WHEN HATE SPEECH LEADS TO HATEFUL ACTIONS: A CORPUS AND DISCOURSE ANalytic APPROACH TO LINGUISTIC THREAT ASSESSMENT OF HATE SPEECH

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By

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ABSTRACT

Inspired by recent acts of mass violence motivated by hate, this work considers hate speech from a sociolinguistic perspective by combining corpus analysis and discourse analytic methods. The goals of this work are twofold. First, this research aims to propose a comprehensive definition of hate speech by leveraging the linguistic body of knowledge in conjunction with insights from legal scholarship, cross-disciplinary academic work, lexicography, and non-academic perspectives collected through a two-part survey. This work then employs the definition of hate speech that is developed to build two corpora of hate speech, one authored by those who went on to commit violence and the other by those who did not, called “Hunters” and “Howlers” respectively according to the threat assessment paradigm of Calhoun and Weston (2009; 2012). These data are used to address the second goal – to enrich future threat assessment protocols by identifying language patterns which correlate with violent behavior by the authors of hate speech. A bottom-up and top-down corpus analysis is complemented by a discourse analytic case study which focuses on positioning and stancetaking within two texts, one Hunter and one Howler, to identify a number of linguistic forms and functions that differentiate the Hunters’ hate speech from the Howlers’.
DEDICATION

Dad, there are more than 80,000 words in this dissertation, but I have no words for how much I miss you. This is for you.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

On October 27, 2018 a gunman entered the Tree of Life Synagogue in the Squirrel Hill neighborhood of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania during a Shabbat service. He allegedly yelled “All Jews must die” and opened fire on those inside, killing eleven and injuring seven others (Carissimo 2018). The shooter was identified as 46-year-old Robert Bowers, who has since been charged with 63 criminal counts including eleven counts of hate crimes resulting in death and two counts of hate crimes involving attempted murder (Weill 2019). As this is being written, he awaits a trial on those charges.

In the months leading up to the attack, Bowers posted extensively on Gab.com, a social media site on which users could post messages called “gabs” of up to 300 characters. The site’s motto was “Speak Freely” and it was popular amongst white supremacists for the lax view its terms of service took on hateful and abusive content, in contrast to more mainstream social media sites like Twitter. Because of this propensity for problematic content, the site has since shut down (Graham 2018). On this site, Bowers ranted against what he called “filthy vile degenerate jews,” and posted things like “glad the overwhelming jew problem has been solved so we can now fight with each other,” “just want to put this psa out there for all the vile degenerate oven dodgers. the goyim know. this is becoming increasingly obvious. eventually it will not be safe here for you and you will be unable to leave. it takes time to convert your stuff to shekels and flee. time is critical. that is all,” and “– the gov is full of kikes – antifa supports kikes why is anyone even the least bit surprised?” His posts culminated with one published right before the synagogue attack which said “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in
that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics. I’m going in.”

Robert Bowers’ posts and actions reignited a debate that has become far too common in the United States in recent years regarding hate speech on social media platforms. The rabbi at the Tree of Life Synagogue, Jeffrey Myers, was quoted as having said “hate speech leads to hateful actions. Hate speech leads to what happened in my sanctuary” (Burke 2018). Rabbi Myers is identifying a trend that has been highlighted in recent years with the actions of Elliot Rodger, Dylann Roof, and others who have expressed disturbing, overtly hateful opinions on social networking sites and blogs and then have acted on those ideologies in terrible and violent ways. The trend begs the question, if scholars and law enforcement professionals had greater insight into hate speech, are there ‘red flags’ that might suggest an increased risk of violence and help identify those authors who represent a high risk and those who may be lower risk?

1.1 Motivations and Implications of Research

With the advent of social media, individuals are generating and publishing more language data through the internet than ever before. One no longer needs an individual's diary or journal to access his/her thoughts and perspectives. Through blogs, Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Snapchat etc., people put their thoughts, feelings, and language on display daily. It is unfortunately not uncommon to find insulting, hateful, or even violent opinions expressed in these online social spaces. Sometimes these expressions may simply be “an expressive discharge of anger that is viewed as a solution to the individual's pent up frustration and dissatisfaction” (Turner and Gelles 2003, 94) and may therefore achieve the author’s desired emotional release simply through the communication. These authors are what threat assessors Calhoun and Weston would
call Howlers (2009; 2012), those who “like to threaten and frighten with words...but they never follow through with any action” (2009, 7). This is in contrast to Hunters, who “truly intend to use lethal violence” (Calhoun and Weston 2009, 7). The goal of this work is to identify language patterns in hate speech which differentiate the Hunters from the Howlers. By increasing our understanding of hate speech and which characteristics of hate speech may indicate increased risk of impending violence, professionals in psychology, law enforcement, and threat management can, as appropriate, intervene to prevent violence, stop potentially dangerous individuals before anyone gets hurt, and see that individuals troubled by violent thoughts receive help.

The author acknowledges that this may activate the problematic idea of surveillance or censorship. Though it is hard to research hate speech without a discussion which touches on those issues, this research is not intended to advocate for Big Brother-style law enforcement surveillance. Among the most valuable resources in the prevention of mass violence are individuals who bring the problematic language or behavior of their friends or family to the attention of law enforcement. For example, a family friend of school shooter Nikolas Cruz identified a number of things about his behavior, including concerning online posts, that caused her to report him to the FBI tipline as a potential risk. Unfortunately, due to a mishandling of that tip there was no investigative follow-up and Cruz killed seventeen people and injured seventeen more at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School on February 14, 2018 (Fleshler 2018). Though Cruz’s posts did not necessarily constitute hate speech, this situation is an important demonstration that identification of troubling behavior does not require law enforcement surveillance. It is the hope of this author that the findings of this work can be used in a situation
like this to better allocate investigative resources to identify the Hunters from the Howlers when a problematic individual is brought to the attention of law enforcement.

The findings will also be shown to have important implications for linguistic notions of stance and speech acts. There is a robust body of work that employs corpus analyses to explore the characteristics and dimensions of different types of speech and writing, for example academic prose, conversation, etc. (Biber, et al. 1999; Biber 1988; Biber 2006; Halliday 1988; Atkinson 1992 among many others). This dissertation follows in that model, using corpus analysis to suggest attributes that are characteristic of hate speech, and the ways in which hate speech conforms and diverges from other researched types of speech. It is an important contribution to the linguistic body of knowledge, especially the burgeoning field of forensic linguistics, to catalogue the ways in which hate speech differs from and is similar to other types of writing, both problematic and more mainstream, in terms of the characteristics of the texts and the ways in which stancetaking and positioning are accomplished. This work also expands the idea of speech acts to encompass a larger text which, though it may be made up of numerous individual speech acts, achieves a social action which is greater than the sum of the individual actions. The texts under consideration here contain many individual acts (e.g. they inform, analyze, advise, threaten), but to analyze each act individually fails to capture the full force of the acts taken together. Language which may not be hateful or offensive if taken as a part, can become hateful when juxtaposed with other speech acts. For example, saying “[the] average IQ, in Africa, borders on retarded – 70 to 100” may be analyzed as an informing speech act, or perhaps a MISinforming speech act. However, it does not on its face seem to express a particular hatred. However, when juxtaposed with a warning speech act, “Their chemical-driven
aggression, combined with their low-IQ-driven impulses, means they will simply take what you have and kill you...They want your gold and your women. Not just want your gold and your women...They’re here to definitively, boldly, and with jewesh-backing, tell you that THEY ARE GOING TO TAKE THEM!”, the original speech act seems to express an attitude full of animus, fear-mongering, and it might well be considered hate speech.

As a forewarning from the researcher, the nature of the data in this work necessitates the reproduction of some very disturbing and potentially offensive language. The decision has been made to replicate all language in its entirety, without any censorship. It cannot be asserted strongly enough that this decision does not represent any kind of tacit approval of this language or the sentiments it expresses. The author does not want to present any of this language as normal or acceptable, but rather believes that if we as an academic and civic community are going to combat the hateful opinions and deplorable actions which this work addresses, we must confront them head on, having the courage not to turn away from what we might find upsetting or painful.

1.2 Research Questions

The events at the Tree of Life Synagogue, though they occurred after this work was begun, illustrate the importance of increasing our academic understanding about hate speech and correlations with violence. To that end, this work considers five main research questions:

1. How can non-academic ideologies about hate speech be synthesized with legal, academic, lexicographic, and linguistic perspectives to produce a definition of hate speech as a speech act?
2. What, if any, linguistic characteristics or language patterns in hate speech are correlated with increased risk of violent behavior?
3. Are previous scholarly findings about language features that correlate with enhanced risk of violence in threatening communication and/or existing law enforcement threat
assessment protocols which focus on language borne out in a linguistic analysis of hate speech?

4. How do the authors of hate speech position themselves, their ingroups, and the outgroups/objects of hatred? Does this differ between authors who actually intend to commit violent actions (Hunters) and those who do not (Howlers)?

5. What epistemic stances do the authors of hate speech take that strengthen or weaken commitment to their hate? Does this differ between Hunters and Howlers?

In its methodology, this work owes a debt to Gales (2010) who used a triangulation of methods – survey, corpus, and discourse analytic – to achieve a comprehensive picture of stance in threatening communications. Her first source of data was a survey of 100 undergraduate students to determine how a layperson audience views threatening language. She compared the assumptions and impressions of the students to those of scholars and threat assessment practitioners in a way which strongly inspired the integrated approach to defining hate speech in this project. Second, corpus analysis using a collection of authentic threatening communications allowed her to track patterns across a range of types of threats, ensuring that the observations were not idiosyncrasies of a single author or a single kind of threat. This gave her conclusions generalizability. Finally, supplementing this approach with the discourse analytic tool of appraisal analysis gave her a deeper and richer perspective of how stance functioned in her corpora, allowing her to “move beyond intuitive, ideologically-based assessments of the function of language” (Gales 2010, 90) and consider a more nuanced, context-rich environment to uncover how meaning is constructed to reveal an author's perspectives, emotions, and intentions.

1.2.1 Research Question 1

How can non-academic ideologies about hate speech be synthesized with legal, academic, lexicographic, and linguistic perspectives to produce a definition of hate speech as a speech act?
In order to investigate features associated with a risk of violence in hate speech, one must first establish a definition of hate speech, a need which motivates the first research question. The definition of hate speech which this work proposes applies specifically to the United States context. Hate speech is an issue in many different countries and cultural contexts, but since all speech acts are constrained by the cultural understandings of their form and context (Searle 1969) and since the data which ground this definition are limited to the U.S. context, it is appropriate to confine this definition to hate speech in the United States. Consideration of a United States context brings up a number of interesting issues. Despite a common misconception, U.S. jurisprudence provides neither a clear definition of hate speech, nor explicit prohibition of it. U.S. legal principles are largely based on the precedents set by case law, so the legal treatment of hateful language has been negotiated in legal decisions throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Though it is not the main focus of this work, the tension in these legal precedents is chiefly between the ensconced First Amendment protections of free speech and an interest in respecting the dignity and safety of American citizens who may find certain language threatening or deeply offensive. In fact, one of the gaps in current research surrounding hate speech, which exists primarily from a legal or sociological perspective, is a result of scholarship which takes the definition of hate speech for granted as it argues against certain types of speech (Lillian 2007; McGowan 2012) or enters into the larger debate about First Amendment protections¹, discrimination, and hate crimes (Downing 1999; Prideaux 2011).

¹ Much of the legal scholarship dealing with hate speech revolves around whether or not it should have a protected status (Downing 1999; Parekh 2006; Greene 1995). This project does not take any position for or against the legal restriction of hate speech. That is a question for legal scholars, not linguists. Nothing in this work should be considered as the author’s advocacy for either side of the debate regarding hate speech restriction versus free speech protection.
Rarely is hate speech considered for its linguistic form and force (Kraut, n.d.). This research question aims to leverage the linguistic body of knowledge in conjunction with insights from other academic fields, such as legal scholarship and lexicography, to shed light on what hate speech is and does.

This work adds to the academic conversation regarding problematic speech acts by proposing a comprehensive definition of hate speech which takes into account a variety of cross-disciplinary academic, legal, and non-academic perspectives. To collect non-academic perspectives, this work uses a survey conducted in two phases. The first survey phase employed scenarios and free-response questions to identify patterns in respondents’ perceptions of hate speech. Using the trends indicated by the first phase, a follow-up survey explicitly explored the different conditions and factors that influence respondents’ judgments regarding hate speech. Non-academic opinions were considered an important inclusion in the proposed definition because hate speech is a topic of interest far beyond academic circles and a definition is most useful if it can be recognized and utilized both inside and outside of an academic arena.

1.2.2 Research Questions 2 and 3

What, if any, linguistic characteristics or language patterns in hate speech are correlated with increased risk of violent behavior?

Are previous scholarly findings about language features that correlate with enhanced risk of violence in threatening communication and/or existing law enforcement threat assessment protocols which focus on language borne out in a linguistic analysis of hate speech?

Once a definition of hate speech is established, this work considers two corpora of texts which meet that definition, one of which was written by what Calhoun and Weston (2009; 2012) would call Hunters, and one by Howlers. The Hunters all acted violently towards the group(s) against which their hate speech was targeted; the Howlers did not. Though sincerity/insincerity is an important aspect of speech act theory, the linguistic bedrock on which the proposed definition
of hate speech is grounded, it is not a focus of this research. All of the hate speech texts under examination here were judged by the researcher based on context to be expressions of genuine beliefs and emotions. The distinction is between those who did or did not accompany that hatred with violence (i.e. Hunters and Howlers), not on those who did or did not sincerely mean their expressions of hatred.

The Hunter corpus is made up of eighteen hate speech texts written from 1996 to 2017 totaling 47,823 words; the Howler corpus is 68,329 words across sixteen texts written from 1992 to 2017. A text is considered a collection of a single author’s writing, though each text may include multiple individual posts or comments. Texts were identified online, but come from a variety of online and offline sources – social media, online forums, digitized newsletters, court documents, and media reports. More information about how exactly the Hunters and Howlers were identified is provided in Chapter 2.

The corpus analysis takes a bottom-up and top-down approach; at first it considers the overall composition of the hate speech from a quantitative perspective to determine what features characterized each corpus and significantly differentiated between the Hunters and Howlers. This analysis directly addresses the second research question. To address the third research question, the analysis takes a top-down approach, examining seven language features that have been correlated with an enhanced risk of violence in previous work on threatening communication and incitement to genocide, and considering if those findings hold in the current corpora.

1.2.3 Research Questions 4 and 5

How do the authors of hate speech position themselves, their ingroups, and the outgroups/objects of hatred? Does this differ between Hunters and Howlers?

What epistemic stances do the authors of hate speech take that strengthen or weaken commitment to their hate? Does this differ between Hunters and Howlers?
A qualitative analysis considers the fourth and fifth research questions. This analysis focuses on positioning theory to investigate how the authors construct interpersonal relationships and situate themselves, the other members of their ingroup(s), and the objects of their hatred in relation to one another and to their conceptualization of the world (Davies and Harré 1990; Harré and Moghaddam 2003; Harré 2015). The emphasis on stance in the final research question is inspired by the work of Gales (2010; 2011), whose work uses stance as a lens through which to examine authentic threatening communications in an attempt to uncover features that differentiate realized from unrealized threats. The lenses of stance and positioning were selected to complement and strengthen each other motivated by the model of Du Bois’s (2007) stance triangle which explicitly notes the co-constructive relationship between the two.

1.3 Brief Summary of Results

This work combines cross-disciplinary perspectives of academics with legal precedents, existing dictionary definitions, and non-academic perspectives collected through a survey to establish this definition of hate speech – hate speech is a problematic expressive speech act which conveys derogatory sentiment towards a person or persons based on the perceived possession of a socially defined group characteristic and which is made to the detriment of the target and is addressed to the ingroup with the intention of inciting animus and/or violence or is addressed to the target with the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm.

That definition was used to identify examples of hate speech, the analysis of which suggests some important differences between the hate speech of Hunters and Howlers. The following features were found to be characteristic of the Hunter corpus: first person singular pronouns, particularly in the nominative case in expressions of emotion or desire (e.g. “I had
sincerely hoped to achieve these objections [sic] without harming innocent civilians”); explicit expressions of hatred and anger, particularly a greater number of constructions where the author or his ingroup are the Agents of violence or Sensers of anger or the hated target group is the Recipient/Phenomenon of that violence or anger (e.g. “I wanted to kill every democrat in the U.S. Senate.”); prediction modals which strongly assert a picture of a certain future, especially one which is negative for the ingroup to emphasize a justification for hatred or violence (e.g. “...our race would be bred out of existence”). The Howler corpus is characterized by: communication verbs (e.g. say, tell), particularly with second person pronoun direct objects which highlight the reader’s participation in the act of communication (e.g. “I will explain it to you so that you don’t have to listen to the lying rabbis”); expressions of violence and anger which cast the author and his ingroup(s) as victims of anger or violence perpetrated by the outgroup(s) (“niggers rape tens of thousands of White women”).

When considering the corpora against pre-existing threat assessment protocols results were mixed. Several attributes identified in previous work were also correlated with a risk of violence in hate speech, including expressions of inevitability or the suggestion by the Hunter that there are no alternatives to violent action (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016), and prediction modals which emphasize the justification for violence (Gales 2010). Prior attributes which were not borne out in this research include expressions of contempt, dehumanization, and strong negative evaluation of the victims (Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). In contradiction to previous findings,

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Throughout this dissertation, examples from the corpora under analysis will be indicated by italics within quotations. Non-italicized quotations indicate quotes from previous research or illustrative hypothetical examples, depending upon the presence or absence of a citation. Single quotation marks note scare quotes.
several features previously identified as risk-enhancing were found to be present more in the Howlers’ hate speech. Howlers expressed greater feelings of persecution perpetrated by the victim (Turner and Gelles 2003; Calhoun and Weston 2009; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016) and more frequent use of verbs of communication like “say” and “tell”, which Gales (2010) noted were used in realized threats to strengthen claims or demands related to the threat.

A close analysis of the language of an individual Hunter and a single Howler suggests some intriguing differences and similarities between the two. The authors vary in how they position themselves; the Hunter situates himself as closely involved with his propositional content, positioning himself as knowledgeable and as a reluctant hero who must inevitably act on the information he presents. The Howler positions himself as the spokesperson of a group of like-minded people and situates the perspectives that he communicates as the declarations of the group rather than as his personal opinions. This diffuses his direct responsibility for his claims. Though both the Hunter and Howler position their ingroups as victims, they do so in different ways and diverge strongly in how they position the objects of their hatred and the stances they take. The Hunter positions his white ingroup as victims, but leaves the circumstances and agents of the victimization vague; the outgroup is not positioned as victimizers. This is in contrast to the Howler, who strongly and explicitly positions his ingroup as victims of violent crime and clearly positions the outgroup as aggressive antagonists. He takes a stance of warning or inciting the reader to violence in apparent self-defense. Combined with the findings of the corpus analysis, this suggests that Howlers’ hate speech aligns more with previous findings regarding incitement to violence, suggesting that Howlers who engage in hate speech may not have the intention to
commit violence themselves, as their Hunter counterparts do, but they may nevertheless desire a violent outcome to befall the objects of their hatred.

1.4 Dissertation Outline

The analysis of this project begins in Chapter 2 in which speech act theory is used to explore a definition of hate speech as a speech act, which is used in a broader sense than it has traditional been applied. The definition of hate speech combines U.S. legal precedents surrounding hateful language, dictionary definitions, previous academic definitions from a range of fields, linguistic research on threats and incitement from the perspective of speech act theory, and responses from a two-phase survey that was designed to explore non-experts’ definitions of hate speech, in order to derive a synthesized, comprehensive definition. Chapter 3 discusses threat assessment paradigms previously used to assess threatening communication, describes the corpora under analysis in this work and presents the quantitative corpus analysis, focusing on five features particularly: first person singular personal pronouns, modals, verbs of violence/anger, slurs/epithets, and evaluative words and phrases which modify human nouns. Chapter 4 considers a case study of one Hunter and one Howler text in light of positioning theory and stancetaking. Analysis focuses particularly on the ways in which the authors position themselves in the texts, how both authors use rhetorical questions as a positioning tool, the positioning of the author’s ingroup in the role of victim, and how the authors demonstrate commitment to their hateful claims through evidentiality and epistemics. Chapter 5 returns to the research questions and overviews the findings, considers the limitations of this work, and provides suggestions for further research into this important topic.
Chapter 2 Defining Hate Speech

Given how unfortunately ubiquitous hate speech is in our everyday social and political discourse, it remains a surprisingly under-researched topic in the field of sociolinguistics. Those works which do consider the topic from a sociolinguistic perspective tend to discuss 'hate speech' without providing a definition of the term that is grounded in data. The few scholarly definitions that are offered fail to take into account the general public’s beliefs and conceptualizations about hate speech. Therefore, one of this project’s research questions seeks to address that gap: How can non-academic ideologies about hate speech be synthesized with legal, academic, lexicographic, and linguistic perspectives to produce a definition of hate speech as a speech act?

The premise of this chapter is that there is no universally or even widely agreed upon definition of hate speech, however, that is not to say that it is not a concept or constellation of concepts that exists in our public consciousness, as evidence by the fact that millions of Americans are able to discuss acts of hate speech in a more or less mutually intelligible way. Even lacking a universal definition, a search for “hate speech” in the archive of the New York Times reveals 52 articles from just the month of June 2017 which include the phrase. This demonstrates that the concept of hate speech is mainstream and relevant in American culture, even if there is no wide agreement on what exactly does or does not constitute hate speech. Bringing academic rigor to bear on this issue requires a synthesized, well-researched, and supported definition. After an exploration of the academic literature and a survey of non-academic opinions, both of which will be discussed at length later in this chapter, the following definition of hate speech is proposed: hate speech is a problematic expressive speech act\(^3\) which

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\(^3\) Expressive speech acts are acts which express a psychological state about the speaker or the world, like praising or criticizing (Searle and Vanderveken 1985).
conveys derogatory sentiment towards a person or persons based on the perceived possession of a socially defined group characteristic and which is made to the detriment of the target and is addressed to the ingroup with the intention of inciting animus and/or violence or is addressed to the target with the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm.

This definition is proposed to apply specifically to the United States’ context. Hate speech is, of course, an issue which crosses national borders, but since all speech acts are constrained by the cultural understandings of their form and context (Searle 1969) and the perspectives and data on which this definition is founded are limited to the U.S. context, it is appropriate to confine this definition to hate speech in the United States. Though this discussion is restricted in its scope, it is the hope that this research will contribute to the broader discourse surrounding hate speech.

This chapter begins in Section 2.1 by discussing speech act theory, the theoretical foundation which underpins the above definition of hate speech. Speech act theory provides a productive groundwork to frame the definition of hate speech with linguistic rigor. Section 2.2 explores the legal debate and U.S. legal precedents surrounding hate speech. Section 2.3 reviews dictionary definitions and previous academic literature on hate speech. Though very little of this previous work has been from a linguistic perspective, the overview will highlight the commonalities and trends in the various academic conceptions of hate speech as well as their implications for linguistic analysis. However, this research views any definition of hate speech as incomplete if it fails to take into account the full range of perspectives, both academic and non-academic. The definition proposed by this work attempts to be one that can be agreed upon by academics and non-academics alike. In order to give a voice to non-academic perspectives,
Section 2.4 outlines and presents the results of a two-part survey designed to help uncover non-academic perspectives on hate speech. The first survey uses scenarios and free-response questions to identify patterns in respondents’ perceptions of hate speech. Using the trends indicated by the first part, the second survey explicitly explores the different conditions and factors that influence respondents’ judgments regarding hate speech. Finally, academic and non-academic perspectives are synthesized in Section 2.5 into a combined definition of hate speech.

2.1 Speech Act Theory

Because this research attempts to add the rigor of sociolinguistics to academic, legal, and popular conversations about hate speech, it is important to ground the research in firm linguistic footing. To do that, this research uses speech act theory as a framework. Speech act theory, which was largely formulated by scholars Austin and Searle in the 1960s, is a pragmatic theory that deals with language which performs a social action. For example, when one says “I apologize,” the language itself performs the act of apologizing. In other words, as Austin says “there is something which is at the moment of uttering being done by the person uttering” (1962, 60) – that thing is a speech act. Speech acts are defined by the locutionary act, illocutionary force, and perlocutionary force. Locution simply describes the act of the utterance – the combinations of sounds and words which themselves have meaning. The illocutionary force is the force a statement has by saying something, what the speaker intends. The perlocutionary force is the effect an utterance achieves – that is, the effect on hearers/readers. Just as with threats, which will be discussed later in this section, teasing out the importance of illocution and perlocution in hate speech is a complicated matter, but one that is necessary for a complete definition of hate speech.
Speech act theory provides a useful taxonomy of different varieties of speech acts. Austin (1962) identifies five classes of speech acts defined by the act’s illocution: commissives, verdictives, exercitives, expositives and behabitives. Commissives assume an obligation, declare an intention, or commit to an action; as will be discussed later in this section, threats are commissive speech acts. Verdictives exercise judgment or present a finding about something. These are actions like acquit, convict, analyze, or characterize. Exercitives are assertions of influence, rights, or power like order, appoint, advise, or veto. Expositives clarify reasons, arguments, or communications; affirm, inform, testify, recognize, interrupt, and revise are examples of expositives. Behabitives are speech acts that adopt an attitude and deal with social behavior. This class includes expressives, expressions of emotion and social relationships like apologize, congratulate, resent, deprecate, curse, defy, and protest.

Searle (1976) extends and refines Austin’s taxonomy, suggesting five slightly different categories of speech acts: assertives, which introduce a proposition (e.g. suggesting, boasting, concluding); directives, which direct the addressee’s behavior (e.g. request, order, advise); declarations, in which the utterance achieves the state of affairs it describes (e.g. “I fire you;” “I resign”); commissives, which commit to a future action much the same as Austin’s category of the same name (e.g. promise, bet); and expressives, which articulate how the speaker feels (e.g. thank, welcome, apologize). Scholars have subsequently used this analysis to highlight that speech acts can contain elements of two categories. For example, inviting, which Searle categories as a directive, also has elements of commissive meaning because it not only attempts to direct the behavior of the listener, for example to attend an event, but also commits the speaker to allowing the listener into the event if s/he does attend (Hancher 1979). Though
Section 2.5 argues that hate speech belongs largely in the category of expressive speech acts, it may include elements of threatening, meaning it can also sometimes exhibit characteristics of commissives. As will be discussed, hate speech is typically best understood as a more encompassing speech act which is greater than the sum of its individual components, and therefore is hybrid in nature. This is consistent with previous analysis of speech acts which can be, to a greater or lesser degree, hybrid.

Another useful concept contributed by speech act theory is the idea of deficient speech acts, which Austin (1962) calls “unhappy” and Searle (1969) calls “defective.” In order to be a happy or perfect speech act, an utterance must meet two sets of criteria. First, it must conform to the cultural conventions of form and context; these are called felicity conditions (Searle 1969). For example, the felicity conditions for a declaration of marriage would be the utterance of the correct words (“I now pronounce you married”), by the correct person (an ordained person, judge, or someone else with the legal authority to marry people), in the correct circumstances (to two consenting individuals who have satisfied the legal requirements). If one of these conditions is not met, or if there is no culturally recognized procedure for performing the speech act in question, then the speech act is infelicitous. Second, a speech act may be felicitous but still imperfect if the utterer does not have the appropriate thoughts, feelings, and intentions, or does not carry out the required subsequent action. These deficiencies are called insincerities. A bet entered into in bad faith is an insincere speech act; hate speech intended only as a joke and based on no genuine hateful emotion would be analyzed as insincere.

For the purposes of this research, sincerity will not be a primary concern because although hate speech may be insincere if it is intended only as a joke, all of the hate speech under
examination here was judged by the researcher based on the context to be grounded in genuine beliefs and emotions. The distinction is between those who did or did not accompany that hatred with violence (i.e. Hunters and Howlers, as Chapter 3 will explain), not on those who did or did not sincerely mean their expressions of hatred. Though that is a potential topic of further research, the difficulties associated with identifying hate speech that could reliably be proven to have been made without genuine hateful emotion precluded insincere hate speech from study in this research.

2.1.1 Threats as Speech Acts
The definitions and conditions for threats as speech acts provide a productive model for the current discussion of hate speech because this work is grounded on previous linguistic analysis of threatening communications (Gales 2010). Additionally, 20.9% of respondents to the hate speech survey conducted in connection with this study (see Section 2.4) mention threats in their definition of hate speech, demonstrating that there is a connection between threats and hate speech in the minds of U.S. language users. When considering felicity conditions for threats, there is no universal agreement amongst academics regarding whether illocution or perlocution is more important. In other words, while some consider that speaker/writer intent to instill fear must be established for a speech act to be considered a threat, others maintain that a recipient’s reaction of genuine fear is what defines the act, regardless of speaker intent. To help resolve the issue, numerous scholars look to the similarities between the speech acts of threatening and the more straightforward commissive act of promising (Sami 2015; Kadhim and Abbas 2015; Salgueiro 2010; Gales 2010; Shuy 1993; Milburn and Watman 1981, among others). These scholars note that threats and promises are analogous speech acts, where a promise commits to
an action desired by the listener and a threat commits to an action which the listener does not want to occur. The difference is, as Gales (2010) notes, one could argue that a promise is a promise as long as the speaker intends it to be, regardless of whether or not the hearer accepts this intention, but whether that is the case for threats remains a matter of scholarly debate.

Linguist Fraser (1998) notes three conditions for a threat as a speech act: 1. the speaker intends to commit or orchestrate the commission of an act. 2. The speaker believes this act will be to the detriment of the addressee. 3. The speaker intends for the addressee to be intimidated by an awareness of the act. This definition emphasizes illocution, the speaker’s intention to commit an act and to intimidate, at the exclusion of the perlocution; whether or not the addressee is intimidated or accepts the threat as real is irrelevant to Fraser. Linguists like Sami (2015) concur with Fraser and exclude discussion of the addressee’s uptake from consideration of threats’ felicity.

In contrast, Storey (1995) considers that a threat must “be accepted, or at least acknowledged, by the person being threatened” in order to be sincere (75). In more recent work on threats in English and Arabic, Kadhim and Abbas (2015) present the following three felicity conditions which address both speaker intention and listener uptake: “1. The speaker has the ability to carry out the act of threatening. 2. The hearer believes that the act of threatening will be carried out by the speaker. 3. The hearer does not want the act of threatening to be performed” (232). In this analysis, the hearer must acknowledge the threat by believing the speaker’s sincerity and ability to carry out the threat. Ability to act is not, however, equivalent to the intention to act. A threatener may have the means and not the motivation to carry out a threatened action. As long as the listener believes the speaker will act, according to Kadhim and
Abbas’s felicity conditions, such a threat could be considered felicitous, though it might not be sincere.

The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case which tackled the issue of intention in relation to threats was Watts v. United States (1969). Robert Watts was convicted for threatening the president after he made the statement “[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J” during an anti-war rally, referencing then President Lyndon B. Johnson (Watts v. United States, 1969). The U.S. Supreme Court considered the case and reversed the conviction noting that the speech was “a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.” In other words, they did not deem Watt’s statement a threat to the President because they believed it was clear that he did not intend it to be so. This decision established the “true threat” doctrine that says that a true threat may be exempt from First Amendment protection; however, as has been noted by legal scholars, the doctrine provides no clear definition of what constitutes a “true threat” (Stanner 2006; Fuller 2016). By ruling that Watt’s language was not a “true threat” because he intended it to be political speech, the Supreme Court’s ruling seems to suggest that a “true threat” is defined by the intention of the speaker. However, this precedent has since been tested and further clarified to focus on perlocutionary force. The current U.S. legal precedent now regards language as a “true threat” if a reasonable recipient, familiar with the context of the communication, would interpret it as a threat of injury (U.S. v. Darby 1994; U.S. v. Maisonet 1973; U.S. v. Roberts 1990).

Sociolinguist Gales’s definition of threats combines consideration of illocution and perlocution. She asserts that threats are “communicated (written or spoken) speech acts, that are proffered for the benefit of the speaker and to the detriment of the hearer, that are in the control
of the speaker, and that are intended to and have the effect of instilling fear in or intimidating a recipient” (Gales 2010, 14). She notes that threats must have both an element of speaker intention, and be taken up by the recipient through fear or intimidation. Gales’ definition of threats is the one this work accepts, given that it is based on thorough empirical research and has been demonstrated to be productive in prior linguistic threat assessment research.

2.1.2 Incitement and Insults as Speech Acts

In addition to threats, incitement is another speech act which will be related to hate speech in both this and subsequent chapters. The analysis of incitement as a speech act is a controversial topic, largely due to the emphasis on perlocution that seems to be an important element of the act. Both Austin’s (1962) and Searle’s (1976) taxonomies of speech acts define each act by its illocution, with only minimal consideration of what the perlocutionary effect might be. However, Kurzon (1998) argues that perlocution cannot be overlooked when considering incitement. Gu (1993) calls the type of speech acts to which incitement belongs, which are sometimes referred to as perlocutionary acts, transactional acts because the listener must be an active participant in the transaction which results in a change in the listener’s mind or behavior. In his very thorough analysis of incitement as a speech act, Kurzon (1998) refers to Leech (1983) who reframes these acts as hinging not on the perlocutionary effect that they have on the listener, but the perlocutionary goal of the speaker, what the speaker desires or intends the effect to be. In this way, Kurzon argues that incitement can still be understood as an illocutionary act. He relates incitement to insults, for which he notes that “it is not a necessary condition...that the hearer or receiver of the insult ever acquires the desired mental state of being insulted.” Though that assertion can, of course, be argued, Kurzon concludes that incitement is defined by
the desired effect the speaker hopes to achieve through the utterance, regardless of whether or not the effect occurs. By this rationale, incitement would have characteristics of directives and expressives, in that they attempt to affect the listener’s behavior by articulation of certain beliefs and attitudes. Kurzon also notes that incitement is an especially complicated speech act because it may take the form of other speech acts, such as statements, promises, etc. This conceptualization of incitement provides a model for hate speech, which this work argues is similar to the former in its complex, hybrid nature. Hate speech requires a broader understanding of traditional speech acts because, like Kurzon notes with incitement, it can take the form of one or more other speech acts. However, the social action, the incitement or expression of hatred, is only accomplished by these acts in combination and therefore hate speech must be understood as a compound speech act, often composed of individual constituent speech acts.

Since Kurzon discusses insults, and since this research argues that there are important similarities between the purposes of insults and hate speech, this research also considers prior work on insults. In his work, political and legal philosopher Archard describes both insults and hate speech as “problematic expressive [speech] acts,” (2014, 128) along with bribes, libel, slander, and disturbing the peace. He defines this category of speech acts: 1. They are public, in that they are both communicated in a public setting and target a socially defined group of people. 2. They are directed, in other words they are aimed at a specific target. 3. They have propositional content. In contrast to simple profanities or obscenities, they say something about someone or some people. Archard also details three characteristics of an insult. First, it is an expressive act. Second, it conveys a meaning of disparagement towards the other, though the content need not be true. Third, the insult must be directed at a person or people in respect to a
trait they possess (e.g. a belief, attribute, achievement, relation, etc.). For example, one cannot insult a brunette for being a 'dumb blonde'. As Archard says, “insults must aim to strike their target” (2014, 130). Finally, the purpose of the insult is, as Archard says, “to denigrate, humiliate, diminish, dishonour, or disrespect the other” (127).

This chapter will argue that hate speech constitutes a speech act, in that it performs a social action through language. As has been mentioned, this requires a slight departure from the traditional notion of speech acts, in that an act of hate speech is often an amalgamation of several other speech acts. These may be problematic speech acts, (e.g. threats, incitement, and insults, all three of which will be linked to hate speech in this analysis), or mundane acts such as advising or informing. The individual acts which make up hate speech may not themselves be problematic, but the juxtaposition of each individual social action performs a greater act, which is why analysis of hate speech requires a broader view of speech act theory than has traditionally been taken.

2.2 Legal Definitions of Hate Speech

On April 21, 2017, American politician and 79th Governor of Vermont, Howard Dean, wrote “Hate speech is not protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment.” However, this is a complicated claim to make because U.S. jurisprudence provides neither a clear definition of hate speech, nor explicit legal recourse against it (Volokh 2017; Phillips 2017). The misconception that there is, however, is often expressed by politicians in the wake of hate-fueled violence. Objectionable, hateful language is in most instances, despite any claims to the contrary, protected under U.S. First Amendment safeguards of freedom of speech. This idea was articulated by Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in his 1929 dissent in United States v. Schwimmer, “if there is
any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other, it is
the principle of free thought – not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the
thought that we hate” (United States v. Schwimmer, 1929). Though society may be
uncomfortable with an expressed sentiment, the U.S. legal standard is well-articulated by the
phrase “freedom for the thought that we hate;” such thoughts and expressions are protected
speech.

Since U.S. legal principles are largely based on the precedents of case law, it is necessary
to see how this principle, penned in 1929, has been confirmed or refuted by subsequent rulings.
A 2010 decision written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez
supported the right of a university student organization to “express any viewpoint they wish –
including a discriminatory one” (Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 2010). This was reaffirmed
in a 2017 decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, who said “[restricting] speech expressing
ideas that offend...strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis
of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the
proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express ‘the
thought that we hate’” (Matal v. Tam, 2017). Though this statement by Justice Alito does
reference hateful speech – which he describes as speech that demeans on the basis of a group
characteristic – it is not presented as a legal definition of hate speech. Nor is there any case law
or legislation in the United States, neither at the state nor Federal level, that explicitly defines
hate speech. Legal scholars have argued that the U.S.’s staunch commitment to the First
Amendment’s freedom of speech protection have resulted in the lack of legislation regarding
hate speech (Downing 1999); this is likely also a contributing factor in the reluctance by courts and lawmakers to establish a clear definition of hate speech.

Though there is no legal definition of hate speech in the U.S., the U.S. has participated in international legislation on the subject. Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty adopted in 1966 that has been ratified by 169 countries including the United States, requires legal prohibition of “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence” (Tsesis 2009). However, though the U.S. ratified the Covenant in 1992, it did so with the stipulation that “[a]rticle 20 does not authorize or require legislations or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution” (U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1992). Though the U.S. does not, many of the other participant countries do have clearly-defined anti-hate speech legislation: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, England, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, to name a few (Tsesis 2009). As an example of such legislation, the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1999 prohibits the communication via the internet of a message which expresses “hatred or contempt” based on a person’s “race, national or ethnic origin, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, family status, disability [or] conviction for which a pardon has been granted.” Germany has similar laws against inciting hatred against segments of the population, advocating “violent or arbitrary measures” against them, or “insulting them, maliciously exposing them to contempt or slandering them” (§ 86 StGB (Germany)).
Despite the fact that the U.S. has no laws regarding hate speech, hateful verbal and nonverbal behavior has been and continues to be a matter of much legal debate. In a landmark case, in the spring of 1940 a man named Walter Chaplinsky was sermonizing on the ills of organized religion on a street corner in Rochester, New Hampshire. When the town marshal had Chaplinsky removed, he was alleged to have called the marshal “a God-damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist.” Chaplinsky was charged under a New Hampshire law prohibiting one from addressing “any offensive, derisive or annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street on a public place...or to call him by any offensive or derisive name” (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942). Chaplinsky refuted this ruling and asserted his First Amendment rights.

Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy stated:

there are certain well-defined and limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise a Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or 'fighting' words – those which by their very utterances inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace (Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 1942).

Scholars have argued that the judge’s use of the phrase “insulting or 'fighting' words” provides a definition of hate speech as language intended to insult and incite violence (Matsuda, et al. 1993).

Justice Murphy’s “fighting words” precedent defined the discourse surrounding hate speech in the U.S. in the 1940s and 50s. However, in 1969 the U.S. Federal laws surrounding hate speech were redefined by Brandenburg v. Ohio. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court protected the racist speech of a Ku Klux Klan member and created the “imminent danger” test against which speech is measured. It was ruled that “[t]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force, or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action” (Brandenburg v. Ohio 1969). In other words, as long as hate speech does not incite imminent violence or criminality, it is permissible under free speech protections.

This subject was taken up again by the U.S. Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992). In this case, a racist white gang burned a cross on the front lawn of an African American family's house in St. Paul, Minnesota. Such racist behavior was illegal under a St. Paul ordinance which criminalized behavior which “arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed or religion.” The Supreme Court reviewed whether or not the ordinance was overly broad and if it transgressed First Amendment free speech rights. In a 9-0 decision, the Justices agreed that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it “prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses” (R.A.V v. City of St. Paul 1992). In other words, speech or expression cannot be prohibited only because the ideas expressed are racist or otherwise objectionable. The Justices determined that the ordinance could not prohibit speech solely because of its propensity to cause fear, anger, or resentment based on race, religion, etc. However, they did not say that the cross-burning was legal; the opinion stated that it could have been prosecuted under laws prohibiting threats, arson, or trespassing, but the ordinance criminalizing it for its intent to rouse hate was unconstitutional.

As has been previously mentioned, similar to threats, one of the most difficult and debatable aspects of hate speech is whether it should be defined by its illocutionary force, the author's intention, or its perlocutionary force, the result that it has on the listener (Searle 1969). The American Bar Association defines hate speech as “speech that offends, threatens, or insults groups based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other
traits” (ABA Division for Public Education, n.d.). This defines hate speech by its perlocutionary force, the fact that it causes a listener to feel offended, insulted, or threatened. In this conception, an author’s or speaker's intention is not paramount to classification as hate speech; if the language is interpreted by a listener as offensive, threatening, or insulting, it may be hate speech. Alternative views in this debate will be revisited in the next section.

2.3 *Academic and Lexicographic Definitions of Hate Speech*

A resource that cannot be overlooked when searching for a definition is the dictionary. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines hate speech as “a) a speech or address inciting hatred or intolerance, esp. towards a particular social group on the basis of ethnicity, religious beliefs, sexuality, etc.; b) (as a mass noun) speech (or sometimes written material) inciting such hatred or intolerance” (“hate speech” OED Online 2017). The OED traces the origin of the phrase to a 1938 issue of the Syracuse Herald which used the phrase to describe a speech given by Adolph Hitler. Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines it simply as “speech expressing hatred of a particular group or people” (“hate speech” Merriam Webster Dictionary n.d.).

Dictionary definitions provide useful insight into the meaning of a word or phrase because they are typically based on extensive research. In his article on methods in lexicographical and dictionary research, linguist and lexicographer Schierholz notes that there is currently “no comprehensive and up-to-date documentation of these particular [dictionary production and research] methods in English” (Schierholz 2015, 323). However, as one example, Oxford Dictionaries, the division of Oxford University Press which publishes the OED among other dictionary products, uses multiple data sources when writing its definitions. Definitions are synthesized, researched, and updated by lexicographers who review four data sources: a corpus
of over ten billion English words taken from a wide range of material from newspapers to social media; user-generated content submitted by language users; a corpus of English literature spanning hundreds of years; and responses to public appeals for specific data (Oxford Dictionaries, “How our dictionaries are created”). The lexicographers and editors review this material, identify which aspects of the term are most significant, and draft a definition which captures, in as concise and unambiguous a way as possible, the key characteristics of the term. This definition is then reviewed by one or more of hundreds of consultants with relevant expertise who help ensure that the entries are accurate and complete (“Editing of entries” OED Online, n.d.). While this process is thorough, lexicographers are not necessarily entering into deep and nuanced analysis of the subtleties of all definitions, for example the extensive debate on illocution and perlocution in hate speech, as this work does. As an illustration, the two dictionary definitions above stand on opposite sides of that debate. Merriam Webster’s definition is concerned with the illocution of expressing hateful emotion, while the OED focuses on the perlocution of inciting hatred or intolerance, presumably in the mind of the addressee. Taking dictionary definitions as only one data point in combination with other academic research and survey data will produce the deepest, richest definition of hate speech.

In addition to dictionary definitions, scholars across disciplines have tackled the issue of hate speech. However, as was previously stated, there is a tendency in this research to take the definition of hate speech for granted. For example, though communication scholar Downing's 1999 article on hate speech and First Amendment rights has the words hate speech in the title, and though it explicitly critiques other scholars' definitions of hate speech, the author does not articulate his own definition. Downing’s work advocates against a rigid view of the First
Amendment that admits no exceptions to free speech protections; he calls this strict attitude First Amendment absolutism (Downing 1999). This absolutist ideology is his focus, rather than exploring the nature or linguistic implications of hate speech. Linguist Lillian (2007) suggests that Downing’s failure to define hate speech is typical, claiming that while language analysts often consider racist, sexist, and other discriminatory discourses, they rarely explicitly name these discourses hate speech. Therefore, these examinations lose the opportunity to enter into a wider conversation that considers hateful speech as a systemic social phenomenon that is broader than individual racist, sexist, anti-Semitic, or otherwise discriminatory discourses.

Exceptions to the general trend are gender studies scholar Reddy (2002) and linguists Whillock and Slayden (1995), who provide generalizable definitions of hate speech. Reddy, whose work focuses on homophobic discourse in Africa, uses a narrow definition of hate speech tailored specifically to homophobic speech, but one that can be extrapolated. Reddy defines hate speech as a “discourse of power, dominance and control which is...a kind of performative communication that produces a discourse about homosexuals in order to misrecognize them” (2002, 164). What precisely is meant by ‘misrecognition’ is not entirely clear, but Reddy’s argument deals with the harms of denying the naturalness and legitimacy of same-sex desire. This definition acknowledges that hate speech is a performative communicative act (i.e. a speech act) and its invocation of power, dominance, and control as the driving forces of hate speech can be generalized to all forms of hate speech.

In their book *Hate Speech* (1995), communication scholar Whillock and media scholar Slayden collect essays analyzing a range of discriminatory discourses from political, linguistic and legal perspectives. In her article within that collection, Whillock also defines hate speech by
its perlocutionary force to “move an audience by creating a symbolic code for violence...[and] to inflame the emotions of followers, denigrate the designated out-class, inflict permanent and irreparable harm to the opposition, and ultimately conquer” (32). Additionally, Whillock and Slayden assert that the goal of hate speech is “to polarize particular groups in order to organize opposition, solidify support, and marshal resources towards forcing a 'final solution' to a thorny problem” (xiii). This description highlights the ingroup building function of hate speech, as well as the anti-outgroup function. This emphasis is implicit in definitions which include an element of incitement, but Whillock and Slayden explicitly discuss this dimension of hate speech.

Not all academic definitions focus on perlocution. In contrast to Whillock (1995), Nockleby’s definition in the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, considers hate speech “communications of animosity or disparagement of an individual or a group on account of a group characteristic such as race, color, national origin, sex, disability, religion, or sexual orientation” (Nockleby 2000, 1277). Here, it is defined by its illocutionary force, the fact that the speaker/author communicates his/her “animosity or disparagement.” The emphasis is on the attitude and expression of the speaker, regardless of the effect that the language has on the recipient.

Hate speech has also been explored from a quantitative perspective. In 2016, an interdisciplinary group of computer scientists and communication scholars used a computational strategy to determine a definition of hate speech. They collected two corpora of online speech, one from discourse communities which self-identified as hateful towards a target group and one which came from online support groups for the targets. They then used a number of statistical classification models for machine learning to train an algorithm to differentiate between the two
corpora. For training, they used speech derived from existing hate groups; they state that this method intends to “avoid the issues associated with using manual annotation and keyword searches to produce training data for a classifier” (Saleem, et al. 2016, n.p.). The algorithm was trained using data from self-identified hate groups under the assumption that hateful speech is discourse produced by hate groups; they called this a community-based approach. Once the algorithm was trained, they tested it on the support group and hate group corpora, the hate group data being different from that on which the model was trained. Though they did not report any of the specific language features which differentiated the two test corpora, they did indicate that their community-based classifier outperformed a traditional keyword-based classifier in all cases. They leveraged this research to derive a definition of hate speech as, “speech which contains an expression of hatred on the part of the speaker/author, against a person or people, based on their group identity” (2016, n.p.). While they demonstrate that there is significant merit in an algorithm trained with a community-based approach when identifying hate speech, there are some limitations to their work. They define hate speech as speech which contains an “expression of hatred” but do not clarify how they define hatred. Their model is trained on speech from self-identified hate communities, but lacking a clear definition of hatred, it assumes that the content produced by a hateful community is hate speech, which might not always be true. Their community-based approach is also not target-independent; a model trained on racist hate speech might not accurately identify anti-Semitic or misogynistic hate speech. Additionally, because this study did not report the specific linguistic features which their model used to successfully differentiate the corpora, it is difficult to replicate or build on their findings.
All academic definitions of hate speech uncovered during research for the current project are presented in Table 2.1, displayed from most to least recent publication. Also noted is each author's field of research, to illustrate that although hate speech is a concern raised by a wide variety of disciplines, the voice of the linguistic community is currently lacking in the landscape.

