PUBLIC OPINION, REFUGEE PROGRAMS, AND STATE WELFARE IN TWENTY COUNTRIES

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ABSTRACT

Refugee programs bolster global human rights by promoting responsibility-sharing and assisting the 25.9 million people who have been forced to flee their countries for fear of war or persecution. As refugee numbers soar globally and are depicted unfavorably by the media in the wake of the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, public opinion towards refugees is increasingly measured. As opposed to examining the traits in the refugee population that make it more or less favorable for integration, this paper purports to identify a trait in the third-country host population that makes it more or less amenable to receiving refugees.

Utilizing the 2016 Amnesty International Refugees Welcome survey and data from the 2010-2014 World Values Survey wave, this paper suggests that countries whose individuals prefer a high level of personal responsibility- as opposed to government intervention to ensure economic wellbeing- are more likely to support programs that aid refugees or allow refugees to enter the country. This paper contends that said individuals are less likely to view refugees as competition for government-provided resources and are therefore more supportive of their integration. Furthermore, these individuals support refugees settling or living at closer peripheries, encompassing the home, the neighborhood, or the city/village/town, as opposed to settling within the country at large.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

In January 2020, I caught an Uber ride from a man who claimed to be a resettled refugee. This is a fairly common occurrence in Seattle. When I explained that I study refugees and refugee programs, my driver became excited and began to share more of his experience. It soon became clear to me that he was not, in fact, a refugee, but rather an economic migrant studying in the United States on a student visa that his family had procured through an informal network of connections. Though various members of his family had crossed borders and received refugee status through UNHCR, my driver had pursued a rapid and reasonably direct migration path that is typically available only to those with resources and access. When I gently probed him on his use of the term "refugee," he responded with absolute certainty: he was a refugee.

This project proposes to answer why some countries' populations are more receptive to refugees than others. Stated simply, why do some insiders accept outsiders more readily? I relay the initial anecdote because it illustrates several important discrepancies between policy and reality, insider and outsider status. The legalistic definition of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol bely an essential disconnect between the states and international bodies that craft refugee law and, on the other hand, the recipients of aid on the ground. My driver had leveraged his resources to identify a migration solution that would further his goals; he pursued an education in the United States on a student visa. Though he had fled persecution and crossed an international border, he had made the conscious decision not to seek succor from UNHCR, divining that, given the presented opportunities, a self-determined path was more desirable and would allow him to migrate more quickly and directly, bypassing the waiting time in a camp and

extensive background and medical checks that inhere to either the asylum or the third-country refugee resettlement process.

Migrants leverage various networks to cross borders, including: State, Market, Family, and Community networks (Adelantado et al., 1998). My driver had accessed both family and community network-based solutions, but registered refugees appeal to UNHCR and then to the state to which they are resettled. Despite the many and varied paths to migration, public opinion is not so discerning, and the public has come to regard refugees alternatively as passive vessels for aid or else as tax drains on the state. This paper takes public opinion as its subject; it examines public opinion in 20 different countries in order to identify which characteristics and beliefs make these populations more amendable to accepting refugee programs.

Public opinion is often unmoored from factual knowledge. National belonging is defined by imagined connections that envelop and sustain the insider community, while holding the outsider community at bay. A resettled refugee entering the United States will have registered with UNHCR, completed RSC interviews and biographic checks, been reviewed by USCIS, finalized a USCIS security check, passed an RSC medical exam, received a domestic resettlement agency sponsor, been screened by CBP/TSA, and been deemed admissible by CBP (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2018). An illegal immigrant enters a country without official permission from the state. An asylee claims her right to protection after crossing an international border; if successful she is recognized as a refugee. An individual seeking a green card applies to the quota-based system. Yet prior to receiving citizenship, all are considered outsiders, regardless of the path to arrival.

The refugee label becomes a distorted looking glass through which neither migrants themselves nor citizen "insiders" can parse reality from the mythos that shrouds the term "refugee." To the citizen, the refugee is an "other," and the legalistic boundaries that separate asylum seeker, from economic migrant, from refugee become blurred by the overarching optics of otherness. The incendiary language that dominates too many media narratives evokes a great mass on the horizon, an undifferentiated horde of othered bodies. My driver had called himself a "refugee" because he was unschooled in the legal definitions that parse the rights of distinct categories of migrants but was entirely literate in the language of otherness that conflates one type of migrant with the next. The public succumbs under the weight of these narratives of otherness as well.

Public opinion surveys demonstrate that citizen insiders do not distinguish between various categories of migrants, but rather place them under the umbrella labeled "other," therefore excluding them from a perception of "deservingness" when it comes to state benefits and services. Indeed, as will be explored in subsequent sections, it is populations' attitudes towards the provision of government services to ensure wellbeing that determines how a population will regard refugee programs. This paper will demonstrate that populations that favor personal responsibility instead of government responsibility for wellbeing are more likely to favor settling refugees at closer proximity. It is this mindset that allows particular populations to welcome refugees into their neighborhoods, thereby resisting the urge to "other" the refugee.

A refugee is one who seeks refuge, but one who seeks refuge is not always a refugee. In the introductory story, a persecuted person sought refuge in a third country without appealing to UNHCR or to the third-country government for official refugee status. Yet perhaps because of

the semantics, a certain confusion inheres to the debate, whereby many migrants refer to themselves as refugees, confusing the fact that they are seeking refuge with the conferral of the legal status. Those seeking relief say they are refugees; the states and international bodies that confer the status do not. From the bottom up, the experience looks quite different than from the top down. It is lived experience versus Foucault's biopolitics realized at a mass scale. It is the money and organization that inheres to structuring a camp or a resettlement program versus daily persecution rendered quotidian. Beneath this debate, both migrants and citizens themselves illustrate the incoherence of these legal definitions, by failing to understand both their structures and their relevance. At the end of the day, in a reality that is dominated by constructed binaries, "insider" and "outsider" are the only categories that apply, and bridging this gap is the road to citizenship.

Nevertheless, it is clear that many types of migrants pursue a stability that does not inhere to their home regimes, and that there are many paths to said stability, whether illegal border crossing or the pursuit of citizenship status through normal migratory processes. Likewise, numerous considerations oblige emigrants to desert their homes, whether those considerations be political, financial, or simply related to personal security. These factors compel migrants to cross borders, whether legally or illegally. For its part, the state has a monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber, 2017). However, the state also demonstrates its legitimacy by conferring various services through citizenship. Many who migrate do not simply seek to cross a physical border, but also to obtain the citizenship or legal resident status in which modern civil, political, and social rights are couched. These civil, political, and social rights encompass modern notions of stability in their own right.

In 1958, United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, "Citizenship *is* man's basic right, for it is nothing less than the right to have rights" (Lepore, 2018, p. 674). Citizenship is a legal status that furnishes civil, political, and social rights. The nature of citizenship oscillates upon a careful balance between inclusion and exclusion. The psychological dimension of citizenship binds those within the community together through a common subjectivity, a shared and often inchoate sense of belonging (Carens, 2000, p. 166). Meanwhile, the exclusionary principle divides global citizens who ostensibly share unalienable human rights via national lines and state borders. It separates those within the community from those who linger beyond the border. This paper is concerned with those factors that can motivate citizens to welcome outsiders in.

Citizenship, as a legal status, necessitates the existence of discrete, territorially-bounded political communities to which said citizens belong and to whom are ascribed various and equally-distributed rights and responsibilities: the right to exercise political agency, the responsibility to take up arms and defend the nation, the right and responsibility to a trial by a jury of one's peers, etc. The perfect model of citizenship supposes a world of equality between states. Reality depicts diverse political communities with varying levels of resources, rights, and abilities to impinge upon the sovereignty of their neighbors. This is to say nothing of failed, autocratic, or predatory states.

States that primarily occupy the latter categories have produced enormous flows of refugees in recent years, specifically since World War II- the time at which a legal framework for dealing with and organizing refugees was established (UNHCR, 1951). In a world in which some states can provide aid at negligible cost and others require aid to ensure survival, the nature

and extent of aid must be consistently intellectually interrogated (Walzer, 1983). This includes all types of aid, economic or otherwise. It also includes programs motivated entirely- or seemingly entirely- by humanitarian concerns, such as refugee programs. Refugees must be accepted after crossing a national border under the principle of non-refoulement (UNHCR, 1951). The right of citizens to occupy a specified territory, to draw upon owned resources for themselves, and to exclude others in the name of national belonging butts up against the human right of movement in the name of self-preservation and the right against being involuntarily returned, non-refoulment.

Refugees in particular highlight an illogic in the citizenship-state covenant. Their citizenship pursues them across international boundaries and yet their flight illustrates that their states have ceased to fulfill their ends of the citizenship covenant. Some refugees are granted respite in a third country, and this is called resettlement. Less than one percent of the world's refugees are resettled in third countries every year. Others are granted refugee status after turning up, unannounced on another country's borders. This paper considers public attitudes towards receiving refugees in a community, whether they arrive directly or are resettled to a third country. How refugees integrate into their new host countries is a subject of intense debate, particularly in the post-2015 migratory era. The inequality of states' abilities to procure and distribute resources certainly complicates distributive arguments about states as the best vessel to allocate resources to citizens (Coleman and Harding, 1995).

There are those who argue that goods and resources must be distributed within bounded political communities, and that these communities must have the autonomy to establish the rights of membership for some and thereby to determine and cultivate an internal integrity (Walzer,

1983). By this logic, if world citizens are endowed with the human right to move freely, then they jeopardize national cohesion and patriotism, thereby precipitating the breakdown of the global order of national communities into mere neighborhoods. This claim is, of course, undermined by the existence of many diverse, multi-national states. Thinkers like Habermas posit that the fused political culture must disentangle itself from the majority culture, allowing space for a profusion of minority cultural, ethnic, and religious habits to coexist within the same political community (Habermas, 1998). This is, perhaps, a utopic vision. Nevertheless, the two theorists provide distinct recipes for what to do with the ever-problematic "other."

Belonging and exclusion occupy two poles at either end of the nation-building conversation. When an "other" enters the national territory, is the answer Walzer's paradigm, in which the individual is excluded in order to preserve the integrity of the prevailing national culture? Or is the answer the opposite? Should space be made, as in Habermas's vision, for a future comprised of peaceful, multi-national states in which minority cultures are encouraged within a greater, cohesive political community? Should different, legal categories of others be treated differently? Or should all others be treated similarly, as they are absorbed as one into the national fabric?

One category of these many and varied others are the refugees, who enter into another country and occupy the hurricane's eye of a debate over what to do with them, how to furnish rights, which responsibilities to demand from them, etc. Citizenship, as the vehicle for the provision of rights and resources, can be interpreted in the most restrictive sense. Some argue, as in Orban's Hungary, that political rights should be reserved for the native-born, ethnic majority (Gozdziak, 2019). A former presidential candidate in the United States supported an open border

policy in which illegal immigration was to be decriminalized (Darby, 2019). Other theorists posit the extension of political rights to resident noncitizens and even noncitizen nonresidents whose interests are affected by a particular state (Song, 2009). The debate rages on, and policy is largely dictated by public opinion.

What to do with these outsiders who find themselves on the inside of a territorialized system and whose citizenship follows them like a cloak? How do the insiders, the citizens, choose to accept outsiders and perhaps grant them citizenship status? What to do with the refugees, whose problematic bodies provide a physical, embodied reminder of the rupture in the territorialized logic of citizenship and the provision of its associated rights. If modern statecraft is, in fact, a 'civilizing mission' and an 'internal colonization,' then something must be done with the influx of outsiders that upset a balance based upon interiority (Scott, 1998, p. 82). A pivotal part of this question involves motivating the public to accept outsiders by identifying traits in the public that make it more or less amenable to doing so. This project attempts to address some of these questions.

1.2 The Research Question

This project explores why certain countries' populations are more receptive to refugees than others; in total, it will examine 20 different countries. Among these 20 countries, it asks: why do certain populations accept outsiders more readily than others? According to the Amnesty International Refugees Welcome survey (2016), the level of welcome ranges greatly, with China ranking globally as the most welcoming country, and Russia ranking as the least welcoming. The range is wide, with China scoring an 85 and Russia at 18 (Amnesty International, 2016).

