Featuring

In Memory of George W. Carey (1933-2013)

Separation of Powers and the Madisonian Model

Reflections in Tribute from Former Students of George W. Carey

Looking to the Past and the Future

A Chestertonian Critique of Nietzsche and Plato

Can We Redeem Machiavelli?

Prophetic Untimeliness: How Reformation Apocalypticism Inspired Political Radicalism

Changes in Social Function, Form, and Style of Music in the 18th Century

The Crisis of Manhood and the Need for Christian Men
Utraque Unum

Georgetown University’s seal is based directly on the Great Seal of the United States of America. Instead of an olive branch and arrows in the American eagle’s right and left talons, Georgetown’s eagle is clutching a globe and calipers in its right talon and a cross in its left talon. The American seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, E Pluribus Unum, or “Out of Many, One”, in reference to the many different people and states creating a union. The Georgetown seal’s eagle holds a banner in its beak that states, Utraque Unum.

As the official motto of Georgetown University, Utraque Unum is often translated as “Both One” or “Both and One” and is taken from Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians. This motto is found in a Latin translation of Ephesians 2:14: ipse est enim pax nostra qui fecit utraque unum. The King James Version of the Bible says, “For He [Christ] is our peace, who hath made both one”. Utraque Unum is the Latin phrase to describe Paul’s concept of unity between Jews and Gentiles; that through Jesus Christ both are one.

In view of the Georgetown seal, the motto represents pursuing knowledge of the earthly (the world and calipers) and the spiritual (the cross). Faith and reason should not be exclusive. In unity faith and reason enhance the pursuit of knowledge.
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As always, we welcome your thoughts and comments regarding this journal. If you are or once were a Georgetown University student, professor or staff member we would welcome the opportunity to review your work for publication in Ultaque Unum. In addition to writers, we are looking for section editors, artists, graphic designers and web designers. Please e-mail the editors at utraque.unum@gmail.com for these inquiries.
Cultivating Knowledge of America and the West
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Dear Reader,

My four years on the Hilltop have coincided with a palpable change in campus culture. They have seen the departures of four Georgetown luminaries who had not a little in common: Professor Patrick Deneen, Fr. James Schall, SJ, and Professor George Carey, in that order. We lost them to another institution, to retirement, and to death, also in that order. It is not too much to say that Georgetown’s campus spirit has lost something rich with the combination of these departures.

This issue of Utraque Unum is dedicated to the memory of the most recent of these, Professor Carey, who was not only last of these three to leave the Hilltop but also first to arrive. Having taught his first class in 1961, his teaching tenure at Georgetown exceeded half a century. During the latter years of this tenure he was a faithful friend and enthusiastic supporter of the Tocqueville Forum and Utraque Unum, receiving the Rev. James V. Schall, SJ, Award for Teaching and Humane Letters in 2010 and sitting for an interview published in the Fall 2010 issue of Utraque Unum (Volume 4, Issue 1). I never knew Professor Carey, yet simply from the change that has taken place in the spirit of Georgetown’s student body, along with the words of those who knew him, I can reckon fairly well the stature and influence he had while here. My experience is admittedly limited, and my perspective but one, but in the year and a half since Professor Carey’s passing I have simply encountered fewer students asking probing questions about the American tradition of political thought or seeking venues for doing so.

I first wish to thank Adam Hirschberg of Cambridge University Press for helping me obtain permission to reprint Professor Carey’s essay below. Despite never knowing George Carey, I was seriously edified by preparing this tribute edition. The tributes contained in this issue of Utraque Unum, written by students of Carey’s who literally span his entire 50 year career at Georgetown, paint a robust picture of the dean of conservative constitutional scholars—so robust, in fact, that it is fair to say Professor Carey lives on in the impressions and influences he had on his students. Along with one of his more notable essays on the “Madisonian Model,” we offer them here in his honor for you: to those lucky enough to have known him, for your pleasure in remembering him; to those not so lucky, so that you (and I) may glean something of the wisdom, civility, wit, and humility of one of the great twentieth-century American gentleman scholars.

I owe many thanks to Dr. Claire Carey and Professor Greg Weiner for soliciting all the contributions from older alumni whom I did not know. I also wish to thank Carl Liggio (C ’63), who was in the first class taught by Professor Carey in 1961, for funding the printing of 2,000 extra copies of this issue that will be used to invite support for a fund that will honor Professor Carey. Carl has been working tirelessly to raise funds in Professor Carey’s honor to support a named scholarship and potentially a professorial chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown University. Their efforts, along with the enthusiastic response of each of the contributors featured here, further testify to the admiration Professor Carey earned from those who knew him.

Sincerely,

Jordan Rudinsky
Editor-in-Chief
ABOUT THE FORUM

Looking to the Past and the Future

Thomas M. Kerch

It is with a rather bittersweet feeling that I write my initial “About the Tocqueville Forum” essay. The title of this piece reflects both the contents of this issue of *Utrraque Unum* and what I believe should be one of the underlying principles of the Tocqueville Forum: the future must be built upon what has preceded it. We can do no better than to consider the life and work of George W. Carey as a teacher and scholar who embodied this view concerning the importance of the past as the foundation for tomorrow. Similarly, the student essays published in this journal exemplify the manner in which an understanding of the ideas of previous thinkers can be employed to inform our understanding of the present and guide us into the future. While Professor Carey is no longer with us, the legacy of his publications and the memories of those who were fortunate to have studied and known this remarkable man will live on for generations yet to come.

The eight tributes and remembrances of George Carey by his former students offer a fitting tribute to his brilliance as a scholar and teacher, and give us a well-rounded portrait of the man himself. I, too, was one George’s graduate students in American political thought; and although my primary area of academic interest is the political and moral philosophy of the Greeks and Romans, he never questioned my choice to focus on antiquity rather than on the Founding era. In fact, George seemed to take a measure of pleasure in the way in which I have tried to examine the classical influences on the world views of the Founders. Eventually, we came to have a scholarly reliance on each other: I would consult him to further my understanding of American political theory, while he (admittedly to a far lesser extent) he would turn to me when he had a question about Greece or Rome. The intellectual exchange of ideas between George and myself is precisely the sort of mutually cooperative and intellectually beneficial exercise that is at the heart of the Tocqueville Forum’s participants and programs.

In addition to the other fond reflections of George Carey’s lasting influence expressed in this issue, I would like to relate one anecdote that I think illustrates how George could interact on a personal level with a former student. After receiving my Ph.D. I became George’s colleague at Georgetown University, and eventually we became friends as well. During the last few years of his life, we would regularly meet off campus, usually at a coffee shop, to discuss the state of affairs in American political practice. George dubbed these sessions our “Coffee Summits to Save the Republic.” For the space of a couple of hours or so we would commiserate, kvetch, and discuss the problems and dysfunction of contemporary politics. Our talks ranged over a wide variety of topics, from campaign financing and military spending to the constitutional crisis that only George seemed to recognize as taking place in 21st-century America. Even though George was deeply pessimistic about the future, he still held fast to the view that through civic education we could make...
the necessary corrections to restore the republic to the type of political system envisioned by the Founders. Of course, we never solved the republic’s problems during these “summits”, but both of us came away from these conversations refreshed and with a renewed hope for the future of America. While George was realistic enough to realize that our collective political difficulties could not be resolved quickly and easily, he never permitted himself to become cynical about the prospects for a better future. Despite the almost insurmountable problems in American politics, George retained his wry sense of humor, that special twinkle in the eye, that made a conversation with him so enjoyable and encouraging. One came away from a talk with George Carey with a sense that things could improve, if only …

I am very privileged to have had George Carey as a teacher, mentor, colleague, and friend. Oftentimes I find myself asking “What would George think?”, and I still have an impulse to email or call him to get his advice. He is deeply missed.

It is in the spirit of Professor Carey’s Burkean conservatism that I assume my role as the Interim Director of the Tocqueville Forum. The focus of the Forum should be directed toward the past, toward the traditions that underpin who we are both as individuals and as members of a political community. Yet, we should not unquestioningly hold ourselves to the past, rather we must make use of the past to identify problems in the present, in order to make the corrections required if we are to have a future. Perhaps we can accomplish this by attempting to emulate the life, thought, and principles of George W. Carey as the foundation for the Tocqueville Forum as it continues its activities in the future.

Thomas M. Kerch
Interim Director, Tocqueville Forum
IN MEMORIAM

George W. Carey

1933-2013

52 Years at Georgetown

More than 10,000 students
Central to most assessments of the democratic character of our constitutional order is the doctrine of separation of powers. Many, if not most, students of the American system have accepted the proposition that separation of powers was intentionally fused into our system to thwart majority rule in one way or another. Indeed, the most persistently advanced democratic "reforms" of our institutions call for extensive modification or elimination of our system of separated powers because of the barriers that such a separation seems to pose to the implementation of the majority will.

While populists around the turn of the century—James Allen Smith being the most notable—were among the first to give currency to the notion that the Constitution is a "reactionary" or "undemocratic" document, modern students going well beyond the populists' preoccupation with constitutional forms, have focused their attention on what is fashionably called the "Madisonian model" and its underlying assumptions regarding the need, utility, and purpose of two of its most important elements, checks and balances and separation of powers. Their findings in one crucial respect are the same as those of the populists: through the constitutional mechanism of separation of powers, Madison sought to protect "certain minorities whose advantages of status, power, and wealth would, he thought, probably not be tolerated indefinitely by a constitutionally untrammeled majority." In a similar vein, Eidelberg writes: "Madison wished to institute a system of checks and balances to preserve the Republic from the leveling spirit." James MacGregor Burns puts this conclusion even more forcefully:

[Madison] was not content with a flimsy separation of power that lunging politicians could smash through like paper. He was calling for barricade after barricade against the thrust of a popular majority—and the ultimate and impassable barricade was a system of checks and balances that would use man's essential human nature—his interests, his passions, his ambitions, to control himself.... It was a stunning solution to the Framers' problem of checking the tyranny of the majority.

Modern criticism, however, has gone beyond the populists, principally by pointing out that Madison, in his efforts to prevent tyrannical majorities from ruling, relied principally on institutional checks and balances while largely ignoring the critical role of social checks and balances in a pluralistic society. Dahl writes in his widely acclaimed Preface to Democratic Theory:

The Madisonian argument exaggerates the importance, in preventing tyranny, of specified checks to governmental officials...
by other specified governmental officials; it underestimates the importance of inherent social checks and balances existing in every pluralistic society. Without these social checks and balances, it is doubtful that the intragovernmental checks on officials would in fact operate to prevent tyranny; with them, it is doubtful that all of the intragovernmental checks of the Madisonian system as it operates in the United States are necessary to prevent tyranny.  

And along these same lines Burns critically asks certain very crucial questions with which we shall have occasion to deal later.

If, as Madison said, the first great protection against naked majority rule was the broader diversity of interests in a larger republic and hence the greater difficulty of concerning their “plans of oppression,” why was not this enough? Why would not any popular majority representing such a variety of interests perforce become so broad and moderate in its goals as never to threaten any major or even minor or individual interest? Why was it necessary to have what Madison called “auxiliary precautions” of checks and balances built right into the frame of government?  

In sum, according to these critics, either Madison didn’t or couldn’t perceive the crucial role of social checks and balances, or he did perceive this role but persisted in his efforts to establish and justify even further unnecessary checks and balances to thwart majority rule.

My purpose here, quite simply, is to challenge these interpretations. This task is not an easy one, largely because the critics of the Madisonian model have been selective and partial in their elaboration of the model, especially with respect to the role and purpose of separation of powers. To put this otherwise, the Madisonian model is an intricate construct which attempts to realize and accommodate more than one crucial end value or goal. Yet, more frequently than not, the present-day practice has been to judge the model on the basis of the degree to which it accords with a single value, namely, political equality and its derivative majority rule. As we shall see, this practice not only distorts assessment of the model’s democratic character, it also, and more importantly, excludes from our purview fundamental, normative considerations which better enable us to comprehend the model. At the very least a fuller examination of separation of powers and its place in the Madisonian model would seem prudent before advancing wide-scale reform of our present institutions and practices.

With this end in mind, we shall examine the Madisonian model from three perspectives: (1) the purpose of separation of powers; (2) the compatibility between separation of powers and majority rule; and (3) the purposes of bicameralism (an integral component of Madison’s separation of powers system) and their compatibility with majority rule. Throughout this analysis, I will deal with the contentions raised by Madison’s critics, principally those of Dahl and Burns.

Separation of Powers

“The accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective,” Madison wrote in Federalist 47, “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Of this proposition he went so far as to say, “No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty…”  

Not only do the records of the Philadelphia Convention seem to bear out this assessment, the political writings of such figures as Adams and Jefferson, whose theories were otherwise markedly different, also reveal fundamental agreement on the proposition that accumulation of powers and tyranny were inseparable. Moreover, as Madison correctly noted in Federalist 47, all but two of the states during the revolutionary era had attempted, albeit with very limited success, to provide in one fashion or another for separation of powers. In fact, in six of these
state constitutions, we even find specific declarations to this effect. Beyond this, despite the in-built provisions in the Constitution designed to insure separation of powers, three of the last four of the original 13 states to ratify the Constitution (Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island) submitted recommendatory amendments designed, so it would seem, to reinforce this principle. The wording in each case was the same: “the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers of Government should be separate and distinct...”

While there did seem to be virtual unanimity on the need for separation of powers, the convention debates, as well as the state constitutions, reveal marked differences concerning the specifics of its implementation. What is crucial to note, however, is that the Framers (and Madison as well) had consciously divorced the concept of separation of powers from that of the “mixed regime” with which it had been historically associated. That is, the Framers retained essential elements of Montesquieu’s teachings regarding the principle of separation of branches, but rejected the idea that the branches should represent the dominant social “classes” such as the democratic, aristocratic, and monarchical. In large part, this rejection was simply dictated by the realities of American society which did not possess the social divisions appropriate for a mixed regime as envisioned by Montesquieu. Charles Pinckney, among others, stressed this very point at the Philadelphia Convention:

[the United] States contain but one order that can be assimilated to the British Nation, this is the order of Commons. They will not surely then attempt to form a Government consisting of three branches, two of which shall have nothing to represent. They will not have an Executive and Senate [hereditary] because the King and Lords of England are so. The same reasons do not exist and therefore the same provisions are not necessary.

Likewise, it is clear that the goal sought through separation of powers was the avoidance of governmental tyranny—a goal long associated with the concept of a division of powers. Aristotle, for instance, provides us with an early example of a perceived relationship between a union of powers and tyranny. Tyranny, a perverted form of “perfect monarchy,” he associated with capricious and arbitrary government wherein all powers, as we conceive of them today, were vested in the hands of one. “No freeman,” he wrote, “if he can escape from it, will endure such a governmental.”

John Locke expanded upon Aristotle’s formulation and provided us with the more modern conception of governmental tyranny:

It is a mistake to think this fault is proper only to monarchies; other forms of government are liable to it as well as that. For wherever the power that is put in any hands for the government of the people and the preservation of their properties is applied to other ends, and made use of to impoverish, harass, or subdue them to the arbitrary and irregular commands of those that have it, there it presently becomes tyranny, whether those that thus use it are one or many.

The link between Locke’s thought, as well as Aristotle’s, and American thought during the period preceding the adoption of the Constitution is unmistakable. The Essex Result provides one of the most detailed elaborations on the necessity of a division of powers to avoid governmental tyranny.

If the three powers are united, the government will be absolute, whether these powers are in the hands of one or a large number. The same party will be the legislator, accuser, judge and executioner; and what probability will an accused person have of an acquittal, however innocent he may be, when his judge will also be a party.

Moreover, any union of two powers was viewed as producing the same effect. If the legislative and judicial powers were joined, the laws would be “uncertain,” they would reflect on the “whims,” “caprice,” or “the prejudice of the judge.” If the legislative and executive powers
were united, “the security and protection of the subject would be a shadow—the executive power would make itself absolute, and the government end in a tyranny.”

That such a view of the matter was shared by Madison also seems beyond doubt. Quoting from Montesquieu’s *Spirit of the Laws*, Madison in Federalist 47, the first essay devoted exclusively to separation of powers, endorses this very same line of reasoning:

The reasons on which Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning. “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body” says he, “there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.” Again: “Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary controul, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.” Some of these reasons are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.

We may say, then, that the chief end sought through separation was avoidance of capricious and arbitrary government. The end, however, can be stated more precisely and positively. Article XXX of the Massachusetts Convention of 1780 in which we find the injunction that no branch shall exercise the functions of another concludes “to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.”

We have before us three facts which bear directly upon the modern interpretations of the Madisonian model to which we have referred. First, Madison’s reference to tyranny in Federalist 47 is to governmental tyranny. This tyranny, quite simply, involves those in positions of authority using their powers arbitrarily and capriciously to abuse the nongovernmental portion of society. In this situation, the conflict comes down to the governors versus the governed as distinct from the problem of majority factions oppressing minorities discussed in Federalist 10. As obvious as this may seem, one of the chief weaknesses of modern criticism of the Madisonian model has been its failure to make this distinction regarding the source and kinds of tyranny.

Dahl, for instance, manages to lump Madison’s concern with majority factions together with his treatment of the problem of governmental tyranny. He does this by transforming Madison’s explicit definition of tyranny in Federalist 47 (accumulation of all governmental powers) to conform with his own definition (“severe deprivation of a natural right”)—a definition best suited for an analysis of Federalist 10 and the problem of majority factions. Dahl then treats Madison’s solutions to governmental tyranny as if they were solutions to majority tyranny as well.

The predictable result is that Dahl’s analysis and presentation, not Madison’s, is difficult to follow. For instance, the charge that Madison underestimated the importance of social checks and balances is manifestly false particularly if one looks to Federalist 10 and his “solution” to the problem of majority tyranny. In this essay Madison cites such factors as the multiplicity of interests, the mutual suspicions that inevitably arise between interests, and the probability that representatives will be men “who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters” as barriers to majority tyranny. At no point in the essay, save possibly with his brief mention of federalism, does Madison mention institutional structures as barriers to majority rule, or conversely, as protectors of vested minorities. In sum, we do not find recourse to institutional barriers because Madison believed the social checks and balances inherent in the extended republic were an adequate protection against majority tyranny. When we reach Federalist 47, however, Madison is obviously dealing with tyranny of a different order,
namely, governmental tyranny. And because this tyranny is of a different order, his solution to the problem is markedly different and does concern itself to a great degree with the constitutional checks and balances to which his critics refer. But, given the nature of his concern—control of government or of those with governmental powers—it is impossible to see how he could have done otherwise.

This particular difficulty becomes more obvious when we turn to the major concern expressed by Burns, namely, if, as Madison indicates in Federalist 10, the diversity of interests is a sufficient guard against majority factions or majority tyranny, why then did Madison erect even further barricades against majority rule with a system of checks and balances?29 Burns’ question would be perfectly legitimate, save for the fact that Madison was worried about two sources of tyranny, majority tyranny and, as I have shown, governmental tyranny. Burns has, along with Dahl, assumed that Madison’s purpose in advocating a system of checks and balances was to thwart majority rule. But the assumption, as the text of The Federalist makes abundantly clear, is not warranted. Indeed, after the beginning two-thirds of Federalist 51, which deals with his solution to the problem of how to maintain the necessary partition of powers (in order to control, in Madison’s words, “the abuses of government”),30 Madison changes focus and expressly identifies two distinct sources of tyranny. He writes: “Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers [a matter which he has just finished treating of in the preceding part of this essay], but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part [the problem of minority and majority faction].”31 What follows is unmistakably a reiteration of his “extended republic” theory more elaborately set forth in Federalist 10. This even the most cursory reading reveals, as the following quote—the latter part of which is most interesting in light of the foregoing analysis—illustrates:

In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; and there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of the major party, there must be less pretext also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter; or in other words, a will independent of the society itself.32

A second point is this: Through separation of powers, Madison sought to avoid governmental tyranny which, as we have seen, is closely related to arbitrary and capricious government. We can, of course, conceive of situations where concentration of powers will not result in governmental tyranny—where, that is, those possessed of all governmental powers would not place themselves above the law or rule in their own private interests. So, it is fair to assume, could Madison. Yet Madison was concerned with fundamental principles on which to establish lasting constitutional procedures and forms. Therefore, we can readily imagine him to respond that such instances would be exceptional, so exceptional as to prove the rule. Or, we can also imagine his answer to have taken this form: “Over an extended period of time a concentration of power will inevitably result in governmental tyranny. Benevolent dictators and philosopher kings are hard to come by.”33

Madison’s definition of tyranny presented in Federalist 47 is not ambiguous or meaningless, except, perhaps, to the extreme positivist. Dahl’s difficulty in this respect is, again, of his own doing. Having supplied Madison with a definition of tyranny (“severe deprivation of a natural right”), he finds tyranny to have “no operational meaning” and “Madison’s own definition... a trivial one.”34 Whatever merit Dahl’s analysis of the meaning of tyranny may have in relation to majority factions is not applicable to governmental tyranny. Madison sought to avoid capricious
and arbitrary government which is characteristic of a government of men, not of laws.\textsuperscript{35}

Finally, and most importantly for our subsequent analysis, what is apparent, not only from those portions of The Federalist which deal with separation of powers but also from the work as a whole, is Madison’s conviction that separation of powers is a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for nontyrannical government. This, as we shall see, imposes a limitation on his theoretical development because other values and concerns have to be modified or reconciled with this basic requirement in mind.