As review of Table 2.1 indicates, most of the scholars who work with hate speech are from the fields of legal scholarship, political science, and communications. Given the fact that hate speech is a phenomenon of language, linguists can and should contribute our perspective and expertise. Also included are works about the topic of hate speech in which no explicit definition is given.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Article, Year and Page</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haji Mohammad Saleem¹, Kelly P. Dillon², Susan Benesch³, Derek Ruths¹</td>
<td>Computer Scientists¹ Communications Scholar² Legal Scholar³</td>
<td><em>A Web of Hate: Tackling Hateful Speech in Online Social Spaces</em> (2016, n.p.)</td>
<td>“speech which contains an expression of hatred on the part of the speaker/author, against a person or people, based on their group identity”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emma Townsend</td>
<td>Political Scientist</td>
<td><em>Hate Speech or Genocidal Discourse? An Examination of Anti-Roma Sentiment in Contemporary Europe</em> (2014, 9)</td>
<td>“virulent and often violent language used to stigmatise and denigrate a people belonging to a 'group’”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floyd Abrams</td>
<td>Legal Scholar</td>
<td><em>On American Hate Speech Laws</em> (2012)</td>
<td>NO DEFINITION GIVEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susan Benesch</td>
<td>Legal Scholar</td>
<td><em>Election-Related Violence: The Role of Dangerous Speech</em> (2011, 390)</td>
<td>“a very broad category including (1) speech that is intended to harm directly, by insulting or offending the person or people it purports to describe, and (2) speech intended to cause indirect harm, by inciting one person or group against another”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Dangerous Speech: A Proposal to Prevent Group Violence</em> (2012, 1)</td>
<td>“denigrates people on the basis of their membership in a group”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher S. Josey</td>
<td>Discourse Analyst</td>
<td><em>Hate speech and identity: An analysis of neo racism and the indexing of identity</em> (2010)</td>
<td>NO DEFINITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wibke Timmerman</td>
<td>Legal Scholar</td>
<td><em>Counteracting Hate Speech as a Way of Preventing Genocidal Violence</em> (2008, 359)</td>
<td>“hate speech...excludes the victim group from the ‘human commonwealth’ by means of stigmatization and, through its influence on the addressees who are incited to hatred against the victim group, demonstrates to the latter their utter helplessness and lack of control”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhikhu Parekh</td>
<td>Political Philosopher</td>
<td><em>Hate Speech: Is there a case for banning?</em> (2006, 214)</td>
<td>“hate speech expresses, advocates, encourages, promotes or incites hatred of a group of individuals distinguished by a particular feature or set of features”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic</td>
<td>Critical Race Theorists</td>
<td><em>Understanding Words that Wound</em> (2004, 11-12)</td>
<td>“one can consider hate speech along various axes, including direct and indirect, veiled or overt, single or repeated, backed by authority and power or not, and accompanied by threat of violence or not. One can also consider hate speech based on the characteristic of the person or group at which it is aimed”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Field</td>
<td>Article, Year and Page</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic (cont.)</td>
<td>Critical Race Theorists (cont.)</td>
<td><em>Understanding Words that Wound</em> (2004, 11-12) (cont.)</td>
<td>“different types of hate speech threaten different kinds of harm...[and] can cause serious psychological and physical harm, irrespective of whether the speaker also physically strikes the victim.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Tsesis</td>
<td>Legal Scholar</td>
<td><em>Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements</em> (2002, 211)</td>
<td>“antisocial oratory that is intended to incite persecution against people because of their race, color, religion, ethnic group, or nationality and has a substantial likelihood of causing...harm”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasu Reddy</td>
<td>Literature and Gender Studies Scholar</td>
<td><em>Perverts and Sodomites: Homophobia as Hate Speech in Africa</em> (2002, 164)</td>
<td>“hate speech...is seen as a discourse of power, dominance and control which is not merely a form of patriarchal oppression, but a kind of performative communication that produces a discourse about homosexuals in order to misrecognise them”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Nockleby</td>
<td>Legal Scholar</td>
<td><em>Encyclopedia of the American Constitution</em> (2000, 1277)</td>
<td>“communications of animosity or disparagement of an individual or group on account of a group characteristic such as race, color, national origin, sex, disability, religion, or sexual orientation”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John D.H. Downing</td>
<td>Communications/ Media Scholar</td>
<td>‘Hate Speech’ and 'First Amendment absolutism' discourses in the US (1999)</td>
<td>NO DEFINITION GIVEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rita Kirk Whillock</td>
<td>Political Communications Scholar</td>
<td><em>The Use of Hate as a Stratagem for Achieving Political and Social Goals</em> (1995, 32)</td>
<td>“hate speech[’s] goals are to inflame the emotions of followers, denigrate the designated out-class, inflict permanent and irreparable harm to the opposition and ultimately conquer”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linda Greene</td>
<td>Legal Scholar</td>
<td>Radical discourse, hate speech, and political correctness (1995, 35)</td>
<td>“hate speech [is] the use of epithets and similar words which the speaker intends to cause emotional harm and grievous insult”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklyn Haiman</td>
<td>Communications Scholar and Free Speech Activist</td>
<td>“Speech Acts” and the First Amendment (1993, 26)</td>
<td>“the expression of group hatred solely through words and symbols”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Bar Association, Division for Public Education</td>
<td>Legal Scholars</td>
<td><em>Debating the “Mighty Constitutional Opposites”: Hate Speech Debate</em> (n.d.)</td>
<td>“speech that offends, threatens, or insults groups based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other traits”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Seventeen works, all of which deal with the subject of hate speech, are cited in the table above. Of those seventeen, only thirteen clearly provide a definition of hate speech. Delgado and Stefancic (2004), while they describe attributes and effects of hate speech, do not provide a succinct definition of the actual act. Review of these scholarly definitions reveals four common trends: 1. tension between the importance of speaker intent and listener interpretation 2. dual audience and purpose (i.e. potential haters whom the speaker wishes to incite and/or include; members of the hated group whom the speaker wishes to harm, exclude, and/or control) 3. the mention of violence 4. targeting group membership.

Nine of the authors focus on the illocutionary act of the hate speech by mentioning the act the author/speaker performs (“expresses, advocates, encourages, promotes...hatred” [Parekh 2006, 214]; “communications of animosity or disparagement” [Nockleby 2000, 277]; “expression of group hatred” [Haiman 1993, 26]; “expression of hatred” [Saleem, et al. 2016, n.d.]), or by focusing on the intentions, goals, or uses of the speech by the author/speaker (“intends to cause emotional harm and grievous insult” [Greene 1995, 35]; “intended to incite persecution” [Tsesis 2002, 211]; “intended to harm” [Benesch 2011, 390]; “goals are to inflame the emotions… denigrate… inflict permanent and irreparable harm” [Whillock 1995, 32]; “used to stigmatize and denigrate a people” [Townsend 2014, 9]). Seven scholars focus on the perlocutionary force of the speech, especially its effect of inciting feelings of hatred, exclusion, denigration, offense, or in some way causing harm (“hate speech...incited hatred” [Parekh 2006, 214]; “excludes the victim group...through its influence on the addressees who are incited to hatred” [Timmerman 2008, 359]; “denigrate a people” [Townsend 2014, 9]; “inciting one person or group against another” [Benesch 2011, 390]; “denigrates people on the basis of their
membership in a group” [Benesch 2012, 1]; “speech that offends...or insults groups” [American Bar Association n.d.]; “incite to persecution against people...has a substantial likelihood of causing...harm” [Tsesis 2002, 211]; “to inflame the emotions of followers, denigrate the designated out-class, inflict permanent and irreparable harm” [Whillock 1995, 32]). This suggests that though there might be a slight scholarly preference for emphasizing the illocution of hate speech over the perlocution, a thorough definition of hate speech likely has to consider both its illocutionary and perlocutionary forces, similar to Gales’ (2010) definition of threats which combines the two.

This comparison is particularly apt because two of the authors relate hate speech to threats (“speech that...threatens” [American Bar Association n.d.]; “different types of hate speech threaten different types of harm” [Delgado and Stefancic 2004, 12]). As has already been discussed, there is no scholarly consensus on the precise meaning of threats as a speech act and therefore no way to know whether these academics are relating hate speech to a concept of threats which prioritizes the intentions of the threatener or the feelings of the threatened. The matter of illocutionary and perlocutionary force will be revisited in analysis of the non-academic survey responses in the next section.

Another thread that runs through these scholarly definitions is the implicit notion that hate speech is addressed to two audiences – the ingroup and the outgroup – with separate purposes for each group. The ingroup is incited to violence or persecution (Parekh 2006; Timmerman 2008; Benesch 2011; Tsesis 2002) or inflamed to anger (Whillock 1995) towards the hated group. At the same time, these definitions suggest that hate speech causes the object of the hatred, the outgroup, to be insulted, offended, or denigrated (Benesch 2011; American Bar
Association n.d.; Greene 1995; Townsend 2014; Benesch 2012; Whillock 1995) or otherwise harmed, whether physically, psychologically, or emotionally, including feeling fearful of harm (Benesch 2011; Greene 1995; Whillock 1995; Delgado and Stefancic 2004). Greene asserts that these insults take the form of “epithets and similar words” (1995, 35), referred to by other scholars as slurs (Bianchi 2014). Philosophy of language scholar Bianchi defines slurs as “derogatory terms...targeting individuals and groups of individuals on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender or sexual orientation” (Bianchi 2014, 35). These derogatory words are typically culturally taboo and command a particular power to cause offense or psychological distress.

One more commonality amongst the academic definitions of hate speech is violence. Six of the scholars mention violence or harm (Townsend 2014; Benesch 2011; Delgado and Stefancic 2004; Tsesis 2002; Whillock 1995; Greene 1995). Important to note is the fact that several scholars qualify the idea of harm to include “emotional harm” (Greene 1995) or “indirect harm” (Benesch 2011). If analysis expands the concept of harm to include non-violent harm, Reddy’s description of hate speech as exerting “power, dominance and control” would also constitute a harm, or as he calls it “oppression” (2002, 164). Downing (1999) and Delgado and Stefancic (2004) address this issue explicitly, indicating that there is more than one kind of harm that language can produce. Hate speech may cause physical harm, but hate speech may also cause emotional distress, social alienation, economic hardship, etc., to the victims. Hate speech does not always result in physical violence, but it may be inextricably linked with other, nonphysical harms.
A final theme that appears throughout the academic definitions is that the target of hate speech is based on group membership. This was one of the most agreed upon characteristics across the scholarly definitions and was mentioned in nine of the fourteen articles that provided some form of definition or description. Hate speech is specifically called an “expression of group hatred” (Haiman 1993, 26) where targets are selected based on a shared feature (“on account of a group characteristic” Nockleby 2000, 1277; “based on characteristics of the person or group at which it is aimed” Delgado and Stefancic 2004, 11; “distinguished by a particular feature or set of features” Parekh 2006, 214; “[persecuted] because of their race, color, religion, ethnic group or nationality” Tsesis 2002, 211; “[selected] on the basis of their membership in a group” Benesch 2012, 1; “people belonging to a group” Townsend 2014, 9; “based on race, color, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, disability, or other traits” American Bar Association n.d.; “hatred...against a person or people based on their group identity” Saleem, et al. 2006).

These trends will be synthesized with the themes uncovered during the survey of a non-academic audience, presented in the next section, to propose a combined definition of hate speech in Section 2.5.

2.4 Hate Speech Survey
This project seeks a definition of hate speech that encompasses both academic and non-academic perspectives. In other words, it attempts to uncover and incorporate the culturally recognized conventions for a felicitous act of hate speech. Combing through academic sources provides limited insight into how everyday language users conceptualize hate speech. To bring in this important perspective, this research uses a series of two surveys to collect non-academic understandings of hate speech in order to produce a definition that incorporates perspectives
from a wide range of users of American English, academics and non-academics. The first survey asks for assessments, along a Likert scale, of various scenarios of potential hate speech and for respondents’ definition of hate speech. The second survey builds on the first by confirming the importance of features which the first survey suggested were elements of hate speech and by asking respondents to assess the relative weight of these factors to their definition of hate speech. Using two surveys provides an opportunity for the focus to be emergent and data-driven, rather than dictated by the researcher.

This section begins by providing a description of how the first survey was constructed and distributed. Then it describes who took the survey, focusing on their demographic characteristics and representativeness of the wider U.S. population; after that, it analyzes the responses to the survey. The section concludes with a discussion of the format and results from the second survey, which followed up on the trends which emerged in the first.

2.4.1 Initial Survey Design

The initial survey was primarily a series of language samples, with contextualizing scenarios, identified from previous academic work as hate speech, or real-life examples which the researcher thought might possibly be hate speech. Examples were selected to represent a range of communication situations: in-person, online, speech between acquaintances, speech between strangers, and so on. Though some of the examples taken from previous academic work are naturally occurring speech, it was not always clear if others were hypothetical. Naturally occurring samples were considered preferable to minimize the potential bias of an experimental setting or the academics’ personal notions of hate speech, and to maximize the authenticity of respondents' evaluations. Twenty-three language samples were selected for their representation
of a range of features previously discussed by academics and legal scholars as characteristic of hate speech (e.g. the presence of violent language, use of epithets/slurs, targeting of factors such as race, sex, disability, religion, sexual attraction). The language samples also highlighted factors that the researcher hypothesized might be of potential interest (i.e. whether the speech was online or in-person; the strength of the relationship between the interlocutors; whether the speech was targeted at a minority or majority group; and whether the target group is defined by a voluntary or involuntary identity, such as a professional vs. racial identity). The samples varied in the following aspects: interpersonal relationship between the interlocutors (e.g. friends, acquaintances, strangers), the channel of the speech (i.e. online or in-person), whether the speech is in a public space (e.g. on the street, in the public comments of an online news article) or private space (e.g. in an individual’s home, in a private online message), addressee (i.e. ingroup or outgroup), whether the speech is directed at a minority or majority group (e.g. African Americans or white Americans), the presence of potentially offensive language (e.g. expletives, slurs), the presence of violent language, and whether the speech targets a group based on a voluntary or fairly mutable behavior (e.g. a profession) or a more static identity (e.g. race or sex). Each language sample was contextualized with a brief scenario, chosen to provide a variety of contexts for the language samples. Some scenarios are the genuine context from which the language was taken, while others were fabricated by the researcher to ensure that a range of contextual features could be explored (e.g. online vs. offline; public vs. private; age, gender, ethnicity, etc. of the interlocutors). Whenever possible, the actual context of the language was maintained, but some adjustments and fabrications were necessary to achieve a diversity of contexts.
The initial survey began by asking respondents a series of demographic questions: age, gender identification, ethnic identification, religious affiliation, political affiliation, and native language/dialect. The researcher neglected to ask respondents about their sexual orientation, though some volunteered that information in the free-response questions. These demographics are highly salient in the language samples themselves and in previous academic work on hate speech. The goal was to maintain sufficient anonymity for participants’ comfort while collecting characteristics that the researcher believed could be potentially correlated with respondents’ definitions of and ideologies regarding hate speech. For example, perhaps definitions would differ based on age or identification with an ethnic or religious minority.

Because this research is narrowly focused on hate speech in the early twenty-first century U.S. context, all respondents were speakers of American English or individuals who identified as ethnically American (e.g. a native Arabic speaker who indicated an “Arab-American” ethnic identity). Some respondents did indicate native bilingualism. These responses were included as long as American English was indicated as a native language or the respondent identified as ethnically American. These multilingual respondents represent an important American perspective and to exclude their responses would be to invisibilize an important segment of the American population.

All respondent demographics were self-reported, meaning survey participants were not confined to selecting from a pre-determined list of demographic options. The researcher believes that this led to a richer picture of the sample population than would otherwise have been allowed by forced-choice demographic questions. For example, a number of respondents provided non-binary gender identifications, which might not have been available in a forced-choice question.
Following seven demographic questions, respondents were presented with twenty-three language samples and contexts. Respondents were given a five-point Likert scale and asked to rate the assertion that each sample is hate speech. Respondents could select “I strongly agree that this language is hate speech,” “I agree that this language is hate speech,” “I am neutral about this language being hate speech,” “I disagree that this language is hate speech,” “I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech.” The order in which these scenario-based questions were presented was randomized for each respondent. The last three questions on the survey were open-ended, free-response questions. Respondents were asked to provide their definition of hate speech, to share any factors which influenced their judgments on the language samples, and to add additional comments if desired. Three examples of the scenario questions and the text of the open-ended questions are provided below. The entire survey is replicated in Appendix A.

1. Scenario: The following is said by one friend to his roommate while they are discussing doing the dishes. Both are African American.
Language: Don’t be a lazy nigger.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

2. Scenario: The following is posted on a Facebook page. (“Abo” refers to an aboriginal, the native people of Australia.)
Language: How do you save an abo from drowning? Take your foot off the cunts head.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

3. Scenario: The following is posted as a comment on someone's Facebook page.
Language: [Name] wow you are a nasty little queer...I can almost hear the gay lisp in your post...you dirty little troll...[Name] go back to your cave and die...you contribute NOTHING to society!
a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
b. I agree that this language is hate speech
c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
d. I disagree that this language is hate speech

24. How do you define hate speech?

25. When you were reading the previous scenarios and language examples, what factors influenced your judgments about hate speech?

34. Are there any other thoughts or comments you would like to add on the subject of hate speech? (OPTIONAL)

The survey was first piloted on a small group of respondents, was adjusted according to their feedback, and was ultimately distributed using a “friend-of-a-friend” distribution method. The survey, which was housed on the online platform Survey Gizmo, was shared through the researcher's personal, professional, and academic networks with the request that people share it with their networks if they felt comfortable doing so. This method was employed to return a more diverse population of respondents than in-person distribution or distribution to a university population would afford.

2.4.2 Initial Survey Respondents

The initial survey was completed by 161 people ranging in age from eighteen to seventy-seven, with a variety of ethnic, gender, religious, and political identifications. The average respondent age was 44.9. The survey sample was 55.3% female, 42.2% male and 2.5% non-gender conforming. This compares well to the general U.S. population, where 50.8% of the population is female and 49.2% male4 (United States Census Bureau 2015). Unfortunately, there was less diversity in the respondents' ethnicity; 76.4% self-identified as “white” or “Caucasian.”

4 The 2015 United States census provided only a binary male/female choice for sex. It is unknown how the sex distribution of the U.S. population would be affected if the question was not binary and forced-choice.
The second largest ethnic group represented was Hispanic (6.2%). The remainder were divided amongst “Jewish”, “Asian”, “African American”, “Arab American”, “American”, “Blend”, “European American”, and “Cherokee.”

For brevity, the complete breakdown of religious affiliations is not listed here. Respondents provided a very wide array of religious affiliations. The largest majority, 45.3%, said they had no affiliation, were agnostic, or atheist. Slightly fewer, 40.4%, responded with a Christian affiliation – 15.5% Catholic and the remainder a Protestant denomination or simply “Christian.” There was variety in the remaining 14.3% of responses, including Jewish, Muslim, Pagan, Universal Unitarian, Hindu, Buddhist, and others. None of these religious affiliations had more than five representatives, or 3.1% of the survey sample.

The demographic portion of the survey also elicited information about political affiliation. Nearly half of respondents, 49.0% responded with a “liberal” or Democratic affiliation, 13.7% declared “conservative” or Republican affiliation, 18.0% claimed “independent,” roughly 10% claimed no affiliation, and the remaining 19.9% provided a response of another affiliation (e.g. libertarian, anarchist, socialist, etc.). It is important to note that this survey was conducted immediately following the highly contentious 2016 election cycle. This may well have affected respondents' political self-identifications.

Six respondents claimed that their native language/dialect was not English. Of those, three provided Arabic as their native language and three listed Spanish. As was previously explained, the decision was made not to exclude these responses because the stated goal was to collect the non-academic perspectives of the American public regarding hate speech. According to recent census data, 20.8% of Americans have a home language other than or in addition to
English (United States Census Bureau 2015) and these more than sixty million Americans have an important voice in issues of hate speech and public discourse. Consequently, these respondents' surveys were maintained in the survey data.

Though the survey population has more ethnic homogeneity than is desirable, the researcher believes that the overall diversity across all demographic characteristics of the respondent population means that the results represent a range of different perspectives and kinds of people. One notable limitation is the lack of information regarding respondents’ socioeconomic status, meaning no claims to representativeness can be made regarding that aspect. Regardless, the researcher believes this to be a meaningful sample of public perceptions about hate speech.

2.4.3 Initial Survey Results

As was previously mentioned, after the demographic questions, respondents were presented with language samples and asked whether or not they agreed with the assertion that the samples were hate speech. Results were analyzed according to whether respondents agreed or disagreed that a language sample/scenario was hate speech, as well as the strength of the judgment. Of the twenty-three language samples on the first survey, fifteen were designated as hate speech by more than 50% of respondents. Seven received more than 75% agreement as hate speech and there were three examples that more than 90% of respondents agreed were hate speech. The most agreed-upon scenarios are presented in Table 2.2. When considering the strength of these determinations, there were five that more than 50% of people indicated from the Likert scale that they strongly believed were hate speech. These five are indicated with an asterisk next to the percentage below.
### Table 2.2 The language scenario and samples most agreed upon as hate speech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Percent Agreement</th>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Language Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>96.3%*</td>
<td>The following is posted as a comment on an online public forum</td>
<td>Muslims need to be wiped out clean no more Islam. This is disgusting its time to stop them across the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>95.0%*</td>
<td>The following is posted as a comment on someone's Facebook page.</td>
<td>[Name] wow you are a nasty little queer...I can almost hear the gay lisp in your post...you dirty little troll...[Name] go back to your cave and die...you contribute NOTHING to society!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>91.3%*</td>
<td>The following is written in an opinion article on the internet.</td>
<td>The only way to end racism and the oppression of my people is to destroy the white race. This must be done as quickly as possible; every day a white person lives is one more day that Africans suffer!!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>88.7%</td>
<td>The following is yelled by a man to another man on the street.</td>
<td>Faggot!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>84.2%*</td>
<td>The following is posted on a private Facebook page.</td>
<td>Butcher those who mock Islam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>83.8%*</td>
<td>The following is posted on a Facebook page. (&quot;Abo&quot; refers to an aboriginal, the native people of Australia.)</td>
<td>How do you save an abo from drowning? Take your foot off the cunts head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
<td>The following is said by a man in his late 80s at a family gathering.</td>
<td>Blacks are inherently inferior and predisposed to criminal activities and should not be allowed into respectable areas.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examination of the examples most agreed upon and most strongly agreed upon as hate speech suggest a number of factors which may be characteristic of a general, non-academic perspective of hate speech. The threat or mention of violence may be an important factor (e.g. “go back to your cave and die”, “destroy the white race”, “butcher those who mock Islam”). Five of the seven most-agreed upon examples included violent language – those labeled A, B, C, E, F; all three of the examples which received 90% or more agreement and all five examples which received a majority strong agreement had this feature. Similarly, public speech (e.g. something posted on a public online forum or yelled on the street) tended to receive more agreement than private speech (e.g. something said in a person’s home or in a private online community).
speech represented five of the seven most agreed upon examples (A, B, C, D, F), all three of the examples with 90% or more agreement and four of the five examples with 50% or more strong agreement. This trend is further elaborated by the finding that online speech (e.g. language on Facebook or an online forum) was more often characterized as hate speech than offline speech (e.g. speech delivered on the street or at an in-person conference). Again, online speech represented five of the seven most agreed upon examples (A, B, C, E, F), all three of the 90% or more examples, and all five of the 50% or more examples of strong agreement. Figure 2.1 further illustrates the factors mentioned above and shows the aggregated responses to questions in which the language and/or context were either violent/non-violent, public/private, online/offline.

![Figure 2.1 Survey responses according to factor](image)

As was suggested by the academic definitions, it is also profitable to consider the factor of group membership when considering the target of hate speech. Four of these seven most agreed upon examples specifically targeted their hatred towards a group (A targets Muslims; C targets “the white race”; F targets aboriginals; G targets African Americans). Examples B and D
are addressed to individuals, but they both include slurs which disparage based on association with a stigmatized group, those with same sex desires (“queer” in B and “faggot” in D). The target of example E is unclear; the phrase “those who mock Islam” does not describe a group with any shared characteristics besides a comedic or sincere disrespect for Islam. All the findings described above were explored in greater depth in the follow-up survey, which will be discussed in Section 2.4.4.

In addition to the language samples and scenarios, the survey also presented respondents with several open-ended questions. Some respondents opted not to answer these questions, but answers were provided by about 90% of respondents. The question “how do you define hate speech?” received responses totaling 3,672 words; responses regarding what factors influenced judgments about hate speech totaled 4,258 words; the optional question asking for additional thoughts or comments on the topic of hate speech received a total of 2,655 words. These responses were collected into a corpus and fed into the open-source corpus analytic software Simple Program Concordancer (SPC) for quantitative analysis. A list of 164 highly common English grammatical function words (e.g. “a”, “the”, “and” etc.) were discounted because they lack semantic meaning to contribute to the analysis. Similarly, HATE and SPEECH were, unsurprisingly, very common and were excluded because their frequency does not provide any new insights into a specific definition of hate speech. The remaining words were manually lemmatized and ranked by frequency. Lemmatization is the process of grouping all the inflected forms of a word together so they can be analyzed as a single unit according to the base form, or lemma; e.g. the lemma\textsuperscript{5} STUDY includes “studies,” “studying,” “studied,” etc. The most

\textsuperscript{5} In this work, lemmas will be indicated by the use of all capital letters (e.g. HATE)
frequent lemmas from respondents’ free-response definitions of hate speech are listed with their frequencies in Table 2.3. The right two columns of the table indicate how many unique responses included that lemma and what percent of the total responses included the lemma.

*Table 2.3 Lemmas for question “How do you define hate speech?”*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lemma</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Freq (per 1000 tokens)</th>
<th>Number of Unique Responses</th>
<th>% of Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GROUP</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTENT</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANGUAGE</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIOLENCE</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREAT</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARM</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 The same method of analysis was conducted on responses to the question “When you were reading the previous scenarios and language examples, what factors influenced your judgments about hate speech?” There were 154 responses to that question. SPC was used again to extract the same list of 164 common English function words. The remaining word list was manually lemmatized and the most frequent lemmas are presented in Table 2.4.

*Table 2.4 Lemmas for question “What factors influence your judgments about hate speech?”*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lemma</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Freq (per 1000 tokens)</th>
<th>Number of Unique Responses</th>
<th>% of Total Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTENT</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORD</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTEXT</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIOLENCE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARM</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some of the lemmas which appeared most frequently in responses are unsurprising and do not provide very much insight into a lay-definition of hate speech (e.g. LANGUAGE). However, others do provide significant clues to what a general person believes constitutes hate speech. For example, GROUP featured prominently in both sets of responses; this might suggest that people tend to think hate speech is directed on the basis of group membership rather than because of individual dislike. The relatively high frequency of OTHER might indicate that the general public believes that hate speech is directed at an outgroup, the 'other,' rather than an ingroup member. The high frequency of INTENT might suggest that illocution, the intention of the speaker, is weighed more heavily than perlocution when a person judges hate speech. The prominence of VIOLENCE, THREAT, and HARM might indicate that the incitement to or fear of violence or some other nonphysical harm is a central feature. Perhaps discrimination on the basis of race and religion is the most widely visible or canonical hate speech, as a high frequency of survey-takers also mentioned those characteristics in their definition responses. It is also possible that the presence of specific derogatory words, slurs, or swears are indicative of hate speech, because WORD had a high frequency of usage in both response sets, though this might simply be a function of asking people to carefully consider language. Finally, the frequency of CONTEXT, FRIEND, and SPEAKER might point to the interpersonal relationship of the interlocutors (e.g. friend, stranger, acquaintance, etc.) and contextual factors, such as venue or mode of delivery, as other important factors.
To illustrate these trends, Table 2.5 shows a selection of responses to the open-ended question “How do you define hate speech?” These responses are fairly representative, with many of the sentiments repeated across respondents. In the table, bold formatting indicates mention of violence, harm, or threat; underlined phrases emphasize the illocution; italics indicate phrases which emphasize perlocution. Mentions of threats have been marked as both illocutionary and perlocutionary, due to previous discussions about the complicated status of threats as regards intention and uptake.

Table 2.5 Sample responses to question “How do you define hate speech?”

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A communication, usually given to a group, with the intent to <strong>incite violence</strong>. Often a direct <strong>threat</strong> or call to action, but can be veiled or implied. Mere offensive language is not enough to qualify something as hate speech, it must be a statement that promotes responsive action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Any speech that <strong>calls for violence</strong> against another or a group regardless of what the motive is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Hate speech is expressing hatred of or extreme contempt for a certain group of people, especially marginalized populations, in an <strong>insulting</strong> or <strong>violent way</strong>. It is also using slurs to express hatred of a group of people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Hate speech is language, written or verbal, that <strong>threatens</strong> or <strong>demeans</strong> (or <strong>encourages others to threaten</strong> or demean) people based on a quality about them (race, gender, sex, religion, etc.) that they are opposed to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>I think hate speech is when you degrade others and <strong>try to make them feel</strong> inferior just because they look a certain way or are part of a certain group. It is hateful speech <strong>meant to harm</strong> the other party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Language using an aspect someone was born with or a life choice they have made that is healthy against them or an entire group. I group obesity in with choosing to do hard drugs, sexuality is a born with trait, religion can be either depending on someone's childhood. I guess peanut allergies(^6) would fall into hate speech in my definition, but that still seems ridiculous to me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>Not just a statement showing or demonstrating prejudice, but a prejudiced statement <strong>designed to hurt</strong>, <strong>cause harm</strong> or <strong>incite violence</strong>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Public speech that <strong>demeans</strong> or <strong>threatens</strong> a religious, social, or ethnic group in a way that could be seen to <strong>encourage or provoke violence</strong> towards that group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>When a person knowingly suggests and/or demands that a person or people should <strong>suffer emotionally</strong>, <strong>physically</strong>, <strong>spiritually</strong> <strong>and/or die</strong> for what is believed to be an inferior part of their physical, mental, and/or spiritual make-up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td><strong>[L]anguage offensive or threatening</strong> to a group, gender, ethnicity, or class of people</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) One of the language samples was, “Peanut allergies are a genetic weakness. Survival of the fittest says those people ought to die.”
One of the trends these responses clearly demonstrate is the tension between illocution and perlocution. Responses A, E, G, and J use language which seems to emphasize the illocution of the speech. These phrases are underlined in the table. Words like “intent” and “knowingly” and phrases like “meant to harm” and “designed to hurt” define hate speech according to the intention of the speaker. Language like this, which focuses on intent, was more common in the responses than that which focused on perlocution, but there were still many respondents who emphasized the effect of the speech rather than the intention. Those words and phrases are italicized above. Respondent B explicitly rejects the idea that intention shapes hate speech, judging speech “regardless of what the motive is.” Other respondents were more subtle in their suggestions, instead defining hate speech by its offensive, insulting, or demeaning nature (C, D, H, K). These descriptors emphasize the feeling that the speech invokes, rather than the intention of the speaker to create any particularly feeling.

Numerous respondents, 20.9%, related hate speech to threats in their definitions, as in examples A “often a direct threat,” D “language...that threatens,” H “speech that...threatens,” and K “language...threatening to a group.” As has been discussed several times, debate regarding whether threats are defined by illocution or perlocution means it is impossible to know precisely what each respondent means when s/he uses the term. However, this does reinforce the appropriateness of considering hate speech alongside threats, as the two acts seem to be related in the schemas of both academics and lay-people.

One more trend identified in the academic definitions that is borne out in the survey data is that hate speech seems to have two audiences – the speaker’s ingroup who are encouraged to hate or are incited to negative behavior (e.g. “communications usually given to a group...to incite
violence” A; “calls for violence” B; “encourages others to threaten or demean” D; “encourage or provoke violence” H) and the outgroup against whom the hatred is targeted who may feel insulted, demeaned, or hurt (e.g. “an insulting...way” C; “demeans” D; “make them feel inferior” E; “hurt, cause harm” G; “speech that demeans” H).

Another characteristic of many respondents’ definitions of hate speech is violence. Whether respondents focused on illocutionary or perlocutionary force, violence and harm ran across many definitions. Examples from the table above are bolded. Some respondents, though fewer, explicitly mentioned non-physical violence, though typically in conjunction with physical violence, as in respondent J’s definition (e.g. “suffer emotionally, physically, spiritually and/or die”). One important detail revealed by a qualitative analysis that is not shown by the lemma frequency data is that an incitement to violent action seems paramount to the mere mentioning of violence. For example, respondents A (“incite violence”), B (“calls for violence”), D (“encourages others to threaten”), G (“incite violence”), H (“encourage or provoke violence”), and J (“suggests and/or demands that a person or people should suffer”) all mention not just that the speech itself is violent, but that the speech encourages violence on the part of others towards the object of the speaker’s hatred.

Finally, example H is illustrative because it encapsulates the internal tension that many respondents expressed. The definition presented by respondent H seems to contradict itself by the final sentence, in which s/he acknowledges that the internal logic of the definition does not match his/her own emotional judgments of hate speech, “I guess peanut allergies would fall into hate speech in my definition, but that still seems ridiculous to me” (referring to the example “Peanut allergies are a genetic weakness. Survival of the fittest says those people ought to die.”).
This internal struggle with the challenge of defining hate speech was also succinctly expressed by a respondent whose response when asked for a definition of hate speech was, “hell i don't know. it's complicated.”

2.4.4 Follow-up Survey
Though defining hate speech is complicated, the findings from both the language examples and short answer questions in the first survey did suggest some trends that might characterize general, non-academic perceptions of hate speech. A second survey further explored these trends. The second survey served to confirm that the features identified by the first survey were indeed the most important factors of non-academic attitudes of hate speech and had respondents rank these features to identify their relative importance in general conceptions of hate speech. The follow-up survey was distributed to all respondents from the first survey who provided their email addresses and indicated their willingness to participate in a follow-up. Participation in the second survey was not limited to original respondents; participants were told that they were welcome to share the second survey should they want to. The follow-up survey received forty-nine responses.

The average age of respondents was 36.9, with a range from twenty to sixty-four. Respondents were well balanced between male and female, 53.1% female, 42.9% male, 2% non-binary identification. Again, the ethnic self-identification of respondents was highly skewed towards white/Caucasian, 83.7%, with the remaining respondents divided among five other ethnic self-identifications: Jewish, Asian, Hispanic, African American, and European American. This sample is less diverse than the first but still includes a variety of perspectives.
The first survey provided a wide range of scenarios and several free-response questions designed to elicit broad data about perceptions of hate speech. The second survey examined the specific trends identified in the first survey’s results to gain a greater depth of understanding. The first survey suggested several elements of hate speech which might be focused on: the speech event (e.g. conversation, argument), interpersonal relationship between the interlocutors (e.g. friends, acquaintances, strangers), whether the addressee is a member of the speaker’s ingroup or outgroup, the weight of illocutionary vs. perlocutionary force, channel of the speech (i.e. online or in-person), whether the speech is in a public or private space, characteristics of the target (e.g. race, gender, religion, etc.), characteristics of the speaker (e.g. race, gender, etc.), whether the speech contains violent language or mentions violence, and whether the speech contains profanity or other culturally taboo language. The second survey explicitly collected data on perceptions relating to those aspects. The first two questions of the second survey presented a single language sample and asked respondents to indicate under which conditions, from a list that was provided, they would or would not consider the language hate speech. The conditions contained the elements described above. To illustrate the results, the first question and the most frequent responses are displayed in Figure 2.2 with the percentages at which they occurred.
Figure 2.2 Response to example follow-up survey question

The findings suggest that the intent of the speaker defines hate speech in the minds of non-academics far more than the perception of the listener. Also, speech is much more likely to be considered hate speech if it is exchanged between strangers than between friends. Another trend that emerges in the data suggests that hate speech according to non-academics is more likely to be delivered in public than in private. There is also a slight preference for characterizing online speech as hate speech rather than in-person speech. This may be influenced by the current prevalence of media coverage about cyber-bullying and online hate groups and the fact that online speech tends to be much more public and far-reaching in its distribution.

Similar to the first survey, the next three questions presented a sample of language and asked if the respondent considers it hate speech. Based on the response, the follow-up question for each example asked the respondent to select reasons for the choice from a list or provide her/his own reason. The choices included the factors determined by the first survey to be characteristic of hate speech. This question was intended to ensure that all of the most agreed
upon factors had been captured and no additional important factors were being neglected. Though several respondents did provide write-in answers, none of them introduced new elements or aspects; all of them were articulations of the features already identified which were simply rephrased in the respondents own words (e.g. it is not hate speech because “it does not incite violence”; it is hate speech because “[the] use specifically of ‘fuck’ – an action word with a violent history.”) The synthesized results from the three questions are presented in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 Answers to the question “This is hate speech because it...

These responses confirmed that people consider hate speech to be characterized by the use of violent language, the inclusion of epithets or slurs, which Bianchi defines as “derogatory terms...targeting individuals and groups of individuals on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender, or sexual orientation” (2014, 35), the advocating of action, and the targeting of a group rather than an individual. Responses also suggested that an important factor is the relative social and political power of the speaker and target, with hate speech most often targeting a socially or politically marginalized group and delivered by a member of a more powerful group.
The fifth question asked respondents to select which characteristics from a list can be the basis of hate speech. This question was designed to determine if perceptions of hate speech gave privilege to certain types of features over others (e.g. immutable features, legally protected features, etc.). The first survey did not collect any systematic information regarding the characteristics for which a group can be targeted for hate speech. Figure 2.4 presents the results. The percent indicates the percentage of respondents who said that each characteristic could be the basis of hate speech. These results suggest that people believe hate speech is more likely to be based on characteristics which have existing legal protections (i.e. race, nationality, religion, sexual orientation, gender, disability, citizenship, sex). All of these characteristics were indicated by more than 85% of respondents. Age, however, defies this pattern. There are U.S. laws which
protect against age discrimination, though age was agreed upon by fewer respondents, below all
but three characteristics, with only 66% of respondents' agreement.

It was hypothesized based on anecdotal responses to the first survey that people would
more readily consider hate speech to be based on immutable characteristics; in other words, hate
speech is expressing hatred for someone over those things about themselves that they cannot
change as opposed to things which are choices. However, this was not completely borne out by
the data. Religious affiliation, a characteristic which is subject to change (even if not always
easily), was agreed upon by 92% of respondents, while height, a characteristic totally outside an
individual's control, ranked second to last with only 48.6% of respondents. This may be because
the U.S. has federal laws which protect against religious discrimination, but not against
discrimination based on height. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
protections for race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. This fact may have caused
respondents to consider religion a more sensitive characteristic. Similarly, religious
discrimination (e.g. anti-Semitism) has been and continues to be a significant and well-
publicized problem world-wide, one that is often accompanied by hateful rhetoric and violence.

The final question of the survey was intended to explore how respondents weighed the
relative importance of each of the factors that had already been discussed. Prior questions asked
only if a factor (e.g. intent of the speaker) did or did not influence a decision regarding hate
speech. This question asked respondents which considerations were more important in their
definitions. For example, a respondent might say that intent and violence are both attributes of
hate speech, but which is more important to the respondent when considering potential hate
speech? Respondents were given ten factors which, based on the data from the first survey,
seemed to influence people's decisions regarding hate speech. Respondents were asked to rank these factors from most to least influential for them personally. Respondents were also provided with the opportunity to leave any free-response comments on how they ranked the factors. To illustrate the rankings, each factor is given a score. The score is the result of a weighted average where higher ranked items are given a higher weight. For example, out of the ten items, the first ranked item for a respondent would be given a ten, the second a nine, the third an eight and so on. The scores for each item were then averaged across respondents to produce the item’s weighted score. See Table 2.6 for the complete ranking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Weighted Score</th>
<th>Overall Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent language or the threat of violence</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incitement to action against the target</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent of the speaker</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context (e.g. in a conversation, argument, unsolicited comment etc.)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of the target (e.g. race, class, religion, sexual orientation etc.)</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slurs/epithets/profanity</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship between the speaker and listener (e.g. friends, strangers, partners etc.)</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Channel of speech (e.g. public/private, online/face-to-face etc.)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics of the speaker (e.g. race, class, religion, sexual orientation etc.)</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretation of the hearer</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The top three most influential factors were the threat or suggestion of violence, an incitement to action against the target, and the intent of the speaker. The incitement to action contrasts statements that are a simple expression of a hateful sentiment (e.g. 'I hate white people'), with an encouragement or incitement to others to act upon that hateful sentiment,
whether violent or not (e.g. 'Don't sell wedding cakes to faggots' or 'Exterminate the Jews'). According to this, therefore, a canonical statement of hate speech to most people would be a sincere incitement to take violent action against a group of people.

The four factors which ranked in the middle of the pack – context (i.e. speech event), target characteristics, profanity or slurs, the relationship of the interlocutors – were all very closely ranked, indicating that though many respondents considered these four of moderate importance, there was considerable variability in their order among the respondents. Finally, the three factors which were ranked as least influential were channel, speaker characteristics, and the perception of the listener. Speaker characteristics and listener perception were also closely grouped, again indicating that they were evaluated similarly by respondents.

2.5 Comprehensive Definition of Hate Speech

The survey research creates a picture of a non-academic definition of hate speech that can be combined with the academic perspectives and dictionary definitions previously reviewed to produce a collection of factors which are key to hate speech.

First, has this research sufficiently demonstrated that hate speech constitutes a speech act, albeit a compound speech act in the model of Kurzon’s (1998) analysis of incitement, potentially constituted of one or more traditional speech acts? A speech act is language which performs a social action by its utterance (Austin 1962). This action can be declaring an intent, like a promise or a threat; asserting a right, like to advise or to veto; or expressing an attitude, like to praise or to criticize. All the data examined here seem to agree that there is some expressive component of hate speech; as implied by its name, it declares feelings of hatred, whatever else it might also do. This classifies it as a behabitive speech act, one that adopts an attitude, and more specifically an
expressive, which proclaims a psychological state regarding the speaker or the world (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). With this established, prior research on related speech acts can provide a model when defining this one.

Speech act theory has been used to describe and analyze numerous kinds of speech acts; for the analysis of hate speech, it is illustrative to focus on two: insults and threats. Threats were selected because, as noted in the previous sections, they were repeatedly connected to hate speech in the survey results and academic definitions. Additionally, Gales (2010) work on threats provides an excellent model for negotiating a definition of a speech act which respects the tension between illocution and perlocution.

Insults are the other speech act selected as a model, based Archard’s categorization of both as “problematic expressive speech act[s]” (2014, 128), united by their function of denigrating a target. Archard defines insults as expressive acts directed at a person or people in respect to a trait they possess which conveys a meaning of disparagement with the purpose of denigrating, humiliating or dishonoring the target. This element of denigration or disparagement is reminiscent of many of the definitions of hate speech provided by academics (e.g. “language used to...denigrate a people belonging to a group” [Townsend 2014, 9]; “[hate speech] denigrates people on the basis of their membership in a group” [Benesch 2012, 1]) and non-academics (e.g. “[hate speech] targets a particular group of people due to ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender, etc., and denigrates them in a public forum”; “Speech aimed at another with the intent to humiliate or frighten the other”). These similarities are why insults are also a productive speech act model for hate speech.
However, Archard’s (2014) notion of the insult differs from hate speech in the aspect of harm, which Archard downplays. Though he mentions several emotional harms insults can achieve (dishonor, humiliation, etc.), this notion of harm is far less expansive than the definitions of hate speech collected here, where harm was emphasized in both academic (e.g. “speech that is intended to harm directly...[or] to cause indirect harm” [Benesch 2011, 390]; “hate speech... intends to cause emotional harm and grievous insult” [Greene 1995, 35]; “antisocial oratory that is intended to incite persecution...and has a substantial likelihood of causing...harm” [Tsesis 2002, 211]) and non-academic definitions (e.g. “derogatory or harmful language directed at members of a protected class”; “hate speech is words or actions used in a manner to intentionally inflict or cause harm against the person they are targeted towards”; “language that makes harmful, often untrue, generalizations about a specific group of people or threatens violence against them”). In the inclusion of harm, hate speech seems more similar to the speech act of threatening, which also meets Archard’s criteria of a problematic expressive speech act. Gales defines threats as “communicated (written or spoken) speech acts, that are proffered for the benefit of the speaker and to the detriment of the hearer, that are in the control of the speaker, and that are intended to and have the effect of instilling fear in or intimidating a recipient” (2010, 14). The harm that threats do to the threatened is captured in Gales’ definition by the qualification that threats are made “to the detriment of the hearer,” as is hate speech. In this way, hate speech sits at the intersection of the speech acts of insults and threats.

With that in mind, and using the findings of the literature review and survey as a foundation, this research proposes that hate speech is a problematic expressive speech act which conveys derogatory sentiment towards a person or persons based on the perceived possession of
a socially defined group characteristic, which is made to the detriment of the target, and is addressed to the ingroup with the intention of inciting animus and/or violence or is addressed to the target with the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm.

This definition includes seven main elements. 1. It is a problematic expressive speech act. In other words, it is language which performs a social action which targets a socially defined group with negative propositional content. 2. The propositional content which it communicates is derogatory. It may be any disparaging sentiments, but frequently it includes profanity, epithets, or vulgarity. 3. It is made to the detriment of the target. There is harm resulting from the speech act, whether emotional, physical, psychological, economic, etc. 4. It is intended to threaten or incite animus and/or violence if addressed to the ingroup, or has the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm if addressed to the outgroup. This captures the illocutionary force that was highlighted in both academic and non-academic definitions of hate speech, the intention of the speaker to threaten or incite violence, but also acknowledges the perlocutionary force that hate speech can have, the effect of fear in the recipient. As has been discussed, intent is a problematic defining characteristic, but it nevertheless seems to be an important element of hate speech. By considering both the intent of the speaker and the effect on the listener, an analyst is given two measures by which to judge the force of the speech act. 5. The hate speech is grounded in the perception of a socially defined group characteristic. This speaks to why one of the respondents said hate speech against people with peanut allergies “seems ridiculous to me.” People with peanut allergies have one common attribute, but it is not socially recognized as a homogenizing factor. In other ways, that group is so diverse that they are not considered a single social group with shared values, culture, experiences, etc. On the other hand, religion defines a group with
shared beliefs, values, cultural traditions and therefore religious groups are recognized by U.S. society as social groups. 6. The definition includes an element of incitement, which was a frequently mentioned attribute in the survey data. Hate speech not only expresses hatred, one of its purposes is to incite others to hatred or violence. 7. The definition invokes violence against the target. That may come in the form of a direct threat of violence or by instilling a fear of violence or harm through extreme vitriol. Hate speech may cause physical harm, but hate speech may also cause emotional distress, social alienation, economic hardship, etc., to the victims. The distinction between physical and non-physical violence was one not explored by the survey research, though non-physical harms were anecdotally mentioned in addition to physical violence in some survey responses (e.g. “[hate speech is] [a]nything that derives a negative action, or hints at physical, emotional destructive actions”; “Violence...intended to emotionally damage”; “[hate speech has the] intent to emotionally harm, intimidate or embarrass other(s”)”). This research, and the definition it proposes, views violence broadly, encompassing physical and non-physical injury, though the remainder of the research focuses specifically on hate speech that was accompanied by physical violence.

This definition also respects the notion, highlighted throughout this chapter, that hate speech has a dual audience. An ingroup addressee may be incited to violence, or an outgroup addressee may be made fearful. At its core, hate speech is an expression of beliefs or emotions, however this research asserts that pure expression of a sentiment such as “I hate X” said aloud in an empty room is not hate speech. While that might be the expression of an ugly opinion, it is only hate speech if there is a component of harm, either through the incitement of others to hate
or violence, or by instilling fear in a recipient. Gu (1993) would label it a transactional event because it only exists in the transaction of two interlocutors.

By way of validation, this definition can be checked against those language samples most agreed upon by survey respondents to be hate speech. The most agreed upon example of hate speech in the first survey was:

Scenario: The following is posted as a comment on an online public forum
Language: Muslims need to be wiped out clean no more Islam. This is disgusting its time to stop them across the world.

96.3% of respondents agreed that this is hate speech. Does this meet the proposed definition? It is an expressive speech act; it communicates derogatory propositional content – that Muslims and/or Islam is “disgusting” and should be “wiped out.” It is made to the detriment of the target, Muslims. Encouraging hatred and potentially violence against a group is certainly detrimental to their sense of safety, well-being, and productive participation in society.

