunity structures for political actors with unique incentives for maximizing anti-establishment legitimacy and organizational capacities allowing a flexible choice of those economic positions that would maximize anti-establishment legitimacy. Because the structural persistence of center-left parties’ economic positions and their electoral performance were mutually related as an environmental legacy of critical junctures, populist actors tended to be relatively successful in electoral terms where they tended to emerge – in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures. Alternatively, in the aftermath of programmatic alignment, such actors either did not emerge or were relatively less successful in electoral terms.

Overall, then, I have theorized that in Latin America and post-communist Europe, the political dynamics during critical junctures of market reform have path-dependent effects in terms of populist outcomes. These political dynamics are mostly transmitted through a key intervening variable – the evolution of the center-left pillar of party systems – which is
conditioned by the type of critical juncture and which either enhances or limits environmental opportunities for subsequent populist actors. This explanation overcomes some of the problems associated with existing theories that focus on factors associated with structuralism, rationality, or institutions as if such factors were independent from one another. Critically, because my theory of institutional evolution combines elements of both structure and agency, the path dependent effects of critical junctures are historically contingent and probabilistic rather than deterministic in nature. In the next two chapters, I examine such path dependencies – first, between critical junctures and the environmental resources and constraints they leave as a key historical legacy and, second, between environmental legacies and populist outcomes.
5.
HAS THE EAST BECOME THE SOUTH?
LEGACIES OF NEOLIBERAL CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

5.1. Introduction

If critical junctures are key for understanding populist economic positions and electoral success in both Latin America and post-communist Europe, as theorized in Chapter 4, the legacies of critical junctures should contain comparable mechanisms of reproduction that are valid for both regions. This chapter focuses on Latin American and post-communist party systems – the political arenas in which processes of political production and reproduction unfold – in order to establish both a justification for comparability and a key mechanism to explain populism’s rise in both regions. Most fundamentally, the chapter zooms in on the front end of the mechanism of reproduction that originates with critical junctures, reverberates in persistently variable patterns of party system stability, and culminates with variations of populist electoral performances. This chapter contains three parts, each illuminating how critical junctures of market reforms produced similar legacies in both regions and how particular aspects of party system (in)stability relate to the overall argument. In my analysis, I move beyond previous studies by disaggregating party systems in both regions into their constitutive center-left and center-right pillars whose development I trace over time. This process allows me to confirm a central theoretical proposition developed in the previous chapter – that historical path dependencies that are visible specifically in the economic positions and electoral performance of center-left parties constitute lasting and important legacies of critical junctures of market reform.

In the first part of the chapter, I offer two contributions to the existing literature on economic reform and party system development in post-communist Europe. First, I develop a typology of critical junctures of market reform in post-communist Europe, which is inspired
by Roberts’ typology of critical junctures in Latin America. The typology, based on the political agency in favor of and in opposition to the economic reforms during the critical juncture, distinguishes between programmatically aligning and programmatically de-aligning critical junctures in post-communist Europe. Along with Roberts’ typology, this analytical framework is the cornerstone of the critical juncture argument applicable to both regions.

Second, I focus on the evolution of post-communist party system stability in the aftermath of critical junctures. While scholars of both regions have identified party system instability as both persistent and covariate with populist electoral success, systematic work on the effects of neoliberal critical junctures on party system (in)stability exists only with reference to the Latin American region. In my analysis – the first to explore the link between the two for the post-communist region – I replicate recent work on Latin American critical junctures and subsequent party system (in)stability. Specifically, by examining electoral volatility in post-communist Europe I establish variation across space that is also sustained systematically over time. These findings demonstrate that in post-communist Europe, as in Latin America, while programmatic alignment produced relative party system stability, programmatic de-alignment produced significantly and persistently more unstable patterns of electoral competition. The temporal resilience of divergent legacies associated with critical junctures of market reform not only suggests comparable legacies of critical junctures, but also a comparable logic behind similar outcomes, regardless of region.

Third, since the mechanism or reproduction features center-left performance, as theorized in Chapter 4, the second part of this chapter focuses the analytical lens on the center-left pillar of Latin American and post-communist party systems. Particularly, I use three expert surveys to analyze the economic positions and electoral performance after the end of critical junctures of 25 Latin American and 17 post-communist European key center-left parties whose origins can be traced to the period before the end of critical junctures. The empirical analysis
shows that after critical junctures these key center-left parties in both regions tended to take economic positions consistent with their political positions during the critical juncture – either as proponents or skeptics of neoliberal reforms. In turn, these ideological path-dependencies corresponded to varying patterns of electoral performance. Where center-left parties tended to continue positioning themselves on the economic left, they also tended to register electoral gains in the aftermath of programmatic alignment in both regions. By contrast, center-left parties that tended to position themselves closer to the economic center tended to register electoral losses in the aftermath of programmatic de-alignment in both regions. The finding of such comparable patterns supports the theory that critical junctures in Latin America and post-communist Europe generally produce similar effects not only in terms of subsequent center-left economic positions but also in terms of subsequent center-left electoral performance.

Finally, in the fourth part of the chapter I show that critical junctures did not have identical consequences for the center-right pillar of party systems in both regions. By analyzing the electoral performance of 40 key center-right parties in Latin America and 31 key center-right parties in post-communist Europe, I demonstrate that critical junctures did not condition similarly variable patterns of subsequent center-right performance as they did for the center-left. As the path dependencies originating in critical junctures of market reforms did not have the same electoral implications for the center-right as they did for the center-left as well as for the overall stability of entire party systems, the story of varying degrees of party system stability in both regions is mostly a story about the center-left. Overall, as the variation in center-left performance is a key legacy of critical junctures of market reform, it is worth exploring as an intervening variable between critical junctures and variations of populist electoral performance.
5.2. Neoliberal Critical Junctures in Post-communist Europe

As the most dramatic episode of liberalization in economic history, the post-communist transition to capitalism represents a watershed moment for countries in the region. Following Roberts, I define the neoliberal critical juncture as the period during which “countries attempted an ambitious package of market-based stabilization and adjustment policies that were designed to dismantle historic forms of state intervention and open their economies to global markets for trade, investment, and finance.” As a region-wide phenomenon, the post-communist critical juncture lasted just over a decade, beginning in 1989 and ending by early 2003, when most of the fifteen countries under investigation were formally invited to join the European Union the following year – after completing major economic reforms as a prerequisite for membership. As in Latin America, the critical juncture was not uniform across time and space and countries experienced key market reforms at different moments in time. Nevertheless, and as discussed below, even countries that were not invited to join the EU in 2004 had already attempted their most ambitious and comprehensive economic reforms by the end of 2002.

Table 5.1 categorizes types of critical junctures in post-communist Europe by drawing on a Liberalization Index that I developed with data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). For each country, I identify the leading reformers (relevant prime ministers, and presidents for the countries with relatively strong presidencies),

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1 Murrell 1996: 36
2 Roberts 2013: 1430
3 Bohle and Greskovits distinguish between two major phases: (1) liberalization, deregulation, and small-scale privatization and (2) large-scale privatization, firm governance, and competition (2012: 27).
4 To identify the critical periods of economic reform, I constructed a Liberalization Index for the 15 consistently democratic and stable post-communist states under analysis. The Liberalization Index aggregates data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) measuring liberalization in terms of (1) large-scale privatization, (2) small-scale privatization, (3) restructuring, (4) price liberalization, (5) trade and foreign exchange, (6) competition, (7) banking reforms, and (8) securities and markets. To construct the Liberalization Index, I normalized these eight variables on a scale from 0 to 1 and then calculated the mean for each year starting with 1989 (or the first year thereafter for which data are available) and ending with 2012. The Liberalization Index includes the annual average for each country. Next, I use the Liberalization Index to compare the absolute changes towards liberalization achieved under all governments in the 15 countries. For each country, large absolute changes typically correspond to the periods during which the critical juncture of market reform took place.
5 Six of the countries under analysis can be classified as having comparatively stronger presidencies than the rest during the critical juncture – (1) Lithuania, (2) Macedonia, (3) Poland, (4) Romania, (5) Ukraine – all of which
the years during which they undertook the most critical market reforms, their party affiliations, and leading opponents. Based on the political players associated with government and opposition during key periods of reform implementation, the table distinguishes between two main categories of critical junctures in post-communist Europe – (1) programmatically aligning and realigning and (2) programmatically de-aligning. Next, I briefly discuss these types of critical junctures in post-communist Europe.

are characterized by Shugart as “semi-presidential in some form” (2005: 344) – as well as (6) Croatia until 2000. The rest, including Croatia since 2000, can be classified as parliamentary systems with relatively weak presidents.
Table 5.1. Critical junctures of market reform in post-communist Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Leading Reformers</th>
<th>Critical Reform Years</th>
<th>Governing Parties (type)</th>
<th>Leading Opponents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aligning Critical Junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Meksi (PM)</td>
<td>1992-1997</td>
<td>Democratic Party (center-right)</td>
<td>Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party (center-left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Tuđman (Pres.), Valentić (PM)</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (center-right)</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>Pithart, Klaus (PMS)</td>
<td>1990-1996</td>
<td>Civic Democratic Party (center-right)</td>
<td>Communist Party of Bohemia &amp; Moravia (left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Laar, Tarand (PMS)</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>Pro Patria (center-right)</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TB-LNNK/Saimnieks/Latvian Way (center-right)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Re-aligning Critical Junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Kostov (PM)</td>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>Union of Democratic Forces (center-right)</td>
<td>Socialist Party (center-left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Georgievski (PM), Trajkovski (Pres.)</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>VMRO-DPMNE (center-right/conservative)</td>
<td>Social Democratic Union (center-left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Ciubuc, Sturza, Braghis (PMs)</td>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy and Reforms (center-right)</td>
<td>Communist Party (hard left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Constantinescu (Pres.), Ciorba, Vasile, Isarescu (PMS)</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>Romanian Democratic Convention (center-right)</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (center-left)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De-aligning Critical Junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Horn (PM)</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>Socialist Party (center-left)</td>
<td>Alliance of Free Democrats (center-right/liberal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Wałęsa (Pres.)</td>
<td>1990-1993</td>
<td>Populist (labor-based)</td>
<td>Various (fragmented)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Moravčík (PM)</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Democratic Union &amp; Party of the Democrit Left (center-left)</td>
<td>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (populist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dzurinda (PM)</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>Democratic Coalition with Party of Democratic Left, Social Democratic Party, &amp; Party of Civic Understanding (all center-left)</td>
<td>Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (center-right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Drnovšek (PM)</td>
<td>1992-1996</td>
<td>Grand Coalition including United List of Social Democrats (center-left)</td>
<td>Slovenian People's Party (center-right)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Kuchma (Pres.)</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>Populist (elected with support from Communist Party)</td>
<td>Various in highly fragmented parliament</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Programmatic Alignment and Re-alignment

Beginning with aligning critical junctures, while Albania, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia displayed significant variations in terms of their overall paths to liberal democracy, in each of these countries, the most crucial market reforms were implemented by center-right governments immediately after the break with communism. Led by early neoliberal proponents, such as shock therapists Václav Klaus and Mart Laar, prime ministers of the Czech Republic and Estonia, respectively, some of these countries achieved significant levels of liberalization early on. In Albania and Croatia, both under competitive authoritarian rule throughout the 1990s, market reforms were slower, but were nevertheless adopted by political forces clearly associated with the center-right, such the Democratic Party of Albania and the Croatian Democratic Union. Overall, in all four countries, economic reforms were associated from the very beginning with center-right governments that had quickly risen to power by promising free markets.

Although key economic reforms ultimately also ended in programmatic alignments in Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, and Romania, these countries’ economic transitions were somewhat less straightforward. Like Albania and Croatia, these four countries experimented with semi-authoritarian forms of government throughout the 1990s, which greatly complicated market reforms. Differently, however, here initial reforms were adopted not by the center-right, but by former communists willing to cooperate with the International Monetary Fund. While such an initial dynamic may suggest programmatic de-alignment, this was, nevertheless, not the case as ex-communist-led reforms in the four countries remained shallow and incomplete.

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6 Estonia’s case requires further explanation because Mart Laar’s pro-reform government included the Social Democratic Party as a minor coalition partner. Although Tavits and Letki suggest programmatic de-alignment by describing this party as “explicitly right wing in its economic policy behavior” (2009: 565), Estonia is more appropriately categorized as a country that experienced an aligning critical juncture. Indeed, this newly formed party was not ex-communist and for the 1992 and 1995 elections it was in a coalition (the “Moderates”) with the Center Party. Thus, it did not engage in bait-and-switch tactics during the critical juncture.

7 Levitsky and Way 2010
throughout most of the 1990s. Ultimately, in all four, economic liberalization was significantly deepened under democratically elected center-right governments, such as those of president Constantinescu in Romania (1996-2000) and prime-ministers Kostov (1997-2001) and Georgievski (1998-2002) in Bulgaria and Macedonia, respectively. Because center-right forces that had campaigned on pro-reform platforms proved to be the most consequential reformers after an initial period of ex-communist rule and stop-and-go reforms, these four countries eventually experienced re-aligning critical junctures.

Programmatic De-alignment

Major liberalization efforts took place under very different political circumstances in Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, all of which experienced de-aligning critical junctures. Even though in these six countries the context of key reform implementation varied widely across important domains, such as environmental conditions, reform intensity, and degree of political responsibility, they all shared one commonality with path dependent consequences – in all six countries, key market reforms were either spearheaded or implemented with crucial support from political forces traditionally associated with center-left labels and electoral platforms. And in most of these cases, it was the center-right that provided the bulk of parliamentary opposition during the critical juncture.

From this group, Hungary and Poland stand out as the countries where the return of the center-left was most closely associated with democratic consolidation after decisively

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8 Pop-Eleches 2009
9 Conditions varied widely across these six countries. For example, by 1989, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia had more liberalized economies than the rest (Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 26). Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, and Ukraine became newly independent states in the early 1990s. Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine experienced significant crises in the early 1990s. Differently from the other countries, Slovakia and Ukraine were competitive authoritarian throughout most of the 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2010). Second, regarding reform intensity, while some socialists experimented with shock therapy in the 1990s (Hungary), others did not (Slovenia). Third, in terms of political responsibility, some socialists implemented reforms from a position of parliamentary majority (Hungary, Lithuania), others had parliamentary pluralities (Poland), and yet others supported key market reforms as junior, yet necessary, partners in government (Slovenia, Slovakia).
10 Bunce 2002
breaking with the communist past. Indeed, the break was so decisive that, having won the 1994 election by promising to slow down economic liberalization, in 1995, the Socialist government of Hungarian prime-minister Gyula Horn adopted “the most radical adjustment program ever implemented in Hungary” in a “putsch-like manner.” In Lithuania, it was under the government of the ex-communist Democratic Labor Party (1992-1996), led by president Algirdas Brazauskas, that the most significant reforms – such as the currency board and flat tax legislation – were adopted after contrary campaign promises to relax socially punishing measures adopted by the previous conservative government. And while Slovenia and Slovakia markedly differed from one another in terms of democracy and market building, the fragmented nature of their party systems made ex-communist participation in pro-reform governments a necessary condition for the implementation of major liberalization policies. Particularly in Slovakia, as the largest faction supporting prime minister Dzurinda’s pro-reform coalition government (1998-2002), the ex-communist Party of the Democratic Left was granted control over the finance ministry. Having campaigned on a social agenda – to increase wages and pensions, halt privatization, and improve access to health care and free education – Slovakia’s ex-communists, now in charge of the Ministry of Finance, were instead directly responsible for the government’s economically restrictive policies.

Bait-and-switch tactics are, of course, not unique to ex-communist parties. They can also be adopted by populist presidents, especially in countries where strong presidencies are involved in economic policy management. Thus, in Ukraine, former communist and “red director,” Leonid Kuchma, campaigned for “a socially oriented market economy,” a position

11 Grzymala-Busse 2002; Tavits and Letki 2009
12 Cook and Orenstein 1999: 92
13 Bozóki 2002: 103-4
14 Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 109, 112
15 Hloušek and Kopeček 2010: 26; Fisher et al. 2007: 990
16 Fisher 2002
17 Zviglyanich 1995: 143-5
that won him the support of the restorationist Communist Party\textsuperscript{18} for the second round of the 1994 presidential election. And even though “the timing for starting a program based on economic radicalism could hardly be considered favorable,”\textsuperscript{19} as president, Kuchma enacted drastic stabilization measures\textsuperscript{20} in direct contraction to his more moderate campaign rhetoric. A similar presidential reversal had also occurred several years earlier in Poland, where the de-aligning critical juncture had begun even before the ex-communists returned to power in 1993. There, shock therapy was initiated in late 1989 – almost a year prior to the first fully democratic election [for president, in November 1990].\textsuperscript{21} The election pitted Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the prime minister politically responsible for the drastic reforms, against Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa, who ran a heavily populist campaign by organizing around class issues and highlighting wage declines, the disproportionate suffering of workers, and growing impoverishment that existed side by side with growing wealth.\textsuperscript{22} Despite such economically populist rhetoric and the seemingly credible affinity with Poland’s working classes – candidate Wałęsa was, after all, the leader of the country’s largest labor union – as president, he sustained the decisive economic reforms.\textsuperscript{23} In a classic bait-and-switch fashion, president Wałęsa not only retained Leszek Balcerowicz as Minister of Finance, but also helped to prevent a popular backlash against the reforms.\textsuperscript{24}

Whether they did so to fight hyperinflationary crises (as in Poland and Ukraine), economic slowdowns (as in Lithuania, Slovenia, and Slovakia), or impending debt crises (as in Hungary), in all of these cases, political actors originally associated with center-left platforms either initiated or helped sustain consequential market deepening efforts relatively

\textsuperscript{18} Solnchak 1998: 28 \\
\textsuperscript{19} Zviglyanich 1995: 143-5 \\
\textsuperscript{20} Åslund 1995; Weyland 1999: 395 \\
\textsuperscript{21} Therefore, the Mazowiecki government that initiated shock therapy in late 1989/early 1990 could not have broken any election promises. In fact, there was no election campaign prior to Poland’s first semi-democratic election for parliament in June 1989 and the Communist Party still controlled most major media outlets. \\
\textsuperscript{22} Ost 2005: 66-7 \\
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.: 60-93 \\
\textsuperscript{24} Weyland 1999: 387, 396
early in the economic transformation. Necessitated by adverse economic circumstance, such
decisive liberalization measures represented a bait-and-switch political dynamic – because all
these reformers, most of whom were ex-communists, had campaigned and won elections on
economically populist platforms markedly different from the actual economic policies of
*neoliberal acceleration* that they pursued in government. As a result of this convergence
towards the center-right, in all six countries that experienced programmatic de-alignment,
genuine center-left alternatives to neoliberal reforms became virtually indistinguishable. By
contrast, both *aligning* and *re-aligning* critical junctures ultimately produced a pattern of
relatively clear and predictable patterns of competition between center-right proponents of
neoliberal reforms and their center-left opponents.

Overall, while the trajectories and speed of post-communist economic reform were
highly varied, post-communist critical junctures can be included in one of three categories –
aligning, re-aligning, and de-aligning. Countries in the first group experienced a clear
alignment because center-right parties were in charge of the key reform moment while the
center-left was in opposition. Within the second group exhibiting a more “mixed” pattern while
key center-left parties did participate in liberalization efforts initially, reforms are most clearly
associated with center-right political actors – a reason why the observable pattern is also one
of overall alignment. Despite the more mixed legacy, the critical juncture for the second group
of countries is rather similar to the critical juncture for the first group. Finally, the third group
is characterized by a clear programmatic de-alignment – because actors who had come to power
by criticizing neoliberalism actually lent crucial support for market reform implementation.
Next, I explore the legacies of programmatic alignment and de-alignment on party systems.
5.3. Critical Junctures and Party System (In)Stability in Post-communist Europe

On a general level, critical junctures can have powerful effects on subsequent variations of political development, as Collier and Collier showed regarding 20th century politics in Latin America. Yet critical junctures do not necessarily result in the automatic crystallization of outcomes. They are, instead, shaped by a sequence of intervening steps, known as mechanisms of production, that are perpetuated through a series of institutional and political processes, or mechanisms of reproduction. Importantly, because “self-reproducing” sequences in the aftermath of the critical juncture are steadily reinforced over time, there can even be “sizable lags between actors’ actions and the long-term consequences of those actions.”

More recent work on Latin American politics has specified one element of critical significance for the overall mechanism of production and reproduction – the importance of name brand loyalties for party system stability. As argued by Lupu, there is a positive relationship between, on the one hand, programmatic alignments, which produce recognizable party brands, and, on the other hand, party system stability. The question is further studied by Roberts, who has demonstrated that in Latin America’s post-economic reform period there is a strong relationship between programmatic de-alignment and subsequently high levels of party system instability. In particular, Roberts shows the relationship between critical junctures and voters’ behavior by analyzing patterns of electoral volatility. Thus, programmatic alignment is followed by subsequently low volatility levels while programmatic de-alignment is followed by subsequently high volatility levels. Overall, these scholars have demonstrated that the political agency behind – and against – highly contingent choices of neoliberal policy-

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25 Collier and Collier 1991
26 Ibid.: 30-1
27 Mahoney 2000; Thelen 2003
28 Pierson 2004: 14
29 Lupu 2016; Morgan 2011
30 Roberts 2014
31 Roberts 2013: 1441-6
making during critical junctures has powerful implications for subsequent party system
stability in Latin America.

Although scholars of post-communism have emphasized the importance of political
dynamics during economic reform,\textsuperscript{32} they have not analyzed systematically the effects of such
dynamics on subsequent party systems in the region. Indeed, variations in party system stability
are well-documented in post-communist Europe and scholars have attributed such variations
to a number of factors. For example, while for Birch electoral institutions matter most, for Sikk
it is the inner dynamics of incumbent actors that explain patterns of party system stability.\textsuperscript{33}
Other scholars have emphasized the importance of temporal tendencies. While for Tavits
democratic maturity has stabilizing effects on party systems, for Powell and Tucker variations
in party system stability are a “function of long-term economic recovery,” as measured by GPD
change since 1989 (the year of communism’s collapse).\textsuperscript{34} In short, these scholars have shown
that institutional, political, and economic factors are feasible explanations of divergent patterns
of party system stability and that party system instability is indeed a serious problem in post-
communist political development.

Rather than attempt to “refute” such arguments, here I seek to understand whether in
post-communist Europe, too, critical junctures of market reform produce dynamics of party
system stability that are parallel to the ones observable in Latin America. While variation in
patterns of party system stability is not the dependent variable in the present study, scholars
have concretely argued that critical junctures produce variations in party system stability \textit{and}
that populism finds particularly fertile ground in relatively unstable party systems.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore,
if it is shown that post-communist critical junctures condition party systems in ways that are
similar to the Latin American experience, the case for the comparative study of critical

\textsuperscript{32} Bohle and Greskovits 2012
\textsuperscript{33} Birch 2001; Sikk 2005
\textsuperscript{34} Tavits 2008; Powell and Tucker 2014: 1
\textsuperscript{35} Roberts 2013; Mainwaring and Scully, eds. 1995
junctures’ path dependent effects regarding populist voting in both regions will be strengthened.

To analyze the effects of critical junctures on patterns of party system stability, I follow Powell and Tucker and differentiate among three types of electoral volatility in post-communist Europe. While *extra-systemic volatility* refers to parties’ entry into and exit from the political system, *intra-systemic volatility* results from voters switching between parties that are already part of, and remain in, the political system. In turn, *total volatility* represents the sum of extra-systemic and intra-systemic volatilities.\(^{36}\) While, similarly to Powell and Tucker, I use 2% as the cut-off point under which parties are counted as “outside of the system” (and, thus, their vote changes are counted towards extra-systemic volatility), my approach differs from theirs in a fundamental way. Rather than following a generic formula to count mergers, coalitions, and splits, I draw on Sikk’s concept of “genuinely new parties” and calculate relevant volatilities on an election-by-election basis.\(^{37}\) Finally, I focus on legislative elections in post-communist Europe. While scholars of Latin America often include presidential elections, all major studies of post-communist volatility analyze legislative elections only.\(^{38}\) As presidential elections are less important in post-communist Europe’s mostly parliamentary systems than they are in Latin America, and as such elections are held in only nine of the post-communist countries under study, data from legislative elections – held in all 15 countries – are more meaningfully comparable.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{36}\) Powell and Tucker 2014

\(^{37}\) For details, see Powell and Tucker 2014 and Sikk 2005. Most critically, Powell and Tucker count many temporary coalitions and mergers as new or existing parties, which artificially inflates their calculation of extra-systemic volatility. However, many such coalitions and mergers do not actually exit or enter anew the party system and, as such, are readily recognized by voters as already existing parties. For this reason, instead of including vote shifts associated with many mergers and coalitions (especially those of more temporary nature) under extra-systemic volatility, as Powell and Tucker (2014) do, I include such electoral shifts under intra-systemic volatility and I carefully justify each choice on a case-by-case basis. While this approach is significantly more labor-intensive than the one adopted by Powell and Tucker, it is less likely to inflate extra-systemic volatility values.

\(^{38}\) Tavits 2005, Sikk 2005; Powell and Tucker 2014

\(^{39}\) Nevertheless, I also analyzed post-communist presidential elections. The results, available in Appendix E (Figure A.4), confirm the trend observable from legislative elections (see below).
Additionally, my approach differs from the approach adopted by Roberts for Latin America in two respects—*categorization* and *periodization*. First—regarding categorization—while Roberts distinguished among three types of critical junctures in Latin America—aligning, neutral, and de-aligning, for the study of post-communist volatility, I separate post-communist countries in two categories—(1) aligning and re-aligning, on the one hand, and (2) de-aligning, on the other. As explained in the previous section, in the four post-communist countries where critical junctures were “delayed,” an ultimate pattern of alignment was eventually produced. Additionally, across the 15 post-communist countries under study, center-left parties—usually former communists—played prominent roles during the critical juncture period. This was a very different situation from the Latin American context, where in the countries experiencing neutral critical juncture there was no active center-left. In short, post-communist critical junctures were either ultimately aligning or de-aligning; there were no neutral critical junctures in this region.

Second—regarding periodization—while for Latin America Roberts compares volatility *after* critical junctures (in the 2000s) to volatility before critical junctures (in the 1980s), for post-communist countries I compare volatility *after the end of* critical junctures to volatility *before the end of* critical junctures. Post-communist Europe is different from Latin America because of the totalitarian nature of rule immediately prior to democratic reforms. Because democratic and market reforms coincided throughout most of post-communist Europe, electoral volatility *before* critical junctures cannot be meaningfully compared because of the undemocratic elections held under totalitarian rule throughout the region. Therefore, I use average volatility rates before the end of critical junctures as an initial baseline in order to

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40 See the following section and Appendix F for a list of relevant center-left parties. As noted below, the two exceptions where the center-left was not ex-communist were Estonia’s Moderates and Latvia’s National Harmony Party, which traces its roots to the pro-independence national front.

41 As discussed in Chapter 3, as well as in the next section, for Latin America, too, the key difference is between programmatically aligning and neutral critical junctures, on the one hand, and programmatically de-aligning critical junctures, on the other hand.
evaluate the subsequent evolution of party system stability in the aftermath of major market reforms. This approach is not unreasonable, however, because despite the shorter time-horizon, it can still track aggregate changes in volatility. Indeed, to compare “new party volatility” in Latin America, Roberts explicitly compares the 1990s (that is, the period during critical junctures in most Latin American countries) to the 2000s. Therefore, the approach adopted here is sufficiently similar to the approach adopted by Roberts. Appendix D lists the end of critical junctures for each country under analysis in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

Figure 5.1 illustrates mean volatility rates for legislative elections in the two groups of post-communist countries during and after critical junctures of market reforms (for more details, see Appendix E42). First, the figure shows that regardless of the type of critical juncture, party systems exhibited comparable levels of total volatility during this initial baseline period, with only marginal differences between aggregate volatility rates for the two categories of countries. Indeed, as consequential efforts at market liberalization were taking place across the post-communist region, for this baseline period party systems in countries experiencing programmatic alignment were no less volatile, on average, than party systems experiencing programmatic de-alignment. In fact, intra-systemic volatility (in red) was comparable for the two groups of countries and extra-systemic volatility (in blue) was slightly lower during de-aligning critical junctures. Overall, the comparable total volatility rates (of 32.1 and 30.2) suggest similar degrees of vote switching between elections, with nearly a third of the electorate, on average, switching its vote from one election to the next during these early years of market reform. In short, whether they were in the process of programmatic alignment or de-

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42 Appendix E (Table A.3) includes each country’s relevant scores of extra- and intra-systemic volatilities that are included for the construction of Figure 5.1.
alignment, post-communist party systems were similarly unstable during the baseline critical juncture period.

Figure 5.1 also shows that this comparable instability during the critical juncture period was followed by a visible divergence in the aftermath of critical junctures. Thus, after aligning and re-aligning cases average volatility rates declined in the aftermath of critical junctures, signaling the relative stabilization of electoral competition. By contrast, after de-aligning critical junctures, party systems tended to continue on a path of high volatility. Indeed, in countries that had experienced de-aligning critical junctures, both extra-systemic and total...
volatility means saw slight increases relative to the baseline period,43 a symptom of highly unstable patterns of electoral competition in the post-critical juncture period. While these results are based on electoral data from parliamentary elections, results based on data from presidential elections in post-communist Europe confirm the same divergent pattern, as Appendix E (Figure A.4) shows.44

The above evidence demonstrates divergent patterns of party system stability across space, but it does not provide information about what Collier and Collier call “mechanisms of reproduction” that are typically associated with critical junctures45 and that are temporal in nature. To uncover such a temporal dimension, I trace the evolution of volatility over time for both groups of countries by compounding mean volatility scores on a year-by-year basis. This approach allows me to follow evolving volatility means, thereby capturing the effects that new elections have on volatility as time progresses. Having re-calculated evolving volatility means across time by adding elections for each subsequent year, I then compare the compounded means for the two categories of countries – (1) those that experienced de-aligning critical junctures and (2) those that experienced either aligning or re-aligning critical junctures – for each consecutive year.

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43 Hungary is the only exception from the de-aligning group. It is an outlier among countries having experienced programmatic de-alignment – because its low volatility is conditioned by this country’s unique electoral system, which diminishes the likelihood of outsider breakthrough. Notably, if Hungary is excluded, the differences between means are even more pronounced across the two categories of countries in the aftermath of critical junctures.

44 Thus, presidential elections held in countries after de-aligning critical junctures (Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine) were, on average, significantly more volatile than presidential elections after aligning and re-aligning critical junctures (Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, and Moldova). See Appendix E (Figure A.4) for an illustration.

45 Collier and Collier 1991
Table 5.2. The evolution of total electoral volatility means after two types of critical juncture in post-communist Europe (legislative elections only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period after critical junctures</th>
<th>Number of election pairs</th>
<th>Total Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aligning &amp; De-aligning</td>
<td>Aligning &amp; De-aligning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through 2002</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Through 2003</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Through 2004</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Through 2005</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Through 2006</td>
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<td>Through 2007</td>
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<td>Through 2008</td>
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<td>Through 2009</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Through 2010</td>
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<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Through 2011</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>Through 2012</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>Through 2013</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through 2014</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through 2015</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Averages after CJs (since 2002)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period after critical junctures</th>
<th>Number of election pairs</th>
<th>Total Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aligning &amp; De-aligning</td>
<td>Aligning &amp; De-aligning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through 2002</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Through 2003</td>
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<td>Through 2004</td>
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<td>Through 2005</td>
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<td>Through 2007</td>
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<td>Through 2008</td>
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<td>Through 2009</td>
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<td>Through 2015</td>
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<td>31</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: For the post-critical juncture period, I only include volatility scores from elections after the end of each country’s respective critical juncture. As noted, critical junctures ended at somewhat different times but in all countries, they were over by the end of 2002. For Ukraine, I exclude the 2014 legislative election, which was in the aftermath of the 2014 revolution and, therefore, extremely volatile.

* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; two-tailed t-tests for statistical significance of difference between means.

As Table 5.2 above shows, the end of critical junctures – roughly in 2002 for the entire region⁴⁶ – is associated with persistent divergence of total volatility means across time. Indeed, compounded volatility means after de-aligning critical junctures are significantly higher as soon as 2003 – almost immediately after critical junctures ended in all fifteen countries under analysis. Additionally, as volatility averages are recalculated by adding the elections for each subsequent year (indicated in the left-hand side of Table 5.2), the difference between volatility

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⁴⁶ I report the results beginning with 2002 because this year marks the first elections after critical junctures ended in the last two countries – Macedonia and Slovakia. Thus, for each consecutive year, I re-calculated the “moving averages” by including volatility scores for all legislative elections that took place during each consecutive year.
means remains consistent. Finally, performing a series of t-tests to evaluate the difference between means demonstrates that over time this difference increases in significance (reaching the 0.01 level after 2012). These consistent and statistically significant differences between volatility means over time suggest the solidification of divergent legacies associated with critical junctures of market reform. Overall, as post-communist party systems evolved in the aftermath of key market reforms, total volatility was, on average, 10.1% consistently higher after de-aligning critical junctures than it was after aligning and re-aligning ones.47 This finding – that volatility means have been significantly different over time – underscores the temporal resilience of divergent legacies associated with critical junctures of market reform. Thus, across post-communist Europe, new elections solidified, rather than disrupted, patterns of stability or instability associated with different types of critical junctures.

In sum, the above analysis of post-communist electoral volatility suggests a pattern very similar to the one identified by Kenneth Roberts for Latin America. In post-communist Europe, too, programmatic de-alignment produced patterns of electoral competition that were both significantly and persistently more unstable than patterns produced by programmatic alignment. While post-communist European democracies are mostly parliamentary systems that transitioned from totalitarianism – as opposed to Latin America’s presidential systems, most of which transitioned from authoritarianism – the above findings for post-communist Europe substantiate previous scholarship on patterns of party system stability in Latin America. As both regions experienced critical junctures during which previously state-led models of economic development were decisively superseded by market liberalization policies, the

47 These “evolving” averages are slightly higher than those reported in Appendix E (Table A.3). The reason for this is that while Appendix E (Table A.3) reports volatility means at the country level (thus weighing each election somewhat differently, depending on how many elections were held in each country), the aggregations in Table 5.2 are based on analysis at the election level (thus weighing each election equally). Regardless of the somewhat different implications of these two methods of calculating volatility means, they produce essentially the same result. According to both methods of calculation, after de-aligning critical junctures total volatility is, on average, 10% higher than after aligning and re-aligning critical junctures.
legacies of these critical moments defined divergent institutional legacies most clearly visible in divergent patterns of party system stability. In both regions, such divergent patterns were conditional on political dynamics that were “contingent on the strategic positioning and choices of key political actors.” In the following section, I trace the positioning and evolution of one such key political actor – the center-left – whose electoral performance, I argue, is a key intervening variable between types of critical juncture and variations in electoral support for populists in both regions.

5.4. Critical Junctures and the Center-Left in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

While divergent patterns of party system stability are both an important consequence of critical junctures and a context in which opportunity structures for populist electoral success are more or less permissive, they do not highlight a precise mechanism that connects types of critical juncture to variation of populist support. After all, it is already well known that, due to their frequent status as political outsiders, anti-establishment actors are often associated with party system instability. But such a general statement does not offer any specificity with regard to the policy positions of such actors. As discussed in Chapter 2, anti-establishment actors can adopt economic ideologies that are either to the right or to the left of the economic median. Thus, in order to elaborate a more precise mechanism that explains the variation in likelihood of success specifically of populist actors – that is, anti-establishment actors with center-left economic positions – as a consequence of critical junctures, it is necessary to narrow the analytical focus to a factor that links the two in a way that is both theoretically plausible and empirically valid. As theorized in Chapter 4, the electoral performance of key center-left actors after critical junctures of market reform is such a key intervening factor. As the center-left has high potential to condition divergent paths of overall volatility (which the previous section

48 Roberts 2013: 1429
highlighted as symptomatic of the divergent institutional legacies of critical junctures), the center-left is theoretical central for the critical juncture argument. Overall, I have theorized that it is the center-left’s evolution that gives a more precise definition of the institutional legacy of critical junctures of market reform in Latin America and post-communist Europe. From a theoretical perspective outlined in the previous chapter, this legacy involves two crucial steps of production and reproduction that define the historical path dependency and culminate in divergent outcomes in terms of anti-establishment parties’ economic positioning and likelihood for electoral success. These steps have to do with (1) the center-left’s positioning on economic issues and (2) the center-left’s electoral performance. Together, these related factors either facilitate or limit opportunity structures for anti-establishment parties with center-left economic positions.

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to specify what is meant by “key center-left actors.” As noted in Chapter 4, key center-left actors are generally those political actors that have traditionally occupied the center-left ideological space of political systems and whose origins can be traced to the period before the end of critical junctures. In Latin America, such actors are often associated with what Levitsky calls “labor-based parties”49 that “played a leading role in the mobilization and political incorporation of the working classes.”50 Some of Latin America’s most prominent labor-based parties include Argentina’s Justicialist Party, Bolivia’s Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), Peru’s American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), and Venezuela’s Democratic Action (AD). All of these parties defined what Roberts has called “labor mobilizing party systems” in which a central cleavage between mass-based parties, attached to relatively powerful labor movements, and conservative opponents typically characterized politics throughout the 20th century. Not all

49 Levitsky 2003
50 Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 888
Latin American party systems throughout the 20th century were labor-mobilizing, however. In other countries – whose party systems Roberts categorizes as “elitist” – “conservative oligarchic parties incorporated popular sectors, thus maintaining their electoral dominance and containing the process of labor mobilization.”

While labor-mobilizing parties did not develop in elitist party systems, center-left opponents nevertheless materialized and articulated political opposition from the left to dominant conservative forces. Such parties include Costa Rica’s National Liberation Party (PNL), Ecuador’s Democratic Left (ID) and the populist Concentration of People’s Forces (CFP), Panama’s Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), and Uruguay’s Broad Front (FA). A list of all relevant center-left parties in Latin America is available in Appendix F.

For post-communist Europe, the key center-left parties are typically those that were formerly communist. The high degree of institutionalization that many of these parties inherited from the Communist period made them highly relevant players during the post-communist period as well. The two exceptions of relevant center-left parties that were not ex-communist are found in Estonia and Latvia, in both of which the formation of powerful pro-independence popular fronts seriously de-legitimated ruling communist elites and their parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As a result, the left-leaning Moderates eventually evolved into Estonia’s Social Democratic Party while in Latvia the center-left People’s Harmony eventually evolved into the Social Democratic Party Harmony. Both these parties, whose

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51 Roberts 2014: 65-88
52 To identify center-left parties in Latin America, I followed Roberts (2014: 89-11), particularly his illustrations in Table 5.3 (2014: 105-6). For some cases, such as Mexico’s, I consider the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) as the relevant center-left party (rather than the traditional populist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), because PRD broke away from PRI for ideological reasons in 1988, as explained by Roberts (2013: 1436). For the Colombian case, I do not consider the Liberal Party (PL) as a relevant center-left actor because the party joined the Socialist International only after having implemented neoliberal reforms during the critical juncture (see Roberts 2013). By contrast, for Paraguay, I count the Authentic Liberal Radical Party (PLRA) as a center-left party because it not only was the sole relevant opposition to the governing Colorado Party for much of the 20th century, but also (and very differently from the Colombian Liberal Party) was actually in opposition during the critical juncture period.
53 Grzymała-Busse 2002
origins lay before the end of the critical juncture, are the key actors on the center-left in these countries. Finally, I include two center-left parties for both the Czech Republic and Ukraine. In these two countries, reformed communists (later socialists) and unreformed communists were electorally successful throughout the post-communist period, thus jointly defining the center-left pillar of party systems. A list of all relevant center-left parties in post-communist Europe is available in Appendix F.

As I show next, in both Latin America and post-communist Europe center-left actors tended to continue down the ideological paths they had taken during the critical juncture, thus reinforcing a long-term pattern of programmatic alignment or de-alignment in the post-critical juncture period. Second, where the legacy was one of programmatic de-alignment, bait-and-switch reformers on the center-left tended to experience electoral decline in the post-critical juncture period. By contrast, in cases of overall programmatic alignment (or neutrality, as in some Latin American cases), center-left forces faithful to neoliberal skepticism tended to register relative electoral gains. Finally, I show that critical junctures did not have identically differential effects on center-right actors in the two regions. In both Latin America and post-communist Europe, while the center-right experienced electoral decline in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures, it did not experience an upsurge comparable to the electoral fortunes of center-left actors after programmatic alignment.

Path Dependencies of Center-Left Parties’ Economic Positions

As Chapter 4 theorized, because critical junctures give rise to path dependent processes, the political positions of center-left parties during critical junctures of market reform are expected to have long-term path-dependent effects in terms of these parties’ economic positions in the aftermath of critical junctures. Central to this path-dependent logic are the incentives for relative consistency in terms of economic positions, as explained in Chapter 4.
Measurement Strategy

To study the positions of relevant center-left actors in the two regions in the aftermath period, I rely on the same data sources that I used for the procedure to measure left-populist electoral performance in Chapter 3. As already noted in that chapter, expert surveys afford “various advantages” for “measuring empirical information on policy positions across a wide range of countries.” For Latin America, I once again use I use the Baker and Greene (B-G 2011) dataset, which updates the Wiesehomeier and Benoit (W-B 2009) expert survey conducted in 2006 and 2007. For post-communist Europe, I mostly rely on the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) with waves for 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. For the two post-communist countries for which CHES data are unavailable (Moldova and Ukraine before 2014), I use the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) with data collected in 2008 and 2009. These three surveys score political actors’ economic positions on a left-right scale, which measures degrees of economic state interventionism. To construct overall parties’ scores, I averaged the scores of relevant center-left parties for the electoral cycles in which these parties participated throughout the post-critical juncture period – from the end of the critical juncture in each country to 2015 for all countries. Thus, the score for each country is the average of the recorded positions – as measured by the expert surveys – of the country’s relevant center-left party (or parties) in elections after critical junctures. In addition to the average economic positions of relevant center-left parties, for each country I also provide three additional data points – the country median, the average distance from the country median, and the average distance from the regional median. The country median represents the median economic position obtained from all expert survey data points available for a given country while the regional median does the same with reference to all countries, thereby offering a

54 Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009: 1437
55 Kitschelt et al. 2009
56 For economic positions obtained from the DALP expert survey, I calculated an average score based on the three questions about social spending (d1), state role in the economy (d2), and public spending (d3).
measure of external validity. The last two columns report the average distances from the country and regional medians, respectively, which are obtained by subtracting the average economic position of center-left parties from the respective medians. Thus, negative signs in the last two columns indicate that center-left parties tend to be to the left of the respective medians. By contrast, positive signs in these columns indicate that center-left parties tend to be positioned to the right of the respective medians.

Finally, because the Latin American data upon which I rely (B-G 2011) use a 1-20 scale and the DALP survey uses a 1-5 scale for the relevant questions, I normalized scores on a 0-10 scale to make them comparable with results from the CHES surveys. The 0-10 scale is also more easily interpretable – with 0 indicating an extremely state-interventionist position (i.e., extreme economic left), 5 representing the economic center, and 10 indicating an extreme neoliberal position (i.e., extreme economic right).

**Latin America**

Table 5.3 below reports average economic positions of Latin American center-left parties in the aftermath of critical junctures of market reform. First, in the aftermath of aligning critical junctures, center-left parties’ average economic position was well to the left of the economic median, both at the country and regional level (-2.6 and -2.7, respectively). While some parties within this group – such as El Salvador’s FMLN, Mexico’s PRD, and Nicaragua’s FSLN – were more significantly leftist, others – such as Brazil’s PT, Chile’s PS, and Uruguay’s FA – defined what Castañeda refers to as the social-democratic variety of Latin America’s left turn.57 Second, in the aftermath of neutral critical junctures – in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay58 – center-left parties also tended to position themselves to...
the left of median, both at the country and regional level (-2.3 and -1.6, respectively). With an average position of 4.0, these parties exhibited a similar ideological tendency to center-left parties in the first group. Third, after de-aligning critical junctures, center-left parties tended to continue on a more neoliberal path – with an average economic position of 5.5. Within this last group, while Ecuador’s ID continued positioning itself to the left of the economic median, in the rest of the countries, traditional center-left parties were either more centrist or, in the case of Bolivia, moved explicitly to the right. The overall centrist tendency of center-left parties in this third group is indicated by the average economic distance of 0.7, or to the right of the average country median, and virtually at the regional median (-0.1).
Table 5.3. Average economic positions and distance from the country and regional medians for center-left parties in Latin America after critical junctures of market reform, 0-10 scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Average economic position</th>
<th>Country median</th>
<th>Average distance from country median</th>
<th>Average distance from regional median</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Concertación/PS</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 36)</td>
<td>(N = 226)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>M-19, Polo</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>URNG, UNE</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>PINU, PUD</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>PLRA, PEN</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 32)</td>
<td>(N = 173)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligning &amp; neutral CJs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined group average</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 68)</td>
<td>(N = 419)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>MNR, MIR</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>PLN</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 28)</td>
<td>(N = 286)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. N equals expert survey data points (party-year) used for the calculations. Thus, each data point is the mean of all expert scores for the party for a given survey year. Scores are calculated from Baker and Greene’s (2011) dataset, 2.0 version (2016), and results are normalized on a 0-10 scale. 0 represents the extreme economic left and 10 represents extreme neoliberalism.
2. Peru is excluded, because its critical juncture took place under populist president Fujimori and not under the leadership of the country’s surviving labor-based party, APRA. Nevertheless, a decade after the critical juncture was over, APRA also moved further to the economic center-right. Including Peru (with a median of 6.3) with APRA (with an average economic position of 5.5) changes the group average distance from the country median for the de-aligning group only marginally (from 0.7 to 0.5; i.e., still to the right of the median, on average) and does not affect the average distance from the regional median.
Overall, the findings reported in Table 5.3 lend initial support to the theory developed previously. The positions of center-left parties after neutral critical junctures tended to closely resemble those of center-left parties after aligning critical junctures, with parties in both groups tending to the left of the economic medium. Their combined group average of 3.6 is to the left of the average country median (-2.2) as well as to the left of the regional median (-2.0), respectively. By contrast, after de-aligning critical junctures, center-left parties tended to adopt more centrist positions throughout the period after critical junctures. In sum, the political positions in which Latin American center-left parties found themselves during the critical juncture – either as pro-market reform incumbents or as neoliberal skeptics – tended to reproduce themselves in these parties’ economic positions throughout the aftermath period.

Post-communist Europe

In post-communist Europe, the overall ideological situation of the center-left was not much different after critical junctures, as Table 5.4 below reports. First, as explained above, re-aligning critical junctures are theoretically similar to aligning ones because of the ultimate programmatic alignments that both produced prior to the end of critical junctures. Thus, center-left parties in both sets of countries exhibited an average position that were significantly to the left of the average country medians for the two groups (both at -2.0) as well as to the left of the regional median (-1.6 and -2.0 respectively), as the table shows. Overall, the combined group average distance for center-left parties after aligning and re-aligning critical junctures was significantly to the left of the average country median as well as to the left of the regional median (-2.0 and -1.8).

By contrast, the average economic position of center-left parties in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures tended to follow more centrist tendencies – at the average country median. Even if such parties were to the left of the reginal median (-0.6), their economic positions were considerably more centrist than the positions of center-left parties in the
aftermath of overall programmatic alignment. Indeed, given their long-term economic positions, some “reformist” ex-communist parties in the second group can hardly be considered as belonging to the economic center-left at the country level. For example, Hungary’s and Poland’s ex-communists register, on average, the most centrist positions which are, in fact, to the right of these countries’ median economic position. Thus, in post-communist Europe, too, center-left parties’ economic positions after critical junctures tended to reflect their political positions from the period of the critical junctures.
Table 5.4. Average economic positions and distance from the country and regional medians for center-left parties in post-communist Europe after critical junctures of market reform, 0-10 scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Average economic position</th>
<th>Average distance from country median</th>
<th>Average distance from regional median (4.80)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aligning Critical Junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>SPH</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>ČSSD, KSČM</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>SDPS</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-1.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 17)</td>
<td>(N = 104)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Re-aligning Critical Junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>SDSM</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>PCRM</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 11)</td>
<td>(N = 82)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aligning &amp; re-aligning Critical Junctures combined group average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SDL</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>5.9*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LDP/LSP</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-0.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 16)</td>
<td>(N = 169)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. N equals expert survey data points (party-year) used for the calculations. Thus, each data point is the mean of all expert scores for the party for a given survey year. Most of the aggregates are calculated with data from the Chapel Hill Experts Surveys (CHES 2002-2014; see Polk et al. 2017). The regional median (4.80) is calculated from the 361 available data points from these surveys. Data for Moldova are obtained from the DALP expert survey (see Kitschelt et al. 2009). 0 represents the extreme economic left and 10 represents extreme neoliberalism.
2. Ukraine’s Communist Party and Socialist Party are excluded because the critical juncture occurred under populist president Kuchma, and these parties were not as instrumental for the actual implementation of neoliberal reforms under Kuchma as the rest of the center-left parties under de-aligning critical junctures. Including the DALP expert survey results\(^59\) for Ukraine (with a median of 3.0) with these two parties (with an average economic position of 1.4) changes the average distance for the de-aligning group to -0.7.
3. No data are available for Slovakia’s SDL, which is the reason why this country’s median score (5.9) is not counted towards the calculation. Including Slovakia’s median in the calculation – despite the lack of data on the economic positioning of the SDL – results in an average distance of -0.4 from the average country mean for the de-aligning group. While such a result would be to the left of the average country median after de-aligning critical junctures, even such a result is notably to the right when compared to the center-left’s average distance from the median after aligning and re-aligning critical junctures.

\(^59\) For Ukraine, including results from the DALP expert survey, rather than from the CHES expert surveys, is more appropriate. Neither the CHES nor DALP surveys include time-series data for Ukraine. The Chapel Hill expert survey collected its first data for Ukraine in 2014 – after the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution and, thus, outside of the scope of interest here. By contrast, the DALP expert survey data were collected in 2008/9 – about half way between the end of critical junctures and 2015 (the end of the post-critical juncture period.)
To sum up the above findings for both regions, critical junctures gave rise to “self-reproducing” sequences, thereby leaving powerful legacies in terms of center-left parties’ economic positions in the long run. In both Latin America and post-communist Europe, *center-left parties after de-aligning critical junctures continued to position themselves well to the right relative to center-left parties after alternative critical junctures*. Such path dependent positioning is reflected both in parties’ average economic positions and in their average distance from the economic median.

Finally, in both regions, the average medians after de-aligning critical junctures tend to be to the left of medians after aligning (or neutral) critical junctures. The reason for this is that in all cases of programmatic de-alignment, anti-establishment actors eventually rose during the analyzed post-critical juncture period by voicing economically populist positions in opposition to the economic reforms. It is the center-left positions of such populist actors – which rose as a reaction to programmatic de-alignment – that tended to “move” country medians after de-aligning critical junctures to the left. Before turning to the rise of such populist actors in the following chapter, I examine the electoral performance of center-left actors and center-right actors in the aftermath of critical junctures from a comparative perspective. I do so because I have theorized that it is particularly center-left electoral performance that is a critical intervening variable between types of critical juncture and the outcome of interest.

**The Rise and Fall of the Center-Left in the Aftermath of Critical Junctures**

Whether center-left parties had engaged in bait-and-switch tactics during critical junctures had long-term implications not only in terms of their economic positions but also in terms of their electoral performance. Where center-left actors diluted their brands, as Lupu shows for the cases of Argentina and Venezuela, party breakdown becomes possible, especially
if parties actually performed poorly while in office.\textsuperscript{60} By highlighting \textit{bad performance}, Lupu explains the “sudden breakdowns” of cases such as Bolivia’s MNR and MIR, Peru’s APRA, and Venezuela’s AD.\textsuperscript{61} Yet, there are two reasons why a focus on bad performance is less helpful for understanding the decline of the center-left in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

First, as Lupu notes, evaluating performance can be tricky as factors other than “objective economic conditions”\textsuperscript{62} can affect the public’s opinion of an incumbent’s performance. For example, Pop-Eleches points to several such factors that can contribute to what he calls a “remarkable incumbency disadvantage” even for “the most capable governments.” Such alternative factors can include (1) welfare cuts and rising inequality, which are driven by (2) Western conditionality (from the World Bank and the IMF) as well as (3) high levels of perceived corruption.\textsuperscript{63} Overall, as such factors may be less amenable to an “objective” evaluation of economic condition and more dependent on \textit{subjective perceptions}, it is difficult to decide what “bad performance” means, especially from the perspective of voting publics.

Second, even if \textit{bad performance} is a necessary and, along with party brand dilution, jointly sufficient condition “to cause established parties” – both on the center-left and center-right – “to break down,”\textsuperscript{64} it does not necessarily explain \textit{center-left decline}. As Lupu shows, \textit{high brand dilution} can lead to “partisan erosion” even in the absence of bad performance – as was the case with Venezuela’s AD in 1993 and Argentina’s PJ in 1995, when neither of these

\textsuperscript{60} Lupu 2016
\textsuperscript{61} Lupu 2014: 573, 596
\textsuperscript{62} Lupu evaluates performance by constructing a “misery index” which incorporates GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment (Ibid.: 574).
\textsuperscript{63} Pop-Eleches 2010: 235-6. Pop-Eleches also suggests that another factor may be organizational weakness leading to leadership defection and party splits. However, I do not include this factor above because organizational weakness may be a consequence, not necessarily a cause, of incumbency decline. Additionally, Pop-Eleches excepts ex-communists and highlights newer center parties that are more likely to suffer organizational weakness.
\textsuperscript{64} Lupu 2014: 564
two parties collapsed at the time. Rather than collapse, historically important center-left parties in Latin America – such as Costa Rica’s PLN or, especially, Ecuador’s ID – experienced decline that is more prolonged and no less consequential in terms of subsequent populist mobilization.

Similarly, in post-communist Europe, while there are center-left parties that experienced instant collapse – most prominently, Slovakia’s SDL – most cases of center-left weakening have been more gradual. For example, both Lithuania’s and Poland’s ex-communists experienced gradual weakening despite objectively good economic performance while in office. The Polish case is especially striking because the ex-communist SLD presided over the economic recovery in the 1990s and during the country’s integration into the European Union in the early 2000s, both of which signal rather good performance in Lupu’s terms. Overall, then, bad performance does not explain patterns of center-left electoral decline across Latin America and post-communist Europe. Instead, such similar patterns are best understood as consequences of critical junctures of market reform in both regions.

**Latin America**

Table 5.5 below compares the electoral performance in presidential elections of center-left actors before and after the end of critical junctures in Latin America. Intuitively, center-left actors had been most dominant before the end of de-aligning critical junctures, winning an average of 40.7% of the vote in presidential elections. By comparison, center-left actors had gained an average of 31.1% in presidential elections before the end of aligning critical junctures and only 15.5% before the end of neutral critical junctures, signaling the relatively weaker performance of the center-left in such contexts. Next, as predicted by the theoretical framework

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65 Ibid.: 575
66 Having been the largest party in the pro-reform coalition between 1998 and 2002, Slovakia’s SDL effectively disappeared immediately thereafter, gaining just 1.4% of the vote in the 2002 parliamentary election. Because of its effective disappearance, expert survey data on the economic positions of this party are not available.
in Chapter 4, the end of critical junctures resulted in center-left upsurge after both aligning and neutral critical junctures – 9.6% and 7.4%, respectively, for a combined average improvement of 8.7% after the end of aligning and neutral critical junctures when compared to levels before the end of critical junctures. By contrast, in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures, center-left actors lost, on average, 10.0% relative to their electoral support before the end of critical junctures in Latin America.67

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67 Note that this result does not include in the calculation the 1998 and 2000 presidential elections in Venezuela during which Acción Democrática (AD) did not support its own candidate, nor does it include the 2011 presidential elections in Peru during which APRA did not field a candidate. Including these elections would have resulted in even larger average loss of electoral support for center-left actors after de-aligning critical junctures. For an alternative measurement, see Appendix G (Table A.5).
Table 5.5. Center-left performance in Latin America before and after the end of critical junctures of market reform (% votes cast in presidential elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Average performance before end of CJs</th>
<th>Average performance after end of CJs</th>
<th>Change in performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aligning critical junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Concertación/PS</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 10)</td>
<td>(N = 31)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Neutral critical junctures</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>M-19, Polo</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>PINU, PUD</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>PLRA, PEN</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>41.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aligning and neutral CJs combined groups average</strong></td>
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<td>24.9</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 15)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>De-aligning critical junctures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>PJ</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>MNR, MIR</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>PLN</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>ID</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>APRA</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>-27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
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<td>40.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 17)</td>
<td>(N = 31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. N equals the number of elections in which parties competed during each period – before the end of critical junctures and after critical junctures. (As explained in Chapter 4, critical junctures ended at somewhat different times in the different countries.)
2. El Salvador (de-aligning CJ) and Guatemala (neutral CJ) are excluded due to conditions of civil war before the end of these countries’ critical junctures. For an alternative calculation, which includes these countries, see Appendix G (Table A.5).
3. For Argentina, PJ's performance after the critical juncture includes support for Menem and Kirchner (in 2003) and for Kirchnerismo thereafter.
4. For Peru, included in the calculation for the post-CJ average are only results from the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections because APRA did not run a candidate in the 2011 presidential election. Excluding Peru completely (as in the above table for ideological positions) yields nearly identical group average change in performance for the de-aligning group (-11.1).
5. For Venezuela, AD's result only from the 1993 presidential election is included for the calculation of the post-critical juncture average, because the party did not support its own candidates in 1998 and 2000. As an alternative, the 1998 and 2000 legislative election results (24.1% and 16.1%, respectively) can be included in lieu of presidential election results, thus yielding very similar results both for Venezuela and for the overall de-aligning group average change in performance (-10.8).
Of the de-aligning group, Argentina’s PJ is the only party that saw electoral gains after the critical juncture. However, PJ’s average performance after the end of the critical juncture does not account for the important internal party fragmentation beginning with the 2003 election, when Carlos Menem and Nestor Kirchner spilt most of the Peronist vote.\(^{68}\) Indeed, as one of Latin America’s most highly institutionalized and programmatically flexible parties,\(^{69}\) Argentina’s PJ single-handedly led the market reform process in the 1990s, after which it “channeled much of the social and political backlash against it in the 2000s, making it the only major bait-and-switch reformer in the region not to get outflanked on the left by new partisan or populist contenders.”\(^{70}\) As the Menemist wing of the party declined, a new populist wing – Front for Victory (FpV), led by Nestor Kirchner and his wife, Cristina Fernández – first emerged from within the party and then came to dominate it in the aftermath of Argentina’s de-aligning critical juncture. Overall, even after including the somewhat unique Argentinian case, the difference between aligning and neutral critical junctures, on the one hand, and de-aligning critical juncture, on the one hand, is striking. Where center-left actors typically maintained economic positions to the left of the median, they tended to gain votes after the end of critical junctures; where such actors tended to veer towards the center or to the right of the medium – usually in the aftermath of bait-and-switch reforms – these actors tended to be punished at the ballot box in the aftermath of critical junctures of market reform.

**Post-communist Europe**

In post-communist Europe, too, similarly divergent patterns are observable in terms of the electoral performance of center-left parties after critical junctures of market reform. Table 5.6 below documents the change of electoral performance in legislative elections before and after the end of post-communist critical junctures. First, before the end of critical junctures, ex-

\(^{68}\) A third Peronist candidate, Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, captured 14.1% of the vote in the 2003 presidential election, 
\(^{69}\) Burgess and Levitsky 2003 
\(^{70}\) Roberts 2014: 229-70
communist parties tended to perform best by gaining, on average, 27.9% of the vote before the end of re-aligning critical junctures. These center-left parties’ impressive performance early in the transition process was due to a variety of factors, including the comparatively poor economic conditions of these countries as well as the competitive authoritarian style of rule associated with ex-communist governments throughout periods of the 1990s. Nevertheless, as explained above, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, and Romania eventually experienced re-aligning critical junctures as center-right contenders implemented these countries’ most significant market reforms. Second, center-left parties achieved somewhat similar results before the end of aligning and de-aligning critical junctures – with averages of 18.9% and 21.3%, respectively. While these electoral results are somewhat comparable, the political roles that center-left parties performed tended to be very different before the end of aligning and de-aligning critical junctures – opponents in the first case, incumbents in the second.

71 Levitsky and Way 2010
72 As discussed above, despite the ambiguity of Estonia’s case, the critical juncture is best classified as aligning due to the fact that at the time the Moderates (future Social Democratic Party) did not engage in bait-and-switch tactics and only defined themselves as social democrats a full decade after the critical juncture.
73 With the exception of Ukraine’s Communist Party and Socialist Party. These parties were not instrumental for the implementation of market reforms during the critical juncture under populist president Leonid Kuchma. However, Kuchma used these parties’ support to win the second round of the 1994 election, soon after which the critical juncture began.
Table 5.6. Center-left performance in post-communist Europe before and after the end of critical junctures of market reform (% votes cast in parliamentary elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Average performance before end of CJs</th>
<th>Average performance after end of CJs</th>
<th>Change in performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aligning critical junctures</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>SPH</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>ČSSD, KSČM</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>11.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>SDPS</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>18.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 10)</td>
<td>(N = 29)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-aligning critical junctures</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>SDSM</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>PCRM</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>27.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 10)</td>
<td>(N = 19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligning and re-aligning CJs combined groups average</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>22.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.6</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(N = 20)</td>
<td>(N = 48)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>De-aligning critical junctures</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>LDDP/LSP</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>-27.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SDL´</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>KPU, SPU</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>21.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>16.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>-4.9</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(N = 11)</td>
<td>(N = 31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. N equals the number of elections in which parties competed during each period – before critical junctures and after critical junctures. (As explained in Chapter 4, critical junctures ended at somewhat different times in the different countries.)
2. Ukraine's Communist Party and Socialist Parties are included, even though they were not instrumental for the implementation of neoliberal reforms under populist president Kuchma. Excluding Ukraine (as in the above table for ideological positions) strengthens the results even further, resulting in a group average change in performance of -6.2 after de-aligning critical junctures.

Such comparable results are hardly reproduced after critical junctures, however. As Table 5.6 shows, after both aligning and re-aligning critical junctures, center-left parties tended to gain – an average of 9.5% and 5.2%, respectively – when compared to the prior period. The
combined average improvement of 7.6% for such parties contrasts with cases in which center-left parties’ behavior had produced a pattern of programmatic de-alignment during the critical juncture, leading to an average post-critical juncture decline of 4.9% when compared to previous period.

Of course, such electoral trends were uneven as they interacted with unique institutional endowments across post-communist Europe. Thus, the improved electoral performance of Hungary’s socialists must be interpreted with a view towards this country’s highly disproportionate electoral system which, uniquely for the region, “awards the largest parties additional seats instead of compensating smaller parties.” Additionally, Slovenia, the only post-communist country to avoid IMF involvement, emerged from the critical juncture with a neocorporatist, rather than neoliberal, welfare state. Unique for the post-communist region, such a cooperative institutional arrangement somewhat ameliorated some of the long-term consequences of programmatic de-alignment, such as the degree of ex-communist decline. Despite such institutional idiosyncrasies, however, the average electoral showings of major center-left parties clearly diverged in the aftermath of aligning and de-aligning critical junctures. This divergent trend is all the more obvious when considering the similar electoral performance of de-aligning cases (21.3%), on the one hand, and aligning/re-aligning cases (22.8%), on the other, before the end of post-communist critical junctures. Given this comparable baseline before the end of critical junctures, mean electoral support for the center-left was nearly twice lower (16.4%) after de-aligning critical junctures than it was after aligning and re-aligning critical junctures (30.5%). In sum, as major center-left parties adopted varying long-term economic positions – either as neoliberal reformers or skeptics – their electoral fortunes tended to diverge in the post-critical juncture period.

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74 See Benoit (2005) for Hungary’s institutional distinctiveness.
75 Roaf et al. 2014
76 Bohle and Greskowits 2012
Finally, Tables 5.5 and 5.6 above compare center-left performance before and after the end of critical junctures, which themselves are key moments of market liberalization that occurred at somewhat different moments in different countries. While in Latin America “the region-wide momentum for reform clearly crested in the late 1990s,”77 in post-communist Europe most-countries had also implemented their most decisive reforms before the 2000s.78 Therefore, as an alternative measure of comparison, it is reasonable to also evaluate center-left performance during the 2000s relative to performance before the 2000s.

The results of such comparisons are presented in Appendix G (Table A.5 for Latin America and Table A.6 for post-communist Europe). Because of the different time horizons used for the calculations, these results are slightly different from the results presented above. Nevertheless, they provide additional confirmation of the divergent trends presented above. In Latin America, depending on the type of critical junctures, center-left parties performed very differently during the 2000s relative to the prior period. On average, they tended to gain the most after aligning critical junctures (9.7%), tended to gain less after neutral critical junctures (2.0%), and tended to lose after de-aligning critical junctures (-11.6%). And in post-communist Europe, center-left parties exhibited similar patterns in terms of their performance during the 2000s in comparison to the 1990s. On average, they tended to gain the most after aligning critical junctures (9.8%), less after re-aligning critical junctures (5.2%), and tended to lose after de-aligning critical junctures (-4.9%).

Overall, these results offer strong support for the theory that critical junctures of market reform had very different implications for subsequent center-left performance in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Programmatic alignment – associated with aligning critical junctures in both regions, neutral critical junctures in Latin America, and re-aligning critical junctures in post-communist Europe.

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77 Roberts 2013: 1438
78 With the partial exception of Macedonia, Moldova, and Slovakia, in all of which the critical juncture ended by 2002 (see the first section of the present chapter).
junctures in post-communist Europe – tended to strengthen center-left performance in the aftermath of critical junctures. By contrast, programmatic de-alignment – associated with bait-and-switch economic policy behavior during critical junctures – tended to weaken center-left performance in the aftermath of the critical juncture.

Most importantly, as documented above, such divergent paths are strongly associated with the divergent economic positions that key center-left actors tended to reproduce as a consequence of their political positions during critical junctures of market reform. In sum, as critical junctures ended in Latin America and post-communist Europe, incentives for relative consistency in economic positions translated the political positions in which key center-left actors found themselves during the critical juncture into path dependent divergences in terms of subsequent electoral outcomes.

5.5. Critical Junctures and the Center-Right in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

If critical junctures mattered for subsequent center-left performance, what were their implications for the performance of center-right actors in Latin America and post-communist Europe? According to the theory advanced in Chapter 4, center-left performance is an intervening variable that links types of critical junctures, on the one hand, and the likelihood of success specifically of populist actors, on the other. However, as shown both by Roberts for Latin America79 and in the first part of this chapter for post-communist Europe, critical junctures produced different legacies in terms of entire party systems, of which both center-left and center-right actors are certainly important parts. In other words, if critical junctures produce variable effects on the subsequent electoral fortunes of traditional center-left actors, they may also have variable effects on the electoral performance of political actors traditionally associated with the center-right pillar of party systems. Yet to argue that center-left

79 Roberts 2013; 2014
performance is the crucial intervening variable between types of critical juncture and populist performance also requires demonstrating that center-right performance does not play an identical role. This, in turn, requires showing that (1) critical junctures do not affect the performance of center-right actors in the same ways that they affect center-left performance and (2) that center-left electoral performance is a stronger and more reliable predictor of populist performance than center-right electoral performance. While I engage with the second question in the next chapter, here I engage with the first question.

To assess the effects of critical junctures on the center-right side of party systems, next I analyze center-right performance in both regions in a manner identical to the one adopted above for the analysis of center-left performance. First, I identify all relevant center-right parties for Latin American and post-communist Europe. For Latin America, I identify all “traditional” center-right parties by using the recent work of Lupu and Roberts. 80 In general, these are parties which, during the ISI era had an elitist core and “generally advocated a continuation of traditional export-oriented liberalism” 81 and which, during the current era prefer deregulation, privatization, and globalization. 82 To be maximally inclusive, I include as “key traditional” parties those parties whose origins can be traced before 1990 and which achieved at least 10% electoral support in at least one presidential election. Therefore, to the list of center-right parties, such as Argentina’s UCR, Venezuela’s COPEI, El Salvador’s ARENA, and Honduras’ PNH and PLH, I also add parties associated with Uribismo in Colombia and Fujimorismo in Peru, both of which are conservative pillars of their respective countries’ party systems and can be traced to the period before the end of critical junctures. The complete list with all relevant center-right parties in the eighteen Latin American countries under analysis is available in Appendix H.

80 See especially Lupu (2014: 573-4), particularly Table 1, as well as Roberts (2014: 89-134), specifically Tables 5.3 and 6.1.
81 Roberts 2013: 1448n5
82 Wiesehomeier 2010: 23
For post-communist Europe, I identify key center-right parties by mostly relying on the work of Hanley, Czcerbiak, and Vachudova. While Eastern Europe’s recent totalitarian history means that in this region center-right parties have shorter histories than their Latin American counterparts, it is nevertheless possible to identify those center-right parties that performed the role of the “traditional” center-right after the fall of communism. In general, center-right parties in post-communist Europe seek “broad electoral support for programs fusing elements of liberalism (including neoliberalism) and varieties of conservatism” and “balance the demands of post-communist social transformation, modernization and Europeanization with older historical identities and ideologies.”

To identify such “traditional” center-right parties in a maximally inclusive way, I focus on parties whose origins can be traced to the period before the end of critical junctures. Thus, to the list of parties such as Albania’s PDSH, Macedonia’s VMRO-DPMNE, Romania’s PNL, Slovakia’s SDKU-DS, and Slovenia’s LDS and SLS, I also include the Estonian Reform Party (ER), with origins in the Fatherland Bloc of 1992, and Poland’s Civic Platform (PO), with origins in the center-right Freedom Union and Solidarity Electoral Action from the 1990s. As for Latin America, I include center-right parties that gained at least 10% of the national vote in at least one legislative election. Finally, since I am interested in center-right parties that can be considered “traditional,” I exclude from consideration parties identified by Pop-Eleches as “unorthodox,” many of which are, indeed, populist. A complete list including all relevant center-right parties in the fifteen post-communist European countries under analysis is available in Appendix H.

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83 Hanley 2004; Hanley and Szcerbiak 2006; Vachudova 2008a
84 Hanley 2004: 22-3
85 Pop-Eleches 2010. The only exception is HDZ in Croatia, which is the “traditional” center-right party of this country. Additionally, for Hungary, I code as center-right the liberal (and very economically “orthodox”) SZDSZ, not Fidesz (which is classified as “populist” throughout the present work, as discussed in Chapter 2).
Latin America

Table 5.7 below documents center-right performance Latin American presidential elections before and after the end of critical junctures of market reform. As the table shows, performed better before the end of aligning and neutral critical junctures (with an average showing of 53.3%) than before the end of de-aligning critical junctures (36.5%). This is logical, of course, as both aligning and neutral critical junctures are characterized by center-right incumbency during critical junctures, which is more likely after superior electoral results.
### Table 5.7. Center-right performance in Latin America before and after the end of critical junctures of market reform (% votes cast in presidential elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Average performance before end of CJs</th>
<th>Average performance after end of CJs</th>
<th>Change in performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aligning critical junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>RN, UDI</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>PR/PRSC, PLD</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>ARENA, PCN, PDC</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>-35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PLC, AL, PLI</td>
<td>54.7</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>PN, PC</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>51.1</td>
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<td>(N = 35)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Neutral critical junctures</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>PCC/PSC, Uribismo, PSUN</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
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<td>38.7</td>
<td>32.9</td>
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<td>89.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>combined groups average</td>
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<td>53.3</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 22)</td>
<td>(N = 59)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De-aligning critical junctures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>ADN</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>-13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>PUSC</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>PSC, PD/UDC</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>PP, PDC/PP, MOLIRENA, CD</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>AP, PPC, Fujimorismo, PP</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>COPEI</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>-17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 17)</td>
<td>(N = 31)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. N equals the number of elections in which parties competed during each period – before and after the end of critical junctures. (As noted in Chapter 4, critical junctures ended at somewhat different times across the region.)

2. For Argentina, I include results for the Union of the Democratic Center (UCEDE), Action for the Republic (ApR), Recreate for Growth (RECREAR), Federal Peronism, and Let’s Change (Cambiemos).
Turning to the post-critical juncture period, center-right parties lost, on average, 6.1%, in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures when compared to the previous period – a negative pattern somewhat similar to the one experienced by center-left parties after de-aligning critical junctures, as shown in the previous Table 5.5 for Latin America. Indeed, these patterns corroborate Roberts’ argument that as entire party systems collapsed after de-aligning critical junctures in Latin America, both the center-left and center-right lost out.86 Interestingly, however, center-right actors also tended to lose in the aftermath of aligning and neutral critical junctures – by an average of 3.3% and 7.1%, respectively – for an average drop of 4.7% for the two groups combined when compared to the previous period. Therefore, if a divergent pattern is clearly visible in terms of center-left electoral performance after critical junctures, the same cannot be asserted in terms of center-right electoral performance. In sum, center-right actors tended to experience relative decline not only in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures but also in the aftermath of aligning and neutral critical junctures in Latin America.

Post-communist Europe

Next, Table 5.8 documents parliamentary electoral performance of post-communist European center-right parties before and after the end of critical junctures. As in Latin America, baseline center-right performance was logically strongest (36.8% on average) before the end of aligning critical junctures. While center-right performance is somewhat weaker before the end of critical junctures in the second group of countries (an average of 22.7% for Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, and Romania) – due to ex-communist dominance throughout most of the 1990s – the center-right would eventually implement the most crucial market reforms, thereby re-aligning critical junctures. Finally, before the end of de-aligning critical junctures, baseline center-left performance was at 27.6%, reflecting that these parties were electorally

86 Roberts 2014: 89-110
very competitive. Indeed, as post-communist publics transitioned out of totalitarian regimes, many center-right parties, typically associated with anti-communism, benefitted electorally across the region. As explained in the first section of this chapter, while all of these countries experienced programmatic de-alignment, in some cases – such as in Slovakia and Slovenia – de-alignment occurred in the context of coalition governments led by the center-right and crucially supported by the center-left. Thus, center-right parties tended to perform relatively well even before the end of de-aligning critical junctures.
Table 5.8. Center-right performance in post-communist Europe before and after the end of critical junctures of market reform (% votes cast in parliamentary elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Average performance before end of CJs</th>
<th>Average performance after end of CJs</th>
<th>Change in performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>PDSH</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>ODS, KDU-ČSL</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Fatherland/ER</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LC/LPP</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group average</strong></td>
<td><strong>36.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>-8.9</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 10)</td>
<td>(N = 28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>SDS/ODS, DSB, SK, RB</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>-26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>VMRO-DPMNE</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>PPCD, RP/LP</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>CDR, PNL, ADA, PDL</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group average</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>-3.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 10)</td>
<td>(N = 19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligning and re-aligning CJs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined groups average</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>30.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>-6.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 20)</td>
<td>(N = 47)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>TS-LKD, LKDP</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>-13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>UD/UW, AWS, PO</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SDKU-DS, KDH, SMK-MKP</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>LDS, SLS, SKD, SDS</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Rukh/Our Ukraine</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group average</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-2.6</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 11)</td>
<td>(N = 30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N equals the number of elections in which parties competed during each period – before and after the end of critical junctures. (As noted in Chapter 4, critical junctures ended at somewhat different times across the region.)

Next, and as in Latin America, the period after the end of critical junctures was associated with electoral decline of center-right actors across the board, as the right side of Table 4.8 shows. Indeed, the center-right tended to lose the most, on average (8.9%), relative to the previous period in contexts after aligning critical junctures, where it had initiated market liberalization, and it lost the least, on average (2.6%), after de-aligning critical junctures. While the effects of critical junctures on center-right electoral performance may not be as large in
post-communist Europe as they are in Latin America, the central point is that as key market liberalization efforts concluded in both regions, center-right actors did not experience similarly divergent electoral patterns as center-left actors did. Unlike center-left actors, whose electoral fortunes exhibited clear divergence depending on types of critical juncture, center-right actors in both regions tended to experience electoral decline regardless of critical juncture varieties. While the general declines experienced by the center-right were more dramatic in some cases than in others, critical junctures did not tend to produce electoral upsurge for center-right actors after critical junctures in either region. These results are confirmed when considering a different periodization (before and after 2000) in order to compare center-right electoral performance, as reported in Appendix I.\(^7\)

As a conclusion to the above analysis, in the aftermath of critical juncture in Latin America and post-communist Europe, the center-left and the center-right experienced different patterns in terms of their performance relative to types of critical junctures. Overall, while center-right parties tended to experience relative decline after all types of critical junctures, center-left parties tended to experience decline after de-aligning critical junctures, but not after other types of critical junctures. Even when critical junctures affected both center-left and center-right pillars of political systems, they tended to condition particularly center-left performance in ways that were both more predictable and covariate with levels of overall party system instability. Therefore, the story of how critical junctures affect the stability of party systems in Latin America and post-communist Europe is mostly a story about the center-left.

\(^7\) See Appendix I for an alternative comparative periodization for assessing center-right performance in Latin America (Table A.7) and post-communist Europe (Table A.8). Applying the same logic as in the analysis of center-left actors, it is possible to evaluate center-right performance by comparing the period of the 2000s to the period before 2000. The results for Latin America reveal even greater losses for center-right parties after the three types of critical junctures. Because in most Latin American countries the critical juncture had ended well before the year 2000, the path-dependent effects of critical junctures seem to have yielded *increasing (negative) returns* for center-right actors over time. The results for post-communist Europe are nearly identical to the ones presented above – because of the relatively later end of critical junctures (closer to the year 2000) and, thus, because of the nearly identical observations used for the two types of calculation.
5.6. Conclusion

Varieties of critical junctures of market reform produced similarly divergent legacies in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Where the key moment of market reform created patterns of programmatic alignment, entire party systems became comparatively more stable than in contexts where critical junctures produced programmatic de-alignment. More specifically, in both Latin America and post-communist Europe, variation of party system stability was associated with the crucially important and mutually related legacies of the critical juncture – patterns of center-left party positioning on economic issues and patterns of center-left electoral performance. Overall, critical junctures of overall programmatic alignment tended to produce a path dependent logic whereby center-left parties both continued to be associated with center-left economic positions and registered comparatively superior electoral performances. By contrast, after de-aligning critical junctures, center-left parties tended to position themselves closer to the economic center and to lose electoral support in the process. Since critical junctures did not tend to produce an identical divergence in terms of center-right parties’ electoral performances, the divergent legacy of critical junctures of market reform is more clearly associated with the center-left.

This chapter has provided four important contributions in terms of the comparative study of politics in Latin America and post-communist Europe. First, it has offered a typology of critical junctures of market reform in post-communist Europe. Inspired by the work of Kenneth Roberts, who offered the original typology for Latin America, my typology distinguishes between de-aligning, aligning, and re-aligning critical junctures in post-communist Europe based on data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This first step of the analysis is an important cornerstone for the comparative analysis of critical junctures of market reforms in the two regions under analysis.
Second, I have analyzed the development of post-communist party system stability by focusing on patterns of electoral volatility. While previous work on party system instability in post-communist Europe exists, such work has not linked critical moments of economic reform to subsequent patterns of party system volatility. My findings demonstrate that, similarly to the patterns observed by Roberts for Latin America, programmatic alignment in post-communist Europe was associated with subsequent relative stability of party systems while programmatic de-alignment was associated with relatively higher degrees of electoral volatility. Overall, these two analytical steps suggest comparable legacies of critical junctures with a potentially comparable logic regardless of regional specificities.

Third, to begin uncovering mechanisms behind similar patterns of variation in electoral support for populists, as identified in Chapter 3, I have focused specifically on center-left actors in both regions. My analysis is the first explicit comparison of “traditional” center-left parties’ economic positions and electoral performance in the aftermath of critical junctures in both regions. The analytical focus on key center-left parties whose origins lay in the period before the end of critical junctures is dictated by the logic of the theory advanced in Chapter 4, which expects that critical junctures produce subsequently divergent patterns in terms of both center-left economic positions and electoral performance. As my analysis based on expert surveys demonstrates for both regions, the economic positions of key center-left parties tended to be located further to the left in the aftermath of aligning critical junctures, while in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures the center-left was more clearly associated with positions closer to the median. As theorized previously, the economic positioning of center-left parties after the critical juncture tended to follow the logic of the moment during the critical juncture. Where such parties had been associated with market reform opposition during the critical juncture, they tended to continue in a more explicit center-left direction; where they had been associated with market reform implementation during the critical juncture, they tended to
exhibit a tendency towards more centrist positions. As a result of such divergences, their electoral fortunes in the aftermath of the critical juncture also tended to diverge, thereby confirming the theory that programmatic alignment and de-alignment have very different path dependent implications in terms of subsequent electoral performances.

Fourth, I have also analyzed the electoral performance of a large number of center-right parties in Latin America and post-communist Europe. I have taken this step to better assess the mechanism which specifically focuses on the center-left, as proposed in the previous chapter. Indeed, I have found that critical junctures were not associated with identically divergent patterns in terms of center-right electoral performance as they were in terms of center-left electoral performance. For this reason, center-left electoral performance in the aftermath of critical junctures is a more feasible mechanism linking the type of critical juncture to the likelihood of electoral support for populists after key neoliberal reforms.

Overall, the analysis in this chapter is the first to examine from a comparative perspective the legacies of critical junctures of market reform in post-communist Europe and Latin America. In my analysis, I have gone a step beyond the existing literature – in two directions. First, I have shown that critical junctures of market reform produced comparable legacies in two very different world regions. Second, I have specified a particular mechanism of reproduction that originates in critical junctures and culminates with variable patterns of populist electoral performance. Having demonstrated the relationship between critical junctures and subsequent center-left performance in both regions, in the following chapter I use quantitative methods to systematically assess the second part of the mechanism – the relationship between center-left electoral performance and the populist vote in the aftermath of critical junctures of market reform.
6. ASSESSING THEORIES OF POPULISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

6.1. Introduction

While critical junctures of market reform condition the subsequent performance of the center-left in Latin America and post-communist Europe along similar path dependent patterns, does center-left electoral performance predict variation in the electoral support for populists in identical ways despite the many contextual differences between the two regions? Such an assessment of center-left electoral performance as a key intervening variable is necessary for establishing the validity of the proposed mechanism of the critical juncture explanation. After all, if center-left performance is not a reliable predictor of variation of populist electoral support across both regions, the argument advanced in Chapter 4 remains unconvincing and its predictive power limited.

As I show in this chapter, although Latin America and post-communist Europe represent two very different systems, the electoral fortunes of populists are conditional on similar forces that extend back to the moment of critical junctures of market reform in both regions. As I have theorized, critical junctures condition variable patterns of subsequent electoral performance particularly of center-left political forces, which, in turn, either facilitate or limit the electoral fortunes of populists. Having analyzed the relationship between critical junctures and the subsequent structural persistence and reactive sequences associated with the center-left in the previous chapter, in this chapter I evaluate the relationship between center-left electoral performance and populist electoral performance in both Latin America and post-communist Europe. Thus, the present chapter is mostly an empirical contribution which tests statistically the
critical juncture theory vis-à-vis alternative theories. The results demonstrate that despite the many contextual differences between Latin America and post-communist Europe, the similar legacies of critical junctures of market reform engendered similar effects in terms of the electoral fortunes of populists with “left of the median” economic positions in the aftermath period. Overall, the chapter offers an empirical assessment of the validity of the critical juncture approach by focusing on center-left electoral performance in the aftermath of critical junctures as the key intervening variable. The results support the validity of the explanatory mechanism hypothesized to be at work for both regions. Where and when populists tend to perform relatively strongly in electoral terms, such performance are at least partially, and quite reliably, predicted by long-term center-left electoral decline, which itself is more likely in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures, as shown in Chapter 5.

This chapter proceeds in three steps. First, I develop a strategy for empirical assessment by highlighting scope, variables of interest, and the data used in the empirical analysis. The scope includes a total of 153 democratic elections in the aftermath of critical junctures – 83 presidential elections in Latin America and 70 legislative elections in post-communist Europe – in 33 countries in the two regions. Particularly in the section on variables of interest, I propose several measurements to assess the validity of the central explanation – the electoral performance of the center-left relative to critical junctures – specifically vis-à-vis the electoral performance of the center-right, which, as analyzed in the previous chapter, constitutes the second important pillar of party systems. I also distinguish between measures of electoral performance associated with the long-term effects of critical junctures and a measure of electoral performance in the short-term. Next, I present a rich dataset that I created to evaluate the critical juncture theory against other the rival explanations outlined in Chapter 4 – those highlighting structural demand, proximate
demand, cultural factors, institutional factors, and international relations factors.

