GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

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Abstract

In recent decades, social innovation and social entrepreneurship have risen to the forefront of both international and national consciousness. Promulgated by academics, but more strongly in mainstream writings, social entrepreneurship and enterprise, henceforth collectively referred to as SE, have been lauded as an alternative to often failed and ineffective government interventions to social issues. In this thesis, I challenge the narrative that government has little to no role in SE; I explore how government support 1) manifests in the broader Ugandan and Indian SE ecosystems and 2) adheres to Frank and Shockley’s ‘functions of government in social entrepreneurship’ typology. Uganda and India pose interesting case studies, as their respective political systems belie their disproportionately high and low levels of social entrepreneurship.

Using empirical country-level data, comparative political analysis, and narrative interview analysis derived from 20 qualitative semi-structured interviews with founders, staff, and academics working with SE, I argue that government’s role in SE is decisive though often indirect. Though authoritarian, Uganda’s electoral autocracy has created a semblance of political consistency, facilitating an ecosystem where government involvement in SE has consolidated around political expediency, corruption, and inefficiency. In India, electoral democracy and political fragmentation have fostered government involvement in SE lacking a cohesive, dominant narrative, though political maneuvering and acumen appear to increase with organizational size and scale. I thus nuance Frank and Shockley’s typology; as a middle capacity state, government in India functions as a ‘scaler’, while government in the low-capacity state of Uganda functions as both a ‘bystander’ and ‘enabler’.
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Introduction

At Jaipur Foot, or BMVSS, in Jaipur, India, patients meander along the corridors, trying on their prosthetics or waiting for their appointments. Upon hearing their name called, they make their way to the room where their prosthetic is being constructed. The employees, some with prosthetics themselves, are busy measuring, cutting, fitting, re-measuring, re-cutting, and refitting the artificial limbs, as patients witness the process unfold in real time.

South of the equator in Uganda, Frank Neil Yiga of Anuel Energy shepherds his small team of engineers and accountants. In the corner is a display case, containing the Chinese-manufactured solar lamps that the company has been selling to rural Ugandans. Mr. Yiga animatedly talks about the company’s partnerships with various tech companies like Angaza, whose software they’ve been using to track micropayments from their small-scale users. Micropayments constitute one option from the enterprise’s affordable financing plans, through which customers can pay as they go in small monthly installments averaging UGX 50,000, roughly equivalent to USD 13.50 (observation, March 2018).

Tucked away in their offices in their respective corners of the world, these organizations appear to be calmly going about their day, seemingly playing a bigger role in their patients’ and beneficiaries’ lives than any other entity in their own organizations. Yet despite all the agency they may hold over the choices made and the environments created to grow and scale their work, they are not solely responsible. Behind all these operations and behind the physical tangibility of their successes, one cannot forget the surrounding enabling environment that has been shaped and molded by government. One Ashoka Fellow, founder of an educational social enterprise in Uganda concedes that the desired impact will never be achieved without this entity, saying, “Gone are the days when you can work alone.”
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Enabling environment notwithstanding, these organizations exemplify the rising popularity of ‘social enterprises’, organizations that use innovative and efficient processes characteristic of for-profit businesses to solve complex social issues, that span the spectrum of health, poverty, environmental sustainability, and education. Thanks to individuals like Ashoka founder Bill Drayton, New Venture founder Ed Skloot, and The Rise of the Social Entrepreneur author Charles Leadbeater who have elevated their work to the forefront of national and international discussions and consciousness (Nicholls, 2014; Leadbeater, 1997). However, social entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurs, and social enterprises have existed in function for some time. Goodwill Industries, for example, was founded in 1902, pioneering the concept of “a hand up, not a handout” by employing the poor to mend and repair goods. Resold to the public or redistributed to underprivileged populations, the profits of these sales and other income sources helped Goodwill recover a large majority of its budget while continuing to support economic self-sustainability through employment and job training opportunities (“Social Enterprise”).

Despite acknowledgements of government’s necessity by practitioners, perceptions of government incapacity have grown in tandem with popularizations of social entrepreneurship. Though the task of alleviating social issues has traditionally fallen to government and civil society, government has come to be viewed as inefficient, incapable, or even a perpetrator of these issues (Dees, 2007), while NGOs are plagued by overreliance on grants and donations that ultimately limit their organizational sustainability and scale of work (Dees, 1998; Nicholls, 2014, p. 206). Many practitioners argue that this has revealed a systemic gap in addressing large-scale social change and consequently promote SE as an alternative to tackle these issues (Agapitova, Sanchez, & Tinsley, 2017, p. 5). Yet even in cases where there is government and policy support, bureaucratic red tape and rigidity have induced sluggish support for SE, stymying government
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funding and innovation and perpetuating the perception of government inefficiency (observation, March 2018).

Because of these perceptions, there has also been a dearth of literature examining government’s potential role, at least on a theoretical basis. One of the most notable writings that underlies much of my work is the typology created by Gordon Shockley and Peter Frank (2011). Titled the ‘functions of government in social entrepreneurship’, Frank and Shockley examine how government support manifests itself in countries with high and low state capacities (2011).

Because the legitimacy of the field as an academic area of study has been undermined by a lack of broad consensus on a definition for social entrepreneurship and its associated phrases, I make an assumption about the relationship between “social entrepreneurship” and “social enterprise”. This assumption was driven by the lack of a formalized definition of social entrepreneurship and was influenced by Peredo and McLean’s widely cited critical view of social entrepreneurship as a concept (2006). They write,

Social enterprise as an activity (normally represented by using the term without a definite or indefinite article) is commonly equated…with social entrepreneurship. It is assumed in what follows that elucidating the concept of social entrepreneurship amounts to elucidating the notion of social enterprise as an activity (Peredo & McLean, 2006, p. 57).

I thus follow theirs and other writers’ lead and accept these intuitive similarities, though social enterprises as organizations are more nuanced than the term allows (p. 57). For the rest of this paper I refer to social entrepreneurship and social enterprise collectively through the acronym ‘SE’.

For this thesis, I use a combination of methods that include comparative political analysis and semi-structured, qualitative interviews. Throughout the past couple months, I have
conducted 20 qualitative semi-structured interviews with founders, staff, and academics engaged in SE work—10 each from Uganda and India. Their perceptions and experiences working with government directly and indirectly through collaboration and policy are telling of the broader policy and governance climate surrounding SE.

Rather than accept that government is incapable and has little presence, I explore more nuanced roles of how government currently plays and can play a role in supporting SE in the Ugandan and Indian SE ecosystems. To do so, I first conduct a literature review, contextualizing and questioning the narrative that social entrepreneurship is most effective when it happens independent of government. I then analyze the political and regime typologies of Uganda and India, synthesizing empirical data to ascribe a state capacity classification and finally, analyze individual experiences and perceptions towards government collaboration. Through these steps, I also add to Frank and Shockley’s (2011) typology by exploring and characterizing how government involvement is manifested these two countries, whose functions and capacities are more nuanced than the typology provides.

These analyses deeply inform the role of government in the respective SE ecosystems of the two countries. In Uganda, electoral autocracy has created a type of political consistency that has facilitated an ecosystem where government involvement in SE is consolidating around a narrative focused on political expediency, corruption and inefficiency. In India, electoral democracy and political fragmentation have fostered government involvement in SE that lacks a cohesive, dominant paradigm, though political maneuvering is important for the larger-scale organizations. I thus nuance Frank and Shockley’s typology, identifying government in the middle-capacity state of India as a ‘scaler’, while government in the low-capacity state of Uganda as both a ‘bystander’ and ‘enabler’.
Social Entrepreneurship: Literature and Overview

Though informal forms of social entrepreneurship have existed for decades, its formal coinage and conceptualization emerged from the work of Ashoka’s Bill Drayton and New Ventures’ Ed Skloot (Nicholls, 2014). The roots of the modern form of corporate social enterprise and social entrepreneurship, however, can be traced back to the United States and European countries in the late 1970s and 1980s. In the United States, the economic downturn and federal spending cutbacks caused many charities to seek alternative revenue streams beyond grants and donations. Between 1982 and 2000, charities started generating revenue from commercial activities, increasing this proportion of income by 20 percent (Doeringer, 2010, p. 293). At around the same time, European countries witnessed high unemployment rates. Much of this unemployment was long-term in nature, leading a rise in the number of NGOs focused on combatting structural unemployment which also provided programs in job-training and work-integration; many of these programs were characteristic of commercial and social enterprises (Doeringer, 2010, p. 294).

Ashoka founder Bill Drayton, whose organization identified and supported social entrepreneurs and innovators around the world, and New Ventures founder Ed Skloot, who helped nonprofits seek new sources of income, pioneered contemporary ideas of social entrepreneurship (Nicholls, 2014). Since then, social entrepreneurship and innovation have continued to be perceived as the “next biggest thing”, as government bodies, educational institutions, and numerous notable figures and corporations have come to laud them as welcome and innovative ways to solve some of the most complex societal issues (Hand, 2016).
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Schools of Thought

As argued by Dees and Anderson, a significant body of literature has developed that follows two disparate schools of thought—the ‘Social Enterprise’ School and ‘Social Innovation’ School, whose adherents are disseminated among academic and practitioner circles (2016). While the former is focused on “the generation of ‘earned-income’ to serve a social mission”, the latter is focused on “establishing new and better ways to address social problems or meet social needs” (Dees & Anderson, 2016, p. 41).

The ‘Social Enterprise’ School is informed by a more straightforward understanding of social entrepreneurship and social entrepreneurs, who are the organizers and operators of businesses with more socially-oriented dimensions. This school emerged for three reasons (Dees & Anderson, 2016). The first motivation was due to the work of Ed Skloot, who coined the “nonprofit entrepreneurship” movement that sought alternative sources of funding for NGOs. The second motivation was a growing awareness among business executives that for-profit companies could provide social services; Control Data Corporation founder William Norris, for example, thought social needs created business opportunities (Dees & Anderson, 2016, p. 42). Lastly, the work of other thought leaders, institutions, initiatives, and consultancies have contributed to the emergence of a social enterprise “industry” that distinguishes the Social Enterprise School from being a component of nonprofit finance (Dees & Anderson, 2016, p. 44).

The ‘Social Innovation’ School, on the other hand, finds its roots in classical entrepreneurship theory. Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter proposed what is now arguably one of the defining tenets of entrepreneurship: successful entrepreneurship encourages continued iteration and innovation and sets off a chain reaction leading to “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1942). This state of “creative destruction” informs the conceptual foundation for
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this school of thought because the work of social entrepreneurs inherently “reform[s] or revolutionize[s] the patterns of producing social value, shifting resources into areas of higher yield for society” (Dees & Anderson, 2016, p. 44). It follows that the byproducts of social entrepreneurship are the effective obsolescence of existing ventures, products, models, and processes (Osberg & Martin, 2007; Schumpeter, 1942). Bill Drayton and Ashoka were the prominent drivers of the Social Innovation School through their work identifying changemakers who could foment social change with “pattern setting ideas” (Drayton & MacDonald, 1993, p. i).

Defining Social Entrepreneurship

Despite the growth of SE, much of its literature is still budding. Early writings in this field focus on defining social entrepreneurship and its components; there have been constant attempts to delineate its boundaries and increase conceptual clarity (Dees, 1998; Dacin, et al., 2011). Dees put forth one of the earliest definitions of social entrepreneurship which emphasizes the role of the individual, who acts a social sector change agent by:

1. Adopting a mission to create and sustain social value (not just private value),
2. Recognizing and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities to serve that mission,
3. Engaging in a process of continuous innovation, adaptation, and learning,
4. Acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in hand, and
5. Exhibiting heightened accountability to the constituencies served and for the outcomes created (1998, p. 5).

Subsequent definitions have furthered this notion of the entrepreneur as the sole agent of change by enumerating individual behaviors and characteristics exhibited by prominent social entrepreneurs (Martin and Osberg, 2007; Peredo & McLean, 2006). Martin and Osberg (2007) mention as examples Muhammad Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank and father of
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microcredit, Robert Redford, founder of the Sundance Film Festival, and Victoria Hale, creator of the OneWorld Health Institute, the world’s first nonprofit pharmaceutical company with the goal of ensuring equitable access to drugs. These individuals are characterized as dynamic agents of change, who have “confronted” (p. 9), “seized the chance” (p. 9), and “became determined” (p. 10) to challenge an existing unjust equilibrium by “forging a new, stable, equilibrium that releases trapped potential or alleviates the suffering of the targeted group” (p. 8). In this type of characterization, the unit of change is the individual: the dynamic and motivated entrepreneur. This sentiment has been confirmed in my interviews, some of which have focused on entrepreneurs specifically when asked to identify factors contributing to SE success.

More recent works expand beyond the individual, defining SE more broadly as the processes, organizations, and individuals that adopt determined, creative, and resourceful qualities often associated with businesses (Dees, 2007). Nicholls (2014) emphasizes that social entrepreneurship constitutes two parts: a strategic focus on social impact coupled with an innovative approach to mission. Additional works similarly seek to define social entrepreneurship by treating its constituent components of ‘social’ and ‘entrepreneurship’ as more or less distinct (Mair & Marti, 2011; Peredo & McLean, 2006). One aspect of the SE landscape that underlies my study is that of policy and governance, which I will examine later.

Further academic inquiry has illuminated the delineations between ‘social innovation’, ‘social entrepreneurship’, ‘social enterprise’, and the ‘social entrepreneur’. While social innovation broadly refers to “the process of developing and deploying effective solutions to challenging and often systemic social and environmental issues in support of social progress,” social entrepreneurship is subset of social innovation; however, both refer to processes and behaviors (“Defining Social Innovation”, 2019). ‘Social enterprise’ is the organizational
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manifestation of social entrepreneurship, while a ‘social entrepreneur’ is the individual, often founder, who operates at the helm of the social enterprise (Mair & Marti, 2011).

Within the ‘social entrepreneurship’ subset, definitions of ‘social enterprise’ continue to differ (Nicholls, 2014). Some definitions characterize social enterprises as revenue-generating businesses; the UK Business, Innovation and Skills Department defines social enterprise as “a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximize profit for shareholders and owners” (British Council, 2015). The Asian Development Bank defines social enterprises as organizations unbounded by legal structure with “triple bottom line returns…[that] have a financially sustainable revenue model (or plan to become sustainable in the near future)” (India Social Enterprise, 2012).

Other definitions eschew financial considerations altogether and instead highlight the use of innovative processes characteristic of for-profit businesses to achieve the social enterprise’s socially-oriented mission (Agapitova et al., 2017). Similar to the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank’s definition of social enterprise is not just limited to ‘business’, expanding them to “private for-profit, nonprofit, and hybrid organizations with a social mission to serve the Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP) that use business approaches to achieve their objectives” (Agapitova et al., 2017, p. 5).

While considerable progress and definitional consolidation have been made, there is still no consensus over a formal definition (Nicholls, 2014), which can be attributed in part to regional influences (Kerlin, 2014). Different countries and regions of the world have come to associate ‘social enterprise’ “with their own distinct models and activities” (Kerlin, 2014, p.1).
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Regional differences have made it difficult to reach consensus on international, over-arching definitions of social entrepreneurship and enterprise.

For the purposes of this thesis, I use a broad definition of social enterprise as I focus more on the potential role of government than the social enterprises themselves. Furthermore, I consider the criticisms of Dacin et al., who state that writings on social entrepreneurship and social enterprise ascribe heavily to heroic characterizations that overemphasize the individual as the sole proponent of change (2011). Due to notions of SE that vary on a contextual basis, I am wary about spending too much time digging for an exact definition of SE. To do so would overvalue semantics while devaluing the importance of the work that the organizations do.

Thus, I focus on the organizations themselves, using a definition of SE that can broadly be defined as organizations that use innovative practices and processes often found in for-profit businesses with the goal of creating social impact. This definition is an amalgamation of those used by the World Bank and Ashoka, and has also been informed by my time in-country. A broad definition of SE allows me to focus more acutely on how government might play a role in supporting SE, rather than be bogged down in definitional nitpicking present in earlier debates.

Understanding Social Entrepreneurship

In this section, I contextualize the foundations for why SE is often thought about and taught independent of government, explained in part by the large roles of business and the private sector. The adoption of SE by business schools have primarily driven the education of the next generation of social entrepreneurs through courses, degree-granting programs, and practitioner publications.

According to the Social Innovation School, early works examining social entrepreneurship are grounded in entrepreneurship theory (Dees & Anderson, 2016; Dees, 1998).
The prominence of entrepreneurship theorists like Schumpeter with his “creative destruction” theory have lent credence to entrepreneurship as a legitimate field of study, while social entrepreneurship, to a limited extent, suffers from a “liability of newness” (Stinchcombe, 1965). Thus, some SE definitions continue to incorporate ideas from existing approaches and theoretical frameworks rooted in classical entrepreneurship, including ideas of “institutional theory, network theory, and discursive approaches” (Dacin et al., 2011; Bruton, Ahlstrom, & Li, 2011).

As with all fields of study, academics and practitioners continue to think about SE in manners that run the risk of being siloed but are also represent the fields in which they work. Academics devote a significant amount of attention creating a sound theoretical basis (Hand, 2016). On the other hand, in commercial writings, mass media, and business school publications, there is a preponderance of attention on practicality over theoretical grounding.

Within academia, the loci of focus in research can be split into two groups: social science researchers and business school practitioners. Dacin et. al. (2011) represent the locus of social science research that examines the theoretical basis of SE as a domain of inquiry. Their article evaluates the promise of SE and proposes several meaningful ways to look at SE, with a specific focus on outcomes and context. They believe that a “mission-focused definition…provides the field with the potential to offer something unique to organizational science” (p. 1206). The authors contend that SE remains a promising and important area, provided that researchers within the organization science community address some of the critiques of SE that follow.

One of Dacin et. al.’s main critiques of SE is that existing SE literature is largely atheoretical and descriptive; this can be attributed to the predominance and seeming overreliance on case studies and anecdotes to paint a specific picture of SEs and entrepreneurship as unique entities (Comini, Barki, & Aguiar, 2012; Seelos & Mair, 2005). Furthermore, the dearth of
studies grounded in quantitative analysis and the absence of large-scale databases have continued to detract from the legitimacy of SE as a field that warrants substantive academic inquiry (Hand, 2016). To address the field’s atheoretical grounding, Dacin et. al. propose five areas at which to build theory: institutions and social movements, networks, culture, identity and image, and cognition (2011, p. 121).

Additionally, the meteoric rise and embrace of social entrepreneurship in certain circles has generated criticism about its “self-evidently good image” and role as “an increasingly important international phenomenon (Dey, 2006, p. 121). This type of rhetoric has invaded social science discourse akin to a fashionable trend (Dacin et al., 2011). While these writings have not altogether discounted the possible benefits of these processes, they do call for a more nuanced and critical look at the field in general.