Continuing through the definition, Muslims are a social group united by the culturally relevant attribute of religion, and the shared beliefs and values which accompany that religious affiliation. There is a clear element of incitement. The phrase “its [sic] time to stop” references temporality to create urgency surrounding the perceived problem, in this case Islam, which encourages that the problem be addressed promptly, in this case by wiping out Islam. Finally, asserting that Muslims ought to be “wiped out” and “stop[ped]...across the world” is an indirect threat of violence. A group is “wiped out” through genocide. Though the author is not explicitly threatening to carry out the violence him/herself, the threat of violence remains clear and a reasonable listener would interpret these words as a threat of violent action to “stop” the “disgusting” Muslims. This is particularly true in the current U.S. cultural climate of anti-Islamic
rhetoric and fear driven by what is widely perceived as the looming menace of international terrorism. As analysis demonstrates, this example meets all of the criteria of hate speech, a sentiment agreed upon by 96.3% of the 161 people surveyed.

Does this definition similarly distinguish utterances which the majority of respondents agreed were not hate speech? 67.6% of respondents on the first survey agreed that the following example was not hate speech:

Scenario: The following is chanted by a rival team at a basketball game.
Language: Fuck the Hoyas!7

First, this statement does not meet the definition of a problematic expressive speech act because it communicates no propositional content; in other words, it is not really saying anything about the target, though it does include profanity that may be offensive to some listeners. One could argue that the phrase creates psychological or emotional harm to the target due to its use of offensive language. The use of “fuck” in this vocative expression is what Goddard calls an “abuse formula” (2015, 201). He claims the phrase fuck you derives from the expressive impulse “I want something very bad to happen to you” (2015, 201). Accepting this analysis, the phrase “fuck the Hoyas” does indirectly invoke some unnamed harm.

Another portion of the definition which falls short is the requirement of a socially defined group. Georgetown University basketball fans are a heterogeneous group with little socially defined commonality, aside from shared sports fandom. This fandom does not denote any commonality of belief or demographic unity in a socially relevant category (e.g. race, religion, age, socioeconomic status, culture, etc.). For these reasons, Georgetown fans are not considered

7 Hoyas refers to the Georgetown University Hoyas.
a socially defined group. Additionally, as a vocative expression with no propositional content, there is no element of incitement to any emotion or action against the target. However, though there is no explicit threat of violence, a fan might feel a fear of violence due to the strength of the indirect harm invoked by “fuck” as previously mentioned by Goddard (2015). This may be especially true in the context of a heated sports rivalry, or in a culture where sports-related violence is prevalent. Ultimately, the utterance does not meet the definition of hate speech, though it shares some characteristics with hate speech. This might account for why a minority of participants, 16.9%, believed that the language was hate speech, although the majority, 67.6%, agreed that it was not.

Having passed a brief test, and with the support of dictionary definitions, academic research, and public perceptions, this research reiterates the definition of hate speech previously presented. Hate speech is a problematic expressive speech act which conveys derogatory sentiment towards a person or persons based on the perceived possession of a socially defined group characteristic and which is made to the detriment of the target and is addressed to the ingroup with the intention of inciting animus and/or violence or is addressed to the target with the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm. The next undertaking of this study is to use this definition to identify examples of hate speech that both were and were not accompanied by violence and compare them for linguistic characteristics which distinguish the two sets. This process will be the focus of Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 A Corpus Analysis of Hunter and Howler Hate Speech

Chapter 2 defined hate speech as a problematic expressive speech act\(^8\) which conveys derogatory sentiment towards a person or persons based on the perceived possession of a socially defined group characteristic and which is made to the detriment of the target and is addressed either to an ingroup with the intention of inciting animus and/or violence or is addressed to the target with the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm. This chapter employs that definition to address the questions: 1. What, if any, linguistic characteristics or language patterns in hate speech are correlated with increased risk of violent behavior? 2. Are previous scholarly findings about language features that correlate with enhanced risk of violence in threatening communication and/or existing law enforcement threat assessment protocols which focus on language borne out in a linguistic analysis of hate speech?

To answer these questions, this chapter takes a bottom-up and top-down approach. The analysis begins by considering the overall composition of the hate speech from a quantitative perspective – using a corpus analysis to determine what features characterize each corpus and significantly differentiate hate speech that was and was not accompanied by violence. It then takes a top-down approach, examining language forms and functions that correlate with an enhanced risk of violence in previous work on threatening communication and incitement to genocide, and considering if those findings hold in the current corpora.

The key distinction which this work makes regarding the authors of hate speech is between those who act out hate-fueled violence and those who simply engage in hateful rhetoric.

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\(^8\) Expressive speech acts are acts which express a psychological state about the speaker or the world, like praising or criticizing (Searle and Vanderveken 1985).
Threat assessment professionals Calhoun and Weston (2009) call the violent bad actors Hunters; in contrast, those who engage in hate speech but do not act violently would be characterized by Calhoun and Weston (2009) as Howlers.

Based on the findings of previous threat assessment research and the ways in which scholars have conceptualized the distinction between Hunters and Howlers in the past, the current study hypothesizes that Hunters’ hate speech will be characterized by: language which justifies violence, especially using prediction modals (Gales 2010; Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); a focus on the hated target group(s) as victimizers of the author or the author’s ingroup (Turner and Gelles 2003; Calhoun and Weston 2009; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); expressions of inevitability or a lack of alternatives to violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); and strong negative evaluation and contempt for the target outgroup(s) (Calhoun and Weston 2009; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).

The findings will reveal the hypotheses to be borne out in part; in addition, some other features also emerged from the bottom-up portion of the analysis as distinguishing the speech of Hunters and Howlers. The findings reveal that Hunters’ hate speech is characterized by greater use of first person singular pronouns, particularly in the nominative case (i.e. “I”) and expressions of personal emotion or desire using these first person singular nominative constructions (e.g. “I hated the feeling of being trapped and lost“ or “I hope a nigger rapes her to death and kills her”). Howlers’ first person singular nominative constructions focus on the act of communication using verbs like “explain” or “tell.” Analysis also found that there is a
significant preference for Howlers to use verbs of violence and anger to portray the author or his\textsuperscript{9} ingroup as victims at the hands of the target group, who are the agents of the violence or anger, contrary to what would be expected based on the previous studies and protocols. Hunters were found to show a significant preference for modals which express with certainty a prediction for a future in which the target group will be subjugated or eliminated, which supports the idea that expressions of inevitability are correlated with a greater risk of violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). Prediction modals in the Hunters’ writing also served to emphasize the justification for violence by painting a picture of future harm which would be visited on the writer or an ingroup, consistent with the expectations regarding prediction modals (Gales 2010) and justification of violence in previous threat assessment findings (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). At the same time, though, Howlers focused even more than the Hunters on feelings of victimization at the hands of the hated outgroup. Similarly, an analysis of the descriptors used to modify the author’s ingroup and outgroup support Gales’ (2010) findings that realized threats often had both negative self and other evaluation.

This chapter begins by providing a discussion of the distinctions between Hunters and Howlers according to the paradigm of Calhoun and Weston (2009; 2012). Section 3.2 presents different ways law enforcement, threat management professionals, and scholars have assessed these groups in the past. Though this section touches on a variety of threat assessment protocols, it focuses particularly on how linguistic analysis has been used for risk assessment in the

\textsuperscript{9} As will be discussed later, the availability of data necessitated that all of the Hunter and Howler texts under examination here were written by male authors. FBI statistics suggest that the majority of perpetrators of this kind of hate-motivated mass violence are male (“Active Shooter Incidents in the United States from 2000-2017”).
consideration of threatening communication. Sections 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5 overview the theoretical foundations that ground this analysis. Section 3.3 reviews methods that are used to analyze language corpora. 3.4 introduces the analytical approach of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), which considers language as expressing contextually-bound social meaning, in contrast to theories that view language merely as a system of grammatical rules (Halliday and Hasan 1985). Section 3.5 briefly addresses the complicated theorization and operationalization of stance, the ways in which language encodes an author’s/speaker’s feelings, attitudes, and judgments regarding conversational participants, conversational content, and the world (Biber, et al. 1999). Stance is overviewed at greater length in Section 4.1.2. These theoretical foundations were selected based on their productive use in previous linguistic threat assessment research. Section 3.6 describes the creation and composition of the corpora under analysis here. There are two corpora considered by this analysis, both made up of language which meets the definition of hate speech asserted in the previous chapter. The first corpus, the Hunter corpus, is hate speech from authors who went on to commit violent crimes against the targets of their hatred. The second, the Howler corpus, is made up of hate speech that was not accompanied by any violence. The next section, 3.7, presents the analysis and focuses on five features particularly: 3.7.1 first person singular personal pronouns, 3.7.2 modals, 3.7.3 verbs of violence/anger, 3.7.4 slurs/epithets, and 3.7.5 evaluative words and phrases which modify animate nouns. Several of these features (first person singular personal pronouns, verbs of violence/anger) were identified in the bottom-up corpus analysis as being indicative of the Hunter corpus and were investigated further on that basis. Slurs/epithets were the subject of closer analysis because of their prominence in the survey data and prior academic definitions of hate speech (reviewed in Chapter 2). Modals and
evaluative words and phrases were examined based on the top-down consideration of features which were previously correlated with increased risk of violence in threats. Section 3.8 revisits the research questions and prior threat assessment research in light of the findings from the corpus analysis.

3.1 Hunters vs. Howlers: Those Who Act and Those Who Don’t

One way of analyzing the difference between those who commit hate-fueled violence and those who do not is using Calhoun and Weston’s conceptualization of the Hunter versus Howler dichotomy (2009). Calhoun is a researcher and threat assessment professional who helped the U.S. Marshals Service develop their protocol for assessing threats against federal judges. Weston is a lawyer and former president of the Northern California chapter of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals. He managed the threat assessment unit for the California Highway Patrol for fifteen years. Calhoun and Weston propose analyzing problematic individuals on a spectrum from Hunters to Howlers, as defined by the individual’s observable behavior. An analysis of the problematic individual’s language can serve to complement analysis of other behaviors. On one end of the spectrum, Hunters are those who “truly intend to use lethal violence” (Calhoun and Weston 2009, 7); on the other end are Howlers, who “like to threaten and frighten with words...but they never follow through with any action” (2009, 7). In between these poles are a range of other problematic behaviors – harassment, vandalism, stalking, abuse, and so on.

In this model, both Hunters and Howlers hold grievances for which they attempt to find a release and redress. The actual content of the grievance may be big or small, global or personal, and may not have any clear basis in reality for anyone other than the individual. The grievance is
highly intimate in that it is very important to the Hunter or Howler and he or she often views it as having a direct or particular impact on him or her. For the assessment of threat, the actual nature of the perceived injustice is far less important than the individual’s emotional investment in it (Calhoun and Weston 2009).

What differentiates Hunters and Howlers is how they go about addressing the perceived grievance. Hunters see violence as the only means of redress, and so proceed with deliberate acts of violence. On the other hand, though Howlers’ messages may include graphic, disturbing threats of violence, the ultimate goal of the Howler is to express “anger, hatred, desire to kill or maim, or emotional frustration with the target or the world” (Calhoun and Weston 2009, 74). Their purpose is to achieve psychological harm through the fear, disgust, and anger they instill in their target. Howlers derive a sense of pleasure and power from seeing or imagining the reaction of their victim(s) to their messages.

Within the categories of Hunter and Howler, there are distinguishable sub-classifications based on motive and behavior. Calhoun and Weston (2012) suggest that these distinctions exist within both Hunters and Howlers, but that because the specific classification of a Hunter may emerge only after the act of violence, the distinctions are less productive for Hunters from a proactive threat assessment perspective. However, the category of Howler may emerge earlier in the pattern of behavior, and may provide important clues for the threat assessor regarding how to best deal with the situation. The taxonomy of Howlers that Calhoun and Weston (2012) suggest is depicted in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1 Taxonomy of Howlers from Calhoun and Weston (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal: the Howler knows his/her target personally</th>
<th>Binder</th>
<th>Sinister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Maintainer – uses inappropriate communication in an attempt to continue a relationship that the target is attempting to end</td>
<td>seeks a personal (often intimate) relationship with his/her target</td>
<td>• Controller – uses inappropriate communication as a means of control, often to a partner or family member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Seeker – seeks to establish an intimate relationship with the target, even in the face of refusal</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Intimidator – threatens to intimidate someone who is typically part of their social circle (coworker, classmate, etc.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impersonal: the Howler does not know his/her target</th>
<th>Binder</th>
<th>Sinister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Deluded – communicates inappropriately as a result of a delusional relationship or potential relationship with the target</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Self-Defender – feels they are defending themselves from a target or organization which attacked them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Celebrity-Seeking – communicates inappropriately with target because of his/her public status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Habitual – communicates inappropriately as a hobby</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Crusader – communicates inappropriately to advance a personal cause</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Copycat – is inspired by other acts or threats of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Delusional – is suffering a mental delusion which is compelling their inappropriate actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As was mentioned, these same categories do hold for Hunters, but they are less productive distinctions. For example, James Kopp, who murdered Dr. Barnett Slepian in Amherst, NY in 1998 because the doctor performed abortions, would be considered a crusader Hunter; Mark Chapman, who assassinated John Lennon in 1980, is a celebrity-seeking Hunter; Jack McKnight, who in 1993 shot five people in a U.S. District Court where he was due to be sentenced on firearm and drug charges, is a self-defender Hunter; Dennis Rader, the so-called “BTK” serial killer active from 1974 to 1991 is a habitual Hunter (Calhoun and Weston 2012). Once an individual has been assessed to be a Hunter, categorizing the Hunter is far less important than neutralizing the threat, so these distinctions are often only made after the fact.
A legitimate criticism of the Hunter/Howler dichotomy is that, as the authors acknowledge, the distinction is “somewhat tautologous” (Calhoun and Weston 2009, 134). Hunters “hunt” (i.e. engage in deliberate violence to address a perceived injustice or detrimental situation), while Howlers “howl” (i.e. communicate to address a perceived wrong, but do not take any action beyond communication). If a Howler suddenly acts on his/her threats, then s/he becomes a Hunter; similarly, if a Hunter begins to act like a Howler, with no attempt to act, he/she ceases to be a Hunter. Despite this criticism, the Hunter/Howler paradigm remains useful because in addition to being founded on years of threat assessment experience and scholarly expertise, it categorizes problematic individuals based on observable behavior, including behaviors regarding communication.

Calhoun and Weston’s (2009) work notes several language features that can be used to differentiate Hunters from Howlers, in particular the individual’s expression of his/her grievance. They describe increased risk associated with an “intense, unbending, emotionally exaggerated and fixated” focus on the perceived grievance (2009, 48). From a language standpoint, this may manifest in strong expressions of negative affect, evaluation, or emotion. Though Calhoun and Weston do not analyze Hunters’ and Howlers’ language from a standpoint of linguistic theory, many of these features correlate with stance markers, which will be explained further in Section 3.5. Emotional exaggeration and intensity can take the form of intensified negative evaluation through strong evaluative adjectives and modifiers; unbending fixation may manifest in strong expressed commitment to presented propositional content.

Calhoun and Weston (2009) also suggest that Hunters and Howlers often associate their grievances with a larger issue or campaign, claiming grandiosity. This behavior can be seen, for
example, in anti-Semitic hate speech which claims that ‘Jewish agents’ control the governments of powerful western nations in a conspiracy known as the Zionist Occupational Government (abbreviated as ZOG). Hunters often see violence as their only means of redress to these perceived grandiose grievances. On the other hand, the Howler achieves his/her goal through instilling fear and expressing anger or frustration, without actually acting on these emotions. Calhoun and Weston (2009) note that Howlers tend to express themselves more straightforwardly and explicitly, frequently making direct, detailed threats and describing graphic violence. Because the Howler’s emotional release is achieved through imagining the fear of the target, elaborate or disturbing language makes the communication more chilling and causes more potential for the target’s fear and distress.

Based on this, it is hypothesized that Howlers would use more direct and graphic descriptions of violence, as well as more culturally taboo language (e.g. slurs, epithets, expletives) to disturb and offend. In contrast, Hunters may use language that while not as aggressive or disturbing on the surface, demonstrates a more intense and emotional negative evaluation of the target of their hatred. Based on Calhoun and Weston’s (2009) assertions, Hunters’ language may also be characterized by expressions of inevitability or a loss of nonviolent options for redress.

Table 3.2 illustrates some of the aspects of the Hunter/Howler assessment model that will be most relevant for this analysis and some ways in which those attributes may manifest in language. Other threat assessment strategies that can be used to analyze language and supplement Calhoun and Weston (2009) will be further explored in the next section.
Table 3.2 Summary of Hunter and Howler features and language correlates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hunter</th>
<th>Example of manifestations in language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Views violence as only means of addressing grievance</td>
<td>Expressions of strong commitment, certainty, and inevitability (e.g. certainty adverbs and epistemic modals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intense and emotionally exaggerated focus on grievance</td>
<td>Strong negative evaluative adjectives and modifiers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Howler</th>
<th>Example of manifestations in language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gains emotional release through imagining fear of victims</td>
<td>Graphic descriptions of violence Culturally taboo language (e.g. slurs, expletives) intended to frighten and offend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straightforward expressions of anger</td>
<td>Direct threats of violence Clear communication of anger and grievances</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2 Threat Assessment Literature Review

This section begins by overviewing literature concerned with the assessment of threatening communication. Threats are categorized as commissives, speech acts which declare an intention or commit to an action (Searle 1969). As was discussed in Chapter 2, threats may be made even when the threatener has no intention to carry them out, in which case they may be insincere, but would nevertheless be commissive speech acts. Indirect threats, where language is frequently vague and the threatened action may be opaque and left to the interpretation of the recipient (Gales 2010), can similarly be either sincere or insincere. These indirect threats introduce analytic complexity, but may still be categorized as indirect commissive speech acts where the performative act of the language is implied rather than directly stated (Searle 1969). Hate speech, though it may discuss, encourage, or allude to a specific act against a hated target group, does not necessarily declare any intention to commit a specific act, though it may. In this way, hate speech is distinctly different from threats but, as the survey and literature review in Chapter 2 established, the two are related problematic speech acts. Because of this connection, it is fruitful to explore established models of analysis and assessment for threats to evaluate any features which might be indicative of violence across both types of speech.
Many threat assessment protocols currently in use, largely developed by law enforcement professionals and criminologists, consider a constellation of factors when determining an individual's potential for violence. For example, the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment model considers risk factors such as psychopathy, prior criminal behavior, a history of violence, childhood abuse, drug or alcohol abuse, and poverty (Monahan, et al. 2001). The U.S. Secret Service's model of threat assessment considers risk as contextually dependent and dynamic, focusing on “pathways of ideas and behaviors that may lead to violent action” (Borum, et al. 1999, 327). The emphasis on contextual dependency and behavioral indicators means that the two models function best in an environment rich in details about the potential perpetrator, potential victim(s), circumstances, etc. While these models certainly have value, their contextual dependence make them of limited usefulness when anonymous or decontextualized language data are the primary or sole source of data for an analysis.

In the threat assessment literature, there is a tradition of psychologists, criminologists and law enforcement professionals taking up the question of linguistic threat assessment. Some of this work purports to take a psycholinguistic perspective. However, the kind of ‘psycholinguistics’ that is referred to stands in contrast to the branch of linguistics of the same name. To differentiate the two, the psycholinguistic perspective often taken by threat assessment literature will here be called law enforcement (LE) psycholinguistics. When academic linguists use the term psycholinguistics, it refers to the exploration of the cognitive processing of language. That study is akin to the combination of neurobiology, cognitive science, and linguistics. On the other hand, LE psycholinguistic studies are more akin to a combination of psychology and linguistics. LE psycholinguists consider language as a symbolic expression of a
speaker’s or author's underlying psychological state (Knoll and Meloy 2014). They, therefore, use analysis of language to evaluate psychological states (Gottschalk 1995; Gottschalk and Bechtel 2001) and personality characteristics (Hermann 2003; Knoll and Meloy 2014), with the goal of identifying certain psychological disorders and profiles associated with violence. LE psycholinguistic analysis has been used to develop threat assessment computer programs like Gottschalk and Bechtel's (2001) Psychiatric Content Analysis and Diagnosis (PCAD), Young's Profiler Plus (Young 2001), and the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker, et al. 2007). Because this research attempts to avoid psychological analysis, for which as a linguist not a psychologist the researcher is unqualified, LE psycholinguistic threat assessment models will be of limited use in this analysis.

Of greater applicability is a threat assessment model developed by psychologists at the private threat assessment organization International Assessment Services, Inc. because, although it was established by psychologists, it does not focus on psychiatric diagnosis; instead it presents five principles of analysis for the assessment of threatening communications (Turner and Gelles 2003). Also useful for the present work, this model does not rely on contextual factors external to language because it was developed to be suitable for the review of anonymous communications. Below are the five principles established by Turner and Gelles (2003):

- **Degree of organization** – A high degree of logical argumentation, specification, and a continuous linear theme are associated with increased risk.
- **Fixation** – A preoccupation with blame allocation to a specific individual or organization is associated with increased risk.
- **Focus** – Expressions of feelings of persecution and the identification of a specific target as responsible are associated with increased risk.
- **Action Imperative** – Articulation of a specific plan of action, expression of pressure to act or loss of other options, and indicators of rehearsal are all associated with increased risk.
- **Time Imperative** – Specified time frame or an expression of a time sensitive pressure to act are associated with increased risk.
In this model, each factor is assessed independently as high, medium, or low, considering potential for causing both emotional distress and physical harm. These rankings then create a baseline against which future communications can be compared; deviations from the baseline may indicate an increased risk.

Another similar model for the analysis of anonymous threatening communications is presented by two law enforcement practitioners from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) (Simons and Turkel 2014). This model considers seven factors: mode of delivery, victimology, linguistic staging (intentionally manipulating language to redirect the investigation or disguise motivation e.g. explicitly claiming to be a terrorist organization to conceal being a lone author), motive, veracity, resolution to commit violence, and imminence. Not all factors will be applicable in every case. The most relevant to this work is resolution to commit violence, which is further expanded by the authors.

Commitment to violence considers another seven factors, similar to the five identified by Turner and Gelles (2003): justification, commitment of energy and efforts, demonstrated or perceived ability, lack of resiliency (i.e. an incapability to deal with adverse emotional situations), contempt for the victim(s), acceptance of consequences, and inevitability (Simons and Turkel 2014). These are explained in greater depth below with examples of each taken from BAU cases.

*Justification* is the rationalization of violence as necessary or warranted (e.g. “Your actions cannot be tolerated. It is a disgrace. For this reason, I am going to kill you. This is because you tried to assert authority over me and my family. You have committed a wrongful act and you will pay for it.” [Simons and Turkel 2014, 207]). In this example, the violence is
presented as a justified response to the victim’s “wrongful act.” *Commitment of energy and effort* may be illustrated by descriptions of recent surveillance, vandalism, or other descriptions that suggest time, money, or energy is being expended on the preparation and planning of threatened acts; these descriptions, however, might not correlate with actual behavior and so these indicators are strongest when investigators can corroborate them by evidence of planning and preparation beyond the language, though that is obviously outside the scope of this analysis.

*Ability to commit the threatened acts* can be seen in language through a demonstrated accurate knowledge of weapons, explosives, or the victim’s personal habits that may suggest access and ability to act on threatened violence. A *lack of resiliency* can be manifested by language which expresses hopelessness, overwhelmedness, or fatigue, such as expressing “I can’t do this anymore.” *Contempt for victim(s)* may be seen in an articulation of superiority and hostility towards the target (e.g. “Watching you on television makes me want to vomit; as far as I am concerned you are subspecies and not even worth the cost of the bullet I will use to end your wretched life” [Simons and Turkel 2014, 208]). *Acceptance of consequences* may be exhibited in articulations of resignation or acceptance (e.g. “I don’t care if the cops come to my house and shoot me or I’m executed in the chair, I will get my revenge” [2014, 208]) or in language which evidences suicidal ideation (e.g. “my days are nearing an end” [2014, 208]). Finally, *inevitability* can be seen in language which indicates that the author feels no other options besides violence, such as “When the Court rejected my last appeal, you left me with no alternative but to take matters into my own hands” (2014, 208).

Though not developed for threat assessment in the law enforcement sense, another analytical framework for assessing potential violence results from legal scholar Benesch’s work.
on what she terms “dangerous speech” (Benesch 2011) in incitement to genocide rhetoric. Her work is grounded in extensive research regarding the language that surrounded genocides in Kenya and Rwanda and this focus on rich, if tragic, real-world data gives her valuable insight. Benesch defines “dangerous speech” as “incitement that is likely to succeed in catalyzing violence” (2011, 389). Her focus is on incitement to genocide, so she is more interested in language which inspires violence in others than that which is correlated with violence committed by the speaker/author. This provides an important corollary to the threat assessment work previously discussed because those models focused on writing where the audience was the potential victim. As was established in Chapter 2, hate speech may be directed at the hated target group, but it is also often directed to an ingroup. The speech either attempts to incite the ingroup to violence or expresses hatred or violent intentions towards a third party. This kind of language, which communicates a threat directed at a third party rather than a direct addressee, has been called a “pledge to harm” (Harmon 2008) and has recently been considered in the language of mass shooters who indicate their violent intentions through pre-attack fantasies of violence (Hurt and Grant 2019). Hurt and Grant’s work suggests that this kind of language which expresses a desire to harm or see harm done to a third party is used by both those with their own violent intentions (i.e. mass shooters) and to those trying to instigate the violence of others (i.e. inciters).

Benesch’s (2011) framework for dangerous speech consists of five risk factors which correlate with language that is effective at inspiring acts of genocide. These factors relate to characteristics of the speaker/author, the audience, the socio-historical context, the content of the speech, and the mode of dissemination (Benesch 2011). Many of these factors, such as an existing culture of ideological silos or the source of the author’s power, exist outside the
language and must be derived by analysts from a knowledge of the cultural, social, and historical context of the speech. They are, therefore, of minimal use in an analysis that endeavors to focus solely on language. However, in more recent work Benesch and her colleague Leader Maynard (2016) expand this analysis to ten features, four related to the context of the language, and six to the content. The Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016) model is described in Table 3.3 below.

**Table 3.3 Model of dangerous speech from Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context features</th>
<th>Increased risk if...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>• the author’s power derives from political or religious authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the author has strong influence derived from significant social status or high charisma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audience&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>• the audience is seriously afraid of being harmed by the target group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the audience believes in a threat to their continued existence as a group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the audience is mostly young men, who research shows are more likely to commit violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-historical Context</td>
<td>• there are longstanding inter-group grievances or a history of violence between the speaker’s group and the target group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• there is a weak or dysfunctional institutional justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• there is (real or perceived) competition for resources, historical or current, between the speaker’s group and the target group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method of Dissemination</td>
<td>• the distribution source is credible and/or ubiquitous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• there is an existing culture of ideological silos or ‘echo chambers’ of self-reinforcing ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• a mother-tongue or common dialect reinforces a sense of solidarity with the speaker</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content features</th>
<th>Increased risk if...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dehumanization</td>
<td>• the speaker denies the humanity of the target group to “erode affective moral concern” for them (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016, 80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the target is presented as biologically, mechanically, or supernaturally inhuman (e.g. referred to as animals, inanimate, demons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the language of purification is invoked (e.g. target compared with toxins, cancer, insects)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guilt Attribution</td>
<td>• attribution of past crimes to the target group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• conflations of individual crimes as group guilt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• framing of violence as just punishment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>10</sup> As was addressed in Chapter 2, this work has shown that hate speech often has two audiences – the author’s ingroup and the outgroup – but because Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016) are concerned with rhetoric that incites an ingroup to genocidal action against an outgroup, their work considers only the ingroup as the audience.
For an analysis that focuses on language of potentially unknown authorship or without extensive context regarding the author, the content-related features described above will be the most useful. Of particular interest is the idea of “accusation in a mirror,” (2016, 82) which Leader Maynard and Benesch describe as rhetoric which accuses the target group of harboring the kind of hateful, violent intentions against the ingroup which the author/speaker is inciting against them (e.g. “Jews are natural born liars and murderers, and they hate whites worse than any other group”). This is a very common strategy in white supremacist discourse, where it is often claimed that ‘white genocide’ is being perpetrated by minorities against white Americans. Guilt attribution, conflating the crimes of an individual to the guilt of a group, and the presentation of violence as inevitable and without alternatives will also be important for this analysis, particularly in the next chapter.

Of all the threat assessment research surveyed here, the most foundational for this current project is Gales' research on stance in threatening communication (2010; 2011). As will be addressed more thoroughly in Section 3.5 and at even greater length in Chapter 4, stance is a complicated concept with competing analytical approaches. Broadly, it is a way of encoding an
author’s or speaker’s feelings, attitudes, evaluations, commitments, and judgments about conversational content, interlocutors, and the world (Biber, et al. 1999).

To investigate stance in threatening communication, Gales (2010) examined a corpus of 470 threatening communications that were collected from The Academy Group Inc., a private threat assessment company; these communications represent authentic, real-world threats, as opposed to language from an experimental or academic setting. These threats were divided according to whether they were realized (i.e. cases where the threatener followed through with action that resulted in tangible harm to the victim(s)), and non-realized (i.e. cases where through arrest or admission, the threatener was revealed to have had neither the intention nor means to carry out the threat). Gales found two major interpersonal functions that stance serves – strengthening and weakening – both of which were present in realized and non-realized threats. In other words, even in realized threats, while stance may serve in places to strengthen the apparent commitment to the threat, elsewhere in the communication(s), it may seem to weaken the perceived severity of the threat. Practically speaking, this means that both realized and unrealized threats showed both strengthening features such as a strong commitment to violence and dominance over the victim(s), and apparent weakening features such as polite, face-saving language, compassion, and passivity. Gales (2010) notes linguistic forms which served a number of strengthening and weakening functions in realized threats. The examples provided are from Gales’ corpus of authentic threats. Examples of forms which served weakening functions are prediction modals like “would,” which were used to emphasize the justification of the threat (e.g. “We had hoped that it would not be necessary to hold Martinez for a long period, but we may have been wrong [2010, 186]); certainty adverbials like “never,” used to emphasize the
threatener’s belief in the justification for the threat, thereby deflecting the threatener’s responsibility for the violence (e.g. “I’ve got a little list, of society offenders who might well be underground who would never be missed” [2010, 188]); prediction modals such as “will” or “be going to,” used to add conditionality to the threat (e.g. “Any delays will result in his automatic execution” [2010, 185]); and causation verbs such as “try to,” used in conditional directives with the threatened action (e.g. “He better not try to smile; lest his face might crack” [2010, 195]).

Causation verbs are one of Biber’s (2006) five semantic categories of verbs which control infinitive complement clauses: probability verbs (e.g. appear, seem), cognition (e.g. assume, know), intention or desire (e.g. love, want), causation (e.g. encourage, require), and speech act or communicative verbs (e.g. claim, promise) (Biber 2006). Causation verbs indicate that a person or entity brings about a change of affairs. Gales also notes the stance-strengthening function in realized threats of speech act verbs such as “tell, say, state,” to strengthen a demand or emphasize a request (e.g. “As I was telling you, I ask for total discretion”) (Gales 2010, 133).

Speech act verbs are verbs which explicitly describe the action that they are performing (Biber, et al. 1999). For example, in the sentence “I recommend that you call a lawyer,” “recommend” is a speech act verb which names the act which it simultaneously accomplishes. These verbs will also be referred to as “verbal” verbs when using Halliday’s (1994) taxonomy of verb types which will be explained in Section 3.4.

As an example, Gales (2010) analyzes Eric Rudolph’s so-called “Army of God” letters. Rudolph, also known as the Olympic Park Bomber, was convicted of several bombings between 1996 and 1998, motivated by his anti-abortion and anti-gay ideology. In 1997, Rudolph sent a series of letters to media outlets written under the moniker “Army of God.” In one of these
letters, Rudolph specified the details of an attack in direct, unequivocal language, which Gales analyzes as a strengthening strategy, “20 people will die...the first explosion will occur, six will die.” However, as Gales explains, Rudolph also makes frequent use of the modal “may,” which is an epistemic stance marker weakening commitment to the proposed action (e.g. “those who participate in anyway [sic] in the murder of children may be targeted,” “innocent people may become the primary casualties” (emphasis added)). Gales (2010) suggests that this mix of strengthening and weakening stances may be related to the range of functions which an author intends a threat to serve – instilling fear, negotiating an interpersonal relationship, provoking a desired action, or justifying an author's act of violence.

In addition to analyzing stance markers which both intensify and mitigate commitment, Gales (2010) uses a combination of discourse analytic and corpus-based methods to reveal that the affective evaluation of the threatener and victim(s) may be more complicated than the clear positive/negative asymmetrical relationship typically found in in/out group relationships. Close textual analysis revealed negative self-evaluation as well as negative other-evaluation in the corpus of threatening communications. For example, in the Army of God threat, Gales (2010) analyzes Rudolph's stance as indicative of an author empty of affect, rather than one gripped by rage and negative emotion. She suggests that his flat affect allows him to distance himself from his victims; remaining emotionally unattached may make it easier to carry out the violence he intends. She invokes the work of Schbley (2006), who suggests that many religious terrorists do not necessarily see their own actions as proper or pure given their own backgrounds and religious beliefs. Religious terrorists may feel internal conflict from their belief in religious teachings which suggest that violence is wrong and the calling they feel to carry out violence.
Therefore, as a religiously motivated domestic terrorist, it is perhaps unsurprising that Rudolph negatively evaluates himself in addition to his victims, but this nuance was previously uncaptured in the traditional us/them-positive/negative evaluative binaries assumed to be associated with violence in threats.

Considering all these works concerning assessment of threatening communication and incitement to genocide, a number of attributes of high-risk language are highlighted by multiple authors. Those which seem to have gained consensus will be focused on most prominently in the following analysis. They are: justification of violence, also described as a fixation with assigning blame or guilt to the victim(s) (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); a focus on grievances or feelings of persecution perpetrated by the victim (Turner and Gelles 2003; Calhoun and Weston 2009; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); inevitability or lack of alternatives to violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); contempt, dehumanization, and strong negative evaluation of the victim(s) (Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016; Gales 2010). In addition, analysis will also focus on several specific grammatical forms and their associated functions that Gales (2010) notes were salient in realized threats: prediction modals like “would” that emphasize the justification of the threat; speech act verbs, verbs that declare the action that they are performing (Biber, et al. 1999) such as “tell,” “say,” and “state,” that strengthen claims or demands related to the threat; and prediction modals such as “will” or “be going to” that add conditionality to the threat. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 will explore these threat assessment features in light of the hate speech data.
3.3 Corpus Analytic Methods

This research uses a corpus analytic methodological approach to analyze two corpora of hate speech, one in which the authors acted out their hate through violence and the other in which there was no accompanying violence. A corpus is a systematic collection of digitized texts which is traditionally large and representative of a particular variety or genre of language (Baker 2010). The corpus is analyzed to extrapolate frequencies and patterns of language use to a wider population of language users (McEnery, et al. 2006). The collection of hate speech data which this project analyzes is neither particularly large nor perfectly representative. It may, therefore, more accurately be called a specialized corpus, or what McEnery (2006) terms a “problem oriented corpus,” a corpus designed to explore a single problem rather than developed for broad representativeness or wide usage.

Though corpus linguistics primarily takes a distributional approach, meaning it focuses on the frequencies of individual linguistic elements or the frequencies of co-occurrences of elements (Gries 2010), it provides a suite of analytical methods, rather than a single approach, with different methods and measures for exploring different kinds of questions (Teubert 2005). Corpus linguistics has been used to describe the characteristics of different registers such as conversation, academic prose, and newspaper writing (Biber, et al. 1999) and to analyze academic writing across numerous dimensions (Biber 1988; Halliday 1988; Atkinson 1992, among many others). Six measures are frequently considered in corpus analyses (frequency, type-token ratio, concordances, collocates, keywords, dispersion), each of which is appropriate for considering different aspects of a text (Baker 2010).

Frequency is the number of times a feature of interest occurs in a text or corpus; Gries calls this the “observed absolute frequency” (2010, 6). The feature of interest can be a particular
word, a specific realization, a grammatical structure, a multi-word unit, etc. Just as in variationist sociolinguistics, it is not the raw count that is usually of interest, but a normalized measure which allows comparison across corpora. This normalized value may be represented as the number of realizations out of the total number of words or the “observed relative frequency” (Gries 2010; 7); the often-used measure is occurrences per thousand or million words depending on the overall size of the corpus. For example, when conducting a vocabulary analysis of materials used to teach English as a foreign or second language, Biber (2006) considered the frequency of each lemma, the base form of a word discarding inflectional morphemes, normalized by occurrence per one million words to account for the size difference between the different subcorpora analyzed. In his analysis, he reported the relative frequency of the lemma WORK\textsuperscript{11} as 1095 times out of a total of 1,665,000 words, or 657.15 times per million words (2006, 35).

This measurement is similar to the second descriptive measure – type-token ratio, a measure of lexical repetition where the types, the number of different words, many of which may appear numerous times, is divided by the tokens, the total number of words in a text (Baker 2010). The type-token ratio is the traditional measure of lexical richness because it provides the analyst with a measure of the size of the vocabulary represented within the text. This can then be compared across texts, genres, authors, genders, etc. However, type-token ratio should be used with caution because it can be skewed by text length; generally, as text length increases type-token ratio decreases (McCarthy and Jarvis 2007).

The third and fourth common descriptive features considered with corpus analyses are concordances, lists of all of the occurrences of a feature of interest within a text or corpus

\textsuperscript{11} In this work, lemmas will be indicated by the use of all capital letters (e.g. WORK)
presented along with their context (Baker 2010), and collocations, which demonstrate the relationship between two words or linguistic features by providing a measure of the frequency with which they co-occur (Gries 2010). Certain words may collocate together, but the exact nature of their relationship or function (whether part of an idiom, compound noun, discourse marker, etc.) often is only revealed by a review of the context in which the words occur, presented in a concordance list. Concordances allow the researcher to enrich the quantitative results with her or his own theoretical knowledge and interpretative skill. Though analyzing a concordance list can be a time-consuming process, it is through this process that patterns emerge and a researcher can better understand the quantitative findings. For example, Biber, Conrad, and Cortes (2004) reviewed concordances of specific collocations and found that in many instances the same lexical bundle varied in function depending on the context. For example, “at the end of” could serve as a time reference or a place reference (Biber, et al. 2004).

The fifth feature is keyness, often discussed as keywords. These are not necessarily the most frequently occurring words within a corpus, as those are generally articles and function words, but they are words that appear with greater frequency than might be expected as compared to a reference corpus. Keyness is a way of presenting a feature’s relative difference in frequency between two corpora and can be used to identify keywords, key parts of speech, or key concepts (Scott 2008). The relative frequency of a feature in two texts or corpora is compared via an appropriate test for statistical significance, such as a chi-square or log-likelihood test, to identify whether it is significantly more frequent in one corpus, indicating that it may be a keyword, phrase, or concept. A very simple illustration is given by considering the frequency of the word “song” in the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) sub-corpora for
Academic Music texts and Academic Medicine texts (Davies 2008). One would obviously expect “song” to appear more frequently in texts about music, as it does (95.6 tokens per million words in the Music corpus compared to 3.6 tokens per million words in the Medicine corpus).

But is that more frequent use significant; in other words, is “song” a keyword of the Music corpus? When comparing texts of a similar genre and register, keyness can be a clue to the semantic focus of the text or corpus or, in comparisons done across genres, it may indicate genre features (Baker 2010). Keyness is often expressed in a log likelihood ratio (LL), a statistical test which expresses the goodness of fit of two statistical models, in this case one being that the feature of interest appears in the two corpora at roughly the same frequency, the other being that it is in one corpus more frequently. The log likelihood ratio indicates how many times more likely the data are under one model than the other; LL values over 3.84 indicate a significant difference at a probability of 0.05 (with 1 degree of freedom). In other words, a LL of 3.84 or higher suggests that the observed difference between two measures is highly unlikely to be due to random chance (Rayson, et al. 2004). Returning to the example of “song,” a keyness analysis reveals a LL of 158.76, much greater than 3.84, suggesting that the lexical item does appear significantly more frequently in the Music corpus as compared to the Medicine corpus. Because the Music corpus is the target corpus in this example and the Medicine corpus is treated as the reference corpus, this shows that “song” is a keyword of the Music corpus.

The final feature often used in corpus analysis is dispersion, the degree to which occurrences of a feature are evenly spread out across a corpus or are unevenly distributed (Gries in press), which is used in conjunction with frequency counts to get a picture of the consistency of a feature across a corpus (Baker 2010). When considering a corpus of different authors, it is
important to know if a frequent feature or keyword is the result of idiosyncratic use by a single
author or is dispersed fairly evenly across the texts. By way of illustration, Gries (in press)
provides the examples of the words “enormous” and “staining” in the Brown corpus of 1960s
written American English. Both lexical items occur thirty-seven times, but “enormous” occurs
once in thirty-five separate texts in the corpus and twice in one more, meaning it has a much
more even dispersion than “staining” which occurs thirty-seven times in only one text (Gries in
press).

In addition to these common analytical measures, several methods of corpus annotation
were used in this analysis of hate speech. The corpora were tagged for part-of-speech (POS),
which is the most common form of corpus annotation. A POS tagger is software that reviews and
automatically assigns each word in a corpus to a specific part of speech, such as noun, adjective,
etc. (Toutanova, et al. 2003). The available tags are pre-populated from a list already built into
the tagger. The corpus annotation software used in this project is Wmatrix, which was developed
by Paul Rayson at Lancaster University as a tool to combine corpus annotation and analysis
(Rayson 2008). Though it was originally developed to facilitate semantic analysis, it has since
been updated to include robust functionality to tag a corpus for part of speech as well as semantic
category and to generate analytic measures like frequency lists and concordances.

For POS tagging, Wmatrix uses the Constituent Likelihood Automatic Word-tagging
System (CLAWS). The CLAWS system was originally developed in the early 1980s and has
been continuously updated since then. Using the most current tagset (C7) made up of over 160
tags, CLAWS consistently achieves a 96-97% accuracy, though accuracy does vary according to
the genre of the text being tagged and the amount of non-standard language used (Rayson n.d.).
After the corpora were run through the automatic tagger, several random paragraphs were spot-checked by hand to ensure the general accuracy of the tagger. This check revealed an accuracy rate of 94.7%, which, although slightly lower than CLAWS’s general accuracy, was judged by the researcher to be high enough to make manual recoding unnecessary. Example 3.1 is an illustration of the tagging system. For example, tag CS indicates a subordinating conjunction, AT1 marks a singular article and NN1 is a singular common noun.

Example 3.1

“Until a majority of will and determination arises to reclaim our ancestral lands for ourselves alone, we can expect even more innocent White men, women, and children to die needlessly in the crossfire.”

Until_CS a_AT1 majority_NN1 of_IO will_NN1 and_CC determination_NN1 arises_VVZ to_TO reclaim_VVI our_AAPQE ancestral_JJ lands_NN2 for_IF ourselves_PPX2 alone_RR, we_PPIS2 can_VM expect_VVI even_RR more_RGR innocent_JJ White_JJ men_NN2, women_NN2, and_CC children_NN2 to_TO die_VVI needlessly_RR in_II the_AT crossfire_NN1.

In addition to POS tagging, the corpora were also annotated for semantic category using Wmatrix’s automatic semantic tagging system, which categorizes according to the UCREL Semantic Analysis System (USAS). Just as POS tagging groups words according to their grammatical parts of speech, semantic tagging groups words according to similar mental concepts, including synonyms, antonyms, hypernyms, and hyponyms (Archer, et al. 2002). The USAS semantic tagset was developed in the 1990s by scholars at Lancaster University based on the Longman Lexicon of Contemporary English (McArthur 1981), though the tagset has since been refined as the developers have continued to use it (Archer, et al. 2002). The current USAS lexicon contains nearly 37,000 words and an additional more than 16,000 multi-word units. It

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12 UCREL is the University Center for Computer Corpus Research on Language at Lancaster University.
groups each word or multi-word unit into 21 major topic fields (e.g. general and abstract terms, the body and the individual, arts and crafts, emotion, food and farming, government and public) that are then further subdivided into more fine-grained categories. Tags are made up of an upper-case letter to indicate the general topic (e.g. E indicates emotional actions, states, and processes) and a digit indicating the first subdivision of that field (e.g. E3 is the tag for calm/violent/angry and E4 is the tag for happy/sad). If there is a further subdivision within that finer subtopic, it is indicated by a decimal point and another digit (e.g. Q1 is communication, Q1.1 is communication in general, Q1.2 is paper documents and writing, Q1.3 is telecommunications), though not all subdivisions have further divisions. Another optional distinction within some categories is a (+) or (–) to indicate the positive or negative aspects of the category. For example, E4.1 is the tag for terms depicting levels of happiness and prototypical examples would be “amused (+)” and “dejected (–)”. Finally, tags can also include an optional slash and a second tag to indicate clear double membership. “Accountant” would be tagged I2.1/S2 to indicate membership in both general business (tag I2.1) and words relating to or denoting people (tag S2) (Archer, et al. 2002). An example of semantically tagged text is presented in Example 3.2 below.

In this example, tag Z5 is for function words, called “grammatical bin” because they signal grammatical relationships within the text, tag N5 is “quantities,” X7 is “wanting, planning, and choosing.” Some words have more than one tag if the tagger has assigned it more than one meaning. For example, “innocent” is tagged with G2.1+ (law & order), X9.1- (ability, intelligence), and G2.2+ (general ethics).

Example 3.2

“Until a majority of will and determination arises to reclaim our ancestral lands for ourselves alone, we can expect even more innocent White men, women, and children to die needlessly in the crossfire.”
Until a majority of will and determination arises a majority of will and determination A2.2 A7+ arises A1.1.1 M1 to reclaim our ancestral lands for ourselves alone we can expect even more innocent White men, women, and children to die needlessly in the crossfire.

Just as with the POS tagger, several paragraphs were spot-checked for accuracy. As will be explained in Section 3.7, the results from the semantic tagger were also supplemented by manual coding prior to analysis.

3.4 Systemic Functional Linguistics

Following the model of Gales’ work on threatening communications, one key theoretical foundation this research utilizes is that of Systemic Functional Linguistic (SFL), a linguistic approach which considers language as a “social semiotic” resource “concerned particularly with the relationship between language and social structure” (Halliday and Hasan 1985, 4). In other words, SFL views language as expressing contextually bound social meaning, in contrast to theories that view language merely as a system of grammatical rules. Halliday (1994) describes SFL’s model of reality as made up of processes which encompass different types of internal and external experiences. These process types can, Halliday (1994) argues, also be applied to language. Halliday’s process types, as hand-coded by the researcher, will provide a framework to supplement the automatic POS and semantic tagging to analyze what internal and external realities the hate speech authors are expressing, particularly for the discussion of the first person singular nominative personal pronoun clauses in Section 3.7.1.

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13 Where manual coding is noted, this coding was performed only by the researcher. Time and resource constraints precluded coding by a second analyst which could then have been compared to demonstrate inter-rater reliability. This is an acknowledged shortcoming of this work, but it is the researcher’s belief that despite this omission, the findings described here still represent a valuable first foray into the important topic of threat assessment and hate speech. To facilitate future replication, more extensive examples of data and codes than what are available in the body of this project are included in Appendix B for reference.
Halliday (1994) describes six different categories of processes, all of which can be realized as verbs. Halliday conceives of this taxonomy as a circle, like a color wheel. Figure 3.1 provides a visualization. The ‘primary colors’ on the wheel are relational, material, and mental processes. The ‘secondary colors,’ verbal, behavioral, and existential, sit between the ‘primary colors’ and represent the remaining three of Halliday’s six categories. Behavioral processes lie at the intersection of material and mental; verbal processes share characteristics of mental and relational; existential processes are a mix of relational and material. Verbs are categorized based on their function, not form, so the same verb may be categorized differently depending upon how it is used.

In addition to these six types, three of the categories (material, relational, and mental) have sub-types that provide more fine-grained distinctions. Halliday (1994) provides extensive examples of each category and subcategory and should be referenced for more information than can be provided here due to space constraints.

Figure 3.1 Verb process types. (Image reproduced from Halliday 1994)
Material processes are actions of the external world which Halliday (1994) further divides into processes of happening, creating/changing, and doing. In his example, “the lion chased the tourist lazily through the bush,” one could probe the experiences further by asking either what did the lion do, emphasizing the process of doing, or what happened to the tourist, emphasizing the process of happening. All of Halliday’s process types were manually categorized by the researcher. The six types were further coded for subtype (e.g. happening, creating, doing). More comprehensive examples of coding including subtype will be included in Appendix B. Example 3.3 shows data that were coded as material processes. Emphasis was added to indicate which portion of the example is the “material” verb. All three examples were categorized as a “doing” subtype.

