SCHOOLS IN SANCTUARY CITIES: DO SANCTUARY CITY POLICIES DIMINISH CHRONIC
ABSENTEEISM AMONG IMMIGRANT CHILDREN?

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By

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ABSTRACT

Local immigration enforcement is associated with myriad negative socioeconomic, health, and education outcomes for immigrant children and families. While anecdotal evidence shows that local enforcement also negatively effects student attendance in the short term, there is a dearth of research showing any long-term association, nor is there any showing the impact of sanctuary city policies. This study uses immigration, school, and county data from the Immigrant Legal Resource Center's PEP Tracker, the Department of Education's Civil Rights Data Collection and Common Core of Data, the American Community Survey, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture to explore the association between sanctuary city policies and chronic absenteeism rates for English Language-Learners (ELLs) during the 2015-2016 school year. An Ordinary Least Squares regression with school and county socioeconomic controls and state fixed-effects reveals that sanctuary cities that refuse to accept ICE detainer and notification requests are associated with a marginal decrease in ELL chronic absenteeism of 0.6 percentage points, on average. Sanctuary cities that only refuse detainer requests do not show any statistically significant association. Given the small size of this association, additional research is needed to clarify the relationship between sanctuary cities and ELL chronic absenteeism.

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INTRODUCTION

As news spread that six undocumented teenagers were detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on their way to school in Charlotte, North Carolina, in the fall of 2016, other immigrant students reported missing school because they were fearful that they or their family members would be deported (Lee 2016). In Las Cruces, New Mexico, public schools experienced a 62 percent increase in absences after an ICE raid at a trailer park (Blitzer 2017). While these stories make headlines in the era of President Trump's anti-immigration rhetoric and executive orders, the Obama Administration had deported more immigrants than any other president since 2006 ("Donald Trump is Deporting Fewer…" 2017). And while there are myriad anecdotes of immigrant children missing school out of fear, there is no quantitative research showing how immigration enforcement or sanctuary city policies affects their attendance.

Intensified immigration enforcement has unintended consequences for education policy, as 9.5 percent of public-school students are English Language Learners (ELLs), ranging from 1 percent in West Virginia to 21.2 percent in California (NCES 2018) (see Figure 1). Not all ELLs are immigrants, and not all immigrants are undocumented immigrants, but ELLs are likely to have a family member who is an undocumented immigrant (Dreby 2010). Over three-fourths of ELLs speak Spanish, but many other languages are represented among them as well, including Arabic (2.4 percent), Chinese (2.1 percent), and Vietnamese (1.7 percent) (NCES 2018) (see Figure 2). Similarly, while most undocumented immigrants are Hispanic, 12 percent are estimated to be Asian (Pew Research 2018).

The goal of the present study is to explore whether sanctuary city policies are associated with reduced chronic absenteeism rates for ELLs using Ordinary Least Squares regression and

controlling for important socioeconomic factors and state fixed-effects. The Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC), one of the nation's preeminent immigrant advocacy organizations, used a Freedom of Information Act request to obtain data from ICE on which localities do and do not collaborate with ICE by accepting or rejecting notification and detainer requests (Graber & Marquez 2016). School-level data on chronic absenteeism by ELL-status and other covariate data were obtained from the U.S. Department of Education's Civil Rights Data Collection and Common Core of Data for the 2015-2016 school year. County-level data for socioeconomic controls were gleaned from the American Community Survey 5-year estimates for 2010-2015 and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. This study focuses on immigration enforcement in the 2015-2016 school year, which falls during the end of the Obama Administration and before the Trump Administration, but amid Trump's anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Chronic absenteeism decreases academic performance and future success, as the following literature review illustrates. Interestingly, ELLs are less likely to be chronically absent than their peers (ED 2016), so the possibly of increasing absenteeism as a result of immigration enforcement would be alarming. Furthermore, at least 36 states plus the District of Columbia have elected to measure chronic absenteeism as one of their school quality and student success indicators under the Every Student Succeeds Act (Jordan & Miller 2017). Schools and districts that perform poorly on their accountability indicators will be targeted for interventions by the state, including being shut down. Thus, the findings from this study will be valuable to schools, school districts, counties, and states who, on average, have a student body that is 9.5 percent ELL. These findings also have ramifications for immigration policy, specifically for a locality's decision to partner with ICE for immigration enforcement.

Spanish is the most dominant language spoken by ELLs, at 77.1%, although its share has been stable since 2008. Other less-spoken languages are on the rise, specifically Karen and Nepali, which have tripled since then.

Change in Number of Speakers, 2008 to 2015

-36% 0%   340%

Spanish: 77.1%

Other: 22.9%

Telugu
Tagalog
Swahili
Hmong
Urdu
Vietnamese 1.7%
Japanese
Chinese 2.1%
Filipino
Karen
Khmer
Hindi
Amharic
Burmese
Arabic 2.4%
Korean
Haitian
Bengali
Gujarati
German French
Nepali
Somali
Russian
Persian
Panjabi
Portuguese Polish

Source: National Center for Education Statistics

Figure 1: Top 30 languages spoken by English-language learners by size and growth, 2015

Nationally, English-Language Learners (ELLs) make up 9.5 percent of the student body. ELLs are concentrated on the coasts, especially the West Coast.

AK
ME
VT   NH
WA   MT   ND   MN   WI   MI   NY   MA   RI
ID   WY   SD   IA   IL   IN   OH   PA   NJ   CT
OR   NV   CO   NE   MO   KY   WV   MD   DE   West Virginia has the lowest concentration of ELLs
CA   AZ   UT   KS   AR   TN   VA   NC   DC
California has the highest concentration of ELLs
NM   OK   LA   MS   AL   SC
TX   GA
HI   FL

1%   21%

Source: National Center for Education Statistics

Figure 2: Percent of English-language learners in student body by state, 2015

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OVERVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE AND CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Immigration enforcement in the U.S.

Although the U.S. Department of Justice had overseen immigration matters through Immigration and Naturalization Services since 1933, the federal government did not focus on enforcement until Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986. IRCA made it illegal to hire undocumented immigrants, increased funding for border security, and gave legal status to many undocumented immigrants (Meissner et al. 2013). About this time, the modern sanctuary city movement began when localities like Berkley, California, named themselves "cities of refuge" for Central American migrants who crossed the border illegally to escape the deadly civil war in their countries (McMillan 1987).

After the 9/11 attacks, immigration enforcement evolved once more when President George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and assigned the responsibility of immigration enforcement to three internal bureaus: Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Customs and Border Protection, and Citizenship and Immigration Services. With immigration framed in terms of homeland security instead of justice, funding for immigration enforcement increased 15-fold when controlling for inflation (Meissner et al. 2013). Under the direction of the Obama Administration, ICE was supposed to focus on immigrants with criminal convictions; however, this was often not the reality. In 2011, 92 percent of the leading charges in prosecuted immigration cases were for immigration crimes such as entering the country illegally or after being removed (Meissner et al. 2013); however, President Obama relaxed immigration enforcement towards the end of his administration, beginning around 2014 (Chishti et al. 2017).

This paper will focus on sanctuary cities, which are local jurisdictions that have resisted participating in local immigration enforcement. This is only one aspect of local immigration enforcement; the Migration Policy Institute divides enforcement into six pillars: enforcement at the border, visa and travel screening, data and tracking systems, workplace enforcement, junctures with the criminal justice system, and the detention and deportation of immigrants (Meissner et al. 2013). While DHS oversees immigration enforcement at the federal level, in recent years ICE has collaborated with state and local law enforcement agencies for the last two pillars of enforcement to increase the breadth and efficiency of its removal operations.

For example, since 1996, some states and counties have elected to enter in 287(g) agreements with ICE, which permit state and local law enforcement officers to perform certain federal immigration enforcement tasks, such as checking immigration status and detaining unauthorized immigrations until ICE takes custody (Meissner et al. 2013). The implementation of the program varies from locality to locality, yet it remains an important tool for deportation; in 2009, 12 percent of ICE apprehensions were from the 287(g) program. This agreement was notoriously abused by Sheriff Jo Arpaio's department in Arizona; in 2011 the Department of Justice found his department guilty of racial profiling, and, shortly thereafter, DHS ended their 287(g) partnership (Meisner et al. 2013). After implementing a 287(g) agreement in Costa Mesa, California, Latinx residents reported more negative perceptions of police, feeling less accepted in the community, and that they were less likely to report crimes (Vidales et al. 2009). By 2016, only 25 communities participated in the 287(g) program (Graber & Marquez 2016).

