Hearing the Human Struggle in Tarkovsky’s Solaris

Humanizing Political Theory

Crises in Venezuela: The Road to the Roosevelt Corollary and the Residue of American Statecraft

Rashid Rida and the Evolution of His Thought

American Perception of China and the Anglo-Chinese Opium War

IRA: The Irish Resistance in America

The Ethics of Neurolaw

Transgender Identity, Language, and the Christian God

Plato and Nietzsche on Hope

Mortal Permanence: A Study of Self-Sacrifice in Three Nineteenth-Century British Novels

A Window of Opportunity: Alignment between Mrs. Ramsay and Lily Briscoe in Woolf’s To the Lighthouse

Tess Trumps Alec: An Analysis of the Murder of Alec d’Urberville in Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles

“During the base-ball season confessors have far fewer mortal sins”: Georgetown’s Catholicism Through America’s National Pastime

History of the Philodemic Society, Pt. II: “That Magic Word”–Defining Liberty in the Antebellum Period
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Since it was founded by students of the Tocqueville Forum in 2007, the editors of *Utraque Unum* have worked to provide you with the best student scholarship Georgetown University has to offer. The purpose of the journal is not only to celebrate student scholarship and acquaint students with the tasks of serious writing and editing, but also to encourage reflection on complex problems in politics, in culture, and in life on the Hilltop. We strive to facilitate productive, meaningful, and judicious discourse, and believe that undergraduates represent an oft-overlooked source of thought and analysis. Within these pages, you will find essays on political theory and politics, history, philosophy and theology, arts and culture, and campus life and liberal learning.

If you are interested in submitting an essay for publication in *Utraque Unum* or would like to receive the latest issue via mail, please email the Editor-in-Chief at utraque.unum@gmail.com.
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Ear Reader,

I started writing in books earnest soon after I came to Georgetown. Before college, I saw it as a taboo activity, only acceptable with well-worn books already heavily highlighted or underlined. I remember returning my lightly-marked up copy of *Dubliners* to my 12th grade English teacher, prepared to deny everything, or possibly to flee the classroom, if she happened to page through it. Now, two and a half years later, it is hard for me to read a book without a pencil in my hand, underlining especially meaningful passages and furiously scribbling messy notes in the margins. This activity changes the text in a literal, physical sense, as the pages come to contain markings and words which the author did not put there. I believe that it also changes the text in a more substantial sense. Writing in a book captures the unique relationship between yourself and the words on the page. It creates a new text which is preserved for you to discover later, whether you are revisiting the book after many years or returning to an assigned text for a final paper.

Nowhere is the value of writing in books clearer to me than when I have reread a book I previously marked up. In addition to comments on certain passages and connections to other works, I often write the names of friends or family members in the margins of a text, and even ideas from conversations of which the book reminded me. These comments are always a joy to rediscover. They contain a mixture of humorously ‘earth-shattering’ insights which I have long since moved past, serious thoughts that produce deep reflection, and memories I frequently find that I have forgotten. They give me glimpses of how I thought about the book in the context of my life when I first read it, and even of who I was then.

At Georgetown, we hear a lot about the virtues of “dialogue,” which adopts many forms. Class discussions, panel events, and political debates are all different types of dialogue which push us to explain our views and defend our positions. The university administration frequently reminds the student body of its commitment to diversity, which it pursues at least in part to improve our educational experience by encouraging dialogue between students from different cultural backgrounds. In my Intro to Philosophy class, I learned that Plato’s philosophical works take the form of conversations between people earnestly seeking the truth. Each of these types of dialogue between individuals is important. However, by writing in books, I hope to stimulate dialogue both between myself and the text and, crucially, between myself as I was and myself as I am now. In her essay “On Keeping a Notebook,” Joan Didion writes, “I think we are well advised to keep on nodding terms with the people we used to be whether we find them attractive company or not.” I wholeheartedly second that idea, with one modification: I think it is important to keep on speaking terms with the people we used to be, to the extent that it is possible to do so. I have found education, and particularly my time in college, to be an intensely personal process characterized by large identity shifts. I am not the same person who I was when I started college. One major purpose of education is to take these inevitable personal changes in hand—to control who we are today and who we will become tomorrow.

It is easy to lose ourselves amidst the hectic pace of life on the Hilltop. We can get so wrapped up in our work and in dialogue with others, whether academic or social, that we neglect to look within. There are many ways to do this. Some people keep a journal, while others meditate. The Jesuits have the Daily Examen, with which they reflect on the day, seek God’s presence in their lives, and look to tomorrow. I write in books, to keep a record of who I used to be and of the ideas and passions I had
at a particular moment in my life. It helps me trace how I became the person I am now, and maybe even helps me decide who I will be in the future.

As you read the fantastic articles in this semester’s edition of *Utraque Unum*, I hope you reach insights that carry not only intellectual, but also personal significance. The work that follows in this journal is well worth marking up and revisiting. For that I have the authors to thank: each of them dedicated themselves to painstakingly perfecting papers that were already excellent, a crucial yet taxing activity which I consider the most difficult step of the writing process. I owe a great debt of gratitude to Jake Dyson, whose unmatched hard work over the past two years has ensured that the journal is not only still alive but thriving. To Jake and to our other seniors, Benjamin Brazzel and William Leo, I wish the best of luck, although none of them will need it. I am also immensely grateful to my Managing Editor, Emily Ren, whose infectious energy, great editorial skills, and creative ideas for the future have already begun to ‘yeet’ the journal to even greater heights. I would also like to thank the rest of editors on the the journal staff: Christof Kuehne, Aidan Poling, Carrie Connelly, Savannah Willard, Sachin Meier, and Nathalie Danso. It has been an honor to work with them this semester, and their dedication has made this edition something we all deserve to be proud of. In addition, Sarah Jiang created a beautiful drawing for this edition, which can be found in the opening pages of the journal. Finally, thank you to Professor Richard Boyd and Professor Thomas Kerch, as always, for their invaluable guidance and contributions to *Utraque Unum*.

Sincerely,

Mark McNiskin

*Editor-in-Chief*
Like many of the contemporary social sciences, political science often aspires to the status of a hard “science.” Political theory, by way of contrast, remains firmly anchored in the humanities. This may be a weakness in the sense that the normative insights of political theory do not lend themselves to objective demonstration or falsifiability like other branches of the social sciences. But rather than political theory’s humanistic center of gravity being a liability to be excused, it can also be a virtue to be embraced. One of the great things about teaching political theory is the ability to draw on other genres of writing, especially literature. Although political theory traditionally reserves a prominent place for treatises, essays, and histories—think of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, David Hume’s History of England, or Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations—some of my favorite courses at Georgetown incorporate healthy doses of classic and contemporary literature. Whether it’s Greek tragedy, Shakespeare’s comedies, or modern European novels, there is much to be gleaned from other humanistic works of the Western tradition.

Human Nature and the Human Condition

One abiding complaint about political philosophers—especially those of the modern variety—is that their theories abstract from complex psychological and social realities. Can human beings be as single-mindedly self-interested as Thomas Hobbes hypothesizes? Are we really as motivated by the acquisition of property as John Locke imagines? Does anyone think like Rawls’s fabled minimum-maximizers?

To be sure, generous readings of these and other alleged offenders reveal a far richer vision of human nature than the CliffsNotes versions. Even so, their snapshots of the human condition are deliberate oversimplifications. Human beings are rendered one-dimensional for purposes of the normative arguments they advance. Great works of literature, however, labor under no similar imperative to boil human nature down to a single postulate. World literature shows the human condition in all its ambiguity—if not ambivalence. In the plays of Shakespeare or the novels of Stendhal, for example, we find promethean ambition coexisting with pacific self-restraint; the virtues of sacrificial love alongside vices of enmity, jealousy, and greed; sociability melded with misanthropy in the person of a single character. Unlike the imaginary men of Hobbes or Rousseau’s states of nature, the leading figures of world literature are never simply “evil” or “good.”

Great works of literature evoke fundamental philosophical and moral questions just as readily as the classic works of political philosophy. What does it mean to live a good life? What should a decent human being do in a bad regime? What is the nature of happiness? These are enduring themes in the Western tradition, but philosophers hardly have a monopoly on them. Novelists, playwrights, poets, and painters have proffered answers no less worthy of consideration than their philosophical brethren. And yet unlike the works of so many philosophers which
purport to offer conclusive answers to these questions, the essence of the literary form is to leave them tantalizingly unanswered—at least in any definitive way.

**Dramatizing Moral Ambiguity**

Maybe the best example of the aporetic nature of the humanities is how great works of literature treat moral ambiguity. Take for example Sophocles’s *Antigone*, which dramatizes perennial dilemmas of political obligation. The protagonist Antigone bravely defies her uncle (and sovereign) Kreon’s edict that her treasonous brother Polyneices’s body must go unburied, a command which runs contrary to the traditional religious and familial injunctions of Thebes. In the name of laws higher than the city, Antigone declares Kreon’s edict null and void, buries her brother, and earns a death sentence for herself. It is tempting to take sides in the moral stand-off: either Antigone is right to disobey, or conversely, Kreon’s edict—however wrong-headed—must be obeyed in the name of Thebes’s security. We can marshal political philosophers—Hobbes or Aquinas or Thoreau or King—who proffer definitive answers to this moral quandary. But rather offering a clear-cut resolution, Sophocles instead portrays Antigone and Kreon as both right in a certain respect. Put the other way around, we are made to see the appeals of each as partial or incomplete, with Antigone denying the legitimate authority of the political and Kreon disregarding the pre-political claims of family and religion. Maybe the closest we get to a resolution is the sister Ismene’s acknowledgment of the incommensurable nature of certain kinds of moral obligations: “Well, if you will, go on. Know this; that though you are wrong to go, your friends/ are right to love you.”

Unlike the natural sciences, which cling to notions of “value-freedom,” or more analytical works of political theory and philosophy, which approach moral questions by way of deduction or logical propositions, literature operates in the world of moral ambiguity. Great novels and plays embrace the inescapable plurality of obligations that real people must navigate. Ought Shakespeare’s Antony to side with the conspirators—and presumably his nation—against his friend Caesar? Is Coriolanus a national hero or a traitor? Does the protagonist of Ralph Ellison’s *Invisible Man* incite overt political action or a form of subterranean withdrawal? Rather than a strike against literature for failing to paint these dilemmas in Manichean terms of right or wrong, great literature faithfully captures the complex moral predicaments in which humans can find themselves.

**Showcasing Real World Applications**

Another thing that sometimes makes canonical works of political philosophy less useful than they might otherwise be is the difficulty of applying them to concrete situations in the real world. For a thinker like Machiavelli, the translation from theory to practice is relatively straightforward, whereas for others, such as Plato and Hegel, the action point can be frustratingly hard to pin down. Even modern treatises intended to be logical or analytical do not escape this difficulty. When, exactly, are we allowed to make a revolution against the sovereign, according to John Locke?

There is a similar difficulty applying normative theories to real world politics. Discussions of American government often invoke moral vantages of idealism, pragmatism, or even nihilism. However, these ethical discussions are too often perfunctory. Rather than weighing divergent moral perspectives and assessing how they might operate in a given context, contemporary social science often just begins with an intuition (democracy is good; corruption is bad) and proceeds on the basis of this normative ideal as a given.

By contrast, great works of literature—say, Henry Adams’s novella *Democracy*, Robert Penn Warren’s *All the King’s Men* or Shakespeare’s *Coriolanus*—provide glimpses not only of the
complexity of political dilemmas but also examine them in those murky real-life settings where so much of political life transpires. The histories and identities of characters, their emotions and peculiar psychologies, circumstances and contingency—all of these factor into the treatment. For example, Richard Wright's *Native Son* explores the matter of justice in the case of a young African-American who commits a brutal murder on Chicago's South Side. In one sense the issue is cut-and-dried: Bigger Thomas is guilty of a heinous capital crime. And yet we are pressed to consider how a more contextualist view of justice might support lenience toward Bigger in view of his life circumstances. The difference in principles of justice is clearest and most dramatic when personified in stories of particular characters.

The Value of Rhetoric

Great philosophy operates by and large through the medium of logic and reason. And surely our rational faculties must be the starting point for understanding the nature of social and political life. Modern philosophy in particular, from at least Hobbes onward, is predicated on elevating reason over and above the vagaries of unruly passions, unpredictable affect, and confounding rhetoric. Thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries likewise targeted the vices of superstition, enthusiasm, prejudice, and unexamined custom. Whether through the deductive method of Hobbes or the inductive falsification of Mill's logic, reason is key to making sense of moral and political affairs.

Literature, however, draws upon different forms of rhetoric to convey and persuade. We sympathize (or not) with exemplary characters. Our moral assessment of their actions is as much visceral or emotional as it is rational. Literature dramatizes political life whereas even the best philosophy all too often flattens it out. Irony, comedy, satire, raillery, hyperbole, tragedy—these are all strategies for conveying moral judgment that have the effect, whether calculated or not, of reaching us in ways that supersede ordinary register of logic and reason.

At its best, literature raises provocative questions under the guise of comedy or satire. Shakespeare's buffoon Launcelot Gobbo in the *Merchant of Venice* asks subversive questions about the nature of religious belief, the futility of evangelical conversion, and the distinctiveness of Christianity. Points can be made subtly in ways that invite sympathy, identification, contempt, or reproach. Rabindranath Tagore's *The Home and the World* dramatizes the pathologies of both rabid nationalism and cool disinterested cosmopolitanism through the story of a tragic infidelity with which the reader either sympathizes or disapproves. Literature can also be multivalent, steadfastly refusing to take sides. Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* highlights what is tragic in the follies of romanticism and the arrogance of modern natural science, neither affirming nor rejecting the Enlightenment.

Conclusion

Just as the natural and social sciences help us to better understand the world by arranging its particulars into generalizable propositions, political theory seeks to edify by offering normative truths which are generalizable, even if not empirically demonstrable or falsifiable. And therein lies the value of canonical works of political theory: they articulate important—one might even say timeless—truths about the moral and political universe. Nonetheless, there are constraints to this enterprise imposed by the very nature of the genre of political theory. Some thinkers, such as Plato and Nietzsche, sought to transcend these limitations by making their writings more literary in nature—dialogic, epigrammatic, ironic, or dramatic—and others, such as Machiavelli and Montesquieu, turned to plays or fictional narratives to amplify their formal political ideas. Yet our sources of important moral and political lessons are hardly exhausted by the list of canonical political philosophers. Indeed, as I've tried to suggest above, the kinds of
questions of interest to political philosophers are often conveyed as well—if not better—via the genre of literature. Novels, plays, short stories, and even poems may just as easily capture the subtlety, conditionality, and contradictions inherent in moral and political life.

With all this in mind, I hope that you will turn with great interest to the outstanding student essays contained in this number of *Utraque Unum*. They represent superlative models of the spirit of interdisciplinary inquiry sketched out above—that is, the common project of drawing on a wide variety of authors, texts, genres, and methods to divine valuable insights into the human condition.

Richard Boyd
Associate Professor of Government
Director, Tocqueville Forum for Political Understanding
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the United States develop a radical new view of its role in shaping the political affairs of and defending its hegemonic influence over the Western Hemisphere. For most of the nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine, a principle kept rather in thought than in deed, stood alone in molding the hemispheric posture of the United States, enshrining its ostensible objective to deter further European colonization in the Americas. It was not until the 1890s, however, that the United States, then a minor power in the global arena, saw fit to enforce the Monroe Doctrine to reduce European influence in the Western Hemisphere and to enlarge the scope of American hegemony beyond North America. Moreover, transnational crises emerged in Venezuela in 1895 and 1902 which offered the United States its first opportunities to assert its perceived jurisdiction in hemispheric affairs by, in both cases, demanding that European powers consent to foreign arbitration of their disputes with the Venezuelan government and, thus, implicitly accede to the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. The uncommonly truculent tenor of American diplomacy and military aggression in the settlement of these Latino-European quarrels proved essential to the evolution of the interventionist character of American statecraft in the Western Hemisphere. Hence, in 1904 and 1905, exploiting seductive visions of unfettered American hemispheric dominion, President Theodore Roosevelt advanced the so-called Roosevelt Corollary, which broadened the ambit of the Monroe Doctrine to require American intervention in any conflict between a European power and a sovereign state in the Americas. The advent of the Roosevelt Corollary saw the United States commit itself unequivocally to the defense of the alleged interests of the Western Hemisphere, a paternalistic role that has typified American foreign policy ever since. Venezuela thereby became a playground for nascent American imperialism and regime change doctrine, a historical residue that echoes to the present moment, in which it is still in the crosshairs of the Pentagon and military planners.

For most of the nineteenth century, the chief policy governing the role of the United States in the Western Hemisphere was the Monroe Doctrine, a policy developed by John Quincy Adams and first enunciated by President James Monroe in his address to Congress in December 1823. Maintaining that the Old World and New World had irreconcilable political systems and social imperatives, he enumerated four formative criteria: first, that the U.S. would not meddle in the “internal concerns” of or conflicts among European powers; second, that it would not interfere with “existing colonies or dependencies of any European power”; third, that future colonization in the western hemisphere was impermissible; and fourth, that the U.S. would “consider any attempt [by a European power] to extend [its] system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” to be met, if necessary, with military action. Monroe’s policy sprang from a fear among American and British policymakers “that the continental powers would attempt to [seize] Spain’s former colonies … many of which had become newly independent nations.” Nonetheless, for most of

Henry Silver
the nineteenth century, the U.S., not yet a major contender in the geopolitical battlefield, could not practically uphold the Monroe Doctrine, so the policy went altogether ignored outside the U.S. until the twilight years of the nineteenth century.4

One of the first cases in which the United States enforced the Monroe Doctrine to check European clout in Latin America came in 1895, when a longstanding border dispute between Venezuela and the British Empire culminated in the so-called Venezuelan Crisis of 1895. The feud initially arose in 1841, when the Venezuelan government alleged that the British had for several decades encroached on Venezuelan territory just west of the border with British Guiana (now Guyana), which Britain had acquired through a treaty with the Dutch in 1814.5 Until 1895, the British disregarded Venezuelan grievances about these enormous land claims and even attempted on multiple occasions to expand the boundary farther west into Venezuelan soil, particularly after the discovery of gold, iron ore, manganese, and diamonds in the borderlands in the 1870s.6

Enraged by British obstinacy, Venezuela, under President Joaquín Crespo, rejected all British attempts at enlarging Guiana, severed all diplomatic relations with Britain, and appealed to the United States for aid in the late 1870s, positing the Monroe Doctrine as grounds for demanding arbitration from or even mounting a military campaign against the British.7 Initially, the U.S. merely expressed concern and did little to mediate a resolution.8 In 1895, however, newly-appointed Secretary of State Richard Olney, under the aegis of President Grover Cleveland, sent an impassioned letter, often hailed as one of the earliest and most seminal assertions of American hemispheric hegemony, to British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, imploring him to submit the boundary dispute to arbitration.9 Salisbury replied dismissively, insisting the Monroe Doctrine, “a novel principle which was never recognized before … and has not since been accepted by the Government [sic] of any other country,” had no firm basis in international law.10

In response, Cleveland solicited Congressional consent in December 1895 to appoint a boundary commission to broker the dispute. Congress approved the measure summarily, and “talk of war with Great Britain began to circulate in the U.S. press.”11 Facing hostilities in South Africa with the Boers, wrangles with Russia, and a furor over Turkish massacres of Armenians, the British could ill afford to manage another conflict. Therefore, Salisbury’s government quietly remitted the dispute to the American commission, withholding any concession that the British had, for the first time, acquiesced to the Monroe Doctrine and tacitly validated the self-proclaimed jurisdiction of the United States in policing the Western Hemisphere.12 Despite Venezuelan optimism that the boundary commission would rule against Britain, it ultimately dictated in October 1899 that the border conform more or less to Britain’s original delineations.13

Not only did the triumph of the United States in the dispute, however serendipitous it might have been, enliven the romanticism of American dreams of hemispheric dominance, but Britain’s begrudging acceptance of the Monroe Doctrine also legitimated the authority of the U.S. in hemispheric affairs. In addition, the U.S. diplomatic victory initiated the Great Rapprochement, a spirit of cordial diplomatic cooperation founded on mutual political interests between Britain and the U.S. in the period leading up to the First World War.14 The Great Rapprochement saw British statecraft defer more and more to American control of Latin America, thus laying more explicit recognition of American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. Furthermore, by the turn of the century, though Britain was still the global “kingmaker,” the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895 and observation of “imperial overextension” led Britain to consider receding from the Western Hemisphere not only politically, but also militarily.15 In the years following the crisis, the British navy substantially reduced its presence in the Caribbean, inviting the U.S. navy to
take its place. In broad terms, the comity forged between the two powers coincided with and intensified the American embrace of a stalwart imperialist agenda. This agenda underlay motives for the seizure of Spanish territories during the Spanish-American War of 1898.

International contretemps in Venezuela resurfaced in 1902 when another crisis in Venezuela ensued from European discontent over Venezuela’s refusal to repay its prodigious debts. Beset by years of revolution and the regime of an unscrupulous despot, Venezuela in the first years of the twentieth century was neither recuperating its debts nor recompensing foreigners for damages incurred on account of domestic strife. Exasperated by the perception of the hollow promises and guile of Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro, many Western creditor states chafed at this debt and sniffed out an opportunity for regime change.

The general attitude of the U.S. at first, however, was that the Monroe Doctrine prohibited European seizure of Western Hemispheric territory, not necessarily European interventions. Statements by American government officials and other diplomatic messages to Venezuela show that the U.S. shared the view of its European counterparts about the temptation of abusing Venezuelan debt as a pretext for an overseas imperial adventure. Indeed, after countless attempts at a diplomatic resolution, Britain, Italy, and Germany established a naval blockade of Venezuela to compel Castro to bow to their ultimata.

Despite the swift defeat of the Venezuelan navy, Castro refused to yield. However, he ultimately agreed to submit the dispute to international arbitration. British and Italian officials were more or less amenable, but the Germans, who had had their eyes set on conquest in the Western Hemisphere, avidly demurred to this proposition. Seizing on the opportunity, in part, to defy German imperialism, which had bred intense American-German antagonism in the early years of the twentieth century, President Theodore Roosevelt dispatched a large fleet of American ships to Venezuela and exorted the Germans to back down on pain of war. In light of Castro’s intransigence and deep concerns about American involvement in the conflict, the Germans acquiesced to a compromise: the dispute would come before the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, but the blockade would continue during the negotiations. In February 1903, the court decreed that Venezuela devote about 30% of its customs duties to relieving national debt to European creditors and that the blockade dissolve. Moreover, the gesture of German assent to “the supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean” in the affair provided a critical spur to the development of the Roosevelt Corollary.

Now convinced that the United States had arrogated to itself the task of protecting the Western Hemisphere from any form of European encroachment, Roosevelt, in his annual messages to Congress in 1904 and 1905, articulated a new policy toward Latin America known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. In tandem with enshrining American interventionism in all Latino-European conflicts, he contended that the U.S. did “not intend to permit the Monroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this Continent [sic] as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its own misdeeds against foreign nations,” just as Castro had hoped. The doctrine sought rather to make “the other republics [in the hemisphere] happy and prosperous” by safeguarding their sovereignty and monitoring their relations with hostile entities. At the heart of the Roosevelt Corollary lay the opinion, shaped by the events in Venezuela in 1895 and 1902-03, that “the mere threat of territorial aggrandisement [sic] by a European power” constituted just cause for American intervention. At the same time, that the U.S. had to ensure that Latin American nations recoup their debts to Europe and have governments subservient to American-European commercial and diplomatic interests. In one form or another, the Roosevelt
Corollary has dictated U.S. policy in Latin America for generations and colored American visions of hemispheric dominance.28

The evolution of American foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere and the promulgation of the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine turned, in large measure, on developments in Venezuela between 1895 and 1903 and on the extent to which the course of those events cemented American hemispheric hegemony. The long-running boundary dispute between Venezuela and the preoccupied British Empire ultimately afforded the United States the chance to brandish its diplomatic mettle by upholding the Monroe Doctrine for more or less the first time and insisting that the British remit the dispute to American mediation. Moreover, Britain’s eventual assent to American arbitration lent vital credence to the legitimacy of the Monroe Doctrine on the global stage and instigated the Great Rapprochement, an era that featured substantive British support of American ascendancy over hemispheric affairs. Seven years later, the naval blockade imposed on Venezuela by Britain, Germany, and Italy in light of the nation’s unwieldy debt offered yet another occasion for the United States to assert its dominion over Latin American affairs and to challenge German imperialism in the Western Hemisphere. Roosevelt’s plucky display of American naval might and his threat of war induced the uncompromising Germans to consent to international arbitration of the debt crisis, thus further validating the Monroe Doctrine. At last, to square official foreign policy with American actions in the Venezuelan Crisis of 1902-03 and to satisfy growing imperatives for U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere, Roosevelt propounded his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, extending the scope of American authority to all Latino-European relations and bounding the parameters of American foreign policy for the next three decades. Despite some cosmetic modifications, the Roosevelt Corollary and its saber-rattling spirit have continued to undergird the American hegemonic project, which now has its eyes set once again on regime change in Venezuela, the original testing ground for that very project.

Henry Silver is a sophomore in the College.
Muhammad Rashid Rida was born in 1865 in Tripoli, a city located in modern-day Lebanon, and died in 1935 in Cairo, Egypt. A disciple of Muhammad 'Abduh and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, two late nineteenth century scholars who first called for the reform and modernization of Islam, Rida witnessed the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, World War One, and the colonization of the Arab world through the mandate system after the War. He lived in a period of turbulent developments for his people and home, experiencing the emergence and decline of 'Abduh's Islamic Modernism. Rida emigrated to Cairo in 1897 to join 'Abduh, whom he had first met in the early 1880s, and whose journal, 'Urwa al-wuthqa, wielded a strong influence on him. Together, the two thinkers began publishing a monthly journal called al-Manar, which Rida continued to write for alone after Abduh's death in 1905. The last edition of the journal was published in 1935, with publication ending only because Rida passed away. This journal, along with the various books and articles that Rida wrote during his lifetime, documents the thoughts of a man who stood at the intersection between the innovation-driven ideology of Islamic modernism and the imitative nature of modern-day Salafism.

Indeed, Albert Hourani, one of the foremost historians of nineteenth century Middle East, states that Rida, “belonged to the last generation of those who could be fully educated and yet alive in a self-sufficient Islamic world of thought.” Despite the unique position Rida occupies in the history of Islamic thought, little attention has been paid to him and his ideas. Most scholarship on Rida can be divided into two categories. The first treats Rida as a minor member of a larger Islamic modernist movement led by figures like 'Abduh and al-Afghani, spending little time on Rida's ideas and the process that led to their conceptualization. These scholars view Rida as a disciple of more influential thinkers, not recognizing the historical flux he lived in and the reach of al-Manar in the international Islamic modernist community. Their analysis of Rida's works is generally straightforward but fails to recognize the effect political developments had on his ideas. The second category includes academics who focus on a specific aspect of Rida's work, usually his treatise on the Islamic Caliphate or political involvements, and explore it in depth. Such analyses, while more extensive than the first category, are limited by their narrow scope and fail to contextualize Rida within his time period. Both categories of analysis fail to capture the nuances of Rida's thought and gloss over the sometimes-contradictory aspects of his work, approaching his ideas as ready-made concepts without studying their development over the years.

In order to truly understand Rida's works, a more holistic and contextual approach is necessary. By using various quotations from and references to al-Manar in the above-mentioned works, this piece will analyze the history of Rida's thoughts from 1898, when he arrived in Egypt, until his death. Rida was driven by the need to maintain the political independence of Muslim-majority lands above all else, but his
work also marks the ideological turning point between reformists like Abduh and Islamists like Hassan al-Banna. Providing historical context for this shift will be a useful addition to our understanding of Islamist movements, as well as to the impact that colonization had on the Arab world and its ideological development. The aim of this piece is to trace the development of Rashid Rida’s thoughts across his various publications in a chronological order, emphasizing the historical developments that were unfolding as he wrote. How did the political developments and everyday events that occurred during his lifetime change his opinions and perspectives?

I. Methodology
The biggest difficulty in this research has been the lack of English-language translations of al-Manar. All the authors that have written about Rashid Rida have referenced al-Manar, either providing direct quotes or paraphrasing Rida’s words. While al-Manar was published monthly, its issues have been collected according to year of publication and numbered 1 through 35, with the first collection including all articles published in 1898 and the 35th issue including all articles published in 1935 before Rida’s death. However, because they were published following the Hijri calendar, the corresponding Gregorian years of publication sometimes overlap: for example, issue VI includes articles from 1903 and 1904 while Issue VII includes only articles from 1904. This occurs when the Hijri new year falls sometime in the middle of the Gregorian year, causing the issues’ year of publication to overlap without there being any repetition of articles. While collecting references to the various al-Manar issues from secondary sources, I have catalogued them according to issue number and year of publication.

