FALLING INTO SHAME: THE CULTURAL HISTORY OF AN EMOTION IN PRE-MODERN IBERIA

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores literary and visual representations of shame with a particular focus on the 14th to 16th centuries. Through a survey of prose literary works and Early Modern visual culture, this project argues for an understanding of shame as a social construction of the period connected to different cultural factors. In medieval conduct manuals, authors prescribe and proscribe feelings of shame based on gender, and the societal institutions of honor and virtue. In his Crónica Sarracina, Castilian writer Pedro de Corral constructs a shame experience around the figure of Florinda La Cava and the 711 Fall of Spain that echoes that of Lucretia and the fall of the Roman Kingdom. Additionally, as fifteenth-century historiographers seek to reckon with that Fall, they use literary texts and representations of the port city of Ceuta as a means of finding redemption for national shame. During the period of imperial expansion, however, when European understandings of emotions came face to face with those of indigenous communities of West Africa and the New World, cultural differences as they pertain to emotion led to the othering of indigenous and black bodies as “shameless,” as is the case the chronicles of Gomes Eanes de Zurara and Pêro Vaz de Caminha. Finally, I turn to representations of public shaming as a punishment used in the Spanish Inquisition, and I examine the connections between emotion and power structures in paintings from Pedro Berruguete to Francisco de Goya.
As a whole, this dissertation seeks to expand Medieval and Early Modern paradigms of gender, race, and historiography in order to include emotional factors. That is to say, shame defines, and is defined by, the medieval sex/gender system, ethnographic observations in the colonial contact zone, and late-medieval modes of transmitting history.
DEDICATION

To Eliana Karlan
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INTRODUCTION

Researcher Brené Brown’s 2012 TED Talk “Listening to Shame” has over twelve million views. The day after the impeachment of President Donald Trump, George Conway, in an Opinion piece in the Washington Post, questions if Republican Senators will be “shamed by Trump himself.” Season Five of HBO’s critically acclaimed series Game of Thrones included the famous “Walk of Atonement,” a scene that quickly became a meme of neomedieval culture. Shame permeates our culture and touches every part of our lives, whether or not we think about it explicitly. Shame is something we have probably all felt at some point. We can quickly identify its symptoms among friends, in paintings, in television shows or films; we recognize blushing, crying, and the bowing of the head as visual cues for feelings of shame. We know of public shaming, used as punishment or for humiliation, grounded in the act of exposing people to the judgment of a crowd. At the same time, we expect a sense of shame from those around us or even celebrities or elected officials. The exclamation, “Do they have no shame?” upon observing indecent behavior is common parlance in the English language. Shame’s proliferation throughout modern society makes the writing of its history a Sisyphean task, never fully able to capture its entirety, its nuances, or the breadth of cultures that experience shame in different ways.

This project is an interdisciplinary survey of shame’s history in a culturally-specific moment: late-medieval and Early Modern Iberia. This specific period of Iberian history presents four specific factors that offer a robust context for the study of shame’s cultural presence on the Peninsula, and each of these factors will play an important role in the following chapters. The first factor is that the latter part of the Middle Ages saw the continued rise in medieval shame — and shame/honor — cultures. As Juan Manuel Cacho Blecua and Emily Francomano note, in
Spain, the thirteenth century was the moment shame became an important social issue in literary culture. The second factor is the fact that the fifteenth century marked an increased preoccupation with notions of national shame and a reckoning with Spain’s shameful history dating back to the eighth century. The third factor is that Iberia’s colonial expeditions — the Portuguese in North Africa, Asia, and Brazil, and the Spanish in the Americas — offer a unique context where emotional norms can be compared and contrasted between Judeo-Christian Europeans and Indigenous communities. Finally, the fourth factor is the establishment of the Spanish Inquisition, when institutionalized practices of public shaming took center stage as a mode of punishment.

These four factors converge making this moment of Iberian history and its cultural production a useful source for the history of shame. In this dissertation, I will show how literary and artistic works reflect as they seek to shape shame experiences grounded in specific cultural dispositions, including gender, politics, memory, race, and religion. As a whole, this project supports a social constructivist view of the emotion and illustrates a specific historical and geographical context of the emotional experience of shame.

**THE HISTORY OF THE HISTORY OF EMOTIONS, AND WHAT DOES “EMOTION” MEAN?**

What is the History of Emotions? The field has gained significant traction in the last few decades and is often dominated by the disciplinary intersections of history, anthropology, and psychology. The mission of the field is to understand the human experience of emotions over time and across cultural contexts, and the idea that emotions have a “history” is grounded in emotion’s ability to be historicized, “varying in structure from one culture, community, or period
to the next and serving diverse social functions,” to use Sarah McNamer’s words (*Affective Meditation* 3).

The ability to historicize emotions is also dependent on how emotions are defined, though the search for a precise definition of emotion has lasted for millennia. Western ideas of emotion find their roots in the philosophies of Aristotle, Thucydides, Polybius, and Galen. Broad in its scope and considered by Jan Plamper and others to be a good starting point when defining emotions, Aristotle’s definition says that “the emotions are all those affections which cause men to change their opinion in regard to their judgments, and are accompanied by pleasure and pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar emotions and their contraries” (*Rhetoric* 91-2). One of the most striking parts of Aristotle’s definition is the question of judgments, echoed by other thinkers of the period. Thucydides, for example, believed that emotion was an impulse to human action, while Polybius looked at emotions as a “motivating factor in human decision-making and action” (Plamper 44). For these thinkers, there is a direct correlation between feeling and action, and emotion is what connects inner feelings with conscious decision-making. And, in the following centuries, the notion of inner feelings also connected emotions to the human body. In the second century C.E., Galen began to look at the relationship between emotions and bodily fluids. Blood, phlegm, yellow gall, and black gall were each associated with the four humors: sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic, respectively. While other Classical theories of emotions allude to the internal aspects of emotions, Galen’s humoral theories show a direct correlation between one’s biological constitution and emotional state.

The connection between emotions, the conscious, and the body reappears at the dawn of modernity. René Descartes’ theory of mind-body dualism, for example, formed the foundation of
the modern divide between reason and emotion; the mind can think and be rational, while the body responds to stimuli with emotions independent of reason. Immanuel Kant also sought to juxtapose emotion from reason, positioning the two ideas as diametrically opposite one another, while other thinkers, notably David Hume, note that emotions can actually control a person’s reason. The question of bodily experience reappears in the writings of Thomas Hobbes. For instance, in Chapter Six of his *Leviathan*, Hobbes draws important connections between physical motions — toward or away from something — with affects and feelings — appetite and aversion. The essence of Hobbes’ observations about the passions, as he calls them, is that appetite and aversion are the basis of human feelings in relation to different objects; passions such as desire, love, and happiness are grounded in appetite, while passions like disgust and hate are grounded in aversion.

In the wake of these important historical theories, defining emotion today remains a challenging task. In Classical and Enlightenment theories of emotions and passions, it is clear that emotions are grounded both in the mind and the body, leading contemporary scholars to define it in a way that incorporates both components. William Reddy is one theorist who has sought to bridge the divide between internal and external manifestations of emotion through his idea of the “emotive” or “utterances or forms of expression” that express emotion (105); these are utterances that are aimed at “briefly characterizing the current state of activated thought material” (111). The statement “I feel ashamed” could be an example of a simple emotive. Reddy builds his idea of “emotives” tangentially off of J.L. Austin’s “speech act theory” from his 1962 book *How to Do Things with Words*. Instead of only looking at speech as descriptive, or “constative,” Austin proposes the existence of “performative” speech, or the idea that one’s
speech can be used to “perform or accomplish something” instead of just describe a situation” (Reddy 97). Emotives, in this vein, are neither performative nor constative in Reddy’s view, since emotives describe a mental state as is, but also require a certain amount of performativity in relation to others and the self (99-101).

While the “emotive” does blend mind and body by vocalizing the unconscious, the theory does have its limitations which will be addressed in Chapter Two. Additionally, the “emotive” is not, and cannot be, an overarching or broad definition of emotion as a whole. Barbara Rosenwein, in her book *Generations of Feeling*, presents her own definition of emotion that stems from her synthesis of previous theories as well as her own idea of “emotional communities.” Her definitions says, “there is a biological and universal aptitude for feeling and expressing what we now call ‘emotions.’ But what those emotions are, what they are called, how they are evaluated and felt, and how they are expressed (or not) — all these are shaped by ‘emotional communities’” (3). Rosenwein’s notion of emotional communities, which will be further discussed throughout this project, comes from her 2006 book *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*. They are groups in which people share the same emotional norms and values, often times overlapping and intersecting. Her definition of emotion is a hybrid theory that weaves together psychology and cultural anthropology. That is, emotion is an inherent part of human psychology, but how and why different emotions are felt and understood — or even called — depends on social contexts in which groups of people experience those emotions for the same reasons or in similar ways.

I turn specifically Rosenwein’s definition because of its interdisciplinary approach to emotions and its understanding that emotions can be the intersection of human biology and
culture, something Monique Scheer also echoes in her article, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice (And is That What Makes Them Have a History?): A Bourdeuian Approach to Understanding Emotion.” Scheer, like Rosenwein, notes that in defining emotion one must reckon with both the “inner” and “outer” parts of feeling, and the idea that emotions are something we both “have” and “manifest” (195). In connecting these two parts, Scheer proposes that emotions are, indeed, a type of practice in Bourdieu’s sense of the word. Emotions are products of the “knowing body” and pertain to a given *habitus*, or set of dispositions that would include an array of social contexts. Scheer explains, “For the purposes of emotional practice it is important to note that these acts are not only habituated and automatically executed movements of the body, but also encompassed a learned, culturally specific, and habitual distribution of attention to ‘inner’ processes of thought, feeling, and perception” (200). She goes on to bring up some important qualifications to her theory of emotional practice. The first is that the *habitus* is not the subject who feels but the “precondition of subjectification,” including all social influences and prescriptions for how to feel and express emotions. Secondly, Scheer explains how, “Conceiving of emotions as practices or acts also provides a way of counterbalancing the dominant language of emotions as always and essentially *reactions*, or triggered responses” (206). As practices, emotions can actually stand as their own “cultural activity” and inform audiences about social contexts, as opposed to always being understood as the byproduct of social or historical triggers.

Considering all of these definitions of emotion from Aristotle through today, I wish to synthesize my own broad definition within the context of this project. As I examine emotions in the Middle Ages and in the Early Modern period, it is important to take certain things into consideration, such as an anachronistic applications of Cartesian dualism to medieval modes of
thought, or historical changes in understanding humoral theory from Galen through the seventeenth century. I will therefore propose that emotions — which also includes feelings and passions — are psychological experiences or affects, the embodiment of which is contingent on a bilateral relationship with external stimuli and an adherence to culturally understood social norms.

THE CRITICAL DIVIDE — UNIVERSALISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

While I define emotion in a way that includes both psychological and cultural components in the experience of feeling, it is important to note that the field of Emotions History has long been split between universalist approaches, typically stemming from psychology, and social constructivist approaches, typically stemming from anthropology. This critical divide has dominated the field for decades, and often dominates the current dialogue on the study of emotions in the Humanities where different methodologies — literary studies, art history, etc. — are beginning to find their way into the conversation.

Universalism is the idea that emotions, or what we now call emotions, are the same throughout history and across cultures. Grounded in psychology and neurobiology, the universalist approach to emotions seeks to find commonalities in how the brain experiences emotion or conveys feeling. Emotions like fear are the result of communication between the amygdala, which puts the body in a state of alarm, and the cerebral cortex, which evaluates danger and responds accordingly by sending other signals throughout the body (Plamper 213). This underlying biological or physiological response is what universalists point to as a unifying
factor for the emotional experience of all humans, though what we call those experiences and what triggers those experiences will differ across languages and geographical regions.

Beyond neurobiology, other theories of universalism include those in experimental psychology, notably the work of Paul Ekman, known for his studies on basic emotions and facial expressions, which will be an important component of Chapter Five. Ekman’s work shows that humans experience basic emotions that are communicable to outside observers through recognition of facial expressions. For his experiments, Ekman showed images of different people making different faces and observers were tasked with describing how the subjects in the images felt. His conclusion shows that certain emotions — including happiness, anger, disgust, etc. — are universally recognizable across all cultures.

The universalist approach to emotions is countered by the social constructivist approach which proposes that emotions are inherently connected to their surroundings and constructed by different cultural factors. While Jan Plamper claims social constructivism “destabilizes any idea of pancultural emotions,” I would argue that it is not that simple. Instead, social constructivism destabilizes the assertion that emotions are always the same across cultures, and focuses on certain contexts and stimuli.

Plamper turns to fear as an example of how emotions can be socially constructed. While on one hand, fear can be understood as a neurological reaction as seen above, sometimes the stimulus for what causes fear is based on specific cultural contexts. Plamper explains that some stimuli that cause fear have come and gone due to certain societal changes. Take, for instance, the fear of being buried alive which became an international terror in the late nineteenth century. The “casual treatment” of the dead led some to fear that they might be buried before their death
was confirmed, and in some cases, people who were buried did in fact come back to life. Steps were put in place to put this fear to rest, including coffins with bells and breathing tubes so that the victim could survive and call for help. Today, advancements in science and learning from mistakes of the past have eradicated the need for such measures, and the fear of being buried alive is not as common as it was in that time. Though a strangely specific and dark example, Plamper’s point is that what stimulates emotional responses or shapes emotion expression can change over time, rendering different emotional experiences from one generation to the next.

More broadly, social constructivism also finds its grounding in more formal anthropological studies. Michelle Rosaldo’s work on the idea of anger in the Ilongot language of the Philippines is often cited as one of the foundational studies of a constructivist approach to emotions. Her work shows that for the Ilongot, the emotion *liget* is a driving force in society and a sign of honor. *Liget*, in English, has no direct translation, but is related to the idea of anger, though the result of different circumstances. The importance of *liget* in Ilongot society and its context for feeling shows how certain emotions are cultural byproducts. In his engagement with Rosaldo’s work, William Reddy praises her understanding of emotions in comparison to the universalists. He explains, “By Rosaldo’s approach, the human self was almost infinitely malleable; when Western psychologists thought they were studying universal characteristics of the human psyche, they were, more often than not, only charting the local characteristics of Western emotional culture. In other times and places, the self and its feelings were quite different constituted, by culture” (Navigation 37).
Beyond the rift between psychology and anthropology, the History of Emotions field is one that is growing to recognize the importance of history and culture, and the present project seeks to bring literature and art in history into the conversation about emotions, in this case, shame. The case for literature’s inclusion in the History of Emotions has been especially promoted by Sarah McNamer. In her 2015 article, “The Literariness of Literature and the History of Emotions,” McNamer recognizes and responds to the marginalized state of literary sources in the field, noting how there has been a pattern “in which the more literary the text, the less likely it is to be regarded as a valuable source for the history of feeling” (1435). She nevertheless contends that such texts, due to their literariness and service as affective scripts that “generate emotional experience” do in fact “contribute to an important historical task: the illumination of the hows of affective history” (1436).

Similarly, art historians have also begun to note the importance of visual culture in the History of Emotions. For example, Erin Sullivan and Marie Louise Herzfeld-Schild, in their introduction to a special edition of the journal Cultural History, show that, “Given artworks’ ability to provide opportunities for experiencing elements of the past in a very immediate and direct way, it is perhaps surprising that they have not played a more central role in the study of the history of emotions that has flourished across the humanities over the past twenty years”. Their claim is also grounded in the idea that art is a communication of emotion “through symbolic expression,” and can therefore shed light on the history of feeling in a given artistic moment or context (119).
In the following chapters, literary and art historical sources are used to understand shame in late medieval and early modern Iberian culture. Shame is of particular interest due to its complex history and the challenges that come with defining it. In Western history, and perhaps most notably in the Middle Ages, shame was something you could both feel and have; that is, one could feel ashamed, or have a sense of shame, which in turn was an important part of European social constructions of honor.

Like formal definitions of “emotion,” formal definitions of “shame” go back to the Classical era and the philosophy of Aristotle. In his Rhetoric, Aristotle considers shame and other emotions as tools available to orators in rhetorical construction. He defines shame as:

Pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit; and shamelessness as contempt or indifference in regard to these same bad things. If this definition be granted, it follows that we feel shame at such bad things as we think are disgraceful to ourselves or to those we care for. (107)

Aristotle later continues his discussion of the emotion when he says, “men feel shame when they have acts or exploits to their credit on which they are bringing dishonour, whether these are their own, or those of their ancestors, or those of other persons with whom they have some close connexion” (111). Aristotle’s definition establishes some of the most important pillars of shame in a historical context. First, is that shame has a predominantly negative connotation, as it is associated with “bad things.” Second, is that shame involves some sort of social discredit, especially in the case of honor, where the end result is social disgrace for the shamed individual or that individual’s close acquaintances. He also stipulates that “shamelessness” is the
indifference to the bad things that cause shame. This view of shame is more akin to the notion of *having* shame. If you are shameless — that is, without shame — you do not have the capacity to *feel* shame in situations where society dictates you should.

Psychology’s significant attention to shame over the last few decades primarily strives to understand some of the underlying factors of the emotion across cultural groups. One key observation of psychologists who study shame is the importance of a recognition of the self, or that shame is a “self-conscious” emotion, requiring “the capacity to evaluate the self in light of others” and more often learned in childhood than certain instinctual feelings like fear (Stearns 2). Psychologist Donald Nathanson opens his collection of essays, *The Many Faces of Shame*, with his own definition, that “shame implies that some quality of the self has been brought into question” (4). The feeling of shame is thus considered to be a response to that self-questioning, or more specifically, a “response to exposure” of the aspect of the self in question. Brené Brown, in her sociological study on women and shame defines shame as, “An intensely painful feeling or experience of believing we are flawed and therefore unworthy of acceptance and belonging” (“Shame Resilience” 45). For both Nathanson and Brown, shame is the product of an individual’s ability to recognize his or her own flaws — whether or not they are truly flaws — or traits that are open for outside critique and judgement.

Psychologists also often look at somatic manifestations of shame as indications of internal feeling. As Nathanson and Silvan Tomkins, among others, observe, this often includes blushing and the bowing of the head, gestures that we will return to later in this project. Tomkins views blushing as evidence for a heightened sense of self-consciousness. Additionally, Tomkins observes a musculoskeletal response in individuals who feel shame: “lowering the eyelid,
decreasing the tonus of all facial muscles, lowering the head via a reduction in tonus of the neck muscles, or a tilting of the head in one direction” (Tomkins 143). These physical manifestations of shame have become generally recognizable, much in the way Paul Ekman’s experiments propose a recognizability of certain facial expressions as being indicative of certain emotions. This does not mean, however, that shame is universal, because why people feel shame, who feels it and when depend entirely on certain social norms and prescribed conditions, as we will see throughout this project.

It is also worth noting explicitly what shame is and what shame is not. For the purposes of this project, we will define shame as a feeling in the following way: an affect by which an individual recognizes his or her public disgrace — or potential for disgrace — in the eyes of others and under established norms of social behavior within a given cultural community. Beyond feeling shame, having shame is the ability to recognize potential disgrace, and as we will see in Chapter One, this includes the ideas of modesty, virtue, and honor.

Shame must then also be differentiated from other similar affects like guilt and humiliation. Both guilt and humiliation are closely linked to shame and in some regards, the three can all be used to describe similar phenomena; that is, all three express a negative self-conscious state due to external judgement for one’s behavior. Scholars have nevertheless sought to highlight some of the differences. Guilt, for example, differs from shame in that it emphasizes the event rather than the subject. As June Price Tangney and Ronda Dearing show, shame is about the “global self” where the individual who feels shame focuses on the idea that “I did that horrible thing” as opposed to guilt, where the subject focuses on the specific behavior, “I did that horrible thing” (25, emphasis in original). Guilt also has less effect on one’s place in society.
Shame can yield great social consequences while guilt is more often associated with one’s own feelings of regret, but without the social repercussions. Similarly, humiliation is more closely related to the event than a greater implication of the self. Humiliation, which William Ian Miller also associates with “embarrassment” includes the “little falls and the barely perceptible attacks on our self-esteem and self-respect,” often times grounded in amusement. Miller contrasts humiliation with shame, pointing out that shame is often connected to darker moments of embarrassment, like “torture, rape, and masochism” (133). Additionally, the fear of ridicule that comes along with humiliation is more trivial than that of shame (138). Making distinctions between these terms is more than a mere intellectual exercise, especially within the historical context of the pre-modern Mediterranean where shame, and its connection to honor, separates the emotion from its more casual counterparts.

MEDITERRANEAN PARADIGMS OF SHAME/HONOR

As previously mentioned, the present study seeks to understand shame as represented in cultural productions at the end of what we call the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Early Modern period. This study also seeks to expand more traditional understandings of shame in medieval and Early Modern Europe by examining shame in new cultural contexts given that much of how we think about shame today comes from studies of shame and honor as the central tenet of Mediterranean society. In 1965, J.G. Peristiany originally published a collection of essays called Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society, deemed by anthropologist David Gilmore to be the seminal publication on the subject. Gilmore would produce his own volume in 1987, Honor and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean, which
would continue to solidify the idea that the Mediterranean, as a whole, was a society that centered upon these two traits. Gilmore explains that his predecessors saw “Mediterranean peoples as united by a pervasive and relatively uniform value system based on complementary codes of honor and shame” (2).

The foundation of this idea is that “honor and shame are reciprocal moral values representing primordial integration of individual to ‘group.’ They reflect, respectively, the conferral of public esteem upon the person and the sensitivity to public opinion upon which the former depends” (Gilmore 3). Innumerable social institutions of medieval society depend on this individual-to-group dynamic including, but not limited to, noble lineages, chivalry, and feminine virtue. Shame and honor were driving forces of Mediterranean society due to the very fact that — as Julian Pitt-Rivers explains — honor establishes social status, while shame has the ability to remove status. Status via honor can be established at birth, through noble lineage or royalty, or it can be gained over time through deeds and actions (Honour and Social Status 23).

At the same time, honor can be affected by group dynamics, who someone is associated with, or relationships of fidelity (35-6). It is important to note that honor is not an emotion. And, perhaps, nor is it even an affect. Rather, it is a socially constructed trait that is ascribed to individuals with no real implication of “feeling.” It could be said that honor is a type of social capital, exchanged and valued among individuals, but not felt or related to inner experience.

Shame in this Mediterranean context is similar. One’s sense of shame, or the shame someone has, is not an emotion, per se, but rather a trait that enables individuals to prevent themselves from doing things that would negatively affect their honor. Shame can therefore be

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1 See also Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status.”
considered a feeling of social disgrace or a potential for feeling social disgrace in an effort to avoid infamy.

**The Iberian Lexicon for Shame**

Shame, both as an emotion and as a character trait associated with honor, has a wide lexicon in medieval Iberia, and the most common term used is *vergüença* in Spanish, or *vergonha* in Portuguese. Juan Manuel Cacho Blecua, in his study of shame in sapiential literature in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, lists over twenty different terms that, at some point in Spain’s literary history, also refer to the notion of shame. Some of these terms include (along with their spelling variants), *afruenta, culpa, denosto, dolor, embargo, escarnio, facerio, fama mala, mengua, miedo, onra/desonra, pavor, peligro, pena, pesar, quebranto, rezelo*, and others.

While references to these terms and their literary contexts will appear throughout the following chapters, I would like to take a moment to formally define some of the most important ones.

*Vergüença* and *vergonha* are the most common terms used in Spanish and Portuguese respectively. Like other words for shame in the Romance languages, *vergüença* derives from the Latin *verecundia*, meaning a sense of modesty, and is defined as such in Antonio de Nebrija’s 1494 *Vocabulario español-latino*. Nebrija also shows that *vergüença* is associated with the Latin *pudor*, which also means shame and modesty. Over the years *vergüença* also had other definitions that are associated with feelings of shame and will be examined later in this project. For example, *vergüéncias* and *vergonhas* were used to call a man or woman’s genitals. Additionally, John Steven’s 1706 *New Spanish-English Dictionary* presents a number of Spanish
proverbs that discuss shame to highlight alternate definitions. One important example is the idea of public shaming, which we will return to in Chapter Five, and the saying, “sacar uno a la vergüenza” — “to expose a man by punishment.”

Almost identical to vergüenza is the term onta or honta — related to the French honte, — more often found in Catalan and in some Castilian texts, including the thirteenth-century mester de clerecia poem the Libro de Alexandre. While onta is less common in the works surveyed in this dissertation, it is nonetheless a common term for shame used in the time period.

In Chapter Two, we will pay closer attention to two other terms that were used to illustrate feelings of shame beyond having a sense of shame: escarnio and pesar. Both of these terms appear to more properly illustrate symptoms of what we today would call “feeling shame.” Escarnio, as defined in the 1591 Percival Bibliothecae Hispanicae pars altera, implies a sense of mocking, while pesar, in that same dictionary, is defined as sorrow, or emotional heaviness. As we will see, these terms are used in concert with each other, with vergüenza, and with other expressions of shamefulness.

SHAME AND THE FALL IN GENESIS — WESTERN ROOTS

An important thread that runs through this project is the significance of the legend of the Fall from the Garden of Eden in Genesis in the creation of Western, Judeo-Christian notions of shame. Patristic writers and early exegesis shows that Genesis 3 is the decisive moment of the beginning of human shame, expressed in Adam’s response to God when God discovers he is hiding: “I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid” (Genesis 3:10). As we will see in Chapter Four, and as Saint Augustine will contend, it is in this moment that nakedness became associated
with feeling shame and the need to conceal one’s private parts. This need to conceal the genitalia is the root of Western constructions of modesty and sexual virtue as well, both of which are crucial to the behavior of those deemed to have a sense of shame in the Middle Ages.

There is a wider implication here as well, which is that the moment of the Fall of Mankind is recognized as the great shame of humanity. It is the moment when humans lost their innocence and became susceptible to sin, evil, and disgrace. Beyond nakedness, the Fall embodies a state of an ashamed humankind in need of reconciliation and redemption. In this dissertation, for example, the idea of redemption in the wake of the Fall will become crucial to Spain’s feelings of national shame and the need to reconcile its “fallen” state after the Umayyad invasion of 711. The Fall is thus a symbol that can be both deeply personal — as is the case with one’s nakedness — and more broadly applied to an entire emotional community.

**Selection of Materials and Outline of Chapters**

The corpus of materials selected for this dissertation includes medieval conduct manuals, historiography, and some pieces of visual culture. For textual sources, I chose to select works in prose as a means of adhering to certain practical genres of the time: mirrors and historiography. Mirrors, or works of conduct literature, illustrate prescriptions of social conduct, though are seldom studied for their emotional components. These works not only provide insight into the lived shame experience, but also shape the shame experience of their audiences. The other genre of text I have selected is historiography, including historical works of the House of Aviz, as well as Pedro de Coral’s *Crónica sarracina*, which blends generic norms, but nevertheless presents itself as historiographic. Historiographic prose might not be initially considered an “emotional”
genre, but in recent years there has been an urge, by Gabrielle Spiegel and others, to study historiography for its literary value. Often at the periphery of emotions scholarship, I turn to historiography in an attempt to uncover some of the emotional norms that chroniclers include as part of their literary creations. Finally, in Chapter Five, I turn to paintings from the fifteenth, seventeenth, and nineteenth centuries. As previously mentioned, painting has the ability to script emotional experiences for spectators. However, I show that paintings, and visual culture as a whole, can also be important tools for understanding emotional dynamics in different individuals and groups.

Chapter One, “Shame, Conduct, and the Emotional Construction of Gender in Medieval Iberia,” examines how conduct manuals prescribe and proscribe certain emotional experiences to their readers, constructing a shame “practice,” in the Bourdieusian sense of the word. This chapter more specifically analyzes the differences in these shame experiences based on gender, arguing that emotion — specifically shame— is part of the construction of the fifteenth-century Iberian sex/gender system, to use Gayle Rubin’s terminology. For women, shame is tightly bound to questions of chastity and virtue, while for men, shame is often considered to be the opposite of honor.

Chapter Two, “Shame and the Rape of a Kingdom in Pedro de Corral’s Crónica sarracina” explores the role of shame in Pedro de Corral’s fifteenth-century version of the rape of La Cava by King Rodrigo, the last of the Visigothic kings before the Muslim invasion of 711. I illustrate how parallels in the emotion practice between La Cava and the story of Lucretia in Rome show that shame is the operative emotion of historiographic narratives dealing with rape and the question of royal power. However, while typological parallels are certainly evident,
divergences in the two stories demonstrate the influence of Corral’s historical context, specifically the influence of Neogothicism and the need to legitimize Trastamaran claims to the Castilian throne.

Chapter Three, “Ceuta as a Shameful Memory Place in 15th-Century Iberian Historiography,” looks at the connections between the notions of shame and place or how a memory place — or Pierre Nora’s notion of the lieu de mémoire — can be marked by a specific emotion. This chapter looks at representations of the city of Ceuta in the Crónica sarracina as well as the 15th-century Portuguese Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta, and the Crónica de dom Pedro de Meneses by Gomes Eanes de Zurara. I argue for a reading of the city as a shame-based memory site due to continuous loss over time. From the Muslim invasion of 711 to the sack of Ceuta in 1415 by the Portuguese, the city’s shift in hands has always marked it as a site of loss and shame for various Iberian communities.

Chapter Four, “Portuguese Expansion and the Shameless Other” puts the cultural construction of shame to the test through an examination of Portuguese chronicles that recount encounters with indigenous communities in West Africa and the New World. In these chronicles, Portuguese chroniclers often describe the nudity of black West Africans and Indigenous Brazilians as being shameless. This chapter, therefore, argues that in Mary Louise Pratt’s imperial “contact zone,” differences in emotional communities become apparent, and in the case of the Iberian colonies, cultural factors that lead to shame — mainly Judeo-Christian views on nudity and sin — do not apply to indigenous groups who adhere to different cultural norms.

Finally, Chapter Five, “The Spectacle of Shaming in Early Modernity,” examines visual representations of public shaming throughout the period of the Spanish Inquisition, beginning in
the late fifteenth century and ending in the early nineteenth century. I look specifically at the
work of Pedro Berruguete, Francisco Rizi, and later Francisco de Goya’s representations of the
Inquisition’s waning years. Grounded in Foucault’s theories of public executions and Bakhtin’s
studies of festivity, I look at different representations of the *auto-da-fé*, or “act of faith,” process
in order to establish relationships between the “shamed” heretic and the “shaming” audience.
CHAPTER I: SHAME, CONDUCT, AND THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER IN MEDIEVAL IBERIA

“Shame feels the same for men and women but it is organized by gender.”
-Brené Brown

In his *Castigos e documentos para bien vivir* — a collection of advice and lessons addressed to his son commonly known as the *Castigos de Sancho IV* — King Sancho IV begins a discussion of *vergüença* that occupies Lesson Six of the work, and captures the essence of the many facets of *vergüença* as an idea central to the nobility of late-medieval Iberia. He emphasizes that “*vergüença es freno de toda maldad,*” or that “*shame curbs all evil,*” and Sancho’s lessons are characteristic of broader instances in which *vergüença*, with its many meanings, is a pillar of medieval life. Shame appears in an array of conduct manuals for both men and women, books of exempla, mirrors for princes, and other works of didactic and sapiential literature. Both a feeling and a character trait, this chapter explores how the concepts of having and feeling *vergüença* holds an important place in these works of literature. Given the prescriptive and proscriptive aspects of these works — that is, their stake in portraying the presupposed ideals of public behavior, often in the nobility — they works offer a look into how teach of shame to different audiences, reinforce shame’s connection to honor, and portray shame as a capital, able to be exchanged among different agents in society. I propose a reading of shame in which the emotional experience of shame and gender dynamics of late-medieval Iberian society go hand in hand. That is, the gendered experience of shame as evident in didactic literature fits into a late-medieval framework of social conduct where shame, including the threat

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2 All translations throughout this dissertation are my own unless otherwise specified.
of feeling shame or losing one’s sense of shame, has a stake in the sex/gender system of late-
medieval Iberia.

When it comes to conceptualizing in more concrete terms what exactly didactic literature
or conduct literature is, I turn to Nuria Silleras-Fernandez’s comprehensive yet concise working
definition of didactic literature as literature, or a text, that is “intended to teach, advise, edify, and
moderate” one’s character, behavior, and actions in a way that is both utilitarian and entertaining
for the reader (10). In the context of this chapter, didactic literature plays an important role in
illustrating the foundation of socially acceptable behavior — or at the very least what is
prescribed as socially acceptable — in the written record of cultural history. While representative
of a broad selection of didactic texts, including those that are meant for both men and women, as
well as differences in language and social class, the corpus of texts analyzed in this chapter is
nonetheless only a snapshot of late-medieval Iberian conduct. Most notable is the fact that these
texts are often written by men and grounded in Christian theology, limiting the scope of the study
of the History of Emotions within that framework. Despite these limitations, these manuals
demonstrate some of the most important aspects of behavior, and specifically how shame fits into
behavior patterns at the time.

Using Silleras-Fernandez’s definition as a critical point of departure and surveying a wide
number of texts allows for a broad understanding of shame’s diverse uses as a literary motif, a
basis for social conduct, and as an emotion. To date, vergüença has received little scholarly
attention. An exception is the work done by Juan Manuel Cacho Blecua in two articles. His 2000
article, “Vergüenza, sabiduría y pecado en la literatura medieval castellana (del Bonium a don
Juan Manuel),” examines some of the different ways vergüença is portrayed and depicted in
Castilian sapiential literature of the Middle Ages, mainly in relation to the transfer of knowledge and the aversion to sin. His 1997 article, on the other hand, “La vergüenza en el discurso del poder laico desde Alfonso X a don Juan Manuel” looks specifically at the relationship between vergüenza and royalty and chivalry. His analysis of shame is grounded in the ideas of law and politics of the late 13th and early 14th centuries, examining more formally the associations between shame and lay power, class, and legitimacy of heritage, a point we will return to later on in this chapter.

The representation of shame in conduct literature illustrates clear gender divisions between men and women, both in terms of how men and women have a sense of shame and how they experience feelings of shame. Emotion, therefore, offers twenty-first century scholars another tool for defining medieval genders beyond biological sex in a particular historical moment. The gendered representation of the shame experience informs a notion of what it meant to be a man or a woman beyond other factors including anatomy, or even clothing. The inverse is also true such that emotion not only construct gender, but gender can help construct, or dictate, emotional experiences. In other words, there is a reciprocal connection between emotion and the performance of gender. At the same time, conduct literature also prescribes how a person should feel in certain contexts based on their gender. More specifically, I propose a place for shame within the sex/gender system of late-medieval Iberia and that shame not only helps define certain gendered experiences within that system, but also acts as a commodity within the economy of that system. In other words, shame might be different for men and women, but those differences are intricately connected within the dynamics of the gendered social system.

3 See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, for theories on the performativity of gender.
As we have seen in the introduction to this project, the relationship between shame and honor is the “standard Mediterranean paradigm,” and anthropologists of the Mediterranean region have tackled these concepts for decades (Gilmore 2). Shame and honor are mutually dependent traits, grounded in social reputation and interpersonal relationships, such that, as Julian Pitt-Rivers explains, “the basis of repute, honour, and shame are synonymous, since shamelessness is dishonorable” (42).

The gendered differences in the shame/honor paradigm have also not gone unnoticed by anthropologists. Pitt-Rivers even shows how, “the honour of a man and of a woman [...] imply quite different modes of conduct. A woman is dishonored, loses her verguenza, with the tainting of her sexual purity, but a man does not” (42). This theme will run throughout this chapter, illustrating how men’s shame and women’s shame find their foundation in different lived experiences and social dynamics, notably the feminine dependence on sexual virtue and the masculine dependence on social status, among other factors. What this chapter does beyond the anthropological approach evident in Pitt-Rivers, Gilmore, and others, is show how these norms of the shame/honor paradigm are represented in the cultural materials of the period. Additionally, I seek to move beyond the establishment of honor as a pillar of medieval society to look at the emotional experience of shame in instances where honor is gained or lost.

**H A V I N G  A  S E N S E  O F  S H A M E**

As mentioned in the Introduction, defining shame in the context of medieval conduct proves challenging given that shame is both considered something one feels or something one has. In fact, one of the most common ways shame is represented in late-medieval conduct
literature is as something a man or woman possesses, and in possessing a sense of shame, men and women are steered away from evil. In the *Castigos de Sancho IV*, for example, King Sancho reminds his sons — the inscribed audience of the work — that:

> Vergüença es freno de toda maldat. E el que vergüenza ha de sí mismo conviene que la aya de Dios e de todos los otros omnes quel veen e lo oyen. El mal omne non puede seer acabado en toda maldat a menos de perder de sí vergüenza, e, desque la ha perdida non se siente de mal que faga. E desque la vergüenza la pierde, tiene que faziendo mal vive a su sabor, e es vida astrosa e menguada e lixosa, e tiénela por buena e por acabada. [...] ¿Qué te diré más? Tornal de estado de omne a seer bestia. (102)\(^4\)

In order to curb all evil, a man must have a sense of shame, here linguistically represented with the verb *haver*: “ha de sí mesmo…aya de Dios…” Shame here is a trait that allows for men to behave appropriately and not fall into a life of lust and filth. Sancho reinforces this idea throughout Lesson Six of his work, emphasizing the notion that “La vergüença desvía los malos fechos e da carrera por que se fagan los buenos” (105).\(^5\) Sancho is not the only writer to use illustrate shame’s relationship to good behavior. In his *Libro del cavallero et del escudero*, don Juan Manuel also reminds readers that, “la vergüença es la cosa por que el omne dexa de fazer todas las cosas que non deve fazer et le fazer todo lo que deve. Et por ende, la madre et la cabeza

\(^4\) “Shame curbs all wickedness. It behooves a man who feels shame for himself to feel shameful before God and before all men who see and hear him. A bad man cannot be fully wicked unless he loses his sense of shame, because once it is lost, he does not feel the evil that he does. Once shame is lost, he feels that his evil living is pleasant, though in reality it is wretched, deficient, and filthy, and he takes it for good and perfect. What more can I tell you? He turns from a man into a beast.” (Francomano, “Castilian Castigos,” 203)

\(^5\) “Shame diverts bad deeds and shows the way to doing good.” (Francomano 207)
Like Sancho, Juan Manuel reinforces how having a sense of shame steers a man to do good things instead of falling into a life of sin; shame is the “mother” of all good acts.

Having a sense of shame promotes good behavior, but there also exists the risk of losing that sense of shame and falling into a life of sin, as Sancho suggests in the quotation above. Sin not only stems from the loss of vergüenza but also the loss of the ability to reflect on one’s own actions and recognize good from evil. A sense of shame therefore depends heavily on the act of self-reflection and the ability to “feel” when behavior is evil, or as Sancho states, sentir “de mal que faga.” As we have seen, shame is considered a “self-conscious” emotion within the History of Emotions scholarship; it depends on the ability of the individual to reflect on one’s actions in relation to group norms (Stearns 1). A man feels shame when he, or others, view his actions as inappropriate; in Stearns’ words, shame is the “evaluation of the self in light of others” (2).

Having a sense of shame takes this idea one step further: it is the possession of the emotional capacity to perform this self-reflection. Additionally, having a sense of shame allows for the individual to recognize the potential to feel shame and what actions will result in that emotional experience. Having and feeling shame, therefore, both stem from the same inner function but manifest in separate, yet related, emotional constructs.

Since shame can be possessed, it only makes sense that it can also be lost, and when lost, the consequences are weighed against established social norms. As Sancho explains, a man is no longer able to reflect on his actions and he is no longer able to differentiate good actions from

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6 “Shame is the thing that causes men to not do the things they shouldn’t and do what they should. As such the mother and head of all goodness is shame.”
evil ones. As these lines between good and evil disappear, that shameless man will fall into a life full of sin. Indeed, Sancho takes this notion even further, suggesting that a man who loses his sense of shame is no longer a man, but rather a lowly beast. In other words, the capacity for evaluation of the self actually makes men human and separates them from animals who — in Sancho’s eyes — do not possess this ability for self-reflection. As we will see in Chapter Four of this project, the implications of shame and shamelessness as they pertain to human behavior becomes an important issue in the colonial space where, in some cases, indigenous people are labeled as “animals” because of their supposed shameless behavior in the eyes of the colonizer.

The notion of having a sense of shame is also often represented quite literally in the corpus of late-medieval Iberian conduct literature, as shame is often given a physical or material manifestation. Sancho IV, for example, explains, “tal es la vergüenza en el rey commo el panno blanco en que non ha manzilla ninguna,” where the idea of the unstained kerchief represents the king’s sense of shame and untainted reputation. Don Sancho immediately follows this idea of a king’s vergüenza by noting that if a king were to lose his sense of shame he would be like a leper who has lost his lips and nose: “la deve aver commo el gafo que por gafedat ha perdido los beços e las narizes” (106). A sense of vergüenza, then, is imagined as a part of the male body, just like facial features or limbs. The implication here is that losing one’s sense of shame could also be considered an illness or physical malady; that is, without shame, one cannot be a healthy person.

