

VOLUNTARY POLITICAL PARTY QUOTAS AND GENDER EQUALITY:
DOES INCREASED FEMALE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION YIELD MORE POSITIVE
VIEWS ON GENDER EQUALITY?

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By

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ABSTRACT

The present study will address the main research question: do voluntary political party quotas have an impact on views on gender equality more broadly in society? The hypothesis is that they do have an impact and that increased female political participation will yield more positive views of women as equals in society. The study provides preliminary evidence for policies that promote quotas as ways to both increase female political participation as well as use that increased representation as a tool to improve women's status in society outside of the political arena. The study will use multivariate OLS regression analysis to assess this hypothesis. The study will utilize multiple data sources including Quality of Government data, World Values Survey data, and International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance data to this end.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: Introduction	1
Chapter 2: Background	5
Chapter 3: Literature Review	8
Chapter 4: Case Study: Quotas in the Balkans	10
Chapter 5: Conceptual Model and Analysis Plan	14
Chapter 6: Data Description and Empirical Results	16
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Policy Implications.....	28
Appendix: Supplementary Table	31
References.....	32

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Proportions of Women in Parliamentary Seats Worldwide	2
Figure 2. Female Representation in Former Yugoslavia Over Time.....	11

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Political Representation in the Balkans	10
Table 2. World Values Survey Gender Index Questions	17
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Countries with Voluntary Political Party Quotas	19
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Countries without Voluntary Political Party Quotas	20
Table 5. Multivariate Regression Results for Women in Politics.....	23
Table 6. Multivariate Regression Results for Women in Education	24
Table 7. Multivariate Regression Results for Women in Jobs.....	25
Table 8. Correlation between Voluntary Political Party Quotas and the Dependent Variables ...	31

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The average participation rate of women in parliaments across the world is 24.5 percent (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019), which is the highest it has been in history, but the world still has a long way to go in order to achieve parliamentary gender parity. In order to work towards these goals, many countries have adopted parliamentary quotas, either by constitutional or electoral code or by the choice of the political parties. Over the past two decades, quotas have been instrumental in increasing the number of women in political power, particularly in Europe. Bringing more women into the political fold can allow for more representative decisions and provide an example for younger women to enter political office later in life. However, the reverberating impacts of gender quotas remain to be studied. The present study will address this question and will use data to analyze the impact of gender quotas on views on gender equality more broadly in society.




Figure 1. Proportions of Women in Parliamentary Seats Worldwide

As the number of women in political offices worldwide increases, questions about the efficacy of quotas are critical. While there is evidence that quotas are associated with an increase in the number of women in political life, the impact of quotas on other sectors of society, namely business and education, are still unclear. Thus, the research question for the present study is: are gender-based parliamentary quotas a useful policy tool for improving societal views of women outside of the political realm?

The hypothesis tested throughout the present study is that gender-based quotas, particularly at the political party level, not only increase the number of women in political office but increase the overall views of women as equals in society. My theory of change is that as more women enter political life, the idea of women in power becomes more normalized and sets a very public and visible example for seeing women in power (Krook, 2006). The more normal it becomes to see women in power in political life, the more normal it becomes in other sectors as well. In order to maintain the number of women entering the political sector, more women will need to obtain higher education, and seeing more women in the higher education arena normalizes that as well. This theory surmises that all sectors of society are linked, and thus, increasing the number of women in one sector will have reverberating impacts on other sectors (Dahlerup, 2013). Quotas could serve as a useful policy tool for lawmakers to bring women into the political fold and in turn, increase the both the number and views of women in other sectors of society as well.

In order to assess this question, the present study will use multivariate OLS regression to test the hypothesis. The analysis includes data from three sources: The World Values Survey, the Quality of Government data, and the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance quotas database. The study uses voluntary political party quotas as the independent

variable, and views on women in politics, jobs, and education as the dependent variables. All models use macro-level controls including GDP, trade, and population to reduce omitted variable bias.