More recently, the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) enabled ICE to ask local law enforcement agencies to notify them and/or detain priority individuals following their release

from prison or jail. When individuals are booked by local law enforcement, their fingerprints are taken and compared to an FBI criminal database, whereby ICE is alerted (ICE 2018b). In 2015, PEP replaced the controversial Secure Communities program, through which ICE previously issued detainer requests for immigrants who have been arrested—not convicted—of both civil and criminal crimes (ICE 2017). Detainers remain an essential part of PEP, although they are only used for individuals accused of specific criminal crimes, including gang activity or endangering national security (Ibid.). Both programs have been challenged in court for violating probable cause, due process, and ICE's statutory authority (Avila et al. 2018), including in *Galarza v. Szalcyzk* 745 F. 3d 634 (Court of Appeals, 3rd Circuit 2014) after a U.S. citizen was wrongly detained through PEP (Wong 2017). Nevertheless, PEP ended in 2017 when President Trump passed an executive order reinstating Secure Communities and aiming to end sanctuary cities (ICE 2018b).

There is no official policy that makes a city (or county) a sanctuary city or not; it's an umbrella term. Sanctuary cities are local jurisdictions that have passed any of a range of laws meant to protect their non-citizen residents, ranging from non-cooperation with ICE to keeping resident's immigration status private (Villazor 2010). The ILRC takes a pyramid approach to sanctuary cities, defining the foundation as "stay and be safe laws" that separate local law enforcement from immigration enforcement. Next on the pyramid are "survive and thrive" policies, which include offering driver's licenses and in-state tuition to unauthorized immigrants who reside in their state. The tip of the pyramid includes policies of "belonging" such as financing residents' naturalization fees and promoting cross-cultural exchange (Graber &

Marquez 2016). The latter policies are the most generous, but they are built on policies below them on the pyramid.

The present study examines "stay and be safe" types of laws— specifically, localities that refuse to accept ICE's PEP notification and/or detainer requests. In previous studies, Wong used localities that don't accept ICE detainer requests as a proxy for sanctuary cities (2017). Using coarsened exact matching, he found that sanctuary cities are associated with less crime and a stronger local economy (Ibid.). His study did not look at the impact on children.

Consequences of local immigration enforcement for children

Undocumented immigrant children are afforded certain rights per the U.S. Constitution, but they still face both direct and indirect risks. Prominently, according to *Plyler v. Doe* 457 (U.S. 202 1982), the Supreme Court ruled that undocumented immigrant children are entitled to the same free and public education that native-born citizens are. Similarly, many schools have prohibited ICE from entering their property (Hoffmann 2016), and ICE has claimed that they will not do so except in dire circumstances (ICE 2018a). While immigrant children are afforded certain protections, their parents are not. Furthermore, immigrant children still suffer when their parents and family members are deported.

Local immigration enforcement has negative social, economic, and health consequences for the children that are left behind. As a result of increased deportations from 2005-2015, which deported many fathers of U.S. citizens, native-born Hispanic children were 19 percent more likely to live without either of their parents and 20 percent more likely to live alone with an undocumented mother (Amuedo-Dorantes & Arenas-Arroyo 2019). The implementation of a

287(g) agreement increased food insecurity by 10 percent among Mexican non-citizen households (Potochnick et al. 2016) and also increased foreclosure rates for Hispanic households (Rugh & Hall 2016). After ICE raids in Everett, Massachusetts, health care providers reported negative physical and psychological effects for their patients (Hacker et al. 2012). A general review of literature shows that Hispanic children experience many negative psychological, physical, social, and economic effects from immigration enforcement (Capps et al. 2015), as do case studies (Chaudry et al. 2010).

The trauma of local immigration enforcement also adversely affects children's education outcomes. Intensified enforcement is associated with children repeating a grade and dropping out of school; using their own index for immigration enforcement, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez (2015) found that intensified immigration enforcement causes the children of likely-undocumented immigrants to repeat grades and drop out of school, with the strongest effects for children aged 6-13, who are 6 percent more likely to repeat a grade and 25.2 percent more likely to drop out of school. Similarly, Dee and Murphy (2018) found that counties which implement a 287(g) agreement see a 10 percent reduction in Hispanic student enrollment in their school districts over two years. These negative consequences of immigration enforcement motivate many localities to pass sanctuary policies.

The impacts of chronic absenteeism

The present study examines chronic absenteeism as the dependent variable, as absenteeism is associated with reduced math and reading achievement outcomes, reduced educational engagement, and reduced social engagement (Gottfried 2010, Gottfried 2014,

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Goodman 2014). The Department of Education defines chronic absenteeism as missing 15 or more days of school in a year (ED 2016). As previously mentioned, there is anecdotal evidence that increased immigration enforcement causes immigrant students to miss school in the short term. In general, migration stressors (traumatic family events, choice of migration, discrimination, and documentation status) increase risk of depressive symptoms and anxiety for first-generation immigrant Latinx youth (Potochnick & Perreira 2010). Even legal immigrant children and U.S. citizens face secondary trauma from enforcement when they have family members who are undocumented (Rabin 2018, Dreby 2010). However, chronic absenteeism is a result of many other factors besides just immigration enforcement.

Education outcomes are related to many individual, family, neighborhood, and school factors. Chronic absenteeism rates are higher for children with poor health, high internalizing behaviors, a larger family, and lower socioeconomic status (Gottfried & Ghee 2017). For Latinx ELL students, socioeconomic status is especially important for educational outcomes such as school completion— even more so than factors such as parent expectations, parent-child communication, and school connectedness (Jimerson et al. 2016). Neighborhood-level factors also influence a child's success in school; a meta-level regression of 88 studies found that neighborhood poverty, educational climate, concentration of ethnic groups, and social disorganization are significantly associated with success (Nieuwenhuis & Hooimeijer 2014).

Urban students also report that a negative school climate, as it pertains to their perception of safety, relationships, and the external environment (building and academics), increases absenteeism (Van Eck et al. 2017). While it can be difficult to quantify school climate, studies generally focus on the presence of positive supports and relationships and the absence of unfair

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punishments such as zero tolerance discipline policies (Vega 2015). Latinx students report that school security measures both make them feel safe at school and threaten their wellbeing, with first-generation Mexican immigrant youth most likely to see the security measures as targeted against them. Interestingly, both groups viewed their school resource officer (SRO) in a positive manner, even when the school's discipline policies target their racial groups (Portillos et al. 2011). In particular, the presence of SRO and sworn police offers in schools contributes to the school-to-prison pipeline in disadvantaged schools, a process which removes minority children from the academic environment through suspensions, expulsions, and arrests, culminating in entry into the criminal justice system (Lynch 2018).

For undocumented students and their families, seeing police officers in their schools may make them fearful, especially if their county has a 287(g) agreement which permits police officers to inquire about immigration status. While this is not part of a SRO's responsibility, immigrant advocates in Wake Forest, North Carolina (which participates in the 287(g) program), encouraged the school district to pass a resolution to ensure that SROs would not intervene in any non-school related matters (Hui 2017). Existing federal laws, including FERPA, prohibit schools from sharing information with ICE; furthermore, some school districts have passed additional policies explicitly stating that they will not collaborate with ICE or allow them on school grounds (Hoffmann 2016). Yet, many immigrant communities remain skeptical after a handful of incidents have proven that school officials are not always aware of these laws (Ibid.).

On the other hand, some immigrant families see their school as a safe space separate from local enforcement policies. Some schools have responded to intensified immigration enforcement by increasing their outreach to the immigrant community—so much so that some

have even improved academic outcomes for immigrant students despite an anti-immigrant climate (Capps et al. 2015).

The current study

This literature forms the underpinning of the conceptual model (see Figure 3) that influences immigrant children's aggregate level of school attendance. The current study focuses on the county level, controlling for school-level characteristics when appropriate, instead of individual factors in order to assess the impact of certain sanctuary policies. In this analysis, it is important to control for county-level factors that influence school attendance for immigrant children, such as the average education level, marriage rate of adults, and percentage of non-citizen foreigners. Characteristics on race, poverty, and the prevalence of school security officers are included at the school-level of analysis. Data was not available for all concepts in this model.

Figure 3: Conceptual model for English-language learner chronic absenteeism

Data sources

School-level data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Education's Civil Rights

Data Collection (CRDC) and the National Center for Education Services' Common Core of Data

(CCD) for the 2015-2016 school year. County-level data on immigration policies was obtained

with permission from the Immigrant Legal Resource Center's (ILRC) PEP Tracker, which the

ILRC obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests from ICE in 2016. Additional

county-level data was gleaned from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey

(ACS) five-year estimates for 2010-2015 and the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic

Research Service rural-urban continuum codes for 2013 (the most recent year available).