The “Castigos del Rey de Mentón,” a didactic portion of the fourteenth-century chivalric Libro del caballero Zifar, equates shame to a mirror. The King tells his sons, “E verguença es tal
commo el espejo bueno, ca quien ende se cata, non dexa manziella en su rostro” (287). Unlike equating shame to a body part, the mirror metaphor portrays shame as a tool that can be used to prevent you from doing bad things. As a literal reflective object, meant to allow the viewer to see and evaluate himself, the mirror emphasizes the self-reflective component of shame and the need for self-evaluation. The mirror allows for the possessor of shame to find any blemishes — manziella — an image of the manifestations of shamelessness that might stain one’s character or reputation. The parallel use of vergüença and manzilla in both the *Libro del caballero Zifar* and the *Castigos de Sancho IV* shows the significance of the notion of “staining” one’s character through a loss of shame. To have a sense of shame is to be like an unstained cloth or an unblemished face, and also equips you with the tools to see when blemishes and moments of shamelessness appear.

A woman’s vergüença is also given a material manifestation. Sancho IV, for example, compares a woman’s shame to her clothing: “Tal es la buena muger en que Dios pone vergüença grande e buena commo aquella que está vestida de pannos de oro e de aljófar e de piedras preciosas. E tal es la que non ha vergüença commo aquella que está toda desnuda” (105). A woman’s sense of shame is a prized possession and as Sancho describes is just like her fine clothes and precious jewels. This image is a nod to the Book of Proverbs which compares another trait, wisdom, to jewels, stating “wisdom is better than rubies” (Proverbs 8:11). Jewels are not only a physical manifestation of the image of shame, but an image with a perceived

8 “And shame is like a good mirror, for they who look into it leave no blemish on their face.”

9 The good woman in whom God puts great and good shame is like a woman dressed in cloths of gold and pearls and precious jewels. A shameless woman is like a woman who is completely naked. (Francomano 207)
economic value, an idea we will return to later in this chapter. Shame is precious and should be guarded as one would guard their expensive possessions. There is, of course, also a question of social class given the parallels between clothing and wealth status; one could assume that a woman who has jewels and fine clothes is more likely to be of a noble class. The indication here could be that a noble woman is more likely to be a woman of shame, and that a woman of a lower class has more potential to be shameless. However, any woman, no matter her social class, can be without shame, just like she can be without her clothes, making her naked and exposed.

One must note, however, that this representation of shame and lesson on shamelessness appears in a text that was meant for a predominantly male readership. The male gaze determines a woman’s sense of shame in this moment of Sancho’s narrative, and is expressed to other men.

**Establishing the Shame Sex/Gender System**

Given that having a sense of shame was an important component of both male and female behavior in late-medieval Iberia, there exists the question of how shame is prescribed differently for men and women within this corpus of didactic literature. Men and women could, and often should, have a sense of shame for different reasons or even feel shame in different contexts. Late-medieval conduct literature establishes certain social norms — that is, the social norms within a given readership — based on gendered differences in the shame experience. The broader theoretical implications within the construction of medieval genders here is the notion that emotion, and more specifically shame, adds a new dimension to the late-medieval Iberian sex/gender system, to borrow Gayle Rubin’s terminology. As she explains, the sex/gender system is, “the set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of
human activity” (159). In other words, I propose that how and why someone feels shame can be understood as an additional factor in defining what it means to be a man or a woman at the time on the Iberian Peninsula. As we will see in the following cases, the shame components of the sex/gender system are principally concerned with honor and chivalry for men, and chastity and modesty for women.

**Masculine Shame and the Question of Honor**

Shame allows men to avoid evil and do good things, but the question then becomes, what is at stake for good or bad behavior? A stain on one’s reputation, as Sancho and the anonymous author of the *Zifar* state, has broader implications for a man’s status in the world, as his reputation is tightly linked to his honor. Shame can greatly affect that reputation for better or for worse. A sense of shame that leads to good deeds could bring a knight more honor in the eyes of his peers, while exhibiting shameless behavior could bring shame to that knight and future generations of his lineage. Throughout the conduct literature of the time, the link between shame and honor or chivalry is so strong that Juan Manuel even includes *vergüença* as one of the most important components of chivalry and honor. In the *Libro del caballero et del escudero*, he explains to his squire, “A lo que me preguntastes qué cosa es la cavallería, vos respondo que la cavallería es estado muy peligroso et muy onrado. Otrosí, a lo que me preguntastes cómmo se puede aver et guardar, vos respondo que la puede omne aver et guardar con la gracia de Dios et con buen seso et con vergüença” (14).¹⁰

¹⁰ “With regard to what you ask regarding the nature of chivalry, I tell you that chivalry is a dangerous and honorable state. Furthermore, with regard to how to gain and keep chivalry, I tell you it is through the grace of God, with wisdom, and with shame.”
To be chivalrous is to be a man of honor, and in order to gain and preserve your honor, you must have a sense of shame, along with intelligence and grace, the other two pillars of chivalry. Shame and honor are so closely linked that the masculine shame experience is arguably constructed within the “dense” social institution of chivalry, and shame is thus able to exist where “one’s reputation really matters, where the opinions of others are valued, where social rank is effective, where credit can be given and debts owed, [and] where honor can be realized or lost […].” (Gross 42).

Sancho also emphasizes the importance of *vergüença* in the context of chivalry, but for him, shame is the *raison d’être* of the institution of chivalry as a whole. For Sancho, there are three contexts of shame that all contribute to the construction of chivalry: “Lo primero del linaje onde viene. Lo segundo de sí mismo. Lo terçero de aquellos que han de venir déllos. E guardando estas otras vergüenças fazen los fijosdalgos bien” (*Castigos* 105). The first and third points that Sancho presents more thoroughly explain how *vergüença* contributes to the foundation of chivalry as a social institution. He explains: “La vergënça faze conosçer a omne el linaje onde viene e que tome vergüença de su linaje e de sí mesmo e los que han de venir dél. Ca por fecho que faga omne contra su generación de vergüença él lo echará en vergüença” (105).

For Sancho, a chivalrous man must have a sense of shame about who his family is, and he must honor his ancestors who came before him. As Juan Manuel Cacho Blecua says, “En este contexto, la vergënza es sólo un indicio externo de la excelencia del linaje, considerado

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11 “In the first place, for the sake of the lineage from whence they come. In the second place, for themselves. In the third place, for the sake of those who will come after them. Noblemen do well by looking to these three things.” (Francomano 208)

12 “Shame makes a man appreciate his lineage and gives him a sense of shame for his line and for himself and for those who will come after him, because a shameful deed that a man does will cast shame upon his descendants.” (Francomano 207)
significativamente como una lejana heredad que se debe cuidar” (“Poder laico” 402). A knight must also recognize that if he were to exhibit shameless behavior, he would taint the reputation of his relatives and destroy his family line for future generations; there is an implication that shamelessness can have grave implications of your children and your children’s children. The social consequences of shamelessness, then, have an effect not only on the man himself, but his entire family, both past and present.

Masculine shame-based honor, and in turn the late-medieval male honor-based community, is therefore a social construction based on hypotheticals and imagined interpersonal relationships. Here, shame is part of a social system more than a biological experience. In other words, shame that is the result of losing honor, or even shame that transcends generations, is a foundational part of the institution of chivalry but not always grounded in feelings. Or, as Stearns says, “honor-based shame does not necessarily involve the same kind of internal wrestling that other forms of shame entail. Some honor issues had more to do with political and financial expediency […] than any deep emotional experience” (Shame 39). Knights act based on their perceived place within the shame-honor continuum, balancing how much of each trait they have or believe they have. The exception to Stearns’ proposition is the fact that a man can still feel shame when dishonored. This shame experience is therefore one grounded in feeling, but still stems from the social system of honor. The opening sections of the Libro del caballero Zifar offer a literary case study of this phenomenon.

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13 “In this case, shame is only an external indicator of the excellence of one’s lineage, considered to be a distant heritage one should maintain.”

14 Texts like the Poema de mio Cid, address questions of lineage and honor in very direct ways, and in a poetic context.
The Zifar opens, in part, with a discussion of the relationship between Zifar and the king. Zifar, the famous knight, brings honor to the king through his performance in battle. However, Zifar’s horses inexplicably die every ten days, and while the king gives Zifar new horses so he can continue to fight, other knights raise the point that those resources could go to hundreds of other men instead of one. The king then stops calling on Zifar to come to battle, giving in to the other men, but is only met with continual defeat and the dishonor of military losses. Concurrently, Zifar wonders why the king has stopped sending for him, wondering if he had erred in the past, and in a moment of self-doubt, decides to regain his honor with the king and sets off on his journey.

The king feels shame and is dishonored when he starts losing battles without Zifar on the field. The narrator tells, “E quando enbiava dos mill o tres mill cavalleros dezian que non podian conquerir por ninguna manera, e a los logares del rey dexavanlos perder; asy que fincava el rey desonrrado e perdido e con grant vergüença” (77). This quotation demonstrates the process of the king’s shame; he loses battles and becomes dishonored by his losses, and then feels ashamed — expressed both with “perdido” and “grant vergüenza” — of his dishonor. These emotional experiences are only established by the other knights and the fact that he is consistently defeated without Zifar’s help. An alternative reading here would more closely correspond to Sancho IV or Stearns’ approach, in which the King’s dishonor brings shame to himself where shame is a more abstract idea that pertains to social order rather than an emotional experience. In both scenarios, however, the relationship between honor and shame, as they pertain to chivalric codes, is clear.

15 “And when he sent two or three thousand knights they said they could not win by any means, and in those places the king let them lose; the king was therefore dishonored and with great shame.”
The king’s shame becomes more grounded in feeling when he reckons with his need to keep his promise to the other knights. He knows he cannot win in battle without Zifar’s skills, but has promised other knights that he will support them and give them the supplies that would otherwise go to Zifar. He remembers, however, that, “certas, verguença e mayor mengua es en querer guardar el prometimiento dañoso e con desonrra, que en lo revocar” and that, “non deve aver verguença de revocar su yerro aquel que es puesto en la tierra para emendar los yerros agenos que los otros fazen” (78). In other words, the king should not feel shame for not keeping his promise to the other knights because he should not have to move forward under the poor decisions he made. The king needs to regain his honor and should not be ashamed to do so, even if that means backing out of a deal. In the abstract, this is a complex situation that puts the king in a deadlock; if his honor is determined by other men and how he performs in battles, then what happens when the men who are in those battles feel betrayed by the king’s revocation of a promise? In this particular moment of the story, the narrator discusses this in more philosophical terms, perhaps a didactic take on the shame/honor paradigm where the idea that “one should not feel shame in doing what is best for his honor” is the most accepted. However, this moment also shows that no matter how dependent the shame/honor paradigm is on male-male relationships, one’s shame is also an inherently internal and personal experience. For the king, he must take his honor into his own hands in order to not feel shame, perhaps breaking away from the judgement of others that made him feel shame in the first place.

16 “It is better to have shame and discredit in wanting to keep a difficult promise with dishonor, than to back out of that promise.” — “One should not have shame in backing out of a mistake if it means amending old mistakes by others.”
Zifar himself is also subject to this shame/honor phenomenon. While thinking about his predicament of not being called by the king, Zifar is overcome with a sense of doubt and fears that the king doubts his abilities to fight in battle or that he had committed some sort of mistake in a previous favor to the king. On one hand, this self-doubt shows that Zifar’s shame stems from a perceived notion of what the king might think of his abilities as a knight. Zifar of course does not know what the king truly thinks nor that the king is in his own bind when it comes to supporting Zifar. During his meditation, however, Zifar consoles himself by stating:

No deuo auer miedo ni verguença, ca ninguna cosa non faze medroso nin vergoñoso el coraçon del ome synon la conçiencia de la su vida, sy es mala, non faziendo lo que deue; e pues la mi conçiencia non me acusa, la verdat me deue saluar, e con grant fuzia que en ella he non abre miedo, e yre con lo que començe cabo adelante, e non dexare mi proposito començado. (78-9)

Reemphasizing the personal nature of shame — here linguistically combining having shame, “aver verguença,” and being ashamed in the heart, “vergoñoso,” — Zifar reminds himself that shame is only the result of a man knowing he has lived a bad life, a self-reflective realization as examined above. Confident in himself that he has been a good knight and lived a good life, he convinces himself that feeling shame is not an option and seeks to prove his worth through his acts as a knight. Like the king who rights his error, Zifar breaks out of the mold of feeling shame based on the judgement of others because his conscience knows that he has not lost his honor and has no reason to feel ashamed of himself.

17 “I should not be afraid or have shame, because there is nothing scarier or more shameful in a man’s heart than a conscience of a bad life and not doing what one should. My conscience does not betray me, the truth is, it saves me, and with great trust I will have no fear, and I will go finish what I started.”
The shame/honor paradigm does have another emotional component that contributes to what a man can feel in certain situations regarding his honor: fear. Fear of shame in a chivalric setting is an important part of the male shame experience as prescribed in conduct literature, whether in the abstract — such as labeling your lineage as being shamed — or as an emotive — such as feeling ashamed of one’s loss of honor. This idea stems from shame’s use as a punishment. The history of shame as a punishment spans both space and time, notably in situations of public shaming or humiliation, which will be further explored in Chapter Five (Stearns 28-9). In the context of chivalry, feeling shame or being labeled as “shamed” was punishment enough. Even Sancho IV says, “La verguença es el mejor castigo del mundo. E bien aventurado es el que se castiga en ante por vergüenza e non por feridas” (326). In fact, I argue that the emotional foundation of shame in the context of punishment is not necessarily feeling shame, but feeling fear about the potential of feeling or experiencing shame. In other words, fear is the operative emotion in the context of shameful punishment rather than shame itself.

18 “Shame is the best punishment in the world. And blessed is he who punishes with shame and not physical harm.” The first use of “castigo” in this quotation could also have a double-meaning, both as “punishment” and as “advice.” That is, “shame is the best punishment in the world,” but also “the best piece of advice in the world.”

19 This quotation alludes to, but does not specifically address, public shaming as a form of punishment as it is often understood in the scholarship of the History of Emotions. Beyond Stearns’ mention of public humiliation in his book Shame: A Brief history, Martha Nussbaum dedicates a chapter of her Hiding From Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law to the question of “shaming citizens” in which she explores the idea of shame and stigma within the sphere of public policy and society. For Sancho IV, one’s shame and loss of honor exists in the public eye and is therefore a punishment in and of itself, and he does not address other forms of public humiliation like hangings or whippings (Stearns 29). See Chapter Five for further analysis.
In the “Castigos del Rey de Mentón” within the *Libro del caballero Zifar*, Zifar tells his sons: “E seyendo ome sofrido e paçiente non puede caer en verguença, que es cosa de que el ome se deue reçelar de caer en ella, […] non cadra en yerro por miedo de verguença. […] E asy el que se quiere guardar de yerro e de verguença es dado por sabio e entendido” (287).²⁰ Zifar emphasizes the idea that a man should fear falling into shame, here using both *recelar* and *miedo*. Overcoming fear and and being able to curb errors and shame allows for a man to be considered wise and learned, a positive side to the possibility of outside judgement. One’s fear of feeling shame is just as powerful as having a sense of shame. Even Juan Manuel in the *Libro del caballero et del escudero* implies this feeling of fear without explicitly stating it when he says, “Et pues digo que ante sufrirá la muerte, que caer en vergüenza, vien devedes entender que non dexarán de fazer ninguna cosa, nin la fará, por que en vergüenna pueda caer” (16).²¹ Here, without saying *miedo* or *receio*, Juan Manuel simply shows that a man should not do something bad because he might feel shame if he does. He also quite dramatically states that if a man were to err it is preferable to die than to fall into shame.

In the Portuguese tradition, King dom Duarte I’s *Livro de ensinança de bem cavalgar toda sela* (=*Bem cavalgar*), a text written in the first half of the fifteenth century makes explicit connections between shame and fear in one portion of the narrative.²² Formally, the *Bem cavalgar* is a text that is meant to teach the art of horseback riding, one of the pillars of chivalry,

²⁰ “A man of suffering and patience cannot fall into shame, which is something a man should fear falling into […] He will not fall into error for fear of shame. […] And such, he who wants to protect himself from error and he who is of shame is considered wise and learned.”

²¹ “And I say that it is better to suffer death than fall into shame. You should know not to do anything for which you will fall into shame.”

²² The text is believed to be started while Duarte was still a prince, but the composition continued through his reign as king until his death in 1438.
but dom Duarte’s prose extends far beyond mere mechanics and covers much of the intangible aspects of being a good knight and nobleman. Aida Fernanda Dias explains:

Esta obra enriquece-se por aspectos que, embora estejam intimamente ligados à prática cavaleiresca, ultrapassam a doutrina de um simples manual de equitação. A pedagogia volta-se agora para o homem e para a educação da vontade, o cultivo das boas manhas e das virtudes militares, a autoconfiança, [e] a luta contra o receio (=medo). (Dias 311)

Shame, or in Portuguese vergonha, comprises one of these digressions from the more standard rules of riding, and actually appears in Dom Duarte’s discussion warding off fear, or receio, one of the didactic pieces of the book Dias mentions above. In this section of the narrative, dom Duarte discusses the importance of not being afraid when a knight is on his horse, but also how a sense of shame allows a knight to not be afraid and puts him on a path to do good. One interesting aspect of Duarte’s explanation of shame is that he uses two different terms: vergonha and empacho, both of which are necessary traits to curb wrongdoings. According to Michael Ferreira’s Lexicon of Old Porutugese, in the fifteenth century “empacho” would have meant an impediment or hindrance, or, something along the lines of “obstruir, impedir” (Ferreira 340).

Dom Duarte explains that having a sense of shame prevents you from doing things that would bring about the judgement of others, echoing Sancho’s previously mentioned idea that having shame instills a fear of judgement from both other people and God. Duarte explains, “E assy teē alguūs tam grande vergonha ou ēpacho defazer alguās cousas que ante se porriam assofrer alguū grande perigoo q as fazerē em lugar de praça, por receo de prasmo das gētes, ou

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23 “This work is enriched by aspects that, while intimately tied to the practice of chivalry, go beyond the doctrines of a simple riding guide. Its pedagogy turns to men and to the teaching of good will, craftiness, military virtues, self confidence, [and] fighting against fear.”
Here, dom Duarte explains how a man’s fear of judgement from others — *o prasmo das gentes* — will prevent him from behaving a certain way or committing such an act that would result in that state. It is this feeling of fear that opens the door for such a man to behave as a man of shame, or as Clifford B. Yorke states, “[t]he *fear of shame* is a forceful motivator of human behavior” (35). In Duarte’s example, a man’s sense of shame and desire to do good is thus a direct result of his feelings of fear of being judged by his peers and the potential of feeling ashamed if judged poorly. In fact, judgement of others is one of the foundational elements of a shame culture as described by Ruth Benedict in her *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*. While Benedict’s work deals with Japan, her ideas about shame culture as a whole have clear parallels to late-medieval Iberia. She explains:

> In a culture where shame is a major sanction, people are chagrined about acts which we expect people to feel guilty about. [...] True shame cultures rely on external sanctions for good behavior, not, as true guilt cultures do, on an internalized conviction of sin. Shame is a reaction to other people’s criticism. A man is shamed either by being openly ridiculed and rejected or by fantasizing to himself that he has been made ridiculous. (222-223)

With this in mind, it is clear that any fear of other people’s criticism is an important part of avoiding feelings of shame. Here judgement is also related to the aforementioned shame-economy, since shame from judgement is inherently dependent on an interaction — or gaze — between two subjects. As Benedict points out this is part of what defines shame as being separate from guilt, which she describes as more of a one-sided, internal emotional phenomenon.

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24 “And some have such shame of doing things that they would rather put themselves in danger than do those things in a plaza, for fear of the judgement of other people, or fear of being found.”
The fear of judgement, especially human judgement, has also been tightly connected to shame since Ancient Greece. Aristotle, for example, wrote extensively about shame in both his *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. In his *Rhetoric*, he explains how:

> We only care what opinion is held of us because of the people who form that opinion, it follows that the people before whom we feel shame are those whose opinion of us matters to us. Such persons are: those who admire us, those whom we admire, those by whom we wish to be admired, those with whom we are competing, and those whose opinion of us we respect. (109)

Though Aristotle writes long before the beginnings of Christianity and the medieval institution of chivalry as we know it, it is clear that loved ones, other noblemen, knights, and, perhaps, divine power fit into Aristotle’s categories of those whose opinions matter. Aristotle implies that one cares about the opinions of others because being held in low regard is inherently shameful.

Similarly, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle illustrates the relationship between disgrace and shame. Unlike in the *Rhetoric* where shame is felt by the recipient of outside judgement, in the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle explains that shamelessness, or not having a sense of shame, shows one’s disregard for his own reputation; he says that he who fears disgrace is “good and modest, and he who does not is shameless” (*NE* III.6, 44).

In addition to fearing judgement from peers, Sancho IV shows how shame is often linked to the fear of judgement by God. In chapter six of Sancho’s *Castigos*, the King tells his son that “La vergüença raygada en el coraçón del omne bueno e de la buena muger guarda el themor de Dios e dal conosciencia contra Él.” (*Castigos* 105), a point later echoed by Juan Manuel who

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25 “Shame rooted in the heart of a good man and in a good woman maintains the fear of God and gives knowledge of Him.” (Francomano 207)
states, “si vergüenza oviere, guardarse ha quanto podiere de non fazer cosa por que se vea en vergüenza contra Dios” (Cavaller 16).\(^{26}\) Instilling a fear of God in readers is one of the easiest ways to reinforce good behavior, and feeling a sense of shame in God’s shadow was a common manifestation of that idea. This was common not only in conduct literature but also in law, emphasized on multiple occasions in the *Siete Partidas* of Alfonso X, where people were encouraged to fear God in their daily lives: “debe el pueblo temer a Dios…” (Partidas, II, XIII, XV, qtd in Cacho Blecua).

**Feminine Shame and the Question of Chastity**

In didactic works written for women, many of the underlying ideas of having shame are similar to those for men. That is, the basic idea that shame curbs evil remains constant for both genders. However, I seek to demonstrate that the cultural contexts of these shame experiences, and how that shame is expressed or represented, is different. For some medieval writers, the shame that a woman has even has its own creation story that goes back to the creation of women. Fransesc Eiximenis is one such writer who includes his own interpretation of the beginnings of a woman’s sense of shame in his *Llibre de les dones*. The *Llibre de les dones* was a work composed in Eiximenis’ native Catalan and dedicated to Lady Sanxa Ximenis d’Arenós, a woman who, after over twenty years of marriage to Pere d’Aragó, Count of Prades, left her husband and three children behind and never returned.\(^{27}\) Given the Countess’ new life as an independent woman, the *Llibre* was “intended for her education and daily use, written with the tone of authority a Franciscan friar would use when addressing a female believer who had

\(^{26}\) “If there is shame, keep it as much as you can as to not do things that make you ashamed before God.”

\(^{27}\) See Nuria Silleras-Fernandez, *Chariot of Ladies*. 

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strayed. It was a work intended as a guide for moral and spiritual discipline” (Silleras-Fernandez 61).

Eiximenis’ description of shame retells the story of Genesis as the moment that women were given a sense of shame. He explains:

Per què deus açí saber que nostre senyor Déu, après que ach l’om creat e la dona, ço és Adam e Eva en lo començament del món, […] e féu-los marit e muller, e per special gràcia sua, après que hagueren peccat per inobediència feyta a Déu donà a la dona vergonya en la cara molt més que a l’hom en esta part […] E com diu la Scriptura, cant les dones perderen lur puritat e la vergonya après la primera etat del món, e feyen legees de si metexes, lavors nostre senyor Déu tramès diluvi general en lo món, per lo qual totes coses neguaren […]. (10)28

Eiximenis explains how women were given a sense of shame by God, and how Eve’s original sin resulted in women receiving much more vergonya than men. However, while Original Sin is the reason behind women’s vergonya, its purpose is similar to that for men: to prevent evil. Eiximenis reminds his female audience that a sense of shame is crucial in order for a woman to “preserve” herself from all evils, and, when this shame is lost, the results are often catastrophic, an idea he backs up with the dramatic example of the flood narrative of Genesis.

Other conduct writers have noted potential catastrophic effects of the loss of shame in works dedicated to both men and women. For some, as previously mentioned, instilling a sense

28 “Because you must know that Our Lord God, after having created man, created woman, Adam and Eve at the beginning of the world […] and made them husband and wife, and by His grace, after they sinned for disobedience, God gave woman shame in the face much more than men. […] And as Scripture says, women lose their purity and shame after this first stage of the world, and they made laws for themselves, then Our Lord God sent the great flood over the world, which caused the destruction of all things”
of shame in men is a question of warding off bad behavior, where the “evils” addressed by
Sancho IV, Juan Manuel, and dom Duarte, are generally a question of a man’s own actions. Even
for Sancho IV, the question of mass destruction — in his example, the fall of Spain to the
Moorish invaders — is a direct result of a man’s actions when affected by shame. What makes
Eiximenis’ example unique is that when a woman loses her sense of shame, it is God that
punishes the entire world, not the woman herself. There is, therefore, a slight difference in how
men and women should control their actions: a shameless man will perform evil acts that can
destroy their honor, or in rare cases, have devastating effects on the world; shameless women, on
the other hand, lose their sense of purity and God punishes all of humanity.

There are many other specific examples about how a sense of shame is important in a
woman’s daily comportment, and most notably, many authors of manuals meant for a female
readership deal directly with the connection between shame and modesty. The anonymous
fifteenth-century Castigos y doctrinas que un sabio dava a sus hijas, for example, describes
numerous examples of prescriptions of shame for women based on their daily behavior. As a
whole, this text is explicitly directed at a young female audience, and as Emily Francomano
describes, the “anonymous father addresses daughters who are not destined for the highest ranks
of the nobility, but rather for lives as urban and moneyed housewives of a high social
standing” (Francomano, “Castilian Castigos” 187). Part of the text promotes a sense of shame as
a way of moderating public behavior, especially with regard to chastity and modesty, so that, “las
gentes la tengan por buena,” or “everyone considers her good” (Francomano 264). For example,
the father explains: “dicho es del profeta que de lo que avemos vergüenza de hacer que ayamos
By hearing or speaking obscenities, there is an implication that a woman would also wish to do the things she says or engages with. Therefore, in order to not be ashamed of her own desires, a woman must pay no attention to those “dirty” thoughts and tell others that she finds no pleasure in them. If she does not do this, people may not find her to be virtuous and she will feel ashamed for wishing to do things that are unaccepted in society.

The Castigos y doctrinas also includes two subsections on clothing and ornamentation, perhaps one of the most important indicators of a woman’s shame and modesty. The question of dress and ornamentation is addressed explicitly by the father-author in Lesson Five, where he describes how women should maintain their modesty through proper dress and with minimal ornament to show a sense of decency. The author says:

Lo primero en los traeres y vestiduras y tocados demasiados y desonestos porque todo esto ha de ser considerado: el estado y renta de vuestros maridos y su ábito de bivir, y su hedad y disposición y las vuestras, ca no sólo harés plazer a vuestros maridos en ser honestas en el gasto y en el traje de vuestras ropas y tocados, más aún, no gastarés vuestras faziendas en ellos y daréys causaa que los que vos vieren no vos tengan por locas ni demasiadas, antes vos loen de honestas y de vergüença. (264)

29 “[A]s the prophet has said, that which we are ashamed of doing, we should also be ashamed to speak of, and clean speech adorns the soul and conquers evil.” (Francomano 269)

30 “The first concerns excessive and immodest ornaments, attire, and headdresses, because you must consider all these things: the estate and income of your husbands, their manner of living, their age and disposition, and your own, for not only will you please your husbands by being modest in your expenses on clothing and headdresses, but even more, you will not waste your wealth on clothes and not cause those who see you to consider you foolish or extravagant; rather, they will praise your modesty and decency.” (Francomano 264). Here “vergüença” is translated as “modesty and decency” specifically.
Clothing, and the responsibility of wearing appropriate clothing has a direct impact on how others will perceive a woman’s sense of shame. In the above quotation, a woman must not wear overly ornate clothing so that people will not think she is “foolish or extravagant” — to paraphrase Francomano’s translation — and so that she does not spend all of her money or dowry. Additionally, a woman’s dress is a representation not only of herself but also of her husband, an allusion to the value a woman has on her husband’s reputation, an idea that will be explored in further detail below.

In addition to clothing, cosmetics are also a source of shame for women warned about by the father of the Castigos but also by Fray Martín de Córdoba in his Jardín de nobles donzellas.31 The Jardín — a text written in the 1460s and addressed to the princess Isabel of Castille, who, at the time of the work’s composition, had become the clear heir to the throne — includes a part in which Fray Martín describes the qualities that good women should possess. He devotes a portion of its second part to the importance of shame, and how shame is a crucial part of any noble woman’s character. Fray Martín’s imagery includes allusions to cosmetics when he describes vergüença as “un arrebol,” a “blush” that should be used to paint and adorn the face to make a “suave color,” one that is more truthful and modest (197). This is a clear contradiction to many of society’s preconceived notions of cosmetics, including the writings of St. Jerome, whom Fray

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31 Unlike Eiximenis’ work where Lady Sanxa was the implied reader of the Llibre, Fray Martín’s dedication could have been a ploy to appeal to a wider readership, a common strategy in which works were “directed to a prominent person solely to arouse the interest of the general readership” (Goldberg 33-4). Similar to Eiximenis’ work, however, the dedication does point to a certain type of noble reader, likely above the wealthy housewife of the Castigos y doctrinas, who, through Fray Martín’s linguistic play and direct conversation with Isabel, puts herself in royal shoes. Harriet Goldberg notes, for example, how Fray Martín “creates a bond between Isabel and himself by indirectly assuming that she shares his opinion [...] . What reader could resist the temptation to join the elite group of those who agree with Fray Martín and Isabel?” (49). Given this context of composition, the stakes were high for Fray Martín’s readers, and the behavior that he promotes and prescribes in the text were to have been taken to heart.
Martín references in the preceding sentence — “segund Sant Jherónimo, que la virginidad es como el lirio blanco; la vergüenza es como una rosa colorada” (197) — and who decries the use of cosmetics in devout Christian women. Goldberg, in her critical edition, acknowledges the curious comparison since the metaphor of cosmetics would seldom be used to counsel chastity (Jardín 197n). In general, the idea of blending colors is a useful comparison for Fray Martín, since the whiteness, or “aluayalde,” of virginity and chastity should be complemented with the “rosada vergüenza,” after all, there are numerous literary examples that use roses, the color pink, and the rosada of blushing all as a way of describing and depicting shame. In the fifteenth-century Crónica sarracina by Pedro de Corral, which is further explored in chapters two and three, King Rodrigo’s sexual advances on La Cava — a lady in his court and the daughter of one of his important diplomats — she turns red out of shame: “E ella tornó colorada, e tal como una rosa de vergüenza” (Corral I, 450).

The question of ornament itself is especially problematic because of R. Howard Bloch’s studies of female ornament in the Middle Ages. In his book Medieval Misogyny and the Invention of Western Romantic Love, Bloch explains how women are, by their “secondary nature, associated with artifice and decoration” (40). The very act of ornamentation through cosmetics, extravagant clothing, or jewelry — what Bloch himself calls “scandalous excess,” an idea later adapted by Alcuin Blamires — implies a sense of trickery and deception by women, for, as Bloch continues, “to decorate oneself is to be guilty of ‘meretricious allurement,’ since embellishment of the body, or the attempt ‘to show advantage,’ re-creates and is the sign of an

32 “According to Saint Jerome, virginity is like a white lily; shame is like a red rose.”

33 “She blushed red, like a rose of shame.”
original act of pride that is the source of potential concupiscence” (41). Bloch’s ideas echo widely circulated literature of the time; Andreas Capellanus’ *Art of Courtly Love*, for example, warns men of women who use too much cosmetics specifically because such women are often not virtuous or do not have good character: “If you see a woman too heavily rouged, you will not be taken in by her beauty unless you have already discovered that she is good company besides, since a woman who puts all her reliance on her rouge usually doesn’t have any particular gifts of character” (Capellanus 34).

Beyond modesty in clothing and adornments, other aspects of a woman’s behavior also have a bearing on her sense of shame. Eating and drinking in public, the topic of Lesson Six, requires moderation by women as to not say inappropriate things or spill secrets. The father explains, “como dize Oraçio, el vino haze descobrir las poridades y revelar los secretos, y haze consentir cosas desonestas, y haze mucho hablar y perder la verguença” (275). Here, just as we have seen in the previous examples with men and concerning masculine conduct, women have the ability to lose their sense of shame through bad behavior. In this lesson, the father expresses his concern that alcohol is a way for a woman to lose her sense of shame by saying things she should not. Modesty is also in question when it comes to eating and drinking, since a woman should not be shameless and consume too much alcohol or food. The father reminds women that one of the best reasons to not drink is so your husband does not smell it on your breath, and being a gluttonous eater opens the door for men to think you enjoy lavish meals and indulgent pleasures which are both costly, and, if your husband is not present, in the absence of the man

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34 “What is more, as Horace says, wine makes one uncover private things and reveal secrets, and allow immodest things, and it makes one talkative and shameless.” (Francomano 275)
who is supposed to bring you such pleasures: “syquiera por dar a entender que no queréys gozar 
de buena cosa, ni aver plazer complido no estando ellos con vosotras” (275).  

While for men, one’s shame is closely linked with honor, the above examples show how a 
woman’s shame is closely linked to modesty. In the Jardin, the notion of modesty is also refined 
to more specifically refer to chastity and virginity, which is, according to Fray Martín a crucial 
part of being a woman of shame. He echoes the father of the Castigos y doctrinas who states,“la 
muger casta guarda el mandamiento de Nuestro Señor Dios y muestra que quiere bien a su 
marido y conserva su onra” (260-1). In other words, a woman’s chastity is not only a testament 
to her following God’s commandment, but also a sign of her fidelity to her husband and his 
honor. Fray Martín reminds his readers, “Ésta es, pues, una condición natural buena delas 
mugeres, que son vergonçosas e aun questa condición sea loable en todas las mugeres, pero en 
especial enlas moças vírgines por tres razones: la una es por que refrena la hedad; la segunda, por 
que las viste de honestad; la tercera por que pinta la virginidad” (194-5).  

The Jardín’s context of composition, however, also raises questions of a strong political 
influence when it comes to championing chastity and virginity, which could, perhaps, explain 
Fray Martín’s investment in a woman’s sense of vergüenza. Barbara Weissberger, in her Isabel 
Rules, explores the issue of Isabel’s succession to the throne, where the question of sexual 
misconduct was used as a weapon against Enrique IV, and subsequently his daughter Juana of  

35 “If only in order to make them think that you do not want to enjoy any good thing or have full pleasure 
when they are not with you.” (Francomano 275)  
36 “The chaste woman keeps the commandment of Our Lord God and shows that she loves her husband 
well and preserves his honor.” (Francomano 260-1)  
37 “This is, then, a natural condition of women, they are shamefast and this condition is honorable for all 
women, but especially for virgins for three reasons: one, because it keeps them young; two, it dresses 
them in honesty; three, it paints them in virginity.”
Castille’s legitimate claim to the throne. Given Fray Martín’s dedication of the _Jardín_ to Isabel, the new heir from the collateral line, and the sexually driven campaign against Juana, the question of chastity is rather curious. Weissberger explains, “the emphasis _Jardín_ places on female chastity before and fidelity during marriage becomes another discursive weapon in the Castilian seigniorial and clerical effort to ward off the dynastic claims of the legitimate heir Juana and consolidate those of Isabel, whom they believed would protect the enormous wealth and power they had accumulated in the fifteenth century” (41). For Fray Martín’s readers, the _Jardín de nobles donzellas_ offered an opportunity to “try on” royal conduct for a moment in time, but for Fray Martín himself, and Isabel as the dedicatee of the work, the notion of chastity had the potential for a second layer of meaning and for a political discourse far beyond the daily comportment of the noble woman. The promotion of a sense of shame and the focus on virginity in a political climate where overt sexuality was frowned upon allowed for the _Jardín_ to play a role “in advancing Isabel’s acceptance of the suitor her advisers deemed most appropriate”: Fernando de Aragón (Weissberger 42).

Fray Martín’s specific uses of “vestir” and “pintar” as verbs to describe the ascription of honesty, or modesty, and virginity to women reinforces a certain idea that shame is an accessory for women. A sense of shame and all of its accompanying characteristics are merely garments or cosmetics that can be removed at any point. A woman’s shame can be stripped away at any point, which raises a point Sancho IV makes in the _Castigos_, “tal es la que non ha vergüenza commo aquella que está toda desnuda,” or “A shameless woman is like a woman who is completely naked” (_Castigos_ 105; Francomano 207) and only women who are lucky enough to be given shame by God — “la buena muger en que Dios pone vergüenza” — can wear it on their bodies.
as ornament. Whether clothed and ornamented or nude, one thing is clear, conduct literature’s representation of a woman’s experience of shame is deeply connected to the female body. That is, for women, the question of shame is intimately linked to everything corporeal. Having a sense of shame is based on how a woman presents herself, how she dresses, and how chaste she is; vergüenza is a question of sexual purity and when a woman’s sense of shame is lost — and she begins to feel shame — she is depicted as naked and sexually vulnerable or exposed to the world around her. Sancho IV, for example, explains how when a woman becomes shameless she exposes herself and her wrongdoings to the world in the plazas and gates of the city: “La mala muger el día que pierde la vergüenza e pregoná por todo el mundo la su maldat e el su pecado non lo quiere fazer en ascondido e valo fazer a las plaças e a las puertas de la çibdat por que todos vengan a la su maldat” (103).

The deep connection between a woman’s sense of shame or shamelessness and her nude body could be a result of Eve’s role in the Fall of the Garden of Eden, where, as we have noted previously and will return to in Chapter Four, the basis of Western Judeo-Christian notions of shame are based on the exposure of the naked body after Original Sin. However, I would argue that the emphasis that many conduct texts put on the female body regarding having a sense of shame and moderating behavior is based on the cultural notion of women as purely sexual beings that was common in the Middle Ages. If works like Alfonso Martínez de Toledo’s Corbacho or Andreas Capellanus’ De amore, or The Art of Courtly Love, teach medieval men something about women, it is that they are dangerously sexual. Men must protect themselves from the seductive

38 “A bad woman, on the day that she loses her shame and proclaims her wickedness and sin to all the world, does not want to sin in secret, so she goes to do it in the city squares and at the city gates so that all may come to her wickedness and may know it each day.” (Francomano 203)
powers of women since women, as the descendents of Eve, are the ones who have no control over their physical desires.

**THE SHAME ECONOMY AND GENDERED EXCHANGES**

While shame — as represented in conduct literature — is one component of the sex/gender system of the time, it is not always relegated to a strict division of the male-female gender binary. In fact, much of the conduct literature of late-medieval Iberia illustrates how shame, both in terms of how it is possessed and felt, is exchanged, shared, and transferred within the sex/gender system. The shame a man or woman experiences affects not only him or herself, but also others around them. As we saw in the case of honor, masculine shame can affect future generations of male offspring or other noblemen who are peers. And as we will see in a moment, shame breaks out of the gender binary in many scenarios, where masculine or feminine shame experiences affect the shame of the opposite gender.

If shame moves between different agents, it can then be said that shame has capital in the Bourdieusian sense, such that *vergüenza* is considered a cultural commodity within a gendered economic system. If shame has capital, it must also have a cultural value ascribed to it within the habitus of the shame-based society of late-medieval Iberia. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, representations of shame as physical objects, including clothing, jewels, and body parts, that can be lost, gained, or exchanged reinforces the idea that shame has capital. As an emotion, shame is grounded in the “embodied state,” or a sociological phenomenon, yet moves toward the “objectified state,” to use Bourdieu’s words (47), in these examples. Medieval conduct authors
ground the abstract social idea of shame in an objectified image so that readers can assign it a
certain social value.

The cultural value of shame, and the idea that it can be gained and lost, is especially
relevant in recent scholarship in the field of the history of emotions and senses. An economy
inherently implies that commodities are exchanged between different agents, and interpersonal
relationships are crucial to the economics of shame as a form of cultural capital. Turning to
Daniel Gross’ *The Secret History of Emotions*, he analyzes Thomas Hobbes’ 1651 *Leviathan* in
order to describe what he refers to as the political economy of emotions. From the Hobbesian
perspective, passions — or in our case, emotions or character traits that are often conflated with
emotions — originate in “the contested space between politically and historically situated
agents” and exist as economic entities that are distributed among agents in a given society. This
distribution, however, is unfair and inequitable in Hobbes’ view (Gross 45-6). Gross’ analysis of
Hobbes serves as a useful critical complement to Gilmore’s anthropological approach to the
honor/shame paradigm in that it explains, in slightly more economic terms, the exchange of
shame and honor between men as different agents. It is also worth noting here that passions are
not necessarily biological phenomena, but rather cultural constructions. Within the scope of
conduct literature, this approach to emotions seems rather appropriate given the corpus of
literature’s representation of shame as a social commodity that pertains to a given experience
rather than a psychosomatic experience that emerges from the body.