The results of the study are promising: both the politics and jobs models included yield statistically significant results. Compared to countries without voluntary political party quotas, people in countries with voluntary political party quotas are 7.45 percentage points less likely to view women as politically inferior. Conversely, compared to the countries without voluntary political party quotas, people in countries with voluntary political party quotas are 5.27 percentage points more likely to view women as equivalent to men politically. Additionally, compared to countries without voluntary political party quotas, people in countries with voluntary political party quotas are 11.8 percentage points less likely to view women as inferior in terms of careers. These results are promising evidence that increasing the number of women in political office has spillover effects into the job market, and that quotas could be a very effective policy tool to work towards gender equality and empowerment.

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND

Policy Field

The present study addresses the question: “do legislated gender quotas in a country increase perceived gender equality in a society?” In order to do so, the study utilizes voluntary political party quotas as the independent variable and tool for quota implementation. However, there are multiple avenues that this could take, including pre-election and election stage quotas, and voluntarily adopted political party quotas or legally mandated quotas by constitutional or electoral code (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016). This research will take a global comparative approach, looking at quotas across all regions of the world, but will discuss a brief case study through the background and literature review of the unique case of quota implementation in the Balkans.

History and Timeline

Quotas were implemented throughout the world in three waves. The first wave began in a number of socialist and/or communist countries, as well as Pakistan beginning in 1956, Bangladesh in 1972, and Egypt from 1979 to 1984 (Dahlerup and Antić Gaber, 2017). However, during this time, none of these quotas were popular amongst citizens. At the end of this first wave, Nordic countries began to adopt political party quotas starting in the 1970s and 1990s.

The second wave of quotas began in Argentina in 1991, and this served as a model for most of South and Latin America, especially after the quota was presented at the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (Dahlerup and Antić Gaber, 2017).

The third wave of gender quotas consists mostly of revisions of original laws. More than 30 countries have revised their quotas to improve the impact of such legislation on female political participation. Recently, there has been a major shift in European countries away from voluntary party quotas, primarily adopted by left and green parties, and towards legislated binding quotas for all political parties, coupled with sanctions for noncompliance. As Bjarnegård and Zetterberg point out in their research, “*quota laws are most effective whenever they include strong sanctions (e.g. nullification of the candidate list) for non-compliance with either the legally specified proportion of women on the list or with placement mandates (that ensure women are put in electable slots on the lists)*” (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2016).

According to data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2004, in National Parliaments (lower houses of government) women accounted for 39.7 percent of the body of representatives in Nordic countries, 16.3 percent in European countries outside of the Nordic countries, 18.5 percent in the Americas, 15.1 percent in Asia, 14.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 11.1 percent in the Pacific, and 6.0 percent in Arab States (Ballington, Binda, and IDEA, 2005). Despite strong overall female political participation in the Nordic countries, by the early 2000s there was a fair amount of variance between countries: Sweden led the region with 45.3 percent and Iceland trailed with only 30.2 percent. Overall, the global average for 2018 was only 23 percent for women in national parliaments (IDEA, 2019).

When examining quotas worldwide, Europe stands out as a region with both a large number of countries with quotas, as well as an increase in female political representation in the last two decades. Currently, there is a divide between the regions of Europe in terms of quota implementation: Nordic countries favor voluntary political party quotas, largely due to cultural

factors already favoring women's representation in parliament; Central and Eastern European countries have more recently begun implementing legislated candidate quotas with mixed results.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

Regional Impacts of Quotas

Quotas across the world have had vastly different effects: some have had a tremendous impact on female political participation, while others have been lackluster. Culture plays a role in female political participation, as does the type of quota implemented. The country with the highest female political participation is Rwanda, where women made up 48.8 percent of the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, by 2005 (Baldez, 2006) and by 2019, women accounted for 61.25 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 38.46 percent of the upper house, the Senate (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019). This is largely due to the gender quota in place in Rwanda: the constitution requires that women must hold 30 percent of political positions. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the majority of the countries in the top 20 list of most women in national parliaments have some kind of gender quota in place, however, Rwanda is the only one in the top 20 list with reserved seats set aside for women, similar to the system in place in Kosovo. Of the other countries in the top 20 list, five have candidate quota laws that require a certain percentage of all legislative candidates to be women (Argentina, Belgium, Costa Rica, Guyana, and Iraq), and 11 have voluntary party-level quotas (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Mozambique, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden) (Baldez, 2006).