Second, to analyze the observed variation in the dependent variable – electoral support for populists with center-left economic positions in the aftermath of critical junctures – I estimate a series of regressions by using techniques for quantitative data analysis including ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects, and random-effects models appropriate for panel data analysis. Importantly, my line of inquiry follows the logic developed in Chapter 5. This means that in this chapter I systematically assess the validity of the hypothesized intervening variable of interest – center-left electoral performance – not only against a number of control variables but also against identically developed variables measuring center-right electoral performance. Finally, I analyze the two regions both separately and jointly, and present the results of these analyses. The results support the central theoretical proposition that center-left electoral performance – particularly when conceptualized as a long-term consequence of critical junctures – is the most reliable predictor of variation in populist voting. Specifically, I show strong evidence of inverse and statistically significant relationships between, on the one hand, center-left electoral performance as a key explanatory variable and, on the other hand, the populist vote conceptualized both “at minimum” and “at maximum,” as proposed in Chapter 3. Overall, the present chapter provides further empirical support validating the critical juncture approach as a useful comparative framework for the analysis of contemporary populism in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

6.2. Strategy for Empirical Analysis

Scope

I assess the validity of the critical juncture argument vis-à-vis the above hypotheses with the help of a dataset that includes data for the 33 countries under analysis – 18 in Latin America
and 15 in post-communist Europe – over a period of roughly two decades. Overall, the dataset consists of 153 elections – 83 presidential elections in Latin America and 70 parliamentary elections in post-communist Europe – spanning the years after critical junctures of market reform in each country in the dataset. First, I focus on the period after critical junctures for two reasons – one analytical and one practical. Analytically, I am interested in the effect of critical junctures on subsequent developments. On the practical side, to construct both the dependent and independent variables (discussed in Chapters 3 and 5, respectively), I rely on systematic data on the economic positions of relevant political actors via expert surveys, which are available for the post-critical juncture period and not before or during the critical juncture. Information based on how the dependent and independent variables are constructed is available in the appendices.¹

Second, as discussed previously, I limit my analysis to elections up until and during 2015 – the year considered here as the end of the post-critical juncture period in both regions. As noted, this cut-off point is associated with the end of the commodities boom thought to have sustained in power several leftist governments after de-aligning critical junctures in Latin America. It also marks the beginning of what can be understood as a new critical juncture in Europe – the massive refugee crisis that would reenergize populist radical right movements based on a newly salient dimension. Overall, by the end of 2015 the critical juncture associated with marked reforms had run its course in both Latin America and post-communist Europe.

¹ See the appendices for precise lists of when the critical junctures ended in each country (Appendix D), what elections are included and excluded from the analysis (Appendix J), and how the dependent variable is scored for every election under analysis (Appendix K, which itself is based on the scoring presented in Appendix C). The parties whose electoral performance is used to construct the independent variables are presented in Appendix F (center-left parties) and Appendix H (center right parties).
Variables of Interest

Dependent Variable

The outcome of interest in this chapter is the electoral performance of relevant populist actors – that is, candidates in Latin American presidential elections and political parties in post-communist legislative elections identified as left-populist in Chapter 3. While including presidential candidates and political parties under the same category of *left-populist actor* may seem counter-intuitive, leaders and parties “are interlinked, which often makes it difficult to differentiate between the ideas of the former and the latter,” as Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser write.² This is particularly the case with populist platforms – whether in presidential or parliamentary systems – in which leaders tend to dominate political organizations from the top down. As explained in greater detail below, I first analyze Latin American presidential systems and post-communist (mostly) parliamentary systems separately, thus following a “most similar” systems design in which populist candidates in Latin American presidential elections are treated separately from populist parties in post-communist parliamentary elections. Overall, and following Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, the empirical analysis is focused on leaders in Latin America and on parties in post-communist Europe.³

For my operationalization of the dependent variable, I utilize the two measures of populism developed in Chapter 3 – left-populism “at minimum” and left-populism “at maximum.” As a reminder, the “at minimum” measure aggregates the sum of vote shares of “high-degree” left-populists, as identified in Chapter 3, at each analyzed election. By contrast, the “at maximum” measure aggregates the sum of vote shares of “high-degree” and “medium-degree” left-populists.⁴

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² Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013: 156
³ Ibid.
⁴ As explained in detail in Chapter 3, these two measures rely on specific categorizations of members belonging to the left-populist party families in the two regions. To determine the category for each relevant actor at each analyzed
While the first measure is a more “realistic” metric of populism, considering only the electoral performance of relatively undisputable populist actors that exhibit high degrees on the dimensions used to score cases (ideological positioning, location relative to party systems, and personalism), the second measure is a more “expansive” metric also incorporating the electoral performance of actors that exhibit relatively lower values on some of these dimensions and can, therefore, be reasonably considered as sufficiently populist. As discussed in Chapter 3, these two metrics are highly correlated \( r = 0.93 \), meaning that they ought to be similarly valid measures of the dependent variable. Procedurally, I present results in the main text of this chapter based on the “at minimum” measure of the dependent variable. I present results using the second measure in Appendix O.

As noted in Chapter 3, the analysis of the sum of vote shares is a reasonable proxy for measuring levels of populism because electoral performance accounts for the interaction between demand and supply factors. Such an approach is also in line with important empirical work on populism and outsider politics in both regions.\(^5\) Additionally, because the dependent variable uses electoral support, I only analyze cases in which elections can be considered meaningfully “democratic” according to Polity IV and Freedom House.\(^6\) Thus, I exclude from the analysis cases where populist incumbents might have consolidated power, thereby threatening liberal democratic standards. I operationalize “possible consolidation of power” as a potentially undemocratic

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6 This means a Polity IV score of 6 or above, or, if the Polity IV score is 5 (as in the only case of Ecuador in 2009), a Freedom House score of 3 or below. I include this case because of the relatively “democratic” Freedom House scores and because by the time of the 2009 election populist president Rafael Correa had not yet consolidated power. Excluding this case from the analysis does not change the results.
situation in which a populist incumbent (1) has served a full term and (2) wins a plurality of the vote in the subsequent election (which the incumbent populist also organizes and oversees). Based on this logic, I exclude from the analysis elections in Venezuela (2006 and thereafter), Argentina (2007, 2011 and 2015\(^7\)), Bolivia (2009 and 2014), Ecuador (2013), Slovakia (2010), and Hungary (2014),\(^8\) but include cases such as Hungary (2002), Poland (2007), and Slovakia (2012).\(^9\) Appendix J offers a list of elections included and excluded from the analysis for each country and the reasons for these decisions.

Finally, the construction of the dependent variables utilizes “the sum of the vote shares received by all candidates classed as populist in the first round of presidential elections”\(^10\) in Latin America\(^11\) as well as the sum of the vote shares of all parties identified as populist in parliamentary elections in post-communist Europe.\(^12\) By doing so, I capture the fluctuating level of support for populist candidates in both regions. Appendix K presents the “at minimum” and “at maximum” scores of the dependent variable for each case – that is, the sum of relevant actors’ vote shares for each election under analysis.

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\(^7\) Although anti-incumbent Mauricio Macri won the second round of the 2015 Argentinian presidential election, Daniel Scioli – who represented the Front for Victory (FpV) of populist incumbent Cristina Kirchner – won the first round of the election. As I only study results from the first round of presidential elections, I exclude the 2015 election in Argentina.

\(^8\) Since these are all countries after de-aligning critical junctures and since all of these populist incumbents performed well in the elections excluded from the analysis, dropping these cases actually weakens the results supporting the critical juncture hypothesis.

\(^9\) I include the 2002 election in Hungary because populist incumbent Fidesz failed to win a plurality, the 2007 election in Poland because populist incumbent Law and Justice (PiS) failed to win a plurality (having also failed to complete the full term), and the 2012 election in Slovakia because populist SMER had been in opposition prior to that election.

\(^10\) Doyle 2011: 1454

\(^11\) The only exception is the performance of Fernando Lugo in the 2008 presidential election in Paraguay. While Lugo received 42.4% of the vote, his populist credentials are “ambiguous” because his “coalition included Paraguay’s most established coalition party, the Authentic Radical Liberal Party” (see Levitsky and Roberts 2011: 25, 28n11). Due to Lugo’s coalition with PLRA, I assign to this case a score 13.3, which is the difference between 42.4% (Lugo’s performance in the presidential election) and 29.1% (the performance of PLRA in the simultaneous legislative election). Theoretically, this score captures the actual support that populist candidate Lugo received in 2008 outside of support for PLRA. This is the only case out of the 153 cases where such a decision had to be made; in all other cases, center-left electoral performance and populist electoral performance are clearly identifiable. Excluding this case from the analysis does not change the overall results.

\(^12\) This approach is similar to the one adopted by Pop-Eleches (2010).
**Key Independent Variables**

To analyze the effects of the type of critical juncture on the electoral support for populists, I use several explanatory variables. First, the type of critical juncture is analyzed as a dichotomous variable – that is, either as de-aligning or not. As theorized in Chapter 4, the crux of the critical juncture argument centers on programmatic de-alignment in Latin America and post-communist Europe. For both regions, therefore, I first conceptualize the critical juncture as a simple dichotomous variable. While this independent variable cannot provide any information regarding the temporal variation in populist support after the end of critical junctures, it is an important first approximation of the relationship between type of critical junctures and populist support across countries in the aftermath of critical junctures.

Second, as shown in Chapter 5, the type of critical juncture produces a systematic effect in terms of the performance of center-left political actors after the end of critical junctures. In other words, if populist actors are expected to be more successful in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures, this is so mostly because of the weakening of center-left political actors associated with market reforms. On the other hand, where critical junctures had been characterized by programmatic alignment, center-left actors were relatively more successful, thus limiting opportunities for populist actors with center-left economic positions. To reiterate the argument from the previous two chapters, the relative success of center-left parties can be conceptualized as an intervening variable that specifies an important mechanism mediating between type of critical juncture and the relative success of populist actors. Overall, a programmatically de-aligning critical juncture tends to weaken traditional center-left parties, which, in turn, is theorized to lead to a relatively higher vote share for populist actors with center-left economic positions. Alternatively, programmatic alignment during the critical juncture does not tend to weaken
traditional center-left parties, which, in turn, is theorized to lead to a relatively lower vote shares for such populist actors.

As argued in Chapter 4, the relationship between critical junctures, the center-left, and the populist vote is not the same as the relationship between critical junctures and the center-right. While Chapter 5 demonstrated that the path dependent effects of critical junctures are not the same in terms of center-left and center-right performance after critical junctures, to complete the argument it is still necessary to consider its second part – that is, to compare the effects of center-left and center-right electoral performance on the populist vote. If the critical juncture argument is correct, the effects of center-left electoral performance will be stronger than the effects of center-right electoral performance.

To test these theoretical propositions, I conceptualize as key variables of interest the electoral performance of center-left and the center-right after critical junctures of market reform. I conceptualize these electoral performances in three main ways – (1) by considering de facto electoral performance; (2) by considering de facto electoral performance relative to electoral performance at the brink of the critical juncture; and (3) by considering vote change from one election to the next. Notably, these conceptualizations reflect two ways of thinking about the temporal dimension of electoral performance. Thus, because “de facto” performance is conditioned by the type of critical juncture, as shown in Chapter 5, it is more reflective of long-term effects. By contrast, the vote change in consecutive elections is a measure of more short-term effects. This distinction is important in terms of the comparative assessment of the long-term effects of the critical juncture.

While I have used the same procedures to construct the key independent variables for all center-left and center-right parties analyzed in Chapter 5 (and presented in Appendices F and H
for the previous chapter), for the sake of clarity in the following discussion, I focus on the center-left, which is the hypothesized intervening variable of interest. As a point of clarification for the following discussion, Table 6.1 demonstrates the construction of the main independent variables for two hypothetical center-left Parties A and B. In both hypothetical scenarios, the critical juncture began soon after the 1996 election, lasted between 1997 and 1999, and was followed by post-critical juncture elections in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Notably, Parties A and B performed differently before the critical juncture (Elections 1-3) but identically after it (Elections 4-7).

**Table 6.1. Conceptualization of key independent variables: Electoral performance after critical junctures of market reform**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Electoral performance (de facto)</th>
<th>Performance relative to CJ (minus baseline)</th>
<th>Performance relative to CJ (% of baseline)</th>
<th>Vote change (minus previous)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Election 1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Election 2</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Election 3</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-99</td>
<td>Critical juncture of market reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Election 4</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Election 5</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Election 6</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-22</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Election 7</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average after CJ</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>23.25</td>
<td>-16.75</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>-41.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*De facto electoral performance*

First, de facto electoral performance – in Column 3 – compares the actual vote shares of Parties A and B after the critical juncture. According to the above example, the performance of the two parties is identical, with an average of 23.25. However, based on both the theoretical expectation advanced in Chapter 4 and the empirical findings in Chapter 5, Parties A and B are
likely to have different electoral performances after the critical juncture if they experience different types of critical junctures. Overall, programmatic de-alignment is likely to produce weaker post-critical juncture electoral performance while programmatic alignment is likely to produce superior post-critical juncture electoral performance of center-left parties. Because of the path-dependent effect of critical junctures on post-critical juncture performance (as shown in Chapter 5), de facto center-left electoral performance is expected to predict variation in the dependent variable more reliably than de facto center-right electoral performance.

Finally, while center-left electoral performance is theoretically prior to populist electoral support, as Chapters 3 and 4 have made clear, variation in de facto center-left electoral performance is strictly contemporaneous with variation in the dependent variable. As such, it raises concerns of reverse causality and endogeneity, meaning that weakened center-left performance could be the result, rather than the cause, of populist support.\footnote{The logic is similar to the one discussed by Pop-Eleches (2010: 247).}

**Electoral Performance Relative to Critical Juncture**

To alleviate the concerns just noted, I analyze the evolving electoral performance of the center-left relative to a moment in time that is both prior and theoretically crucial – its electoral performance at the brink of the critical juncture. Specifically, I highlight the effects of the critical juncture by considering the extent to which parties registered declines or improvements relative to the moment immediately prior to the critical juncture. Effectively, such a conceptualization constitutes an interaction between two phenomena – (1) de facto center-left electoral performance in the aftermath of the critical juncture and (2) center-left performance immediately before the critical juncture. Relating the performance of the center-left after the critical juncture to the moment immediate before the critical juncture addresses concerns of endogeneity because such a
procedure involves an interaction with a moment that is empirically prior to the electoral performance of both the center-left and populist actors after the critical juncture.

Columns 4 and 5 in Table 5.1 demonstrate two strategies for evaluating center-left electoral performance relative to the critical juncture, that is the electoral performance of center-left Parties A and B in the post-critical juncture elections relative to the baseline immediately prior to the critical juncture. In Column 4, performance relative to the critical juncture is conceptualized as the difference between the de facto electoral performance and the baseline electoral performance immediately prior to the critical juncture. In Column 5, it is conceptualized as the de facto electoral performance as a percentage of baseline electoral performance. For example, in Column 4, the score of Party A for 2000 is obtained by subtracting 40% (the baseline performance) from 25% (the 2000 performance), resulting in a loss of 15 points relative to the critical juncture for Party A in 2000. In Column 5, the score of Party A in 2000 is obtained by expressing the de facto performance in 2000 as a percentage of the critical juncture baseline, resulting in a drop of 37.5 points relative to the critical juncture for Party A in 2000.

Overall, while the two conceptualizations in Columns 4 and 5 differ in terms of scoring, the intuition behind them is similar because they emphasize the role of incumbency or opposition during the critical juncture of market reform. As argued in Chapter 4, it is this legacy of incumbency or opposition during the critical juncture that gives rise to the path dependent logic culminating with variation of likelihood of populist electoral success. In short, whether center-left parties experience subsequent decline or upsurge relative to their own performance immediately before the critical juncture matters for the likelihood of populist success at the ballot box.

Notably, even though the de facto performance of Parties A and B is identical (as per Column 3), in Columns 4 and 5, Party A is a relative loser, on average, while Party B is a relative
winner, on average, in relation to the moment immediately before the critical juncture. Importantly, this variation between Parties A and B is present because de facto performance is related to different baseline values – 40% in the case of Party A and 20% in the case of Party B in 1996. Indeed, with 40% electoral support immediate before the critical juncture, Party A is more likely to be an incumbent during the critical juncture while Party B, with 20%, is more likely to be in opposition during the same period. Because of their political roles during the critical juncture, center-left Parties A and B are likely to experience subsequent decline and upsurge, respectively, in the aftermath of the critical juncture, as argued in the previous two chapters.

Finally, Columns 4 and 5 may be motivated by the same idea – to relate de facto electoral performance to the moment immediately before the critical juncture – but they contribute different nuances to the analysis. Because scores in Column 4 are derived by subtracting a fixed baseline performance from de facto electoral performance, the differences between subsequent scores for Parties A and B is the same as the difference between their actual election results. In other words, measuring the independent variable by subtracting from the baseline mirrors the same pattern of change as that of de facto electoral performance, with the added benefit of relating this change to the moment before the critical juncture. In short, Column 4 captures the effect of raw shifts in electoral performance relative to the critical juncture. By contrast, Column 5 conceptualizes the interaction between de facto electoral performance and the moment immediate before the critical juncture as a percentage, thereby capturing the effect of 1% change of de facto performance relative to the critical juncture.

Importantly, the above method of relating electoral performance after the critical juncture to performance immediate before it is preferable to the alternative, which would have been to analyze de facto electoral performance relative to average performance prior to the critical
The latter approach is less useful for a simple theoretical reason. To reiterate the logic in the critical juncture theory, the argument emphasizes economic reforms implemented by particular incumbents that came to power immediately prior to critical junctures via particular electoral platforms, after which they either engaged in bait-and-switch tactics or did not engage in such tactics. Therefore, it is more appropriate to focus on the electoral performance of center-left parties immediately prior to this historical moment. Consider again Table 6.1. While the average electoral performances of Parties A and B were the same before the critical juncture (15% for both), the average electoral performance does not reflect which party was in a position of incumbency immediate prior to the critical juncture. By contrast, with 40% electoral support in 1996, Party A more likely to be in a position of incumbency, thereby implementing economic reforms, than Party B (which had 20% electoral support immediately prior to the critical juncture). Overall, if a center-left party was responsible for economic reform implementation from a position of incumbency, it likely had relatively high electoral support in the election immediately prior to the critical juncture. This nuance is captured by relating de facto electoral performance after the end of critical junctures to performance immediate before the critical juncture. A full list of all center-left actors whose electoral results are used for the construction of the main independent variables is available in Appendix F.14

Overall, relating de facto electoral performance to the moment immediately prior to the

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14 I take the last center-left electoral result from the last relevant election before the critical juncture for all countries except for two, for both of which I use a higher baseline—Albania and Croatia. For Albania’s Socialist Party (PSS), I use the vote from the 1997 election (31.6%) rather than from the 1992 election (23.7%). For Croatia’s Social Democratic Party (SDP), I use the vote from the 1995 election (8.9%) rather than from the 1992 election (5.5%). The reason for these decisions is that both of these countries were under competitive authoritarian rule at the time (see Levitsky and Way 2010) and, thus, these parties could have faced additional electoral challenges. Thus, the higher electoral results are more likely to be indicative of these parties’ actual popularity. Note that since both of these countries are categorized as cases of aligning critical junctures, a higher threshold actually raises the bar for the statistical tests. This is so because higher thresholds for center-left parties in aligning critical junctures actually reduce the hypothesized likelihood of center-left electoral success in subsequent elections relative to the moment of the critical juncture.
critical juncture not only captures the evolving performance of Parties A and B over time but also their electoral performance relative to the moment immediately before the critical juncture. While the above discussion has focused on center-left parties, the independent variables for center-right parties are constructed in the exact same way – by relating their de facto electoral performance after the end of critical junctures to center-right electoral performance at the brink of the critical juncture. Conceived identically for the center-left and the center-right, these independent variables – electoral performance relative to critical junctures – simulate the effect of the critical juncture on party performance over time while addressing potential problems of endogeneity.

Vote Change Between Elections

Finally, I include in the analysis the vote change that center-left and center-right parties experience between consecutive elections. As shown in Column 6 of Table 6.1, this is a variable that considers vote shifts from one election to the next, thus tending to ignore the magnitude of actual electoral performance captured in Column 3. Additionally, the vote change between elections is likely to be relatively more influenced by short-term factors rather than the long-term environmental conditions associated with the path dependent effects of the critical juncture. Nevertheless, I include vote changes between elections for center-left and center-right parties for two reasons – (1) because such changes can nevertheless be associated with the critical juncture and (2) because short-term losses are expected to be an important source of electoral support for populists. Thus, although center-left electoral volatility from one election to the next is only partially due to the path-dependent long-term effects of the critical juncture, electoral losses are still expected to be correlated with populist support. Alternatively, short-term center-right volatility is expected to be less associated with electoral support for populists.

Overall, then, to assess the validity of center-left performance particularly against center-
right performance, I have constructed four measures of electoral performance after the end of critical junctures in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Because each of these four measures is adopted for the center-left and the center-right, the result is eight independent variables of interest. Thus, for both the center-left and the center-right, I examine the effects of electoral performance after the critical juncture by considering the following key independent variables:

1. electoral performance relative to critical junctures expressed as the difference between evolving de facto electoral performance and baseline electoral performance (immediately prior to the critical juncture), thereby capturing the effect of one point raw change relative to the baseline;
2. electoral performance relative to critical junctures expressed as evolving de facto electoral performance as a percentage of the baseline electoral performance (immediately prior to the critical juncture), thereby capturing the effect of 1% change relative to the baseline;
3. de facto electoral performance, thereby capturing the effect of 1% change in the magnitude of actual performance – itself conditioned by type of critical juncture – from one election to the next;
4. vote change between consecutive elections, thereby capturing the “short-term” effect of one point change in volatility relative to the previous election, regardless of the magnitude of actual performance.

In sum, I have distinguished between a “short-term” measure of electoral performance, conceptualized as vote change between consecutive elections, and three measures conceptualizing electoral performance as a more direct consequence of critical junctures in the longer term. Additionally, I have hypothesized that the type of critical juncture of economic reforms explains cross-country variation in support for populist actors in both Latin America and post-communist Europe. Where critical junctures had been de-aligning – as in six Latin American and six post-communist European countries – the support for populist actors in the post-critical juncture period is expected to be considerably higher than in countries where the critical juncture had been aligning. Finally, I have hypothesized that the mechanism behind such variation involves a crucial intervening variable – the evolving performance of center-left parties, which itself tends to be
conditional on the type of critical juncture, as shown in Chapter 5. Overall, and in line with the theory advanced in Chapter 4, I expect that in the post-critical juncture period the electoral performance of the center-left will be a reliable predictor that is negatively correlated with electoral support for populist actors.

**Data**

Having presented the dependent and key explanatory variables, which use election results from presidential (in Latin America) and parliamentary (in post-communist Europe) elections, I next turn to presenting the data based on which I test rival explanations against the central hypothesis posited by the theory focusing on critical junctures of economic reform. As the detailed review of existing explanations of populism presented in Chapter 4 makes clear, there are a number of factors that are unrelated to the institutional consequences of economic reform and that can potentially affect the likelihood of support for populist actors. To assess the validity of such factors against the critical juncture argument, I have collected data on economic, political, and institutional developments in Latin America and post-communist Europe from a wide variety of sources, usually from reputable international organizations with comprehensive datasets. A problem when constructing such a dataset is that for several of the variables there is a lack of reliable time-series data. In such cases, I make careful use of data from alternative sources where available, take values from proximate years or impute average values based on available data from proximate years where a trend can be reasonably assumed, or simply restrict the analysis of specific variables within the time period for which data are available. Finally, I utilize many of the standard operationalizations from the literature with one exception – to test the explanation featuring populist contagion (see below).
**Measuring Structural Demand**

To test theories of structural demand, we need to assess the effects on populist voting of globalization, structural crises, mass society, and dependency. To begin, I use the standard operationalizations of a state’s exposure to globalization by utilizing data on unemployment, poverty, inequality, and trade openness. While data on unemployment come from the IMF, data on poverty, inequality, and trade openness come from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. For poverty, I decided to use the percent of the population living on less than $3.10 a day – rather than the percent living on less than $1.90 per day – as a more standardized measure of poverty not only in Latin America but also in post-communist Europe, where poverty is less extreme. (For my dataset, the correlation between these two measures of poverty is extremely high; r = 0.96). For inequality, I adopt Doyle’s approach and use countries’ GINI coefficients. Another measure of the effect of globalization can be captured by rates of union membership – because globalization is theoretically correlated with decreasing union density. Following standard procedures, all of these data are lagged one year.

Next, to evaluate theories about the effects of structural crises, mass society, and dependency, I follow Hawkins’ operationalizations from his study of populism around the world. Thus, to measure structural crisis (and “long-term economic voting”), I calculate average growth

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15 In the few cases where data are missing, I use figures from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. This indicator is also used by Pop-Eleches (2010).
16 Doyle 2011: 1459
17 In this, I follow Hawkins (2010) who also tests the effects of decreasing union membership. Data for this variable come from a variety of sources: OECD data for Chile, Mexico, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia and International Labor Organization (ILO) data beginning in 2001 for many of the countries. The ILO data are very similar to the OECD data. For earlier years, I also use data on post-communist union density presented by Crowley (2004) and on Latin American union density presented by Roberts (2007b), who provides the peak union density and the average union densities for all Latin American countries except for El Salvador and Guatemala.
18 For trade openness, I follow Doyle (2011) and use the log of trade – the sum of all imports and exports – as a percentage of the GDP.
in real per-capita GDP for 10-year periods for Latin American countries and for 5-year periods for post-communist countries, including the relevant election year. While data allowing the calculation of longer-term averages is available for all Latin American cases, some post-communist countries miss data on GDP per capita from the 1980s and 1990s, thus limiting the long-term evaluation of the structural crisis hypothesis to a 5-year period.\(^1\)

To test theories of mass society, like Hawkins, I consider media exposure and levels of enrollment in secondary education. Because mass society theories posit that populism can be the product of high levels of media access in combination with poorly educated citizens, I calculate the difference between percent of the households with a TV set and percent of the population enrolled in secondary education. Data on secondary education enrollment come from the World Bank’s Development Indicators and data on TV access come from the International Telecommunications Union.\(^2\) While Hawkins considers Freedom House’s scores on media freedom, I do not use media freedom towards my measures of mass society. The reason for this decision is that since I have deliberately limited the analysis to cases of democratic elections, differences in media freedom are theoretically negligible and, therefore, unlikely to produce considerable effects on populist messaging.\(^3\)

Since dependency theory was developed particularly by emphasizing Latin America’s

\(^1\) Hawkins (2010) uses 5-, 10-, and 20-year averages of GDP growth per capita to measure structural crisis. I calculated 5-, 10-, 15, and 20-year averages where possible. For my dataset, the 15- and 20-year averages are very highly correlated (\(r = 0.85\)) and the 10- and 15-year averages are still correlated (\(r = 0.75\)). For Latin America, I chose the 10-year averages as a reasonable compromise reflecting relatively long-term time horizons. For the post-communist region, I chose the 5-year average mostly due to data availability. For the analysis of both regions together, I use the 5-year average.

\(^2\) For both measures, where data were unavailable I imputed values by considering the data available.

\(^3\) Additionally, my method of measuring mass society differs from Hawkins’ (2010: 137-41) in two other ways. First, I use gross enrollment rates (for which more data are available), rather than net enrollment rates (for which data are more scarce). Where gross enrollment exceeds 100%, I simply use 100% enrollment. Second, to obtain the media-education gap, Hawkins calculates the residuals from a regression of percent of households with a TV on education. I prefer to calculate the actual observed differences per country.
commodity exports, I analyze dependency in Latin America by considering commodity exports.\textsuperscript{22} Following Hawkins, I measure dependency on commodity exports by taking the product of the total commodity exports as a percentage of the GDP\textsuperscript{23} and foreign direct investment (FDI) as a percentage of the GDP. Overall, the combination of high exports and FDI presence is indicative of high levels of dependency. All data on commodity exports and FDI used for these calculations come from the World Bank’s Development Indicators and is lagged one year.

\textit{Measuring Proximate Demand}

To evaluate the potential impact of proximate demand, I analyze the effects on populist voting of economic crisis, perceived corruption, institutional distrust, and availability of resource rents. To measure short-term economic crisis at the national level, I use two measures that are also preferred by Levitsky and Loxton in their study of Andean populism\textsuperscript{24} – (1) inflation, which is commonly utilized in the literature as both a proxy for economic crisis \textit{and} a predictor of populism,\textsuperscript{25} and (2) 2-year GDP per-capita averages. While data on inflation come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), data for the calculation of 2-year GDP per-capita averages come from the World Bank’s Development Indicators.

To measure perceived corruption in Latin America and post-communist Europe, I follow both Hawkins and Carreras, and use Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index,

\textsuperscript{22} Hawkins 2010: 145-8  
\textsuperscript{23} To obtain commodity exports as a percentage of the GDP, I divide the total commodity exports as a percentage of merchandise exports by the exports of goods and services as a percentage of the GDP. (The total commodity exports as a percentage of merchandise exports is the sum of all food, agricultural raw materials, ores and metals, and fuel exports as a percentage of the merchandise.)  
\textsuperscript{24} Levitsky and Loxton operationalize economic crisis as “two consecutive years of GDP per capita decline, one year of 5% or more decline, or monthly inflation surpassing 50% during the period spanning from one year before to one year after” assumption of office (2013: 114). Differently from these authors, I treat economic crisis as a continuous (rather than dichotomous) variable, which is why I do not use the 5% cutting point for GDP per capita or the 50% cutting point for inflation. Nevertheless, short-term economic crises are adequately captured by the two variables I use.  
\textsuperscript{25} This is best exemplified by Weyland (1999), but see also Pop-Eleches (2010) and Levitsky and Loxton (2013).
which measures the perceptions of misuse of public power for personal benefit.\textsuperscript{26} Next, similarly to Doyle, I measure institutional distrust in Latin America by using annual data from Latinobarómetro, based on which I create an index averaging distrust in the judiciary, legislature, and political parties.\textsuperscript{27} Unfortunately, since similar data for post-communist countries are available only after 2001, thus severely limiting the number of observations for the regression analyses to 46, I do not test the institutional distrust hypothesis for the post-communist European context. Another hypothesis relevant only for the Latin American context is the rentier state hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, I follow Doyle and Levitsky and Loxton, and collect data on ore, metal and fuel exports.\textsuperscript{28} My measure of rentier state potential is the product of the sum of ores, metals and fuels as a percentage of the merchandise and all exports of goods and services as a percentage of the GDP. Data for this measure come from the World Bank’s Development Indicators. All data for the evaluation of the proximate demand hypotheses are lagged one year.

\textit{Measuring Cultural Demand}

I test the two theories about cultural demand – those focused on the weakness of civil society and on democratic demands – by using data from the World Values Survey. Specifically, I follow Howard who studied “actual behavior” – rather than attitudes – in civil society,\textsuperscript{29} and collect data on the organizational memberships per person for the nine types of organizations analyzed by Howard – (1) religious, (2) sports, (3) educational, cultural, and artistic, (4) labor unions, (5) political parties, (6) environmental, (7) professional, (8) charitable, and (9) any other

\textsuperscript{26} Hawkins 2010; Carreras 2012
\textsuperscript{27} Unlike Doyle (2011) who creates the index by averaging all responses (including “A lot of confidence” and “Some confidence”), my index only uses the sum of the percentages for respondents who have “Little confidence” or “No confidence” in these institutions. In reality, both of these measures should be highly correlated, but since I am interested in measuring particularly distrust, I chose to use only answers betraying relative lack of confidence.
\textsuperscript{28} Doyle 2011; Levitsky and Loxton 2013
\textsuperscript{29} Howard 2002: 158
voluntary organizations. In terms of democratic norms, I use the 4-point post-materialist index developed by Ronald Inglehad. While I could have chosen to use the 12-point post-materialist index, which “taps long-term preoccupations, not one’s response to the immediate situation,” I prefer the 4-item index because I am interested in respondents’ perceptions of the “immediate situation” as it unfolds across time in the aftermath of critical junctures. Yet, as Inglehart and Abramson have explained, both indices of post-materialism produce similar results. Indeed, the correlation between the two indices is high in my dataset (r = 0.90). For both measures of civil society and post-materialism, I use population-weighted averages.

Two caveats must be mentioned regarding the World Values Survey data and its use for the current project. First, unfortunately, I am only able to test the civil society and post-materialism hypotheses on post-communist cases. Due to insufficient data limiting the number of observations to 43 and 44 respectively, I do not test the civil society and post-materialism hypotheses on Latin American cases. Second, as the World Values Survey has conducted six waves of surveys that are not annual, I use values from the waves that correspond to a given year under analysis. A major challenge is that even for countries where the questions about organizational membership and post-material values were asked, these questions were not necessarily asked in all survey waves. However, this concern is somewhat alleviated by the fact that neither organizational membership nor cultural values experience significant fluctuations over short periods of times. Thus, for post-communist cases where data are missing, I impute values by either taking the averages from adjacent waves for which responses are available or by taking the only values available.

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30 Inglehart 1977: 43
31 Inglehart and Abramson 1999
**Measuring Institutional Supply**

To estimate the effects of institutional supply, I focus on two variables per region. To begin, within Latin American presidential systems, I evaluate Carreras’ theory that non-concurrent elections and competing incumbents increase the likelihood of electoral success of outsider candidates.\(^\text{32}\) While Carreras did not specifically focus on “populist” politicians with center-left economic platforms, in Latin America’s presidential systems many outsiders can be considered populist, as argued by many scholars including Schedler, Barr, and Levitsky and Loxton.\(^\text{33}\) Indeed, since throughout Latin America’s “pink wave” many of these outsiders rose to prominence by positioning themselves against the neoliberal economic establishment, the argument that institutional factors can contribute to the success of such populist candidates is relevant.

Next, within the context of post-communist (mostly) parliamentary systems, I test the possible effects of electoral systems and constitutional provisions for direct presidential elections. Regarding electoral systems, the literature expects that proportional representation systems may contribute to radicalization and fragmentation,\(^\text{34}\) both of which can, of course, facilitate the rise of populism.\(^\text{35}\) Such tendencies can be particularly strong in countries with elected presidents, in which the appeal of personality-based politics is strengthened,\(^\text{36}\) thus contributing to the increased attraction of populists. Importantly, even though the presidency in post-communist parliamentary systems is not as powerful as it is in Latin America, in the post-critical juncture period, anti-status quo politicians with center-left economic positions (i.e., populists) performed particularly well in presidential elections in countries such as Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania. Thus, I test the

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\(^{32}\) Carreras 2012
\(^{34}\) Pop-Eleches 2010: 243
\(^{35}\) Mainwaring and Scully 1995
\(^{36}\) Pop-Eleches 2010: 244
hypothesis that the mere constitutional provision of presidential elections can have a spill-over effect, increasing the chances of populist success in parliamentary elections. For all cases in both regions, I test the above four hypotheses by assigning dichotomous (dummy) variables.37

I do not test other institutional propositions, such as those highlighting high district magnitude and low electoral thresholds in parliamentary systems because, to a large extend, such factors are either functions of the electoral systems or they do not anticipate the presence of specific economic positions in anti-establishment actors. Likewise, I do not test Mainwaring and Scully’s party system institutionalization hypothesis according to which weak or weakening party systems contribute to populist surge38 by using data from available datasets. There are two reasons for this. First, reliably systematic and time-series measures of party system institutionalization have not been developed for most of the countries in my sample. Where such measures exist – such as the one proposed by the Bartelsman Stiftung (BTI) – they do not cover the full range of years in the present study. Second, as discussed both by Roberts39 and in Chapter 5 in the present study, the degree of electoral volatility – which is one important aspect, although not the only aspect, of party system institutionalization – is a consequence of the type of critical juncture. As shown in Chapter 5, electoral volatility is to a large degree associated with the electoral performance of center-left parties, which itself is an explanatory variable of interest in the present analysis. Additionally, in my analysis I include the electoral performance of major center-right parties, which constitutes the right-hand pillar of party systems. Thus, while I do not use publically available datasets to test the party system institutionalization hypothesis due to data scarcity and the lack of clarity regarding

37 Thus, I score as 1’s the presence of concurrent elections as well as incumbents running in Latin America. Similarly, I score as 1’s proportional representation (PR) electoral systems (as opposed to “mixed” or single-member district electoral systems) as well as the presence of direct presidential elections in post-communist Europe.
38 Mainwaring and Scully 1995
39 Roberts 2014
what exactly is being measured, I do test the effect of party system institutionalization implicitly by focusing on the central independent variables of interest – the performance of key center-left and center-right actors in the aftermath of critical junctures. Differently from other authors, I disaggregate party systems into their constitutive center-left and center-right pillars and test how the evolution of these pillars affects the populist vote.

**Measuring Western Leverage and Populist Contagion in International Relations**

I test the two hypotheses from the international relations literature on both regions. First, I conceptualize *Western leverage* in ways that are contextually appropriate for Latin American and post-communist Europe. For Latin America, I base my conceptualization on Levitsky and Way’s definition of leverage by considering the size of the economy and whether a country is a major oil producer. Following these authors, I code *Low Western leverage* if for a given year a Latin American country had a large economy (total GDP of more than $100 billion) or if its annual petroleum production was more than 1 million barrels of crude oil per day; I code *Medium Western leverage* for cases of medium-sized economies (total GDP between $50 and 100 billion) or moderate oil production (between 200,000 and 1 million barrels of crude oil per day); and I code *High Western leverage* for cases of small economies (total GDP of less than $50 billion) and low annual petroleum production (less than 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day). Like Levitsky and Way, I use data from the World Bank’s Development Indicators for total GDP and from the U.S. Energy Information Administration for oil production.

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40 Levitsky and Way 2010: 372
41 Unlike Levitsky and Way (2010), I do not consider competing security issues and “black knight” support in my conceptualization of Western leverage. First, competing security issues were not as relevant for my universe of cases. Second, “black knight” assistance, which strengthens the power of incumbents, is also less relevant as I only study elections that are broadly considered to be democratic and exclude elections when populists could have possibly consolidated power, as discussed above. Such assistance is potentially relevant in the case of Ecuador in 2009, when Venezuela could have assisted populist incumbent Rafael Correa. However, changing Ecuador’s Western leverage score for 2009 from “high” (0) to “low” (1) does not affect the statistical results.
While oil production may be an important factor in Latin America, no post-communist country under analysis qualifies as a medium or large oil producer for the analyzed period. In this region, the major source of Western leverage has been the prospect of EU membership. Thus, prospective members with reasonable chance for EU membership (e.g., first- and second-tier candidates) face higher Western leverage than countries that are either already members or have no reasonable prospects for membership in the foreseeable future (e.g., third-tier candidates). Based on this logic, I follow Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker, and for each year I categorize each post-communist country as belonging to one of four categories – “EU member,” “first-tier candidate,” “second-tier candidate,” and “third-tier candidate.” Next, I combine these categorizations with Levitsky and Way’s condition for measuring leverage that is indeed relevant for the post-communist region – size of the economy. Namely, I code Low Western leverage for two conditions: (1) cases in which countries were EU members with large or medium-sized economies or (2) cases of third-tier candidates with large economies. I code Medium Western leverage for three conditions: (1) EU member states with small economies; (2) second- or third-tier EU candidates with large economies; or (3) third-tier candidates with medium economies. I code High Western leverage for two conditions: (1) second- and third-tier candidates with medium or small economies or (2) third-tier candidates with small economies. Each categorization is applied at the election level depending on values for the specific year during which elections were held. This interaction between size of the economy and EU membership status (or relative prospects for such status) is a reasonable proxy for a temporally sensitive measure of Western leverage in post-communist Europe.

Finally, following the logic of Brinks and Coppedge’s argument about diffusion from

42 Vachudova 2005
43 Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009: 473
contiguous countries, it is possible that electorates are more likely to choose populist options if they are emboldened by examples set by populists in power in a neighboring country. To test whether “the physical geography of a country can matter for processes of… development,” I use my own dataset and analyze whether “the location of a country with neighboring states” can influence patterns of regional diffusion and spill-over effects in terms of populist voting. Indeed, this is a reasonable proposition as populism has been most prevalent in particular sub-regions within Latin America and post-communist Europe that are made of bordering countries, such as the Andes and Central Europe, respectively. To test this explanation, I code as a dummy variable the presence or absence of a populist incumbent – presidents in both Latin America and post-communist Europe and prime-ministers in post-communist Europe – in a neighboring country at the time of each of the 153 elections under analysis.

**Model Estimation and Analytical Procedure**

The dataset I have prepared includes a total of 153 observations – 83 for Latin America and 70 for post-communist Europe. I use aggregate country-level rather than individual-level analysis because in individual-level analysis it is still possible for individual-level relationships between explanatory variables and vote choice to remain the same across elections even if consequential aggregate shifts in both variables occur, thus missing important causal implications. In other words, measuring populism by aggregate time-series data (population-averaged effects expressed through overall election results) at the country-level is preferred to measuring it by using individual-level survey data because, when studying public opinion and election outcomes across countries, this method is more likely to yield valid inferences about the underlying individual-level...
effects being measured.\textsuperscript{47} Additionally, aggregate-level analysis is most appropriate when making causal claims connecting “institutions or systemic phenomena and populist movements, all of which are more than the sum of individual attitudes and behaviors.”\textsuperscript{48}

To test hypotheses systematically, I rely on two techniques for model estimations, in both of which the dependent variable – the total vote share for populists – is treated as a continuous variable. First, I use standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression models with robust standard errors clustered by country in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity in the standard errors within countries. This approach is appropriate for the data at hand because of the relatively limited number of observations as well as the nature of several of the independent variables, which are either time-invariant or do not vary much within countries.\textsuperscript{49}

Second, while OLS estimations are appropriate given the nature of the dataset, they do not specifically address issues of temporal variation within countries and issues of unobserved heterogeneity among countries – two issues that can result in omitted variable bias. Therefore, as a robustness check and to address such issues, I also utilize methods more appropriate for panel data analysis. Specifically, I use fixed-effects and random-effects estimations with panel-corrected standard errors that are robust to potential problems of heteroscedasticity.\textsuperscript{50} The main difference between these two techniques is that fixed-effects models assume that time-invariant unobserved differences within countries are systematically correlated with the predictors while random-effects models assume that such country-specific differences are not systematically correlated with the predictors. While fixed-effects models are an appropriate method for panel data analysis, they

\textsuperscript{47}Kramer 1983: 93
\textsuperscript{48}Hawkins 2010: 131
\textsuperscript{49}This technique is identical to the one used by Powell and Tucker (2014) in their study of post-communist volatility.
\textsuperscript{50}While serial correlation is less likely to be a problem due to the large-N, small-T nature of the data, I nevertheless tested for serial correlation.
significantly reduce the degrees of freedom due to the clustering by country. This can be a problem given the total number of observations per region and the fact that for some countries the number of observations is especially limited. For this reason, I use panel data estimations only for the joint analysis of the two regions, for which I include all 153 observations.\footnote{Following Pop-Eleches, this is “a sufficiently large number of observations to be analyzed by traditional statistical methods for time-series cross sectional data” (2010: 238). The dataset of post-communist elections for which Pop-Eleches uses such methods contains 76 cases.} In sum, I analyze the two regions separately by using OLS estimations and then jointly by using both OLS and panel data analyses.

In terms of analytical procedure, I perform the analysis in two main stages. First, I assess the relationship between the dependent variable and the key independent variables of interest – type of critical juncture as well as center-left and center-right performance as conceptualized in the section “Key Independent Variables” above. I perform this analysis by estimating OLS regressions and \textit{without} using additional controls. I do so in order to assess the extent to which the key independent variables are correlated with variation in the dependent variable independently from any other conditions and to what extent they are independently responsible for explaining overall variation in the dependent variable.

Second, I add to the analysis the control variables derived from the literature on populism discussed in Chapter 4 and presented in the “Data” section above. I do so by studying the regions both separately and jointly. Studying the regions separately – or as two distinct “most similar” systems – allows me to hold region-specific factors constant while analyzing variables available and relevant for each region. For each region, I also consider all independent variables one by one by estimating a series of OLS regressions in order to test the sufficiency of alternative explanations for predicting variation in the dependent variable. Finally, I combine observations from both Latin
America and post-communist Europe and analyze relevant variables that are common to both regions. This approach allows me to maximize the generalizing power of the analysis by incorporating all 153 observations in the dataset, which I analyze by using OLS, fixed-effects, and random-effects models.

6.3. Results

Key Independent Variables

The results for the key independent variables are presented in Table 6.2 below. These results strongly support the hypothesis that de-aligning critical junctures of economic reforms significantly improve the electoral performance of populist candidates with left-of-the-median economic position in both regions. Specifically, the results support the hypothesized inverse relationship between the key intervening variable – center-left electoral support in the aftermath of critical junctures – and the dependent variable. The effect is statistically significant when considering all conceptualizations of the intervening variable – first for Latin America (Models 1-5), second for post-communist Europe (Models 6-10), and third for both regions combined (Models 11-15).
Table 6.2. Key independent variables predicting the populist vote “at minimum”: Latin America and post-communist Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Latin America (OLS)</th>
<th>(2) Latin America (CLS)</th>
<th>(3) Latin America (CLS)</th>
<th>(4) Latin America (CLS)</th>
<th>(5) Latin America (CLS)</th>
<th>(6) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(7) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(8) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(9) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(10) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(11) Both regions (CLS)</th>
<th>(12) Both regions (OLS)</th>
<th>(13) Both regions (OLS)</th>
<th>(14) Both regions (OLS)</th>
<th>(15) Both regions (OLS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dealigning CI</td>
<td>24.64*** (3.41)</td>
<td>-0.57*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.14** (0.06)</td>
<td>19.44*** (4.94)</td>
<td>-0.57*** (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.12)</td>
<td>22.29*** (2.99)</td>
<td>-0.56*** (0.07)</td>
<td>-0.13*** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.98*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.02* (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.38*** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.29*** (0.07)</td>
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<td>C-L relative to CJ (diff)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.08*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.51*** (0.16)</td>
<td>-0.22 (0.19)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.38*** (0.10)</td>
<td>-0.29*** (0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-L relative to CJ (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.33** (0.12)</td>
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<td>-0.19</td>
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<td>C-R relative to CJ (%)</td>
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<td>-0.36*** (0.10)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-L vote (de facto)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-0.49*** (0.14)</td>
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<td>C-R vote (de facto)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.84* (0.44)</td>
<td>8.16*** (1.73)</td>
<td>11.07*** (2.58)</td>
<td>32.38*** (8.54)</td>
<td>7.41*** (2.26)</td>
<td>4.49*** (1.58)</td>
<td>14.32*** (2.22)</td>
<td>14.35*** (3.10)</td>
<td>29.80*** (8.66)</td>
<td>11.26*** (2.89)</td>
<td>2.36*** (0.86)</td>
<td>10.41*** (1.63)</td>
<td>12.38*** (1.97)</td>
<td>29.77*** (5.71)</td>
<td>9.29*** (1.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>153</td>
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<td>153</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Beginning with Latin America, Models 1 through 5 analyze populist performance in 83 presidential elections after the end of critical junctures. According to Model 1, the effect of the critical juncture itself is highly significant and substantial – after de-aligning critical junctures, Latin American populists are expected to gain 24.6% electoral support, on average, in presidential elections. Next, Models 2 and 3 compare center-left and center-right performance relative to the critical juncture baseline. Whether electoral performance is considered as a raw difference from (Model 2) or as percentage relative to (Model 3) the moment immediately prior to the critical juncture, center-left performance relative to the critical juncture is both a highly significant and more substantive predictor than center-right performance relative to the critical juncture. For example, as Model 2 shows, one percentage point in center-left loss relative to the election immediately prior to the critical juncture is associated with populist electoral gains of more than half of a percent. Next, according to Model 4, the effect of 1% change in magnitude of actual (de facto) performance is roughly the same for both the center-left and center-right. This finding supports previous scholarship on Latin America, clearly demonstrating that populist candidates gain from both the center-left and the center-right. Finally, Model 5 captures the effects of one point change in volatility relative to the previous election and regardless of the magnitude of actual performance. Once again, short-term losses of the center-left are more highly correlated with, as well as more substantive predictors of, the dependent variable than are short-term losses of the center-right. Overall, center-left electoral performance tends to outperform center-right electoral performance in most of the specifications presented in Models 2 through 5, signaling its relatively stronger predictive power for the Latin American context.

Models 6 through 10 provide a similar analysis of populist electoral performance in 70 parliamentary elections after the end of critical junctures in post-communist Europe. Model 6
demonstrates that in post-communist Europe programmatic de-alignment also has a significant effect, with populists gaining, on average, 19.5% of the vote after de-aligning critical junctures. Next, Models 7 through 10 demonstrate that whether center-left and center-right electoral performances are conceptualized as relative to the critical juncture or not matters little in post-communist Europe; center-left performance is inversely correlated with the dependent variable in ways that are both more substantive and statistically significant than center-right performance. Intriguingly, the models for post-communist Europe are striking particularly because the coefficients for center-left performance in Models 7 through 10 are very similar to – and, in some cases, larger than – the corresponding coefficients for the Latin American context. In other words, not only is center-left electoral performance a better predictor of variation in populist support than center-right electoral performance in post-communist Europe, but the effects of center-left electoral performance on the dependent variable are similar to the ones observed in Latin America.

Finally, Models 11 through 15 incorporate all 153 observations in one OLS estimation. Not surprisingly, center-left electoral performance after critical junctures is once again a superior predictor of variation in the dependent variable than center-right electoral performance. This finding generalizes the already established pattern observable when the two regions are analyzed separately. It also confirms that different conceptualizations of the independent variable have different implications in terms of the explained variation in the dependent variable. For example, type of critical juncture (Model 11) explains 44% of variation in the dependent variable while short-term vote changes from one election to the next (Models 15) explain significantly less of this variation (about 15%). This is expected because, as noted above, short-term vote changes from one election to the next can be independent from the magnitude of actual electoral performance, which itself is conditional on the type of critical juncture, as shown in Chapter 5. By contrast,
independent variables conceptualized in relation to the baseline moment immediately prior to the critical juncture as well as de facto electoral performance of center-left parties explain more of the variation in the dependent variable. This important point is worth reiterating because de facto center-left electoral performance – which reflects actual magnitude – tends to be conditioned by the long-term effects of critical juncture. By contrast, volatility from one election to the next is less affected by the long-term effects of the critical juncture. The fact that Model 14 has an R-squared value (0.31) that is more than twice higher than that of Model 15 (0.15) confirms that the long-term effects of the critical juncture – which influence the actual magnitude of center-left electoral performance – have more explanatory power than the short-term effects of volatility in consecutive elections.

Overall, the above analysis shows that center-left electoral performance is generally a more powerful and reliable predictor of the populist vote share than center-right electoral performance. Even where center-left and center-right electoral performances are equally statistically significant (as in Model 14), one unit change in center-left electoral performance is still associated with a greater impact on the dependent variable than one unit change in center-right electoral performance. Thus, center-left electoral performance is the key intervening variable between type of critical juncture and populist electoral performance. To demonstrate this relationship visually, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 below present two scatterplots of the relationship between center-left electoral performance, as the key intervening variable, and the dependent variable for both regions. These figures focus on two intuitive conceptualizations – center-left de facto performance and center-left vote change in consecutive elections (Models 14 and 15 in Table 6.2).
Note: For a country-level graph with averages for each country (N = 33), see Appendix L (Figure A.11).

**Figure 6.1. Center-left de facto electoral performance and the populist vote “at minimum” (election-level)**

Figure 6.1 clearly shows the already established inverse and statistically significant relationship between de facto center-left electoral performance and the populist vote by including all 153 observations from both regions. Overall, as the center-left vote share increases, the populist vote share decreases. Alternatively, the most powerful populist electoral performances tend to be associated with relatively weak center-left performance, as the left side of the figure shows. Notably, the figure also shows that there are several outlier cases, including elections in Hungary, where relatively strong center-left electoral performance corresponds to relatively strong populist results, as well as elections particularly in Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, and Estonia, where
weak center-left electoral performance was not associated with strong populist electoral performance. (For a more explicit visualization of these outliers, see Appendix L (Figure A.11), in which both variables are aggregated at the country-level.) While these outliers deserve more in-depth analysis, the Hungarian case is explained by the country’s unique electoral system, as noted in the previous chapter, while the other four countries are distinguished by the historical weakness of the center-left. In other words, these countries are outliers not because of the dependent variable, but rather because of the independent variable. In theory, because these four countries experienced programmatic alignment during the critical juncture, cases from these countries should be found on the bottom right of Figure 6.1 – that is, featuring strong center-left performance and weak populist performance. However, the historical weakness of center-left actors seems to have prevented them from making substantial electoral gains in the aftermath of critical junctures.\footnote{The center-left was weak for different reasons in these countries. In Columbia, the center-left was traditionally weak partly because it failed to clearly differentiate itself from the Revolutionary Armed Forced of Colombia (FARC). In Guatemala, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was de-legitimated having participated in atrocities during the Guatemalan Civil War. In Honduras, US military presence during the years of the Reagan administration stymied – at times by violent means – the development of the center-left. Finally, Estonia’s center-left is not ex-communist and thus not well institutionalized.} With the exception of these outliers – which do not contradict the basic critical juncture theory that, as noted in the last section of Chapter 4, is probabilistic in nature – the figure asserts the statistically significant inverse relationship between the key intervening variable and the dependent variable.

Finally, Figure 6.2 plots populist electoral performance against center-left vote change in consecutive elections. Overall, as the center-left loses votes from one election to the next, the values of the dependent variable tend to increase, as the left side of Figure 6.2 shows. Alternatively, center-left electoral gains from one election to the next correspond to lower scores for the dependent variable. Although this relationship involving short-term center-left volatility is less
likely to be the product of long-term effects of the critical juncture, as explained above, it nevertheless confirms the hypothesized relationship between the variables. Appendix L (Figure A.12) presents the relationship by aggregating data at the country level.

![Graph showing relationship between populist vote share and change of center-left vote share](image)

Note: For a country-level graph with averages for each country (N = 33), see Appendix L (Figure A.12).

**Figure 6.2. Center-left vote change from one election to the next and the populist vote “at minimum” (election-level)**

**Testing Alternative Explanations**

While the above discussion has demonstrated that center-left electoral performance after the end of critical junctures is a reliable predictor of variations in the populist vote share in both regions, the main hypothesis must be evaluated against rival explanations in order to arrive at a more complete understanding of the determinants of variation in populist voting. Next, I consider
alternative hypotheses derived from the literature on populism by analyzing the two regions separately and together.

Table 6.3 below presents the results from separate OLS analyses for the two regions. Models 1 through 4 show results for the 83 cases in Latin America by analyzing, in turn, the four different conceptualizations of center-left electoral performance against 17 control variables, including corresponding measures of center-right electoral performance. Models 4 through 8 adopt an identical strategy for hypothesis testing for the 70 cases in the post-communist context. For this region, I add 15 controls, including corresponding measures for center-right electoral performance. Finally, for all models, I have examined variance inflation factors (VIFs) and excluded variables showing signs of multicollinearity.\(^{53}\) I have also excluded the variable *Distrust in institutions* from the multivariate analysis for Latin America due to the fact that including this variable would reduce the already limited number of analyzed observations even further.\(^{54}\) (However, I have tested all control variables for both regions independently – see Appendix N).
Table 6.3. Determinants of the populist vote “at minimum” in Latin America and post-communist Europe: OLS analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLES</th>
<th>(1) Latin America (OLS)</th>
<th>(2) Latin America (OLS)</th>
<th>(3) Latin America (OLS)</th>
<th>(4) Latin America (OLS)</th>
<th>(5) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(6) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(7) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
<th>(8) Post-communist (OLS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-L vote relative to CJ (diff.)</td>
<td>-0.58***</td>
<td>-0.44***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R vote relative to CJ (diff.)</td>
<td>-0.14***</td>
<td>0.22*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-L vote relative to CJ (%)</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>-0.65***</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R vote relative to CJ (%)</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-L vote (de facto)</td>
<td>-0.37**</td>
<td>-0.48***</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R vote (de facto)</td>
<td>-0.31**</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
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<td>(3.21)</td>
<td>(3.21)</td>
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<td>(3.21)</td>
<td>(3.21)</td>
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<td>0.64</td>
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<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
**Latin America**

Beginning with the estimations for Latin America (Models 1-4), center-left electoral performance is a superior predictor than center-right electoral performance in all four models. Particularly strong predictors are the three operationalizations of center-left performance relative to the critical juncture (Models 1, 2, and 3). As shown in Model 1, for example, one-point gains for the center-left relative to the moment immediately prior to critical juncture are associated with 0.58% in electoral losses for Latin American populists. In Model 3, 1% gains in actual electoral performance is associated with 0.37% losses for populists. Even when center-left electoral performance loses some of its significance, as in Model 4, it still has a larger coefficient than center-right performance and remains statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Thus, center-left electoral performance is a stronger predictor of populist voting than center-right electoral performance in Latin America.

Additionally, *Rentier potential* and *Low Western leverage* deserve attention due to their significance in most of the models for Latin America. The significance of *Rentier potential* lends support to the theoretical literature expecting a positive correlation, meaning that Latin American populists are expected to attract followers with hopes for mass redistribution of rents. The second finding, however, is more surprising – *Low Western leverage* appears associated with poorer electoral results for populists. Given the operationalization of *Low Western leverage* – a situation in which a country is either relatively rich in mineral resource or has a large economy, or both – and the positive relationship between *Rentier potential* and the populist vote just noted, it can be concluded that it is the size of the economy that must be negatively correlated with the dependent variable. Thus, populists tend to be less electorally successful in large economies, such as Brazil’s,

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55 The large coefficient is mostly due to the operationalization of *Low Western leverage* as a dummy variable.
and more successful in small- and medium-sized economies, especially ones reliant on oil production, such as Ecuador’s. Overall, greater economic independence from the West is correlated with poorer electoral results for populists. By contrast, where Western leverage is medium or high, populists are more electorally successful.

Other independent variables perform less convincingly for the Latin American context. For example, *Dependency* – measured as the interaction between foreign direct investment (FDI) and all commodity exports (food, agricultural products in addition to ores, metals, and fuels) – is statistically significant in two of the models, but with small coefficients. In turn, *Poverty, Union density*, and *Mass society* – none of which is as significant as center-left electoral performance – lose significance after the first model. None of the other predictors are statistically significant correlates of the dependent variable in any of the four models.

The above analysis for Latin America includes potentially controversial cases in Nicaragua and Mexico, where traditional center-left parties – the FSLN and the PRD, respectively – are frequently classed as “populist,” contrary to my inclusion of their electoral performance in the construction of the key *independent* variables. As explained in Chapter 3, the origins of these parties in the period before the third wave of democratization disqualify them from the populist label in the present analysis. Nevertheless, their inclusion in the dependent variable can be subject to debate. For this reason, I also performed the above statistical analysis for Latin America by excluding cases from these two countries. This analysis, presented in Appendix M, confirms the substantive findings from the analysis above. While *Rentier potential* and *Low Western leverage* gain significance in more models, center-left electoral performance remains a predictor that is statistically significant and superior to center-right electoral performance in all four models without Nicaragua and Mexico.
Overall, while Rentier potential and Low Western leverage appear as significant in the multivariate analysis, these variables gain significance only when considered in concert with others. Indeed, as reported in Appendix N (Table A.14), no control variable is significant when considered independently for the Latin American context, a reason why control variables cannot alone provide a sufficient explanation of the variation in populist voting. By contrast, center-left electoral performance is the only predictor that is statistically significant both when considered independently and in combination with control variables. Finally, the conceptualizations of center-left electoral performance as a long-term effect of the critical juncture have more predictive power than the “short-term” conceptualization as volatility in consecutive elections. Thus, in Model 4 in Table 6.3 above, the main explanatory variable is less significant than it is in the first three models. These results demonstrate that in Latin America the long-term effects of the critical juncture – directly measured in Models 1 and 2, and reflected in actual center-left vote magnitude in Model 3 – are superior predictors than the short-term effects of center-left vote change from one election to the next.

Post-communist Europe

Shifting the focus to the post-communist region, in Models 5 through 8 in Table 6.3 above, we observe similarly impressive findings regarding the predictive power of center-left electoral performance. First, regardless of specification, center-left performance appears as statistically significant in all four models. By contrast, center-right electoral performance appears somewhat significant (at the 0.1 level) in just one of the four models. As shown in Model 5 and 7, one point gains in center-left electoral performance relative to the moment immediately before the critical juncture is associated with 0.44% electoral losses for populists, whereas 1% decline in de facto electoral performance is associated with 0.48% electoral losses for populists.
Second, most of the other independent variables exhibit little predictive potential. Several controls—*Inequality, Mass society, Low Western leverage, and Direct presidential elections*—are weakly correlated (at the 0.1 level) with the dependent variables, but do not show much promise since they are not significant in most models. Two variables appear more promising—*Inflation* (in Model 8, but also somewhat in Models 5 and 6) and *Union density* (in all four models, and particularly in Models 7 and 8). While the positive correlation between inflation and the populist vote validates arguments focused on economic crisis, such as Weyland’s,\(^{56}\) the inverse correlation between union membership and populist voting is not surprising in the post-communist context. Indeed, there has been a massive decline in union membership as labor markets have become increasingly flexible across the region. As the regression results for post-communist Europe suggest, populists with center-left economic platforms may have capitalized on the rising insecurity associated with union decline, especially in contexts of rising inflation.

Notably, however, and unlike the conceptualizations for the key intervening variable, *Inflation* and *Union density* are not, on their own, sufficient predictors of the populist vote. As shown in Appendix N (Table A.15) for post-communist Europe, neither of these controls is significant at the 0.05 level or below, meaning that they only gain statistical significance in interaction with other variables. The only control that is independently significant at the 0.5 level in Appendix N (Table A.15) is *Low Western leverage*, which, however, loses its significance in interaction with controls. Unlike these variables, the four operationalizations of center-left performance remain highly significant when analyzed both with and without the control variables. As in Latin America, the electoral performance of the center-left remains the most consistent predictor of the populist vote.

\(^{56}\) Weyland 1999
Finally, while the above results for both regions are based on an analysis of the populist vote “at minimum,” the main patterns of these results are mostly confirmed through an analysis of the alternative and more expansive “at maximum” metric of populism. Results from this analysis are reported in Appendix O (Table A.16). While changing the values of the dependent variable to reflect a more expansive conceptualization of populism alters some of the results, the overall significance of center-left electoral performance persists, particularly when it is conceptualized as a long-term effect of the critical juncture. In the analysis of populism “at maximum,” the key explanatory variable exhibits a lower degree of significance (for Latin America) or no significance (for post-communist Europe) when conceptualized as short-term volatility in consecutive elections. Once again, center-left electoral performance is a more important predictor of the populist vote when conceptualized as a long term-effect of the critical juncture rather than a short-term change in electoral support from one election to the next.

Both Regions Together

Having analyzed the two regions separately, I conclude this chapter by presenting results from a joint analysis of all 153 observations in the dataset. As a way to check the generalizing power of the proposed explanation, I use OLS, fixed-effects, and random-effects model. I use the latter two techniques in order to specifically focus on the temporal variation within countries and to further test the validity of estimates obtained from the OLS estimations. A particular strength of

57 As Appendix O (Table A.16) shows, for Latin America, Rentier potential remains mostly significant and Populist contagion and Incumbent running gain some significance. While two of the operationalizations for the center-left remain significant at the 0.01 level, the other two lose some predictive power, but remain significant at the 0.1 level. In the analysis of the populist vote “at maximum” in post-communist Europe, Inflation remains highly significant and Inequality and Mass society gain some significance – but with surprising signs. Both increased inequality and an increased media/education gap appear negatively correlated with the dependent variable. Center-left electoral performance remains statistically significant in three of the four models for post-communist Europe, losing significance for the “short-term” conceptualization as vote change in consecutive elections (see Appendix O, Table A.16).
fixed-effects models is that they correct for unobservable time-invariant factors. However, if such country-specific effects are *not* correlated with the predictors, random-effects models are a more efficient method of estimation for panel data.\(^{58}\) Overall, if results from both analyses are similar, conclusions can be made regardless of whether country-specific effects are correlated with the independent variables. To perform these analyses, I exclude from the analysis several region-specific variables, none of which showed particular promise in the analysis of the regions separately. Particularly, these are time-invariant factors of institutional supply\(^{59}\) as well as dependency and 10-year average per-capita growth, the latter two being specific to Latin America. Overall, for the joint analysis of the two regions, I test the main proposition against 13 alternative explanations relevant to both regions, including corresponding measures of center-right electoral performance.

The results of these analyses are reported in Table 6.4. These results strongly support the theory that center-left electoral performance is a significant predictor of the populist vote in both regions. In eleven of the twelve models presented in Table 6.4, center-left electoral performance is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and it has larger coefficients than center-right electoral performance in all models, regardless of conceptualization. By contrast, center-right electoral performance reaches such a high level of significance in only two of the models and it never exhibits coefficients as large as those for the various conceptualizations of center-left electoral performance.

\(^{58}\) I decided to use both models for the combined analysis of the two regions rather than to make assumptions about the extent to which unobservable factors may be correlated with the independent variables. As the table shows, the results of these two methods are very similar. An alternative option is using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the null hypothesis that time-invariant characteristics are not systematically correlated with the independent variables, rejection of which suggests that fixed effects estimation produces more consistent estimates.

\(^{59}\) For example, the only post-communist countries that displayed any variation for *Direct presidential elections* are Moldova, which has not held any direct presidential elections since 1996, and the Czech Republic, which introduced direct presidential elections in 2012 and held its first such election in 2013.
Table 6.4. Determinants of the populist vote “at minimum” in both regions: OLS and panel data analyses

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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>C-R vote relative to CJ (%)</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
None of the other variables performs as reliably, although several controls reach significance at the 0.05 level, particularly in the fixed-effects models focused only on temporal variation – Corruption perception (Model 8, but also Models 2, 10 and 12), Unemployment and 2-year average GDP per capita growth (Models 5 and 7), and Rentier potential (Models 5-8). Interestingly, increasing perceptions of corruptions and increasing GDP per capita correlate with poorer electoral performances of populists, as the fixed-effects models show. By contrast, increased unemployment and higher rentier potential over time correlate with stronger electoral performances of populists. Even these variables, however, are not as reliable predictors as center-left electoral performance due to their inconsistency across model specifications. In sum, whether estimations are performed using OLS regressions or panel data models, the central contention about center-left electoral performance is supported by the joint analysis of the two regions. Although the separate analyses of the regions suggested factors such as Low Western leverage and Inflation to be regionally important, such factors lose statistical significance in the joint analysis while the electoral performance of the center-left remains consistently significant across models.

While center-left electoral performance is the most reliable predictor of the populist vote, it is important to distinguish between conceptualizing it as a long-term effect of the critical juncture and a short-term vote change. When center-left-electoral performance is conceptualized explicitly in relation to the moment immediately before the critical juncture (in Models 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10) or as de facto performance (in Models 3, 7, and 11) – itself affected by type of critical juncture, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 – all these models explain much of the variation in the dependent variable. By contrast, when center-left electoral performance is conceptualized as short-term volatility between consecutive elections (in Models 4, 8, and 12), the models explain comparably less of the variation in the dependent variable, as demonstrated by their comparatively low R-
square values. Overall, then, center-left performance is an especially powerful predictor particularly when conceptualized as a long-term consequence of critical junctures of market reform rather than as a short-term vote change in consecutive elections.

To confirm the robustness of these results, I performed two further procedures. First, and following Doyle, I performed a modified jackknife, “whereby each country is eliminated from the analysis one at a time and the results [are] re-estimated.”60 Second, I re-estimated the above analysis by using the alternative measure of populism “at maximum.” The results from these estimations confirm the central contention of the above analysis. As Appendix O (Table A.17) shows, while Rentier potential remains statistically significant and while Low Western leverage gains significance in some of the models, center-left electoral performance – particularly when conceptualized as a long-term effect of the critical juncture – remains the most reliable predictor of voting for populists in both regions. By contrast, when conceptualized as a short-term vote change in consecutive elections, the key explanatory variable loses statistical significance in the models analyzing temporal variation of populism “at maximum” (see Appendix O, Table A.17).

Finally, it is also true that center-right electoral performance is statistically significant in many of the models for the joint analysis – both in Table 6.4 (in the analysis of the “at minimum” measure of populism) and in Appendix O (in the analysis of the “at maximum” measure presented in Table A.17). This is an important point because the electoral performance of “traditional” center-right parties is a key component of overall party system volatility, which, as discussed by authors such as Mainwaring and Scully and Roberts,61 is a major factor behind populist voting. Yet whether populism is analyzed by using the “at minimum” or “at maximum” measure, center-right electoral performance never exhibits coefficients as high as those for center-left electoral

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60 Doyle 2011: 1465. I re-estimated results from the OLS models.
61 Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Roberts 2014
performance. Thus, it can be concluded that what matters most in terms of populist voting in both regions is the overall development of party systems’ center-left pillars, especially as they relate to the moment immediately before critical junctures. In particular, while center-right electoral performance is at times a significant predictor of the dependent variable, no predictor is more powerful or reliable than center-left electoral performance after critical junctures of market reform.

6.4. Conclusion

In both Latin America and post-communist Europe, critical junctures of market reforms mattered in the aftermath period. Where such junctures facilitated programmatic alignment, center-left forces tended to strengthen, thus limiting the degree of populist electoral success over time. The opposite effects are observable in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures, where center-left forces tended to weaken, thereby contributing to superior electoral results of populist actors. While the previous chapter focused on the connection between critical junctures and center-left electoral performance, this chapter focused on the connection between center-left electoral performance and the populist vote. In particular, it provided evidence in support of the validity of this connection across countries and time for two regions of the world analyzed both separately and together.

The chapter began by elaborating a strategy for empirical assessment of the proposed theory against rival explanations. Having elaborated the scope of the study – covering 153 democratic elections in 18 Latin American and 15 post-communist countries in the aftermath of critical junctures of economic reform – I highlighted eight variables of interest. The eight variables of interest include four different specifications of center-left performance in the aftermath of

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62 As discussed in the previous chapters, this includes Latin America’s aligning and neutral critical junctures as well as post-communist Europe’s aligning and re-aligning critical junctures.
critical junctures and four corresponding measures for center-right electoral performance. The rationale for this choice of key independent variables of interest was to facilitate a systematic comparison of the effects that changes in the two main pillars of party systems – the center-left and the center-right – may have on the populist vote, the dependent variable measured both “at minimum” and “at maximum” (as developed in Chapter 3). Additionally, while three of these variables conceptualize electoral performance as a long-term effect of the critical juncture, the fourth variable conceptualizes it as a short-term vote change from one election to the next. Such a differentiation allows for a distinction between long-term effects conditioned by critical junctures and more proximate effects that are less associated with critical junctures.

Next, I presented the rich dataset that I specifically developed for the present analysis. Based on this dataset, I performed a number of statistical tests by analyzing the regions separately and together with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations, as well as with fixed-effects and random-effects models appropriate for analyzing panel data. I examined the key variables of interests both independently and against a number of controls that operationalize many explanations from the literature in order to provide a systematic assessment of the possible effects of a variety of factors on the dependent variable for both regions.

The results from the analysis strongly support the hypothesis that center-left electoral performance in the aftermath of critical junctures of market reform made a difference in terms of electoral support for populists in Latin America and post-communist Europe. The probabilistic effects of the critical juncture are tangible both across space and across time, as the different specifications of the main explanatory variable – center-left electoral performance after critical junctures – show in both the OLS and panel data analyses. In both regions, center-left electoral performance is a partial, yet consistent predictor that is inversely correlated with the populist vote.
While the ongoing performance of the center-left is contingent on many factors, which I have not explored here, critical junctures have powerful conditioning effects on the electoral performance of the center-left in both regions, as Chapter 5 showed. In turn, the electoral performance of the center-left – especially when conceptualized relative to the moment immediately before the critical juncture – is a powerful and reliable predictor of populist voting in Latin America and post-communist Europe. By contrast, when center-left electoral performance is conceptualized as the short-term vote change form one election to the next, it explains less of the variation in the dependent variable.

Of course, the electoral performance of the center-left is to a large extent related to issues of overall party system institutionalization. As shown in detail in Chapter 5, where the center-left is highly volatile, party systems tend to be less institutionalized than in contexts with a stable center-left. Of course, party systems are not solely comprised of center-left actors. By analyzing the respective electoral performances of the two traditional pillars of party systems – the center-left and the center-right – as independent variables, I have examined one important aspect of party system institutionalization. As shown by previous research, populist actors in Latin America and post-communist Europe are more likely to be electorally successful where party systems are relatively volatile. This chapter contributes to this literature by specifying the role of the center-left and the center-right in this process. The above analysis has demonstrated that if party systems exhibit a significant degree of variation in terms of institutionalization and if populists manage to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by weakly institutionalized party systems, it is mostly the center-left whose long-term electoral decline such populists tend to exploit in the aftermath of critical junctures of market reform.

As this chapter has also shown, the statistically significant inverse relationship between
center-left and populist electoral performance is not 1:1. Indeed, as the statistical models demonstrated, there are other factors that can also matter for populist electoral success. For example, both rentier potential and low Western leverage correlate with the populist vote in Latin America while inflation and union density appear as potentially relevant factors in post-communist Europe. However, because such factors only become significant in interaction with others, they are not, by themselves, sufficient predictors of the populist vote. Moreover, while such factors may be important in one of the regions, they tend to lose significance in the joint analysis of both regions. What is important in both regions – whether analyzed separately or together – is long-term center-left electoral performance, which is both inversely correlated with the populist vote and conditioned by critical junctures of market reform.

Intriguingly, the inverse relationship between center-left electoral performance and populist electoral performance in the two regions is comparable despite the institutional, cultural, and socio-economic differences between Latin America and post-communist Europe. As the statistical models show, center-left electoral performance appears as a significant and substantial predictor of the populist vote in both regions. Thus, even with their unique contexts, these two regions share much in common. As their recent political histories were conditioned by the legacies of critical junctures of market reform, Latin America and post-communist Europe experienced similar path dependent processes. Of particular importance in these processes was the center-left, whose variable political positions during the critical juncture tended to translate into long-term divergences in terms of its own subsequent electoral performance, which, in turn, conditioned opportunities for variable degrees of populist success at the ballot box. If the “reactive sequence” originating in critical junctures of market reform culminated with the electoral rise of populists in both regions, the mediating role that the center-left played in this process is difficult to dispute.
7.
ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS AND CRISES IN PERU AND ECUADOR

7.1. Introduction

If critical junctures are moments of dramatic change, they must obviously disrupt previous long-term patterns of development. Yet critical junctures also resolve key tensions accumulated in the immediately preceding cleavages which, in turn, are shaped by antecedent historical conditions. This chapter begins identifying the historical processes of continuity and change by focusing on the case studies of Peru and Ecuador – two otherwise similar Andean countries in which varying patterns of critical antecedents gave rise to contrasting cleavages before critical junctures of market reform. The chapter is organized in two main sections of comparative historical analysis – the first focusing on critical antecedents, the second on the subsequent periods of cleavage and crisis – in Peru and Ecuador.

In the first part, I show how despite the many historical similarities between Peru and Ecuador, the two countries differed regarding the most defining political experience of the 20th century – that with populism. In Peru, the development – and political exclusion – of a powerful labor-based populist party eventually led to a statist military dictatorship with labor-mobilizing prerogatives. In Ecuador, by contrast, populism – which developed in an elitist party system and which the country experienced in the executive branch on many occasions – was more patrimonial and labor-demobilizing. These historical differences between labor-mobilization and elitism would, in turn, give rise to contrasting cleavage patterns in Peru and Ecuador.

In the second part, I analyze the evolution of the contrasting cleavages and crises that grew out of the different historical experiences in what are otherwise generally similar contexts. Indeed, broad historical similarities between Peru and Ecuador persisted – first, with a similar transition
from military statism to military conservatism, second – with the pacted transition to democracy, third, with the ideological polarization between partisans of economic populism and their neoliberal opponents, and fourth, with the failures of conservative governments to implement lasting market reforms in the early democratic period after the fall of military dictatorships. Yet the cleavage periods of the two countries ended in ways that were dramatically different – with a major hyperinflationary crisis that delegitimized key left-leaning political actors in Peru and with a comparably minor economic decline in the context of which left-leaning political actors remained relatively strong in Ecuador. Importantly, these outcomes immediately before the critical juncture were conditioned by the two countries’ critical antecedents.

In Peru, where the labor-based populist party APRA had been uniquely excluded from politics (rather than “allowed” to govern in the middle of the 20th century), labor-mobilization was taken up by a military dictatorship, a development that effectively strengthened the radical partisan Left. This strong Left then created an environmental context that pressured APRA, finally legal and in power in the democratic 1980s, to engage in populist economic policy despite Peru’s growing economic problems. Overall, the result – hyperinflationary disaster and the delegitimization of left-leaning parties – was a path-dependent effect of the historical pattern of labor mobilization. Although the logic of the Peruvian case is exceptional in the context of Latin America’s other labor-mobilizing systems due to APRA’s historical exclusion from politics, it nevertheless confirms Roberts’ finding that high degrees of labor mobilization led to relatively deeper economic problems as the state-led model of economic development became exhausted.

In Ecuador, by contrast, the historical pattern of party system elitism meant low levels of labor mobilization, even in the context of a progressive military dictatorship similar to Peru’s. As the country transitioned to democracy, the absence of a powerful radical Left similar to the one
that had emerged in Peru meant that the democratic governments of the 1980s had a freer hand in terms of implementing limited austerity measures, thereby preventing economic collapse. In a context of relative economic stability, the patrimonial legacies from the past persisted while limited economically populist measures benefited popular majorities. Importantly, Ecuador’s economic decline without collapse in the 1980s benefited the social democratic party rather than de-legitimize it – a somewhat ironic outcome given the country’s elitist critical antecedents.

Overall, this chapter accomplishes three main objectives. First, it compares and contrasts the historical experiences of two otherwise similar systems in order to discover critical differences that would condition further developments in both. Second, it identifies the main periods of cleavage and crisis as analytically different and prior to the subsequent critical junctures of market reform (which they nevertheless conditioned). Third and finally, the chapter lays the analytical groundwork for comparing not only subsequent critical junctures and their effects in Peru and Ecuador, but also in the geographically distant but analytically parallel contrasting experiences of Poland and Slovakia.

**7.2. Antecedent Conditions in Peru and Ecuador**

Peru and Ecuador share a number of historical commonalities featuring both economic and political instability, alternating periods of military repression and intermittent and weak democracy, and progressive military dictatorships towards the end of the state-led model of economic development. Yet the two countries’ historical experience with populism was dramatically different. Whereas in Peru, the historical populist project was organized around a labor-based party whose exclusion from politics resulted in a statist and labor-mobilizing military dictatorship, in Ecuador the long history of populism was characterized by elitist and patrimonial tendencies that effectively resulted in labor mobilization that remained weak even under the
auspices of left-leaning military statism. Despite the many similarities between the two countries, these key and contrasting critical antecedents would evolve into very different types of cleavage during the period immediately preceding critical junctures.

Peru’s Antecedent Conditions: Labor Mobilization Under Democracy and Dictatorship

Oligarchic Domination Before the 1930s

Even before Peru’s independence from Spain, Lima had grown to political, religious, and cultural prominence as the coastal city had served as the administrative capital of the viceroyalty of Peru, from where colonial rule was extended over most of South America. From Lima, European economic elites, constituting a “republic of Spaniards,” profited from commercial, agricultural, and mining activities that depended heavily on the labor of those living in the highland “republic of Indians.”¹ The native population was mostly distributed in large estates (encomiendas), where a privileged white class (encomenderos) exploited Indians for the purposes of large scale agriculture² and especially metal production for an export-oriented economy.³ Often acting as direct representatives of the Spanish government in the countryside (corregidores), members of the privileged class had distributed among themselves such “enormous blocs of native labor, land, and mineral resources”⁴ that they did not fully embrace independence until relatively late out of fear of Indian and slave retribution.⁵

When Peru achieved independence in 1824, the economic structure was largely preserved as the encomiendas gave way to large-scale haciendas that sustained similarly exploitative land

¹ Levitt 2012: 7
² Engerman and Sokoloff 2000: 126
³ Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 18
⁴ Engerman and Sokoloff 2000: 125
⁵ Levitt 2012: 7-8
and labor practices as well as a highly unequal distribution of wealth and political power.\footnote{Engerman and Sokoloff 2000: 126, 129} When conflicts developed, they were between Arequipa merchants and Lima elites whose “intense struggles”\footnote{Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 18} contributed to enormous political instability marked by six constitutions in the 1820s and 1830s and over forty presidents between 1821 and 1845,\footnote{Levitt 2012: 8} the year when strongman Ramón Castilla rose to the presidency. The caudillo’s rule coincided with the \textit{guano} export boom between the 1840s and 1870s,\footnote{Coatsworth 1998: 33} a period during which Castilla attempted to modernize Peru by abolishing slavery and repealing the head tax on Indians. He also attempted to centralize the state, broaden participation, professionalize the military, and build a public-school system.\footnote{Levitt 2012: 8} This liberal modernization project failed to outlast what turned out to be a short-lived \textit{guano} windfall, however, as geographical fragmentation and the resistance of regional landed elites – such as those controlling mining and sheep raising in the central and southern highlands – proved to be unsurmountable obstacles to state-led change. By the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Peru had fallen behind not only because of the lost War of the Pacific to Chile,\footnote{Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 26} but also because its unreformed economic system continued relying on high tax and regulatory burdens as well as on cheap indigenous and slave labor in less accessible highland regions.\footnote{Coatsworth 1998: 38}

Nevertheless, largely due to Peru’s considerable economic heterogeneity relying on a diverse set of exports, such as copper, sugar, cotton, oil, wool, and rubber,\footnote{Collier and Collier 1991: 130} export-based growth resumed by the 1890s. In turn, the ascendancy of the agro-export bourgeoisie culminated in the Aristocratic Republic (1885-1919), a period of stability, which was ushered in by Nicolás de
Pierola and during which political domination came to be structured mostly through the oligarchic Civilista Party representing the interests of the economic elite of the coast. While other parties – such as the Democrats, the Constitutionalists, and the Liberals – existed, they were more regionally oriented and largely agreed with the Civilistas in their acceptance of economic liberalism. Although “the central state became more institutionalized and the size of the electorate grew,” politics was still dominated by regionally based oligarchs who “retained their authority over the indigenous labor force even after the triumph of liberalism.”

At the same time, by the beginning of the 20th century, Lima’s urbanization had started to provide the basis for early and “unusually intense” and “vigorous labor protest running well ahead of the systematic organization of unions.” In turn, the growing mobilization, including Peru’s first general strike in 1911, resulted in attempts to pass progressive legislation during José Pardo’s, Augusto Leguía’s, and Guillermo Billinghurst’s administrations before 1919. When in 1919 new unprecedented protests led to the passage of the eight-hour work day while also intensifying state repression under Pardo’s second government, Civilista rule became discredited in the eyes of both protestors and conservatives. When the disputed 1919 election resulted in a 11-year military dictatorship under Leguía, the Aristocratic Republic was over.

Although mass mobilization had triggered the transition out of oligarchic rule, Leguía soon moved from cooperation with to repression of urban labor. In turn, this triggered the further mobilization of popular sectors under two new factions – the socialists, led by José Carlos Mariátegui, who would become 20th century Latin America’s most influential leftist thinker, and

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14 Levitt 2012: 8
15 Collier and Collier 1991: 131
16 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 26
17 Levitt 2012: 8-9
18 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 27
19 Collier and Collier 1991: 90
20 Ibid.: 91, 132-3, 749
the populists, led by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who would become 20th century Peru’s most important political figure. Underpinned by an exponentially growing working class – particularly in Lima – these movements protested what was a new plutocracy created by the “wildly pro-US dictatorship”21 whose challenge of the oligarchy was only superficial as it favored new individuals from the already established coastal and highland elites.22 By the 1930s, the most pressing question for Peruvian elites was how to deal with popular, and particularly labor, mobilization.

**Dictatorial and Democratic Solutions to Labor Incorporation (1930s-1960s)**

In the early 1930s, lower classes had coalesced around Haya’s American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) and nationalist-populist general Luis Sánchez Cerro, who assumed the presidency by leading a coup in 1930 and who was in fact supported by the old and still-dominant economic elite. When Haya lost the 1931 presidential election to Sánchez Cerro, radicalized APRA militants responded by adopting anti-imperialist appeals, by calling for the incorporation of the indigenous majority into political life, and, in 1933, by assassinating the president.23 Following a period of intense popular mobilization featuring the less successful efforts of the socialist-led union General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) and the more successful, but violent, efforts of the charismatic-led and radicalized APRA, Peru’s labor movement still faced “severe restrictions” in terms of trade union organizing. Even though Peru’s next dictator, Óscar Benavides (1933-39), adopted some legislation favoring unions,24 the fact that a growing labor movement was now dominated by a radicalized and proscribed party complicated

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21 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 30-1  
22 Collier and Collier 1991: 138-45  
23 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 32-3  
24 Collier and Collier 149-57
the relationship between organized labor and the state, which was still dominated by the fiscal austerity-favoring export bourgeoisie.25

The end of Benavides’ dictatorship in 1939 coincided with a new climate favoring the emerging commercial and manufacturing urban sectors and with greater acceptance of leftist parties, such as APRA, in the context of WWII.26 Consequentially, “conservative modernizer” Manuel Prado (1939-45), elected with APRA and communist support, made a “modest step” towards democracy and gradually incorporated the labor movement into political life. To this end, Prado’s administration legalized APRA and supported the formation of a new union, the Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CTP),27 which APRA came to dominate.28 Likewise, the next president, José Luis Bustamante (1945-48), was also brought to power by an alliance which incorporated both the communists and APRA,29 and which by now constituted a multiclass coalition of union workers, middle classes represented in the party’s leadership, peasants from the north, and provincial aristocrats.30 Bustamante launched a project “from above” to institutionalize the labor movements into political life, which APRA accommodated by embracing considerable ideological flexibility and restraint. For its moderation, APRA was rewarded privileged access to the state and its resources, which, in turn, helped it dominate the labor movement whose demands – for higher wages, collective bargaining, and congressional representation – were now recognized and addressed by the state, but whose leadership turned increasingly conservative. Nevertheless, this critical juncture of ambitious labor incorporation into Peruvian politics was marred by a deepening antagonism between APRA and the old oligarchy, which interpreted the new economic

25 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 35
26 Collier and Collier 1991: 153, 316-7
27 Confederación de Trabajadores del Perú
28 Collier and Collier 1991: 318
29 Levitt 2012: 11
30 Collier and Collier 1991: 319
policy favoring labor as inflationary. In fact, the high degree of labor mobilization associated with APRA’s incorporation into the political system meant that public spending had accelerated under both Prado’s and Bustamante’s administrations.

