EXPANDING ON THE TRUMP EFFECT: HOW TRUMP CAMPAIGN RALLIES ARE
ASSOCIATED WITH HATE

A Thesis
submitted to the faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Public Policy

By

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Washington D.C.
April 16, 2020

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ABSTRACT

In August 2019 a young man walked into an El Paso Wal Mart and began shooting at
shoppers, leaving 22 dead and 24 wounded. According to one survivor, the shooter allowed the
white shoppers to escape as he intentionally targeted Hispanic and African Americans. Just
before beginning his killing spree, the shooter published a manifesto on the online message
board *8chan* where he described a "Hispanic invasion" and sought to rally others to his cause.
"Don't blame Trump," he added, foreshadowing the national conversation that would
subsequently occur. Many speculated that Trump's rhetoric might incite violence as evidenced
by an observed spike in hate crimes around the same time as his emergence as a viable national
candidate. A study by Ayal Feinberg and his colleagues Regina Branton and Valerie Martinez-
Ebers of the University of North Texas sought to quantify this relationship, claiming that Trump
rallies are associated with a 226% increase in hate crimes in the counties which host them.
However, a conflicting study by two Harvard PhD candidates Matthew Lilley and Brian
Wheaton argue that there is no statistical correlation between Trump rallies and increases in hate
crimes. This study expands on their work by using the same data sources as Feinberg et al. and
Lilley and Wheaton to perform panel regressions and difference-in-difference models. This study
also examines Clinton rallies, hypothesizing that Trump rallies do lead to an increase in hate
crimes while Clinton rallies do not. The results of this study reveal that there is preliminary
evidence to suggest that hate crimes do increase following Trump rallies, supporting the
hypothesis and inviting further research to confirm.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

On Saturday, August 3, 2019 in El Paso, Texas, a young white male with an AK-47-style assault rifle and extra magazines launched a massacre that killed 22 people and injured 24 more. The killing-spree occurred at a Walmart near the Mexican border, in a town where 80% of residents have Hispanic or Latino heritage (Danner 2019). Minutes before the attack, the gunman posted a manifesto with white nationalist and hate-filled rhetoric on the message board *8chan*, citing a "Hispanic invasion" (Danner 2019) and calling on others to commit similar attacks. According to one survivor, the shooter appeared to be targeting Hispanics only, allowing white and black shoppers the opportunity to escape (Montes 2019).

"Don't blame Trump," the shooter wrote, foreshadowing, or perhaps inspiring, the national conversation that would follow after the massacre (Danner 2019). Many observers noted striking similarities between the language used by the shooter and rhetoric from the president. Speaking about undocumented immigration in 2018, Mr. Trump stated "you look at what is marching up, that is an invasion… That is an invasion!" (Baker and Shear 2019). Announcing his candidacy for president, Trump infamously described Mexican immigrants as "bringing drugs… bringing crime… They are rapists." (Sanchez 2015). Trump and his administration have called any implication of a connection between the president's rhetoric and acts of violence outrageous. However, critics of the president point to a spike in hate crimes since 2017 as evidence that a correlation exists (Williamson & Gelfand, 2019).

It is problematic to try to measure perceived connections between political speech and specific acts of violence unless it is a direct call for violence with specific targets. However, a recent study by the University of North Texas attempted to do just that. In a working paper titled "The Trump Effect," professors Ayal Feinberg, Regina Branton, and Valerie Martinez-Ebers

make the claim that "counties which hosted a Trump rally [between June 17th, 2015 to November 7th, 2016] experienced a 226% increase in hate-motivated incidents" (2019). Their study measures the number of reported white supremacy propaganda, anti-Semitic incidents, and other reported hate crimes before and after campaign events using data by the Anti-Defamation League's (ADL) Center on Extremism. Speaking to the Associated Press about their work, Mrs. Martinez-Ebers stated that "this research confirms, at least in my mind, that the political rhetoric that's happening today is influencing the American public's actions" (Kunzelman and Galvan 2019). However, other studies have disputed these claims and Feinberg et al. acknowledge that their study fails to test whether rallies from Trump's rival, Hillary Clinton, also lead to an increase in hate crimes (Lilley and Wheaton 2019).

This study uses the same data sources as Feinberg et al. to expand upon their work by testing the relationship between Trump rallies and hate crimes using panel regressions and difference-in-difference models. This study also examines any observed correlation between Clinton rallies and hate crimes. Using the same data sources as Feinberg et al., the hypothesis of this study is that Trump rallies do, in fact, lead to an increase in hate crimes while Clinton rallies do not. The results show that there is preliminary evidence to suggest a small, yet statistically significant increase in hate crimes in counties that hosted Trump rallies. However, all of the difference-in-difference models conducted in this study also show no statistical correlation for Trump or Clinton rallies. Further research is needed to confirm these results and to continue probing the relationship between Trump's rallies and increases in hate crimes.

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Does President Trump's rallies lead to an increase in hate crimes? This question is at the heart of the study by professors Ayal Feinberg, Regina Branton, and Valerie Martinez-Ebers which claims that counties that hosted a Trump rally between June 17th, 2015 to November 7th, 2016 experienced a 226% increase in hate-motivated incidents (2019). Their working paper is the first of its kind to quantify the correlation between specifically Trump rallies and increases in hate crimes. The findings of Feinberg et al. were picked up by media outlets such as *The Washington Post* (Feinberg, Branton, & Martinez-Ebers, 2019), *Vox* (Sakuma, 2019)*,* and *CNN* (Avlon, 2019)*.* High-profile politicians such as Senator Bernie Sanders and Congresswoman Ilhan Omar also shared these headline results as evidence of the dangers of Trump's rhetoric (Lilley & Wheaton, 2019).

One study, however, challenges the assertions and methods of Feinberg et al. Two PhD. candidates at Harvard University, Matthew Lilley and Brian Wheaton, claim that the effect of Hillary Clinton rallies on hate crimes is even larger than Trump rallies when using the same methods to compare the two candidates (Lilley and Wheaton 2019). However, they also add that data for Clinton and Trump rallies are all statistically insignificant, rendering their results inconclusive. The authors also argue that the statistical methods used by Feinberg et al. fail to control for population, writing that "higher population places will tend to have proportionally higher counts of crime" (Lilley & Wheaton, 2019). In other words, it's not necessarily that Trump's rallies lead to an increase in hate crimes, Lilley and Wheaton argue, but rather that hate crimes were already occurring at increased rates in higher-population areas which are also high-likelihood locations for presidential candidates to host rallies. Feinberg publicly responded by claiming that he and his colleagues performed additional analysis that did control for population

and still shows a greater increase in hate crime incidents from Trump rallies compared with Clinton rallies; however, these findings have not yet been published (Lott 2019).

