Featuring

The Danger of Democratic Equality
Individualism, Democratic Despotism, and the Safeguards of Liberty

The Trinitarian Soul and the Golden Citizenry

Morgenthau and Morality in International Politics

Ruling by Reason Alone: Democratic Aristocrats and Philosopher-Prophets in Alfarabi’s Righteous Ummah

Christianity’s Crowning of the Theotokos

Motivating Collaboration in Nazi-Occupied Ukraine

Enemies of Coincidence

Choral Music and the Voice in 19th-Century Vienna

“I Am and I Love”: Wounds, Embodiment, and Incarnation in Crime & Punishment, Demons, and The Brothers Karamazov

Interview with Professor Jo Ann Moran Cruz
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UTRAQUE UNUM

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Georgetown University’s
Tocqueville Forum for
Political Understanding
Utraque Unum

Georgetown University’s seal is based directly on the Great Seal of the United States of America. Instead of an olive branch and arrows in the American eagle’s right and left talons, Georgetown’s eagle is clutching a globe and calipers in its right talon and a cross in its left talon. The American seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, E Pluribus Unum, or “Out of Many, One”, in reference to the many different people and states creating a union. The Georgetown seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, Utraque Unum.

As the official motto of Georgetown University, Utraque Unum is often translated as “Both One” or “Both and One” and is taken from Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians. This motto is found in a Latin translation of Ephesians 2:14: *ipse est enim pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum*. The King James Version of the Bible says, “For He [Christ] is our peace, who hath made both one”. Utraque Unum is the Latin phrase to describe Paul’s concept of unity between Jews and Gentiles; that through Jesus Christ both are one.

In view of the Georgetown seal, the motto represents pursuing knowledge of the earthly (the world and calipers) and the spiritual (the cross). Faith and reason should not be exclusive. In unity faith and reason enhance the pursuit of knowledge.
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As always, we welcome your thoughts and comments regarding this journal. If you are or once were a Georgetown University student, professor or staff member we would welcome the opportunity to review your work for publication in *Utraque Unum*. In addition to writers, we are looking for section editors, artists, graphic designers and web designers. Please e-mail the editors at utraque.unum@gmail.com for these inquiries.
Uttraque Unum is a journal of the Tocqueville Forum for Political Understanding written and edited by Georgetown undergraduates comprising of essays on law and politics, religion, culture, and campus life and liberal learning at Georgetown University. The purpose of the journal is not only to acquaint students with the tasks of serious writing and editing, but also to allow them to think through complex problems in politics, in culture, and in Georgetown University life. If you are interested in submitting an essay to be considered for the Uttraque Unum or would like to receive the latest issue via mail, please send an e-mail to the Editor of Uttraque Unum at utraque.unum@gmail.com.
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Dear Reader,

This Editor’s Letter is addressed to the new freshman class of 2019. It is our goal that each issue of *Utraque Unum* be a microcosm of the great enterprise of liberal education that, among much else, Georgetown offers you. In these pages you will find original reflections upon timely and timeless questions that engage sources old and new, from our canon and from others—reflections that contribute to the discussion that is the lifeblood of the University. This Georgetown offers you, but she does not offer it in the manner of most of the offerings you are by now dizzyingly aware of. You won’t find it in Red Square with a banner and free cookies. Nor will you get daily e-mails about it. It is in fragments scattered across this hilltop for you to find and to piece together (and it will have no intelligible shape apart from your doing so). At first finding it may give you the feeling that you’re visiting Chatsworth house, or one of its kind, to admire the art, only to notice someone letting the dog in the back door and at that moment realize, to your surprise, that people actually still live there. In this way, unlike the many offerings announced loudly and frequently, this offering may be discerned only by one who has an eye for it. If you worry this excludes you, don’t. For this eye is nothing more than curiosity paired with a modest measure of courage. It was this same eye, in fact, that moved Glaucon—young, ambitious, and somewhat stubborn like many a Georgetown student—to raise the question, at the start of Book II, without which Plato’s *Republic* would never have been written.

A few months ago Georgetown lost another luminary when Fr. James Walsh of the Society of Jesus passed away. About thirty years previous, Fr. Walsh had conveyed to the graduating class of 1986 a vision of their past four years. “Education,” he said, “is a matter of ‘conversation.’ It has to do with listening to and taking part in a conversation that has been going on for four or five thousand years. It tries to bring you into that conversation, with Shakespeare and Aquinas and Freud and Plato and Isaiah and a great many other people. It forms habits of mind that make you capable of being part of that conversation: reverence, a historical sense, a certain critical (and self-critical) awareness, an ability to enter generously, sympathetically, and imaginatively into the lives and feelings of people of other times and cultures. It forms in you the ability to listen; to go out of yourself; to be friends.”

What Georgetown demurely offers you, in short, is the opportunity, not just to learn things, but to become educated. Do not settle for what your friends happen to think, or what your professor tells you. Follow Glaucon’s lead and raise the question without which your book will not be written. Endeavoring to answer it you will unearth, right here on this Hilltop, what no activities fair or email blast could possibly contain. Welcome to the conversation. Welcome to Georgetown.

Jordan A. Rudinsky
*Editor-in-Chief*
The title of this issue’s Director’s Letter is a paraphrase of Fr. James V. Schall’s book, Another Sort of Learning. The premise of Fr. Schall’s book is that by acquiring an understanding of the ideas contained in great books, we become equipped to reach an understanding of ourselves. Reading leads to understanding, which in turn leads to a recognition concerning “the truth about our lives.” Underlying Fr. Schall’s argument is the notion that we must come to know ourselves and our place in the world. What better resource could we possess for this fundamental undertaking than to enter into conversation with the great thinkers, artists, theologians, authors, and poets of the past and present whose ideas form the foundation of who we are today and who we will become tomorrow?

Clearly, there are different sorts of learning. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word “learning” as “Knowledge acquired by systematic study; the possession of such knowledge.” At a basic level we learn certain skills to enable us to function in the world. At a higher level the skills that we utilize in our careers constitute another sort of learned knowledge. Beyond these two types of learning, however, there is a third and more significant type of learning. This is the type of learning that Fr. Schall discusses in his book; learning that forms and defines our characters, and provides us with the intellectual resources that enable us to question and confront the problems we face in the world. It is the sort of learning that allows us to make sense of our lives. Perhaps most importantly, it is this kind of learning that permits us to attempt to discover meaning about ourselves and the cosmos.

The start of another academic year is an appropriate time to recall the advice of Fr. Schall. Many of you will be concentrating on your courses in preparation for the careers you have chosen to pursue. Others will be focusing on the traditional Fall semester ritual of job interviews. In both cases it would appear that there is little need for the sort of learning I have been discussing. Those who think this way could not be farther from the truth. It is precisely at the times when the pressures of school and career exert the strongest demands on our physical and mental energies that we must attend to the intellectual resources we have cultivated during our years of study. As far-fetched as it may sound, we can turn to the ideas of a Plato, Augustine, Tocqueville, or other great thinkers to act as intellectual and spiritual guides for those times when we are called upon to make difficult choices. In other words, we should not merely rely on the learned skills that enable us to practice a particular profession. Rather, the best way in which to act in our daily lives and careers is by employing all the acquired intellectual resources which we have at our disposal.

As you continue, and in some cases finish, your studies at Georgetown University, I urge you to recall and make use of the sort of learning that I have been discussing. As Fr. Schall argues: “Yet, we must search for the highest things. We must seek to erect cities where the search is not forbidden, even though in those cities where it is not forbidden, it is not often pursued”. It is our responsibility as human beings to follow this pursuit; this life of the mind. If we cannot do so for its own sake, then we at least must to so
for the purpose of our own natures, for all those with whom we have relationships, and for the social and political communities of which we are members. Truly, this is the principal use for this sort of learning.

In closing, I wish to express my admiration and thanks for all the students who have contributed essays to *Utraque Unum*. These writings are proof that the sort of learning defended by Fr. Schall and myself are very prominent among the Tocqueville Forum Fellows. Also, I would like to thank the editorial staff of the journal for their dedication and hard work in bringing two issues a year to publication. All of you have my sincere gratitude and thanks.

Thomas M. Kerch
Interim Director, Tocqueville Forum
In his seminal work *Democracy in America*, French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville studies the inexorable advance of democratic equality in the Western world by using the United States as a fertile observing ground to see what political and cultural changes such equality may engender. While noting the many benefits that democratic equality can bring to a society, Tocqueville also recognizes a singular danger, stating: “Vices originating in despotism are precisely those favored by equality…Despotism, dangerous at all times, is therefore to be particularly feared in ages of democracy.”

What are these despotic vices promoted by democratic equality, and how can they be mitigated? Tocqueville answers these questions by arguing the following: democratic equality poses the risk of democratic despotism by causing men to tend toward individualism. This vice can only be mitigated through two concomitant safeguards, namely voluntary associations and the doctrine of self-interest properly understood. The viability of these safeguards can be demonstrated through Robert Putnam’s *Bowling Alone*, which notes the dire consequences that ensue when such safeguards are eroded.

According to Tocqueville, the singular danger that democratic equality poses is democratic despotism brought on through the civic vice of individualism. This vice, while similar to egoism, is a unique habit of solely democratic origin. For while egoism is a passionate and irrationally exaggerated love of self, individualism is “a calm and considered feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows and withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with this little society formed to his taste, he gladly leaves the greater society to look after itself.” In addition, while egoism springs from blind instinct, individualism springs from misguided judgment; it is due “more to inadequate understanding than to perversity of heart.” Before observing why this deficiency of understanding is dangerous, one must first comprehend how this vice is brought on through democratic equality.

Tocqueville begins his analysis of the origins of individualism by comparing human relations in aristocratic and democratic societies. In aristocratic societies, where people are rooted in a hierarchical social structure, everyone is linked in one great chain of being. In democratic societies, where all social links (including economic and political) are broken, this chain of being no longer exists. Consequently, members of democratic society do not see how their interests are tied up in the interests of others. Such members, Tocqueville states, “form the habit of thinking...
of themselves in isolation and imagine that their destiny is in their own hands.” Thus democratic equality engenders the civic vice of individualism by breaking the social bonds that tie members of a society to one another. Participation in public affairs is not deemed necessary when one is isolated from their contemporaries and unable to understand how their interests might be related to one’s own.

With the definition and origins of individualism laid out, Tocqueville then explains why this civic vice is dangerous. He does so by first observing a universal characteristic of despotism, namely its reliance on the isolation of citizens. Despotism, according to Tocqueville, “sees the isolation of men as the best guarantee of its own permanence...A despot will lightly forgive his subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love one another.” Besides breaking such emotional bonds between citizens, despotism also seeks to break the civic bonds between citizens. For a despot “calls those who try to unite their efforts to create a general prosperity ‘turbulent and restless spirits’ [and]...calls those ‘good citizens’ who care for none but themselves.” Based on this understanding of the nature of despotism, it is quite easy to see how Tocqueville considers democratic equality and despotism to be fatal counterparts. Despotism’s attempt to turn civic disengagement into a public virtue is much more likely to be fulfilled when democratic equality already predisposes men to the vice of individualism.

For Tocqueville, the despotism that can arise from democratic equality is unique and especially terrifying in its oppressiveness. Envisioning the type of society that would exist under democratic despotism, Tocqueville states:

I see an innumerable multitude of men, all alike and equal, constantly circling around in pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls. Each one of them, withdrawn into himself, is almost unaware of the fate of the rest...He exists in and for himself, and though he still may have a family, one can at least say that he has not got a fatherland. Equal in their servitude, these men have wholly succumbed to the vice of individualism. At the same time, the despotic power that rules over these men is absolute, provident, and gentle. For Tocqueville, democratic despotism “would resemble parental authority if, father-like, it tried to prepare its charges for a man’s life, but on the contrary, it only tries to keep them in perpetual childhood...[It] entirely relieve[s] them from the trouble of thinking and all the cares of living.” Such a power permeates every facet of society through minute and uniform rules, regulating or directing all actions and industries. Observing the disastrous effects such a power has on the souls of its citizens, Tocqueville states:

[Democratic despotism] does not break men’s will, but softens, bends, and guides it...it is not at all tyrannical, but it hinders, restrains, enervates, stifles, and stultifies so much that in the end each nation is no more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the government as its shepherd.

The tragedy of this state of affairs is that it is entirely self-inflicted. Predisposed to individualism by democratic equality, members of democratic society are entirely capable of voluntarily relinquishing their freedom in order to fulfill their harmful desire of becoming disengaged from broader civic life. So ardently focused on equality, democratic Man is in constant danger of forgetting that it is the liberty of self-government that truly results in the flourishing of his soul.

Fortunately for democratic society, there are two concomitant safeguards of liberty capable of mitigating the vice of individualism: voluntary associations and the doctrine of self-interest properly understood. Voluntary associations are organizations of citizens centered on achieving specific common goals that require collective action; not necessarily political in nature, they provide “an infinite number of occasions for the citizens to act together and...[remind] people that they depend on one another.” In other words, voluntary associations are mechanisms for collective action by which social bonds among individuals are formed.
According to Tocqueville, voluntary associations are critical for the preservation of independence and even civilization itself in democratic society. A comparison of aristocratic and democratic society makes this idea plain. In aristocratic society, there is no need for voluntary associations, for “every rich and powerful citizen is in practice the head of a permanent and enforced association composed of all those whom he makes help in the execution of his designs.”

Collective action is not necessary because elite individuals have sufficient resources ingrained within a hierarchical social structure to overcome societal problems. However, this is not the case in democratic society, where each citizen is independent, cut off the great chain of being, and much weaker comparatively. Without the existence of voluntary associations, democratic citizens would be helpless in solving societal problems requiring collective action. Indeed, Tocqueville notes that “a people in which individuals had lost the power of carrying through great enterprises by themselves, without acquiring the faculty of doing them together, would soon fall back into barbarism.”

Moreover, government would not be a sufficient remedy for such a deficiency. This is because only associations can artificially create the social bonds naturally missing in democratic society. In Tocqueville’s words, “feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed only by the reciprocal action of men upon one another.”

Thus voluntary associations draw men away from their natural individualistic tendencies by clarifying how their personal interests are tied up in the interests of others. The more areas a government leaves open to the purview of voluntary associations, the stronger each citizen’s engagement in public affairs and in establishing a good rapport with his comrades, without whom he would be utterly powerless to accomplish anything. By building such bonds (i.e. social capital), a democratic nation is able to mitigate the vice of individualism, “a disorder at once so natural to the body social of a democracy and so fatal,” and thus preserve the liberty of the people from the danger of democratic despotism.

The safeguard of voluntary associations is concomitant with another: the doctrine self-interest properly understood. This doctrine, according to Tocqueville, inverts self-interest so that it is re-directed away from the self and channeled towards others. Noting how American proponents of this doctrine accept the inevitability of democratic equality pushing men towards individualistic self-interest, Tocqueville states: “They therefore do not raise objections to men pursuing their interests, but they do all they can to prove that it is in each man’s interest to be good.”

In other words, the doctrine of self-interest properly understood holds that making sacrifices for the good of another is ultimately beneficial for both the recipient and the benefactor. This doctrine, while not new, is certainly tailored to the needs of democratic rather than aristocratic society. For in aristocratic society, the few elite individuals “entertain a sublime conception of the duties of man. It gratifie[s] them to make out that it is a glorious thing to forget oneself and that one should do good without self-interest, as God himself does.” This sort of altruism is unthinkable in democratic society; such overflowing and transcendent disinterestedness is impossible
when the rocklike foundations of birth and social class, which guarantee power regardless of the degree of sacrifice, have been worn away. Fortunately, this doctrine “has no difficulty in keeping its power [in democratic society], for it turns private interest against itself and uses the same goad which excites [people] to direct passions.”

By turning the self-interest of democratic Man toward the interests of others, the doctrine of self-interest properly understood plays a crucial role in the mitigation of the civic vice of individualism. Tocqueville says its effects on human relations are as follows:

The doctrine of self-interest properly understood does not inspire great sacrifices, but every day it prompts some small ones; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous, but its discipline shapes a lot of orderly, temperate, moderate, careful, and self-controlled citizens…[Its] teaching may stop some men from rising far above the common level of humanity, but many of those who fall below this standard grasp it and are restrained by it. Some individuals it lowers, but mankind it raises.

While it comes at the cost of the rare men who can demonstrate extraordinary virtue, the doctrine of self-interest properly understood elevates the average member of democratic society to a higher level of enlightened self-interest. This enlightenment enables such members to moderate themselves and to turn their attention toward others. Only among such temperate and other-considering citizens can voluntary associations be formed to foster civic engagement, for such organizations require the reciprocal sacrifices that come with collective action. Thus the doctrine of self-interest properly understood combats individualism (and thus protects liberty) by conditioning citizens in democratic society to act and think in ways that will allow voluntary associations to develop. For that reason, Tocqueville sees this doctrine as “the strongest remaining guarantee against [citizens] themselves.”

With Tocqueville’s argument on individualism, democratic despotism, and the safeguards of liberty laid out, a single question remains: How viable are these safeguards for the preservation of liberty in democratic society; in other words, is Tocqueville’s argument true? To answer this question, one must analyze the effects of the erosion of such safeguards. If Tocqueville’s argument is viable, then the erosion of voluntary associations and the doctrine of self-interest properly understood would lead to a surge in individualism and put society at a greater risk of succumbing to democratic despotism. Fortunately, social scientist Robert Putnam provides insights for this scenario in his work *Bowling Alone*.

Putnam’s analysis is centered on observing the decline in civic engagement that has been occurring in the United States since the 1960s, explaining the detrimental effects of that decline, diagnosing why it occurred, and offering potential solutions to the problem. In his observations, Putnam relates the decline of voluntary, social capital-creating organizations in all aspects of American life, from religion to politics, to leisure, and even to the workplace. After examining the declining participation in each of these types of voluntary associations, Putnam concludes:

“Most Americans no longer spend much time in community organizations—we’ve stopped doing committee work, stopped serving as officers, and stopped going to meetings…In short, Americans have been dropping out in droves, not merely from political life, but from organized community life more generally.”

In other words, the United States has stopped being the nation of joiners that Tocqueville remarked were crucial to the preservation of liberty. Thus Putnam demonstrates clear evidence of the erosion of voluntary associations in modern American society, one of the requirements for evaluating the veracity of Tocqueville’s argument. In addition, Putnam’s analysis provides insight into the erosion of the doctrine of self-interest properly understood through its focus on social trust between individuals in American society. Social trust is related to the doctrine
of self-interest properly understood because it is the conditioning of citizens under said doctrine that enables them to trust one another. If citizens are not other—considering, temperate, and self-controlled, then they are certainly not trustworthy. Without that trust, the reciprocal sacrifices of collective action in voluntary organizations are not possible. Putnam puts forward this idea when, paraphrasing Tocqueville, he states: “Generalized reciprocity becomes hard to distinguish from altruism…Nevertheless, this is what Tocqueville, insightfully, meant by ‘self-interest rightly understood’…Honesty and trust lubricate the inevitable frictions of social life.”

Unfortunately, Putnam finds that social trust has also declined in modern American society. Using data such as public opinion polls, crime rates, the explosion of “preventive lawyering”, and even increasing instances of accidents due to road rage, Putnam demonstrates that each succeeding generation is becoming less and less trustful of others. Claiming that such a decline in trust is one of the most revealing indicators of the fraying of the American social fabric, Putnam is forced to conclude: “For better or worse, we rely increasingly—we are forced to rely increasingly—on formal institutions, and above all on the law, to accomplish what we used to accomplish through informal networks reinforced by generalized reciprocity.”

From the erosion of social trust, it can be inferred that the doctrine of self-interest properly understood has also been eroded. Thus the second requirement for evaluating the veracity of Tocqueville’s argument is also manifested in modern American society.

Based on the erosion of these two safeguards to liberty, Putnam is able to draw a frightening picture for the state of American democracy. Without people getting civically engaged through voluntary associations or being other-considering through self-interest properly understood (due to a lack of social trust), participation in democratic society is weakening. People are withdrawing into themselves and succumbing more and more to the vice of individualism. Indeed, the loss of voluntary associations, the “schools for democracy” is so detrimental to Putnam is forced to posit:

A politics without face-to-face socializing and organizing might take the form of a Perot-style electronic town hall, a kind of plebiscitary democracy. Many opinions would be heard, but only as a muddle of disembodied voices, neither engaging with one another nor offering much guidance to decision makers.”

Surely, such a vision of government is not a far cry from Tocqueville’s own vision of just the sort of isolated democratic society that would occur under democratic despotism. Based on Putnam’s real-world analysis of the erosion of the safeguards to liberty and the surge of individualism that has resulted, and based on his vision of democratic society if such erosion is not reversed, Tocqueville’s theoretical argument is given very solid validity within the material world. Thus, it is safe to conclude that his argument is indeed quite true.

In conclusion, Tocqueville argues that the danger of democratic equality is that it poses the risk of democratic despotism by causing men to tend toward individualism. This vice can only be mitigated through two concomitant safeguards, namely voluntary associations and the doctrine of self-interest properly understood. The viability of these safeguards can be demonstrated through Robert Putnam’s *Bowling Alone*, which notes the dire consequences that ensue when such safeguards are eroded. Certainly, modern American society is more individualistic than in recent decades. That much cannot be denied. But is it too late? Have we, perhaps, already been forced under the oppressive but gentle authority of the guardian state? It depends on whom you ask. Some proponents of modern conservatism certainly seem to think so. Even some adherents of modern liberalism willingly accept that such a state has arisen; indeed, they celebrate the guardian state, for if no one else in society will protect the most vulnerable, then in their eyes the state has a moral imperative to do so.
However, Putnam believes that such a state of society is by no means inescapable or unchangeable. Using Tocqueville’s argument on how to preserve liberty in democratic society is how we as a country can find a way out of the rut Putnam has discovered this nation is in. Conversation on this topic among all citizens will be the only way to ensure not simply the betterment of our society but also the betterment of our souls.

*Kevin Kimes is a junior in the College of Arts & Sciences studying Government.*
Plato’s *Republic* is widely considered to be a foundation of political philosophy, or at the very least that of western philosophical thought. Yet while the work is immensely influential and revolutionary, this does not mean that it is correct in its prescriptions for society. Plato’s arguments are elegant, yet possibly predicated on erroneous or strained assumptions that distort what seems to be intuitively evident with regards to human nature. Furthermore, his methodology is crafted in such a way as to create cyclical fallacies that undermine the strength of his message. I find that, however, Plato is useful in discovering a basic structure of the human soul that, after modification, leads to a richer understanding of human nature and its place within the state. After this aforementioned modification, we find that the structure of the ideal city does not follow the lines of the *kallipolis* but rather the structure outlined by Aristotle. It follows a structure that is built upon a natural self-selecting process without the need of differing hierarchical classes.