Three themes emerge from my analysis of al-Manar and Rida’s other writings as a single body of work. The first is the need for reform of contemporary Islam to recreate the “perfect religion” that had led Muslims to greatness and civilization expansion at the time of the Salaf. The second theme is Rida’s opinions of the European powers rapidly encroaching on Muslim-majority areas. The last theme is Rida’s fluctuating opinion of the Ottoman Empire. It should be noted that each issue of al-Manar is several hundred pages long and included works written by other authors, publications of ‘Abduh’s tafsir of the Qur’an, and Rida’s answers to letters from readers, among other things. I decided to focus on the above-mentioned themes both because they are most often discussed in secondary resources, and because they best reflect how historical context affected his views.

II. Thematic Analysis
II.1. Revision and Reform in Islam
In an article included in the first (1898) issue of al-Manar, Rida argued that Islam was not to blame for the backwardness of Muslim states; rather, he accused the ‘umara of being corrupt and described the ‘ulama as even more to blame for trying to curry the favor of rulers instead of working in the interests of Muslims and Islam. The ‘ulama had failed Muslims by neglecting modern sciences and being too loyal to their separate madhhab, leading to stagnation in Islamic societies.

This criticism of the ‘ulama and the madhhab is part of a larger critique of taqlid—which means imitation or emulation—and is the process through which legislation that was dictated by past scholars of a certain madhab is considered absolute and forever-applicable. Rida saw this “immutable system of legislation” as permeating society and discouraging development on all fronts. Furthermore, Rida viewed the fragmentation into different madhhab as a weakness of Muslim societies since it led Muslims to quarrel amongst themselves instead of uniting to protect each other from foreign control. As Rida wrote in al-Manar in 1901: “What is harmful is fragmentation of Muslims into sects and parties, while each of them requires its members to follow a scholar whom they call an imam […] and assemble themselves against the followers of
another scholar, leading finally to the negligence of the Book and the Sunna.”10

Rida’s animosity towards the madhahib and the role they played in the weakening of Muslim societies is shown in his 1907 plea for the ‘ulama from all over the world to come together and “produce a book of Islamic law that was free from ambiguity and easy for everyone to understand.”11 With this suggestion, Rida was not encouraging the dissolution of the different legal schools, but was instead calling for collaboration to ensure an easier understanding and application of Islamic law. Rida considered the lack of cooperation among madhahib as an important contributor to the stagnation of Islamic law—as well as Muslim societies more generally—and he hoped that by having them work together, a uniform legal system could be established.

Rida’s views on the debate between taqlid and ijtihad—or independent reasoning—are best exemplified in a book which he published in 1906 but was first written as a series of al-Manar articles in 1901. The book, titled Muhawarat al-Muslih wa al-Muqallid (The Debates of The Reformer and the Traditionalist), is a work of fiction in which a young Muslim intellectual debates issues of religious reform with an older shaykh, a traditionalist.12 During the debates, Rida, through the young reformer, discusses the necessity for the ‘ulama to use ijtihad to “decide by consulting one another what is most beneficial for the Community according to the circumstances of the times.”13 Rida cites the Companions of the Prophet as proof that ijtihad is the way forward, stating that they themselves employed independent reasoning and thus recognized that “the correct principle was to adopt whatever course was beneficial rather than to cling to the details and subsidiary rules of laws.”14 The use of the Companions, or the Salaf, as an example for reform is the main characteristic of the subgroup of Islamic modernism called Salafism. Rida, like ‘Abduh before him, did not call for blind imitation of the Salaf, as the Salafists did in the twenty-first century; rather, they called for Muslims to use the same independent reasoning that the Prophet’s Companions used to adapt to their context and restore the greatness of Islam during their time. This reform agenda, pushed by thinkers like Rida, involved “the closing of the gates of blind taqlid and the opening of the gate of reflection and reasoning [as the] beginning of any reform.”15

Rida makes another interesting point in his Muhawarat: at the beginning of the discussion between the reformer and the shaykh, the latter is still convinced that there is nothing wrong with Muslim societies, and that they are not suffering from ignorance. When the young reformer encourages the shaykh to read newspapers for evidence of his distress, the shaykh responds, “how would I be convinced of your words when they are based on no other arguments than the books of geography and the twaddle of newspapers. This is all lies with no documentation, all their sources are of the unbelievers and ‘the unbeliever do not accept what he tells you.”16 This rejection of what the ‘ulama termed “Western sciences” is one of their biggest faults in Rida’s eyes. Rather than reject all knowledge by non-Muslim thinkers, his young reformer encourages the acceptance of knowledge through independent critical analysis of an author’s sources and possible motives. Thinkers across the Muslim world shared this type of argument, placing Rida squarely within the modernist tradition of his time. The book concludes with Rida’s reformer proposing that the ahl al-hall wa al-aqd, a term Rida uses to refer to the most competent religious scholars and representatives of the umma, come together and create a book of precepts that respond to the needs of their time.17

Throughout his career, Rida fought for reform and reduced reliance on the madhahib, but he never called for the removal of religion from the public sphere or from politics. He considered himself a part of the “moderate Islam” camp, affirming that if Islam was interpreted and reformed according to his vision, it could prove to be the solution to the political, social, and religious problems of the time.19 As such, when secularism began to gain traction among Muslim
intellectuals, Rida was appalled. In 1925-6, Rida published a scalding condemnation of ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq and his book on the Caliphate. In his book, al-Raziq argued that the Prophet was a religious figure that had never held any political power and that, as such, there is no requirement in Islam for the establishment of a Caliphate that unites both religious and political authority.20

Having witnessed the gradual European takeover of former Ottoman territories, Rida accused al-Raziq of playing into the hands of imperialist interests that were trying to divide the Muslim people so they could become “a prey to the wild beasts of imperialism.”21 While there is no way to know how Rida would have reacted to such a suggestion in the early 1900s, his strong words against al-Raziq are an indication of his disillusionment with European influence, which secularism is inherently associated with.

In 1930, Rida delivered a lecture at the Society of the Oriental League showcasing his disdain for secularism and his continued commitment to religious reform. Titled “al-tajdid wa al-tajaddud wa al-mujaddidun” (Renewal, Renewing and Reformers), the lecture begins with a criticism of the “hoard of heretics [that] are at present attempting to assume this honourable title” of renewalers.22 Rida criticizes the Ottoman Empire and Amanullah Khan of Afghanistan for their secularization efforts and imitation of Europe, claiming that those efforts led to the collapse of their rule. He warns that secularism could lead to “worse than the divisions of ethnic and national extremists and of political parties,” and calls for “religious renewal and earthly renewal” based on both the old and the modern.23 Religious renewal, according to Rida, consists of returning to the simplicity and guidance of religion as it was in the early days of Islam as well as the reunification of Muslims around their religion. This should be coupled with earthly renewal involving the development of stable industries and trade, as well as the creation of functioning schools, hospitals, and orphanages.24 Rida urges Muslims to do this in accordance with shari’a and by employing ijtihad, which the Prophet himself mandated when he said “God sends to this nation at the beginning of every century someone who renews its religion.”25 It is unclear who Rida considers this divinely mandated leader, but he might have been referring to himself and his fellow intellectuals.

This strong criticism of imitators of Europe and of secularism as a state ideology reflects the evolution of another theme that recurs throughout Rida’s writings: his relations and opinions of the West. We shall explore this theme in the next section.

II.2. The Western Powers

In the 1898 issue of al-Manar, Rida had called for the establishment of an Islamic Society that would, under the patronage of the Caliph, allow Islam to function as “a bond which unites all Muslims as one community and […] the Shari’ah, the Divine Law of Islam, can unite all nationalities in equality of government, both Muslim and non-Muslim.”26 This is the first hint at Rida’s political activism in later years, but it also shows a recognition that Muslims needed to organize and unite as a community, under one code of law and one interpretation of Islam, in order to ensure the survival of the Ottoman Empire. In a series of articles in Issue X of al-Manar published in 1907, titled “The Advantages and Disadvantages of Europeans in the East,” Rida argued that one of the greatest benefits of European influence in Muslim countries was the establishment of communal societies and organizations.27 This recognition of the role of European civil society in the development of European civilization, coupled with his earlier calls for a unified Islamic Society and the urgency he felt to unify Muslims under a single interpretation of Islam, led Rida to approach Ottoman authorities with a plan for a school. This school would combine both religious and modern scientific education as Rida felt that its pupils needed to “study the actual situation of Muslims and not simply the ideal in the Muslim texts.”28 When the government in Istanbul turned down his request for funds, Rida turned to the British
in Egypt and in 1911 founded the Dar al-Da’wa al-Irshad, translated both as the Association of Proselytism and Guidance and the Association of Propaganda and Guidance. In issue XIV of al-Manar, published in 1911, Rida set out his aim for this institution and its graduates, believing that they should guide the Muslim community on the right path, away from religious deviation, as well as spread Islam to non-Muslims in missionary-like fashion.

Rida recognized the strengths of European power and believed that Muslim societies should learn from their experiences without blindly imitating their development. In the 1899 and 1900 issues of al-Manar, Rida discussed how the Europeans were subjugated to the authority of the Catholic Church at first but then, after the Crusades, they rebelled against this authority once they realized their weakness. The parallel Rida drew was between Europe’s rebellion against the authoritarian tendencies of the Catholic Church and his belief that Muslims needed to rebel against the ‘ulama. Throughout his life, Rida’s chief concern was to ensure Muslim independence, and he argued that Muslims needed to develop the nation and force their rulers to reform according to the public’s wishes, as “this age is the age of nations, not individuals; discipline and solidarity, not despotism.” Indeed, in the series of articles about the advantages and disadvantages of European presence in the Muslim world, Rida referred to the emergence from tyrannical governments as one of the benefits, stating that “the greatest benefit that the East has derived from the Europeans is knowledge of what a government should be.” Rida did not mean that Muslim-majority areas should adopt the European democratic model, but rather, that they should establish governments based on the principle of shura, or consultation, and on the shari’a.

The idea that Muslims should adopt some of Europe’s ideas without giving up their Islamic identity led Rida to develop an admiration for Japan. In the 1903-4 issue of al-Manar, Rida argued that Japan’s victory over Russia and its quick and successful modernization were proof that the West was not inherently superior to non-Western nations. Japan’s moral and military independence for thousands of years was the key to its success, something that Muslims had never experienced. In Japan, Rida saw the perfect balance between Westernization and modernization. He saw that the Islamic world could adopt the West’s modern sciences and industrial development while preserving its local moral and value systems. While Japan was efficiently modernizing to a point where it could take on Russia’s military and win, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire at large were falling behind.

Despite his continued admiration for European scientific and technological advancements, Rida was also painfully aware of Europe’s slow but steady encroachment of Ottoman territories. As early as 1905, Rida warned that “Europe attacks [Muslims] with the strength of its nations, sciences, industries, organization, wealth, shrewdness and wisdom.” While this motivated him to call for modernization within the Ottoman Empire, he also made interesting off-handed comments about the possibility of direct British rule over Muslim territories. In the 1906 issue of al-Manar, Rida stated that if Muslims had to be ruled by a foreign power, the British would be the preferred option because at least they would ensure religious freedom. If the cities of Mecca and Medina were protected from foreign aggression, or at least free from non-Muslim influence, being under British rule could be acceptable. Several years later, in 1912, Rida gave a speech in Lucknow, India while on a business visit. During this speech, which was later published in al-Manar, Rida stated that among all the colonial powers, the British gave their subjects the most freedoms and “it was possible for those living under their shadow to develop themselves so long as they followed a rational and sagacious path.” As we shall see later, political developments in the Ottoman Empire around that time had greatly impacted Rida’s hopes for the future of the Ottoman Empire. The Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 had cost the Ottoman
Empire yet another chunk of North Africa, while the Balkan wars of 1912-13 would cause it to lose all its Eastern European territory. It is possible that, upon seeing the increasing level of European control of Muslim-majority areas and the rising tensions in Europe among the various colonial powers, Rida might have been attempting to curry the favor of the power he viewed as the least evil. This hypothesis is reinforced by Rida’s comments about France, which were published in the 1913 issue of *al-Manar*. Rida said: “France in Europe is totally opposite of France in Africa. In Europe it is the mother of freedom and equality and the source of science and arts. However, there are no traces of these aspects in Africa.” If European control of Arab people was inevitable, Rida would prefer British control to French rule.

Any favorable opinion of European countries that Rida had was completely swept away by the First World War and the creation of the mandate system that followed. In the 1922 issue of *al-Manar*, Rida wrote: “Europe has destroyed all the good reputation it had in the East after her experience during and after the war. Nobody believes the word of the Europeans any more, nor does anybody trust them or ever perceive them to be qualified to exercise justice and virtue.” The disappointments of Rida’s attempts at political negotiations with the British during the war, coupled with the crushing of Faisal’s independent Syrian kingdom and the promise of Palestinian to Zionist immigration, resulted in Rida’s complete disillusionment with Europe.

**II.3. The Ottoman Empire and Turco-Arab Relations**

Rida’s opinions of the Ottoman Empire underwent several changes before the start of the First World War. When he began publishing *al-Manar* in 1898, Sultan Abdul Hamid was still in power and the Ottoman Empire, while weak, was still a major world player. The threat of European encroachment was already strong, however, so Rida took pains to encourage cooperation between Arabs and Turks for the preservation of Islam’s independence and the durability of the Ottoman Empire. In an article titled “*al-Turk wa al-‘Arab*” published in 1900 (Issue III), Rida established a social hierarchy in which Arabs represented the core strength of Islam and the Empire’s religion, while the Turks represented the military might and political strength necessary for the Empire’s survival. Rida believed that Arabs were behind Turks in three fields necessary for defending themselves: “[modern] knowledge, wealth and military preparedness.” His calls for cooperation between Arabs and Turks were motivated by his fears that Arabs would be more vulnerable to foreign occupation. He therefore argued that the Islamic soul of the Ottoman Empire could not survive without Arabs, but the state structure needed Turkish military strength to survive; the two peoples must cooperate to ensure their freedom.

His anxieties about the future of Ottoman Arab subjects were further heightened by the coming to power of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1908. In the 1908 issue of *al-Manar*, Rida threw his support behind the CUP and the reinstatement of the constitution, while simultaneously reminding them of the legitimacy of Sultan Abdul Hamid as the head of the Islamic Umma. A year later, however, when the CUP deposed the Sultan, Rida wrote another article in which he criticized the Sultan for conspiring to restore his own absolute power. This made him an illegitimate ruler in Rida’s eyes; thus, Rida viewed his deposition as lawful. Rida’s eagerness to appease the CUP and throw his support behind their reforms was most likely motivated by his fears of the rising Turkish nationalism in Anatolia and the possible negative consequences that Turkish nationalist policies would have on the Arab subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, in the same 1909 issue of *al-Manar*, he published another article titled “*al-Turk wa al-‘Arab*,” once more calling for cooperation between the two people against foreign control. In the article, he argued against nationalism based on race, claiming that such a European concept had no place in the Ottoman Empire because of its multi-racial composition.
In October 1911, Italy invaded Libya (then known as the province of Tripolitania) and within a few months had gained control of the entire Ottoman province. To Rida, this defeat at the hands of one of the weaker European powers was a telltale sign of the weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the very real threat of its collapse. In that year’s issue of al-Manar, Rida described the Ottoman Empire as the representative and guardian of Islam worldwide. He recognized that “it may fall short in serving Islam because of the despotism of some of its sultans, or the irreligion of some of its pashas, or the threats from Europe. But these are symptoms that will disappear when their cause cease, as long as the [Ottoman] state remains independent and responsible for the office of the caliphate.”

At this stage Rida still considered the Ottoman Empire to be Muslims’ best option for continued independence, but he was adamant that the Empire needed to reform its government structure through modernization and Islamic renewal.

The Balkan War began to truly shake Rida’s confidence in the Empire’s future. When the war started in 1912, Rida penned an article titled “al-Harb al-balqaniyya wa al-mas’ala al-sharqiyya,” in which he questioned the Ottomans’ ability to defend the holy cities Mecca and Medina and reminded his readers that the soul of this Muslim empire was the Arabian Peninsula where the Ka’ba was located and the Qur’an had been revealed. In Rida’s opinion, the Empire’s insistence on fighting for its Eastern European provinces was indicative of a disregard for the real roots of Islam and the importance of Turco-Arab relations. He wrote as much in an article published in al-Manar in 1913, demanding that the Empire focus on its Asian provinces and their development and security instead. In the same article, he also suggested to move the Ottoman capital from Istanbul to either Damascus or Konya, a city in Anatolia. Istanbul could become a military outpost, but the capital should be moved in order to ensure that the Ottoman government could defend the entirety of its territory in case of invasion.

In 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, Rida accused the CUP of having abandoned Islamism and Ottomanism in favour of Turkish nationalism. Rida was careful in the years preceding the war not to be too critical of the Ottoman regime and the CUP, supporting Ottomanism but being somewhat critical of their policies. His main concern remained ensuring Arab and Muslim independence from foreign control—and he was not ready to give up on the Ottoman Empire in the initial stages of the war. As the tide of the war slowly turned against the Ottomans when the United States joined the war, Rida’s hopes and dreams for a continuation of the Ottoman Empire died and he became increasingly involved with British intelligence officers and diplomats stationed in Cairo, working towards Arab independence instead.

III. Conclusion

Rida spent his life grappling with an ever-changing political environment and with the continued emergence of new challenges to Islam and the Muslim independence. His initial thoughts, in the immediate aftermath of his arrival in Egypt, were concerned with more philosophical questions of how to reform Islam from within. He called for a new legal system and for the ‘ulama to embrace natural sciences and modernity instead of refuting it simply because of its European, and therefore non-Muslim, origins. Rida struggled to convince his fellow religious scholars that accepting certain things from Europe would not compromise the identity of Muslims and the nature of Islam, but rather, that it could bring economic prosperity and the chance to ward off European encroachment on Ottoman territory.

His own views on Europe and the colonial powers changed as time went by and their intentions to take over Ottoman lands became clearer and clearer. Rida admired their scientific progress and military might but recognized the threat that these posed to Muslims, especially as the Ottoman Empire failed to successfully stop
its own decline. In Rida’s mind, Muslims could achieve higher levels of prosperity because, unlike Europeans, they had not renounced their religion and therefore still followed strict moral standards that the European powers seemed to have lost. Over the years before the First World War, Rida’s opinion of Europe soured and he became more critical and wearier of their involvement with Muslim-majority lands, but he never stopped thinking that certain aspects of their civilization could be emulated by Muslims.

It is perhaps Rida’s relationship with and writings about the Ottoman Empire that suffered the most drastic changes over the years, as this paper has shown. Starting out in Cairo as a supporter of the Ottoman government, Rida wrote very favorably about the Young Turks and their attempts to reform a state that Rida recognized was atrophying. His thoughts changed quickly once it became clear that the CUP and their Turkification policies would leave the Arab population of the Ottoman Empire exposed to foreign influence and control. Furthermore, the continued loss of territory in the Balkans and North Africa made Rida incredibly worried for the future independence of Muslims. The First World War and the Ottoman government’s decision to join on the side of Germany convinced him of the need for a drastic change in governmental structure.

In the post-World War One era, Rida was scrambling for a solution to the question of Arab independence, a goal that became increasingly more impossible as the mandate system came into effect and Turkey declared its independence and abolished the Ottoman Sultanate. Rida’s commitment to the role Islam should play in any political system governing Muslims was overshadowed by intellectuals who embraced secularism as the ideology behind state formation, a line of thinking that was actively encouraged and pursued by both British and French mandate authorities. The frustration Rida felt as a result is best embodied by his 1930 lecture, “Renewal, Renewing, and Renewers,” in which he criticized those scholars who championed secularism as the form of renewal that the Islamic world needed to develop and modernize.

Rida and his ideas were later forgotten as Islamists like Hassan al-Banna and his Muslim Brotherhood stole the stage as champions of political Islam. Regardless of his influence on later generations, or the lack of attention that has been paid to him by scholars and historians, Rida’s writings represent a rare insight into the thoughts of a man who was both politically engaged and an intellectually apt. He allowed the political developments that took place around him to influence his writings because he did not distinguish between his religious belief and his political ideas, something which makes him somewhat unique in the modern era.

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When considering the perception of China in the American imagination, we often think about the immigration crises of the Gilded Age, or about the racist depictions of Chinese people in the early-mid 1900s, or about the common view of China as a communist threat throughout the second half of the twentieth century - all negative. But in doing so, we may overlook that there was a time when Americans looked on China with wonder and admiration and fell in love with the popular image of Chinese culture. When and why the American view changed is an important question, as it marks the early turning point in U.S.-China relations which would change both countries forever.

Tea, porcelain, silk - the popularity of Chinese goods in America starting in the late 1700s is a testament to the attraction Americans had towards the mysterious foreign land many at the time called “Cathay”. This attraction manifested itself in broadly positive depictions of China, which were driven by a romantic view characterized by curiosity and admiration. Yet only a few decades later, American opinion of the Chinese drastically shifted to one of derision and distrust. China went from being thought of as a grand empire to being thought of as an archaic, arrogant, and despotic nation, and would remain this way in the American imagination for decades to come. This paper argues that the change in perception was a result of the Anglo-Chinese Opium War of 1839-1842. To do so, I will examine the early American view of China and why it was so positive, then describe the factors behind the emergence of an unfavorable image of China and explain how it was popularized by the Opium War.

The “Celestial Empire”
In 1784, American army officer Samuel Shaw docked in the port city of Guangzhou aboard the Empress of China, bringing with him a cargo of ginseng to trade. At the time, the United States had only just freed American trade from British control and looked to China as a source of silver to finance its international trade and burgeoning industry. Shaw made a healthy profit on the ginseng he sold to China, and the United States continued to sell ginseng and furs to China for several decades. However, American traders quickly realized that there was more profit to be made by selling Chinese goods to the American public, and began to focus their efforts on purchasing Chinese teas, silks, furniture, and porcelain to sell to Americans. What resulted was a massive influx of Chinese goods into the hands of Americans, and as a result, the first exposure of China to the American public.

At the time, China was almost entirely closed off from the rest of the world. The Canton trade system, in place since 1757, restricted all foreign trade with China to Guangzhou and made first-hand observation of the vast territory beyond all
American Perception of China and the Anglo-Chinese Opium WarZW

but impossible. In *China of the American Imagination*, John R. Haddad argues that the absence of concrete information about China granted Americans license to construct a fantastical image of China that “did not require much grounding in reality.”² Furthermore, the few Americans that did successfully study Chinese culture brought back to America vast collections of Chinese oddities and artifacts, which they housed in massively popular museums.³ Besides these museums, the only exposure most Americans had to China was in the designs on the sides of Chinese porcelain, which depicted strange-looking houses and ships, beautiful flowers and landscapes, and fantastical elements of Chinese mythology. Americans quickly fell in love with this distant, serene world, so much so that English traveler Claude C. Robin observed during his trip to America, “there is not a single person to be found, who does not drink [tea] out of China cups and saucers”.⁴ Robin was bearing witness to the rapid spread of porcelain across the country, both as a result of and proliferating a newfound fascination with China.

American infatuation with China in the late 1700s and early 1800s was reflected in academic publications. In 1792, *American Museum* contended that “nothing is more remarkable, nor better calculated for good government than the means used in China”.⁵ In 1823, *North American Review* described China as “a second civilized world, much more ancient and populous, in some respects happier and wiser...than the one with which we are acquainted”, and went so far as to recommend that the Chinese language be taught “as one of the branches of liberal knowledge” in American schools.⁶ *Southern Review* in 1827 asserted that the Chinese lived in “a polished state of society, enjoying the comforts and elegancies attendant on the highest degree of civilization”.⁷ These examples all indicate a popular appreciation for China as a well-managed, civilized, and knowledgeable society. Fueled by the allure of a mysterious higher civilization, Americans viewed China with a great deal of respect.

Opium, Poverty, and Perception

By the time the Opium War started in 1839, American views of China had become much more mixed. Years of missionary excursions and commercial contact had started to erode the fantastical view of the Chinese in the American imagination. In *The Unwelcome Immigrant*, Stuart Creighton Miller argues that the technological advancements which gave rise to the penny press in the 1830s allowed the mass proliferation of widely read newspapers covering China.⁸

In addition, the 1830s saw a surge in missionary activity in China, fueled by eagerly absorbed letters and reports on the pagan Chinese written by a British missionary named Robert Morrison.⁹ These two developments combined to bring the American public a much greater volume of information about China. The influence of porcelain designs and elaborate museum exhibitions was quickly overridden by easily available reports from missionaries, which were decidedly less positive. This is made evident by an 1837 issue of *Knickerbocker Magazine*, which lamented that Americans had been “greatly misled in the opinions [they] form[ed] of the Chinese character from the figures sitting in idealess abstraction of porcelain and tea-chests.”¹⁰ Having been restricted to Canton, American visitors of China spent virtually all their time amid poverty and corruption. Their descriptions of squalor typified the Chinese as degraded heathens, or as put by Yale lecturer Edward Everett, “pagan savages...the slaves of the most odious and oppressive despotism”.¹¹ The ancient Chinese empire, once viewed with reverence, started to be viewed by many Americans as decadent; in 1838, the same *North American Review* which had just a few years ago praised the Chinese as wise and civilized had this to say:

For ourselves, we think it is time we should cease to denominate the Chinese the glory of the Asiatic race, merely because they boast to have produced a sort of barbarian Plato some hundreds of years before the Christian era, shave their heads to ape the baldness of wisdom, print by means of
embossed blocks of wood, in no better artistic style than that of the ancient Peruvians, and have a fashion of instructing their youth in crude, unnatural monstrosities, and in poems which, to hear, would have made Hafiz and Sadi break their lyres, in a fit of epilepsy.12

While earlier perceptions of China were of a wise and glorious society, the same things which had impressed Americans then (wood engravings, poetry, Confucianism, etc.) now seemed outdated and archaic. This came at a time when America was developing a powerful sense of national identity. What they saw in China was contrasted by what they saw in themselves. Where China was a seen as a despotic empire in decline, the United States was a progressive and democratic republic. How Americans started to perceive Canton was fueled by the United States’ growing belief in itself as the pinnacle of civilization, and as a result, the older, fantastical view of China in the American imagination started to fade away.13

In American Perceptions of China, Gary Lee Todd posits that understanding America’s relationship with Great Britain is fundamental to understanding the formation of the early American image of China. By 1840, America was still smarting from having recently fought two wars with Britain, and the yet-unsettled Maine boundary, Oregon dispute, and countless other small conflicts all contributed to sour diplomatic relations.14 It was within this anglophobic context, as well as within the development of America’s crusading spirit, that Americans perceived the opium trade. The British dealing of opium quickly became “a moral issue...an evil to be exposed and denounced.”15 Merchant’s Magazine & Commercial Review in 1839 described opium as “one of the most destructive narcotics ever known”, and lamented that “its dreadful effects may be constantly observed in the streets of Canton, and a confirmed opium smoker is, of all pitiable objects, apparently the most degraded and worthless.”16 The epidemic incited genuine concern for the Chinese victims of the opium trade, but it also reinforced the growing American view of China as a debauched land of weak-willed addicts. In this sense, American perception of the Chinese in 1840 was contradictory. The Chinese were too weak to help themselves, which encouraged a dually benevolent and derivative American attitude. Images of China’s imperial glory still lingered but were beginning to be overtaken by images of squalor and poverty.17

The Opium War

In September 1839, Chinese restrictions on the import on opium and a growing trade deficit Britain to formally declare war on China. While there was much moral outrage against the British forcing the opium trade upon the Chinese, there was also a vocal minority of the American population that sided with the British on the issue. Most famously, none other than John Quincy Adams applauded Britain for enforcing free trade and opening he perpetually-shuttered doors to Chinese trade. He argued that “the fundamental principle of the Chinese empire is anti-commercial”, and that Britain had “the righteous cause” in the war, which had been incited not by opium, but by “the arrogant and insupportable pretensions of China”.18 This was a controversial but not unheard of opinion at the time. In January 1840, the New York Herald “hailed Britain’s attack on China, comparing it to the defeat of the Mexicans and establishment of the Texas republic.”19 This indicates the existence, albeit a small one, of a pro-British argument being made at the time. While this was a minority view, the American public at large objected not to the contempt for the Chinese, but to the justification of England’s aggression in China.

As the war progressed, it became clear that American opposition to the war was far more founded in hatred of the British than it was sympathy for the Chinese. Monthly Chronicle in 1840 argued that “neither China’s conceit, ignorance, nor ludicrous institutions” justified an armed attack.20 Nile’s National Register listed “China and her imbecile world of mortals” as England’s latest victim it its “sad catalogue of outrages upon
Horace Greeley of the *New Yorker* bitterly professed that a Christian nation “deliberately setting aside all restraints of law and justice, and entering upon a contest with a semi-civilized country” would set a bad example for the “idolatrous savages” of greater Asia.22 These examples all show a pointed disdain of both China and of Britain, but a view of Britain as the superior, civilized, Christian country compared to the uncivilized and paganist China. Rather than rallying America to be China’s ally in its time of need, the Opium War merely confirmed for the majority of Americans the weakness and inferiority of the Chinese, along with the immorality of the British.

