INGROUP AND OUTGROUP DIFFERENTIATION IN SUPPORTING CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER THREAT

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ABSTRACT

Feelings of threat arise from a wide variety of sources – from fears of economic burdens, to fears of cultural loss, to fears of death and the unknown. The violence that emerges when we feel threatened has widespread impact at the psychological-level, developing into support for extreme political actions. This may be why seventy years since signing the Declaration of Human Rights, human right violations are still occurring across the globe. Research has not fully concluded why restrictions of human rights occur when individuals feel threatened, nor whether or not we choose to support the restriction of rights differently depending on whose rights are being restricted. A meta-analysis and three experiments included in this dissertation were conducted with the goals of (1) determining the strength of the relationship of perceived threat on support for the restriction of human rights, (2) identifying if the targeted group of these restrictions moderates the aforementioned relationship, and (3) examining the boundaries of group membership where these determinations of restrictions of human rights occur. Results show that restrictions of civil liberties and human rights does increase under times of threat, and that this relationship is moderated by target group of the restrictions. When considering the rights of non-citizens, increases in feelings of threat were related to increases in support for the restrictions of civil liberties.
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Many thanks,
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CHAPTER I: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

“The average American, I will bet you this morning, does not think crime is down. Does not think they are safer…. As a political candidate, I’ll go with how people feel, and I’ll let you go with the theoreticians.” - Newt Gingrich, 2016 (CNN Transcripts, 2016).

While direct violent has declined (Pinker, 2011), crime is an extremely or very serious concern for half of Americans (Norman, 2018), and six out of ten individuals said the world was a more dangerous place today than two years ago (Mannion, 2018). Statistics and historical analyses may point to a safer and more prosperous world, but it is our perceptions of these facts –how we construct both the threats of the past (de Saint Laurent, Bresco de Luna, Awad, & Wagoner, 2017; Wagoner & Brescó, 2016) and of the future (de Saint Laurent, Obradovic, & Carriere, 2018) – that impact how we make meaning of our worlds (Carriere, 2013). When New Gringrich was discussing crime rates, he targeted the crux of the issue: it is our perception of crime, our perception of threat, that drives public opinion much more than the actual presence of threat.

Feelings of threat arise from a wide variety of sources. One may feel threatened by the limitation of resources, such as our jobs or our health and wellbeing. Public opinion shows that 29% of Americans say that undocumented immigrants take jobs U.S. citizens would like and 26% state they are more likely than U.S. citizens to commit serious crimes (Pew Research Center, 2018b). Others may feel threatened by the loss of our immaterial goods – such as traditions, language, and culture. These fears develop into extreme political actions - Denmark and France have been condemned for their burqa bans, restricting the movement of Muslim women in public spaces (Margolis, 2018), and in the United States, families have been separated
at the border, which has been called a cruel practice by the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (Al Hussein, 2018).

The violence that emerges when we feel threatened has widespread impact at the psychological-level, and I argue this is particularly important for democracies (Jaspal, Carriere, & Moghaddam, 2016). Democracies are meant to represent the pinnacle of human rights and freedom of expression (Davenport & Armstrong, 2004; Poe & Tate, 1999)– but are far from ideal (Wagoner, Bresco de Luna, & Glaveanu, 2018; Moghaddam, 2016; Carriere & Encinosa, 2017). When faced with threats, even in democracies, psychological violence against our fellow humans can quickly emerge (Carriere, Garney, & Moghaddam, 2016). Individuals who wear the Muslim veil in public in France are subject to a “French Citizenship” class to learn the ‘proper’ way to be French (Heider, 2012). In the United States, the emergence of highly controversial laws such as Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 – under which police officers are legally obligated to arrest any individual under suspicion they may be unlawfully present in the USA – puts an overwhelming burden on immigrants who attempt to acculturate into the country. While cultural expression and unwarranted search and seizure are protected rights\(^a\), their protection seems to extend only as far as one’s (suspected) citizenship.

\(^a\) The terms ‘human rights’ and ‘civil liberties’ are used interchangeably for two reasons. The terms civil liberties and human rights are used interchangeably across the literature (c.f. Cohrs et al., 2005; van der Noll, 2010; Lahav & Courtemanche, 2012). Definitionally, civil liberties are the rights and freedoms guaranteed by a government, while human rights are rights that should be granted to all individuals regardless of their nationality. While human rights can be understood as something innate to the person in defining their personhood, civil liberties are resources that the government chooses to provide. An individual may have the human right to freedom of thought and religion (Article 18), but one’s government may restrict its citizens’ civil liberties to only permit the expression of select religions (Pew Research Center, 2018a) The difference from a research point-of-view is semantic, with human rights being the higher-ordered prescribed ideal, yet the tangible interaction of rights is one’s civil liberties. By equating their
Policy – such as the two examples of burqa bans and border-closing – place individuals into groups – i.e. those who have no need for the citizenship classes, and those that do. This bifurcation of who is in my group, and who is not in the group that I belong to – can have severe impacts on support for policy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Individuals who glorify the idea that ‘our ingroup is good’ – e.g. “The U.S. is better than other nations in all respects” demand less justice (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010) and feel less guilt (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006) when faced with human rights violations by their in-group. Those who endorsed high importance of “Being American” as part of their identity were more likely than those who did not to favor policies that would expel unauthorized immigrants, support large decreases in immigration levels, approve of status checks, and oppose citizenship for illegal immigrants who entered the United States as children (Espinosa et al., 2018; Marshall & Shapiro, 2018). These policies in France and the United States have a strong emphasis on one’s citizenship as a critical component of civil liberties and human rights.

The Restrictions of Rights

However, research has yet to explore (1) how much impact threat has on our willingness to support the restriction of rights, (2) if this relationship of threat with support for the restriction of civil liberties is moderated by who the targeted group is, and (3) where the division exists between ingroup and outgroup around issues of rights. In addition to these questions, there is an overarching question that remains – why do we support the restrictions of human rights at all? We can answer this broader question by looking at two possible opposing explanations on a meanings, I can speak more broadly about the overarching theory that unites the restrictions of liberty and rights (Healy, 2017).
continuum, with one end anchored at “Preventative Restrictions” and another at “Punitive Restrictions.” (See Figure I-1).

Preventative Restrictions ←---------------------------------→ Punitive Restrictions

Figure I-1. A spectrum of restrictions of civil liberties based on reasoning

**Preventative Restrictions**

Civil wars, revolutions, and collective action all require significant material investments in order to achieve the protection of a right for a given group of individuals (Wagoner, Moghaddam, & Valsiner, 2018; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Once they are attained, there are immaterial costs to maintaining rights – for example, providing the opportunity for free speech provides free speech for everyone – including our least liked groups (c.f. Ceci & Williams, 2018). Since rights have a cost in their maintenance and in their existence, individuals may see the revocation of their own rights as a way to divert valuable, limited resources to more pressing concerns – such as dealing with threats. In this way, a preventative view of human rights restrictions approaches the restriction of rights as purely a defensive, protective measure against perceived threats. Rights are like any other finite resource, and while there are benefits to holding them, there are also costs. In 2016, Apple was sued by the Federal Bureau of Investigations to create a backdoor to unlock the phone of the San Bernardino shooter. Apple refused, saying the creation of such a backdoor would risk the privacy of their users. However, the public was not on their side, with only 38% of respondents supporting Apple’s stance of not unlocking the iPhone (Pew Research Center, 2016). This trend of feeling threatened and supporting restrictive measures against oneself is longstanding (Carriere, Hendricks, &

If we view rights-restrictions as a purely preventative measure, then restrictions of rights should not vary between groups because there should be no consideration of group membership. Since certain human rights are supported across cultures (Hoppe-Graff & Kim, 2005; McFarland, 2015; Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990; Moghaddam & Riley, 2005; Passini, 2012; Passini & Emiliani, 2009; Worchel, 2005), the violations of these rights should be categorically rejected across the same cultures. Restriction of rights is simply a limited trading of resources, recognizing that the resources required to maintain rights are better directed towards other more pressing concerns. Authoritarian leaders build their messages on security, harmony, and peace, and simply require their citizens to remove some of their freedoms (albeit, this may be forcefully required) in order for the country to ‘prosper’ (Moghaddam, 2013).

Punitive Restrictions

A fully punitive reasoning to restrict human rights approaches the restriction of human rights as a form of punishment. Rights are controlled by those in power, who demand dutiful obedience to those below them (Moghaddam, 2004). The benefit of civil liberties and human rights is in having them – and thereby, by restricting access them, one is selectively discriminating against groups that do not conform to the culture and norms of the larger community. Individuals who perceive threat increase their prejudice and react with violence and restrictions of resources (Abrams, Van de Vyver, Houston, & Vasiljevic, 2017; Thörner, 2014). The perceived expansion of different cultures can lead to restrictions against religious symbols in public (van der Noll,
reductions in support for rights to immigrants (Verkuyten, 2009; Rapp, 2015) and increased demand for cultural adoptions and rejections of the immigrant’s culture (Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013).

On this end of the model, the revocation of rights is less about the costs associated with carrying rights – the resources being poured into their maintenance and defense – and instead about those outgroups that are fundamentally different. It becomes a form of discrimination. When one approaches the restriction of human rights as a punitive measure, the rights being restricted are heavily weighted towards the outgroup.

**Or Somewhere In-between?**

In practicality, neither extreme – purely preventative means or purely punitive means - is likely the answer. For example, one may divide the proportion of rights restricted based on the likelihood that harm may come from the specific group. This logic – that rights are restricted for preventative purposes – still involves bias against an outgroup. By viewing the other group as more threatening and therefore deserving of more restrictions than the ingroup, individuals approach their preventative restrictions with a punitive mindset. On the other hand, research in discrimination and prejudice notes that these types of punitive, outgroup-hate actions are built from a threat against one’s self-concept (Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In this way, restrictions as a punitive measure – as a way to put down and isolate the outgroup further – carries preventative reasonings in its attempts to bolster the self-esteem and self-concept of the individual. For example, individuals who had their self-image threatened increased their self-esteem through derogating a stereotyped outgroup member (Fein & Spencer, 1997).

Regardless of their impracticality, it is useful to consider these two ends of the spectrum due to the questions that arise. For one, if rights can be differentially restricted for preventative
means, then one would expect to see that ingroup-members who evoke threat are met with ingroup-focused restrictions. That is – if we manipulate the threat creator, then support for restrictions of civil liberties should be focused on the specific group that evoked the feelings of threat. If a member of my ingroup is involved in a terroristic action, I should be more willing to restrict the rights of ingroup members in order to further protect myself, while I should be more willing to restrict the rights of outgroup members if they are the ones involved in a terrorist plot. If restrictions are based on punitive-but-preventative for self-image means, then ingroup members who create threat may not be associated with increased restrictions against ingroup members, but instead may be forced out of the ingroup in order to protect the status and prestige of the ingroup. For example, individuals who leak governmental misconduct are labeled as “whistleblowers” and are subject to arrest and incarceration (Hopman & van Leeuwen, 2009) and the U.S. government has attempted to expel transgendered individuals from the military due to perceived threats of the classic, heteronormative militaristic identity (Hirschfield-Davis, 2017). Attempting to understand the reactions against threats from ingroup or outgroup members is an issue receiving increased research attention in the field (Greenaway & Cruwy, 2019), and approaching this from a punitive or preventative framework allows a deeper consideration of the driving forces behind such reactions.

Solving the problem of how to increase support for human rights in the face of threat requires researchers to place individuals on the spectrum presented in Figure 1. If restrictions lean towards a preventive measure, research would need to examine the mental calculus in an individual’s rate of substitutions of rights for security. Individuals are supporting the restrictions of civil liberties because they believe it should increase the amount of security provided. In actuality, countries that violate human rights in order to guard against terrorism were more likely
to be targeted by terrorism (Thoms & Ron, 2007; Walsh & Piazza, 2010), suggesting that this preventative-based approach may not work as intended. Apple’s CEO Tim Cook argued that creating the backdoor for the FBI would only make its consumers less safe (Cook, 2016) and the ACLU argued such a demand violated the 5th Amendment (Brief for American Civil Liberties Union, 2016). Research would need to find ways to increase the individual value of rights to the point where no tradeoff would be worth their removal, or emphasize the potential consequences of the removal of rights and see if knowledge of such consequences would suppress the willingness to restrict them.

However, if restrictions are a punitive measure, then research surrounding deservingness and removal of civil liberties requires further expansion (Drolet, 2014; Drolet, Hafer, & Heuer, 2016; Hafer, 2012). In this research, we take the position that ‘our ingroup is good and therefore deserves rights’ and place it against ‘that outgroup is bad and therefore does not deserve rights’ (Hafer, 2012). Therefore, exploring ways to cognitively expand the ingroup –through thinking in terms of a global community (Hackett, Omoto, & Matthews, 2015) – may reduce restrictions of civil liberties. Formulating one's ingroup as the global community has been shown to be a strong predictor of solidarity with victims of human rights violations (Barth, et al, 2015; McFarland & Mathews, 2005a) and concern for human rights (Hackett et al., 2015; McFarland, 2010; McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012; McFarland, Brown, & Webb, 2013).

In the following dissertation, I shed light on the restrictions of rights against members of one’s outgroup compared to one’s ingroup under times of threat. Moreover, I test how the role of citizenship factors into these decisions. In order to examine these questions, a meta-analysis and three follow up experiments were conducted. In the second chapter, I address the question: What is the true effect size of threat on human right violations for ingroups and outgroups?
While there have been systematic reviews on human rights (McFarland, 2015) and human rights violations (Carriere, 2019b), these reviews have been strictly qualitative in their approach. Qualitative reviews are useful for providing insight into the state of research, but they are unable to quantify the effect size of threat on human rights. In order to test this question, a meta-analysis is conducted on the effect of threat on human rights violations. Among the various moderators that will be tested on this relationship will be whether or not the rights under investigation were ingroup rights, outgroup rights, or both ingroup and outgroup rights.

The second chapter concludes with the confirmation that there are significant differences in the effect size of threat when considering the rights of ingroups or outgroup members. However, meta-analyses provide only measured differences – not manipulated differences. Since no study had manipulated the question of ingroup and outgroup rights, the third chapter takes a manipulated whether or not individuals were considering the rights of ingroup or outgroup members when faced with threat. The meta-analysis was also unable to tease apart where the ingroup/outgroup division was being drawn. Chapter three presents three experiments to examine where individuals separate themselves in terms of the ingroup and the outgroup when considering rights, and to what extent the tradeoff of rights and security exists in comparing for ingroups and outgroups.

The third chapter reports evidence that there is a significant difference between considering the rights of ingroup and outgroup members, and that the line between ingroup and outgroup members is drawn around questions of citizenship status. The final chapter discusses the results reported in chapters two and three, and considers future work on the basis of citizenship centrality and expanding the ingroup through a global community.
CHAPTER II: RESTRICTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS DUE TO PERCEIVED THREAT: A META-ANALYSIS

In December 1948, the United Nations passed a resolution which contained the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, setting a standard of rights to be universally protected (United Nations General Assembly, 1948). This declaration defined human rights as basic and fundamental rights that uphold our freedom and dignity and are inherently universal and inalienable (Amnesty International, 2012) including in civil, political, economic, social, and cultural domains (Twose & Cohrs, 2015). Yet, seventy years later, human rights violations continue to occur (Cingranelli, Fajardo-Heyward, & Filippov, 2013; Ruhs, 2012). In recent years, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands have all been condemned for their burqa bans that restrict the movement of Muslim women in public spaces (Margolis, 2018). Individuals in Kazakhstan have been arrested and killed for union labor actions (Human Rights Watch, 2018). In the United States, families have been separated at the U.S.-Mexico border, which has been called a cruel practice by the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (Al Hussein, 2018).

An extensive body of literature demonstrates that the presence of threats – e.g. differences in cultural values, political instability, economic job insecurity) – can lead to restrictions of one’s rights as either a punishment for wrongdoing or a preventative measure to avoid further threats (Carriere et al., 2016; Carriere, 2019b). In this research, the focus has been on different types of threat, including cultural threat (Pehrson, Gheorghiu, & Ireland, 2011; Rapp, 2015), economic threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Levin, Pratto, Matthews, Sidanius, & Kteily, 2012), interfaith threat (Choma, Haji, Hodson, & Hoffarth, 2016), intergroup threat (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009), safety threat (Abrams et al., 2017), security threat (Lahav & Courtmanche, 2012), outgroup threat (Beck & Plant, 2018; Verkuyten, 2009) and value
differences (Hunt, 2011). These different threats can be categorized as realistic, involving one’s tangible resources, including income and one’s own life, or symbolic, involving one’s intangible goods such as culture and values (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). Importantly, many studies measure a composite of both symbolic and realistic threat together under the construct of ‘intergroup threat’ (Beck & Plant, 2018; Canetti, Haperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Djupe & Calfano, 2013; Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Seate, 2012; Shitrit, Elad-Strenger, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2017; Verkuyten, 2009). Finally, the onset of a new wave of terrorism has shown a third type of threat – terroristic threat. Measures of terroristic threat focus on one’s own fear of dying in a terrorist attack (e.g. “How concerned are you personally about you yourself, a friend, or a relative being the victim of a future terrorist attack in the United States?”) or the collective whole coming under attack (e.g. “How concerned are you that terrorists will attack the U.S. with biological or chemical weapons?”). These questions target an individual’s tangible goods of their lives and the lives of their family members. Yet, terroristic threat has stronger correlations with measures of symbolic threat rather than realistic threat (Crowson, 2009; Hitlan, Carrillo, Zarate, & Aikman, 2007; White, Duck, & Newcombe, 2012).