School districts and counties are not always congruous, so the school's county identifier

(although with other covariates) was merged in from the CCD to match school and county-level

data. Instead of regrouping schools into counties (instead of districts), observations were kept at

the school-level to account for the heterogeneity of school characteristics and inequalities

between schools within a county.

Analysis sample

After cleaning and merging these data files together, 99.9 percent (86,784/86,849) of all

schools in the CRDC successfully matched. This excludes the 5,321 schools described in the

CRDC as juvenile justice facilities, special education schools, and/or alternative schools, as these

schools have unique settings, policies, and student needs. Schools not in the contiguous U.S.

(n=767) were also excluded. PEP data was not available for certain counties, and the entire states

of West Virginia and Rhode Island were excluded from this analysis due to difficulty finding

data. Ultimately, 91.1 percent (79,063/ 86,784) of schools in the initial dataset were in counties

with PEP data; the final universe of data for this analysis includes 79,063 school-level

observations.

Dependent variable: English-language learner chronic absenteeism

The dependent variable is the *chronic absenteeism rate for ELL students*. As previously mentioned, ELL students are less likely to be chronically absent than their peers (ED 2016). In the universe of data for this analysis (which excludes certain schools) shown in Table 1, the average chronic absenteeism rate in the 2015-2016 school year was 15.1 percent

Table 1: Chronic absenteeism rates for English-language learner and non-English-language learner students		
Grades	ELL students	Non-ELL students
Elementary	0.1279 (0.1767)	0.1335 (0.1164)
Middle	0.1456 (0.1999)	0.1456 (0.1194)
High	0.2366 (0.2684)	0.2185 (0.1926)
Overall	0.1513 (.2071)	0.1539 (0.1437)

Mean (0-1) with standard deviation in parenthesis
Data Source: ED CRDC 2015-2016

for ELL students and 15.4 percent for non-ELL students, although the variance is much higher

for ELL students (these means are statistically different (p<.000); see Appendix A, Table 1). The

only instance when ELL students are more likely to be chronically absent than their peers is in

high school, where there is a significant difference between the absenteeism rates for both

groups. Older students, especially immigrant students, often face additional obligations, such as

having to work to support their families, and having greater de facto autonomy over the decision

of whether and when to attend school.

Key explanatory variables: Immigrant Legal Resource Center sanctuary city status

The key explanatory variable is a *locality's sanctuary city status*, which is determined by their PEP tracker category, which the ILRC obtained from ICE (see Table 2). As previously mentioned, the Wong study used counties that do not accept ICE detainer requests as a proxy for sanctuary cities (PEP status = 1, 2, or 3), which account for approximately 23.2 percent of counties in the current study. Model II will test this sanctuary framework. Model I will test a more stringent conception of sanctuary cities by classifying sanctuary cities as those that do not accept ICE detainer *or* notification requests (PEP status= 1 or 2). Only about 4.8 percent of localities meet this criterion. The plurality of counties is willing to accept both ICE detainer and notification requests, as this is the default; localities must elect not to accept ICE's requests.

Table 2: Immigrant Legal Resource Center Priority Enforcement Program tracker categories with characteristics			
PEP status	**% of counties in dataset**	**% of schools in dataset**	**Av. ELL chr. abs. rate** (Std. dev.)
1: Not willing to accept (I-247N) Notifications and (I-247D) Detainers	.0107	.0364	.1869 (.2202)
2: Considering, but (currently) not willing to accept (I-247N) Notifications and/or (I-247D) Detainers	.0376	.0555	.1903 (.2175)
3: Willing to accept (I-247N) Notifications but not (I-247D) Detainers	.1836	.1750	.1675 (.2122)
4: Willing to accept both (I-247N) Notifications and (I-247D) Detainers	.7586	.4768	.1414 (.2079)
5: Willing to accept (I-247D) Detainers but not (I-247N) Notifications	.0096	.0472	.1180 (.1269)

Data Source: ILRC PEP Tracker 2016

Control variables are included in the model to address the other determinants of student absenteeism. School-level covariates were gleaned from the CRDC as well as the CCD and include the *concentration of ELL students*, *racial breakdown of ELL students*, *racial breakdown of school enrollment,* and *percentage of FARMS recipients* (an indicator of poverty). The *non-ELL chronic absenteeism rate* is also included, as it isn't too highly correlated with the ELL rate (r= .44) and it potentially captures unobserved variables such as a school-going culture, student body health, and the ease of getting to school. Additionally, the *security officers* and *social workers per capita* are included to measure school security and support. Lastly, the model includes indicator variables for being a *big or small school*, which correspond to being in the upper or lower 10 percent of the enrollment distribution for the respective school levels, as these schools may have unique environments and characteristics.

County-level covariates were acquired from the 2010-2015 5-year ACS estimates and include the *percentage of foreign-born residents who are non-citizens*, *average family size, average marriage rate*, and variables for level of completed *education* (percentage of residents over age 25 without a high school diploma and those with a bachelor's degree or higher). Additionally, an indicator variable for each county's classification on the USDA's ERS rural-urban continuum was included for *metropolitan areas* and *completely rural areas*.

Data was cleaned to generate percentages, transform data to per pupil ratios, and correct for improperly coded data. Of the 79,063 schools included in the final dataset, 61,963 had data on chronic absenteeism for ELL, which presumes that the school has an ELL population above

the minimum reporting requirements. Summary statistics for these variables can be found in

Table 3.

Table 3: Summary statistics for model variables

Dependent variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ELL chronic absenteeism (%)	61,963	0.1513	0.2071	0	1

Immigration-level variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
PEP detainer status	78,329	3.5669	0.8629	1	5

School level variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
ELL enrollment (overall- %)	76,781	0.0977	0.1522	0	1
ELL: Asian (%)	62,336	0.1751	0.2574	0	1
ELL: Black (%)	62,336	0.0595	0.1566	0	1
ELL: Hispanic (%)	62,336	0.6813	0.3384	0	1
ELL: other minority (%)	62,330	0.0398	0.1259	0	1
Sch. enrollment: Asian (%)	76,781	0.0381	0.0783	0	1
Sch. enrollment: Black (%)	76,781	0.1524	0.2379	0	1
Sch. enrollment: Hispanic (%)	76,781	0.2280	0.2701	0	1
Sch. enrollment: other minority (%)	76,770	0.0513	0.0793	0	1
Non-ELL chronic absenteeism (%)	75,747	0.1539	.01437	0	1
FARMS recipients (%)	71,783	0.5285	0.2793	0	1
Security officers per capita	76,779	0.0005	0.0055	0	1
Social workers per capita	76,775	0.0006	0.0057	0	1
Big school	78,329	0.1271	0.3330	0	1
Small school	78,329	0.0845	0.2781	0	1

County level variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Non-citizens in foreign-born pop. (%)	78,304	0.5505	0.1228	0	1
Average family size	78,329	3.2326	0.2741	2.3300	5.4700
Percent married	78,329	0.4872	0.0619	0.1889	0.7253
No HS diploma (%)	78,329	0.1361	0.0608	0.0230	0.5372
Bachelor's degree or higher (%)	78,329	0.1825	0.0581	0.0478	0.4466
Metro county area (0/1)	79,063	0.7793	0.4147	0	1
Rural county area (0/1)	79,063	0.0346	0.1827	0	1

Data Sources: ED CRDC & CCD 2015-2016, ILRC PEP Tracker 2016, and USDA ERS 2013

Data limitations

Using ELL-status as a proxy for pupils affected by local immigration enforcement policies is both a strength and limitation of the study. As previously mentioned, it includes a broader group of immigrants by not just focusing on Hispanic students. This classification also includes students who do not have unauthorized immigrants in their family and are not impacted by this policy, and it excludes immigrant students who are not a part of the ELL program but might be affected, either because they speak English perfectly and never were a ELL-student, or they already graduated from the ELL program ("ever-ELL"). To address this problem, the model includes controls for the ethnicity of ELL students, as Hispanic students are most affected by these policies. Additionally, a control is included for the percentage of foreign-born residents who are noncitizens in a county, but this does not differentiate between legal and unauthorized non-citizens, nor does it control for the number of foreign-born noncitizens at the school-level (since it is at the county-level).