There are many and diverse explanations for the various factors that might undergird this range, from social media discourses, to proximity to refugee-generating conflicts, to traditional social capital. If refugees' countries have ceased to fulfill their ends of the citizen-state covenant, and have expulsed their citizens through predatory policies or through the collapsed infrastructure and the impending insecurity typical of a failed state, then it is important that these "people out of place" encounter safety and stability and avoid the "refugee warehousing" that too often occurs in camps. Once settled in a third country, refugees will likely rely upon certain resources typically reserved for citizens, particularly in their first months and years. This necessity can stir anything from resentment to generosity in the host population.

As conflicts become increasingly protracted, climate change wreaks havoc in numerous communities, and refugee flows feature heavily in social media and the news, it is important to understand what moves a host population to welcome the refugees in their midst. With such a wide range in numbers, it is clear that refugee sentiment is not static, and that one or many factors influence said sentiment in a variety of countries around the world. The purpose of this study is to understand one of the variables that determines public opinion towards refugees and refugee programs in 20 countries around the world.

While many studies examine the characteristics that make refugees more or less desirable to host populations, this paper takes the opposite approach. Numerous studies propose that linguistic ability, skin color, religious practices, or financial independence determine the welcome that refugees will receive. This may be true. However, this paper purports to examine which characteristics in the *host* population dictate the level of acceptance or rejection that will be displayed towards refugees who settle in their communities. While refugees must attempt to

integrate, host populations must maintain an openness to acceptance. This paper takes the onus off the refugee by determining which host populations have the potential and capacity to provide a superior community for refugees. This will be discussed in greater detail in Section 1.4: Research Design and Scope.

1.3 Existing Literature

Much has been written about refugee issues, and the tenor of the conversations has gained a distinct urgency in the wake of the recent Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on migration to Europe in particular. Because this paper examines the factors that move individuals to perceive refugees as insiders or outsiders, it is important to outline a definition of citizenship and its relationship to both the state and the nation.

Citizenship is commonly regarded as a covenant between an individual and a political community, though this has been amended to include a national community (Morjé Howard, 2006) and a geographic community (Bloemraad et al., 2008). The centrality of territoriality is key (Gellner 2006; Malkki, 1992), as these discrete, bounded spaces provide a visual key to understanding insider and outsider status. Citizens generally reside within the bounded space, accessing its resources through a variety of welfare networks, whether healthcare or pensions (Esping-Anderson, 1993; Adelantado et al., 1998). The specificity of the welfare network depends on the state in question. Meanwhile, the outsiders are perceived to lurk beyond the national boundaries and are barred from accessing the resources that are reserved for those who possess citizen status.

Citizenship undergirds the covenant that disburses resources, along with political, civil and social rights. It comprises a nebulous and yet resilient bond, an imagined community between "similar" peoples (Anderson, 2006; Scott, 1998). Worded differently, there exists a shared, national consciousness, which stems from common identities, memories, and cultural content that transcends generations and is capitalized upon to pursue nation-building policies (Gellner, 2006; Baubock, 2008). This shared consciousness is both inclusive and exclusive. It includes the "People" contained within, but it excludes the "people" who are marginalized. These "people" are those who are encompassed in the state but jettisoned from the nation (Agamben, 2000; Isin, 2007).

In the context of this paper, the binary is clear. Citizens share a community of imagined bonds and perceived similarities. On the other hand, refugees are outside of the imagined community, and the shared memories, symbols, and practices cannot serve as a cultural touchstone to weave them into the larger, majority culture. They are "people" who are separate from Agamben's "People," and therefore they are marginalized in order to preserve a continuous, national fabric of similitude.

In a perfect world, all citizens reside within a territory whose state is able to provide the necessary services in order to ensure their continued security and wellbeing. If this were the case, each state would contain one, similar People that shared cultural traditions and imagined bonds. The state and its attending resources would be strong; little border-crossing would be necessary. Insiders would draw upon the resources provided by their state to its homogenous People, and low-class migration would be replaced by a high-class cosmopolitanism or tourist travel.

Of course, this is not the case, and when failed or predatory states manifest, citizenship becomes, in essence, a juridico-political title and identity devoid of real-world meaning (Heater, 2004). In other words, if all men are born equal, then they become unequal at the moment they receive (or do not receive) citizenship, depending on the granting state. Refugees occupy a niche that is particularly ripe for intellectual interrogation, because their state has reneged on its end of the citizen-state covenant. Therefore, refugee status offers an interesting window through which to examine the effectiveness of citizenship as the modern vehicle for the distribution of human rights and the ability of states to protect their citizens. There is literally no state to which they have the option to return, given that their goal is self-preservation, achieved through flight from persecution.

This is the basic, theoretical framework. Citizenship rights complicate the bestowal of human rights. The conferral of human rights is performed through the mechanism of citizenship, and yet citizenship is inherently unequal. Refugee protection programs, which seek to grant safety and welfare to those whose states fail to provide citizenship rights, take a step in righting this imbalance between citizenship and human rights.

If the goal is to attain equal, human rights, then refugee programs, including refugee resettlement programs, are a strategy that works towards this end, however imperfectly. Integration is best achieved in societies that are open to refugees or refugee settlement programs, and various characteristics in the host population determine the level of acceptance that will be displayed. Before delving into these factors, it is important to understand the legacy of the international refugee system, so that we might situate ourselves comfortably within its historical trajectory.

The modern refugee paradigm was constructed in 1951 with the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and was later modified by the 1967 Protocol, the 1984 Cartagena Convention and the 1974 OAU Convention. The refugee regime as a whole has been critiqued without end over the years, for being used as a Cold War political cudgel (Betts et al., 2012), for being manipulated to privilege some nationalities over others (Portes et al., 1985), for protecting states' rights over human rights (Behrman, 2018), for providing few protections (Castles et al., 2000), and for manipulating the language of human rights (Chimni, 2000), among other reasons. As outlined in the introduction, it is clear that the protections provided by the 1951 Convention and its signatories suffer an interpretational disconnect; lived experience and human data and analytics can hardly provide a cohesive picture unless they are construed in unison and, in fact, intimately intertwined.

The disconnect between reality and perception persists once refugees are settled in another country. This tiny percentage of the total refugee population are the individuals that this paper concerns. A variety of studies demonstrate that refugees have high levels of entrepreneurship in Germany (Freudenberg et al., 2018), that they are able to economically integrate into the United States (New American Economy, 2017), and even that they are able to innovate and establish business ventures while they remain in camps (Turner, 2020; Peteet, 2009). Astonishingly, all this entrepreneurship is primarily accomplished through leveraging community and family networks in order to circumvent the considerable barriers posed by market citizenship (Grace et al., 2018). All these studies bely the myth of the "passive refugee," who is a recipient of aid, often referred to as a "social services drain." This mentality and this language too often conflate all forms of immigration with illegality (Parrott et al., 2019).

Furthermore, these studies, while extremely important in illustrating the economic independence and entrepreneurial spirit of refugees in general, further the tradition of emphasizing characteristics in the refugee population that make them appealing for settlement and integration. They elide that refugee integration is a relationship between two populations: the refugee and the citizen/host populations. They comprise an extensive body of research that too often interrogates one half of the refugee-host community relationship, once again placing the onus for successful integration on refugees alone and bowing to the whims and preferences of the host populations that typically hail from UNHCR donor countries, even if 85% of the world's refugees reside in developing countries. In attempting to understand the perceptions of the host countries, public opinion surveys are a vital resource.

Public opinion towards refugees has been measured through a variety of surveys; the biggest and most widely cited are the Amnesty International Refugees Welcome Survey (2016), Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Survey (Stokes, 2017), and the European Social Survey (2016). These are the three most cited surveys and rely on different methodologies to measure varying attitudes in different countries, though each is characterized by a metropolitan and Eurocentric bias. In part, this bias is intuitive; refugees are most often resettled in metropolitan areas of Europe, Oceania, or North America. Nevertheless, this paper will utilize the Amnesty International 2016 survey, which refers to refugees at large and measures perceptions globally. This decision will be explained in greater detail in Section 3: Methodology and Quantitative Model.

In addition to the aforementioned surveys, smaller surveys measuring attitudes towards refugees and immigrats in general abound. Blitz (2017) argues that, despite media coverage,

there is much support for refugees. Bansak et al. (2016) utilizes three variables to measure public opinion towards asylum seekers in Europe, finding that migrants who are viewed as "economically viable," are the most favored by the general public across 15 countries. Kobe et al. (2016) argues that the European public believes that all citizenship-seekers must first "pay their dues" through taxes and other civic responsibilities before they should be entitled to welfare or social services. The limitation of most of these surveys is, of course, that they are quite Eurocentric. At the global level, Dempster et al. (2017) finds that Oceania is the most welcoming region of the world for immigrants as a whole category, while Europe occupies the other extreme. Again, each of these surveys emphasize biases that these host populations hold about refugees, regardless of the reality.

Clearly there is much scholarship on refugee, citizenship, and social welfare-related issues. One of the clearest limitations in the scholarship is the lack of studies that emphasize countries outside of Europe, North America, and Australia. While the aforementioned regions permanently resettle the majority of the world's refugees, increased burden-sharing will only serve to lighten the load on the four countries where refugees are most often "warehoused"- Turkey, Uganda, Pakistan, Lebanon- before they can be considered for resettlement (UNHCR, 2017). Furthermore, that the majority of the world's refugees are resettled in the aforementioned regions does not imply that resettlement programs are not offered in other areas, as evinced by the Southern Cone Solidarity Resettlement Program in South America, which has resettled Syrians and Palestinians, as well as Latin Americans (Marcogliese, 2017). A more diverse and global array of resettlement options is, of course, a pathway towards the goal of a greater provision of human rights through refugee resettlement programs.

With this in mind, this paper seeks to examine the motivations behind public opinion towards refugees in 20 different countries that are more globally dispersed. When citizens decide who is "in" and who is "out," certain factors can make a population more or less lenient in its determinations. As established, citizens are more likely to accept immigrants who have been deemed "economically viable." This indicates that financial stability is a determining factor for the "outsiders" but also for the "insiders," those who are already citizens. However, this study asks if there are factors independent of refugee perceptions that impact support for or aversion to refugee programs.

This study suggests that populations that support an expanded welfare state with increased support for state institutions are less likely to welcome refugees into their communities. Welfare state provisions are not put in the context of refugees, of migrants, or of welfare provisions for non-citizens in general. Rather, public opinion towards expanded or contracted welfare states in general and in the service of citizens is an independent variable that affects support for refugee programs and the acceptance of outsiders into the national community.

1.4 Research Design and Scope

This quantitative study examines how desire for increased or decreased government responsibility for citizens' wellbeing affects acceptance of refugee programs in respondents' communities at varying distances. From among the three big studies that were previously stated, I selected the Amnesty International Refugees Welcome survey (2016), due to its global scope and its attention to acceptance at varying social circumferences. Specifically, the Amnesty

International survey measures acceptance at the following distances: the home, the neighborhood, the city/town/village, and the country. To this end, I take as my dependent variable respondents' acceptance or rejection of hosting refugees in the stated community peripheries. Therefore, if a respondent is coded as accepting, I analyze the distance at which the respondent would maintain the refugee.

My independent variable is respondents' professed desire for greater government responsibility or greater personal responsibility to ensure fellow citizens' wellbeing. This data, collected from the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014), is used as an indicator to illustrate desire for increased or decreased social services. Both datasets were collected over a similar time period, utilizing face-to-face and telephone interviews. Both surveys also collected data from over 20,000 respondents across 20 countries. I use data from all countries for which there is information in both of the surveys.

It is important to remember that the independent variable measures respondents' opinions of whether or not the government should provide more services, not the quality or quantity of the services that their governments currently provide. Therefore, respondents from Sweden might, on average, desire greater government services than respondents from Lebanon, even if the Swedish government in fact provides more welfare assistance than the Lebanese government. This is a public opinion variable, not a measure of real government spending.

Furthermore, the structure of the question, as presented by World Values Survey, is important. Respondents were presented with two options: 1. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, and 2. People should take more

responsibility to provide for themselves. Respondents were then expected to choose a value from 1-10, 1 indicating greater government responsibility, and 10 indicating greater personal responsibility.

This is the wording of the question, and respondents can interpret the phrasing as such. The phrasing is couched in a language of social welfare, indicating a binary between government and personal responsibility, while the verb "to provide for" indicates a measure of monetary or welfare assistance. However, there is no specificity to the question, whether to health care systems, pension programs, or cash assistance. Respondents are likely to interpret this question based on their individual, cultural assumptions, and on the welfare that their state currently provides.