\textbf{Separation of Powers and Majority Rule}

As emphasized above, critics of the Madisonian model have been quick to point out the incompatibility between separation of powers and majority rule. In this context the critics view separation of powers as a device to protect minorities of wealth, status, and the like, and, as such, a gross departure from the republican principle of political equality.

In retrospect it is obvious that Madison did have to deal with two incompatible goals, though from his vantage point he had no qualms about which goal should take precedence. But the incompatible goals were not, as some modern critics assert, majority rule and minority rights.\textsuperscript{36} In Madison’s mind, at least, these goals were not incompatible. The very first paragraph of Federalist 10, where he proposes a solution to the problem of majority factions, reveals this:

\begin{quote}
Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular government never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Madison proceeds then to set forth his famous theoretical “solution” to this problem by showing how the need for representation coupled with the multiplicity and diversity of interests in an extended republic by themselves provide “a Republican remedy for the diseases most incident to Republican Government.”\textsuperscript{38} Moreover, we repeat, his solution does not involve institutional or constitutional mechanisms.

At various points in The Federalist and other writings, Madison seems fully aware of pure republicanism and what the structure of a model republican government would involve. Why, then, did he support checks and balances which to all outward appearances would only serve to diffuse or dilute majority control and direction of government, essential elements of republicanism? In asking this question, perhaps the most important question relative to the criticisms directed as his model, we are focusing on one incompatibility of value goals which goes a long way toward understanding the model and the form it takes. The answer, in light of what we have said in the previous section, is this: adequate provision for separation of powers, necessary for a nontyrannical government, imposes demands which in certain particulars are at variance with the principles of pure republicanism.

Let us tend carefully to the nature of this incompatibility, lest it be understood to mean that separation of powers imposes requirements which were intended to prohibit majority rule and protect specific minorities, as the critics contend. We can do this best by specifically considering the problems associated with the legislative branch which, on all sides, is considered the mainspring of the republican principle and whose very bicameralism is viewed by contemporaries as \textit{prima facie} evidence of the undemocratic character of the Madisonian model.

We cannot overestimate Madison’s concern that the legislative body represented the greatest threat to separation of powers. On July 17th at the Philadelphia Convention, for instance, Madison set forth a theme that was to recur,
principally in Federalists 48 to 50, where he discussed how to preserve the “necessary partition of powers.”

Experience had proved a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the Legislative vortex. The Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the legislatures omnipotent. If no effectual check be devised for restraining the instability of encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or other would be inevitable. The preservation of Republican Government therefore required some expedient for the purpose, but required evidently at the same time that in devising it, the genuine principles of that form should be kept in view.  

This passage also reveals Madison’s desire to maximize simultaneously two goals, republicanism and separation of powers.

Madison’s concern on this score was, beyond any question, based on the fact that the legislative body, consonant with republican principles, would possess the vast bulk of the substantive powers of government. The problem, therefore, of guarding against a concentration of powers in a republican government, he perceived, differed from that encountered in “mixed” monarchies. “The founders of our republics,” he writes in Federalist 48, have been so preoccupied with the “danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate” that they have overlooked “legislative usurpations” which, in a republic, pose the greatest threats to liberty.

Furthermore, because the legislature “alone has access to the pockets of the people, and… a prevailing influence over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former.”

Second, in Federalist 49 Madison addresses himself to the question of whether occasional appeals initiated by two-thirds of the members of two of the three branches calling for a constitutional convention would serve to maintain the necessary separation of powers. Again, he is something more than skeptical. Such occasional appeals, he argues, could be thwarted by a one-third minority in any two branches; they would carry with them the implication that the government is defective, thereby seriously undermining that popular veneration of government which is necessary for “stability;” and, what is more, they would serve to arouse the “public
passions” to a dangerous degree. “But the greatest objection of all,” writes Madison, “is that the decisions which would probably result from such appeals, would not answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium of the government.” Judges and members of the executive branch are relatively few “and can be personally known to a small part only of the people.” In contrast, the legislators are “numerous,” “are distributed and dwell among the people at large,” and have “connections of blood, of friendship and of acquaintance [which] embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the society.” Given these conditions, “it could hardly be supposed” that the judicial and the executive branches “would have an equal chance for a favorable” resolution of any conflict with the legislature.

Finally, in Federalist 50, he considers whether periodic appeals to the people, at fixed intervals, would preserve the necessary partition. He also finds this proposal inadequate. If the interval between appeals is a short one, “the measures to be reviewed and rectified, will have been of recent date, and will be connected with all the circumstances which tend to viciate and pervert the result of occasional revisions.” On the other hand, if the interval is a relatively long one, the “distant prospect of public censure” probably would not serve as an adequate restraint on the more immediate motives of that department bent on encroachment. By way of illustrating his contentions regarding periodic appeals, he discusses the experience of Pennsylvania’s “council of censors.” This popularly elected council which met in 1783-84 was, as Madison observes, charged with the responsibility of determining “whether the Constitution [of Pennsylvania] had been violated and whether the legislature and executive departments had encroached on each other.” The results of this procedure, he notes, were predictable and far from satisfactory: the men who were elected to judge of the actions of the legislative and executive branches were, to a great extent, those who had served in those very branches at the time the questionable actions were committed; party animosities in the council were so severe that “passion, not reason” seemed to dominate the proceedings; and the legislature felt no obligation to abide by the decisions of the council.

What can be said of Madison’s analysis relative to republicanism and separation of powers? The most striking fact is that, for reasons specified, Madison is of no mind to allow popular majorities to decide disputes between the branches of government. This mode of resolution, he felt, was certain to result in legislative tyranny because the experiences at the state level had shown that this branch would most likely commit the transgressions and then would, for all intents and purposes, act as the judge of its own actions. Thus, preservation of the partition of powers necessitated this departure from the republican principle.

More revealing, in light of the contentions advanced by some contemporary students, is the nature of this limitation. First, majority control is inhibited only with respect to resolution of disputes between the branches on matters involving their spheres of authority. This leaves popular majorities as free as the most ardent populist could wish to initiate and enact any social policy to their liking. In this regard, Madison’s limitations scarcely touch at all upon curbing majority tyranny and then only by indirection. Second, and equally important, Madison is not seeking to curb majority initiative. There is no intimation that a popular majority itself would push for proposals designed to obliterate the partition of powers. On the contrary, it is the legislators themselves who, because they are operating as a small body in a context relatively free from the restraints inherent to an extended republic, would press forward with such schemes and then, after the fact, seek popular endorsement. Thus, the limitation is not directed at curbing majorities in the usual sense of that term. And, in this connection, we cannot help but note Madison’s total silence in these essays about separation of powers being in any way related to prevention of majority
tyranny. Finally, this very partial limitation on the sphere of majority decision making is consonant with a broader theory of constitutionalism which Madison and most of the Framers shared. Within the confines of this theory, fundamental law or the Constitution could only be changed through an act as authoritative as the adoption of the Constitution itself (i.e., the amendment process). Separation of powers inseparable as it is from the constitutional fabric, would certainly seem, on these grounds, to be immune from alteration or abolition by simple majorities. If, that is, popular majorities could legitimize basic alteration in the relative powers of the three branches, the way would be open to allowing basic constitutional alterations by simple legislative majorities.

The solution to the problem that Madison set out to resolve (how to maintain in practice the necessary partition of powers) is, as is well known, contained in Federalist 51. It “consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack.” This would seemingly obviate the need for frequent or periodical appeals to the people. And Madison in elaborating on this solution continues: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest reflection on human nature?”

While an evaluation of this solution is beyond our purposes here, two comments relative to it are in order.

1. Madison does rely upon constitutional or institutional mechanisms for maintenance of separation of powers. His reference to the “necessary constitutional means” in the context of the passage cited above is evidence of this. However, he is far from oblivious to the need for the proper type of internal motivation, a distinctly non-institutional factor, to achieve this end. References to “personal motive,” “ambition” counteracting “ambition,” and the connection between the “interest of the man” and “the constitutional rights of the place” are abundant evidence to the effect. He may well have reasoned that proper constitutional provisions would unleash, protect, and even cultivate behavior patterns conducive to the end he sought.

Yet, and to a matter which has not been explored thoroughly to my knowledge, Madison must have presumed limits to the behavior he anticipated. His discussion, couched as it is in terms of conflict and competition, might well lead one to believe that such would be the normal state of affairs between the branches. But clearly, if this were the case, adoption of the model would be an open invitation to stalemate and catastrophe. For this reason, we can safely surmise that one unarticulated premise of the Madisonian system must have been that the members of the branches would hold substantially the same views regarding the legitimate domain of the three branches and that, moreover, these members would show a high degree of forbearance, high enough at any rate not to repeatedly push the system to the brink of collapse.

2. Madison’s solution is, in his own words, directed to controlling the “abuses of government.” He acknowledges at the end of this particular passage the more general maxim of republican government, “dependence on the people is doubt the primary controul on government,” but he goes on to say consistent with his teachings on this point that “experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.” Clearly the phrase “auxiliary precautions” refers to additional obstacles to governmental abuses and not to majority tyranny.

Bicameralism and Majority Rule
For critics of the Madisonian system, as we have mentioned, the bicameral structure of Congress seems to provide incontrovertible evidence of Madison’s hostility toward republicanism and
his desire to protect vested minorities. At first glance, the case is a strong one which, without injustice, we may put as follows: separation of powers does not in theory, at least, require a bicameral legislature. Indeed, a bicameral legislature is a significant deviation from the republican principle for it divides the purely democratic element of the constitution which can only serve to diffuse, blunt, or obfuscate the will of popular majorities. In fact, while separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers does not inherently represent a departure from pure principles of republicanism, bicameralism does. Moreover, a second or “upper” chamber cannot help but develop a “clubbishness” or sense of superiority which will set it apart from the “lower” house and transform it into a more “aristocratic” body with views markedly different from those of the “lower” chamber.55

At face value, these and like contentions are deceptively convincing, the more so as a second chamber is historically associated with institutions representative of the aristocratic class.56 Yet, in so far as the Madisonian model is concerned, such views of the second chamber are far from the mark and serve only to conceal an important theoretical dimension of Madison’s theory.

We must, in treating of bicameralism and its purpose, once again bear in mind Madison’s overriding concern to maintain separation of powers in order to avoid governmental tyranny. This, we may say, was his principal reason for advocating a divided legislature. So much we find in Federalist 51 where he writes of the impossibility of giving “each department an equal power of self-defence” because in republican governments “the legislative authority, necessarily, predominates.” Therefore, he writes, the “weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be ... divided.”57 In this assessment he was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that virtually all the major powers of government, consistent with the republican principle, were vested by the Constitution in Congress.

The need for two chambers to prevent governmental abuse was a recurrent theme in his thoughts and writings. In speaking to the Convention on 26 June he observed,

A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of Government most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charged with the public happiness, might betray their trust. An obvious precaution against this danger would be to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch and check each other.58

A second chamber, he noted on this occasion, would serve “to protect the people against their rulers.”

Again, in Federalist 62, when dealing specifically with the justifications for the Senate, he writes:

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it, may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one, would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it.59

Clearly we see that in Madison’s estimation the requirement of bicameralism necessitated a deviation from the pure republican structure. And we can also see clearly that this particular deviation is thoroughly consistent with and best understood in terms of his broader theory concerning the need to avoid governmental tyranny, as well as his fear of legislative usurpation. Moreover, his support of bicameralism is quite
removed from any concern with majority tyranny or minority “rights” and, on the positive side, may even be viewed as an effort to preserve conditions necessary for popular majorities to form and operate free from governmental control.

While his concern with preventing governmental tyranny would alone justify his defense of bicameralism, Madison offers still another reason for it which does bear upon the problem of majority tyranny. It is at this point that bicameralism fits hand in glove with his concern to prevent majority tyranny. Since this coincidence clearly bears upon the republican character of the Madisonian model, I shall examine it with some care.

In his June 26th remarks at Philadelphia, Madison notes that a second end to be served by bicameralism is “to protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led.” And, in Federalist 63, after surveying six advantages of bicameralism “only as they relate to the representatives of the people,” he continues,

To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusion. As the cool and deliberate sense of the community ought, and actually will in all free governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so there are particular moments in public affairs, when the people stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people themselves, until reason, justice and truth, can regain their authority over the public mind? As if by way of answering those, such as Burns, who ask why the “solution” provided in Federalist 10 is not a sufficient barrier to majority tyranny, Madison writes:

It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive region, cannot like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be subject to the infection of violent passions; or to the danger of combining in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have on the contrary endeavored in a former paper [Federalist 10], to shew that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. In the framework of Madison’s thought, this “auxiliary precaution” is, so to speak, a “bonus” derived from his perceived need to protect the people from their government through bicameralism. Put otherwise, though needed to guard against governmental tyranny, the second chamber also provides a further “auxiliary precaution” against majorities. In these terms, which coincide with the manner in which Madison presents his theory, we must seriously question what seems to be a commonly held presumption to the effect that a second chamber was designed primarily to prevent the so-called excesses of democracy and to protect vested minorities. Rather, to Madison’s way of thinking a second chamber was necessary, quite apart from any role it might play with respect to the problem of majority tyranny and minority “rights.”

We gain a further insight into this relationship between republicanism and bicameralism by examining the function the Senate is to perform in curbing majorities. Here the only deviation, if it can fairly be called that, from the republican principle relates to a matter of delay in responding to the wishes of a popular majority until such time as “reason, justice and truth” can “regain their authority over the public mind.” He seeks to insure that “the cool and deliberate sense of the community” will predominate—an
end which, we may surmise, was primarily fostered by conditions associated with an extended republic, which likewise necessitated delay in the process of the formation of majorities.

Moreover, if we look to the factors which contribute to the Senate’s effectiveness in performing this delay function, we see that they are fundamentally noninstitutional. In his speech of June 26th which bears directly upon majority factions and the role of a second chamber, Madison inquires, “How is the danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded against?” His answer: “Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Government sufficiently respectable for its wisdom and virtue, to aid on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale.”

The Senate would serve as an institution composed of a “temperate and respectable body of citizens” who would, because of their “wisdom and virtue” be capable of cultivating those “internal restraints” so necessary for the avoidance of majority tyranny. Failing this, the Senate would pose no difficulties for persistent majorities. In Madison’s words, there is an “irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free government, which has the people on its side.” He continues:

Against the force of the immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and support of the entire body of the people themselves.

Equally important, Madison does not urge a second house with in-built or entrenched minorities. Quite the contrary. Madison was most critical of the Connecticut compromise, principally on grounds that it did deviate from the republican principle. His exchange with Paterson at the Convention on July 9th indicates this. Paterson in discussing “the true principle of Representation” calls it “an expedient by which an assembly of certain individuals chosen by the people is substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of the people themselves.” Madison, in response to this, “reminded Mr. Patterson that his doctrine of Representation which was in its principle the genuine one, must for ever silence the pretensions of the small States to an equality of votes with the large ones. They ought to vote in the same proportion in which their citizens would do, if the people of all the States were collectively met.”

By all evidence, Madison had to “swallow hard” in accepting the Connecticut compromise. In Federalist 62, he remarks that the compromise “is allowed on all hands to be the result not of theory, but ‘of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensable.’” But the proposed constitution, even with provision for equality of state representation in the Senate was, in his judgment, a “lesser evil” than the existing form of government under the Articles.

More to the point—save for southern sectional interests—Madison could not conceive of any interest in need of a structural protection in the Senate which might necessitate a deviation from the republican principle in either the mode of election or representation:

He admitted that every peculiar interest whether in any class of citizens, or any description of States, ought to be secured as far as possible. Wherever there is danger of attack, there ought be given a constitutional power of defence. But he contended that the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, but by other circumstance; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves.

Thus, he could write of the Connecticut compromise in Federalist 62:

It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial;
and that the peculiar defence which it involves in favour of the smaller State, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to a peculiar danger. 67

Yet, Madison’s very line of reasoning on this point could be used to argue that the Connecticut compromise, though a deviation from republicanism, did not, in fact, entrench specific minorities. If, that is, no great dissimilarities of interests were to be found between the small and large states, there is no reason, a priori, to assume that this body would act to protect any specific minority or to thwart legitimate majorities. Perhaps for this reason, Madison could write in good conscience, “it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears in contemplation.” 68

Conclusion

Though the foregoing analysis of separation of powers and its role in the Madisonian model opens upon new avenues for an exploration of the intended roles of the three branches in our constitutional system, 69 I shall make just two general observations which are directly related to this specific undertaking.

First, intelligent and meaningful evaluation of the Madisonian model makes sense only to the extent that we “enter” the model itself. This is true with respect to a full understanding of the values which Madison sought to maximize, the difficulties he encountered in this enterprise, as well as evaluation of the model in terms of principles or norms such as those associated with liberal democracy. For instance, as this paper illustrates, in Madison’s framework of thought there was little to fear from Congress, acting in the capacity of a translator of a deliberate majority will. Nor did he feel that the Congress as constituted would be able to thwart persistent and, thus presumably, mature and deliberate majorities. What he did fear was Congress, using its enormous powers and prestige, acting as a force independent of society and imposing its will—much in the fashion of elected despots who presume to articulate the “general will”—on the whole society. Bearing this in mind, we can easily see that from Madison’s point of view a more pristine form of republicanism, such as that advanced by his modern critics, would carry with it the probability of governmental tyranny.

We can state this another way: without effective separation of powers any system of government, even one in which republican values (i.e., political equality and majority rule) are fully realized, will degenerate into tyranny. The problem of governmental tyranny is, then, common to all forms of government. Madison most certainly must have subscribed to these or basically similar propositions. And, given this perception of the matter, we can scarcely fault him for his advocacy of separation of powers. But Madison’s concerns went well beyond this; he had to “reconcile” the need for separation of powers with the principles of republicanism. He can, of course, be faulted for the form his reconciliation finally assumed, but one would have to deny the existence of governmental tyranny in order to ignore the problems it poses, particularly in the deliberate construction of a republican form of government.

This leads to a second general and related observation. One of the great hindrances to getting “inside” the Madisonian model, so it would seem, has been a preoccupation with “one value” analysis. 70 Such analyses, because they do not grasp the inner dimensions and tensions of the model, ultimately come down to a critique of the model without appreciation or consideration of the fundamental values upon which it rests, no matter how sensible or worthy they may be. Specifically, Madison’s alleged theoretical shortcomings almost invariably relate to deviations from the principles of “liberal democracy,” political equality and its corollary majority rule. 71 Principally on this score, Dahl concludes that Madison’s theory will not bear up under examination and could with relative ease be placed “in the camp of the great antidemocratic theorists,” such as Plato and Lenin. More: his theory centers “on the goal of avoiding majority control” and
“goes about as far as ... possible” in this direction “while still remaining within the rubric of democracy.”

Clearly, however, Madison’s deviations from political equality, as we have seen, were trivial, the more so when compared with those attributed to him by his critics. More importantly, they were mandated by what Madison perceived to be a requisite for a republic without governmental tyranny. Indeed, the degree to which he was able simultaneously to maximize both the goals of republicanism and the necessary partition of powers is astonishing. Of course, one could say that Madison’s concern with governmental tyranny was unfounded, exaggerated, or that the means he adopted to the end were inappropriate. Nevertheless, I submit, no sensible person immersed in the better part of the Western liberal tradition would ignore the potential danger of governmental tyranny. For this reason, if no other, Madison’s concern still remains a challenge to the modern political theorist.

George W. Carey was Professor of Government at Georgetown University from 1961 until his death in 2013.
Reflections in Tribute from Former Students of George W. Carey

In September 1961 I was a 17-year-old sophomore at Georgetown attending my first class of the semester in Government 101 taught by a newly minted Professor, George W. Carey. Little did I know then the impact that this person would have on both my personal and professional life. Aside from my family, George was one of a very small group of people (5 to be exact including George) that had a major impact on my personal and professional life as a lawyer and as a businessman. He (as well as his wonderful wife Claire) became a lifelong friend of 52 years until he passed away in 2013. George was a remarkable person—a true scholar, an engaging teacher, and a wonderful person.

Today, some 54 years later I still remember several of George’s lectures, which provided me with a framework for analyzing and understanding the political process as well the fundamental workings of the constitution and the construction of our government. His lectures were not just substantive information, but included pragmatic explanations of how the system worked (and, by implication, should work). His explanation of the legislative give and take process using a make believe community on a small island was surprisingly simple, but clearly understandable. His example of the scope of the commerce clause and the ability of the federal government to enhance the powers of the federal government (and in my view intrude upon the state versus federal framework) brought to life the issues and problems created by the Supreme Court.

