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By

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During the 1980s, public diplomacy campaigns on both sides of the Atlantic competed for moral, political, and scientific legitimacy in debates over arms control, the deployment of new missile systems, ballistic missile defense, and the consequences of nuclear war. The U.S. and U.K. governments, led respectively by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, and backed by a network of think tanks and political organizations associated with the New Right, sought to win public support for a policy of Western nuclear superiority over the Soviet bloc. Transatlantic peace movement and scientific communities, in contrast, promoted the language and logic of arms reduction as an alternative to the arms race. Their campaigns produced new approaches for relating scientific knowledge and the voice of previously neglected groups such as women, racial minorities, and the poor, to the public debate to illuminate the detrimental effects of reliance on nuclear weapons for Western society. The conflict between these simultaneously domestic and transnational campaigns transformed the nature of diplomacy and public diplomacy, in which official and unofficial actors engaged transnational publics in order to win support for their policy preferences, emerged as an important complement to state-based institutional channels of international relations.
The public dimension of diplomacy that flourished in the “nuclear 1980s” altered American and British perceptions of the Cold War, creating space for Western leaders to respond positively to moves by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to deescalate and demilitarize the Cold War. The Thatcher government exploited Britain’s position as an essential conduit for U.S.-Soviet diplomacy and as an independent nuclear actor, even as elements of British society embraced disarmament ideas. Years of competing with the antinuclear movement for public support and the influence of the Thatcher government led Reagan and his second Secretary of State George Shultz, to engage with Gorbachev in efforts to end the arms race and the Cold War. Thus, although the antinuclear movement initially failed to prevent the deployment and development of new nuclear systems, it succeeded in creating a climate in which major nuclear arms reductions agreements could be reached.
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To my wife, Kelly.
You have provided immeasurable love and support during the writing of this dissertation, and always.

To my father, Marshall.
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### GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND TERMS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-ballistic missile; a system designed to target and destroy incoming ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACDA</td>
<td>Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>American Friends Service Committee (United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAT</td>
<td>Anti-satellite weapon; a weapon designed to destroy satellites in space.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>British Atlantic Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ballistic missile</td>
<td>A multi-phase missile that does not rely on aerodynamic lift and follows a ballistic trajectory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic missile defense; a system for defending against incoming ballistic missiles, see ABM.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLW</td>
<td>Council for a Livable World.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (United Kingdom).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Church of England.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterforce</td>
<td>Nuclear targeting doctrine that prioritizes enemy military targets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countervalue</td>
<td>Nuclear targeting doctrine that prioritizes enemy population and economic centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Committee on the Present Danger (United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Committee for Peace through Security (United Kingdom).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Conservative Research Department (United Kingdom).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cruise missile</td>
<td>A guided missile using aerodynamic lift, usually slower than ballistic missiles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dense pack</td>
<td>A concept for basing the MX missile.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>END</td>
<td>European Nuclear Disarmament (United Kingdom).</td>
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</table>
ESPRIT: European Strategic Program for Research in Information Technology

ESR: Educators for Social Responsibility (United States).

FAS: Federation of American Scientists (United States).

FBS: Forward-based systems; U.S. weapon systems based outside of the United States that are capable of striking targets within the Soviet mainland.

FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom).

FOR: Fellowship of Reconciliation.

freeze: A concept for checking the arms race by first freezing the size of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, and then freezing other aspects of nuclear programs including testing; also, the largest antinuclear organization in the United States in the 1980s.

FV 84: Freeze voter 84.

GCW: Greenham Common Women Peace Encampment (United Kingdom).

GLCM: Ground-launched cruise missile, see cruise missile.

hardened site: A site constructed to withstand a nuclear blast.

ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile; a fixed or mobile missile that can deliver warheads in excess of 5,500 kilometers and follows a sub-orbital ballistic trajectory. Ranges defined by SALT/SALT II Treaty.

INF: Intermediate-range nuclear forces; land based missiles and aircraft with a range/combat radius between the battle field and 5,500 kilometers.

JCS: The Joint Chiefs of Staff for the U.S. military.

JWP: Jobs with Peace (United States).

kiloton: Nuclear yield equal to one thousand tons of TNT.
MAD: Mutual assured destruction; a concept of strategic stability under which rivals are deterred from launching a nuclear attack because each possess the nuclear capability to destroy the other in a counter-attack.

megaton: Nuclear yield equal to one million tons of TNT.

Midgetman: A small highly accurate and mobile ICBM carrying a single warhead.

MIRV: Multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles; multiple reentry vehicles carried on a ballistic missile that can be directed at separate targets.

MoD: Ministry of Defence (United Kingdom).

MX ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile capable of carrying ten nuclear warheads, renamed “Peacekeeper” by Reagan administration.

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

national technical means: Assets under national control, including photo and aerial reconnaissance, satellites, radars, and other tools used to monitor arms control compliance.

NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; an international agreement designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries and the increase in size of existing nuclear arsenals. Signed 1968, enters into force 1970.


NST: Nuclear and Space Talks.

NVDA: Non-violent direct action.

NWFZ: Nuclear Weapon Free Zone movement.