While research has shown that all measures of threat and support for restrictions of civil liberties (SRCL) are correlated, there is relatively little research on (1) how strong the relationship between threat and SRCL is (2) whose civil liberties are under investigation – that is, are we restricting the rights of ingroup members (i.e. others similar to ourselves) or outgroup members (i.e. others with dissimilar features, beliefs, or behaviors to ourselves) and (3) if there is a difference based on ingroup membership, how do we distinguish between the groups?
Ingroups and Outgroups

In many cases, research focuses on the restrictions of the rights of others who are in a different group compared to our own, i.e. an outgroup. Individuals who perceive threat increase their prejudice against outgroups and react with violence and restrictions of resources (Abrams et al., 2017; Thörner, 2014). The perceived expansion of different cultures can lead to restrictions against religious symbols in public (van der Noll, 2010), reductions in support for rights to immigrants (Rapp, 2015; Verkuyten, 2009) and increased demand for cultural adoptions and rejections of the immigrant’s culture (Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013). We may perceive an increase in outgroup size (Semyonov, Raijman, Yom Tov, & Schmidt, 2004) or cultural influence (Newman, Hartman, & Taber, 2012), and we respond by restricting the outgroup’s rights.

This is in line with research on ingroup bias, even on a trivial basis (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Since one’s ingroup is given preferential treatment (Brewer, 1999), the lack of preferential treatment for outgroup members permits a restriction of rights for a target group that is not one’s own. We are less willing to provide negative attributions to ingroup members who are deviant (Harrison & Abrishami, 2004) and give higher approval of misdeeds from ingroup members compared to outgroup members (Schruijer et al., 1994; Tarrant, Branscombe, Warner, & Weston, 2012). Individuals show increased levels of trust for in-group members (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009), cooperate more with ingroup members (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014) and provide more positive resources to their ingroup within the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). While our ingroup is trusted, forgiven, and supported, members of outgroups do not receive such benefits and can have their rights removed under times of threat.
This approach to restrictions of civil liberties – where we restrict more rights of outgroup members – can be understood as a punitive approach to human rights restrictions. In response to feelings of threat, we take away rights from others as a punishment. This view of civil liberties presents rights as relatively risk-neutral goods that provide social benefits. The benefit of civil liberties is in having them – and thereby, by restricting access them, one is selectively discriminating against groups that do not conform or agree to the culture and norms of the community that otherwise reaps the benefits. If the effect of threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties is driven by punitive based means, we should expect to see higher effect sizes when looking at restrictions towards outgroup members, not ingroup members.

However, it is not always the case that threat causes us to restrict the rights of outgroup members. Sometimes, threat motivates us to restrict the rights of our own group or both groups equally. When individuals were led to believe there is a high probability of a terrorist attack, they supported harsher punishments against petty crime (Fischer et al., 2006), higher measures of surveillance (Cohrs et al., 2005; Doosje, Zimmermann, Küpper, Zick, & Meertens, 2009; Henderson-King, Henderson-King, & Hathaway, 2009), and further withholdment of rights (Bozzoli & Müller, 2011; Huddy, Feldman, & Weber, 2007; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004; Welch, 2016). At the beginning of the ‘war on terror’, 21% of Americans believed the Patriot Act did not go far enough, while 43% believed it reached just well enough, compared to only 26% who believed it went too far (Saad, 2004). After the Paris attacks in 2015, a state of emergency lasted two years; granting the French government the authority to disband groups, close privately-owned venues such as bars and theaters, restrict access to any webpage, search any home at any time, and place any individual under house arrest (Loi n°2015-1501, 2015).
Examining restrictions by looking at times when we restrict rights of ingroup members alongside of outgroup members would suggest a preventative, not punitive, measure of human rights restrictions. In this way, rights and liberties are resources that by themselves are risk-laden – that by removing them, we remove some risk incurred by having liberties. When considering the preventative approach to restricting civil liberties, the focus turns more towards why individuals would revoke their own groups’ rights, not the rights of outgroups. In this case, if threat’s effect on support for the restriction of civil liberties is driven by preventative based means, then restrictions of rights should not vary between groups because there should be no consideration of group membership, only of protection (Hoppe-Graff & Kim, 2005; McFarland, 2015; Moghaddam & Riley, 2005; Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990; Passini & Emiliani, 2009; Passini, 2012; Worchel, 2005).

Research has not sufficiently concluded whether or not revocation of rights under times of threat is impacted based on which group’s rights is under question, nor if the relationship is stronger for ingroup members or outgroup members. This binary distinction of preventative/punitive does not dismiss the presence of both – however, it requires us to consider if threat has a stronger impact when approaching SRCL for outgroups and ingroups. In using a meta-analytic approach, I am able to assess the effect sizes of threat and support for the restriction of civil liberties when targeting outgroup members, ingroup members, and both ingroup and outgroup members.

Other Moderators of Interest

SRCL is not only due to threat. Personality differences- mainly right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) – are positively correlated to restrictions of human rights. RWA is a personality trait that focuses on adherence to social
convention and submission to authority (Altemeyer, 1981), while SDO focuses primarily on the superiority of one’s ingroup compared to an outgroup (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). RWA significantly predicts support for a variety of civil liberty restrictions (Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990; Swami et al., 2012), including support for warrantless wiretapping, video cameras in public places, oppose criticizing the president, support media censorship, and national ID cards (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). Scores on measures of RWA were negatively associated with pro-human right attitudes and positively associated with human right restrictions (Cohrs, Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; Crowson, 2007; Crowson, 2009) and support for torture (Asbrock & Fritsche, 2013; Benjamin, 2016; Beck & Plant, 2018; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).

SDO has been predictive of limiting human rights (Cohrs et al., 2007; Crowson, 2007; Crowson, 2009; Crowson, Debacker, & Thoma, 2006; McFarland & Mathews, 2005) and a reduction in human right commitment (McFarland, 2010; McFarland & Mathews, 2005). With SDO measuring the superiority of one’s ingroup compared to an outgroup, its relation to the suspension of rights is found mainly in the context of war (Crowson, DeBacker & Thoma, 2005; Crowson et al., 2006; Pratto et al., 1994).

Other individual differences may account for further limitations on rights. Gender has been a contested issue, with some studies showing women being more intolerant of least-liked groups (Golebiowska, 1999; Parker, 2010; Wemlinger, 2013) while others found the reverse effect (Avery, 1988; Byrne, 2006; Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997), with women being more likely to reject ‘advanced interrogation tactics’ (Haider-Markel & Vieux, 2008). Age may also play a role, with conservativism increasing with age (Kerr, 1944; Thumin, 1972) and adults showing higher levels of perceived threat than their children (Byrne, 2006), and lower support for equal rights (Verkuyten, 2009). Since perceived threat is focused primarily on the impact of
majority group’s perception of minority groups, it would stand to reason that the amount of majority group members in a sample may impact the effects of threat. Caucasians show higher levels of anger after an attack compared to minority groups (Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004), and are more willing to give up civil liberties when they feel threatened in comparison to Black participants (Davis & Silver, 2004).

No quantitative meta-analysis has yet confirmed the strength of the threat and SRCL relationship nor how the relationship of threat and SRCL differs across groups, populations, and traits (for qualitative review, see Carriere, 2019). While there has been a meta-analytic study on intergroup threat and general outgroup attitudes (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006), their outcome variable focused on outgroup evaluations and measurements of prejudice, not support for the restriction of civil liberties. Another recent meta-analysis reviewed the effects of threat on the contact-prejudice relationship (Aberson, 2019), but it focused on how threat mediates the relationship between contact and prejudice, not on the relationship of threat and civil liberty violations. This study is unique in that it directly targets the relationship between threat and SRCL.

No experimental research has tested the differences in impact of threat for civil liberties when considering the rights of ingroup and outgroup members. Instead, experimental work has tested either rights of ingroup members, outgroup members, or both ingroup and outgroup members in isolation, not considering the chance that threat may motivate us to protect our ingroup more – and be willing to restrict our own rights heavily – or, threat may motivate us to punish those who threaten us, and have us be more willing to restrict others’ rights more heavily. By synthesizing all research on SRCL and threat, I am able to quantify the effect sizes of threat
on SRCL for studies that restrict rights of the ingroup, outgroup, and both ingroup and outgroup
to see if there are differences across measurements.

This study aims to quantify the relationship between perceived threat and human right
violations. I conducted a meta-analysis examining the effect of four different measures of
perceived threat – realistic, symbolic, intergroup, and terroristic – on support for civil liberty
restrictions. I test to see if there are differential effects between restricting the rights of our
ingroup compared to the rights of the outgroup. Finally, in light of personality, gender, and age
differences, I test the effect of threat on these demographic differences on support for civil
liberties.

Methods

This study followed the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-
Analyses (PRISMA) guidelines statement (Moher, Liberati, Tetzlaff, & Altman, 2009).

Literature Search

A comprehensive search using PSYCInfo (from 1806-2018) Academic Search Premier, (from
1887-2019), Econ Lit (from 1972-2018), Sociological Abstracts (from 1954-2018), Social
Sciences Full Texts (from 1983-2018), and Humanities & Social Science Index Retrospective
(from 1907-1984). The following keywords were used: threat perception, intergroup threat,
inter-group threat, intragroup threat, terrorist threat, threat of terrorism, threat from terrorism,
perceived threat, direct threat, external threat, cultural threat, resource deprivation, internal
threat, collective threat, sociotropic threat, fear of threat, or symbolic threat and one of (human
right*, civil right*, political right*, civil liberty*, political tolerance, political intolerance,
tolerance, right*, liberty*, physical integrity, civil constraint, security*, exclusion, restriction ,
torture, violation*, or repression. This initial search yielded a total of 16,526 articles. 2,397 duplicate titles were removed, leaving 14,129 to be reviewed.

Titles of studies were screened according to the following exclusion criteria: (a) genetic-based studies, (b) animal studies, (c) titles not written in English (d) mentions of qualitative methods, (e) titles that reference co-morbidities (depression, bipolar, injuries), (f) mentions of brain scanning methods (g) veterans, (h) sports, (i) novels and fiction, (j) familial or romantic relationships, (k) youth populations, (l) governmental-level analyses, (m) health issues and threats of disease, (n) book reviews, (o) patent applications, (p) editorials. In doing so, 11,416 articles were screened out, leaving 2,697 potential studies. These studies were reviewed for the above exclusion criteria and the following inclusion criteria for titles and abstracts: (a) empirical study, (b) mentions of both perceived threat and (c) civil liberties/human rights, (d) that the threat is related to group-relations, and (e) the sample is above the age of 18. A total of 496 studies met this inclusion criteria. From this, 270 studies failed to measure support for restriction of civil liberties or rights, 38 studies failed to have a threat measure, 8 studies failed to have both measures, 14 did not include any reported statistical analyses, 24 were not individual level, 4 were not in English, and 6 did not have a threat on rights measurement, leaving a final total of 43 studies for 139 effect sizes.

**Data Extraction**

Extracted data was converted to Pearson’s R if not already provided. 58 effect sizes reported and used Pearson’s R for their effect size. For the rest, Pearson’s r was calculated by hand, (43 reported beta coefficient and standard error, 5 reported t statistic, 3 reported F statistic, 6 reported Cohen’s $d$; 12 reported Spearman’s rho (Rupinski & Dunlap, 1996)). If multiple models were presented for the same subgroup and outcome (i.e. a hierarchical linear regression with
interactions at higher levels), the model in the highest level was chosen. In recognizing the definitional differences of threat, conversions of betas into t statistics into Pearson’s R correlations will estimate a semi-partial correlation, due to various models controlling for various predictors. This allows a very conservative under-estimation of the effect size. For Pearson’s R, I take from Cohen’s work that \( r = .1 \) is a small effect, \( r = .25 \) is a medium effect, and \( r = .5 \) is a large effect (Cohen, 1988). Figure II-1 shows the density plot of Study based on the type of threat measured across time.

![Figure II-1. Density plot of studies extracted based on the type of threat measured.](image)

A total of 48 effect sizes also reported right-wing authoritarianism, 10 for social dominance orientation, 32 reported the percent of the sample white, 52 of the studies reported the mean age of their sample, and 70 reported the percent of the sample that was male.
Data Analysis

All data analysis was completed using R.

Effect sizes. I employed a random-effects approach in order to account for anticipated heterogeneity in effect sizes across the studies included in this meta-analysis due to differences in population and time of study.

Heterogeneity. Heterogeneity was tested using $I^2$. In comparison to Cochrane’s Q – which has too much power as a test of heterogeneity when the number of studies is large, and can be underpowered if the studies are too few (Higgins & Thompson, 2002; Higgins et al., 2003) - $I^2$ estimates the percent of variation due to heterogeneity rather than random chance. Due to a high range in sample sizes of reported studies (N=39 to N=9,627), confidence intervals with Knapp-Hartung corrections (Knapp & Hartung, 2003) are reported instead of prediction intervals (Partlett & Riley, 2017).

File drawer problem. A weighted fail-safe N (FSN) was used to assess number of unpublished or novel null findings required to make the combined effect non-significant at $p<.05$ (Rosenberg, 2005). Models need to receive FSN greater than 5k+10 (k: number of effects in model) to display higher tolerance to non-reported null findings (Rosenthal, 1979). This approach was combined with Egger’s mixed effects model regression test on funnel plots (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; Sterne, Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2006) to test for asymmetry. However, in the presence of significant heterogeneity, full plot asymmetry is not an appropriate estimate of publication bias, as asymmetry can be attributed due to differences in study characteristics or sampling variations (Sterne et al., 2011).

Moderators. There were five demographic moderators: (a) Gender, operationalized as percent male, (b) Age, reflecting the average age of the sample, (c) Race, operationalized as the
percent white, (d) right-wing authoritarianism, reflected as the effect size of RWA on SRCL, and (e) social dominance orientation, reflected as the effect size of SDO on SRCL. There were also five moderators reflecting study characteristics (a) Statistic reported, which was based on the effect sizes used to convert into Pearson’s $r$ correlation coefficients, (b) type of threat measured – either symbolic, realistic, a composite of the two, or terroristic, (c) the group target of restrictions – either ingroups, outgroups, or both ingroup and outgroup (d) whether the study manipulated or measured threat, and (e) if measured, was the measure a high reliability ($\alpha$.7), low reliability ($\alpha$.7), not reported, or a single item measure.

**Results**

**Random Intercept Models**

The overall random effects model showed a medium effect ($b=0.29$, $se=0.02$, $t=11.76$, $p<.001$, $CI=[.241, .338]$). The overall model showed significant heterogeneity ($Q(127)=5032$, $p<.001$, $I^2=97.9%$), therefore funnel plot asymmetry was not used. Using a trim and fill method with R0 as our estimator, I test the null hypothesis that the number of missing studies (on the chosen side) is zero (Duval, 2006). There are an estimated 44 studies missing from the left side. Adding these studies in reduces the effect to a smaller effect ($b=.11$, $se=.03$, $CI=[.05, .17]$). The fail-safe N for the overall model is 178,507, meaning 178,507 more studies would need to be taken averaging null results to make the model insignificant. This is above 15 ($5k+10$ where $k=1$), suggesting the model is robust to potential unpublished or null findings. While results indicate that very large statistical heterogeneity is present, despite this, the random effect meta-analysis shows a statistically significant negative effect of threat, even after using trim and fill. Accordingly, I conclude there is strong evidence for an effect of threat, however, the true size of the effect is unclear due to heterogeneity.
### Table II-1. Results of meta-analysis with subgroup analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable and class</th>
<th>Between classes effect ((Q_b))</th>
<th>(I^2)</th>
<th>(k)</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>(r) and [95% CI]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Threat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic</td>
<td>(Q_b (3)=64.87, \ p&lt;.001)</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28646</td>
<td>.26\text{ab}[.19, .33]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic</td>
<td></td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15571</td>
<td>.33\text{a}[.26, .40]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intergroup</td>
<td></td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4146</td>
<td>.77[.63, .90]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terroristic</td>
<td></td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33953</td>
<td>.17\text{b}[.10, .23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat</strong></td>
<td>(Q_b (1)=6.18, \ p=.0129)</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>3207</td>
<td>.12[-.01, .26]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>79109</td>
<td>.31[.26, .36]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alpha of Threat</strong></td>
<td>(Q_b (3)=36.10, \ p&lt;.001)</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>22903</td>
<td>.43[.37, .50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3180</td>
<td>.34\text{a}[.18, .51]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33172</td>
<td>.16\text{a}[.08, .25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Item</td>
<td></td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20819</td>
<td>.14\text{a}[.03, .25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreported</td>
<td></td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20819</td>
<td>.14\text{a}[.03, .25]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target of SRCL</strong></td>
<td>(Q_b (2)=16.47, \ p&lt;.001)</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13682</td>
<td>.09\text{a}[-.01, .21]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td></td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>64684</td>
<td>.34\text{b}[.29, .39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td></td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4300</td>
<td>.21\text{ab}[.09, .34]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Statistic Used</strong></td>
<td>(Q_b (5)=36.65, \ p&lt;.001)</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>26026</td>
<td>.44\text{c}[.38, .50]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td></td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41229</td>
<td>.16\text{ab}[.09, .23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1676</td>
<td>.11\text{ab}[-.08, .30]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td></td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>.12\text{ab}[-.15, .39]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8282</td>
<td>.14\text{ab}[.01, .27]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rho</td>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4657</td>
<td>.34\text{bc}[.14, .55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td></td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Notes: r’s with shared subscript letters indicate subgroups are not significantly different from each other at \(p<.05\).*

**Type of threat.** The first sub-group analysis explored whether or not type of threat had differential impacts on SRCL, see Table II-1. Running this moderator analysis showed significant main effect \((Q(3)=64.24, \ p<.001; \ F(4,124)=58.57, \ p<.001\). All four measurements were significantly different from zero, with intergroup threat \((b=0.77, \ se=.08, \ t=9.68 \ p<.001\,
CI=[0.61, 0.92]), realistic threat (b=0.26, se=0.04, t=6.98 p<.001, CI=[0.19, 0.34]), symbolic threat (b=0.33, se=0.04, t=8.35, p<.001, CI=[0.25, 0.41]), and terroristic threat (b=0.17, se=0.04, t=4.70, p<.001, CI=[0.10, 0.24]). Running uncorrected simultaneous tests for linear hypotheses post-hoc comparisons indicated the effect on SRCL was significantly higher if measuring the combined measurement of intergroup threat compared to realistic (b=-.50, se=.09, z=-5.71, p<.001), symbolic (b=-.43, se=.09, z=-4.90, p<.001), and terroristic (b=-.59, se=.09, z=-6.82, p<.001). Symbolic threat measurements also reported higher effect sizes than terroristic threat measurements (b=-.16, se=.05, z=-2.97, p=.003), but no significant differences were found when comparing symbolic to realistic or realistic to terroristic (See Figure II-2 for plotted betas).