Neither is this variable linked to refugees, migrants, or any form of "other." In this case, the government welfare is likely perceived to be reserved for citizens. The responsibility of a government is to its citizens, which is why "the responsibility to provide for everyone" is likely regarded as an internal observation. In this context, I view this vagueness as a positive, because the phrasing provides more information about the host population and less about the refugee population. If a country contains a population that supports higher government spending to provide for "everyone," is this population more or less likely to support settlement of refugees? Respondents who support increased government responsibility towards fellow citizens are likely to have experienced or to be experiencing hardship. Otherwise, there would be no need to increase government welfare.

By this logic, it is intuitive that those respondents who favor an increase in government responsibility are more likely to reject refugees and the attending welfare for "outsiders." The bonds of citizenship imply an imagined community that is defined by its internality. The obligations of the community are first and foremost towards itself. In times of hardship, the political community will privilege benefits that are directed internally and towards fellow citizens, rather than externally and towards others, namely refugees.

The intent of this study is to examine whether desire for increased or decreased government intervention- and therefore social services- affect the distance at which individuals choose to hold refugees. By analyzing data from 20 different countries across the world, I diversify the dataset and ensure that it is not impacted by geographic location, proximity to war zones that generate refugees, GDP, etc. In performing these data sets, I find that there exists a definitive relationship between desire for government intervention and social services and support or aversion for refugee programs. This relationship is more firmly established among populations that express support for refugee programs in closer proximity.

1.5 Hypothesis

This paper puts two public opinion variables in conversation: 1. Support for or rejection of refugee programs at varying distances, including home, neighborhood, city/town/village, and country, and 2. Support for or rejection for greater government or personal responsibility in addressing perceived social wellbeing and economic hardship. The hypothesis put forward by this paper is that a professed desire for social welfare and government responsibility correlates to a greater aversion for refugee programs, particularly in closer proximities.

As discussed, greater government responsibility is not put in the context of welfare for outsiders and is therefore interpreted as government welfare for citizens. Typically, those citizens who desire increased government welfare do so because they face economic hardships. This paper contends that, during times of hardship and due to the imagined bonds between the citizens that comprise a political community, respondents will be less accepting of refugee programs. Therefore, those countries whose respondents profess a greater desire for government responsibility in times of hardship will be also be more averse to refugees. This is explained in greater detail in the above Section 1.4: Research Design and Scope.

This paper contends that populations that desire a greater degree of government services, likely for themselves and for their immediate community networks, will be less likely to welcome outsiders who might compete for the same public resources. Burden-sharing impulses are likely to decline when populations feel economically threatened and therefore more receptive to increased state welfare programming. The impulse of national populations is to conserve resources for the members of the national territory.

Again, it is important to note that the World Values Survey government welfare question is phrased so that said welfare is independent of benefits for outsiders and is perceived to apply only to citizens. This paper attempts to examine the attributes of the host population that affect acceptance for refugees. How the host population perceives refugees should be kept independent of this variable. Therefore, this paper contends that any refugee will receive a warmer welcome among populations that privilege individual responsibility for personal welfare, regardless of the "type" of refugee that is to be resettled, whether she is Catholic, economically independent, or possesses limited language abilities. This is important data to collect, as it speaks to

characteristics of the host population that will make it more amenable to refugees. As settlement and integration becomes increasingly necessarily and more countries are elected to provide assistance, it will be important to understand which factors in the citizen/host population contribute to the success of refugee programs and refugee integration initiatives.

Populations that prefer greater personal responsibility for economic hardship over increased government welfare are increasingly likely to support refugees, particularly at closer proximities. These populations are less likely to agonize over the economic implications of settling and supporting refugees who will likely rely upon welfare during their initial phases of settling. The fact that said populations are willing to accept refugees at closer proximities is important, because refugee settlement occurs, of course, at the local level. Refugees have neighbors, colleagues, and friends, and the support that these native-born individuals are willing to provide is integral to successful integration.

1.6 Summary of Contributions and Implications for Future Policy

As can be seen in subsequent sections, the majority of contemporary surveys emphasize the characteristics in refugee populations that are more or less likely to stir support for their settlement and integration. Host populations tend to prefer refugees who are religiously similar, who are economically independent, or who speak their language fluently. These factors have been proven time and again through surveys big and small.

However, there are few studies that examine the factors in the *host* population that determine acceptance for or rejection of refugees. This paper does not seek to determine which factors in the refugee population contribute to acceptance, which state resources citizens feel that

refugees should receive, or at which point refugees should receive said resources. On the contrary, the two variables are entirely independent of one another. The dependent variable is support for or rejection of refugees and refugee programs. The independent variable is support for or rejection of increased government responsibility for social welfare. In other words, the independent variable has nothing to do with the allocation of state resources for refugees themselves.

Current research too frequently puts the onus for successful integration on the refugee populations and rarely examines the characteristics in the receiving populations that propel them towards an accepting attitude. While it is important to understand which characteristics in the refugee populations stir acceptance in a citizen/host population, it is equally important to understand which host populations are *a priori* more amenable to reception. This paper is important because it seeks to examine the other side of integration in an era when cross-border migration of any type is increasingly a reality, when conflicts have grown more protracted, and when climate-induced migration will only rise.

An increase in refugee flows will mean that host populations must necessarily become more receptive to outsiders who do not fit within their perceived national characteristics and consciousness. This research questions which factors can aid in the process of stimulating acceptance and welcome. If research can identify elements that contribute to a welcoming attitude, then it can help to determine which communities are better suited to host future refugee programs.

2. AN EXPLANATION OF CITIZENSHIP, REFUGEE STATUS, AND PUBLIC OPINION

2.1 A Brief Outline of Citizenship and its Relation to Nation and State

This paper proposes to examine which characteristic in an insider population compels it to accept a specific category of outsider. Insider and outsider are mere illustrative terms for: citizen and refugee. The specific aspects that distinguish one from the other are integral to an understanding of this project. Therefore, what is a citizen? What is her relationship to both her nation and her state? Finally, what do each of them owe to one another?

Defined differently over the years as the term expands and contracts to include or exclude various populations depending on the contemporary political context, citizenship can be loosely designated: a covenant between an individual member and a political community, wherein the member enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Further revisions of the term specify that said political community be a national community (Morjé Howard, 2006, p. 443) or a geographic community (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 154), emphasizing the important distinction of territoriality.

The binary between inclusion and exclusion is integral to an understanding of citizenship; the boundary separating inclusion and exclusion- determining who is "in" and who is "out"- oscillates with the historical context, with the political parties in power, and with the formation of borders, among other factors. Put simply, "the evolution of citizenship, involving a set of exclusionary rights that established claims to collected resources, contribut[ed] to the formation of the state and then the nation" (Isin et al., 2007, p. 6). Citizens may access collective resources

that are provided by the state to members of a bounded nation. What, how, and how much depends on the state apparatus in question. It is inclusive in the sharing of resources, duties, and obligations; it is exclusive in the drawing of boundaries between citizens and non-citizens.

Within this framework, then, a refugee program punctures the simplistic logic of citizenship, couched as it is in a binary mentality of insider and outsider arranged across the span of a territorial boundary. By inserting outsiders, refugees, into the interiority of the national territory, and by providing access to citizen resources, refugees complicate the integrity of the citizenship system and interrogate its limits and limitations. By rocking the ideological boat so profoundly, they provide both a complex aperture through which one might consider citizenship, and also generate public opinion shockwaves as the physical space of the nation is penetrated and resources are either shared or usurped, depending on the perspective.

In the drawing of figurative boundaries between citizen and non-citizen, territoriality is key because it is central to the conception of the modern nation-state. A Gellnerian world imagines a collection of discrete, spatially discontinuous entities which couches our understanding of nations in a vocabulary of boundaries and borderlands (Gellner, 2006). Put differently, boundaries and borderlands lie at the "center of our analytical frameworks" and sedentarism is privileged (Malkki, 1992, p. 25). A citizen remains (primarily) within the boundaries of her own nation and draws upon the particular resources provided by her own state, paying for this privilege through taxes, military service, jury duty, etcetera. This is the assumption that undergirds how we imagine the nation-state. In this context, a Syrian stays in Syria; an American remains in the United States.

In the age of the modern-day welfare state, it is the privilege of the citizen to draw upon resources that are provided by her corresponding state. Some states offer more expansive resources, ranging from residual to universal frameworks (Esping-Anderson, 1993). Citizens of different countries draw upon the welfare network provided by a unique configuration of State, Market, Family and Community Networks (Adelantado et al., 1998). A residual configuration like the United States obliges citizens to participate in market-based welfare solutions, while a Swedish citizen might access a greater array of state resources provided by the universal paradigm. This is all to state the obvious: different states provide different quantities and qualities of resources and services to their citizens.

While it is obvious that different states provide different configurations of welfare and resources to their citizens, it is also a truism so assert that the states resources are imagined as existing exclusively for citizens. It is the citizens who pay the taxes, serve in the military, and form a jury of peers; therefore, it is the citizens who receive state welfare. To return to the example, a Syrian accesses healthcare provided by the Syrian state; an American receives unemployment benefits allocated by the U.S. federal government. Nevertheless, "outsiders," for example refugees, often draw upon these resources when they enter the bounded territory. How this is perceived by global citizens varies widely. Public opinion towards refugees ranges widely, from high in China and Spain to low in Russia and Thailand (Amnesty International, 2016).

Nevertheless, all states- with the exception of failed states- provide some measure of state welfare to their citizens. It was T. H. Marshall (1949), one of the founding fathers of citizenship theory, who posited that citizenship provided a framework for combatting social inequalities in the post-World War era. Ever optimistic, he theorized a historical continuity in the bestowal of

civil, political and social rights, which would lead to a more equal society. His findings have since been challenged by numerous scholars, and yet his arguments remain relevant in that they emphasize the provision of State-sponsored welfare for members of a specific community with the intention of mitigating inequality within a specific, bounded territory. The logic is clear: some states provide more benefits than others, but each state provides exclusively for its own citizens.

Who is in and who is out?; who gets to be a citizen and thereby access the resources provided by the state? What to do with the non-citizens who nevertheless reside within the territory? Should the border-crossers receive welfare or not? What about refugees, who occupy the path to citizenship, and yet are not yet citizens? Benedict Anderson writes that *the people* and *the nation* are both imagined communities, that their bonds are comprised of imagined connections rather than from direct, physical interactions (Anderson, 2006). A national community is derived from imagined connections over time, through shared symbols, memories and histories.

Meanwhile, "the people" is forged through space, through imagined connections within a bounded territory (Yack, 2003, p. 36-37). These conceptions have little to do with fact, and much to do with narrative. There is no physical marker of belonging, but rather a shared sense of narrative. Citizenship is couched in and drawn from this imagined community and obliges that stringent rules and laws of belonging be applied. Refugees, lacking contextual, national knowledge, are perceived to exist outside of both people and nation. Most citizens believe that the state's resources should be reserved for sharers of the imagined connection (Kolbe et al., 2016); I will return to this point later in greater detail. Given that historical context is vital to

nation building, nationalism, and citizenship, it is important to examine a brief history of nation building and its ramifications.

Gellner examines the idea of a pre-political community, in which national consciousness- stemming from shared identities, memories, and cultural content- is integral to state formation; the state then capitalizes on this shared content to pursue nation-building policies (Gellner, 2006). In contrast, social contract theories imagine the political community as "a voluntary association of individuals [who] are political in the sense that they ground the identity and legitimacy of a polity in a shared political purpose" (Bauböck, 2018, p. 39). Nationhood and the attending shared consciousness in which it is enmeshed can come from a shared connection that exists *a priori* to the state and which the state utilizes to forge the national consciousness, or it can come from pledging allegiance to a shared political purpose and national project. Both necessitate the erection of borders between insiders and outsiders.

Nationalism can be imagined as a state's turn towards a cleansing of the population, in favor of an undifferentiated majority population. Gellner (2006), in his theory of nationalism, suggests a turn towards the homogenization of cultures, and Brendan O'Leary posits the necessity of a *Staatsvolk*, a dominant people, to ensure the continuity of stable democratic federations (O'Leary, 2003, p. 58). This dominant people represents through is pure physicality the "face of the nation" and determines the national narrative and the national direction. A group of people that challenges this majority in numerical terms, like minorities, migrants, or refugees, will erode the character of the nation by undermining imagined commonalities and social capital (Putnam, 1995). It can be compared to Agamben's division between *People* and *people*. In times

of pronounced nationalism, like the present day, public opinion might turn towards purging the nation of minorities, or else limiting their access to various services.