OTA: Office of Technology Assessment (United States).

Pershing II: Intermediate range ballistic missiles (United States).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSR:</td>
<td>Physicians for Social Responsibility (United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RACE:</td>
<td>Research for Advance Communications in Europe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAGE:</td>
<td>Ratepayers Against the Greenham Encampments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT:</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT II:</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, negotiation that take place after initial treaty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANA:</td>
<td>Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (United Kingdom).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SANE:</td>
<td>Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy; also papers of SANE (United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC:</td>
<td>Standing Consultative Commission; a permanent U.S.-Soviet commission to implement and maintain SALT agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOPE-ENUWAR:</td>
<td>A study from the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment on the environmental effects of nuclear war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDI:</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative; a defense project comprised of the development and future deployment of multiple types of ABM capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDIO:</td>
<td>Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP:</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party (United Kingdom).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSOD:</td>
<td>Special Session on Disarmament in the United Nations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START:</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>throw-weight:</td>
<td>Weight of a missile that can be placed on a target trajectory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident I (C-4):</td>
<td>A submarine-launched ballistic missile (United States).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trident II (D-5):</td>
<td>A submarine-launched ballistic missile with improved range and accuracy over the Trident I (United States).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TTAPS: The initials of the authors of the nuclear winters study, often used as an acronym to reference the study; authors in order, R.P. Turco, O.B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, Carl Sagan.

TUC: Trade Union Congress (United Kingdom).

UCS: Union of Concern Scientists (United States).

WAND: Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament.

warhead: The explosive component of a nuclear weapon.

WFD: Women and Families for Defense (United Kingdom).

WILPF: Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

WPA: Women’s Pentagon Action.

WPS: Women’s Party for Survival (United States).
	yard: Energy released in an explosion, usually expressed in terms of TNT equivalent.
INTRODUCTION

Eminent British historian and antinuclear activist E.P. Thompson and U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposed each other in a heavily-promoted debate at the Oxford Union on 27 February 1984, at a time of peak Cold War anxiety. Organizers billed the event as historic, with Weinberger becoming the first sitting U.S. defense secretary to participate in an Oxford Union debate. It also marked the first direct confrontation between an official representative of the Ronald Reagan administration and the British antinuclear movement. The motion on that evening was broad: “there is no moral difference between the foreign policies of the USA and the USSR,” but both Weinberger and Thompson refocused the debate on the competing merits of nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament. Thompson argued that the development of deterrence had pushed the United States into a belligerent military posture that eroded the moral differences between the superpowers that once existed at the beginning of the Cold War. Now, in 1984 he claimed, “there is no morality.” Weinberger countered that deterrence had in fact guaranteed U.S. moral superiority over the Soviet Union.

Weinberger justified the U.S. nuclear build-up to maintain the credibility of deterrence by suggesting that it was based not on U.S. aggression, but on a calculation of what deterred the men in the Kremlin from asserting their immoral philosophy over Western Europe and the rest of the “free world.” By a margin of 271-232, the Oxford Union voted against the motion and in favor of Weinberger’s argument that deterrence was moral because it secured Western freedoms.¹

The encounter served as the centerpiece of wider debate on the issues of deterrence and disarmament in the United States and United Kingdom. Weinberger remained in the United Kingdom to discuss the moral justifications for nuclear deterrence with leading members of the Anglican clergy and other British opinionmakers.² Thompson’s debate performance followed a lecture tour in the United States, during which he expanded upon arguments for nuclear disarmament that he had made in his widely read “Letter to America” in 1981.³ He finished his American tour in spring 1983 with a speech to the prestigious National Press Club in Washington D.C., which hosted a mixed audience of government officials, the press, and a variety of policy-interested elites.⁴

The Weinberger-Thompson debate was a remarkable convergence and display of public diplomacy, the vitality of the “special nuclear relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom, and the predominance of nuclear issues as a defining feature of American and British society in the 1980s. The intersection of these phenomena illuminates the nature of the Cold War and explanations for how and when it came to an end. Government officials, peace movement activists, and scientists developed a new form of public diplomacy to judge the technological requirements, social consequences, and security function of deterrence. These deterrence debates reshaped Americans’ and Britons’ commitment to the Cold War paradigm at home and abroad, while expanding diplomacy from private encounters between government

² Caspar Weinberger to Ronald Reagan, 29 February 1984, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RRPL) NSC Executive Secretariat, United Kingdom Country Files, Box 46.
officials into a method practiced by both state and non-state actors for building and influencing the transnational public sphere. This diplomatic revolution elevated the influence of public opinion in nuclear policymaking.

Understanding the new public diplomacy necessitates a reconceptualization of diplomatic actors and the practice of diplomacy in a globalizing world. This new public diplomacy was both an instrument that U.S. and U.K. government officials utilized to achieve their desired nuclear policies and a reorientation of the relationship between the transnational antinuclear movement, the public sphere, and government officials. Peace movement activists may not have thought of themselves as public diplomats, but they often behaved as such. If Weinberger’s appearance at the Oxford Union was an act of public diplomacy by the U.S. government, then Thompson’s participation in the debate should be considered public diplomacy on behalf of the peace movement.