The Form of the City

Where to begin? It may be most apt for me to start with the organic development of the city in much the same way the work itself does (though I shall do so with some brevity). Through the macrocosm of the city, Plato believes that it is possible to learn the structure of the human soul and in doing so find a working definition of justice that is both explicit and exhaustive. He believes that if one finds the virtue of justice as it pertains to the best city, one could therefore understand justice as it pertains to the individual. His logic is that, since the city is a structure made up of various individuals, a body politick as Hobbes would say, then justice and virtue within the city should mirror quite closely with what one finds in a human soul. Some may take issue with this statement, criticizing the methodology at its core as flawed. Personally, I am apt to agree with those individuals, however I will leave it to the readers to accept or deny this claim; let us continue to follow the argument.

Plato begins the creation of *kallipolis* (the beautiful city) organically, with what is commonly referred to the City of Pigs or in more delicate terms, the Austere City. The city is founded under the basis of needs; that men and women coalesce into cities and civilizations in order to fulfill certain needs that either cannot easily or at all be accomplished alone. Thus, the city is founded on the principle that each individual does that which he or she does best in order to serve the collective good of each person fulfilling the aforementioned needs. It is important to note that Plato inserts a premise that each individual does one form of labor for purposes of efficiency as it is this very premise that bears the foundation of his views on justice.

After a small quip from Glaucon that criticizes the austerity of this first formation (and thus granting it a name), Socrates begins to describe the next phase, the City of Luxury, or the
Fevered City. Given that the city now has a new love of luxuries, it is inevitable (as described by Socrates) for war to break out, as population increases lead to the need for more land and resources to fuel society.\(^{31}\) And since Socrates convinced his audience earlier that each individual must do only one thing for proprieties sake, it must be that there will be a new professional military that takes up “defense” of the city, whereby those who have the greatest aptitude for war and defense are trained since childhood to be a part of this new caste.\(^{32}\) These guardians, in order to properly act as agents of the city, are to be formally educated in both the physical and philosophical curricula so that they are not only true warriors for defensive purposes, but also have the ability to interact with society in a positive manner.\(^{33}\) It is this group of individuals that is then further broken down in Book IV into the two true classes: the Guardians (the rulers) and the Auxiliaries (the warriors).

Now, after the establishment of the Guardians class, Socrates states that the city, by the merit of its guardians, is to be considered “good.”\(^{34}\) And since the nature of the city is considered to be good, it must also follow that the city be virtuous, for something virtuous is something good, and vice versa.\(^{35}\) Thus, a city must contain, in some way, shape, or form \textit{wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice}.

The Soul of the City
Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, Justice. There is a certain inherent beauty to these concepts; something that deeply resonates with each individual. At this point in \textit{The Republic}, Plato begins his search for the virtues of the city, with the goal of finding the specific virtue of justice. His methodology is that, if he can find the “location” of the other virtues, then he shall by default find the location of justice.

First, Socrates finds wisdom within the Guardians class (the aforementioned rulers of the city). Plato through Socrates, describes the wisdom of the city to be that which, “...[is not] about any particular matter but about the city as a whole and the maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities.”\(^{37}\) When he then asks what this form of knowledge is called, and who has it within the city, Glaucon responds that it is \textit{guardianship} and obviously it is the guardian caste who is characterized by such. By a similar tactic, Plato finds that courage is the chief virtue of the Auxiliary caste as one would expect courage to be the defining characteristic of martial prowess (which is this class’ essential function).

Temperance is a virtue that acts as a control of sorts—a means of binding. He states that we refer to one who has temperance as being self-controlled and because of that fact, it must be so that one part of the soul dominates the other. Thus, Plato states that temperance is found in an individual when one moderates his or her desires by means his or her reason. We see now that temperance is a virtue that governs internal interaction rather than specific behaviors. Thus when applied to the city, temperance is a principle that governs the interaction of the individual parts of the city and not found within a certain group.

Finally, after having gone through the former three virtues, Plato has Socrates reach the conclusion that justice is that which had been described at the founding of the city: that all ought to do that which they are most suited to do and should not “meddle” in the affairs and work of others. With that Plato has found that justice, like temperance, is an overarching virtue that governs an interaction of the parts and not their individual facets or characters. Now that we have seen to it that \textit{kallipolis} is explained, we can move onto Plato’s arguments for how the human soul is structured, and its place in society.

The Form of the Soul
The first two pieces of the soul that are determined, are what in the Greek are referred to as the logistikon (the love and use of knowledge and reason) and the epithymetikon (the place of carnal and concupiscent lusts). These are determined through means of the principle...
of non-contradiction. He states, “It is clear that the same thing will never do or undergo opposite things in the same part of it and towards the same thing at the same time; so if we find this happening, we shall know it was not one thing but more than one.” In order to make show how this formulation is applicable to the soul, Plato describes a scenario in which the individual is at odds with himself or herself, which I do not believe is something hard for us to imagine. For example, there is a desire within each of us to eat foods that could be considered unhealthy. While we desire this, it goes against our reason to partake in such pleasures, as we would be worse off in the long term after receiving a short-term (and what Plato would call false) gratification. Thus we find that there are at least two parts of the human soul, that which is reasonable, and that which is fueled by the illogical appetites.

That an individual can simultaneously want something, and deny himself or herself said desire, necessitates that there are two pieces of the soul (one for each action) by way of non-contradiction. As these two pieces of the human soul are represented in the macrocosm of the city (the guardians must use their wisdom to temper the appetites of the producers), Plato believes the matter to be settled.

At this point, Plato throws into the fold the thymoeides or “spirited” part of the soul (the piece by which we become enraged or moved to action). He comes to the conclusion that the thymoeides portion of our souls can neither be of a part of the epithymetikon, for anger rouses us to do that which we do not wish to do (by use of an anecdote) nor that it be of the logistikon for there are those that are spirited but have little in the way of logic. This thymos is also, according to Plato, the location of the love of honor, glory, and the expression of courage, which leads it to be the preeminent part of the soul within the auxiliary.

The city (soul) is considered just and properly tempered when the guardians (logistikon) with the aid of a properly honed and controlled auxiliary (thymoeides) is able to combat and rule over the producing/consuming masses (epithymetikon). While I must give credit to the elegance of the system that Plato has created, I believe that there are both errors in the assumptions that lead to said system and that the argument for the kallipolis system seems strained and perhaps even circular.

A Few Criticisms

At this point we can begin to look at the some of the issues present in Plato’s arguments. With regard to his statement on the nature of wisdom, it would seem that Plato has taken too narrow a scope. He dismisses the fact that wisdom is anything but a specific kind of knowledge. He states, only a bit after the quoted material, that wisdom is “good judgement.” This is something quite agreeable, but the previous statement does not seem to outline wisdom in general, but rather a form of knowledge such as diplomacy. That one can judge proper relations in maintenance of the city does not mean that they are necessarily wise, but rather that they are diplomatically knowledgeable. His rejection of the metal-workers as skilled rather than wise creates a false distinction. A metal-worker may know metal better than all others, but by his knowledge of metal working he will have knowledge unbeknownst to miners and soldiers regarding mining and soldiering respectively. Mining technique have positive or negative effects upon the quality of the metal used, and certain fighting styles may degrade a weapon faster or cause it to break in battle.

Knowledge is something that transcends a singular profession, and this will have implications later on in Plato’s conception of justice. So, having knowledge in a specific form of knowledge does not beget wisdom but rather knowledge of many forms of fact and relation are what constitute it. This is something that will espoused by Cicero at a later time, having been blessed with hindsight.

His notions regarding temperance also presents some issue. Plato is stating that if one is to be self-controlled, that there necessarily be a “greater part” and a “lesser part” to the soul. I
do not believe that argument stands very well as there are plenty of other considerations and possibilities besides a greater and lesser part. However, his addition of the love of wisdom to the wise part of the soul forces this argument a bit. Otherwise, one could say that the temperate man is he whose desires are properly ordered internally. Temperance would not in this case promote hierarchy but equal harmony. While I would be in agreement with Plato in essence, that Temperance is found in kallipolis as an overarching characterization (at least within the confines of his argument), I have strong reservations with his specifics. That temperance is specifically found when wisdom (the guardian class) dominates over the desires/appetites (the producer class) I find to go too far. Granted, this arises from Plato’s fundamental conception of the city which colors his arguments for where virtue lies within the individual. This begins to highlight that the macrocosm view doesn’t necessarily pertain well to the finding of human virtue. Virtues for one being could be analogous to that of another but to say that they are equivocal is another matter entirely.

As for his conception of the virtue of justice, there is little for criticism given what has just been said. That theory is derived from all of the other premises (as was the structure of the argument). That justice is when the differing parts of the city do not meddle in the affairs of the others seems to be a bit too constricting and assumes a separation of knowledge and skillsets that simply does not exist. It seems to be predicated on Plato’s views of expert knowledge, but as was pointed out earlier, that view doesn’t account for interlace within society.

A Different Soul
I agree with Plato that the soul is divided into three separate parts, however it is my opinion that Plato’s conception, while insightful, is weakened by his own methodology. By searching for the structure of the soul within the structure of a city, Plato has lost a fundamental truth that one predates the other; the perfect city reflects and accommodates the nature of the human soul. Even though he states that this is the case, his forced arguments would suggest otherwise. On another critical note, Plato separates desires into each of the parts of the soul; that the logistikon contains the love of knowledge, the thymos contains the love of honor, with the appetites being left with generally, if not only, negative desires. It seems to me that desires in general ought to be its own part of the whole, the good and the bad. With this change, we come to the table in a new light. In the following paragraphs, I will outline my own personal view on the structure of the soul, based simply on internal reflection and in the subsequent part of the paper, determine the government best suited for it.

When I say that the soul is divided into three parts, I need to make clear that I have one major distinction from Plato. I believe that soul is not hierarchical, but rather made up of three distinct parts that must work in complete equal harmony; one does not rule the other. It is impossible, by their very natures, for any one piece to act in opposition to the others. There is a single, definite unity that contains very unique and distinct aspects of the whole. One cannot separate any one “piece” but neither could we call these facets the same. For proprieties sake, I will refer to them as “parts” and “pieces” to help facilitate discussion. Plato seems to eventually hold a similar view in his Laws but in that work he creates a bipartite theory of the soul’s structure which I take small issue with.

The first piece of the soul is what I will call logiki (which in Greek would mean rationality). Unlike Plato’s logikon which is an amalgamation of both logic and the love of knowledge, logiki is solely the former in the strictest sense of the term. It is the minds capacity (our notions of non-contradiction, existence, etc...) to formulate thoughts. The second piece of the soul is our thymos or anima. The thymos is that by which we formulate thoughts. It is the part of ourselves that gives us the ability to make decisions and use the tools that make up the logiki to form the third part of our soul which I prefer to call skepsi.
or thought. It does not have bearing upon what is desired in and of itself, but it allows for its acquisition. The skepsi is an important distinction as it includes all desires, whether they be intellectual, physical, or what have you—the skepsi is a hierarchy in and of itself of that which the individual believes.43 Thus our soul is divided into our capacity to think, that by which we think, and that which we think. To put it in more mundane terms, I believe that the fundamental parts of a soul are intelligence, drive, and beliefs.44

Furthermore, there are varying degrees of change that can occur within the soul. The logiki is the most rigid as it is very difficult to exogenously change one’s intelligence.45 The thymos is less rigid than the logiki, and while one might have a natural state of drive and anima, this may be changed over time; one may gain more or less fortitude throughout life.46 The skepsi does not change as the thymos does on a scale but rather is malleable. The skepsi represents who we are, as it encompasses what we perceive and believe about the world and ourselves. Thus it is the most changeable of the parts as it is partially determined by our perceptions and capabilities.

A Different City
Virtue in regards to this soul takes on a new role. Virtues now act solely upon our skepsi. Whereas as courage does have the capability of strengthening the thymos, virtues of justice, temperance, and wisdom are only applicable to what is contained within the skepsi. Wisdom begets the knowledge to build upon the skepsi, while temperance and justice both work to build it in such a way as to be ordered toward what allows us to flourish. Courage, or rather its Roman incarnation of Fortitude, plays a part in its ability to stabilize skepsi and allow one to keep to certain premises and beliefs.

This view brings us more into accordance with Aristotle’s views on virtue and education. Since all of the virtues work in conjunction to regulate and shape a malleable portion of the soul, there is much more capability for individual greatness. We find now that education ought not be made for the development of a class system for the good of the city but instead be focused more on individual eudaimonia. From the flourishing of individual citizens, the state will naturally progress into its own perfected state. Education ought to shift the orientation of the skepsi toward the flourishing of the individual, it ought to grant them the knowledge necessary to achieve said flourishing, and it ought to temper the soul of the individual with virtue so that the individual may truly flourish.47

When we take into account this new attitude that most individuals are capable of learning virtue, and that differences between us are determined less by differences in virtue (which can be taught), and more in physical or intellectual aptitude; we find that there is much more room for society to grow.48 It ought to be that we do not solely strive to find a single philosopher ruler (a single golden soul), but to form a golden citizenry, in which all who are able live virtuous lives according to their vocational preferences. With this view, government is seen to be more organic. The rulers of the city ought to be those who show not only the greatest capacity for thought, but whose education has allowed them to find eudemonia in governance. While the philosopher-king may seem to meet these requirements on the surface (and indeed he would), it is important to note that he is an individual that is both groomed and chosen among the population by certain members of society. The issue that arises in Plato’s construction of kallipolis is that its very nature as a construct makes it impossible to establish naturally (his waves are meaningless without an already present class of philosopher rulers powerful enough to establish a philosopher king). This new conception has a much more natural pathway toward fruition and could, as I will explain later, come about even in the midst of a society that is not virtuous (though chances would be slim).

The soul wishes for a society in which individuals are able to enter into government based on their own preferences for eudaemonia. It is not that they are chosen to lead by some outside
group, but that there is a self-selection process by which individuals within a virtuous society elect themselves for positions of office based on their own desire to govern and their virtues. Of course, this is predicated on the assumption the education process mentioned earlier has imparted enough to the individual to spur them towards further education in governance and other applicable forms of knowledge. That being said, we find that the best form of government is Aristocracy, yet this rule by the best (in a truly virtuous society) is ruled by those who are willing. While the philosopher-king must be chosen and groomed by an outside force (creating a bit of a catch-22 situation), these aristocrats are naturally selected from among a virtuous and educated populace. The hurdle has become proper education in virtue and craft steering society. Should the system allow individuals a proper base knowledge of crafts and a grounding in virtue, the natural aristocrats could then begin to attain the expert “knowledge” necessary for governance on their own.  

In reality, the best form of government becomes the polity, by which the willing, who are not necessarily the most virtuous individuals, are constricted by the will of the general masses. Those who are willing to rule attempt to take up office, but it is the people who, by nature of their own desires, will hopefully choose the most qualified and virtuous individuals in order to live in a respectful and efficient society. The goal is that of Aristocracy, but the polity allows for an imperfect world to achieve a second best option, where the best still hopefully gain power. When these best gain power, it is their responsibility to educate the populace in such a way that will eventually lead to the true Aristocracy.

Conclusion
Of course, this final piece is based on the hope that the people recognize at least some semblance of what is good for the whole of society. Plato’s Republic is centered on this notion that the state and soul are inexorably tied together in what can be seen as a one-to-one fashion. While I do believe that there is a link between the two, I find that the notion of structural similarity to be somewhat off. Government is meant to serve society, namely in the flourishing of its citizens. Furthermore, Plato’s class system within kallipolis is founded on arbitrary distinctions within the soul that do not, I think, truly capture who or what we are. When we see the soul as a harmonious entity, one that is for the most part malleable in society, the structure of the ideal government changes drastically. Caste systems are not necessarily valid when individuals are not permanently fixed in a certain state of virtue as Plato would hold. Gold souls may be born, but they are also made, and it is the purpose of the state to allow the entirety of its population shine in the light.

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Hans J. Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* is considered a classic text of international relations theory. Most well known are its famous six principles of political realism, further narrowed down to the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Morgenthau’s principles are typically used as the starting point for modern neorealism, with its focus on the pressures of the international system that push states into a competition driven by the desire for power and the need for security. Neorealism, the dominant form of realism today, has received widespread criticism, with one author pointing out: “Realists are either amoral analysts of the international system who focus only on power or immoral Machiavellians who see nothing wrong with using violence and deception to advance the national interest. This, at least, is the caricature often found in critical and even some sympathetic accounts of the realist tradition.” Neorealism, however, bears little relation to the classical realism of Morgenthau. Upon closer examination, Morgenthau thoroughly engages with the question of morality in international politics, and his power politics can actually be understood as an attempt to address the ethical issues of statecraft, even though he never fully resolves the tension in his work. What, according to Morgenthau is the role of morality in international politics? More widely, how can morality and ethics be understood in international relations and policy-making?

Proper understanding of Morgenthau begins with a discussion of the unique historical context that influenced Morgenthau and his work. Born in 1904 in Coburg, Germany, Morgenthau was a German Jew that grew to adulthood amidst the economic difficulties and growing nationalism of interwar Germany. Emigrating from Germany in 1932 to Geneva, then Madrid, and lastly the United States, Morgenthau was personally affected by the Second World War. Two of his seminal works on international politics, *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics* and *Politics Among Nations*, (both of which discuss morality and power in sometimes conflicting ways) were published in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. *Politics Among Nations* was published in 1948, as the Cold War began.

Although writing against the backdrop of the Cold War, Morgenthau was far from a ‘cold warrior’ in the traditional sense of the term. Rather, as the final chapters of *Politics Among Nations* reveal, Morgenthau’s central concern was the “mitigation and minimization of those political conflicts that in our time pit the two superpowers against each other and evoke the spectre of a cataclysmic war.” The prescription for peace...
according to Morgenthau was accommodation by the instrument of diplomacy, an element of Morgenthau’s theory that is often overlooked in conventional depictions of his legacy in international relations theory. The end goal of diplomacy would be to “create the conditions under which it will not be impossible from the outset to establish a world state,” even though such a state is “unattainable” under present moral, social, and political conditions.

The rather radical conclusion that a world state is the only possible method of achieving lasting peace stems from the historical context of Morgenthau’s writing. Morgenthau’s theory of international politics is a direct response to what he saw as a troubling moralistic nationalism accompanying the nation state in the 20th century. The Second World War was a clash between two universalist systems of morality. Construction of the conflict in this way removes the cause of the war from the political sphere, where compromise is possible. This leads to demonization of the ‘other’ in the conflict, with total war now acceptable and demanded, since the other side had no right to fight in the conflict. Morgenthau saw this as inherent in the Wilsonian foreign policy that turned diplomacy into a moral crusade—the advancement of the liberal democratic order by force. Morgenthau witnessed the force of nationalism in Nazi Germany, and he was dismayed that the “new moral force of nationalistic universalism” entrenched itself in the bipolar system of the Cold War.

Nationalistic universalism caused the decline of diplomacy as exercised during its golden age from the end of the Thirty Year’s War to the beginning of the First World War. Diplomacy in its ideal form, as Morgenthau describes it, is a sort of sacred political space insulated from the pressures of public exposure and the nationalist sentiment brought by public demands. It is administrated by elite, educated, cosmopolitan diplomats who share a common set of values and intuitively understand the ‘rules of the game.’ “Persuasion and compromise” prevail, instead of the either-or choice between “victory and defeat.” This conception of diplomacy can hardly be further from the modern Realist conception of politics as a zero-sum game.

While Morgenthau’s concept of interest defined in terms of power leads many to conclude that unbridled pursuit of national self-interest is the highest good, Morgenthau’s normative theory of international politics is sharply critical of nationalistic ethics. His power politics is designed to provide a better alternative for analysis that will avoid the dangers of the dominant thinking at the time. Morgenthau did not set out to create an amoral theory of international politics; for him, “the choice was not between moral principles and the national interest, but between ‘one set of moral principles divorced from political reality, and another set of moral principles derived from political reality.”

So what, for Morgenthau, is political reality and the framework of morality it produces? This essay discussed Morgenthau’s best practical solution for peace (diplomacy) first, in order to contrast certain elements of his argument against this solution, both to explain these arguments better and to show contradictions within them. The next part of this essay will analyze the three parts of Morgenthau’s argument: the concepts of interests, power, and morality. The interaction of interests and power occurs within the sphere of politics, while morality is a constraint on politics, delineating its boundaries and possibilities. Some authors have emphasized the concept of tragedy that runs throughout Morgenthau’s work. This is a good place to begin the discussion, since it strongly influences Morgenthau’s view of human nature, the nation-state, and moral perfectionism.

From the opening pages of Politics Among Nations, Morgenthau takes a rather tragic view of human nature, stating that his theory stands in opposition to that school of thought that “assumes the essential goodness and infinite malleability of human nature.” Here Morgenthau strongly implies that human nature as he sees it is corrupted and fixed in its imperfect ways. This is further articulated in Scientific Man and Power.
Politics, where Morgenthau refutes the idea that science can be a means of correcting “the irresolvable tragedies of human existence.”\textsuperscript{58} The corrupt human nature is characterized by the will to power (the *animus dominandi*), which leads man to pursue power for its own purposes. Politics itself is the sphere in which this pursuit of power takes place. As Williams points out, this idea of politics does not imply eye-for-an-eye, tooth-for-a-tooth struggle; it is a deliberate attempt to reduce politics to its essence and differentiate it from other spheres, making it a limited and autonomous sphere in keeping with the Weberian legacy of politics. This has important analytical value for Morgenthau, as distilling the essence of politics to the pursuit of power allows us to focus on the interest calculations that determine how states behave. As Williams points out, in Schmitt’s conception of politics (which Morgenthau’s conception parallels), politics is essentially a blank space where negotiations to determine policy can take place. States do not have permanent interests, as those who hold the reins of power construct them. Morgenthau acknowledges in his third principle of realism that interests and power change depending on the political and cultural environment.