In 1989 I was testifying before Congress on behalf of the Association of Corporate Counsel on a bill involving product liability standards that would further erode a state’s prerogatives and enhance the federal powers in a way that troubled me. At the same time underlying rationale and need for the legislation was clearly evident from a global commercial standpoint. After a short discussion with George about the issue in which he was able to take me back to the concepts embodied in what the founding fathers stood for, I was able to reconcile the policy conflict I was having. George’s response was not only lucid, but gave me an even greater insight to the issues; it was a perspective based on his thorough understanding of the founding fathers and the core of American political thought.

George’s passion for “American Political Thought”, which grew over the years, provided a basis for understanding our system and formulating views on how government should operate. The beauty of George’s teaching was that he put forward ideas and concepts without telling you what you should conclude. He stimulated the mind to cause you to reach your own conclusions to reach your own answer to many political questions.

With George’s passing, we have lost a brilliant mind whose understanding and explanation of our political processes and the genius of our founding fathers will be hard to replace. I can only hope that there will be others who will follow in his footsteps and be the beacons of light that he has been for so many years in the area of American Political Thought.

George, you were a scholar, a great teacher, a leader, and a friend. We will all miss you.

Carl Liggio, formerly General Counsel of Arthur Young and Ernst & Young and named by the National Law Journal as one of the 100 most powerful lawyers in the US, is a 1963 graduate of the Georgetown College of Arts & Sciences.
Prof. George Carey was one of the nation’s premier constitutional thinkers. He always kept the original “Philadelphia Constitution” at the forefront of his thought and knew the Federalist, which he edited, by heart. Because of his deep Madisonian structural commitment to the Constitution’s checks and balances, he would criticize executive branch overreach by Republican and Democratic administrations as strongly as he critiqued the Warren Court’s judicial excesses in his many articles and books.

Dr. Carey had an amazing network of students and followers who personified his emphasis upon the need for constant dialog in pursuit of constitutional morality. I first met Professor Carey when I was the Chapter President of Georgetown University Law Center’s Federalist Society when 1L Scott Shuda invited his undergraduate government professor to speak to Georgetown’s law students. In the Law Center’s 600 New Jersey Avenue environment where a commitment to the U.S. Constitution’s original understanding was routinely dismissed, Professor Carey’s defense of the Constitution, the title of one of his many books, was refreshing and inspiring.

In due time, he became a cherished friend and colleague. He kindly invited me to speak to his undergraduate classes about my latest research endeavors, whether judicial overreach and equality before the law or the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. In a conversation at the Cato Institute with Gene Healy in the early 1990s, we quickly discovered that we were Carey devotees. Professor Carey, Gene and his fellow Georgetown undergraduate colleague Tom Jenney and I would continue spirited discussions for over two decades during lunches at the Tombs.

George Carey set a model for distinguished teaching and scholarship. When I began teaching, Professor Carey was always a phone call or email away whenever I had a question about what “Publius” would have thought. His books are required reading for my Waynesburg University students. Even as we miss him and honor his wife Claire—“the other Dr. Carey”—we can be thankful that Professor Carey’s constitutional wisdom will endure in his writings. For the sake of global civilization, all citizens should read and cherish his work.

Lawrence M. Stratton, PhD, (L, ’92) is the Director of Waynesburg University’s Stover Center for Constitutional Studies and Moral Leadership and an Assistant Professor of Ethics and Constitutional Law.

Like tens of thousands of Georgetown undergrads through his five-decade career there, I knew George Carey first of all as a teacher.

My freshman year began a few months before the Berlin Wall came down, and that Fall, a couple of my dorm buddies and I regularly made the trek across campus to join 70 or so other students for American Government with Professor Carey.

He held our attention effortlessly. We were 18 or 19 years old; Professor Carey would have been 55, but we thought he was cool—cool in the way that only someone who’d smirk at that description can be. He was entirely self-possessed, cheerfully curmudgeonly, and eccentric without affectation. Was he having us on with those repeated deadpan references to “the Great Coolidge”? And what was this “George W. Carey (TME)” business on the syllabus? We eventually ferreted out that the initials stood for “The Most Enlightened,” a self-designation that would have seemed pompous coming from anyone else, but one he offered with a twinkle in his eye.

Like all good teachers, Carey was tough. A couple of his syllabi over the years featured a Flannery O’Connor quote: “And if the student find this is not to his taste, well, that is regrettable. Most regrettable. His taste should not be consulted; it is being formed.” My second year, in an intensive, small-group seminar, I had what I suppose was a sophomoric reaction to Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France. When you’ve just slipped the parental chains, sentiments like, “we ought to see what it will please [men] to do [with their liberties],
before we risk congratulations” don’t go down as easily as Keystone Light. Firmly but fairly, he convinced me I was wrong. My memories of that seminar, “The Individual and the Modern State,” have a weird glow about them: I was 20 years old and I’d just found something I wanted to do forever.

We kept in touch after I graduated, getting together periodically for lunch at the Tombs with mutual friends (and my fellow TME fans) Larry Stratton and Tom Jenney to bemoan the state of the Right and the drift toward perpetual war abroad and permanent emergency at home. In 2007, on short notice as I struggled to finish my book, the *Cult of the Presidency*, Professor Carey gave me incisive and indispensably valuable comments, signing off with the encouragement/command “KEEP WORKING.” That someone I admired so much—without whom it never would have been written—actually liked the thing, made the sore back and countless all-nighters worth it in the end.

Disgusted as he was with what American government had become, George Carey never lost his air of bemused good cheer. In a May 2011 email from Professor Carey to Larry Stratton and me, subject line “Yikes,” he wrote:

Gentlemen: Just think about this :

(A) smaller military, no matter how superb, will be able to go fewer places and do fewer things.” ([Secretary of Defense Robert] Gates) Mind boggling.

George Carey was a gentleman, a scholar, an inspiration, and a mensch—and I feel very lucky to have known him.

*Gene Healy is Vice President of the Cato Institute and a 1993 graduate of the Georgetown College of Arts & Sciences. A version of this piece ran at TheAmericanConservative.com in June 2013.*

My favorite memories of Professor Carey were of quiet afternoons spent in his office in friendly conversation. Sometimes, before teaching a class, he would seek my opinion about what questions to ask his undergraduates about the text they had been assigned to read for that day’s class—perhaps from Tocqueville or Nisbet. Other times, a small group of his graduate students would congregate for an informal conversation, or for a private reading group—of Burke, of Oakeshott, of the Adams – Jefferson correspondence. Whatever the occasion, Professor Carey was always quick with a smile and a warm welcome, “Hello, friend.”

Teaching—more particularly mentoring—was the activity, I think, that Professor Carey loved most. Certainly it was the activity that brought out the most attractive parts of his character—his geniality, his sense of humor, his commitment to the highest standards of scholarship, and, yes, his sense of urgency about the future his younger colleagues had a share in shaping. To be sure, not all students who encountered Carey, or even most of them, ever came to know this side of him. He was fond of telling undergraduates in the first session of his courses, particularly in his seminars for upperclassmen, that he would expect them to do a significant amount of reading and writing, and that if they were not prepared for that, they should reconsider their decision to take his class. This pronouncement was intimidating to many of his undergraduates—it was meant to be—and had its desired effect, paring from his class those students who saw education merely as a credential, and who had no loftier ambition than earning the easy “A’s” that would gain them admittance to Ivy League law schools.

Along with this stern façade, however, was a playful side. He announced himself to his students as “TME”—“The Most Enlightened”. He was sly about it, merely writing the acronym on his syllabi, or appending it to his e-mails, with no explanation. It was a boast, but one so characteristically modest that an uninitiated student would not recognize it as such. To be sure, Professor Carey’s boast of enlightenment was not made without some justification. He was the most enlightened teacher that most of his students would likely ever know (though the students blessed enough to know Professor Carey
as The Most Enlightened would inevitably follow his direction to take courses with Georgetown’s venerable Father Schall). But it was not the boast that was important; instead, it was the curiosity it piqued in those students not intimidated by Professor Carey’s high expectations. These were the students who mustered up the courage to approach this eminent man to ask, “What does TME mean?” That distance which separates a man of great accomplishment, a man of high position, a man due high esteem, from his inferiors would disappear with his playful grin, and with his ironic explanation came the start of a mentorship he would cultivate until his last days, and that will continue to shape his students until their last days.

Professor Carey’s legacy as a scholar and conservative intellect is perhaps best described in terms he used to describe the legacy of John Adams. “…there is no single contribution, episode, or position with which he can be readily identified that captures the public mind, one that would distinguish him and secure him an undisputed place among the front ranks of the founders. While an important figure during virtually the entire founding period, he never occupied center stage.” Though he was happily willing to cede the center stage to others, this does not diminish the lasting significance of his many contributions to the academic literature, his behind-the-scenes contributions as a board member to the most important conservative academic organizations, or his contributions to shaping the intellect of numerous undergraduate and graduate students who came to know him as “TME”.

One final anecdote to give some color to George Carey’s personality: The only time I recall Professor Carey occupying center stage was when he accepted (only after much persuasion) Georgetown’s James V. Schall Award for Teaching and Humane Letters. He gave an address characteristically humble in style, but demonstrating his deep reflection about the challenges of constitutional self-government in America. After the address I congratulated him on his well-deserved recognition. He quite literally blushed, smiled, and sheepishly looked downward, seeming too humble to accept the compliment. Then his dear wife Claire let him off the hook: “Jason, enough with the compliments – you are going to give him a big head! If you keep complimenting him like that I’ll never be able to get him to take out the trash again!” What a dear couple, and what a dear man.

To my teacher, mentor, and friend, Professor Carey,

Requiescat in pace.

Jason Ross is Director of Programs at the Ashbrook Center at Ashland University and received his PhD from Georgetown in 2008. These reflections are adapted from an essay that appeared in Anamnesis at http://anamnesisjournal.info/issues/2-web-essays/85-george-carey-constitutionalism-conservatism-and-character.

George Westcott Carey (1933‒2013) was known by his colleagues and students for his research in American political thought, his founding and editing of the Political Science Review, his work as a teacher and mentor, his contributions to the American conservative movement, and (perhaps most) his gracious manner. Although his prolific scholarship speaks for itself (e.g., In Defense of the Constitution [1989], The Federalist: Design for a Constitutional Republic [1994], and [with Willmoore Kendall] Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition [1970], “The ‘Intensity’ Problem in Democratic Theory,” in The American Political Science Review [1968], etc.), the character and perspective they reveal can probably best be described as “Old Federalist.” Carey was a dedicated champion of what he thought to be the inherently nomocratic vision of the American founding, as he interpreted this within both the text of the Constitution and the Federalist Papers of Publius, the pseudonym for James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. In characterizing Carey’s vision of the American political tradition as being nomocratic, I refer readers to
Carey’s and his co-author’s (Willmoore Kendall) discussion of the Preamble’s inclusion of normative values such as “Justice:”

The words of the Preamble tell us that men, “We the People,” are instituting government in order to promote purposes or ends to which “We the People” subscribe. And by implication, at least, the Preamble suggests that this entire process is not predestined: Rather it is a matter of deliberate choice, so much so that the people can and have a “right” to establish their own ends or purposes when constituting government, not ends derived from a source other than the people. This does not mean the Framers did not envision dispute over the meaning of or the priority of the ends. If this were the case, they would have had little reason to write the remainder of the document, which in effect sets forth the procedures by which we are to fulfill the ends of the Preamble. The presumption is clearly that the people operating under the forms and processes established by the Constitution can conscientiously subscribe to the proposition that justice will be forthcoming.

For Carey, the American nation (as founded by the Constitution and Publius) was not a teleocratic enterprise-association for advancing ideologically specific ends; rather, the Constitution established certain rules, procedures, and institutions through which future American generations could determine their own interpretations of the Preamble’s values.

Carey’s Old Federalism was not merely about the Constitution and the Federalist Papers. In a review of Michael Federici’s recent *The Political Philosophy of Alexander Hamilton* shortly before his death, Carey publically sided with Hamilton’s vision for the American nation; it was tellingly entitled “Hamilton Was Right” (2012). Here Carey did not endorse the hypernationalism that is often associated with the Lincolnian tradition’s image of Hamilton, i.e. the one usually admired by contemporary neoconservatives. No, Carey’s Hamilton was the more conservative, prudent, rule-of-law, still-definitely-nationalist Hamilton that is portrayed by authors such as Federici and Forest McDonald.

By the end of his life, Carey had become increasingly concerned with violations of Publius’s interpretation of the Constitution. He argued in a 2010 lecture that the constitutional morality set in place by Publius had become a dead letter, and he feared many of the resulting institutional problems facing America. In continuity with his career-long concern about the federal government’s abandonment of Publius’s (as Carey interpreted him) view of Congressional supremacy, his later writing—e.g., “The Presidency: A Realistic Appraisal” (2010)—showed an increasingly pessimistic awareness of the expansion of executive power. This was compounded, Carey thought, by the abandonment of Publius’s vision of separation of powers by a feckless Congress whose members are more interested in advancing the interests of their political parties than they are in protecting the institutional integrity of their offices.

With respect to his role within the American conservative movement, Carey remained a gentleman to the end. Although many of his friends and favorite institutions (e.g., the Philadelphia Society and the Intercollegiate Studies Institute) were gradually overrun by ideological forces with which Carey disagreed, he continued to take the noble route; he eventually chose gradual retirement from the movement, rather than engaging in bitter fights with those on the American Right whom he could have done little to dissuade or disrupt. Some might disagree with Carey’s decision, but it had the merit of maintaining his civility.

Finally, a brief mention must be made of Carey as teacher and mentor. The lives are legion whom he blessed with his devoted good counsel. Even when dealing with independent-minded friends and advisees who challenged his positions, Carey would still support their projects. He was an ever-flowing vessel of understanding, tolerance, and often charity to those
whom he found in his professional care. There are countless stories to be told about this, and I can speak for all his students in now expressing a “Thank You!” to his immortal soul.

Peter Haworth received his PhD from Georgetown in 2008.

George Carey was a man of ideas, but not a man of system. It is difficult, I think, to capture his mind in a phrase or idea or even an article-length treatment. And this owes partly to the fact that, for Carey, politics was not an abstract undertaking. He sought after no monoliths, no transcendent truths for all times and all places. For him, as for the practical American founders he so seriously studied, there were no new truths to be had. The truths of Christianity and the West were well-established. The only correct posture toward them was one aimed at understanding and, upon understanding, honor and deference. The truths he and the American founders held dear were to be preserved by each grateful generation and applied to the invariably varying circumstances of human life. Each new application of tried political truth represents an opportunity for recommitment, not for rejection or innovation. For Carey, seeking after some new discovery under the political sun smacked of arrogance, revolution, and the ideology of The New. Carey would have none of it. Such a seeking should make us suspicious, skeptical, and repelled, he’d argue, rather than intrigued and attracted. This is all to say that Carey was a conservative, though not a reactionary.

And yet his conservatism wasn’t a moribund, settled thing. He never stopped reading or thinking or asking questions. When he read a good book or heard a good question, he praised it to all he encountered. As we are all likely wont to do, Carey’s major writing slowed toward the end of his career. But his own reflections and productive work continued in correspondence—he was easily the best emailer born in the 1930s—and in the formation of students.

With students he was eager to help, if not eager to give false hope or false encouragement. Without completely dashing hopes, Carey would tell it like it is. He was never profuse in his praise, but his students were never in doubt about his opinions. He was never cruel in his critiques, stating matter-of-factly what the issues were in a paper or argument. Further, when he had no critiques or no especial praise, he did that one thing that is far more difficult for us academics than for the rest of the population: he held his tongue. This is an instance of, funny to say, the man’s now-renowned humility.

George Carey was wry. In scholarly discussions, his demeanor was straightforward and straightfaced. But in nearly all other interactions, whether discussing current events and day-to-day politics or some other matter, Carey spoke with a slight grin. One of the proudest ornaments of his office wall was a framed copy of a student newspaper article; it was a piece honoring Carey for his “Centuries of Excellence,” among other things, and he loved it. It should probably be added here that his perpetual hope in the success of the Washington Redskins might also be considered a feature of his sense of humor.

I am honored to be numbered among his students, having benefitted from the humor, the guidance, and the excellence of the man who never pointed to himself and, therefore, gave us all something to admire about him.

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Dr. Johnson is said to have remarked that if someone seeking shelter from the rain were to find himself for even a few moments under a shed with Edmund Burke, he would say, “This is an extraordinary man.” It took longer than that, sitting in the perpetually broken high-backed chair reserved for students in George W. Carey’s office, to reach the same conclusion. He did not reveal it easily, perhaps because he was simply unaware of it himself. Professor Carey did not
speak first; he sought his students’ opinions. His ever-cheerful greeting indicated his humility. “Hello, friend!” he would say, even though one could not imagine being his peer. From one of the luminaries of his time. “An old gray eminence,” someone told me before I met him. “The last of the gentleman scholars,” another professor once remarked. Yet that was always his greeting. “Hello, friend!”

But it did not take long to reach the conclusion that this was, indeed, an extraordinary man. It was not merely because he was an extraordinary teacher, although he was. His time for students was limitless; so was his patience, except when it came to finishing dissertations. When I announced, mid-dissertation, that my wife and I were expecting our third child, Dean Carey, his wife, gushed. Professor Carey replied, doubtless eyes a-twinkle, “congratulations … I guess.”

Nor was he an extraordinary man merely because he was an extraordinary scholar, though he was that too. His insight was perceptive; his integrity, rigid as steel yet prudent as Burke, was immense. His work in American political thought will be read by scholars of the field for generations hence. He taught his students to read texts for meanings that were fixed and actual and unchanging according to political convenience, and such was a fine way to read Professor Carey too. Like the meaning of The Federalist, events moved; he did not. His views were framed by perspective but untouched by partisanship.

He rejoiced in his work. His retirement was imminent as long as I knew him. Yet he remained productive, writing daily, teaching actively as the age of 80 approached. Retirement next year. Always next year.

All this was extraordinary. But what made George W. Carey an extraordinary man is that he was all these things and was entitled to all the pretense that so often attends them but had not so much as a whisper of it. That his was the office of one of the greatest minds in American political thought of his time was unknowable from the bare walls, the door festooned with tattered political cartoons, the ever-so-slightly bent posture, ever-so-slightly rumpled suit coats and the utterly unassuming demeanor.

His sensibilities were a brew of Midwestern and Victorian. Men were “chaps”; reading Burke was like listening to Mozart; he greeted the news that I had gotten a post-doc with the comment, “Good show.” His smile was wry with a touch of impish, as in the time he settled a political debate with, “Well, Greg, do you believe everything your government tells you?”

He relished political exchange yet engaged in it with unceasing civility; for nearly 47 years he was married to a woman of often-contrary political views, yet they never seriously quarreled. In all correspondence, his wife, the retired dean of the College, was “THE DEAN,” always in capital letters that indicated his teasing affection. Professor Carey was a father who delighted in his family—his daughter Michelle, son-in-law Russell and their girls, Eliza, Hanna and Emelie.

And he was devoted to his students. After I graduated from Georgetown, Professor Carey’s duty to me was discharged and mine to him ought to have begun. Yet he continued to mentor me with generosity, reading with patience and care everything I wrote. He could be delightfully frank with feedback. Once, when I approached him about a potential research project, he replied, “Greg: Put that one on the back burner—the one way in the back.” One of the last emails I received from him, after I accepted an invitation to appear on a panel when he believed—correctly—I should have been working to meet a book deadline instead, read: “Not only did you reject my sensible counsel, you also accepted, I take it, a really weird topic. Parentheses: Don’t tell me you thought of it!” I had. But of course he proceeded to help with research anyway. Yet precisely because his reproach was so clear, his encouragement and praise—always ample—were so credible. One knew one could rest at ease when, having read a draft of some sort, he employed the eminently Victorian descriptor “splendid.”

The summer we lost him, I was a guest blogger for a web site sponsored by the Liberty Fund,
one of Professor Carey’s devoted causes, when I happened to notice a list of the most frequent Google searches that had brought visitors to the site. They were mostly highbrow: the meaning of liberty, the rights of property, and so forth, when ranked fifth among them I noticed the kicker. People were searching Google for, “So what did George W. Carey mean by ‘TME’?”

Once you knew the answer to that question you had the full measure of the man. You knew the humor and the humility and the deeper truth he was too decent to see. You knew why, if one was to find oneself for a few years sitting in the broken chair in George W. Carey’s office, as I had the privilege to do, one would say: “This was an extraordinary man.” And if one were to find oneself having lost a mentor who was like a father, a daily correspondent and an honest critic, an encouraging supporter and a constant standard of scholarship and chivalry one could never hope to meet but to which one could always aspire, one would conclude one’s reflections with two pained but privileged words: “Goodbye, friend.”

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George W. Carey was a model man and a model professor and rightly deserves to be remembered in these pages. First of all, he was the consummate gentleman. I cannot recall seeing him without a jacket and tie. He was always uncommonly polite, self-effacing, and welcoming in an almost grandfatherly way. I, for one, will forever associate Werther’s Original caramels with Professor Carey and his seminars as he would pass them around before every class. When he passed away, it was remarkable to see the outpouring of love and respect for him both personally and professionally, all of which was immensely deserved. I am thrilled to see it continue here. Indeed, while his direct involvement with the Tocqueville Forum was minimal, he was one of the Forum’s intellectual founders. For decades he promoted and preserved the discussions the Forum in turn seeks to facilitate.