Some critics of the emotions and senses have recently explored this idea of emotional or
sensory economies in greater detail. Cultural historian Camille Bégin, for example, studies the
food culture of the New Deal United States and the sense of taste in her book *Taste of the Nation.*
She presents an outline of a “sensory economy” in which senses have value and create value (Bégin 11). She analyzes the sense of taste specifically “as symbolic, cultural, affective, and economic currency always in circulation and that, once mobilized, allows eaters to identify and differentiate themselves along race, class, gender, and ethnic lines” (17). Bégin argues that the sensory economy of taste actually defines and constructs different groups in society based on cuisines, common tastes, and shared experiences.

Twentieth-century United States and late-medieval Iberia are certainly worlds apart, however, Bégin’s theoretical basis for her argument can be applied to the economy of shame. Firstly, as we have seen above, Juan Manuel and Sancho IV support the idea that shame, as a character trait, has a cultural value; though it is not one of the five senses, having a “sense” of shame may also allow for us to call it a sensory economy. The material nature of shame’s literary representation gives an idea, albeit metaphorically, of how medieval writers understood vergüença as a trait that was in circulation. Additionally, I argue that the exchange and circulation of vergüença within the late-medieval Iberian sex/gender system not only reinforces the system itself, but also illustrates its fluid nature and the subtleties of its power dynamics. In other words, as Bégin states, and as we have seen above, the shame experience defines and is defined by gender. At the same time, shame is circulated between agents who differentiate themselves based on those shame-based gender definitions. A man’s shame and a woman’s shame are therefore distinct entities but exist within an economic framework in which they affect each other.

The male-female shame economy shows these complexities principally based on the fact that a man, in this historical and didactic context, is the bearer of the gaze and therefore the one
who determines whether a woman is a woman of vergüenza. If we return to the example of clothing in the *Castigos y doctrinas*, the anonymous father emphasizes how if a woman is well behaved and modest in her clothing, she opens the doors for others to consider her a woman of shame. She is, therefore, only a woman of shame if others see her as one; her vergüenza is determined by an outside — and masculine — gaze that has the ability to judge her behavior. The economy of shame in this instance is based on the granting of shame to a woman by a man. Her sense of shame is not her own, but rather given to her by a male outside observer. The paradox, however, is that the father in the *Castigos* also recommends that his daughters not be in a place where they can be seen by other men — including open windows and doors — in order to preserve their modesty. A woman’s shame, therefore, could be understood as being determined by the very male gaze that is prohibited in the first place.

Domestic relationships between men and women can also determine how a woman should feel ashamed. The fifteenth-century Catalan *Conseyll de bones doctrines que una reyna de França donà a una filla sua que fonch muller del rey d’Anglaterra*, a short conduct guide for women written in the form of list of advice for women who are about to get married, illustrates this idea and how women can avoid feeling shame if there were to be a domestic quarrel. The Queen’s twelfth piece of advice explains how when women fight with their husbands, they should not tell anyone and should not stop their regular daily behavior. She says, “te dich que […] per paraules iroses qui fossen entre tu e ell, que no vulles murmurar ni parlar en neguna manera, ni axí poch fer mala cara, ni cessar-li la paraula ni lo seure de la taula ni lo jaure en son
lit; car, s'i o fahies, fé comte que doblaries la tua honta e dolor” (Cantavella 53). If a woman were to fight with her husband and speak of it to someone else, or stop talking to him, not sleep with him, nor eat with him, her own pain and feelings of shame — here the Catalan honta — will only double — doblaries — and get worse. Not only can we see that domestic behavior can lead a woman to feel shame, but there are ways to acquire more shame in certain situations.

Within the shame-based gendered economy, the Queen of France’s advice demonstrates a few important points. Firstly, shame’s ability to “double” reinforces its capacity for cultural value. It is practically quantifiable in this example, and a woman must be careful to control her behavior as to not gain additional shame. Secondly, this quotation shows how a woman is able to manage her own investment in the shame economy. While her feminine shame is established by her relationship with her husband, she avoids further exchanges of shame if she follows the Queen’s advice by being discreet. Her husband, and others who she informs of her fights at home, will not be able to label her as shameless or impose shame upon her.

In the Jardín de nobles donzellas, Fray Martín reminds his readers that “es necesario a todas las donzellas, mucho más alas princesas que esperan casar con reyes e príncipes, los quales lo primero que pesquisan dela esposa es, si es honesta e virtuosa e de compuesta vergüenza” (Jardín 197). In this quotation, Fray Martín illustrates the importance of the male gaze when it comes to a woman’s sense of shame when it comes to royalty and the search for a wife that will become a princess. It is up to the man to look for a woman that he deems one of

39 “I told you that if there is bickering between you and him, you should not want to speak of it in any way, nor make a bad face, nor stop talking to him, nor not sit at the table, or sleep together, because if you do your shame and pain will only double.”

40 “It is necessary for all women, but much more for princesses that await marriage to kings and princes, that the first thing the men look for in a wife is that she is honest and virtuous and composed of shame.”
vergüença, especially since virtue and a sense of shame — together in this context almost synonymous to modesty — are the first things a prince will look for when ready for marriage. Once again, the paradox of being seen still applies, but is not as explicitly advised against as in the Castigos y doctrinas. Shame is also so important that as Fray Martín states, “una moça virgen, si es desvergonçada, no la quieren por muger” (196). Even if a woman is a virgin, it is her sense of shame that makes her a true woman in the eyes of a courtier. The relationship between virginity and shame here becomes rather blurry given that they are not mutually exclusive. A woman can be a virgin but at the same time lustful, which, in the eyes of a man makes her shameless and an unfit bride.

There are situations where this power dynamic within the economic system is reversed. That is, there are many cases where a woman’s loss of vergüença can bring shame to her husband. While male shame is subject to female behavior, the woman cannot deem a man shameless. Instead, once she is shamed or loses her sense of shame, her husband also loses his honor and falls into shame. The Castigos y doctrinas, for example, is a text that is explicitly preoccupied with how women’s behavior affects a man’s honor and his life as a whole. The anonymous father reminds his daughters that even the law condemns those women who are not chaste for their husbands: “las grandes penas que los derechos ponen a las que no guardan castidad a sus maridos” (263). A woman must maintain her modesty (honestidad) to ensure that her husband does not become suspicious of any misbehavior or become dishonored himself. The

41 “A virgen who is shameless is not taken as a woman.”

42 “las grandes penas que los derechos ponen a las que no guardan castidad a sus maridos.” (Francomano 263)
In the discussion of a woman’s use of cosmetics, the author of the _Castigos y doctrinas_ writes more specifically how, “Ca yo vos digo, hijas, que el que tiene muger que no se afeyta mucho, muy sin vergüenza está donde hablan de las que mucho de afeytan; y el que tiene muger d’estas y de poca vergüenza, muy corrido está quando oye alabar a las que no lo fazen” (266). In other words, a husband whose wife uses cosmetics excessively will feel ashamed or embarrassed to know that others are praising women who do not use cosmetics. He may become self-conscious of the fact that his wife does not fit into the praise of his peers, or that she is perhaps stigmatized for her shamelessness in ornamentation.

In the above examples, it is clear that the shame economy is a male-dominated dynamic. In most cases in the male-female economy, it is the male gaze toward another subject that determines a certain shame experience. In cases where a shameless woman brings shame to her husband, this gaze — while never fully vanished — is suspended in the societal preoccupations with masculine honor, turning the gaze inward. David Gilmore echoes this idea when he observes that, “Sexual shame is not only the arbiter of chaste femininity, but also, when lost, the negation of masculine identity” (11). In other words, the shame that a man feels when his wife is unchaste or even rumored to be immodest dishonors him in a way that strips him of his masculinity. In this reading of the shame economy as it relates to the sex/gender system

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43 She “often makes her husband suspicious, as well as others who see her, and thus loses her reputation and dishonours her husband.” (Francomano 264)

44 “For, I tell you, daughters, that he who has a wife who uses little make-up feels no shame when they talk of women who use much make-up; but he whose wife is one of these with little shame, is embarrassed when he hears praise of those that do not” (Francomano 266)

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established earlier, the dependence of male honor on female chastity is a symptom of the broader notion of “anxious masculinity,” or in the words of Mark Breitenberg, “the anxiety and violence engendered in men by a patriarchal economy that constructs masculine identity as dependent on the coercive and symbolic regulation of women’s sexuality” (377). In this vein, it is also important to note that the authors of didactic literature for women were predominantly men, and as is evident in this chapter, such authors guide women to behave well — and have a sense of shame — to the end of maintaining their husbands’ honor.
CHAPTER 2: SHAME AND THE RAPE OF A KINGDOM IN PEDRO DE CORRAL’S CRÓNICA SARRACINA

Devés de vengar, señor, esta tan gran villanía
y ser Bruto, el gran romano, pues Tarquino él se hazía;
si no, yo seré Lucrecia, la que dio fin a su vida.

[You must avenge, sir, this great affront, and show yourself to be Brutus, the great Roman, since he (Rodrigo) acted as Tarquin; if not, I will be Lucretia, who ended her own life.”

--Romancero del Rey Rodrigo

The verses above from the sixteenth-century Romancero poetic tradition are spoken by Florinda La Cava to her father, Count Julian of Ceuta. After King Rodrigo — the last of the Visigothic kings of Spain — rapes La Cava, she urges her father to take action against the King for her dishonor, eventually leading to the Fall of Visigothic Spain in 711 and the Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula. In her plea for vengeance, La Cava compares herself and her dishonored state to that of Lucretia, the legendary Roman matron who was raped by the tyrant Tarquin and whose father, Brutus, lead the take-down of the Kingdom of Rome and brought about the rise of the Roman Republic.

Both La Cava and Lucretia are legendary female figures in European history, whose narratives revolve around their rape and the questions of empire, tyranny, and vengeance. Lucretia’s story was widely known throughout the pre-modern world. Her story appeared in an array of medieval compendia of virtuous women, including those by Boccaccio, Chaucer, and Álvaro de Luna, and she later became a prominent subject of Renaissance and Baroque masters,

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45 Translation by Patricia Grieve, Eve of Spain, 138

46 La Cava’s historical existence is yet to be proven, yet she is a recurring figure in Spain’s medieval historiography.
notably Botticelli, Titian, and Artemisia Gentileschi. Lucretia’s story was embraced by Christian Europe, turning to honorable figures of Antiquity and looking to draw upon her example of virtue and martyrdom (Donaldson 26).

La Cava’s story was not as widely circulated as Lucretia’s, but the story of her rape by Rodrigo and her father’s actions against the Visigothic kingdom was told and retold in a variety of forms on the Iberian Peninsula. While initially unnamed, La Cava makes her first literary appearance in the ninth century in Arabic stories of the Muslim conquest. La Cava receives more attention in later versions of the narrative, including in the Crónica del moro Rasis dating back to the tenth century, Alfonso X’s Estoria de Espanna from the thirteenth century, and the Crónica Geral de Espanha de 1344, which eventually serves as the source-text of La Cava’s most profound narrative appearance: the Crónica del rey don Rodrigo postrimero rey de los godos, more commonly known as the Crónica sarracina, by Pedro de Corral. Corral’s version of the story was composed at some point before 1430 and is the emotionally-wrought retelling of the story of the Fall of Spain beginning with Rodrigo’s coronation and ending with the Muslim conquest and Rodrigo’s alleged penance in Portugal. It is a text that grounds itself in history, but is, for all intents and purposes, a work that bends generic conventions of historiography and chivalric romance, so much so that Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, in his Generaciones y semblanzas, pans the work as “trufa o mentira paladina,” discrediting the text’s stake in history and critiquing its literary embellishments.

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47 Derek Carr proposes that the Crónica sarracina must have been composed at some point before the death of Enrique de Villena in 1434. In a letter to Suero de Quiñones, Villena makes reference to a historia gótica written by a certain Peral, which Carr proposes is a misreading of the name Corral. If this reference is in fact valid, then Carr believes Corral’s text would have been composed somewhere around 1425.
The present chapter highlights the emotional parallels in the stories of Lucretia and La Cava, specifically with regard to their experiences of shame. It is this emotion which is the result of a rape and is the driving force of both narratives, catalyzing the fall of a kingdom and the rise of a new regime. However, while typological relationships are certainly evident, divergences in the two stories demonstrate the influence of the fifteenth-century historical context in which Corral writes. Notably, the rise of the Trastamarian dynasty to the Castilian throne and the need for political legitimization under the ideology of Neogothicism leads Corral to shift the shame experience from La Cava to Rodrigo and subsequently absolve him of his heinous actions. Corral thus defines a shame practice but also turns it upside-down for his own political message.

The story of La Cava’s rape and the “Fall of Spain” is the subject of three recent critical monographs: Patricia Grieve’s *The Eve of Spain* from 2009, and Elizabeth Drayson’s *The King and the Whore* from 2007, and James D. Fogelquist’s 2013 *Pedro de Corral’s Reconfiguration of La Cava in the Crónica del Rey don Rodrigo*. Grieve’s highly acclaimed book looks at the transmission of the story of La Cava and the invasion of the peninsula by the Moors as a national legend and an origin myth: “it is about how Spain created itself through fiction and narrative history” (Grieve 12). Grieve’s book is grounded in the notion of national identity, and how historiography affects the identity of a nation or community. Drayson’s book, on the other hand, looks more specifically at the transmission and variations of the La Cava/Rodrigo story from the Middle Ages through today. Drayson studies historiographic work, poetry, theater, novels, and other traditions of literary transmission to show the life of the story beyond its creation as well as its reception and adaptation over time.
Both Grieve and Drayson discuss the *Crónica sarracina* to some extent. Grieve positions the *Crónica* as the foundation for many of the ballads, or orally recited court poems that were written and told in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and often recounted national legends and important moments in Spanish history (6). She further describes the text as “an encyclopedic touchstone for all of fifteenth-century Spain’s most salient anxieties, about the Jews, the Muslims, national origins, and religious concerns, which [Corral] shapes within the sexualized framework of anxieties about women” (69). Part of Grieve’s analysis is therefore concerned with the aspects of Corral’s text that seek to christianize the national legend as a fundamental component of the *Reconquista* mentality and the hegemony of the Catholic crown.

Drayson takes a more Rodrigo-centered approach in her section on the *Crónica*. Mirroring her article, “Penance or Pornography?” from 2005, Drayson looks specifically at the King’s exile in the second part of the work, observing his penance through the lens of pornography, arguing that Corral’s version of the story “subverts ascetic precepts forcefully,” blurring the line between the profane, grotesque, and sexualized nature of the final scene — as examined later in this chapter — and the sacred act of repentant devotion (*King and Whore* 41).

Fogelquist’s work attempts the most complete study of La Cava’s place in Corral’s version of the story, but is not without faults. His monograph begins by looking at La Cava’s roots, tracing the character’s creation and development over the centuries, drawing from Biblical sources, like Bathsheba, and from other sources in medieval Iberia. The second part of Fogelquist’s book looks specifically at how Corral interprets the figure of La Cava and presents her differently than in past iterations, including, but not limited to, the fact that La Cava has a more decisive voice in the *Crónica sarracina* than most other versions of the story of Spain’s
Fall. By observing both La Cava’s history and the differences in her representation, Fogelquist argues for an expressly political reading of the text, claiming, “Pedro de Corral wrote his version of the legend of the destruyción from the margin of the power structure of his day. His is an oblique vision intended to expose the moral degeneracy veiled by the extravagant ceremonial of the Castilian court of Juan II” (70). Fogelquist’s argument assumes that the little knowledge of Corral’s life implies he remained at a political distance from the King. However, I argue that this take on the work echoes traditional ideas of Juan II’s court and relies on potentially false assumptions about Corral’s place in that court.  

Other important studies of the Crónica sarracina include those by Marina Brownlee (2006), Gloria Álvarez-Hess (1989), and Henry Berlin (2009). Each of these studies stresses, in Berlin’s words, the “text’s interweaving of history, hagiography, epic, and chivalric fiction” (108). Álvarez-Hess, for example, pays particular attention to the aspects of the text that are predominantly chivalric, which comprise a large portion of the Crónica as a whole. Scenes of Rodrigo’s coronation, jousting, battles with Moors, and the overall figuration of Rodrigo, Julián, and La Cava as chivalric figures form the foundation of the work’s foray into that very genre. At the same time, scholars like Ljiljana Milojevic, whose dissertation, La Crónica sarracina como obra historiográfica, looks at the elements of the narrative and the Crónica’s structure as historiographic.

The text’s mere breadth and defiance of generic conventions make it a robust retelling of Spain’s fateful historical moment and is filled with representations of emotions as constructed by Corral. Diverging from the debate over genre and historical truths that dominates scholarship on  

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48 See Karlan, “Who is Mestre Pedro?”
the Crónica, I turn the conversation to the work’s ability to represent emotion and emotional truths. Henry Berlin’s “Ritual Mourning and National Nostalgia in the Crónica Sarracina” begins this conversation and looks at mourning and nostalgia as two examples of emotions that serve as central themes of the text as a whole. There are, however, a large number of other emotions present in the text, especially within Corral’s elaboration on the La Cava figure, where the author reflects and shapes La Cava’s experience of shame within a courtly space in the context of her rape.

THE LUcretIA AND LA CAVA STORIES

The story of Lucretia is passed down through Late Antiquity principally through the writings of Livy in the History of Rome, written in Latin, and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his Roman Antiquities, written in Greek, both of which date to the first century BCE. While these two versions vary slightly in their details, the narrative arc of the story is roughly the same: During the siege of Ardea, Sextus Tarquinius, son of the tyrannical King Lucius Tarquinius, is overcome with a great lust for Lucretia, the wife of fellow soldier Collatinus. In Livy’s account, this lust begins with a competition amongst the soldiers at the camp about which of their wives is most virtuous; the title is given to Lucretia when the men return to Collatinus’ home and they observe Lucretia simply attending to household tasks. Overcome with her beauty and virtuous nature, Sextus Tarquinius (=Tarquin) sneaks into Lucretia’s bedroom and forces himself upon her threatening to kill her should she not give in to his desires. Livy also tells of how Tarquin threatens to kill one of Lucretia’s slaves, strip them naked and put them in bed together, claiming he found them in an adulterous affair and took their lives as punishment for their crime. Lucretia
is immediately overcome with shame about what happened and she immediately sends for her father to gather as many men as he can so they all can hear her story, and not learn of the events through gossip. Lucretia tearfully urges her father to seek vengeance against Tarquin and the tyrannical Tarquinius regime as she has been dishonored and disgraced. She insists that death is the only remedy to her situation and she takes her own life with a dagger concealed in her cloak. Distraught at this sight and infuriated by Tarquin’s abuse, Lucretia’s father, Brutus, and the other men take action, bringing about a revolution and the fall of the Kingdom of Rome the rise of the Roman Republic.

Over a thousand years after Lucretia’s rape and almost a thousand miles to the west, on the Iberian Peninsula, similar events began to unfold. The year was 711, and the power-hungry King Rodrigo set his eyes on La Cava, the daughter of Count Julian of Ceuta, the Spanish city bordering Morocco on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Julian sends his daughter to Toledo to attend to the Queen in the royal court. One day, Rodrigo gazes down into the gardens below his window and notices La Cava, the fairest and most chaste of a group of girls playing on the castle grounds. Determined to seduce her, Rodrigo makes a number of advances, though La Cava, knowing he is married and looking to conserve her own chastity, repels his advances. However, one night Rodrigo sends one of his servants to summon La Cava to his chambers where he has his way with her by force. Ashamed of the event, La Cava tries to hide, but after telling her friend Alquifa what had happened, she is urged to send a letter to her father confessing everything and informing him of the dishonor brought to their family. La Cava eventually returns to Ceuta, and her father seeks revenge against the King. He consults with Umayyad forces in Morocco and allows them entrance into Spain through Ceuta’s port, leading to the 711 Muslim
invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the beginnings of the Christian process known as
Reconquista that would last until the end of the fifteenth century.49

Determining whether or not the Lucretia story directly influenced Corral’s writing is an
impossible task and one that is historically problematic given the development of the La Cava
narrative over the centuries leading up to the Crónica’s composition. Corral’s version of the story
is a translation and elaboration of the Crónica Geral de 1344 from roughly a century prior, and
that text itself pulls from an array of preexisting texts, including the Crónica del moro Rasis from
the tenth century. With this rich textual history in mind, it would be a disservice to consider
Corral’s work in a vacuum and search for some sort of authorial influence with respect to his
knowledge of the Lucretia story — a story he would have most certainly known given its
popularity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries across Europe.

Instead, the narrative parallels between Lucretia and La Cava should be considered to be
the result of centuries of myth-making and the development of a national legend using a certain
narrative model for a cultural or political purpose. For Corral, La Cava’s story is a cultural
reconstruction and reimagining of the Lucretia legend in a specifically Iberian context in which
the medieval Christian Spain must reckon with its identity and roots in the fall of Spain’s own
tyrannical regime of the past. Stephanie Jed and Ian Donaldson have noticed and supported such
a reading of the Lucretia legend’s malleability. Donaldson, for example, states:

That the story takes the form it does — a form shared to some extent by other, rather
similar, stories — may indicate that from earliest times it has been subjected to a certain

49 The term “Reconquista” is a modern term for the Spanish quest to reclaim the parts of the Iberian
Peninsula under Islamic rule. It is often used as a generalization of the events that took place over seven
hundred years and is often considered by modern scholars to be problematic.
deliberate narrative shaping; a shaping that is satisfying not merely in aesthetic terms, but in other ways as well. Though the story may well contain elements of historical fact, these elements — along with others which are clearly fictitious — appear to have been fashioned into a powerful aetiological myth, intended to rehearse and to explain the origins of certain fundamental Roman ideals. (8)

In other words, for Donaldson, the narrative shaping of the story allows for a specific historical and political message, one which rationalizes and legitimizes the Roman Republic. At the same time, the story can be adapted beyond the context of Rome. Stephanie Jed explains, “From the perspective of the legend’s transmission, we can begin to see this rape not as an inevitable prologue to Rome’s liberation but as a historical figuration, formed and reformed to serve various interests and needs in different historical moments” (7). Corral’s composition of the *Crónica sarracina* does exactly that, as it is the reformed Spanish version of the legend that fits the political needs of his specific historical moment: the legitimization of the Trastamarian dynasty as the rightful descendants of Visigothic Spain, an ideology known as Neogothicism. Corral’s stake in the politics of fifteenth-century Castile, as we will see below, adds another dimension to the legend’s malleability, no longer making it solely about the Fall of Spain, but also about what Spain can do to recover from that fall nearly seven hundred years later.

**SHAME AND THE EMOTIVE**

Typology and structural parallels comprise only one aspect of Lucretia’s literary reincarnation as La Cava in eighth-century Spain. Many of the narrative parallels and relationships between the two stories are relatively straightforward. Lucretia and La Cava are the
violated women who turn the course of history; Tarquin and Rodrigo are the tyrannous abusers; both women turn to their fathers after their rapes; in an act of revenge the Roman Kingdom and Visigothic Spain fall into new hands, to name a few. Beyond plot points and narrative arc, I propose that both myths actually rely on the role of emotion. More specifically, it is the role of shame in both myths that allows for a Lucretian reading of La Cava in Corral’s fifteenth-century account. Without feeling shame, neither Lucretia nor La Cava would confess their rapes to their fathers, and without the confession, neither Brutus nor Julian would seek to take down the tyranny of Tarquin or Rodrigo.

In comparing Corral’s narrative with those of Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy, all three writers construct an experience of shame for the female protagonist that is grounded in specific elements that comprise, what I will call, their “shame practice.” As we have seen in the introduction to this project, the idea of the “shame practice” draws from Monique Scheer’s proposal of emotions-as-practice in the Bourdieusian sense. This refers to the notion that emotions can be understood to be the summation of bodily experiences that are shaped by different cultural factors that might be associated with specific social spaces, race, gender, and class, to name a few. For Scheer, emotions are “not only habituated and automatically executed movements of the body, but also [encompass] a learned, culturally specific, and habitual distribution of attention to ‘inner’ processes of thought, feeling, and perception” (200). For both Lucretia and La Cava, the “shame practice” consists of both physical and social components, including their psycho-somatic reactions to their shame, as well as the cultural implications of rape within a pre-modern courtly space.
Beginning with Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ account of the Lucretia story in his *Roman Antiquities*, he tells of Lucretia’s actions after the rape took place, explaining:

When it was day, Sextus, having gratified his wicked and baneful passion, returned to the camp. But Lucretia, overwhelmed with shame [δεινως φέρουσα] at what had happened, got into her carriage in all haste, dressed in black raiment under which she had a dagger concealed, and set out for Rome, without saying a word to any person who saluted her when they met or making answer to those who wished to know what had befallen her, but continued thoughtful and downcast, with her eyes full of tears. [...] When she came to her father’s house, where some of his relations happened to be present, she threw herself at his feet and embracing his knees, wept for some time without uttering a word. (477)

When Lucretia begins to speak and confess her dishonored state she says, “I come to you as a suppliant, father, having endured terrible and intolerable outrage, and I beg you to avenge me and not to overlook your daughter’s having suffered worse things than death” (477). Lucretia then begs her father, Brutus, to call for his men to bear witness to her confession, imploring that, “when you have learned to what shameful [αισχρὰς] and dire straits I was reduced, consult with them in what manner you will avenge both me and yourself” (479).

In his roughly contemporaneous *History of Rome*, Livy tells the story of Lucretia in a similar way. After she is raped, he explains how, “Lucretia, grieving at her great disaster, dispatched the same message to her father in Rome and to her husband at Ardea” (201). Similar to Lucretia’s plea in Dionysius’ account, the message urges Brutus to gather as many men as he can to bear witness to her testimony. Everyone discovers Lucretia sad in her room — *sedentem maestam in cubiculo inveniunt* — and “the entrance of her friends brought the tears to her eyes.”
When Collatinus, her husband, asks her if everything is okay and she responds, “Far from it; for what can be well with a woman when she has lost her honour [amissa pudicitia]? The print of a strange man, Collatinus, is in your bed. Yet my body only has been violated; my heart is guiltless, as death shall be my witness. But pledge your right hands and your words that the adulterer shall not go unpunished” (203).

In both of these accounts, Lucretia’s emotional state is the direct result of her sexual violation by Tarquin. It becomes clear that her rape and the loss of honor associated with her rape leads her to feel shame about what happened. In the case of Dionysius’ account, he describes how Lucretia was “overwhelmed with shame” — δεινως φέρουσα, which also could translate to “carrying shame” — before departing for Rome to tell her father what happened. For both Dionysius and Livy, Lucretia also makes a first-person emotion claim about her shame, though Livy’s version is less direct. While Dionysius writes of Lucretia’s “shameful and dire straits,” using the greek “αἰσχρὰς,” Livy recalls how Lucretia discusses how she lost her honor, or “amissa pudicitia.” Here, pudicitia more specifically implies a “sense of shame” given the root pudet, or “to cause shame.” Lucretia acknowledges her loss of honor but her language appears to imply a perceived loss of a sense of shame given her sexually violated state. However, in reality, Lucretia is not quite “shameless” because her rape implies that she is not at fault, meaning she maintains her virtue even though she has been physically dishonored.

In Pedro de Corral’s version of the La Cava story, La Cava’s shame is also expressed both by Corral’s narrative voice and by La Cava herself in a first person claim. Immediately following Rodrigo’s rape, Corral describes how:
Así como la Caba se sentió escarnida del Rey de cómo compliera en ella su voluntad, tomó gran pesar en su coraçón que comenzó cada día a perder la fermosura que avía de tal guisa que aquellos que la conoscían de ante veían claramente que ella no avía plazer, e que ante tenía algund grand pesar. (Corral I, 455-6)

Corral’s description of La Cava’s shame is most notable in his statement that “se sentió escarnida del Rey.” Here, La Cava’s shame after her rape is expressed as something she directly feels — sentirse. The term escarnida here is used to express shame; escarnida, linguistically a participle used as an adjective, would come from the terms escarnio or escarnecimiento, defined in Nebrija’s 1495 dictionary as “derissio,” or a sense of being mocked, ridiculed, or embarrassed. The term was used to signify shame as Juan Manuel Cacho Blecua points out is this case in texts including the Siete Partidas (76). Phil Mollon clarifies the differences and connections between embarrassment and shame, explaining, “Embarrassment is an immediate shock reaction experienced at the moment of disrupted presentation of self in a social situation — shame is the close associate of embarrassment, but may be a more enduring, and sometimes lethal, pain arising from the memory of the scene of embarrassment” (24). In the case of La Cava, her feeling escarnida would refer to her shame as she is removed from the moment of the rape itself when her emotions are described and her pain endured for the majority of the narrative of the chronicle. Later on in this same quotation, “grand pesar,” also figuratively implies a sort of shame. Literally “pesar” might mean that she felt a heaviness, yet colloquially would have also illustrated her feelings of shame as we have seen in the Introduction.

50 “La Cava felt ashamed by the King and how he did with her as he pleased; she had a great heaviness in her heart such that every day she began to lose her beauty to the point that those who knew her well clearly saw that she was without pleasure or enjoyment, and that she had a great shame.”
This moment of Corral’s narrative, similar to Dionysius’ claim that Lucretia was “overwhelmed with shame,” is a third person claim, and a representation of the character’s emotional state as presented by the author. William Reddy’s stipulation to his own theory of the “emotive” is that, “second- and third-person emotion claims [...] are not emotives for the person who utters them, but they can elicit rehearsal of the claim by the person spoken to, or spoken about, in the first-person present tense” (107). The literary nature of Corral’s speech-acts means that a first-person present tense emotive by a character is essentially impossible given the fact that the character is always an expression of an authorial voice.

However, in line with Reddy’s theory, Corral’s statement about La Cava’s shame is inherently a “rehearsal” of an emotion claim, in that it is a representation of Corral’s understanding of shame in a gendered courtly space as applied to the character he writes. When La Cava is described as feeling shame, she bridges the lived experience of Corral’s real world with the constructed literary space and the habitus she inhabits in the text. Therefore, it is my proposal that within the literary context, these speech acts that serve as imagined and “rehearsed” expression of the characters’ emotions could serve as a “literary emotive.” A literary emotive would therefore be defined by the author’s ability to express a “current state of activated thought material” on behalf of the character (111). As a male writer, likely writing for a predominantly elite male readership, the emotional experience of a woman’s rape is one that Corral inherently infers and constructs based on the available knowledge of the courtly shame/honor paradigm, the social implications of sex, and the historiographic sources from which he gets his facts. He is therefore rehearsing a certain emotional experience through the act of writing and representation, and the audience understands that rehearsal through the act of reading.
La Cava’s first-person emotion claims do exist, appearing first in her letter to her father, Julian. The letter, which she sends from Toledo to Ceuta requesting that her father come and remove her from Rodrigo’s court reads:

Señor padre, quiero que sepades como vós cuidávades fazer vuestra honra en me embiar en la corte del Rey don Rodrigo, fezistes vuestra desonra, e grand pérdida, e esto es que el Rey sin mi grado me tomó para sí, e complió en mí su voluntad, e del grand pesar que yo ansí he de ser escarnida si más en su corte estó ál no me verná sino es la muerte con grand amargura que he. Porende, señor padre, ruégovos que enbiedes por mí luego, e ayades piedad de la triste cuitada que en mal día nació, si no yo me dexaré morir. E si fasta aquí só biva no es por ál sino por una vegada de ver a mi madre. (Corral I, 458)

Using both escarnida and grand pesar again, La Cava, in the form of a written statement, tells of her feelings of shame after Rodrigo rapes her. Here, Corral represents La Cava’s voice through a more formal use of emotive statements, to borrow Reddy’s terminology, where the phrasing of “grand pesar que yo ansí he de ser escarnida,” or, roughly, “the great pain I have from having become ashamed,” is an explicit use of a first-person present tense emotion claim.

ELEMENTS OF THE SHAME PRACTICE

Emotion claims are only one component of how the three writers represent shame in the context of their narratives. While these specific moments say that Lucretia and La Cava feel

51 “Sir, Father, I want you to know that, in believing you were supporting your honor in sending me to the court of the King don Rodrigo, you were dishonored and shamed, and that is because the King, without my consent, took me for himself, and did with me as he wished, and with the great pain I have from having become ashamed, if I should remain in his court any longer, I will surely die in my bitter state. Therefore, my father, I beg you to send for me soon and have pity for the sad, poor girl who was born on a bad day, otherwise I will let myself die. And if I should continue to live, it is for nothing more than the hope of seeing my mother.”
shame, there are other elements of the above quotations that show how Lucretia and La Cava feel shame. In other words, beyond emotion claims, Dionysius, Livy, and Corral all construct an emotional practice that is grounded in other elements that come together to give a broader view of the shame experience through significant linguistic and narrative parallels. Lucretia and La Cava’s shame experiences as represented by these writers are almost identical. However, it should be noted that these men are working within a specific political framework and a courtly habitus. The shame practice they represent moves the narrative for the feminine experience of shame, post-rape, in the face of tyranny, but is not a universal experience of shame. The practice Dionysius, Livy and Corral all construct is based on four different components: the recognition of the loss of honor, the somatic reaction in the form of crying, the need for an outside observer, and an invocation of death.

As we have seen in Chapter One, the connection between a woman’s virtue and shame is a fundamental component of her femininity. And the loss of honor — whether the loss of virginity or modesty as a whole — leads to a state of shame. It is therefore natural that the first piece of the shame practice Dionysius, Livy, and Corral all construct is an explicit recognition of the loss of honor. Livy recounts in his narrative how Lucretia asks the rhetorical question, “what can be well with a woman when she has lost her honour? [quid enim salvi est mulieri amissa pudicitia?],” a direct exclamation of her dishonored state (203). La Cava is no different, claiming her dishonor during her conversation with her mother, the Countess Frandina. La Cava exclaims, “[Y]o soy desonrada por la manera quel Rey me deshonró, por el mal que es fecho no pierdo cosa de mi desonra” (II, 25). This particular quotation is curious in that she recognizes her dishonor because the King dishonored her; based on the events themselves, I lose nothing to my dishonor.”
dishonor, but does not take responsibility, something Lucretia does as well as we will see below. However, eventually La Cava will contradict this statement and take the responsibility for the fate of Spain. Her state of dishonor independent of culpability is further reinforced by the Count who reminds La Cava, “tu, la mi hija, has seido deshonrada e maltractada;” “you, my daughter have been dishonored and mistreated.” (II, 27). What is also notable about these quotations in the case of La Cava, is that dishonor is both a state but also an action that the King performs on her. She is in a state of dishonor by the rape, but also is dishonored by the King.

Additionally, in the case of La Cava, there is a clear connection between her dishonor and the dishonor of those around her, notably her father. As different agents in the shame economy, La Cava’s state brings dishonor to her father whose reputation is stained by her rape. In her letter to her father, La Cava tells the Count that by sending her to the court, he dishonored himself: “fezistes Vuestra deshonra” (I, 458). La Cava is not the only one to recognize the connection between her rape, shame, and loss of honor for her family. Her mother, in an exchange with the Count, laments about her husband, “¡O viejo desonrado!, ¡cómo has avido tan mala ventura en te escarnecer por tal manera el traidor del Rey don Rodrigo en te deshonrar la tu buena hija,” drawing explicit connections between La Cava’s violation by the King and its effect on the Count’s own reputation (I, 473).

However, La Cava’s discussions with her mother at the beginning of Book II shows how her shame and dishonor become a bit more complicated than that of Lucretia in terms of how both women view their own dishonored state. In Livy’s account, Lucretia explains how, “my body only has been violated; my heart is guiltless” (203), drawing a fine line between her

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53 “Oh you dishonored man! You have such bad fortune in shaming yourself by that traitor King Rodrigo, dishonoring yourself and your daughter!”
dishonored physical state that is the result of her rape, and her ability to maintain a chaste heart. In other words, Lucretia was a chaste wife, she was not a virgin but maintains her virtue. While La Cava’s situation is essentially identical, her own opinions on the matter do not always reflect the same amount of innocence that Lucretia proclaims for herself. As mentioned previously, she does at one point maintain her innocence in the situation. But, in the course of La Cava’s conversations with her mother, she repeatedly expresses her concern for her own reputation in history and her eternal shame. She exclaims, “e la mi mala fama según los méritos míos durará fasta la fin del mundo,” or that “my infamy from my acts will last until the end of the world” (II, 25). She is so concerned with how she will be viewed throughout history that at one point she even asks her father to stop his plan of revenge, perhaps Corral’s own hindsight with regard to the events of 711 from a fifteenth-century perspective. The Countess, however, asks La Cava, “Fija mía, ¿por qué vós doledes tanto de la destrucción del Rey don Rodrigo? No lo devedes fazer, acordándose vós de la grand desonra que vos fizo” (II, 13). Frandina’s reassurance that La Cava has done no wrong also echoes the support of Brutus and his men for Lucretia: “They tell her it is the mind that sins, not the body; and that where purpose has been wanting there is no guilt” (203).

The question of fault and blame here becomes especially problematic given La Cava’s statement that her dishonor is due to “méritos míos,” or “my own merits.” The Countess makes it clear that the King is to blame, that it is he who dishonored La Cava through his own actions, yet La Cava is convinced that history will determine otherwise. Her unwarranted preoccupations harken back to her initial fears of telling her father, and the idea that “men, to our dismay, often

54 “My daughter. Why do you feel so much pain for the destruction of the King don Rodrigo? You should not, remembering the great dishonor he caused you.”
judge us as being evil” — “todavía los ombres por nuestra grande desventura nos juzgan por la mayor parte de ser malas” (I, 457). Per Corral’s representation of the events, La Cava worries that the male view of female sexual behavior will prevent her from being viewed as innocent through the course of history, and it will be her that bears the responsibility of the Fall of Spain, when in reality she is innocent and it is Rodrigo’s own licentiousness that is the true cause of the end of Visigothic rule. Curiously, Corral’s inclusion of such preoccupations are actually a self-fulfilling prophecy given that his work is composed roughly seven hundred years after the events supposedly took place. Corral perpetuates La Cava’s supposed concerns through the very act of retelling her story. While La Cava does have a stronger voice in the Crónica sarracina than she previously had in other chronicles, she nonetheless takes on much of the blame for the Fall of Spain through her own words and her own view of the events at hand.

The second component of the shame practice is the physical component, notably the fact that in all three instances above, the principal somatic reaction for Lucretia and La Cava is to cry. Dionysius explains how Lucretia rode to Rome in her carriage “with her eyes full of tears,” and then, “When she came to her father’s house, […] she threw herself at his feet and embracing his knees, wept for some time without uttering a word” (477). For Livy, it is the sight of her friends who enter her room that brings her to tears. In the Crónica sarracina, Corral elaborates on La Cava’s crying on multiple occasions. The first is when La Cava tells her story to Alquifa, her dear friend and handmaiden during her stay in Toledo. Corral explains that “as she told her story she cried so much that it was almost like she were in front of her deceased father,” painting a dramatic yet highly descriptive image of La Cava in this moment — “e como gelo contava llorava de los ojos de tal guisa como si delante de sí tuviese a su padre muerto” (I, 456).
This image could be deliberate, an allusion to the act of mourning, which given the circumstances of her rape, might be a reference to La Cava’s loss of innocence, agency, or even the loss of her virginity itself. The King’s abuse forcefully stripped away the virginity and virtue for which La Cava was praised as a lady of the court, and she weeps for the loss of that past public self. Mourning is also not an uncommon practice throughout the text, and La Cava’s rehearsal of mourning practices — practices such as crying that were often delegated to women and, at times, theologically charged (Berlin 116-7) — calls to mind many of the other images of women mourning the loss of their loved ones in battle. In one dramatic moment at the end of Book I, after Rodrigo flees to the north and Spain is met with repeated defeats in battles against the Moors, the fictive historian Eleastras tells of the “llanto de las dueñas e donzellas,” mourning of the ladies, crying for the loss of Spain while trying to stay strong in the face of their enemies (I, 646-8). While many of the women of the court mourn the death of husbands and sons, a wider reading of this instance also shows that the women could be mourning the loss of their kingdom and the death of a past “Spain.”55 This repeated imagery reinforces a certain reading of La Cava’s actions as being both shameful and connected to loss or mourning in the context of her confession of shame post-rape.