Example 3.3
a) I hurried back to the vacant lot I had used as a staging area… (HUNTER)

b) So I bought a domain name extension for 99 cents… (HOWLER)

c) I gonna [sic] kill everybody who voted for Trump (HUNTER)

The second process category Halliday (1994) describes is mental processes, which he defines as internal processes of consciousness or sensing – further broken down into perception (e.g. seeing, hearing), affection (e.g. wanting, liking), and cognition (e.g. thinking, understanding). Example 3.4 shows processes coded as mental in the data. Subtype is indicated in the parentheses following each example.

Example 3.4
a) I had sincerely hoped to achieve these objections [sic] without harming innocent civilians. (affection) (HUNTER)

b) This phenomenon is probably widespread across the United States, I don’t know, but I can only believe that it is… (cognition) (HOWLER)

c) I look at white and I look at black, and if there’s any threat to the white, kill the fucking black” (perception) (HUNTER)
The third process type that Halliday (1994) mentions is relational, or processes of being. These types of processes draw relationships between two things. This type can be further subdivided into what Halliday calls intensive (\(x \text{ is } a\), where \(a\) is an attribute of \(x\) or is the identity of \(x\)), circumstantial (\(x \text{ is at/in/on/for/with/etc. } a\)), or possessive (\(x \text{ has } a\)). Below (Example 3.5) are illustrations of these process types from the data:

Example 3.5  
a) *Since I am in politics, there is one phrase coined by our Founding Fathers that really strikes me* (circumstantial) (HOWLER)  
b) *don’t think that I am a dirty old man because all I am doing is telling the truth about the Jews and their rabbinical teachings* (intensive) (HOWLER)  
c) *We are offering five hundred dollars, that I have in my hand to any member of the community...who kills, maims, or seriously injures a member of the American Nazi Party.* (possessive) (HUNTER)

Halliday’s (1994) next process type is behavioral, which are those processes which deal with physiological or psychological actions and states such as physical gestures or bodily conditions. Halliday acknowledges the difficulties in differentiating behavioral and mental or material processes, suggesting that behavioral processes exist on a continuum between mental and material. In order to provide more clarity, Scheibman (2001) labels behavioral processes as corporeal and provides the examples “eat,” “drink,” “smoke,” “live,” “sleep.” Halliday (1994) also includes “smile,” “dream,” and “stare,” by way of illustration. Because the researcher found the emphasis on processes of the body to be a more useful distinction, the label corporeal was favored over behavioral. Example 3.6 are data which were coded as corporeal:

Example 3.6  
a) *I thought it was so I could die as cannon fodder in Viet Nam, but I somehow cheated the devil out of that plan.* (HUNTER)  
b) *I laugh and I smile.* (HUNTER)
The next category are verbal processes, processes of saying, or in a broader sense communicating meaning through symbolic exchange. Because the hate speech data considered here are written texts, in contrast to Halliday’s (1994) and Scheibman’s (2001) mostly spoken data, written and computer-mediated expressive processes (e.g. write, post) were an important inclusion in this type. This category constitutes obviously verbal processes such as “say” and “tell,” as well as “ask,” “praise,” “blame,” and “explain.” Illustrations are in Example 3.7 below.

Example 3.7
a) Now, if you cannot come to the conclusion of what you SHOULD be thinking after I said that I will tell you. (HUNTER)
b) What if I said there was this RACE problem... (HOWLER)
c) I don’t post frivolous posts that are not well thought out. (HUNTER)

The final category is existential, language that describes something which exists or happens. Halliday’s existential and material categories both refer to happening, with the distinction being that material verbs describe processes in which the subject is active, such as the lion chasing the tourist, whereas existential processes describe passive processes, such as residing in a neighborhood as in Example 3.8a below. Halliday (1994) notes that existential clauses typically include the verb “be,” however they can include other verbs which describe existence (e.g. occur, remain), time (e.g. follow, ensure), or place (e.g. sit, hang, lie, emerge). It is also important to note that verb process category is based on function, not form, so the same verb may be categorized differently depending upon how it is used, as is the case with “be” which is also common in relational clauses. Example 3.8 demonstrates some of the ways in which existential process verbs were used in the data.

Example 3.8
a) My neighborhood, in which I was born and raised – and where I still reside – was your average run-of-the-mill type neighborhood. (HOWLER)
b) After I was married for 7 years my ex-wife told me that she had square danced with a boy that was 1/8 Indian when she was in the fifth grade. (HUNTER)

Taking into consideration all of Halliday’s (1994) verb types, below (Example 3.9) is an illustration of the coding scheme, with the verb types associated with the first person singular subjects noted. The text is from the Hunter corpus.

Example 3.9

My Comrades, we are fighting, as I said [verbal] before, the most important cause the world has ever known. We have to utilize every emotion within ourselves to win this cause. We can laugh at our enemies, mock them. We can show the fire in our hearts and our eyes. I like [mental affection] to look at each and every one of you and see, look for that fire. I want [mental affection] to see it in each and every one of you.

In addition to categorizing types of processes, the approach of SFL can also be employed to analyze the relationships between participants and entities involved in a process. Matthiessen and Halliday (1997) note that the traditional model of such analysis considers transitivity, where a transitive process is one in which an Actor impacts a Goal and an intransitive process is one without this agentive component. Matthiessen and Halliday comment that this model works well for the processes which they designate material, but not as well for processes which they categorize as mental, verbal, and relational. They suggest an alternative, the ergative model, which focuses on causation. In this model, the participant most closely associated with the process is designated the Medium, “the medium through which the process is manifested” (Matthiessen and Halliday 1997, n.p.), generally equivalent to the Actor or Goal in a standard transitive analysis (Holopainen 2005). There can also be an Agent specified if the process was specifically caused by another participant. The authors provide the following contrasting examples:

The door opened – [Medium:] the door [Process:] opened
The wind opened the door – [Agent:] the wind [Process:] opened [Medium:] the door
Matthiessen and Halliday (1997) demonstrate that the same pattern, with some modifications, can be used to analyze processes that are not *material* processes of happening or doing. For example, they analyze the mental process “She liked the new musical” as [**Senser:**] she [**Process:**] liked [**Phenomenon:**] the new musical (1997, n.p.). They note that Sensers can experience senses regarding Phenomena, or Phenomena can bring about senses in a Senser. The precise configuration of these roles is dependent on the process type of the clause. Matthiessen and Halliday (1997) provide the following examples presented in Table 3.4.

*Table 3.4 Examples of participant roles and process types according to Matthiessen and Halliday (1997)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Type</th>
<th>Process Function</th>
<th>Structural Realization Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>material</td>
<td>doing/happening</td>
<td>[<strong>Agent:</strong>] The company [<strong>Process:</strong>] is giving [<strong>Goal:</strong>] a new teapot [<strong>Recipient:</strong>] to my aunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mental</td>
<td>sensing</td>
<td>[<strong>Senser:</strong>] My aunt [<strong>Process:</strong>] wants [<strong>Phenomenon:</strong>] a new teapot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>verbal</td>
<td>saying</td>
<td>[<strong>Sayer:</strong>] The company’s letter [<strong>Process:</strong>] says [<strong>Verbiage:</strong>] kind things [<strong>Receiver:</strong>] to my aunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>being/having</td>
<td>[<strong>Carrier:</strong>] The teapot [<strong>Process:</strong>] is [<strong>Attribute:</strong>] beautiful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the present study, Halliday’s (1994) process types were employed to analyze the verbs used with first person singular constructions in both corpora (Section 3.7.1). Matthiessen and Halliday’s ergative model of analyzing relationships between participants and entities was used to analyze the verbs of violence/anger in Section 3.7.3.

### 3.5 Stance

As a theory concerned with language as a social resource, one of the analytical concerns of Systemic Functional Linguistics is the ways in which the author/speaker relates to and evaluates interlocutors and propositions. Scholars use different terms to describe this concept – evaluation (Hunston and Thompson 2000), attitude (Halliday 1994), epistemic modality (Hyland 1998), appraisal (Martin 2000; White 2003), and stance (Biber and Finegan 1989; Hyland 1999; Gales 2010), but broadly all refer to an examination of “personal feelings, attitudes, value
judgments or assessments” (Biber, et al. 1999, 996). This research will use the term stance. Research regarding stance will be briefly overviewed here and will be reviewed at greater length in Chapter 4.

Stance is often divided into subtypes, though what those subtypes are varies across scholars. For example, when Ochs (1989) considers stance, she divides it into three facets: evaluation (assessment, value judgments, and attitudes), affect (emotions and personal feelings), and epistemicity (ways of knowing and commitment to what is being discussed). Martin and Rose (2007) use a three-part framework called appraisal analysis consisting of attitudes (which express emotions, judgments, and evaluations), amplification (which intensifies or weakens assertions), and source (which describes the origin of and commitment to propositional content, similar to Ochs’ (1989) epistemicity).

In Chapter 4, this work will make extensive use of the framework of epistemic discourse analysis, which considers how claims to knowledge are made in language (van Dijk 2013). An understanding of epistemic stance is crucial to that framework. For the purposes of the corpus analysis in this chapter, stance is overviewed primarily to provide context to the discussion of epistemic modals, which were considered largely for their ability to express epistemic stance. The idea of epistemic stance, which expresses commitment and ways of knowing, is a feature of both Ochs’ (1989) and Conrad and Biber’s (2000) frameworks for stance analysis. Though the conceptualization of epistemic stance in the two frameworks is similar, the focus of this brief section will be Conrad and Biber’s system, which was selected because the work is based on corpus analysis similar to that undertaken in this chapter. This will provide sufficient context for this chapter’s analysis and will preview a deeper discussion of epistemic stance in Chapter 4.
Conrad and Biber (2000) divide stance into epistemic, style, and attitudinal. Epistemic stance deals with an author’s or speaker’s commitment or certainty regarding a proposition and is encoded, amongst other ways, through modals, adverbials, and complement clauses (Conrad and Biber 2000; Gales 2010). Style stance describes the manner in which information is conveyed, typically indicated by adverbial words or phrases such as “frankly” or “to be honest” (Biber, et al. 1999). Attitudinal stance expresses the feelings, attitudes, or expectations of the speaker or author (Biber, et al. 1999). This tripartite framework is similar to, but does not exactly correspond with the facets Ochs (1989) or Martin and Rose (2007) describe. Examples of Conrad and Biber’s (2000) types of stances from the data are below in Example 3.9; stance markers are bolded.

Example 3.9
a) TODAY, WE DECLARE WAR AGAINST THE KLU KLUX KLAN AND ANY RACIST ORGANIZATION THAT ATTACK BLACK PEOPLE! Now is **most certainly** the time! (epistemic) (HOWLER)

b) You will **probably** be gassed for being such a faggot. (epistemic) (HUNTER)

c) But **unfortunately**, killing a Mexican is illegal in California, (attitudinal) (HOWLER)

d) I wish with a passion that niggers were treated terribly throughout history by Whites (attitudinal) (HUNTER)

e) We tell them **truthfully** that they have been lied to their entire lives by the academy and by the media. (style) (HOWLER)

Stance was not coded for quantitative analysis. Stance is reviewed here to contextualize the analysis of epistemic modals, which were considered largely for their ability to express epistemic stance. This project does consider stance, but primarily from a qualitative perspective in the discourse analysis described in Chapter 4.

3.6 Text Selection

The selection of texts to comprise the two corpora for the current study, which will be designated the Hunter and Howler (Calhoun and Weston 2009) corpora, presented challenges,
both anticipated and unanticipated. The Hunter corpus is made up of texts which were accompanied by attempted or perpetrated acts of violence against the targets of the authors’ hatred. The Howler group had no associated acts of violence. How precisely these two groups were defined for the purposes of text selection will be explained in this section.

The Hunter texts were identified by searching online and through news sources for hate-motivated crimes and then extracting all the language available in news reports, social media accounts, or the internet presence of the perpetrator. While data do include some of the more prominent examples of hate-motivated violence from the past few years, extensive research through court documents and news outlets attempted to identify a variety of both well-known and less notorious examples. Some individuals released a manifesto or ideological document associated with their crimes, which was collected. For others, Facebook activity, message board posts, or blog entries were available. Many of the texts under analysis came from white nationalist/supremacist message boards like Stormfront, National Vanguard, or Iron March, all of which are white supremacist and neo-Nazi hate outlets recognized by the Southern Poverty Law Center. In some instances, posters made no effort to hide their identity and included identifying information and links to personal blogs. In other cases, court documents and affidavits revealed the online handle of an individual, the username he or she uses on one or more online platforms, which was then used to identify posts written by the Hunter. In a few cases, the hate speech texts were reproduced in documents associated with relevant court cases. All data were publicly available to any internet user. Once a post on a particular message board thread or social media site was identified as hate speech, all the surrounding posts and thread responses written by the Hunter were collected, even if a subsequent response did not satisfy the definition of hate speech.
as postulated in Chapter 2. This is to replicate a circumstance where a potentially problematic individual has been noted by law enforcement and all of his or her social media posts are under review for potential indicators of violence. In this manner, data were not unduly restricted, but the majority of the data met the definition of hate speech as outlined in Chapter 2.

Due to the sensitive nature of the violent incidents and the ongoing nature of many related legal proceedings, accessibility of these Hunter texts was an anticipated difficulty. Some social media profiles were accessible by invitation only and some websites and message boards required membership to access. While the existence of some language evidence was alluded to in court documents or news reports about violent incidents, the evidence itself was not always available because it may have been removed by law enforcement or expunged by the social media platform. This left many potentially important linguistic usages unavailable, but was unavoidable given the sensitive nature of the data under examination here. This process of data scrubbing was especially applicable in the case of terrorist incidents which may have had a foreign nexus. Consequently, though violence related to anti-American hate and international terrorism (e.g. ISIS) is an undeniable concern and has certainly generated some hate speech, these actors are under-represented in these data. Perhaps the findings generated from the available data could be extended in further research conducted with the support of law enforcement or intelligence agencies with access to a wider range of data.

Identifying Howler hate speech proved to be a more difficult and less anticipated challenge. Unless there had been some law enforcement investigation, it was impossible to know if an individual had acted upon his/her hateful speech with violence and if they did not, whether it was because of a genuine lack of intention, or whether the author may have had violent
intentions but was hindered by a factor such as lack of resources, timing, apprehension by authorities, and so forth. Some individuals admitted during an investigation or subsequent reporting that they never intended to act on the violence they described, while others were investigated for a potential risk of violence and were ultimately arrested for other crimes, (e.g. theft or forgery). In a few instances, individuals were convicted of violent charges (e.g. molestation or abuse), but these crimes were domestic or relationship violence, not directed at the target of their hatred. Other Howlers are prominent members of a bigoted community (e.g. anti-LGBT ‘activists’, white nationalist leaders) who are in the public eye and have been investigated leading to no charges. Most appropriately, these data should be considered as not having yet resulted in violence, since one cannot guarantee the authors’ future behavior.

However, for the feasibility of the project, the assumption was made that if a reasonable amount of time had elapsed without violence (i.e. one year or more) or an investigation has shown that the author did not have the means or intention to act, the authors were categorized as Howlers. While a lack of means is not equivalent to a lack of desire to act, it does suggest a low risk of violence (Olson 2005; Simons and Turkel 2014). The researcher acknowledges that this is not an infallible method to identify Howlers, but this was judged to be the best possible way to differentiate Hunters and Howlers based on limited available contextual data.

Data were excluded if access required subscription to or membership in a closed social network (e.g. private message board or Facebook group). Data were also excluded where the author had been rendered incapable of following through due to, for example, death or incarceration. As an exception, if the author was arrested or killed in the course of carrying out violence motivated by his hate speech, he was coded as a Hunter. Though this was not the initial
intention of the researcher, the texts were restricted to male authors; all of the Hunters identified were male, so the Howlers were also limited to male authors. This is not at all to suggest that women are not capable of vicious words or deeds but rather was a necessity to reduce the potentially confounding effects of gender on the final results. However, this is consistent with statistics collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) that indicate that the majority of perpetrators of mass violence are male. According to a 2018 report only nine of the 250 active shooters documented between 2000 and 2017 (3.6%) were female (“Active Shooter Incidents in the United States from 2000-2017”).

Data were collected from June through August 2017. As has already been stated, Hunter texts were identified by searching for individuals who are known to have committed acts of violence motivated by hate, either because they were killed in the commission of such acts or have been convicted of such violence, and then searching for language material posted online, available in court documents, or reprinted in their entirety in news sources. Special care was taken to ensure that the language was complete and unredacted. The Howler examples were identified in the same types of sources – social media, online forums, digitized newsletters, court documents, and media reports. As was previously discussed, these authors were considered Howlers because they had admitted that they had no violent intention or had been investigated and not charged or charged with crimes unrelated to their hate speech. Exceptionally long texts were excerpted to eliminate any undue statistical weight that a much longer text would have in relation to shorter texts and to ensure the two corpora remained close in size. Eighteen Hunter texts totaling 47,823 words and sixteen Howler texts totaling 68,329 words were identified for analysis. Table 4.3 at the end of this section provides a summary of the texts in the two corpora.
Though all the data were accessed online, not all of them originated there. Eight of the Hunter texts originated online on social media, message boards, or blogs; eight of the texts came either from material that was digitized as part of court documents or printed pamphlets and newsletters that were digitized; the origins, whether online or offline, of the remaining two texts were unclear. The Howler texts skewed slightly more towards online origin with ten being from online sources – social media, message boards, etc. – and five having been digitized from originally offline sources; the origin of one could not be certainly identified. If the data were in an online format, it was preserved as faithfully as possible, including partitions to note different posts and notation of embedded images or emojis. These versions of all the texts were preserved for qualitative analysis; however, to facilitate the corpus analysis, all the texts were converted to plain text files, excluding any formatting besides the simple text. To encourage the most accurate possible automatic POS and semantic tagging, non-standard spellings were corrected and the plain text files were edited for any spacing or punctuation idiosyncrasies that would confuse the taggers. All non-standard spellings were preserved in the versions of the corpora which were used for qualitative analysis, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

An effort was made to match the two corpora in terms of the group targeted in the hate speech, but due to the limited availability of data, the two corpora could not be perfectly matched. The texts were divided into four categories: racial hatred, gender hatred, political hatred, and religious hatred. Though some texts display more than one of these types, texts were categorized based on the primary target of the hateful sentiment. Racial categorized texts targeted both white Americans and African Americans, though the significant majority in both corpora targeted African Americans. The gender category for both corpora represent only texts
targeting women. No texts which met the criteria of hate speech and targeted men could be identified during text selection. Similarly, the religious texts all target members of the Jewish faith. Though some texts included secondary anti-Muslim and anti-Christian sentiment, anti-Semitism was overwhelmingly pervasive. Unfortunately, all three of the texts in the political category come from the Hunter corpus. Of those, two are directed against liberals and one against neo-Nazis. Though neo-Nazis are typically thought of as being the perpetrators of hate speech rather than the victims, as a discrete group who share ideological values, they are as eligible to be the victims of hate speech as any other ideological group. It also serves as an important reminder that, as much as is possible, researchers should consider their own potential biases when defining and researching hate speech. While the language reviewed arouses deep personal aversion in the researcher, every attempt was made to drive the research based on empirical facts and not the researcher’s beliefs or biases about what ideologies are repugnant or what groups deserve consideration. Overall, thirteen of the thirty-four texts are categorized as racial hate speech, five from the Hunter corpus and eight from the Howler; two texts are gender hate speech, one from each corpus; sixteen are religious hate speech, nine Hunter and seven Howler; the three political hate speech texts are all from the Hunter corpus, as has already been noted. The Hunter texts were written in the years 1996 to 2017 and the Howler corpus spans the years 1992 to 2017. The dates of three texts are unknown, two in the Howler corpus and one in the Hunter corpus. Table 3.5 summarizes the texts that make up the two corpora.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Types</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Hate Speech Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Jim David Adkisson</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter William Christopher Gibbs</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Dylann Roof</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>2331</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Types</td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Hate Speech Type</td>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Elliot Rodger</td>
<td>2540</td>
<td>14774</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter James von Brunn</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Sean Michael Gillespie</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Matt Hale</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>2608</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Fraizer Glenn Miller</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>1220</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Jeremy Christian</td>
<td>1634</td>
<td>4718</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Kori Ali Muhammad</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter David Lane</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>4050</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Brandon Russell</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Larry Wayne Shoemaker</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunter Irving David Rubin</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Kevin Harpham</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>2057</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Todd Vanbiber</td>
<td>1443</td>
<td>4752</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Randal Lee Krager</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter Eric Robert Rudolph</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>4436</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HUNTER TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>14276</td>
<td>47823</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Paul Driscoll</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Martin Lindsted</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>1641</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Eric Thomson</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Craig Cobb</td>
<td>1140</td>
<td>2637</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Mauricelem-Lei Mielere</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>4121</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Robert Witaker</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Jared Taylor</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>2541</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Morris Gullet</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>5428</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Kevin Alfred Strom</td>
<td>2467</td>
<td>8915</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Michael Oljaca</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>2705</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Alex Linder</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>7807</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler David Duke</td>
<td>1479</td>
<td>4918</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler James Gregory Delaney</td>
<td>3429</td>
<td>18132</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Malik Zulu Shabazz</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler Dean Saxton</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler William L. Pierce</td>
<td>2057</td>
<td>6711</td>
<td>Racial</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HOWLER TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>19351</td>
<td>68329</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.7 Corpus Analysis

After the two corpora were collected, converted to plain text files, and standardized for spelling and punctuation, they were annotated using the corpus analytic software Wmatrix. As noted above, Wmatrix is a robust corpus annotation and analysis software which includes functionality for automatic part of speech (POS) and semantic tagging, as well as the easy generation of frequency list, concordances, and keyness analysis. Both the corpora were tagged for POS and semantic category.

After the corpora were tagged, they were analyzed using the Wmatrix program. The first phase was bottom-up, beginning with a keyness analysis to identify statistically significant features that differentiated the two corpora. Those features were then individually explored with deeper analysis, including a top-down approach which considered risk-enhancing characteristics identified in previous work in light of the current data. In order to present meaningful comparisons between corpora of differing sizes, relative frequencies are used. Relative frequency is a normalized measure of how common a feature is in a corpus, derived by taking the number of tokens divided by the total words in the corpus. Depending upon the size of the corpus, this is frequently multiplied by one thousand, ten thousand, or one million to produce the number of instances of that word or feature out of every thousand or million words. Due to the relatively small size of the corpora analyzed here, all relative frequencies in this analysis are reported as X tokens out of every thousand words.

The analysis begins by overviewing the keywords and key concepts found within each corpus. This keyness analysis suggests that pronouns, particularly first person pronouns, are a significant feature of the Hunter corpus as compared to the Howler corpus. Section 3.7.1 explores this further, focusing specifically on first person nominative pronouns and the verbs
which appear in their predicates. Section 3.7.2 focuses on modals in the two corpora inspired by Gales’ (2010) findings that prediction modals, when used for functions such as emphasizing the justification for violence, served as important indicators of stance in realized threats. Section 7.3.3 focuses on verbs of violence and anger. Violence and anger was a key concept in the Hunter corpus, and further examination also leads to consideration of several features noted in previous threat assessment research – justification of violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016) and articulation of grievances or persecution (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016; Calhoun and Weston 2009).

After that analysis, Section 3.7.4 investigates the idea that Howlers may use more slurs or epithets in order to spark greater fear and outrage, because Howlers derive their desired emotional release from imagining the fear and distress of their victim(s) (Calhoun and Weston 2009). This would also be consistent with findings that profanity tends to be characteristic of unrealized threats over realized ones (Gales 2010; 2019). The final subsection of this analysis considers the words and phrases that are used to modify and evaluate nouns which represent the authors’ ingroups and outgroups. This considers the threat feature of contempt and dehumanization of the victim (Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016), but also the claim that realized threats may contain negative evaluation of both the self and other (Gales 2010).

Initial keyness analysis considered which key parts of speech (POS) differentiated the Hunter corpus from the Howler corpus. Table 3.6 below shows the top ten parts of speech that are used significantly more frequently in the Hunter corpus, as compared to the Howler corpus.
As a reminder, log likelihood (LL) values over 3.84 indicate that the feature occurs significantly more frequently in the target corpus at a probability of 0.05 with 1 degree of freedom; relative frequencies are reported per 1000 words. In this case, the log likelihoods all consider the proposition that the feature occurs more frequently in the Hunter corpus. In other words, these are statistically significant, key parts of speech that characterize the Hunter texts as compared to the Howlers.

Table 3.6 Key parts of speech

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part of Speech (CLAWS7 POS tag)</th>
<th>Example(s)</th>
<th>Hunter Corpus</th>
<th>Howler Corpus</th>
<th>Log Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Relative Frequency</td>
<td>Tokens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st person sing. subjective personal pronoun (PPIS1)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>1372</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st person sing. objective personal pronoun (PPIO1)</td>
<td>me</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past tense lexical verb (VVD)</td>
<td>saw, said, wanted</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAS (VBDZ)</td>
<td>was</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAD – Past participle (VHD)</td>
<td>had</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAVE – infinitive (VHI)</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infinitive (VVI)</td>
<td>(to) get, make, go</td>
<td>1643</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>1835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DID (VDD)</td>
<td>did</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporal noun, singular (NNT1)</td>
<td>time, day, year</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modal auxiliary (VM)</td>
<td>will, would, can</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This key POS analysis suggests that hate speech accompanied by violence is most strongly distinguished by the use of first person singular pronouns (POS tags PPIS1 and PPIO1). Nini (2017) notes that pronouns are an important form in threatening texts; he has found that threatening texts display a higher frequency of both first and second person pronouns and a lower frequency of third person pronouns compared to non-threatening texts. Pennebaker, et al.
(2003) also reports a number of analyses that have focused on pronouns, including examinations of individuals under stress (Weintrab 1989), linguistic differences across genders (Mulac and Lundell 1994; Pennebaker and King 1999), personality traits (Scherwitz and Canick 1988; Pennebaker and King 1999; Stirman and Pennebaker 2001), depression and suicidal ideation (Bucci and Freedman 1981; Stirman and Pennebaker 2001; Rude, et al. 2002), and deception (Knapp, et al. 1974; Newman, et al. 2002; Feldman Barrett, et al. 2002). These studies have indicated that higher use of first person pronouns may be correlated with high neuroticism (Pennebaker and King 1999), high self-involvement (Scherwitz and Canick 1988; Stirman and Pennebaker 2001), depression – especially high use of first person singular pronouns coupled with low use of second and third person pronouns (Bucci and Freedman 1981; Rude, et al. 2002), and suicidal ideation – particularly paired with low first person plural pronoun usage (Stirman and Pennebaker 2001). Contrarily, low first person pronoun usage has been tied to deception, where researchers suggest a liar may avoid ownership or disassociate him/herself from the communication (Knapp, et al. 1974; Newman, et al. 2002; Feldman Barrett, et al. 2002).

To contextualize the findings presented in Table 3.5, recent work which overviewed first person pronoun usage across a variety of written genres (autobiography, proposal, interview report, synthesis paper, argumentative essay) reported an average relative frequency of “I” as 16.4 per 1000 words, “me” as 3.6 per 1000 words (Wang 2018). Though some variation is to be expected due to the differences between these types of writing and hate speech, comparison does suggest that first person singular pronoun usage in the Hunter corpus could be characterized as elevated and potentially lowered in the Howler corpus. The Hunter corpus had normalized
frequency of 28.7 per 1000 words for “I” and 6.3 per 1000 words for “me”; the Howler corpus had frequencies of 4.9 and 0.9, respectively.

The importance of pronouns is further suggested by a keyness analysis which considers key concepts based on the automatic semantic tags, where pronouns are the most significant differentiator between the two corpora. Table 3.7 presents the top ten most significant key concepts from the Hunter corpus.

Table 3.7 Key concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semantic Category (USAS Tag)</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Hunter Corpus</th>
<th>Howler Corpus</th>
<th>Log Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Relative Frequency</td>
<td>Tokens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pronouns (Z8)</td>
<td>I, it, my</td>
<td>6099</td>
<td>127.5</td>
<td>6772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time: Period (T1.3)</td>
<td>day, year(s), night</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment of appearance: Positive (O4.2+)</td>
<td>beautiful, attracted, attractive</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving, coming and going (M1)</td>
<td>go, went, going</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent/Angry (E3-)</td>
<td>Retribution, force, attack</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad (E4.1-)</td>
<td>Suffering, miserable, suffer</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time: Future (T1.1.3)</td>
<td>will, going to, ‘ll</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People: Female (S2.1)</td>
<td>women, girl(s)</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The universe (W1)</td>
<td>World, planet, universe</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanting (X7+)</td>
<td>Want, wanted, plan</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To confirm that the keyness of pronouns as a semantic category is driven by the first person pronouns, Table 3.8 below shows the top five lexical items for each corpus that make up the Pronoun semantic tag (Z8).
This table suggests that there is not only a significant difference in the frequency of pronouns, as the key concept analysis would suggest, but also a tendency towards pronouns of different person (first versus third) in the two corpora. The top three pronouns in the Hunter corpus (I, it, my) are used significantly more often than in the Howler corpus (LL = 1112.83, 15.35, and 384.08 respectively), while the pronouns they and their in the Howler corpus also appear significantly more often (LL = 6.91 and 42.53 respectively).

However, this aggregate analysis masks the potentially confounding factor of distribution. For example, the word “retribution” is a significant keyword of the Hunter corpus (LL = 53.33). However, it appears in only one of the eighteen Hunter texts. It is therefore unhelpful as a predictive tool because it is more idiosyncratic of one author than characteristic of the group. This can be demonstrated with a dispersion plot, which is used to visualize the consistency or inconsistency of a feature across a corpus. In the dispersion plots below\(^\text{14}\), each box indicates a text in the corpus, and each line in the box indicates a token of the lexical item under consideration. Therefore, the lone box in Figure 3.2, which shows the dispersion of “retribution,” indicates that though the lexical item appeared 30 times, it was only in one text

\(^{14}\) Though corpus analysis was conducted using Wmatrix (Rayson 2008) as already described, these dispersion plots were made using AntConc (Anthony 2014).
across the corpus. In contrast, the many boxes in Figure 3.3, which represents the dispersion of “I,” indicates that it is well distributed across the Hunter corpus, though it is certainly the most frequent in File 5/Text 8, for which the bar is almost completely black. This is because Text 8 is written as a personal narrative, which will be elaborated on in the beginning of the next section.

Figure 3.2 Dispersion of “retribution” in the Hunter corpus
As Figure 3.3 shows, “I” is well distributed across the Hunter corpus. The feature is represented across sixteen of the eighteen Hunter files, meaning that the keyness of “I” in the Hunter corpus as compared to the Howler corpus is a reliable differentiator. The significance indicated by the keyness and the good dispersion of “I” make it a prime feature for deeper consideration in the next section.

### 3.7.1 First Person Singular Nominative Personal Pronouns

As was mentioned in the last section, pronouns were used significantly more often in the Hunter corpus (LL= 202.72), and the first person singular nominative personal pronoun (POS tag PPIS1) was the POS with the strongest keyness in the Hunter corpus (LL = 1097.90). As Figure 3.3 shows, it is a fairly well dispersed feature, but is particularly frequent in one of the Hunter texts. Elliot Rodger’s manifesto *My Twisted World: The Story of Elliot Rodger* (Text 8 in Figure

122
3.3) has very frequent “I” constructions because Rodger’s essay is written in the style of a personal narrative recounting the events of his life which led to his violent hatred of women and the death or injury of twenty people when he went on a killing spree in Isla Vista, California in 2014. A few sentences in Example 3.11 illustrate the heavy use of first person singular nominative constructions in this text.

Example 3.11
I opened it to see about seven police officers asking for me. As soon as I saw those cops, the biggest fear I had ever felt in my life overcame me. I had the striking and devastating fear that someone had somehow discovered what I was planning to do, and reported me for it.

However, analysis revealed that even excluding Rodger’s text, the difference between the relative frequencies for PPIS1 remains significant (LL=423.00). Though there were other texts in both corpora that included a personal narrative element, none were as extensive as Rodger’s. This does potentially suggest that the data may be slightly skewed according to style or genre. In an ideal world, research would consider a representative sample of texts balanced according to genre and style within and across both corpora. However, the limitations of the data, already mentioned and further discussed in the concluding chapter, precluded an ideal scenario. Within the limitations of the current work and with the hope that future work will be able to consider data that are more evenly balanced according to style, the next portion of the analysis excludes the text authored by Rodger to reduce any undue influence his idiosyncratic or stylistic linguistic uses might have on the statistical conclusions regarding singular first person pronoun clauses. To further explore these clauses, this research turns to Systemic Functional Linguists and the taxonomy of process types explained in Section 3.4.

Using Halliday’s taxonomy of process types (relational, verbal, mental, behavioral, material, and existential), the predicate of each token of first person singular nominative personal
pronouns in both corpora was hand-categorized according to the model of Scheibman (2001). Scheibman’s work employed a usage-based corpus approach to uncover patterns in American English conversations to explore the ways in which speakers refer to themselves and their subjective experiences of the world. Scheibman compared relationships between person, semantic verb type (according to Halliday’s model), and tense in order to discover the most common subject-verb type combinations.

In keeping with Scheibman’s (2001) methodology, the main verb of each clause with a first person singular nominative personal pronoun was categorized as belonging to one of Halliday’s (1994) six process types. Table 3.9 below shows the breakdown of the clauses in the two corpora.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hunter Corpus</th>
<th>Howler Corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>581</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.50%</td>
<td>34.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46.13%</td>
<td>36.34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.81%</td>
<td>7.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.23%</td>
<td>18.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>3.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, the largest difference between the two corpora is in the mental category; this was significant with a log likelihood of 156.79. To dig further into this difference, the mental
clauses were broken down into cognition, affection, and perception as in Halliday (1994). The categories further broken down are presented in Table 3.10.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb Process Type</th>
<th>Hunter Corpus</th>
<th>Howler Corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.50%</td>
<td>34.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental – Cognition</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.65%</td>
<td>18.87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental – Affection</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.73%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental – Perception</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.75%</td>
<td>6.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.81%</td>
<td>7.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.20%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.23%</td>
<td>18.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.13%</td>
<td>3.38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The patterns displayed in the charts above show that the corpora differ most strongly in the mental-affection and verbal verb categories. There is a statistically significant difference in both categories (LL=8.46 for mental-affection and 21.4 for verbal). Affection verb types are used more in the Hunter corpus, while verbal types are used more in the Howler. Illustrations of both verb types are below in Example 3.12.

Example 3.12
a) I respect you [sic] service to our constitution not to our Zionist infested ZOG government (mental – affection) (HUNTER)
b) I hate with a passion the whole idea of the suburbs. (mental – affection) (HUNTER)
c) I will explain it to you so that you don't have to listen to the lying rabbis (verbal) (HOWLER)
d) I told all you tards [sic] that Traitor Glenn Miller was a drunken ZOGbot (verbal) (HOWLER)
Beyond the frequency, analyzing the types of verbal clauses suggests that the verbal clauses in the Howler corpus tend to use words like “explain”, “warn”, and “describe”, which communicate information from a position of authority. This difference suggests that hate speech Howlers may take a position of leader or inciter, rather than as violent actors themselves. In addition, more of the verbal tokens in the Howler corpus have “you” as the direct object (see examples 3.13c and 3.13d below), focusing both on the communicative acts of giving and receiving information (e.g. “let me tell you”). Second person pronouns in these types of verbal processes have been noted in previous work as emphasizing the listener’s/reader’s role as an active addressee in the speech event and focusing their attention on what is being communicated (Chaemsaitthong 2015). Examples of these verbal tokens in the Howler corpus are below in Example 3.13.

Example 3.13
a) ...how in the world can they brave the rare perception that something as profound and awful as what I describe is actually happening when no one around them even says anything!

b) I explain why, beginning in the late 19th century, American Jews have found the explicit representation of sex, and four-letter words, so very useful.

c) I warned you ladies, studying Jews is a nasty business.

d) I tell you to buy a gun to protect yourself because the white race, Oreos, other non-blacks are killing you.

In summary, this section determined that the frequent use of singular first person pronouns, particularly in the nominative case, is a significant distinguisher of the Hunter corpus. Further review of the types of verbs paired with these singular first person pronoun subjects suggests that Hunters use more verbs which express emotion and desire, whereas Howlers use more singular first person clauses which Halliday (1994) labels the verbal type, which emphasize the communicative act.
3.7.2 Modals

Modal auxiliaries were highlighted by Gales (2010) for their important role in stancetaking and for their ability to both strengthen and weaken a threatener’s apparent commitment in realized threats. By virtue of this, they are the subject of this section’s investigation. Modal auxiliary verbs (e.g. can, could, may) and quasi-modals (e.g. have to, need to, going to) express a range of ideas: possibility, necessity, ability, obligation, permission, and hypotheticality (Collins 2009). There is robust scholarship surrounding the sometimes subtle differences between modal auxiliaries, quasi-modals, semi-modals, and lexico-modals; Collins’ (2009) book *Modals and Quasi-modals in English* is recommended for a thorough literature review on the array of perspectives. For the purposes of this work, these will all be discussed under the umbrella term of ‘modals’, which are taken to be words and phrases that present a “speaker’s judgment that a proposition is possibly or necessarily true or that the actualization of a situation is necessary or possible” (Depraetere and Reed 2006, 269). In accordance with this definition, modals can be divided into those of necessity and obligation (e.g. must, should, ought to, need to, have to, have got to, had better, be supposed to), possibility and permission (e.g. may, can, might, could, be able to), and prediction and volition (e.g. will, shall, would, be going to, want to, be about to) (Collins 2009; Biber, et al. 1999). Modals can also be divided according to deontic and epistemic meaning. Deontic modals refer to actions that are under the control of an animate subject, such as modals of permission, obligation, volition, and intention; epistemic modals, such as modals of possibility, necessity, and prediction, are those which refer to the logic of states or events (Biber, et al. 1999). The same form can express both epistemic and deontic meaning. For example, “must” in the sentence “you must have some cake” is a deontic meaning because it shows obligation in the control of animate “you.” However, “must” in the
sentence “you have a cake, so it must be your birthday,” serves an epistemic function, noting a logical necessity – the fact that it is your birthday is a logical deduction based on the presence of the cake.

The researcher reviewed all the modals identified by Wmatrix as belonging to the POS modal auxiliary (CLAWS7 tag VM) and manually coded them according to the type of modal. Each modal token was first categorized into the three broader categories necessity/obligation, possibility/permission, or prediction/volition and then noted as deontic or epistemic according to the meaning. A breakdown of the instances of these categories of modals across both corpora is in Table 3.11 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of modals</th>
<th>Hunter Tokens</th>
<th>Hunter Percent</th>
<th>Howler Tokens</th>
<th>Howler Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>possibility/permission</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>27.77%</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>38.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessity/obligation</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>17.53%</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>20.27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prediction/volition</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>54.70%</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>41.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>958</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.70%</strong></td>
<td><strong>1031</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both corpora, predictive/volitional modals were the most common, followed by possibility/permission modals and then necessity/obligation modals. This general pattern is consistent with what Gales (2010) found in threatening communications (2010), and follows the expected pattern across a variety of genres (Biber, et al. 1999). After the broader distinction was made, each of the three categories was further subdivided for epistemic/deontic meaning. Because this analysis is concerned with how modals express commitment, modals with epistemic meaning were the focus (i.e. modals of necessity, possibility, and prediction). The breakdown of the epistemic modals across the two corpora is presented in Table 3.12. The percent is the percent of each type out of the total number of epistemic modals.
### Table 3.12 Comparison of epistemic modals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hunter</th>
<th>Howler</th>
<th>Log Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Tokens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>possibility</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>35.20%</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>necessity</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>9.32%</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prediction</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>55.47%</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>622</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>693</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the table above, the Log Likelihood represents the Hunter corpus compared with the Howler corpus; a positive number of 3.84 or higher suggests that the modal type is used significantly more frequently in the Hunter corpus, while a number lower than -3.84 suggests the same for the Howler corpus. The table above shows that necessity modals are used significantly more frequently in the Howler corpus (LL=-5.30); prediction modals are likewise significantly more frequent in the Hunter corpus (LL=72.09). This final finding is consistent with Gales (2010), who found prediction modals to be an important feature of realized threats when used to emphasize the justification for the threat. The prediction modals in the Hunter corpus are primarily of two types – expressions of certainty regarding future harms and detriments that the author or an ingroup will suffer (examples 3.14a and 3.14b below), or depictions of a future in which an ingroup has achieved dominance and the outgroup is punished or eliminated (examples 3.14c and 3.14d below).

**Example 3.14**

a) *I was never going to* lose my virginity; *I was never going to experience love and sex* (HUNTER)

b) *Until the white race realizes that there is only one source from which we can ascertain lasting truths, there will never be peace or stability on this earth,* (HUNTER)

c) *Today, we may be scorned. But tomorrow – they will* love us. (HUNTER)

d) Degenerates *will hang from lamp posts.* (HUNTER)
Many of the prediction modals described above are modified with certainty adverbs, which serve to strengthen the commitment to a modal expression, as Gales (2010) also found in threatening communications, which strengthen the claims expressed. One of the useful properties of modals is that they can mark epistemic stance by expressing the speaker’s commitment to a proposition. This property is called the modal strength (Huddleston and Pullum 2002), and it was coded in each modal token in addition to the type of modal. Modal strength exists on a continuum. On the one end are modals which express a strong commitment; these assert a proposition and leave little room for alternatives (e.g. must). On the other end of the spectrum are weak modals, which express only mild commitment; these assert one of several alternative propositions or realities (e.g. might). In between are modals of medium strength (e.g. should); these commit more strongly than weak, but less unequivocally than strong modals. As might be intuitive, some types of modals tend toward a certain modal strength. For example, necessity modals express obligation or requirement, and therefore tend to make stronger claims about an assertion than epistemic possibility modals like “might” or “may,” which express only a theoretical reality. Consider the following examples from Collins (2009, 26).

a) He must be making an absolute killing.
b) He should be making an absolute killing.
c) He may be making an absolute killing.

The epistemic necessity modal “must” in sentence (a) conjures the image of a man who is certainly doing well. Sentence (b) creates the impression of someone who is likely doing well, but also introduces doubt. Sentence (c) suggests a lack of surety regarding the man’s situation. Modal strength is an important concept when analyzing the strength of commitment to the hateful propositions that the authors assert. Though Collins (2009) does not include the modal “would” in his examples, it is analogous to “should,” since both communicate a subjunctive
mood, which describes wishes or hypothetical situations. Other modals may also be used to communicate the subjunctive mood, for example “might” in the sentence “she might be in her room” suggests a hypothetical reality in which she is in her room. Ngula (2017), whose recent work considers Collins breakdown of modal strength, includes “would” as a medium strength modal in that it expresses a reality that is conditional or hypothetical and therefore indicates surety regarding the truth of the proposition in some but not all situations.

Modal strength is, however, not static. Context affects modal meaning, and modal assertions can be strengthened or weakened by the addition of qualifiers, modifiers, and pragmatic factors (Depraetere 2017). Modal strengthening is the process by which commitment to a modal proposition is enhanced through the addition of modifiers (e.g. adverbs) or contextual factors; weakening is the opposite process. For example, Huddleston and Pullum (2002, 176) provide the example of a boss saying “you may leave now” to a subordinate. This is an example of pragmatic strengthening whereby the modal “may,” the deontic interpretation of which expresses weak permission, is strengthened to a command. The pragmatic relationship between the two interlocutors changes the assertion to a dismissal, rather than an invitation to consider leaving as one of several options, as it might be between peers. Depraetere (2017) notes that the strengthening or weakening effect can also be achieved by the addition of lexical items. This is illustrated by the following example from the data: “[T]here is an excellent chance that you would give them the same rank order that an IQ test would.” The addition of “excellent chance” makes it clear that the possible outcome expressed by the moderate strength deontic modal “would” is more likely than not, giving it a more similar meaning to the strong modal “will.” In this way, the idea of modal strength is roughly analogous to Biber, et al.’s (1999) idea of degrees
of certainty. The more certainty that a linguistic form (e.g. adverb or modal) encodes regarding the likelihood that the proposition it communicates or modifies is true, the stronger it is considered to be. Forms which suggest a high degree of certainty (e.g. must, have to) are categorized as strong, forms which express only moderate certainty (e.g. would, should) are medium strength, and forms that suggest low certainty or doubt (e.g. may, might) are weak. It is important to remember in consideration of Biber, et al.’s cline of certainty that though certain modal forms may tend towards certain strengths, modal strength can also be modified based on the context and modifiers, as Huddleston and Pullum (2002) noted.

Each instance of a modal, based on the list of items tagged by the automatic Wmatrix tagger as being modal auxiliaries (CLAWS7 tag VM), was manually coded for modal strength according to Collins’s (2009) categorization of strong, moderate, and weak, keeping in mind epistemic and deontic meaning. This categorization considered the degree of certainty communicated and considered any modifiers which strengthened or weakened the modal proposition (as in examples 3.15b, 3.15c, and 3.15h below). Examples of modals from the data and how they were coded for strength is presented in Example 3.15 below. Emphasis has been added to highlight the modal and any strengthening or weakening modifiers.

Example 3.15
a) The environmental nuts have to be stopped (strong) (HUNTER)

b) [T]here is an excellent chance that you would give them the same rank order that an IQ test would. (strong) (HOWLER)

c) This will no doubt increase the hatred between the Mexicans and blacks. (strong) (HUNTER)

d) No Jew can be trusted to tell the truth. (medium) (HOWLER)

e) We shall build an army of holy warriors to strike terror into the hearts of harlots across the globe. (medium) (HOWLER)

f) Some are so anti racist that they may kill you for what we believe. (medium) (HUNTER)

g) That book is so dirty that you might catch a Jewish disease just by turning the pages. (weak) (HOWLER)
h) *We need a couple thousand pro White psychopaths then maybe we might start getting somewhere with this White Revolution.* (weak) (HUNTER)

Table 3.13 below displays frequency counts for the modals in the two corpora by strength with the tokens and percentages out of the total number of modals in that corpus. Both corpora favored medium strength modals, with just over half of all modals falling into this category. The Hunter corpus had more strong modals, 41% compared to 35% in the Howler corpus; the Howler corpus had slightly more weak modals, 8.8% compared to 6.6% in the Hunter corpus. The difference in frequency of strong modals across the two corpora is significant at a 95% confidence (LL=4.57). The differences in frequency of medium and weak modals across corpora were not significant.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modal Strength</th>
<th>Hunter</th>
<th>Howler</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>958</td>
<td>1031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41.02%</td>
<td>35.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.40%</td>
<td>56.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.58%</td>
<td>8.83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering how modals strengthened or weakened commitment in threatening communications, Gales (2010) found that realized threats, those in which the threatener attempted to or did carry out harm against the victim(s), were characterized by the presence of both modals which strengthened commitment, like the strong deontic prediction modal “will,” (e.g. “I will make you pay”) and weakened apparent commitment, such as the weaker epistemic possibility modal “may” (e.g. “the end may be near for you”) (Gales 2010). This is not entirely contradictory to the findings here, which showed a mix of strong, medium, and weak modals in
both types of hate speech. However, the significant presence of stronger modals in the Hunter corpus as compared to the Howler corpus may also indicate a stronger commitment to the expressed hate, which would support Simons and Turkel (2014), who suggest that demonstrations of commitment of energy and efforts towards threats are associated with increased risk of violence. This section also showed that prediction modals were used significantly more frequently in the Hunter corpus, consistent with the previous findings of Gales (2010), who found that prediction modals used to emphasize the justification of a threat were correlated with realized threats.

3.7.3 Verbs of Violence and Anger
With a log-likelihood of 43.43, words semantically categorized by the USAS automatic tagger as expressing violence or anger (semantic tag E3-) were used significantly more often in the Hunter corpus than the Howler corpus. These words were considered categorically as either expressing violence/anger or not; they were not graded for intensity. In addition to this significance, this feature was selected for further analysis because violence was repeatedly mentioned as an important factor of hate speech in both the survey responses and academic research regarding hate speech, both described in Chapter 2. The attribution and justification of violence are also factors identified in previous threat assessment paradigms (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). For greater insight, this research asks a few questions: Who is committing the violence or expressing the anger in the two corpora and is there a significant difference? Who is the violence or anger directed against in the two corpora and is there a difference? To answer these questions, this research again uses the framework of Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL), particularly its paradigm for analyzing the
relationships between participants and entities described in Section 3.4. SFL’s ergative model of agency was used to analyze the relationships between the perpetrators of violence and anger (Agents/Sensers according to Matthiessen and Halliday [1997]) and targets of the verbs of violence or anger (Recipient/Phenomenon in Matthiessen and Halliday’s framework).