The case model structure of research on SE can be attributed to the role of business schools, whose loci of focus has been split between educating practitioners and conducting research. While business school was originally seen as a trade school, in recent decades, the increasing prestige of business schools has contributed significantly to the momentum behind social entrepreneurship. For example, Harvard Business School’s popularization of the case study method of learning among business schools and other institutions has also been applied to the scope of SE, lending ground to criticisms that the field of study lacks theoretical grounding (Dacin et al., 2011).

Indeed, among business schools, the interest in social entrepreneurship has been considerable, strengthening the associations between SE and the private sector. Numerous academic institutions around the world have set up research centers and postgraduate programs, like Harvard Business School’s Initiative on Social Enterprise, Stanford Graduate School of
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Business’s Center for Social Innovation which also publishes the *Stanford Social Innovation Review*, and Oxford Said Business School’s Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneurship, among others.

In addition to offering courses on social entrepreneurship, a number are also degree-granting programs that prepare students for careers in social impact and entrepreneurship. At the University of Pennsylvania, Wharton undergraduates can pursue a concentration in Social Impact & Responsibility, which is designed to help students answer the question, “How should business enterprises and business thinking be engaged to improve society in areas not always associated with business?” (“Social Impact and Responsibility”, 2019). Graduate students can pursue a joint MBA-MSW in partnership with the Penn School of Social Policy and Practice, though this program seems to teach business and social work jointly, but still as disparate topics rather than a singular program focused on social entrepreneurship. For graduate students, Wharton’s MBA program offers an Innovation and Entrepreneurship major, but its constituent courses are not necessarily social impact-focused, comprising courses like ‘Private Equity in Emerging Markets’, ‘Negotiations’, and ‘Corporate Development: Mergers and Acquisitions’ in addition to ‘Social Entrepreneurship’, ‘Creativity’, and ‘Scaling Operations’ (“Social Impact and Responsibility”, 2019).

Alternatively, Duke University’s Fuqua School of Business offers an MBA program with a concentration in Social Entrepreneurship through the Center for the Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship (CASE). As the academic home of the late J. Gregory Dees, internationally recognized for legitimizing social entrepreneurship as an academic field of study and penning seminal writings on SE, Duke is “widely recognized for its pioneering leadership in [SE] education.” Students who pursue this concentration will foster their “entrepreneurial spirit of
social impact to become social sector leaders learn the skills necessary to recognize the unique challenges, opportunities, and qualities associated with trying to create social value.” Compared to Penn’s SE courses, Duke University’s conception of SE appears more focused on creating social value than integrating social elements into business practices. Thus, SE appears to be treated more holistically at Duke as opposed to two disparate fields of study.

The prolific interest in working and studying in this field has also led to the establishment of organizations that focus on practitioner-driven writings and solutions. In recent years, various support networks for social entrepreneurs have popped up, like the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, the Global Social Entrepreneurship Network (GSEN), and the Social Enterprise Alliance. Consultancies like the Bridgespan Group aim to provide organizational management solutions to social sector organizations, while venture philanthropy organizations like New Philanthropy Capital, grant-giving institutions, and federal agencies like the United States Agency for International Development identify and have the capacity to fund promising social enterprises. Perhaps the most prominent is Ashoka, an NGO that identifies, invests in, and mentors selected social entrepreneurs throughout various stages in their careers.

In business circles, the clamor around social entrepreneurship and enterprise remained relatively separate from Bill Drayton and Ed Skloot’s work, instead finding its roots in C.K. Prahalad’s seminal article “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid”, first published in Strategy+Business magazine with Stuart Hart (2002). A renowned organizational management expert, Prahalad advocated for the role of multinational corporations (MNCs) in poverty alleviation, organizations that were large, resource-rich, and exercised global influence. His work read as a call to action, urging the world’s largest multinational companies (MNCs) to develop products for the four billion people living on four dollars a day or less, all the while making a
profit. These people constitute the “bottom of the pyramid” or “base of the pyramid” (BOP), a term popularized by Prahalad. As the population swells, Prahalad and Hart argue, the BOP demographic will become a multitrillion dollar market, becoming an attractive market for the products and services of MNCs.

Prahalad’s ideas however did not include social enterprises and social entrepreneurship at the onset, instead focusing on multinational corporations and how they can grow through this BOP approach. The growth promised by the millions of middle-class consumers “clamoring for products from MNCs…was wildly oversold,” while the Asian and Latin American financial crises “[had] greatly diminished the attractiveness of emerging markets” (Prahalad, 2002). For MNCs, it was time to globalize, but through a “new lens of inclusive capitalism,” allowing the world’s wealthiest companies to sell “to the poor and [help] them prove their lives by producing and distributing products and services in culturally sensitive, environmentally sustainable, and economically profitable ways” (Prahalad, 2002). To business practitioners, these ideas were revolutionary. It seemed that finally, there was no trade-off; it was possible to be both socially impactful and profit-generating.

In the years since, various MNCs have adopted Prahalad’s approach to varying degrees of success, including GE Health, Hindustan Lever, and Godrej. In India, GE Healthcare developed an electrocardiogram (ECG) for use in rural areas whose design considered the poor infrastructure, lack of electricity, and trained doctors. The resulting product was battery-powered, could be operated by paramedics, was mobile and robust, and printed ECG results on the spot. Most importantly, it was affordable at a price of USD 800 compared to USD 10,000 in the United States for ECG machines that were 50 pound standalone machines (Prahalad, 2012). Similarly, Hindustan Lever, the Indian subsidiary of Unilever, was one of the first companies in
India to market salt based on the platform of iodization and health, eventually addressing iodine deficiency disorder (IDD). The company subsequently became endorsed by the International Council for the Control of Iodine Deficiency.

The publication of *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid* has both advanced the field of SE and galvanized a prolific volume of research and exploration focused on the most effective models of product and service delivery to bottom of the pyramid customers (Karamchandani, Kubzanksy, & Frandano, 2009; Prahalad, 2006; Galvin & Iannotti, 2014; Seelos & Mair, 2005). For example, the Monitor Group’s report “Emerging Markets, Emerging Models”, based on extensive research on sustainable, market-based solutions to helping the poor, identifies seven distinctive business models that work to serve low-income customers and engaging them as suppliers, producers, and workers (Karamchandani, Kubzanksy, & Frandano, 2009). Seelos and Mair (2005) examine models of social entrepreneurship narrowed down to three organizations: Grameen Bank, Sekem, and the Institute for OneWorld Health, arguing that these organizations exemplify successful challenges toward the status quo and our thinking about what is feasible. Galvin and Iannotti (2014) similarly employ the case study approach, but conduct an in-depth exploration of the Kickstart model of social enterprise and its advantages in the context of international development. Thus, identifying organizational practices and business models has come to underlie and exemplify the atheoretical critiques in social entrepreneurship literature.

Prahalad’s works have also garnered a healthy amount of criticism; this criticism has advanced the field of social entrepreneurship and business social sector practices considerably. His embrace of the role of MNCs in generating social change gave rise to critics like Kulkarni, who contends that Prahalad’s ideas condone an exploitative relationship between MNCs and poor consumers. In fact, some of the products marketed to poor consumers took advantage of
their desires to have autonomy of choice while propagating negative societal externalities; Coke and skin-whitening creams are prominent examples (Karnani, 2006).

Polak and Warwick (2014) add to this criticism of MNCs, contending that there is little evidence they have convincingly penetrated the BOP market. Due to the rigidity and bureaucracy of large companies, they are unlikely to adequately address poverty issues affecting the poor because they are change averse, and constantly face the temptation to use existing models and resources (Polak & Warwick, 2014). As they argue, ideas created at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy have the tendency to be vetoed especially if the “proposed project requires a wholly fresh approach to design, marketing, and distribution...in an exotic locale [with] an unfamiliar language and confounding culture” (Polak & Warwick, 2014).

In subsequent writings, Prahalad adapts his ideas to these criticisms, broadening his argument to include organizations of all sizes, not just MNCs. This shift is encapsulated in the 2006 publication of his book *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid* which expanded upon the initial ideas in his *Strategy+Business* article of the same name (2002). He cites non-profit organizations, social enterprises, and educational institutions, like NGOs Aravind Eye Care, Grameen Bank, and Jaipur Foot, which have successfully worked within the poorest demographics.

Furthermore, Hart, who had initially coauthored the article with Prahalad, proposes a “next generation BoP strategy” because “‘first generation’ corporate BoP strategies have...failed to hit the mark” and have instead alienated the communities they intend to serve (Simanis & Hart, 2008, p. 1). To avoid “engaging in the latest form of corporate imperialism” on behalf of MNCs, the authors advocate for a “BoP 2.0 strategy” that functions within “an embedded process of co-invention and business co-creation...[moving] beyond mere deep *listening* into
deep *dialogue* with the poor” (p.2). This new strategy focusing on partnership rooted in mutual sharing and learning is thus more reminiscent of the approaches in SE literature that take co-creation, partnership, and shared commitment as more or less a given. Initial criticism of “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” has thus pushed business interests to be more considerate of the wellbeing and interests of the poor, a paradigm of thinking characteristic of the social sector.

Prahalad’s work initially represented a parallel body of thought in the private sector that challenged corporations’ long-held assumptions about the role of business and government in poverty alleviation. However, the adaptation of arguments to critiques coupled with NGO and social enterprise adoption of the phrases “bottom of the pyramid” and “base of the pyramid” have demonstrated a number of intersections between SE literature and business writings. The two fields have noticeably overlapped, in spite of historical divisions between “managers in MNCs, public policymakers, and NGO activists [who] all suffer from “thinking that compartmentalizes non-profit and for-profit organizations into binary and mutually exclusive categories.” As Prahalad aptly characterized, “it is tragic that as Western capitalists we have implicitly assumed that the rich will be served by the corporate sector, while governments and NGOs will protect the poor and environment” (2002). Catering to the BOP segment “represents a chance for business, government, and civil society to join together in a common cause” (Prahalad, 2002).

In particular, the term ‘BOP’, traditionally considered a target demographic of multinational corporations, has converged with SE literature; SE and BOP now pretty much go hand-on-hand. A cursory overview of Google Scholar suggests that as early as 2002, the year Prahalad’s work was published, the term BOP was used in conjunction with social
entrepreneurship, particularly in the developing nation context (Foryt, 2002). In 2003, prominent academics on social entrepreneurship Anderson and Dees named the enterprise Voxiva, which bridged the divide for populations without access to the internet, as a business that “exemplifies the types of opportunities…existing at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’” (Dees & Anderson, 2003, p. 15). Similarly, other successful social enterprises like Grameen Bank and other poverty alleviation initiatives are used to exemplify Prahalad’s BOP approach, despite microfinance predating Prahalad’s work by some two decades. On the flip side, enterprises, nonprofits, and other organizations have also repurposed the phrase “bottom of the pyramid” to their beneficiaries, a formal encapsulation of the poor populations they have always served. On the website of Anuel Energy, for example, the organization hopes to impact “people at the bottom of the economic pyramid” with its affordable and clean solar energy products. The conjunction of these ideas in addition to the expansion of Prahalad’s argument signaled the intersection of seemingly disparate strands of thought on poverty alleviation.

Nevertheless, the convergence of these sectors in academic writings, coupled with attention on successful, high-profile Indian social enterprises and entrepreneurs, and the declining role of the state have propelled social entrepreneurship into the mainstream. The close associations between SE and business and private serve to reinforce perceptions of a type of SE in which government plays little to no role. This is a perception that I challenge and nuance in my study, through interviews with SE founders, staff, and academics.

**International Social Entrepreneurship**

In international contexts, Janelle Kerlin’s work is one of the first of its kind to “discuss social enterprise as a global phenomenon in a comparative perspective” (Kerlin, 2010). Unlike previous works that explore social entrepreneurship among several countries or a single region or
anecdotes of successful individual social entrepreneurs, Kerlin considers how context has shaped
social entrepreneurship in terms of the “kind of need, purpose, activity, organizational form,
legal structure, and process involved in its creation and realization” (2010). Her work proposes
that regional differences in social enterprises are a byproduct of their regional socioeconomic
contexts and draws upon social origins theory, which explains how “existing social structures
and institutions” shape and constrain social enterprise development. Kerlin evaluates several
characteristics of social enterprise, including types of outcome emphasis, program area focus,
legal framework, and societal sector, among others, in seven primary regions. These regions
comprise 1) the United States, 2) Western Europe, 3) Japan, 4) East-Central Europe, 5)
Argentina, 6) Zimbabwe/Zambia, and 7) Southeast Asia. According to Kerlin, analysis shows
that SE appears to “draw on those dominant socioeconomic factors that offer the most strength in
a given region or country” and suggests that the development of SE is aligned with the
development of nonprofit sectors (Kerlin, 2010, p. 177).

Social entrepreneurship in Uganda. Literature around social entrepreneurship in
Uganda is paltry. The most robust studies seem to be mainly World Bank reports; the “Social
Enterprise Ecosystem Country Profile: Uganda” specifically includes interviews with various
stakeholders, while the “Emerging Social Enterprise Ecosystems in East and South African
Countries” examines more broadly the East African region through primary and secondary
sources. Indeed, most of the SE literature generalizes Ugandan social entrepreneurship to East
African social entrepreneurship, deferring to the country’s neighbors like Ethiopia and Kenya
with comparatively more mature SE landscapes. Similarly, Frank and Shockley broadly discuss
the region of sub-Saharan Africa, which is “notorious in its incapacity or reluctance to provide a
stable and enforceable framework” (Shockley & Frank, 2011, p. 191). Subsequent studies and
my interviews with Ugandan social entrepreneurs also align with this sentiment, which I explored in later sections.

The literature that does exist examines specific organizational or topical case studies, as has been the trend with writings on social entrepreneurship in general. Tukamushaba, et. al. develop a theoretical model to explain “why some individuals are able to seize opportunities in international environments and take action on these international opportunities while others do not” (Tukamushaba, Orobia, & George, 2011, p. 283). They apply this model specifically to the organization BeadForLife, which employs mainly internally displaced women in Ugandan who construct colorful beads out of recycled paper. The organization is examined in the context of the Ugandan cottage industry and how its products have quickly internationalized despite fears about exploitation of domestic industries. However, the paper only evaluates one Ugandan organization — which is registered in Colorado and has foreign founders — and spends the majority of the paper setting up an applicable theoretical framework. There is little to no mention of the history of SE in Uganda, nor are there any anthropological investigations into the role of foreign influences and how they have shaped the country’s SE landscape. To bridge these gaps, I explore these ideas later in my thesis.

Further literature similarly explores individual organizations or the role of SE in sectoral issues (Sserwanga, Kiconco, Nystrand, & Mindra, 2014; Hayhurst, 2013). For example, Sserwanga et. al. explore the role of social entrepreneurship in post-conflict recovery in the Gulu district of northern Uganda. Using an exploratory and qualitative research design, their study reveals that SE has “supported the building of social and psychological aspects of individuals” through the enhancement of community social capital (p. 313). The authors have also asserted that SEs have made improvements at several levels, from expanding educational, employment,
and business opportunities at the societal level for marginalized youths and women, to uplifting the “reputation, personal initiative, self-efficacy, networking opportunities and leadership opportunities of the beneficiaries” on an individual level (p. 313).

In a similar vein, Hayhurst explores social entrepreneurship in the context of a sectoral and gender-specific issue, in terms of how athletics can decrease gender inequities. Specifically, the author examines how Sustainable Development Programs for Ugandan girls that focus on social entrepreneurship have tended to overlook “structural inequalities and gender relations that marginalize girls in the first place” (Hayhurst, 2013, p. 1). These studies by Sserwanga et. al. and Hayhurst are both specific to a certain topic, to a certain district, conflict, gender, or issue; as a result, they do not consider broader economic, governance, and social metrics that describe the country as a whole. My thesis, on the other hand, takes a very broad view of social entrepreneurship and governance in the country.

Non-academic writings, such as articles and other online publications, are more descriptive and journalistic in nature. Outlets like Medium and Ugandan news companies like The Independent and NewVision highlight individuals and organizations. A cursory overview of Google search results for ‘social entrepreneurship in Uganda’ yields results for individuals, like the social entrepreneur Charles Batte, founder of Tree Adoption Uganda, who won the ‘Bright Ideas from a Young Commonwealth Contest’ (“Social Entrepreneur from Uganda”, 2015) and the organization KadAfrica, which has been “driving social entrepreneurship in Uganda” (Nantaba, 2017). They are, in a nonacademic sense, also case studies and serve to reinforce the critique that the field and practice of SE is overreliant on these forms.

In line with the points from earlier sections of the literature review, I seek to create a broader overview of SE in Uganda, influenced by the preponderance of mainstream and
academic literature that is overwhelmingly focused on individuals and organizations as is the case with the former non-academic sources, and sectoral-specific issues that SE seeks to alleviate, as is the case with the latter academic literature.

**Social entrepreneurship in India.** In comparison, literature on social entrepreneurship in India is far more robust due to the country’s size and history of SE. There are several India-specific studies of the social entrepreneurship landscape, published by various institutions like the British Council, Swissnex, and Asian Development Bank, among others.

The majority of reports provide a broad overview of the Indian SE landscape (Awasthi, 2015; British Council, 2016; *Indian Social Enterprise*, 2012; *Social Entrepreneurship in India*, 2015). While these reports may be structured differently, their content and examinations of key support institutions, prominent social enterprises, and actors in the SE enabling system are very similar, though their target readers may differ to a minor extent. Swissnex’s report, *Social Entrepreneurship in India: Unveiling the Unlimited Opportunities* targets Swiss social entrepreneurs and stakeholders specifically, outlining “different support categories and…a detailed list of the most important support institutions” to advocate that Swiss social stakeholders look towards the Indian market (*Social Entrepreneurship in India*, 2015, p. 3).

The British Council has published the most comprehensive reports of the Indian social enterprise ecosystem to date, which include *The State of Social Enterprise in India* and *Social Enterprise: An Overview of the Policy Framework in India*. The latter report identifies several main areas of policy to understand the context for social enterprise development, among which are 1) NGO and civil society policy, 2) Financial inclusion and microfinance development regulation, and 3) Private sector development, in particular, support to Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) (Awasthi, 2015). Additionally, livelihoods programming and
social service programming have also been identified as particularly relevant, and are echoed by the results of my own research. The primary areas that directly influence SE are:

1. Organization and registration
2. Finance and investment
3. Incentives—taxation and subsidies
4. Programs of support—in terms of skills development, access to markets and finance, support to social innovation and program targeted at supporting disadvantaged groups
5. Sector-level policies, for example in health, education, water and sanitation (Awasthi, 2015).