Methodology: OLS with state-fixed effects

Taking into account the above demographic and socioeconomic variables, along with state fixed-effects, multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is employed to analyze the association between sanctuary city policies and chronic absenteeism for ELL students in the 2015-2016 school year. To measure local immigration enforcement, the analysis focuses on two primary models: Model I looks at counties that are not willing to accept ICE notifications or detainers (even if they are considering otherwise), while Model II follows Wong's specification of a sanctuary city and includes counties that accept ICE notifications.

Wong's definition of a sanctuary city is more lenient and allows for substantially more localities to be counted as a sanctuary city. Only about 5 percent of localities meet the definition of a sanctuary city in Model I, while more than 23 percent of localities meet the definition in Model II, showing that cities are somewhat more willing to accept ICE notifications than they are detainers.

While rejecting ICE detainer requests has been the focus of sanctuary city policies, immigrant rights activists have also called for denying ICE notification requests (Graber & Marquez 2016). In fact, in its 2018 immigration enforcement index, the ILRC puts equal weight on both policies when comparing local policies (Avila et al. 2018). Arguably, a sanctuary city truly isn't a sanctuary city if it is still willing to notify ICE when it releases certain immigrants from custody; however, this definition is included for analysis in this study since it has been used before in Wong's study.

In both models, analysis for the ILRC total score and sanctuary city indicator was broken down by school level: all schools (n=58,474), elementary schools (n= 35,649), middle schools (n=11,022), high schools (n=9,922), and schools that are a combination of grade levels (n=1,881).

Methods limitations

OLS cannot determine causation, only association, although including robust control variables can better approximate that association. Nonetheless, this model does not account for unobserved variables that might influence the ELL chronic absenteeism rate, such as fear of deportation or the strength of immigrant outreach programs. While past studies on sanctuary

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cities have used coarsened exact matching to approximate a more experimental design (Wong 2017), the variables in this model did not allow for comparable matches to be made across different schools and counties.

Additionally, this analysis only includes data for 2016, which is perhaps the most lenient year of immigration enforcement in the past decade. The data in this study comes from the second half of President Obama's second term (2014-2016)—during which he relaxed the intense immigration enforcement from his first term and attempted to establish Deferred Action for Parents of Americans—but before President Trump intensified enforcement starting in 2017. In fact, 2015 and 2016 saw the lowest number of apprehensions and deportations during the Obama Administration; 450,954 individuals were deported in 2016 compared to 973,937 in 2009 (Chishti, Pierce, & Bolter 2017). Thus, this may limit the generalizability of these results. Time series data both before and after 2016 would be useful for further analysis.

Model I: Sanctuary cities with no detainers or notifications

For Model I, sanctuary cities are classified as those localities that do not accept ICE detainer or notification requests, even if they may be considering doing so. The results for Model I show that being a sanctuary city is associated with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in ELL chronic absenteeism (p=0.02), on average, when controlling for school and county-level socioeconomic variables as well as state fixed-effect (see Table 4, Column 1). Effectively, this means that sanctuary cities are, on average, associated with a decrease in ELL chronic absenteeism from 15.1 percent to 14.5 percent across all grade levels, or a decrease of 3.1 percent of one standard deviation.

The size of the association varies by school level, but it is only statistically significant for elementary schools. In elementary schools (see Column 2), the effect is about the same as it is overall, at 0.6 percentage points on average (p= .040). The sanctuary city coefficient is not statistically significant for middle, high, or combination schools.

Table 4: Unstandardized regression coefficients for models predicting English-language learner chronic absenteeism in sanctuary cities that don't accept either ICE detainers or notifications

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
Sanctuary- No detainers/ notifications	-0.00648** (0.00284)	-0.00649** (0.00316)	-0.00601 (0.00699)	0.00842 (0.00843)	-0.0198 (0.0207)
ELL enrollment (overall- %)	-0.177*** (0.00677)	-0.110*** (0.00793)	-0.203*** (0.0213)	-0.221*** (0.0346)	-0.241*** (0.0517)
ELL: Asian (%)	0.0182*** (0.00621)	0.0371*** (0.00818)	-0.00328 (0.0129)	0.00752 (0.0154)	-0.0153 (0.0335)
ELL: Black (%)	0.0143 (0.00884)	0.0257** (0.0118)	-0.0139 (0.0175)	0.00844 (0.0215)	0.0221 (0.0428)
ELL: Hispanic (%)	0.0617*** (0.00519)	0.0571*** (0.00672)	0.0606*** (0.0112)	0.0966*** (0.0133)	0.0485* (0.0275)
ELL: other minority (%)	0.102*** (0.0118)	0.0974*** (0.0151)	0.127*** (0.0274)	0.0716** (0.0286)	0.115* (0.0651)

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	All schools	Elementary	Middle	High	Combo
Non-ELL chronic abs. (%)	0.00328	-0.0392***	0.0247	0.0275	-0.0807
	(0.00948)	(0.0118)	(0.0211)	(0.0280)	(0.0713)
FARMS recipients (%)	-0.0109*	-0.0211***	0.00221	0.00101	0.0192
	(0.00660)	(0.00801)	(0.0157)	(0.0182)	(0.0367)
Security officers per capita	0.0133*	-0.0144*	0.0196	0.0103	0.000175
	(0.00686)	(0.00816)	(0.0161)	(0.0204)	(0.0401)
Social workers per capita	-0.0146	-0.00343	0.0320	0.0191	-0.106
	(0.0185)	(0.0219)	(0.0486)	(0.0491)	(0.109)
Big school	0.676***	0.547***	0.603***	0.752***	0.682***
	(0.00954)	(0.0150)	(0.0248)	(0.0166)	(0.0405)
Small school	-0.0343***	-0.0254***	-0.0118	-0.0107	-0.0101
	(0.00501)	(0.00585)	(0.0126)	(0.0159)	(0.0294)
Sch. enrollment: Asian (%)	2.258***	2.238*	3.959***	0.417	4.431***
	(0.639)	(1.335)	(1.211)	(0.638)	(1.379)
Sch. enrollment: Black (%)	-0.654	-1.018	-1.312	1.868	-1.651
	(0.885)	(1.103)	(1.483)	(1.902)	(2.953)
Sch. enrollment: Hispanic (%)	0.000863	-0.000806	0.00314	0.00144	0.00157
	(0.00166)	(0.00195)	(0.00405)	(0.00461)	(0.0116)
Sch. enrollment: other minority (%)	0.00250	0.00492	-0.0214*	0.00860	-0.130**
	(0.00579)	(0.00665)	(0.0124)	(0.0223)	(0.0632)
Non-citizens in foreign-born pop. (%)	-0.0173*	-0.0423***	-0.0143	0.0368	-0.00356
	(0.0104)	(0.0127)	(0.0241)	(0.0270)	(0.0543)
Average family size	0.00529	0.00202	0.0128	0.00256	0.0373
	(0.00567)	(0.00642)	(0.0146)	(0.0154)	(0.0332)
Marriage rate (%)	0.0424**	0.00750	0.0221	0.106**	0.0385
	(0.0173)	(0.0202)	(0.0390)	(0.0510)	(0.125)
No HS diploma (%)	0.0741**	0.0384	0.0408	0.135	0.0471
	(0.0292)	(0.0333)	(0.0697)	(0.0845)	(0.183)
Bachelor's degree or higher (%)	0.150***	0.0969***	0.106**	0.328***	0.108
	(0.0232)	(0.0269)	(0.0533)	(0.0680)	(0.161)
Metro county	0.00555*	0.0100***	-0.00199	0.00900	0.0202
	(0.00303)	(0.00370)	(0.00676)	(0.00784)	(0.0190)
Rural county	-0.0132	0.00134	-0.0103	-0.0486***	0.00371
	(0.00835)	(0.0111)	(0.0233)	(0.0173)	(0.0328)
Constant	-0.0937***	-0.0126	-0.0898	-0.254***	-0.259**
	(0.0219)	(0.0254)	(0.0547)	(0.0608)	(0.131)
Observations	58,436	35,621	11,015	9,919	1,881
R-squared	0.254	0.182	0.198	0.342	0.339

Table 4 (Cont'd.)

Data Sources: ED CRDC & CCD 2015-2016, ILRC PEP Tracker 2016, and USDA ERS 2013

Note: This output does not show state fixed-effects. For the full output, see Appendix B, Table 1.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model II: Sanctuary cities with no detainers only

Model II builds on Model I by including localities that accept ICE notifications (but not detainers), as in the Wong study. However, none of the sanctuary city point estimates in Model II are statistically significant, including overall (p= .68). Even if they were, the effect size is near zero.