Identification of these verbs began by cross-referencing the list of items tagged by Wmatrix’s POS tagger as verbs with the list of words tagged as belonging to the semantic category violent or angry (USAS tag E3-). This list was then supplemented through manual coding of the list of verbs, noting additional items which could be categorized as violent or angry. The resulting list was twenty-one lemmas for verbs of violence or anger: KILL, HATE, FUCK, DIE, FIGHT, DEFY, DESTROY, HIT, THREATEN, DETEST, ATTACK, DETONATE, BEAT, MURDER, ASSAULT, RAPE, SHOOT, STAB, KICK, PUNISH, LYNCH. Tokens were only included if they were a verb (e.g. examples of HATE used as a modifier like “hate group” or “hate crime” were excluded). Of that list, seven verbs – FUCK, DEFY, HIT, DETEST, DETONATE, STAB, LYNCH – were excluded because they appeared in only one text, or their relative frequency in either corpus was less than 0.1 out of 1000 words. This was done to eliminate usage that might be due to a single author’s idiosyncrasies or lexical items which were so infrequent as to be poor predictors. A table of the remaining fourteen verbs of violence or anger and their frequencies is presented in Table 3.14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lemma</th>
<th>Hunter Corpus</th>
<th>Howler Corpus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Relative Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KILL</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HATE</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.14 Verbs of violence and anger
In total, there were 332 tokens of the fourteen verbs of violence or anger in the Hunter corpus, and 367 in the Howler corpus, or a relative frequency of 6.94 and 5.37 respectively. This shows a statistically significant preference for violent language in the Hunter corpus (LL=11.40). This is contrary to Calhoun and Weston’s (2009) finding that Howlers tend to use more direct, violent language in search of the emotional release achieved from imagining the fear of the victim(s).

Each token of the fourteen verbs of violence or anger was manually coded for the ergative role, according to the model of Matthiessen and Halliday (1997), in other words who was the Agent of the violence or Senser of the anger and who was the Recipient/Phenomenon. For the purposes of this coding, an ingroup is defined as either a specific group to which the author belongs or a member of a shared demographic group with which the author self-identifies (e.g. “my comrades”); the outgroup is defined as the target of the author’s hatred or a group to which the author self-identifies as not belonging (e.g. “the Mexicans”). Though each role was initially coded separately, the categories were collapsed into four categories for analysis because

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Tokens</th>
<th>Relative Frequency</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Relative Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIE</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGHT</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROY</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATEN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTACK</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAT</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURDER</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSAULT</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAPE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHOOT</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KICK</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUNISH</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
of the consistent correlations. In the first category, the author or an ingroup is the Agent/Senser and/or the Recipient/Phenomenon is the group at which the hate speech is targeted. The second category is imperative or second person constructions where the reader is cast as the Agent or Senser. As was noted in Chapter 2, hate speech can either be addressed to the author’s ingroup, who are being incited to anger, hatred, or violence, or the outgroup against which the hatred or violence is addressed. In the instances in which the verbs of anger or violence were used with second person subjects, the “you” addressed was invariably an ingroup, as the examples below illustrate. These instances often served a function of encouraging or inciting an ingroup to violence, as in examples 3.16B1 and 3.16B3 below. In the third category, the Agent/Senser is the target outgroup and the Recipient/Phenomenon of the hatred or violence is the author or the author’s ingroup. Finally, instances where the verb of violence or anger was used metaphorically or where the parties of the described violence were neither the hated target group nor the authors’ ingroup were coded as ‘other.’ Examples of each category are in Example 3.16 below; emphasis has been added to highlight the verb of violence or anger.

Example 3.16
A. Agent/Senser = author/ingroup AND/OR Recipient = target outgroup
   1. “I wanted to kill every democrat in the U.S. Senate” (HUNTER)
   2. “My Comrades, we are fighting back” (HUNTER)
   3. “We want to train an army of holy warriors to go out and rape harlots around the world” (HOWLER)
   4. “Women must be punished for their crimes” (HUNTER)
B. Agent/Senser = reader
   1. “like and share if you are willing to kill as many DEA Agents as you can” (HUNTER)
   2. “your instincts says [sic] you should hate your enemies” (HUNTER)
   3. “if she tells anyone, you will kill her entire family” (HOWLER)
C. Agent/Senser = outgroup AND/OR Recipient = author/ingroup
   1. “niggers rape tens of thousands of White women” (HUNTER)
2. “they started **kicking me**” (HUNTER)
3. “the Mexicans **hate** your guts” (HOWLER)

**D. Other**
1. “God says that he **hates** Esau and loves Jacob” (HOWLER)
2. “which in turn leads to the **rape** of Nature and destruction of the environment” (HUNTER)
3. “Germany did have the right to **attack** Russia but shouldn’t have” (HUNTER)

There is a preference in the Hunter corpus for the author or author’s ingroup to be the Agent/Senser of the violence or anger and for the target group to be the Recipient/Phenomenon; roughly 40% of the tokens fell into this category; this is significant with a LL of 58.19. The Howler corpus showed a strong preference for the Agent/Senser of the violence to be the outgroup, or for the Recipient/Phenomenon of the violence to be the author or author’s ingroup; these accounted for approximately 64% of the tokens. This is also significant, with a LL of 49.12. The category with the violence attributed to an ingroup reader as the Agent/Senser is likewise significant though not as strongly, with a greater use in the Hunter corpus and a LL of 5.75. See Table 3.15 below for the percentages.

**Table 3.15 Ergative roles for verbs of violence and anger**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Hunter (total tokens 332)</th>
<th></th>
<th>Howler (total tokens 367)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent/Senser ingroup/author or outgroup Recipient</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>39.76%</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>16.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent/Senser reader</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6.93%</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent/Senser outgroup or ingroup Recipient</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>28.31%</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>64.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>15.26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The depiction of the outgroup’s anger and violence towards an ingroup can be seen as an expression of the persecution and grievance that Simons and Turkel (2014) and Turner and Gelles (2003) note increases the risk of violence in communicated threats. This feeling of persecution may serve as justification of the author’s own hatred or violence. Leader Maynard
and Benesch (2016) describe this as “accusation in a mirror,” accusing an outgroup of harboring the feelings of hatred and genocidal intention that the author in fact feels towards them. Given this prior research, one might expect to see this behavior more in the Hunter corpus, but the fact that it is more prevalent amongst the Howlers suggests that Howlers emphasize their victimhood, a potentially important departure from previous threat assessment models.

3.7.4 Slurs and Epithets

Slurs and epithets, defined as “derogatory terms...targeting individuals and groups of individuals on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender or sexual orientation” (Bianchi 2014, 35) were a prominent feature of hate speech noted by respondents of the hate speech survey and prior scholarly definitions of hate speech (Greene 1995) (see Chapter 2). It was hypothesized that Howlers’ desire to elicit fear and distress (Calhoun and Weston 2009) might cause them to use stronger and more shocking taboo language. To identify slurs, the researcher reviewed the list of words tagged by Wmatrix as nouns and noted fourteen slurs (FAG, NIGGER, SHIT SKIN, MUD, KIKE, NIG, NEGRO, MESTIZO, BEANER, FAGGOT, MONGREL, SPIC, QUEER, and GOYIM). An inspection of the individual texts indicated three more (CHIMP, WHIGGER, MONKEY-MAN). For convenience, the slurs were considered as lemmas; for the most part, this meant counting the singular and plural forms together. For MUD, the researcher decided to group together those slurs which had MUD as the core epithet (i.e. muds, mud hoards, mud races). Table 3.16 below shows the slurs and their token counts and relative frequencies (reported as tokens per 1000 words) across both corpora.
Table 3.16 Frequencies of slurs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Slur</th>
<th>Hunter Tokens</th>
<th>Howler Tokens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Relative Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nigger(s)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fag(s)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shit skin</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muds (races, hoards)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kike(s)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nig(s)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negro(s)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo(s)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>faggot(s)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongrel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spic(s)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goyim</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chimp</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whigger</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monkey-man</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When totaled, these slurs appeared 109 times in the Hunter corpus and 129 times in the Howler corpus, with relative frequencies of 2.28 and 1.89 respectively. Though there is a slightly greater use in the Hunter corpus, the difference is not statistically significant (LL = 2.08). This indicates that despite the fact that these words may elicit strong emotional responses and be characteristic of hate speech more generally, this kind of ugly, offensive language does not appear more often in the hate speech of either Hunters or Howlers.

3.7.5 Evaluative Modifiers

One of the features correlated with increased risk of violence that received a consensus in prior threat assessment literature is contempt for or the dehumanization of the victim (Turner and
Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). To explore this feature in the hate speech corpora, this analysis considers the ways in which Hunters and Howlers describe and modify the animate nouns they discuss.

Initially, the top nouns, those with a relative frequency of 0.5 per 1000 words or greater in either corpus, were noted from the list of singular and plural nouns as tagged by Wmatrix (CLAWS7 POS tags NN1 and NN2 respectively). To compare evenly across both corpora, the same nouns were analyzed even if they fell below the 0.5 threshold in one of the two corpora. Items were, however, excluded if they appeared in only one text in either corpus; this was done to eliminate the influence of features which are potentially idiosyncratic rather than generalizable. Nouns were then separated into those which referred to humans and those which did not. This process identified twenty nouns: americans, blacks, children, enemies, father, friends, girl, girls, jew, jews, man, men, Mexicans, nation (only when referring to people e.g. “his black nation”, not a place or political entity e.g. “the greatest nation on Earth”), nigger, people, police, race (again, only when referring to a group of people e.g. “the white race”, not an attribute of a person), whites, and women. Each token of the twenty nouns was noted.

The method identified 858 tokens from the Hunter corpus and 1686 in the Howler corpus. Each token was manually categorized as referring to a) an ingroup – either a specific group to which the author belongs (e.g. “my friends”) or a member of a shared demographic group with which the author self-identifies (e.g. “white children”); b) the outgroup – the target of the author’s hatred or a group to which the author self-identifies as not belonging (e.g. “our enemies”); c) a third party – someone who is not the target of hatred, and/or a group to which the
author indicates neither belonging nor distance (e.g. “unborn children”). The results are presented in Table 3.17.

Table 3.17 Referents coded for ingroup and outgroup

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hunter Upon (total tokens 858)</th>
<th>Howler Upon (total tokens 1686)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>26.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>47.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third party</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>25.99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is no significant difference between the number of ingroup and outgroup referents in the two corpora. This indicates that the frequency with which an author refers to the object of his hatred is not a predictor of future violent action towards that group. However, both corpora referred to the outgroup nearly twice as much as the ingroup, suggesting that fixation with the outgroup is characteristic of hate speech in general rather than correlated with increased threat of violence.

Each token identified as ingroup or outgroup was further manually coded for how it was described or evaluated. If a noun was modified by desirable adjectives or ascribed positive characteristics, it was coded as positive. Example 3.17 provides illustrations of positive descriptions.

Example 3.17
a) *The most beautiful of women* chose to mate with the *most brutal of men* (outgroup) (HUNTER)

b) *There is considerable overlap between more intelligent blacks and less intelligent whites* (outgroup) (HOWLER)

c) Any *White man with healthy instincts* feels disgust and revulsion when he sees a woman of his race with a man of another race (ingroup) (HUNTER)

d) ...bray down TAA as “hate” because it brings the *honest white man* the news he needs to protect his family. (ingroup) (HOWLER)
If the token was modified by undesirable adjectives, characterized in an undesirable way, or had undesirable behavior ascribed to it, the token was coded as negative. It is important to note that some of these undesirable characteristics are specific to the author’s evaluative system. Some attributes that might be seen as undesirable in other moral schemas (e.g. *we [are] a Fascist MEN [sic]*) were coded as positive if it was clear from the context that the author viewed those attributes positively and vice versa. The exception to this context-driven coding were instances where juxtaposition of positive and negative evaluators (e.g. “*one cop against hundreds of pious lying Jews*”) suggested that positive evaluators are being used sarcastically, or that the author is using positive evaluation to voice the perspective of the outgroup. In the model of Goffman (1981), these positive evaluators juxtaposed with negative may represent the distinction between the author’s role as principal and animator. Though the author is serving as the animator of the sentiment – that is, the person actually producing the utterance, the principal – the source of the belief or viewpoint – of the positive evaluator (in this case, *pious*) would be the outgroup, expressing how they see themselves. The principal of the negative evaluator (*lying*) would be the author, expressing how he sees the outgroup. The two different viewpoints are juxtaposed to highlight the drastic difference between them. Because this meaning is still exploiting juxtaposition of the positive evaluation, they were coded as positive, but noted for further analysis. Examples of negative evaluation are in Example 3.18 below.

**Example 3.18**

a) *their whole coalition of perverts, non-Whites, moral cripples, and other ‘equals,’‘* (outgroup) (HOWLER)

b) *Women are vicious, evil, barbaric animals* (outgroup) (HUNTER)

c) *Cowardice has been the White man’s prime survival strategy* (ingroup) (HUNTER)

d) *There is no camaraderie or trust among fellow Whites.* (ingroup) (HOWLER)
If a token was not explicitly evaluated in any way, the token was coded as neutral (see Example 3.19).

Example 3.19
a) *We must withdraw our black children from the white public schools.* (ingroup) (HOWLER)
b) *I reunited with my old friends Philip and Addison* (ingroup) (HUNTER)
c) *...buses were bringing in more and more Blacks from predominantly Black neighborhoods* (outgroup) (HOWLER)
d) *Moses wasn’t a Jew and most certainly Jesus was not a Jew.* (outgroup) (HOWLER)

The summary of all coded tokens is in Table 3.18.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hunter</th>
<th>Howler</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tokens</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup positive</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup negative</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ingroup total</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup positive</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outgroup negative</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>40.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outgroup total</strong></td>
<td><strong>407</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing across the rows of the table above, none of the individual combinations (e.g. ingroup+positive, outgroup+positive) were significantly different across the two corpora.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the chi-square test of significance indicates that the evaluative distribution within the corpus is significant for both corpora (Hunter p<0.0001 and Howler p<.00001). This significance is largely driven in both corpora by the negative outgroup evaluation. In other words, for both corpora the combination of outgroup and negative evaluation is significantly more likely than any other combination. This on its own is hardly surprising, but it is important to note that this is no more true for the Hunter corpus than the Howler, suggesting that evaluation of the Other is not a good predictor of violence.
3.8 Discussion

At the outset, this chapter asked what, if any, linguistic characteristics or language patterns in hate speech are correlated with increased risk of violent behavior. The corpus analysis identified a number of features that significantly differentiated the Hunters from the Howlers. Hunters’ hate speech showed significantly more first person singular pronouns, particularly in the nominative case (e.g. “I”). These nominative singular first person pronouns also differed in the ways they were used. The Hunters’ first person singular nominative clauses included more verbs of a mental–affective type, expressing more emotion and desire (Halliday 1994), like “hate” or “hope.” The Howler corpus had significantly more first person singular nominative verbal clauses that describe processes of communication (Halliday 1994) like “explain,” “describe,” or “tell.” A review of the concordances suggests that the Howlers’ verbal constructions tend to include second person pronouns in these verbal constructions, suggesting a focus on both the communicative acts of giving and receiving information. Overall, these patterns of first person nominative personal pronouns seem to suggest that Hunter texts focus more on their emotions and desires, whereas Howlers focus more on the act of communicating.

Considering the important stancetaking functions of modals, this analysis next focused on them. For both corpora, prediction modals were most common, followed by possibility and necessity modals, adhering to a common pattern across genres, including threatening communications (Biber, et al. 2009; Gales 2010). Considering the epistemic modal usages, possibility modals were used significantly more frequently by Howlers, while Hunters used more necessity modals. The Hunter corpus had significantly more strong or strengthened modals, potentially suggesting stronger expressions of commitment by the Hunters, which might support
Simons and Turkel’s (2014) prior finding that demonstrations of commitment of energy and efforts towards threats are associated with increased risk of violence.

The next section examined verbs of violence or anger and found that such expressions were significantly more common in the Hunter corpus. The Hunters also used a greater number of constructions where the author or his ingroup expressed violence and anger against the hated target group. This is in contrast to the hate speech Howlers, who more frequently depicted the hated outgroup as the Agents/Sensers of violence and anger against the author or author’s ingroup.

There was no difference identified in the use of slurs and epithets across the corpora, nor was there a difference in how positively or negatively the Hunters and Howlers described or evaluated the ingroup or outgroup. Both used a mix of positive and negative descriptors for the ingroup and overwhelmingly negative descriptors for the outgroup. Table 3.19 summarizes the forms and functions which were significantly associated with the two corpora.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant forms and functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hunter</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- First person singular nominative pronouns, especially in mental–affective clauses (e.g. “I hated the feeling of being trapped and lost” or “I hope a nigger rapes her to death and kills her”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- prediction modals, particularly expressing either a certain future harm to the author or ingroup, or describing a future in which an ingroup is dominant and the outgroup is subjugated or eliminated,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- strong or strengthened modals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- expressions of violence/anger, especially where the author or ingroup is the Agent/Sensor or the outgroup is the Recipient/Phenomena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Howler</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- First person singular verbal nominative clauses (e.g. <em>I will explain it to you so that you don't have to listen to the lying rabbis</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- necessity modals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- expressions of violence/anger where the outgroup is the Agent/Sensor or the ingroup is the Recipient/Phenomena</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How do these findings relate to previous work on risk assessment in threats and incitement to genocide? Seven features were selected for particular focus: justification of violence, also described as a fixation with placing blame or guilt on the victims (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); a focus on grievances or feelings of persecution perpetrated by the victim (Turner and Gelles 2003; Calhoun and Weston 2009; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); inevitability or lack of alternatives to violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); contempt, dehumanization, and strong negative evaluation of the victims (Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); prediction modals like “would” that emphasized the justification for the threat (Gales 2010); speech act verbs like “say” and “tell” used to strengthened claims or demands related to the threat (Gales 2010); and prediction modals such as “will” or “be going to” that added conditionality to the threat (Gales 2010).

A focus on the justification of violence and the attribution of guilt to the victim group may have been expected to manifest as a greater preoccupation in the Hunter corpus with violence perpetrated by the outgroup. “Dangerous speech” often includes “accusation in a mirror,” whereby someone trying to incite violence accuses the target of their hatred of the violent desires they themselves harbor (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). This reframes violence as justified in self-defense rather than unprovoked aggression. Contrary to what was expected, the Howlers attributed more violence to the target outgroup. The significant preference for the attribution of anger and violence to the outgroup in the Howler corpus does not support the findings of previous threat assessment research.
Similarly, the findings suggest that contrary to expectations, by ascribing more verbs of violence and anger to the outgroup as Agent/Senser, the Howler group expressed greater feelings of victimization and persecution. Turner and Gelles (2003), Simons and Turkel (2014) and Calhoun and Weston (2009) all suggest that in threats these expressions are associated with greater risk, while here they were more characteristic of the Howler corpus.

The next feature of note is expressions of inevitability and a lack of alternatives to violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). Modal auxiliaries are a resource for expressing an author’s judgment regarding the possibility, necessity, or truth of a proposition or situation (Depraetere and Reed 2006), and therefore can be an indicator of whether an alternative is presented as potential, likely, or inevitable. Modals which expressed a prediction for a future action or state were used significantly more in the Hunter corpus, and there was a slight preference for these prediction modals to be strong, asserting a prediction for the future with certainty. Most of these predictive modal expressions either articulated a dystopian future of harm to the author or ingroup, for example, “I will never have sex, never have love, never have children” and “Until the white race realizes that there is only one source from which we can ascertain lasting truths, there will never be peace or stability on this earth,” or described a future in which an ingroup is dominant and the outgroup is subjugated or eliminated, such as “someday we will be rid of nigger loving shit such as yourself and then it won't be so pathetic.” Usages of the former type will be address in the next paragraph, but the later variety, which strongly assert a specific vision of the future, do suggest that expressions of inevitability may correlate with violence in hate speech, as they have been shown to do with threatening communications and incitement to genocide.
These prediction modals and the futures that they describe also speak to Gales’ (2010) finding that prediction modals in realized threats often served to emphasize the justification for the threat or highlight the conditionality of the threat in a way that diminished the author’s sense of responsibility or ownership for the threatened actions. Unlike with threats, the hate examined here was generally expressed unconditionally, so this analysis of hate speech did not indicate any association between the prediction modals and conditionality. However, the futures that the prediction modals constructed did often serve to emphasize the justification for hatred or violence by articulating the Hunter’s grievances (e.g. “Knowing that... they would never give me a chance to be their boyfriend only increased my already boiling hatred towards all women.” “...our race would be bred out of existence”). This was noted in both corpora, but this type of predictive modal function was more characteristic of the Hunters, as were prediction modals generally.

Prior threat assessment research also proposes that increased risk is associated with expressions of contempt and dehumanization of the victim (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). This process is succinctly described by Reisigl and Wodak, who assert “the simplest and most elementary form of linguistic and rhetorical discrimination is that of identifying persons or groups of persons linguistically by naming them derogatorily, debasingly, or vituperatively” (2001, 45). Many of the terms examined in Section 3.5.4 as slurs are precisely the sort of dehumanizing, derogatory, debasing, and vituperative terms to which the researchers are referring. These slurs serve to distance the target from the reader, enhancing their “otherness” and “eroding] affective moral concern” (Maynard and Benesch 2016). In some instances, this is by literally conflating the target with
non-humans (e.g. “chimp”, “monkey-man”, “mongrel”), or by reducing the target to a single physical attribute and then negatively evaluating that characteristic (e.g. “shit skin”). However, analysis found no significant difference between the rates with which these kinds of slurs were used between the two corpora, suggesting that dehumanization and contempt may be characteristic of hate speech, but not necessarily indicative of increased risk of violence.

An analysis of the types of descriptors and modifiers which were used to evaluate ingroup and outgroup nouns also revealed no significant difference between the two corpora, supporting the conclusion that contempt and negative evaluation is not correlated with an increased risk violence in hate speech. Although negative Other evaluation was the most common across both corpora, the corpora exhibited both negative ingroup and outgroup characterization, as well as positive evaluation for both groups; however, the positive Other evaluation, though present, was minimal across both corpora and was often presented as contrary to the genuine feelings of the author. Though this finding does not support the previous work of Simons and Turkel (2014) and Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016), it does conform to the pattern noted by Gales (2010), who found that realized threats often had both negative self and other evaluation. Her analysis complicates the traditional notion of binary positive/negative ingroup/outgroup affect. There was a slight preference for negative ingroup characterization in the Hunter corpus (approximately 10% compared to approximately 8% of ingroup tokens), using phrases like “the values and morals of our people are the wrong ones.” Consideration of the context of these instances suggest that in both corpora these negative descriptions are primarily of members of a demographic ingroup but not ideological ingroup; the authors negatively evaluate those who do not agree with their hate. These uses seem to represent an effort to shame
members of the demographic ingroup into agreement or to illustrate the error of their ways (e.g. “Cowardice has been the White man's prime survival strategy for at least the last 4 decades” and “The morality accepted by our people today is fractured, confused, vague, and artificial. It is our task to replace it with true morality.”).

Finally, in realized threats Gales (2010) noted an emphasis on speech act verbs which strengthened the demands of the threat. This research found that it was Howlers who use more of this type of verb in the singular first person nominative clauses explored, indicating that, in accordance with Calhoun and Weston (2009), they may be placing greater emphasis on the act of communication as their emotional release. These clauses often include second person direct objects, focusing on the role of the author as the keeper and communicator of knowledge and reader as receiver. This is in contrast to the Hunters, who use significantly more verbs which express emotion and desire, perhaps also supporting Calhoun and Weston’s (2009) assertion that stronger emotional investment in the expressed grievances may correlate with increased risk. These findings will be addressed at greater length through discourse analytic consideration of stance and positioning in the next chapter.
Chapter 4 Analysis of Positioning and Stance in Two Examples of Hate Speech

The prior chapter used quantitative methods to uncover generalized trends in the Hunter and Howler hate speech corpora. However, quantitative analysis provides only one view of the whole. Qualitative analysis affords a deeper exploration of how the authors use the linguistic forms and functions identified in the corpus analysis to position themselves, their ingroups, and their targeted outgroups, and how those features work in conjunction with positioning to shape authors’ epistemic stances. Understanding epistemic stance is important to an investigation of Hunters and Howlers (recall that Hunters are those who “truly intend to use lethal violence” [Calhoun and Weston 2009, 7] and Howlers are those who “like to threaten and frighten with words...but they never follow through with any action” [2009, 7]) because it deals directly with the linguistic expression of certainty and commitment. It was hypothesized that Hunters may demonstrate stronger commitment to their hate than Howlers as a result of their intention to commit hate-motivated violence. Positioning describes how authors/speakers assign rights and duties to themselves and others based on the storylines in which they consider themselves to be participating (Davies and Harré 1990; Harré and Moghaddam 2003; Harré 2015); these storylines and the positions the authors construct within them offer a window into how Hunters and Howlers view themselves and their world. As Du Bois’s (2007) stance triangle illustrates, positioning is an important component of stancetaking and thus the two theories offer complementary lenses.

This chapter employs a discourse analytic perspective to address the research questions: How do the authors of hate speech position themselves, their ingroups, and the target outgroups/objects of hatred? Does this differ between Hunters and Howlers? What epistemic
stances do the authors of hate speech take and what do these stances indicate about their commitment to their hate? Does this differ between Hunters and Howlers? 

Epistemic stance encompasses the source of an author’s beliefs, knowledge, and evidence (evidentiality) and how certain an author is regarding the truth of his/her propositions (epistemics) (Chafe 1986; Chafe 2013; Bongelli, et al. 2018; Marin-Arrese 2015). Epistemic stance was selected as a lens through which to consider these hate speech texts because epistemic stance suggests an author’s certainty and commitment to the propositions s/he expresses (Cornilie 2018). For example, an evidential claim which indicates that information is based on first-hand experiences suggests that the author is highly involved in what s/he is claiming, demonstrating strong commitment to the proposition. Similarly, epistemic expressions such as “obviously” or “without a doubt” suggest that the speaker has high certainty regarding the proposition and is therefore strongly committed to its truth.

Positioning was chosen as a theory to complement an analysis of stance based on the work of Du Bois (2007), who uses a triangle to illustrate how stances are constructed from the interaction between evaluation, positioning, and alignment, which will be explained at greater length in Section 4.1.2. Briefly, he describes positioning as an act by which an interlocutor situates him/herself along an affective or epistemic scale and through which s/he claims or is assigned responsibilities of stancetaking. This connects to other scholars who describe positions as collections of rights and duties to act or speak in certain ways based on interactional context and co-constructed storylines (Davies and Harré 1990; Harré and Moghaddam 2003; Harré 2015). Positioning is, therefore, both a productive lens to consider how an author views
him/herself or the reader and is an important component in how the author encodes a wider stance towards the content and the world.

The analysis in this chapter will show how the Hunter uses features identified in the corpus analyses such as first person singular pronouns, justification of violence via predictive modals, and expressions of inevitability, to position himself within a storyline of a personal journey to enlightenment whereby he has gained knowledge, and to present himself as the only person who can act as a reluctant but inevitable savior to address the issues he mentions. In addition, other features contributing to his stance of justifying or explaining actions which he already believes to be necessary are inductive modes of knowing based on sensory and inferential evidence and rhetorical questions. On the other hand, the Howler uses first person plural pronouns, other plural referents, and constructed dialogue, to position himself as the spokesperson for a larger group who share his ideology. He also uses rhetorical questions and, as noted in the corpus analysis, explicit and repeated constructions in which an outgroup is the Agent of violence against an ingroup to position his ingroup as the victims in a storyline in which the outgroup are the violent victimizers. Overall, the Howler projects a more detached and less emotionally involved stance than the Hunter while he seeks to incite the reader to violence by exploiting strategies which have been noted in “dangerous speech” associated with incitement to genocide, such as a threat of destruction and conflating individual crimes with group guilt, (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).

This chapter begins in Section 4.1 by overviewing the theoretical foundations which will ground the discourse analysis; Section 4.1.1 discusses positioning theory, a conceptualization of how speakers/authors construct interpersonal relationships and situate themselves in relation to
co-constructed storylines (Davies and Harré 1990; Moghaddam and Harré 2010; Harré, et al. 2009; Harré and van Langenhove 1991). Section 4.1.2 reviews theories of stance, the ways in which language users encode their attitudes, feelings, and judgments regarding conversational content, interlocutors, and their wider experience of the world (Biber and Finegan 1989; Bednarek 2006; Du Bois 2007; Gales 2010). In particular, the focus will be on epistemic stance. Section 4.1.3 focuses on the ways in which epistemic stance can be investigated through epistemic discourse analysis, an approach described by van Dijk (2013) as analysis of how ways of knowing are managed through language. Section 4.2 explains the methods of text selection which were used to identify the two texts that are the focus of this chapter and describes the texts and their authors. Section 4.3 describes the ways in which the authors position themselves in their texts. 4.3.1 focuses on the Hunter’s self-positioning, particularly how he constructs a storyline of a personal journey from unknowing to knowing, and his frequent use of first person singular pronouns to emphasize his own involvement in the content he expresses. Section 4.3.2 details how the Howler uses constructed dialogue to position himself in relation to other voices in his text, and how he uses exclusive first person plural pronouns and other forms of self-reference to position himself as the spokesperson of a like-minded group. Section 4.3.3 describes the ways in which the Hunter and Howler use rhetorical questions to claim primary epistemic rights to the information that they present, positioning themselves as authoritative and knowledgeable in relation to the reader. Section 4.4 addresses a specific kind of positioning of the author’s ingroup in the role of victim and the concomitant positioning of the outgroup in the role of aggressor. Section 4.5 analyzes the ways in which the two texts source their evidential claims. Finally, the chapter ends in Section 4.6 with a summary of the findings and what they
suggest regarding the differences between hate speech that is accompanied by violence and that which is not.

4.1 Theoretical Foundations

The qualitative analysis undertaken here focuses on stance and uses positioning theory as a lens through which stance can be examined. This theoretical overview begins by reviewing positioning theory, focusing particularly how pronouns are a resource for positioning because of their ability to construct identities and situate the self and others. It then surveys scholarly perspectives on stance, how positioning theory relates to stancetaking, and how commitment is encoded in stance, particularly in epistemic stances.

4.1.1 Positioning Theory

Positioning theory rose out of cognitive psychology as a means of “revealing the explicit and implicit patterns of reasoning that are realized in the ways that people act towards others” (Harré, et al. 2009; 5). In other words, it is an attempt to explore the ways in which an individual thinks, feels, and behaves in a given circumstance (Harré, et al. 2009). Positioning theory originated in the work of Davies and Harré (1990), who defined positioning as a dynamic process by which interlocutors are situated in a conversation in relation to co-constructed storylines. Moghaddam and Harré describe positioning theory as “how people use words (and discourse of all types) to locate themselves and others” (2010, 2). In other words, positioning is the dynamic process through which the interpersonal relationships between interlocutors are constructed. One can reflexively position oneself, or can interactively position one's conversational partner. These positioning moves emerge across a social encounter through micro-interactional features, which constantly constitute, negotiate, and reconstitute the
positioning of the interlocutors in relation to one another and the conversational content. Davies and Harré argue that “one's beliefs about the sorts of persons, including oneself, who are engaged in a conversation are central to how one understands what has been said” (1990, 48); in other words, the complete meaning of a speech act is constructed by the combination of the illocutionary and perlocutionary forces of the speech act and the social force exerted by the positioning of the interlocutors (Harré, et al. 2009). In this way, positioning theory is complementary to speech act theory, which was explored in Chapter 2.

A position is a collection of rights and duties to act and speak in certain ways (Harré and Moghaddam 2003). Positions are assigned, resisted, changed, and constrained according to the context of an interaction and how the discursive meaning is co-constructed (Harré 2015). The rights and duties associated with a position are both local, according to specific context, and global, according to the norms and values of a society. Positions may also be momentary and challenged both implicitly and explicitly (Harré, et al. 2009). As Harré (2015) notes, positioning depends on three things: 1. the storylines which the interlocutors consider themselves to be playing out; 2. the meaning of the actions performed individually or jointly; 3. the sociocultural factors of the situation, the “context and distribution of rights and duties among those people at that time and place” (Harré 2015, n.p.). Positioning is also strongly affected by the rights and duties an individual is assumed to possess based on the attributes that individual is ascribed; positions based on assumptions which interlocutors hold prior to the negotiation of interaction are called prepositions (Harré, et al. 2009). For example, the existence of bus seats specifically designated for pregnant women preposition these women as having the right to expect and receive accommodations from others. When someone stands to offer a seat to a pregnant woman,
he or she is accepting that prepositioning and honoring the pregnant woman’s right to the seat and his or her obligation to provide it to her. However, an expectant mother may reject that prepositioning and assert her own self-positioning as a person who requires no special treatment by electing instead to stand when the seat is offered to her. Harré and van Langenhove (1991) emphasize the give-and-take of positioning, noting that when a speaker positions him or herself, s/he is also positioning the addressee, and likewise when a speaker is positioning an addressee s/he is also positioning him or herself in turn. In other words, “an explicit positioning of self naturally involves an implicit positioning of [the] other and an explicit positioning of [the] other involves implicit positioning of self” (Minow 2012, 98).

Positioning theory is most often analyzed in face-to-face conversations; however, it has also been a productive lens in the analysis of computer-mediated communication. For example, Badarneh and Migdadi (2018) leveraged positioning theory to explore how Jordanian readers construct identities for themselves and others in comments on news websites in response to political, social, and economic events. Particularly, they identified three main strategies. First, they discuss impoliteness and face attacks, in which a writer positions a previous commenter or the larger social group to which a commenter belongs, as ignorant, inaccurate, or lacking objectivity (e.g. “Read article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...so that you will not remain captives to your bigotry and your narrow horizon as if history begins and ends with you” [2018, 97]). The next strategy is to invoke national identity, positioning themselves or others positively as proud and patriotic Jordanians (e.g. “But I say that Jordan will always remain impregnable and on its rock all conspiracies of the coward will shatter.” [2018, 101]). A third strategy Badarneh and Migdadi (2018) discuss is to invoke religious identity, in which the
commenter positions himself as a true Muslim through the invocation of religious terms and phrases (e.g. “services for citizens are harām, facilitating people’s lives is bāţil” [2018, 102]) and then position others in either congruity or opposition. Though these specific positions and positioning strategies may not appear in the hate speech under examination in this chapter, this analysis illustrates how positioning, typically considered to be a dialogic process (Baynham 2011), is also accomplished in internet comments which, though they may respond to prior comments, are written without many of the features of traditional conversational interaction such as immediate turn-taking, overlap, prosody, gesture, etc. Many of the hate speech data under analysis in this work were taken from computer-mediated mediums like social media posts or messageboard comments or singly-authored monologic essays/blogs, so Badarneh and Migdadi (2018) provides a model of the ways in which positioning is accomplished in interactions which may unfold without a close temporal relationship between interlocutors and without the same paralinguistic or contextual cues that a face-to-face conversation provides.

One linguistic form which Badarneh and Migdadi (2018) note can be used as a positioning resource are pronouns. Pronouns are an important window into positioning and stancetaking because they establish connections between the linguistic and extra-linguistic worlds. As terms of reference, pronouns create characters in a textual world (the world constructed by the language) and relate those characters to individuals and identities in the interactional world (the world within which the conversation is taking place) (Schiffrin 2006). Pronouns are deictic, in that their meaning depends on the particular environment of the speech act (van Engelenhoven 2011), and therefore pronouns provide important clues regarding the speaker’s orientation to and perceptions of his or her environment. As Pennycook (1994)
highlights, pronouns inherently position both the self and other. *I* creates opposition to *you* or *they*; *we* also “constructs a *we/you* or a *we/they* dichotomy...[and] must always be understood with reference to other assumptions about who is being defined as the *we* from which the *you* and the *they* differ” (Pennycook 1994, 176, emphasis in original). The reciprocal positioning accomplished by pronouns mirrors the process by which Harré and van Langenhove (1991) assert that all explicit self-positioning inherently involves the implicit positioning of the other.

In his work on pronoun use as a tool for identity construction and relationship building in courtroom opening statements, Chaemsaiithong (2015) notes that speakers can manipulate pronouns to convey “subtle social meanings that relate to their social identities or to their positions with respect to other interlocutors...and to the experiences and topic being discussed.” (2015, 2). Chaemsaiithong considers how attorneys use pronouns to represent jurors and themselves in the monologic speech event of opening statements. For example, second person pronouns represent jurors as entertaining alternative opinions to respect jurors’ autonomy of thought and introduce pre-emptive refutation (e.g. “Probably some of you are saying...however...” [2015, 11]). Second person pronouns are also used to foreground jurors’ participant role in the speech event and focus their attention in what is otherwise a monologue delivered by the lawyer (e.g. I’m here to tell you that these charges are fictitious” (2015, 11), “don’t forget this when I tell you...” [2015, 11]). Chaemsaiithong further shows how first person pronouns highlight the lawyer’s role as creator and organizer of the information being presented (e.g. “I’m going to take you through various topics” [2015, 15]). With verbs describing mental processes, he notes that first person singular pronouns indicate commitment to the truth of a proposition (e.g. “on this point...I wholeheartedly agree with him” [2015, 16]). Finally, he analyzes lawyers’
use of first person plural pronouns to, among other things, include the jurors in a homogeneous unit of shared knowledge and experiences (e.g. “We all know where we were when we learned about the [September 11th] attacks” [2015, 18]) and align themselves with jurors by constructing a sense of shared values (e.g. “this trial is much more about us and who we are than it even is about him anymore” [2015, 19]). In short, Chaemsaiithong concludes that through both these and other strategies, the lawyers use pronouns to construct a shared identity with jurors while simultaneously positioning themselves in a relationship of authority so jurors will align with their version of reality. Section 4.3 will illustrate how Hunters and Howlers use pronouns and other forms of self-reference to accomplish the work of positioning.

4.1.2 Stance

One of the motivating factors for the focus on stance in this work is its productive use by Gales (2010) in her research on threatening communications. This work was overviewed at length in Chapter 3; Chapter 3 also contained a brief introduction to literature on stance, but this section addresses the subject in greater detail. Stance is a valuable framework for a consideration of the relationship between language and action, either in threatening communication or hate speech, because stance is a lens through which one may examine an author’s beliefs and subsequent commitment to action. In general terms (though see below for complications), stance describes how an author or speaker uses language to express “attitudes, feelings, judgments or commitment concerning the propositional content of a message” (Biber and Finegan 1989, 92). Though stance cannot be considered a direct proxy for intentionality, it can provide insight into what an author thinks and feels, how strongly committed s/he is to that worldview, and his/her expectations of the interlocutor or addressee. As humans, we constantly evaluate ourselves, our
environment, and the people with whom we interact; these evaluations, which are encoded in language through stance, make up our experience of the world and, consequently, drive our behavior. Therefore, an analysis of stance serves to help contextualize past behavior and predict future actions, which is valuable to a study such as this one which seeks to identify language usages which correlate with future violent behavior.

Stance is a well-theorized concept, but has been explored under different labels and conceptualizations. As such, previous scholars have acknowledged the difficulty of studying stance with precision (Gales 2010; Almedia 2012; Hunston 2007). Biber, et al. (1999) define stance as “personal feelings, attitudes, value judgments or assessment” (996). Bednarek defines it as a linguistic “device for interpreting the world and offering that interpretation to others” (Bednarek 2006, 4). Under these conceptions, stance is an umbrella term for concepts referred to elsewhere as evaluation (Hunston and Thomas 2000), attitude (Halliday 1994), appraisal (Martin and Rose 2007), and evidentiality (Chafe and Nichols 1986). This section will provide an overview of several different theoretical frameworks for stance, concluding with an in-depth discussion of epistemic stance, which will be the focus of this stance analysis because of its ability to reveal authors’ “knowledge about described events and their commitment to the validity of the communicated information” (Marin-Arrese 2015; 211). Commitment to knowledge and beliefs (i.e. the strength with which an author believes in the truth of a proposition or outcome) is hypothesized to relate to actions and hence to differences between the hate speech of Hunters and Howlers who do and do not act violently on the knowledge and beliefs they express.
One perspective on stance is provided by Englebretson (2007), who articulates five principles of stancetaking:

1. Stance is a personal belief, attitude or social value.
2. Stance is public and open to the interpretation of others.
3. Stance is created in interaction.
4. Stance is indexical (meaning it points to larger aspects or beliefs in society).
5. Stance has consequences for the stancetaker.

In other words, stance is a phenomenon through which people negotiate the personal and social. Stance is dependent upon the internal thoughts and feelings of the stancetaker and the contextually dependent interpretation of those thoughts and feelings by the interlocutor within a specific socio-historical moment. While stances do provide insight into the stancetaker, they also speak to the norms and values of the society in which the stancetaker is participating.

A very early model for the analysis of stance is that of Ochs (1989). She divides stance into three categories: evaluation (assessment, value judgments, and attitudes), affect (emotions and personal feelings), and epistemicity (ways of knowing and commitment to what is being discussed). Particularly important to the discussion of epistemic stance later in this section, Ochs uses the term epistemicity to consider the strength of commitment which an author demonstrates to a claim and whose voices are being invoked as authoritative, which, again, is important for this study because it reflects the certainty and commitment of the Hunter or Howler.

Another similar tripartite conceptualization of stance was established based on the corpus analyses of Conrad and Biber (2000). This framework was described in Chapter 3. Conrad and Biber (2000) divide stance into attitude, which expresses the feelings, attitudes, or expectations of the speaker or author; style, which describes the manner in which information is conveyed;
and epistemic stance, which deals with an author’s or speaker’s commitment or certainty regarding a proposition.

The idea of a three-part framework for the analysis of stance was further developed by systemic functional linguists Martin and Rose (2007), who call their system “appraisal analysis.” This is the framework Gales employed for her analysis of stance in threatening communications. Appraisal analysis considers attitudes, amplification, and source, all of which are simultaneously employed to express a speaker’s or author's experience of the world. Attitudes may include affect (expression of feelings), judgment (evaluation of character), and appreciation (determination of value). Amplification, also called graduation, can refer either to “force,” an increase or decrease in intensity, or “focus”, the sharpening or softening of a non-gradable boundary (Martin and Rose 2007). Finally, source, also referred to as engagement, describes the voices in a text using projection (attribution of speech or thought), modality (which negotiates obligation and probability), concession (how readers' expectations are tracked, met, and/or subverted through words like “but” “even if” and “suddenly”) (Martin and Rose 2007). These three three-fold frameworks for stance analysis are displayed in Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Categories of Stance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ochs (1989)</td>
<td>• Evaluation (assessment, value judgments, and attitudes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Affect (emotions and personal feelings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Epistemicity (ways of knowing and commitment to what is being discussed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conrad and Biber (2000)</td>
<td>• Attitude (feelings, attitudes, expectations of the speaker/author)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Style (manner in which information is conveyed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Epistemic (author’s/speaker’s commitment or certainty regarding proposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin and Rose (2007)</td>
<td>• Attitude (affect, judgment, appreciation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Amplification/Graduation (increase or decrease in intensity, sharpening or softening of a non-gradable boundary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Source/Engagement (projection, modality, concession)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The final theorization of stance presented here is the one which motivates the combination of stance and positioning as complementary analyses and is, for this work, the most influential view of stance to have come out of the various examinations of this important yet elusive concept – the stance triangle of Du Bois (2007). Du Bois contributes to the literature regarding stance by emphasizing the dialogic nature of the relationship between the author/speaker, the subject, and the reader/hearer. He describes stance as “a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, positioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, with respect to any salient dimensions of the sociocultural field” (2007, 163). He more informally explains this triangular relationship, “I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with you” (2007, 163). This definition contains reference to several other linguistic concepts which he notes have been well-theorized by other scholars – evaluation (Conrad and Biber 2000; Hunston and Thompson 2000; Thompson and Hunston 2000; Martin 2000), positioning (Davies and Harré 1990; Du Bois 2002), and alignment (Du Bois 2002; Heritage 2002; Heritage and Raymond 2005). Du Bois (2007) helpfully provides definitions of each and examples of how they fit into his greater conceptualization of stance. He defines evaluation as “the process whereby a stancetaker orients to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value” (2007, 143) (e.g. “That’s horrible” or “That’s ideal” [2007, 142]). He defines positioning as “the act of situating a social actor with respect to responsibility for stance and invoking sociocultural value” (2007, 143). He analyzes that positions can be taken along an affective scale (e.g. “I’m so glad” or “I’m just amazed” [2007, 143]) or an epistemic scale (e.g. “I don’t know” [2007, 143]). Finally, he defines alignment as “the act of calibrating the
relationship between two stances, and by implication between two stancetakers.” As an example, he explains how “I agree” defines the stance of the speaker as closely related to that of the addressee based on a prior assertion. He also notes that alignment can be illustrated by markers like “yes” or “no,” by extralinguistic gestures like a nod, or can simply be left open to inference through a comparison of the interlocutor’s relevant stances. Du Bois (2007) illustrates the relationships between the concepts of evaluation, positioning, and alignment and how they co-construct stance, through what he calls the “stance triangle”, replicated in Figure 4.1.

![Figure 4.1 Stance triangle. (Replicated from Du Bois 2007)](image)

The relationships that Du Bois (2007) draws between evaluation, positioning, and alignment, as well as how they combine to accomplish the work of stancetaking, will be an important foundation for this analysis. The current work is particularly concerned with epistemic stance as a way to consider how Hunters and Howlers claim knowledge and communicate their certainty and commitment to the realities they assert. Literature regarding epistemic stance will be overviewed in the next section.

4.1.3 Epistemic Discourse Analysis

This work engages in what van Dijk (2013) calls “Epistemic Discourse Analysis,” a multidisciplinary field which examines how ways of knowing are expressed, implied, presupposed, and in other ways managed through language. Chafe describes his work of this
nature as “thought-oriented” or “thought-based” linguistics (2013, 501; 2018) because of its concern with how language begins with a thought in the mind of the speaker and ends with some version of that thought in the mind of the listener. He contrasts this with what he says is traditional “sound-oriented linguistics.” Because this work is concerned with what hate speech suggests about the thoughts of the authors and how those thoughts may or may not translate to action, thought-oriented epistemic discourse analysis is a useful theoretical foundation.

Epistemic stance has been described by some scholars as an author’s or speaker’s commitment to the truth of a proposition (Chindamo, et al. 2012; Verstraete 2001; Conrad and Biber 2000), while others include the source of information or ways of knowing (Ochs 1989; Bongelli, et al. 2018). Some scholars also draw a distinction between epistemic status, an individual’s state of knowledge and access to information within a particular sphere of knowledge or experience (an epistemic domain), and epistemic stance, how interlocutors interactively position themselves in terms of their epistemic status (Heritage 2012). Epistemic status may vary between epistemic domains. For example, a podiatrist may be an authority within her particular medical specialty (an epistemic domain), and therefore have primary epistemic status. However, her general medical knowledge may cause her or her interlocutors to position her in an epistemic stance of authority or expertise within a conversation about cardiology, despite it being outside her primary epistemic domain.

In the field of Conversation Analysis (CA), Heritage considers epistemics in action formation, the ways in which turns at talk are formed such that they are recognized as particular social actions. The CA concept of action formation is in contrast to speech act theory (Schegloff 1988), which was explained at length in Chapter 2. The specific type of action formation
Heritage considers in his 2012 work is whether an utterance in English should be understood as the action of conveying or requesting information. He proposes that when analyzing this question, epistemic status takes precedence over morphosyntax and intonation. Epistemic status is the access an interlocutor has to information and it is a relational concept. In other words, epistemic status is judged in relation to other interlocutors. How an utterance is interpreted is affected by the understanding of which interlocutor has greater access to the relevant knowledge. Factors which influence epistemic status include the information’s recency, provenance, validity, clarity, the socially sanctioned right of the person to know, etc. (Stivers, Mondada, and Steensig 2011). Many of these factors are subsumed under what other scholars would call evidentiality (Chafe 2013; Bongelli, et al. 2018; Chafe 1986; Marin-Arrese 2015).