As Agamben describes, "The P/people" is imagined in two senses: 1. The People under a nation-state, whole, unified, bounded, or 2. The people, as in the masses, the marginalized. One is an integral body politic and the other is a mass of excluded bodies (Agamben, 2000, p. 29-35). This polar extreme reflects the complex relationship between bare life and political existence. In large part, the industrialized world has produced People without fracture, with the exception of specific populations including (as I will discuss later): refugees, migrants, asylum-seekers, and others who do not comprise the nation, are not participatory in People or in the *Staatsvolk*, and should therefore be excluded from citizenship and its corresponding welfare state, according to public opinion.

As previously discussed, Anderson's *nation* and *people* are both imagined communities, changing with time and with political and social context. What comprises the People or the *Staatsvolk* in one century may look radically different in the next. Yet the inherent weakness of a citizenship that relies upon the definition of the nation and its corresponding people is clear. It is perhaps best articulated by Hannah Arendt when she decries "the transformation of the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation" (Arendt, 1973, p. 275). It is against this force that certain groups must struggle to gain recognition, most notably those who are "ostensibly *of* the state but remained *out* of the nation" (Isin et al., 2007, p. 12). Those who are perceived to be *out* of the nation, and are therefore divorced from the state and undeserving of its corresponding welfare, have varied with time and place. As has been noted by a variety of scholars, we occupy an era of high nationalism paired with high refugee flows. Refugees are the

focus of this paper, but it is important to note that those people deemed "out" of the nation is by no means a static concept.

2.2 Defining "Us"

Countries grant citizenship through a variety of avenues including *jus soli*, *jus sanguini*, and naturalization. Countries that grant citizenship based on birth within the territory, *jus soli*, include the United States, most Western Hemisphere countries, and a few others (Library of Congress, 2018). Most of the rest of the world operates under a *jus sanguini* framework. Matthew Wright (2011) finds that most *jus soli* countries believe in achieved citizenship, attained through achievable markers such as law abidingness or time spent in-country. They are more likely to welcome outsiders and to loosen access to welfare. However, this claim is disputed by Bauböck, who points out that *jus sanguini* countries like Sweden are compatible with inclusive naturalization (Bauböck, 2018, p. 70).

Both of these studies are important because they pair with the project at hand to emphasize characteristics in the host population that compel it to welcome outsiders. Though there is no consensus on whether Wright or Bauböck is correct, these studies set a precedent for examining characteristics in both the refugee and host populations, which is an important advance. In other words, both are vital in the effort to promote a diversity of opinions and theories about integration potential in both refugee and host populations.

O'Leary (2003) introduced the idea of the *Staatsvolk*, which evinces a preoccupation with preserving the integrity of a national majority. *Jus sanguini* countries advocate an ascribed citizenship, based off blood ties. This, in and of itself, is a manner of preserving the ethnic

majority. However, countries like Germany have adopted ethnic citizenship laws and liberal refugee policies, blurring the boundary by creating a more accessible path to naturalization (Blomraad et al., 2008, p. 159). It is in this context that Germany has welcomed over one million refugees from the Middle East, primarily from Syria (The World Bank, 2018). On the other end of the spectrum, countries like Hungary under Orbán promote an ascriptive regime and have tightened borders and thus a path to naturalization (Fekete, 2016). In summary, paths to citizenship lie upon a spectrum between ascriptive and achieved, rather than at one end or the other.

What has been given can then be taken away; countries have defined and redefined the national conception of People and citizenship over time, the most dramatic instances devolving into genocide, such as in the Nazi Regime (Arendt, 1943) or the Rwandan genocide (Malkki, 1992). It is important that Nazi Germany felt the need to strip Jewish citizens of their citizenship before deporting them to the concentration camps (Jewish Daily Bulletin, 1935). Such crimes could not be perpetrated against citizens of the Reich.

However, less dramatic examples appear throughout history, including the incorporation of U.S. white women in 1920 with the Nineteenth Amendment, which continued to bar Puerto Rican women from voting and hardly ensured voting access for black women, along with many black men (Kerber, 1997, p. 839-843). This is to say nothing of Asian minorities, particularly the exclusion of the Chinese under the 15th Amendment and subsequent Supreme Court decisions in the late 1800s (Lepore, 2018, p. 326-327). In contrast, New Zealand women were enfranchised in 1893 and the Kuwaiti parliament rejected female suffrage in 1999. South Africa did not become a multi-racial nation of legally equal citizens until 1996 (Heater, 2004, p. 125). There

exists a diversity of velocities at which countries determine People, disperse citizenship, and grant access to its affiliated benefits. The right to these benefits is tightly guarded; it involves not only the right to access, but also a general perception of deservingness.

In Canada, belonging, as it often is, is narrated by political parties, including the New Right, which decries the welfare state as economically untenable. By contrast, it advocates a welfare state which, under Adelantado et al.'s diamond structure (1998), would be light on the State and heavy on the Market. In other words, a regime that is highly mercantilized (Esping-Anderson, 1993). For Kymlicka et al., this is a rejection of the idea that "citizenship confers a status independent of economic standing" (Kymlicka et al., 1994, p. 357). It is the antithesis of Marshall's optimistic vision. Furthermore, it denies citizenship to clear members of a society and disenfranchises them for reasons purely related to economic standing. This is particularly true of migrants, disabled people, and children (Kymlicka et al., 2018). Refugees would be included in this category.

One of the most provocative points of this study is its counterintuitive nature when put in conversation with traditional conservative and liberal political positions in the US, Canada, and Europe. Conservativism has traditionally mandated a small state and a heavy emphasis on personal responsibility. The modern conservative establishment is also associated with slashing refugee admittance numbers. Nevertheless, as will be explored in greater detail, this paper links populations who advocate greater personal responsibility with support for refugees and refugee programs. This suggests that public opinion does not always align with political party mandated narrative.

As previously stated, different states provide different configurations of political, legal, and social rights. Some countries treat healthcare as a human right; others do not. To illustrate this difference, one need look only at China, where near universal coverage admitting over 95% of the population was achieved in 2011 (Sun et al., 2017). In the U.S. the uninsured rate stood at 18% in 2014 before the implementation of the individual mandate (Witters, 2019). Meanwhile, the Russian constitution stipulates that all citizens have a right to medical care in a state or municipal facility free of charge (Potapchik, 2016), but 17,500 towns and villages are without basic, medical infrastructure (Bennetts, 2016). There is no universal consensus about which rights a state must provide, how often it must provide them, how much it must make available, or, importantly, to who services should be provided.

In each of these cases, public opinion helps the state to answer to these questions and to determine which services will be provided, in what volume, at what velocity, and to whom. Populations lean towards more government responsibility for citizens' welfare, or else towards personal responsibility in maintaining health and employment, among other factors. This paper will of course argue that those populations that favor greater personal responsibility are more likely to support refugee programs, thereby welcoming outsiders into the nation and providing them with a path to citizenship. It should be mentioned, of course, that citizenship is merely a vehicle through which states ensure the provision of human rights.

A hotly debated topic in citizenship theory is the tension between citizen and human rights, and the question of whether citizenship prevents the application of universal human rights by relegating non-citizens to an inferior category. It is important to examine this tension before then delving into the situation of those who lack recourse to citizenship rights, their state having

failed them by slipping into obsolescence or engaging in active persecution, in other words, refugees.

2.3 Citizen Rights versus Human Rights

For the project at hand, the difference between citizen rights, human rights, and their various implications, are pivotal concepts. Refugees being humans, they are owed human rights; however, they exist in a citizenship limbo, their former state having failed to fulfill its previously discussed half of the citizen-state covenant. The difference between human and citizen rights, and the ways in which citizen rights act as a vehicle for the provision of human rights are important to understanding the situation in which refugees find themselves.

Agamben argues that our current paradigm demands that we abandon "Man" and assume the mantel of "Citizen, who clothe it temporarily and represent it with their 'rights.'" (Agamben, 2000, p. 12). Though the U.S. Declaration of Independence speaks to the unalienable rights of Man, it guarantees the provision of said rights only to the citizens within its bounded territory (U.S., 1776). Etymologically, nation is entertwined with *nascita* (nativity), emphasizing that one is granted citizenship when one is born. Rights are ascribed to the citizen, rather than the human being, necessitating that one be a citizen in order to receive human rights. In Agamben's words, the Rights of Man are tied to the nation-state, and the "waning of the latter necessarily implies the obsolescence of the former" (Agamben, 2000, p. 22). When a refugee's state fails, she loses not only access to resources tied to citizenship, but also the human rights that said citizenship made legible.

Theoretically, citizenship and the rights that it entails are imagined as an improvement upon man's natural environment. In fact, it "empowers" man to control and improve upon the environment into which she is born (Bobbio, 1984) and represents a mastery over a Hobbesian universe that endows men, now identified as citizens, with rights (Castles et al. 2000, p. 26). The problem is that, in a reality of unequal states, not all human beings are granted citizenship rights and therefore not all human rights seem to be created equal in said "empowerment" over man's natural state. In other words, if all men are born equal, then they become unequal at the moment they receive (or do not receive) citizenship, depending on the granting state, in order to ensure human rights in the absence of functioning citizenship.

In the context of refugees, the vehicle that purports to provide human rights via citizen rights- the state- has failed. Therefore, refugees have no avenue through which to access their rights, whether civil, political, or social. A refugee flees because of fear of persecution, enabled by the breakdown of the integrity of the state. UNHCR and other states must step forward to fill the vacuum left by the failed or predatory state.

It can be argued that the presence of International Law, the U.N. and the International Criminal Court provides protections for human rights that transcend national borders. However, these overarching international bodies often do not enforce punishments within national borders and so their decisions are non-binding (Castles, 2005). This is particularly true of the U.S. and its suspension of non-citizens' rights in defense matters of national security and terrorism (Taub, 2019). T.V. Paul (2003) remarks that this trend is likely to continue, as national security preoccupations rise in tandem with the pressures of globalization; he argues that loyalty to the state will not wane in favor of a globalized cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, these international

bodies exist at the whim of the states, and UNHCR in particular has been used as a political cudgel by donor states. In the context of refugee settlement, it is fair to critique a nominally impartial international body that is nevertheless funded by and therefore beholden to refugee host countries. This will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.

Rainer Bauböck critiques the configuration of an international state system that reduces the duty of states to protect the non-citizens who reside outside of their territorial borders from the ramifications of their decisions which often spill over the delineation of a bounded territory (Bauböck, 2018, p. 24). It is in this vein that some critics have argued that the political community should include all who are affected by a state's decision, regardless of citizenship. This argument is based on acclaim of affectedness rather than in birth (Owen, 2011). The International Criminal Court nominally performs this task, though implementation of its decisions, as previously discussed, is inhibited by an imbalance of power between states.

These are examples of one state violating another's sovereignty by subverting the rights it grants its citizens; this is, of course, due to unequal power between states. However, internal denial of rights can happen as well, wherein a state would either refuse or be unable to grant its citizens their political, civil and/or social rights and "citizenship would be a juridico-political title and identity void of its proper meaning" (Heater, 2004, p. 115). Heater uses this framework to expound upon authoritarian states; however, the same can be said for failed states and the masses of refugees that they produce.

In the late 20th and 21st centuries, mass North-South migration has become an object of obsessive worry, and in recent years refugee flows have increasingly entered into the public

consciousness, defined as a homogenous mass of uncontrolled and undesirable bodies (Castles, 2000). Castles (2008) notes that there is a sedentary bias in migration studies, predisposing scholars to view migration (low class) as bad, and mobility (high class) as good. Certainly, there is something "pathological" about the refugee, which Malkki (1992) describes as "matter out of place," as people who are produced by a break or rupture in the territorialized system of nations. One has only to open a news tab to see this language on display.

The response to refugees has emphasized order and systematization, an approach that seems increasingly futile in an age of intractable conflict, natural disasters, and 68.5 million people displaced worldwide (UNHCR, 2017). Foucault's (1976) biopolitics is increasingly relevant as states and NGOs turn to quantitative data to order disordered bodies, and refugee flows are regarded as both a scientific and political problem. Though the refugee system is ostensibly organized by the UNHCR, an international body, it was created at the disposition of the states, who exercise an enormous amount of control in the division of refugees and the distribution of rights and welfare.

Refugee organization and administration is, then, both a practical and a political reality. Disordered bodies must be ordered, and refugee settlement operations are a practical necessity. On the other hand, they can never be equitable when administered by an international organization like the UN, which is predisposed to privilege the opinions and desires of large, donor states like the United States and the EU countries. Furthermore, public opinion plays an outsized role in determining what quantity of refugees these states choose to accept. This tension between practicality and politics has unspooled over decades, and a cohesive understanding of the history of refugee administration is integral to the project at hand.