Authors from both studies stand by their methods and conclusions, begging the question of who is right and what is the true effect, if any, of Trump rallies on hate crimes? It's reasonable to hypothesize that hateful rhetoric by political leaders may lead to an increase in reported hate crimes, but how do we measure hate and how can we determine if rallies specifically make any difference at all? What are the research methods used by Feinberg et al. as well as Lilley and Wheaton and what are the possible flaws to their methodologies? This literature review examines the claims and methods of Feinberg et al.'s controversial study as well as related research on hate crimes, hate speech, and possible links between President Trump's rhetoric and observed spikes in hate crimes.

2.1 Defining Hate Crimes

First, it is important to begin with clearly defined terms. The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Civil Rights division define hate crimes as "a traditional offense like murder, arson, or vandalism with an added element of bias" (FBI 2016). For statistical purposes, this definition is expanded to include any "criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity" (FBI 2016). Under this definition it is important to note that only unlawful acts with a clear element of bias constitute as hate crimes, meaning that hateful rhetoric or other hateful acts are not be reported as hate crimes. Furthermore, while the FBI collects hate crime statistics under these criteria, state laws vary widely on whether gender,

gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation are counted as hate crime, leading to discrepancies across states.

In addition to using publicly available data from the FBI, Feinberg et al. use data from the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), an anti-hate advocacy organization which monitors and reports on hate incidents across the country. The ADL expands on available data from the FBI to compile a comprehensive dataset of "extremist and anti-Semitic incidents" (ADL 2019). This data includes not only hate crimes labeled as such under the FBI definition, but also some hate incidents that may go unreported in the FBI count. "Incidents" might include anything from posting racially charged fliers in a community to hosting a lawful white supremacy event (which would be lawful, but nonetheless an act of hate).

2.2 Measuring Hate Crimes

Since the Hate Crime Statistics Act (HCSA) became law in 1990, the Justice Department has been required to collect and report hate crime statistics. However, the FBI relies on local law enforcement to submit this data and there is no authority compelling local agencies to submit reports accurately or to submit them at all. Of the 16,149 participating agencies that did submit reports in 2017, over 87 percent of them reported that they had no hate crimes at all for that year, including zero reported cases from the entire state of Hawaii (FBI 2018). Similarly, the ADL conducted an analysis which showed that more than 90 large cities with 100,000 residents or more reported zero hate crimes for all years (Greenblatt 2019), a figure that should invite skepticism for obvious reasons. Experts generally agree that true hate crime rates are vastly underreported for two main reasons: victim underreporting and police agency misclassification (Pezzella, Fetzer, & Keller 2019). According to Ken Schwencke of ProPublica, "local law

enforcement agencies reported a total of 6,121 hate crimes in 2016 to the FBI, but estimates from the National Crime Victimization Survey, conducted by the federal government, pin the number of potential hate crimes at almost 250,000 a year — one indication of the inadequacy of the FBI's data" (Schwencke 2019).

Regarding why victims tend not to report hate crimes, Pezzella et al. from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice write that "groups that are the most prevalent victims of hate crimes simultaneously sustain histories of strained relationships with the police," adding that "lack of confidence in the police are significant predictors of victim underreporting of hate crimes for a number of marginalized groups protected under contemporary hate crime legislation" (Pezzella, Fetzer, & Keller 2019). Language barriers, fear of deportation, cultural differences, and fear of retaliation are also significant reasons for underreporting (Pezzella et al. 2019).

Given these inherent flaws in the data, readers should note that the figures used in this and other studies are therefore imperfect and likely represent an undercount. However, the available data still represents the best measurements available for observing changes in hate crime rates in America.

2.3 Reported Hate Crimes are Increasing

Despite a likely underestimation of the true hate crime rate in the United States, this study, like others, can still use available data to examine whether there is a correlation between President Trump's rhetoric and increases in hate crime rates. However, before testing this hypothesis we must first assess the sometimes-controversial assumption that hate crimes are, in fact, increasing in the United States.

Most law enforcement officials, advocacy groups, and scholars accept the data which point to an unequivocal increase in hate crime rates over the last four years (Balsamo 2018). The Brookings Institute observed that President Trump's election in 2016 was associated with "the second-largest uptick in hate crimes in the 25 years for which data are available, second only to the spike after September 11, 2001" (Williamson & Gelfand, 2019). Reported hate crimes continued to increase in 2017 with the FBI reporting a 17% increase in reported cases from the previous year as well as a notable 37% spike in crimes targeting Jews (Greenblatt 2019). Figure 1 displays reported FBI hate crime incidents from 1997 to 2017, revealing a decline in hate crimes after a sharp increase in 2001 (largely attributed to the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks) as well as a steady increase around 2015 (Romero 2018).


Figure 1: Hate Crimes in the US

Skeptics will point out that some of the increase may be the result of better police reporting at the local level, as evidenced by a Bureau of Justice Statistics finding that showed a

decrease in estimated *unreported* hate crimes at the same time that *reported* hate crimes have increased (Oudekerk 2019). In other words, maybe it's not that hate crimes have increased but that the reporting structures have improved and therefore the rates appear higher. Although hate crime reporting does appear to be marginally improving, it is unlikely that this would account for an increase by the thousands in reported cases. Furthermore, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported that the number of hate groups in the US reached "near-historic highs" in 2016, rising from 892 in 2015 to 917 groups, adding that "that's only about 100 fewer organizations than the 1,018 tallied in 2011, which was the all-time high in some 30 years of SPLC counts" (Potok 2017). Even if hate crime data were being reported more accurately than previous years, that should not impact the SPLC's tally of hate groups that exist in America, which appears to be increasing as well.

Skeptics from the far-right, such as Wilfred Reilly, a professor of Political Science at Kentucky State University and author of *Hate Crime Hoax: How the Left is Selling a Fake Race War* also point to over 400 cases of false or dubious hate crime allegations from 2010 to 2017 as evidence of widespread fraud (Reily 2019). This misleading narrative became more common after the high-profile case of Jussie Smollette, an actor who falsely claimed that he was attacked by Trump-supporters for being black and gay (he later confessed to staging the incident for increased publicity). However, even if we accept these 400 cases as false reporting, the FBI still reported over 50,000 hate crimes during the same period (Greenblatt 2019), calling into doubt whether Reilley's findings represent any real widespread problem of false reporting.

In fact, several quantitative studies on false hate crime reporting revealed it to be an extremely rare occurrence. Brian Levine from the Center for the Study of Hate and Extremism at California State University finds that only 11 cases out of an estimated 7,600 reported cases in

2018 (or 0.14 percent), were proven to be false (Levine 2019). False reporting has even decreased since 2017, from 28 to 11 reported false claims (Levine 2019). Experts and researchers who track hate crimes are generally of the consensus that underreporting poses a greater challenge to accurate hate crime statistics rather than fake reports. The rest of this paper continues under the assumption that hate crimes are in fact increasing and that the figures represent a likely underestimation.

