MILITARIZED POLITICS
AND
INDISCRIMINATE COUNTERINSURGENCY

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Stephan Pikner, MPA

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Militarized Politics
and
Indiscriminate Counterinsurgency

Stephan Pikner, MPA

Dissertation Advisor: Desha Girod, PhD

ABSTRACT

Why do some states fighting a civil war use force indiscriminately? Despite the risks to regime legitimacy and questionable practical effectiveness, indiscriminate violence in civil war remains a common phenomenon. While such abuses have typically been attributed to authoritarian rule, regimes with electoral systems and broad selectorates also use indiscriminate counterinsurgency. I argue that a critical—and underexplored—mechanism behind indiscriminate counterinsurgency is the political role of the military within a broader electoral regime. If politically reliant on or unable to rein in their armed forces, a regime’s civilian leadership may defer to the military’s predisposition for using overwhelming firepower, limited ability to differentiate insurgents from the general population, and preferred goal of unconditional victory. In these cases, attempts to moderate the military’s strategy may result in the armed forces undermining the civilian leadership, threatening its political survival. Drawing on a novel extension of a recent coding of indirect military rule, I use a series of Bayesian multi-level models to test whether the interaction between militarized politics and the regime’s breadth of support drives the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in the post Cold-War world. I then explore the Indonesian military’s use of indiscriminate violence against civilians in Aceh in the years following the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime. Over the course of the four presidents that followed Suharto
there was significant variation in the both political clout of the military and the breadth of support for the government, as well as in my dependent variable of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. By focusing within this single case, an intrastate conflict where the broader dynamics often linked with regime violence largely remained constant, I am able to better isolate the effect of militarized politics and selectorate size on indiscriminate counterinsurgency. Tracing how these shifts in Jakarta, particularly the political relevance and independence of the military, shaped events on the ground in Aceh provides strong qualitative evidence that complements my statistical model and supports my theorized role of militarized politics as an important causal factor in explaining the phenomenon of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

INDEX WORDS: mass killing, indiscriminate victimization, civil war, military politics, dissertations
For Tina
Embarking on a PhD in your mid-30s is an interesting undertaking, and one which I would have been unable to attempt if not for the support, encouragement, and mentorship from a tremendous community of family, friends, faculty, and fellow military officers. First I would like to thank those that made my acceptance into the US Army’s Advanced Strategy and Policy Program (ASP3) a reality: Lieutenant General Frederick Rudesheim, Mr. Dan Klippstein, Colonels Susan Bryant, Francis Park, Jeff Hannon, Brian Lamson, Mike Shekleton, Shon McCormick, and Joe Kemmer, as well as Drs. Jeff Kubiak and Robert Davis at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Studying at Georgetown has been at once the most intellectually humbling and exhilarating experience of my life. For this, I thank the faculty at the Department of Government, who took the time to challenge, inspire, and guide me throughout my studies there. In particular, I thank my committee: Professor Desha Girod, Professor Laia Balcels, and Dean Daniel Byman. Without their deep knowledge, incisive criticism, and boundless energy this project would not have come to fruition.

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Hopefully I have contributed to it as well. To mix military and academic metaphors, I’ll see you on the intellectual high ground.

Despite sometimes seeming like a ‘fire-and-forget’ system I would not be in the position to even attempt any of this without my father’s nurturing of my youthful curiosity and mother’s constant love. My wife, Tina, has been my touchstone throughout this journey, loving me despite my late-acquired grad school habits. She is (deservedly) looking forward to a home where books are read one at a time rather than scattered in disheveled piles. Finally, to our children Joshua and Isabella, who now wonder whether homework ever ends after seeing me slog through quant problem sets. This subject matter, while critically important, is not easy to explain to a child. During coursework, I spent a sunny Saturday reading Dara Cohen’s excellent work on sexual violence in intrastate conflicts. My daughter, then 9 years old and blessedly ignorant of the book’s topic, wrote a little poem urging me to go outside and play with her: “Ati is such a bore//all he does is read Rape During Civil War.” I was at once horrified at what Isa wrote and profoundly thankful that she was ignorant of that word’s meaning. We study these things so that we understand them, and by understanding them, end them.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Motivating Puzzle

Why do some regimes embroiled in civil wars deliberately and indiscriminately use lethal violence against civilians? Despite the unfortunate commonality of this approach, there is a range of reasons for regimes to not use such methods. In addition to violating the normative and legal constraints that preclude its use, indiscriminate violence often backfires. Large-scale repression can solidify support for the more radical opponents of the regime as dissidents are driven from peaceful opposition towards outright rebellion (Goodwin 2001; Wood 2003; Polk 2007; Cederman, Hug, Schubiger, and Villamil 2017). It can “remove the mask of benevolence from a dictatorial regime,” undermining its legitimacy (Francisco 2005: 62). Indiscriminate violence also invalidates the promise of protection extended to regime collaborators, eliminating a valuable source of intelligence for the government (Kalyvas 2006). While taking up arms against the state is typically a risky proposition, raising a collective action problem among a community of potential rebels, indiscriminate violence reduces the benefits of free riding as both combatants and noncombatants now face similar dangers (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007). Repression can drive defections in the army that is ordered to carry it out (Martinez and Eng 2018). Correlations between widespread violence against civilians in civil war and regime victory are often endogenous, since a side that is already winning militarily may seek revenge through ethnic
cleansing or politicide (Downes and Cochran 2010). Domestic abuses can also trigger foreign intervention aimed at ending the violence, interventions that impinge deeply on the sovereignty of the offending state and threaten the survival of the regime (Glanville 2014). In trying to leverage the ineffectiveness of indiscriminate regime violence against civilians, insurgent groups often seek to provoke government forces into conducting reprisals in the hope that this repressive response will backfire and turn greater numbers against the state¹ (Kalyvas 2004). Even in autocratic regimes, where the state’s use of mass repression is often assumed to be axiomatic, strategies of general coercion are often superseded by more nuanced approaches that can blend economic modernization, mass surveillance, and the co-option of rebel ideology² to win popular support without fundamentally reforming the authoritarian regime itself (Ucko 2016). When unable to identify specific opponents, authoritarian regimes often attempt to justify random physical violence with a veneer of forced confessions and fabricated evidence that provide post-hoc justification for their actions (Kalyvas 2004). In the cases where a strategy of indiscriminate violence against civilians has succeeded, it was pursued on a massive and comprehensive scale.³ Given the massive

¹There are a handful of cases where the costs of reprisals have curtailed insurgent activity, such as with Norwegian partisans during the Second World War (Kalyvas 2004).

²For example the adoption of strict Islamic rules by the Moscow-backed Kadyrov regime in Chechnya (Ucko 2016).

³As Valentino points out, the “methodological problem that confounds research on the effectiveness of violence against civilians is the difficulty in identifying the appropriate set of alternative strategies against which to compare violence against civilians. After all, civilian victimization can be said to succeed or fail only in comparison to some other strategy that its perpetrators might have chosen...these questions are further complicated by the likelihood that certain political or ideological goals—e.g., ethnic cleansing—might virtually require violence against civilians, rendering the question of the ‘effectiveness’ of alternative strategies almost meaningless. Ultimately, these methodological problems mean that progress on the question of whether violence against civilians ‘works’ is likely to require detailed case studies and careful process tracing to tease out the mechanisms of success or failure when different strategies are utilized” (2014: 100). Exploring these mechanisms is the motivation behind my multi-method research design, detailed in Section 1.4.
concentration of effort and strict ideological coherence needed for such an approach to succeed, it is unclear whether success in these cases is not preordained.

Yet indiscriminate regime violence against civilians during civil wars endures. In the past several years, regime forces in Syria, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Myanmar, and Nigeria have all deliberately killed large numbers of civilians who had no specific links to rebel combatants. In the 1990s, government forces in Russia, Serbia, and Indonesia have done so as well. While this is by no means an exhaustive list, it does capture important variation. Some regimes listed above are firmly autocratic, while others are established electoral democracies. While many of the rebel groups have separatist aims, not all do. The states involved, while weakened by civil war, still have functioning governments and organized security forces. Neither are they all international pariahs, though some regimes (such as in Syria and Myanmar) are shunned by western democracies and others (Serbia and Libya) faced international military action designed to stop the regime’s abuses. Finally, while some regimes pursue (or avoid) indiscriminate counterinsurgency throughout the entire length of the conflict, others deliberately change strategies. This variation raises a puzzling question: why do regimes avoid, adopt, or abandon a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency?

1.2 The Argument in Brief

The leadership of any regime must continually balance legitimacy, coercion, and reward to maintain political power. While they draw legitimacy from varying blends of charisma, tradition, and rational-legal efficiency, a degree of consent-based authority is always present to some degree (Weber 1947). Similarly, the state’s coercive capacity can exist largely as an implicit background condition to deter any actors that challenge the state’s monopoly of violence, or more openly as a tool of active repression
that routinely violates the physical integrity rights of its citizens. Rewards provided by the regime can take the form of private goods doled out to specific power brokers in order to co-opt them, or as public goods that benefit all members of a society and increase the regime’s functional legitimacy (Bellin 2012; Carnegie 2015).

Striking this balance becomes more complex during a civil war. Instead of being able to focus solely on maintaining the loyalty of a critical subset of elites through the provision of private goods, political elites must now consider three unique sets of actors and the viability of using a broader range of sticks and carrots. In general, threats to political survival can come from within the selectorate, from disenfranchised domestic residents, or from foreign actors. First, in systems with a small elite that holds exclusive political power, the use of violent repression to counter dissent is a commonplace method of ensuring political survival. In systems with larger and more diverse selectorates, a category which includes some autocracies as well as all democracies, rival political groups within the regime may move against a leader that opposes their preferred policy (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003). Second, armed rebellion gives a political voice to marginalized groups that are outside of the selectorate, particularly in regimes that otherwise limit political representation. If the insurgency is powerful enough to threaten the immediate physical survival of the regime, the leadership may resort to indiscriminate methods in a desperate attempt to preserve itself. Conversely, if the rebels are not as powerful, using indiscriminate counterinsurgency increases the longer run risk of the delegitimization of the regime, the material cost of repression, and the possible mobilization of more widespread dissent (Goodwin 2001; Wood 2003; Francisco 2005; Kalyvas 2006; Polk 2007; Cederman et al. 2017). The third and final factor that shapes a regime’s decision regarding indiscriminate counterinsurgency is the role of foreign actors on domestic decision makers. External powers may use sanctions, coercive diplomacy, or military
intervention to punish a regime that uses such indiscriminate methods, impinging on the sovereignty of the state and the political survival of the regime’s leadership (Finnemore 2003; Glanville 2014; Stanton 2016; Escribá-Folch and Wright 2015).

The political leadership’s incentives for using force is only one half of the equation, though. Ultimately, the military must carry out—or ignore—those policy decisions. While in many regimes the lines between political principal and military agent are clearly demarcated, this is by no means universal. Militaries often have institutional biases and motivations that are distinct from the political leadership’s. The armed forces typically consider themselves experts in the application of physical force, and can be loathe to accept restrictions or directives from civilian leaders narrowly focused on their own, political survival that are perceived to be in contradiction with the military’s self-identified role as ultimate defenders of the state. Despite this assumption, the military is often ill-equipped to solve the identification problem that is often at the heart of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, as their intelligence structures are typically geared towards conventional warfare and their doctrine often uses overwhelming firepower. Additionally, through professional selection and socialization, the military is often biased against compromising with adversaries, liable to groupthink, and predisposed to use force (Huntington 1957; Finer 1962; Weeks 2014). Solving the ‘information problem’ of discerning who is directly supporting the insurgent combatants becomes more difficult when non-local counterinsurgent forces whose organizations are structured for the large-scale use of force and whose organizational incentives reward decisiveness—essentially, most armies—dominate security policymaking.4

In short, I argue that a regime’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency hinges on an interaction between the breadth of a leader’s base of support and the militarization

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4For an interesting consideration of how military culture drives approaches to solve the ‘information problem’ of discrimination in counterinsurgency campaigns see Luttwak’s critique of American technology-driven intelligence operations in Iraq (2007).
of politics. Assertive, independent, and unaccountable military institutions that are able to exploit unevenness in a regime’s base of support to shape strategy unhindered by civilian rule are more likely to use indiscriminate means, despite the risks to the state and delegitimization of the regime over the long run. While similar dynamics were explored in the study of military regimes and autocracies, particularly during the later stages of the Cold War, the dramatic decline in the number of states explicitly led by a group of army officers and the widespread emergence of unconsolidated democracies over the past three decades necessitates a reframing of the question of regimes and indiscriminate counterinsurgency to account for the subtle, yet widespread, role of indirect military involvement in shaping political decisions in partially democratic regimes.

1.2.1 Importance and Novelty of this Study

This work seeks to generalize theoretical and case-specific findings about the political role of the military using a novel extension of a newly coded dataset that measures the level and nature of indirect military rule. By bringing this dimension of military-influenced ‘domain democracy’ to the question of regime conduct during intrastate conflict in a cross-sectional study, I seek to test and generalize mechanisms that more narrowly-focused case studies have identified as important in specific contexts (Merkel 2004). In the field of conflict studies, this incorporates the important yet understudied role of indirect military rule into the cross-national literatures on civil

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5Importantly, this is not a effectiveness argument, although the armed forces often defend their use of indiscriminate force in terms of military effectiveness or necessity. Rather, I assert that a military’s autonomy in counterinsurgency policymaking reinforces biases and gaps inherent in an organization fundamentally organized, trained, and equipped for interstate warfare, leading to ultimately ineffective methods being justified in terms of ‘military effectiveness.’

6The expert-coded Political Role of the Military data (Croissant, Eschenauer, and Kamerling 2017) and my extension of it is detailed further in Chapter 3 and Appendix A.
war and state use of indiscriminate violence. For policy purposes, this research is particularly valuable for institutions that engage globally with regimes and militaries facing domestic unrest.

1.3 Definitions

To establish a common foundation for the following chapters of this dissertation this section defines a series of important terms. While the definitions adopted below are drawn from the broader literature on intrastate conflict, and comparative regimes, they are not universal.

Following Wahmen, Teroell, and Hadenius, the regime is “the [set of] institutions on which elites rely in order to regulate the access to and maintenance of public authority” (2013: 21). This is distinct from the government, which both includes organs of the state that do not hold political power and excludes important institutions such as religion, social class, militias, or political party. This latter set of institutions reside outside of the government, but is nonetheless critical for continued access to and maintenance of public authority.

Per Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s definition, the leadership is comprised of “one or more individuals with the authority to raise revenue and allocate resources” (2003: 38). While they are drawn from the selectorate, and supported by a coalition from within that politically enfranchised group, not all members of the selectorate are eligible to become the leader of that regime. Additionally, while Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s version of selectorate theory hinges largely on economic sticks and carrots, my conceptualization of a regime’s leadership includes the ability to use a broader set of incentives, to include the use of physical force and constraints on civil liberties, in the exercise of control over the state.
At the heart of any policy decision is a drive for political survival. While in democracies the physical risk associated with failure are usually less dire than in highly personalized autocracies, the basic motivation remains. Though in some regimes there is often a chance for rehabilitation or reelection after being voted out of power, staying in office is the most reliable method of political survival. The same desire for political survival that makes members of the US Congress, in Mayhew’s famous formulation, “single minded seekers of reelection” similarly shapes the decisions and preferences of leaders in all regimes (1974).

The elites that lead (or represent) the institutions which in turn constitute the regime are termed the selectorate. Specifically, they are “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership” (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 42). Politically disenfranchised individuals within the state are referred to as residents, following Bueno de Mesquita et al.

The military is an institution organized, trained, and equipped primarily to protect the state from external adversaries through the use of physical force. In some contexts, the military can also play an important role in the economy, as a mechanism by which the regime maintains domestic order and control, or as a means of building national identity among recruits. To fulfill these tasks, the military develops internal norms and mechanisms that prioritize loyalty, discipline, and espirit de corps among its members. In my conceptualization, the military is distinct from other government institutions that also use physical coercion, such as the police, gendarmerie, etc.

7For style and readability, I use the terms military, army, and armed forces interchangeably.
or domestic intelligence services. The military is also distinct from paramilitary or militia groups that are informally aligned with the state, although in some cases these groups may include off-duty soldiers (Carey and Mitchell 2017). The military is the regime’s “repressive agent of last resort”—often “the police and internal security services simply do not have enough personnel, equipment, or training to combat armed guerrillas or suppress and uprising of several tens of thousands of protesters” (Svolik 2012: 127).

While ideally the military is subordinate to civilian leadership, a relationship more thoroughly explored in Chapter 2, oftentimes the armed forces impose their will onto the political process. Following Finer, I define militarized politics as “the armed forces’ constrained substitution of their own policies and personnel for those of the recognized civilian authorities” (1962: 23). In addition to outright military rule, militarized politics can take more indirect forms where the armed forces act as a political spoiler or critical supporter, or operate in ‘reserved domains’ where they set policy and conduct activities without civilian oversight (Rüland and Manea 2014; Croissant, Eschenauer, and Kamerling 2017). Militarized politics is distinct from a politicized military, where a strong autocratic regime uses invasive control mechanisms such as unit-level commissars, ideological indoctrination, or selective promotion of loyalists to exercise subjective control of the armed forces.

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8This is an important distinction that is not universal. For example, Acemoğlu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2010: 1) include “the secret police and other law-enforcement agencies” in their definition of the military, while Croissant and Kuehn (2015: 259) scope the military in a similar way as I do above, distinguishing it from “security forces” or “security agents.” While the literature of coup-proofing and pro-government militias, in particular, emphasizes this distinction between the military and the broader security sector (Quinlivan 1999; Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013), work on Security Sector Reform (SSR) often takes a more holistic approach and considers not only coercive state institutions but also political, economic, and cultural factors (Rüland and Manea 2013: 5).
Civil wars are all “consciously conducted and planned [as opposed to spontaneous] political campaigns of armed violence where one party is the government of the state and the other is any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility” (Allansson, Melander, and Themnèr 2017: 2). While there are several subtypes of civil wars, most prominently insurgencies9 (a term largely interchangeable with guerrilla or irregular wars), a longer running conflict can include several of these specific technologies of rebellion (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). Other typologies of civil war are largely inductive, drawing their categories from commonalities among recently observed conflicts rather than from theoretically based interactions between the rebels, segments of the population, and the government (Fearon 2004). Acknowledging that it reaches beyond the narrow definition of insurgency, I use the term counterinsurgency broadly to refer to the government’s efforts against the rebels in a civil war, regardless of the specific technology of rebellion involved.

Repression, as defined by Davenport, is “the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities” (2007a: 2). Levitsky and Way contrast between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ repression, with the former being more violent and public and the latter largely subtle and intended to demobilize or dissuade (2002). A large body of comparative political

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9A commonly cited definition of insurgency comes from a 1980s US Central Intelligence Agency handbook, which states that “insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed towards completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity— including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy.” (quoted in Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Branna 2001: 4) While I believe that this term is too narrowly focused on the Cold War political dynamics which included a stream of external support for these movements to persist, it does capture the important elements of partially control of territory, irregular military means, and popular support.
science scholarship explores the variation in repression between regimes, the interaction between repression and dissent, and how different regimes use different mixes of repression, legitimation, and co-option to maintain their rule (Gerschewski 2013). This dissertation builds on this broader work by specifically focusing on why regimes use ‘hard’ repression indiscriminately—that is, at the collective, rather than selective or individual level—in the context of civil wars.

1.3.1 Defining and Scoping Indiscriminate Counterinsurgency

I define *indiscriminate counterinsurgency*\(^{10}\) as a strategy of fighting a civil war that includes widespread, intentional use of lethal violence against civilians not directly involved in military operations against the regime or individually associated in supporting the insurgents with intelligence, logistics, or protection.\(^{11}\) Kalyvas dif-

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\(^{10}\)Scholars in the field use a variety of similar terms: ‘indiscriminate violence against non-combatants’ (Downes 2007b); ‘coercive counterinsurgency’ (Toft and Zhukov 2012); ‘coercion by punishment’ (Pape 1996); ‘indiscriminate violence’ (Weinstein 2007); ‘mass killing’ (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004); ‘high casualty control/terrorism/cleansing’ (Stanton 2016); ‘out-terrorizing the insurgents’ (Luttwak 2007); ‘terrorism’ (Kalyvas 2004); ‘civilian victimization’ (Downes 2008). Each of these works are framed differently and ask unique questions, but their specific definitions and measurements often share broad similarities.

\(^{11}\)This is broader than the definition used by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). In 2009 the ICRC produced interpretive guidance that sought to clarify the distinction between combatant and non-combatant in non-state armed conflict. This document did not alter the distinction made in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions but rather sought to clarify ambiguous language within them. Specifically, “for the purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international armed conflict, all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict [eg, rebel groups] are civilians and, therefore, *entitled to protection against direct attack unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.* In non-international armed conflict, organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State party to the conflict and *consist only of individuals whose continuous function it is to take direct part in hostilities.*” (emphasis added) Following the ICRC’s interpretive guidance, I use the term civilian and non-combatant interchangeably. While the ICRC’s definition of civilian is expansive, it does provide a common baseline from which to compare regime strategies (McGoldrick, Williams, and Akande, 2010).
ferentiates selective from indiscriminate violence “on the level at which ‘guilt’ (and hence targeting) is determined.” (2006: 141) As he frames it:

Violence is selective or discriminant when individuals are targeted based on personalized information about their actions; it is indiscriminate when individuals are targeted solely on the basis of their membership in a group perceived to be connected with the opposition and irrespective of their individual actions (groups may be based on ties of kinship, location, class, ethnicity, etc.) (Kalyvas 2004: 101).

Indiscriminate violence is targeting by, at best, general association.12 This does not necessarily mean that it is random; counterinsurgents often have a general understanding of which areas, ethnicities, or social classes form the rebel’s base of support, and target civilians from these broad groups with lethal violence (Kalyvas 2004; Valentino et al. 2004; Downes 2007a).

Indiscriminate counterinsurgency contrasts with a firepower intensive, combatant-focused strategy that targets armed insurgents through often inaccurate methods such as heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. While such an enemy combatant-centric approach often results in significant collateral damage, this violence is not aimed at civilians, but rather at insurgent combatants.13 The distinction between these

12In the language of the Geneva Conventions, this is considered a ‘grave breach’ of International Humanitarian Law. According to Article 85 of Additional Protocol I, “launching an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects...is a grave breach” (ICRC 1977: Article 85(3)(b), emphasis added).

13In the terminology of the law of armed conflict, the doctrine of double effect does allow for a degree of noncombatant casualties (Waltzer 1976). However, Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions prohibits “an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (ICRC 1977: Article 41(5)(b), emphasis added). In contrast to the grave breach in the
two approaches is often less clear in practice, as counterinsurgents have historically often excused deliberate violence against civilians as collateral damage, and insurgent combatants have purposefully sought to blend in with noncombatants to create a dilemma for armed forces seeking to strictly adhere to the laws of armed conflict (Walzer 1976, Merom 2003, Downes 2008).

Indiscriminate counterinsurgency is not directed against specific, individual sympathizers, supporters, or informants, but rather at entire communities. It does not have to be genocidal in scope, but rather intended to punish or intimidate the civilian population as a whole, rather than selected individuals within it. Additionally, the regime violence measured must be targeted against civilians, rather than combatants. In practice this distinction between civilian and combatant in intrastate conflict can be slippery, and counterinsurgents often use broad categories such as ‘fighting age males’ in situations where they lack the information to accurately discriminate between members of general groups (Kinsella 2011; Kalyvas 2006). The ICRC’s definition of non-state combatant hinges on a conceptualization of ‘direct participation’ that is relatively narrow and transient (McGoldrick et al., 2010). While few (if any) states engaged in a civil war fully adhere to the ICRC’s interpretive guidance, this provides a valuable benchmark for comparison. Finally, the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency must be widespread and tolerated, rather than a handful of isolated excesses by individual military units or pro-government militias whose abuses lead to concrete sanctions by the regime.

In addition to its failure to differentiate combatants from civilians, indiscriminate counterinsurgency hinges on violence being intentional and lethal. Through the doctrine of double effect, a degree of unintentional, collateral damage is permissible when previous footnote, which centers on the lack of discrimination between civilian and military target, this lesser violation is one of proportionality.
targeting an enemy’s military forces (Walzer 1976). In many cases of both international and civil war, double effect has been stretched beyond recognition with civilians intentionally targeted through aerial bombings, blockades, dislocations, and sieges (Downes 2008). Finally, the violence must be lethal. In many cases of counterinsurgency campaigns rural populations were relocated to more concentrated, defensible, and controlled villages or camps. In some instances, such as the British in Malaya, this relocation was largely accepted, and civilian casualties as a result of the relocation were minimal. In others, such as the US-led strategic hamlet program in Vietnam, the new villages were inadequately resourced and largely unable to defend themselves against the Viet Cong, but the concentration of civilians was not itself intended to be coercive (Nagl 2006). These examples stand in contrast to, for example, the British program in the Boer War, where the civilians detained in camps died through deliberate neglect intended to put pressure on the remaining rebels in the field, a strategy that would qualify as indiscriminate counterinsurgency (Downes 2007).

Finally, indiscriminate counterinsurgency is a purposeful, though often counterproductive, approach. This differentiates it from both collateral damage suffered by noncombatants and from ‘primordial’ explanations for violence that rest on factors such as psychological distress, sadism, personal revenge, or criminality (Valentino 2014; Grossman 1995; Weinstein 2007; Kalyvas 2006; Mueller 2000). It is a strategic approach, in the sense that it is driven by political, military, structural, and organizational motivations.14

1.4 Research Design

In this dissertation I seek to address the puzzle of regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency using a nested analysis approach that uses both large-n statistical anal-

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14 Framing of ‘strategic’ motivations derived from Chenoweth (2013).
ysis and small-n case study methods (Lieberman, 2005). The quantitative portion, outlined further below and detailed fully in Chapter 3, not only tests a series of hypotheses that explore the relationship between indirect military rule and regime type in a global context but also identifies deviant cases that fall outside of model’s predictions. The qualitative chapter examines how a partially democratic regime with varying levels of militarized politics used differing levels of indiscriminate counterinsurgency within the case of the Indonesian government’s campaign in Aceh after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998 and subsequent transition to electoral government.

1.4.1 Quantitative Cross-National Analysis

The empirical portion opens with a cross sectional quantitative analysis of all intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War. There are four goals in this approach: first, to compare a large set widely-ranging conflicts; second, to incorporate a recently developed measurement of indirect military rule into existing models; third, to systematically discover outlier cases for further qualitative exploration and the identification of missing variables; last, to test several of the alternate explanations for indiscriminate counterinsurgency outlined in the theory chapters.

In contrast to much of the recent statistical work on conflict onset, duration, and termination, which by and large use pooled time series cross sectional (or fixed effects) approaches to test for statistical significance, I will explicitly model the hierarchical relationship between the regime, the conflict, and the individually measured conflict-year observations. The series of Bayesian multi-level linear regression models developed and tested in Chapter 3 allow for more nuanced consideration of the effects of covariates at various levels, while retaining between-group structure at the conflict and regime level.
1.4.2 Qualitative Within-Case Study

The qualitative case study portion builds on the quantitative analysis and is intended to explore the hypothesized theories by tracing the interaction between political elites and the military that results in the use, or abandonment, of a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. Rather than compare across cases, as was done using the quantitative multi-level model, the qualitative portion of this multi-method design will focus on within-case variation in a long-running conflict over significant variation in both regime structure and military involvement in politics. The in-depth consideration of a single case allows for more detailed specification of my dependent variable and the consideration of alternative hypotheses that could not be directly tested using large-\(n\) methods (Lieberman 2005). Since then time-series cross-sectional data I am using in the quantitative portion aggregates all regime behavior for a country-year observation of my dependent variable, this is particularly important in cases where a regime is fighting multiple insurgencies or is disposed to use violent repression broadly as a mechanism of political control.

1.5 Research Scope

Rebellion against and repression by the state has been studied throughout history by historians and political theorists who sought to explain either particular events and leaders or, more broadly, explore the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. More recently, political science research has leveraged cross-national datasets to quantitatively compare similar conflicts to identify significant structural, military, or political variation that explains the onset, duration, intensity, relapse, and termination of intrastate conflict. These works vary in temporal scope, but often consider wars
fought either since the 1945, since the end of the colonial era (roughly 1960), or since the end of the Cold War. In this study, I look exclusively at post-1989 conflicts.

While intrastate wars have been fought throughout history, and many of today’s conflicts have roots in long-running disputes, I limit the scope of this analysis of regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency to the post-Cold War era for three reasons. First, the collapse of Soviet communism removed a critical ideological dimension that influenced the nature of civil wars and state repression throughout much of the world. Both rebels and regimes sought to align themselves with the superpowers and often shaped their political doctrines to fit the mold of their benefactors in Moscow or Washington. This resulted in the adoption of techniques and policies that, while unsuited for the specific context of the domestic conflict, sought to confirm broader ideological assumptions. For example, during the uprising in the western Afghan city of Herat against the Communist regime in Kabul prior the 1979 Soviet invasion the Politburo in Moscow framed recommendations to Nur Muhammad Taraki, their Afghan counterpart, in traditional Marxist terms of mobilizing urban workers, of which Afghanistan had vanishingly few.\textsuperscript{15} Second, large scale international material support to belligerents in intrastate wars allowed conflicts that would otherwise be unsustainable to endure. External support to guerrillas, who use unconventional tactics to wear down larger, better equipped regime forces, was more common during the Cold War and allowed this technology of rebellion to be more viable that it would be otherwise (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). A guerrilla approach has historically been closely correlated with mass killing in intrastate wars, as regimes are often unable to discriminate between fighters and the civilians that given them logistical support, intelligence, and concealment (Valentino et al. 2004). Third, the interaction

\textsuperscript{15}The transcript of the Soviet Politburo discussion is available from the Wilson Center digital archive; full citation is in the works cited. This example was first raised to the author by Andy Bennett in a 2017 discussion.
of geostrategically motivated ideological alignment and material support resulted in autocratic regimes, particularly those led by the military, to endure longer than they would otherwise have remained in power. As Magaloni and Kicheli argue,

Cold War Conditions were particularly conducive to the emergence of closed dictatorships, and in particular to military dictatorships, which strategically used the communist threat to get funds from international financial institutions and from the United States to repress their opponents (2010: 135, quoted in Kim and Kroeger 2018).

The end of the Cold War resulted in fundamental changes to the existing power dynamic between political elites, the military, and other institutions in regimes across the world. Previously common forms of autocracy, such as juntas led by a small group of uniformed military officers, became increasingly rare as once-tolerant Western states now saw these systems as fundamentally undemocratic. Overt intervention in politics, once common in many parts of the world, is increasingly rare—for example, “in nine of thirteen cases examined from Latin America [from 1990-2010] militaries have refused presidential orders to intervene against civilian opposition forces” (Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas 2010: 395). The number of military regimes, as coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, has fallen from a peak of twenty in 1978 to five in 1999 and only three in 2010 (2014: 319). Other measurements of direct military rule show similar downward trends since the end of the Cold War (Croissant et al. 2017).

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16 This conception of military rule builds on the work of O’Donnell (1973) and Stepan (1973), who emphasized “consultation within the officer corps and implied constraint by other officers on the dictator” (quoted in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014: 323). This stands in contrast with rule by a “military strongman,” a dictator who happens to wear a uniform but otherwise maintains power in personalist manner.
1.5.1 Why Civil Wars

The cross-national study of the onset, termination, and duration of civil wars is an important and fruitful research program within the larger conflict literature (e.g., Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; M. Ross 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Hegre 2014; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014; for criticisms of the research program, see Vreeland 2008 and Ward, Greenhill, and Bakke 2010). In this dissertation, however, I am exogenizing these questions and instead focusing on regime decision-making within the context of an ongoing civil war. I do so for three reasons. First, while most violent interstate conflicts have clearly defined start and end points, marked by declarations of war, peace treaties, or ceasefires, many intrastate wars do not. Belligerent groups often merge, demobilize without being defeated, or shift from politically-motivated violence to pure criminality (Florea 2012). Second, while preventing the onset of interstate war is the clearest way to limit violent deaths in the international context, states have used large-scale physical repression internally outside the context of civil war. This makes understanding and preventing the onset of civil war secondary to understanding why regimes repress indiscriminately.\footnote{Or put another way, if you want to prevent states from killing citizens of another state, simply prevent international wars from starting. If you want to prevent states from killing their own citizens, preventing civil wars from starting may help but is not enough.} Third, the long-running nature of many civil wars can divorce the motivations for onset from the mechanisms that drive a regime’s later decision to use repressive counterinsurgency.

The context of a civil war provides an important and unique vantage point though which to consider a regime’s decisions regarding indiscriminate, lethal repression. While they may be relatively weak when compared to the government, rebels are organized, armed, and motivated enough to use deadly violence at a politically sign-
nificant scale. They can concentrate force and establish real, albeit often fleeting, control over an area, undermining the state’s legitimacy. This threat from disenfranchised residents changes the survival calculation of the leadership within the regime. In contrast to protests or dissident groups, which may be repressed by police, intelligence, or gendarmerie forces closely linked to the regime, civil wars generally require wider mobilization and deployment of the military, an institution that is often itself considered a threat to the regime and can have institutional priorities, biases, and motivations distinct from the political leadership’s (Svolik 2012). How to manage the position of these newly politically enfranchised actors in the domestic power structure is largely a function of the existing institutions and systems of accountability that constitute the regime itself. This dynamic is particularly important early in a conflict, at distinct inflections within it, or during lower intensity periods where the threat of the insurgents to the regime is not existential. In these circumstances the incentives for using repressive counterinsurgency to ensure political survival are not as clear-cut, and a cycle of military mobilization and retribution has not set in.