As quotas become more prevalent throughout the world, one of the biggest issues is the difference between equality of opportunity and equality of result. Danish quota expert Drude Dahlerup (2007) points out that due to the variation in level of democracy and electoral system where quotas are implemented, electoral gender quotas come closer to providing real equality of

opportunity rather than equality of result, and at times, quota regimes may even increase competition over elected position since gender quotas change the most common de facto situation, where men only compete with men (Dahlerup, 2007).

Dahlerup (2007) has examined this discrepancy between equality of opportunity and result, and alongside Lenita Freidenvall (2005), sought to understand why Scandinavian countries have had more success in achieving increased female political participation, but why that may no longer serve as the best model for quota implementation outside of the Nordic nations. The authors argue that the Scandinavian model – also called the “incremental track” – may no longer be a valid model for quota implementation compared to the “fast track” model utilized in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in many Latin American and African nations (Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2005). The authors also assert that without specifications that match the electoral system in question, as well as rules about the rank order of candidates and non-compliance sanctions, quotas may end up being purely symbolic.

CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY: QUOTAS IN THE BALKANS

The Balkans present an interesting case study due to the nature of their quota implementation: upon the fall of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, all of the new countries created unique constitutions, and in the resulting decade, all countries in the region also adopted gender-based parliamentary quotas (Dahlerup and Antić Gaber, 2017). Since that point, female representation has increased in all parliaments in the Balkans, presenting a unique case study for views on gender equality as female political representation increases.

Table 1. Political Representation in the Balkans

Country	Year of Quota Passage	Percent of women in parliament (2019)	Percent of women in parliament (2004)
Slovenia	2005	27.8%	11.4%
Croatia	2008	20.5%	21.7%
Serbia	2004	37.7%	11.3%
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	1998	21.4%	16.7%
Montenegro	2011	23.5%	10.6%
Kosovo	2008	32.5%	29.0%
Albania	2008	29.5%	5.7%
North Macedonia	2002	39.2%	18.3%

Source: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2019




Figure 2. Female Representation in Former Yugoslavia Over Time

As shown in both Table 1 and Figure 2, over time, with the exception of Croatia, female parliamentary representation has increased following the adoption of quota measures throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, only two of these countries have a voluntary political party quota measure adopted (Croatia and Slovenia) while the rest have either electoral or constitutional quotas. Kosovo stands out as the only country in the region with a reserved seats quota measure, requiring that political parties' ballots include 30 percent female candidates (IDEA, 2019).

The Balkans present a completely different story than the Nordic countries outlined above for a variety of factors. While most Nordic nations utilized an "incremental track" to increase female political representation in their approach to quota implementation, most Balkan nations utilized the "fast track" approach, using quotas to immediately increase the number of women in political office through legislated parliamentary quotas and reserved seat models (Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2005). As Antić and Lokar (2007) point out, the post-conflict situation in the Balkans after the end of the war in the 1990s and the fall of Yugoslavia has made it difficult for women in the political parties and for women's NGOs to be heard (Antić and Lokar, 2007). However, this reconfiguration of the political systems in each resulting country following the breakup of Yugoslavia has opened some windows of opportunity, which some women's organizations have been able to use. The authors also analyze the three distinct historical time periods for quotas in the Balkans:

1. 1990-1995: electoral gender quotas were openly rejected after the first free elections due to the open conservative setback

2. 1995-1999: following the Beijing UN 4th World Conference on Women, there was a period of unwilling acceptance of the ideological concepts of the Beijing Platform for Action, and then the gradual acceptance of electoral gender quotas within the parties
3. 1999-2004: the period of the “Stability Pact for the South Eastern Europe (SP)” where women became a distinct political subject, as well as the time period of the enactment of quota rules and the start of the parity movement. Bottom up pressure in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo led to the enactment of quotas in these countries as well as the surrounding Balkan nations.