Table 5: Unstandardized regression coefficients for models predicting English-language learner chronic absenteeism in sanctuary cities that only don't accept ICE detainer requests

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
Sanctuary- No detainers/ notifications	0.000902	-0.000814	0.00297	0.00916	0.00824
	(0.00219)	(0.00246)	(0.00530)	(0.00660)	(0.0184)
ELL enrollment (overall- %)	-0.178***	-0.111***	-0.203***	-0.222***	-0.243***
	(0.00679)	(0.00797)	(0.0214)	(0.0345)	(0.0520)
ELL: Asian (%)	0.0186***	0.0374***	-0.00273	0.00751	-0.0141
	(0.00621)	(0.00818)	(0.0129)	(0.0154)	(0.0336)
ELL: Black (%)	0.0138	0.0253**	-0.0142	0.00845	0.0198
	(0.00884)	(0.0118)	(0.0175)	(0.0215)	(0.0427)
ELL: Hispanic (%)	0.0615***	0.0568***	0.0607***	0.0968***	0.0488*
	(0.00519)	(0.00671)	(0.0112)	(0.0133)	(0.0275)
ELL: other minority (%)	0.102***	0.0975***	0.127***	0.0716**	0.118*
	(0.0118)	(0.0151)	(0.0273)	(0.0286)	(0.0653)
Non-ELL chronic abs. (%)	0.00137	-0.0409***	0.0221	0.0283	-0.0793
	(0.00943)	(0.0118)	(0.0210)	(0.0278)	(0.0715)
FARMS recipients (%)	-0.0113*	-0.0213***	0.00201	0.00107	0.0185
	(0.00661)	(0.00802)	(0.0157)	(0.0183)	(0.0367)
Security officers per capita	0.0136**	-0.0141*	0.0196	0.0105	0.000495
	(0.00686)	(0.00816)	(0.0160)	(0.0204)	(0.0401)
Social workers per capita	-0.0156	-0.00380	0.0312	0.0176	-0.113
	(0.0185)	(0.0219)	(0.0486)	(0.0492)	(0.109)
Big school	0.675***	0.546***	0.602***	0.752***	0.683***
	(0.00956)	(0.0150)	(0.0248)	(0.0166)	(0.0405)
Small school	-0.0341***	-0.0250***	-0.0117	-0.0108	-0.00896
	(0.00501)	(0.00587)	(0.0126)	(0.0159)	(0.0294)
Sch. enrollment: Asian (%)	2.239***	2.177	3.959***	0.426	4.534***
	(0.637)	(1.335)	(1.195)	(0.639)	(1.386)
Sch. enrollment: Black (%)	-0.640	-1.007	-1.329	1.895	-1.525
	(0.882)	(1.099)	(1.482)	(1.901)	(2.912)
Sch. enrollment: Hispanic (%)	0.000991	-0.000752	0.00353	0.00139	0.00157
	(0.00166)	(0.00195)	(0.00405)	(0.00460)	(0.0116)
Sch. enrollment: other minority (%)	0.00231	0.00475	-0.0214*	0.00841	-0.135**
	(0.00579)	(0.00665)	(0.0124)	(0.0223)	(0.0618)
Non-citizens in foreign-born pop. (%)	-0.0177*	-0.0422***	-0.0153	0.0348	-0.00517
	(0.0104)	(0.0128)	(0.0242)	(0.0271)	(0.0545)

Table 5 (Cont'd.)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	All schools	Elementary	Middle	High	Combo
Average family size	0.00592	0.00236	0.0135	0.00392	0.0395
	(0.00569)	(0.00643)	(0.0146)	(0.0154)	(0.0332)
Marriage rate (%)	0.0468***	0.0111	0.0269	0.108**	0.0512
	(0.0172)	(0.0201)	(0.0386)	(0.0508)	(0.124)
No HS diploma (%)	0.0717**	0.0359	0.0395	0.135	0.0363
	(0.0292)	(0.0332)	(0.0696)	(0.0844)	(0.182)
Bachelor's degree or higher	0.145***	0.0920***	0.101*	0.330***	0.0943
(%)	(0.0231)	(0.0267)	(0.0532)	(0.0678)	(0.161)
Metro county	0.00569*	0.0103***	-0.00207	0.00824	0.0206
	(0.00304)	(0.00371)	(0.00679)	(0.00786)	(0.0190)
Rural county	-0.0133	0.00125	-0.0105	-0.0482***	0.00443
	(0.00834)	(0.0111)	(0.0233)	(0.0173)	(0.0328)
Constant	-0.0963***	-0.0143	-0.0927*	-0.258***	-0.268**
	(0.0219)	(0.0254)	(0.0546)	(0.0607)	(0.131)
Observations	58,436	35,621	11,015	9,919	1,881
R-squared	0.254	0.181	0.198	0.342	0.339

Data Sources: ED CRDC & CCD 2015-2016, ILRC PEP Tracker 2016, and USDA ERS 2013

Note: This output does not show state fixed-effects. For the full output, see the Appendix B, Table 2.

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Assessing substantive significant and model limitations

This analysis revealed that certain types of sanctuary city policies are associated with marginally reduced rates of chronic absenteeism for ELL students. Model I shows that sanctuary cities that don't accept ICE detainer or notification requests are associated with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in ELL chronic absenteeism. While this effect size is small, especially given the large variance in absenteeism rates, it is not inconsequential given the sheer number of ELL students in public schools. If the ELL chronic absenteeism rate were to improve by 0.6 percentage points for all schools in this dataset alone, it would mean that an additional 29,579 ELL students would not be chronically absent from school.

Model II, which includes sanctuary cities that accept ICE notification requests, does not show any statistically or substantively significant association with sanctuary city policies. This could be because it is not appropriate to count localities that accept ICE notification requests as sanctuary localities. Many immigrant rights activists place an equal weight on rejecting ICE notifications and detainers (Graber & Marquez 2016), so rejecting detainer requests may not be enough to change the impacts of these policies on children.

However, both models omit an important variable for sanctuary and non-sanctuary cities: the strength of a school's immigrant outreach program. A set of case studies has found that while immigration enforcement has negative academic outcomes for children in the short term, some schools have such strong outreach programs that students were able to recover, or even surpass, their educational outcomes in the long term (Chaudry et al. 2010). Thus, it could be the case that intensified immigration enforcement increases short term absence, but not to the extent of

chronic absenteeism (missing 15 or more school days in a year). In this case, data on the strength of immigrant outreach programs is needed so that it can be controlled for in the model. Other potentially important omitted variables include being a bilingual school and the number of ELL teachers, among others.

Lastly, as mentioned in the data and methods section, this study is limited by the fact that it only looks at data from the 2015-2016 school year, which was an abnormal year for immigration policy. Immigration enforcement that year was relatively laxed, meaning that sanctuary cities and non-sanctuary cities may not have looked too differently on the ground during this year.

Implications for future studies

The present study assesses immigration policy in the 2015-2016 school year, but much has changed since President Trump assumed office in 2017. Through one of his first executive orders, President Trump reinstated the Secure Communities program and aimed to take federal funds away from sanctuary cities (Executive Order 13768). Although a federal judge blocked his attempts to end sanctuary cities, the Secure Communities program remains (ICE 2017) and deportations have risen (Chishti et al. 2017).

Future studies should include more robust measures of immigration enforcement and sanctuary city policies. In 2018, the ILRC updated its local enforcement database with more detailed measures of local immigration enforcement. This database now includes information about seven immigration policies, with accepting ICE detainers and notification request only accounting for 2 of the 7 policies. With this new data in hand, the ILRC assigned each county a

score ranging from 0 to 7 based on the number of local assistance policies in a locality, with 0 being the most involvement with ICE and 7 being the least involvement with ICE (Avila et al. 2018). Once 2017-2018 school data is available, this study should be repeated with the 2018 ILRC local enforcement data. Even better, future researchers should include additional measures of sanctuary, such as a state's decision to give in-state tuition for undocumented students or a locality's choice to fund their immigrant residents' immigration fees and court costs.

Policy recommendations

As President Trump heightens anti-immigrant rhetoric and pushes for greater immigration enforcement at the border, it is up to localities to decide how much they chose to collaborate with ICE on the local level, including whether or not they want to accept Secure Communities notification and detainer requests.