2.4 The Psychology and Rhetoric of Hate

This study has now established a working definition of hate crimes and examined some of the evidence indicating that hate crimes are increasing. With this in mind, it is now appropriate to look more closely at the psychology of hate, how political rhetoric impacts hate crimes, and what effect, if any, President Trump's rallies may have in explaining increases in hate crimes.

In the field of psychology, the concept of hate is one of the most under-researched and disputed topics, although that has begun to change recently. In the journal *Emotion Review*, Fischer et al. summarize the various ways psychologists and scholars have tried to classified hate, writing that hate can be described as "an emotional attitude, a syndrome, a form of generalized anger, a generalized evaluation, a normative judgment, a motive to devalue others, or simply an emotion" (Fischer, Halperin, Canetti, & Jasini, 2018). The term "hate crime" did not become commonplace in the American lexicon until the 1980s and only recently have "hate studies" become a new field of research in psychology (Chakraborti 2018). Although there is still much that is unknown about the nature of why humans hate, new research is shedding light on

the characteristics of hate, how it spreads within a community, and how hateful feelings can turn into hate-motivated acts of violence.

According to Fischer et al. the main difference between hatred and other negative emotions such as anger or fear are its tendencies towards action as well as what Fischer describes as "emotivational goals" (2018). Unlike fear, which often leads to a flight, rather than fight response, or anger which can sometimes lead to constructive responses, the "emotivational goal" of hatred is a desire to harm, humiliate, or destroy perceived opponents (Fischer, Halperin, Canetti, & Jasini, 2018). How these destructive actions are manifested vary widely depending on the circumstances. At the intergroup level, hate can be instigated by events that raise the perceived threats to the in-group (Mackie, Devos, &Smith 2000). Fisher et al. write that "extensive research has demonstrated that, in some situations, there is a connection between hate and its various active political manifestations, such as outgroup exclusionism, terrorism, the motivation to fight and kill in battle, and hate crimes" (2018). Hate can spread among in-group members when there is a heightened sense of collective victimhood (reinforced from other in-group members) as well as increased resentment or feelings of insecurity (Salmela & von Scheve 2017).

Politically, there is an abundance of evidence that hate can be used to reinforce group identity and mobilize voters (Hutchings, Valentino, Philpot, & White, 2006). In *Feeling Politics: Emotion in Political Information Processing*, Hutchings et al. (2006) show how racial cues can evoke strong emotional reactions vital to voter mobilization and persuasion for some candidates. Fischer et al. write that hatred is a "simple, political tool that is commonly used by politicians to attain ingroup solidarity and political benefits," adding that, "campaign ads, canvassing, and slogans based on collective hatred are the bread and butter of successful campaigns because the

message is simple and emotionally appealing" (2018). Several other studies have also found linkages between specific forms of political rhetoric and increased sentiments of hate. Karsten Müller and Carlo Schwarz's study, for example, finds that Trump's tweets relating to Muslims are highly correlated with the number of anti-Muslim hate crimes (Müller & Schwarz 2019), indicating there is a connection between Trump's rhetoric and hate crimes.

2.5 Does President Trump Inspire Hate?

President Trump has repeatedly claimed that he is the "least racist person" and has strongly pushed back against allegations that he incites hate-motivated violence (Lopez 2019). However, a record of his past rhetoric and actions, both as president and before his political career, show a clear pattern of racially charged comments**.** Before announcing his candidacy, Trump gained political prominence by perpetuating the "birther" conspiracy theory which falsely claimed that President Obama was not born in the United States, a move widely viewed as tapping into racial sentiments by critics (Budowsky 2016). When Trump announced his candidacy to run for president, he infamously described Mexican immigrants as "rapists" and "murderers" who are bringing crime and drugs (Casares 2019). Less than a year later when Trump insisted that an American judge with Mexican ancestry could not be impartial in a lawsuit against him, former Speaker of the House Paul Ryan stated that his comments were "the textbook definition of a racist comment" (Caygle 2016).

Finally, in Charlottesville, Virginia, neo-Nazi's chanting "Jews will not replace us" killed a woman, Heather Heyer, by driving a car through a crowd of counter-protesters. After the incident, President Trump was widely condemned for stating that there were "very fine people on both sides" of the protests (Holan 2019), a move viewed as emboldening the neo-Nazi

protesters. During the COVID-19 public health crisis, Trump routinely referred to the virus as the "Chinese virus" in national press briefings, even as hate crimes against Asian Americans shot up sharply in March of 2020 (Margolin 2020). Many other examples of racially charged rhetoric targeting African Americans (Whack and Bauer 2019), Muslims (Bonn 2019), Jews (Rubin 2019), and other groups have also been well-documented by scholars and journalists.

Despite this long list of comments, it is still problematic to try to categorize the words of a politician as "hateful" because of the subjectivity of hate and political rhetoric. What one might consider hateful may not be viewed as such by others. Whether or not it can be proved that Trump is using hateful rhetoric for his political advantage, there is still qualitative evidence that leaders of hate groups are emboldened by Trump's words (Graham et al. 2019). After the neo-Nazi protests in Charlottesville, alt-right leader Richard Spencer stated:

> There is no question that Charlottesville wouldn't have occurred without Trump. It really was because of his campaign and this new potential for a nationalist candidate who was resonating with the public in a very intense way. The alt-right found something in Trump. He changed the paradigm and made this kind of public presence of the alt-right possible (Graham et al. 2019).

Similarly, David Duke, the former leader of the Ku Klux Klan, called Charlottesville a "turning point" for the white supremacy movement, adding that Duke's followers will "fulfill the promises of Donald Trump." (Graham et al. 2019). Whether or not Trump admits that his rhetoric is having an impact on hate groups, it is clear that the leaders of hate groups are responding and acting on it.

2.6 Trump Rallies and Hate Crimes

There are many studies which suggest that Trump's rhetoric does have an impact on hate crimes. However, Feinberg et al. make the specific claim that Trump rallies are associated with a 226% increase in hate crimes while a conflicting study argues the opposite. To understand how two opposing conclusions can be reached despite using the same data sources one must examine the methods used in each study.

Feinberg et al. use a negative binomial regression using data compiled by the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism regarding hate, extremism, ant-Semitism, and terrorist incidents reported between January 1, 2016 and December 31 (Feinberg et al., 2019). They aggregate incident data and Trump rally data down to the county-level, then used a count of hate incidents targeting minorities that occurred in each county by month as their dependent variable. Feinberg's model includes various demographic and control variables, such as the per capita Jewish population of each county, the number of hate groups in 2016 as reported by the Southern Poverty Law Center, as well as county-level per capita violent crime and per capita property crime data (provided by the FBI's 2015 Unified Crime Report). In their results section, Feinberg et al. write:

> counties that hosted a rally are predicted to have a 3.26 times higher incident ratio rate of extremist and/or anti-Semitic incidents (or a 226% increase) than counties that did not host a rally … there were heighten incidents targeting minorities in counties hosting a Trump rally compared to counties that did not host Trump rallies (Feinberg et al., 2019)

Lilley and Wheaton claim that Feinberg et al. failed to control for the natural logarithm of population, which, when applied, eliminates the statistical significance to their findings (2019).