The collaboration between Indian social enterprise incubator Villgro Innovations Foundation and the research and consulting group Okapi Research went beyond the national level, classifying the regional social enterprise ecosystems in specific Indian states. The report examines nine regions, identified with potential to emerge as SE hubs: Jaipur, Chandigarh, Trivandrum, Bhopal, Patna, Lucknow, Guwahati, Bhubaneswar, and Pune (Sonne & Jamal, 2016). The authors of the report apply a conceptual framework that examines indicators from several areas comprising the ‘Local Economy’, ‘Entrepreneurship’, ‘Support’, ‘Skills and Research’, ‘Communication’, and ‘Policy’ (Sonne & Jamal, 2016). The ‘Policy’ indicators that are especially relevant to this thesis include the following: 1) SE government policies and schemes, 2) SE policy priority, 3) Non-SE schemes relevant to SEs, and 4) Ease of accessing government schemes (Table 1). I use such language to frame my Discussion section.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Metric</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SE government policies and schemes</td>
<td>Are there government programs and schemes to support SE (national, state, local) active locally?</td>
<td>List of types of programs, activity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SE policy priority</th>
<th>Is social enterprise a stated priority by regional government actors?</th>
<th>Yes/no + example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-SE schemes relevant to SEs</td>
<td>Non-SE government schemes that can be used by social entrepreneurs locally? (e.g. livelihoods, MFI, handicraft, MSME). How are they used?</td>
<td>No, type and activity of schemes. Examples of schemes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of accessing government schemes</td>
<td>The ease of access and use of government program supporting social enterprises?</td>
<td>Qualitative—how long does it take, challenges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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**Government in Social Enterprise**

As a result of government incapacity and NGO and non-profits’ lack of scale, social enterprises and entrepreneurs operating outside the traditional constraints of the public and civil sectors have the potential to find, implement, and effect considerable social change (observation, March 2018). The field of social innovation has largely operated independent of collaboration with the government, due to the prevailing notion that the government lacks the capacity to solve, and in some countries, has even abetted in the perpetuation of these social problems (Dees, 2007). Yet, the reality is that little or no social change resulting from SE scales without government’s role in fostering enabling institutions, resources, and policies, even in political contexts reputed to be inefficient and corrupt (Shockley & Frank, 2011).

Governance is always a relevant social issue, because policy decisions and quality of governance affect social enterprises’ organizational capacities to complete impactful work (Agapitova et al., 2017). However, the issue of governance, especially in the context of SE—which are nimbler and are more likely to have independent but sustainable streams of income or private sector funding—is often seen as distantly removed from the more immediate and confrontational issues of inequality, health, and other indicators of poverty and social well-being (observation, May 2018).
Frank and Shockley’s typology. One typology that stands prominent in the dearth of literature examining government in SE is the work of Frank and Shockley (2011) that underlies part of my analysis (Table 2). Notably, their work is perhaps the broadest theoretical framework that examines government’s role in SE compared to other literature that examines specific case studies or countries.

Table 2. The functions of government in social entrepreneurship

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<th></th>
<th>Higherstate capacity</th>
<th>Lowerstate capacity</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down social</td>
<td>Government function:</td>
<td>Government function:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Originator and implementer</td>
<td>Bungler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up social</td>
<td>Government function:</td>
<td>Government function:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>entrepreneurship</td>
<td>Adapter and promoter</td>
<td>Imitator and adopter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

They adopt the classical view of entrepreneurship as applied to SE, recognizing it as a universal phenomenon that operates in all institutional environments. This assumption justifies the creation of a typology that examines the level of state capacity (i.e., higher or lower) and locus of social innovation (i.e., top-down or bottom-up) (Table 2) (Shockley & Frank, 2011).

Considering my focus on government in social enterprise, it makes sense that Frank and Shockley have expanded ‘classical’ entrepreneurship to social entrepreneurship. Some definitions of social entrepreneurship overemphasize the role of entrepreneurs (Light, 2008); Schumpeter and Kirzner’s definitions allow room for government to emerge as an effector of change, whose actions directly affect social enterprise formation and outcomes. Frank and Shockley’s typology thus present an adequate framework to analyze government involvement in SE as a function of state capacity.

However, the typology fails to address the reality that state capacities are not binary in nature; they range from ‘low’ to ‘high’. Most glaringly, it lacks a designation for a country with ‘middle’ state capacity, which is especially pertinent given that my study comprises India and
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Uganda, the former of which is arguably of ‘middle’ state capacity. Through my thesis, I expound on this typology, examining government involvement in the context of Ugandan and Indian social enterprises and how those two countries have institutionalized their involvement—through the creation of policies recognizing and promoting SE and through the active (or lack of) financing of these efforts.

Furthermore, because the authors only use cases of successful organizations to provide generalizations about government function, their classifications lack robust grounding. Through my interviews, I hope to not only illuminate this function in countries with middle state capacity, but also propose alternative ways that governments in low-capacity states may act.

Other literature. We cannot examine the literature around government in SE without acknowledging the robust scholarship around private and public sector involvement in international development. Because there are significant overlaps between SE and international development, both often serve similar demographics, namely the poor, who are the direct beneficiaries of initiatives around poverty reduction, health, and education. In the international development context, foreign governments and multilateral agencies have also been castigated for failing to reduce poverty, in spite of neoliberalist colonial agendas pushing in foreign aid. Bill Easterly’s provocative novel *The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* is one such work that illuminates these failures.

In the mature and often inflexible area of international development, SE has been viewed excitedly. As another avenue through which development objectives can be reached, SE sheds the rigid bureaucracy often present in foreign aid agencies. Nathan Wong, the United Nations’ Science, Technology and Innovation Adviser and the DFID’s former Head of the Innovation Hub observes that “some of the most promising development innovations…were being pioneered by
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commercially sustainable [SEs] that aim to deliver positive social change” (Ramalingam &
Bound, 2016, p. 121).

However, the literature about government in SE, specifically, is paltry. While
foundational SE writers like Nicholls briefly acknowledge that government can play a role in SE
through policy, it is often treated as an afterthought and given little attention. Few would now
agree that solving social issues should remain exclusively in the domain of government, as was
the case decades before. In fact, the theoretical basis for social entrepreneurship could be
described as inherently anti-government, based on the assumption that SE activity arises out of
governmental inability to solve social issues (Dees, 1998; Dees, 2007; Harding, 2007; Skoll,
2008). Government incapacity, it is argued, is a catalyst for socially entrepreneurial activity; this
incapacity has even been described as responsible for “our crumbling present” (Dees, 2007; Dey,
2006). Yet other writings mention the influence of government and how its role has become
overshadowed by the efforts of the private sector and other actors (Giridharadas, 2018). While
this focus is understandable as the glacial pace of government often hinders more than it
supports, such a narrow scope glosses over how governmental resources and influence have
extensive ability to help these ventures scale their impact (Shockley & Frank, 2011).

What, then, explains this fixation on employing private sector solutions to solve very
public problems? Giridharadas argues that the post-1960s era was “taken over by an ascendant
ideology [of neoliberalism] of how best to change the world” that was upheld by political figures
such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan who rose to power belittling the role of
government (2018, p. 18). Instead of government, the liberation of “individual entrepreneurial
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property
rights, free markets, and free trade” was the best way to advance human well-being (Harvey,
As Giridharadas suggests quite cynically, this belief lent credence to “the rise of…social enterprises, social venture capital, impact investing, benefit corporations, double and triple bottom lines,” a product of the “win-win” frame of mind, where there exists a “presumed harmony” between making money and doing social good (2018, p. 37-38). Capitalists, it seems, “are more capable than any government could ever be” (Giridharadas, 2018, p. 45).

In part due to these influences that favor business-minded over government-managed social impact, there appears to be a dearth of academic scholarship and theoretical grounding that situates the role of government and public policy specifically in SE. Those that do draw upon writings exploring how these factors influence classic forms of entrepreneurship (Shockley & Frank, 2011; Ostapenko, 2016), especially since attention on entrepreneurship began in advance of its socially-minded counterpart. Existing literature continues to examine how and if governments can positively influence entrepreneurial activity (Minniti, 2008).

Ostapenko’s (2016) work is one such example. She examines the “research gap related to the indirect influence of national culture on entrepreneurs’ performance,” proposing a framework of research for examining national culture on entrepreneurship (2016, p. 364). Overall, she suggest that entrepreneurs would perceive government actions differently depending on the types of informal institutions present. In countries where formal institutions are perceived to be weaker, entrepreneurs have expressed that institutional trust is more important. While Ostapenko’s writings do not explore the SE dimension, her methodology can also be extrapolated to research in this field. Her study of entrepreneurs’ perceptions toward government is especially pertinent. Even among the interviews that I conducted, one founder of an education SE has heavily emphasized that because India is a low trust society, trust is very important.
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Similar to Janelle Kerlin’s aforementioned work on comparative social entrepreneurship, Griffiths et. al. (2013) also adopt a contextual approach, but in a more nuanced manner, examining whether socio-political, economic, and cultural factors influence the emergence of social enterprise. Government is a component, which is why this work is of particular interest. This work is one of the first “to investigate the role of macro-level variables on social entrepreneurial activity” (Griffiths et. al., 2013, p. 350). “Utilizing the maxims and concepts developed in commercial entrepreneurship,” the authors analyze data using hierarchical regression modeling, which is a more robust type of quantitative analysis than earlier literature on social entrepreneurship. In their discussion, they note that, interestingly, many of the variables that were found to be important in studies on traditional entrepreneurship “do not seem to play a significant role in the case of social entrepreneurship” (2013, p. 350). Nonetheless, the study did indicate that variables of gender equality and religion highly correlated with rates of social entrepreneurship activity. While I do not explore gender equality and religion, elements of macro-level variables are present in my work as well.

The work of Griffiths et. al. were deeply influenced by Ferri and Urbano (2010), who conduct regression analysis to determine correlative relationships between levels of social entrepreneurial dynamism and both formal (‘public spending’, ‘government effectiveness’, and ‘access to finance’) and informal (‘education’, ‘social needs’, ‘societal attitudes’) factors (p.18). The authors test five hypotheses, most notable among which is the hypothesis that higher rates of public spending, like subsidy payments, grants, and social benefits, increase public trust in the ability of government to address social issues, thereby disincentivizing social entrepreneurial ventures. However, the authors’ data analysis rejects this claim. There are limitations to the methodology used; of the sampled list of 49 countries, almost half were in Europe (or the United
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States), countries that have substantial social safety nets. Ultimately, the results do suggest that government has a role to play in enhancing the entrepreneurial dynamism of an economy, justifying the direction of inquiry in my thesis.

On a more micro level, Korosec and Berman (2006) report that city government support promoted community social entrepreneurship. Through in-depth interviews and mail surveys with senior managers in American cities with populations over 50,000, the study found that municipal activities like information and community awareness building, coordination and support in program implementation, and assistance in resource acquisition significantly enhanced levels of social entrepreneurship (Korosec & Berman, 2006). Because the study was confined to the United States, its findings may have limited applicability in Uganda and India, where municipal governance might be low or nonexistent. Regardless, a surface-level overview suggests that program implementation and awareness improve the probability of SE success.

Only recently in practitioner circles have institutions like the World Bank Group and the British Council begun to publish a small number of studies exploring the policy and environmental landscapes around social entrepreneurship (Agapitova et al., 2017; Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2015; Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2017). The World Bank Report on “Emerging Social Enterprise Ecosystems in East and South African Countries: A Diagnosis of Supporting Environments and Activity of Social Enterprises” is one such example that conducts a regional survey of social enterprise landscapes (Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2015). The report in question offers opportunities to “prioritize policy, infrastructure, and financial and capacity building interventions designed to improve the SE ecosystem in support of the development of SEs and their ability to provide critical services at the BoP” (Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2015, p. 4). By providing an evidence base for a more supportive ecosystem for SE
that include factors that inform supply, demand, and enabling conditions, the authors hope to facilitate understanding on the part of governments and funding agencies on the importance of scaling the development impact of SEs (Agapitova, Sanchez, & Tinsley, 2017; Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2015; Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2017).

There are also single-country case studies with policy analysis, such as reports examining the Indian SE landscape from Swissnex India, the British Council, and the Asian Development Bank (Awasthi, 2015; British Council, 2016; Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2017; India Social Enterprise, 2012; Social Entrepreneurship in India, 2015). In 2017, the World Bank published the policy note “Government Support to the Social Enterprise Sector: Comparative Review of Policy Frameworks and Tools,” which justifies government inclusion of the SE sector in development agendas and examines approaches and tools that could foster SE activity and contribute to development results (Agapitova, Sanchez, & Tinsley, 2017). Agapitova, et. al. develop a methodology for classifying the government support frameworks to SE in various countries, categorizing 14 countries into ‘Mature’, ‘Growing’, ‘Emerging’, or ‘Early Stage’ policy frameworks. India is labeled as a country with an ‘Emerging Policy Framework,’ while Uganda was not included in the study. Its neighbor Kenya, which has a comparatively more developed SE sector, is classified as a country with an ‘Early Stage Policy Framework’, suggesting that Uganda would be classified similarly or as having a more nascent policy framework (Agapitova, Sanchez, & Tinsley, 2017).

According to Agapitova, et. al., ‘Mature’ support frameworks “offer support toward building SE capacity for scalability and replicability, and therefore have a larger range of policy tools that cover the different stages of growth of SEs” (2017, p. 15). These tools include credit lines, early stage seed capital, and venture capital, compared to emerging and growing policy...
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frameworks that “normally concentrate their support efforts through financing and extension service programs for early stage development of SEs” (p. 15). The compilation of World Bank Reports are all similar in their country-level analysis. The policy note on policy frameworks relies on desk research which includes 1) an extensive literature review of current SE policies and 2) analysis of secondary sources based on the characteristics of level of SE activity, presence of enabling organizations providing support to SEs, and 3) the existence of national policies and programs specifically directed toward SEs (Agapitova, Sanchez, & Tinsley, 2017). My research examines similar aspects, with a closer focus on the enabling policy environment.

Methodology

This project was influenced by the literature review and theoretical paradigm that asserts that government and SE act independently. It aimed to answer the following research questions:

1. What, if any, role does government play in supporting SE in the context of the Ugandan and Indian social entrepreneurship ecosystems?

2. How can this support be explained by the regime types and state capacities of the two countries?

3. How does government support of SE fit into Frank and Shockley’s typology ‘functions of government in social entrepreneurship’?

To answer these questions, I focused primarily on gathering qualitative data through semi-structured interviews with organizational staff, founders, and relevant individuals who have worked within SE, which would illuminate personal and organizational experiences with government. Even though I interviewed individuals for their own experiences and opinions, I generalize these remarks to the organizations for which they represent and work. A country-level
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of analysis is required to generalize how the government of an entire country supports SE, so I use existing empirical country-level data and political histories to bolster these extrapolations.

Research

Primary research.

Field notes. Over the course of four months, I used a notebook to collect field notes. By living and studying in Uganda and India for around a month each, my program peers and I visited over 50 different organizations, most of which were social enterprises. I developed an understanding of the entrepreneurial ecosystems that shaped each country’s social enterprises, how these organizations view government involvement and the role of government in their development, and other general organizational identifiers. My field notes detail specifically how I perceived these organizations, evaluating their social and financial capital, and other notable organizational qualities.
Interview methodology. The second component of my data collection centers around 20 semi-structured qualitative interviews over a multi-month basis. While India is much larger population-wise, I decided to interview 10 individuals from Uganda and 10 individuals from India so that the qualitative data would be similarly robust. To recruit interview subjects for this thesis, I contacted previous professors and social entrepreneurs I had interacted with through my program. From there, I used snowball sampling to connect with additional individuals whom my interviewees thought would be productive to interview. Additionally, I also cold-emailed staff members from individual social enterprises; however, the response rates for this method were noticeably lower. For both methods of cold-email communication and connection through other interviewees, I found that it was more timely and effective to reach out directly through WhatsApp rather than through email. From there, I made a more concentrated effort to reach out to potential interviewees first through WhatsApp.

Early on, I prepared two sets of interview questions: one for academics and one for practitioners. The original set can be referenced in Appendix B. The types of questions differed based on the background of the interviewee; I assumed that academics would have a broader overview of social entrepreneurship in their respective countries, while practitioners could provide more detail about how government involvement contributed to their organizational development, if at all. Some of my interviewees were both academics and practitioners, for whom I combined the two sets of questions. The separate sets of questions can be found in the Appendix. Regardless, the interviews were based generally on the following questions:

1. Describe your country’s social entrepreneurial ecosystem.
2. How do you and other social entrepreneurs generally perceive government collaboration and support of SE?
3. How has government supported social entrepreneurship? In your organization and others?

4. What are the biggest barriers to government collaboration?

5. How can government engagement with social enterprises and social entrepreneurs be improved?

Because every interviewee had a different experience with, length of exposure to, and perception of social entrepreneurship and government, I decided to use progressive focusing after the conclusion of my initial interviews. As a result, the aforementioned questions were subject to change depending on the direction of our conversation. Through this progressive focusing, I identified which additional concepts or relationships required further exploration and adjusted my research questions as subsequent interviews demonstrated this need. By doing so, we could dig deeply into topics of interest to the interviewee, which also allowed me to develop a broader understanding of how government involvement fit into their specific work and how government dynamics changed within sectors. This method, in addition to asking more open-ended questions, revealed telling information, for the interviewees spoke of issues that would not have arisen had I followed a rigid line of questioning.

Each of the 20 interviews with individuals from Uganda and India were 30 to 40 minutes in length, with a handful that were up to or even over an hour. Interviews were conducted through Skype or WhatsApp audio, with two individuals representing the India sample that were conducted in person. Interviewees provided both verbal and written consent to being recorded—the consent form can be viewed in Appendix B; interviews conducted over WhatsApp or Skype were put on speakerphone and then recorded using the Voice Memos AppSpot website. Those who were not recorded gave verbal consent to the interviews; I then took notes in a notebook.
The names of organizations and individuals interviewed have all been removed to protect interviewee confidentiality, though the study has been accepted as minimal to no risk by the Institutional Review Board process.