In the end, Peru’s mid-century democratic interlude ended as growing tensions precipitated another military coup and the subsequent dictatorship under Manuel Odría (1948-56) who immediately repressed APRA, the communists, and the overall labor movement, and reinstated liberal economic policies favoring cotton and sugar agro-exporters from the north. At the same time, Odría attempted to gain labor support with wage increases and public spending, especially on low income communities. These initiatives did not last long, however, as the end of WWII diminished export-led growth, a development which, in turn, convinced the military that a more open presidential election in 1956 may pre-empt an imminent systemic crisis. Still illegal and fearing that presidential contender Fernando Belaúnde presented a credible reformist alternative that could potentially threaten APRA’s dominant position in the labor movement, APRA supported the oligarchic candidate Manuel Prado. As demonstrated by Collier and Collier, this act – motivated by APRA’s ban – would fundamentally shape the Peruvian political arena in subsequent decades.

With APRA’s crucial support, Prado won the election and legalized APRA, thereby ushering in a period known as the coexistence (convivencia) between 1956 and 1962. During this period, APRA achieved congressional representation and lobbied for labor-friendly policies, such as a comprehensive industrial law, tariff protections for domestic industry, and pension increases.

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31 Ibid.: 319-30
32 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 35; Collier and Collier 1991: 749
33 Levitt 2012: 12
34 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 35
35 Collier and Collier 1991: 470-4
36 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 36
measures that consolidated its links with labor unions and the working class electoral base but not with middle sectors or the peasantry. Notwithstanding such advances in terms of labor links and policies, APRA experienced a generalized programmatic shift to the center-right, now visible in the abandonment of its former class-conflict orientation and calls for agrarian reform in favor of acceptance of Prado’s generally pro-export economic approach favoring the oligarchy.

**APRA’s Anti-reformism in the 1960s**

By the early 1960s, APRA was playing a “difficult game” that guaranteed the party’s participation in political life, but at the cost of an ideological “conservatization” that essentially guaranteed a missed “historical opportunity to play a central role in the new reformism.” Instead, the reformist currents were now associated with the Christian Democrats, the Social Progressives, the Communists, and especially with Popular Action (AP) – Belaúnde’s centrist and non-ideological party of cadres that claimed APRA’s former progressive mantle. While all of these parties would subsequently express their reformist orientation by mobilizing the massive peasant sectors of the highlands, APRA was engaged in conservative coalition-making – first with Prado (and the oligarchy), second with Odría, and third with AP’s conservative wing. This new orientation was confirmed when – in the aftermath of the 1962 and 1963 general elections in which Haya de la Torre was finally allowed to run as a presidential contender – APRA formed an anti-reformist coalition with the party of Manuel Odría, the dictator who had repressed APRA in the

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37 Collier and Collier 1991: 477-81  
38 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 36  
39 Collier and Collier 1991: 469, 477, 482  
40 Levitt 2012: 12-3  
41 In 1962, APRA won over 40% of congressional seats while party leader Haya de la Torre won a plurality in the presidential election (33%) but not the minimum one-third of the vote required to become president. This ultimately provoked a military coup on the part of anti-APRA generals. In 1963, Haya won over a third of the vote, but placed second, after Belaúnde who became president.
past. If APRA’s coalition with Odría largely stymied the progressive plans for tax and agrarian reform of Belaúnde’s presidency (1963-68), the subsequent coalition with the AP’s conservative faction strengthened the position of financial, industrial, and agro-export domestic elites with strong ties to foreign capital. Indeed, as traditional agro-exports declined and foreign capital became more dominant in half of Peru’s manufacturing and most mining production, APRA opportunistically reoriented itself from a coalition with the domestic oligarchy to a coalition favorable to foreign capital. Such tactical maneuvers were the political price APRA had to pay for entry into the political system after a 30-year period of repression. Nevertheless, even though this ideological reorientation drained leftist elements from APRA, the party still managed to retain “a major working class electoral base” and union support throughout the early 1960s.

By the late 1960s, however, even with continuous control over its core labor constituency, most of which was concentrated in the coastal north, APRA was failing to respond to new peasant and leftist grievances inspired by the Cuban Revolution. Instead, APRA’s anti-reformist coalitions with the persistently strong oligarchy, its anti-reformist and obstructionist coalition with Odría, and its endorsement of an economic stabilization program in order to deal with the crisis in 1967 all discredited APRA, both in the eyes of important sectors of the Left and in the eyes of an already antagonistic military (which now feared peasant mobilization and guerilla movements). In the end, APRA’s anti-reformism throughout the 1960s undermined the legitimacy of the democratic regime as both popular sectors and the military now saw the party as too conservative to provide a credible alternative for governance in Peru. It was in this context of Peru’s “difficult game” – according

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42 Collier and Collier 1991: 482, 696-706
43 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 38; Levitt 2012: 13; Collier and Collier 1991: 703, 715-7
44 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 37-8
45 Collier and Collier 1991: 705-6; 710-14
46 Ibid.: 695, 714, 719-20

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to whose paradoxical logic the labor movement constituted the backbone of an anti-reformist opposition – that the military took over by a coup in 1968.

**Military Statism and Transition to Democracy (1968-1980)**

The decade-long military dictatorship proceeded in two stages – the first associated with nationalist popular mobilization and anti-business policies; the second associated with economic and political liberalization. The first phase was dominated by General Velasco Alvarado (1968-75) who sought to confront the budgetary and balance-of-payments problems (caused by the decline of agro-exports and decreasing levels of foreign investment) by economically nationalistic means consistent with the new anti-oligarchic position of a newly emergent developmentalist coalition.\(^47\) Indeed, as the brief 1962-3 military interlude had already indicated, important sectors within the increasingly professionalized military had emerged as advocates for structural changes and agrarian reform as they identified the oligopolistic concentration of assets in the hands of local oligarchs and foreign investors to be the main reasons for Peru’s underdevelopment.\(^48\) In line with such thinking, under general Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75), Peru experienced a massive expansion of the state in terms of public institutions, employees, and state enterprises as well as a drastic limitation on the role of foreign capital by means of regulation and limitation of property rights (including the nationalization and expropriation of holdings).\(^49\) Overall, Velasco’s adoption of ISI seriously antagonized business and mobilized popular organization, including of the peasantry, not only discursively but also – and more importantly – in practical terms. This included the implementation of an ambitious agrarian reform, the creation of a new system for agrarian

\(^{47}\) Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 39

\(^{48}\) Ibid.: 38, 51

\(^{49}\) Ibid.: 52, 60-1
social mobilization (SINAMOS\textsuperscript{50}), the foundation of a new labor confederation aligned with the military (CTRP\textsuperscript{51}), and the legalization of the communist union CGTP\textsuperscript{52} – all of which mobilized to support a new “social property sector” favorable to labor and lower-class groups.\textsuperscript{53} In turn, such actions significantly weakened APRA and strengthened the “New Left.”\textsuperscript{54}

Peru’s social revolution under Velasco Alvarado caused significant capital flight and began being associated with a stagnant export sector, growing mismanagement and indebtedness problems signaling economic decline.\textsuperscript{55} This provoked a right-wing challenge on the part of a new intellectual class – headed by figures such as economist Hernando de Soto and novelist Mario Vargas Llosa – against “irrational state growth.” Typically channeled via the National Society of Industries (SNI),\textsuperscript{56} such attacks eventually materialized in the removal of Velasco and the subsequent installation of a more conservative military regime under Francisco Morales Bermúdez (1975-80).\textsuperscript{57} This new regime initiated political liberalization that was welcomed by political parties and began a process of economic liberalization that was opposed by the popular sectors recently mobilized under Velasco. For example, a 1977 general strike protesting price increases “was the largest and most comprehensive in Peru’s history.”\textsuperscript{58} Although partial reforms improved Peru’s economic position, popular dissatisfaction made it difficult to control spending and the fiscal deficit, a situation that, in turn, complicated negotiations with the IMF.\textsuperscript{59} Such problems, coupled with intense social opposition to the reforms, sealed the military’s decision to allow a

\textsuperscript{50} Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (National System for the Support of Social Mobilization)
\textsuperscript{51} Federación de Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana (Workers’ Federation of the Peruvian Revolution)
\textsuperscript{52} Confederación General de Trabajadores del Perú (General Confederation of Peruvian Workers)
\textsuperscript{53} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 58-62, 64-6
\textsuperscript{54} Levitt 2012: 14. E.g., the APRA-led union CTP was destroyed.
\textsuperscript{55} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 100-2
\textsuperscript{56} Sociedad Nacional de Industrias
\textsuperscript{57} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 80, 84-5
\textsuperscript{58} Levitt 2012: 15
\textsuperscript{59} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 104
democratic transition by means of an election for Constituent Assembly in 1978. With Belaúnde’s reformist AP refusing to participate, the Constitutional Assembly – presided over by a now octogenarian Haya de la Torre – came to be dominated by APRA and the Christian People’s Party (PPC), both of which agreed to define Peru as a social market economy and to restore property rights. With the return of democracy, APRA was once again a central political player – but this time in a different Peru whose new “massive informal sector” was now available for another wave of political mobilization.

**Ecuador’s Antecedent Conditions: Populist Patrimonialism in an Elitist Party System**

**The Oligarchic Duopoly Before the 1930s**

Immediately after achieving independence with the breakup of Gran Colombia in 1830, Ecuador became characterized by the rise of social divisions based on *caudillismo* and by sustained emerging territorial rivalries between the Andean highlands and the coastal regions. The highlands, dominated by the capital Quito, gradually became the ground of conservative elites who based their rule on pre-existing colonial landholding patterns of agrarian production. According to these patterns, the descendants of European colonizers – either *criollos* or *mestizos* – subjected the large indigenous population to racial and cultural discrimination as well as to servitude for the purposes of agricultural production for an export-oriented economy. The coastal areas, on the other hand, gradually developed as a more liberal region around the country’s main port city Guayaquil which promoted commercial agro-export interests and from where frequent

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60 Conaghan and Mally 1994: 86-9, 95; Levitt 2012: 16
61 Collier and Collier 1991: 765
62 *Criollos* were individuals of European descent born in the Americas. *Mestizos* are individuals of mixed indigenous and European descent. As explained by Mardid, racial mixing (*mestizaje*) has not eliminated racial discrimination (2012: 20-1).
63 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 18
insurrections challenged power in Quito throughout the 19th century.\textsuperscript{64}

Conservatives and liberals alternated in power between the second half of the 19th century and the 1920s. First, under the presidency of García Moreno – the founder of the Conservative Party (PC) – a conservative revolution modernized the country through a series of public works while also elevating the status of the Catholic Church and repressing the liberal opposition. After Moreno was assassinated, Ecuador plunged into political uncertainty marked by unsuccessful attempts to bridge the partisan divide – first by dictatorial means under General Ignacio de Veintimilla, then by more moderate means under the civilian presidents of the 1880s and early 1890s. In 1895, Eloy Alfaro – who had founded the Ecuadorian Radical Liberal Party (PLRE) – led a liberal revolution that launched Ecuador’s second ambitious modernization program which included building a Trans-Andean Railroad connecting Quito and Guayaquil, restricting the power of the Catholic Church, and establishing a repressive dictatorship. Under Alfaro, the dominant highland oligarchy that had underpinned earlier conservative rule was replaced by a coastal coalition of banking interests and landlords overseeing the production of cocoa, of which Ecuador had become the world’s leading producer.\textsuperscript{65} A symbiotic relationship – known as the bancocracia – emerged according to which Ecuador’s central government, in a perpetual state of fiscal crisis, borrowed heavily from domestic banks that were controlled by the economically powerful agro-exporting elites.\textsuperscript{66} Overall, whether Ecuador’s revolutions were conservative or liberal, the patrimonial political structure that – under the leadership of a national caudillo – divided the country between a landholding oligarchic class (first in the highlands, then on the coast) and manual laborers persisted well into the 20th century.

\textsuperscript{64} Lauderbaugh 2012: 23-52; Alexander 2007: 155-6; de la Torre 2010
\textsuperscript{65} Lauderbaugh 2012: 53-93
\textsuperscript{66} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 26-7
While regional cleavages based on clientelistic relationships continued as a legacy of the 19th century, the transition to an agro-export economy during the years of Alfaro’s Liberal Revolution had brought the rise of middle classes that preferred military careers and of urban working classes that demanded higher wages and improved working conditions. When world market demand for cacao began dropping in the 1920s, those working on the cocoa plantations staged strikes and protests while inflation deepened the divisions inside the dominant liberal camp, leading to its deposition through a military coup known as the July Revolution. Although the military government of Isidro Ayora reversed debt-fed public spending by implementing austerity measures and by restructuring Ecuador’s bureaucracy and business-government relations, such innovations could not counteract the negative effects the Great Depression of 1929 had on evolving class structures. The situation deteriorated further when conservatives and liberals attempted to settle the disputed 1932 presidential election results via a four-day armed conflict.

Velasco’s Labor-demobilizing Populism (1930s-1960s)

It was under such circumstances of severe political fragmentation and economic crisis that Velasquismo – 20th century Ecuador’s “most important political phenomenon” – came to initial prominence in 1933, when conservative highland elites supported José María Velasco Ibarra’s first presidential candidacy. Running the first modern campaign in Ecuador’s history, Velasco was a highly charismatic and rhetorically anti-oligarchic candidate who took extensive trips to directly transmit his populist message to a changing electorate. His first presidency – which did not even last a year – featured a new program of clientelistic spending, intense confrontation with congress,
and an attempt to impose a dictatorship in the midst of economic crisis, an act for which Velasco
was promptly deposed in a military coup in 1935. Next, it was the military government, not
Velasco, that introduced some pro-labor measures before the liberals returned to power (by
defrauding Velasco) to reverse progressive reforms.

After WWII, the liberals were once again removed in a coup and Velasco was re-installed
as president for a second time in 1944. Although this time he had been brought to power by a
diverse coalition including the Conservative Party as well as socialists, communists, liberal
dissidents, workers, and students, he soon decided to govern independently from congress and
with the support of the military – an ill-fated experiment that ended with another coup in 1947.
When Velasco returned to the presidency for a third time in 1952, his coalition was different once
more, this time including the support of the ultra-right wing Ecuadorian Nationalist Revolutionary
Action Party and of the Concentration of People’s Forces (CFP), a new populist party of the coast.
The extreme cabinet instability that resulted from Velasco’s volatile coalition did not impede the
president from constructing more public works, such as highways and schools, or from expanding
the military budget, based on which he managed to gain the army’s loyalty while also increasing
the country’s debt. After completing his only full term in office, Velasco supported social-
Christian candidate Camilo Ponce Enriquez who became Ecuador’s next president in 1956.

In the 1960s, Velasco returned to the presidency twice more. His fourth term – which he
won as an independent and after breaking with Ponce Enriquez – began in 1960 and featured the
construction of low-cost housing for the poor, a controversial endorsement of the Cuban

71 Lauderbaugh 2012: 102
72 See the discussion towards the end of this section.
73 In 1940, Velasco competed against candidates of both the PC and PLRE.
75 de la Torre 2000: 37
76 Lauderbaugh 2012: 107-12
77 Ibid.: 117-22
Revolution, and the repression of student and labor union demonstrators. This, in turn, led to violence precipitating another military coup in 1961. Returning to the presidency for a fifth and final time in 1968, Velasco assumed dictatorial powers two years later and used Ecuador’s newly found oil reserves to boost public spending and to borrow heavily. For a fourth and final time, he failed to complete his term as the military deposed him in 1972, months before his constitutional term would have expired.  

Velasco’s unique role in Ecuadorian politics is highly controversial and associated both with considerable change and continuity. The change was that the two traditional oligarchic parties – PC and PLRE – gradually lost control of Ecuador’s patrimonial state and its clientelistic apparatus, as Velasco routinely defeated their candidates between 1933 and 1968 by incorporating “previously excluded people in the political community.” From this perspective, Velasquismo can be interpreted as a democratizing force, especially considering that the period of the mid-twentieth century coincided with the gradual removal of voting restrictions and the increasing availability of popular constituencies for incorporation into the political process.

At the same time, however, Velasco represents continuity because he was “closely linked to the traditional parties and the dominant class-backers” and “did not incorporate redistributive promises into his popular rhetorical package” or in his actual economic policies. Indeed, Velasco’s struggle was primarily against the liberal oligarchy. Due to his “deep conservatism,” Velasco was supported by the Conservative Party in 1933 and 1944, and he himself supported conservative Ponce Enríquez when he could not compete in 1956. By the 1960s, when the Liberal

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78 Lauderbaugh 2012: 123-9
79 de la Torre 2010: 30, 36
80 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 33
81 de la Torre 2010: 47-59
82 Conaghan 1988: 80
Party was in decline and the Conservative Party had all but disappeared, Velasco’s relations with the center-left and populist CFP were adversarial. In short, although Velasco rhetorically opposed the old oligarchic duopoly, the popular incorporation he achieved “was more symbolic than real.” Rather than build “a mass-based, labor-mobilizing alternative,” as Haya de la Torre had done in Peru, Ecuador’s most successful populist preferred to sustain elitist forms of domination centered on patrimonial relations – as demonstrated not only by his highly idiosyncratic and unstable electoral coalitions and his refusal to respect institutionalized party politics, but also by his clientelistic public works projects, the only constant feature of Velasco’s otherwise ideologically inconsistent presidencies.

**Military Statism (1970s)**

The political agent that acted to empower Ecuador’s lower classes was the military. Although Ecuador’s populist experience did not produce a mass-based party in support of ISI, the introduction of ISI as an alternative to traditional agro-export dependence had been a subject of discussion within many of the governments since the 1940s. In fact, the first serious attempt to challenge Ecuador’s traditional economic structure was in the late 1930s, when the military “granted legal recognition to trade unions, struck down restrictions on left-wing parties, and proposed tighter regulations on foreign investment,” policies that were immediately reversed by a liberal president. The second attempt to promote an alternative “developmentalist” model was between 1963 and 1966, when the military attempted to implement modest tax and agrarian

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83 The adversarial relationship had begun in 1952, when Velasco sent CFP’s leader, Guevara Moreno, in exile after Guevara Moreno withdrew the party’s support of Velasco’s candidature in the last moment (Lauderbaugh 2012: 120)
84 de la Torre 2000
85 Roberts 2014: 76
86 Conaghan 1988: 41-7
87 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 33
reforms, including the redistribution of property\textsuperscript{88} and the abolition of \textit{huasipungo} – a long-standing practice of exploiting indigenous labor that approximated medieval serfdom.\textsuperscript{89} Because the progressive measures faced an “across-the-board mobilization by business groups” from both the coast and the highlands, the military retreated, giving back power to traditional sectors.\textsuperscript{90}

The military’s third attempt to challenge the agro-exporting model dominated by the traditional oligarchy was most successful. Motivated by security concerns that the failures of oligarchic elites would eventually lead to a communist revolutionary movement, in 1972, General Rodríguez Lara embarked on an effort to build a “nationalist, popular, anti-feudal and anti-oligarchic”\textsuperscript{91} developmental state in line with dependency theory and on the basis of import substitution industrialization (ISI).\textsuperscript{92} While the ultimate goal was the creation of a nationalist industrial bourgeoisie and many of the actual policies benefited business elites,\textsuperscript{93} Rodríguez Lara’s dictatorship was in fact opposed by the industrial bourgeoisie\textsuperscript{94} – mostly because the regime significantly increased the size and role of the state\textsuperscript{95} and introduced an agrarian reform law according to which non-productive agricultural property could be expropriated.\textsuperscript{96} Under statist military rule, minimal wages and labor union membership grew, a reason why the dictatorship was supported by the CTE,\textsuperscript{97} Ecuador’s largest trade union.\textsuperscript{98} The military’s corporatist land reforms

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.: 39, 51
\textsuperscript{89} Lauderbaugh 2012: 127
\textsuperscript{90} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 39
\textsuperscript{91} Conaghan 1988: 9
\textsuperscript{92} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 48, 55
\textsuperscript{93} For example, the government bailed out failing firms and transferred oil revenues to investors in large-scale industries. Overall, the military was favorable to big business, with preferential treatment for nontraditional export industries (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 56).
\textsuperscript{94} Conaghan 1988: 76-101
\textsuperscript{95} Public sector investment and consumption as percentage of the GDP increased from 16\% to 23\% between 1972 and 1976 (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 51-2).
\textsuperscript{96} Conaghan 1988: 94-7
\textsuperscript{97} Confederación de Trabajadores Ecuatorianos, founded in 1944
\textsuperscript{98} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 62-3; Alexander 2007: 194
also incorporated Indians and peasants and expanded social programs to the rural poor.\textsuperscript{99} While such initiatives were meant to incorporate Ecuador’s Indians into the national culture, they had the unintended consequence of facilitating indigenous local autonomy and subsequent appeals for legal recognition.\textsuperscript{100}

**Labor Weakness and Transition to Democracy**

Despite the military’s efforts, Ecuador’s overall political and economic developments throughout the 20\textsuperscript{th} century had highly negative implications for organized labor. Due to continued oligarchic domination over workers employed in agro-exporting activities, Velasco’s opportunism, and the military’s anti-communism, the labor movement had been traditionally weak. Indeed, well after WWII Ecuador “was the only South American country in which a clear distinction had not appeared between mutual benefit societies and trade unions.”\textsuperscript{101} After WWII, workers were typically organized under one of three labor organizations – the leftist CTE, the traditionally Catholic CEDOC,\textsuperscript{102} and the centrist CEOSL\textsuperscript{103} – none of which had a reliable political patron until the 1970s. For example, although the CTE was founded during the second presidency of Velasco (1944-47) – to which he had been brought with socialist and communist support – Velasco’s subsequent repression of the Left significantly strained relations between the CTE and populism.\textsuperscript{104} Labor relations with the military were also strained until the 1970s, as demonstrated by the hostility of the 1963-66 military regime towards both the CTE and CEOSL.\textsuperscript{105} And while relations between Rodríguez Lara’s military regime and organized labor were initially

\textsuperscript{99} Yashar 2005: 91-97
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.: 95-6
\textsuperscript{101} Alexander 2007: 156
\textsuperscript{102} Confederación Nacional de Obreros Católicos, founded in the 1930s
\textsuperscript{103} Confederación Ecuatoriana de Organizaciones Sindicales Libres, founded in 1962
\textsuperscript{104} Alexander 2007: 169-170, 173, 182-3, 192
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.: 181, 189-90
warm, this lasted only a short period – until the generals’ handling of the economy provoked union opposition in 1975. Even so, Ecuador’s labor unions remained marginal as “the majority of organized workers were in unions that did not belong to any central labor organization.”

In Ecuador, peak trade union density reached only 13.5%. Overall, the attempts of Rodríguez Lara’s military regime to incorporate organized labor largely failed. Similarly, although the generals had meant to create a national bourgeoisie, they began losing power as soon as Ecuador’s traditional business elites staged an organized challenge against their statist policies. The military’s legitimation of workers’ and peasants’ redistributive claims frustrated business elites, provoking a conservative mobilization to contain the activist military state by means of democratization. Business group activism around commercial and industrial federations articulated an ideological critique linking the policies of the military regime with communism. Under increasing business pressure, Rodríguez Lara was ousted in 1976 and a new military government under a triumvirate headed by general Alfredo Poveda Burbano initiated a period of managed transition. Yet while conservative business elites had played a key role in bringing down Rodríguez Lara’s statist military regime and then attempted to control Ecuador’s transition to democracy, the reformist generals did not trust them to oversee the process of writing a new constitution. Instead, this process was placed in the hands of reformist party leaders, such as Jaime Roldós of the left-populist CFP, who chose to mandate the development of a “communal property” sector of the economy and to enfranchise illiterates. This further expansion of the franchise secured Roldós’ victory over Sixto Durán Ballén, of the conservative

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106 Ibid.: 194-6
107 Roberts 2014: 72
108 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 71
109 Ibid.: 83, 88
110 Ibid.: 94
Social Christian Party (PSC), in the presidential election of 1978/79. In this way, the military secured relative continuity for the economically reformist spirit of their government.

In sum, Ecuador’s antecedent conditions were characterized by party system elitism with patrimonial overtones, by a relatively low degree of industrialization with correspondingly weak labor mobilization, and by military attempts to install an alternative economic model, the implementation of which had been repeatedly frustrated by conservative elites. When democratization came to Ecuador, it was not because of pressures from popular sectors – which actually supported the military’s redistributive policies – but because of pressures from business elites who adamantly opposed the statist model of development. Moreover, democratization brought back the dualistic brand of Ecuadorian populism featuring both a democratizing expansion of the franchise and the long-standing personality-based patrimonial tradition. The latter was clearly evidenced by the resounding success of the CFP – a party of coastal caudillos – in Ecuador’s first democratic election. The frustrated efforts at state-led development and the weak degree of institutionalized labor mobilization meant that Ecuador would enter the democratic period both relatively prepared to absorb the “shocks” of future deregulation and already predisposed to personalistic forms of political mobilization.

**Synopsis: Antecedent Conditions in Peru and Ecuador**

In terms of the historical record, Peru and Ecuador are two Andean countries characterized by a number of historical similarities as well as a key difference with regard to their historical development. They are similar in that early on both were characterized by economic inequality and stagnation, by political instability associated with the alternation of liberal and conservative

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111 The peak of the manufacturing share of GDP was 20.2% between 1970 and 1980; the index of state interventionism was 6.0; peak trade union density was 13.5% (see Roberts 2014: 72, 84-5).

112 Roberts 2014
oligarchs and caudillos in power, and by political repression. In the 20th century, both countries developed strongly populist tendencies and both ended with military dictatorships that governed in two phases – first, by enforcing economic strategies of state-led development, and second, by adopting market-friendlier policies and a strategy of pacted transition to democracy.

Yet the two country’s historical experiences contrasted with regard to a central theme. Whereas Peru’s populism was labor-mobilizing and was mostly kept excluded from the political sphere, Ecuador’s populism – which the country experienced in the presidency on five different occasions between the 1930s and 1970s – was labor de-mobilizing. When both countries ended up with statist military dictatorships in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they had reached this point via two distinct paths. The Peruvian path featured a prominent and labor-mobilizing, yet ideologically inconsistent populist party (APRA) whose historical exclusion from the political arena had led to a period of military rule during which the mobilization of available labor sectors had been a high priority. By contrast, labor mobilization had been much more modest and inconsistent in Ecuador, where Velasco Ibarra’s patrimonial populism had been rather de-mobilizing and where the military junta did not prioritize efforts at popular mobilization.

Overall, and as classified by Roberts, if Peru’s 20th century political system was guided by labor mobilization, Ecuador’s was characterized by elitism.113 In turn, these divergent macro-historical experiences conditioned the two countries’ relevant periods of cleavage or crisis prior to the critical juncture.

7.3. Cleavages and Crises in Peru and Ecuador

The contrasting critical antecedents of labor-mobilization in Peru and elitism in Ecuador shaped very different periods of cleavage and crisis immediately prior to the critical juncture.

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113 Ibid.
Importantly, historical similarities between the two countries persisted during the cleavage period. Thus, after progressive military dictatorships of Velasco (in Peru) and Rodríguez Lara (in Ecuador), a second, more conservative phase of military rule opened up the way both to initial market reforms and to pacted transitions to democracy in the late 1970s. As the new democratic system opened up arenas for significant ideological polarization between left-leaning partisan advocates of state-interventionist economic solutions and their neoliberal opponents, the conservative administrations of the 1980s failed to sustain decisive neoliberal reforms in both countries.

Despite these similarities, long-standing historical patterns asserted themselves, culminating in altogether different experiences during the cleavage periods of Peru and Ecuador. In Peru – where unique labor-incorporating experience had featured political exclusion of the labor-based populist party APRA and led to Velasco’s statist military rule – labor mobilization resulted in the strengthening of the radical partisan Left. The electorally strong Left, in turn, created environmental pressures for APRA, once again allowed to participate in democratic politics, to undertake “irresponsible” populist economic policies while in office – to the effect of catastrophic hyperinflation in the context of which left-leaning parties were weakened or discredited.

In Ecuador, by contrast, the critical antecedents of party system elitism meant that even the military’s statist model did not lead to the development of comparable effects of labor-mobilization or partisan radicalism from the Left. Consequently, when the economy began to slow down in the democratic 1980s, Ecuador’s political environment allowed, more than Peru’s, the adoption of limited reform measures that kept the economy going. In the context of an economy that declined without collapsing, the center-left was not discredited, as in Peru, and various political actors engaged in patrimonial projects that were a historical legacy from the past, as well as in limited
economically populist projects with clear socio-economic benefits for the popular majority. Overall, then, Ecuador’s critical antecedents of elitism and patrimonialism – which contrasted with Peru’s historical pattern of labor-mobilization – led to very different economic and political contexts during the period of cleavage. While Peru’s cleavage was characterized by a deep hyperinflationary crisis and discredited left-leaning parties, Ecuador’s cleavage featured relative economic stability and comparable center-left party strength.

**Peru’s Cleavage and Hyperinflationary Crisis (1980-1990)**

*Political Normalization Amid Economic Decline*

By the time of the 1980 general election, Peru’s national politics appeared to be on a course towards normalization featuring both economic stabilization and the emergence of somewhat competitive party system with center-left and center-right pillars within a democratic framework. Morales Bermúdez’s conservative military junta had put an end to Velasco’s nationalist statism and a short-term boom in international prices for Peru’s mineral exports had brought partial recovery. It was in this context that Fernando Belaúnde won the 1980 presidential election with a “neoliberal coalition” that was numerically dominated by the AP and ideologically dominated by the PPC. The propitious circumstances of macroeconomic upsurge and stable congressional coalition allowed Belaúnde to introduce a number of liberal economic measures. These included the removal of price controls, exchange rate devaluations, major efforts to attract foreign investment, increased credit to the private sector, and – most importantly – substantial trade liberalization that reduced tariffs from 115% to 30%, thus facilitating IMF negotiations.114 At first, these measures facilitated solid growth rates, but as the government assumed an increasingly

114 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 139-42, 155
exclusionary governing style,\textsuperscript{115} the economic reforms were met with significant opposition from society. This opposition – having already been palpable under Morales Bermúdez’s conservative military junta – resumed in 1981 under Belaúnde’s civilian presidency. As stated by Conaghan and Malloy, “Peruvian workers had already established a track record of resistance to such measures.”\textsuperscript{116} Indeed, this consistent record of labor mobilization had characterized Peruvian politics ever since the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, as discussed above.

Overall, during Belaúnde’s term Peru entered a period of relative normalcy. Universal suffrage and the end of literacy restrictions enabled the channeling of popular grievances into institutional politics. Political actors were committed to a democratic regime featuring increasingly distinctive ideological positions. In opposition to the governing “neoliberal coalition” of AP and PPC were APRA, now in the process or recovery after Haya’s death and finally allowed to compete freely, and a new and growing United Left (IU).\textsuperscript{117} Both APRA and IU made significant electoral gains – including of Lima’s mayoralty for the IU – during the 1983 municipal elections\textsuperscript{118} by criticizing the government’s neoliberal policies, thereby constituting a center-left pillar of the party system.

Notwithstanding Belaúnde’s neoliberal policies, however, his presidency did not constitute a critical juncture of market reform. First, as the president was not particularly interested in economic policy, mounting economic problems quickly shook his administration’s commitment to reform. By 1983, Peru was entering a major recession evidenced by a 12\% decline in GDP, 125\% inflation, 13\% unemployment, and 17\% decline in real wages. Poor weather conditions caused by El Niño brought a serious decline in agricultural production. By 1983, additional strikes

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item \textsuperscript{115} Pop-Eleches 2009
\item \textsuperscript{116} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 149
\item \textsuperscript{117} Izquierda Unida
\item \textsuperscript{118} Levitt 2012: 15-7
\end{thebibliography}
and the growing violence of the Maoist guerilla movement Sendero Luminoso\textsuperscript{119} signaled the end of Belaúnde’s frustrated neoliberal experiment.\textsuperscript{120} Indeed, despite the conservative administration’s neoliberal outlook, Peru’s liberalization index actually \textit{declined} by 12.6% during Belaúnde’s presidency – a reflection of the government’s “populist impulses.”\textsuperscript{121} By contrast, during the preceding five years under Morales Bermúdez’s conservative military junta (1975-80), the liberalization index had improved by 17.9\%\textsuperscript{122} Thus, Belaúnde’s presidency can be characterized as a period of “failed orthodoxy”\textsuperscript{123} rather than successful economic liberalization.

\textsuperscript{119} Shining Path
\textsuperscript{120} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 163-6, 174-6; see also Pop-Eleches 2009.
\textsuperscript{121} Crabtree 1998: 12
\textsuperscript{122} Morley et al.’s index does not cover the beginning of Velasco Alvarado’s administration, but between 1970 and 1975 there was an 18.7\% decline (from 0.482 in 1970 to 0.392 in 1975), which is reflective of Velasco’s statism.
\textsuperscript{123} Pop-Eleches 2009
Table 7.1. Selected economic indicators in Peru, 1970s and 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/President</th>
<th>Velasco Alvarado 10/68 - 08/75</th>
<th>Morales-Bermúdez 08/75 - 07/80</th>
<th>Belaúnde 07/80 - 07/85</th>
<th>García I 07/85 - 07/90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>1979.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current accounts balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, % of GNI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real minimum wage base (monthly avg., USD [2010 = 100])</td>
<td>156.8</td>
<td>156.8</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-38.5%</td>
<td>-79.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

1. The table captures level and speed of market liberalization by indicating annual scores and the percentage “change of the annual liberalization index” (Heybey and Murrell 1999 cited in Fidrmuc 2003: 589), respectively. It uses two liberalization indices – Morley et al.’s (1999), covering the 1970–1995 period, and Lora’s (2012), covering the 1985–2009 period. Velasco Alvarado’s, Morales-Bermúdez’s, and Belaúnde’s presidencies are covered only by Morley et al.’s index while García’s first presidency is covered by both indices. The two indices are comparable – Morley et al.’s index is the average of five sub-indices measuring liberalization in commerce, financial reform, capital accounts, privatization, and tax reform; Lora’s (2012) index is also the average of five sub-indices measuring liberalization in commercial, financial, and tax policies, privatization, and labor market legislation.

2. All index scores measuring liberalization are for the end of a given presidential term. However, because the indices cover entire calendar years, thereby not exactly coinciding with presidential terms, I have at times modified them slightly to achieve a more realistic approximation for each administration. Thus, for presidencies that began and/or ended in “the middle of the year” – that is, after March and before October – I take the average between the score from the year under consideration and the previous year’s score. (For dates between October and March, I simply use the original index numbers – that is, the number for a given year for dates in the October – December period and the number for the previous year in the January – March period. Thus, the original index scores are assumed to be relatively representative in terms of presidential periods that begin and/or end in the first or last three months of a calendar year. Importantly, this method of calculation does not distort the main findings, as using the original index numbers for the given years yields a 17.3% improvement under Morales-Bermúdez and 4.6% decline under Belaúnde.) The only exception to the above method of calculation is the 0.484 score (from 1989) for the end of García’s government. This is due to the fact that the rise of Peru’s index for the subsequent year (1990), when García exited the executive in July, is due to Fujimori’s reforms immediately after he entered office.

3. For a more detailed overview of how different component of the two liberalization indices evolved in the Peruvian context, see the Appendix P (Table A.20).

Sources: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics of Peru (INEI); International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; Morley et al. 1999; Lora 2012.
From Economic Decline to Disaster

When Alan García defeated the IU’s Alfonso Barrantes in the presidential elections of 1985, APRA not only gained the presidency for the first time, but also came to control majorities in both houses of congress. Despite this clear political domination, however, García’s presidency was a failure for both security and economic reasons. On the security side, Sendero’s growing violence resulted in a substantial increase of deaths from political violence – from 1,395 in 1985 to 3,198 deaths in 1989 – which also featured an exponential increase of killed police and armed forces personnel. As García blamed the military for government sponsored human rights violations, the rising tensions – further aggravated by declining salaries in the armed forces – gave way to plans for a military coup throughout García’s presidency.124

Second, García undertook a heterodox economic experiment that ended in a hyperinflationary disaster. When he entered office in 1985, García faced “a heavy debt burden and triple digit inflation,” which he attempted to confront “in line with his party’s center-left political platform.”125 This included a break with the IMF, the limitation of debt service payments to no more than 10% of export earnings, and a heterodox economic policy program. García’s economic heterodoxy also featured combining fixed exchange rates and price controls, low interest rates and taxes, and increased subsidies and higher wages – all meant to stimulate domestic demand.126 While these measures led to an initial recovery – featuring economic growth and declining inflation – by mid-1987, the Peruvian economic collapse was impending. As the economy entered into a deep recession, inflation grew to “crippling levels from mid-1988 until early 1990.”127 In response, García’s government implemented a series of misguided policy packages, such as the

124 Kenney 2004: 31-8
125 Pop-Eleches 2009
126 Seawright 2012: 66
127 Pop-Eleches 2009
nationalization of the privately held portion of the financial sector.\textsuperscript{128} According to Pop-Eleches, such measures were necessarily heterodox due to three factors – (1) the center-left ideological position on which the government’s legitimacy and popularity were based, (2) the business sector’s distrust of an APRA-led reform coalition, and (3) the already confrontational nature of relations between García’s government and the IMF. Overall, mostly as a result of APRA’s center-left positioning – due to which the government had “burned bridges with a variety of potential domestic and international allies”\textsuperscript{129} – austerity measures to reverse Peru’s hyperinflationary crisis of the late 1980s were not undertaken.\textsuperscript{130} As the average household in Lima experienced a 55% decline in per capita consumption and an enormous increase in the incidence of starvation between 1985 and 1990, “the Peruvian economy underwent a full-scale collapse.”\textsuperscript{131}

\textit{Peru’s Party System Before the Critical Juncture}

As noted above, Peru’s party system throughout the 1980s can be characterized as “normalized” and featuring relatively clear center-right and center-left pillars. Because of this clear ideological antagonism, Mainwaring and Scully categorized the Peruvian party system as one displaying the highest degree of ideological polarization\textsuperscript{132} before the critical juncture.

On the center-right, PPC and AP had already emerged as champions of anti-statist alternatives during Velasco’s dictatorship. PPC, which had split from AP in the 1960s, was especially pro-business, drawing its leadership from the privileged social circles and its ideas – from University of Chicago economists. On its part, Belaúnde’s more centrist AP had transitioned away from its 1960s reformism, during which it had been supported by Peru’s small industrial

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item[128] Kenney 2004: 31
  \item[129] Pop-Eleches 2009
  \item[130] Weyland 1999; Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 892
  \item[131] Seawright 2012: 66
  \item[132] Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 31
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
bourgeoisie, and towards greater affinity with “domestic elite and international banking circles” whose influence was becoming more felt in the party’s higher echelons.\textsuperscript{133} Overall, as discussed by Conaghan, “in the 1980s, the PPC and AP became the standard-bearers for forces on the right.”\textsuperscript{134} At the end of the decade, these two parties constituted FREDEMO – an electoral bloc that ran a unified slate of candidates in the 1990 general election.\textsuperscript{135}

To the left of the political center were the populist APRA and the United Left (IU). It is important to underscore that although APRA had been previously associated with opportunistic shifts to the right, as discussed above, students of Peruvian politics typically characterize the party as “center-left”\textsuperscript{136} and “traditional”\textsuperscript{137} throughout the 1980s. APRA’s center-left orientation was due to the fact that after Haya de la Torre’s death, García single-handedly “engineered a remarkable renovation of APRA’s image and rhetoric,”\textsuperscript{138} thus broadening its appeal particularly among the urban poor.\textsuperscript{139} This renovation was necessitated by interrelated sociological and electoral environment factors. Sociologically, Peru’s relatively substantial formal working class was becoming increasingly informal\textsuperscript{140} and available for electoral mobilization. In turn, the presence of an electorally powerful – and more radical – United Left (IU) throughout the 1980s\textsuperscript{141} incentivized APRA to veer to the left “in an effort to increase its share of the popular sector

\textsuperscript{133} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 115-20. Notably, future president, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, then in the AP, would be a major exponent of pro-business interests in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century.
\textsuperscript{134} Conaghan 2000: 259. Roberts also qualifies PPC and AD as right/center-right (1996: 74).
\textsuperscript{135} See Cameron 1994: 59-76
\textsuperscript{136} Cameron 1994: 124; Kenny 2017: 162
\textsuperscript{137} Seawright 2012: 47
\textsuperscript{139} Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 903. For more on APRA ideological re-positioning in order to capture the informal sector, see Cameron 1994: 42-8.
\textsuperscript{140} Conaghan and Malloy report that due to the relatively large manufacturing sector, the “formal proletariat” constituted 26.7\% of the economically active population in the early 1970s. By the 1980s, urban informal workers constituted 40\% of Peru’s non-agricultural labor force (1994: 42, 150).
\textsuperscript{141} For most of the 1980s, IU was Peru’s second most electorally successful party – especially in the municipal elections of 1980 (23.9\%), 1983 (28.8\%), and 1986 (30.5\%), but also in the presidential election of 1985 (24.7\%) (Roberts 1996: 74).
vote.”142 As shown by Seawright – who uses surveys of Peruvians’ ideologies in 1990 – the public, too, saw APRA as a left-of-center party.143 Overall, APRA in the 1980s is best characterized as “populist” with a center-left economic orientation.144 Indeed, the left-leaning orientation of APRA and IU “suggested the possibility of sustained cooperation” between these two parties.145

Overall, then, if PPC and AP constituted the neoliberal pillar to the right of the center, APRA and IU occupied the space to the left of the center in Peruvian politics. Together, these four parties formed a relatively coherent party system throughout the 1980s. While for the 1989 and 1990 elections the center-right pillar was represented under a new name (FREDEMO), this was simply a regrouping of AP and PPC around presidential candidate Mario Vargas Llosa.146 According to the election results data presented in Table 7.2, together, these actors constituted a relatively stable party system throughout the 1980s, gathering an impressive combined average of 84.9% of the overall valid vote share in the ten presidential, congressional, and municipal elections in the eleven-year period from 1980 to 1990.147

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142 Burgess and Levitsky 2003: 898
143 Seawright 2012: 114-5
144 See Cameron 2011
145 Conaghan 2000: 262
146 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 225. FREDEMO also included “a small new party of technocrats,” Solidarity and Democracy (SODE), along with the more established PPC and AP (Conaghan 2000: 256, 261).
147 Excluding the last two elections, which were associated with the rise of outsider candidate Alberto Fujimori, yields a combined average of 90.1%.
Table 7.2. Peruvian election results, 1980-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Left IU*</th>
<th>Center-Left APRA</th>
<th>Right of Center AP (Fredero in 1989 &amp; 1990)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980 Pres.</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Congr.</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Munic.</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983 Munic.</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 Pres.</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985 Congr.</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Munic.</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Munic.</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Pres.</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Congr.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres. Average</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congr. Average</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munic. Average</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Average</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>84.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Because IU was formed in September 1980, for the April 1980 presidential and congressional elections, I include the results of the parties that subsequently participated in the formation of IU: Union of the Revolutionary Left (UNIR), Unity of the Left (IU) which included both the Peruvian Communist Party (PSP) and the Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), Popular Democratic Unity (UDP), Workers, Peasants, Students and Popular Front (FOCEP), Socialist Political Action (APS), and Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR). I exclude the 1980 election results of the Workers Revolutionary Party (PRT) because this group did not participate in the subsequent formation of IU (see Roberts 1998: 222-3). The 1990 election results do not include the vote share of the Socialist Left (IS) which splintered from the IU and gained 4.8% and 5.0% in the 1990 presidential and congressional elections, respectively.

Sources: Tuesta Soldevilla and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).

As the table indicates, Peru experienced the usual cyclical shifts associated with anti-incumbent voting, particularly in the context of economic crisis. Thus, the pattern of electoral decline for the center-right that began three years into Belaúnde’s presidency was also experienced by APRA in the late 1980s as punishment for García policies. What is less usual, however, is that the Peruvian Left failed to capitalize on incumbency failures as the economic crisis – which produced an increasingly deindustrialized and informal economy – eroded the Left’s traditional social base of organized labor. Moreover, the negative effects of the economic crisis were compounded by Sendero’s violence, which additionally fractured alternative (non-class based)
popular organizations, such as those located in shantytowns and the countryside.\textsuperscript{148} As “IU could not articulate the interests of such fragmented popular sectors,” it quickly disintegrated.\textsuperscript{149} With the disintegration of the Left, the weakening of APRA, and the reconfiguration of the center-right, by the late 1980s Peru’s party system was experiencing significant weakness in the context of hyperinflationary crisis.


*Crises Management Amid Historical Continuities*

Having taken power amid an oil boom in 1972, Ecuador’s military regime nevertheless failed to resolve the country’s structural problems caused by dependence on a single-export product – in this case, crude oil – for economic development. During the 1970s, these problems were exacerbated by the growing industrial demand for raw materials and capital goods, a situation that led to an increased reliance on foreign loans to cover current accounts deficits.\textsuperscript{150} Indeed, the particular use of Ecuador’s newly discovered oil reserves exacerbated the problem of “unsustainable and short-sighted development policy” – while the military government invested heavily on social programs, including land reform, rural credit, education and health,\textsuperscript{151} it also borrowed heavily from international lenders attracted by Ecuador’s status as a major oil exporter. By the time Jaime Roldós took office in 1979, Ecuador was in deep debt, reaching 174.4\% of exports of goods and services.\textsuperscript{152}

Despite such signs of structural weakness, Roldós had more incentives to continue the military’s developmentalist project than to reverse it. The new president was from a left-populist

\textsuperscript{148} Roberts 1998
\textsuperscript{149} Roberts 1996: 83
\textsuperscript{150} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 111
\textsuperscript{151} Yashar 2005: 135
\textsuperscript{152} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 113
party, CFP, and had won an election with the support of newly enfranchised constituencies with socioeconomic demands for increased government spending. Indeed, having championed the extension of citizenship rights to illiterates during the constitution writing process, Roldós had actively enfranchised “many indigenous peoples for the first time.”

When the peasant-indigenous alliances FENOC\textsuperscript{154} and ECUARUNARI\textsuperscript{155} called for changes in the agrarian reform law by staging a large demonstration in Quito, the president – who during his inauguration had addressed the new indigenous citizens in their native language Kichwa\textsuperscript{156} – announced a National Program for Rural Development that increased spending on the rural poor.\textsuperscript{157} Additionally, the government continued subsidizing “domestic consumption of oil and electricity” while congress – controlled by Roldós’ populist CFP – reduced the work week to 40 hours and increased salaries for public sector employees. As shown in Table 7.3 below, the nominal minimum wage went up by 100% under Roldós – from $80 in 1979 to $160 in 1980. Additionally, Roldós’ government reduced the work week from 44 to 40 hours and established women’s retirement after 25 years of work.\textsuperscript{158} In sum, Roldós’ government was associated with fiscal generosity. While it is true that soon after world oil prices began falling Roldós introduced some price hikes for domestic oil products and transportation fees, such measures were only half-heartedly opposed by organized labor. Although unions staged a nationwide general strike,\textsuperscript{159} they soon retreated and proclaimed support for the government for the benefit of consolidating democracy.\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{153} The percentage of indigenous people in Ecuador is contested and depends on the definitional criteria. According to Becker, it is between 7% and 40% of the total population (2011: 3).
\textsuperscript{154} Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (National Federation of Peasant Organizations)
\textsuperscript{155} Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy: (Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indigenous People; later changed to Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa, or Confederation of the Peoples of the Kichwa Nationality of Ecuador)
\textsuperscript{156} Becker 2008: 163-4
\textsuperscript{157} Yashar 2005: 135
\textsuperscript{158} Lauderbaugh 2012: 136
\textsuperscript{159} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 112
\textsuperscript{160} Alexander 2007: 202
After Roldós died in an airplane crash in May 1981, his successor, vice-president Osvaldo Hurtado of the centrist Popular Democracy (DP),\textsuperscript{161} made three separate attempts to stabilize Ecuador’s economy – to no significant effect. First, faced with higher interest rates payments on the country’s ballooning foreign debt,\textsuperscript{162} Hurtado devalued the national currency by 33\% in May 1982. Second, in October the same year, the government attempted a consolidation of the state budget by introducing new taxes on beer, cigarettes, and cars, by eliminating wheat subsidies, and by increasing domestic gas prices. After labor unions stages nationwide protests, the president declared a state of emergency and then, after talks with labor leaders, softened his stance. Third, in March 1983, the government devalued the currency once more and created a system according to which the exchange rate could be adjusted on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{163}

Despite these attempts at economic stabilization, Hurtado’s government was not neoliberal. It also “fomented the development of over four thousand new unions and popular organizations in rural areas,” reasons why committed neoliberal advocates in the business and right-wing partisan circles felt “deep animosity” despite the austerity which was only introduced as a measure for crisis management.\textsuperscript{164} Indeed, Hurtado oversaw a new labor code for rural workers and the introduction of worker representation on corporate boards.\textsuperscript{165} Overall, Hurtado’s government, like Roldós’ before it, “did not bring about a major transformation in the conduct of economic policy.”\textsuperscript{166}

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\textsuperscript{161} Conaghan 1995  
\textsuperscript{162} In 1981, the debt had surpassed 200\% of exports of goods and services (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 113).  
\textsuperscript{163} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 112-3  
\textsuperscript{164} Ibid.: 114  
\textsuperscript{165} Lauderbaugh 2012: 137  
\textsuperscript{166} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 111-2
Table 7.3. Selected economic indicators in Ecuador, 1970s and 1980s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/President</th>
<th>Velasco 09/78 - 02/82</th>
<th>Rodriq. Lara 02/72 - 01/75</th>
<th>Poveda 01/76 - 08/79</th>
<th>Roldós 08/79 - 05/81</th>
<th>Hurtado 05/81 - 08/84</th>
<th>F. Cordero 08/84 - 08/88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current accounts balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, % of GNI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real minimum wage base (monthly avg., USD (2010 = 100)</td>
<td>173.5</td>
<td>170.8</td>
<td>219.4</td>
<td>376.7</td>
<td>273.5</td>
<td>154.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>-27.3%</td>
<td>-43.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Level and speed of market liberalization (at term’s end)**

| General reform index (Morley et al. 1999)    | 0.499                  | 0.493                        | 0.508                | 0.529                | 0.546                  | 0.551                    |
| % change from previous period                | -1.2%                  | 3.0%                         | 4.1%                 | 3.2%                 | 0.9%                   |                          |
| Structural reform index (Lora 2012)          | 0.346                  | 0.350                        |                      |                      |                        |                          |
| % change                                     | 2.9%                   |                              |                      |                      |                        |                          |

Note: The table captures level and speed of market liberalization by using the same indices utilized for the Peruvian case – Morley et al.’s (1999), covering the 1970–1995 period, and Lora’s (2012), covering the 1985–2009 period – and the same method of periodization for the calculation of level and speed of market liberalization under different administrations (see the notes to Table 7.1 above). Roldós’ and Hurtado’s presidencies are only covered by Morley et al.’s index while Febres Cordero’s presidency is covered by both indices. For a more detailed overview of how different component of these two indices evolved in the Ecuadorian context, see the Appendix P (Table A.18).

Sources: Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE); International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; Morley et al. 1999; Lora 2012.

Hurtado’s modest measures led to the moderation of inflation as well as to economic growth of more than 4%.\(^{167}\) Thus, crisis had been averted prior to the 1984 presidential election, which produced the victory of conservative León Febres Cordero of Social Christian Party (PSC) over social democrat Rodrigo Borja of the Democratic Left (ID). At first, and having assembled “a solid domestic coalition of businessmen, politicians, and technocrats,”\(^ {168}\) the new conservative president combined “immediate stabilization measures with restructuring measures,” such as deregulating exchange rates, lifting agricultural price controls, freeing interest rates, and increasing prices on gasoline and electricity.\(^ {169}\) Governing mostly by “urgent economic decrees” – due to his

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\(^{167}\) Roberts 2014: 157
\(^{168}\) Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 136
\(^{169}\) Ibid.: 143
lack of clear congressional majority – Febres Cordero responded to trade union protests of price increases and wage decreases by employing state violence.170

Despite the new administration’s seeming neoliberal commitment, however, it also failed to implement significant economic liberalization171 for two reasons. First, because Febres Cordero advocated for a slow reduction of tariffs and for the need for industry to adjust gradually,172 his approach to economic restructuring can be characterized as pragmatically gradualist. Second, when oil prices and exports fell and political tensions rose,173 this gradualism transformed into an overall retreat away from the neoliberal project.174 In the end, Ecuador’s first conservative government in nearly 30 years not only failed to restructure the public sector through cuts or to privatize major state enterprises, but also increased public spending in a last-ditch effort to complete the constitutional term.175 Thus, Febres Cordero’s government “ended with a populist tune.”176 While Febres Cordero’s neoliberals could not oversee significant liberalization in Ecuador, they did see a worsening of economic conditions – as evidenced by the dwindling productivity rate and growing inflation and external debt shown in Table 7.3.

Finally, and as also demonstrated in Table 7.3, Ecuador’s liberalization index improved very marginally under the presidencies of Roldós (by 4.1%), Hurtado (by 3.2%) and Febres

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170 Ibid.: 145, 148-9
171 Vos 2002: 268
172 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 159
173 Febres Cordero’s neoliberal experiment was frustrated by a series of three unexpected and major events between 1986 and 1987: (1) the collapse in international oil prices in 1986 resulted in huge budget revenue losses; (2) a 1987 political crisis which culminated with the president being kidnapped by air force troops and subsequently released, shook his commitment to reforms while crystalizing congressional opposition from the center-left; (3) a 1987 earthquake disrupted oil exports for five additional months, even after oil prices had begun to recover (Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 166 – 172).
174 Roberts 2014: 157
175 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 172
176 Vos 2002: 268
Overall, rather than lead to significant economic liberalization, Ecuador’s first democratic decade was a period of inconsistent market reforms amid gradual economic decline. It was also a period of economically populist measures – most clearly under Roldós, but also under his successors.

**Ecuador’s Party System Before the Critical Juncture**

The first democratic decade in Ecuador was characterized by a party system that, as shown in Table 7.4, was considerably more fragmented than Peru’s. Despite this fragmentation, the system still featured a clear cleavage between neoliberal and state-interventionist solutions, a reason why Mainwaring and Scully classified Ecuador’s party system as “moderately high” in terms of ideological polarization.\(^{178}\)

On the neoliberal side (*Right of Center*), the already declining traditional-oligarchic liberals (PLRE) and conservatives (PC) were being replaced by Febres Cordero’s rising PSC with strong presence on the coast.\(^{179}\) As Table 7.4 shows, center-right parties usually collected about a quarter of the vote, even reaching a 30% average in presidential elections, in the first democratic decade. On the state-interventionist side, while Ecuador’s left was fragmented and weak, the social-democratic ID, on the center-left, was the best organized party with a strong presence at the subnational level, as demonstrated by its high average in municipal relative to national elections. ID was also the most “nationalized” party throughout the 1980, meaning that although it was

\(^{177}\) The 2.9% improvement under Febres Cordero according to Lora’s index is also very insignificant. Roberts, who uses data from Escaith and Paunovic (2004), reports a similarly insignificant change for the years under Febres Cordero’s administration (2014: 157).

\(^{178}\) Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 31

\(^{179}\) Polga-Hecimovich 2014
strongest in the highlands, its results in the coastal areas were far from disappointing.\textsuperscript{180} This party single-handedly collected an average of 21.4\% of the vote between 1978 and 1988.

Table 7.4. Ecuadorian election results, 1978-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Left MPD, PSE, FADI</th>
<th>Center Left ID</th>
<th>Populist CFP, PRE, FRA, APRE</th>
<th>Center DP, PD</th>
<th>Right of Center PSC, PLRE, PCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978 Pres.</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 Munic. Councils</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 Congr.</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Pres.</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Congr.</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Munic. Councils</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Congr.</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 Munic. Councils</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>25.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988 Pres.</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988 Congr.</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Munic. Councils</td>
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<td>29.3</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.4</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congr. Average</td>
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<td>18.0</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munic. Average</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Average</td>
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<td>21.4</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
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</table>


Third, in between these two ideological positions were the centrist and ideologically less coherent populist parties. Of the two centrist parties – the Democratic Party (PD) and Popular Democracy (DP) – the first was already in obvious decline by the mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{181} While DP, led by Osvaldo Hurtado, performed with consistency in national and municipal elections, its electoral results were generally weaker than those of the leading center-left ID and center-right PSC. Finally, the populist parties included the Concentration of People’s Forces (CFP) and the Ecuadorian Roldosist Party (PRE) as well as two much smaller parties. Although CFP is generally considered

\textsuperscript{180} Polga-Hecimovich 2014
\textsuperscript{181} PD also lost legal registration by the early 1990s (see Conaghan 1995: 437).
“populist,” unlike APRA in Peru, it was not labor mobilizing because of the historically elitist nature of Ecuador’s party system, as discussed above. Overall, rather than with organized labor, CFP’s populism had more to do with clientelistic networks on the coast as well as with economically generous policies under Roldós. Nevertheless, after CFP became internally split during Roldós’ presidency,\textsuperscript{182} it entered a period of a steady electoral decline.\textsuperscript{183} In turn, CFP’s decline opened up space for PRE, which – under the leadership of Roldós’ brother-in-law Abdalá Bucaram – came to dominate the relatively strong populist wing of Ecuador’s party system.

Importantly, although Ecuador’s populists are to be distinguished from the center-left, as the dispute between neoliberal and state-interventionist solutions persisted in Ecuador’s moderately-high polarized party system throughout the 1980s, the populist actors tended to associate themselves with the state interventionist approach. This was most evident in the mobilization of the political and economic Right against Roldós’ (and later Hurtado’s\textsuperscript{184}) candidacy and tenure\textsuperscript{185} as well as in the state-activist socio-economic policies of Roldós’ presidency. It was also visible in the center-left alliances in which PRE engaged both before and during Febres Cordero’s conservative rule (1984-88).\textsuperscript{186} Therefore, although Ecuador party system was Latin America’s most inchoate throughout the 1980s,\textsuperscript{187} societal opposition to market liberalization was channeled not only via a social democratic party but also via populist actors, such as CFP and PRE. By 1988, PSC, ID, and PRE had come to dominate the Ecuadorian party system’s pro-market, pro-social, and populist pillars, respectively.

\textsuperscript{182} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 131, 135
\textsuperscript{183} For a brief overview of the internal developments and vague ideology of CFP, see Conaghan 1988: 123-6.
\textsuperscript{184} Gorney 1981
\textsuperscript{185} Conaghan 1988: 124, 126
\textsuperscript{186} See Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001: 207. Additionally, PRE emerged from the pro-Roldós faction that split from CFP.
\textsuperscript{187} Conaghan 1995
Synopsis: Cleavages and Crises in Peru and Ecuador

Regardless of some obvious similarities that the two countries shared in terms of their political and economic developments throughout the 1980s, the experiences immediately before critical junctures in Peru and Ecuador were ultimately marked by cleavages and crises that were different in a major way. In terms of similarities, in both countries the end of military dictatorship – whose latter phase featured market-friendly policies – led to new democracies with ideologically polarized political systems and economies that were obviously slowing down in the aftermath of the state-led model of development associated with the initial phase of prior military rule. In this context, however, critical junctures of market reform failed to materialize. The key difference was related to the divergent historical patterns of labor-mobilizing and elitist party systems in Peru and Ecuador, respectively.\(^\text{188}\) Whereas the Peruvian cleavage ultimately culminated in a serious economic crisis, the Ecuadorian cleavage did not.

**Similarities**

Regarding party systemic similarities, while it is true that the Peruvian and Ecuadorian party systems in the first democratic decade were inchoate, they were certainly characterized by relatively high degrees of ideological polarization, as discussed by Mainwaring and Scully.\(^\text{189}\) This meant that, before the critical juncture, party systems in both countries exhibited a relatively clear cleavage between a pillar advocating a center-left vision of economic development prescribing continuity with the recent state-interventionist past and neoliberal opponents on the center-right. Included in the center-left pillar were Peru’s IU and APRA as well as Ecuador’s ID and CFP. Admittedly, these parties were very different from one another. Whereas Peru’s IU was most

\(^{188}\) Roberts 2014: 81-8

\(^{189}\) Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 31
clearly leftist, Ecuador’s IU was social-democratic. While both Peru’s APRA and Ecuador’s CFP were “populist,” APRA was “labor-mobilizing” while the CFP was not. Yet within the contexts of their respective party systems throughout the 1980s, all four parties were ideologically associated with state-interventionism, the reason why they were vigorously opposed by parties advocating for neoliberal economic policy. As such, these parties constituted the center-left pillars of the Peruvian and Ecuadorian party systems.

Regarding similarities in the economic realm, the end of the state-led developmentalist model provoked the need to liberalize markets in both countries – an idea that was championed by the parties which formed the coalitions around presidents Belaúnde (1980-85) in Peru and Febres Cordero (1984-88) in Ecuador. Yet although economic liberalization had already begun during the second phase of military dictatorships – under generals Morales Bermúdez (1975-80) in Peru and Alfredo Poveda (1976-79) in Ecuador – this process hardly continued under democratic rule. Indeed, efforts at market liberalization during the 1980s were modest even under the center-right governments of Belaúnde in Peru and Febres Cordero in Ecuador. Importantly, Peru and Ecuador were similar to one another in that neoliberal experiments in both countries faltered under conservative leadership as these administrations failed to build strong coalitions within the party system and business community.190 It is for this reason that these conservative governments failed to introduce a critical juncture of market reforms.

**The Key Difference and its Critical Antecedents**

The key difference between Peru and Ecuador before the critical juncture has to do with the magnitude of economic crisis, which itself is related to the chief difference in what Slater and Simmons call “critical antecedents.” As demonstrated by Roberts, Latin America’s historically

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190 Conaghan and Malloy 1994
labor-mobilizing party systems, such as Peru’s, tended to result in considerably deeper economic crises than elitist party systems, such as Ecuador’s. Overall, because labor-mobilizing party systems relied on state interventionism in the economy to a greater extent, they were more prone to disruptions when the state-led model of development (known as ISI) became exhausted. In this framework, the state interventionist model of economic development, which ended by the early 1980s, was almost always led by labor-mobilizing parties.191 Peru, where APRA had been traditionally excluded from the executive branch, is an interesting exception.

Yet even the Peruvian exception confirms Roberts’ hypothesis about the general relationship between labor mobilization throughout the 20th century and deep economic crisis after the end of the ISI model. When APRA was finally “allowed” to take over the presidency after winning the general election of 1985, it governed after the ISI model had already begun to unravel throughout Latin America. Nevertheless, in an ideologically polarized party system with the IU as a strong leftist contender, APRA adopted an economically “populist” strategy and governed from the center-left, as discussed by Burgess and Levitsky.192 Even if APRA adopted a state-interventionist governing strategy due to environmental pressures from the Left, such pressures cannot be viewed in isolation from the labor-mobilizing aspects of Peru’s long-term historical developments. As popular mobilization accelerated before and especially during Velasco’s statist military rule – which itself was the result of Peru’s unique pattern of labor incorporation, as shown by Collier and Collier193 – the Peruvian Left was strengthened,194 thus providing the environmental context for APRA’s center-left positioning. Therefore, the historical antecedents of powerful labor-mobilization in Peru ultimately conditioned APRA’s experiment in statist economics which

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191 Roberts 2014: 81-8
192 Burgess and Levitsky 2003
193 Collier and Collier 1991
194 Roberts 1996: 73
— in the context of an already deteriorating economy — ended in a hyperinflationary disaster and, as shown by Roberts, in the subsequent weakening of the leftist IU. For these reasons, Peru would enter the critical juncture with a weakened Left (IU), a discredited populist party (APRA) whose rule from the center-left was associated with catastrophically bad living standards, and at a moment of severe economic crisis.

By contrast, the economic situation in Ecuador was shaped by very different historical antecedents. There, even in the context of general Rodríguez Lara’s state-led economic experiment, the historically elitist nature of political development meant that neither labor mobilization would be extensive nor would the state-led model (or even ideas associated with it) become sufficiently entrenched. Consequently, when world oil prices fell and the economy began slowing down in the early 1980s, the economic decline was not as precipitous as in the Peruvian case. As labor mobilization had never been a significant feature of the Ecuadorian party system, environmental pressures from the Left did not constrain the economic policy of Roldós’ populist government (or of Hurtado’s subsequent government) to the same extent as they did in the Peruvian case of APRA. As a result, the governments of Roldós and Hurtado implemented minimal adjustments that were nevertheless sufficient to avoid economic disaster. Not only was disaster averted throughout the 1980s, but Ecuador’s populist experience before the critical juncture — as epitomized by Roldós’ government — was associated with clear socio-economic benefits for the popular majority. Indeed, as the economy continued to slow down without collapsing, economically populist policies continued under both Hurtado and Febres Cordero.

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195 Roberts 1996; 1998
7.4. Conclusion: From Critical Antecedents to Critical Junctures in Peru and Ecuador

A critical juncture analysis requires an interrogation of prior conditions, including of historical antecedents and of the cleavages and crises that arise from them and to which subsequent moments of significant change provide resolution. This chapter constitutes the first step in the comparative historical analysis of two similar systems – Peru and Ecuador – where, despite the many commonalities, contrasting critical antecedents culminated in different cleavages and crises.

First, Peru and Ecuador share a number of historical commonalities. Throughout their histories, both countries experienced early conflicts between liberal and conservative strongmen, numerous moments of political and economic instability and underdevelopment, seemingly never ending cycles of military interruptions of weak democratic rule, bouts of populism, and even progressive military dictatorships by the early 1970s. The parallels continued as historical patterns culminated in cleavages during which (1) conservative military elements initiated market reforms after asserting themselves over progressive ones, (2) pacted transitions to democracy were negotiated, (3) conservative administrations failed to sustain neoliberal reforms, and (4) polarization between political proponents of state-interventionism and their neoliberal opponents developed. Despite these historical similarities between Peru and Ecuador, however, the defining 20th century political experience – that with populism – was very different in these two countries. While Peruvian populism had been labor-mobilizing, Ecuador’s – having developed in an elitist party system – was patrimonial and labor-demobilizing. This key difference would impact the two counties’ contrasting experiences during the cleavage periods.

In Peru, the historical exclusion of labor-based APRA culminated with Velasco’s statist dictatorship which engaged in labor-mobilization and as a consequence of which the radical Left was strengthened. This strengthening, in turn, resulted in environmental pressures for APRA, once
again legal and in power for the first time in the 1980s, to adopt “irresponsible” populist economic policies in the context of a declining economy. The effect was an economic collapse and the weakening or de-legitimization of left-leaning parties in Peru. In Ecuador, by contrast, historical patterns of labor weakness re-asserted themselves as the country transitioned to democracy in the first decade of which radical Left pressures were insignificant. This facilitated incumbent administrations to enact limited austerity measures, thus sustaining relative economic stability and allowing more space for patrimonial continuities with the past. If in the beginning of the cleavage period high oil prices had allowed president Roldós to enact economically populist policies with clear socio-economic benefits for the popular majority, the lack of deep economic crisis by the period’s end had allowed Ecuador’s social democratic party to remain relatively strong – an outcome very different from that in Peru. In sum, the contrasting patterns during the periods of cleavage – deep economic crisis and center-left weakening versus relative economic stability and comparably strong center-left – are rooted in the different historical antecedents of labor-mobilization versus party system elitism in Peru in Ecuador, respectively.

Overall, this chapter has taken history seriously by examining these two countries’ antecedent conditions and the cleavages and crises that unfolded from these conditions. These contrasting historical antecedents shed much light onto the contexts within which critical junctures would unfold as well as onto consequent path dependencies which – while directly affected by events during the critical junctures – are by no means divorced from the legacies of the historical record. While history has its critical moments with particular consequences, such moments do not occur in a vacuum; they can be strongly conditioned by long-term historical developments. As I show in Chapter 9, the relative depth of the economic crisis and the relative strength of center-left parties – both of which were products of long-term historical developments – conditioned the ways
in which neoliberal critical juncture unfolded in Peru and Ecuador. Before turning to these critical junctures, however, I next examine historical developments in two central European cases where contrasting historical experiences – although very different from the ones in Latin America – bear intriguing parallels to the records of Peru and Ecuador.
8.
ANTECEDENT CONDITIONS AND CRISES IN POLAND AND SLOVAKIA

8.1. Introduction

As in Peru and Ecuador, distinctive critical antecedents conditioned varying experiences during the periods of cleavage and crisis in Poland and Slovakia. While these two central European countries are very different from the Andean ones examined in the previous chapter, the key contrasts in their respective long-term developments and subsequent periods of cleavage parallel, in important ways, the historical contrasts between Peru and Ecuador. This chapter, analyzing the antecedent conditions, cleavages, and crises in Poland and Slovakia, is organized in two main parts.

In the first part, I examine the long-term antecedent conditions in Poland and Slovakia. Although these two countries can be seen as broadly similar in many respects, the historical relationship between state and society differs in a fundamental way. In Poland, the activist civil society that had characterized the pre-communist period progressively developed into powerful and confrontational mobilization of labor against a communist state with accommodationist prerogatives. In Slovakia, a much more passive civil society characterized both the pre-communist and communist periods, during which patrimonial and significantly more elitist strategies for dealing with national problems were sustained on the part of the state. The key difference – a tendency towards labor-based mobilization in Poland’s traditionally more activist civil society versus a historical pattern of elitism and patrimonial rule over Slovakia’s traditionally more anemic civil society – would condition the main contours of the two countries’ periods of cleavage and crisis.
In the second part, I analyze the periods of cleavage and crisis that arose from these antecedent conditions. In Poland, heightened labor-based mobilization led to major concessions on the part of the communist state, including both a negotiated transition to democracy and wage increases for workers in the context of a deepening economic crisis in the late 1980s. In turn, the economic concessions – driven by the main cleavage pitting a mobilized civil society against the state – contributed to a hyperinflationary crisis that the new Solidarity-led government managed with shock therapy measures. In Slovakia, where initial market reforms within Czechoslovakia had led to elite-driven independence, authoritarian rule characterized by both the refusal to enact major neoliberal reforms and important continuities with the patrimonial past defined the Mečiarism/anti-Mečiarism cleavage. Here, the top-down management of state/society relations – possible in a context of weak labor-mobilization – ensured a period of relative economic stability during which a majority of the electorate preferred state-interventionist solutions to economic problems.

Overall, the chapter accomplishes three tasks. First, it demonstrates how the different historical antecedents – labor mobilization versus elitist patrimonialism – shaped contrasting experiences in the countries’ respective cleavage periods, culminating in a major economic crisis and in relative stability in Poland and Slovakia, respectively. Second, by carefully analyzing the cleavage periods, the chapter elaborates how, although they featured major changes in both Poland and Slovakia, these periods are analytically different from the subsequent periods of neoliberal critical junctures. Third, the chapter concludes by elaborating how despite the major contextual differences from the Latin American contexts, the contrasting critical antecedents and cleavages of Poland and Slovakia exhibit intriguing and analytically important parallels with the contrasting experiences of Peru and Ecuador. These intriguing parallels in terms of intra-regional contrasts
will guide the subsequent comparative analysis of critical junctures and their consequences from a cross-regional perspective.

8.2. Antecedent Conditions in Poland and Slovakia

Although Poland and Slovakia are two neighboring countries with broadly similar historical characteristics – such as long periods of denied national independence, dominant Catholic culture, and national-accommodative communist rule – the long historical view reveals a key contrasting pattern with regard to how their states and societies related to each other. In Poland, the pattern of highly active and resistant civil society prior to communist rule progressively morphed into labor-based mobilization against the state during communism. In Slovakia, patrimonial and elitist tendencies dominated political questions – including that of nationalism – both before and during communism. These contrasting antecedents would shape the subsequent periods of cleavage in both countries.

Poland’s Antecedent Conditions: Accommodating Popular Mobilization

Developments Before the Second Republic

The Polish state can be traced back to the Piast dynasty between the 10th and 14th centuries, which consolidated its rule over various Western Slavic tribes and then ushered in Poland’s Golden Age. After the last Piast ruler, Kazimierz the Great, died, a Polish-Lithuanian political union, known as the Jagiellonian Kingdom, introduced a system in which not only was the king elected by the nobility, but also the nobility exercised a further check on the king from a bicameral parliament (Sejm). The political importance of the gentry became increasingly articulated through the ideology of Sarmatianism, which promoted the Polonization of Lithuanian and Ukrainian gentry (but not of burghers and peasants), posited Poland’s special mission in defending Roman
Catholicism from Eastern paganism, and led to the questioning of Western Europe’s commitment to Polish security.¹

Having developed a cosmopolitan culture centered around the capital Cracow, the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom protected itself from Muscovite ambitions – first, by moving the capital to Warsaw, which, with its equidistance from Cracow and Vilnius, facilitated Polish and Lithuanian nobility to enact joint legislation, and second, by winning a series of military victories against Russia. Yet, neither Poland’s influence abroad nor its political stability at home would last long as a series of external wars, the failure to polonize large segments of the population, and the inherent contradictions of the “democratic kingdom” led to failure. By the end of the 18th century, a series of partitions divided Poland among Russia, Prussia, and Austria.²

While an independent Polish state had ceased to exist, a series of pro-independence uprisings demonstrated a high degree of national mobilization against the partitioning powers. Polish mobilization was so intense that it prompted the Austrian chancellor Metternich to equate “Polonism” with revolution and “the war on all existing institutions,” provided justification for Russia’s reign of terror against Polish nationalism, and motivated Bismark to seek the elimination of “all manifestations of Polish language and culture.” Under the repressive circumstances of partition, by the late 19th century, Poles in the three empires began to conceptualize the sphere of civil society as “the only ideological alternative to foreign domination.”³ Indeed, popular mobilization against rule imposed from abroad would prove to be a distinguishing characteristic shaping Polish political developments well into the future.

¹ Castle and Taras: 2002: 2-6
² Ibid.: 6-14
³ Ibid: 15-8
At the turn of the 20th century, Polish industrialization led to the rise of mass political movements associated with new ideas, particularly on the Left. For example, followers of the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, led by Rosa Luxemburg, saw internationalism, rather than independence, as a solution to the problems of the Polish people. Others, such as followers of the Polish Socialist Party, led by Józef Piłsudski, were attracted to cross-class appeals centered around a civic type of nationalism and favoring independence as “a significant condition for the victory of socialism.” On the Right, followers of Roman Dmowski’s National Democracy advocated a seemingly strange mix of pro-Russian and ethno-nationalist positions based on the principles of Neo-Slavism and anti-Semitism. While some of these debates became irrelevant when the Bolshevik government in Moscow annulled old partition agreements, Germany became weakened, and the Habsburg Empire collapsed at the end of WWI, it was these political forces – especially Piłsudski’s and Dmowski’s – that defined national politics in the Second Polish Republic after independence in 1918.

*From the Second Republic to the Second World War (1919-1945)*

The Second Polish Republic lasted until 1939 and featured eight years of democracy (with just two free elections – in 1919 and 1922) and then thirteen years of military rule. Triggered by an unstable political system featuring a multitude of parties and a weak presidency, Piłsudski led a coup ‘d’état in 1926, which resulted in a personalized dictatorship that curtained political rights, marginalized parliamentary opposition, and managed elections. In terms of social structure, the Versailles Treaty, as well as subsequent military exploits led by Piłsudski, had created an

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4 Pankowski 2010: 15; Kitschelt et al. 1999: 97
5 Pankowski 2010: 21-4
6 Castle and Taras 2002: 18-20; Pankowski 2010: 15-31; Rae 2008: 35
7 Pankowski 2010: 16
8 Kitshelt et al. 1999
ethnically heterogeneous state in which—perhaps unsurprisingly due to the revanchist legacies of partition—minority groups, and especially Jews, were largely excluded from business and intellectual life.\(^9\) In terms of social class, this society was comprised of a large peasant population, a small middle class (of about 11% of the population), a shrinking nobility with predominantly (and paradoxically) radical left views, and an expanding working class (reaching 25% of the population in the 1920s).\(^10\) Based on such shifting demographics and on his personal standing as a military leader, Piłsudski “was able to use his past connections with the left” “to win the support of large sections of society.”\(^11\) During the period of “semi-authoritarianism” begun under Piłsudski, other parties, such as the Polish Peasant Party (PSL)\(^12\) and the weaker Communist Party, engaged in “constrained competition.”\(^13\)

Poland’s international politics of this period was at first marked by military conflicts motivated by border disputes, followed by dreams of a Third Europe of Central European states led by Poland and as an alternative to Soviet and German influences. Whereas under Piłsudski’s leadership the Second Republic made relative gains, especially against the Soviets,\(^14\) such gains were completely reversed as a consequence of Nazi and Soviet invasions, annexations, and atrocities following the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939. During WWII, Poland was not only entirely partitioned once again, but, as a result of Nazi and Soviet genocidal activities, it also lost 20% of its pre-war population, including 3 million Polish Jews and some 3 million ethnic Poles.\(^15\)

At a time when Poland became the site of mass murder during WWII, it was also a site of considerable resistance activities, such as the defense of the Jewish ghetto in Warsaw in the spring

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\(^9\) Rae 2008: 34  
\(^10\) Castle and Taras 2002: 22-3  
\(^11\) Rae 2008: 37  
\(^12\) Castle and Taras 2002: 20  
\(^13\) Kitschelt 2002: 18  
\(^14\) Rae 2008: 34  
\(^15\) Castle and Taras 2002: 25
of 1943 (during which 60,000 Polish Jews were murdered) and the Warsaw Uprising in the fall of 1944 (as a result of which 200,000 Poles were killed and 800,000 deported to Nazi camps or otherwise displaced). The resistance movement – one of “the strongest in Europe”\textsuperscript{16} and “the most effective of any established in a Nazi occupied country” – was coordinated by organizations such as the Home Army, which was linked to the pro-Western government in exile in London. Another resistance force was the People’s Guard, linked to the Soviet Union and out of which the Polish Workers’ Party was created with Stalin’s approval in 1944.\textsuperscript{17} Thus, the impressive mobilizational capacity that Polish civil society had demonstrated under imperial partition was by no means extinguished amid the extreme atrocities of WWII.


Having grown out of the communist resistance against Nazism, the Polish Workers’ Party formed the core of Poland’s post-WWII provisional government after a series of externally dominated political events first alienated and then effectively marginalized the London-based government in exile.\textsuperscript{18} Once in power, the Polish Workers’ Party “was painfully aware of its lack of [public] support,”\textsuperscript{19} a reason why it had to govern by using accommodative strategies. On his part, Stalin tried “to eradicate any stirrings of national communism” – first, by eliminating the Polish Communist Party in 1938,\textsuperscript{20} second, by electoral fraud,\textsuperscript{21} and third, by ordering the incorporation of the Polish Socialist Party and the surviving remnants of the Polish Peasant Party

\begin{footnotes}
\item[16] Poland’s resistance was strongest, along with Yugoslavia’s (Linz and Stepan 1996: 259).
\item[17] Castle and Taras 2002: 25-8
\item[18] These events include the Tehran Conference of 1943, which concluded with a favorable to Russia agreement regarding disputes about Poland’s post-WWII borders, the march of the Red Army into Poland in early 1945, and the subsequent Yalta Conference during which an agreement for an interim government of national unity was made (Castle and Taras 2002: 27-8).
\item[19] Grzymała-Busse 2002: 41
\item[20] Kitschelt 2002: 18
\item[21] Grzymała-Busse 2002: 42; Ekiert 1998: 17
\end{footnotes}
(PSL) into the new Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) in 1948. Yet such efforts failed to achieve the “coupling between the party and society” and to stop the subsequent mobilization of protest in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980-1. In turn, efforts at popular mobilization “achieved a rollback of land reforms, considerable autonomy for the Catholic Church, and a circumscribed area of civil liberties.” A central figure of this relatively “more humane… version of the communist regime,” the first secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Władysław Gomułka, was imprisoned during the period of Stalinization for “right-nationalist deviations,” only to be restored to power “on the wave of popular protest in 1956.”

Due to Poland’s powerful mobilization during WWII – which, as noted above, was itself a legacy of the politics of imperial partition and which continued during the interwar period – “the Soviet Union could not attempt to legitimate” its presence in Poland the way it did in Czechoslovakia. Indeed, “from the beginning” of Communist rule, Polish nationalist antagonism provided “a deep reservoir of resistance.” As a result, and unlike in Czechoslovakia, Poland’s communists were unable to install totalitarianism. For Linz and Stepan, communist Poland was an authoritarian state with “a significant de facto degree of societal pluralism, which imposed limits on totalitarian penetration, and affected the regime’s leadership style.” A similar idea, although one that does not isolate Poland as a unique communist case, lies behind Kitschelt et al.’s classification of the Polish communist experience as “national-accommodative.” According to

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22 Ekiert 1998: 18; Castle and Taras 2002: 31
23 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 44
24 Ekiert 1998: 15
25 Kitschelt et al. 1999: 97-9. These points are explained in further detail in Linz and Stepan (1996: 253-61)
26 Pankowski 2010: 47
27 Kitschelt et al. 1999: 36-7
28 Linz and Stepan 1996: 255-9; see also Ekiert 1998
29 Kitschelt et al. 1999. These authors actually locate Poland between the “national-accommodative” and the “bureaucratic-authoritarian” varieties of communism (1999: 39), suggesting that the regime was more repressive than argued by Linz and Stepan (1996). However, this mixed classification is due to the more state-centric view considering greater “repression against open dissident movements” (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 40). Overall, Kitschelt et al. discuss
these authors, Poland’s well-developed civil and political mobilization prior to communist rule conditioned anti-communist mobilization, thereby forcing significant concessions to the anti-communist opposition.\textsuperscript{30} Although the communist regime used increasingly repressive tactics to quash popular mobilization in 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980, collective protest repertoires became impressively adaptable.\textsuperscript{31}

An example of this adaptability are the protests of 1970 and 1976, which were motivated by price hikes\textsuperscript{32} and which became particularly consequential for two interrelated reasons. First, as “the largest and most violent working class uprising in the history of state socialist regimes,” the protests of the 1970s “became a symbolic reference point in working class resistance.” Subsequent anti-communist mobilization would be phrased particularly in working class terms because intellectuals, such as the founders of the Committee for Defense of Workers (KOR), “recognized that real strength lay only in cooperating with and supporting the workers.”\textsuperscript{33} This evolution of Polish protest action specifically as labor-based mobilization would find its most clear expression in the subsequent rise of Solidarity.

Second, the workers’ rebellion of 1970 led to the replacement of Gomulka with Edward Gierek as First Secretary of the party.\textsuperscript{34} Faced with popular protest, Gierek initially made economic concessions by giving up on the price increases and by opening Poland to Western credits and technology transfers. Yet such liberalizing measures were at the cost of “a rapidly mounting hard currency debt,” which was further exacerbated by the failure “to produce the exports to pay those

\textsuperscript{30} Kitschelt 2002: 18-9
\textsuperscript{31} Ekiert 1998: 280
\textsuperscript{32} Grzymała-Busse 2002: 49
\textsuperscript{33} Ekiert 1998: 28-31
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.: 30
debts before they grew to crisis proportions.” Overall, because Poland’s economic institutions and practices remained unreformed, Gierek’s opening of the economy eventually backfired. As Poland’s foreign debt and trade deficit continued to grow, Gierek mandated more food price rises in 1976, which, in turn, provoked new mass protests as well as the formation of KOR. By the end of the 1970s, Poland was not only experiencing declining living standards and shortages, but was also a clear “credit risk” – with “the largest foreign debt of any Eastern European country,” a national income that “declined by 25%,” and inflation that “hit triple digits.” These conditions led to the creation of Solidarity – the most important labor-mobilizing opposition movement in the communist world. Overall, as the 1980s approached, Polish communist leaders faced significant mobilization in civil society, particularly from organized labor, as well as an increasingly deteriorating economy.