They argue that when their study controls for population then the coefficients fall to levels statistically indistinguishable from zero (Lilley and Wheaton, 2019). To demonstrate their claim, they substitute the dependent variable of hate crimes for frequency of Taco Bell restaurants, showing that according to their model this "implausibly yields an estimated effect from Trump rallies of 160%" (Lilley and Wheaton, 2019). They also claim that Clinton rallies produce an even greater effect on hate crimes than Trump rallies, although all results are statistically insignificant according to their methods (Lilley and Wheaton, 2019).

These conflicting findings highlight the need for more research on the possible links between the president's rhetoric and observed increases in hate crimes. The next section outlines the methods and models that this study uses to examine these claims, using the same data sources as previous studies. This research, in addition to the contributions of Feinberg et al and Lilley and Wheaton are particularly relevant in the current political context of the 2020 presidential election where Trump has already held several rallies since taking office and will likely hold more as the election approaches.

CHAPTER 3. DATA AND METHODS

This study uses two models to test the hypothesis that Trump rallies lead to an increase in hate crimes: a simple panel regression model and a difference-in-difference model. The dependent variable is the number of hate crimes while the independent variables include indicators for Trump and Clinton rallies as well as several control variables.

The data used in this study's analysis was conveniently made available on GitHub by Lilley and Wheaton and was independently verified prior to being used for this study's analysis.[1] The data for the dependent variable originally comes from the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism regarding hate, extremism, ant-Semitism, and terrorist incidents reported between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2018 (ADL 2019). The original data source includes 6,915 hate crime incidents with descriptions of the reported incidents, the city, state, and date of the reported incidents, as well as partial data on the ideology of the instigators. It also specifies the type of incident, including assault, vandalism, murder, or terrorist attack. A problem with this data set is that it is likely an underestimation of the true count of hate crime incidence, as explained in the literature review section of this study. Another potential issue is that there is no consistency in the driving-ideology of hate crime incidents, meaning that this model would be counting both left-wing and right-wing hate crimes.

For the independent variables, this study uses data on the cities, states, and dates of all Trump rallies held between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2016. Feinberg et al. start with a Wikipedia page that lists all 275 Trump rallies that occurred in 2016 and cross references this information with Newsbank, an online archive of U.S. newspapers, to see if there were any additional reported rallies. They report they did not find any additional rallies, and this information was also included in Lilley and Wheaton publicly accessible dataset which includes the state, county, month, and FIPS of each rally. In order to assign the correct county FIPS for each location of Trump and Clinton's rallies, Lilley and Wheaton use the Missouri Census Data Center's geographic correspondence dataset, which is based on GIS to correctly assign each rally to each county. This step is important because it ensures that each rally as well as each hate

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[1] Available at https://github.com/lilleymatthew/Trump_Rallies_Replication_Materials

crime incident is being counted in the correct county. Lilley and Wheaton also provide data on Hillary Clinton's rallies, something Feinberg's analysis omitted. This data has also been cleaned and published online, but Lilley and Wheaton acknowledge that it originally came from FairVote, a 501(c)(3) organization that advocates for electoral reform.[2] It is important to note that FairVote only recorded Clinton rallies beginning in late-July, 2016, after she secured the Democratic nomination and pivoted towards the general election. This is slightly problematic as the results section of this study will later show because it significantly reduces the sample size of Clinton rallies to the point where most results are statistically insignificant.

3.1 Control Variables

This study also uses a variety of control variables for a better-fitted model. First, this study uses data from the Southern Poverty Law Center to control for the number of number of hate groups in 2016 as one might predict that areas with more hate groups would see a greater probability of more hate crimes than areas with fewer groups. One potential problem with this variable is that it may report hate groups that have split into two or more factions in recent years, making it appear as though a county has a larger number of hate groups despite having the same number of members of hate groups. Furthermore, as witnessed in Charlottesville, Virginia, there is also the possibility that hate crimes are committed outside of the county where the members of a hate group are originally from. Unfortunately the data and models used in this study have no way to account for individuals who may have been motivated by a Trump rally but return to their

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[2] Available at:
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/14Lxw0vc4YBUwQ8cZouyewZvOGg6PyzS2mArWNe3iJcY/edit#gid=0

home county to commit a hate crime nor for individuals who travel to other counties to commit hate crimes such as the El Paso shooter.

Additional control variables include population controls, county-level estimates for percent of Jewish Population, percent of college educated population, percent living in poverty, and violent crime rate. All of these variables are included in both the models of Feinberg et al.'s and Lilley and Wheaton and are publicly available on GitHub by Lilley and Wheaton. Data for the estimated percent of Jewish Population originally comes from the 2011 North American Jewish Data Bank and the 2011 American Community Survey (ACS). The percent of college educated population also comes from the American Community Survey (2015) and the violent crime rate data originally comes from the FBI's 2015 Unified Crime Report, all of which are publicly available online. Finally, this study also includes the percent of GOP vote share in 2012 rather than more recent election data. Although it might make more sense to use more recent voting data, the 2012 data is the same dataset used by Feinberg et al. and Lilley and Wheaton and will therefore provide a better comparison with their results. The 2012 election data is originally from Dave Leip's Election Atlas election data, available for free online. Finally, population data at the county level originally comes from 2010 Census data and is reformatted into the log of population by Lilly and Wheaton.

Table 1 outlines all the independent variables that the model includes and the hypothesized relationship between these variables with the probability of increased hate crimes.