Building off of the data in Table 1, we can see the impact that quotas have had in the two different regions. The Balkans, which implemented their quotas, on average, around 2004, have seen tremendous return to the quotas in terms of female representation in parliament. This is likely a reflection of Dahlerup’s (2007) assertion that the incremental track, which worked for Nordic countries and allowed parties to pursue quotas voluntarily, is not the right pathway for countries with more cultural pushback to female representation, and that perhaps the best pathway to increasing female political participation is by quota implementation, with the stipulations outlined above.

CHAPTER 5: CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS PLAN

Hypothesis

The present study seeks to answer the question, “*does increased female parliamentary representation due to legislated quotas lead to more positive views of women as equals in society?*” The hypothesis is that increased female parliamentary representation due to legislated quotas will lead to increased views of women as equals in society, outside of the governmental sector.

However, there are many factors that complicate this hypothesis and bar legislated parliamentary quotas from serving as a “silver bullet” for gender equality in society. One such factor is culture. Each region, country and continent has vastly different views about women in society and their place both in the home and at work. The analysis will utilize global data to assess this question, with a dataset that includes countries encompassing a wide range of geographic, cultural, and political differences.

The present study will focus on testing the above hypothesis and will seek to answer the question of replicability and scalability of gender quotas worldwide, hypothesizing that underlying regional cultural differences will create difficulties for the replicability of successful gender quotas worldwide, where success is defined as increasing female representation in parliament.

The theory of change being tested by the present study is that the more exposure citizens in a country have to female political representation, the more normalized female political power becomes, and thus, the more likely it is that they will continue to elect women into political offices. As this repeated continued exposure to female political representation normalizes gender

equality in the political sector, it will have spillover effects into the rest of society and women will become viewed as equals in the jobs and education sectors of society as well.

CHAPTER 6: DATA DESCRIPTION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Data Description

The data used for the present study come from three independent datasets: The Quality of Government standard time series dataset, the World Values Survey longitudinal time series dataset, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) quota database dataset. The Quality of Government dataset covers the time period between 1946 and 2018 and represents 194 countries, with an additional 17 historical countries that did not exist prior to 2014, to create a total country population of 211. The indicators used as controls in the following multivariate regression models originate from this data source and include population (log), trade as a percentage of country GDP, GDP per capita (log), GDP growth per country, and democracy/Freedom House polity scores.

The World Values Survey dataset encompasses data from 1981 to 2014, representing 184 countries across 440 different variables. Each country's data represents a sample from the overall population of people aged 18 years and older, and consists of a sample of at least 1,200 (1,000 in countries where the population is less than two million, and 1,500 where there is a greater population distribution – Russia, China, Brazil, USA, etc.). The dependent variables in the multivariate regression models originate from this data set and are comprised of an averaged index across questions pertaining to gender equality throughout the survey. The gender equality index is broken down into three sub-categories: jobs, education, and politics. The relevant survey questions are listed in Table 2.

Table 2. World Values Survey Gender Index Questions

Thematic Area	Selected Question(s)
<i>Jobs</i>	When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.
	If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.
	Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.
	When a mother works for pay, the children suffer.
	On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.
	Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay.
<i>Politics</i>	On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.
<i>Education</i>	A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.

The scores across the questions in the jobs category are averaged for each country to create an index for overall views on gender equality related to jobs in a society, where “low” represents poor views of women in the working world and “high” represents views of women as equals in the working world. The other two questions, politics and education, are scaled from “very low” to “very high” in a four-part scale, following the same system as the jobs index.