Slovakia’s Antecedent Conditions: Communist Patrimonialism and Elite-led Transformations

Developments Before Communism

Although Slovakia’s earliest roots can be traced to the ninth century and the Great Moravian Empire, throughout the majority of its history, it was under some type of Hungarian control – first, as part of the Hungarian Kingdom between the early tenth century and 1867, and second, as part of Austria-Hungary between 1867 and the end of WWI. As a reaction to imperial policies heavily promoting Magyarization – or the forceful imposition of Hungarian language and culture – Slovakia began to forge ties with the culturally similar Czech lands, another Western Slavic people that at the time was under Austrian control within the dual empire. Because of the

35 Connor and Ploszajski 1992: 18
36 Ekiert 1998: 31
37 Connor and Ploszajski 1992: 18
38 Rae 2008: 46
harshly oppressive characteristics of the Hungarian state, “Slovak national aspirations were articulated most prominently by Slovaks abroad,” such as Milan Rastislav Štefánik. When the end of WWI marked the demise of Austria-Hungary in 1918, Štefánik, along with Czechs Tomáš Masaryk and Edvard Beneš, laid the formal union between Bohemia and Slovakia in what became the Czechoslovak Republic.39

While the Czech and Slovak lands were formally part of the same “democratic, but centralized, republic” – in which the Czech and Slovak peoples formally constituted a single Czechoslovak nation40 – for the two decades between the end of WWI and the beginning of WWII, their experiences could have hardly been more different. These experiences are traceable to the Habsburg imperial period, during which the two Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia were turned into “one of the most industrial parts of the empire” under Austrian control, while the Slovak lands lagged as a poorly developed agrarian area under Hungarian rule.41 Not only were the two parts of Czechoslovakia marked by very different political economies – industrial capitalism in the Czech lands and an agricultural economy that could no longer benefit from its traditional Hungarian markets in Slovakia; they could also be distinguished by divergent levels of public mobilization and religious proclivities, which, in turn, gave rise to opposite political-ideological tendencies. Whereas highly mobilized urban middle and working classes underpinned a competitive representative-democratic regime in the more secular Czech lands, in more Catholic Slovakia, civil society and popular mobilization were among the weakest in the East Central European region during the inter-war period.42 Additionally, the administrative apparatus, educational system, and all five governments of Czechoslovakia during the interwar period were dominated by the more

39 Henderson 2002: 1-4, 7
40 Ibid.: 6
41 Linz and Stepan 1996: 328
numerous and administratively experienced Czechs.\textsuperscript{43}

It was partly due to such marked disbalances – which only accentuated Slovaks’ unfulfilled desire for autonomy within Czechoslovakia – that Slovakia began increasingly susceptible to the radicalization epitomized by the rise of the popular Catholic-nationalist Hlinka Slovak People’s Party, the leadership of which would be assumed by the Catholic priest Josef Tiso beginning in the fall of 1938.\textsuperscript{44} Under Tiso’s leadership, Slovakia gained autonomy within what was now the Czecho-Slovak Republic immediately after the Munich Agreement formalized the Nazi annexation of the Sudetenland,\textsuperscript{45} a move that foreshadowed the subsequent declaration of independent Slovak statehood under pressure from Hitler. When “the Slovak state” was established by seceding from Czechoslovakia in March 1939, it was “a quasi-independent Nazi puppet” one-party state.\textsuperscript{46} Under president Tiso, between March and October 1942, the Slovak government deported “around 58,000”\textsuperscript{47} Slovak Jews to concentration and death camps, mostly located in Poland, in exchange for “500 marks for every Jew deported” paid by the German Reich.\textsuperscript{48} When German troops occupied Slovakia to suppress the anti-fascist Slovak National Uprising of 1944, “some 12,000 more” were deported, for a total of approximately 70,000 deported Jews,\textsuperscript{49} while additional “reprisals claimed some 5,000 lives in Slovakia.”\textsuperscript{50} After WWII, Tiso was eventually tried and found guilty of “destroying the first Czechoslovak Republic, collaborating with her enemies, betraying the uprising, and committing crimes against humanity” – for all of which he

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{43} Henderson 2002: 7-9\\
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.: 9-12\\
\textsuperscript{45} Immediately after Slovakia declared autonomy, the Vienna Award of November 1939 assigned Slovakia’s southern territories to Hungary (Henderson 2002: 12; Ward 2013: 166), which was followed by the Slovak People’s Party’s consolidation of power demonstrated in the elections December 1938.\\
\textsuperscript{46} Linz and Stepan 1996: 328; Henderson 2002: 13; Fisher 2006: 26\\
\textsuperscript{47} Ward 2013: 235\\
\textsuperscript{48} Henderson 2002: 13\\
\textsuperscript{49} Fisher 2006: 26\\
\textsuperscript{50} Ward 2013: 253
\end{flushleft}
was hanged in 1947.\textsuperscript{51}

\textit{Patrimonial Communism (1948-1989)}

In 1945, Czechoslovakia was reunited under a democratic framework with free elections, yet this arrangement proved to be merely a three-year pre-totalitarian overture marked by the failures to secure autonomy and to stop communism. First, Slovakia failed to gain autonomy due to its recent fascist betrayal, Czechoslovak electoral arithmetic, and the newly popular communist ideas of centralism. Second, although the non-communist Democratic Party was popular in Slovakia,\textsuperscript{52} where communists “received a considerably smaller percentage of the vote” than in the Czech lands, the communists “fomented a crisis” and “took over power completely in a coup d’état” in 1948.\textsuperscript{53}

The first two decades of Czechoslovak communism were marked by the nationalization, industrialization, and collectivization of agriculture, the repression of the Catholic Church (which was now perceived as having collaborated with Nazism), and the centralization of power in Prague, from where convinced hardliners kept ordering Stalinist-style purges even after Stalin’s death in 1953 (and especially as a reaction to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956).\textsuperscript{54} The federal idea was mostly “forgotten.”\textsuperscript{55} Politically, the party insisted on “Bolshevization” late into communism and party organization was very dense from the very beginning, albeit less so in Slovakia than in the Czech lands.\textsuperscript{56} On the economic front, the less developed Slovakia saw impressive outcomes in terms of industrial and co-operative agricultural modernization, both of which resulted in new

\begin{enumerate}
\item Ward 2013: 260-6
\item Henderson 2002: 15-18
\item Grzymała-Busse 2002: 30. This author reports a membership rate of “9.1% of adult Slovaks, about a third of the rates in the Czech lands” (2002: 35).
\item Henderson 2002: 18-21; Grzymała-Busse 2002: 40
\item Fisher 2006: 27
\item Grzyamalla-Busse 2002: 32-3
\end{enumerate}
security and welfare benefits for a more professional labor force. When this growth came to an abrupt stop in 1963, it was in the context of delayed de-Stalinization and a deteriorating relationship between Antonín Novotný (First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and incumbent Czechoslovak president), Alexander Dubček (First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party).  

In 1968, a “major reform movement of liberalization,” better known as the Prague Spring, was initiated from “within the party” with the installation of Dubček as the new leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. By abolishing censorship and allowing free criticism of the regime, the leaders encouraged an unusually open period of introspection known as “communism with a human face.” This liberalization, however, was swiftly ended when Warsaw Pact troops invaded the country justified by the principles of the new Brezhnev doctrine, which treated even minimal signs of liberalization in one country as dangerous precedents that could unleash a domino effect against totalitarian rule everywhere. Within months, Dubček was replaced by another Slovak, Gustáv Husák, as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Commencing a repressive period of “normalization,” the communists expelled “hundreds of thousands” from the party and governed over a more apathetic and disaffected public. Meanwhile, Slovakia achieved federal republic status through “sudden and rapid decentralization.” The new federalist arrangement drove already existing resentment between Czechs, who believed that Slovaks had been insufficiently interested in democratization during the 1968 events, and Slovaks, who – having been less active in the Prague Spring – faced less intensive repression and even a somewhat

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57 Henderson 2002: 18-21. There was a Czechoslovak Communist Party, which ruled over the entire country, and a Slovak Communist Party for Slovakia, but no Czech Communist Party for the Czech part of the federation.
58 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 34
59 Henderson 2002: 21-6
60 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 34-5
61 Bunce 1999: 221
privileged status in the party. Slovaks were also perceived as enjoying favoritism on behalf of (Slovak) Husák’s government in terms of both public administration appointments and economic development, which exhibited higher growth in Slovakia than in the Czech part.

When Gorbachev initiated his political and economic reforms, Czechoslovak party leaders – most of whom had risen to power as opponents of the similarly liberalizing intentions of the Prague Spring – were “reticent.” While many leaders in the party were replaced and minimal forms of freelance economic activity were allowed, such measures were mostly superficial “as the party feared another loss of control.” In terms of the economy, the absence of social pressure for communist accommodation (of the type in Poland and Hungary) meant that Czechoslovakia’s communist party leaders insulated themselves from popular discontent, stuck to economic centralization, and “shunned anything beyond cosmetic reform measures.”

Transition to Democracy

The Czechoslovak transition out of communism is often associated with successful mass mobilization, mostly due to popular demonstrations in the Czech lands. Indeed, the mobilization animated by the well-known Charter 77 was mostly associated with the Czech cities of Prague and Brno rather than with pro-democratic Slovak activism. Overall, “the steady build-up of demonstrations… was centered on Prague, with far smaller ones taking place in Bratislava.” Having organized only seven major Bratislava demonstrations between March 1988 and October 1989, “as well as smaller demonstrations about other religious and ecological issues,” Slovaks

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63 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 36
64 Henderson 2002: 21-6; Grzymała-Busse 2002: 41
65 Henderson 2002: 26-7
66 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 40-1
67 Myant and Drahokoupil 2011: 37
68 Bunce is careful to specify anti-regime popular protests in “the Czech lands” (2003: 176).
were significantly more passive than their Czech counterparts.\textsuperscript{69} Even after demonstration in Slovakia intensified after intellectuals founded the anti-communist Public Against Violence, these protests largely attracted students and the intelligentsia rather than ordinary working people. Even so, major changes in the political leadership followed at both the federal and state levels, culminating in the election of Dubček as chair of the Federal Assembly and of Václav Havel as president of Czechoslovakia, marking the successful end of the Velvet Revolution.\textsuperscript{70} The communist regime of Czechoslovakia had “imploded”\textsuperscript{71} – and not because of economic or long-term societal pressures, but because “though brief,” the strikes “demonstrated mass working-class support for the students, actors, and dissidents in Prague [but not in Bratislava], something the communists had not expected.”\textsuperscript{72}

Overall, although the Czech and Slovak lands were part of the same communist federation after 1968, their experiences were generally divergent. In the Western part of the federation, the Czech lands underwent what Kitschelt et al. call “bureaucratic-authoritarian” communism characterized by intensive degrees of repression buttressed by high levels of formal professional bureaucratization and low corruption. In the Slovak East, the regime was generally less repressive, yet anti-communist societal pressures – of the sort that “propelled the elite’s accommodation from below” in “national accommodative” Poland\textsuperscript{73} – were nevertheless absent. Instead – and as a result of the historical legacies in both economic-developmentalist and popular-mobilizational terms – Slovakia’s communist polity displayed attributes of “patrimonial communism” distinguished by

\textsuperscript{69} Henderson (2002: 29). On the same page, this author provides a good comparative example of the difference – whereas 200 students demonstrated in Bratislava on November 16, 1989, 50,000 people turned out for protests the following day in Prague.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid.: 29-32
\textsuperscript{71} Kitschelt 1999: 39
\textsuperscript{72} Orenstein 2001: 65. My italics for Prague, emphasizing that the epicenter of these demonstrations was not in Slovakia.
\textsuperscript{73} Kitschelt 2002: 20
high degrees of repression, rampant corruption, and co-optation. Although Slovakia displayed interesting national-accommodative tendencies – because “republic-level communist party leaderships fought… for autonomy and… national-accommodationist arrangements” 74 – such proclivities clearly remained at the elite level of Slovak communist leadership. In fact, any idea of Slovak “bourgeois nationalism” was attacked by Prague, both before and after 1968. 75 Because it never developed the mass mobilization more typical of the national-accommodative variety of communism, from the perspective of state-society relations, Slovakia’s overall communist experience is best characterized as patrimonial.

**Synopsis: Antecedent Conditions in Poland and Slovakia**

The long-view historical records of Poland and Slovakia reveal two contrasting paths in terms of the general relationship between the state and society. While the Polish path was characterized by popular mobilization whose relationship with the state was increasingly confrontational, the Slovak path exhibited more elitist-patrimonial patterns according to which pressures from civil society were significantly weaker in the periods before and during communism. It is true that neighboring Poland and Slovakia (as part of Czechoslovakia) exhibited some important similarities – such as predominant Catholic culture and characteristics similar enough as to warrant both countries’ inclusion under Kitschelt et al.’s national-accommodative category of communism. However, whereas communist accommodation in Poland was meant to appease a civil society that became increasingly mobilized around labor issues, the Czechoslovak communist state aimed to accommodate Slovak political elites rather than civil society.

74 Kitschelt et al. 1999: 40-1. Likewise, Grzymała-Busse confirms the lack of national-accommodationist strategies in Slovakia by writing that Slovaks gained “some administrative autonomy, largely as a result of Slovak lobbying,” and that the Czechoslovak Communist Party “appeared completely out of touch with society” because it did not engage in “any societal negotiations” (2002: 36, 41).

75 Fisher 2006: 27
The Polish historical record reveals a very consistent pattern of high mobilization in civil society. First, national mobilization, which was a legacy of the 19th century partitions, continued during the interwar period under the Second Polish Republic and played an important role in resisting Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Following the war, resistance in civil society persisted as a historical legacy, expressing itself in at least five major protest waves between the 1950s and 1980s and forcing the Communist government to seek accommodative strategies for dealing with popular mobilization. Overall, Polish civil society not only precluded the successful coupling of the Polish party-state and society through its strength in resistance, but also developed protest repertoires that became increasingly adaptable over time. By the 1970s, mobilization had become specifically labor-based as intellectuals and workers realized the potential that an activist and inclusive civil society had in terms of making demands on the communist regime. As workers’ rebellions intensified, a renewed communist leadership at first sought to make concessions to the increasingly mobilized labor, yet found it difficult to deal with a contentious civil society in the context of a declining economy. As Poland entered the 1980s, a clear cleavage had emerged between, on the one hand, highly mobilized labor in civil society represented by Solidarity and demanded solutions to the deepening economic problems and, on the other hand, a communist state that offered no such solutions.

In Slovakia, by contrast, the pre-1989 history was mostly driven by patrimonial and elitist, rather than popular-mobilizational, characteristics. Such elitist tendencies predominated both during the pre-communist period of industrial underdevelopment, when key demands for national autonomy were voiced by a small intellectual circle, and during communism, when, in contrast to Poland, the lack of opposition from civil society conditioned an easier installation of totalitarian rule. Under communism, elitist patterns persisted in key moments – when the Prague Spring of
1968 was initiated by communist elites around Dubček and even when anti-communist popular struggles took place in Slovakia – at first in a much more anemic fashion (when compared to the Czech lands) and then more decisively once the intellectual elite organized. Overall, this weakness of Slovak civil society resulted in a communist rule that – being characterized by state-led repression, corruption, and the cooptation of civil society – was more patrimonial than national in nature. Indeed, even Slovakia’s frustrated nationalism – which, due to the failure to secure independent statehood before communism, led to Tiso’s collaboration with Nazi Germany – was mostly elite-driven. For example, Slovak demands for federalism in communist Czechoslovakia were expressed and won by struggles at the elite level.

These divergent historical tendencies – towards popular mobilization against the state in Poland and towards elite-driven nationalism and patrimonialism in Slovakia – would condition the emergence of the particular cleavages in the run-up to critical junctures in the two countries.

8.3. Cleavages and Crises in Poland and Slovakia

Conditioned by very different historical legacies, Poland and Slovakia experienced the periods of cleavage in contrasting ways. In Poland, the state/society cleavage – which crystalized during the last decade of Communism and was based on the historical legacy of civil society activism – culminated with major concessions on the part of the Communist state, including not only a negotiated transition to democracy, but also income and wage indexation demanded by Solidarity on behalf of its mobilized labor constituency. In turn, the wage increases contributed to the hyperinflationary crisis that Solidarity, now leading the government, handled by enacting economic shock therapy in the context of a quickly deteriorating economy. By contrast, in Slovakia, initial market reforms lead to elite-driven independence and the imposition of competitive authoritarianism, which itself was marked by important continuities with the
communist past and the refusal to enact major economic liberalization – the two central issues that defined the Mečiarism/anti-Mečiarism cleavage. Independent Slovakia’s top-down management of state/society relations, possible in a context of weak labor mobilization in civil society, characterized a cleavage period marked by a relative economic stability and during which most of the electorate preferred parties advocating social protection. Overall, the different historical antecedents of labor mobilization in civil society (in Poland) versus elitist patrimonialism (in Slovakia) led to contrasting periods of cleavage, particularly with respect to how state/society relations conditioned the relative depth of economic problems.

 importantly, while the cleavage periods contrasted because they were conditioned by the divergent critical antecedents of the past, these periods are analytically different from and prior to the subsequent periods of critical juncture. First, the two countries experienced obvious changes immediately before or during their respective cleavage periods – the collapse of communism in both, the initial introduction of shock therapy in Poland, and new statehood and relatively free elections in Slovakia. Yet these changes did not represent a neoliberal critical juncture in either country. If neoliberal critical junctures are periods when major market reforms are enacted and sustained over the course of a political administration76 after recent democratic elections during which policy options are presented for public ratification, then Poland’s critical juncture began with Lech Wałęsa’s election in 1990 and Slovakia’s critical juncture began with the 1998 election. By contrast, the periods analyzed below were moments which exhibited important continuities with the past and during which historical antecedents culminated in crises that would be resolved during subsequent critical junctures.

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76 Defined as at least half of the term limit in office.
Poland’s Cleavage and Hyperinflationary Crisis

The Cleavage Between State and Society in the 1980s

The interrelated processes of growing economic decline and popular mobilization structured the key cleavage in Poland through the 1980s, culminating not only in the political transition out of one party communist rule, but also in a deep economic crisis. Having precipitated in the context of labor mobilization, this crisis triggered Poland’s de-aligning critical juncture.

If the protest of the 1950s and 1960s had been associated with intellectuals and those of the 1970s were an expression of workers’ demands, popular mobilization in the 1980s “bridged the political and social gaps between workers, intellectuals,” and the Catholic Church. Built on the intellectual foundations of KOR and representing the interests of 10 million members, Solidarity was a labor-mobilizing movement that demanded both political and economic rights. Formed in August 1980, after a summer of “rapid mass mobilization and unprecedented level of strikes,” Solidarity represented the emergence of a multidimensional, self-organized, strong, and independent civil society” whose collective identity reflected “the unsurmountable division between the alien communist state “Them” and society “Us.” Although the imposition of martial law in December 1981 introduced highly repressive measures, such the 1982 ban of Solidarity and the jailing of many of its activists, underground organizing and widespread opposition to the communist regime continued throughout the 1980s. While by the end of the 1980s political repression subsided and “Poland again became one of the most politically liberal countries in the

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77 Ekiert 1998: 32  
78 Castle and Taras 2002: 52-62  
79 Ekiert 1998: 35
the deep cleavage between the communist state and civil society, mobilized around the idea of defending workers’ interests, persisted throughout the final decade of communism. 

So did Poland’s economic problems. As worsening macroeconomic conditions resulted in the removal of Gierek, the center of power eventually shifted to the military under General Wojciech Jaruzelski. At the same time, the significant popular mobilization – albeit illegal – urged the communist rulers to search “for some sort of accommodation.” This featured partial market reforms “designed to establish the environment for the market to function, including the removal of price restrictions, the implementation of enterprise self-finance, the liquidation of unprofitable enterprises,” the commercialization of the banking sector, and the liquidation of subsidies. Yet, under military rule, prices of most consumer goods went up by 300-400%, the cost of living standards rose by 100%, and real wages dropped by 25%. As the country became the third largest debtor in the world by 1985, “the situation reached absurd levels,” with Poland exporting raw materials and in return receiving poorly processed goods.

The numbers in Table 8.1 reflect some of Poland’s economic problems throughout Jaruzewski’s rule. The serious decline of real GDP in 1981 was followed by a significant growth in inflation – first in 1982, then in 1984, and finally between 1987 and 1989 in a more consistent and menacing fashion. Meanwhile, as the bottom of the table shows, the growth of real average wages never matched the growth of inflation throughout the period. This discrepancy between inflation and real wages would result in important labor-based pressures from civil society for accommodations on the part of the communist state. As discussed below, the economic measures

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80 Ibid.: 36-7
81 Castle and Taras 2002: 55
82 Ekiert 1998: 37
83 Rae 2008: 48
84 Ibid.: 48
that the communist state took in order to accommodate a mobilized civil society would only lead to deeper economic crisis in Poland.

Table 8.1. Selected economic indicators in Poland, 1980-1989

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>251.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 1% share of national income (pre tax)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bottom 50% share of national income (pre tax)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income inequality (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current accounts balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real average wage (annual avg., PLN 2010 = 100)</td>
<td>1799.1</td>
<td>1922.5</td>
<td>1428.7</td>
<td>1416.3</td>
<td>1427.7</td>
<td>1521.0</td>
<td>1571.8</td>
<td>1506.4</td>
<td>1726.5</td>
<td>1951.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>-25.7%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>-4.2%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Differently from the tables for the cleavage periods of the other three countries, for Poland I include data for each year of the cleavage period (which roughly coincided with the 1980s in this country) rather than broken down by administrations. This is because the 1980s can be considered as falling under a single communist administration, with Wojciech Jaruzelski acting as First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party from October 1981 to July 1989. Jaruzelski became First Secretary after another communist, Stanisław Kania (1980-81), who had succeeded Edward Gierek (1970-80).
2. Income inequality is measured as the share of national income for the top 1% divided by the share of national income for the bottom 50% (before tax).

Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; World Inequality Database (WID).

From Cleavage to Hyperinflationary Crisis

As argued by János Kornai, “attempts to press ahead with market reforms lead inevitably into instability.”85 Poland’s experience throughout the 1980s substantiates this argument. The already bad economic situation of the late 1970s and early 1980s was exacerbated as Jaruzelski’s government allowed “enterprises greater freedom without the controls that a full market system would have provided.”86 When prices of rents, heating, and fuel [once again] went up by 140-

85 Myant and Drahoukopil 2011: 37
86 Ibid.: 38
200% in 1988, further inflationary pressures caused a new wave of strikes. As it became clear that the government could not continue ruling “without reference to the opposition,” roundtable discussions with Solidarity were organized in early 1989. These discussions concluded with communist concessions to allow semi-free elections in the summer of 1989 and to budge to Solidarity’s economic demands. Although achieving market equilibrium and a functioning price system would be “left for the new government to try to clear up,” the communists conceded “to allow indexation so that wages would increase to cover 80% of price rises and to maintain employment levels and security for employees.” It was due to pressures from organized labor – in 1988 by mass protests and in 1989 by Solidarity-led negotiations – that the real average wage increased by 14.6% and 13.0% in the last two years of communism, as shown in Table 8.1 above. In particular, after the strikes of 1988, the new “general wage and income indexation system [of 1989] … was forced through by Solidarity.” While meant to accommodate labor, these wage increases – adopted in a period of already high inflation – would immediately provoke hyperinflation.

Poland’s negotiated transition meant that Solidarity, “not knowing what would happen in the future, made concessions they would not have made” otherwise. These included elections that guaranteed 65% of the lower house to the communists and a parallel executive in the hands of the previous non-democratic regime.” At the same time, Solidarity was able to achieve unexpected gains by overwhelmingly winning the seats that were open to free competitive elections, including 99% of seats in the newly created Senate. Ultimately, while communist Jaruzelski occupied the

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87 Rae 2008: 38; Connor and Ploszajski 1992: 20
89 See “Polish Workers Strike and Win a Raise” (New York Times Special by John Tagliabue, April 26, 1988)
90 Kolodko 1991
91 Ibid.
92 Linz and Stepan 1996: 266. For a richer discussion of Poland’s negotiated transition, see Przeworski 1991.
newly created – and ambiguous—position of president, after some Peasant Party deputies defected from the communist coalition, in August 1989, Solidarity’s Tadeusz Mazowiecki was appointed as “the first non-communist prime minister in Eastern Europe since Stalin.”

When a cabinet dominated by Solidarity was formed, Poland was already in a deep economic crisis. Because the previous government had relaxed price controls and “caved in to higher wage demands” during the spring 1989 negotiations with Solidarity, inflation spiraled, hitting 54% per month in October 1989. In addition, Poland was seriously indebted and strikes were breaking across a country “in the grip of hyperinflation.” The most influential cabinet member of Mazowiecki’s government, finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz, quickly “assembled a small and cohesive team,” which, in cooperation with the IMF, multilateral banks, and Western governments, developed an economic strategy of shock therapy known as the Balcerowicz Plan.

The Balcerowicz Plan, inspired by Schumpeter’s ideas about “creative destruction” as well as by Kornai’s ideas about the unreformability of the command economy by gradualist means, introduced “big-bang” neoliberal reforms on January 1, 1990. The reforms featured the freeing of imports, devaluation of currency, and liberalization of prices, leading to an immediate price increase to nearly 180% compared to the previous month. Facing continued hyperinflation that reached 586% in 1990, Mazowiecki’s government responded with a stabilization program of restrictive policies centered on low credit supply through high interest rates meant to reduce domestic demand. While the numbers for January 1990 were most dramatic, the circular-flow-
of-income logic meant that by the end of 1990, Poland had seen 75.4% decline in real wages, 81.6% decline in consumption, and 75.8% decline in industrial output as compared to the last month of 1989 – an overall process of rapid economic decline that accelerated in 1989 and continued throughout 1990. Even though by the end of 1990 inflation levels were gradually reduced, “a degree of macroeconomic instability continued.”

Overall, while economists disagree on whether long-term or short-term problems caused Poland’s rapid economic recession, multiple attempts at partial reform that had originated as methods to accommodate civil society certainly did not help, either in the long or short term. Poland suffered its worst bouts of hyperinflation in 1990, but hyperinflation had already been a problem in 1989 – before the Balcerowicz Plan took effect and after Solidarity had negotiated wage increases during the roundtable talks. As discussed above, Poland’s labor-based mobilization contributed, at least partially, to unsuccessful attempts at market reform, elements of which were meant to accommodate an unruly civil society both in the last two decades and the final two years of Polish communism. In turn, the escalation of the hyperinflationary crisis in 1989 and 1990 conditioned Poland’s neoliberal critical juncture that began with the election of Lech Wałęsa to the presidency.

Slovakia’s Post-communist Cleavage

Initial Developments in a New Czechoslovakia (1989-1992)

Unlike Poland’s transition to democracy, the Czechoslovak transition was not driven by economic instability. Because there had been no societal pressures for market reform during

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100 Myant and Drahokoupil 2011: 58
101 Differently from the discussion of cleavages in Peru, Ecuador, and Slovakia, the analysis of the cleavage period in Poland does not examine the party system during the cleavage period. This is because during this period Poland did not have fully democratic elections that would have produced a meaningful party system. The first such elections (discussed in Chapter 9) were held in December 1990 (for president) and then in October 1991 (for parliament).
communism, the communist leadership had managed to keep central control over the economy, which became an example of macroeconomic stability after 1968.\textsuperscript{102} This meant that rather than inheriting “budget deficits, generalized shortages, inflation or a collapse in production,” as in neighboring Poland, “the new regime took over a functioning state machine, a functioning currency and central bank, and a stable economic situation”\textsuperscript{103} upon which to build the new economic order.

The new Czechoslovak government that was quickly formed was one of “national understanding” – led by playwright and dissident Václav Havel as president, reformed communist Marián Čalfa as prime minister, and economic radical Václav Klaus as minister of finance. Next, an economic program of “social liberalism” – a mix of radical-neoliberal and social elements – was formulated to restructure the economy.\textsuperscript{104} Rejecting gradualism as “absolutely the wrong approach” in a context of a full-fledged democracy, this program corrected the budget, cut government expenditure, launched institutional restructuring, devalued the currency, instituted a fixed exchange rate, liberalized prizes wages, and foreign trade, and initiated voucher privatization.\textsuperscript{105} Yet to maintain popular support, Czech leaders astutely used both direct cash payments to buy off socially vulnerable and electorally influential populations, like pensioners and the unemployed, and economic nationalist methods of banking and privatization.\textsuperscript{106} Even with such safeguards, Czechoslovakia did not avoid the “inevitable transformation recession” featuring a loss of a third of industrial output, one-fourth of agriculture, and one-fifth of GDP in the first

\textsuperscript{102} In 1989, Czechoslovak economic output was highest in the communist world relative to the West (55.3% of that of the West) and economic decline was low relative to comparable countries, such as Hungary and Poland (8.4 points decline between 1973 and 1990 compared to 14.7 points decline for Poland) (Myant and Drahokoupil 2011: 13. 1989).
\textsuperscript{103} Myant and Drahokoupil 2011: 37.
\textsuperscript{104} Orenstein 2001: 66-72
\textsuperscript{105} Klaus 2014: 56, 59-61
\textsuperscript{106} Orenstein 2001: 73-9; Greskovits 1998: 139
three years of the transformation, as well as 57% inflation in 1991. This downturn was “more severe in Slovakia” – if unemployment, a now entirely new reality, in the Czech part was 3%, in Slovakia it reached 11.5%.

Following well-established historical norm, “most of Czechoslovakia’s reformers were Czechs; Slovak economists played a much smaller role.” In this context, the declining output and the 1991 inflation were important reasons why Slovak leaders – such as Vladimir Mečiar and Ján Čarnogurský, the first two post-1989 prime ministers of the Slovak Republic – opposed economic austerity imposed from Prague. Economic policy disputes quickly erupted between Czechs, who preferred austerity, and Slovaks, who were discontent with Klaus’ economic radicalism and preferred gradualist reforms with minimal social disruption. As admitted by leading Czech and Slovak neoliberal reformers, such disputes “were part of the reason for the split” of Czechoslovakia. While the question of this split has been fruitfully explored elsewhere, it is undisputable that, because “there was never a majority in either republic that wanted a split,” “political opportunism” played a key role. This was especially true regarding Slovak political elites whose part of the federation was “hit earlier and harder” by “the social consequences of Czech-led economic transformation.” In line with historical precedent, Slovakia’s independence

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107 Klaus 2014: 62-4
108 This was mostly due to fact that the Slovak economy was based on heavy industry exported to other communist economies, all of which were facing their own difficulties at the time (Mikloš 2014: 115 and 115n3).
109 Klaus 2014: 55
110 Raimondi 1991: 7
111 Henderson 1995; Innes 2001; Stein 1997 cited in Fischer et al. 2007
113 Klaus 2014: 55; Mikloš 2014: 115
114 E.g., Stolarik 2016 (particularly Part I)
115 Orenstein 2001: 85
was purely “an agreement between political elites,” not a product of popularly sanctioned nationalist mobilization.

Return to Illiberalism and Continuities with the Past (1992-1998)

Although as part of the federation Slovakia had transitioned out of the communist one-party state and centrally planned economy, the initial political and economic reforms were truncated once Slovakia achieved independent statehood in 1993. Instead of transitioning into a liberal market democracy, under the leadership of prime-minister Mečiar, the new state descended into a competitive authoritarian regime with patrimonial characteristics, or what became known as Mečiarism.\textsuperscript{118} Crucially, Slovakia’s first post-communist decade exhibited a key structural similarity with the Communist bargain after 1968 – namely, a regime-sanctioned wager of “as much in the sphere of social security as possible”\textsuperscript{119} in exchange for “securing acquiescence to”\textsuperscript{120} the authoritarian regime.\textsuperscript{121} Due to the “revival of important aspects of the Husák legacy,” such as “welfare paternalism, subsidies and protective regulation for inherited industries, and nationalism,”\textsuperscript{122} Mečiarism’s basic premise can be understood as a period of relative continuity with, rather than a significant break from, the previous regime.\textsuperscript{123} Conditioned by the antecedent patrimonial and elitist tendencies discussed above, Mečiarism delineated the basic cleavage to be resolved during Slovakia’s subsequent critical juncture.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Henderson 2002: 34
\item \textsuperscript{118} Fisher et al. 2007
\item \textsuperscript{119} Polák 2004
\item \textsuperscript{120} Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 145
\item \textsuperscript{121} See Levitsky and Way (2010), who argue that competitive authoritarian regimes, such as the one established by Mečiar in Slovakia, do not deserve the title “democratic.” These authors write that “Mečiar governed in an authoritarian way” (2010: 93).
\item \textsuperscript{122} Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 146
\item \textsuperscript{123} Polák 2004. Note also that Mečiar made broad use of the internal-security apparatus inherited from the communist regime “to carry out broad surveillance of political society, including much of the media, business, political parties, the church, trade unions, and most major civil-society foundations” (Levitsky and Way 2010: 92). This does not mean, however, that there were no changes. In fact, Slovakia now traded with Western Europe and had a multi-party system (Levitsky and Way 2010: 92).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Except for a seven-month period in 1994, Mečiar governed Slovakia from the summer of 1992, when he won elections and became prime-minister of the then Slovak part of the federation for a second time, until the fall of 1998. At first, Mečiar’s HZDS formed a one-party government that ruled, with tacit support from the nationalist SNS, from 1992 to 1994. In 1994, Mečiar’s government was dismissed after a no-confidence vote and replaced by a broad left-right minority coalition government led by Josef Moravčík, who had defected from Mečiar’s party. Yet Mečiar returned as prime minister after winning the fall 1994 parliamentary election and forming a government with the nationalist SNS and far-left Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). Led by Mečiar’s HZDS, this government favored power politics, national identity politics, and the weakening of the basic institutions of market democracy. In turn, these methods defined the major cleavage to be resolved in Slovak politics – that between Mečiarism, on the one hand, and the opposition to Mečiar, on the other.

As the de-facto founder of the new Slovakia and having won two democratic elections (in 1992 and 1994) by leading a national-populist party, Mečiar acted as Slovakia’s new protector, justified by a manufactured image of a country at risk and in need of protection. Not surprisingly, nationalism played a key role in Mečiarism’s appeal, particularly by occupying

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124 Before becoming prime minister for the second time, Mečiar had first been minister of the interior before the first free parliamentary elections in June 1990, as a result of which he became prime minister for the first time for the period between June 1990 and May 1991. After Mečiar formed a nationalist faction within the Public Against Violence (VPN) and was dismissed from the prime-ministerial post, he founded HZDS and formally split from VPN. At this point, Mečiar was replaced by Christian Democrat Ján Čarnogurský who became Slovakia’s second prime minister between May 1991 and June 1992, when the second democratic elections took place (see Henderson 2002: 34-5; Fisher 2006: 30, 35, 38, 51).
125 Henderson 2002: 42-4
126 Fitzmaurice 1995 cited in Levitsky and Way 2010: 93
127 Fisher 2006: 87; Henderson 2002: 44
128 Fisher et al. 2007: 988
129 Deegan-Krause 2006: 42-5
130 Učeň 2007: 52; See also Fisher 2006.
132 Fisher et al. 2007: 988
a primary place in HZDS’s ideology, which also included elements of center-left economic appeals and, secondarily, of Christianity. This ideological eclecticism\(^\text{133}\) was buttressed by an “unusually strong party organization” featuring “the largest number of paid employees” of all Slovak parties,\(^\text{134}\) 2,000 local organizations, staff to research and analyze public opinion,\(^\text{135}\) and extensive ties to the business elites.\(^\text{136}\) HZDS’s organization was decidedly top-down, featuring Mečiar as a “charismatic” and “omnipotent” leader, quasi-extortionist tactics to maintain parliamentary discipline, non-transparent finances, and by far the largest membership of all Slovak parties at the time.\(^\text{137}\)

Armed with an organizational endowment that was significantly superior to that of all other parties\(^\text{138}\) and presented with a fragmented opposition\(^\text{139}\) that was divided along “ideological and ethnic lines,” Mečiar successfully created a competitive authoritarian regime.\(^\text{140}\) This regime abused power with what Levitsky and Way characterize as “medium high” coercive capacity by skewing the media playing field, by using the internal-security apparatus to surveil media, business, political parties, the church, trade unions, and civil society, and by persecuting political opponents\(^\text{141}\) in a series of “targeted, extra-legal encroachments.”\(^\text{142}\) Heavily used between 1993 and 1998,\(^\text{143}\) such authoritarian tactics drew the political lines of the cleavage between Mečiarism and the anti-Mečiar opposition.

On the economic front, independent Slovakia’s position was weak. With very low

\(^{133}\) Haughton 2001: 748-54
\(^{134}\) Ibid.: 757
\(^{135}\) Deegan-Krause 2006: 125
\(^{136}\) Levitsky and Way 2010: 81-2
\(^{137}\) Haughton 2001: 754-9; O’Dwyer 2006: 50-1
\(^{138}\) Deegan-Krause 2006: 81-3
\(^{139}\) Fisher 2006: 153
\(^{140}\) Levitsky and Way 2010: 94
\(^{141}\) Deegan-Krause 2006: 34-5; Levitsky and Way 2010: 92
\(^{142}\) Deegan-Krause 2006: 35-8
\(^{143}\) Levitsky and Way 2010: 91
international reserves, the country was in dire need of structural reforms, particularly of the arms industry in which Slovakia had specialized and which had shrunk by almost 90%, resulting in high unemployment rates.” Yet, Mečiar insisted on a nationalist and confrontational rhetoric, refusing to sign any IMF agreements, which in turn deprived the country of needed loans and FDI investment.  

At the same time, and despite the rhetorical bravado, Mečiar managed to maintain a healthy economy by keeping GDP growth high, by keeping inflation low, and by using fiscal and monetary policies that were “in line with IMF conditionality,” especially in 1995-6. As indicated by the economic indicators presented in Table 8.2 below, the Slovak economy remained relatively healthy throughout the 1990s. This, in turn, facilitated broad public support.

Even so, the overall economic strategy of the government was considered “irresponsible and populist” because it was characterized by increasingly expansionary fiscal policy, growing international indebtedness, clientelism, and corrupt rent-seeking. A prime example of this was Mečiar’s strategy of replacing the coupon privatization launched by Klaus before the breakup of Czechoslovakia with a non-transparent program of direct sales. The new program was highly clientelistic because it benefited “individuals with close links to the ruling parties” who “only paid a symbolic price” for the largest previously state-owned banks and natural monopolies, such as gas utilities, electricity and telecommunication companies.

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144 Pop-Eleches 2009: 114  
145 Levitsky and Way 2010: 94; Fisher 2006: 151  
146 Pop-Eleches 2009: 115-6, 179  
147 Fisher 2006: 151  
148 Mikloš 2014: 116
Table 8.2. Selected economic indicators in Slovakia, 1993-1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/Prime Minister</th>
<th>Mečiar II 06/92 - 03/94</th>
<th>Moravčík 03/94 - 12/94</th>
<th>Mečiar III 12/94 - 10/98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (annual avg.)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current accounts balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real average wage (quarterly avg.), EUR (2010 = 100)</td>
<td>516.1</td>
<td>570.1</td>
<td>629.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

level and speed of market liberalization
(at term’s end)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EBRD Index (unweighted)</th>
<th>Mečiar II 06/92 - 03/94</th>
<th>Moravčík 03/94 - 12/94</th>
<th>Mečiar III 12/94 - 10/98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Foundation overall score</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>-4.6%</td>
<td>-5.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The table uses the same method of periodization for the calculation of level and speed of market liberalization under different administrations as used for the Peruvian and Ecuadorian cases in Chapter 7. The only exceptions are the EBRD index (0.713) and the Heritage Foundation overall score (54.2), which are used for the end of Mečiar’s third government (in 1998) and which are both numbers for the previous year (1997). This is due to the fact that the rise of these two indicators in the subsequent year (1998) was due to Dzurinda’s reforms.
2. For the calculations of percent change in the real average wage and EBRD Index for Mečiar’s second government, the previous period is 1990-92 (that is, the period after the fall of communism and before Slovakia formally split from Czechoslovakia). These are the only two indicators for which data specifically for the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia are readily available.
3. The unweighted EBRD index is the average score of the following eight EBRD indicators, all of which were normalized on a 0-1 scale: (1) large-scale privatization, (2) small-scale privatization, (3) banking reform, (4) restructuring, (5) price liberalization, (6) trade and foreign exchange, (7) competition, and (8) securities markets.

Sources: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR); International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; European Bank for Reconstruction of Development (EBRD): Transition Indicators; The Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom.

The economic system that emerged under Mečiarism was one of nationally flavored economic centralism in which the state was viewed as an enabler. Indeed, as HZDS completely “colonized” and doubled the national state administration, a dense patronage network was solidified during this period. Importantly, the patrimonial apparatus was directly “inherited from

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149 Haughton 2001: 749 cited in Fischer et al. 2007
150 O’Dwyer 2006: 6
the communist model of the state,“\textsuperscript{151} according to which the \textit{nomenklatura} system fused party and state administration, personalism and corruption became predominant as Leninist ideology was increasingly de-legitimated, and arbitrariness, rather than professionalism, dictated administrative agendas.\textsuperscript{152} Replacing the Communist Party at the helm, HZDS captured control over the economic transformation\textsuperscript{153} by completely dominating Slovakia’s administrative system.\textsuperscript{154} The fact that the basic \textit{economic policy} of the government was to use “state property for political gain”\textsuperscript{155} highlights Mečiarism’s decidedly patrimonial character.

In sum, although Mečiar’s government “privatized and restructured a large part of the economy,”\textsuperscript{156} it was, in fact, using liberal means for illiberal ends.\textsuperscript{157} As a result, Slovakia did not see meaningful improvements in terms of its overall degree of market liberalization, as shown in Table 8.2 above. Indeed, the country’s Heritage Foundation “overall score” declined by 5.9% during Mečiar’s 1994-98 term. Overall, the patrimonial manner in which economic governance was carried under Mečiar underscores important elements of continuity with, rather than change from, the previous system.

By 1997-98, Mečiarism was driving the country into deeper economic problems and isolation. On the economic front, the inefficient firms that had not been restructured made Slovakia less competitive while patrimonial economic relations, tax evasion, and unreformed welfare institutions led to a deepening fiscal crisis.\textsuperscript{158} Meanwhile, the country’s indebtedness and interest rates significantly increased, the “government stopped honoring its obligations,” and “primary and

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid.: 99
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.: 31
\textsuperscript{153} Gould and Szomolányi 2000 cited in Fischer et al. 2007: 988
\textsuperscript{154} O’Dwyer 2006: 14
\textsuperscript{155} Fisher 2006: 83-100
\textsuperscript{156} Pop-Eleches 2009: 116-7
\textsuperscript{157} Fisher et al. 2007: 988
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.: 989
secondary insolvency” led to the “freezing of the economic system.” These economic problems only contributed to Slovakia’s designation as a “black hole” that repelled foreign investors due to the non-democratic nature of the regime. Crucially, the country faced extensive international pressure, was excluded from the OECD and the first round of NATO enlargement, and failed to enter EU accession negotiations along with other governments from the region. In turn, this international “pariah status” became “a central theme of domestic politics,” prompting numerous government resignations and strengthening the opposition. By the summer of 1998, “Slovakia was on the verge” of economic and political crisis and “Mečiarism appeared to offer no long-term solutions.”

**Slovakia’s Party System Before the Critical Juncture**

Slovakia’s party system during most of the first post-communist decade was mostly structured around the Mečiarism/anti-Mečiarism cleavage which entailed, above all, questions of nationalism, state building, Catholicism, and democracy. The importance of these dimensions does not mean, however, that redistributive issues were insignificant in Slovakia. Rather, as a result of the imposition of market liberalism from the Prague in the 1990-92 period before the split, the populist-nationalist backlash associated with Mečiarism also subsumed an important materialist dimension. Indeed, as shown by Markowski, “throughout the 1990s, economic populism versus liberalism [was] also a strong force structuring public opinion.” For this reason, left-right party placement in Slovakia in the 1990s is best predicted by both socio-cultural and economic

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159 Mikloš 2014: 117
160 Fitch Ratings 2001: 7 cited in Fischer et al. 2007
161 Mikloš 2014: 116
162 Levitsky and Way 2010: 94
163 Ibid.: 94-6
164 Fisher et al. 2007
166 Markowski 1997: 231
factors. Overall, while national and democratic issues were salient in Slovakia, socio-economic issues were entailed in the broader debate about Mečiar’s populism and were important for a sizeable portion of the electorate that voted for parties perceived as left-leaning on such issues.

Without a doubt, the most successful political party in Slovakia before the critical juncture was Mečiar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), which, as shown in Table 8.3, captured, on average, a third of the national vote (33.1%) between 1992 and 1998. The party was highly successful for many reasons – its patronage networks, competitive authoritarian style of rule, and nationalist and socio-conservative appeals popular in a new state with a mostly Catholic population. Another important reason for HZDS’s electoral strength was the party’s program of managed economic transition. While this strategy complicated relations with the IMF, the party’s emphasis on the “social aspect” of reform and its policy of trade union co-optation allowed HZDS to successfully colonize much of the sizeable left-leaning electorate – particularly “those with an equivocal attitude to the process of marketization and those nostalgic for Communist times.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Left KSS, ZRS</th>
<th>Center-left SDL'</th>
<th>Populist Left HZDS</th>
<th>Right of Center KDH, DS, DU, SDK</th>
<th>Hungarian Minority SMK-MKP</th>
<th>Far Right SNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 Parl.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Parl.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Parl.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 Parl.</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Mun. Councils</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New mayors</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR).

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167 Bušítková and Kitschelt 2009: 473
168 Deegan-Krause 2000; Grzymała-Busse 2002: 151-2; O’Dwyer 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010
169 Pop Eleches 2009
170 Haughton 2004: 182-3
Due to its economically populist appeals, HZDS dominated much of the left-leaning electorate mostly at the expense of the social-democratic Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). SDL was the communist successor party that, under the centralized leadership of Peter Weiss, reformed itself and rapidly broke with the communist past. In particular, the party rejected its former communist ideology and communist members, sought to distinguish itself as the democratic alternative to HZDS on the center-left, and featured ideological flexibility in the pursuit of broad electoral support.\(^\text{171}\) Despite this flexibility (discussed in Chapter 9), SDL’s “stress on solidarity, social justice, and the promotion of the health and economic well-being of working people was at the core of its declarations” consistently throughout the 1990s.\(^\text{172}\) Finally, although SDL was seemingly weak at the ballot box – with an average of 13.3% of the national vote in the first post-communist decade – it was, in fact, Slovakia’s second electorally most successful party, on average, during this period.\(^\text{173}\) The party owed this, in part, to its organizational strength, which it largely maintained despite the membership purges of the early 1990s.\(^\text{174}\) Evidence of this organizational strength is the fact that SDL was the only Slovak party with an electoral performance superior at the local level than at the national level, as shown in Table 8.3.\(^\text{175}\)

If HZDS and SDL positioned themselves to the left of the economic center, economic liberalism was championed by the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Democratic Party (DS), and the Democratic Union (DU)\(^\text{176}\) – all of which formed the core of the Slovak Democratic

\(^{171}\) Grzymała-Busse 2002: 92-9, 150-60, 197-204, 244-9  
\(^{172}\) Haughton 2004: 183  
\(^{173}\) SDL was second, behind only HZDS, in the 1992 and 1994 elections. It was third in the 1998 election, the winner of which was a coalition of five parties (see below).  
\(^{174}\) Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2009  
\(^{175}\) As opposed to the personalist tendencies more typical in parties that tend to be electorally strong at the national level but weaker locally.  
\(^{176}\) For a classification of these parties, see Wightman 2001: 132, Henderson 2002: 46-7, Fisher 2006: 154-5, and Mikloš 2014: 117n9. The international affiliations of these parties are also indicative of their ideologies (Pop-Eleches 2010). On the center-right, KDH was a member of the European Democratic Union and the European Union of
Coalition (SDK) in 1998.\textsuperscript{177} Of the three parties, KDH was largest, socially conservative, and emphasizing a “traditional free-market agenda,”\textsuperscript{178} as exemplified by the tendency towards pro-market economic content in its manifestos. By the same measure, both DS and DU were significantly more economically liberal than the average Slovak party.\textsuperscript{179} The pro-market bent of these three parties would be the basis for a future coalition (SDK in 1998) and a subsequent merger of neoliberal parties (SDKÚ in 2000) – which included both DS and DU as well as a significant portion of the 1990s KDH, and which was led by Mikuláš Dzurinda (himself a founder of KDH). While these parties varied on a number of other dimensions,\textsuperscript{180} together they represented the principles of economic liberalism throughout the 1990s. These principles were also consistently defended by the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP), an ethnic minority party with a stable electoral support base and a clear pro-market position.\textsuperscript{181}

Finally, the fringes of Slovakia’s political spectrum were occupied by the extreme nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) to the right and radical left Communist Party (KSS) and Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS).\textsuperscript{182} While KSS, formed as a reaction against the moderation of the communist successor SDL, failed to enter parliament in the 1990s, both ZRS and SNS were Mečiar’s ruling coalition partners from 1994 to 1998. Whereas ZRS became practically irrelevant immediately after participating in Mečiar’s government, SNS was strengthened. Notably, SNS focused on questions of identity and anti-Hungarian appeals. Its

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\textsuperscript{177} SDK also included two marginal center-left parties – the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and the Green Party (SZ). SDSS, which was a member of the Socialist International, had gained 4\% of national vote in the 1992 parliamentary election and the SZ had gained 3.5\% and 1.1\%, respectively, in the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections. Both parties participated in the “Common Choice” coalition led by SDL in 1994.

\textsuperscript{178} Grzymała-Busse 2002: 152; See also Deegan-Krause 2000: 43n8.

\textsuperscript{179} Rybár and Deegan-Krause 2008: 508

\textsuperscript{180} Rybár and Deegan Krause 2009

\textsuperscript{181} Rybár and Deegan-Krause 2008: 508; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2009: 829

\textsuperscript{182} For a classification of these parties, see Pop-Eleches 2010: 230.
economic ideology vacillated widely, but tended to be less pro-market in comparison to that of most other parties.\textsuperscript{183}

In sum, throughout the 1990s, Slovakia’s party system was dominated by Mečiar’s populism. This entailed divisions not only regarding questions of nationalism and democracy but also regarding socio-economic questions about the material aspects of reform. Analyzed from this perspective, the Slovak political spectrum featured parties with relatively clear left-leaning and right-leaning tendencies. Leaning to the left were Mečiar’s populist HZDS and the post-communist and social-democratic SDL. HZDS included many former communists in its leadership and dominated Slovakia’s left-leaning constituencies at the expense of SDL, the performance of which was sub-par especially when compared to similar reformed communist parties in Hungary and Poland. Nevertheless, throughout the 1990s SDL was Slovakia’s second most successful party, on average, organizationally strong, and identifiable with rhetorical sensitivity to the social aspects of market reform (which it shared with Mečiar’s HZDS). Skepticism of market reform was also expressed on the ideological fringes, including on the extreme right. Together, the parties associated with economically populist rhetoric consistently represented at least half of the Slovak electorate throughout the 1990s.\textsuperscript{184} By contrast, at most a third of the electorate, on average, preferred parties with a clear preference for market liberalism – KDH, DS, DU (later KDS), and SMK-MKP.\textsuperscript{185}

Overall, even though the main cleavage in Slovakia was not structured exclusively around material questions, previous research has shown that economic issues were by no means

\textsuperscript{183} Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 508
\textsuperscript{184} This is true even if the electoral support for SNS is excluded due to voters’ potentially disproportionate prioritization of anti-Hungarian appeals rather than economically populist appeals. Thus, even when minimizing support for economically populist parties, at least half of the electorate is left-leaning.
\textsuperscript{185} Even though SMK-MKP was mostly an ethnic party with as much popular support as the extreme-nationalist SNS, its electoral support is included purposefully – to maximize potential support for economically liberal parties.
insignificant throughout the 1990s. From this perspective, a focus on the economic positioning of parties and overall electoral preferences of the electorate can be instructive with regard to understanding the cleavage associated with Mečiarism. Overall, Mečiarism was a phenomenon that pertained not only to issues of nationalism and democracy but also to issues of economic development. The perspective reveals that, as a whole, the Slovak electorate of the 1990s had a clear preference for parties with positions prioritizing the social, rather than the liberal, aspects of market reform.

**Synopsis: Cleavages and Crises in Poland and Slovakia**

Conditioned by different historical antecedents, the periods of cleavage and crisis in Poland and Slovakia were characterized by clearly divergent dynamics. Following a decade-long period of confrontation between the communist state and a civil society mobilized around questions of workers’ right, the Polish cleavage culminated in major concessions to civil society, severe economic crisis, and the beginning of drastic economic reforms. In Slovakia – where elite-induced transition and independence gave way to competitive authoritarian rule – the central cleavage did not feature a major economic crisis. Rather, it featured interesting continuities with the past as well as political and societal polarization in the context of a multi-dimensional populist phenomenon that subsumed important questions of socio-economic development. Importantly, if critical junctures of market reform are periods of significant economic liberalization in the aftermath of competitive elections in which electorates are presented with meaningful policy choices, Poland’s critical juncture did not begin before the end of 1990 and Slovakia’s did not start until 1998.

In Poland, as the Communist regime entered its final decade, a central cleavage crystalized between a state incapable of solving the country’s economic problems and a civil society mobilized around the idea of defending workers’ rights. As Solidarity demanded solutions to the problems
of growing inflation and as real wage declined throughout the 1980s, labor mobilization led to major accommodations from the state in the spring of 1989. In addition to a negotiated transition out of communism, these concessions also included wage indexation – which Solidarity demanded as a way of increasing workers’ income in the context of a growing inflation and which would directly lead to hyperinflation. When, as a result of the limited political opening, a Solidarity-led government was formed in the fall of 1989, the country was already in a hyperinflationary crisis. As a response, the government initiated Balcerowicz’s shock therapy program, which, however, did not immediately solve the worsening economic situation that now included growing unemployment and drastically deteriorating living standards throughout 1990. Overall, as both labor mobilization and the subsequent hyperinflation were significantly more intense in Poland than in comparable countries, the deep economic crisis here emerged out of the particular cleavage, itself the product of high societal mobilization as a critical historical antecedent.

In Slovakia, where due to societal quiescence there had been no clear state/society conflict before the end of communism, the cleavage period did not begin until after the country gained formal independence in 1993. Having managed to keep control over the economy, the Slovak communist leadership had engineered a transition out of communism by “pre-emptive elite reform.”186 Yet because the new Czechoslovak government in Prague immediately began implementing radical market reforms with particularly negative effects for the eastern part of the federation, Slovak politicians initiated a move towards independence. In line with Slovakia’s historically familiar pattern of societal quiescence, this move was once again completely elite-driven. It was this new context of new statehood that gave rise to Mečiarism, a complex populist phenomenon that defined the main cleavage in Slovakia throughout the 1990s. As prime minister,

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186 Kitschelt 1995: 456
Vladimir Mečiar built a (competitive) authoritarian regime based on a top-down and strong party organization and patronage networks that represented important continuities with, rather than a decisive break from, the past. Such continuities were evident in the fusion of the party (dominated by members of the old nomenclature\textsuperscript{187}) and state administration for the purposes of political domination \textit{as well as} in the state-sanctioned system of buying societal acquiescence to authoritarian rule in exchange for social security for the nation. While issues of nationalism and democracy were most salient during the period of cleavage in the 1990s, popular concerns about economic security were also important – and skillfully used by Mečiar to buy electoral support. In this context, the party system that developed under the domination of his party, HZDS, reflected the preference for social protection on the part of most of the electorate, which tended to support left-leaning parties, including the social-democratic and second most successful party, SDL. Indeed, questions of economic populism were salient in a country where inflation had been kept low via a mix of responsible policies that were possible in the absence of high societal mobilization and where the economic problems – although gradually deepening – were very mild by regional standards. While in the end Mečiar’s political and economic illiberalism resulted in international exclusion, and therefore required a solution during the subsequent critical juncture, the Mečiarism/anti-Mečiarism cleavage – which did \textit{not} end with a major economic crisis – was heavily conditioned by elitism and patrimonialism as critical historical antecedents.

Finally, although Poland and Slovakia exited communism at the same time, their cleavages and crises diverged not only in terms of their nature but also in terms of their timing. In Poland, the state/society cleavage that had become increasingly dominant in the last decades of communism culminated in an intense economic crisis in 1989/1990, before a party system was

\textsuperscript{187} Ibid.: 457
even formed. Importantly, the first year of the Balcerowicz Plan did not represent a critical juncture in Poland because the election that led to the first Solidarity government was transitional and only partially democratic – and, as such, it bypassed any debate regarding economic choices that would be presented to the electorate. From this perspective, although Solidarity was primarily a labor organization, its “flip-flop” – from protecting workers’ right to enacting neoliberal reforms – was not (yet) a critical juncture, but rather a foretoken of the impending critical juncture that began with Lech Wałęsa’s election in December 1990.

In Slovakia, by contrast, the Mečiarism/anti-Mečiarism cleavage defined an emergent party system after initial market reforms within Czechoslovakia and after the country’s independence in 1993. The Czechoslovak market reforms, rather than mark a neoliberal critical juncture, provoked Slovakia’s elite-driven independence, thereby initiating the cleavage period. During the cleavage period between 1992 and 1998, the preservation of key state/society relations highlighted important continuities with, rather than dramatic changes from, the non-democratic and patrimonial past. Indeed, Mečiarism defined the newly independent country’s experience by prioritizing state/society relations that were mostly patrimonial, managed by elites within the state, and characterized by the provision of social security for the nation in exchange for societal acceptance of authoritarian rule. Because such patterns were indicative of continuities with Slovakia’s communist past and because Mečiar’s regime did not enact drastic neoliberal reforms, the years of Mečiarism are best characterized as a period of cleavage. Due to these important characteristics of continuity, this period of cleavage is analytically different from the following period of critical juncture during which independent Slovakia’s most crucial economic reforms would be initiated after the 1998 democratic election.
8.4. Conclusion: Critical Antecedents and Crises Across Regional Contexts

This chapter has explained how the contrasting historical antecedents shaped two very different periods of cleavage and crisis in Poland and Slovakia. In Poland, a historical pattern of high activity in civil society displayed increasingly labor mobilizing tendencies that had to be accommodated by the communist state. The growing economic problems of the 1980s not only further de-legitimated the communist party – which agreed to a transition to democracy – but also ended in a hyperinflationary crisis after pressures from mobilized labor forced the state to agree to important economic concessions in the form of wage increases. By contrast, in Slovakia – where the historical pattern had been much more elitist and patrimonial in nature – initial market reforms within Czechoslovakia resulted in an elite-driven independence after a transition to democracy that had also been elite-led (in Slovakia). The Mečiarism/anti-Mečiarism cleavage that developed immediately thereafter featured important continuities with the patrimonial communist past, such as non-democratic rule and societal cooptation, whereby the state provided social benefits in exchange for societal quiescence and acceptance of authoritarianism. Moreover, as the state guaranteed relative economic stability, a societal majority consistently preferred left-leaning parties with economically populist positions, such as the governing HZDS and the social-democratic SDL, Slovakia’s second most important party in this period. Overall, these divergent outcomes – hyperinflationary disaster and a (temporarily) de-legitimated post-communist party versus relative economic stability and a relatively important post-communist party\textsuperscript{188} – were conditioned by the historical antecedents of labor mobilization and elitist patrimonialism in Poland and Slovakia, respectively.

\textsuperscript{188} This statement – that Poland’s ex-communists were de-legitimated while the Slovakia’s were not – is true only for the period of cleavage and crisis and before the critical juncture – which will be conditioned by these parties’ relative strength, as discussed in the next chapter. After the critical juncture, Poland’s ex-communists will make a comeback while Slovakia’s will collapses, as it will be discussed in subsequent chapters.
Importantly, these divergences also display a striking parallel with the contrasting historical antecedents of Peru and Ecuador examined in the previous chapter. While it is true that Latin American and central European cases are located in two very different systems characterized by distinct historical trajectories, if critical antecedents and the cleavages that emerge from them are understood as abstract categories helpful for the analysis of cases beyond unique contexts, then the cross-regional parallels are in fact remarkable. Indeed, the overall Polish experience before the critical juncture exhibits intriguing similarities with the Peruvian one, while Slovakia’s is broadly comparable to Ecuador’s. As discussed in detail in the previous and current chapters, while the historical path of each country was unique, the critical antecedents and cleavages that characterized each pair before the neoliberal critical juncture were highly analogous.

In both Peru and Poland, historical patterns of labor-mobilization resulted in catastrophic hyperinflationary crises and the (temporary) de-legitimation of left-leaning parties at the end of the cleavage period. Given these broad similarities, the two countries would be conditioned similarly for the subsequent critical junctures under neoliberal populism. Indeed, as discussed in the following chapter, the weakness of left-leaning parties and the ongoing hyperinflationary disasters provided a context in which neoliberal populists Alberto Fujimori and Lech Wałęsa were elected as presidents in Peru and Poland, respectively. To be sure, these outcomes were reached under very different conditions – a transition from democracy to competitive authoritarianism in Peru versus a transition from communist autocracy to capitalist democracy in Poland. Nevertheless, the two countries share a major parallel from a perspective focused on the critical antecedent of labor mobilization and the subsequent hyperinflation, de-legitimization of left-leaning parties, and neoliberal populist ascendancy.

In Ecuador and Slovakia, on the other hand, historical patterns of elitism and
patrimonialism resulted in comparative macroeconomic stability (decline without collapse), economically populist projects (under Roldós in Ecuador and Mečiar in Slovakia) that benefited popular majorities, and the relative significance of social-democratic parties which were not de-legitimated or significantly weakened. These key characteristics during the periods of cleavage then provided a context in which critical market reforms would be implemented under social-democratic leadership in both Ecuador and Slovakia. It is true that the circumstances of and beyond the critical juncture were very different in these two countries – featuring democratic continuity, economic deterioration, and political instability in oil-rich Ecuador versus transition from competitive authoritarianism to democracy, economic upsurge, and political stability in natural resource-poor Slovakia. Yet from a broad comparative historical perspective, the two countries shared a common critical antecedent of elitist patrimonialism that led to periods of cleavage featuring similar aspects – relative economic stability during which economically populist projects benefited broad social groups and comparably significant left-leaning parties.

Overall, these different macro trajectories would condition similar patterns of neoliberal critical junctures in each analytical pair. The cleavages of Ecuador and Slovakia, featuring comparatively milder economic problems and relatively important left-leaning parties, would give rise to more standard political coalitions with key social democratic parties in charge of critical market reforms. By contrast, the hyperinflationary crises of Peru and Poland, where left-leaning parties became temporarily de-legitimated, would be resolved by less standard neoliberal-populist means. It is for this reason that the subsequent discussion proceeds by switching from intra-regional comparisons of relatively similar systems with contrasting critical antecedents to cross-regional comparisons focused on similarities in most different systems. As the following analysis demonstrates, while for each analytical pair the cross-regional parallels would assert themselves
in both the critical junctures and in their legacies, the shadow of the historical antecedents would remain relevant well into the future.
9.
VARIETIES OF DE-ALIGNMENT:
“SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC” AND “NEOLIBERAL-POPULIST”
CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN THE ANDES AND CENTRAL EUROPE

9.1. Introduction

As it is well known, the transition towards liberalism in Latin America and post-communism featured not only important political similarities, which qualify both regions as part of the third-wave of democratization,¹ but also key parallels in terms of building markets.² The parallels are especially pertinent when considering the experiences of some Latin American countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, where the statist economic policies of the left-leaning military dictatorships of the 1970s had more in common with developments in communist Poland than in authoritarian Chile. Having culminated from antecedent conditions, such as the ones discussed in the previous two chapters, critical junctures of market reform conditioned subsequent developments throughout Latin America and post-communist Europe. As this chapter demonstrates, it is possible to distinguish between varieties of de-aligning critical junctures – that is, critical junctures in which bait-and-switch tactics were adopted by political actors that had come to power by criticizing neoliberal restructuring. Whereas in Ecuador and Slovakia key economic reforms were enacted under social-democratic leadership, in Peru and Poland, critical junctures are best characterized as “neoliberal-populist.”

The chapter proceeds in two main parts. The first part analyzes “social-democratic” critical junctures in Ecuador and Slovakia. In these two countries, the historical antecedents of elitism and patrimonialism had conditioned relatively mild economic recessions as the countries transitioned

¹ Huntington 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996
² Przeworski 1991
out of dictatorships in the late 1970 and late 1980s, respectively. As a result, traditional center-left parties preserved their relatively prominent positions in the political arena, mostly due to their electoral appeals as legitimate opponents of deep economic restructuring. Having eventually entered political power, these social democratic parties then led economic reforms that, from a comparative historical perspective, were the most drastic and socially costly for the entire period after the transition away from dictatorial rule. As such, the neoliberal reforms led by these parties – between 1988 and 1992 in Ecuador and between 1998 and 2002 in Slovakia – can be understood as critical junctures.

The second part of the chapter analyses “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures in Peru and Poland. In both of these countries, the antecedent conditions of labor mobilization had led to hyperinflationary crises during which center-left forces were politically delegitimized. In a context of traditional center-left weakness, populist candidates Alberto Fujimori and Lech Wałęsa rose to the presidencies of Peru and Poland, respectively, as seemingly legitimate opponents of neoliberal candidates. Yet the need to manage hyperinflation quickly forced these populists to either introduce (in Peru) or defend (in Poland) deep economic restructuring. The shock therapeutic reforms that were implemented under their leadership were even more profound than were market reforms in Ecuador and Slovakia, and also highly costly from a societal perspective. Due to the nature of the political agency during these reforms, the Peruvian and Polish critical junctures can be characterized as “neoliberal-populist.”

Overall, the chapter identifies the critical junctures of market reform in the four cases by carefully analyzing market reforms in each country from a comparative historical perspective. While the critical junctures are less easily identifiable in Ecuador and Slovakia than in Peru and Poland, it is important to locate these crucial periods by specifying what qualifies them as “critical
junctures.” I document (1) how in all four countries the critical junctures exhibited a “bait-and
switch” pattern, (2) how they were associated with the most drastic and socially costly market
reforms when compared to market reforms under other administrations in these countries’ recent
histories, and (3) how, while they were conditioned by historical antecedents, they were
nevertheless historically contingent rather than inevitable, as all critical junctures necessarily are.

Finally, the analytical pairs – of cases distinguished by “social-democratic” and
“neoliberal-populist” critical junctures – clearly represent most different systems, with each pair
including one case from each region. The differences of systems within each pair are great,
including institutional, political, socio-economic, and cultural factors. Even in terms of market-
making success, the differences within each pair are striking – with Slovakia’s neoliberal reforms
being more successful than Ecuador’s and the Peruvian reforms being more decisive than Poland’s.
However, these differences ought not to obscure the key parallels which, from the perspective of
subsequent political developments, are indeed decisive. Because the distinctions between “social-
democratic” and “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures are as pronounced in terms of their
consequences as they are in terms of their antecedents and most crucial characteristics, these two
distinct types of programmatic de-alignment deserve careful consideration.

9.2. “Social-Democratic” De-alignment in Ecuador and Slovakia

Despite the great contextual differences between Ecuador and Slovakia, these two
countries experienced de-aligning critical junctures that were stingingly similar. As this section
explains in detail, of notable significance are four similarities: (1) the social democratic agency
behind the most crucial market reforms, (2) the highest level and speed of these economic reforms
from a comparative historical perspective, (3) the great social costs produced by the critical
juncture, and (4) the contingent nature of the political choices made during the critical juncture.
The following analysis identifies the aspects that make the contingent moments under question indeed most “critical” from a comparative historical perspective focused on neoliberal reform implementation. It is this similarity in terms of the “criticalness” of the key moments of economic reform that would condition subsequent parallel developments in Ecuador and Slovakia.

**Ecuador’s Critical Juncture: Programmatic De-alignment and the Subsequent Politics of Partial Reform**

**A Social-Democratic Critical Juncture**

During Ecuador’s first democratic decade, politicians from across the ideological spectrum had introduced austerity measures without significantly improving Ecuador’s overall level of liberalization, as discussed in Chapter 7. Consequently, having avoided a major economic crisis, throughout the 1980s, Ecuador mostly stuck with the developmentalist project introduced by the military regime in the 1970s. With a new election approaching in May 1988, the economy was once again in decline as Febres Cordero’s new foreign exchange regulations failed to stop the falling value of the sucre.³ Faced with a looming economic crisis, voters next elected Rodrigo Borja of the social democratic Democratic Left (ID) as next president. Having secured 24.5% of the national vote in the first round against a wide field of presidential candidates, Borja won the second round against Abdalá Bucaram of the new populist PRE.⁴ In line with his opposition to any neoliberal experiments during Febres Cordero’s term,⁵ Borja came to power as a committed social democrat opposing neoliberalism.

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³ Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 180-1
⁴ Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (Ecuadorian Roldosist Party), which had split from the CFP after the death of Jaime Roldós (who was Bucaram’s brother-in-law).
⁵ Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 147
This anti-neoliberal commitment was broadly seen as legitimate. Borja had founded the ID in 1970, when he led other young militants to split from the oligarchic Liberal Party specifically in protest of the old-style politics epitomized by a legislative pact between the liberals and Velasquismo after the 1968 election. After its creation, the ID was “the only party that tried consciously to construct a binding party myth” by emphasizing a “mission” in line with social democratic principles, such as the “just distribution of income, economic security, and the rejection of foreign dependency.” Prior to winning the presidency as well as a plurality of congressional seats in 1988, the party had campaigned on an explicitly center-left platform seeking “social change and the modification of social injustice through a commitment to the humble, the poor, the peasants, the marginalized, the working youth, and the Ecuadorian woman.”

As earlier elections had shown, such social democratic promises certainly enjoyed popularity. For example, beginning with the first democratic election of 1978 – which was ultimately won by Jaime Roldós of the populist CFP – “most observers [had] expected Borja to prevail.” And in 1984, Borja lost the presidency to Febres Cordero by surprise, after actually winning the first round with 28.7%. Meanwhile, ID had enjoyed a legislative plurality which it used to form a progressive bloc “with the express purpose of opposing neoliberalism” throughout Febres Cordero’s entire term. In 1988, although ID did not win an outright congressional majority, it did win a very substantial plurality. Indeed, social-democratic president Borja had strong congressional support. His party, in control of 40.8% of congressional seats, dominated a coalition with two other “disciplined and coherent actors” – ex-president Hurtado’s centrist DP-

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6 Conaghan 1995: 441  
7 Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001: 131  
8 Conaghan 1995: 447  
9 Freidenbert and Alcántara 2001: 138  
10 Lauderbaugh 2012: 135  
11 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 135-6;  
UDC,\textsuperscript{13} which had originated on the center-left but had embraced economic liberalism during Hurtado’s presidency,\textsuperscript{14} and the leftist FADI,\textsuperscript{15} which had “a long-standing relationship with Ecuador’s largest (and leftist) labor union CTE.\textsuperscript{16}

The social democrats’ long-standing anti-neoliberal commitments, however, were to be immediately violated. In addition to Ecuador’s perennial external debt problem and the once-again falling oil prices between 1987 and 1988,\textsuperscript{17} Borja’s government inherited a high fiscal deficit of over 20% of the GDP in 1987-88 and a record-high inflation which reached over 80% in late 1988. Under such adverse conditions, the president decided “to announce an economic adjustment program”\textsuperscript{18} in order to procure “more loans and prevent Ecuador from defaulting on its debt payments.” In August 1989, Borja secured a $135-million loan from the IMF and an additional $136 million in February 1991. The price for these cash infusions, however, was “a spectacular about-face”\textsuperscript{19} – in exchange for the loans, Borja initiated a number of austerity measures, such as gradual trade liberalization by reducing tariff barriers, fiscal restraint by cutting social programs, sharp increases in state-controlled energy prices, stiff liberalization of price controls, wage controls to contain inflation, periodic mini-devaluations, and export incentives.\textsuperscript{20} The government also continued Febres Cordero’s deregulations on price controls for agriculture.\textsuperscript{21} Trade liberalization – the most major reform effort – was implemented between 1990 and 1992 as real wages continued to decline.\textsuperscript{22} With these measures, Borja’s government created a sense of betrayal in important

\textsuperscript{13} Democracia Popular - Unión Demócrata Cristiana (Popular Democracy – Christian Democratic Union)
\textsuperscript{14} Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001: 90-1
\textsuperscript{15} Frente Amplio de la Izquierda (Broad Left Front)
\textsuperscript{16} Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001: 152; Conagnan 1995: 451
\textsuperscript{17} Vos 2002: 269-70
\textsuperscript{18} Silva 2009: 155
\textsuperscript{19} Lauderbaugh 2012: 140
\textsuperscript{20} Silva 2009: 155
\textsuperscript{21} Yashar 2005: 136
\textsuperscript{22} Vos 2002: 271
constituencies, such as the labor movement\textsuperscript{23} led by FUT,\textsuperscript{24} and the incipient indigenous movement.\textsuperscript{25} Indeed, the labor and indigenous movements had legitimate grounds for disappointment as minimal wages declined drastically under Borja’s administration, falling to a third of the 1980 level.\textsuperscript{26} As Table 9.1 below shows, these wage declines were the most profound, on average, under Borja than under any other administration after Ecuador transition to democracy.

Even though Borja’s stabilization measures were “very similar to the 1982-3 adjustment program” under Hurtado, and despite the fact that the administration did not attempt to restructure the labor market,\textsuperscript{27} the effect of market liberalization under a social-democratic administration was greater than ever before. Indeed, because the external debt ballooned and remained persistently high throughout Borja’s term, the government sustained the austerity measures. This is reflected in Ecuador’s liberalization index, which improved significantly in the 1988-92 period, as shown in Table 9.1 below. Importantly, as discussed in Chapter 7, the degree of earlier liberalization efforts under both Hurtado and Febres Cordero had been much more modest. As such, Borja’s otherwise social-democratic government enacted the most significant step towards market liberalization to date.

\textsuperscript{23} Silva 2009: 155
\textsuperscript{24} Frente Unitario de Trabajadores (the Unitary Workers’ Front which unified the CTE, CEDOC, and CEOSL)
\textsuperscript{25} Van Cott 2005: 110-1
\textsuperscript{26} Vos 2002: 290
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.: 270-1. For example, Borja’s government kept the institutional wage setting structure, maintained bonuses and cost-of-living compensations, and did not restructure the public-sector employment system due to pressure from trade unions.
Table 9.1. Selected economic indicators in Ecuador, 1984-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/President</th>
<th>F. Cordero (08/84 - 08/88)</th>
<th>Borja (08/88 - 08/92)</th>
<th>Durán Ballén (08/92 - 08/96)</th>
<th>Bucaram (08/96 - 02/97)</th>
<th>Alarcón (02/97 - 08/98)</th>
<th>Mahuad (08/98 - 01/00)</th>
<th>Noboa (01/00 - 01/03)</th>
<th>Gutiérrez (01/03 - 04/05)</th>
<th>Palacio (04/05 - 01/07)</th>
<th>Correa (01/07 - 05/17)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (annual avg.)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current accounts balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, % of GNI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real minimum wage base (monthly avg.), USD (2010 = 100)</td>
<td>154.1</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>100.6</td>
<td>153.4</td>
<td>171.3</td>
<td>171.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>-43.7%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>-29.6%</td>
<td>-15.0%</td>
<td>-26.2%</td>
<td>-54.5%</td>
<td>657.6%</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The table uses the same sources and the same method of periodization for the calculation of level and speed of market liberalization under different administrations as used in Chapter 7 (which covers the 1968-88 period in Ecuador). For a better comparative perspective, the table begins with Febres Cordero’s government, which preceded the critical juncture. The statistics for the period of the critical juncture are presented in the shaded region.
2. An alternative measure that does not adjust the scores for dates in “the middle of the year” presents no challenge to the main conclusion that the greatest change in terms of market liberalization was achieved under Borja’s administration. In fact, not adjusting the index scores actually strengthens this conclusion. Thus, under the alternative measure, under Borja (1988-92), Morley et al.’s (1999) index improves by 42.7% (from 0.548 in 1988 to 0.782 in 1992) and Lora’s (2001) index improves by 55.9% (from 0.34 in 1988 to 0.53 in 1992). The numbers reported by Roberts (2014: 157) – based on Escaith and Paunovic’s 2004 index – are very similar.

Sources: Central Bank of Ecuador (BCE); International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; Morley et al. 1999; Lora 2012.
Although attempts at neoliberal reform were repeatedly made under subsequent presidents in crisis-ridden Ecuador, no administration managed to achieve economic liberalization as significant as that under Borja. Such attempts continued immediately after the social democrats lost the 1992 general election, in which they placed fourth – not only behind two right-wing parties but also behind Bucaram’s populist PRE. The winner of the election was Sixto Durán Ballén, a founder of the center-right PSC who had recently split and created a personalist vehicle, the Republican Union Party (PUR), with which he defeated runner-up and PSC candidate Jaime Nebot. To underscore his conservative commitments, Durán “forged an alliance with Ecuador’s oldest party, the Conservative Party (PC),” named its leader and former “intellectual architect” of Febres Cordero’s neoliberal experiment, Alberto Dahik, as his running mate, and campaigned for more fiscal austerity. While Durán’s party placed only as third largest in congress, the Right – represented by PSC, PUR, and PC – was in control of an outright congressional majority and set to continue implementing the neoliberal agenda.

Indeed, Durán’s presidency “radicalized neoliberalism” by pushing for an aggressive orthodox stabilization and structural adjustment program stressing inflation control, currency devaluation, and fiscal restraint. Using executive decrees, the president rigorously tightened fiscal policy by eliminating price subsidies for fuel and staple consumer goods, cutting public services, and slashing social insurance. Legislation in congress introduced tariff reductions to liberalize trade, capital movements, and foreign investments. The government also modified the exchange rate regime in order to cut inflationary pressures and liberalized the domestic financial sector.

28 Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 132
29 Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 118
30 Conaghan 1995: 438
31 Silva 2009: 161
Importantly, Durán guaranteed private property rights and land markets by passing an Agrarian Development Law. Such measures were taken in consultation with international commercial creditors that agreed to refinance Ecuador’s debt.\textsuperscript{32}

Nevertheless, Durán’s committed neoliberal government faced considerable difficulties in implementing reforms, and not only because of structural factors, such as persistently high inflation and low international oil prices.\textsuperscript{33} Although the Right controlled a majority of congressional seats, the conservative majority was “undisciplined and fractious” as deputies from the president’s own PUR voted against the government’s agenda while the PSC at times calculated that opposing Durán would better serve its electoral interests. While Durán “struggled to exert influence already during the first year,”\textsuperscript{34} infighting within the administration and a series of resignations further contributed to the lack of policy cohesiveness. Because “the neoliberal reform stalled throughout the administration’s first year in office and many of the reform proposals “were rejected or simply languished in congress,”\textsuperscript{35} subsidies on basic utilities, such as electricity, cooking gas, water, and housing remained intact and only a small share of public enterprises was privatized. By 1995, issues of security and corruption averted the government’s attention from the goal of economic adjustment.

Overall, despite the conservative government’s neoliberal ambitions, “only very modest progress was made during Durán’s administration.”\textsuperscript{36} As shown in Table 9.1, Durán’s failure to achieve significant restructuring is reflected in Ecuador’s liberalization index, which improved

\textsuperscript{32} Vos 2002: 271-2; Silva 2009: 161-2
\textsuperscript{33} Silva 2009: 162
\textsuperscript{34} Conaghan and Malloy 1994: 229
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.: 228
\textsuperscript{36} Vos 2002: 271-2
only marginally between 1992 and 1996.\textsuperscript{37} As also shown in Appendix P (Table A.18),\textsuperscript{38} especially when compared to the previous social democratic government, Durán’s reforms in terms of capital accounts, commerce, financial reform, and tax reform can be judged as less critical – a reason why both Morley et al.’s general-reform and Lora’s structural-reform indices reflect significantly less impressive improvements during Durán’s tenure than during Borja’s.

After Durán, “career outsider” and “full-blown populist”\textsuperscript{39} Abdalá Bucaram won the presidency in 1996 against Christian democrat Jaime Nebot by campaigning “to support the economic interests of the poor, oppose monopolies, and defend labor unions against liberalization policies.”\textsuperscript{40} Despite such promises, as president, Bucaram immediately adopted austerity measures, including privatization, major devaluation, cuts in job security, and huge price hikes for... gas, electricity, transportation, and telephones.\textsuperscript{41} When massive protests against such policies coincided with major corruption scandals, congress removed Bucaram “on the dubious constitutional grounds of mental incapacity.”\textsuperscript{42}

While Roberts convincingly makes the case that Bucaram’s adoption of austerity after a populist campaign represents “at least a partial case of de-alignment,”\textsuperscript{43} there are two reasons why this is a less clear-cut case of bait-and-switch than that of Borja’s 1988-92 administration. First, before assuming the presidency, Bucaram had not been explicitly anti-neoliberal. For example,

\textsuperscript{37} Unfortunately, Morley et al.’s index (which covers the 1970-95 period) does not include Durán’s last seven months in office (his term expired on August 10, 1996). However, a comparison of the two indices for the 1992-95 period can be instructive because, according to Lora’s index, Ecuador’s score of 0.54 did not change between 1995 and 1996. This is consistent with the above discussion that most of the progress under Durán was made before 1995. Thus, for the 1992-1995 period, Lora’s index still shows a 1.9% change while Morley’s index shows a 2.4% change (from 0.782 to 0.801). These two very similar results validate the point that little overall progress was achieved under Durán’s presidency.

\textsuperscript{38} Appendix P (Table A.18) presents the components comprising both indices, also broken down by presidential periods.

\textsuperscript{39} Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 119

\textsuperscript{40} Roberts 2014: 158-9

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.: 159

\textsuperscript{42} Silva 2009: 170-1; Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 119

\textsuperscript{43} Roberts 2014: 159
although his personalistic party, PRE, had formed coalitions with the Left in the 1980s, in the early 1990s it formed coalitions with the center-right PSC. In fact, Bucaram “believed in neoliberalism” and his campaign “stressed a gradual approach to unavoidable economic stabilization,” a reason why his multiclass coalition was supported by “emergent marginal political and economic elites.” Second, Bucaram was removed from office on February 6, 1997, after less than even six months in the Carondelet Palace. While he implemented certain austerity measures, such a short period is hardly enough to achieve any significant liberalization. Although Bucaram is frequently compared to neoliberal populist presidents, such as Argentina’s Menem, Peru’s Fujimori, Mexico’s Salinas, or Brazil’s Collor, he is unlike such presidents in one important respect – his economic plan was rejected by the elites (both coastal and highland) who conspired to depose him in short order. Perhaps due to its limited duration, then, Bucaram’s half-a-year government did not improve Ecuador’s overall index of structural reforms, as shown in Table 9.1.

For these reasons, rather than being a major cause of party system de-alignment, Bucaram’s government was an expression of the initial symptoms of an already destabilizing party system in the aftermath of programmatic de-alignment. As such, the instability associated with Bucaram’s presidency – from his presidential campaign, which targeted the poor and during which “the indigenous movements had originally supported him,” to his ouster, in which the social movement played a key role – is best understood as a consequence of the critical juncture. Indeed, while the president’s ouster in 1997 closed future prospects for comprehensive market liberalization, the protest movement’s effort to force the convocation of a constituent assembly

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44 Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001: 207
45 de la Torre 2010: 89
46 Silva 2009: 170
47 de la Torre 2010: 89, 93, 95
48 de la Torre 2000: 81; Silva 2009: 171
49 Van Cott 2005: 125
50 Roberts 2014: 159
to reform the political system was a demand dating back to 1990\textsuperscript{51} – when indigenous activists organized the first major uprising because social democratic president Borja had “not complied with his electoral promises”\textsuperscript{52} (see Chapter 10).

As it is well known, the extreme instability that began with Bucaram’s ouster would continue for a decade featuring nine different presidents between 1997 and 2007, when Rafael Correa was first inaugurated. During this decade, the two other \textit{popularly elected presidents} that attempted to implement further neoliberal reforms after Bucaram – Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000) and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-05) – were also ousted amid popular protest and neither of them managed to improve Ecuador’s overall level of market liberalization, as indicated in Table 8.1.

Faced with fiscal and foreign debt problems, as well as a new banking crisis generating “the worst economic depression since the 1930s,” Jamil Mahuad imposed a “shock treatment style stabilization,” attempting to privatize the oil, telecommunications, and electricity sectors, to freeze public sector wages, and to flexibilize the labor code. However, massive strikes organized by the labor and indigenous movements forced Mahuad to consider a more gradual approach to economic stabilization, including a rollback on fuel price hikes and a reduction of the price of electricity. When Mahuad’s administration announced the dollarization of Ecuador’s economy, protestors stormed the Carondelet Palace and ousted the president.\textsuperscript{53} In the end, political obstructionism in congress stalled Mahuad’s reforms, a reason why negotiations with the IMF were delayed.\textsuperscript{54}

The cycle of neoliberal reform and intense social protest continued after Mahuad – most manifestly under Lucio Gutiérrez, who had led the coup against Mahuad in 2000 and who had won the 2003 presidential election by campaigning as a left-leaning populist outsider promising “to

\textsuperscript{51} Van Cott 2005: 124  
\textsuperscript{52} Becker 2009: 178  
\textsuperscript{53} Silva 2009: 175-88  
\textsuperscript{54} Vos 2002: 274
reject the neoliberal model.” In a painfully familiar bait-and-switch fashion, however, president Gutiérrez “signed a letter of intent with the IMF, came out in support of regional free trade, and proposed a package of economic adjustments that included major privatization, price hikes, and a wage freeze.” Similarly to Bucaram and Mahuad before him, Gutiérrez was ousted in what was the third congressional coup since 1997 before having a chance to oversee an improvement in market liberalization.

As both Table 9.1 and Appendix P (Table A.18) show, further liberalization was only possible under Mahuad’s vice-president and successor Gustavo Noboa (2000-03), who “pushed through a series of neoliberal legislative measures that privatized state enterprises including telephone, petroleum, and electricity and the social security system,” and “dollarized” the economy – “a move so radical that it did not even enjoy the support of the IMF.” By contrast, as the table shows, Ecuador’s index of structural reform actually declined under Mahuad and Gutiérrez – both of whom had been ousted amid unsuccessful attempts to implement structural adjustment. As the development of social movements in opposition constituted a “social veto” that had been born as a reactive byproduct of the critical juncture under Borja and had grown in the aftermath period, popularly elected presidents were not in a position to implement further structural reforms in Ecuador.

Overall, a number of Ecuadorian presidents attempted to implement neoliberal reforms in order to revive Ecuador’s troubled economy, which was in various states of recession since the generals relinquished power in the late 1970s. While the continuous economic problems

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55 Madrid 2012: 99  
56 Roberts 2014: 267  
57 de la Torre and Ortiz 2016: 4  
58 Becker 2011: 68, 72  
59 Roberts 2014: 159
necessitated repeated efforts at market liberalization, most of these efforts failed as a powerful resistance movements developed – most prominently in the indigenous-dominated agricultural sector – and spilled over to include labor as well as, by 2005, Ecuador’s middle class. As the above discussion has demonstrated, while numerous conservative and populist presidents had attempted to speed up market reform, such efforts were in the aftermath of the critical juncture and usually futile.