The many definitions of public diplomacy make it both a challenging and rewarding organizing principle for studying the nuclear developments of the 1980s. Bruce Gregory attributes the lack of consensus regarding the analytical boundaries of public diplomacy as a product of its “sunrise as an academic field.”

State actors’ behavior reflected Joseph Nye’s taxonomy of public diplomacy practices, which he deems an exercise of “soft power.” According to Nye, public diplomacy involves routine communications that explain the context of specific policy decisions to both a domestic and foreign press, and to other elites known to be public opinion influencers. A second feature of public diplomacy is strategic communication of simple themes delivered through symbolic events and speeches by government and non-government actors. Lastly, public diplomacy hinges on a “two-way flow” of information and influence between official and unofficial actors through activities such as educational exchanges or overseas conferences and political tours.\(^7\) Nye’s definition hews closely to the terms used in the 1980s by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy to conduct oversight of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and other U.S. government public diplomacy operations.\(^8\) Official records from the Reagan administration also bring these categories to life. What is unique about the Reagan administration is the degree to which officials deliberated policies via the circulation of talking points, question and answer guide sheets, speech drafts, and other forms of internal communications concerned primarily with the public presentation of policies.

The rise of global civil society and empowerment of transnational social collectives beginning in the 1970s and 1980s have led others to question whether “diplomacy is solely the domain of the state” and bring the “public” back into the study of public diplomacy.\(^9\) Manuel Castells sees public diplomacy as a form of negotiation


between civil society and the state. He claims, “public diplomacy is the diplomacy of the public, that is, the projection in the international arena of the values and ideas of the public.”\(^\text{10}\) For Castells, public diplomacy involves the development of a common language and meaning by “social collectives,” which then facilitates the realization of their power and interests in public policy.\(^\text{11}\) John Robert Kelley argues that the age of diplomacy as a state-based institution has given way to an era of diplomacy classified as a behavior which is exhibited by non-state actors who mobilize transnational networks and master information communication technologies. Without the authority derived from serving as official political representatives, these non-state actors depend upon their moral legitimacy to be effective public diplomats.\(^\text{12}\) Ronald Reagan also identified the “moral element” as a pillar of his administration’s public diplomacy, which presented American society as a city set upon a hill to international publics to distinguish the United States from the Soviet Union.\(^\text{13}\) Thus, the moral framing of the Weinberger-Thompson debate made it both a public diplomacy exercise, and a real-time assessment of public diplomacy as practiced by the Reagan administration and its transnational peace movement opponents.

The highly technical nature of nuclear weapons made changes in the production and communication of scientific knowledge a feature of the public diplomacy revolution. Scholars have demonstrated that nuclear issues and science diplomacy evolved hand-in-hand.

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\(^{11}\) Ibid., 91.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 286-305.

hand, but they have yet to explore the public dimension of this relationship. They have focused instead on private approaches to science diplomacy or on the developing relationship between science communication and domestic politics during the Cold War. Early Cold War scientific opposition to the nuclear arms race coalesced into organizations that aimed to influence governing elites and fellow scientists rather than inform mass antinuclear activism. This style of private science diplomacy can be characterized by scientists’ attempts to leverage their expertise in exclusive exchanges with national officials or close surrogates to directly influence nuclear policies. Matthew Evangelista and Kai-Henrik Barth show that this private approach to science diplomacy helped generate political will for nuclear arms control among the leadership of the Soviet Union in the final years of the 1980s.

The expanding practice of science diplomacy related to nuclear weapons—as well as the depletion of the ozone layer, climate change, international public health, and other issues—has led to an increasing awareness among academics of the paucity of scholarship on the characteristics of science diplomacy. Much of the small body of literature on science diplomacy has framed scientists as agents of soft power in service of the state abroad. The British Royal Society and the American Association for the

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Advancement of Science identified three modes of science diplomacy, all of which relate to the state in some way and thus are akin to private science diplomacy in that they privilege direct influence over policy. “Science in diplomacy” is the use of scientific advice to inform foreign policy. “Diplomacy for science” refers to measures that advance international scientific cooperation. Lastly, “science for diplomacy” means the use of scientific cooperation to improve international relations between countries.\(^\text{18}\) Under this widely adopted framework, both private science diplomacy initiatives such as those explored by Evangelista and Barth and state-directed science diplomacy are considered effective tools for building international consensus because “scientific values of rationality, transparency, and universality are the same the world over,” and because “science provides a non-ideological environment for the participation and free exchange of ideas between people.”\(^\text{19}\)

Historians of science have demonstrated, however, that cultural, social, moral, and political environments inform scientific practices, including those within what is currently called “science diplomacy.” Opposition to the Vietnam War radicalized part of the scientific community and stimulated science activism, which consequently altered research agendas and funding arrangements between the state and academia.\(^\text{20}\) During the 1980s in the United States, scientific debates over nuclear winter and the Strategic


\(^{19}\) Ibid., 15.