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance quota database includes data from 2003 to 2013 across 85 countries and territories that have enacted legislation around gender quotas, including voluntary political party quotas, mandatory constitutional or electoral parliamentary quotas, and subnational quotas. This dataset provides the independent variable used in the multivariate regression models: voluntary political party quota enactment.

Descriptive Statistics

The different models tested examine the relationship between the independent variable, voluntary political party enactment, and the key dependent variables measuring views of women

across three sectors of society: jobs, politics, and education. Macro-level controls are included in the model as well. These were chosen due to their connection with development in a country: it is likely that more developed countries will have more progressive views on gender equality, although not always the case. These variables are included to reduce bias between the independent and dependent variables. Freedom House polity scores are included as well to account for the level of democracy in a country and further reduce potential bias.

Figure 1, shown in the introduction, displays the relationship between the proportion of women occupying lower house and upper house seats, and is included to examine the relationship between increased representation between both houses of government, in countries that have a bicameral system. In the sample, 41.54 percent of countries have a bicameral system while 58.46 percent have a unicameral system. Additionally, 72.51 percent of countries do not have voluntary political party quotas enacted, while 27.49 percent do have voluntary political party quotas. Of the countries included in the sample, the mean percentage of women in parliament is 16.02, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 63.8 (Rwanda from 2013-2016).

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Countries with Voluntary Political Party Quotas

Country Has Voluntary Political Party Quota

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables				
Views of women in jobs - low	0.2813451	0.1499776	0.0198314	0.6898273
Views of women in jobs - medium	0.1779577	0.1328321	0	0.7004695
Views of women in jobs - high	0.5406973	0.2191028	0.0175593	0.9411184
Views of women in politics - very low	0.1217072	0.0986016	0.0142712	0.520073
Views of women in politics - low	0.2414864	0.1003859	0.0634698	0.470305
Views of women in politics - high	0.409112	0.1215082	0.1730769	0.6493634
Views of women in politics - very high	0.2276944	0.1329128	0.0370879	0.6278158
Views of women in education - very low	0.0615415	0.0545715	0	0.2796726
Views of women in education - low	0.1189453	0.064766	0.0108855	0.2712721
Views of women in education - high	0.4375197	0.1315194	0.0980392	0.6855346
Views of women in education - very high	0.3819935	0.1552735	0.0866303	0.8647059
Control Variables				
Population (log)	16.08901	1.488289	12.07582	19.15922
Trade Percentage of GDP	70.50033	49.92778	5.726872	531.7374
GDP Growth	3.915837	5.528703	-26.47879	149.973
GDP per capita (log)	8.006824	1.737614	3.877015	11.68877
Democracy/Freedom House Polity Score	7.176185	3.11391	0.5	10

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of Countries without Voluntary Political Party Quotas

Country Does Not Have Voluntary Political Party Quotas

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent Variables				
Views of women in jobs - low	0.4672794	0.2004378	0.0437988	0.896
Views of women in jobs - medium	0.1658659	0.1094677	0	0.6912257
Views of women in jobs - high	0.3668548	0.1870705	0.004	0.8989526
Views of women in politics - very low	0.2569524	0.127812	0.0101935	0.7301193
Views of women in politics - low	0.3174404	0.0974594	0.0906307	0.547619
Views of women in politics - high	0.3214199	0.1403827	0.0613104	0.7107796
Views of women in politics - very high	0.1041873	0.0829053	0.0125444	0.487882
Views of women in education - very low	0.1169222	0.0890534	0.0066644	0.4098134
Views of women in education - low	0.1655181	0.0696942	0.0114722	0.4241055
Views of women in education - high	0.4534467	0.1322583	0.1632997	0.7248183
Views of women in education - very high	0.264113	0.1174534	0.0868839	0.6851852
Control Variables				
Population (log)	15.0096	2.327605	8.738255	21.04997
Trade Percentage of GDP	78.48217	47.87701	0.0209992	441.6038
GDP Growth	3.889439	7.013931	-64.04711	123.1396
GDP per capita (log)	7.354982	1.633941	3.624824	15.53092
Democracy/Freedom House Polity Score	4.535604	3.21624	0	10