Discussing evidentiality, Chafe (1986) provides an extensive analysis of ways of knowing. First, he makes clear that he intends evidentiality broadly to encompass all the ways in which language users encode attitudes towards knowledge, more than just “expressions of ‘evidence’ per se” (1986, 262). He also notes that there are different epistemological considerations with writing and speaking because speakers make evidential decisions extemporaneously, whereas writers have more time to consider and edit the language they produce. In the present study, all of the data under consideration in the corpora are from written texts and may therefore display slightly different evidential sources than spoken hate speech. Chafe describes four modes of knowing, all of which can exist on a spectrum of reliable to unreliable and which are related to certain sources of knowledge. Figure 4.2 below is modified from a diagram Chafe presents (1986, 263).
Chafe describes each mode of knowing in detail, noting that modes of knowing often imply certain states of reliability. For example, belief (or its weaker relation, opinion) is a mode of knowing which downplays evidence. Chafe claims that though evidence may be presented to support a belief, a belief is always based on something other than just evidence. Phrases such as “I guess,” “I think,” or “I suppose” often indicate beliefs. In contrast, induction is a mode of knowing which Chafe describes as centrally concerned with evidence, though English does not always require an indication of the source of the evidence on which the induction is based. The most common marker of induction is “must,” in its epistemic modal usage which signals a high degree of reliability (e.g. “It must have been a kid” [Chafe 1986, 266]). Other indicators of an inductive mode of knowing are “obvious” (e.g. “Well it was just obvious I couldn’t work” [Chafe 1986, 266]) which expresses even stronger reliability, and “seem” which communicates weaker reliability (e.g. “she absolutely did not seem to know what was going on” [Chafe 1986, 267]). Sometimes the evidence on which inductions are based is clearly indicated through explicit verbs which suggest sensory evidence (e.g. see, hear, feel). The use of these marked sensory evidential sources suggests high reliability; as Chafe demonstrates, the assertion “I hear her taking a shower” is equivalent to the assertion “She’s taking a shower” (Chafe 1986, 267). However, inductions based on sensory evidence can also express weaker reliability, using
phrases like “looks like”, “sounds like”, or “feels like.” The sentence “It looks like she’s asleep” expresses a degree of doubt that perhaps she is not actually asleep.

There are a variety of English phrases to express the next mode of knowing Chafe (1986) describes, hearsay. English can express hearsay using phrases like “people say,” “I’ve been told,” or “he said,” all of which suggest that the source of the information is language rather than direct experience, as with sensory evidence and induction (Chafe 1986, 268). Hearsay can also be marked by less direct phrases like “supposed to” (e.g. “It’s supposed to be the most expensive place to live”) or “apparently” (e.g. “Apparently at the end of the movie the ship sinks” [Chafe 1986, 268]). The final mode of knowing Chafe describes is deduction, which involves an intuitive leap where a hypothesis is the source of knowledge. In English “should” and “presumably” often mark deduction (e.g. “Adults presumably are capable of purely logical thought” [Chafe 1986, 269]). Deduction can also express a range of reliability from less reliable assertions marked by “can” or “could” (e.g. “no rule could account for this behavior”) to the more reliable assertions marked by “should” (e.g. “he should take longer to respond this time”). Chafe also notes that “would” indicates hypothetical deductive knowledge contingent on conditions (e.g. “the finding would be consistent with the previous results”).

For the purposes of the present project, evidentiality will be defined as how an author claims the source of information and modes of knowing (Chafe 1986) and epistemicity as how the author evaluates the information on a scale of certainty to uncertainty and reality to unreality (Chafe 2013; Bonegli, et al. 2018). The idea of epistemicity is also sometimes referred to as epistemic modality (Kärkkäinen 2003; Cornillie 2018). Kärkkäinen’s (2003) work on epistemic stance notes that epistemic modality can be expressed by a wide range of linguistic forms.
including epistemic adverbs, adjectives, nouns, lexical verbs, modal auxiliaries, and phrases. Phrase like “of course” and adverbs like “certainly” explicitly encode the speaker’s/author’s high level of certainty regarding a proposition. These explicit words and phrases express the speaker’s orientation on a scale of reality to unreality (Chafe 2013). Kärkkäinen also describes the use of lexical verbs such as “hope” in phrases like “I hope there’s enough there” to convey both the non-epistemic meaning of an attitude towards the proposition and the epistemic meaning of a lack of certainty (2003, 22).

Both epistemics and evidentiality encode an author’s/speaker’s commitment. Commitment is the dedication that a speaker or author demonstrates to propositional content (Verstraete 2001), which can be an overt claim, a presupposition or thought, or a future course of action (Cornillie 2018). In the paradigm of speech act theory, discussed at length in Chapter 2, commitment is the strength with which an assertive speech act is made and exists on a continuum of weak to strong (Searle 1969). However, other scholars believe that commitment is binary, not gradable (Katriel and Dascal 1989). These scholars believe that an author is either committed to a proposition or not and strength is accounted for by greater or less speaker involvement (Cornillie 2018). This analysis will discuss commitment in gradable terms to express the strength of the author’s sentiments, but the researcher accepts that some readers may interpret commitment strength differently.

Commitment can be expressed through evidentiality as Cornillie (2018) demonstrates in his analysis of markers of epistemic stance in Spanish. When speakers/authors provide cues about the provenance of information, they are indicating a level of personal involvement in the proposition that they are communicating (e.g. through the phrases “por lo visto” (“seemingly”))
referring to a fact known from an indirect source, or “al parecer” (“apparently”) marking that the speaker was not a direct witness to what is being related [2018, 165-166]). Cornillie (2018) cites Cornillie and Delbecque (2008) in defining speaker involvement as “the speaker’s role in the subjective construal or conceptualization of an expression” (2018, 165). In other words, a speaker’s personal involvement is the extent to which the speaker is associated with or distanced from the information and its source. Ways of knowing which suggest direct experiences, such as first-hand sensory perception or induction based on direct evidence, suggest high speaker involvement and therefore high commitment. Conjecture or deduction based on indirect evidence display moderate involvement and commitment, and hearsay evidence corresponds to low involvement and weak commitment (Cornillie 2018; Ricci and Rossari 2018).

Expressed commitment can also be tied to the idea of realis and irrealis, indications of the ‘reality status’ of an utterance (Elliot 2000). Realis mood (e.g. indicative) is used when the content of an utterance is something which the speaker knows or strongly believes to be true or real in the world; irrealis (indicated via subjunctive, conditional, etc.) is used to indicate situations, actions, etc. that are not believed by the speaker to be factual in the current world. Different ways of knowing can make stronger or weaker claims to reality or irreality. For example, an evidential claim based on direct experience (e.g. I see that it is raining) makes a stronger claim to reality than hearsay (e.g. He said it was raining), while a modal phrase (e.g. It should have started raining by now) can indicate an irrealis mood, though potentially a state of affairs which the speaker may desire.

Commitment can also be marked by epistemic adverbs or phrases such as Kärkkäinen’s examples “of course” and “certainly” (2003) or by epistemic modal expressions which indicate
that the author believes a proposition is more or less probable (Cornillie 2018). This was illustrated by Gales (2010; 2011) who used the appraisal analysis concept of engagement to analyze threateners’ apparent commitment to the threats which they expressed. In the threats of Eric Rudolph, the Olympic Park Bomber who was convicted of several ideologically motivated bombings between 1996 and 1998, she notes how epistemic modals both strengthen and weaken his commitment. For example, she identifies the use of epistemic prediction modal “will” to suggest inevitability, “we will target all facilities and personnel.” It serves as a “contracting utterance,” which strengthens the displayed commitment of the threatener by closing off further negotiation or debate (2011, 38). She also notes the use of the epistemic modal “may” to weaken the strength of the threatener’s commitment by expressing a low probability of action (e.g. “innocent people may become the primary casualties” [2011, 39]). See Chapter 3, Section 3.2 for a more complete discussion of Gales’ analysis of Rudolph’s threats.

Chafe (2013) notes that questions can also be a resource for expressing epistemic commitment by asserting the reality or unreality of a proposition. Yes/no questions serve as a request for the listener to state whether a proposition is real or not. For example, “Are you married?” is a request for an assessment of the reality of a world in which you are married. Similarly, Chafe analyzes that wh-questions assume the reality of a situation and request more information about a specific component or participant in that reality. Consider the question “What is your husband’s name?” It assumes the reality that the addressee has a husband, and simply requests more information about that individual.

Similarly, rhetorical questions can be a resource for epistemic stancetaking. Rhetorical questions are conversational contributions which in form request information, but in function do
not expect a reply (Crystal 2008); in other words, they have the force of an assertive statement in the guise of an interrogative (Cerović 2016; Ilie 1994). Rhetorical questions have power because they can serve as a covert claim to knowledge and authority on the part of the speaker. They can also serve to package an opinion in a subtle way to influence an interlocutor by presenting a particular assertion or belief to him or her, while creating the illusion that the conclusion arose organically from the listener’s own deduction (Ranganath, et al. 2018; Gass and Seiter 2015). Rhetorical questions are a resource for the construction of epistemic stance because they situate the questioner in a knowledgeable position (Heritage and Raymond 2012). Heritage (2012) explains that a standard interrogative question positions the questioner in an unknowing position and the addressee in a knowing position because the addressee presumably has the answer to the question that the questioner does not have. However, a rhetorical question positions the questioner as knowledgeable in relation to the addressee by asserting that the questioner already has the answer, indicating that the questioner has primary epistemic rights to the information in the question. Rhetorical questions have the assertive force of a declaration; a positive rhetorical question asserts the truth of the negative situation (Cerović 2016). In other words, the rhetorical question “Who knows?” asserts the reality that “nobody knows.”

4.2 Text Selection

Two texts were selected for qualitative analysis; one was categorized as a Hunter text according to the model of Calhoun and Weston (2009; 2012), hate speech that was associated with violent action by the author, and one as a Howler text, hate speech which was not accompanied by violence. Both texts represent one of the most common types of hate speech found in the data – racist hate speech directed against African Americans; they also both contain
anti-Semitic sentiments, though more focus is given to white supremacist rhetoric. The Hunter text was selected from the eleven Hunter texts which had more than one thousand words each, to ensure enough data for a robust analysis. Out of that pool of eleven, the text was randomly selected by assigning numbers to each text and then using a random number generator to select a number from one to eleven. A Howler text was selected by the researcher out of the twelve Howler texts with more than one thousand words to be as similar as possible to the Hunter text. The two texts are similar in length (2,331 words in the Hunter text and 2,637 in the Howler text), both target African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Jews, and both are written in the style of an essay or manifesto.

The Hunter text under consideration is authored by Dylann Roof, a white supremacist who was convicted of 33 federal counts in connection with the mass murder of nine parishioners at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina on June 17, 2015 (Blinder and Sack 2016). Roof confessed to the shootings in an interview with FBI agents after his arrest and acknowledged that his motivation was racial hatred. His 2,331-word manifesto was posted on lastrhodesian.com, a website registered to Roof under a masked identity (Bernstein and Horowitz 2015). In this manifesto, he discusses his hatred of African Americans, people of Jewish faith, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans in sections labeled “Blacks… Jews… Hispanics… East Asians… Patriotism… An Explanation”. Roof begins his essay by describing how his sense of injustice was ignited by what he perceives as a mismatch between the coverage of crime perpetrated by African Americans and white Americans. This sparked research into “black on White crime” that led him to be what he calls “completely racially aware.” He details his beliefs that African Americans are inferior, that the crimes of slavery were an exaggeration,
that segregation is a positive thing, that Jewish social networks and cultural solidarity is a problem, that Hispanic Americans are the enemy of white Americans, that East Asians are naturally racist and therefore potential allies for white Americans, that American patriotism is a “joke”, and finally that he must act on this knowledge because there are no “skinheads” or “real KKK” to address the problems he describes.

The Howler text chosen to contrast Roof is written by Craig Cobb, a white supremacist who runs the website Podblanc, a video-sharing platform targeted at white supremacists. He adheres to the Creativity Movement, a self-styled religion centered around the supremacy of the “White race,” and he advocates a “racial holy war” in support of white separatism (Cobb 2010). This text is a 2,637-word essay he wrote for a white supremacist publication titled The Aryan Alternative. In the fall of 2013, Cobb was arrested in connection with a failure to install a compliant water and sewage system on his North Dakota property and a related accusation of terrorizing and threatening a town resident (Carter 2013). Despite his high-profile status, public support of violence, and other arrests, Cobb has never been arrested for any violent crime in connection with his white supremacist rhetoric. His essay is largely a catalogue of crimes committed by African Americans and Hispanic Americans against white Americans, especially focusing on crimes against white women. He also asserts the inferiority of African Americans and the conspiracy theory that Jews control the media in order to downplay the danger to white Americans and to enable and support the continued violence against white Americans.

Using the theoretical frameworks of positioning theory and stancetaking, and considering both features highlighted by the previous quantitative analysis (e.g. first person pronouns, constructions expressing violence, prediction modals) and new features which were motivated by
work in positioning and stancetaking (e.g. rhetorical questions, verbs which mark evidentiality),
this section compares the two texts in how they position the author, the author’s ingroup, and the
commitments they express to their ideologies of hatred. To examine these facets, this chapter
will focus on personal pronouns and other forms of self-reference, rhetorical questions which
display epistemicity, and the ways in which the two authors displays their evidential ways of
knowing. Because positioning and stancetaking are co-constructive, the features will be
discussed in terms of their ability to display both positions and stances, as well as the
commitment each author conveys. The complete texts of both the Hunter and Howler case
studies are provided in Appendixes C and D.

4.3 Hunter’s and Howler’s Self-Positioning

Recall from Section 4.1.1 that positions are collections of rights or duties to speak and
behave in certain ways in an interaction (Harré and Moghaddam 2003). As has already been
discussed, pronouns are an important resource for positioning in that they construct social
relationships and inherently position interlocutors with respect to one another (Chaemsaithong
2015; Pennycook 1994). The distribution of pronouns, especially first person pronouns, was also
established in the previous chapter as a feature which differentiated the Hunter and Howler
corpora; the Hunter hate speech was characterized by significantly more frequent use of first
person singular pronouns than the Howler hate speech. This pattern holds in the two texts under
analysis here. Combined, the Hunter text uses the first person singular pronouns I/me/my twenty-
eight times per 1000 words compared to just over three per 1000 in the Howler text; first person
plural pronouns we/us/our are used a standardized seventeen times by Roof compared to thirteen
by Cobb. The qualitative analysis in this section provides deeper insight into this general trend
by showing how the use of different types of pronouns contribute to different types of positions and stances.

Section 4.3.1 begins by showing how Roof constructs and positions himself in a storyline of a personal journey to ‘racial awareness’, using first person singular pronouns to highlight his transition from unknowing to knowing and his ultimate position as knowledgeable and authoritative. Roof also positions himself as a reluctant hero in a storyline which ends with his perception that he has a mandate to act on the information he has presented. Section 4.3.2 analyzes how Cobb uses constructed dialogue and plural forms of reference to position himself as the knowledgeable spokesperson of a like-minded group, claiming the authority granted by the support of a group. Though both authors claim knowledge and authority, they do so in different ways using different kinds of pronouns and self-referents.

4.3.1 Hunter’s Self-Positioning through Pronouns

Through the prodigious use of first person pronouns, the Hunter positions himself as having the right to have his subjective experiences valued. The first line of Roof’s manifesto, “I was not raised in a racist home or environment” sets the expectation that what follows will be strongly steeped in his own subjectivity. Roof’s immediate use of the first person singular nominative pronoun to relay his personal experience activates the frame of a personal narrative, though topic headings (“Blacks...Jews...Hispanics...East Asians...Patriotism...An Explanation”) also suggest the format of an essay or lecture. He begins by relating the personal narrative of his experience researching the Trayvon Martin case, which led him to his opinions of race relations. In February 2012 in Sanford Florida, seventeen-year-old African American Trayvon Martin was fatally shot by George Zimmerman, a member of his community’s neighborhood watch.
Zimmerman claimed self-defense under a Florida Stand-Your-Ground law, and though he was charged with second degree murder and manslaughter, he was acquitted in July 2013 (Grigsby Bates 2019). Example 4.1 is what Roof says about the case; emphasis has been added to highlight the first person pronouns.

Example 4.1
"The event that truly awakened me was the Trayvon Martin case. I kept hearing and seeing his name, and eventually I decided to look him up. I read the Wikipedia article and right away I was unable to understand what the big deal was. It was obvious that Zimmerman was in the right. But more importantly this prompted me to type in the words “black on White crime” into Google, and I have never been the same since that day."

As has been noted by Du Bois (2007), claiming knowledge is an act of positioning whereby an author situates him or herself along a scale of knowledge with respect to the interlocutor. In this passage, Roof begins by positioning himself as unknowing. Saying “the event that truly awakened me” implies that prior to this event, he was not awakened, in this context meaning that he was not knowledgeable regarding what he views as the unfair bias against white Americans. The Google search marks what Mishler (2006) calls a turning point, an event in a narrative that causes a change in the speaker’s understanding of past events or a different sense of self and trajectory for future feelings and behaviors. In this case, Roof walks the reader through his research process (“I read the Wikipedia article...this prompted me to type in the words “black on White crime” into Google”), emphasizing the individual actions he took. From before to after the Google search his level of knowledge, and also sense of himself and his world, is irrevocably changed, “I have never been the same since that day” meaning his level of knowledge and perception of the world had changed. Following this change, Roof closes his introductory section by saying “I can say today that I am completely racially aware,” marking
the completion of his knowledge journey. His repeated use of the first person pronouns highlights the personal nature of his journey and foregrounds his role as the synthesizer and presenter of the knowledge he is about to communicate in the rest of the essay. This is very similar to the use of first person pronouns Chaemsaithong (2015) observed in attorneys’ opening statements, where first person pronouns emphasized the attorneys’ position of authority as the creators and organizers of the information they were presenting.

Immediately following the lines reproduced in Example 4.1, Roof goes on to write:

Example 4.2
“The first website I came to was the Council of Conservative Citizens. There were pages upon pages of these brutal black on White murders. I was in disbelief. At this moment I realized that something was very wrong. How could the news be blowing up the Trayvon Martin case while hundreds of these black on White murders got ignored?

He is again describing the very moment of his turning point. Mishler (2006) notes that turning points often cause a reconstruction of the meaning of past events and sometimes a repositioning in relation to other participants in a narrative. In this case, Roof is repositioning himself as formerly unknowing and then “in disbelief” at the moment of the turning point, leading to a knowing position, “I realized that something was very wrong.” His conclusion, that “something was very wrong,” with “hundreds of these black on White murders...[being] ignored” might have been presented from the evidential vantage point of the websites he visited (e.g. ‘the research showed that something was wrong’), but instead Roof presents this conclusion with a first person singular pronoun as the result of his own inferential process (“At this moment I realized...”). He goes as far as to verbalize the question he thought in the moment he “realized” saying, “How could the news be blowing up the Trayvon Martin case while hundreds of these black on White murders got ignored?” This explicit presentation of his own subjective
experience of the research and realization process indicates his own involvement in what he is relaying. The storyline in which he positions himself is a personal narrative of knowledge seeking; personal narratives accomplish identity work as they construct an identity for the self within the narrative. As Mishler notes, turning points recast the self within the narrative by constructing a self before and after the turning point (Mishler 2006). By describing the process through which he became aware of what he sees as problematic race relations, Roof emphasizes the change in his positioning from unknowing to enlightened, what he later describes as “completely racially aware.” By describing his completed knowledge journey, he both suggests that the reader can accomplish a similar enlightenment and claims the knowledge to authorize him to speak on the subjects upon which he expounds. He is showing the reader how, through this journey, the topics pertaining to race relations that he discusses become part of his epistemic domain, the sphere of knowledge and experience to which he has authoritative access (Heritage 2012).

Roof concludes his essay in a paragraph that uses several singular first person pronouns. He begins by invoking a quote from his “favorite film, 15” “Even if my life is worth less than a speck of dirt, I want to use it for the good of society.” He goes on to say “I have no choice... Well someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.” This time the “I” is not making a claim to knowledge, but is positioning Roof as a reluctant hero, forced by necessity to address the ills that he outlined earlier in his writing. The phrases “I have no choice” and “it has to be me” both suggest inevitability, indicated in previous work to be indicative of a heightened risk of violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014;)

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15 Roof is quoting the Japanese film Himizu from a scene in which a boy who has just killed his father delivers a monologue while preparing to commit an act of mass violence (West 2015).
Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). These phrases also suggest a lack of agency. He positions himself as someone with no control over his behavior (“I have no choice,”), which suggests a diminished responsibility for his actions. He describes a mandate to act, but not necessarily an unequivocal willingness to do so. The inclusion of the phrase “I guess” weakens the assertion of inevitability and communicates a reticence. Guessing is a cognitive process which indicates a lack of surety, in contrast to assertive cognitive choices like “I know.” “[H]as to” is being used as an epistemic modal expressing the necessity of the situation (Collins 2009). Combined with the close proximity to “no choice,” despite the weakening introduced by “I guess,” the ultimate effect is still the assertion of an inevitable situation in which Roof contends that there are no alternatives to his action. Though he does not specify what exactly he means by “take it to the real world,” his later actions suggest that he is referring to his act of mass violence.

4.3.2 Howler’s Self-Positioning through Constructed Dialogue and Plural Terms of Reference

Whereas Roof makes extensive use of first person singular pronouns to position himself very explicitly in his writing, consistent with the broader findings of the pronoun usage in the Hunter corpus, Cobb uses less explicit means to position himself within the Howler text. One of those means is the use of constructed dialogue, through which he creates characters whom he voices in specific ways and with respect to whom he then positions himself in symmetry or opposition. Constructed dialogue, also referred to as “reported speech” or “direct reported speech,” was coined by Tannen to refer to speech which is “not reported at all but creatively constructed by a current speaker in a current situation” (2007, 105). She notes that even when speech is reproduced verbatim, the addition of a new context invariably alters the original utterance. Cobb uses first person singular pronouns exclusively in situations in which he is not
referring to himself, but is rather creatively voicing others. In the examples of constructed
dialogue that follow, Cobb constructs the speech of a bereaved father and a woman who has
contracted HIV, and by doing so positions them, thereby reciprocally positioning himself as is
inherent in the give-and-take of positioning (Harré and van Langenhove 1991; Minow 2012).
The way in which this bidirectional positioning is achieved can be illustrated by Du Bois’s
stance triangle (2007).

The first instance of this constructed dialogue is when Cobb is voicing Bob Hlass, the
father of murder victim Eric Hlass, writing to his son’s killer, Vernon Spence. In July 2003,
Spence and several accomplices burgled Hlass’s Ohio State University apartment in an apparent
attempt to steal drugs and money that Spence believed Hlass’s roommate, Aaron Grexa, had in
his possession (State v. Spence 2006). During the commission of the burglary, Spence killed
Hlass, Grexa, and Grexa’s girlfriend Kayla Hurst. In Example 4.3, Cobb quotes what Bob Hlass
purportedly wrote to Spence while he was in jail. The constructed dialogue is bolded.

Example 4.3
Bob Hlass, father of 22-year-old victim Erik\textsuperscript{16} [sic] Hlass, who was annihilated [sic] along with
Kayla, wrote a letter to jailhouse bootlip Spence that spat a vindictive venom rarely seen in the
post-civil rights’ era: “How I wish I could get a hold of you and kick your (expletive) [sic] to a
bloody pulp, before I ram my shotgun down your chicken-(expletive) [sic] throat and pull the
trigger.” Then Bob Hlass told the judge he had no regrets for having written the messages.

This excerpt can be well analyzed by Du Bois’s stance triangle (2007). Du Bois explains,
“I evaluate something, and thereby position myself, and thereby align with you” (2007, 163).
Figure 4.3 illustrates how Du Bois’s stance triangle accounts for the relationships constructed in
this passage.

\textsuperscript{16} The murder victim’s name is properly spelled “Eric.” Cobb misspells it as “Erik.”
Though the positioning arrows point in the directions of Hlass and Cobb from the stance object, Spence, it is their evaluation of Spence which positions them, not any stance work accomplished by Spence. Both subjects, Hlass and Cobb, negatively evaluate Spence. Hlass does so by indicating his desire to commit violence against Spence (“I wish I could get a hold of you and kick your (expletive) [sic] to a bloody pulp, before I ram my shotgun down your chicken-(expletive) [sic] throat and pull the trigger.”) Cobb expresses his negative evaluation by referring to Spence in dehumanizing, highly inflammatory ways; a few sentences earlier in the text Cobb refers to him as “orangutan Vernon Lorenzo Spence.” He also calls him “jailhouse bootlip Spence” and later in the essay “Proud nigger murderer of three humans, Vernon Spence.” By demonstrating how they share a common evaluation, Cobb is constructing a close alignment between himself and Hlass, indicating that they are of one mind regarding Spence. As Du Bois’s triangle suggests, evaluation and alignment also necessarily lead to positioning.

Cobb positions Hlass as supportive of his white supremacist movement by recontextualizing his quotation to be surrounded by language which foregrounds Spence’s race. Cobb uses racial slurs and epithets, “orangutan” and “proud nigger,” to invite the reader to interpret Spence’s violent behavior as tied to his race rather than the specific circumstances of this situation. Nowhere in Hlass’s statement does he mention Spence’s race or suggest that his
anger is directed at anyone other than Spence, African American or otherwise. However, Cobb suggests that Spence’s violent behavior is indicative of a larger problem a few sentences later when he says “There are millions more Spences out there,” suggesting that because there are millions of African Americans in this country, there are millions of potential violent criminals. Cobb extrapolates the stance object from Spence as an individual to African Americans as a group. Cobb takes up and extends Hlass’s stance of violent anger towards Spence, extrapolating it to violent anger towards all African Americans. Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016) note that conflation of an individual’s crime with the guilt of a group is a marker of “dangerous speech,” rhetoric which incites genocide (2016). By quoting Hlass’s violent sentiments, which are a response to an individual’s crime, and conflating them with the guilt of all African Americans, Cobb is able to assert a message which suggests that all African Americans are violent while minimizing his own personal involvement in the claim – it is not represented as a sentiment which comes directly from him. A reader can understand the anger of a grief-stricken father towards his son’s murderer; using Hlass’s words of anger and violence lends pathos and may even invoke the reader’s outrage on behalf of Hlass. Though a rational reader may not condone Hlass’s desire for violent vengeance, it is at least understandable in the wake of loss and pain. However, by conflating Spence’s crimes with his racial identity, Cobb implies that Hlass endorses his wider racist views. The reader is led to the conclusion that “millions more” African Americans represent a threat to their families just like Spence proved a danger to Hlass’s and therefore that Hlass’s violent reaction is one that they should support. The anger and fear he is invoking is presented through the words of Hlass, thereby positioning Hlass as in agreement with him and positioning Cobb as someone whose ideas have support.
Cobb uses constructed dialogue again in his essay; this time he voices Tonia Vandervliet, a woman who contracted HIV from a partner who Cobb asserts was African American, calling him “an HIV+ boogaboo.” Example 4.4 is what he says about Vandervliet. Again, the constructed dialogue is bolded for illustration purposes.

Example 4.4
Finally, this issue, (much more in #4), we have Tonia Vandervliet, who got ‘sexed,’ as the coons say, by an HIV+ boogaboo. *Sometimes this medicine is used for other things I’ve heard. [S]o at first I wasn’t too scared.* Yeah, that’s right Tonia – maybe it’s yohimbe bark that he uses, the better to cut a rug to Piddly/Diddly/Doodly, whatever it ‘represents’ by these days. Vandervliet continues: *I was just concerned because he told me he was from Huron, and I asked him if he’d been with anybody in Huron and he said he hasn’t [sic] and he did a bunch of tests in the prison, and they all came up negative.*

Cobb again uses constructed dialogue to introduce a single anecdote and then extrapolate to suggest that African Americans are dangerous, this time because of HIV. By presenting the anecdote in the voice of a participant rather than his own authorial voice, Cobb is able to communicate his message without having to explicitly assert or avow the sentiment that he invites the reader to infer. Not only does Cobb voice Vandervliet, but he engages in a mock dialogue with his constructed version of her, using a sarcastic tone to characterize her as gullible and her trust in her partner as foolish, thereby also positioning her African American partner as untrustworthy. After he voices Vandervliet as saying “*Sometimes this medicine is used for other things I’ve heard. [S]o at first I wasn’t too scared.*” he comments, “Yeah, that’s right Tonia – maybe it’s yohimbe bark that he uses, the better to cut a rug to Piddly/Diddly/Doodly, whatever it ‘represents’ by these days.” Although this statement asserts his personal judgment, Cobb does not indicate it with a first person construction in the same way that Roof frequently does (e.g. “I want to say...”). Instead, the source of this evaluation is unmarked; it is presented as if it is the
natural reaction to Vandervliet. This positions Cobb in opposition to Vandervliet, who is positioned as gullible and ignorant. He is therefore positioned as wise, able to correctly identify foolish behavior, and to judge Vandervliet from a position of greater knowledge, implicitly the knowledge of the dangerous nature of “an HIV+ boogaboo.”

An additional strategy that Cobb uses to position himself within his writing is the use of terms of reference which construct his authorial identity as a group identity. Sometimes Cobb uses first person plural pronouns such as “we” or “us,” and at other times he explicitly conflates himself with the entire publication for which he is writing by using the publication’s full name “The Aryan Alternative” or “TAA,” as in Example 4.5 below (emphasis has been added).

Example 4.5
a) “The Aryan Alternative apologizes for the chicken MSM (mainstream media)-redacted quotations and is tempted to insert "expletives" of our own.”
b) “The Aryan Alternative asks you, White reader: Is your daughter next?”
c) “The TAA asks: When did Christianity become a white-racial suicide pact?”

Cobb is the only author credited with this article, so when he apologizes for something he wrote, or writes “Is your daughter next?” or asks “When did Christianity become a white-racial suicide pact?” he is presumably the only one who authored those words. However, rather than saying ‘I ask’ or ‘the author apologizes,’ he presents his questions and assertions as if they come from a collective represented by the entire publication. In other instances, Cobb uses first person plural pronouns to refer to his authorial identity, as he does in Example 4.6 below (emphasis added).

Example 4.6
a) “As we say, kikes like grinny [sic] Bernie [left] even pay money to set up shelters for invading murderers and rapists like Martinez and Rodriguez. [sic]”
b) “As we always say at TAA, NO WAY OUT BUT THROUGH THE JEWS.”
c) “There are millions more Spences out there, believe us.”
d) “Big Jew who made these horrible hush crimes not merely possible but inevitable. ‘Inevitable’? What do we mean by that?”

All of these first person plural pronouns are best understood as exclusive based on the context; they refer to an entity which does not include the reader. In example 4.6a, Cobb is talking about Bernie Marcus, the co-founder and former CEO of Home Depot. In the original formatting, a picture of Marcus appears to the left of this text, as the “[left]” indicates. Marcus was also a topic of discussion earlier in the essay. That earlier discussion is what Cobb is referencing when he says “as we say;” Because the reader had no role in penning the previous portion of the essay and therefore is not included in the “we” who previously commented on Marcus, Cobb’s first person plural pronoun in this instance is best understood as exclusive. In example 4.6b it is very clear that “we” exclusively refers to the members of the publication because Cobb says “we...at TAA.” Example 4.6c is also understood as exclusive. It presents an assertion to the reader that “there are millions more Spences out there” and then adds “believe us.” Assuming that the reader is included in the “us” would be suggesting that the reader is already in possession of the knowledge asserted and therefore no belief would be necessary, nor would the assertion need to be made at all. The only way this statement makes sense is as a statement made by a knowledgeable “us” to inform or convince an unknowing reader, excluded from the “us.” Finally, example 4.6d also presents an exclusive “we” because the “we” refers to the author of the previous statement. This example makes a claim, “Big Jew who made these horrible hush crimes not merely possible but inevitable” and then anticipates a request for clarification, “Inevitable’? What do we mean by that?” In this request, the “we” must be knowledgeable regarding the intended meaning of “inevitable” or the inquiry makes no sense. Therefore, the “we” must refer to the authors of the prior statement, who would know what was
meant by it. Because the reader is not an author, the “we” cannot include the reader and is therefore best understood as exclusive.

Previous research suggests that first person plural pronouns can position a claim as a “group declaration rather than a personal undertaking” (Tan and Moghaddam 1995, 397) by positioning the author as one member of a concerned larger group who share a claim or grievance (Badarneh and Migdadi 2018). Through the use of these exclusive plural referents, Cobb positions himself as the spokesperson for a larger group, the exact size of which remains unstated. This positioning lends Cobb’s assertions the authority of a group, expressed by the old adage ‘strength in numbers.’ As the aphorism suggests, a claim seems more credible when it is agreed upon by many people, as opposed to the assertion of one lone individual. In this way, Cobb is claiming the authority to speak from a position of knowledge, just as Roof does, but they accomplish this positioning in different ways, using different types of pronouns.

This section analyzed the ways in which the Hunter and Howler positioned themselves in their texts. Roof uses numerous first person singular pronouns in a storyline of a personal knowledge journey, which emphasizes his position as knowledgeable and foregrounds his role as the organizer and synthesizer of the information he presents. His first person singular pronouns also communicate high personal involvement and therefore strong commitment to the truth of his propositions. In addition to positioning himself as an authoritative source of knowledge, Roof uses singular first person pronouns to position himself as a reluctant hero, who must inevitably act on the knowledge he has claimed. He describes a lack of agency and a requirement to act though also a reluctance, with the phrases “I guess,” and “I have no choice.” However, the epistemic modal in “it has to be me” suggests a strong commitment to this inevitable reality. This
finding conforms to previous threat assessment work described in Chapter 3 in which a destruction of alternative courses of action was indicative of a heightened risk of violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).

The Howler positions himself most explicitly using exclusive first person plural pronouns and other terms of address that equate his authorial identity with the entire publication. This positions him as the spokesperson for a group who shares his opinions and concerns, strengthening his assertions with the credibility of mass agreement. Though positioning himself as the representative of a group allows him to claim credibility in one arena, it contradicts the commitment he demonstrates in another way; by not taking direct, individual responsibility for his assertions, he diffuses responsibility for his claims to the entire group, displaying less personal involvement and therefore weaker commitment. He is hiding behind the credibility of a group rather than the more vulnerable and intimate decision to connect his own individual identity with his words, which would suggest that he believes in them more strongly and is therefore more committed. The responsibility for his claims is diffused amongst a group of unknown number. This creates distance between himself and his content, disavowing direct, unequivocal responsibility. This is similar to the distance created by Cobb’s use of the constructed dialogue of Bob Hlass, which allows him to assert a message of violence, while minimizing his personal involvement or responsibility for the statement. Cobb’s use of constructed dialogue allows him to construct identities and then position himself in relation to them. The researcher argues that Cobb’s constructed dialogue also conflates individual crimes with group guilt, inviting the reader to see the anecdotes presented as indicative of a wider threat.
of violence and danger represented by African Americans. His hate speech shares this rhetorical strategy with incitement to genocide rhetoric (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).

4.3.3 Rhetorical Questions as an Epistemic Resource

As Chafe (2013) highlights, questions are epistemic resources in that they request information about the reality or unreality of an event or element of an event. He notes that yes/no questions are typically a request to the listener to state the reality or unreality of a situation and wh-questions generally assume a situation is real and ask the listener for the “identity of a participant” (2013, 504), which may be a person or element of the situation. In general, unknowing speakers ask questions and knowing speakers make assertions. However, as has previously been discussed, rhetorical questions typically position the questioner as already possessing the propositional content s/he is asking about because a rhetorical question has the assertive power of a declarative in the form of an interrogative (Heritage 2012; Cerović 2016; Ilie 1994). A true interrogative requests information which is outside the speaker’s epistemic domain, the sphere of knowledge and experience to which a speaker has direct access (Heritage 2012); when a speaker is using the form of an interrogative to address information that is understood to be within his/her epistemic domain, the question is presumed to be rhetorical. In this way, Heritage (2012) says that rhetorical questions emphasize the questioner’s primary epistemic rights to the information ostensibly requested. Roof’s use of such questions emphasizes his position as a knowledgeable authority, and emphasizes the role of the reader by creating a pseudo-dialogue. Illustrations of rhetorical questions in the Hunter text are bolded in Example 4.7.
In Example 4.7a Roof, who was previously discussing integration in schools, introduces the new topic of the suburbs by explicitly providing his opinion, “I hate with a passion the whole idea of the suburbs.” By volunteering his opinion in strong, unequivocal terms, he positions himself as an authoritative voice who has the right to have his opinion heard and positions the reader as someone who cares about his opinion. The phrase “To me,” which begins the next sentence, emphasizes that he is the source of the information that follows. He then poses the first rhetorical question, “Why should we have to flee the cities we created for the security of the suburbs?” As Chafe (2013) notes, wh-questions assert that a situation is real, in this case that “we” are “flee[ing] the cities we created for the security of the suburbs.” The rhetorical question, however, also asserts another reality. As Cerović (2016) notes, positive rhetorical questions assert the reality of the negative situation, so by asking “why should we...” Roof is asserting, “we should not.” His use of the rhetorical question indicates that he has primary epistemic rights to this information (Heritage 2012) while still, as Badarneh and Migdadi (2018) suggest, creating an apparent dialogue with the reader that engages them and heightens their involvement. Roof follows with a second rhetorical question to which he immediately provides his own response, “Why are the suburbs secure in the first place? Because they are White.” This further strengthens his positioning as an authority on the subject, one who already has all the answers. In addition, it
is a powerful way to naturalize the notion that whiteness equals security. The immediate answer to the rhetorical question suggests that this is the only answer. The rhetorical question is being used as what Gales calls a “contracting utterance” (2011, 42), which displays strong commitment by closing off further debate and disallowing any alternative perspectives. Roof’s immediate response to the question suggests that his is the only or most natural answer to the question, thereby closing off further debate on the subject.

In Example 4.7b, Roof introduces a new topic, the white separatist plan for an aryan nation in the Pacific Northwest called the Northwest Front, and then again immediately offers his explicitly personal evaluation, “I think this idea is beyond stupid,” positioning himself as one who has an opinion that should be listened to and valued, one who has the knowledge within his epistemic domain to make a judgment on this matter. As before, he uses the rhetorical question that follows, “Why should I for example, give up the beauty and history of my state to go to the Northwest? [sic]” to assert the opposite truth, “I should not.” Again, the rhetorical nature of this question positions Roof as already possessing the epistemic rights to an answer. Part of the power of rhetorical questions is their ability to make these assertions in a way such that readers often accept them, possibly even believing that the logic that they have been given is of their own devising as Ranganath, et al. (2018) and Gass and Seiter (2015) suggest.

Whereas Roof primarily uses rhetorical questions as a resource to assert that he already has the answers, thereby claiming epistemic authority for himself, in the Howler text Cobb uses rhetorical questions primarily to position the reader. Cobb spends much of his essay describing violent crimes that have been perpetrated against white Americans, mostly women, by individuals whom he identifies as nonwhite. Several of the cases will be discussed at length in
Section 4.4. After explaining one such case in which a woman was murdered, Cobb poses a rhetorical question, to which he immediately provides an answer.

**Example 4.7**

“The Aryan Alternative asks you, White reader: Is your daughter next? The answer is yes, if you’re Mr. Tharp.”

There is a non-rhetorical interpretation of this question, in which Cobb is posing it for the reader to ponder and he is providing one possible response, though not necessarily usurping the reader’s right to provide their own answer. However, Cobb does provide his own preferred response, as one does with a rhetorical question. The conditional “if” in his response activates an irrealis mood in which Cobb asserts that the statement would be true if the reader were Mr. Tharp, which suggests that the statement is not true, given that the reader is very likely not. At the same time, though, Cobb’s response enables him to invoke a situation in which someone’s daughter, Marissa Tharp, was indeed victimized, and so therefore the line between irrealis and realis in this situation may be thin. If it could happen to Mr. Tharp, it could happen to the reader.

As Chafe (2013) notes, yes/no questions function differently than wh-questions. Rather than asserting an epistemic claim, a traditional yes/no question invites the listener to present an epistemic assessment by stating whether an event or state is real or not. In this case the situation is whether the “White reader[‘s]” daughter could be the next victim of violence. With an interpretation of this question which emphasizes the rhetorical nature of Cobb’s preferred response, Cobb claims the epistemic authority to answer, asserting the reality of “yes,” an epistemic claim which he strengthens by mentioning the father of a white woman who was indeed murdered, Mr. Tharp. Because the conditional is only true if the reader is Mr. Tharp, a more accurate response to Cobb’s question might be “no, unless you’re Mr. Tharp” or “if you’re Mr. Tharp the answer is yes.” However, the power of the rhetorical question affords Cobb the
opportunity to claim the primary epistemic right to answer in a form of his choosing. The answer he provides frontloads the positive response by beginning with the forceful assertion, “the answer is yes,” therefore giving his preferred response greater emphasis than the conditional, which becomes almost an afterthought. Given Cobb’s repeated assertions throughout his essay that African Americans, Hispanics, and Jews all pose a threat to white people, the conclusion that Cobb wishes the reader to draw is clearly that yes, they and their family are potential victims. The use of the rhetorical question, which leads the reader by the hand to a conclusion rather than directly asserting it (Ranganath, et al. 2018; Gass and Seiter 2015), is a powerful tool in this instance because the work of positioning the reader as a victim is not solely accomplished by Cobb. Rather, the reader is invited to position him/herself as a potential victim. Other ways in which Cobb positions his ingroup as victims of violence will be discussed in the next section.

4.4 Positioning the Ingroup and Outgroup

One of the findings of the corpus analysis in Chapter 3 is that Hunters present themselves and their ingroups differently in relation to the target outgroup than do Howlers, as evidenced by the significantly different distribution of participant roles that appeared with verbs of violence and anger. The corpus analysis showed that Hunters tend to represent themselves and their ingroup as Agents of violence and Sensors of hatred, while Howlers are more likely to describe themselves or their ingroups as victims (see Section 3.7.3 in Chapter 3). A qualitative analysis of positioning illustrates how Hunters and Howlers construct different relationships between themselves, their ingroups, and their outgroups, as well as situate these players in a storyline of victimhood/victimization.
4.4.1 Vague “Problems” and Unclear Victimhood in the Hunter Text

Example 4.8 shows Roof positioning his ingroup, white Americans, as the innocent victims of implicit persecution, but the specifics of this persecution and the harms it causes the ingroup is left highly vague. The vague statements in the passage have been bolded for emphasis.

Example 4.8
“I wish with a passion that niggers were treated terribly throughout history by Whites, that every White person had an ancestor who owned slaves, that segregation was an evil an [sic] oppressive institution, and so on. Because if it was all it [sic] true, it would make it so much easier for me to accept our current situation. But it isnt [sic] true. None of it is. We are told to accept what is happening to us because of ancestors [sic] wrong doing, but it is all based on historical lies, exaggerations and myths. I have tried endlessly to think of reasons we deserve this, and I have only came [sic] back more irritated because there are no reasons.”

Roof mentions “every White person had an ancestor who owned slaves” and then a few sentences later references “ancestors” again, indicating the same ancestors of “every White person” mentioned before. The “wrong doing” refers back to the aforementioned “evil an [sic] oppressive institution” of slavery and segregation. This illustrates that the “us,” those facing the consequences of the “ancestors [sic] wrong doing,” also refers to “every White person.” He positions this white ingroup as innocent victims of “historical lies, exaggerations and myths,” being treated in a manner for which he asserts “there are no reasons.” In this way, Roof positions his white ingroup as maligned and victimized, but what precise form this victimhood takes is unclear.

Roof alludes to a “current situation” affecting his established “us,” but he never clearly defines what that situation is, or exactly “what is happening to us.” He uses the demonstrative pronoun “this” (“I have tried endlessly to think of reasons we deserve this”) which, in the absence of a specific reference, relies entirely on the reader to interpret the meaning, providing no specification at all regarding exactly what harms Roof is describing. However, by his
assertion that “what is happening” is rationalized by “ancestors [sic] wrong doing” and his fruitless efforts to “think of reasons we deserve this,” the reader is led to assume that “our current situation” is both negative and undeserved. By not explaining the “situation”, Roof positions the reader as someone who is in need of no explanation. Knowledge of “our current situation” becomes what Stalnaker describes as common ground, “the mutually recognized shared information in a situation in which an act of trying to communicate takes place” (Stalnaker 2002, 704). In other words, it is a “common or mutual belief,” or a belief that the author/speaker presumes to be mutual. In this case, Roof is presuming the common ground that there is a negative, unfair situation regarding race relations and the status of white people in America. In other words, he is prepositioning the reader as part of an ingroup who recognizes his concerns. Because the reader is assumed to come to the text already understanding the problems Roof is discussing, his stance becomes one of not educating or explaining, but of commiserating with an ingroup.

This pattern continues in Example 4.10 where Roof alludes to “the Jewish problem and other issues facing our race,” but the threat or danger that the “problem and other issues” pose is never made explicit, nor are the concomitant harms to which the ingroup may fall victim. Emphasis has been added in each example.

**Example 4.10**

a) From here I found out about the Jewish problem and other issues facing our race, and I can say today that I am completely racially aware.

b) I think it is is [sic] fitting to start off with the group [African Americans] I have the most real life experience with, and the group that is the biggest problem for Americans. Niggers are stupid and violent.

c) Black people are racially aware almost from birth, but White people on average dont [sic] think about race in their daily lives. And this is our problem.
d) Hispanics are obviously a huge problem for Americans.

What is “the biggest problem” represented by African Americans? Why is it “our problem” that “White people on average dont [sic] think about race in their daily lives” and what detriment is it causing? In what way are “Hispanics...a huge problem?” Roof never answers these questions or explicitly explains the harms being caused to “Americans.” He follows the assertion of a “problem” with the declarative that “Niggers are stupid and violent,” which through proximity invites the reader to connect the two notions, but he never makes a clear statement that such ignorance or violence is the “problem” to which he refers. And though he explicitly positions African Americans as violent, he does not specify that his ingroup are the victims of that violence.

Roof portrays an ingroup victim more explicitly in Example 4.11 when he describes a theoretical child in a predominantly African American school who is “picked on” for his race. However, his choice of the phrase “picked on,” does not strongly position the theoretical ingroup member as a victim.

Example 4.11
“What about the White children who, because of school zoning laws, are forced to go to a school that is 90 percent black? Do we really think that that White kid will be able to go one day without being picked on for being White, or called a “white boy”? And who is fighting for him? Who is fighting for these White people forced by economic circumstances to live among negroes?”

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the phrasal verb “pick on” as to “repeatedly single (someone) out for criticism or unkind treatment in a way perceived to be unfair” (OED Online “picked on”). “Picked on” does not connote any level of violence and the experience of being picked on is often thought to be a fairly normal part of childhood. Though unkind and unfair, there are no specific harms being described; the hypothetical child is not described as in
fear for his life or safety, nor is depicted as emotionally harmed beyond what might be considered a typical childhood experience. Similarly, it is unclear what detriment is befalling the “White people forced by economic circumstances to live among negroes” that requires them to need “fighting for.” As an articulation of the “problem,” this hypothetical scenario is vague at best and does not strongly position Roof’s white ingroup as victims.

The only time Roof does explicitly position white Americans as victims of obvious and explicit harm is when he is criticizing American patriotism. “Modern American patriotism is an absolute joke. People pretending like they have something to be proud [of] while White people are being murdered daily in the streets.” Here he does propose that “White people” are in danger of being murdered, and he does so using the present progressive construction “are being murdered.” This construction suggests that the action is ongoing and will continue into the future, that white people have been and will continue to be murdered. However, it asserts this in a passive construction, invisibilizing who is doing the murdering. Although Roof positions his ingroup as victims, it is not explicitly at the hands of any of the groups towards which Roof expresses hatred. This proposition could be just as true if white people were murdered exclusively by other “White people.” Roof’s ingroup may be positioned as the potential victims of murder, but this does not implicate the African Americans, Jews, and Hispanics that Roof rails against.

4.4.2 Explicit Victims and Victimizers in the Howler Text

Roof’s failure to position the target of his hatred in a role of victimizer stands in sharp contrast to Cobb, who explicitly positions his white ingroup as victims of violent crimes at the hands of those whom he hates. He describes specific harms that are and will continue to be
perpetrated against white people, and accuses specific groups of committing them, as can be seen in Example 4.12.

Example 4.12

a) It is a priceless advantage to live among civilized Whites, but the black man and the brown man and the jew don’t appreciate that. Instead, they repay our generosity with assaults, rapes, murders, and lies – and endless complaints that we treat them unfairly.

b) Home Depot is known for giving money to build shelters for day laborers – illegal invaders just like Mr. Rodriguez above – guys who just come here to work...and to rape/torture/murder our women.

c) If the government cared about white lives, it wouldn’t uncage niggers and admit Mexicans who have proved time after time that crime is what they do, what they are – their life. Whether genocidal self-interest or delusional utopianism, the government’s attempt to coerce integration is literally killing us as individuals and as a race.