Despite the tragedy in international politics, Morgenthau does not take a Hobbesian-Machiavellian approach to humanity. Life is not nasty, brutish, and short, and as the quote at the beginning of the essay stated, Morgenthau himself rejected attempts to label him as a Hobbesian thinker that has rejected standards of universal morality. A.J.H. Murray argues that Morgenthau’s view of human nature and its possibilities for improvement lie within the Judeo-Christian tradition articulated by Augustine. Augustine is well-known within the Christian tradition for his defence of the doctrine of original sin against the Pelagians, but he also was a noted thinker on other pressing questions, such as how Christians should live in this world, a topic discussed at length in *The City of God*. Murray summarizes Augustine’s argument:

> Christians must therefore learn to live with reality, rather than assume that it will suddenly be transformed.... Christians are therefore obliged to engage in politics. Despite the moral hardships involved, they owe a duty to society.... The grievous necessities of political life must not be moralized, but accepted as a mark of the wretchedness of human life. However virtuous men are, the taint of corruption upon all action makes moral perfection ultimately impossible. They must simply struggle to do their best, and hope that their virtue will attain them forgiveness for their sins.\textsuperscript{59}

Murray sees echoes of this in Morgenthau’s work, speaking of the “dialectical relation between the imperatives of a transcendental morality and the dictates of recalcitrant reality which characterizes Morgenthau’s realism, not the moral derision or ignorance of Machiavelli or the moral relativism of Hobbes.”\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, a morally perfectionist theory of international politics, like the liberal ‘moral crusaders’ that Morgenthau derides, fails because it assumes the basic perfectibility of mankind. Morgenthau seeks to walk the line between acknowledging universal standards of morality, without falling into the traps of crusader politics (which glorifies war and obscures political visions), scientific rationalism (which ignores the tragedy of politics and the reality of the pursuit of power), or unbridled pursuit of power (which leads to more bloodshed and strategically bad decisions).

The Augustinian reading of Morgenthau is right in that it highlights the contradictions that are not fully resolved within Morgenthau’s thinking. By calling our attention to the lust for power within the individual, and exposing the evil within the very nature of politics itself, Morgenthau lays out a sort of ‘total depravity’ of politics, in contrast to the high standards of morality. If politics is evil in its core, the pursuit of it, no matter how personally just the politicians are, cannot help but be tinged with evil. By rejecting the moralism of countries such as the United States during the Cold War—which some
argue brought about the triumph of liberalism—Morgenthau’s theory essentially marginalizes political decisions that are made to promote a moral agenda.

Furthermore, Morgenthau explicitly rejects the notion that states can define a universal and nationalistic standard of morality, in favor of one organically developed among a community of nation states. In that case, how can states condemn the behavior of states that disregard the universal standards which Morgenthau admits exist? And what about actions that are morally dubious but politically advantageous, or directly affect national survival? Murray puts it this way: “Morgenthau’s statesman is thus faced with the dilemma that to apply moral imperatives directly will yield disaster, while to abandon them altogether will contradict the necessities of conscience.”

There are two possible ways to address this tension. The first is outlined by what Murray calls “the Augustinian synthesis:” if national survival is the highest moral good, then interest and morality can be united. Many people have found this very unsatisfactory, however, as it justifies acts in the name of national survival that many Western states, and our own consciences, would call morally reprehensible.

As another way of resolving this tension, Lang explores the virtue of prudence, taken from Aristotle’s Politics, which moderates the ambitions of power and makes a diplomatic solution to the problem of conflict possible. For Lang, the ethics of Morgenthau in international politics is governed by an Aristotelian view of ethics, whose cardinal virtue is prudence. Like Aristotle, Morgenthau aimed to create a positive theory of agency that explained why people behave the way they do, as their behavior and goals are influenced by their environment. Because of the animus dominandi, political action can never reach the standards of a perfectionist morality. As Morgenthau states:

Neither science nor ethics nor politics can resolve the conflict between politics and the ethics of harmony. We have no choice between power and common good. To act successfully, that is, according to the rules of the political art, is political wisdom. To know with despair [the tragedy] that the political act is inevitably evil, and to act nevertheless, is moral courage. To choose among several expedient actions the least evil one is moral judgment. In combination of political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment man reconciles his political nature with his moral destiny.

Further extending Morgenthau’s argument, Anthony Lang focuses on how the existence of a political framework modified by prudence makes Morgenthau’s solution of diplomacy workable. States do not exist in isolation but in a community of other states in the arena of international politics. The choices of the other members of the community limit and shape the range of available choices, thus states learn to moderate their behavior because they must take into account the preferences of others. Perhaps prudence can be to Morgenthau’s dialectic of international politics what grace is to Augustine’s theological dialectic.

Despite the unresolved tension between morality and politics within Morgenthau’s theory, when properly understood, it has much insight to offer both international relations theorists and policymakers. Morgenthau promulgated a thoughtful brand of Realism, one that elevated shrewd political wisdom, moral courage, and moral judgment to discern between the conflicting political pressures within the nation and abroad. Morgenthau’s Realism was deeply aware of the dangers of hubris, which had no place in the diplomatic community that he envisioned. While his lack of prescriptive moral principles may seem frustrating to international relations theorists, the dialectic in Morgenthau’s normative theory bear much resemblance to the real world, where policymakers frequently make moral choices among multiple evils, where the only “right” choice is the lesser evil.

Far from being an irrelevant or missing part of Classical Realist theory, morality plays a central
role in Morgenthau’s conception of international politics. *Politics Among Nations* was a response to what Morgenthau saw as the moralist crusades of the 20th century, which crowded out the space for diplomacy and set two nuclear-armed superpowers against each other, with the potential to destroy the world. Morgenthau’s theory of politics as the pursuit of interests defined in terms of power was not a license for wanton warmongering or for reckless pursuit of power. Rather, it was an attempt to lay out a workable solution for states with legitimate differences to achieve peace, which cannot resolve these differences until they mutually acknowledge the right of other states to pursue their own interests. Good diplomacy, according to Morgenthau, requires understanding what the other party values and being willing to compromise on interests that are not vital.

Although the international order has changed in the over 65 years since *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau’s theory of international politics is still relevant today. Its value stands primarily in its injunction to avoid moralist crusades and attempts to export a particular system of morality and government to the rest of the world. As United States foreign policy recovers from the loss of strategic clarity during the crusade-like Global War on Terror, policymakers would do well to keep Morgenthau’s cautions and principles of good diplomacy in mind. Adopting a foreign policy of, in the words of President Obama, “strong and principled” diplomacy based on national interests, but tempered with humility and prudence, would be a positive step forward for Western nations.65

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Alfarabi, a tenth century Baghdad Aristotelian, Persian or Turkish by birth, carves out the bed through which the river of Arabic philosophy would flow after him—a brook including Yahya ibn ‘Adi, Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali, Ibn Rushd, and Maimonides. His sobriquet, the “Second Teacher” is given to him due to this influence of his, as well as his capacity to pithily grasp much of Aristotle’s political and metaphysical thought. His *Book of Letters* (*Kitab al-Huruf*), Alfarabi’s expositional commentary to Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, is consequently a crucial work for Near eastern philosophy, not only because it signifies the great achievement of transposing Aristotelian metaphysics into Arabic thought, but also because within it lies the essential political logic that would prove to define the Arab philosopher’s comportment to divine revelation. In this *Book of Letters*, particularly in Books 23-25, Alfarabi lies the groundwork for a political philosophy that treats the community—the Ummah—as a hylomorphic substance that therefore has both a form and matter. The Ummah’s form and matter, for Alfarabi, is language and historical memory: consequently, Alfarabi’s—and by extension Arabic philosophy’s—ideal political society is historical. The Philosopher’s fullness is in his prophethood, his capacity to instantiate the fully just regime; not, unlike in Plato, in his capacity to embrace his own death (see Socrates’s death; footnote to be added.). Alfarabi’s righteous ummah is that community which is guided by the philosopher-prophets: the aristocrat ruling by reason alone and thereby democratically making Truth accessible to all.

Alfarabi’s book is essentially concerned with defining the very form and matter of the community, and how one can descry the object in which the Community is defined and how its substance is known by mind. For Alfarabi, Language and Memory coalesce to generate one people; the fruition of philosophy and religion perfect them—so that while speaking and recollecting is the basis for a community’s subsistence, the community’s existence fruitions through reason reckoning and memory recalling the Divine Origin of humanity. One might think that Alfarabi’s *Book of Letters* is consequently an overly-Aristotelian political philosophy; yet, an original ontology and epistemology are woven into the fabric of this book; metaphysics does not cease, for Alfarabi, where the study of man and the rational ordering of political activity begins. Rather, metaphysics is also a social phenomenon or, better yet, is excavated to be used as the great jewel for the rightly guided community, which, in good Aristotelian fashion, develops and improves the natural art of reason towards man’s end. Man’s End is the happiness of all peoples given concrete historical life when metaphysics, and thereby the art of logic, is allowed to take over the reins of government to form, not only political life, but language and memory. Reason incarnate—philosophy and religion founded...
by prophets—is the fundamental prerequisite for human flourishing. Reason in Alfarabi, and consequently in Arabic philosophy, then, is not grounded in a timeless state; rather, because Reason is constituted as the divine overflowing into matter, truth is always located, for the Arab philosophers, in the Timeless manifested through the sagacious prophets. Reason incarnates itself through the words of philosopher-prophets, whom we might call democratic aristocrats as they, unlike the Stoic dwelling in his private garden, munificently mediate their knowledge to mankind for the sake of man’s beatification.

Consequently, the Philosopher in the stream of Arabic political philosophy finds himself ruminating upon the nature of language and memory of the community, as part of a people’s teleological potency to manifest, or beget, some perfect lawgiver. Al-Farabi, in this sense, is then more universal and ideal than Aristotle because he dwells on the Ideal as governing its concrete historical expression. Alfarabi’s humanism, likewise, attempts to unconceal the hylomorphism of the expanding Anthropic Community itself, rather than the substance of some specific manifestation of culture in a particular, local community. Alfarabi is not after custom, but her timeless Idea; not laws, but the Law.

On the other hand, Alfarabi is more particular and historical than Plato - he contemplates human society in light of its historical development. He does not refract human experience through the prism of a utopianism, which might reveal the individual soul’s fierce struggle to pierce through the mists of ignorance to the Divine Ideas. Rather, Alfarabi locates the Law and the Idea of culture in its fruition in time mediated through philosopher-prophets, so called here because Alfarabi’s prophet is the philosopher who can properly teach his community and thereby refract the divine light into the prism of the world.

Ultimately, though, al-Farabi rejects the assumption that the community and its individual parts are inseparable. Philosophy is never, for him, solely an individual venture that has no political ramifications. Furthermore it is also unlikely that al-Farabi would have taught that Aristotle and Plato as being diametrically opposed to one another. Unlike Plato and perhaps Aristotle, al-Farabi does not liken the parts of the soul to the parts of the state, making the person a microcosm of the polis. Rather, he takes the community (ummah) as a real thing, independent, though consisting of, its various members. Alfarabi’s Platonic Aristotelianism thereby grounds his philosophica lhorizon solely in historical time; yet, for Alfarabi, the political horizon of philosophy is in the end made possible by his direct knowledge of the Ideas.

Al-Farabi therefore does not set up the state as an analogy to the soul, like Plato, Alfarabi is more interested in the nature of the righteous community more than the character of the individual, philosophical soul. To look at this community, or Ummah, Alfarabi considers language to be the form of the community, whose matter, then, are the human beings within it who are shaped according to their dispositions: that is, who possess historical memory. The community and the human beings within it develop, if unhindered, move towards a “fullness of time” wherein a lawgiver will arise who shall legislate according to the principles of demonstrative philosophy. He thereby democratizes, through religion, the happiness that until then was only within the grasp of the theoretical philosopher. However, in good aristocratic fashion the philosopher keeps the highest position in the community, being the “elect unqualifiedly.” Yet in good democratic fashion, he—through his bountiful capacity to mediate truth—makes bliss and eternal life available to all.

In Book II of the Book of Letters Alfarabi suggests that the language of the ummah is the incarnational vessel for philosophical truth transcendent of time. For one, he treats philosophy, which for the Greeks was a lonely, dangerous calling, as a communal property. For Alfarabi, philosophy deals with universal truth, which may or may not conflict with religion, the beliefs of the multitude, and so must, in its ideal
state, make truth available to everyone. In various places al-Farabi defines philosophy as the “knowledge of existing things insofar as they are existent (Harmonization, 25),” while in the Exhortation he makes the peculiar case that moral philosophy is preceded by theoretical philosophy. To be more exact, to achieve happiness, the acquiring of seemly things is required, which in turn can only be attained only through philosophy. Philosophy, in her turn, arises in those of good judgment, which these individuals find through strength of mind. This strength, finally, is developed through logic: the ability to discern truth and falsehood.  

This intricate chain of cause and effect ties the origin for the practical art of political philosophy in the rich, golden vein the theoretical; in a similar vein, al-Farabi says that “if a religion depends on a philosophy perfected after all the syllogistic arts have been distinguished from one another in the way and the order that we have recounted, it will be an excellently valid religion.”  

The order al-Farabi has in mind is in chapter 23, where philosophy gradually emerges in a civilization, finally being perfected in both its theoretical and practical arts, after which it is transmitted as an art in that society: the elite will learn demonstration, while the multitude will acquire its truths through dialectics, rhetoric, and poetry.

Thus, for each individual member of that community in which perfected philosophy flourishes, that philosopher is learned in and uses logic as an art, for the sake of both the elite and the multitude. However, this practice for the individual is of an entirely different kind for the philosophy of that community considered as a whole rather than its individual parts. al-Farabi, significantly, describes philosophy as an artisan only in its relation to theology and religion (Letters, 110). In its relation to dialectics and sophistry, philosophy is prior to them just as “the tree being nourished is prior to the fruit or in the way the tree’s blossom is prior to the fruit (Letters, 110).” The tree as a whole, presumably, is the community, whose root is language, so that just as sophistry and poetry arise when utterances become ambiguous and equivocal as a consequence of native-speakers beginning to distinguish between universals and individuals (Letters, 123-126).

However, that whose end is teleological and natural cannot also have that same end as an art. Therefore, considered as belonging to the essence of the community, philosophy is its natural end. It is not an art, and thereby an accident, of the virtuous city. Considered in its function within that society, philosophy depends on, and makes use of, the pith of its branches, rhetoric and sophistry, to invigorate and guide the whole in a return to its origin: the ordinary arts and the people. Philosophy is the natural fulfillment of the ummah, in that through Sophia the virtuous city can burst into and persevere through history; yet, Philosophy is also an art insofar as it becomes a tradition to be handed over to successive generations in that city.

Philosophy, that is, the attainment of happiness and the knowledge of existing things, is thus essentially social. It is the ummah’s essence fully laden with fruit. Likewise, just as an unhealthy tree bears no fruit, so a community, based in erroneous religion or a philosophy of opinion, cannot bear fruit. Philosophy and religion, in that ummah, are condemned to eternally conflict with one another. the philosophers in those cultures, eventually withdraw or are driven out by the ignorant (Letters, 148-153).

To be clear, though religion is a function of the lawgiver who uses rhetoric and poetry to persuade the multitude, it does not necessarily follow that the philosopher cannot acquiesce to the beliefs of the religion. On the contrary, if the religion’s laws are derived from demonstrative philosophy, then the philosopher must in fact admit the soundness of that religion and its unity with philosophy. He will recognize the image of the theoretical intelligibles and cease actively opposing it.

Thus, Philosophy and Theology, Law and Reason, are in harmony when they both are derived from the perfected arts that ensure definite
demonstration, and which are fully independent of unexamined opinion. For al-Farabi, that community whose linguistic purity is maintained will maintain the harmony of all its individual parts. Generally speaking, a religion which "[...] depends on a philosophy perfected after all the syllogistic arts have been distinguished from one another in the way and the order that we have recounted[...] it will be an excellently valid religion."76

To be more precise, religion, when its legislation is the image of the philosophy generated from good judgment and the Master of Logic, will perfectly guide its followers towards the achievement of final happiness. The philosophers, seeing the truth, will enable the many to see the same truth as incarnated in the images fashioned to the needs and capacity of the multitude. Hence the community will be in complete accord with itself without, as it were, ill-humours causing fevers or distemper within it.

Valid religion is harmonious with philosophy. This harmony, significantly, does not seem to be rooted in the religion’s particular laws, but rather in the principles that guide the lawgiver in all his legislation. What this harmony is, at least, is an ordering of the philosophical soul ensconced in language so that it uses its intellect as a benefit for the whole community. In this context, the elite may without censure compromise the purity of language for the sake of perfectly forming demonstrative philosophy, the root of health for the body juridical. While this concern for the whole echoes the Greek concern that philosophy must edify, the Book of Letters is unique in that, because it take the Ummah as a separate, hylomorphic compound, philosophy must also be intricately concerned with grammar and logic in order to achieve harmony of form. Harmony of language, then, being essentially concerned with the many, indelibly impacts the individuals souls. Doing so, correct language is the necessary, though not sufficient, cause for the harmony of the matter of the ummah: the individuals in the towns and country who participate in the virtuous city.77 Language becomes

the vehicle for Truth, an Ark bearing the rightly-guided through the destructive flood of historical time.

In this case language, the form of the community, not only preserves, but gives shape to and unifies the multitude and the elect, while the matter, memory, is the clay which speech forms according to its will. Put another way, while memory collectively held is a kind of experience resembling primeval matter, without form shape, or meaning; language gives sense and meaning to historical experience: it is the Idea molding primeval matter into a community with both a history and guidance from the Eternal.

Erring religion, on the other hand, arises when it is based in philosophies containing within them unexamined opinion. The cause for this is the imperfect mastery, on the philosopher’s part, of the arts of dialectic.78 The image becomes even more corrupted than that philosophy, and anything flowing from this wellspring will become more and more polluted, especially as it becomes increasingly separated from its root by history.79 Ominously, any religion or philosophy that is imported into another community will generate disharmony just as foreign elements of a language, when used by another people, will cause change and rupture in that language such that the various arts revolving around the use of utterances will be confused. It would seem, then, that theology and philosophy cannot exist as one in communities whose guiding principles are admixed with unexamined opinion.

The erring community is not without a religion or philosophy. Indeed, it is impossible for a community to exist without one or the other. Rather, it errs because either its religion or philosophy mistakes falsehood for truth regarding the causes or theoretical sciences. The good community is then that which discerns the true from the true and the false from the false,80 and while it is not immediately clear whether this community must hold to a form of perfect justice in its laws, it at least requires a certain interwoven, strengthening harmony between religion and philosophy.81 At the very least, then, the
theoretical sciences must be in harmony with one another, while the practical arts, those concerned with the will and actions of man, would ostensibly reflect this inner harmony in the rightly-guided ummah.

Truth, then, and its relation to reality, are contingent on the past reception of both religion and philosophy. One cannot flourish without the other, and each include the other as part of its end. Indeed, conflicting philosophy and religion is the mark of Cain that distinguishes an erring community from one grounded in truth. After all, the death of Socrates was a sign that Athens, despite its love for freedom, still clung to its old superstitions of the gods.

Could this mean, then, that the philosopher is, as Hegel supposed, a product of his time, insofar as he is radically dependent on the past and his language? It would seem on the one hand, that the community takes unprecedented importance for al-Farabi in the emergence of philosophical thought. Conversely, however, the influence of the philosopher in the community is also totally unprecedented. The “Farabian” philosopher can be rooted in time and language while still having the capacity to intellect the first intelligibles and primary paradigms. Much of the Book of Letters and the Utterances also attempt to assure the reader that there is a logical connection between grammar and logic, such that particular language can ascend to universal logical propositions.

What does follow from presenting the community as a hylomorphic compound consisting of language and historical memory is that every community must relate to the truth in some way—even if, for example, it denies truth’s very existence and its fruit withers. Every community, then, has a philosophy and is essentially governed by some lawgiver and some philosopher’s principles. Whether or not this community will reflect truth is, in a way, not up to any particular person in that society. Its fate is much like the fate of Alcibiades in the Platonic Dialogues: some communities, like him, are destined to a history of vice and tyranny.

For al-Farabi truth as such transcends time. While philosophy is rooted in it, the philosopher may still grasp true reality (ةقيقحلا) concerning the Cause of Causes as well as the mathematical and geometrical form of motion or substance in things. As shown already, though, philosophy will egregiously err when it is not fully formed, when it inadvertently using unexamined opinion.

Therefore, there is special merit in reading the Book of Letters as primarily treating the ummah as having a separate existence from the individual soul. One can philosophically explain the philosopher’s fascination with language and grammar. One also, rather neatly, avoids dully proffering a historical description of that concern. We can explain, then, why al-Farabi writes a history of culture and a political philosophy in a work seemingly concerned with theoretical science—atemporal logic and metaphysics. It may be why, for al-Farabi, philosophy may spontaneously be both practical and theoretical, both moral and profound. The practical, one might say, must be grounded in the whole of philosophy, since it is like the fruit of the tree of knowledge: the past incarnating itself in the present. Theoretical philosophy’s ripe harvest, on the other hand, is a practical philosophy that internally harmonizes the community under Law.

The evidence for Alfarabi’s ummah having substance and essence is most evident in the importance he places in the development of its language. He uses the meaning of signs in language as a helpful way to explain his intense concern for the principles of linguistic translation and morphology in the Book of Letters. Language, for al-Farabi, carries meaning regardless of whether it is spoken or written. It reflects the patterns of the soul formed by its aesthetic or intellectual perception of existents. In its turn, language forms the dispositions and form of the individual souls through historical memory. This is the incarnate ummah. If the soul is composed of both matter and form, then, in addition to its psychical makeup, language also informs the physicality of the soul’s body: specifically, in the use of the throat and larynx. Al-Farabi’s
scientific philology, rather than oddly misplaced in a book on metaphysics, is entirely in keeping with the Aristotelian paradigm of the inseparability of the form from matter. He demonstrates, then, that the soul’s form, as determined by language and its disposition, also informs the body wherein it dwells through the use of particular muscles in uttering meaningful sounds.

A further study is required to makes sense of how one thing, the community, can be made up of essentially many, the individual souls. At the least it can be said that the people of a civilization participate in it through knowing their language and past. Yet, their civilization is greater, as a whole, then the amalgamation of the number of souls within its tradition. Tradition itself is a kind of living thing, unable to fully manipulated by any one individual.

Ultimately, the souls of the elite—philosophers and prophets—are inseparable from the community and vice versa. This is why the head of these communities, either wisemen or lawgivers, are given such special attention by al-Farabi. They represent the guiding light of the community, from whom the possibility for happiness emanates into the multitude.