Methodology

The present study will examine the association between voluntary political party enactment and views on gender equality more broadly in society by using multivariate OLS regression analysis. The model can be written such that:

$$\text{Gender equality views index} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 (\text{voluntary political party quota}) + \beta_2 (\text{population log}) + \beta_3 (\text{GDP per capita}) + \beta_4 (\text{GDP \% trade}) + \beta_5 (\text{GDP growth log}) + \beta_6 (\text{FH/democracy score}) + e$$

where the independent variable used is the indicator variable, voluntary political party quotas. The dependent variable used is views on gender equality more broadly in society, measured across three indices: jobs, politics, and education. Each variable is scaled from high to low, resulting in eleven total models to examine each relationship. Lastly, the macro-level controls used in the model are population (log), GDP per capita (log), trade as a percentage of GDP per country, GDP growth per country, and the democracy/Freedom House polity scores.

Results

As shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7, the results of the multivariate regression models are consistent with the theory of change of the present study. Table 5 presents the results of the relationship between voluntary political party quota enactment and views of women in politics, in response to the question: “On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.” The coefficients on the voluntary political party variable for both the very low and very high models are statistically significant at the five percent level. Compared to countries without voluntary political party quotas, people in countries with voluntary political party quotas are 7.45 percentage points less likely to view women as politically inferior. Conversely, compared to the countries without voluntary political party quotas, people in countries with voluntary political party quotas are 5.27 percentage points more likely to view women as equivalent to men

politically. This is consistent with the theory of change: as the percentage of women represented in government increases, the increased visibility is associated with a more positive view of women as political figures.

The results in Table 7 also are statistically significant at the one percent level for the women in jobs averaged index for the “low” model. This would support the hypothesis that increased female political representation has spillovers outside of the political arena. Compared to countries without voluntary political party quotas, people in countries with voluntary political party quotas are 11.8 percentage points less likely to view women as inferior in terms of careers. The opposite side of the model measuring the “high” response to views of gender equality in jobs follows the same sign pattern but is not statistically significant. While not statistically significant, the education models follow the same pattern in terms of their sign, following the expected results of hypothesis.

Table 5. Multivariate Regression Results for Women in Politics

VARIABLES	Views of Women in Politics - Very Low	Views of Women in Politics - Low	Views of Women in Politics - High	Views of Women in Politics - Very High
Voluntary political party quotas	-0.0745***	-0.0364	0.0324	0.0527**
	(0.0287)	(0.0236)	(0.0232)	(0.0255)
Population (log)	-0.015	0.0118*	0.0126	-0.0112*
	(0.0105)	(0.00616)	(0.00909)	(0.00584)
Trade Percentage of GDP	-0.000407	0.000528***	0.000139	-0.000436***
	(0.000248)	(0.000164)	(0.000308)	(0.000137)
GDP growth	0.000596	0.00123	-0.00185	-0.000269
	(0.00219)	(0.00145)	(0.00172)	(0.00122)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0207*	-0.0153*	0.0149	0.0287***
	(0.0119)	(0.00797)	(0.0093)	(0.0101)
Democracy/Freedom House Polity Score	-0.0173***	-0.00559	0.0146***	0.0109***
	(0.00655)	(0.00357)	(0.00449)	(0.0035)
Constant	0.776***	0.248*	-0.0683	0.0225
	(0.208)	(0.135)	(0.196)	(0.122)
Observations	189	189	189	189