The representation of shame’s physical side, often times in the form of blushing, or in the cases of Lucretia and La Cava, crying, also points to shame’s public aspects. Because shame is often a physical emotion, it is often visible to others. Thus, the third disposition of the shame practice is the social component recalling Burrus’ notion that shame is “the most intimate of

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55 In the eighth century, Spain was not yet a nation. In the fifteenth century, the individual kingdoms (Castile, Aragon, etc) were also still separate. Corral’s use of “España” is a reference to the Visigothic Hispania but also Spanish identity as a whole and his 15th-century political ideals.
internal emotions” and also “quintessentially public” (Burrus 2). For Lucretia and La Cava, their shame becomes social in two ways. The first is the noticeable and observable experience by other people. In Dionysius’ account, he explains how Lucretia did not answer those “who wished to know what had befallen her,” a clear indication that her internal experience was comprehensible to onlookers who thought to inquire about what was wrong (477). For La Cava, Corral’s account is not much different, notably when he explains how, “començó cada día a perder la fermosura que avía de tal guisa que aquellos que la conoscían de ante veían claramente que ella no avía plazer” (I, 456). Corral does not explain exactly how La Cava loses her beauty, but the implication is that she exhibited some sort of physical change as a result of her emotional state, leading others to be able to observe and notice her feelings based on her appearance. The loss of beauty La Cava experiences could be considered another somatic symptom demonstrating, in more drastic terms, shame’s strong physical aspects. As Virginia Burrus explains, “shame is an affect closely linked with sensation, and this in itself binds it tightly to the flesh” and “registers most vividly on the exposed surfaces of our flesh” (45). In psychological and biological studies of shame, it has been observed that someone who experiences shame often has a musculoskeletal response: “The response of shame includes lowering the eyelid, decreasing the tonus of all facial muscles, lowering the head via a reduction in tonus of the neck muscles, or a tilting of the head in one direction” (Tomkins 143).

Some scholars have shown how the idea of ugliness is also often linked to shame, specifically with regard to the “grotesque body” notably by Mary Flannery and Gail Kern Paster.

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56 La Cava does blush at one point but it is before her rape. She blushes when she turns downs the King’s advances, feeling embarrassed at his proposals of marriage and a sexual relation: “E ella tornó colorada, e tal como una rosa de vergüenza” (Corral I, 450)
They support the idea that the grotesque body is often the “site and source of shame” as evident in the Early Modern period (Flannery 174). The link between the grotesque body and shame is evident in the story of Sophia from the *Apocryphon of John*, studied by Burrus, for example. She explains that Sophia’s shame results from her failure to abide by the patriarchal structures around her and her emotion materializes into an “unfortunate creature [that] metamorphizes into the monstrous figure of a lion-faced serpent whom Sophia swiftly banishes” (Burrus 59). While Sophia herself does not become grotesque, her emotions do, and the monster is, for all intents and purposes, the physical symbol of her shame.

In La Cava’s case, her body loses beauty — but is not necessarily grotesque — and is therefore not the source of her shame but becomes synonymous with her shame. In the literary context of the *Crónica sarracina*, Corral uses this image to paint a broader visual picture in order to convey an emotional practice. Since readers cannot interact with or see the characters of the work, the “location” of the emotion as it is represented in the text, “has consequences for its linguistic articulation, above all with respect to imagery and metaphor” (Plamper 30). By depicting La Cava’s shame as resulting in a full physical transformation, the corporeal location of her shame allows for a more thorough representation in the text. Corral’s statement that she “lost her beauty every day” serves as a useful linguistic articulation of an image of her internal experience that is comprehensible to the reader in a more accessible way than recounting her blushing and bowing of the head.\(^{57}\) Beyond a simple statement of her emotions, Corral elicits an

\(^{57}\) Plamper also notes that the relationship between localization and representation does vary, depending on the image used, the medium of representation (literature, painting, audio, etc) and other factors. In the case of Corral, his literary representation puts La Cava’s emotion on her body in addition to her speech-acts.
image of her physical state that allows for both readerly comprehension of her situation and sympathy.

Beyond the physical aspects that are observable by others, Lucretia and La Cava’s shame must also be confessed, demonstrating a social side of shame and their need for witnesses and an inclusion of others. Notably, both women turn to their fathers, Brutus and Julian, who are the ones that bear witness to their daughters’ confessions; Brutus in a heart-wrenching in-person interaction, and Julian through epistolary exchange. In addition to her father, Lucretia also urges Brutus to gather as many men as he can to bear witness to her confession. La Cava, on the other hand confesses in multiple instances, first to Alquifa, then in the letter to her father, then to her mother back in Ceuta. In both stories, shame is communicated and shared such that the need for a witness is a fundamental piece of the shame practice and the act of confession is so important because it allows for the translation of inner emotions into social interaction; it is the direct expression of an internal state. As Burrus explains, “confession seems to remain crucially a verbal act — or, perhaps better, a verbalizing act. Seen, touched and tasted, even smelled [...] shame must still make itself heard” (111). This, of course, could not be more the case for La Cava and Lucretia given that people could see their emotions before they said anything.

Virginia Burrus argues that a person who feels shame is torn, however, between sharing their shameful information and the shame that comes with the very act of sharing (Burrus 112). Before La Cava confesses to Alquifa, Corral explains how she “felt shame from hiding from Alquifa” and keeping the information regarding her rape to herself; “La Caba [...] avía grand vergüenza de cómo se encobría tanto tiempo de Alquifa” (I, 456). With Burrus’ idea in mind, this moment shows how La Cava is placed within a shame dilemma and the unfortunate reality that
she will feel shame whether or not she confesses to her friend. These different shames, however, are based on different relationalities. If she continues to keep to herself, she will feel shame related to the rape itself and her dishonor, but also feel shame in relation to hiding and keeping her rape a secret from her friends. If she confesses to Alquifa — which she ultimately does — she risks feeling shame from the exposure of her shameful experience and the potential judgement of others.

La Cava here experiences the push and pull of the private and public aspects of the emotion grounded in the idea that “shame gets to be associated with privacy and the world of the hidden [...] shame often attends the exposure of something that we would have preferred kept hidden, of a private part of the self” (Nathanson, Shame and Pride 145). For this reason it is natural to want to hide or avoid any possibility of judgement from the outside world. La Cava’s desire to hide could also be read as symptomatic of the shame she feels, given the fact that, “if shame is paradigmatically the anxiety that attends being observed and judged by others, then wanting to put distance between us and the judging eyes must be the natural reaction” (Deonna et al. 49). Nevertheless, when she is confronted by Alquifa, La Cava does confess and opens up to her friend about the truth of her rape, no longer able to hide.

Alquifa’s practical and pragmatic nature does push back against the risks associated with a shameful confession. She does not judge La Cava for her dishonored state but rather helps her come up with logical solutions to her predicament. Alquifa encourages La Cava to tell the Count what had happened — the second confession — merely based on the fact that Rodrigo will likely continue to pursue sexual relations with her and if she were to become pregnant, the world would find out anyway. La Cava agrees to send the letter to her father but not without hesitation.
Though she acknowledges her father is a rational and good man, she is worried that he will not believe her story to be true given the fact that men are known to think lowly of women. She states:

Si aquellos que este fecho sopiesen lo juzgasen como pasó yo no avría que temer de lo enbiar dezir a mi padre; mas como mi padre es ombre de buen seso, e muy entendido en todas las cosas, e todavía los ombres por nuestra grande desventura nos juzgan por la mayor parte ser malas, he miedo que él no lo creyese que así avía pasado, e echaría a mí toda la culpa, e diría que por mi grado lo oviese hecho. (I, 457)

La Cava outwardly expresses her concerns and the vulnerability that comes along with confessing her shame. She knows that by opening up and sharing her shame, there is a chance that she may be poorly judged by her father or by other men, only reinforcing the shame she already feels.

In La Cava’s final confession to her mother, La Cava’s continued pain shows that the process of confession and the exposure of what is meant to be private is an ongoing process. As Burrus contends, one needs to confess shame as a means of coping, but it is “not catharsis but an ongoing responsiveness — a painfully unrelieved openness” (115). For Lucretia, her confession and death are one moment, while for La Cava, her confessional process repeats and is ongoing throughout the narrative.

The final component of the shame practice as represented by Dionysius, Livy, and Corral is the invocation of death. While Lucretia does take her own life in a literal invocation of death,

58 “If those who learn of the facts judge them as they were, I would not fear telling my father; but given that my father is a wise man and learned in all things, and that men on the whole, much to our dismay, judge us [women] as evil, I fear that he will not believe what had happened and will put all of the blame on me, and he will say it was done from my own actions.”
both women use death as a frequent point of comparison for their emotional state. Dionysius recounts how Lucretia begs her father not to “overlook your daughter’s having suffered worse things than death” (477). In Livy’s account, Lucretia confesses her shame and declares that “death shall be my witness [mors testis erit]” (203). In La Cava’s case, she tells her father that if she were to remain in Toledo, she could only see death in her future: “si más en su corte estó ál no me verná sino es la muerte” (Corral I, 458). For Lucretia, the question of death takes on a much more literal role, as she unveils her hidden dagger and takes her own life in front of her family and acquaintances. La Cava, on the other hand, does not take her own life in this instance, but Corral does take a figurative page from Lucretia’s book when La Cava, as part of her conversation with her mother, states, “E mejor fuera que [me] matara por mis manos,” or “It’s better for me to take my life with my own hands” (II, 25). The irony of the situation is that La Cava does eventually take her own life. However, per Corral’s description, her death is unrelated to her post-rape emotional state, and is even somewhat of a footnote in the narrative, despite the grotesque nature of here suicide. While Julian is in Seville moving toward Córdoba, Corral merely mentions that he is sad because he received news of his daughter’s death. The death was the result of an infection caused by a fish bone being caught under La Cava’s fingernail. As the infection spread throughout her body, the pain was so intolerable that she actually consumed her own flesh and died (II, 348).

This invocation of death in the wake of sexual shame is directly related to the social norms of feminine honor. Or, as Ian Donaldson affirms, “The fact that Lucretia should find it necessary to kill herself may seem explicable partly in terms of the status of women in Roman society” (11), a society grounded in the shame/honor paradigms explored in Chapter One.
Lucretia’s suicide is the final act of her dedication to her virtue; it is a “sign of Lucretia’s moral perfectionism rather than her moral fallability. Her death is indeed the ultimate sign of her innocence, her crowning act of virtue” (Donaldson 22). Lucretia’s moral purity shows that she certainly is not required to take her own life, but she feels obligated to do so. She claims, “though I acquit myself of the sin, I do not absolve myself from punishment” (Livy 203), reminding everyone that “certain values matter more than life itself” (Donaldson 23).

La Cava’s statement that she is “better off dead” in the *Cronica sarracina* appears to be grounded both in her preoccupations with honor, like Lucretia, but also her own investment in her reputation and feelings of pain. When La Cava exclaims, “e mejor fuera que [me] matara por mis manos,” she does so as part of her lamenting how she will be perceived throughout history drawing close associations between her eternal dishonor and her need for death (II, 25). La Cava unjustly blames herself for the destruction of Spain, and the death of thousands of soldiers. Her solution is to ask her father to cease his quest for revenge and to take her own life in order to stop any further damage. Additionally, unlike Lucretia, La Cava also sees death as a way out of her suffering and feelings of shame, recalling her letter to her father where she asserts that death is her only possible escape from her situation in the court in Toledo should her father not come for her and bring her back to Ceuta.

**The Shame of the Nation and the Fall of Spain**

For both Lucretia and Corral’s La Cava, the shame practice is not just about their own feelings. Over time, their literary existence has also allowed their own emotional state to stand in for the emotions of the empire as a whole. As Ian Donaldson notes, “Lucretia is not simply
Lucretia, but the figure of violated Rome; the rape epitomizes the wider tyranny of the Tarquins. The symbolism of the story runs two ways: if Rome is like Lucretia, Lucretia is also like Rome and its neighboring cities. Tarquin lays siege to her in much the same spirit as he besieges Ardea” (9).

Corral’s La Cava holds the same symbolic reciprocity to the Lucretia story but not without its own complications. La Cava’s rape epitomizes Rodrigo’s tyranny and abuse of power throughout his reign. Like the siege of Ardea Donaldson alludes to, Rodrigo’s force upon La Cava’s body even calls to mind another important moment of his tyranny, his forced entry into the Casa de Hercules, which — according to Corral’s narrative — was the “primero signo,” or first sign of Spain’s destruction. Rodrigo’s entry into the Casa de Hercules stands as the first example of his violation of space and abuse of power.

The episode tells of a tower supposedly built by Hercules which stands as a legacy of the Roman presence in Iberia and a monument to Visigothic power. The tower is locked and legend says that he who opens it will cause Spain to be deserted and lost, “despoblada e perdida” (I, 178). Rodrigo, full of greed, defiantly breaks the locks and opens the tower, and upon entering finds that the legend begins to come to life. He finds a cloth with a prophecy written on it that states, “Quando este paño fuere estendido e parescieren estas figuras hombres que andarán así armados conquirrán a España e serán della señores,” the men here referring to the images of Moorish-looking soldiers painted on the walls (I, 180).

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59 Donaldson also reminds readers that they should not let a reading of Lucretia as a symbol diminish her human experience of rape. “By converting a woman into a symbol (or object of veneration), you may partly obscure the fact that her story is actually a dispiriting one” (10).

60 “When this cloth is opened and these figures appear, men who are armed like them will conquer Spain and you will be their subjects.”
Like La Cava’s chaste and virtuous body, the tower is locked and untouched. Corral even describes it as “full of bright light and with more luster than a crystal” — “e todo el palacio era muy claro e más luziente quel cristal,” — calling to mind a comparison to a jewel, a sign of female virtue as we have seen in Chapter One. Even the colors of the interior of the palace mirror Corral’s description of the scene in the garden where Rodrigo first spots La Cava playing with her friends and the site that marks the beginning of his sexual advances. The tower is described as having four parts with four different colors, green, red, black, and white. Green might denote the garden itself, while red (bermeja) echoes the “fine scarlet” silks worn by the girls, “de fina escarlata” (I, 449), and the black brings to mind the darkness of the castle from which the King gazes down into the gardens at his newfound lust. It is the white, however, that is most important here, as Corral uses the phrase, “tan blanca como la nieve” to describe both the interior of the Casa de Hercules and La Cava’s legs, which she exposes by lifting up her skirt, while playing with her friends unaware that a man is watching. In describing both bodies as “white as snow,” Corral evokes the connections between whiteness and virginity, or that of the unstained, pure reputation. The Casa de Hercules episode is, therefore, a rape of its own kind, not of an individual, but of the image of a community and communal history of Visigothic Spain. The Casa de Hercules is an extension of Rodrigo’s Toledo and the rape that takes place there, just as Ardea is an extension of the Tarquin’s Rome.

While they tie the stories of Lucretia and La Cava together in general terms, the metonymic relationships between rape and tyranny, Lucretia and Rome, and La Cava and the Fallen Spain are also the beginnings of where these two narratives diverge. One of the principal differences in these stories is the result of the fathers’ revenge. Brutus seeks revenge against
Tarquin and brings down the Kingdom of Rome in order to build a better Republic. He avenges Lucretia’s dishonored state, making himself a hero, while Lucretia’s suicide is an act of virtue, making her a heroine. Julian, on the other hand, finds his revenge in allowing the entrance of Umayyad forces into Spain, not only leading to the fall of the Visigothic Kingdom, but the fall of Christian Spain as a whole. Neither Julian nor La Cava go down in history as bringing about positive change, but rather are often blamed for the destruction of the nation despite standing up against Rodrigo’s tyrannical behavior. Alfonso X’s *Estoria de Espanna* antagonizes Julián, calling him a traitor and explaining that even his name is detested: “amargo es el su nombre en la boca qui l' nombra” (310). Similarly, romancero poetry unjustly targets La Cava, calling her seductive and even “malvada” for having told her father what happened (*Romancero* 136).

If La Cava’s rape embodies Rodrigo’s tyranny, it thus also embodies the violated state of a fallen Spain, a Spain that is invaded, lost, and full of shame. This is unlike the case of Lucretia, where, while her rape embodies the tyranny of the Tarquins, the new state that Brutus catalyzes does not leave Rome in a state of loss. Much like La Cava’s body, Corral describes Spain as being “perdida e asolada,” or lost and overtaken (II, 371). “Perdida,” of course implies a literal loss to the enemy, but also evokes a feeling of loss and dishonor, recalling La Cava’s letter to her father in which she informs him of his “gran pérdida” (I, 458). La Cava and Spain both lose their sense of Christian honor; La Cava loses her sexual honor and Spain loses its entire Christian political identity.

61 “Bitter is his name in the mouth who speaks it.” Corral will also echo this idea at the end of his work, stating about Julian, “amargo es el su nombre” (II, 405).

62 Note that the connotation of loss is the same, but the part of speech is different. La Cava uses *pérdida* as a noun, while Corral uses *perdida* as a participle to describe Spain’s state.
Corral’s text evokes feelings of national shame in more nuanced ways as well, notably through his allusions to imagery of Eden, the source of shame for all of humanity. If the Fall of Eden represents the beginning of human shame, and Visigothic Spain is a stand-in for the Garden that falls, then the Fall of Spain signifies the beginning of Spain’s shame. As Pat Grieve states, “the legend of the fall of Spain, like the fall from the Garden of Eden, came to be identified not by the acts of men, but by its Eve: Florinda La Cava, the cause of Spain’s perdition” (24).

Medieval theologians viewed shame as “the emotional byproduct of the Fall” (Flannery 166). In his *City of God*, St. Augustine reminds us “For after God’s command had been disobeyed, the first human beings, as divine favour departed from them, straightway became ashamed of the nakedness of their bodies” (179). For the first time, humanity felt vulnerable and no longer a part of the perfect paradise that was the Garden before the original sin. Beyond the naked body, which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four, shame also became associated with lust and sexual desire, as well as intercourse itself; nudity and what one did with that nudity was looked down upon and scorned. For most of theological history, that moment of the Fall and the original sin is the beginning of humanity’s experience of shame that rests on Eve’s shoulders — the woman is to blame, she is the recipient of the Devil’s temptation, the lesser sex, the one who conversed with the serpent (Jager 30-31). Paralleling this history, much of the La Cava legend’s history, especially from the late Middle Ages, blames her for being the seductress, tempting the King, and not telling him no during the rape.

The relationship between the two stories is grounded in the fact that the idyllic paradise comes to its demise through the supposed sins of the principal feminine figure, and Spanish writers often used the Biblical story of Eden as the model for their retellings of 711. The Eve-La
Cava connection is one that becomes even clearer given the fact that La Cava’s name holds close connections with the Hebrew name “Chava,” or Eve. These connections are crucial to the legend-forming aspects of the story as Grieve emphasizes, and the reworking of the Genesis story through these figurative relationships in a Spanish context reinforces Eric Jager’s claim that “typology turns Genesis 3 into a continually renewable moral exemplum” (14). For Jager, “the Fall functioned as a ‘myth’ both in Mircea Eliade’s sense of the term — a primeval story explaining the origin and nature of things — and in Roland Barthes’s sense — a fiction whose narrative and symbols could be manipulated to benefit those having (or seeking) power, authority, or legitimacy” (2). La Cava’s story fits both sides of this idea of myth: it is the origin story of the medieval Spain that Christian realms are actively trying to recover from Muslim power, and a literary manipulation of the Genesis narrative politically charged in favor of that recovery.

The figures of La Cava and Eve are generally blamed for the destruction of the world around them, but even more specifically, they are responsible for the shame of their collective community. For Eve, her actions result in a sense of shame regarding the nakedness of the human body, a time when it is open and vulnerable, that would mark humanity for the rest of time. For La Cava, her actions in the majority of accounts bring about a shame in Spain because Spain is vulnerable and open to attack by its Muslim neighbors. The national shame that Spain experiences is the shame of being vulnerable to an enemy and being open to defeat. Returning to

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63 La Cava’s name is a point of contention among scholars as there are two drastically different interpretations. Here I present what Grieve discusses in *The Eve of Spain* (25) and the connections to the Hebrew “Eve” which reinforces the Eden connection. Drayson (*The King and the Whore*) and Weissberger (*Isabel Rules*) emphasize the arabic translation of “Cava” which roughly translates to “whore” or “prostitute.”
the ideas of Augustine, Grieve explains that “One of his conclusions about the Fall of Adam and Eve, and the fallen state of humanity is that men lost their original ability to govern themselves” (34). Ashamed and politically “naked,” Spain lost its ability to govern itself in the most literal sense.

Turning to Corral’s narrative, many characters in the work echo a Genesis trope, making La Cava a seductress and placing the responsibility for perdition in her hands. Eleastras, for example, questions La Cava’s lack of defense during her encounter with Rodrigo. Addressing Julián, he says:

Sabes bien que quando el diablo engañó al Rey don Rodrigo de se enamorar de tu fija que primero gelo dixo, e le rogó que lo fiziese, e andovo grand tiempo sobre esta razón; no le fizo fuerça. E si tu fija era de tan buen seso como fasta aquí la loavan, ¿por qué en aquella ora que el Rey le dixo cosa que no le plazía no te lo enbió a dezir así como después quel mal fue fecho? O ¿por qué no lo dixo a la Reina que lo escusara si una vegada lo sopiera? O ¿por qué se fiava de entrar do el Rey fuese sin compañía? (Corral I, 463)

For Eleastras, it was the devil — and the devilish woman — that fooled and deceived Rodrigo, just as Adam was seduced by Eve to eat the fruit despite being told not to by God; “The man said, ‘The woman whom you gave to be with me, she gave me fruit from the tree, and I ate.’” (Genesis 3:12). Rodrigo is not to blame because, according to Eleastras, the King did not force anything on La Cava, and if he did, why would La Cava not say anything at the time?

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64 “You know well that when the devil tricked King Rodrigo into falling in love with your daughter who said it first and begged him to do it, and spent much time on it, the King did not force her. And if your daughter was of the wisdom for which she is praised, why, in those times when the King said things to her that she did not like, did she not send for you like she did after the fact of the bad act? Or, why did she not say anything to the Queen to excuse it when she knew? Or, why did she trust the King to enter his chambers without other company?”
Corral does eventually return to this image during Rodrigo’s penance. The Devil disguises himself as La Cava and attempts to seduce Rodrigo as a test of his repentance, drawing yet another parallel to Genesis and the role of the Devil, seduction, and the woman, in the context of temptation (Corral II, 394-6).

The straightforward parallels begins to fall apart in the *Crónica sarracina*, however, as the story continues and Eleastras’ questions go unanswered. His claims that La Cava is to blame are never confirmed nor contested; in fact it is Julian who has the last word on the matter when he returns to Ceuta and recounts to the men of his court what happened back in Toledo: “Él se enamoró de mi fija la Caba, e tanto fizo que dolmió con ella aun por fuerça” (471).65 In that moment, Rodrigo remains the one responsible for violating La Cava and inciting Julian’s revenge. Not to mention the fact that Corral very clearly outlines the exact course of action, which does not include any explicit seduction. Eleastras’ seemingly false claim is therefore based only on his postlapsarian misogynist tendencies of blaming women as seductresses on the whole, given that all women are descendants of Eve. He even says to Julián directly, “E devieras parar ojo cómo las mugeres con falsedad que en ellas ay vencen, e vienen plazenteras de fazer los tales fechos por la naturaleza gelo requerir” (Corral I, 462).66

In Barbara Weissberger’s examination of this late-medieval oral transmission of the story of Rodrigo through the romancero tradition — a tradition based on Corral’s version of the narrative — she explains how in these ballads, “although Cava is malvada, what actually causes the Muslim invasion is not just that she is a willing participant and perhaps instigator of the

65 “He fell in love with my daughter La Cava, so much so that he slept with her by force.”

66 “You should keep an eye on how women, with falsehoods, are victorious and receive pleasure from doing such things because their nature requires it.”
sexual act, but that she does not keep her shameful secret to herself,” as well as the fact that “not only is Rodrigo’s rape of Cava made into an act of seduction on her part, but that act is ultimately presented as a crime against masculine honor rather than feminine virtue” (Isabel Rules 109). Or, as Patricia Grieve notes, “in the story’s later, more misogynistic manifestations, [...] she used her sexuality shamelessly, tempting the man who was powerless against such a seduction” (Eve 25).

NEOGOTHICISM AND CORRAL’S PLACE IN THE TRASTAMARAN COURT

Corral’s representation of the Fall of Spain as the nation’s shame is removed from the events he describes by several hundred years. Yet Corral’s composition reinforces the notion of national shame both because of, and in spite of, this temporal distance. Sara Ahmed shows how national shame can be a part of national identity, especially when it comes to recognizing wrongdoing. Her work on twentieth-century Australia, explores the process of shame and reconciliation as follows:

National shame can be a mechanism for reconciliation as self-reconciliation, in which the ‘wrong’ that is committed provides the grounds for claiming a national identity, for restoring pride that is threatened in the moment of recognition, and then regained in the capacity to bear witness. [...] By witnessing what is shameful about the past, the nation can ‘live up to’ the ideals that secure its identity or being in the present. In other words, our shame means that we mean well, and can work to reproduce the nation as an ideal. (109, italics in original)

In medieval Spain, the need for reconciliation and restoration of pride in the wake of the Fall is notably clear and present, as Corral is writing at a time when Christian kingdoms had reclaimed
much of Iberia’s land, Islamic rule was approaching its end, and the question of Christian identity was at the forefront of Spanish politics and culture. The Muslim presence on the peninsula was still a real threat to Christian Spain, but their power was dwindling. The Nasrid dynasty’s final stronghold in Granada was growing weaker by the year, and critical sites like Ceuta were recently back in Iberian hands, as will be explored in Chapter Three.

Corral’s text, however, takes a drastic turn from previous versions of the story, and his quest for “reconciliation” — to use Ahmed’s term — takes the form of penance for King Rodrigo. In Corral’s text, Rodrigo flees the battlefields in Spain and makes his way to the north of Portugal to a hermitage to begin a lengthy and grotesque process of atonement for his wrongdoings. Corral’s version of the story is the first to add this element of forgiveness and to construct a shame experience for Rodrigo that is then absolved. I argue that the need to absolve Rodrigo — both making him the clear culprit in Spain’s Fall but also the hero of the Crónica — stems from Corral’s place in the court of the Trastamara and the rise of Neo-Gothicism, or the claim that the Trastamara were the legitimate royal house as direct descendants of the Visigothic kings. Formally, Neogothicism “affirmed an uninterrupted line of descent from the Visigothic kings who ruled the peninsula before the Moorish invasion of 711 through to the Trastamaran sovereigns who claimed the Castilian throne in 1369” under Enrique II (Wessberger 96).

While little is known about Pedro de Corral’s life, he became part of the Castilian and Aragonese courts through the military success of his brother, Rodrigo de Villandrando. Don Rodrigo held an important place in in the court of Juan II of Castile after fighting in the Hundred Years War. Yet don Rodrigo and Pedro’s political affiliations were more properly defined through their connections with Álvaro de Luna, who had firmly allied himself with the Aragonese line of
Trastamaran power. James Fogelquist echoes Juan Menéndez Pidal, stating, “al declararse Rodrigo de Villandrando y Pedro de Corral de parte de don Álvaro de Luna poco después de ofrecerse al Rey de Aragón [Juan II de Aragón], le habrían provocado el odio a Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, quien cayó preso en 1432 por asociación con el bando de los Infantes de Aragón” (Fogelquist, *Crónica* 10).

Either way, Corral, his family, and his associates, were invested in the political and social world of the Trastamaran throne, and as a writer in the court, it is no surprise that the politics in which he was surrounded would enter his work. The rise of both Castilian and Aragonese Trastamaran power contextualizes Corral’s political tendencies, such that, as Fernando Gomez Redondo states, Corral “decide adentrarse en una de las páginas más turbulentas de la historia peninsular [...] para conectar el episodio opuesto (la restauración de la monarquía visigótica del rey don Pelayo) con los fervores nacionalistas bajo los que don Álvaro pretende amparar la monarquía de Juan II” (3342-3).

The *Crónica sarracina’s* stake in its own historical moment has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Marina Brownlee, for example, contends that Corral’s claim of historiographic narrative is directly related to his politics. She says, “Epic history, by definition concerned with nation-building, and romance, the utopic vehicle for aristocratic, personal self-aggrandizement, will echo the graft and corruption of Juan II’s Spain (1405-54), simultaneously offering a model for justifying the Trastámara usurpation of the throne” (“Iconicity” 121). I propose that Corral’s

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67 “Upon Rodrigo de Villandrando and Pedro de Corral declaring themselves on the side of Álvaro de Luna shortly after offering themselves to the King of Aragón [Juan II], they had provoked the ire of Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, who had become a prisoner in 1432 for his associations with the band of the Infantes de Aragón.”

68 Corral “decides to intervene in one of the most turbulent pages in the history of the peninsula [...] in order to connect the opposing episode (the restoration of the Visigothic monarchy of King don Pelayo) with nationalist fervor under which Álvaro de Luna sought to protect the monarchy of Juan II.”
strategy for this justification lies in the construction of Rodrigo’s shame experience and the subsequent penance. Corral turns the narrative from La Cava to Rodrigo and in doing so absolves Rodrigo of his sins and Spain of its national shame.

**RODRIGO’S SHAME**

Corral’s attempts to reconcile Spain’s shameful past through Rodrigo’s penance would not exist without his construction of Rodrigo’s own shame experience. It is worth noting that the construction of Rodrigo’s shame experience serves a specific purpose; it is an element of the story meant to be remedied through Corral’s authorship. That is, Rodrigo’s penance is not a historical fact but rather serves a literary function, giving Corral the opportunity forgive Rodrigo for his wrongdoings in a way that does not negate his true actions in history. Rodrigo’s shame is, at times, a feeling, but as a whole, his shame experience is grounded in the fact that he acted shamelessly and brought about the shame of his kingdom in the form of its fall and destruction.

Rodrigo’s shame, or shameful state, is evident from the beginning of the work. After breaking into the Casa de Hercules, Rodrigo is met with the prophecy and a preview of his eventual political fate, and Corral describes his reaction: “él tenía grand pesar en su coraçón,” — “he had great shame or heaviness in his — language that directly parallels La Cava’s emotions after her rape (I, 180). This moment of the narrative is the first in which Corral begins to develop Rodrigo’s experience of shame, and while it is early in the narrative, it will eventually become the foundation for Rodrigo’s need to find penance in Viseu as it is the beginning of Spain’s fall.
Later in the story, even after Rodrigo seems to lack any regret of his actions toward La Cava, Corral acknowledges that Rodrigo had committed shameful acts. One of the most curious and metanarrative moments of the work is Chapter 214 in Book I, titled “Cómo el Rey don Rodrigo mandó a Eleastras que [no] escriviese de los fechos que fizo con la Caba” (I, 527). In it, Corral explains how Rodrigo retroactively asks Eleastras — his court chronicler and the inscribed author of Crónica itself — to include all of the details about his encounter with La Cava including the brutal realities of her rape in his text. The idea was for Rodrigo to share the real reason — “la causa verdadera” — that Julian decided to betray him and begin Spain’s destruction, the facts of which Eleastras and most of the world did not know (II, 528). Additionally, this chapter shows how Rodrigo recognizes the validity of the prophecy he found in the Casa de Hercules, making this chapter a significant inflection point of the narrative where Rodrigo transitions from a tyrannical king to showing regret for his actions.

Rodrigo’s regret or remorse for his shameful acts is especially evident in the emotionally-wrought descriptions of his sharing his story with Eleastras. Corral explains: “E todavía llorando de sus ojos que otra cosa non fazía. E como ovo fecho su duelo un grand rato, mandó a Eleastras que escriviese todo lo que acaesciera con la Caba que cosa no fallesció, e que lo pusiese en el lugar do avedes oído; e fue hecho así” (I, 529). On one hand, this description of Rodrigo emphasizes his tears, echoing one of the foundational elements of the Lucretia/La Cava shame.

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69 “How the King don Rodrigo had Eleastras [not] write about the facts of what he did with La Cava.” In Fogelquist’s 2001 edition he notes that the chapter title varies between different print editions of the Crónica. The “no” appears in 1499 and 1587, but the chapter recounts the opposite. See Chapter 2 for translation.

70 “And he was still crying, for that is all he did. And once he had his grief for some time, he sent for Eleastras to write everything that happened with La Cava without fail, and to put it in the place where you heard it; and it was done.”
practice examined at the beginning of this chapter. In fact, one of the most striking parallels is the fact that both La Cava and Rodrigo cry during the act of recounting the story of the rape. Similar to La Cava, Rodrigo feels the need to confess his shame to Eleastras, and cries during this confessional process of making his shame heard. In Corral’s description of this moment, he also notes that Rodrigo only confesses after he had “ovo fecho su duelo un grand rato,” or had grief for some time. It is an act of self-reflection, but as is evident in other moments of this chapter, he likely does not mourn or dwell on the rape itself, but rather the consequences of his actions as they lead to his loss of political power.

That chapter also ends with a lesson for Corral’s readers in which he reminds his audience that all shameful acts will eventually see public light: “E todos los hombres del mundo se devrían castigar por lo que aquí havedes oído, e non fazer cosas que si sabidas son den vergüenza a los que la fazen; que non puede ser que tarde o cedo no se descubran, e después rescibirán dellas los semejantes males” (I, 530). This lesson explicitly states that what the King had done with La Cava was a shameful act, or to paraphrase, an act that would bring shame to he that commits it. Even more damning to the King is Corral’s suggestion that Rodrigo himself should have known the shameful consequences of his actions, and now, in the fifteenth century, his errors should serve as an example for Corral’s courtly readers to not fall into the same vices as their Visigothic predecessors and to absolve the shame brought about by those vices.

When Rodrigo finally decides to find penance in Viseu, his shame experience becomes corporeal and closely linked with his body, similar to the cases of Lucretia and La Cava, and

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71 “And all the men of the world should heed this advice given what you have heard, and not do things if you know they will bring you shame; sooner or later it will be discovered, you after you will experience similar evils.”
reflecting the ideas of Burrus that shame is tightly bound to flesh. As he begins his journey to the hermitage, Corral tells how Rodrigo, “desnudó todas sus armas, e sus guarniciones, e tiróse su corona de la cabeza, y echólo todo en el tremendal” (II, 372). The discarding of the crown is a symbol of Rodrigo’s loss of his kingdom that he, quite literally, “threw away” when he committed his sin against La Cava. At the same time, the act of stripping off his clothes also puts him in a naked and vulnerable state. Similar to Sancho IV’s assertion that women who are shameless might as well be naked in the gates and plazas of the cities, Rodrigo strips himself of all protections and coverings, leaving himself open and exposed to judgement (Castigos 102). The question of vulnerability, which Brené Brown reminds us comes from the latin vulnerare and the possibility of being “open to attack or damage,” is crucial to the beginning of Rodrigo’s penance process (48). He is open to attack or criticism from himself, from others, and most importantly from God, who will eventually decide his fate.

At one point in the narrative, Corral even explains how Rodrigo was visited by the Holy Spirit and experiences feelings of shame: “alçó la cara, e havía grand vergüença de lo mirar” — “he raised his head, and had great shame upon seeing Him” (II, 397). Here, it is clear that Rodrigo feels shame in direct relation to God. In the emotional paradigm of relationality, explained by Sara Ahmed as the fact that emotions “always involve (re)actions or relations of ‘towardness’ or ‘awayness’” to various subjects, Rodrigo’s shame is relational to the possibility of judgement by God (8). While La Cava’s shame is relational to the rape and the societal implications of that rape, Rodrigo’s shame is not in relation to his active participation in the rape, but rather the potential consequences. This moment of the narrative also implies that Rodrigo

72 “He stripped off his armor and clothing, and threw the crown from his head into the swamp.”
feels shame upon being seen and potentially judged by God. Combined with a psychosomatic reading of shame, where the bowing of the head is a symptom of feeling or coping with shame, Rodrigo here breaks from that symptom to face God. No longer protected by his physical state of hiding, he feels ashamed upon receiving God’s reciprocal gaze.

At the same time, Corral’s fifteenth-century readership also have the ability to judge Rodrigo’s vulnerable state and search for forgiveness. Readers that are part of the intellectual communities of the Trastamarian court can use Corral’s invented alternative ending as judgement of Rodrigo’s ability for positive change and a reconciliation of his betrayals, political greed, and uncontrollable lust. In fact, Corral makes it very clear that Rodrigo’s process of penance is more about his own stake in history than his faith or service to God. Rodrigo explicitly says, “Non vine yo aqui a esta hermita a servir a Dios sino por fazer penitencia de mis pecados, por que mi alma non se pierda” (II, 381).

Similar to Lucretia and La Cava’s practice, Rodrigo’s shame practice also includes the somatic reaction of crying. In fact, throughout the end of Book II, Corral repeatedly uses the image of Rodrigo’s tears as a means of expressing his emotional state during his penance. On various occasions, Corral tells how Rodrigo, “pusose de rodillas en el suelo llorando muy de rezio de los sus ojos” (II, 387), or “El rey [...] no hazía otra cosa sino llorar” (II, 396). Like those of Lucretia and La Cava, Rodrigo’s tears are a physical marker of his internal emotional state, and his crying is the result of his feelings of shame, his search for forgiveness, as well as the mourning of the loss of his own kingdom.

73 “I did not come here to this hermitage to serve God, but to seek penance for my since, so my soul is not lost.”

74 Rodrigo “got down on his knees on the ground, forcefully crying.”
THE POLITICS OF PENANCE

Rodrigo’s penance is the final episode of the *Crónica sarracina*. While Rodrigo’s process of atonement is lengthy, covering about twenty chapters of the work, it culminates in a grotesque image of Rodrigo’s death. The King, naked, enters a sepulcre with a two-headed snake that eventually eats both Rodrigo’s heart and genitalia. It is a moment that has been debated by scholars for its blurring of the line between the sacred and the profane. Yet, in spite of its strict adherence to Christian theology, this bold ending to the text reinforces Drayson and Gloria Álvarez-Hess’ idea that penance is the main didactic theme of the work (Drayson 40). Drayson argues, however, that, “the plain Christian moral that sin will be punished, and can be atoned for through contrition is challenged by Corral’s insistence on elements of eroticism, violence, and even sadism in his account of the relationship between Roderick and La Cava, and of the king’s exile” (*King and Whore* 37). Nevertheless, even if these elements of Corral’s story challenge Christian doctrine, atonement still reigns supreme, and as Drayson herself even suggests, these elements reflect other hagiographical tropes of explicit descriptions of violence and sexuality (*Penance* 201).

If we take Rodrigo’s penance as a given independent of the theological implications of Corral’s depiction of sexuality and violence, we can look at this moment for its political value grounded in the act of castration and the role of gender in the formation of Spain’s political identity. The cause of Rodrigo’s death is the consumption of his genitalia, “which was the cause of Spain’s destruction,” or “la natura, la qual fuera la causa de la grand destrucción de España” (II, 404). It is an act of castration that not only grants Rodrigo his penance, but also has the ability to restore his sense of shame through the negation of any potential of lust or
shameless behavior. As Corral mentions, it is Rodrigo’s genitalia, *la natura*, that brings about Spain’s Fall through his abusive sexual acts, an error that can only be corrected through the removal of those sexual parts. As we will see in Chapter Four, the word *naturas* was also often substituted with the word *vergüenças* to denote one’s genitalia, illustrating how one’s genitalia were considered one’s shameful parts. Rodrigo’s castration by the snake — a symbol that Drayson also contends is phallic in and of itself — is thus the absolution of Rodrigo’s shame through the consumption of his shameful parts and the source of that shame.

The act of castration, however, is also one of emasculation, a type of shaming in its own right. By stripping Rodrigo of his genitalia, Corral also strips Rodrigo, and in turn Spain, of the masculinity they once possessed, literary strategy that both embraces and problematizes Neogothic preoccupations of masculinity and lineage. As Barbara Weissberger explains:

[T]he royal dynasty founded by the illegitimate Enrique II were believed to have inherited Gothic — and masculine — characteristics of virility, sobriety, and vigor, the very traits required to complete the sacred mission of the Iberian kingdoms: the recuperation of the territorial and moral integrity of ancient Romano-Gothic Hispania through the expulsion of the Muslim conquerors. (96)

The invaded, and thus Muslim, Spain is therefore also considered a feminine body, or a body that is viewed as “broken and consequently both vulnerable to contamination and themselves contaminating” (Weissberger 98). The masculine Visigothic Spain of Rodrigo — the Spain full of chivalry, jousting matches, and celebrations of Rodrigo’s rise to power — becomes a feminized Muslim space after the invasion of the outside power, echoing David Gilmore’s assertion that “sexual shame is not only the arbiter of chaste femininity, but also, when lost, the
negation of masculine identity” (11). It is, like La Cava, a penetrated and violated feminine body who falls from the grace of an ideal — or Edenic — beauty.