Britain’s utter and total defeat of China in the Opium War further damaged the image of the Chinese in the United States. Perhaps because of a lingering image of China’s ancient glory, Americans vastly overestimated its ability to defend against the British. The editor of the *Boston Evening Transcript* wrote in 1840 that “the universal opinion is that the force of the British is inadequate to make any important impression.”23 The overwhelming destruction of the Chinese defenses, then, surely surprised him. China’s wooden flotillas stood no chance against Britain’s modern steam warships; the H.M.S. *Nemesis* was reported to have sunk as many as forty Chinese junks in one afternoon. Fatality estimates were as high as four hundred Chinese for every British soldier lost.24 The editor of *Nile’s National Register* in 1841 was disgusted at China’s failure to extract a higher toll for the British victory, going as far as to say that “with every successful collision between the Chinese and their invaders, the imbecility of the former appears more and more manifest”.25 China’s inability to defend against British attacks confirmed for Americans that the fantastical empire they had dreamed about at the turn of the century was a fantasy, and that like all other Mongol races, the Chinese were beneath them in dignity and strength.

In the years following the war, what was left of sympathy for the Chinese vanished in American publications. Gone was the image of the helpless Chinese victim suffering at the hands of evil drug peddlers. In its place, a perception grew of China as “a nation whose overwhelming sense of superiority and ignorant pride had made the war unavoidable and necessary”.26 In 1842, a South Carolinian pastor named Thomas Smyth offered an explanation for why China’s defeat elicited derision rather than empathy. According to Smyth, China demonstrated an “excessive affinity for highfalutin pomp, ridiculous ceremonies, and gratuitous formalities, all of which serve[d] only to provoke laughter, since they were] conducted with an air of high seriousness.” He points out that despite “overwhelming evidence of their own impotence and futility, the Chinese failed to adopt even a measure of humility and instead persisted in believing the illusion of their own power.”27

Smyth’s portrayal of the Chinese is likely unfair but does provide insight into how Americans perceived China after the end of the Opium War. The same pomp and ceremony which had once enchanted America now took on an air of arrogance. However, this change in perception was just as much a result of China’s defeat during the war as it was a result of a changing American national identity. Where Americans at the turn of the nineteenth century fell in love with the majesty of Imperial China, Americans by 1842 turned their nose up at it, convinced of the superiority of their republican experiment.

**Conclusion**

The Opium War had a devastating effect on American perceptions of the Chinese, but the rapid proliferation of information on China in the 1830s is what had started to disseminate negative perception that the war would popularize. The Opium War both coincided with and reinforced newly vitalized ideas of American exceptionalism. As America transitioned from admiring to looking down upon the Chinese, the Chinese defeat at the hands of the British confirmed their status as a lower people. Chinese sympathies during the war were driven by
a hatred of the British far more than they were respect for the Chinese, and after the war was over and relations with the British smoothed over, any lingering feelings of companionship vanished.

Understanding how Americans viewed China is a part of understanding how Americans viewed themselves in the context of the rest of the world. Their opinion of the Chinese fell as their opinion of themselves rose. Figuring out which came first is a chicken-and-egg problem, but regardless, it was ultimately the Opium War and what came with it that fundamentally and forever shifted China in the American imagination.

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“The Troubles” refers to the thirty-year period, from approximately 1968 to 1998, during which Northern Ireland was consumed by sectarian violence. This euphemistic name for the conflict glosses over the extreme violence and terrorism perpetrated by republican and unionist paramilitary organizations and government security forces in pursuit of competing political goals for the future of Northern Ireland. Though statistics vary, the conflict led to the death of at least 3,400 people and the often-crippling injury of thousands more. The unionist faction opposed the reunification of the island of Ireland and sought to preserve the status quo of membership in the United Kingdom. The republican faction rejected the possibility of remaining in the United Kingdom and pushed for Irish reunification. Unionists were mostly Protestant, while republicans were mostly Catholic. The relationship between republicans in Northern Ireland and the Irish diaspora in America was characterized by reciprocal innovation, political engagement, and significant cooperation, often despite the objections of the U.S. government. By and large, Irish America actively supported the republicans throughout the Troubles. By creating political and fundraising organizations, the Irish diaspora in America directly supported the republican movement in the campaign for Catholic rights and the reunification of Ireland. Furthermore, Irish American contributions to the republican movement expanded its rhetorical and political legitimacy and assisted its military activities.

The hostility between the republican and unionist camps stems from centuries of British rule of Ireland, beginning with the Norman invasion in the twelfth century. Over the following centuries, the Irish experienced colonization, violence, and economic exploitation at the hands of the British. First English subjects, and later Scots, were encouraged to settle the colony, and they received lands confiscated from Irish owners. Their descendants constitute much of the population of the northern part of Ireland. The personal union of Ireland and Britain under the Tudor monarchy and later as a part of the United Kingdom through the 1801 Act of Union shifted the brunt of the oppression the Irish experienced from military force into the law. Restrictions of the Gaelic language, the practice of Catholicism, and curtailed voting and property rights were all codified. Despite numerous attempts at revolution, Ireland did not move towards independence until the early twentieth century, when the failed Easter Rising of 1916 and the rise in nationalism associated with World War I lead to the Irish War of Independence.

The British Parliament’s 1920 Government of Ireland Act resulted in dramatic changes for the political status of Ireland: the vast majority of Ireland would constitute the new Irish Free State, a pseudo-independent nation that remained under British authority. As a compromise measure, it also created a separate Northern Irish Government to satisfy Unionists. The popular view of the partition was that it was a measure of temporary compromise, and the Anglo-Irish Treaty established a Council of Ireland to oversee what
most perceived as the likely eventual reconciliation between north and south. But after Northern Ireland opted out of the Irish Free State and the Irish Civil War between the pro- and anti-Treaty factions resulted in death and division, reunification no longer seemed immediately tangible. In 1949, the Irish Free State, composed of twenty counties, formally declared Independence from Britain and formed the Republic of Ireland. The six counties of Northern Ireland, known as Ulster to the Protestant population, remained part of Britain. However, apart from the military, tax policy, trade, and currency, Northern Ireland mostly governed itself independently of Britain. This autonomy led to political and social practices that greatly favored the Protestant majority.

The erasure of formal laws restricting Catholicism did not significantly counter centuries of state-sponsored animus toward the minority religious group. Although Catholics were fully permitted to practice their faith, the Catholic minority still did not enjoy the same societal status as Protestant citizens. Through gerrymandering, Catholic Northern Irish were prevented from having proportional political representation. This in turn hindered their ability to address government abuses, such as discrimination against Catholics in the receipt of government benefits and the extrajudicial and police violence Catholic citizens were often subjected to. The pattern of discrimination, resulting in a lack of political, economic, and social opportunity, fostered the already existent nationalism among Catholics and encouraged reunification with the Republic of Ireland, in which they would no longer be an oppressed religious minority. The majority of Protestant Northern Irish opposed the establishment of a united Ireland, partially because they feared they themselves would become the religious minority.

In response to discrimination, Northern Irish Catholics began an overwhelmingly nonviolent civil rights campaign in the mid-1960s, inspired by the American civil rights movement. The movement sought to redress injustices by protesting gerrymandering, property requirements for voting, housing and employment discrimination, and the brutality of “the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and, particularly, the 8,500-man paramilitary ‘B specials’ reserve force.” The National Catholic Reporter observed that the conflict’s immediate roots were connected with the Catholic push for civil rights, as the unionist faction sought to suppress protesting Catholics. Protestants were filmed using sticks to assault Catholic protesters and shouting “‘No Pope here!’”. The unionist backlash stoked sectarian tension and led to the resurrection of the Irish Republican Army, an anti-Treaty military organization which had lost the Irish Civil War of the early 1920s and had become largely defunct by the time of the Catholic civil rights movement. At this time, the IRA characterized its role as a defensive paramilitary organization formed to protect Catholics who were under siege from the predominantly Protestant security forces of the RUC and B Specials paramilitary reserve.

In response to rising violence in the spring of 1969, the government of Northern Ireland petitioned the British government to send troops to restore order. Britain sent 4,000 troops, assigned to a limited role as peacekeepers. Both the Ulster and British governments anticipated that their presence in Northern Ireland would be brief, and the British Parliament advocated for political and social reforms instead of violence. British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland reached an agreement on the enactment of a reform package to begin addressing the issues raised in the civil rights movement. These reforms included the abolition of the property requirement for voting and designated an official to address complaints of housing and employment discrimination. However, the reforms failed to put a complete end to violence, which resumed during the summer.

While Catholic nationalists were initially encouraged by the presence of British troops in Northern Ireland, they gradually began to see
them as enablers of oppression. In September 1969, the British Army ordered the destruction of barricades both Catholics and Protestants had built around their segregated neighborhoods and promised to provide security through a “peace line” of troops in the area.11 Both Catholics and Protestants complied, and tensions seemed to ease. But less than a month later, rioting recommenced. The “peace line” was simultaneously porous enough to permit Protestants to firebomb Catholic homes and secure enough to prevent fire trucks from reaching the burning Belfast neighborhood.12 Yet despite the British Army’s apparent complicity in Protestant violence, many Protestants rioted against the RUC, which they believed had been modified to be less Protestant by the Army.13 The layers of antagonism led to the creation of several paramilitary groups, many of which claimed that their objectives were to protect Protestant or Catholic populations, respectively, from sectarian violence. In reality, mobs and unionist or loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA) terrorized Catholic communities through arson, riots, and bombings.14 In addition, the IRA became notorious for its bombing campaigns, which targeted both government officials and civilians in Northern Ireland, Britain, and the Republic of Ireland. Far from simply seeking to protect Northern Ireland’s Catholic or nationalist population, the IRA sought to force Britain to withdraw and create a unified Irish state.15 By 1970, Northern Ireland was overwhelmed by guerilla warfare and terrorist bombings perpetrated by paramilitaries and targeted killings by government security forces.

The interaction of the Irish diaspora in America with the political and paramilitary actors of the Troubles reflects the singular nature of Irish immigration in American history and its impact on Irish American identity. Most Irish immigrants to the America, beginning in the colonial era and continuing into the early nineteenth century, were Protestant, many of whom were Presbyterian and traced their origins to Northern Ireland. This group is largely referred to as “Scotch-Irish”, and the degree to which the immigration of these Irish Protestants from Ulster continued into the nineteenth century is disputed.16 Irish immigration to the United States proliferated in the nineteenth century, and the immigration of Irish Catholics especially expanded due to poverty, Protestant domination of Ireland, and the Great Famine of 1840-1849.17 Once in America, Irish immigrants had to contend with a robust nativist sentiment demonstrated by many Protestant Americans. This religious and racial discrimination helped fuse the connection between Irishness and Catholicism for the immigrant population: as Lawrence McCaffrey writes, “Catholicism became the glue of the Irish community, the one familiar institution bridging rural Ireland and urban America”.18 It was primarily these Catholic Irish Americans who later became involved in the Troubles.

Irish Americans supported a number of uprisings in the mother country throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although the U.S. government did not answer Irish rebels’ appeals for help. For example, when the Fenians, an Irish republican organization founded in the United States, attempted to end British rule in Ireland in 1867, the Fenian organization in America sent a ship bearing arms and thirty-eight volunteers.19 After World War I, as the Irish War for Independence commenced, President Woodrow Wilson refused to consider the question of Irish self-determination.20 This pattern of Irish American engagement despite hesitance or hostility from the U.S. presidency also characterized the Troubles.

Furthermore, the sheer volume of Irish Americans made their involvement a significant factor in the United States’ and world’s perceptions of the struggle. At the beginning of the Troubles, the Irish American population was five times larger than the population of Ireland itself, and Irish Americans formed the second largest ethnic population in the U.S.21 Unsurprisingly, Irish Americans were active in calling
attention to the conflict, protesting human rights abuses, advocating for U.S. government involvement, and in some cases actively supporting parties to the conflict by providing funds and arms. The Irish American lobby was critically important in “shaping American public and political attitudes toward not just the IRA, but, crucially, also toward the British military efforts to quash its campaign”.

Despite the legitimate concerns these Americans raised about the human rights violations of the British military during the first decade of the Troubles, U.S. presidents avoided addressing the conflict. In breaking with a pattern of U.S. support for British counterinsurgencies, the Nixon administration declined to become involved, likely because it “was willing to see the flaring of the Troubles predominantly through the lens of civil rights”, not terrorism. This view was reflected by a number of media commentators as well, who “equated Northern Irish Catholics with African Americans in their mutual struggle for equal political and social rights.”

The interpretation of the Troubles primarily as a continuation of the Catholic civil rights movement that had begun in the 1960s helped contribute to a relatively favorable opinion of the nationalist republican cause among Americans. The movement was inspired by the non-violent methods Martin Luther King, Jr. had employed in the United States. As stated above, the Catholic civil rights campaign began in earnest in the fall of 1968, as Catholics challenged Protestant supremacy in Northern Ireland. Yet although it viewed the conflict as a collateral effect of civil rights advocacy, the Nixon administration did not respond in any way that showed that either civil rights concerns or the violence were a concern for the United States. Even after “ Bloody Sunday,” when the British Army killed 14 protestors at a civil rights march in Derry, the White House remained silent, due to its fear of damaging its relationship with Britain. Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, did not significantly depart from Nixon’s precedent.

As the violence intensified and the presidency proved reluctant to address the situation, members of Congress, particularly those of Irish heritage or representing districts with substantial Irish American populations, began to speak about the Troubles publicly. Four particularly outspoken Catholic, Irish American Democrats became known as the “Four Horsemen”: Senator Ted Kennedy, Speaker Tip O’Neill, Rep. Hugh Carey, and Senator Patrick Moynihan. The four, especially Kennedy, condemned the reintroduction of internment without trial for suspected members of the IRA and the violence committed against the Bloody Sunday marchers. They met with President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to begin to create a policy on Northern Ireland. The British government became nervous in August 1977, when Carter condemned the violence of the Troubles and promised American aid if the sides reached a peace settlement. More significantly, Carter’s State Department ended arms sales to the RUC, generally done only in cases of regimes guilty of human rights abuses, due to its policing practices in Northern Ireland. The cooperation between the Four Horsemen and President Carter ended the era of American isolationism from the Troubles and provided the precedent for Presidents Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton to further work with the Irish and British governments.

Though important, political figures like Kennedy, who rejected the violence of the IRA, were not the most significant American actors during the Troubles. Despite the American public’s moderate nationalist stance on the Northern Ireland issue, the most influential figures were those who endorsed a more radical nationalist ideology, such as that espoused by the IRA. In 1974, a group of republican hardliners founded the Irish National Caucus, a powerful lobby group that sought to publicize “the perceived brutality of the British military, the rough-justice policing meted out by the RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary], and the social discrimination of Catholics.” Militant nationalists, dissatisfied with what they perceived as the U.S. government’s milquetoast nationalism, sought a new way to support the republican movement. They
viewed the Four Horsemen as traitors to the republican cause for denouncing IRA violence and established several lobbying groups to influence other members of Congress.

The most pivotal Americans involved in the Troubles were those who were members of or contributed monetarily to Irish American republican organizations, which directed funds to the republican movement, including the IRA. Although Irish Americans as a whole did not endorse terrorism to achieve a united Ireland, enough republican organizations were tolerant of terrorism or willing to ignore its contributions to the republican cause they supported. The epitome of this kind of organization was the Irish Northern Aid Committee, known as Noraid or INAC. Founded in the early 1970s by Michael Flannery, an IRA veteran from the Irish War of Independence and Irish Civil War, Noraid’s ostensible purpose was to provide for the dependents of imprisoned republicans.30 Despite its stated humanitarian objective, Noraid was widely viewed as the American wing of the IRA, helping it to raise money and acquire arms.31 Noraid’s communication and collaboration with Sinn Féin, the nationalist republican party regarded as the IRA’s political wing, did not help matters. The exact nature of the relationship between Noraid and the IRA was unclear and difficult for observers and governments to discern throughout much of the Troubles. The relationship was especially unclear at the beginning of the conflict, when money raised by Noraid was extremely difficult to track.32 Noraid registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) in 1971, as required by U.S. law, and named the Northern Aid Committee, Belfast as its foreign principal.33 Eventually, an FBI investigation into the group’s activities forced Noraid to register the IRA as its foreign principal, although Noraid denied funding it. Individual members of Noraid were often suspected and sometimes proven to have engaged in arms smuggling, though the organization was never legally proven to have directly funded the IRA. The geographical and monetary distance from the battlegrounds of Northern Irish cities facilitated the flow of American cash into the republican movement and enabled paramilitary violence. Even assuming that Noraid did not directly fund the IRA, the money and support it sent to the families of imprisoned republicans helped the IRA focus its own funds on arming its paramilitary forces.

In the midst of the Troubles, Gerry Adams, a prominent Irish republican and member of Sinn Féin, realized that the Irish republican movement would need to include political engagement in order to succeed, and led a restructuring of the movement to increase its popular support.34 In the political sphere, Adams believed a new agenda could help Sinn Féin become the primary nationalist party in the North. By fusing continued militarism with political involvement, Adams hoped to expedite the unification of Ireland. Though many within the nationalist movement opposed their emphasis on political issues, “Adams and his supporters gradually established control over the republican movement by the late 1970s,” and the new strategy proved successful during the 1980-1981 hunger strikes, when republican prisoners won elections.35 Sinn Féin also experienced electoral success in the 1982 Northern Ireland Assembly elections and the 1983 British General Election, which saw Adams elected to a seat in Parliament.36 With popular appeal and electoral victories, the new republican strategy represented an important shift for the movement.

This drive to include political matters into republican action was also translated into Irish republican activities within the United States, namely within Noraid, the most significant republican support organization in America. As Sinn Féin increased its involvement in politics in the late 1970s, Noraid began to participate in publicity campaigns.37 Even in America, the plight of the Irish hunger strikers attracted support to the republican cause and increased media attention.38 Publicity events, such as the American tours of relatives of the dying hunger strikers, had the unsurprising side effect of
increasing donations to Noraid. After the successes related to the prison protest and hunger strikes, Noraid underwent a protracted debate and subsequent division over its purpose. One faction advocated for an increased emphasis on publicity and political activism centered around Britain’s human rights record in Northern Ireland. They hoped that such activism in the United States would increase and highlight worldwide support for Sinn Féin’s objectives. But the traditionalist faction of Noraid, many of whom were born in Ireland, were hesitant to use American politics to support the cause. Many “believed that involvement in politics would detract from the primary function of raising cash and force Noraid to compromise its support for the ‘armed struggle’”. In a strategy meeting between Noraid and Sinn Féin leaders in 1986, Adams urged the group to undertake politicization, urging Noraid to supplement its fundraising efforts with political lobbying to support Sinn Féin. But when Sinn Féin itself split over a controversial decision to end its policy of abstention from the Irish parliament, the repercussions were felt within Irish American republicanism. Noraid founder Michael Flannery and a number of other prominent republicans left the organization and founded Cumann na Saoirse, a group which fund-raised for the new abstentionist Republican Sinn Féin party.

One of the first conventionally political issues Noraid became involved in was the MacBride Principles campaign, which sought to require American companies operating in Northern Ireland to follow fair employment guidelines to counteract longstanding discrimination against Catholics. Noraid also sought to raise awareness about the case of Joe Doherty, an IRA volunteer who was to be extradited from the United States to Britain. Those who remained in Noraid were split over the organization’s shift in focus. A number of those who were uneasy with the group’s new direction were politically conservative and supported Catholic social thought rather than the more radical Marxist socialism espoused by nationalists. Additionally, “Noraid’s pursuit of ‘solidarity politics,’ involving co-operation with liberal and minority groups, tended to further alienate these individuals”. A second split within Noraid over political and fund-raising goals occurred a few years after the first. Dissident members, including four National Presidents and seven chapter heads, purchased a full-page ad in the Irish Echo and the Irish Voice accusing Noraid of abandoning its founding principles and objectives. This division resulted in the creation of the Friends of Irish Freedom (FIF), which was dedicated solely to fundraising for the dependents of republican prisoners and quickly established chapters in Boston, New York, and Chicago.

The republican movement in Northern Ireland was aware of Noraid’s splintering and feared the effects it might have. Sinn Féin disapproved of the growing divisions among Irish American republicans and sought to mitigate the damage before it expanded. “Republican leaders in Belfast were deeply irritated by the formation of FIF” and responded by sending Bob Smith, the National Secretary of An Cumann Cabhrach, the republican aid organization that distributed funds from Irish American republicans, to remind the fledgling organization that Noraid was the only group the republican movement in Northern Ireland recognized as a fundraising organization. The Friends of Irish Freedom responded by sending funds to other organizations, which only compounded the disunity and animosity within the Irish American republican movement. In 1991, Gerry Adams himself published a statement asserting that “FIF had ‘no mandate from anyone involved in the struggle in Ireland’” and that, “every dollar contributed to them is a dollar lost to the dependents of Irish prisoners of war”. The Friends of Irish Freedom responded by accusing Noraid members of working as FBI informants. Sinn Féin was notably determined to prevent further Irish American dissension and divisions, likely due to the publicity and logistical repercussions on the republican movement at large, though the impact on its own electoral future may certainly
have contributed as well. Though the diversion of Irish American funds into various groups could very well have hampered the republican movement, as of 1989, the movement had a relatively strong independent financial network that would not have been severely impacted by a decrease in American funding.\textsuperscript{55} Nonetheless, Irish American funds and arms greatly benefited the IRA in the early years of the Troubles, and enabled the paramilitary to persist in its guerilla campaigns for so long.

Like Irish participation in the Troubles, Irish Americans’ involvement in the Troubles can be largely explained by the interaction of three factors: religion, nationalism, and politics. Catholic Irish Americans were much more likely than Protestant Irish Americans to actively participate in fundraising, publicity or other activities related to the Troubles. The divisions and strategy changes which characterized the republican movement within Northern Ireland often spilled over into the U.S., where most of the Irish population, as well as the population at large, supported the nationalist republican cause to some extent. However, there were sharp disagreements over the acceptability of violence to achieve republican goals. Ultimately, the engagement of Irish Americans in the Troubles reflects the degree to which the Irish diaspora still associated its identity with the political plight of its home country.

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In the American criminal justice system, one must possess *mens reus*, or a guilty mind, to be convicted of a crime. Without proof of a guilty mind, one technically cannot be found guilty, even if they committed the transgression. *Mens reus* does not mean a criminal act needs to be planned out in advance, but only that the suspect was knowingly in control at the exact moment of the crime. While this concept is a cornerstone of the justice system, there is a relatively modern field of study threatening to undermine its legitimacy. This field is the study of neuroscience, and it is attempting to bridge the classical binary that separates body and mind, therefore forcing us to reconceptualize the way we think about guilt, blame, and responsibility.

Philosophers grappled with the question of consciousness long before the advent of neuroscience. In the early seventeenth century, Baruch Spinoza proposed the dual aspect theory, which hypothesized that the mind and the brain were just two different levels of study threatening to undermine its legitimacy. This field is the study of neuroscience, and it is attempting to bridge the classical binary that separates body and mind, therefore forcing us to reconceptualize the way we think about guilt, blame, and responsibility.

While lawyers do not explicitly invoke *mens reus* at most criminal trials, the defense will occasionally argue that their defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). NGRI is a “judicial determination that a criminal defendant is absolved of criminal responsibility because of a mental disorder that significantly affected his behavior”5. While NGRI is widely discussed because it usually involves disturbing and high profile cases, “research indicates that the insanity defense is rarely used, is successful only in the most extreme cases, and even when successful is no bargain for the person acquitted”6. As it currently stands, NGRI is meant only for those cases when there is ample evidence the defendant did not have control over their actions due to a clear mental disorder. Those who are found NGRI, whether due to a schizophrenic delusional episode or some other form of mania, are usually institutionalized for indefinite periods of time. While traditionally NGRI has been used by analyzing someone’s outward deeply rooted concepts like theology and free will. The goal of this paper is to uncover the ethical and moral implications of using neuroscience and neuroimaging in the criminal justice system. It will analyze how the use of neuroscience leads into questions of free will and criminal responsibility that are likely to emerge and clash with current conceptions of justice. While neuroscience and neuroimaging have some potential upside, its unfettered use in the criminal justice system will likely create tension. Neuroscience research is opening up the possibility for our current notions of free will to become destabilized, which may force the criminal justice system to reconceptualize ideas of guilt and responsibility that inherently rely on the notion of free will.

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behavior, neuroimaging has provided a new line of defense. In addition to claims of insanity due to mental disorders, defendants are now able to point to brain abnormalities, whether it be lesions or tumors, as evidence against a guilty mind. While this defense does not usually result in a full acquittal, it can lead to reduced sentencing. In one recent and controversial case, a suspect who was accused of downloading child pornography claimed a recent brain surgery to remove his epileptic seizures had damaged his anterior temporal lobes, which helps control and filter our behavior. His lawyers suggested this surgery was responsible for the defendant’s actions and although he was eventually found guilty, the punishment was severely reduced given the seriousness of the crime.

While cases like this one remain a fringe minority, they are setting important precedents for the use of neuroscience in the courtroom. It may seem logical to give someone a lesser sentence if they have a tumor or lesion that is clearly identifiable through neuroimaging and is directly affecting their actions, but it is still significant because one is claiming that their brain made them do it. While this is almost always true of defendants arguing for NGRI, brain imaging provides the most direct evidence yet that someone may not have had control of their actions. Additionally, neuroimaging technology has only scratched the surface of its potential. As imaging advances, it is likely that brain abnormalities will become easier to identify, including incredibly small lesions that current imaging technology cannot capture. However, is there a point at which we can claim all brains are in some way abnormal? In other words, at the neural level, how do we distinguish between someone with a normal brain and someone whose brain is just abnormal enough that they are supposedly unable to control their actions?

Ultimately, this discussion boils down to questions of free will. Most people are aware of the importance of the brain for thought and action, but it is generally assumed there is some separation between the strict biological workings of the brain and how one ultimately acts. It is assumed one raises their hand of their own free will, and it is assumed that consciousness is not just a manifestation of one’s brain structure. Philosophers like Spinoza, utilizing pure logical reasoning, were skeptical of this distinction between mind and body. However, Joshua Green and Jonathan Cohen believe neuroscience will be able to empirically test and prove what philosophers like Spinoza have long theorized. In their paper, they argue, “naturalistic philosophers and scientists have known for a long time that magical mental causation is a non-starter… We argue that neuroscience can help people appreciate the mechanical nature of human action in a way that bypasses complicated arguments”.

In the spirit of Greene and Cohen, a number of researchers have begun the effort to study the origins of willed action in the brain. One study conducted by Benjamin Libet suggests that prior to any conscious desire to act, a number of neurons are cued up unconsciously. Most of these neurons are then inhibited, leaving the remaining neurons to fire and activate a particular action. In the study, Libet’s requested that participants press a button when they wanted to, and record on a clock when they pressed this button, but he also “recorded electrical brain activity before, during, and after participants decided whether to press the button…Libet’s results showed that neuronal firings in a particular region of the brain located in the frontal lobe known as the supplementary motor area preceded the conscious choice to press the button”.

This study is not sufficient to make any substantial claims about the presence or absence of free will, but it does blur the distinction between action and reaction and raises questions about the relationship and timing between consciousness and unconscious action.

In a more recent study, Desmurget electrically stimulated specific areas of the brain in patients with brain tumors who “were immobilized in a stereotactic frame as part of preparations for
neurosurgery”12. Desmurget’s most significant finding was that patients “who received electrical stimulation of inferior parietal sites, experienced a clear intention and desire to move, without any overt movement”13. These findings support the hypothesis “that the experience of free will reflects the workings of widely-distributed brain areas encompassing a frontal-parietal network whose coordinated activity provides a sense of agency”14. These nascent studies have limitations, but they have provided a precedent for exploring the metaphysical realities of free will through the use of neuroscience and neuroscientific technology. While we may be far away from reaching any empirical conclusions about the causality of willed action, the progression of these studies means the general public has reason to think critically about the notion of free will and its real-world applications.

Conversations surrounding the implications of this research are particularly sensitive when it comes to the question of responsibility, specifically criminal responsibility. While it is inherently reductionist to categorize different perspectives around this debate, there are some patterns of thought worth abstracting. One perspective includes those who believe in determinism over free will on a metaphysical level, but do not believe this should change our conceptions of responsibility in practice. This is best articulated in philosopher Peter Strawson’s piece titled “Freedom and Resentment”. The piece is not directly related to criminal justice, but to the idea of moral responsibility on an individual level and whether or not resentment of someone else’s actions is warranted. Strawson never directly addresses whether he believes in determinism, but instead argues that metaphysical questions of determinism and causality should be separated from questions of resentment and moral responsibility15. The concern is that inter-personal reactions rest on the assumption of at least some form of personal control, and the “acceptance of the truth of a general thesis of determinism” could lead to “the end of gratitude, resentment, and forgiveness; of all reciprocated loves; of all the essentially personal antagonisms”16. To cease believing in free will, particularly in the context of inter-personal interactions, would thus mean a breakdown of many of the norms on which society rests. To no longer believe in moral responsibility might lead to the creation of a forgiving environment, as people would no longer attribute an action to the actor, but it would also mean separating an actor from all of their good deeds.