Table 6. Multivariate Regression Results for Women in Education

VARIABLES	Views of Women in Education - Very Low	Views of Women in Education - Low	Views of Women in Education - High	Views of Women in Education - Very High
Voluntary political party quotas	-0.0136	-0.0119	-0.0207	0.0474
	(0.0146)	(0.0159)	(0.0276)	(0.035)
Population (log)	0.00157	0.0112**	0.0161	-0.0286***
	(0.00574)	(0.00467)	(0.0113)	(0.00863)
Trade Percentage of GDP	-0.000156	0.000273*	0.000339	-0.000430*
	(0.000113)	(0.000158)	(0.000277)	(0.000259)
GDP growth	-0.000509	0.000569	-0.000767	0.000744
	(0.00125)	(0.00102)	(0.00190)	(0.00183)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0134**	-0.0129**	-0.00579	0.0316**
	(0.00642)	(0.00593)	(0.0111)	(0.0138)
Democracy/Freedom House Polity Score	-0.00799**	-0.00422*	0.00657	0.00563
	(0.00317)	(0.00251)	(0.00517)	(0.0051)
Constant	0.236**	0.0916	0.198	0.473**
	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.231)	(0.199)
Observations	189	189	189	189

Table 7. Multivariate Regression Results for Women in Jobs

VARIABLES	Views of Women in Jobs - Low	Views of Women in Jobs - Medium	Views of Women in Jobs - High
Voluntary political party quotas	-0.118***	-0.00436	0.0614
	(0.0456)	(0.0385)	(0.0527)
Population (log)	0.00421	0.0134*	-0.0149
	(0.0117)	(0.00718)	(0.0137)
Trade Percentage of GDP	-0.000376	0.000259	-6.03e-05
	(0.000341)	(0.000221)	(0.000365)
GDP growth	-0.00142	-0.000311	0.00110
	(0.00187)	(0.00221)	(0.00290)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0175	0.00825	0.0185
	(0.0140)	(0.0129)	(0.0179)
Democracy/Freedom House Polity Score	-0.0209***	0.000835	0.0313***
	(0.00696)	(0.00388)	(0.00729)
Constant	0.677***	-0.179	0.378
	(0.223)	(0.179)	(0.298)
Observations	202	202	202

Limitations and Scope for Future Research

Despite the present study's strong data set from three independent sources, the combination of those sources presents some empirical limitations. First, when merged, some countries are not matched and no longer present, which limits the geographic scope of the results. One of the most critical examples of this is Kosovo, which is dropped from the final data set due to differing views by various governmental agencies on Kosovo's independence. As this paper includes the case study of the Balkans, consisting primarily of the former Yugoslav countries for the purposes of the present study, the addition of Kosovo would have been beneficial. It also would be a particularly interesting addition as it is the only former Yugoslav country with reserved seats as a quota measure (IDEA, 2019).

The key independent variable could be measured in a variety of ways, and the data set contains a multitude of these. For this study, the metric chosen was voluntary political party quotas, indicating whether or not the country has this measure. Other possible ways to measure a quota include lower house or upper house electoral quotas, lower house or upper house constitutional quotas, and subnational constitutional or electoral quotas. As the present study focuses on federal-level initiatives, this last metric was not relevant, however, the other quota variables could be interesting extensions for future research.

The key dependent variable could be measured in a variety of ways as well, which presents some challenges for the study. The key dependent variable, the way that people in each country view gender equality, was measured by the World Values Survey across a series of areas. Instead of a general gender equality variable, the World Values Survey broke this question into politics, education, and jobs, where survey respondents were asked how they viewed women's access to these three areas. The question scales responses from "very low" to "very

high” for politics and education, where “very low” indicates that respondents do not believe that women should have improved access to these arenas, and “very high” indicates that respondents should have more access to these arenas. The question for jobs is scaled from “low” to “high” in three parts, where the responses indicate the same scale as aforementioned.

Due to the tripartite formation of this variable, there are some limitations. The multivariate regression results do not indicate respondents’ overall views of gender equality, but rather, their views of women within the different categories. While useful for the present study, a more generalized question about women’s access to society overall could be a better metric of this measure when trying to assess how these quotas relate to overall views of gender equality.