From a gendered perspective, this final moment of the narrative is quite complex and ambiguous. Rodrigo is simultaneously a feminized figure of Spain’s past and an idealized inspiration of Spain’s masculine fifteenth-century present. However, from a broader viewpoint, what is lost for Rodrigo also happens to be what is gained for Corral’s readership and his fifteenth-century Spain; the Crónica sarracina scripts the remasculinization of Spain through the emasculation of the perpetrator of its fall, and the mere act of penance or forgiveness, despite Rodrigo’s death and castrated state, pushes a grotesque yet effective image of the possibility of reconciliation of Spain’s past.

CONCLUSIONS: THE LITERARY SERIES

I have shown that the legend of Lucretia and the story of La Cava both revolve around the experience of shame by the female protagonist after her rape when the integrity of a kingdom is at stake. Shame is the operative feeling that moves the story forward and changes the course of history in dramatic ways. And while it is impossible to prove that Lucretia’s story was an inspiration for Corral, the similarities as well as the significant differences in both legends brings about the importance of historical context and the fact that whoever went on to write the Rodrigo story certainly felt the influence of the Lucretia legend.

With this in mind, I turn to Hans Robert Jauss’ fifth thesis of literary history from his Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, which states:
The theory of the aesthetics of reception not only allows one to conceive the meaning and form of a literary work in the historical unfolding of its understanding. It also demands that one insert the individual work into its ‘literary series’ to recognize its historical position and significance in the context of the experience of literature. In the step from a history of the reception of works to an eventful history of literature, the latter manifests itself as a process in which the passive reception is on the part of the authors. Put another way, the next work can solve formal and moral problems left behind by the last work, and present new problems in turn. (Jauss 32)

Corral’s *Crónica sarracina* is a work that exists somewhere in the middle of the “literary series” of two types of narratives. One is purely national, based on the legacy of La Cava and her endless reconfiguration over the centuries. Corral, while giving La Cava a voice, also takes an ambiguous stand on whether or not to blame her for the Fall of Spain. The other series is cross-cultural, grounded in narratives of rapes of virtuous women and the effect of those rapes on the course of history. The *Crónica sarracina* is an embodiment of a Lucretian cultural history, and while Corral may not “solve” the moral problems of the Roman Kingdom, he uses Lucretia’s image to attempt to solve the political problems of his own present, reminding readers of the need for Spain’s redemption in the shadow of its shameful Fall through the penance of Rodrigo, the perpetrator of the rape.
CHAPTER 3: CEUTA AS A SHAMEFUL MEMORY PLACE IN FIFTEENTH-CENTURY IBERIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

En este mundo no dexas otra cosa sino la memoria de las cosas que feziste.

[In this world you leave behind nothing more than the memory of what you’ve done.]

Pedro de Corral, Crónica sarracina, I, 468-9

Fifteenth century Portuguese royal chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara, in his Chronicle of the Conquest of Guinea, states that, “ca por certo nom se pode negar que a cidade de Cepta nom seja chave de todo o mar Medyoterreno” or that “one cannot deny that the city of Ceuta is but the key to the whole Mediterranean Sea.” The famed port at the northern tip of Morocco and currently part of Spain was an important city throughout the Middle Ages; it was a site of trade and commerce, a gateway between North Africa and the Iberian peninsula, and more abstractly a geographic symbol of Iberian/African relations over the years. From the invasion of 711 that saw the beginning of Muslim rule on the Iberian Peninsula through the beginnings of the Portuguese period of expansion, the volatility and highly contested nature of the city itself appears throughout the literature of the fifteenth century and is ingrained in the cultural memory of the Iberian Peninsula.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, shame’s role in the cultural history of the 711 invasion was crucial to its depiction in the fifteenth-century context of the Crónica sarracina. And, while shame is associated with the literary and historical figures of the moment of the Muslim invasion, it can also be associated with certain spaces. Given Ceuta’s central place as the site of Spain’s shame and Fall, the present chapter examines the emotional landscape surrounding the volatility of the city as it is represented in the fifteenth century; how Ceuta’s role
in 711 and the subsequent struggles that occur there as the Portuguese crown reclaims the land in 1415 lead to a representation of the city as a place that is intimately connected to feelings of shame and reconciliation of that shame. The city of Ceuta is a place grounded in cultural memory serving as the geographic marker that is used symbolically for the people and events one must remember with regard to Spain’s Fall. Ultimately, it is the memory of the shame associated with that Fall — the violated state of Iberia — that fifteenth century chroniclers seek to alleviate and reconcile. Drawing from Pierre Nora’s theories of the memory place, or lieu de mémoire, Ceuta can be understood not only as a memory place within the cultural mindset of medieval Iberia, but more specifically as a shameful memory site whose memory is linked to the feelings it evokes.

Pedro de Corral’s Crónica sarracina is one fifteenth century text that exemplifies Ceuta’s position as a shameful memory place in that it reckons with the memory of the Moorish invasion nearly 700 years after the event itself. In his representation of the city and his recounting of the city’s position in Spain’s history from centuries prior, Corral puts his own emotion-filled narrative spin on the events, emphasizing a sense of “national shame,” to use Sara Ahmed’s terminology, that Spain experiences in relation to the port city. Roughly two decades after Corral’s composition of the Crónica sarracina, the Portuguese royal chronicler of the House of Aviz, Gomes Eanes de Zurara, wrote his Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta, and later the Crónica do Comde dom Pedro de Meneses. These texts chronicle the Portuguese sack of the city of Ceuta in 1415 and the governorship of Pedro de Meneses, the first governor of Ceuta under Portuguese control respectively. Zurara, like Corral, acknowledges the past of the city in his works, but I argue, as part of his mission to the crown, he glorifies Portugal’s presence in the region as a means of reclaiming the both the land and its emotional associations. All of these works —
independently and collectively — illustrate how Ceuta is a site associated with both devastating loss and optimistic reclamation, and everything in between, while also a place whose initial shame of the Fall of Spain has left its mark for anyone who chooses to write about it and reckon with that memory.

CORRAL AND ZURARA TOGETHER

While Corral and Zurara’s texts are seldom studied together, this chapter puts them into conversation for a few important reasons. The first is that the Crónica sarracina, the Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta (=Tomada de Ceuta), and the Crónica do Comde dom Pedro de Meneses (=Crónica de dom Pedro) adhere to a historical sequentiality both in terms of their subject matter as well as their time of composition. While Zurara’s texts are composed more closely to the events they recount, all of these works are written about, and in the wake of, major geopolitical changes in the city of Ceuta. The second reason is that all of these texts are highly literary creations written in a courtly context. As we have seen in the previous chapter, while there is little known about him in general, Corral was known to be a member of the Castilian nobility and of the Trastamara court, and his composition is full of literary embellishments that read more closely to the conventions of romance than historiography. Zurara, writing in Portugal, was also a member of the royal court as he was named the cronista-mor, or royal chronicler, after Fernão Lopes under King Alfonso V. Zurara’s work was officially considered historical chronicle, but at the same time Zurara is known for his highly literary style, breaking with his predecessor in the position. Over the course of his tenure, Zurara develops, as Saraiva and Lopes explain, “a teoria de que a finalidade das crónicas é perpetuar a glória dos que praticaram grandes feitos” (História
giving his chronicles a sense of grandiose praise rather than accuracy in the details. Fifteenth-century historiography thus poses a challenge to readers; these texts were not necessarily historically accurate, but rather driven by an authorial partiality. Scholars such as Gabrielle Spiegel have begun to push back against a passive view of the genre, or the view that these texts should be read as mere repetition of facts or events. She states, “it is only recently that medieval historiography in general has begun to be investigated as an intellectual tradition that demands the same sympathetic attention to is underlying beliefs and techniques of expression accorded other genres produced by medieval intellectual life” (The Past as Text 84). As court writers, Corral and Zurara’s stake in representation of a so-called “national” history becomes intricately intertwined with their use of emotions as one such “technique of expression” in their works.

I also propose that Zurara might have been a reader of Corral’s work indicating an intellectual fluidity between courts in the early fifteenth century. In his Tomada de Ceuta, Zurara cites three sources for their claim that Ceuta was under Christian rule until the moorish invasion under Rodrigo: “Santo Isidro. e mestre Pedro. e Dom Lucas de Tuy” (43). Saint Isidore of Seville died a century prior to the Muslim invasion, but nonetheless discusses the city of Septem in his Historia de Regibus Gothorum, Vandalorum et Suevorum. Lucas de Tuy, in his Chronicon Mundi also discusses the history of the Goths in Spain. It is the “mestre Pedro” to whom Zurara makes reference that poses the most questions. Joaquim Carvalho proposes:

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75 “The theory that the goal of the chronicles is to perpetuate the glory of those who did good deeds.”

76 Zurara’s stake in the truth is, at times, supported by scholars, including Reis Brasil who, in his introduction to the Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta explains “As suas narrativas são claras e clarificadoras, transparecendo nelas o seu profundo amor pela ‘verdade’” (18).
Mestre Pedro parece dever identificar-se, quanto mais não seja por exclusão de partes, com Pedro Comestor, e sendo assim, a associação aos dois autores espanhóis do autor da *Historia scholastica* — onde não há, nem podia haver, dado o assunto de que se ocupa, qualquer referência ao grande tema da perdição de Espanha pela invasão árabe — parece impor a opinião de que Zurara fez citações de cor e de segunda mão. (162)

Carvalho’s argument is undermined by his own observation that the *Historia scholastica* makes no reference to the city. While it is possible that Zurara did not read the texts he cites, it is also likely that Zurara would have made reference to texts that, at the very least, discuss Ceuta under Gothic rule. It is also well known that Pedro de Corral’s *Crónica* circulated widely among the educated Iberian elite, not to mention the potential overlap in intellectual circles given Zurara’s status in the Portuguese court, and the movement of Castilian and Aragonese politicians across borders; this of course includes Alfonso de Cartagena’s post as ambassador in Portugal — beginning in 1421 but whose influence stretched into the 1430s — having come directly from the circles of the likes of Álvaro de Luna, Fernán Pérez de Guzmán, and others in Corral’s orbit.

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77 “Mestre Pedro seems to be, even if by default, Pedro Comestor, and as such, the association between the two Spanish writers with him, the author of the *Historia scholastica* — which has, and cannot have, given the subject matter any reference to the theme of the Fall of Spain from the Muslim invasion — seems to support the idea that Zurara made references off memory or second hand.”

78 If Zurara is making a reference to Corral, this specific citation would be important in the overall context of the text’s production and transmission for a few reasons. On one hand, it would allude to the fact that Zurara knew Corral was the author of the text. Critical studies of the *Crónica sarracina* often cite Pérez de Guzmán as the only source that identifies Corral as the author, so Zurara’s reference could show a deeper association between the author and the text than previously understood. It would also mean that, contrary to Pérez de Guzmán’s impassioned claims against the veracity of Corral’s text. Like the other authorities listed, Zurara would consider Corral to be a faithful historian.
City Under Siege: Ceuta in 711 and in 1415

Ceuta’s historical significance in Iberian and North African history is founded on the city’s pivotal role in the major shifts in power of the Middle Ages between Christians and Muslims. The first important moment in Ceuta’s medieval history is the Muslim invasion of 711, the legend that became central to Iberian identity during the Middle Ages and sparked the need for the movement widely known as the Reconquista. In this moment, Ceuta was the ideological and physical entryway through which Umayyad forces were allowed to enter the Iberian peninsula. As we have seen in Chapter Two, King Rodrigo’s rape of La Cava was a decisive moment in that La Cava’s dishonor on the part of the King is what inspired her father, Julián the Count of Ceuta, to seek revenge against the kingdom.

Different chronicles recount the role of Ceuta in different ways, yet what remains consistent across these different depictions is the fact that the city was the site of the beginning of Spain’s fall. In Alfonso X’s Estoria de Espanna, for example, Ceuta is only briefly mentioned. Count Julián is initially described as a count from “la tierra de Africa,” or “from the land of Africa” (307) and after he finds out about Rodrigo’s actions with his daughter, Ceuta is mentioned as the Count’s destination: “mas despues que ovo dicho todo su mandado en que fuera al rey, tomo su muger et fuese sin espedirse, et desí en medio del yvierno passo la mar et fuese a Çepta, et dexo y la muger et ell aver, et fablo con los moros” (308). In this version of the story, Ceuta is merely the site of negotiation, where Julián spoke to the Moors and gave them

79 Zurara alludes to the city’s history in the Tomada de Ceuta and explains that the founder of the city was one of Noah’s grandsons — “seu neto de Noé”— and was his first settlement in Africa. The name Ceuta comes from the Chaldean for “the beginning of beauty (começo de fermosura),” (Tomada 42)

80 “But after he said his demands to the King, he took his wife and left in a hurry, and in the middle of winter crossed the sea to Ceuta, where he left his wife and went to speak with the Moors.”
permission to enter Spain. While this narrative does not emphasize Ceuta, it nonetheless shows that the city played a role in the conquest.

Other later chronicles, however, begin to put more emphasis on Ceuta as playing a more vital role in the story of the invasion. One such example is the Crónica Geral de Espanha de 1344, a Portuguese chronicle that is a partial translation and expansion of the Ajbār Mulūk al-Andalus by Ahmad Ibn Muhammad Ibn Mūsā al-Rāzī from the tenth century — better known in Castile as the Crónica del moro Rasis — and also serves as the foundation for Pedro de Corral’s work a century later. The Crónica de 1344 expands significantly upon the discussion of the period surrounding Spain’s fall. Beyond a mere mention of Ceuta being the site of discussion between Julián and unnamed Muslim forces, the city becomes a setting for important parts of the narrative. Julián’s responsibility as count is firmly positioned in the port, separating him geographically from the court of Rodrigo in Toledo. Furthermore, Ceuta is the city to which La Cava returns home after her rape, and in the 1344 version, it is there that she gives her father the letter she has written about her experience in the Toledo court. Ceuta also is described as the place in which Julián seeks advice from his counsel and his family before forming his alliance with Muça, the Umayyad governor at the time. That alliance then allowed for the invasion of Iberia beginning with the taking of the village of Tarifa by 185,000 berber forces (1344 324). This narrative arc, and the importance given to Ceuta, is also apparent in Pedro de Corral’s version of the story. In the Crónica sarracina, Ceuta continues to play a central role in how the

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81 While geopolitical boundaries of “Spain” were not formally established at the time of the invasion, the Crónica de 1344 uses “Spanha” as the place of invasion. Later, Zurara’s chronicles use “Espanha” as well, though in the eighth century the boundaries were more fluid and the region currently known as Portugal would have also been part of the “Hispania” or Iberia that was invaded.
The year 1415 marked another watershed moment for Ceuta with regard to its relationship between Iberian Christian and Moroccan Muslim powers. While the story of Ceuta in 711 is left to the subjective nature of the chroniclers that told the myth for generations, the 1415 siege by the Portuguese was a documented military campaign led by Prince Henry the Navigator, the fourth son of João I, and the younger brother of Duarte I of the House of Aviz. The motive of the siege, however, remains unclear. Gomes Eanes de Zurara’s *Tomada de Ceuta* and subsequent works of the period note the importance of crusading as the principal motivating factor for the siege, and recent scholars have been troubled by the lack of economic incentives. Peter Russell explains, “Modern scholars have often been unwilling to believe that the expedition against Ceuta can have been motivated simply by religious and crusading zealotry and by the wish of a new dynasty to make its mark on the European stage by embarking on a major military venture of that kind outside its frontiers” (Russell 35). Other explanations, however, lack evidence or are deemed unlikely given the relationship — or lack thereof — between Portugal and the city. For example, according to Zurara’s account, the Portuguese crown had sent spies to Ceuta to scout out possible points of entry for the invasion, leading many to believe that Ceuta was unfamiliar territory, perhaps because it was not necessarily at the forefront of the Portuguese economy.

The city of Ceuta was nonetheless a powerful port for trade throughout the Mediterranean and a significant fortress given its geographic location in the Strait of Gibraltar, but it was not easy to maintain. A Portuguese presence on the other side of the Strait proved difficult when
attacks and battles tested Portuguese power, including some that came right after the installation of Pedro de Meneses as governor. 1419, for example, saw an attempt by combined forces from Morocco and Granada to retake Ceuta at a time when the city was vulnerable both politically and financially. Just a year prior, the economy of the city forced its leaders to send a petition to the Pope allowing Ceuta to trade with Muslim communities in order to have certain essentials, including food, a clear illustration of their weakness (Russell 65). While these minor battles were held off by Portuguese forces, 1437 marked another decisive moment for the region when Henry the Navigator planned to take Tangier and its neighboring ports. The attack did not go as planned and the Portuguese army, led by Henry, needed to retreat. Moroccan authorities planned to take Ceuta as part of their military victory but instead, the Portuguese were allowed to keep Ceuta as long as the infante Fernando — Henry’s younger brother — remained a Moroccan hostage.

The failed attack on Tangier in 1437 did not result in the loss of Ceuta, but did exemplify the complexities of the first few decades of Portuguese presence in North Africa. Portugal’s stake in the region was weak and the city itself was a drain in almost all regards; Peter Russell states that Ceuta was an “intolerable burden on the King’s resources” (54). Henry’s decision to hand over his own brother instead of the city itself is demonstrative of just how significant Ceuta was for imperial power — or at the very least the image of imperial power. Portugal’s rocky start in Ceuta did not become a concrete part of the cultural history of the Iberian Peninsula in the way that the 711 invasion was mythologized. The volatility of the city’s political, economic, and religious status was nonetheless a part of the fifteenth-century literary production of the Portuguese court with Gomes Eanes de Zurara at the helm. Zurara reckons with this period of Ceuta’s history in his own nuanced way. In the following sections we will see how Zurara
understands and represents Ceuta’s contentious place in Portuguese politics while also addressing its importance in the cultural memory of the region. By reconciling both its distant shameful past as well as more recent difficulties in the city, Zurara expresses a political message and support the power of the crown’s expansionist tendencies at a time when they could be questioned.

AN INVESTMENT IN CEUTA AS A MEMORY SITE

The presence of Spain’s 711 Fall in the literature of the fifteenth century is a testament to the lasting legacy of that historical moment and its place as national myth. The question of why Corral produces his text at the time that he does is troubling for some scholars given the temporal difference between his work and the Fall of Spain over 700 years prior. Some, including James Donald Fogelquist turn to the state of Juan II’s court and the need for critiques of his decadence (Reconfiguring 71). However, as we have examined in Chapter Two, Corral’s investment in Rodrigo’s penance serves as a means of legitimizing Trastamaran power as he absolves Juan’s supposed ancestor of the harm and shame he has caused in Spain. The Crónica sarracina, then, is not a critique of Juan II’s Spain, but an attempt to support a Trastamaran message, or at least construct the literary scaffolding needed to read his text as a unifying message at a time of political stress.

Given the dramatic changes in Ceuta’s status at the beginning of the fifteenth century, Pedro de Corral’s Crónica sarracina appears at a time when the city is the subject of renewed political attention. While the exact date of the Crónica’s composition is unknown, Derek C. Carr asserts that the text was written roughly around 1425 with the latest possible date being 1434, the
year of Enrique de Villena’s death. Villena references a specific moment of the *Crónica sarracina* in a letter he writes to Suero de Quiñones where he alludes to a certain “peral” who writes a *historia gótica*; *peral*, according to Carr, is a misreading of Corral’s true name (3). If we take Carr’s proposal of 1425 for Corral’s date of composition, the *Crónica* appears just after the 1415 Portuguese sack of Ceuta, which I argue is not a coincidence. Corral’s narrative breathes life into a centuries-old legend in which Ceuta plays an important geographic role at a time when the city reappears at the center of Iberian politics.

While the bulk of narrative action in the *Crónica sarracina* does not take place in Ceuta — but rather in Toledo, the battle sites, and later Viseu — the city is nonetheless represented as geographically and strategically important at a time when Ceuta was being used as a stronghold in the Iberian fight against the Umayyad. With Ceuta now at the focus of crusading efforts and given Corral’s interest in the Rodrigo story, Corral was no stranger to Ceuta’s importance. When the Count don Julián is introduced in the text, Corral explains that he is given the territory of Ceuta and with that land he “tenié por sí todos los puertos de la mar Medio Terráneo, e del estrecho así los desta parte como allende del mar hasta Túnez” (I, 175).82 Corral, similar to Zurara’s statement a few decades later that opens this chapter, notes that with Ceuta, one controls the entire Mediterranean sea; or that Ceuta is the key and the entryway into the Mediterranean; with this level of geographic control, Julián is considered “muy poderoso.” Corral recognizes that the city of Ceuta is a crucial component of Mediterranean power, and uncoincidentally the re-christianization of the city in 1415 was a manifestation of that power Corral describes.

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82 “He had all of the ports on the Mediterranean Sea, from the Strait, to these parts, to those by Tunis.”
The question of time, place, and narrative representation all come together in a consideration of Ceuta as a site of memory, or lieu de memoire to use the words of Pierre Nora. As Corral rewrites the city’s history, Ceuta is the geographic space where “memory crystalizes and secretes itself,” and more specifically the memory of Spain’s shame (Nora 7). Two aspects of Nora’s notion of the memory place are of particular importance when it comes to Ceuta’s representation in fifteenth century literary texts. Nora stipulates a lieu de memoire requires a “commemorative vigilance” or a deliberate creation of the memory associated with the place in question (12). In considering Ceuta to be a shameful memory site, I argue that Corral, and later Zurara, are responsible for this commemoration and creation through their conscious decisions to focus on the city during its time of change. The field of cultural memory studies stipulates an element of creation in the demarcation of a memory site. While Ceuta itself is the land on which memory is placed, I argue that the emotional and textual community formed by Corral and Zurara in the fifteenth century is the constructed element of the lieu de memoire achieved through literary creation.

The second component is that of “distance-memory” and the idea that “distance demands the rapprochement that negates it while giving it resonance” (17). Corral and Zurara narrow the gaps between Ceuta’s past and its present as a means of reckoning with the city’s history. While Corral chooses to commemorate Ceuta’s past at a time when the city returns to the political stage, Zurara narrows the gap even further by making that past relevant to the present struggles that plague the city, as we will see in the following sections. As a whole, by understanding and rearticulating the past within the context of present changes centered around a particular space,
both writers are able to regard Ceuta as the site of the memory of the Fall of Spain and the reconciliation of that fall through the act of writing.

Looking back in time to cities as sites of community identity is in no way new, and while Ceuta is a culturally and geographically specific site for Iberian identity, other cities, including Rome, Carthage, and Troy have received similar treatment in the construction of myths. Troy is one of the central sites of European cultural identity throughout Western history. A historical gaze combined with present-day ideologies is the foundation of historical memory as it pertains to cities and memory sites, or the words of Christian Baier, “intentional history bridges the gap between the myth of Troy as a mnemonic signifier and the category of European cultural identity” (45). The Trojan legend even became an important component of Iberian cultural production in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, including, but not limited to, Alfonso XI’s Castilian Crónica Troyana and other Galician versions of the story.83 Like Troy, Ceuta in a fifteenth-century context, and with the retrospective gaze to the eighth century, can become Spain’s own Troy. In fact, as Josiah Blackmore suggests, Zurara’s retelling of Ceuta’s history back to Noah’s grandson places the city in a broader global context, “not as a component of a more local or Iberian past but in terms that trace the city to the beginning of the world” (Moorings 36). As part of a global history, Ceuta becomes a part of the conversation surrounding its Classical counterparts like Troy. However, I would also contend that within the context of Zurara’s writing, questions of Iberian identity are at the forefront of the historiographic agenda of the cronista-mor, and Ceuta’s conquered and Christian state after 1415 is an inherent sign of its Portugueseness.

Though a physical place, Ceuta, in the context of this chapter and the fifteenth-century chronicles, is an imagined memory site grounded in emotion. That is, there is no physical memorial, but rather the idea of Ceuta is what becomes the memory site in Corral and Zurara’s texts through their use of emotions and emotional associations with that place. Nora alludes to the importance of emotion when it comes to recording history, noting that in today’s society, one is often compelled to “record his feelings” (14), but the role of emotion in the creation of lieux de mémoire is not the central point of his argument. Nonetheless, certain affects and feelings are crucial to the notion of cultural memory and to its manifestation in a specific space. Nostalgia, for example, is one such emotion, and as Henry Berlin has pointed out, an important piece of Crónica sarracina scholarship, especially from the perspective of Corral’s distance from the events at hand. I argue, however, that emotion’s place in the designation of Ceuta as a lieu de mémoire is actually two-fold. Like nostalgia, emotions — specifically shame — are the unifying factor that unites the populace as a community in order to remember the events of 711. A sense of national shame is what is described and even scripted by Corral and Zurara in their texts. But shame is also what is being remembered. It is the memory that is crystalized in the city space; fifteenth-century Spanish and Portuguese readers must remember the shame of losing their land to Moorish enemies.

_SANCTUARY OR FALLEN CITY?_ SHAME IN/FROM CEUTA IN THE _CRÓNICA SARRACINA_

Shame’s place in Ceuta is two-fold as represented in Corral’s work; Ceuta is a place where shame exists, but also from which shame stems. Unlike Toledo, which is the location of

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84 Henry Berlin, for example, explains, “Corral projects the unity he desires for the present into a distant past” (Ritual 108).
Rodrigo’s court, or Viseu, the site of Rodrigo’s penance, Ceuta is the place where La Cava returns after her rape and is the location of negotiations between Julián and Muslim forces led by Muça. It embodies the idea of home for a dishonored La Cava but also the site of danger for all of Spain’s safety. Ceuta is the city that, in Corral’s reimagining of eighth-century geopolitics, hovers on the line between being a sanctuary and being vulnerable; it is the place to which the ashamed return or the site of Spain’s shame as a whole. This duality could be considered yet another example of the inherent ambiguities in Corral’s text, either the result of his own narrative style, or his juggling of various sources combined with his own voice, as we have seen in Chapter Two. Nevertheless, the ambiguities surrounding the duality of Ceuta’s place in Spain’s shame as represented by Corral illustrate the complexities of the Crónica in its mission to reconcile Spain’s shame.

The city symbolizes a beacon of hope for an ashamed La Cava who is dishonored by the King in his Toledo castle: “si más en su corte estó ál no me verná sino es la muerte [...] Ruegovos que enbiedes por mí luego,” she writes to her father in a letter she has a squire bring to Ceuta (I, 458).85 Contrasted with the court in Toledo, Ceuta is home, and Ceuta is a place that is safe for La Cava to return and escape from Rodrigo’s sexual desires. La Cava’s return to Ceuta is a return to her family, and also a return to a community that shares feelings of shame in relation to her rape. She is not alone in her emotional experience, as her father is also ashamed: “nunca él hovo pesar que a éste se comparase” (I, 459).86 Ceuta becomes a sanctuary of sorts where La Cava freely feels her shame, and her father seeks vengeance from a distance. It is a city that embodies

85 Translation in Chapter 2.
86 “He had never had shame that could compare to this.”
a certain sense of security and safety when it comes to bringing down Rodrigo’s tyranny in spite of La Cava’s hesitations.

With this sense of community and sanctuary, Ceuta then also acts as a physical site of Barbara Rosenwein’s notion of the “emotional community.” Beyond the shared feelings of shame, and the “common stake, interests, values, and goals” that La Cava, her father, her mother, and others feel as a unit, Ceuta is a physical delineation of the community at play (Rosenwein 24). Ceuta’s role in the emotional community of the Cronica sarracina can also be two-fold. On one hand it is the physical space in which members of a metaphysical community can manifest their shared values and feelings. On the other hand, the city is the embodiment of certain feelings; it is the basis of feelings of security for La Cava and her family, of Spanishness for Corral’s readership in opposition to Rodrigo’s Toledo, and of shame when the city does eventually fall.

In spite of the city being a sanctuary at times, in the Crónica sarracina Count Julián is not blind to the vulnerability of Ceuta. In fact, after Rodrigo opens up the Casa de Hércules and reveals the prophecy that Spain will fall to the Moors, Julián responds: “Si verdad es que España se ha de perder a mí viene la primera destrucción, e yo seré aquel que primero seré muerto, e destruida la mi tierra” (I, 182). Julián understands that his land is the buffer zone between Spain and Moorish territories, and in this ironic moment of the narrative, he fears that his death

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87 In the Crónica sarracina, Corral recounts the legend of what happened when Rodrigo goes to the Casa or Palacio de Hércules, a tower which has been locked for centuries that Rodrigo insists on opening. When he breaks the locks and enters, he discovers a beautifully adorned palace with images of Moorish men all around. In the palace he also finds a prophecy that explains that whoever opens the door of the palace will bring about the fall of Hispania. This story is told in various other sources as well, each with their own variations. Also see Chapter Two for more information.

88 “If it is true that Spain will fall, the first attack will come to me, and I will be the first one dead, and my land destroyed.”
will be unavoidable should the Moors invade Spain through his port. The reader later finds out that Julián’s concerns are valid, but it is he himself who causes the very invasion he fears. Ceuta quickly becomes the meeting place for Muça’s forces, as he reaches out to all of his leaders and soldiers to pass through the city on their way to invade the Peninsula (I, 600-1). Later on, after Julián and his wife, the Countess Frandina, lose both their son and daughter, Muça’s forces take the city by force, no longer using it as an entry point into Spain, but rather claiming it for the Moors: he sends two thousand troops with ships to take Ceuta, Tangier, and the surrounding areas (II, 349). The city is thus the very place of Spain’s destruction and the site of Spain’s Fall, as it not only opened the door to the entire Peninsula but also fell as part of a weak and failing presence in North Africa.

The city is the physical representation of a fallen state at the end of Book Two of the Crónica sarracina when Ceuta is the site of the Moors’ last stand against La Cava’s family. The new Muslim King Alahor has his henchmen kill Alarbot — La Cava’s younger brother — by throwing him off of the tallest tower in Ceuta. To make their final mark on the city, they then burn the city to the ground: “Yuça fue con Alarbot de suso de la más alta torre que en la cibdat avía [...] lo puso entre dos almenas, e dexólo caer ayuso, e dio tan gran golpe en la peña que todo se fizo menudo que no quedó un miembro junto con otro. [...] El Rey mandó que lo echasen en la

89 Before her death in Seville, Frandina engages in a heated debate with King Alahor who accuses her of deceitful language: “ruégote que quieras callar de aquestas palabras soberviosas” (II, 361). In the overarching typological relationship between the Fall of Spain and the Fall of the Garden of Eden, the importance of shame and a woman’s language is an interesting side-note. In an Augustinian reading of this moment, it is Frandina’s shamelessness that allows her to speak freely and with no inhibition about her desire for vengeance and anger against the moors. See Eric Jager, The Tempter’s Voice.
mar, e luego fue echo, e fizo poner fuego a toda la cibdat” (II, 368-9). While Ceuta was once the a sanctuary for La Cava and her family from the shame Rodrigo had caused, as all of Spain is shamed, their land must also fall to Moorish hands and vanish entirely. This is, interestingly, Corral’s final image of Ceuta in his narrative as he moves to talk about Pelayo’s fight in León, and Rodrigo’s penance in Viseu. Not only is Ceuta part of the fallen Spain politically and socially, it is physically destroyed and engulfed in flames.

It is worth noting that Ceuta also briefly becomes the city of Frandina’s rejection, which, combined with La Cava’s hesitations about her father’s search for revenge, is a symptom of the dissipation of the emotional community described above. Frandina’s rejection of the city is also her self-imposed exile. As Julian’s actions begin to put the city and their status in Spanish politics in jeopardy, she chooses to depart for Seville in order to return to her hometown. She says, “Soon I will leave and remain in Ceuta no longer, and I will go to my city where I have my lineage.” (I, 473). The return to her place of “heredad” or lineage shifts Frandina’s sense of sanctuary from Ceuta to Seville grounded in her own familial memory and history. Ironically, Seville is subsequently the place where she meets her own fate as she is stoned to death.

Both sides of the sanctuary/destruction duality that is evident in Corral’s text illustrate how Ceuta is both a site and source of Spain’s shame. It is a place where shame is felt by characters in the text, but at the same time is a place that represents the geographically-bound components of the Fall itself. With the exception of La Cava’s physical rape, Ceuta is the

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90 “Yuça went with Alarbot to the highest tower in the city, […] put him between two battlements and let him fall to his death, and he fell hitting the rocks with such a strike that no part of his body remained attached to another […] And the King sent for his remains to be thrown into the ocean, which was done, and then he set fire to the city.”

91 “Soon I will leave and remain in Ceuta no longer, and I will go to my city where I have my lineage.”

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location of the major working elements of the Muslim invasion of 711; it is the “where” of Spain’s Fall, and the axis around which the entire Fall turns. If the Fall of Spain is a reimagining or typology of the Fall of the Garden of Eden, and thus the beginning of Spain’s shame, Ceuta would be a part of the broader “Eden,” or the site that falls. It is that which is destroyed in a fallen and shamed state.

That which has fallen must be redeemed, however. Leaving his readers with a destroyed Ceuta serves as a useful literary tool that leaves the image of the city as a blank slate, both figuratively and literally, that can be rebuilt in the imagination of his readers. As for Nora’s notion of “distance-memory,” Corral’s final image of the burned city is juxtaposed with the new fifteenth-century reality of Portugal’s imperial presence in Ceuta. There is just enough distance between the supposed destruction of Ceuta in the eighth-century and the contemporary image of that destruction as a means of inspiring a desire to rebuild and retake land that was once lost.

**Discursive Shifts in Zurara’s Historiography: Shame and Redemption**

In 1450, Gomes Eanes de Zurara published the *Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta*, his first work, while holding the post of *cronista-mor* under Afonso V. The *Tomada de Ceuta* was the third piece of the chronicles of King João I, the first two parts of which were finished by Zurara’s predecessor, Fernão Lopes. The text recounted the story of the sack of Ceuta in 1415 by the Portuguese, thus beginning Portugal’s presence in North Africa and opening the door for further expansion.

Zurara makes only one reference to the story of King Rodrigo in the *Tomada de Ceuta*, which appears in the introduction when he briefly describes the history of the city. Zurara
explains the history of the city, claiming how since its founding “Foi convertida à Fé de nosso Senhor Jesus Cristo, na qual durou até o tempo que a o conde Julião entregou aos mouros, quando por vingança de el-Rei Dom Rodrigo primeiramente os mouros passaram en Espanha” (Zurara 43). Outside of this mention of Rodrigo and Julián, Zurara’s text pays little attention to that moment of the invasion. In fact, beyond Zurara’s editorial voice in the introduction, the city of Ceuta is unfamiliar to the characters within the work.

The roots of Ceuta’s soon-to-be conquest appears in chapter nine of the *Tomada*, when a Joham Affonso (João Afonso), the royal superintendent, takes the Infantes Henry and Afonso aside and encourages them to take the little-known city as a means of building up their honor and reputation and receiving knighthood. João Afonso’s proposition is recounted as follows:

> Vossos pensamentos, disse ele, são assaz de grandes e bons e, pois que vos tal vontade tendes, eu vos posso assinar uma cousa em que o podeis bem e honradamente executar. E isto é a cidade de Ceuta que é em terra de África que é uma mui notável cidade e mui azada para se tomar. E isto sei eu, principalmente, por um meu criado [...]. Ele me contou como é uma mui grande cidade rica e mui formosa e como de todas as partes a cerca o mar afora uma mui pequena parte por que hão saída para terra. E segundo o grande desejo de vosso padre e o vosso não sinto, por o presente, cousa em que mais

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92 “It was converted to the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, which lasted until the time that Count Julian gave it to the Moors, when, in an act of vengeance against the King Don Rodrigo, the Moors first passed into Spain.”
honrosamente pudésseis fazer de vossas honras como no filhamento daquela cidade.

(57-8)

Afonso’s statement is curious in that it is almost contradictory, given that he draws important bonds between the city and notions of honor, but is seemingly unfamiliar with the city. What João Afonso does know about the city — its riches, physical beauty, and position on the Mediterranean — are second-hand details, yet he nevertheless asserts that the city would be a critical for the princes’ reputation and honor. Taking Ceuta is not just about the princes’ honor, but also about the honor of Iberian history. As Blackmore notes, this quest for honor is one component of Ceuta’s importance, but the wider narrative pertains to the city’s “centuries-long legend of betrayal” from the 711 invasion (Moorings 38). The city’s close link with honor for the infantes can then be extruded to signify the honor of Portugal — or Iberia more broadly — in the quest to remedy the betrayal narrative.

In 1463, in the Crónica do Comde dom Pedro de Meneses, Zurara explicitly reminds his readers of Ceuta’s troubled past. Zurara tells readers of Meneses’ messages to his men as they depart Lisbon for Ceuta. Upon seeing their sadness and tears from leaving their homes and families, he reminds his fellow travelers that they are defending a noble lineage: “Caa me llembrey que decemdeys daquella muy nobre llynhagem dos Godos [...] Soes aymda filhos daquelles que, semdo toda Espanha perdida e os mouros apoderados della, se ajumtarão com aquelle catholico prinçipe dom Rramigio e per força de seu samgue empuxarão os

93 ‘Your ideas, he said, are good, and since you are inclined, I can share with you something that you can easily and honorably execute. That is the city of Ceuta in the land of Africa, a famous city that is promising in its capture. And I know this principally from one of my men [...] He told me how it is a large and rich city, beautiful and all of it surrounded by water except for one small part that allows for exit on land. And given the great wish of you and of your father, I feel that at present there is no more honorable deed that you can to than to sack this city.’
ymigos” (217). It is no coincidence that Meneses makes this statement en route to Ceuta of all places, the very site of the “perdida” he describes. His statement is also a reminder of the connection between a fifteenth-century pan-Iberian identity and the Gothic lineage that many tried to reclaim, especially in the Spanish courts during Trastamaran power. The construction of the beginning of Meneses’ statement is noteworthy, however, in that the lineage of the Goths is something that he remembers — me lembrei. The fact that Gothic lineage is something that Meneses expresses as a memory, or something he remembers illustrates the temporal distance of Visigothic Spain without stripping it of its importance in the fifteenth century.

Zurara’s investment in Ceuta’s role in the fall of Spain is evident in other moments of *Dom Pedro de Meneses* after Pedro’s governorship is established, but the city is forced to deal with threats of invasion. In a speech given by Gonçalo Velho, a commander of the Order of Christ perhaps most famous for his role in the colonization of the Azores (Russell 73), he reminds his fellow soldiers to beware of the Muslims who come to invade Ceuta in 1419. He reminds his men that these same Muslim soldiers are the ones who brought down Castile, “onde foram mortos nobres homees, nô sem gramde perdo doutra gente comum, o pior que foy a vergonha dos cristãos” (*Meneses* 566). In this moment of the narrative, Zurara explicitly illustrates the connection between Christian shame and the Muslim invasion in 711, noting how Castile was the site of the greatest shame of all. Many lives were lost, especially of average citizens throughout the peninsula. But what Zurara makes clear here, is that the greatest loss of

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94 “For I remember that you all descend from that noble lineage of the Goths. […] You are still the sons of those who — while Spain had Fallen and the Moors took power — joined with the Catholic Prince Ramigio [Ramiro], and with force and your blood pushed out the enemy.”

95 “Where great noblemen died, not also without the loss of civilian life, the worst being the shame of all Christians.”

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all was the fact that all Iberian Christians were shamed in the process of the invasion. Velho also deliberately uses the word *vergonha*, directly labeling the 711 invasion as the source of national and religious shame, unlike Meneses’ rally cry which seeks to motivate his subjects through an implicit reminder of Spain’s shame.

It is in the *Crónica de dom Pedro de Meneses* that Zurara reinforces the notion of Ceuta being the site and source of Iberian shame in the eighth century. In *Pedro de Meneses* specifically, Zurara recounts moments where this very shame serves as inspiration and motivation for troops to remember why they are in Ceuta and why the city matters. By reminding soldiers of their political and military obligations to absolve Iberia of the shame it experienced in past generations, both the Meneses and Velho characters in the narrative are able to appeal to the emotions of their troops. Beyond the sense of unity under Meneses’ governorship and Portuguese power in Ceuta, I propose that these moments of Zurara’s narrative add emotional factors to the unity of Ceuta’s fifteenth-century political identity. That is, the shame associated with Ceuta’s role in the fall of Spain becomes a shared emotional experience by the city’s new defenders and therefore contributes to the sense of unification of the city’s subjects. It is a rhetorical strategy that echoes Sara Ahmed’s notion that “By witnessing what is shameful about the past, the nation can ‘live up’ to the ideals [...] in the present” (109) while at the same time fulfilling Nora’s desired *rapprochement* by making the past relevant to the present. As a leader, however, it is curious that Meneses linguistically removes himself from the “noble lineage” by telling his men that they are the ones who are its descendants, without the first person plural “nós” and instead stating *decendeis* or *sois ainda filhos*. It should be clear that Meneses represents the leadership of the Gothic lineage in the new Christian Ceuta, but by using a second-person plural *vós*, Meneses
employs a rhetoric that nonetheless groups his men together as one and reinforces their nobility and stake in the region.