Table 1: Variables and Data Source

Independent Variables	Original Data Source	Hypothesized relationship between variable and increase in hate crimes
# of Hate Groups	SPLC	Positive
Population	2010 Census	Positive
Region: South	--	Positive
Region: Midwest	--	Negative
Region: Northeast	--	Positive
Region: West	--	Negative
% College Educated	2015 ACS	Negative
% Jewish Population	ACS and North American Jewish Data Bank	Positive
Violent Crime Rate	FBI UCR	Positive
% GOP Vote Share in 2012	Dave Leip's Election Atlas	Positive

3.2 Model Specification

This study uses a simple panel regression as well as a difference-in-difference model to determine whether Trump and Clinton rallies lead to either an increase in hate crimes, a decrease in hate crimes, or no change at all. The dependent variable is the number of recorded hate crimes in a given month while the independent variables include dummy variables for Trump and Clinton rallies as well as several control variables. The unrestricted panel model is as follows:

 # Hate Crimes = β0 + β1(County with Trump Rally) + β2 (Indicator for months after a Trump Rally) + β3 (County with Clinton Rally) + β4 (Indicator for months after a Clinton Rally) + β5 (month) + β6 (GOP vote share in 2012) + β7 (% Jewish Population) + β8 (Log of County Population) + β9 (# of Hate Groups) + β10 (% College Educated) + β11 (Violent Crime Rate)

The difference-in-difference model is similar but includes interaction variables for month and treatment groups. In this case, treatment groups are counties which held a rally and are assigned the value of "1" to indicate as such. Two types of panel and difference-in-difference models are conducted, first with the months after a rally all being assigned the value of "1" equally, whether the month is one month after the rally or five months after. Because we might expect hate crimes to spike immediately after a rally, a second dummy variable was generated to show the impact for each month after a rally. For this second indicator variable, the month after a rally is assigned "1," the second month after is assigned "2," and so on. In some cases, the candidates held multiple rallies in the same county. For these counties, the count restarts back to 1 after each new rally. Two sets of panel models and difference-in-difference models were conducted for each type of indicator, as explained in greater detail in the empirical results section.

CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Before diving into the results of the models, this study begins with descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables from all counties, Next, counties with only Trump or Clinton rallies are analyzed for a comparison of the two candidates. Each table is followed by an explanation of the principle findings.

4.1 Univariate Results

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables from all counties, regardless of whether there was a Trump or Clinton rally. The first observations that

stands out from this data is that the average number of hate crimes in any given month is 0.17, essentially zero hate crimes on average. The median statistic confirms that most counties in the United States report no hate crimes, however the maximum ranges up to 42 hate crimes in a single month. This could be that most counties do not report hate crimes, as discussed in the literature review section, or it could also be that most counties are so small as to not have very many hate crimes. The next observation that stands out is the population of the counties. Although the mean population for all counties in the United States is 98,318, the median is 25,890, indicating that a few populous counties are increasing the overall average, while the vast majority of counties are much smaller. We can safely assume that the true number of hate crimes is likely much higher than what is reported in this data, however this is the best available data available for this study's analysis.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics from All Counties

Variable	Mean	Median	S.E. of Mean	Minimum	Maximum
# Hate Crimes (per month)	0.17	0.00	0.01	0	42
# Hate Groups	24.56	23.00	0.09	0	79
Jewish Population Per Capita	0.3%	0.00%	0.00	0	29.3%
% Republican 2012	59.6%	60.7%	0.00	7.3%	95.9%
% College	20.4%	18.8%	0.00	1.9%	78.8%
Violent Crime Rate (Per 10K)	28.16	22.34	0.16	0	920.88
Population	98317.92	25890	16.12	82	9818605

Next, this study looks at the same statistics but only for counties that hosted rallies. There were 275 reported Trump rallies held in 2016 spread out over 196 counties, compared with 68 Clinton rallies in 40 counties. There were 30 counties where both Trump and Clinton held rallies.

Tables 3-5 show the descriptive statistics of counties that held Clinton rallies only, Trump rallies only, and both candidates, respectively.

Table 3: Counties with Clinton Rallies Only

Variable	Mean	Median	S.E of Mean	Minimum	Maximum
# Hate Crimes	1.41	0.00	0.28	0	15
# Hate Groups	41.10	37.50	1.45	16	63
Jewish Population Per Capita	2.0%	1.2%	0.00	0.0%	8.1%
% Republican 2012	41.6%	44.0%	0.01	14.0%	66.6%
% College	26.6%	23.8%	0.01	19.9%	46.9%
Violent Crime Rate (Per 10K)	41.44	31.27	2.70	10.57	102.97
Population	691113.8	453150	50104.86	161419	1820584

Table 4: Counties with Trump Rallies Only

Variable	Mean	Median	S.E. of Mean	Minimum	Maximum
# Hate Crimes	0.70	0.00	0.04	0	16
# Hate Groups	26.22	22.00	0.45	1	79
Jewish Population Per Capita	1.0%	0.3%	0.00	0%	17.2%
% Republican 2012	48.9%	48.5%	0.00	16.0%	83.2%
% College	30.0%	28.8%	0.00	10.7%	58.2%
Violent Crime Rate (Per 10K)	36.79	32.09	0.58	1.44	181.78
Population	405200.7	236862	10744.02	16408	3095313

Table 5: Counties with Both Clinton and Trump Rallies

Variable	Mean	Median	S.E. of Mean	Minimum	Maximum
# Hate Crimes	1.98	0.00	0.23	0	31
# Hate Groups	34.20	35.00	1.12	4	63
Jewish Population Per Capita	2.3%	1.1%	0.00	0.1%	15.8%
% Republican 2012	43.0%	41.9%	0.00	29.6%	58.1%
% College	31.1%	31.0%	0.00	18.0%	49.0%
Violent Crime Rate (Per 10K)	43.96	43.97	0.79	20.16	81.54
Population	850754.8	491499.5	42446.57	123143	3817117

The first observation is that counties that held Clinton rallies generally have a much higher population and tend to have twice as many hate crimes on average (0.70 for Trump counties compared with 1.4 for Clinton counties). Similarly, counties that Clinton went to also tend to have more hate groups and higher Jewish populations. This makes sense if we look at the counties that the candidates went to, with Clinton generally going to more diverse, urban areas, while Trump went to a combination of urban, suburban, and rural counties.

Finally, before running the panel and difference-in-difference regressions, this study looks at the descriptive statistics of hate crimes for the months after a rally compared with the months before. To determine these figures, a simple indicator variable is assigned for each month after a rally. Months after a rally are given the value of 1 and months before are given a value of 0. The months of the rallies are also assigned the value of zero because some rallies occurred towards the end of the month while others occurred towards the beginning and there is no way to break down the data lower than the month level. It should be noted that if a rally occurred in January, all months after January are equally assigned the value of "1", meaning that December and February are weighted equally and both assigned the value of "1".

Because we might expect hate crimes to spike immediately after a rally, a second dummy variable was generated to show the impact for each month after a rally. For this second indicator variable, the month after a rally is assigned "1," the second month after is assigned "2," and so on. In some cases, the candidates held multiple rallies in the same county. For these counties, the count restarts back to 1 after each new rally. Using this indicator, we can look at whether there is a spike in hate crimes one, two, or more months after a rally. Table 6 shows the simple "before and after" dummy as well as the break down for each month after the rally for each candidate. Because the control variables are annual figures, they do not change month by month, therefore

the data presented in the following tables only show changes in hate crimes for Trump and

Clinton rallies. It should be noted that these are descriptive statistics, they are only observations,

not a regression analysis of the relationship between rallies and hate crimes. Months after four

months have also been omitted.