Armed resistance to the state also changes the incentives for the military. While the military may be loathe to use indiscriminate violence against massive, but peaceful, protests the presence of an active, armed challenger can shift the army’s incentives. The military exists to protect the security of the state; if its integrity is being violently challenged the army is often professionally socialized to instinctively and decisively respond. By viewing the domestic threat in similar terms as an international one, the military may ignore overriding concerns about human rights, uneven support for the rebels among civilians, or the long-term viability of a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency (Cardenas 2007). While firmly entrenched institutions such as the judiciary or civil society may be able to restrain such excesses, in many regimes the military has either a veto over policy decisions or can act with impunity. The context
of an armed intrastate conflict often expands the military’s incentives to use force on a large scale and without restraint, and when coupled with weak institutional constraints on its behavior may increase the likelihood of the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

Finally, regime repression can either be a temporary, wartime strategy, or a continuation of a more general policy. Regimes may use the emergency conditions of civil war to consolidate power more broadly through indiscriminate means, even to the point of exaggerating the threat of the insurgents (Cardenas 2007). Whether indiscriminately repressive policies are relaxed after the termination a civil war or extended indefinitely provides an important insight into the motivations and nature of the regime, as well as constraints on domestic behavior from the international system (Hill and Jones 2014).

1.6 Plan for the Dissertation

This dissertation unfolds in five chapters. After this introductory chapter which lays out the motivating puzzle, basic argument, scope, and research design come theory, quantitative analysis, and qualitative case study chapters, followed by concluding chapter proposing a series of policy recommendations.

Chapter 2 proposes a theory of indiscriminate counterinsurgency that hinges on the interaction of militarized politics and political survival within a regime with a broader selectorate. It opens with an overview of different conceptions of how leaders establish and maintain political power, followed by a discussion of civil-military relations. Central to this discussion is the political role of the armed forces in political transitions and unconsolidated democratic regimes, which can lead to the preservation of reserved domains and the ability to veto or ignore decisions by civilian leaders.
The theorized interaction between militarized politics and the political leadership’s base of support generates a set of testable hypotheses, which are followed by a series of alternate hypotheses drawn from the larger extant literature on civil wars and state repression. Importantly, while the validity of several of these alternate hypotheses is reinforced by the model specifications presented in Chapter 3, these alternate explanations do not diminish the strength of the interaction between militarized politics and selectorate size.

Chapter 3 presents a quantitative analysis of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. Using a Bayesian multi-level model that incorporates a novel extension to a recently coded cross national dataset of indirect military rule, the quantitative models in Chapter 3 provide a thorough exploration of both the primary and alternate hypothesis within the scope established in Chapter 1. In addition to testing the primary and alternate hypotheses, Chapter 3 includes a set of outlier cases whose actual levels of indiscriminate counterinsurgency did not match the multi-level model’s predictions. A brief qualitative summary of the most salient of these cases both helps validate the model itself and identifies a missing variable—the success of failure of a peace process—as a specific mechanism through which militarized politics impacts indiscriminate counterinsurgency and can also be considered in more detail in a full case study.

Chapter 4, the qualitative portion of this mixed methods research, presents a within-case exploration of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh. During the period analyzed, the Indonesian regime transitioned from the increasingly personalistic autocratic rule of President Suharto to a reform era with a series of political leaders whose legitimacy and power was drawn from a broader range of sources. During that same period the military repeatedly involved itself indirectly, but decisively, in national politics. The connection between the varying the level of militarized
politics and the amount of indiscriminate violence in Aceh broadly follows the mechanisms hypothesized in Chapter 2.

In addition to summarizing the theory and arguments the concluding chapter presents a series of specific policy recommendations intended for foreign actors seeking to reducing the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency by a partner state. By using military prestige items as leverage, broadening intelligence cooperation and police capacity building to solve the identification problem, and scoping transitional justice proposals to further acceptance of a negotiated settlement international actors can work to demilitarize politics and reduce the risk of the armed forces acting as a spoiler in the peace process. Further study into the effectiveness of these proposals for ‘security sector reform while in contact’, the broader use of the quantitative measurement of indirect military rule detailed in Appendix A and applied in Chapter 3, and the application of heterogeneous actors within the selectorate are the major implications for research from this work.
Chapter 2

Theory

Consolidating and retaining political power hinges on a regime’s continued ability to blend legitimacy, coercion, and rewards in a way that satisfies supporters, deters defectors, and represses revolutionaries (Gerschewski 2013; Kailitz and Stockemer 2015). While this mixture varies greatly between different regime types, the basic elements are universally present. Organized, armed resistance to the regime’s continued rule can upset this balance as its leadership must now both counter the insurgents and maintain political support (Bellin 2012). While autocrats are seemingly able to use force at will to remain in power, the organizations that carry out violence on their behalf—most notably, the armed forces—are often themselves as much a threat to the regime’s survival as the rebels. Leaders in some electoral democracies, especially ones with autonomous military establishments loathe to subordinate themselves to civilian control, may find their desired policies increasingly out of step with the military’s preferences. The interaction of incentives between these two loci of state power—the political leadership and the military—can significantly shape levels of indiscriminate state violence in a civil war.

This chapter outlines a theory of regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in civil war. I argue that the decision to use such a strategy is a result of the leadership’s balancing of various domestic power bases, complicated by the involvement of previously disenfranchised rebels. This calculation often includes special consideration of the military’s priorities and aspirations, as the armed forces are often largely...
autonomous and their institutional incentives may not align with the political leadership's. This tension may result in either military intervention at the political level to shape regime strategy directly or through the independent execution of a counterinsurgency campaign by the military that is divorced from regime constraints or priorities. Exploring how the interaction between the regime’s need to maintain its base of support and a politically assertive military influences the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency is an important, generalizable factor in the study of intrastate war, and sheds light on the puzzle why some regimes opt for this seemingly counterproductive approach.

2.1 Leaders, Challengers, and Political Survival

Carl von Clausewitz’s famous dictum about war being a continuation of politics holds true for intrastate conflicts as well (Freedman 2013). While civil wars are sometimes viewed in isolation, with distinct start and end points demarcated often by a casualty threshold, they can be better conceptualized as struggles fought within a larger political dynamic where a regime’s leaders must not only counter the armed rebels but also other threats to their continued rule (Florea 2012). The regime’s interaction with this broader opposition sometimes involves violence, but often does not (Tilly 1978). How opposition is perceived by the leadership—whether it is viewed as an immediate threat to survival, a constituency to be appeased and co-opted, or a proper expression of popular sentiment—frame the state’s response. How a regime balances these other challenges to its rule with its strategy towards intrastate conflict is largely a function of how it more generally blends coercion, legitimacy, and reward to survive politically (Gerschewski 2013).
This theory focuses on the regime and the military because they are almost always the most capable and organized actors in a civil war (Rüland and Manea 2013). While in cases of state collapse or foreign occupation their roles may be minimized, in most instances they wield overwhelming coercive power.\(^1\) While insurgents can, and often do, terrorize civilians, the scale of the state’s coercive power typically makes their choice of whether to indiscriminately use violence far more consequential. Indeed, if the regime is no longer the primary political entity with the capacity to wield overwhelming force, its very status as such is in question.

Furthermore, international actors are incentivized to work with the government and its military to further reciprocal norms of sovereignty (Hurd 2007). Aiding a government in a civil war does not broadly undermine sovereignty norms, while supporting rebels or undertaking an armed intervention to separate the belligerents does. While this does not preclude intervention, it does increase the burden of justification and consensus needed for international actors to legitimately involve themselves in support of an actor other than the government (Finnemore 2003).

Since the state is the dominant actor, exploring how and why its leadership make decisions about counterinsurgency strategy requires looking into the incentives and constraints that define the broader political regime. There are four general approaches to this question: first, the relative level of democracy; second, how the leader ensures loyalty and support from their winning coalition within a broader selectorate; third, typological categories that consider several possible sources of power and legitimacy, often drawing inductively from real-world examples; fourth, the often indirect role of the military in political decisions. By considering each of these approaches of categorizing political regimes and their relationships with the military I develop a series

\(^1\)As mentioned in the introductory chapter, my scope conditions exclude interregnum country-years such as foreign occupation, lack of central government, and transition, as defined and identified by the Center for Systemic Peace.
of hypotheses that link regime decision-making to the incentives an embattled leader faces during a civil war.

The first three of these approaches have been widely used in cross-national studies on state violence, but as I detail below each have limitations. These limitations open an important, and largely unexplored, space in the cross-national study of intrastate conflict. The mechanism of militarized politics—alternatively called military tutelage, military veto, or indirect military rule—is a clear, recurring feature in country-specific studies, yet until recently has not been comprehensively coded on a cross-national scale. The following sections outline the theoretical importance of this mechanism of indirect military involvement, which is then measured and tested quantitatively and qualitatively in subsequent chapters.

2.1.1 DEMOCRACY VS. AUTOCRACY

The broadest and most commonly used differentiation between regimes centers around the role of a state’s citizens in choosing and restraining their leaders. Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy, the starting point for much of the modern discourse, focused solely on the process of elections (1942). Robert Dahl expanded this conception of democracy by adding a second dimension of liberalism to Schumpeter’s inclusiveness. Dahl’s conception of democracy hinged on “continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals” (1971: 1). While there is a wide range of variation among established liberal democracies that fit Dahl’s criteria, all of these regimes are responsive to their citizens’ choices and broadly respectful of minority rights (Lijphart 1984). Sovereignty lies with the people, who elect representatives who enact policies on their behalf.

The openly contentious nature of democracy allows tensions and debates that would otherwise be repressed to be debated firmly, but peacefully, in public. In con-
trast to authoritarian regimes, electoral process and liberal norms offer a stable and peaceful alternative to violent insurgency in established democracies (Goodwin 2001). Or, as Adam Przeworski succinctly put it, democracy is “a system for processing conflicts without killing one another” (1991; quoted in Cardenas 2007: 28). For this system of peaceful, managed contestation to work, however, a democratic regime must not only include the procedural mechanisms laid out by Schumpeter, which alone may lead to oppressive majoritarian rule, but also incorporate the respect for minority rights and liberalism detailed by Dahl.

When compared to authoritarian states, democracies also typically field more capable and professionalized militaries, largely because of superior human capital and more harmonious relations between civilian and military leaders (Biddle and Long 2004). This increased military effectiveness may reduce the need to resort to an indiscriminately repressive strategy. Additionally, liberal norms, the rule of law, and electoral pressures can all constrain the use of force by democracies against non-combatants during a counterinsurgency campaign (Merom 2003).

Autocracies, by contrast, are considered in this dichotomous categorization as a residual category of nondemocracies (Snyder 2006). Instead of evolving politically to meet the will of the citizens through the peaceful mechanism of elections coupled with respect for minority positions, autocratic regimes impose their chosen policies on politically disenfranchised residents of the state. Authoritarian regimes should excel at countering insurgencies through indiscriminate violence—they have the motivation, organization, and latitude to use force at will. Indiscriminate violations of the personal integrity of civilians during a counterinsurgency campaign are an extension of, rather than a deviation from, the means used by autocracies to maintain control (Byman 2016; Ucko 2016; Valentino et al. 2004).
Between these two poles of authoritarianism and democracy lies an array of anocracies, which some have argued are unable to either impose order through violence or to assuage political discontent through liberal norms and electoral mechanisms (Gurr 1970). Domestic restraints on the regime do exist, but the institutions that enforce them are neither strong nor liberal enough to prevent broader civil violence. Testing this argument quantitatively has proved difficult, however. Research into the ‘more violence in the middle’ theory has largely drawn on monodimensional measure of regime type such as the Polity index, an approach which is often misspecified because of the inclusion of political violence as part of that composite measure of democracy (Vreeland 2008; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010). Using a range of measures for democracy and more flexible quantitative models than most of the existing cross-national literature, Jones and Lupu (2018) find some support for the theory that state repression does steadily decrease as a regimes become less autocratic, while terrorism and civil war onset tends to peak in the middle, anocratic range of semi-democracy.

This monodimensional categorization of political regimes as more or less democratic oversimplifies several points, though. First, instead of as ruling purely through terror, autocratic regimes do need to maintain a degree of legitimacy from at least some of their subjects to remain in power. The effectiveness of repression is not clear-cut, as political scientists have not been able show a consistent link between repression and dissent (Davenport 2005; Gerschewski 2013). Second, the link between autocracy and repression may be endogenous if the categorization of such regimes includes a measure of lack of respect for its citizen’s rights (Vreeland 2008; Lawrence and Chenoweth 2010; Hill and Jones 2014). Third, categorizing anocracies as diminished forms of either democracies or autocracies overlooks the mechanisms through which such regimes maintain power and make decisions in crises, such as whether to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency during an intrastate conflict. To more accu-
rately capture these dynamics, I turn now to a second conceptualization of regimes: selectorate theory.

2.1.2 Balancing Challenges to and Support for Rule

While established democracies largely eschew indiscriminate counterinsurgency, framing regimes as simply more or less democratic can overlook the mechanisms by which political leaders across all regimes ensure their continued political survival. Some of this oversight is due to the “democratization bias” in much of the political science literature on regimes, which assumed that, with the collapse of Soviet communism and right-wing autocracies in the developing world, polities across the globe would transition steadily towards liberal democracy (Carothers 2002). This bias was furthered by the relative impenetrability of the decision making circles and processes in authoritarian regimes.

Detailed study of the later Soviet system, however, helped inspire an alternate way of conceptualizing how leaders survive in power: selectorate theory (Roeder 1993, Zimmerman 2014). Known as the ‘theory of everything’ by its devotees, selectorate theory offers a comprehensive logic for the use of repression and incentives to maintain political power across the full range of regimes (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011; Gallagher and Hanson 2015). In essence, this theory argues that a political leader will distribute private goods to their key supporters in an effort to ensure loyalty. These key supporters form a winning coalition of supporters from within the selectorate, a broader category of politically enfranchised individuals.² Those outside of

²This scoping of the selectorate used by Bueno de Mesquita et al., which mirrors the definition in the opening chapter, is not universal. Roeder (1993), whose work on the Soviet Union motivated much of the later, generalized work on selectorate theory, has a much narrower conception of the selectorate as the “group that makes key policies, and [who] regime leaders must retain the support of...to remain in power” (quoted in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014: 315).
the selectorate, mere ‘residents’ of the state, have no political voice within the normal
cconduct of regime affairs. A smaller winning coalition allows for private goods to be
more concentrated more efficiently, maintaining the loyalty of those that matter most
for continued political survival without diluting the value of the spoils. A challenge
from within the selectorate amounts to a coup, either in the traditional military sense
or in a vote of no confidence in a parliamentary system. In either case, the logic of
maintaining power in any political system remains the same—retaining the loyalty of
the winning coalition is central to ensuring continued survival (Bueno de Mesquita et
al. 2003).

While regimes with small winning coalitions often maintain loyalty through the
concentrated provision of public goods to key supporters, democracies largely avoid
this dynamic by expanding the selectorate so broadly that providing public goods
such as education or infrastructure is a more cost effective method of appealing for
their political support than solely spending on private goods to shore up the loy-
alty of their winning coalition. An expanded selectorate also incentivizes the political
opposition to act through institutionalized mechanisms, rather than through a rev-
olution aimed at overturning the system itself. For example, authoritarian leaders
often establish effective parliaments to allow for dissent to be expressed within that
structure, rather than outside of it (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Svolik 2012). For
this mechanism of channeling dissent through institutions such as a parliament to
be effective, elections need to be relatively competitive—it must be possible, though
unlikely, for the incumbents to be voted out. (Schedler 2006, Levitsky and Way 2010)

By varying the relative size of the winning coalition and the selectorate, Bueno
de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrate how leaders shape their decisions on how and
where to allocate resources across a range of policy issue areas in order to retain polit-
ical survival. In this more generalized formulation of selectorate theory, the politically
disenfranchised ‘residents’ who exist outside of the selectorate are irrelevant. In political systems with a well defined and narrow selectorate, leaders are not incentivized to provide public goods for the general welfare of the entire state, outside of the cynical motivation of increasing the general tax base that can be captured and redirected towards maintaining the loyalty of the relatively minuscule winning coalition. In such cases, indiscriminate repression may be the only viable option for the leader and his cronies. The only mechanism for the disenfranchised to gain a political voice is through an extralegal uprising, and the optimal response to which is often violence (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011). If there is a credible threat of large-scale revolt, the leadership must either empower the military to deter or repress the potential rebels or provide the disenfranchised with access to political or economic goods. If the leader fails to maintain either the sticks to suppress or carrots to co-opt this ‘ejecorate,’ their political (and often physical) survival will be at risk (Zimmerman 2014). A leader’s consideration of this ‘revolutionary constraint’ on their abuse of the residents in order to appease the winning coalition helps both explain the expansion of suffrage in some authoritarian states and the liberalization of economic markets in others (Acemoğlu and Robinson 2000; Gallagher and Hanson 2013).

The context of a civil war expands the range and role of politically relevant actors. A segment of the previously disenfranchised residents of the state has taken up arms to either overthrow the regime or carve out an autonomous space of de facto sovereignty. The military, an institution which previously may have been sidelined to prevent a coup, must suddenly be both loyal to the regime and capable of countering the rebels. Given the military’s potential to wield coercive force on a large scale, resourcing them to the levels needed to defeat an insurgency may also make them a direct political challenger to the leadership’s continued rule or an empowered, autonomous institution with an implicit veto over policy and resource decisions (Acemoğlu, Ticchi,
Vindigni 2010; Svolik 2012). Incorporating an expanded range and role of politically relevant actors requires moving beyond measures of democracy and autocracy, and to instead consider how regimes maintain the loyalties and balance the relative power of the various politically relevant constituencies within the state.

A central theoretical\textsuperscript{3} critique of the strict application of selectorate theory is that in its parsimonious version the power of all members of the selectorate and the winning coalition are broadly interchangeable.\textsuperscript{4} Such a simplification makes sense in the analysis of, say, coalition politics in a parliamentary system, but less so in one where the institutions and individuals that constitute the regime and underwrite the leadership’s continued rule are heterogeneous. The military’s ability to use force for domestic ends and its strong sense of institutional autonomy often makes it fundamentally different from other politically relevant actors (Croissant, Kuehn, Chambers, and Wolf 2010; Svolik 2012). While high levels of military spending is correlated with regime stability in transitional democracies, the capture and distribution of economic goods as the sole medium of maintaining loyalty greatly oversimplifies the range of unique incentives valued by actors such as the military (Powell, Faulkner, Dean, and Romano 2018; Feaver 1999).

In sum, while selectorate theory does provide general insights into why a regime’s leadership makes decisions, its assumptions about actor homogeneity limit its applicability when considering how military-influenced regimes differ from other, similarly authoritarian systems in decisions about indiscriminate counterinsurgency. As Weeks (2014) shows when applying Bueno de Mesquita’s concepts as an alternate explanation of why certain regimes are more predisposed to go to war than others, the

\textsuperscript{3}There are several methodological critiques of Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s operationalization of selectorate theory that I address and attempt to overcome in Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{4}Bueno de Mesquita et al. include a dimension of affinity, but this is largely to ensure the game theoretic models work (Gallagher and Hanson 2015).
leadership’s assumptions about the utility of force, perceptions of risk, and processes for reaching policy decisions all matter greatly but are not accounted for by selectorate theory. For these dynamics, a more inductive approach to differentiating regimes is needed.

2.1.3 REGIMES TYPOLOGIES

In addition to the monodimensional measures of relative democracy and the compelling, but hard to reliably quantify, logic of selectorate theory, one can also classify political systems using various typologies based on various widely-held commonalities. The definition of regime from the opening chapter, where institutions play a central role in access to and maintenance of political power, supports this typological approach. This is particularly important in more authoritarian regimes, where the divergence between *de facto* power dynamics and *de jure* structure of the government can vary widely (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). While variations between liberal democratic systems have been studied in detail, they make largely similar choices when faces with questions about war, intrastate conflict, and repression (Davenport 2007b; Weeks 2014; Lijphart 1984). There can be as much variation between different types authoritarian regimes as there is between democracy and autocracy, however (Geddes 1999). Instead of resulting in a common approach towards war and repression, as in the case of democracies, this heterogeneity results in a wide range of behaviors among different autocratic regime types.

A key advantage of these typologies when considering why regimes use indiscriminate counterinsurgency is their consideration of the variation in coercive and organizational capability among those that underwrite the regime’s continued survival. Unlike selectorate theory, which considers the enfranchised to be homogeneous, interchangeable actors whose individual loyalty can be secured through the distribution of
private goods, or measures of democracy, which typically view juntas and politburos as equally autocratic, typologies account for, among other things, the influence of the military in politics. This is of particular importance when studying a regime’s decision to use force. Military regimes, professionally socialized to regard force as having supreme utility, may be inclined to overestimate the benefits of using it in an unrestrained way (Geddes 1999; Weeks 2014). Civil wars are more likely to break out under military rule, a finding that Fjelde (2010) attributes to the relatively clumsy political disposition and professional aversion to compromise typical of a committee of military officers. Christian Davenport\(^5\) explores the variation in domestic repression between autocratic regime types and finds that single-party regimes are consistently the least repressive form of autocracy, while “military juntas are less repressive than other forms of autocracy when civil liberties are considered, but are [most prone to use] torture and mass killing.” (2007b: 500) I argue that this logic should extend to the use indiscriminate counterinsurgency as well.

Within the regime, the decision whether to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency is influenced by the leadership’s estimate of the effectiveness of repression and their perceived risk of backlash. *Ceteris paribus*, authoritarian regimes with a wider range of veto holders such as independent judiciaries or consensus-based politburos generally use widespread physical repression less reflexively than similarly autocratic regimes led by a singular dictator or a military junta (Davenport 2007b). These party-based authoritarian regimes do repress, but often use a blend of blanket restrictions on civil liberties in conjunction with selective physical violence against particular political

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\(^5\)Davenport is looking at autocratic repression at all times, not only during periods of open rebellion and civil war. He does control for civil war, interstate war, and violent dissent (eg. riots) in his quantitative models, and (unsurprisingly) these increase both civil liberty and personal integrity violations. The increase in repression linked to civil wars is not disaggregated by regime type, though.
opponents. Introducing a limited degree of political contestation can draw opponents into the open, exposing them to targeted physical violence (Franz and Kendall-Taylor 2014). In contrast to this balanced (yet still repressive) approach, military officers tend to be professionally socialized to regard physical force as uniquely and supremely effective. Therefore, military regimes may often consider a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency less critically than other, more diverse authoritarian regimes (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 2007b). This stands in contrast with ‘party machine’ regimes, in particular, who through a process of consensus building and veto wielding are particularly risk averse (Weeks 2014). In sum, military regimes are far more likely overestimate the effectiveness of wide-scale violent repression as a tool of political control.

While broadly useful, regime typologies have several drawbacks when applied as a conceptual organization to explain the use indiscriminate counterinsurgency. First, the opacity of de facto power dynamics in authoritarian politics makes accurate generalization and cross-national comparison difficult. For example, most modern authoritarian countries have elected legislatures, and while many of these bodies are merely rubber-stamps for the leadership, some wield real power (Boix and Svolik 2013). This holds true for the judiciary as well (Conrad 2014). Political parties in authoritarian states can underwrite the regime’s legitimacy, as in the Soviet Union, or can merely be vehicles for a personalist dictator’s own agenda. While area experts have deep knowledge about regional norms, establishing a common standard for global comparison is not always straightforward (Geddes 1999). Second, like in any typology, there is a tension between theory-driven and empirically-driven categorization. While theory-driven work is often more straightforward, it can result in the shoe-horning of cases into a typological straitjacket. Empirically-driven categorization, by contrast, can result in a conglomeration of ‘just-so’ groupings that are not readily comparable
Finally, shifts in international norms can alter the most observable characteristics of a regime, qualities that often define the typology itself. These shifts may only be cosmetic, however—rubber-stamp parliaments, non-competitive elections, and nominally civilian heads of state are all superficially liberalizing moves that, although not convincing to country experts, may confound cross-national typologies that rely on the *de jure* existence of such institutions (Svolik 2012).

One specific example of this shift centrally relevant to the question of why some regimes adopt a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency is the role of the military in politics. Much of the literature about the armed forces’ role in politics has centered on coups, and several cross-national typologies have considered having an active officer as head of government as an important (or sole) criteria for classifying an autocracy as a military regime (Croissant et al. 2010; Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014). While these criteria did capture much of the military’s role in politics, especially during the Cold War, it underestimates the often-indirect—but still decisive—political influence that the military can have in both autocratic and hybrid regimes. As international norms shifted away from tolerating overtly military regimes in the 1990s, the number of states categorized as having such governments fell dramatically (Croissant et al. 2017). However, this recent aversion to overt coups and ruling juntas does not mean that armed forces across the globe have adopted a Huntingtonian, professional disposition where officers view themselves as subordinate to civilian control and as clearly distinct from politics (Huntington 1957). Rather, militaries are often still deeply involved in the political decision making of many regimes, including anocracies. In these cases the armed forces retains *de facto* veto authority over decisions about resourcing, strategy, and other policy matters, authority that is typically retained by civilian leaders in more consolidated regimes. Theorizing how this influence shapes regime behavior regarding indiscriminate counterinsurgency and
measuring its prevalence since the end of the Cold War are central to answering the broader question of why some states choose to use indiscriminate, lethal means against civilians during an intrastate conflict.

2.1.4 Indirect Military Rule

Explicitly military regimes, led by a junta of officers that governs the state, are generally short-lived (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014) and increasingly rare (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013). In contrast to personalist dictatorships led by a strongman in uniform, juntas often leave power in a negotiated manner. Their self-identified role as guardian of the state implies that the military’s mission extends beyond direct, political rule, and can be threatened by the factionalism, infighting, and intrinsically non-military functions that invariable come with sustained governing. Compared with other autocratic regimes, military juntas are by far the most likely to transition peacefully to democracy (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Debs 2016). In this process of liberalization, however, the military often retains a special and independent status within the state. This indirect form of militarized politics often confounds cross-national quantitative analyses by overlooking mechanisms such as the armed forces retaining reserved policy domains, holding a veto over political decisions, or acting as a critical supporter for the regime. I argue that these indirect mechanisms are also an important, and overlooked, factor in the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

The ongoing regime violence against Rohingya civilians in Myanmar is a stark example of this dynamic. Starting in 2010, a series of political and economic reforms were undertaken by the military regime, culminating in “nationwide parliamentary elections that the public widely accepted as a credible reflection of the will of the people, despite some structural flaws” and a resounding victory for the opposition
party (US Department of State 2015). While the military retained key ministerial posts, seats in parliament, and administrative independence, the liberalization of Myanmar was seen at the time as a major transition away towards democracy. This shift towards an electoral regime did not constrain the military’s use of indiscriminate violence. According to the UN:

> The constitutional powers of the civilian authorities afford little scope for controlling the actions of the [military]. Nor is there any indication that they directly participated in planning or implementing security operations or were part of the command structure. Nevertheless, nothing indicates that civilian authorities used their limited powers to influence the situation...where crimes were being perpetrated. Through their acts and omissions, the civilian authorities have contributed to the commission of atrocity crimes. (United Nations Human Rights Council 2018: 17)

While the military junta that previously ruled Myanmar used indiscriminate violence against civilians widely when countering the range of insurgencies it faced, the scale of the post-liberalization atrocities against the Rohingya stands out. This may be due to the military retaining significant autonomy as the civilian-led regime exploited ethnic and religious divisions for its own benefit, creating the conditions for indiscriminate violence on a massive scale (UN Human Rights Council 2018).

Area studies of specific regions have long found that the armed forces continue to play an important role in politics, despite the marked decline in military regimes coded as such in cross-national datasets (Croissant et al. 2017). Some of this shift to a supporting, rather than outright ruling, role for the military can be explained by policy changes by America in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Previously, the West’s geostrategic priorities led it to retain the loyalty of repressive, but firmly
anti-communists, juntas. While the post-9/11 security environment has created similar pressures, particularly in the greater Middle East, the armed forces have largely remained in the political background in an increasing numbers of states, acting in a supporting, albeit critical, position for the regime.

Part of this shift towards a supporting role is the realization by many militaries that their position in the background shields them from direct scrutiny, both internationally and domestically. Rather than taking the blame for mismanagement at home or face sanction abroad, by positioning themselves as critical supporters of the regime—the indispensible piece of the leadership’s winning coalition—the armed forces can maintain their status, influence, and autonomy at a much lower political and institutional price. While in previous conceptualizations of civil-military relations incidents of coups were seen as the primary evidence of militarized politics, more recent work has theorized that a military comfortable in its privileged, tutelage position within a broader regime is unlikely to attempt an outright coup but will instead undermine the consolidation of civilian control and shape policies to fit its own ends (Croissant et al. 2010, Tusalem 2014).

When conceptualizing regimes and how their makeup shapes decisions to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency more broadly, it is critical to incorporate this dimension of indirect military rule. Previous work which relied on cross-nationally coded definitions of military regimes largely overlooks this more subtle dynamic, often grouping them into a larger agglomeration of unconsolidated anocracies. However, the effect of the military’s approach towards balancing coercion, legitimacy and restraint, their calculation of risk, and their innate assumptions about the efficacy of physical violence, effects that have been shown by Davenport (2007b) to increase the use of force domestically and by Weeks (2014) to increase the risk of interstate war, may all still
manifest themselves in strategies of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in regimes that include indirect military rule.

2.2 Military Autonomy and Impunity

The constitution of the regime and the way that its political leadership approach decisions about the use of force and repression only partially impacts whether indiscriminate counterinsurgency is used. Ultimately, the regime’s decision must be carried out. While tensions between political and military leaders are common occurrences, the context of a civil war makes them particularly acute. An autonomous military may choose to sideline political leaders in decisions, resulting in a more directly adversarial approach towards opposition collective action against the state. For these reasons the autonomy of the military is a second dimension that shapes whether a regime uses a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

2.2.1 Civilian Control of the Military

The military, as an institution, is often a self-interested political actor. In most states, the military is subject to what Huntington termed ‘subjective control’—a series of direct mechanisms crafted by the political leadership to ensure loyalty and civilian command over the armed forces. Huntington contrasts this intrusive method with ‘objective control,’ where professional military norms of nonpartisan orientation and subordination to civilian rule ensure continued separation of political and military spheres of decision-making (Huntington 1957). Subjective control is rarely complete, however—indeed, the motivating question for the study of civil-military relations is why aren’t armies, with their massive coercive abilities, in power across the world.
To maintain control over their militaries, regimes can buy their loyalty with material perks, grant them institutional autonomy, fill their most critical ranks with kin, or fragment them into competing organizations. Importantly, these exercises in subjective control risks weakening the armed forces to the point that they are unable to defend the state from external enemies nor bankrupt the state through excessive largess (Feaver 1999/2003).

The loyalty and capabilities of the security forces—including, in a civil war, the military—drives their ability to implement their political leadership’s chosen strategy. A personalist dictator’s control over the military often requires coup-proofing, or the deliberate weakening and fracturing of the security forces to preclude an organized challenge to the leader’s rule. Rather than promote officers meritocratically and organize the armed forces in a coherent, unitary structure, personalist autocrats often elevate slavishly loyal officers and build a variety of independent, competing military units. While effective at mitigating the threat of a coup, such efforts by personalist dictators severely undercut the combat strength of their militaries (Quinlivan 1999; Talmadge 2015). In these cases, ruling elites place the army outside the regime structure of institutions needed to maintain authority. The coup-proofed military’s resulting weakness is less evident outside the context of an insurgency, since internal security or paramilitary forces chosen for their loyalty to the regime can generally repress unorganized or opposition or small-scale protests. As insurgents consolidate and arm themselves, however, the deliberate weakening through coup-proofing of the army may become a critical vulnerability for the regime.

Backlash against the regime’s orders to use indiscriminate violence can come from the military, particularly if it has been politically exiled by a regime that considers

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6Building on the definition of militarized politics from Chapter 1, such a coup-proofing effort which involves politicizing what are typically military functions is a method of subjective control that is the inverse of indirect military rule.
the armed forces themselves as a threat. The willingness of the army to use lethal force against its own people is an important, and often unknown, variable to the regime leadership early on. While the military is often considered as a unitary actor, in many cases it is split into various fiefdoms where loyalty lies with a particular commander or service branch. In these cases, the principal (the regime’s political leadership) faces an array of agents within a fractured military hierarchy, each of which can play an independent role in executing a decided-upon strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency (Albrecht and Ohl 2016). For example, in the 2011 anti-regime protests in Tunisia, the military opted not to use force against demonstrators. This refusal was largely due to it being sidelined by President Ben Ali’s regime in the years prior to the Arab Spring and resulted in his ouster (Brooks 2013). Leadership in military regimes, in particular, should have better information about the reliability and unity of the armed forces than any other autocratic regime type, making their decision to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency less contingent on perceptions of the loyalty of the army.

Another stark example of this dynamic is the fall of the Ceaușescu regime in Romania. Large-scale demonstrations erupted in 1989, despite the efforts of the powerful secret police. The military, which had been starved of resources and sidelined by the regime, did not intervene: “the refusal of the regular army to suppress the demonstrations was due in part to its alienation from Ceaușescu as a result of the dictator’s coddling of the Securitate [secret police] and his use of it to spy on and divide the army.” (Goodwin 2001: 285) In contrast to the communist leadership of other Warsaw Pact countries, who largely survived the collapse of their regimes, military rebels captured and executed Ceaușescu after series of battles with loyalist, hard-line security forces.
These two examples of militaries refusing to use indiscriminate violence against armed opponents of a regime which has sidelined the army highlight the risk of coup-proofing. By fracturing the security services into competing fiefdoms, the political leadership minimizes the risk that any one of them—including the military—can overthrow them. Such coup-proofing badly damages military effectiveness, as seen in the examples of Saddam Hussein’s military performance in 1991 and the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in the mid-1970s (Talmadge 2015). Coup-proofing also diminishes the incentives for the armed forces, who often view themselves as defenders of the nation rather than strictly the regime, to use violence indiscriminately at the behest of an embattled regime. In cases of militarized politics, however, the armed forces are invested in the regime’s decisions and survival. While through the preservation of reserved domains and prevention of reform the military does hamstring the state, it does not seek to upend the existing political order. Although many long-standing arguments about the use of violent repression center around autocratic regimes such as Ben Ali or Ceauşescu’s, the more insidious mechanism of militarized politics may have a positive effects on the regime’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

2.2.2 ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS

This military, typically the most cohesive organization in a state undergoing political upheaval, often plays an important role in political transitions. The collapse of Soviet communism, in the eyes of many political scientists and policymakers, removed the artificial constraints that precluded polities from forming liberal democratic regimes. In their landmark book on transitions from authoritarian rule, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) emphasized that liberalizing reforms were often started and, at least initially, managed by authoritarian rulers. This is not done as an act of political
self-abnegation, but rather as a method of assuaging calls for reform while ultimately remaining in charge, or at an absolute minimum managing the transition so that it is beneficial to the ruling elite.