In Example 4.12a Cobb is asserting that “the black man and the brown man and the jew” assault, rape, murder, lie to, and complain about “civilized Whites.” Though some of these accusations are more serious than others, all of them position Cobb’s ingroup as potential victims and the hated nonwhites as aggressors. An important part of positioning is the situation of individuals and events along emerging storylines (Harré, et al. 2009). Cobb is constructing a storyline where generous, under-appreciated “civilized Whites” are the protagonists, threatened by the “the black man and the brown man and the jew” who are positioned in contrast to the “civilized Whites,” as savage, ungrateful, and violent antagonists. Example 4.12b is the same. This time the victims of the storyline are white women who are the proverbial damsels in distress, in danger of “rape/torture/murder” by the enemies, “illegal invaders,” who in this case are equated with presumably undocumented “day laborers.” Invoking the traditionally hispanic name “Mr. Rodriguez,” Cobb is positioning these “day laborers” as hispanic, therefore positioning white women as potential victims of violence perpetrated by hispanic men. This
positioning is strengthened through repetition in Example 4.12c. In this example “niggers” and “Mexicans” are positioned as perpetually and inherently criminals. Criminal behavior is presented as an enduring (“time after time”) and inevitable part of their nature (“crime is what they do, what they are – their life”). Juxtaposing this assertion with the conditional statement “if the government cared about white lives” suggests that the government does not, heightening a positioning of the ingroup as isolated and in danger. The strengthening epistemic adverb “literally” in the proposition “integration is literally killing us as individuals and as a race,” suggests that the danger is not an exaggeration, strengthening both Cobb’s commitment to the assertion and his positioning of his white ingroup as victims of “crimes” and in mortal danger.

Harré, et al. discuss positionings as features of a “moral landscape,” in that they indicate rights and duties which are “shorthand terms for clusters of moral (normative) presuppositions which people believe or are told or slip into” (2009, 9). In this way, by activating a storyline where Cobb’s white ingroup is in peril from the outgroup, who he positions as mortal enemies, Cobb is activating the right and duty of the ingroup to protect itself. This also conforms to a characteristic function of incitement to genocide rhetoric which Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016) call a threat of destruction, whereby violence is represented as justifiable in self-defense due to the aggression and threat posed by the group against which the genocidal intentions are directed.

The suggestion that the Howlers more frequently characterize themselves or their ingroup as the victim of the anger and violence of the outgroup was a striking finding of the corpus analysis in the previous chapter. The qualitative analysis complicates that finding by suggesting that the Hunter also portray his ingroup as victims, though in a vaguer way, using phrases such as a “huge problem” and “what is happening to us.” It may be that Howlers do not actually
position the ingroup as victims more frequently than the Hunters, only more explicitly. Rather than clearly define the harms perpetrated by the outgroup against the ingroup, as the Howler Cobb does, the Hunter Roof relies on the presupposition that the reader shares a common ground with him regarding the nature of the problems. When he is more explicit about the nature of the ingroup’s victimhood, he is vague about the agent of the harm (e.g. “White people are being murdered daily in the streets”) or presents the harm as mild (e.g. “being picked on for being White”). Roof does not express certain knowledge about the specific details of his ingroup’s victimization and therefore suggests weaker commitment to a notion of ingroup victimhood. In contrast, as outlined above, the qualitative analysis supports the findings of Chapter 3 which suggests that the Howler displays strong commitment to the proposition of his ingroup as victims. Cobb is highly explicit about the violence and harm to which his ingroup is subject, particularly women (e.g. “rape/torture/murder our women”). This is reinforced through repeated mention of cases in which white women were murdered by those who Cobb counts amongst the outgroup and the use of the epistemic adverb “literally” to suggest certainty and seriousness in “literally killing us as individuals and as a race.” Cobb activates storylines of mortal danger where the ingroup are generous and innocent protagonists and the outgroup are enemies lying in wait to violently attack or even kill the ingroup. As Harré, et al. (2009) suggest, positioning implies certain rights and duties and this positioning suggests that the ingroup may have the right and responsibility to act on the situation in their own defense.

4.5 Evidentiality – Ways of Knowing in the Hunter and Howler Texts

Recall that epistemic stance is a type of stance which specifically refers to how knowledge is claimed and how strongly propositions are asserted (Ochs 1989). Practically
speaking, it considers what is the source of the propositional content being asserted and how strongly committed is the author/speaker to the assertion. As was discussed in Section 4.1.2, stance is the dialogic result of positioning, evaluation, and alignment (Du Bois 2007). As such, it is impossible to completely prevent a discussion of positioning from touching on stances, as has been clear from the prior sections. However, this section will focus more narrowly and thoroughly on the sources from which the Hunter and Howler draw their propositions and the ways in which these evidentials indicate stance and illustrate commitment.

4.5.1 The Hunter’s Ways of Knowing

The source of much of the propositional content in the Hunter text is personal experience, as denoted by the repeated use of first person declarative constructions to convey sensory evidential information gathered from personal experience through the senses (e.g. “I saw” and “while watching”) and inferential evidentiality, information that is the result of cognitive processes (e.g. “I have tried...to think” or “I believe”) (Cornillie 2018). Examples of these evidential sources in the Hunter text are presented in Example 4.13. Emphasis has been added to highlight the evidential claims which will be the focus of the analysis to come.

Example 4.13

a) From this point I researched deeper and found out what was happening in Europe. I saw that the same things were happening in England and France, and in all the other Western European countries.

b) I remember while watching hispanic television stations, the shows and even the commercials were more White than our own.

c) I have tried endlessly to think of reasons we deserve this, and I have only come back more irritated because there are no reasons.

d) I believe that even if we made up only 30 percent of the population we could take it back completely.
Following Chafe’s (1986) taxonomy of ways of knowing, which differs slightly from Cornillie’s framework (2018), Examples 4.13a and 4.13b would be described as cases of inductive modes of knowing based on sensory evidence, since these statements emphasize Roof’s observations and thoughts as the evidential origin of the content he presents. As Chafe notes, induction based on explicit sensory evidence (what one hears, sees, feels, etc.), tends to be perceived as high in reliability. Roof takes advantage of this in Example 4.13a when he presents his knowledge of race relations in other countries as based on his own sensory observations (“I saw…”). This statement is made after Roof describes “I researched deeper and found out what was happening in Europe,” suggesting that the information was gathered from second-hand sources and is therefore probably based on less reliable hearsay evidence (Chafe 1986), not direct experiences through international travel. However, Roof’s language obscures that fact. Rather than report “I read…” he opts for a sensory verb, “saw” that emphasizes his role as the subjective filter through which the information is presented. In Example 4.13b he reports a remembered sensory experience of watching television as the data on which he bases his conclusions, “I remember while watching...”. As Chafe (1986) notes, experiencing something directly suggests strong commitment and reliability. Though Example 4.13a likely does not reference direct personal experience and Example 4.13b is qualified as being a direct experience mitigated by the cognitive process of memory, both sensory evidential claims suggest strong commitment, even if credibility may be mitigated by the aforementioned conditions.

In Examples 4.13c and 4.13d Roof attributes the propositional content to his inferential cognitive processes (“I...think...”, “I believe...”). In her thorough work on the epistemic phrase “I think,” Kärkkäinen (2003) notes that the phrase has often been analyzed as a marker of
tentativeness (indicating uncertainty), or deliberateness (indicating certainty and reassurance), but she proposes that it is also a way of introducing the speaker’s personal perspective into the discourse and indicating that an upcoming turn will contain that new perspective. In the case of 4.13c, “I have tried endlessly...to think” foregrounds that the perspective is directly from the author, indicating strong personal involvement, and also suggests that the idea that “there are no reasons” is a new perspective offered by Roof. The use of the modifying adverb “endlessly,” indicating that extraordinary time and effort has been dedicated to the cognitive endeavor, emphasizes surety and strengthens the commitment it expresses. Similarly, Example 4.13d expresses strong commitment because it articulates Roof’s belief, “I believe that...” Beliefs are another mode of knowing described by Chafe (1986); he claims that beliefs are as not highly concerned with evidence because though evidence may be provided for beliefs, they are strong personally held notions which are always based on something beyond simple evidence. Beliefs imply emotional investment, in contrast to cognitive processes such as inductive or deductive reasoning, which are not as emotionally charged. The dimension of emotional investment inherent in the mental process of believing indicates that “I believe that even if we made up only 30 percent of the population we could take it back completely” asserts strong commitment.

4.5.2 Indirect Hearsay Across Both Hunter and Howler Texts

The way of knowing that displays the weakest commitment is reportative evidentiality, information which is attributed to an external source (Cornillie 2018; Ricci and Rossari 2018), which Chafe (1986) calls hearsay. Though the majority of the propositional content of the Hunter text is presented as Roof’s experiences or thoughts, he also invokes hearsay evidence. Chafe notes that hearsay can be precise, in which the source of the information is clear, or it can be
indirect, in which the reported information is derived from a source which remains unclear. Less direct hearsay evidentials express less reliability. These are the kind that Roof uses in Example 4.14; emphasis has been added for illustration.

Example 4.14

a) **Only a fourth to a third of people in the South owned even one slave.** Yet every White person is treated as if they had a slave owning ancestor.

b) **The fact is** that how good a school is considered directly corresponds to how White it is.

c) **Negroes have lower Iqs [sic], lower impulse control, and higher testosterone levels in generals.**

d) **It is a well known fact** that White hispanics make up the elite of most hispanics [sic] countries.

The claim in Example 4.14a that “**only a fourth to a third of people in the South owned even one slave,**” is presented as a historical fact, but no evidential source is provided to support the claim. Similarly, the idea in Example 4.14b, that the quality of a school is proportional to its population of white students, and the inflammatory claims regarding African Americans’ IQs and hormones in 4.14c are presented uncritically as natural “**fact[s],**” with no true evidential support. This is strikingly evident in Example 4.14d in which Roof declares that an unsubstantiated claim, “**that White hispanics make up the elite of most hispanics [sic] countries,**” is “**a well known fact.**” It is not even clear what Roof means by “**White hispanics**” let alone where such a claim might have originated. Though all these statements seem to allude to an evidentiary source or well of common knowledge that Roof is drawing upon, it is not at all clear what that source is. As before, these statements might be assuming a foundation of common knowledge, but why Roof would expect his reader to know these very specific facts is unclear. The fact that these assertions are indirect and highly vague hearsay evidentials displays weak reliability.

In contrast to the Hunter text, in which Roof prefers evidential claims based on induction and sensory evidence and only rarely uses hearsay evidentials, Cobb’s evidential sources in the
Howler text tend strongly toward hearsay, with very few inductive evidential claims. In addition, the precise sources of Cobb’s hearsay evidentials are, similar to Roof’s few hearsay claims, often indirect. This can be seen in Example 4.15 (again, emphasis has been added).

**Example 4.15**

*a) Their average IQ, in Africa, borders on retarded – 70 to our 100. That, and no other reason, is why Africa never developed. You can’t say it on tv or in papers, of course, but the fact is known among academicians who study the stuff.*

*b) Authorities say j-bunny Baskins is responsible for murdering, robbing and raping at least eight other people.*

*c) The accused, one Shantez Hairston, 25, was an ex-con who drove around White college campuses in his Caddy. Marissa is said to have been "involved" with him, though her father, after she was killed, denied it.*

*d) Home Depot is known for giving money to build shelters for day laborers – illegal invaders just like Mr. Rodriguez.*

*e) Time after time polls have shown we don’t want rapist Rodriguez and murderer Martinez in this country.*

Cobb is using the same indirect hearsay strategies as Roof does in Example 4.14, appealing to unspecified common knowledge (“*Home Depot is known for...*”) and unnamed sources (“*the fact is known among academicians...*”, “*Marissa is said to have been...*”, “*polls have shown...*”, “*Authorities say...*”). Though both Cobb and Roof’s hearsay evidentials have vague sources, Cobb tends to claim that his sources are specifically authoritative. Whereas Roof asserts “*the fact is...*” and “*it is a well known fact...,*” Cobb cites “*academicians who study the stuff*” as the source of the IQ claims he makes in 4.15a and “*authorities*” who report the crimes of “*j-bunny Baskins*” in 4.15b and “*polls have shown,*” which suggests some organization that has conducted research. Though they are not at all specific, the assumption is that “*academicians, “authorities,”*” and polling organizations have some particular expertise or specialized knowledge that make them authoritative, in comparison to the unspecified common
knowledge that Roof cites. However, the reader is left to wonder who exactly are these “academicians” and “authorities”; the sources are still not clear. Similarly, citing a poll in 4.15e makes a claim seem credible and scientific, but Cobb does not specify which poll, who was polled, or any exact information that would be needed to track down, confirm, or refute this information. Because they are so vague, these hearsay evidentials assert a weak claim of reality and therefore weak commitment.

Cobb also uses hearsay evidentials in the form of direct quotations, which are sometimes attributed and sometimes left vague, as can be seen in Example 4.16.

**Example 4.16**

a) Rodriguez’ indictment says Sjodin was killed "in an especially heinous, cruel and depraved manner."

b) Laura Higgins, 28, was shot in the back at the warehouse where she worked by shitskin Lamar Baskins [sic] Jr. Laura's niece said of the black demon: "It's sickening, it really is, because he was in jail before and he should have stayed there."

c) FACT: “AIDS affects nearly seven times more African Americans and three times more Hispanics than whites.” (Centers for Disease Control)

As was previously mentioned, direct quotations can be analyzed as what Tannen (2007) calls “constructed dialogue.” She notes that even when speech is reproduced verbatim, the addition of a different context invariably changes the meaning, as it does in the above cases. There is no way to fact check whether or not these are complete and accurate reproductions of prior language, whether they are paraphrasings, or total fabrications. However, regardless of their accuracy, constructing this language in new contexts repurposes it to support Cobb’s claims, while appropriating the authority of the original source. Asserting direct hearsay evidentiality allows the author to present the propositional content as unbiased, because it is a quote from
another source, while covertly allowing him to introduce his own perspective by manipulating
the context in which the quote appears.

In Examples 4.16a and 4.16b, Cobb employs constructed dialogue to claim the enhanced
authority of someone with personal knowledge or involvement in the content being discussed.
Each example references a murder case, the murder of Dru Sjodin in 4.16a and of Laura Powell
Higgins in 4.16b. Dru Sjodin was a twenty-two year old University of North Dakota college
student who was abducted in November 2003 from the Columbia Mall in Grand Forks, North
Dakota by Alfonso Rodriguez Jr. Rodriguez, who had previously served a 23-year prison term
for rape, aggravated assault, and kidnapping (Bell n.d.). The crime prompted the creation of the
Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Registry, an online searchable database of sex
offenders in the United States. The case Cobb references in Example 4.16b is the December
2002 robbery and murder of twenty-eight year old Laura Powell Higgins in Houston, Texas by
Lamar Baskin Jr. (Davis 2005). Houston homicide investigators tied Baskin to the shooting of
five other individuals and three sexual assaults. Cobb erroneously refers to Baskin as “Baskins.”

Example 4.16a is purportedly quoting the indictment of Alfonso Rodriguez. An
indictment is the formal statement of charges brought against someone in the U.S. legal system.
Repurposing the language apparently from the indictment presents a stance of objective
credibility because it is the official recounting of Rodriguez’s crimes as presented in a court of
law. It also allows Cobb to introduce evaluation, that the crime was “especially heinous, cruel
and depraved,” as objective judgments from the official indictment, distanced from his own
subjective opinions. In truth, because the language is removed from its original context, those
evaluative adjectives could be referring to anything described within the indictment, or they may
not be in the indictment at all. The statement is, therefore, still very much representative of the subjective choices made by Cobb when recontextualizing the quotation for his reader. However, by presenting it as constructed dialogue, Cobb is displaying low personal involvement and attempting to exploit the credibility of an official legal document. In his work on narratives, Labov defines credibility as “the extent to which listeners believe that the events described actually occurred in the form described by the narrator (1997, 407). Though not specifically in the context of a narrative, credibility in this situation could be considered the extent to which a reader believes the claims made by Cobb. Labov mentions that the appearance of objectivity, which he defines as knowledge gained by an author’s personal experience as opposed to internal reaction, emotion, or memory, may increase credibility. If that is the case, Example 4.16a claims strong credibility by virtue of its presentation as the objective report of the indictment, rather than as Cobb’s internal emotional reaction to his knowledge of the crimes.

Example 4.16b is similar. Cobb cites a quotation from Higgins’ niece referencing her aunt’s murderer and the fact that her murderer had a prior history of violence, “It’s sickening, it really is, because he [Baskin] was in jail before and he should have stayed there.” Again, utilizing the words of an individual with strong personal involvement and knowledge about the situation gives Cobb’s assertion credibility. As Labov (1997) indicates, direct, objective personal experience claims strong credibility; the niece of the murder victim certainly has a much more direct connection to the case than Cobb, and therefore shows higher credibility than he would. Cobb employs her quotation to borrow her strong commitment borne of her personal involvement, while showing low involvement and commitment himself through the hearsay evidentials. Cobb also recontextualizes the quotation to support his own proposition. For all a
discerning reader knows, the quotation may have originally been describing the failure of the criminal justice system as “sickening” rather than Baskin, or it may be a total invention of Cobb that he simply attributes to Higgins’ niece. However, Cobb makes the unsupported claim that the quote was “said of the black demon [Baskin],” making her words serve his own ends.

The final example of a direct quotation as hearsay evidential is a “FACT” ascribed to the (U.S.) Center for Disease Control (CDC), that “AIDS affects nearly seven times more African Americans and three times more Hispanics than whites.” Cobb cites this in the text almost as one would cite an academic source. However, unlike an academic citation, there is not quite enough information about the publication source or data to fact check the claim. Even if one does take the statistic at face value, it is hard to believe that the CDC intended it to be construed as supporting claims of racial superiority. More likely, CDC researchers would argue that this statistic highlights confounding factors of economic inequality and a lack of equal access to healthcare and proper sex-education in the United States. But by decontextualizing and repurposing the quotation, Cobb’s assertion gets the apparent support of a well-respected government agency which establishes a more credible stance than his own subjective opinion would.

In a comparison of the ways of knowing which the two texts employ, the Hunter uses mostly inductive sensory and inferential evidence based on his own subjective experiences and cognitive processes. This suggest high personal involvement in what he is communicating and a strong commitment. When he does use hearsay evidentials, they are highly vague and suggest weak commitment; however, he uses very few of this type of evidential claim. This is in contrast to the Howler, who displays a preference for hearsay evidentials. He often assigns the evidence
on which his hearsay is based to authoritative sources, such as “academicians” or law enforcement “authorities.” Though this may represent an attempt to borrow the authority or expertise of these sources, it displays low personal involvement because none of the information comes from the author himself; the author is positioned as having no primary epistemic rights to the information (Heritage 2012). This lack of involvement and epistemic rights corresponds to low reliability and commitment. The tradeoff Cobb makes for low commitment is the increased credibility which he gains through constructed dialogue in which he presents hearsay as the objective information from authoritative sources like official indictments or the CDC. He creatively recontextualizes these quotations for his own purposes and exploits the credibility they invoke.

4.6 Conclusions

This work takes a mixed-methods approach which incorporates both corpus analysis and discourse analysis. The quantitative viewpoint reveals how language patterns in the hate speech of Hunters and Howlers, while qualitative investigation suggests in greater depth how and why those patterns emerge and provides insight into nuanced usages that a corpus analysis alone could not reveal. Providing this deeper qualitative perspective is the motivation behind the consideration of the two research questions which this chapter explores: How do the authors of hate speech position themselves, their ingroups, and the target outgroups/objects of hatred and does this differ between Hunters and Howlers? What epistemic stances do the authors of hate speech take, what do these stances indicate about their commitment to their hate, and does this differ between Hunters and Howlers?
The Hunter positions himself in a storyline of a personal journey to knowledge which emphasizes his final position as knowledgeable and “completely racially aware.” He uses numerous first person singular pronouns to foreground his role as the originator or synthesizer of the information he relays, emphasizing his role in the evidential chain even when the information is clearly not based on his first-hand experience or inference. This positions him as knowledgeable and suggests that the topics about which he writes are within his epistemic domain, giving him primary epistemic rights as an authority on these subjects. He also positions himself as a reluctant hero who must inevitably act on the information he presents. This positioning conforms to previous findings in threat assessment literature that expressions of inevitability are correlated with increased risk of violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).

The Howler positions himself explicitly with exclusive first person plural pronouns and referents which conflate the singular author with the plural identity of the entire publication (e.g. “The Aryan Alternative asks…”). As has been seen in other research, Cobb’s use of plural referents positions him as a member of a larger group who shares his concerns, situating the content he communicates as the declarations of a group (Tan and Moghaddam 1995; Badarneh and Migdadi 2018). He also uses constructed dialogue to voice other characters in his essay and position himself in relation to them. He positions himself as having the support of others by his reciprocal positioning of a bereaved father whose violent anger, he suggests, aligns with his own ideology, and as wise and well-informed by positioning himself in opposition to a woman who he paints as ignorant and gullible. Both authors position themselves as claiming the authority to
speak from a vantage point of knowledge, but they accomplish this positioning in different ways, using different strategies, including different types of pronouns.

The two corpora differ strikingly in the ways in which authors position their ingroups and outgroups. Furthering the findings presented in Chapter 3 that Howlers more frequently cast their ingroups as victims of the anger and violence of the outgroup, this analysis suggests that it might not be that Howlers position their ingroup as victims more frequently than Hunters, but that they do so more explicitly and that they explicitly position their hated outgroups as the agents of that victimization, where the Hunters do not. Though the Hunter does repeatedly allude to “a huge problem” which affects the ingroup, he does not explicitly define or explain this problem. He constructs the vision of a child “picked on” for his race and does once assert that “White people are being murdered daily in the streets,” which positions his ingroup as victims of a threat, but because the circumstances and agents of this victimization are left so vague, there is no concomitant positioning of the outgroup as aggressors.

This is very different from the Howler who strongly and explicitly positions his ingroup as victims of violent crime and clearly positions the outgroup as criminals. He does this through explicit assertions (e.g. “illegal invaders...who just come here to work...and to rape/torture/murder our women”) and by repeatedly mentioning cases in which white individuals were the victims of violent crimes by nonwhite perpetrators. By using these cases to position the outgroup, Cobb is engaging in a strategy that has been noted in rhetoric which incites genocidal violence – he is conflating the crimes of the individual with the guilt of the group (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).
The second research question considers what epistemic stances Hunters and Howlers take and how they strengthen or weaken the commitment that they demonstrate. Previous work has noted that commitment can be expressed through epistemic markers which communicate certainty regarding a proposition (Kärrkäinen 2003) and through modes of knowing which demonstrate high reliability and personal involvement (Cornillie 2018; Chafe 1986). The Hunter’s prodigious use of first person singular pronouns situates him as closely involved with his propositional content, and his tendency to use evidential claims which are presented as inductions based on sensory experiences suggest high reliability and commitment. However, Roof displays weak commitment to his positioning of the ingroup as victims. The vagueness with which he asserts the positioning of his ingroup as victims assumes his reader already understands the problems he describes and therefore constructs a stance more of commiseration over an unfair situation than of warning of real existential peril.

Overall, Roof seems more concerned with explaining the rationale of his actions, rather than motivating the reader to act. He positions himself in a storyline where he is the informed and inevitable savior; though he assumes a common ground of understanding and sympathy towards the “problem” he vaguely describes, he presents his experiences and inferences to highlight his personal racial enlightenment, commiserate regarding the problems he knows the reader also faces, and ultimately present himself as the only one who can act as a savior. His strong commitment also suggests that his stance is one of justifying or explaining actions which he already believes to be necessary.

The Howler employs strategies which display lower commitment. The fact that Cobb constructs his identity as one member of a group diffuses responsibility for his claims, displaying
low personal involvement and weak commitment. The Howler draws his authority from a positioning as the spokesperson for a larger group who shares his ideology. This gives his claims the veneer of credibility, but also serves to distance him from a personal connection to the assertions. Diffusing responsibility shows weaker commitment to the ideology. His preference for hearsay evidentiality also indicates low personal involvement and suggests weak commitment.

Cobb primarily claims external sources of his knowledge through hearsay evidentials which suggest that he is synthesizing and presenting ideas supported by the evidence of others. While this may be a strategy to bolster authority by borrowing credibility from others, it also weakens personal involvement as it dilutes direct personal responsibility for the propositions. Overall, this projects a more detached and less emotionally involved stance than that of the Hunter. This is combined with Cobb’s strong, repeated positioning of his ingroup as potential victims in a storyline where “they [the black man and the brown man and the jew] repay our [civilized Whites] generosity with assaults, rapes, murders, and lies.” His white ingroup are positioned in contrast to the outgroup who, in Cobb’s constructed storyline, are the violent antagonists. He constructs these positions through elaborate descriptions of white individuals who have been the victims of violence purportedly perpetrated by his hated outgroups, African Americans and Hispanic Americans. In this way, his stance seems to be one of inciting the reader to violence by exploiting strategies such as raising a threat of destruction and conflating individual crimes with group guilt, which have been noted in “dangerous speech” associated with incitement to genocide (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). Within the context of this dissertation, these findings suggest that the Hunter and Howler examined here differ in the
stances they take towards their ingroup audience (commiserating or warning/inciting) and how they position the characters in their texts – both themselves (either closely involved with a mandate for action or distanced as the spokesperson of a group), and their outgroups (as a vague “problem” or as an explicit threat). Whereas both authors position their ingroups as victims, the narrative of victimhood was far stronger and more explicit in the Howler text. This is in line with the findings of the corpus analysis in Chapter 3, but the qualitative analysis suggests the more nuanced picture that the Hunter also positions his ingroup as victims only in much less explicit terms and with no concomitant positioning of the outgroup as victimizer.

In addition to suggesting the ways in which a Hunter and Howler construct different positions and stances, this analysis also highlights the numerous ways in which positioning can be accomplished in a monologic form, in this case an essay or manifesto-style writing. Pronouns, constructed dialogue, and rhetorical questions served to position the authors, ingroups, and outgroups. This analysis also demonstrated how an authoritative stance of expertise, which both authors claim, can be constructed using different, seemingly opposite strategies, through the use of first person singular or plural pronouns.

Finally, this chapter draws strong parallels between the Howler’s language and that which has been noted in “dangerous speech” associated with incitement to genocide, such as a threat of destruction and conflating individual crimes with group guilt (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). This suggests that the underlying purpose of the Hunter and Howler hate speech may be different. As Calhoun and Weston (2009) suggest, Hunters’ hate speech may express intense personal grievances which they see as only addressable through violence, but contrary to what has been noted before, Howlers may be engaging more in incitement than in a simple expression
of grievances. Though they may not intend to act themselves, the similarities between the rhetoric of the Howler and incitement to genocide rhetoric suggests that hate speech Howlers may be taking the role of inciter, using their hate speech primarily to inflame the hatred and violent actions of others.
Chapter 5 Concluding Thoughts

To return to the account of events presented at the outset of this dissertation, alleged mass murderer Robert Bowers posted vile sentiments on a publicly accessible social media website prior to the shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue. In the news coverage, Bowers’ words were called hate speech, an assessment which would be supported by the definition proposed in this work. In discussing the murder of eleven people at his synagogue, Rabbi Jeffrey Myers said “hate speech leads to what happened in my sanctuary” (Burke 2018). He may be right, but it is luckily true that not all people who express hate speech act violently in the way Robert Bowers is alleged to have done. If there are any clues that can be found in the language of their hate speech to identify those likely to act violently and those who pose a low risk, this author believes it is the obligation of linguists to leverage our knowledge and skills to help.

5.1 Research Questions

Given the obvious stakes of hate speech, it has been a surprisingly under-researched topic in the field of sociolinguistics. This oversight is particularly dire when one considers recent examples in which a greater understanding of and analytic framework for hate speech might have potentially provided a clue to individuals’ impending violent intentions. In an effort to turn the analytical eye of sociolinguistics on this problem, this work considered five main research questions.

1. How can non-academic ideologies about hate speech be synthesized with legal, academic, lexicographic, and linguistic perspectives to produce a definition of hate speech as a speech act?
2. What, if any, linguistic characteristics or language patterns in hate speech are correlated with increased risk of violent behavior?
3. Are previous scholarly findings about characteristics correlated with increased risk of violence in threatening communication and/or existing law enforcement threat
assessment protocols which focus on language borne out in a linguistic analysis of hate speech?

4. How do the authors of hate speech position themselves, their ingroups, and the target outgroups/objects of hatred? Does this differ between authors who actually intend to commit violent actions (Hunters) and those who do not (Howlers)?

5. What epistemic stances do the authors of hate speech take that strengthen or weaken commitment to their hate? Does this differ between Hunters and Howlers?

This concluding chapter will summarize the findings regarding each of these questions, synthesize the findings together, and discuss the greater implications. It will then present the limitations of the current work and suggest future avenues of further research.

5.1.1 How Can Non-Academic Ideologies About Hate Speech be Synthesized with Academic and Linguistic Perspectives to Produce a Definition of Hate Speech as a Speech Act?

As the literature review in Chapter 2 revealed, although hate speech is a popular topic of discussion in the United States in both mainstream news outlets and scholarly work across a variety of disciplines, there is great variability regarding how hate speech is defined. This research considers the definition of hate speech through the lens of speech act theory, which deals with language which performs a social action (Austin 1962). In doing so, this work proposes a broader understanding of speech acts, suggesting that hate speech is a compound speech act that may be composed of several other speech acts (e.g. threatening, informing, warning), which taken alone may not constitute hate speech, but which taken together meet the definition proposed below. This research highlights the notion that analyzing hate speech requires the understanding that the act of hate speech is greater than the sum of its parts.

The speech act of threats, the subject of Gales’ comprehensive research (2010; 2011) was considered as a prime model. As with threats, one of the primary tensions is whether to prioritize the act’s illocutionary force (the intention of the speaker) or perlocutionary force (the effect of
the utterance on the listener). As has been mentioned, hate speech is an important topic for both academics and non-academics. To collect non-academic perspectives and gain specific insight into particular features of hate speech, this work employed a two-phase survey; the first phase gathered general insights to identify broad trends and the second refined those findings by asking more targeted questions. These findings were synthesized with previous academic definitions from numerous disciplines, previous U.S. legal precedents, and dictionary definitions to propose a comprehensive definition of hate speech. Because the data on which this definition is grounded are restricted to the U.S. context, this definition is intended to apply specifically to hate speech in the United States cultural context. This work proposes that hate speech is:

a problematic expressive speech act which conveys derogatory sentiment towards a person or persons based on the perceived possession of a socially defined group characteristic and which is made to the detriment of the target and is addressed to the ingroup with the intention of inciting animus and/or violence or is addressed to the target with the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm.

An expressive speech act is one which proclaims a psychological state regarding the speaker or the world, such as praising or insulting (Searle and Vanderveken 1985). A problematic expressive speech act is language which proclaims a negative psychological state regarding a socially defined group (Archard 2014). Whatever else it might do or achieve, there was strong consensus that hate speech expresses negative propositional content targeted at a group. The nature of the problematic expressive speech act also encompasses the second major feature of this definition, that the speech expresses derogatory content. As was noted by both scholars and non-academics, hate speech often includes profanity, epithets, and vulgarity (Greene 1995; Bianchi 2014), but these attributes are not necessary as long as the content expressed is derogatory or disparaging.
Hate speech is based on the perception of a socially defined group characteristic. This group characteristic must be socially recognized as a homogenizing factor. For example, in the survey the majority of applicants did not label language hate speech when it was aimed at fans of Georgetown athletics or people with peanut allergies; these characteristics may be shared by a group, but do not rise to the level of social importance in an otherwise heterogeneous group. On the other hand, shared values, culture, experiences, beliefs, or ideologies, such as is seen with religious or ethnic groups, do designate socially defined groups.

In her definition of threats, which scholars and survey respondents note are strongly related to hate speech (American Bar Association n.d.; Delgado and Stefancic 2004), Gales defines threats in part as being made “to the detriment of the hearer” (2010, 14). Hate speech is similar; there is some detriment to the target. Hate speech may cause physical harm, but it may also cause emotional distress, social alienation, economic hardship, psychological damage, etc. to the victims. Numerous survey respondents explicitly stated this broad view of harm (e.g. hate speech is “[a]nything that derives a negative action, or hints at physical, emotional destructive actions”; “Violence...intended to emotionally damage”; “[hate speech has the] intent to emotionally harm, intimidate or embarrass other(s)”). Though this research focuses specifically on a risk of physical violence, the proposed definition of hate speech is intended to encompass both physical and non-physical violence and harm.

One of the other trends which emerged in both academic and non-academic perspectives is that hate speech is addressed to two separate audiences, with a different function as it relates to each audience. If addressed to an ingroup, it is intended to threaten or incite animus and/or violence (Parekh 2006; Timmerman 2008; Benesch 2011; Tsesis 2002; Whillock 1995). If
addressed to the target outgroup, it has the effect of instilling a fear of violence or harm (Benesch 2011; American Bar Association n.d.; Greene 1995; Townsend 2014; Benesch 2012; Whillock 1995; Delgado and Stefancic 2004). These two audiences and purposes are not mutually exclusive; the same speech can achieve both purposes if addressed to both groups. This dual consideration captures the illocutionary force that was highlighted in both academic and non-academic definitions of hate speech – the intention of the speaker to threaten or incite violence – but also acknowledges the perlocutionary force that hate speech can have – the effect of fear in the recipient. Rather than prioritizing either force at the exclusion of the other, by considering both the intent of the speaker and the effect on the listener, an analyst is given two measures by which to judge the force of the speech act.

The proposed comprehensive definition was used to select thirty-four texts which could be labeled as hate speech. These texts were categorized as written by either Hunters or Howlers, using Calhoun and Weston’s (2009; 2012) risk assessment paradigm for managing individuals who engage in problematic and threatening behavior. According to Calhoun and Weston, Hunters are those who “truly intend to use lethal violence” (Calhoun and Weston 2009, 7) and Howlers are those who “like to threaten and frighten with words...but they never follow through with any action” (2009, 7). Eighteen hate speech texts make up the Hunter corpus, totaling 47,823 words, and sixteen texts are in the Howler corpus, totaling 68,329 words. These corpora became the foundation for an exploration of the next two research questions.

5.1.2 What, If Any, Linguistic Characteristics or Language Patterns in Hate Speech are Correlated with Increased Risk of Violent Behavior?

The corpus analysis undertaken by this work began with a bottom-up approach, using frequency analyses of key words, parts of speech, and semantic categories to identify features
which differentiated the Hunter and Howler corpora. The most distinctive feature that emerged from this analysis was singular first person pronouns, particularly in the nominative case (i.e. “I”). These pronouns are used significantly more frequently in the Hunter corpus than the Howler corpus. An analysis grounded in the Systemic Functional Linguistic taxonomy of process types (Halliday 1994) suggested that not only do these pronouns differ in their frequency, but they differ in their functions as well. The clauses in which the Hunters use first person singular nominative pronouns are significantly more likely to include verbs of a mental–affective type (Halliday 1994), which express emotion and desire (e.g. “I hate with a passion the whole idea of the suburbs.” “I had sincerely hoped to achieve these objections [sic] without harming innocent civilians”). This suggests that the Hunters’ hate speech is characterized by explicit expressions of their own feelings and subjective desires. Though the Howler corpus has significantly fewer first person singular constructions overall, when the Howlers do use these forms, they use significantly more verbal clauses that describe processes of communication like “explain,” “describe,” or “tell” (Halliday 1994). These uses communicate information from a position of greater knowledge. A review of the concordances suggested that the Howlers’ verbal constructions also tend to include second person direct objects, focusing on both the production and reception of information. This emphasizes the Howler’s role as the owner and transmitter of knowledge and focuses the readers’ attention, foregrounding their role as the recipients of the information (Chaemsaitong 2015). Overall, these patterns of first person singular nominative pronouns seem to suggest that Hunter texts focus more on the author’s subjective feelings and grievances, whereas Howlers focus more on the act of communicating what they perceive as their ‘knowledge’ to others.
Another feature which frequency-based corpus analysis identifies as differentiating the two corpora is the use of words belonging to the semantic category of violence and anger. Words which express violence or anger (e.g. attack, force, hate) are used significantly more frequently in the Hunter corpus as compared to the Howler corpus. Automated semantic tagging supplemented by hand-coding resulted in a list of fourteen verbs of violence or anger which were analyzed according to Matthiessen and Halliday’s (1997) framework for categorizing participant roles. This analysis identifies who is the Agent of the violence or Senser of the anger and who is the Recipient/Phenomenon against whom the violence or anger is directed. This analysis found that Hunters use a greater number of constructions where the author or his ingroup are the Agent or Senser of violence or anger or the hated target group is the Recipient/Phenomena (e.g. “I wanted to kill every democrat in the U.S. Senate.”). This is consistent with the previous finding that Hunters tend to use more affective verbs which explicitly express their emotions and desires in their hate speech. In contrast, the Howlers’ hate speech more frequently depicts the hated outgroup as the Agents/Sensers of violence and anger against the author or author’s ingroup (“niggers rape tens of thousands of White women”). This suggests that Howlers are constructing a storyline of victimhood where they or their ingroup are being targeted and victimized by the objects of their hatred.

The frequency analysis also shows that modal auxiliaries are used significantly more in the Hunter corpus than the Howler corpus. However, modals are a large category which can be used to express a wide range of meanings, so a more thorough analysis was necessary to determine the full implications of this finding. Modals, an umbrella term which this work uses to discuss modal auxiliaries (e.g. can, could, may) and quasi-modals (e.g. have to, need to, going
to), express a range of ideas – possibility, necessity, ability, obligation, permission, hypotheticality (Collins 2009). Modals can express deontic meaning, describing actions that are under the control of an animate subject (e.g. modals of permission, obligation, volition and intention) or epistemic meanings, describing the logical necessity of events (e.g. possibility, necessity, and prediction) (Biber, et al. 1999). In addition to these two types of meaning, modals can be divided into those of necessity and obligation (e.g. must, should, ought to, need to, have to, have got to, had better, be supposed to), possibility and permission (e.g. may, can, might, could, be able to), prediction and volition (e.g. will, shall, would, be going to, want to, be about to) (Collins 2009; Biber, et al. 1999). Considering the epistemic modal usages, prediction modals are used significantly more frequently by Hunters, while Howlers use more necessity modals. Another feature of these modals which was considered is the strength with which they express commitment to the authors’ propositions. Modal strength exists on a continuum (Huddleston and Pullum 2002). On the one end are modals which express a strong commitment by asserting a proposition and leaving no room for alternatives (e.g. must). On the other end of the spectrum are weak modals, which express mild commitment by asserting one of several alternative propositions or realities (e.g. might). In between are modals of medium strength (e.g. should), which express moderate commitment. Context affects modal meaning, and modal assertions can be strengthened or weakened by the addition of qualifiers, modifiers, and pragmatic factors (Depraetere 2017). The Hunter corpus has significantly more strong or strengthened modals, suggesting that not only do the Hunters express their desires and emotions more explicitly than their Howler counterparts, their modal uses are also demonstrating stronger commitment to those propositions.
In addition to considering features which emerged from a frequency analysis as significant differentiators between the corpora, this work also considers if there are any differences in the Hunters’ and Howlers’ use of slurs/epithets and the evaluative modifiers they use to describe their ingroups and outgroups. Slurs and epithets, defined as “derogatory terms...targeting individuals and groups of individuals on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender or sexual orientation” (Bianchi 2014, 35) are a prominent feature of hate speech noted by respondents to the hate speech survey and prior scholarly definitions of hate speech (Greene 1995). Because Calhoun and Weston (2009) note that Howlers achieve their desired emotional release via picturing the fear and distress that their problematic communication elicits in the victim, it was hypothesized that the Howlers’ hate speech might use stronger and more shocking taboo language to elicit a greater emotional response from the reader. To examine this claim, seventeen lemmas were manually identified as slurs from the list of lexical items in both corpora: FAG, NIGGER, SHIT SKIN, MUD, KIKE, NIG, NEGRO, MESTIZO, BEANER, FAGGOT, MONGREL, SPIC, QUEER, GOYIM, CHIMP, WHIGGER, and MONKEY-MAN. There is a combined total of 109 tokens of these slurs in the Hunter corpus and 129 in the Howler corpus, but this does not represent a significant difference between the frequency of use across the corpora. This suggests that though these words may be characteristic of hate speech as a speech act, this kind of ugly, offensive language is not indicative of whether the author is a Hunter or Howler.

Finally, to consider evaluative modifiers the researcher considered all tokens of nouns which appeared more than 0.5 times per 1000 words in either corpus and referred to humans (858 tokens for the Hunter corpus and 1686 for the Howler corpus) and separated them into those
which referred to the author’s ingroups, outgroups, and other. First, it should be noted that there is no significant difference between the rate of ingroup and outgroup referents in the two corpora, suggesting that neither corpus could be differentiated by a preoccupation with discussing one group over the other. Then, each token of the ingroup and outgroup referents was manually coded for how it was described or modified, either positively (e.g. “it brings the honest white man the news he needs to protect his family”), negatively (e.g. “Women are vicious, evil, barbaric animals”), or neutrally/not explicitly evaluated (e.g. “buses were bringing in more and more Blacks from predominantly Black neighborhoods”). Considering the individual combinations of group and evaluation (e.g. ingroup+positive, outgroup+positive), both corpora significantly favor negative evaluation of the outgroup. Given that expressing negative propositional content about a target outgroup is part of the definition of hate speech, this is not a surprising finding. Both Hunters and Howlers use a mix of positive and negative descriptors for the ingroup and outgroup, although many positive outgroup evaluations are contextually understood to be the author serving as animator (Goffman 1981) to the outgroups’ self-evaluation, based on the juxtaposition of positive and negative evaluators (e.g. “one cop against hundreds of pious lying Jews”). Compared statistically, there is no significant difference between the patterns of evaluation for the Hunter and Howler corpora, suggesting that the ways in which hate speech authors evaluate and describe their ingroups and outgroups is not a good indicator of violent intention.
5.1.3 Are Previous Scholarly Findings About Risk-Enhancing Characteristics in Threatening Communication and/or Existing Law Enforcement Threat Assessment Protocols which Focus on Language Borne Out in a Linguistic Analysis of Hate Speech?

Following a bottom-up analysis of the emergent features which differentiate the Hunter and Howler corpus, this work pursued a top-down approach, whereby existing paradigms of threat assessment for threatening communications and incitement to genocide were applied to the hate speech corpora to determine which previously discussed features, if any, also prove to be indicative of violent action in hate speech. Seven features from prior research were selected for particular focus: justification of violence, for example presenting violence as justified based on a target’s perceived guilt or wrongdoing (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); expressions that the victim is persecuting the author (Turner and Gelles 2003; Calhoun and Weston 2009; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); inevitability or lack of alternatives to violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); contempt, dehumanization, and strong negative evaluation of the victims (Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016); prediction modals like “would” that emphasized the justification of the threat (Gales 2010); speech act verbs like “say” and “tell” used to strengthened claims or demands related to the threat (Gales 2010); and prediction modals such as “will” or “be going to” that add conditionality to the threat (Gales 2010). This section will review the findings on each of these features.

If, as scholars have suggested in work on other problematic communications (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016), violence is associated with the attribution of guilt to the victim group and a focus on the justification of violence, one might expect the Hunter corpus to display a greater preoccupation with violence perpetrated by the outgroup. “Dangerous speech” which effectively incites violence often
includes “accusation in a mirror,” whereby speakers accuse their victims of harboring the violent desires they themselves hold (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). This reframes violence as justified in self-defense rather than as unprovoked aggression. This finding is not borne out in the hate speech corpora. Contrary to what was expected, there is a significant tendency for the Howlers to characterize the hated outgroups as the Agents of violence or Sensers of anger towards the author or an ingroup.

However, research regarding modals suggests that Hunters may present a justification of violence in a more subtle way than explicit attribution of violence to the outgroup. The Hunter corpus is characterized by more frequent use of prediction modals, which assert a vision of a future state or action. In her work on threatening communications, Gales (2010) found that prediction modals in realized threats often served to emphasize the justification for the threat or highlight the conditionality of the threat in a way that diminished the author’s sense of responsibility or ownership for the threatened actions. Unlike with threats, the hate examined here was generally expressed unconditionally, so this analysis of hate speech does not indicate any association between prediction modals and conditionality. However, prediction modals do often serve to justify hatred or violence by emphasizing the Hunter’s grievance or a negative future that the Hunter’s ingroup will face if there is no change in the situation (e.g. “Knowing that... they would never give me a chance to be their boyfriend only increased my already boiling hatred towards all women.” “…our race would be bred out of existence”). These strong predictive expressions raise the specter of a negative future for the Hunter or his ingroup, which serve to emphasize the need for violence to intervene in this otherwise inevitable trajectory. Though this kind of justification is present in both corpora, it was more characteristic of the
Hunters, as is the use of predictive modal expressions generally. Overall, this suggests that the matter of justification in hate speech is a complex question. Hunters may not be justifying their hatred and violence explicitly by attributing violence and anger to their targets, but they may be using projections of a future in which the ingroup is in a negative situation to justify their preemptive hatred or violence. Prediction modals will be discussed again later in this section in relation to expressions of inevitability.

This finding is closely tied to an analysis of feelings of persecution and victimization, which has also been a feature associated with increased risk of violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Calhoun and Weston 2009; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). As was mentioned, though the Hunters demonstrate a preoccupation with expressions of anger and desire which often serve to articulate what they believe are the wrongs and ills caused by the objects of their hatred, they less frequently cast themselves or their ingroups in the position of victim. The Howlers significantly more often characterize the outgroup as Agents/Sensers of violence or anger directed at the ingroup as Recipient/Phenomenon, thus expressing greater feelings of victimization and persecution, contrary to previous findings that associate expressions of victimization with violence.

The next feature which previous work has correlated with violence is the use of expressions of inevitability and a lack of alternatives to violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). As a resource for expressing an author’s judgment regarding the possibility, necessity, or truth of a proposition or situation (Depraetere and Reed 2008), modals can be indicators of whether an alternative is viewed by the author as potential, likely, or inevitable. Prediction modals are significantly more common in the
Hunter corpus, and there is a slight preference for these to be strong, asserting a prediction for a future state or action with certainty. From a standpoint of function, these predictive modal expressions often fall into two categories. As have already been mentioned, the first are articulations of a future in which harm will befall the author or ingroup, for example, “I will never have sex, never have love, never have children” and “Until the white race realizes that there is only one source from which we can ascertain lasting truths, there will never be peace or stability on this earth.” The second category into which the Hunters’ predictive modals often fall is a description of a future in which the ingroup is dominant and the outgroup is subjugated or eliminated, (e.g. “someday we will be rid of nigger loving shit such as yourself and then it won't be so pathetic”). Both categories assert a vision of the future with great certainty, broaching no alternatives and suggesting inevitability. This conforms to the claims of prior research that expressions of inevitability correlate with enhanced risk of violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).

Prior threat assessment research also proposes that increased risk is associated with expressions of contempt and dehumanization of the victim (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). Many of the slurs and epithets analyzed in Chapter 3 express precisely that contempt and dehumanization. They distance the target from the reader, enhancing their “otherness” and “erod[ing] affective moral concern” (Maynard and Benesch 2016). In some instances, they literally conflate the object of hatred with non-humans (e.g. “chimp,” “monkey-man,” “mongrel”), or reduce them to a single physical attribute which is degraded (e.g. “shit skin”). However, the corpus analysis finds no difference between the rates with which this kind of dehumanizing language was used in the two corpora. An analysis of the
types of descriptors and modifiers which are used to evaluate ingroup and outgroup human nouns also reveals no significant difference between the two corpora. Because hate speech is a speech act which necessarily expresses derogatory sentiment, it may be unsurprising that this kind of dehumanizing language is characteristic, but it does not prove to be correlated with violence.

The analysis of evaluative modifiers used with nouns referring to humans in the corpora does support a pattern noted by Gales (2010), who found that realized threats often had both negative self and other evaluation. Her analysis complicates the traditional assumption that threats and related problematic speech will be characterized by a simple binary between positive evaluation of self/ingroup and negative evaluation of the outgroup. Although negative Other evaluation is the most common across both corpora, both corpora exhibit negative ingroup and outgroup characterization as well as positive evaluation for both groups. As has been mentioned, the positive Other evaluation is minimal across both corpora and is often not presented as the genuine beliefs of the author. The instances of negative ingroup evaluation across both corpora are primarily descriptions of members of the author’s demographic but not ideological ingroup, those who disagree with the authors’ views. These instances are used to describe the dissenting ingroup members as shameful or to emphasize the error of their ways (e.g. “the values and morals of our people are the wrong ones,” “Cowardice has been the White man’s prime survival strategy for at least the last 4 decades” and “The morality accepted by our people today is fractured, confused, vague, and artificial. It is our task to replace it with true morality.”).

Finally, in previous research on realized threats, Gales (2010) notes an emphasis on speech act verbs which strengthened the demands of the threat. Contrary to that expectation, this research finds that it is Howlers who use more communication verbs in the first person singular
nominative clauses which were explored, indicating that, in accordance with Calhoun and Weston (2009), they may be placing greater emphasis on the act of communication for their emotional release. Howler’s verbs of communication also include more second person objects (e.g. “I warned you ladies, studying Jews is a nasty business” or “I tell you to buy a gun to protect yourself because the white race”) which emphasize the author’s role as the keeper and communicator of knowledge and reader as receiver of that knowledge.