Table 6: Hate Crimes Before and After a Rally

Variable	Mean	Median	S.E. of Mean	Minimum	Maximum
Counties that held Trump Rallies					
# Hate Crimes Before Rally	0.77	0.00	0.06	0	25
# Hate Crimes After Rally	0.99	0.00	0.07	0	31
1 month after	1.13	0	0.20	0	31
2 months after	1.22	0	0.19	0	20
3 months after	0.91	0	0.16	0	17
4 months after	1.01	0	0.20	0	21
Counties that held Clinton Rallies					
# Hate Crimes Before Rally	1.77	0.00	0.21	0	31
# Hate Crimes After Rally	2.01	0	0.38	0	20
1 month after	2.64	1	0.60	0	20
2 months after	1.52	0	0.69	0	17
3 months after	0.36	0	0.17	0	2
4 months after	0.22	0	0.15	0	1

The first observation is that there does appear to be a spike in hate crimes for both

candidates immediately following a rally. Although the spike for Clinton rallies is greater, the

standard error is also much larger, a product of the small sample size most likely. The

hypothesized trend also appears to be true where there is a quick jump in hate crimes in the first

month after a rally, then it slowly starts to come down. With these given descriptive statistics in

mind, this study will now run panel and difference-in-difference regressions to test whether any

of this data is statistically significant.

4.2 Multivariate Modeling Results

The multivariate model begins with a simple, restricted panel regression, then expands to an unrestricted panel regression, followed the difference-in-difference models. The first results display a simple panel regression with hate crimes as the dependent variable and dummies for Trump rallies and months before and after rallies. To reduce standard errors, the model is clustered by county. The results are displayed in Table 7 for Trump rallies and Table 8 for Clinton rallies.

Table 7: Restricted Panel Regression, Trump Rallies

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
County w/ Trump Rally	0.711	0.140	5.09	0.000	***
Indicator for Months after Rally	0.124	0.065	1.90	0.057	*
Constant	0.076	0.014	5.33	0.000	***
Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var			1.089
Overall r-squared	0.031	Number of obs			37704.000
Chi-square	91.554	Prob > chi2			0.000
R-squared within	0.005	R-squared between			0.037

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: Restricted Panel Regression, Clinton Rallies

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
County w/ Clinton Rally	1.644	0.566	2.90	0.004	***
Indicator for Months after Rally	0.174	0.202	0.86	0.389	
Constant	0.100	0.014	7.12	0.000	***
Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var			1.089
Overall r-squared	0.031	Number of obs			37704.000
Chi-square	76.692	Prob > chi2			0.000
R-squared within	0.005	R-squared between			0.037

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Finally, the unrestricted model includes all control variables, including month, as displayed in Table 9 below.

Table 9: Unrestricted Panel Regression

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
Trump Rally County	0.024	0.126	0.19	0.848	
Months After Trump Rally	0.114	0.068	1.69	0.092	*
Clinton Rally County	0.734	0.564	1.30	0.194	
Months After Clinton Rally	0.128	0.211	0.61	0.542	
January	0.000	.	.	.	
February	0.000	0.011	-0.04	0.970	
March	0.035	0.011	3.09	0.002	***
April	0.032	0.011	2.84	0.004	***
May	0.032	0.011	2.81	0.005	***
June	0.044	0.012	3.65	0.000	***
July	0.069	0.013	5.44	0.000	***
August	0.039	0.012	3.42	0.001	***
September	0.043	0.011	4.02	0.000	***
October	0.054	0.011	4.69	0.000	***
November	0.111	0.016	7.02	0.000	***
December	0.027	0.012	2.19	0.028	**
% GOP 2012	-0.212	0.116	-1.84	0.066	*
Jewish Population Per Capita	19.793	5.870	3.37	0.001	***
Log Population	0.136	0.029	4.73	0.000	***
# Hate Crimes	0.000	0.001	-0.24	0.811	
% College	0.238	0.331	0.72	0.472	
Violent Crime Rate (per 10K)	0.001	0.000	2.78	0.005	***
Constant	-1.301	0.260	-5.00	0.000	***
Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var			1.090
Overall r-squared	0.170	Number of obs			37668.000
Chi-square	130.288	Prob > chi2			0.000
R-squared within	0.005	R-squared between			0.207

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The bottom line of these results is that the rallies of either candidate show little impact on hate crimes, however there is an observable 0.114 increase in hate crimes after a Trump rally at the 10 percent significance level. Although the coefficient for the months after a Clinton rally is higher (0.734), the results are statistically insignificant, most likely due to the low sample size.

Although it is difficult to extrapolate a statistically significant trend following Trump rallies, one

could argue from these results that a Trump rally increases hate crimes by 0.11 on average. In

other words, for every 10 Trump rallies, hate crimes increase by 1 in the United States. No

statements can be made about Clinton rallies because the results are statistically insignificant. To

test these results further, this study continues with a difference-in-difference model using month

as a time dummy and Trump/Clinton rallies as treatment dummies. The results of this

unrestricted difference-in-difference model can be found below in Tables 10 and 11.

Table 10: Restricted Difference-In-Difference for Trump Rallies

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
County with Trump Rally	0.657	0.121	5.45	0.000	***
Months After Trump Rally	0.219	0.146	1.50	0.135	
Constant	0.117	0.016	7.44	0.000	***
Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var			1.089
R-squared	0.031	Number of obs			37704.000
F-test	16.195	Prob > F			0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC)	112255.737	Bayesian crit. (BIC)			112281.350

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

It should be noted that the difference-in-difference interaction variable (treatment variable

multiplied by time variable) was omitted because of collinearity, which casts doubt on the

usefulness of a difference-in-difference model for this analysis. The results are similar for

Clinton rallies:

Table 11: Restricted Difference-In-Difference for Clinton Rallies

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
County with Clinton Rally	1.628	0.585	2.78	0.005	***
Months after a Clinton Rally	0.236	0.484	0.49	0.626	
Constant	0.144	0.016	9.13	0.000	***
Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var			1.089
R-squared	0.030	Number of obs			37704.000
F-test	4.290	Prob > F			0.014
Akaike crit. (AIC)	112272.135	Bayesian crit. (BIC)			112297.748

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Again, in these restricted difference-in-difference models the variable of interest is not statistically significant for either candidate. Table 12 adds control variables to provide an unrestricted difference-in-difference model.