Despite hopes to the contrary, transitions do not always result in a consolidated democracy. Procedural reforms that avoid substantive changes can often buttress the incumbent—for example, authoritarian regimes can hold elections as a method of legitimizing their continued rule, thereby reducing the risk of a violent removal from power and lowering the costs of continued repression (Cox 2008; Svolik 2009; Magaloni 2010). Throughout the 1990s, former communist regimes were largely deemed to be in the process of transitioning, alongside former military dictatorships in the global south that were at the forefront of third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). As the decade wore on, however, observers noted that many regimes had stalled along this road to reform, opting instead for a system of ‘illiberal democracy’ that included many of the electoral procedures identified by Schumpeter while ignoring the longer list of conditions necessary for full democracy (Zakaria 1997). Overtly military regimes, where a junta of high-ranking officers ruled directly, also became less common in the post-Cold War period. In many cases, though, the military did not withdraw from politics, but rather took up a supporting role within the regime. By acting as a repressive agent for the regime, wielding veto power of government policies, and retaining autonomy and impunity, militaries in these regimes retained significant influence (Croissant et al. 2017) and often sought to thwart the process of consolidation, ensuring their continued political relevance even if they were not directly in power (Acemoğlu et al. 2010; Gürsoy 2017).

Autocracies go through a period of consolidation as well. In this phase, competing groups often seek to retain their veto over the leadership, while the aspiring dictator tries to limit their autonomy. Ideally a leader would seek to control all potential
challengers to their rule, but this process is rife with the danger of backlash from elites or a coup by the military (Svolik 2012). While this period can be an unstable, dangerous time for the regime, continued turbulence may be advantageous for the military (Gürsoy 2017). The armed forces’ institutional cohesion and ability to credibly threaten violence can result in it acting with impunity in an unconsolidated regime.

In short, transitions generally offer the armed forces an opportunity to militarize politics by establishing themselves as a powerful member of the selectorate. From this position they can preserve their institutional autonomy, act as political spoilers, or serve as critical supporters of an embattled leaders. In the context of a civil war, this privileged position of indirect military rule within a larger regime can result in security policies—in particular, the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency—that reflect the armed forces’ internal preferences more than the will of a political leadership that is struggling to establish its legitimacy or maintain its rule.

The level of regime consolidation and the associated risk of the military operating with impunity shape the interaction between the civilian leadership and the armed forces formalized below. As stated in the opening of this chapter, political survival requires striking a balance of legitimacy, co-option, and coercion. While maintaining this balance requires continuous readjustment and is particularly difficult in the context of an intrastate conflict, it is most challenging early in a regime’s tenure. In all the theoretical variations framed in Figure 2.1 (below), this dimension of regime consolidation remains as a critical background factor in explaining and predicting the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.
2.3 Interaction between Political Regime and Military

The interaction between the political leadership and the military shapes not only what policy is decided on also how it is carried out. The context of an armed intrastate conflict reshapes the number of viable political actors and often increases the importance of the military to the regime. This is particularly true in an unconsolidated regime. Figure 2.1 depicts how the interaction of the breadth of political support and the political role of the military shapes whether a regime will use indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MILITARY ROLE IN POLITICS</th>
<th>BREADTH OF REGIME SUPPORT</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Small</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Box 1: “Hanging Together”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal gap between pol &amp; mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Communal military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(coethnic/factional with leader)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Military regime (junta)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Large</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Box 3: “We’ll Do it Our Way”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High civ-mil tension, may lead to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Slippage (indiscriminate COIN)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Box 4: “War by Other Means”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other COIN approaches/ disengagement from conflict</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Box 2: “Wait and See”</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Military sidelined, may lead to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Military shirking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Political leaders using other means (militias, gendarmerie, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2.1: Theorized Interaction between Political and Military
2.3.1 Box 1: “Hanging Together”

Regimes whose political survival hinges on the support of a narrow winning coalition which includes the military—a situation seen in juntas, for example, or in civilian-led regimes where the military is one of a small handful of supporters—will tend to use large-scale, indiscriminate violence against civilians. An overthrow of the regime would, at a minimum, discredit the military’s elite in the new order, and more likely end its institutional autonomy. In cases of militaries structured around shared communal ties with the regime, there is a strong incentive to stay loyal to the political leadership and use unlimited military means (Makara 2013; Albrecht and Ohl 2016). Finally, in these cases where the armed forces are intimately involved in all political decisions, there is no room for ‘slippage’ or the military to act as a spoiler; its violent actions are a direct, physical manifestation of the regime’s drive for political survival (Davenport 2007b).

2.3.2 Box 2: “Wait and See”

Leaders whose political power is built on the loyalty of a small winning coalition are often concerned about threats from a politically assertive military. To counter this threat, they will create alternate sources of coercive power, such as competing domestic intelligence or gendarmerie forces. By focusing the military on external threats or starving them of resources altogether, the regime can either exclude them from the winning coalition needed to maintain domestic control.

This balance can become problematic in times of crisis, though, as the military may not be willing to risk its reputation by using indiscriminate violence against civilians. While alternate domestic security forces may be able to repress day-to-day dissent, countering an organized, armed opposition movement is often beyond their
organizational capacity. A sidelined army, however, may be loathe to intervene on behalf of such a regime. Therefore while a coup-proofed military may not be a direct threat to the regime its inability or unwillingness to defend the regime in times of intrastate conflict may threaten the leadership’s political survival. Alternatively, once a civil war reaches a certain level the dynamics of revenge and defection may drive the military to accept the regime’s desire to use indiscriminate means. In such cases of a regime with a small winning coalition and a marginalized military, the probability of repressive counterinsurgency being used may be contingent on case-specific factors.

2.3.3 Box 3: “We’ll Do It Our Way”

A high level of militarized politics, coupled with the relatively large selectorate in a multiparty system, can result in cases where the armed forces exercise outsized influence over the government’s makeup and regime policy more broadly. In these cases, an assertive, autonomous military may seek a ‘free hand’ from the regime to pursue a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, despite the risk this decision entails for the political leadership. If the regime is unwilling or unable to rein in the military, the result may be indiscriminate application of a military strategy that carries high risks for the regime’s survival.

2.3.4 Box 4: “War by Other Means”

In regimes that rely on a large or diverse winning coalition to sustain their rule, a decision to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency may inspire a political backlash against such harsh measures. If the military is subordinate to civilian policymakers (unlike in Box 3) this largely precludes its use. It also constrains the scale and conduct of overseas counterinsurgency campaigns by established democracies with politically subordinate militaries (Merom 2003). Regimes that draw from a large and diverse
selectorate may also be more attuned to the long-term risks of violence and more measured in their application of it (Weeks 2014). By drawing on a large and diverse winning coalition, the leadership of such regimes may also be able to offer credible commitments of autonomy or political representation to the insurgents and their supporters (Svolik 2012). The militaries in these regimes are often professionally socialized to apolitically subordinate themselves to civilian rule, and the broad alignment of the regime’s interests with the state’s reduces the risk of the armed forces’ loyalty being split between regime and state. This alignment makes indiscriminate counterinsurgency highly unlikely.

![Figure 2.2: Examples of Interaction between Political and Military](partially adapted from Croissant, Kuehn, Lorenz and Chambers 2013)
2.4 Hypotheses

The theorized interaction between the breadth of the regime’s support and the political role of the military outlined in Figure 2.1 can be formalized in a series of hypotheses that more narrowly test the prediction of each quadrant. While the first three hypotheses below have been explored elsewhere in the literature on civil wars and state repression, their role here is twofold. First, their specification and testing establish the validity of the scope conditions and quantitative multi-level model in the quantitative portion of this dissertation. Second, their expression form a firm foundation for Hypothesis 4, which explores the central explanation of my theory: that indiscriminate counterinsurgency is shaped by the interaction of militarized politics and the breadth of a regime’s political support.

2.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Democracy

Democracies are characterized by a wide breadth of popular support for the regime and a military whose position is clearly subordinate civilian policy makers. In Figure 2.1, this corresponds with the lower right quadrant (Box 4) and a lower probability of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

\[
H_1: \text{Democratic regimes are less likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than more autocratic ones}
\]

2.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Selectorate Size

Regimes that draw their power from a broad range of politically enfranchised supporters must balance their varied demands, making them more open to compromise and less inclined to use indiscriminate violence. In contrast, regimes with a narrow base of support must ruthlessly prioritize loyalty and discount anyone outside of the...
small winning coalition to maintain power. In Figure 2.1, these regimes with a broader base of support are depicted on the right half of the diagram.

\[ H_2: \text{Regimes with a broader base of support are less likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than those whose power is drawn from a small base.} \]

2.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Regime Types

How regimes consider the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency may be shaped by dynamics beyond the differentiation between democracies and autocracies. Relevant variation between autocracies can shape regime decisions about conflict onset, restriction of liberties, and other behavior that had previously been largely considered common to non-democracies. Military regimes, in particular, have been shown in other work to be prone to wholesale violations of physical integrity rights and likely to initiate interstate war. In Figure 2.1, military regimes are included in the top left quadrant (Box 1).

\[ H_3: \text{Military-led regimes are more likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than other regimes.} \]

2.4.4 Hypothesis 4: Indirect Military Rule

In countries with militarized politics where the regime needs a wide range of supporters to remain in power the civilian leadership may be unwilling to bear the political costs of opposing the armed forces or unable to prevent them from acting with impunity. In such cases, I posit that the regime may default to the military’s inherent preference for indiscriminate counterinsurgency, even though they may be otherwise
considered a procedural democracy. In Figure 2.1, this case is represented in the top right quadrant (Box 3).

\[ H_4: \text{Regimes with a diverse base of support but militarized politics are more likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than those with a military subordinate to civilian control.} \]

Hypothesis 4 gets to the core of this dissertation’s proposed explanation of the puzzle as to why some regimes use indiscriminate counterinsurgency, despite the high risks and dubious effectiveness of such an approach. This hypothesis frames the question as one of civilian control over the military, a unique approach that builds on both the extant cross-national literature on regimes types and repression and also the narrow histories of specific conflicts. By extended this hypothesis across the full range of regimes involved in intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War, this hypothesis provides a novel insight into the more general relationship between militarized politics and indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

2.5 Alternate Explanations

There is a range of other explanations for indiscriminate counterinsurgency that have been developed within the broader research project into state repression, human rights, and civil war. Accounting for these alternate mechanisms is critical to a valid exploration of the role of militarized politics in indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

The first is linked to a regime’s cooperation in the US-led Global War on Terror, which arguably reintroduced an element of overriding geostrategic incentive to tolerate certain behaviors that, immediately after the end of the Cold War, were no longer permissible. Second is the deliberate use of violence as a signal of strength to deter other separatist groups. Third is a clumsy response to evasive guerrilla forces that
draw support from sympathetic civilians. Fourth is is popular frustration with costly conflicts, while the sixth alternate explanation considers whether oil rents, correlated with a host of governance ills, can reduce the domestic and international costs of repression for a regime. Regional effects, where shared governance approaches, human rights standards, and history influence regime behavior in similar ways, is the fourth alternate explanation considered. In the penultimate alternation explanation, pro-government militias can potentially act independently of the military and carry out a policy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. Finally, an independent judiciary may be able to curtail both political and military excesses, regardless of the mechanisms laid out in Figure 2.1.

The end of the Cold War led not only to a widespread wave of political transition towards democracy but also to a shift away from external support to repressive regimes that, despite their indiscriminate abuses, were seen as reliable geopolitical allies in the larger struggle between the US and USSR. The post-9/11 US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) has arguably reintroduced the incentive for the West to overlook abuses in exchange for support against the campaign against violent extremism (Callaway and Matthews 2008). Alternatively, increased breadth and depth of US presence in states involved in the GWOT may reduce indiscriminate use of repression by regimes concerned about the exposure of abuses. Therefore, an alternate explanation for variation in regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency may be the state’s post-9/11 geostrategic or ideological value.

Indiscriminate regime violence can be a calculated means of signaling strength and resolve to other possible separatist communities in a state, a benefit which extends beyond the immediate conflict dyad. To deter other groups from demanding independence, a ‘separatist domino effect,’ the regime may publicly and indiscriminately use lethal violence against civilians whose coethnics are rebelling against the state. By
establishing this reputation for violently repressing separatists, the regime can deter others who may seek autonomy or independence (Walter 2009). More recent work that builds on Walter’s theory finds that a regime that accommodates a nonviolent separatist movement does not face the same reputation costs as one that concedes during a civil war. Alternatively, a regime and a separatist movement may be able to find a mutually acceptable compromise and avoid both full scale war and outright independence (Bormann and Savun 2018). If the region in question is critical to the regime’s political power base or important economically, a dynamic seen in ‘sons of the soil’ wars and elsewhere, conflicts often endure far longer than similar ones elsewhere (Fearon 2004). In contrast to ‘center-seeking’ rebels with maximalist aims who seek to overthrow the regime and seize control of the state, separatists can gain limited autonomy as part of a negotiated settlement, allowing the regime to end the conflict short of resorting to indiscriminate counterinsurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2007).

Guerrilla warfare, in particular, has been historically strongly correlated with state abuse of civilians. Unlike conventional civil wars, where both sides are organized along traditional military lines, or symmetric nonconventional conflicts, where neither the regime nor the insurgents can muster the organization, training, or equipment to fight effectively at a large scale, in irregular (or guerrilla) conflicts the rebels are often hard to differentiate from the population among whom they operate and draw support (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Faced with the inability to discriminate between sympathetic non-combatants and guerrilla fighters, regimes often resort to mass killings of civilians in order to ‘drain the sea’ of support for the irregular insurgents (Valentino et al. 2004). This argument is not universal, however; others argue that mass killing is more likely in conventionally-fought intrastate wars (Krcmaric 2018).

Alex Downes (2008) argues that even erstwhile restrained democracies can target civilians during war during long, costly wars. While looking primarily at interstate
wars, he argues that popular domestic frustration with the cost and duration of a conflict, particularly a war of attrition, can drive an established liberal democratic regime to use violence against enemy noncombatants. In intrastate war, this popular frustration can emerge from rebel violence such as acts of terrorism. Emerging and unconsolidated democracies face additional pressures, as elite politics and mass mobilization can take an illiberal form that casts a minority group as a fifth column (Gagnon 2004; Mansfield and Snyder 2009). Taken together, these scholars argue that popular frustration with a costly war can lead to indiscriminate violence against civilians.

Regimes which benefit from significant economic rents—in particular, from oil exports—can leverage these resources to repress domestic challenges to their continued rule (Girod, Stewart, and Walters 2016). While other lootable resources, such as illicit drugs, diamonds, or rare earth minerals are correlated with longer intrastate conflicts, oil stands out as both conflict-inducing and perpetuating (M. Ross 2004). Many of the arguments against indiscriminate counterinsurgency laid out in the beginning of Chapter 1 are negated by the regime’s access to a reliable and lucrative source of income that is independent of popular support. Building on this extant work on domestic protests and conflict onset, high oil rents may be another driving mechanism behind indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

Regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency may be influence by region as well. Norms of state-citizen relationships, standards of governance, and patterns of state capacity can all be roughly similar across a common region. Some regions, such as Latin America, are shaped by a similar colonial heritage and economic position in the global South, while others, such as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), are greatly influenced by a shared religion. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union share a common ideological and economic foundation, as well as recent memories of
post-communist turmoil. These regional effects may override the interaction between a politicized military and the breadth of the regime’s support that I hypothesize best explain the use of repressive counterinsurgency.

Other than the military, a possible perpetrator of indiscriminate counterinsurgency are militias. Theoretically, there are three reasons governments would want to outsource violence to pro-government militias. First, the leadership may want to ‘keep their hands clea’ by creating ambiguity about culpability for the abuses that they tacitly approve of. Second, autocratic militaries are often subject to thorough coup-proofing, which saps them of their ability to fight (Eck 2015). Returning to Figure 1 above, this would be the case in the lower left quadrant (Box 2). Finally, the military may be required to focus on external, interstate threats, leaving the counterinsurgency efforts to a less well-resourced militia. Stanton (2015) finds, however, that governments rarely outsource violence in this way. While militias often use indiscriminate methods, they do so alongside government forces and because of a strategic decision by the regime. Cohen and Nordas (2015) find similar patterns in the use of sexual violence by pro-government militias—rather than delegate shameful behavior, government forces and their associated militias act in similar ways. The identification problem that limits a military’s ability to discriminate between combatants and civilians can often be solved using locally-recruited militias (Kalyvas 2004; Luttwak 2007; Lyall 2010). If effectively used as a means to distinguish unaffiliated civilians from those that actively and materially support the insurgents, pro-government militias can reduce indiscriminate violence. This use of militias as sources of local intelligence to deliver selective, as opposed to indiscriminate, violence is contingent on the regime’s military using them effectively in this role and militia members not using the military to settle local disputes unassociated with the conflict itself (Kalyvas 2006).
Strong domestic judicial institutions have been shown limit human rights violations, even in autocratic states (Conrad, 2014). Mitchell, Ring, and Spellman (2013) show that states with common law systems are particularly respectful of their citizen’s human rights, even when controlling for democracy, military regimes, and civil war.

Looking specifically at torture in the post-Cold War period of 1987-2000, Powell and Staton (2009) find the effectiveness of the judicial system to be the most significant restraint on regime behavior. In their more general criticism of the quantitative-centric literature on the determinants of state repression, Hill and Jones (2014) explicitly spare work on domestic legal institutions such as the judiciary from their harshest critiques of the quantitative civil war literature. This intriguing line of research complements my argument in several ways. First, regime type and the strength of domestic judicial institutions are not independent. Second, while the research on the judiciary listed considers all state abuses, the context of intrastate war often allows the regime to implement emergency measures and suspension of legal rights. While juntas or personalist dictators may seek to neuter the courts at lower levels of conflict, more institutionalized systems such as single-party autocracies may not. At higher intensities of conflict, though, constraints on the judiciary may be common throughout.

Importantly, these alternate explanations for a regime’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency does not negate the viability of the theory of indirect military rule laid out in this chapter. Several of these other mechanisms—in particular, an independent judiciary, unconsolidated regime, and pro-government militias—may act as complements to a politically independent military’s ability to carry out such a campaign. Additionally, the military may be able to leverage popular frustration with the length and cost of a conflict to further its preferred approach. In sum, many of these alternate explanations may be extensions of a politicized military’s outsized role in shaping and executing a counterinsurgency campaign.
2.6 Summary

This chapter outlined a theory of indiscriminate counterinsurgency—the regime’s intentional, widespread use of lethal violence against civilians not directly involved in military operations during a civil war. This theory hinges on the interaction of two related, but often independent, mechanisms: the political leadership’s continued balancing of supporters to ensure political survival, and the military’s institutional desire for autonomy and its status within the regime’s power structure. When the survival of the regime and the military are closely intertwined, the incentives to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency are highest. When the military has been sidelined through comprehensive coup-proofing, it may fail to act as a ‘repressor of last resort’ for an embattled, autocratic regime. If the armed forces have a powerful veto over civilian policy they may carry out an indiscriminate counterinsurgency campaign despite political concerns, as the militarized politics of the regimes makes the army indispensable for the leadership’s rule. Finally, a military firmly under the control of a civilian regime that draws its political power from a larger coalition of supporters is the least likely to use such indiscriminate violence.
Chapter 3

A Quantitative Model of Indiscriminate Counterinsurgency

The purpose of the statistical analysis portion of this research design is four fold. First, by considering a large set of diverse cases across a quarter century, I aim to uncover patterns of regimes use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency across a wide range of conflicts and contexts. Second, the large-n portion will build on existing quantitative work in the study of civil wars through the novel extension of expert-coded measurements of the indirect role of the military in domestic politics. Third, by identifying outlier cases, the statistical analysis will identify additional factors to explore in the qualitative case study. Fourth, the multi-level model developed and tested below lends itself well to exploring several of the alternate explanations of regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency laid out at the end of Chapter 2.

3.1 Design and Method

To test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2, I develop and test a series of a Bayesian multi-level linear regression models. This approach contrasts with much of the existing quantitative political science work on state repression, intrastate conflict, or regime types, work which typically uses logistic regressions with dummy variables to account for structural factors that vary little over the independently modeled country-year
observations. While using such a fixed effects approach to account for between-
country (or other higher level) variation in time-series cross-sectional data does allow
for cleaner interpretation of observation (often country-year) level effects, this ‘no-
pooling’ approach estimates a separate intercept for each group which accounts for
all inter-group variation and “does not allow [for] the sharing of potentially impor-
tant information from across [higher-level groups]” (Shor, Bafumi, Keele, and Park
2007: 168; Stadelmann-Steffen and Bühlmann 2009, Bartels 2009). This is particularly
important when considering the effect of time-invariant or slow-moving variables such
as ethnic fractionalization, ruggedness of terrain, population size, or political insti-
tutions alongside more dynamic variables such as conflict intensity (Bell and Jones
2015).

A multi-level approach, by contrast, allows for partial pooling of like groups. The
modeled effect of each higher-level group (eg. country or school district) is incorpo-
rated into the base, observational level (eg. country-year or pupil) equation, resulting
in improved model fit and more accurate uncertainty estimates (Bafumi and Gelman
2006; Shor et al. 2007). Multi-level models are clearer representations of theorized
effects of structural and regime-level factors on a dependent variable across a range of
cases than the interaction terms commonly used in maximum likelihood models such
as logistic regressions (Chaudoin, Milner, and Pang 2015).

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1Examples cited in previous chapters include Weeks (2014), Stanton (2016), Davenport
(2007b), Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014), Downes and Cochran (2010), and Valentino
et al. (2004). This widespread use of pooled time-series cross section analysis is common
beyond just conflict studies: Stadelmann-Steffen and Bühlmann describe it as “en vogue in
the relevant [comparative political science] literature” (2008: 30).

2Bafumi and Gelman (2006) prefer calling these “modeled varying intercepts,” while
acknowledging that many refer to them as “random effects.” Gelman and Hill list five dif-
fering definitions for fixed and random effects, emphasizing that there is no consensus in the
Finally, the basic assumption that underpin frequentist regression—that the sample analyzed is randomly drawn from a larger population—does not hold in this research design, which considers all observable conflict-years. Bayesian inference overcomes this problem by incorporating subjective probability into the model (Western and Jackman 1994). Bayesian multi-level setups are better suited to model populations with several, increasingly narrow, hierarchical levels, such as my three level conceptualization of conflict-year, country, and regime type detailed in Section 3.3 below (Shor et al. 2007; Stegmueller 2013; Pang 2014).

3.2 Measuring Indiscriminate Counterinsurgency

As detailed in Chapter 1, I define indiscriminate counterinsurgency as a strategy of fighting a civil war that includes the widespread, intentional use of lethal violence against civilians, an approach that stands in contrast to the selective use of force against rebel combatants and those directly supporting the insurgents with intelligence, logistics, or protection. Indiscriminate counterinsurgency is distinct from a simple count of civilian casualties in war, as such deaths can also be collateral to military operations that target enemy combatants or selective regime violence that specifically targets individuals who materially support the insurgents.

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3While Western and Jackman argue for the use of theoretically-informed priors, I use diffuse (of ‘flat’) priors in my analysis. This avoids the criticism that I am priming the model with preloaded answers, while retaining the theoretical and practical advantages of Bayesian analysis. The use of uninformed priors is common practice in much of the Bayesian inference work in social science (Shor et al. 2007).

4As outlined in Chapter 1, for this doctrine of double effect to be valid force must be directed at and proportional to the military objective being targeted.

5Such selective violence can be large scale, such as the approximately 500,000 South Vietnamese civilians killed by the Viet Cong in the pre-Tet Offensive phase of the Vietnam War (Kalyvas 2004).
Violence against civilians can be measured in several ways. This section surveys the most comprehensive and widely used cross-national measurements of repression, focusing on how they conceptualize and measure different types of regime violations, particularly in regards to whether state violence was selective or indiscriminate. It ends by outlining the work of Fariss (2014), who integrated several of these datasets into a dynamic model of state repression that accounts for shifts in measurement over time as global human rights standards improved over the past four decades. This synthesis by Farriss captures not only the intensity of state violence against civilians but also how selectively it was applied, a measure that in the context of a civil war aligns with my concept of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

Most fundamentally, regime conduct is captured either through standards- or event-based data (Poe and Tate 1994). Standards-based datasets use a variety of sources, such as interviews, inspections, and media reports to generate an annual, written reports on human rights in a given country. Regime behavior is measured against an ideal type, rather than against other that of other regimes. Since the mid-1970s, annual reports by the US Department of State and Amnesty International have been generated for nearly every country, allowing for global and year-on-year comparisons. Similar measures have been produced by Freedom House. Teams of researchers have systematically coded these reports, generating ordinal rankings for political terror, physical integrity violations, and civil liberties abuses for each available country-year (eg. Poe and Tate 1994; Wood and Gibney 2010; Cingranelli and Richards 2010). While during the Cold War there was criticism that ideological bias factored into reporting by the US State Department, these reports now more closely align with the ones independently generated by Amnesty International (Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 2001). Standards-based datasets allows for a more holistic assessment
of a regime’s behavior, since they can incorporate broader repressive trends than the more strictly defined event data.

In contrast to standards-based data, event data such as the One-Sided Violence (OSV) database maintained by Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) captures the magnitude of specific events, such as killings, torture, or forced displacement. Event datasets have several advantages over standards-based data. First, they can be updated retrospectively as evidence of past atrocities is uncovered. Second, they are relatively objective—deaths, for example, are more easily quantifiable than the tone of a human rights report.\textsuperscript{6} Third, event data remains constant through time, while standards-based data has been shown to shift as norms shift. Put another way, it takes less violence for a state to score a 5 (the worst score) in 2010 than it did two decades earlier, due to the diffusion of norms proscribing state violence. Events-based data, by contrast, does not suffer from this inflation (Fariss 2014).

Event-based datasets, however, often include a large number of false negatives, where a lack of reporting may be assumed to be a lack of violence. While they are often quite accurate in the context of a specific conflict, where historians can draw on primary sources and physical evidence for specific counts, event-based data is often uneven globally. Several datasets draw from global media sources for event data, creating bias against historically under-reported regions. In short, while often they can often excellent documentation of a particular event or period of time, event-based datasets often suffer from false precision when used globally.

\textsuperscript{6}This is not meant to imply that event-based data is inherently apolitical. This is particularly true for estimates of indirect deaths, which often sidestep alternate (and often violent or repressive) scenarios and instead compare mortality rates against an idealized benchmark for greater political impact (Andreas and Greenhill 2010). Count data also often fails to differentiate between victims of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, selective government violence, and collateral damage (Kalyvas 2004).
In order to quantify regime behavior for cross-national comparison, several groups have reviewed standards-based reports and systematically coded regime-years using common criteria. One widely used set is the Political Terror Scale (PTS), reintroduced most recently by Wood and Gibney (2010). The PTS systematically codes US State Department and Amnesty International Reports from 1976 to the present on a 5-point ordinal scale that captures scope and intensity of state terror.\(^7\) Both of these dimensions are necessary for my conceptualization of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, since it must be non-selective in scope and lethal in intensity. Per its codebook, the PTS scores explicitly capture “the proportion of the population subjected to abuse (e.g., targeted and selected violence, rather than indiscriminate abuse)” (Haschke 2017: 5).\(^8\) Importantly for the quantification of repressive counterinsurgency, the PTS considers “actual violations of physical integrity rights more than general political repression” (Wood and Gibney 2010: 370). In this regard, the

---

\(^7\)State terror is defined as “violations of physical or personal integrity rights...by a state (or its agents). The meaning of the word terror that [Wood and Gibney] employ is different from the meaning that ‘terror’ has now taken on, particularly after the events of 11 September 2001.” (Wood and Gibney 2010: 369) While violations of physical integrity rights by pro-government militias are included in the measurement, general levels of apolitical violence such as crime are not.

\(^8\)Specifically, the coding scheme for the PTS is:
Level 1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
Level 4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas. (Emphasis added)
Level 5: The terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals (Emphasis added) (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke, Arnon 2017)
PTS differs from scales such as Freedom House which focus largely on constraints on political liberties. In the most comprehensively repressive states, where opposition to the regime is next to impossible to organize, the level of physical violence can often be surprisingly low outside the context of a civil war.

A second widely used standards-based dataset is the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). While both CIRI and PTS largely draw on the same fundamental documents—annually produced, country specific reports prepared by Amnesty International and the US State Department—the CIRI project disaggregates its measurements into several subtypes. Specifically with regards to indiscriminate counterinsurgency, CIRI’s category of physical integrity rights codes torture, extrajudicial killing, disappearance, and political imprisonment independently. This differentiation between different forms of abuse is particularly valuable to researchers looking at state compliance with particular treaties that preclude specific types of violations, such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture (eg. Cardenas 2007; Davenport 2007b; Conrad 2014). Additionally, it is helpful in exploring whether the specific repressive methods that regimes use are complements or substitutes. For example, imprisonment and torture can be considered complements, as political imprisonment is often a precondition for torture. Since extrajudicial killing eliminates a rival while torture can be used to extract information or intimidate, but not necessarily kill, these two types of abuses may be considered substitutes (Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014). This is particularly informative when considering how different regime types tend to use particular forms of repression (Davenport 2007b).

These two sources—PTS and CIRI—have been the foundation for much of the cross-national quantitative research into state repression in the past two decades: “between 1999 and 2011, ninety articles using either PTS or CIRI were published in
the top political science and human rights journals” (Clark and Sikkink 2013: 541).

In the four decades since the inaugural publication of the annual series of human rights reports that underpin these datasets, however, two shifts in the field have taken place. First, as normative constraints on abuses have diffused across the world, state behavior that was once considered less than ideal but within reasonable bounds is now viewed much more harshly, a drift that Fariss (2014: 297) calls “changing standards of accountability.” Second, as monitoring and reporting increase, violations that were previously invisible are being meticulously documented, creating a “human rights information paradox” where more accurate measurement and greater access leads to the impression that human rights violations are increasing (Clark and Sikkink 2013: 542). These two trends can lead to misleading results when using either PTS or CIRI as the basis for analyzing changes in state behavior such as indiscriminate counterinsurgency over time (Fariss 2014; Clark and Sikkink 2013; Fariss and Schnakenberg 2014).

To account for these shifts in standards-based measurement of state respect for human rights, Fariss (2014) developed a ‘dynamic standard model’ that uses event-based data to adjust for the changing standards of accountability over time. Despite the differences between the two broad categories, both event- and standards-based datasets seek to measure the same underlying, latent variable—state use of repression. Since event-based data captures absolute levels of violence, it forms a constant baseline through which to adjust the more widely measured but subjective standards-based datasets and account for changing standards over time. While standards-based measurements evolves in response to new norms and more in-depth reporting, making it seem that human rights abuses are getting worse when using uncorrected time-series, cross-sectional data panels, event-based data can correct this inflation by tying human rights standards to objective measurements of state violence.
In the series of multi-level models of regime use of violence in civil wars presented below I use the dynamic standard model dataset developed by Fariss as both the dependent variable and to control for pre-war levels of state repression.\footnote{The lagged measure of repression is used in the structural, as opposed to the conflict-year or regime, level of the multi-level model, detailed further below.} This measure incorporates several standards-based sources, including the PTS and CIRI, along with five event-based datasets, including the UCDP One-Sided Violence and Political Instability Task Force’s Genocide and Politicide measurements (Fariss 2014). The differentiation between selective and indiscriminate violence is explicitly captured in these base sources; the Political Terror Scale, for example, gives a worse score if repression is applied to the whole population, rather than just those involved in politics (Gibney et al. 2017). By incorporating these various sources into a single measurement of the regime’s use of repression, Fariss’s dataset allows for more accurate and widely comparable consideration of the occurrence of indiscriminate counterinsurgency that accounts for shifts in standards-based measurement over time and overlaps temporally limited datasets into a longer-running measure of the underlying proclivity of regimes to repress indiscriminately.

3.3 Base Model

The basic structure of the multi-level model is largely common throughout the various specifications used to explore the hypotheses posited in Chapter 2. The fundamental observation is the post-Cold War intrastate conflict-year, as defined by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (ACD), from 1990-2013.\footnote{I consider both low- and high-intensity conflicts, defined by ACD as >25 and >1000 annual battle-deaths, respectively.} Each of these level-1 observations in the base model has three component variables: the dependent

\[ y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{ijt-1} + \beta_2 z_{ijt} + \epsilon_{ijt}, \]
variable, detailed above; regime duration (logged), which measures how long the political regime in the state fighting a civil war has been in power; intensity level of the conflict, as defined and measured in the ACD.\textsuperscript{11}

The level-2 observations capture structural conditions that are largely invariate during a conflict (Bell and Jones 2015). Level-2 observations are delineated by intrastate conflict, as defined by PRIO; a single conflict, often spanning several years, is considered once at this level. Each conflict has its own set of particular structural, level-2 measurements—if a state is fighting multiple insurgencies with distinct starting years, some structural variables may vary marginally between the two conflicts. The level-2, structural variables in the base model presented in this section are drawn from concepts found to be relevant elsewhere in the literature on civil wars onset, intensity, and state repression.\textsuperscript{12} The first two are measures of the ruggedness of the terrain and ethnic fractionalization, building on Fearon and Laitin’s seminal 2003 article and subsequent work. The third and fourth structural variables are Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDPpc) and population, measured by the United Nations and World Bank, respectively. These measures are used widely as proxies for state capacity (eg Valentino et al. 2004; Davenport 2007b; Hill and Jones 2014). The fifth level-2 variable is the KOF combined index of globalization, which is the weighted average of economic, social, and political globalization as detailed by Dreher (2006). Finally, the structural set of variables includes a lag of the dependent variable, as calculated by Fariss and set to the year prior to the outbreak of

\textsuperscript{11}While battle deaths are separate from violence against civilians, and it is possible to have either a high-intensity civil war where neither side uses indiscriminate violence against civilians or a lower-intensity conflict with relatively few battle deaths but large-scale regime abuses, controlling for intensity accounts for the scale of overall violence and the capacity for lethality present.