While Strawson’s argument focuses on individual interactions, it is easy to see how this could relate to moral responsibility in the criminal justice system. If Strawson believes resentment of one’s actions is justified, then why should the assumption of intentional action on which the current justice system rests be disrupted? New evidence from neurobiological studies on the fallacy of free will are unlikely to convince Strawson, as his argument is not dependent on the reality of free will or determinism. However, it is worth noting that Strawson goes out of his way to make exceptions to the idea of moral responsibility. These exceptions, in similar fashion to current norms in the criminal justice system, “allows that the circumstances were normal, but presents the agent as psychologically abnormal—or as morally undeveloped. The agent was himself; but he is warped or deranged, neurotic or just a child”17. Following the action of an actor, particularly if this action emotionally or physically harms someone else, one can react in either an objective or participant stance. A participant stance relates to our natural, although possibly illogical, emotional response in which we react negatively or positively towards the actor. An objective stance would be the view of hard determinists, who believe it is morally wrong to attribute any action to any actor given that willful action is philosophically implausible. Under normal circumstances, Strawson supports the participant stance over the objective stance. However, in cases of brain immaturity and severe psychological disorders, he believes it is warranted to take an objective stance and see them “perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a
subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment”.18

Strawson provides one more argument for the continuation of the participant stance approach to human action. Even if neuroscience empirically proved the fallacy of free will, “the human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-personal relationships is... too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might so change our world that, in it, there were no longer any such things as inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them”19. Strawson’s first argument was that individuals must maintain a cognitive dissonance between the possible objective reality of determinism and the emotional approach one naturally feels. Here, Strawson argues that this dissonance is already too deeply engrained in our identity for anyone to seriously internalize the realities of determinism. This is a persuasive argument, as most people would likely agree the participant stance is a natural, gut response to the actions of others. Even if one whole-heartedly believed in determinism on a theoretical level, it would be difficult to see a wrong committed, particularly a violent rape or murder, and not place at least some blame on the actor. This point is actually supported by some of the same neuroscientific studies that questioned the reality of free will. Desmurget’s study implies a biological and evolutionary basis for the belief in free will, suggesting that “free will is naturally selected for both its utility as well as for its neural resonance – that is, the ease with which the experience and belief of free will can be either incorporated by preexisting brain circuitry or accommodated by synaptic plasticity or new cortical connections”20. Free will is so deeply engrained, not only because it is a powerful social construct, but because it is an evolutionarily advantageous trait. Even if free will is a social and evolutionary construct, it is worth questioning at what point it becomes so subconscious and intuitive that the question of the metaphysical realness becomes largely irrelevant.

The other significant perspective, which was earlier referred to as hard determinism, is the belief that blame is an incorrect approach because it rests on the incorrect assumption of free will. The most prominent theorists of this perspective are Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, professors of psychology working at Harvard and Princeton, respectively. Greene and Cohen claim the idea that free will and separation of mind and brain has long been argued by certain philosophers, but that neuroscience provides a simpler and more accessible way for the layman to grasp and accept this concept. They believe “new neuroscience will affect the way we view the law” and “ultimately reshape our intuitive sense of justice...not by furnishing us with new ideas or arguments about the nature of human actions, but by breathing new life into old ones”21. In addressing why they believe advances in neuroscience require a reconceptualization of the criminal justice system, Greene and Cohen inadvertently touch on many of the same themes as Strawson.

Greene and Cohen’s piece does not perfectly compare to Strawson’s piece because Strawson is more concerned with individual ethics, while Greene and Cohen are interested in a more structural lens. However, on an individual level, Greene and Cohen and Strawson might have more in common than a cursory glance would suggest. While Greene and Cohen are adamant about restructuring systems on an institutional level to account for our lack of free will, it is not clear that they disagree with Strawson about interactions on a micro level. Greene and Cohen offer a helpful analogy to modern physics. In our day-to-day lives, there is no reason “to see the world as anything other than flatly Euclidean... However, when we are, for example, planning the launch of a spacecraft, we can and should make use of relativistic physical principles that are less intuitive but more accurate”22. This argument mirrors Nestor and Strawson, as they are suggesting that belief in free will is intuitive and convenient for basic functioning on an individual level. However, like the belief in a flat
world, free will is conceptually erroneous, and this should be taken into account on a structural level, such as with criminal justice. In fact, it is precisely because we are able to dissociate from the metaphysical truth of our existence on a day-to-day basis that Greene and Cohen advocate for institutional change. They believe we can understand the fallacy of free will on a theoretical level and can apply this knowledge to create a more structurally just society without dramatically changing our identities or how we interact with the world around us.

The obvious question then becomes, what structural changes do Greene and Cohen believe are necessary to create a criminal justice system that is more rooted in the realities of determinism? Their answer is to move away from a retributive system and towards a utilitarian, consequentialist approach, because “retributivists want to know whether the defendant truly deserves to be punished.” The concept of retributivism is incompatible with determinism because it is a deontological theory of justice that necessitates the belief that one willingly chooses to do wrong and thus deserves punishment. This punishment is necessary not because it benefits society or reforms the criminal, but because it is ethically the right thing to do. While the American criminal justice system does not fit neatly into one theory of punishment, the importance of *mens reus* for a guilty verdict suggests retributive justice has a strong influence. In light of the shortcomings of retributivism, Greene and Cohen would prefer to see a shift to consequentialism, which is “not concerned with whether anyone is really innocent or guilty in some ultimate sense that might depend on people’s having free will, but only with the likely effects of punishment.” If concepts of guilt and desert are outdated then the most logical alternative would be a purely utilitarian form of deterrence, where the end goal is crime reduction and an overall safer society. Such a system would allow us to hold people responsible for their actions without attributing it to the actor, thus making for a realistic, yet sympathetic criminal justice system. In Greene and Cohen’s own words, “the law deals firmly but mercifully with individuals whose behavior is obviously the product of forces that are ultimately beyond their control. Someday, the law may treat all convicted criminals this way. That is, humanely.”

While Greene and Cohen should get credit for theorizing such a bold reconceptualization of the criminal justice system, their theory has major limitations, particularly due to the dangerous implications of labeling and categorization. Greene and Cohen’s argument rests on the assumption that this reconceptualization of criminal action will lead to greater sympathy of the actor because they were not truly in control and thus did not act with malicious intent. However, it is quixotic to believe the opposite could not happen just as easily: a person’s brain scan would be shown in court as proof that her predisposition towards violence caused her to act in a deviant manner and would likely cause her to do so again.

Greene and Cohen also claim the law currently deals mercifully with those whose behavior is proven to be outside their control. However, if the United States is any indication, this claim is overly forgiving. It ignores the long and dark history of abuse in both historical psychiatric hospitals and the current system, which largely incarcerates those with severe psychiatric disorders in normal prison environments only serving to worsen underlying issues. Even with a much improved system for dealing with mental health disorders, the stigmatization around those who would require treatment is likely to make a normal readjustment into society incredibly difficult. Additionally, the risk of self-fulfilling prophecies is extraordinarily high. To remove the terminology of blame and volition risks severe disenfranchisement. If one is led to believe their deviant actions were ultimately out of their control, what incentive is there for repentance and rehabilitation. Furthermore, to take away blame arguably risks degrading the moral norms on which society functions. Instead of something being wrong because it is a moral
violation, right and wrong are delegated to a conventional violation. For example, punching someone is wrong because it is against the law, rather than because it hurts the other person.

There is another dangerous possibility if we were to start allowing neuroscientific technology to dictate how we conceptualize criminal justice. A 1995 study found that people who are exposed to early childhood trauma are likely to have permanent effects, which can be traced both behaviorally and on a neural level. Due to the way the brain develops, “disruptions of experience-dependent neurochemical signals during these periods may lead to major abnormalities or deficits in neurodevelopment – some of which may not be reversible”27. Given that “conservative estimates of the number of children in the United States exposed to a traumatic event in 1 year exceed 4 million”, it is worth wondering if there is a spillover effect.28 Indeed, evidence suggests that there is an association between childhood trauma and socially detrimental outcomes including an increased likelihood of incarceration.29 Moreover, a jury following the consequentialist approach would not know or care about a defendant’s past if they committed a violent crime, particularly if neuroimaging shows them to have irreversible brain abnormalities. While punishing this person solely on the basis of their action and their pre-disposition to violence might make society safer in the short-term, it ignores important systemic issues that led one to violence in the first place. It is morally dubious to remove someone from society solely because their neuroscience suggests they are pre-disposed to violence. It also may be ineffective in the long run because it does not get to the root of the issue: the environment that allowed for such generational trauma.

Neuroscience is an exciting field of research, but it should be met with extreme caution in the context of the criminal justice system. To completely disregard any potential relationship between neuroscience and law would be naïve, both because it is inevitable that it will be used at some point and because there are potential benefits to using it. It should also be noted that many people hope this technology will be introduced to the criminal justice system because it will reduce harmful biases, such as racial bias, in favor of a more objective and equitable system. While this is an admirable motive, it seems more likely that neuroscience would lead to further dehumanization, reducing the power of the courts to introduce empathy and forgiveness in a way technology is unlikely to achieve. To introduce this technology into the criminal justice system without seriously discussing its implications would be a grave mistake.

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The relationship between Scripture and faith changes when viewed through different lenses of scriptural interpretation. In one of three lenses of scriptural interpretation presented by theologian Dorothee Sölle in her book “Thinking about God: An Introduction to Theology,” she asserts that because orthodox interpretations see Scripture as the direct word of God, the language itself must be followed exactly. Specific to this Genesis passage, these believers would assert that all people are literally created “in His own [physical] image.” Two other lenses of interpretation called “liberal” and “radical” arose to criticize Scripture contextually and to apply its lessons to today’s structural injustices, according to Sölle. While many find the orthodox lens spiritually liberating, groups which orthodox interpretations of the Bible fail to represent lack a similarly loving, benevolent, and omnipotent God, necessitating liberal and radical interpretations.

Christians who employ orthodox interpretations often disagree with transgender Christians about the definition of truth. In theology, it is said that we come to truth through two ways: natural and revealed theology. Natural theology is theology yielded from reason and experience. For transgender people, natural theology leads them to recognize that their gender dysphoria, or the misalignment between their gender at birth and the gender they identify with, is an indication and expression of their faith to a benevolent, omnipotent God. The second route to truth in theology is revealed theology, yielded from Scripture and religious experience.

As a branch of the radical interpretation, queer theology and feminist liberation theology assert the constructive role of female Bible characters and reevaluate the gender of God with the queer experience in mind. With the gendering of God present in Christian Scripture, transgender people maintain a unique experience regarding representation and exclusion through gender. These conflicting ideas about gender are presented through revealed and natural theology. The question remains how the transgender faith experience relates to such orthodox interpretations of biblical language that assert that transgender identity is an abomination. As opposed to the more restrictive orthodox lens of interpretation, Trans studies within queer theology provides transgender people an alternative to binary restrictions and empowers them through a radical interpretation of Scripture and a non-binary representation of God. Sölle clarifies the challenges of interpreting Scripture through revealed theology by presenting the three common lenses of interpretation discussed above: orthodox, liberal, and radical.
Orthodox interpretations often take Scripture as the literal word of God while disregarding the historical criticism that provides literary or social context. The orthodox view maintains that Scripture demands the full attention and commitment of the believer. Since different parts of Scripture between and within the Old and New Testaments contradict one another, orthodox interpretations necessarily bracket out certain sections they do not personally agree with. As an example, Luke 12:10 reads “And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost it shall not be forgiven.” This passage states that forsaking the name of God is unforgivable. At the same time, Romans 10:13 reads, “For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.” This passage states that the same people who acted against God can still rely on God to be saved. While orthodox interpretations must choose between conflicting passages, liberal interpretations willingly critique the text, its sources, its authority, and its power dynamics as doctrine inspired by the word of God. This approach extracts the metaphorical and symbolic meaning of the text by both criticizing it and accounting for context.

The radical interpretation takes the liberal interpretation further by extrapolating these metaphorical and symbolic lessons to apply a critical perspective on gender to contemporary institutions and institutional power dynamics. Audiences who typically employ radical interpretations also compare groups which appear in Scripture to those present today. The questions raised by this interpretation are often focused on issues of poverty and structural injustice, but different types of radical interpretations focus these issues on specific demographics. Specifically, feminist liberation theology and queer theology discuss issues from the female and queer perspectives, respectively. Liberal and radical interpretations rely on the same foundational assumption that orthodox interpretations fail to substantially address: historical and literary context are crucial to improving one’s reality today. Pamela Lightsey, a scholar of black and queer theology, suggests that Scripture must be evaluated for its applicability to each individual Christian’s life. If little tension exists between one’s natural and revealed theologies, those believers could incorporate a mix of Scriptural interpretations. There usually exists, however, an inescapable tension between orthodox and liberal or radical interpretations. This tension alludes to the conflict between natural and revealed theology as two valid means of reaching an ultimate truth and a greater understanding of God in one’s life. Believers whose natural and revealed truths contrast must decide which one is the ‘higher truth’ that must be observed. For example, someone who identifies with the queer community likely reads Scripture with queer theology in mind. Once that decision is made, one can choose which specified branch within revealed theology is best suited for the individual based on their experiences and identity.

In the past, believers have used orthodox interpretations of Scripture to justify denying transgender identity and to subjugate women. Many Christian women have difficulty reconciling the Bible’s repeated subjugation of women in the same way people of color struggle to recognize slavery’s normalization. Orthodox interpretations can assert these and similar conclusions that exclude large groups from the religious community and disregard their significance. Especially concerning the transgender experience, orthodox and radical interpretations of Scripture make very different value claims about the importance of truth yielded from natural theology. There are many orthodox interpretations of Scripture that deny the validity of the experiences of transgender believers as a form of religious truth. Deuteronomy often legislates that gender non-conforming individuals acted against God’s truth. For example, Deuteronomy 22:5 states, “A woman shall not wear a man’s garment, nor shall a man put on a woman’s cloak, for whoever does these things is an abomination to the Lord your God.” Deuteronomy 23:1
asserts the importance of gender-conformity and
gender-roles by condemning certain individu-
als’ participation in religious services, stating
“No one whose testicles are crushed or whose
male organ is cut off shall enter the assembly of
the Lord.”

Orthodox interpretations of these and similar passages would maintain that trans-
gender people are not welcome in Christian-
ity—much less ministry positions—because they
act outside the gender binary and the cis-gender
roles allegedly established by God. Sections of
the Old and New Testament mirror similar sen-
timents. For example, see Romans 1:24-25 and
1:32:

Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness through the lusts of their own
hearts, to dishonour their own bodies be-
tween themselves: Who changed the truth of
God into a lie, and worshipped and served
the creature more than the Creator, who is
blessed forever. Amen.... Who knowing the
judgment of God, that they which commit
such things are worthy of death, not only do
the same, but have pleasure in them that do
them.

While it is commonly understood that the
above passage refers to homosexuality, much of
the language could be applied towards transgen-
der experiences. Paul implies that homosexuals
and others—like transgender people—who act
outside gender norms and heteronormative cul-
ture chose a selfish service “to the creature” out
of “lust” rather than an expression of one’s iden-
tity. This passage exploits how people can mis-
understand the difference between one’s gender
identity and physical gender to an exclusive
degree. Specifically, orthodox believers could
misperceive transgender identity as a choice be-
tween whichever gender one prefers rather than
which gender one identifies with internally. Ro-
mans 1:25 reads that expression of one’s gender
or sexual identity is a transformation from God’s
truth into a selfish “lie.” Orthodox interpreta-
tions would use this to support that revealed
theology of Scripture prevails over transgender
believers’ conflicting natural theology.

The Roman Catholic Church has used scrip-
tural interpretation to condemn transgender
identity as well. In 2011, the Vatican sent an of-
official document to top religious leaders stating
that “sex-change” operations did not change the
individual’s gender to the Church or to God.
Moreover, it claimed that the procedure’s modi-
ification of the exterior does not alter the person-
ality. The Vatican’s second statement confuses
personality with gender identity as it does with
gender stereotypes. In this view, the natural the-
ology of transgender people yields something
like a ‘less valid’ truth than Scripture. More re-
cently, Pope Francis declared in 2017 that trans-
sitioning procedures are a “manipulation of
sexual difference” that allegedly mislead people
to believe gender is a “free choice.”

The condemnation of ‘transgenderism’ from the Church
is a public expression of the Church’s orthodox
stance. Outside the Church, a 2015 conference of
the Association of Certified Biblical Counselors
classified ‘transgenderism’ as a psychological
disorder and rejected that gender identity could
exist separate and different from biological sex.
Orthodox interpretations of Scripture, both in-
side and outside the Church, can thus exclude
transgender believers.

One important passage for both orthodox
interpreters and transgender people of faith is
Genesis 1:27. Orthodox interpretations would
primarily take the passage as evidence that the
gender binary is God-willed and natural. A com-
mon step taken after this analysis is to assume
that transgender people, by superseding the nat-
ural binary, act against God’s will. An extended
step taken from this interpretation is the belief
that whatever gender one was assigned at birth
is the gender identity one shall accept. Even
in discussions about gender identity, evident
in Pope Francis’s and the conference’s binary
stance on gender, some orthodox interpretations
support the opposing view that biological sex
inherently determines gender identity. By igno-
ing that gender identity can be separate from bi-
ological sex, these believers then do not consider
that gender identity should and does prevail for
many. For them, gender and gender identity are determined by God. They then think that because God is omniscient and benevolent, whatever gender God assigned one at birth is correct. The explicit conclusion drawn from an orthodox interpretation of Genesis 1:27 is that transgender people claiming a gender not assigned at birth questions God’s qualities as ultimate Creator, an ultimate abomination in the eyes of the Church.

In contrast, the radical interpretation of Genesis 1:27 uses historical and literary criticism to apply this passage to the transgender experience. Joy Ladin, a scholar on trans religious studies and a transgender woman, ascribes to the radical interpretation of Genesis 1:27. She asserts that rather than focusing on the words “male” and “female,” which only occur once, the reader should note the emphasis on humanity’s reflection of God’s image, a sentiment echoed four times in the surrounding passage. She also maintains that enforcing cis-gender conformity through this passage is humanity’s way of trying to understand the “invisible, disembodied,” and transcendent God. By assigning something as fundamental to human experience as gender to God, this brings God closer to a human conception that is easier to conceptualize and internalize. Ladin’s acknowledgement of this trend does not place positive value on it, however. She implies that the attempt of “gender-binary traditionalists” to understand God through the orthodox interpretation of Genesis is a futile attempt to define and, inherently, restrict God’s nature to human terms. An extension of this is to say that as Christians, everyone, no matter their cis- or transgender identity, should be concerned with how to better express God’s image within themselves through their commitment to others. This is an example of queer theology’s radical interpretative response to orthodox scriptural interpretation.

Apart from interpretative disputes, there are also many quotations in the New Testament which assert that external and internal differences among humans do not matter in the eyes of God. Galatians 3:28 clarifies this dissolving differences in gender, class, and ethnicity: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus.” Here, believers are unified in their shared devotion to the Lord. Other portions of Scripture that queer theology relies upon are Jesus’s teachings throughout the New Testament. Some radical interpretations hold that his compassion and commitment towards the disadvantaged and the disenfranchised can be considered to apply to transgender individuals today. As I will discuss more fully later, Jesus’s compassion for the disenfranchised grounds much of the transgender community’s faith.

Placing a gender on God enforces cis-gender conformity alongside orthodox interpretations of Scripture. The common conception of God as male is widely supported by some interpretations of Scripture, the most common being that He is typically discussed with male pronouns. These are constantly sustained by Scripture’s association of God with traditionally “male traits” like authority, refuge, and strength. More specifically, he is given titles usually given to men, often King, Father, Judge, and Master. Outside of Scripture, the gendering of God as male is also reinforced by Western culture’s idolization of the male form. Sigmund Freud asserts that humanity seeks a male God as their protector after outgrowing their human mother because their immense, subconscious fear of “superior powers” can only be satisfied by a God, made stronger in male form. This view is extreme, but it does acknowledge the undeniable value that patriarchal society places on gender roles. Gender carries certain values and assumptions in society; gender roles and assumptions of “masculine” traits of power and strength and “feminine” traits of passivity and weakness are maintained by each generation in a self-reinforcing cycle. To combat anxiety about weakness in the face of “superior powers,” like poverty or social oppression, society often extends these gender roles towards the only higher power that can protect them: God. Transgender identity upends
this system by blurring the lines between physical sex and gender identity and between ‘male’ and ‘female’ characteristics.

In response, feminist liberation theology leads the opposition against male-centric conceptions of God. From the perspective of feminist liberation theology, denoting God as male with many aggressive, authoritative characteristics disqualifies typical female experiences, usually understood as more passive or maternal, as true representations of God.20 Under this view, male believers can have a deeper connection with God in part because their experiences and attitudes mimic those of God more closely than feminine experiences. Theologian Elizabeth Johnson furthers this feminist perspective by claiming that these conceptions of God as emulating male experience and behavior are idolatrous.21 She maintains that attempting to limit God’s transcendent nature through comparison to male experience idolizes a false, patriarchal conception of God rather than God’s abstract, disembodied reality.

This gendered conception of God is even more exclusive to transgender people of faith. While it is helpful to women of faith for female liberation theology to simply claim “God is a woman, too,” transgender people do not have the same luxury. While cis-gendered people of faith can maintain through the orthodox interpretation of Genesis 1:27 that their bodies can be reflections of God’s actual image, the misalignment between gender identity and biological sex for transgender people begs the question of where they fit in.22 Their transgender identity suggests an important question that cis-male and cis-female believers do not have to consider: if their gender and identity were created by God, and they were supposedly created in God’s image, why is altering God’s image internally or externally the only way for transgender people to feel and live fulfilled? This enforcement of cis-gender identity as an inherent facet of God’s image excludes transgender people because they subvert it. Partly because of the pervasive nature of these transphobic orthodox interpretations, transgender people have been told that their natural truth and God’s will through Scripture are mutually exclusive. One modern response to this was a conception of God without gender.

Apart from feminist liberation theology, queer theology claims that God is beyond gender. Radical interpreters within feminist liberation theology proposed that God can be both male and female, rendering both sets of pronouns appropriate. While some believe this better connects women to God, feminist theologian Mary Daly asserts otherwise. She proposes that when gendered pronouns for God were switched from male to female, similar to a “transsexual operation” as she puts it, no psychological or social change has happened—God remains male in a patriarchal society.23 Her point is that simply changing the pronouns but maintaining the binary system does not change how God’s binary gender excludes women. This is implicit in the Catechism of the Catholic Church #239, which states, “In no way is God in man’s image. He is neither man nor woman.”24 While it is incredibly significant that the Catholic Church recognizes the non-binary gender of God, this reveals the other side of Daly’s point. Despite holding that God is not confined by human gender, continuing to refer to God as “Him” asserts the inherently exclusionary cis-gender roles of society that religion intends to overcome with the idea of a non-gendered God. Queer theology attempts to resolve this issue by illuminating the Scriptural analogies to God’s “feminine” qualities of compassion and comfort and referring to God with non-binary pronouns like “they.”25

Max Strassfeld, assistant professor of religious studies at the University of Arizona, often writes about the importance of including the transgender perspective to more fully understand religion. He maintains this is a fundamental step towards acceptance in religion and its study and away from former conceptions of religious studies as “anachronistic, hostile to women, and solely misogynistic.”26 Ladin offers another extension of trans studies by explaining that is simply a fuller understanding of religion

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rather than a specified lens. She proposes that trans studies takes universal questions about humanity and identity that originated within the transgender faith experience and extends them towards all people of faith. Ladin expresses this more fully: “Whether or not we are transgender, we engage in trans theology whenever we try to look past sex and gender, bodies and binaries, to understand what in humanity reflects the image of God.” Rather than defining God within the binary at all, trans studies argues that the omnipotent, benevolent God is beyond human descriptions of gender. Ladin’s radical interpretation of Genesis 1:27 also applies to a non-binary conception of gender. Humanity’s attempts at quantifying God as reflections of humanity’s image, shown through gendered pronouns and constant analogies to socially constructed gender norms, falsely constricts God’s true nature. Instead of trying to conceive a false notion of God within the equally-false idea of the gender binary, Ladin explains that trans studies accepts God’s ambiguity.

Gendered language of God and cis-gender conformity in Scripture as shown through orthodox interpretations often complicate the faith of transgender people. Constant assertions that their experience and identities are incompatible with a loving God deter many transgender people from Christianity. Most responses to these problems reinterpret Scripture to include transgender perspectives and support the rise of trans studies alongside queer theology. In addition to these responses, there exist a diverse range of individual responses to these problems. The approach of Episcopal priest Carla Robinson was two-fold. She always understood God as loving and accepting while humans had problems with her trans identity. Carla’s transformed faith as a transgender woman partly relies on radical interpretations of Scripture; she includes herself and other trans people as members of the disadvantaged that received Jesus’s compassion. Orthodox interpretations that asserted God’s disapproval of transgender people were overridden by her conviction that the inherently omnipotent and benevolent God gave her this identity on purpose. After transitioning as a young adult who received severe social exile and handled depression, she recognized another transformation in her faith. She likened her struggle to Jesus’s resurrection to separate her old life from her new one. This deepened her devotion to God by portraying the struggles of transgender people as continuously cycling between death and resurrection, allowing her to always maintain hope and faith. Consequently, she views all transgender believers as “icons of resurrection” who live their own resurrection story. This furthered her radical interpretation of Scripture by taking this story and applying it directly to transgender people, therefore redefining their identity within Christianity from abominations to “icons.” This simultaneously elevates their role in Christianity overall and acknowledges their specific spiritual and emotional poverty, both classic extensions of radical interpretation.

The transgender faith experience continues to develop theologically, through the continuous development of trans studies and queer theology, and religiously, through everyone’s choices among interpretations and theologies. Though many interpretations of Scripture exclude transgender people from the Christian faith, radical interpretations of the Bible offer readings of the text which welcome the transgender experience. Ultimately, we must hope that the religion’s foundation of compassion and acceptance prevails.

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All deliberation must consider whether a given course of action will attain its expected goal. Actions are justifiable in some part by our ability to conceive of them as fruitful and worthy of execution. The ability of practical actors to trust in a certain course of action is hope. Hope is both an ordinary and an extraordinary thing which can be based on anything from confidence in one’s ability to guess the outcome of a course of action following past events to a supernatural faith in a divine Other’s promise to show favor. Hope furnishes agents the ability to entrust themselves to a course of action and is therefore of supreme importance to both personal and political deliberation.

Religion, taken as an understanding of the past that has significance for the future, used to be the dominant source for drawing and articulating hope in Western societies. Augustine of Hippo demonstrated this hope when, amid the collapse of the Roman Empire, he said that the city of God “now awaits in steadfast patience, until justice returns in judgment.” The inherited political order of classical antiquity was collapsing, yet the Bishop of Hippo never fell into the terror of that moment in history. Instead, he evinced the hope that whatever course history may take, God has promised to set everything right on the last day. But Augustine’s position is hardly unique, for there are bound to be times when one’s memory and what has constituted one’s self is called into question, whether on a personal or on a collective level. In the West and particularly in America, collective memory—following the narrative of Enlightenment arising out of the Dark Ages, the founding of America and the crowning of democracy, and recently the triumph of America over the Soviet Union—is being called into question in diverse circles and for even more diverse reasons. The central question seems to be: is enlightenment liberalism a viable project to which we can entrust ourselves, or is it doomed to fail as a political project?

The aim of this paper is not to render a verdict on political liberalism, but rather to attempt to understand what any debate about the viability of a political ideology presupposes—the ability of deliberators to entrust themselves to a political project. The motivating question is “on what basis or in what way are members of a modern, pluralistic society able to hope?” Since the opposite of hope—despair—creeps in when deliberators confront a world that is strange and unfamiliar, one can also ask, “when all that was previously trustworthy turns to naught, how will I continue to conduct myself?” In a moment in which the memory of the past contradicts the experience of the present, the question of how to live becomes necessary for defusing the pandemic tension that is the result of the familiar world becoming strange.

Two thinkers who understand this phenomenon of the world made strange are Plato and Nietzsche. Neither of them based his thinking on the content of a revealed religion the way Augustine did, and so both seem fitting commentators on the present situation, and can be asked, “Is there hope? Can any action be justified?” Their answers will help the development of purely philosophical understanding of how citizens...
should act in a public sphere even when there is no unified basis for articulating hope.

Nietzsche provides a recognizably modern example of someone who confronts a world that has suddenly become totally strange and alien. In part nine of *Beyond Good and Evil*, entitled “What is Noble,” Nietzsche describes a psychologist who has lost the ability to relate to the world in the same manner as everybody else. Specifically, the psychologist suffers from a nihilism induced by contemplation of the fact of universal ruination: “For the corruption, the ruination of the higher men, of the souls of a stranger type, is the rule: it is terrible to have such a rule always before one’s eyes.” The torture of the psychologist results in a peculiar way of acting in the world:

In almost every psychologist one will perceive a telltale preference for and delight in association with everyday, well-ordered people: this reveals that he always requires a cure, that he needs a kind of escape and forgetting, away from all that with which his insights, his incisions, his “craft” have burdened his conscience. He is characterized by fear of his memory. He is easily silenced by the judgements of others; he listens with an immobile face as they venerate, admire, love, and transfigure where he has seen—or he even conceals his silence by expressly agreeing with some foreground opinion.

This psychologist is one who is unable to venerate or hold anything as divine, because he has ascertained how all venerable things are contingent and subject eventually to disintegrate under the rule of universal ruination. The psychologist witnesses that his inheritance is just the construction of a few men who were powerful but not immortal. What was familiar to him is now strange, and normal intercourse with the rest of society can only happen by means of a dishonesty rooted in fear.