I never knew him as well as others, nor as much as I wish I had. He was, however, a mentor to me, as for so many others. Over his decades at Georgetown, he witnessed the decay of intellectual debate and the rise of bureaucratization, rendering the environment unwelcome and the career prospects bleak for likeminded students. Perhaps the most important advice he gave me was the sad realization that sincere intellectual debate in academia is dying and that it is perhaps most important for us as thoughtful conservatives to go out into the professional world in order to debate and uphold the principles we share.

Beyond his personal character and the advice he gave me, it is impossible to convey how deeply he shaped my philosophical and political beliefs. Professor Carey was an increasingly rare breed at Georgetown. He actually fostered intellectual debate and discussion about things that matter; namely where have we come from as a nation, where we are going, and what institutions and aspects of society are worth fighting to preserve in the process. His views of the importance of ordered liberty to a flourishing society have influenced for the better modern American political thought.

In total, I had the privilege of taking three courses with Professor Carey as an undergraduate. In American Political Theory, I was introduced to his humble brilliance and his dedicated respect for the Founders and constitutional republicanism. The class was also an introduction for many students to the original documents of the American Founding. It was here that we began to understand that the American Republic did not sprout fully formed like Athena from the skull of Zeus. Rather, independence and the Constitution were the culmination of a political debate that had been developing since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock.

In the Problems of Democratic Theory, he challenged our preconceived notions about the unerring virtues of liberal democratic government
and helped us understand the philosophical and moral consequences of majoritarianism. He exposèd us to countless great works from Plato to Tocqueville, de Jouvenel, Hobbes, and Locke. In doing so, he nurtured an understanding of the excesses and abuses that democratic governance can bring and the importance of mitigating institutions to preserve the ordered liberty of which he was such a profound proponent.

Finally, in Contemporary Conservative Thought, we were exposed to the intellectual underpinnings and variations of modern conservatism and libertarianism from Burke and, of course his beloved Federalist, to Kirk and Hayek. While many seek to pigeonhole those on the right as being ideologically unified, he opened our eyes to the myriad of ways in which the various traditions interact with each other. This, rather than making us relativists, gave us a better understanding of the deep and complex history of the movement and an appreciation for the internal discussions that are often overlooked and cast aside in contemporary discourse.

While the principles Professor Carey believed and taught are timeless, they also have an immediate importance to political conservatives and libertarians, as well as to every American. Professor Carey long warned of the rise of the imperial presidency and the eclipsing of legislative supremacy, specifically the hazards of unchecked war powers. Too often, modern public officials evoke the principles and ideals of the Founders without truly understanding the foundation for those beliefs and the importance of their preservation. He will be both personally and intellectually missed on the Hilltop, but also in contemporary political discourse, where his deep intellectual thoughtfulness and serenity is becoming increasingly rare. Professor Carey’s life and work are a testament to the importance of preserving our traditions and heritage in an ever-changing world.

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Happily for me, I knew George Carey my entire undergraduate career. I was enrolled in his American Political Theory course from my first day at Georgetown, and sat next to him at a talk on the last day of his final semester teaching. He was a fixture of my Georgetown education, a pillar of American constitutional studies, and a supremely good and generous man.

I first got to know Professor Carey—cryptically “TME” to all—about six weeks into my freshman year. Assigned to interview a teacher on the topic of education, TME and I talked perhaps an hour and quarter about his life and academic background, his thoughts on modern curricula and university life, and on the state of the liberal arts. Then we turned the Dictaphone off and continued, evenly divided if memory serves, between the Supreme Court and college football.

I came away dazzled. He was amiable and utterly unpretentious, sprinkling in stories from the Georgetown he arrived at in 1961 and memories of his time as a Marine at Quantico between serious critiques of the changing academic landscape. Though he was not himself a Catholic, he was troubled by Georgetown’s gradual deemphasis of its religious foundations, a process he witnessed over the course of six decades on campus. He noted how student expectations for various facilities and amenities had soared while the corresponding academic demands professors could place on them continuously fell. He recounted the changes in the profession, particularly the growing specialization of academics. Though he was too modest to ever bring it up, and indeed whispered incredulously, “How did you know that?” when prompted, he played a major role in battling the rising tide of behavioralism and positivism that threatened to engulf his more humane understanding of politics by founding and chairing the Conference for Democratic Politics through the 1970’s, as well as launching the Political Science Reviewer, an academic journal that focused on matters of traditional political theory.

By the time I met George Carey, he no longer fought those battles. The intervening decades
had seen the rise, and then the entrenchment, of the political and social scientists, and Carey was nothing if not a realist. So he did the only prudential thing to do: retreat, philosopher-like, with good humor and recognition of the madness around, to the shelter of a low wall while the profession raged around him. He took refuge in a sort of medieval conception of the university, a last preserve of personal relationships, where age might directly convey to the young the accumulated wisdom of generations. Perhaps such a framework made the burgeoning academic bureaucracy—he once griped to me, with a mischievous grin, about the new “Vice President for Grass”—so particularly odious to TME. Far removed and ever-expanding regulation could strangle the very lifeblood of education, the business of personal contact and encouragement of which Carey was master. Localism and subsidiarity, two central themes of Carey’s federalist philosophy, really did live in and through the professor’s actions. So impressed was I at this principled stand that I registered in my second term for his upperclassman seminar on American conservatism, violating the first of no doubt many decanal prohibitions.

The George Carey I knew was thus not only a scholar who probably knew more about the American founding and the development of the Constitution than anyone else, but also—perhaps even principally—a man of supererogatory care for his students. He attributed cultural degeneration in no small part to the modern university’s abrogation of a sacred duty to look after not only the pedagogical aspects of education, but the personal and moral formation of her charges. In short, relationships and people mattered to TME. Despite offers from other universities, including the chairmanship of the Politics Department at the University of Dallas when his colleague and collaborator Willmoore Kendall died, Carey never left Georgetown, save for a sabbatical year at Indiana to work with his own supervisor Charles Hyneman. I asked him once why that was, and he responded that it was the people of Georgetown, “Mrs. Nicely at the President’s office, Mrs. Sweetly at the registrar,” that made life not only tolerable, but pleasant.

Professor Carey’s final years were therefore spent in the old-fashioned business of dealing with people and ideas, not bureaucrats or “classroom technology” or increasingly farcical university politics. He would concentrate on mentoring students and transmitting to them fundamental texts and ways of thinking, perhaps in the hope that civilization might survive a little bit longer. In the end, I think, Professor Carey’s scholarship and his teaching converged into the much the same basic tenet; “moral formation” and “constitutional morality” both presupposed genuine care for the human person and the development of his freedom to think. But it was a freedom, Professor Carey would quote Burke, “connected with order, that not only exists along with order and virtue, but which cannot exist at all without them.” The republic would not endure without a citizenry invested in the common good, which in turn required the education, both moral and civic, only offered by those who had given their lives to communicating that tradition. This George Carey did with gentleness of soul and greatness of spirit.

Stephen Wu is a 2013 graduate of the Georgetown College of Arts & Sciences and former Editor-in-Chief of Utraque Unum.
Nietzsche writes in a time of great historical change: the Enlightenment has run its course, the grand aristocratic systems of Europe have crumbled, capitalism has begun to take root, and the traditional Christian faith of Europe has been rejected. Modern man is “too strong” to accept the Christian story of his ancestors, yet too weak to forge a new world. Instead, we are stuck in the middle of a brave new world and our Christian past—too proud to return to our origins and too scared to march forward. We prefer the remnants of dilapidated, tired world. We feed parasitically on other cultures, including a now defunct Christian culture. In our exhaustion, we have kept certain social and moral values made possible by Christianity, such as democracy, equality, and the dignity of the human person, but have rejected Christianity itself. Nietzsche argues that this acceptance of the weighty moral claims of Christian orthodoxy without its foundational beliefs is unjustified; without the ontological claims of Christianity, there is no basis upon which its ethics can stand. These moral claims only enchain and burden us; as Nietzsche says, “apart from the church, we, too, love the poison.” As a result of our slavish regard for outmoded moral claims, we suffer from a lack of creativity and vitality, and our civilization is in decline. Therefore we must overcome our moral superstitions in order to rebuild a vital world.

Nietzsche characterizes this current state of creative exhaustion as one of three recurring stages in the development of societies throughout history; Nietzsche describes these three cyclical stages as the age of the child, the age of the camel, and, finally, the age of the lion. For Nietzsche, the development of society starts with the child, the creative force that invents a new world; he identifies the child of our age as Plato and Socrates. After the child, the camel then carries the civilization forward on the direction set by the child. After a while, the camel society gets tired, so in order to cast off the dead weight of tradition, a lion must come to destroy the old tablets which were the rule of the former society. Only through this destruction can another child can bring vitality once again. In our current state, modern man has lost the will to be a lion. We have rejected part of the old tablets, Christianity, but we have kept the poison which comes with it. We must therefore wait until the Übermensch come to destroy the old tablets and rebuild society. Nietzsche laments that modern man resists the efforts of the lion; he argues that a certain weakness of will is intrinsic to western civilization following Plato. Nietzsche says that, after thousands of years under the rule of Plato (in the form of Christianity, as “Christianity is Platonism for ‘the people’”) replete with ‘thou shalt nots,” which make the will turn against itself, we are no longer able to will anew.

Plato is not without his own response to Nietzsche’s claims. He too saw the same problem in his own time and offered his own solution. However, to the Christian, both the Platonic solution and the Nietzschean solution are inadequate. Through the elucidation of G.K.
Chesterton, I will show that Christianity and the Church respond more adequately to the problem of modernity raised by Nietzsche than Nietzsche himself or than Plato.

I: Nietzsche’s Rejection of the Rational Enterprise

Nietzsche’s apathy toward truth claims made by philosophers makes it difficult to find the common ground necessary to engage with him. Instead, he interests himself only with whether the claims of philosophers bring vitality or not. He says, “the falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a judgment…. The question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life-preserving, species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating.” Nietzsche questions why philosophers historically have had “the will to truth”; “Why not rather untruth? and uncertainty? even ignorance?,” he asks. Even if the philosophy of Kant does illuminate the truth, for example, this does not matter to Nietzsche if this truth does not also lead to vitality. Why care about truth? The Platonic and Christian response is that there is something outside of ourselves to which we are drawn, and that we will not be content until we have it; for Christians, “our hearts are restless until we rest in thee.” In contrast, Nietzsche rejects the idea of the Good or of God as simply the projection of a wounded animal; realizing the terror of the world, the weak soul projects the notion of the divine to comfort herself. Indeed, for Nietzsche, all thoughts are merely the outworking of physiology: “most of the conscious thinking of a philosopher is secretly guided and forced into certain channels by his instincts. Behind all logic and its seemingly sovereignty of movement, too, there stand valuations or, more clearly, physiological demands for the preservation of a certain type of life.” For him, the Christian and the Platonist are too weak to accept the fact that the world is not perfect and that we are alone in the dark world. In order to compensate for their inner weakness, they project outwards. One cannot come to the conclusion that there is a Good or God outside of us through rational dialectic either, because he cannot rationally demonstrate the soundness of rational demonstration. Nietzsche’s rejection of traditional philosophical methods is an essential part of his prognosis for dying Western civilization. He goes so far as to reject the very grounds of thought. Reasoning is based on using known principles to move to unknown principles; however, if we are truly to doubt everything, as Descartes wanted, we must come to the conclusion that we do not even have any known premises. Take the seemingly obvious first principle “I think.” It seems obviously true as to deny this assertion would involve a thought. However, Nietzsche argues as follows:

When I analyze the process that is expressed in the sentence, ‘I think,’ I find a whole series of daring assertions that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to prove; for example, that it is I who think, that there must necessarily be something that thinks, that thinking is an activity and operation on the part of a being who is thought of as a cause, that there is an, ‘ego,’ and, finally that it is determined what is to be designated by thinking—that I know what thinking is. In short, the assertion ‘I think’ assumes that I compare my state at the present moment with other states of myself which I know, in order to determine what it is; on account of this retrospective connection with further ‘knowledge,’ it has, at any rate, no immediate certainty for me.

If any rational judgment requires a comparison with other knowledge, we can never establish a first knowledge on which to base our subsequent reasoning. But if our most basic premises cannot be rationally known, then neither can any conclusions that are derived from them. This extreme skepticism destroys the entire rational enterprise. Instead of relying on reason, we must let the ecstatic elements of the id free rather than try to constrain the id with an ego that is beholden to moral principles. This will allow the artistic impulses of man to come forth, such that art can spring forth spontaneously, restoring vitality.
Plato has a response to Nietzsche’s solution to the problem. Plato would argue that to let the id take over is equivalent to letting the appetitive part of the soul disorderedly rule. Nietzsche’s Übermensch is very similar to Thrasymachus’s tyrant, who Plato argues is the least happy of souls. Because we live in the world of coming into being and passing away, as Plato sees it, we deal on this earth only with shadows. Consequently, Nietzsche is exactly right, unless the light of the Good breaks into the world. If there is no Good, then we are left with merely the will to power and art. But Plato wagers that there is a Good. He agrees with Nietzsche in his critique of Enlightenment Cartesian rationalism, unless the light of the Good illuminates our minds to find the truth as “the relation of the sun to vision and its objects in the visible world is the same as the relation of the good to reason and the objects of reason in the world of intellect.” Just as the sun’s light allows us to see, so too does the light of the Good allow us to know and escape from Nietzsche’s critique of reason. At every moment, we are capable of falling into aporia, the dark knot of confusion preceding true wisdom, by challenging our own first principles. When we have reached a state of aporia, then we are ready to be illuminated by the light of the Good.

Illuminated by the light of the good, our souls will be aligned, with each part of the soul doing the job that it is meant to do. As such, the lives of philosophers—those that have seen the light of the good—will be well ordered and most happy. Plato has two problems that he must sort out with his account. First, Plato’s claim about the light of the Good breaking in must be justified by human experience. To justify this claim by dialectic would be question begging against Nietzsche, because we can only trust dialectic if the light of the Good does shine on us, which is exactly what we are trying to prove. Therefore it must be justified experientially. Secondly, Plato’s solution seems rather bleak for the majority of mankind. Indeed, the ability to love wisdom and fall into aporia to see the light of the Good is open to everyone at every moment, but Plato himself realizes that few will be saved from a life in the shadows this way, saying, “philosophy—the love of wisdom—is impossible for the multitude.” The allegory of the cave confirms this, as it is clear that it is only “one prisoner is freed from his shackles,” while many remain in chains. To have so few philosophers does not bode well for humanity; the outlook for us is rather dark. Yes, aporia and the light of the good is open to us all, but it is the impossible possibility for most; something that can never be actualized, like the Republic itself. Furthermore, if the good is diffusive of itself, as the great neo-Platonist Plotinus argued, then why are so few of the prisoners freed? It is only a select few who see the light of the Good.

Christianity, as seen through the lens of Chesterton, has answers to both the problem of experientially justifying that there is a Good that breaks in and the problem of the improbability of attaining the light of the Good for the vast majority of humanity, being non-philosophers. The two are intimately connected, in fact.

Chesterton agrees with Nietzsche that reason can destroy itself. In fact, he presents very similar arguments to Nietzsche against the half-hearted skeptics of his day, who refused to accept the full-blown skepticism that they ought to have, saying, “reason itself is a matter of faith. It is an act of faith to assert that our thoughts have any relation to reality at all…. Why should not good logic be as misleading as bad logic? They are both movements in the mind of a bewildered ape.” In the end of ends, Chesterton recognized the power of reason to come to know the truth, but reason can only grasp reality after having assented to first principles by an act of faith. Chesterton comes to this faith through the use of myth, or fairytales.

II: Experiential Truths of Myth and the Christian Story

All three thinkers hold myth to be a crucial element intertwined with the very nature of man. Nietzsche’s magnum opus, Zarathustra, was written in the form of a myth. Nietzsche explains that
we need art, or myth, to point to where reason cannot go; he says, “when they see to their horror how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its own tail—suddenly the new form of insight breaks through, tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as a protection and remedy.” For Plato too, myth is important. Myth is used to mold people’s souls when they are still young; consequently, Plato says that “we must expand our supervision to those who write and tell stories about these matters, too.”

Furthermore, he uses myth to explore what cannot be straightforwardly articulated by reason. The illustration of the sun relating to the light of the Good is itself a myth, and the allegory of the cave particularly is mythic. Plato recognized that the depths of rationality do not go all the way down, and myth is needed to explain the innermost secrets of reality, saying of the Good, “I fear my power may not be able to reach so far.”

Myth is used where reason cannot go. Chesterton too understood the importance of myth, or fairytale. Myth and fairytales teach us many things about the world which would be difficult to prove through rational dialectic. Chesterton had the insight that the truths of the Christian religion readily explain the experiential truths gleaned from myth. Chesterton describes what he learned from the nursery, from fairytales. He notes firstly that, against the naïve philosophy of certain scientists, the laws of nature ultimately lack final explanatory power. The law of universal gravitation is something that is reliably true, but it is merely a contingent truth; we can easily conceive of it not being the case, as opposed to the necessary truths of mathematics for example. He says:

The witch in the fairy tale says, ‘Blow the horn, and the ogre’s castle will fall’; but she does not say it as if it were something in which the effect obviously arose out of the cause. Doubtless she has given the advice to many champions, and has seen many castles fall, but she does not lose either her wonder or her reason. She does not muddle her head until it imagines a necessary mental connection between a horn and a falling tower. But the scientific men do muddle heads, until they imagine a necessary mental connection between an apple leaving the tree and an apple reaching the ground. The contingent truths of science should still surprise us, because they are merely contingent and not necessary, just like the horn of the witch. A castle falls from the horn every time it is blown, but the connection between the two events is not necessary. What explains the relation?

The universal law of horn blowing cannot explain the connection, because that merely states that there is a connection. The only explanation we can give for the connection is that it is magic. The same holds for the relation of the law of universal gravitation, and other scientific laws. Yes it is true that all objects are attracted to other objects, and perhaps this can be explained by the curvature of space-time or whatever the most recent scientific theory may be, but ultimately the connection between an object and its falling to the earth must rest on some fact that just is, without a scientific explanation. Either the first link in the scientific causal chain is contingent or necessary. But it cannot be necessary, because effects take their modality from their cause, so if the cause causes necessarily then the effect will be necessary. But this is clearly not the case as many contingent things exist around us. Therefore, the root explanatory scientific cause must be contingent without itself having a scientific explanation. In other words, it is magic. Nietzsche of course will reject this scholastic logic, but I think most people can see the simple truth learned from fairytales that “this world does not explain itself…. The thing is magic, true or false.”

Secondly, through fairytales Chesterton came to see that “there was something personal in the world, as in a work of art; whatever it meant it meant violently.” Chesterton, valuing the importance of the will and art like Nietzsche, started to think that perhaps the universe is not cold and deterministic, but instead the sun rises each day because of a will saying to the sun “do
it again” as a little child does to something that brings her joy or like an audience wanting another encore in a play. The modern entertainment of reality TV shows supports this intuition: the stories of actual people leading actual lives are worth watching. Ordinary lives are fun and adventurous; sometimes we need only see someone else’s fun and adventure to be reminded that ours is too. Furthermore, just as there is a producer of The Jersey Shore, perhaps there is a producer for the show which is my life.

Thirdly, Chesterton learned “that the proper form of thanks... is some form of humility and restraint”91 from the myth of Santa Claus, arguing that “children are grateful when Santa Claus puts in their stockings gifts of toys or sweets. Could I not be grateful to Santa Claus when he put in my stockings the gift of two miraculous legs?”92 This seems very obvious and in accord with experience, upon reflection. His final point was that “there had come into my mind a vague and vast impressions in some way all good was a remnant to be stored and held sacred out of some primordial ruin. Man had saved his good as Crusoe saved his goods: he saved them from a wreck.”93

We need not have all of the great and wonderful thing that are around us, and we could have had much more too. The fact “that there are two sexes and one sun, was like the fact that there were two guns and one axe” which were saved from Crusoe’s sinking ship.94 Chesterton considered these things that he learned the most sensible of anything he ever learned. These truths are gleaned from myth and experience.

Christianity has handy explanations for these truths we learn from myth and fairytale. The world does not explain itself, and it is magic, precisely because it was created by a magician. Similarly the world is a work of art that has meaning, because it was created by our artist-God, who meant something in His creation. We ought to be thankful for having feet in our stockings because they are not there by a blind process of naturalistic development, but instead because they were gifted to us, freely and undeservedly. We are all thankful for gifts. It seems that all good that we have is saved from a primordial ruin precisely because there was a primordial ruin in the Fall. Christianity accounts for what we have learned from fairytales. This is not to say from this that we can know Christianity to be true, but just that so far it seems that “the key [of Christianity] fits the lock” which is our experience of existence.95

III: A Theory of Vitality and Christianity

Continuing to focus on the experiential aspect of our lives, I will now address the topic of whether Christianity can lead to vitality. This will not prove that Christianity is true, but if the arguments are successful then we will have another instance of the key fitting the lock of experience. Firstly, vitality presupposes a willingness of Christians to enact change, rather than accept present stagnation. As Chesterton says, “we have to feel the universe at once as an ogre’s castle, to be stormed, and yet as our own cottage, to which we can return at evening....Can we hate it enough to change it, and yet love it enough to think it worth changing?”96 We have to be uncomfortable in the world such that we seek to change it, but we also have to be at home in the world enough that we feel it is worth saving. This is the first paradox which the theory of vitality requires. Secondly, the theory requires a fixed goal: the goal cannot simply be change because to have change as a goal is itself monotonous. The goal must be fixed in order to get closer to it.