Beyond their value as reminders of the shame associated with the fall of 711, these quotations demonstrate a larger discursive shift in Zurara’s style in terms how he discusses the city of Ceuta in different works. On one hand, the differences in how Zurara describes the memory of Ceuta in the *Tomada de Ceuta* and *Dom Pedro de Meneses* illustrate changes in Zurara’s rhetorical style and serve as evidence for his inclusion of emotional factors when discussing Ceuta. Over a span of thirteen years, from 1450–1463, the addition of emotion is paired with a shift in depicting Ceuta as a relatively unknown port on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar to a site of cultural memory that must be defended in the name of the crown, noble lineages, and the Christian faith. The shift is rather dramatic and, I propose, the product of the rapidly changing state of the city. In the first half of the fifteenth century, Ceuta was an important political symbol of a fallen state, but also the site of economic, political, and military complications; it is the the place of struggle that becomes a new, fifteenth-century source of shame which Zurara’s emotion-filled writing seeks to reconcile, or at the very least serve as a counterbalance.

The notion of reconciliation in this context not only refers to the need to absolve Iberia of its shameful past from centuries prior, but also to positively portray and rectify the political difficulties of the moment though textual representation and glorification. That is, if the Fall must eventually yield Redemption, the shame associated with the Fall must eventually yield a positive emotional reconciliation. Zurara portrays this reconciliation in a number of ways, including his account of the happiness of João I’s return to Evora after Ceuta is finally taken as
described in the *Tomada*, as well as his glorification of the Governor Meneses in the *Crónica do Comde*.

In Chapter 103 of the *Tomada de Ceuta*, Zurara recounts the King’s return to Evora and his reception in the city. As he and the infantes arrive, Zurara describes the celebratory nature of the event:

> E não ficou homem na cidade, que de pé ou de cavalo não saísse fora tanto era a sua ledice com a vinda de el-Rei. E as mulheres alimpavam as ruas, lançando às janelas as melhores cousas que tinham. [...] E qual seria o coração que visse aquele recebimento que todos faziam a el-Rei, que pudesse reter aquela veias por onde correm as lágrimas, que não se enchessem seus olhos de água. E, não somente as pessoas de cumprido emtendimento, mas os meninos parvos haviam entender para se alegarem com a vinda daquele príncipe. E assim vinham todos ante ele cantando, como se fosse alguma cousa celestial enviada a eles para sua salvação. (290)\(^96\)

The overarching emotion of this moment of the King’s return is happiness, expressed through the “ledice,” or “alegria” of the men in the city, the author’s implication that it is nearly impossible to not cry tears of joy, and the understanding of all Evora residents — both educated adults and uneducated children — that the arrival is a joyous occasion. Happiness, in this case, is one possible counter-emotion to the national shame associated with Ceuta. The emotions that are a part of the celebration of Portuguese victory in Ceuta are a sign of Portugal’s reconciliation of

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\(^{96}\) “And there was not a man in the city, either on foot or horseback, that did not come out due to such happiness upon the arrival of the King. And the women cleaned the streets, throwing the best things they had from the windows. [...] And what would a heart be that, upon seeing such an arrival for the King, could hold back tears and not have their eyes fill with water. And this is not just for learned men, but also for uneducated children who understood to be happy upon the arrival of the prince. And they all followed singing, as if he had been sent by the heavens for their salvation.”

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the shame associated with the city from centuries prior. The relationship between shame and happiness is not unique to Zurara’s text, and there is some precedent for looking at these emotions as inversely related with one another. Emily Francomano, in her forthcoming study on emotions in the *Libro de Apolonio*, for example, notes how in the poem, happiness is often placed in opposition to shame (*vergüenza*) and sadness (*tristeza*) as the narrative takes the King Apolonio through different stages of Fortune’s Wheel.

In addition to the happiness that comes along with the King’s return in the wake of victory in Ceuta is the fact that Zurara compares the event to salvation; the King arrives in Evora as if sent from the heavens for the salvation of its residents. The use of the term “salvação” is a direct indication that this moment of the narrative is defined by its redemptive qualities. The townspeople of Evora celebrate and rejoice the King’s arrival and the reversal in Ceuta’s shameful history, and it is João I that ushers in the salvation, or Redemption, of the city’s Fall from centuries before.

In the *Crónica do Comde* Zurara also glorifies Meneses’ role as governor and the state of the city as a means of portraying the city’s state of Redemption. Ceuta was weak and Meneses was in poor health around 1437, but as Zurara explains in the penultimate chapter of his text, the governor wanted nothing more than to fight with the forces heading to Tangier in that same year. Meneses, according to Zurara, repeatedly asked the King to fight on his behalf, but the King denied him, telling him to stay in Ceuta to take care of both himself and the city. Zurara describes how Pedro gave in to the King’s wishes but at the same time, “ouve dello gramde desprazer, caa, como lhe a vida ja desfalleçida, desejava a natureza de fazer aquelo que sempre
fezera” (712), in this case, “doing what he always had” was defending the crown. The remainder of the chapter maintains a somber yet romantic tone that glorifies Pedro’s desire to fight for his country while at the same time being too weak to do so. He gives his son Duarte advice for the battle, and a powerful moment is described when Duarte kissed his father’s hands, and Meneses cried and expressed his love to his son (714). This affective moment depicts Pedro through two lights: that of human sadness and a superhuman political hero. He is a dying father to Duarte, but also a dying godfather to the city; a martyr, per se, that glorifies his figure beyond the hardships of the reality of the Portuguese presence in North Africa. The work even ends with a prayer for Pedro, much in the way a hagiographic work would end: “que lhes praza rroguar a Deus, […] pola alma deste comde dom Pedro, que tamto trabalhou per acrecentamento da santa fee e per homrra da casa de Portugal” (718). This saint-like depiction of Pedro throws a positive spin on the shameful historical moment in the region in a political effort to emphasize Portugal’s strengths in North Africa by any means necessary.

Glorifying Meneses’ role as governor and the Portuguese political presence in Ceuta is a viable narrative strategy to reconcile the differences between reality and desired representation. Zurara’s text is thus a romantic view of the — not too distant — past as a means of fulfilling a certain purpose in his role as royal chronicler. This narrative strategy recalls the work of Gabrielle Spiegel who, in her study of French prose historiography of the thirteenth century, posits, “romancing of the past in vernacular historiography [...] addressed sentiments of loss and decline” (Romancing 3), at least in her view of medieval French aristocrats. The case in Portugal

97 “He was greatly displeased, because, as life had weakened him, he longed to do what he always had.”

98 “Let it please you to pray to God, for the soul of that Count Dom Pedro, who worked to spread the faith and for the honor of the Royal House of Portugal.”
was not much different, however. As Zurara wrote of the overseas exploits of the crown, his stake in the narrative representation of the crown’s power and its effect on the nobility involved with imperial endeavors would naturally have an inverse correlation to the feelings of loss and weakness experienced by his audiences; that is, as the crown experiences more loss, Zurara must fabricate more positivity in his work. However, the caveat, as Spiegel also acknowledges, is the fact that both the feelings of loss and the need for narrative flexibility depend on the “perception” of decline. Portugal held on to Ceuta in spite of the challenges the city faced, yet the financial and military strains, and Meneses’ overall weak governorship gave a higher perception of political decline in North Africa that needed to be corrected in the chronicles.\footnote{Also note that Portugal had already moved further south in Africa by the time of Zurara’s writing of \textit{Pedro de Meneses}, and therefore already had established some strength in the region. The gap between the period of Meneses’ governorship and Zurara’s chronicle is part of what Spiegel describes as the “displacement of the past” (8).}

\textbf{SHAME, REFLEXIVITY, AND DYNAMICS OF WRITING ABOUT MEMORY}

Scholarly conversations about shame, notably in psychology, point to shame’s reflexive nature. It is an emotion that requires a “self-focus” or gaze inward that “involves a severe, but not all-encompassing, evaluation of the self” (Deonna et al. 151). Both Zurara and Corral write on behalf of the “nation” — Portugal and Spain respectively — which, of course, differs from an individual subject studied in psychology. Nevertheless, their historiographic process of composition is inherently self-reflexive and inward-facing as it seeks to evaluate shameful moments in Iberian history and encourage readers to look at these “national” moments. If the nation is the “self,” then Corral and Zurara are responsible for the inward-facing reflections on
that self through the process of writing. In fact, both writers reckon with the importance of writing in their works.

Chapter Thirty-Eight of the *Tomada de Ceuta* introduces Zurara’s ideas about the importance of writing history. He explains that the role of the historian is the “recontamento das virtuosas pessoas,” or the “recounting of virtuous people,” (143) which has two objectives. The first, he explains, is didactic: the writings of a historian “é aquele espelho, que Sócrates grande filósofo, mandava que os homens mancebos esguardassem a miúde, por tal que os bons feitos de seus antecessores fossem a eles proveitoso ensino.” The second objective concerns the idea of memory. Zurara explains, “se os homens sentissem que, pelo falecimento de sua vida, se acabaria toda sua renembrança certamente não se poria a tão grandes trabalhos e perigos, como vemos que se manifestamente põem. A qual cousa foi o principal azo por que os primeiros autores se esforçaram a compor histórias” (144). The first objective Zurara cites is one that demonstrates his investment in the self-reflexive nature of historiographic writing. By looking at the past — and specifically the good deeds of virtuous men and women — other generations can learn and follow the examples of their predecessors. Readers of Zurara’s text, then, are encouraged to look inward at a national past and reflect on history’s relationship with the present. With this in mind, the second objective solidifies the act of remembrance through the process of writing; that is, one remembers history by recording it.

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100 “Is a mirror, that Socrates, the great philosopher, commands that young men respect such that the good deeds of their ancestors are beneficial lessons to them.”

101 “If men were to feel that, upon death, their memory would end certainly they would not record all of their great deeds and challenges, as we see that they do. This was the principal reason that the first authors sought to compose histories.”
The act of recording history, the importance of historical memory, and references to the work’s own historiographic elements also appear throughout Corral’s *Crónica sarracina*. The epigraph to this chapter is a quotation spoken by Eleastras, Rodrigo’s court chronicler, in which he places a value on memory, reminding the King that his actions will become his legacy and the foundation for how future generations remember him. And, it is Eleastras who is in charge of recording that very history, a point which becomes especially contentious in Chapter 214 of Book 1, “Como el Rey don Rodrigo mandó a Eleastras que [no] escriviese de los fechos que fizo con la Caba,” which we saw in Chapter 2 of this project. As previously shown, this chapter tells of how Rodrigo requested that Eleastras, his royal chronicler, not spare any details in his manuscript about what happened between the King and La Cava. It is said that Rodrigo wanted to make sure readers knew the true reason that Julián sought revenge: “E todo esto fazía el rey por poner en el libro quál fuera la causa verdadera porque el Conde don Julián viniera contra él, y el comienço de España ser destruida por qué vino.” We might also recall the moral of the episode, that shameful acts will eventually be discovered: “todos los hombres del mundo se devrián castigar por lo que aquí havedes oído, e non fazer cosas que si sabidas son den vergüenza a los que las fazen; que non puede ser que tarde o cedo no se descubran e después rescibirán dellas los semejantes males” (I, 530). In the context of memory studies, this moment of the narrative demonstrates the confluence of memory, shame, history, and how the act of writing brings everything together in order to reconcile the past. Corral writes in the fifteenth century, however, and imagines an eighth-century legend through the creation of an imagined chronicler.

\[102\] It is interesting to note, however, that Corral’s fictionalization of the story of Rodrigo does not adhere to strict historiographic standards that align with the conservation of memory he and Zurara suggest.

\[103\] See Chapter 2.
and chronicle. Nevertheless, it is this very distance from the event at hand — both temporal
distance and textual distance — that allows Corral to express his theory on how readers must
remember the shame of Spain’s Fall through his own writings. It is Corral himself who heeds his
own advice, though depicted through the fictional lens of Eleastras.\footnote{104}

The reflexive nature of historiographic writing that both chroniclers exhibit can be
applied to more than just the actions of certain men. I argue that their process of writing-as-
memory not only forms the foundation of Ceuta as an emotional memory site, but also allows for
it to continue and live on given the ever-changing dynamics of the Ceuta region and the need for
memory sites to maintain a certain amount of cultural investment. The notion of continuity is
important when it comes to maintaining a memory site that has been established. Ann Rigney
explains the complexity of what she calls the dynamic nature of cultural memory:

Existing memory sites become invested with new meanings and gain a new lease of life.

But they may also be upstaged by alternative sites and become effectively obsolete or
inert. Indeed, the ‘dynamic’ perspective of cultural remembrance suggests that ‘memory
sites,’ while they come into being as points where many acts of remembrance converge,
only stay alive as long as people consider it worthwhile to argue about their meaning.

(Rigney 346)

At a time when Ceuta is under consistent political pressure and change, both Corral and Zurara
write as a means of maintaining the worthwhileness, to use Rigney’s terms, of keeping Ceuta in
the cultural dialogue of the fifteenth century. By allowing readers to look back at Iberian history

\footnote{104 The “found manuscript” trope also makes the past more relevant. It is a way of narrowing the narrative
gap between Corral’s real life in the fifteenth century and the need for documentary proof of certain
events from centuries before.}
and remember the shame associated with the city, while also recognizing recent developments as the city returns to Christian power, both chroniclers keep Ceuta alive in the collective memory of their readership; it is the intersection of a shameful past and a complicated present, where emotions are intertwined with political changes over the course of centuries.

The relationship between negative emotions and *lieux de memoire* can be complex. As Jay Winter explains, “Moments of national humiliation are rarely commemorated or marked in material form, though here too there are exceptions of a hortatory kind” (62). Ceuta’s cultural memory is textual and not material due to the nature of historiographic writing and the quest for the creation of textual memory. Nonetheless its textual memory is one that does commemorate a humiliating — that is, shameful — moment with a positive spin. Both Corral and Zurara seek to use the shame of the past to create a better future; by remembering the shame of what went wrong in the past, one is able to make better decisions in the present. In the words of Sara Ahmed, “National shame can be a mechanism for reconciliation as self-reconciliation, in which the ‘wrong’ [...] provides the grounds for claiming a national identity, for restoring a pride that is threatened in the moment of recognition, and then regained in the capacity to bear witness” (109). In the previous sections we have seen just how Corral and Zurara accomplish this. By focusing on Ceuta as the site and source of Iberian shame in the eighth century, and by drawing connections between that shame and the political present in the fifteenth century, both chroniclers are able to reckon with the value of emotion, the formation of national feelings, and a reconciliation of those feelings through the act of writing. After all, as Jager points out, “In Augustine’s garden, the spoken word and the written word [...] not only redeem the individual but also betoken a redemption of language itself” (91).
THE OTHER SIDE: MUSLIM SHAME IN CEUTA

While Corral and Zurara both write from an Iberian Christian perspective, Zurara at times includes the Muslim perspective in his writings. While Zurara, in his position as cronista-mor writes on behalf of the non-dominant discursive voice, he also shows the associations between Ceuta and the shame of loss from the — ostensibly imagined — Moorish perspective. In the Crónica da Tomada de Ceuta, for example, Zurara writes about the “grande pranto” or great lamentation of the Moors as they lose Ceuta. He explains: “começavan de fazer seu pranto mui dorido, chorando sua perdição, cá se nembravam das cousas que perderam, as quais eram tantas e tão grandes, que cada um, por si, lhe fazia mui doloroso sentimento. [...][] Há no mundo, diziam eles, entendimento em que poderá caber, que uma tão nobre e real cidade em um só dia se pudesse caber?” (258-9). In this moment, Zurara shows the effects of the loss of Ceuta from the Moorish perspective, illustrating the sadness that the residents feel as a result of the loss. Here sadness, mourning, and lamentation are the driving emotions experienced by Ceuta’s citizens, evident in their painful tears. But in this moment of the narrative, Zurara shows how memory is an important part of that sadness. They mourn for what they have lost — das cousas que perderam — through the act of memory — nembravam. Additionally, the loss of Ceuta is that much more devastating given the circumstances under which it fell. The Portuguese were able to take the city in just one day, a relatively embarrassing military loss for the Muslim forces. When Zurara poses the question of how such a noble city is able to fall in just one day, he

105 “They began their painful lamentation, crying for their perdition, because they remembered the things they lost; they were so many and so great that everyone felt their own pain. They said, is there a way in the world that such a noble and royal city could fall in just one day the way this one [Ceuta] did?”
expresses a certain tone of embarrassment on behalf of the Ceutans. He represents their sense of disbelief in a way that is not explicitly shameful, but rather embarrassing.

It is also important to notice the parallels between Zurara’s representation of Muslim mourning of the loss of Ceuta and the emotions of the ladies of Rodrigo’s court as described in the Crónica sarracina after the Moors begin to take Spain. At the end of Book I of the Crónica, the fictional historian and chronicler Eleastras describes how the women of the court mourn the loss of Spain, as he explains “Al pueblo doloroso es fuerte e dulce cosa fartarse en lloros, ca dulce cosas es llorar e gemir en los lloros a la gente que ha compañía de mucho pueblo que continúan semejante dolor e llanto a gemido complido” (I, 647). Corral’s mission in this moment of the narrative is to inspire unity among the Christian population in relation to the loss of their land; tears and mourning can be a good thing if it is shared by the community. At the same time, there are significant parallels in language used to represent the emotional state of a certain community in relation to their land being taken by an enemy. Both Zurara and Corral use the idea of “painful tears” — pranto dorido, chorando and pueblo doloroso...en lloros respectively.

Sadness, lamentation, and shame are important emotions in the context of the loss of Ceuta, and Zurara will continue to make more direct references the feelings of shame in the Crónica do Conde d. Pedro when he describes how the Moors react to losing Almina, a part of the Ceuta region in North Africa. In a speech by Muhammed VIII, known as Rey Ezquerdo, the Sultan of Granada, it is said, “ca a hua tam gramde perda [...] como a casa de Grada tem

106 “For the mourning community it is a strong and sweet thing to be full of tears, for it is a sweet thing to cry and lament in the tears in the company of fellow citizens who continue in similar pain and tears and mourning.”
Muhammed’s desire for revenge is the remedy the shame associated with losing their territory. More specifically, however, Ezquerdo reminds his listeners that it would be shameful to not seek revenge against the Christians, and that it is not only his shame as a ruler, but the shame of the entire Muslim nobility of the region.

In one moment of the Tomada de Ceuta, the Moorish voice Zurara inscribes into the text questions whether or not the Portuguese will be able to hold on to Ceuta even after their initial invasion. In conversations amongst themselves, some Moors ask, “pode ser que Deus obrará em nós com a Sua misericórdia, e tronar-nos-á [sic] posse da nossa cidade? A qual ainda que al não fosse, é tão longe do reino de Portugal, que os cristãos a não poderão manter” (261). This quotation is of particular interest because it offers a multi-layered reading of how Zurara chooses to convey the difficulties of the crown’s presence in Ceuta. On one hand it serves as a subtle admission by Zurara that Ceuta is, in fact, a difficult city to maintain. He proposes through an othered voice that the mere distance between the territory and Portugal could cause a strain on the city’s strength. For all intents and purposes, the statement is accurate, as the history of the region shows, but by distancing himself from the statement and by using the voice of the Moors, Zurara displaces the doubts some might have about the territory onto someone else and avoid any direct discussion of the legitimate problems facing Ceuta. At the same time, this quotation is a very real hypothesis of what could happen in Ceuta given the circumstances. If the Portuguese are not careful, it very well could be the fate of the city to return back to Muslim hands. With this

107 “For if such a great loss […] like that of the House of Granada, were to go without revenge, […] it would be a shame, not only my shame, but the shame to the nobility of every one of you, my subjects.

108 “Could it be that God will work his mercy on us and return to us possession of our city? Which, even if he did not, it is so far from the Kingdom of Portugal, that the Christians will not be able to maintain it.”
in mind, Zurara, in this moment of the text, could also be doubling-down on his political motivations and his intention to rally the Portuguese court at a time when they know Ceuta is weak.

**CONCLUSIONS: THE WRITTEN CITY SPACE AS EMOTIONAL PALIMPSEST**

As a memory site with a firm footing in the textual history of the fifteenth century, the writing and rewriting of Ceuta’s relationship with the shame as it pertains to the Fall of Spain in 711 and the status of the city after the 1415 Portuguese sack shows how the city is inherently connected to “national” emotions. Political changes in the fifteenth century allowed for chroniclers to reimagine the shameful past of the city and reclaim Ceuta as an important site for reconciliation. At the same time, the 1415 sack was a loss to the Moors who had dominated the city for nearly seven centuries, and the Portuguese presence there was weak both politically and financially. The shame of the city, then, is felt by a diverse group of populations, for different reasons, and at different times. While it fulfills Pierre Nora’s definition of a memory site, albeit constructed through the textual community of fifteenth-century historiography.

The emotional experience associated with the city, and felt by these different communities, leads me to argue that Ceuta can also be considered an emotional, or even shameful, palimpsest. It is an urban space onto which emotions are written over and over again, each a different iteration of shame, or an iteration of one’s attempt to reconcile shame in that place. Ceuta is, therefore, the space of devastating loss and optimistic reclamation, and perhaps everything in between. It is a concrete vessel through which the abstract nature of “national shame” can take physical form.
CHAPTER 4: PORTUGUESE EXPANSION AND THE SHAMELESS OTHER

“Assi fomos abrindo aqueles mares,
Que geração algúm não abriu”

[Thus we opened those seas,
That no other generation had opened]

Luís de Camões, *Os Lusíadas* (V.4)

Luís de Camões’ 1572 epic poem, *Os Lusíadas*, eloquently captures the legacy and cultural importance of the beginnings of Portuguese maritime travel through its creative retelling of Vasco da Gama’s journey to India. The above epigraph, appearing in the beginning of the poem’s fifth canto, powerfully illustrates the notion of “opening”: the opening of a world to which the Portuguese believed no one had gone before, and the encounter of new lands and new peoples. This opening of discovery and exploration that lies at the core of Camões’ imperial narrative also forms the foundation of the chronicles and historiographic texts that preceded him. Portuguese royal chronicler Gomes Eanes de Zurara, as well as travelers themselves — Pêro Vaz de Caminha in his famous *Carta*, or Pêro de Magalhães Gândavo in his *Tratado da Província do Brasil* later in the 16th century — illustrated and represented the opening of lands and an opening of contact with communities that were new, unusual, and different from the Europe they knew.

The contact between the Portuguese and the communities they encountered in Africa and South America became central to the Lusophone written history of the fifteenth century. This contact and its documentation opens the door for a nuanced reading of the cultural construction of shame. In previous chapters we have seen how shame is represented in the cultural traditions of Iberia as being tightly bound to the notions of honor, memory, and gender. This chapter,
however, will discuss what happens when the Iberian notion of shame is displaced from the context of its construction. In other words: What happens when writers represent their own views of shame in a place where shame is a result of a different set of cultural cues? This chapter will look at the imposition of shame, or in many cases shamelessness, on non-Europeans by Portuguese chroniclers and explore some of the associated affects and experiences related to the colonial contact. I argue that it is an imposition that is undeniably hegemonic, grounded in the perceived political, cultural, and theological superiority of the Portuguese chroniclers, and stems from early exegetic interpretations of Genesis.

The chronicles of the imperial encounter and collision of cultures between the Portuguese and native African or Brazilian communities serve as a literary petri dish of sorts; the chronicles serve as a case history in which observable cultural differences with regard to emotion reflect the notion that, “The way in which feelings are organized in different cultures definitively undermines any idea that feelings are common to humanity, even that feelings unite us as humans” (Plamper 77). This is possible because the Portuguese’s descriptions of shame and shamelessness is part of the colonial discourse that is dependent on the fact that the figure of the naked “indio” — as a described object in the chronicles — acquires meaning from the Portuguese perspective as being “sem vergonha” due to the very encounter itself. It is the forced meeting of the two cultures in what Mary Louise Pratt describes as the “contact zone” that provides the theoretical foundation for the scenario in which a differentiation of emotional experience is able to take place. The “contact zone” in Pratt’s words describes, “the space of colonial encounters [...] in which peoples geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish ongoing relations, usually involving conditions of coercion,
radical inequality, and intractable conflict” (8). A comparison of the cultural constructions of shame in a colonial “contact zone” is therefore based on a notion of relations, or the process of identification in which one’s own being is defined in relation to the other, an idea explored by Homi Bhabha, drawing from Frantz Fanon and Jacqueline Rose.

At the same time, it is important to recognize the constraints of this analysis as being restricted to the Portuguese perspective of the encounter or based on what Walter Mignolo — via Ernst von Glaserfeld — would call the “constructivist epistemology, in which the world (or the text) is constructed by the subject as ‘representation’” (Darker 21). That is, the Portuguese chronicle is only a representation of indigenous communities from the discursively dominant Portuguese perspective. Stephen Greenblatt, in his Marvelous Possessions, reinforces this idea when he states, “We can be certain only that European representations of the New World [and in our case, Africa] tell us something about the European practices of representation” (7). Thus, my argument for a reading of a sense of shamelessness imposed on the indigenous bodies by the Portuguese chroniclers is one that is based on the fact that the Portuguese can only write from their own experience, and in turn, our reading of the Portuguese chronicles is only accessible through the imperial discourse of the hegemon, recalling the phrase attributed to Antonio de Nebrija that language is the handmaiden (compañera) of empire. That said, the writings of the Portuguese chroniclers, and the imperial discourse associated with them, nonetheless lends themselves to a comparative and historicized reading of emotion that has yet to be done. While the study of Portuguese expansion to Brazil has a wide critical base, current scholarship has only begun to scratch the surface of Lusophone texts about Africa and the Age of Expansion in African territories; it is a door that has been opened by Jerome Branch’s studies of race in
colonial Spain and Portugal and by Josiah Blackmore’s foundational book *Moorings*, one of the first books dedicated entirely to the Portuguese writings about Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries from a literary perspective.

In this chapter, we will look at a set of materials, including letters, chronicles, and diaries, that deal with the Portuguese expansion to the New World and Africa, all of which include as a primary point of observation a physical description of the indigenous communities that the Portuguese voyagers encounter. In Africa, I will turn predominantly to Gomes Eanes de Zurara’s *Crónica da Conquista de Guiné* (=Guiné), a text composed by Zurara around 1453, during his time as the royal chronicler, or *cronista-mor* of the Portuguese court. The text, which survived in a lost manuscript discovered in Paris in 1837109, describes much of the explorations, discoveries, and conquests under Henry the Navigator in West Africa. It is a text that is often contested or questioned by modern scholars due to its dramatic treatment of certain encounters with native communities and its grandiose treatment of Prince Henry. Despite this, or perhaps because of this, it is a valuable source for emotions history in the context of Portugal’s overseas expansion.

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, I will turn to two historical documents, Pêro Vaz de Caminha’s 1500 letter and Pêro de Magalhães Gândavo’s book from the 1570s, both of which describe the indigenous peoples of Brazil. Caminha’s letter, which Jerry Williams refers to as the “first page of Brazil’s literary history,” shows some of the initial observations of the Portuguese

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109 This chapter will use the 1973 critical edition by José Bragança for quotations. However, this chapter will also engage with José Pereira da Costa’s paleographic reading of the *Códice Valentim Fernandes* which includes a manuscript version of *Guiné* dating to about 1506 or 1507. Existing critical editions of the text are based on the Paris manuscript, however, I find that the Valentim Fernandes manuscript, though abridged in many places, offers useful insight because of its time and context of creation, especially given Fernandes’ success as a publisher in Lisbon. It is likely that this version would have circulated or at least would have been planned to circulate at the turn of the 16th century.
about their colony (59). Gândavo’s *Tratado da Provincia do Brasil*, serves as a natural history (Janiga-Perkins 29), describing the territory in detailed terms, while portraying the new colonial territory as being ideal place to live and expand the Portuguese Empire.

Twentieth and twenty-first century scholarship, including the work of Branche, Blackmore, and others often turns to these texts in the context of colonialism or colonial literary analysis, and they serve as a window into the subordination of indigenous communities by the Europeans or as examples of early travel literature of the Portuguese Expansion. This chapter expands the colonialist perspective and advocates for the inclusion of emotional factors and gives emotion, namely shame, a place in colonial discourse. That is, I argue that in addition to race, politics, geography, ecology, economics, and other factors, emotion and differences in emotional experiences are an important, and often overlooked, part of the construction of Portugal’s imperial identity. Evident in the chronicles studied in this chapter, *how* and *why* the colonial experience of emotion differs from that of the colonizer is a factor in the othering of imperial subjects. How the Portuguese depict and write about emotional experience — either their own or that of the indigenous subject — illustrates a new layer of imperial power beyond, and perhaps more specific than, the traditional binaries of Christian/non-Christian or white/non-white. Emotion and emotional experience become another way of understanding the colonial difference in a way that is more nuanced, creating the shame/shameless binary.

**Observing the Indigenous African/Brazilian**

In the many chronicles of the Portuguese explorations of Africa, one of the first observations chroniclers make about the indigenous communities they encounter is usually
regarding skin color and physical appearance. Viewed as tangible evidence for establishing observable differences between Christian and pagan communities, skin color often took center stage when discussing the people of West and sub Saharan Africa. In the Guiné, for example, Zurara refers to the explored region as the “terra dos negros,” or the “land of the blacks.” In the 1507 Valentim Fernandes Codex version of Zurara’s text, the editor slightly adjusts the text to describe how, upon arriving at the Senegal River — mistakenly named the Nile in the chronicle — Denis Diaz and the Portuguese explorers encountered the Guinean people, which he sees as synonymous to their blackness: “Teendo ja passada estas caravellas a terra de Zaara [Sahara] como dito he virom as duas palmeiras com que amte topara Denis Diaz pellas quaes conhecerom que ally se começaua a terra dos negros […] a gente desta terra som chamados guyneus que quer tanto dizer como negros, e a terra Guinee” (Pereira 237).

Differing from other versions in its phrasing, the Codex implies that the demonym “guinean” is equivalent to “black.” Other versions of the text acknowledge the land as being the “terra dos Negros” simply because everyone there is black, but do not make the same explicit demonymic connection that Fernandes does. Skin color, for the Portuguese, was the first and most apparent means of othering indigenous communities from themselves, and “by metonymically racializing African land through the colors of its inhabitants, Zurara and others attempt to establish otherness as an inert

110 “As the caravels passed the land of the Sahara, as I have said, they saw two palms that Denis Diaz had encountered before, and because of this knew that there began the land of the blacks […] the peoples of this land are called Guineus, which is also to mean they are black, and the land is called Guiné.”

111 José de Bragança’s version based on the found manuscript simply states: “ali se começava a terra dos Negros, com cuja vista folgaram assaz” (255) and later on draws the connection between skin color and geography: “E esta gente desta terra verde é toda negra, e porem é chamada terra dos Negros, ou terra de Guiné, por cujo azo os homens e mulheres dela são chamados Guineus, que quer tanto dizer como negros” (256).
fact of nature waiting to be revealed through the hermeneutic activity of writing” (Blackmore 31).

Physical othering was an easy and visual way for the Portuguese conquerors to subjugate the Guinean native. To be black — or a mouro or negro — was to be a non-Christian, and to be a non-Christian was to be inferior to the Catholic European. As Blackmore explains, “the operative distinction made between Portuguese imperialist voyagers and African Others is not ‘Portuguese versus ‘African’ but ‘Christian’ versus ‘moor,’ ‘infidel,’ or ‘pagan’” (21). This mode of differentiation is not as inherently visible as skin color, thus skin color becomes a tangible manifestation and legible signifier of religion-based colonial power. This subjugation based on phenotypic differences and its implication with regard to religious belief has formed much of the critical discussion around Portuguese colonial power and discourse. Jerome Branche, in his Colonialism and Race in Luso-Hispanic Literature for example, devotes the entire first chapter to a reading of Zurara’s subjugation of black Africans based on physical and spiritual differences; they are depicted as “barbarous, less than human, and somehow deserving of their subordination in the new imperial order” (35). This description also serves as the foundation for race relations on the peninsula and in the colonies during the period.

Observable differences between the Portuguese and the West African communities they sought to subordinate were not only phenotypic, but also emotional. Zurara, and the other writers of the period, reckon with discrepancies in indigenous behavior and dress as they pertain to European models of shame and shamelessness. One such example is a section of the Guinê in which Zurara describes the arrival of Prince Henry’s fleet to the island of Gomeira, situated off the coast of Morocco. The author describes the people of the island, noting how they, “andam
Zurara’s emphasis on the fact that the natives of Gomeira have no shame in their nakedness illustrates his apparent drawing of connections between emotional and physical states. Shame is immediately associated — in the Portuguese eye — with the native’s lack of concern for his or her state of nakedness, so much that Zurara notes that the natives laugh at the Portuguese for their clothing because it looks like they put themselves into a large bag or sack.

Explorations of the other side of the Atlantic Ocean show a similar phenomenon with regard to the Portuguese interpretation of indigenous nudity in Brazil. Pêro Vaz de Caminha’s famous 1500 letter to the King Manuel (=Carta) chronicled the arrival of Pedro Alvares Cabral’s fleet to the shores of Brazil and details both the geography of the region and the initial encounter with the indigenous groups that live there. Similar to Zurara, Caminha is drawn to some of the observable physical differences of the natives, specifically their state of nakedness. He explains, for example, “Nem estimam de cobrir ou de mostrar suas vergonhas; e nisso têm tanta inocência como em mostrar o rosto” (Carta). Similar to the prescribed “sense of shame” that Sancho IV and other conduct writers explored in previous centuries, Caminha is struck by the fact that the Brazilian native feels no shame — or rather expresses their innocence — in showing their genitalia in the same way that they do not cover their faces. There is a disconnect between the social conduct of the native and the prescribed conduct of the Portuguese traveler from his home. Caminha assumes that the natives would feel shame or show some sort of modesty by covering

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112 “They walk around nude, without wearing anything, for which they have little shame; they mock clothing, saying it is nothing more than a sack that men put on.”

113 “They do not care whether to cover or expose their private parts; and for this they have just as much innocence as when they show their face”
their genitalia, yet they do not feel the same way that he would were he in the same physical state.

It is also worth noting the linguistic connection between shame and genitalia in romance languages, which we will return to again in Chapter Five. The word *vergonha* is used for both shame as an emotion and as a way of describing one’s private parts — *partes vergonhosas* and *as vergonhas*. This has a historically observed foundation given the etymology of *vergonha* as being from the Latin *verecundia*, meaning shame or modesty, evident in the 1495 Nebrija Castilian dictionary and other linguistic related works of the time. In the early seventh century, Isidore of Seville offers another interpretation of the historical relationship between the two when he explains some of the alleged linguistic roots of the shame/genitalia relationship in his *Etymologies*. During his discussion of the genitalia he says: “They are also known as ‘organs of modesty’ (*pudenda*) on account of a feeling of shame (cf. *pudor*, ‘shame’)” (237). *Vergonhas* thus becomes the popular word used for genitalia throughout the chronicles of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

The connection between the physical state — being naked or nude — and shameless emotional state allows for a reading of shame as the primary affective factor in the differentiation between the colonizer and the colonized in the works of Zurara and Caminha. While on one hand, Zurara argues that the nakedness of certain communities is merely a part of tradition when he says their nakedness is “como por seu antigo costume” — or out of old customs — (Bragança 92), I argue for a wider reading of these moments of shame/shamelessness in the context of the colonial framework. The manifestation of this difference in colonial chronicles can be understood as an expression of hegemony based on certain cultural power dynamics. The
emotional difference based on behaviors of dress assumes an understanding of some of the major postcolonial theories and colonial discourses that have been widely popular for decades and whose critical foundation is created by Edward Said, Mary Louise Pratt, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, Stephen Greenblatt, and others. Each of these theorists critique and contextualize the notion of colonial “positionality,” or the “division of self/other [...] or colonizer/colonized” to use Bhabha’s words (Bhabha 150).

In Zurara’s text especially — where his perspective is that of a royal chronicler whose main goal is to write a commissioned work for the Prince — the hegemonic authority of the Portuguese is clear in its othering of the indigenous body and way of dress, or lack thereof, in a way that could be considered Orientalist based on Said’s own classification of his term:

Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hays has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures. (7)

A surface level reading of Zurara or Caminha’s texts, then, shows how the literary descriptions of Africans and Brazilians depict them as different from, and necessarily inferior to, the Portuguese colonizer, a concept widely accepted in Colonial Studies. In Zurara or Caminha’s representation of the colonial subjects, it is clear that they are different from the Portuguese based on the very fact that they do not wear clothing, illustrating an “us versus them” division. A cultural inferiority based on clothing and nudity is a very visual example of the self/other and colonizer/colonized dichotomy of positionality. However, it is the addition of emotion that adds a new
dimension to this colonial paradigm. The emotions associated with being naked for the Portuguese — namely shame — augment the division between the colonizer/colonized since they do not only dress differently, but also feel differently about such states of dress.

Similar to the orientalist gaze that is necessary for othering, Claire Pajaczkowska, in her study on shame and sexuality, raises the point that “Shame appears to be visited upon the subject from the outside, just as awareness of the self requires the existence of an other through whose eyes the subject acknowledges himself as ‘being seen’” (134). The colonial context for representing shame and shamelessness in colonized subjects reinforces this point, in that the gaze of the colonizer toward the colonial subject is quite literally the visitation from the outside that shame requires. In the same way that the colonized is “othered” based on his or her relation to the colonizer, the colonized is designated as shameless based on the same relationality and outside gaze. It is the Portuguese perspective that represents the naked Brazilian or Guinean as having a perceived absence of shame, an absence of the ability to feel shame upon being naked and the absence of a sense of shame. However, the absence of shame is only a perception because the construction of the shame/nudity paradigm that is prescribed in Iberian medieval culture does not exist in the pre-contact colonial space.

Turning to current scholarship of the history of emotion, these cultural differences in the shame/nudity experience fall in line with Barbara Rosenwein’s notion of the emotional community. Generally defined in her critical study, *Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages*, as “groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value—or devalue—the same or related emotions” (Rosenwein 2), how, when, and why people feel shame becomes the foundation for the Portuguese explorers and the indigenous Africans or
Brazilians as two separate emotional communities. The Portuguese emotional community is founded upon the basic understanding that social conduct prescribes one to cover their private parts in public spaces in order to avoid the feeling ashamed or to show their sense of shame and honor. The African and Brazilian emotional communities, on the other hand, are not founded their shared emotional values with regard to their nakedness, but rather the lack of shared emotional values in the eyes of the Portuguese.

Zurara’s observation of the disconnect between the people of Gomeira and the Portuguese and their ideas about clothing, and the emotional communities that appear as a result of this difference, also sheds light on some of Rosenwein’s critiques of Norbert Elias’ notion of the “Civilizing Process.” Rosenwein and other scholars acknowledge the fact that Elias’ 1939 publication is outdated and Eurocentric, especially in the context of Renaissance colonialism. Here, however, I argue that the idea of the “civilizing process” lends itself to not only a diachronic analysis of behavior and emotion in the Early Modern period, but also a comparative analysis in colonial “contact zones.” Given the fact that the crux of Elias’ argument is that the process of civilized behavior in the Middle Ages is based on the shared experience of embarrassment when one behaves poorly, nakedness thus becomes the point of comparison where European conduct is recognized as “civilized” by the Portuguese because they feel ashamed of being naked while the indigenous communities do not feel shame when naked and are therefore “uncivilized.” In looking at late medieval and Early Modern conduct manuals, Elias emphasizes, “The greater or lesser discomfort we feel towards people who discuss or mention their bodily functions more openly, who conceal and restrain these functions less than we do, is one of the dominant feelings expressed in the judgement ‘barbaric’ or ‘uncivilized’”(52).
Portuguese contact with Africa and the New World as represented by Zurara and Caminha did not discuss the details of bodily functions, yet the very nakedness and shamelessness of being naked caught the Portuguese’s attention as an apparent civilizing difference. Elias’ initial work on emotion and conduct thus becomes especially relevant in the colonial context since the two emotional communities — the ashamed and the shameless — also determines the hierarchy of civilized and uncivilized.

Later in the *Guiné* when describing João Gonçalves Zarco’s expedition in the Guinea region, Zurara’s description of the Guinean women offers an interesting twist on Zurara’s understanding of the community’s notion of shame. He explains: “As mulheres vestem alquices que são assim como mantos, com os quais somente cobrem os rostros, e por ali entendem que acabam de cobrir toda sua vergonha, que os corpos trazem todos nus” (323). In this description, there is a semantic shift in the word *vergonha*. Previously we have seen the connection between shame and genitalia in the word *vergonha* itself, as being the signifier of the part of the body that brings about shame. For the Guinean women, Zurara implies that it is not their genitalia but rather their face that represents the “shameful parts” of the body since that is the part they cover with their shawls. It is thus assumed that their face must be what brings them shame. The face then becomes the *vergonha* in this new context for Zurara. This does not mean, however, that Zurara resigns himself entirely to this interpretation of the body or the word. He continues by looking at the women’s genitalia and begins to question whether or not there is a desire for those parts to be covered.