Sanctuary city policies are just some of the many policies that local jurisdictions have at their disposal to reduce chronic absenteeism. Other studies have found that schools can reduce chronic absenteeism through various interventions, including monitoring and mentoring programs (Balfanz & Byrnes 2014; Guryan et al. 2017), sending text to parents when their children miss class (Bergman & Chan 2017), and mailing nudge postcards to parents (Rogers et al. 2017). Additional research should investigate whether or not these interventions are effective for ELL students, too, especially those who live in non-sanctuary cities.

APPENDIX A: DIFFERENCE OF MEANS T-TEST FOR CHRONIC ABSENTEEISM RATES FOR ENGLISH-LANGUAGE LEARNERS AND NON-ENGLISH-LANGUAGE LEARNERS

```
. ttest sch_abs_lep_pct = sch_abs_nonlep_pct

Paired t test
```

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
sch_ab..	61,905	.151412	.0008324	.2071087	.1497805	.1530435
sch_ab..	61,905	.1553392	.0005572	.1386376	.1542471	.1564313
diff	61,905	-.0039272	.0007647	.1902705	-.0054261	-.0024283

```
    mean(diff) = mean(sch_abs_lep_pct - sch_abs_nonlep~t)          t =  -5.1354
Ho: mean(diff) = 0                                degrees of freedom =     61904

Ha: mean(diff) < 0              Ha: mean(diff) != 0             Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0000          Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 1.0000
```

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Table 1: Unstandardized regression coefficients for models predicting English-language learner chronic absenteeism in sanctuary cities that don't accept either ICE detainers or notifications

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
Sanctuary- no D/S	-0.00648**	-0.00649**	-0.00601	0.00842	-0.0198
	(0.00284)	(0.00316)	(0.00699)	(0.00843)	(0.0207)
ELL enrollment (overall- %)	-0.177***	-0.110***	-0.203***	-0.221***	-0.241***
	(0.00677)	(0.00793)	(0.0213)	(0.0346)	(0.0517)
ELL: Asian (%)	0.0182***	0.0371***	-0.00328	0.00752	-0.0153
	(0.00621)	(0.00818)	(0.0129)	(0.0154)	(0.0335)
ELL: Black (%)	0.0143	0.0257**	-0.0139	0.00844	0.0221
	(0.00884)	(0.0118)	(0.0175)	(0.0215)	(0.0428)
ELL: Hispanic (%)	0.0617***	0.0571***	0.0606***	0.0966***	0.0485*
	(0.00519)	(0.00672)	(0.0112)	(0.0133)	(0.0275)
ELL: other minority (%)	0.102***	0.0974***	0.127***	0.0716**	0.115*
	(0.0118)	(0.0151)	(0.0274)	(0.0286)	(0.0651)
Non- ELL chronic abs (%)	0.00328	-0.0392***	0.0247	0.0275	-0.0807
	(0.00948)	(0.0118)	(0.0211)	(0.0280)	(0.0713)
FARMS recipients (%)	-0.0109*	-0.0211***	0.00221	0.00101	0.0192
	(0.00660)	(0.00801)	(0.0157)	(0.0182)	(0.0367)
Security officers per capita	0.0133*	-0.0144*	0.0196	0.0103	0.000175
	(0.00686)	(0.00816)	(0.0161)	(0.0204)	(0.0401)
Social workers per capita	-0.0146	-0.00343	0.0320	0.0191	-0.106
	(0.0185)	(0.0219)	(0.0486)	(0.0491)	(0.109)
Big school	0.676***	0.547***	0.603***	0.752***	0.682***
	(0.00954)	(0.0150)	(0.0248)	(0.0166)	(0.0405)
Small school	-0.0343***	-0.0254***	-0.0118	-0.0107	-0.0101
	(0.00501)	(0.00585)	(0.0126)	(0.0159)	(0.0294)
Sch. enrollment: Asian (%)	2.258***	2.238*	3.959***	0.417	4.431***
	(0.639)	(1.335)	(1.211)	(0.638)	(1.379)
Sch. enrollment: Black (%)	-0.654	-1.018	-1.312	1.868	-1.651
	(0.885)	(1.103)	(1.483)	(1.902)	(2.953)
Sch. enr: Hispanic (%)	0.000863	-0.000806	0.00314	0.00144	0.00157
	(0.00166)	(0.00195)	(0.00405)	(0.00461)	(0.0116)
Sch. enr: other minority (%)	0.00250	0.00492	-0.0214*	0.00860	-0.130**
	(0.00579)	(0.00665)	(0.0124)	(0.0223)	(0.0632)
Non-citizens in foreign-born pop. (%)	-0.0173*	-0.0423***	-0.0143	0.0368	-0.00356
	(0.0104)	(0.0127)	(0.0241)	(0.0270)	(0.0543)
Average family size	0.00529	0.00202	0.0128	0.00256	0.0373
	(0.00567)	(0.00642)	(0.0146)	(0.0154)	(0.0332)
Marriage rate (%)	0.0424**	0.00750	0.0221	0.106**	0.0385
	(0.0173)	(0.0202)	(0.0390)	(0.0510)	(0.125)
No HS diploma (%)	0.0741**	0.0384	0.0408	0.135	0.0471
	(0.0292)	(0.0333)	(0.0697)	(0.0845)	(0.183)
Bachelor's or higher (%)	0.150***	0.0969***	0.106**	0.328***	0.108
	(0.0232)	(0.0269)	(0.0533)	(0.0680)	(0.161)
Metro county	0.00555*	0.0100***	-0.00199	0.00900	0.0202
	(0.00303)	(0.00370)	(0.00676)	(0.00784)	(0.0190)

Table 1 (Cont'd.)

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
Rural county	-0.0132	0.00134	-0.0103	-0.0486***	0.00371
	(0.00835)	(0.0111)	(0.0233)	(0.0173)	(0.0328)
Arizona	0.0744***	0.0739***	0.0861***	0.0923***	0.0766**
	(0.00902)	(0.0112)	(0.0245)	(0.0250)	(0.0369)
Arkansas	0.000984	0.000829	-0.0202	-0.00976	0.103***
	(0.00837)	(0.0113)	(0.0181)	(0.0206)	(0.0342)
California	0.0482***	0.0268***	0.0288	0.0917***	0.109***
	(0.00715)	(0.00920)	(0.0178)	(0.0185)	(0.0261)
Colorado	0.00561	0.00229	-0.00521	0.0321	0.00712
	(0.00824)	(0.0102)	(0.0197)	(0.0237)	(0.0301)
Connecticut	0.0843***	0.0747***	0.0403	0.106***	0.0751
	(0.0123)	(0.0158)	(0.0268)	(0.0292)	(0.0879)
DC	0.00489	-0.0240	-0.00775	0.0141	0.296***
	(0.0182)	(0.0196)	(0.0534)	(0.0517)	(0.112)
Florida	0.0651***	0.0606***	0.0428**	0.0736***	0.114***
	(0.00728)	(0.00935)	(0.0181)	(0.0189)	(0.0270)
Georgia	0.0432***	0.0121	0.0364**	0.0850***	0.119**
	(0.00730)	(0.00907)	(0.0183)	(0.0192)	(0.0469)
Idaho	0.0447***	0.0235*	0.0295	0.0869***	0.106**
	(0.0106)	(0.0138)	(0.0221)	(0.0285)	(0.0440)
Illinois	0.0699***	0.0488***	0.0729***	0.0912***	0.116**
	(0.00783)	(0.00983)	(0.0198)	(0.0208)	(0.0464)
Indiana	0.0513***	0.0275**	0.0228	0.101***	0.115***
	(0.00819)	(0.0107)	(0.0183)	(0.0209)	(0.0447)
Iowa	0.123***	0.0866***	0.139***	0.172***	0.151
	(0.0123)	(0.0151)	(0.0295)	(0.0320)	(0.0939)
Kansas	0.0496***	0.0353***	0.0307	0.0673***	0.124***
	(0.00861)	(0.0111)	(0.0199)	(0.0227)	(0.0353)
Kentucky	0.0316***	0.00293	0.00453	0.101***	0.174**
	(0.00960)	(0.0115)	(0.0206)	(0.0300)	(0.0688)
Louisiana	0.0278***	0.0111	0.0148	0.0500**	0.0682*
	(0.00887)	(0.0110)	(0.0220)	(0.0230)	(0.0361)
Maine	0.0690***	0.0456*	0.0823**	0.0850***	0.253*
	(0.0167)	(0.0236)	(0.0365)	(0.0310)	(0.150)
Maryland	-0.0131	-0.0227*	0.0101	0.0331	-0.0575
	(0.0103)	(0.0120)	(0.0247)	(0.0294)	(0.113)
Michigan	0.0933***	0.0780***	0.0752***	0.144***	0.142***
	(0.00848)	(0.0111)	(0.0207)	(0.0215)	(0.0248)
Minnesota	0.0894***	0.0606***	0.0908***	0.123***	0.170***
	(0.00953)	(0.0115)	(0.0231)	(0.0257)	(0.0536)
Mississippi	0.0389***	0.0222	0.0144	0.0686**	0.0632
	(0.0112)	(0.0140)	(0.0238)	(0.0304)	(0.0534)
Missouri	0.0561***	0.0368***	0.0451**	0.0757***	0.237***
	(0.00903)	(0.0114)	(0.0214)	(0.0236)	(0.0816)
Montana	0.0898***	0.0955***	0.0899*	0.0371	
	(0.0242)	(0.0311)	(0.0480)	(0.0623)	
Nebraska	0.0818***	0.0429***	0.0924**	0.159***	
	(0.0144)	(0.0143)	(0.0442)	(0.0541)	
Nevada	0.0457***	0.0166	0.0446**	0.121***	0.117***
	(0.00905)	(0.0103)	(0.0219)	(0.0301)	(0.0395)

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Table 1 (Cont'd.)