Defense Initiative (SDI) politicized science and transformed the relationship between scientific practice, peer review, and public communication.21

An analysis of public science diplomacy helps to develop a more comprehensive view of scientists’ role as diplomats contributing to the end of the Cold War by considering the domestic transformation of science as part of a contest between non-state antinuclear actors and pronuclear governments that crafted the messages about nuclear weapons for public consumption. Public science diplomacy refers to a broad range of activities in which experts draw on their technical authority to influence policy indirectly by shaping public attitudes, both foreign and domestic. In the 1980s, a key strain of public science diplomacy aimed to expose the risks of nuclear deterrence. Examples of public science diplomacy include: scientific studies on the effects of nuclear war conducted for local authorities, film consultations, teach-ins on college campuses, contributions to print, radio, and other forms of popular media, service on technical advisory boards for various grassroots antinuclear organizations, overseas speaking tours, and the establishment of specialized organizations to synthesize international scientific research on nuclear problems to inform both public attitudes and official policymaking.

The interaction between the public diplomacy innovations of government, the transnational antinuclear movement, and the public engagement of the scientific community constituted a public diplomacy revolution. Contextualizing this revolution within the contours of diplomacy in the twentieth century and the broad engagement of

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Anglo-American society with nuclear issues in the 1980s helps to clarify its importance to the end of the Cold War.

The Nuclear 1980s and the End of the Cold War

Any study that deals with the end of the Cold War is on firmer ground when it introduces which Cold War, or at least which aspect of the Cold War is in focus.\(^{22}\) Superpower ideological, economic, and resource competitions have received substantial attention, as have human rights issues and military interventions in the Third World.\(^{23}\) These myriad realms of conflict have led to a multiplicity of explanations for the Cold War that cannot be simply conflated with a single dramatic endpoint.\(^{24}\) This study focuses on the nuclear dimension of the Cold War because it is the dimension that made the conflict so cold, and ultimately was the area in which the initial thaw began. When George Orwell coined the term “Cold War” in an October 1945 essay, “You and the Atom Bomb,” he presciently envisioned a future world dominated by a handful of super-states in possession of nuclear weapons. These world-ending arsenals would restrain global powers from major direct military encounters, but nonetheless keep them locked in a “peace that is no peace.”\(^{25}\) In line with Orwell’s prediction, the Cold War played out as


an “imaginary war” of theoretical exchanges between the nuclear forces of the Western and Eastern blocs, which inhibited a direct military confrontation between the superpowers but simultaneously sustained geopolitical conflict and violence in the Third World.\textsuperscript{26} While the end of traditional wars can be determined by the cessation of physical violence, the Cold War ended when nuclear war no longer dominated the public imagination and the official mind. The sharp reduction in the tools for nuclear violence signified a de-escalation of the Cold War, by 1991 the United States and Soviet Union had jointly cut their nuclear stockpiles by over 15,500 warheads from their peaks in the 1980s, but the beginning of the end commenced before this reduction when leaders and citizens of combatant states came to believe that the nuclear stalemate had been broken.\textsuperscript{27}

Framing the final decade of the Cold War as “the nuclear 1980s” underscores the transformative effect of nuclear events on the interaction between the scientific community, culture, and social movements that conditioned the public sphere in which diplomacy operated. This era began in 1979 with a dramatic increase in nuclear fear and the revival of the antinuclear movement in response to the partial meltdown of the Three Mile Island nuclear power station and NATO’s dual-track decision. Nuclear issues were perhaps most pervasive and volatile in 1983, which witnessed the announcement of the


\textsuperscript{27} More scholarly work is needed to understand how and when the general Soviet population came to believe that the Cold War had ended. On how Soviet elites and intellectuals conceived of the end of the Cold War, see Robert English, \textit{Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000); also, Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, \textit{The Last of the Superpower Summits: Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War} (Baltimore: Central European Press, 2016). On nuclear stockpiles, see Hans Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945-2013,” \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists} 69 (2013): 75-81.}
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March, a major role for nuclear debates in the British election throughout the spring, the Soviet shoot-down of Korean Airlines flight 007 in September, the public revelation of nuclear winter theory in late October, a trio of November events that included a nuclear war scare caused by NATO’s Operation Able Archer exercise, the initial deployments of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles to Europe, and the widely watched television premiere of the nuclear disaster film *The Day After*, and lastly the Soviet walkout of arms control talks in December. The nuclear 1980s wound down as the political influence of the antinuclear movement diminished after 1984, and came to a close with the bilateral summits that led to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987 and the subsequent peaceful end to the Cold War. These flashpoints, and other nuclear events throughout the decade, proved critical in stimulating an evolution in how diplomacy related to the public sphere.

“Nuclear 1980s” is an especially germane framing of key developments in Anglo-American society at the end of the Cold War, though admittedly not exclusive to it. Lawrence Wittner’s seminal work on the global antinuclear movement has inspired a cascade of follow-on studies showing that nuclear anxiety motivated people to become politically active in the Western world more than any other issue. Daniel Cordle

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adopted the nuclear 1980s perspective to analyze late Cold War Anglo-American nuclear literature as a representation of transnational gender, environmental, and political debates. Cordle argues, “the whole topography of the decade, comprising cultural, social, geopolitical, domestic political, economic, technological, and scientific features, was both shaped by and shaped nuclear preoccupations.”