\textsuperscript{12}See Hill and Jones 2014 for an overview of these ‘usual suspects’ and their relative importance in predictive modeling of state repression.
the conflict, as recorded by the ACD. Lagging the dependent variable in this way accounts for the preexisting, structural level of repression by the state independent of the conflict.

The third level of the multi-level model centers on the regime. Changes in regime are taken from the Polity IV persist measurement, which considers how long “the polity has persisted without a recorded change in values on any of the six\(^{13}\) component variables” (Polity IV handbook 2016: 17). Periods that are coded by Polity as foreign occupation (interruption, -66), a complete collapse of authority (interregnum, -77), or transition (-88) are dropped from dataset, as these years fall outside the scope of this research since the regime is not in a position to make or implement a decision on whether to use repressive counterinsurgency. Additionally, country-year observations with missing data were deleted from the dataset.\(^{14}\)

The basic three level model outlined above can be expressed as:

\[
y_{ijk} = \alpha + \beta_1^w x_{1ij} + \beta_2^w x_{2ik} + \gamma_1 U_j + \gamma_2 x_{1j} + \delta_1 Z_k + \delta_2 x_{2k} + e_{ijk} + f_j + g_k
\]

where \(y\) is the dependent variable, measured at each \(i\), or conflict-year (\(N=625\)). The constant is \(\alpha\). The level-1 coefficients, \(\beta_1^w\) and \(\beta_2^w\), represent the within-group effects of the variables \(x_1\) and \(x_2\), respectively. The second (structural) level covariates are

---

\(^{13}\)These components are Regulation of Executive Recruitment, Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Executive Constraints, Regulation of Participation, and Competitiveness of Participation. This measurement allows for a more granular consideration of regime change than durable, previously used by Polity, which only considers changes of three or more points in their overall index of democracy. Use of the persist measurement captures meaningful shifts in the political power structure within otherwise seemingly consistently autocratic systems, a criticism highlighted by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) in their formulation of autocratic regime typologies.

\(^{14}\)While this approach is less than ideal, most missingness was in the synthesized PRM variables whose generation is described in detail in Appendix A. Imputing missing values on top of already estimated values would further increase the uncertainty of the models presented. Deliberately excluding failed states for theoretical reasons, as my research questions involves regime strategy, removes much of the risk that missing data are skewed towards more disruptive conflicts.
Table 3.1: Summary of Variables and Levels for Base Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Conflict-Year, N=625, i)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Repression</td>
<td>LATENT_MEAN</td>
<td>Fariss (v2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Intensity</td>
<td>INTENSITY_LEVEL</td>
<td>PRIO (17.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Duration</td>
<td>LOG_DURATION</td>
<td>Polity IV (2017)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Structural, N=91, j)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Index of Globalization</td>
<td>DR_IG</td>
<td>Dreher (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugged Terrain</td>
<td>NUNN_RUGGED</td>
<td>Nunn and Puga (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>UN (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagged repression</td>
<td>LATENT_MEAN_START</td>
<td>Fariss (v2.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>GDPPC</td>
<td>World Bank (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>ETHNIC_FRAC</td>
<td>Fearon and Laitin (2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Regime, N=127, k)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Level 3 variables are unique to each specification, detailed in each section below)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Source dates and versions refer to the article or codebook where the concept was most recently established. All data covers through 2013.

indexed by j (N=91), labelled U, and modeled with the set of coefficients \( \gamma_1 \). The third (regime) level is indexed by k (N=127) with the set of covariates Z. The level-3 coefficients are labelled \( \delta \).

To separate the within-group effects of the level-1 variables from the between-group effects, the higher-level means of these two level-1 variables (conflict intensity and regime duration) are included as \( \bar{x}_{1j} \) and \( \bar{x}_{2k} \). They are modeled with the coefficients \( \gamma_2 \) and \( \delta_2 \) at the conflict and regime levels, respectively. This technique,
Mundlak centering, accounts for the ‘between’ effect of these variables, making the coefficients for intensity and duration ($\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$) a result of only within-case variation\textsuperscript{15} (Bafumi and Gelman 2006; Gelman and Hill 2007; Shor et al. 2007; Bartels 2009; Bell and Jones 2015; Bell, Jones, and Fairbrother 2017).

The residuals at all levels are assumed to by normally distributed:

\begin{align*}
e_{ijk} &\sim N(0, \sigma_e^2) \\
f_j &\sim N(0, \sigma_f^2) \\
g_k &\sim N(0, \sigma_g^2)
\end{align*}

All covariates have been standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation prior to being segregated into their respective levels. This process of standardizing places all resulting coefficients on a common scale, making interpretation of the results more straightforward (Gelman and Hill 2007).

While some other models form a clean hierarchical structure, where the second level observations are clear subcomponents of the third, this is not the case in this multi-level model of conflict years, conflicts, and regimes. The first level ($i$) fits into both the second and third level categories, but the structural conflict level ($j$) does not match within the regime ($k$) level, as some countries experience regime changes during a single conflict and others face multiple conflicts under the same regime. Considering conflicts as level-2 and regimes as level-3 is arbitrary but is consistent throughout.

Much of the variation between how regimes are conceptualized and measured, outlined in the hypotheses presented in Chapter 2, is incorporated into this third level

\textsuperscript{15}As Bartels puts it, “the estimation of distinct within- and between-cluster effects for $X$...satisfies the assumption that $X$ is now completely uncorrelated with the between-cluster random effects, $[f_j$ and $g_k]$.\textsuperscript{11} (2009: 12-13) For an argument against separating within- and between-cluster effects, see Kelley, Evans, Lowman, and Lykes 2017.
of the multi-level model and held as constant for over the regime period, as delineated by the PERSIST coding. Several of the alternate explanations and associated hypotheses center on structural variables, and in the specifications that follow this general model explanation these additional measures are integrated as level-2 variables. Finally, other specifications such as region necessitate adding a fourth level in the multi-level structure.\footnote{As a clarification, hierarchical (or nested) models are a subset of multi-level models. Some data structures fit neatly into a hierarchical structure, such as elementary school students being part of a class, which in turn is in a larger school. Higher levels in other structures, particularly in a comparative setting, often do not fit as subcategories of each other but also can be modeled using a multi-level approach (Gelman and Hill 2007).}

3.4 Testing the Hypotheses

The four primary hypotheses from Chapter 2 are testable propositions of how the interaction between the level of politicization of the military and the regime’s breadth of support shape its use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. In brief, they posit that: democracies are less likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency; regimes with a narrow base of support are more likely to use such methods; military-led regimes are particularly disposed to indiscriminate counterinsurgency; regimes with a base of support but a militarized politics are more likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than those with either a smaller base of support or a less politicized military. In the following section I detail how each of those concepts is defined and modeled, and whether the proposed hypothesis is supported by analysis of the quantitative data.

3.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Democracy

The first hypothesis proposes that more democratic regimes are less likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency that more autocratic ones. While this is not a novel
proposition, much of the literature on state repression, intrastate conflict, and the indiscriminate use of force considers questions either of onset or routine (as opposed to exclusively wartime) use of physical terror by the regime. Since my scope conditions exogenize conflict onset, reassessing the role of democracy within the parameters of my research question and the structure of the multi-level model detailed above is useful a starting point.

Much of the extant research into both state repression and civil wars uses the Polity score, or a similarly monodimensional measure, to categorize regimes as more or less democratic.\textsuperscript{17} Influential studies that explored specific causal mechanisms such as the effect of international law in restraining weak states, ethnic fractionalization, reputation and separatists, and mass killing of civilians in areas friendly to guerrillas often use similar measures to categorize a critical actor that largely determines the nature and intensity of the conflict: the state (Stanton 2016; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Walter 2009; Valentino et al. 2004).

In addition to using the Polity IV score as a measurement of democracy I modeled a second specification using the Participatory Democracy Index calculated by the Varieties of Democracy (\textsc{vdem}) project and a measure of judicial independence. The Participatory Democracy Index is one of \textsc{vdem}'s series high-level democracy indexes which aggregate various components of democracy into a single overarching measurement, and specifically emphasizes “active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral” (Coppedge et al. 2015: 39). As the \texttt{v2x\_partipdem} measure does not include judicial independence, I include it as a separately. The independent judiciary variable (\texttt{h\_j}) is taken from the Political Con-

\textsuperscript{17} Jones and Lupu (2018: 665) comprehensively surveyed the literature and found 60 published articles that use the square of the Polity term in regressions to either test or control for the ‘more violence in the middle’ hypothesis.
Table 3.2: Level 3 Variables for Hypothesis 1 (Democracy)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 (Regime, N=127, k)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>p_polity</td>
<td>Polity IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification 2</td>
<td>v2X_PARTIPDEM</td>
<td>VDEM v8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory Democracy</td>
<td>h_j</td>
<td>Henisz (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td></td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Constraints database, which in turn draws from Polity’s Executive Constraints measure and the International Country Risk Guide’s index of law and order (Henisz 2002).

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 present the results of the models specified to test Hypothesis 1. All variables presented have been rescaled for clearer presentation, with positive coefficients (to the right of the blue zero line) correlating with increased regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency and negative coefficients on the left correlating with greater restraint. The error bars presented indicate a 95% credible interval of the effect of each modeled parameter, with the null hypothesis of a variable having no effect indicated by the vertical line at $\beta=0$.

18Associated regression tables for all figures presented, along with full size versions of side-by-side figures in this chapter, are found in Appendix C. The full size versions of Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are C.1 and C.2.

19The uncertainty of results in a Bayesian model are reported as a credible interval, rather than with the confidence interval used with frequentist statistics. Practical interpretation of the statistical and substantive significance of the two is largely indistinguishable (Karreth 2018).
Both specifications modeled support the assertion that democracy has a restraining effect on regimes embroiled in an intrastate conflict. In addition to this result, several other elements of the base model have a significant effect on regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. At the structural level, the lagged (pre-conflict) measure of repression has a strong and positive effect, suggesting that much of the regime’s use of violence during a conflict is rooted in previous behavior. The regime duration variable is the coefficient of the level-1 measurement, which captures the ‘within’ effect of regime age. That is, as regimes endure they are less like to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency.\(^{20}\) Finally, higher conflict intensity—that is, the higher levels of combatant casualties resulting from battle between the belligerents—is correlated with greater use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency against civilians.\(^{21}\)

\(^{20}\) The second estimator of regime duration, set at the regime level, accounts for the potential heterogeneity bias of modeling both variation between distinct regimes and within a given regime. This second estimator uses the average duration for each modeled regime, and therefore captures the difference between within and between effects (Bell and Jones 2015). For simplicity, I present only the within-effects for regime duration.

\(^{21}\) Like regime duration, conflict intensity is accounted for both at level-1 (conflict-year) and, as a mean for the entire conflict, at level-3. The presented coefficient and associated credible interval are the effect of conflict intensity over time within a given conflict. That is, regimes tend to use more indiscriminate counterinsurgency in years where combatant deaths are high, when compared to other, less intense years within the same conflict.
3.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Selectorate Size

Hypothesis 2 formalizes Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s conjecture that regimes whose power rests on a small winning coalition formed from a large selectorate must be more ruthless and risk-acceptant in order to survive. Translating this general pattern of behavior to the question of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, regimes based on small winning coalitions are more likely to broadly use such violent, repressive measures.

Though the logic behind selectorate theory is compelling, operationalizing the mechanisms to make generalizable predictions is less straightforward. While Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) quantify the relative size of the winning coalition and selectorate, and use the ratio between the two as an independent variable that explains a range of regime behavior, their work has been criticized for its measurement of each of these groups. In their 2003 formulation, the size of the selectorate was determined by whether there was a legislature chosen by popular election, while the size of the winning coalition was a function of regime type, competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and competitiveness of participation. All of these variables were coded separately by other teams of political scientist on a country-year basis. Regime type was coded by Banks (1996), and the remaining variables were taken from Polity. While Bueno de Mesquita et al. admit that this is an overly simplistic coding of their concept of the selectorate, there has been little refinement in the cross-national measurement of these concepts since (Gallagher and Hanson 2015).

There are several additional critiques of Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s measurement of the selectorate and winning coalition. It remains unclear, for example, whether to consider labor union leadership as part of the selectorate, rather than the individual

\footnote{Military regimes are “assumed to have particularly small coalitions” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 134).}
voters that its members cast. Quantifying the political role of elected parliaments in an authoritarian system is similar fraught, since in some cases they wield real power while in others these legislative bodies are merely window-dressing (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gallagher and Hanson 2015). This challenge of measurement becomes more complicated when extending concept of the regime and the selectorate to institutions and individuals that are not formally part of the state, such as religious figures or oligarchs. Finally, as selectorate theory focuses on political survival of a leader, it overlooks the stability of institutionalized, planned changes in autocratic rule, such as in the People’s Republic of China over the past four decades. By conflating a ruler’s tenure with a regime’s, the narrow formulation of selectorate theory promoted by Bueno de Mesquita and his adherents significantly underestimates the longevity and stability of single-party rule (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Taken together, the logic of political survival outlined in selectorate theory is a useful tool to frame leader decisions in the context of a civil war, but is not powerful enough to fully explain the variation in decision making between regimes.

Table 3.3: Level 3 Variables for Hypothesis 2 (Selectorate Size)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 (Regime, N=127, k)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of Consultation</td>
<td>v2X_DLCONSILT</td>
<td>VDEM v8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td>h J</td>
<td>Henisz (2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To more accurately measure the concepts laid out by Bueno de Mesquita et al., I turn to the VDEM dataset. It includes a measure the leadership’s range of consultation, which answers the question “when important policy changes are being considered, how
wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?”

(Coppedge et al. 2018: 143) This measure of the latent concept of winning coalition relative to the selectorate size, labeled as $v_{2X}_{DLCONSLLT}$ by the compilers of VDEM, is based on expert ratings of country years and uses an item-response test model to account for variations between respondents (Marquardt and Pemstein 2018). Lower scores on the $v_{2X}_{DLCONSLLT}$ measurement correspond with political dynamic predicted when there is a smaller ratio of winning coalition to selectorate, as conceptualized by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2013).

---

23 The possible responses are:

0: None. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party’s or parties’ local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

(Coppedge et al. 2018: 143)
As seen in Figure 3.3 the leadership’s range of consultation does not have a significant effect on the regime’s overall disposition towards using indiscriminate counterinsurgency. This lack of support is particularly interesting because it stands in contrast with the two specifications of democracy that were used to test Hypothesis 1, both of which had a significant, negative correlation between democracy and indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

3.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Regime Typologies

While the first two hypotheses tested above focused on monodimensional measurements, hypothesis three draws on more recent work on variations between autocracies. Specifically, work by Jessica Weeks (2014) explored the sizable differences between
different autocratic regimes in regards to the onset of interstate war. Research into domestic repression commonly uses a dummy variable for military regimes, which often has statistical (although not always strong predictive) significance (Davenport 2007b; Hill and Jones 2014). To test the hypothesis that military regimes are more prone to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency I first explore how and why various typologies were developed since the end of the Cold War, then turn to the specifications of a multi-level model that includes them as the sole measure at the regime level.

Several efforts to categorize authoritarian regimes have been undertaken in the past two decades. These efforts were largely motivated by the democratization and modernization literatures, which acknowledged that the institutional and political starting point for a state embarking on a process of liberalization greatly shaped how successful such a project would be. While transitions from autocracy to democracy are easily identified in cross-national studies using metrics such as Polity or Freedom House, shifts from one type of autocratic regime to another (such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution) are less evident without a more nuanced understanding of the varieties of authoritarianism (Geddes 1999).

Barbara Geddes (1999) formulated a typology of autocratic regime types that formed the foundation for several later projects. In addition to the archetypal personalist dictator, Geddes included two autocratic regime types where elites play a central role in counterbalancing both the leader and each other. In single party regimes, access into government is controlled by a group of civilian elites who adhere to a shared ideology and corporate ruling style. The most widely-known examples of single-party regimes are many later communist countries, who after evolving from the personalist tendencies of Mao and Stalin consolidated their rule though the structure of the Communist party. In contrast to single party ‘machines,’ in military regimes a junta of
officers controls the government. The military, as a relatively autonomous organization, exists before and after the regime—its political rule is temporary, and often short (Geddes, Frantz, and Wright 2014; Debs 2016). The officers who make up the ruling junta are often more ideologically homogeneous than in a single party system, and are often more inclined to prioritize cohesion and loyalty over individual ambition. Importantly for the question of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, military-led regimes are predisposed to view the use of force as the ultimate political tool, making them both prone to fight interstate wars (Weeks 2014) and use physical repression domestically (Davenport 2007a). Geddes’s third category, personalist dictators, rule through “informal and often quite unstable personal networks” rather than through institutionalized mechanisms (1999: 133). In addition to these basic types Geddes coded hybrid forms, which are commonly observed regimes that often result from political consolidation or shifts in the sources of the leadership’s power and legitimacy.

Regimes that incorporate both democratic and authoritarian elements have been similarly categorized. Prior to the end of the Cold War anocracies were largely discounted as a residual—and relatively weak—form of government, unable to either repress to the levels needed for full autocracy or establish the institutions and norms that underpin democracy (Gurr 1970; Davenport 2007a). In the research on state repression, these regimes were often theorized as the most violent.\textsuperscript{24}

After the collapse of the Soviet Union many reforming, former communist states were grouped into this mid-range classification of regimes. While throughout much of the 1990s these anocracies were largely considered transitioning towards liberal democracy, observers noted that many regimes had stalled along this road to reform, opting instead for a system of ‘illiberal democracy’ that included many of the electoral elements.

\textsuperscript{24}See Jones and Lupu 2018 for an overview of the literature exploring this “more violence in the middle” hypothesis.
procedures identified by Schumpeter while ignoring the longer list of conditions laid out by Dahl (Zakaria 1997).

By the turn of the millennium, it became clear that the ‘transition paradigm’ of a reliably steady progression towards liberal democracy was no longer adequate. (Carothers 2002) Rather, many of these regimes were able to blend elements of democracy with autocratic controls on civil liberties to create a stable, if normatively sub-optimal, ‘third way.’ These regimes were categorized by political scientists as either diminished forms of democracy—‘with adjectives’, ‘minimalist’, ‘incomplete’, ‘unconsolidated’, ‘defective’, ‘pseudo’, ‘ethno’, ‘delegative’—or of autocracy—‘semi’, ‘competitive’, ‘electoral.’ (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Møller and Skaaning 2013; Snyder 2000; Ottaway 2003; Linz 2000; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler 2006) Since a maximalist definition of democracy, such as the one that includes all eight of Dahl’s guarantees, can be diminished along several dimensions, these ‘democracies with adjectives’ can take on a range of specific forms. (Levitsky and Way 2010)

Applying a consistent theoretical framework of how regimes should be categorized is challenging. On one hand, regimes that appear similar in many respects may fundamentally differ in how power is distributed within the country. For example, Levitsky and Way (2010) exclude Sri Lanka and Colombia from their set of competitive authoritarian regimes because they judge them to be, ‘illiberal democracies,’ while other regimes, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran are better considered ‘tutelage’ regimes because of unelected veto-wielding institutions such as the military or the clergy. These differences that are not obvious from commonly used cross national datasets but are relatively clear to area studies experts who have deep knowledge of the power structure within those particular regimes. Taken too far, however, this approach of selectively excluding regimes that do not fit the theory approaches selecting on the dependent variable (Geddes 1990). Some consider approaches such
as Levitsky and Way’s to be largely judgment based, subjective, and therefore contingent on the author and difficult to replicate (Geddes, Wright, and Franz 2014). Others use similar criteria, but with quantified measurements, and “let the chips fall where they may” (Howard and Roessler 2006: 368).

In the past decade three comprehensive country-year datasets of authoritarian regime types have been widely used to explore an array of puzzles ranging from why certain autocracies are more prone to fight interstate wars to why some ignore certain treaties to why some repress some rights but not others (Weeks 2014; Escribafolch and Wright 2015; Davenport 2007a). Wahmen, Teroell, and Hadenius (hereafter HTW) coded a dataset that, in addition to the basic types laid out by Geddes in 1999, includes multiparty authoritarian regimes as a distinct form of autocracy (2013). Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (CGV) motivate their typology by distinguishing “the characteristics of [their] inner sanctums”—how decisions are made and, most importantly, how leaders are removed (CGV 2010: 84). This typology results in CGV coding a trio of distinct authoritarian types where leader removal is not through an electoral process: monarchy, military, and civilian. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (or GWF) extended Geddes’s original 1999 typology in their 2014 revision, which now included monarchic, indirect military, and oligarchical regimes in addition to the original set of personalist, direct military, and dominant-party types.
Table 3.4: Level 3 Variables for Hypothesis 3 (Regime Types)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 (Regime, N=127, k)</td>
<td>HTW</td>
<td>Wahmen, Teroell, and Hadenius</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Country-Years</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>158</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi Party</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>245</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Party</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(Omitted: Reference Category)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monarchy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(Omitted: too few obs.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these three commonly used typologies do agree on how to code regimes—for example, there is strong alignment between their coding of authoritarian monarchies—in other categories there is less agreement. Some of this variation stems from the differing definitions of ‘regime,’ which in GWF and CGV’s understanding centers on the group where leaders come from and who influences them, while in HTW’s conception hinges on the institutions that elites rely on to stay in power. Other discrepancies arise from how military regimes, in particular, are coded. Of all the widely coded autocratic regime types, military regimes have the most varied coding: from 1972-2010 “CGV sort 19% of all country-years into the military dictatorship category, and [HTW] categorize 15% of the years as military, whereas GWF only put 7.5% in this category” (HTW 2013: 30). GWF, in contrast to the other two typologies discussed, identifies many regimes led by a uniformed officer as a personalist, rather than military, regime. While this categorization follows GWF’s demarcation between personalist and collective regimes, and forms the basis for work such as Jessica Weeks’s

25My definition of regime, laid out in the opening chapter, follows HTW.
distinctions between authoritarian regimes and their proclivity for starting war, it highlights the difficulties of accurate classifying of often-opaque power structures.\footnote{Weeks (2014) builds on Geddes (2003) by incorporating additional data from the Banks dataset, which also informs HTW’s coding of military and monarchy regimes (HTW 2013).}

To test Hypothesis 3, I use a simplified version of HTW’s typology that reduces the number of hybrid types.\footnote{HTW’s simplified categories are are: Monarchy, Single-party, Military, Multi-party autocracy, Democracy, and a residual Other. The breakdown of these regimes in countries fighting post-Cold War intrastate conflicts is in Table 3.4.} In contrast to GWF, HTW explicitly include democracies, rather than treating them as a residual category of non-authoritarian states.\footnote{HTW use a combination of Polity and Freedom House political rights and civil liberties measurements to distinguish democracies from multiparty electoral autocracies (Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahman 2017).}
HTW also do not include the level of personalization of control in their typology, choosing instead to focus on the regimes as a larger dynamic of institutions that shape, bound, and carry out decisions. This conceptualization sidesteps the theoretically interesting but largely unmeasurable element of indirect constraints that limit a leader’s power. While central to narrow studies of specific cases, generalizing and measuring the level of personalist rule is fraught with uncertainty (HTW 2013). Since Hypothesis 3 centers on the question of military rule and indiscriminate counterinsurgency, HTW’s framing is the best of the three widely used typologies to explore the relationship between regime type and indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

Figure 3.4 depicts a direct test of Hypothesis 3, which posits that military regimes are more likely than others to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency. In addition to the level-3 variable of military-led regimes coded by HTW, which is contrasted with a base category of all other regime types, the model presented in Figure 3.4 also controls for a regime’s Polity score. This level-3 control is included to account for the strong authoritarian nature of overtly military regimes; in other words, the significant effect of MILITARY_RULE on the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency is not merely because they are less democratic, as tested in Hypothesis 1.

Figure 3.5 illustrates the variation in the effect of all regime types, rather than just contrasting military regimes with all others. This model (whose full results are presented in Table C.5) incorporates the same level-1 and level-2 controls as the previous specifications and allows for direct comparisons between regime categories. While democracies are less likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than other

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29 The associated regression results are presented in Table C.4
30 The median in the dark horizontal line, with the upper and lower edges of the box representing the 75th and 25th percentiles, respectively. The ‘whiskers’ extend 1.5 times the interquartile range beyond the quartile box, representing an interval which is roughly equivalent to a 95% confidence interval. The circles beyond the whiskers are outliers (http://astrostatistics.psu.edu/su07/R/html/grDevices/html/boxplot.stats.html).
regimes, further supporting Hypothesis 1, the difference between military and the residual category of ‘other’ regimes is negligible. Furthermore, there are a number of multi-party autocratic outliers that are more likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency. While the models presented in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 lend support to Hypothesis 3’s assertion that military regimes are more inclined to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency, a finding that has support in much of the extant literature, only considering overtly military regimes may miss a large swath of hybrid, electoral regimes with militarized politics where the armed forces play a critical, indirect role in shaping policy and buttressing the civilian leadership’s position in office. To explore this further I
turn to this dissertation’s primary hypothesis: exploring the effect of indirect military rule on indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

3.4.4 **Hypothesis 4: Indirect Military Rule**

A common observation of all three regime typology sets detailed above, however, is sharp reduction in the number of military regimes in the past two decades. While once a commonly-observed phenomenon—second only to dominant party autocracies in the late 1970s, per GWF’s criteria—overtly military regimes, as coded by those same standards, are now vanishingly rare (Croissant et al. 2017). Much of this decline is empirical, stemming to the popular rejection of military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, which promised modernization in exchange for political restrictions, and the decline in western support to juntas that opposed communism after the end of the Cold War. Some of this declining count of military regimes in time series cross sectional datasets is a also theoretical: coding criteria that center on the role of coups and presence of active-duty officers in key political positions in government did not accurately capture the level of militarized politics (Croissant et al. 2010). As militaries across the world shifted to more indirect methods of control, typologies whose criteria relied on specific, overt behavior by the armed forces increasingly coded them as something other than a military regime.

This does not mean, however, that armed forces across the globe have stepped away from political affairs; in fact, while cross-national datasets have shown a marked decrease in military rule, regional studies maintain that their influence remains. While instances of direct military rule have diminished in the past few decades, the armed

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31 These theoretical and empirical shifts are often interrelated; as legislation in the West placed strict limits on support to explicitly military regimes, coups became less popular. Militarized politics evolved partially as a way to bypass this delegitimization of juntas by avoiding the narrowly defined mechanism of a coup.
Table 3.5: Level 3 Variables for Hypothesis 4 (Indirect Military Rule)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 (Regime, N=127, ( k ))</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range of Consultation</td>
<td>( v2x_dlconslt )</td>
<td>( vdem \ v8 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td>( h_j )</td>
<td>Henisz (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( v2x_dlconslt ) * MIL_SUP</td>
<td>INTERACTION</td>
<td>(calculated)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Military Rule</td>
<td>MIL_SUP</td>
<td>Croissant et al. 2017,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MARS Simulations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: INTERACTION is the standardized product of the normalized \( v2x\_dlconslt \) and MIL\_SUP terms.

Forces have often retained a powerful, if less public, role in the power structures of many regimes (Tusalem 2014). Measuring these more subtle but equally critical cases of a political system where the military either has veto power the civilian leadership’s policy-making or can act with impunity is an imperfect and often subjective task. The methods by which the military maintains influence in politics, such as exclusive rights to particular sectors of the economy, reserved seats in parliament, a separate and unaccountable legal system, or the lingering threat of a coup, often vary between countries or across regions.

To account for this variation while also capturing the military’s political role, Croissant, Eschenauer, and Kamerling (2017) developed a Political Roles of the Military (PRM) dataset which, among other things, codes whether the military holds a
veto over civilian policy decisions\textsuperscript{32} and whether the military can act with impunity.\textsuperscript{33} Their dataset, which covers 129 countries from 1999-2016, draws on country-specific data from the Database of Political Institutions, Freedom House, the BTI Country Reports, and the US State Department’s annual Human Rights Reports (Croissant et al. 2017: 406). In Appendix A I detail how I extended this coding to the entire post-Cold War scope conditions. The resulting country-year dichotomous coding of these two\textsuperscript{34} components of the ‘military supporter’ dimension of militarized politics. These measures both more accurately capture the continuing, albeit less public, role of the military in politics that has emerged since the end of the Cold War and closely align with my theorized mechanism of the military’s indirect but important role in the regime being a significant factor of whether the regime employs a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

Figure 3.6 illustrates the marginal effect of indirect military rule (\textit{mil\_sup}) over the full range of winning coalition to selectorate sizes ratios, as measured by the range of consultation variable (\textit{v2x\_dlconslt}). The range of consultation variable, described in Section 3.4.2 (above), measures how widely the political leadership consults other elites prior to making important policy decisions. Recalling the theorized

\textsuperscript{32}Croissant et al. define ‘military veto’ as an extension of a broader concept laid out in the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). BTI considers “to what extent do democratically elected political representatives have the effective power to govern, or to what extent are there veto powers and political enclaves? Veto powers refer to individuals or groups who have the power to undermine democratic procedures without questioning the system as such, and can veto the results of democratic decisions or retain perogatives that cannot be touched by democratically elected officeholders.” (Donner, Hartmann, and Schawz 2018: 18).

\textsuperscript{33}Croissant et al. consider ‘military impunity’ when “members of the armed forces engage in illegal activities and there are no reports on prosecution and conviction, or prosecution and conviction are politically motivated, or de facto prosecution and conviction must be considered highly disproportional to the number and severity of crimes committed” (2017: 406). Taken together, these concepts form my measure of militarized politics.

\textsuperscript{34}The third component, military as a ‘repressive agent,’ is highly colinear with my dependent variable. Therefore, I use only the two remaining components of military supporter, veto power and impunity.
interaction of these two variables illustrated in the Figure 2.1 from Chapter 2, indirect military rule is hypothesized to be most significant when the regime must draw on a broad set of supporters for its power. In these cases, the political leadership does not have the unity to reform or restrain an independently minded military. The armed forces, professionally socialized to pursue military victory above all else, may seize the opportunity of limited political control by a fractured regime to implement a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

This proposed effect, laid out in Hypothesis 4, is supported by the modeled interaction on the right third of Figure 3.6. As the regime is required to maintain the support of a larger swathe of elites, the effect of a politically assertive military on the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency is significant and positive. The effect of such
a politically assertive military disappears with a smaller selectorate, an interaction that is both theoretically and empirically unlikely. Theoretically, a small selectorate coupled with an indirect political role for the military is unlikely since the armed forces are either likely to be directly in charge (an outright military regime) or politically sidelined through a process of coup-proofing and authoritarian consolidation. Empirically, the dearth of cases of this combination results in large error margins for smaller selectorate sizes, since there is a lack of common statistical support in that region (Hainmueller, Mummmolo, and Xu 2018).

In cases of larger selectorates and militarized politics, shown on the right third of Figure 3.6, there is a statistically significant, positive effect on the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. In other words, once the political arena becomes large enough—the selectorate grows to include actors beyond a small inner circle of regime supporters—militarized politics becomes important. Regimes with wide selectorates and ‘healthy’ civil-military relations, where the armed forces do not exercise a veto over civilian policymaker’s decisions and do not act with impunity, are less likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than those with militarized politics. This holds true when controlling for conflict intensity, ethnic fractionalization, regime longevity, prior use of repression, and the remaining measures included in the base model presented earlier in Section 3.3.

\[35\] For interpretation of interaction models and the use of marginal effects plots to discern significance, see Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) and Kam and Franzese (2010). The regression table for Hypothesis 4 is Table C.6 in Appendix C. While the coefficients on the interaction term are not statistically significant across the entire range of selectorate size, “mere presentation of regression coefficients and their standard errors is inadequate for the interpretation of interactive effects...the estimated effects of variables involved in interactive terms and the standard errors of these estimated effects vary depending on the values of the conditioning variables” (Kam and Franzese 2010: 60). An alternate specification of the model for Hypothesis 4 which does not use an interaction between selectorate size and indirect military rule, is presented in Figure C.4 and Table C.7 in Appendix C. In this alternate specification without the interaction, indirect military rule has a statistically significant, positive effect on regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.
3.4.5 Posterior Predictive Checks of Interaction Model

To further evaluate the validity of the multi-level model of indiscriminate counterinsurgency presented in Figure 3.6 and Table C.6 and use it to identify outliers I now turn to a series of posterior predictive checks (Ntzoufras 2009). Broadly, posterior predictive checks compare the observed data with estimates generated from the model. Posterior p-values, illustrated in Figure 3.7 for the interaction model, are the probability that a future sample will have a higher distribution than the observed value. A posterior p-value of 0.5 means that the distribution of the observed data matches the replications closely, while high or low p-values (set at 0.05 and 0.95 and colored red in Figure 3.7) are reflective of significant differences between the replicated and observed values (Gelman, Meng, and Stern 1996). The predictive concordance of the observed and predicted values is 0.9948.36

Figure 3.7: p-values of Predicted vs. Observed Data for Hypothesis 4

To explore the validity of the multi-level model presented above I extracted the country-years that have unusually low (<0.05) or high (>0.95) p-values. Countries with lower scores used indiscriminate counterinsurgency significantly less than the

360.95 is the lower threshold for acceptable model quality (Karreth 2018)
model predicted, while those with higher scores were uncharacteristically more violent.