Figure II-2. Effect size of threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties by type of threat measured.
**Target group.** The second subgroup analysis examines whether or not the relationship between threat and support for the restriction of civil liberties differs depending on the target of the restrictions of civil liberties – the outgroup, the ingroup, or if the target is both the ingroup and the outgroup. Running this moderator analysis showed significant main effect (\(Q(2) = 16.49, p = .0003\); \(F(3,125) = 55.57, p < .001\)). When Ingroup was the target, the effect size failed to reach significance (\(p = .08\)). However, when considering the target of everyone (\(b = 0.21, se = .07, z = 3.14, p = .0017, CI = [0.08, 0.35]\)) or just the Outgroup (\(b = 0.34, se = .03, z = 13.13, p < .001, CI = [0.29, 0.39]\)), the effect size of threat on SRCL was significantly different than zero. Running uncorrected simultaneous tests for linear hypotheses post-hoc comparisons indicated the effect on SRCL was significantly higher if comparing the Outgroup to the Ingroup (\(b = -0.24, se = .07, z = 3.69, p < .001\)), but comparisons of the combined measure were not significantly different from either individual measure (\(ps > .10\)) (See Figure II-3 for means).
Figure II-3. Effect size of threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties by target of restrictions.

**Study characteristics.**

*Measured vs. manipulated.* Running this moderator analysis showed significant main effect ($Q(1)=6.19, p=.01$; $F(2,126)=74.24, p<.001$). Studies that manipulated threat did not show a significant difference from zero ($b=0.13, se=.07, z=1.83, p=0.07, CI=[-0.01, 0.26]$) but those that measured threat did ($b=0.31, se=.02, z=12.91, p<0.001, CI=[0.26, 0.36]$). A linear post-hoc comparison showed that this effect was higher for studies that measured threat ($b_{diff}=0.18, se=.07, z=2.33, p=.02$).

When examining just the studies that measured threat, I tested to see if there were significant differences across the $\alpha$ – if the measurement was a single item, where it was below .7, above .7, or unreported. This model showed a significant effect ($Q(3)=37.26, p<.001$; $F(4,110)=49.46, p<.001$). All four categories were significantly different from zero, with high $\alpha$. 
low alpha \((b=0.35, se=.09, t=3.82, p=.0002, CI=[0.08, 0.26])\), and unreported \((b=0.14, se=.06, t=2.42, p=.02, CI=[0.03, 0.26])\). Running uncorrected tests for post-hoc comparisons indicated the effect on SRCL was significantly higher if the measurement had a high alpha compared to unreported alphas \((b_{diff}=-.29, se=.07, z=-4.26, p<.001)\) or compared to a single item measurement \((b_{diff}=-.27, se=.06, z=-4.76, p<.001)\). No other effects were significantly different at a \(p<.05\) level (See Figure II-4).

**Figure II-4. Effect size of threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties by alpha level**

Statistic used. Since I collected and interpreted \(t\)-values from beta coefficients to transform into Pearson’s \(r\), subgroup analyses were run in order to see if there was a significant difference in effect size based on the type of statistic collected. This model showed a significant overall effect \((Q(5)=46.83, p=.01; F(6,122)=36.91, p<.001)\). Effect sizes measured in terms of unstandardized beta coefficients \((b=0.17, se=.03, z=4.76, p<.001, CI=[0.10, 0.23])\), Pearson’s \(r\)
Running post-hoc linear combinations, I find that the differences exist within comparisons against correlation-based effect sizes. The effect size of correlation coefficients was larger than betas ($b_{dif}=0.28$, $se=0.05$, $z=-5.70$, $p<.001$), Cohen’s $d$ ($b_{dif}=0.33$, $se=0.11$, $z=3.11$, $p=.002$), $F$ statistics ($b_{dif}=0.32$, $se=0.15$, $z=2.19$, $p=.03$), and Spearman’s $rho$ ($b_{dif}=0.30$, $se=0.08$, $z=-3.93$, $p<.001$), but not significant different than $t$ statistics (See Figure II-5).

**Figure II-5.** Effect size of threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties by statistic reported.

**Demographics.** There were no significant moderators on percent of sample white ($b=0.02$, $se=0.37$, $t=0.06$, $p=.95$, $CI=[-0.74, 0.79]$) or percent of the sample that was male ($b=0.35$, $se=0.31$, $t=1.16$, $p=.25$, $CI=[-0.25, 0.96]$). There was a significant effect of average age of the sample ($b=.02$, $se=.004$, $t=4.28$, $p<.0001$, $CI=[.01, .02]$) and a significant effect of year of
study \( b=.02, \ se=.004, \ t=4.95, \ p<.0001, \ CI=[.01, .03] \), in which a one unit increase from the average \( \text{Age}_M=29.74 \text{ years old}; \text{Year}_M=2010.89 \) was associated with a .02 increase in effect size of threat (See Table II-2).

### Table II-2. Effect size information for continuous moderator analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Res. Hetero</th>
<th>( I^2 )</th>
<th>( \tau^2 )</th>
<th>( k )</th>
<th>( N )</th>
<th>( b ) and [95% CI]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent White</td>
<td>Q(_b) (29)=1528.63, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18615</td>
<td>.02 [-0.74, 0.79]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Male</td>
<td>Q(_e) (68)=2699.29, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>29635</td>
<td>.35 [-0.25, 0.96]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age</td>
<td>Q(_e) (55)=1199.79, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>25163</td>
<td>.02 [0.01, 0.02]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Study</td>
<td>Q(_e) (126)=4718.04, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>82666</td>
<td>.02 [0.01, 0.03]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDO</td>
<td>Q(_e) (8)=253.97, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4145</td>
<td>1.38 [0.52, 2.23]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>Q(_e) (68)=1089.47, p&lt;.001</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>43047</td>
<td>.78 [0.47, 1.11]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Personality characteristics.** Both social dominance orientation (SDO) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) were run as centered moderators on support for restrictions of civil liberties. A total of 10 effect sizes reported SDO, and a total of 48 effect sizes included RWA. The model predicting SDO was significant \( F(1,8)=10.00, \ p=.002 \), with a one unit increase in the correlation of SDO to SRCL was associated with a 1.38 increase in effect size of threat on SRCL \( b=1.38, \ se=0.44, \ z=3.16, \ p<.002, \ CI=[0.52, 2.23] \). The model including RWA as a moderator was also significant \( F(1,8)=23.50, \ p<.001 \), with a one unit increase in the correlation
of RWA and SRCL being associated with a 0.78 increase in the effect size of threat on SRCL ($b=0.79$, $se=0.16$, $z=4.85$, $p<.001$, $CI=[0.47, 1.11]$).

**Discussion**

The results of this study provide the first meta-analytic evidence for the effect of threat on civil liberty restrictions. The present research provides a quantitative review of an increasingly large field of research that has examined the relationship between perceived threat on the one hand and individuals’ support for the restrictions of civil liberties (SRCL) on the other. The present study provides meta-analytic results from primary published studies that indicate that perceived threat is overall positively related to SRCL. Moreover, results reveal an instructive estimation of the magnitude of the relationship of $r = .29$, which is of moderate size (Cohen, 1988). Results suggest that while threat impacts support for restrictions on both groups, we see stronger effects on SRCL when targeting outgroups compared to ingroups.

We used several methods to estimate and correct for measurement and publication bias in the identified set of studies. Fail-safe $N$ for effect size analysis (Rosenthal, 1979) indicated that 178,507 unidentified samples with a correlation of zero would be needed to reduce the effect size to a small size of $r = .05$. The trim and fill method (Duval, 2006; Duval & Tweedie, 2000a; Duval & Tweedie, 2000b) revealed an unbiased effect size of $r = .11$ after imputing potentially missing studies.

Due to the heterogeneity of the data, I caution to place a definitive effect size onto the relationship. The mass of heterogeneity may be due to a variety of issues. For one, I noted the variety of ways under which threat has been defined. It may be the subtle differences between these approaches is increasing the heterogeneity across studies. It also may be that different cultures experience threat in different ways. This concern was addressed by the use of random-
effect models instead of fixed-effect models. The extent of heterogeneity may also be due to the variety of effect sizes included in the study, as some were partial correlations while others were strictly the provided Pearson correlations. Further investigation of what else is influencing this relationship needs to be explored.

I examined several theoretically relevant variables as qualifying conditions of the observed relationship between threat and SRCL. Results indicated that increases in the relationship between both right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and SRCL increase the relation between threat and SRCL. However, I found no effect of gender, age of the sample, or ethnicity of the sample. My results also showed that the relationship between threat and SRCL has been increasing in strength over time. This relationship could be due to a myriad of reasons including but not limited to increases in media coverage of threatening events and decreases in measurement error from the researcher.

The present research substantiates assertions that individuals’ perceptions of threat has implications for support for civil liberties for both ingroup and outgroup members. At the same time, it extends our understanding of previous empirical studies by providing a more comprehensive, precise, and quantitative assessment of the threat-liberty relationship. The evidence reveals that perceptions of threat relates to decreased support for civil liberties, and this is stronger when considering the civil liberties of outgroup members. In this way, the present research expands upon a wider literature that has asserted that support for civil liberties and human rights are influenced by social factors in general and issues of group membership in particular (Hafer, 2012).

I have shown that the threat-SRCL relationship is strongest when considering the civil liberties of outgroups, suggesting that restrictions of civil liberties are a punitive measure. The
result of a weaker effect when considering the rights of one’s own group does not support the notion that rights are removed in order to protect ourselves. If there was a concern for the wellbeing of the group due to the threat, social identity theory would argue its focus would be on protection by supporting the restrictions of rights for all individuals equally. While research has shown that individuals are willing to support restrictions of their own rights in the face of threat (Cohrs et al., 2005; Doosje et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2006; Henderson-King et al., 2009; Huddy et al., 2007; Skitka et al., 2004; Welch, 2016) it may be the case that the restriction of rights for oneself is rooted in a deeper, more insidious restriction of rights for the outgroup as well. Further research into exploring the motivations and underpinnings of restrictions of rights against one’s own group should be explored.

Instead, by finding that outgroup right limitations have a stronger effect size under times of threat, two main conclusions can be drawn. First, if the goal of research is to limit the restrictions of human rights, finding ways to propagate notions that no one deserves to lose their civil liberties –through thinking in terms of a global community (Hackett et al., 2015) or identification with all of humanity (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; McFarland et al., 2013) – may assist in this endeavor. By reducing the size of the outgroup, and increasing the size of the ingroup, less individuals would find themselves on the receiving end of restricted human rights. This leads into the second point – that this result requires we consider where the line for ingroups and outgroups are drawn when considering human rights and civil liberties.

**Conclusion**

This meta-analysis showed that the effect size for support for restrictions of civil liberties under threat differed when considering whose rights are restricted. When considering the rights of
ingroup members, the effect of threat was significantly smaller than when considering the rights of outgroup members. This is a novel result.

Two studies have tested portions of this result. Hunt (2011) showed that when presenting symbolic threats from either ingroup members or outgroup members, anger towards Muslim immigrants was significantly higher for those in high threat-outgroup compared to low threat-outgroup, control-outgroup, and low-threat ingroup. However, they found no significant differences in anger towards Muslim immigrants when comparing high threat ingroup and high threat outgroup. Hunt (2011) did not test to see if these conditions then varied the support for willingness to extend civil liberties. On the other hand, Mentovich et al. (2016) showed that support for freedom of speech significantly differed between targets closer to themselves – from self to U.S. citizens – compared to non-U.S. citizens and terrorists (Study 1 & Study 4). However, this study did not consider the effects of threat when examining the relation of ingroup and outgroup differentiation in supporting civil liberties.

This result that threats lead to different civil liberty restrictions towards ingroup and outgroup members is a result that was examined through the collation of all prior literature that studied the relationship between threat and civil liberties. This is an important result because it moves the conversation of civil liberties towards a greater consideration of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) – that the group we identify with is salient and important to considerations of liberty. While prior research showed that individuals are more willing to support torture and are more likely to believe that the torture will be effective when it is to save ingroup members (Houck & Conway, 2013; Houck, Conway, & Repke, 2014), this study showed that the effect of threat was largest when considering the removal of others’ rights, not our own, lending support for a punitive model of restrictions. This suggests that in order to support civil
liberties, we need to either cognitively expand the ingroup – so fewer individuals are left in the outgroup position – or suggest alternative punitive measures in lieu of restricting civil liberties.

In being able to compare across many studies and many effect sizes, the meta-analysis showed a gap in the literature – that threat differentially impacts the influence of support for civil liberties for ingroups and outgroups. One limitation in the meta-analysis was defining the boundaries of the ingroup and outgroup. Ingroups and outgroups can be defined in multiple ways (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and the meta-analysis was not able to tease apart the wide variety of cultural, historical, and social variation that comes with the development of one’s group identity. While I was able to show that threat’s effect on SRCL was stronger for outgroups, I was not able to identify where this distinction of ingroup and outgroup appears.

The boundary between an ingroup and an outgroup is critical for coming to terms with the restrictions of human rights. Individuals who glorify the idea that ‘our ingroup is good’ – e.g. “The U.S. is better than other nations in all respects” demand less justice (Leidner et al., 2010) and feel less guilt (Roccas et al., 2006) when faced with human rights violations by their ingroup. This ingroup glorification of one’s identity can rapidly evolve into negative consequences. Americans, in particular, have a tenuous relationship between feeling American and sharing human rights. Those who endorsed high importance of “Being American” as part of their identity were more likely than those who did not to favor policies that would expel unauthorized immigrants, favor large decreases in immigration levels, favor status checks, and oppose citizenship for illegal immigrants who entered the United States as children (Espinosa et al., 2018; Marshall & Shapiro, 2018). The rise of nationalism is a rise of anti-human rights sentiment (Skitka, 2005) – with strong positive associations between uncritical acceptance of national authorities and a belief in the superiority and dominant status of one’s nation and greater
support for restrictions of civil liberties for one’s ingroup and outgroup (Sekerdej & Kossowaska, 2011).

In the following chapter, I approach this next question – where do we place the outgroup when considering restrictions of civil liberties and human rights? In three studies, I manipulate presentations of ingroup members and outgroup members – both within subjects (Studies 1 & 2) and between subjects (Study 3). Studies 1 and 2 replicate the finding that we are willing to restrict rights of outgroup members more than ingroup members. Beyond that, the results show that a significant differentiation of rights-based restriction occurs once someone is presented with non-citizenship status – that is, a legal resident of the United States. Study 3 test the differentiation of citizenship in a new setting, replicating the finding that individuals are much more willing to restrict rights of outgroup non-citizens. It also examines if there’s a limit to the amount of rights one is willing to restrict both for the ingroup and the outgroup.
CHAPTER III: MODERATION OF TARGETED GROUP ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEIVED THREAT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THREE EXPERIMENTS

The meta-analysis in the prior chapter showed differences in the effect of threat on civil liberties for ingroup members compared against outgroup members. However, it could not uncover who falls into the ingroup, and who falls into the outgroup. In the next three experiments, I replicate the finding of threat leading to lower support for civil liberties and human rights for outgroups. Further, I examine who falls into the ingroup and outgroup, and how far are we willing to restrict human rights for the ingroup and outgroup in the face of threat.

Ingroups and Outgroups

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that individuals are motivated to view their in-group in a positive light. In creating group categorizations of those who are like us (and belong to our ingroup) and those who are not like us (and belong to one of various outgroups), we can maintain a balance of positive emotions and group cohesion. Groups are essential to making meaning of the world – as a collective whole, they form cultural carriers to develop the meaning of what it means to be an American, of what it means to be a citizen, and what it means to be a member of the ingroup or outgroup (Carriere, 2014; Moghaddam, 2002). Group identity determines what is worth fighting for by mobilizing us to make changes and attain rights for one’s group (Power, 2018) and other less fortunate groups (Carriere, 2018). There is an infinite litany of groups one can belong to – one’s family, one’s community, one’s neighborhood, citizenship, global citizen, bus-riders, car-drivers, gender identity, sexual identity, protesters, and the protested, to name a few. This fluidity and salience of one’s group membership can vary by context. When British women were primed to think of their national identity (i.e. “list three things that you have in common with British citizens”), they felt greater
terroristic threat when exposed to photos of the London Bombing, but felt less terroristic threat if primed to think about their gender identity (i.e. “list three things that you have in common with women”) (Fischer, Haslam, & Smith, 2010).