Indeed, the most decisive steps towards market liberalization had been taken under Rodrigo Borja’s social democratic administration, a period during which Ecuador’s structural reforms proceeded with highest speed. As shown in Table 9.1, this period featured not only the highest levels of inflation but also the greatest decline in real minimum wages, on average, when compared to all other administrations after Ecuador’s transition to democracy. Overall, while the high social costs of Ecuador’s economic reforms were not unique to the 1988-92 period, it is during the critical juncture under Borja’s social democratic administration that the social costs were perhaps most pronounced.

Slovakia’s Critical Juncture: Key Reforms Under Social-Democratic Leadership

**Political Dynamics of De-alignment**

In 1998, the crises associated with Mečiarism were resolved through the initiation of “a process of major institutional change” that lasted between 1998 and 2006.  In particular, after 1998 Slovakia not only became democratic, but also implemented the economic reforms that defined its neoliberal critical juncture. These processes were driven by two coalition governments, of which the first was a broad left-right coalition. Because of the key role of the post-communist

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60 Gould 2009: 6
61 Levitsky and Way 2010: 97

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party in opening the way for the country’s neoliberal revolution, Slovakia experienced a de-aligning critical juncture.

Once Western linkage and leverage raised the salience of government abuse and international isolation, a flurry of NGO activity helped strengthen and unite Slovakia’s opposition parties for the watershed 1998 election.\(^\text{62}\) This opposition formally included four parties from across the political spectrum – the ideologically diverse Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the ex-communist Party of the Democratic Left (SDL’), the center-right Party of the Hungarian Community (SMK), and the newly-formed centrist Party of Civic Understanding (SOP). Because of a new law that had made coalition formation challenging,\(^\text{63}\) the SDK – the largest opposition “party” – was a \textit{de facto coalition of five parties}, of which three were center-right and two were center-left, as discussed in Chapter 8.

Notably, the 1998 election was still won by Mečiar’s populist HZDS with 27.0% of the vote, followed by the ideologically mixed SDK with 26.3%, and the center-left SDL’ with 14.7%. The other three parties that made it into the National Council were the center-right SMK, the nationalist SNS, and the centrist SOP.\(^\text{64}\) Given HZDS’s victory, Mečiar was once again the first to be given a chance to form a new government. Because one of his former coalition partners – the left-populist ZRS – had failed to enter parliament and because both SDK and SMK “immediately rejected talks with the HZDS,” Mečiar approached the social democratic SDL’ as a potential coalition partner.\(^\text{65}\) This was a logical move for two reasons: (1) the two parties shared “strikingly

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\(^{62}\) Vachudova 2005: 170-5

\(^{63}\) The law, passed by Mečiar’s HZDS, required each party in an electoral coalition to attain 5% of the vote (Vachudova 2005: 171).

\(^{64}\) Thus, HZDS received 28.7% of seats, SDK – 28% of seats, and SDL’ – 15.3% of seats. The results of the other parties were: SMK – 9.1% (10% of seats), SNS – 9.1% (9.3% of seats), and SOP – 8.0% (8.7% of seats). The Union of Slovak Workers (ZRS) – which had been in Mečiar’s 1994-98 coalition – gained only 1.3% of the vote and no seats.

\(^{65}\) Fisher 2002: 134
similar” language stressing solidarity, social justice, and the promotion of the health and economic well-being of working people and (2) throughout the 1990s, they had “occasionally discussed the possibility of cooperation.”

Given these factors, the possibility of an HZDS-led coalition with the crucial participation of SDL was clearly viable. Nevertheless, SDL ultimately announced plans to participate in a coalition government with the other opposition parties. At this stage, Mečiar offered SDL to form a one-party “minority government with tacit support from the HZDS and SNS” — a “toleration model” inspired by developments in the Czech Republic just three months earlier. Yet, realizing that such a model would have been a “political suicide,” SDL resisted the proposal. Particularly important was SDL’s realization of a popular “desire for a real change” and that “if the party had acted against such signals, unrest could have ensued.”

Of course, SDL’s decision to participate in an anti-HZDS coalition had much to do with the circumstances associated with Mečiarism, such as the EU’s “active leverage” and the oppositional motivation to correct Slovakia’s pariah status. Yet while SDL’s decision in 1998 was conditioned by the struggles surrounding the country’s main cleavage (Mečiarism versus opposition), this decision was not a foregone conclusion. Given that “SDL was initially reluctant

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66 Haughton 2004: 183
67 Deegan-Krause 2006: 104
68 Levitsky and Way (2010: 96n89) indicate that a viable coalition among HZDS, SNS, SDL, and SOP would have controlled a 93-seat majority (or 62% of seats) after 1998. Notably, a coalition could have included either the far-right SNS or the centrist SOP, meaning that if one of these two parties had agreed to a coalition with HZDS and SDL, the other would not have been necessary. While SNS certainly would have agreed, the SOP initially called for "reconciliation" (Vachudova 2005: 170), thereby provoking fear that his party would cooperate with HZDS (Fisher 2006: 155). A HZDS – SDL – SOP coalition would have controlled 52.6% of seats while a HZDS – SDL – SNS coalition would have controlled 53.3% of seats.
69 Fisher 2006: 167
70 In the Czech Republic, the Social Democrats (ČSSD) that had been in opposition till 1998 “managed to forge an agreement” with the formerly incumbent Civil Democratic Party (ODS), “whereby the ODS would tolerate a one-party ČSSD minority government” (Fisher 2002: 130n17).
71 Fisher 2002: 135
72 Fisher et al. 2007
73 Vachudova 2005: 170-5
to cooperate with the center-right” and that it took the organization of a Democratic Round Table to negotiate the terms of Slovakia’s democratization, the party’s decision was clearly subject to qualified uncertainty. Even though – in retrospect – the party’s pro-democratic decision might look “correct,” SDL’ had made strategic blunders in the past. SDL’s decision in 1998 was by no means inevitable.

On the other hand, without SDL the other opposition parties would have been unable to form a stable governing coalition – because they would have controlled only 45.1% of all seats. Due to the deep polarization between HZDS and SNS, on the one hand, and the opposition parties, on the other hand, SDL was truly in a position of kingmaker. It is for this reason that SDL demanded “more cabinet positions than its election results warranted.” In the end, SDL received six ministerial portfolios out of the twenty available and, most critically, gained control over the key ministries of finance, labor and social affairs, and agriculture. Crucially, although SDK gained nine ministries, these portfolios were, in fact, shared by several SDK member parties with unique identities and agendas. Indeed, SDK would soon splinter into its constitutive elements. The important point is that because SDK was a coalition of several smaller non-conventional parties, the center-left SDL was not only “the one standard party” but also the de-facto largest single party in the coalition government. Indeed, SDL was represented in government “beyond the proportion to which its [14.7%] electoral vote share entitled it” as it controlled nine ministries out

74 Fisher 2006: 155
75 Vachudova 2005: 171-3
76 See Haughton (2004: 184) and Grzymala-Busse (2002). Even in Grzymala-Busse’s path-dependent and non-voluntaristic account, the Slovak social democrats were less experienced and skilled than, for example, the Polish social democrats (2002: 266). Whether strategic errors are based on short-term miscalculations or long-term causes, such errors are always a possibility.
77 Fisher 2002: 135
78 The other three portfolios SDL controlled were deputy prime minister for legislation, defense, and education (Fisher 2002: 135). See also Casal Bétoa’s database (2016).
79 Wightman 2001: 133
Importantly, accepting responsibility for the Finance Ministry, from which critical economic reforms would be implemented beginning in 1998, was a bait-and-switch move on the part of SDL. Under new party leader Jozef Migaš – who had called for “taking Marx off the shelf and dusting him off” – SDL had campaigned on leftist principles, such as addressing social problems, increasing wages and pensions, putting a halt to partisan privatization, guaranteeing state participation in strategic firms and financial institutions, creating new jobs, securing accessible and quality healthcare for all, free access to education for every citizen, and housing for young and socially weak families. Such policy proposals were in line with SDL’s self-identification as a “Left party” emphasizing its ties to the Socialist International, especially after its renewed criticism of the market in the aftermath of its poor performance in the 1994 elections.

In short, between 1995 and 1998, SDL campaigned as the clear center-left and democratic alternative to economically populist but undemocratic HZDS. As the broader electoral support for private enterprise declined during the 1990s, SDL “was seen as the party most likely to lessen the economic burden and to increase pensions and benefits.”

**Critical Economic Reforms**

Between 1989 and 2006, Slovakia experienced three waves of market liberalization – (1) between 1989 and 1992 within Czechoslovakia (as discussed in Chapter 8), (2) in 1994, and (3) after 1998. In a pattern similar to the one observed in Ecuador, while the first two waves had been interrupted and partially reversed (in both cases, by Mečiar’s governments), it was the successful

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80 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 248
81 Fisher 2002: 129, 133
82 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 154-8
83 Ibid.: 158, 201
third wave that defined the country’s de-aligning critical juncture. The first wave – which took
place before Slovakia became an independent state – had been one of the major reasons for
Slovakia’s independence, as discussed in Chapter 8. In turn, the second and, especially, third waves
have direct significance in terms of subsequent developments in Slovakia as an independent state.

The political circumstances of Slovakia’s reforms in the 1998-2002 period were similar to
those in 1994, when, after a no-confidence vote against Mečiar’s second government, a caretaker
left-right coalition including SDL on the left, KDH on the right, and centrist defectors from HZDS
and SNS governed for a brief period.84 Led by Jozef Moravčík, the coalition implemented austerity
measures in a 6-month IMF-sponsored “neoliberal intermezzo”85 during which a second wave of
voucher privatization was initiated. A crucially important part was played by SDL, which
controlled a plurality of ministries, including that of the economy.86 As a result, between 1993 and
1994, Slovakia’s EBRD-based liberalization index improved by 10.0%, as discussed in the
previous chapter. Another result of these reforms was SDL’s deteriorating electoral performance
in the early 1994 election, when – rather than “broaden its appeal” by forming a coalition with
other center-left parties – SDL lost a third of its electoral support.87 With the loss of electoral
support for reform-minded parties, Mečiar promptly returned to power in the fall of 1994 and
reversed this second wave of liberalization.

Despite the negative electoral returns in the aftermath of the 1994 reforms, between 1998
and 2002, SDL – as the de facto largest single party in the ruling coalition – once again engaged

84 Henderson 2002: 44
85 Pop Eleches 2009: 178
86 SDL controlled six of eighteen ministries, KDH and the Alternative for Political Realism (which, under Moravčík’s
leadership, had splintered from HZDS) each controlled five. See Casal Bétoa’s database (2016).
87 I.e., 29.2% (the change from 14.7% in 1992 to 10.41% in 1994). Importantly, while in 1992 SDL had competed
alone, for the 1994 election it led the “Common Choice” coalition, which also included the Social Democratic Party,
the Green Party, and the Farmers’ Movement (Haughton 2004: 181, 185). Due to the 1994 electoral coalition, it is
possible that SDL, as a single party, actually lost more than a third of its electorate between 1992 and 1994.
in neoliberal reform leadership, and this time the reforms were critical. The 1998-2002 reforms were led by SDL’ Finance Minister Brigita Schmögnerová, who, faced with a “deteriorating economic situation,” “was forced to take many unpopular steps,” such as the raising the minimum level of the value-added tax (VAT)\(^88\) and adopting a “tough fiscal package to reduce the budget deficit” featuring “increases in rents and fuel.”\(^89\) By 2002, the government had “restored macroeconomic balances” and privatized large financial institutions”\(^90\) and industrial firms, which were sold to international investors.\(^91\)

Even more reforms were implemented following the 2002 election, which entirely eliminated SDL’ from parliament and produced prime minister Dzurinda’s cohesive center-right second government.\(^92\) This allowed the new finance minister Ivan Mikloš to launch “an attack on the welfare state legacy”\(^93\) and to implement new reforms in the areas of public finance, taxation, fiscal decentralization, the labor market, pensions, welfare, and healthcare.\(^94\) As a result, by 2006 Slovakia had metamorphosed from Central Europe’s “black sheep” to “tiger of the Tatra mountains.”\(^95\) Neoliberal reforms also continued under Robert Fico’s subsequent government – which, as discussed in Chapter 10, was elected in 2006 on the promise of reversing market reforms.\(^96\)

Although students of Slovakia correctly place the country’s “neoliberal turn” in the years

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\(^{88}\) Fisher 2002: 136
\(^{89}\) Haughton 2004: 185; see also Bohle and Greskovitz 2012: 148
\(^{90}\) Mikloš 2014: 118
\(^{91}\) Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 180
\(^{92}\) Dzurinda’s second government (2002-2006) included representatives of only center-right parties – the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU), KDH, SMK, the Alliance of New Citizens (ANO), and the Democratic Party (DS). See Casal Bétoa’s database (2016).
\(^{93}\) Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 180
\(^{94}\) Mikloš 2014: 120-18
\(^{95}\) Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 170
\(^{96}\) Ibid.: 245-6
between 2002 and 2006, the critical juncture began in 1998, when SDL was crucially involved in economic policy making from the Ministry of Finance. If critical junctures are periods of institutional innovation associated with “significant change” or “key choice points,” as argued by Mahoney, then the first Dzurinda government is characterized by a higher degree of “criticalness” than the otherwise more neoliberal second Dzurinda government. The reason for this is that, after the 1998 choice point – when SDL decided to participate in the reform government – Slovakia demonstrated an ideological commitment to building a liberal market in substantive terms, a reason why it had moved to the forefront of the EU accession competition by the end of the 1998-2002 term.

Indeed, by November 2001 the European Commission had concluded that “Slovakia is a functioning market economy,” which was mostly due to the “much delayed introduction of market forces” and the six-fold increase of foreign direct investment in 2000. Additionally, Mečiar’s ban regarding the privatization of strategic state-owned enterprises was reversed as soon as Dzurinda’s first government came to power and triggered the privatization of banking and telecommunications enterprises – an important cornerstone in post-communist transition to capitalism. For these reasons, Dzurinda’s second government, during which market reforms were doubtlessly intensified, should be seen as a substantive continuation of the first. Because Dzurinda’s first government reconstituted the fundamental rules of the economic game in Slovakia, it represented a critical choice point and a period of significant change.

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97 Fisher et al. 2007; Could 2009. In particular, Fischer et al. categorize the most important neoliberal reforms as those promoting fiscal prudence and structural reform, labor code and investment, pensions, healthcare, and education, and justice reform (2007: 980-7)
99 Collier and Collier 1991
99 Mahoney 2001: 113-4
100 Kelemen and Capoccia 2007: 360-3
101 Vachudova 2005
102 Henderson 2002: 123-4
103 Myant and Drahoukopol 2011
Table 9.2. Selected economic indicators in Slovakia, 1994-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/Prime Minister</th>
<th>Mečiar III 12/94 - 10/98</th>
<th>Dzurinda I 10/98 - 10/02</th>
<th>Dzurinda II 07/02 - 07/06</th>
<th>Fico I 07/06 - 07/10</th>
<th>Radčišová 07/10 - 04/12</th>
<th>Fico II 4/12 - 4/16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (annual avg.)</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GINI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current accounts balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real average wage (quarterly avg.), EUR (2010 = 100)</td>
<td>629.2</td>
<td>573.8</td>
<td>766.8</td>
<td>1018.1</td>
<td>1033.9</td>
<td>975.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>-8.8%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level and speed of market liberalization (at term’s end)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD Index (unweighted)</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.844</td>
<td>0.917</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Foundation overall score</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>-5.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The table uses the same sources and the same method of periodization for the calculation of level and speed of market liberalization under different administrations as used in Chapter 8 (which covers the 1992-98 period in Slovakia). For a better comparative perspective, the table begins with the Mečiar’s third government, which preceded the critical juncture. The statistics for the period of the critical juncture are presented in the shaded region.
2. Unlike for Poland (see below), I do not use de Melo et al.’s (1996) unweighted index for Slovakia because this index ends just two years after Slovakia’s independence.

Sources: Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR); International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; European Bank for Reconstruction of Development (EBRD): Transition Indicators; The Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom.

The relative “criticalness” of Dzurinda’s first government is captured by standard quantitative indicators of economic reform. As shown in Table 9.2, Slovakia’s Heritage Foundation “overall score” improved by an impressive 19.2% during Dzurinda’s first government and by 7.7% during his second government. Alternative measures confirm the greater “criticalness” of the first Dzurinda government, during which Slovakia’s unweighted EBRD score improved by 10.6%, indicating greater liberalization than during the subsequent period. The critical 1998-2002 period also allowed Slovakia to achieve the Bartelsman Stiftung’s highest possible score of 5 for four out of seven indicators – level of socioeconomic development, market
structure and competition, private property, and welfare regime.  

In sum, while Slovakia’s neoliberal reform moment lasted between 1998 and 2006, 1998-2002 was the period of most significant change. In 1998, a year of uncertainty, the center-left SDL was at what Mahoney calls a *key choice point* and it chose not only to participate in Dzurinda’s first reform government, but also to lead economic liberalization from the Ministry of Finance. Because, as the largest “standard” party in the reform government, SDL was responsible for the implementation of economic reforms that laid the foundation of fundamental changes in Slovakia’s liberal market institutions, Slovakia experienced a de-aligning critical juncture of market reform.

Finally, and as shown in Table 9.2, the 1998-2002 reforms had the most significant societal impact when compared to reforms under other administrations. Notably, Dzurinda’s first government averaged the lowest productivity per capita and the highest inflation rates of any government in post-communist Slovakia. For the average Slovak, this meant that the 1998-2002 years proved to be a period featuring the highest average unemployment levels (18.4%) and the lowest real incomes when compared to the periods under any other Slovak government. While the administrations *before* and *after* Dzurinda’s first government were associated with increases in average real wages, the 1998-2002 period was associated with a corresponding decline. Indeed, as Table 9.2 makes clear, the 8.8% decline during Dzurinda’s first term was the greatest reduction in average real income for any administration after communism. In short, it was under social-democratic leadership from the Ministries of Finance and Labor and Social Affairs that Slovak society experienced the most negative societal costs of the post-communist economic transition.

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104 See Transformation Index BTI.
Synopsis: “Social-Democratic” Critical Junctures in Ecuador and Slovakia

Although Ecuador and Slovakia represent two very different systems, these countries experienced de-aligning critical junctures during which key social democratic parties oversaw both substantial improvement in terms of market liberalization and significant deterioration in terms of associated social costs. The historical records of the two countries point to a number of important similarities in terms of critical market reform implementation. Of particular importance are four parallels: (1) the political agency behind the most critical reforms, (2) the level and speed of market reform in comparative historical perspective, (3) the great social costs associated with the critical juncture, also in comparative historical perspective, and (4) the historical contingencies marked by previous conditions that were broadly similar in nature.

First, in both countries, social-democratic parties – ID in Ecuador and SDĽ in Slovakia – came to power after a decade featuring a stop-and-go pattern of economic restructuring during most of which they had campaigned as legitimate opponents of neoliberalism. As both parties, which were members of the Socialist International, had embraced center-left principles of social justice – such as a more just distribution of income, a concern for the poor and the working, promises to increase wages and pensions, and a commitment to slow down privatization – their social sensitivity in the context of transition from state-led development to more open markets was broadly seen as legitimate. Yet both of these parties immediately reversed course while in office and implemented significant market reforms.

Second, from a comparative historical perspective, these market reforms were more significant than reforms under any other government after both countries transitioned out of dictatorship (and, in Slovakia’s case, became independent). As shown in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 above (and in Tables A.18 and A.19 in Appendix P) for Ecuador and Slovakia, respectively, market
deepening was most decisive in the 1988-92 period in Ecuador and in the 1998-2002 period in Slovakia. More specifically, for Ecuador this meant greatest strides in trade liberalization, financial and tax reform. For Slovakia, this meant greatest progress in privatization, reductions in government spending, investment and financial freedom. Overall, while during the critical juncture each of the two countries deepened reforms most in contextually particular areas, overall progress in terms of liberalization was greatest under Borja’s administration in Ecuador and during the period when SDL was in charge of the Ministry of Finance in Slovakia. Because of the social democratic leadership in both cases, the critical junctures of market reform were de-aligning.

Third, also from a comparative historical perspective, in both countries the period of the critical juncture entailed greater social costs than under all other governments in the democratic period. As shown in Table 9.1 for Ecuador, Borja’s administration was distinguished by the highest inflation levels and the greatest decline of real minimum wages, on average, when compared to all other administrations. As shown in Table 9.2 for Slovakia, the years of the critical juncture were associated with the highest unemployment levels and the greatest decline in real income, on average, when compared to all other governments. Overall, from a comparative historical perspective, the critical junctures of Ecuador and Slovakia meant not only greatest progress in terms of economic liberalization but also the most substantial social costs – especially in terms of declines in real income.

Fourth, in both cases the leading role of social democrats was historically contingent in nature. It is true that in both countries the critical juncture was preceded by a decade-long economic decline (without collapse) which conditioned the subsequent adoption of austerity measures by social democratic actors. Yet in neither case was critical economic liberalization under social-democratic leadership a foregone conclusion. In Ecuador, Borja could have decided to not pursue
restructuring. Additionally, his reforms were conditional on maintaining a congressional majority – something that neither his right-wing predecessor, Febres Cordero, nor his right-wing successor, Durán Ballén, managed to sustain. In Slovakia, SDL, which ended up as the *de-facto* largest party in the coalition government, had several options – a coalition with the populist HZDS, a “toleration model” after the then-current Czech example, or simply not to participate in the pro-reform coalition government. Other coalition members could have prevented the party from taking over the Ministry of Finance. Overall, critical market reforms under social democratic leadership were by no means inevitable in either Ecuador or Slovakia.

And yet, finding themselves at crucial “choice points,” social democrats – now in a position of power – chose to pursue the most drastic market reforms these two countries would experience after the fall of dictatorships. Clearly, these choices were conditioned by the prior periods of cleavage that had featured deepening economic problems, stalled efforts at market reform, and political polarization. As these cleavages progressively morphed into crises – economic in Ecuador, political in Slovakia – social democrats’ menu of options, even if not pre-determined, was considerably narrowed in favor of pursuing market liberalization.

Importantly, the critical junctures of Ecuador and Slovakia were similar despite the many contextual differences between the two countries. If in Ecuador’s presidential system the critical juncture took place in the aftermath of a decade-long democratic experiment and contentious executive-legislative relations under three presidents, in Slovakia’s parliamentary system the critical juncture coincided with a period of transition away from competitive authoritarian domination. In Ecuador, social democrats had been more consistently critical of neoliberalism and enjoyed broader electoral support than in Slovakia. While in both countries, subsequent center-right governments “radicalized” neoliberalism, the results were profoundly different. In crisis-
The critical juncture was followed by muddled and unsuccessful economic reforms in the context of extreme instability featuring an escalating economic crisis, a coup, and a series of ousted presidents. In Slovakia, by contrast, the critical juncture was followed by political and economic stability, the latter of which has been largely guaranteed by the country’s conformity to EU rules after becoming a member in 2004.

These contextual differences notwithstanding, greatest economic liberalization and associated social costs were experienced under the leadership of social democratic actors in both countries. In comparative perspective, other political actors had been less successful or impactful. While reforms were continued under subsequent governments immediately after the critical juncture, such governments were comparably less liberalizing than their social democratic predecessors had been. From this perspective, the reforms under Dzurinda’s second government (2002-6) in Slovakia are best seen as a continuation rather than an institutional choice point. In Ecuador, while all administrations before Correa (2007-17) pursued further liberalization, under none of them were market reforms as drastic or as impactful as under Borja. Overall, despite the many contextual particularities as well as the historically contingent aspects of market reform, Ecuador and Slovakia are similar in a crucial respect – the neoliberal critical juncture in both countries took place under social-democratic leadership.

9.3. “Neoliberal-Populist” De-alignment in Peru and Poland

Although Peru and Poland exhibit great differences, their critical juncture experiences were defined by three major similarities: (1) the rise of neoliberal populism in the context of hyperinflationary disasters during which left-leaning forces had become discredited, (2) the undeniably profound impact that the market reforms enacted and/or defended by neoliberal populist presidents had in terms of economic liberalization and societal costs, and (3) the
historically contingent nature of these reforms, which – although conditioned by hyperinflation as
a similar critical antecedent – were by no means historically inevitable. Overall, the following
analysis demonstrates in detail that the Peruvian and Polish experiences under presidents Fujimori
and Wałęsa, respectively, constitute very similar critical junctures that have more in common with
one another than with the Ecuadorian and Slovak cases.

Peru’s Neoliberal Populism Under Alberto Fujimori

Fujimori’s Rise as a Credible Opponent of the Neoliberal Right

The hyperinflationary crisis in which Peru found itself in the late 1980s created the
opportunity for dramatic changes in terms of relevant political actors and policies. The opening
for this shift was facilitated by the ongoing decline of the center-left pillar of Peru’s party system.
As explained in Chapter 7, while APRA – which had acted as Peru’s center-left throughout the
1980s – was significantly weakened due to the disastrous economic policies of Alan García’s
presidency, the leftist United Left (IU) was in the process of disintegration. In this context of
center-left debilitation, the 1990 presidential election became a contest between the traditional
center-right, represented by Mario Vargas Llosa, the presidential candidate of FREDEMO, and
Alberto Fujimori, a political outsider whose anti-neoliberal appeal resonated with lower-class
voters, or what Roberts called the “atomized electoral constituency of the Left.”

While most voters unequivocally perceived Vargas Llosa and FREDEMO as belonging to
the neoliberal right, mostly due to Vargas Llosa’s tendencies to promote a radical defense of

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105 The party split between the more radical United Left (IU), now led by Henry Pease, and the more moderate Socialist
Left (IS), led by Alfonso Barrantes (see Cameron 1994; Roberts 1998).
106 FREDEMO was an alliance which supported Vargas Llosa and ran a unified slate of candidates from center-right
Popular Action (AP) and the right Christian People’s Party (PPC), both of which had governed together during
107 Roberts 1998: 10, 264
economic shock therapy, Fujimori occupied the now-available center-left by “reject[ing] economic shock measures”\textsuperscript{108} and by promising to “avoid a harsh economic stabilization program.”\textsuperscript{109} Although Fujimori’s candidacy took off just a month before the first round of the 1990 election, such promises made him the champion of “the people against the wealthy white elite represented by his opponent.”\textsuperscript{110} Indeed, with such promises Fujimori managed to attract the backing of workers and the informal sector – two constituencies whose support Fujimori shared with the Left and, to a lesser extent, with APRA.\textsuperscript{111} Overall, Fujimori’s campaign was built on three inter-related pillars that, together, constitute what Madrid calls “ethno-populist” appeals\textsuperscript{112} – (1) the strong anti-establishment and personalistic appeal of a political outsider; (2) an increasingly “classist” rhetoric that focused on lower classes, championed the poor against the rich,\textsuperscript{113} and rejected the shock therapy ideas of his rich opponent; and (3) powerful ethnic appeals based on the contrast between Fujimori, himself from an ethnic minority group, and the white-skinned and aristocratic Vargas Llosa.\textsuperscript{114} Importantly, in a country like Peru, where “indigenous people tend to be much poorer”\textsuperscript{115} than other ethnic groups, Fujimori’s ethnic and classist appeals were highly complementary. While Fujimori’s positioning as a defender of the lower classes from Vargas Llosa’s economic radicalism was not the only aspect of his campaign, his skepticism of neoliberal measures clearly resonated with Peru’s lower-class constituencies that voted for Fujimori.

\textsuperscript{108} Cameron 1994: 112-3, 118, 121
\textsuperscript{109} Roberts 1995: 95. See also Roberts 2014: 126.
\textsuperscript{110} Boas 2016: 138
\textsuperscript{111} See Cameron (1994: 121), who shows statistically significant correlations between party support and social classes in Metropolitan Lima in the 1990 election. While the vote shares of Fujimori’s Cambio ’90, the Left, and APRA are positively correlated with the electoral support of workers and the informal sector at statistically significant levels, these actors underperformed with employers and the white-collar sector (whose support is associated with FREDEMO’s vote shares).
\textsuperscript{112} Madrid 2012: 8
\textsuperscript{113} Boas 2016: 140
\textsuperscript{114} Madrid 2012: 122
\textsuperscript{115} Madrid 2011: 269
Overall, “with APRA discredited and the Marxist left divided,” Fujimori’s electoral strategy allowed him to secure “much of Peru’s left and center-left” electorate that had been “frightened” by Vargas Llosa’s calls for economic shock therapy. This was enough to qualify Fujimori, who gained 29.1% of the vote in the first-round, for the run-off of the 1990 presidential election. While Vargas Llosa gained nearly a third of the valid vote (32.6%) in the first round, the other opponents of economic radicalism – the candidates of APRA, the United Left (IU), and the Socialist Left (IS) – gained 22.5%, 8.2%, and 4.7%, respectively. Importantly, in a context of high ideological polarization, both the Left and APRA supported Fujimori in the second round. Indeed, this support was both necessary and sufficient for Fujimori’s victory as “the sum of votes for these forces in the first round fell within 2.0% of the final vote for Fujimori in the second round.”

Most importantly, Fujimori won the 1990 election because both political elites and popular constituencies had a similar perception of him. While popular constituencies voted for Fujimori due to his ethno-populist appeal – an important aspect of which included rhetorical opposition to Vargas Llosa’s economic radicalism – political elites from the traditional left and center-left parties in decline gave him second-round support motivated by their struggle against the Right. Indeed, both APRA and the Left encouraged their supporters to vote for Fujimori for two related reasons. First, because Fujimori had already attempted “to obtain a position on the senatorial list of… the Socialist Left,” his opposition to the application of shock measures was understood as legitimate. Second, Fujimori’s strength among the lower classes [which he had already

116 McClintock 2013
117 See Seawright (2012: 141, 166), who discusses this polarization. While APRA’s “drift to the left… made center-right voters inaccessible to APRA’s 1990 candidate,” the center-right AP and PPC coalesced around Vargas Llosa on the right.
118 Cameron 1994: 138-40
119 Ibid.: 37
120 Roberts 1995: 95
demonstrated in the first round] “endeared him greatly to the Left and APRA”\textsuperscript{121} as well as to the major labor federations that supported him in the second round.\textsuperscript{122} Therefore, both elites and the public saw Fujimori as a credible opponent of Vargas Llosa’s proposed program of drastic neoliberal reforms.\textsuperscript{123}

\textit{Fujishock and Beyond}

Despite his campaign and left-leaning constituency, within two weeks of his inauguration Fujimori adopted a drastic stabilization program that was tougher than Vargas Llosa’s proposals. Fujimori’s new program was implemented with encouragement from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and was “heavily influenced by neoliberal apostle Hernando de Soto,” who replaced Fujimori’s campaign economic advisers\textsuperscript{124} and around whom Vargas Llosa’s own economic technocrats coalesced.\textsuperscript{125} Such a dramatic change in economic strategy was “imposed by surprise”\textsuperscript{126} because it was completely at odds with Fujimori’s campaign as a credible opponent of neoliberalism.

Fujimori’s choice of a drastic stabilization program, known as \textit{Fujishock}, was dictated by the dire economic circumstances that he inherited from García’s prior administration. Indeed, the economic disaster of the late 1980s entailed the loss of 800,000 jobs in 1988-89,\textsuperscript{127} as well as more than 3% average annual decline in GPD per capita, an average annual inflation of nearly 2,000%,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Cameron 1994: 137
\item \textsuperscript{122} Roberts 1995: 99
\item \textsuperscript{123} The fact that Fujimori had tried – and failed – “to obtain a position on the senatorial list of… the Socialist Left” (Roberts 1995: 95) is further evidence of his perceived credibility as an opponent of neoliberal reform.
\item \textsuperscript{124} Roberts 1995: 96
\item \textsuperscript{125} Silva 2009: 237
\item \textsuperscript{126} Seawright 2012: 66
\item \textsuperscript{127} Roberts 1995: 96
\end{itemize}
and a substantial fall in real minimal wages, as shown in Table 9.3 below. In such a context, Fujimori’s economic measures were seen as “the only viable paths to economic stabilization.”

The Fujishock was an impressive neoliberal program that featured intensive stabilization and structural reforms. The stabilization included liberalization of prices, the removal of subsidies for basic food products, a tight monetary policy, and the resumption of foreign debt repayments. The structural reforms liberalized foreign exchange rates, trade, and capital markets, removed export taxes, employment security laws, and wage indexation, cut state employment, and mandated considerably more flexible labor relations. The measures also included the dismantling of agrarian reforms, the introduction of banking and tax reform, healthcare decentralization, and the aggressive privatization of social security pensions. Overall, Fujimori’s reforms were some of the deepest – not only in Peruvian history but also in Latin America. While Fujimori’s program successfully stabilized the economy and eliminated inflation (reducing it to 1-2% per month in 1994), it also had a profound effect on a society that experienced considerable increases in poverty and inequality, as well as heightened levels of unemployment (as shown in Table 9.3 below), underemployment, and informal employment during Fujimori’s first term in office.

As it is well known, within two years of Fujimori’s inauguration, political resistance to such intense reforms contributed to the president’s decision in favor of a self-coup (autogolpe) in 1992, which opened the way to the subsequent continuation of market reforms by authoritarian means. However, although Fujimori’s competitive authoritarian regime and further economic reforms continued until 2000, according to Roberts, the critical juncture was over before the end

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128 Silva 2009: 237
129 Ibid.: 237-8
130 Arce 2006: 37-8
131 For a comprehensive discussion of Fujimori’s reforms, see Crabtree and Thomas, eds. 1998 and Diaz, Saavedra and Torero 2002.
132 See Roberts (1995: 97) for a discussion of the numbers behind these societal trends.
133 Cameron 1994; Roberts 1998; Levitsky and Way 2010: 161-70
of his first term in office.\textsuperscript{134} Indeed, and as shown in Table 9.3, while further liberalization certainly took place during Fujimori’s second term (1995-2000) – during which Lora’s liberalization index improved by 17.4% – the intensity of market reform had clearly abated in comparison to the 81.7% improvement in the liberalization index during Fujimori’s first term.\textsuperscript{135}

\textbf{Table 9.3. Selected economic indicators in Peru, 1985-2016}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/President</th>
<th>Garcia I 07/85 - 07/90</th>
<th>Fujimori I 07/90 - 07/95</th>
<th>Fujimori II 07/95 - 11/00</th>
<th>Panagua 11/00 - 07/01</th>
<th>Toledo 07/01 - 07/04</th>
<th>García II 06/06 - 07/11</th>
<th>Humala 07/11 - 07/16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>1979.0</td>
<td>1122.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (annual avg.)</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>-2.3</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, % of GNI (annual avg.)</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real minimum wage base (monthly avg.), USD (2010 = 100)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>133.5</td>
<td>140.1</td>
<td>150.7</td>
<td>186.2</td>
<td>238.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>-79.6%</td>
<td>-291.8%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level and speed of market liberalization (at term's end)</th>
<th>General reform index (Morley et al. 1999)</th>
<th>0.484</th>
<th>0.348</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>74.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural reform index (Lora 2012)</th>
<th>0.300</th>
<th>0.56%</th>
<th>0.640</th>
<th>0.640</th>
<th>0.555</th>
<th>0.690</th>
<th>n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{Note:} The table uses the same sources and the same method of periodization for the calculation of level and speed of market liberalization under different administrations as used in Chapter 7 (which covers the 1968-90 period in Peru). For a better comparative perspective, the table begins with García’s first government, which preceded the critical juncture. The statistics for the period of the critical juncture are presented in the shaded region.

Sources: National Institute of Statistics and Informatics of Peru (INEI); International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; Morley et al. 1999; Lora 2012.

The market model imposed by Fujimori is seen as highly successful because it led to Peru’s gradual economic recovery.\textsuperscript{136} As shown in the table, inflation was reigned in, the current accounts

\textsuperscript{134} Roberts 2014: 114
\textsuperscript{135} A more differentiated comparison of the components of the reform indices offered by Lora (2012) and Morley et al. (1999) is available in Appendix P (Table A.20). The numbers presented confirm unequivocally that reforms during Fujimori’s first term in office were both deepest and speediest.
\textsuperscript{136} McClintock 2013: 220
balance improved, and the external debt was significantly reduced. Yet, according to Weyland, Fujimori’s economic success entailed a paradox – the resolution of the economic crisis by authoritarian means led the Peruvians’ growing skepticism of Fujimori’s authoritarian project.\(^{137}\) With the economy slowing down once again,\(^ {138}\) as reflected by the lower GDP per capita growth during Fujimori’s second term in office, Fujimori’s corruption eventually led to popular protests and his resignation in late 2000.\(^ {139}\)

Despite Fujimori’s departure, the success of his reforms meant the general pursuit of continuity of economic policy under his successors. While these presidents came to power by very different means – Toledo as an outsider on ethnic appeals,\(^ {140}\) García with the support of APRA, and Humala as a more classical populist – they all sustained the neoliberal model of development. In Toledo’s case, the institutionalization of structural adjustment programs (including privatization)\(^ {141}\) continued under appointees Roberto Dañino and Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, both of whom had served under Belaúnde in the early 1980s\(^ {142}\) and both of whom favored fiscal austerity.\(^ {143}\) More surprisingly, after winning the presidency for a second time in 2006, Alan García did not govern from the Left but rather “embraced the neoliberal economic model” by “neglecting to pursue even moderately redistributive and state-building policies.”\(^ {144}\) Because of this continuity, Peru’s structural reform index improved under the administrations of both Toledo and García, as shown in Table 9.3.

\(^{137}\) Weyland 2006: 13-38 cited in McClintock 2013: 225
\(^{138}\) St John 2010: 34
\(^{139}\) Levitsky and Way 2010
\(^{140}\) Madrid 2011: 134-6
\(^{141}\) Silva 2009: 246
\(^{142}\) Dañino, who under Belaúnde had served as secretary general of the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Trade, served as Toledo’s Prime Minister in 2001-2. Kuczynski, who under Belaúnde had served as minister of energy and mines (1980-2), served as Toledo’s minister of finance and the economy in 2001-2 and 2004-5 and as prime minister in 2005-6.
\(^{143}\) St John 2010: 40.
\(^{144}\) Cameron 2011: 376-7
Indeed, the Peruvian neoliberal model has enjoyed remarkable stability well into the 21st century, even under president Ollanta Humala, who had led a populist campaign against this model. According to Vergara and Encinas, the reason for this lies in the 1993 Constitution\textsuperscript{145} with which Fujimori established a neoliberal citizenship regime where “public participation in the economic sphere must only be subsidiary.”\textsuperscript{146} The moment was particularly crucial because it formalized neoliberalism as a model that would reproduce itself from within the state bureaucracy by means of a progressive – and successful – technocratic entrenchment in the Peruvian state.\textsuperscript{147} It is for this reason that while economic policy continuity under subsequent administrations can be viewed as a legacy of Fujimori’s economic reforms, the moment of these reforms is typically understood as a critical juncture.\textsuperscript{148} Because Fujimori’s drastic reforms followed a campaign that had explicitly rejected such measures, the critical juncture was de-aligning. Even though Humala eventually also governed in line with the neoliberal model, it was this critical juncture that created the opportunity structure for Humala’s electoral ascent (see Chapter 11).

From a societal perspective, Fujimori’s reforms had profound effects. Provided that these reforms were implemented in the aftermath of a deep economic crisis, socio-economic conditions in Peru generally improved during Fujimori’s presidency. Indeed, inflation was drastically reduced, productivity per capita increased, and the external debt was on track to recovery, as shown in Table 9.3. The real minimum wage, which had declined to its lowest levels under García’s previous government, saw a significant increase – although not quite to the levels of previous governments.\textsuperscript{149}

\textsuperscript{145} Particularly Articles 58-65, which lay the constitutional groundwork for the market system.
\textsuperscript{146} Vergara and Encinas 2016: 162
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Tanaka 2001 cited in Vergara and Encinas 2016: 166
\textsuperscript{149} During the late 1990s, the real minimum wage would surpass the levels from the early 1980s. It would reach the levels of the 1970s during the latter stages of Toledo’s government.
At the same time, Fujimori’s reforms were associated with profound social costs that – mostly due to their informal nature – are not captured in Table 9.3. These costs were mainly due to increased unemployment resulting from the opening of previously protected industrial sectors to external competition,\(^{150}\) as well as the cuts in public sector employment. Most importantly, the rise and persistence of *informal employment* (up to 57% in 1993) and *underemployment* were among the most considerable societal costs of Fujimori’s reforms.\(^{151}\) Significantly, because Fujimori’s social spending programs mostly targeted the creation of clientelistic relationships, “there was little by way of empowerment in the social sphere.”\(^{152}\) For this reason, the level of poverty rose to include more than half of the population after Fujimori’s reforms. As inequality also increased under Fujimori’s rule,\(^{153}\) the overall social cost of reforms was “extremely high.”\(^{154}\)

**Poland’s Neoliberal Populism Under Lech Wałęsa**


Although a government dominated by Solidarity implemented neoliberal shock therapy in Poland, such a choice was at odds with the movement’s long-standing ideology. Solidarity was grounded in workers’ struggles not only against communism but also against low pay and high prices. Solidarity’s ideas about evolutionary transformation based on worker ownership of the means of production dated back to 1945\(^{155}\) and were rearticulated throughout the 1970s and 1980s by dissidents, such as Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń, who emphasized workers’ self-

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\(^{150}\) Abugattas 1998: 72-8
\(^{151}\) Roberts (1995: 97) reports combined unemployment and underemployment rising from 81.4% in 1990 to 87.3% in 1993.
\(^{152}\) Crabtree and Thomas 1998: 269
\(^{153}\) See Roberts (1995: 97), who reports figures on rising inequality *and* poverty, which went up to “54% of the population in the aftermath of the Fujishock.” Similarly, Crabtree and Thomas (1998: 269) report 51.3% living in poverty in 1996.
\(^{154}\) Crabtree 1998: 16
\(^{155}\) Orenstein 2001: 26
management as a basic organizational principle of a solidaristic society. In line with such thinking, employee councils – which were reinvigorated in 1988 and 1989 – formed “an essential part of the support base of Solidarity.” Solidarity’s preoccupation with the wellbeing of labor was further highlighted during the roundtable negotiations of early 1988, when the union’s “major economic demand” was wage indexation to 80% of inflation. In short, in early 1988, it was Poland’s communist government seeking to implement an austerity program and Solidarity attempting to offset the effects of such a program by emphasizing the need to protect workers.

Despite Solidarity’s profile as a powerful labor movement, according to Orenstein, it quickly re-oriented itself towards neoliberalism. The re-orientation was due to three factors – (1) the suddenness with which Solidarity unexpectedly took power, (2) the dramatic economic crisis, and (3) the choice of Balcerowicz (whose preferences had switched from self-management to neoliberalism throughout the repressive 1980s) as market-reform leader. Beginning with the roundtable talks, when “workers all but disappeared” from the negotiations, and certainly by September 1989, when Balcerowicz was appointed finance minister, Solidarity had experienced an “unexpected shift to neoliberalism.” Such a shift was not reflected in Solidarity’s electoral platform of 1989, however, and indeed, no clear economic positions were reflected. Because roundtable participants had agreed on “competitive but not confrontational elections” to be held two months after the negotiations, contestants “had little time to prepare full-fledged electoral campaigns.” Solidarity won the competitive 35% of lower-house seats in these partially free elections simply by describing itself as “a more competent, democratic, and viable alternative.”

156 Michnik 1985
157 Orenstein 2001: 27-8
158 Ibid.: 28-30
159 Castle and Taras: 2002: 81
Despite Solidarity’s neoliberal turn – itself obscured by “the ambiguity of what was happening”\textsuperscript{161} – most of prime-minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s first year in office was a honeymoon period of “extraordinary politics” during which “the Polish electorate appeared to be biased in favor of reform because of the tremendous costs and instability of the crumbling communist system.”\textsuperscript{162} Indeed, because most Poles trusted the government, around 90\% supported what they called “horse therapy” – “in spite of the drastic deterioration in living conditions during the first months of the economic program.”\textsuperscript{163} However, as 1990 progressed and more people experienced a drop in living standards due to the rise of unemployment,\textsuperscript{164} declines in real wages, and the collapse of budgetary expenditure and social benefits,\textsuperscript{165} Solidarity began to lose public support along with all state institutions, such as the government and both houses of parliament. By September 1990, nine of ten Poles considered the economic situation to be poor\textsuperscript{166} and a series of new protests demonstrated worker opposition to Balcerowicz’s reforms. Balcerowicz’s notion that “the period of extraordinary politics usually lasts no more than one or two years”\textsuperscript{167} appeared to be true.

By the end of 1990, the public agitation led to an open “war at the top” among Solidarity leaders and was clearly articulated in Poland’s first democratic election. The presidential election of November 1990 pitted prime-minister Mazowiecki, who defended the reforms thus far, against long-time Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa, who sharply criticized Mazowiecki and made vague promises to reduce the social costs of the reforms. Surprisingly, Mazowiecki was eliminated in the first round not only by Wałęsa, who represented “the frustration of the old Solidarity camp,” but

\textsuperscript{161} Ost 2005: 58
\textsuperscript{162} Bell 2001: 6
\textsuperscript{163} Przeworski 1991: 165
\textsuperscript{164} Orenstein 2001: 36-7
\textsuperscript{165} Ibid.: 37; Bell 2001: 15
\textsuperscript{166} Bell 2001: 26
\textsuperscript{167} Balcerowicz and Gelb 1995: 209 cited in Bell 2001: 54
also by Stanisław Tymiński, who “exploited the frustration of the people who did not identify with Solidarity.”\footnote{Orenstein 2001: 37-9} Mazowiecki resigned immediately thereafter and Wałęsa – who had gained an impressive 40% of the vote in the first round – easily defeated Tymiński in the second round two weeks later.

Despite his criticism of Mazowiecki’s government on explicitly economic grounds, Wałęsa converted a popular rejection of the Balcerowicz Plan into a mandate for continuing shock therapy with Balcerowicz still at the helm.\footnote{Ibid.: 39-40} It is this bait-and-switch tactic that qualifies Wałęsa as a “neoliberal populist.”\footnote{Weyland 1999, 2001; Ost 2005: 67} Most importantly, Wałęsa’s contradiction of earlier campaign promises produced a de-aligning logic in terms of Poland’s neoliberal critical juncture. As the long-standing leader of the country’s most important labor union, which had recently channeled powerful popular mobilization centered on labor rights, Wałęsa had won the election by using “anti-reform and pro-populist rhetoric”\footnote{Greskovitz 1998: 110} that targeted the Balcerowicz Plan. More specifically, he had explicitly organized around class issues by accusing Mazowiecki’s government of hurting workers in particular and by criticizing wage declines, “the collapse of industrial towns,” and “the growing impoverishment existing side by side with growing wealth.”\footnote{Ost 2005: 66} Yet immediately after a presidential campaign that had stoked anti-capitalist anger\footnote{Ibid.: 67} by means of its social sensitivity to, and criticism of, the social costs of Balcerowicz’s shock therapy, Wałęsa “abandoned his campaign promises” and “settled for a government of economic policy continuity.”\footnote{Millard: 1999: 17}

This continuity was most clearly visible in the fact that Wałęsa made retaining Balcerowicz as minister of finance a condition for supporting a new government – a reason why at least one
potential coalition government, which would have been headed by shock therapy skeptic Jan Olszewski, failed to form.\textsuperscript{175} Instead, Wałęsa successfully nominated for prime minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, a liberal economist\textsuperscript{176} who was among the most market-oriented elements of Solidarity\textsuperscript{177} and whom the president chose while sidelining the nationalist wing of Solidarity.\textsuperscript{178} (This sidelined nationalist wing, which had lent crucial support during Wałęsa’s 1990 presidential campaign,\textsuperscript{179} would be of central importance in the aftermath of Poland’s critical juncture.) As both Wałęsa and Bielecki supported the continuation of Balcerowicz’s radical reforms,\textsuperscript{180} the new government set – and overachieved – new program targets.\textsuperscript{181} Yet “precisely because of the continuation of the economic program,” strikes grew in the lead-up to the first democratic parliamentary elections in the fall of 1991.\textsuperscript{182} These elections returned a highly fragmented parliament, “dominated by a post-Solidarity Catholic Right that opposed radical economic transformation.”\textsuperscript{183} When Balcerowicz resigned in December 1991,\textsuperscript{184} the period of “extraordinary politics” associated with Polish shock therapy was over.

\textit{The End of Poland’s Critical Juncture (1992-1993)}

Even though politics became more “ordinary” after 1991 – meaning that the initial euphoria that had sustained painful reforms during the 1989-90 period had given way to a clear popular disappointment with neoliberalism – this did not mean the end of Poland’s economic reforms.

\textsuperscript{175} Millard 2010: 27
\textsuperscript{176} Retrospectively, the continuity is obvious in terms of party politics as well. Bielecki’s Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) and Mazowiecki’s Democratic Union (UD) were both economically liberal post-Solidarity parties. In 1994, KLD and UD would merge to form the liberal Freedom Union (UW), which, in turn, would form the basis of Civic Platform (PO) beginning in 2001 (Frye 2010: 217; Millard 2010: 99).
\textsuperscript{177} Millard:2010: 28
\textsuperscript{178} Orenstein 2001: 39
\textsuperscript{179} Ost 2005: 67
\textsuperscript{180} Greskovitz 1998: 41
\textsuperscript{181} Stone 2002: 97-98
\textsuperscript{182} Ost 2005: 69
\textsuperscript{183} Orenstein: 2001: 42
\textsuperscript{184} Balcerowicz 2014
After the 1991 parliamentary election, Bielecki was replaced by Olczewski of the Center Agreement, a new party that, under Jarosław Kaczyński’s leadership, represented the national-conservative wing of Solidarity. Having “campaigned strongly against the Balcerowicz Plan,” Olczewski, under pressure from the IMF, “had to accept Balcerowicz’s provisional budget that contained drastic cuts and tax increases,” thereby “reproducing” neoliberalism. When Olszewski’s government collapsed in the summer of 1992 due to a no-confidence vote, it was replaced by a new coalition government led by Hanna Suchocka of Mazowiecki’s neoliberal Democratic Union. Suchocka’s cabinet “largely continued the economic strategy launched in 1990.” After a series of Solidarity-led worker strikes – featuring “the largest mine strike in European history” and other mass protests in a variety of sectors – Suchocka also lost a no-confidence vote. When early elections were held in September 1993, Poland’s ex-communists’ turn to govern had come again.

Poland’s most decisive market reforms were over by 1993. This is not to say that market reform stopped that year. As discussed by leading scholars of post-communism, it is true that market reforms continued well after the critical juncture – mostly under socialist-led governments before EU accession in 2004 and mostly under center-right governments afterwards. Yet the critical juncture – that is, the moment of most decisive economic reforms – was most obviously associated with the Solidarity-led governments of the early 1990s.

This is clearly reflected in the most commonly used indices measuring market reform progress in post-communist Europe. In addition to presenting several standard economic

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185 Orenstein 2001: 45
186 Ost 2005: 72
187 Millard 2010: 59
188 Balcerowicz 1995: 322 in Orenstein 2001: 46
189 Ost 2005: 74-8
190 Frye 2010: 219-21; Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 244-5
191 See de Melo et al. 1996a, 1996b; Wolf 1999; Fidrmuc 2003
indicators, Table 9.4 below also documents two such indices – the first weighted, the second unweighted – which capture level and speed of liberalization in Poland between 1989 and 2015. Additionally, the table indicates the respective periods during which Poland’s prime ministers governed after the fall of communism. While prime-ministerial tenure clearly did not coincide with exact calendar years, in most cases prime ministerial terms ended either in the very last or very first calendar months. For this reason, the table is largely reflective of the level of economic liberalization experienced under each prime minister in democratic Poland.

Table 9.4. Selected economic indicators in Poland, 1989-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/Prime Minister</th>
<th>Communist regime (P?/R)</th>
<th>Mazowiecki (Solidarity)</th>
<th>Bielecki (Solidarity)</th>
<th>Olszewski (Solidarity)</th>
<th>Suchodola (Solidarity)</th>
<th>Pawlak (PiS)</th>
<th>Oleksy/Cimoszewicz (AWS)</th>
<th>Buzek (PiS)</th>
<th>Miller/Belka (PiS)</th>
<th>Marcinkiewicz/Kaczyński (PiS)</th>
<th>Tusk/Kopacz (PO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP growth (annual avg.)</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (annual avg.)</td>
<td>251.1</td>
<td>585.8</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (monthly avg.)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality (annual avg.)</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current accounts balance, % of GDP (annual avg.)</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real average wage (annual avg), PLN (2010 = 100)</td>
<td>1951.5</td>
<td>1482.8</td>
<td>1142.6</td>
<td>1544.2</td>
<td>1641.4</td>
<td>1618.3</td>
<td>1761.8</td>
<td>2382.7</td>
<td>2684.3</td>
<td>2908.4</td>
<td>3230.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>-24.0%</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level and speed of market liberalization (at term's end)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD index (weighted) (de Melo et al. 1996)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>183.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD index (unweighted)</td>
<td>0.088</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.460</td>
<td>0.470</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.663</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.813</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>114.3%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Foundation overall score</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% change</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The table uses the same method of periodization for the calculation of level and speed of market liberalization under different administrations as for the other three countries under study. The statistics for the period of the critical juncture are presented in the shaded region.
2. Income inequality is measured as the share of national income for the top 1% divided by the share of national income for the bottom 50% (before tax).
3. As noted in Chapter 8, the unweighted EBRD index is the average of eight indicators, all of which were normalized on a 0-1 scale. However, due to data unavailability, the scores for 1989 and 1990 are based on an average of six indicators (excluding banking reform and securities markets from the calculation). The score for 1991 (0.460) is the average from calculations based on the six indicators available for the previous two years and all eight indicators available beginning with 1991, or 0.4833 and 0.4375, respectively. The reason for this scoring decision was to establish consistency in terms of calculating the percentage change from one year to the next. Comparing 1990 and 1991 based on six indicators for the first year and eight indicators for the second year would have underestimated the actual depth of the liberalization.

Sources: Central Statistical Office of Poland (CSOP); International Monetary Fund (IMF): World Economic Outlook datasets; World Bank: World Development Indicators; World Inequality Database (WID); European Bank for Reconstruction of Development (EBRD): Transition Indicators; The Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom; de Melo et al. 1996.
Perhaps the most influential quantitative measure of early post-communist market reform progress is the weighted annual liberalization index developed by de Melo and collaborators\(^{193}\) on the basis of data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).\(^{194}\) According to de Melo et al.’s index, Poland’s liberalization score improved by 183.3% between 1989 and 1991. Because it “moved fairly close to full liberalization,” according to Wolf’s retrospective classification, Poland is considered a “radical” reformer that had completed its most important reforms by the end of 1991\(^{195}\) – the end of Bielecki’s government. Yet – and as discussed above – reforms continued under subsequent governments appointed by Wałęsa.

As an alternative measure of Poland’s market liberalization, the unweighted EBRD index (which was also used for Slovakia), demonstrates somewhat similar findings – a massive improvement of 314.3% under prime-minister Mazowiecki, a 27% improvement under Bielecki in 1991, and another impressive improvement of 33% in 1993 under Suchocka. The results of this index are somewhat different because it assigns comparatively less weight to small privatization and price liberalization both of which had been largely completed by 1992, and comparatively more weight to banking reform, restructuring, trade and foreign exchange, and competition – all of which improved significantly between 1992 and 1993, according to EBRD data. Depending on the emphasis, then, there are three possibilities for when Poland’s critical juncture concluded – (1) by the end of 1991 (according to Wolf’s “subjective” classification\(^{196}\) based on interpreting de

\(^{193}\) de Melo et al. 1996a; 1996b; for authors using this index, see Wolf 1999 and Fidrmuc 2000, 2003.

\(^{194}\) De Melo et al.’s index is based on EBRD data in three categories – internal prices (price liberalization and competition), external markets (trade and foreign exchange system), and private sector entry (large-scale privatization, small-scale privatization, and banking reform). It is a weighted average (with weights 0.3, 0.3, and 0.4 respectively) and it ranges from 0 (“unreformed”) to 1 (“basically reformed”) (see de Melo et al. 1996a: 6, 37).

\(^{195}\) Wolf uses de Melo et al.’s index and classifies as “radical” those countries whose index “jumped by at least 0.4 over any two-year period and equals 0.7.” Thus, by the end of 1991, Poland was in a “radical” group only with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, to be joined by Albania, Estonia, and Lithuania in 1992, and the Kyrgyz Republic in 1993. No other country achieved “radical” status before 1995 (Wolf 1999: 7-9).

\(^{196}\) Wolf 1999: 7
Melo et al.’s weighted index), (2) by the end of 1992 (according to the objective percentage change in 1992 in de Melo et al.’s weighted index), or (3) by the end of 1993 (according to the unweighted index based on the same data). According to the EBRD data – and in agreement with the literature on Polish reforms – liberalization in Poland continued after 1993, but at a much slower speed, a point generally confirmed by the Heritage Foundation “overall score” at the bottom of Table 9.4.

Overall, while interpreting when Poland’s critical juncture ended exactly may be a matter of subjective assessment based on what reforms are emphasized, three uncontestable facts are more relevant. First, the critical juncture took place under the early 1990s government of Solidarity – Poland’s largest trade union that had been built specifically to defend workers’ interests. Second, Poland’s critical juncture ended after Wałęsa’s election as president. Because Wałęsa – who had been Solidarity’s long-term chairman and who had campaigned by criticizing shock therapy – defended and sustained radical economic reforms, he clearly engaged in bait-and-switch tactics associated with neoliberal populism, a reason why Poland experienced a de-aligning critical juncture.

Third, from a societal perspective, the years of the critical juncture were most destabilizing. As shown in Table 9.4, while the problem of hyperinflation was solved, Polish unemployment more than tripled, income inequality doubled, and the average real wage declined substantially between 1989 and 1993. As the table makes clear, subsequent years would bring fluctuations in unemployment, improvements in real wages, and worsening inequality. The central point is that under no future administration would the societal costs be nearly as drastic and as negative, on average, as they were during the Solidarity governments of the early 1990s.
Synopsis: “Neoliberal-Populist” Critical Junctures in Peru and Poland

Regardless of the many differences, Peru and Poland experienced de-aligning critical junctures under the leadership of neoliberal-populist presidents Alberto Fujimori and Lech Wałęsa, both of whom championed neoliberal shock therapy in contradiction to former campaign promises. The two countries share a number of important parallels with regard to the developments under these two presidents: (1) the rise of neoliberal populism in the context of deep hyperinflationary crises during which left-leaning forces had been discredited, (2) the “criticalness” of reforms that had major impacts in terms of liberalization and societal costs, and (3) the historically contingent nature of the reforms.

First, as argued by Weyland, the hyperinflationary years immediately before the critical juncture created opportunities for the rise of personalist leaders, especially in countries with relatively strong presidencies, such as Peru and Poland.197 In both countries, the ascent of neoliberal populists Fujimori and Wałęsa took place in the context of already discredited left-leaning parties. As discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, throughout the 1980s, APRA in Peru and the United Workers Party (PZPR) in Poland had mishandled the already accelerating economic crisis by responding to pressures from political actors representing labor interests – the United Left (IU) in Peru and Solidarity in Poland. While in the context of Polish communism Solidarity was by no means a leftist actor in the sense that Peru’s IU was, as Poland’s most important labor union, Solidarity did pressure the communist regime to increase workers’ wages in the late 1980s. Peru’s IU had a similar effect in constraining APRA to economic populism. Because in both cases inflation had already been a problem, the effect of APRA’s and PZPR’s populist economic

197 Weyland 1999
measures was hyperinflation and the de-legitimation of left-leaning parties (including the IU in Peru).

It is in this context of center-left debilitation that Fujimori and Wałęsa succeeded by campaigning as anti-establishment and personalist outsiders who were unlike the traditional – and discredited – left-leaning parties, but who also managed to present themselves as credible opponents of neoliberalism. Indeed, as presidential candidates in 1990, both Wałęsa and Fujimori won against explicit neoliberal advocates – Vargas Llosa in Peru and Mazowiecki in Poland – by opposing their ideas of radical market reform. Wałęsa’s and Fujimori’s classist rhetoric, focused on the social costs of economic reforms and based on former political experiences, was seen as credible both by lower-class voters, who tended to support them, and by political elites skeptical of neoliberal reform, such as the declining left-leaning parties in Peru and the national-conservative wing of Solidarity in Poland.

Second, immediately upon entering the presidency, both Fujimori and Wałęsa enacted shock therapy reforms that constitute a de-aligning critical juncture because of the bait-and-switch tactics and because of the reform’s dramatic effects. This is more obviously true in the case of Peru, where the improvement in the liberalization indices was more impressive under Fujimori’s first term than under any other administration. In Poland, major economic reforms had already been in progress for a year prior to Wałęsa’s rise to the presidency. Yet these early reforms in Poland were characterized by two unique factors. First, considering the liberalization index based on unweighted EBRD data, because Poland – due to its communist past – had started from a comparably low baseline, most economic reforms were still to be implemented as of the time when Wałęsa entered office in December 1990 (or less than a year after the Balcerowicz Plan had been

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198 As noted above, Fujimori had attempted to run for a senatorial seat as a candidate of Peru’s United Left and Wałęsa had been the head of Poland’s most powerful labor union.
officially enacted). Second, the initial reforms were enacted after a transitional parliamentary election (in 1989) that was neither fully democratic nor featuring debate on economic issues. Thus, the 1990 presidential election was the first time in which the idea of neoliberal economic reforms was presented for public ratification in Poland.

Having campaigned – and won – by criticizing their neoliberal opponents, presidents Fujimori and Wałęsa violated their campaign promises immediately after taking office by retaining their neoliberal opponents’ chief economic advisors – Vargas Llosa’s economic technocrats in Peru and Balcerowicz’s team in Poland. While Fujimori initiated the program in Peru, Wałęsa “maintained it virtually intact and helped prevent a popular backlash against it”\(^{199}\) in Poland. In both cases, these reforms entailed considerable social costs. In Peru, increased underemployment and informal employment contributed to the additional spikes of poverty and inequality – the highest after Peru’s transition to democracy. In Poland, in comparison to the periods under subsequent administrations, the period of the critical juncture was marked by the most drastic declines of unemployment and real income, which, in turn, resulted in a two-fold increase of income inequality.

Third, in both cases, the de-aligning critical juncture was of historically contingent, rather than pre-determined, nature. Indeed, there are good reasons to argue that had Vargas Llosa moderated his message or had the United Left overcome internal factionalism – both of which were possibilities – Fujimori’s election could have been prevented in Peru.\(^{200}\) In Poland, neither the “war at the top” between Solidarity’s “left” and “anti-communist” wings (behind Mazowiecki and Wałęsa, respectively) nor the adoption of direct presidential elections in September 1990 was

\(^{199}\) Weyland 1999: 381
\(^{200}\) Cameron 1994: 126
historically inevitable,\textsuperscript{201} and yet it was these two factors that made it possible for Wałęsa to oppose Mazowiecki in the electoral arena.

Notwithstanding the historically contingent character of the critical junctures, the shock therapy reforms associated with Fujimori and Wałęsa were \textit{conditioned} by the hyperinflationary crises at the end of the cleavage period in both countries. As explained in Chapters 7 and 8, because deep economic crises were at least partially the result of historically dominant patterns of labor mobilization in Peru and Poland, the particular neoliberal shock-therapy solution to such crises has a critical historical antecedent. Additionally, the de-legitimation of left-leaning political forces (APRA in Peru, the Communist Party in Poland) that had failed to manage the escalating crisis – itself resultant from high levels of social mobilization – had broadened opportunities for the rise of personalistic candidates with pro-social rhetoric. Overall then, while the de-aligning critical juncture was historically contingent in both countries, the neoliberal-populist character of both Fujimori and Wałęsa was historically conditioned by the critical antecedents of Peru and Poland.

Finally, these important parallels between the critical junctures are against the backdrop of great difference between the two countries. In Peru’s presidential-parliamentary system, shock therapy was initiated in the context of comparably worse hyperinflation as well as a transition from a decade of democracy to a decade of authoritarianism and relative political stability. In Poland’s premier-presidential system, shock therapy was continued in the context of hyperinflation that was milder than in Peru and during a period of democratization and growing political instability. The main agents of reform also had different characteristics – a previously unknown political newcomer in Peru and \textit{the} very well-known leader of the largest labor union in Poland.\textsuperscript{202}

\textsuperscript{201} See Millard 2010: 18-23
\textsuperscript{202} Compared to Fujimori, Wałęsa was more “popular” initially as he received comparatively broader electoral support. Thus, in each of the two rounds of the 1990 presidential election in Poland, Wałęsa gained 11-12% more than Fujimori did in each of the two rounds of the 1990 presidential election in Peru.
Polarization also evolved differently. In Peru, the key political divide changed from an ideological conflict between left-leaning and right-leaning parties to a conflict between Fujimorismo and anti-Fujimori forces. Poland’s main political divide evolved from a conflict between the Communists state, on the one hand, and society (represented by Solidarity), on the other hand, to an ideological “war at the top” between Solidarity’s liberal and national-conservative factions with divergent views regarding the Communist past (and the post-communist “present”). Once in power, Fujimori relied heavily on the material means of clientelist exchange in order to maintain popular support. By contrast, Wałęsa emphasized ideological appeals, such as anti-communism, nationalism, and conservatism.203 If the continuity of the Peruvian neoliberal model has been guaranteed by internal factors – specifically, by the model’s embeddedness in the state, the continuity of Polish market reforms has been more associated with external pressures from the European Union, both before and after accession.

Despite these differences, the critical junctures of Peru and Poland were similarly definitive experiences that were shaped by key parallels. Overall, these historically contingent critical junctures not only signified the most radical moment of market liberalization in both countries’ histories, but also took place under general conditions that were very different from the ones observed in Ecuador and Slovakia. Rather than under social-democratic leadership, as in Ecuador and Slovakia, the key reforms in Peru and Poland took place under conditions of traditional left-leaning party weakness and neoliberal-populist rise. It is for this reason that the neoliberal-populist critical junctures of Peru and Poland have more in common with one another than with the Ecuadorian and Slovak experiences of social-democratic de-alignment.

9.4. Conclusion: De-aligning Critical Junctures in the Andes and Central Europe

The bait-and-switch approach of the political actors in charge of the most critical economic liberalization efforts in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia qualify these countries as belonging to the de-aligning critical juncture of market reform. As argued in the previous two chapters, relatively low or high levels of popular mobilization had conditioned relatively shallow (in Ecuador and Slovakia) or deep (in Peru and Poland) economic crises, respectively, as the state-led model of development lost its way in Latin America and post-communist Europe. As discussed in the present chapter, these critical antecedents resulted in two general sub-types of de-aligning critical junctures – “social-democratic” and “neoliberal-populist.” As the chapter documented for the four cases, what made these experiences “critical” was the uniquely profound depth and societal impact of market reforms, and what made them “junctures” was the historical contingent nature of the circumstances of these reforms. In all four cases, critical junctures were conditioned, although not entirely determined, by antecedent conditions.

With regard to the conditioning role of critical antecedents, the relatively shallow economic crises of Ecuador and Slovakia contributed to the significant role that traditional center-left parties played in the implementation of key market reforms. While the leading role of the center-left was a matter of historical contingency, the lack of deep economic crisis in these two countries meant that such parties were not seriously weakened or delegitimized – which, in turn, translated in their relative importance during the critical juncture. Due to these parties’ leading roles in market reforms, the de-aligning critical junctures of Ecuador and Slovakia are best characterized as “social-democratic.” By contrast, the hyperinflationary crises in Peru and Poland were associated with the ascent to the presidency of populist outsiders Fujimori and Wałęsa. While, as argued by Weyland, this rise was conditional on several other factors – such as weak party systems and...
relatively strong presidencies\textsuperscript{204} – it was the general weakening of political parties associated with
the state-led model of development that cleared the way for these populist candidates to channel
societal grievances by campaigning \textit{against} the drastic economic measures endorsed by their
neoliberal opponents. Yet, in their attempts to solve the crises, both Fujimori and Wałęsa engaged
in bait-and-switch tactics, thus betraying their original mandates. For this reason, the de-aligning
critical junctures shaped by these personalist outsiders are best understood as “neoliberal-
populist.”

Notably, economic reforms in each conceptual pair followed very different logics in terms
of their overall trajectory, results, and historical contexts. For this reason, each conceptual pair
includes two \textit{most different systems}. For example, the “social-democratic” critical junctures took
place in very different contexts and were followed by variable conditions. If in Ecuador’s
presidential system the critical juncture took place in the aftermath of a decade-long democratic
experiment and contentious executive-legislative relations under three presidents, in Slovakia’s
parliamentary system the critical juncture coincided with a period of transition away from
competitive authoritarian domination. If in Ecuador the critical juncture was followed by muddled
and unsuccessful economic reforms in the context of extreme political instability, in Slovakia it
was followed by successful market reforms in the context of relative political stability. The
contextual dynamics of “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures also varied widely. In Peru’s
presidential-parliamentary system, the most critical economic reforms, which followed a decade-
long democratic rule, were decisively carried out as the country transitioned into Fujimori’s
competitive authoritarian rule. In Poland’s premier-presidential system, which had just exited
authoritarian rule, critical reforms were carried out under democratic conditions. If in Peru the

\textsuperscript{204} Weyland 1999
critical juncture was followed by the consolidation of the neoliberal model, in Poland further reforms were, at least initially, distinguished by their more intermittent nature.

Such different circumstances and unique characteristics notwithstanding, the critical juncture in each of the four countries is best judged by the nature of the agency in charge of those economic liberalization efforts that exhibited the highest level, speed, and societal impact. As the discussion of the overall trajectory of market reforms in each country has shown, the critical juncture took place under social-democratic rule in Ecuador and Slovakia and under neoliberal-populist rule in Peru and Poland. Importantly, these periods not only featured the most intensive market reforms, but also considerable social costs associated with these reforms. While these social costs were contingent on somewhat contextually specific factors, they typically entailed the greatest deterioration of living standards – as measured by real wages – in the most recent democratic histories of Ecuador, Slovakia, and Poland. In Peru, which had already experienced its steepest decline in real income in the years immediately prior to key market reforms, the critical juncture was associated with further increases of already high levels of underemployment and informal employment – both of which would contribute to the subsequent increase of inequality. In Slovakia, too, the critical juncture was characterized by the highest average level of unemployment when compared to other periods. Thus, even though the social costs of key market reforms were somewhat context-specific, the critical juncture – understood as the period under the administration that imposed the deepest and speediest market reforms – entailed high social costs from a comparative historical perspective.

In sum, this chapter has examined the historical record of the four cases in order to identify the critical junctures of market reform. Based on the analysis, the chapter also made the case for distinguishing between two conceptual pairs of de-aligning critical junctures – “social democratic”
in Ecuador and Slovakia and “neoliberal populist” in Peru and Poland. While the identification of
these two varieties of de-aligning critical junctures is based on the historically contingent political
agency in charge of the most critical economic reforms, the observable similarities are also
conditioned by the effect of similar historical antecedents on the relative prominence of the
traditional center-left. As the next two chapters – each focused on the consequences of these
distinct types of de-aligning critical junctures – demonstrate, the interesting similarities identified
above would result in intriguingly parallel developments from the point of view of illiberal populist
mobilization in the aftermath of critical junctures.
Critical junctures produce long-term legacies, but these legacies are not necessarily the same, even after apparently similar types of critical junctures. Even if populists are successful at the ballot box after crucial market reforms, their electoral successes do not necessarily imply sameness in terms of either overall patterns or mechanisms. For example, programmatic de-alignment can be followed by more or less stable forms of populist power – such as populist hegemony in Ecuador and Slovakia or lack of such hegemony in Peru and Poland. While all four countries have traditionally been characterized by regional divides in terms of voting behavior, only in the first two did populists manage to overcome these divides by building broad coalitions with highly nationalized electorates. The present and following chapters distinguish between such variable patterns and mechanisms, and trace the processes that led to divergent outcomes after de-aligning critical junctures in the four countries under study.

This chapter identifies the path dependencies that led to populist hegemonies in Ecuador and Slovakia. In these two countries, populist actors dominated national politics for at least a decade in the aftermath of critical junctures of market reform. Importantly, these actors not only won election after election over time, but also became electorally dominant across space by winning considerable and relatively uniform voter support throughout Ecuador and Slovakia. As I discuss in the final chapter, these two aspects of electoral domination – across time and across space – are conceptually distinct and not necessarily correlated. However, there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that the overcoming of traditional territorial-electoral divides contributed to populist domination of executive power.
across time in both countries.¹ I leave the discussion of these reasons for the final chapter; here, I focus on the processes that led to the rise to power of Ecuadorian and Slovak hegemonic populists.

The most intuitive way to grasp the similar outcome of populist hegemony in Ecuador and Slovakia is by observing performance in national elections across time. Indeed, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa and his movement Alianza PAIS and Slovakia’s SMER, led by Robert Fico, won multiple consecutive elections, which allowed them to control the executive for over a decade beginning in 2006. In Slovakia, SMER’s dominance began when the party won the 2006 legislative election and continued with victories throughout the following three electoral cycles – in 2010, 2012, and 2016. While the 2016 election is outside of the period of analytical interest,² SMER won each election, averaging an impressive 36.1% of the national vote between 2006 and 2012 – a particularly remarkable result given that the party competed as a non-incumbent in both 2006 and 2012. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa won the 2006, 2009, and 2013 presidential elections while the presidential candidate supported by Alianza PAIS won the 2017 election. While the 2013 and 2017 elections are outside the scope of the present study,³ Correa won the first two presidential elections in which he ran (2006 and 2009) by averaging 37.4% of the first-round vote.⁴ Overall, then, the decade-long populist domination of Ecuadorian and Slovak populists was characterized by similarly successful performances in national elections.⁵

As I discuss in greater detail in the final chapter, typically, accounts of such populist hegemonies focus on the relevant actors’ tenure in the executive branch. It is true that as

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¹ For a study of Ecuador, see Polga-Hecimovich 2014.
² Due to the hypothetical new critical juncture that began in 2015 with the European migrant crisis.
³ Because of the possible consolidation of competitive authoritarian rule after 2009 and because the 2017 election falls outside of the period of analytical interest (see Chapter 1).
⁴ Curiously, Correa’s average in the first two presidential elections that he won was the exact same average that SMER-supported candidates gained in the first two presidential elections (2009 and 2014) when the party endorsed candidates in Slovakia.
⁵ Although here I only focus on national elections, populists also dominated subnational elections.
incumbents populists can establish competitive authoritarian rule and use oil revenues to reward loyal clienteles. Even though they were particularly relevant to the Ecuadorian experience, such factors provide an incomplete account when explaining populist success more generally. In Slovakia, the populist party SMER also dominated the executive for over a decade\(^6\) without being associated with competitive authoritarianism or revenues from natural resources. Clearly, this domination was the product of a high average in the three legislative elections between 2006 and 2012, during which the center-right all but disintegrated while SMER consolidated an electoral coalition that had been impressively broad from the beginning. A very similar pattern of center-right weakness and populist electoral success based on a reliably broad popular coalition is observable in Ecuador. While subsequent policies in office certainly contributed to the maintenance of highly nationalized electorates, it is important to understand that such broad coalitions had already been formed even before hegemonic populists initially came to power.

I show that despite the great differences between Ecuador and Slovakia, the reactive sequences towards populist hegemony featured three stages: (1) the electoral decline of the traditional center-left after “social-democratic” critical junctures, which created opportunity structures for the rise of ant-establishment personalists actors critical of neoliberal reforms; (2) although these populists rose to prominence, at first they failed to achieve their most fundamental objectives; (3) having strategically (re-) positioned themselves by adjusting their appeals, populists were successful in building broad electoral coalitions based on which they rose to executive power in both countries. As the following discussion demonstrates, country-specific dynamics, actors, objectives, institutions, and coalitions were admittedly very different in Ecuador and Slovakia. Yet such differences ought not to obscure the generally

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\(^6\) With a brief 21-month pause between July 2010 and April 2012.
similar trajectory of populist development after the critical juncture, the legacies of which eventually culminating in populist hegemonies in both countries.

Crucially, populist hegemons in Ecuador and Slovakia were built in conditions that began with the decline of the traditional center-left, which had performed a leading role in “social-democratic” critical junctures. In turn, the opportunity structures that this decline engendered were exploited by populist actors adopting strategies for electoral success. These populist actors’ strategies were ultimately successful as they attracted broad electoral coalitions that transcended regional divides and that constituted the base of populist hegemonic power in subsequent years. I analyze the breadth of electoral coalitions by using weighted Party Nationalization Scores (wPNSs) that, as discussed in Appendix Q, are used as a technique for measuring electoral homogeneity across territorial units. As I demonstrate, the wPNSs of dominant populist actors in Ecuador and Slovakia were consistently superior to those of their political competitors.

Overall, then, this chapter uncovers intriguing commonalities on the path to populist hegemony in Ecuador and Slovakia despite the undeniable systemic differences between these two very different countries. Importantly, by focusing on populist electoral mobilization I develop a probabilistic explanation. This explanation seeks to account not for all contextual peculiarities, but rather for populist developments understood specifically in electoral terms. And even though the Ecuadorian and Slovak paths towards populist hegemony differed in many respects, the processes traced in this chapter reveal a similar reactive sequence. In both contexts, this sequence began with center-left decline after “social-democratic” critical junctures, evolved through processes of failure and strategic adjustments, and culminated in a legacy of populist hegemony characterized by broad electoral coalitions. It is these path dependent legacies of the critical juncture that make the Ecuadorian and Slovak experiences with populism surprisingly similar.
10.2. Populist Reactions in Ecuador

The Seed: Beginnings of Mobilizational Success Against Neoliberalism

Rodrigo Borja’s social democratic government (1988-92) faced organized resistance immediately after initiating key market reforms. Although Borja negotiated with the United Workers’ Front (FUT)\(^7\) representing urban organized labor, the main challenge to his administration’s neoliberal policies came from Ecuador’s rural popular sectors represented by the National Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE).\(^8\) Created during Febres Cordero’s presidency as the union of the highland and lowland strands of indigenous movements – Ecuarunari and Confeniae, respectively\(^9\) – that had been organizing since the 1970s,\(^10\) CONAIE “took a central role in leading struggles against neoliberal economic policy” beginning in 1990\(^11\) – the midpoint of Borja’s social democratic administration.

Having been enfranchised during the transition to democracy, throughout the 1980s the peasant and indigenous population had typically been represented by center-left parties, and especially by Borja’s Democratic Left (ID) – “the only major party to recruit a number of indigenous leaders”\(^12\) and “to include indigenous autonomy demands in its platform.”\(^13\) However, president Borja’s refusal to actually meet such demands – many of which also revolved around economic issues\(^14\) of citizenship and class\(^15\) – led to considerable social mobilization in the second part of his presidency, after his bait-and-switch policies became obvious. Articulated most clearly during the first National indigenous Uprising of 1990,

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\(^7\) Frente Unitario de Trabajadores
\(^8\) Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador
\(^10\) Yashar 2005: 139; Silva 2009: 156
\(^11\) Becker 2011: 27; see also Yashar 2005: 144
\(^12\) Madrid 2012: 82
\(^13\) Mijeski and Beck 2011: 16 citing Birnir 2000: 10
\(^14\) Becker 2011: 30
\(^15\) Yashar 2005: 145; Silva 2009: 157-8
CONAIE’s demands were based on the central claim that peasants and indigenous nationalities were “most affected by… the government’s social policies.” Although initially CONAIE had pushed for cultural issues, its most important demands for land reform “originated in the economic dislocation caused by neoliberal reforms… which depressed sources of income at a time of soaring prices…, increased poverty and turned attention back to land as a principal source of income.”

Thus, from having once been “one reason that the party [ID] gained most of its votes in the heavily indigenous sierra,” and thereby having served as the Social Democrats’ electoral backbone throughout the previous decade, by the early 1990s, Ecuador’s indigenous peasants were explicitly mobilized against Borja’s neoliberal restructuring. Moreover, as a formative experience of alliance formation and consciousness raising, the importance of the Indian uprising of 1990 cannot be overstated – because it represented “the high point of [the] opening wave of anti-neoliberal contention” in Ecuador.

Two Waves of Populist Electoral Mobilization

The period following the indigenous uprising during the critical juncture was characterized by two waves of populist electoral mobilization. First, by the mid-1990s, the indigenous mobilization that had reached its organizational apex in 1990 morphed into a populist electoral movement against neoliberalism. As neoliberalism radicalized, this populist movement intensified, reaching a first electoral high tide when Lucio Gutiérrez was elevated to the presidency with its support in 2002. A second and even more intensive, albeit quite different, populist electoral wave followed with Rafael Correa’s ascendance to the presidency in 2006. These two populist electoral waves – the first in 1996, 1998, and 2002; the second in

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16 Becker: 2011: 32
17 Silva 2009: 156-7
18 Van Cott 2005: 105, citing Birmir 2000: 10; Madrid 2012: 83
19 Yashar 2005: 146-51
20 Van Cott 2005: 111
21 Silva 2009: 160-9
2006 and 2009 – are a heritage of Ecuador’s social democratic critical juncture for two reasons. First, both waves incorporated former key constituencies that abandoned the social democrats – the indigenous vote during the first wave and even broader leftist sectors during the second wave. Additionally, as the second wave was motivated by the failures of the first, and the first wave had itself been built on organizational foundations and ideological aspirations dating back to the uprising against Borja’s reforms, the legacies of the critical juncture are indeed profound.

**First Wave: 1996-2002**

Although Ecuador experienced great political and economic instability between 1996 and 2002, from the perspective of populist electoral mobilization, this period can be characterized as a first wave that featured an important aspect of coherence. The overall instability, featuring president Bucaram’s ouster and the Constitutional Assembly in 1997, as well as president Mahuad’s ouster amid a deep economic crisis in 1999, has been exhaustively discussed elsewhere.\(^22\) More relevantly for the present analysis focused on elections, this period featured the establishment of Pachakutik as a major populist actor that displayed a degree of electoral stability unusual for Ecuador.\(^23\) Ending with Pachakutik’s decline, this first wave of Ecuadorian post-critical juncture populism is an excellent example of the link between opportunity structures and rational agency, as theorized in Chapter 4.

As explained in the previous chapter, although Duran Ballen’s presidency immediately following the critical juncture radicalized neoliberalism, this radicalization was mostly abortive. Meanwhile, CONAIE responded in much the same way as it had done under Borja – by organizing protests and strikes in response to price hikes and proposed economic reforms, especially Duran’s efforts in the realm of privatization. This time, however, anti-

\(^{22}\) Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Silva 2009; Madrid 2012

\(^{23}\) Madrid 2012: 100
neoliberal mobilizational capacity was expanded through the creation of an alternative organization, the Social Movements Coordinator (CMS), which united both organized and informal labor with Christian communities for the purposes of collaborating with CONAIE.

This new collaboration, in turn, represented the opening of a new page in terms of Ecuador’s anti-neoliberal contention – the entrance into electoral politics. The first wave of specifically electoral populist mobilization after the critical juncture began in 1996, when the Movement of Plurinational Unity Pachakutik – New Country (MUPP-NP) was formed as a multiclass (and multi-racial) coalition among the indigenous CONAIE, the labor-based CMS, and the Citizens’ Movement for a New Country (MNCP). While the reasons for the decision to participate in electoral politics are complex, Pachakutik’s formation was a direct consequence of “the weakness of the parties on the left” – and particularly of the ID – which “after 1992 opened space on this part of the political spectrum for the ethnic party that would form in 1996.” In other words, the weakening of ID created a direct opportunity for Pachakutik’s rise.

As an electoral vehicle, Pachakutik was decidedly populist. The brand-new anti-establishment coalition attached itself to well-known presidential candidates with undisputed anti-establishment and outsider credentials – telegenic television host (and MNCP leader) Freddy Ehlers in 1996 and 1998 and “military putschist” Lucio Gutiérrez. In turn, these personalistic leaders appealed to the broad set of interests represented by Pachakutik as a multi-class coalition by adopting pro-poor and generally anti-establishment appeals, which, without being explicitly “leftist,” revolved around nationalistic and anti-neoliberal economic positions. Importantly, as neither Ehlers nor Gutiérrez was ideological, these presidential

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24 Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales
25 Silva 2009: 163
26 MUPP-NP stands for Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País. MCNP stands for Movimiento de Ciudadanía por un Nuevo País.
28 Van Cott 2005: 114
29 Madrid 2012: 95; Levitsky and Loxton 2013: 120
candidates’ attachment to left-leaning Pachakutik can be interpreted as purely strategic.\textsuperscript{30} For instance, the vicissitudes of Pachakutik’s “on-off-on-again relationship” with Ehlers were due not only to the presidential candidate’s inadequacies as a challenger of the center-right,\textsuperscript{31} but also due to indigenous perceptions of Ehlers’ opportunism and even racism.\textsuperscript{32} Regarding Gutiérrez, Pachakutik’s decision to support him was also pragmatic, especially considering indigenous concerns about the nominee’s trip “to New York and Washington to promise international capitalists that he would cooperate with international trading agencies.”\textsuperscript{33} Additionally, the \textit{immediacy} with which Gutiérrez abandoned his pre-election leftist rhetoric in favor of austerity measures just a month after becoming president in 2003\textsuperscript{34} supports the contention of his strategic positioning on the economic left for electoral purposes.

The nexus between Pachakutik and personalistic candidates is important for empirical reasons with theoretical implications. Empirically, without these presidential candidates, Pachakutik’s electoral results would have been significantly more modest. For instance, between 1996 and 2002, Pachakutik’s presidential candidates averaged 18.6% in the first round of presidential elections, a number significantly higher than the averages for provincial deputies (6.8%) and national deputies (10.4%).\textsuperscript{35} This empirical point is theoretically relevant because in this project Latin American populism has been measured specifically with reference to the \textit{presidential elections} that define the region’s presidential systems.\textsuperscript{36}

Overall, Pachakutik’s populist nature – and electoral results in presidential elections – is

\textsuperscript{30} See Madrid (2012: 94-9), who is careful to note that neither of these candidates explicitly identified with the Left and that their supporters were more likely to hold centrist positions when compared to the more leftist voters for Pachakutik’s legislative candidates.