**Secondary research.** To provide a link between interview data that included individual experiences that were then extrapolated to the organization and country level for Uganda and India, I also conducted secondary research on existing data. Because I look at regime type and then state capacity, I use political histories, mainly informed by prominent Indian historian Ramachandra Guha for India and various journals and books for Uganda. For state capacity, I focused on quantifiable metrics of each of the two countries, including economic, social, and governance indicators, as well as qualitative assessments of each country’s SE landscape (Tables 8 and 9). I chose the indicators that were the most relevant to my research questions, SE, and most importantly, government and state capacity. Notable governance indicators include the government structure, the Corruption Perceptions Index, the Ease of Doing Business index, and select measures of state capacity from the Brookings Institution’s *Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* (Rice & Patrick, 2008). It was also important to look at social and economic indicators, as these metrics are demonstrative of state capacity. The indicators that I focused on are those that have been adopted widely, including the Gini Index, Human Development Index, and GDP per capita, to name a few.

The quantitative empirical data was easily accessed through sources like the World Bank, CIA World Factbook, and other studies. On the other hand, to find qualitative information on the social entrepreneurship landscape of each country, I used primarily World Bank reports; few studies focus on the overarching Uganda ecosystem, instead focusing on spotlighting individual
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organizations. Data on India’s social entrepreneurship ecosystem was found with more ease, thanks to reports from the World Bank and other multilateral organizations and research groups.

Analysis

The study includes a two-part analysis. The first is a country-level analysis that assigns a regime type based on Kailitz’s typology of political regimes (2013) for Uganda and India and also assigns a state capacity based on the country-level empirical data. Kailitz’s typology forms the foundation of my political analysis, as it has allowed for more nuanced explanations of some hybrid and autocratizing regimes beyond the dichotomous characterization proposed by Alvarez Chiebub, Limongi, and Przeworski that strikes a binary between democracies and dictatorships (Alvarez et. al., 1996). Under Alvarez, et. al.’s classification system, dictatorships are interchangeable with authoritarian regimes; this is too reductive in the case of Uganda, which had suffered under a brutal dictatorship and is now authoritarian. I present a historical overview of the governments and politics of Uganda and India, classify their regime types, and provide a comparative analysis using empirical data that includes economic, social, and governance indicators. I then justify a state capacity classification for Uganda and India, respectively, that falls into ‘low’, ‘middle’, or ‘high’ capacity.

The second part applies an inductive, grounded theory, qualitative method of analysis for the 20 in-depth interviews. I transcribed my recorded interviews, coding and categorizing them before identifying emerging central themes that would frame my interview analysis and discussion. These central themes provide complexity to the nature of government support of SE that is often analyzed in a reductive and simplistic manner.

To explain some of the government support programs that my interviewees identified and use appropriate language to describe the broader SE ecosystem, I use Sonne and Jamal’s policy
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indicators (Table 1). These indicators are used to contextualize, frame, and label the analysis in my Discussion section. While the wording that my interviewees used does not align exactly with that of Sonne and Jamal’s wording, Table 1 is still a useful framework in terms of terminology. Although the phrases have been used specifically for regional SE systems, these regions undoubtedly comprise the national SE system. Thus, it is appropriate to extrapolate these indicators to the national level as well.

Thus, this combination of empirical country data, political regime type classification, and qualitative interview analysis are conducted with the purpose of situating the Ugandan and Indian governments in Frank and Shockley’s typology presented in Table 2 (2011).

Country Choice Rationale

While I examine India and Uganda distinctly and then comparatively in my study, it is important to address why I have chosen these two countries specifically. Uganda and India have vastly disparate histories, political structures, socioeconomics, and societal and cultural contexts. These differences have deeply influenced how SE manifests itself in each of the two countries, to the degree that they deviate from the characterizations that Frank and Shockley have proposed, especially in the case of India, whose status as a middle-capacity state is addressed.

Most influential in my pursuit of the comparative study of these countries has been the U.K. company Approved Index’s 2015 ranking of the most entrepreneurial countries in the world. Based on their methodology, entrepreneurship is defined as the “percentage of an adult population who own (or co-own) a new business and has paid salaries or wages for at least [three] months” (Rajna, 2015). A considerable number of countries were not included in the study due to lack of data; regardless the dearth of literature and vague boundaries between social
entrepreneurship certainly justify further study of both India and Uganda’s SE landscapes.

In Uganda, a massive 28.1% of the population is engaged in entrepreneurship, encouraged by the “freedom that comes with shirking off decades-long rule by dictatorship” (Brinded, 2015). While entrepreneurship is often viewed in relation to start-ups in the United Kingdom and the United States, in the Ugandan context, entrepreneurship is a way of life; it is a necessity rather than a dream. In Uganda, which has been viewed as an archetypal recipient of development aid due to higher poverty rates and burdens of disease, this aid has also paved the way for the importation of Western conceptions of social entrepreneurship.

In contrast, India was the fifteenth least entrepreneurial country in the world, with only 2.5% of the adult population engaged in entrepreneurial activities. What explains this discrepancy, considering some of the most illustrious stories of social entrepreneurship have emerged out of India? There are a multitude of reasons. First, the population of India, at over 1.3 billion people, is massive. Even a small proportion of the population who are entrepreneurs constitutes 26 million people, more than half of the population of Uganda. Despite this smaller proportion, successful social entrepreneurs have both reached scale and wide acclaim, which is why studying SE in India is paramount to understanding the history and impetus behind SE in the broader mainstream context.

Furthermore, the institutional environments of these two countries are vastly disparate. In recent decades, Uganda has become increasingly authoritarian; President Yoweri Museveni came into power through guerilla war in 1986 and held that position for an astonishing 33 years. Yet despite the county’s political structure, there is a level of richness in social entrepreneurship activity that is quite unexpected given the growing authoritarianism in Uganda. While India is a
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democracy, albeit an incredibly complex and multifaceted one with strong federalist influences,
there is a system of deeply entrenched and relatively unquestioned corruption on both the central
and state levels. In the subsequent section, I more closely examine these two countries’ political
structures through a comparative government analysis.

Comparative Analysis: Government and Regime Typology

In this section, I first examine the histories of the political regimes of the two countries of
Uganda and India and then classify them using Kailitz’s typology from “Classifying Political
Regimes Revisited: Legitimacy and Durability” (2013). To understand how government plays a
role in supporting SE and how they can be placed in Frank and Shockley’s typology, it is
important to examine regime type and its effects on the policy and governance environment.

Uganda

As one of the fastest growing countries in Africa, Uganda is also notorious for the
decades of dictatorial oppression under Idi Amin that is characteristic of other personalist
regimes during the African post-colonial era. The subsequent influx of foreign aid has also
dramatically influenced the political landscape, including fiscal budgetary expenditures and
policy priorities. Collectively, these factors have deeply shaped contemporary Ugandan culture
and national consciousness, paving the way for a certain type of SE ecosystem to emerge.

Formally, Uganda is a presidential republic, in which the president is both head of state
and head of government. However, after three decades in power, the Ugandan government under
President Museveni has shifted from one that is “broad-based and constitutional to one
increasingly reliant on authoritarian power and patronage” (Taylor, 2017). Based on the
classifications presented by Kailitz, which is formed on the basis of legitimation as foundation of
government power, Uganda most closely aligns with an electoral autocracy. I will first explore
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the country’s political history and authoritarian tendencies and then examine Uganda as an electoral autocracy as contextualized to Kailitz’s classification.

**Political history and authoritarianism.** In 1986, Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA) captured Kampala, the seat of power, following years of brutal and despotic rulers. Upon taking power, Museveni declared that the NRA, which had become the National Resistance Movement (NRM), represented not just a ‘mere change of the guard’, but rather, a ‘fundamental change’ (Museveni, 1992). However, the NRM’s goals of creating a broad-based governance system to both solidify power, undermine sectarian tendencies, and grant political power based on individual merit rather than traditional ethnic-based affiliations were eroded from the beginning. The reasons are multifaceted. They include the fusion of state and military, the consolidation of power in Museveni himself, and nepotistic practices favoring kinsmen and co-ethnics for civilian and personnel positions in state institutions (Anderson & Fisher, 2016).

Until 2005, the country had a ‘no-party’ political system. A referendum showed overwhelming support for a return to multiparty politics which bolstered its reintroduction. At the same time, the “reintroduction of multi-partyism itself was a device to entrench [the] authority” of the Museveni government (Anderson & Fisher, 2016, p. 70). Thus, “multiparty legislative elections” is a caveat (Kailitz, 2013, p. 45). Despite the purported opening of political space, freedom of speech, association, and political pluralism have become increasingly restricted since then. Furthermore, the harassment and arrest of opposition party leaders and supporters, as well treatment of protesters by security forces and “informal para-military groups linked to them” is now more frequent (p. 70). Museveni has also shut down critical media and pro-democracy groups, arresting dozens of journalists. The country has thus increasingly become authoritarian. Over the years its political classification has transitioned from one lauding the
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country as “an innovative agent of decentralization and democratization” to that of semi-authoritarian, and now, to an authoritarian regime that “relies on its control of the state to bypass democratic processes” (Wilkins & Vokes, 2017).

Museveni and the ruling National Resistance Movement have won several elections, but to allegations of widespread election rigging and vote-buying. As evidenced by the 2016 elections, Museveni massively outspent his opponents, relying on vote-buying and patronage to win the election despite an uninspiring campaign message. Currently, he is serving a fifth term in office, after the two-term limits originally written into the constitution were scrapped in 2005. Museveni, who is currently 74 years-old, is positioning himself for a sixth term in the 2021 elections, bolstered by the Uganda Constitutional Court’s approval of lifting the presidential age limit of 75. This was the second time that lawmakers made amendments prolonging Museveni’s presidency; many Ugandans expect or have accepted that he may be president for life.

However, there is growing discontent among the younger Ugandan population. The country’s growth rate of 3.3% pits Uganda as one of the fastest growing countries on the African continent [Figure 2]. At the same time, the country has one of the youngest populations, second after Niger; half of the population is 15 years or younger and the median age is 16 years-old. Thus, the majority of the Ugandan population has grown up under Museveni’s rule, but have also not been subjected to the brutal and repressive regimes that predate his rule nor the subsequent breakdown of “a normative structure vital for a normally functioning society” (Rubongoya, 2016, p. 50). Lacking jobs and opportunities and with youth unemployment at 60%, many young people feel little allegiance the aging leader.

Uganda’s decline in governance has numerous implications for the entire country. A rapidly growing population has created strains on core services. Infrastructure and agriculture
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have been adversely affected, due to delays in urgent infrastructure projects and the long-awaited start of oil production. The public sector, undermined by decades of nepotism and corruption, has had difficulty meeting demand for expanded, quality service delivery (“Uganda’s Slow Slide into Crisis”, 2017). The patronage system, which siphons money from the public budget, has garnered supporters through the redrawing of administrative lines and handouts from development programs (“Uganda’s Slow Slide into Crisis”, 2017, p. 10). This consequently “reduces the fiscal space for priority expenditure”, favoring huge expenditures on infrastructure at the expense of social spending and initiatives that might directly or indirectly support SE (“Uganda: Political Economy Analysis”, 2018, p. 7). Thus, weak service infrastructure, low organizational capacity, and limited funding for services serve as barriers to government institutionalization of involvement in SE (Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2015).

Finally, a discussion of Uganda and governance is not complete without an examination of its identity as an aid recipient. While the country has been traditionally an important aid recipient especially with budgetary support, the donor landscape has changed considerably over the years. While traditional donors have reduced their country presence, Uganda has turned towards emerging donors like China, who offers non-concessional loans. As UNICEF posits, these changes have affected spending in a multifaceted manner. First, a decline in aid dependency has changed the government’s policy priorities, exemplified by a shift in focus towards energy and infrastructure spending and away from social sector expenditures (“Uganda: Political Economy Analysis”, 2018, p. 6). Second, “the shift away from general budget support has had a direct impact on the level of poverty reduction expenditures”, negatively impacting pro-poor spending in “primary education, primary health care, water and sanitation, agriculture, and rural feeder roads” (p. 6).
Yet in the context of Uganda’s hybrid regime that is increasingly authoritarian, the Ugandan social entrepreneurial landscape is paradoxically more bustling and rich than ever. While some of this might be attributed to a large informal sector and the circumvention of government policy, it will be productive to examine how policies under a government that is authoritarian plays a role, if any, in social entrepreneurship in the country. Thus, this section has set the stage for these future discussions, because Uganda’s history and political climate have undoubtedly shaped the country’s developmental state and enabling environment.

**Kailitz’s electoral autocracy.** Below is the table for Uganda, according to the factors outlined in Kailitz’s classification of electoral autocracies and other regimes. All of these classifications align with that of Kailitz’s for an electoral autocracy except for the first; Kailitz states that electoral autocracies are generally not legitimized by a dignified source outside the political regime (Kailitz, 2013).

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While Uganda has technically been legitimized by a ‘dignified source outside the political regime’, Kailitz’s framework does not consider the nuances of this type of legitimacy. Uganda’s receipt of extensive development aid propelled the country into the spotlight as “a potential ‘showcase’ for largely discredited neo-liberal donor prescriptions” (Anderson & Fisher, 2016, p. 72). After its embrace of the World Bank’s economic prescriptions during the 1980s, the United States, United Kingdom, World Bank, and mid-level donors that included Denmark,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland increased their aid flows to, effectively legitimizing the Museveni regime through expanded budgetary allocations. Indeed, this enthusiasm over the Uganda ‘model’ channeled aid into the national budget; by the early 2000s, more than half of government spending in the country was attributed to donor contributions (Anderson & Fisher, 2016, p. 72). Political legitimacy of the regime was effectively conferred by large aid inflows; Uganda is not disqualified as an electoral autocracy on the basis of this issue.

While Museveni’s government does hold multiparty legislative elections and elections with multiple candidates, the elections that have cemented Museveni’s presidency have been highly contested and filled with allegations of fraud as mentioned previously. The rejection of constitutional amendments that are supposed to limit the president’s age and term length have demonstrated that even what has been enshrined in the Ugandan constitution is not immune to executive willpower. Little to no executive constraints limit Museveni.

India

With over 1.3 billion people, India is one of the most populous in the world, second only to China. The country’s massive size and scale are difficult to envision—for comparison, 10 out of India’s 29 states are each individually larger than Uganda’s entire population of 45 million. India’s sheer size only creates more pronounced differences, especially within a subcontinent whose extensive history and linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity underlie the complex and messy behemoth that is the Indian polity today.

India is a federal parliamentary constitutional socialist republic. The President of India is the head of state, while the Prime Minister of India is the head of government. India follows a dual polity system, with a central government at the center and state governments on the periphery. The Constitution calls for bicameral legislature with the Rajya Sabha upper house
representing the states, and the Lok Sabha lower house representing the people of India. Based on the classifications presented by Kailitz, India is an electoral autocracy—the largest in the world. I will first explore the country’s democratic formation and political history; I will then examine the factors leading to India’s identification as a liberal democracy as contextualized to Kailitz’s classification.

**Political history and democracy.** The post-independence years after the end of British imperial rule in 1947 were turbulent, marked by the Partition of India which has left indelible scars in the nation’s collective consciousness to this day, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, and the integration of over 500 princely states in the formation of a united nation. Before the Indian Constitution went into effect in 1950, it was presided over by prominent Dalit activist, politician, and scholar Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and a constituent drafting assembly of more than 500 members. Rather than infuriate and alienate the non-Hindi speaking populations in the eastern and southern parts of the country, the assembly decided to keep the language of the Constitution in English—the language of their British colonial rulers (Denyer, 2014, p. 10).

As the drafting of the Constitution exemplifies, state ties are often stronger than that of country. Religious, linguistic, caste, and geographic heterogeneity within the country, in addition to the sheer size of state constituencies lends itself to an India that is more federalist than centrist. Chief ministers govern states, and are the elected leaders of a political party or coalition of parties with a majority in the state assembly. Each state also has a governor, who is a federal appointee holding a ceremonial, nonpartisan, constitutional position. After an election, the party or coalition that has won the most seats is invited to create the government. The system is a testament to the “provincial pride” that has emerged (Guha, 2007, p. 208).
In 1956, the States Reorganization Act divided states along linguistic lines. This reorganization was in part due to the belief that shared language would facilitate communication and promote more civic engagement in local government. For many Indians, “language proved to be a more powerful marker of identity than caste or religion” (Guha, 2007, p. 207). At the start however, the nationalist elite were deeply apprehensive, worried it would “lead to the Balkanization of India, to the creation of many more Pakistans” (Guha, 2007, p. 208). In retrospect, linguistic reorganization “has acted as a largely constructive channel for provincial pride” and seems to have consolidated the unity of India rather than break it down (p. 208).

One of the hallmarks of Indian democracy has been the country’s ability to facilitate the largest exercise of democracy in the world. India also has the world’s largest voting population; for the 2019 national elections held in April and May, the country faces the herculean task of enfranchising, organizing, and counting the votes of an Indian electorate that comprise an astonishing 900 million people.

The institution behind this remarkable feat is the Indian Election Commission. Established after Independence as a constitutionally autonomous body, the Commission commands an unrivaled degree of institutional credibility and authority. For the 2019 elections, around 11 million election workers and police officers will be employed, in addition to an army of helicopters, tractors, bullock carts, and even animals—donkeys, camels, and elephants—deployed to reach the diverse geographic locations. Regardless of geography, whether that ranges from snow-capped mountains and forests to deserts and islands, Indian law stipulates that voters cannot travel more than 1.25 miles to cast their ballots. As such, the national elections this year will feature more than one million polling stations with more than two million electronic voting machines (Denyer, 2014, p. 86). The scale is unimaginable.
To slow down the rampant ballot-box stuffing and electoral fraud that have occurred in the past, the Commission uses electronic voting machines that record at most five votes a minute. Police out of state are brought in because they are less susceptible to political influence, and “polls are staggered in the most lawless states to give the full forces of law and order time to provide fuller coverage” (p. 86). To further reduce fraud, poll videography, photographic computerization of the electoral database, and individual election are all used. The police also identify polling booths with the highest probability of booth-capturing both in the past and the future so that preemptive actions can be taken.

The first elections were held in 1952. Of the around 360 million population of India at the time, more than 173 million were eligible, resulting in a voter turnout rate of 45.7 percent. Around 85 percent of the population was illiterate, posing a large challenge to the Indian Election Commission, which was running the election. As a result, each candidate was assigned a different colored box at the voting booth on which the candidate’s name and political symbol were written. By the end of the 67 voting phases during the 1951 to 1952 election cycle, Jawaharlal Nehru, Gandhi’s protégée and face of the Indian National Congress Party, became the country’s first democratically elected Prime Minister.