As the individual souls and their community morph into a complex array of knowledge held together by its memory and its sages, language too begins to develop and organize itself to express the overflowering of truth’s aspects into explicit speech. As language attempts to express the idea of like cases, words are changed to signify universals and the particulars. From this arises ambiguity and equivocation, out of which poetry and rhetoric are formulated naturally. This natural grace inevitably achieves an art form grounded in vocal patterns and mnemonic devices. Eventually, this system of memory becomes burdensome, and so writing is produced. As the science of language is developed (i.e., grammar), minds arise curious about the causes and the mathematical discoveries of the practical arts. As they formulate dialectics and mathematics and, when they return to the proverbial cave, these minds create political philosophy and a corresponding vocabulary. So is theoretical philosophy born and reaches its apogee as the fruit of language and memory.

This morphology of language, then, impacts the being of the souls in that community, in the same way that souls/ideas, inseparable from matter, give life to and move its physical instantiation in time.

Thus, reading al-Farabi’s book as being essentially concerned with the form of the community provides a holistic interpretation for the Book of Letters because it takes into account the myriad, seemingly disparate topics the philosopher addresses. We see his concern regarding the essence of the ummah manifest itself in that he does not consider the development of nations, at least, as an analogy for the soul. We see the form of the community, language, incarnate in time as informing the destinies and dispositions of its peoples. He moves beyond individual knowledge and metaphysics to demonstrate how are they essentially manifested chronotopically. In this way, the Book of Letters itself is a sort of portrait image of the ideal nation that demonstrates to the reader the potency of the nations. In this way the Book of Letters is a potent apologetic for the necessity of philosophy in a religious culture; it is an attempt to wed reason and faith together. Then, when the philosopher is of the highest caliber, and the religion of soundest doctrine, they will perfectly coalesce into and through each other through, one is tempted to say, the great Ark that is the Lawgiver.

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Introduction: The Necessity of a Doctrine on the Incarnation for Salvation History

Many of the documents penned by the early Church Fathers in the first centuries of Christianity dealt with the doctrine surrounding the theology of the Incarnation. Given the ambiguities found in Scripture concerning the nature of Christ and his relation to the Father, there were myriad opportunities for heresies to be put forward. Without a definitive doctrine developed on the matter, these heresies were free to run rampant throughout early Christendom, promulgated by thinkers who passed off their own interpretations of these vague Biblical passages as Truth. Entire councils were convened to address an issue that seems, at a precursory glance, to be a matter of semantics and mistranslations. However, these very translations carried the weight of the entire structure of Christianity, for a misinterpretation of the Incarnation had the distinct possibility of rendering the entire Passion and Resurrection meaningless.

Providing a sound and comprehensive doctrine on the Incarnation not only served as a bulwark against the heresies that threatened to tear down Christianity, but also solidified the role of Mary in Salvation History. While Mary was of course greatly esteemed as the woman who birthed Jesus, Scriptural evidence concerning her relationship to the divine nature of the Incarnation was decidedly ambiguous. She was widely considered, and rightly so, to be the foil to Eve; where Eve had brought Original Sin to Eden, Mary was the woman who had borne mankind’s Savior. However, without a coherently formulated theology of the Incarnation, Mary’s precise status was unclear. With the Incarnation rightly defined as being both fully human and fully divine, and with both natures existing in a single hypostasis, Mary was deemed to be the Theotokos, the “Bearer of God”. In so doing this, the early Christian Fathers granted Mary her proper place in the redemption of humanity as not only as the recapitulation of Eve, but as the Mother of God. Furthermore, the patently intrinsic relationship between the status of the Theotokos and the nature of the Incarnation means that any devaluation of Mary is not only a slight to the Bearer of God, but also a devaluation of the suffering, death, and resurrection of Christ and thus would rip the entire fabric of Christianity asunder.

The development of the doctrine on the Incarnation that would eventually be deemed orthodox evolved slowly and involved the...
necessary repudiation of heresies. The great heresy of Arianism, the theology preached by Arian, prompted the responses of many Church officials and led to the Council of Nicaea. At this Council, Athanasius, who would later become Archbishop of Alexandria, became well versed in Arianism and went on to write numerous works denouncing Arian and contributing to the orthodox teachings on the Logos as being consubstantial and coeternal with the Father. Over a century later, Nestorios based his entire attack on the bestowal of the term “Theotokos” on Mary on the heresy that the Incarnation was two distinct hypostases, a concept which threatened to undermine the entire salvation of Humanity. Nestorios’s arguments were responded to, and repudiated by, Cyril of Alexandria, whose brilliant defense of the Theotokos not only prevented the devaluation of Mary, but also provided the clarity regarding the hypostatic union found within the Incarnation, a position that would later be validated by the Council of Chalcedon.

The Heresy of Arius and Its Implications for Salvation

Arius’s great heresy stemmed in large part from a further extrapolation of the points put forth by Origen. The works of the latter hinted at a level of subordination between the Son and the Father, implying that there was a hierarchical structure in the Trinity. While Origen’s work is not considered to be orthodox after the Council of Nicaea, he is hardly considered outright heretical. Arian however is considered thusly, because he argued unabashedly that the Logos was a mere creation of the Father, begotten in a temporal sense rather than having an eternal beginning as claimed by Origen. He bolstered his argument with his own interpretations of vague Scripture passages, chief among them the verses regarding the creation of Wisdom: “The Lord created me at the beginning of his work, the first of His acts of old, ages ago I was set up at the first.”88 From this, Arian posited the crux of his argument, claiming: “En Hote Pote Out En” which translates from the Greek to mean: “There was a ‘when’ when He was not.” This phrase, which would become the rallying cry of Arianism, essentially meant that the Son, the Word of God, was neither consubstantial nor coeternal with the Father.

The heresy of Arianism is profoundly damaging for two reasons. The lesser reason being that it is too much of an attempt to rationalize God. Knowledge of God is not irrational, but Arian, by trying to place a temporal and physical limitation on the creation of the Word of God is projecting the finitude of his own mind onto the term “begotten.” Rationality is of course a gift; it is what separates man from beast. However, an over-application of rationalism in matters of theology can prove detrimental because it denies the role of the Holy Spirit, which grants man the certitude in the truth of divine revelation without demanding full comprehension as a prerequisite for belief. The rationalism of Arius, which was in and of itself deeply harmful, placed finite constraints upon the Logos, the implications of which brought forth the second and far larger reason for which Arius was anathematized.

The crucial point of Arianism, when taken to its logical conclusion, is that the Son, being only a creation of the Father, is susceptible to change. Alexander of Alexandria and his clergy point out this great fallacy in their encyclical written in 319. They write: “Someone accordingly asked them whether the Word of God could be changed, as the devil has been, and they feared not to say ‘Yes: he certainly could; for being begotten and created, his nature is susceptible of change.’”89 This statement, if taken as the Truth, invalidates the entire Incarnation, for it denies that Jesus was both fully human and fully divine. Rather, it claims that the Son is somehow of a wholly different essence from the Father, an assertion which would mean that the man had not truly been redeemed, for nothing that is not consubstantial with the Father could have provided such redemption. If the Incarnation was not capable of redeeming mankind, as Arianism purports, then the entire foundation of Christianity, which rests upon the claim that humanity
was redeemed by God’s passion, death, and resurrection upon the cross, is destroyed. For this reason, the early Church Fathers sought immediately to thwart the spread of Arianism and preserve the Incarnation as one in being with the Father and the Savior of all mankind.

Athanasius’s Response to Arianism in Post-Nicaean Christianity

When the Council of Nicaea was convened in 325 in response to the Arian heresies, it was discerned that creation was created *ex nihilo* in time and space. This claim not only emphasized the absolute transcendence of God, but it concretely and explicitly stripped the term “begotten” of any temporal or corporeal meaning. The Council of Nicaea also put forth the term “consubstantial” in regard to the relation between the Father and the Son. However, despite the clarity brought by Nicaea to the doctrine of the Church, strains of Arianism continued to permeate throughout early Christendom. It was at this time that Athanasius, who had been present at the Council and soon afterwards had been named Archbishop of Alexandria, wrote his definitive defense of the Incarnation as being coeternal with the Father. Athanasius did this in three parts, first by developing his theology of the *Logos*, and then by adding two Apologies, one to the Jews and a second to the Greek Gentiles.

For both the Jews and the Gentiles who were converting to Christianity, the crux of their willingness to believe Arian’s heresies stemmed from their unwillingness to believe that God would allow himself to suffer and die on the Cross. Athanasius adeptly worked around this by providing a theology of the *Logos* that had its emphasis on the Incarnation rather than the crucifixion. While later theologians would place the focus of Salvation on the Cross, Athanasius highlighted instead the exact moment in which God took human form within the Virgin Mary as the moment of humanity’s salvation. He wrote: “…through this union of the immortal Son of God with our human nature, all men were clothed with incorruption …by virtue of the Word’s indwelling in a [body], the corruption which goes with death has lost its power over all.” In thus orienting the theology of the *Logos* on the moment of the Jesus’s coming to dwell within Mary, Athanasius was able to refocus those Jewish and Gentile converts onto the critical point of redemption. Only after doing this did he go on to provide an Apology to each faction.

For the Jews’ argument that God would never submit to death, particularly such a brutal execution on the Cross, Athanasius relied predominantly on Scriptural evidence from the Old Testament prophesies concerning the suffering and death that stated the Lord would endure for the sake of man’s redemption. Athanasius wrote: “[The Scriptures] are not silent even about His death…they refer to it with the utmost clearness…He endures it, they say, not for His own sake, but for the sake of bringing [salvation] to all.” These passages had been the backbone of the Jewish faith for centuries, and therefore could not be discounted, even if they indicated that God Himself would die upon a cross. Thus, Athanasius pacified the Jewish protest by proving Christ’s Passion to be the fulfillment of their own past prophesies before moving to address the Gentiles’ similar argument.

As the Gentiles did not have the same relationship with the Scripture as the Jews, Athanasius instead posited the Crucifixion to be the sign of divine reconciliation, and thus wholly necessary for man’s salvation. Therefore, he wrote: “...He put on a body, so that in the body He might find death and blot it out. And, indeed, how could the Lord have proved to be the Life at all, had He not endured with life that which was subject to death?” (Athanasius, 44). To redeem humanity, God needed to enflesh himself in order that death, the corruption of man, could be defeated by His body’s own resurrection. In this way, Athanasius proved that Jesus’s death upon the Cross was not a sign that the Son was not the same as the Father, but rather that it was the perfect solution found in the Divine Reconciliation between man and God.
How Nestorios’s Argument against the Theotokos Denied the Hypostatic Union of Christ

Nestorios’s argument is ostensibly him taking a position against the title of Theotokos, which had long been used to describe Mary. However, in order to devalue Mary’s role in Salvation History as he does, he had to provide a clear statement that the Logos did not experience a fleshly birth, and thus was not wholly enfleshed in a human body. Nestorios’s argument was far more nuanced than Arius; indeed he recognized that Christ is both fully human and fully divine, and he wrote: “But Christ is not a mere man, O slander! No he is at once God and man.”92 This set him utterly apart from the anathematized Arius, whose theology claimed that the Incarnation was of an entirely different substance than the Father. What Nestorios did, in his denouncement of the Theotokos, is he divided the two natures into two hypostases, or two concrete beings. Thus, rather than the Logos being entangled with the rational human mind, it is simply conjoined, described by Nestorius as two distinct natures which have been merely conjoined, not fully intertwined as one distinct being, in Christ.

Having made such an argument, it is reasonable to see why Nestorios believed that Mary could not be the Theotokos, for to admit her as being the Bearer of Christ would be to say that the Logos had been entangled with the rational human mind, since conception. It seemed intuitive to claim that the Word of God, being consubstantial and coeternal with the Father, must by necessity be “uncreatable.” However, there Nestorios’s position tread far too closely to rationalism as he tried to comprehend the nature of the Incarnation in monolithic terms. Furthermore, in reality, the logical conclusion to Nestorios’s argument against the Theotokos must be that the divine Logos never fully assumed flesh. The implications of this for the Incarnation were devastating, because that which is not assumed cannot be saved; therefore, by denying that the Logos assumed humanity utterly through a fleshly birth, and that the divine Word of God was fully enfleshed in humanity, Nestorios was simultaneously devaluing Mary as the Bearer of God and undermining the entire economy of salvation.

Cyril’s Assertion of the Hypostatic Union and his Subsequent Defense of the Theotokos

While never once outright condemning Nestorios of any form of heresy, St. Cyril of Alexandria offered a gentle but firm rebuke regarding the former’s position on the Theotokos and his denial of the Incarnation’s hypostatic union. In his second letter to Nestorios, Cyril wrote: “...we say that while the natures which were brought together into a true unity were different, there [is] because of the unspeakable and unutterable convergence into unity, one Christ and one son out of the two.”93 Cyril’s clear assertion not only plainly elucidated the entwining of both natures into one concrete being, but he also referred to the entire Incarnation as “unspeakable and unutterable” thus condemning any attempt made to rationalize or explain the incomprehensible. Cyril’s affirmation of the hypostatic union was not only based on what the Council of Nicaea determined regarding Jesus as being both fully human and fully divine, but it laid the foundation for the Council of Chalcedon’s definitive position regarding the fleshly birth, death, and resurrection of the Logos.

Cyril’s defense of the hypostatic union in the face of Nestorios’s skepticism managed to save Christianity from the potentially devastating claims put forward by the latter. His affirmation of the two natures of Christ existing in one being, rather than separating one from the other, ensured that the physical body is assumed fully by the divine Logos. With this assertion made, the full magnitude of humanity’s redemption remained intact. Furthermore, by repudiating the notion that the Logos had no fleshly birth, Cyril placed Mary once again as the Theotokos, even if the Logos itself existed long before it took human
form within her. In the end of his letter, having elucidated the existence of two natures in the single being of Christ, he wrote: “...not because the nature of the Logos or the deity [began] in the holy Virgin, but because the holy body which was born of her, possessed as it was of a rational soul, and to which the Logos was hypostatically united, is said to have had a fleshly birth.” With the “fleshly birth” of the Logos established, the hypostatic union of the Incarnation is affirmed and the Salvation of mankind, along with Mary’s critical role, is preserved.

Conclusion: The Denial of the Theotokos Must Lead to the Devaluation of the Cross

The evolution of the theology of the Incarnation took several centuries before solidifying, relatively so, at the Council of Chalcedon in the fifth century. First the heresy of Arius, who claimed that the Logos was a creation of the Father rather than being consubstantial with Him, was refuted by the Council of Nicaea. This refutation was further elucidated by Athanasius who put forth a clear theology of the Logos which served the dual use of being an Apology to both the Jewish and Gentile convert factions who were scandalized by the notion of a God who suffered death. He achieved this by putting the focus of mankind’s salvation on the moment of the Incarnation rather than the Passion and Crucifixion. This assuaged some of those who were displeased by a God who debased himself upon the Cross, and his claims were supported with references to both Old Testament passages and the recognized necessity of a Divine reconciliation. The Arian controversy, and doctrinal developments which evolved in its aftermath, established the Incarnation as being fully human and fully divine, but it would be the discussions of the following century that would establish Christ as being a single hypostasis with Mary as the Theotokos.

The writings of Nestorios, which catalyzed the response of St. Cyril and the convening of the Council of Chalcedon addressed the matter of the hypostatic union found in the Incarnation. When Nestorios attempted to devalue Mary as the Theotokos, he did so by making the claim that the Logos had not truly and utterly assumed flesh, remaining a distinct hypostasis from the human nature of Christ. Cyril rightly repudiated this by defending the enfleshment of the Logos, which simultaneously cast Mary in her proper role in Salvation history as well as affirmed that the Incarnation fully redeemed humanity because the Logos fully assumed humanity and had both a fleshly birth and death. This argument maintained the full redemption of humanity that occurred in the death and resurrection of the Incarnation. In so doing, Cyril rescued the entire foundation of Christianity from falling prey to Nestorios’s undermining of the Incarnation’s full and comprehensive redemption of mankind, as well as maintaining Mary as the Bearer of God.

The doctrinal developments surrounding the nature of the Incarnation are intrinsically linked to the place of Mary in humanity’s redemption. When the fully human and fully divine natures of Christ are rightly understood as existing in hypostatic union, Mary is granted her due as being the Theotokos. If however, she is demoted from her rightful position as the Mother and Bearer of God, then by necessity it must follow that the Logos was not fully enfleshed and thus humanity was not fully redeemed. Conversely, if the Logos is deemed to be two natures, even if it is recognized that He is both fully human and fully divine, then Mary is reduced to no more than the bearer of the human nature of the Christ. Therefore, because of this inextricable connection between Christ and his mother, it follows that when one is devalued, the other must be as well; thus, the proper understanding of both must be held if Christianity is to avoid degrading the entire economy of salvation and destroying its own foundations.

Bio needed.
In his groundbreaking book, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder argues “…only a small minority [of Ukrainian collaborators] had political motives of any discernible sort…[f]ar more…simply said the right things, or said nothing and did what they were told.” In his review of Bloodlands, Omer Bartov takes quite the opposite view, criticizing Snyder for depicting occupied populations “largely as victims, helpless pawns who, even when they resist or collaborate, do so within severe constraints that greatly limit their choices.” Instead, he suggests most collaborators were motivated not by fear (Snyder’s claim) but rather by “traditional prejudices and radicalized ideologies of integral nationalism, as well as resentment and greed…”

This is the precipice upon which my subject stands. Historians agree on the fact of collaboration; that Soviet citizens in the Ukraine helped Hitler’s army commit heinous atrocities cannot be denied. What motivated those ‘treasonous’ acts, however, remains a source of conflict. This division appears no clearer than in the disagreement between Snyder and Bartov.

As happens so often in the historical field, both posit reasonable theses. Many collaborators, as Snyder suggests, were motivated by fear and “negative opportunism”—that is, “the hope to avoid a still worse personal fate.” Additionally, scores of Ukrainians also had political, ideological reasons for supporting the Führer’s work—antisemitic nationalists played an integral role in Nazi crimes. Consequently, the aforementioned disagreement is really no disagreement at all. Rather, it constitutes a difference in focus—Snyder on the influence of coercion and Bartov on the effect of politics. Bringing these focuses together reveals the complex nature of collaborators’ motives: they were diverse, hard to define, and deadly.

To fully understand the intricacy of Ukrainian collaboration, one must first look to the past. Before the outbreak of World War I, the Austro-Hungarian Empire held sway in Ukrainian-populated eastern Galicia and Bukovina, Central European regions annexed in the eighteenth century. The Habsburgs allowed the Ukrainian intelligentsia “to absorb the main currents of nationalist politics that circulated within the Austrian empire in the nineteenth century.” This relative political freedom gave root to a powerful nationalist movement, which, when threatened by Russian occupation in 1914, ensured Galician Ukrainians’ support for Austria-Hungary.

Following the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, war erupted in Galicia. Leaders from eastern Galicia and Bukovina hoped to unite western Ukraine, while Poland wanted to incorporate the region into its new empire. Romanian forces quickly subdued Bukovina, and by 1920, Poland had taken eastern Galicia. The Allies, concerned by the Ukrainian Galician Army’s reliance on Austrian and German officers,
recognized Poland’s gains in 1923. This defeat cemented a “natural” alliance between Ukrainian nationalist circles and Germany against the West and its draconian Treaty of Versailles.102

Poland’s victory fanned the flames of Ukrainian nationalism. In 1920, a number of radicals formed the terrorist Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO). Led by Colonel Ievhen Konovalets, the UVO “forged ties with the German military and rightwing organizations in order to destabilize Poland.”103 Groups like the UVO gained strength as Poland attempted to impose its culture on nationalistic eastern Galicia.

Over the course of the next fifteen years, anti-Polish, antisemitic, and anti-Soviet sentiments grew in the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Though hatred of Russia and the Soviet system often outweighed anger toward the Jews, leading militants like Dmytro Dontsov condemned them nonetheless: “The Jews are guilty, horribly guilty, because they…helped secure Russian rule in Ukraine…,” he wrote in response to the controversial acquittal of assassin Samuel Schwarzbart. “Only when Russia falls in Ukraine will we be able to order the Jewish question in our country in a way that lies in the interest of the Ukrainian people.”104

Antisemitic fervor continued to fester throughout the 1920s. In 1928, Colonel Konovalets reorganized the UVO into the fiercely anti-Russian, antisemitic Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN, though somewhat unpopular with leading Nazi officials, maintained its German ties for many years. In fact, the Abwehr, German military intelligence, “provided support and training” to “militant Ukrainian nationalists” throughout much of the 1920s and 1930s.105 The Nazis’ effect on the OUN proved particularly devastating for the Jews. Hitler’s extreme racism, at the very least, gave the group’s antisemitic tendencies credibility, fueling an already dangerous fire. Colonel Konovalets’ 1937 assassination, carried out by a Soviet agent, further escalated tensions. The following poem, released in an OUN-affiliated newspaper on the one-year anniversary of his death, illustrates just that: “And know, you Muscovite Jewish reptile / Which has sucked our blood for centuries / That the soul nurtures a hellish wrath / That we will have to meet with you.”106

Following the 1939 invasion of Poland, during which “the OUN was a faithful German auxiliary…,”107 Galicia became part of the Soviet Union. Naturally, a Communist occupation did not sit well with the OUN and other nationalist groups. The Nazis made up for the disappointment with concessions, forming the Ukrainian Central Committee (UTsK), led by Volodymyr Kubiiovych, which acted as the “only officially sanctioned Ukrainian political and community organization in the Generalgouvernement…” [and] the channel for pursuing nationalist goals”; the UTsK “maintained close ties to the OUN….”108 The General Government with which the UTsK was involved comprised “those parts of the occupied interwar Polish state not incorporated into Germany [or the USSR]…,” including pieces of western Ukraine.109

Although many nationalists saw the UTsK as a step in the right direction, others felt it did not go far enough. By 1940, radical members of the OUN, led by Stepan Bandera, had split off and formed the OUN-B. The more moderate OUN-M, led by Andrii Melnyk, preferred patience, hoping the Nazis would eventually sanction a peaceful transition to statehood. The OUN-B wanted independence as soon as possible.