Nuclear culture productions—television programming, literature, music, films, video games, fine art, and fashion chief among them—became key to bonding nuclear themes to other concerns in Anglo-American society. Pronuclear attitudes also became intertwined with the contentious transnational rise of neoliberalism as the prevailing political and economic order in the United States and the United Kingdom under the leadership of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher.

Nuclear politics emerged as the primary focus of public diplomacy in the 1980s. In the spring of 1981, Kenneth Adelman, Deputy U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and eventually the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Reagan, predicted in Foreign Affairs, “public diplomacy…may become Washington’s major growth industry in the coming years…Public diplomacy is the component of international affairs [Reagan] knows best and does best. It has the makings of becoming a hallmark of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy.”

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appear prophetic. In September 1987, amidst preparations for the last of the bilateral summits that de-escalated U.S.-Soviet nuclear tensions and eventually brought about a resolution to the Cold War, Reagan commented, “I believe that our public diplomacy represents a powerful force, perhaps the most powerful force at our disposal for shaping the history of the world.”

Reagan’s remarks reflected dramatic progress in the field of public diplomacy, both in regard to its elevated importance to national security policymaking and in how the administration sought to disseminate its policies and values overseas.

Many Reagan administration veterans including Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Council Director for Arms Control Sven Kraemer argue that public diplomacy played a major role in the formulation of Reagan’s nuclear policies and in ensuring public support for them in the United States and Europe. Some scholars have credited these developments with the rehabilitation of U.S. public diplomacy. Carnes Lord, a political scientist and Reagan’s Director of International Communications and Information Policy on the National Security Council, referred to this period as the “golden age of American public diplomacy.”

Historian and former State Department official N. Stephen Kane recognizes the Reagan administration for the “innovation of the public diplomacy regime.”

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Though scholars and former officials are for the most part unanimous in their assessment that the Reagan administration prioritized public nuclear diplomacy, no such consensus exists regarding its effectiveness. Disagreement over Reagan’s public diplomacy can in part be explained by a focus on different events, audiences, and agents for public diplomacy. N. Stephen Kane judges Reagan’s public diplomacy efforts to be a failure because the president’s official communications team proved ineffective at generating a positive change in U.S. public opinion polls on both the MX intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and SDI. In contrast, Carnes Lord sees the Reagan administration’s persuasion of Western European publics to accept deployments of intermediate range nuclear forces in the fall of 1983 as proof of an effective public diplomacy operation.

To focus exclusively on the effects of government directed public diplomacy on either domestic or foreign nuclear attitudes misses the transnational interactions between non-state actors that condition the public sphere. Both scholars and Reagan’s public diplomacy practitioners at the time recognized that transnational interactions between American and British publics occurred with far greater regularity in the emergent information age than in earlier periods and contributed to an ongoing revolution in public diplomacy.

Pronuclear public diplomacy in the nuclear 1980s revolved around selling the merits of deterrence as both an international security relationship and a domestic social

38 Kane, Selling Reagan’s Foreign Policy, 117-184.
contract. In practice this meant persuading citizens that protection of their freedoms from hostile foreign actors by their countries’ nuclear arsenal did not infringe on their freedoms, or at the very least that the benefits of deterrence outweighed its detrimental effects for government transparency, economic opportunity, and equal representation of all citizens in decision-making processes related to defense and democracy. This posed a significant challenge given that deterrence rested on secrecy, the veneration of specific forms of technical expertise, and by extension the exclusion of other forms of knowledge.

Fred Kaplan, Lynn Eden, Paul Erickson, Hugh Gusterson, and others have demonstrated that strategic analysts based at a small number of think tanks, military engineers and experts, scientists at national laboratories, and high-ranking nuclear policymakers constituted a “technical priesthood” or a body of “defense intellectuals” who constructed deterrence by asserting control over how to define the problem of nuclear war and what processes and expertise could be employed to devise a solution for survival.41 Their authority obscured, or tried to, the risks of nuclear conflict from wider view. In this regard, they developed deterrence as both a strategic concept and as a related technological system that rationalized the compatibility of weapons and

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components in the U.S. and British nuclear arsenals, which functioned as a “black box” whose internal operations need not be understood.\textsuperscript{42}

Deterrence thinking, especially when formatted for public diplomacy, perpetuated the Cold War. British scholar Michael MccGwire argued that the Western construct of “deterrence dogma increased international tension by fueling the arms race and fostering a paranoid approach to arms control negotiations…. [which] encouraged exaggerated, moralistic rhetoric directed at domestic constituencies as well as opponents.”\textsuperscript{43} Given MccGwire’s argument that the rigid rationalities, or rather irrationalities, of defense intellectuals had kept deterrence thinking frozen in the mold of the early Cold War and thus sustained the conflict, the peace movement’s project to replace the language of deterrence with the language of disarmament should be understood as a critical step in ending the Cold War in American and British minds.\textsuperscript{44} Antinuclear public diplomacy endeavored to open up the black box of deterrence and show how its parameters neglected, minimized, or overlooked a variety of risks. Non-state antinuclear actors accomplished this by relating the cost of preparing for nuclear war to economic, social, racial, and gender inequality, a lack of government transparency, compromised collective morals, the degradation of the natural environment, the corruption of scientific standards and norms, and even to clear-minded strategic planning.