The condition of this modern psychologist can be illustrated by his characteristic “fear of his memory.” Memory, for Nietzsche, is not a simple log of past events, but rather cuts much deeper. One’s understanding of good and evil and even one’s ability to reason is rooted in one’s memory. “How can one create a memory for the human animal?” asks Nietzsche, “if something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory.” Memory is only formed in connection with the infliction of pain on a body. The bearer of a scarred memory will accordingly think and act in order to avoid further punishment:

With the aid of such images [of gruesome punishment] and procedures one finally remembers five or six “I will not’s,” in regard to which one had given one’s promise so as to participate in the advantages of society—and it was indeed with the aid of this kind of memory that one at last came “to reason!” Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects, the whole somber thing called reflection ... how dearly they have been bought! How much blood and cruelty lie at the bottom of all “good things”!

The one who is able to see through this mnemonic process is one who is able to see the ultimate arbitrariness of all our reasoning and opinions about good and evil. The world can never be quite the same to anyone who knows this fact of psychology. The psychologist’s fear of his own memory is the fear that whatever pattern of scars and burns he has inherited can be no true guide in this world. Hope has no basis once all that is “great” and “venerable” is humiliated. Nihilism flourishes, and cripples those who know and have seen. This renders them incapable of acting to solve problems, as any action would require judgement about the good—which is impossible in the void beyond good and evil. Any attempt at veneration, moreover, would be an exercise in dishonesty.

The suffering psychologist is hardly the solution Nietzsche offers, but rather someone who can forge ahead even when inherited reasoning and opinions about good and evil are discovered to be arbitrary. The psychologist is hopeless and weak because he is terrorized by his memory. He can realize the insufficiency of his inheritance,
but he cannot move on to something actionable. This moving on, according to Nietzsche, requires forgetfulness, with which the strong alone are capable enough of slaying the beast of memory and finding hope:

There could be no happiness, not cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no present, without forgetfulness. The man in whom this apparatus of repression is damaged and ceases to function properly may be compared (and more than merely compared) with a dyspeptic—he cannot “have done” with anything.7

The hope one needs to overcome a world made strange cannot be provided by the physically or mentally weak and unhealthy. In a world of force, the one with the strength to repress one’s memory can persevere and even thrive when inheritance is proven insufficient, because now instead of despair there is a blank canvas on which to paint the future. Nihilism can be vanquished on the field beyond good and evil. Slaying the beast of memory opens up the possibility for hope, but something is still needed to be the object of hope. Artistic creation represents one possible object of hope. Nietzsche specifically speaks of music as enabling forgetfulness:

In song and in dance man expresses himself as a member of a higher community; he has forgotten how to walk and speak and is on the way toward flying into the air, dancing. His very gestures express enchantment. Just as the animals now talk, and the earth yields milk and honey, supernatural sounds emanate from him, too: he feels himself a god, he himself now walks about enchanted, in ecstasy, like the gods he saw walking in his dreams.8

Art, the creation of man, affords a re-enchantment. Through art, forgetfulness is possible, for the usual ways of doing things—walking and talking—are made supernatural in song and dance. By extension, this kind of art is a way out for those like the psychologist who have witnessed a world having become strange. The musician and dancer are able to break out of the everyday and create new expressions, and, by extension, people are capable of breaking out of their inheritance to create new values.

The faux-religious quality of Nietzsche’s hope is so apparent in some texts that one could perhaps say that Nietzsche is carrying away the inheritance of Christendom as his own spoils of Egypt, to be refurbished for the use in his new temple for man, the artist. The Christian framework for hope was perhaps so inescapable that he could not help but steal its basic framework. Nietzsche at times becomes prayerful, reaching out his hands for the supernatural gift of faith:

If there are divine goddesses in the realm beyond good and evil—grant me the sight, but one glance at something perfect, wholly achieved, happy, mighty, triumphant, something still capable of arousing fear! Of a man who justifies man, of a complementary and redeeming lucky hit on the part of man for the sake of which one may still believe in man!9

He can even be caught as if John the Baptist to the anti-Christ:

This victor over God and nothingness—he must come one day—but what am I saying? Enough! Enough! At this point it behooves me only to be silent; or I shall usurp that to which only one younger...and stronger than I has a right—that which only Zarathustra has a right, Zarathustra the godless.10

Nietzsche’s enchanted world preserves the architecture and dynamics—obvious in these select outbursts—of his Christian inheritance. What is gone is any reference to God’s promise, the grounding of Augustine’s hope. What is also gone is that crippling nihilism from which the psychologist suffered. The inhabitants of the world made strange can now place their hope in man, creator in the world of coming into being and passing away.

A Nietzschean basis for hope would necessarily be a hope in the creative action of someone who could create a new mode of life. In this new mode, people will be able to forget their old
way of living, characterized by an insufficient inherited memory, morality, and reasoning. The articulation of new values will reconstitute political society and inform a new, better way of life. Hope will be possible again in public discourse because there will be a new object of trust and faith. Man will justify man. Those heavily burdened with despair and guilt will be comforted, because action will once again be able to be redeemed. They are restored to the world in the way Zarathustra describes: “The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a wheel rolling out of itself, a first movement, a sacred yes-saying. Yes, for the game of creation my brothers a sacred yes-saying is required. The spirit wants its will, the one lost to the world now wins its own world.”11 Pity and contempt do not consume the child the way they consume the psychologist, because the child has moved on from constituting himself in relation to another, and now only constitutes himself from the self, or more specifically, the affirmation of his will to life.

For any hope to have a basis in secular public discourse, however, there needs to be some commonality. A swarm of self-worshippers hardly seems to be the basis of some consensus about anything other than the value of their self-worship. Hope requires a particular will, it seems, in which to rest. Augustine put his hope in God, not an abstraction. A hope in man as the artist-creator would hardly work without some particular man or group of men. Moreover, a democratic Nietzscheanism seems disingenuous insofar as it stipulates a vision of political society that Nietzsche himself would never express. One can picture a regime in which each citizen is given the right to become value creators, vanquishers of memory, and innocent newborns. One can imagine a polity ordered to this end. Educators will teach children to say yes to their wills alone, and not to constitute themselves in relation to their parents or any others. Strength will be valued above all. Each will be distributed what is needed to be strong in mind and body. Those who had memory of a time before this regime would be counseled to forget and to trust in themselves, in order that they may not despair of themselves and be caught up in the past. Such a regime would be consummately unstable, because it would have to justify itself to a people who refuse to sit with one set of values. It would be spawning citizens whose inclination would be to forget, not obey. Equality, then, would be impossible to maintain, because commanding obedience to equality would not be possible without law and punishment for those who transgressed. Once one has created a generation of this quality, there would be no way to enforce a democratic equality that was the very basis for such a public discourse in the first place, for such a public discourse is predicated on the possibility of resolution of conflicts through persuasion and not force.

The Nietzschean democrat should not be blamed for making the bet that such a society could work. After all, Nietzsche offers the possibility of conditions being such that value creation and respect for equality are compatible:

Refraining mutually from injury, violence, and exploitation and placing one’s will on par with that of someone else—this may become, in a certain rough sense, good manners among individuals if the appropriate conditions are present (namely, if these men are actually similar in strength and value standards and belong together in one body). But as soon as this principle is extended, and possibly even accepted as the fundamental principle of society, it immediately proves to be what it really is—a will to the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and decay.12

Democratic Nietzscheanism can only be maintained by an equality characterized by de facto conditions of power. Where this does not obtain, there will be no equality. Hope will be possible only in the context of a promise made by the strong, or the “best,” and people will only be able to understand this promise through life in an aristocracy, a rule by the “best.” The whole process of cruelty and memory formation will
begin again with a new aristocracy making the painful incisions:

Every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work of an aristocratic society...To be sure, one should not yield to humanitarian illusions about the origins of an aristocratic society...Human beings whose nature was still natural, barbarians in every terrible sense of the word, men of prey who were still in possession of unbroken strength of will and lust for power, hurled themselves upon weaker, more civilized, more peaceful races...In the beginning, the noble caste was always the barbarian caste.13

Any aversion that such a barbarism might evoke in the minds of the denizens of post-Christianity, however, would necessarily be proof of their incomplete escape from their Christian heritage. In the world made strange, where the inheritance is discovered to be insufficient, one’s reasoning and one’s understanding of morality are then arbitrary marks on the conscience, wounds and scars with no more signification than any other pattern of wounds or scars. Public discourse will take place among the minds that have instilled the “thou shalt not” statements and then reason from them. Persuasion is for lesser souls. Hope exists insofar as the promise of the particular aristocracy still commands trust and faithfulness. The servants of the aristocracy, then, will attend to their masters only insofar as they know themselves to be lesser than and incapable of usurping their masters. Right is simply the reverence that might commands.

A problem appears for the Nietzschean view of value creation when one considers the possibility of resolving on such a creation. Imagine a citizen that espouses the Nietzschean approach described thus far. This citizen will be a servant of the reigning order only insofar as its promise obtains in enough circumstances to command respect. Where these promises do not obtain he rushes to power in order to enact a new promise, which will serve as the foundation of hope in the society thenceforth. This citizen will be able to forget but also to remember what he has promised: “this animal which needs to be forgetful, in which forgetting represents a force, a form of robust health, has bred in itself an opposing faculty, a memory, with the aid of which forgetfulness is abrogated in certain cases—namely in those cases where promises are made.”14 This faithfulness to the original “I will” is what is necessary to “ordain the future.”15 There is clearly a struggle with oneself that is necessary for these promises to obtain. If they were abandoned, the basis of hope in the society would vanish, and new power-hungry individuals will rise to offer that promise and future. The power that ordains the future also constrains the one ordaining. There is at least this paradox in the Nietzschean approach.

This paradox curiously appears more than two thousand years earlier in Plato’s Republic. In the ninth book, Plato describes the life of the tyrannical soul. Noticeably, the tyrannical soul behaves in a way not particularly befitting the title of master:

Consider the private men living in the cities who are very rich and have many slaves. They resemble the tyrant in that they rule over many...You know that they feel secure, that they are not frightened of their servants...But supposing some god should lay hold of a man with fifty slaves and carry him off together with his wife and children...Supposing he and all his property and servants were set down in some lonely place where there were no free men to come to his aid...Would he not at once feel constrained to truckle to some of his slaves, going against his own will and making them promises and even freeing them? Would he not be compelled to be the flatterer of his own servants?

Making promises, then, appears just as much the work of the servant as the master. By constituting himself in terms of himself, as Nietzsche would counsel, and by treating others as no more than tools or instruments, the master has substituted his own power for the power of the servants. Seemingly at the height of power, the
master has suddenly lost all power. He is therefore bound to his servants under pain of death. The one who said “yes” to his own will has thus become the one who cannot refuse to say “yes” to his servants. A great reversal has occurred: “he who is the tyrant is completely the slave.”

Where Nietzsche was imagining the one with the “right to make promises” as the “man who has his own independent, protracted will…and in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle,” Plato had already imagined someone “cowering in his house and envying those who can enjoy the pleasure of travel abroad.” The supreme man of action, the one who forgets about the past and builds his own future, is the supreme man of inaction in the eyes of Plato.

The Nietzschean approach to ordaining the future ends in a contradiction when it comes to creating new values by which to live. Plato illustrates why this contradiction is the case. But before Nietzsche is discarded as a thinker who cannot offer an understanding of the secular basis of hope, Plato must be made to present an alternative vision that resolves the contradictions.

The problem with Plato, first of all, is that he predates Augustine by almost eight-hundred years. The second problem is that he does not have any concept of hope similar to Augustine or Nietzsche. He does, however, treat the phenomenon of the familiar world made strange. In his discussion of the education in dialectic, Socrates illustrates why it is that students of dialectic become lawless:

Haven’t you noticed that current practice in the dialectic is causing great harm? In what way? Its students have become lawless. That is true. But is their behavior cause for wonder? Can you find no sympathy for them? Just why should I? Their situation resembles that of an adopted son raised in a great and numerous family with abundant wealth, all of which has attracted a horde of flatterers. On reaching manhood he becomes aware that he is not the flesh and blood of his adopted parents and that he will be unable to locate his real parents. Can you imagine the difference in his feelings towards his adopted family and toward those flatterers before and after he learns the truth about his adoption? …I would guess that before knowing the truth, he would more likely honor his adoptive parents and family than his flatterers… but afterward, I should guess, his sense of honor and devotion to the family would languish.

Similar concepts are invoked in this account of the world made strange. Like Nietzsche’s psychologist, the adopted son has seen through what he previously held to be venerable. What was once venerable and an object of devotion is now demonstrated to be not truly venerable or commanding devotion. Unlike, the psychologist, however, he does not despair but associates himself with the flatterers. There is no interior despair causing a capitulation to “foreground opinion,” but rather a relaxation of previous devotion and a kind of moving on seemingly unrecognizable from the forgetting that Nietzsche proposed.

The disinherited do not confront nihilism in Plato, but simply move on. What is the basis for this moving on? The psychologist, it seems, falls into a deeper abyss than the adopted son. His location becomes a place beyond good and evil, where judgments about good and evil and, hence, justification, are impossible. Good and evil are not lost on the adopted son, on the other hand. There are still logically things which ought to be pursued and things which ought to be avoided.

But why does the adopted son not enter the realm beyond good and evil? Recall that for Nietzsche, good and bad are simply those prejudices which have been inflicted on persons by means of a scarred memory. Knowledge of the good, then, is entirely predicated on power relations in the world of coming into being and passing away. Plato, on the other hand, does not conceive of the good with a Nietzschean
expression such as an “I will” or evil as an “I will not.” While the Republic, being a dialogue, cannot always be understood as making declarative statements about what Plato thought, it evinces a radically different understanding of what goodness is. In Book I, the good is invoked when talking about corruption and excellence: “Then the good cannot corrupt, any more than heat can generate cold or dryness water.” Later on in Book VI, Socrates says “The good, then, is what every man wants. For its sake he will do all that he does. He intuits what the good is, but at the same time he is baffled, for the nature of the good is something he comprehends only inadequately.” The good is located outside of the person, and it even is “governor of the intelligible order.” The good is both the object of desire and a necessity of understanding. So, when the adopted son’s inheritance disintegrated, good and evil persist as recognizable, even if not expressible.

This understanding of good as both what is desired and what is needed to understand the intelligible order complicates the Nietzschean presentation of hope. Posing the question “what is the basis of hope?” to Plato will not yield an answer that does not challenge the question. In Nietzsche, as in Augustine, hope is intelligible through reference to history. One’s actions are justifiable in the light of some promise. This promise is made by the one who embodies the measure of justice in some way. The world of coming into being and passing away is not bookmarked by promises in the Platonic conception of history. Therefore, there is no hope in Plato, but an alternative way of thinking about action.

Justice and action for Plato belong to the order of the soul and its parts. When the parts are in harmony, there is justice; when one part usurps the function of another, there is injustice. Justice in the soul is the prerequisite for justice in action:

The reality is that justice is not a matter of external behavior but the way a man privately and truly governs his inner self... When he has brought all this together in temperance and harmony, he will have made himself one man instead of many. Only then will he be ready to do whatever he does in society: making money, training the body, involving himself in politics or in business transactions. In all the public activities in which he is engaged he will call just and beautiful only that conduct which harmonizes with and preserves his own inner order which we have just described. And the knowledge that understands the meaning and importance of such conduct he will call wisdom.

Justification of action does not require looking out but looking in. The good, although outside of the self for Plato, curiously is manifested within the self. Equally curious is that in Nietzsche our notion of good is located within the individual and is then manifested in action. Plato’s understanding of action, then, is much quieter, and requires no spectacle of value creation. The differences in character and speech of Plato’s Socrates and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra further illustrate how they envision somebody acting in the public sphere. Zarathustra, when he arrives at the marketplace, is much more oratorical and poetic:

I teach you the overman. Human being is something that must be overcome. What have you done to overcome him? All creatures so far created something beyond themselves; and you want to be the ebb of this great flood and would even rather go back to animals than overcome humans? What is the ape to a human? A laughing stock or a painful embarrassment. And this is precisely what the human shall be to the overman...

I beseech you, my brothers, remain faithful to the earth and do not believe those who speak to you of extraterrestrial hopes! They are mixers of poisons whether they know it or not.
One can sense in Zarathustra something akin to a violent birth. He is overflowing with speech and trying to ram his ideas into the mind of the audience. He speaks in declarative statements followed by poetic illustrations. What else, moreover, is his speech on the Three Metamorphoses of Camel, Lion, and Child than a poem? Socrates’s action, on the other hand, betray a peace between him and those teeming with false convictions about justice. He appears in Book I going to the marketplace with others in order to participate in a festival, whereas Zarathustra had confronted the crowd that had gathered to see a tight-rope performance. He proceeds always conversationally and by posing questions. When his interlocutor fails to see the good, he is not distraught or angry. When Glaucon completely misses what Socrates is saying about education, for example, he simply says “We ought not to be too sure about that.” Socrates, unlike Zarathustra, is capable of a civic friendship that is supremely tolerant and patient.

When the familiar world is made strange to Socrates, he proceeds by gently questioning those who claim to know the truth, exposing their contradictions by cross-examination, and engaging in dialogue that might resolve those contradictions. While the good is baffling and incommunicable, it is not inaccessible. When the good illuminates the soul, the actions that proceed from it are just. The challenge here for Plato is that unless one is fully illuminated by the good, there does not seem to be any way in which one’s soul can be understood as thoroughly just and hence one’s action as thoroughly just. The dilemma is visible in his claim that “any measure that falls short of reality is no measure at all. Nothing that is imperfect is the measure of anything, even though some people sometimes think that enough has been done and that no further inquiry is needed.” Nevertheless, the dilemma appears to be solved in the way that he conducts himself in the public sphere. He embodies a friend who is at peace with the faults of his companions. He does not condemn, and not due to an apathy towards judgements involving good and evil, but by his ability to assert that he in fact knows nothing. The insufficiency of any measure does not lead to despair of action but rather to an amicable disposition towards his fellow man and city.

Socrates’s peculiar conduct in the public sphere was his way of avoiding being terrified by action. If the good had not fully illuminated the soul and thus allowed for truly just actions proceeding from a just soul, he could persevere by way of his irony that characterized his interactions with the rest of the world. How, after all, could the character we first see offering devotions the fertility goddess Bendis later strike out every line of Greek poetry that did not convey doing what a rational mind would dictate that the gods would do? Only by way of his ability to accept his world and his inheritance—his adoptive home—was he able to be friends with the world and not fall into a crippling pity, as the psychologist did, or a belligerent outrage, as Zarathustra did. Søren Kierkegaard saw Socrates as displaying the ability to exist at peace amid an insufficient world:

The whole substantial life of Hellenism had lost its validity for him, that is to say, the established actuality had become unreal for him, not in some particular aspect but in its totality as such. In relation to this invalid actuality he allowed the established to feign existence and thereby brought on its destruction...Hence we see from the present discussion that the standpoint of Socrates was irony as infinite negativity. However, it was not actuality altogether that he negated, but the given actuality of a certain age, of substantiality as embodied in Hellas; and what his irony demanded was the actuality of subjectivity, of ideality.

The insufficiency of his inheritance, the “invalid actuality” of Athenian civilization, was no frightful beast. There was no need to vanquish it, like how the lion vanquishes the dragon of inheritance in Zarathustra’s Three Metamorphoses, because its own insufficiency was its death warrant. He knew that anything not participating
in the good was doomed in some way to de-
struction. He did not need to reenchant society
or impose his vision on it, but simply to allow
it to “feign existence.” It was only by living
ironically—honoring the gods but never being
content with the poets, dialoguing on the good
while never pretending that the good is wholly
communicable in speech—that Socrates was
to navigate the world when the entire familiar
world has become strange.

The problem of the world made strange
faced by numerous in times of crisis renders
the ability to relate and interact normally with
fellow citizens impossible. Whether the dis-
inherited take the Nietzschean or the Socratic
approach depends on how they understand
their situation and perhaps most importantly
the question “how is my understanding of the
good rendered inadequate by the insufficiency
of my inheritance?” The Nietzschean approach,
although it affords room for the imagination to
picture an ideal future that may enkindle in the
heart a great desire to see it ordained, neverthe-
less is bound to be frustrated by the dynamics of
the master becoming the slave. The Socratic ap-
proach eludes frustration by imagining a way of
life where action is possible even if knowledge of
absolute goodness is baffling. Although the vir-
tues and drawbacks of each may be enumerated
and compared, what causes one approach to
be chosen over the other may ultimately be the
work of soul-craft and not just argumentation.

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ne of the most confusing questions surrounding the human condition concerns the decision some individuals make to end their own lives. Central to several of the novels in the canon of nineteenth-century British fiction is a dark fascination with mortality in dialogue with rational, calculated self-destruction. In each of Charlotte Brontë’s *Jane Eyre*, Thomas Hardy’s *Tess of the d’Urbervilles*, and Joseph Conrad’s *Lord Jim*, a character’s self-destruction is portrayed as cold and dark, yet intentional and rehearsed. While all three books demonstrate an exploration of orchestrated death, each deals with this concept in a different way. In *Jane Eyre*, self-sacrifice serves as a tool, a device utilized by one character to symbolically harm another. In *Tess of the d’Urbervilles*, self-sacrifice is presented in the form of a social message; a melancholic comment on the female-figure’s demise in compensation for the sins of those around her. Lastly, in *Lord Jim*, self-sacrifice is presented in the context of man’s search for immortality, born out of a sense of egoism and romantic desire. By including such instances of self-obliteration, these novels function as commentaries demonstrating the conflict between self-preservation and principle that many individuals often grapple with, but that few truly act upon.

In *Jane Eyre*, self-sacrifice takes on a particularly dark, sinister role, functioning as an intentionally directed action meant to induce a level of mental torment, by the tormented, onto the tormentor. By the end of the novel, the lasting impression the author provides leaves both the reader and the protagonist feeling haunted by one particular individual’s actions that go far beyond mere self-destruction.

After setting fire to Thornfield, Bertha Mason’s final act of defiance and pure anger towards her oppressor, Rochester, is a corporeal elimination intended to inflict a far more compelling psychological rupture in the mind of her captor. As a crazed Bertha stands on the mansion roof, a confused Rochester pleads her not to jump. However, his words are in vain, as Bertha “[yells] and [gives] a spring, and the next minute she [lies] smashed on the pavement.” For the majority of the novel, Bertha’s has impeded Jane’s and Rochester’s happiness. At the same time, however, she has been the consequence of male oppression; Rochester’s decision to keep her locked away in his mansion effectively creates the ‘madwoman’ that Bertha is presented as being. Ultimately, Berkeley’s decision to end her life the way she does represents arguably the clearest, most formidable stand against her oppression possible. Rochester’s physical damage, in the form of losing his vision, along with a hand, as a consequence of the fire Bertha instigates, is only the first layer of torment. The deeper trauma is the sheer scene that Bertha seems to actively orchestrate in order to burn the consequence of Rochester’s wrongdoings into his memory.

The fact that she places herself on the roof, and only follows through with the dreadful act after Rochester notices her and asks her to come
down, reflects on this notion of a calculated self-destruction with the intent of instigating a long-lasting grief. Indeed, the way in which “[Bertha] was on the roof...waving her arms above the battlements, and shouting out till they could hear her a mile off,” acts as an analogy to the character Ulrica, from Walter Scott’s *Ivanhoe*, in which the aforementioned character, like Bertha, appears on a turret in a moment of gendered defiance, is particularly interesting. Bertha’s par-allelizing of this scene further lends itself to the notion of her action being a carefully planned act of revenge. If she were purely mad, as she is made out to be, it would not seem to make sense that she would go to such great lengths to create such a terrifying image for both Rochester and the reader. The fact that she does, however, speaks to an arguably rational, premeditated scheme intended to punish the oppressor, even later in the midst of his apparent happiness.

While it could be that Bertha’s suicide actually represents a high point for the protagonists, in the sense that it allows them to finally be to-gether, the way in which the novel itself ends suggests that the couple’s happiness is anything but determined. Rather, by problematizing and complicating Jane’s level of independence at the end of the novel, arguably through the metaphor of Rochester’s regaining a sense of male authority through the “obscurity clouding one eye...becoming less dense,” the author subtly implies that the apparent joy in the couple’s reunion cannot be taken at face value. It may be argued, then, that Bertha’s self-destruction functions as a sort of curse on those who have wronged her. It is a calculated effort to impose in their relationship an ever-lasting, lingering memory of Rochester’s sins and Jane’s interference that may. If it does not ruin them, this memory will at least linger on their minds to remind them of the sacrifice that was required for them to attain their happiness. Indeed, Bertha’s departure from the fictional world aligns closely with the way in which she enters it: as a secluded figure who understands far more than what those around her think she does. Thomas Hardy similarly reflects on this theme, though the motivation in committing the act differs.

In *Tess of the d’Urbervilles*, self-sacrifice functions, in contrast to *Jane Eyre*, as more symbolic of a sort of social commentary, meant to deliver a message on a pervasive cultural issue, with Tess’s sacrifice portrayed as repayment for the sins of those around her.

At the novel’s end, after having been on the run for several days following Alec’s murder, Tess and Angel eventually find themselves at the historic site of Stonehenge. As Tess ponders this strange place, she asks Angel “Did they sacrifice to God here?” prompting him to answer that, in fact, the sacrifices were not to God, but “to the sun. That lofty stone set away by itself is in the direction of the sun, which will presently rise behind it.” Tess’s posing of this question fore-shadows what will soon be her own fate, an offering to some higher power for a greater moral reason. Indeed, after Tess falls asleep from ex-haustion, the couple are eventually surrounded by officers there to arrest them. Just as they are to wake Tess up, however, Angel stops them, imploring them to let her rest. The way in which the visual illustration of this scene finds Tess, the oppressed woman of the nineteenth-century Victorian society, with a group of men in a circle around her—there to take her and literally strip her of her freedom—molds Tess’s body as a sort of sacrifice for the consequences of ‘man’s’ sins. In this interpretation of the female’s destiny, one must pay for ‘man’s’ sinful sexual urges, in the form of Alec d’Urberville. One must pay for the psychological subjugation utilized by the likes of Angel Clare. One must pay for the sins of a tarnished virginity, despite the female’s lack of autonomy over this matter. Thus, the novel, in this scene, attempts to elucidate the hypocrisy of the fact that the one who compensates for the sins of ‘man’ is, in fact, the victim of those very sins.

The way in which the men, “when they saw where she lay, which they had not done till then...showed no objection, and stood watching her, as still as the pillars around,” not only subjects Tess’s body to the male gaze, but also
conjures up the image of a ritualistic activity of sorts, one infested with irony and sexual tension. Even after she wakes, the way in which Tess understands and responds to the situation she finds herself in represents a realization of the inevitability of her destiny. As soon as she wakes and sees the men, Tess asks “What is it Angel…Have they come for me?” There is no objection; there is no resistance. Instead, Tess seems to come to an understanding of the society in which she lives, wherein the name of the man who drives the woman to extreme action remains un tarnished, whereas the woman must suffer as an example. The fact that Tess notices that “It is as it should be,” and that “[she is] ready,” comments on the woman’s expectations of her fate in the social circumstances of the time period. Despite attempting to show her autonomy by trying to support her family after they’ve lost everything, taking Alec’s life, and finally reuniting with Angel, the inevitability of her demise is illustrated as effectively inescapable.

The argument for Tess’s sacrifice acting as a sort of peace offering may even further be substantiated when one considers the relationship implied at the end of the novel. After Tess is hanged, Angel walks off with Tess’s sister, 'Liza-Lu, hand-in-hand, seemingly into the sunset. Despite the lack of insight offered here, it may be argued that Angel is fulfilling an earlier desire of Tess’s, in which she voices her hope that, if anything is to happen to her, Angel will agree to effectively marry her younger sister and support the family. Adopting this particular reading, it may be argued that Tess’s turmoil, hardship, and ultimate sacrifice is meant to act as the offering required to ensure the future happiness and stability of her family. Tess’s downfall, then, effectively operates as a means to an end. Her sacrifice or, at the very least, willing acceptance of her fate, essentially clears the junction for the potential of prospective well-being for those around her.

Joseph Conrad’s novel presents a contrary reasoning for self-destruction. In Lord Jim, the novel’s examination of self-sacrifice is presented as aligning with a sense of egotistical desire for immortality, combined with a belief in the inevitability of the human condition—finding as its underlying basis the notion of the need for the fulfillment of an unquenchable sense of romanticized heroism.

After his misjudgment in the conflict against Gentleman Brown, Jim knows that he must answer for his negligence. Following Dain Waris’s death, he realizes his destiny lies at the behest of his friend’s father, Doramin. The way in which Jim approaches this inevitable death is particularly interesting. Despite desperate pleas from his servant Tamb’Itam, along with tearful appeals from his lover, Jewel, Jim decides that the only choice he has is to meet his fate at Doramin’s hand. The fact that Jim, although in a position of power due to his legendary status among the Bugis people and thus perfectly capable of trying to take matters in his own hands, actually willingly accepts this prospect, transcends sheer acceptance of custom. Rather, there is an added element of egoism in his decision, a fascination with mortality that finds itself undeniably intertwined with man’s desire to have his name remembered.