Jawaharlal Nehru fathered the most dominant political family in India, even in the five decades after his death. While Nehru strove to uphold democratic institutions—by “resist[ing] the temptation to allow broad popularity to slide into one-party rule or to undermine the checks and balances of a democratic system”, his daughter Indira Gandhi, did quite the contrary (Denyer, 2014, p. 10). Within Congress, she was retrogressive; she feared challengers, consequently abandoning “internal elections for party posts and encouraging a culture of sycophancy that persists to this day” (p. 101). Reacting to judicial challenge and popular
protests, Indira suspended democracy during the Emergency in 1975. During this time, Indira jailed tens of thousands of members of opponents and limited free speech. As aptly penned by Denyer, “it remains Indian democracy’s darkest hour” (2014, p. 11). Yet two years later, Indian democracy proved resurgent when Indira was voted out at the polls.

In the aftermath of Indira’s assassination by her Sikh bodyguards, an estimated 3000 Sikhs died in mob riots, that were often led by members of the Congress Party. Indira’s son Rajiv came to power in the subsequent elections. While Rajiv Gandhi can be credited with starting the modernization process of India’s economy and the beginnings of the country’s dominance in information technology, his administration was roiled by scandal. Senior government officials had been paid millions of dollars in bribes to secure the import of howitzers as part of an arms deal; Rajiv himself “swung back and forth in an attempt to appease distinctly unmodern religious sentiments” (Denyer, 2014, p. 102).

In 1991, Rajiv too was assassinated, by a Sri Lankan ethnic Tamil suicide bomber, leaving behind his Italian-born wife Sonia and their son Rahul. While his type of politics has been described as “heart-in-the-right-place”, in the two years leading up to the 2014 national elections, his ratings had dropped to a low of 10 percent, 11 percentage points behind the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) candidate Narendra Modi. Rahul represented not just silence during pivotal moments in the country, but also the “dynastic nature of Indian politics and the lack of internal democracy within its main political parties” (Denyer, 2014, p. 115).

During the 2014 national elections, few could have predicted the extent to which Modi and the BJP quashed the competition presented by Rahul and the Indian National Congress. Running on a platform that promised to revise the country’s stagnating economy, the BJP won 282 of 543 seats of the Lok Sabha—the first time a single political party has captured a majority
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in three decades. In contrast, the Congress’s seat tally sank to 44 seats, in comparison to 206 seats a mere five years earlier. There was a record high voter turnout, with a 66.4 percent voter participation rate, even in the face of a sharp increase in the total size of the population that is eligible to vote. While the number of candidates and political parties both increased, these votes still appeared to be concentrated around a relatively small number of main parties (Vaishnav & Smogard, 2014).

The V-Dem Annual Democracy Report of 2018 identifies India as one of several countries exhibiting “disquieting trends” through autocratization—the decline of democratic attributes. Modi’s election signaled a monumental shift, from an inclusive India to one that was growing increasingly wary of minorities. The rise of the BJP Party brought forth a surge in Hindu nationalism as well censorship, harassment of journalists, and a partial closing of the civil space for society. In particular, the government’s Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) has increasingly restricted the entry and exit of civil society organizations. As of 2017, 20,000 organizations working on human rights and environmental issues have lost their licenses to operate, leaving 13,000 CSOs that can work unconstrained. It remains to be seen whether the 2019 national elections will reaffirm the dominance of Modi and the BJP, and in turn, the extent to which the democratic values of the country are upheld.

Despite the longstanding success of Indian democracy—which has been undoubtedly called into question during this administration—the government bureaucracy is not without its challenges. Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index labels India as the 78th most corrupt country in the world out of 180 countries assessed; this is emblematic of the deeply entrenched corruption and cronyism in the country where paying bribes is part of the process of getting things done. In politics, “bribes, patronage, and trading favors have become the only way
that politicians can survive” in today’s India (Denyer, 2014, p. 83). To cover the cost of running elections in the country, many political parties have sought other sources of money. As author and journalist Edward Luce puts, “the more local you get, the worse the corruption seems to be and the more control civil servants have over people’s lives” (Luce, 2007).

**Kailitz’s electoral democracy.** India is an electoral democracy. Its legitimacy has been recognized by countries around the world regarding its democratic status, as well as the ‘selection and control of an institution that protects the popular will’ (Kailitz, 2013). As mentioned previously, the Indian Constitution calls for a bicameral legislature; the Lok Sabha or ‘House of the People’ comprises members who are elected by adult universal suffrage and a first-past-the-post system to represent their respective constituencies.

**Table 4. Uganda regime classification based on patterns of legitimation according to Kailitz**

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India is unapologetically a multiparty, multicandidate country. From 2009 to 2014, the number of political parties grew at a rate of 28 percent, from 363 to 464 parties (Vaishnay & Smogard, 2014). The bulk of this increase has been driven by smaller parties that have not met the requirements for official recognition as state or national political parties. At the same time, dynastic politics have an outsized influence on Indian elections and politics; the deep entrenchment of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty has impeded talented and politically skilled people from rising to influential positions while greatly facilitating political fragmentation (Denyer, 2014, p. 115).
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA

Comparative Analysis

**Regime type comparative analysis.** The most prominent differences between Uganda and India, politically, are their respective regime types. While both have electoral systems, their governments contrast widely between autocracy and democracy. In Uganda, Museveni’s political dominance and circumvention around constitutional term limit constraints have perpetuated the country’s increasing authoritarianism. Though elections are held, they are corrupt and affirm Museveni’s de facto one-party rule.

Table 5. *Comparative regime types of Uganda and India per Kailitz*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Autocracy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pattern of Legitimation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By a dignified source outside the political regime</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By selection and control of an institution that protects popular will</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By procedures to select and control the ruler directly by the people:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiparty legislative elections</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-candidate election of ruler</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness of elections</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive constraints</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast, India might suffer from too many political parties. Numbering in the hundreds, with differing caste, religion, and regional affiliations, political parties continue to contribute to an uptick in political violence against the backdrop of increasing Hindu nationalism. Though the Indian Election Commission has taken steps to make elections as fair as possible, corruption on various administrative levels continues to undermine the legitimacy of what, in theory, should be a truly democratic process.
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Macroeconomic country comparative analysis. Much of the empirical data on social, governance, and economic indicators situates Uganda lower than India in terms of country rankings and raw scores (Table 7). The empirical data can be found in Table 6 in Appendix A. For all three types of indicators, I classify Uganda as mostly ‘low’ with one ‘low-medium’, while India is ‘medium’. It must be noted that because these classifications consider macro indicators only, they reduce the entire country into a monolithic entity. Even within a country, there are niches of good governance and socioeconomic that are not reflected in country-level data. However, for simplicity and ease of analysis, I continue with the country-level unit of analysis.

Table 7. State capacities for Uganda and India—economic, social, and governance indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Low-Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall State Capacity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic indicators. According to Table 6, India’s GDP per capita is still more than triple than that of Uganda’s, though its population size is more than 30 times that of Uganda’s. At USD 2 and 3 billion, Uganda and India both receive similar levels of aid, though India’s population is far larger. Even though Uganda is ranked higher in terms of the proportion of population that is engaged in entrepreneurial activities, this can be explained by the quality of implementation and enforcement of business regulation. India, in recent years, has drastically improved the ease of doing business; Uganda has improved too, thanks to its easing up of credit, but is still plagued by costly and complex business registration procedures that have been echoed in my primary research. Thus, Uganda would be classified ‘Low’ and India would be classified as ‘Medium’ in terms of economic indicators (Table 7).
**Social indicators.** Developmentally, Uganda is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a Human Capital Index score that puts it at the 137th lowest out of 157 countries assessed, compared to India, which is ranked at 115 (Table 6). An overwhelming majority (71.9%) of the Uganda workforce is based in agriculture; however, this figure does not consider the fact that a plurality of the Ugandan population comprises youth suffering from incredibly high unemployment rates. With Gini coefficients of 42.8 (2016) and 35.1 (2011) respectively, Uganda and India are in the middle range of income inequality, explained by a considerable part of the population that is still impoverished. However, it must be noted that India’s Gini coefficient was from 2011; since then, the country has continued to emerge as an information technology and services powerhouse though inequality has remained high. Uganda would be classified as ‘Low’ while India would be classified as ‘Medium’ (Table 7).

**Governance indicators.** Both countries suffer from endemic corruption, though it is more pronounced in Uganda, where large-scale siphoning of public funds is pervasive and accepted. The Ugandan public sector is one of the most corrupt in the world; in 2014, Ugandan parliamentarians earned 60 times more than public sector employees. Yet Uganda’s Museveni has been in power for so long, that despite slowly increasing authoritarianism, political stability is ranked comparatively highly compared to other empirical data. According to the Brookings Institution’s “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World”, Uganda’s political situation with regard to “Government Effectiveness”, “Rule of Law”, and “Voice and Accountability” are ranked in the third quintile of 147 states assessed, the highest-performing of the all the Uganda-specific indicators.
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In contrast, in India, corruption scandals are also frequent, but they are also prolifically and publicly vilified by a vocal and free press. Ranking-wise, India is comparatively better, ranked in the top quintile due to comparatively more effective enforcement of the democratic process (Table 6). Thus, politically, India would be classified as ‘Medium’ and Uganda would be ‘Low-Medium’ (Table 7).

Social Entrepreneurship: Country Backgrounds

Uganda

In Uganda especially, the burden of poverty alleviation has traditionally fallen to international aid agencies, directly through on-ground assistance and indirectly through grants and transfers of human capital and capacity building. Despite longstanding development gaps, the country has been named one of the most entrepreneurial in the world, with a startling number of first-time entrepreneurs and high rates of business formation. International influence and leadership have led many newer social enterprises to define themselves as social enterprises, despite no formal legal recognition for SEs themselves. Regardless, these organizations find commonality in innovative processes and products and finding support in a social entrepreneurial ecosystem that is bustling, bolstered by private sector support, impact investment groups, consultancies, conferences, competitions, incubators, and co-working spaces, among others.
History of Ugandan social entrepreneurship. As one of the most entrepreneurial countries in the world, Uganda is a growing hub of social entrepreneurship, but lack of access to low interest capital and subsequent inability to scale facilitates early venture failure. Not to mention, the multitude of grants available are often given to deeply entrenched organizations—funding opportunities for more innovative ideas often manifest themselves in the form of competitions, of which only a select few win a one-time lump sum of money. Furthermore, due to Uganda’s history of colonial legacy, there is little history of robust entrepreneurship, and many entrepreneurs—both social or otherwise—are first generation, decreasing the likelihood for organizational sustainability.

In recent years, attempts to decrease reliance on foreign and recognition of the importance of community-led development have contributed to a boom in SE, which is why contemporary notions of SE are quite new. Yet the country has not been able to shirk foreign influences altogether, considering the country’s history of foreign aid and the management of development activities by international NGOs and/or local NGOs with foreign funding. Ugandan SE has been deeply influenced the more mature SE ecosystems in the United States and other European countries.

Most recently established enterprises usually identify as ‘social enterprises’, many of which have international ownerships, leadership, and close international collaboration (Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2017). Such examples include Tugende and ENVenture (Site visit, March 2018). Yet the World Bank Group’s report notes that a large proportion of social enterprises are also registered as businesses in Uganda, some of which have existed for five to ten years and have reached the point where they are no focusing on rolling out and scaling their enterprise (Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2015).
Social entrepreneurship ecosystem. In addition to government, Uganda’s SE scene includes various incubators, accelerators, impact investors, foreign aid agencies, competitions, policymakers, and to a lesser degree, coworking and maker spaces, and networks and forums (Table 8). While these actors are not the focus of my thesis, they are still important to mention nonetheless.

Table 8. Players in Uganda’s SE ecosystem according to type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incubators &amp; Accelerators</th>
<th>Impact Investors</th>
<th>Coworking &amp; Maker Spaces</th>
<th>Policymakers</th>
<th>Networks &amp; Forums</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Mara Launch Pad</td>
<td>● Yunus Business Fund</td>
<td>● Ntinda Innovation Village</td>
<td>● Government of Uganda</td>
<td>● East Africa Social Enterprise Network (EASEN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● FinAfrica</td>
<td>● Mango Fund</td>
<td>● Hive Colab</td>
<td></td>
<td>● ASPEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Consortium for Enhancing University Responsiveness to Agribusiness Development (CURAD)</td>
<td>● Root Capital</td>
<td>● Venture Labs</td>
<td></td>
<td>● Global Social Entrepreneurs Network (GSEN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Renewable Energy Incubator</td>
<td>● GoU Youth Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>● Ashoka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● ICCO Investments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● ONII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Grofin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Government and social entrepreneurship. In terms of policy strategy, government policy and attitude towards the private sector and NGOs influence the space for SEs; some parts of government still question the value of market liberalization and privatization, despite growing willingness to engage with the private sector. Social enterprise still does not have formal political recognition, with the exception of social marketing organizations. SEs have three registration options: 1) Companies with Limited Guarantee (CLG), 2) Companies with Limited Shares (CLS), or as 3) NGOs with an enterprise (Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2017). The ease of doing business is quite low, as incentives favor large investors and make it difficult to benefit smaller SEs. SEs registered as religious, charitable, or educational institutions can have income tax exemptions, partially explaining the multitude of faith-based organizations in the country (Navarrete Moreno & Agapitova, 2015).

India

India has a lengthy history of engagement with SE; this is in part due to the proliferation of success stories of individuals and organizations operating in this space. Muhamad Yunus of Grameen Bank, the Aravind Eye Hospital, and Childline International all exemplify individuals and organizations that have successfully scaled their impact. The most prominent of which is Muhammad Yunus, founder of Grameen Bank and 2006 Nobel Peace Prize laureate. As the father of microcredit, Yunus is credited with the concept of lending without collateral to the poor. As of 2014, Grameen Bank was operating 1537 branches, providing credit to 4.7 million people in Bangladesh.

Aravind Eye Hospital was founded in 1976 by Dr. Venkataswamy to provide affordable eye care to millions of people lacking access to quality care. Since then, Aravind Eye Hospital has treated 32 million patients and performed around 4 million eye surgeries, the vast majority of
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA

which were free or low-cost. The organization’s business model is centered around the
disaggregation of the course of care, where doctors and paramedics attend to patients at different
stages to minimize the demands on the doctors’ time.

In 1999, the CHILDLINE India Foundation launched CHILDLINE 1098, India’s first
and only toll-free helpline for children. Using the numbers 1098, they rationalized that children
would universally know how to count backwards from 10 to dial in 10-9-8. When a child called
the line, volunteers would answer and go to the child in need. These calls were logged, and
eventually formed the evidential basis of child protection policies in the country.

While many social enterprises, nonprofits, and other organizations are doing impactful work that
might not be as expansive but are certainly deep and transformative, scale takes utmost priority,
considering the country’s population and booming birth rates. The aforementioned organizations
have been lauded and cited prolifically in many SE writings and case studies precisely because
they have scaled so widely and successfully such that a sizeable part of the Indian population has
been beneficiaries (Osberg & Martin, 2007; Mair & Marti, 2006; India Social Enterprise, 2012;
Nicholls, 2014).

History of Indian social entrepreneurship. India’s long history of entrepreneurship and
civic mindedness has created a deep level of engagement with social entrepreneurship. Over the
past decade and a half, India has witnessed extensive growth within the sector, due to expanded
awareness, financing, training and workshop opportunities.

According to a 2016 report by the British Council, India’s first social entrepreneur
Vinoba Bhave started his work decades ago in 1950, founding and leading the Land Gift
Movement that redistributed millions of acres of land to poor and landless Indians. This
movement is credited with instilling in Indian society the moral imperative to assist the poor. At
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA around the same time, Dr. Verghese Kurien, known as the ‘Father of the White Revolution’ in
India by reshaping the Amul Dairy Cooperative. Kurien used the first business model that
formed a privately owned supply chain that was professionally managed by low-income dairy
farmers. In 1960, FabIndia was founded, connecting 80,000 artisans to the urban market. The
company’s community-owned model provided a steady income and dividends to the artisans
who had also become shareholders (British Council, 2016).

Despite the existence of these social enterprises, the term ‘social entrepreneurship’ was
not formally introduced in India until the establishment of Ashoka in 1981. Later, in 1995 and
1996, the organizations SELCO Solar and BASIX brought rural services like low-cost solar
products, servicing, and financing through Grameen village banks and cooperative societies, to
poor households through their sustainable business models.

In 1997, a few years after the founding of SELCO Solar and BASIX, the Grassroots
Innovations Augmentation Network became the country’s first non-profit social venture capital
fund, paving the way for the development of an enabling environment for social enterprises. The
first impact investment came later in 2001, when Aravind Eye Hospital received funds from
Acumen Fund. Aavishkaar was established the same year, becoming the country’s first for-profit
impact fund (British Council, 2016).

In 2007, the country’s first social enterprise-related academic course was introduced at
the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Mumbai. With the creation of this course granting a
Masters in Social Entrepreneurship, SE became a viable and formalized career path for future
generations of socially-minded entrepreneurs. Along the same vein, the first social
entrepreneurship-focused convening occurred in 2009 through the Sankalp Forum in Mumbai. It
brought together prominent players in the social sector that included entrepreneurs as well as funders and enablers, among others.

**Social entrepreneurship ecosystem.** Prominent actors that support social enterprises within India include various incubators and accelerators, impact investors, multilaterals and donor agencies, corporations, and chambers of commerce and industry associations. There are also online platforms and media, forums and networks, co-working spaces, and social innovation events and awards (Table 9).

Incubators provide financial and advisory support to seed-stage and early-stage social entrepreneurs hoping to develop and pilot their ideas. There are also several accelerators that directly support social enterprises, by creating access to mentorship, funding, workshops and training, refining business models and innovations, and supporting research. Most of these incubators are based urban areas like Mumbai due to the concentration of clients, better infrastructure, networks, and funding and business development opportunities.

According to the British Council report, over 50 impact funds are currently operating in India. These funds actively invest across a variety of impact sectors and engage with social enterprises at various stages, including seed funding, early-stage funding, and growth-stage funding. Between 2014 and 2018, one study found that the average investment size from the most active impact funds was US$ 2.75 million; however, the majority of funds were focused on growth stage funding rather than seed or early stage funding (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018).