The presence of group membership in the world allows for selectivity and discrimination in a wide variety of ways (Dovidio, Gaertner, Niemann, & Snider, 2001), and this remains true when looking at rights. We exhibit ingroup favoritism in this area, being more willing to support torture and believe that the torture will be effective when it is to save someone we love (Houck & Conway, 2013; Houck et al., 2014). We also display negative outgroup bias. Laws such as Stop-And-Frisk in New York and SB 1070 in Arizona were targeted disproportionately on racial minorities due to their group membership (Gelman, Fagan, & Kiss, 2007; Sadowski-Smith & Li, 2016); police recording devices disproportionally have more ‘malfunctions’ in minority majority neighborhoods (Daley, 2014). In the end, policy is made by groups, supported by groups, and applied inconsistently by groups towards other groups.

**Outgroups**

Even though individuals reported high agreement in support of human rights, they did not apply equal access to human rights when targeting specific minority groups (Abrams, Houston, Van de Vyver, & Vasiljevic, 2015; McClosky, 1964; Zellman & Sears, 1971). While some minority groups did receive equal treatment (women, the disabled, and the elderly), other minority groups (Blacks, Muslims, and homosexuals) were blamed for receiving unfair advantages (Abrams et al., 2015). This inequality hypocrisy- that we state support for rights, but then do not distribute rights evenly – has been linked to measures of trust and threat. Support for violations of an outgroup’s human rights increase as distrust of outgroup members increase (Maoz & McCauley, 2011; Jabeen, 2013). If individuals perceive an outgroup as threatening, they support the
limitation of economic, political, and human rights because they perceive the outgroup also
growing in numerical size (Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2004).

The importance of the outgroup can be seen in work examining individuals with a
psychological sense of a global community (PSGC). Formulating one's ingroup as the global
community has been shown to be a strong positive predictor of solidarity with victims of human
rights violations (Barth et al., 2015; McFarland & Mathews, 2005a) and concern for human
rights (Hackett et al., 2015; McFarland, 2010; McFarland et al., 2012; McFarland et al., 2013).
Indicators of global community include statements such as “I feel a sense of connection to
people all over the world, even if I don’t know them personally” (Hackett et al., 2015, p. 52).
However, these measures of a psychological sense of a global community have never been tested
under circumstances of threat, so how they interact when individuals are feeling threatened is
less clear.

While the literature around PSGC suggests that having an expanded ingroup can promote
support for civil liberties, threat also has significant impacts on our support of ingroup rights.
Increases in perceived threat are related to increases in willingness to support wiretapping and
other methods of surveillance that interfere with our own civil liberties (Carriere, Hendricks, &
Moghaddam, under review; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Sekerdej & Kossowaska, 2011). The
effect of threat for both ingroups and outgroups is amplified when individuals score high on
measures of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1998). Individuals who are high in
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) are submissive to authorities, show aggressiveness to norm-
deviant individuals, and adhere to traditional values (Altemeyer, 1998). RWA significantly
predicts support for a variety of civil liberty restrictions, including support for warrantless
wiretapping, video cameras in public places, media censorship, torture, national ID cards, and
opposition to criticizing the president (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). Scores on measures of RWA were negatively associated with pro-human right attitudes (Moghaddam & Vuksanovic, 1990; Swami et al., 2012) and positively associated with human right restrictions (Cohrs et al., 2007; Crowson, 2007; Crowson, 2009) and support for torture (Benjamin, 2016). However, the comparison of restrictions on outgroup or ingroup and the role of threat in these decisions to restrict is neglected by researchers.

**Targets of Threat**

It could be the case that the effect of threat differs based on the group that is threatening. That is, one may be willing to restrict the rights of outgroup members not because they are outgroup members, but because the threat is coming from an outgroup. One may be just as willing to restrict the rights of fellow ingroup members if ingroup members were the ones to create the threat. Israeli-Jews who felt high levels of injustice from others against their ingroup were more likely to support extreme restrictive policies against Palestinians (Maoz & Eidelson, 2007) and felt less guilt towards current transgressions against Palestinians if thinking about their own past victimhood (Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). This shows that restrictions of rights seem to target the outgroup when the outgroup is seen to be the cause of the threat.

However, research that examines an ingroup member creating threat towards other ingroup members is few and far between – and only recently have models examining intragroup threat emerged (c.f. Greenaway & Cruwy, 2019). This could be because individuals place deviant, threat-creating ingroup members into the outgroup (Marques & Paez, 1994). When individuals learn that an ingroup member is acting against the ingroup norm, they distance themselves from deviant group member by denouncing their behavior (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010). Therefore, research may be limited
because as soon as an ingroup member threatens us, we ostracize them into an outgroup and are willing to restrict their rights. Consider those who speak out against governmental policies – they are labeled as “whistleblowers” and are arrested for their speech (Hopman & van Leeuwen, 2009), or those transgendered individuals in the military, who face expulsion from the military due to a perceived threat of militaristic identity (Hirschfield-Davis, 2017).

On the other hand, threats from the ingroup may simply not be acknowledged as threats. Outspoken members of the ingroup are perceived to have the group’s best interest at heart (Hornsey, Trembath, & Gunthrope, 2004) and are misunderstood. Individuals who glorify the idea that ‘our ingroup is good’ – e.g. “The U.S. is better than other nations in all respects” demand less justice (Leidner et al., 2010) and feel less guilt (Roccas et al., 2006) when faced with human rights violations by their in-group, to the extent they justify when their own in-group members torture (Tarrant et al., 2012). While one study showed that participants had less expressed threat when reading about a ‘homegrown extremist’ in comparison to ‘radical Islamic’ (Woods, 2011), it was unable to show if the comparison of ‘homegrown extremist’ was significantly different than a no threat condition at all, while another study showed that there were no significant differences between threat-creators (Garcia & Gova, 2016), and others show that threats are rated as more dangerous when the perpetrator is an ingroup member compared to an outgroup member (Chen et al., 2015).

**Defining Ingroups and Outgroups**

Both discussions – of what happens to ingroup and outgroup members when we perceive threat, and the considerations of feeling threatened by ingroup and outgroup members – rely on the question of the delineation of *who* falls into the ingroup, and *who* falls into the outgroup. While group membership is relatively fluid, there are some groups that are more central to who we are
as an individual. When an identity is central to us, it leads us to be particularly sensitive to threats against the central group (Leach et al., 2008). In America, individuals with higher American identity centrality had more pessimistic views regarding the impact of immigrants and supported policies that would expel unauthorized immigrants (Espinosa et al, 2018) especially if primed with vermin metaphors (Marshall & Shapiro, 2018). For American samples, questions of citizenship may be a prominent separation point of group membership, however it has not been substantively explored in research.

In the following studies, I test to see where these differentiations between ingroup and outgroup lines are drawn when considering support for the restriction of civil liberties (SRCL), and whether or not threat moderates this process. Study 1 examines SRCL when considering a multitude of group differentiations – from oneself, to one’s family, to one’s citizenship status, to terrorists. This study also examines if threat coming from an ingroup or outgroup member has different effects. It uses a specific, invasive policy and examines how these differences in group differentiation vary within individuals by using a repeated measured design. Study 2 replicates Study 1 with a broader categorization of group membership in regards to SRCL, looking specifically at citizenship status. Study 3 expands on Studies 1 and 2 by measuring the ratio of rights one would be willing to give up for ingroup and outgroup members in order to reduce terrorism in a between-subjects framework. In looking at the tradeoff ratio of rights for security, Study 3 generalizes SRCL from a specific policy towards general support for restrictions.

**Study 1**

As reviewed, there is a significant effect of threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties. This effect could be different based on group membership, both on which group is creating the threat, and which group is being targeted due to threat. Research has shown that in response to
threats, we are willing to restrict rights of both ingroup members and outgroup members, but it has not tested to see if support for the restriction of such rights is higher for one group compared to the other. Beyond this, there may be differential effects depending on which group is causing the threat. We may be threatened to a larger extent if someone from our ingroup attacks our ingroup, or we may be more willing to accept their misdeeds and be scared only of outgroup attackers. In both cases, a secondary question emerges, namely, if such a difference exists, where are the boundaries of group membership drawn?

Before such questions can be answered, one has to consider the other variables that may be impacting this relationship. Chapter II showed that measures of age and right-wing authoritarianism significantly moderated support for the restriction of civil liberties. Having a psychological sense of a global community also has been shown to be related to measures of human rights support, as is one’s baseline level of human rights commitment. Beyond these demographic, individual difference variables, it may also be the case that support for the restrictions of human rights and civil liberties depends on the extremity of the restrictions or the extremity of threat felt.

Study 1 seeks to establish the main prediction of this dissertation, that support for the restriction of civil liberties (SRCL) differs between groups, and that threat moderates this difference. In Study 1, I investigate how much individuals would be willing to support a specific invasive policy if it selectively targeted various groups. The groups were chosen in such a way to uncover at what point the support for restrictions would significantly increase. I test to see if this effect of targeted outgroup would exist across the intensity of threat (high or low), the threat creator (an ingroup member or an outgroup member), and the intensity of the restrictions of civil liberties (very restrictive or lower restrictive).
Methods

Participants

Using G*Power software (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996), I concluded that a sample of 210 people is likely to detect a medium effect size ($f=.25$) with a power of 95% for a study with six groups. This medium effect is estimated from the meta-analysis in Chapter II, where we found a small to medium effect of threat on support for civil liberties. 202 Participants (88 males) from Prolific Academic were recruited ($M=34.13$, $SD=10.03$), with the only requirement being that they had to be U.S. citizens. Males were not significantly more represented in any condition ($\chi^2(3) = .69, p=.87$), nor did participants significantly differ on their PANAS measurements ($p's>.33$) based on condition.

Procedure

Participants first completed a series of questionnaires presented randomly: Psychological Sense of Global Community (Hackett et al., 2015), a distraction questionnaire (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a 4-item measure of RWA used in American National Election Survey data (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and three measures of support for human rights.

This portion of the procedure follows from prior work (c.f. Garcia & Geva, 2016). Participants were exposed to a fictional news article, detailing a bomb attack that had occurred in Dallas Texas (See Appendix A). In one condition, the attack caused minimal damage and the Department of Homeland Security maintained a terror alert of green. In the other condition, the attack caused multiple deaths, and the Homeland Security raised the terror level to its highest level - red. The high damage condition was accompanied by three photos detailing the destruction, while the low damage condition did not include images. In half the conditions, it was
reported that a domestic terrorist group, The White Knights – were responsible, while the other
reported that a foreign group – Al-Jammut- was responsible. Individuals were then presented
with a statement from the Secretary of Homeland Defense, detailing a new proposed policy. In
half of the conditions, the policy was relatively low on its restrictions – mainly changing and
enforcing immigration. The other condition involved a much more restrictive policy proposal,
limiting access to government buildings, collection and storage of all personal financial
information, retention of DNA samples of suspected but not charged criminals, restrictions of
arrest and detention and allowed the torture of suspected terrorists (see Appendix B).

Participants then were asked to rate how invasive the policy was, how secure it made
them feel, and if they would generally support such a policy. These three questions served as
manipulation checks and will be analyzed in a between-subjects manner. Next, they were given
seven sliders to rate their level of support for the policy if the policy was selectively applied to:
themselves, their family, their local community, Citizens of the United States, Non-Citizens of
the United States, people outside of the United States, and terrorists (1=Would Not Support at
All to 7=Would Completely Support). After rating, participants filled out measures of symbolic,
realistic, and terrorist threat and provided demographic information.

Therefore, this study was a 2 (Threat Intensity: High or Low) x 2 (Threat Creator: Ingroup
or Outgroup) x 2 (Policy: High Restriction or Low Restriction) x 7 (Target Group of Policy:
Oneself, Your Family, Your Community, U.S. Citizens, U.S. Non-Citizens, Not U.S. Citizens, and
Terrorists) mixed design.

Justification of procedure. The procedure uses hypothetical vignettes as a way to target
one’s feelings of threat. Hypothetical vignettes are used throughout the literature to engage
participants in emotionally-salient material such as terrorist attacks (Fischer et al., 2010; Fischer
et al., 2011; Houck et al., 2014). While some studies do use threatening, real world media in manipulations (i.e. ISIS recruitment videos, c.f. Carriere & Blackman, 2016), the hypothetical vignette approach ensures that no participant will have a personal connection with the attacks (as may be the case if real situations were used) and avoids some ethical problems with this higher risk.

**Measures**

See Table III-1 for all bivariate correlations of the following measures.

**Table III-1. Pearson correlation matrix for Study 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IT</th>
<th>TT</th>
<th>SRCL</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>PSGC</th>
<th>SHR-T</th>
<th>SHR-G</th>
<th>SHR-P</th>
<th>PI</th>
<th>PS</th>
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<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>.36</td>
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<td>.25</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-G</td>
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<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-.17</td>
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<td>-.10</td>
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<td>.44</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.12</td>
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<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.55</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** IT=Intergroup Threat, TT=Terroristic Threat, SRCL=Support for Restrictions of Civil Liberties, RWA=Right Wing Authoritarianism, SHR-T=Support for no torture, SHR-G=Support Human Rights Generally, SHR-P=Support Privacy, PI=Invasiveness of Policy, PS=Security of Policy * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001.

**Positive and negative affect scale.** The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) was included as a distractor to the questions of interest about support for civil liberties as to not give away the point of the study. Both scales showed strong reliability for both the positive (α=.88; M=4.38, SD=1.02) and negative (α=.93; M=1.90, SD=1.09) scales.

**Psychological sense of a global community.** The Psychological Sense of Global Community scale (PSGC; Hackett et al., 2015) has been found to be a large predictor of support
for human rights (McFarland & Hornsby, 2016; Marcus, Deutsch, & Liu, 2017). Participants rated four statements from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), such as “I feel a sense of belonging to a human or world community, one that extends beyond where I live and includes more than just people I know.” The scale showed acceptable reliability ($\alpha = .71$) and was combined into a single index, where higher scores relate to higher support for a global community ($M = 4.80$, $SD = 1.05$). This measure was included in order to control for one’s baseline level of ingroup placement when considering civil liberty restrictions.

**Threat measurements.** Three questions were asked to tap into one’s feelings of threat from terrorism: To what extent do you feel personally threatened by terrorism, to what extent do you feel your loved ones are personally threatened by terrorism, and how likely is it that you will be a victim of a terrorist attack? Participants responded on 1-7 scales; the combined items formed a single index with high reliability ($\alpha = .88$, $M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.19$). Eight questions were used in order to create a realistic threat measure (Stephan et al., 1999). While the original scale delineates Asian immigrants, the scale was adapted to be generalized to all immigrants (i.e. “Immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans.”). The computed single index was highly reliable ($\alpha = .95$, $M = 2.95$, $SD = 1.55$). Six statements measured one’s feeling of symbolic threat against immigrants (Stephan et al., 1999), (i.e. “Immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as possible after they arrive.”) and combined into a single index, with higher scores signifying increased levels of threat ($\alpha = .88$, $M = 3.40$, $SD = 1.34$). See Appendix C for all questions.

**Right-wing authoritarianism.** Right-wing authoritarianism was taken from the 4 authoritarian personality questions asked across the ANES about child-rearing, which has shown to be a reliable measure of one’s authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1998;
Feldman, 2003). Participants responded by choosing one of two possible traits they felt were more important for a child to have in binary opposition to each other. Each authoritarian (A) response was coded as a 1, and each non-authoritarian response was coded as 0, and an index for all four scores was created. The options were independence (A) or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners (A), obedience (A) or self-reliance, being considerate or being well behaved (A) ($M=0.29$, $SD=0.33$, $\alpha=.73$).

**Baseline support for human rights.** Three different questions were asked to assess individuals’ baseline support for human rights. One question asked about their general support for human rights (“The fundamental human rights as written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be protected at all costs for all peoples”), one specifically about torture (“No one should be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment for any reason”), and one about privacy (“No one should have their privacy invaded through wiretapping or other means without a legal search warrant”). All questions were rated on 1-7 scales with 1 being Strongly Disagree and 7 being Strongly Agree. These questions were not combined into a single index.

**Manipulation check measurements.** One question was asked to assess whether or not the Policy manipulation (High Restrictions or Low Restrictions) had a significant effect on participants. I asked “How invasive is this policy with regards to your civil liberties?” with 1= Not invasive at all to 7= Extremely invasive ($M=5.14$, $SD=1.67$). One question was asked to assess whether or not the Policy manipulation increased one’s feelings of security. Participants were asked “Does this policy make you feel secure in terms of preventing future acts of terrorism in the US?” with 1=Not secure at all to 7= Extremely secure ($M=2.83$, $SD=1.56$). Participants were asked to rate their general support of the policy proposal prior to being asked to rate it if it
targeted different groups. They were asked “Would you support such a policy to be implemented?” anchored at 1= Would not support at all and 7= Extremely support ($M=2.87$, $SD=1.77$).

**Support based on target group.** Participants were finally presented with seven questions targeting “how much they would support the policy if it selected targeted [Oneself | Your Family | Your Community | U.S. Citizens | U.S. Non-Citizens | Not U.S. Citizens | Terrorists].

**Results**

**Measurement Checks**

I first aimed to assess whether responses on the measured threat items successfully tapped into separable underlying constructs. To this end, I entered all 17 items into a parallel factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction. Two factors returned back eigen values of above 1 (See Table III-2 for eigen values).

**Table III-2. Eigenvalues for Factor Analysis on perceived threat in Study 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>53.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>12.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table III-2 shows eigenvalues and percent of variance explained for the top five factors yielded by maximum likelihood extraction in participant responses to threat items. Two factors (those above the dashed line) were retained.