Table 3.6: Outlier Observations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2001-2004, 2006</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Internationalized Intrastate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Conflict Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2009, 2012-2013</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1992-1995</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>Intrastate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Internationalized Intrastate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The brief examination of the outlier observations presented in Table 3.6 that follows will focus on a commonality between all three countries (Algeria, Colombia, and Israel) that had periods of both higher and lower observed violence than predicted by the multi-level model. All of these cases involved long-running conflicts punctuated by peace overtures. Higher than predicted levels of violence are associated with breakdowns in the peace process, while lower levels are (in the cases of Colombia and Israel) linked with renewed dialogue.

Peace negotiations between the Government of Colombia and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), a powerful guerrilla force involved in a long-running intrastate conflict that also included a range of pro-government militias and drug cartels, broke down in 2002. The new Colombian President, Alvaro Uribe, was elected on a platform of confronting, rather than accommodating, the insurgents.
This included a comprehensive push to demobilize the pro-government militias, groups who were widely associated with human rights abuses and whose continued association with the regime was a hindrance to wider assistance from the United States (Daly 2016). One of Uribe’s first moves was to extend legal authority to the military, allowing them to arrest and detain without cause. This decidedly illiberal decree earned a rebuke from the United Nations, which claimed that it violated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Posnanski 2005). The Colombian Constitutional Court deemed this decree illegal, and the military’s police powers were later suspended. (Delgado 2015: 840). Additionally, Uribe extended offers of immunity in return for demilitarization to right-wing paramilitary groups that were designated terrorists by Americans without a similar offer to the FARC (Posnanski 2005). This series of moves led to a stark increase in violence in 2003.

Uribe’s successor as president, Juan Manual Santos, served previously as Uribe’s Minister of Defense and under him crafted the Colombian army’s counterinsurgency strategy. While initially Santos continued to pressure the FARC militarily, in 2012 Santos shifted to a policy of negotiation under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). This pivot to peace upset many in the military, who were convinced that the FARC were near defeat and would not negotiate in good faith (Delgado, 2015: 849). A formal peace agreement with the FARC, a deal which included alternative sentences and guaranteed seats in legislature for the political wing of the insurgency, was crafted in the following years and ultimately presented to the Colombian electorate for a referendum in 2016 (Angelo 2017). The cease-fire associated with the renewed negotiations dramatically reduced the observed violence in Colombia in 2011-2013, a shift that the quantitative model did not capture in its predictions.
The difference between predicted and observed violence follows a similar pattern in the case of Israel. The years of lower violence\textsuperscript{37}, 1992-1995, followed in the aftermath of the First Intifada, the PLO’s disastrous decision to side with Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, the collapse of the Soviet Union. This combination of events brought the Palestinians, led by Yasir Arafat, to the peace table first at the Madrid Conference in 1991 and subsequently through the Oslo process, which culminated in the signing of the first round of the eponymous peace Accords in 1993 (D. Ross 2004). The halcyon years of the early Oslo period saw the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the hope of a smooth transition to a two-state solution which satisfies both the issues of Palestinian sovereignty and Israeli security. Unfortunately these plans were overly ambitious, thwarted by endemic corruption within the PA, rival Palestinian armed factions (most notably Hamas) who sought to undermine both the PA and the larger peace process, concerns within Israel about the evacuation of settlements in the West Bank, and the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzkak Rabin by an Israeli extremist in 1995 (Byman 2010).

The Oslo process of gradual transition of control and incremental steps slowed in the late 1990s, leading to frustration on both sides. Tensions erupted into full scale violence in 2000 as provocations intended to improve the standings of factional leaders within their own selectorates escalated beyond their control (Byman 2010; Shapiro 2013). The resulting Second Intifada was marked with waves of suicide bombings aimed against civilians in Israel, armed competition between the PA

\textsuperscript{37}Measuring indiscriminate counterinsurgency in the Israeli case is particularly fraught, as the issue is politically divisive among not only among the immediate participants but also across the authors of the human rights documents used to generate the Political Terrors Scale and CIRI, the base scores of which are used in turn by Fariss to create the dynamic model of human rights that I use as the dependant variable in my model. The US State Department and Amnesty International have historically been on opposite sides of this divide and have been accused of holding a strong bias for, and against, Israel, respectively.
which was increasingly associated with Arafat’s political party, Fatah) and Hamas, and the wholesale reoccupation of the West Bank by the Israel Defense Forces (Dowty 2013; Breaking the Silence 2012). Far bloodier than its first iteration in the 1980s, the Second Intifada badly damaged the political viability of a negotiated peace within Israel, leading to ultimately more coercive security policies.

Algeria’s long conflict against an array of Islamist rebels was increasingly being fought against the more hard-line GIA (Groupe islamique armée) when voters approved a referendum in 2005 to extend amnesty to former rebels and security forces implicated in abuses. The amnesty was widely seen as a failure, as few fighters surrendered under its terms. This period also coincided with the expansion of al-Qaeda into the region, which resulted in greater use of suicide terrorism and higher levels of violence in general (Joffeé 2008). While the failed amnesty law’s similarities to other outlying cases may explain why the model failed to predict the increase in Algerian use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, the rise of AQIM is a confounding factor.

That the outlier cases of Algeria, Colombia, and Israel share a common thread of unexpectedly low levels of violence after successful peace talks and the reverse after the collapse of negotiations makes theoretical sense. As negotiations were not included in the large-\(n\) model, it also follows that the quantitative predictions of violence in these particular cases do not match the observed values. It also points to the possibility that the expectations for peace, and blame for their failure, are subtly included in the standards-based reports produced by the US State Department and Amnesty International, reports which in turn form an important part of the measurement of my dependent variable. Militarized politics can play an important role in the success of a peace initiative, as the armed forces can act as a spoiler to either prevent or undermine negotiations. As I turn to the qualitative case study of
Indonesia’s campaign in Aceh in Chapter 4, this dimension of militarized politics and peace negotiations becomes an important mechanism that explains how variations in the armed force’s role vis-à-vis in the regime can lead to the use of, or turn away from, indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

3.5 Alternate Explanations

Chapter 2 proposed a series of alternate explanations for regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency that have been developed and tested within the larger literature on civil conflict, state repression, and human rights. While several of these alternate mechanisms are better explored using qualitative methods, most lend themselves to inclusion in the multi-level quantitative model detailed above. Specifically, I will test the alternate explanations regarding the regime’s role in the post-9/11 US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT), separatists, guerrilla warfare, oil rents, regional effects, and an independent judiciary as extensions the model specified to test Hypothesis 4, my primary hypothesis.

The first alternate explanation for the indiscriminate counterinsurgency hinges on a regime’s geostrategic importance to the West. While this effect diminished greatly after the fall of the Soviet Union, some have argued that it has reemerged after 9/11.\textsuperscript{38} To operationalize this theory, I code whether a country/year listed in the UCDP dataset is also on the country/year eligibility for the US Department of Defense Global War On Terror (GWOT) Expeditionary Medal (Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness 2018). Figure 3.8a below and Table C.8 in Appendix C summarize the modeled effect of GWOT participation at the regime level of the multi-level model. The effect of a state’s involvement with the US-led GWOT has

\textsuperscript{38}Note that since countries under foreign occupation are not included in my scope conditions this measure does not include Afghanistan or Iraq for most of the 2000s.
a negative effect on indiscriminate counterinsurgency, though this may be partially endogenous as the US may be less willing to publicly ally with states widely abusing human rights.

While insurgents have specific and often parochial aims, they can be broadly categorized as either ‘center-seeking’ (fighting for the goal of overthrowing the existing regime and seizing power) or ‘separatist.’ This latter category seeks autonomy or independence for a particular region, and in widely heterogeneous states with a range of possible separatist movements some argue that the regime will counter these groups with indiscriminate violence to deter other schisms (Walter 2009). The ACD codes
insurgent movements as either having a territory or government incompatibility with the state based on the group’s stated objectives (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). Figure 3.8b and Table C.9 in Appendix C summarize the modeled effect separatism as a level-2 (conflict) component of the multi-level model specification. While this coding is less sophisticated than the one put forth by Walter (2009), which included reputation and deterrence factors as well, the stated goals of the insurgents are insignificant in this specification of the regime’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

The use of irregular (or guerrilla) warfare, a ‘technology of rebellion’ marked by rebel combatant use of hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and fluid control of territory, has been empirically linked to mass killings by counterinsurgents struggling with the differentiating fighters from a larger population (Valentino et al. 2004; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014). Since guerrilla forces are reliant on the civilian population for logistics, intelligence, and protection noncombatants in areas where rebels operate are often indiscriminately targeted by military forces unable to selectively identify individual supporters. To test this alternate explanation of regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, I extended the technologies of rebellion dataset developed by Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). Their framing of intrastate conflict hinges on the military balance between the state and the rebels; irregular wars, in particular, are “when the government’s conventional military faces lightly armed rebels” (Balcells and Kalyvas 2014: 1391). To extend the technologies of rebellion dataset to include all cases covered in my scope conditions I used an extension developed by Krcmaric (2018), which I supplemented with the Non-State Actors dataset (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013) and conflict narratives from the UCDP/PRIO database (Pettersson, Therése and Eck 2018). As my puzzle hinges on state behavior and the role of the regime in implementing counterinsurgency strategy, I did not include observations where there
was no functioning government, a decision which reduced the number of symmetrical non-conventional conflicts (those where both the government and the rebels are too weak to use conventional military means). Figure 3.8c and Table C.10 in Appendix C present the results on the model with the guerrilla technology of rebellion as a conflict-level variable. While positive, the effect of irregular warfare on regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency is not a statistically significant alternate explanation.

The role of resources, particularly the ‘lootable’ sort that are easily extracted and exported, in the onset, duration, and intensity of civil war has been studied closely by political scientists and economists. Of the various categories of resources considered, oil stands out as having a particularly pernicious effect (M. Ross 2004). To model the role of oil as an alternate explanation for indiscriminate counterinsurgency, I use the World Bank’s data on oil rents, which record “the difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production” (Teorell et al. 2018: 686). The data covers all years in my scope, but not all countries; if a country is missing from the data, I assumed it is not an oil producer. Unlike other alternate explanations, which are often slowly-changing structural factors, oil rent can vary significantly year-on-year as production costs and world prices fluctuate. Therefore, I added oil rent as a level-1 (conflict-year) variable, with a second, mean value at the structural (conflict) level to isolate the within-conflict effects of oil rents on indiscriminate counterinsurgency. Figure 3.8d and Table C.11 summarize the modeled effect of oil rent within a given conflict, which is insignificant.39

39I also modeled average oil rent over a conflict’s duration separately and found a similar, insignificant effect. Given that oil prices are not as stable as other level-2 variables, modeling the effect of oil rent on an annual basis, as presented in Figure 3.8d, is more theoretically sound.
Another alternate explanation for regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency considers regional variation. Controlling for region using fixed effects is common in time-series, cross-sectional quantitative studies of repression and civil war (e.g., Walter 2009; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014). To explore the potential influence of region, I added regional dummies to the regime level of my model based on HTW’s coding.40

Figure 3.9 illustrates the regional effects; while there are no significant changes in the other modeled parameters, regimes in the regions of Latin America and South Asia are more likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency than otherwise similar ones in Eastern Europe. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the base region for the regression. The full results are presented in Figure C.9 and Table C.12 in Appendix C.

Finally, an assertive, independent judiciary may have a particularly strong effect in restraining excesses by the regime. Much like the regime duration variable, the judicial independence was included as a level-3 (regime) covariate in the series of models used to test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4. Unlike duration, however, the independence of the judiciary had no significant influence on the regime’s proclivity to use indiscriminate

40HTW’s Authoritarian Regime Type Dataset includes coding of regions, based on “geographical proximity and demarcation by areas specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization” (Teorell et al. 2018: 352). Since there are no observations of intrastate conflicts within my scope conditions for the Pacific region, and few in the regions of Western Europe, East Asia, or the Caribbean, I omitted these from the results presented in Figure 3.9.
1. Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central Asia)
2. Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic)
3. North Africa and the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey and Cyprus): MENA
4. Sub-Saharan Africa
5. Western Europe and North America (including Australia New Zealand)
6. East Asia (including Japan and Mongolia)
7. South-East Asia
8. South Asia
9. The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand)
10. The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana and Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Rep.)
counterinsurgency. An alternate specification of judicial independence, detailed in Figure B.2 and Table B.2, also shows a null result.

3.6 SUMMARY

This chapter tested the proposed hypotheses against the full set of observed intrastate conflicts since 1989, incorporated and extend the measurement of indirect military rule into a large-scale time-series, cross sectional analysis, identified additional outlier

41MENA is base category
factors for later qualitative theory exploration, and explored several proposed alternate explanations. While the analysis supported Hypothesis 1 (democracies are less likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency) there was no support for my specification of the selectorate-theory based Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3, which posited that military-led regimes were especially likely to use a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, was supported as juntas were significantly more likely to use such methods than other regime types. These three initial Hypotheses largely reinforced previous findings in the literature, which helps validate my scope conditions, measurement, and the specification of the multi-level modeling approach used. The testing of these three initial hypotheses forms the foundation for the central argument of my theory, expressed in Hypothesis 4. This hypothesis, which proposed a higher likelihood of indiscriminate counterinsurgency when militarized politics interacts with a regime reliant on a broad set of supporters, was supported. This interaction is particularly important in answering the motivating puzzle of why some regimes adopt such repressive strategies in the face of strong evidence that they are often counterproductive.

While several of the alternate hypotheses amenable to quantitative specification were found to have an effect on indiscriminate counterinsurgency, reinforcing findings elsewhere in the literature, they did not negate the significance of the interaction between militarized politics and selectorate size. Finally, a brief exploration of commonalities between outlier observations points to peace negotiations as an important factor in the difference between observed and predicted values. To further explore how such a strategy is decided on and implemented, I turn now to an in depth qualitative exploration of Indonesia’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh over a period of varying levels of militarized politics and regime structure.
Chapter 4

Indonesia: A Case Study in Militarized Politics and Indiscriminate Counterinsurgency

This chapter presents a qualitative exploration of the hypothesized relationship between the military’s role in politics, the breadth of the regime’s support, and the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. This section of my larger multi-method approach traces the primary mechanism of militarized politics in a broad-based regime proposed in Chapter 2, and complements the quantitative cross sectional tests presented in Chapter 3. Rather than compare across cases, as was done using the multi-level model, this chapter will focus on within-case variation in a long-running conflict that endured over significant changes in both the Indonesian regime and the military’s involvement in politics. The in-depth consideration of a single case allows for more detailed specification of my dependent variable and the consideration of alternative hypotheses that could not be directly tested using large-n methods (Lieberman 2005).

This case study unfolds in five parts. First is an overview of the qualitative portion of my research design, to include observable implications of the hypothesized mechanism, why the conflict in Aceh was chosen as a case, and how alternate explanations for indiscriminate counterinsurgency will be addressed. Second is an overview of Indonesia, focusing on the evolution of civil-military relations and the background of the conflict in Aceh. The third section traces the process of how the military’s political function in the sequence of post-Suharto regimes varied, and how those changes
drove shifts on the ground in Aceh. After this analysis of the primary hypothesis is the penultimate section, which addresses several of the alternate explanations originally presented in Chapter 2 that are best considered qualitatively, followed by a conclusion.

4.1 DESIGN AND METHOD

This section outlines the contribution of qualitative methods within my larger research design and how the central hypothesis posited in Chapter 2 will be operationalized and considered using within-case analysis of an intrastate conflict. This section then considers how the alternate explanations which were deemed less suitable for quantitative specification can be approached qualitatively before discussing the case selection strategy used for the within-case analysis that follows.

4.1.1 EXPLORING INDISCRIMINATE COUNTERINSURGENCY USING A WITHIN-CASE STUDY

The pathway from regime dynamics to indiscriminate counterinsurgency include intermediate steps and factors that cannot be consistently conceptualized or accurately measured across a large range of cases. While the specifics of these causal mechanisms can vary, exploring how they function within a specific case adds nuance and granularity to the broader patterns modeled quantitatively in Chapter 3. Additionally, the cross sectional measurement of concepts such as democracy, military influence, and indiscriminate counterinsurgency is inherently prone to error (Adcock and Collier 2001). Qualitatively considering these concepts and tracing the hypothesized mechanisms within a given case not only provides insight into how the interaction between militarized politics and the regime shapes the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency
within a specific case but also reinforces the generalizability of the quantitative findings by illustrating their validity under more refined measurement.

4.1.2 Hypotheses, Predictions, and Qualitative Evidence

Chapter 2 proposed a set of hypotheses of how different constraints on and power dynamics within the regime, along with the military’s level of autonomy and willingness to involve itself politically, shape whether indiscriminate counterinsurgency is used in a civil war. The most salient of these, Hypothesis 4, explores how the interaction between the breadth of politically relevant actors and the level of militarized politics shapes the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. Briefly, a military that can dictate or veto the policies of a political leader who is balancing a tenuous coalition of supporters is particularly prone to using indiscriminate counterinsurgency, as the control and accountability mechanisms of such a political regime are incapable of restraining or punishing it.

The quantitative models in Chapter 2 operationalized the concept of the span of politically relevant actors using a cross-national measure of consultation which estimates the breadth of policy discussion at the elite level. This measure was used to test both Hypothesis 2 (an extension of Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s selectorate theory) and, importantly, the hypothesis that considers the interaction of selectorate size and military autonomy. This qualitative case will address several of the methodological critiques of operationalizing selectorate theory, namely the independence and unity of the institutions whose leaders are consulted and the importance of their opinion in shaping decisions about the use of force. By tracing the process by which a leader can be removed from power I will also be able to identify critical veto players in the political arena and explore how subsequent governments incorporated the positions of these actors into their decisions on the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.
The interaction between the regime’s support base and the military’s role in politics shapes the nature of civil-military relations and, by extension, the likelihood of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. This intermediate civil-military step is often context-specific and difficult to measure and compare quantitatively. Much of this variation stems from the self-identified role of the military within the state, which can range from guarantor of Westphalian sovereignty\(^1\) to a vehicle for national identity and cohesion to an armed extension of the ruling party. This corporate identity is replicated through the training and education of cadets, reinforced through the professional and societal norms of the officer corps, and shapes how the armed forces relate to the state’s civilian leadership. A consensus among military officers that they are above the law, beyond the control of civilian leaders, and arbiters of the national interest can lead to divergence between the armed forces and the regime. Tracing the pervasiveness of this attitude, the capacity of the civilian regime to contain it, and the interaction between the military’s independence and the regime’s reliance on it for political survival is vital qualitative evidence for the process proposed in Hypothesis 4.

In addition to the primary hypotheses, a range of alternate explanations for indiscriminate counterinsurgency were proposed in Chapter 2. Several of these alternate hypotheses are not specifiable quantitatively, and the validity of others which are will increase with an additional, qualitative consideration. First is the effect of international shifts in security priorities, such as 9/11 and the subsequent US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT), on a regime’s tactics against violent non-state actors. The second alternate explanation is the hypothesized link between insurgents using guerrilla tactics and indiscriminate counterinsurgency. The effect of guerrilla tactics (alternatively

\(^1\)Defined by Steven Krasner as “an institutional arrangement for organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures” (1999: 20).
termed irregular warfare) has been established quantitatively elsewhere, and while the model I specified in Chapter 3 did not find this technology of rebellion to be significantly correlated with regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency it does bear a further, qualitative exploration (Valentino et al. 2004; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014).

The third alternate explanation is how separatism, and the regime's desire to deter other potential separatist groups from rebelling, accounts for the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Finally I explore the effect of popular frustration with the the cost and duration of the conflict on regime strategy. This set of alternate explanations will be explicitly discussed at the end of this case study.

4.1.3 Case Selection

Much of the literature on qualitative case selection focuses on choosing high leverage, least-likely, or most-similar cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008; Rapport 2015; Lieberman 2005). These cases can complement the quantitative portion of a multi-method research design by accounting for outliers, present ‘hard tests’ for theories, and allow for the application of techniques building on Mill’s methods to isolate the effect of specific independent variables. Alternatively, process-tracing techniques focus on the mechanisms within a single case, and instead of direct comparisons with other events use methods such as counterfactuals and out-of-sample testing to avoid telling ‘just-so’ stories and to establish a level of generalizability (Lyall 2014).

The conflict in Aceh, which stretched over several realignments of the Indonesian regime and coincided with a period of military reform and democratization, presents a compelling subject for within-case analysis for several reasons. First, within Indonesia, the counterinsurgency effort against the GAM\(^2\) was one of several intrastate conflicts

\(^2\)Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or Free Aceh Movement
being fought simultaneously. This allows for the disaggregation of local and countrywide mechanisms which may otherwise be lumped together at the state level in a cross-national comparison. It also allows for intrastate comparison of different conflicts within the same general context. Second, the conflict has deep roots in Cold-War era campaigns by the authoritarian Suharto regime against the separatists, a condition which allows for the particular conditions of conflict onset to be exogenized from the analysis. Third, variation in both the regime and the military’s political role within it during the conflict allows for direct linkages between these independent variables and the dependent variable of indiscriminate counterinsurgency to be drawn. Fourth, while international concerns about human rights abuses and, after the September 11th attacks, the presumed Islamist nature of the GAM did attract foreign attention to the conflict there was no larger great-power conflict that shaped support to either side of the conflict in Aceh. Fifth, it is one of only two recent conflicts where the regime fundamentally changed for reasons exogenous to the civil war itself, making it a clearer case of the hypothesized mechanisms over several political realignments (Stanton 2016). Sixth and finally, the conflict is recent, terminated, and well studied, allowing for an impartial, thorough consideration of the factors involved from a variety of sources. The case of the conflict in Aceh covers much of the theorized interaction space outlined in Chapter 2, with corresponding variation on the dependent variable, making it an excellent case of the hypothesized interaction between a politically active military and a regime seeking to maintain its base of support.

4.2 Indonesia Overview

This section provides a brief overview of Indonesia as background for the in-depth exploration of the case of the TNI’s approach in Aceh during the post-Suharto refor-
While not directly exploring the theory of the effects of military involvement in politics on the prevalence of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, the circumstances outlined in this overview section form the foundation for later events. It opens with a summary of Indonesian history, focusing on the key events and institutions that later shaped the separatist movement in Aceh and the state’s reaction to it. After this broader history is an overview of the evolution of civil-military relations, followed by an introduction to the region of Aceh and the roots of the GAM.

4.2.1 Indonesia background

Modern-day Indonesia stretches 3,000 miles from the western edge of the island of Sumatra to the eastern island of Papua, and 1,150 miles from the vicinity of Australia’s northern coast to southern edge of the Philippines. 80% of its surface area
is water, forming an easily navigable highway linking the 6,000 inhabited, and often rugged, islands of the archipelago. Most of the ethnically heterodox population practices Sunni Islam, though the centrality of religion to society varies greatly. The first Europeans to trade and proselytize in the region were the Portuguese in the 16th century, who were followed by the Dutch. The consolidation of an array of independent companies under the newly formed United East India Company centralized control over much of today’s Indonesia. The Dutch government formally took over administration of the colony in 1830 after a series of uprisings and bankruptcies, governing through a divide-and-rule approach that offered protection for local leaders who submitted to colonial rule. The Dutch rulers were contending with rising nationalist sentiments in the 1920s and 30s, spearheaded by the Indonesian Nationalist Party (or PNI) led by future President Sukarno, before World War II broke out and the Japanese invaded (Challiss 2001).

The Japanese occupation during the Second World War introduced three elements that would later shape both Indonesia’s civil-military relations and the conflict in Aceh. First, Japanese rule over regions of the archipelago was not run through a central administration in Java, as it had been under the Dutch and would later be organized when Indonesia gained its independence, but rather from the regional level directly to a higher, theater-wide headquarters that ran affairs across occupied territory in Southeast Asia (Anderson 1983). Second, the series of Japanese military successes against European powers shattered the illusion of Western military invincibility, making armed resistance against the Dutch a viable option. Finally, and most importantly, the dominant role of the military in ordering and controlling society was viewed positively by the auxiliary Indonesian forces working alongside the Japanese, forces who would later fight against the Dutch and form the core of the newly independent nation’s armed forces. While the Japanese occupation was in many respects
brutal, many independence-minded Indonesians collaborated and were well-armed when the Japanese surrendered (Kingsbury 2005).

The armed resistance to the attempted reimposition of Dutch rule after Japanese surrender was a decentralized, popular effort resourced overwhelmingly through local means (Anderson 1983). The initial structure of the Indonesian state after the Dutch quit in 1949 was decentralized to the point of incoherence; to maintain some semblance of unity the federal system was unilaterally revoked in 1950. Part of this decision was a response to the Dutch colonial practice of turning local leaders against each other as a way to counter the national movement led by Sukarno’s PNI (Challiss 2001). The underlying societal, historical, geographic, and economic disparities that threatened to pull the state apart remained unresolved, with the armed forces increasingly acting as the glue that maintained unity (Kingsbury 2003: 238).

President Sukarno’s regime evolved from a parliamentary system to the more consolidated ‘Guided Democracy,’ where his personal charisma built on anti-colonial leadership allowed for direct mobilization of support. Guided Democracy was also underwritten by an alignment with the armed forces, who were equally committed to national unity. Sukarno was increasingly concerned about the military’s loyalty, whose more concentrated industrial interests were largely in opposition to the ‘popular sector’ of common laborers and peasants. The inability of the Sukarno regime to balance competing economic forces and modernize the state led to hyperinflation in the early 1960s, and ultimately the rise of Suharto (Anderson 1983).

Suharto’s three decades of rule, detailed further below, reshaped (among other things) civil-military relations and the army’s proclivity to using mass violence to counter domestic challengers. He placed the military at the center of economic, social, and political life in Indonesia. Rather than being an agent of the regime, this position instead made the military the clearest manifestation of the state itself.
4.2.2 Foundations of the Indonesian Military

The Indonesian military (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, or TNI) was initially organized from the loose association of militias that resisted Dutch colonial occupation (Rabasa and Haseman 2002). The rugged terrain of the 13,667 islands that make up the archipelago were fertile ground for localized militias, who operated largely independent of each other and with the direct support of the population (Vatikiotis 1993). This close linkage with communities across Indonesia remains a central part of the military’s self-conceived role vis-a-vis the state; rather than being an institution of the government, the armed forces largely saw themselves as an extension of the people’s power and will (Halder 2014: 79).

As the Dutch withdrew, they left behind significant economic interests across Indonesia. To reduce the pull of separatism inherent in such a heterogeneous and geographically fractured state while also satisfying the now excess but still active array of militias, the nascent Indonesian government turned management of newly nationalized industrial concerns over to the army in exchange for their loyalty to the central government in Jakarta. This agreement peacefully solidified state control, satiated the economic needs of recently demobilized fighters, and provided steady resources for the military independent of the Indonesian government’s budget (Nordholt 2002). The economic role of the military expanded in 1957, when Indonesian unions seized control of many of the remaining Dutch corporate interests, which the government subsequently turned over to the armed forces (Anderson 1983).

\footnote{Prior to the ousting of Suharto and the reformasi the Indonesian military was referred to as the *Angkatan Berenjata Republik Indonesia*, or ABRI (Vatikiotis 1993). Originally the TNI was the name of the armed resistance forces that fought against the Dutch, and the post-Suharto resurrection of this term was intended to strengthen the connection with the war of independence (Croissant and Kuehn 2009). Some works use the acronym used in the period described, while other use TNI throughout. For clarity, I opt for the latter.}
Involvement in the economy remained an important source of revenue for the TNI for decades. While the official percentage of the national budget appropriated for defense has historically been relatively small\textsuperscript{4} the majority of the TNI’s budget—often in the neighborhood of 70\% of total military expenditures—comes from private, military controlled enterprises (Mietzner 2006). While much of this revenue comes from legitimate, albeit inefficient, businesses the pervasive involvement of the armed forces in private enterprise allows for large-scale corruption. Furthermore, the TNI’s external resourcing limits the government’s leverage over military policy and operations. Large ‘off the books’ accounts can be used for a range of illicit activities, from funding militias to corrupt expansions of economic control, and fundamentally undermine civilian control of the military (Wandelt 2007).

As Croissant and Kuehn argue, “national defense is the core function of any military,” and the geography of Indonesia coupled with this historical dominance of the army drove Indonesia’s approach to external defense. (2009: 190; emphasis in the original). The army was long the dominant service within the Indonesian armed forces, due to its size, central role in internal security, and history as the force that defeated the Dutch. This made the army the most active service politically (Kingsbury 2003). The navy and air force are comparably tiny and under resourced, outfitted with obsolete equipment tasked largely with supporting the army (Rabasa and Haseman 2002). Indonesia’s far-flung islands and rugged topography made it both difficult to comprehensively defend and complicated to attack, resulting in a doctrine dubbed ‘Total People’s Defense’ that sought to absorb and attrit an invader with territorial

\textsuperscript{4}Year-on-year comparisons are often misleading because of fluctuations in both the GDP and exchange rates. The lack of large-scale weapons programs, which are often priced in dollars and are budgeted over several years, further exacerbates this unevenness. That said, expenditures in the late 1990s and early 2000s were in the range of 1.5-2.0\% of GNP, roughly half of regional equivalents such as Thailand (Kingsbury 2003: 189).
forces (Kodam) using conventional and guerrilla tactics. As these peripheral forces were overcome the army’s strategic reserve (Kostrad) would mobilize for a decisive battle, most likely in defense of the central island of Java. This doctrine required the territorial forces, who were both the bulk of the army and the first line of defense against an invader, to have intimate knowledge of their locale and a close relationship with the communities therein (Rabasa and Haseman 2003). The strong relationship between the TNI and the irregular forces that would play and important role in the exercise of Total People’s Defense against an invader also laid the groundwork for the use of these pro-government militias as proxies in intrastate conflict (Kingsbury 2003: 31).

Territorial forces also bore the brunt of maintaining domestic control and subduing localized unrest. Their day-to-day involvement in local politics was akin to the Dutch system, which used a similar structure to exercise control (O’Rourke 2002). Within a territorial command (of which there were 12 as of 2003) there was typically a quick-reaction battalion (approximately 500 soldiers) that could be rapidly deployed as needed to quell violence. The remaining territorial battalions within a Kodam were stationed across the region, with subordinate units assigned to and living alongside communities throughout (Rabasa and Haseman 2003). The Indonesian National Police (or Polri) were, until a post-Suharto reform detailed below, a branch of the armed forces and constituted a significant part of the Kodam’s forces (Kingsbury 2003). While often corrupt and ill-equipped these territorial forces were deeply embedded in Indonesian society and were well-positioned to selectively discriminate between rebels, criminals, and the civilians who lived in their midst.

The Kostrad, in contrast to the territorial Kodam forces, was centrally controlled, well-equipped, and highly trained. The first Kostrad commander was Suharto\(^5\), who

\(^5\) Many, but not all, Javanese use a single name without a surname.
used this military position to overthrow President Sukarno and organized an anti-communist campaign of mass killing in the 1965-66 (Cribb 2001). Subsequent Kostrad commanders were chosen for their loyalty to now-President Suharto, and the command’s political role was increasingly important after his ouster in 1998 (Kingsbury 2003). A third branch, the Kopassus or Special Forces Command, is relatively small but highly trained and capable. Kopassus units operate at relatively small\(^6\) scale, and often work alongside the more conventional Kostrad units forces deployed to combat intrastate threats (Rabasa and Haseman 2002). Personal loyalty within the Indonesian military is largely built through service within one of these three larger organization, where patron-client relationships often form between more senior and promising junior officers.

In contrast to the ‘Guided Democracy’ of mass mobilization under Sukarno, Suharto implemented a system dubbed the ‘New Order’ whose legitimacy rested heavily on economic modernization. For the TNI, this was implemented through the ‘dual function’ concept known as \textit{dwifungsi}. This concept broadened the military’s role beyond security and economics by giving it responsibility to comprehensively implement the New Order through involvement in regional government, the legislature, and the press (Honna 2003). This role was considered to be permanent, in contrast to military-led reform movements in similarly developing nations that largely saw the socio-political function armed forces as an intermediate, bridging step (Anderson 1983). The permanence of this socio-political role for the military and its explicit, doctrinal expression (rather than haphazard evolution) is unique; most countries with seemingly similar arrangements lacked the legal and ideological foundations that Indonesia had (Vatikiotis 1993: 61). In a sense \textit{dwifungsi} was an

\(^6\)At most company, or roughly 100-soldier unit, sized operations
extension of the Japanese colonial experience, where the government was similarly
divided into distinct military and civilian spheres (Kingsbury 2003: 27).

By the 1990s, however, the armed forces were less enthralled with the doctrine
of *dwifungsi*. As Suharto sought to maintain the military’s support for his rule, he
increasingly selected leading generals for promotion based on personal, often familial,
ties (Halder 2014). This caused factionalism within the military, which while effec-
tive at minimizing the risk of a coup damaged the army’s professionalism as ambi-
tious officers concentrated on pleasing Suharto and his cronies. Selective promotion
based on personal loyalty damaged morale, and Suharto’s increasing willingness to use
the army to counter political rivals—such as the repression of pro-Megawati civilian
protesters in 1996—threatened the military’s status as protector of the people, rather
than merely the regime⁷ (Honna 2009). To counter this trend reform-minded officers⁸
in the 1990s began advocating for a ‘back-to-basics’ approach that sought to dis-
tance the armed forces from the more corrupting dimensions of Suharto’s New Order
(Honna 2003: 86-88).

⁷While the armed forces were granted wide autonomy under the New Order when dealing
with separatist movements across the archipelago, Suharto personally controlled the military
units and tactics used against challengers (or ‘center-seeking’ rebels, in the Fearon and
Laitin’s (2007) terminology) to his rule (Croissant et al. 2013).