2.4 Refugees, Resettlement, and Rights

Before refugees are accepted into a resettlement program and land in their new countries, they often navigate the complex UN system. A history of UNHCR and of the refugee settlement and resettlement apparatus at large is integral to understanding how refugees move from here to there. After developing a narrative of refugee settlement and resettlement, we can then parse how public opinion affects which refugees are accepted, at what volume, and to where they are resettled.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its corresponding 1967 Protocol outline a system in which refugee protections provided by the international community are based on persecution for reasons of: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion (UNHCR, 1951). The 1967 Protocol opens the territory and scope of international obligations to refugees and acknowledges a multiplicity of refugee experiences (Malkki, 1995). From here, refugees may either return to their former country, remain settled in a camp or in the community for an indefinite period of time, or possibly be resettled in a third country.

This paper focuses on refugees who have settled in other countries, either through UNHCR or by arriving to another country and being granted refugee status by that state. The majority of refugees are "warehoused" for the foreseeable future, most likely in Turkey, Uganda, Pakistan or Lebanon (UNHCR, 2017). Some- less than 1% of the total of refugees- are eligible for resettlement, and these candidates likely end up in the U.S. (31%), Canada (14%), UK (10%), or France or Sweden (9% respectively) (UNHCR, 2018). This is not to suggest that these are the

only countries that host resettlement programs, as evinced by the new Southern Cone resettlement project in Latin America that prioritizes solidarity resettlement, but does accept extra-regional resettlement, particularly of Palestinians and Syrians (Ruiz, 2015). In theory this sounds perfectly logical, through the principles have been and continue to be subverted to accomplish states' goals.

In particular, the U.S. was accused of using refugee programs and refugee resettlement as a political cudgel during the Cold War, accepting refugees from Soviet states to embarrass the Soviet Union (Betts et al., 2012). Betts et al. in particular critiques the Western allies for creating an agency (UNHCR) that would neither pose a significant financial obligation, nor impinge upon national sovereignty, while serving the dual purpose of "stigmatizing the fledgling Communist regimes as persecutors" (Bretts et al. 2012, p. 14). Portes et al. (1985) produced a fascinating critique of the U.S.'s late 20th century prioritization of Cuban over Mexican refugees and asylum-seekers based on political motivations in order to discredit the Communist regime.

Though many critiques have been levied at the United States, a variety of scholars condemn the system as a whole, alleging that the refugee system was never founded in principles of protection, but rather protects states' rights over the control and maintenance of their borders (Behrman, 2018). This dialogue harkens back to the discussion between international law and human rights and whether human rights can even exist without a claim to citizenship. Castles asserts that asylum-seekers are among the least protected populations (Castles et al., 2000, p. 73). Even the few protections are provided ad hoc. The Cold War context demonstrates "not only differences of interpretation as between states, but also different interpretations by the same state in application to specific situations" (Sztucki, 1999, p. 58). Likewise, Chimni (2000) asserts that

Northern countries “manipulate the language of human rights to legitimize a range of dubious practices, including its selective defense” (p. 244).

Shacknove points out that different regions recognize protections differently. Europeans and North Americans created UNHCR at a time when refugees were primarily persecuted by predatory states. Examples of this phenomenon are Nazi Germany, the former Soviet States, and Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, the OAU Convention (1996) recognizes that the bond between citizen and state can be severed in a variety of ways, including through a frailty indicative of failed states. This is, of course, more pertinent to the African context generally (Shacknove, 1985, p. 276). It is also germane to the modern-day situation and the vast majority of contemporary refugees.

Meanwhile, the Cartagena Convention (1984) has been applied successfully throughout Latin America and advocates the enlargement of the concept “refugee” to include those who are threatened by “generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights…” (Cartagena Declaration, 1984). This is more pertinent to the Latin American and particularly Central American context (Sztucki, 1999). Sztucki (1989) in particular believes that these regional interpretations are more effective than the generalized Convention and Protocol, wherein of the top three refugee hosting countries- Pakistan, Lebanon and Turkey- two are not even Convention signatories (Behrman, 2018).

This is all to say that the underlying principles of institutional refugee protection, which were founded in a post-World War II optimism, have elicited an increasingly jaded response due to their selective application by refugee-receiving countries. While the UNHCR has attempted to

induce states to engage in burden sharing, there has instead been a turn towards burden shifting (Betts, 2012, p. 102). As refugees increasingly hale from ethnically distinct, majority non-white, non-Christian countries in the 21st century context, "refugees have become a symbol of system overload, instead of a symbol of what was always best in the Western liberal tradition" (Loescher, 2001, p. 46). As discussed earlier, states are increasingly motivated to distribute resources among those individuals who share the "face of the nation."

Until the 1967 Protocol, recognized refugees were European in origin, ethnically similar, and less "visibly different" to the naked eye. Now, receiving countries integrate refugees of Latin American, African, or Asian origin. These people are "undesirable," and many receiving countries would prefer to maintain them in an un-discussed non-space or camp where they might remain invisible to the public and weightless to the welfare state (Limbu, 2009, p. 267). This coincides with a state that is increasingly utilized, as previously discussed, as an instrument of the nation (Isin, et al., 2007).

In other words, the nation, which Yack (2003) reminds us is constructed via imagined connections, uses the state to undertake its national agenda. Only individuals comprising the imagined nation, the People, are welcome to partake in said state's resources and projects; the system is largely exclusionary towards perceived outsiders, not allowing for citizenship stakeholders in the promotion of democratic inclusion (Carens, 2018). Which characteristics in a population cause it to be more welcoming towards refugees and refugee programs and to integrate with individuals who do not share the "face of the nation?" If refugees are increasingly "a burden," they are clearly excluded from the imagined community, the national project, and are therefore unwelcome in state resource sharing, regardless of how said state's decisions affect

them. The narrowness or expansiveness of interpretations relating to refugee guidelines correspond to national consciousness and the historical context.

Whether one takes the UNHCR, OAU, or Cartagena guidelines for what constitutes a refugee or persecution, it is clear that: 1. There is a failure of the state to command its monopoly on legitimate violence, as in many African and Central American cases, or 2. An authoritarian state has persecuted its own people, as in the case of Yugoslavia or Nazi Germany (Weber, 2017). While this breakdown necessitates the presence of persecution and a fear for personal safety, it also implies the breakdown of the welfare state in the country of origin and the resulting collapse of economic protections for refugees whose states have failed in the state-citizen covenant, alternatively imagined as the territory, state, birth trinity (Agamben, 2000).

While many of the countries where refugees settle provide paths to naturalization, citizenship is by no means immediate, fast, or even assured. As discussed, state resources are often viewed to be a resource for members of the imagined nation, for those who hold citizenship. These citizens are more often than not unwilling to share said resources with perceived outsiders, with non-citizens. Refugees, while accepting the protections of another state, are not citizens and are therefore often viewed as unwelcome interlopers who usurp state resources and funds better preserved for natural-born citizens who enjoy the nativity-nation legitimacy inherent to modern day citizenship conceptions.

As inequality between countries has declined but inequality within countries has increased (Qureshi, 2017), worries about welfare have risen to the foreground, and debates over state resources that might mitigate said inequalities have gained in volume and pitch. When

economic conditions worsen, citizens are likely to turn to the state and the welfare network that it provides. This paper questions whether citizens who advocate a larger role for the welfare state are more or less likely to support refugees, whose presence implies the enlargement of the welfare net in order to protect both insiders and outsiders.

2.5 Public Opinion and Refugees

Public perception is an important factor in determining states' reactions towards refugee settlement, and economic preoccupations play a large role in shaping perception. As previously discussed, the nation-state system protects human rights by conflating said rights with citizenship rights. Refugees, whose states have failed to fulfill their end of the covenant, are settled in third countries in which they are not citizens. Nevertheless, state resources are allocated to these refugees who are neither citizens nor part of the imagined national community, in an age when state resources are increasingly allocated by national consciousness motivations.

The aim of this paper is to establish a link between two public perception variables: 1. Support for or rejection of refugees and refugee programs within a national territory, and 2. Support for or rejection of an expansive welfare state apparatus. How that data will be compiled and compared will be addressed in Section 3: Methodology and Quantitative Model. For the present purposes, it is important to understand how citizens' perceptions of their economic status and the perceived role of the welfare state affects their perceptions of refugees. To provide context, I will discuss the economic and private property frameworks that constrain refugees, state options upon settlement, and public perception towards sharing state resources.

Because refugees face a legitimate fear of violence, they often abandon much of their property in flight and certainly abandon their homes and other non-portable capital. The 2005 UN Principles on Housing (Pinheiro Principles) were an attempt to promote a serious conversation around property restitution. Though the Principles rectify the belief that property loss is an acceptable result of war and conflict, they have been critiqued for promoting restitution instead of compensation (Anderson, 2008). This is particularly troublesome in regions where property has been destroyed, or in areas like Palestine where property has been appropriated and repurposed (Stein, 2010). Certainly, compensation would give refugees a greater capital base to restart in a third country.

Regardless of the permeability of borders, cross-border portability of capital is difficult due to incompatibilities between international law and varying national laws. It is difficult to compensate for property, to recognize the legitimacy of a degree in a third country, or to recognize deeds. For this reason, Verhellen (2018) critiques most countries' focus on short-term problems associated with refugees (bed-bath-bread), rather than confronting trickier logistical issues involving the interaction of international refugee law and private international law. A refugee who may have held advanced degrees and owned a home in her birth country will be left with no property, no degrees, and or even obsolete documentation regarding age, parental or marital status.

Nevertheless, refugees are judged based on their tax-paying ability, purchasing power, and wholesale economic integration, which is increasingly regarded as an indicator of successful, holistic integration. The RISE Overall Integration Score depends heavily on economic integration over time and has been deemed a successful model for measuring resettlement

success (Puma et al, 2018). Bloemraad et al. (2008) compiled a variety of studies that demonstrate how economic success or failure (along with race) determine the communities into which refugees will integrate. Finally, refugees who remain abroad for longer periods of time are more likely to view migration as having a positive impact on their social status (Ruiz, 2015). This corresponds to the time it takes refugees to become economically viable and independent of state welfare programs. A study by New American Economy (2017) found that it took refugees an average of 16-25 years in the United States to achieve the Median 2015 U.S. Household Income of $53,000, after which time they surpassed it to earn an average of $67,000 after 25 years of third-country resettlement.

Within Adelantado et al.'s conceptual framework, this means that refugees, initially dependent on state resources, integrate into the market-based framework within 16-25 years to achieve economic independence (in the U.S. context). This is particularly impressive given the inflexibility of the residual, market-based economy in the U.S. Given that the modern state bases much of its legitimacy on the provision and protection of private property, which in turn enables access to market-based economic advantages, refugees- who enter the system with little to no private property- are able to overcome high odds to integrate economically (Castel, 2002, p. 321; 2003, p. 23-24). In fact, refugees collectively earned $77.2 billion as a social group in the United States in 2015 (New American Economy, 2017). Often, this is accomplished through family and community networks, which allow refugees to circumvent the original barriers posed by market citizenship (Grace et al., 2018).

While refugees can leverage family and community networks to integrate into a market-based system and decrease their reliance on state support, public perception is another matter

entirely. As previously discussed, many citizens believe that state resources should be reserved for specific groups, primarily citizens. Refugees, usually migrating along a South-North axis, are frequently not circumscribed within the required, visible, national characteristics, nor are they citizens. So how do national populations decide whether to accept outsiders? What factors contribute to acceptance?

In reference to the introductory anecdote, my Syrian driver had leveraged family and community networks to procure a student visa; he had not entered the US through a government program, but rather through via a University-sponsored visa. Nevertheless, his claim that he was an "outsider," a refugee, a member of one of the most visibly outsider categories, details how he sees himself, and likely how others see him as well. His complaint that he felt "othered," speaks not to his reality, as a student with a stable income, but rather to the ways in which he is perceived by citizen insiders.

There are three major studies that measure the dependent variable, public opinion towards refugees: Amnesty International's Refugees Welcome Survey (2016), Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Survey (Stokes, 2017), and European Social Survey (2016). They are the most cited surveys and rely on different methodologies and measure attitudes in different countries (Blitz, 2017: 386). I will explore why this paper chooses to utilize the Amnesty International's Refugees Welcome Survey in the methods section of the paper, where I will contrast it to the other two surveys and explore why these three surveys are the most cited, as well as their individual advantages and shortcomings. Critics have used the surveys to measure a multiplicity of data surrounding public opinion. It is important to note that these findings primarily center on

Europe and North America. This is a key flaw in the body of data, but also one that is widely acknowledged by the authors of the surveys and critics alike.