The practice of public diplomacy by antinuclear actors occurred in local, national, and transnational contexts. Local and national antinuclear actors in the United States and

\textsuperscript{42} For more on the meaning of “black box” as an analytical device, see Langdon Winner, “Upon Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty: Social Constructivism and the Philosophy of Technology,” \textit{Science, Technology, & Human Values} 18 (Summer 1993): 365.


\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 774, 780-781.
the United Kingdom engaged in domestic battles with pronuclear conservative national
governments over what vision of a (non)-nuclear society should be disseminated to the
world. They used many of the same public diplomacy tools and strategies employed by
their official counterparts. American and British antinuclear actors produced their own
journals and films for routine communication of alternative policy positions. They
established long-term durable relationships between elites and foreign publics through
joint protest activities. They developed simple yet symbolic themes around which to
make a case for disarmament such as the “nuclear freeze” and “protest and survive.”
They even cooperated with foreign governments at the sub-national level to advance their
interests.

Public science diplomacy also occurred at local, national, and transnational levels.
At times, this was achieved by integrating local politics and scientific knowledge as well
as by partnering with organizations, such as the Catholic Church, with significant
influence at the community level. The British film *Threads* was the first cinematic
representation of nuclear winter in 1984. Set it in Sheffield, a municipality whose
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone status represented a successful convergence of political and
social critiques of the Thatcher government’s support for nuclear deterrence, *Threads*’
visual depiction of nuclear winter, a theory proposed by American scientists, provided a
scientific vindication of domestic political opposition to Thatcher’s broader neoliberal
program for British society, which had been framed as a justification for deterrence.

Public diplomacy practice by non-state antinuclear actors reoriented communities
around an ideational space—specifically a progressive antinuclear space that assimilated
environmental, feminist, racial, labor, moral, and scientific concerns into a critique of
deterrence—rather than geographical place. The “paradiplomatic” activities of antinuclear actors detached protest communities, which included municipal nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ), antinuclear religious congregations, and all-female protest encampments, from their traditional hierarchical political geographies and realigned them into a horizontal transnational antinuclear community.45

Despite the global scope of Cold War public diplomacy, literature on the subject has predominantly focused on institutional histories of U.S. government agencies and the effects of U.S. public diplomacy efforts east of the Iron Curtain or on Gorbachev’s deft manipulation of the media and courtship of Western Europe.46 The Anglo-American context provides a uniquely beneficial case study for illuminating how the public diplomacy revolution that took hold in the scientific community, within the antinuclear movement, and at the official level brought about a reduction in nuclear tension and helped end the Cold War. Bringing in the British perspective expands this coverage and in so doing answers the call of Michael Cox, who argues that U.S.-centric narratives distort our understanding of how the Cold War came to an end by neglecting the role of


foreign partners and non-state actors in making their own histories. Examining British agency in public nuclear diplomacy also provides another comparative case to pair with studies that analyze the effect of Gorbachev’s public diplomacy, especially in light of Archie Brown’s argument that Gorbachev considered Thatcher’s public endorsements essential to the creation of a positive Western perception of his policy reforms.

Viewing public nuclear diplomacy as a force that animated and shaped the “special relationship” between the United States and the United Kingdom reconciles a divorce between the robust body of scholarship on Anglo-American nuclear cooperation, which far surpassed any other two states in the world, and work on the social and cultural dimensions of that nuclear relationship. One of the reasons that public nuclear diplomacy played such a dynamic role in the Anglo-American relationship is because of the high integration of both countries’ nuclear establishments dating back to the Manhattan Project. Britain depended upon the United States for nuclear testing facilities and for its primary deterrent force composed of U.S.-supplied Polaris and Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The United States relied on the United Kingdom for forward nuclear-basing facilities both on the British Isles and around the world, and for diplomatic assistance on nuclear matters concerning NATO and the Soviet Union. Together they spearheaded non-proliferation efforts, such as the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and joint working groups on new technologies and intelligence methods to counter proliferation. Countless other areas of nuclear cooperation existed, including on trilateral comprehensive test ban talks in the 1970s. Much scholarship on these topics

suggests that shared geostrategic and security interests as determined by high-ranking officials is what sustained Anglo-American nuclear cooperation rather than transnational social, cultural, linguistic, or intellectual affinities. As Holger Nehring demonstrated in the shared British and West German case, these types of transnational ties deserve consideration for they contribute to the discourse and interpretations of collective memories that define shared strategic and security interests. This process is perhaps even more relevant in the Anglo-American case given the shared use of the English language. American and British public diplomats did not have to contend with loss of symbolic meaning from the translation of phrases such as “peace through strength,” or “protest and survive,” which helped shape the public’s understanding of deterrence and disarmament.