Table 12: Unrestricted Difference-in-Difference Model

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
Months after a Trump Rally	0.246	0.149	1.66	0.097	*
County with Trump Rally	-0.052	0.142	-0.36	0.715	
County with Clinton Rally	0.745	0.589	1.26	0.206	
Months after a Clinton rally	0.095	0.504	0.19	0.850	
Interaction Variable (omitted)	0.000	.	.	.	
% GOP Share 2012	-0.212	0.115	-1.84	0.066	*
% Jewish Population	19.787	5.870	3.37	0.001	***
Log Population	0.136	0.029	4.73	0.000	***
# Hate Groups	0.000	0.001	-0.20	0.846	
% College Share	0.239	0.331	0.72	0.471	
Violent Crime Rate (per 10K)	0.001	0.000	2.77	0.006	***
Constant	-1.263	0.260	-4.86	0.000	***
Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var			1.090
R-squared	0.169	Number of obs			37668.000
F-test	9.758	Prob > F			0.000
Akaike crit. (AIC)	106388.520	Bayesian crit. (BIC)			106482.423

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Interestingly, the coefficient with control variables added reveals an *increase* in the impact of a Trump rally on hate crimes to 0.246 which is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Again, Clinton rallies show a higher coefficient but are statistically insignificant and therefore no conclusions can be drawn. One noteworthy problem with this model is that the interaction variables were again omitted because of collinearity, casting doubt on the overall results of this model. The bottom line is that the results are insignificant for Clinton rallies, but for Trump rallies the results show a small, but statistically significant increase in hate crimes in the months following a hate crime. While the panel regression revealed a 0.11 increase, the difference-in-difference model showed a 0.246 increase. In other words, for every ten Trump rallies there is an increase of one hate crime in the United States or for every four Trump rallies there is an increase of one hate crime, depending on the model used. Again, the difference-in-difference model which yielded a 0.246 should not be viewed as conclusive because of collinearity in the model.

These results are not necessarily surprising. The small sample size for Clinton rallies means the results are likely to not have a high p-value or be statistically significant. The data shows minimal increases in hate crimes after Trump rallies, far from the 226% increase suggested by Feinstein et al. However, it still does show an increase after Trump rallies with a coefficient that is positive and statistically significant. One possible problem is that all months after a rally are assigned equal weight, as discussed earlier. What this effectively means is that if a rally was held in January, the "months after" variable would capture hate crime data from both February as well as December and everything in between, with equal weight for all months after. To test whether this had an impact on the results, this study ran the same models but instead used a new dummy variable that assigned ordinal values for each month after a rally. When a county

had multiple rallies, the numbering started back over with "1" for the month immediately after the rally. Following the same pattern as the previous regression, these new regressions start with restricted and unrestricted panel models using this new dummy variable. The results can be found below in Tables 13-14.

Table 13 : Restricted Panel Regression for Trump Rallies by Months After Rally

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
County with Trump Rally	0.738	0.141	5.24	0.000	***
Months After a Rally					
1 month after	0.037	0.109	0.33	0.738	
2 months after	0.204	0.083	2.46	0.014	**
3 months after	-0.043	0.097	-0.45	0.653	*
4 months after	0.075	0.113	0.66	0.509	
5 months after	-0.011	0.120	-0.09	0.927	
6 months after	0.159	0.126	1.26	0.208	
7 months after	0.082	0.118	0.70	0.487	
8 months after	0.134	0.136	0.99	0.324	
9 months after	-0.010	0.134	-0.07	0.942	
10 months after	0.307	0.196	1.56	0.118	
11 months after	0.009	0.116	0.08	0.936	
Constant	0.075	0.014	5.21	0.000	***

Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var		1.089
Overall r-squared	0.031	Number of obs		37704.000
Chi-square	108.402	Prob > chi2		0.000
R-squared within	0.006	R-squared between		0.037

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 14: Restricted Panel Regression for Clinton Rallies by Months After Rally

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
County with Clinton Rally	1.649	0.566	2.91	0.004	***
Months after Clinton Rally	0.000	.	.	.	
1 Month after	0.429	0.337	1.27	0.202	
2 months after	-0.207	0.236	-0.88	0.379	
3 months after	-0.044	0.134	-0.32	0.746	
4 months after	-0.059	0.171	-0.35	0.728	
5 months after	-0.317	0.132	-2.40	0.017	**
Constant	0.100	0.014	7.11	0.000	***
Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var			1.089
Overall r-squared	0.032	Number of obs			37704.000
Chi-square	81.647	Prob > chi2			0.000
R-squared within	0.006	R-squared between			0.038

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

From these restricted models we can observe that two and three months after a Trump rally there is a positive and statistically significant increases in hate crimes. For Clinton rallies we do observe one coefficient at five months after a rally that is statistically significant and reveals a decrease in hate crimes (p<0.05, coefficient = -0.3.17). The next step is to run an unrestricted panel regression model with all control variables added and fixed effects.

Table 15: Unrestricted Panel Regression for Candidate Rallies by Months After

Hate Crimes	Coef.	St.Err	t-value	p-value	Sig.
Months after a Trump Rally					
1 month after	0.041	0.108	0.38	0.705	
2 months after	0.214	0.084	2.56	0.011	**
3 months after	-0.024	0.102	-0.24	0.811	
4 months after	0.094	0.115	0.81	0.416	
5 months after	0.034	0.120	0.28	0.776	
6 months after	0.200	0.127	1.57	0.115	
7 months after	0.120	0.120	1.01	0.314	
8 months after	0.181	0.138	1.31	0.188	
9 months after	0.049	0.138	0.36	0.720	
10 months after	0.383	0.193	1.98	0.048	**
11 months after	0.036	0.119	0.30	0.763	
Months After Clinton Rallies					
1 Month after	0.426	0.341	1.25	0.212	
2 months after	-0.232	0.244	-0.95	0.343	
3 months after	0.008	0.130	0.06	0.950	
4 months after	-0.009	0.180	-0.05	0.960	
5 months after	-0.282	0.140	-2.02	0.044	**
Constant	0.162	0.002	66.41	0.000	***

Mean dependent var	0.166	SD dependent var		1.090
R-squared	0.003	Number of obs		37668.000
F-test	1.475	Prob > F		0.105
Akaike crit. (AIC)	49306.941	Bayesian crit. (BIC)		49443.526

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Again, we find that no Clinton data yields any statistically significant results except for five months after. For Trump rallies we find a statistically significant and positive coefficient for two months after again. One explanation that two months, rather than one month after a Trump rally is statistically significant could be that the time variable began with the month after a rally, rather than starting with "1" for the month of the rally.

Most of the results are not statistically significant, meaning that further analysis is required to be confident that there is indeed a positive relationship between Trump rallies and

hate crimes in this data. This is especially true for Clinton rallies which yielded no significant results most likely due to a low sample size. However, these results do suggest that Trump rallies lead to increases in hate crimes in the months after a rally and at least one of these variables is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For this variable (two months after a Trump rally), hate crimes increase by 0.214, suggesting that for every five Trump rallies, hate crimes increase by 1. Between the restricted and unrestricted panel and difference-in-difference models conducted, this study has found a range of outcomes from Trump rallies, all of which are positive. This means that Trump rallies likely have anywhere between a 0.114 increase to a 0.214 increase in hate crimes. In other words, it could be that for every ten Trump rallies there is an increase of one reported hate crime in the United States, or it could be that for every five Trump rallies there is an increase of one hate crime.