The fact that “the courtyard was full of armed Bugis with their followers, and of Patu san people,” sets the scene that Jim enters as full of spectators, the audience eagerly awaiting the show that is to follow. When Jim enters the camp, he is solemn, yet assertive in his approach towards his destiny. In the midst of the murmurs and whispers of the crowd, Jim’s claim that he has come to meet his punishment “Upon [his] head,” along with the fact that, when Doramin approaches him, Jim “[looks] him straight in the face,” points to a certain pride that Jim actively adopts in the moment of his demise. He announces his decision to the crowd; he looks the harbinger of his death in the eyes as he is about to end his life. The whole scene seems romanticized: the death being, in a way, rather free from crudeness or imperfection. Jim presents himself as a sort of a elevated human being, absolved of fear and ready to die a martyr.
Moreover, the particular way in which he dies is indicative of this fascination with a romanticized notoriety. The fact that, after he is shot, Jim, “with his hand over his lips...fell forward, dead,” serves to substantiate this idea of the ‘fame-factor’ behind Jim’s sacrifice, his decision to keep his lips shut possibly illustrating an almost mocking tone towards those who wanted to know more about him and his life. ‘No,’ he says in his final moment. ‘Even in death, I shall reveal nothing. I will let you all suffer as you try and piece together my story. You will never know...’ This desire to be remembered through the maintaining of secrecy serves to substantiate the notion of self-destruction as a sincere form of immortalization.

The novel’s last page reveals an intriguing dichotomy that Marlow largely proposes to apply to Jim, but that may perhaps concern human beings in general. Recounting Jim’s decision to enter Doramin’s camp, Marlow voices his own confusion over the matter, illustrating Jim as “an obscure conqueror of fame, tearing himself out of the arms of a jealous love at the sign, at the call of his exalted egoism.” This ‘exalted egoism’ has been central to Jim’s internal struggle throughout the course of the novel. From the text’s very first pages, the reader learns of Jim’s romantic fascination with heroism: he desires acts of great importance and lasting legacy. However, whether in his failure to act on the Patna, his inability to truly ‘love’ Jewel, or his negligence against Gentleman Brown, Jim constantly finds his desire for greatness impeded by his own shortcomings as an individual. It is compelling, then, that the one time it can be argued that he truly attains this goal is when he dies—surrounded by individuals, in a moment of great visceral appeal, and motivated by reasons nobody around him can truly discern.

Lastly, the fact that, as Marlow contends, Jim “goes away from a living woman to celebrate his pitiless wedding with a shadowy ideal of conduct,” presents his decision as a trade-off between two ‘lovers,’ one a living woman in the form of Jewel, the other some amorphous notion of self-fulfillment, leads the reader to contemplate the reasoning behind individuals who seem to forego life’s material benefits for the sake of some abstract principle that penetrates not just the heart, but the very soul. Without leaving much of his own opinions on the matter, Conrad, then, invites the reader to ponder what defines life’s worth, and whether any ideal can be held above it.

Extending this analysis, it is interesting to contemplate the way in which the theme of mortality and the human condition continued into the new age of the British novel of the twentieth century. The exploration of the psychology of the human mind, what motivates man’s actions, and the ways in which our thoughts dabble with questions relating to our own existences, are often found in this new literary period. Some examples of the way in which such questions appear in the twentieth-century novel can be observed in the works of Virginia Woolf and James Joyce. In Mrs. Dalloway, for instance, the protagonist often finds herself self-reflecting on her life choices, even at times on the possibility of self-destruction in light of the miserable situation of meaninglessness she finds herself in. Similarly, in Joyce’s The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, the protagonist often finds himself grappling with questions of spiritual salvation versus corporeal damnation. The same questions also turn up in the poetry of the period. In T. S. Eliot’s The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, the protagonist laments over the problems in his life, his lack of love, and his bleak prospects: “I grow old ... I grow old ..., he cries, “I shall wear the bottoms of my trousers rolled.” Thus, here, too, questions surrounding one’s decay are brought to mind; the contemplation of one’s existential termination.

In the nineteenth-century British novels discussed, self-inflicted destruction happens to be a much more calculated effort to enforce some long-lasting message or effect on both the other characters in the story and the reader. However,
in twentieth century, questions of mortality come across as much more free-flowing, part of the tapestry of conscious thought that reveals the everyday musings of the human psyche. Previously, as in the novels discussed, self-destruction has a more or less clear goal in each situation: a functional utility towards achieving some greater purpose. However, whether in Woolf’s ‘Dalloway’ or Eliot’s ‘Prufrock,’ the question of mortality occurs much more naturally, in the midst of tinkering thoughts and fleeting wonders. The crucial point of departure, then, seems to be, as the twentieth-century selection argues, a focus on the fact that such questions almost instinctively lay dormant in all human beings and, as the nineteenth-century selection contends, are only brought to the fore when trying to achieve some higher-level purpose. In this way, the motif of mortality continues into the literature’s new age, though the trajectory of focus seems to undergo a shift, whereby musings over the matter are more internalized and unspoken.

Considering the commonality of the theme of suicide over the expanse of both time periods, the inevitable questions finally become clear. What might the authors be trying to tell the reader by invoking such questions concerning mortality? Are we as humans destined to be stuck in our own unique perceptual cycles of conflict, escape from which can only be achieved through self-destruction? Dr. Ilana M. Blumberg reflects on this question, arguing that “the Victorians, critical of asceticism, melded self-sacrifice with rational self-interest and its counterpart, obligation to a communal good.”17 Adopting this view, it can be inferred that the mortality question might not be instructing the reader to take on any particular viewpoint regarding his particular place in the world. Rather, the intention is to force some reaction, wherein the formerly placid reader or observer is both physically and psychologically shocked by the way in which, often, the human condition finds itself stuck in a web of turmoil. Escape from this web requires the individual to sit back and consider which values he might measure his own existence against, and wonder whether there are some higher ideals, like Tess’s altruism or Jim’s search for immortality, that might both define and decide a “life worth living.”

The fact that, in the literature, the committing of self-sacrifice seems to align with a sense of ‘rational self-interest’ seems evident. Indeed, a central point being made by these authors is that the choice of life is an entirely subjective matter. There may be other, higher principles that guide one in making the choices one does, principles that the individual believes will have impacts beyond himself and his own timeline. To most, it may indeed be that no other principle has more value than that of the preservation of one’s life. But to the likes of Jim, Tess, or Bertha, their life obtains a certain value based on how they want to be remembered, whom they want to impact amidst an inevitable downfall, and their sense of integrity, respectively. To undervalue the complex nature of the decision such individuals make would be a gross undervaluing of the elaborate matrix that is the human condition.

A somewhat obscure, yet undoubtedly compelling theme of the nineteenth-century British novel reflects upon the idea of a conscious effort and calculated decision to take one’s life. Though this phenomenon occurs in a number of novels during this century, the meaning of the self-sacrifice varies with each text. In Jane Eyre, self-sacrifice seems directed towards an effort to impose a level of psychological torment on another character. On the other hand, in Tess of the d’Urbervilles, the protagonist’s self-destruction seems a sacrifice for the sins of those around her, a necessary action to ensure the happiness and prosperity of other loved ones amidst an acceptance of an unjust end. Finally, in Lord Jim, the willingness to accept one’s death seems tied to man’s desire for immortality, a need to be remembered beyond physical termination. Ultimately, George Bernard Shaw’s words that “self-sacrifice enables us to sacrifice others without blushing”18 might be considered an apt conclusion to an unforgivingly complex set of questions; the irony of life, the puzzle of
rationality, and the paradox of living one’s life insofar as it meets a criteria of internalized values above and beyond mere flesh and blood. In focusing on such questions, these three novels of the nineteenth century present a unique and compelling exploration of self-sacrifice as a purposeful act, in contrast to the twentieth-century focus on the same theme as a constant presence simmering under the surface of daily life.

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Solaris, Tarkovsky’s 1972 film based on Stanislaw Lem’s science fiction novel, was originally not supposed to have any music. Composer Eduard Artemyev, who wrote the scores for many of Tarkovsky’s films, was initially brought on set as a “musical ear” to “organize the sounds of nature” in the movie. Artemyev, however, convinced the Russian director that music was a necessary element in the film; from that moment on, the special musical language that continues to define the movie today began to take form. Although often compared to Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey—an another science fiction film characterized by the use of silence—Solaris is, at its core, a very different movie. Rather than portraying the grandeur of humankind’s innovations in space travel, Solaris focuses on the memories of a single individual: a man who must come face-to-face with his past. The protagonist, psychologist Kris Kelvin, visits a space station orbiting the mysterious and oceanic planet, Solaris. In an attempt to communicate with the scientists on the station, the planet accesses their most profound memories and creates copies of meaningful people from their lives. When Kelvin encounters a copy of Hari, his late wife who committed suicide, Kelvin falls in love with her again and has to face his inner demons. Solaris is not a classic science fiction movie: instead of having an emphasis on, say, alien life, Solaris is personal, philosophical, and first and foremost, human.

An analysis of music can reveal the less obvious meanings of a film—a key theme or a character’s emotions—which could have been missed by the viewer at first glance. While engaging with a film, it is worth keeping in mind a few questions: what emotions are associated with the music in the film, and how do certain instruments affect them? How do the sounds allow the viewer to enter the world on the screen? Just as importantly, is there silence? If so, what does this absence of music suggest? What role does diegetic music, or music that exists in the character’s world, play? Is there non-diegetic music which only the audience can hear? Are there leitmotifs, or musical themes associated with a certain character?

In the case of Solaris, an analysis of the Bach theme, the synthesized music, and silence are key in understanding the way in which music—or the absence thereof—influences the viewers’ perception of the film. Eduard Artemyev’s score captures humanity at the heart of the film: the recurring solo organ Bach theme represents Kelvin’s nostalgic memories and his past on
Earth, while the synthesized music belongs to the planet Solaris. This juxtaposition in music allows the viewer to make a distinction between the two worlds, grounding the film in feelings of nostalgia and loneliness. This intimate experience is further highlighted by the presence of silence, which places the human voice squarely at the heart of the film.

I. The Bach Theme

Although appearing only four times in the entire film, Bach's "Choral Prelude in F Minor" is without a doubt the key theme in Solaris. It is the very first music heard in the movie, and is played during the opening credits, (0:34). Bach's often-religious music captures the spiritual quality of the director's work, while the airy sound of the organ music–reminiscent of breathing–contributes to the earthly, almost-human sound. The Choral Prelude is, indeed, a melody rooted in human nature. Moreover, the very association with the classical composer is key in Solaris, since Bach serves as a contrast to the futuristic setting in the majority of the film. Along with Bruegel's The Hunters in the Snow, a Russian icon, and a reference to Rembrandt's The Return of the Prodigal Son, Bach's Prelude roots a "science fiction" film in the past. In context, this link to the past is key in Kris Kelvin's character, as he is lost in memories of his wife, mother, father, and childhood home. Tarkovsky's nostalgia for classic art and music parallels Kelvin's nostalgia for his childhood and the time before his wife's death.

Bach's Prelude is played a second time when Kelvin is in the space station with Hari, watching a film of Kelvin when he was a child, (1:39:26). The scene establishes a connection between the melody and Kelvin's memories of his childhood. The music is thus tied to the protagonist, but instead of functioning as his theme, it captures the sorrow, loneliness, and nostalgia he feels when remembering his past. Just as a smell or a taste can trigger a memory, Bach's music is an example of how memories can be tied to music. In Kelvin's case, Bach is associated with his past, a time when he was a child or when Hari was alive. Because Hari is dead and time cannot be reversed, the past is something distant, unreachable, and long gone. In reflecting Kelvin's feelings of nostalgia, Bach's theme highlights the personal human struggle in the scene, and allows the viewer to sympathize with the protagonist.

I. The Bach Theme

The same solo organ version of Bach's "Choral Prelude in F Minor" is heard the first two times the piece is played, but the music evolves as the film progresses. The third time the music is heard is during the scene when Hari and Kelvin are levitating in the library, (2:12:34). While the levitation can be explained by zero gravity, there is nonetheless a dreamlike quality to the scene to which the music contributes. Instead of having the piece be purely orchestral, Artemyev—using the Bach theme as a "cantus firmus," or a pre-existing melody used as the base for a multi-layered piece of music—added a synthesized layer on top of the original music. The new layer is a vibrating synthesized melody that sounds otherworldly and adds to the dreamy nature of the scene. This dream-like quality reflects Kelvin's disconnect from reality, as he descends into reveries about the past for which he yearns.

To come full circle, the prelude is played one last time at the very end of the movie when Kelvin seems to return home. As he walks around the pond, the original solo organ version evolves into the synthesized version with the extra, otherworldly layer. Indeed, the presence of the synthesizer—largely used as a futuristic-sounding instrument—should hint at the fact that Kelvin has not yet left Solaris: the home he visits in the end is merely an island on the planet. Unlike the first time the synthesized prelude is heard, however, the last version is a much fuller sound with violins and a chorus. The addition of multiple orchestral layers undoubtedly makes this version the most powerful one. Moreover, the high violins and chorus contribute to the hopeful tone at the end of what was previously a nostalgic, sorrowful piece, and help the prelude come to what appears to be a positive resolution. This change in the music makes the ending even
more misleading, and fools the viewer into believing that Kelvin has returned home and will find peace.

While the Bach Prelude is generally remembered as the only "musical" piece in the film—with the rest of the movie's music being primarily ambient—there is one other instance where a different melody breaks through, subtly sneaking into the film and changing the tone of the single scene in which it appears. When Hari and Kelvin stand in front of a mirror (1:44:23), Hari looks at her reflection, states that she "does not know herself," and has an unclear memory of her past. It is at this moment, when she is questioning the meaning of her existence, that Hari starts to realize that she is just a copy of Kelvin's late wife. As she is looking at her reflection, a melody sung by a choir is heard. When the camera rests on Hari's face as she sleeps in the following scene, a wind instrument joins the chorus: the melody is pensive, somber, and melancholic, but the most defining characteristic—the singing—makes it sound even more human than Bach's prelude. It is ironic, of course, that the most "human" melody in the film is associated with a clone; however, this music is key in allowing the viewer to empathize with Hari's character—to see her as no less human than Kelvin—and to understand that humanity itself can be more nuanced than we initially believe.

II. The Synthesized Score and the Planet Solaris

Hari's theme and the Bach piece make up a very small part of the film's score altogether, though they allow the viewer to understand a character's nostalgia or sorrow through very "human" melodies. Indeed, the majority of the music is not "musical" per se; instead, it is what Artemyev described as a "fluctuating mass of sound," and is a mix of orchestral and synthesized sounds. It is important to keep in mind that electronic and synthesized music were still very new during the 1960s and 1970s, and were seen as strange and alien-like. The otherworldly sounds created by the ANS synthesizer used by Artemyev were thus perfect for a film taking place on another planet, and allowed the viewer to be transported into the fantastic world of Solaris.

One should also note that although it is a primarily synthesized score, much of the music does not sound overwhelmingly futuristic and generally does not characterize the film as classically "sci-fi." More than anything, the music is used to create an ambiance. Indeed, the synthesized low drone is dominant in the film and—despite not being "musical" or "melodic"—establishes an unsettling tone. At first, the low drone and "space sounds" heard during Kelvin's trip to Solaris (43:17) appear to be non-diegetic. As Kelvin approaches Solaris, the quick and erratic sounds parallel the imagery of flashing lights and Kelvin floating, while the low drone creates an uneasy feeling that is accentuated with the image of Kelvin's eyes in darkness. Then, three humming, buzzing, and vibrating sounds that play as the planet comes into focus help create a tense and mysterious atmosphere. A similar unsettling low drone can be heard when Kelvin enters the space station (46:30), and often fades in and fades out very naturally throughout the movie without the viewer even noticing. The non-diegetic low drone and synthesized humming are thus key in drawing the viewer into the fantastical world and making the world believable; however, while the low drone and "space sounds" seem to function as non-diegetic music that creates an unsettling atmosphere, it soon becomes clear that they belong to the fictional world on the screen. Soon after Kelvin learns that one of the scientists on the space station committed suicide, the low drone kicks in and gets louder and louder (56:56). When Kelvin turns around to look out at the darkness (57:19), the camera zooms in on the window to let the viewer know that the sound is coming from outside. The same buzzing is heard and gets louder when Kelvin looks out another window and the camera zooms in on the darkness (58:49). The drone functions both as the sound of fear and the unknown and as the music of the planet itself.
While the “human” Bach theme causes Kelvin to recall memories, the low and otherworldly drone—simultaneously shaping an unsettling atmosphere—belongs to Solaris and suggests that the planet is itself a character. The first clear connection between the drone and the planet occurs when Kelvin looks at the ocean through the window in the daytime (1:02:12). The synthesizer brings the oceanic planet to life with a fluctuating humming sound that evokes a wave-like feeling. The connection between the noise and the planet is made time and time again (1:39:13, 1:49:19, 2:13:52, 2:21:25, 2:25:52). The fact that Solaris has its own theme indicates that the planet itself is a character in the movie. A similar low drone brings Bruegel’s painting, *The Hunters in the Snow*, to life. In the long sequence that follows, panning across close-ups of the painting (2:09:15), the humming white noise seems to be coming from the painting itself, tying the sounds of living things within it together.

When the low drone by itself is not directly linked to Solaris or used to bring an element in the film to life, it captures the chaos or tension in a scene. Towards the end of the film, Kelvin’s psychological decline becomes apparent, and the music parallels it: as Kelvin begins to consider the purpose of love and the meaning of life (2:24:55), the low drone kicks in once again, but continues to grow louder instead of fading as usual; then, when Hari helps the feverish Kelvin down the hallway, lights are flashing and the drone gets deafening and out of control (2:26:37). The buzzing and humming is both constant and overwhelming, and drowns out Kelvin’s voice (2:27:26). Simultaneously, the drone is reminiscent of the buzzing one hears when ill, allowing the viewer to vicariously experience Kelvin’s delirious state. In a different scene, the droning combined with a sequence in which Hari, Kelvin’s mother as a young woman, and his dog are all seen in his room on Solaris (2:28:05), emphasizing the absurdity and surreal nature of the scene. The drone is key in capturing the unsettling, dream-like aspects of the film and lets the viewer experience the protagonist’s worsening psychosis and detachment from reality.

### III. Silence

Although the film contains both “human” melodies and synthesized music, silence is—without a doubt—dominant. Tarkovsky—originally wishing for no music whatsoever in the film—felt that the images and voices of characters would be enough to tell the story; as Michel Chion said, “il y a les voix, et tout le reste,” (there are voices, and then everything else). Voices are at the heart of films, and this is especially true in *Solaris*. In the majority of cases, whenever one of the characters is speaking, there is no music. This is most striking when Kelvin watches a video of Gibarian, a previous scientist who committed suicide on the space station (54:06): it sounds as though Gibarian is in the room with Kelvin, despite its being a recording; the silence in the scene accentuates his voice, making it quite musical on its own. In a film about deeply human conflicts and experiences, it seems only natural that the human voice be at the core of the movie.

The “impression of silence” is further achieved in the juxtaposition of extremely loud and quiet moments. Silent scenes in the film are often preceded by noise-filled sequences: as Michel Chion explains, “silence is never a neutral emptiness. It is a negative of sound we’ve heard before hand or imagined; it is the product of a contrast.” This technique is used multiple times in *Solaris*, and discombobulates the viewer by accentuating the sudden, unsettling stillness in a scene. During the long driving-through-Tokyo sequence filled with the loud sound of cars and synthesized noises (38:25), the film suddenly cuts to the quiet pond near Kelvin’s home in the evening. The sharp contrast between the loud noises and the quiet—combined with the clear visual contrast between the busy city with the lights of cars and the stillness of the pond—disorients the viewer and plunges them into a completely different atmosphere. The silence of the pond becomes much more pronounced when paired
with the noise-filled sequence before it, and the sound of birds chirping further emphasizes this. Other scenes in the film use the reverse version of the effect by having a loud noise break the silence. This is the case when Hari drops a bottle of liquid oxygen in her attempt to commit suicide, (2:04:41). The sound of the bottle shattering as it hits the floor—causing a crash that is almost unrealistically loud—puts an end to the Bach theme and is followed by stillness. The sudden emphasis on the unsettling quietness not only conveys the gravity of a scene, but also forces the viewer to confront the very human struggle at the heart of the scene.

Tarkovsky uses another method to evoke silence that "consists in subjecting the listener to noises."8 The very first scene in which Kelvin is walking through the woods by his childhood home is filled with sounds of nature: water gurgling, birds chirping, and a horse trotting. All of these sounds capture the stillness of the scene and help create a peaceful atmosphere. Similarly, when Kelvin visits his mother in his old home in a dream, the sounds of bugs and a clock ticking accentuate the stillness in the room, (2:29:49). This stillness is key in capturing the serenity of the moment, and also highlights the voices of characters. Interestingly enough, there is a distinction to be made between the use of sounds from the natural world and the "artificial" sounds found in the space station. The sounds coming from nature associate silence with peacefulness, but sounds in the station create an uneasy atmosphere. This is notably the case with the recurring sound of windchimes associated with the "visitors," (1:05:50). The dripping water in Kelvin's bathroom (1:22:49) has the same effect and emphasizes the unsettling silence—and thus emptiness—in Kelvin's room. Perhaps the most memorable use of "artificial" sounds is the attempt to recreate the earthly sound of rustling leaves by attaching pieces of paper to a fan, (1:27:20). Instead of reproducing the peaceful stillness found in the opening scene of the film, the fake rustling leaves create an uneasiness and add to the tension in the sequence.

The contrast between noise-filled sequences and quiet scenes—along with the use of noises themselves—to evoke stillness reveals that there are different levels of silence within the film. The low drone on its own could be seen as an element contributing to the silence, as it does not have a clear melody, and makes the quiet sequences stand out more. In these cases, quietness is captured through noises. There is, however, one scene where there is pure silence: the first time the viewer sees the planet Solaris is through a video shown to a panel of scientists. The footage of the oceanic planet, much to the viewer's surprise, is not accompanied by a low drone, a synthesized sound, or even white noise. It is pure silence, and because of its rarity in film, it is unexpected and incredibly perturbing. While a synthesized drone can create tension, there is nothing that can rival the startling atmosphere created by the complete absence of noise.

IV. Conclusion

It is thus the careful balance between silence, synthesized music, and the Bach theme that shapes the atmosphere of the film and brings to light the aspect that makes Solaris different from any other science fiction movie: its emphasis on the personal human experience. Silence is key to creating either a peaceful or unsettling atmosphere, while also bringing the voices of characters in the film to the forefront. The emphasis on human voices is key in a film that deals with personal human struggles and emotions. In addition, the atmospheric synthesized music associated with Solaris personifies the planet, but also draws the viewers into the fantastic world. The synthesized music and silence, however, work in tandem to highlight the music at the core of the film: Bach's "Choral Prelude in F Minor." The variations of the somber and pensive solo organ theme capture sorrow, loneliness, and, first and foremost, nostalgia. Kelvin's longing for the past, and the suffering which ensues from his realization that the past is unattainable, shapes the film and ultimately makes Solaris less of a classic science fiction film and more of
a personal and philosophical narrative. Instead of using overly futuristic synthesized music to clearly classify the film in the science fiction genre, the synthesized music blends with the Bach theme: never drowning it out, but rather assuring its power in the film. The prelude is the key to understanding the character’s emotions, and it is what makes *Solaris* overwhelmingly beautiful and melancholic.

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A Window of Opportunity
Alignment between Mrs. Ramsay and Lily Briscoe in Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse*

Caroline Provost

Ataclysmic bifurcation of the Victorian era and the Modern era occurred after the Great War, better known as World War I. Lily Briscoe and Charles Tansley represent their generation, the Modern Generation, in Virginia Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse*. Division of the sexes designates Lily as the Modern Woman and Charles as the Modern Man. While Victorian Man easily transitions to Modern Man in the case of Mr. Ramsay and Charles, there is no peaceful transition from Victorian Woman to Modern Woman, i.e., no transition from Mrs. Ramsay to Lily. Lily and Charles do not couple off together, and Lily in fact does not couple with anyone—not even Mr. William Bankes, a friend of Mr. Ramsay. Lily’s independence from Victorian notions of male-female relations as exemplified by Mrs. Ramsay represents the rupture between the Victorian era and the post-World War I Modern era.

Woolf locates the rupture of Victorian and Modern in Lily’s relationship with Mrs. Ramsay. Charles parallels Mr. Ramsay across the Victorian-Modern divide, and there is continuity between generations as Charles emulates Mr. Ramsay. Yet Lily does not do the same with Mrs. Ramsay. To demonstrate this generational rupture, I will first examine Charles’s emulation of Mr. Ramsay, and secondly, the rupture of parallelism between Lily and Mrs. Ramsay.

Charles emulates Mr. Ramsay, as both are snooty academics who engage in high diction and esoteric and dusty discussions. The Ramsay children list what the two academicians chat about: the “first-rate man’ at Latin verses,” who “had won this, who had won that,” and who was the “ablest fellow in Balliol.” Charles and Mr. Ramsay’s involvement in high academia is obvious from the mention of “Bristol and Bedford,” Latin verses, and Balliol, a college at Oxford University, as well as their use of “Prolegomena,” the Greek word for “beforehand.” Evidently, they both share in the pursuit of knowledge.1

Yet it is the fact that Mr. Ramsay’s children so strongly associate Charles with Mr. Ramsay that solidifies the parallelism between the two. Woolf exemplifies the Ramsay children’s hatred for their father in the youngest Ramsay, James. After Mr. Ramsay decrees there shall be no trip to the lighthouse, James is enraged: “Had there been an axe handy, or a poker, any weapon that would have gashed a hole in his father’s breast and killed him…James would have seized it.”2 Mr. Ramsay’s “mere presence” incites his children to violence. Charles has a similar effect on the Ramsay children. According to the children, Charles is “a miserable specimen,” “all humps and hollows,” and “a sarcastic brute.”3

Woolf makes clear the break between Mrs. Ramsay and Lily from interrelations at Mrs. Ramsay’s dinner party. The two women interact
differently with Mr. William Bankes, revealing the rupture between the Victorian and Modern generations. Lily’s perspective on Mrs. Ramsay portrays the Victorian matriarch as motivated by pity, Mrs. Ramsay’s default mode for interactions with men: it is “as if her own weariness had been partly pitying people...She pitied men always,” because “they lacked something—women never.” In contrast, Lily not only rejects female pity for men, but pities Mrs. Ramsay because she, the exceptional Victorian woman, is only motivated and animated by pity. For example, while Mrs. Ramsay pities William Bankes, Lily sees him differently. In her view, he “is not in the least pitiable,” because he “has his work.” Lily admires this aspect of Mr. Bankes, which inspires her to pursue her artistry. Directly after admiring Mr. Bankes for his work, Lily turns to think of her own painting. Mr. Bankes is a positive force that turns Lily to her own autonomy as a female artist. Based on Lily’s narrative, Mrs. Ramsay’s pity “arise[s] from some need of her own rather than of other people’s,” a debilitating strike against Mrs. Ramsay as sympathetic matriarch. Where pity fulfills Mrs. Ramsay, the pursuit of art fulfills Lily.

Charles is another point of rupture between the Victorian and the Modern. Mrs. Ramsay pities Charles, Lily observes, and Mrs. Ramsay’s interaction with Charles demonstrates her female pity for men. She asks him, “Do you write many letters, Mr. Tansley?” as part of banal, dinner party small talk. Although her question is a mere pleasantry, it is also a generous conversational move to include Charles, an aspiring-to-be-upper-middle class academic and aspiring social climber, and engage him on a subject to which he can relate. Lily makes no such effort to include Charles. She taunts and laughs at him: “Oh, Mr. Tansley,” feigning feminine rapture, “do take me to the Lighthouse with you. I should so love it.” Charles notices this acted damsel tone, and her laughter emasculates him. He snaps back, “You’d be sick.” He regrets this short quip—not because of any harm to Lily—but because he made it in the presence of Mrs. Ramsay: “He wished he could think of something to say to Mrs. Ramsay...which would show her he was not just a dry prig.” In Lily and Charles’s short exchange, Woolf demonstrates that Charles is aligned with Mrs. Ramsay and the Victorian, as she is the woman he aspires to impress. Lily is aligned with neither Mrs. Ramsay’s attitude of pity nor Charles’s comical heroism. Lily vaguely attempts and ultimately fails to emulate Mrs. Ramsay’s fondness towards Charles: she weakly states that “she likes his eyes; they are blue.” However, she cannot ignore his belief that “women can’t write, women can’t paint;” he is “the most uncharming human being she had ever met.” She despises Charles as much as the Ramsay children do. Thus, Lily is aligned with the Ramsay children—themselves members of the Modern generation—rather than Mrs. Ramsay and the Victorian generation.