The promax rotated solution shows a clear two factor categorization: Factor 1 loaded highly on all symbolic and realistic threat items (with 53.33% variance explained), and Factor 2 loaded highly only on terroristic threat items (with 12.23% variance explained) (see Table III-3
for loadings). Note that in all cases, no loading cross-loaded above .2. The final sample of 200 complete cases resulted in a subject-to-item ratio of over 11:1, above the 10:1 subject-to-item ratio shown to be acceptable for exploratory factor analysis (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Because of this, I proceed with a combined measure of realistic and symbolic threat \((M=3.14, SD=1.40, \alpha =.95)\) as intergroup threat, while leaving terroristic threat as its own measurement.

**Table III-3. Factor loadings for perceived threat factor analysis in Study 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT2</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT3</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST1</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST2</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST3</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST4</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST5</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST6</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT1</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT2</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT3</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT4</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT5</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT6</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT7</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT8</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Table III-3 shows rotated factor loadings for the 2-factor solution for all 17 items. Loadings with an absolute value below .2 are suppressed. The table shows that Factors 1 and 2 closely correspond to realistic & symbolic threat and terroristic threat items, respectively.

Second, I checked to ensure that baseline support for human rights is high within the sample. I ran three independent sample t-tests from the median point (4=neither agree nor Disagree). Participants were significantly supportive of human rights generally \((t(201)=24.97, p<.001, d=1.76, M=5.74, SD=1.10)\), the right to not be tortured \((t(201)=16.86, p<.001, d=1.19,\)
\[ M=5.74, \ SD=1.46 \), and the right to privacy \( t(201)=17.81, p<.001, d=1.25, M=5.74, SD=1.39 \).

Participants do support human rights at baseline, and I can use their baseline support of human rights as controls for following analyses.

**Manipulation Checks**

**Threat creator.** Participants were asked in free response to identify who was responsible for the attack. Only a single participant was unable to properly identify the attackers for the in-group attackers, and all were able to identify the out-group attackers. Results do not change with inclusion or exclusion of the participant, so they were included in all following analyses. This suggests that the participants did recognize the group differences in the manipulation.

**Policy.** A Welch’s two samples t-test on how invasive the policy was showed a significant effect. Those exposed to the Higher Restrictions policy \((M=5.93, SD=1.23)\) rated the policy as significantly more invasive than those in the Lower Restriction policy \((M=4.36, SD=0.68)\) \((t(183.82)=7.60, p<.0001, d=1.07)\).

**Threat intensity.** Two Welch’s two sample t-tests were run on the High Threat Intensity and Low Threat Intensity and feelings of terroristic and intergroup threat. No significant differences were found. Those in Higher Threat Intensity condition experienced equal terroristic \((M=2.38, SD=1.06, t(191.82)=0.35, d=.-.05, \ p=.72)\) and intergroup threat \((M=3.12, SD=1.38, t(199.68)=-0.25, d=.-.04, \ p=.80)\) than those in Low Threat Intensity condition \((M=2.32, SD=1.31)\) and \((M=3.17, SD=1.43)\) respectively. Since the Threat Intensity manipulation did not have a significant impact on participants’ reported feelings of threat, this manipulated factor was collapsed in further analyses. In its place, I use both measures of threat (intergroup and terroristic threats) to account for the impact of individual-levels of threats on the dependent variable.
Between Subjects Analyses

Participants’ felt security of the policy was submitted to a 2 (Threat Creator: Ingroup or Outgroup) x 2 (Policy: High Restrictions or Low Restrictions) between-subjects ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of Threat Creator ($F(1,198)=5.86, p<.01, \eta^2 = .029$). Those who were presented with the Outgroup attacking felt the policy would be more secure ($M=3.10, SD=1.58$) than those presented with the Ingroup attacking ($M=2.57, SD=1.51$). There was no significant effect of Policy ($F(1,198)=0.070, p=.79, \eta^2 = .0003$) nor an interaction between Threat Creator and Policy ($F(1,198)=0.152, p=.69, \eta^2 = .0007$). Those who read about the more restrictive policy felt it was just as secure ($M=2.83, SD=1.55$) as those who read about the lower restrictive policy ($M=2.83, SD=1.58$).

Participants’ general support of the policy was submitted to a 2 (Threat Creator: Ingroup or Outgroup) x 2 (Policy: High Restrictions or Low Restrictions) between-subjects ANOVA. There were significant main effects of both Threat Creator ($F(1,198)=5.49, p<.02, \eta^2 = .033$) and Policy ($F(1,198)=8.78, p<.003, \eta^2 = .041$). Those who were presented with the Outgroup attacking were more supportive of the policy ($M=3.16, SD=1.68$) than those faced with the in-group ($M=2.59, SD=1.82$). Those who were presented with the lower restrictions of rights were more supportive of the policy ($M=3.20, SD=1.76$) than those who read the higher restrictions of rights ($M=2.54, SD=1.74$). There was no significant interaction ($F(1,198)=.001, p=.97, \eta^2 < .001$).

Within Subjects Analyses

A linear mixed model fit with REML with Satterthwaite approximations of degrees of freedom was run predicting support for the policy if it selectively targeted a given group. The linear mixed model provides individual slopes for each participant, taking first into account the fixed
effects prior to estimating the random effects portion of the residuals. The within-subjects manipulation, Target Group, had seven levels – themselves, their family, their local community, Citizens of the United States, Non-Citizens of the United States, people outside of the United States, and terrorists.

Models showed no better fit if including the two way interactions of Threat Creator and Policy, Target Group and Threat Creator, and Target Group and Policy ($\chi^2(13)=11.66, p=.55$), nor if including the full three way interaction ($\chi^2(6)=2.10, p=.91$). Therefore, analyses proceed without interaction terms of the manipulated variables. The model includes controls for age, right-wing authoritarianism, baseline support for human rights, one’s psychological sense of a global community, terroristic threat, and intergroup threat. All continuous covariates have been centered at their means. The model results can be seen in Table III-4, Model 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support for Policy Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Support for Policy Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Your Family</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family * IT</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community * IT</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Citizens</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Citizen * IT</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Citizen</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Citizen * IT</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>0.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.09</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Person</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Person * IT</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td><strong>0.38</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.09</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists * IT</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out Group Attacker</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.19+</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.19+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Restrictions</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
<td>-0.71</td>
<td>0.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-T</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-G</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-P</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.087*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.10+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGC</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note: All covariates are mean-centered. IT=Intergroup Threat, TT=Terroristic Threat, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, SHR-T=Support for no torture, SHR-G= Support Human Rights Generally, SHR-P= Support Privacy. + <.10, * <.05, ** <.01, ***<.001

The model shows that all groups besides "Your Family" are significantly different from the base category – oneself. One sees stronger support for the policy as measures of right-wing authoritarianism increase (b=1.13, se=.31, t=3.74, p<.001) and as feelings of intergroup threat increase (b=0.31, se=.08, t=3.67, p<.001). I find decrease support for the policy with increases of supporting the right to privacy (b=-0.16, se=.07, t=-2.32, p=.021) and if the policy has higher restrictions (b=-0.71, se=.19, t=-3.73, p<.001). There are no significant effects of mean-centered age or one’s psychological sense of a global community.

Running linear combinations on all seven within-subject conditions of Target Group with Bonferroni corrections, I can examine comparisons across categories instead of simply comparing against the base category (See Figure III-1 for the plotted means with standard errors with lettered comparisons, where different letters indicate significant differences).
Figure III-1. Average support of the restriction of civil liberties when targeting specific groups in Study 1

There are significant differences between oneself and U.S. citizens \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.48, se=0.13, z=3.80, p=.003) \), non-U.S. citizens \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.94, se=0.13, z=7.48, p<.001) \), people outside of the United States \( (b=1.17, se=0.13, z=9.29, p<.001) \), and terrorists \( (b_{\text{diff}}=2.88, se=0.13, z=22.82, p<.001) \). In comparing against one’s family, there are significant differences between one’s family and U.S. citizens \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.47, se=0.13, z=3.68, p=.004) \), non-citizens of the United States \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.93, se=0.13, z=7.36, p<.001) \), individuals outside of the United States \( (b_{\text{diff}}=1.15, se=0.13, z=9.12, p<.001) \), and terrorists \( (b_{\text{diff}}=2.87, se=0.13, z=22.71, p<.001) \). There were
significant differences between one’s community and non-US citizens \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.68, se=0.13, z=5.40, p<.001) \), individuals outside of the United States \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.91, se=0.13, z=7.16, p<.001) \), and terrorists \( (b_{\text{diff}}=2.62, se=0.13, z=20.75, p<.001) \). There were differences between U.S. citizens and individuals who were not citizens \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.47, se=0.13, z=3.68, p=0.004) \), U.S. citizens and individuals outside of the United States \( (b_{\text{diff}}=0.69, se=0.13, z=5.44, p<.001) \), and U.S. citizens and terrorists \( (b_{\text{diff}}=2.41, se=0.13, z=19.03, p<.001) \). Finally, terrorists were also significantly different than Non-US Citizens \( (b_{\text{diff}}=1.94, se=0.13, z=15.35, p<.001) \) and outsiders to the United States \( (b_{\text{diff}}=1.72, se=0.13, z=13.58, p<.001) \).

**Threat as a moderator of target group and support for the restriction of civil liberties relationship.** While the above model controlled for feelings of threat, it did not test to see if threat moderated the relationship between Target Group and SRCL. It may be the case that decisions of restrictions of civil liberties depends on one’s feeling of threat. A second model including Intergroup Threat as a moderating variable showed significantly better fit than without \( (\chi^2(6)=57.908, p<.001) \). The model can be seen in Table III-4, Model 2 with a visualization of the moderating effects of Intergroup Threat on Target Group can be seen in Figure III-2.
Figure III-2. Moderating effect of intergroup threat when examining target group on support for the restriction of civil liberties in Study 1

The model shows that all Target Groups besides “Your Family” are significantly different from the base category – oneself. There are no significant effects if the Outgroup was attacking ($b=0.38$, $se=0.19$, $t=1.97$, $p=.051$). The effect of intergroup threat is read as the effect of intergroup threat when considering oneself, of which it was not significantly different from zero ($b=0.18$, $se=0.10$, $t=1.73$, $p=.08$). However, the main effects of Target Group were moderated Intergroup Threat for non-US Citizens ($b=0.43$, $se=0.08$, $t=4.91$, $p<.001$) and for Non-US Citizens ($b=0.38$, $se=0.08$, $t=4.28$, $p<.001$). The effects of threat significantly increase one’s support for the policy when the Target Group does not hold U.S. citizenship. The model shows...
stronger support for the policy as measures of right-wing authoritarianism \((b=1.13, \, se=0.31, \, t=3.61, \, p<.001)\) and as feelings of terroristic threat \((b=0.18, \, se=0.09, \, t=2.09, \, p=.04)\) increase. I find decrease support for the presented policy with increases of supporting the right to privacy \((b=-0.16, \, se=0.07, \, t=-2.325, \, p=.02)\) and if the policy has higher restrictions \((b=-0.71, \, se=0.19, \, t=-3.728, \, p<.001)\). Tukey HSD comparisons were not run, as by using a continuous by categorical moderation, the Tukey comparisons are made by assuming the continuous predictor is held to zero. Therefore, the results in the prior analysis would be the same, and do not need repeating.

**Discussion**

In controlling for multiple comparisons, I find that target groups of one’s family and one’s community are both not significantly different from oneself as a selected target of the policy. I also find that community is not significantly different from one’s family and United States citizens as a target group. Individuals who live in the United States but are not citizens and individuals who are not citizens and do not live in the United States are treated differently from all other categories, which is even more pronounced when considering terrorists, who are significantly different than every other category.

The differences suggest that the ingroup line falls somewhere at the boundary of one’s community and U.S. citizens, since United States citizens were not significantly different from those in our community. However, once the moderating effect of threat was accounted for, significant moderating effects of threat on non-citizen residents and foreigners were found, where increases in intergroup threat lead to increases in SRCL for those two groups. Overall, there is a dividing line between supporting the restriction of rights for citizens and non-citizens,
individuals who had not achieved citizenship status and beyond were significantly different from
the ‘ingroup.’

Similar to Garcia & Geva (2016), no significant interactions were present when
examining support for the restriction of civil liberties (Garcia & Geva, 2016, p. 41, Table 1).
Furthermore, the manipulation of Threat Intensity (High or Low) was not successful. Many
studies do not attempt to manipulate threat when examining the support for the restriction of civil
liberties, and instead simply measure one’s individual feelings of perceived terroristic threat,
realistic threat, or symbolic threat. Work on using vignettes as a way to emphasize differences in
damages across conditions is met with success (Evangelidis & Van den Bergh, 2013; Carriere,
2019a), so it is slightly surprising that the damages did not have a similar reaction in this case.
The meta-analysis in the prior chapter had shown that manipulated effects of threat were
significantly smaller in their effect size compared to measured reports of threat, so it may be the
case that the effect of threat is not being captured, or is simply more present in one’s own
personal feelings.

Interestingly, participants reported less support for the more restrictive policy, replicating
the finding of Garcia & Geva (2016). While some research has shown support for more extreme
policies (Maoz & McCauley, 2008), cultural variations and differences need to be taken into
consideration. For example, in Maoz & McCauley (2008), Israeli participants were asked to rate
their support from detaining Palestinians at check points, to administrative detention, to torture
of Palestinians, with reported support ranging from 55% support to 34% support of these actions.
For American samples, support for torture in United States have been limited to warzone
manipulations (Drolet, 2014; Drolet, et al., 2016). Both of these cases are heavy in their war-
zone context, and it could be the case that higher restrictive policies are only more supportive
when in the context of war, while only lesser restrictive policies are permissible to participants on a day-to-day level.

Finally, the manipulation of Threat Creator was not significant. Individuals were just as willing to restrict rights of ingroup and outgroup members regardless of which group was attacking. Since I had a manipulation check that confirmed participants understood who the attacker was, it seemed that participants were aware of the attacker’s origins. However, it may be the case that the participants either did not place “nationalists” into their schema for an ingroup, and therefore, equated them to a level equal to that of the other manipulation. In a sense, both groups may have been treated as outgroups. Prior evidence suggests that using terms of Islamic terrorist compared to homegrown terrorism have significantly different impacts on one’s feelings of threat (Woods, 2011), so even if both were placed in terms of outgroups, there still should have been differences in which outgroup was attacking. It also may be the case that while the manipulation of Threat Creator was noticed and understood, individuals still wished to restrict rights of outgroup members - that even if the threat came from an ingroup member, there was no need for a preventative approach to restrictions by restricting rights of ingroup members even more. Instead, continuing with the punitive approach to restrictions, individuals chose to lash out against the outgroup when feeling threat – regardless of where the threat came from.

Limitations

There are some limitations that must be mentioned prior to continuing to Study 2. This study, and its replication in Study 2, use manipulations that are not equivalent. The length of the High Restriction policy is much longer than the length of the Low Restriction policy. Therefore, I cannot confirm whether or not individuals disapproved of the Higher policy because it was more invasive, or if they disapproved of it due to other reasons (i.e. higher cognitive load in
reading). This issue will be addressed in Study 3. For now, I can only recognize that more invasive policies, and more restrictions, require more text for the policy to take place. Therefore, if there were differences due to text, we can extrapolate that it may also relate to policy differences as well.

Similarly, the manipulations of High Threat Intensity and Low Threat Intensity were substantively different. Those who were exposed to High Threat Intensity had images used, while those in Low Threat Intensity had no images. While no differences resulted, it is not clear if the lack of manipulation was solely due to the amount of deaths and damages, or if it was due to the presence and absence of images. Since we collapsed conditions and uses measures of threat compared to manipulated threat, these non-significant differences are averaged out together. A secondary issue exists with this manipulation – that is of a lack of a baseline comparison category. Individuals were not tested to see if no Threat Intensity manipulation had a significantly lower level of reported threat. It could have been the case that those who experienced either High or Low Intensity of threat were threatened, but simply threatened above and beyond their typical feelings of threat. However, questions of restrictions of rights do not typically occur in the media and in the policy sector when attacks do not happen. These discussions of the restrictions of rights are a reactionary consideration after a threat becomes salient and present in our lives and political discourse. In this way, while I cannot be sure of whether or not threat did increase above a baseline level, not having it keeps the manipulation more in line with reality.

Conclusion

Overall, the first study provides a proof of concept – that threat moderates the relationship of support for restrictions of civil liberties and targeted group of the restrictions.
Moreover, it provides preliminary evidence that the importance of group membership occurs when targeted individuals do not share the same citizenship category as the participants.

**Study 2**

Study 2 serves as a replication for Study 1 with slight modification. First, participants were only shown the High Threat Intensity conditions, so no manipulation of Threat Intensity was presented. Second, participants were only provided with two options on the within subjects’ manipulation – U.S. citizens or Not U.S. Citizens. Besides these two changes, the methodology, order, and measures of the experiment did not vary. This serves a dual purpose – first, it allows for a test of the result of Study 1 – that differences are occurring at SRCL when considering different targets of these policies. Second, it simplifies the manipulation of the target groups to two easily identifiable categories.