Thirdly, our theory of vitality “must not (if it is to satisfy our souls) be the mere victory of some one thing swallowing up everything else, love or pride or peace or adventure; it must be a definite picture composed of these elements in their best proportion and relation.”97 Here Plato would agree. We do not want one part of the soul (even reason) to completely overtake the rest of the soul, but instead each part of the soul must do its proper job and only its job; no more, no less. Chesterton provides an argument from myth for this proposition: what we really want
is “a certain amount of restraint and a respect, a certain amount of energy and mastery,” as shown by the fact that “the beauty of a fairy-tale lies in this: that the prince has a wonder which just stops short of being fear. If he is afraid of the giant, there is an end of him; but also if he is not astonished at the giant, there is an end of the fairy-tale.”

To have a truly artistic and fulfilling life, we must have the adventure of war and ecstatic freedom of Nietzsche and the humility and gratitude of St. Ignatius. Both are necessary for true adventure, art, romance, and vitality.

Fourthly, our theory of what can bring vitality must take into account the “startling swiftness with which popular systems turn oppressive.” Nietzsche would have no reason to accept this claim, why should he care about oppression? But progressives have reason to accept this. Chesterton states that this is the only argument against being a conservative. If popular systems do not turn oppressive or even continually improve naturally, then we ought to let the systems be or tweak them occasionally as the conservative would wish. It is only if popular systems do turn oppressive quickly that we need to continually work to improve, even have a revolution. Thus, the progressive ought to believe that popular systems can turn oppressive quickly.

Christianity is the key which fits the lock of our existence with regard to our theory of vitality; as Chesterton asserts, “Orthodoxy is not only (as is often urged) the only safe guardian of morality or order, but is also the only logical guardian of liberty, innovation and advance.”

Christianity meets our four requirements for ensuring vitality perfectly. According to the Christian vision, we are in the world but not of the world. We are hylomorphic compounds who are made for the material world, yet we are ultimately called to Christ, who is the perfect union of materiality and incorporeality. This world is both our home that we live and a battlefield against Satan for our very souls. We can hate the world enough to want to change it, and love the world enough to find it worth changing. Secondly, Christianity does have a fixed goal, which is to be taken up into the divine life of Christ through the process of theosis. “God became man so that man might become god,” as St. Athanasius said. The fourth reason is also met with a ready explanation: indeed, systems do get progressively worse because of the Fall. Man is fallen because he fell. As a result, the Christian of the post-lapsarian world is vigilant against decay rather than excessively beholden to societies built by intrinsically flawed human.

The third requirement requires more discussion than the rest. Our theory of vitality must be the combination, right relation, and proportion of many different, even conflicting elements. Here Nietzsche objects that Christianity does not pass muster; for him, Christianity is a one-dimensional slave morality and “maintains no belief more ardently than the belief that the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey to be a lamb—for thus they gain the right to make the bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.”

He objects that the strong man, the bird of prey, the lion has no place in the Christian scheme and thus is left out. Christianity lacks proper balance and proportion. However, the strong man, the bird of prey, and the lion do have a place in the Christian picture. Chesterton asks, “Can the lion lie down with the lamb and still retain his royal ferocity? That is the problem the Church attempted; that is the miracle she achieved.” Aristotle saw virtue as being in the middle of two vices. Chesterton agrees with this as an outline, but like all things pagan, Aristotle is incomplete.

Christian virtue is no mere balance or median between two extremes, but rather “the collision of two passions apparently opposite.”

Christian virtues are not static means but rather roaring opposites that meet fighting in the middle. Christian virtue does not take the mean between Tolstoy and Nietzsche, but instead through a delicate and adventurous balancing act paradoxically captures the virtue of both. The Christian must combine Tolstoy’s “pleasure in plain things, especially in plain pity, the actualities of the earth, the reverence for the poor,
the dignity of the bowed back” with Nietzsche’s “mutiny against the emptiness and timidity of our times….his cry for the ecstatic equilibrium of danger, his hunger for the rush of great horses, his cry to arms.” This paradoxical, romantic, adventurous combination of virtues has indeed been actualized in Joan of Arc. She not only had a reverence for the poor but was poor. She not only had a cry to arms, but even fought in battle. She had the virtues of each Tolstoy and Nietzsche, except even more so because she actually lived as they preached. Christ himself said both to turn the other cheek and that he came to bring not peace but the sword. The lion can lay with the lamb and maintain the ferocity which makes it a lion. But of course this is a delicate and perilous balancing act. This explains the need for dogma and doctrine, according to Chesterton. Because Christian virtue relies on a complex balancing act, to give an inch on one side of dogma would make the entire system off balance and collapse. Now that we have established that Christian orthodoxy is the true guide and safeguard of vitality, we can move on to the question of whether to accept the Christian theory as true or not.

IV: Authority of Christian Truth

Someone could rightfully object at this point and say that although these truths to which the Church points are necessary to secure vitality, liberty, and health in a society, there is no reason to accept the entirety of the Christian story. We can accept merely those truths necessary for maintaining vitality as scattered and separate truths rather than the entire Christian story. Ultimately, the response to this is to appeal to authority. Plato may have taught us many things, and his writings can try to do what they can to lead us towards the Good, but that is inadequate. As Plato himself thought, to get to truth requires a conversation; a speech cannot be read from a scroll and knowledge simply soaked up; a Socratic dialogue is necessary to reach a person where they are at. This is confirmed by what Chesterton says:

The Christian Church in its practical relation to my soul is a living teacher, not a dead one…. Plato has told you a truth; but Plato is dead….But imagine what it would be to live with such men still living, to know that Plato might break out with an original lecture tomorrow….The man who lives in contact with what he believes to be a living Church is a man always expecting to meet Plato and Shakespeare tomorrow at breakfast.

The Church is a living, breathing, functioning authority. It can engage us in conversation. The Church also combines the art of a Shakespeare with the philosophy of a Plato such that it can meet people where they are at, based on their dispositions. Plato is correct to dismiss Aristotelian habituation as insufficient measures. Glaucos shows this by explaining how the fathers only taught the sons to be just because of the effects it brings, and not for the sake of justice itself. Habituation can only get us so far, as humans necessarily can only pass on defective versions of what they had to their children. This is true unless the habitation is not of human origin.

Through the Church we partake of a divine habituation. This is not the result of human actions and wills, but instead it is a divine gift breaking into the world. Our fathers cannot pass on what we need, but our Mother Church can, by the grace of God. Chesterton says that the only parallel to having the Church as a living, divine teacher is “the parallel of the life in which we all began.” When we were young and wondered through the garden, our parents told us many truths. Thorns would hurt if we touched them. The water would be cold if we touched it. The sun will further the growth of plants. Prophecy after prophecy was fulfilled. We, as children unskilled in the ways of the world, did not merely accept the scattered truths of our parents, saying “my father is a rude, barbaric symbol, enshrining (perhaps unconsciously) the deep delicate truths that flower smell.” Instead, we accepted not the truths that our parents told us, but we...
accepted our parents as tellers of truths. Just like our parents, the Church has told us many truths that seem odd at first, but nevertheless fit. The key fits the lock. The Church does not merely tell us truths, but as a divine parent is a truth teller. All of this, crucially, was established through experience: fairytales, our experience of vitality and art, and our experience as children.

The authority of the Church solves another of our problems: Nietzsche’s hyper-skepticism and critique of reason. Indeed, Chesterton says that the entire point of religious authority is to prevent reason from destroying itself: “there is a thought that stops thought. That is the only thought that ought to be stopped. That is the ultimate evil against which all religious authority was aimed.”

With the Protestant rejection of the authority of the Church, there was no authority to curtail the excesses of reason. This very naturally led people to think that freedom from the authority of the Church would lead to a liberated and powerful rational faculty because the Church was no longer holding it back; reason had boundless potential according to the enlightenment. The failure of the enlightenment project coupled with the very natural fact that rational criticism was eventually used against reason itself led to Nietzsche’s outright rejection of it. Rationality, like all other Christian virtues, could not give an inch on either side in dogma or doctrine without crumbling, because rationality itself is the carefully balanced collision between two extremes: the thought of turnips, for they reject nothing, and the thought of the hyper-skeptic, who rejects everything. The Thomistic doctrine of analogical predication preserves this, for it boldly claims that we can speak truths about the nature of God while simultaneously holding that the divine nature is completely unknowable and foreign to us in this life. To maintain sanity is delicate business, and to reject that authority that exists to keep you sane will in the end make you madman, like Nietzsche.

The Christian answer also responds to the second dilemma earlier raised about the inadequacy of the Platonic response because of how few people will be saved from the chains in the cave. Not everyone can be a philosopher, but everyone can obey divine authority and participate in sacraments that further the process of being taken up into the divine life of God which is theosis. Of course there is still room from the mystical philosophers like Plato in the Church—St. Bonaventure is an example—but one need not be skilled in dialectic in order to achieve our end. The reason behind this is the Incarnation. Chesterton points out that the most stables in Bethlehem at the time of Christ would have been inside of caves. The fact Christ was born into this world, in a cave, uproots the Platonic solution. We are not stuck in the cave waiting to be realized to leave it while the light of the good remains outside. Instead, in the Christian vision, the Sun/Son Himself entered into the cave and lived with the shadow-dwellers. The light of the Good broke into the cave. The Sun itself was staring at shadows on the wall. Christ, fully God and thus fully the Good, and fully man and thus material, sanctified materiality and made it holy. The Christian does not live in Plato’s world of shadows now, but a world where flesh and spirit are reconciled and made one; a world where “every little leaf is striving towards the Word, sings glory to God, weeps to Christ,” as Dostoevsky said.

The philosophers do have a place in the Church; as Chesterton points out, the three wise men who came to worship the infant Jesus were stargazers and philosophers. But the shepherds, men purely of myth and lore and fairytales—men who dwelt in the shadows—came too. For Christ and His Church are for all. Nietzsche would object that because “art represents the highest task and the truly metaphysical activity of this life.” Christian insistence on morality, which is merely resentment towards the powerful, displaces art from its rightful place. Nietzsche says “in truth, nothing could be
more opposed to the purely aesthetic interpretation and justification of the world which are taught in this book than the Christian teaching, which is, and wants to be, only moral and which relegates art, every art, to the realm of lies; with its absolute standards, beginning with the truthfulness of God, it negates, judges, and damns art.” I hope by now it is clear the importance that Chesterton too places on art. The world is a novel, or a play, or a cave painting come to life. God is the creator-artist, and we participate in His artwork, as actors in the play or as painters: “this is not a world, but rather the material for a world. God has given us not so much the colours of a picture as the colours of a palette. But he has also given us a subject, a model, a fixed vision.” This deeply Platonic line—that we can build the earth based on an eternal idea—highlights how art and Christianity are congruous. Christian morality too is in fact congruous with art, contra Nietzsche. This is because “art, like morality, consists in drawing the line somewhere.” Art inherently is restrictive, like morality; you cannot draw a giraffe without a long neck, for then it would not be a giraffe. A painting rests within a frame. Limitations are necessary for art. This does not show Christian morality to be true by any means, but it does show that art is congruous with morality as they are based on similar principles, so Nietzsche’s objection is defeated.

Nietzsche would further object that Christian morality destroys “the will to life, which is bent on power.” Nietzsche praises the will itself as key, and Christian morality, consisting of “thou shalt nots” restricts and hampers the will. This is why modern man has lost the strength to will anew. Chesterton responds to Nietzsche and has followers, such as Bernard Shaw, that it is not possible to praise the will in general: “If Mr. Bernard Shaw comes up to me and says, ‘Will something,’ that is tantamount to saying, ‘I do not mind what you will,’ and that is tantamount to saying, ‘I have no will in the matter.’ You cannot admire will in general, because the essence of will is that it is particular.” To will is a necessarily a transitive verb. You can only will some object or state, and you cannot evaluate the will without reference to that object or state. Furthermore, Nietzsche and friends “always talk of will as something that expands and breaks out. But it is quite the opposite. Every act of will is an act of self-limitation. To desire action is to desire limitation… When you choose anything, you reject everything else.” When I will to have milk with my dinner, I necessarily will not to have other drinks. Because will exists only in the particular, to will one particular means that you do not will the other competing particulars. We cannot take a walk, read a book, and play piano at the same time; we must will one to the exclusion of the others. Furthermore, to act on your will requires a thou shalt not issued to others: “it is surely obvious that ‘thou shalt not’ is one of the necessary corollaries of ‘I will.’ ‘I will go to the Lord Mayor’s Show, and thou shalt not stop me.” Yes, the truly strong person wishes her parasites well because she knows that she is strong enough to live with them as Nietzsche said, but there is surely a sense in which actualizing your will requires that others do not stop you; in other words it requires a “thou shalt not.” Nietzsche would seem to agree that there is a thou shalt not prohibiting turning the will against itself, which led to this modern dilemma. There is a thou shalt not against thou shalt nots! This objection, then, does not stand either.

In my eyes, the most serious objection leveled against the Chestertonian Christian position described is to say that it is unfit for the modern democratic age, characterized by misanthropy. Both Plato and Nietzsche would object in this way, but I will follow the argument of Plato, for he specifically deals with the democratic city and soul. The objection is twofold. First, the democracy and tradition that are necessary for orthodoxy are opposed: “the democratic city cares nothing for the past behavior of the man who enters public life.” The second objection is that democracy “makes the souls of citizens so hypersensitive that they cannot bear to hear even the mention of authority.” Of all the objections this is most formidable. Anyone who looks around
in our democratic society today can find ample evidence to support these claims. Chesterton, however, is a counter-example to this objection, for he accepted authority, even found it adventurous and romantic, but at the same time he was a proud democrat. He is aware of these two related objections, one about tradition the other about authority. To answer the first, he states that tradition is itself democratic, and it cannot be any other way, for “tradition may be defined as an extension of the franchise. Tradition means giving votes to the most obscure of all classes, our ancestors. It is the democracy of the dead. Tradition refuses to submit to the small and arrogant oligarchy of those who merely happen to be walking about.”

Democracy is centered on equality, as Plato recognized. Democracy “[dispenses] a sort of equality to equal and unequal alike.” The Rawlsian objects to the libertarian because he does not recognize that our capacities, gifts, and other predicates of existence are determined by the mere accidents of birth. But the Rawlsian does not recognize that the absence of the say of those who came before is determined by the mere accident of death. Why should the mere accident of time prevent someone from having a say in the government? Is not time of birth within a country on par with place of birth within a country, color of your skin, and wealth of your family? Why can we prevent someone from having a say in the government based on one but not the others? Tradition is the logical requirement of democracy.

To answer the second objection, Chesterton says that all the truths preached by authority, especially the unpopular dogmas, turn out to be “the very props of the people.” Authority protects democracy and does not destroy it, and he thinks this will lead people to accept it. It is crazy to argue that miracles are illiberal or undemocratic, Chesterton argues. How can the feeding of the 5000, whether it actually happened or not, be considered illiberal and undemocratic? Furthermore, democrats ought to accept miracles, because common folk from throughout history have testified to them. The Trinity is not an illiberal dogma, for the Trinity is a society of equals. The divinity of Christ is liberal and democratic, because Christ Himself was a rebel: “let the revolutionists choose a creed from all the creeds and a god from all the gods of the world....They will not find another god who has himself been in revolt.”

Even the doctrine of hell is necessary for adventure in a democratic society: in a novel “the hero is not eaten by cannibals; but it is essential to the existence of the thrill that he might be eaten by cannibals. The hero must (so to speak) be an eatable hero. So Christian morals have always said to the man, not that he would lose his soul, but that he must take care that he didn’t.” The threat of hell makes life a movie worth watching. No one wants a see an adventure movie without any risk to the hero. Original sin is the doctrine that makes all people universal siblings. Only by the doctrine of original sin can we argue against the concentration of power into the hands of a few elites. Only with the doctrine of original sin can the democrat respond to the Platonic thought that a few chosen philosophers should rule. The democrat who believes in original sin can say that power concentrated in the hands of a few, even if they are generally virtuous, is dangerous because power corrupts and people are weak. To know the good is not necessarily to do the good. The truths of orthodoxy are necessary for democracy, and so is the authority that teaches these truths. Indeed, Chesterton thinks that the democratic age is more likely to produce a belief in orthodoxy. In response to the objection that orthodoxy cannot be believed in the modern age, Chesterton says “oddly enough, there really is a sense in which a creed, if it is believed at all, can be believed more fixedly in a complex society than in a simple one.... For the more complicated seems the coincidence, the less it can be a coincidence.” If the key fits into a simple lock with only a few grooves, like the simple world of a thousand years ago, we have some reason to think it is the right key. But if the lock is extremely intricate and complicated like modern life is and the key still fits, we have
every reason to think it is the right key. This is another reason why dogmas and doctrines must be complicated: they have to fit our complicated world.

In the end of ends, Nietzsche is correct about the need for an Übermensch. He is correct about the importance of strength, will and beauty flowing from ecstatic art. He is correct that we people of today are just the transitioning point to something higher. However, he does not see where these premises lead. What is wrong with Nietzsche’s strength and beauty is that it can be defeated by death. As Vladimir Solovyov wondered, “is strength powerless before death really strength? Is a decomposing body a thing of beauty?” The most truly strong and beautiful being would be the one who has billions serve Him over the course of thousands of years. The most truly strong and beautiful being would have a will that could command even material objects to obey. The most truly strong and beautiful being would triumph over death itself, which is the ruin of strength and beauty in normal people, while preserving his strength and beauty, even increasing it! The most truly strong and beautiful being is the one who could shout, with John Donne, “Death, thou shalt die.” The most truly strong and beautiful being—the true Übermensch—is Christ.

In conclusion, Nietzsche’s critique of modern society is one worth dealing with because he is correct in the diagnoses, but he is also very wrong in the prescription of the cure. Plato does a better job prescribing a cure, but unfortunately the medicine is only effective for a very few number of people, due to our weakness. However, the Christian prescription will cure the disease and can be effective for all. Using myth, we can find the truths that Christianity points to, including the need for the romantic and adventurous balancing act that is Christian virtue, and accept the Church as a teller of truths. Only by accepting the authority of the Church can we save reason from itself. We can also see how the truths of the Church are necessary and fitting for the democratic age.

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Can We Redeem Machiavelli?

Chris Grillo

Almost any inquiry into the foundation of modern political philosophy points to Machiavelli and Hobbes, and justly so. Machiavelli separated men from classical and Christian conceptions of the good and true, while Hobbes separated men from his fellow men. But although Machiavelli and Hobbes both find home in the tradition they themselves initiated, noticeable differences remain, particularly in reference to their respective views on freedom and liberty. In *Discourses on Livy*, Niccolo Machiavelli advocates secure republican government, which grants its citizens “republican freedom,” which he later specifies as freedom from domination or tyranny. In *Leviathan*, Hobbes calls for the establishment of a sovereign that dictates and directly establishes the liberty of each citizen. These small differences have broader implications. Amongst these two visions of governance, Machiavelli’s republican definition of liberty affirms the existence of a higher moral good, which results in a more liberal and stable government than Hobbes’ materialist definition prescribes. Thus, it may be worth reconsidering our understanding of the relationship between Machiavelli and Hobbes, and asking how this impacts our understanding of the modern political philosophy tradition.

In *Discourses*, Machiavelli writes that “whoever desires to found a state must start with assuming that all men are bad and ready to display their vicious nature” and “that men act right only under compulsion,” highlighting not only man’s orientation towards evil, but also his equal capacity for good. Thus, Machiavelli holds that “the law makes man good.” Although Machiavelli does not articulate the specific liberties he has in mind, he insinuates that the liberties that the people seek concern their desire to be free from domination. He puts forward that the quarrels of the Senators of Rome, men who had a “great desire to dominate,” and the common people, who rarely demanded anything “pernicious to their liberty,” gave rise to the popular origins of liberty in Rome. In the Roman Republic, the people pursued extreme measures to directly challenge the power of the ruling Senate and to threaten the security of the state, and consequently left no choice but for the Senate to oblige. Thus, the Roman people won the right to select their own representatives who articulated their unique concerns with the establishment of the Tribune, and earned their political liberty.