Table 9. *Players in India’s SE ecosystem according to type*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incubators &amp; Accelerators</th>
<th>Impact Investors</th>
<th>Coworking &amp; Maker Spaces</th>
<th>Policymakers</th>
<th>Forums &amp; Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• UnLtd India</td>
<td>• Unitus Seed Fund</td>
<td>• Bombay Connect 91Springboard Ventures</td>
<td>• Ministry of Agriculture and</td>
<td>• Ashoka Sankalp Forum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9 continued. *Players in India’s SE ecosystem according to type*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilaterals &amp; Donor Agencies</th>
<th>Corporations</th>
<th>Chambers of Commerce &amp; Industry Associations</th>
<th>Online Platforms &amp; Media</th>
<th>Social Innovation Events &amp; Awards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK Dept. for International Development (DFID)</td>
<td>Various, due to the Companies Act of 2013</td>
<td>Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce Associated Chambers of Commerce</td>
<td>YourStory The Better India Think Change India</td>
<td>TATA Social Enterprise Challenge NASSCOM’S 10,000 Start-Ups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemelson Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael &amp; Susan Dell Foundation</td>
<td>Rockefeller Foundation</td>
<td>Deutshe Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)</td>
<td>NESTA</td>
<td>and Industry of India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Government and social entrepreneurship.** India has relatively more robust systems of governance around social entrepreneurship, enabling an incredibly prolific and arguably one of the most developed SE ecosystems. Indeed, much of this movement is bolstered by a longstanding culture of civil society activism, mostly self-help groups and NGOs. Many entrepreneurs and organizations are multigenerational, facilitating organizational sustainability. Furthermore, social innovation and social entrepreneurship received recognition as critical areas for national development. The government has instituted a mandatory corporate social responsibility policy, where corporations are mandated to donate a certain percentage of their earnings towards organizations working in the social sector annually.

With India’s population size, scale is of utmost significance. The organizations that have been successful in scaling, namely the Jaipur Foot Foundation, are not necessarily pursuing grants all the time—Jaipur Foot’s Jain donor base creates a relatively high assurance that donations will continue to pour in (observation, April 2018). Additionally, the scope of its work numbers more than a million—Jaipur Foot has become a tool of India’s soft power, which has facilitated its global expansion, even in countries like Pakistan whose relationship with India remains strained. Other notable successes include the Aravind Eye Hospital and Grameen Bank.

**Registration options.** Since then, the growth in these social enterprises has been in part supported by the Indian government, which has provided a range of legal registration options for social enterprise (save for the actual phrase itself). These designations include trust, society, non-profit company, private limited company, sole proprietorship, limited liability partnership, public limited company, and producer company (Awasthi, 2015). Such a range allows for organizational flexibility and is preferable to a regulatory structure that is nonexistent; government is thus able to both adapt and promote social enterprise (Shockley & Frank, 2011).
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Companies Act of 2013. Furthermore, in 2013, India rewrote its corporate laws, mandating firms over a certain size to donate 2% of their profits to corporate social responsibility through Section 135 of the Indian Companies Act; for companies that met specified financial thresholds, they were mandated to spend at least 2% of their average net profits on Corporate Social Responsibility in the immediate three preceding years. The wording of this legislation was revised later to exclude the term “social business” to weed out organizations that were more profit-driven than mission-driven. It was the first country in the world to do so, paving the way for a potentially hefty sum of funding for social enterprise (Awasthi, 2015). However, despite the magnitude of this act, implementation and reinforcement appears to be less than stringent.

Organizations like Goonj mentioned deriving a certain percentage of income from CSR contributions, thanks to the aforementioned Companies Act (Goonj, 2018). In terms of issue-specific enterprises, the government generally encourages ventures into affordable healthcare, specifically through public funding; Jaipur Foot is likely a large beneficiary of such support, considering that 30% of its budget is sourced from government grants (Jaipur Foot).

SE policy priority. No formal social enterprise policy existed at the national or state level as of 2014, but social enterprises found much support in new initiatives aimed at improving the country’s entrepreneurial and innovation capacities.

Twelfth Five-Year Plan. In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan from 2012 to 2017, the government emphasized the importance of innovation and social enterprises, signaling a focus on innovation and SE as priorities in the national policy agenda.

National Innovation Council. The establishment of the National Innovation Council (NinC) during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s administration cemented this focus. The council was set up to discuss, analyze, and implement strategies for inclusive innovation in the
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country. However, Prime Minister Modi’s administration eventually shut down the council after entrepreneur Sam Pitroda stepped down as chairman, implying a lack of political will.

The closing of the National Innovation Council stalled plans for the State Innovation Councils that were intended to increase state-level support for innovation by highlighting innovation opportunities, organizing workshops, and facilitating collaboration (Awasthi, 2015). However, the Bihar government has sponsored the Bihar State Innovation Forum, run in conjunction with the World Bank, the Bihar State Innovation Council, and the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society.

*National Policy for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, 2015.* The Modi government introduced the National Policy for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (NPSDE) in July of 2015. Citing the country’s progression towards a knowledge economy, India ‘must meet the rising aspirations of its youth’ through a ‘focus on advancement of skills that are relevant to the emerging economic environment’ (GOI, 2015). This policy explicitly mentions ‘social entrepreneurship’ to meet one of its two core objectives: 1) empowerment of the individual and 2) the coordination and strengthening of factors essential for growth of entrepreneurship across the country.

To meet the second objective, the NPSDE explicitly acknowledges the importance of “foster[ing] innovation-driven and social entrepreneurship to address the needs of the population at the ‘bottom of the pyramid.’” In fact, the policy also recognizes that these socially-oriented business innovations “seek to answer…social problems by offering new products and services which allow the poor to interact with markets as active participants rather than passive recipients” (GOI, 2015). As part of its nine-part entrepreneurship strategy framework, the NPSDE aims to ‘foster social entrepreneurship and grassroots innovations’.
Science and technology. The Department of Science and Technology, however, does have a National Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board (NSTEDB), that provides incubation and seed funding. There is also a Science for Equity, Empowerment, and Development Division that supports the field-testing of technology that can then be scaled up by the NSTEDB. While stakeholders from the Department of Science and Technology have expressed that while there is no specific social enterprise-focus, “they will often choose to support enterprise with a bigger social impact” and will work with incubators that support social enterprise” (Awasthi, 2015).

In August of 2018, the Government of India established the Prime Minister’s Science, Technology & Innovation Advisory Council (PM-STIAC) to “advise the Prime Minister on all matters related to Science, Technology, and to monitor the implementation of Prime Minister’s vision on the same” (GOI, 2018). The memo does not explicitly name social enterprises as a focus, but several of its aims could be perceived to broadly support and include SE.

Data Analysis

The following section summarizes the findings of my interviews, with ten individuals each from Uganda and India. To maintain confidentiality, I have withheld the names of individuals and the organizations they represent, but have included their positions and descriptions of these organizations in Tables 10 and 11 in Appendix A.
In the following sections, I outline central themes that emerged from my conversations with 10 founders, organizational staff, and academics (Table 10). These themes concern key insights regarding the role of government in SE, specifically the role of sectoral-specific support and how political expediency and corruption undermine efficiency and implementation.

Despite a decline in foreign aid in recent years, interviewees have consistently acknowledged how Uganda’s history as the posterchild recipient of donations from NGOs, aid agencies, and other organizations has shaped the country’s SE landscape. Many NGOs have existed in the country for decades, but only recently has there been a more collective and conscious movement towards the development of social enterprises that are both financially sustainable and socially impactful. Thus, the distinction between social enterprises and NGOs in Uganda is more binary, where the former are often influenced by Western conceptual imports while the latter often have deeper religious affiliations. This stands in contrast to India, where a rich history of civil society has emerged independent of Western influences and whose intersections with SE have blurred such distinctions.
The role of government. Responses assessing the role of government in supporting SE have varied, from involvement that was direct, to muted, or even nonexistent. Overall, the interviewees have viewed government involvement in SE in the more traditional sense; where government failure to address certain social issues has given rise to the proliferation of social enterprises, NGOs and other socially impactful organizations in the country. Several interviewees, based on their responses, seem to view government as important in the creation of an enabling environment conducive to foreign investment and knowledge transfer, but as unnecessary in the ultimate success of social enterprises in the country. As aptly put, “Government is involved, but maybe from behind, not from the front.” Yet others, like S, believe that government is necessary and should provide incentives like “reduced taxes, fee holidays, [and] opportunities [like] policies and resources.” S says, “You’re never going to get the impact you want without government…gone are the days when you can work alone.”

According to Y, who has consulted and worked for a variety of early-stage social enterprises, government has yet to support social enterprise. Policy frameworks to support the concept of SE itself are nascent and remain undefined, do little “to address the challenges being faced by SEs,” and have few appropriate business registration laws. Social entrepreneurs must resort to “current forms of business definitions, like NGOs, or privates, or limited liability companies, or corporations or partnerships.” Thus, because these definitions have not been institutionalized, “the support [one] would want to get from a government in terms of laws or policies that gives us social enterprise or in the form of taxation…will be limited.” Thus, it seems that government has done little to explicitly, legally, and institutionally recognize the work of social enterprises; there is no ‘social enterprise’ registration option nor are there tax incentives
for non-NGOs doing socially impactful work, so social enterprises and other non-NGO organizations are “put in [the] same pool in terms of taxes, funding” [S].

Though the government does run a number of ‘non-SE schemes relevant to SE’, some contend that it “is not the biggest player in this space” nor is it the biggest influencer of entrepreneurship. Instead, the nature of entrepreneurship in Uganda is driven by the private sector, “not from the government necessarily.” Yet others attribute the growth of social entrepreneurship to the international community, alluding to SE’s foreign influences in terms of ideology, financing, and organizational founders, among others.

**Social entrepreneurship’s sectoral nature.** Social enterprises across the country work directly or indirectly with different line ministries through collaboration. They can also be affected by the ancillary effects of policy, manifested as ‘non-SE schemes relevant to SE’ like government-aided programs that grant land or space in industrial parks from where organizations can work or conduct production activities. Yet it seems that the government still doesn’t “exactly appreciate social enterprises like we do,” Y observes.

Y asserts that social enterprises operate in an environment where policies, funding, support, and other enabling factors are based on their sectors of operation rather than explicit recognition of SE. The Government of Uganda has led sectoral-specific initiatives, including setting up workshops, exhibitions, programs, encouraging different line ministries to support entrepreneurs, and working together with development partners and the agencies that are involved in the respective sectors.

This effort has been especially pronounced in the renewable and clean energy space, where budgetary allocations place energy as one of the top five government priorities. Because of increased government attention and funding, there has been an increase in the number of
social enterprises offering various kinds of clean or solar cookstoves, according to W. For example, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development works closely with the UN Capital Development Fund, which actively promotes private businesses, specifically social enterprises working in agriculture and clean energy.

In education, the Ministry of Education, for example, has worked closely with S and SO, an education organization that has expanded to 10 districts in Uganda. Despite SO’s success as a social enterprise and S’s identity as a social entrepreneur, there is no denying that the perception of education as a national priority takes precedence over the perception that SE is a problem for which SEs can find innovative solutions. Because education is a national program with endemic government involvement, SO’s work with government appears to be more sectoral-specific rather than SE-specific support. S reveals, “I don’t think government in Uganda really understands what social enterprise really is”; rather, it is more so the case that SO has come to fill a gap in the education space occupied by struggling government-established institutions.

Another example of a sectoral specific, ‘non-SE scheme relevant to SE’, is the Ugandan government’s Youth Livelihood Fund, which was created to address issues of high youth unemployment in the country through a revolving fund for skills development and income-generating projects. While the Fund can support youth who may be SE founders, staff, or beneficiaries, its explicit objective is sector-specific: to support youth. Reaffirming social enterprise’s sectoral nature, S notes,

I find that they [social entrepreneurs] are there but there’s nothing actually bringing them together. Many people are doing selected activities or projects, but we do not have a forum or network that brings us together so we can have one voice [where] you can work together, collaborate, showcase…When you are advocating for support, when you fall in
love with the idea [of your organization], you keep going, you become so obsessed with what you’re doing you kind of forget what’s going on around you. When you get into that mode, you forget there are so many problems you can be solving [S].

**Working with government: experiences and perceptions.** “Government is warm to social entrepreneurship,” Z observes. In recent years, Professor Muhammad Yunus addressed Parliament, while the Ashoka Fellowship in Uganda has also been growing by leaps and bounds. Notably, the Diplomatic Corps’ influence in the Government of Uganda has resulted in policy shifts towards supporting social entrepreneurship, especially spurring programs to address youth unemployment in the country.

While politicians at higher levels of government may be aware of SE successes, the day-to-day administrative processes beleaguer hopeful social entrepreneurs. On paper, government processes are very structured, but bureaucratic rigidity and inefficiency prolong them, lending to perceptions and experiences of government slowness. S notes with blunt acceptance that while “government can be your enemy…you can’t do without government.” While “not everyone in the government doesn’t listen,” government is necessary. Otherwise, “how [else] are you going to get the policies to get passed?”

V observes that “once you follow structure, it doesn’t work,” suggesting that to go through normal processes of registering one’s organization, getting a license, and seeking financing won’t be as successful as paying one’s way to speed up a certain process. In Uganda, both Z and X have observed that the process to do so is very corrupt. There is a certain procedure on paper that must be followed to register a business, but in practice, there is no clear way forward. Even before the SE goes into operation, “there are all these people you have to pay off [to speed up the process]…you’re going to have to create this extra cash, because this person has
to actively stamp or approve. There’s a failure to streamline the process.” Potential social entrepreneurs must overcome so many hurdles such that some question the point of going through such drawn-out processes or even give up before the business kicks off.

Indeed, for some interviewees, “there is little enthusiasm in doing business with government because of the challenges with bureaucracy and getting paid for goods and services rendered and the like...Generally, entrepreneurs in the private sector are more at ease dealing with other businesses in the private sector than with the government.” Z similarly comments that “any business worth its weight typically [does not] go to government for such methods of funding for their working capital or capital expenditure,” so much so that “they’d be more at ease dealing with financial institutions.”

Other interviewees have implied that there are several prerequisites to working with government that include longer timelines and adequate capital bases. S claims that to work with government, three to five years are necessary to gain some momentum; this was the case with S’s organization SO, where five years were required before they got the full attention of the Ministry of Education. Z, likewise, observes that the one needs a “very strong working capital base to withstand longer payment periods for services rendered or products delivered to government…Organizations need to be mature and should have some semblance of political clout.” Thus, rather than start-up organizations or businesses, “business[es] that are already standing, running well, and work with government with interest” would be the most likely to collaborate.
Lack of consolidation. V asserts that social entrepreneurship has always been present in the country, even before the coinage of the term itself. However, it just has not been presented as distinctively enough as a process and type of organization that creates tangible impact. V accordingly sees this issue in terms of priorities and framing, where SE is not foremost on the government agenda because,

Government does not recognize these people. Government is much more concerned—how do we create jobs? But they do not recognize that in the process, social entrepreneurs are key players in that, and that they’re actually already doing it. And therefore by identifying them and recognizing them and supporting them, it would make it easier [V].

Inter-sectoral connections are thus important in making the case for government involvement in social entrepreneurship, especially because government prioritizes other issues like youth unemployment, health, and education, according to R. V observes that, “we [as academics and social entrepreneurs] have not come out to present a case for social entrepreneurs. We have not profiled them.” If there is visible and publicized evidence “that social entrepreneurs are doing a remarkable job by complementing government efforts in fighting poverty, unemployment, domestic violence,” then it will become clear that social entrepreneurs and enterprises are one of the key players in the social impact landscape.

Inefficiency and implementation. With a low public spending rate of 20% and large proportion of the adult population that prioritizes social goals as national objectives, there is a “worse perception of the capacity of government to formulate and implement effective policies” (Ferri & Urbano, 2010, p. 17). Indeed, while the government has enacted several policies to
support social enterprise and ancillary sectors, implementation has not often not followed suit.

As W says, “the policies are not grounded in a very good understanding of the needs of different sectors…Policies are not only just for government…If you don’t engage [different stakeholders] in the policy formulation process, you find that there’s a lack of ownership.” There’s a noticeable discrepancy between what the government thinks it can deliver and what the other sector players think they can deliver, which is especially glaring given the government’s ambitious goal to deliver complete energy access by 2030. However, “no one in the development sector or private sector think that is possible” [W].

The government has demonstrated some initiative by creating different agencies in an attempt to improve efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery, but agency performances differ widely. There are some, according to Y, “that are really good in what they’re doing. They…use the funds given for what they’re supposed to use them for.” On the other hand, “there are some that are business as usual. There’s no efficiency, their service delivery is poor, they’re unreliable. So even though they’re trying to do all these things, still it may not be as effective as they would want them to be.”

Take the Youth Livelihood Fund that was previously mentioned. While it was supposed to be invested in youth who have businesses to generate financial returns, funds were disbursed when it was financially expedient to do so. This was done most commonly during elections or periods of high political fervor to gain political goodwill. As a result, many of these funds were given to youth who were not “competent enough to handle them and [didn’t] have viable enough running businesses.”
Indeed, often the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation has been compromised by political expediency. Policies and programs, T says, are not implemented unless if a majority of people embrace them, while Z cynically asserts that they’re “not implemented unless it’s politically correct to implement them.” Regardless, action is not taken unless there’s a critical mass of people or popular will that can make a substantial difference in the level of political goodwill for the government. Anything that provides political capital to the government, then, is driven to implementation quite quickly, compared to those that generate more social good or social will. “If those two issues intersect, then…government [is] really involved very enthusiastically. But if they don’t intersect, then the policies stay on paper” [Z].

The Youth Livelihood Fund, for example, sat at exactly that intersection between fulfilling both political and social will, but the quality of its implementation was compromised by the status quo of political expediency. Fund disbursement occurred to garner political goodwill, at the expense of the quality, skills, and experience of individuals and businesses that were supposed to be financially solvent enough to pay back into the revolving fund. Perhaps more sinisterly, Z gives the example of it’s “politically correct to provide water, they’ll drum up political support and funding.

On the other hand, “if it’s not politically correct or expedient, it’ll take the backwaters” [Z]. When V was working with an entrepreneur that employed people in slum communities to turn recycled used straws into handicrafts, the entrepreneur had been promised repeatedly machinery that can press straws. And yet, there has been little progress in getting this piece of machinery. It is symptomatic of a larger issue: government fails to understand the impact of this
small straw handicrafts enterprise on this community and consequently decides that obtaining such machinery necessitates little political expediency.

X describes the government’s approach as laissez faire, where “when there’s no incentive for the guy in office, he’s going to be very, very lax talking about your company or putting you on the list of potential companies to get incentives for.” Consequently, entrepreneurs looking work with government to expand their organizations must have the right relationships or know “the right guy to go in the room and say, ‘Hey, you know this company is doing really awesome stuff for the people of Uganda.’ Unfortunately that’s just what it is.”

Thus, sometimes the visibility of social enterprises and social entrepreneurs hinges on an individual within the government bureaucracy who takes an interest; to have a voice and a champion individual from government is an endorsement that can catapult a low visibility organization to one of high visibility and priority. And yet, a champion still does not always guarantee a speedy and effective working relationship. S’s relationship with Ashoka as a Fellow meant that SO organization would receive both funding, mentorship, and network support that comes with the recognition and political clout of Ashoka. Yet, it still took five years for the government to fully advocate and support SO.