Woolf further directs Lily’s character to the future as Lily looks at the window situated behind Charles at the dinner table. At the table, Charles “sat opposite to her with his back to the window precisely in the middle of view.” It is unclear if Charles is in the middle of the window view or Lily’s view. Charles’s position parallels Lily’s vision of her painting; Lily “saw her picture” and “shall put the tree further in the middle,” paralleling Charles with the tree in Lily’s painting. This parallel could indicate that Charles and Lily are aligned with one another. However, this is a tenuous connection, and the grander parallelism is between the painting and the window rather than mere artistic elements of composition. Lily’s painting is a window to a view of Mrs. Ramsay seated on a step outside. The dining room window is a view as well. Woolf situates Lily to look outside, beyond Charles Tansley, Mrs. Ramsay, and the Victorian era.

What makes the rupture interesting is that it is not between couples of the Modern era but between the women of the Victorian and Modern eras. Woolf does not simply make a feminist statement about gender roles of her generation. Instead, she focuses on the relationships between
women as she locates the rupture within a relationship between a mother figure and a daughter figure. Although the rupture is between Lily and Mrs. Ramsay, Woolf makes this evident through their differences in interaction with men. While Mrs. Ramsay is aligned with Charles Tansley, a vestige of the Victorian era, Lily is aligned with both her art and the window, which are a visual escape from the Victorian era and into the Modern era. The fact that Woolf describes the dinner party scene through Lily implicitly emphasizes Lily’s autonomy and power of vision. Thus, Lily is fulfilled as an independent Modern woman through her vision, metaphorically as an artist and literally as a narrator.

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Tess Trumps Alec
An Analysis of the Murder of Alec d’Urberville in Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles

George Grigg

Tess’s bloody murder of Alec d’Urberville is seemingly the finale of Thomas Hardy’s Tess of the d’Urbervilles. In this dramatic scene, Tess stabs Alec in the heart in response to Alec’s “cruel persuasion” and continued meddling in her life. First, Hardy presents in this scene a role reversal of rapist to victim and victim to murderer. This in turn serves as a perpetuation of the tragedy and as the completion of Tess’s “fall.” Second, Hardy uses this scene as the culmination to the fatalistic symbolism recurring throughout the novel. Both aspects contribute to a profound social commentary on the unbalanced and harsh nature of Victorian sexual mores.

First, Hardy establishes Tess’s bloody murder of Alec as strangely reminiscent of Tess’s rape. In a moment of heroic defiance, the protagonist “stab[s]” Alec “in his bed.” This scene is simultaneously linking back to, but also departing from, the earlier rape, symbolically reversing the two roles. The actual murder features inverted sexual imagery. Alec is killed whilst reclining on the bed, a typical site of sexual intercourse between couples. The protagonist also uses “a carving knife,” a symbolically phallic weapon, and “touch[es] the heart of the victim” with the “point of the blade.” Here, the author effectively characterizes both the murder and rape as acts of passionate and violent penetration. Also, Alec’s rape of Tess caused her to be “bloodied” through sexual violence, which became a moral “stain” on her character. Similarly, Tess’s murder of Alec causes not only a “lot of blood” to “run down upon the floor,” but a “scarlet blot,” or physical “blood stain,” on the room’s floor.

In addition to this role reversal, there is an added layer of irony. One of the key links between the rape and the murder is violence: rape is a violent sexual act, murder a violent non-sexual act. But the second violent act (the murder) includes sexual elements (the bed and the blood), so there is actually a very close overlap between the two incidents. The first signs of Tess’s bloody murder, as observed by Mrs. Brookes, is the “spot” in the middle of the ceiling. This “blood stain” soon grows and dramatically resembles a “gigantic ace of hearts.” Here, Hardy switches from stark realism to a pointed symbolism. Tess in bloody style has effectively “trumped” Alec, having previously been exclusively subject to his will throughout the book. In addition, the description of how the “oblong white ceiling” is stained with a “scarlet blot” encapsulates the novel’s narrative as a whole. The novel depicts the struggles of a “maiden” who is ineluctably “stained” through rape. Here, the “whiteness” of the ceiling represents the purity and innocence that Tess once had. The “redness” of the blood meanwhile represents the “staining” carnal desire and violence that she was subject to, and then tragically comes to embody. Hardy therefore uses color to suggest a linkage between Tess’s original violation, and her eventual murder of Alec.

Alongside this ironic symbolism, there is, however, a certain tragic dimension to Tess’s vengeance. The protagonist’s violence serves
as an extension of the original degradation and “stain” that she suffered from Alec. “The maiden” became “impure” through Alec’s actions. Yet, Tess’s response is to “sin” again. Tess’s bloody murder of Alec thereby becomes a mark of her fallenness, rather than an act of moral purification and defiance. There are, therefore, two conflicting readings of this phase’s subtitle, *Fulfilment*. The first is an optimistic interpretation of Tess’s revenge as the courageous and just response to Alec’s past cruelty. The second understands the murder as a device to demonstrate conclusively the extent of Tess’s “fallen” status. This latter reading would further the tragic narrative surrounding Tess’s pathetic life. Given the novel’s title, this pessimistic understanding seems more likely, as ultimately, Tess becomes one “of the d’Urbervilles.” This genitive within the novel’s title implies ownership and dominance, both of which are demonstrated not only in Alec’s attitude towards Tess, but also in his actions. Alec’s rape of Tess proves, despite her best effort, an inescapable fact throughout the novel. What is damned in a woman, Tess, is condoned in a man, Alec. Tess’s status as a “fallen” women completely ruins her life, impacting her economic choices, familial situation and most tragically, her romantic choices. As Tess herself tersely remarks on her fallen status in Chapter XLVII, “once victim, always victim - that’s the law!” Alec’s crime goes totally unpunished and there are no material consequences, leaving the whole burden to fall on Tess. Through this unbalanced aspect, the novel’s narrative demonstrates the injustice of Victorian sexual mores. Earlier in this chapter in an attempt to construct her narrative of defense, Tess even accuses Alec of making her “a victim” and a “caged bird.” The phrase about being “caged” connotes certain wider societal implication. Alec as a character embodies the oppressive patriarchal society of Victorian England that “cage[s]” and restricts women in general. This abusive aristocrat neatly represents the attitudes and habits of the time, where privileged and moneyed men can degrade working-class women and abuse their womanhood. As Tess herself estimates, Alec has “[torn] her life to pieces.” Accordingly, Hardy uses this scene as a stark social commentary on the imbalance between the sexes in nineteenth-century England: men have great power and privilege, while women are victimized.

Finally, Hardy constructs the novel’s narrative with a fatal anticipation of this exact crisis moment. From the novel’s beginning, Tess is symbolically “bloodied.” In chapter IV, Prince, the family horse, is killed by “the pointed shaft of the cart” and blood promptly begins “sprouting in a stream” and Tess is “splashed from face to skirt with the crimson drops.” The cart’s shaft “[enters] the breast of the unhappy Prince like a sword.” This act of bloody penetration, which is conveyed using phallic imagery with words such as “shaft” and sword,” allude both to Tess’s rape and eventual killing of Alec. In a similar moment of foreshadowing, in Chapter XLVII, Tess “passionately” swings a “heavy and thick” glove directly into Alec’s face. A “scarlet oozing” follows as “blood [begins dripping]” from his mouth. This scene is highly anticipatory of the final murder. Blood will have blood, as Alec, who originally made Tess bleed, now stands before her, bleeding.

Ultimately, Hardy crafts this scene as Tess’s tragic defiance against Alec. The protagonist can take revenge after all the wrongs, both deliberate and inadvertent, that Alec has committed against her. In doing so, Hardy also explores the unjust nature of Victorian society that allows for grossly different standards of sexuality in men and women.

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“During the base-ball season confessors have far fewer mortal sins”

Georgetown’s Catholicism through America’s National Pastime

Julia Greenwood

Georgetown University takes not an insignificant amount of pride in claiming 1789 as the year of its establishment. Though that year is somewhat “weak on historical grounds as a founding date,” as the historian Robert Emmett Curran has noted, it conveniently aligns the origins of the institution with those of the nation itself. While the two have grown up together throughout the centuries, Georgetown has not always enjoyed quite as warm an embrace from this country as it would have liked; as a Catholic—and, especially, a Jesuit—university, the school’s position as an American institution has often been precarious. As baseball “mania” swept the nation in the years following the Civil War, the Jesuit college on the banks of the Potomac was not immune. Georgetown had just emerged, battered and bruised and barely breathing, from the Civil War. It was ready to renew its project of becoming an institution with national appeal, particularly as the South—the home of a majority of Georgetown’s student population in pre-war years—was languishing in economic ruin after its defeat in the War. Having achieved new heights of popularity during the Civil War, baseball promised to be a force for national unity in the wake of the war’s destruction. It quickly gained a hold on the Hilltop, becoming the first organized sport on campus when two intramural teams were formed in 1866.

In the ensuing decades, the game would gain the support of the university and Georgetown’s teams would become quite a force at the very end of the century, before continuing to somewhat more modest success in the first few decades of the twentieth century. Although the trajectory of baseball at Georgetown reflects trends in the development of the sport itself, of course, it also provides an opportunity to examine tensions surrounding Georgetown’s efforts to reaffirm its American identity, often at odds with its Catholicism, and pursue a status as a nationally-respected university. While these quests played out very broadly, having wide-ranging implications across the institution and the path that it would pursue throughout the twentieth century, examining the history of baseball at Georgetown provides an opportunity to observe how these tensions over the institution’s identity played out on a smaller scale, permeating even athletics. As 1866 saw the dawn of organized baseball—in the form of intramural contests—that year provides a natural beginning for the considerations of this paper, and the end of World War II in 1918 offers a close to this period.
As organized sports took shape in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Georgetown keenly recognized the benefits that athletic success on the intercollegiate level promised for a still-fledgling college of its small size. Sport had come to be regarded as a vehicle for building character and instilling virtue among young males. Success in athletic endeavors, then, “became an almost irresistible quest for virtually every college,” and an appealing means through which “undersized, underfinanced” schools—like Georgetown—might attain to assert themselves even among more elite and well-established institutions. In many ways, Georgetown did embrace athletics as not only a valuable component of the education of its students but, at times, a means through which to pursue national renown. This process, however, played out unevenly under the watch of different presidents of the college, shaped by various factors relating to the broader arc of Georgetown’s development into a university, historical pressures, and the evolution in the form of the game of baseball itself. The story of baseball on the Hilltop does not form a single trajectory, then; it undulates through different time periods and varying personalities of the individual presidents at the helm of the institution. Nonetheless, examining the history of this program opens a window into an understanding of how the quest for the identity of an institution that was perpetually self-conscious about its Catholicism and anxious about the authenticity of its American roots played out in very tangible ways.

The lengths that Georgetown went to in its pursuit of athletic success illustrated the degree to which it adopted distinctly American measures of success. While sporting endeavors initially emerged organically and informally by student initiative in the middle of the nineteenth century, athletic pursuits quickly became structured and regimented, following patterns of development common to many college campuses. Baseball was first played informally on the Hilltop, before students formed intramural teams in 1866, later yielding to a single lineup that would face outside baseball clubs and eventually become a varsity team. An entirely student-run Athletic Association formed by student initiative in 1874 would provide certain structure to campus athletic endeavors, eventually even funding the teams itself; in 1889, though, it was reformed to provide for more university oversight and support. In order to bolster prospects for victory, the Georgetown College Journal began urging the Athletic Association in 1890 to permit the Law and Medical students to play on intercollegiate teams, saying that this would allow the sports to “truly come under the name ‘Varsity.’” By 1893, the baseball team was comprised almost entirely of graduate students; many of these athletes were even veterans of college ball at other institutions.

These measures were quite beneficial to Georgetown’s success on the baseball diamond, which in turn raised her to new heights. Between 1891 and 1900, the Blue and Gray were able to stack their schedule with the great teams from prominent schools—Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Dartmouth, Cornell, the University of Pennsylvania, Navy—which Georgetown prevailed against about three-quarters of the time. This “brought her into national and international prominence,” in addition to cultivating a rabid following back on campus. When team from the championship season of 1899 returned from a trip north, for instance, “virtually the entire university” greeted them at the local railroad station and led a parade through town back to the Hilltop—and a fireworks display.

This devotion to cultivating athletic success often came at the expense of institutional and academic integrity. Whereas the Athletic Association ostensibly offered limited numbers of scholarships to student athletes from its own fundraising efforts, the university began providing secret funds to the Association apparently in 1892. This made Father Joseph Havens Richards, S.J., the president at the time, uneasy. Robert Emmett Curran comments in his history of the university that Richards “clearly did not want the university to be identified publicly
with the practice of subsidizing athletes but felt bound to do it, given the extraordinary importance that organized sport had assumed in the world of higher education.” 14 Even with this covert support from the administration, the Athletic Association had acquired a nearly $80,000 deficit by 1927, as it failed to fund the tuition and board for the 140 athletes it had committed to support. Additionally, patterns of academic exploitation developed around these such scholarship recipients. Many athletes were admitted to the University’s constituent schools despite their inferior records and the objections of the schools’ deans. Once at Georgetown, athletes were frequently “’shipped around the University,’” that is, placed into new programs after failing out of old ones to maintain sporting eligibility, as one dean complained. 15 Because practices occurred in the late afternoon, as classes at the professional schools were just beginning across town, it was often difficult for athletes in the Dental, Law, and Medical Schools to attend classes regularly; these students were often known to fail to appear on examination dates. 16

Georgetown’s devotion to cultivating athletic success thus resulted in a certain unfortunate notoriety. As early as 1895, university authorities had begun to seriously consider the university’s commitment to sport. That year, Yale players’ complaints in papers about competing against a school pursuing “’a semi-professional game’” preceded Georgetown’s board of directors discussing the desirability of “’semi-professional athletics’” on the Hilltop, though apparently decided against taking any action. 17 The press contributed to this animosity: Harper’s Weekly ran a negative article about the professionalism of Georgetown athletics in 1897, and newspapers reported in 1904 that the Blue and Gray’s star pitcher had played professional ball the year prior. At least one prominent baseball team shunned them in those years; the University of Virginia refused to play against Georgetown until it implemented higher standards for those admitted to its roster. Such displeasure also percolated among the university community. A recent graduate of the college penned an open letter to students in 1905, lamenting the professionalism of the baseball team in particular. “Such a reputation as we have made in baseball and football,” he wrote, “would be something to be proud of if it were honest [but] it has been earned by hypocrisy and double-faced dealing.” 18 The Jesuit Community diarist noted that this opinion was common among both faculty and students. 19 In coming years, the university would carefully extract itself from its prior levels of commitment to athletics in order to be “kept clear from that professional taint.” 20

While the arc of the University’s financial and institutional commitments to developing its athletic programs, which brought both great success and a certain disillusionment, allow for a broader view of the institution’s approach to its identity, the tensions surrounding Georgetown’s character played out in smaller scenarios, as well. In the 1890s, Fr. Richards repeatedly sought permission from Superior General of the Society of Jesus for Georgetown’s baseball nine to take a week-long trip north to play several prestigious universities. He had to issue three separate pleas over the span of several years before the Superior General ultimately acquiesced to his request. 21 The president argued that making a northern excursion was critical to the success of the team and, consequentially, the university itself. Fr. Richards labored to explain the “fever for athletics which has persisted among young men in America” and begged the Superior General to consider “the customs of the country”—which was underlined for emphasis—in reconsidering the previous denial of his request. 22

Moreover, the president explained, if the institution was forced to continue to curtail the activities of its students, they would grow resentful and “leave us with hatred in their hearts and go to the non-Catholic universities where they are subject to no control at all, and where very temptation both to faith and morals, beset them at every step.” 23 Catholic students had already begun enrolling at non-Catholic schools in droves;
in those years, Harvard had more Catholic students than Georgetown.\textsuperscript{24} Georgetown could not, then, afford to deter Catholic young men by withholding the opportunity for its baseball team to travel. Fr. Richards apparently felt that leveraging the status of his students’ souls was a convincing tactic; he also claimed that baseball improves one’s position before God. “It is a well-known fact in boarding colleges,” he wrote in his February 1896 petition to Rome, “that during the base-ball season confessors have far fewer mortal sins to absolve them at other times.”\textsuperscript{25}

The desperation which seems to color his words here underscores the necessity of securing permission to send the baseball team to seek victory over the elite Northern schools. Additionally, it illuminates some of the tensions “inherent in the effort to develop a university on American standards while being bound, at the same time, to a highly conservative European tradition of discipline for the young,” as the Jesuit historian Father Joseph Durkin, S.J. explained in a history of Georgetown.\textsuperscript{26} Not only were the Jesuit superiors entrenched such a tradition of discipline, but they moreover were so far removed that they did not understand the cultural environment of America.

The priorities of the presidency of Father Alphonsus Donlon, S.J. twenty years later similarly provide a case study in the project of Georgetown’s endeavors to position itself as both Catholic and wholly American. In office from 1912 through 1918, Fr. Donlon was so dedicated to promoting athletic success that a future president would fondly remember him as “the father of Georgetown athletics.”\textsuperscript{27} A former star shortstop of the Blue and Gray himself, Fr. Donlon believed that a competitive football program, in particular, was critical for morale, alumni engagement, and the reputation of Georgetown.\textsuperscript{28} When the United States entered World War I, though, he focused the university’s energies on both supporting the war efforts and demonstrating their commitment to the nation. The university was acutely aware of the importance of exhibiting its patriotism, especially given its Catholic status. President Donlon wrote to the provincial superior in fall 1917 that he had “met many who are asking what the Jesuits are doing in the wary,” saying: “I fear that if we do not make a better showing that we shall lose credit in the country.”\textsuperscript{29} The provincial concurred, writing back that in those “abnormal times, . . . one must give external manifestation of his patriotism, in order that he may avoid suspicion of lacking this virtue.”\textsuperscript{30}

Georgetown indeed succeeded in demonstrating its love of country, so much so that the provincial superior wrote to the presidents of East coast Jesuit colleges and universities after the war to commend them for their fine war efforts, which, he said, “had given them an unprecedented prominence among government and educators.”\textsuperscript{31} Georgetown proceeded to announce the establishment of its School of Foreign Service in 1919.\textsuperscript{32} Though this project began after Fr. Donlon’s presidency ended in 1918, he had himself considered establishing a similar school while he had been at the helm of the university.\textsuperscript{33} While there is not necessarily an explicit connection between Fr. Donlon’s convictions about the importance of intercollegiate athletics in developing Georgetown’s prestige and his understanding of the necessity of demonstrating the school’s patriotism to its reputation as an American Catholic school, the significance that he saw in each endeavor as contributing towards Georgetown’s identity suggests that he may have seen them as at least loosely connected.\textsuperscript{34}
This apparent relationship between Fr. Donlon’s devotion to developing athletics and an aura of patriotism, as well as Fr. Richards’s desperation to secure permission for his baseball team to seek victory against the Ivies, illustrate how tensions surrounding Georgetown’s identity as a Catholic institution of higher education in America played out on the baseball diamond. The broader narrative of the development—and eventual downfall—of the semi-professional model of intercollegiate sport at Georgetown also provides a means through which to examine the reality of how grand ideas about being a Catholic university manifested in America’s so-called national pastime. This is, necessarily, a quite messy task. As Georgetown developed and, of course, ideas about American identity and perceptions of Catholicism shifted throughout these years between the close of Civil and first World Wars, baseball itself was evolving too—in its style of play, the structure of the professional game, and its cultural significance, among other measures. Nonetheless, reading Georgetown’s identity through baseball allows a certain window into how deeply it grappled with its own meaning and purpose as it wrestled with itself over its embrace of American standards of excellence—and its pursuit to succeed in America’s national pastime.

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History of the Philodemic Society, Pt. II

“That Magic Word”—Defining Liberty in the Antebellum Period

Jonathan Marrow

This article is the second of a four-part series on the history of the Philodemic Society at Georgetown in the nineteenth century. Pt. I can be found in the Fall 2018 issue of the journal or on our website, utraqueunum.org

When Benjamin Rush Floyd spoke at the Commencement of Georgetown College in July 1836 on the invitation of the school’s literary society, just under six years after he and 30-odd confederates had established the Philodemic Society, he aimed to identify the founding principles of the organization:

In the first place, we endeavored to adapt it to the peculiar institutions of our country; we went back to the source of all power—to the foundation stone of the republic—the people. As our government is an anomaly in government—as it is established on principles the reverse of all upon which political institutions have heretofore been based, so much necessarily be every institution which has the same foundation, and has for its object the support of that system which grows out of it. Therefore, did we base our infant society, upon the same permanent pedestal, by which the stupendous fabric of our government is supported—the people. The object of thus establishing it on an attachment for the people, was a wish at some future time, to assist our countrymen in watching over and defending the government, which guaranteed to all the inestimable blessing of Liberty.1

Floyd, who had graduated from Georgetown in 1832, would go on to practice law in Virginia, eventually serving as a member of the House of Delegates, State Senate, and the state’s 1850 Constitutional Convention. In many ways, Floyd’s forensic efforts, ideals, and future career marked him out not as an outlier but as the culmination of everything a member of Georgetown’s Philodemic Society aspired to be, and often achieved: a dedicated, principled patriot and a prominent Catholic citizen devoted to public life. Although the rhetoric of Floyd and his compatriots over the course of the antebellum period may seem overblown or overly idealistic, it is a faithful testament to the skills they practiced and ideals they attempted to foster and encourage in each other as members of the oldest literary society at the country’s first and oldest Catholic college. His 1836 speech highlighted the society’s specific and unceasing commitment to what Philodemicians saw as the ideological core of the nation: liberty.

Liberty was the first and foremost value in the universe of the political ideals that Floyd and other members of the Society worshipped. Often framed as a quasi-spiritual civic and
political ideal, liberty was broadly and flexibly defined. However, it generally attempted to incorporate the founding values of the American Republic, the Constitution and Declaration of Independence, and the “Spirit of ’76” or the values expressed by Founding Fathers like George Washington. What this meant in action was much less clear. Mostly Catholic Philodemicians turned Groucho Marx’s famous phrase on its head—whatever liberty was, they were for it. Liberty was so often the theme of Philodemic speeches, yet seen as so central to its efforts, that an 1837 orator opened his address by asking rhetorically “Shall I speak of Liberty, a theme hackneyed as it is inspiring?”

Liberty was often conceived of as a literal inheritance from the generation of founding revolutionaries, an inherited social and moral reality captured in the Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and the Union of the States and to be preserved at all costs. But it was also a consciously calculated feeling—an expression of sentimentality which young patriots like the Philodemicians had to commemorate in regular festivities, reviving memories of past heroes and generations. To do so, they read documents of the past, and, where possible, they joined their celebrations with individuals who represented their values, whether surviving veterans of the Revolutionary generation or descendants of their heroes. Besides the weekly meetings of the body, the three most prominent occasions on the Society’s calendar were the July 4th Independence Day exercises, the orations at the college commencement in late July, and the commemoration of Washington’s Birthday on February 22, an event which served simultaneously as a commemoration of George Washington’s Birthday and the “anniversary celebration” of the Philodemic. In January 1832, a Society-appointed committee resolved to fix the “anniversary” of the Society on February 22 despite its actual foundation date of September 25. This choice was slightly incongruous but that allowed the Philodemic to combine its patriotic exertions towards the memory of the “Father of the Country” with its celebration of itself as a distinctly patriotic institution. For Philodemicians, Washington was the paramount figure of patriotic devotion, stout fidelity, and moral character, but he also functioned as a leitmotif of liberty, the central American idea.

These three annual events of the Philodemic Society—Washington’s Birthday, Independence Day, and the college Commencement—each featured a major event and reading, paired with an orator selected by the Society. This orator was either a student or a prominent member of local society with some connection to the Philodemic, Georgetown, or the Catholic community. On February 22nd, it was customary to read Washington’s Farewell Address accompanied by two sets of remarks—usually brief prefatory remarks by the individual selected to read the address, and a longer oration by a separate individual selected for the purpose; on the 4th of July, the order was replicated, but the Farewell Address was replaced with the Declaration of Independence. After the forensic exercises concluded, the attendees—members of the Society, college professors and Jesuit priests, and prominent members of local society—sat down to dinners, which included numerous toasts of a patriotic and moral character. These scripted celebrations—the annual festivities on patriotic holidays, the reading of the founding documents, accompanying orations, and dinner toasts—were not a new innovation. These exercises had been inaugurated as part of the formation of American nationalism in the early decades of the Republic, and had quickly grown partisan with the development of political parties and the founding of local societies with implicit political loyalties. The prescribed readings that accompanied speeches offered fertile ground for patriotic reflections: the Declaration of Independence provided a chance to consider the meaning of the revolutionary generation and republicanism more broadly, while Washington’s Farewell Address, highlighting especially the dangers of political partisanship, was an opportunity to reflect on Washington’s personal legacy, the current
state of politics in the country, and the ideal political leader. College debating societies eagerly took up the mantle of these festivities and came up with their own innovations. At the University of Virginia, the birthday of Thomas Jefferson, who founded the school, replaced the traditional celebration of Washington’s Birthday, and the preeminent debating society (founded in 1825) was named in Jefferson’s honor.6

The toasts that succeeded these recitations—some scripted in advance, others extemporaneous—were equally central elements of the ritual. The prescribed “regular toasts,” usually read by the Society’s president, were followed by “volunteer toasts,” extemporaneously offered by any individual present at the celebration. The scripted toasts generally numbered 13, to commemorate the founding 13 states of the Union; each of these toasts generally highlighted national themes and objects, like George Washington, the Army, the Navy, the States, the Union, or the Constitution, among others. Voluntary toasts, by contrast, were more likely to highlight smaller themes like the home state of the toast-giver, a particular revolutionary hero of subsidiary importance to Washington or Jefferson, for instance, especially foreign advisors like the Marquis de Lafayette, Casimir Pulaski, Tadeusz Kościuszko, and Richard Montgomery. These toasts might also laud or mourn contemporary revolts or uprisings for liberty, like those of Poland and Ireland.

If the primary purpose of the annual readings of the Declaration of Independence and the Farewell Address were a ritualized form of reinscribed memory, the toasts were primarily about encouraging sentimentality in their members. David Waldstreicher, a scholar of American nationalism in the early Republic, says the following about these annual festivals:

The stress on behavior and appearance at these festivals and their public nature point to efforts that went far beyond ensuring politically correct speech. If the rhetoric of these reports is to be taken at all seriously, it was national virtue itself that was being searched for in the faces and the general demeanor of participants... real virtue was not an abstract quality of moral character; it was experienced and seen as patriotic feeling. This quality of feeling was intimately bound up with every affective, natural tie among people.7

Two self-referencing toasts from the inaugural celebration of Washington’s Birthday in 1832 make sentimental feeling clear as one of the aims of the celebration. Whereas one member toasted “The Philodemic Society—actuated by the spirit of the day,” a professor in attendance raised his glass to “The members of the Philod. Soc.—may the double spirit of patriotism and Liberty, that breathed in the hearts of Cicero and Demosthenes, ever animate and emblazon the eloquence of our American youth.”8

This idealization of catharsis in pursuit of liberty was advocated by many of the orators who spoke at Philodemic festivals in the antebellum years. One 1840 oration for Washington’s Birthday, delivered by a member from Tennessee, contended that the value of the day’s festival lay in the “feelings... which animat[e] the bosom of the patriot” for “whilst he contemplates the character of GEORGE WASHINGTON, he feels and knows himself a freeman, enfranchised by the sword of that immortal man [emphasis original].”9 John O’Neill, an orator at the July 4th celebration the following year, waxed poetic about the emotions and sentimental value of liberty, a word which had a “magic” quality to it:

What indescribable emotions are awakened in the human breast at the bare mention of liberty! It is that angelic form, which robs the glittering diadem of its imaginary splendor; it is that magic word, which captivates the heart by the witchery of its accents, governs by the influence of its own irresistible allurements, disarms the cannon of its terrors, and sweetens death with the promise of immortality.10

But ironically, O’Neill went on to argue, “the only impediments to the preservations of our liberty” were “sectional prejudice and party
spirit.” Capturing the right kind of “spirit” was part of the Philodemic’s question to define and reach an ideal state of liberty. Party spirit, partisan loyalties—and sometimes, over-strong sectional loyalties—were dangerous to the health of the republic, as they risked inciting the popular masses away from thoughtful and informed decisions to the insinuating demagoguery of self-interested politicians.

In speeches that highlighted the danger of party spirit and demagoguery—the wrong kind of “feelings”—Philodemic orators most often highlighted education and the liberal arts as the pathway to a more considered, virtuous public patriotism and civic involvement. It was most often the Commencement speeches of the Society that appropriately took education as their theme, and connected it with an ideal of patriotism. Consistent with their society’s classical name that claimed a “love for the people,” Philodemicians were confident in the public’s innate political views and hopes, as long as they were not led astray by biased governmental institutions or instigating agitators. The 1840 commencement speaker, Daniel C. Digges, argued that

“The people, when left to the free exercise of an unbiased judgment, untrammeled by the ex cathedra opinions of governmental censors, and unawed by the sentiments of those above them, have never failed to cherish, to foster, and to guard, those high spirits who have left an enduring evidence to posterity of the benefits to be reaped and the happiness to be derived from a free, full, and proper cultivation of the Arts.”

To the danger of “the unhallowed altar of odious party spirit” that produced “miserable demagoguerism... party slang and party vituperation,” the Philodemic Society’s exertions were the answer. Digges told his audience that, “Your duties as men, citizens, Americans, as Philodemicians urge you onward to the grateful task” of cultivating knowledge and the arts.