\textsuperscript{31} Mijeski and Beck 2011: 53

\textsuperscript{32} Becker 2011: 53

\textsuperscript{33} Becker 2011: 79-80

\textsuperscript{34} Van Cott 2005: 136

\textsuperscript{35} Pachakutik’s results in these general elections are as follows: in the first round of presidential elections – 20.6%, 14.7%, and 20.6%; for provincial deputies – 7.1%, 5.3%, and 7.9%; and for national deputies – 10.8% and 9.2% (in 1996, 1998, and 2002, respectively; there was no election for national deputies in 2002). Because “in all these elections Pachakutik ran in alliances with others parties in some of the districts (Madrid 2012: 100n39), these numbers are not exactly the same as the numbers presented by other authors, such as Mijeski and Beck (2011: 49, 56), although they are very similar.

\textsuperscript{36} Particularly, first-round presidential election results (see Chapters 3 and 6). As a reminder, in the present analysis, Latin American populism is measured with reference to presidential elections.
inseparable from the personalism and rational positioning of its presidential candidates Ehlers and Gutiérrez. On the other hand, because the weakness of the left enabled Pachakutik “to absorb a good share of the left’s human and financial resources,” Pachakutik was a direct consequence of the decline of the social-democratic ID immediately after the critical juncture. In sum, Pachakutik’s role in Ecuadorian politics between 1996 and 2002 is a pure expression of the critical juncture’s heritage, as theorized in Chapter 4. As reflected by Pachakutik’s overall experience, this heritage linked rational agency with the opportunity structure that opened on the left as a consequence of the ID’s decline.

Pachakutik’s electoral rise followed the center-left’s post-critical juncture decline, which, as shown in Table 10.1, was uniquely precipitous among Ecuador’s major parties of the period. A look at the social democratic ID’s performance in presidential elections reveals that the party’s 9.6% average in the decade immediately after the critical juncture (1992-2002) was significantly more disappointing than the 21.7% average during the previous decade (1979-88) and much worse than the 24.5% in the 1988 presidential election immediate prior to the critical juncture. Notably, Pachakutik’s electoral gains (beginning in 1996) were in the aftermath of the ID’s decline. For example, the decline that ID suffered at the ballot box as soon as it enacted neoliberal reforms is evidenced by its immediate drop from 22.7% in the 1988 congressional election for provincial deputies to 13.0% in the 1990 midterm election and then to 9.2% in 1992.

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37 Van Cott 2005: 124

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID (center-left)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential, 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; round</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<td>-41.1%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>21.9</td>
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<td>-26.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial deputies</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>142.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE (pre-critical juncture populist)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential, 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; round</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial deputies</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>89.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP (center-center-right)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential, 1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt; round</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial deputies</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. Because not all parties competed in all election, interpreting averages can be tricky. The reason for this is that by calculating averages based only on elections in which parties actually participated, results would be inflated. Yet once competitive, if a party does not participate in a given election, the usual reason is electoral weakness. For this reason, I use 0’s for elections in which parties did not participate having once become competitive (meaning having competed at least once).

2. The above consideration is especially relevant for the calculation of averages from presidential elections. Presidential elections were held in 1978, 1984 and 1988 (before the critical juncture) and in 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2002 (after the critical juncture). Having previously competed, ID did not participate in 1996, PSC – in 1998, and DP in 2002 – the three cases in which I assign 0’s for the calculation of the post-critical juncture averages. (The cases of DP and PRE before the critical juncture are treated differently because the parties had not yet become competitive. Rather than assign 0’s for these cases, I calculate the relevant pre-critical juncture averages for these parties by excluding the 1979 election for both parties (because they had not yet been registered) and the 1984 election for PRE.

3. Regarding legislative elections, elections for provincial deputies were held in 1979, 1984, 1986 and 1988 before the critical juncture. After the critical juncture, such elections were held in 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2002. All four parties participated in all these legislative elections except for the PRE, which did not participate in the 1979 election since it was formed later.

4. The numbers are produced by the author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from Polga-Hecimovich (2014), Mustillo’s (2012) dataset in the Latin American Electronic Data Archive (LEADA), and Ecuador’s National Election Council (CNE).

As shown in Table 10.1, no other party suffered as much as ID did in the decade after the critical juncture relative to the previous period. PSC was the only party that registered a comparative electoral decline in presidential elections, but this relative decline (–26.5%) was twice smaller than what ID experienced (–55.8%). The other two major parties – PRE and DP – improved their average performance in presidential elections. Notably, PRE also displayed
considerable stability between 1996, when its leader Bucaram was elected to the presidency, and the 1998 presidential election soon after his ouster (in 1997 with Pachakutik’s support). PRE’s electoral stability between 1996 (26.3%) and 1998 (23.6%) demonstrates that even if Bucaram’s governing tactics constituted a bait-and-switch (as argued by Roberts), the electoral consequences were not as negative as they had been in the case of ID’s bait-and-switching.\textsuperscript{38} Regarding DP, even though the party collapsed after its leader Mahuad’s troubled and short-lived presidency (1998-2000), this collapse does not account for Pachakutik’s gains in the 1996 and 1998 elections, which took place before Mahuad’s term.

Finally, although I only use presidential elections to measure populism in Latin America, it is worth noting that in legislative elections, too, these three major parties registered improvements in the decade after the critical juncture relative to the previous period. By contrast, ID was the only major party that registered a significant decline in legislative as well as in presidential elections. These overall patterns are strong evidence that Pachakutik’s electoral success during Ecuador’s first post-critical juncture decade cannot be explained by the changes in electoral performance of major parties other than ID.

A focus on the geographic distribution of votes in presidential elections provides further evidence of the direct connection between the center-left’s decline and Pachakutik’s subsequent rise. Table 10.2 below compares the geographic distribution of the vote in presidential elections for Ecuador’s major parties before and after the critical juncture. In particular, the table compares the six coastal provinces, in which the share of the indigenous population is among the lowest, to the eight provinces with highest shares of indigenous population.\textsuperscript{39} The comparison is key because Pachakutik, as an indigenous-based populist

\textsuperscript{38} As argued in the previous chapter, Bucaram’s short presidency represented neither meaningful bait-and-switching nor a de-aligning critical juncture. The present discussion substantiates this argument.

\textsuperscript{39} Percentages for indigenous population by province are taken from Van Cott (2005: 101). The indigenous population is, on average, less than 2% in the six coastal provinces and more than 20% in each of the eight provinces with highest indigenous population. Five of these indigenous-rich provinces are in the more densely populated sierra: Bolivar (28.4% indigenous), Chimborazo (49.3%), Cotopaxi (27.9%), Imbabura (39.6%), and
party, succeeded most in provinces (typically located in the mountainous *sierra* region) where a relatively high percentage of the population is indigenous.\(^{40}\) As shown at the top of the table, in the decade after the critical juncture, Pachakutik received, on average, three times more support in indigenous-rich provinces than on the coast. Once again, this support was clearly not due to electoral losses for PRE (much stronger on the coast) or the DP (somewhat stronger in indigenous areas) as both of these parties registered gains in both types of provinces after the critical juncture, as shown towards the bottom of the table.

By contrast, after the critical juncture, the center-right PSC and the center-left ID registered electoral declines in both types of provinces. Still, the patterns of these electoral losses over time betray that Pachakutik’s success was due more to the losses of the center-left. Thus, although PSC declined disproportionately more in indigenous provinces than on the coast, PSC’s average losses (−10.1 points) were less serious than ID’s losses (−15.4 points) in these provinces. Moreover, whereas before the critical juncture PSC had received relatively similar support regardless of indigenous population, ID’s support during the same period had been more disproportionately based in indigenous-rich provinces. Thus, throughout the 1980s, ID had been Ecuador’s by-far strongest party in the *sierra*,\(^{41}\) achieving an average vote share of 33.8% in presidential elections in the eight indigenous-rich provinces. In the decade after the critical juncture, Pachakutik-backed candidates achieved an identical vote average – 32.1% – in the same eight provinces. Finally, even where populists made gains in the indigenous-poor provinces on the coast, such gains, too, were more likely the product of ID’s decline (−14.7 points) than PSC’s decline (−2 points) in coastal areas. In sum, both in the indigenous-rich provinces that constituted its electoral base and on the indigenous-poor coast, Pachakutik’s electoral gains after the critical juncture were obviously

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\(^{40}\) Tingurahua (25.8%). Three of the indigenous-rich provinces are located in the more scarcely populated Amazon: Morona (25.5%), Napo (24.5%), and Pastaza (46.9%).

\(^{41}\) Madrid 2012

Van Cott 2005: 111
less due to the center-right’s losses than to the center-left’s electoral decline. As noted above, the center-left’s decline had begun after social democratic president Borja introduced key market reforms and before Pachakutik’s rise.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Populists</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID (center-left)</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC (center-right)</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE (pre-critical juncture populists)</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP (center-center-right)</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 provinces with highest indigenous population</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>-15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 provinces with highest indigenous population</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from Polga-Hecimovich (2014), Mustillo’s (2012) dataset in the Latin American Electronic Data Archive (LEADA), and Ecuador’s National Election Council (CNE).

The fact that the core electorate upon which Pachakutik based its performance was mostly the center-left electorate that ID lost after the critical juncture is made even more obvious by the collaboration between the two parties in the 1996 election. Indeed, after its disastrous 8.5% in the 1992 presidential election, rather than run its own candidate, ID supported Ehlers in the 1996 presidential election and ran in alliance with Pachakutik in some
districts in the legislative election.\textsuperscript{42} Although ID members participated actively in Ehlers’ campaign,\textsuperscript{43} this alliance should be interpreted as indicative of ID’s weakness rather than a reconfiguration of the center-left under either ID’s or Pachakutik’s leadership. Indeed, in 1996, the two parties still ran separate lists for provincial deputies in the majority of provinces and separate lists for national deputies in all provinces.\textsuperscript{44} By 1998, ID and Pachakutik were once again on different paths – with separate presidential candidates and separate candidates for provincial deputies in nineteen of Ecuador’s twenty-one provinces.\textsuperscript{45} And although in 1998 and 2002 Borja, once again the center-left’s candidate, performed better in the highlands than on the coast, in both of these elections, his average vote share in the eight indigenous-rich provinces that had been the core of his electoral coalition before the critical juncture ranked after the vote share averages of Pachakutik-backed candidates’.\textsuperscript{46}

By 2002, the populist coalition with its core indigenous constituency was headed by Lucio Gutiérrez, the formal military general who, along with CONAIE, had supported “the last coup of the twentieth century,” against president Mahuad in 2000.\textsuperscript{47} Now heading a coalition between his own Patriotic Society Party (PSP)\textsuperscript{48} and Pachakutik, Gutiérrez performed especially well in the sierra region that had previously been ID’s stronghold. By contrast, the more conservative coast was dominated by PRE and PRIAN, a new right-wing party headed by banana magnate Álvaro Noboa. Notably, this regional divide was preserved in the run-off, which Gutiérrez won with 54.8% of the overall vote, with an average of 71.6% in the sierra and 77.9% in the eight indigenous-rich provinces. By contrast, Noboa averaged only 28.4% in the sierra and 56% in the indigenous-poor coastal provinces.

\textsuperscript{42} Van Cott 2005: 124; Mijeski and Beck 2011: 48
\textsuperscript{43} Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001: 144
\textsuperscript{44} To determine this, I use Polga-Hecimovich’s (2014) data.
\textsuperscript{45} Beck and Mijeski 2001
\textsuperscript{46} This should not be confused with the fact that Borja gained more than Ehlers in the national election as a whole.
\textsuperscript{47} Becker 2011: 67
\textsuperscript{48} Partido Sociedad Patriótica
And yet, considered from a cross-temporal perspective, Gutiérrez’s populist coalition was comparatively less ethnic than Ehlers’ electoral coalitions had been in 1996 and 1998. As analyzed by Mijeski and Beck, the important indigenous support for Gutiérrez notwithstanding, his victories in both rounds of the 2002 presidential election were more due to regional, rather than ethnic, voting. Overall, although indigenous ethnicity played a key role in all three elections, its importance was highest in 1996 and lowest in 2002.\(^\text{49}\) These authors’ conclusion bodes well with Raul Madrid’s explanation of indigenous party success as a function of broad populist, rather than narrow ethnic, appeals.\(^\text{50}\) In sum, even within this first wave of post-critical juncture electoral populism – which was largely defined by the key role of an ethnic-based party – over time, populist coalitions relied increasingly on broader electorates and decreasingly on ethnic support. As time passed, the populist coalitions between 1996 and 2002 looked increasingly similar to the coalitions that had supported the center-left ID, which had relied on both indigenous and non-indigenous voters before the critical juncture.

Overall, during the first wave of post-critical juncture electoral populism, Pachakutik-supported candidates came to dominate the indigenous-rich sierra that had constituted the core of the center-left ID’s electoral base. While in 1996, ID’s weakness necessitated the party’s support for Ehlers as the populist presidential candidate, in 1998 and 2002, ID managed to reclaim some of its previous core constituency in indigenous-rich provinces. Nevertheless, the bulk of this constituency seemed to have been irreversibly lost to the populists associated with Pachakutik. From this perspective purely focused on elections, Ecuador exhibited considerable stability despite the political and economic turbulence of two presidential ousters, a new constitution, a deep economic crisis, and an attempted coup during this period. This stability, associated with a new claimant of what used to be the center-left’s

\(^{49}\) Mijeski and Beck 2011: 59-61, 84-7  
\(^{50}\) Madrid 2012
core electorate before the critical juncture, translated in a continued regional divide, whereby Ecuador’s coastal provinces were dominated by conservative presidential candidates while the *sierra* was dominated by Pachakutik-backed populist candidates. Meanwhile, although the role of ethnicity remained key between 1996 and 2002, populist coalitions became steadily more inclusive, and thus more similar to what used to be the center-left coalition before the critical juncture. As shown below, this trend towards inclusion would continue even more decisively after 2002, when a new populist actor overcame Ecuador’s regional divide.

*Towards Populist Hegemony After 2002*

If the first wave of electoral populism was associated with Pachakutik’s rise that sustained Ecuador’s long-standing regional divide, the second wave was characterized by the overcoming of this divide by a new populist. Indeed, Rafael Correa was the first politician to gain relatively equal levels of support throughout Ecuador, reflected in a high party nationalization score. Standard explanations of Correa’s electoral success *across* Ecuador focus on his policies and actions *while in office*, highlighting his generous social policies based on oil rents or his competitive authoritarian methods. I argue against such accounts by highlighting Correa’s highly nationalized electorate in 2006, that is, *before entering office*. In particular, Correa’s nationalized electorate reflects his ability to build a coalition uniting coastal voters with large segments of the center-left electorate that had previously voted for Pachakutik-backed candidates. In turn, the latter electorate supported Correa due to Pachakutik’s loss of legitimacy as a result of its association with Gutiérrez’s failed presidency (2003-5). Because, as explained above, Gutiérrez’s presidency had represented a culmination of indigenous mobilization with roots in Ecuador’s critical juncture, Correa’s

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51 See Polga-Hecimovich 2014.
52 See Appendix Q.
subsequent overcoming of the regional divide is best viewed as a development shaped by historical factors.

Although president Gutiérrez’s economic policy measures did not constitute a critical juncture, as shown in the previous chapter, his bait-and-switching provoked a deep political crisis. After indigenous communities began protesting within a week of Gutiérrez’s inauguration, Pachakutik and the president broke by early August 2003, a development that forced Gutiérrez to seek a congressional alliance with the center-right PSC. As this alliance also failed by the following year, and PSC turned against Gutiérrez, Pachakutik lost legitimacy among indigenous activists who now perceived it as engaged in backroom dealings “with a party of the oligarchy.”

Pachakutik’s new role in what was Ecuadorian politics as usual, however, contributed to a uniquely precipitous decline of public trust in political institutions. If in 2002, 59% of Ecuadorians expressed “no confidence” in parliament, just one year later this number was 71.6%.

Importantly, the correlates of this drop were different from what was observed in 2000 – the only other instance of similarly steep decline of trust in political institutions. The difference was that, if in 2000 declining trust reflected an enormous rise of dissatisfaction with the economic situation under president Mahuad, perceptions of the economy remained relatively stable between 2002 and 2003. This renewed escalation of distrust in democratic institutions was, therefore, due to political rather than economic factors. Chief among these political factors was the loss of legitimacy of Ecuador’s most important political actor, Pachakutik, due to its involvement with Gutiérrez between 2002 and 2003.

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53 Becker 2011: 83-92
54 Data come from Latinobarómetro. The decline in confidence in parties is similarly precipitous – from 62.6% to 70.8% expressing “no confidence” in parties in 2002 and 2003, respectively.
55 According to Latinobarómetro, in 2000, 29.6% of Ecuadorians evaluated the economic situation as “very bad,” a number almost twice higher than the 15.8% in 1998 (no survey was carried out in 1999). By contrast, in 2003, the number was 18.8% – a much more modest change from the 16.7% in 2002.
By 2005, the largely discredited indigenous movements played only a minor role in the urban middle-class rebellion of the *forajidos* (outlaws),\(^{56}\) which culminated with the third ouster of a democratically elected president in only eight years. For most of these years, the indigenous movement kept pushing for yet another constitutional assembly in order to correct the neoliberal ramifications of the constitution it itself had promulgated in 1998.\(^{57}\) It was for these reasons that in 2006 much of Pachakutik’s constituency supported Rafael Correa, a new presidential candidate who indeed promised a constitutional assembly. Yet, given that the constituent assembly idea had been a key issue of long-standing salience for Pachakutik, Correa’s promise is subject to some qualification.

As discussed in much of the literature, Correa’s 2006 candidacy was decidedly populist – featuring heavy doses of personalism, anti-political and anti-economic establishment appeals, economic nationalism, and social conservatism inspired by Catholic and law and order doctrines.\(^{58}\) Of equal theoretical interest is his opportunism, due to which the relationship between Correa and the indigenous movement was neither natural nor easy from the beginning. Despite Correa’s legitimately anti-neoliberal credentials,\(^{59}\) the indigenous movement viewed him with suspicion as he campaigned with the support of “a small group of intellectuals, technocrats, and political operatives”\(^{60}\) with origins in coastal Guayaquil rather than in the indigenous-rich highlands. Additional reasons for skepticism included Correa’s mestizo, rather than indigenous, background, his association with Catholic liberation theology, rather than with social movement organization, and his Keynesian, rather than Marxist, critiques of neoliberalism. As explained by Becker, when Correa – at first, “very slow to support social movements and their central demands” – “came to support… the

\(^{56}\) Becker 2011: 94

\(^{57}\) Ibid.: 60, 96


\(^{59}\) Having served as president Palacio’s short-term finance minister after Gutiérrez’s ouster, Correa’s anti-neoliberal views led to his resignation under US pressure (Silva 2009: 191; Becker 2011: 104).

\(^{60}\) Conaghan 2011: 267
holding of a constituent assembly, he did so in an opportunistic fashion that co-opted a key issue and undermined the strength of social movements.”  

Thus, while Correa’s anti-neoliberalism was more organic than Ehlers’ and Gutiérrez’s, like them, he was strategic in his opportunistic adoption of what became his most salient issue, a reason why some indigenous leaders saw him as another Gutiérrez. 

As attempts at an alliance between Correa and Pachakutik failed due to disagreements over who should lead the presidential ticket, Correa underscored his co-optation of the new constituent assembly idea by strategically running for the presidency without a congressional list. Because a presidential winner without a congressional party would have been clearly incapable of governing (especially given Ecuador’s recent history of multiple presidential impeachments), this electoral strategy of “personalism taken to the extreme” was highly attractive specifically to the constituency hoping for a new constituent assembly. Consequently, in the 2006 presidential election, many former members of the by-now delegitimized Pachakutik, “as well as many of the labor unions and civil society organizations that had previously backed Pachakutik,” supported Correa rather than Pachakutik’s own candidate, Luis Macas. 

Nevertheless, Correa’s populist coalition was not deeply rooted in indigenous support and was, therefore, qualitatively different from the coalitions during Ecuador’s first wave of post-critical juncture electoral populism. Indeed, while 16% of indigenous voters backed Correa, 45% supported Gilmar Gutiérrez, who stood in for his brother recently ousted from the presidency. Before being ousted in a middle-class uprising, Lucio Gutiérrez had established clientelistic networks specifically targeting the poor – a typical neoliberal populist

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61 Becker 2011: 104  
62 Ibid.: 105; also Madrid 2012: 105  
63 Mijeski and Beck 2011: 104-5; Madrid 2012: 103  
64 Roberts 2014: 268  
65 Madrid 2012: 104  
66 Mijeski and Beck 2011: 110
move\textsuperscript{67} that now guaranteed much of the indigenous vote to his younger brother.\textsuperscript{68} Yet, as Gilmar Gutiérrez’s economic positioning was not to the left of the center in 2006,\textsuperscript{69} he was \textit{not} a populist according to the operationalization presented in Chapter 3.

In more \textit{quantitative} terms, the only clear populist in that election, Correa, did not do significantly better than populists Ehlers and Lucio Gutiérrez had done in the first rounds of the three previous elections. With 22.8\% of the overall vote, Correa qualified for the second round against Noboa by placing five points ahead of third-place finisher Gilmar Gutiérrez. While analysts of the 2006 election do not speculate whether Correa qualified for the second round due to the indigenous support that he took away from Gutiérrez and Macas, they are unanimous that indigenous support was necessary for Correa’s victory in the second round.\textsuperscript{70}

Indeed, for the second round, Pachakutik “announced its unconditional support for Correa,”\textsuperscript{71} who had already secured the backing of most center-left parties.\textsuperscript{72} Even though Gutiérrez initially tried to bring “his indigenous base against Pachakutik’s new ally,”\textsuperscript{73} “Correa worked hard to win over the voters who had backed Gutiérrez… by “promising various populist measures” in terms of poverty reduction, housing, and subsidies for services. As a result, “Correa’s efforts paid off, as he easily won the second round” – especially by “winning 73\% of the vote in counties where the indigenous represent the majority of the population.”\textsuperscript{74} By the end of the 2006 election, Correa had incorporated most of the indigenous constituency into his winning coalition.

As explained above, Correa’s central promise to this constituency was an idea he had strategically co-opted from the indigenous movement – the convocation of a constituent

\textsuperscript{67} See Roberts 1996
\textsuperscript{68} Mijeski and Beck 2011: 110; Madrid 2012: 105
\textsuperscript{69} Baker and Greene 2011
\textsuperscript{70} Báez Rivera and Solo de Zaldivar 2006: 22-3; Mijeski and Beck 2011: 106-11; Madrid 2012: 105-7.
\textsuperscript{71} Becker 2011: 111
\textsuperscript{72} Madrid 2012: 106
\textsuperscript{73} Becker 2011: 111-2
\textsuperscript{74} Madrid 2012: 106
assembly. Indeed, in 2008, Correa convoked elections for constituent assembly, which his party dominated with nearly 70% of the vote. With such an overwhelming majority, Correa then wrote a new constitution that called for new presidential and legislative elections to be held in 2009. Correa won overwhelmingly once more – in the first round in the presidential election and achieving an unprecedented congressional majority in the legislative election. These elections consolidated Correa’s hegemonic grip on power, which he held until 2017. During this period, Correa enacted what Levitsky and Way call competitive authoritarian rule as well as many social reforms that guaranteed Correa and his Alianza PAIS a number of electoral victories on all levels of government. Such electoral victories were characterized by high degrees of party nationalization – that is, Correa’s overcoming of Ecuador’s regional divide (or the achievement of a relatively equitable distribution of the pro-Correa vote across the country’s territory, as measured by the weighted Party Nationalization Score, $wPNS$), which scholars typically explain as stemming from Correa’s actions while in office.

While such scholarship correctly situates the importance of Correa’s social policies, Correa’s actions in office do not necessarily explain his highly nationalized electorate – which, in fact, was uniquely inclusive from the beginning. As shown in Table 10.3 below, Correa’s equitable vote distribution translates in a relatively high $wPNS$ of 0.833 for the first round of the 2006 presidential election. By contrast, his two principle first-round opponents achieved $wPNS$s of 0.784 and 0.679, respectively, demonstrating a relatively more regionally distributed vote for Noboa and Gutiérrez, respectively. Even more importantly, Correa’s nationalized electorate is impressive in historical perspective.

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75 Ibid.: 106
76 Levitsky and Way 2010
77 Polga-Hecimovich 2014
### Table 10.3. Weighted Party Nationalization Scores (wPNSs) for candidates with at least 10 percent of the national vote share in Ecuadorian presidential elections, 1978-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Presidential candidate (party)</th>
<th>Vote share (first round)</th>
<th>wPNS (first round)</th>
<th>Vote share (second round)</th>
<th>wPNS (second round)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>J. Roldos (CFP)</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>0.752</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>0.942</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Duran Ballen (PSC)</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>0.806</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>0.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Huerta (PLRE)</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>0.820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borja (ID)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Borja (ID)</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>0.839</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Febres Cordero (PSC)</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>0.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duarte (CFP)</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Borja (ID)</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bucaram (PRE)</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>0.781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Durán-Ballén (PSC/PC)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.875</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vargas Pazzos (APRE/PSE)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahuad (DP-UDC)</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Durán-Ballén (PUR/PC)</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>0.818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nebot (PSC)</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>0.692</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>0.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bucaram (PRE)</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>0.763</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Nebot (PSC)</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>0.725</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bucaram (PRE)</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>0.748</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>0.905</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ehlers (MUPP-NP)</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paz (DP-UDC)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.613</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Mahuad (DP-UDC)</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>0.935</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>0.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noboa (PRE-APRE-UPL)</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>0.665</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>0.825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borja (ID)</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>0.599</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ehlers (MCNP)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>L. Gutiérrez (PSP/MUPP-NP)</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>0.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noboa (PRIAN)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.802</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Roldós Aguillera (RP)</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borja (ID)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neira Menéndez (PSC)</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.615</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bucarám Ortíz (PRE)</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Noboa (PRIAN)</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>0.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Correa (MPAIS/PS-FA)</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>0.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Gutiérrez (PSP)</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.679</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Roldós Aguillera (ID/RED)</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Correa (MPAIS)</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>0.904</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Gutiérrez (PSP)</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Noboa (PRIAN)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.772</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Note: wPNS scores come from the author’s own database created with subnational level election data from Polga-Hecimovich (2014), Mustillo’s (2012) dataset in the Latin American Electronic Data Archive (LEADA), and Ecuador’s National Election Council (CNE).

As the table demonstrates, Correa’s electorate in the first round of the 2006 presidential election was among the most nationalized for any competitive presidential
contender in the first round of presidential elections since democratization began in 1978. Of all presidential candidates to gain at least 10% of the national vote share, only Borja (1988), Febres Cordero (1988), Durán-Ballén (1992), Mahuad (1998), and Leon Roldós (2002) have wPNSs higher than Correa’s 2006 score. Notably, of the 24 observations after the end of the critical juncture (1992), Correa’s wPNSs (in 2006 and 2009) are two of the four highest. Although Mahuad’s 1998 first-round wPNS is more impressive than Correa’s subsequent scores, by the second round, Mahuad’s 1998 electorate had become considerably less nationalized. By contrast, Correa’s 2006 electorate became more nationalized in the second round. Indeed, of the 16 observations covering all second-round results in presidential elections, Correa’s 2006 second-round wPNS is among the two highest in Ecuador’s recent history (along with Roldós’ 1978 second-round wPNS score). Overall, then, while the 2009 election confirms Correa’s overcoming of Ecuador’s regional divide, Correa had, in fact, largely overcome this divide three years earlier, and especially in the second round of the 2006 presidential election.

Indeed, already in the first round of 2006, Correa had begun to overcome the regional divide as he won a 25.4% average vote share in the coastal provinces along with a 25.3% average in the highlands. Additionally, already in 2006, Correa had also begun to overcome Ecuador’s ethnic divide – with a 20.2% average specifically in the eight indigenous-rich provinces, a result that would double by 2009.\textsuperscript{78} Notably, after 2002, Correa was the only electorally competitive political actor with such a highly nationalized electorate; no other competitive presidential candidate achieved a comparable wPNS, and neither did any party other than Correa’s Alianza PAIS in legislative elections.\textsuperscript{79} It was due to Correa’s success in

\textsuperscript{78} In 2009, Correa averaged 39.8% in the eight indigenous-rich provinces, 52% in the highlands (sierra), and 55.4% on the coast.

\textsuperscript{79} The 2009 wPNS of Alianza PAIS was 0.832 – higher than any competitive party since Mahuad’s DP in 1998 (author’s dataset).
attracting such a highly nationalized electorate, already visible in 2006, that he began establishing a populist hegemony in Ecuador.

In sum, in 2006 Correa achieved a highly nationalized electoral coalition with crucial support from sectors of an indigenous electorate that had become deeply fragmented as a result of Lucio Gutiérrez’s presidency. Having experienced Pachakutik’s rise and subsequent decline in the aftermath of Ecuador’s critical juncture, such sectors found great appeal in Correa’s strategic co-optation of the indigenous movement’s most fundamental demand – to convene a constituent assembly. As Correa subsequently kept his promise and reconstituted Ecuador’s state, he consolidated his power. Yet this consolidation had its roots in the nexus between earlier (mostly, although not exclusively, indigenous) hopes for, and strategic (or opportunistic) populist promises of, a reconstitution of the state. While the indigenous vote did not form Correa’s core support base, Correa’s ability to attract important segments of it by strategically adopting the indigenous movement’s most fundamental demand guaranteed the highly nationalized electorate that gave him the electoral victory in 2006. Overall, a crucial part of this electorate came from the indigenous movement which had become politically activated after the center-left’s decline associated with the critical juncture, but whose own political project had been discredited largely due to its own success as Gutiérrez’s populist vehicle. Having absorbed a highly nationalized electorate into his electoral coalition before winning the presidency, Correa’s populist movement then managed to establish hegemonic control over the state for more than a decade.

10.3. The Populist Reaction in Slovakia

The Seed: SMER’s Populist Beginnings

The Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) started experiencing problems as soon as it began implementing economic reforms from the Ministry of Finance of Mikuláš Dzurinda’s first government (1998-2002). At the government level, the problems were between SDL and
its coalitions partners – over the method for presidential elections, the state budget, the land fund, and funding for minority culture. More fundamentally, these problems were provoked by internal tensions over SDL’s participation in the reformist coalition. As a “radical-socialist” wing around party chairman Migaš openly confronted the “modernist” wing more clearly associated with Dzurinda’s government, the entire governing coalition was on the verge of collapse. Although the government survived, SDL was clearly experiencing a crisis of identity. While this crisis was provoked by several factors, including personality clashes and debates over European integration, what appeared central was the party’s failure to reconcile the tension between its leading role in the economically reformist cabinet and more radical-socialist ideas.

As internal tensions boiled, SDL’s most popular politician – the “young, charismatic” Robert Fico – decided to leave the party in December 1999. After SDL’s leadership failed to reward Fico with a cabinet post, despite his contribution to party’s electoral success, he founded the new party SMER (“Direction”) “as an untraditional party” focused on “order, justice, and stability.” Indeed, from its inception SMER was a typical populist party – an anti-establishment and personalist vehicle of a prominent politician who proclaimed that “if speaking the truth is populism, then I want to be a populist.” From the beginning, the party promoted the “rise of new faces to power” as a solution to problems such as the criminality of gypsies, with which neither Dzurinda’s ruling coalition nor the opposition, then dominated by

80 Fisher 2002: 135-6
81 Kopeček 2002: 246-7
82 Haughton 2004: 186
83 This failure was confirmed in 2002, when “the radical-socialist wing… forced the dismissal” of SDL’s finance minister Schmögnerová, after which “modernists” exited SDL and created the Social Democratic Alternative (SDA) (Kopeček 2002: 248). Additionally, because EU conditionality required significant economic reforms, debates over European integration and over economic ideology cannot be easily decoupled.
84 Fisher 2002: 138; Marušiak 2005: 165
85 Pop-Eleches 2010: 231-2
Mečiar, could deal. Importantly, such positions against the entire political establishment were supplemented by loud criticism of “the government’s privatization policies and its servility towards the West.” As a solution, Fico’s “new direction” saw the role of the state during the socio-economic transformation as “irreplaceable.” Therefore, SMER was decidedly populist under the operationalization developed in Chapter 3. As evidenced in the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys, from the very beginning, SMER’s economic positions were to the left of the center and aligned with economic statism.

As a party, SMER was born relatively popular – with 10.8% approval rating in January 2000, just a month after its foundation. Meanwhile, the popularity of the party from which SMER splintered – SDL – plummeted from the 14.7% that voted for it in 1998 to the 8.5% that approved of it in January 2000. By the following parliamentary election, in September 2002, Slovakia’s traditional center-left would be completely replaced by SMER, with Fico’s party gaining 14.7% and SDL gaining just 1.4%, behind even the “modernist” Social Democratic Alternative (SDA) that splintered from it in April 2002. This course of events raises the possibility that, rather than being subsequent to the center-left’s electoral demise, SMER’s electoral success could have, in fact, led to it. Yet, as I discuss below, it was the center-left’s identity crisis that led to Robert Fico’s populist rise.

The Center-Left’s Identity Crisis as a Cause of Populist Rise

Perhaps the best type of data that could offer hints regarding the degree to which center-left supporters were abandoning SDL after the party’s association with market reforms and independently from their attraction to SMER is public opinion data for the year 1999 – that is, after the 1998 election and before SMER’s foundation. Unfortunately, neither leading

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88 Učeň 2001: 407  
89 Fisher 2004: 138  
90 Marušiak 2005: 165  
91 Bakker et al. 2015; Polk et al. 2017  
92 Kopeček 2002: 255  
93 Ibid.: 248
surveys that usually investigate public opinion regarding ideology and/or political parties nor data from Slovak sources are available for this particular year.\textsuperscript{94} Given these constraints, the question is not easy to resolve. Yet, as argued by Učeň, SDL’s internal conflicts coincided with “a dramatic decrease of popularity” as the economic policies supported by the reformists around Peter Weiss contradicted party chairman Migaš’ reliance on clientelistic networks and his “resolute advocacy of leftist positions.”\textsuperscript{95}

This tension within SDL provides an important \textit{first hint} regarding \textit{why} and \textit{how} the internal ideological conflict led to the party’s demise, of which Fico’s subsequent splintering was one symptom rather than the underlying cause. As discussed by Rybář and Deegan-Krause, after \textit{pro-reform party elites} had led SDL towards large-scale privatization and foreign direct investment in the early 1990s, the party’s participation in Moravčík’s short-lived pro-reform government resulted in a disappointing result in the 1994 election. Consequently, power within the party shifted – this time away from pro-reform party elites and towards cadres at lower (district) organizational levels. Reflected in Migaš’ successful bid for the party chairmanship with the support of these local organizations, this relative decentralization of power within SDL correlated with a shift towards greater skepticism of neoliberal reforms.\textsuperscript{96} As noted by Grzymała-Busse, the party’s executive committee even promised a new program, one that would “better reflect the Left character of the party” that had apparently been “lost.” And yet “there was little immediate difference in the party’s responsiveness” as even then “party elites simply approved the existing programmatic line.”\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{94} Eurobarometer skipped the post-communist countries in the 1998-2000 period, the European Social Survey did not begin until 2002, and the World Values Survey was last administered in Slovakia in 1998 (when 14.0% – or 15.1% of “Don’t Know/Not Available” responses are excluded – of respondents selected SDL as a first choice for which they voted, a result virtually identical to the actual election that year). Likewise, data from Slovak sources, such as the Statistical Office (SOSR) and the leading think-tank, the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), are unavailable for 1999.
\textsuperscript{95} Učeň 2001: 409
\textsuperscript{96} Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 504
\textsuperscript{97} Grzymała-Busse 2002: 155-7
After 1998, it was once again pro-reform elites from SDL’s upper echelons that enacted key economic reforms\(^\text{98}\) – an obvious contradiction to the party’s promises to local organizations.

Of course, these reformist elites were the only elements from within the party that could have possibly been acceptable as partners representing SDL in Dzurinda’s pro-reform coalition. Because this coalition was necessary for Slovakia’s democratization, as discussed in the previous chapter, SDL’s elites had little real choice, with or without tensions within the party. And yet the party’s leading role in market reforms accelerated its ideological identity crisis. Clearly visible in the tensions between an elite minority in favor or market-reforms and an organizational majority skeptical of neoliberalism, this identity crisis would have profound destabilizing effects – first, leading to dramatic losses in party membership and, second, culminating with SDL’s splintering.

Party membership trends provide a second hint that SDL was experiencing problems due to its ideological identity crisis before SMER’s creation. Having boasted the largest membership of all Slovak parties in the 1990s – with a 48,000-member peak in 1992 – SDL steadily lost members throughout the 1990s. Notably, membership fell to 27,600 immediately after the party participated in Moravčík’s pro-reform government in 1994 – a clear indication that the broad party base found market reforms unpalatable. Next, membership declined by a whopping 23.2% – from 27,600 in 1996 (the last year for which figures are available before the formation of Dzurinda’s government) to 21,200 in 1999 (after a year of reforms in Dzurinda’s government and before SMER’s foundation). By contrast, membership fell to 20,000 in both 2000 and 2001, or by only 5.7% immediately after SMER was founded.\(^\text{99}\) Overall, this comparative perspective on party membership reveals two facts – (1) that SDL was bleeding members before SMER’s foundation and (2) that the party’s greatest

\(^{98}\) Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 504
\(^{99}\) Kopeček 2002: 253
membership losses were associated with the party’s participation in economically reformist
governments.

Finally, a third hint regarding the primary importance of SDL’s ideological identity
crisis is suggested by SMER’s positioning on economic questions as soon as it was created.
Although Fico’s splintering could be interpreted as a typical opportunistic move of a
charismatic, but disrespected, politician hungry for power, such an interpretation would be
overly simplistic due to its inability to explain SMER’s emphasis on economic statism. Indeed, even though SMER opportunistically portrayed itself as “non-ideological”\(^{100}\) – in order to distinguish itself from the entire political establishment – its criticism of privatization
targeted much of SDL’s middle-level organizational base that was skeptical of reforms. As
shown by Rybář and Deegan-Krause, as the two parties’ supporters were equally in favor of
state (over personal) responsibility in the economy, SMER’s manifestos contained the least
amount of pro-market economic content of all competitive parties except for the
communists.\(^{101}\) Overall, Fico’s early choices of economic positions reflected clear efforts to
target specifically SDL’s more leftist popular wing – the broader “alienated membership,”\(^{102}\)
much of which had already left, as discussed above – rather than the more economically-
reformist and narrower elitist faction. If the opposite were true – and SMER’s early efforts
targeted supporters of SDL’s elitist faction – SMER would not have “refused the radical
suppression of the state”\(^{103}\) precisely at a moment when intra-party tensions were boiling as
SDL’s elites led market reforms from the Ministry of Finance.

Overall, then, SDL’s organizational and membership dynamics, as well as SMER’s
subsequent positions that were taken in the context of these dynamics, point to the conclusion
that SDL’s declining popularity was due more to its internal identity crisis than to SMER’s

\(^{100}\) March 2011: 144; Pop-Eleches 2010
\(^{101}\) Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 508-9
\(^{102}\) Grzymała-Busse 2002: 155
\(^{103}\) Marušiak 2005: 165
foundation. Indeed, by creating SMER, Fico was “quick to exploit the political opportunity structure”\textsuperscript{104} that had already been created as a result of the center-left’s embrace of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s. This opportunistic quickness, however, should not obscure the important tensions that led to the weakening of Slovakia’s most significant center-left party of the 1990s due to its engagement with economic reform-making.

The fact that economic ideas were highly relevant in SMER’s pitch towards disaffected constituencies is especially visible in the first European Social Survey (ESS) administered in Slovakia between October and December 2004. Reflective of public opinion soon after the 2002 election, this survey demonstrates that while SMER’s voters expressed other “populist” attitudes at levels comparable to other parties’ supporters, they were particularly preoccupied with economic considerations. The 2004 wave of the ESS did not ask whether respondents had voted for the traditional center-left as by that time SDLČ had already collapsed into irrelevance. However, the results shown in Table 10.4 below lend significant support to the above claim that specifically economic issues were central as SMER made its pitch in order to attract those who had exited SDLČ.

The left part of the Table 10.4 reflects the importance of these economic issues. First, 49.3\% of SMER voters self-identified as “left” of “center-left,” a share considerably higher than that of any other competitive party’s supporters. Importantly, the bulk of this leftism can be interpreted in economic, rather than socio-cultural, terms for a simple reason: while SMER supporters do not appear more progressive, on average, than other parties’ supporters on immigration, religion and public safety,\textsuperscript{105} they do appear comparatively most progressive on economic issues. For example, 35.1\% of SMER supporters were inclined to favor government reduction in income differences – more than any other party’s supporters and significantly higher than the national average. Finally, while SMER supporters exhibited

\textsuperscript{104} Haughton 2004: 187

\textsuperscript{105} As the table shows, SDKU supporters were more welcoming to immigrants, SNS supporters were more secular, and SDKU and SMK supporters were less concerned with public safety.
other “populist” tendencies – such as dissatisfaction with the government, parties, and democracy – such tendencies were not unique for two reasons. First, on such questions SMER voters did not deviate much from the national average and, second other parties’ voters were more even more dissatisfied. To reiterate, where SMER voters distinguished themselves from supporters of other competitive parties was their “leftist” willingness to favor economic interventionism.
Table 10.4. Slovak partisanship and attitudes regarding selected issues in 2004 (European Social Survey)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Percent of party voters self-identifying as &quot;left&quot; or &quot;center-left&quot;</th>
<th>Strongly agree government should reduce differences in income</th>
<th>Dissatisfied with economy</th>
<th>Currently member of a trade union</th>
<th>Dissatisfied with national government</th>
<th>Distrust parties</th>
<th>Dissatisfied with democracy</th>
<th>Agree immigrants make country worse place to live</th>
<th>Rather religious</th>
<th>Agree or very much agree it is important the government is strong and ensures safety</th>
<th>Have at most secondary education, with no upper diploma</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SMER</td>
<td>49.32</td>
<td>35.14</td>
<td>41.89</td>
<td>12.84</td>
<td>45.27</td>
<td>52.03</td>
<td>31.08</td>
<td>12.16</td>
<td>18.92</td>
<td>75.68</td>
<td>34.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HZDS</td>
<td>35.37</td>
<td>33.19</td>
<td>49.34</td>
<td>7.86</td>
<td>54.59</td>
<td>48.91</td>
<td>39.30</td>
<td>27.07</td>
<td>41.92</td>
<td>72.49</td>
<td>59.39</td>
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<td>SDKU</td>
<td>15.95</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>23.31</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>21.47</td>
<td>38.04</td>
<td>14.72</td>
<td>9.78</td>
<td>30.68</td>
<td>65.03</td>
<td>27.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMK</td>
<td>20.63</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td>30.16</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>15.86</td>
<td>36.51</td>
<td>19.05</td>
<td>17.46</td>
<td>36.51</td>
<td>63.49</td>
<td>50.79</td>
</tr>
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<td>21.13</td>
<td>28.17</td>
<td>14.08</td>
<td>26.79</td>
<td>40.07</td>
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<td>21.13</td>
<td>78.87</td>
<td>77.46</td>
<td>43.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>17.46</td>
<td>23.81</td>
<td>31.75</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>30.16</td>
<td>53.97</td>
<td>22.22</td>
<td>6.35</td>
<td>17.42</td>
<td>79.37</td>
<td>25.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Slovakia</td>
<td>29.76</td>
<td>24.47</td>
<td>38.69</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>39.62</td>
<td>49.47</td>
<td>29.10</td>
<td>15.08</td>
<td>33.40</td>
<td>66.01</td>
<td>48.02</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: To produce these tendencies, I had to make the following coding decision according to which different subcategories for the various questions were merged:

The 2\textsuperscript{nd} column uses ESS responses 0, 1, 2, 3, 4;
The 3\textsuperscript{rd} column uses ESS response 1;
The 4\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS responses 0, 1, 2;
The 5\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS response “yes, currently”;
The 6\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS responses 0, 1, 2;
The 7\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS responses 0, 1, 2;
The 8\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS responses 0, 1, 2;
The 9\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS responses 0, 1, 2;
The 10\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS responses 8, 9, 10;
The 11\textsuperscript{th} column uses ESS responses 0, 1;
The 12\textsuperscript{th} column uses the first two options in the ESS survey.
This conclusion becomes even more striking when voters who backed SMER in 2002 are directly compared to voters of HZDS, which, as explained in the previous chapter, had been the social democrats’ main competitor for the center-left electorate throughout the 1990s. Indeed, although in 2004 SMER voters were less dissatisfied with the economy than HZDS voters, they were still more likely to favor government intervention in the economy and more likely to be members of trade unions. The conclusion that emerges from this comparison is that the economic leftism of SMER voters was less likely a function of perceptions regarding ongoing economic performance and more likely a function of other factors. (This conclusion is further confirmed in the 2006 wave of the ESS, when the share of SMER voters in favor of government intervention increased from 35.1% to 38.3%, even though the share of SMER supporters dissatisfied with the economy had dropped from 41.9% to 15.7%). As discussed above, these other factors had much to do with the deeper ideological inclinations of those SMER voters who had exited SDL’ as party elites engaged in economic reforms.

Overall, as discussed by Rybář and Deegan-Krause, the opinions of early SMER voters “showed considerable continuity with those who had previously voted for SDL.”\textsuperscript{106} While these authors reach the same conclusion also regarding cultural and national questions, the continuities regarding economic issues appear as most straightforward and striking. As they elaborate, by 2002, SDL’s shrinking voting base had become more economically centrist while the positions of SMER voters were “rather reminiscent of SDL voters of the late 1990s.”\textsuperscript{107} Because the 1990s had been a period during which SDL’s voter base had included a larger anti-neoliberal constituency, as discussed above, Rybář and Deegan-Krause’s observation means that by 2002 it was this constituency that largely reoriented itself toward SMER while moderate voters were more likely to stay loyal to SDL.

\textsuperscript{106} Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 510
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.: 509
It is, then, precisely this reorientation of the center-left’s more radical voters that explains why large portions of SDL’s 1998 electorate shifted towards SMER in 2002. As explained by Rybář and Deegan-Krause, “while there was not a 1:1 correspondence between SDL and SMER voters,” the voters who shifted from SDL to SMER between 1998 and 2002 “represented the largest single group,” with somewhere between a quarter and a fifth of SDL’s 1998 electorate voting for SMER in 2002. On the losing end, therefore, of all voters who exited SDL – a 10.3% of the entire national electorate – the largest share went to SMER, larger than the shares of SDL voters shifting to any other parties, including the more orthodox Communists or the modernist splinter SDA. On the receiving end, of those who constituted SMER’s initial voter base in 2002, a plurality came from SDL (2.6% of the entire national electorate). Put simply, between the 1998 and 2002 elections, SDL lost a plurality of its voters to SMER and SMER gained a plurality of its voters from SDL.

In sum, while the emergence and initial electoral performance of SMER may be attributable to a complex set of factors, the most significant and straightforward cause appears to be the exodus of many center-left voters from SDL. As explained above, this exodus is best understood in the context of the center-left’s identity crisis, which pitted an elitist pro-reform faction against a more popular faction at the lower levels of party organization that, under Migas’s leadership, was skeptical of market reforms. As the elitist faction asserted itself, placing SDL in a position of neoliberal reform leadership after Mečiar’s defeat in 1998, the brewing identity crisis within the party culminated in Robert Fico’s opportunistic splintering and the creation of SMER. Having previously backed Migas’s more statist and redistributive vision of economic development, many disaffected voters were now attracted to SMER’s “considerable attention” to the state as a “significant

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108 Haughton (2004: 186) reports a 25.3% shift, which is closer to a fourth, while Rybář and Deegan-Krause estimate one-fifth (2008: 514).
109 Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 514-5
110 Rybář and Deegan-Krause (2009) note that more than other parties, SDL depended on cooperation and consensus within the party’s executive body.
tool for pursuing… national interests” particularly in economic policy.\textsuperscript{111} It was with such
appeals that “Fico… successfully attracted many SDL voters who were dissatisfied with the
part that their party played in an otherwise market-oriented coalition.”\textsuperscript{112} Overall, it is hard to
imagine how SMER could have appealed to what constituted the plurality of its 2002 voters
had it not been for the escalation of the center-left’s identity crisis during Slovakia’s critical
juncture years.

\textbf{From Populist Rise to Populist Hegemony}

Having risen to prominence by gaining the support of SDL’s faction favoring
economically redistribution, SMER next evolved through efforts to correct its failure to win
the 2002 election. Now in parliamentary opposition to a government implementing further
austerity, the populist party strategically hardened its positioning as a leftist defender of the
nation, thus attracting many voters who had previously supported Mečiar’s HZDS. SMER
achieved this feat easily as it benefited from adopting much of SDL’s old structures into its
personalistic organization, which did not tolerate internal dissent. Characterized by a highly
nationalized electorate from the very beginning, by 2006 SMER dominated the center-left
field, thereby solidifying its transcendence of regional divides and paving the way towards
populist hegemony in Slovakia.

SMER’s 13.5% vote share in the 2002 parliamentary election was interpreted as a
disappointing defeat contrary to its leader’s expectations to become part of the
government.\textsuperscript{113} While the result signaled the party’s initial rise as a replacement for the
collapsing SDL on the center-left, it also assigned for SMER only a role in parliamentary
opposition to Dzurinda’s second and explicitly neoliberal coalition government between 2002
and 2006. As explained in the previous chapter, although not constituting a critical juncture,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Marušiak 2005: 166
  \item \textsuperscript{112} See Rybář and Deegan-Krause (2008: 512) who on the same page note how “SMER’s climb in 2000 mirrors
SDL’s drop, and the slowdown in SDL’s decline corresponds to a slowdown in SMER’s climb.”
  \item \textsuperscript{113} Mesežnikov et al. 2008: 111
\end{itemize}
intense economic reforms continued during the four years immediately after the critical juncture. During this period, SMER’s role in parliamentary opposition was secondary in quantitative terms – after Mečiar’s HZDS, which was once again excluded from the government, despite having won a fourth consecutive election. The continuation of economic austerity clearly antagonized Mečiar’s electoral base, which, with 19.5% of the national vote, had produced the largest party in parliament.\(^\text{114}\) As shown in Table 10.4 above, as of 2004, HZDS voters expressed significantly higher levels of dissatisfaction than other voters not only with the national government (54.6%) and with democracy (39.3%) but also with the economy (49.3%). These predominantly negative attitudes are particularly notable as HZDS voters were also significantly more likely than the average Slovak voter (and the second most likely after SMER voters) to self-identify as leftists and to prefer state interventionism in the economy. Indeed, as argued by Haughton, HZDS voters were “those who had suffered more during [the] economic transformation,”\(^\text{115}\) a reason why HZDS had credibly challenged SDL for the center-left vote in the 1990s.\(^\text{116}\)

Therefore, if before the critical juncture most of the center-left vote had been shared between SDL and HZDS, after 2002 it was shared between SMER and HZDS. The difference was that, whereas the 1990s had featured greater competitiveness for the center-left vote, this was no longer the case after the critical juncture. The reason for this was that HZDS, now kept out of power, was a party in decline and thus ever less capable of retaining its dissatisfied voter base. Indeed, having become discredited as Slovakia moved towards democracy, liberalization, and Europeanization, by 2000 HZDS had begun experiencing internal problems. Related to HZDS’s problems was the shifting of issue salience corresponding to the transition from Mečiar’s competitive authoritarianism of the 1990s to

\(^{114}\) After the 2002 election, HZDS controlled 36 mandates, or 24.0% of parliamentary seats (Fitzmaurice 2004: 165).

\(^{115}\) Haughton 2001: 760

\(^{116}\) Haughton 2004: 180-4; Grzymała Busse 2002: 159
liberal democracy and market reforms thereafter. As explained by Rybář and Deegan-Krause, while the salience of questions of democracy, nationalism, and ethnic rights diminished, the salience of economic questions increased in the context of continued market reform implementation in the early 2000s. This shifting of issue salience both accelerated HZDS’s internal crisis and focused greater attention on the economy after the critical juncture. SMER responded to this shifting environment by adopting a strategy which benefited the party’s efforts to consolidate domination over the center-left field and which featured both organizational and programmatic components typical of populism, as elaborated in Chapter 2.

In organizational terms, SMER’s strategically absorbed the institutional structure of the collapsed center-left in a manner that presented no challenge to Fico’s top-down decision-making. Importantly, the incorporation of “the electorally weak but organizationally strong” SDL into SMER was engineered in a way reflecting the leader’s “strong aversion” to the “decentralization and internal discord” that had complicated the old center-left’s internal crisis. Instead of organizational complexity, SMER embraced simplicity according to which power within the party was exercised from the top down in a way that was “accepted and undisputed.” At the same time, even as SMER acquired property and membership from SDL (thereby significantly enhancing its power at the municipal level between 2002 and 2006), the party leadership denied membership to some former SDL members. With such explicitly top-down control and vetting procedures in place, neither SMER’s personnel structure nor its program (both of which were dependent on the leader) was challenged in any significant way.

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117 Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 513-4
118 Ibid.: 504-5
119 Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2009
120 See Rybář and Deegan-Krause (2009) for a more detailed discussion of Fico’s decisive leadership in terms of membership, organization, candidate selection and policy determination, as well as the lack of within-party contestation for the leadership.
121 Marušiak 2005: 172
In programmatic terms, having already attracted moderate redistribution-oriented voters from SDL, after 2002 SMER managed to appeal to many voters from the “unraveling” HZDS by strategically taking positions more explicitly associated with economic redistribution and nationalism. First, having adopted a “third way” program at its second congress in December 2001, in 2002 SMER began articulating a clearer social-democratic orientation. Even as party leader Fico refused to identify the party as “socialist” in 2003, SMER applied to the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists (PES). By late 2004, Fico declared SMER a “modern social democratic” party (whose name indeed changed to SMER – Social Democracy) with a strong focus on economic policy, new jobs, and education as a way “to meet the challenges of globalization.”

More specifically, SMER “adopted a radical stance to the social-economic policies” of Dzurinda’s liberal-conservative government, threatening to reverse the reforms and to “change” the government’s “anti-social policies.” Having singled out privatization, commercial banks, and international corporations as the main causes of poverty, Fico promised to stop the privatization of public health systems, to ban banks’ service fees, to revoke the flat income tax (which attracted international corporations), to increase the minimum wage, and to cancel tuition fees at universities, among other economically populist measures. These appeals corresponded to a clear shift of the party’s overall economic positioning, as perceived by experts – from 3.75 in 2002 to 2.36 in 2006. Yet this obvious drift to the left did not mean that SMER was seen as a legitimate social-democratic party. Differently from standard social democrats, SMER explicitly rejected atheism but embraced nationalism and a controversial position toward minorities, reasons why it faced criticism both from members of Slovakia’s now disintegrating social democratic parties and from...

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122 Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008: 513
123 Marušiak 2005: 168-71
124 See Bohle and Greskovits 2012
125 Mesežníkov et al. 2008: 111
126 See Bakker et al. 2015
European socialists\textsuperscript{127} (who would later expel the party from their structures, before readmitting it\textsuperscript{128}). Overall, even if its nationalism and socio-cultural positions did not obviously align with social democratic principles, SMER, more than any other Slovak party, demonstrated issue ownership in terms of socioeconomic questions in a context of continued economic austerity. Such issue ownership by a party championing the poor against the rich clearly resonated with voters who had become increasingly concerned with poverty and economic issues\textsuperscript{129}.

SMER’s strategic embrace of economic redistribution and nationalism after 2002 successfully attracted many HZDS voters. Table 10.5 shows how, between 2002 and 2006, SMER gained most particularly in those provinces that had previously been HZDS strongholds and where HZDS lost the most support between 2002 and 2006. While HZDS had dominated Slovak politics throughout the 1990s, it had been particularly strong in Slovakia’s western Trenčín and central Žilina regions, followed by the eastern Prešov and central Banská Bystrica regions. As the top part of the table shows, HZDS’s losses between 1998 and 2002 were relatively equitable across Slovakia’s eight regions (standard deviation of 1.5). As a result, even though HZDS lost support, its best performances in the 2002 parliamentary election were still in the same four regions.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{127} Marušiak 2005: 168
  \item \textsuperscript{128} Mesežníkov et al. 2008: 111
  \item \textsuperscript{129} Rybář and Deegan-Krause 2008
\end{itemize}
Table 10.5. Regional vote averages for Slovakia’s HZDS and SMER, 1998-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>-8.8</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislavský (western)</td>
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<td>14.0</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košický (eastern)</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitriansky (western)</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prešovský (eastern)</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trenčiansky (western)</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trnavský (western)</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>-6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žilinský (central)</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard deviation</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.5</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banskobystrický (central)</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bratislavský (western)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>-7.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Košický (eastern)</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitriansky (western)</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prešovský (eastern)</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-12.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trenčiansky (western)</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>-17.3</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trnavský (western)</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>-9.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Žilinský (central)</td>
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<td>11.3</td>
<td>-16.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard deviation</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR).

The bottom part of the table shows more disproportionate changes between 2002 and 2006. First, HZDS’s losses were no longer as equitably distributed across regions (the standard deviation for the average vote change across regions is now 3.8). Second, the larger deviation is due to the fact that HZDS lost disproportionately more support in the same four regions that used to be the party’s strongholds. Third, while SMER had performed relatively similarly across regions in 2002 (standard deviation of 1.1), in 2006 SMER gained the most in the same four regions where HZDS lost the most support. Overall, by 2006 SMER was over-performing in the same regions where HZDS had been strongest and where HZDS lost the most electoral support. The reorientation of HZDS voters towards SMER’s indicates that as Dzurinda’s second government continued implementing neoliberal reforms in the
aftermath of the critical juncture, SMER’s strategic positioning to the left of the economic center paid off.

Overall, after 2002 SMER managed to establish institutional linkages with many of SDL’s former voters while orienting its programmatic efforts towards HZDS voters. Because SDL had collapsed and HZDS declined, by 2006 SMER managed to consolidate much of the center-left space for which both of these parties had competed in the prior decade. Importantly, SMER’s growth before 2006 was primarily due to support from these two parties’ former voters than to a decline of Slovakia’s center-right parties. Indeed, having gained 26.3% of the vote in 1998, 23.4% in 2002, and 26.7% in 2006, Slovakia’s center-right parties were a comparatively less significant source of support for SMER in both 2002 and 2006. In fact, these parties’ support base was primarily concentrated in regions where SMER’s performances were less impressive – the capital Bratislava and Trnava in western Slovakia, as well as Košice to the east.

Finally, even though these trends are indicative of regional divides, SMER’s support base has been more homogenously distributed than any other party’s vote distribution across Slovakia after the critical juncture. In other words, the breadth of SMER’s popular coalition consistently exceeded that of political rivals, as demonstrated in Table 10.6 below. As the left side of Table 10.6 shows, before the critical juncture, only two parties achieved wPNS scores above 0.8 – the anti-communist Public Against Violence (VPN) in 1990 and the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), which was the Communist Party in 1990 and which led the Common Choice coalition in 1994. However, while VPN disintegrated soon after the 1990 election, SDL never reached considerable electoral success (with a maximum of 14.7% of the overall vote in 1992 and 1998). By contrast, Slovakia’s most successful party of the 1990s – HZDS

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130 See also Rybář and Deegan-Krause (2008).
131 By “center-right parties” I mean primarily the Dzurinda-led Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) in 1998 and the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKÚ) in 2002 and 2006. While the center-right Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) performed best in Prešov and Žilina, it was SDKÚ that dominated the coalition as its electoral results were significantly stronger than the KDH’s (see Table 10.6 below).
was less nationalized, with strongholds particularly in western and central Slovakia, as discussed above. Overall, before the critical juncture, no Slovak party had managed to both overcome the country’s regional divides and achieve considerable electoral success.

Table 10.6. Weighted Party Nationalization Scores \((wPNS)\) for parties with at least 5 percent of the national vote share in Slovak legislative elections, 1990-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote share</th>
<th>wPNS</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote share</th>
<th>wPNS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>VPN</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>HZDS</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>0.746</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KDH</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td></td>
<td>SDKÚ</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>0.698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMER</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>0.871</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>0.869</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMK-MKP</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>ESWMK</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td></td>
<td>KDH</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HZDS</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>0.792</td>
<td></td>
<td>ANO</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.787</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td></td>
<td>KSS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>KDH</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>SMER</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>SDKÚ-DS</td>
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<td>MKM-EGY</td>
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<td>0.216</td>
<td></td>
<td>SNS</td>
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<td>0.762</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>HZDS-RSS</td>
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<td>0.791</td>
<td></td>
<td>SMK-MKP</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>0.241</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SDC-ed coalition</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>0.845</td>
<td></td>
<td>LS-HZDS</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.781</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.213</td>
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<td>KDH</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>0.716</td>
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<td></td>
<td>KDH</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>SMER</td>
<td>34.8</td>
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<td>DU</td>
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<td>0.749</td>
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<td>SDKÚ - DS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>KDH</td>
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<td>0.714</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>HZDS</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td></td>
<td>MOST - HÍD</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.391</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SDC</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td></td>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.752</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMK-MKP</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>SMER</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>0.843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.710</td>
<td></td>
<td>OGeNo</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.783</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td></td>
<td>MOST - HÍD</td>
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<td>0.391</td>
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<td>0.718</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SaS</td>
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<td>0.703</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(wPNS\) scores come from the author’s own database created with subnational level election data from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR).

By contrast, after the critical juncture SMER did manage to both overcome the regional divide and achieve considerable electoral success. As shown on the right of Table 10.6, SMER’s \(wPNS\) scores are not only above 0.8, but also considerably higher than the \(wPNS\) scores of other parties’. Notably, SMER’s \(wPNS\) score is highest in 2002 – as soon as the party took over much of the electorate of the collapsing SDL (which had been the party with the consistently highest \(wPNS\) score before the critical juncture). As SMER attracted voters from other sources – most prominently, from the less nationalized HZDS – SMER’s
electoral results improved in 2006, 2010, and 2012 while its \( wPNS \) score somewhat declined. Nevertheless, in comparative terms, SMER’s expanding electorate was more nationalized that the electorates of all other parties after the critical juncture.

Importantly, Tables 10.5 and 10.6 make it clear that if SMER’s improved electoral results were mostly due to attracting HZDS voters, the high level of party nationalization was mostly due to attracting SDL’ voters. As shown, SMER’s electorate was most nationalized in 2002, when the plurality of its coalition was comprised of SDL’ voters. Over time, as the party’s coalition expanded – mostly by attracting HZDS voters through strategic positioning – SMER’s electorate become somewhat less nationalized than in 2002. Still, SMER’s average \( wPNS \) between 2002 and 2012 was 0.843, indicating that as the party expanded its coalition, it did not sacrifice much of its electoral base, which itself had been highly nationalized from the very beginning. Because SMER adopted this highly nationalized electoral base from the similarly highly nationalized center-left (SDL’), the importance of incorporating both HZDS and SDL’ voters into SMER’s broad electoral coalition must be recognized.

In sum, after the critical juncture in Slovakia, SMER managed to become the party with the broadest electoral coalition. In particular, by dominating the entire center-left field, SMER incorporated an electorate for which SDL’ and HZDS had competed before the critical juncture. Having achieved such domination on the center-left, SMER then scored a series of electoral victories beginning in 2006. Yet, as SMER’s experience demonstrates, party nationalization and electoral success are not necessarily positively correlated. Moreover, while other Slovak parties also achieved impressive electoral results, none featured an electorate as consistently nationalized as SMER’s. As the above analysis has made clear, it is SMER’s strategic positioning for the purposes of exploiting the post-critical juncture opportunity structure – characterized by the availability for electoral mobilization of many
center-left voters – that best explains how the party came to incorporate much of the center-left field even before taking power for the first time in 2006. Because SMER’s growing electoral coalition was highly nationalized even before 2006 (and remained so thereafter), it is the successful incorporation of center-left voters, rather than SMER’s subsequent policies in office, that paved the way towards populist hegemony in Slovakia.

10.4. Conclusion: Towards Populist Hegemony After “Social-Democratic” Critical Junctures

The year 2006 marked a similar turning point in the political development of two otherwise very different countries – Ecuador and Slovakia. In both contexts, populists came to political power, which they then proceeded to dominate for longer than a decade, thereby successfully establishing populist hegemonies. This chapter has examined the intriguingly similar dynamics that resulted in this similar outcome and that asserted themselves despite the contextual differences between the two countries. Having traced these dynamics separately for each country, I conclude by specifying the parallel developments that constituted similar path dependencies in the two contexts. If these path dependencies began with the “social democratic” critical junctures discussed in Chapter 9 and culminated with decade-long populist hegemonies in both countries, they also featured similar populist reactions and adaptations. It is this intriguing similarity of populist reactions that betrays one particular logic to general populist development across contexts.

Having led market reforms during the critical juncture, social democrats in Ecuador and Slovakia experienced an immediate electoral decline. Although the decline was more pronounced in Slovakia (where the post-communist SDL virtually collapsed) than in Ecuador (where the social-democratic ID dramatically declined), in both contexts the relative losses of the traditional center-left opened up an opportunity structure characterized by the availability
for electoral mobilization of center-left voters abandoned by a social-democratic Left engaged in neoliberal reforms during the critical juncture.

Before the critical juncture, Ecuador’s ID and Slovakia’s SDL had credibly “owned” economic issues by advocating for greater state involvement in the market and particularly for economic redistribution. Such appeals had attracted broad electoral coalitions – as evidenced by these parties’ high wPNs before the critical juncture – which incorporated key popular elements, such as many Indian voters in Ecuador’s highlands and the constituency dominating the lower organizational levels of Slovakia’s SDL. As party elites engaged in neoliberal reformism, these anti-elitist factions already skeptical of neoliberal reforms were necessarily marginalized and alienated. As a result, Ecuador’s ID lost much of its support soon after the critical juncture began in 1988 and Slovakia’s SDL experienced a series of splinters soon after the critical juncture commenced in 1998.

I identified these moments as the “seed” of populist mobilization in both countries. Admittedly, these key moments were characterized by fundamentally different types of mobilization – bottom-up in Ecuador, where the indigenous movement led a series of uprisings, and top-down in Slovakia, where Robert Fico founded a new populist party. Notwithstanding this difference, the populist “seed,” planted less than two years after the social-democratic bait-and-switch, featured a key similarity – the activation of new political projects that attracted particularly those voters that had constituted the popular faction of the old social-democratic coalitions in both countries.

Having been activated, these new political projects then rose to prominence in a first wave of populist electoral mobilization after the critical juncture. In Ecuador, the indigenous and anti-neoliberal party Pachakutik formed alliances with personalistic leaders Freddy Ehlers and Lucio Gutiérrez between 1996 and 2002. The resultant populist projects could not be seen as successful – because Ehlers’ failed to qualify for the second round of the 1996 and
1998 presidential elections because Gutiérrez, having won the presidency in 2002, quickly betrayed the indigenous movement’s anti-neoliberal agenda. Having risen to political prominence during this first wave of populist mobilization after the critical juncture, by the early 2000s Ecuador’s populist project had failed to achieve its most fundamental objective of a reconstitution of Ecuador’s political order. In general terms, this development was similar to the one observed in Slovakia, where Robert Fico’s populist party SMER also grew to prominence in the early 2000s, but failed to achieve its goal of winning the 2002 election. Even if the ambition of the populist project in Slovakia was more modest than in Ecuador, both countries were similar in that the first wave of anti-liberal populism could not be seen as successful given these two countries’ particular contexts.

Having failed once, populists in both countries strategically adapted themselves for success. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa adopted indigenous calls for a reconstitution of the state. Having been marginalized due to their involvement with Gutiérrez, key sectors of Ecuador’s indigenous movement allied with Correa in 2006, thereby constituting an important part of his winning coalition. In Slovakia, SMER, under Fico’s leadership, strategically incorporated the party structures of the collapsed center-left and embraced more explicitly economic redistribution and nationalism, with which SMER attracted voters from the declining HZDS into a broadened coalition. The strategic positioning of populist actors in Ecuador and Slovakia took advantage of conceptually similar opportunity structures featuring center-left decline. In both cases, the strategic repositioning paid off as broad populist coalitions won elections in Ecuador and Slovakia. Indeed, as evidenced by their high weighted Party Nationalization Scores (wPNSs) these populist coalitions featured highly nationalized electorates. By 2006, populist actors’ electorates were more highly nationalized than those of any political competitor. Coupled with robust electoral performances, the high degree of relative nationalization of Rafael Correa’s project in Ecuador and Robert Fico’s SMER in
Slovakia signaled the hegemonic domination of politics, which these actors would exercise throughout the subsequent decade.

Overall, then, populist hegemonies in Ecuador and Slovakia can be attributed to a sequence of path dependent developments that featured three main stages: (1) the electoral decline of the traditional center-left that had instituted de-aligning critical junctures; (2) the initial rise of populist challengers that achieved electoral prominence without fully achieving the objectives they had set for themselves; and (3) the strategic (re-) positioning of populist actors in a context of continuous economic liberalization, which led to the formation of broad winning coalitions with highly nationalized electorates. Admittedly, great contextual differences are observable at each of these three stages. First, in Ecuador the center-left declined while in Slovakia it collapsed. Second, in Ecuador the reactive sequences, featuring indigenous mobilization, was longer and populist demands for reconstitution of the state were more radical than in Slovakia. Third, in Ecuador it was an entirely new populist actor, Rafael Correa, who positioned himself by opportunistically adopting calls for a new constitution while in Slovakia it was the same populist actor, SMER, that adjusted its ideological positions. These obvious contextual differences notwithstanding, the populist reaction evolved in a generally similar way in both countries – following a similar “social democratic” critical juncture, featuring similar dynamics, and culminating in similarly hegemonic populist domination characterized by highly nationalized electorates.

Critically, the path dependency towards hegemonic populism in Ecuador and Slovakia began with the decline of the traditional center left as a consequence of “social-democratic” critical junctures. This decline created opportunity structures within which populist actors later emerged and evolved by adopting strategies for electoral success. These populists’ electoral successes in the aftermath of critical junctures are, of course, probabilistic rather than deterministic. Thus, my account does not explain why populists did not compete in the
Ecuadorian 1992 elections immediately after the critical juncture, exactly why populist Rafael Correa decided against running party lists in the 2006 legislative election while populist Lucio Gutiérrez did not adopt such a strategy four years earlier, or why Slovakia’s SMER did not adopt a more successful strategy that might have won it the 2002 legislative election immediately after the critical juncture. My account does not explain such *sui generis* detours in the path dependencies originating with critical junctures. However, it does explain generally similar path-dependencies, whereby critical junctures in both countries created opportunity structures within which populist actors evolved and positioned themselves in order to build broad coalitions with highly nationalized electorates. It was these highly nationalized electorates – initially made available after “social democratic” critical junctures and then strategically exploited by dynamic populist actors – that underpinned subsequent populist hegemonies in Ecuador and Slovakia.
11.
REACTIVE SEQUENCES AFTER “NEOLIBERAL-POPULIST” CRITICAL JUNCTURES: TOWARDS REGIONAL POLARIZATION IN PERU AND POLAND

11.1. Introduction

If populist actors succeeded in establishing decade-long hegemonies in Ecuador and Slovakia, their counterparts in Peru and Poland failed to achieve such political feats. Even though populists in Peru and Poland also rose to prominence in the aftermath of de-aligning critical junctures of market reform, their political coalitions were considerably less expansive. In contrast to developments in Ecuador and Slovakia, Peruvian and Polish populists mostly failed to transcend pre-existing regional divides. I discuss how these limited electoral coalitions contributed to populist inability to dominate politics in the final chapter. In this chapter, I analyze the parallel processes that led to the rise of geographically limited populist coalitions in Peru and Poland.

As it is well known, rather than appeal to broad societal coalitions, prominent populist in Peru and Poland tended to be electorally dominant only in specific regions of their respective countries. In Peruvian presidential elections, populist Ollanta Humala performed especially well in the indigenous highlands, whereas in Poland the populist party Law and Justice (PiS) excelled electorally in the southern and eastern territories that had been parts of the Austrian and Russian partitions in the 19th century. While they over-performed in their counties’ less developed parts, Peruvian and Polish populists were far less appealing to constituencies in more developed western regions, which were electorally dominated by parties espousing economically liberal ideas.

Such patterns of regional polarization have been typically explained with reference to pre-existing cleavages responsible for variable levels of socio-economic or cultural development – such as the indigenous/non-indigenous divide in Peru or the 19th century
partitions of Poland. While it is true that such long-standing cleavages define modern political developments, it has remained unclear exactly how such divides tend to be more significant in some cases (such as in Peru and Poland) than in others (such as in Ecuador and Slovakia). By focusing on the Peruvian and Polish cases, in this chapter I discuss how such cleavages were politically activated, or politicized, during critical junctures and how and why this activation consequentially led to important path dependencies. As I show, the paths towards regional polarization are strikingly similar, despite the drastic contextual differences between Peru and Poland. In particular, I focus on three parallel developments – (1) neoliberal populist dynamics associated with the critical juncture, (2) the transformation and decline of the traditional center-left, and (3) the rise of populists disproportionately dominant in less developed regions.

First, my analysis returns to the defining moment in modern Peruvian and Polish politics – the critical junctures associated with the presidencies of Alberto Fujimori and Lech Wałęsa. I explain how both of these populist presidential candidates pioneered the activation of long-standing cleavages for electoral gain in 1990. In Peru, Fujimori was the first to win a presidential election by mixing anti-neoliberal rhetoric with ethno-populist appeals that activated the indigenous electorate. That same year, Lech Wałęsa won the presidential election in Poland by combining criticism of his neoliberal opponent Mazowiecki with nationalist and socioculturally conservative appeals attractive to the electorate of southern and eastern Poland. In sum, presidential candidates Fujimori and Wałęsa were the first to mobilize anti-capitalist anger against their liberal opponents. By doing so, these populists politicized their countries’ developmental divides.

Having won the 1990 elections, Fujimori and Wałęsa proceeded with shock therapy market reforms, the reason why scholars have identified both as “neoliberal populist” presidents. These market reforms, however, hurt disproportionately their core electoral
coalitions while actually benefitting constituencies in more developed regions. Therefore, if regionally defined developmental divides had existed previously in Peru and Poland, such divides were deepened during the critical juncture. Overall, after activating regional divides for electoral gain, neoliberal populist presidents Fujimori and Wałęsa then sustained these divides through the economic policies they championed while in office. It is this facet of neoliberal populism – featuring both the political activation of constituencies in less developed regions and the implementation of neoliberal reforms that disproportionately hurt these same constituencies – that defined subsequent development in Peru and Poland.

Second, the traditional center-left regenerated in both countries. Having been de-legitimated due to the economic catastrophes of the 1980s, Peru’s APRA and Poland’s social democrats (SLD) proved their transformation by embracing economic liberalism. By doing so, APRA and SLD appealed to the more developed western regions with the electoral support of which they even managed to return to executive power. The economic policy continuity that characterized their tenure in power sustained the developmental gaps between the two Perus and the two Polands. When these parties declined once more, their electorates reoriented themselves towards new liberal parties while constituencies in less developed regions were ripe for a new round of populist mobilization.

Third, the availability of these latter constituencies was electorally exploited by populist critics of neoliberalism. Notably, these populists employed campaign themes very similar to the ones used by Fujimori and Wałęsa in 1990. If nationalist Humala utilized Fujimori’s ethic appeals in Peru, Law and Justice (PiS) used Wałęsa’s nationalist and conservative rhetoric in Poland. The return to the themes of 1990 also resulted in the approximation of Fujimori’s and Wałęsa’s highly uneven patterns of electoral support. As continuous economic reform sustained developmental discrepancies, regional polarization in terms of voting behavior gradually became a defining feature of early 21st century politics in
both countries. Because this polarization had been activated with both the campaign rhetoric and economic policies associated with the critical juncture, it should be understood as an example of path-dependent development after the critical juncture.

Overall, despite the otherwise obvious differences between Peru and Poland, from the perspective of voting behavior, these two countries share important parallels. Beginning with “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures, the parallels asserted themselves in terms of the politicization of pre-existing divides, the subsequent transformation and decline of the traditional center-left, and the solidification of a regional cleavage that both benefited and limited new populist actors after the critical juncture. If historical divides persisted in Peru and Poland, it is the polarizing effect of political agency during the critical juncture that shaped their modern political significance.

11.2. Populist Politicization and its Aftermath in Peru

Populist Politicization in the Context of Center-Left Weakness

Alberto Fujimori ascendance to the Peruvian presidency in 1990 was in the context of a party system collapse.¹ As discussed in Chapter 7, this particularly meant the delegitimization of political forces to the left of the political center, such as the United Left (IU) and the center-left represented by APRA – parties that could no longer mobilize a labor sector that had become increasingly informal due to Peru’s hyperinflation.² Together, in 1990, Peru’s center-left parties registered a combined electoral result that was substantially lower than results in the previous decade – namely, lower by 20 and 12.0 percentage points, on average, in presidential and legislative election, respectively.³ By contrast, the decline of parties more typically associated with economic liberalization – the Popular Alliance (AP)

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¹ Weyland 1999
² Collier and Collier 1991; Roberts 1998
³ Together, APRA, the United Left (IU), and the Socialist Left (IS), which splintered from IU, registered 35.5% and 40.0% in the 1990 presidential and legislative elections, respectively. Throughout the prior decade, these parties averaged 50.5% and 52.0% in presidential and legislative elections, respectively. These numbers are slightly different from the ones presented in table 7.2 due to the inclusion of the IS’s results in the calculation.
and Christian People’s Party (PPC) – was much less pronounced. Having coalesced into FREDEMO, the reconstituted center-right registered results that were very similar to the combined average performance of the AP and PPC in the previous decade. Therefore, the disintegration of the Peruvian party system on the eve of Fujimori’s election was less due to the losses of the center-right and more clearly due to losses of the center-left.

Fujimori’s 1990 election was critical not only because of the neoliberal reforms and competitive authoritarianism that followed it, but also from the perspective of Peru’s electoral map. As discussed by Madrid, the 1990 election – during which Fujimori clearly dominated the indigenous vote – was the first to feature a clear divide between indigenous and non-indigenous areas in Peru. Having been actuated only recently – socially, during the years of Velasco’s military rule and politically after the 1978 Constitution granted the vote to illiterates – the indigenous public had not been a priority in Peruvian politics during the 1980s and instead had been demobilized due to Sendero’s violence. Additionally, as demonstrated in Table 11.1 below, Peru’s traditional parties (AP, PPC, and APRA) all underperformed both in the highland provinces, where most of the indigenous population lives, and specifically in provinces with more than 20% indigenous population. Although AP had over-performed in indigenous-rich areas in the 1980 presidential and legislative elections, by 1985 the party clearly lost its appeal to the indigenous public. In turn, while APRA gained a plurality of the vote in indigenous-rich areas in the 1985 presidential and legislative elections, it, too, underperformed in indigenous-rich areas. As the table shows, the

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4 As shown in Table 7.2, between 1980 and 1990, the center-right’s averages were 35.4% and 32.7% in presidential and congressional elections, respectively. The 1990 results from the presidential and legislative election – 32.6% and 30.1%, respectively – were very similar to the average of the prior decade.
5 Madrid 2011
6 Van Cott 2005: 150
7 Madrid 2012: 121-2
8 Van Cott 2005: 152
9 I follow Van Cott’s measure of indigenous identity “based on language being Aymara, Quechua, or another native language” (2005: 142). Madrid’s (2012) important study of ethnicity in Latin American politics uses the same measure.
10 From here on, I use “indigenous-rich” for those regions where the indigenous population is over 20%.
only parties that managed to consistently appeal to the indigenous vote were parties on the Left. Such parties had specifically utilized ethnic appeals, recruitment among indigenous people, and ties to peasant organizations.11 As a result, between 1980 and 1985, parties on the Left fared, on average, 8.2 and 9.6 points better in presidential and legislative elections, respectively, in indigenous-rich regions relative to the rest of Peru.12

11 Madrid 2011: 271
12 The discussion in this chapter distinguishes between two pairs of types of regions that have exhibited high degrees of stability over time with regard to their share of the overall Peruvian population – coastal versus highland and indigenous-rich (where at least 20% of the population is indigenous by language spoken) versus the rest of Peru. I do not present results for the Amazonian region (selva), where a much lower proportion of the overall voting population lives. As part of the total voting population, the coastal regions constituted 70% in 1990 and 66.2% in 2011. The highlands constituted 24.2% (1990) and 26.8% (2011) of the overall voting population, while the Amazon had 5.3% (1990) and 7% (2011). Indigenous-rich areas constituted 17.2% (1990) and 19.1% (2011) of the overall voting population. (Author’s own calculations based on the number of valid votes in Peru’s regions in the first rounds of the 1990 and 2011 presidential election.)
Table 11.1. Average vote share based on regional attributes in Peruvian presidential and legislative elections, 1980-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>APRA</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>PPC</th>
<th>FREDEMO</th>
<th>Fujimori/ Cambio '90</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980 Presidential (total)</strong></td>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>16.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12.2</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
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<td>38.9</td>
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<td>30.3</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<td>20.1</td>
<td>48.7</td>
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<td>41.6</td>
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<td>53.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
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<td>9.7</td>
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<td>50.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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<td>23.6</td>
<td>51.9</td>
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<td>Indig. population &gt; 20%</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1990 Presidential, 1st round (total)</strong></td>
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<td>29.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Highland</td>
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<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>26.9</td>
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</tr>
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<td>24.7</td>
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<td>34.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
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<td>22.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highland</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>31.9</td>
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<td>Indig. population &lt; 20%</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>33.5</td>
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<td><strong>1990 Legislative (total)</strong></td>
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<td>Highland</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The regions correspond to what used to be departments.
2. The coastal regions include Áncash, Callao, Ica, La Libertad, Lambayeque, Metropolitan Lima, Lima Region, Moquegua, Piura, Tacna, and Tumbes. The highland regions include Apurímac, Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Cusco, Huancavelica, Huánuco, Junín, Pasco, and Puno.
3. There are 10 regions with indigenous population above 20%: Áncash, Moquegua, Tacna, Madre de Dios, Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Huánuco, and Puno (Van Cott 2005: 142).
4. The Left includes the following parties: in 1980 – the Workers Revolutionary Party (PRT), the Worker Peasant Student and Popular Front (FOCEP), the People’s Democratic Union (UDP), the Unity of the Left (IU), and the Revolutionary Left Union; in 1985 – the United Left (IU); and in 1990 – the United Left (IU) and the Socialist Left (IS).
5. The numbers are produced by the author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from Tuesta Soldevilla and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).
Even though some voting patterns based on ethnicity were discernible before the 1990 election, ethnicity did not become a major dividing line until specifically the second round of the election that brought Fujimori to power. As shown in Table 11.1, the electoral pattern of Fujimori in the first round of the 1990 presidential election (and of his electoral vehicle, Cambio ’90 [Change ’90], in the legislative election) was not much different from how the Left had fared in the prior decade. In the first round, Fujimori and his party fared 8.8 and 8.4 points *better* in the presidential and legislative elections, respectively, in indigenous-rich regions relative to the rest of the country. By contrast, Vargas Llosa and FREDEMO fared, respectively, 12.8 and 8.8 points *worse* in indigenous-rich regions relative to the rest of Peru – a pattern very similar to the one displayed by APRA between 1980 and 1990.\(^{13}\) In the second round of the 1990 presidential election, the gap between indigenous and non-indigenous vote had widened substantially – Fujimori fared 15.9 points *better* while Vargas Llosa fared 15.9 points *worse* in indigenous-rich regions relative to the rest of Peru.\(^{14}\) Overall, then, the ethnic divide had never been as explicit prior to 1990; Fujimori’s election is the first to open a noticeable gap between the indigenous and non-indigenous vote\(^{15}\) in Peru.

There are two related reasons why Fujimori managed to capture the ethnic vote in 1990 – (1) the decline of the political parties to the left of the center and (2) Fujimori’s ethno-populist appeals. First, in 1985, APRA and IU had dominated the indigenous vote in both presidential and legislative elections. As both of these parties experienced marked declines in

\(^{13}\) Between 1980 and 1990, APRA fared, on average, 8.9 and 11.3 points *worse* in indigenous-rich regions relative to the rest of Peru in presidential and legislative elections, respectively.

\(^{14}\) My unit of analysis is at the regional level, with indigenous-rich regions being those with more than 20% indigenous population. In his analysis, Madrid uses a different unit of analysis (provinces) and finds that in majority indigenous provinces, Fujimori gained 16% more, on average, than in minority indigenous provinces (Madrid 2012: 123). Although my unit of analysis emphasizes indigenous identity in a less refined manner than Madrid’s, the quantitative similarity with regard to the difference between indigenous-rich areas and the rest of Peru is notable.

\(^{15}\) According to Madrid, this election was the first during which a party’s or a presidential candidate’s support in majority indigenous provinces exceeded support in minority indigenous provinces by more than 10% (2011: 271). As seen in Table 11.1, support for the United Left (IU) was 11.3 and 12.4 points higher in “indigenous-rich” regions relative to the rest of Peru in the 1985 and 1990 legislative elections, respectively. Nevertheless, Peruvian legislative elections are less important than presidential ones, and IU did not emerge as the winner from these elections. By contrast, Fujimori’s victory as a presidential candidate created very different conditions that would have lasting effects (see below).
the 1990 election, they also lost ground in indigenous-rich areas. These losses were somewhat less pronounced for APRA than for IU – which lost 26.8 points in indigenous-rich regions compared to its overall losses of 11.7 points.\(^\text{16}\) Clearly, the indigenous voters who turned away from APRA and IU tended to primarily vote for Fujimori,\(^\text{17}\) who clearly over-performed in the highlands and indigenous-rich regions in 1990, as shown in Table 11.1.