⁸A central figure among these reform minded officers was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
(hereafter SBY), who realized that since Suharto’s regime was not indefinite for the military
to remain relevant after the eventual transition away from the New Order it needed to reform
sooner rather than later. This position made SBY a pivotal figure during the reformasi
period and concurrent conflict in Aceh, culminating in his election as president in 2004
(Mietzner 2006).
4.2.3 Aceh, Separatism, and the GAM

The region of Aceh\textsuperscript{9} sits on the northwest tip of the island of Sumatra at the westernmost end of the sprawling archipelago that makes up modern-day Indonesia. Described as the ‘front porch of Mecca,’ its native inhabitants practice a stricter form of Islam than most Indonesians (Smith 2002). Aceh has historically been either at the far edge of Javanese influence or independent of it, acting as a power in its own right. The region’s high point was during the 17th century peak of the sultanate of Aceh, which controlled much of the lucrative spice trade (Smith 2002). The sultanate, protected by the British who sought to counter Dutch hegemony in the region, continued to flourish while the rest of what is today Indonesia fell under Dutch rule (Challis 2001). In 1873, after the British withdrew their support, the Acehnese defeated a Dutch invasion force in what was their worst military setback in the region (Smith 2002). Even after colonial rule was established in the capital, Banda Aceh, armed resistance continued in the rugged hinterlands (Kingsbury 2003). Following the Japanese occupation during the Second World War the Dutch reimposed rule of all of their former colonial territories except for Aceh, which they deemed to difficult to conquer (Miller 2009).

Despite this history of resistance to outside rule and the central role of Islam in its politics and society, Aceh opted to voluntarily join the newly established state of Indonesia in 1949. This decision to freely join is in contrast to East Timor and West Papua, regions which were conquered in 1975 and 1962, respectively (Ross 2005). Subordination to Jakarta’s secular-nationalist rule was not total, however; armed resistance continued in various forms, most notably in the 1950s as part of the larger

\textsuperscript{9}The founder of the GAM, Hasan di Tiro, used the spelling ‘Acheh’ in part to distinguish from the Javanese spelling of the region as ‘Aceh’ (Smith 2002). Throughout this chapter I adopt the more widely used ‘Aceh.’
Darul Islam revolt that sought a bigger role for Islam in politics and society across Indonesia (Aspinall 2013). The conflict ended in 1962 with a promise of the elevation of Aceh to a ‘special region’ where Islam was given a more prominent role in public life. (Ross 2005). This pledge was subsequently walked back as the central government reestablished comprehensive control under Suharto’s New Order, sowing mistrust in the latent Acehnese separatist movement (Miller 2009).

Aceh was also an important location in the anti-communist violence in 1965-66 that swept Indonesia as part of Sukarno’s ousting by Suharto. The Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI, had a small following in devoutly Muslim Aceh, but the sensitivity of the region’s religious leaders to abuses elsewhere, coupled with anti-PKI sentiment in the armed forces, led to Aceh being the starting point for large-scale violence that ultimately killed an estimated 500,000 Indonesians.\textsuperscript{10} While previous academics either blamed “spontaneous, religious-inspired popular violence” or militias loosely affiliated with Suharto’s forces, more recent scholarship argues that the army had a direct and active role in planning and implementing the mass killings on PKI-associated civilians (Melvin 2018: 14).

The Acheh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), more commonly referred to as the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (the Free Aceh Movement, or GAM), was founded in 1976 by Hasan di Toro. The grandson of a noted armed resistance leader in the war of independence against the Dutch and a descendant of the Sultan of Aceh, di Toro’s ideology and legitimacy largely flowed from his charisma and hereditary ties to leaders from Aceh’s pre-colonial golden age. While there were some references to

\textsuperscript{10}While Melvin (2018) and Cribb (2001) explicitly uses the term ‘genocide’ to describe the anti-communist violence of this period, ‘politicide’ may be more accurate.
the political role of Islam in GAM’s literature, these were secondary and largely an accommodation to devout Acehnese rather than a central goal of the movement.\footnote{The concern that GAM is Islamist (that is, “holding the belief that Islam should be the foundation of government”) was heightened after the September 11th, 2001 attacks and subsequent US-led Global War on Terror. This argument, while furthered by the Indonesian government as justification for the intensity of their counterinsurgency campaign in the early 2000s, is weaker in the opinion of many scholars who instead point to the historical and economic grievances cited by GAM and the lack of links to transnational terror networks since its severing of ties with Libya in the early 1990s (Smith 2002: 69). Responding in 2000 to Jakarta’s offer to allow Islamic law in Aceh a GAM negotiator retorted that “the Indonesian government wants to make us look like [Taliban-governed] Afghanistan” (quoted in Miller 2009: 92).}

GAM’s case for independence from Jakarta was predominately a rational-legal one; they argued that the central Indonesian state had fundamentally mismanaged the economy and, in particular, was unfairly profiting from oil and natural gas extraction in Aceh (Smith 2002). This framing of the Indonesian central government as ‘Javanese neo-colonialists’ exploiting the recently discovered reserves shaped much of the GAM’s early military operations, which were primarily targeted at a newly-build Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility (Schulze 2004, Ross 2005).

The initial separatist campaign fizzled by 1982 as the Indonesian security forces captured or drove into exile most GAM leaders. Many of those exiled went to Libya for training, and upon their return to Aceh in 1989 launched a second wave of violence. The GAM largely used hit-and-run tactics against their targets, which included Indonesian state offices, non-Acehnese settlers, and suspected informers. While they controlled little territory directly, the GAM established networks within villages throughout the region to recruit new fighters, access resources, and gain intelligence (Ross 2005). Suharto’s regime responded heavy-handedly, declaring the region a ‘Special Operations Area’ (Daerah Operasi Militer, or DOM) and using indiscriminate force with impunity (Miller 2009; Smith 2002; Ross 2005). The TNI deployed a total
of 12,000 additional troops to the province, many of whom had used collective punishment tactics previously in East Timor (Smith 2010). These ‘non-organic’ troops were viewed in a particularly negative light by the Acehnese, who suffered broadly from their indiscriminate use of force. The most aggressive and well-equipped units, the Kostrad paratroopers, were both the elite of the Indonesian military and the least able solve the identification problem central to using force selectively (Robinson 2001).

While by 1991 the province was again largely under the control of the Indonesian central government, the DOM continued until 1998. This ‘DOM period’ was marked by massive repression by the TNI, which involved “approximately 5-6,000 deaths, widespread torture, arrest without trial, and the systemic rape and sexual assault of women believed to be linked, or sympathetic to GAM” (Smith 2002: 77).\footnote{While this violence against civilians was directed broadly towards those associated by ethnicity, religious devotion, or proximity with the GAM, and could be in a sense considered a strategic (or purposeful) mechanism to break the will of an adversary’s base of popular support, the perpetrators neither discriminated between combatant and noncombatants nor used military means proportional to the threat faced. Therefore, according to the definition laid out in Chapter 1, this use of violence falls squarely within my concept of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.} The security services profited greatly from extortion during the period, leading to a saying among the TNI that “if you go to Aceh, you will come back either dead or very rich” (Smith 2010: 21).

4.3 Counterinsurgency during Democratization

The variation in the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh during the period of post-Suharto democratic consolidation and halting efforts at military reform provides a rich case for my main hypothesis. This argument posits that a politically independent military, when coupled with a regime that draws its power from a wide
array of supporters, is particularly likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency. The mechanisms by which this happens include the propagation of a military culture of impunity and independence, the political leadership's maneuvering to maintain power within a larger regime of elites and institutions, and how the civilian leadership attempts to reform, restrain, or subordinate the military to its will. The underlying assumption behind focusing on these patterns of civilian control and stability is that the military, if unrestrained, will default to a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in an intrastate conflict.

Specifically to Indonesia, this section traces how shifts in the political leadership's base of support, interacted with the political assertiveness and independence of the military, shaped the army's use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh. It traces the development of this interaction over the four post-Suharto presidencies: Habibie, Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono (widely known by his initials, SBY). This section begins with the immediate aftermath of Suharto's ouster, where a politically cowed military largely withdrew from Aceh and undertook several wide-ranging reforms. Habibie's political ambitions outran his base of support, however, leading to a resurgence of military autonomy. The second post-Suharto president, Wahid, quickly squandered his political legitimacy, making him dependent on the military's support, which in turn led to escalation in Aceh and, ultimately, the TNI abandoning him for his vice president, Megawati. Megawati's term was marked by a hands-off approach towards the military that put her in power, resulting levels of indiscriminate violence approaching that of the authoritarian DOM period. The fourth and final phase, following the election of SBY and the devastating tsunami in late 2004, saw an assertive and pragmatic president undermine the TNI's autonomy and assuage its concerns about lost economic revenue and criminal accountability for previous abuses. Together, these moves sidelined the TNI and prevented it from acting as a
spoiler in the peace process, resulting in an enduring and mutually beneficial end to the long-running conflict in Aceh.

The fall of President Suharto and subsequent democratization unleashed forces that shaped the nature of TNI’s anti-separatist counterinsurgency campaign in Aceh. The reshaping of civil-military relations during the post-Suharto reformasi period increased pressure on the TNI to reform and account for past abuses. As detailed below, however, overly ambitious calls for accountability often backfired as factions within the armed forces closed ranks and undermined a series of fledgling civilian governments. Suharto’s ouster also unleashed a wave of separatist sentiment across long-restive regions. Emboldened by the new regime’s seemingly conciliatory policies, separatists in Aceh agitated for independence, only to face an overwhelming response from the military when the political leaders in Jakarta proved unable to retain power and restrain the army. I argue that the interaction of these two mechanisms: the military’s continued role in policy making and freedom to act with de facto impunity, coupled with the civilian regime’s tenuous grip on political power, were driving conditions for the TNI’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh.

4.3.1 The Habibie Interim: Constrained Military in a New Political World

Suharto’s three-decade long rule came to an abrupt end in 1998 when the devastating economic effects of the Asian financial crisis sparked widespread protests calling for an the end to his increasingly corrupt regime. While Suharto used the military to repress political opponents and separatist movements throughout his tenure as president, the armed forces opted not to impose martial law against the protestors (Lee 2005). General Wiranto, the commander in chief of the armed forces, outmaneuvered Lieutenant General Prabowo, the ambitious former Kopassus officer who recently
was elevated to command of the *Kostrad*\(^\text{13}\) and who had lobbied for a harder line against the protesters. Wiranto sided with the student protesters, allowing them to occupy the parliament in Jakarta, a move which aligned the two great ‘moral forces’ in Indonesia—the military and the people—against Suharto. The vice president, Habibie, shifted his support from Prabowo to Wiranto, setting the conditions for a managed transition from Suharto to an interim government (Lee 2009). This maneuvering ensured Wiranto’s continued leadership of the TNI, allowed for the armed forces to dictate the pace and depth of subsequent reform efforts, and reinforced the political role of the military as an institution in post-New Order Indonesia. Critically, it linked the survival of now-President Habibie with Wiranto and the TNI (Mietzner 2006).

Under pressure from both the newly invigorated middle class and from reformist officers within the armed forces General Wiranto introduced a series of reforms in 1998 dubbed the ‘New Paradigm’ which sought to reshape the military’s role in Indonesian politics and society. The concepts behind many of these reforms originated from internal reform-minded factions within the TNI who, during the 1990s, argued for professionalizing the armed forces by separating it from Suharto’s increasingly personalistic rule. Wiranto also used these initial reforms to sideline Prabowo and his faction of hard-line *Kopassus* officers, charging them with human rights violations during the Suharto period (Honna 2003: 164). The doctrine of *dwifungsi* was jettisoned, which removed active duty officers serving in the state bureaucracy, reduced the number of reserved military seats in parliament, and separated the police from the TNI (Mietzner 2006). Rather than being at the forefront of Indonesian politics

\(^{13}\)The powerful *Kostrad*, or strategic reserve, was commanded by then-Major General Suharto in 1965 when he pushed out President Sukarno (Kingsbury 2003).
and society, the military would now take an indirect, but still active and powerful, role.

The scope of this initial reform effort by General Wiranto is notable for four reasons. First, it solidified his personal position as head of the TNI by distancing him from the military’s history of abuses. Second, it retained the central means of the military’s economic profit and societal control: the territorial Kodam system. Habibie’s government was in the midst of a decentralization initiative, and maintenance of the Kodam system allowed the TNI to actually increase the leverage it had over the newly-empowered regional governments and their growing budgets (Honna 2003). Third, while the TNI’s reforms acknowledged popular criticisms of its past human rights abuses, its fundamental institutional interests were untouched (Mietzner 2006). Finally, the pace of the reforms was brisk. President Habibie, widely seen as a holdover from the Suharto regime, encouraged the rapid implementation of these (and other) reforms to shore up political support, but was ultimately reliant on the TNI for his continued rule. The speed of several of his other initiatives, taken without consultation with the TNI, eroded the military’s faith in him and in the leadership of democratically elected politicians more broadly (Halder 2014: 92).

A critical structural element of strengthened civil control of the military was missing entirely from this set of reforms—control over resourcing. Nearly three-quarters of the TNI’s budget continued to come from outside the government, extending a long-running pattern. While much of this funding came from legitimate military-owned and operated industries there were also large-scale activities whose legality was more murky and whose revenues were used to fund unsanctioned operations. Additionally, extortion and petty corruption continued to pervade the TNI, especially in the territorial units. While widely understood as detrimental to the TNI’s professionalism and harmful to its reputation among Indonesia’s population,
without adequate funding from the central government these economic activities were needed to maintain the armed forces. Leaving this issue unaddressed in the initial reform effort allowed the military to continue operations independent of civilian control (Croissant et al. 2013).

The fall of President Suharto also opened the door for the expression of long-suppressed grievances across Indonesia. East Timor, a restive province that is largely Christian which was only incorporated into Muslim-majority Indonesia after the ruling Portuguese left in 1975, was promised a referendum on secession by President Habibie shortly after taking office. The TNI’s leadership widely opposed this offer, fearing it would unleash a wave of separatist sentiment across Indonesia. In Aceh calls for a similar referendum grew louder as large, but generally peaceful, protests demanded greater freedom from Jakarta. In addition to the long-running grievances about repression and a lack of autonomy Acehnese pointed to the increasingly lucrative oil and natural gas industry operating in the region. The revenue from these concessions went overwhelmingly to Jakarta, instead of remaining in Aceh (Ross 2005). The influx of foreign workers who operated the LNG facility brought with it vices that were deemed un-Islamic by the more devoutly Muslim Acehnese (Robinson 2001).

The DOM period, which had been in effect in Aceh since the GAM’s second campaign started in 1989, came to an end shortly after Suharto’s departure from office when non-organic troops (i.e., units not assigned to the territorial command that included Aceh) were withdrawn in May 1998. While official figures were not released, and rumors of non-organic units secretly returning abounded, roughly 65% of the 12,000 security personnel in Aceh towards the end of the DOM period were withdrawn (Miller 2009). The ignominious retreat of TNI soldiers, some of whom were publicly insulted by civilians as they departed, was coupled with a public apology.
by General Wiranto to the Acehnese people (Smith 2002). Implementing the New Paradigm in Aceh proved to be a complicated task. The separation of the military from the police in the newly-restructured TNI resulted in an under-resourced civilian national police force (the *Kopolisian Republik Indonesia*, or *Polri*) with a convoluted chain of command, while the enduring existence of the military’s territorial system ensured continued, albeit informal, involvement of the army in the regional government (Miller 2009: 23)

While GAM-related violence in Aceh largely disappeared during the latter half of the DOM period, the TNI’s historical use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency planted seeds that led to the relapse following Suharto’s ouster. As Miller writes, at the beginning of Habibie’s presidency “Aceh was still in shock after more than a decade of rape, torture, summary executions, theft, and a litany of other crimes committed against the civilian population during the DOM” (2009: 18). The children of victims of TNI violence proved to be willing recruits for the GAM’s resurgent numbers, constituting most of the group’s fighters by 2000 (Ross 2005). Kingsbury described the scene in a village where the GAM operated freely:

A 10-year old boy stood nearby, self-consciously part of this group of hardened men. His father had been shot by Brimob [the Indonesian mobile police brigade units] a few days previously, and died soon after. This boy was already the next generation of the [independence] struggle, waiting his turn (2003: 226).¹⁴

Riding the rising anti-Jakarta sentiment, the newly invigorated GAM settled old scores with informers and started attacking Indonesian security forces, particularly

¹⁴While not necessarily a specific case of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, this example highlights the dynamic of escalation and perpetuation of conflict that makes indiscriminate counterinsurgency an often-ineffective strategy.
the newly-independent and undermanned police. Seasoned fighters who had fled to Malaysia or who were previously held by the regime but were freed as part of an amnesty program returned to GAM’s ranks (Aspinall and Crouch 2003).

The new regime tried to assuage calls for independence by pledging increased regional autonomy and accountability for the military’s behavior during the DOM period. Promises of increased oil revenue and devolution of authority to the regional level were largely ignored, however, by an Acehnese population that lacked trust in the predominantly Javanese national leadership. The human rights investigations into abuses during Suharto’s last decade in power also did little to reduce tensions. The report by the newly-established National Human Rights Commission acknowledged far fewer conflict-related fatalities than were widely believed to have been committed, resulting in widespread protests in Aceh. The TNI was angered by the findings as well, which publicized the ubiquity of its abuses during the DOM period. The timing of this report, which was produced in relatively short order during the first year after Suharto’s ouster, helped solidify TNI opposition to further investigation and coalesce a military institution that had largely been divided about its political role and the need for comprehensive reform in the post-Suharto era (Miller 2009).

The decisions by Habibie to hold the referendum on independence in East Timor and to publicly investigate human rights abuses during the DOM period in Aceh greatly embarrassed the military and undermined its confidence in and support of the new regime’s leadership. They also kneecapped the reformist faction within the TNI that had sought to distance the armed forces from day-to-day politics to minimize the corrupting and divisive effects of deep military involvement in economic and social affairs.\(^\text{15}\) Instead, it reinforced the belief among Indonesian military officers that “only

\(^{15}\)One of interesting aspect of Indonesian military reform during this period is that calls for a more narrow, professional role for the armed forces came from within the TNI itself,
the TNI is capable of rising above the petty rivalries and self-interested behavior of post-Suharto civilian politicians” (Sebastian and Isgindarasah 2013: 30). Since the TNI subscribed to an ideology that centered on the inviolability to the Indonesian state, an ideology that was fundamentally incompatible with any form of separatism, it needed to re-militarize politics to fulfill its duty (Honna 2009: 239).

Habibie’s limited legitimacy—being Suharto’s Vice President, he was widely seen as an interim leader—was compounded by the widening of Indonesian politics. Previously sidelined institutions, such as the Parliament\textsuperscript{16}, civil society, and the press exerted their new found power when Habibie sought to extend his term by standing in the 1999 presidential elections. This shifted his role from a transitional caretaker to a more traditional political candidate, opening him to criticism for his mishandling of the East Timor referendum and subsequent violence (Halder 2014). This violence was largely driven by the Wiranto-led TNI, which was fundamentally opposed to secession and sought to deter others from similarly seeking to break away (Walter 2009). The loss of civilian political support made Habibie increasingly reliant on the military for his continued rule, but the armed force’s anger at his conciliatory measures eroded its support while other candidates wooed the TNI (Mietzer 2006). Habibie lost the 1999 presidential election\textsuperscript{17} to Abdurrahman Wahid, who had provided “guarantees that the military’s interests would be ‘protected’ if he won the election” but stopped short of naming the TNI commander as vice president, as General Wiranto had asked (Mietzner 2006: 16). This shift in military support from Habibie to Wahid reflected rather than from outside. This made it difficult to continue pushing for reform from within when external events threatened the institution (Mietzner 2006)

\textsuperscript{16}Known formally as the MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or People’s Consultative Assembly (Mietzner 2006)

\textsuperscript{17}As an interim measure the presidential candidates were elected by Parliament, rather than directly by the people. This arrangement persisted until general elections could be held, the first of which took place in 2004 (Kingsbury 2005)
the new position of the TNI in the Indonesian political system as an important and independent, but not dominant, member of larger post-Suharto selectorate.

My central hypothesis posits that a more constrained military that is unable to act independently of a political leadership which draws its support from a broad selectorate is less likely to use a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. The first half of Habibie’s presidency, when popular anger at the TNI’s abuses during the Suharto regime and a broad mandate for reform impinged on the military’s ability to shape policy and act with impunity, saw a decline in government-inflicted indiscriminate violence against civilians in Aceh. Apologies, investigations, and the withdrawal of non-organic security forces from the region all point to this more restrained posture. However, the fundamental tensions over self-determination and the distribution of resource wealth fueled the GAM’s resurgence and a relapse of conflict as Habibie’s political base eroded and the military reasserted itself in policy debates.

4.3.2 Wahid’s Overplays His Hand, Military Reimposes Its Will

Once in power, President Wahid sought to further rein in the TNI as part of the larger post-Suharto reformasi program. General Wiranto, who helped ease Suharto out of power and wielded significant political influence, was retired from active service and brought into Wahid’s cabinet as a civilian minister. Replacing him as TNI commander was Admiral Widodo, who as a naval officer was an unusual choice to lead the army-dominated military. Wiranto was subsequently forced to resign from Wahid’s cabinet due to his mishandling of the crisis in East Timor, though he remained active in politics and later ran (unsuccessfully) for president (Mietzner 2006).

18Some argue that Widodo had served closely with Wiranto, and would continue of the latter’s policy of internally driven, halting military reform (Kingsbury 2003). This view is not universally shared in the literature, as others point to Widodo’s naval background as evidence that Wahid chose as TNI commander an officer that was not beholden to the army.
During this political turnover in Jakarta the situation in Aceh deteriorated. The reform of the TNI convoluted the relationship between the civilian police (Poltri) and the territorial military (Kodem) units that remained in the region after the end of the DOM period. The economic incentives for the TNI to maintain a level of insecurity also remained: protection for the oil and gas infrastructure was largely provided by soldiers and police working informally as private security contractors. Other activities were more illicit, ranging from taking bribes at checkpoint to selling drugs to selling arms to the GAM (Miller 2009; Honna 2009). The level of mistrust and pervasiveness of conspiratorial rumors also contributed to this general sense of insecurity. The protests accompanying the withdrawal of non-organic troops, for example, were thought by some to be orchestrated by the TNI as a way of continuing its lucrative presence in the region (Human Rights Watch 2001).

The GAM took advantage of the relative lack of state capacity to extract revenge on alleged informants and regime sympathizers, many of whom were non-Acehnese migrants from Java (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). The limited, remaining TNI presence acted as kindling for a renewed conflagration. Six Indonesian soldiers kidnapped and killed in December 1998, sparking a cycle of retribution that culminated in Operation Satgas Wibawa (Miller 2009: 28). This military operation both saw the large-scale reintroduction of non-organic TNI troops to Aceh and the use of collective punishment techniques such as the burning of entire villages thought to be GAM-affiliated (Human Rights Watch 2001). The identification problem, where security forces are unable to differentiate between civilians who directly and materially support the insurgents and the population at large, returned (Kalyvas 2004). The military’s practice of shooting indiscriminately into crowds became more frequent as demonstrations increased in number and intensity (Miller 2009). Specifically during this period were
the ‘Simpang KKA’ incident,’ where soldiers killed 56 residents of a village in North Aceh in May 1999, and the killing of 38 people near a boarding school in West Aceh in July (Smith 2002; Miller 2009; Suh 2015). Importantly, both incidents were documented by the Indonesian media. This documentation, along with the minor sentences handed down to only a handful of lower-ranking soldiers, furthered the perception that the TNI’s penchant for using indiscriminate violence with impunity remained unchanged, despite the apologies of Habibie and Wiranto for such behavior during the previous DOM period (Smith 2010).

Wahid sought to reduce the violence in Aceh, saying during his campaign that “for a long time I have said that I agree with a referendum for Aceh” (quoted in Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 9). As president, however, he found himself limited by an elite consensus firmly opposed to such a vote. The military was particularly opposed to such a measure, arguing that since “Aceh is the property of the entire Indonesian nation” the entire country, rather than just the province itself, should be able to vote (Military spokesman Major General Sudradjat, quoted in Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 9). Unable to hold a referendum, Wahid instead opened peace talks with the GAM, following a more general pattern discussed earlier in Section 3.4.5.

The start of negotiations coincided with Wahid’s dismissal of Wiranto from the cabinet, further deepening the rift between the president and the TNI. The army was dominated by officers whose formative service was in the New Order, and continued to adhere to the Suharto-era dogma that separatism could only be countered with massive military force (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). As Wahid promoted loyal-

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19 This event is also referred to as the Buetong Ateuh incident. Per the US State Department’s 2000 Human Rights Report on Indonesia, “Twenty-four army personnel received jail sentences of 8 to 10 years in May [2000] for the massacre of 58 civilians in Beutong Ateuh, West Aceh, in May 1999. However, the most senior military officer involved in the incident inexplicably disappeared after the convictions.” (US Department of State, 2002) Note the minor difference in casualty figures.
ists within the military, a faction of more conservative officers, many of whom were personally beholden to the now-sidelined Wiranto, coalesced in opposition to further reform efforts. In particular, they were concerned that Wahid was accelerating reforms to improve his political standing among Indonesian elites, at the expense of both the TNI and Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Between the poles of conservatives and Wahid’s hand picked officers were a group of generals who realized reform was needed, but sought to manage its pace and scope. Specifically, this centrist faction was able to indefinitely defer the disbanding of the territorial structure of the army, arguing that while it was a corrupting influence on the military it was an irreplaceable source of funding (Mietzner 2006).

Wahid overplayed his hand, however, leading to the military coalescing around the more conservative, ‘security first’ faction. While a unified civilian leadership would have likely been able to bring about fundamental reform of the military, Wahid mismanaged his heterogeneous mix of civilian supporters. He dismissed several cabinet ministers from various political parties in his coalition, replacing them with loyalists who did not represent any larger movement. Wahid’s attempt to replace General Sutarto, the TNI commander known as a hard-liner in both civil-military and Acehnese affairs, was circumvented by the military as they rejected any political interference in what they deemed were internal, military personnel decisions (Honna 2003). The newly created, and civilian-led, Ministry of Defense largely failed to cement its position as superior to the TNI’s uniformed leadership and was routinely outmaneuvered in policy debates by the generals during Wahid’s tenure (Wandelt 2007). While some scholars argue the failure of Wahid’s ambitious program of security sector reform was due to sabotage by entrenched TNI interests (Kingsbury 2003), others attribute its lack of success to Wahid’s penchant for political blundering and inability to build the civilian coalition that was necessary to force through these reforms (Honna 2003).
As Mietzner put it, “conflict between the President and Parliament provided TNI with the opportunity and self-confidence to show open opposition and insubordination to the President” (2006: 27).

The TNI’s opposition to Wahid manifested itself on the ground in Aceh in the TNI’s counterinsurgency operations during the negotiations and subsequent ‘humanitarian pause’ with the GAM. The agreement, which went into effect in June 2000, still allowed for the TNI to conduct ‘routine patrols’ in Aceh, patrols that often resulted in clashes. While violence declined during the initial months of the pause, “by September violence had returned to roughly pre-pause levels” (US Department of State 2001). Although eventually extended several months by Wahid, “violence was at least as high as before the pause, with civilians...bearing the brunt” (ICG 2003: 2).

In all of 2000, 841 people were killed in Aceh (676 civilians, 124 Indonesian security forces, and 41 GAM fighters), a rate that was twice as high as 1999 (Miller 2009: 84). This includes an attack on a convoy of unarmed pro-referendum activists that was fired upon by the TNI at a checkpoint, resulting in scores of civilian deaths (Miller 2009).

The scale of TNI disregard for Wahid’s peace initiatives in both Aceh and in East Timor, coupled with his crumbling civilian political support, drove Parliament to initiate an impeachment process. In Jakarta Wahid attempted to order the military into ‘freezing’ Parliament, a move which General Sutarto ignored (Mietzner 2006). Instead of supporting Wahid, the strategically important Kostrad surrounded the

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20 Though “the government resisted calling it a cease-fire because this term might be seen as constituting recognition of GAM as an equal belligerent,” the agreement was in all practical purposes that (Smith 2002: 15).

21 SIRA (Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh or the Aceh Referendum Information Center), a pro-independence Achnese student organization, claimed 54 civilians were killed, while Komnas HAM (the Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights, established by President Habibie as part of the original post-Suharto reformasi) reported 30 deaths (Human Rights Watch 2002; Miller 2009).
presidential palace in July 2001, signalling the TNI’s displeasure with his continued rule and paving the way for his vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to succeed him.\textsuperscript{22} This interjection into politics greatly increased the military’s popularity in Indonesia, improving a reputation that had been tarnished during the later Suharto years (Wandelt 2007). It also clarified the military’s self-perceived status as a veto-wielding force: as General Sutarto put it in 2001, the “TNI is obliged to reject the president when it conflicts with the national interest” (quoted in Honna 2009: 24).

During this period of turmoil the conflict in Aceh was not a priority for Wahid, as he was focused on his political survival. Taking advantage of this distraction, the TNI moved to turn policy in Aceh from Wahid’s conciliatory approach to a confrontational one (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). By May 2001, when Wahid’s presidency was increasingly irrelevant, the “Indonesian security forces moved forward with an all-out offensive to crush ‘separatists’ [in Aceh]” (Human Rights Watch 2001: 5). Additional police and military units surged into Aceh, raising the total number of Indonesian security personnel in the region to roughly 30,000. The lines of authority between the various Indonesian government elements were convoluted, despite the establishment of a regional police headquarters that officially had command of all forces (including army units) in the region. Even though the police were now formally separated from the military, the army remained the dominant actor in the domestic security field, a legacy of the pre-\textit{reformasi} hierarchy where law enforcement was subordinate to the armed forces. As a result,

A bewildering array of security forces were operating on the ground in Aceh as of July 2001. These included local police, at the subdistrict

\textsuperscript{22}While many Javanese are known by one name, Megawati’s commonly used surname, literally ‘daughter of Sukarno’, highlights the close link between her and her father, the first president of Indonesia.
(polsek), district (polres) and provincial (polda) levels; mobile police brigade units (Brimob), many of them sent in from outside Aceh to assist with operations (known as BKO or bantuan kendali operasi, essentially auxiliary forces). The military units included ‘organic’ or locally-based forces at the subdistrict (Koramil), district (Kodim), sub-province (Korem) and regional (Kodam) levels, as well as specially trained units [such as Kopassus teams (Kingsbury 2003)] sent in from West Java (Human Rights Watch 2001: 14).

This amalgam of different forces and the tension between the official primacy of the police and the de facto lead role of the army led to a situation that diffused responsibility and encouraged abuses. The intensity of counterinsurgency operations increased, with 539 killed in 193 events between April and August 2001 (roughly double the rate from January to April). The human rights organizations that reported these incidents also “reported that conditions were now worse than during the height of the notorious DOM period” (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 22). Despite the establishment of joint civil-military courts, the “government’s critical failure [in 2001] to pursue accountability for human rights violations reinforces the impression that there would be continued impunity for security force abuses” (US Department of State, 2002).

Confusion over the official chain of command allowed the Indonesian security forces to pass off abuses as independent actions by individual soldiers or small units, an approach similar to arguments used both in East Timor and during the 1965-66 spell of mass violence. While in East Timor much of the killing was attributed initially to militias, in 2008 then-President Yudoyono acknowledged that much of the violence perpetrated by militias in East Timor was in fact tightly orchestrated by the military (Tajima 2014). Similarly, the mass killings that coincided with Sukarno’s
ouster, while often reported as ‘spontaneous violence,’ were later to be shown using archival documents as deliberately planned and instigated by the military (Melvin 2018).

In summary, Wahid’s shrinking power base, a result of missteps that alienated political allies, resulted in his increasing dependence on the military. The TNI, which recovered some of its standing after the post-Suharto nadir in the early Habibie years, took advantage of Wahid’s predicament by reimposing itself as a central force in Indonesian politics. While no longer the outward face of the government, the TNI was an indispensable member of the selectorate, a position which allowed it to reintroduce itself in Aceh. As Wahid lurched from crisis to crisis towards the end of his administration the military took decisions about security policy into its own hands, a move which resulted in the reintroduction of non-organic forces ill-equipped to differentiate rebel supporters from noncombatants and increasing levels of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in the war-torn province.

4.3.3 Megawati: The TNI Calls the Shots in Aceh

As a newly installed president Megawati Sukarnoputri put less emphasis on reforming and restraining the TNI that her two predecessors did at the beginning of their terms. Her top goal was national unity: at a military parade shortly after taking office she told the assembled officers that “it was their duty to do everything to hold the country together...they should not hold back out of a fear they might be violating human rights” (quoted in Kingsbury 2003: 227). The military also had newfound confidence in the political arena. The TNI played a decisive role in Wahid’s ouster, as they had deliberately ignored his desperate order to overrule the Parliament’s decision to remove him from office. While the generals were following the law by ignoring Wahid’s last-ditch effort to retain power, their inaction was nonetheless critical to
Megawati’s elevation. As Mietzner (2006: 32) argues, this reinforced the post-Suharto political role of the military in Indonesia as an important member of the selectorate, particularly during periods of discord between civilian elites.

Megawati was attuned to the pivotal role that the TNI played in both her rise to the presidency and as an indispensable member of her winning coalition. Learning from the missteps of Wahid, who at first sought to impose reforms on the military but then became increasingly dependent on it to remain power as his political coalition shrank, Megawati sough to solidify the TNI’s support early on in her tenure as president. Reversing the post-Suharto trend of imposing reforms on the military, Megawati gave the TNI greater autonomy to set security policy. This hands-off approach was possible partially because of popular disillusionment with the broader reformasi program, which had lost much of the momentum that it had in the initial post-Suharto years (Mietzner 2006). Megawati’s reliance on the military for political support does not mean that she was entirely supine, however; some important reforms, like the phasing out of reserved seats for the TNI in parliament (Halder 2014).

Megawati delegated much of the authority for setting policy in Aceh to her Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security, retired Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. While SBY was a noted reformer within the TNI, his views on the GAM hardened, stating in 2001 that “no country solves its armed movement problems with dialogue” (quoted in Miller 2009: 107). The remainder of Megawati’s cabinet was military-heavy as well, featuring several hard-line retired generals who saw Aceh entirely through a security lens and consistently advocated for a heavy-handed solution (Miller 2009: 103). This hands-off approach by Megawati satisfied the leadership of the TNI, who after the restrictions and reforms imposed by Hababie and Wahid were eager to use military means on what they considered a military problem. Operations on the ground mirrored this new, military-centric strategy: “In July 2002,
the Aceh regional army commander claimed that 947 ‘suspected’ GAM members had been killed since the launch of the military offensive in May 2001” (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 24).