However, as Machiavelli articulates, liberty need not only be won in the republic, but it also needs to be preserved. Examining relations amongst citizens, Machiavelli promotes as a critical and very effective liberty in the Republic the right “to give vent.” Through legal channels, citizens utilize the faculty of accusation to express their discontent over legal disputes, which yields two benefits that enhance the security of the state; first, because of an apprehension of being accused, citizens are deterred from committing crimes, second, the evil dispositions within men that Machiavelli assumes to exist exhaust themselves before they ferment into something that would be much more dangerous to the republic. Additionally, Machiavelli emphasizes that the state must grant this political freedom.
because what the citizens “are unable to take away from themselves, they are less likely to take it away from others.” He relies on this specific liberty “to give vent” to duly protect citizens from each other and, in the process, promote a more general sense of freedom from the treachery of others. This leads to Machiavelli’s highest praise of the republic, as the government that is most firm and stable when given a quarreling citizenry where different factions obsess over power and domination.

Although Hobbes also strives to achieve security for every man by imagining a government rooted in maintaining peace in *Leviathan*, his radical notion of human nature inspires a vision for government that subordinates liberty to the authority of the sovereign ruler. The sovereign’s unlimited power reduces the liberty of the subjects in the commonwealth merely to what the sovereign does not proclaim as illegal within the commonwealth as well as the most extreme cases of self-preservation. *Leviathan’s* famous description of the man’s life in the state of nature, resulting from the combined effect of “the restless desire of power after power in all men” in search of their own security and “men so equal in the faculties of body and mind,” as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” This extreme view of men with unrestricted liberty leads Hobbes to conclude that only a sovereign with unlimited power established by the commonwealth can ensure that society escapes the state of nature. The sovereign possesses unlimited power to make civil laws that restrict the liberties of the will using his definitions of “right and wrong, what is contrary and what is not contrary to the rule.” Therefore, the sovereign defines the political liberty of the subjects, and his authority, transferred to him by the consent of the citizens, is absolute. In the process of establishing a government that guarantees this escape from nature, the sovereign deems certain liberties essential and legal, and others harmful and illegal. However, the materialist Hobbes notes the sovereign’s inability to have “rules set down enough for the regulating all the actions and words of men.” The subjects of the commonwealth retain their natural liberties that remain undefined by the sovereign, known as the “the silence of the law.” This accounts for the variety of liberty among different states, as some rulers believe it to be more necessary to restrict certain freedoms than others. With the important exception to the inalienable liberty of bodily integrity, *Leviathan* adopts an unambiguous stance indifferent to the role of political freedom in the commonwealth.

Hobbes’ extreme conclusions about the power of the sovereign and repressed liberty of the subjects of the commonwealth allude to the flaws in his argument about the proper means of governing human beings. Ultimately, *Leviathan* hyperbolizes the brutality of the state of nature, and as a consequence, it does not sufficiently emphasize the critical role of civil liberties in fostering civic participation, a critical element of government stability. Desperate to escape the state of nature, Hobbes argues that all laws and liberties effectively rest in the will of the sovereign. But once the sovereign believes that the citizens of the commonwealth are abusing these liberties, he restricts or removes these liberties. The mutability and impermanence of the liberty effectively renders the liberties the sovereign grants non-existent, because the essential function of a political liberty is to assure a citizen of his or her security so absolutely that he or she will not seek out more dangerous means to guarantee it. Ironically, Hobbes states that there is one, inalienable liberty within the commonwealth, namely, that each man has an absolute right to self-preservation. For more clarification, Hobbes remarks that every man “is not bound to confess a crime’’ or “bound by the words themselves to kill himself.” This very literal conception of self-preservation ignores the means by which citizens actually seek and ensure their own survival, as security is not strictly a political matter; for example, a citizen can seek economic security through employment, or social security by establishing a group of friends or joining a religious congregation. These citizens
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Can seek to improve their lives without acquiring the “power after power” that would threaten the livelihood of their fellow citizens. In fact, they acquire their power through cooperation and relations with their fellow citizens, marking a sharp contrast with the state of nature that Hobbes describes. These ideas of security, akin to stability, call for more government protection in the form of granting more liberty to its citizens so that they can interact and benefit from their social relations. The absence of the citizens’ political freedom thus leaves no means of guaranteeing these more practical, yet equally important freedoms. Thus, the threat to political freedom breeds political instability, and ultimately undermines the security that the Commonwealth seeks to provide.

The absolute political authority of the sovereign does not imply absolute control over the people. Thus, civil dissonance concerning what liberty is proper to the commonwealth between the citizens and the sovereign can emerge. In his discussion of the extreme circumstances in which a citizen may reject the authority of the sovereign, Hobbes obscures the limits of a citizen’s right to protest. Hobbes’ statement, “When, therefore, our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained, then there is no liberty to refuse; otherwise, there is,” confirms this absolute lack of input and civilian participation in the activity of a government. Most problematically, the quote highlights the implications of Hobbes’ rejection of the existence of the “sumnum bonum,” the idea of a moral truth that extends into and beyond the commonwealth. The highest good, according to Hobbes, is not a matter of truth that anyone can ascertain, which would in turn lend credence to the decentralization of political power. Instead, the highest good is whatever the sovereign wills. However, this idea is a contradiction at its very core. According to Hobbes, the end is not the will of the sovereign, but the preservation of every law-abiding citizen in the commonwealth, or a form of the common good. If the sovereign can will a people to a greater (if not necessarily the highest) good, then the sumnum bonum that he rejects must exist. As a consequence, the citizens of the state possess equally intellectual capabilities as the sovereign to determine that truth. In this case, it makes no sense to centralize political power to such an extreme, because once the sovereign errs, as Hobbes acknowledges is entirely possible when recounting the story of David and Uriah, then the citizens have no outlet to channel their frustration and irritation. Hobbes naively hopes to deter this phenomenon by making an act deemed illegal by the sovereign punishable to the greatest extent of the law. Instead, this will create even more irritation, and the suppression of political liberty in the commonwealth central to the authority of the sovereign will ultimately endanger the security of the people whom Hobbes sought to protect.

On the other hand, Machiavelli’s republican liberty openly encourages the participation of the citizenry in government activity. Their essential freedoms, preserved in the “right to vent” and, in Rome, in the Tribunes, a political body that represents the interests of the common people, provide a foundation of liberties that assures each man of his own security. This unique assurance of security results in more civilian participation in government, because the structure of the republican government specifically requires people to exercise their liberty in order to function properly. Through the Tribune, the common people can question the motivations and actions of the other branches of government, particularly the nobles of the Senate, without any trepidation or hesitance. More importantly, republican government does not threaten men with absolute control. Its very form of governance aims to preserve the liberty of a free people through a separation of powers. Here is where Machiavelli’s concept of freedom diverges most from Hobbes. Machiavelli recognizes two kinds of freedom: freedom in an institutional sense and freedom in the classical sense of self-mastery. Ideally, these two freedoms work in conjunction to maintain the political freedoms of people who live in a free society. At times, institutional freedoms may
be sacrificed in order to tame the licentiousness of a people who threaten to become slave to their desires and appetites. Conversely, Machiavelli recognizes that “where good discipline prevails there will also prevail good order,” suggesting that a well-disciplined people who are free in the natural sense can rightly acquire more political liberty. Machiavelli’s examination of the downfall of Rome explains why true freedom, properly understood, goes beyond and at times can conflict with enabling political freedoms:

For after the Romans had subjugated Africa and Asia, and had reduced Greece to their obedience, they felt assured of their liberty, and saw no enemies that could cause them apprehension. This security and the weakness of the conquered nations caused the Romans no longer to bestow the consulate according to the merits of the candidates, but according to favor; giving that dignity and to those who best knew how to entertain the people, and not to those who knew best how to conquer their enemies. After that they had descended from those who were most favored to such as those who had the most wealth and the most power, so that the really meritorious became wholly excluded from that dignity.\footnote{150} Machiavelli recognizes that the path to licentiousness and anarchy, which caused the citizens of Rome to abuse their political liberties in a manner that ultimately made them slaves both to their desires and the Roman state, is too easy for political freedom not to be restricted. His dualistic conception of freedom fights internal enemies of the state and the illicit desires inside of every man. This translates into a republican government that does not threaten to invade and dominate the personal lives of private citizens, like Hobbes’ Leviathan. Rather, it seeks to compel good behavior from men in order to make them better men with more liberty.

In turn, we reaffirm that the central tenets of the modern project begin with a negative view of the human person, whether it is Machiavelli’s citizens within the Roman Republic or Hobbes’ man in the state of nature. Both authors seek to create a viable political entity that will survive the efforts of individuals with the capacity and inclination for wrongdoing. As a result, the best governments do not grant their citizens or subjects absolute, self-defeating liberty. But for Machiavelli, individual morality plays a central role in the health of the state, whereas for Hobbes, the survival of state has no predication on the moral outlook of the individual because the individual has little capacity for morality in the first place.

Fundamentally, Machiavelli’s freedom from domination and Hobbes’ liberty conditional to the will of the sovereign, ask different questions. Hobbes’ inquiry searches for the best means to control humans, reduced to animals in Leviathan with appetites for power over each other. Machiavelli’s inquiry is more persuasive. Rather than seeking the best means of controlling men, Machiavelli seeks the best means to transform a populace into a virtuous people, like he believed the Romans of the Republican Age to be. As Machiavelli recognizes, liberty’s tremendous power as a moral force makes it sacred and revered.

Can government shape man entirely in its image, casting into doubt the very concept of liberty? Machiavelli’s Discourses indicates not, as the various factions of the Tribunes and the Senate continue as self-interested stakeholders in Rome. But it can teach virtue in a way that the Leviathan cannot. And ironically, the very success that Machiavelli’s civic virtue engenders, reflected in the conquering Roman state, ultimately sets the stage for later failure. Machiavelli dismisses the telos from the study of politics, but demonstrates some awareness that the meaning of virtue goes beyond success, security and mere survival.

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Prophetic Untimeliness
How Reformation Apocalypticism Inspired Political Radicalism

Caleb M. Morell

On a late Autumn night in the Lutherhaus in Wittenburg in 1536, undoubtedly under the influence of homebrewed beer and lively company, Martin Luther speculated, without causing the least consternation to his guests, that world would come to an end before a hundred years had passed. Such remarks were hardly unusual for Luther. In an age pulsating with apocalyptic anticipation, such speculations ran rampant. In fact, Luther’s fellow Augustinian monk and early supporter, Michael Stifel even went as far as to suggest that Luther was the angel of the Apocalypse described in Revelation chapter fourteen, bringing the eternal gospel in a counterattack against the heretically human teachings of the pope, thereby placing Luther at the center of the end of history. Without a doubt, Luther and his contemporaries believed themselves to live in the last days.

German New Testament scholar Ernst Käsemann once called apocalypticism “the mother of all Christian theology.” While this may be an overstatement, it is certainly true that what Luther and his fellow reformers believed about the future and its imminence shaped the way they lived. This paper examines the complicated relationship between eschatology and political engagement by contrasting four Christian theologians—Augustine, Luther, Calvin and Müntzer—according to their eschatological views. (See Appendix A for a visual representation of their differences.) Each one must be viewed through the lens of their respective eschatological views for the extent of their political radicalism to become apparent.

The comparison and contrast of different Christian eschatological views reveals that the degree of one’s political radicalism depends in part on the combination of two factors: (1) whether or not prophecy can be interpreted historically to determine the time of the Parousia (Greek for “Second Coming”); and (2) whether or not the effects of Christ’s Parousia (that is, the fulfillment of eschatological promises in scripture) can be brought about by man’s efforts. In conclusion, it becomes apparent that Müntzer’s belief in the imminence of the apocalypse combined with the conviction that it could be brought about by human effort, motivated radical sacrifice as evidenced in the outcome of the German Peasant’s War. When combined, each of these two elements intensifies the other and, especially in the case of Müntzer, led to disastrous consequences.

Before elucidating the views of each respective theologian, a simple defining of terms may be helpful. The word apocalypse means “revelation,” the unveiling or exposing of divine secrets, as if exposing the truth from behind a curtain. It is similar but distinct from eschatology, which refers to beliefs regarding end times or, literally, “the study of last things.” As one scholar notes, “Every Christian view of history is in some sense eschatological insofar as it sees history as a teleological process and believes that Scripture reveals truths about its End.” What distinguishes apocalypticism is that it is a particular
kind of belief about the last things—“the End of history and what lies beyond it.” More specifically, apocalypticism includes,

First, a sense of the unity and structure of history conceived as a divinely predetermined totality; second, pessimism about the present and conviction of its imminent crisis; and third, belief in the proximate judgment of evil and triumph of the good, the element of vindication.

The distinction between these two categories—eschatology and apocalypticism—is both helpful in theology and germane for the purpose of this analysis.

From Augustine onward, apocalypticism had lost its prominence from among the standard bearers of Christian orthodoxy. Instead, Augustine’s heritage consisted of a Christian political posture thoroughly “disenchanted” from apocalypticism. The sources of Augustine’s political moderation were largely twofold. He (1) denied the reliability of vain speculations into the end times and (2) denied human agency any role in invoking the effects that could only be brought about by Christ’s return. To be fully understood, these two assertions must be understood in Augustine’s own context.

Augustine’s seminal work City of God was written in a truly “apocalyptic context.” The Church was in crisis, heresies ran rampant, and to top it all off, Alaric the Visigoth sacked Rome in 410 CE. As Bishop of Hippo in North Africa, Augustine faced the challenge of pastoring vast amounts of incoming refugees from Rome who struggled to see how God could have allowed the collapse of a Christian empire. As many of the refugees turned back to “perishable defenders” in the belief that the destruction of Rome was punishment for having turned from the old Roman gods, Augustine took up his quill to write, City of God Against the Heathens.

Augustine’s task was made difficult by the teachings of the church that prevailed before the destruction of Rome. Eusebius, the early Christian historian, taught that the destiny of the Church was aligned with that of Rome. Those who opposed Rome, opposed the Church, and those who opposed the church, opposed God, and would in turn be promptly punished. He taught,

The disastrous end of the life of each one indicated the manifest punishment for their hostility to God, just as the end of Constantine made plain to everybody the rewards of the love of God.

The teaching was simple, popular, and hardly distinguishable from other Roman classics: God protects those who honor Him, and God destroys those who dishonor him. Eusebius’ teachings could not possibly contrast with Augustine’s more sharply.

Augustine responded with two major ideas that resonate throughout the pages of City of God. First, although Christ’s reign is inaugurated in his Church through his First Coming, it will not be fully consummated until His Second Coming. Accordingly, the realization of some of the effects and benefits, or one could say the promises, of Christ await the Parousia and cannot be brought about by human effort.

In this temporal stage between Christ’s condescension and consummation, the “Heavenly City [is] on pilgrimage in this world,” divided and awaiting reunification. The Christian’s task therefore, is not to sever ties between these two cities, for “in truth, those two cities, are intertwined and intermixed in this era, and shall await separation at the last judgment.” (See Appendix B for a visual representation of the this-worldly division between these two cities.) Instead, the charge of the Christian is to wait in “steadfast patience” until “the final victory is won and peace is established.” Any attempt to take matters into one’s own hands and bring about God’s Kingdom by force reflects the hubris of the City of Man—“which aims at dominion…but is itself dominated by that very lust of dominion”—and demonstrates no understanding the “power and excellence” of the humility of the City of God.

Second, Augustine asserts that the time of Christ’s Parousia is unknown and cannot be
determined by human effort. This can be contrasted with the millenarian tendencies during his own time that viewed the Rome as the thousand-year reign of blessedness before the Parousia. "For," as he writes, "had it been in our interest to know [the time of Christ’s return], who could have been a better informant than the master, God himself?" However, "when the disciples asked him... He replied, 'It is not for you to know the times which the Father has reserved for his own control.'" Similar to vain attempts to bring about the effects of Christ’s Parousia by force, the desire to know for certain what God has left uncertain likewise reflects the vanity of the City of Man. It was unwise, therefore, for theologians such as Eusebius to align the destiny of the church with that of Rome. Such prophetic interpretations of history should be avoided as they only bring disappointment and distraction to God’s people; or, as in Augustine’s own time, lead many to abandon their faith.

Together, these twin principles of anti-apocalypticism and anti-millenariansim form Augustine’s political moderation. They reflect the dynamic-tension between the “already” but “not yet” so present in Paul’s writings. One could say that the City of God marked a retreat from apocalypticism to eschatology; that is, a shift in focus from the specific when and the how of Christ’s return to God’s general purposes in salvation history. Furthermore, Augustine effectively demonstrated the destructive consequences of an overly literal reading of prophetic texts. Rather than reading apocalyptic texts in search of particular events, they should be read eschatologically as references to the end of history of which no one can know the time.

Politically, the fact that Christ is already reigning on earth in his church explains how grace emanates from the church into the world and gives hope and purpose to present efforts, tempering pessimism and angst when outward circumstances decline. (“The fire which makes gold shine makes chaff smoke; the same flail breaks up the straw and clears the grain.”) At the same time, the second principle—that the two cities will remain intertwined until Christ’s return—tempers any tendency toward prideful politics of any “City of Man” that would claim to represent God’s kingdom on earth. Nonetheless, the moderate political posture that exudes from Augustine’s writings had dwindled by the medieval ages. Instead, in Augustine’s wake, the stream parted in two directions in Luther and Calvin. To varying degrees, the history of political theology since Augustine has erred in maintaining one principle while neglecting the other. Rarely, have they ever since been held in the necessary dynamic tension.

In stark contrast to the Augustinian heritage, by the time of the German Reformation, eschatological excitement and millenarian hopes had peaked. While it is true that from Augustine onward, apocalypticism had lost its prominence within the Catholic Church, it thrived among the laity. Spurned on by religious dissenters as well as larger factors such as the Black Death, the crisis of the medieval church and the Turkish expansion to the east, convictions of the imminent end of the world continued to rise among the populous during the medieval ages.

Consequently, by the time Luther was born in 1483, he entered a world that was far from “disenchanted” from medieval apocalypticism. More than any of the other mainline Protestant reformers, Luther inherited the “prophetic mentality” of the Medieval Ages. Luther’s cosmology closely resembled a struggle between God and the Devil, between Gospel and its enemies. Although he certainly overstates Luther’s inheritance of medieval superstitions, German folklorist Will Erich Peuckert gets something right when he says, “the entire eschatological stock of the Middle Ages lived on in Luther, and he himself lived thoroughly in it.” Although, Luther certainly was influenced by his German medieval surroundings, his real eschatological ingenuity came with his Biblical exegesis of prophecies.

Luther’s eschatological contribution consisted both of innovation and continuation, demonstrating his eschatological ingenuity and
originality. Contrary to medieval precedents and to the disappointment of the peasant masses, Luther agreed with Augustine that the Kingdom of God would never be a worldly kingdom until Christ’s return. That is, in line with Luther’s more pessimistic language, man’s best efforts would never eradicate the distinction between the wicked and the righteous. On the other hand, Luther demonstrated a break from Augustine, as well as from his fellow reformers Calvin and Zwingli, by his interest in the historical fulfillment of prophecy. That is, through careful study of prophecies, in particular the books of Daniel and Revelation, Luther was thoroughly convinced of the imminence of the destruction of the world. Both of these aspects of Luther’s eschatological beliefs must be examined for their practical implications to be seen.

Luther’s conviction that he was living in the end days began with his discovery that the Pope was the Antichrist, a conviction rooted in his prophetic interpretation of history. While it was nothing new to call the Pope the antichrist, Luther’s novelty consisted in his making the same charge on biblical rather than moral grounds. That is, by juxtaposing Biblical prophecies and history, Luther believed he could accurately and authoritatively know the future. Luther first revealed his suspicions that the Pope was the antichrist in a letter to Spalatin, written in March 1519. Any doubt in Luther’s mind was sealed by the Papal Bull of excommunication, Exsurge, Domine in 1520, and, in his response Adversus execrabilem Antichristi bullam, Luther for the first time publicly identified the Pope as the Antichrist. The sign of the anti-Christ proved the end was imminent: “For my part,” Luther concluded, “I am sure that the Day of Judgment is just around the corner. It doesn’t matter that we don’t know the precise day… perhaps someone else can figure it out. But it is certain that time is now at an end.” Surrounding events such as the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1529 only confirmed these apocalyptic suspicions.

Another aspect that distinguishes Luther’s eschatology is that contrary to the medieval teachings that Christ’s coming would bring a profound transformation to the present age, Luther taught that it would bring complete annihilation and the entire existing order destroyed. After the destruction of the old world, Luther argues that God will make a new order:

On the Last Day there will be a great destruction. Then all the elements will be reduced to ashes, and the whole world will return to its original chaos. Then a new heaven and a new earthed will be fashioned; and we shall be changed.

Christ would be coming soon, but his coming would be completely independent of the actions of the church.

An implication of the annihilation of the world rather than its transformation is Luther’s pessimistic view of man’s contribution to Christ’s return. For Luther, man lacked any agency to facilitate or invoke Christ’s return. Here, contrary to his view on prophecy, Luther is more in line with Augustine. In pristine Augustinian fashion, Luther remained firmly convinced that the wicked and the righteous would co-mingle in this life. He spells his views out most clearly in On Secular Authority (1523), where he sarcastically quips that before one attempts to rule with the gospel one ought to make a society consisting solely of Christians,

...For the wicked are always far more numerous than the pious... No one can become pious before God by means of the secular government without Christ’s spiritual rule. But as matters stand, Christ’s rule does not extend over all. On the contrary Christians are always in the minority and are in the midst of non-Christians.