**Methods**

**Participants**

Using G*Power software (Erdfelder et al., 1996), I concluded that a sample of 170 participants is likely to detect a medium effect size ($f=.25$) with a power of 90% for a study with four groups. The decision to pick a medium effect size is based on Chapter II’s meta-analysis results. 167 participants (92 males, $M=32.22$, $SD=11.67$ years old) took part in this online study recruited from a Prolific Panel. Distribution of gender was not significantly different among condition ($\chi^2(3)=3.80$, $p=.28$), nor were their positive ($F(1,165)=0.71$, $p=.40$) or negative ($F(1,165)=.33$, $p=.57$) affects based on the PANAS scale.
Procedure

The procedure of Study 1 was replicated. Participants only read the High Threat Intensity manipulation reported in Study 1, and were only presented with two options of SRCL targets – U.S. Citizens or Not U.S. Citizens. This study then follows a 2 (Threat Creator: Al Jammut or White Knights) x 2 (Policy: High Restrictions or Low Restrictions) x 2 (Target Group: U.S. Citizens or Not U.S. Citizens) mixed design.

Measures

See Table III-5 for all bivariate correlations of the following measures.

Table III-5. Pearson correlation matrix in Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IT</th>
<th>TT</th>
<th>SRCL</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>PSGC</th>
<th>SHR-T</th>
<th>SHR-G</th>
<th>SHR-P</th>
<th>PI</th>
<th>PS</th>
<th>GSRCL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRCL</td>
<td>.49**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGC</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-T</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.32**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-G</td>
<td>-.45**</td>
<td>-.37**</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-P</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.14**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.20**</td>
<td>.26**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>.40**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.18**</td>
<td>-.22**</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSRCL</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.27**</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.19**</td>
<td>-.21**</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>-.53**</td>
<td>.62**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: IT=Intergroup Threat, TT=Terroristic Threat, SRCL = Support for Restrictions of Civil Liberties, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, SHR-T=Support for no torture, SHR-G=Support Human Rights Generally, SHR-P= Support Privacy, PI=Invasiveness of Policy, PS=Security of Policy, GSRCL = Support of Policy Generally, * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001.

Positive and negative affect scale. Both scales showed strong reliability for both the positive (α = .87; M=4.40, SD=0.95) and negative (α = .93; M=2.22, SD=1.19) scales.

Psychological sense of a global community. The Psychological Sense of Global Community scale showed weaker but still adequate reliability than Study 1 (α = .63) and was averaged together, where higher scores relate to higher support for a global community (M=4.84, SD=1.05).
**Threat measures.** Three questions were asked to tap into one’s feelings of threat from terrorism and were combined into a single score ($\alpha = .85, M = 2.34, SD = 1.26$). Eight questions were used in order to create a realistic threat measure generalized to all immigrants and averaged into a single index ($\alpha = .92; M = 2.81, SD = 1.36$). Six statements were directed at measuring one’s feeling of symbolic threat against immigrants ($\alpha = .83, M = 3.17, SD = 1.18$). See Appendix C for all questions.

**Right-wing authoritarianism.** Each authoritarian (A) response was coded as a 1, and each non-authoritarian response was coded as 0, and an index was computed combining all four scores ($M = 0.27, SD = 0.27, \alpha = .50$). The alpha for this measure is low, however, this measurement of right-wing authoritarianism has been supported in the literature as valid (MacWilliams, 2016) and is used frequently when analyzing policy-relevant questions (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

**Baseline support for human rights.** Three different questions were asked to assess individuals’ baseline support for human rights. One question asked about their general support for human rights (“The fundamental human rights as written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be protected at all costs for all peoples”), one specifically about torture (“No one should be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment for any reason”), and one about privacy (“No one should have their privacy invaded through wiretapping or other means without a legal search warrant”). All questions were rated on 1-7 scales with 1 being Strongly disagree and 7 being Strongly Agree.

**Manipulation check measurements.** One question was asked to assess whether or not the Policy manipulation (High Restrictions or Low Restrictions) had a significant effect on participants. I asked “How invasive is this policy with regards to your civil liberties?” with 1= 
Not invasive at all to 7= Extremely invasive ($M=5.03, SD=1.74$). One question was asked to assess whether or not the Policy manipulation increased one’s feelings of security. Participants were asked “Does this policy make you feel secure in terms of preventing future acts of terrorism in the US?” with 1=Not secure at all to 7= Extremely secure ($M=2.92, SD=1.52$). Participants were asked to rate their general support of the policy proposal prior to being asked to rate it if it targeted different groups. They were asked “Would you support such a policy to be implemented?” anchored at 1= Would not support at all and 7= Extremely support ($M=2.61, SD=1.68$).

**Support based on target group.** Participants were finally presented with two questions targeting “how much they would support the policy if it selected targeted [U.S. Citizens | Not U.S. Citizens].

**Results**

**Measurement Checks**

I first assessed whether responses on the threat items successfully measured separable underlying constructs. To this end, I entered all 17 items into a parallel factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction. Three factors returned back eigen values of above 1 (See Table III-6 for eigen values).
Table III-6. Eigenvalues from factor analysis on perceived threat in Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>49.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>10.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>4.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table III-6 shows eigenvalues and percent of variance explained for the top five factors yielded by maximum likelihood extraction in participant responses to threat items. Two factors (those above the dashed line) were retained.

However, the third factor accounted for only 6.56% of the variance. As such, two factors were retained. It is important to note that the third factor does not split the questionnaires in any meaningful way – the third factor only loads .3 or higher on two symbolic threat measures—“Immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as possible after they arrive” and “Immigrants should not have to accept the American ways”. The promax rotated solution shows a clear two factor categorization: Factor 1 loaded highly on all symbolic and realistic threat items (with 49.49% variance explained), and Factor 2 loaded highly only on terroristic threat items (with 10.95% variance explained) (Table III-7 for loadings).
Table III-7. Factor loadings for perceived threat factor analysis in Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT2</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT3</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST1</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST2</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST3</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST4</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST5</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST6</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT1</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT2</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT3</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT4</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT5</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT6</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT7</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT8</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table III-7 shows rotated factor loadings for the 2-factor solution for all 17 items. Loadings with an absolute value below .2 are suppressed. The table shows that Factors 1 and 2 closely correspond to realistic & symbolic threat and terroristic threat items, respectively.

Note that in all cases, no loading cross-loaded above .2. Because of this, I proceed with a combined measure of realistic and symbolic threat ($M=2.96, SD=1.22, \alpha = .94$), while leaving terroristic threat as its own measurement ($\alpha = .85, M=2.34, SD=1.26$).

Second, I checked to ensure that baseline support for human rights is high within the sample. I ran three independent sample t-tests from the median point (4=neither agree nor disagree). Participants were significantly supportive of human rights generally ($t(164)=26.12, p<.001, d=2.03, M=6.14, SD=1.05$), the right to not be tortured ($t(164)=13.08, p<.001, d=1.02, M=5.70, SD=1.67$), and the right to privacy ($t(164)=15.98, p<.001, d=1.24, M=5.84, SD=1.48$).
From this, I can confirm that participants do support human rights at baseline, and can use their baseline support of human rights as controls for following analyses.

**Manipulation Checks**

**Threat creator.** Participants were asked to identify who was responsible for the attack. Only a single participant was unable to properly identify the attackers for the in-group attackers, and all were able to identify the out-group attackers. Thus, the participants did recognize the group differences in the manipulation. Results do not change with inclusion or exclusion of the participant, so they were included in all following analyses.

**Policy.** A Welch’s two samples t-test on how invasive the policy was showed a significant effect of Policy. Those exposed to the Higher Restriction policy ($M=5.74$, $SD=1.42$) rated the policy as significantly more invasive than those in the Lower Restriction policy ($M=4.31$, $SD=1.73$) ($t(156.29)=5.80$, $p<.001$, $d=0.90$).

**Between Subjects Analyses**

Participants’ felt security of the policy was submitted to a 2 (Threat Creator: Ingroup or Outgroup) x 2 (Policy: High Restriction or Low Restriction) between-subjects ANOVA. There was no significant main effect of Threat Creator ($F(1,163)=.479$, $p=.49$) nor of Policy ($F(1,163)=0.29$, $p=.59$). There was no significant interaction across conditions either ($F(1,163)=1.16$, $p=.28$). The manipulation had no effect on how secure participants felt they would be with the policy in place.

Participants’ general support of the policy was submitted to a 2 (Threat Creator: Ingroup or Outgroup) x 2 (Policy: High Restrictions or Low Restrictions) between-subjects ANOVA. There was no significant main effect of Threat Creator ($F(1,163)=.866$, $p=.35$) nor of Policy ($F(1,163)=1.60$, $p=.21$). There was no significant interaction across conditions either
The manipulation had no effect on how generally supportive participants would be of the presented policy.

**Within Subjects Analyses**

A linear mixed model fit with REML with Satterthwaite approximations of degrees of freedom was run. Models showed no better fit if including the two way interactions of Threat Creator (Ingroup or Outgroup) and Policy (High Restrictions or Low Restrictions), Target Group (U.S. Citizens vs Non-U.S. Citizens) and Threat Creator, and Target Group and Policy ($\chi^2(3)=1.09, p=.78$), nor if including the full three way interaction ($\chi^2(1)=0.29, p=.59$). Therefore, analyses proceed without interaction terms. The model includes controls for age, right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), prior support for human rights, one’s psychological sense of a global community, terroristic threat, and intergroup threat. The model omits gender, as it was non-significant in Chapter II, though inclusion into the model has no effect on significance or substance. Age and RWA are included due to their significant effects in the meta-analysis, while prior support for human rights is included to capture individuals’ baseline support for human rights. The inclusion of the psychological sense of a global community is both due to theoretical purposes if being highly predictive of support for human rights, but also to test to see if baseline larger-ingroup beliefs influence the manipulation of Target Group. All continuous covariates were centered around their mean prior to entering into the model. The results are shown in Table III-8, Model 1.
Table III-8. Mixed model results predicting support for restrictive policy in Study 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Support for Policy Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Support for Policy Model 2</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Citizen</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.13***</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.12***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Citizen * IT</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out Group Attacker</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Restrictions</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.44*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-T</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-G</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-P</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGC</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All covariates are mean-centered. IT=Intergroup Threat, TT=Terroristic Threat, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, SHR-T=Support for No Torture, SHR-G= Support Human Rights Generally, SHR-P= Support Privacy, PSGC=Psychology Sense of a Global Community. + <.10, * <.05, ** <.01, *** <.001

The results of the regression output show that there is a significant difference between considering the rights of U.S. citizens (the base category) and individuals who have not achieved citizenship status ($b=0.52$, $se=0.13$, $t=4.06$, $p<.001$). When asked to consider the rights of outgroup members, individuals rated their willingness to support a policy that targeted those...
members .52 points on the scale more than when considering rights of U.S. citizens. Increases in intergroup threat \((b=0.59, \text{se}=0.11, t=5.26, p<.001)\), RWA \((b=1.12, \text{se}=0.44, t=2.55, p=.012)\), and being exposed to the lower invasive policy \((b=0.76, \text{se}=0.21, t=3.61, p<.001)\) were all associated with higher support for the policy across target groups, while one’s support for privacy was negatively associated with support for the policy \((b=-0.20, \text{se}=0.08, t=-2.54, p=.012)\).

**Threat as a moderator of target group and support for the restriction of civil liberties relationship.** While the above model controlled for feelings of threat, it did not test to see if threat moderated the relationship between Target Group and SRCL. It may be that decisions of restrictions of civil liberties changes on target group based on one’s feeling of threat. A second model including Intergroup Threat as a moderating variable showed significantly better fit than without \(\chi^2(1)=24.36, p<.001\). The model can be seen in Table III-8, Model 2 with a visualization of the moderating effects of Intergroup Threat on Target Group can be seen in Figure III-3.
Figure III-3. Moderating effect of intergroup threat when examining target group on support for the restriction of civil liberties in Study 2

Adding the moderator of intergroup threat reduced the estimate of the intergroup threat measurement, which now represents the impact of intergroup threat for considering the rights of U.S. citizens ($b=0.34, se=0.12, t=2.77, p<.001$). There was a significant moderation, so that the slope of threat when considering the rights of non-U.S. citizens was .50 points greater than U.S. citizens ($b=0.50, se=0.10, t=5.09, p<.001$). All other effects remained the same from the prior model.


**Discussion**

Study 2 replicated the general effect from Study 1 – that differentiation between rights of individuals occurs at the border of citizenship. In this study, I found that SRCL was higher when considering the rights of non-citizens compared to citizens, and that threat moderated the relationship of Target Group and SRCL, such that those considering the rights of outgroup members were significantly more supportive of SRCL when feeling threatened.

This study also replicated Study 1’s non-significant differences in terms of Threat Creator. Individuals were not significantly more reactant to the threat if it came from an outgroup (Al-Jammat) or ingroup (White Knights) member. Why we failed to find significant results is not clear. It may be the case that group membership is not a critical question when it comes to perceiving threat – that threats from ingroup and outgroup members that put us in danger are equally as threatening. Since there was no control condition without threat, I cannot speculate any further. It may also be the case that radical ring-wing terrorism is not included in one’s ingroup to begin with, so the manipulation is unable to grasp the presence of an ingroup-deviant member.

**Limitations**

Study 2 shared the limitations of Study 1 – that manipulations for both the policy and the threat conditions were not parallel, it is not clear if inclusion of additional stimuli and or reading influenced participant behavior, and that I did not include a control condition of no threat. Studies 1 and 2 were limited in that participants only rated their willingness to support a specific policy with very explicit details about the effects of supporting such a policy, even if the length varied. However, public knowledge of policies is not typically this fine grain. Instead, citizens are typically classified as poorly informed (Delli Carpini, 2005) and struggle to understand the
nuances of policy and are simply informed on the policies that are immediately relevant to them (Page & Shapiro, 1983). In actuality, being told of the extent of the Patriot Act by listing out specific legal methods significantly decreased its support compared to control conditions where its reach was discussed in vague details (Best & McDermott, 2007). When citizens find out what a given policy entails, their opinion changes dramatically.

**Conclusion**

In the next study, I test if the results change when we ask about rights more broadly, instead of through a specific policy. In looking at individual’s marginal rate of substitution – the tradeoffs between how many rights one would be willing to give up for some security, I can uncover not just if right-restricting policies are differentially restricted to ingroups or outgroups, but if a preventative measure of restrictions – restrictions in the name of security – are inherently biased against the outgroup. I also remove the manipulations of threat to see if this effect can be seen regardless of a threat intensity-manipulation.

**Study 3**

Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that we support a policy which restricts rights when the policy selectively targets outgroup members instead of ingroup members, and that intergroup threat moderates this relationship. Study 3 seeks to expand on these findings by testing if these findings can be extended to a general restriction of rights in the name of security. By manipulating how much security one is promised, I test to see how quickly we are willing to give up rights of ourselves and our outgroups, and if there is a maximum amount of rights one would be willing to restrict. This experiment provides more external validity because in the real world, citizens are not told how or by which means their rights would be restricted. Instead, citizens must state their support based on their general knowledge of policy – selectively little. Instead of knowing how
such actions will be taken, citizens simply elect others to make the changes they seek – “build
the Wall”, “healthcare for all”, “restrict that group’s rights”.

Methods

Participants
Using G*Power software (Erdfelder et al., 1996), I concluded that a sample of 90 participants is
likely to detect a medium effect size ($f=.25$) with a power of 90% for a study with four groups.
90 participants (44 males, $M=32.58$, $SD=12.55$ years old) took part in this online study.
Distribution of gender was not significantly different among condition ($\chi^2(1)=0.04$, $p=.83$).

Procedure
First, participants were randomly presented with the full battery of measures used in prior
studies, including three measures of threat, right-wing authoritarianism, psychological sense of a
global community, and support for rights, but without the PANAS distraction questionnaire.
After filling out all measures, participants were then asked through free response what they
believed, in percentage, the likelihood of a terrorist attack would be. After reporting their
baseline percent belief of a terrorist attack, they were presented a series of questions that serve as
the foci point of this study, with one question per page. The questions read “I would be willing
to give up ____ % of [United States citizens’ /United States non-citizens’] rights if it reduced the
chance of a terrorist attack by ____ %”, where half of the participants read the target of U.S.
citizens while the other half were presented with the target of U.S. non-citizens. The reduction in
terrorism increased after each question by about ten percent (9%, 23%, 36%, 44%, 57%, 66%,
70%, 83%, 96%, 106%, 113%, 120%, 136%, 147%, 154%, 166%, 173%, 189%), for a total of
eighteen questions. Participants responded each time, for a total of eighteen ratings, using a
sliding scale from 0 to 100% with 2 decimal points of accuracy. Participants then filled out demographic information, and were thanked and debriefed.

**Measures**

See Table III-9 for all bivariate correlations of the following measures.

**Table III-9. Pearson correlation matrix in Study 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IT</th>
<th>TT</th>
<th>SRCL</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>PSGC</th>
<th>SHR-T</th>
<th>SHR-G</th>
<th>SHR-P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>----</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRCL</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>-.23</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGC</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-T</td>
<td>-.37</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.20</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-G</td>
<td>-.58</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-P</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.24</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** IT=Intergroup Threat, TT=Terroristic Threat, SRCL = Support for Restrictions of Civil Liberties, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, PSGC = Psychological Sense of Global Community, SHR-T=Support for no torture, SHR-G= Support Human Rights Generally, SHR-P= Support Privacy, BR=Baseline Risk of Terrorism. * p<.05, ** p<.01, ***p<.001.

**Psychological sense of a global community.** The Psychological Sense of Global Community scale showed weaker reliability than Study 1 and 2 ($\alpha=.63$) but was averaged together, where higher scores relate to higher support for a global community ($M=4.56$, $SD=1.15$).