**Corruption.** Tangentially related to political expediency is the widespread issue of rampant corruption, especially at the top levels of bureaucracy. Gauging the responses of the interviewees, three interviewees explicitly acknowledged the role of corruption in undermining policy implementation, efficiency, and support for SE. There is feeling of resigned acceptance and recognition of corruption endemic to the country, bolstered by a president who has been in power for decades. Especially among the youth in the country, there exists widespread fatigue over Museveni’s rule and an itch for new leadership.
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There’s no surprise then, that when many of the interviewees were asked about why there are persistent feelings of burdensomeness when dealing with government, Y agrees this these sentiments extend “from issues like corruption, bureaucracy, nepotism…the usual things that you get through governments in third world countries. Likewise, Z “can’t rule out the challenges of corruption…[which are] commonplace in the developing world and that’s the challenge that you know that drives entrepreneurs from dealing with government.”

Future considerations. Almost all of the interviewees expressed considerable optimism for the future of Uganda’s social entrepreneurship landscape. However, this optimism is tempered by the awareness that considerable change needs to be made, especially where government is concerned. Processes including registration and licensing should be streamlined, considering the vast discrepancy between what is on paper and what happens in practice. One recommendation was to create a social enterprise registration desk or program to institutionalize SE and better serve their interests (Nantaba, 2017).

First, it is important to recognize the potential cross-sectoral successes and impacts of social entrepreneurs and social enterprises, rather than relegating SE successes to the realm of a single sector. Sectoral successes can be SE successes as well; it is important to recognize and frame SE in such a way that focuses on both its SE identity and ability to fulfill government priorities like health, education, youth unemployment, and renewable energy. This way, SE can be elevated as a holistic national policy priority.

Second, there is a demonstrated need for a SE forum or network to foster collaboration, showcase ideas, and connect promising and successful social enterprises and social entrepreneurs. One of the issues that arose through the qualitative interviews is that knowledge and awareness of the impact of SE by government is thin and unconsolidated. A uniquely
Other interviewees have called for increased financing opportunities for SE and financial support for social innovation. However, “even if government releases money, it gets lost along the way” due to endemic corruption and bribery [T]. “Dirty politics” is no doubt pervasive in the country, considering the fact that even the president, who has been in power for over 30 years, is also entrenched in nepotistic and authoritarian practices. Regardless, recognition, awareness, and knowledge are the first steps in creating an institutionalized legal framework for SE.

W took the conversation a step further, posing several inquiries and potential areas of exploration for the future:

1. At what point should government support stop?
2. How can government continue supporting SEs without distorting the market?
3. When should the support stop when they’ve created this so-called enabling environment?
4. And if it’s efficient, then what role should they be playing? [W]

The wording of W’s questions is interesting; there is the presumption that government support is inherent, as well as an acceptance that government does have a role to play in supporting social entrepreneurs and social enterprises. Furthermore, there’s the consideration of to what extent can “government continue supporting SEs without distorting the market…because some of the government interventions are not targeted at potential to compete and sometimes they distort the market.” These questions, to a certain degree, are quite futuristic in that they
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assume government support to SE will one day be adequate enough to cease; they are still substantive and provocative nonetheless.

**India**

In this section, I similarly highlight central themes identified from the ten interviews conducted with Indian founders, organizational staff, and academics engaged with SE (Table 11). These themes are centered around the government’s role in supporting SE, with specific attention to the federalist nature of the country, as well as the importance of political acumen and relationship building in the SE expansion.

**The role of government.** On the whole, almost every one of the founders and staff members of social enterprises I interviewed recognized the role and importance of working with government, either directly or indirectly. Interviewees represented social enterprises of various sectors, sizes, and impact. The scope of their work and levels of collaboration with government differed from organization to organization, but also from state to state. The federalist and decentralized nature of Indian governance is conducive to interstate competition, especially “if a state sees success other states want to replicate it.”

As a result of this decentralization, expanding an organization beyond state borders requires individual agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with individual state governments. Larger organizations which had scaled successfully to various Indian states could not have done so without the support of the state government, and as such, are likely to have deeper connections with the state rather than central government. However, this does not mean that organizations do not interact with the central government at all; rather, its effects are merely felt more indirectly, through government schemes, policies, and in the case of large social
enterprises, even patronage by prominent central government figures. Government is thus vital to helping organizations scale in the Indian context.

Yet at the same time, to operate as a social enterprise, NGO, or any other socially impactful organization is to be subject to the scrutiny of government, especially in a climate where there is growing distrust of NGOs as evidenced by the passage and implementation of the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA). While the most successful organizations, in terms of scale, size, and impact, have appeared to have been endorsed by government through media coverage and celebrations, this may not be the case for smaller organizations. Their lack of visibility, of political acumen, or of political priority suggest that, despite the overwhelmingly positive narrative behind social entrepreneurship and social innovation, the needs of smaller organizations may remain unaddressed.

**Experiences working with government.** “The government, for us, has been essential to scale” [C]. This sentiment has seemed especially relevant for most, if not all of the interviewees. While size and scale of impact prevented some organizations from interfacing with government directly, there exists a “deep willingness” to do so, as is the case with C, who recognizes that government has the resources to provide some of these critical social security programs for migrant workers and impoverished communities.

While it appears that C and CO have only interfaced with government indirectly through policies and government schemes, others have directly worked and communicated with state and central governments. In addition to receiving government funding, HO has several partnerships with the Governments of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, specifically working the former state government to install energy grids throughout the state.
Likewise, A, through collaboration, has expanded AO organization to 19 states across India. Though not all of these relationships use memoranda of understanding (MOUs), A has received permission from various state governments to bring the organization’s mobile science labs to schools and to conduct classes. The government has been supportive, from figuring out scheduling and visit logistics; however, A qualifies, that “as long as we’re not asking them for funding, for the most part, they’re very supportive.”

It appears that A’s path working with government has been quite smooth; few bureaucratic actors have done little to reject or block their work. The worst-case scenario, A contends, is if the governments adopts a laissez faire attitude: rejecting an active partnership and but doing little to stop an organization that is using its own funding to continue to work with beneficiaries. If that’s the approach, the government would “by all means” allow it; if it’s not of value, A challenges the government to “prevent [them] from operating and all the rest of it.”

Similarly, D’s explanation of how DO has expanded its water pumps to other state governments takes on a degree of surprising ease. While DO currently has agreements with the Governments of Karnataka, Telangana, and Maharashtra, its work in Karnataka (GoK) is especially notable given the degree of government closeness with D’s organization. In fact, D’s organization has emerged as the one of the foremost technical advisers to the GoK, leveraging its existing skills and technical processes to re-outfit several hundred of the defunct or mismanaged water kiosks in the state. As a demonstration of unity and collaboration, one of the Ministry buildings has even given DO office space. While a physical space confers DO a certain degree of legitimacy, it is also a testament to the importance of personal relationships in getting things done, especially within the Indian context.
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DO has also received favorable treatment from the Maharashtra and Telangana governments, though the treatment stops short of office space. In Maharashtra, “governance is so devolved and decentralized” that the district administration plays a large role in interacting with social enterprises and other civil society organizations. DO has since entered into an MOU with three districts within the state of Maharashtra, thanks to “government buy-in and conversations with communities.” Reflecting on successful partnerships with three of the state governments in India, D expresses a considerable degree of warmth in addressing “some amazing allies in the government, both state and national.”

Perception of government support. When faced with the question of whether the government has been proactive at scaling socially impactful work up, A feigns a similar type of resigned acceptance. While it may have come close at the central level, it didn’t happen to an acceptable extent. “Maybe that’s the nature of government,” A reflects. While merely an individual opinion, it is evident of a larger pattern of complacency in dealing with deeply entrenched corruption.

Yet others, like D, believe that the organization has “had some amazing allies in the government, both state and national.” Thus, D is hesitant to blame the government unitarily for failing to solve and alleviate India’s pressing social issues, almost defending it. Considering DO’s extensive support from the Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Telangana governments, it’s no wonder D’s attitude and perception of government support of DO is so warm.

Inefficiency and implementation. In considering policy and implementation, time is the name of the game. With regards to bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape, many of the interviewees viewed these hindrances with an air of acceptance and resignation.
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“I…understand there are limitations on that side. But I do think working with the
government does lend the perception of having to be patient. It’s not something that I think will
effectively but it’s something that there is a deep willingness to do” [C]. This understanding
applies to the reality that oftentimes, even though an official act has been passed, it takes a while
to be activated and implemented within government systems, especially in the broader landscape
of government decentralization.

Political acumen and relationships. For the largest social enterprises and organizations,
it appears that certain degree of political acumen is required to navigate the complex Indian
landscape and to gather enterprise support. One of the reasons, A says, that many NGOs seem to
have problems working with government is that “the head of the NGO doesn’t know how to
interface with bureaucracy.” Many young social entrepreneurs in their mid-twenties to thirties
might be passionate, brilliant even. However, because they do not have the network nor the
“political maturity to know how to present” themselves, what had been a great idea did not fulfill
its potential because it was not sold effectively. While it is possible that the shrewdness in
interfacing with bureaucracy might not always be mandatory depending on the scope and
visibility of an organization’s work, what A says does carry considerable weight.

When A went to meet the Chief Ministers of one of the biggest states in India, several
advisers were brought along, which included the former Chief Adviser of the Indian Economic
Energy Commission and one of the former principals of one of the best boarding schools in
India. “These are people who are perceived and are known to have done great work,” A adds,
“apolitical people…So when you do that, the senior bureaucrat treats you with respect.” Political
acumen, it seems, more acutely means the ability to build relationships and foster the right kind
of network, and use them to one’s advantage, especially when “dealing with government.” With
age and experience comes political shrewdness, and the young and inexperienced are at a disadvantage.

Similarly, HO has reached the level of visibility, stature, and recognition such that the organization was recently invited to a panel at Hyderabad with a prominent foreign political figure. The extension of an invitation and presence of the aforementioned individual are endorsements that illuminate HO’s stature within the state. Referencing the necessity of interfacing in the country to promote one’s organization, H acknowledges that it’s important to “pay reverence to politicians, as one does in India, but we are not committed to it.”

In February 2019, B’s midday meals organization hosted its ‘3 Billion Meals Commemoration’ event, which was livestreamed and attended by the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who served the three billionth meal. While Modi’s appearance was nominal in nature, his presence as a prominent political figure confers an incredible degree of organizational legitimacy, effectively endorsing not just the work that BO does, but also the organization itself.

Thus, for H, O, and B’s organizations, political acumen seems to be a requirement that comes with providing such expansive services, especially at a level that requires working with not just the central government, but also various state-level governments to expand midday meals services across state lines.

_Perception and public relations_. “India is a democracy, which means you’re innocent unless proven guilty, [but] we tend to operate very close to the opposite model.” Indeed, this mindset seems to pervade institutional interactions and perceptions, to the degree that the government views most NGOs in India with suspicion. Against the backdrop of deeply
entrenched corruption at the local, state, and administrative levels, India ostensibly appears to be a low-trust society.

Throughout my interview with A, the concept of trust was repeatedly brought up and enforced. A mentioned ‘trust’ around 20 times, highlighting the importance of engendering trust to build relationships and foster collaboration. The norms for the right and wrong things to do are necessary to build trust, but they are developed over time. In a supposedly low-trust society like India, trust then, in terms of credibility, background, and network, appear to take precedence when getting others to trust in the work that organizations like AO have been doing.

In a country like India that is incredibly political, divided, and changing, and where administrations and elections are watched and analyzed repeatedly, it depends on the game one plays and whether one is playing the long game or looking for short-term successes. “Perception becomes very important…if [you’re] seen as a guy who’s constantly seen wheeling and dealing with politicians…there will be a perception that you have a political agenda, though you might still succeed. But then you’re playing a very different kind of game.”

Thus, A and AO have had to be very careful with the media coverage of the organization. A has had to strike a balance between garnering support for the AO organization and not being perceived as political. Though many requests to appear on television have been received, A has only done so a handle of times. Media coverage no doubt helps raise visibility and money, but there is always the unintended consequence as being perceived as having some other agenda. They want to avoid being asked questions like “Why is he always on television? Is he planning to run for office?” For these reasons, A and his organization have decided to remain and be perceived as politically neutral. It would be incredibly unwise to sit and lambaste the
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government, but to turn around “and go to them and say hey, I need your Commission to operate
on all of my schools.”

**Other commentaries.** C has commented on the monolithic nature of the attention around
social entrepreneurship in the country. As numerous critiques of literature have revealed, the
dominant narrative surrounding social entrepreneurship in the India is largely positive, bolstered
by case studies of success and stories about the ease with which SEs receive funding. However,
the organization that C runs has largely “been quite contrary to what we see on social media and
the news and the general climate around social entrepreneurship.” C says,

…A lot of the focus on SE right now is largely around on technology-driven initiatives or
technology-driven enterprises. It leads to a situation where last-mile SEs which focus on
directly working with grassroots communities who may not necessarily have technology
as their core competence…get left out of the narrative or…don’t get adequately
represented in the narrative…My fear is that we are excluding a significant group of SEs
whose work does not necessarily include technology but could really complement other
technology-based initiatives. I would say that that’s the space that we fit in.

The focus on the technology-driven initiatives is palpable in current national policies.
While the National Innovation Council is one of the few national endeavors in recent years that
explicitly recognize and support social enterprise, it is largely defunct due to lack of political ill.
NSTEDB and PM-STIAC, by contrast, have largely focused on ‘technology’ and
‘entrepreneurship’, which can explain its disproportionate influence.

Indeed, for all organizations, though to varying extents, government schemes and policies
have been implemented in fickle manners. Inconsistent implementation is a multifaceted issue
attributed to bureaucratic rigidity, corruption, and lack of political willpower, among others.
Interestingly, C places a large amount of emphasis on political transition and administration and its effects on carrying out government schemes successfully. C warns against “particular schemes whose timelines exceed more than 5 years… because there have been examples in the past where governments have changed and schemes have stopped and people’s monies have been stuck.” Furthermore, schemes announced during election years, like the Pradhan Mantri Shramyogi Mandhan Pension Yojana (PMSYM) Scheme, should be taken with a grain of salt. PMSYM was announced and launched in February of this year, offering pensions of Rs. 3000 per month for eligible unrecognized sector workers after they reach 60 years-old. However, because it is an election year, it is possible that the scheme is improperly implemented and is more likely an attempt gain voter loyalty. Should the Modi government be voted out of office, the implementation of schemes like PMSYM remain in question.

It might be better to focus on “low-hanging fruit” instead, C offers. Perhaps this emphasis can be attributed to the size of the organization itself as well as the sector in which it operates. Since the organization’s founding in 2007, it has impacted over 20,000 families, helping to create greater visibility around migrant worker challenges in the financial sector. While impact of any size is impressive and meaningful, in context of India’s billion-plus population and other organizations that have impacted millions, C’s organization is relatively small. Organizational size and scale, especially in India, are quite telling; they suggest that the organization is still in its early stages, hasn’t received adequate funding, or is focused on a more localized approach, among others.

**Comparative Analysis**

Despite their shared histories of British colonialism, India and Uganda are two vastly differing countries. Their regime types, macroeconomic indicators, and more specifically,
populations, are on completely different orders of magnitude. These differences underlie the central themes that have emerged from primary research: that government plays a decisive role in the SE systems of each country, though its support often manifests differently.

**Uganda.** Despite the sectoral nature of SE, there is generally a more consolidated notion of social enterprise and central understandings about the capabilities of the central government. This is thanks to the influx of Western notions of social entrepreneurship, whose effects seem to be felt more acutely given Uganda’s comparatively smaller area and population. This increased collective understanding thus gives rise to a more cohesive narrative regarding the role of government in social enterprise and entrepreneurship within the country. Indeed, within Uganda, government inefficiency and incapacity has come to dominate the narrative, though interviewees have largely acknowledged that there is a need for government to support SE. Despite increasing levels of support for SE in the country, the sluggishness of bureaucratic processes has often impeded early-stage social enterprise formation. These processes, coupled with lax business regulation and a burgeoning informal sector, underlie the country’s high rates of entrepreneurship, despite immense difficulties registering a business. Furthermore, political expediency takes precedence during the implementation process; whatever action that generates the most collective political goodwill is the action that is taken.

**India.** On the other hand, the federalist nature of the Indian polity and the country’s dizzying array of religions, cultures, castes, and languages manifest themselves in a narrative around government involvement in social entrepreneurship that is comparatively more disjointed and less cohesive. Understandings of social entrepreneurship and NGOs are more blurred, considering the country’s rich history of domestically-formed civil society organizations. The federalist nature of Indian states further contributes to what can be perceived as a disjointed
narrative; many of India’s 29 states have populations that are larger than the whole of Uganda, it is no wonder that organizational expansion to different states relies heavily on relationships, trust, and perceived credibility, especially in the backdrop of high political fragmentation, where the enforcement of political priorities and policy promises including but are not just limited to SE, differ from administration to administration. There is no denying that relationships, politics, and organizational size and scale of impact are interrelated in the context of government involvement. For the individuals and organizations interviewed, it can be said that those with leadership who had high political acumen and leveraged their relationships had the highest likelihood of achieving scale.

Both. Yet despite these narrative differences around the role of government in supporting SE, these interviews have revealed some significant similarities. Though Uganda and India have different types of political systems, corruption is endemic, though it is more centered at the top levels of bureaucracy with the former, and more localized with the latter. There is widespread resigned acceptance of the reality of corruption in both of these countries. Politics, too, plays a significant role, whether that is political expediency and priority, as is the case with Uganda, or political relationships and perception, as is the case with India. Yet on the whole, interviewees from both countries have expressed optimism regarding the future of social entrepreneurship in their respective countries, though there is still considerable concern over the mitigation of bureaucratic barriers to social enterprises success and scale.

Discussion

In this section, I will examine how comparative political analysis, synthesis of country-level empirical data, and interview analysis support the finding that government can play a decisive, though often indirect role in the SE ecosystems of Uganda and India. These analyses
are adequate enough to amend and add nuance to Frank and Shockley’s typology with respect to the Indian and Ugandan SE contexts.

**The Decisive Role of Government**

Intuitively, decisive government support of ‘SE’ might refer to active efforts to recognize, promote, and support SE through ‘SE government policies and schemes’ and ‘SE policy priority’. Interviews with individuals representing Uganda and India reveal, however, that this active, direct support is not always the case. Even if there is institutionalized policy support, implementation is often hindered by bureaucratic rigidity, inefficiency, and political expediency, among others.