From 1939 to mid-1941, German troops stationed in Poland embarked on a systematic program of persecution. Mass deportations filled Ukrainian-dominated regions with the Nazis’ unwanted Jews. On April 18, 1941, widespread ‘ghettoization’ and overcrowding led Kubiiovych to ask that “ethnic Ukrainian territories in the General Government [be purged] of ‘Polish and Jewish elements.’”110

During this time, antisemitism flourished as false ‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ stereotypes persisted, driven by anti-Soviet zeal—Stalin’s brief occupation of Galicia, wrongly perceived as favorable to the Jews, included political repression and ethnic violence. The OUN-B in particular
became incredibly anti-Jewish. In May 1941, a month before Hitler invaded Russia, the group released a set of guidelines for its military task forces, among which appeared the following: “[A]t a time of chaos and confusion liquidation of undesirable Polish, Muscovite, and Jewish activists is permitted, especially supporters of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism.” 111 A section on government organization made the OUN-B’s intentions abundantly clear: “The national minorities are divided into a. those that are friendly to us...and b. those that are hostile to us—Muscovites, Poles, and Jews...Re. b. Destruction in the struggle, especially of those who defend the regime...Assimilation of Jews is barred.” 112

All of the factors mentioned here made Ukrainian nationalists (not just those in the OUN) 113 ripe for collaboration: the birth of groups like the UVO and their intimate ties with Germany, hatred for the USSR, the belief that Jews benefited from and supported the Soviet Union, the rise of antisemitism, and confidence that Hitler would give Ukraine independence. Thus, by the time German troops poured over the USSR’s vast western border, Ukraine’s political environment tolerated, and in many cases welcomed, anti-Jewish violence.

On June 22, 1941, western Russia erupted in flames, and with it the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact that had held Hitler and Stalin apart since 1939. The largest invasion force in history overran the Soviets, encountering little resistance from a weak border guard. Army Group South, led by Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, was tasked with taking Ukraine and expected “no unusual hostility from most of the civilian population...[who were] considered ‘German friendly....’” 114 This expectation proved accurate, at least in the beginning.

The massacres started immediately. In fact, “even before the Germans conquered western Ukraine...Ukrainian [nationalists]...had begun immediate preparations for a ‘new order’....” 115

One of the Nazis’ first major acts of genocide occurred a week after they crossed the border: the June 30 pogrom in L’viv, which involved German troops and the OUN-B, caused the deaths of 4,000 Jews. 116 On July 2, days later, an infantry platoon assisted in the execution of 1,160 Jewish males in Lutsk. 117 At first, the bloodshed was limited to men; women and children were generally spared. By the end of July, however, this ‘policy’ had been reversed (when or by whom, we do not know): SS and German police units subsequently targeted men, women, and children. 118 In late August, 23,600 Jews were executed in what came to be called the Kamianets-Podilsky massacre; 119 in the preceding weeks, 80,000 had died “as a result of shootings and pogroms.” 120 Thus, after only two months of occupation, the Germans had murdered about 100,000 Ukrainian Jews. As fall dawned, the death rate accelerated. Approximately 135,000 people were killed in September, 119,000 in October, 65,000 in November, and 87,000 in December. Altogether, the Nazis and their collaborators slaughtered more than 500,000 in less than six months. 121

In addition to the horrors discussed above, Hitler’s forces encouraged bloody pogroms throughout the western Soviet Union, a “mobilization of anti-Jewish mass violence” attempted in no other occupied territories. 122 The ensuing Ukrainian bloodbath, largely instigated by the Einsatzgruppen, mobile Nazi killing units, garnered support from the OUN, whose leaders “cooperated with and cleared the way for the Germans...” 123 and wanted to bring “German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like.” 124 This might explain why some pogroms materialized without Nazi encouragement. It should be noted that although local populations were indeed incited to violence, the Germans’ antisemitic “inspiration” could not have succeeded if “local inhabitants [had not already] harbored a good deal of hostility toward the Jews.” 125 Widespread antisemitism, however, ought not obscure the diversity of participants’ motives: some acted out of greed, looting liquidated ghettos and abandoned businesses; others out of fear; and still more out of Bartov’s “traditional prejudices” and “integral nationalism.”
The astonishing rate at which the Nazis butchered Ukraine’s Jewish population relied on mass collaboration. The Germans’ main ally was the so-called Schutzmannschaft, or ‘indigenous police.’ All in all, approximately 300,000 Ukrainians were serving in the force by the end of 1942. Membership was largely voluntary and “it is believed that most of the officers sympathized with the OUN-M or the Front of National Unity, a pro-German, fascist-oriented prewar movement....”

In addition to local administrative duties, Ukrainian collaborators helped the Nazis make their Holocaust a reality. Besides registering Jews, guarding ghettos, and escorting ‘prisoners’ to the killing fields, policemen actively participated in mass executions. The slaughter of 33,771 Jews at Babi Yar, near Kiev, in late September 1941, is a prime example. Dina Pronicheva, a survivor, affirmed the presence of non-German collaborators. Several documents regarding her post-war testimony refer to “Ukrainian policemen,” while another asserts an “open space [into which the Jews were herded] was ‘full of German soldiers and Ukrainian nationalists and Ukrainian policeman.’” The reference to Ukrainian nationalists is especially intriguing considering German testimony places units “created or commanded” by members of the antisemitic OUN-M at the scene. Though we cannot know exactly what motivated these men to join the Nazis at Babi Yar, their affiliations suggest, at the very least, nationalist tendencies.

Unfortunately, Babi Yar was not unique. Indigenous police took part in executions throughout occupied Ukraine. Moreover, scores of Soviet POWs, primarily Ukrainians, joined the SS. As noted by several scholars, Ukrainian prisoners were released in droves in 1941, casting doubt on the effect coercion had on their decisions. This does not necessarily mean they collaborated for ideological reasons or that fear did not play a role; it simply shows that to some extent, their choice was voluntary. Granted, not all historians agree. According to John-Paul Himka, there were also cases of extreme coercion, by which thousands of Soviet prisoners were starved to death and the few who survived “given the option of serving the Germans.” Either way, Soviet prisoners clearly felt compelled to collaborate. Those who did, the so-called “Trawniki men,” were trained by the SS in Poland and deployed to extermination camps across the region, gaining a reputation as ruthless killers.

Returning to the Ukrainian nationalist movement, the OUN’s ‘honeymoon’ with Hitler ended as soon as it began. Although the Germans initially tolerated the group, they had no intention of granting Ukraine its independence. As a result, when Yaroslav Stets’ko, an OUN-B leader, declared the creation of an independent Ukrainian state in L’viv on June 30, the Nazis responded with suppression. Stepan Bandera and Stets’ko were swiftly arrested, and on November 25, “all members of the OUN(b) were made subject to arrest.”

What remained of the OUN-B eventually formed the basis of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which took Poles, Germans, and Soviets as its enemies. Organized in 1942, this antisemitic partisan force, “whose goals included the total liquidation of the Jews...” advocated for an independent, non-occupied state. However, by 1944, as the Red Army moved further into Ukraine, collaboration with the Nazis increased. The Germans gave the UPA “training and supplies” in exchange for information. Furthermore, according to field intelligence, the UPA actively hunted down and killed Jews during this time. As Omer Bartov notes, “The UPA saw itself engaged not only in a struggle for liberation from Polish rule, German occupation, and Soviet oppression; they also fought what they saw as Jewish exploitation and collaboration with Ukraine’s enemies and oppressors.”

Despite this last-minute ‘re-alliance,’ the Nazis and UPA were pushed back by the Soviets, leaving a legacy of unspeakable atrocity behind them.

Deciphering Ukrainian collaboration is no easy task. The information provided here serves...
Motivating Collaboration in Nazi-Occupied Ukraine

to illustrate its complexity. Motives were incredibly diverse: as discussed at length, antisemitism and hatred for the USSR plagued nationalist movements, which facilitated massacres like the infamous slaughter at Babi Yar; Soviet POWs faced with certain starvation chose instead to guard extermination camps like Treblinka and Auschwitz; and common citizens, confronting an uncertain future, chose “power and easy gains.”

Fear, antisemitism, nationalism, greed, and more: all played a role in occupied Ukraine. Just as it is unfair to say every collaborator was motivated by ideology, it is also unfair to say they acted unwillingly. There is no ‘catch-all’ motive; rather, each individual found his or her own reason to help the Nazis.

To be absolutely clear, this investigation has focused on a minority of Ukrainians. The vast majority did not actively involve themselves in Nazi crimes or approve of them. Though antisemitism had a strong presence in Ukraine, especially in the OUN, it was rarely strong enough to warrant outright support for the Holocaust. Most people were horrified by the Nazis’ unprovoked liquidation of the Jews; some even risked their lives to save them.

Despite the intricacy of this issue, one thing is clear: both fear and ideology played a role in Ukrainian collaboration. Snyder’s claim that “almost none of these people collaborated for ideological reasons” is patently false; Omer Bartov’s suggestion that fear played a minimal role is equally inaccurate. Rather, fear and ideology worked together, often coupled with greed and opportunism, to motivate collaborators. This comprehensive explanation captures the issue’s complexity: a combination of factors, rather than one or the other, motivated participation in one of history’s greatest crimes. In the end, the Nazis gave many Ukrainians an opportunity; for one reason or another, they seized it.

Bio needed.
In the middle of the town square in Krakow, the cultural center of Poland, stands a massive statue to Adam Mickiewicz, Poland’s greatest and most-loved epic poet. Every Polish schoolchild reads Pan Tadeusz, Mickiewicz’s masterpiece, and learns its opening lines by heart: “Litwo! Ojczyzno moja! ty jesteś jak zdrowie (Lithuania! My fatherland! You are like health)...” While the entire poem is written in Polish, the battle and heroes extolled in the narrative are identified as Lithuanian. Even the author Mickiewicz was himself probably of Lithuanian origin. It seems strange that Poland’s national poem is not even about Poland.

Upon closer examination, however, Pan Tadeusz exhibits the fluid and multi-ethnic characteristics of Polish national identity existing at the time of its publication in 1834. This complex and multi-faceted identity was forged centuries earlier when Poland’s territorial extent and ambitions peaked during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and was reshaped by the first partitions of Poland, the final partition after 1795, and the modern retelling of Polish history. Central to this Polish self-identification of nationhood was Poland’s relationship with its powerful neighbor, Russia, whose continual presence in Polish politics, economic life, and military conflicts guaranteed that it would indelibly influence Polish identity.

In the contemporary, post-Communist retelling of the relationship between Russia and Poland, Poles predominately view Russia as the historical aggressor, who consistently included Poland in its designs to dominate the Slavic world. Reality, however, is more complex. During the Polish Golden Age (loosely defined as the period between the end of the Jagiellonian Dynasty and the Thirty Year’s War between Poland and Russia in the mid-17th century), Polish military, economic, and cultural strength rivaled that of Muscovy. Poland thus influenced Russian history, affecting not only Russian territorial and political developments, but also its cultural life. Furthermore, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was multi-ethnic, which created a political identity of Polishness shared by the cultural elite of Poland proper and the other constituent entities of the Commonwealth. In this context, then, a Polish national poem extolling Lithuania is merely a nod to Poland’s complex political and cultural past.

This essay returns to the historical roots of Polish identity. First, it will examine the beginnings of Polish national identity forged as a result of the struggle with the Teutonic Knights and the Knights’ attempt to cast Poles as the enemies of true, Rome-sanctioned Christianity. Secondly, it will look at the forging of a common Polish identity and Polish-Lithuanian state. Next, it
will examine the complicated relationship between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russia, which culminated in Polish attempts at territorial expansion during Russia’s Time of Troubles. Finally, the paper will examine Poland’s shift to the strategic defensive as a result of weak management, Cossack uprisings, and the final Truce of Andrusovo that permanently broke Polish power vis-à-vis Russia.

**Surrounded by enemies: Poland’s clashes with the Teutonic Knights and the East**

Historians have long debated when Polish nationhood began, but it is clear that Polish national consciousness began to be firmly established by the early 14th century. Symons-Symonolewicz describes this as a medieval sort of Polish nationhood, which was shared largely among the elite of society, but in times of national peril, also shared by the common members of society. The Polish petitions to the Vatican for arbitration (1313, 1320, and 1339) during the occupation of Polish territory by the Teutonic Knights indicate a common sense of nationality. At these hearings, multiple witnesses representing a broad cross-section of Polish society, including the church, local government officials, and townsmen, testified that the Teutonic Knights were illegally occupying territory that belonged to the Polish nation. The testimony from varied classes of Polish society demonstrates this newfound sense of nationhood.

The Polish conflict with the Teutonic Knights took place against the background of Poland’s orientation towards the West both politically and in matters of religion. At the same time as Polish commissions were seeking Papal intervention in defense of the Polish state against the Teutonic Knights (who were radical Catholics portraying Poles as pagans), Poland was working to be seen by the Papacy as a defender of Western Christendom against the Tatar invaders. The King of Poland, Władysław Łokietek, contacted the Pope in 1323 asking for Papal resources so that Poland might begin a crusade against pagans such as the Tatars. The pope eventually granted this authority and Łokietek decided to invade the ancient kingdom of Ruthenia in the absence of a strong Ruthenian leader so that Poland might defend this territory against the Tatars. Since the Mongols dominated Rus at this time, Polish territory was indeed on the front lines of the battle between the “West” and invaders from the “East”; furthermore, as the Easternmost Catholic state, Poland would have the duty of defender of Christendom regardless of Russian capacity to fight.

Although on the one hand Poland was indispensable for fighting invaders from the East—a trend that continued in Polish history, when King Jan Sobieski defended Vienna against the Turks in 1683—Poland was itself condemned to the “periphery” of power relations with the West. The conflict with the Teutonic Knights showed that Poland could be both fully Catholic and yet condemned as pagans for political purposes by ethnic Germans. The struggle with the Teutonic Knights resulted in Poland seeking to bring Lithuania—an Eastern, pagan nation whom Poland had fought—into the fold. Poland’s role as frontier state defender against pagans had been used in the past as a justification of Polish incursions into Lithuanian territory. But the modus operandi shifted when the opportunity came in 1384 to ally with Lithuania by marrying the Polish princess Jadwiga to Grand Duke Jagiello of Lithuania. Both Poland and Lithuania saw the Teutonic Knights as a threat, and Poland entered this alliance to shore up its position in the West. Furthermore, Knoll argues that Poland’s alliance with Lithuania and the subsequent conversion of the Lithuanian pagans to Christianity undermined the position of the Knights as crusaders and true defenders of the faith, as the Poles had managed to convert an entire nation with diplomacy rather than force. The collaboration between Poland and Lithuania led to the decisive defeat of the Teutonic Knights at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410, which began the decline of the Knights’ power.
For the Lithuanians, joining with Poland was also a way to combat the growing influence of Muscovy. Thus at the beginning of the 15th century, Poland was reoriented from ensuring its territorial integrity in the West to becoming a great power with a presence in the Eastern Slavic territories. Poland was now a course that could truly bring it to collision with Muscovy, which was also seeking to consolidate territory in Ukraine.

Forging a Common Identity: Poland, Lithuania, and the Commonwealth

As the result of the union with Poland, Lithuanian nobles were required to convert to Catholicism, and the nobles that became Catholic were to receive certain privileges. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, however, was itself a multi-ethnic political entity that included territory in the Rus lands, which remained Orthodox and ethnically Russian. These regions remained semi-autonomous, with their own political authorities and cultural figures who in written materials expressed themes of Rus ethnic nationhood. A notable Rus (Ruthenian) cultural figure within the Rus lands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was Frantsishak Skaryna, who was Polish educated but a native of Polatsk and self-identified as a Ruthenian. His writings used language extolling the identity of the Ruthenian people of the Grand Duchy and promoting the idea of loyalty to one’s homeland.

The Ruthenian element in the Grand Duchy was significant, although it was initially politically marginalized; the grand dukes of Lithuania ruled the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and after the union with Poland, these state offices were closed to foreigners. However, Ruthenians outnumbered the Lithuanians two to one, or in some estimates three or four to one, which forced the Lithuanians to recognize Ruthenian rights. In light of the internal imbalances in the Grand Duchy, the union with Poland was initially a mere political affiliation that left the two nations running in parallel but not merging into one. The wide political umbrella of the Grand Duchy included many Orthodox Ruthenians, as well as a few Jews and Tatars, and despite mass conversions of Lithuanians to Catholicism, only later were the elite Polonized.

Poland and Lithuania strengthened the political union in 1569 to form the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita). The Commonwealth kept Poland and Lithuania separate as nations but united them politically under one-elected king and a common Sejm, or legislative body. A number of changes within both countries precipitated this new political arrangement. Within Poland, the nobility had taken advantage of the fact that the Jagiellonian dynasty was not hereditary to secure more rights for themselves, forcing the king to share his sovereignty with his subjects. This took the form of the nation-wide Sejm, and regional parliaments, the sejmiki, both of which were dominated by the nobility. The Polish nobility thus supported a constitutional rather than hereditary union with Lithuania, since it would strengthen and enhance these forms of government within Poland. In Lithuania, the nobility may have desired some of the same rights as the Polish nobility. Maczak argues that perhaps the Lithuanian gentry brought about the Union despite the opposition of the Lithuanian magnates, since they hoped it would improve their political position. Additionally, Russian aggression weakened the position of the Lithuanian nobles relative to the Poles, leading to desire for greater unity. Overall, however, the Lithuanian and Polish political systems at this time were still markedly separate, and the momentum for unification came largely from the Polish nobility.

The effects of the union were wide-ranging. First, the Polonization of Lithuania and its incorporation into the Polish system of government and culture began in earnest. The closer integration of the two nations forged a common identity that included both the Polish nobles and the Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobles incorporated into the union. This forging of a common
identity was accomplished first by the political unity that the union created. Rather than the disjointed and loose association of ruling classes that characterized the earlier Polish-Lithuanian relationship, the Polish and Lithuanian elites became integrated, as they shared the same legislative body. This political unity was also furthered by "a kind of legalism" that emphasized rule of law that applied to everyone, including the most powerful nobles and the king. This focus on following proper legal procedures to achieve stated political aims ensured continuity of the use of royal authority and served as an arbiter of the interests of the nobles. The famous "Golden Freedom" that required unanimous consent in the assembly to approve certain measures further ensured "Polish liberty" among the members of the nobility of the Commonwealth.

Furthermore, elite unity was strengthened when the Polish language became the lingua franca of the realm, as all elites began to learn it in order to communicate with one another. Around this time, the Polish language began to supplant Latin as a sophisticated language within the realm, with Polish writers composing works in Polish rather than Latin. Mikolaj Rej was one such author, who declared "A niechaj narodowie wżdy postronni znają, iż Polacy nie gęsi, iż swój język mają (Let foreign nations know that Poles speak not [Latin] but have their own language)."

Ukrainian and Ruthenian authors also composed works in Polish in addition to Latin, since Polish was becoming the language of the cultural elite. This shift occurred against the backdrop of the Renaissance that took place in Poland, influencing architecture, art, and literature. The printing press allowed Polish written works to circulate among the Lithuanian and Ruthenian populations, contributing to the Polonization of the East. Furthermore, this growth in Polish "high culture" reached as far as Muscovy; some of the Muscovite elite learned Polish and Polish works were translated for Muscovite consumption. At this point, Poland was the cultural center of Eastern Europe, with Muscovite Russia benefiting from Polish cultural exports, which shows the complexity of relations between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Although their relationship as neighbors was uneasy, Poland and Russia were tied together by some common cultural themes, with Poland in fact dominating the exchange of information.

The combination of an attractive and inclusive political system and a common language created a strong sense of national identity in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. One did not have to be ethnically Polish or even Catholic to identify as a Pole in political terms; therefore, the Commonwealth became a broad tent that was able to incorporate members from varying ethnic backgrounds and maintain influence over a large swath of territory. Stanislaw Orzechowski was a writer who styled himself as "gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus," indicating that he considered himself ethnically Ruthenian but politically Polish, since he relished the political privileges of the Polish system. This shared pride in a common political system was further reinforced by the creation of new national myths that served a political purpose. One of these myths was that Poles were descended from the ancient European Sarmatians. This myth allowed the Poles to sidestep legends about the mythical Lithuanians or of ancient Kiev, and create their own vision of Poles as distinct, superior, and imbued with certain values, chief among them liberty.

The Sarmatian myth further justified the political structure of the Commonwealth, with the nobility (Polish, Lithuanian, and Ruthenian) descended from the Sarmatians ruling over the peasant population.

The Polish Golden Age and Conflict with Russia

So how did citizens of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth see themselves vis-à-vis Russia? The formation of the Commonwealth and the ongoing process of creating a common identity had substantial foreign policy implications. For one, Poland was now a partner to any wars with
Russia that Lithuania would fight. Earlier in the 16th century, Poland had abstained from intervening in conflicts between Lithuania and Russia, and some Lithuanians had actively sought this Union precisely because they sought security in stronger Polish protections. The incorporation of areas with a large Ruthenian population brought the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth directly into opposition with Russia. At the same time as Ivan IV was declaring himself tsar of all the Rus, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth now contained the White, Black, and Red Rus. At this time, as well, the Ruthenian population of the Commonwealth were beginning to see themselves as distinct from the Great Rus of Muscovy, labeling the Muscovites as the “others.” This became particularly apparent after the Union of Brest in 1596, which aimed to create religious unity between the Catholic and Orthodox wings of the Commonwealth. This shift in identity, however, was not necessarily the result of Polonization. In fact, Plokhy challenges the conventional narrative of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a multi-ethnic state that Polonized its citizens. Rather, he sees the formation of the Commonwealth as contributing to greater Ukrainian and Belorussian self-awareness of nationhood. At the same time, however, the Ruthenian elite of the Commonwealth were politically loyal to their semi-centralized system of government. This political differentiation from the Rus of Muscovy led the Ruthenians to see themselves as separate from the Muscovites, destroying the prospect of all-Rus unity. Furthermore, despite his titular claim to be the ruler of all-Rus and his emphasis of Russian historical origins in Kiev, Ivan IV did not act upon his proclamations. He chose to focus on asserting his political claims diplomatically with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth rather than protecting or enlisting support from a group that, while ethnically and religiously similar to Muscovy, chose to identify with the government of the Commonwealth rather than pledging allegiance to the tsar. The Union between Poland and Lithuania, then, solidified this political division and its basis for identity differences among the Rus people.