Blitz (2017) uses the data to defend his opinion that there is much sympathy for refugees that is not reflected in public policy. In particular, he notes that the public supports refugees who it deems economically viable; he calls this phenomenon the "dominance of human capital thinking" (Blitz, 2017, p. 395). Importantly, he outlines in detail a central challenge in all migration work: the public's conflation of unknown terms, including but not limited to: migrant, refugee, asylum-seeker, internally displaced person, illegal immigrant, stateless person, alien, etc. The public, lacking proficiency in the legal distinctions between these terms, is unable to distinguish one non-citizen category from the other, and frequently conflates them.

Bansak et al. (2016) utilizes three variables to measure European public opinion towards asylum seekers, and they use their own data produced via a large-scale public opinion survey spanning 15 European countries. The three factors they measured are: economic, humanitarian, and religious considerations. Intuitively, the majority of Europeans privilege economically viable, religiously-similar individuals who are perceived to have experienced a "greater level" of persecution. Because this paper examines only economic motivations, I will confine my observations to the first variable only. Importantly, Bansak et al. found that respondents are far more likely to accept an economically viable refugee, at similar rates, regardless of the country. This means that Spain and Czechia, distinguished by markedly different public policy responses to migration, have similar responses to economically viable asylum seekers at the level of public opinion. Though Spain accepts many more asylum-seekers and grants them refugee status, the public opinion response in Czechia is almost the same; both populations prefer asylum-seekers

who are viewed as able to economically integrate and excel, thereby lessening their reliance on the welfare state. This finding casts doubt on the link between public opinion and public policy.

Kobe et al. (2016) examines the time at which natural-born citizens, naturalized citizens, and aliens believe that immigrants (non-specified) should be allowed to access social welfare benefits. They performed the study across 26 European countries and found that public opinion surrounding social welfare access is couched in a sense of ownership and "paying one's dues." The majority, in each of the three categories, believes that social welfare benefits should only be accessed by aliens after having worked and paid taxes for a minimum of a year (Kolbe et al., 2016, p. 107). There is little convergence in each of the other categories, where natives and naturalized citizens are much stricter in their interpretation of social welfare access than aliens. In other words, a greater proportion of aliens than citizens believes that aliens should be allowed to receive welfare benefits immediately upon arrival. The data is clear that natural-born citizens believe that redistribution should absolutely be restricted to those who have paid their taxes, and in many cases, to those who are or have become citizens. This would exclude those who occupy the "outsider" category, including refugees.

Dempster et al. (2017) responds to a 2012-2014 Gallup poll (IOM, 2015) that measures attitudes towards immigration writ-large across the world's regions. Their findings reveal that Europe typifies the most extreme end of the spectrum, while Oceania is the most welcoming (Dempster et al., 2017, p. 8). The vast majority of people across all regions except Europe prefer that immigration remain at its current levels. They stipulated that there is, of course, a vast West-East divide between attitudes towards accepting refugees in Europe. Nevertheless, this speaks to a widening gap in public opinion towards non-citizens globally.

Drawing upon these data sets, the paper will analyze attitudes towards refugees who settle in various communities around the world. It will contrast this variable with attitudes towards the distribution of state resources and social welfare for citizens. It will take into account the cited data about different populations' attitudes towards who should receive welfare, when it should be received, and what should be sacrificed or contributed in return, but will not analyze said attitudes towards outsiders' access of social welfare directly (Wright, 2011; Grace, 2018; Kolbe, 2016; Bansak, 2016; Blitz, 2016). Attitudes towards social welfare will be pulled from a World Values Survey (2014) data set, which solely asks respondents about their opinions of their state's role in providing social welfare and ensuring general wellbeing. There is no mention of refugees. The studies that examine refugees and social benefits directly will serve to provide context only.

In contrast to the aforementioned studies, this paper's independent variable will not address public opinion about when refugees should receive benefits, which benefits they should receive, or which "types" of refugees citizens prefer. Rather, it will establish a link between two public perception variables: 1. Support for or rejection of refugees at varying distances, and 2. Support for or rejection of an expansive welfare state apparatus. In this fashion, the paper hopes to add to the commentary on citizenship by establishing that a sense of economic security impacts citizens' acceptance of perceived outsiders, in this case refugees, regardless of said refugee's national origin, religion, or socioeconomic status.

This study differs from the ones previously cited because it illustrates an independent variable that is exclusive to host/citizen populations. It argues that a host/citizen population that feel economically secure and does not desire greater government spending will be more accommodating towards refugee programs. In contrast, the other studies examine characteristics

of the refugee population that will generate welcoming impulses in the country for the refugees who settle in their midst.

Both perspectives are integral to an understanding of refugee settlement and public opinion. As previously stated, refugee settlement implies a relationship between refugees themselves and the host community. It is important to understand which traits in both populations facilitate a fluid integration program at the level of public opinion. This paper takes the information on desired refugee characteristics garnered by the others studies to understand one half of the relationship, and contributes to a dearth of data in the other half by providing greater perspective on which characteristics in a host population enable it to welcome outsiders.

As previously discussed, conflicts are increasingly intractable, climate change has impacted sea levels and produced desertification, and borders are disputed between weak and predatory states. Each of these factors have contributed to increased refugee flows, particularly in the developing world, whether Sub-Saharan Africa or the Middle East. Certainly, particular refugees are more desirable to host populations than others, but the overwhelming numbers of displaced people require that even "undesirable refugees"- those who do not speak the language or who practice a different religion- will need to be resettled to third countries around the world. Therefore, it is important to understand which characteristics in a host population makes it more or less amenable to hosting refugees. This paper attempts to begin to answer this important question.

3. METHODOLOGY AND QUANTITATIVE MODEL

3.1 Research Design: Summary

I examine how desire for increased or decreased government responsibility for citizens' wellbeing affects acceptance of refugees in respondents' communities at varying distances. These distances include: the home, the neighborhood, the city/town/village, and the country. To this end, I use data collected over the span of six years, utilizing face-to-face and telephone interviews performed by Amnesty International and questionnaires utilized by the World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014). I take as my dependent variable respondents' acceptance or rejection of refugees in the stated community peripheries. If a respondent is categorized as accepting, I analyze the distance at which he or she would maintain refugees (home, neighborhood, country, etc.).

As my independent variable, I examine respondents' professed desire for greater government responsibility or greater personal responsibility to ensure citizens' wellbeing. This data is used as an indicator to illustrate a desire for increased or decreased social services. The responses are coded and range from "Very High Government Responsibility" to "Very High Personal Responsibility," and the first is interpreted to imply a greater desire for social services, while the opposite is true of the latter. This will be discussed in detail in the following sections.

The intent of this study is to examine whether desire for increased or decreased government intervention- and therefore social services- affect the distance at which individuals choose to hold refugees. By analyzing data from 20 different countries across the world, I ensure the diversity of the dataset and guarantee that it is not impacted by geographic location,

proximity to war zones that generate refugees, GDP, etc. In performing these data sets, I find that there exists a definitive relationship between desire for government intervention and social services and support or aversion for refugees. This relationship is more firmly established among populations that express support for refugee settlement in closer proximity.

3.2 Dependent Variable: Amnesty International Refugees Welcome Survey 2016 Views of Citizens Across 27 Countries: Summary and Limitations

In the wake of the perceived refugee crisis of 2015, production of datasets measuring public opinion attitudes towards refugees surged. In 2016, Amnesty International, the Pew Research Center, and the European Social Survey released three of the most widely cited surveys (Blitz, 2017). All the surveys contained comparably large samples sizes and were completed over a similar time frame. Nevertheless, their methodologies and objectives differed slightly, while similar limitations inhered to each.

The Amnesty International Refugees Welcome Survey (2016), conducted in cooperation with GlobeScan, polled 27,000 people across 27 countries. All respondents were asked three questions by way of over-the-phone or face-to-face interviews from January-March 2016. The questions were framed as either: 1. structured surveys with closed questions, or 2. a ranking system where participants were obliged to choose between a series of responses, ranging from agreement to disagreement. The margin of error per country ranged from +/- 2.8-3.7 percent 19 times out of 20.

As seen in Table 4.1, the survey extended beyond Europe, the United States, and Canada. Respondents were polled in: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Most of these countries are European settlement hubs, or else peripheral countries to conflict zones that host vast refugee populations, with a few exceptions. The result is that the data is skewed towards multi-cultural, refugee-receiving populations that generally have extensive contact with refugee and immigrant populations.

Country	Sample size (unweighted)	Age	Type of sample	Methodology	Field dates
Argentina	1001	16+	National	Face-to-face	March 2–14, 2016
Australia	802	18+	National	Telephone	February 29–March 21, 2016
Brazil	804	18-69	Urban[1]	Face-to-face	January 25–February 12, 2016
Canada	1020	18+	National	Telephone	March 7–24, 2016
Chile	1200	18+	National	Face-to-face	December 2–January 5, 2016
China	1055	18+	Urban[2]	Telephone	April 2–15, 2016
France	1091	18+	National	Telephone	February 22–29, 2016
Germany	1001	16–70	National	Telephone	February 4–8, 2016
Ghana	1049	18-65	National	Face-to-face	March 16 – April 12, 2016
Greece	704	18+	National	Telephone	March 16–28, 2016
India	1269	18+	National	Face-to-face	March 15–30, 2016
Indonesia	1000	18+	Urban[3]	Face-to-face	March 12–26, 2016
Jordan	1000	15+	National	Telephone	March 1–30, 2016
Kenya	1010	18+	Urban[4]	Face-to-face	March 4–20, 2016
Lebanon	1000	15+	National	Telephone	March 1–30, 2016
Mexico	999	18+	National	Face-to-face	March 18–22, 2016
Nigeria	800	18+	National	Face-to-face	March 9–24, 2016
Pakistan	1000	18+	National	Face-to-face	February 19–March 5, 2016
Poland	1011	15+	National	Face-to-face	March 4–9, 2016
Russia	1020	18+	National	Telephone	March 9–21, 2016
S. Africa	2000	18+	Urban[5]	Face-to-face	February 17–March 1, 2016
S. Korea	1000	19+	National	Telephone	March 20–24, 2016
Spain	815	18+	National	Telephone	February 29 – March 29 2016
Thailand	1000	15+	National	Online	March 9–13, 2016
Turkey	1018	15+	Urban	Telephone	March 24–April 2, 2016
UK	1005	18+	National	Telephone	February 22–March 13, 2016
USA	1006	18+	National	Telephone	February 29–March 13, 2016

Figure 3.1: Amnesty International Refugees Welcome Survey 2016, Methodology.

Source: Amnesty International (2016)

The Amnesty International survey asked two questions:

1. Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following statements:
    a. People should be able to take refuge in other countries to escape from war or persecution.
    b. Our government should do more to help refugees fleeing war or persecution.
2. How closely would you personally accept people fleeing war or persecution? Would you let them live…? **CHOOSE ONE [RESPONDENT SHOULD CHOOSE THE FIRST ONE ON THE LIST THAT APPLIES TO THEM]**
    1. In your household
    2. In your neighborhood
    3. In your city, town, or village
    4. In your country
    5. Or would you refuse them entry to your country

The Amnesty International Survey is unique in that it examines the personal responsibility that each respondent would shoulder, as well as the distance at which each respondent would maintain refugees. Respondents had the opportunity to select between various proximities, demonstrating the responsibility that each community would take in terms of reception. This question of proximity favors the multi-cultural populations addressed above,



Source: Amnesty International (2016)

Figure 3.2: Amnesty International Refugees Welcome Survey 2016, Question 3

which are accustomed to interacting with refugees and migrants. More culturally homogenous states like Poland or South Korea should have been featured, in order to avoid an exposure bias.

Nevertheless, the Amnesty International Survey is also unique because of its global scope. Nearly all surveys focus entirely on the EU States, the United States, and Canada. In contrast to this Eurocentric focus, the Amnesty International survey examines attitudes in the most diverse selection of countries. While most of the polled countries are either peripheral to conflict and therefore receive refugees, or else centers of refugee resettlement, the Amnesty International survey goes the furthest in attempting to measure a truly global perspective.