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
New Hampshire	0.0498***	0.0349*	0.0804**	0.0485	
	(0.0155)	(0.0197)	(0.0376)	(0.0334)	
New Jersey	0.0283***	0.0184*	0.0184	0.0522**	0.0822
	(0.00822)	(0.0104)	(0.0201)	(0.0215)	(0.0544)
New Mexico	0.0612***	0.0545***	0.0461**	0.0664***	0.138**
	(0.00907)	(0.0114)	(0.0218)	(0.0232)	(0.0545)
New York	0.0938***	0.0824***	0.0724***	0.132***	0.192***
	(0.00851)	(0.0110)	(0.0211)	(0.0212)	(0.0384)
North Carolina	0.0592***	0.0313***	0.0564***	0.106***	0.121***
	(0.00737)	(0.00954)	(0.0181)	(0.0182)	(0.0308)
North Dakota	0.0876***	0.0781***	0.131**	0.0633**	0.0964
	(0.0191)	(0.0252)	(0.0598)	(0.0302)	(0.0735)
Ohio	0.0752***	0.0483***	0.0766***	0.123***	0.177***
	(0.00858)	(0.0110)	(0.0207)	(0.0216)	(0.0442)
Oklahoma	0.0606***	0.0314***	0.0615**	0.0974**	0.160**
	(0.0110)	(0.0119)	(0.0294)	(0.0416)	(0.0629)
Oregon	0.0954***	0.0813***	0.0853***	0.122***	0.119
	(0.0102)	(0.0124)	(0.0248)	(0.0286)	(0.0735)
Pennsylvania	0.0605***	0.0297***	0.0576***	0.121***	0.0872**
	(0.00898)	(0.0114)	(0.0212)	(0.0230)	(0.0425)
South Carolina	0.0342***	0.0160	0.0168	0.0595***	0.0406
	(0.00785)	(0.0102)	(0.0184)	(0.0204)	(0.0280)
South Dakota	0.0487***	0.0339*	0.00121	0.0362	
	(0.0162)	(0.0185)	(0.0375)	(0.0497)	
Texas	0.0335***	0.0123	0.0154	0.0693***	0.0922***
	(0.00688)	(0.00882)	(0.0169)	(0.0182)	(0.0225)
Utah	0.0832***	0.0616***	0.0675***	0.151***	0.195***
	(0.0106)	(0.0131)	(0.0235)	(0.0294)	(0.0550)
Vermont	0.0680***	0.0509*	0.0252	0.0595	0.248
	(0.0237)	(0.0301)	(0.0560)	(0.0411)	(0.157)
Virginia	0.0619***	0.0361***	0.0503**	0.114***	0.160***
	(0.00804)	(0.0101)	(0.0204)	(0.0205)	(0.0518)
Washington	0.153***	0.107***	0.173***	0.263***	0.199***
	(0.00865)	(0.0107)	(0.0210)	(0.0230)	(0.0435)
Wisconsin	0.0784***	0.0512***	0.0605***	0.141***	0.146***
	(0.00880)	(0.0112)	(0.0203)	(0.0230)	(0.0440)
Wyoming	0.0758***	0.0672***	0.0958*	0.0748	0.0618*
	(0.0205)	(0.0253)	(0.0499)	(0.0540)	(0.0329)
Constant	-0.0937***	-0.0126	-0.0898	-0.254***	-0.259**
	(0.0219)	(0.0254)	(0.0547)	(0.0608)	(0.131)
Observations	58,436	35,621	11,015	9,919	1,881
R-squared	0.254	0.182	0.198	0.342	0.339

Data Sources: ED CRDC & CCD 2015-2016, ILRC PEP Tracker 2016, and USDA ERS 2013.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Unstandardized regression coefficients for models predicting English-language learner chronic absenteeism in sanctuary cities that only don't accept ICE detainer requests

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
Sanctuary- no D/S	0.000902 (0.00219)	-0.000814 (0.00246)	0.00297 (0.00530)	0.00916 (0.00660)	0.00824 (0.0184)
ELL enrollment (overall- %)	-0.178*** (0.00679)	-0.111*** (0.00797)	-0.203*** (0.0214)	-0.222*** (0.0345)	-0.243*** (0.0520)
ELL: Asian (%)	0.0186*** (0.00621)	0.0374*** (0.00818)	-0.00273 (0.0129)	0.00751 (0.0154)	-0.0141 (0.0336)
ELL: Black (%)	0.0138 (0.00884)	0.0253** (0.0118)	-0.0142 (0.0175)	0.00845 (0.0215)	0.0198 (0.0427)
ELL: Hispanic (%)	0.0615*** (0.00519)	0.0568*** (0.00671)	0.0607*** (0.0112)	0.0968*** (0.0133)	0.0488* (0.0275)
ELL: other minority (%)	0.102*** (0.0118)	0.0975*** (0.0151)	0.127*** (0.0273)	0.0716** (0.0286)	0.118* (0.0653)
Non- ELL chronic abs (%)	0.00137 (0.00943)	-0.0409*** (0.0118)	0.0221 (0.0210)	0.0283 (0.0278)	-0.0793 (0.0715)
FARMS recipients (%)	-0.0113* (0.00661)	-0.0213*** (0.00802)	0.00201 (0.0157)	0.00107 (0.0183)	0.0185 (0.0367)
Security officers per capita	0.0136** (0.00686)	-0.0141* (0.00816)	0.0196 (0.0160)	0.0105 (0.0204)	0.000495 (0.0401)
Social workers per capita	-0.0156 (0.0185)	-0.00380 (0.0219)	0.0312 (0.0486)	0.0176 (0.0492)	-0.113 (0.109)
Big school	0.675*** (0.00956)	0.546*** (0.0150)	0.602*** (0.0248)	0.752*** (0.0166)	0.683*** (0.0405)
Small school	-0.0341*** (0.00501)	-0.0250*** (0.00587)	-0.0117 (0.0126)	-0.0108 (0.0159)	-0.00896 (0.0294)
Sch. enrollment: Asian (%)	2.239*** (0.637)	2.177 (1.335)	3.959*** (1.195)	0.426 (0.639)	4.534*** (1.386)
Sch. enrollment: Black (%)	-0.640 (0.882)	-1.007 (1.099)	-1.329 (1.482)	1.895 (1.901)	-1.525 (2.912)
Sch. enr: Hispanic (%)	0.000991 (0.00166)	-0.000752 (0.00195)	0.00353 (0.00405)	0.00139 (0.00460)	0.00157 (0.0116)
Sch. enr: other minority (%)	0.00231 (0.00579)	0.00475 (0.00665)	-0.0214* (0.0124)	0.00841 (0.0223)	-0.135** (0.0618)
Non-citizens in foreign-born pop. (%)	-0.0177* (0.0104)	-0.0422*** (0.0128)	-0.0153 (0.0242)	0.0348 (0.0271)	-0.00517 (0.0545)
Average family size	0.00592 (0.00569)	0.00236 (0.00643)	0.0135 (0.0146)	0.00392 (0.0154)	0.0395 (0.0332)
Marriage rate (%)	0.0468*** (0.0172)	0.0111 (0.0201)	0.0269 (0.0386)	0.108** (0.0508)	0.0512 (0.124)
No HS diploma (%)	0.0717** (0.0292)	0.0359 (0.0332)	0.0395 (0.0696)	0.135 (0.0844)	0.0363 (0.182)
Bachelor's or higher (%)	0.145*** (0.0231)	0.0920*** (0.0267)	0.101* (0.0532)	0.330*** (0.0678)	0.0943 (0.161)
Metro county	0.00569* (0.00304)	0.0103*** (0.00371)	-0.00207 (0.00679)	0.00824 (0.00786)	0.0206 (0.0190)
Rural county	-0.0133 (0.00834)	0.00125 (0.0111)	-0.0105 (0.0233)	-0.0482*** (0.0173)	0.00443 (0.0328)
Arizona	0.0743*** (—)	0.0739*** (—)	0.0860*** (—)	0.0922*** (—)	0.0767** (—)

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Table 2 (Cont'd.)