Despite these inherent tensions between Russia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, war was ultimately the result of the territorial ambitions of the Polish king. The Jagiellonian dynasty died out shortly after the Union between Poland and Lithuania, and with the end of this line of kings, the Polish throne lost the legitimacy of birth that the Jagiellonians had claimed. It was now time to elect the first king under the procedures laid out in the Union of Lublin. After a brief and disastrous interlude as elected king of Poland, Henry Valois left to become king of France, and Stefan Batory was elected to succeed him. Batory was a strong ruler that chose as his foreign policy orientation to make peace with the Turks, expand into Hungary, and fight Moscow. He was a skilled military leader who initiated military reforms (including introducing the famous Hussar cavalry) and managed to wrest Livonia and Polotsk from the Muscovites.

While Batory’s foreign policy orientation of opposing Ivan IV with armed force was supported by Parliamentary authority and tax levies, Batory faced opposition at home from nobles that opposed his particular track of foreign policy. The Polish nation was not united against the Muscovites by any means; some nobles wanted the Commonwealth to attack the Turks. Furthermore, some nobles, such as the Zborowski family, opposed Batory’s consuming drive to acquire the Hungarian throne and his methods of doing government business. Stone labels the Zborowki response to the king a “public relations offensive against royal ‘tyranny’ [that] laid the foundations for the nobility’s common action against royal power.” This precedent of Polish nobility opposing the king would re-surface continually in Polish-Lithuanian interactions with Russia. Although Poland recognized the threat from Muscovite territorial ambitions, nobles were more concerned with their domestic political considerations, so political wrangling at home held up Batory’s attempts to get authorization for war. In 1584 after Ivan IV’s death,
the Sejm refused to grant Batory all the taxes that he sought for further military action against Russia.181

The Polish intervention against Russia, then, was not the product of a particular national identity that saw Russia as an enemy. Rather, it was dominated by personal choices of political leaders (such as the king) that stood to benefit from escalating tensions with Moscow beyond an intermittent border conflict. This became abundantly clear under the leadership of the next king of Poland, Zygmunt III. Zygmunt’s reign was dominated by his Swedish concerns, as he ruled both Sweden and Poland. The Polish nobles originally elected him as king to strengthen ties between Sweden and the Commonwealth, but he soon found himself mired down in conflict while trying to retain his throne in Sweden. Intensely Catholic and a proponent of special privileges for Catholic nobles, Zygmunt was hated in Lutheran Sweden when he attempted to impose Catholicism there. Regarding its overall foreign policy, then, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth found itself pulled into what Norman Davies describes as a “triangular” struggle for power and influence in the Baltic between Sweden, Russia, and the Commonwealth.182 Poland had hoped to leverage its connections with Sweden to achieve its own territorial gains from Swedish incursions against Russia, but this plan fell apart when Sweden made peace with Russia and Zygmunt’s relations with Sweden deteriorated.

Regarding its foreign policy towards Russia, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under Zygmunt decided to exploit the weakness of Russia during the Time of Troubles. In the course of the intervention, the Poles under Zolkiewski marched up to the Kremlin, established a garrison, and attempted to install Zygmunt’s son Władysław as tsar. But the intervention was not at all a grand moment of Polish triumph as it was later portrayed. Davies points out that the Sejm and Polish commanders such as Zolkiewski were consistently opposed to intervention, and in the end, the Poles only intervened at the behest of certain Muscovite boyars who asked them to intervene.183 Other historians such as Stone emphasize the role of certain powerful Polish magnates (such as Jerzy Mniszech, whose had his daughter marry the False Dmitri), who were angling to wrest power within Russia through political maneuvering and armed force.184 The Russian boyars and Polish nobles were already discussing a possible union between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy, and in 1610 invited Władysław to become tsar.185 In the end, though, the political intrigues on both sides tore apart any prospect for Polish rule of Moscow, as Zygmunt wanted the throne for himself rather than his son, and numerous boyars intervened to regain Moscow. Political unrest ensured at home in Poland as troops rioted for their back pay. These outcomes led Davies to comment: “In terms of men killed and of money squandered, the Time of Troubles was almost as troublesome for the Republic as for Muscovy.”186 While the Polish reaction to Moscow’s difficulty shows that Poland was capable of holding its own against Moscow and even attempting to impose a favorable political settlement, it also shows the limits of Polish power.

The Beginning of the End: The Polish Retreat to the Strategic Defensive

The intervention in Moscow during the Time of Troubles marked the high water point for Polish military power and expansion vis-à-vis Russia. By the end of the Thirteen Year’s War with Russia from 1654-1667, Polish control over the Russian lands of the Commonwealth was permanently broken, and about a hundred years later, Poland itself was partitioned. This paper cannot explore in any depth the reasons for the Commonwealth’s loss of momentum in foreign policy and its later internal unraveling, but a few points relevant to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s sense of nationhood and relations with Russia will be discussed.
The precipitating cause of Poland’s loss of strength relative to Muscovy was internal difficulties, from political dissension to uprisings by the Ukrainian Cossacks, which Russia was able to exploit.\textsuperscript{187} The Cossack rebellions were directed against the Ruthenian elite of the Commonwealth and the system of government that they represented that allowed the nobility to control much of the land’s wealth.\textsuperscript{188} Despite the Polonization of the Ruthenian elite and their resulting loyalty to the Commonwealth they were unable to control the Ukrainian Cossacks, who remained a dissembling unit within the Commonwealth. The Khmelnytsky Uprising of 1648 showed the weaknesses of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that were inherent to its system of government and multi-ethnic composition. As mentioned earlier, the Polonization of elites in the Commonwealth took place through a number of avenues: the spread of Polish high culture, the Polish language, the Sarmatian myth, and the sharing of power among noble families. This process, however, with its focus on the rights of the nobility to rule, was unable to incorporate rising populist sentiment among Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{189} Even for the Ruthenian nobility (some of which supported the Cossack uprisings), the \textit{gente Ruthenus} was an important part of their identity despite Polonization.\textsuperscript{190} Furthermore, the Ukrainians often resented the fact that their Orthodox religion was marginalized within the Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{191} The Cossack uprisings were able to exploit these weaknesses to foment rebellion among the peasant classes against the Polonized Ukrainian nobility.

The Union of Lublin also created disastrous effects in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century by instituting political sharing of power between the king and the nobility, through the election of Polish kings. This new system of electing a king caused the loss of legitimacy for the king that the dynastic Jagiellonian rulers had enjoyed. It also shifted some of the king’s previous powers to the hands of the nobles, who jockeyed for power among themselves while electing a new candidate. Although succession problems were common in countries of this period (in Russia they occurred quite often until the Romanovs came to power), the Polish system inevitably created political uncertainty every time a new king was chosen. Furthermore, the Polish system was unique in that it created certain expectations of freedom for the nobility, while giving disproportionate power to noble families. Since everyone wanted to join the group of the nobility and enjoy their freedoms, uprisings found support.

While relying heavily on peasant outrage against the excesses of the nobles, Khmelnytsky’s Uprising also was supported by some of the Ukrainian nobles and magnates, who hoped for greater rights and protections similar to those the Poles enjoyed.\textsuperscript{192} Furthermore, it took place during the election of a new king to the Polish throne—a politically vulnerable time for the Commonwealth. Recognizing the importance of influencing this election process, Khmelnytsky made overtures to Jan Kazimierz, who was eventually elected king of Poland, asking him to protect Cossack freedoms.\textsuperscript{193} The nobles were unwilling to accommodate a Cossack leader that pledged allegiance only to the king, and Khmelnytsky turned to Muscovy and Sweden for support.\textsuperscript{194} In 1654, the Cossacks signed the Pereislav Agreement with Muscovy, putting themselves under Moscow’s protection in exchange for a guarantee that the Ukrainian nobility would receive the rights of the Polish nobility from the tsar.\textsuperscript{195}

The invitation to Russia was the beginning of the end for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Although the Poles attempted to assuage the Cossacks with the Union of Hadiach in 1659, which would have granted the political demands of the Ukrainians by creating the Grand Duchy of Rus, armed intervention from Russia and Sweden prevented the Union from being carried out.\textsuperscript{196} In the end, the internal strife created the right conditions for outside intervention. As Kamiński comments, “In the welter of domestic rivalries for power and serious social strife, an exterior factor—Russia—proved decisive.”\textsuperscript{197} At the Treaty of Adrusovo in 1667,
Muscovy took control of all of left-bank Ukraine, and Polish power would never recover.198

Conclusions
After examining the factors that shaped Polish identity and its relations with Russia prior to the 18th century, it is clear that they are more complex than is commonly portrayed. While a strong sense of Polish nationhood existed by the end of this period—and was shared by Catholic and Orthodox, Lithuanian and Ruthenian nobility of the Commonwealth—it was not necessarily anti-Muscovy. Poles did not define themselves in opposition to the Rus or even to Muscovy; the Commonwealth was inclusive of multiple ethnicities, including the Rus, and accommodated multiple layers of identity. Admittedly, multiple layers of identity coexisting in the same space were quite common during this period. However, Poland actively cultivated a cross-border Polish national identity shared by the “Polonized” elite, who had little in common besides membership in the same political bodies and a common Polish language, yet took pride in this identity.

In fact, it was the very attractiveness of this political identity and its exclusivity to the nobility that, by encouraging Cossack revolts, led to Poland’s military defeat at the hands of Muscovy and a loss of political territory. Furthermore, the grand political bargain that created the Commonwealth also was fraught with internal weaknesses. The nobles retained many of the powers that traditionally went to a hereditary king, thus creating fractiousness decision making and numerous instances where the Sejm refused to fund the army that was necessary for Poland’s wars. Although modern retellings of Polish history tend to paint a picture of a unified Poland that consistently opposed Russian aggression, the story neglects to mention that most of the Polish elite opposed the most noteworthy of Poland’s interventions against Moscow during the Time of Troubles. Moscow was on the agenda of countries of concern, but Poland was not mired in continual conflict with Muscovy until after the Cossack uprisings.

Furthermore, the story omits the cultural closeness between the Slavs in general. Both Poles and Muscovites learned from each other culturally, and Polish national consciousness was birthed not during a time of conflict with Moscow, but during an extensive struggle centuries earlier against the Teutonic Knights. In some ways, the Germans were the original enemy, with Russia only of peripheral and later concern when the Polish nation was forced to expand to the East by joining with Lithuania to defeat the Teutonic Knights. Russia and Poland, then, were enemies of coincidence, and Polish national identity vis-à-vis Russia was complex and multifaceted throughout this period.

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Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750) spent his life writing music and working for the Lutheran Church in Germany. Bach’s multiple positions as a Lutheran organist and Kapellmeister equipped him with tools and exposure that he then used to develop the German chorale, a genre with which Bach popularized and secularized a choral tradition in a way that would impact the whole German speaking world for the two centuries to follow. Long before Bach, the Vienna Boys’ Choir, or Wiener Sängerknaben, had been developing the German choral tradition at the Imperial Court Chapel since 1498, allowing composers to have stable jobs while composing and working for the Emperor. Bach’s musical legacy and the Wiener Sängerknaben are of paramount importance for German culture because they constitute the origin of an essentially German choral and vocal tradition; this very tradition developed further as choral music and the Lied [‘art song’] evolved in response to larger social and cultural changes at the intersection of music performance and social musical understanding in 19th-century Vienna.

In this paper I will explore the intersection of music and society in Vienna by examining the lives and work of composers from the First and Second Viennese Schools (Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, Wolf, Bruckner, and Schönberg), as well as Richard Wagner—who inherited and transformed the German vocal tradition. I will trace how these composers’ unique approach to choral music and the voice intersected with major social changes in Vienna over the long 19th century.

**The popularization of song in Ludwig Van Beethoven (1770-1827)**

Ludwig van Beethoven’s approach to the genre of the song in the late 18th century was the beginning of a socialization process that brought music into the public sphere and slowly transformed it into a tool of speech and public opinion.

**The role of song in Viennese public life**

As early as the 18th century, Vienna was a conservative city wherein the Emperor’s legitimacy was unquestionable. Yet, Vienna was also a relatively cosmopolitan city, hosting people from all over the Holy Roman Empire. As the French army headed to Vienna in 1796, the Austrian government used popular songs as a method to whip up public courage and patriotism. During his time in Vienna, Beethoven experienced first-hand the general attitude of disapproval for the French Revolution and hostility toward
the Napoleonic Wars. Beethoven took advantage of the fact that in his time song was not a piece of music to be performed at a concert but rather a popular art form and an effective tool for social cohesion and identity building: he wrote the songs *Verwünschungen der Franzosen* (1793), *Abschiedsgesang an Wiens Bürger* (1796), and *Kriegslied der Österreicher* (1797) to create social cohesion in the Austrian identity. In 1797, Joseph Haydn set to music Lorenz Leopold Haschka’s “Gott erhalte Franz der Kaiser” ['God save Franz the Emperor'], which became the *Kaiserhymne* or Austrian national anthem—later the *Deutschlandslied* or German national anthem.

In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, and especially after the Sixth Coalition defeated the French Army in 1814, Vienna saw the influx of many positive social changes that enhanced the cultural activity and engagement of its population. That same year, European rulers met at the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) to redefine Europe geographically. The events celebrating the victory over the Napoleonic troops were accompanied with the popular music and songs that Beethoven and Haydn had composed during the time of the occupation. In the years following the Congress of Vienna, the city saw significant improvements in education; in the growth of the middle class, bourgeoisie, and intellectuals; and in increased work opportunities for musicians. These changes contributed significantly to the increase in musical activity in the city: more and more aspiring musicians moved to Vienna to pursue a career in performance or composition, musical literacy was more and more common among the upper and middle classes, and attending concerts became not only a sign of good taste and intellectual curiosity but also a respected social activity. Moreover, although choral music performance was still considered an amateur practice confined to sacred spaces at this time, the foundation of new choral societies like the *Gesellschaft der Musikfreunde* in 1812 institutionalized, democratized, and secularized the practice of choral music to fit into the new Viennese social context.

Symphony No. 9 “Choral”, IV: Presto—Allegro Assai—Choral Finale
Throughout his time in Vienna, Beethoven learned to take advantage of the aforementioned social changes to promote his music. Although he was the first composer in Vienna to be completely independent from patronage, he managed to find significant sponsors amongst the nobility and bourgeoisie who became increasingly interested in the newest compositions. Yet, rather than taking commissions from patrons, he composed his music independently so that he could touch on topics that he was personally interested in, which often included social or cultural commentary. Through the changes in social welfare after the Congress of Vienna, the Viennese public became increasingly cultured and thus more able to understand the messages behind Beethoven’s compositions. The few times that Beethoven used text in his pieces, he did so with the clear purpose of immediate communication through lyricism and rhetoric.

The fourth movement of Beethoven’s *Ninth Symphony* most clearly displays this communicative intention, and it greatly affected the social approach to choral music of all composers in the following decades. Beethoven used Schiller’s poem “*An die Freude*” ['The Ode to Joy'] as the text for his chorale, lending his composition deep human significance. The text conveys a feeling of humanity with which all people can identify, as well as the ultimate joy of finding the meaning of one’s existence. Throughout the other three movements of the symphony, the music itself explores the ideas of self, existence, and humanity, and Beethoven accompanies these themes with recurring leitmotifs of the chorale theme to anticipate the heroic finale. The final movement stands as the first exposition of the complementary communicative roles that music and language can play in great symphonic pieces to convey a universal message to a society that was slowly discovering the power of these artistic forms.

It is important to note that Beethoven’s reinvention of the symphony—as an indivisible piece...
in four movements—places the fourth movement of the “Choral” Symphony into a very privileged position. By adding a choral finale to an instrumental symphony, Beethoven elevated choral music to the same level as the symphony itself. The proportions of the piece when it was first performed were unprecedented: a full orchestra, a quartet of vocal soloist, a four-part chorus of around 150 singers, and two conductors.\(^{201}\) The addition of a chorale was astonishing at the time, especially given its multiple functions within the piece: it added to the symphonic complexity of the piece, played a communicative role through the use of Schiller’s poem, and worked to build social cohesion among the choral societies that participated in the performance. Music critic Thomas Kelly wrote in his memoir the following observations concerning the piece:

The soloist and chorus take the role of solo instruments, it is like a symphony in itself, with varying moods, tempos, and movements, it is like an oratorio, with a solo singer and a choir, it is like a French revolutionary cantata, culminating in a great passionate outburst.\(^{202}\)

Franz Schubert (1797-1828)

Public and private spheres in Vienna

While Beethoven performed symphonies in big, public concert halls, Schubert was slowly developing the opposite genre, the Lied [‘art song’], which belonged to the private social sphere. Schubert preferred to perform his music—usually piano pieces, chamber music, and Lieder—in front of smaller audiences because, according to music scholar Leon Botstein, he “fitted neatly into a chauvinist vision of a local Viennese nati

The Lied

By creating the Lied, Schubert transformed popular song into a more elevated musical and intellectual art form. The people who were now exposed to these short compositions knew not only about music but also about the cultural and literary contexts wherein the Lieder originated. In music scholar Christopher Gibbs’s words, the Lied “is more than a tune. As the genre deepened, so did its constituent musical and literary elements, which offered new extra-musical possibilities beyond song”\(^{206}\) because it created intersection between literature, popular culture, tradition and music, and because it used not only the voice but also the accompaniment as a narrative tool.

Through these interdisciplinary and musical intersections, Schubert achieved a transformation in the structure of the song. From the traditional strophic folkloric musical form, Schubert
turned to modified-strophic and through-composed structures. His aim was not only to illustrate the qualities of the poetry but also to create new dynamics, interpretations, and nuances that would speak to his specified circle of listeners. More importantly, Schubert created unprecedented relationships between the accompaniment and the vocal line. In *An die Musik*, he gave these two voices equally important roles in the musical narrative—almost turning it into a duet. In *Gretchen am Spinnrade*, he used the accompaniment as a prop for character development. In *Erlkönig*, too, he used the accompaniment as a characterizing tool to differentiate from one character to another.

The *Lied* and its relationships between the voice and the role of music that he created were groundbreaking during Schubert’s time. Their innovative quality only increased after Schubert’s death, when the gradual disappearance of the private scene that had sheltered the production of his *Lieder* and his symphonies gave way to a raging popularization of all his works, which were constantly performed in the best Viennese concert halls.

**Johannes Brahms (1833-1897)**

*Musical conception*

By 1863 Beethoven’s music had impacted contemporary composition so much that it had quickly become part of the German canon, and Beethoven himself had become a legendary figure of Viennese musical history. At the same time, Schubert’s *Lieder* had reached such popularity at all social levels that the practice of amateur choral singing skyrocketed and produced more demand for choral societies. As he arrived in Vienna in 1863 to be the director of the Wiener Singakademie, Johannes Brahms was attracted to these new conceptions of Germanic history and cultural identity and of a German musical canon. Yet, he was also haunted by Beethoven’s shadow and by Robert Schumann’s expectation that he would become the next big German composer.

Although he was highly pressured by the two aforementioned circumstances, Brahms managed to find his niche in the amateur choral societies of Vienna—most of which had been founded a decade before his arrival and were growing in numbers and overshadowing the role of the solo voice. Like folkloric songs in Beethoven’s time, these singing societies functioned as mechanisms of social integration and cohesion. As professional ensembles, they accepted people from all social classes and thus neutralized the social constructs that arose in the concert hall by creating a community that not only empowered the role of the voice in the Viennese musical world but also enabled Brahms to build a circle of friends and a comfort zone for himself. In spite of Brahms’ difficult way of life and doubts about how successful he could actually be in Vienna, it was his position at the Singakademie that convinced him to remain in Vienna, though it took him years to complete his first symphony.

Founded in 1858, the *Singakademie* focused its musical repertoire primarily on early church music and unaccompanied singing, which resonated with Brahms’ traditional and Bachian style. Brahms’ role as director of the Singakademie allowed him to reach a high public profile and provided him with a good platform upon which he could showcase the early choral works he had composed in Hamburg. It also constituted a safe haven in which he was able to rediscover the characteristics of his previous choral works and to explore how those could develop into greater symphonic compositions that would then lead to his biggest choral work: the German Requiem.

**Ein Deutsches Requiem, Op. 45**

While in Vienna, Brahms was involved in an intellectual and musical debate with Wagner’s “New German School”—a debate that would come to be known as “The War of the Romantics.” Unlike Wagner, Brahms did not believe that music should have any metaphoric power, meaning that music should not illustrate a different art form or a different concept or idea. He advocated
for what he called “absolute music,” a type of composition whose aim was purely to expose the music itself, which stood opposed to Wagner’s “programmatic music,” which intended to illustrate an idea, a concept, or a narrative.

The time between 1861 and 1868 constituted a developmental period that would result in Brahms’ Deutsches Requiem, which premiered in 1867 and which secured Brahms’ international reputation. Brahms borrowed from the Catholic requiem and appropriated it by setting to music selected excerpts from Luther’s Bible “that would not only mourn the dead but also comfort the living.” For Brahms this was a way of conveying the message that redemption is a fundamental component of human fate and that, whether we remain on Earth or part from the living, we must do so with peace in our souls.

With this piece Brahms touches on the spiritual and on the reflective nature of sacred music, trying to convey the essence of the debate that opposed the two Viennese Romantic schools through the use of language and specific texts. The German Requiem is more solemn and more strategic than other choral compositions such as his own Alto Rhapsody or Schicksalslied. In a way, the War of the Romantics between conservatives and progressives could be assessed as a musical representation of each group’s understanding of Viennese society and as a debate on how those should be communicated through their choral and vocal compositions. Unfortunately for Brahms’ musically puritan purposes, the imminent success of the Lied and of Wagner’s opera cast him aside as the last composer of a whole generation.

Richard Wagner (1813-1883) and the Gesamtkunstwerk
Although Wagner is not directly related in terms of genre and musical tradition to the aforementioned Viennese composers like Beethoven and Schubert, his impact on the evolution of the voice in Viennese music has proved just as significant as Beethoven’s influence on the reinvention of the symphony. His musical views were the complete opposite of Brahms’: Wagner was a progressive and the leader of the “New German School,” and he believed that music could be programmatic and could possess an underlying meaning that could be represented by the music itself. Wagner endeavored to create a new art form, the ultimate performance wherein all of the performing arts—music, theatre, and dance—would converge: the Gesamtkunstwerk ['total artwork'].

Wagner’s idea of what should constitute a musical work was completely new: he held that the voice is equal to any other instrument in the orchestra and therefore must blend in with the music rather than being showcased by the accompaniment. The singers introduce the leitmotifs, which are then picked up by the orchestra to develop the musical and psychological ideas they entail. In Wagner’s musical theory, one can perceive elements of Beethoven’s idea that a choral composition can be just as sublime as a symphony as well as elements of the way in which Schubert had equated the voice to the musical accompaniment in his Lieder.