The military’s offensive did have an effect on the GAM, which lost significant numbers of fighters was forced to retreat from areas that it had previously operated openly in. While previously it controlled 60-70% of Aceh, by the end of 2001 the GAM was now limited to only 30-40% of the region. Civilian casualties in 2001 numbered 1,028, the highest since the collapse of Suharto’s New Order (Miller 2009: 112).

Seeking to build on the momentum it established during this campaign, Megawati’s government reopened peace negotiations with the GAM in early 2002. These negotiations sought to build on the legal framework of the recently passed special autonomy (commonly referred to as the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, or NAD) law intended to grant a measure of self-rule to the Achnese while maintaining national unity (Aspinall and Crouch 2003). The TNI was impatient with the pace of the peace talks in Geneva, with the Army Chief of Staff saying “dialogue for a thousand years hasn’t brought results” (quoted in Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 29). Violence on the ground continued unabated, and in June 2002 SBY, previously a proponent for dialogue who had grown frustrated with the lack of diplomatic progress and continued pressure from the army to increase military pressure, ordered intensified security operations against the GAM.

The negotiations in Geneva continued, however, and eventually culminated in the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002. The CoHA was intended to be the first in a series of confidence-building measures that would lead to a negotiated settlement of the long-running Aceh conflict. The TNI never fully accepted the CoHA and immediately sought to undermine the agreement (Honna 2009). In the forefront of the military’s collective mind was the recent, and successful, secession movement in East Timor. Concerned that the GAM was using the
CoHA to reestablish administrative control over areas where they had been driven out of and agitate for independence, the military argued for an end to the peace agreement almost as soon as it was signed (ICG 2003). Critically, the military viewed GAM activities such as levying taxes, formally installing military commanders in previously government held villages, and framing the CoHA as a step towards independence as breaches of both the spirit and letter of the agreement that was based on implementing the NAD law, rather than as an interim step towards an independence referendum. While in the first month of the agreement violence dropped precipitously, the TNI feared it was losing the narrative battle to the GAM and its political allies (Aspinall and Crouch 2003).

The military ignored important elements of the CoHA as well. Instead of the agreed-upon ‘simultaneous phased reallocation’ of its security personnel, the TNI’s footprint in Aceh increased by 4,000 to a total of 38,000 soldiers and police, the largest since the end of the DOM period (Miller 2009: 122). Anti-GAM demonstrations in Aceh that protested against rebel-levied taxes and called for increased TNI presence were “seen by virtually all observers as engineered by the security forces” (Aspinall and Crouch 2003: 41). Despite these concerns by both the GAM and the TNI that the other was negotiating in bad faith, violence decreased dramatically; in its 2003 report on Indonesia’s human rights practices, the US State Department writes that “fewer than 50 violent deaths occurred during [the] 5-month period [of the CoHA], representing a significant decrease from the 1,307 violent deaths during the 11 months prior to the signing” (US Department of State 2004).

Frustrated with the lack of diplomatic process in negotiating follow-on agreements to the CoHA and the concern that the GAM was using the cessation of hostilities to rearm and rebuild its military strength, the TNI pushed Megawati to declare martial
law in Aceh and launch an all-out military offensive in the region. Megawati, who was politically reliant on the military and deferred to the retired generals who constituted much of her cabinet for decisions on security matters, supported this resumption of hostilities (Halder 2014). The immediate prelude to ending the ceasefire was a last-ditch effort in May 2003 aimed at continuing the peace talks in Tokyo; the TNI unleashed a large-scale ‘show and awe’ offensive the day after these negotiations collapsed, timing which has been cited as evidence that the failure of the peace process was a predetermined formality designed to assuage concerns among the international community that had midwifed the CoHA (Miller 2009). This offensive, the largest Indonesian military operation since 1975, was not only popular within the ranks but also with the broader Indonesian public, which was increasingly frustrated with the Acehnese separatist movement (Smith 2010).

Unlike previous campaigns, Operasi Terpadu did not even attempt to nest its military objectives within a larger social, political, or economic framework. Instead the roughly 44,000 security personnel now in Aceh focused solely on militarily defeating the GAM. Through the martial law declaration, command of all security forces—including the police—reverted to the army, and access to the area for journalists, non-governmental organizations, and international observers was strictly limited (Miller 2009). These limitations made independent reporting from Aceh difficult; though the Indonesian Red Cross recovered 151 bodies dressed in civilian

\footnote{While martial law only technically lasted for a short period in May, it was followed by a civil emergency which saw equally harsh restrictions on the freedoms of speech, assembly, and movement. Importantly, the TNI was permitted to (and routinely did) arrest civilians during the civil emergency period, a power which was supposedly restricted to the civil police (US Department of State 2004).}

\footnote{The TNI adopted the practice of ‘embedding’ journalists within its units, a practice which Kingsbury (2005) argues reduced their objectivity. Embedded journalists, along with the explicit use of ‘shock and awe’ tactics were direct lifts from the recently completed US-led invasion of Iraq.}
clothes in the first three weeks, though they could not confirm that they were in fact noncombatants (Human Rights Watch 2003).

The scale of the operation took its toll both on the GAM and civilians in Aceh. “On December 31, Aceh’s provincial police chief, Inspector General Bahrumsyah Kasman, told reporters that during the military operation, 580 GAM members had been killed, along with 470 civilians, 50 soldiers and 26 police officers, for a total of 1,126 deaths” (US State Department 2004). Although the GAM were responsible for many of these civilian casualties, the government’s unwillingness to investigate alleged TNI violations, coupled with the over 10:1 ratio of government security forces to GAM fighters, implicates the Indonesian military in much of the violence directed against civilians. Based on interviews of Acehnese refugees in Malaysia, Human Rights Watch observed that:

There appear to be two types of visible executions currently taking place in Aceh. The first type typically occurs when security forces enter villages during so-called ‘sweeping operations.’ During these raids young men were singled out and shot, and there was no attempt to hide the execution. The second type of visible killing is of civilians shot while fleeing Indonesian security forces. The deliberate and public nature of these killings suggest that they seek to send a warning to deter villagers from supporting GAM (Human Rights Watch 2003: 19).

A common theme throughout the interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch was the military’s assumption of guilt in rural villages in Aceh; if young men were absent, that was taken as evidence that they were GAM, and the TNI routinely and violently abused the remaining villagers to incite a response. If men were present in
the village, they were interrogated and tortured. The open application of this often-lethal violence was intended to intimidate and deter cooperation with the rebels, but its indiscriminate application disassociated the desired behavior (siding with the Indonesian state) with the likelihood of suffering such abuse.

While the TNI dismissed reports of the indiscriminate use of force against civilians by its soldiers as individual failings by individuals or small groups, many of the tactics seen in Aceh were previously used against rebel-controlled areas in East Timor and Papau. Abusers were often rewarded: “Retired and active duty military officers known to have committed serious human rights violations occupied or were promoted to senior positions in the Government and the TNI” (US State Department 2004).

During 2003 there was some marginal improvement in the Indonesian security forces’ willingness and ability to hold abusers of human rights within its ranks to account, but these efforts were primarily directed at lower-ranking soldiers and police officers and cited more minor crimes, such as excessive beatings of civilians (US State Department 2004). While this was an improvement over the complete impunity enjoyed by the army during the DOM period, Human Rights Watch argues that “the light sentences, selective prosecution, and low rank of those charged demonstrate a lack of seriousness in punishing or deterring crimes by members of the armed forces” (Human Rights Watch 2003: 44). Despite these limited attempts at accountability, no charges of unlawful killing were brought, ignoring widespread evidence that “security force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements, especially in Aceh” (US Department of State 2004). This lack of accountability extended well past the end of the conflict in Aceh,

\[25\] One particular documented example was of Major General Damiri, who was convicted of crimes against humanity for actions in East Timor in 1999 but subsequently promoted to the General Staff and involved in directing military operations during Operasi Terpadu in Aceh (Human Rights Watch 2003).
as neither formal judicial proceedings nor transitional justice measures have been implemented, despite the legal structure authorizing them (Suh 2015).26

The repressive campaign in Aceh continued through the end of Megawati’s tenure as president. During her term she remained politically beholden to the TNI, accommodating both their opposition to the CoHA and the subsequent imposition of martial law and sweeping counterinsurgency campaign. Both popular and elite opinion was less concerned about security sector reform than in the previous Habibie and Wahid administrations, making restraining the military less pressing of an issue for Megawati as she sought to balance political interests and maintain power. This lack of pressure from other members of the selectorate, coupled with a politically assertive and confident military establishment which sought to independently shape policy in war-torn Aceh, resulted in Megawati ceding control of the campaign to hard-liners in the TNI, who in turned pursued a campaign of indiscriminate counterinsurgency (Miller 2009; Croissant et al. 2013).

4.3.4 SBY: The Former General Restrains the Army

In contrast to the previous post-Suharto presidents, who were chosen by the MPR as an interim measure during the transition to democracy, the 2004 election was a popular vote. While this shift from parliamentary to direct elections was originally opposed by the military, retired officers such as SBY and Wiranto27 soon began

26Per Suh, a central reason for this omission in the post-conflict years is that the Indonesian government made clear that any such trials or commission would also look into crimes by the GAM. Since these were numerous and brutal as well, and many senior GAM leaders are now in politics, neither side has pushed hard for such an accounting.

27Retired General Wiranto, the former TNI commander sidelined by Wahid, was not able to gain consolidated support from the TNI and placed third in the first round of the 2004 presidential election (Trivedi 2015). Wiranto had previously curtailed SBY’s military career during the Wahid administration, retiring him as a Lieutenant General and moving him to a minor ministerial post (O’Rourke 2002).
working to build popular political support for their own candidacies. Yudhoyono was able to leverage his resignation from Megawati’s cabinet in 2004 as a repudiation of the petty politics that many military officers thought hindered the effectiveness of the post-Suharto civilian leadership, particularly in their involvement in security sector reform and the conduct of the conflict in Aceh. SBY crushed Megawati in the October 2004 elections, making the retired general the first directly elected post-New Order president of Indonesia (Mietzner 2006).

While Megawati had largely deferred to the military for security policy decisions, SBY methodically removed hardliners from the ranks of the TNI (Halder 2014). Chief among these was General Ryacudu, the Army Chief of Staff chosen by Megawati to replace Sutarto as TNI commander and strong opponent to further negotiations with the GAM. While SBY had previously himself been frustrated with the halting pace of negotiations and oversaw the post-CoHA offensive in Aceh, his public removal of Ryacudu was a clear warning to the military that he would not broach a repeated sabotage of talks or subversion of presidential decisions (Mietzner 2006). Confident in his electoral mandate and his administration’s ability to maintain its base of power, SBY’s move to demilitarize politics gave him the space to pursue peace with the GAM at his own pace, despite lingering opposition within the now-marginalized TNI.

Despite this consolidation of civilian control, SBY’s initial approach to Aceh was largely a continuation of the policy under Megawati. The ongoing counterinsurgency effort had badly hurt, but not destroyed, the GAM. Popular opinion within Indonesia had swung firmly against the separatists, who were widely seen as overly dogmatic in their rejection of the NAD law (Miller 2009). The conflict also remained lucrative for the TNI, who continued to benefit from a war economy that included illicit trade in arms, drugs, and logging (Croissant and Kuehn 2009). While there were some diplomatic feelers from the GAM to gauge the response of the new administration,
no major talks, troop reductions, apologies, or changes in policy were made by SBY in the months after his election.

The devastating tsunami that hit Aceh in December 2004, killing 165,000 and flattening cities across the region, acted as a catalyst to bring about peace. The GAM called for an immediate ceasefire, and Aceh was soon filled with foreign military and civilian relief personnel. International press were allowed back in to the region, which returned to the forefront of the world’s attention. Additionally, the TNI’s inability to efficiently mobilize its far-flung forces to aid in the recovery exposed the inadequacies of the territorial system and the limitations of the Indonesian military (Miller 2009). Most importantly, the tsunami opened political maneuver space for both sides to compromise on what had previously been inviolable positions, such as GAM’s insistence on independence (Aspinall 2014).

In contrast to the Humanitarian Pause and CoHA, both of which were intended as interim steps towards a final status agreement, the Helsinki process which ultimately resulted in a peace agreement sought to resolve all outstanding issues. To ensure the agreement’s durability, both the Indonesian government and the GAM had to restrain potential spoilers on their respective sides. Chief among these was the TNI, which stood to lose not only ideologically if the GAM used the peace agreement to return to demands for an independent state, but also economically from the curtailment of the lucrative war economy and judicially from investigations into human rights abuses committed during the counterinsurgency campaign (Aspinall 2014). While the tsunami accelerated the peace process, the acceptance of the Helsinki agreement by the TNI was not preordained. Its ultimate success was driven by SBY’s deliberate curtailment of the TNI’s political independence and his addressing of its institutional concerns (Mietzner 2006).
The ideology of national cohesion as paramount is central to the TNI’s self-perceived role in the Indonesian state. The twin shocks of the East Timor referendum and continued Acehnese agitation for independence during the CoHA drove military reactions against both armed separatists but also civilians loosely associated with them.28 SBY initially addressed this risk of the TNI spoiling the peace initiative for ideological reasons by removing General Ryacudu, but much of the burden fell on the GAM disarming, renouncing its calls for outright independence, and accepting the special status for Aceh agreed upon in the Helsinki accords. Given the long history of unfulfilled promises by Jakarta of autonomy for Aceh, dating back to the Sukarno regime, this acceptance by the GAM was not guaranteed (Aspinall 2005). SBY’s concerted efforts to deliver on the political aspects of autonomy prevented renewed calls for independence and, in turn, limited the TNI’s ideological opposition to the peace agreement.

The military’s long-running involvement in both legitimate and illicit economic activity was a recurring barrier to reform during the reformasi period. To offset the loss in revenue the TNI faced from peace in Aceh, SBY allocated $50 million to the military to fund the withdrawal, a figure roughly equal to what the army would have received if the conflict continued (Mietzner 2006). This shift away from external financing was the start of a broader effort by SBY to separate the TNI from economic activity; the defense budget increased by 73% between 2005 and 2009, and in 2010 the military received an across-the-board 40% pay raise. At the same time, the proportion

28 Returning to the definition of indiscriminate counterinsurgency from Chapter 1, the military’s broad use of lethal force against noncombatants is a violation of the principle of distinction that in turn underpins the law of armed conflict. Although widespread violence against civilians whose demographic tends to support, say, a separatist referendum may be ‘strategic’, it falls within my concept of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.
of the TNI budget funded from non-government revenue fell dramatically\(^{29}\) (Croissant et al. 2013).

A third concern of the TNI was legal proceedings against individuals who committed human rights abuses during the conflict in Aceh. The military’s wariness of such investigations was based in the earlier moves both by the Hababie administration to account for abuses during the DOM period and later in the wake of violence in East Timor. The Helsinki agreement did establish the legal framework for both a human-rights court and a truth and reconciliation commission, but these mechanisms largely laid dormant in the years that followed (Suh 2015). Part of this inaction is due to the overall inefficiency of the Indonesian judicial system, coupled with a strong hostility to internationalizing what is seen by elites as a fundamentally domestic function. Additionally, the Indonesian government made it clear to the GAM that their leadership would be accountable to such a judicial process as well, limiting calls from the former rebels for deeper investigation (Aspinall 2010). This informal understanding that past abuses would not be punished helped assuage fears among the TNI that the Helsinki agreement threatened them directly, which reduced the risk of the military acting as a spoiler by undermining the peace process.\(^{30}\)

\(^{29}\)Though the figures are estimates, the non-government funded portion of the TNI's overall budget fell from roughly 70% in 2004 to less than 25% in 2009 (Croissant et al. 2013).

\(^{30}\)The normative question of whether amnesty for past abuses as an incentive for accepting a peace settlement is preferable to strict accountability for crimes, especially human rights violations, is an open one which I do not attempt to answer here, but has been discussed in detail elsewhere (see Tepperman 2002; Sikkink and Walling 2007; Aspinall 2010; Loyle and Davenport 2015). This tradeoff is encapsulated in the US Department of State’s 2006 human rights report in Indonesia: “During the year there was a sharp decrease in unlawful killing by security forces, particularly in the conflict areas of Aceh and Papua. However, the government, in the past, rarely investigated such killings and largely failed to hold soldiers and police accountable for killings and other serious human rights abuses that occurred in past years.”
The peace in Aceh was surprisingly durable and comprehensive. As the US State Department wrote in 2006:

During the year the implementation of the Aceh peace accord, signed in 2005, continued to yield substantial legal and judicial improvements. No unlawful disappearances occurred; human rights observers were given open access to the province; and the year marked the election of a former Free Aceh Movement (GAM) leader as governor.

Over a decade later the peace negotiated at Helsinki is still holding strong. While some former fighters turned to organized crime, by and large the GAM has remained a coherent organization and has transitioned into a purely political entity. The durability of peace in Aceh remains a source of pride for the Indonesian government and is seen as an important inflection point in the country’s recent trajectory (Aspinall 2010).

For the TNI, particularly the army, the durability of the peace in Aceh removed a central ideological pillar which justified its used of indiscriminate counterinsurgency both there and in separatist conflicts in East Timor and Papau; the indispensability of force in suppressing and deterring secessionist movements. Through its history the Indonesian military has viewed itself as the force that binds together the far-flung archipelago into a coherent state, and has often acted brutally to coerce regions that want to secede and deter others from doing so as well. Aceh’s post-conflict autonomous status within Indonesia, an outgrowth of the Helsinki peace process, undermines that argument and, more broadly, the TNI’s self-perceived domestic role (Miller 2009). SBY, a former general himself, understood these dynamics well and leveraged them as president to further less ambitious, but more durable, security sector reforms than his predecessors had attempted. While the TNI is still far from the Huntingtonian
civil-military ideal of objective control, its post-Helsinki agreement posture makes it unlikely to act to undermine the peace in Aceh (Sebastian and Isindarash 2013).

In summary, SBY’s deliberate demilitarization of Indonesian politics, a move that previous presidents were unable or unwilling to make due to their limited legitimacy and uneven base of support, set the conditions for his administration to capitalize on the post-tsunami opportunity for compromise. Specifically, SBY’s sidelining of reactionary generals, his economic side payments to offset the loss of revenue from the war economy, and unwillingness to pursue post-conflict judicial measures against perpetrators of human rights violations diminished the TNI’s motivation to independently shape the conflict to its own ends. The GAM’s acceptance of autonomy, instead of full independence, also undermined the TNI’s position that national unity justified harsh military measures against civilians. While the army was still politically popular among Indonesians, it acted less as a coherent bloc than in previous post-Suharto administrations as individual retired generals sought elected office by directly appealing to the electorate, rather than acting through or on behalf of the military as an institution. This shift began with the 2004 election, where SBY (as a retired general) ran against several other former officers, and continued through his tenure as president. Rather than remain a veto-wielding actor among the larger selectorate, the TNI’s political role diminished, opening the door for SBY to curtail its role in Aceh and successfully pursue a lasting peace agreement.

4.4 ALTERNATE EXPLANATIONS

Chapter 2 laid out a series of alternate explanations for regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency that have been explored elsewhere in the broader literature on intrastate conflict and government repression. Several of these alternate explanations
were testing using the large-$n$ models developed in Chapter 3, but some were less directly quantifiable or deserve further, qualitatively interrogation. In this section, I will explore the effects of regime duration, the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT), the state’s building of a reputation for violence to deter other armed separatist movements, the GAM’s use of the guerrilla technology of rebellion, the effect of popular dissatisfaction with the cost of the war in Aceh, and the role of pro-government militias.

The impact of post-transition consolidation on a regime’s predilection for using indiscriminate counterinsurgency was conceptualized simply as a function of time after a significant change in a state’s Polity score in the quantitative models presented in Chapter 3. While the overall effect was negative (the longer a regime was in power, the less likely it was to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency), there are both cases of a long-established regime using such methods and a lack of clarity on what specific mechanisms within the larger process of consolidation drive this pacifying effect. Politically powerful militaries often seek to prevent consolidation in order to preserve their reserved domains and dedicated resources (Gürsory 2017). During the latter half of Wahid’s presidency and for the duration of the Megawati administration the military interfered with proposed reforms of the lucrative territorial system, dictated policy in Aceh, and curtailed civilian involvement in the security sector more broadly, even though the series of peaceful transitions of power between leaders would qualify, by some standards, Indonesia as consolidated regime. SBY’s ultimately successful moves to limit the TNI’s ability to veto his peace initiative in Aceh was less a function of time or of more general reforms in Indonesia than a deliberate strategy to impose his will on the military. The continuation of reforms across the security sector after the Helsinki agreement built on the success of the peace talks. In this
case regime consolidation was the result, rather than the cause, of deliberate moves by the civilian leadership to subordinate the military to its control.

The shift in international toleration of separatist movement following the September 11th, 2001 attacks did have an impact on the Indonesian government’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh, but foreign involvement in the region after the tsunami played a role in moderating the violence. The GAM, whose ideology was partially influenced by the region’s devoutly Muslim identity, were quick to disavow any links with al-Qaeda following 9/11, despite Jakarta’s efforts to paint them with the same broad brush. The TNI’s used of ‘shock and awe’ tactics (such as dramatic paratrooper assaults in the opening phases of the post-CoHA campaign in May 2003) and embedding journalists within military units were adaptations of American techniques used during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The GAM and the Indonesian government both negotiated under international mediation, however, and struck an agreement during the height of the post-9/11 Global War on Terror. Furthermore, the spike in international presence following the tsunami limited the TNI’s ability to continue its post-CoHA campaign in relative obscurity (Miller 2009). While the Indonesian government did adopt the language and some of the methods used in the GWOT in its campaign in Aceh, and unrelated terror attacks in 2002 in Bali and 2004 at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta led to increased counterterrorism coordination with the US, these shifts had little direct impact on the conflict in Aceh (Mietzner 2006).

The issue of separatism and the centralized character of the Indonesian state loomed large in the post-Suharto political landscape. East Timor’s independence movement was met with brutal violence, nominally carried out by pro-government militias but largely orchestrated by the TNI. Key military officers involved in East Timor were later deployed to Aceh, where they reflexively used similar methods. Army
leaders throughout the conflict used anti-separatist rhetoric and referred to the TNI’s overarching mission of maintaining the unity of the Indonesian state as justification for their strategy in Aceh. The GAM did renounce their goal of independence during the Helsinki negotiations, but many influential hard-line TNI officers saw this as a ploy, much like during the previous, failed CoHA process, and advocated for a return to large-scale military operation. While acknowledging this ideology is important to understand the military’s position, it does not explain the variation in indiscriminate counterinsurgency during the shifts in the civilian leadership. The military’s anti-separatist position was necessary but not sufficient—for a strategy of indiscriminate counterinsurgency to be pursued, the military must also have the leverage within the larger balance of political power to impose this preference on the civilian leadership.

The GAM’s weapons, organization, and tactics are typical of guerrilla warfare (Valentino et al. 2004; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). While the GAM used violent means to further its goal of Acehnese independence, a larger, nonviolent movement also mobilized for secession. The TNI’s frequent and heavy-handed use of force against these demonstrators over the decades-long conflict ultimately strengthened the GAM, a pattern seen through guerrilla wars more broadly. The inability of the TNI to reliably discern fighter from civilian often led to the indiscriminate use of force. While the Indonesian government often proposed strategies that balanced political, economic, and military lines of effort, the TNI’s preference for using non-organic forces largely incapable of identifying GAM supporters and predisposed to use force indiscrimi-

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31 The TNI, through its doctrine of ‘Total People’s Defense’, was similarly postured to use unconventional means to counter a foreign invader. Furthermore, its territorial structure and reliance on locally generated revenue for most of its budget are systems similar to guerrilla forces that rely on the local population for support. Despite these similarities between the TNI and the GAM, I do not consider that the conflict was a symmetric nonconventional one; the Indonesian military, despite its limitations, was overwhelmingly more powerful than the GAM.
inally routinely overrode the other elements of these campaigns. It was only after SBY deliberately undercut the hard-line elements of the TNI and limited its capacity to undermine the peace process did the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh cease. Since there was no variation in the GAM’s use of guerrilla methods, it cannot be determined whether this technology of rebellion had a role in the TNI’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

Popular frustration with the cost and duration of a conflict can add pressure on a regime to use violence against civilians in war (Downes 2008). In many modern intrastate conflicts, the difficulty of discriminating combatants from civilians leads democracies to abandon these wars (Merom 2003). In the case of Aceh, there was strong popular resentment of the TNI’s involvement in Suharto-era repression and corruption, manifested in the Habibie administration’s popular efforts to reform the military and account for previous human rights abuses. This anti-military feeling faded as the economic stagnation dragged on, the Wahid administration’s legitimacy collapsed, and the GAM took advantage for the Humanitarian Pause to rebuild its strength. The NAD law, which granted significant autonomy to the Acehnese, was seen as generous by most Indonesians and the GAM’s continued opposition to it was viewed negatively (Miller 2009). While the human costs of the operation in Aceh were not insignificant, there was little related violence outside of the region and the material costs were largely funded through indirect means. Aceh did not feature prominently in the 2004 presidential campaign, though unrelated terror attacks by Jama’ah Islamiyah and the need for further reform of the military did feature prominently (Kingsbury 2005). In short, there is little evidence that popular frustration with the cost of the war in Aceh drove the TNI’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

Pro-government militias were a common element in the Indonesian response to the insurgency in Aceh. There fell broadly into three categories: ethnic Javanese living in
Aceh who formed self-defense groups to protect themselves from the GAM; Achenese collaborators with the Indonesian security forces; external armed groups that were often off-duty TNI soldiers. The first group of migrants to northern Sumatra focused primarily on defending their communities and economic interests, many of which were tied to the LNG extraction and export industry. Achenese collaborators from the DOM period faced violent retribution at the hands of the GAM immediately following the fall of Suharto. This precedent made it more difficult in later years for the Indonesian security forces to effectively recruit coethnics to help solve the identification problem of who was directly supporting the GAM. Finally, the use of militia groups that were largely TNI in civilian clothes, a tactic also used widely in East Timor, did little to shift blame for indiscriminate violence away from the Indonesian state. In both contemporary reports and retrospective studies there was no distinction made between these two. The use of these militias may have diffused responsibility within the security forces, since the chain of command and units involved were obfuscated, but the tight links to the Indonesian state were clear.

In sum, several of the alternate explanations for indiscriminate counterinsurgency discussed here largely remained constant through the conflict in Aceh. While the GAM was a separatist movement that used guerrilla methods, two circumstances often correlated with mass killings, this remained constant through variation in the military’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. The impact of internationally relevant events such as 9/11 and the 2004 tsunami temporarily increased interest in Aceh, but not the levels seen in East Timor or in the aftermath of the Bali bombings. If anything, pressure from the United States was directed at reforming the TNI and focusing it narrowly on security issues, rather than the continuation of its largely self-interested campaign in Aceh (Mietzner 2006). This reform of demilitarizing politics, carried out by the SBY administration, remains the best explanation for the success
of the Helsinki agreement and the end of decades of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in Aceh.

4.5 Summary

The case of Aceh provided a rich context in which to trace how shifts in militarized politics and a political leader’s base of support influence whether indiscriminate counterinsurgency is used. The TNI’s political influence was already waning towards the end of the autocratic Suharto regime, and in the immediate aftermath of his ouster reached a nadir as political leaders such as Presidents Habibe and Wahid sought to curtail the military’s role and amend for historical human rights abuses. The expansion of the political sphere was mishandled by Wahid, who was unable to maintain the support of the broad base of actors that now wielded power in post-Suharto Indonesia. The TNI took this opportunity to reassert itself both politically in Jakarta and militarily in Aceh, where it reintroduced external troops and imposed policies that were neither capable of nor intended to differentiate between GAM insurgents and the broader population. Abortive attempts at negotiations, a fallback approach used by Wahid after a referendum was deemed a political non-starter, did little to stem the violence. The TNI’s withdrawal of political support for Wahid led to his departure, and his successor, President Megawati, gave the military a wide berth. The military’s influence in shaping policy in Aceh peaked during her presidency, resulting in widespread, indiscriminate violence, a derailed peace process, and a GAM insurgency that, though battered, remained militarily effective. Megawati lost the 2004 election to a retired general, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. While having a history of pursuing a relatively hard line against the separatist movement in Aceh, SBY made deliberate efforts to demilitarize politics by publicly dismissing the most assertive
and independently-minded generals in the TNI and addressing the army’s budgetary and legal concerns. When a devastating tsunami struck Aceh, opening political space for both the GAM and SBY’s administration to reach a compromise peace, the dissenting voices within the Indonesian military that had previously derailed negotiations found themselves sidelined and incapable of acting as a veto or spoiler, as they had previously. This process of military reform, political maneuvering, and shifts in the Indonesian security forces’ approach in Aceh closely follows the hypothesized interaction between militarized politics and the breadth of regime support laid out in Chapter 2 and quantitatively tested in Chapter 3.
Chapter 5

Conclusion and Policy Implications

This closing chapter begins with a brief summary of the argument and empirical findings before moving to a series of policy recommendations. These recommendations are intended for international actors who aim to reduce a regime’s use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency and enable a durable peace to an intrastate conflict. They focus on ways to demilitarize politics and help security forces more effectively solve the ‘identification problem’ of differentiating insurgents from unaffiliated noncombatants, and can also be used as incentives in a peace process to minimize military opposition. First is the mechanism of military prestige, where in return for a diminished political and domestic security role the armed forces gain access to training, equipment, and professional recognition. Second is an increased emphasis on intelligence cooperation and police capacity building, recommendations intended to help the regime better identify insurgents and, in doing so, prevent indiscriminate violence. Third are considerations for post-conflict tribunals, and fourth is a discussion of how these mechanisms may be used in the course of a peace process to remove the armed forces as a potential spoiler. Following this chapter’s policy recommendations are a trio of implications for future research, along with a final conclusion.

5.1 Summary of the Argument

This dissertation sought to answer the puzzling use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency by regimes fighting a civil war. The effectiveness of such a technique, which
instead of specifically targeting rebel combatants and their direct supporters uses lethal means against broad swathes of the population who at most are only marginally associated with the insurgents through shared identity, is questionable at best and typically generates a range of practical and political problems problems for the state that applies it. Despite this, such indiscriminate use of force persists.

I argue that an important—and underexplored—mechanism that drives regime use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency is the role of the military in politics. While outright military regimes, autocracies led by a small group of senior officers, have been shown to use force more reflexively in international affairs as well as domestically, juntas are increasingly rare in the post-Cold War environment. Militarized politics has instead taken a more insidious form in many regimes, as the armed forces often retain a veto over certain policy domains, act as a critical political supporter of the civilian leadership, or conduct themselves with impunity. The volatile mix of militarized politics within a regime whose power is drawn from a broad base of support can result in the armed forces dominating policy decisions about an ongoing civil war, sabotaging peace negotiations for their own institutional benefit, and undermining support for a leader that opposes them. Freed of both the institutional constraints limiting the domestic use of force and the risks to legitimacy associated with abuses in an overtly military regime, the army’s approach to a domestic challenger may be fundamentally driven by its internal assumptions, organization, and training. Since these are structured largely for waging conventional, interstate war against an equally armed adversary, rather than identifying individual insurgents, this approach can result in the widespread use of lethal force against noncombatants that are only generally associated with the rebels.
5.2 Summary of Empirics

To test whether my theorized interaction between militarized politics and a regime balancing a wide range of supporters is linked with indiscriminate counterinsurgency, I employed a multi-method research design that used a large-n quantitative model to consider all post-Cold War intrastate conflicts, coupled with a within-case study of the conflict in Aceh between the Indonesian state and the GAM. I focused the research on ongoing civil wars, rather than all repressive regime behavior, to highlight the role of the armed forces. In doing so, I exogenized the question of onset and instead considered how shifts in the regime's base of support and the political role of the military affect indiscriminate counterinsurgency. I also did not consider interregnum regimes, ones where the government is essentially nonexistent, as in these cases the hypothesized relationship between the military and the regime is largely absent. My research scope also excluded cases prior to the end of the Cold War, as the fundamental changes in international structure and incentives that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union reshaped both how insurgencies are fought and how embattled regimes use force to counter them.

While the general implications of indirect military rule are widely discussed in country- and regional-level surveys, the influence of this dynamic on regime conduct in a civil war has not been explored in a comprehensive, cross-national manner. In addition to incorporating more recent conflicts, using an inflation-corrected measure of indiscriminate counterinsurgency that accounts for the diffusion of norms against such practices, and several newer measures of concepts such as selectorate size, this study uses a novel extension of the recently-coded Political Roles of the Military dataset as a cross-sectional measure of militarized politics. Through this extension I was able to quantitatively model the effect of a phenomenon that, while often discussed in
quantitative work, has not (to my knowledge) been explicit modeled in a large-\(n\) study of regime behavior in intrastate conflict.

In the quantitative portion I used a series of Bayesian multi-level models to test a trio of initial hypotheses that explored the relationship between indiscriminate counterinsurgency and democracy, selectorate size, and regime type. The tests confirmed the long-established, negative relationship between democracy and indiscriminate repression, as well as the higher proclivity of overtly military regimes—those led by a junta of generals—to use repression, even when compared to other, similarly authoritarian, ones. While selectorate size was not a significant predictor of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, the results of tests of these initial three hypotheses formed the foundation for the model which tested the interaction between militarized politics and base of support. Tests of the interaction returned a positive, significant effect of militarized politics on the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency in cases of a larger selectorate—in other words, an effect contingent on the breadth of regime support. This is supported both theoretically and empirically; regimes with a narrow selectorate are either overtly led by the military (as opposed through the indirect mechanism of militarized politics) or by dictators who have coup-proofed their regimes by marginalizing the armed forces. A brief exploration of outlier cases identified a common theme of peace negotiations (a factor not explicitly modeled in the quantitative model) as a missing variable. Peace processes led to both examples of lower than expected violence, but also (in cases where talks collapsed) observations that were worse than predicted. Importantly, the mechanism of militarized politics can directly impact the success of peace talks, as an army that wants a conflict to continue for economic, ideological, or political reasons may sabotage a ceasefire to further its own, narrow ends.
The Indonesian counterinsurgency efforts against the GAM following the collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998 served as a rich case through which to explore how variations in militarized politics and the political strength of civilian leaders shaped indiscriminate violence in Aceh. Building on the quantitative findings, this case study considered not only the hypothesized interaction but also how and why the intermittent peace efforts were influenced by the military. Interestingly, the lasting peace negotiated in 2005 after the deliberate sidelining hard-line factions within the military and the satisfaction of its economic concerns was implemented by a retired general, then serving as the elected president. How President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was able to demilitarize politics, a task attempted but bungled by his predecessors, in order to establish the conditions necessary for peace serves as a basis for the more general policy recommendations that follow.