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
	(0.00902)	(0.0112)	(0.0245)	(0.0250)	(0.0369)
Arkansas	0.000840	0.000680	-0.0203	-0.00985	0.104***
	(0.00837)	(0.0113)	(0.0181)	(0.0206)	(0.0342)
California	0.0463***	0.0260***	0.0258	0.0883***	0.1000***
	(0.00723)	(0.00929)	(0.0180)	(0.0188)	(0.0276)
Colorado	0.00454	0.00288	-0.00823	0.0230	-0.00112
	(0.00852)	(0.0105)	(0.0204)	(0.0246)	(0.0343)
Connecticut	0.0770***	0.0690***	0.0315	0.105***	0.0481
	(0.0122)	(0.0157)	(0.0266)	(0.0289)	(0.0873)
DC	-0.000927	-0.0284	-0.0151	0.0135	0.272**
	(0.0181)	(0.0196)	(0.0533)	(0.0516)	(0.112)
Florida	0.0642***	0.0610***	0.0402**	0.0666***	0.108***
	(0.00752)	(0.00961)	(0.0187)	(0.0197)	(0.0296)
Georgia	0.0430***	0.0120	0.0359**	0.0843***	0.118**
	(0.00730)	(0.00907)	(0.0183)	(0.0192)	(0.0470)
Idaho	0.0442***	0.0232*	0.0289	0.0863***	0.106**
	(0.0106)	(0.0138)	(0.0221)	(0.0285)	(0.0440)
Illinois	0.0663***	0.0459***	0.0693***	0.0903***	0.0953**
	(0.00780)	(0.00981)	(0.0197)	(0.0207)	(0.0450)
Indiana	0.0501***	0.0265**	0.0213	0.101***	0.110**
	(0.00819)	(0.0107)	(0.0183)	(0.0208)	(0.0448)
Iowa	0.122***	0.0872***	0.137***	0.165***	0.144
	(0.0124)	(0.0153)	(0.0297)	(0.0325)	(0.0946)
Kansas	0.0492***	0.0353***	0.0298	0.0655***	0.124***
	(0.00864)	(0.0111)	(0.0200)	(0.0227)	(0.0353)
Kentucky	0.0304***	0.00203	0.00317	0.100***	0.165**
	(0.00961)	(0.0115)	(0.0206)	(0.0300)	(0.0708)
Louisiana	0.0278***	0.0112	0.0146	0.0492**	0.0681*
	(0.00887)	(0.0110)	(0.0220)	(0.0230)	(0.0361)
Maine	0.0689***	0.0455*	0.0823**	0.0848***	0.252*
	(0.0167)	(0.0236)	(0.0365)	(0.0310)	(0.150)
Maryland	-0.0156	-0.0245**	0.00713	0.0318	-0.0749
	(0.0103)	(0.0120)	(0.0249)	(0.0295)	(0.117)
Michigan	0.0930***	0.0777***	0.0748***	0.144***	0.142***
	(0.00848)	(0.0111)	(0.0207)	(0.0215)	(0.0248)
Minnesota	0.0887***	0.0616***	0.0880***	0.114***	0.162***
	(0.00973)	(0.0117)	(0.0236)	(0.0263)	(0.0563)
Mississippi	0.0390***	0.0223	0.0143	0.0683**	0.0634
	(0.0112)	(0.0140)	(0.0238)	(0.0304)	(0.0535)
Missouri	0.0559***	0.0367***	0.0449**	0.0755***	0.236***
	(0.00903)	(0.0114)	(0.0214)	(0.0236)	(0.0816)
Montana	0.0899***	0.0956***	0.0900*	0.0368	
	(0.0242)	(0.0311)	(0.0480)	(0.0622)	
Nebraska	0.0811***	0.0436***	0.0901**	0.153***	
	(0.0145)	(0.0144)	(0.0442)	(0.0540)	
Nevada	0.0456***	0.0166	0.0443**	0.121***	0.118***
	(0.00905)	(0.0103)	(0.0219)	(0.0301)	(0.0395)
New Hampshire	0.0497***	0.0348*	0.0804**	0.0480	
	(0.0155)	(0.0197)	(0.0376)	(0.0334)	
New Jersey	0.0282***	0.0188*	0.0178	0.0498**	0.0808

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Table 2 (Cont'd)

VARIABLES	(1) All schools	(2) Elementary	(3) Middle	(4) High	(5) Combo
	(0.00824)	(0.0105)	(0.0201)	(0.0215)	(0.0545)
New Mexico	0.0603***	0.0551***	0.0434*	0.0579**	0.131**
	(0.00926)	(0.0116)	(0.0223)	(0.0239)	(0.0563)
New York	0.0930***	0.0825***	0.0707***	0.127***	0.182***
	(0.00851)	(0.0109)	(0.0210)	(0.0212)	(0.0398)
North Carolina	0.0593***	0.0313***	0.0565***	0.106***	0.123***
	(0.00737)	(0.00954)	(0.0181)	(0.0182)	(0.0309)
North Dakota	0.0868***	0.0790***	0.129**	0.0536*	0.0887
	(0.0192)	(0.0253)	(0.0600)	(0.0308)	(0.0755)
Ohio	0.0741***	0.0474***	0.0752***	0.123***	0.175***
	(0.00857)	(0.0110)	(0.0207)	(0.0216)	(0.0442)
Oklahoma	0.0609***	0.0315***	0.0618**	0.0977**	0.161**
	(0.0110)	(0.0119)	(0.0295)	(0.0416)	(0.0629)
Oregon	0.0895***	0.0768***	0.0780***	0.120***	0.100
	(0.0101)	(0.0123)	(0.0243)	(0.0284)	(0.0731)
Pennsylvania	0.0588***	0.0287**	0.0555***	0.118***	0.0730*
	(0.00904)	(0.0115)	(0.0213)	(0.0231)	(0.0420)
South Carolina	0.0343***	0.0160	0.0168	0.0596***	0.0412
	(0.00785)	(0.0102)	(0.0184)	(0.0204)	(0.0281)
South Dakota	0.0480***	0.0348*	-0.00163	0.0271	
	(0.0164)	(0.0187)	(0.0377)	(0.0500)	
Texas	0.0334***	0.0123	0.0151	0.0689***	0.0926***
	(0.00688)	(0.00882)	(0.0169)	(0.0182)	(0.0225)
Utah	0.0826***	0.0612***	0.0668***	0.150***	0.194***
	(0.0106)	(0.0131)	(0.0235)	(0.0294)	(0.0549)
Vermont	0.0681***	0.0510*	0.0257	0.0590	0.249
	(0.0237)	(0.0301)	(0.0560)	(0.0411)	(0.157)
Virginia	0.0616***	0.0360***	0.0498**	0.113***	0.160***
	(0.00804)	(0.0101)	(0.0205)	(0.0205)	(0.0519)
Washington	0.148***	0.104***	0.167***	0.259***	0.181***
	(0.00873)	(0.0108)	(0.0212)	(0.0234)	(0.0449)
Wisconsin	0.0780***	0.0510***	0.0598***	0.140***	0.143***
	(0.00881)	(0.0112)	(0.0203)	(0.0230)	(0.0440)
Wyoming	0.0750***	0.0677***	0.0935*	0.0669	0.0571*
	(0.0205)	(0.0253)	(0.0500)	(0.0540)	(0.0345)
Constant	-0.0963***	-0.0143	-0.0927*	-0.258***	-0.268**
	(0.0219)	(0.0254)	(0.0546)	(0.0607)	(0.131)
Observations	58,436	35,621	11,015	9,919	1,881
R-squared	0.254	0.181	0.198	0.342	0.339

Data Sources: ED CRDC & CCD 2015-2016, ILRC PEP Tracker 2016, and USDA ERS 2013

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

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