Reagan’s and Thatcher’s public diplomacy sought to craft memories of peace to manage the social and cultural aspects of security and deterrence. They held inter-generational conflict responsible for public antinuclear sentiment, believing that a younger generation of Westerners condemned the Reagan administration’s nuclear policies because they had not borne witness to the U.S.-led liberation and reconstruction of Western Europe in the 1940s and 1950s. “Peace through strength,” the symbolic


message at the heart of Reagan’s and Thatcher’s public nuclear diplomacy, was itself an allusion to “situations of strength,” the premise that mandated the principle of U.S. nuclear superiority as key to both its security relationship with the Soviet Union and the incorporation of Western Europe into the United States’ sphere of influence during the 1940s and 1950s. Paul Nitze, who had served in the upper echelons of the national security policy apparatus since the Truman administration, played a crucial role in the design and implementation of both ideas. In other words, pronuclear advocates justified their deterrence commitments with memories of decisive U.S. action in the early Cold War when Washington policymakers enjoyed indisputable nuclear superiority, while antinuclear activists recalled the excesses of the Cold War that led to the Vietnam War and increasing cost of the arms race to argue for disarmament over deterrence.

The emergence of public diplomacy in the nuclear 1980s is historically significant because it marks the beginning of a period in international relations in which public opinion took on a greater role in shaping U.S. and British foreign policy and diplomacy. This moment also represents a turning point in the history of the antinuclear movement, as antinuclear activism transitioned from its earlier nationalistic orientation supported in public by less powerful groups in society to a transnational public diplomacy operation that acquired a high degree of political respectability. Unpacking this change provides lessons for the study of science in relation to global politics, specifically by defining how scientists behaved as public diplomats and opened a new track for science diplomacy heading into the twenty-first century. All of these developments show the special

relationship was found not just at the level of official cooperation, but also in common
dissent expressed through shared language, culture, and modes of unofficial political
organization. Both provided a foundation for the further growth of transnational
conservatism and progressive politics. These transformations were the product of a
deeper questioning of the Cold War and the deterrence model that sustained it in Western
perception and politics for forty years. The real challenge facing Anglo-American public
diplomats in the 1980s was how to bring the Cold War to an end, with increased
investment in deterrence or an unprecedented commitment to disarmament. The tension
between those proposed solutions and their effects for resolving the nuclear Cold War in
the Anglo-American mind shaped the nuclear 1980s.

**Chapter Overview**

Chapter one examines the Reagan administration’s efforts in 1981-1982 to
transform his critique of U.S.-Soviet détente and his nostalgia for nuclear superiority into
a specific program for U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. The administration gradually
came to realize that public diplomacy had a major role to play in returning the United
States to a position of nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Although some scholars
claim that Reagan was a deeply committed nuclear abolitionist who detested deterrence,
it is more precise to argue that Reagan abhorred Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the
deterrence formulation that underpinned détente.\(^{53}\) Reagan and his allies believed that by
codifying nuclear parity between the superpowers, MAD inhibited the ability of the
United States to contain the Soviet Union. Most of the administration’s actions in its

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early years suggest that Reagan wanted to replace MAD with nuclear superiority in order to enable the containment or even the rollback of global communism.

Reagan’s pursuit of nuclear superiority involved a build-up of the U.S. and NATO nuclear arsenal. This build-up included plans for the production and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles, intermediate range nuclear forces, an upgraded bomber fleet, modernized nuclear submarines and missiles, and enhanced strategic defenses and communications. Exit polling from the 1980 election showing the stubborn popularity of arms control and the continued political viability of antinuclear positions provided an early indication to the administration that it had to pay attention to public opinion. Public diplomacy operations emerged as a key complement to the build-up of nuclear armaments.

Chapter one also brings into view the emerging partnership between the U.S. State Department and the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, which eventually convinced the Reagan administration to take seriously transnational public opinion on Western plans to enhance deterrence. The British proved essential in persuading the U.S. administration to conceive of the audience for public diplomacy in transnational terms. British officials made a second important contribution to U.S. public diplomacy by insisting on the continuation of arms control as a strategy for managing public antinuclear attitudes. As part of this effort, they effectively lobbied for the connection between strategic arms control and negotiations that covered intermediate nuclear range forces in Europe in order to maintain NATO unity.

Chapters two through four track the dramatic manifestation of antinuclear views in transatlantic public opinion from 1980 to 1985 in response to U.S. and NATO plans
for a nuclear arms build-up, and the public nuclear diplomacy counter campaign directed by Reagan, Thatcher, and their allies. The antinuclear movements in the United States and the United Kingdom pursued the related goals of nuclear disarmament and halting the realignment of political power that appeared to favor the rise of New Right conservatism. In both countries, antinuclear public diplomacy provided a progressive coalition building experience for women, minorities, labor groups, religious leaders, and the scientific community that more thoroughly embedded their perspectives into mainstream center-left politics. They also show the importance of public science diplomacy and religious leaders’ moral critiques of nuclear deterrence for the development of municipal internationalism, which can be defined as civic ties between communities across national borders. Cooperation between local authorities and international actors facilitated the growth of a transatlantic nuclear culture and commentary that influenced U.S. approaches to arms control. Though antinuclear politics contributed to the reform of the British Labour Party and buoyed Democratic congressional candidates, these chapters also illustrate the limitations of disarmament rhetoric as a tool for thwarting Reagan’s and Thatcher’s electoral ambitions.