To test this hypothesis further it would be helpful to observe the counties with multiple rallies to see if multiple rallies in the same county have greater impacts on hate crimes than counties with just one rally. Other issues of collinearity in the difference-in-difference model also cast doubt on the results from those models, however the panel regression models suggest that there are statistically significant and positive impacts on hate crimes after Trump rallies.

CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION

Is there evidence that Trump or Clinton Rallies lead to an increase in hate crimes? This study adds to the work of Feinberg et al. as well as Lilly and Wheaton to determine what impact, if any, Trump and Clinton rallies have on the number of hate crimes in the United States. Feinberg et al. offer evidence using a binomial regression model that counties which host Trump

rallies experience a 226% increase in hate-motivated incidents. Lilley and Wheaton refute this claim, arguing that their results are not statistically significant. This study ran a simple panel regression and a difference-in-difference model using the same data as Feinberg et al. and Lilley and Wheaton to re-examine this question. The hypothesis of this study is that Trump rallies do, in fact, lead to an increase in hate crimes while Clinton rallies do not. The results study suggest that this hypothesis is correct: there is evidence that Trump rallies do lead to a small, but statistically significant increase in hate crimes while Clinton rallies did not show any statistically significant results.

The difference-in-difference models consistently revealed issues of collinearity, rendering most of those results unusable for practical analysis, unfortunately. However, the panel regressions did yield positive and statistically significant results for Trump rallies which included population controls and additional fixed effects. Variations of the panel regression reveal that hate crimes increase in counties that hosted Trump rallies by as little as 0.11 by one estimate and as much as 0.214 by another, both of which are statistically significant at least at the 10% level. This means that for every five Trump rallies there is one additional hate crime in America by one estimate, or for every ten Trump rallies there is one additional hate crime. The difference in these panel models is whether all months after a Trump rally are given the same weight or if the immediate months after are given a greater weight. Clinton rallies did not yield any statistically significant results for either model, most likely because of the low sample size. While there are several limitations to this study's approach, these positive results suggest that Trump rallies are associated with increases in hate crimes, even if those increases are small. Greater study is needed to confirm and expand these results, the limitations of which are discussed in greater detail below.

Most reports and studies on hate crimes and political rhetoric suggest that hate crimes have increased since Trump entered the political arena and that his rhetoric may be a contributing factor. Even at the publishing date of this study, a rigorous debate is ensuing regarding Trump's use of the term "Chinese Virus" to describe COVID-19 and whether this may be responsible for a sharp uptick in attacks against Asian Americans (Morgolin 2020). It is not within the scope of the data set to quantify whether Trump's rhetoric in general is correlated with increases in hate crimes; however, it is within this study's scope to declare that there is evidence that his rallies are positively and significantly correlated with increases in hate crimes. It could be that the mere gathering of Trump-supporters, rather than Trump's rhetoric per say, is leading to increases in hate crimes, or it could also be that his rhetoric is having an impact. As Salmela & von Scheve pointed out, hate can spread among in-group members of a community when there is a heightened sense of collective victimhood (2017). Whether that collective victimhood is heightened because of Trump's rhetoric or because of a hive-mentality when like-minded individuals congregate is not answered in this study. Certainly, a main feature of political rallies is certainly listening to a candidate speak, therefore it would be appropriate to speculate that Trump's rhetoric at these rallies is likely a contributing factor to increased feelings of hate and increased hate crimes.

In Lilley and Wheaton's study, the researchers point out that the coefficient for Clinton rallies is greater than for Trump rallies, but that these results are not statistically significant. This study's analysis confirms that the coefficients for Clinton rallies yield greater increases in hate crimes than Trump's rallies, but also that these figures are not statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance is almost certainly due to the low sample size of Clinton rallies (68 compared with Trump's 275). However, it could also be a comment on model control variables

that were not considered by Feinberg, Lilley, or this study. Clinton's rallies were held predominantly in diverse, urban areas where there are already higher incidence of hate crimes. An interesting analysis that was not conducted in this or any other study would be to examine Senator Bernie Sanders' rallies as well. By doing so, researchers might be able to test whether there is a correlation with hate crimes because his campaign held more rallies than Clinton's, thus giving us a larger sample size to work with.

Another limitation is that this study's approach does not show what happens when someone from another county travels to another county to attend a rally. The El Paso shooter, for example, traveled from Collin County, Texas to El Paso County to commit his crime and there is also no evidence that we know of that he attended a Trump rally prior to his crime. This study has no way of accounting for individuals who may be associated with hate groups who travel to other counties to attend Trump's rallies and whether the rallies had any impact on them. While there is no empirical data on these individuals, there is anecdotal evidence that hate groups are emboldened by Trump's rhetoric and one can hypothesize that rallies would energize these individuals, potentially to commit crimes back in their home counties rather than in the counties they traveled to. They may also travel to counties that have certain demographic factors as well.

It should be noted that this study does not seek to claim that Trump's words specifically cause increases in hate crimes. More important than what the results reveal is what they do not reveal. When difference-in-difference models were performed, both restricted models and models with controls, the results all contained issues of collinearity, suggesting that this was not the best model to use for this data set. Furthermore, while two tests came back with statistically significant results from the panel regressions, most regressions did not show any statistically significant results, suggesting that the panel model may also require greater scrutiny. The results

merely suggest that there is likely an association that requires additional research to confirm.

Along with the findings of Feinberg et al. and Lilley and Wheaton, these results need to be

examined in the context of the larger body of literature and for future researchers to continue.

One additional step that can be taken to test the efficacy of these panel models would be to

examine counties with multiple rallies to see if there is a greater spike in hate crimes there. This

would be difficult to test because of the low sample size of counties with multiple Trump rallies,

but it would be worth analyzing, nonetheless.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

This study presents some evidence that there are minor, yet positive and statistically

significant, increases in hate crimes following Trump rallies. Clinton rallies yielded no

significant results most likely due to a low sample size, making any meaningful comparisons

between Trump and Clinton rallies impossible given the data. One estimate revealed that hate

crimes increase by 0.214 in the months after a hate crime, which is statistically significant at the

5 percent level. This suggests that for every five Trump rallies, hate crimes increase by one. A

more conservative estimate reveals an increase of 0.11, significant at the 10% level, indicating

that for every ten rallies there is an increase of one hate crime. Although there are several

limitations to these models, this study offers support to Feinberg et al.'s conclusion that Trump's

rallies are positively associated with increases in hate crimes in America. These findings add to

the growing body of literature on hate crimes in the era of Trump and how rhetoric and political

rallies can lead to observable changes in the public. These findings are particularly relevant as

the 2020 election approaches and political rallies continue in the coming months.

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