If the passionate inflaming of the public by orators was an ever-present danger, so were pre-existing prejudices, which were, according to one 1842 orator, “more difficult to be resisted than the more violent but less persevering salies of passion.” The speaker, P. P. Morris, condemned all prejudices, whether “of the abolitionist—or the slaveholder—of the various sects of the religionists—of the American—of the European” because “to the prejudiced eye nothing wears a natural aspect.” The focus on both conceptions of unhealthy bias can be easily understood according to the character of the Philodemic Society. Given that a majority of its members in most years were Catholic, it feared both the long-existing prejudices against Catholic participation in public life and beliefs in the supposed incompatibility of Catholicism with American republicanism. Likewise, although the Philodemic had begun its existence in an era of relative toleration for Catholic-Americans in public life, the 1840s saw a rising tide of attacks on the faith, especially directed toward Catholic involvement in political life. Sometimes prejudice and passion could amount to one and the same thing. The 1837 commencement speaker, Charles Constantine Pise, a Jesuit priest who had been the first Roman Catholic chaplain to the U.S. Senate, warned that the “the most fierce, the most dangerous of all prejudice” was “religious prejudice.” It impelled men “to condemn, to persecute, to burn, to torture, in every barbarous variety of manner.... actuated by mere passion.”

Indeed, many of the orators at these patriotic events made it clear that an added benefit to the celebrations—if not their primary purpose—was in their disproving the slurs hurled against Catholic-Americans, and especially the Society of Jesus. The orator of the valedictory address at the 1844 commencement, William Pinkney Brooke, defended the Jesuits, declaring that artful and designing men have attempted to deceive our countrymen with the false idea that the Catholics—but, above all, the Jesuits—are the deadly opponents of the free institutions of their country. This assertion, I, in the name and upon the authority of every member of my class, whether Protestant or Catholic, and in the name and upon the
authority of every student of the college, pronounce to be false, and as maliciously false as it possibly could be... Let the manner in which, by their direction, our national festivities are celebrated, speak for them—a manner which challenges competition with the celebrations of any class of citizens in any portion of our widely extended country.17

The national festivities—however unconsciously—could always be construed as competing for a higher and dearer patriotism with other citizens. But Catholic-Americans did not have the benefit of being judged fairly, as they were so often ascribed with anti-American motivations, intentions, and actions. As a result, Philodemicians had to celebrate as energetically and forcefully as possible, to provide an open example of their commitment to the union of the states, the country’s free institutions, and its republican values. And Georgetown’s college celebrations were remarkably distinctive, if not entirely unique. At a number of Commencements throughout the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, U.S. Presidents attended as celebrated guests of the College, often on stage with the Archbishop of Baltimore, the highest-ranking Catholic prelate in the United States. Where else in the ante-bellum United States would the Protestant head of state and a Catholic archbishop stand together on stage to present diplomas, awards, and medals together, as they did in 1849, 1854, and other occasions?28

But religious prejudices and the passions of sectarian bigotry were not the only expressions of feeling that threatened the republican makeup of the Union in the ante-bellum period. Discussions of, worries about, and advocacy of union—beyond mere patriotic celebration—were central to Philodemic festivals from the very beginning. Two regular toasts from the 1832 celebration of Washington’s Birthday read,

11th. The Union: the Palladium of our political safety & prosperity: we would watch its preservation with jealous anxiety; and discountenance whatever may suggest ever a suspicion that it can in any event be ever [sic] abandoned.

13th. Union – Union – Union. Union of charity in heaven – Union of affection in Matrimony – Union of patriotism in the Republic – a triple bond by which the three great governments, Celestial, Domestic and Political are preserved.19

Just so, a toaster at an 1836 celebration of Washington’s Birthday raised his glass to “The Union of the States:—Next to Liberty, the gravest blessing that Americans possess. May he be deemed a traitor to his country who advises a separation.”20

The omnipresent threat was disunion, and the most feared policy that could bring on disunion was abolition. Abolition and related measures were debated and phrased differently in the pre-war years, as captured by the debates on union and secession, political parties, and slavery. With the crystallization of slavery as an increasingly partisan issue after 1840, Washington’s traditional warnings against political parties took on a new meaning. The benefits of “party spirit” or “political parties” were debated just once before 1847, but were then the topic of eleven more debates in the following eleven years. In their speeches and toasts, Philodemic members and guests frequently practiced the rhetorical device of praeteritio, calling attention to the dangers of disunion by seeming to disregard it. In 1859, as sectional tensions reached their height on the eve of the Civil War, a February 22nd speaker asked,

Is there, then, a man in any State, so lost to the glorious remembrance of the past and the bright anticipations of the future, as to harbor in his breast a thought hostile to his country? Is there a demagogue in the land who would wish to see this proud Union broken into fragments and crumbled into dust? ... No! There exists no fanatic, no demagogue, who would wish to have his name blasted through all time.21

Such rhetoric was not just expressed on the eve of the war. A prefatory address to the reading...
of the Farewell Address in 1840 “blush[ed] to say that there are some who, from motives of local interest or selfish ambition, would dare to suggest the advantage of the dismemberment of our Union. Palsied be the tongue that would whisper the possibility of such a measure…” But it was not clear that wishing away the problem of disunion worked very well for Philodemicians, no matter how strongly they condemned it. An 1843 toast by a Philodemic member, Richard H. Clarke, cried, “Disunion: The only devil whose spell can cause our fleet to flee, make our shipmates give up the ship; pluck out our armies (eyes,) then have our soldiers sold…” while a year later he toasted. “Abolition: A thing which would do in deed, what those most concerned in it have often done in word—convert THIS Union into dis-Union. May it be forever banished from our legislation and our language and our land [emphasis original].”

Instead of being an issue of liberty to Philodemicians, they saw abolition as a threat to liberty. Abolition was never the primary topic of addresses, but often was mentioned as a brief coda to a speech on republicanism, union, or liberty. An 1839 Independence Day speaker called abolition the “one question” which could “change the whole nature of things, and sever the bond by which the several members of our confederacy are united.” Defending state sovereignty, he invoked abolition as a political cause that literally carried the appearance of conflict and war into the national polity, exclaiming,

Look to the North and East. Tell me! What mean those societies and associations? What mean those incendiary pamphlets, carrying death and destruction into the bosoms of the young and unsuspicious? What mean those exciting addresses directed to the passions and prejudices, rather than to the judgement and understanding of men? What mean those numerous petitions which have flooded our National Legislature, praying them to do that which the Constitution does not grant, and which sound policy forbids?

But in decrying the threat of civil war, this Philodemic member from Georgia seemed to make it become all the more real, even as he claimed that “I would not, gentlemen, on a festive day like this, point you to the battle-field, red with the blood of our citizens, not to contending armies… [nor] speak to you of the horrors of a civil war, in which the children of the same family must appear as antagonists.”

Although few Philodemic speeches defended slavery and most preferred to castigate abolition and its adherents, the years 1830 – 1860 saw the specific merits of slavery debated by the society eighteen times. These debates centered on various slavery-related questions, including whether slavery was just, evil, consistent with republican institutions, should be extended into new territories, and whether abolition would be beneficial or detrimental to the country. Despite its mixed but strongly Southern membership, the Society was often divided on these, rendering thirteen pro-slavery decisions and five decisions favoring abolition or opposing slavery. The ambivalence of the Society towards the institution of slavery can be captured in the fact that in March 1844, it negated the debate “Is the institution of slavery just?” by a vote of 2-10, only to affirm, the following January, the question “Is slavery consistent with republican institutions?” by a vote of 13-1.

Sometimes the Philodemic’s prohibition of partisan topics kicked in when slavery was brought up in the Society; at other times, it did not. When a Philodemic speech for Washington’s Birthday in 1837 contained remarks on the subject of abolition, minutes recorded that the Society felt itself “compelled in obedience to its laws to withhold the remarks… from publication,” though it insisted on recording that the opinions expressed were “in accordance with those of many of the Society, particularly on the odious and fanatical doctrine of abolition,” and the orator was asked to deposit a copy of his speech in the Society’s library. An April 21, 1850 debate on whether “the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia [would] be consistent with policy”
was temporarily halted “for some time” as the members discussed whether or not it was constitutional, before deciding that it was. A meeting on March 30 of the following year deemed the topic “Would the repeal of the fugitive slave law justify disunion in the South?” prohibited. However, the Society chose to replace it with another racially minded topic: “Whether the Indian or African has received more injuries from the hand of man?”

Other meeting minutes require a more subtle eye: a January 18, 1845 topic, “Are all men free and equal?” was changed to strike out the word “free” in what was possibly an attempt to avoid discussing slavery, but the next week, the debate was dispensed with, with one member “not thinking… tonight’s debate a very argumentative one” successfully moved that it be replaced by “Which is preferable, civic or military fame?”

Understanding the Philodemic’s feelings towards slavery—its attempts to decry abolition as fanatic, partisan, unconstitutional, and threatening to union—requires looking to its founder, Fr. James Ryder, S.J., (1800 – 1860). An Irish-born immigrant to the U.S. who attended Georgetown College and entered the Society of Jesus, he served two stints as President of the College, from 1840 – 1845 and 1848 – 1851. Remarkably, in an 1835 speech to a local Catholic “committee of vigilance” that followed a series of anti-abolition resolutions, Ryder gave a stridently Catholic defense of slavery, or rather, an argument for Catholic opposition to abolition:

I am happy, opposed as I should otherwise be to take any part in political discussions, in having the opportunity of assuring my fellow citizens of the South that the Catholic body, both clergy and laity, North of the Potomac, will go heart and hand with them in defence of the Constitution, for the maintenance of social order, and in resistance to the unholy efforts of incendiary fanatics to mar the peace and happiness of this distinguished portion of our common country. The fidelity of Catholics to the laws of the land cannot be misunderstood. For centuries, they have bled under the lash of imperial tyrants, without one expression of resistance to constituted authorities; for centuries their creed has been outlawed and persecuted, and its professors subjected to every species of oppression and injustice by the British government; and yet, the fidelity of Catholics has been proof against every temptation to ameliorate their condition by revolt against their oppressors.

Repeatedly throughout the address, Ryder linked the patriotism and fidelity of American Catholics (in North and South), with resistance to constitutional changes, and the aspirations of “philanthropic” but “fanatical” abolitionists. For Ryder, first and foremost, the debate over slavery was a ready-made opportunity for American Catholics to demonstrate their civic and national bona fides, the inherent positive value of his co-religionists to the Republic. The refrain of “Liberty” recurred throughout the speech. However, it referred only to the liberty of slaveholders or of national institutions.

Catholic ambivalence towards slavery was not a phenomenon unique to the Philodemic. William Gaston, Georgetown’s first student and an honorary member of the Society, represented the divide within pre-war Southern Catholics well. A representative from North Carolina who would later serve on the state Supreme Court, he owned as many as forty slaves, yet simultaneously advocated for abolition and authored two judicial decisions supporting the rights of slaves and free blacks in his state. In what is perhaps a more direct and pertinent example, the 1838 sale of 272 slaves owned by the Maryland Province of Jesuits to help raise funds for the college reflected a wide variety of concerns among Georgetown Jesuits, including financial pressures, some support for abolition, and moral concerns for the slaves, among others.

Philodemic orators were happy to use the vocabulary of slavery, but not to talk about the institution itself. An 1843 address commemorating Washington’s Birthday foretold that the influences which Washington sprung on the
nation would progress “till every shackle, every fragment, every lingering vestige of slavery shall have been drawn in and buried.”31 A speaker at the college Commencement later that year called the lack of religious freedom a “moral slavery,” while an 1847 commencement orator, Thomas Semmes, who urged unrestricted suffrage (for white males), justified his argument by saying, “Unless a man possesses this right he is not a citizen, but a slave; for without this he does not participate in self-government, and slavery is but the negation of self-government.”32 A citizen without suffrage, Semmes claimed, was “like the slave” in that “he feels no interest in the social and political circumstances that encompass him, because he cannot influence their operation…”33

As much as some Philodemicians were able to conceive of slavery as the opposite of liberty, the expression of tyranny or despotism, it still remained for many an inherent part of the American constitutional system, and, for that reason, could not be opposed.

Nevertheless, Philodemicians did not just conceive of liberty in constitutional terms, or, as mentioned before, in terms of sentimental catharsis or legal inheritance. For many speakers, Liberty represented a Godlike form—and indeed, the Philodemic’s badge, intended to capture the motto of “Eloquence in the Defense of Liberty,” depicted the Roman Goddess Liberty clasping hands with Mercury, God of Eloquence.34 In this light, the forensic exercises of the Philodemic on events like Independence Day or Washington’s Birthday became quasi-religious rituals, in which civic commemoration took on a sacred character. Various speeches took up this rhetorical theme, mixing classical, pagan, Christian, and patriotic motifs in an attempt to deify liberty. One particularly extreme example of this was a Independence Day address by a Philodemic member, Hugh Caperton Jr., who credited the founding fathers for “consecrat[ing] this day the political Sabbath of a free people,” and spoke of Philodemicians as gathered “around the shrine of liberty.”35 The founding fathers were “the illustrious Patriarchs of Independence,” and collectively “the living oracle,” while Thomas Jefferson was “the Apostle of democracy.”36 Caperton spoke of the Philodemic in an amalgamation of Catholic, classical, and republican symbols:

As then Athenians of old celebrating the Panathenaean festivals, bearing the sacrifices to offer up in honor of the Patroness of their city, so do we annually assemble on this Birth Day of our Freedom, all breathing but one great American spirit, to make a joint offering on country’s altars of our gratitude and veneration to the Goddess of Liberty, through the intercession and patronage of our sainted ancestors.37

One way to analyze this rhetoric is as the Philodemic’s attempt to elevate liberty to higher and higher heights, another attempt by students to integrate the curricular focus of their courses on classical texts with their contemporary republican patriotism and Catholic identity. Washington—his name almost always entirely capitalized in printed Philodemic orations—was also commonly deified in Philodemic rhetoric, and the other Founding Fathers raised to the level of prophetic soothsayers, if not Gods themselves. The irony of Catholic-Americans imbibing the patriotic frenzy of the early republic to such a degree that they participated in the deification of its largely Protestant founders would not have been lost on the contemporary observer.

With this said, Philodemicians did everything they could to elevate the status and historical memory of Catholic participants in the Revolutionary War. Many events featured toasts and speeches celebrating foreign advisors from Catholic countries, such as Pulaski, Kosciusko, Montgomery, Lafayette, as well as the only Catholic signer of the Declaration of Independence, Charles Carroll of Carrollton. The focus on foreign revolutionary heroes from Catholic countries—and a concomitant focus on those nations’ plight for republican liberty—helped give the Philodemicians’ ideology of liberty a universal, international quality that transcended borders and allowed them to answer, at least implicitly,
Protestant claims that Catholicism was inimical to liberty. An Independence Day speech from 1839 exhorted the Society to “not forget the praiseworthy actions of foreign patriots who made common cause with us, in defence of their principles, which have a co-existence in every portion of the earth.” Three toasts from the February 22nd celebration of 1836 showcase this attempt to bring in foreign influences into the dialogue of liberty:

By Nicolas Stonestreet, Jr. Md. Treasurer.
Brave but unfortunate Poland:—Should she again endeavor to throw off the yoke of tyranny, and to make ‘That Home of the Brave’ once more ‘the Land of the Free,’ may the Sons of Columbia, ever mindful of a Kosciusko and a Pulaski, tender to her all the assurance their wisdom can dictate, or their generosity suggest.

By Francis Kernan, N. Y. Gallant but oppressed Poland:—May the patriotism of a Kosciusko nerve her sons to the conflict... the virtues and genius of a Washington guide them to freedom.


In the same manner, Daniel O’Connell, the contemporary Irish politician who fought for his island’s rights under the British monarchy, received a good deal of focus in Philodemic debates, toasts, and speeches in the 1830s and 1840s, with one 1843 member toasting him as “The Demosthenes of Ireland; whose eloquence, like a two edged sword, is about to sever the galling chain of tyranny which England has cast around his own green isle.”

For the Philodemicians of the antebellum period, awash in annual patriotic festivals and weekly debates, liberty was the omnipresent but highly flexible centerpiece of their rhetoric. In their speeches, members of the debating society sketched out diverse concepts of liberty—as deified goddess, as constitutional status quo, as sentimental catharsis, as moral inheritance, and as universal principle. In each case, the conceptions of liberty helped the predominantly Catholic debating society move towards an energetically patriotic position that sought to prove itself as a valuable part of the system of American republicanism.

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FROM THE DIRECTOR

Humanizing Political Theory


THE FORUM

Crises in Venezuela: The Road to the Roosevelt Corollary and the Residue of American Statecraft


3 “Monroe Doctrine,” Encyclopædia Britannica.


Ibid.


Mitchell, *The Danger of Dreams*, 64.


**Rashid Rida and the Evolution of His Thought**


2 Ibid., 226.

3 Ibid., 235.


Islamic Thought in a Radical Age (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Emad E. Shahin, Through Muslim Eyes: M. Rashid Rida and the West, (VA: The International Institute for Islamic Thought, 1993).

6 In Arabic, the word ‘umara literally means princes. However, in a political theory context the word is oftentimes used to refer to government officials, bureaucrats and more generally members of government.

7 The ‘ulama are Muslim religious scholars who study the Qur’an and the Hadith (the sayings and traditions of the Prophet). They are not comparable to Christian priests because they oftentimes are also legal scholars who study how to interpret religious texts to derive laws; they can also be philosophers, mathematicians, lawyers and government officials.

8 A madhhab (pl. madhahib) is an Islamic school of legal tradition. In the Sunni world there are four prominent ones, each named after its founder: the Hanafi school, the Maliki school, the Sha’afi school and the Hanbali school. While the schools agree on the foundational aspects of Islam (ex: the Qur’an is the word of God and laws should be derived from it), they disagree on the methods that can be used to derive laws from the divine scriptures. Most notably, they differ on the role that human independent reasoning should play in the legal derivation process.

9 Al-Manar I (1898), 606-10 as cited in ibid., 254.


11 Al-Manar X (1907-08), 234, as cited in Hourani, 236.


13 Al-Manar IV (1901), 209-210, as cited in Kerr, 190.

14 Ibid.

15 Rashid Rida, Muhawarat (1906) as cited in Petersen, 100.

16 Rida, Muhawarat, 101.

17 Petersen, 97.

18 There is very little information regarding what Rida wrote in al-Manar about the topic of renewal and reform of Islam during and after the First World War. I have been unable to find references to al-Manar that are pertinent to this theme from those years and while that may be because Rida was more focused on political developments and machinations during that time, considering the length of every al-Manar issue it is unlikely that he wrote nothing on this subject for over 15 years.

19 Al-Manar VII (1904), 52 as cited in Adams, 185.


21 Al-Manar XXVI (1925-26), 100 as cited in Hourani, 241.
“Renewal, Renewing and Renewers,” OISO.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Adams, Islam and Modernism, 183.


Badawi, Reformers, 117.

Zaman, Modern Islamic Thought, 9 and Badawi, Reformers, 117.

Badawi, Reformers, 116.

Al-Manar II (1899), 69 and al-Manar III (1900), 31, as cited in Shahin, 45.

Al-Manar VIII (1905), 759 as cited in Shahin, 41.

Al-Manar X (1907), 282 as cited in Haddad in Yasushi, 61.

Ibid.


Al-Manar VIII (1905), 759 as cited in Shahin, 41.

Al-Manar IX (1906), 231-3 as cited in Haddad, 255.

Al-Manar 15 (1912), 334-5 as cited in Zaman, 10.

Al-Manar XVI (1913), 666 as cited in Shahin, 75.

Al-Manar XXII (1922), 142 as cited in Shahin, 85.

Al-Manar III (1900), 78 as cited in Haddad, Rereading Rashid Rida, 259.

Al-Manar III (1900), 123-3 as cited in ibid., 260.

Al-Manar XXI (1908), 539-44, as cited in ibid., 261.

Al-Manar XXII (1909), 304-314, as cited in ibid.

Ibid.


Al-Manar XIV (1911), 834 as cited in Haddad, Rereading Rashid Rida, 261.

Al-Manar XVI (1913), 110-1 as cited in ibid., 262.

Ibid.

Al-Manar XVII (1914), 615-7 as cited in ibid., 261.
THE ARCHIVE

American Perception of China and the Anglo-Chinese Opium War

1 John R. Haddad, China of the American Imagination: The Influence of Trade of US Portrayals of China, 1820 to 1850 (Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 56.
2 Ibid., 58.
3 Ibid., 59.
7 Timkowski, George, Travels of the Russian mission through Mongolia to China, Southern Review, Vol. 4, Art. 7., 1827, 201.
8 Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant, 83-84.
11 Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant, 94-95.
13 Todd, American Perceptions of China, 18.
14 Ibid., 19.
15 Ibid., 32.
17 Todd, American Perceptions of China, 21-22.
18 Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant, 95.
19 Ibid., 96.
21 Nile’s National Register, Vol. 61, Oct. 30, 1841, 130.
22 Miller, The Unwelcome Immigrant, 104-105.
23 Boston Evening Transcript, Jun. 19, 1840.
26 Todd, American Perceptions of China, 52.
27 Haddad, China of the American Imagination, 81-82.
IRA: The Irish Resistance in America


3 Ibid., 18.


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.


9 Ibid., 3.


11 Ibid., 3.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 3-4.

14 Kennedy-Pipe, *Origins*, 47.


18 Ibid., 59.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., 146.

24 Ibid.


27 Ibid., 149.
THE SANCTUARY

The Ethics of Neurolaw


5 Bartol and Bartol, *Psychology and Law*, 467.

6 Ibid., 115.
7 Ibid.
8 “Blame,” September 12, 2013, in Radiolab, podcast, MP3 audio.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 4.
14 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 10.
17 Ibid., 8.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 11.
20 Nestor, “In defense of free will,” 6.
21 Greene and Cohen, “For the law, neuroscience changes nothing and everything,” 1775.
22 Ibid., 1784.
23 Ibid., 1777.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 1784.
28 Ibid., 273.

Transgender Identity, Language, and the Christian God

1 Gen. 1:27 (King James Version).
2 Dorothee Sölle, Thinking about God: An Introduction to Theology (SCM Press, 1990), 24.
3 Ibid, 26.

Sölle, Thinking about God, 24.

Ibid., 26.

Ibid., 34.


Deut. 22:5 (KJV).

Deut. 23:1 (KJV).

Rom. 1:24-25, and 32 (KJV).


Ibid.

Gal. 3:28 (KJV).


Ibid.

Gen. 1:27 (KJV).

Mary Daly, Beyond God the Father: Towards a Philosophy of Women’s Liberation (Boston: Beacon, 1973), xvii-xviiiiv.

Catholic Church, “Male and Female He Created Them,” in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2nd ed (Vatican: Libreria Editrice Vaticana 2012), 84.


Ibid, 56.

Ibid.

Plato and Nietzsche on Hope

3. Ibid.
5. Some of Nietzsche’s earliest work concerned Greek tragedy, and the idea of wisdom coming through suffering is apparent from the Chorus in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon: “Zeus, who guided men to think, / who has laid it down that wisdom / comes alone through suffering. / Still there drips in sleep against the heart / grief of memory; against / our will temperance comes,” in Aeschylus, Agamemnon, in Aeschylus II, trans. Richard Lattimore and David Grene (The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 176-81. His predilection for ancient tragedy may be because his philosophy was trying to not just erase God but also overcome nihilism, an overcoming that he perhaps saw taking place in Greek tragedy.
7. Ibid., 58.
9. Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 44.
10. Ibid., 96.
12. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 203.
13. Ibid., 201–2.
15. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 579d.
20. Ibid., 537e–538b.
21. Ibid., 335d.
THE PARLOR

Mortal Permanence: A Study of Self-Sacrifice in Three Nineteenth-Century British Novels

2 Ibid., 493.
3 Ibid., 520.
5 Ibid., 394.
6 Ibid., 395.
7 Ibid., 396.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid., 317.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid. 317.
14 Ibid., 318.
15 Ibid.
Hearing the Human Struggle in Tarkovsky’s *Solaris*
2 It is important to note that Bach was Tarkovsky’s favorite composer, and the director included many of his pieces in his films.
3 Eduard Artemyev interview, Criterion Collection.
4 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 57.
8 Ibid.

A Window of Opportunity: Alignment between Mrs. Ramsay and Lily Briscoe in Woolf’s *To the Lighthouse*
2 Ibid., 4.
3 Ibid., 7.
4 Ibid., 84-85.
5 Ibid., 84.
6 Ibid., 85.
7 Ibid., 86.
8 Ibid., 87.
9 Ibid., 85.
10 Ibid., 86.
11 Ibid., 85.
12 Ibid., 84.

Tess Trumps Alec: An Analysis of the Murder of Alec d’Urberville in Hardy’s *Tess of the d’Urbervilles*
2 Ibid., 383.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 328.
5 Ibid., 382.
6 Ibid., 383.
7 Ibid., 382.
8 Ibid.
THE CLOCK TOWER

“During the base-ball season confessors have far fewer mortal sins”: Georgetown’s Catholicism Through America’s National Pastime


2 Ibid., 287.

3 Ibid.


5 Ibid., 116.

6 Curran, From Academy to University, 288, 287.

7 Ibid., 127.

8 “Athletic Notes,” Georgetown College Journal, December 2, 1890, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/104435/GUJournal_Vol19_No03.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

9 Curran, The Quest for Excellence, 118.


11 Ibid., 89.

12 Curran, The Quest for Excellence, 127.

13 Ibid., 128.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid., 135.

16 Ibid., 128-129.

17 Ibid., 129-130.

18 Ibid., 130.

19 Ibid.
While it would be irresponsible to make terribly strong claims here, the fact that both of these pursuits—those of bolstering athletics and patriotism—were so important to Fr. Donlon does seem to hint at a relationship between the two endeavors.

History of the Philodemic Society, Pt. II

1 Luke C. Dillon, Georgetown University baseball team in front of horse-drawn streetcar, 1895, photograph, Georgetown University Library, https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/554808.
2 Benjamin Rush Floyd, Annual Address of the Philodemic Society of Georgetown College, Delivered at the Annual Commencement, Held on Tuesday, July 26, 1836 by Benjamin Rush Floyd, A.M. of Wythe County, Va.” (Metropolitan Office, 1836).
4 “Amanuensis Book, September 18, 1831 – February 10, 1832” Philodemic Society Archives, Box 1, Folder 1, Georgetown University Archives, entry for January 18, 1832.
5 The Philodemic’s devotion to the memory of George Washington—and that of other literary institutions in the surrounding region—is documented in Daniel F. Rendleman, “From Revolution to Rebellion: George Washington as Seen by the Collegiate Literary Societies of the Greater Chesapeake, 1813-1868” (Georgetown University, 2009).
7 Howard and Gallogly, Society Ties, 41.
7 Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes*, 73.
8 “Anniversary Celebration of the Philodemic Society” February 22, 1832, Philodemic Society Archives, Box 1, Folder 14, Georgetown University Archives.
11 Ibid., 12.
13 Ibid., 9-10.
15 Ibid.
18 Commencement Files, Box 1, Folder 38; Box 1, Folder 43, Georgetown University Archives.
19 “Anniversary Celebration of the Philodemic Society” February 22, 1832, Georgetown University Archives.
20 *The Metropolitan*, February 26, 1832, Vol. II, No. 24 edition, Philodemic Society Archives, Box 1, Folder 19, Georgetown University Archives.
Oliver A. Luckett, *Oration Delivered before the Philodemic Society of Georgetown College (On the 4th of July, 1839.)* by Oliver A. Luckett, of Georgia. [Published at the Request of Many of the Students.] (Georgetown: John L. Smith, 1839), 14-15.

“Amanuensis Book, October 2, 1830 – July 25, 1837” Philodemic Society Archives, Box 1, Folder 4, Georgetown University Archives, entries for February 23, and February 27, 1837.

“Amanuensis Book, October 7, 1849 – April 22, 1852” Philodemic Society Archives, Box 5, Folder 3, Georgetown University Archives, entries for April 21, 1850, and March 30, 1851.

“Amanuensis Book, October 22, 1843 – June 23, 1845” Philodemic Society Archives, Box 2, Folder 7, Georgetown University Archives, entries for January 18 and January 26, 1845.


George Columbus Morgan, *Oration Delivered before the Philodemic Society of Georgetown College, District of Columbia, February 22, 1843, by Geo. Columbus Morgan, of Maryland. To Which Are Prefixed the Remarks of William D. Wynn, of Georgia, Previous to His Reading the Farewell Address of Washington.* (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1843), 27.

J. M. S. Causin, *Oration Delivered before the Philodemic Society of Georgetown College, District of Columbia, at the Annual Commencement, July 25, 1843, by J. M. S. Causin, Esq., of St. Mary’s County, Maryland, A Member of the Society* (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1843), 12.


“Amanuensis Book, October 2, 1830 – July 25, 1837” Philodemic Society Archives, Box 4, Georgetown University Archives, see entry for January 17, 1831 for the original design. Today’s Philodemic still uses a version of modified version of this design as its badge, with Mercury and Liberty’s respective symbols—the liberty pole and caduceus—to represent them.

36 Ibid., 4-5.
37 Ibid., 8.
40 Kirkpatrick, *Address*, 16.