Politically, for Luther, this view led to an “apocalyptic pessimism” where there was little else to do but sit back and pray, “Lord come quickly.” More than anything, this “apocalyptic pessimism” helps explain Luther’s unwavering opposition to political rebellion in the context of the German Peasants War (1524-5), since it was impossible for him to view opposition to civil authority as anything but the work of the devil.
For this reason, in his 1522 treatise *A Sincere Admonition to Guard Against Rebellion*, Luther urged the agitating peasants to obey temporal authorities. Bloodshed, violence and upheaval were certain signs of the end times, always favoring the Devil’s schemes. Hence, when the Peasants’ Rebellion did come, Luther could only view the Peasants as co-conspirers with the Devil. In his response to the Peasant’s Twelve Articles, Luther was unequivocally clear that he had no desire to see government denigrated into what he called “mob rule.” “The Devil,” he said, wants to “turn us into a mob,” but the Christian’s must resist. Since, the Devil “takes no holiday until he has mixed the two swords,” Christians should never participate in such “rabble-making” since the fact “that the devil brews everything into one mess is nothing new...” Such musings hardly reflect Augustinian concerns, but instead evidence Luther’s indebtedness the medieval inheritance that left him between God and the Devil.

Luther’s conviction of the imminence of the end, his pessimistic view of man’s ability to participate in invoking Christ’s return and his conviction that the world was soon to be destroyed all culminate in his political pessimism. When the time came and the Peasant’s War was in full throws, all he could disinterestedly muster was to call the Princes to “smite slay and stab” the rebellious peasants. Luther gloomily concluded his infamous *Against the Murdering and Robbing Hordes of Peasants* with the lament, “the destruction of the world is to be expected every hour.” It is unsurprising and not too far from the truth, therefore, that in response to the shock of the Peasant’s Rebellion and the faltering pace of his own reformation, Luther tended toward “quietism,” easily allowing the state to co-opt the future of the German Reformation.

While Calvin and the Reformed movement opposed Luther’s tendency to interpret apocalyptic prophecies historically, they were nonetheless more politically radical than Luther. The Reformed movement provided a clear rational for political engagement for the sake of maintaining the “pure worship” of God, because, although Calvin agreed with Augustine that prophecies ought not to be interpreted historically, the Reformed movement tended toward a transformationalist eschatology where the world would be gradually evangelized until Christ’s return. More than anything, this mindset led to a zealous commitment to civic righteousness at home and a fervent desire to spread the gospel abroad.

In contrast to Luther, Calvin paid far less attention to the fulfillment of prophecy in history, instead opting to focus on the individual’s salvation, death and the coming judgment. When he did speak of the Last Day, it was only to emphasis that its date could not be known. In his chapter on eschatology in the *Institutes*, Calvin sided with Augustine in that “it is foolish and rash to inquire concerning unknown matters more deeply than God permits us to know.” Such “trifling” results from “an immoderate desire” from which “no profit can be derived.” With reformers such as Luther or Müntzer seemingly in mind, Calvin states, “those who indulge in [these questions] entangle themselves in dangerous speculations.” Accordingly, Calvin calls such questions “harmful.” Instead, completely in step with Augustine, Calvin believed it sufficient to know that Christ would return and not to vainly speculate as to when.

Yet, far more so than Augustine, Calvin provided more legitimacy to “this-worldly” engagement because of his view of man’s capacity to bring about the effects Christ’s return. Not that God was a puppet to be summoned; indeed, Calvin had far too high a view of God’s freedom and man’s impotence for that. Rather, Calvin held that God intended man to participate in the events leading up to his return. Namely, that Christ’s Parousia would result from the gradual evangelization of the ungodly and the spread of the gospel throughout the nations.

This theme of the expansion of Christ’s Kingdom and the decline of Satan’s dominion pervade Calvin’s writings. This greater degree of optimism distinguished Calvin from Augustine.
and further separated him from Luther. In the *Institutes* Calvin writes that believers presently share in God’s glory as “with ever-increasing splendor, he displays his light and truth, by which the darkness and falsehoods of Satan’s kingdom vanish, are extinguished, and pass away.” And although Calvin never would have gone so far, he left open the possibility of melioristic tendencies among his intellectual successors, the Puritans. As one scholar observes of Calvin’s influence, “Reformed Protestants tended to see the end as the culmination of a historical process involving the moral development of the community.” Given their circumstances, this is understandable for the Calvinists who, more so than the Lutherans were steadily gaining ground throughout the sixteenth century.

However, beyond his disagreement with prophetic interpretation of history, what really prevented Calvin from lapsing into the political radicalism of Müntzer was his vehement condemnation of Millennariansim. Here, Calvin, Augustine and Luther were jointly united in their disapproval of Millenarianism or Chiliasm, that is, the idea that Christ would set up a literal political kingdom on earth before his Parousia. Calvin unquestionably condemns the “fiction” of the “Chiliasts” who “limited the reign of Christ to a thousand years.” Instead, Calvin held that Christ would only appear “when sin is blotted out, death swallowed up, and everlasting life fully restored” at which point his unending reign would forever begin. To conclude this portion on Calvin, Reformed eschatology bears many similarities with Augustine’s thought in regard to the futility of prophetic speculation. Also, although Calvin’s optimistic view of the future motivated a greater degree of political and social engagement than Augustine’s, it was precisely his anti-apocalypticism and anti-millenarianism that prevented the Reformed movement from condoning the political radicalism of Müntzer and the Anabaptists.

Originally a follower of Luther, Thomas Müntzer soon became one of his chief critics. As pastor in the town of Allstedt in 1523, Müntzer began violent iconoclasm and soon began to call on his parishioners to take up their swords in active armed rebellion against impious rulers. In his eschatology as in his political rebellion, Müntzer capitalized on the popular sentiment that Luther did not take the Reformation far enough for the common man.

The conflict between Müntzer and the other reformers began over the most crucial Reformation doctrine of Sola Scriptura. That is not to say that Müntzer did not prize or emphasize scripture. After all, in his Sermon to the Princes in 1524, he decries the ignorance of the corrupt Catholic priests and calls for the restoration of the true preaching of the Word of God. However, Müntzer’s interpretation of scripture favored an emphasis on personal revelation and prophecy. For instance, in his *Sermon to the Princes* Müntzer argues that spiritual renewal will only come by the expectation of divine revelations and participating in the “spirit of Christ.”

Personal revelation mattered because it confirmed Müntzer’s role as a prophet of the last days. Like Luther, he saw himself at the end of history; however, it was Müntzer’s emphasis on personal revelation that radicalized him in comparison. As Müntzer snidely comments, “It is no wonder that Brother Fattened-swine and Brother Soft-life [Luther] rejects visions…”

Whoever is inexperienced and an enemy of visions because of a carnal consciousness, and either accepts them all without any discrimination or rejects them all because the false dream interpreters of the world have done such harm by being greedy and selfish people, this person will not fare well. Rather, he will be in conflict with the holy spirit...

Müntzer’s emphasis on personal revelation severed him from his fellow reformers and deeply radicalized his reformation-agenda. Additionally, and more importantly for his political views, Müntzer parted ways with Luther and Augustine—and was even more radical than Calvin—in his emphasis on the church’s role in bringing about Christ’s kingdom on earth.
This “radical apocalypticism” fused his belief in the imminence of Christ’s return and his transformationalist, Millenarian eschatology. That is, Müntzer believed and advocated that God had ordained the “true church” as the means of separating out the “true Christians” from among the non-Christians through force. Such statements would not come from Luther who taught that faith could not be forced: “Hence arises the common saying, found also in St. Augustine, ‘No one can or ought to be forced to believe.”202 Whereas the other reformers all agreed that only Christ’s return would finally, once and for all, “separate the wheat and the chaff,” Müntzer saw this separation as the God-given role of the Church: to kill the Godless.

Müntzer’s confidence did not depend on the Princes’ support, but on the fact that his victory was revealed in prophecies. This foreknowledge formed the basis for Müntzer’s theory of rebellion. He explained that should the Princes fail to accomplish God’s work, “then the sword will be taken away from them.”208 With or without the Princes’ support, the time was at hand: “The tares must be pulled out of God’s vineyard at the time of harvest.”209 If the Princes will not do it, then God’s people must. Müntzer left the Princes in no doubt as to whom he intended to kill. He wrote, “Godless rulers, especially the priests and monks, should be killed.”210 After all, “the godless have no right to life except that which the elect decide to grant them.”211

To conclude, Müntzer demonstrated a political radicalism that is unprecedented among the other reformers. Only the combination of Müntzer’s fervent belief in the imminence of Christ’s return, his confidence that his own interpretation of Biblical prophecies was correct, and his belief that Christ’s Kingdom must be brought about by human agency, explain the degree of
his political radicalism that distinguished him from the other Reformers. Furthermore, it can be said that to the degree he departed from the Augustinian heritage, to that same degree he grew gradually more and more radical.

On a macro-level, the response to Müntzer’s apocalyptic radicalism led to a counterbalance against the dangers of political radicalism, leaving the fate of Luther’s Protestant Reformation in Germany carefully in the hands of the powers-that-be. The German Reformation donned a more conservative façade, as magisterial reform came to dominate the political field. The less radical and more hierarchically ordered nature of the reformation left Luther’s church increasingly linked to political authority, as confirmed through by “Protesting Princes” at the diet of Speyer in 1529 and the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.212 The Peace of Augsburg enshrined the anti-apocalyptic sentiment in the principle: “Cuius regio, eius religio,” affirming the Princes’ independence over their region as well as their religion. Even Luther grew more cautious and sullen in his apocalyptic interpretations, although his pessimism continued as he essentially gave up on insisting on his “Two Kingdom” system.213

Contrary to Müntzer’s threats to the German Princes, the Peasants’ War did not let the magistrate’s “sword rust away in its scabbard,” but left it speckled by the blood of the rebels. Thomas Müntzer died along with an estimated 3,000 peasants at the Battle of Frankenhausen on May 27, 1525.214 The close of the Peasants’ War followed shortly thereafter, ending with an estimated 300,000 peasants dead.215 Like the refugees fleeing Alaric’s sacking of Rome in 410 CE, the mass disappointment and disillusionment

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**Figure 2: Tripartite Division of the Medieval World**
Prophetic Untimeliness

led many away from Müntzer’s radicalism. Indeed, Müntzer’s prophecy that the tares would be “pulled out of God’s vineyard at the time of harvest” did come true.216 Only little did Müntzer know that he prophesized against himself. The prophetic untimeliness of it all could not be more ironic.

In the end it becomes apparent that both Luther and Calvin were constrained in their radicalism by their Augustinian inheritance. Luther’s pessimism outweighed his apocalypticism and Calvin’s anti-apocalypticism tempered his optimism. This was not so for Müntzer. Here, if the eschatological stream split after Augustine into two separate streams, Müntzer is to be found on the dry bank in between, as Augustine’s diametric opposite. Whereas Augustine decried the prophetic interpretation of history, Müntzer relished it. Whereas Augustine lamented millenarianism, Müntzer held it as his rallying cry. Whereas Augustine held that the wicked and the righteous would forever remain entangled until Christ’s return, Müntzer made it his aim to disentangle them, drawing the sickle as the one who would separate the wheat from the chaff. In the end, the question remains, will the Augustinian stream of eschatological moderation, once divided, ever merge again? It only seems fitting to answer in Augustine’s own words, “The task is long and arduous; but God is our helper.”217

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Changes in Social Function, Form, and Style of Music in the 18th Century

James Gadea

The Enlightenment period begat a new musical era in Europe. How did the social functions, form and style of music change during this period, and why did these changes take place? To answer these questions, it is necessary to imagine how the music of the era sounded. As the great Doobie Brothers once said, “listen to the music.”

The music of classicism marked a transformation from the era of the Baroque to an original type of music. It was presented in new ways, served novel functions, and had its own unique and state-of-the-art style. Social functions changed as a result of the commercial elite class that was rising through the ranks of society and seeking new opportunities to break into the upper echelon. As more people developed an interest in the art, music’s form became a public affair, with symphonies taking place in public concert areas, taverns, music clubs, and other places that were much more open than those in previous eras, and style changed to fit the needs of the times, becoming more emotionally resonating, more energetic, more segmented, and more carefully crafted.

Function can be defined as the “role” of something. Exactly what social role did music play during this period? One social role was the effort by the elite class to claim new music as their own to accomplish political goals. With the 1784 Handel Commemoration, the members of the British aristocracy cemented their unified love for the music of the “older repertoire,” and presented how that music could be used for political purposes through their Commemoration. The Commemoration of 1784 “suggests how a cultural world such as music could interact so closely with political events,” essentially bringing together the cultural aspects of the period and having those aspects claimed by the elite as their own. William Weber writes, “the cultural life of the elites spilled over naturally into their political life… the commemoration was the culmination of a century’s development of the annual music meetings—musical rituals that had strong political overtones… they were developed in the interests of the established church and the ruling class it served.”

However, the Commemoration’s inclusion of the elite’s cultural practices must not obscure the era’s more open attitude towards allowing (though unwittingly) others to share in the music.

Yet looking at the “patron, performer, and publisher as transparent windows or mere facilitators between the composer and the wider audience because they materially affected the creation of the works and the works themselves” is to be avoided because it simplifies an intensely complex series of issues regarding the context, environment, and society in which the music was operating. Instead, the music of the time developed from previous centuries to be more inclusive, affording all those with the means to
Changes in Social Function, Form, and Style of Music in the 18th Century

get themselves into the venue the opportunity to listen:

A kind of social and musical ritual arose around the music which proved remarkably appealing and adaptable. Its grandest settings were not just concerts; they were seen as festivals, events of special importance given to help or honour the social order... Their scope and influence appeared astonishing and adaptable. Its grandest settings were not just concerts; they were seen as festivals, events of special importance given to help or honour the social order...

The music of the time period was not restricted to the extremely rich, who, although they saw themselves as the “patrons” of the arts, were not the only ones to love the escape of the musical performances, which were now much larger, allowing more and more people to partake. Music’s new function had evolved into the grounds for celebrating and socializing with other up-and-coming well-to-do members of society as well as acting as a means of establishing oneself in the social spheres of influence of the rich and powerful. The sonatas, concertos, and the symphonies now became a way for middle class persons to mingle with the upper crust of society. “The decline of the court and the growth of the upper-class public” meant that the public’s taste in music was greater, and now “music was no longer written for a patron or a family, but for performances in a place of general resort where a whole variety of tastes competed with each other in a commercial market-place.”

There were now competing audiences who all vied for the chance to hear some of the new compositions of the era, and the appearance of new audiences affected the production of music itself. Music’s function now also became a way of servicing these new audience’s needs. Franz Josef Haydn, one of the early developers of the Classical genre, was fascinated by this concept and his “career and works reveal, as well as revel in, the idea of the multiple audience that emerged in this period.” Haydn felt his work was often judged unfairly, writing: “To receive approval, one must write something so easy to understand that a coachman can sign it right back to you, or so incomprehensible that it pleases precisely because no rational person can understand it.” Dealing with these extremes in opinion presented a problem to the composers of the era as they attempted to balance all the various interest groups at play in their efforts. The audiences that the music of the time aimed at pleasing were not just split between “connoisseurs and amateurs” but rather included a wide variety of other listener bases: “performers and listeners, publishers and purchasers, connoisseurs and critics.”

Form can be defined as structure and the way music manifested and presented itself in this period. How and why the form of the music changed in this period is an engaging story of transformation. In England, for example, “The movement of taste” would cause a change that “historians call England’s ‘Rise to Greatness’ around 1700—the victory of Blenheim, the burgeoning of commerce, and the consolidation of a parliamentary monarchy, among other things... learning and morals were central to the interest in old music from the very start...” Music was adopted and “proponents... defined this music morally, as the source of elevated taste and public virtue.” They even added to it “an intellectual factor” revealing some of “the influence of empiricism upon musical thinking.”

All who wanted to self-identify by such intellectual factors sought to partake in the cultural capital that were the public concerts of the time. “The oratorio festival” became a unique way of distributing music for the consumption of the people, “programmes of vocal and instrumental works were presented... [in] the largest public” gathering with the “widest social exposure.” As a result, there was a “widespread concern on the part of composers and publishers from reaching both sides of celebrated ‘binaries’ of eighteenth-century cultural forms and musical life—connoisseurs and amateurs, virtuosos and dilettantes—while at the same time considering an entirely different division of his audience, the “present” audience—the known quantity of the local court or city—and the “imagined” audience of a larger musical public that he needed publishers to reach.”

Music lovers came from such a wide variety of backgrounds that composers...
sought to define groups in order to tailor their music more easily. By taking place in a public setting with large audiences, music had shifted from a private luxury for the homes of the rich to a performance open to critics. Haydn wrote “listeners’ music” and “players’ music,” and sometimes music for his career; his symphonic trilogy for Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy, Nos. 6-8 being just such an example, “[won] the prince’s approbation and the musicians’ loyalty.”

Haydn was “plucked from humble origins” and learned the art of composition from an Italian opera composer named Nicola Porpora. His background led Haydn to feel extremely stressed when others seemed to downplay the greatness of his works. His success with his patrons led to his receiving full control over his own works, while later on in life he would become disenchanted with the patronage system. "The term ‘connoisseur’ had several meanings—socially powerful patron, composer, judge—rather than merely designating someone who had studied or who had developed taste.”

Haydn put extra emphasis on study, "an Enlightenment aspect of self-made moral education," and seemingly suggested “education and patronage” should reach out a wider net of “talented youths,” and potentially other yet unpolished Haydns.

Dealing with the various competing interests and tastes now present in the more open environment in which composers wrote led to changes in the style of the period’s music. Stylistic changes made the process of composition an effort to create art that “intended to reach the heart.” Music’s purpose was, according to Haydn, to “instruct, please, and move the passions in the manner appropriate to occasion and venue so that what originated in his own spirit and sensibility would remain in the listener’s heart” which often meant “threading his way between broad appeal and critical detractors.”

Haydn wrote about one of his works, the Capriccio in G Major, that: “In a most playful hour I composed a quite new Capriccio for the piano, which on account of its taste, singularity, and special elaboration is sure to meet with approval from connoisseurs and non-connoisseurs alike.” Artists like Haydn would attempt to capture universal emotion, something to which everyone could relate, and the music of that time, with its emphasis on instrumentation, provided just such an avenue.

Cosmopolitanism as a movement tied into the music of the era as well, bringing to light a desire for music that all could enjoy (or, more accurately, all well-off Europeans could enjoy). Joseph Kurz, who played “the comic character Bernardon in the popular Viennese theater,” asked Haydn to “accompany his gestures of swimming;” to his evident delight, Haydn, “fell into six-eight time.” The composers were energetic and lively, as Haydn exemplifies, and they sought to take their own passion for their music and bring it to others as well, while alienating as few people as possible in the process. Stylistically, the new music of the era developed to be a “lighter, clearer texture than Baroque… [and] less complex.” It is mainly homophonic — melody above chordal accompaniment — although counterpoint was by no means forgotten, especially later in the period. The Classical movement includes “gut strings” which were “invented during the Classical period and they made the string instruments softer.” Melodies would cover the full breadth of a song while complemented by harmonies serving in the background; the various parts taking the same rhythm designate the music as homophonic. More instruments were added to the orchestra, making the organization of the player larger, while the harpsichord was replaced by the piano. An emphasis was put on instrumental music prepared as a “sonata, trio, string quartet, symphony, concerto, serenade and divertimento.” Sonata form developed and was popularized in this period, including the “first movement of most large-scale works, but
also other movements and single pieces (such as overtures)." The music of the time period was also much more segmented, oftentimes encapsulating four different parts. In a sense, this allowed a story-like interpretation of the music and made the music more accessible to many as it could be matched up with an opera or a play. The tonal shifts occurring from segment to segment are easily observed from listening to some of Haydn’s and Mozart’s first few and last symphonies. To best capture the essence of the period, listening to the songs of the composers who wrote the symphonies is irreplaceable. It was a time of change: music had become a gateway of escape. For some it was escape to other worlds, for others it was escape from the middle classes to the upper echelons of society, and for others it was escape to their imaginations. It provided an outlet for brilliant composers like Mozart and Haydn to express their ingenuity in crafting music that flamed emotions, and touched all who heard it. Music changed during this period from being the “high” art of the rich and noble to being the emotional art of the well-off. It underwent one more step towards the complete transformation of music from that of a luxury of the rich, to a shared cultural treasure.

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One of Endo Shusaku’s greatest strengths as a novelist is his ability to expose the complexity and ugliness of human nature. Throughout his works, and particularly in his early novels, Endo sheds light on the crisis of manhood that emerged from the Japanese defeat in the Second World War and the American occupation that followed. Utilizing the various character developments in his novels, Endo presents competing visions of manhood and simultaneously exposes the brutal consequences of the absence of manhood. While Endo never directly endorses any singular paradigm of virility, it is clear from his novels that men of God are needed—Christian men, to be more precise. Many of the crises brought about in Endo’s novels could have been avoided had there been men present who exemplified the Christian life. Christian men have a willingness to give and protect life and they are men of action, emanating an ethos of integrity and moral strength. Endo’s first three novels, *The Sea and Poison*, *Wonderful Fool*, and *Volcano*, expose the crisis of manhood with all of its ugly repercussions.