Second, Fujimori represented “a new form of populism [which]… arose in the political void created by the fragmentation of the IU and the debacle of Aprismo.”\(^\text{18}\) More specifically, this new populism featured a novel combination of ethnic and anti-establishment appeals that became particularly important in the second round of the 1990 presidential election,\(^\text{19}\) when Fujimori competed against Vargas Llosa – the “representative of the wealthy white Lima elite.”\(^\text{20}\) In the second round, Fujimori took “a more combative stance,” thereby attracting votes from the Left and APRA – both of which attacked Vargas Llosa’s plans for neoliberal shock therapy – in an atmosphere of an increasingly polarizing electorate.\(^\text{21}\) In “stark contrast to the unity appeals of the first round,” in the second round, Fujimori used an “aggressive and classist tone”\(^\text{22}\) – with a decisively ethnic undertone. Although Fujimori was not indigenous, he appealed to Peru’s non-white majority by contrasting himself with the privileged Vargas Llosa and by including in his campaign “many more dark skinned people,” among whom were his two vice-presidential candidates, Máximo San Román\(^\text{23}\) and Carlos García – the first of partial indigenous descent, the second Afro-Peruvian.\(^\text{24}\) By using ethnic appeals, “Fujimori took advantage of the profound cultural cleavage” between indigenous

\(^\text{16}\) Between 1985 and 1990, in presidential elections, APRA lost 30.6% overall and 27.7% in indigenous-rich regions. The Left (comprised of IU and IS in 1990) lost 11.7% overall and 26.8% in indigenous-rich regions between 1985 and 1990.

\(^\text{17}\) Cameron bases this conclusion on an analysis of the vote in metropolitan Lima (1994: 121-2). The figures for the overall country presented in Table 11.1 point to a similar conclusion.


\(^\text{19}\) Madrid 2011

\(^\text{20}\) Boas 2016: 140

\(^\text{21}\) Cameron 1994: 140

\(^\text{22}\) Boas 2016: 140

\(^\text{23}\) Madrid 2012: 122-3

\(^\text{24}\) Boas 2016: 140
and non-indigenous Peruvians and won decisive victories in indigenous-dominated provinces, regardless of the degree of poverty.

Overall, Fujimori’s emphasis on ethnicity was a concrete expression of his populist appeal, presented as an anti-elitist defense of society’s subaltern sectors. As discussed above, it was among the subaltern sectors – most clearly represented by Peru’s traditionally discriminated against indigenous population – where Fujimori gained disproportionate support in the second round of the 1990 presidential election. Before 1990, much of the indigenous vote had gone for parties on the Left (IU) and center-left (APRA) that had eschewed explicit ethnic appeals. As these parties declined, Fujimori effectively used “cleavage-priming appeals” in order to fortify his anti-establishment credentials. By mixing ethnic and populist appeals in 1990, Fujimori effectively politicized ethnic identity in Peru.

Having politicized ethnic identities, Fujimori subsequently implemented neoliberal reforms “under conditions of strong popular support and political autonomy.” While the political autonomy was guaranteed by competitive authoritarian rule, the popular support featured an electoral coalition that was obviously reconstituted soon after the critical juncture. Even if this reconstitution of Fujimori’s electoral coalition cannot be easily analyzed due to the fact that elections after 1992 were not fair, much of the reason has to do with the effects of neoliberal restructuring, which created both winners and losers. Among the beneficiaries of Fujimori’s deregulation and privatization programs – credited with stopping hyperinflation – were business and financial elites and the economic sectors supported by them, primarily in coastal areas and particularly in Lima, where underemployment and poverty decreased as real

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25 Roberts 1995: 95
26 Madrid 2012: 124
27 Roberts 1995: 88, 92-3
28 Roberts’ term “subaltern” is equivalent to Madrid’s “lower classes” (2011: 278) which in Peru, are characterized by a mestizo and indigenous majority (Roberts 1995: 95).
29 Thorp and Paredes 2010: 22-31; Madrid 2011: 269-70; 2012: 120
30 Boas 2016: 140
31 Madrid 2012: 122-5, 132-4
32 Vergara and Encinas 2016: 166
33 Levitsky and Way 2010: 161-70
wages began increasing.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, by 1995 Fujimori had won the support of the coastal upper and (emerging) middle classes.\textsuperscript{35}

On the other hand, as shown by Yashar, Fujimori’s neoliberal reforms failed to address the chronic problems of poverty and inequality in most indigenous communities. Although Fujimori created populist assistance programs targeting the indigenous poor, the lack of institutionalization and universality left indigenous communities vulnerable to “significantly higher poverty and extreme poverty rates than the nonindigenous population.”\textsuperscript{36} Not only did the fruits of Fujimori’s market reforms fail to spread across Peru’s provinces, where most of the indigenous population lives,\textsuperscript{37} but economic liberalization had concretely adverse effects on the indigenous public. For instance, as Fujimori liberalized land markets, eliminated subsidies to agriculture, and exempted large landholdings from expropriation, he effectively undermined indigenous communities that had benefitted from “Velasco’s land reform and agricultural support policies.”\textsuperscript{38} In particular, the liberalization of the mining sector for the purposes of attracting foreign direct investment was an important aspects of Fujimori’s liberalization program.\textsuperscript{39} When the Peruvian economy entered an export-led phase in 1994, the liberalization of mining directly threatened indigenous communities in the provinces. As the government acquired community lands (that Velasco’s regime had previously granted to indigenous people) for mineral exploration, violent conflicts over land intensified, “all concerning indigenous populations.”\textsuperscript{40} Along with the forced sterilization, after 1995, of over two hundred thousand women,\textsuperscript{41} most of whom

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Carrión 2006: 130-1
\item Yashar 2005: 239
\item Thorpe and Paredes 2010: 177
\item Yashar 2005: 237
\item Arce 2014: 47
\item Thorpe and Paredes 2010: 177
\item Schmidt 2006: 170
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
were poor and indigenous,\textsuperscript{42} such policies put indigenous communities under attack as Fujimori “reversed the state’s prior commitment to protect them as such.”\textsuperscript{43}

Thus, Fujimori’s liberalization program created varied effects across Peru – benefitting the coast and disproportionately hurting the indigenous population in the highlands. As a result, his electoral coalition was progressively reconstituted. As shown in Appendix R (Table A.21), by 1995 the divide between electoral support for Fujimori’s project in coastal and highland regions had significantly narrowed, while the gap between indigenous-rich regions and the rest of Peru had virtually disappeared in both the presidential and legislative election. By 2000, Fujimori was clearly underperforming in indigenous-rich regions in both rounds of the presidential as well as in the legislative election. Therefore, if Fujimori had won in 1990 with disproportionate support from indigenous communities, by 1995, the indigenous population was no longer his key support base, and by 2000, indigenous people were more likely to vote against Fujimori than for him, as shown by Madrid.\textsuperscript{44}

Overall, Fujimori’s neopopulism featured two important inter-related aspects that have received comparatively less scholarly attention than the more obvious questions concerning political style and macro-economic development in the 1990s. First, Fujimori pioneered the electoral mobilization of indigenous identities by using ethnic appeals. While Raymond and Arce have argued that the politicization of indigenous identities in Peru began in 2001,\textsuperscript{45} subsequent work by Madrid has demonstrated that “ethnicity became a major issue” for the first time in the 1990 presidential campaign.\textsuperscript{46} In particular, Fujimori activated ethnic identities in the context of declining left and center-left parties that had previously received indigenous support without heavily relying on ethnic appeals. In short, Fujimori was

\textsuperscript{42} Lizarzaburu 2015
\textsuperscript{43} Yashar 2005: 239
\textsuperscript{44} Madrid 2012: 124
\textsuperscript{45} Raymond and Arce (2013) begin their analysis with 1995, the first year for which World Values Survey data are available for Peru. These authors do \textit{not} study the 1990 election.
\textsuperscript{46} Madrid 2012: 122
the first to prime the indigenous/non-indigenous cleavage for electoral purposes in Peru.47 Second, having come to power with the indigenous vote as his key support base, Fujimori then enacted economic policies that left this original support base worst off “by any measure,” as discussed by Yashar.48 As competitive authoritarianism created political autonomy that facilitated market liberalization during Peru’s critical juncture, Fujimori’s electoral support base shifted increasingly further away from indigenous-rich areas. Yet the ethnic divide between the “official Peru” of Lima and the “deep Peru [of the highlands], where indigenous people live” would persist.49 This divide – first activated by Fujimori’s 1990 electoral campaign and then sustained via his subsequent economic policies during the critical juncture and beyond – would be reactivated in the aftermath of the critical juncture, shaping its legacy.

Subsequent Political Cycles Vis-à-Vis “Deep Peru”

Mobilizing “Deep Peru” for a Center-Right Project

By the 2000 election, Fujimori domination of the indigenous vote was challenged by Alejandro Toledo, who received an average of 43.5% of the first-round presidential election vote in the 10 regions with indigenous population above 20%. As shown in Appendix R (Table A.21), while Fujimori’s vote averages were higher, he underperformed in indigenous-rich regions, while Toledo over-performed in such regions both in both rounds of the presidential election and in the legislative election.50 These differences were solidified in the 2001 national elections, conducted in a fairer context after Fujimori’s downfall. In 2001,

47 For Boas, these cleavage-priming appeals are an important reason why Fujimori’s 1990 campaign can be considered neopopulist (2016: 140).
48 Yashar 2005: 239
49 Arce 2014: 71
50 As seen in Appendix R (Table A.21), in the first round of the 2000 presidential election, Toledo fared 5.5 percentage points better in indigenous-rich regions compared to the rest of Peru. This gap is very similar to the 6-point difference between Toledo’s first-round vote in majority- and minority-indigenous provinces, as reported by Madrid (2012: 123). Toledo’s vote difference between indigenous-rich regions and the rest of Peru is somewhat smaller for the legislative election (4.2 points) and larger in the second round of the presidential election (7.1 points).
Toledo dominated the first and second rounds of the presidential election while his party (PP) won the legislative election by faring better in indigenous-rich regions than in the rest of the country – by 8.6, 10.9, and 5.8 points, respectively. Overall, Toledo and his party completely dominated the ethnic vote in 2001, with indigenous identity being the most powerful predictor and poor economic position being a secondary predictor of voting for Toledo.\footnote{Madrid reports that Toledo fared better in majority indigenous provinces than in the rest of Peru by 17 points in the first round and by 20 points in the second round of the 2001 presidential election (2012: 123). Due to the focus on lower administrative levels, Madrid’s analysis is more sensitive than mine with regard to the importance of the indigenous vote.}

Toledo, who campaigned as a *cholo*,\footnote{A (usually) pejorative term for a person of at least partial Indian heritage.} decisively won the ethnic vote by a well-documented reliance on ethnic appeals.\footnote{Raymond and Arce (2013: 566) use income while Madrid (2012: 124) uses the share of poor households to measure economic position.} However, he also campaigned on a promise of socioeconomic inclusion aimed at reducing “shockingly high poverty levels.”\footnote{Raymond and Arce 2013: 562; Madrid 2012: 125-7; Boas 2016: 148-9} Such appeals were particularly attractive to the million and a half peasants and farmers – many of whom were indigenous – that, in October 2000, had mobilized a national action “demanding relief from the neoliberal agrarian policies” of the 1990s.\footnote{Silva 2009: 246} In the end, “much of [Toledo’s] support in 2001 was drawn from people who had previously stood behind Fujimori” while his party – a de facto replication of fujimorista organization – “principally embodied the disillusionment with Fujimori.”\footnote{Ibid.: 246} In short, much of “deep Peru” reoriented itself towards Toledo as disillusionment with the “neoliberal citizenship regime”\footnote{Boas 2016: 148} grew among the indigenous community that had previously supported Fujimori.

Yet, as discussed in Chapter 9, due to the embeddedness of the neoliberal citizenship regime in the Peruvian state, Toledo continued Fujimori’s structural adjustment. Although neoliberal reforms were lauded by international financial institutions and investors, socio-
economic conditions in the rural highlands deteriorated further – with poverty at 80% (and even reaching 90%) and indigence at 50% (and reaching 75%).\(^{59}\) Such conditions – amid continued mining extraction but only a limited amount of mineral rents transferred to the regions\(^ {60}\) – led to four waves of anti-neoliberal protests between 2002 and 2005, mostly in the highland provinces of southern Peru, where most mining takes place and where most impoverished provinces are located.\(^ {61}\)

By 2004, the approval rating of Toledo had dropped to 8 percent. While nepotism and corruption were important factors,\(^ {62}\) the president’s policy about-face, which sustained high levels of socio-economic exclusion, had much to do with his decline in popularity.\(^ {63}\) Toledo had come to power on a promise of inclusion, but had governed from the center-right\(^ {64}\) due to the requirements of the neoliberal citizenship regime formalized under Fujimori.\(^ {65}\) In the process, he had antagonized the indigenous base from “deep Peru” that had brought him to power and that was once again available for a new round of populist mobilization.

**APRA’s Resurrection, Transformation, and Decline**

After the fall of Fujimori’s regime, APRA, which had been nearly extinguished during the 1990s, made a surprising political comeback from the center-left. In 2001, its leader and former Peruvian president, Alan García, ran as a critic of neoliberalism by positioning himself to the left to Toledo\(^ {66}\) and by proposing “to scale back Fujimori’s more radical reforms and reaffirm some of the policy achievements of the prior APRA government.”\(^ {67}\) Even though García lost to Toledo in the second round of the 2001

\(^{59}\) Silva 2009: 256  
\(^{60}\) Arce 2014: 49  
\(^{61}\) Arce 2008  
\(^{62}\) St John 2010: 43  
\(^{63}\) Silva 2009: 247  
\(^{64}\) See Baker and Greene (2011) who locate Toledo to the right of the center. For this reason, and unlike Madrid (2012), I do not classify Toledo as a post-critical juncture populist.  
\(^{65}\) Vergara and Encinas 2016  
\(^{66}\) Levitt 2012: 136  
\(^{67}\) Boas 2016: 166; see also Roberts 2007: 7.
presidential election, APRA emerged as the second most numerous and best organized party in congress, from where it led opposition to Toledo’s government by being highly disciplined. Outside of Congress, APRA formed a broad “social front” with civil society groups, thus tapping into dissatisfaction with Toledo’s government. By presenting itself as a more mature center-left force, APRA capitalized by winning 48% of all regions in the 2002 regional election, thus becoming “the only national-level party with important presence across regional governments.” Having led the opposition to Toledo’s presidency, in 2006, García once again ran for the presidency as a center-left candidate, and this time he won the second round against populist Humala. In the legislative election, APRA again came a close second, but was again the best organized party in congress. By 2006, APRA had fully resurrected electorally as a self-identified center-left party, with García ascending to the presidency once more.

Having campaigned by “criticizing the 1993 constitution and the neoliberal model – especially the free trade agreement between Peru and the United States” as a second-time president, García immediately abandoned APRA’s historically center-left redistributive commitment. Because it continued Toledo’s economic reforms, APRA’s second administration is best characterized by what Cameron calls the “left turn that wasn’t.” Whether García’s center-right policies, which improved Peru’s liberalization index (as shown in Chapter 9), were a matter of choice or not, three empirical facts are indisputable: (1) García and APRA had resurrected by campaigning on the center-left, (2) García’s subsequent

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68 Levitt 2012: 142-4
69 Arce 2014: 55
70 McClintock 2013
71 In interviews with the author during late 2015, APRA activists in Lima still relayed that they saw the party as a legitimate member of the Socialist International (similarly to Spain’s Social Democrats and Britain’s Labor Party) rather than as a “neoliberal” party.
72 Vergara and Encinas 2016: 162
73 Levitsky and Roberts 2011: 18
74 Cameron 2011
75 See Cameron (2011) and Vergara and Encinas (2016) on the question of choice versus institutional constraints.
administration (2006-11) governed from the economic right, and (3) the party’s electoral performance declined drastically after García’s second presidential term.\footnote{In 2011, APRA won only 4 congressional seats and did not run a candidate for president. In 2016, APRA formed an alliance with the right-wing PPC, with which it won only 5.8% in the presidential election and 5 congressional seats.}

Importantly, the second APRA administration governed in line with its support base. In particular, García constructed a coalition by “building on the historical strengths of APRA” \footnote{Cameron 2011: 395} [around Trujillo in the coastal north] and consolidating its presence in Lima, where business and middle class voters saw APRA as “the hope of the establishment.”\footnote{Crabtree and Thomas 1998; Cameron 2011} Having overcome the conservative Lourdes Flores in the first round of the presidential election, García was more appealing to the business and middle class sectors as well as the urban poor on the coast, than populist Ollanta Humala, who was widely perceived with suspicion as the Peruvian embodiment of Hugo Chávez. As the coastal regions – inhabited by over two-thirds of the voting population in Peru – had benefited disproportionally from Fujimori’s institutionalized neoliberal project,\footnote{In the first round of the 2006 presidential election, García had an average of only 18.4% in indigenous-rich areas.} they favored García and APRA in 2006.

As shown in Appendix R (Table A.22), García and APRA over-performed by large margins in coastal regions and regions with a low share of indigenous population in both rounds of the presidential election and in the legislative election of 2006. In fact, in terms of García’s winning electoral coalition, the difference between electoral support in regions with low and high indigenous population had widened since the 1980s. For example, in 1985 and 2006, García came on top by winning \textit{very similar overall numbers} at the ballot box – 53.1\% in the \textit{first round} in 1985 and 52.6\% in the \textit{second round} in 2006. These similar results in presidential elections were accompanied by \textit{very different results in indigenous-rich regions} – an average of 47.7\% in 1985 and only 33.9\% in the second round in 2006.\footnote{In the first round of the 2006 presidential election, García had an average of only 18.4\% in indigenous-rich areas.} What is more, \textit{in indigenous-rich regions}, García’s first-round presidential election showing and APRA’s
legislative election performance in 2006 are comparatively worse than in any election in the 1980-1990 period, including the 1990 election immediately after García’s disastrous first presidency. The obvious conclusion is that over time, APRA – Peru’s traditional center-left that embraced economic liberalization – had become increasingly disassociated from “deep Peru.”

**Peru’s Regional Polarization**

*Populist Versus Liberal Peru*

As the center-left turned its back on “deep Peru,” indigenous communities were once again available for populist mobilization. The continuation of neoliberal reforms favoring the coastal areas perpetuated Peru’s long standing regional inequality and rural highland poverty, which remained exponentially higher than in urban areas – with 69% of the population classified as “poor” and 47% as “extremely poor” at the close of Toledo’s term in 2006. Such discrepancies provoked a societal reaction, which found an expression in the radical populist candidacy of Ollanta Humala, the founder of the Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP). In particular, Humala was an ex-military nationalist, who had led an uprising against Fujimori in 2000 and who, by 2006, called for a larger state role in the economy, for economic nationalism (and the nationalization of strategic sectors), and for a revival of ethnocacerism – “a quasi-fascist ideology” that blamed white elites as well as neighboring Chile for the country’s problems and exalted indigenous militaristic heritage as a possible solution. Such appeals were seen as legitimate because Humala himself was of indigenous descent.

Without a doubt, in 2006 Humala was a highly populist presidential candidate. In addition to campaigning as an economic nationalist and leftist favoring redistribution and

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80 McClintock 2013: 227
81 Ibid.: 225-33
82 Madrid 2012: 131
social equality, he was also a personalistic outsider with a poorly institutionalized party and a strong anti-corruption message targeting the entire political establishment. Humala’s message resonated, winning him and his party the first round of the presidential election (30.6%) as well as the legislative election (21.2%) of 2006. Yet his failure to moderate his message for the second round alienated the majority of voters in favor of García. Regardless of the outcome of the 2006 election, as shown in Appendix R (Table A.22), Humala over-performed greatly in indigenous-rich areas — faring 21.1, 18.6, and 13.9 percentage points better in such regions than in the rest of Peru in the first and second rounds of the presidential election and in the legislative election, respectively. Overall, even though Humala lost the second round of the 2006 election, he carried the highlands and other indigenous-rich regions decisively and almost as impressively as Fujimori had done in 1990. The difference from Fujimori’s 1990 electoral performance was that Humala underperformed in the rest of the country while Fujimori had not. Indeed, Humala’s vote differentials between indigenous-rich areas and the rest of Peru were considerably higher than Fujimori’s — a testament to the growing regional polarization in Peru after the critical juncture.

In 2011, Humala won the presidency by moderating his message while still competing as a populist. Although some scholars have interpreted this moderation as a move away from populism, such interpretations are usually post-hoc and based on Humala’s moderate approach as president. However, from a perspective focused on the relationship between anti-establishment appeals, economic ideology, and organization (see Chapter 2), Humala

83 Humala’s failed to register his Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP) in time for the 2006 election and ran as a candidate of the Union for Peru (UPP), which disintegrated quickly after 2006.
84 McClintock 2013; Levitsky and Roberts 2011; Cameron 2011; Madrid 2012
85 Cameron 2011: 376
86 The gaps discussed by Madrid, who specifically analyzes majority indigenous provinces, are very similar – a 23 percentage point difference in both rounds of the presidential election (2012: 123).
87 For an in-depth discussion, see Madrid 2012: 129-30.
88 The numbers are reported in Figure 11.1 and Appendix R (Table A.22).
89 McClintock 2013: 233-7
90 For example, in a public talk in Lima (November 17, 2015), Steven Levitsky argued against the idea that Humala was a populist based on the notion that he did not attack democratic institutions during his presidency.
was once again a populist candidate in 2011. He still ran as (the only) left-leaning critic of both the political establishment and its market-oriented policies and he championed wealth redistribution and the recovery of Peru’s natural resources. Even though Humala was not a clear outsider in 2011, having been in opposition and having participated in electoral politics for fewer than 10 years, he was a “relative outsider,” as proposed in Chapter 3. Moreover, his campaign, although significantly more professional and policy-centric, remained highly personalistic and did not rely on party organization. Finally, it is true that Humala’s campaign in the second round of 2011 was relatively less populist due to the support he received from Peru’s liberal establishment, which rallied around Humala in order to stop Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko. However, in the first round of the 2011 presidential election – which, as explained in Chapter 3, is this project’s basis for measuring Latin American populism after the critical juncture – Humala campaigned against the liberal establishment and was, therefore, still a populist.

Most importantly, by once again relying on ethno-populism, Humala even improved his electoral performance in indigenous-rich regions in both rounds of the 2011 presidential election, as shown in Appendix R (Table A.22). By contrast, and as in earlier elections, the other significant presidential candidates underperformed in indigenous-rich regions and over-performed on the coast and in the rest of the country. Table 11.2 below presents statistics which directly compare average electoral performance in Peru’s relevant types of regions by presenting scores that quantify the relative gaps between average electoral performances in Peruvian regions. Based on division, scores above one (1.0) indicate relatively better electoral

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91 Madrid 2012: 143  
92 McClintock 2013  
93 See Levitsky and Loxton (2013) for a similar operationalization.  
94 Boas 2016: 170-2  
95 PNP activists, interviewed by the author in late 2015, often expressed frustration with the lack of party organization through the life of the Peruvian Nationalist Party.  
96 Madrid 2012: 130-1, 142-4  
97 Similarly, Madrid (2012), in his analysis of the provincial level, shows higher correlation coefficients between the share of the indigenous population and the vote for Humala in 2011 than in 2006.
performance in highland (versus coastal) and indigenous-rich regions (versus the rest of Peru) while scores below 1.0 indicate relatively worse performance in such regions.\(^\text{98}\)

\(^{98}\) The same method is used for the analysis of electoral gaps between regions in Poland (see below).
Table 11.2. Comparisons of average electoral performance in Peru’s regions based on defining characteristic, 2001-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Types of regions compared</th>
<th>Nacionalismo</th>
<th>APRA</th>
<th>Center-Right</th>
<th>Right</th>
<th>Fujimorismo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001 Presidential, 1st round</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001 Presidential, 2nd round</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2001 Legislative</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006 Presidential, 1st round</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006 Presidential, 2nd round</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2006 Legislative</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011 Presidential, 1st round</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011 Presidential, 2nd round</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2011 Legislative</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.02</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Averages</strong></td>
<td>Highland / coastal</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indigenous-rich / rest of Peru</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. The scores in the table are calculated by dividing the vote averages based on defining regional characteristics that are presented in Appendix R (Table A.21 for 2001 and Table A.22 for 2006 and 2011). “Indigenous-rich” regions are those with at least 20% indigenous population.
2. Included are all parties whose presidential candidates gained at least 10% during the 2006-2011 period.
3. *Nacionalismo* includes Union for Peru (UPP) and Peru Wins (GP), both led by Ollanta Humala in 2006 and 2011, respectively.
5. The Right includes National Unity (UN), led by Lourdes Flores in 2001 and 2006, and the Alliance for Great Change (AGC), led by Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in 2011. The Christian People’s Party (PPC) was the building bloc of all these alliances.
7. Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from Tuesta Soldevilla and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).
As the table shows, only Nacionalismo (represented by Humala and his coalitions) and the Center-Right (represented by Toledo and PP) performed relatively better in indigenous-rich regions. Overall, Toledo’s (and PP’s) scores in 2001 are lower than Humala’s in 2006 and 2011. As the bottom of the table shows, only Humala’s Nacionalismo performs (much) better, on average, in indigenous-rich regions. By contrast, APRA and the Right perform worse in such regions. The Center-Right (mostly associated with Toledo) became increasingly oriented towards the coast, and Fujimorismo also tends to underperform in indigenous-rich areas, a pattern that had begun during the 1990s, as discussed above. As a whole, these numbers indicate the solidification of a deep regional divide after the critical juncture in Peru. On the one hand, parties and candidates defending neoliberal solutions – of which “center-left” APRA also became an exponent – found disproportionate support in urban and coastal areas. On the other hand, the populist projects critical of neoliberalism found support in the indigenous-rich areas of “deep Peru,” mostly located in the highlands.

**The Polarizing Effect of Peru’s Critical Juncture**

Regional polarization has been an important effect of Peru’s critical juncture under Alberto Fujimori. While Fujimori was neither the first nor the last to benefit from the ethnic vote, his election and its aftermath constituted a critical juncture. To understand why and how the critical juncture created an effect of regional polarization, it is helpful to compare the episodes of electoral activation of Peru’s indigenous-rich regions. Table 11.3 below provides such a comparison for the four presidential candidates (and their parties in legislative elections) that mobilized the ethnic vote after Peru’s democratization. The upper half of the table directly compares electoral support in indigenous-rich regions. The lower half compares

---

99 Although my analysis stops in 2015 (which means that I do not analyze Peruvian national elections after 2011), the 2016 general election reaffirmed Peru’s regional divide.
the relative gaps between electoral support in indigenous-rich regions and the rest of Peru, with larger numbers corresponding to larger gaps.

### Table 11.3. Comparing episodes of electoral activation of Peru’s indigenous-rich regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential, 1st round</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential, 2nd round</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Electoral performance in indigenous-rich regions relative to the rest of Peru |
|-------------------------------|----------------|
| Presidential, 1st round       | 1.41           |
| Presidential, 2nd round       | 1.26           |
| Legislative                   | 1.54           |

**Notes:**

1. For simplicity, the numbers for Humala and his electoral coalitions are averages from 2006 and 2011. As discussed by Madrid (2012), Humala’s performance in indigenous areas was similar in these two elections.
2. Author’s calculations based on subnational level data from Tuesta Soldevilla and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).

First, the table shows that the United Left, headed by Alfonso Barrantes, dominated the ethnic vote in 1985, that is, before Fujimori. Yet this moment was not “critical” for two reasons discussed above – (1) the Left did not use explicit ethnic appeals and (2) the Left did not win the election. By contrast, Fujimori did both. Having pioneered the explicit use of ethnic appeals – which guaranteed him the indigenous constituency as crucial support base – Fujimori won the presidency from which, in turn, he hurt this constituency with his economic policies. For this reason, Fujimori’s election had profound consequences for the indigenous community.

Second, in the post-Fujimori period, Peru’s regional polarization solidified, at least from the perspective of electoral politics. As Humala (and his electoral coalitions) won more of the indigenous vote than Toledo (and his party) in the three types of national elections,
Humala also registered, on average, greater relative gaps than Toledo between electoral support in indigenous-rich regions and the rest of the country. This means that as Peru continued implementing economic reforms, the electoral gap between indigenous-rich areas and the rest of Peru widened over time. As an example of what Paul Pierson calls “increasing returns,”“deep Peru” – once hurt by Fujimori’s reforms during the critical juncture – became increasingly available for populist mobilization.

Finally, Peru’s pattern of regional polarization means that, differently from Ecuador (and Slovakia), populism did not gain comparable support across the country. After Fujimori’s neoliberal reforms created economic winners in the coastal areas, center-right parties in favor of continued reforms found reliable constituencies there, as documented in the tables above. Analyzed from the perspective of party nationalization, this means that populists after the critical juncture did not manage to create country-wide constituencies, as in Ecuador.

This is clearly reflected in Table 11.4 below. As shown, Humala’s *Weighted Party Nationalization Scores (wPNSs)* in the 2006 and 2011 are comparatively low – and, in fact, lower than the average (0.788). Overall, of the 30 candidates that won at least 5% in the first round of presidential elections, 15 have higher *wPNSs* than Humala. While in 2011 Humala’s second-round *wPNS* improves, it is still lower than both Toledo’s and Fujimori’s second-round *wPNS* scores (and significantly lower than Correa’s second-round *wPNS* score in 2006, as shown in Chapter 10).

---

100 Pierson 2000
Table 11.4. Weighted Party Nationalization Scores (\(wPNSs\)) for candidates with at least 5 percent of the national vote share in Peruvian presidential elections, 1980-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election year</th>
<th>Presidential candidate (party)</th>
<th>Vote share (first round)</th>
<th>wPNS (first round)</th>
<th>Vote share (second round)</th>
<th>wPNS (second round)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Belaúnde (AP)</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>0.851</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Villanueva (APRA)</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>0.732</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Blanco (Left)</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Reyes (PPC)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>García (APRA)</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Barrantes (IU)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Reyes (CD)</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Orlandini (AP)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Vargas Llosa (FREDEMO)</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>0.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>A. Fujimori (Cambio '90)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>0.899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Castro (APRA)</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Pease (IU)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>A. Fujimori (Cambio '90)</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Pérez de Cuéllar (UPP)</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>0.861</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>A. Fujimori (Peru 2000)</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>0.915</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>0.958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Toledo (PP)</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>0.888</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>0.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Toledo (PP)</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>0.868</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>0.882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>García (APRA)</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>0.798</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>0.866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Flores (UN)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>0.822</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Olivera (FIM)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Humala (UPP)</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>0.779</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>0.827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>García (APRA)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>0.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Flores (UN)</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>M. Chávez (AF)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Paniagua (FC)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>0.764</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Humala (GP)</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>0.777</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>0.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>K. Fujimori (Fuerza 2011)</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Kuczynski (AGC)</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Toledo (PP)</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>0.830</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Castañeda (ASN)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(wPNS\) scores come from the author’s own database created with subnational level election data from Tuesta Soldevilla and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).
Overall, and very differently from Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, Peru’s Ollanta Humala did not bridge the electoral gap dividing his country. For example, although between 2006 and 2011 Humala improved his electoral performance in the first round of the presidential election, this improvement did not translate into a higher \( wPNS \). As discussed above, this failure to transcend Peru’s regional divide was not for lack of moderation. While populist Humala indeed moderated his message for the 2011 election, the failure to establish a truly nationalized coalition had more to do with the polarizing legacies of the critical juncture under Fujimori. As the polarizing effect solidified over time, Peru’s populist movement could not transcend its regional limitations. As I discuss in the concluding chapter, this freezing of the electoral divide prevented the establishment of a hegemonic populist project in Peru.

11.3. Populist Politicization and its Aftermath in Poland

Background for Comparison

While the Polish context is clearly different from Peru’s, the two countries share an interesting outcome – regional polarization in terms of voting behavior and the failure on the part of populist actors to establish a long-standing hegemony. Even though Poland’s populist party, Law and Justice (PiS), won the 2005 and 2015 election for both parliament and president, the party spent significantly longer periods in opposition than in government (2001-2005 and 2007-2015). Over time, PiS’s electoral coalition tended towards regional concentration in the eastern part of the country. As a result, in terms of voting behavior, Poland was deeply divided in the early 21st century. In a pattern very similar to the one observable in Peru, a liberal Poland (Polska liberalna or Poland A), located to the west, tended to support either the traditional center-left party (which, as in Peru, increasingly adopted economically liberal positions) or a center-right/liberal option, Civic Platform (PO). By contrast, a solidary Poland (Polska solidarna or Poland B), located to the east and south-east, tended to vote for a populist option (PiS). These tendencies are captured in Figure 11.1,
which shows the sharp electoral divide between liberal (to the west) and solidary Poland (to the south and east). Although the map is for the 2007 parliamentary election, a similar dividing line characterized a number of other elections, such as the parliamentary elections in 1993, 1997, 2005, 2011, and 2015, as well as the presidential elections in 2005, 2010, and 2015.\footnote{Although the dividing lines in all these elections were not exactly identical, the overall pattern was similar over time.}

![Map of Poland showing electoral divide](image)

**Source:** Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013b.

**Figure 11.1. Poland’s electoral divide in the 2007 parliamentary election**

Scholars have converged in explaining this electoral divide as a structural or cultural legacy of the 19th century imperial partitions of Poland among the Prussian/German, Russian, and Habsburg/Austro-Hungarian empires. Structural arguments highlight differences in economic development between an industrial Prussian west, characterized by an extensive railroad network, and the comparatively less developed Austrian south and Russian east, characterized by rural underdevelopment.\footnote{Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013a} Cultural arguments emphasize the legacies of German and Austrian values prioritizing democracy and the rule of law versus the autocratic
norms emanating from 19th century tsarist rule in Russia. However, there are problems with these explanations.

First, cultural explanations are not convincing with regard to the similar preference for populist PiS in territories that used to be parts of the Russian and Austrian partitions. If voters on the Russian side are significantly less liberal than voters on the Austrian side, as argued by Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya, it is unclear why both have tended to prefer PiS, as discussed by Jańczak and as shown on the map. And while the structural explanation seems more convincing, the same divide did not emerge in the few relatively free elections during the interwar Second Republic (1919-38), which was soon after the 19th century and before communism reduced regional inequalities (both economic and cultural) through land reform and the elimination of the gentry class. Instead, the regional divide re-emerged early in the transition from communism. While the historical legacies of the 19th century partitions are certainly a valid explanation of modern voting behavior, as I argue next, Poland’s contemporary electoral divide became activated in the context of the critical juncture.

**Populist Politicization in the Context of Center-Left Weakness**

Polish communism generally reduced social-structural inequalities, but its last decade was marked by a deepening economic crisis, as discussed in Chapter 8. The crisis negatively affected particularly peasants and unskilled workers, the two groups that experienced sharpest declines in income throughout the 1980s. Meanwhile, having previously declined, egalitarian norms in crisis-ridden Poland were once again prevalent by the late 1980s, as

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103 Grosfeld and Zhuravskaya 2013a; Jańczak: 2015
104 Ibid.
105 Parliamentary elections during the Second Republic were held in 1919, 1922, 1928, 1930, 1935, and 1938, with only the first two considered free (see Chapter 8).
106 Wesełowski and Wnuk-Lipiński 1992: 84
found in a number of empirical studies at the time. As explained in Chapter 8, since the communist Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR) had failed to lead the country to economic recovery while engaging in societal repression, it had become largely delegitimized by the time of the transitional 1989 parliamentary election – “an unmitigated catastrophe for the party.” The de-legitimization was so great that, in the 1990 presidential election, former communist Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz ran as an independent, thus choosing to dissociate himself from what was now the ex-communist Social Democratic Party. Having ruled the country until recently, Poland’s ex-communists had become significantly weakened in very short order.

As it is well-known, the 1990 presidential election was won in the second round by Lech Wałęsa. What is less frequently discussed is that this election activated Poland’s historical divides. Indeed, the support that Wałęsa and his main opponent representing the neoliberal right, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, received was highly uneven across Poland. As shown in Table 11.5, Wałęsa over-performed in the territories once associated with the Russian and, particularly, Austrian empires and significantly underperformed in the territories of the former Prussian partition. By contrast, Mazowiecki’s vote exhibited the opposite tendency – over-performing in the territories associated with former Prussia and underperforming in the territories that used to be Austrian and Russian in the 19th century. Stanisław Tymiński – who made it to the second round – had comparatively more equitable support across Poland’s historical partitions – with minor over-performances in lands that used to be part of both the Prussian and Russian empires. Overall, then, Poland’s territorial divide was associated with the 1990 electoral results of Mazowiecki and Wałęsa. On the one hand, neoliberal reformer Mazowiecki was disproportionately supported in the western and northern territories associated with former Prussia. On the other hand, populist Wałęsa was disproportionately

108 Grzymała-Busse 2002: 100
supported in the eastern and southern territories associated with the former Russian and Austrian empires, respectively.

**Table 11.5. Support for Polish presidential candidates in the first round of the 1990 presidential election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Scope</th>
<th>Bartoszcze</th>
<th>Cimoszewicz</th>
<th>Mazowiecki</th>
<th>Moczulski</th>
<th>Tyminski</th>
<th>Wałęsa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Poland (total)</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>former Prussian Empire</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>former Austrian Empire</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>former Russian Empire</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from the National Election Commission (PKW) of the Republic of Poland.

Relating the above discussion to the demographic profile of Mazowiecki’s and Wałęsa’s voters yields two interesting conclusions. In terms of demographic profile, Mazowiecki performed worst in voter categories where Wałęsa did best – in rural communes (41.7% for Wałęsa; 7.4% for Mazowiecki) and among those with only primary education (47.6% for Wałęsa; 10.5% for Mazowiecki).\(^{109}\) The first conclusion is that Wałęsa won the 1990 presidential election by gaining disproportionate support from peasants and unskilled workers\(^{110}\) that, as noted above, had been particularly hurt by the economic crisis of the 1980s. The second conclusion is that these types of voters were predominantly found in the territories of the former Austrian and Russian partitions. Overall, the 1990 election marked, for the first time, a clear dividing line. On the one side was Mazowiecki’s core base – highly educated city dwellers living in the western and northern industrialized territories of former Prussia. On the other side was Wałęsa’s core base – poorly educated farmers living in the rural eastern and southern territories of the former Russian and Austrian empires.

\(^{109}\) The opposite is also true, with Mazowiecki performing best, and Wałęsa – worst, in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants and among the college educated (Jasiewicz 1992: 191-2).

\(^{110}\) By contrast, Mazowiecki’s voters tended to have higher incomes and more secure employment (Bell 2001: 91).
One reason why the 1990 presidential election was so important has to do with the *initial politicization* of this electoral divide. As discussed by David Ost, Lech Wałęsa appealed to his core support base by “organizing anger,” specifically anger with the effects of Mazowiecki’s economic reforms. In true populist fashion, Wałęsa focused on the problem of suffering due to growing inequality, emphasized Polish nationhood and Christian values, and even used anti-Semitic rhetoric. As noted by subsequent populist leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, Wałęsa’s goal in 1990 was to “articulate and use politically the protest against all the painful aspects of the economic reform.” Wałęsa’s politicization effectively activated a “nationalist” versus “liberal” Poland.\(^{111}\) While these *two Polands* had historical bases, their political activation took place during 1990 presidential campaign.

Having politicized the electorate and won the presidency, Wałęsa then defended and perpetuated neoliberal reforms during Poland’s critical juncture. As explained in Chapter 9, from a general perspective, these reforms created political instability because they were carried out in a democratic context. From the less discussed societal perspective, the reforms had more differentiated effects, particularly in terms of regional development. For example, in the four eastern regions of Warminsko-Mazurskie, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, and Podkarpackie, GDP per capita ranged from 70% to 76% the national average.\(^ {112}\) Farmers and farm workers – living mostly in eastern Poland\(^ {113}\) – were the two main social groups that suffered economically during the critical juncture (1990-93). For example, if the income of wage earners, the self-employed, and pensioners and retirees increased between 1990 and 1993, the income of farmers and farm workers decreased by 11.4% and 20.7% respectively.\(^ {114}\) While these two social groups’ income would continue to decline in the

\(^{111}\) Ost 2005: 65-8

\(^{112}\) Rae 2008: 73

\(^{113}\) Poland’s eastern regions are characterized by predominantly small, private farms while the western regions are characterized by industrial concentration (Bell 2001: 122).

\(^{114}\) Author’s calculations based on Rae’s (2008: 73) presentation of social groups’ income as a percentage of the national average.
following years, the drop during the years of the critical juncture was greatest. Overall, the introduction of capitalism during Poland’s critical juncture exaggerated regional inequalities and hurt farmers in particular.\textsuperscript{115}

Most importantly, whereas communism had reduced pre-communist inequalities that had penalized individual farmers, the economic reforms during the post-communist critical juncture re-introduced such inequalities.\textsuperscript{116} In a pattern very similar to the one observed in Peru under neoliberal populist Fujimori, in Poland, neoliberal populist Lech Wałęsa first activated a particular social group for electoral mobilization and then sustained economic reforms the effect of which was to hurt this particular group. Specifically, in Poland’s first truly democratic election, in which economic issues were up for popular ratification, Wałęsa politicized a pre-existing cleavage by using populist appeals. In a context of center-left decline and having disproportionately relied for electoral support on farmers and unskilled workers living in the “solidary Poland” of the east and south, Wałęsa then defended economic reforms\textsuperscript{117} that hurt disproportionately these particular social groups. As noted by Frye, the key supporters of Solidarity [and of Wałęsa] were also most “likely to bear the brunt of the economic reforms introduced by the government.”\textsuperscript{118} Overall, Poland’s neoliberal-populist juncture is “critical” not only because of the intensity and speed of market reforms, but also because of the resurrection of pre-existing cleavages that were electorally cultivated and then economically sustained during the early 1990s. As discussed next, these cleavages would reproduce themselves in the post-critical juncture period in other ways that are parallel to the ones observed in Peru.

\textsuperscript{115} Rae 2008: 72
\textsuperscript{116} Wesełowski and Wnuk-Lipiński 1992: 87
\textsuperscript{117} Weyland 1999: 396
\textsuperscript{118} Frye 2010: 214
Subsequent Political Cycles Vis-à-Vis “Solidary Poland”

Mobilizing “Solidary Poland” for Center-Right Projects

Having taken place less than a year after Wałęsa entered the presidency, the 1991 legislative election did not reproduce Poland’s historic divides. Even though Wałęsa “disappointed many supporters by endorsing the liberal economic option,”119 this election was still too early into the critical juncture for the varied effects of economic reforms to be felt across Poland’s regions. Instead, as discussed in Chapter 9, the 1991 election produced a highly fragmented parliament which, in turn, contributed to political instability120 (characterized by frequent prime-ministerial turnover) in the context of continued economic reform. In the 1993 parliamentary election, political instability and dissatisfaction with the reforms returned the social democrats (SLD) to power, this time in a coalition government with the agrarian-based Polish People’s Party (PSL). Importantly, the 1993 election not only marked an important turnaround for the social democrats (see next section) and returned to the premiership PSL leader Waldemar Pawlak. The 1993 election also produced a deepening of Poland’s historical divide – as demonstrated by PSL’s disproportionate support in “solidary Poland.” This was due to the perpetuation of reforms, which continued disproportionately hurting this part of the country.

PSL is an agrarian-based party advocating subsidies for private farmers and critical of economic liberalization. Having unexpectedly sided with Solidarity in 1989,121 by 1993, the party had dramatically increased its support base particularly in “solidary Poland.” Notably, PSL won farmers’ support by relying on organizational structures at the local level and on ties to other social organizations. Led by Pawlak, “one of the most skillful rural politicians,”122 PSL took advantage of the growing income disparities between farmers and

119 Millard 1999: 84
120 Ibid.: 84-8
121 Frye 2010: 217
122 Tavits 2013: 182-3
other social groups.\textsuperscript{123} As a result, although it came second overall in the 1993 legislative election, PSL over-performed – and indeed won – in territories that used to be parts of the Austrian and Russian 19\textsuperscript{th} century partitions, as documented in Table 11.6 below.

Although PSL was less enthusiastic about the continuation of neoliberal reforms, the coalition government of PSL and SLD did not alter the basic commitment to a market economy.\textsuperscript{124} The main political loser of this coalition was specifically PSL. For example, Pawlak’s tenure was cut short due to inter-coalition conflicts.\textsuperscript{125} Additionally, even if the government opted for more conscious attempts at building national capitalism by strengthening domestic business,\textsuperscript{126} inefficiencies, such as the strikingly poor redistribution of growing fiscal revenues, “resulted in the freezing of backward rural structures.”\textsuperscript{127} Overall, the government’s agricultural policies were “not at the level demanded by farmers.”\textsuperscript{128} As a result, although the senior coalition partner SLD was electorally rewarded for the continuity in economic policy,\textsuperscript{129} the same cannot be said about the agrarian-based PSL. As shown in Table 11.6, by the 1997 legislative election, the party lost more than half of its 1993 electoral support base, including in “solidary Poland.”

\textsuperscript{123} Rae 2008: 73
\textsuperscript{124} Frye 2010: 220
\textsuperscript{125} Bell 2001: 36
\textsuperscript{126} Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 144
\textsuperscript{127} Markowski 2002: 65
\textsuperscript{128} Bell 2001: 37
\textsuperscript{129} Frye 2010: 220
Table 11.6. Electoral support for parties in Polish legislative elections in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Election</th>
<th>Geographical Scope</th>
<th>Center-left parties</th>
<th>Agrarian-based party</th>
<th>Solidarity successor parties</th>
<th>Other parties</th>
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<td>UP</td>
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<td>PL</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Contemporary Poland (total)</td>
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Notes:
1. The table includes only parties that gained at least 5% in parliamentary elections.
2. In order of appearance in the table, the parties (or coalitions) are: Labor Union (UP), the Social Democrats (SLD), Polish People’s Party (PSL); Solidarity (S), Peasants’ Agreement (PL), Center Civic Alliance (POC), Catholic Election Action (WAK) in 1991 (or Electoral Committee “Homeland” in 1993), Nonpartisan Bloc for Support of Reforms (BBWR), Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), Democratic Union (UD), Freedom Union (UW), Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), Confederation of Independent Poland (KPN), and Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (ROP).
3. Of the important successors of the Solidarity labor movement, most can be considered as center-right parties. The center-left UP also emerged from Solidarity and was anti-communist (Frye 2010: 217).
4. Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA).
If the 1993 parliamentary election had suggested Poland’s regional divide due to PSL’s the disproportionately better performance in the “solidary Poland” that had once been part of the Austrian and Russian empires, the 1997 parliamentary election deepened this divide. As documented in Table 11.6 above, parties in favor of economic liberalism – the liberal Freedom Union (UW) and the social-democratic SLD – over-performed in regions that once belonged to the Prussian Empire while Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) underperformed in such regions. The opposite is true for regions that once belonged to the Austrian Empire – where SLD and UW underperformed and where AWS over-performed. While regions that once belonged to the Russian Empire exhibit less clear tendencies, a plurality of voters there still chose AWS. Therefore, relative to 1993, the 1997 election results indicate a deepening regional divide in terms of electoral behavior, with voters in “solidary Poland” predominantly choosing AWS.

To a large extent, AWS represented a unification of the post-Solidarity Right. However, AWS was “populist leaning” and thus different from the “consistently liberalizing” post-Solidarity parties, such as the UD, UW, and KLD.\footnote{Frye 2010: 217} As an electoral coalition, AWS incorporated “some 40 parties, organizations, and groups” including most Catholics and nationalists that had splintered from the once-powerful Solidarity.\footnote{Millard 2010: 83-4} The coalition included Jarosław Kaczyński’s Center Alliance, which had played a leading role in Wałęsa’s 1990 presidential campaign but had subsequently turned against Wałęsa (who had marginalized it).\footnote{Millard 1999: 82, 86} Indeed, voters preferring traditionalist values and economic interventionism had chosen parties, such as Kaczyński’s Central Alliance and the more nationalist Catholic Election Action (WAK) in the 1993 parliamentary election and had then abandoned Wałęsa in the
1995 presidential election. Such voters were now enticed by AWS’s promises of “social solidarity” including subsidies for the countryside.\textsuperscript{133}

Having attracted a clear plurality of voters in “solidary Poland,” AWS won the 1997 election and then governed from the economic right. Under prime minister Jerzy Buzek, AWS “formed a coalition government with the Freedom Union (UW), a party with impeccable pro-market credentials headed by [shock-therapist] Leszek Balcerowicz,” and then introduced “difficult economic reforms in pensions, health care, and education.”\textsuperscript{134}

Overall, having been politically activated, the core constituency associated with rural underdevelopment in Poland was then mobilized in support of continued economic reform under AWS’s center-right government. In the process, the schism between “liberal” and “solidary” Poland had hardened, with just 1% of AWS voters indicating willingness to vote for another party and no SLD supporters foreseeing switching in favor of AWS.\textsuperscript{135} This electoral mobilization of rurally-based electorates for the purposes of continued economic reform \textit{and} the deepening electoral divide are both very similar to the ones observed in Peru.

\textbf{The Center-left’s Resurgence, Transformation, and Decline}

Having been completely de-legitimated by the early 1990s,\textsuperscript{136} in 1993, Poland’s social democrats began a gradual and steady resurgence that lasted for a full decade. After winning the parliamentary election in 1993 with 20.6% of the national vote, SLD improved to 27.1% in 1997, and then dominated the 2001 parliamentary election by winning 41.0% in coalition with the United Left (UP).\textsuperscript{137} The party was highly successful in presidential races too – its candidate, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, came on top (with 35.1% of the national vote) in the first round and then defeated Wałęsa in the second round of the 1995 presidential election,

\textsuperscript{133} Millard 2010: 52, 86
\textsuperscript{134} Frye 2010: 220. My addition in the parentheses.
\textsuperscript{135} Bell 2001: 173
\textsuperscript{136} Grzymała-Busse 2002: 100-1; Tavits and Letki 2009: 559
\textsuperscript{137} This SLD-UP coalition also dominated the 2002 local elections by winning 33.7% of voivodeship seats.
before comfortably winning the 2000 presidential election in the first round (with 53.9% of the vote). Overall, whether SLD and its presidential candidate were in opposition or in government\textsuperscript{138} seemed to matter little – the party’s electoral resurgence only strengthened between the early 1990s and early 2000s.

Influential scholarship on post-communist party development has ascribed the Polish social democratic resurgence to the SLD’s (near) complete regeneration after the fall of communism. In particular, Grzymała-Busse has explained how the party’s relatively open elite-advancement policies empowered reform-minded leaders under whose centralized leadership SLD “broke with the communist past.”\textsuperscript{139} As the SLD-led government between 1993 and 1997 showed,\textsuperscript{140} the regeneration featured economic policies meant to channel the party’s unambiguously non-communist commitment.\textsuperscript{141} In line with dominant arguments on post-communist party development, under the leadership of “pragmatic” professionals Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Józef Oleksy, and Leszek Miller,\textsuperscript{142} the party transformed by embracing economic liberalization, which, in turn, explains SLD’s electoral resurgence.\textsuperscript{143}

These optimistic arguments about post-communist ideological transformation are convincing in terms of explaining both SLD’s trajectory towards electoral resurgence and Poland’s rapid economic reform under conditions of low polarization,\textsuperscript{144} but they are incomplete for two reasons. First, although authors argue that in the process of ideological liberalization SLD “significantly broadened [its] electoral base,”\textsuperscript{145} they usually ignore the trend towards increasing polarization within Poland’s overall electorate, as discussed above. Second, arguments focused on the merits of post-communist party liberalization do not

\textsuperscript{138} During Poland’s first democratic decade, SLD was initially in parliamentary opposition (1989-93), then in government (1993-97), then again in opposition (1997-2001). Kwaśniewski first ran against the incumbent president in 1995, and then competed as the incumbent president in 2000.

\textsuperscript{139} Grzymała-Busse 2002: 14-6, 45-9, 105-7

\textsuperscript{140} Markowski 2002; Frye 2012

\textsuperscript{141} Tavits and Letki 2009: 559

\textsuperscript{142} Tavits 2013: 184-5

\textsuperscript{143} Grzymała-Busse 2002; Tavits and Letki 2009

\textsuperscript{144} Frye 2010: 219-21

\textsuperscript{145} Grzymała-Busse 2002; Tavits and Letki 2009: 557
account for subsequent developments – such as the decline of the increasingly liberalizing
SLD and the electoral power of populist actors critical of neoliberalism.¹⁴⁶ Yet the fact that
SLD’s resurgence was also marked by sustained – and even increasing – regional polarization
in terms of electoral behavior means that the party generally failed to build an inclusive and
reliably durable electoral coalition.

As shown in Table 11.6 above, SLD’s improved performances throughout the 1990s
coincided with an increasing gap between, on the one hand, its vote in the territories of
“liberal Poland” that had once been associated with the 19th century Prussian partition and, on
the other hand, its vote associated with the territories of “solidary Poland” that had once
belonged to the Austrian and Russian empires. For instance, in 1991, the gap had been almost
non-existent with SLD performing, on average, only 2.3 points better¹⁴⁷ in “liberal Poland”
and actually performing best, on average, in parts of “solidarity Poland” – the formerly
Russian territories. Thereafter, the gap grows to 6 points in 1993 and to 10.5 points in 1997.
Notably, SLD did not close this regional gap in the 2001 parliamentary election. Although
the party increased its vote across Poland in 2001, it still performed 10 points better, on
average, in territories associated with the former 19th century Prussian partition than in the
rest of Poland.¹⁴⁸ In fact, while in 1993 and 1997 SLD only underperformed specifically in
territories once associated with the Austrian Empire (but not with the Russian Empire), by
2001 the party was underperforming in both types of territories. These observations lead to
two conclusions: (1) that SLD’s decisive victory in the 2001 parliamentary election was
mostly due to its vote in “liberal Poland” and (2) that, having consistently widened

¹⁴⁶ These problems are pertinent to developments in both Poland and Hungary.
¹⁴⁷ I calculate the gap by subtracting the average vote in the territories once associated with the Prussian/German
Empire (“liberal Poland”) from the mean of the averages for territories once associated with the Russian and
Austrian empires (“solidarity Poland”).
¹⁴⁸ SLD’s averages from the 2001 parliamentary election were 45.9%, 32.5%, and 39.4% in territories once
associated with the Prussian/German, Austrian, and Russian empires, respectively. (Author’s calculations based
on powiat-level data from the National Election Commission of the Republic of Poland.)
throughout the 1990s, Poland’s regional divide was sustained even in the 2001 parliamentary election.

Finally, the SLD-UD government under social democratic prime minister Leszek Miller continued economic reforms, this time driven by the desire to achieve a fast-track entry into the European Monetary Union (EMU) in the context of the upcoming accession to the European Union (EU). Additionally, pressured by the need to reduce Poland’s fast-growing public debt, the left-wing coalition “repeatedly undertook ambitious attempts to cut public expenditure” and even drafted a new stabilization program known as the Hausner Plan. The result of these measures was a clear electoral defeat in the 2005 parliamentary election which, in fact, marked the beginning of the end for Poland’s social democrats. The party performed progressively worse in all elections thereafter, failing to gain any parliamentary seats in the 2015 election.

Notably, in the aftermath of the neoliberal-critical juncture, Poland’s social democrats had experienced a fate very similar to that of the Peruvian traditional center-left represented by APRA. As in Peru, after a period of de-legitimization, Poland’s center-left had resurrected by mostly relying for electoral support on the liberal part of the country, where economic reforms had been comparatively less penalizing to the public. Having proven its ideological transformation while leading the country, Poland’s center-left finally experienced a dramatic electoral decline. Meanwhile, as in Peru, regional polarization was sustained in Poland, and voters in less developed regions were once again available for populist electoral mobilization.

**Poland’s Regional Polarization**

**Populist Versus Liberal Poland**

Throughout the first post-communist decade, no party had managed to establish lasting electoral domination in the “solidary Poland” represented by lands previously

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149 Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 176
occupied by the Austrian and Russian empires. Having been politically activated by Wałęsa’s electoral campaign in 1990, this electorate had disproportionately favored the agrarian-based PSL in 1993 and then Solidarity Electoral Action in 1997. Meanwhile, the center-left SLD mostly targeted the “liberal Poland” historically associated with former Prussia. Moreover, while the “liberal Poland” that SLD tended to mobilize generally benefited from the economic transformation process, the same cannot be said of “solidary Poland” as within-country regional disparities increased in the 1995-2005 period, mostly because unfinished restructuring in agriculture.¹⁵⁰ Due to such developments, by the early 21st century, “solidary Poland” was once again ripe for political mobilization against penalizing market reforms.

The party that took advantage of this opening – and then established stable electoral domination of southern and eastern Poland – was the populist Law and Justice (PiS). There is little debate among scholars of Poland with regard to PiS’s legitimately populist nature. Having initially emerged as a “maverick” formation¹⁵¹ from the splintering Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), the highly personalistic PiS developed a strong anti-establishment ethos, characterized by anti-corruption rhetoric¹⁵² and anti-liberal ideology including both nationalism and social conservatism.¹⁵³ What is less frequently discussed is PiS’s equally important emphasis on anti-neoliberal ideas with which the party targeted its core electorate. Indeed, having achieved a mediocre fourth place (with 9.5% of the national vote) in the 2001 parliamentary election and having witnessed growing popular dissatisfaction with the governing SLD, PiS “underwent a spectacular change” from a fairly typical conservative party with noticeable though weak nationalist and populist leanings into a radical nationalist, and visibly populist-socialist one.”¹⁵⁴ Between 2001 and 2005, PiS specifically targeted the “losers” of the transformation by attacking liberal reforms and particularly “monetarist”

¹⁵⁰ Bogumil 2009
¹⁵¹ For a definition, see Chapter 2.
¹⁵² Pop-Eleches 2010
¹⁵³ See Pankowski (2010: 151-66) for an in-depth discussion of PiS’s evolution and ideology.
¹⁵⁴ Markowski 2007: 820
Leszek Balcerowicz – leading shock therapist in the early 1990s and acting chairman of the Central Bank after 2001. As a result of these attacks, PiS started attracting “leftist voters” who typically identified as more religious, slightly poorer, occupying less prestigious labor market positions, and “far less favorably inclined towards privatization.” As shown in Appendix R (Table A.23), such voters were most typically located in the same regions once politicized by Wałęsa – particularly the lands of the former Austrian partition where Wałęsa had also performed best in 1990.

Having won the 2005 parliamentary (and presidential) elections, PiS then formed a populist coalition with the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense (SO), the first of which also tended to over-perform in “solidary Poland” and both of which had campaigned on state-interventionist promises in 2001 and 2005. As the leader of the coalition, PiS tried to “highjack and implement [these parties’] programs” by taking “a pro-labor and pro-social policy stance.” Although the populist coalition only lasted in power less than 2 years and PiS lost the 2007 election to the liberal Civic Platform (PO), PiS actually improved its electoral result by attracting voters from SPR and SO. As documented in Appendix R (Table A.23), PiS’s electoral improvement between 2005 and 2007 was more dramatic in the former Russian and Austrian partitions (58% and 27% improvement, respectively) than in the Prussian partition (13% improvement). As analyzed by Markowski, PiS’s electoral improvements were mostly due to the party’s ability to attract voters with socially sensitive socio-economic attitudes and policy preferences, many of whom tended to be more favorable to socialism and redistribution than to confessional socio-cultural principles. Albeit paradoxical, the obvious conclusion is that even if PiS is usually

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155 Ibid.: 821, 826-7
156 Markowski 2006: 826; Pankowski 2010: 166
157 Millard 2010: 106-7, 130-1
158 Bohle and Greskovits 2012: 244
159 Stanley 2016
160 Pankowski 2010: 167
analyzed as a “right-wing” party, it represents electorates that “in socio-economic terms are… predominantly leftist.”

After 2007, even as Poland was experiencing economic stability, PiS continued to appeal to its core constituency though what leading neoliberal reformer Leszek Balcerowicz saw as “anti-capitalist propaganda” similar to Venezuela’s. In particular, PiS’s promises of earlier retirement, minimum hourly wage, and the Family 500+” program focused “the debate on socio-economic issues and forced [the liberal] Civic Platform to compete in a context of ever more generous welfare promises. Over time, such a leftist mix of economic nationalism and social welfarism remained highly attractive to PiS’s core constituency. As a result, the party once again over-performed in southern and eastern Poland in both the 2011 and 2015 parliamentary elections.

Meanwhile, the decline of the social democrats cleared the way for another party – Civic Platform (PO) – to become dominant in the “liberal Poland” of the west. Similarly to PiS, PO was not entirely “new” and can be best described as a “maverick” formation with origins in the liberal wing of Solidarity Electoral Action and the liberal Freedom Union around Donald Tusk (which had been the most institutionalized of all post-Solidarity parties and which had withdrawn from the AWS-led ruling coalition after 1997). From the very beginning, PO’s ideology was centered on individual values and the free market. While PO was initially perceived as a “grouping with no chance of electoral success,” by 2005 it already dominated western Poland, receiving nearly twice the support of the declining SLD. Indeed, 2005 was the first year after the critical juncture in which a crystal clear electoral

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161 See Markowski (2008: 1065) for an illustration of where parties competing in the 2007 parliamentary election fit in a two-dimensional space.
162 Balcerowicz 2016
163 This program offers a monthly allowance for every second and subsequent child.
164 Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016: 61, 66
165 Rupnik 2016: 81
166 Millard 2010: 105-9
divide emerged as ideological polarization between PO and PiS increased.\textsuperscript{167} PO and PiS performed comparably in the presidential and parliamentary election that year by establishing electoral domination in “liberal” and “solidary” Poland, respectively.

Table 11.7 below demonstrates quantitatively the solidification of a clear regional divide in Poland after 2001. For each relevant political party (with at least 5% of the national vote) in each of the five parliamentary elections between 2001 and 2015, the table presents three data points: (1) the party’s national vote share, (2) the difference, on average, between “solidary” and “liberal” Poland, and (3) the party’s vote in “solidary Poland” as a share of the vote in “liberal Poland.” The second and third data points are calculated based on the numbers presented in Appendix R (Table A.23) and quantify the “gap” between the vote in “solidary” and “liberal” Poland. While the second data point analyzes the gap in absolute terms (by subtracting the average vote in “liberal Poland” from the average vote share in “solidary Poland”), the third data points analyses the gap in relative terms (by division).\textsuperscript{168}

A focus on the data for PiS and PO reveals two interesting facts – (1) the nearly “mirror” development with regard to the regional electoral performances of PiS and PO and (2) the dynamic nature of the regional divide. In terms of the “mirror” development, for each of these five elections, the difference between the two parties’ vote in the two Polands is nearly the same – but with opposite signs. In other words, PiS dominated “solidary Poland” (at the expense of its electoral performances in the west) as much as PO dominated “liberal Poland” (at the expense of its electoral performances in the south and east). Such regionalization of the vote is clear evidence of regional polarization, specifically after 2005.

\textsuperscript{167} Markowski 2006; Millard 2010: 135
\textsuperscript{168} This is the same method used above to analyze electoral gaps in Peru.
Table 11.7. Comparisons of average electoral performance of parties in parliamentary elections across Poland, 2001-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parl. Election</th>
<th>Geographical Scope</th>
<th>Center-Left</th>
<th>Agrarian-based</th>
<th>Successors of Solidarity</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SLD &amp; partners</td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>AWSP</td>
<td>PiS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 National result (total vote share)</td>
<td></td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference b/w solidary &amp; liberal Poland (avg.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary / liberal Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 National result (total vote share)</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference b/w solidary &amp; liberal Poland (avg.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary / liberal Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 National result (total vote share)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference b/w solidary &amp; liberal Poland (avg.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>-12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary / liberal Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011 National result (total vote share)</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference b/w solidary &amp; liberal Poland (avg.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary / liberal Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 National result (total vote share)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference b/w solidary &amp; liberal Poland (avg.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidary / liberal Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. Included are only parties (and electoral coalitions) that gained at least 5% in national elections between 2001 and 2015.
2. On the center-left, SLD was in a coalition with the United Left (UP) in 2001, in the Left and Democrats (LiD) coalition in 2007, and in a broad United Left (ZL) coalition in 2015.
3. The other parties are: Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Solidarity Electoral Action (ASWP), Law and Justice (PiS), Civil Platform (PO), League of Polish Families (LPR), Self-Defense (SO), Palikot’s Movement (RP), Kukiz ‘15, and Modern.
4. The differences between “solidary” and “liberal” Poland are calculated by subtracting average electoral results in territories that used to be associated with the Prussian/German Empire (“liberal Poland”) from the mean of the averages for territories once associated with the Russian and Austrian empires (“solidary Poland”)
5. The Solidarity / liberal Poland score is obtained by dividing the average results for “solidary” and “liberal” Poland.
6. All scores in this table are calculated based on powiat-level election data from the National Election Commission (PKW) of the Republic of Poland.
Second, although regional polarization became static, this was not always the case. For example, the differences between the two parties’ vote shares in the *two Polands* were negligible in 2001 and still relatively small in 2005. It is true that in the 2001 election the social democratic SLD dominated by over-performing in “liberal Poland.” Yet, in 2001, the divide (best conceptualized as the numerical distance between SLD’s negative score of -10.0 and PSL’s positive score of +6.9) is still small in comparison to the 2007 distance between PO’s negative score of -12.9 and PiS’s positive score of +14.6. As the table shows, even in 2005, the disproportionalities of PO’s and PiS’s electoral support across Poland were still small in comparison to what followed. Overall, while it ultimately stabilized, Poland’s regional polarization was subject to prior evolution over time.

**The Polarizing Effect of Poland’s Critical Juncture**

As in Peru, contemporary regional polarization in Poland was strongly conditioned by developments related to the critical juncture. Although Poland’s electorate is clearly divided along the historical lines of 19th century imperial partition, relatively recent historical developments best explain *how* and *why* such divisions were activated and then magnified before persisting over time. In particular, in his 1990 presidential campaign, Lech Wałęsa activated the historical divide in electoral terms by mobilizing a populist campaign against Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the clear advocate of liberal market reform. Having originated in the recent split within Solidarity and benefitting from growing popular dissatisfaction with neoliberal reforms, Wałęsa’s populist politicization specifically activated anti-capitalist anger and pitted solidaristic (and nationalist) Poland against Solidarity’s liberal wing.

Next, although his campaign was predominantly supported by the “solidary Poland” of the former Austrian and Russian imperial partitions, as president, Wałęsa defended and helped sustain reforms whose material effects were disproportionately negative for his core electoral constituency. Having been “betrayed” by Wałęsa, this constituency then tended to
support a variety of actors whose electoral performances in southern and eastern Poland were disproportionately superior to results in western Poland. Table 11.8 compares these episodes of electoral mobilization in “solidary Poland” and specifically relates them to electoral performance in “liberal Poland.”

Table 11.8. Comparing episodes of electoral activation in “solidary Poland”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solidary Poland (average vote share)</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute difference b/w solidary &amp; liberal Poland (avg.)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative difference: solidary / liberal Poland</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: author’s calculations based on subnational level data from the National Election Commission (PKW) of the Republic of Poland and the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA).

As the table shows, both the agrarian PSL and (especially) the Solidarity-based coalition AWS performed disproportionately well in these territories between 1991 and 2001. However, it was not until the second decade of the 21st century that both the average vote share in “solidary Poland” and the absolute difference between electoral performances in the two Polands began to look like they had in the 1990 presidential election won by Wałęsa. Indeed, this is not surprising. If the 1990 presidential election articulated the division within Solidarity, PiS’s electoral domination of the electorate, which had been activated and then betrayed by Wałęsa, can be understood as a maturation of this division. Importantly, as the economic reforms that had originally disappointed Wałęsa’s core electorate were further sustained under both social democratic and liberal governments, the developmental gap between Poland’s historical divides also matured. The fact that PiS consistently appealed to its core constituency with themes similar to the ones used by Wałęsa in the 1990 presidential campaign is best understood as a lasting legacy of Poland’s critical juncture.
Of course, this deep electoral divide means that, unlike in Slovakia (and Ecuador), populists in Poland did not manage to appeal to constituencies reliably broader than those of other political parties. Indeed, as measured by the *weighted Party Nationalization Scores* (*wPNSs*), PiS electorate was usually *not* the most highly nationalized. As shown in Table 11.9 below, of the five parliamentary elections in which it competed, PiS electorate was the most highly nationalized only twice – in 2005 and 2007. By contrast, PiS’s *wPNS* was sixth in 2001, third in 2011, and second in 2015. In the 2011 and 2015 parliamentary elections, other parties – PO, PR, and Kukiz ’15 – were characterized by broader electoral coalitions.

Table 11.9. Weighted Party Nationalization Scores (*wPNSs*) for parties with at least 5 percent of the national vote share in Polish legislative elections, 1991-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote share</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>UD</th>
<th>12.3</th>
<th>0.799</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>PIS</th>
<th>27.0</th>
<th>0.854</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>0.819</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>0.781</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WAK</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>POC</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0.629</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>POC</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.803</td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.766</td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KLD</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.486</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0.672</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UP</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>0.795</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Homeland”</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>0.798</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BBWR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>33.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UW</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>0.792</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>0.609</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ROP</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.811</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BBWR</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>0.819</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SLD-UP</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>0.859</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>0.741</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SO</td>
<td>10.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>PIS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>9.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>0.766</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AWSP</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: wPNS scores come from the author’s own database created with subnational level election data from National Election Commission (PKW) of the Republic of Poland and the Constituency-Level Elections Archive (CLEA).
Finally, this table is further evidence of the fact that although PiS was among Poland’s most electorally successful parties in the early 21st century, it tended towards a geographically restricted electorate. If the party’s improved electoral performances signaled the broadening of PiS’s electoral coalition (in 2005 and 2007), this broadening was limited – and usually inferior to that of other political actors, as the 2011 and 2015 wPNS scores demonstrate. Indeed, while the legacies of the critical juncture enabled the populist party PiS to dominate the more underdeveloped “solidary Poland,” the polarizing effect of these legacies also conditioned PiS’s general inability to expand significantly beyond its core constituency. As I discuss in the final chapter, this circumscribed constituency prevented PiS from establishing a populist hegemony – a development similar to the Peruvian experience (and very different from the Slovak and Ecuadorian ones). If during Poland’s critical juncture, Solidarity had split because it had reached the limits of liberalization, the polarization produced by this split likewise defined the limits of Poland’s predominant populists.

11.4. Conclusion: Towards Regional Polarization After “Neoliberal-Populist” Critical Junctures

From the perspective of electoral support for and against populism, the first fifteen years of the 21st century were defined by parallel developments in Peru and Poland despite the otherwise great differences between these two countries. In particular, both cases featured polarization along regional lines – with major populist actors failing to overcome, in the long run, their geographically limited constituencies. Having examined the parallel developments that led to these similar outcomes, I close by focusing on the key similarities along the path towards populist polarization. If in both countries these paths began with “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures, they were also characterized by reactive sequences that were intriguingly similar.
Having experienced dramatic periods of hyperinflation, during which traditional left-leaning parties had been de-legitimated, Peru and Poland saw the electoral rise of Alberto Fujimori and Lech Wałęsa – two personalistic figures who led populist campaigns against their neoliberal opponents in the 1990 presidential elections in both countries. In their campaigns, these populists activated constituencies predominantly inhabiting territories historically associated with economic underdevelopment – the indigenous highlands in Peru and the Polish lands that had belonged to the 19th century Austrian and Russian partitions. In Peru, Fujimori politicized the constituency known as “deep Peru” by being the first politician to specifically rely on ethnic appeals in an electoral campaign. In Poland, Wałęsa politicized the constituency known as “solidary Poland” by pioneering the use of nationalist and culturally conservative appeals for electoral gain. In both countries, these populist candidates used these contextually specific appeals for the electoral purposes of exploiting anti-capitalist anger against their neoliberal opponents, Mario Vargas Llosa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki. By doing this, Fujimori and Wałęsa specifically activated deep historical divides for instrumental purposes. Although the profound divisions between the two Perus and the two Polands were by no means new, their political activation for electoral gain was pioneered by the populist presidential candidates of 1990.

After winning the presidency by relying on populist appeals to the core electorate in their countries’ less developed regions, Fujimori and Wałęsa either enacted (Fujimori) or defended (Wałęsa) economic restructuring through shock therapy. Having evolved into neoliberal populists, both presidents were associated with key market reforms that significantly liberalized their countries’ economies. Yet the reforms during these critical junctures also disproportionately hurt the core constituencies that had elevated them to the presidency. In short, having politicized these constituencies, neoliberal populists Fujimori and Wałęsa then presided over economic policies that mostly benefitted those who had voted
for their liberal opponents, at the expense of these presidents’ original core electoral constituencies – the relative “losers” of the economic transformation. While the regional divides of Peru and Poland had clearly been pre-existing, it was not until the critical juncture that they were initially activated for the purposes of electoral politics and then sustained according to the prerogatives of neoliberal reform.

As this chapter has demonstrated, the regionally-based electoral and developmental discrepancies associated with neoliberal populism became “critical” for subsequent political developments. First, once Fujimori and Wałęsa exited the political scene, their core electoral constituencies were re-activated for the center-right projects of Toledo (in Peru) and Solidary Electoral Action (AWS) in Poland. Although traditional center-left parties (Peru’s APRA and Poland’s SLD) resurrected after a period of de-legitimization, these parties had to prove that they had transformed since the time they had led both countries into hyperinflationary disasters in the 1980s. It is for this reason that Peru’s APRA and Poland’s social democratic SLD appealed to the “liberal” electorates located in more developed regions to the west. Having even reached executive power after the critical juncture, these transformed representatives of the traditional center-left then experienced steep electoral declines, thereby freeing space for new political competitors on the pro-neoliberal Right.

While electorates in more developed regions came to be dominated by economically liberal political actors, those in the less developed regions consistently chose populist options – associated with presidential candidate Ollanta Humala in Peru and the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland. Crucially, these populist actors found electoral support specifically by relying on the campaign methods first activated by Fujimori and Wałęsa. In Peru, Humala effectively combined anti-neoliberal rhetoric with ethnic appeals in a way similar to the one pioneered by Fujimori. In Poland, PiS mixed its critique of economic liberalism with nationalist and Catholic rhetoric, much like Wałęsa had done. Most centrally, after the shock
therapy beginnings during the critical juncture, political actors in Peru and Poland continued on a seemingly irreversible path of market reform, which, however, also sustained regional inequalities. It is these regional inequalities that populist actors in both countries exploited by returning to the populist rhetoric of 1990. As a result, the patterns of their electoral support – and their electoral limits (as evidenced by their wPNS scores) – increasingly approximated Fujimori’s and Wałęsa’s. Having been activated by the presidents associated with the critical juncture, regional polarization in Peru and Poland is an example of path dependency with “increasing returns.”

Of course, this generally similar trend towards regional polarization took place in two otherwise radically different contexts. In addition to the great political, economic, institutional, and cultural differences, Peru and Poland also had variable experiences with both economic reform and populism. If in Peru the principles of the liberal market were embedded in a constitution ratified under competitive authoritarian rule, in Poland neoliberal momentum was sustained mostly through external pressure. In Peru, APRA declined faster and was replaced by a plethora of unstable actors on the Right, whereas in Poland the social democrats declined slower and were replaced by a more stable liberal actor (PO). Moreover, while populist Ollanta Humala neglected party development in Peru, Polish populists were considerably more successful in terms of institutionalizing their party.

Such obvious differences should not obscure the central path dependency presented here – that despite these contextual particularities, the “neoliberal-populist” critical juncture gave rise to parallel developments in both countries. These developments featured the transformation and decline of traditional left-leaning actors as well as the solidification of a regional cleavage that populist actors mostly failed to overcome. As in the account presented in the previous chapter, the general explanation proposed here is probabilistic, not deterministic. As such, it does not explain why Toledo was not a populist in Peru, why
Humala moderated in 2011, or why PiS was not more electorally successful in 2001. What the above account does explain is the general similarity in outcome in terms of patterns of voting behavior after “neoliberal-populist” critical juncture in Peru and Poland. As I have shown, these similar patterns resulted from generally parallel logics with origins that can be traced back to the critical juncture.

Perhaps most intriguingly, the Peruvian and Polish pattern of regional polarization is very different from general developments in Ecuador and Slovakia, where populist actors managed to overcome long-standing regional divides. Having originated in two dissimilar types of de-aligning critical juncture – “social-democratic” versus “neoliberal-populist” – two very different sets of reactive sequences led to populist hegemony in Ecuador and Slovakia, on the one hand, and to regional polarization in Peru and Poland, on the other hand. In line with the general theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 4, in all four countries, center-left actors (eventually) enacted market reforms and then declined while populists rose in the aftermath of the critical juncture. Yet the pattern of populist rise was not uniform across countries; while some populists failed to overcome regional divides, others succeeded. The ones that failed – in Peru and Poland – remained secondary political actors in the long term, a legacy of the limits of polarization that had emanated from “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures. The ones that succeeded – in Ecuador and Slovakia – established populist hegemonies by appealing to broad electoral coalitions that social democrats had sacrificed for the sake of leading market reform during the critical juncture.
12.
CONCLUSION:
DIVERGENT LEGACIES, SOCIAL COALITIONS, AND POPULISM

In the preceding chapters, I have offered an empirical analysis linking causes and effects through concrete mechanisms after critical junctures of economic reform in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Beginning with matters of conceptualization, measurement, and theory, my overall analytical framework has allowed me to identify divergent developmental paths and outcomes, as well as intriguing cross-regional parallels. In this concluding chapter, I end the analysis in three final steps. First, I restate my arguments and findings by emphasizing general ideas, the identified causes and effects, and the mechanisms that shape the investigated causal processes.

Second, I dedicate the middle (and largest) section to an analysis of why and how pre-existing electoral coalitions are related to the divergent outcomes of populist hegemonies versus populists in more secondary roles. While in the previous two chapters I suggested a link between the relative breadth of populists’ prior electoral coalitions and their subsequent ability to dominate political arenas, I have not yet elaborated why this is the case. After presenting and arguing against several possible accounts that underscore institutions, here I develop an explanation emphasizing the importance of prior social coalitions. Moreover, based on data from the countries in the paired comparisons, I present empirical evidence linking the relative breadth of prior electoral coalitions to populists’ subsequent ability to dominate political systems featuring radically different institutional configurations. Importantly, I show that whereas the breadth of electoral coalition is not necessarily synonymous with electoral success, broad electoral coalitions facilitate electoral domination, that is, electoral victories by large margins. Because the varying breadth of prior social
coalitions is a legacy of critical junctures, the sources of populists’ varying ability to dominate are not institutional but rather historical and societal.

Third, I end by drawing the theoretical implications of this dissertation. These implications concern (1) the cross-regional study of critical junctures as analytical constructs combining agency and structure into probabilistic causality, (2) the need to reconsider questions about the center-left’s role in the representative politics of developing democracies, and (3) the desirability of approaching the problems of liberal democracies not only from dominant institutionalist viewpoints but also from perspectives focused on societies. I conclude by suggesting that, because societies are arenas that reflect the complex interactions among political agency, structures, and institutions, the study of why and how societies react to shape political realities must be front and center in the analysis of liberal democracy and its problems.

12.1. Key Arguments and Findings

General Ideas

At its core, this dissertation has argued that political agency matters in similar ways for path dependent outcomes in radically different contexts. Political dynamics during critical junctures of development shape subsequent historical trajectories in parallel ways and regardless of structural, cultural, or institutional peculiarities. Indeed, such obvious peculiarities are superficial relative to the striking and exciting similarities that emanate from political dynamics that shape societies, thereby conditioning opportunities for subsequent political actors. Because this iterative historical process involves elements of agency and structure, political agents are both the makers and products of historical processes which – albeit contingent – feature recognizably similar societal paths and behaviors.

I made this abstract, but commonsense, argument by specifically emphasizing the effects that political dynamics have on societies. To do so, I studied how analogous critical
junctures affect the prospects of seemingly different anti-establishment phenomena, which are, in fact, an expression of a similar populist syndrome in Latin American and post-communist European societies. Because this populist syndrome represents a general pattern of illiberal symptoms that characterize some societies more than others, I sought the sources of this variation in a critically important moment for the histories of both regions – the political dynamics during the transition from undemocratic and state-led forms of political and economic development to liberal democracy and the market. Having advanced an argument positing that the choices political agents make during these critical moments are crucial for strikingly parallel subsequent developments across regional contexts, I then not only found evidence in support of this argument, but also uncovered variable mechanisms that link agency and structure in similar ways in Latin America and post-communist Europe.

In general terms, then, this project has demonstrated how developments relative to the populist syndrome can be studied cross-regionally and from the perspective of a probabilistic theory grounded in critical juncture analysis linking agency and structure. Because of its general nature and sweeping scope, the argument was made by introducing several innovations in terms of conceptualization, theory, and empirical investigation. Part I of the project dealt with issues of concept, measurement, and theory, whereas Parts II and III took various approaches to the empirical analysis of critical junctures and their effects on party systems and prospective populist phenomena in both regions.

**Populism, Causes, and Effects**

I began this project by redefining populism as a “family resemblance” concept. I argued against minimalistic (and static) definitions based on necessary and sufficient conditions and for treating populism as a conceptual construct that is adaptable enough as to account for the dynamic and diverse nature of the empirical phenomena it describes in scholarly and ordinary language. By focusing on populism’s disaggregated attributes, which
all too frequently overlap in aggregations of familiar patterns, I discussed how analytical discipline can be imposed and meaningful comparisons made, particularly of phenomena that regionally-focused scholars typically recognize as “populist.”

Having re-conceptualized populism for a disciplined cross-regional analysis, I next developed scoring procedures, which I used to identify variable pattern in Latin America and post-communist Europe. Specifically, I anchored my strictly empirical approach to scoring in what Acemoglu et al. call “the left of the median” aspect of populism,¹ and I used expert surveys and the literature to score all relevant actors in both regions based on ideological positions, location relative to party systems, and personalism. Having provided details regarding the scoring procedures in Chapter 3, I distinguished among “high-degree,” “medium-degree,” and “low-degree” populists for each relevant election cycle in the 33 countries under analysis. This, in turn, allowed me to aggregate the election results of “high-degree” populists only and “high-degree” and “medium-degree” populists combined, thereby constructing two measures of populism. Because these two empirically derived measures are both highly correlated with one another and reflective of the literature on populism in the two regions, my scoring based on the family resemblance conceptualization of populism is valid. Overall, the measures allowed me to observe significant variation in the average total populist vote share among countries in Latin American and post-communist Europe.

I concluded Part I by theorizing this observable variation in both regions. I began by discussing how arguments focused on structure, agency, culture, institutions, or international relations fall short in explaining this variation since they threat such factors without linking them to one another and without transcending within-regional analyses. Next, drawing insights from these different explanations, I developed my own argument, which links agency and structure into a historically contingent theory of institutional development. In particular,

¹ Because this aspect of populism is not inherently stable, my conceptualization is not based on necessary and sufficient conditions.
I based my core argument on Kenneth Roberts’ pioneering work on neoliberal critical junctures in Latin America. First, I argued that because political dynamics during post-communist Europe’s transition to democracy and the market were similar to the ones in Latin America, the critical juncture experience was equally defining for both regions.

Next, I specified this argument by making three key points: (1) I explained why analysis should focus particularly on the political role of historically important “traditional” center-left pillars of party systems during critical junctures; (2) I posited that incentives for ideological consistency and differentiation defined these actors political paths after critical junctures; and (3) I argued that anti-establishment actors with unique incentives (to maximize anti-establishment legitimacy) and organizational capacities (i.e., highly autonomous leaders who make decisions opportunistically) adapted differently to the opportunity structures defined by the center-left. In particular, I hypothesized that if the center-left led market reforms by bait-and-switching during de-aligning critical junctures, subsequent incentives for ideological consistency would lead such center-left market reformers on a centrist path to electoral decline, thus opening opportunity structures for electorally viable populists after the critical juncture. By contrast, where the center-left did not lead market reforms during critical junctures, its more consistent center-left positioning on economic issues would be better able to channel societal grievances, thereby limiting opportunities for subsequent populists’ electoral viability. Notably, because critical junctures, like all historical events, are contingent, this is a probabilistic, not deterministic, theory.

Part II of this project tested this probabilistic theory in two steps. In Chapter 5, I first established empirically that the effects post-communist European critical junctures had on party systems were equivalent to effects in Latin America. Then I disaggregated party systems in both regions into their center-left and center-right pillars and studied the relationship between each of these two pillars’ political positioning during and after critical
junctures, on the one hand, and their subsequent electoral trajectories, on the other hand. By using expert survey data, I specifically showed how incentives for ideological consistency after critical junctures played a variable role for the center-left’s electoral fortunes, and how critical junctures tended to affect the center-left’s electoral performance more than the center-right’s electoral performance.

Having verified the general veracity of the hypothesized relationship between critical junctures and the center-left, I next turned to studying the relationship between center-left electoral performance, as an intervening variable, and the dependent variable – the vote share for populists in both regions. In Chapter 6, I conceptualized four different ways to measure the effect of the critical juncture on both the center-left and center-right pillars of party systems, and I used techniques for statistical analysis to test the hypothesized inverse relationship between center-left electoral performance and the populist vote against many explanations from the literature. By using a rich dataset that I constructed, I performed a variety of statistical tests for both regions separately and together, based on which I concluded that my theory linking types of critical junctures, the center-left, and populism is well supported by the empirical evidence. Where the center-left engaged in economic reform leadership during de-aligning critical junctures, it tended to experience electoral decline which, in turn, facilitated an increased likelihood of populist electoral success in both Latin America and post-communist Europe.