Overall, the risk-enhancing characteristics from prior research which were found to also be indicative of hate speech written by Hunters are expressions of inevitability or a lack of alternatives to violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016) and prediction modals which emphasize the justification of the threat (Gales 2010). Those which the data do not support are a focus on feelings of persecution perpetrated by the victims (Turner and Gelles 2003; Calhoun and Weston 2009; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016), speech act verbs like “say” and “tell” used to strengthened claims or demands related to the threat (Gales 2010), and contempt, dehumanization, and strong negative evaluation of the victims (Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016). Consistent with what Gales (2010) found, both Hunters and Howlers used a mix of positive and negative evaluation for their ingroup. The strong preference for negatively evaluating the outgroup was no different between the corpora. The findings regarding a fixation with placing blame or guilt on the victims in order to justify violence (Turner and Gelles 2003; Simons and Turkel 2014; Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016) are complicated. Although the Howlers are significantly more likely to portray themselves or their ingroups as the victims of violence and anger perpetrated by an
outgroup, the Hunters do use prediction modals significantly more often to present the picture of a certain negative future which serves to justify their negative emotions and violent desires.

5.1.4 How Does the Author of Hate Speech Position Himself, His Ingroup, and the Target Outgroup/Object of Hatred? Does This Differ Between Hunters and Howlers?

In order to explore how the Hunters and Howlers position themselves, their ingroups, and their outgroups within their hate speech as well as the stances that they take, this work dives into a case study of two texts, one classified as a Hunter and one as a Howler. Qualitative discourse analysis of these two texts allows deeper investigation of the linguistic uses identified in the corpus analysis. The Hunter text is authored by Dylann Roof, a white supremacist who confessed to murdering nine African American parishioners at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina in June of 2015 (Blinder and Sack 2016). Roof published a 2,444-word manifesto on his website explaining the racial hatred which he later said motivated his crimes. The Howler text is a 2,734-word essay written by white supremacist Craig Cobb for a publication titled The Aryan Alternative. Cobb is a high-profile proponent of a “racial holy war” (Cobb 2010) and though he publicly supports racial violence and has been arrested on other charges, he has never been arrested for any violent crime in connection with his white supremacist rhetoric.

Consistent with findings from the bottom-up quantitative portion of this study regarding the importance of the Hunters’ expressions of their personal subjective emotions and experiences, an analysis of Roof’s self-positioning suggests that he positions himself in a storyline of a journey to knowledge which emphasizes his final position as knowledgeable and “completely racially aware.” He uses numerous first person singular pronouns to foreground his role as the originator or synthesizer of the information his writing relays by claiming ways of
knowing based on evidence apparently derived from first-hand sensory experience and personal inferential induction (e.g. *I saw that the same things were happening in England and France*” “*I remember while watching hispanic television stations...*”) (Chafe 1986). This positions him as knowledgeable and an authority on the topics about which he writes. He also uses rhetorical questions to present himself as knowing and to lead his reader to draw conclusions which conform to his ideology.

Again, consistent with the top-down quantitative analysis, in a crucial moment at the end of his essay Roof also uses first person singular pronouns and expressions of inevitability (“*I have no choice... Well someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.*”) to position himself as a reluctant hero who must inevitably act on the information he presents. His use of the epistemic modal, “*has to*” expresses a certain commitment to a future situation (Collins 2009) in which he is required to act.

The Howler never uses singular first person pronouns to refer to himself. Instead Cobb refers to himself exclusively with plural pronouns and referents which imply that he is speaking for the entire publication (e.g. “*The Aryan Alternative apologizes*”). This positions him as the spokesperson of a larger group and situates the perspectives that he communicates as the declarations of a group rather than as his personal opinions (Tan and Moghaddam 1995; Badarneh and Migdadi 2018). Though on the one hand, distancing himself from direct, single responsibility for his claims suggests less credibility than Roof demonstrates, positioning himself as one of a like-minded group gives his assertions a different kind of authority, the force of ‘strength-in-numbers.’ Cobb also positions himself in relation to others whose voices he introduces using constructed dialogue, speech which is attributed to another speaker but is
creatively constructed by the current author/speaker through fabrication and/or recontextualization (Tannen 2007). He voices a bereaved father to suggest that his picture of African Americans as dangerous and violent is grounded in fact and is supported by a man whose family has been directly affected by this purportedly violent nature. This positions him as authoritative and again as someone who is speaking for others. He also positions himself in opposition to a woman who does not recognize the danger of African Americans and is therefore ignorant and gullible; he positions himself as wise in contrast to her because he possesses knowledge that she does not, knowledge that he is sharing with the reader.

Though there are differences in how they accomplish this self-positioning, both the Hunter and Howler position themselves as knowledgeable and authoritative on matters of race relations. The ways in which they position their ingroup and outgroup show a far greater contrast. The corpus analysis in Chapter 3 demonstrated that Howlers portray their ingroups as the victims of violence and anger significantly more frequently than the Hunters; a qualitative analysis complicates that finding by suggesting that it might not be that Howlers position their ingroups as victims more frequently than Hunters, but that they do so more explicitly and that they explicitly position their hated outgroups as the agents of that victimization, where the Hunters do not. Roof does indicate that his ingroup, white Americans, are being hurt by “a huge problem,” which he attributes to African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Jews. However, whereas Cobb makes it clear that violence towards his ingroup is the problem, Roof never clearly specifies precisely what harm the “problem” is causing his ingroup. The closest he gets to explicitly positioning his white ingroup as victims is when he constructs the vision of a child “picked on” at school for his race, and asserts that that “White people are being murdered daily
“in the streets.” However, in neither instance does he specify the Agent of these actions; he does not say who is doing the picking on or the murdering. In this way, though he is vaguely positioning his ingroup in the role of victim, he is not explicitly positioning his outgroup as the perpetrators of that aggression.

This is in stark contrast to Cobb who, as the quantitative analysis suggested, strongly and explicitly positions his ingroup as victims of violent crime and clearly positions the outgroup as victimizers. He does this through explicit assertions (e.g. “illegal invaders...who just come here to work...and to rape/torture/murder our women”) and by repeatedly mentioning cases in which white individuals were the victims of violent crimes by nonwhite perpetrators. This positioning of the ingroup and outgroup corresponds with two features that Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016) note in rhetoric which incites genocide. Cobb invokes the threat of destruction of the ingroup, suggesting that they and their families are in danger of death and violent assault. He also conflates the crimes of the individuals with the guilt of the group. By repeatedly mentioning cases in which individual African Americans and Hispanic Americans committed murders, Cobb extrapolates this guilt to invite the reader to believe that all Africans Americans and Hispanic Americans are violent and dangerous. As Leader Maynard and Benesch (2016) have noted, this can then be used to justify violence in apparent self-defense against innocent members of a group who represent no danger at all.

5.1.5 What Epistemic Stances do the Authors of Hate Speech Take that Strengthen or Weaken Commitment to Their Hate? Does This Differ Between Hunters and Howlers?

Epistemic stance is a combination of evidentiality, how the speaker/author positions him/herself in terms of knowledge and his/her ways of knowing (Chafe 1986; Du Bois 2007; Bongelli, et al. 2018) and epistemicity, the author’s/speaker’s belief in or certainty of the reality
of the information being conveyed (Chafe 2013; Kärkkäinen’s 2003; Bongelli, et al. 2018).

Previous work has noted that commitment can be expressed through epistemic markers which communicate certainty regarding a proposition (Kärkkäinen 2003) and through modes of knowing which demonstrate high reliability and personal involvement (Chafe 1986; Cornillie 2018).

Roof’s prodigious use of singular first person pronouns situates him as closely involved with his propositional content and his tendency to use evidential claims which are presented as inductions based on sensory experiences suggest high reliability and commitment to his propositions of white supremacy and the “problem” that nonwhite Americans represent. However, when positioning his white ingroup in the role of victim of this “problem,” he paints this picture with a vagueness that displays a weak reliability and commitment to this idea. His overall stance is one of commiseration with the ingroup over an unfair situation, rather than a warning of mortal peril. He takes the stance of a knowledgeable and enlightened hero, sharing his experiences and thought processes along his path to being “completely racially aware” and his conclusion that he is the only one who has “the bravery to take it to the real world.”

“Tak[ing] it to the real world” seems to indicate his sense that he must act on the information he has outlined in his essay, mobilizing “it” “to the real world” through violent action.

The Howler employs strategies which display weakened commitment. Conflating his single authorial identity with the entire publication (e.g. “As we always say at TAA” and “What do we mean by that?” (emphasis added)) lends his assertions the credibility of a group’s agreement, but also serves to distance himself from a personal connection by diffusing responsibility for his claims. This shows weaker commitment to the content he is expressing.
Cobb uses hearsay evidentials which report the assertions of others (Chafe 1986) (e.g. “Marissa is said to have been…,” “Home Depot is known for…,” and “Authorities say…” ) to suggest that he is synthesizing and presenting ideas supported by the evidence of others. While this may be a strategy to appear objective and therefore more credible, it also weakens personal involvement and therefore weakens commitment as it again dilutes direct personal responsibility for the propositions. Overall, Cobb projects a more detached and less emotionally involved stance than the Hunter, which is consistent with the quantitative findings that Hunters’ hate speech is characterized by greater expressions of emotion and desire. The Howler’s stance seems to be one of inciting the reader to violence by exploiting strategies such as raising a threat of destruction and conflating individual crimes with group guilt, which have been noted in “dangerous speech” associated with incitement to genocide (Leader Maynard and Benesch 2016).

5.2 Summary of Findings

Table 5.1 presents language forms and functions that were found to be characteristic of the Hunter and Howler corpora.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hunter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• First person singular nominative pronouns, especially in mental–affective clauses (e.g. “I hated the feeling of being trapped and lost” or “I hope a nigger rapes her to death and kills her”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• prediction modals, particularly expressing either a certain future harm to the author or ingroup, or describing a future in which an ingroup is dominant and the outgroup is subjugated or eliminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• strong or strengthened modals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• expressions of violence/anger, especially where the author or ingroup is the Agent/Sensor or the outgroup is the Recipient/Phenomenon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• expressions of inevitability which suggest a lack of alternatives to violence (e.g. “I have no choice... Well someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.”)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the case study of a Hunter text, Dylann Roof says “someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.” However, throughout his writing, he never seems to be interested in convincing the reader that s/he should act. He assumes a common ground of understanding with the reader regarding the “problem” of the hated outgroup, but does not position the outgroup as dangerous or suggest that they pose an imminent threat to the ingroup. He is preoccupied with his own experiences and positioning himself as a knowledgeable authority. He presents his experiences and inferences to highlight his personal racial enlightenment and to commiserate with the reader regarding the “problem” he knows they also face. Roof positions himself as the informed and inevitable savior, forced by necessity to act on the knowledge that he presents in his writing. His stance is one of justifying or explaining actions which he already believes to be necessary and which he has already decided he must carry out. Combined with the findings from the corpus analysis, this suggests that Hunters display stronger emotion and greater personal involvement with the hate that they express. Expressions of inevitability and the suggestion that violence is justified by a certain future if no action is taken may also be red flags of violent intention.

The discourse analysis of the Howler text shows that Craig Cobb positions himself as the spokesperson of a group, through the use of first person plural pronouns and referents which conflate his authorial identity with the entire publication. He uses constructed dialogue to
position himself as wise and to strengthen the idea that his propositions have the support of others. He favors hearsay evidentials which suggest that his information comes from external sources and demonstrates low personal involvement and an emotionally detached attitude. Cobb emphasizes the positioning of his ingroup as potential victims of the violence he describes by assertions such as “they [the black man and the brown man and the jew] repay our [civilized Whites] generosity with assaults, rapes, murders, and lies” and by elaborate descriptions of white individuals who have been the victims of violence purportedly perpetrated by African Americans and Hispanic Americans. He takes a stance of warning or inciting the reader to violence in apparent self-defense. Combined with the findings of the corpus analysis, this suggests that Howler’s hate speech aligns more with previous findings regarding incitement to violence, suggesting that Howlers who engage in hate speech may not have the intention to commit violence themselves, as their Hunter counterparts do, but they may nevertheless desire a violent outcome to befall the objects of their hatred.

5.3 Limitations
It is the sincere belief of the researcher that this work represents an important first step in establishing a definition of hate speech that can be productively employed in later research, and in a consideration of assessing risk of violence in hate speech. However, there are limitations in the data and methodology which must be acknowledged in the hopes that future research can address these gaps.

First, as was previously discussed, the respondents to the survey were more demographically homogeneous than would have been ideal, particularly in self-declared ethnicity. While there was a broader range of diversity in religious affiliation, age, and gender
One of the major problems that this research faced was in the identification and collection of data. As was mentioned, data were limited to publicly available sources, excluding any groups which required admission to a closed network. Because hate communities tend to recognize the social stigma of their ideas, many restrict their message boards, social media networks, and websites, requiring that visitors register with personal information before they are admitted into the group. This limited the available data. Similarly, as was noted, hate speech associated with incidents of violence, especially violence with a potential nexus to international terrorism, was often removed very quickly from social media sites and archives. This meant that many examples of Hunters’ hate speech were unavailable, causing an inevitable gap in the research. Another limitation in the Hunter data pool is the constraint of gender. All of the Hunters identified were male, which ultimately led to all the Howlers also being male, so as not to introduce gender as a potential confounding factor. Though statistics collected by the FBI support the idea that the majority of perpetrators of mass violence are male – according to a 2018 report only nine of the 250 active shooters documented between 2000 and 2017 (3.6%) were female (“Active Shooter Incidents in the United States from 2000-2017”) – not all authors of hate speech are male nor are all perpetrators of hate-motivated crimes. The restriction of this
study to male authors marks a limitation of the work, though the findings regarding male authors remains highly applicable.

Less anticipated by the researcher but ultimately a larger limitation, was the identification of hate speech that could be deemed to be authored by a Howler. Without a documented investigation by law enforcement into potential violence which concluded that there was no violent intention, it is virtually impossible to designate someone a Howler with complete certainty; even an overt statement by the author that there was no violent intention may not always be relied upon as fact, as issues of access, timing, etc. could prevent someone from acting even when s/he may have intended to. Similarly, it is impossible to establish with certainty that the designated Howlers may not be Hunters lying in wait. As Calhoun and Weston (2009) acknowledge, the categories of Hunter and Howler are not immutable; if a Howler suddenly acts on his/her threats, then s/he becomes a Hunter; similarly, if a Hunter begins to act like a Howler, with no attempt to act, he/she ceases to be a Hunter. The researcher acknowledges the unfortunate possibility that some designated Howlers may commit future acts of violence that would cause them to be reclassified as Hunters, therefore affecting the findings detailed here.

Finally, one of the limitations acknowledged in a footnote of Chapter 3, but certainly requiring further attention, is the result of the researcher’s manual coding. Due to time and resource constraints, all manual coding in this research was conducted solely by the researcher without the validation of a second coder. It would have been ideal to have another researcher review the data and ensure inter-rater reliability. In the absence of a second coder, it is possible that results have been skewed by the judgments of the researcher. While every effort was made to minimize bias, maximize consistency, provide illustrative examples, and code in a manner that
could be easily replicable, this does represent a limitation of the current work. The author sincerely hopes that any future work which follows up on the findings described here is able to have the added validation of a second coder.

5.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Despite the admitted limitations and faults of this work, the author believes it represents a valuable first foray into providing sociolinguistic insight into the important topics of defining and assessing risk of violence in hate speech. It hopefully lays the groundwork for research to follow which could explore many new and important avenues.

By demonstrating the ways in which positioning and stancetaking function in hate speech, as well as applying speech act theory to define hate speech and corpus analysis to explore its characteristics, this work contributes to the greater body of linguistic knowledge. Future work could extend this research by comparing hate speech to non-hate speech within a single type of writing (e.g. social media comments, personal narratives, persuasive essays etc.) to further explore the ways in which it conforms to and diverges from mainstream genres. There is also much work still to be done to explore other aspects of stancetaking in hate speech. This work focused largely on epistemic stance, but attitudinal stance is a rich avenue for further consideration.

Sociolinguists acknowledge that factors such as gender and register can have significant impacts on language use. This work focused on a fairly narrow slice of hate speech written by male authors. Future work might consider the ways in which other demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, race, socioeconomic status) or spoken hate speech affects these findings. Research
which considers contexts outside the U.S. would also extend and deepen the findings of this work.

Similarly, this work was restricted in scope to thirty-four examples of hate speech authors, eighteen Hunters and sixteen Howlers. While the author would argue that this is a large enough sample upon which to draw initial conclusions, work that considers more robust corpora of data could reveal new trends and validate the current findings. Work conducted in partnership with the law enforcement or intelligence communities could provide access to otherwise unavailable data and would ensure that the research is maximally responsive to real-world operational needs.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, future work should validate the findings described here by demonstrating their applicability in real-world threat assessment situations. The author envisions a study in which one researcher collects examples of hate speech written by Hunters and Howlers and presents them blindly to a second researcher for analysis. The second researcher could then analyze the hate speech texts in light of the findings presented here to predict whether each text was written by a Hunter or Howler. Though the successful application of a threat assessment analysis like that proposed here will always depend on the skill and knowledge of the analyst, and therefore can never have a universally accurate success rate, such a study would illustrate the applicability of the findings of this work for future predictive threat assessment.

5.5 Final Thoughts

Unfortunately, the hateful language of Robert Bowers is not unique on the internet. Whether in town squares, letters to the editor, blogs, or Twitter, there have always been and will
continue to be people who spread words of hate. As long as these messages exist, it will be important to have ways to assess the threat represented by this language, in order to identify which manifestations of hate speech represent simply an expressive release of anger and frustration, and which may indicate violent intentions. This work leverages the skills and knowledge of sociolinguistics to help address that challenge. Proposing a definition of hate speech provides clarity and analytical rigor to the discussion of hateful and offensive language. To that end, this research extends the linguistic notion of a speech act to encompass a more complex, compound speech act, which may be composed of other acts, but the combination of which accomplishes a social action of its own.

This analysis also successfully identified several patterns, both quantitative and qualitative, that differentiate those authors of hate speech who “like to threaten and frighten with words...but […] never follow through with any action” (Calhoun and Weston 2009, 7) from those who “truly intend to use lethal violence” (Calhoun and Weston 2009, 7). It is the profound hope of the researcher that in addition to advancing the understanding of hate speech as a linguistic phenomenon, an increased understanding of the specific patterns in hate speech that are associated with a heightened risk of violence may allow intervention to help prevent potential violence by enabling law enforcement and psychological professionals to take appropriate action and affording troubled individuals the opportunity to receive effective intervention.

Such change is possible, as evidenced by Arno Michaelis, former self-described proponent of a racial holy war and author of the book My Life After Hate. Michaelis admits that he participated in what he calls a “violence machine” (Michaelis 2010) directed at African Americans, Jews, LGBTQ individuals and others, but he is now an activist with groups like
Against Violent Extremism and Serve 2 Unite, where he works with students to foster diversity and peace. This research takes a step towards identifying the most high-risk individuals with a hope that potential victims can be kept safe and that Hunters like Robert Bowers can be changed into helpers like Arno Michaelis.
Appendix A Hate Speech Survey in Two Parts

Survey Part 1

You are being invited to participate in a study titled “Towards defining and assessing hate speech through linguistic analysis”. This study is being conducted by Alexandria Marsters, a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University in the Department of Linguistics. This study examines attitudes about and definitions of hate speech. The study has two main purposes: 1. to develop a definition of hate speech that combines general public and academic perspectives and 2. to examine examples of hate speech to identify language patterns that are correlated with violent behavior. The ultimate goal of this research is to identify language patterns that may serve as “red flags” to identify hate speech that may be associated with violence.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary at all times. You can choose not to participate at all or to leave the study at any time by exiting out of the survey window. In that instance, your responses will not be included as part of the study. Regardless of your decision, there will be no effect on your relationship with the researcher or any other negative consequences.

You are being asked to take part in this study because you are an English-speaking member of the general U.S. community. You have a valuable perspective about hate speech that should be added to the academic discourse.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete the following survey questions which are designed to collect your impressions about hate speech. Some questions will ask for your general thoughts and opinions, while other will present you with examples of language and ask you to make judgments about them. The survey will be conducted entirely online and should take around 30 minutes to complete.

Your responses to these survey questions will be entirely anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. The survey will ask you basic demographic questions, but no personally identifying information was or will be collected at any point. Once you submit the survey, there will be no way to withdraw from the study because the survey contains no identifying information.

Study data will be kept in a digital format, hosted by surveygizmo.com. Access to this data will be restricted to only the Primary Investigator, Alexandria Marsters.

There are minimal risks associated with this study. The survey will present you with speech which you may find offensive. You will be exposed to language and ideas which you may find objectionable. Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may stop and cancel this survey at any time with no effect on your relationship with the researcher or any other consequences.

Although your participation is very much appreciated, you will receive no compensation for this survey. While you will not experience any direct benefit from participation, information
collected in this study may benefit others in the future by helping to understand the phenomenon of hate speech and ultimately to uncover language patterns in hate speech that may help identify high risk situations and prevent potential violent incidents.

If you have any questions regarding the survey or this research project in general, please contact me at am2267@georgetown.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Georgetown University IRB at (202) 687-6553 or irbboard@georgetown.edu.

By clicking “yes” you are indicating your understanding of the above information and your consent to participate in this study.

1. Age (open response.)

2. Gender (open response.)

3. What do you identify as your ethnicity? (open response.)

4. What do you identify as your religious affiliation? (open response.)

6. Are you a native speaker of American English? Please indicate yes or no.

7. If no, what is your native language or dialect of English?

You will now be presented with 23 scenarios followed by an example of language. Please imagine that you encountered the sample language in the described scenario. In the given scenario, indicate the answer that best represents your response.

1. Scenario: The following is written on a sign carried by a person protesting outside a military funeral.
   Language: Thank God for dead soldiers
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

2. Scenario: The following is posted on a Facebook page. (“Abo” refers to an aboriginal, the native people of Australia.)
   Language: How do you save an abo from drowning? Take your foot off the cunts head.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

3. Scenario: The following is posted as a comment on someone's Facebook page.
Language: [Name] wow you are a nasty little queer...I can almost hear the gay lisp in your post...you dirty little troll...[Name] go back to your cave and die...you contribute NOTHING to society!
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

4. Scenario: The following is said by one woman to another woman during a conversation.
Language: You're a hypocritical, man-hating, bullying feminist.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

5. Scenario: The following is posted on a personal blog.
Language: The “Holocaust” never occurred. It is a Jewish invention designed to secure sympathy, financial compensation and the state of Israel.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

6. Scenario: The following is written in an opinion article on the internet.
Language: The only way to end racism and the oppression of my people is to destroy the white race. This must be done as quickly as possible; every day a white person lives is one more day that Africans suffer!!
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

7. Scenario: The following is chanted by a rival team at a basketball game.
Language: Fuck the Hoyas!
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech

d. I disagree that this language is hate speech

e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

8. Scenario: The following is posted as a comment on an article about undocumented immigration to the US.
Language: The simple answer to this problem is as soon as they arrive round them up in a holding camp and tell them no matter why they left their own country they will be shipped back there.

a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech

b. I agree that this language is hate speech

c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech

d. I disagree that this language is hate speech

e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

9. Scenario: The following is said by one friend to his roommate while they are discussing doing the dishes. Both are African American.
Language: Don't be a lazy nigger.

a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech

b. I agree that this language is hate speech

c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech

d. I disagree that this language is hate speech

e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

10. Scenario: The following is said by one classmate to another while discussing a peanut restriction at their school.
Language: Peanut allergies are a genetic weakness. Survival of the fittest says those people ought to die.

a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech

b. I agree that this language is hate speech

c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech

d. I disagree that this language is hate speech

e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

11. Scenario: The following is a caption to a photo of a prominent democratic politician.
Language: Democrats are self-serving, hate-filled, race-baiting. Creating class warfare is what they do best.

a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech

b. I agree that this language is hate speech

c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech

d. I disagree that this language is hate speech

e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech
12. Scenario: The following is written on the wall of a local Republican Party headquarters building.
Language: NAZI REPUBLICANS LEAVE TOWN OR ELSE
a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
b. I agree that this language is hate speech
c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

13. Scenario: The following is on a sign posted on a privately-owned driveway
Language: Parking for English Only. All others will be towed
a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
b. I agree that this language is hate speech
c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

14. Scenario: The following is a comment posted on an online news article about a gang rape in Delhi.
Language: They are all Asian, it's in their religion/life to gang rape young girls in their religion, because women have no Meaning
a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
b. I agree that this language is hate speech
c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

15. Scenario: The following is posted as a comment on an online public forum.
Language: Muslims need to be wiped out clean no more Islam. This is disgusting its time to stop them across the world.
a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
b. I agree that this language is hate speech
c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

16. Scenario: The following is text superimposed on an image of a women's bruised face, posted on Instagram.
Language: 1/3 of women are physically abused 2/3 of men aren't doing their job
a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
b. I agree that this language is hate speech
c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech
17. Scenario: The following is said by a friend who is Christian to his friend who is Jewish while they are dividing a check in a restaurant.
Language: Don't be such a Jew
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

18. Scenario: The following is yelled by a man to another man on the street.
Language: Faggot!
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

19. Scenario: The following is posted on a private Facebook page.
Language: Butcher those who mock Islam.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

20. Scenario: The following is said by a man in his late 80s at a family gathering.
Language: Blacks are inherently inferior and predisposed to criminal activities and should not be allowed into respectable areas.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

21. Scenario: The following is yelled to a police officer at a protest.
Language: Fuck the police!
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

22. Scenario: The following is said by one girl to the girl next to her on the bus.
Language: Fat people are gross! Why do people say being fat is acceptable? It's unhealthy as fuck and it's everyone's fucking problem.
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech
   e. I strongly disagree that this language is hate speech

23. Scenario: The following is shouted by a man from his car when a car driven by a white male cuts him off in traffic.
   Language: Stupid cracker!
   a. I strongly believe that this language is hate speech
   b. I agree that this language is hate speech
   c. I am neutral about this language being hate speech
   d. I disagree that this language is hate speech

24. (open response question)
   How do you define hate speech?

25. (open response question)
   When you were reading the previous scenarios and language examples, what factors influenced your judgments about hate speech?

Please confirm again your willingness to participate in this study. Note that if you choose not to participate, you may click “cancel” and your responses will be neither saved nor submitted. However, by clicking “yes” you are confirming your consent to participate.

Do you consent to participate in this study?

Thank you so much for your participation!

If you wish to participate in a follow up study, please provide your email address below. Participation is completely voluntary and will have no bearing on your participation in this survey. Your email address will only be used to send one email containing the follow-up survey. It will not be retained or transmitted for any other purpose.

_________________ (text box for email address)

If you have any questions regarding the recordings or this research project in general, please contact me at am2267@georgetown.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Georgetown University IRB at (202) 687-6553 or irboard@georgetown.edu.
You are being invited to participate in a study titled “Towards defining and assessing hate speech through linguistic analysis”. This study is being conducted by Alexandria Marsters, a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University in the Department of Linguistics. This study examines attitudes about and definitions of hate speech. The study has two main purposes: 1. to develop a definition of hate speech that combines general public and academic perspectives and 2. to examine examples of hate speech to identify language patterns that are correlated with violent behavior. The ultimate goal of this research is to identify language patterns that may serve as “red flags” to identify hate speech that may be associated with violence.

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary at all times. You can choose not to participate at all or to leave the study at any time by exiting out of the survey window. In that instance, your responses will not be included as part of the study. Regardless of your decision, there will be no effect on your relationship with the researcher or any other negative consequences.

You are being asked to take part in this study because you are an English-speaking member of the general U.S. community. You have a valuable perspective about hate speech that should be added to the academic discourse.

If you agree to participate, you will be asked to complete the following survey questions which are designed to collect your impressions about hate speech. Some questions will ask for your general thoughts and opinions, while other will present you with examples of language and ask you to make judgments about them. The survey will be conducted entirely online and should take around 30 minutes to complete.

Your responses to these survey questions will be entirely anonymous and cannot be linked to you in any way. The survey will ask you basic demographic questions, but no personally identifying information was or will be collected at any point. Once you submit the survey, there will be no way to withdraw from the study because the survey contains no identifying information.

Study data will be kept in a digital format, hosted by surveygizmo.com. Access to this data will be restricted to only the Primary Investigator, Alexandria Marsters.

There are minimal risks associated with this study. The survey will present you with speech which you may find offensive. You will be exposed to language and ideas which you may find objectionable. Participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You may stop and cancel this survey at any time with no effect on your relationship with the researcher or any other consequences.

Although your participation is very much appreciated, you will receive no compensation for this survey. While you will not experience any direct benefit from participation, information collected in this study may benefit others in the future by helping to understand the phenomenon
of hate speech and ultimately to uncover language patterns in hate speech that may help identity high risk situations and prevent potential violent incidents.

If you have any questions regarding the survey or this research project in general, please contact me at am2267@georgetown.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the Georgetown University IRB at (202) 687-6553 or irboard@georgetown.edu.

By clicking “yes” you are indicating your understanding of the above information and your consent to participate in this study.

1. Age (open response.)

2. Gender (open response.)

3. What do you identify as your ethnicity? (open response.)

6. Are you a native speaker of American English? Please indicate yes or no.

7. If no, what is your native language or dialect of English?

You will now be presented with 6 questions. The first 4 will present you with a language sample and ask you to select conditions or reasons that you would consider the language hate speech or not. Questions 5 will ask you to select categories upon which hate speech can be based and question 6 will ask you to rank factors that influence your decisions about what is hate speech.

1. “The only way to end racism and the oppression is to destroy the white race.”

This is hate speech if: (check all that apply)
   • the listener is offended
   • the speaker intended offense
   • it is said to a stranger
   • it is said to a close friend
   • the speaker is a person of color
   • the speaker is white
   • the listener is a person of color
   • the listener is white
   • it is said in a public, offline space (e.g. on the street)
   • it is said in a public, online space (e.g. Twitter)
   • it is said in a private, offline space (e.g. in a person's private home)
   • it is said in a private, online space (e.g. a member's only forum)
   • Other:
This is not hate speech if: (check all that apply)

- the listener is not offended
- the speaker did not intended offense (e.g. a joke)
- the speech was said in the course of an argument
- the speaker is a person of color
- the speaker is white
- the listener is a person of color
- the listener is white
- it is said to a stranger
- it is said to a close friend
- it is said in a public, offline space (e.g. on the street)
- it is said in a public, online space (e.g. Twitter)
- it is said in a private, offline space (e.g. in a person's private home)
- it is said in a private, online space (e.g. a member's only forum)
- Other:

2. “Muslims need to be wiped out clean – no more Islam. This is disgusting. It's time to stop them across the world.” (Assume the speech is delivered with an angry tone)

I believe that this is hate speech: yes/no

“Yes” diverts to this question:
This is hate speech because: (check all that apply)

- it incites or attempt to incite some action against a target
- it invokes or threatens violence towards a target
- it targets a group
- it could be offensive to an individual or group
- the targeted group is a political/social minority
- Other:

“No” diverts to this question:
This is not hate speech because... (explain – free response)

3. “White people are entitled and selfish. It's time to stop them from holding public office across the country.” (Assume the speech is delivered with an angry tone)

I believe that this is hate speech: yes/no

“Yes” diverts to this question:
This is hate speech because:

- it incites or attempt to incite some action against a target
• it targets a group
• it could be offensive to an individual or group
• it is based on a generalization
• Other:

“No” diverts to this question:
This is not hate speech because:
• it does not invoke or threaten violence towards a target
• it is political speech
• it is a personal opinion
• it targets a political/social majority

4. “Fuck Jose. He's an asshole spick.” (Assume the speech is delivered with an angry tone)

I believe that this is hate speech: yes/no

“Yes” diverts to this question:
This is hate speech because:
• it includes profanity
• it includes a slur or epithet
• it could be offensive to an individual or group
• Other:

“No” diverts to this question:
This is not hate speech because:
• it is a personal opinion
• it targets an individual
• Other:

5. I believe hate speech can be based on (check all that apply):
   - race
   - ethnicity
   - religious affiliation (including lack of religious affiliation)
   - age
   - gender presentation
   - biological sex
   - sexual orientation
   - immigration status
   - disability
   - citizenship
   - nationality
   - sports fandom
   - political affiliation
profession
social class
height
weight

6. Please rank the following factors which would influence your decision to label something hate speech (1 being most important, 10 being the least)
   • intent of the speaker
   • interpretation of the hearer
   • relationship between the speaker and listener (e.g. friends, strangers, partners etc.)
   • presence or absence of violent language or a threat of violence
   • presence or absence of an incitement to action against target
   • venue of speech (e.g. public/private; online vs. face-to-face)
   • context (e.g. in a conversation, argument, un-elicited comment etc.)
   • characteristics of the speaker (e.g. race, class, religion, sexual orientation, etc.)
   • presence or absence of slurs/epithets/profanity
   • characteristics of the target (e.g. race, class, religion, sexual orientation, etc.)

Please confirm again your willingness to participate in this study. Note that if you choose not to participate, you may click “cancel” and your responses will be neither saved nor submitted. However, by clicking “yes” you are confirming your consent to participate.

Do you consent to participate in this study?

Thank you so much for your participation!

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## Appendix B Examples of Systemic Functional Linguistic Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Verb Phrase</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Process Type</th>
<th>Subtype (if applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>laugh, smile</td>
<td><em>I laugh</em> and <em>I smile</em>. We are all smiling.</td>
<td>Corporeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>could die</td>
<td>For years, I thought it was so <em>I could die</em> as cannon fodder in Viet Nam,</td>
<td>Corporeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>am</td>
<td><em>This is my home. I am</em> here to stay till death do I</td>
<td>Existential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>reside</td>
<td>which I was born and raised -- and <em>where I still reside</em> --</td>
<td>Existential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>lasted</td>
<td>But <em>I only lasted</em> there from December 10th to December 28th, 2010</td>
<td>Existential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>was stuck</td>
<td>Even when <em>I was stuck</em> in a tiny cell 24 hours a day there was refuge inside being able talk shit to my captors 24/7</td>
<td>Existential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>was</td>
<td><em>When I was</em> in the woods I used a small dugout</td>
<td>Existential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>create</td>
<td>The crudest, most obvious way: <em>I create</em> public schools.</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Creating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>call</td>
<td>if he points his finger like a gun, <em>I call</em> the cops.</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>whistle</td>
<td><em>I make him march</em>. <em>I whistle</em> at him.</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>bought</td>
<td><em>So I bought</em> a domain name extension for 99 cents, and</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>faxed</td>
<td><em>I faxed</em> the press release around to the various media in the state</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>will blast</td>
<td><em>I'll blast</em> you harder that shitlock antifa girl throwing bottles in Berkeley</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Doing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>got assaulted</td>
<td><em>I only got assaulted</em> by niggers in the NutHouse</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Happening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>visited</td>
<td><em>I never visited</em> Rome</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Happening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>received</td>
<td><em>I just received</em> an e-mail yesterday.</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Happening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>might be attacked</td>
<td><em>I might be attacked</em> myself if I get involved</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Happening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>hit</td>
<td><em>I’m getting close to the bottom and when I hit</em> it will be a great relief</td>
<td>Material</td>
<td>Happening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>would love</td>
<td><em>I would love</em> to see a week-long failure of the electrical power grid</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>appreciate</td>
<td><em>I appreciate</em> your impressions.</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>don’t like</td>
<td>“Well, <em>I don’t like</em> blacks, but God loves them,</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>want</td>
<td><em>I want</em> to see it in each and every one of you</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Affection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>wondered</td>
<td><em>I wondered</em> at the time whether or not Mr Clinton had some inside information</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Cognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>believe</td>
<td>It is their fear, <em>I believe</em>, which explains the increasing level of viciousness</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Cognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>decided</td>
<td>a few days ago <em>I decided</em> were the best way to describe the “<em>Facts</em>”</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Cognition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corpus</th>
<th>Verb Phrase</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Process Type</th>
<th>Subtype</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>imagine</td>
<td>I cannot even begin to imagine the stagnation you would have presided over</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Cognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>heard</td>
<td>Too often I have heard people aware of the Jewish problem</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>watched</td>
<td>“I watched [the attacker] drop-kick him in the head several times</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>see</td>
<td>Well I don't see anything about it on social media or the news</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>heard</td>
<td>I just heard today that a 5 year old white girl was shot</td>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Perception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>the term “white supremacist” has become literally a prefix of my name when I am in the news.</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Circumstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>I am not in the position to, alone, go</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Circumstantial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>was</td>
<td>I was quite comfortable.</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (attributive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>This is a police killing just as sure as I am black!</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (attributive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>am being</td>
<td>Am I being edgy?</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (attributive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>It ain't that I'm that cold blooded,</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (attributive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>have been</td>
<td>I have been a broadcast engineer and amateur radio experimenter</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>was</td>
<td>everyone thought that I was a sociopathic Christian Identity half-bearded Nazi</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>who point your plastic fingers at me saying that I am a &quot;murderer,&quot;</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>am</td>
<td>I'm a Criminal, 33rd Degree.</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Intensive (identity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>I HAVE FRIENDS who tell me they don’t like to watch television</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Possessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>It is fitting to start off with the group I have the most real life experience with</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Possessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>We are offering five hundred dollars, that I have in my hand,</td>
<td>Relational</td>
<td>Possessive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>say</td>
<td>I say to the rebel forces attacking France, 'Fight well</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>warn</td>
<td>I warned you ladies, studying Jews is a nasty business</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Howler</td>
<td>told</td>
<td>I told all you tards that Traitor Glenn Miller</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>post</td>
<td>I don't post frivolous posts that are not</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>am talking</td>
<td>I'm talking getting our guns and start pulling trigger</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunter</td>
<td>mentioned</td>
<td>other peoples is also part of the problem I have just mentioned.</td>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C  Hate Speech Text by Dylann Roof

I was not raised in a racist home or environment. Living in the South, almost every White person has a small amount of racial awareness, simply because of the numbers of negroes in this part of the country. But it is a superficial awareness. Growing up, in school, the White and black kids would make racial jokes toward each other, but all they were were jokes. Me and White friends would sometimes would watch things that would make us think that “blacks were the real racists” and other elementary thoughts like this, but there was no real understanding behind it. The event that truly awakened me was the Trayvon Martin case. I kept hearing and seeing his name, and eventually I decided to look him up. I read the Wikipedia article and right away I was unable to understand what the big deal was. It was obvious that Zimmerman was in the right. But more importantly this prompted me to type in the words “black on White crime” into Google, and I have never been the same since that day. The first website I came to was the Council of Conservative Citizens. There were pages upon pages of these brutal black on White murders. I was in disbelief. At this moment I realized that something was very wrong. How could the news be blowing up the Trayvon Martin case while hundreds of these black on White murders got ignored?

From this point I researched deeper and found out what was happening in Europe. I saw that the same things were happening in England and France, and in all the other Western European countries. Again I found myself in disbelief. As an American we are taught to accept living in the melting pot, and black and other minorities have just as much right to be here as we do, since we are all immigrants. But Europe is the homeland of White people, and in many ways the situation is even worse there. From here I found out about the Jewish problem and other issues facing our race, and I can say today that I am completely racially aware.

Blacks

I think it is is fitting to start off with the group I have the most real life experience with, and the group that is the biggest problem for Americans.

Niggers are stupid and violent. At the same time they have the capacity to be very slick. Black people view everything through a racial lense. Thats what racial awareness is, its viewing everything that happens through a racial lense. They are always thinking about the fact that they are black. This is part of the reason they get offended so easily, and think that some thing are intended to be racist towards them, even when a White person wouldnt be thinking about race. The other reason is the Jewish agitation of the black race.

Black people are racially aware almost from birth, but White people on average dont think about race in their daily lives. And this is our problem. We need to and have to.

Say you were to witness a dog being beat by a man. You are almost surely going to feel very sorry for that dog. But then say you were to witness a dog biting a man. You will most likely not feel the same pity you felt for the dog for the man. Why? Because dogs are lower than men.

This same analogy applies to black and White relations. Even today, blacks are subconsciously viewed by White people are lower beings. They are held to a lower standard in general. This is
why they are able to get away with things like obnoxious behavior in public. Because it is expected of them.

Modern history classes instill a subconscious White superiority complex in Whites and an inferiority complex in blacks. This White superiority complex that comes from learning of how we dominated other peoples is also part of the problem I have just mentioned. But of course I dont deny that we are in fact superior.

I wish with a passion that niggers were treated terribly throughout history by Whites, that every White person had an ancestor who owned slaves, that segregation was an evil an oppressive institution, and so on. Because if it was all it true, it would make it so much easier for me to accept our current situation. But it isnt true. None of it is. We are told to accept what is happening to us because of ancestors wrong doing, but it is all based on historical lies, exaggerations and myths. I have tried endlessly to think of reasons we deserve this, and I have only came back more irritated because there are no reasons.

Only a fourth to a third of people in the South owned even one slave. Yet every White person is treated as if they had a slave owning ancestor. This applies to in the states where slavery never existed, as well as people whose families immigrated after slavery was abolished. I have read hundreds of slaves narratives from my state. And almost all of them were positive. One sticks out in my mind where an old ex-slave recounted how the day his mistress died was one of the saddest days of his life. And in many of these narratives the slaves told of how their masters didnt even allowing whipping on his plantation.

Segregation was not a bad thing. It was a defensive measure. Segregation did not exist to hold back negroes. It existed to protect us from them. And I mean that in multiple ways. Not only did it protect us from having to interact with them, and from being physically harmed by them, but it protected us from being brought down to their level. Integration has done nothing but bring Whites down to level of brute animals. The best example of this is obviously our school system.

Now White parents are forced to move to the suburbs to send their children to “good schools”. But what constitutes a “good school”? The fact is that how good a school is considered directly corresponds to how White it is. I hate with a passion the whole idea of the suburbs. To me it represents nothing but scared White people running. Running because they are too weak, scared, and brainwashed to fight. Why should we have to flee the cities we created for the security of the suburbs? Why are the suburbs secure in the first place? Because they are White. The pathetic part is that these White people dont even admit to themselves why they are moving. They tell themselves it is for better schools or simply to live in a nicer neighborhood. But it is honestly just a way to escape niggers and other minorities.

But what about the White people that are left behind? What about the White children who, because of school zoning laws, are forced to go to a school that is 90 percent black? Do we really think that that White kid will be able to go one day without being picked on for being White, or called a “white boy”? And who is fighting for him? Who is fighting for these White people forced by economic circumstances to live among negroes? No one, but someone has to.

Here I would also like to touch on the idea of a Norhtwest Front. I think this idea is beyond stupid. Why should I for example, give up the beauty and history of my state to go to the
Northwest? To me the whole idea just parallels the concept of White people running to the suburbs. The whole idea is pathetic and just another way to run from the problem without facing it.

Some people feel as though the South is beyond saving, that we have too many blacks here. To this I say look at history. The South had a higher ratio of blacks when we were holding them as slaves. Look at South Africa, and how such a small minority held the black in apartheid for years and years. Speaking of South Africa, if anyone thinks that think will eventually just change for the better, consider how in South Africa they have affirmative action for the black population that makes up 80 percent of the population.

It is far from being too late for America or Europe. I believe that even if we made up only 30 percent of the population we could take it back completely. But by no means should we wait any longer to take drastic action.

Anyone who thinks that White and black people look as different as we do on the outside, but are somehow magically the same on the inside, is delusional. How could our faces, skin, hair, and body structure all be different, but our brains be exactly the same? This is the nonsense we are led to believe.

Negroes have lower Iqs, lower impulse control, and higher testosterone levels in generals. These three things alone are a recipe for violent behavior. If a scientist publishes a paper on the differences between the races in Western Europe or Americans, he can expect to lose his job. There are personality traits within human families, and within different breeds of cats or dogs, so why not within the races?

A horse and a donkey can breed and make a mule, but they are still two completely different animals. Just because we can breed with the other races doesn’t make us the same.

In a modern history class it is always emphasized that, when talking about “bad” things Whites have done in history, they were White. But when we learn about the numerous, almost countless wonderful things Whites have done, it is never pointed out that these people were White. Yet when we learn about anything important done by a black person in history, it is always pointed out repeatedly that they were black. For example when we learn about how George Washington carver was the first nigger smart enough to open a peanut.

On another subject I want to say this. Many White people feel as though they don’t have a unique culture. The reason for this is that White culture is world culture. I don’t mean that our culture is made up of other cultures, I mean that our culture has been adopted by everyone in the world. This makes us feel as though our culture isn’t special or unique. Say for example that every business man in the world wore a kimono, that every skyscraper was in the shape of a pagoda, that every door was a sliding one, and that everyone ate every meal with chopsticks. This would probably make a Japanese man feel as though he had no unique traditional culture.

I have noticed a great disdain for race mixing White women within the White nationalists community, bordering on insanity it. These women are victims, and they can be saved. Stop.

Jews
Unlike many White nationalists, I am of the opinion that the majority of American and European Jews are White. In my opinion the issues with Jews is not their blood, but their identity. I think that if we could somehow destroy the Jewish identity, then they wouldn't cause much of a problem. The problem is that Jews look White, and in many cases are White, yet they see themselves as minorities. Just like niggers, most Jews are always thinking about the fact that they are Jewish. The other issue is that they network. If we could somehow turn every Jew blue for 24 hours, I think there would be a mass awakening, because people would be able to see plainly what is going on.

I don't pretend to understand why Jews do what they do. They are enigma.

Hispanics

Hispanics are obviously a huge problem for Americans. But there are good Hispanics and bad Hispanics. I remember while watching Hispanic television stations, the shows and even the commercials were more White than our own. They have respect for White beauty, and a good portion of Hispanics are White. It is a well known fact that White Hispanics make up the elite of most Hispanic countries. There is good White blood worth saving in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and even Brasil.

But they are still our enemies.

East Asians

I have great respect for the East Asian races. Even if we were to go extinct they could carry something on. They are by nature very racist and could be great allies of the White race. I am not opposed at all to allies with the Northeast Asian races.

Patriotism

I hate the sight of the American flag. Modern American patriotism is an absolute joke. People pretending like they have something to be proud while White people are being murdered daily in the streets. Many veterans believe we owe them something for “protecting our way of life” or “protecting our freedom”. But I'm not sure what way of life they are talking about. How about we protect the White race and stop fighting for the jews. I will say this though, I myself would have rather lived in 1940’s America than Nazi Germany, and no this is not ignorance speaking, it is just my opinion. So I don't blame the veterans of any wars up until after Vietnam, because at least they had an American to be proud of and fight for.

An Explanation

To take a saying from a film, “I see all this stuff going on, and I don't see anyone doing anything about it. And it pisses me off.”. To take a saying from my favorite film, “Even if my life is worth less than a speck of dirt, I want to use it for the good of society.”.

I have no choice. I am not in the position to, alone, go into the ghetto and fight. I chose Charleston because it is most historic city in my state, and at one time had the highest ratio of blacks to Whites in the country. We have no skinheads, no real KKK, no one doing anything but talking on the internet. Well someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has to be me.
Unfortunately at the time of writing I am in a great hurry and some of my best thoughts, actually many of them have been to be left out and lost forever. But I believe enough great White minds are out there already.

Please forgive any typos, I didn't have time to check it.
Appendix D Hate Speech Text by Craig Cobb

"[T]he two races, equally free, cannot live in the same government." – Thomas Jefferson
The answer is yes, if you’re Mr. Tharp. Marissa Tharp [last page, top middle] of Davenport, Iowa, was just 20 years old when she was found abused, stiff, and strangled in a trailer. The accused, one Shanette Harston, 25, was an ex-cop who drove around with college campuses in his Caddy. Marissa is said to have been “involved” with him, though her father, after she was killed, denied it. If you read TAA #42, you learned of young Cassandra Arnold, a girl whose natural maternal interests had been twisted origninally misreported in the press as “Shauntez”, which is a girl whose natural maternal interests had been twisted.

Victoria’s Secret is an international company owned by jew Les Wexner, one of the world’s 200 wealthiest people. Oftentimes, when an employee is murdered in circumstances involving his workplace, corporations issue statements of grief, or even fund a trust in the victim’s name. Despite searching exhaustively online, The Aryan Alternative has discovered no help or sympathy extended from Les Wexner and his retail chain to the family of White ingenue Dru Sjodin. Just another shitskin invader named Rodriguez had been surveilling her where she worked, at Victoria’s Secret in the mall.

Diverse came for Dru...

The jews helped it prey on Higgins...
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