**Threat measures.** Three questions were asked to tap into one’s feelings of threat from terrorism and were combined into a single score ($\alpha=.87$, $M=2.09$, $SD=1.16$). Eight questions were used in order to create a realistic threat measure generalized to all immigrants and averaged into a single index ($\alpha=.92$; $M=2.90$, $SD=1.41$). Six statements were asked directed at measuring
one’s feeling of symbolic threat against immigrants ($\alpha = .83$, $M = 3.52$, $SD = 1.16$). See Appendix C for all questions.

**Right-wing authoritarianism.** Participants responded choosing one of two possible traits they felt were more important for a child to have: independence (A) or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners (A), obedience (A) or self-reliance, being considerate or being well behaved (A). Each authoritarian (A) response was coded as a 1, and each non-authoritarian response was coded as 0, and an index for all four scores was created ($M = 0.30$, $SD = 0.32$, $\alpha = .68$).

**Baseline support for human rights.** Three different questions were asked to assess individuals’ baseline support for human rights. One question asked about their general support for human rights (“The fundamental human rights as written in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be protected at all costs for all peoples”), one specifically about torture (“No one should be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment for any reason”), and one about privacy (“No one should have their privacy invaded through wiretapping or other means without a legal search warrant”). All questions were rated on 1-7 scales with 1 being Strongly Disagree and 7 being Strongly Agree.

**Perceived likelihood of terrorism.** Controlling for participant’s baseline likelihood of terrorism will help correct for individuals who weigh the risk of terrorism quite high, and would be willing to restrict a lot, compared to those who find it very unlikely, and may not be willing to increase security too far beyond their normal lives. Overall, participants rated the likelihood of a terrorist attack very high with a large variance ($M = 41.19\%$, $SD = 36.31\%$).
Results

Measurement Checks

I first assessed whether responses on the threat items successfully measured separable underlying constructs. To this end, I entered all 17 items into a parallel factor analysis using maximum likelihood extraction. Three factors returned back eigen values of above 1 (See Table III-10 for eigen values).

Table III-10. Eigenvalues from factor analysis on perceived threat in Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% Variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>46.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>13.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>6.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>4.73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Table III-10 shows eigenvalues and percent of variance explained for the top five factors yielded by maximum likelihood extraction in participant responses to threat items. Two factors (those above the dashed line) were retained.*

However, the third factor accounted for only 6.67% of the variance in responding. It is important to note that the third factor does not split the questionnaires in any meaningful way – the third factor only loads .3 or higher on three symbolic threat measures that tap into values – “The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding work are quite similar to those of most Americans.”, “The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans”, and “The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.” As such, two factors were retained. The promax rotated solution shows a clear two
factor categorization: Factor 1 loaded highly on all symbolic and realistic threat items, and Factor 2 loaded highly only on terroristic threat items (Table # for loadings). Note that in all cases, no loading cross-loaded above .2. Because of this, I proceed with a combined measure of realistic and symbolic threat (\(M=3.14, SD=1.40 \, \alpha =.95\)), while leaving terroristic threat as its own measurement.

Table III-11. Factor loadings for perceived threat factor analysis in Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT2</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT3</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST1</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST2</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST3</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST4</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST5</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST6</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT1</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT2</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT3</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT4</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT5</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT6</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT7</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT8</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Table III-11 shows rotated factor loadings for the 2-factor solution for all 17 items. Loadings with an absolute value below .2 are suppressed. The table shows that Factors 1 and 2 closely correspond to realistic & symbolic threat and terroristic threat items, respectively.

Second, I checked to ensure that baseline support for human rights is high within the sample. I ran three independent sample t-tests from the median point (4=neither agree nor Disagree). Participants were significantly supportive of human rights generally (\(t(88)=12.93\),...
$p<.001, d=1.37, M=5.85, SD=1.35$), the right to not be tortured ($t(88)=15.45, p<.001, d=1.64, M=6.09, SD=1.28$), and the right to privacy ($t(88)=16.22, p<.001, d=1.72, M=6.11, SD=1.23$).

From this, I can confirm that participants do support human rights at baseline, and can use their baseline support of human rights as controls for following analyses.

**Between Subjects Analyses**

To calculate the amount of rights one is willing to give up, each individual participant’s responses to the eighteen segments were graphed as a line, with the area under each participant’s line computed by trapezoidal integration. This type of analysis targets the relative cost/benefit ratio of another’s rights for one’s own security. Once calculation of area under the curve per individual is calculated, one can then compare the average tradeoffs of rights for restrictions across target groups. Running an independent samples t-test, we find that there is a significant effect of Target Group ($t(78.5)=-2.09, p=.04$), such that individuals considering the rights of U.S. Citizens were willing to restrict less ($M=2,390.05, SD=3,291.92$) than those considering the rights of foreigners ($M=4,184.25, SD=4,731.16$).

Confirming that there is a significant effect of Target Group, I then examine what other variables are contributing to this effect. In order to do so, I ran a linear model on area under the curve being predicted by the manipulation condition and my full range of covariates, including one’s baseline risk percentage of expecting a terrorist attack, one’s support for human rights, right-wing authoritarianism, terroristic threat, intergroup threat, psychological sense of a global community, and average age. All continuous covariates were mean-centered prior to being included in the model. The results for this analysis can be seen on Table III-12, Model 1.
Table III-12. Between subjects model results predicting AUC of tradeoff between rights for security in Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Citizen</td>
<td>1706.87</td>
<td>827.82*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>1077.32</td>
<td>492.98*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Citizen *IT</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Risk %</td>
<td>-14.14</td>
<td>12.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-G</td>
<td>-96.86</td>
<td>383.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>593.89</td>
<td>1462.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>-225.01</td>
<td>377.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGC</td>
<td>-67.28</td>
<td>408.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-29.25</td>
<td>35.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2337.62</td>
<td>575.71***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All covariates are mean-centered. IT=Intergroup Threat, TT=Terroristic Threat, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarianism, SHR-G= Support Human Rights Generally, PSGC=Psychology Sense of a Global Community. + <.10, * <.05, ** <.01, ***<.001

The first model was significant ($F(8,80)=2.38, p<.02, Adj r^2=.11$). Individuals who were exposed to considering the rights of non-citizens showed significantly more total rights given away ($b=1706.87, se=827.82, t=2.06, p=.042$), and a one unit increase in the average feeling of intergroup threat was associated with increases in total area under the curve ($b=1077.32, se=492.98, t=2.19, p=.031$). No other control variables reached significance. It is more telling, however, to test if feelings of threat differentially impacted individuals under each condition.
Adding the moderator term of Intergroup Threat * Target Group significantly improved the model fit ($\chi^2(1)=7.85, p=.006$), with the new model explaining seven percent more variance ($F(9,79)=3.17, p=.003, Adj r^2=.18$; See Table III-12 Model 2). The new model showed that while Target Group was still significant ($b=1755.54, se=794.69, t=2.21, p=.03$), the effect of Intergroup Threat on those who considered the rights of U.S. citizens was non-significant ($b=271.64, se=553.65, t=0.49, p=.63$). Instead, there was a significant interaction, such that increases in intergroup effect showed significantly more area under the curve when considering the rights of non-U.S. citizens ($b=1840.60, se=656.86, t=2.80, p=.006$) (See Figure III-4).
Figure III-4. Moderating effect of intergroup threat when examining target group on area under the curve for rights given up in Study 3

Within Subjects Analyses

The first analysis showed an overall effect of Target Group. The following analysis examines whether or not there are differences across the amount of security one is willing to give up. General linear mixed models fit with REML with Satterthwaite approximations of degrees of freedom were run, all controlling for one’s baseline reported risk, general support for human rights, both measures of threat, right-wing authoritarianism, age, and psychological sense of a global community. The within-subjects independent variable, % reduction of terrorism, was mean-centered and treated as a continuous variable. Mean-centering continuous variables
provides the ability to create a squared term that is less correlated to a term that is not mean centered, increasing predictive value by reducing multicollinearity (Iacobucci, Schenider, Popovich, & Bakamitsos, 2016) ($r=.0007$ for mean-centered terms, $r=.97$ for non-mean centered terms).

The first model tested the simple main effects of increases in the mean centered reduction of terrorism and the effect of Target Group. The second model tests the moderating effect of Target Group on the increases in the reduction of terrorism on one’s percent of rights willing to give up. The final model tests if second order effects of the percent reduction in terrorism – that is, if the slopes for the percent reduction increase or decrease at differing rates. Therefore, Model 3 uses a quadratic model, allowing the marginal impact of the independent variable to change at different levels of the independent variable. Since each model was significantly better than the last ($\chi^2(1)=34.90, p<.001$ for Step 1 to 2; $\chi^2(1)=24.73, p<.001$ for Step 2 to Step 3), only the final model with the squared term and moderating effect will be discussed. All three models can be seen in Table III-13. The betas are adjusted so that a one unit increase in percent reduction of terrorism (i.e. 1%) is associated with a beta unit (%) increase in rights willing to be revoked.
Table III-13. Mixed model results predicting tradeoffs between rights for security including diminishing returns in Study 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US Citizen</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>4.60*</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>4.60*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US * IT</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-US * Security</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security²</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>2.74*</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>2.74*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Risk</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHR-G</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWA</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>8.13</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>8.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>-1.23</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSGC</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>2.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>18.31</td>
<td>7.14*</td>
<td>18.31</td>
<td>7.14*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All covariates are mean-centered. IT=Intergroup Threat, TT=Terroristic Threat, RWA=Right Wing Authoritarianism, SHR-G=Support Human Rights Generally, PSGC=Psychology Sense of a Global Community. + <.10, * <.05, ** <.01, ***<.001

In this model, the between-subjects effect of Target Group did have a main effect \( (b=9.50, se=4.60, t=2.07, p=.042) \), and was qualified by a Target Group by Percent interaction \( (b=0.05, se=0.01, t=5.99, p<.001) \). Holding all else equal, those who considered the rights of
non-citizens were willing to restrict their rights at the average level of a 99% decrease in likelihood of terrorism were willing to give up 9.50% more rights than one who was considering the rights of American citizens, and this difference increased by a hundredth of a percent for each additional percent likelihood. The effect of Security was significant, such that as the decreased risk in terrorism increased, the amount of rights one was willing to restrict also increased ($b=0.07$, $se=0.01$, $t=12.48$, $p<.001$). However, this was qualified by its own squared term ($b=-0.0004$, $se=0.00009$, $t=-5.00$, $p<.001$), meaning that while increases in Security was associated with increases in willingness to revoke rights, the amount each person would be willing to trade off decreased as the Security increased. Only the combined scale of realistic and symbolic threat was significantly associated with increased tradeoffs of rights for security ($b=5.95$, $se=2.74$, $t=2.17$, $p=.032$), with every additional point of threat reported, individuals were willing to give up approximately 6% more of their rights.

Using linear combinations, holding all else at its mean, the quadratic curve of Model 3 hits its maximum at 189% of security, with a predicted 31.48% removal of rights for Foreigners, while the U.S. citizens curve hit its maximum at 185% security with a predicted 17.25% removal of rights (See Figure III-5 for predicted values plot). Both of these predicted values at near the relative maximum of the scale (which was 189%), and predictions out of sample would be unsound, so one cannot conclude that there is a true maximum point, only that there does seem to be evidence of diminishing rates of tradeoffs due to the negative quadratic term.
Figure III-5. Predicted values of rights given up in exchanged for security fitted with loess smoothing in Study 3

Threat as a moderator of target group and support for the restrictions of civil liberties relationship. The last model showed that as promises of protection increased, willingness to give up rights increased with diminishing returns, and that this was more prominent when considering the rights of non-citizens. While threat significantly increased the amount of rights being restricted, it had not been considered as a moderator of this relationship – that is, would threat’s impact on the ratio of rights to security differ when considering the rights of ingroup or outgroup members? Adding threat as a moderator to Model 3 was a significant improvement on the model ($\chi^2(1) = 8.42, p = .004$), and the results can be found in Table III-13 Model 4 (See Figure III-6 for visualization of moderation).
Figure III-6. Moderation of intergroup threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties by promised security in Study 3

In this model, the effect of Target Group was significant ($b = 9.77, se = 4.41, t = 2.21, p = .03$), and was qualified by a Target Group by Security interaction ($b = 0.05, se = 0.01, t = 5.99, p < .001$). Those who were exposed to considering the rights of Foreigners were willing to give up 9.75% more rights for security, and gave up an additional .05% more rights for every percent increase in security on top of the baseline .07% more rights for those considering the rights of U.S. citizens ($b = 0.07, se = 0.01, t = 12.48, p < .001$). There was also a significant interaction of Target Group and Intergroup Threat. If considering the rights of U.S. citizens, intergroup threat had no effect on the willingness to trade rights for security ($b = 1.47, se = 3.08, t = 0.48, p = .64$). However, if considering
the rights of non-U.S. citizens, every point increase beyond the average feeling of intergroup threat was associated with 10% more restrictions of rights ($b=10.22, se=3.65, t=2.80, p.006$).

**Discussion**

In Study 3, I tested the relationship between restrictions of rights and security gains, with ingroup and outgroup as targets of rights restrictions. Results show that individuals are (a) willing to give up non-citizens rights much more and (b) while there was a limit to such restrictions, the rights of the outgroup were restricted more in order to gain security. Specifically, rights of the outgroup were restricted about twice as much as rights of the ingroup for the same level of security promised. While increased levels of security were met with increased willingness to restrict rights, this effect was attenuated by decreasing effects as promised security increased. This study also showed a significant effect of intergroup threat, but no effect of terroristic threat. It highlighted that the effects of intergroup threat are moderated by the Target Group – that increases in threat are related to increases in SRCL only when considering the rights of outgroup members and not for ingroup members.

**General Discussion**

In these three studies, I found that individuals were more willing to support policies that restricted the rights of a wide range of outgroup members (Study 1), that this range could be bifurcated at citizenship (Study 2), and that this bifurcation could be extended to be willing to remove up to 31.48% of the outgroups’ rights for the sake of increased security (Study 3).

Across studies, factor analysis loadings showed that realistic and symbolic threats were tapping into the same factor, and that the data best fit a two-factor model (the two factors were intergroup threat and terroristic threat). This supports works that has measured intergroup threat in combining measures of both symbolic and realistic threat (Beck & Plant, 2018; Canetti et al.,
2009; Djupe & Calfano, 2013; Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Seate, 2012; Shitrit et al., 2017; Verkuyten, 2009). At the same time, it also highlights that terroristic threat loads on a different measure of threat that is not purely realistic or symbolic. While some research has found that terrorism is correlated to symbolic threats (Crowson, 2009), further work understanding the differences between symbolic, terroristic, and realistic threat is warranted. The effect sizes of threat on support for the restrictions of civil liberties should also be noted. In the bivariate correlations, $r$’s of .41, .38, and .29 for intergroup threat and .28, .27, -.01, for terroristic threat were found. These results line up with the effect sizes found in Chapter II, that terroristic threat would be lower than intergroup threat, but both were in a medium effect size range.

With a intergroup threat measure, I found significant moderation of threat’s impact on the support for the rights of ingroups and outgroups (Study 1-3), with threat’s impact being most severe on members of non-citizenship status (Study 1), but not significant or lower when considering the rights of ingroup members (Studies 1 and 3). Study 2 did find a significant effect of threat on restrictions of the rights of ingroup members, but all three studies showed threat’s effect was greater when considering the rights of outgroup members. This is an important finding. It highlights that issues of group membership are highly salient when one is feeling particularly threatened. For American populations, this group membership-threat relationship may be particularly impactful at the citizenship level. Recent work has started to explore the impact of American identity centrality (Espinosa et al., 2018; Marshall & Shapiro, 2018), where those with higher identity centrality are particularly prejudiced against immigrant populations. Future work should examine how threat mediates this relationship between identity centrality and citizenship prejudice, since when an identity is central to us, it leads us to be particularly sensitive to threats against the central group (Leach et al., 2008).
Study 1 & 2 showed that this effect of threat was independent from the sources of the threat as being from the ingroup or outgroup. Instead, the restrictions of rights on outgroup members came regardless of whether or not an outgroup member had even caused the attack. Study 3 showed that even without the presentation or priming of an attack by members of the ingroup or outgroup, individuals were still willing to be more restrictive of outgroup rights. These results suggest that restrictions of rights are not driven purely for preventative means. Studies 1 & 2 showed this through the non-significance of the manipulation of Threat Creator. However, it could have been the case that the Threat Creator was always placed into the outgroup. Study 3 showed that our willingness to prevent terroristic attacks by trading off rights was significantly higher for outgroups rights than our own. While participants were willing to restrict 19% of their own rights to prevent terrorism, the fact they were willing to go above and beyond to restrict the rights of outgroup members suggests that a preventative-focused explanation cannot suffice. Individuals selectively restricted the rights of outgroup members for punitive means – that by being placed in the outgroup, those individuals were not worthy of the same amount of rights protections as those in the ingroup.

I also failed to find any effect of the Psychological Sense of a Global Community (PSGC) scale. It was important to include this measure as a predictor, since one would hope that those who identified a larger ingroup may have been less willing to selectively restrict rights based on the status of group. Some researchers have examined the possibility of a global community or identification with all humanity as the most important mediators in supporting human rights (Dunwoody & McFarland, 2018; Hackett et al., 2015; McFarland et al., 2013). In Dunwoody & McFarland’s (2018) general structural equation model, identification with all of humanity was the only variable to reduce the threat of Muslims which lead to decreases in
support for Anti-Muslim policies. However, there may be limits to how widely applicable an 
ever-expanding notion of an ingroup would be.