The Gesamtkunstwerk also had a social origin: “Wagner prophesized the disappearance of opera as artificial entertainment for an elite and the emergence of a new kind of musical stage work for the people, expressing the self-realization of free humanity.”

Hugo Wolf (1860-1903)
Intersections of Schubert and Wagner on the voice
Just as Schubert’s Lied was the compositional opposite to Beethoven’s choral additions to
instrumental music, Hugo Wolf’s Lied stood as the counterpart to Wagner’s musical dramas. Wolf had a passion for Wagner and his use of the voice as another instrument in the composition, but he struggled with operatic projects. Indeed, Wolf rejected Wagner’s idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk because he believed that the length of Wagner’s musical dramas was unnecessary to capture importance of the voice as an instrument and the Romantic character of a piece. For this reason, he focused his work on showing that the same power and emotion could be conveyed through a shorter piece like the Lied.

Partly due to the merge between the private and the public sector of Viennese cultural life and partly due to Wolf’s own approach to the Lieder, the character of these small musical compositions changed completely at the end of the 19th century. Unlike Schubert, however, Wolf faced different and greater challenges in trying to expand the implications of the Lied—an endeavor which in fact brought his work closer to Wagnerian compositions than he might have thought—because the Lied was increasingly becoming a small symphonic piece rather than a piece of solely chamber music characteristic. Wolf used many texts that Schubert had also set to music. Thus, Wolf was able to give new interpretations to stories that were already largely familiar to the Viennese public. Wolf’s approach was to assimilate the interpretations of Schubert and Schumann and to make the poem his own through the musical innovations that Wagner and Liszt had established in previous years.

Wolf wrote Gesammtmusikwerke for solo piano and voice, using the same poetic content that Wagner used. As described by Susan Youens, Wolf’s Lieder contains an “aesthetic whose true originality we are only beginning to appreciate.” The fact that Wolf used famous texts allowed him to explore new tonalities and to provide nuances different from those that emerge in the work of Schubert or Schumann—nuances that resonated more with the social and cultural changes happening in Vienna in the late 19th century.

Due to the popularization of the Lied and the improvement in music education, the private sphere that had sheltered Schubert’s work had completely disappeared when Wolf worked in Vienna, and thus his Lieder became exposed to a wider and more demanding audience. The solely poetic character of the Lied that had inspired Schubert had also disappeared, giving way to Lieder that were as much pieces of programmatic music as Wagner’s compositions. These social and cultural changes—as well as the general admiration for Wagner—encouraged Wolf to also write his Lieder as program music for the concert hall: his piano parts are like orchestral reductions, and, as in Wagner’s dramas, his voice lines separate or merge with the piano, introducing and developing leitmotifs as the drama and psychology of the pieces unfold.

Mausfallensprüchlein is one of Wolf’s masterpiece Lieder, and it is, according to Youens, “his first example of what one might call tendentious humour in the Lied.” The piece takes musical humor to a modern harmonic and tonal level in line with Wagnerian influences; the voice-leading is chromatic, the music achieves a good rendering of the poetic reading, and the setting is emotionally dense. The Grablled, a short piece for a capella SATB choir, is also emotionally dense, highly rhythmical, and full of significant dynamics. Given that in Wolf’s context death and sickness were considered an escape from society and from the oppression of the city much more than it was in Schubert’s time, this latter example addresses a reality that was no different from Schubert’s or Brahms’ reality—namely, that though Vienna had considerably improved as a city, many people were still dying from the spread of diseases. Yet, Wolf managed to convey that reality in a much more powerful artistic manner.

The music circles wherein Wolf presented his music often considered his approach to the Lied as too innovative and even confusing because its Wagnerian character and harmonic explorations challenged the texts that had inspired Schubert’s traditional Lieder. Yet, Wolf knew he had to write
for a different audience that Schubert. The social and cultural changes that Vienna had experienced produced a more modern, more critical and more intellectual and educated population, which would better understand the parallels between Wolf’s compositions and their own everyday lives.

Anton Bruckner (1824-1896)

The New German School versus the Cecilian Reform

As a composer of the late 19th-century Viennese School, Anton Bruckner proves to be an extremely interesting case because his understanding of music and his compositional style were caught between the two sides of the War of the Romantics. The influences that inspired Bruckner’s music were extremely varied. As an organist in Sankt Florian’s Monastery he was exposed to Gregorian chant, Bach, Mozart, Schubert, and Mendelssohn. The fact that Bruckner spent most of his life until 1861 (when he arrived in Vienna) in remote rural areas explains why he had never been exposed to the more progressive music of his contemporaries and why the early versions of his choral music are so embedded in the classical style.

Bruckner wrote most of his choral music—masses, motets, and the like—before his years in Vienna. These early pieces are homophonic and contrapuntal; they use 18th-century harmonic language, and they are all sacred music compositions. The years he spent in Sankt Florian also brought Bruckner very close to his Catholic faith. His religious devotion encouraged him to follow the Cecilian Movement, which advocated for a retrospective, traditional, and conservative interpretation and performance of sacred music and Gregorian chant. Yet, ironically enough, his devout Catholicism also brought him closer to Wagner’s “New German School,” since, unlike Brahms, Wagner was also a Catholic.

Thus, Bruckner and his music represent the balance between the conservative and the progressive, between sacred and secular music, and between solo voice and choral ensembles. In his choral pieces he takes advantage of long pauses to inspire inner reflection. He considered conveying something extra-musical through dynamics and harmonic language to be an essential part of his understanding of program music. He would use combinations of arias, recitatives, choruses, and chorales in his masses, bringing these pieces closer to the concept of Gesamtkunstwerk—albeit in an exclusively sacred way. Even though plainchant and Gregorian chant techniques recur in all of Bruckner’s choral compositions, the musically eye-opening experience he had in Vienna introduced him to new technical features—such as additional orchestration, instrumental accompaniments, more complex harmonic language, stretched melodic lines, and more independence in the voice lines—all of which slowly started to appear in the revisions of these pieces, and all of which make Bruckner’s work extremely rich in what music scholar Paul Hawkshaw calls “an entire spectrum of styles from old-fashioned through consciously retrospective to avant-garde.”

Bruckner’s Sacred Music

Hawkshaw argues that “It is in these sacred compositions that one must track [Bruckner’s] growth into a mature composer,” precisely because—with the exception of the Te Deum—Bruckner composed all of his sacred choral works before his Vienna years, then revised them multiple times in Vienna as he was exposed to Wagner and his followers. In Vienna his sacred works took on a more lyrical character, and though the plainchant and chorales were essential, the solo parts gained more centrality. Through all of his choral music, Bruckner employs all sorts of choir configurations, which provide a variety of different tonal nuances in his pieces. The effect, however, is not random, since Bruckner intended to show how the nuances of Wagnerian music could be incorporated in conservative traditions like the Catholic liturgy.

The following five choral pieces are the best examples of Bruckner’s blend of traditional
sacred music and Wagnerian influences in choral music. The *Ave Maria* (WAB 5) shows counterpuntal facility, but Bruckner used the low bass lines and the high notes in the soprano line to create contrast and emphasize the text. The *Pange Lingua*’s (WAB 33) opening in unison, restricted voice ranges, pure chordal progressions, and modal cadences make it essentially Gregorian, but the lack of strict counterpoint reveals Bruckner’s sympathy toward progressive ideas. The *Locus iste* (WAB 23), though Mozartian at first, becomes chromatic and Wagnerian with the phrase “*inestimabile sacramentum.*” The *Tota pulchra est* (WAB 46) is a responsorial plainchant, very faithful to the text, but is modernized by a tenor solo. The *Ave Maria* (WAB 7) for solo soprano, accompanied by wide dynamic ranges and dramatic octave leaps, is another example of how one single voice makes a traditional motet a more modern piece.

All in all, Bruckner’s motets and sacred choral works are extremely demanding for the voice. He wrote them with experienced singers in mind; this fact alone demonstrates how, by the time Bruckner and Wolf were in Vienna, the roles of choral music and the human voice—both in opera and in the *Lied*—had been highly influenced by new techniques, had blended into new genres, and had taken different places in society due to the recent cultural and social changes.

**Arnold Schönberg (1874-1951)**

*Pierrot Lunaire, Op. 21 and Sprechstimme*

At the end of the 19th century Arnold Schönberg developed in Vienna a new technique of vocal production called *Sprechstimme* [‘speaking voice’] style, which can be considered one of the most significant innovations in vocal production of the late-19th and 20th centuries. This enigmatic approach to the voice can be described as the recitation of the text with a slight intonation—rather than the traditional lyrical singing. In many ways, this style was inspired by Sigmund Freud’s psychological discoveries on human consciousness. In his approach to *Sprechstimme*, which appeared for the first time *Pierrot Lunaire, Op. 21*, Schönberg wanted the reciter to avoid adding emotions to the recitation of the text—that is, to avoid singing the text. His aim was to use the natural sounds of language as a new musical resource, which would reflect the psychology of the piece. This unfamiliar style of vocal production consists in being able to coordinate random combinations of spoken pitches, timbres, and rhythms, without ever really signing them, and it is shocking to both the performer and the audience; furthermore, it requires extremely skilled vocal technique.

Music scholar Richard Kurt explains Schönberg’s compositions by saying that “the music is a transcription of vocal and instrumental gestures that Schoenberg imagined spontaneously in response to each poem’s sonic material.”221 This means that each piece in which Schönberg used the *Sprechstimme* technique blends his own interpretation of the musical potential of the poem with its psychological qualities, and each showcases Schönberg’s new ideas on tonality. *Pierrot Lunaire* combines the unfamiliar *Sprechstimme* technique with Schönberg’s characteristic atonal progressions, a compositional technique that he invented that revolutionized the use of the voice and of instrumental accompaniment, the genre of the *Lied*, and the concept of tonality in modern western music.222 While Schönberg wrote *Pierrot Lunaire*, taught *Sprechstimme* to voice students, and experimented with atonality, he was flexible about pitch accuracy when performing this piece. As is evident, the role of the voice and the social psychology of Viennese society took a radical turn during the 19th century.

**Conclusion**

Throughout the long 19th century there were two areas of musical social life that developed hand in hand: one was the participation in choral ensemble and societies, and the other was the increased relevance of the voice in the development of the *Lied* and the German operatic style. Choirs served as more than just communities...
during religious services: they slowly became secular societies in which citizens of Vienna found a niche wherein they could be part of the musical process as amateurs. As the solo voice developed into the central element of the Lied, music for the voice also matured in the Viennese choral societies, the number of which grew constantly.

In Christopher Gibbs’s words, “Although the stature of instrumental music reached new heights during the early nineteenth century, the prestige of vocal music continued in opera, oratorio, and more intimate genres such as newly prominent Kunstlied.” Yet, it was with Wagner’s promotion of the Gesamtkunstwerk and with the introduction of the “New German School” that the idea of blending different types of music and performance in the same piece became a reality. Anton Bruckner realized this goal in his masses and sacred music, and—just as Wolf did with the Lied—he managed to take a traditional genre to a completely new musical level.

Schönberg’s atonal theory and use of the Sprechstimme stands as the last real milestone achieved in music in terms of the use of the voice in 19th-century Vienna. Its effects have yet to be seen, largely because the style was so unprecedented. While atonal music has already made its way into 21st-century instrumental compositions, the role of the voice has remained more highly influenced by Wagner. All in all, time has yet to reveal where the cultural, social, and historical experiences of the 20th and 21st century will take the use of the voice in future music composition.

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“I Am and I Love”
Wounds, Embodiment, and Incarnation in
*Crime & Punishment*, *Demons*, and *The Brothers Karamazov*

Katie Bellamy Mitchell

“My sage said, ‘Wounded soul, if, earlier, he had been able to believe what he had only glimpsed within my poetry, then he would not have set his hand against you...’”

—Dante Alighieri, *Inferno* Canto XIII, 46-49

In Dostoevsky’s *The Brothers Karamazov*, Father Zosima defines hell as, “[t]he suffering of being no longer able to love.” What is most striking about this definition is how it sets the necessary parameters within which love must exist: in limited, earthly life. Zosima tells a story of a spirit that was given the opportunity to love—and ultimately lost it:

Once in infinite existence, measured neither by time nor by space, a certain spiritual being, through his appearance on earth, was granted the ability to say to himself: “I am and I love.” Once, once only, he was given a moment of active, living love, and for that he was given earthly life with its times and seasons.

In this narrative, the physical limitations themselves give this otherwise infinite and unbounded being his identity and possibility: the ability to say to himself as a subject, “I am and I love.”
As narrated above, this brief musing of Zosima’s, entitled “Of Hell and Hell Fire: A Mystical Discourse,” exemplifies Dostoevsky’s understanding of the possibilities and dangers of bodily human existence—that is, of incarnation. The physical, earthly existence of Dostoevsky’s characters circumscribes their possibilities, and so Zosima’s homily explores a similarly circumscribed world. The earthy, temporal, corporeal world—the same world that Dostoevsky’s characters inhabit in his novels, The Brothers Karamazov, Demons, and Crime and Punishment—circumscribes all possibilities. Zosima’s homily necessarily takes place in this same limited world, as a loss of connection to the body is a loss of the possibility of love. These three novels are full of apparently contradictory bodily encounters—moments in which some aspect of the body functions as both a powerful symbol and a simple physical reality. In these three novels, the body as the interface between individuals serves as both 1) the locus of cruel abstraction, violence, and misunderstanding, and 2) the foundation of the possibility of love between individuals through a recognition of the embodied human.

As noted, the physical is not consistently positive in Dostoevsky’s novels. In fact, each novel centers on acts of remarkable ferocity and undeniably physical cruelty: the murder of innocent (or at least relatively innocent) people. Physicality, then, while it may be the locus of salvation, is double-edged and difficult to pin down, as are the wounds that the characters inflict on one another. The symbols of bodily involvement—the different ways that characters touch each other—cut both ways. However, this mutability does not undermine the importance of bodies but actually strengthens the presence of the earthly.

What is powerful in these gestures is not the wounding itself but rather the bodily confrontation with the other through touch that the injury or self-injury represents—as well as those moments in which characters neglect physical contact. For example, Raskolnikov, the troubled and philosophical murderer in Crime and Punishment, is disaffected and cut loose from his relationships and his acknowledgment of the reality of both his victims and his family members. He deals with ideas rather than reality, with concepts rather than bodies, and so his world and the people in it are utterly distorted by his theoretical worldview. His actions are generally acquisitive, vicious, and consuming, and he justifies them by understanding himself as an exception. Raskolnikov’s theory justifies his murder of an old woman and her daughter by enabling those who are remarkable world-changers to encounter others either merely as bodies in the way of, or in the service of, their vision. According to this theory, ‘great men’ like Napoleon and Alexander of Macedon are allowed to use people as means rather than ends, as empty physicality rather than embodied humans. He explains his theory as follows:

Those of the [exceptional] category all transgress the law, are destroyers or inclined to destroy, depending on their abilities. The crimes of these people, naturally, are relative and variegated; for the most part they call, in quite diverse declarations, for the destruction of the present in the name of the better. But if such a one needs, for the sake of his idea, to step even over a dead body, over blood, then within himself, in his conscience, he can.226

Here there is no space for active, living love because there is no physical context. With his theory, Raskolnikov denies people the integrity of their physicality and treats them as mere numbers. To him, bodies and blood mean nothing.

Whereas in Crime and Punishment physical violence most obviously unfolds between an aggressor and a victim, in Demons and Brothers these questions unfold in the context of a duel. A pistol duel seems like an ideal—albeit violent—instance of mutual physical recognition: two individuals face each other as humans who have somehow wronged each other, each with a full awareness of the other’s mortality. However, the books Demons and Brothers both contain duels for gentlemanly honor in which the mutual
recognition of the participants is strangely subverted when one participant refuses to engage the other in a traditional way. The difference between the attitudes of the non-combative shooters, Zosima and Nikolai Vsevoldovich, in their respective novels articulates a difference between a true encounter and a warped encounter with human physicality.

In *Brothers*, Zosimov remembers his powerful conversion toward compassion that resulted in his embrace of life and love. In the moment, Zosima was unable to shoot at his opponent, and he dropped out of the regiment because he threw away his pistol after his opponent had shot and the bullet had grazed him. He rejoiced that neither he nor his opponent had killed—that instead of death there was life—and he urged the members of the regiment to be thankful:

> look at the divine gifts around us: the clear sky, the fresh air, the tender grass, the birds, nature is beautiful and sinless and we, we alone, are godless and foolish, and do not understand that life is a paradise, for we need only wish to understand, and it will come at once in all its beauty, and we shall embrace each other and weep...

Notably, Zosimia believes that reconciliation recognizes the power of the world, its physical beauty and purity. Life, and all that is in it, is like a paradise. He believes that once humans can find divine beauty in the earthly, they will embrace physically and will also recognize their deeper bonds to one another as a part of the divine gift.

Conversely, in *Demons*, Nikolai Vsevoldovich corrupts the same pacifist gesture. His refusal to engage Gaganov in combat comes not from a place of awe and respect at living humanity but rather from an utter lack of belief and complete boredom. It is almost as if he does not see the man in front of him—let alone acknowledge his suffering or the emotional tension of the situation. Gaganov resents being spared, and Nikolai Vsevoldovich explains that he did not mean to offend him: "‘I fired high because I don’t want to kill anyone anymore, neither you nor anyone else, it has nothing to do with you personally. It’s true that I do not consider myself offended, and I’m sorry it makes you angry.’" The repeated line, “‘it has nothing to do with you personally’” sounds like it is meant to comfort; instead, it displays Nikolai Vsevoldovich’s belief in the interchangeability of all human bodies and desires and souls, and so their utter unimportance. If nothing has anything to do with anyone personally, then we have eliminated the person entirely.

Physicality is also made puzzlingly and strikingly present through the motif of finger-breaking, or even biting out of anger or spite—an act that occurs in each of the three novels. This image resonates visually with the image from the epigraph of the curious Dante breaking the brittle, outstretched branch of a tree that a human soul has been bound into, and, in doing so, allowing the tree to speak of its sin. The most powerful biting scene plays out in *Brothers*, as Illyusha, the son of the disgraced “whiskbroom” Snegiryov, protects his father’s honor by fighting the neighborhood kids and taking a vicious bite out of Alyosha’s finger. Alyosha understands later that his own brother Dimitri is to blame for Snegiryov’s shame, but even as the little boy apparently unwarrantedly bites into his knuckle, a moment passes between the two of them as the boy unleashes his frustration and impotence and a sense of injustice. This bite, an inarticulate and physical accusation, is a powerful form of communication. Later on in *Brothers*, Liza punishes herself after a fit of madness and of cruelly imagining situations involving other’s suffering. After Alyosha departs, she immediately inflicts harm upon herself:

> She unlocked the door at once, opened it a little, put her finger into the chink, and, slamming the door, crushed it with all her might. Ten seconds later, having released her hand, she went quietly and slowly to her chair, sat straight up in it, and began looking intently at her blackened finger and the blood oozing from under the nail. Her lips trembled, and she whispered very quickly to herself: ‘Mean, mean, mean mean!’
The finger-biting motif emerges also in *Demons*, as Kirillov—coerced into killing himself by his own strange suicidal philosophy and the machinations of Pyotr Stepanovich—bites into the true culprit’s finger right before he kills himself. Ilyusha’s attack of Alyosha in defense of his father’s honor, Liza’s self-punishing door slam, and Kirillov’s final attack on Pyotr Stepanovich before he commits suicide all read as assertions of the biter’s humanity. Just as Vergil insists that Dante must hurt the sinner physically in order to learn of his sin, so these individuals must inflict pain on one another in order to communicate their own ineffable pain. In a crude way, these bites are requests for attention; furthermore, they are reminders of the truth, accusations that cannot be ignored or brushed off by the victim because he or she has been physically inflicted and must carry the marks.

Physical interaction proves to be not only harmful but also redemptive and healing in these novels, as characters touch or otherwise acknowledge the wounds of others and then care for the injured. As the turbulent Ivan from *Brothers* sets out to find Smerdyakov—the lackey and true murderer of Ivan’s father—to discuss their mutual implication in his death, Ivan has an utterly alienating encounter with someone who quite literally is only an obstacle to him: he knocks a drunkard into the snow and proceeds to walk by. Shortly thereafter Ivan decides that he will testify falsely to his own guilt, with solid evidence, and he is elated: “‘It’s something physical,’” he remarks about his decision to turn himself in, and he also experiences an internal rebirth that is tied to a real encounter with another’s physicality:

It was as if a sort of joy now descended into his soul. He felt an infinite firmness in himself: the end to his hesitations... At that moment he suddenly stumbled against something and nearly fell. Having stopped, he made out at his feet the little peasant he had struck down, who was still lying in the same spot, unconscious and not moving. The blizzard had all but covered him... Ivan proceeds to take care of the peasant, looking after him and providing monetary compensation to the authorities for a doctor. He devotes himself to the physical tasks at hand in a narrative that recalls the parable of the Good Samaritan. Ivan’s physical and definitive action allows him to see himself as existing in a network of other humans with physical needs, and this connection to the human is a powerful source for good. Similarly, in *Demons*, Kirillov is momentarily pulled back into the incarnate life as his neighbor Shatov bustles over his wife’s going into labor. Although he professes to believe that the true source of man’s meaning would be to become a man-god and to commit suicide, his response to the news that Shatov’s wife is giving birth actually reveals how, even with his theory, he has not found the true source of vital meaning that Shatov has in family and in the physical continuation of life. He muses, “‘It’s a great pity that I’m not able to give birth... to make it so there is birth.’”

These powerful physical vignettes—both destructive and redemptive—stand in contrast to the abstractly spiritual and ascetic rhetoric of the then-contemporary church, which is most notably present in *The Brothers Karamazov* in the character of Father Ferapont. Ferapont’s overenthusiastic fasting and prayer causes him to hallucinate and imagine that devils are everywhere, yet it also lends him a certain authority to judge others: because he rejects physicality, he is perceived as having sole access to a higher, non-physical reality. Father Zosima, by contrast, lives in a full, loving, and distinctly incarnational way. Zosima’s bodily humanity emerges most evidently in his physical mortality, as the narrator emphasizes the smell of his body decomposing. This normal human fact of mortality, however, destroys the religious community around him, for his fellow monks have not expected the sacred and the profane worlds to collide. They drive the distinction between body and spirit so strongly that they initially do not even open the windows to air out the body, as they do not expect his body to decay. In fact, those in the room judged that the expectation of corruption was, “
a perfect absurdity, even deserving of pity (if not laughter) with regard to the thoughtlessness and little faith of the one who had uttered the question. For quite the opposite was expected."