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114 “The women wear cloaks that are like sheets, and they only cover their faces, which leads one to believe that they cover all of their shameful parts, and the rest of their bodies are naked”
On one hand, Zurara reminds readers that the nudity of the Guinean women was used as a justification for viewing them as beasts and less than human, since they would have covered their genitalia — the parts that should be covered — were they to have human reasoning. On the other hand, Zurara also implies that there is some sort of inherent desire to cover the genitalia because many of the Guinean women let their pubic hair grow until it covers the sex organs sufficiently, covering what he refers to as “lugares de vossa vergonha” or places of “your shame,” as if talking directly to the reader and reminding that reader of his or her own context of shame and nudity.

In Brazil, Caminha comments on some of the young women who let their hair grow long to cover their private parts, and the Portuguese feel no shame in seeing them naked: “Ali andavam entre eles três ou quatro moças, bem novinhas e gentis, com cabelos muito pretos e compridos pelas costas; e suas vergonhas, tão altas e tão cerradinhas e tão limpas das cabeleiras

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115 “Indeed, he who compiled this story said that this is one of the things for which you can see their beastly ways, for if they had just a bit of reason, they would follow nature, covering those parts that nature deems should be covered, and we see naturally that all of those shameful parts nature put near hair, showing that she wanted to hide them; and there are still some who let these hairs grow until they cover all those parts of your shame.”
que, de as nós muito bem olharmos, não se envergonhavam” (Carta).\footnote{There were three or four very young and pretty girls with long black hair down to their waist; their private parts, high, covered, and clean from their hair did not make us feel any shame when looking at them closely.} While the question of humanity is not specifically at stake in this moment of Caminha’s letter, we see here that there is a subtle distinction between nudity as something open, and nudity with some sort of covering of the shameful parts, even if that means the body’s own hair.

The emotional differences in the experience of nakedness and shame among Portuguese and Brazilian communities does take an interesting turn later in Caminha’s letter. Caminha recounts some of the bodily ornamentation of some women, noting their piercings, use of feathers, and black body paint. He tells how, “uma daquelas moças era toda tingida, de baixo a cima daquela tintura; e certo era tão bem-feita e tão redonda, e sua vergonha (que ela não tinha) tão graciosa, que a muitas mulheres da nossa terra, vendo-lhe tais feições, fízera vergonha, por não terem a sua como ela” (Carta).\footnote{“One of the girls was fully painted from top to bottom in that black paint; she was so well-built and round, and her lack of shame was so lovely that some of our women would be ashamed upon seeing her to not have a body like hers.”} Here there is an interesting inversion of the experience of shame where the Portuguese women feel shame for not being as free and open with their bodies as the beautiful young indigenous women. Linguistically, Caminha illustrates the subtleties of the idea of shame when he shows that the Brazilian women have no sense of shame — “vergonha (que ela não tinha)” — but it is the Portuguese women who feel shame — “fízera vergonha.”

In the sixteenth century, Pêro de Magalhães Gândavo further explains how, beyond nudity, indigenous Brazilian sexual behavior was a point of differentiation between having shame and being shameless. In one moment of his Tratado da Provinicia do Brasil — originally published in 1576 under the title Historia da Provincia de Santa Cruz que Vulgarmente
Chamamos Brasil — he denounces the indios as inhuman and overtly sexual beings, describing them as animals:

Finally q são estes indios mui desumanos e crueis não se movem a nenhûa piedade.
Vivê como brutos animais sem ordem nê conçerto de homês. São mui desonestos e dados a sensualidade e entregao se aos viços como se nelles naõ ouvera Rezão de humanos:
ainda que todavia sempre tem Resguardo os machos e as femeas em seu ajuntamento e mostrão ter nisto algûa vergonha. (57)118

Here, Gândavo shows the strong division between the shamelessness of the indios based on their sexuality, and the appearance of vergonha — in this case referring to a sense of shame — when that sexuality is restrained. There is a clear illustration of the overarching notion of the colonial subject from Gândavo’s perspective based on two ideas: One, to openly give into sensualidade was to be inhuman, or animal-like, and two, being modest or at least holding back on sensual desires was to show a sense of shame and reflect a certain amount of civility. It is also worth noting here that Gândavo’s observation of the indigenous Brazilians emphasizes the inverse of Zurara or Caminha’s observations. That is, instead of looking at where the indigenous inhabitants of the colony are shameless, Gândavo instead emphasizes moments where they defy their assumed shameless norms to show a sense of shame in the Portuguese sense.

It is important to note that the idea of sensuality, or sensualidade, would have been closely associated, if not synonymous, with sex and luxuria, or lust, in the sixteenth century (Ferreira 813). The apparently overt sexuality of the indios meant they would give into certain

118 “Finally, these indios are inhumane and cruel that they have no piety. They live like brutal animals with no sense of order like men. They are dishonest and give into lust, succumbing to vices like they have no sense of human reason; although at times men and women show some restraint when together, and with that they show some sense of shame.”
vices, which in turn was interpreted by the Portuguese as not abiding by human reasoning. From a purely sexual perspective, the Tratado’s representation of the indios as animal-like beings who are susceptible to lustful desire and showcase their sexuality publicly reflects certain standards of Augustinian theology that likely would have been understood by Gândavo and other Portuguese writers. Augustine proposes that living a life according to the flesh was instinctual and part of animal bodies that gave in to the “base vices” of licentious intercourse and other practices (361). For Augustine, public performances of sex were so frowned upon that he even writes that harlotry and prostitution — the most controversial of sex practices — were nevertheless performed in the private spaces of the brothel (361). Even in cases of marital intimacy, an act that was sought to be reserved for reproductive purposes only, all sexual encounters were done behind closed doors and out of sight from outside viewers (363).

Overt sexuality, for Gândavo, is thus an important part of the differentiation between the shameless indio and the shamefast Portuguese reader his work is intended for. Gândavo nonetheless does find some semblance of common ground when he shows that the Brazilians can at times restrain themselves and exhibit behaviors that might be more aligned with the Portuguese model of shame. In other words, the indios are animals or beasts when they show lust, but are men and women when they show sexual prudence.

Prelapsarian Nostalgia

While ethnographic observations and social differentiations are significant results of the implementation of the nudity/shame paradigm in the contact zone, the roots of the ideological clash can be traced to theological origins grounded in Genesis and its medieval exegesis. In The
City of God, Saint Augustine opened the door for a deeper discussion into the relationship between shame and nudity as it pertains to Christian doctrine. Giorgio Agamben explains that Augustine’s text is, “in every sense, a decisive moment for the construction of the theological apparatus of nature (nudity)/grace (clothing)” (67). The Biblical root of this apparatus appears in Genesis, chapter Three, in the episode of Adam and Eve’s fall from the Garden of Eden. After eating the forbidden fruit, scripture reads, “Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and they realized they were naked; so they sewed fig leaves together and made coverings for themselves” (Genesis 3:7). When God asks for Adam, who is hiding, Adam responds, “I was afraid because I was naked; so I hid” (Genesis 3:10).

In The City of God, Augustine recognizes the importance of this particular episode as the foundation of shame’s connection with nakedness, even so far as the idea of genitalia as “shameful parts, as they were not [shameful] before man sinned” (City 357). Augustine explains: “Accordingly, ‘they realized that they were naked,’ stripped naked, that is, of the grace that kept nakedness of body from embarrassing them before the laws of sin came into opposition with their minds” (359). In other words, susceptibility to shame from the exposure of the naked body was not only the direct result of Original Sin, but also an awakening of consciousness or awareness of that result. Because of this, Augustine continues, “Ever since that time, this habit of concealing the pudenda has been deeply ingrained in all peoples, descended, as they are, from the original stock,” so much so that even in barbaric communities (barbari), individuals go so far as to wash themselves while covering their genitalia (361). As the descendants of Adam and Eve, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Christians thus inherited the need to conceal their genitalia in
order to not feel shame. The question then becomes: What happens when medieval Christians
encounter communities who are not familiar with this doctrine?

The Portuguese writing of African and Brazilian bodies as being shameless in their
nakedness demonstrates a disconnect between the Christian theological norms of nudity that had
been absorbed into Iberian society and the behavior of indigenous communities who do not share
the same belief system. It is worth making a note here about the terminology of nakedness/naked
versus nudity/nude, a distinction one must make in English — but does not appear in Portuguese
where nu is used for both — between two conflicting ideas in the arts and humanities. I turn
specifically to Jill Burke’s recent study The Italian Renaissance Nude and John Berger’s
canonical analysis of the Renaissance nude in his Ways of Seeing. Burke, as part of her
examination of nudity and social order reminds readers that the “emphasis on clothes as a marker
of social distinction [in European society] meant that when Europeans encountered other cultures
with different attitudes to covering the body they understood these peoples as ‘naked’ — with all
its social and cultural implications” (34). She additionally points out that in certain cases wheree
indigenous peoples used “socially distinctive clothing” such as genital coverings or other
adornments, they were nonetheless considered “naked” (35). The term “naked” is especially
important given John Berger’s fundamental notion — pulling from Kenneth Clark — that one of
the most important differences between “nakedness” and “nudity” is that “to be naked is simply
to be without clothes, whereas the nude is a form of art” (53). He adds that, “to be naked is to be
without disguise [...] The nude is condemned to never being naked. Nudity is a form of
dress” (54). The notion of nudity-as-dress here is based on the idea that the Renaissance nude
“wears” her nudity as part of her objectification. While indigenous Brazilians and West Africans
are objectified by the Portuguese chroniclers in many ways, their nakedness is still not nudity because it is not being “placed on display” as an artistic disguise of their true self (54).\textsuperscript{119} Instead, the chroniclers portray their nakedness as an observation of their state of being; it is a fact of their state of dress, and they are naked as themselves.

Furthermore, Berger uses depictions of Adam and Eve to postulate that, “Nakedness was created in the mind of the beholder,” since after eating the forbidden fruit, “each saw the other differently” (48). The dependence on an outside gaze translated into an art historical phenomenon of Renaissance images where Adam and Eve cover their genitalia such that, “now their shame is not so much in relation to one another as to the spectator” (49). Within the colonial context of the Portuguese empire Berger’s specifications of “nakedness” informs an important distinction, that indigenous \textit{nakedness} as represented in the chronicles is entirely dependent on the theological and ethnological perceptions of the beholder. It is the Portuguese who see the \textit{indio} as naked, without the sense of shame that comes along with the disguise — or dress — of nudity.

As we have seen above, the social implications of acceptable behavior serve as one way to establish colonial authority, and, as colonial theory shows, Christian authority was regularly at the center of the establishment of power dynamics. At the same time, the emotional experience associated with nakedness as it pertains to religious authority adds yet another layer. Not only did the Portuguese consider themselves to be superior because they were Christians occupying pagan land; they also used their own perspective founded in Genesis 3 as a means of labeling naked indigenous bodies as shameless — and thus sinners— to further exercise their power. In labeling

\textsuperscript{119} 17th-century Dutch artist Albert Eckhout will eventually blur these lines of the naked/nude indigenous Brazilian in his portraits of subjects in Dutch-controlled Pernambuco, Brazil.
these communities as sinners, Portuguese chroniclers were able to quickly and easily offer their own remedy: salvation. In West Africa, for example, Henry the Navigator represented the Order of Christ and therefore had religious authority during his crusading expeditions. In the Guiné, Zurara even notes how one of Henry’s missions in West Africa was to find non-Christian communities and offer salvation: “acrescentar em a santa fé de nosso senior Jesus Cristo, e tracer a era todas Aslas Almas qua se quisessem salvar” (45).120

Looking at the shame/nudity paradigm in the Portuguese chronicles through the lens of Genesis 3, one can notice important distinctions that come to light between the representation of African bodies and the representation of Brazilian bodies. As we have seen above, the initial description of indigenous bodies often pays particular attention to the lack of clothing. However, two specific instances demonstrate the slight linguistic differences used when describing indigenous communities in Brazil versus those in the Guinea region. As we saw above, the Carta de Caminha explains, “nem estimam de cobrar ou de mostrar suas vergonhas; e nisso têm tanta inocência como em mostrar o rostro” (Carta). Similarly, though with slight differences in language, Zurara describes the people of the island of Gomeira as, “nuus [...] de que teem pequena vergonha” (Pereira 260).121 These two quotations are similar in that they describe the naked subject and acknowledge that, for one reason or another, that subject does not feel ashamed of their nakedness. In terms of the emotional experience, these two quotations roughly illustrate the same phenomenon on both sides of the Atlantic.

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120 “expand the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, and bring it to all those souls who want salvation.”

121 “naked [...] for which they have little shame.”
What is perhaps most important about these two quotations, however, is the semantic differences between being shameless — “sem vergonha” — and innocent —“inocência” across regions. Describing one group (Africa) as shameless and one (Brazil) as innocent affects how each of these discourses fits into the Genesis model of representation. In the case of the naked West African, including on the island of Gomeira, Zurara uses the phrase “sem vergonha” to illustrate that by being nude, they do not have a sense of shame in the same way that the Portuguese do and therefore do not feel ashamed of their naked state. On the other hand, by describing indigenous bodies in Brazil as having “inocência,” Caminha’s letter implies that these subjects are not at fault, they are innocent from the constraints of the European emotional experience of shame and nudity. More importantly, however, to be nude and innocent is to harken back to a prelapsarian state of innocence before Original Sin and to be mimetic to a state of existence before the Fall; here “nudity” is used deliberately, as a prelapsarian state implies that nakedness in the mind of the beholder does not exist or is yet to exist. An observation of this mimesis is also the foundation of what Giorgio Agamben would describe as the “nostalgia for nudity without shame, the idea that what was lost through sin is the possibility of being nude without blushing” (71).

If innocence allows for a nostalgia for nudity without shame, the question then becomes: what about those that are shameless? I argue that the difference between those that are innocent and those that are shameless is that the innocent are able to fulfill the desire for a prelapsarian nostalgia while the shameless cannot. This difference stems from the theological undercurrents that West Africa can never return to a prelapsarian Edenic state because it was part of the world that fell, while Brazil, a terra incognita or terra nullis in the eyes of the Portuguese explorer, was
in fact a New World that had yet to experience the Fall. In other words, the naked West African is
shameless because his or her nakedness is subject to the experience of shame that is part of the
norm of the fallen world, while the indigenous Brazilian is innocent because the New World
never fell; he or she is “innocent” to the consequences of Original Sin. J.M. Coetzee further
explains this idea in *White Writing*, which holds an important place in the rise in critical literary
studies of African literature in the twentieth century. Dealing with texts in both English and
Afrikaans, Coetzee raises the point that, “Africa could never, in the European imagination, be the
home of the earthly paradise because Africa was not a new world” (2). Africa was, in the context
of late medieval and early Renaissance imperial Portugal, a land that was known to exist for
millennia; it was the land of myth, of invaders, and of the Moors who had taken the Iberian
Peninsula almost a thousand years before the Portuguese expansion to North Africa began. It was
known to be a savage and — with the exception of certain Christian centers of power like
Abyssinia— a non-Christian land, that in some cases promised “less of the perfection of man in a
recovered original innocence than of the degeneration of man into brute” as Coetzee describes of
the British and Netherlandish colonization of the Cape of Good Hope (3).

Throughout Zurara’s writing, one can notice the impossibility of a prelapsarian Africa on
more than one occasion. In addition to the shamelessness described by the chronicler, Zurara, at
one moment, also classifies the black Guinean slaves as being descendants of Adam, or in
Augustine’s terms, of the original stock in Eden. In the well-known chapter on the slave market
in the *Crónica de Guiné*, which we will examine more closely below, Zurara reflects on the
emotions of the slaves at the market and reminds his readers that they are, in fact, “da geração
dos filhos de Adão” despite being equated more closely to animals in other moments of the
narrative (Bragança 122). It is important to note that at this particular moment, Zurara does not comment as to whether the slaves are clothed. Nonetheless, by recognizing black Guineans as “sons of Adam,” Zurara makes a broader statement about the community as a whole, that they are part of the fallen world, at least in the eyes of Christian doctrine.

Additionally, in the beginning of the Crónica de Guiné, Zurara explains Prince Henry’s process in thinking about exploring beyond Cape Bojador on the West Coast of Africa. The initial description of what lies beyond the cape shows that little is known beyond a suspected wasteland: “Despois deste Cabo não ha aí gente nem povoação alguma; a terra não é menos areosa que os desertos de Libia, onde não ha agua, nem arvore, nem herva verde; e o mar é tão baixo, que a uma légua de terra não ha fundo mais que uma braça” (Bragança 50). What is crucial to understand here is that the sailors knew that the land they would explore in West Africa was a continuation of the world that already existed and was known. The assumption was that it was merely an extension of the arid desert Iberians were already familiar with in the Sahara. The communities of black West Africans that these explorers found were, therefore, unfamiliar but not quite “new.” Jerome Branche stipulates that the Guiné “confirms the papal premise of the non-Christian world being a terra nullis, or uncharted land, available for conversion and domination” (Colonialism 47). However, this does not change the fact that the explored region pertained to the notion of a three-continent world that can be found, for example, in the work of Isidore of Seville, who in his Etymologies, tells of the division of land between Europe, Africa, and Asia. He explains that Europe and Africa together make up half of the Earth, while Asia

122 “from the generation of the sons of Adam.”

123 “After this cape there are no people or communities of any kind; it is nothing but dry land like the deserts of Libya where there is no water, trees, or any green; and the sea is so shallow that even at a league away from land, the water is no more than an arms-length deep.”
occupies the other half (285). Isidore’s relatively primitive vision of Africa — an image that cartographic advancements later in the Middle Ages correct — shows, at the very least, that Africa was always a part of the fallen world, and often believed to be made up of the descendants of Ham, Noah’s son. It is also interesting to note that other descriptions of Africa throughout the Iberian Middle Ages show that Africa was generally considered an arid, uninhabitable land that could never support human life, let alone serve as its cradle.

The experience of shamelessness in the West African communities described by Zurara thus presents what I would call a typological misfiring\(^{124}\) where the appearance of an Edenic mimesis is interrupted by a historical recognition of the impossibility of such mimesis. While the Guineans’ nudity might remind readers of a prelapsarian state, it should not be construed to be so given the circumstances above. Similar to the imposition of social norms, this typological misfiring represents more broadly the difficulties in the imposition of Western theology on the colonized subject. That is, the Portuguese chroniclers’ descriptions of the shameless “other” are founded upon a Christian doctrine — as dictated in Genesis — that becomes the dominant discourse of the chronicle’s stake in emotional differences. Within a wider framework of colonial and post-colonial theory, this imposition and misfiring serves as evidence of the inability to separate the Portuguese “self” from the “other,” or in the words of Ananya Chakravarti, the denial of the “possibility of genuine encounter in the chasm of cultural incommensurability” — also considered the mirror model of colonial encounter in which the other is some distorted reflection of the self (13). A colonial subject who does not feel shame when nude is a “distorted” reflection of the Christian, Portuguese emotional experience of shame with nudity and therefore

\(^{124}\) Thank you to Emily Francomano for discussing this term.
notable when it comes to the composition of chronicles and the justification of salvation. Emotional experience, beyond the social demarcation of savage versus civilized, also becomes a clear division between non-Christian versus Christian which, through conversion, can be remedied.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the metaphorical role of the nude colonized subject could more properly fit a prelapsarian image merely based on the fact that Brazil and the New World as a whole was, in the eyes of the Portuguese, a *terra nullis* and more closely reflected the possibility of an Edenic world. The idea that the Americas were “new,” and not part of the world known to Europeans can be traced back to Christopher Columbus’ letters in which he describes his discoveries as “otro mundo” or “another world.” Spanish Dominican friar and supporter of indigenous communities Bartolomé de las Casas would further theorize the “newness” of the New World in the sixteenth century by clarifying that it is indeed new, but not a separate world, an important difference when it comes to the application of the laws of nature that governed the “old” Christian world. Las Casas’ stance in the prologue of his *Historia de las Indias* is explained by Nicolás Wey-Gomez:

Las Casas’ reference to a newly discovered ‘machine’ pointed to the equivocal neologism *mundus novus*, or ‘new world,’ by which many Europeans since Peter Martyr had marveled at the discovery of a vast and seemingly alien orb populated by nations whose cultural practices appear inscrutable, if not demonic. Las Casas was here stating the obvious: the New World was merely the newly discovered province of one and the same world-machine. (95)
Whether a truly “new” world in the most literal sense, or based on Las Casas’ nuanced clarifications of the geography of the Americas, the New World was nonetheless a blank slate that offered a fresh start for geographic, anthropological, and ecological observation that would appear throughout the sixteenth century.

Caminha’s Carta and Pêro de Magalhães Gândavo’s Tratado da Provincia do Brasil are two important examples of texts that seek to record such geographic, anthropological, ecological, and — as evident in this chapter — affective observations. Uncharted and unfamiliar, the Brazilian coast was often described as a sort of undiscovered paradise, offering an Edenic image of the land. Caminha, for example, describes: “Neste dia, a horas de véspera, houvemos vista de terra! Primeiramente dum grande monte, mui alto e redondo; e doutras serras mais baixas ao sul dele; e de terra chã, com grandes arvoredos: ao monte alto o capitão pôs nome – o Monte Pascoal e à terra – a Terra da Vera Cruz.” (Carta).125 The landscape is verdant and full, and the almost Arcadian territory’s paradisiacal quality is evident in the naming of the Paschal mountains and the land of the “true cross.” A half-century later, Gândavo’s Tratado da Provincia do Brasil paints a similar image of the Brazilian land. He describes the land as “mui fertile e viçosa toda cuberta de altissimos e frondosos arvoredos, permanece sempre a verdure nela inverno e verão” (147-9).126 One could picture the image in the Portuguese imagination when reading about this colony that experienced greenery and lush landscapes year-round. Gândavo also spends an entire chapter describing the fruits of the region, illustrating the garden-like quality of

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125 “On that day, at Vespers, we saw land! First a great mountain, tall and round; and then other lower hills to the south; and then the low lands with great woodlands. The captain named the mountain Pascal Mountain, and the land, The Land of the Holy Cross.”

126 “Very fertile and lush, covered in tall and leafy woods, and it is always green both in winter and summer.”
the Brazilian colony and describing both the quantity and deliciousness — *muito sabrosa* — of many different fruits including pineapples and bananas (165). In this vein, Brazil was also a land of sweetness and abundance, much like Eden.

Given Brazil’s state as a “New” World and a world reminiscent of Eden, Caminha’s use of the word “inocência” to describe the nude indigenous Brazilians more closely reflects a mimesis of a prelapsarian state where Adam and Eve are naked and innocent before Original Sin. Brazil, after all, offered chroniclers an image of what it would be like to start over, a *tabula rasa* of sorts where the indigenous communities were free from the effects of Adam and Eve’s legacy and surrounded by beauty that reflected the Garden. Caminha even explains in his letter that these communities do not seem to have any sort of religious belief at all and, were it not for issues of language they could easily be converted to Christianity: “Parece-me gente de tal inocência que, se homem os entendesse e eles a nós, seriam logo cristãos, porque eles, segundo parece, não têm, nem entendem em nenhuma crença” (*Carta*).\(^{127}\) The idea of “innocence,” however, demonstrates the imposition of Christianity’s investment in a world without sin due to the very fact that, while mimetic of a prelapsarian state, the indigenous Brazilians’ nudity without shame is unrelated to the Fall of Eden entirely. It is a visual convergence — a term borrowed from Lawrence Weschler — where one image reflects another unrelated image based on the latter’s place in a sort of collective cultural unconscious of the observer. In other words, indigenous communities can only be innocent from the perspective of the Portuguese Christian chronicler who sees the disconnect between the visual similarities and the emotional differences when naked.

\(^{127}\) “They seem to me like men of such innocence that if they understood us, and us them, they would quickly become Christians, because they — as it seems — do not have or believe in any faith.”
Homi Bhabha’s work on meaning-making in colonial spaces, and his analysis of the English book, can provide a useful framework for thinking about this dynamic. In his study “Signs Taken for Wonders,” Bhabha analyzes the phenomenon of an object in a colonial space. He explains:

The English book acquires its meaning after the traumatic scenario of colonial difference, cultural or racial, returns the eye of power to some prior, archaic image or identity. Paradoxically, however, such an image can neither be original — by virtue of the act of repetition that constructs it — nor identical — by virtue of the difference that defines it. Consequently, the colonial presence is always ambivalent, split between its appearance as original and authoritative and its articulation as repetition and difference. (150)

The innocence of the colonial subject thus only functions within the colonial framework when the “eye of power” returns to the Biblical authority of Genesis as understood by Caminha and the other chroniclers. Instead of a physical book, the body of the indigenous Brazilian reflects the “archaic image” of Eden but is neither original — since it is a reflection of the authorial voice of the chronicler — nor identical — since the image of the Fall depends on the Fall itself and exists in a geographically and historically distinct context.

The ultimate challenge to the Edenic image of colonial Brazil — and the innocence from shame imagined by the Portuguese — is the underlying motive of Christian conversion in the colonial space. This presents what I argue to be one of the most interesting paradoxes of both Caminha and Gândavo’s texts: after portraying a seemingly prelapsarian state of the nude indigenous subject, the effort to evangelize and convert indigenous Brazilians to Christianity brings those communities into the fallen world. In other words, the imposition of Western
theology dictates feelings of shame with nudity to a community that previously held other emotional construct within the shame/nudity paradigm. The Portuguese colonizer, thus negates the possibility of a prelapsarian state by bringing Christian doctrine to the “innocent” indigenous Brazilians, who, after their conversion are no longer innocent and are the descendants of Original Sin.

The negation of innocence is the byproduct of the European mentality described by Ananya Chakravarti, that “indigenous inhabitants of Brazil were not so much people, as clay to be moulded in the image of the Christian European” (35). It is this very “moulding” that, while considered the pious thing to do, contradicts the nostalgia alleged by Agamben. Twentieth-century Brazilian poet Oswald de Andrade even addresses this very paradox in his poem “Erro de Português.”:

Quando o português chegou
Debaixo duma bruta chuva
Vestiu o índio
Que pena! Fosse uma manhã de sol
O índio tinha despido
O português.

[When the Portuguese arrived
Under a brutal rain
He clothed the *indio,*
What a shame! Had it been a sunny morning}
The *indio* would have undressed

The Portuguese].

The Portuguese brought the Fall to the *indio*, as opposed to the *indio* forcing the Portuguese to embrace a life of nudity without sin or shame. The possibility for a return to a state of innocence and shamelessness existed but was not the course of history taken by the Portuguese due to an emphasis on evangelical efforts in the colony and desire for the expansion of Christendom. While Andrade posits an alternate history based on the weather, perhaps even tongue-in-cheek, the underlying problem nonetheless stands and demonstrates the tensions of the contact zone based on nudity and the process of imperial dominance.

Gândavo’s *Tratado*, does portray some ambiguities to the Brazil-Eden image, however, and the text makes its own contributions to the idea of a typological misfiring mentioned above. Specifically, Gândavo’s observations of shame and shamelessness in the Brazilian colonial space as it pertains to sexuality and lust can be placed into conversation with Augustine’s notion that lust, as an emotion, did not exist before the Fall (365). He further explains that, “lust has somehow brought [men] so completely under its rule that they are incapable of activity if this on emotion is lacking and has not sprung up spontaneously or in answer to a stimulus. Here is the cause of shame” (367).

Gândavo’s representation of the *indio*’s ability to recognize and check their lust when in groups, as we have seen in the previous section, results in a crisis of analogy and an inherent contradiction in the apparent image of a prelapsarian Brazil. If lust only exists after Original Sin, then Gândavo’s representation of the *indios* as being “dados a sensualidade” and susceptible to sexual vices implies that they are — within the Portuguese vision of the colonized
— postlapsarian sinners. It is once again an imposition of the Fall onto a community that exists outside of the Genesis framework, as their construction of lust, and the shame associated with lustful behavior, is notably different from the European models in the wake of Augustine’s writing. Therefore the underlying question is: How can it be that the indigenous Brazilians exist in a state independent of Genesis but are represented through a literary lens that depends on a cultural understanding of the Genesis narrative? After all it is Gândavo’s work that depicts Brazil as an edenic land and an ideal place to live, full of undiscovered flora and fauna, beautiful landscapes, beaches, and delicious fruits and vegetables. It reminds the Portuguese so much of their image of paradise they call it the land of “Santa Cruz,” and Gândavo is not shy about his propagandistic message, asserting in his prologue that he writes of Brazil so that, “todos aqueles que nestes reinos vivem em pobreza não duvidem escolhê-la para seu amparo; porque a terra é tal e tão favorável aos que a vão buscar” (Primeira História 38).128

Gândavo’s Brazil is the ultimate mimesis of the imagined Eden, yet his representation of the people demonstrates the potential tensions and contradictions that come with the colonial process of composing chronicles. It is a misfiring in which the imagery in the text becomes conflated with certain realities in the act of representation. Beyond not being able to separate European norms of lust and sexuality from his depiction of indigenous behavior, other factors, such as cannibalism, strange diets, inter-tribal wars, and legends of great beasts, also contribute to the undermining of the image of Brazil as paradise. Nevertheless, with respect to shame, lust, and the emotions at play, the crisis of the analogue is especially significant in its illustration of the difficulties of representation in the Portuguese colonial space.

128 “All those who live in poverty in this land should not doubt to choose there as their home; the land is so favorable for those who seek it.”
William Reddy might postulate that shame is the driving force behind the Portuguese “emotional regime” — or a “general suffering under a certain discipline” (Interview 241) — in this case the imposition of Portuguese shame models on the indigenous body. However, while I propose that shame is a driving force behind the emotional hegemony of the Portuguese colonizer, there are moments where emotions are shared between the colonizer and the colonized, and new emotional communities take shape; after all, part of Rosenwein’s central message of her book is that “there are (and were) various ‘emotional communities’ at any given time” (Emotional Communities 22). In one of the more emotionally charged moments of Zurara’s chronicle, he describes the scene of a slave market, pointing out — and sympathizing with — the heart-wrenching state of the slaves up for sale. Zurara recalls the early morning when the merchants and sailors began herding black Africans of all different shades of skin, ages, and genders to be sold. What catches Zurara’s eye, however, is the emotions felt by the enslaved people themselves:

Que uns tinham as caras baixas e os rostros lavados com lagrimas, olando uns contra os outros; outros estavam gemendo mui dolorosamente, esguardando a altura dos ceus, firmando os olhos em eles, bradando altamente como se pedissem acorro ao Padre da natureza; outros feriam seu rostro com suas palmas, lançando-se tendidos ao meio do chão; outros faziam suas lamentações em maneira de canto, segundo o costume de sua terra. (Bragança 122)\(^{129}\)

\(^{129}\) “Some had their faces down and covered in tears, turning towards each other. Others were groaning in pain looking up to the heavens, crying, as if asking for help from Nature. Others struck their faces with their hands and threw themselves to the ground. Others lamented in song, as was customary in their land.”
Zurara observes a great deal of somatic emotional responses exhibited by the slaves from the bowing of heads to crying, or even lamenting in song.

As readers, our understanding of the emotional state of the slaves is expressed through these gestures; Zurara’s description of their physical actions allow for readers to identify how they feel. Paul Murphy’s recent scholarship on the connection between gesture and emotion in medieval literature recognizes some of the difficulty in studying gesture from the past, given that “they are frozen in texts and images that provide our best access to them” (412-3). Nonetheless, Murphy shows how the reimagination and reappropriation of gestural descriptions in medieval texts — often based on the Bible or other religious works — offers insight into the connection between gesture and affective response as understood by readers of the time. In one of Murphy’s examples, for instance, the Middle English *Mirror of the Blessed Life of Jesus Christ*, Christ’s own bowing of the head is associated with his physical and mental anguish (418). As we will also see in Chapter Five, gestures serve as visual cues for understanding inner affects. While the correlations are not always defined, some might be generally codified in the language of cultural production, such as Murphy’s notion of Christ’s head-bowing and its relation to anguish. In Zurara’s chronicle, gesture becomes a way of reading the slaves’ experiences, and though he does use explicit emotives, he portrays them as having their heads lowered and crying — “caras baixas e os rostros lavados com lagrimas” (Bragança 122). Given the context of their sale and separation from their loved ones, these gestures are assumed to be the visual result of their sadness and anguish.

Perhaps more importantly, this moment of the narrative is also an admission by Zurara that he recognizes the humanity of the slaves and feels pain with them and for them. Beyond a
mere observation of the emotions of the slaves, he expresses his own sympathy in relation their visible strain. He explains:

Eu te rogo que as minhas lagrimas nem sejam dano da minha consciencia, que nem por sua lei daquestes, mas a sua humanidade constrange a minha que chore piedosamente o seu padecimento. E se as brutas animalias, com seu bestial sentir, por um natural instinto conhecem os danos de suas semelhantes, que queres que faça esta minha humanal natureza, vendo assim ante os meus olhos aquesta miseravel companha, lembrando-me de que são da geração dos filhos de Adão. (Bragança 121-2)130

Zurara recognizes the slaves’ struggle and cries for their sake, asking God to help him so that his crying does not damage his conscience. However, while Zurara’s emotional response to seeing the slave market informs his recognition of black Africans as “filhos de Adão,” or sons of Adam just like the Portuguese, he insists on referring to them as “brutas animalias” or brutal animals, who only feel basic visceral emotions.

In the colonial context, this moment of the narrative deconstructs many of the presupposed binaries of the colonizer and colonized. Josiah Blackmore explains:

Zurara’s slave market presents the possibility of a somatic link between slave traders and slaves, between conquistatorial explorers and human booty. African darkness, Zurara implies, is not all that different from Portuguese whiteness, and in this his narrative voice is sympathetic to the lamentations of the captives and to the genealogical violence the slave trade causes. (Moorings 29)

130 “I beg you that my tears do not hurt my conscience, for it is not their laws but their humanity that makes me weep for their suffering. If those brutal animals, in their beastly ways, have some instinct to know their suffering, what would You have my mere human nature do upon seeing such miserable company, and remembering that they too are sons of Adam?”
Zurara implicitly states that the slaves are men too, just like any Portuguese man, and they can also experience pain. From an emotional perspective this can be related to the foundations of sympathy as described by Daniel Gross, who explains, “In order to be moved by the grief or joy of another [...] we must be informed of the cause and be familiar with the relevant characters” (*Secret* 173). Zurara recognizes the cause of the slaves’ feelings and recognizes that the ones who are causing that pain are his own people. He can understand and sympathize with the slaves’ grief because he knows the oppressor and is the observer of the oppressed. Zurara understands that the slaves, like the Portuguese, have families, wives, and children, all of which draw more parallels than differences between the groups.

Even more specific than sympathy is the question of compassion. While compassion “cannot be defined any more precisely than what its Latin etymology (*com - patior*) suggests: ‘suffering with,’” Sarah McNamer’s description of compassion in a medieval context supports a reading of Zurara’s feelings as compassionate. McNamer describes how medieval Christian compassion “is intimate (ideally, dyadic) in structure; it is not easily described as ‘altruistic,’ for it can be intensely selfinterested; it does not often assume that the other’s suffering ought to be prevented [...] it is conflated with love, gratitude, guilt, and grief” (*Affective* 11). Each of these individual components of medieval compassion fits into Zurara’s narrative. Firstly, his text is deeply reflective, intimate, and personal, as if the reader is invited to hear his own plea with God — in which the Zurara/God relationship is the dyadic structure — for reacting so emotionally to the treatment of the slaves. Secondly, Zurara’s compassion has a selfinterested component. Luis Barreto argues that Zurara, “afirma-se toda uma superioridade, uma crença absoluta no valor da
sua luz sócio-cultural” (347). Zurara might feel better about himself for recognizing the abuse experienced by the slaves and the horrific actions of his fellow Portuguese. This self-aggrandizement implied by Barreto is rather confusing, however, given that Zurara appears to feel guilty about his compassion, leading to McNamer’s fourth point. It is as if the chronicler does not want to sympathize with the men he considers beasts, and prays that his tears do not affect his conscience. Finally, McNamer’s point that compassion does not assume that “the other’s suffering ought to be prevented” is evident throughout the chronicle. Much of the Guiné’s narrative bulk revolves around recounting the Portuguese capturing of black Africans, much of which is celebrated as part of the Christian expansion throughout the region. The slave trade is ostensibly something Zurara supports in theory, but he is disturbed by only when the practice is placed in front of him and he is reminded of the affective responses and emotional capacity of the slaves who are every bit as human as he is.

It becomes clear that Zurara is both compassionate yet torn about feeling sympathy toward the slaves, exhibiting a “dupla orientação: um sentimento de contradição que procura mas não consegue disfarçar,” (346) as Luis Barreto describes it. On a surface level, Zurara must ascribe to the colonial notion of the African as “less than” the Portuguese colonizer, as beasts and uncivilized, while at the same time he recognizes that the slaves are men and women who feel and emote in similar ways to him. Zurara is torn between his own compassion and feeling ashamed about that very compassion. The chronicler’s prayers illustrate a rejection of his own compassion and sympathy, as if to say that he understands that he is emoting and crying, but hopes those emotions have no weight.

131 Zurara “affirms his superiority, an absolute belief in his own socio-cultural enlightenment.”
From a rhetorical perspective, this episode is unique in the text in that it allows for Zurara’s authorial voice to come through from an intimate and personal perspective. Zurara’s expression of his tears and compassion for the slaves at the market can be read in the context of Reddy’s “emotive,” since this moment of the narrative is full of first-person emotion claims (Navigation 104). Zurara’s mention of “minhas lagrimas” and how he “chore piedosamente o seu padecimento” expresses his own first-hand present tense sadness and distress at viewing the slaves’ suffering. I argue that the emotional confusion experienced by Zurara, and his seemingly contradictory stance toward the slaves and his own feelings might imply that he is not scripting how a reader should feel towards the Portuguese slave-trade, but rather is a devotional cry for help and confessional statement, in Virginia Burrus’ use of the phrase examined in chapter one, in reaction to his own somatic response. That is, Zurara’s shame in feeling compassion forces him to confess his feelings in a way that makes his emotional state heard (Burrus 111). He nevertheless expresses his frustration with his own emotions, evident in his final plea, “what do you want my mere human nature to do?”, “que queres que faça esta minha humanal natureza?”
CHAPTER 5: THE SPECTACLE OF PUBLIC SHAMING IN EARLY MODERNITY

“To demonstrate her repentance, she will cast aside all pride, all artifice, and present herself as the gods made her... to you, the good people of this city. She comes before you with a solemn heart, shorn of secrets, naked before the eyes of gods and men, to make her walk of atonement.”

- High Sparrow, Game of Thrones, HBO

A study of shame’s history in the pre-modern period would not be complete without recognition of the emotion’s important role in punishment. Medieval and Early Modern institutions of punishment often depended on public shaming of sinners, criminals, or other individuals subjected to a political or religious judicial system. Under the Spanish Inquisition in the final decades of the fifteenth century and lasting well into the nineteenth century, autos-da-fé, or the “act of faith” ceremonies in which heretics were condemned — often to death — visualized and made public the Inquisitorial process and the rule of law in the most dramatic sense. These ceremonies depended on the shaming of heretics as a part of the punishment process. This chapter looks at the visual representation of the process of public shaming and public punishment as a spectacle in early modern Spanish painting, grounded in the presence of an audience and a blurring of the line between the emotional experience of the individual being shamed and the emotional community of the spectators. Specifically, I turn to Pedro Berruguete’s 1495 Saint Dominic Presiding over an Auto-da-fé as well as Francisco Rizi’s 1683 Auto de Fé in the Plaza Mayor of Madrid, both of which are at the Museo del Prado today. Finally, Francisco de Goya’s painting The Inquisition Tribunal from the early nineteenth century illustrates how later critical views of the Inquisition influenced Goya’s representation of public shaming and his promotion of sympathy in the viewer.
SAINT DOMINIC PRESIDING OVER AN AUTO-DÁ-FÉ

Details of Castilian Renaissance painter Pedro Berruguete’s life are generally sparse and unknown, and he is believed to have been born at some point in the early 1450s in Paredes de Nava, a small town located in the province of Palencia. Historians agree that his early training appears to be grounded in the Hispano-Flemish tradition that permeated throughout Spain in the fifteenth century, but in the 1470s or early 1480s, Berruguete was formally exposed to Italian styles during his time in the court of the Duke of Urbino. Back in Spain at the end of the 1480s, Berruguete’s career began to flourish and became much better documented. He worked for the Cathedral of Toledo before settling in the town of Ávila at some point in the early 1490s. There, his main patron was the Dominican monastery of Santo Tomás, and he resided in Ávila until his death, the exact date of which is unknown but estimated to be around 1503.132

Painted around 1495, Berruguete’s Saint Dominic Presiding over an Auto-da-Fé (=Auto-da-Fé) is one of the earliest — if not the earliest — Spanish depiction of the Inquisitorial process of an auto-da-fé or “act of faith.”133 The work was commissioned by, and initially exhibited at, the Santo Tomás monastery, whose construction had been directed by Fray Tomás de Torquemada, Grand Inquisitor of Spain (Brown 21). The monastery itself also held close ties to the Catholic monarchs Isabel and Fernando, both of whom were patrons. The painting’s connections with the monarchy as well as with Torquemada and the monastery have led scholars to support an almost “unanimous celebratory interpretation” of the work (Galperín 317). In serving the Grand Inquisitor and the crown, Berruguete offers an artwork that records and

132 See Brown and Silva Maroto.
133 See Appendix A, Fig. 1.
historicizes Spain’s crusades against heresy and quest for Catholic purity. It is an image that shows the realities of the contemporary public execution process while at the same time grounding it in the legend of Saint Dominic, the founder of the Dominican Order which is by no coincidence the commissioner of the work.