The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Survey (2016) utilized a relatively smaller sample size of 14,514 participants, roughly half the size of Amnesty International's survey. The survey was conducted in 14 countries, just after the aforementioned survey, from April 4-May 29, 2016. The methodology was similar, whereby respondents participated in over-the-phone and face-to-face interviews. However, the objectives were different, as the survey sought to uncover perceptions behind how those born elsewhere can become part of "the nation." The variables included: birthplace, language, religious denomination, and shared customs and traditions.

The second survey covers the same EU countries as the first, but adds more, including: Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. It also includes Japan. As mentioned, the objectives of this survey were different, and many questions probed satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the EU's and various European apparatuses' handling of the migration and refugee crises. The survey also examined variables pertaining to national identity and belonging. The survey is less global in scope and quite Eurocentric. Beyond the narrow sample, the Pew Research Center survey does not integrate the same "personal responsibility" factor, as in the Amnesty International survey. The responses measure national belonging at large, and the factors that most heavily influence perceptions of national belonging. Both surveys contain different visions of what it means to measure public opinion towards refugees and integration.



Figure 3.3: Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey (2016)

The last widely cited survey is the European Social Survey (2016), often referenced as ESS. This exercise attempts to measure values, beliefs, and patterns that inhere to EU and non-EU states, including Russia. The ESS "is conducted every two years and has been in use since 2001. It thus offers longitudinal and cross-national data" (Blitz, 2017: pg. 390). The relevant module on immigration is contained within ESS7 Round 2014-2015. The survey was conducted between August 2014 and December 2015, and thus encompasses a different time frame from the other two surveys.

ESS7 Round has a sample size of 28,221 and is thus similar to the Amnesty International survey. Furthermore, the sample population in each of the surveyed states was 800-1,500, lending a similar size to the other two surveys. ESS7 Round includes data from EU countries, European Economic Area countries, and Israel.

Importantly, ESS7 Round does not explicitly mention refugees. Rather, it examines attitudes towards migrants, particularly different kinds of migrants, such as those who are "poor," "non-white," or "non-Christian" (European Social Survey, 2016). It measures receptivity to each of these populations. Though there is some debate over whether this survey can be used as a proxy to examine attitudes towards refugees, this point is often argued to be moot. Researchers emphasize that the general population does not possess a sufficiently advanced knowledge of the differences between refugee, migrant, asylee, etc. to distinguish and therefore adjust its perceptions and prejudices to each legal category accordingly (Blitz, 2017: pg. 393).

There are two other big reports on public opinion towards migration in general, including the International Organization of Migration's How The World Views Migration report (2015)

and the Overseas Development Institute Understanding's Public Attitudes towards Refugees and Migrants report (2017). The former surveyed 183,000 adults across more than 140 countries from 2012-2014; it asked questions about immigration in general and made no mention of the word "refugee." The second drew on 160 studies and focused largely on the UK, but included work from other European countries, as well as the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, Pakistan, and Jordan. It explicitly mentions the word "refugee."

Apart from these surveys that are characterized by their large sample size, there are a variety of smaller surveys that measure public opinion and factors related to refugee studies. In the European context, Bansak et al. (2019) produced a more recent study that measures how economic, humanitarian, and religious concerns shape attitudes towards asylum seekers. Its objectives are most similar to the Pew Research Center study. Kolbe et al. (2016) studies attitudes towards immigrants' reception of social benefits. Siapera et al. (2018) measures public opinion towards refugees globally through social networks and Twitter. All of these surveys and studies attempt to address a different piece of the public opinion puzzle over refugees and national belonging.

For the purposes of this project, public opinion towards refugees serves as the dependent variable. The data is taken from the Amnesty International Refugees Welcome 2016 survey for a variety of reasons. First, the Amnesty International survey is the most global in scope, and this project attempts to examine differences in public opinion globally. There is a paucity of truly global data, suggesting avenues for future projects. Nevertheless, the Amnesty International survey goes the furthest in responding to said lack. Put simply, it is the least Eurocentric.

Second, the Amnesty International survey provides a manner of analyzing respondents' personal commitment to supporting refugees. Because respondents can select the distance at which they would maintain settled refugees, the data illustrates public opinion towards both personal and impersonal commitments. This creates a unique window into the subjectivity of respondents from each of the 27 countries.

Third, the Amnesty International survey is the most explicit in addressing attitudes towards refugees. While the survey does not say the word "refugee," it instead provides the definition of a refugee: a person fleeing persecution. Thus, the survey avoids the negative connotations that surround the word "refugee," likely due to a toxic media environment. However, it collects data most explicitly tied to the refugee settlement, by providing the legal definition, in language simply rendered. It is the only survey to do so. The other surveys collect data that is explicitly tied to "national belonging," "migrants," or "asylum-seekers." Refugee theorists then trust in the public's general and inadequate knowledge of the legal definitions to extrapolate public opinion data tied to refugees. To avoid this ambiguity, the Amnesty International survey treats refugees as a wholly separate category. It is an extra precaution.

In this paper, I code a percentage of respondents in each country as either "Very High Refugee Support," "High Refugee Support," "Moderate Refugee Support," "Limited Refugee Support," or "No Refugee Support/Exclusionary." "Very High Refugee Support" refers to the percentage of individuals within a country who would accept refugees into their household. "High Refugee Support" is defined as the percentage of respondents who would accept refugees into their household or neighborhood. "Moderate Refugee Support" describes the percentage of individuals who would welcome refugees into the aforementioned categories or their

city/town/village. Finally, "Limited Refugee Support" includes the country at large. "Exclusionary" includes the percentage of respondents who would bar refugees entrance into the country. According to this logic, "Welcoming" is defined in relation to proximity, as I understand "the household" to indicate that respondents would both share personal space with refugees and also support them materially and culturally. This logic expands outwards, inferring that "neighborhood" respondents would provide more material support than "city" respondents and so on.

The dependent variable countries range from "Highly Welcoming" to "Exclusionary," and also vary in the distance of welcome. For example, Chile and the United States are nearly equally "Welcoming" on my scale, but the grade of this "welcome" varies widely. 15% of Americans are "Very Highly Supportive" and would therefore welcome refugees into the home. Only 5% of Chileans elect to do the same. On the other hand, 22% of Americans would bar refugees from the country while only 4% of Chileans demonstrate the same aversion.

The dependent variable also differs across other factors in order to avoid a selection bias. The countries vary in terms of size, population, GDP, infant mortality, and proximity to hotspots of refugee crises. It is important to keep each of these factors in mind when judging the reasons behind aversion or acceptance of in-country refugee programs. Yet this paper does not seek to evaluate each of these factors, but rather to determine a possible motivation behind acceptance or rejection for refugees by comparing the dependent variable to a desire for increased or decreased government spending, and increased or decreased social services in times of hardship.

All of the Amnesty International survey data points, for which there exists correlating independent variable data, are used. The independent variable is, of course, desire for government spending. This variable is comprised of data pulled from the World Values Survey.

3.3 Independent Variable: World Values Survey Wave 6 2010-2014: Summary and Limitations

The independent variable is a stated desire for increased or decreased government spending measured in the 2010-2014 World Values Survey Wave 6 (Inglehart, R et al., 2014). The World Values Survey asks thousands of respondents across various countries in the span of four years to respond to lengthy questionnaires that will provide a representative picture of the values of the country as a whole.

V98.- Government responsibility

Cross by -- Change --

Display Show Column % (all responses)

	TOTAL	Country/region		
		China	Germany	Spain
The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for	12.2%	12.4%	12.0%	12.3%
2	8.8%	9.0%	8.0%	9.8%
3	16.3%	18.2%	14.1%	16.5%
4	11.3%	10.5%	10.8%	14.0%
5	15.6%	9.8%	20.9%	17.6%
6	8.1%	7.1%	8.5%	9.2%
7	9.0%	8.2%	10.6%	7.8%
8	7.6%	8.7%	7.6%	5.8%
9	3.3%	5.4%	1.6%	2.5%
People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves	4.1%	4.0%	5.5%	2.0%
DE,SE:Inapplicable ; RU:Inappropriate response; HT: Dropped out survey	*	-	0.1%	-
No answer	2.3%	5.1%	0.1%	0.6%
Don´t know	1.2%	1.7%	0.3%	2.0%
(N)	(5,535)	(2,300)	(2,046)	(1,189)
Mean	4.62	4.65	4.75	4.35
Standard Deviation	2.51	2.65	2.47	2.28
Base mean	(5,339)	(2,145)	(2,036)	(1,158)

Figure 3.4: World Values Survey Question V98 (2010-2014)

World Values Survey reached approximately 1,000 respondents for each country surveyed. Taken as a whole, the independent variable utilizes approximately 20,000 surveys from the 1,000 respondents across each of the 20 countries for which there is corresponding data for the dependent variable. Obviously, these responses, taken as a lump sum rather than as a percentage of the population, carry a different weight in Uruguay as opposed to Argentina. Nevertheless, World Values Survey is widely cited survey whose methodology is highly respected. It has given rise to more than 400 publications in more than 20 languages (Haerpfer, Christian W.).

This study utilizes World Values Survey question V98: Government Responsibility. Respondents are presented with alternative opinions: 1. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for, and 2. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. Respondents can then select an answer from 1-10 that most closely corresponds to their opinion. The format can be viewed in Table 4.4.

Because this study seeks to understand intense support and rejection for refugee programs, I utilize the extreme data at either end of the spectrum. I code a response of "1" as "Very High Government Responsibility" and a combined "1 and 2" as "High Government Responsibility." For example, China would receive a "High Government Responsibility" score of 21.4%, and a "Very High Government Responsibility" score of 12.4%. I code for one other value, which is "Very High Personal Responsibility." In this category, China would receive a score of 4.0%. Each of these categories can then be compared to levels of support for refugees as the dependent variable, in order to determine if advocacy for government or personal responsibility for financial security determines support or rejection for refugees.

Because the World Values Survey respondents are chosen at random, I trust these responses to be representational of the attitudes of citizens within a country as a whole. However, there are challenges inherent to the use of this source. In a time where information passes hands quickly and nationalism is on the global rise, examining countries across the span of four years allows much time for attitudes to change between 2010 and 2014. If respondents' desire for increased or decreased government spending is linked to global economic upturns and downturns, then said desire could change dramatically from Brazil to Thailand in four years. Equally important is that the Amnesty International survey took place in 2016, meaning that the temporal range in data collection is not ideal.

One of the issues with combining these datasets is that their datapoints do not seamlessly interlink. Of the 27 countries for which Amnesty International collects data, only twenty are contained within the World Values Survey 2010-2014 dataset. World Values Survey collects data for 60 countries in the 2010-2014 wave. Earlier years contain information for various other countries included in the Amnesty International 2016 survey, but the data is too time sensitive to consider integrating two or more WVS waves.

The subsequent World Values Survey is due to be published in 2020, and a further iteration of this paper would utilize data the comes from a 2016-2020 survey. Of course, the same problems of temporal displacement will inhere, but a current dataset will dialogue better with the 2016 Amnesty International Survey and will be located firmly on the crest of the nationalist wave, rather than at its beginnings.

The World Values Survey data serves as an indicator for increased or decreased government spending, and therefore increased or decreased social services. Though the question does not explicitly name social services, or even government spending, I consider "government responsibility" and "everyone is provided for" to be terms that suggest the aforementioned factors. This paper argues that, in times of economic hardship, citizens will support the provision of social benefits for themselves over perceived outsiders.

As this paper will demonstrate, countries whose respondents favor "Very High Government Responsibility" and "High Government Responsibility" tend to reject refugees in greater numbers. Meanwhile, countries whose respondents select those two categories in lower quantities are more supportive of refugees. This does not necessarily imply that the second group favors increased "Very High Personal Responsibility." In fact, the data reveals no correction between "Very High Personal Responsibility" and support or rejection for refugee programs, at any personal distance. Therefore, it is desire for increased government responsibility, and- as I have extrapolated- increased social services, that determines public opinion towards refugees.

4. RESULTS

4.1 Very High Support for Refugees

As described in section 3.2, I have coded "Very High Support for Refugees" to include the percentage of respondents who would welcome refugees into their homes, as per the Amnesty International survey. These respondents profess the highest degree of personal commitment to aiding in refugee settlement. The dependent variable ranges widely; 46% of respondents in China would welcome refugees into their homes, while only 1% of respondents from Russia or Indonesia would do the same. I compare Very High Support for Refugees against various independent variables, including: "Very High Government Responsibility," "High Government Responsibility," and "Very High Personal Responsibility," in order to prove a correlation between decreased desire for increased government responsibility and social benefits, and increased support for refugees.