Corrupt and inefficient governance no doubt applied to Uganda, where government recognition of what SE can do to achieve national policy priority goals has remained largely unrealized. SE has not been institutionalized in national policy by the Government of Uganda, nor are there SE-friendly or social business-friendly registration options made available. As mentioned before, government’s role has been largely sectoral, with extensive support ‘non-SE schemes relevant to SEs’ like the Youth Livelihood Fund and ministries’ financial support of energy and education projects that make the environment for SEs focused on these issues more welcoming. However, the long-term success and implementation of the aforementioned Fund remains in question due to concerns around political expediency and corruption.

In contrast, the government of India has institutionalized SE in various policies like the National Policy for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship of 2015 and the Twelfth Five-Year Plan from 2012 to 2017 on a national level. However, the implementation of many of these policies has been slow, hampered by political fragmentation and administrations that decrease the ‘ease of accessing government schemes’. As the same time, there are various national
schemes that are not SE-specific but are still relevant to the work that SEs do, like the PMSYM Scheme. PMSYM too, was announced recently, likely to gain the support of voters in the national elections; the implementation of this scheme too, is uncertain, due to the current uncertainty of whether Modi’s BJP-backed administration will remain in power.

Yet, despite these shortfalls, government still has a role to play in supporting SE in both countries. Without the enabling institutions, resources, and policies of government, even ones with reputations for inefficiency or corruption, little or no social change resulting from social entrepreneurship reaches a large scale (Shockley & Frank, 2011). Yes, government support to Uganda is largely sector-specific, but without measures like the easing up of credit and the provision of government programs to improve youth unemployment, the broader ecosystem would not be hospitable to social enterprises and social entrepreneurs. Uganda’s political history and current political regime has also fostered this environment, ushering in decades of political ‘stability’ under Museveni, even though his rule has been warped by increasing authoritarianism. Regardless, compared to the decades of internal strife that plagued the country in the decades before Museveni, political stability under Museveni’s electoral autocracy has been transformative for the SE ecosystem at large. Thus, while policy implementation of ‘non-SE schemes relevant to SEs’ and the ease of accessing government schemes has been hindered by inefficiency and political expediency, government’s role has consolidated around this narrative and remains decisive in creating an enabling environment to support SE.

While the narrative for the Indian government’s part in SE is less consolidated due to the sheer size of the population and diversity of NGOs operating within India, there are still decisive roles to be played. Due to the federalist nature of the Indian system of governance, national schemes and policies that have supported SE face barriers in implementation, especially due to
bureaucratic slowness and uncertainty in rollout during election years. Thus, implementation remains paltry at the national level, despite recognition of SE as a policy priority. At the state level though, government seems to play a more hands-on role, specifically in helping SEs scale to other states through the issuance of MOUs. However, it seems that state government’s hands-on collaboration with SE is largely relegated to those organizations that have scaled widely, established a certain degree of political clout, and whose leadership has developed political acumen and leveraged relationships. The organizations that have not reached this scale thus interact with government as a byproduct of policies and schemes that are ‘non-SE schemes relevant to SEs’. This dichotomy between larger and smaller scale organizations seemed especially pronounced in my interviews with individuals representing India, where scale is of utmost importance. This contrast also serves to justify a characterization of government involvement in SE that is disjointed and lacking in consolidation and coherence, reminiscent of the federalist and politically fragmented nature of Indian government that comes with a large, messy, democracy.

**Revision to Frank and Shockley’s Typology**

The Discussion above and interpretative interview analysis demonstrates that government has a decisive role to play in supporting SE and thus justifies an amendment to Frank and Shockley’s typology, which the table above slightly nuances. It makes no distinction between bottom-up and top-down social entrepreneurship, instead collating both forms into the broader category of ‘social entrepreneurship’ in accordance with the types of questions asked of interviewees. Instead, I introduce a new government function specific to India, whose classification as a middle-state capacity country remains ill-addressed. Furthermore, I add nuance to the category of lower-state capacity, with specific reference to Uganda (Table 12).
Table 12. Revision to Frank and Shockley’s typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Higher-state capacity</th>
<th>Middle-state capacity</th>
<th>Lower-state capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>None studied</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>None studied</td>
<td>Scaler</td>
<td>Bystander and enabler</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the previously analyzed country-level empirical data, India falls into a middle-state capacity category. In the context of Indian social entrepreneurship, government—both central and state—functions as a scaler; with the appropriate political clout, relationships, credibility, and level of demonstrated impact, social enterprises can enter into MOUs with other states to expand their operations and be effectively endorsed. Many of the organizations represented by the interviewees fall under this paradigm.

Uganda in contrast, is a country with lower-state capacity. Government in Uganda is not necessarily a ‘Bungler’, ‘Limitator’, or ‘Adopter’ of social entrepreneurship. Many interviewees have recognized that execution of this SE support remains shrouded by ambiguity, corruption, and inefficiency, though government is increasingly warming up to and supporting social entrepreneurs. Thus ‘Bungler’ is not an appropriate characterization because government has not fully recognized nor scorned SE. Neither is the government an ‘Adopter’, as numerous interviewees have expressed that while government is not one of the largest players in the social entrepreneurship space, it has been quite successful in improving and fostering an enabling environment for SE to flourish without creating explicit SE policies. As a result, the characterizations of ‘Bystander’ and ‘Enabler’ are more accurate in the Ugandan context.

Conclusions

Though SE is often considered a third sector intervention in social issues that are ill-addressed or even perpetuated by government incapacity, government has and continues to scale,
enable, and remain complacent to varying degrees in the context of the Ugandan and Indian SE ecosystems. Despite theoretical assumptions asserting that government has no role in SE, the data support that government is decisive in the Ugandan and Indian SE ecosystems, though often manifested indirectly.

In Uganda, electoral autocracy has abetted the entrenchment of corruption but has also created a type of political consistency that comes with having the same president for over three decades. In recent years, a gradual decline in foreign aid has also cleared the way for an influx of Western notions of social entrepreneurship that have largely consolidated ideas of social enterprise in the country. Thus, government involvement in SE, through sectoral-specific policies that are tangentially relevant to SE and the creation of an enabling environment for with deep private sector and international community influences, has manifested in a consolidated narrative, characterized by extensive political expediency and inefficiency in implementation.

In India, an astonishing level of religious, cultural, and caste diversity has fomented a high degree of political fragmentation and federalist governance. These disparities are also reflected in the way government involvement has been manifested in the SE ecosystem, which has created a narrative that is disjointed and lacking in cohesion. Government support of SE is dependent upon organizational scale and influence, at which point, political acumen, public perception, and relationships factor heavily into collaborating with government to scale an organization.

Thus, it is both premature and reductive to view SE independent of government involvement. India is a ‘scaler’ while Uganda is an ‘enabler’ and ‘bystander’, classification that are more complex that Frank and Shockley’s typology originally proposed. There is no doubt that regime type, political histories, and country-level empirical data factor heavily in
illuminating how government manifests itself directly or indirectly in the SE ecosystem of the Uganda and India. Its effects are far reaching and are far more nuanced than what is credited by prevailing mainstream thought and writings.
Appendices

Appendix A

Table 1. Sonne and Jamal’s policy indicators in regional SE ecosystems

Table 2. The functions of government in social entrepreneurship

Table 6. Macro-level country indicators for Uganda and India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Uganda</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP Per Capita</td>
<td>$604.00</td>
<td>$1,939.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net official development assistance/official aid received (World Bank, 2017)</td>
<td>$2 billion</td>
<td>$3.1 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI as % of GDP (World Bank, 2017)</td>
<td>2.69%</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% entrepreneurs in formal and informal sectors (Approved Index, 2015)</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurship Ranking (Approved Index, 2015)</td>
<td>1st most entrepreneurial</td>
<td>15th least entrepreneurial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of Doing Business (World Bank, 2019)</td>
<td>127/190</td>
<td>77/190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Indicators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>Low (0.516)</td>
<td>Medium (0.640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>162/189</td>
<td>130/189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Capital Index (World Bank)</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>137/157</td>
<td>115/157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce distribution</td>
<td>Industry: 4.4%</td>
<td>Industry: 23.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Services: 23.7%</td>
<td>Services: 33.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agriculture: 71.9%</td>
<td>Agriculture: 42.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonizing power; year of independence</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gini Index</td>
<td>42.8 (2016)</td>
<td>35.1 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(World Bank, 2017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA

**Governance Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of government</th>
<th>Unitary dominant-party, semi-presidential republic</th>
<th>Federal parliamentary constitutional socialist republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government effectiveness (Brookings, 2016)</td>
<td>6.26/10</td>
<td>4.92/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Brookings, 2016)</td>
<td>Third quintile</td>
<td>Fourth quintile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law (Brookings, 2016)</td>
<td>7.33/10</td>
<td>5.50/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Brookings, 2016)</td>
<td>Third quintile</td>
<td>Top quintile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice and accountability (Brookings, 2016)</td>
<td>7.50/10</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Brookings, 2016)</td>
<td>Third quintile</td>
<td>Fourth quintile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2018)</td>
<td>149/180</td>
<td>78/180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levels of corruption</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of state capacity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Interviewee and Organizational Data: Uganda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Org. ID</th>
<th>Organization Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>Academic; Senior Portfolio Manager</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>International organization with branches around the world that finance and support sustainable social businesses in developing economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>YO</td>
<td>Organization that provides inclusive business training and development services to international NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Works to empower micro-entrepreneurs with skills necessary to replicate or franchise successful social business models</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Former employee</td>
<td>XO</td>
<td>For-profit social enterprise that finances income-generating assets, primarily motorcycles, for entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Has financed over 17,000 motorcycles and created more than 7000 new owners since its founding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>Business consultant</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>Multilateral, international organization that accelerates energy organizations for impact and helps them become investment ready</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Director; Academic</td>
<td>VO</td>
<td>Entrepreneurship Center at the business school of a large university in Uganda, which provides consultancy services, incubation, education, and training to foster entrepreneurship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Have worked with large organizations, individuals, and entrepreneurship-support organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>Lecturer; Academic</td>
<td>UO</td>
<td>Business school of a large university in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>UO</td>
<td>Business school of a large university in Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>Ashoka Fellow;</td>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Education organization that offers a variety of youth-support, activity-based learning programs that explore topics in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA

Table 11. Interviewee and Organizational Data: India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Org. ID</th>
<th>Organization Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| A  | Founder          | AO      | One of the largest hands-on science education programs for economically disadvantaged populations in India  
- Up to March 2018, the organization has supported over 10 million and 250,000 teachers from vulnerable communities across India. |
| B  | Founder          | BO      | One of the largest midday meals provider to schoolchildren  
- Recently served the three billionth meal  
- Leverages an extensive public-private partnership model to serve schoolchildren in government and government-aided schools around the country |
| C  | CEO              | CO      | Organization based in southern Rajasthan that provides last-mile financial inclusion services to migrants who are often overlooked by the traditional banking industry  
- To date, CO has worked with over 20,000 families. |
| D  | Vice President   | DO      | Addresses gaps in off-grid water systems across India and another country in sub-Saharan Africa  
- Uses a social water enterprise model; individuals manage water pumps and generate their own incomes, while facilitating decentralization of social services  
- To date, DO has impacted 1.2 million people. |
| E  | Founder          | EO      | Sports organization that identifies, trains, and empowers outstanding prospective athletes, especially in rural India  
- Since its inception, the organization has inducted over 4000 athletes into the program. E has also been involved in the parent organization’s microfinance and agricultural feeding programs. |
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **F** | Former employee; Fellow | FO | - One of the largest social enterprises in India that manufactures, distributes, and sells hand-knotted carpets and rugs  
- Uses a decentralized rug production system centered on a network of over 10,000 low-income, home-based weaver households  
- Manages a non-profit foundation that provides training, education, and health services to artisans and their families |
| **G** | Staff | FO | - See above |
| **H** | Manager | HO | - Organization that uses a participatory and holistic development model to facilitate poverty alleviation  
- Provides sports outreach programs for children and a professional school to help rural professionals access opportunities |
| **I** | Regional Head | IO | - Organization that oversees the country’s first toll-free helpline for street children in distress  
- Up to March 2015: serviced a total of 36 million calls |
| **J** | Manager | JO | - Delhi-based organization that works to ensure equitable and sustainable production and consumption of materials, and improved disposal of waste |
Appendix B

Thesis Interview Questions

**Study Title:** Government and Social Entrepreneurship in India and Uganda: A Comparative Analysis

**Principal Investigator:** Cindy Fan

**INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: STAFF MEMBERS AT [UGANDAN, INDIAN] SOCIAL ENTERPRISES**

- **Government Involvement**

6. How would you characterize government involvement in social enterprise in your country?
   a) Differences from region to region, state to state
   b) Type of work
   c) Supportive/obstructive

7. What kind of involvement does this entail?
   a) Funding and other initiatives
   b) Bureaucratic barriers
   c) Other factors

- **Identifying Organizational Steps to Scale**

8. Would you classify your organization as a social enterprise? If so, why? What is your definition of a social enterprise?

9. Can you briefly detail the work your organization does? What are its service/product offerings?

10. What steps did your organization take to scale, if at all? How successful do you think these steps were?

11. What are the biggest challenges your organization has faced in achieving scale?
   a) Internal challenges
      i) Extensiveness of social network
      ii) Organizational capital
      iii) Social capital (staff, capabilities, etc.)
   b) External challenges
      i) Legal barriers
      ii) Access to capital
      iii) Availability of opportunities to improve social network and form partnerships

12. What are other challenges that your organization (or other organizations) have/may face when scaling?
Organizational-Level Analysis: Traits

13. Organizational factors that affect ability to scale (high-medium-low)
   a) Finance
   b) Social capital
   c) Transportation

14. External factors affecting ability to scale
   a) Access to capital
   b) Social network—partnerships, etc.
   c) Regulations

15. Can you describe your organization’s network? How connected is it with other related organizations?

16. Can you describe the organizational culture? What are the major descriptors that come to mind?

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL/ACADEMIC WHO WORKS/HAS WORKED WITH ISSUES DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RELATED TO SOCIAL ENTERPRISE POLICY

Identifying Effectiveness of Government in Promoting Social Enterprise

1. How would you describe social enterprise? What are some examples?
2. From your perspective, how has your government promoted social enterprise, if at all?
3. How effective do you think these policies have been? How have they affected social enterprise?
4. How might the way your government addresses social enterprise differ from that of other government responses?
5. What do you think are the strengths and weaknesses of your government in regulating these policies?

General Questions

○ Do you have another official/academic/organizational staff member that you recommend that I speak with?
○ Is there anyone else that you recommend that I speak with?
Appendix C

Georgetown University
Consent to Participate in Research Study

INTRODUCTION

You are invited to consider participating in this research study. Please take as much time as you need to make your decision. Feel free to discuss your decision with whomever you want, but remember that the decision to participate, or not to participate, is yours. If you decide that you want to participate, please sign and date where indicated at the end of this form.

If you have any questions, you should ask the researcher who explains this study to you.

BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

This study is being conducted to assess the role of government in promoting social enterprises in Brazil, India, and Uganda. The study will answer the question: “How does government involvement foster or hinder social enterprises?” This analysis will foster a better understanding of how and why some social enterprises are more successful than others, examining government involvement specifically and comparatively contextualized in Uganda and India.

We will use the information provided by you in this interview to contribute to our discussion of social enterprises in Uganda and India and government actions that influence their success.

STUDY PLAN

You are being asked to take part in this study because you fall into one of the following categories: a staff member that works or has worked at a [Uganda or India] social enterprise that has/is attempting to scale successfully; an Official that works or has worked with issues related directly or indirectly to social enterprise policy; or an Academic that works or has worked directly or indirectly with social enterprise and macroeconomic and governance conditions. About 24 subjects will take part in this study.

If you decide to participate in this study, you will take part in only this interview. We will only have contact following this interview if you ask to send us more information regarding our questions following the interview. This interview should last around 30-60 minutes. The interview will take place over the phone or at a location that you choose. During the interview, you will be asked questions about potential factors that have contributed to successful scaling by social enterprises, which include macroeconomic conditions, policies, and/or organizational qualities depending on which category you fall into.
GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA

You will be in the study for only the 30-60 minute interview. This study involves audio recording. You will be audio recorded for the study unless you indicate to the researcher verbally before the interview begins that you do not want the interview to be recorded. We will delete the recording at any point if you inform us that you want the audio recording of the interview to be deleted. We will be audio recording the interview only to assist us during the study in ensuring that the conclusions we make in the thesis, thesis presentation, and publication accurately convey what was stated in the study's interviews.

You can stop participating at any time. However, if you decide to stop participating in the study, we encourage you to talk to the researcher first.

**Risks**

There are no risks associated with participating in this study.

**Benefits**

If you agree to take part in this study, there will be no direct benefit to you. However, information gathered in this study may provide valuable insight on conditions that affect the ability of social enterprises to scale successfully and provide a multinational comparative analysis between Uganda, India, and Brazilian. The information gathered may also provide insight into what policies or changes can be implemented and extrapolated to different countries that may successfully facilitate organizational scaling.

**Confidentiality**

Every effort will be made to keep any information collected about you confidential. However, it is impossible to guarantee absolute confidentiality.

In order to keep information about you safe, study data will be kept in a password-protected file on the researcher's personal computer which only the researcher can access. In addition, no identifiers will be associated with your interview. A pseudonym will be used in the thesis, thesis presentation, and publication to communicate your individual perspective. The identifiable data collected during this interview will only be shared among the members of this study's research team. Any emails or documents (digital and non-digital) will be deleted or shredded following the submission and presentation of the thesis in May 2019.

Your name or other identifiable information will not be included in the thesis, the thesis presentation, or the thesis publication. Please note that, even if your name is not used in publication, the researcher will still be able to connect you to the information gathered about you in this study.

The Georgetown University IRB is allowed to access your study records if there is any need to review the data for any reason.

**Your Rights As A Research Participant**

Participation in this study is entirely voluntary at all times. You can choose not to participate at all or to leave the study at any point. If you decide not to participate or to leave the study, there will be no effect on your relationship with the researchers or any other negative consequences.
If you decide that you no longer want to take part in the interview, you are encouraged to inform the researcher of your decision. The information already obtained through your participation will not be included in the data analysis and final report for this study.

**QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS?**
If you have questions about the study, you may contact Cindy Fan at +1(908) 938-0292 or cf653@georgetown.edu. You may also contact the researcher’s faculty advisor, Michael P. Ryan at ryanmp@georgetown.edu.

Please call the Georgetown University IRB Office at **+1 202-687-1506** (8:30am to 5:00pm, Monday to Friday) if you have any questions about your rights as a research participant.
References


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GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN INDIA AND UGANDA