**Uncovering Mechanisms**

With the hypothesized causal relationships supported by the results from the quantitative analysis, in Part III I turned to uncovering the specific mechanisms linking the variables of my theory by means of comparative historical analysis. Because de-aligning critical junctures are the sources of populist electoral viability, they are particularly interesting to study for both normative and theoretical reasons, and especially from a
perspective focused on an intriguing, but unexplored, variation in political dynamics. For example, while some de-aligning critical junctures featured more standard social democratic leadership whose actual policies were in contradiction to campaign promises, as in Ecuador and Slovakia, others featured neoliberal-populist leadership, such as the one associated with Peruvian and Polish presidents Alberto Fujimori and Lech Wałęsa, both of whom also accelerated market reforms after winning elections as opponents of neoliberal candidates. I began studying the effects of such variable subtypes of de-aligning critical junctures by initially paring as “most similar” systems Ecuador and Peru, on the one hand, and Poland and Slovakia, on the other hand.

I started the comparative historical analysis by exploring antecedent conditions and crises – the first two building blocks of critical juncture analysis – in each of these pairs of “most similar” systems. In Chapters 7 and 8, I found a fascinating historical parallel – how despite the many differences across regions, a historical pattern of labor mobilization culminated in hyperinflationary crises during which the traditional center-left was delegitimized in Peru and Poland, whereas a historical pattern of labor de-mobilization or quiescence resulted in relatively milder crises and a comparatively more legitimate center-left in Ecuador and Slovakia. In turn, center-left weakness resulted in the rise of neoliberal populism that would resolve the hyperinflationary disasters during the critical junctures of Peru and Poland. By contrast, a relatively more legitimate center-left would resolve the milder economic crises during the critical junctures of Ecuador and Slovakia. These distinctions between subtypes of de-aligning critical junctures were studied in Chapter 9, where I explored what periods best qualify as “critical” for market reform, exactly what political dynamics took place during these periods, and why critical junctures were highly contingent events in all four countries. Most importantly, despite the great contextual differences, critical junctures in Ecuador and Slovakia were “social-democratic” whereas
critical junctures in Peru and Poland were “neoliberal-populist.” Based on these conceptual parallels, I next switched to pairing “most different” systems for the analysis of path dependencies after these different modes of programmatic de-alignment.

Finally, by tracing the processes emanating from similar subtypes of de-aligning critical junctures, Chapters 10 and 11 found strikingly parallel reactive sequences in radically different systems. In Ecuador and Slovakia, the center-left declined as soon as it led peak market reforms, after which a first populist wave came to electoral prominence without fully achieving its original objectives. Based on these initial failures, opportunistic populist actors (re)positioned themselves for electoral success in a context of continuous economic liberalization, thereby attracting the broad electoral constituencies once associated with the traditional center-left. Having been characterized by social democratic reformism, the critical junctures in Ecuador and Slovakia created a legacy of center-left electoral decline, which was then used as a valuable resource by adaptable populist actors that attracted broad electoral coalitions.

The reactive sequences of Peru and Poland were very different. Having used populist rhetoric to activate for electoral gain constituencies in less developed historical regions, presidents Fujimori and Wałęsa then hurt disproportionately those same electorates with the shock therapeutic measures they sustained in office. Although these now-politicized electorates became available for new rounds of electoral mobilization, they were not mobilized by the traditional center-left whose political comeback depended on its ability to re-generate itself (after being de-legitimized by the late 1980s) by adopting pro-market positions attractive to constituencies in more developed regions. As developmental discrepancies between more and less developed regions were sustained after the critical juncture, the electorates once activated by Fujimori and Wałęsa were eventually used as electoral resources by new populist echoing Fujimori and Wałęsa’s rhetoric and appeals. Yet
the regional polarization that had been activated during the critical juncture also channeled important constraints that limited the breadth of subsequent populists’ electoral coalitions.

Synopsis of Findings

In summary, having re-conceptualized populism, I have not only found similarly variable empirical patterns of populist electoral viability, but also that such patterns are linked to similar causes – namely, the political dynamics during critical junctures – in Latin America and post-communist Europe. By further specifying Roberts’ argument originally developed for Latin America, I have also demonstrated that populists are more likely to be electorally viable after de-aligning critical junctures (associated with bait-and-switch policies) specifically because they have both the incentives and capacities needed to use center-left electoral decline as an opportunity for adaptation and electoral success. Thus, my analysis uncovers similar patterns and then both specifies and generalizes the argument about the variable effects of neoliberal critical junctures.

If my first set of findings is about the generalizability of variable patterns and causal relationships, my second set of finding is about the mechanisms that link causes and effects. Having specified a concrete temporal sequences between agency during critical junctures, subsequent structural legacies, and institutional outcomes, I subjected both steps of this sequence to empirical tests against other potential explanations. The finding that processes associated with the “traditional” center-left (here conceptualized as an intervening variable) matter in analogous ways, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in both context puts in perspective the idea that party systems matter for populist outcomes. I have shown that it is specifically the center-left pillar of party systems that matters most.

My third set of findings comes explicitly from the comparative historical analysis in Part III. First, the tracing of historical processes afforded qualitative validity and context to the more quantitatively based findings in Part II. This is especially evident in the study of
reactive sequences in Ecuador and Slovakia, where social democrats led key market reforms and then declined electorally, a process that ultimately benefited adaptable populist actors, such as Ecuador’s Correa and Slovakia’s SMER. The general logic was also evident in Peru and Poland, where the traditional center-left at first made a comeback after “neoliberal-populist” critical juncture, but then, having adopted more centrist economic positions, declined once again – an opportunity that still benefited populists after the critical juncture\(^2\) (albeit to a lesser extent than in Ecuador and Slovakia).

Additionally, the comparative historical analysis has shown that critical junctures are distinguished by two main factors – (1) the importance of agency and (2) their probabilistic logics. Regarding agency, I found that social-democratic and neoliberal-populist agencies mattered for subsequently divergent outcomes. Yet the type of agency during the critical juncture is also subject to some historical correlates. For instance, social-democratic and neoliberal-populist agency materialized in the contexts of very different types of economic crisis – hyperinflationary *versus* milder crises – which themselves had been conditioned by very different types of historical antecedents – either labor mobilization or labor quiescence. Because agency shapes subsequent outcomes and seems to be conditioned by historical processes, critical junctures likely involve aspects of both structures and agency, as intuited by Thelen, Collier and Munck, and Soifer.\(^3\) Additionally, because agency *does* matter for subsequent outcomes *and* agency is subject to historical contingencies both during and after critical junctures, effects can only be probabilistic. Indeed, as the reactive sequences in the paired comparisons also featured events not explained by the theory, I have found probabilistic, rather than deterministic, causality.

\(^2\) Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS), which after 2001 incorporated voters from the declining center-left, benefited more (and more directly) from the center-left’s decline as compared to Peru’s nationalists led by Ollanta Humala.

\(^3\) Thelen 2004; Collier and Munck 2017; Soifer 2012
Third, I have found that similar political events during critical junctures shape similar political paths regardless of regional particularities. The more unique cases of programmatic de-alignment (under neoliberal populists) in Peru and Poland presented an especially interesting opportunity for theory building from a comparative perspective. By showing how these countries featured reactive sequences that ended with relatively more limited populist constituencies as compared to Ecuador and Slovakia, I demonstrated that the paths to populism can be variable. Specifically, not all populists are able to build broad electoral coalitions. Where their electoral coalitions were relatively broad – as in Ecuador and Slovakia – populists seem to have used opportunity structures after critical junctures as a resource; where social coalitions were relatively narrow – as in Peru and Poland – opportunity structures after critical junctures were both resources and constraints for populists.

Therefore, populists’ social coalitions are an important legacy of how critical junctures shape resources and constraints in subsequent opportunity structures. While I investigated this question of process in Chapters 10 and 11, I also linked the processes characterized by generally variable breadths of social coalitions to divergent legacies in terms of populist abilities to establish long-term domination over political systems. Because I have not yet explored how social coalitions affect populists’ ability to dominate political systems after critical junctures, I dedicate the next section to this important question.

12.2. Populist Coalitions, Hegemonies, and Second Fiddles

In Chapters 10 and 11, I argued that the breath of electoral coalitions matters for populist actors’ abilities to establish hegemonic domination or not. By “hegemonic domination” I mean the ability to command political arenas by winning national elections and governing from the executive branch of government for extended periods of time. In particular, I argued that the broad electoral coalitions in Ecuador and Slovakia facilitated
subsequent populist hegemonies while the more regionally circumscribed electoral coalitions of populist actors in Peru and Poland limited the prospects of such hegemonies. In this section, I specify this argument by explaining in more detail why populists’ electoral coalitions matter more than other factors for their ability to dominate. Before I proceed, however, I briefly discuss these different outcomes and three possible, but problematic, explanations against which I argue.

Populists in Ecuador and Slovakia dominated political arenas for more than a decade. In Ecuador, Rafael Correa and his “party,” Alianza PAIS, won every election during the decade beginning in 2006. As a result, Correa was president for 10 years during which his party dominated Ecuador’s legislature. Meanwhile, also beginning with 2006, the populist party SMER likewise dominated the Slovak government for more than a decade. Altogether, with the exception of a brief 21-month period, SMER governed Slovakia for more than a full decade by winning four consecutive parliamentary elections in 2006, 2010, 2012, and 2016. The fact that both Alianza PAIS and SMER continue governing Ecuador and Slovakia as of the time of this writing (June 2018) is a testament to their long-term commanding power. In short, beginning with their initial electoral victories in 2006, both of these populist actors successfully established hegemonic domination over their countries’ political systems.

A very different outcome is observable in Peru and Poland where populist actors have been much less successful in terms of staying in executive power. In Peru, populist Ollanta Humala first failed to win the presidency in 2006 and then was president for one term (between 2011 and 2016) during which his coalition disintegrated in congress. In Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) won the 2005 and 2015 parliamentary and presidential elections but came second in the 2007 and 2011 parliamentary elections (as well as in the 2010 presidential election). Having risen to prominence in 2005, PiS then spent the eight years between 2007

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4 The candidates backed by SMER also won the first round of the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections.
and 2015 in opposition, as a second fiddle to the dominant Civic Platform (PO). In sum, during the analyzed post-critical juncture period, populists in Peru and Poland failed to establish the type of hegemonic domination achieved by their counterparts in Ecuador and Slovakia.

Overall, populist actors that are otherwise comparably successful in national elections after critical junctures diverge in terms of their ability to dominate political systems. Possibly because such variable patterns are not necessarily related to authoritarian outcomes, institutionalist scholarship focused on (admittedly important) regime types has refrained from studying such divergences. Nevertheless, understanding the sources of this variation is important if we are to make better sense of the links between populists and the actual societies whose legitimate representatives they claim to be.

Possible Explanations and Their Problems

Although scholarship has not directly engaged with the question why some modern populists manage to establish long-term political domination while other fail, the literature suggests three possible factors of importance. Usually grounded in more region-specific arguments and focused on incumbency, these explanations prioritize resources and institutions that either facilitate or restrict populists’ abilities to dominate political systems. While these factors are important for interpreting contextual developments, they cannot explain the variable hegemony-building abilities that populist actors exhibit across regions.

The first argument links the electoral support for populists to the availability of natural resources, such as oil. For example, Kurt Weyland has discussed how the availability of resource wealth can lead risk-prone electorates to support populists in the hope of favorable distribution of rents. In turn, if they manage to ascend to executive power, populists become especially well-positioned to use natural resources for public works and/or

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5 Weyland 2009
clientelistic networks thus “buying” the electoral support of broad constituencies. In sum, the resource-wealth argument posits that the availability of natural wealth enables populist incumbents to prolong executive tenure by clientelistic and other public policy means. Yet this account does not explain why some populists that can exploit natural resource rents – for example, Venezuela’s “maverick populist” president Rafael Caldera (1994-99) – choose not to,\(^6\) while others – such as Slovakia’s SMER – stay in power for long periods without access to such resources. Overall, the natural resource argument does not explain variation in populists’ ability to dominate.

Second, regarding institutions, Levitsky and Way have shown how competitive authoritarian control over the electoral system, judiciary, and media can tilt the playing field in favor of incumbents refusing to step down.\(^7\) Additionally, Levitsky and Loxton have argued convincingly that competitive authoritarian proclivities to corrupt the political game are particularly likely on the part of Andean populists, such as Rafael Correa.\(^8\) Putting Levitsky’s two arguments together and relating them to the issue of hegemonic domination, populism leads to competitive authoritarianism, which can then facilitate hegemonic domination.

While this institutional account explains many developments in the Andes, it also faces important empirical challenges. First, some populists do not attempt to subvert the institutional order in their favor. A direct comparison between Ecuador’s Correa and Peru’s Humala is instructive. Having begun with less popular support than Humala,\(^9\) Correa subverted Ecuador’s institutions after winning a constitutional referendum. By contrast, Humala, who was at first comparably more popular than Correa, did not ever attempts to rule

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\(^6\) Levitsky and Loxton 2013  
\(^7\) Levitsky and Way 2010  
\(^8\) Levitsky and Loxton 2013  
\(^9\) In the 2006 presidential election, Correa began with only 22.8% in the first round. By contrast, Humala won considerably more – 30.6% and 31.7% in the first rounds of the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections, respectively.
in an authoritarian manner. Outside of the Andes, Slovakia’s SMER is another example of a populist actor that refrained from competitive authoritarianism. Second, even when populists attempt competitive-authoritarian tactics, they are not always successful. For instance, Poland’s PiS tried to subvert the constitutional order between 2005 and 2007, but was quickly ousted in 2007. In particular, PiS has been less successful in sabotaging liberal constitutionalism than populist Fidesz in neighboring Hungary. In sum, it is possible for populists to not become (successful competitive) authoritarians. Because the link between populism and competitive authoritarianism remains unclear, the institutionalist argument is not fully convincing.

A second institutionalist argument pertains to party organizations. Its general form posits that the more organizationally capable a party is to adapt, the better its election prospects (and thus the higher its “staying power”). While Burgess and Levitsky have advanced a version of this argument with regard to “leadership autonomy” in Latin America’s (traditional) “labor-based” populist parties, Anna Grzymała-Busse and, more recently, Margit Tavits have argued that party centralization and professionalism lead to electoral success in post-communist Europe. Although important, such arguments are harder to make specifically for modern populist parties, most of which are (invariably) distinguished by uniquely high levels of leadership autonomy. This is certainly the case for the Ecuadorian, Peruvian, Polish, and Slovak parties under analysis, all of which are highly personalistic organizations with considerable leadership autonomy. In addition, Correa’s PAIS and Humala’s PNP are both poorly institutionalized while Fico’s SMER and Kaczyński’s PiS are both relatively well-institutionalized. Because such similar patterns of

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10 While it can be argued that when he won the presidency in 2011 Humala was no longer a populist, this is a post-hoc statement, as noted in Chapter 11. In fact, even though Humala was less radical in 2011 than in 2006, he displayed enough populist features to be considered a populist in 2011 (see Chapter 11). By the same token, Poland’s PiS has also displayed variable levels of radicalism over the years, yet scholarship has consistently considered it “populist.”

11 Burgess and Levitsky 2001

12 Grzymała-Busse 2002; Tavits 2013
institutionalization in each region cannot explain divergent abilities to dominate political systems, the “party institutionalization” argument is inadequate when applied to modern populists.

A final relevant argument is the one about “overcoming regional divides,” as advanced by Polga-Hecimovich regarding Ecuador. This author posits that the long-term electoral success of Alianza PAIS is attributable to the *coattails* of its leader, Rafael Correa, whose presidential election showings featured highly nationalized coalitions. While it is likely that Correa’s appeal in presidential elections is due to either clientelism or competitive authoritarianism (or both), Polga-Hecimovich’s argument also features some institutionalist logic – Correa’s *presidential election* coattails facilitate overall electoral success. In short, the personalist appeals associated with broadly attractive populists, such as Correa, are especially possible in *presidential systems*. While intuitively correct, this account has two problems. First, by focusing on the 2013 elections, it ignores the fact (shown in Chapter 10) that Correa had mostly overcome Ecuador’s regional divide already in the 2006 presidential election – that is, before even becoming president. Second, it does not explain how populist actors can overcome regional divides in non-presidential systems. For example, Slovakia – a country of well-documented regional electoral cleavages – is a parliamentary system where parties do not benefit from presidents’ electoral coattails. Regardless of this, Slovakia’s populist party SMER features a relatively highly nationalized electorate, as discussed in Chapter 10.

Notably, the above explanations *really* are arguments mostly about *incumbency* or *institutions*. Populists stay in power and dominate political systems by taking advantage of the institutions and/or resources that their position of incumbency affords them. As explained

13 Polga-Hecimovich 2014
14 Ibid.
15 Krivý 1995; Szabó and Tátraí 2016; see also Chapter 10, where I show that even HZDS, which dominated Slovakia in the 1990s, had a less nationalized coalition than SMER.
above, such institutional arguments fall short in terms of explaining variation between long-
term populist hegemonies, such as those in Ecuador and Slovakia, and populists in mostly secondary roles, such as those in Peru and Poland. The reason why they fall short, I next argue, has to do with their insufficient attention to the electoral coalitions that populists command – even before they ascent to executive power.

The Importance of Electoral Coalitions

Overall, neither institutional nor other contextual variables can explain populists’ variable ability to establish hegemonies. Because the pairs of “dominant” and “second-fiddle” populists are located in “most different” systems – Ecuador and Slovakia versus Peru and Poland, respectively – the key to this variation must belong to factors beyond institutional and contextual specificities. As an alternative, looking at society can be a theoretically useful strategy. After all, populists represent societal reactions, as this study has argued. As demonstrated with the analysis of weighted Party Nationalization Scores (wPNSs)\(^\text{16}\) in Chapters 10 and 11, in some cases these reactions embody broader electoral coalitions than in others. In particular, the electoral coalitions of dominant populists in Ecuador and Slovakia were comparatively broad. They were comparatively broad in two senses – (1) relative to the electoral coalitions of other political actors in their own countries and (2) relative to the electoral coalition of less dominant populists in Peru and Poland. By contrast, less dominant populists in Peru and Poland had electoral coalitions that were more geographically circumscribed than those of other relevant political actors in these countries.

In short, the relatively broad electoral coalitions of Ecuador’s Correa (and his party) and Slovakia’s SMER correlate with populist hegemonies in these countries. By contrast, the relatively narrow electoral coalitions of Peru’s Humala (and his party) and Poland’s PiS correlate with populist failure to establish long-term domination. Therefore, even if Polga-

\(^{16}\) See Appendix Q for how these scores were calculated.
Hecimovich’s explanation does not apply to the cross-regional analysis of the ability to establish hegemonic domination, his observation about the connection between electoral coalition breadth and populist domination is generalizable – at least within a scope including the countries from this study’s paired comparisons.

**Theoretical Implications of “Party Nationalization”**

Indeed, the extensiveness of electoral coalitions – reflecting variable abilities to attract comparable levels electoral support *across space*\(^{17}\) – can matter a great deal for political outcomes. Scholars of party politics consider this territorial aspect – known as “party nationalization” – to be directly relevant to “fundamental questions about politics and representation, such as state building, the integration of a country’s regions, and distribution of government resources.”\(^{18}\) Overall, then, broad electoral coalitions correspond to high degrees of party nationalization, which is theoretically relevant for important political outcomes. In particular, there are three reasons why the breath of electoral coalitions is relevant to the discussion of populists’ variable ability to dominate in the long term.

First, highly nationalized parties are hypothetically more disciplined\(^ {19}\) and better institutionalized – that is, territorially comprehensive, well-organized, and in charge of their own resources.\(^ {20}\) Second, parties’ ability to transcend regional divides and to attract voters from across the country facilitates “responsible” government that adopts policies benefitting national, rather than local, constituencies.\(^ {21}\) Third, broad electorates facilitate governability because they enhance party unity (around national questions) and because they provide broad

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\(^{17}\) See Appendix Q for a detailed explanation of how electoral support across space is measured. Known also as *(static) party nationalization*, this is the distribution of electoral support *throughout the country* measured as the degree to which a party’s electorate is homogenously distributed across geographical districts (Morgenstern and Pothoff 2005; Morgenstern 2017).

\(^{18}\) Morgenstern 2017: 16, 19

\(^{19}\) Amorim Neto and Santos 2001

\(^{20}\) Lupu 2015

\(^{21}\) Alemán and Kellam 2008: 194
public support allowing executives to form legislative coalitions behind public policies that have a national scope.\textsuperscript{22}

Admittedly, the causal relationships between party nationalization, on the one hand, and either institutionalization or public policy, on the other hand, are not fully understood.\textsuperscript{23} Yet, whether it is related to party organization or it facilitates increased spending on public goods that are \textit{national} in scope,\textsuperscript{24} high party nationalization is associated with political advantages in terms of electoral prospects.\textsuperscript{25} One possible mechanism may be that the positive relationship between party nationalization and the allocation of nationally targeted public goods may create virtuous cycles resulting in the (further) enhancement of nationalized parties’ popular appeals (and election results) and the corresponding erosion of support for less-nationalized political competitors over time.

Regardless of the exact mechanism, according to these theoretical propositions, high degrees of party nationalization benefit both the parties that achieve it \textit{and} their broad (national) electoral coalitions. Highly nationalized parties benefit, including electorally, because they are more united and disciplined around political issues of national importance. Their broad electoral coalitions benefit because they are more likely to gain from national public programs that such parties can adopt. According to this “win-win” scenario, the relationship between parties “staying power” and the breadth of their electoral coalitions is symbiotic. Notably, these theoretical considerations do not suggest in any way that parties’ public policies precede their high degree of party nationalization. It is, in fact, perfectly possible that the opposite is true. As shown in Chapters 10 and 11, the cases of Ecuador,

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{22} Jones and Mainwaring 2003: 143-4; Alemán and Kellam 2008: 193-4; Morgenstern 2017: 20
\textsuperscript{23} Crisp \textit{et al.} 2013
\textsuperscript{24} Castaneda-Angarita 2013. Even for Crisp \textit{et al.} – who argue that party nationalization is \textit{not} a sufficient condition for public goods provision – it is, along with party-system nationalization, a necessary condition (2013: 450).
\textsuperscript{25} Jones and Mainwaring (2003: 160) demonstrate these advantages by showing positive correlations between party nationalization and \textit{size} (conceptualized as vote share) and between party nationalization and \textit{growth} (conceptualized as vote change).
\end{footnotesize}
Slovakia, Peru, and Poland demonstrate that electoral coalitions of variable breadth, indeed, precede populist incumbency.

Electoral Coalitions and Domination: The Empirical Record from the Paired Comparisons

Although I do not test the mechanisms linking party nationalization and subsequent outcomes, the above discussion is highly suggestive that the territorial aspect of electoral support can matter for populists’ ability to dominate political systems. Going back to the paired comparisons of this study, all four countries used to feature regional cleavages. Yet, populists succeeded in overcoming such cleavages in Ecuador and Slovakia while they failed in Peru and Poland. Most importantly, as shown in Chapters 10 and 11, the shape of their social coalitions was obvious even before populists became incumbents. Having attracted highly nationalized coalitions even before coming to power, populists in Ecuador and Slovakia then governed with disciplined parties and allocated public goods. By contrast, having been supported by more regionally defined constituencies, populists in Peru and Poland experienced party splits, defections, and instability.\textsuperscript{26}

In sum, for the four countries from the paired comparisons, relationships between patterns of pre-existing electoral coalitions, on the one hand, and subsequent governability, on the other hand, match the theoretical propositions discussed above. Whereas broad electoral coalitions enhanced populists’ ability to govern in Ecuador and Slovakia, more limited electoral coalitions constrained populists’ ability to govern in Peru and Poland. Because the relative breadth of their electoral coalitions preceded populists’ ascendance to executive power, the original form of these coalitions cannot be a consequence of incumbency. Instead, it is the ability to appeal broadly to the electorate – either across the

\textsuperscript{26} Humala’s coalitions in Peru experienced splintering soon after the 2006 election and then again in the 2011-16 period. In Poland, PiS experienced defections in 2010-11, when Poland Plus, Poland Comes First, and Solidary Poland all splintered from the party. Such splinters did not characterize Ecuador’s Alianza PAIS and Slovakia’s SMER during the period under analysis.
entire country or predominantly in parts of it – that shapes populist prospects to dominate political arenas.

The example of Ecuador’s Rafael Correa is illustrative. As it is well-know, Correa dominated power after winning a referendum for a constitutional assembly which allowed him to re-write the constitution. However, as discussed in Chapter 10, this referendum was not Correa’s idea; in fact, it took Correa some time before adopting this idea from the indigenous movement. Once he appropriated this idea for his 2006 campaign, Correa won the support of the indigenous movement for the second round of the 2006 presidential election. As a result, his coalition became considerably broader. This increased breadth was reflected in the quantitative change in Correa’s weighted Party Nationalization Scores (wPNSs) between the two rounds of the 2006 presidential election – from 0.833 in the first round to 0.939 in the second round. In fact, Correa’s electoral coalition in the second round of the 2006 election was the highest of any presidential candidate in Ecuador since 1978.27 Similarly, already in 2002 – or four years before coming to power – Slovakia’s SMER had the highest wPNS (0.871) for any party in modern Slovakia. In short, populist actors in Ecuador and Slovakia had broad electoral coalitions before becoming incumbents.

Table 12.1 below elaborates the importance of highly nationalized coalitions for populists’ prospects to dominate in the long run. As the table shows, in Ecuador, Correa’s wPNSs were highest in both elections (2006 and 2009) under considerations. In Slovakia, SMER also featured consistently highest wPNSs in every election in which it took part.28 By contrast, in Peru, Humala’s wPNSs in both 2006 and 2011 were generally less impressive

27 Correa’s wPNS from the second round of the 2006 presidential election is overall the second highest in Ecuador’s modern history. The highest wPNS was Jaime Roldós’ score (0.942) from the second round of the 1978 presidential election.
28 While SMER’s wPNS actually dropped somewhat between 2002 and 2006, it was still higher than any other party’s wPNS in 2006 and among the five highest after the fall of communism.
relative to those of other presidential candidates. In Poland, PiS electoral coalitions were also not the highest, on average, in parliamentary elections between 2001 and 2015.

Table 12.1. Comparing the breadth of populist electoral coalitions in Ecuador, Peru, Poland and Slovakia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant populists</th>
<th>Second-fiddle populists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Correa in Ecuador</td>
<td>SMER in Slovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pres. election</td>
<td>Parl. wPNS relative to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006, 1st round highest</td>
<td>2002 highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006, 1nd round highest</td>
<td>2006 highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009, 1st round highest</td>
<td>2010 highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009, 1nd round highest</td>
<td>2012 highest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average wPNS ranking</td>
<td>highest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: weighted Party Nationalizations Scores (wPNSs) come from the author’s own dataset created with subnational level election data for each country.

Overall, populists’ wPNSs were consistently highest in Ecuador and Slovakia whereas they were, on average, second best in Peru and Poland. This means that where populists became dominant, their electoral coalitions were consistently broader than the electoral coalitions of their competitors. By contrast, where populists lacked such consistently broad electoral coalitions, their roles in political arenas were also secondary. Once again, this table shows the centrally important finding that the relative breadth of electoral coalitions is not a consequence of populist incumbency. Correa’s wPNS in 2006 and SMER’s wPNSs in 2002 and 2006 were highest even before these populists became incumbents. This means that if there is a relationship between electoral coalitions and populists’ ability to stay in power, such a relationship starts in society rather than in the executive.

29 In fact, as measured by wPNSs, Humala’s electoral coalition in the first round of the 2011 presidential election (which he won in the second round) was no more nationalized than it was in the first round of the 2006 presidential election (which he lost in the second round).
The general relationship between the breadth of electoral coalitions and overall election results is explored in Figure 12.1 below. This figures is a scatterplot with a total of 1,312 observations depicting the \textit{wPNS and vote share} of all political actors competing in 70 relevant legislative and presidential elections since the fall of dictatorships in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia. As shown, the vast variety of electoral competitors were unsuccessful (clustered on the left) and featuring coalitions of variable breadth (wide-ranging \textit{wPNSs}). However, because the figure shows that parties with relatively high electoral support (above 20.0\%) tend to feature relatively high \textit{wPNSs}, a broad electoral coalition is, in general, a necessary, although insufficient, condition for electoral success. In sum, a broad electoral coalition is clearly not the same as – or the only factor behind – an impressive electoral showing. However, broad electoral coalitions are needed for electoral success, which itself is required for gaining – and staying in – power in the four countries under analysis.

Figure 12.1. Relationship between breadth of electoral coalition and electoral support in legislative and first-round presidential elections in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia
If broad electoral coalitions are necessary for electoral success, they are even more necessary for *dominating* elections – that is, for *winning elections by large margins relative to other political competitors*. Throughout the analysis in Chapters 10 and 11, I specifically emphasized the breadth of populist electoral coalitions *relative* to other political actors’ constituencies. This is, of course, logical. If electorates are a finite resource that political competitors can use in elections, election winners can be expected to have, on average, broader electoral coalitions than election losers. Yet, because the relationship between electoral coalition breadth and absolute electoral results is not linear (as shown in the figure above), the question of victors’ electoral coalition breadth *relative* to that of other parties deserves more careful consideration.

This more *intricate relationship* between electoral coalition breadth and electoral success *relative* to other election competitors is explored in Figure 12.2 below, which once again analyzes observations from the 70 relevant elections in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia. In particular, the figure explores the relationship between the election victor’s wPNS relative to the wPNSs of the effective number of parties\(^\text{30}\) (*the x-axis*) and the likelihood of winning an election (*the y-axis*). Put simply, Figure 12.2 explores the question whether relatively broader electoral coalitions increase the likelihood of *dominating elections* by winning with large margins.

\(^{30}\) I calculated the effective number of parties in each election by using the standard Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula.
Notes:
1. The graph is based on election results and wPNSs from a total of 70 election – 43 legislative and 27 presidential (first-round) – since the fall of dictatorships in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia;
2. The 43 legislative elections include 19 elections for Ecuador (7 for national deputies and 12 for provincial deputies), 8 for Peru, 8 for Poland, and 8 for Slovakia;
3. The 27 first-round presidential elections include 9 elections for Ecuador, 8 for Peru, 6 for Poland, and 4 for Slovakia;
4. I do not consider results from the 22 second-round presidential elections held in the four countries during the period of interest because these elections are only between two candidates (or effective number of parties) and the winners always have higher wPNS scores than the losers.

**Figure 12.2.** Likelihood that election winner’s wPNS is highest among wPNSs of effective number of parties – relative to election victory margin

As shown in this figure, if all 70 elections are considered *regardless of victory margin*, the likelihood that the victor’s wPNS will be highest among the effective number of parties is basically 50-50 (or 51.4% of the cases). Thus, the relative breadth of electoral coalitions does not matter for winning elections *in general* – a finding that substantiates the overall picture presented in the scatterplot above. However, the breadth of electoral coalitions *does* begin to matter for increased margins of victory. For example, when an election victor wins by *at least* 5 percentage points more than the runner-up, the likelihood that the victor’s wPNS score will be highest among those of the effective number of parties increases to 63.3%. In turn, victory margins by at least 10, 15, and 25 point differences from the runner-up correspond to progressively increased likelihood – 70.8%, 87.5%, and 100%, respectively.
– that the victor’s electoral coalition will be the broadest. In sum, the higher the margin of victory, the more likely that the electoral coalition of the victor will be broadest relative to the electoral coalitions of other relevant parties.

**From Institutions to Societies**

Overall, then, broad social coalitions may be necessary for electoral success in absolute terms (as shown in Figure 12.1), but they are even more necessary for winning elections by large margins – that is, in relative terms (as shown in Figure 12.2). While this conclusion is based on election results and \( wPNS \)s for all competitors in elections in the four countries from the paired comparisons, it is particularly relevant for the populist actors analyzed in this project. Table 12.2 below demonstrates how the breadth of electoral coalitions is related to populist electoral domination by only considering the elections (either legislative or first-round presidential\(^{31} \)) actually won by the populist actors after critical juncture in the four countries under analysis. These victorious populist actors are either parties in legislative elections or the candidates these parties supported in presidential elections, and they are ordered from top to bottom by the size of their margins of victory.

\(^{31} \text{Once again, I exclude second-round presidential elections from this analysis because such elections are always won by the candidate with the broader electoral coalition, as measured by } wPNSs.} \)
Table 12.2. Comparing populist electoral domination by margin of victory in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Populist actor</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Election type</th>
<th>Institutional system</th>
<th>Incumbent</th>
<th>Margin of victory</th>
<th>Broader coalition among effective number of parties?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SMER</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Alianza PAIS</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Correa (PAIS)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Presidential (1st round)</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SMER</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Premier-pres.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SMER</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Galčík (Smer)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Presidential (1st round)</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Humala (UPP)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Presidential (1st round)</td>
<td>Presidential-parl.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Humala (PNP)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Presidential (1st round)</td>
<td>Presidential-parl.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Fico (Smer)</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Presidential (1st round)</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>PIS</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Premier-pres.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Presidential-parl.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Duda (PS)</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Presidential (1st round)</td>
<td>Premier-pres.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>UPP</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Legislative</td>
<td>Presidential-parl.</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As this table shows, populist actors won a total of 14 elections during the analyzed period after de-aligning critical junctures in the four countries, and their margins of victory ranged widely – from 0.5 to 35.6 points, with a median of 8.4 (represented by the line separating the top half from the rest). Notably, the order of these victory margin sizes corresponds to neither type of election nor overall institutional system. Regarding election type, presidential and legislative election can be found on both sides of the line, and in fact populists are more likely to dominate legislative elections, which predominate towards the top. Regarding institutional systems, presidentialism clearly does not matter more than parliamentarism – both types as well as subtypes of both systems are found across the range of margins of victory. Incumbency also matters little – whereas incumbents more typically score larger margins of victory, three of the top seven margins, including the largest margin, belong to non-incumbents.

The variable corresponding most to the size of victory margins is the relative breadth of electoral coalitions. Indeed, five of the seven smallest margins of victory (including the three smallest) correspond to electoral coalitions that were not the broadest among effective number of parties. By contrast, six of the top seven margins of victory (including the four
largest margins) correspond to electoral coalitions that were broadest among effective number of parties. Notably, four of the seven largest populist electoral victories took place in Slovakia, with SMER’s 2012 victory displaying the largest of all margins – a whopping 35.6-points ahead of the runner up. Crucially, SMER’s impressive electoral domination in 2012 had nothing to do with the advantages of incumbency, presidentialism, or competitive authoritarianism, and everything to do with the party’s electoral coalition, which was considerably broader than the coalitions of its competitors.

In sum, although broad electoral coalitions are not necessarily synonymous with electoral success, they are considerably helpful for electoral domination. This is the case in both presidential and parliamentary systems, as well as for incumbents and non-incumbents in the four countries under analysis. While I have not tested the mechanisms linking electoral coalition breadth and electoral domination, such mechanisms have been theorized to improve the prospects of governability and redistributive public policies, as discussed above. If some populists establish long-term domination due to such theoretical advantages, the sources of these advantages lie not in institutions, but in the broad electoral coalitions that carry populists to power. Indeed, dominant populists are popular because they often respond to the demands of the broad social constituencies that bring them to power. If, as discussed by Jones and Mainwaring, highly nationalized electorates are normatively desirable because they improve the prospects of governability,\textsuperscript{32} it should come as no surprise that populists who initially enter office with broad coalitions can then capitalize in subsequent elections based on their ability to govern and to redistribute economic resources.

Therefore, social coalitions matter more than institutions for populists’ ability to dominate elections – and political systems of varied institutional configurations – in the long term. As argued in Chapters 10 and 11, whether populists enter power with or without broad

\textsuperscript{32} Jones and Mainwaring 2003. These authors also hypothesize that high party nationalization is favorable for the survival of democracy (2003: 144).
electoral coalitions relative to their political competitors is a function of the political dynamics and path dependencies related to prior critical junctures. As shown above, six of the bottom seven populist margins of victory are found in either Peru or Poland – where populists after neoliberal-populist critical junctures attracted comparatively narrow constituencies. By contrast, six of the top seven margins of victory are found in either Ecuador or Slovakia – where populists after social democratic critical junctures attracted relatively broad constituencies. It is specifically after social democrats betray their originally broad constituencies during critical junctures that populists become particularly likely to exploit these newly available electorates as resources for subsequent electoral domination. Because such populists then provide their already broad constituencies with the public goods that social democrats had failed to offer during and after critical junctures, electorates routinely reward populists with the support necessary for long-term hegemonic domination.

12.3. Theoretical Implications

Overall, this dissertation offers several implications about how to improve the study of liberal democracies and their problems from a comparative perspective that is methodologically pluralistic as well as sensitive to historical structures and contingencies. In particular, there are three sets of theoretical implications, each having to do with the overall argument’s main components – critical junctures, the center-left, and populism.

Beginning with critical junctures, the implications are mostly methodological. Although few studies approach critical junctures from a cross-regional angle, such studies can tell us much about how similar historical moments can have parallel path dependent effects on politics and societies regardless of contextual particularities. Scholars can think about what other historical events qualify as sufficiently similar in the ways that the Latin American and post-communist European transitions to democracy and the market were. For example, are the migrant crises provoked by political violence and instability in the Middle
East and Central America similarly comparable critical junctures and do they have parallel effects on the polities and societies they affect? Overall, by expanding the geographical scope of analysis, scholars can learn from experiences in other regions about how causes and effects are related in generalizable ways that are also sensitive to history.

Second, to study the effects of critical junctures means to analyze how agents and structures interact in historically contingent and probable ways. Since historical events are contingent, historical institutional analysis does not have to rely solely on qualitative techniques or deterministic logics, an argument already advanced by Dunning. In fact, qualitative and quantitative research can and should be mixed in order to learn more about how political agents affect structures and are, in turn, affected by them. Most importantly, because contingency and determinism interact, to study historical macro phenomena means to study central tendencies. Comparative historical analysis does not have to explain every event, but rather the general picture, and to do this, methods underscoring determinism ought to be mixed with methods suited for analyzing probable causality, as this study has done.

Third, as the case studies in this project demonstrated, critical junctures can condition opportunity structures best understood as resources, constraints, or both. Scholars should distinguish more carefully between opportunity structures as resources or constraints, and theorize under what conditions variable opportunity structures are more likely to emerge in the aftermath of critical junctures, as well as how such structures can affect subsequent political behaviors. For example, based on the paired comparison in this study, I theorized why and how critical junctures were mostly used as resources by populists in Ecuador and Slovakia whereas they were both resources and constraints due to the regional polarization in Peru and Poland. The more scholars develop such theories, the more insight we will gain about how exactly critical junctures matter.

33 Dunning 2017
Regarding the center-left, my findings put in some perspective previous research by leading scholars of post-communism, such as Grzymała-Busse and Tavits, who have argued that the re-generation of ex-communist parties was generally a positive development both for these parties’ electoral prospects and for liberal democracy. Benefitting from an expanded geographical scope and a temporal perspective covering developments after these authors’ publications, my findings problematize such optimistic conclusions. In fact, my findings suggest the opposite – that the center-left’s acceptance of economically liberal ideas comes with a heavy price in the long term. Specifically, if such ideological regeneration results in long-term electoral decline that facilitates opportunities for a populist backlash, liberal democracies may end up weakened rather than strengthened. Here, I am certainly not advancing a normative argument for a return to communist ideology nor am I proposing that such parties had much of a choice. However, rather than close the book on the center-left’s ideological transformation, scholars should consider that the long-term consequences of the social democratic abdication from representative politics are not necessarily positive for developing liberal democracies.

Finally, this study has remained agnostic about the effects of populism, which was treated impartially and, for the most part, as a dependent variable. 34 This approach is obviously different from many others that treat populism as an independent variable with potentially detrimental effects for liberal democracy. While these are admittedly pertinent and timely questions that should continue attracting scholarly attention., I have not theorized or analyzed why some populists sabotage liberal democratic orders. Because all modern populists ascend to power with the democratic support of electoral coalitions, I have instead focused on the electoral sources of populism as a global phenomenon that afflicts some societies more than others.

34 Except for studying the effects of “neoliberal-populist” critical junctures under Fujimori and Wałęsa.
According to my perspective, the links between political agents, structures, and institutions can be complex, but they are clearly reflected in the societies defined and governed by them. Societies are arenas that are affected by political agency and from which reactions against institutional orders emerge under given structural conditions. Yet, as this study has shown, these conditions depend not on particularistic structural, cultural, or institutional configurations, but rather on the ways in which critical junctures shape developmental paths. It is for this reason that standard analyses focused on specific elites and institutions are considerably limited when it comes to understanding the problem of contemporary populism. Although liberal democracies in Latin America and post-communist Europe may come in varying institutional configurations, the problems that their societies experienced after critical junctures of economic reform were not very different. For this reason, a perspective emphasizing why and how societies react can tell us more than institutional accounts can about some common problems of many liberal democracies around the world.

Of course, not all liberal democracies encounter analogous problems and neither do they experience the populist syndrome for the same reasons. Indeed, this study has not analyzed developments in the United States, Western Europe, or other contexts where racism and xenophobia – rather than reactions to political dynamics during market reform – seem to have fueled new populist phenomena. Even within Latin America and post-communist Europe, recent developments have indicated the likely end of the post-neoliberal period and the rise of newly salient issues that may shape political trajectories well into the future. What this study has emphasized are the parallel ways in which similar political dynamics during the consequential experiences of transition to democracy and the market shaped political realities and subsequent behaviors in two distinct world regions. Despite the historical specificity of the argument, its main takeaway is a general and hopeful one. If human agency
is both the product and the maker of political reality, then people are responsible not only for the problems of their own democratic societies, but also for the solutions to these problems.
APPENDICES

Appendix A. List of Interviews Conducted During Fieldwork in Poland, Slovakia, Peru, and Ecuador (In Chronological Order)

As part of the research for this project, I conducted 101 interviews during fieldwork in Poland (25 interviews), Slovakia (20 interviews), Peru (32 interviews), and Ecuador (24 interviews). The lists below include all of these interviews, the great majority of which are de-identified for the purposes of confidentiality.

Overall, 83 of the interviews listed contain a code with letters and numbers. The letters indicate the country where the interview took place (“POL” for Poland, “SVK” for Slovakia, “PER” for Peru, and “ECU” for Ecuador) and the numbers document the order of interviews within the overall sequence in each country. The remaining 18 interviewees are identified by name because these individuals, all of whom are public figures (mostly national level politicians), gave me explicit permission to use their names for the purposes of this research project, even after I outlined matters of confidentiality during informed consent procedures.

Each item in the lists below contains three parts: (1) the interviewee’s code (or name where appropriate), (2) a brief description of the individual, and (3) the location and date of the interview.

Interviews in Poland (March – April, 2015)

1. POL-01: district board chairman from Law and Justice (PiS). Krakow, March 12, 2015;
2. Wojciech Kolarski: elected councilor representing PiS in Krakow’s city council and then-presidential candidate Andrzej Duda’s bureau chief at the time of the interview. Krakow, March 13, 2015;
3. POL-03: local party functionary from PiS. Krakow, March 15, 2015;
4. POL-04: local politician from PiS. Krakow, March 18, 2015;
5. POL-05: assistant to a high-ranking politician from PiS. Krakow, March 18, 2015;
6. POL-06: local politician from PiS. Krakow, March 18, 2015;
7. POL-07: local politician from PiS. Krakow, March 19, 2015;
8. POL-08: treasurer of a district board from PiS. Krakow, March 24, 2015;
9. POL-09: district board chairman from PiS. Krakow, March 24, 2015;
11. POL-11: local politician from PiS. Krakow, March 26, 2015;
12. POL-12: local politician from PiS. Krakow, March 26, 2015;
13. POL-13: district board treasurer from PiS. Krakow, March 27, 2015;
15. POL-15: district board chairman from PiS. Krakow, March 28, 2015;
17. POL-17: district board chairman from PiS. Krakow, March 29, 2015;
18. Peter Boron: former senator from PiS. Krakow, March 30, 2015;
19. POL-19: assistant to a high-level politician from PiS. Krakow, April 1, 2015;
20. POL-20: young PiS activist. Warsaw, April 7, 2015;
21. POL-21: youth leader from PiS. Warsaw, April 9, 2015;
22. POL-22: PiS activist. Warsaw, April 12, 2015;
23. POL-23: local politician from PiS. Warsaw, April 14, 2015;
24. POL-24: journalist with a national newspaper. Warsaw, April 16, 2015;
25. POL-25: social scientist employed at a leading NGO. Warsaw, April 16, 2016.

Interviews in Slovakia (April – May, 2015)

26. SVK-01: civil society activist opposed to Direction (SMER). Bratislava, April 21, 2015;
27. SVK-02: political analyst and academic. Bratislava, April 22, 2015;
28. SVK-03: former SMER politician. Bratislava, April 23, 2015;
29. SVK-04: political scientist and commentator. Bratislava, April 23, 2015;
32. SVK-08: social scientist and political commentator. Bratislava, April 30, 2015;
33. SVK-09: social scientist and political commentator. Bratislava, April 30, 2015;
34. Robert Žanony – left-leaning political consultant associated with SMER and prime minister Robert Fico. Bratislava, April 30, 2015;
35. Katarína Nevedałová – former member of the European Parliament from SMER who, at the time of the interview, was in charge of the party’s foreign office. Bratislava, May 4, 2015;
36. Dr. Martin Muránsky: director of SMER’s think-tank ASA and self-described Kantian and Haideggerian political theorist. Bratislava, May 6, 2015;
37. Miroslav Čiž: deputy speaker of Slovakia’s parliament from SMER. Bratislava, May 6, 2015;
38. Luboš Blaha: leftist member of parliament from SMER. Bratislava, May 6, 2015;
39. SVK-15: high-ranking member of a Slovak NGO. Bratislava, May 7, 2015;
41. SVK-17: employee of the national government. Bratislava, May 13, 2015;
42. Andrej Kolesík: member of parliament from SMER. Bratislava, May 13, 2015;
43. SVK-19: social scientist and political commentator. Bratislava, May 13, 2015;

Interviews in Peru (October, 2015 – January, 2016)

46. PER-01: APRA activist. Lima, October 28, 2015;
47. PER-02: APRA activist. Lima, October 30, 2015;
48. PER-03: long-term APRA activist. Lima, November 4, 2015;
49. PER-04: ARPA activist. Lima, November 5, 2015;
Interviews in Ecuador (June – August, 2016)

78. ECU-01: small business owner antagonistic to Alianza PAIS. Quito, June 15, 2016;
79. ECU-02: small business owner antagonistic to Alianza PAIS. Quito, June 20, 2016;
81. ECU-04: Alianza PAIS activist. Quito, July 10, 2016;
82. ECU-05: leading journalist opposed to Alianza PAIS. Quito, July 18, 2016;
83. ECU-06: political functionary employed at the National Assembly. Quito, July 26, 2016;
84. ECU-07: social scientist and political commentator. Quito, July 26, 2016;
86. ECU-10: former activist of Pachakutik who, at the time of the interview, was a government employee sympathetic to Alianza PAIS. Quito, July 29, 2016;
87. ECU-10: government employee sympathetic to Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 2, 2016;
88. ECU-11: government employee sympathetic to Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 2, 2016;
89. ECU-12: government employee highly critical of Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 3, 2016;
90. ECU-13: leading journalist critical of Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 4, 2016;
91. ECU-14: youth leader of Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 4, 2016;
92. ECU-15: government employee associated with Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 8, 2016;
93. ECU-16: social scientist employed with Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 14, 2016;
94. Pamela Troya: LGBTQ and human right activist and speaker for the campaign “Egalitarian Civil Union in Ecuador.” Quito, August 15, 2016;
95. ECU-18: social scientist and political commentator. Quito, August 17, 2016;
96. ECU-19: leading civil society activist opposed to Alianza PAIS. Quito, August 18, 2016;
97. ECU-20: high-ranking member of an Ecuadorian NGO. Quito, August 18, 2016;
98. ECU-21: political functionary of the Democratic Left (ID). Quito, August 19, 2016;
99. Luis Monge: Alianza PAIS secretary responsible for the party’s territorial organization. Quito, August 19, 2016;
100. ECU-23: leftist social scientist and political commentator. Quito, August 23, 2016;
## Appendix B. Left-Populist Party Families in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

### Latin America: 47 parties in the “left-populist” party family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Front for Victory (FpV): Frente para la Victoria</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Front for a Country in Solidarity (FREPASO): Frente por un País Solidario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support for an Egalitarian Republic / Civic Coalition (ARI/CCC): Afirmación para una República de Iguales / Confederación Coalición Civica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broad Progressive Front / Progresistas (FAP/Progresistas): Frente Amplio Progresista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Workers’ Left Front (FIT): Frente de Izquierda y de los Trabajadores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Conscience of the Fatherland (CONDEPA): Conciencia de Patria</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solidarity Civic Unity (UCS): Unidad Civica Solidaridad</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Free Bolivia Movement (MBL): Movimiento Bolivia Libre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Left (IU): Izquierda Unida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement for Socialism (MAS): Movimiento al Socialismo</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pachakutik Indigenous Movement (MIP): Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberty and Justice Party (LJ): Partido Libertad y Justicia</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Alliance (AS): Alianza Social</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Movement Without Fear (MSM): Movimiento Sin Miedo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Democratic Labor Party (PDT): Partido Democrático Trabalhista</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialism and Liberty Party (PSOL): Partido Socialismo e Libertade</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>Progressive Party (PP): Partido Progresista</td>
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<td>Humanist Party (PH): Partido Humanista</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>Democratic Force (FD): Fuerza Democrática</td>
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<td>Broad Bront (FA): Frente Amplio</td>
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<tr>
<td>Domin. Rep.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>New Country Movement (MNP): Movimiento Nuevo País</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement – New Country (MUPP-NP):</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik – Nuevo País</td>
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<td>Patriotic Society Party (PSP): Partido Sociedad Patriótica</td>
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<td>PAIS Alliance – Proud and Sovereign Fatherland (PAIS): Alianza PAIS – Patria Altiva i Soberana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democratic People’s Movement (MPD): Movimiento Popular Democratico</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizens’ Movement (MC): Movimiento Ciudadano</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethics and Democracy Network (RED): Red Ética y Democracia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

563
El Salvador  United Democratic Center (CDU): Centro Demócrata Unido

Guatemala  Authentic Integral Development (DIA): Desarrollo Integral Auténtico
Democratic Union (UD): Unión Democrática
Democratic Front New Guatemala (FDNG): Frente Demócratico Nueva Guatemala
Progressive Liberating Party (PLP): Partido Libertador Progresista
Center for National Action (CASA): Centro de Acción Social

Honduras  Liberty and Refoundation (LIBRE): Libertad y Refundación

Mexico  Labor Party (PT): Partido del Trabajo
Social Democratic and Peasant Alternative Party (PASC): Partido Alternativa Socialdemócrata y Campesina

Nicaragua  Sandanista Renovation Movement (MRS): Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista

Panama  None

Paraguay  Patriotic Alliance for Change (APC): Alianza Patriótica por el Cambio
Guasú Front (FG): Frente Guasú
Forward Country (AP): Avanza País

Peru  Union for Peru (UPP): Unión por el Perú
Peruvian Nationalist Party (PNP): Partido Nacionalista Peruano

Uruguay  New Space (NE): Nuevo Espacio
Independent Party (PI): Partido Independiente

Venezuela  Fifth Republic Movement / United Socialist Party of Venezuela (MVR/PSUV): Movimiento Quinta (V) República / Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
Radical Cause (LCR): La Causa Radical

Post-communist Europe: 53 parties in the “left-populist” party family

Albania  Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI): Lëvizja Socialiste për Integrin

Bulgaria  Party “Attack” (ATAKA): Ataka / Атака
Bulgaria Without Censorship (BBT): Balgarija Bez Tsensura / България Без Цензура
National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) Natzionalen Front za Spasenie na Bulgaria / Национален Фронт за Спасение на България
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO-BND) (Vatreshna Makedonska Revolyutcionna Organizatsiya -
Bulgarsko Natsionalno Dvizhenie / Вътрешна Македонска Революционна Организация – Българско Национално Движение, ВМРО-БНД
Order, Law, and Justice (RZS): Red, Zakonnost i Spravedlivost / Ред, Законност и Справедливост
Liberal Initiative for Democratic European Development (LIDER): Liberalna Initiativa za Demokratichno Evropeisko Razvitie / Либерална Инициатива за Демократично Европейско Развитие
Alternative for Bulgarian Revival (ABV): Alternativa za Balgarsko Vazrazhdane / Алтернатива за Българско Възраждане

Croatia
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP): Hrvatska Stranka Prava
Croatian Party of Rights Dr. Ante Starčević (HSP-AS): Hrvatska Stranka Prava dr. Ante Starčević

Czech Rep.
None

Estonia
Estonian Country People’s Party / People’s Union (EME/ER): Eesti Maarahva Erakond / Eestimaa Rahvaliit
Estonian Center Party (EK): Eesti Keskerakond

Hungary
Fidesz – Hungarian Civil Union (FIDESZ): Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség
Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP): Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja
Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik): Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom
Politics Can Be Different (LMP): Lehet Más a Politika

Latvia
None

Lithuania
New Union (NS): Naujoji Sąjunga
Order and Justice (TT): Tvarka ir Teisingumas
Labor Party (DP): Darbo Partija
Way of Courage (DK): Drąsos Kelias
Lithuanian Peasants’ Party (LVP): Lietuvos Valstiečių Partija
Lithuanian Peasant and Popular Union / Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (LVLS/LVŽS): Lietuvos Valstiečių Liaudininkų Sąjunga / Lietuvos Valstiečių ir Žaliųjų Sąjunga
New Democracy Party (NDP): Naujosios Demokratijos Partija
Front Party (FRONTAS): Fronto Partija

Macedonia
New Social Democratic Party (NSDP): Nova Socijaldemokratska Partija / Нова Социјалдемократска Партија
Citizen’s Option for Macedonia (GROM): Graѓanska Opcija za Makedonija / Граѓанска Опција за Македонија
Moldova  
Socialist Party of Moldova “Motherland” / Party of Socialists (PSMPR/PSRM): Partidul Socialiștilor din Moldova Patria “Rodina” / Partidul Socialiștilor din Republica Moldova
Blocul Electoral "Alianța Braghiș" (BEAB): Electoral Bloc Braghiș Alliance
Social Democratic Party of Moldova (PSD): Partidul Social Democrat

Poland  
Law and Justice (PiS): Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
Self-Defense of the Republic (SRP): Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej
League of Polish Families (LPR): Liga Polskich Rodzin
Labor Union (UP): Unia Pracy
Social Democracy of Poland (SDPL): Socjaldemokracja Polska

Romania  
Greater Romania Party (PRM): Partidul România Mare
People’s Party – Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD): Partidul Poporului – Dan Diaconescu
National Union for the Progress of Romania (UNPR): Uniunea Națională pentru Progresul României
Romanian Humanist Party / Conservative Patty (PUR/PC): Partidul Umanist Român / Partidul Conservator

Slovakia  
Direction – Social Democracy (SMER): Smer – Sociálna Demokracia
Slovak National Party (SNS): Slovenská Národná Strana
True Slovak National Party (PSNS): Pravá Slovenská Národná Strana
Movement for Democracy (HZD): Hnutie za Demokraciu
People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS): L’udová Strana – Hnutie za Demokratické Slovensko

Slovenia  
Slovenian National Party (SNS): Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka
For Real – New Politics (ZARES): Žares – Nova Politika
Positive Slovenia (PS): Pozitivna Slovenija
Alliance of Alenka Bratušek (ZaAB): Zavezništvo Alenke Bratušek
United Left (ZL): Združena Levica
Active Slovenia (AS): Aktivna Slovenija

Ukraine  
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU): Prohresivna Sotsjialistychna Partiya Ukrayiny / Прогресивна Соціалістична Партія України
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc / All Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” (BYuT/Fatherland): Blok Yuliyi Tymoshenko / Vseukrayinske Obyednannya “Batkyvshchyna” (Блок Юлії Тимошенко / Всеукраїнське Об’єднання "Батьківщина")
All Ukrainian Union “Freedom” (Freedom): Vseukrayinske Obyednannya "Svoboda" / Всеукраїнське Об’єднання “Свобода”
Appendix C. Scoring Members of the Left-Populist Party Families

Table A.1. Scoring members of the left-populist party family in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Relevant Party</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Economy &amp; Global. Score</th>
<th>Location Score</th>
<th>Personalism Score</th>
<th>OVERALL SCORE</th>
<th>Degree of Populism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>FREPASO</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2007</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>high</td>
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<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>medium</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix D. End of Critical Junctures of Market Reform in Latin American and Post-communist European Countries

End of critical junctures in Latin America (for more details, see Roberts 2014)

End of critical junctures in post-communist Europe (for more details, see Chapter 5)
Appendix E. Critical Junctures and Electoral Volatility in Post-communist Europe

Table A.3. Average volatility rates in post-communist Europe by type of critical juncture of market reforms (parliamentary elections only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Extra-systemic</th>
<th>Intra-systemic</th>
<th>Total Volatility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aligning and re-aligning critical junctures</td>
<td>Group average during critical junctures</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2001-2013</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2001-2014</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>2000-2015</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>1996-2013</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1995-2015</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1995-2014</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2002-2014</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>2001-2014</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2000-2012</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group average after critical junctures</strong></td>
<td><strong>(N = 48)</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| De-aligning critical junctures | Group average during critical junctures | 13.0 | 17.2 | 30.2 |
| Hungary      | 1998-2014   | 7.2            | 14.5           | 21.7            |
| Lithuania    | 1996-2012   | 18.2           | 23.6           | 41.8            |
| Poland       | 1997-2015   | 18.5           | 16.8           | 35.3            |
| Slovakia     | 2002-2014   | 20.6           | 14.3           | 34.9            |
| Slovenia     | 1996-2014   | 14.5           | 18.8           | 33.3            |
| Ukraine      | 1998-2012   | 19.2           | 12.8           | 32.1            |
| **Group average after critical junctures** | **(N = 31)** | **16.4** | **16.8** | **33.2** |

Note: N equals number of elections after critical junctures. For each country, I include the last legislative election prior to 2016. For the Ukrainian case, I exclude the 2014 legislative election, which was in aftermath of the 2014 revolution and, therefore, extremely volatile.
Figure A.4. Post-communist volatility rates after critical junctures of market reform (presidential elections only)
Appendix F. Key Center-Left Parties in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

Latin America: Key center-left parties

Argentina
Justicialist Party (PJ): Partido Justicialista

Bolivia
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR): Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario;
Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR): Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria

Brazil
Workers’ Party (PT): Partido dos Trabalhadores

Chile
Coalition/Socialist Party: Concertación/PS

Colombia
19th of April Movement (M-19): Movimiento 19 de Abril (1990);
Colombian Compromise: Compromiso Colombia (1994);
(Independent/Alternative) Democratic Pole: Polo Democrático (Independiente/Alternativo) (2000s)

Costa Rica
National Liberation Party (PLN): Partido Liberación Nacional

Dominican Rep.
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD): Partido Revolucionario Dominicano

Ecuador
Democratic Left (ID): Izquierda Democrática;
Concentration of People’s Forces (CFP): Concertación de Fuerzas Populares

El Salvador
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN): Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional

Guatemala
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG): Unidad Nacional Revolucionaria Guatemalteca;
National Unity of Hope (UNE): Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza

Honduras
Innovation and Unity Party (PINU): Partido Innovación y Unidad;
Democratic Unification Party (PUD): Partido Unificación Democrática

Mexico
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD): Partido de la Revolución Democrática

Nicaragua
Sandanista National Liberation Front (FSLN): Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional

Panama
Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD): Partido Revolucionario
### Post-communist Europe: Key center-left parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Key Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Albania (PSS): Partia Socialiste e Shqipërisë</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP): Bulgarska Sotsialisticheska Partiya (Българска Социалистическа Партия)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Croatia (SPH): Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM): Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Moderates / Social Democratic Party (SDE): Rahvaerakond Mõõdudak / Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP): Magyar Szocialista Párt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party Harmony (SDPS): Sociāldemokrātiskā Partija&quot;Saskaņa&quot; (formerly, People’s Harmony, TSP: Tautas Saskaņas Partija / Harmony Center, SC: Saskaņas Centrs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Democratic Labor Party / Social Democratic Party of Lithuania (LDDP/LSP): Lietuvos Demokratinė Darbo Partija / Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Social Democratic Union (SDSM): Socijaldemokratski Sojuz na Makedonija (Социјалдемократски Сојуз на Македонија)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Party Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM): Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Democratic Left Alliance (SLD): Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (PSD): Partidul Social Democrat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Party of the Democratic Left (SDL): Strana Demokratickej L’avice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Social Democrats (SD): Socialni Demokrati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU): Komunistychna Partiya Ukrayiny (Комуністична партія України)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU): Sotsialistychna Partiya Ukrainy (Соціалістична Партія України)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix G. Electoral Performance of Major Center-Left Parties Relative to Critical Junctures of Market Reform in Latin America and Post-communist Europe (Alternative Measure)

Table A.5. Latin America: Performance of major center-left parties relative to critical junctures of market reform before and during the 2000s (% votes cast in presidential elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Aligning critical junctures</th>
<th>Neutral critical junctures</th>
<th>De-aligning critical junctures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>performance</td>
<td>performance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>before 2000s</td>
<td>during 2000s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PT</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Concertación/PS</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>PRD</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>33.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.8</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Note 1          | N equals the number of elections in which parties competed for each period. The two periods are (1) before the 2000s (up to and including 1999) and (2) the 2000s (2000-2015). |
| Note 2          | For Argentina, PJ's performance after the critical juncture includes support for Menem and Kirchner (in 2003) and for Kirchnerismo thereafter. |
| Note 3          | For Peru, included in the calculation for the post-CJ average are results from the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections only because APRA did not run a candidate in the 2011 presidential election. Excluding Peru completely (as in the table for ideological positions in the main text) results in a similar score for the average change in performance after de-aligning critical junctures (-12.1). |
| Note 4          | For Venezuela, included in the calculation are the 1998 and 2000 legislative election results because AD did not field presidential candidates in these elections. |
Table A.6. Post-communist Europe: Performance of major center-left parties relative to critical junctures of market reform before and during the 2000s (% votes cast in parliamentary elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1990s average performance</th>
<th>2000s average performance</th>
<th>Change in performance</th>
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<td>Aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>PSS</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>SPH</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>ČSSD, KSČM</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>SDE</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>SDPS</td>
<td>10.6</td>
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<td>11.6</td>
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<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>(N = 17)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 22)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Re-aligning critical junctures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
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<td>PCRM</td>
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<td>40.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>16.6</td>
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<td>Group average</td>
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<td>27.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<td>(N = 10)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 19)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aligning and De-aligning CJs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>combined groups average</td>
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<td>23.5</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 41)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De-aligning critical junctures</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Hungary</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
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<td>32.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>17.7</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
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<td>19.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
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<td>SDL'</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>-12.3</td>
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<td>SD</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>KPU, SPU</td>
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<td>14.8</td>
<td>-10.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 16)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. N equals the number of elections in which parties competed for each period. The two period are (1) the 1990s (1990-1999) and (2) the 2000s (2000-2015).
2. Ukraine's Communist Party and Socialist Party are included, even though they were not instrumental for the implementation of neoliberal reforms under populist president Kuchma. Excluding Ukraine (as in the table for ideological positions in the main text) strengthens the results even further, resulting in a group average change in performance of -3.7 after de-aligning critical junctures.
Appendix H. Major Center-Right Parties in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

Latin America: Major center-right parties

Argentina
Union of the Democratic Center (UCEDE): Unión del Centro Democrático
Action for the Republic (ApR): Acción por la República
Recreate for Growth (RECREAR): Recrear para el Crecimiento
Federal/Dissident Peronism: Peronismo Federal/Disidente
Let’s Change (Cambiemos): Cambiemos

Bolivia
Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN): Acción Democrática Nacionalista

Brazil
Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB): Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira

Chile
Alianza: Alliance, with main parties
National Renewal (RN): Renovación Nacional
Independent Democratic Union (UDI): Unión Demócrata Independiente

Colombia
Colombian Conservative Party / Social Conservative Party (PCC/PSC):
Partido Conservador Colombiano / Partido Social Conservador
Uribismo: Colombia First / Democratic Center (PC/CD):
Social Party of National Unity (PSUN): Partido Social de Unidad Nacional

Costa Rica
Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC): Partido Unidad Socialcristiana

Dominican Rep.
Partido Reformista / Partido Reformista Social Cristiano
Dominican Liberation Party (PLD): Partido de la Liberación Dominicana

Ecuador
Popular Democracy / Christian Democratic Union (DP/UDC): Democracia Popular / Unión Demócrata Cristiana

El Salvador
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA): Alianza Republicana Nacionalista
National Coalition Party (PCN): Partido de Concertación Nacional
Christian Democratic Party (PDC): Partido Demócrata Cristiano
Unity (PCN/PDC coalition): Unidad (2014)

Guatemala
Guatemalan Republican Front / Institutional Republican Party FRG/PRI):
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco / Partido Republicano Institucional
National Advancement Party (PAN): Partido de Avanza Nacional
Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG): Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca

Honduras
National Party of Honduras (PNH): Partido Nacional de Honduras
Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH): Partido Liberal de Honduras

Mexico
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI): Partido Revolucionario Institucional
National Action Party (PAN): Partido Acción Nacional

Nicaragua
Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC): Partido Liberal Constitucionalista
Liberal Alliance (AL): Alianza Liberal (1996)

Panama
Panameñista/Arnulfista Party (PP): Partido Panameñista/Arnulfista
Christian Democratic Party / People’s Party (PDC/PP): Partido Demócrata Cristiano / Partido Popular
Nationalist Republican Liberal Movement (MOLIRENA): Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista
Democratic Change (CD): Cambio Democrático (2009 and 2014)

Paraguay
National Republican Association – Colorado Party (ANR-PC): Asociación Nacional Republicana – Partido Colorado

Peru
Popular Action (AP): Acción Popular
Christian People’s Party (PPC): Partido Popular Cristiano
Democratic Front (FREDEMO): Frente Democrático (1990; included AP and PPC)
Alliance for the Great Change – PPK (PPK): Alianza Por El Gran Cambio – Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (2011, led by PPC)

Uruguay
National Party (PN): Partido Nacional
Colorado Party (PC): Partido Colorado

Venezuela
Social Christian Party (COPEI): Partido Socialcristiano (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente)

Post-communist Europe: Major center-right parties

Albania
Democratic Party of Albania (PDSH): Partia Demokratike e Shqipërisë

Bulgaria
Croatia
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ): Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica

Czech Rep.
Civic Democratic Party (ODS): Občanská Demokratická Strana
Christian Democratic Union /People’s Party (KDU–ČSL): Křesťanská a
Demokratická Unie – Československá Strana Lidová

Estonia
Pro Patria/Estonian Reform Party (Fatherland/ER): Isamaaliit / Eesti Reformierakond

Hungary
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ): Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a
Magyar Liberális Párt

Latvia
Latvian Way/Latvia’s First Party (LC/LPP): Latvijas Ceļš / Latvijas Pirmā Partija

Lithuania
Homeland Union – Lithuanian Christian Democrats (TS-LKD): Tėvynės
Sąjunga – Lietuvos Krikščionys Demokratai
Lithuanian Christian Democrats (LKDP): Lietuvos Krikščionių Demokratų Partija

Macedonia
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for
Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE): Vnatrešno Makedonska
Revolucionerna Organizacija - Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Edinstvo (Внатрешна Македонска Революционерна Организация – Демократска Партия за Македонско Национално Единство)

Moldova
Christian Democratic People’s Party (PPCD): Partidul Popular Creștin Democrat
Reform Party / Liberal Party (RP/LP): Partidul Reformei / Partidul Liberal

Poland
Democratic Union / Freedom Union (UD/UW): Unia Demokratyczna /
Unia Wolności
and earlier parties that became part of it
Civic Platform (PO): Platforma Obywatelska

Romania
Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR): Convenţia Democrată Română
National Liberal Party (PNL): Partidul Naţional Liberal
Democratic Liberal Party (PDL): Partidul Democrat-Liberal

Slovakia
Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU-DS): Slovenská
Demokratická a Kresťanská Únia – Demokratická Strana
Christian Democratic Movement (KDH): Kresťanskodemokratické Hnutie
Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK-MKP): Strana Maďarskej Komunity -
Magyar Közösség Pártja
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Name (Country)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy of Slovenia (LDS): Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenian People’s Party (SLS): Slovenska Ljudska Stranka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenian Christian Democrats (SKD): Slovenski Krščanski Demokrati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS): Slovenska Demokratska Stranka,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Rukh/Our Ukraine: People’s Movement of Ukraine / Our Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Narodnyi Rukh Ukrajiny / Nasha Ukrajina (Народний Рух України / Наша Україна)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I. Electoral Performance of Major Center-Right Parties Relative to Critical Junctures of Market Reform in Latin America and Post-communist Europe (Alternative Measure)

Table A.7. Latin America: Electoral performance of major center-right parties relative to critical junctures of market reform before and during the 2000s (% votes cast in presidential elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Average performance before 2000s</th>
<th>Average performance during 2000s</th>
<th>Change in performance</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PSDB</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>RN, UDI</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>PR/PRSC, PLD</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>ARENA, PCN, PDC</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>-26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20.0</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>PLC, AL, PLI</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>PN, PC</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>-20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 26)</td>
<td>(N = 23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>PCC/PSC, Uribismo, PSUN</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>FRG/PRI, PAN, DCG</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>-44.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>PNH, PLH</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>86.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>ANC-PC</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>-18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 17)</td>
<td>(N = 15)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aligning and neutral CJs</td>
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<td>53.3</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined groups average</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 43)</td>
<td>(N = 38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Various</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>-9.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>ADN</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>-33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>PUSC</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>-19.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>PSC, PD/UDC</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>PP, PDC/PP, MOLIRENA, CD</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>AP, PPC, Fujimorismo, PP</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>COPEI</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>-10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 30)</td>
<td>(N = 20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. N equals the number of elections in which parties competed during each period. The two periods are (1) before the 2000s (up to and including 1999) and (2) the 2000s (2000-2015).
2. For Argentina, I include results for the Union of the Democratic Center (UCEDE), Action for the Republic (ApR), Recreate for Growth (RECREAR), Federal Peronism, and Let’s Change (Cambiemos).
Table A.8. Post-communist Europe: Electoral performance of major center-right parties relative to critical junctures of market reform before and during the 2000s (% votes cast in parliamentary elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1990s average performance</th>
<th>2000s average performance</th>
<th>Change in performance</th>
<th>Change in critical junctures</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>PDSH</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
<td>-13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Rep.</td>
<td>ODS, KDU–ČSL</td>
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<td>30.1</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Fatherland/ER</td>
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<td>27.3</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>LC/LPP</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>-15.8</td>
<td>-15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
<td>-9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-aligning critical junctures</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>SDS/ODS, DSB, SK, RB</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>-26.2</td>
<td>-26.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>VMRO-DPMNE</td>
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<td>37.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>PPCD, RP/LP</td>
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<td>11.0</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>CDR, PNL, ADA, PDL</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligning and re-aligning CJs combined groups average</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-aligning critical junctures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>SZDSZ</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
<td>-12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>TS-LKD, LKDP</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>-22.4</td>
<td>-22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>UD/UW, AWS, PO</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SDKU-DS, KDH, SMK-MKP</td>
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<td>30.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
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<td>-12.7</td>
<td>-12.7</td>
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<td>Rukh/Our Ukraine</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group average</td>
<td></td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N equals the number of elections in which parties competed during each period. The two period are (1) the 1990s (1990-1999) and (2) the 2000s (2000-2015).
Appendix J. Elections Included in and Excluded from the Analysis of Populism in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

Elections included in the analysis

83 Latin American presidential elections included in the analysis

70 post-communist European legislative elections included in the analysis

1 To be included in the analysis elections must be sufficiently democratic. Such elections are held in years for which the Polity IV score of countries is 6 or above or, if the Polity IV score is 5, the Freedom House score is 3 or below.
Elections after critical junctures excluded from the analysis

Latin American presidential elections after critical junctures that are excluded from the analysis
Argentina: 2007, 2011, 2015 (populist incumbent with potentially consolidated power)
Bolivia: 2009, 2014 (populist incumbent with potentially consolidated power)
Brazil: 1989 (no data on party positions)
Chile: 1989 (no data on party positions; transitional election)
Costa Rica: 1990 (no data on party positions)
Ecuador: 2013 (populist incumbent with potentially consolidated power)
Guatemala: 1990, 1995 (civil war and not a democracy; Polity IV score: 3; FH score: 4.5)
Mexico: 1994 (not a democracy; Polity IV score: 4; FH score: 4)
Peru: 1995, 2000 (not a democracy; Polity IV score: 1; FH score: 4.5)
Venezuela: 2006, 2010, 2012, 2013 (populist incumbent with potentially consolidated power; also, beginning in 2009, not a democracy; Polity IV score: -3; FH score 4.5 and above)

Post-communist European legislative elections after critical junctures that are excluded from the analysis
Albania: 1997 (not a democracy; Polity IV score 5 and FH score 4; no data on party positions)
Croatia: 1995 (not a democracy; Polity IV score: -5; FH score: 4)
Czech Republic: 1996 (no data on party positions)
Estonia: 1995 (no data on party positions)
Hungary: 2014 (populist incumbent with potentially consolidated power)
Lithuania: 1996 (no data on party positions)
Poland: 1993, 1997 (no data on party positions)
Slovakia: 2010 (populist incumbent with potentially consolidated power)
Slovenia: 1996 (no data on party positions)

---

2 Most of these elections are excluded because they do not meet the requirements to be included in the analysis. Eight election cases are excluded due to the lack of data on party positions.
Appendix K. Scoring of Populism “at Minimum” and “at Maximum” at the Election Level in Latin America and Post-communist Europe

Table A.9. Latin America: Populism “at minimum” and “at maximum”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>&quot;At minimum&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;At maximum&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
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<td>55.9</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2014</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.9</td>
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Table A.9 (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>&quot;At minimum&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;At maximum&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>20.6</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>2015</td>
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</tr>
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Table A.10. Post-communist Europe: Populism “at minimum” and “at maximum”

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Appendix L. Relationship Between the Average Center-Left Vote Share and the Populist Vote Share (Country-level)

Figure A.11. Average center-left electoral performance (de facto) and the populist vote (“at minimum”) in Latin America and post-communist Europe (country-level)
Figure A.12. Average center-left vote change and the populist vote ("at minimum") in Latin America and post-communist Europe (country-level)
Appendix M. Alternative OLS Analysis for Latin America

Table A.13. OLS analysis of the populist vote “at minimum” in Latin America (excluding Nicaragua and Mexico)

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Appendix N. Control Variables and the Populist Vote Share “at Minimum”

Table A.14. Latin America: Control variables and the populist vote share “at minimum” (presidential elections)

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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Appendix O. Determinants of the Populist Vote “at Maximum”

Table A.16. Determinants of the populist vote “at maximum” in Latin America and post-communist Europe: OLS analysis

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R-squared and standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.17. Determinants of the populist vote “at maximum” in both regions: OLS and panel data analyses

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<td>(0.11)</td>
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<td>7.29**</td>
<td>6.66**</td>
<td>7.29**</td>
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<td>2.27</td>
<td>3.36**</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
## Appendix P. Measuring Market Liberalization over Time

### Table A.18. Level and speed of market liberalization in Ecuador

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<th>Indicator/President</th>
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<th>Rodríguez Larco 02/72 - 01/76</th>
<th>Poveda 01/76 - 08/79</th>
<th>Roelós 08/79 - 08/84</th>
<th>Hurtado 08/84 - 08/88</th>
<th>F. Condero 08/88 - 08/92</th>
<th>Borja 08/92 - 02/97</th>
<th>Durán Balse 02/97 - 06/98</th>
<th>Bucaram 06/98 - 01/00</th>
<th>Alarcón 01/00 - 01/03</th>
<th>Mahuad 01/03 - 03/05</th>
<th>Noboa 03/05 - 06/07</th>
<th>Gutiérrez 06/07 - 01/07</th>
<th>Palacio 01/07 - 01/09</th>
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<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.493</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.526</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td>0.567</td>
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<td>% change from previous period</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
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<td>0.9%</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38.6%</td>
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<td>-1.7%</td>
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<td>4.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
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Note: Author’s calculations based on data from Morley et al. 1999 and Lora 2012.
Table A.19. Level and speed of market liberalization in Slovakia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator/Prime Minister</th>
<th>Mečiar II (06/92 - 03/94)</th>
<th>Moravčík (03/94 - 12/94)</th>
<th>Mečiar III (12/94 - 10/98)</th>
<th>Dzurinda I (10/98 - 10/02)</th>
<th>Dzurinda II (07/02 - 07/06)</th>
<th>Fico I (07/06 - 07/10)</th>
<th>Fico II (07/10 - 04/12)</th>
<th>Radičová (04/12 - 4/16)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EBRD Index (unweighted)</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0.688</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>0.788</td>
<td>0.850</td>
<td>0.844</td>
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<tr>
<td>% change from previous period</td>
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<td>10.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heritage Foundation overall score</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-4.6%</td>
<td>-5.9%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government spending (Heritage)</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
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<td>63.7</td>
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<td>18.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investment freedom (Heritage)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial freedom (Heritage)</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>-12.5%</td>
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<td>0.0%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax burden (Heritage)</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>84.7</td>
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<td>-5.9%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>-5.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade freedom (Heritage)</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>87</td>
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<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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<td>Business freedom (Heritage)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td>3.8%</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
<td>-8.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monetary freedom (Heritage)</td>
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<td>65.1</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>81.6</td>
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<td>81.1</td>
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<td>-3.1%</td>
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Note: Author’s calculations based on data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): Transition Indicators and The Heritage Foundation: Index of Economic Freedom.
Table A.20. Level and speed of market liberalization in Peru

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Indicator/President</th>
<th>Velasco Alvarado 10/68 - 08/75</th>
<th>Morales-Bermúdez 07/80 - 07/80</th>
<th>Belaúnde 07/80 - 07/85</th>
<th>García I 07/85 - 07/90</th>
<th>Fujimori I 07/95 - 07/97</th>
<th>Fujimori II 07/95 - 11/00</th>
<th>Paniagua 11/00 - 07/01</th>
<th>Toledo 07/01 - 07/06</th>
<th>García II 07/06 - 07/11</th>
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<tr>
<td>General reform index (Morley et al. 1999)</td>
<td>0.392</td>
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<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.484</td>
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<td>-12.6%</td>
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<td>74.2%</td>
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<td>0.655</td>
<td>0.665</td>
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<td>2.3%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
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<td>Capital accounts (Morley et al. 1999)</td>
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<td>0.311</td>
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<td>2.4%</td>
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<td>2.4%</td>
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<td>-4.3%</td>
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<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
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</table>

Note: Author’s calculations based on data from Morley et al. 1999 and Lora 2012.
Appendix Q. Calculating Weighted Party Nationalizations Scores (wPNSs)

In my consideration of the geographic distribution of the vote at the subnational level, I am particularly interested in what scholars have called party nationalization. There are many conceptualizations and measures of party nationalization, but the literature typically distinguishes between two types – static and dynamic. As explained most recently by Morgenstern, if dynamic nationalization measures the change in the vote at the district level, static nationalization measures the distribution of a party’s vote across a country. If dynamic nationalization analyzes the relative power of the local vote, and, thus, the degree to which legislators are electorally independent from their parties, static nationalization – which is more directly about territoriality – answers “fundamental questions about politics and representation.” As my critical juncture argument, like Roberts’, pays particular attention to issues of political representation, I am specifically interested in static nationalization.

One intuitive measure of static nationalization is the Party Nationalization Score (PNS) proposed by Jones and Mainwaring. According to this measure, each party’s PNS is equal to 1 minus the Gini coefficient, which measures the degree of equality in the distribution of the vote across subnational districts. Yet because this measure can lead to awkward results due to differences in party size and the population of districts, it is more useful if weighted by electoral district size, thereby producing the weighted Party Nationalization Score (wPNS). Following the methodology developed by Bochsler in order to correct for the unequal size of units in a country, “for a country with \( d \) territorial units, ordered according to the increasing vote share of party \( p \), with each territorial unit \( i \) having \( v_i \) voters and \( p_i \) of them voting for a political party \( p \),” the \( wPNS \) score is:

\[
PNS_i = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{d} \left( v_i \cdot \left( \sum_{i=1}^{d} p_i - \frac{p_i}{2} \right) \right)}{\sum_{i=1}^{d} v_i \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{d} p_i}
\]

Notably, this formula is useful only if electoral results are available in the form of number of valid votes for each party or candidate in each subnational electoral district. In many cases, however, what is available is the total number of valid votes along with the vote share (rather than number of valid votes) for each party or candidate in each district. For such cases, I use statistical software to estimate the Gini coefficient for each party (or presidential candidate) by weighing by district size and then subtracting the result from 1. Thus derived, the \( wPNS \) is identical to the

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4 See Morgenstern 2017: 6, 16-21.
5 Jones and Mainwaring 2003
6 The Gini coefficient is normally used to measure wealth inequality among individuals or households. While these authors change what is measured (inequality in vote shares rather than wealth) and the unit of analysis (geographic units rather than individuals), the idea is the same – to measure inequality among units.
7 On the need to use weights, see Morgenstern (2017: 72-5).
8 Bochsler 2010: 162
number produced by Bochsler’s formula.\textsuperscript{9} By following these techniques, I have developed a dataset with wPNS scores for each party and presidential candidate in Ecuador, Peru, Poland, and Slovakia for which subnational electoral data are available. My party nationalization dataset covering all legislative and presidential elections during the third wave of democracy in the four countries includes over 1,300 (party/candidate–election) observations. While I use the entirety of this dataset more explicitly in Chapter 12, in Chapter 10, I mostly focus on the wPNS of relevant parties and presidential candidates.

Overall, the higher the wPNS, the more nationalized the party (or presidential candidate), meaning the more equitably distributed the relevant vote share is across the country. It is worth reiterating that wPNSs measure relative homogeneity in terms of the geographic distribution of the vote across a country by weighing by subnational districts’ size. In other words, the wPNS captures how well a party’s (or a candidate’s) vote is distributed by accounting for the geographic distribution of the population across the country. This means that relatively high wPNSs are more likely the reflection of strong electoral performance in relatively densely populated districts, such as in large cities. By contrast, relatively low wPNS scores are more likely a reflection of general electoral weakness in large cities. Although these basic relationships are not necessarily generalizable due to their dependence on contextual factors,\textsuperscript{10} they can shed much light in terms of any given actor’s vote distribution within each country in terms relative to other actors’ vote distribution. Indeed, it is this relative nature of party nationalization that determines the legacies of critical junctures, as I argue in the final chapter.

\textsuperscript{9} I.e., I subjected the data that I derived by using Stata to external validation by comparing it, where possible, to the data derived through Bochsler’s formula. The correlation coefficient for the cases for which data are available to use for both techniques is above 0.99. The correlation is not exactly 1.00 because for districts where parties did not run candidates I assigned a vote share of 0.0001 (rather than 0.000). I did this because, when estimating the Gini coefficient, the statistical software excludes observations with 0’s from the calculation, thereby overestimating the Gini coefficient (and underestimating inequality across districts). This negligible difference notwithstanding, the two methods produce basically identical wPNS results.

\textsuperscript{10} For example, in Peru, a third of the population lives in the capital Lima whereas in Poland the population is much more equitably distributed. Such differences are not necessarily captured by otherwise identical wPNSs across countries. This is one reason why I am most interested in discussing relative wPNS scores within, rather than across, countries. Thus, I prefer the weighted PNS to Bochsler’s standardized PNS (2010: 162-4). The latter measure facilitates direct comparisons of PNSs across countries, but seems to overestimate scores in cases where data is available for more units at lower administrative levels (such as Poland’s powiats) in comparisons to cases where data is available for fewer units at higher administrative levels (such as Ecuador’s provincias).
Appendix R. Average Vote Share Based on Subnational Attributes in Peru and Poland

Table A.21. Average vote share based on provincial attributes in Peruvian presidential and legislative elections, 1995-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>UPP</th>
<th>APRA</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Fujimorismo</th>
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<td>(total)</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>Fujimorismo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Highland</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1995 Legislative</td>
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<td>APRA</td>
<td>PP</td>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>APRA</td>
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Notes:
1. This table follows the same conventions as Table 11.1 in the main text.
2. Included are only parties that gained at least 10% in the first round in presidential elections. These parties are Union for Peru (UPP), American Revolutionary Popular Alliance (APRA), Possible Peru (PP), National Unity (UN), and Fujimori's electoral vehicles (Cambio ’90 in 1995 and Peru 2000) included under Fujimorismo.
3. Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from Tuesta Soldevilla and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).
Table A.22. Average vote share based on provincial attributes in Peruvian presidential and legislative elections, 2006-2011

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<td>4.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>48.5</td>
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Note: Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from Tuesta Soldevilla and the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).
Table A.23. Electoral support based on historical attributes in Polish legislative elections in the 2000s

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<th>Parl. Election</th>
<th>Geographical Scope</th>
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<th>Agrarian-based</th>
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<th>Other</th>
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<td>PSL</td>
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<td>Contemporary Poland (total)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>former Prussian Empire</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>former Austrian Empire</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>former Russian Empire</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Author’s calculations based on subnational level election data from the National Election Commission (PKW) of the Republic of Poland.


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