Figure 4.1: Very High Refugee Support x Very High Government Responsibility

The X-axis is the dependent variable, or "Very High Support for Refugees." The Y-axis is the independent variable, or "Very High Government Responsibility." There is a downward trendline, so that greater numbers of "Very High Government Responsibility" respondents correlate to less support for close-proximity settlement. It is important to remember that "Very High Refugee Support" is coded for settlement/hosting within the personal home. Stated simply, respondents who desire greater support from the government and more social services are less likely to host refugees within their own homes. At either end of the extreme are China and Russia, Chinese respondents expressing high support for in-home hosting, and Russian respondents professing the opposite.

If the independent variable shifts slightly, the picture remains stable. "High Government Responsibility" includes respondents from the WVS who reported either a "1" or a "2" on their questionnaire. The negative trendline remains stable, emphasizing a negative relationship between "High Government Responsibility" and "Very High Refugee Support." However, it is important to note that the inverse does not hold.



Figure 4.2: Very High Refugee Support x High Government Responsibility



Figure 4.3: Very High Refugee Support x Very High Personal Responsibility

In the prior graphs, it would have been misleading to state that low government responsibility correlates with "Very High Refugee Support." This is because, in this paradigm, low government responsibility is named "Very High Personal Responsibility," and there is no relationship between "Very High Personal Responsibility" and "Very High Refugee Support," as demonstrated in the adjoining table. Instead, one must state that a low "Very High Government Responsibility" score correlates to a high "Very High Refugee Support" score. "Very High Personal Responsibility" indicates those respondents who chose "10" on their WVS questionnaire.

4.2 High Support for Refugees

As described in section 3.2, I have coded "High Support for Refugees" to include the percentage of respondents who would welcome refugees into their homes or into their neighborhoods, as per the Amnesty International survey. These respondents profess a relatively

higher degree of personal commitment to aiding in the settlement process. The dependent variable ranges widely; 74% of respondents in China would welcome refugees into their homes or neighborhoods, while only 4% of respondents from Russia would do the same. This is absolutely at the low end of the spectrum, as the next lowest values are 10% in Thailand and 11% in Poland. The next highest value is 67% in Germany.

I compare "High Support for Refugees" against various independent variables, including: "Very High Government Responsibility," "High Government Responsibility," and "Very High Personal Responsibility," in order to continue establishing a correlation between aversion for increased government responsibility and social benefits, and support for refugee programs. As established, this negative correlation strengthens with the dependent variable value, so that the downward trendline is more pronounced in the "Very High Refugee Support" data, as opposed to the "High Refugee Support" data. The trend continues to manifest; as support for refugees declines, so too does the correlation with the y variable.



Figure 4.4: High Refugee Support x Very High Government Responsibility

As support for refugees becomes less extreme, so too does the trend line. Yet again, China and Russia occupy opposite ends the spectrum, but a variety of countries that profess low levels of desire for government spending join China. There are several outliers, including Jordan and Brazil, that profess higher levels of "Very High Government Responsibility" in relation to their "High Refugee Support" score. Nevertheless, the trendline retains its negative quality, though the slope is less pronounced than in the "Very High Refugee Support" dataset.

The "High Government Responsibility" graph looks similar to the "Very High Government Responsibility" graph, though the Brazil and Jordan datapoints become more aligned with the general trend line as their independent variable more closely adheres to the group. The same general observations apply; China occupies the lower, righthand corner, while Russia occupies the higher, left-hand corner. There is a gentle downward slope. However, the slope is less defined than in the "Very High Refugee Support" dataset. Whereas the "Very High Refugee Support"/ "Very High Personal Responsibility" graph revealed no correlation, the "High Refugee Support" version demonstrates a similar, downward sloping graph.



Figure 4.5: High Refugee Support x High Government Responsibility

The “Very High Personal Responsibility” graphs reveals a more cohesive downward slope than the other two companion graphs. There are a few aspects to emphasize about this graph. First, the United States is the clear outlier, demonstrating an unusually high “Very High Personal Responsibility” score. This is not surprising, given the United States’ cultural aversion to social services and government intervention (Kymlicka, 1994). Second, this graph demonstrates, yet again, that a low “High Government Responsibility” score does not equal a high “Very High Personal Responsibility” score. The two cannot be interpreted as the inverse of one another. High “Responsibility” scores in each case correlate to low support scores.

Nevertheless, the “Very High Refugee Support” and “High Refugee Support” datasets reveals a generalized downward slope, with high Responsibility score correlated to low Support scores, and vice versa. The “High Refugee Support” dataset features a gentler downward slope, indicating that the intensity of the feelings and a greater commitment to refugees generates a steeper slope.



Figure 4.6: High Refugee Support x Very High Personal Responsibility

4.3 Moderate Support for Refugees



Figure 4.7: Moderate Refugee Support x Very High Government Responsibility



Figure 4.8: Moderate Refugee Support x High Government Responsibility

Again, I have coded "Moderate Support for Refugees" to include the percentage of respondents who would welcome refugees into their homes, into their neighborhoods, or into their village/town/city, as per the Amnesty International survey. These respondents profess a

moderate degree of personal commitment to aiding in the settlement process, accepting refugees in some proximity and yet not submitting to a personal commitment. The dependent variable continues to range widely; 88% of respondents in China and Germany would welcome refugees into their homes, neighborhoods, or village/town/city, while only 13% of respondents from Russia would do the same. This is absolutely at the low end of the spectrum, as the next lowest values are 16% in Thailand and 15% in Poland. The next highest value is 68% in Australia.

I compare "Moderate Support for Refugees" against the same independent variables. The negative slope continues to manifest to a moderated degree in relation to the first two: "Very High Government Responsibility" and "High Government Responsibility." There is no correlation between "Moderate Support" and "Very High Personal Responsibility." As in the other two cases, the datapoints continue to disperse in relation to the degree of support. Though the slope trends downwards, it is not as steep as in the two previous datasets. This is the last dataset for which there is some correlation between the two variables. However, it is not a



Figure 4.9: Moderate Refugee Support x Very High Personal Responsibility

strong correlation. As in the other datasets, China and Germany occupy the lower, righthand corner of the graph, while Russia occupies the upper, left-hand corner.

4.4 Limited Support for Refugees

In the last supportive category for refugees, I have coded "Limited Support for Refugees" to include the percentage of respondents who would welcome refugees into their homes, into their neighborhoods, into their village/town/city, or into the country as a whole, as per the Amnesty International survey. These respondents profess very little responsibility for supporting refugees, as the act of welcoming refugees into the country could imply that said respondent will never actually see or interact with a refugee. Therefore, this category is termed as "limited."

In this category, there is no demonstrated correlation between the two variables. The data is clumped together in all the categories: "Very High Government Responsibility," "High Government Responsibility," and "Very High Individual Responsibility." Because the information reveals no pattern, I include the graphs in this category in Annex 1, along with the others.

It is important to note that this dependent variable marks the end of the downward slope trend produced by the two variables.

4.5 No Support for Refugees

In the final category, I have coded "No Support for Refugees/Exclusionary" as the percentage of respondents who would reject any refugees arriving to their country, according to

the Amnesty International survey. This ranges widely, from 3% in Spain and Germany respectively, to 61% in Russia. The next highest value is 31% in South Africa. Clearly, these respondents express no desire to engage with refugee aid within the borders of their respective countries.

In this category, there is no correlation between the variables, and the data points are clumped. Russia, with its uniquely high dependent variable, is far in the upper, righthand corner. Because the datapoints reveal no clear pattern, I will include these graphs in Annex 1 as well.

5. CONCLUSION

5.1 Back to the Big Picture: Reframing Results within the Larger Conversation about Refugees

Countries whose populations desire a greater degree of government responsibility for citizens' welfare are less likely to support the implementation of refugee programs or to welcome refugees to settle within the country. Furthermore, this trend coincides with geographic distance. Populations that advocate a greater degree of personal responsibility for individual welfare are more likely to not only welcome refugee programs, but the welcome refugees at closer distances, such as the home, the neighborhood, or the city/town/village.

Countries like China, Germany, Spain, and the UK contain populations that express a high desire to accommodate refugees at close distances and, likewise, possess populations that express an aversion for government spending, favoring individual responsibility. On the other end of the spectrum, Russian citizens desire greater government responsibility for individual

welfare, and a corresponding 60% of the population would bar refugees from the country entirely. This suggests an aversion towards resource sharing in a population that desires greater economic support.

As the level of proximity declines, so too does the trendline and the relationship between the two variables. This implies that citizens that welcome refugees into the home, implying a greater level of personal and financial responsibility for their wellbeing, are less supportive of increased government spending and welfare programs. As the distance of welcome increases, the correlation between the two variables declines in intensity, until the trendline has more or less dispersed by the Moderate Refugee Support stage.

Citizenship is a covenant between an individual member and a political community, wherein the member enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). The benefits and welfare that the state provides are disbursed because citizens agree to serve in the military in order to protect the homeland, or pay taxes in order to support fellow citizens, or else serve on a jury of peers during the trial of a fellow community member. Government benefits and protections exist for those within the community, and this division between “in” and “out” further solidifies the bond between those who exist within and who are members of the nation-state.

Kolbe et al. (2016) describes that members of the bounded nation believe that, in order to access government benefits and state welfare, aliens should have to pay taxes for at least a year, or else achieve citizenship. In other words, state benefits are a closely guarded resource at the

level of public opinion. Those who desire increased government responsibility for individual welfare are less likely to support refugees, and this sentiment is entirely logical.

A desire for greater government support implies a certain level of financial insecurity. Likewise, a wider dispersal of government benefits implies a lower concentration of said benefits for citizens. In a nation-state system that divides “us” from “them” and that categorizes insiders and outsiders based on a territorialized system of discrete nation-states, the assumption is that government benefits belong to citizens who reside within the bounded territory. Respondents who do not desire and require more government welfare will be less concerned with how this welfare is shared and with whom.

To date, there are 70.8 million forcibly displaced people worldwide, 25.9 million of whom are refugees (UNHCR, 2019). While most of these people will remain warehoused in camps and some may be able to return to their homelands when the violence settles, many will and should settled in other countries where they can attempt to regain a sense of normalcy and stability in a new homeland. It is therefore integral that research be done to understand how these settlement efforts can achieve their most successful iteration, including which countries are best primed to host refugees and refugee programs.

Multiple theorists have examined attitudes towards refugees at large, as well as more focused phenomena. The three, large surveys have studied attitudes towards refugees, though with a metropolitan, Eurocentric focus (Amnesty International, 2016; Stokes, 2016; European Social Survey, 2016). These surveys have polled thousands of people across Europe and North America. Additionally, Bansak et al. (2016), has determined that respondents are more likely to

welcome refugees who practice the same religion, speak the same language, and who have the greatest humanitarian need. Blitz (2017) contends that the data does not reflect the level of sympathy that the public feels towards refugees, and that European and North American citizens feel a deep sympathy towards these persecuted populations. Meanwhile, Dempster (2017) argues that European countries display the least affinity towards refugees, while Oceania is the most welcoming of the world's regions. There exists a multiplicity of data about which regions are the most welcoming, and which characteristics in a refugee population are the most desirable to host countries.

Nevertheless, there exist few studies that examine the characteristics in the citizen/host population that enable or inhibit a welcoming attitude towards refugees. It is a practical necessity that more refugees are able to settle themselves in new homes. Therefore, it is important to understand which countries will be most receptive to refugees and refugee programs and why. This paper attempts to begin to respond to just that question. It is also important to avoid placing the entirety of the responsibility for integration onto refugees themselves. Refugees can do little to achieve successful integration if the communities into which they are placed are averse to accepting them.

In the future, public policy concerning refugees must become both more serious and more expansive. This is a political reality that will percolate from the practical circumstances of the day. As refugee programs expand to accommodate the rising influx of refugees, an understanding of where to place refugees will become increasingly important. In asserting that a desire for increased government spending is linked to an aversion for refugees and refugee

programs, this paper argues that variables like this one can be used to determine locations for successful refugee settlement and integration initiatives.

6. ANNEX



Figure 6.1: Limited Refugee Support x Very High Government Responsibility



Figure 6.2: Limited Refugee Support x High Government Responsibility



Figure 6.3: Limited Refugee Support x Very High Personal Responsibility



Figure 6.4: No Refugee Support x Very High Government Responsibility



Figure 6.5: No Refugee Support x High Government Responsibility



Figure 6.6: No Refugee Support x Very High Personal Responsibility

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