5.3 Implications for Policy

The policy recommendations proposed in this section are focused on narrowly the mechanism of militarized politics in the context of an ongoing intrastate conflict. These recommendations presume that the regime’s intent is favorable conflict termination. In other words, indiscriminate violence is not an end unto itself. These recommendations also assume that the motivations of external actors implementing these policies are ending the conflict and minimizing noncombatant casualties, and that although the regime and their armed forces fighting the civil war may be largely indifferent to noncombatant deaths they fundamentally want the conflict to be favorably terminated as well.\footnote{I deliberately avoid the term ‘winning’ the war because it can imply an unconditional military victory, rather than a negotiated, but favorable and enduring, outcome. This uneven understanding of victory can cause slippage between the regime and its armed forces.}
In this section I propose four policies for international actors intent on reducing the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. The feasibility of these policies hinges on the willingness of the regime embroiled in the conflict to accept external assistance, but the narrowness of some of these recommendations may allow for their adoption even in cases where the embattled state is largely resistant to such foreign involvement. The first proposal is to leverage the military’s desire for prestige, either through the provision of modern weapons systems or international recognition, to refocus them away from undue involvement in domestic affairs and onto purely military missions. Second is improvement in intelligence cooperation to solve the identification problem of distinguishing rebel combatants from civilians, while third is a recommendation to fully consider the consequences of overly-ambitious post-conflict justice efforts. The fourth and final proposal concerns internationally-mediated peace efforts, and argues that the first three policy recommendations could be applied selectively during negotiations to minimize the risk of spoilers, better enforce a cease-fire, and help establish a lasting peace. These policy recommendations can either be tailored to directly reduce indiscriminate counterinsurgency or as a quid pro quo to demilitarize politics in exchange for greater international assistance.

5.3.1 Prestige

The underlying function of the armed forces of any country is national defense. While militaries are often drawn into other activities, ranging from imbuing recruits with a national identity to civil works projects to managing sectors of the economy, their overriding purpose—and source of prestige—is external defense. Even in militaries deeply involved in domestic affairs there are often reformist elements who advocate

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2 Or, as Croissant et al (2013: 27) put it, “the military’s core function [is to] protect the state against the predation of others.”
for a narrow focus on this fundamental role for the armed forces, such as the ‘back to basics’ movement in the Indonesian military during the 1990s. The primacy of external defense is not because of self-abnegation: without this unique mission of defending the sovereignty of the state against foreign foes, the military’s claims to national resources, separate status in society, and institutional autonomy would be threatened.

This emphasis on spending scarce resources on defense against other nation-states, even when facing serious armed challenges within from within, highlights the importance of interstate war for a military’s identity and prestige. In Pakistan, the armed forces routinely diverts foreign aid intended for counter-terrorism capabilities towards bolstering its military posture against India (Lieven 2011). Iraq, which continues to face an array of dire internal challenges and benefits from US security guarantees, insisted on fielding high-performance F-16 fighter jets better suited for conventional warfare than counterinsurgency (DSCA 2011). After an oil windfall in Uganda the Museveni regime bought high-performance Su-30 jets, airplanes similar to F-16s in both their prestige value and limited tactical use against insurgents. Compounding this limitation are the high maintenance and training costs for these systems, which severely constrains their potential in interstate conflict as well (Dörrie 2014). In Turkey, a comprehensive military modernization effort in the early 2000s was framed not though deterring external enemies or countering Kurdish separatist but rather as a way to “further enhance the army’s prestige, [as] training with the most up-to-date equipment and earning international respect from other NATO countries will strengthen the military’s domestic image of professionalism” (Hen-Tov 2004: 51). Taken together, these examples shed light on a common military preference for high-end equipment best suited for, or even in excess of, the requirements of interstate
war. The prestige of having these weapons systems reinforces the military’s unique role in protecting the state, which in turn justifies their resourcing and autonomy.

Weapons exporters often have mechanisms to limit the misuse of military equipment sold overseas, mechanisms which work best with higher-complexity systems that require sophisticated logistics systems to remain functional. German concerns about Saudi Arabia’s conduct in Yemen’s ongoing civil war have led to it blocking spare parts for the Kingdom’s cutting-edge Eurofighter Typhoon jets, effectively grounding them (Deutsche Welle 2019). The United Kingdom raised concerns about Indonesia’s use of British-made Hawk light attack aircraft in counterinsurgency operations in Aceh in 2002, but these simpler aircraft—along with propeller driven, 1960s-era US-made OV-10 Broncos—were less vulnerable to sanctions (Miller 2009).

This broad military preference for prestige extends to professional exchanges and training. While the US-run International Military Exchange and Training (IMET), and similar programs, are often presented as effective ways to imbue foreign officers with norms about military subordination to civilian rule and respect for human rights, the depth of this professional socialization after they are re-immersed in the culture of their own armed forces varies (Byman 2006). More importantly, these programs serve as status symbols in their own right; exclusion of the Indonesian military from US programs following a 1992 massacre in East Timor led to “embarrassment at enforced isolation” among TNI officers (Haseman 2006: 121). Similarly, inclusion in United Nations peacekeeping missions, multinational exercises, and staff talks are often as valuable for the mutual recognition of shared professional status and associated prestige as they are for any tangible improvement in training or interoper-
ability.\textsuperscript{3} Extending, or withholding, such invitations is a low-cost way to both diffuse civil-military norms and censure violators.

Militaries in democratizing regimes often fear not only a reduced political role but also a steep reduction in funding. This concern can lead to higher risk of a coup in a state where the army’s budget is dramatically cut as part of a broader reform effort. This prestige-based policy recommendation builds on the argument that one way to ensure military subordination is to ‘give them toys’—that is, provide sustained levels of funding to the armed forces to maintain their loyalty and apolitical orientation (Powell et al. 2018). This process was seen to an extent in Indonesia, where a critical piece of SBY’s ultimately successful reforms was increased funding for the TNI. These resources displaced the corrupting ‘off-the-book’ self-financing activities that the Indonesian military had relied on for decades and reduced its economic incentives to continue the war in Aceh.

The ability to fight interstate wars differentiates the military from the police, domestic intelligence services, gendarmerie, or other state security organizations. By emphasizing this differentiation through the conditional provision of prestige weapons systems, mutual professional recognition, and foreign training and education for officers, international actors can attempt to pull the military away from its involvement in domestic politics and towards integration in the global security community. While such a shift may not increase the armed forces’ capacity to fight a counterinsurgency campaign, it both opens the space for other, often better-suited, mechanisms of state power involve themselves in the conflict and also serves as a lever to help extricate the military from politics.

\textsuperscript{3}In a previous position as part of a train and assist mission to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) I had several discussions where my interlocutor proposed including the PASF in UN peacekeeping operations as a way to establish their international status as a professional security force.
5.3.2 Intelligence-driven Counterinsurgency

Indiscriminate counterinsurgency often results from the security force’s inability to identify combatants and their direct supporters from the larger, civilian population. While rebels, especially weaker ones who employ the ‘guerrilla’ technology of insurgency to compensate for their lack of military capacity vis-à-vis the state, are often difficult to find, they are relatively easy to defeat once identified. This stands in direct contrast to conventional military forces, which are typically far easier to detect but much harder to destroy. Militaries, primarily socialized, trained, and equipped to fight other states, are therefore particularly ill-suited to solve the identification problem. When this organizational bias is elevated to the level of policymaking through the mechanism of militarized politics indiscriminate counterinsurgency often results.

One potential way to solve the identification problem is through intelligence assistance to a regime embroiled in a civil war. By enabling counterinsurgents with the means and methods to more accurately differentiate civilian from insurgent, force can be used more precisely, effectively, and in stricter alignment with the law of armed conflict. While I outline several specific ways this could happen, it is important to note that there are also a range of risks involved, which I will briefly discuss as well.

Recent advances in biometric technology, coupled with the capacity to store and share data collected, allow for the differentiation of individuals at a massive scale. The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), a program which links an individual’s fingerprints and iris scans to their social benefits, passports, bank accounts, and mobile phone accounts, has enrolled 1.2 billion Indians as of 2018 (The Economist 2018). While not directly linked to a counterinsurgency effort, the UIDAI program’s scale shows the feasibility of such a scheme in a developing country. Smaller-scale efforts were undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan during the American-led counterin-
surgency campaigns there in an attempt to identify individuals who had reoccurring contact with coalition forces (Schmitt and Shanker 2011).

Improvements in the technical capacity of battlefield surveillance systems and, more importantly, techniques of how to best employ them to coordinate and guide counterinsurgent forces on the ground can enable the more precise application of force during military operations. Rather than gathering raw information, the limiting factor in generating usable intelligence is increasingly the capacity of analysts to process the vast quantities of data collected (Schmitt and Shanker 2011). The fusion of these technical collection and processing capabilities with the human intelligence gathering capacity and local knowledge of indigenous counterinsurgency forces—especially ‘ethnic defectors’ that splintered from the broader set of rebels—can result in improvements in the military’s ability to differentiate combatants and their direct supporters from the larger population (Staniland 2012; Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro 2013; Shiraz 2013).

Expanding the role and capability of a state’s police forces may similarly help solve the identification problem. In the context of militarized politics, the armed forces often successfully lobby for taking the lead role in an internal conflict, subordinating the civilian police to their command. While police repression itself can be a contributing grievance that drives the onset of a civil war (McCormick 2013), “unlike the civilian police, the military is not trained in minimal use of force and will likely react to internal security challenges according to the logic of warfare, aiming at physically destroying the enemy” (Croissant et al 2013: 39). External efforts to build the capacity of the police and promote their status in the domestic security hierarchy vis-à-vis the military may bring this relationship back into balance.4 As seen in the case of

4The implementation of a shift towards building police capacity is complicated by the tendency to mirror-image priorities and structure. While the US does have a large military training capability and history, it does not have the same tradition with its disparate police
Indonesia, while the Polri were made independent of the TNI their long-standing subordinate position relative the armed forces minimized their role in shaping policy in Aceh. Emphasizing the role and status of the civil police while simultaneously focusing the military on preparations for higher-prestige, interstate warfare or multinational peacekeeping may help shift a regime’s approach to counterinsurgency away from an overly military one.

Despite the potential for intelligence capacity building efforts to improve the military’s ability to differentiate combatant from civilian and thereby reduce indiscriminate counterinsurgency, there are several risks and limitations that temper this policy recommendation. Sharing intelligence products and techniques is highly restricted, both to preserve capabilities and to protect sources. While this can be overcome in specific contexts, such as within the coalition fighting the ongoing campaign against the remnants of Islamic State (IS), intelligence cooperation remains difficult (Svendsen 2016). Some of these difficulties can be bridged with intelligence liaisons embedded within an embattled country’s security services, but that risks both deepening foreign involvement and internationalizing the civil war, making it part of a broader, global conflict. This latter dynamic was seen widely in the Cold War, as well as in the efforts of al-Qaeda and IS to establish ‘franchises’ that capitalize on local grievances to spread their ideology (Byman 2006). There is also a political risk in providing such intelligence support, since despite its potential for reducing civilian casualties if abuses do occur culpability may be spread among all partner nations involved.

There is a similar risk in building police capacity. While this may reduce the military’s role in setting and implementing domestic security policy, which I argue reduces the risk of indiscriminate counterinsurgency, it may also set the conditions for other states, such as the French, Italians, Germans, Canadians, and British to have both more centralized police or gendarmerie forces and a history of conducting foreign police training (Author discussion with senior RCMP and Bundespolizei officers, 2015).
for the widespread repression of civil liberties. While reducing the risk of physical rights violations, this shift may ultimately reduce the freedom of the state’s residents. Whether this happens is largely a function of the strength of the judicial system; for example the widespread use of surveillance technology in Britain, a response to the Irish Republican Army’s terror campaign, has not impinged on civil liberties in remotely the same way as China’s use of similar systems (Lyon 2004). The risk for international donors seeking to rebalance a state’s security forces away from militarized domestic security towards a civil police-based system is that technical capabilities may be adopted without the parallel buttressing of protections against the emergence of a repressive surveillance state.

5.3.3 Post-Conflict Judicial Concerns

Militaries that have historically acted with impunity may seek to minimize their legal exposure as part of a peace process. Depending on the perceived risk, they may attempt to mount a coup or otherwise derail reform in order to avoid prosecution. Much of the foundational literature on the third wave of democratization, written in the 1980s and early 1990s, explicitly warned of this risk and argued that amnesty was a tolerable price to ensure the success and peace of broader reform. Considering Latin American cases, however, where trials for human rights abuses committed decades earlier became common in the late 1990s, Sikkink and Walling show that the fears of military intervention to curtail the judicial process were misplaced (2007). Even more narrowly in the case of Colombia, where paramilitaries were offered amnesty in exchange for demobilization in the early 2000s, leaders of groups unable to reassert themselves as coherent armed units years later faced trial without a broader relapse of violence (Daly 2016).
This evidence of human rights tribunals not inciting a reaction from the military is largely centered on Latin America and often considers trials that took place either long after the events or after the armed group was no longer a coherent force. In other cases, transitional justice has been misused as a way to further authoritarian rule, particularly when the judicial process has itself not been free of violence (ie. assaults on judges) or when the rule of law in general is lacking. In these cases, transitional justice can become a mechanism for authoritarian consolidation rather than lasting peace (Loyle and Davenport 2016).

This tension was evident in Indonesia. Immediately following the fall of Suharto, President Habibie launched investigations into the TNI’s abuses in Aceh under the previous regime. This process was disliked by all sides, as the Acehnese claimed it masked the scale of regime violence while the army chafed at what it saw as post-hoc condemnation of its execution of Suharto’s orders. Habibie’s mishandling of this process was a large factor in the military’s opposition to further reform, despite the position of many within the TNI that changes were necessary to modernize the armed forces. In contrast, while the ultimately successful Helsinki peace process included a framework for investigations into both GAM and TNI abuses during the conflict, this mechanism has largely gone unused in the years following the peace accords (Suh 2015). One reason for this dormancy is that GAM leaders are liable as well, reducing pressure from the Acehnese to pursue a wide-ranging accounting of abuses during the conflict.

As a broader policy recommendation, the risks associated with post-conflict judicial proceedings should be considered when a politically powerful military is involved in an intrastate conflict. A particular source of tension can be uneven amnesty provisions between the military and the rebels; if the army is accountable for human rights abuses but the insurgents are not, this may lead to the rejection of the agreement by
the armed forces. While the evidence from Latin America cited above is a hopeful sign that the broader concern that any form of judicial accounting will result in a return to arms is misplaced, this risk must still be considered in the context of militarized politics. Regional norms, historical precedents within the institution, and the more general strength of the rule of law should all factor into any proposed post-conflict tribunal mechanism.

5.3.4 Peace Processes

The final policy recommendation concerns peace negotiations between the regime and insurgents. These processes are often brokered by an international actor whose neutrality and legitimacy helps build trust and confidence between the belligerents. A perennial concern in these processes is whether the negotiators at the table are able to deliver on an agreement made—that is, whether the compromises they strike will be accepted by the larger body they represent. While this is most often a concern for insurgents, whose representatives may be exiles with tenuous ties to the rebel combatants, in the case of militarized politics this complicates the regime’s position as well. If the regime’s representatives in a peace process are unable to prevent a powerful element of the state from undermining their position, the negotiations may be counterproductive.

For international facilitators, the first three policy recommendations listed in this chapter—enhancing military prestige with advanced weapons, training, and funding; building intelligence and police capacity; considering the practical implications of post-conflict justice arrangements—can either serve as a direct path to demilitarized politics or in exchange for the armed force’s acquiescence to a negotiated settlement. Such side payments are a common feature in peace processes, and including the
military among the array of independent actors that may seek to disrupt an agreement may help mitigate the risk of a relapse in indiscriminate counterinsurgency.

5.4 Implications for Research

The first implication for further research is the broader application of cross-national data that incorporates quantitative measures of militarized politics. While the theoretical foundations and empirical, country-level evidence for the influence and prevalence of indirect military rule have been established, the cross-national data that allows for comprehensive comparison largely has not. This dissertation’s thorough extension of the Political Roles of the Military data initially coded by Croissant et al. (2017) and its application to a long-standing puzzle in the study of intrastate conflict is an effort that not only seeks to better explain why certain regimes use indiscriminate counterinsurgency but also contributes more broadly to the cross-national study of civil-military relations.

A second avenue for scholarship is the study of ‘security sector reform while in contact.’ Much of the work on security sector reform places it within either the context of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—a post-conflict process—or as part of a larger process of democratization (Rüland and Manea 2013). An enduring civil war can delay efforts towards reform if they are conceived of strictly as post-conflict tasks. Instead, if demilitarizing politics is accepted as a way of reducing indiscriminate counterinsurgency in an ongoing conflict, further research into how and why to further this process while the war is still being fought may be a fruitful endeavour. Though the practical application of ‘security sector reform while in contact’ can be complicated by appeals to military necessity and the risk of involvement for foreign

5‘Contact’ being a military term for active engagement with an enemy force.
donors, the policy recommendations laid out in this closing chapter are tailorable for such circumstances.

A third and final implication for research is the role of heterogeneous actors within the selectorate. Many of the assumptions that underpin the original formulation of selectorate theory were borrowed from economics, which took the relative power and motivation of actors to be equal and interchangeable. Considering the military as a unique actor within this larger constellation of political players may not only help answer narrow questions about how civil-military relations shape policy but also increases the explanatory power of selectorate theory more generally. As leaders maneuver to survive at the apex of a larger regime, they draw on the support of a range of varied, politicized actors. How they promote—or in the case of demilitarizing politics, exclude—particular institutions to ensure their continued rule may offer new avenues within the broader boundaries of selectorate theory.

5.5 Conclusion

To repeat that the dynamics which shape regime actions in a civil war are complex borders on cliché. Monolithic theories cannot explain the widely varying and often competing incentives, perceptions, and motivations of the individuals and institutions involved, and while I do believe there is strong evidence supporting my hypothesis of the effect of militarized politics within a broader political regime defended here there is clearly a range of countervailing and complementary mechanisms that similarly shape the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency. Although the quantitative model did return a significant effect on indiscriminate counterinsurgency for my hypothesized interaction in cases of a large selectorate it is worth noting that the substantive impact
of lagged repression, regime duration, and conflict intensity were also, independently, important factors.

Nevertheless I believe the inclusion of militarized politics in that set of possible causal mechanisms is important for several reasons. First, as militaries are typically the most capable actors on the battlefield their actions and incentives have a disproportionate impact on the conflict. Second, as potentially powerful political player, the military is often in a position to impose its will on, or broadly ignore, the regime. Third, while the armed forces can be considered the ultimate manifestation of sovereignty, they do belong to a larger security field and therefore often desire recognition, resources, cutting-edge equipment, and prestige. Leveraging these aspirations, it may be possible to externally mitigate the use of indiscriminate counterinsurgency through the deliberate demilitarization of politics, even as a conflict is ongoing. If these mechanisms are viable—and there are clear risks involved in their application—they may be a way to shape counterinsurgency efforts away from the indiscriminate use of force.
APPENDIX A

MARS MODEL TO EXTEND THE PRM VARIABLE

The Political Role of the Military (PRM) dataset developed by Croissant et al. (2017) does not code countries with active armed conflicts in PRIO’s Armed Conflict Database and begins in 1999, overlooking the first decade after the Cold War. While states in full-scale collapse, transition, or foreign occupation\(^1\) are beyond the scope of this dissertation, Croissant et al. also ignore coherent yet embattled regimes that are facing more limited intrastate challengers.

To extend Croissant et al.’s coding to the full range of country-years and cases in my scope, I created a model that selected a subset of independent variables closely correlated with the expert coding of the dependent variable and use those same independent variables to generate country-year observations for the missing observations. This approach, it is important to note, is fundamentally atheoretical—I make no claims about causality or why specific variables, the interactions between them, or the number and location of knots detailed below matter. The larger set of independent variables considered by the model are country-level indicators used elsewhere in political science research, and I did minimize the colinearity between them so that the model could more easily and reliably converge. Additionally, this approach iteratively sequesters subsets of the data as it searches for the best model, returning an internally-cross validated result that is not subject to overfitting. I used a similar

\(^1\)Coded by the Polity IV Project as -66, -77, and -88, respectively (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2017)
approach for extending both the MIVETO and MIMPUNITY variables originally coded by Croissant et al.; in the following sections I detail the specific steps taken and validation tests used for generating each variable.

Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines (MARS) is a flexible regression procedure first proposed by Friedman (1991). This nonparametric method builds a series of piecewise linear regressions fitted between knots whose number and placement are allowed to vary as the model searches for the best fitting solution. The process of adding additional piecewise linear basis functions from a larger pool of candidates to the working model, dubbed a forward pass, is coupled with a backwards pass, which prunes terms that least improve the overall residual square error through a process of cross-validation. MARS also allows for interactions between variables, which are incorporated in the candidate pool of potential piecewise linear basis functions. This combination of interactions forward passes, and backwards passes returns a model that accounts for the complex structure of the underlying data without being overfitted to a particular sample (Kooperberg 2006; Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2017).
### Table A.1: Summary of Variables for MARS Model of MIL_VETO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td>Military Veto</td>
<td><strong>RAW_VETO</strong></td>
<td>PRM (version)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td>Head of government installed by military</td>
<td>v2expathhg1</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent judiciary</td>
<td>v2x_jucon</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range of consultation at elite levels</td>
<td>v2dlconsult</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regime relies on military to retain power</td>
<td>v3regimpgroup1</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Defense minister is a military officer</td>
<td>dpi_dmmo</td>
<td>DPI 17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>UNNA_GDPPC</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>fe_etftra</td>
<td>Fearon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armed forces personnel (% of labor force)</td>
<td>wdi_afp</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil rents</td>
<td>wdi_oilrent</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Global Militarization Index</td>
<td>bicc_milper</td>
<td>BICC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Index of Globalization</td>
<td>dr_ig</td>
<td>Dreher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rugged Terrain</td>
<td>nunn_rugged</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Active paramilitary</td>
<td>SEMIofficial.MILITIA.ACTIVE</td>
<td>PGM/Koren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td>h_j</td>
<td>Henisz</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Original PGM data coded by Carey et al. (2013) through 2007; Koren (2017) extended through 2014
- Military governments prefer informal militias, who are often off-duty officers, to semi-official ones, which often are intended to counterbalance the army (Carey and Mitchell 2017).
- DPI: Database of Political Institutions, compiled by the Development Research Group of the World Bank (Thorsten et al. 2001)
- BICC: Bonn International Center for Conversion

MARS is akin to Classification and Regression Tree (CART) methods that use similarly data- (as opposed to theory-) driven approaches that can easily handle problems with large numbers of inputs and potential interactions and are more straightforward to interpret than other methods such as neural networks (Lee and Chen 2005; Austin 2007). Although MARS is fundamentally a regression method by coding the dependent variable as a binary outcome it can function as a classifier as well (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2017). MARS models have been used for classification in a range of fields including medicine (Ennis, Hinton, Naylor, Revow, and Tibshirani 1998; Austin 2007) and credit risk (Lee and Chen 2005).
In my extension of the PRM dataset, I used an open-source R package, EARTH,\(^2\) to generate a model that is trained to classify the military’s impunity and veto characteristics (Milborrow 2018). The response variable is Croissant et al.’s coding of MIL_VETO and MIL_IMPUN, and the independent variables used to fit a model that best classifies each country-year are listed in Tables A.1 and A.2. The main considerations for inclusion of each variable was colinearity and temporal data coverage. If the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score for a set of variables was greater than 4, I removed one of the pair to limit the risk of multicollinear variables confounding the EARTH algorithm. Since the aim of this extension is to synthesize Croissant et al.’s coding criteria and apply it to the years not covered in the original PRM data—all regime-years from 1990-1998, and all regime-years where there is an ACD-coded intrastate conflict—the set of independent variables used to build the PRM coding model need to cover the entire quarter century since the Cold War. While most of the widely used, structural variables used (detailed in Tables A.1 and A.2) are measured continuously since the end of the Cold War, the Pro-Government Militia (PGM) data coded by Carey, Mitchell and Lowe (2013) only covers through 2007. Building off of Carey et al.’s data, Ore Koren (2017) extended the coding of PGMs in countries in conflict through 2014, which I integrated into the set of independent variables. This set was then modeled with the EARTH function, where the degree of interactions was limited to 3 and the number of cross-validation folds was set to 10.\(^3\)

Using the original PGM data with Koren’s extension, along with the full range of structural independent variables and the MARS model trained on Croissant et

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\(^2\)The term MARS has been trademarked by Salford Systems, which markets commercial applications of Friedman’s method.

\(^3\)The number of cross-validation folds is typically not critical unless the sample size is unusually small; 10 is a standard used in much of the machine learning literature (Jones and Hill 2014).
Table A.2: Summary of Variables for MARS Model of mil_impun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Impunity</td>
<td>raw_impun</td>
<td>PRM (version)</td>
<td>1999-2016 (only peace years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Constraints on Exec</td>
<td>v2x_jucon</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
<td>1946-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State removal by mil</td>
<td>v2exremisol_4</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
<td>1946-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State ctrl over mil</td>
<td>v2exctlhs_4</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
<td>1946-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State appt by mil</td>
<td>v2expathhs</td>
<td>vdem v8</td>
<td>1946-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch. Exec is Mil Officer</td>
<td>dpi_cemo</td>
<td>DPI 17.1</td>
<td>1975-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. Min is Mil Officer</td>
<td>dpi_dmmo</td>
<td>DPI 17.1</td>
<td>1975-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>UNNA_gdppc</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>1970-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization</td>
<td>fe_etfra</td>
<td>Fearon</td>
<td>1946-2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Forces Personnel</td>
<td>wd1_afp</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1970-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil rents</td>
<td>wd1_oilrent</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1970-2015</td>
</tr>
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<td>BICC</td>
<td>1990-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal origin</td>
<td>lp_legorr</td>
<td>Porta</td>
<td>1946-2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density</td>
<td>wd1_popden</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1961-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Growth</td>
<td>wd1_popgpr</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1960-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Under 14</td>
<td>wd1_pop14</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>1960-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Index of Globalization</td>
<td>dr_ig</td>
<td>Dreher</td>
<td>1970-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Judiciary</td>
<td>h_j</td>
<td>Henisz</td>
<td>1946-2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugged Terrain</td>
<td>nunn_rugged</td>
<td>Nunn</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive semi-official militias</td>
<td>only.soms.active</td>
<td>PGM/Koren</td>
<td>1981-2007/2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
- Original PGM data coded by Carey et al. (2013) through 2007; Koren (2017) extended through 2014
- Military governments prefer informal militias, who are often off-duty officers, to semi-official ones, which are intended to counterbalance the army (Carey and Mitchell 2017). DRI: Database of Political Institutions, compiled by the Development Research Group of the World Bank
- BICC: Bonn International Center for Conversion
- al.’s original expert coding, I was able to synthesize 2,009 MIL_IMPUNITY and 2,021 MIL_VETO regime-year classifications. To account for the increased missingness after 2007 due to the limited PGM data, I Integrated Croissant et al.’s coding for country-years from 2008-2016 into the synthesized MIL_IMPUNITY and MIL_VETO variables, resulting in a total of 2,605 and 2,617 observations total.
- Difference is a result of variations in missingness in the different sets of independent variables used in each model.

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Table A.3: Tests of MARS Model Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Synthesized mil_impunity</th>
<th>Synthesized mil_veto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R Squared</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohen’s Kappa</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somers’ D</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolmogorov-Smirnov</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.3 presents a series of tests use to measure the quality of the MARS models used to synthesize the mil_impunity and mil_veto variables for country-years not coded by Croissant et al.. First is the widely used $R^2$ measure of a model’s goodness of fit. The second measure is Cohen’s Kappa, which “measures the observed level of agreement between coders for a set of nominal ratings and corrects for agreement that would be expected by chance” (Hallgren 2012: 24). A score of 0 means that any agreement in coding between the original and simulated data is random. The third test, the Somers’ D statistic, is the normalized difference between concordant and discordant pairs (Somers 1962). Unlike Cohen’s Kappa, it does not account for the underlying difference in likelihood between the two values. Finally, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test compares the true positive rate with the false positive rate. All three tests for both models confirm the validity of the MARS models as a viable synthesis of the original expert coding of the PRM components. In Figures A.1 and A.2 the blue curve represents the MARS model, compared to the red line’s responses at random (Prabhakaran 2016).
Figure A.1: mil_impun MARS Model Performance

Figure A.2: mil_veto MARS Model Performance
Appendix B

Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of the variables included in the models used to test Hypotheses 4 I reran the same specifications using several alternate measurements of the same concept. First was infant mortality, as measured by the World Bank, in place of GDP per capita as measure of state capacity (Teorell et al. 2018). The results are reported in Table B.1 and Figure B.1 and are generally consistent with the original model (Table C.6 and Figure C.3 in Appendix 4). The second robustness check used the VDEM measurement of judicial independence, $v_{2x_jucon}$, instead of the scale developed by Henisz that was used in the original model. These results are reported in Table B.2 and Figure B.2, and are comparable to the original measurement in Table C.6 and Figure C.3.

Table B.1: Alternate Specification, Infant Mortality to Measure State Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime_duration</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial_Independence</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil_x_Consult_Interaction</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression_lagged</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military_support</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RuggedTerrain</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range_of_Consultation</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant_Mortality</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
<td>-207.37</td>
<td>-244.24</td>
<td>-161.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure B.1: Alternate Specification Infant Mortality

Table B.2: Alternate Specification of Judicial Independence (v2x_JUCON)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime_duration</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.30</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_per_Capita</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mil_x_Consult_Interaction</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repression_lagged</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military_support</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RuggedTerrain</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range_of_Consultation</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td>Judicial (alt)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
<td>-207.17</td>
<td>-245.56</td>
<td>-160.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure B.2: Alternate Specification of Judicial Independence (v2x_jucon)
### Appendix C

#### Regression Tables

The tables in this Appendix correspond with the coefficient illustrations presented throughout Chapter 3.

**Table C.1: Hypothesis 1, Democracy (With Polity)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Lower 95% CI</th>
<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regime_duration</td>
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<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.22</td>
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<td>GDP_per_Capita</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression_lagged</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<td>Rugged_terrain</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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<td>-206.92</td>
<td>-244.43</td>
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</table>
Table C.2: Hypothesis 1, Democracy (VDEM Measurement)

<table>
<thead>
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<td>-0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_per_Capita</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial_Independence</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression_lagged</td>
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<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RuggedTerrain</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
<td>-206.26</td>
<td>-244.28</td>
<td>-161.47</td>
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</table>
Figure C.2: Hypothesis 1, Democracy (vDEM Measurement), Full Size

Table C.3: Hypothesis 2, Selectorate Size (v2x_consult)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Upper 95% CI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Range_of_Consultation</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime_duration</td>
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<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_per_Capita</td>
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<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial_Independence</td>
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<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression_lagged</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RuggedTerrain</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
<td>-206.39</td>
<td>-245.62</td>
<td>-162.61</td>
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</table>
Table C.4: Hypothesis 3, Effect of Direct Military Rule (HTW)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Military_Rule</td>
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<td>0.56</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
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<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.23</td>
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<td>GDP_per_Capita</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
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<td>-0.20</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.35</td>
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<tr>
<td>RuggedTerrain</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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Table C.5: Hypothesis 3, Effect of Various Regime Types (HTW)

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</thead>
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<td>0.65</td>
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<td>Multi_party</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repression_lagged</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RuggedTerrain</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.14</td>
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<tr>
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</table>
Table C.6: Hypothesis 4, Indirect Military Rule (MIL_SUPPORT and V2X_CONSULT interaction)

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</thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_per_Capita</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial_Independence</td>
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<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict_intensity</td>
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<td>0.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rugged_terrain</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deviance</td>
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</table>

Table C.7: Hypothesis 4, (Alternate Specification with No Interaction)

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</thead>
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<td>Military_support</td>
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<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Range_of_Consultation</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime_duration</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic_Frac</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_per_Capita</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial_Independence</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
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<td>Repression_lagged</td>
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Figure C.3: Hypothesis 4, Interaction between Militarized Politics and Selectorate Size
Figure C.4: Alternate Specification of Hypothesis 4 with no Interaction

Table C.8: Alternate Explanation, GWOT

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Table C.9: Alternate Explanation, Separatist

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Figure C.6: Alternate Explanation, Separatist (full size)

Table C.10: Alternate Explanation, Guerrilla

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Table C.11: Alternate Explanation, Oil Rent

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Figure C.8: Alternate Explanation, Oil Rent (full size)
Figure C.9: Alternate Explanation, Regional Effects

Table C.12: Alternate Explanation, Regional Effects

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</table>
Figure D.1 illustrates the convergence of the parameters used to model Hypothesis 4. Each model started with random initial values, ran for 10,000 iterations (of which the first 5,000 were discarded as ‘burn-in’ in the event that the model took a significant period to mix properly), and consisted of two Markov Chains (illustrated as red and blue in Figure 13). The seemingly random mixing of the evident in Figure D.1 is evident of proper convergence, and is typical of the multi-level models run throughout Chapter 3 (Gelman and Hill 2007: 357).


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