Research on deservingness suggests that such an ideal is impossible and impractical, 
given how we structure ideas and groups as good and bad (Hafer, 2012). Since the notion of who 
deserves something requires a comparison group to who does not deserve it, building an 
overarching group that encompasses everyone could never occur without the comparison falling 
on other targets of violations – the environment, animals, et cetera. Due to this, researchers may 
want to look at ways not to promote human rights or the size of one’s group, but instead, to limit 
the perception of threat across groups, and avoid the conversation of violating rights entirely. 
Still, failure to reject the null hypothesis does not equate to an acceptance of a null hypothesis, 
and there may be other reasons at play for why I failed to find an effect of the PSGC scale. For 
one, this study measured something different from what was measured in earlier studies. Hackett 
et al. (2015) showed strong correlations between PSGC and concern for human rights and 
willingness to get involved in ending abuses. However, one can have concern for human rights 
and still support their violations (see Drolet et al., 2016). Dunwoody and McFarland’s (2018) 
measurement of Identification with All Humanity’s scale (IWAH) showed negative correlations 
with banning religion and rejecting refugees. However, none of the current studies that have 
examined global identification as an ingroup measure have tested its effect on support for 
wiretapping and invasive surveillance, nor its effect on supporting general restrictions of rights 
for security. While support for a global community can be related to higher support for human 
rights as shown in the literature, it may not be impacting these decisions of rights under measures 
of threat.
**Future Directions**

The present findings pave the way for additional lines of research. First, an important problem remains unresolved: what other factors are mediating the decision to selectively restrict rights of the outgroup instead of the ingroup? My research does not provide a definitive answer; however, the moderating results of intergroup threat on target group for individuals with non-U.S. citizenship suggest that issues of citizenship may be at play. If this is the case, examining one’s American citizenship identity centrality and how threat may be mediating this relationship is an important next step.

Second, this research continues the question originally posed in Chapter II – is restrictions of rights a punitive or preventative decision-making process? In the discussion, I outlined how it seems to be heavily punitive, even when the question is framed in strictly preventative means (Study 3). If the restrictions of rights are heavily punitive in their nature, then future work needs to understand what can be done to redirect this aggression in the face of threat. This could be done in a number of ways. For example, we may want to focus on reducing feelings of threat, so punitive reactions are less likely to occur. If threat cannot be avoided or reduced, then we need to find ways to redirect the aggression or make new meanings of the threat, such as educating individuals about the threat. Fischer et al. (2011) showed that providing information about the motivations for terrorism increased one’s affect, hinting that those who gained information found meaning in the attacks and felt less threatened by terrorism.

Third, this research brings a new consideration on the importance of group membership and intergroup relations when explaining the violation of human rights. Cultural memories of victimhood often ensure protection of ingroup rights and disregard for the rights of the outgroup (Vollhardt, 2012), and through this work, we see that victimhood can extend beyond what has
happened and move towards what *might* happen. In many cases, perceptions of violations of the ingroups' human rights can lead to a felt right for retribution and retaliation (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Huddy & Feldman, 2011) creating a cycle of violence and mutual radicalization of both groups involved (Peffley, Hutchison, & Shamir, 2015; Moghaddam, 2018). If individuals are considering the restriction of rights as a preventative measure, they may feel that even considering violating their own ingroups’ rights is a cause for retribution against the outgroup, lending potential support to why the outgroup gets targeted more often.
CHAPTER IV: GENERAL DISCUSSION

In this dissertation, I examined three fundamental questions: First, what is the relationship between threat and support for the restriction of civil liberties (SRCL)? Second, how is this relationship moderated by whose civil liberties and human rights are the target of the restrictions? Third, if there is moderation by group membership, how do individuals define the groups? In Chapter II, I examined the first question by conducting a meta-analysis on the relationship of threat and support for the restriction of civil liberties.

The meta-analysis demonstrated a small to medium effect size of threat on support for the restriction of civil liberties. Among other significant moderators, the effect size was largest when restricting the liberties and rights of outgroup members compared to ingroup members or ingroup and outgroup members. This led to three experiments reported in Chapter III, which explored the next two questions. Across three studies, using both between-subjects and within-subjects designs, I found that threat’s effect on SRCL was moderated by Target Group, and that this moderation occurred at the border of citizenship status. If the Target Group did not hold U.S. citizenship, restrictions of civil liberties were significantly more supported compared to other groups (Study 1), and this applied to both specific restrictive policy proposals (Studies 1 & 2) and generalized restrictions (Study 3).

There are some limitations throughout this dissertation. First, meta-analyses have received a fair bit of criticism (c.f. Brannon, Fleetwood, Mahoney, & Vincent, 2016; Goldin, 1992). In this meta-analysis, we were limited by the potential of unpublished studies that failed to show significance. In order to address this limitation, a variety of statistical measures were taken to check the strength of the effect, and it still remained significant with these conservative restrictions. There is also the inherent assumption within the meta-analysis that each
measurement of threat and SRCL were all measuring the same general construct of threat. However, it may very well be the case that one’s feelings of threat are different across time (c.f. developmental perspective of meaning making; Branco & Valsiner, 2010; Carriere, under review), across cultures (c.f. cross-cultural perspective of meaning making; Keith, 2011); and across targets. Instead, the meta-analysis provided quantitative confirmation of the overall existence of a threat construct, and showed that its effect on the restrictions of civil liberties differed according to both personality characteristics (RWA and SDO) as well as target group (outgroups compared to ingroups).

In the experiments, Studies 1 and 2 did not include parallel manipulations. The more restrictive policy was longer in length of reading, which may have tired individuals out or soured them towards the policy. I was unable to measure the reasons why participants decided to support the less restrictive policy compared to the more restrictive policy. Study 3 was designed to address this confound, where participants are not presented with any policy at all. Study 1 and 2 also failed to test to see if the manipulation of threat was present compared to a baseline category of no threat at all. I was unable to test to see if the manipulation of threat generally influenced individuals one way or another. However, conversations around the restrictions of civil liberties typically happen only after an evocative threat occurs. Therefore, my manipulation, while unable to compare threat’s general role, more accurately reflects the type of questions that emerge after an attack, providing some ecological validity to the studies at large. However, future research should consider what the absence of threat would look like in Studies 1 and 2 to see if manipulated threat does indeed have an active role compared to a baseline category.

Despite these limitations, the results indicate that restrictions of civil liberties and human rights are more of a punitive-based measure, rather than a preventative-based measure, as
discussed in the Introduction. It did not extend to the furthest end of the punitive-based spectrum, since individuals were still willing to restrict the rights of their own group in order to reduce the threat of terrorism in Study 3. At the same time, by explicitly outlining their choices in terms of prevention of terroristic activity in Study 3, I tested the furthest end of the preventative-based spectrum. Individuals were not equally willing to reduce rights, which suggests that restrictions are not a purely preventative-based approach. Future research may want to test the furthest end of the punitive-based spectrum, by informing participants that any restrictions of rights would be met with zero security-based benefit. In this way, there is no preventative benefit to the restrictions of rights – security will not benefit from such actions -- and instead, only a punitive benefit – individuals will lose their rights. It would be important to see how restrictions are distributed – if at all – when there is no benefit to their restrictions.

In the Introduction, I suggested that expanding one’s ingroup through thinking in terms of a global community may show reductions in punitive-driven restrictions. However, across Chapter III, no significant negative relationship emerged between SRCL and identification with a global community. One explanation provided in Chapter III was that this was the first study to examine threat alongside these identification measures, and that in the face of threat, individual differences in global community identity are less important to the relationship under investigation. A second explanation could be that the group divisions were being created to distinguish between those who ‘deserved’ and those who ‘did not’ (Hafer & Bègue, 2005). This second interpretation suggests that restrictions of human rights are connected to the ‘just world hypothesis’ – that our group, being good, deserves rights, and the outgroup, being bad, does not (Hafer, 2012; Darley, 2009). In manipulating how morally reprehensible a suspected terrorist was, Drolet, Hafer, and Heuer (2016) found that the more participants believed the terrorist
deserved severe treatment, the more they were willing to support torturing them. This effect remained even when individuals felt guilty and were faced with the cognitive dissonance of their support for human rights and their support for torture (Drolet, 2014). Since the notion of who deserves something requires a comparison group to who does not deserve it, building an overarching group that encompasses everyone (a la a global community identity) could never occur without the comparison falling on other targets of violations – the environment, animals, et cetera.

Due to this, researchers may want to look at ways not to promote human rights or the size of one’s group, but instead, find ways to limit the perception of threat across groups, and avoid the conversation of violating rights entirely. Researchers may look towards fields such as positive psychology, focusing on an individual’s wellbeing, resilience through hardships (Cohrs et al., 2013) and affirming individual’s personal significance (Kruglanski & Orehek, 2011) as ways of decreasing one’s feelings of threat. The role of education in this effort also should not be understated. Fischer et al. (2011) showed that providing information about the motivations for terrorism increased one’s affect, hinting that those who gained information found meaning in the attacks and felt less threatened by terrorism. Further research supports this claim - in a longitudinal study of U.S. adults, finding existential meaning about the September 11th attacks mediated fear of a future attack and reduced post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms two years later (Updegraff, Silver, & Holman, 2008). Along with the research of both indirect and direct education on human rights (Jenssen & Engesbak, 1994; Jabeen, 2013, Mondak & Hurwitz, 2012; Schmuck & Matthes, 2015; Stellmacher & Sommer, 2008; Theriault, Krause, & Young, 2017), there may be additional benefits to reducing one’s threatening feelings in the face of terrorism and uncertainty.
Restrictions of rights – for any reason – punitive or preventive – should be avoided. The restriction of human rights impedes the ability for actualized democracies to emerge (Moghaddam, 2016). Most harrowing to the futures of democracies was that decisions to restrict human rights and civil liberties were based on issues of citizenship status. This is particularly concerning with the rise in immigration as a political talking point, and the role of one’s “Americanness” is central to this debate. Individuals who reported “being American” as important to their identity had more pessimistic views regarding the impact of immigrants and supported policies that would expel unauthorized immigrants (Espinosa et al, 2018; Marshall & Shapiro, 2018). Since the in-group of ‘American’ is important to who they are, one can expect that those higher in American identity centrality would demand less justice (Leidner et al., 2010) and feel less guilt (Roccas et al., 2006) when faced with human rights violations of their ingroup members – such as border enforcing agents (Tarrant et al., 2012). Further research needs to continue to explore the other factors that are at play when considering human rights violations and one’s citizenship.

Conclusion

The findings from this dissertation emphasize the importance of perceived threat in the decision to support policies that restrict the civil liberties and human rights of others while considering the moderating effect of how different target groups for such policies influence the relationship. By finding that issues of citizenship are the most at play when considering the restrictions of rights, I show that the restriction of rights is due to punitive motivations of discrimination and subjugation. The proposed model of a punitive-driven support for restricted human rights provides a framework for future studies to identify and target ways to reduce one’s desire to punish through education, positive psychology, and a just world.
APPENDIX A: THREAT MANIPULATION FOR STUDY 1

High Threat
Dallas and Houston Terror Attacks
9:35 PM CDT on Monday, October 10, 2011
By John Smith
Press International

[copyrighted photo]
Photo 1. Destruction of the federal agencies in Dallas, Texas.] OR (Low Threat) [No picture].

At approximately 9:35am November 15, 2011 [a series of car bombs exploded simultaneously in front of three major federal offices in the commercial center of downtown Dallas, Texas] OR (Low Threat) [a small explosion occurred in front of a small neighborhood café in the North East commercial side of downtown Dallas, Texas].

[Two additional car bombs exploded directly in front of a federal law enforcement agency location in downtown Houston at approximately 8:40am central time. At this time it is estimated that the attacks have resulted in 86 federal employee deaths as well as the deaths of 140 civilians who were in the vicinity of these busy commercial sites. Close to 100 injuries have also been sustained and the count is still rising.] OR (Low Threat)
[An additional suspicious package was found in front of a federal law enforcement agency location in downtown Houston at approximately 8:40am central time. It has just been confirmed that the package did in fact contain a small explosive device but local law enforcement officials were able to thwart the planned explosion. Fortunately, only two injuries were sustained by Federal agents and no civilian casualties have been reported.]

[copyrighted photo]

[Photo 2. Rescuing civilians in the aftermath in downtown Houston, TX] OR (Low Threat) [No picture.]

[copyrighted photo]

[It is believed that members of two domestic terrorist organizations—the ‘Iron Brigades’ and the ‘White Knights’ are responsible for the attacks.] OR (Outgroup) [It is believed that members of a well-known international terrorist organization—‘Al-Jamuut’—thought to be headquartered in North Africa, are responsible for the attack.]

Each of the federal agencies attacked recently received anonymous letters describing the terrorists’ discontent with recent domestic policy and political stances taken by the government.
The terrorists threatened extreme violent actions in response with this being the first attack of many more destructive events to come.

[The two domestic groups thought to be responsible for the attacks have been associated with various hate crimes across the country in the past.] OR (Outgroup) [The terrorist organization thought to be responsible for the attacks have been associated with various attacks throughout Western Europe and Southeast Asia in recent months.]

Though, it is clear due to the symbolic nature of the targets selected as well as the content of the letters that they currently have more severe grievances. [The level of sophistication involved in these incidents speaks to the meticulous planning and preparation that went into these attacks as well as to the vulnerability of the public at-large.] OR (Low Threat) [Fortunately, local officials were able to identify and prevent the planned attack in downtown Houston. No further information is available at this time.]

[The Homeland Security Advisory System has raised the domestic threat level to “red,” which is the highest level of alert. This clearly indicates the severity of these attacks as well as the high probability of a near future attack. White House officials have warned that anyone living in close proximity to any type of government facility should be worried.] OR (Low Threat) [The Homeland Security Advisory System has maintained its terror alert to “green,” which is the lowest threat level and is often used under minor situations such as these. White House officials have also released a statement saying that there is nothing to be particularly cautious about and that the general public should go about their daily business because the situation has been easily contained. It also does not appear that there will be a similar incident in the near future.]
APPENDIX B: POLICY PROPOSAL MANIPULATION FOR STUDIES 1 AND 2

[High Restrictive] OR [Low Restrictive]

As Secretary of Homeland Security, my highest priority is the safety and security of the American people. In an effort to more meaningfully address the threat of terrorism in the United States, Congress has already drafted and passed into law new legislation intended to enhance national security against acts of terrorism.

[This piece of legislation, known as the ‘Secure the Nation Act,’ imposes greater restrictions on immigration, personal privacy rights in public areas and individual informational privacy, as well as alterations on rights to individual physical privacy and criminal procedural laws.] OR [This piece of legislation, known as the ‘Secure the Nation Act,’ imposes slightly greater restrictions on immigration as well as restrictions on privacy rights in public areas.]

Section 201 sets additional standards for citizenship, admission, and expulsion. [It] OR [Section 203] further limits the number of yearly travel visas to all foreign citizens and creates additional requirements in applying for a visa to the US [and] OR [. Section 205] provides authority for Federal and local law enforcement to utilize automatic number plate recognition systems, which store car registrations as well as images of drivers through public cameras and recording systems.

Government agencies as well as local law enforcement will also be given the right to acquire more detailed personal information on communications and the movement of people through advanced tracking systems.

Section 203 allows for the restriction of access to “high threat” areas such as government buildings and those areas that may be clear targets for terrorist organizations, which will involve highly visible guard posts and surveillance equipment. These restrictions will be determined on a case by case basis.

Section 205 allows for the collection and storage of all personal financial information from banks and other financial institutions, educational information of universities and secondary schools, business transactions, travel information from airlines, as well as data from internet service providers. The government and privately contracted research firms will use this data to search for patterns of suspicious and terroristic activity.

Section 207 allows for the retention of DNA samples and individual profiles of suspected criminals even if they are not charged with a crime. Full body scanning machines will be installed in all regional and international airports with an additional security check between connecting flights. Section 207 also allows for randomized DNA sampling at airport security check points. Section 209 restricts the constitutional rights to protect individuals from the arbitrary deprivation of basic freedoms such as arrest and detention. Terrorist suspects may be kept in custody for 14 days without a lawyer and without a formal criminal investigation.] OR [(These restrictions are only a minimal increase in the current range of government counter-terrorism operations.).]

After carefully considering the recommendations of our top intelligence analysts and advisory staff, the administration believes that the actions specified in the Secure the Nation Act are the most appropriate to take at this time.
APPENDIX C: THREAT MEASUREMENT QUESTIONS

All realistic and symbolic questions are adapted from the following citation:


If the question has a (R), it was reverse coded prior to analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Name</th>
<th>Question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TT1</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel personally threatened by terrorism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT2</td>
<td>To what extent do you feel your loved ones are personally threatened by terrorism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT3</td>
<td>How likely do you think it is that you will be involved in a terrorist attack?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST1</td>
<td>Immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of American society as soon as possible after they arrive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST2</td>
<td>Immigration is undermining American culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST3</td>
<td>The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding work are quite similar to those of most Americans. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST4</td>
<td>The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST5</td>
<td>The values and beliefs of immigrants regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ST6</td>
<td>Immigrants should not have to accept the American ways. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT1</td>
<td>Immigrants get more from this country than they contribute.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT2</td>
<td>The child of immigrants should have the same right to attend public schools in the United States as Americans do. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT3</td>
<td>Immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT4</td>
<td>Immigrants are not displacing American workers from their jobs. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT5</td>
<td>Immigrants should be eligible for the same health care benefits received by Americans. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT6</td>
<td>Social services have become less available to Americans because of immigration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT7</td>
<td>The quality of social services available to Americans has remained the same, despite immigration. (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RT8</td>
<td>Immigrants are entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized utilities (water, sewage, electricity) as poor Americans are. (R)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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doi:10.1093/poq/nfr068