Lastly, another limitation of the formation of the dependent variables is the three- or four-part scaling system. This creates some limitations in terms of reading the implications of the results, but ultimately, it still allows us to interpret the results when statistically significant. In the case of this analysis, a further limitation is statistical significance: the results are not statistically significant at conventional levels for the education model. However, some of the most important models of the jobs and politics models are statistically significant, which does allow the present study to interpret these results in terms of policy implications.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Given the critical importance of gender equality worldwide, I wanted to examine whether or not a quota was an effective tool for both increasing the number of women in political office and the views of women as equals outside of political office. Women have been gaining ground as leaders across the world: today, 59 countries have had a female head of state (Wills, Smith, and Hicks, 2019) and women occupy, on average, 24.5 percent of parliament seats worldwide (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019). However, despite strides for women politically worldwide, the US remains behind other countries in terms of female political representation. The US has yet to elect a female president and ranks 75th globally in terms of women's representation in government. Following the 2018 midterm elections, women represented a historic number of Senate and House seats, with 102 women in the 435 total seats, or 23.5 percent. However, this still lags behind the global average of 24.5 percent for both houses combined, and 24.6 percent for lower house representation. Even worse, it lags behind the regional average for the Americas of 30.6 percent in the lower house and 30.8 percent in both houses combined (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019).

While America trails 74 countries globally, only three countries have a majority-female government: Rwanda (61.4 percent), Cuba (53.2 percent), and Bolivia (53.1 percent). Other countries come close to the parity marker including Mexico, Grenada, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Namibia, South Africa, and Sweden, all ranging from 46 to 48 percent female (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2019). All of these countries have some form of a quota in place.

The results of the model tested have powerful implications for using quotas as a tool for increasing gender equality in a society. The first model tested, examining the relationship

between voluntary political party quotas and views of women in political office, delivers the results expected: countries with voluntary political party quotas are associated with more positive views of women as equals in society and with less negative views of women as inferiors in society. Additionally, the model testing the relationship between voluntary political party quotas and views of women in jobs returns similar results: countries with voluntary political party quotas are associated with less negative views of women as inferior.

Based on the results of the present study, there is a strong indication that quotas are an effective policy tool to increase the number of women holding political office in order to influence views of women more broadly in society. Unfortunately, quota enactment is unlikely in the US due to a pre-existing culture of people largely hesitant to affirmative action measures. However, outside of the US, particularly in countries with female representation far below the world average, quotas could be a useful tool to increase the number of women in political office. Particularly for counties with very low female representation like Nigeria (6 percent), Iran (6 percent), or Japan (10 percent), enacting a quota could dramatically increase the number of women in political office, and that could have reverberating impacts outside of political life. Voluntary political party quotas are a particularly useful tool as they are much easier to implement within the political party and do not require vast electoral or constitutional change. If all political parties elect to enact quotas within their parties for candidates presented on the ballots, the number of women who eventually reach political office could dramatically increase.

The role of women in government is critical, especially today. Women in government provide a vital voice and representation of women in their country. Not only is it important for women to be in political office, it is important for them to occupy roles in both higher education and the private sector as well. Gender empowerment is critical for not just political life, but for

all segments of society, allowing women to thrive and pursue their calling in life without barriers. Additionally, better gender empowerment in a society and more respect for women could mean both improved career outcomes as well as improved domestic outcomes: as men respect women as equals, domestic tasks may become shared more equally and domestic violence could decrease as well. Gender empowerment should be one of the more important goals for governments in the 21st century and using quotas to increase female representation might just be the best avenue to get there.

APPENDIX: Supplementary Table

Table 8. Correlation between Voluntary Political Party Quotas and the Dependent Variables

Dependent Variables	Voluntary Political Party Quotas
Women in Jobs - Low	-0.4523
Women in Jobs - Medium	0.0499
Women in Jobs - High	0.3934
Women in Politics - Very Low	-0.4
Women in Politics - Low	-0.3535
Women in Politics - High	0.3071
Women in Politics - Very High	0.4985
Women in Education - Very Low	-0.3312
Women in Education - Low	-0.3193
Women in Education - High	-0.0591
Women in Education - Very High	0.3974

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