*The Sea and Poison* is a story that is full of death and violence, but devoid of Christian men. Endo contrasts two images of manhood in the young doctors, Toda and Suguro. Toda is an intelligent man of ambition who despises sentimentality. He is a man who values progress more than his patients, thus showing a hardness of heart in his indifference to human suffering. Suguro, on the other hand, is a man of compassion and sympathy. Although he shows a sincere desire to help others, his ultimate flaw is his weakness and inability to follow his conscience, resulting in his failures to help the patients whom he is so concerned about.

Action, which is a key attribute of Christian men, is missing from Suguro. This is seen clearly when he is conversing with the old lady whom he knows is going to be put through an awful, unethical, and unnecessary operation. “Doctor, this operation is going to help me, isn’t it? When she questioned him like this, there was little he could say to console her….what else was there for Suguro to do but to blink his eyes and keep quiet.” Not only does Suguro fail to act, he also withholds the truth from his patient, thus cooperating with the unethical operation. Suguro’s inaction, an utter contradiction of true masculinity, not only affect him and his moral standing, but also the lives of patients whom he could have helped, had he stood up for what is right.

Suguro’s inaction peaks during the vivisections of American soldiers, as he found “himself oppressed by the realization that he had at last come to the point where it was irrevocably a matter of going ahead or turning aside. ‘We are about to kill a man.’ All of a sudden fear and dismay began to flood through him.” Despite this realization, Suguro again does not act. He is “oppressed” by fear. He is weak. Suguro now finds himself in an awkward “lukewarm” middle ground position. When he tries to cowardly back out of the situation, Toda tells him “You’re a fool… having come this far you’re already more than half way, Suguro.” This tepid ethical footing is a “lose-lose” situation for Suguro. He is still morally culpable for participating in the vivisection due to his failure to remove himself, and at the same time, his colleagues view...
him as a coward. Even the military soldier looks at him as “he withered under the officers stare, aware of what he seemed: a doctor unable to carry out his duties — and aware too of what he really was: a spineless coward who had been unable to refuse Dr. Shibata.” A relevant line from Scripture notes, “so, because you are lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will spew you out of my mouth.” This position is actually the worst situation for any man to find himself in, as indeed it is entirely antithetical to the call for man to uphold the ideals of Christianity. Christ will spit such a man out of his mouth, and hence one who is lukewarm cannot in truth be called a Christian man.

Toda is also a flawed man. Endo aptly contrasts the weakness of Suguro with the hardness of Toda. Toda’s life, as developed in the novel, exposes the other extreme image of manhood. For Toda, there was no room for care, concern, or “sentimentality.” Rather, what is most important to him is progress. Complaining about Suguro’s hesitancy at performing the unethical procedure on the old lady, Toda shouts, “oh come off it! Killing a patient isn’t so solemn a matter as all that. It’s nothing new in the world of medicine. That’s how we’ve made our progress!” Medicine should focus itself on progress over people.

While Toda’s lack of compassion and obsession with progress may appear more proactive, and thus manlier in contrast to the weakness of Suguro, it is perhaps more unmanly, as Toda violates a man’s most important duty, the giving and protecting of human life. He is violating this principle on two levels: first as a man, and second as a doctor. His failure to live up to the ideals of manhood and the responsibilities of his medical profession has awful consequences on the people around him and leads to the destruction and disrespect of human life. Toda has an utter lack of concern for his patients, never showing any emotion or concern for their suffering. He says, “to put it bluntly, I am able to remain quite undisturbed in the face of someone else’s terrible suffering and death….if [patients] turned their faces towards me, it did them no good.” He also commits adultery and aborts his own baby, noting, “I borrowed the necessary instruments from a friend studying obstetrics, and with my own hands, I scraped out the fetus.” Toda shows no emotion at all for this evil action. He goes on, “I pulled out the small, bloody lump of flesh. The intention foremost in my mind was never to let anyone know about this unhappy miscalculation, not to have my whole life ruined because of a girl like this.” Toda’s concern is not for the woman or his baby whom he is murdering, but for himself and his own life, completely casting aside “this girl” for fear of “miscalculation.” For him everything must be efficient and calculated. Progress has no time for sacrifice.

In contrast to the Sea and Poison, Endo’s next novel, Wonderful Fool, presents us with a story of a Christian man who is unrecognized by those around him. This man is Gaston Bonaparte, the most unexpected image of an authentic man. He is a figure who models the life of Christ, the true man, coming from a royal lineage with high expectations from his Japanese hosts, Takamori and Tomoe. Tomoe, in particular, was expecting her European guest to be a movie star who would sweep her off her feet. Instead, she found a poor and goofy foreigner, whose “nose was very long” and had “the impression of a horse.” Gaston is a man of action who never gives up and strives to protect life. He takes action when needed, removing bullets from a gangster’s gun to save a victim. Gaston also never runs from the pain, but rather turns the other cheek. This is seen clearly when he does not flee when approached and beat up by thugs soon after arriving in Japan. Takamori, on the other hand, is concerned about his image, as he “did not want his sister to think him a coward.” However, Takamori flees the scene while the criminals attack Gaston. The narration points out that Takamori and the policeman “found [Gaston] after…. everyone had gone.” Despite this terrible experience during
his first visit to Japan, Gaston still presses ahead and does not become bitter towards the Japanese people. Instead, he chooses to leave the company of his gracious hosts and goes out on his own, braving a culture which has thus far proven hostile. Tomoe thinks that he is cowardly, as she ponders, “to meet a few Japanese and get so upset about it—that’s not manly. Tomoe’s nose twitched with displeasure.”

However, that is not the reason for Gaston’s departure. As Takamori states, “he wants to get to know many Japanese. He wants the chance to meet all kinds.” Gaston does not give up after this humiliating event. Rather, as a true Christian man, he turns the other cheek and goes out to spread his love to others.

Finally, Endo’s third novel, *Volcano*, presents readers with several images of manhood.

First, Endo sets a sharp contrast between two visions of Christian manhood with the simple and faithful priest, Fr. Sato, and the apostate priest, Fr. Durand, who strives to scandalize the Christian community. Fr. Sato is a man who lives for others. He goes out and gives the life-giving sacraments to his flock, as he “would take the mini-car…to make the rounds of Catholic homes or to visit the sick. He was prepared to listen to everybody’s hard-luck story.” Modeling the Christian man, he sympathized with those he loved, knowing “the joys and sorrows that were theirs.” While Fr. Sato is not the perfect or most intelligent priest, he did what was right and fulfilled the duty of his ministry and role as a priest.

Fr. Durand, the foil to Fr. Sato, is an example of the failed Christian man. Losing his faith after testing God and having an affair with a woman, he seeks not to bring life, but rather destroy it as he strives to turn others away from the faith. During Christmastime he visits church to scare parishioners. His “emotion raged…he wanted to destroy the whole place—church furnishings, the organ, the faces of Christian huddled in the corner… all of these he wanted to shake up, slash, smash to smithereens.” He is full of hatred and bitterness. It is no wonder that Durand is suffering from a “heart condition.” Instead of looking inward at the hardness of his own heart, Durand bitterly attacks those around him.

Endo also presents readers with a third character, Suda, who represents the secular man. Suda’s life is dull. He has no emotion and is even very distant to his wife, as “the only time he used his hands to touch [her] in bed was when he tried to stop her from snoring.” This is the life of mediocrity that ensues without the adventure of the Christian faith. Indeed, Endo is making a profound point here about the importance of the supernatural life. Even though one may be physically living, without Christ there is no life in its fullest capacity. While Suda goes through the motions, he is empty, and his family suffers the consequences of his lack of compassion and emotion. His wife so badly wants him to show emotion that she even wishes that he had an affair.

Endo’s first three novels present readers with the consequences of absent manhood and the need for Christian men. *The Sea and Poison* brings to light the awful and violent realities of a world devoid of Christian men, while *Wonderful Fool* demonstrates that the true Christian man may go unnoticed and be found in the most unexpected people. In the end, Gaston showed Tomoe and others what it means to truly love and be a man. Finally, *Volcano* contrasts competing Christian men, one full of life, and the other full of bitterness. Perhaps the most poignant component of this story is the dull life of Suda, who, lacking Christ, has no life in him. Suda is undoubtedly an excellent embodiment of the fact that the true greatness of manhood can be found in the ideal of the Christian man, as his unemotional and nearly vegetative state shows readers the banality and hopelessness of a life that is not grounded in Christ.

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Endnotes

Special Feature in Memory of George W. Carey

1 This article originally appeared in American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, Issue 1, pp. 151-164 (1978).
3 The varied and numerous proposals for a more disciplined and responsible party system are the most notable. For an examination of these proposals see Austin Ranney, The Doctrine of Responsible Party Government (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962) and Evron M. Kirkpatrick, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?” American Political Science Review, 65 (December 1971), pp. 965-90.
5 The term “Madisonian model,” very much in vogue today, was first used by James MacGregor Burns in The Deadlock of Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963). Part I of the book which deals with the obstacles to majority rule posed by the American political system is entitled, “The Madisonian Model.”
8 Burns, pp. 20-21.
9 Dahl, p. 22.
10 Burns, pp. 20-21. To my knowledge this line of argument was first set forth by E. E. Schattschneider in his Party Government (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), “Madison’s defense of federalism [his presentation in Federalist 10] annihilates his defense of the separation of powers. If the multiplicity of interests in a large republic makes tyrannical majorities impossible, the principal theoretical prop of the separation of powers has been demolished” (p. 9). As we shall see, however, Madison does not introduce separation of powers as a device to check factious majorities.
11 Most of what follows also critically bears upon salient aspects of the thesis advanced by Paul Eidelberg in The Philosophy of the American Constitution.
Jefferson, for example, was most critical of the Virginia Constitution of 1776 precisely because the powers of government were concentrated. In his oft-quoted words, “All the power of government, legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative body. The concentrating of these in the same hands is precisely the definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands and not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one.” [William Peden, ed., Notes on the State of Virginia (New York: Norton, 1954), p. 120.] It is also interesting to note that both of Jefferson’s drafts of a constitution for the state of Virginia (1776 and 1783) contain specific provisions for separation of powers. John Adams, unlike Jefferson, can be viewed as a proponent of a mixed or balanced government wherein distinct classes would be represented, each with a veto over proposed legislation. See his A Defense of the Constitution of Government of the United States of America in The Works of John Adams, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Boston: Little Brown, 1850-56), Vols. 4 and 5. It should be pointed out that Adams’ views never gained currency because the social structure of the United States, very dissimilar from that of England, was not amenable to such a balanced government. On this point see M. J. C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 148-51. Also see our discussion below.


16 On the difficulties surrounding implementation of the doctrine, particularly with respect to the legislative and judicial branches see Edward S. Corwin, “The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention,” The American Historical Review, 30 (April 1925), pp. 511-36.


22 Oscar and Mary Handlin, eds., The Popular Sources of Political Authority, pp. 337-38.

23 The Federalist, pp. 326-27.

24 Popular Sources, p. 448.
The distinction between governmental tyranny and majority tyranny which seems to be blurred or ignored by many moderns was not lost upon John C. Calhoun. Throughout his Disquisition he treats of these two sources of tyranny as distinct \([A \textit{Disquisition on Government}}\) (1853; rpt. New York: Political Science Classics, 1947).

Dahl, cf. Ch. 1.

\[\text{\textit{Ibid.}, Preface, pp. 6-7.}\]

This particular confusion is reflected in the following passage from Dahl: “In retrospect, the logical and empirical deficiencies of Madison’s own thought seem to have arisen in large part from his inability to reconcile two different goals. On the one hand, Madison substantially accepted the idea that all the adult citizens of a republic must be assigned equal rights, including the right to determine the general direction of government policy.... On the other hand, Madison wished to erect a political system that would guarantee the liberties of certain minorities whose advantages of status, power, and wealth would, he thought, probably not be tolerated indefinitely by a constitutionally untrammeled majority. Hence majorities had to be constitutionally inhibited” (p. 31). Clearly Madison in Federalist 10 did not see the need to constitutionally inhibit majorities. Nor is his concern in Federalists 47 to 51, which deal with separation of powers, the constitutional inhibition of majority factions. In these papers his evident concern is with guaranteeing the liberties of the people from arbitrary and capricious government (see text below).

Cf. Burns, Ch. 1. Burns acknowledges that he is building upon Dahl’s analysis (p. 345).

\[\text{\textit{The Federalist}, p. 349.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 351.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 352-53. Notice that Madison, right after addressing himself to the issue of separation of powers, turns immediately to the problem of majority factions and declares this problem “solved” by social checks and balances which have nothing to do with constitutional checks and balances. At no point does separation of powers play a role in curbing majority factions.}\]

In this connection, it is highly doubtful that Madison was concerned with majority tyranny as that term is normally used. He was concerned about majority factions which could perform a tyrannous act. Madison does acknowledge at least the possibility of this occurring ("seldom" is his word), but this is quite different from a permanent condition of tyranny associated with a concentration of governmental powers. On these grounds majority tyranny (i.e., the act of a factious majority) is not on the same theoretical plane as governmental tyranny.

Dahl, p. 24

\[\text{\textit{The Federalist}, pp. 326-27.}\]

Be they economic, property, social, or civil rights. The incompatibility cannot be couched in terms which would suggest that Madison believed in political equality but thought that some people were more equal than others. See Dahl, Ch. 1, p. 31.

\[\text{\textit{The Federalist}, p. 56; emphasis added.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 65.}\]

\[\text{\textit{Documents Illustrative}, pp. 398-99.}\]

\[\text{\textit{The Federalist}, p. 333.}\]
In this Madison is addressing himself to a scheme for preserving the independence of the branches set forth by Jefferson in his *Notes on Virginia*.

To this point he writes in Federalist 63, “The people can never wilfully betray their own interests: But they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every public act” p. 426-27.

In this regard, Madison writes in Federalist 48 that it is against a legislature “which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes ... that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions,” p. 334.

See Federalist 78 where this theory is articulated with respect to judicial review.

Burns (p. 22) mistakenly reads this as “auxiliary precautions” against majority tyranny. The error is understandable in light of his basic confusion concerning the purpose of separation of powers.

This we submit as a composite argument drawn not only from the critical assessments of the Madisonian model in terms of its democratic character but from legislative behavioral studies as well. In any event, bicameralism certainly opens up the possibility of deadlock and its very existence suggests that there can be two popular majorities on any given issue, a notion logically inconsistent with majoritarian theory.

This, in one form or another, is what most of the critics of the Madisonian model contend bicameralism was intended to do. In this respect, they see the Framers (and Madison as well) attempting to create a “mixed government” along the lines advocated by John Adams. This interpretation was, no doubt, bolstered by Charles A. Beard’s *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1935) which related structural forms to economic interests. See also Malcolm P. Sharp, “The Classical Doctrine of the Separation of Powers,” *University of Chicago Law Review*, 2 (April 1935), pp. 385-436.
Ibid. Madison’s “wish” seems to have been realized. Writes Robert A. Dahl, “The conclusion seems inevitable that the benefits and disadvantages flowing from equal state representation in the Senate are allocated in an entirely arbitrary fashion and cannot be shown to follow from any general principle.” *Pluralistic Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), p. 125.


I have borrowed this term from Professor Charles S. Hyneman.

It is true that the model is also attacked on grounds that its structural forms prevent the realization of economic and social “democracy.” But this is usually viewed as the very object of its presumed deviation from democratic principles.

Dahl, Preface, p. 32.


The Forum


Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 3.


*Republic*, VI, 183.


*Republic*, III, 82.
Ibid., VI, 196.


Ibid., 268.

Ibid.

Ibid., 258.

Ibid., 268.

Ibid.

Ibid., 287.


Ibid., 318.

Ibid., 321.

Chesterton, Orthodoxy, “Authority and the Adventurer,” 347.


Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, §13, 45.


Ibid., 297.

Ibid., “The Suicide of Thought,” 247.

Ibid., “Authority and the Adventurer,” 360.

Ibid., 360.

Ibid.

Orthodoxy, “The Suicide of Thought,” 236.


Fyodor Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 295.


Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §31.

Ibid., §23.


Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 11.


Ibid., 243.

Ibid.

Plato, Republic, VIII, 249.

Ibid., 255.

125 Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, “Authority and the Adventurer,” 362.
130 John Donne, “Holy Sonnet X.”

**The Chamber**

133 Machiavelli, 118.
136 *Ibid.*, 120.
141 *Ibid.*, 76.
148 Machiavelli, 120.

**The Sanctuary**


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156 McGinn, 10.


160 *Life*, 1.10.4. as cited in Augustine, xiv.

161 Augustine, xiv.


166 *Ibid.*, 838. Here, Augustine cites Acts 1:7: “It is not for you to know times or seasons which the Father has fixed by his own authority.” (RSV)

167 See Augustine’s chapter “Blessings and disasters often shared by good and bad” in *City of God*, Pt. 1, Bk. 1, Ch. 8. Page 14.


169 Barnes, 31. For a closer look at Luther’s medieval worldview, see Heiko A. Oberman ; trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart, *Luther: Man Between God And The Devil* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).


171 Barnes, 31.

172 Barnes, 43.

173 WA BR 1, 359. The initials “BR” stand for Luther’s “Correspondences” from the *Weimarer Ausgabe, D. Martin Luthers Werke*. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 90 vols. Weimar, 1883 ff. The initials ‘WA’ are used throughout to refer to the definitive *Weimarer Ausgabe* of Luther’s works (Dr. Martin Luther’s Works: Critical Collected Edition), which is cited by volume, page, and (generally) also by line. Where the vol. no. is obvious it is omitted. Most citations from the WA are taken from Ewald M. Plass’ translation of select passages from the Weimar Edition of Luther’s works as published in *What Luther Says* (St. Louis: Concordia Pub. House, 1959). In following citations, these will be shortened to “WA,” followed by the volume number and page number. Cited in Plass, 29.
174 Plass, 29.
176 Barnes, 41.
177 Ibid., 38.
179 The link between Luther and Augustine is undeniable. As early as 1509 Luther can be said to have discovered and read Augustine’s City of God according to Heiko A. Oberman, Luther: Man Between God And The Devil (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 159.
180 WA 11, 252, Predigten und Schriften 1523.
181 Baylor, 3.
182 W 47, 234. Reihenpredigten über Johannes 16 (1533/34), Druckfassung 1538; Predigten 1538; Reihenpredigten über Johannes 1–2 1537/38.
183 WA 17 I, 211, Predigten 1525.
184 W 46, 734 f. Reihenpredigten über Johannes 16 (1533/34), Druckfassung 1538; Predigten 1538; Reihenpredigten über Johannes 1–2 1537/38.
185 E.G. Rupp and Benjamin Drewery, Martin Luther, Documents of Modern History (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), 126.
187 Harro Höpfl, Luther and Calvin on Secular Authority (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49.
189 Ibid.
190 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxv.6. Quoted in Kerr, 125.
192 Barnes, 33.
193 Ibid., 35-6.
194 Calvin, Institutes, III.xxv.5. Quoted in Kerr, 122.
195 Ibid., Quoted in Kerr, 123.
196 Baylor, 15.
197 Thomas Müntzer, Sermon to Princes (1524) in Michael G, Baylor, The German Reformation and the Peasants’ War: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2012), 68-73.
199 Ibid., 100-1.
200 Ibid., 107.
201 Ibid., 108.
203 Baylor, Revelation and Revolution, 108.
204 Ibid., 111.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid., 112.
207 Ibid., 111.
208 Ibid., 113.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid., 114.
212 Baylor, The German Reformation and the Peasants’ War, 30.
213 Ibid., 30.
214 Ibid., 27.
215 Ibid., 29.
216 Baylor, Revelation and Revolution, 113.
217 Augustine, 5.

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218 Listen to the Music the Very Best of the Doobie Brothers. WEA International, 1993. CD.
223 Ibid., 77.
224 Sisman, 12.
225 Ibid., 5-8.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid., 245.
229 Ibid., 103.
230 Sisman, 4.
231 Ibid., 5.
232 Ibid., 7.
233 Ibid., 7-8.
234  Ibid., 5.
235  Ibid., 10.
236  Ibid.
237  McVeigh, 129.
238  Sisman, 5 and 25.
239  Ibid., 4.
241  Sisman, 12.
243  Ibid.
244  Ibid.
245  Ibid.
246  Ibid.
247  Ibid.
248  Ibid.
249  Mozart, W. A., Symphony No. 7 K. 45 (1768)

The Parlor
251  Ibid., 131 (emphasis added).
252  Ibid., 135.
253  Ibid., 147-8.
254  Revelation 3:16.
255  The Sea and Poison, 51.
256  Ibid., 121.
257  Ibid., 122.
258  Ibid., 123.
260  Ibid., 44.
261  Ibid., 61.
262  Ibid., 65.
263  Ibid., 69.
264  Ibid., 69.
265  Volcano (London: Peter Owen, 2012), 30, emphasis added.
266  Ibid., 32.
267  Ibid., 99.
268  Ibid., 29.
269  Ibid., 148.