The obvious decay of his corpse is disappointing in many ways; it feels too crude and insensitive—too bodily and human—for him to have died in such an ignoble manner. While the praiseworthy monks from folklore had allegedly ascended, sacred and un-scented, toward heaven, Zosmia dies and seems to fail to ascend. His humble and fully human act of dying is interpreted as a metaphysical failure—when in reality it is the completion of his incarnation. Such overt physicality in Dostoevsky’s novels can be dismissed as realism, but it is much more complex than that: these incarnational moments are moments of pointed and unapologetic humanity.

Incarnation shapes tangible reality, the carnal alongside the sacred aspects of the human world. The body both separates and joins people, and so it enables love to be denied or embraced. The urgency of this belief in love anchored in life as lived, most importantly and immediately between embodied people, permeates not only these three novels but also Dostoevsky’s personal correspondence. On December 22, 1849, after he was pardoned and narrowly spared an execution, Dostoevsky wrote the following words to his brother Mikhail:

*There will be people near me, and to be a human being among human beings, and remain one forever, no matter what misfortunes befall, not to become depressed, and not to falter — this is what life is, herein lies the task. I have come to recognize this. This idea has entered into my flesh and blood … the same flesh and blood, which likewise can love and suffer and desire and remember, and this is, after all, life.*

As Dante both physically and poetically travelled through the world of the Inferno, witnessing the bodily and spiritual suffering of those trapped by their sin in their sin, and as Thomas withheld his belief and until he could touch the marks of Christ’s passion on the cross, Dostoevsky’s characters necessarily move through a world heavy with metaphor and spirituality which is ultimately gloriously physical.

The body, as the vehicle for interaction between beings, functions at several levels in these texts: superficially as a symbol for corruption, sin, and punishment, physically as the site of real wounds and injury that need to be considered, and profoundly as a locus of salvation through the understanding of the possibility of love and community. Even at their most transcendent moments, neither Dostoevsky nor his characters are separated from an awareness of their own embodied humanity and that of others. This body and blood is, after all, life.

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Interview with Professor Jo Ann Moran Cruz, Associate Professor of History

Louis Cona

Professor Jo Ann Moran Cruz is an associate professor of history at Georgetown University and former chair of the department. In addition to being a noted leader in her field, Prof. Cruz has made major contributions to Georgetown through her efforts in establishing the Medieval Studies program, as well as the Catholic Studies program. She has directed International Initiatives in the Provost’s Office at Georgetown and has held numerous positions in the Faculty Senate. She has also been involved with faculty governance at Georgetown in a great variety of areas, including athletics, continuing studies, and faculty/staff benefits. She has taught in Georgetown’s SFS program in Qatar, as well as in Georgetown’s program in Florence, Italy and in Alanya, Turkey. She has recently returned to the University after serving as Dean of Humanities and Natural Sciences at Loyola University, New Orleans from 2008-2012.

Prof. Cruz recently spoke with Utraque Unum about her time as a student, her research interests, and her experience in academia.

**Q. Can you tell us about your time as a student at Harvard, Chicago and Brandeis? What led you to pursue a career in academia? How has the role of women in academia changed since your time as an undergraduate?**

**A.** I’ll start by discussing the role of women, which has changed significantly since my time as an undergraduate. I applied and was accepted to Radcliffe College, which was the female equivalent of the all-male Harvard College. At the time, there were perhaps 200 women accepted in comparison to 1,500 men at Harvard. Women, then, were in a significant minority in the classroom. I also had no female professors during my time as an undergraduate. At the time, Judith Shkar was the only female faculty member in the Harvard Government Department, and she taught as an adjunct professor. She eventually became the president of the American Political Science Association and was the author of the classic essay on “Liberalism of Fear.”

At Harvard I studied Government with a concentration in political theory. In my junior year I took a course with the medievalist Jocelyn Hillgarth. The course was a medieval survey with a focus on political thought, and I thrived in the course. I also studied at Harvard with Harvey Mansfield, Maurice Cranston, Carl Friedrich, and Eric Voegelin.
I applied to graduate schools in government, but also in history and was accepted at Chicago to study political theory. I was fairly convinced by that time that I wanted a concentration on the Middle Ages. Graduate school for me was an easy decision because I loved learning and never imagined myself as being anything other than an academic.

Q. How did your interest in political theory enhance your current research and interest in medieval studies and history?

A. While at Chicago I studied political theory with Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, but soon realized when I worked with them that I was more of a historian than a political philosopher. I began to take courses in other departments, including a survey of the Middle Ages with Lester Little and a course on Renaissance history with Hans Baton in the history department and one with Richard McKeon in medieval philosophy, and so my interest in history continued to develop.

I worked with Joseph Cropsey for my Master’s thesis on Machiavelli, grounding Machiavelli in the politics of 15th and 16th Century Florence, including his attitudes toward the Medici. I remember having an argument with Cropsey about contextualizing Machiavelli, which he strongly opposed. As a result, I gradually realized that I was becoming more of a historian in my approach to these texts, applied to transfer to Chicago’s History department and was accepted, but at the time, my husband applied and was accepted to Harvard, and so I moved with him to Cambridge. I was accepted into the PhD program at Brandeis in the History of Ideas, which was the ideal program for me as it integrated political thought and history.

Q. Can you also tell us about your impressions of Leo Strauss during your time at Chicago?

A. Strauss always attracted a large crowd to his classes. He remained seated when he taught and would go line by line through the text offering his commentary, which is very medieval in style. Strauss was also quite soft spoken and normally would use a microphone. Students would literally sit at his feet during the lecture.

Most people were afraid to speak during class, but he would still ask about 6-8 students to present. I did a presentation for him on Kant and remember him pointing out in class that I had studied with Carl Friedrich. At the time, I did not realize that they were intellectual enemies and had known each other in Germany at the same gymnasium. I also historicized Kant in my presentation by looking at later works and his reactions to the French revolution, which is not, of course, a particularly Straussian approach.

Q. One of my favorite classes at Georgetown was your highly sought after, “Age of Dante.” In addition to studying the life and writings of Dante, the course focused extensively on the medieval period, covering a range of topics, such as, art, science, literature, philosophy, theology, and politics. How did you become interested in Dante?

A. I did not encounter Dante in my classes as an undergraduate or graduate student. When I was hired at Georgetown, I was asked to teach courses that covered both the medieval and Renaissance periods. At the time, however, I did not have much experience in Italian and I could not imagine teaching a course on the Renaissance without much knowledge of the language or of Dante. I determined to travel to Italy and stay there to work on my Italian. My husband was sick that summer, and so we did not explore very much. Instead, I would wake up in the morning and read Dante out on the veranda overlooking the Tuscan countryside. It was an incredible experience as I had two hours of complete silence immersed in the beauty of my surroundings to engage the text. It was there that I fell in love with Dante.

I am glad that I read Dante later in my career because I’m not sure if I would have had the
same experience reading him as an undergraduate. The fact that I had studied so much history and political theory beforehand allowed me to contextualize his work. I began to put Dante in a political context, which at the time was unusual. Most interpretations viewed Dante in light of philosophy, theology and literature. Additionally, most scholars interpreted Dante as religiously orthodox, but my reading of Dante found him to be quite heterodox and radical in his political and religious opinions. My view of Dante from the very beginning was against the grain of current interpretations. However, over time, interpretations of Dante as a political thinker have become more common.

Q. In addition to your many other contributions to Georgetown, you are the founder of the university’s Medieval Studies Program. Can you tell us a bit about your experience establishing the program?

A. It became clear to me fairly quickly at Georgetown that we needed to think about a medieval studies concentration. Fr. Royden Davis, dean of the College, was enthusiastic about the idea of establishing an interdisciplinary concentration or minor in medieval studies. Penn Szittya, professor in the English Department and co-founder of Medieval Studies, and I knew we needed an introductory course that would ground students in the medieval period. We could have chosen a medieval survey course, but that would have been too historical. We wanted something much more interdisciplinary. We discussed the possibility of a course on the Canterbury tales and finally settled on Dante, who was a figure around whom we could construct the history of the period and cover a range of topics including literature, science, philosophy, politics, and theology. The course was co-taught by Prof. Szyitta and myself for a number of years. We did a lot of background work on the scriptural and legendary contexts within which Dante wrote. The Medieval Studies minor was officially established in 1991 at the initiative of Fr. Davis and then Fr. Lawton. Many of the students coming out of the Medieval Studies program have gone on to top graduate programs around the world.

Q. Why is medieval studies relevant today and why is it important for us to have this program at Georgetown?

A. First, if we look at the Jesuit tradition of this university, we cannot ignore the medieval period. The Jesuits—even though they were founded during the Renaissance –draw heavily from medieval theology and philosophy. Some of the best medieval studies programs are at Catholic and Jesuit Universities. Georgetown, in many ways, has served as a model for medieval studies and in 1999 Georgetown hosted the annual meeting of the Medieval Academy.

Secondly, by studying the medieval period, students are exposed to a range of great thinkers. Students gain a well-rounded education in various topics covering science, literature, history, theology, philosophy, art, language, and politics. Medieval Studies by its nature is interdisciplinary and global. Moreover, if you look at the origins of universities, parliaments, representative government, the development of technology, literature, legends (which are at the foundation of many cultures), the development of Christianity, Islam, papal authority, and the origins of the Reformation, all come from the medieval period and we must go back to study the era in order to understand these topics.

Finally, Medieval Studies is simply great fun. Students and teachers are constantly surprised by what they are studying. The Middle Ages is an intellectual and cultural adventure. It is certainly not the boring “Dark Ages.” Students walk away with a tremendous respect for the intellectual thought and curiosity of the age. And for students it’s also very impressive to have Medieval Studies on one’s resume. It raises a certain
curiosity about the student and makes the student stand out in a pile of applications.

Georgetown has a great Medieval Studies program, and I hope that we maintain our strength in this field. Fordham University has an actual space on campus where students can go visit and interact with faculty in the program. It would be beneficial to have a central space at Georgetown, perhaps where all interdisciplinary programs are housed, so that students know where to go for information on these programs. It would also raise the presence of Georgetown as a place to do interdisciplinary work.

Q. You also were instrumental in establishing the Catholic Studies program. Can you share with us your thoughts and experiences with Catholic Studies?

A. I worked with Bruce Douglass and others to establish the program. John Pfordresher in the English Department was also instrumental in its founding. One of the reasons why I was so insistent on establishing the program was that I was finding in my courses that students were not very knowledgeable about the Catholic Church. I had to essentially teach Catholic studies in my medieval survey courses.

At the time I was also involved with a Jesuit lay collaborative initiative, which later became the Ignatian Colleagues program in the Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities. The initiative encouraged laity to participate in the Ignatian exercises, to study the history and traditions of the Order and to enhance Jesuit values on campus. As a result, I traveled around the country to various schools and realized that many of them had programs in either Jesuit or Catholic studies, and Georgetown did not. At first there was some resistance to starting the program, but over time the program was instituted.

Q. From 2008-2012 you served as Dean of Humanities and Natural Sciences at Loyola University in New Orleans. Can you share with us some thoughts on your experience there? Are you happy to be back at Georgetown?

A. Loyola was a wonderful experience. The university had been hit hard by Katrina and entirely lost the fall semester of 2005. The university had had a very large freshman class that year and had to disperse the students to about 350 universities across the country, including Georgetown, which I believe accepted about 50 students as well as some of Loyola’s faculty that semester. In fact, we are approaching the 10th anniversary of Katrina. By the time I arrived, the university was still experiencing many difficulties. The freshman classes had not bounced back to their original numbers and this created all sorts of financial difficulties. The university was also facing lawsuits for letting tenured faculty go post-Katrina, and they had closed academic programs. Loyola had also created separate colleges for Social Studies and Humanities & Natural Sciences. It was difficult for a dean to come to a new college where some of the social sciences were missing. That was certainly a challenge, but primarily we were concerned with the recruitment of freshman and faculty and faculty morale. Faculty lost research, lab materials, and homes. As a consequence many of them left, and those who stayed faced numerous challenges.

The University was also censured by the AAUP post-Katrina, which made it difficult to recruit new faculty. I worked with the Provost to establish guidelines for closing programs and cutting faculty, lack of which was a major reason for the censure. There was to be complete transparency with faculty involvement regarding the closure of programs. Before I left the AAUP lifted the censure, departments were fully staffed, and the university was on more solid fiscal ground.

When I accepted the position, I told them that I would only stay, at most, for three years. I am grateful to Georgetown for extending my leave of absence, first to three years and then for an additional year. In the end, Loyola asked me to apply for Provost; I had to make a difficult decision as to whether I wanted to apply and potentially
spend the rest of my career as an administrator, or return to Georgetown as a faculty member. It was a difficult decision because I loved New Orleans as well as the experience at Loyola, but I wanted to end my career as a teacher scholar at Georgetown.

Q. Finally, what are your thoughts on Georgetown’s Jesuit tradition? What were your initial thoughts about Georgetown’s Catholicity when joining the faculty? What are some things that changed during your time at Georgetown?

A. The first thing that was very evident to me when I joined Georgetown was the freedom of inquiry. I had had experience teaching at different colleges and universities, and had found that it was much more difficult to engage issues of religion in the classroom at more secular institutions, and you cannot engage the Middle Ages without religion. There was complete freedom of inquiry at Georgetown.

Georgetown also places a high value on teaching. In addition to research, Georgetown’s faculty are evaluated in teaching and service. I always appreciated that. When I started at Georgetown there were very few women faculty who were married and had children. The application process was a tense time for me, as I did not want the department to know that. In the mid 70’s I had been offered a position at American University, but they withdrew it when they discovered that I had children. At the time only two other women were tenured or tenure-track in the history department. Also, for a long time, it was very difficult for a woman to move up the administrative ranks at Georgetown. Over time this has changed. The number of women on the faculty has increased and Dorothy Brown, of course, was the first female Provost of the university.

I worry a bit about the emphasis on research over teaching that is taking place on campus and elsewhere around the country and appreciate Georgetown’s commitment to *cura personalis*, which should be exercised not only on behalf of students, but also throughout the entire university—with regard to faculty and administrators and among colleagues. Finally, it is gratifying to watch the continued growth in faculty. More faculty provides us with the opportunity to have smaller classes and seminars for freshman and upper classmen, which is very beneficial for students. More team-teaching would also enhance the learning experience for students.

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Endnotes

The Forum
3 Tocqueville, 506.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., 508.
6 Ibid., 509.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 691-692.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 692.
11 Ibid., 511.
12 Ibid., 514.
13 Ibid., 514-515.
14 Ibid., 515.
15 Ibid., 511.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 526.
18 Ibid., 525.
19 Ibid., 527.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Putnam, 63-64.
23 Ibid., 135.
24 Ibid., 147
25 Ibid., 341.
26 Ibid., 414.
28 Ibid. 369a-e
29 Ibid. 370a-d
I have a strong reservation against this argument that is made. While I do believe that Plato brings up a valid point, I do not believe that it is the best course of action. This argument leads to the rise of a certain class of individuals, which in turn sets up his arguments for a hierarchical soul.

Plato, *The Republic*, 373e.

*Ibid.* 374a-e.


This was outlined earlier in work in Socrates’ debates with Polemarchus and Thracymachus.

It is important to note here that Plato is making, what I believe is subtly confining. He is following classical lines of Greek ethical thought (that there were four concrete virtues) this isn’t necessarily true, and it is something that Aristotle will challenge.

Plato, *The Republic*, 428d.


That which does or is A cannot simultaneously do or be its opposite B; they are mutually exclusive.


Plato is supposed to use his *kallipolis* to define the soul, yet he uses anecdotal evidence of individuals (and their souls) in order to prove the virtues of the city (as in the case of the virtue of temperance). He then uses his proof of the virtues of the city as the foundation for his conception of the human soul. While I believe in what is being said to a certain extent, there seems to be a catch-22 involved in his argumentation that I find unsettling.


I conflate beliefs and desires within the skepti. Why is this? Well, I am of the opinion that all thought is essentially boiled down to a matter of belief. A desire is simply something that is believed to be necessary or good to have. Thus, I find that injustices and cruelties manifest themselves when a person does not have beliefs in a proper order that conform truth and virtue. Thus, when an individual acts in a perverse manner, they do so because they perceive there action as having done what they perceive to be good. This concept is not new to Plato, as he himself states within the Gorgias that no individual does what he truly thinks is wrong. A man who betrays his friend for self-preservation does so out of a belief that survival is a greater good than the good of his friend. I must admit that this is a view that I later found to be held by the Roman Catholic Saint Thomas Aquinas, and while I could foray into that field, I believe that is a work for another time.

Where there seems to be an impasse between myself and Plato is our conceptions of knowledge. While I do not doubt in my mind the existence of an absolute objective truth, I am less generous to humanity than perhaps Plato. It is my belief that we exist entirely in the world of Plato’s *pistis* (belief) which can be true or false. Knowledge, I think, can exist only in the realm of a priori or very singular examples whereas the rest must be grasped through certitude. Bleak, perhaps, but I have always found truck with Plato’s conception of the soul’s eternal nature, but this, as with my thoughts on St. Aquinas, would take another large paper or appendix to engage. This will however, have an influence on my later views regarding the education of the populace.
I am aware that intelligence does change over time and is dependent on physical development. I am merely stating that it is the most fixed of the three and is not something that there can be controlled change.

Thus it moves along a singular axis, and behaves similar to one of Aristotle’s virtues.

While I personally believe in a more Ciceronian concept of virtue, those expressed classically work just as well. A farmer ought to have wisdom so that he is constantly prepared for issues that may arise (of which experience ought to be associated with). He ought to have temperance so that he is not taken by moods or zeal. He ought to have courage in order to face the harsh winter season, and plow when it must be done. Finally, he ought to have justice so that he treats those he interacts with fairly and with due respect and courtesy.

Humans aren’t quite as different as Plato has painted us out to be. More likely is Aristotle’s notion that the only group that ought to be differentiated are those unable to participate properly, the “slaves by nature.” While Plato gave preferential treatment to those of differing soul types, here that is not necessarily the case. Those with a strong logiki are not necessarily good or virtuous people (namely, logic does not lead to a good lifestyle), and since virtues can be taught through education, those who are naturally just, courageous, etc. . . . should not be given preferential treatment.

The education system must, it would seem, would need to be both stringent and stratified in order for this society to properly arise. It would require a lengthy, but also broad so that individuals could gain enough experience in the world to properly determine their preferred path in life. Higher education could then provide a more selective education to further them down that path. Rather than the platonic model’s top-down structure however, I would envision a system where individuals choose these paths for themselves and thus we might see a society that is less authoritative than that of Plato but hopefully no less competent and righteous.

The Chamber


Ibid., 205-206.

Ibid., 517.

Ibid., 33.

Ibid., 430.

Ibid.

Ibid., 253-254.

Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 63.


Ibid., 90.

Murray, 97.

Murray, 102.


The Sanctuary


68 Ibid., Letters, 144.

69 Ibid.

70 Ibid., Letters, 113.


72 Ibid., Letters, 147.

73 Ibid., Letters, 143.

74 Ibid., Letters, 143.

75 Ibid., Letters, 149.

76 Ibid., Letters, 147.

77 Ibid., Letters, 133-134.

78 Ibid., Letters, 147

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid., Exhortation.

81 Ibid., Letters, 147.

82 Ibid., Letters 117-119.

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., Letters, 138-139

85 Ibid., Letters, 130-133.

86 Ibid., Letters, 138

87 Ibid., Letters, 141-142.

88 Proverbs, 8:22-24.

89 Alexander, 343.

90 Athanasius, 7.

91 Ibid., 34.

92 Nestorios, 129.

93 Cyril, 133.

94 Cyril, 135.
The Archive

95 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 397.


97 Ibid., 427.

98 Snyder, Bloodlands, 398.

99 Eastern Galicia and Bukovina both extended into what is now western Ukraine; Galicia as a whole stretched into modern-day southeastern Poland while Bukovina continued south into contemporary Romania.


103 Ibid.

104 Ibid., 122.

105 Ibid., 125.

106 Ibid.


112 Ibid., 153-154.

113 This investigation focuses on the OUN because it is well known and seems to be representative of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a whole. That is not to say every nationalist was a member. Ivanovych Zelens’kyi, discussed in Bellezza’s “Discourse over the Nationality Question in Nazi-occupied Ukraine,” is a good example: an antisemitic, Ukrainian nationalist who was not a member of the OUN.


118 Ibid., 28.

119 Ibid., 31.


121 Ibid., 275-277.


139 Dean, *Collaboration in the Holocaust*, 61.


141 Ibid., 20.
142 Symmons-Symonolewicz, 18.
143 Paul W. Knoll, “Poland as ‘Antemurale Christianitatis’ in the Late Middle Ages.” The Catholic Historical Review. 60 (Oct. 1974): 381-401.
144 Ibid., 387-388.
146 Knoll, 394.
147 Ibid., 395-396.
148 Ibid., 396.
150 Ibid., 97.
151 Ibid., 112-114.
152 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
156 Ibid., 2.
158 Plokhy, 115.
159 Butterwick, 63, 82-90.
162 Symmons-Symonolewicz, 28-30.
163 From Mikolaj Rej’s “Do tego co czytał” (“To What He Read,” 1562) http://obcyjezykpolski.strefa.pl/?md=archive&id=55.
165 Maczak, Money, 180-196.
166 Ibid.
167 Birnbaum, 49-50.
168 Symmons-Symonolewicz, 30.
169 Ibid., 32-33.
171 Butterwick, 61.
173 Plokhy, 118-119.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., 114-115.
176 Ibid., 151-156.
178 Ibid., 123.
179 Ibid., 125.
181 Stone, 127.
182 Davies, 454-455.
183 Ibid., 455.
184 Stone, 140-141.
185 Ibid., 141.
186 Davies, 458.
187 Symmons-Symonolewicz, 31.
189 Tazbir, 319.
191 Ibid., 383.
192 Kaminski, 179.
193 Ibid., 181-182.
194 Ibid., 184.
196 Kaminski, 193.
197 Ibid., 196.
198 Davies, 459.

**The Parlor**


229 Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, 585.


233 Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, 330.

234 Richard Peavear’s “Introduction” to *The Brothers Karamazov*, xii-iii.