The painting’s composition is grounded in the visual division between the upper and lower registers. It has been well documented by Jonathan Brown, Karina Galperín, and others that the top half of the painting shows Saint Dominic pardoning an Albigensian heretic. Galperín and Pilar Silva Maroto propose that the heretic is Raimundo de Corsi, an Albigensian who was pardoned by Saint Dominic in legend (Galperín 315; Silva Maroto 241). The true identity of the heretic is not necessarily certain, however, and Saint Dominic’s place as the Inquisitor overseeing the pardoning is based on legends and tales of the Saint’s life, since his supposed involvement in the Medieval Inquisition contradicts the timeline of his 1221 death, and the beginnings of formal Inquisitorial proceedings roughly a decade later.

Nevertheless, the split registers of the work convey this sense of multiple temporalities that make Berruguete’s inclusion of this narrative possible in the fifteenth-century context. Berruguete shows Dominic as presiding over the judicial process accompanied by other members of the clergy who sit with the Saint on the platform above the plaza below. The platform displays a strong linear perspective and orderly arrangement of the different members of the clergy with Dominic, dressed in black and white, sitting in the center on a gilded throne. The cast of characters surrounding him include other Dominican friars, religious nobles, and even one man sleeping just below the Saint’s feet and lying in the exact center of the work.
The devout figures and orderly composition of the platform stand in contrast to the chaos below, where linear perspectives and bright colors fade away; “Its somber tints and lack of embellishment contrast with the chromatic richness of the upper inquisitorial platform” (Galperín 317). In the bottom right-hand corner, tinder and wood is strewn across the ground while above, two men are being burned at the stake, stripped down and tied around the neck. A group of onlookers watches the burning from beneath the clergy’s platform as if hidden in the darkness while two more heretics are being led to the flames by a cloaked priest. Both of these men wear coroza hats and inquisitorial sambenito cloaks that tell of their crimes — the word “condenado” appears legibly on the front of these cloaks. To the left, guards armed with spears, two of which are on horseback, are depicted in mid-action, running toward the events of the punishments as if to bring order to an unruly crowd.

The figure of heretic — perhaps De Corsi — is shown on the far left of the panel, holding the hand of another Dominican friar and removing his coroza hat that had been a part of his inquisitorial garb as a heretic; the legendary pardon allows for his removal of this costuming. His positioning within the frame, while isolated to the side, is quite important, bringing a third point, and thus triangular composition, to the binary — that is, upper/lower, sacred/profane, bright/muted — aspects of the work that exist on both sides of the bisecting line formed by the base of the platform. His coroza hat is angled toward the lower half of the frame while the friar’s hand gestures toward Saint Dominic, whose hand reciprocates a downward gesture toward the pardoned sinner while the base of the triangle is completed by clergyman’s gaze downward toward the two men burning at the stake. The heretic thus stands in a transitional space, somewhere between the heretics who are punished and the devotion of the clergy above. He is
not in the dirt of the plaza below nor is he quite able to ascend the stairs to join those who uphold
the Christian doctrine he once defied.

Existing scholarship on the *Auto-da-Fé* struggles to definitely label Berruguete’s work as
either laudatory or critical. Jonathan Brown, for example, reads the painting as an honor to Saint
Dominic and as drawing visual parallels between the current state of Spain’s Inquisition and the
inquisitorial past associated with the Saint’s life. At the same time, he acknowledges that, “The
execution at the right proceeds with the callous indifference of institutionalized murder,”
undermining some of the celebratory aspects scholars associate with the work. Brown states,
“For all the good intentions of glorifying the holy man, the picture now seems to be less a
testimony to the mercy of the saint than an unforgettable record of Torquemada’s
Inquisition” (21). It is a painting that in its depiction of a saintly legend, also shows some of the
horrors of contemporary life under the policies of Holy Office, commissioned in a context that
would value the blurring of those lines.

Some scholars have also alluded to the presence of more satirical or curious elements in
the work that might contradict more formal religious readings of the work as Karina Galperín
points out. Notably, the central figure of the work is not Dominic but an anonymous friar who is
sleeping; Dominic is just off-center, directly above the sleeping friar, acting as one of the vertices
of the triangular form made by the people in the work. Additionally, if Jews were at the center of
the inquisitorial process, it is curious to portray the execution with such a “visual likening” to
Christ’s Passion (Galperín 318).

With the above qualifications taken into consideration, Galperín’s important study of the
work posits that the painting’s meaning is both laudatory and critical depending on the position
of the observer; the painting can be interpreted “as both supporting and questioning certain practices of the Inquisition, depending on the interpreter” (318). Berruguete’s implementation of a *di sotto in sù* perspective places the spectator of the work “in a corner, twice as close to the victims as the judges [...] encouraging] the beholder to look at what is being shown from an unfamiliar angle” (325). Galperín contends that with this visual cue, the viewer has a choice, to move the eye upward to Dominic and see him as the highest and biggest figure of the work, or move downward with the angle of the work to make the two men burning at the stake the protagonists of the work (325). Galperín also warns, however, that such a reading of the painting’s ambiguities and ambivalences must be qualified by the differences in societal standards in the fifteenth century versus today; twenty-first-century viewers must not let their own disgust and disapproval of the Inquisition’s history alter any possible interpretation of the painting as a celebration of the practice of an auto-da-fé (319).

**PUBLIC SHAMING AND THE SHAME EXPERIENCE IN BERRUGUETE**

Whether formally celebratory or not, Berruguete’s work is a testament of the realities of the inquisitorial process in which the *auto-da-fé* was grounded in the idea of public shaming. The painting is full of elements that illustrate the use of shame as a tool for public punishment, and the complexities of the panel illustrate both sides of shame in the context of the auto-da-fé: the public social aspects as well as the personal experience of the emotion as evident in gesture and other signifiers.

In the history of the Spanish Inquisition, the implementation of public-shaming punishments is well documented but often taken for granted. Henry Kamen, for example, notes
how a common form of physical punishment under the Inquisition was flogging while being paraded through the streets of the city, a severe punishment, “carrying with it the stigma of degradation and shame.” Sometimes these heretics would be “mounted on an ass for greater shame” (202). The ultimate penalty was, of course, a death sentence, or execution by burning at the stake. Still an important piece of the inquisitorial process, these executions were not performed by the Holy Office but rather by the “secular authorities,” excusing the church of the deaths. While death eliminates the ability of feeling emotion in the individual being punished, every aspect of the process that leads to that moment is grounded in the formalities of public shaming for that individual, and in turn, their family. After all, as we have seen in Chapter One, late-medieval notions of honor do not adhere solely to the individual, but also affect one’s legacy, family, and associated communities.

While he does not show public flogging, Berruguete’s work does depict a scene of public shaming. Let us first consider some of the painting’s more straightforward elements, including the use of sanbenitos and coroza hats as symbols that identify the heretics. The sanbenito was an important part of inquisitorial garb, used to physically mark the accused heretics in costume often adorned with flames, devil imagery, and insignia that symbolized the accusation against the individual wearing it. In Berruguete’s depiction, the sanbenito displays the words, “condenado ereticus,” or condemned heretic, making their status known to all who bear witness. The sanbenito itself was a “mark of infamy” worn for “any period from a few months to life” (Kamen 200). The cloth was fundamental to the penitential process, and its preparation was a lengthy and expensive component of the auto-da-fé (Saraiva 104-5).

134 The text is cut off but “ereti-” is visible. See Appendix A.
Coupled with the *sanbenito* is the *coroza*, a conical hat also decorated with flames that was worn by heretics during the tribunal. The direct visual correlation between costume and heresy was a means of publicly exposing those who had committed sins against the Church in a way that would warrant public reprimand by the Holy Office. Throughout this project, we have seen how theories of shame from Aristotle onward understand shame as being — in part — the feeling that accompanies a judgment from others. Dressed in a way that both figuratively and literally labels them as sinners, infidels, or heretics, people under the Inquisition’s investigation are subject to the shame of being judged and decried by the onlookers of their public trial.

One of the most important aspects of Berruguete’s depiction of public shaming is his representation of the men burning at the stake. Both men are stripped almost naked, garroted on the stakes as flames grow at their feet, yet the most striking element is the spikes that emerge from between the men’s legs in the place of their genitalia. As if being naked before an audience of men watching your death was not enough to cause shame, the spikes’ resemblance to an erect phallus brings upon the men a further embarrassment and shame. Visually, Berruguete also portrays a late fifteenth-century Spanish linguistic play between *vergüenza*, shame, and *vergüenzas*, shameful parts, or genitalia, that we saw in Chapter Four. The stake — the very apparatus of their public punishment and the site of their death by garrote — becomes the heretics’ *vergüenza* in the most literal and figurative sense; it is the vehicle for their public shaming as well as the object that replaces their shameful parts.

The phallic elements here also pervert some of the religious undertones of the painting, chiefly the visual cues to the crucifixion of Christ. Galperín reads the stake as a “mnemonic

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135 Being garroted was a way of providing salvation before the flames and was considered more merciful.
“pointer” — a word she borrows from Esther Cross — to the image of Christ on the Cross. The almost naked state of the heretics, the nailing of the men to wooden posts, and the choice to dress the priest in front in a hood that mirrors depictions of Mary at the foot of the cross all contribute to the image’s evocation of elements often associated with images of the crucifixion. Additionally, the downplayed portrayal of the flames and smoke puts more emphasis on the stake than the process of death (329). She further points out that, while the two men are not on crosses per se, Berruguete “turns these sticks into crosses through their contiguity with the understated Cross, not covered by the canopy, that is part of the stage construction in the upper part of the painting” (329).

It is worth noting that Renaissance paintings did exist that depicted the dead Christ with an erect phallus. In his important study, The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in Modern Oblivion, Leo Steinberg spends part of his analysis on images of the adult, dead Christ with an erection. Many of these images—almost all of which Steinberg pulls from the Low Countries—appear in the sixteenth century, including Willem Key’s Pietà, for example. Steinberg brings the reader’s attention to the “turbulence of the loincloth” and the potential insinuation of “phallic tumescence” (84), while in images of the Man of Sorrows, the erection is, in his words, “unmistakable” (86). Steinberg proposes a reading of the erect penis in this context as a symbol of Christ’s immortality and signifies the “risen flesh” of Jesus in what he terms the “erection-resurrection equation” (86-9). This reading affirms the possibility of a metaphor of Christ’s “mortified-vivified flesh” but not without questions of the erection’s place in Christian doctrine. The answer is that the erection was Christ’s sign of power; it is a power over immortality and the ultimate sign of of his power in his resuscitation (90-1).
The phallic spikes in Berruguete’s painting evoke the imagery that Steinberg presents, but not without its own complications. First and foremost is the fact that the spikes are spikes that allude to the phallus they are not phalluses themselves. Additionally, the spike-phallus is not covered with a loincloth or drapery, instead it sticks out beyond the cloths that are used to cover the men’s actual genitalia. The spike is therefore a perversion of the Christ-like imagery, where the phallus is not only fully shown but also displaced by the shaming-apparatus. It is a false metaphor in which the spike gives the appearance of masculine Christ-like power, but is in fact an emasculating tool that contributes to the public shaming of the heretics. By perverting the image of Christ on the cross with the overtly profane detail of the phallic spike, Berruguete establishes a fine line between the mimetic imagery of the Crucifixion and a visual reminder for the viewer that these are heretics whose shame before God is front and center.

On the ground beneath the men burning at the stake, one of the heretics being led to the stake seems to express some of the physiological symptoms associated with shame and this specific figure opens the door for a reading of facial expression and gesture in Berruguete’s work. Facial expression is an important tool in reading emotion both in psychological and cultural contexts. Psychologist Paul Ekman is well known for his work on facial expressions as signifiers of certain universal, or “basic,” emotional experiences. Ekman’s initial experiments tasked subjects with assigning emotion words to different images of faces. He concluded that facial expression is in fact legible and comprehensible to outside viewers, and that some emotions do have a certain amount of universality (“Facial” 114). That is to say, there is a socially recognizable—yet also cross-culturally compatible—association that can be made between certain facial expressions or gestures and internal emotional experience.
In an artistic context, Phillipa Maddern turns to facial gesture as an important indicator of emotional experience in medieval painting. She surveys five different types of expressions that were legible by medieval audiences: face shape as an indication of humoral constitution, facial color, facial gesture, facial output including tears or other somatic reactions, and finally expression based on muscle movement, this last of which is most similar to Ekman’s experiments (Maddern 15). Together, Maddern argues that gesture and facial expression open the door for an array of new approaches to the emotional subtleties of medieval art, and can potentially “testify to inward emotion” (21). In a similar vein, James Clifton examines the role of gesture as a sign of shame and grief in Masaccio’s *Expulsion from the Garden of Eden* and argues that gestures “carry significant meaning” in context (641).

The heretic in front, led to the staircase with a rope around his neck and listening to some sort of utterance from a priest exhibits traits we, as viewers, can associate with shame. Wearing his *coroza* and *sanbenito*, the man’s eyes are almost closed as his face lowers toward the ground with a seemingly relaxed jaw, in a facial gesture that suggest feelings of shame in his context of public humiliation. Within the scholarly tradition of the History of Emotions, we can turn to psychology to affirm such a reading of shame, but not without the complications of falling into universalist tendencies. Silvan Tomkins, for example, explains, “The response of shame includes lowering the eyelid, decreasing the tonus of all facial muscles, lowering the head via a reduction in tonus of the neck muscles, or a tilting of the head in one direction” (143).

In an effort to avoid such universalist tendencies and their potential faults in understanding the representation of emotions in art, I contend that certain semiotic elements of Berruguete’s work—and Goya’s as we will see later in this chapter—allow for a more nuanced
reading of gesture in context. Alongside the inclusion of elements like the coroza and sanbenito as signifiers of public shame, the heretic’s physical expressions can be read as Berruguete’s corporeal representation of that emotional state. Gesture thus becomes a signifier of shame through its relation to the emotion’s other signifiers in the work.

Art, through its visual depictions of gestures, facial expressions, and other signifiers of social experience, is thus an important tool for doing emotions history. Beyond textual sources, where emotions are expressed in words, gestures and codified cultural signifiers create a visual landscape that reflects human emotions as they are understood in the physical world. Additionally, artistic representations of emotion support a constructivist approach to emotions history, given that signifiers of emotion depend on other elements in the work and its context of production, such that similar expressions across works or time might have radically different meanings in terms of the feelings of the works’ subjects that the artists seek to represent. This idea also offers somewhat of a visually-based alternative to William Reddy’s notion of the “emotive,” which has received criticism over the years for its privileging of language over other factors. In Jan Plamper’s interview with William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, and Peter Stearns, Plamper questions Reddy on the idea that “emotives” as a general concept force “the specificity of verbal utterances on such non-verbal body practices as smiling or crying” (241). Reddy responds that emotives derive from a conscious decision of utterance and a hopes of matching a “full” bodily response (242). In the case of visual art, where direct linguistic utterances do not exist, the audience’s ability to understand a represented bodily response depends on the spectator’s ability to contextualize the emotional experience being presented and comprehend
through sympathy, or depend on other cultural signifiers to draw important emotional conclusions.

The heretic in front also stands out as one of the few figures in the work that has a legible emotional facial expression. The majority of the other figures use hand or bodily gestures, yet their faces are predominantly inexpressive. The exceptions here are, of course, the sleeping friar and the heretic burning at the stake who is already dead—the other still remains with his hands together in prayer, yet his face is expressionless—whose gestures define their actions in the painting, or whose state of sleep/death eliminates the possibility of other legible gesturing.

SHAME AS SPECTACLE AND PERFORMANCE

The public aspects of the shaming and execution also make Berruguete’s work a testament to the performativity and spectacle of the auto-da-fé ceremony. Theories of public punishment have been brought to the mainstream by Michel Foucault who, in his *Discipline and Punish*, analyzes the historical phenomenon of the public execution. Foucault begins the text with a description of the public punishment of Robert-François Damiens in eighteenth-century France. The episode serves as a window through which Foucault differentiates a dramatic example of the Early Modern system of public punishment from the modern penal systems he analyzes in the rest of his text. He writes:

The public execution [...] has a juridico-political function. It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most spectacular. The public execution, however hasty and everyday, belongs to a whole series of great rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored
(coronation, entry of the king into a conquered city, the submission of rebellious subjects); over and above the crime that has placed the sovereign in contempt, it deploys before all eyes an invisible force. Its aim is not so much to re-establish a balance as to bring into play, as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength. Although redress of the private injury occasioned by the offence must be proportionate, although the sentence must be equitable, the punishment is carried out in such a way as to give a spectacle not of measure, but of imbalance and excess; in this liturgy of punishment, there must be an emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority.” (Foucault 48-9)

If we break down Foucault’s observation, he identifies three interrelated aspects of the public execution process. First is that the public display serves a political function, a reckoning, or “reconstitution” to use his word, of a political and legal system that had been violated, or “injured.” The second is the fact that the public execution is a ceremonial occasion and grounded in cultural rituals and customs. Finally, the third point to take from Foucault’s description connects the first two that the ritual itself is in fact a “spectacle” grounded in an opposing imbalance of power where the executing authorities have power over those who are executed. If we read Berruguete’s work through a Foucauldian lens, the painting’s ambiguities and ambivalences toward the inquisitorial process becomes all the more clear with regard to the power dynamics at play. At the same time, the painting, like the later work of Francisco Rizi, reinforces a reading of the auto-da-fé as an inherently performative public process that, in expanding Foucault’s ideas, blurs the line between individual and collective emotional experiences.
The composition of Berruguete’s painting illustrates the first and third points of Foucault’s observation that the act of public punishment is a reconstitution of power and a restoration of order, and the punishing body is superior to those who are being punished. Yet here, instead of purely political power, Berruguete illustrates a reconstitution of a theological power inherent to the Holy Office of the Inquisition. The execution and shaming that takes place in the bottom of the work is an institutional remedy to social contamination caused by heresy and other crimes against the Church above, whose power is embodied in the dominating figure of Saint Dominic; Dominic and the clergy are in fact the superior power, hovering over the punishments below. Berruguete’s restoration of order is not only evident in the fact that the clergy reign supreme over the heretics, but also the fact that the execution itself completes the visual balance of the work as a whole. If we look solely at the upper half of the work, the use of the upward-and-outward, di sotto in sù, perspective would make Dominic’s position on the right-hand side of the panel the predominant point in the work’s balance, off-center and looming over the other clergy members and de Corsi. The chaotic scene below offers an equal and opposite counterbalance to the work’s entire composition in turn offering a restoration of order for the viewer, an order reflected in the upper register of the work depicting the clergy and religious authorities.

Foucault’s second point, that the public execution is a ritual and ceremonious occasion, is reflected in some aspects of Berruguete’s work but becomes even clearer in seventeenth-century court painter Francisco Rizi’s 1683 Auto-da-fé in the Plaza Mayor of Madrid, a work in which the auto-da-fé is an enormous spectacle that fills the entire Plaza.\(^{136}\) In Berruguete’s Auto-da-fé,

\(^{136}\) See Appendix A, Fig. 2.
the lower half of the composition lacks the formalities one might associate with a ritualistic celebration. There is not much order to the process of the auto-da-fé and the audience’s view of the event is obscured by the platform above. Nonetheless, the fact that Berruguete depicts a large audience as spectators of the punishment as performative execution. The people below the platform watch as heretics are burned or lined up to be burned, and while the majority of the clergy members above are blind to what happens beneath them, one man looks down off of the balcony and watches the execution with his hands raised. The chaotic representation of the auto-da-fé does reflect the context of Berruguete’s creation, and his lack of overtly celebratory imagery and symbolism is a product of the fact that the Inquisition had yet to establish formal practices for the auto-da-fé (Galperín).

As inquisitorial practices became more established, bigger crowds, feasts, festivities, royal attendees, and other extravagances became a crucial part of the auto-da-fé. António José Saraiva explains the spectacle of auto-da-fé practices in Lisbon in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He notes how, “the auto-da-fé público and its minutely regulated ceremonial grew into a grand and pompous pageant. It was attended by the top brass, often by the king and the royal family and, much as a carnival, it galvanized the whole city into communal bustle” (102-3). By the seventeenth century, the preparation that went into each event was extensive, often times lasting two weeks and requiring fortunes of money. Sanbenitos needed to be made, the plazas prepared with platforms and staging, and food, including pastries and fishcakes totaling thousands of reals, needed to be ordered and prepared (104-6).

In Madrid, Francisco Rizi’s Auto-da-Fé depicts this festive environment on an enormous scale; the canvas measures just over fourteen feet in width. The work depicts the tribunal of two
heretics in the center of the canvas surrounded by hundreds of onlookers in Madrid’s Plaza Mayor, including another hundred or so heretics ready for their turn for judgement. While some wander the plaza others observe from the windows, balconies, or on scaffolded seating constructed in the plaza for the event, divided by their role in society. On the right-hand side, there are rows of heretics adorned with *sanbenitos* and *corozas*, while on the left, the seating appears to be filled by clergymen and other religious figures. The far side of the plaza is occupied by noblemen, wealthy women, and in the center the King Carlos II and his mother Mariana of Austria, who are seated beneath a canopy and directly above the tribunal. Rizi’s canvas portrays, in the most literal sense, the celebratory nature of the auto-da-fé in its more developed state.

A crucial component of both Berruguete and Rizi’s representation of an auto-da-fé is the fact that the public execution takes place on a sort of stage or designated area meant to emphasize the performativity and theatricality of the inquisitorial “celebration.” In Berruguete’s painting, the raised platform on the lower right-hand side of the panel serves as the stage on which the act of execution is occurs. It is a site of performance in view for the audience to see, yet lacks some of the refinements of Rizi’s portrayal, staged at a moment in which the celebration had become established and practiced. Rizi’s work brings a more structured visual emphasis to the theatricality of the auto-da-fé practice drawing clearer lines between the site of performance in the center of the plaza and the audience of observers in tiered rows around the perimeter of the square; he shows the tribunal as a “delimination of an area distinct from and facing one reserved for the audience” (Weigert 31). A tribunal or execution was not the use commonly associated with stages and theatrical spaces, yet there is nevertheless a strong parallel
between the ritualized process of the Inquisition and plays, ceremonies, or celebrations. The dichotomy between the stage and the audience more importantly redirects the focus of the execution from a purely juridical process to a performed ritual such that, as Foucault states, “In the ceremonies of the public execution, the main character was the people, whose real and immediate presence was required for the performance. An execution that was known to be taking place, but which did so in secret, would scarcely have had any meaning.” (57-8)

One can historically situate Foucault’s claim in Rizi’s visual depiction of the auto-da-fé scene in Madrid, where the individuality of the shamed and tried heretic is overshadowed by the size of the audience as the “main character” of the work. Unlike Berruguete’s work where clear interpersonal relationships are delineated either through gesture, facial expressions, or the work’s composition, Rizi’s Auto-da-fé represents the audience as a single mass whose details only become clearer upon closer examination. For example, heretics, clerics, and even the royalty are painted on the same scale, and the small details of their dress and their collective groupings are the only indication of their place in society. Together they comprise a single “unit” whose function in the work is to observe the tribunal that takes place in the center. Smaller details of the work do in fact show some interpersonal relationships that break with the collective whole. For example, beneath Carlos II and the Queen Regent, two clergymen guide a heretic through the plaza and one of the men gestures upward toward the royal family as if to signal their presence. This subtle detail of the work brings three realms of society into close proximity, and the pointing gesture connects the punished sinner to his punishers, the crown and the Church. Nonetheless, the enormous size and scale of the work results in these details being lost to the anonymous masses.
Within the scholarship of the History of Emotions, the anonymous mass of the audience can be considered to be its own “emotional community” to use Barbara Rosenwein’s words. As explored throughout this project, Rosenwein defines the emotional community as “groups in which people adhere to the same norms of emotional expression and value—or devalue—the same or related emotions” (Rosenwein 2). In these representations of the auto-da-fé, I contend that the valued emotion is shame, but not as experienced by the community itself. Instead, I argue that the auto-da-fé audience is an emotional community built around their capacity to incite shame in the individual being publicly punished. It is an emotional community based on a relationality to the emotional experience of the individual in a ritual that perverts norms of festivity and theatrical production.

In considering Early Modern festivity, I turn to Bakhtin’s ideas of the Carnival as the foundation of a model for a performed ritual based on affect or emotion. That is, for Bakhtin, the Carnival is a type of festivity, or a “second life, organized on the basis of laughter,” while I propose that the auto-da-fé is a festivity organized on the basis of shaming (8). Laughter in Carnival and shame in the auto-da-fé is also directional or relational, which does raise some critical questions about the emotional community of the audience. In his three components of Carnival laughter, Bakhtin’s second and third points say that Carnival laughter is “universal in scope; it is directed at all and everyone, including the carnival’s participants. […] Third, this laughter is ambivalent: it is gay, triumphant, and at the same time mocking, deriding” (11-2). Here, Bakhtin implies a multi-relational or multi-directional type of laughter, where anyone can laugh at anything or anyone. Additionally, the laughter in Carnival includes an aspect of playfulness and the fact that the “mocking” or “deriding” is fleeting or momentary.
Shame in the auto-da-fé is also directional and relational, but unlike the laughter of carnivalesque festivity, its distribution is not equitable among the participants. Instead, all shame is directed from the audience to the heretics. Rizi’s use of perspective reinforces this directionality in his work as the focal point of the canvas lies on the two heretics in the center during their trial. The tiered seating, the staircases in the lower portion of the canvas, and the overall high viewpoint in which Rizi places the spectator creates a linear perspective that reinforces the gaze upon those who are being shamed; it is a gaze that cannot be reciprocated.

The shaming gaze is therefore a central disposition in the social unity of the auto-da-fé audience emotional community. Like laughter during Carnival, the us-versus-them qualities of the shaming gaze during the auto-da-fé is a great equalizer of different social groups. The auto-da-fé, in its expenses, feasts, processions, religious practices, and other aspects bore certain similarities to the festivities that came along with Carnival time. But more importantly, Rizi’s depiction of the auto-da-fé audience as one collective unit problematizes Bakhtin’s observation that “carnival celebrated temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order; it marked the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions” (10). On one hand, the King and Queen Regent watch the tribunal alongside noblemen, commoners, clergy, and even other heretics who have yet to be tried. There are physical divisions among the observers of the auto-da-fé, yet the scaled uniformity of the audience as one collective group based on the public shaming of a specific individual helps dismantle some of the social hierarchies that are found in Berruguete’s panel, where Saint Dominic and the clergy in the upper half of the painting are the clear and unequivocal source of power. At the same time, Rizi does reinforce some of the social hierarchies within the uniformity of the audience, bound by their
shaming gaze and their embodiment of a collective social purity. The audience is one and equitable, but nevertheless abides by its own internal structure.

The performative and carnivalesque aspects of the public shaming practices associated with the auto-da-fé raises a question about the locus of shame in Rizi’s work: Is shame performed by the individual or the product of public performance, dependent on the audience’s gaze? Unlike Berruguete’s painting in which the experience of shame is predominantly located in the individual — either through gesture or perversions of iconography — Rizi’s work shows that shame is in fact located in the group identity of the audience. Shame, in this reading of the Auto-da-fé in the Plaza Mayor, is therefore not a feeling in a traditional sense, but rather a social product produced by the institutions of the Holy Office and the shared values of a society who seeks to enforce punishment on those who defy Catholic doctrines in an effort to reestablish social order.

**Goya and the Shamed Individual**

From a theoretical standpoint, Foucault’s claim that the audience is the “main character” of the public punishment seems obvious; after all the “public” is the raison d’être of a public punishment. Nonetheless, the act of representation allows for certain artists to shift the focus back to the individual, making the shamed heretic the “main character” of the work. Such is the case in Francisco de Goya y Lucientes’ early nineteenth-century work, Escena de Inquisición, also known as The Inquisition Tribunal, currently part of the collection at the Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando in Madrid.¹³⁷

¹³⁷ See Appendix A, Fig. 3.
Goya’s oil on panel depicts an Inquisition tribunal but in a very different context than the autos-da-fé found in the works of Berruguete or Rizi, a difference scholars have already noted. Janis Tomlinson, for example, notes how a comparison of the two paintings illustrates “the changing attitude in Spain toward the Inquisition,” emphasizing the transition in Inquisitorial practices from the grandiose celebrations of the auto-da-fé spectacle to the weakening of the Holy Office’s power and more restrained punishment practices (18). Tomlinson further contends:

[Goya’s] scene is not intended to be read literally; it is, rather, a meditation on the dark forces that color modern perception of Spain. [...] Goya assumes the stance of an outsider before the events of Spanish history, a perspective informed by the French Enlightenment view of Spain as a land of oppression and superstition. His ability to distance himself from his subject — in contrast with Rizi, who can only accept and report — attests to his own modernity, as he contemplates Spain’s history and also contributes to the construction of that past in historical memory. (18-9)

From a historical perspective, Tomlinson’s reading of these works does contextualize Spain’s dark history of the practice of autos-da-fé in the rapidly changing times of modernity and the Enlightenment. However, Goya does not distance himself from the subject, nor is he an outsider. Instead he puts himself within the tribunal space and the perspective of the work allows Goya, and in turn the viewer, to become a part of the crowd that observes the tribunal.

The Inquisition Tribunal is also a work that is charged with emotion and reflects Goya’s critiques of Spain’s antiquated institution of the Holy Office. For this reason I propose a counter-argument to Tomlinson, that beyond the physical space, Goya’s dramatic use of emotion — expressed through gesture and through the use of light in the work — actually draws intimate
connections between Goya, his subject, and the spectator. The portrayal of the heretic’s experience of shame allows for Goya’s critiques of Spain’s political institutions to be read through the emotional experience of the individual as opposed to the collective emotional performance of the masses.

Painted toward the end of Goya’s life, around 1815, and toward the end of the Inquisition’s power in Spain — the institution would be disbanded in 1834 — the artist brings the process of public punishment into a dark gothic interior space. The dark colors and heavy use of shadow evokes the tenebrism of the Baroque masters Goya studied throughout his life. This darkness, as well as the relative thickness of his brush stroke, obscures the audience of onlookers in the background which fades into an anonymous mob eventually lacking human form entirely. In the foreground of the work, a single source of light from above partially illuminates the space, especially highlighting one column, a judge on a raised platform reading from a podium, and a convicted heretic who sits on a stage in his sanbenito and coroza. Visible behind the accused is a group of clergymen, whose grotesque faces emerge through the shadows of the dark hall.

The lighting and composition of the work makes the painting’s central figure the heretic who sits on the platform listening to his judicial decision. He is the ultimate embodiment of public shaming. His costuming — the wearing of the sanbenito and coroza — reinforces the public shaming practices we have seen earlier in this chapter, and the heretic is the recipient of the implied critical gaze of the mob that watches from the shadows. Recalling the gestures of shame we examined above in Berruguete’s work, the main character of Goya’s panel also exhibits the physical indicators of shame in a highly dramatic way. His reclined and slouched,
posture exaggerates his downturned head and eyes, and in this work, the redness of his face might imply a rush of blood to the face in a state of embarrassment.

In making the heretic the main character of the work, Goya allows for the spectator to sympathize with the accused man by reading his body language and expressions of shame, forging a connection between the viewer and the emotional state of the individual who is subjected to the cruelty of the Inquisition. If we recall from Chapter Four, Daniel Gross examines sympathy from the perspective of mutual understanding: “In order to be moved by the grief or joy of another [...] we must be informed of the cause and be familiar with the relevant characters” (Secret 173). In Goya’s artwork, the viewer is able to be moved by the heretic’s shame in spite of his anonymity because he or she is familiar with the cultural context and the ideology of the “relevant characters.” The Inquisition was weak and unpopular at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, and Goya had already made his opinions of the Holy Office profoundly clear in his corpus of work. Goya himself had been investigated by the Inquisition for depicting obscenity in his Maja desnuda, so he was familiar with the dealings of the institution and its stifling of open thought (Hughes 333).

The viewer’s sympathy for the accused heretic is notably reinforced by other figures in the work. His shame-filled face contrasts with the grotesquely shadowed faces of the clergy behind him. Goya here leads the spectator to make connections between the evil of the Inquisition and the shame caused by that evil. The grotesqueness of the clerics also contrasts with the views others within the work have toward the main character. To the left, a political figure — considered by Robert Hughes as the magistrate of the trial (Goya 336) — sits on an ornate red chair with his right leg extended in front of him. While relaxed in his posture, he gazes
longingly upward toward the heretic with a downturned mouth, almost as if he feels sorry for the man being punished. His clothing and positioning distinguish him, and his sympathetic gaze, from the religious attendees, draws a stark divide between the pathos of the State versus that of the Church in the waning moments of the Inquisition. On the right-hand side, three other heretics are seated in full costume either awaiting their turn for or having just received their sentences from the Holy Office. While one of these men rests his elbows on his legs and stares downward toward the ground full of shame, another’s head is turned slightly, frowning, as he watches the man on trial, potentially fearing his own decision that awaits him.

Goya’s emotions-based critiques of the Inquisition is also the result of his increasing interest in reflecting his critical views of the realities of Spanish life in the shadow of the Enlightenment. John Moffitt notes:

Particularly in his expressionistic later works, Goya transcended mere realism in order to impose his naturalistic commitment — hence, ethical sense — upon perceptions of a disillusioning world. By his increasing attachment to social commentary, including an implicit proletarian self-identification, Goya returned to that native tradition which considers painting a vehicle for moral instruction as opposed to the concept of painting for art’s sake. (179)

The *Inquisition Tribunal* is certainly one of these “expressionistic later works” that is grounded in social commentary and moral instruction that seeks to humanize the victims of the Inquisition in relatable and sympathetic ways. And while the ethos of this work is darker — both literally and figuratively — and serious in tone, his critiques were not new and his recognition of public shaming practices had already appeared in his more satirical works in the preceding decades.
Goya’s etchings that predate the *Inquisition Tribunal*, including the famed *Caprichos* from the late 1790s, make it explicitly clear that Goya took a strong stand against the institution and sympathized with the victims.

For example, in *Capricho* 24, subtitled “No hubo remedio [There was no remedy],” Goya depicts a woman, naked from the waist up, on the back of a donkey being ridden through a crowd. It is an obvious scene of public shaming and public humiliation designed to represent the shaming practices of the Holy Office that we have traced through this chapter. The woman’s frowning mouth, downturned eyes, and relaxed jaw faces the viewer head-on, inviting him or her to recognize the woman’s despair as she is derided by the crowd below. Her neck is also propped up by the vertical brace, ensuring that her shame-ridden face is exposed to those who shame her. It is Goya’s title to the etching, the implication that “there was no remedy,” that fully captures the satirical nature of the image. In the words of José Manuel Matilla, the image, “junto al título *No hubo remedio*, el pintor critica el estado de superstición y obscurantismo que aún persistía en el pueblo español” (170). For Goya, the dependency of Spanish society on old modes of judgement and punishment was an antiquated way of issuing justice in a more enlightened time.

**CONCLUSIONS: THE LOCUS OF PUBLIC SHAMING**

In all of the works examined in this chapter, the relationship between the individual and the group plays an important role in the works’ compositions. For Berruguete, the ambiguities surrounding his painting’s context of creation manifest in an almost equal division of emotional

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138 See Appendix A. Fig. 4.

139 “Together with the title, “There was no remedy,” the painter criticizes the status of superstition and obscurantism that persisted in Spanish society.”
experience throughout the panel, where the upper and lower registers of the work complement each other in ways that find an emotional balance between the heretics below, the clergy above, and the pardoned heretic whose framing bisects the work as a whole. For Rizi, whose work seeks to celebrate the Inquisition’s grandiose and elaborate rituals, a sense of individuality and individual emotional experience is lost among the experience of the crowd, which Foucault calls the main character of the public punishment event. This approach to the *auto-da-fé* is turned upside down in Goya’s *Tribunal*, where the heretic becomes the main feature of the work. Here, Goya’s Enlightenment dispositions that favor the individual in contrast to the grotesque institution of the Church make the shameful experience of a tried heretic the focal point of his work.

Together, these paintings reflect one of the largest questions that lies at the heart of the field of the History of Emotions: Where are emotions located? A comparative approach to the above representations of Inquisitorial practices from the fifteenth century to the nineteenth shows that when it comes to pinpointing the locus of the emotional experience of public shaming, there is no wrong answer. That is, in the process of public shaming, emotion lies both in the shamed individual and the shaming public that watches. Without the public, there would be no shame for the individual since the foundation of public punishment is, as Foucault says, the “public.” Yet at the same time, the individual being punished feels shame, for their wrongdoings and out of humiliation of the punishment itself.
CONCLUSIONS

I wish to return to Sancho IV’s quotation that “vergüença es el mejor castigo del mundo,” and the challenges that come with translating this phrase: that shame is the best punishment in the world, and that shame is the best advice, or lesson, in the world. This challenge in translation exemplifies the complexities of shame and its place in pre-modern Iberian society. On one hand, shame-as-punishment — “castigo” in the sense that Nebrija defines it: castigatio or punitio — capitalizes on the emotion and the feeling of shame that one might experience when being exposed to judgement or pain, as is the case in the auto-da-fé or after being dishonored. On the other hand, having a sense of shame is one of the most important pieces of advice someone could receive. A sense of shame is what makes men chivalrous and honorable, and women virtuous and wise. Having a sense of shame means you are a descendant of the fallen Garden of Eden, and means that you cover yourself when naked. In just a few words, Sancho alludes to the intricacies of vergüença that the corpus of materials I have chosen demonstrates and reckons with.

I have defined shame as “an affect by which an individual recognizes his or her public disgrace — or potential for disgrace — in the eyes of others and under established norms of social behavior within a given cultural community.” It is a definition that recognizes the need for the “self” as stipulated by psychology, but also emphasizes an openness to cultural influences. Throughout this project, I have argued for an understanding of shame as a social construction through an analysis of shame’s representation in the cultural production of pre-modern Iberia. In each of these chapters, I have demonstrated how shame is tightly linked to different cultural and historical dispositions; we have looked at shame’s relationship to the sex/gender system, its place in nation-building and cultural memory, its destabilization in the colonial Contact Zone, and its
fundamental place in Early Modern punishment. Iberia’s literary and artistic history both represents experiences of shame, and at times shapes how shame is — or should be — experienced by audiences. Conduct manuals, for example, illustrate how shame was a key component of medieval behavioral norms, and due to their prescriptive nature dictate how shame is expressed or felt. Additionally, works of this corpus show just how widespread ideas of shame were throughout Iberian society at the time. In the Portuguese chronicles, it is telling that shame — either the presence or absence of shame — is one of the first and often recurring observations chroniclers make about newly discovered communities.

Although it is not the primary discussion of this project, the role of Genesis 3 as the foundation of Western notions of shame should not be underestimated. It is an omnipresent force in any study of shame, especially in any Judeo-Christian culture. Each of the chapters in this project seeks to shed light on this foundational story, whether in terms of the Fall’s connection to nudity or in terms of the need for redemption upon being shamed. While this is an important component of my work, and future work on shame, it is worth remembering the cultural limitations and that Genesis 3 is the root of a Western Judeo-Christian notion of shame, and is in no way universal. Chapter Four, in part, seeks to combat these limitations, but there is room for further studies that continue to challenge this Western view.

While this dissertation addresses some of these cultural factors and, as a whole, promotes the use of emotions as a meaningful source for the expansion of certain pre-modern Iberian paradigms — such as gender and race — there is still much work to be done. And, as literary and artistic works continue to find their footing in emotions discourse, shame is one emotion that begs to be more properly understood and examined across cultures and across time.
Figure 1: Pedro Berruguete, *Saint Dominic Presiding Over an Auto-da-Fé*. c. 1495, Museo del Prado, Madrid.
Figure 2: Francisco Rizi, *Auto da Fé in the Plaza Mayor of Madrid*. 1683, Museo del Prado, Madrid.
Figure 3: Francisco de Goya y Lucientes, *The Inquisition Tribunal*. c. 1815, Real Academia de Bellas Artes de San Fernando, Madrid.
Figure 4: Francisco de Goya y Lucientes. *Capricho 24 (No hubo remedio).* 1797-1799, Museo del Prado, Madrid.
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