The rise of public antinuclear sentiment intensified government-directed public nuclear diplomacy to reinforce social consensus for deterrence. This revitalization was a jointly managed process from 1982 to 1984 that turned peace through strength into a transnational theme. Two events anchored public diplomacy in this period. Reagan’s address to the British Parliament in June 1982 rooted justifications for nuclear modernization and deployment in the family and faith politics of the transatlantic New Right. Unofficial surrogates implementing Reagan’s and Thatcher’s public nuclear
diplomacy agenda, including televangelists, think tank professionals, political activists, and journalists, reflected tight linkages between the American and British New Right.

The second event was Reagan’s introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative in March 1983, which the president considered a technological fix to the political problem posed by the peace movement. In defense of this initiative a select group of conservative scientists and their allies developed a public campaign around themes of American technological exceptionalism to deflect technical critiques of the president’s pseudo peaceful solution. The theme of American technological exceptionalism appealed to conservative moral values and Reagan’s inclination to engage in mythmaking.

Covering the period from 1983-1985, chapters five and six evaluate how Reagan and Thatcher reformatted their public diplomacy operations to manage public reactions to the demise of arms control, which the Soviets blamed on INF deployments to Europe and the U.S. pursuit of SDI. The British government worked closely with the U.S. State Department to develop a framework that made European arms control interests compatible with SDI. This crucial public diplomacy balancing act ensured a commitment to arms control that restrained the further growth of antinuclear sentiment in Europe, while permitting the continued pursuit of ballistic missile defense.

The effects of SDI on scientific communities, especially outside of the United States, proved critical to the further development of public science diplomacy.\(^5^4\)

U.S. science diplomacy aimed to persuade the Thatcher government to channel Britain’s technical talent and resources into SDI rather than direct it toward advanced technology schemes for European economic development and integration. Though the Reagan administration’s science diplomacy campaign focused on government officials, it nonetheless relied on the extensive network of think tanks and government surrogates that had been established to operate its broader public diplomacy efforts. This network helped Thatcher overcome objections to SDI from defense officials and the diplomatic corps, whose concerns revealed a conflict in geopolitical philosophies at the highest levels of the Conservative Party.

In regard to the peace movement’s public diplomacy, SDI posed a significant challenge in that it had been introduced not as a weapon to reinforce deterrence, but as a technological system that would move the world away from deterrence. Technical realities and details suggested that it was in fact an initiative to enhance deterrence and U.S. nuclear superiority. The politics of SDI grew more contentious as they became entangled with the novel scientific theory of nuclear winter. The new technical orientation of the deterrence debate combined with the failure of the peace movement’s electoral strategy led scientists to become the leading antinuclear public diplomats of the late nuclear 1980s.

The final chapter examines the blending of public and private diplomacy during the superpower summits from 1985 to 1988 that led to the end of the Cold War and highlights Britain’s role as a conduit in superpower relations. Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sought to enhance Thatcher’s role in East-West nuclear affairs.

MA: MIT Press, 2013); Paul Rubinson, Redefining Science: Scientists, the National Security State, and Nuclear Weapons in Cold War America (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016).
because he considered her the most important check on right-wing sentiment in Washington and understood that her endorsement conferred upon him public legitimacy in the West. Reagan accepted Thatcher’s assessment that the new Soviet leader’s mixture of pragmatism, charisma, and firm grasp of nuclear issues made him the most formidable public diplomacy threat of any Soviet leader since Khrushchev. The challenge posed by Gorbachev’s skillful public diplomacy led the Reagan administration to elevate public diplomacy considerations in its own summit preparations, affording a greater role for public opinion in the formulation and negotiation of nuclear arms control agreements.

Though mass peace movements faded in these years, science diplomacy remained an important source of pressure for disarmament. In both the United States and the United Kingdom anti-SDI scientists continued to pressure Western leaders publicly for arms reductions and disarmament. A variety of public science diplomacy efforts, primarily focused on SDI, kept alive the specter of the peace movement in U.S. and U.K. summit planning. Some scholars have emphasized the ways in which American scientists collaborated with Soviet counterparts and Gorbachev at official gatherings and scientific meetings. These private engagements enhanced Gorbachev’s public image of peace maker. Soviet-American scientific encounters existed in a broader world of science diplomacy in which public and private approaches bolstered the effectiveness of each track. This contributed to a change, partially initiated in Britain, of long-standing practices for science activism.

During the superpower summits, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev humanized the Soviet Union in the eyes of Reagan by appealing to the underlying moral themes that the president had stressed in his public diplomacy operations. Responding to
Gorbachev’s arms control concessions, the Reagan administration’s public diplomacy objective shifted from persuading Western publics to accept his nuclear arms build-up to promoting the perception that the Cold War was coming to a peaceful end. Though Reagan and his allies suggested this was the natural outcome of a coherent peace through strength strategy that naturally led to Soviet capitulation, the reality was drastically different. Far from being a set piece that played out according to plan, Reagan’s nuclear strategy at the end of the Cold War reflected years of engagement with the public diplomacy of the transnational peace movement and scientific community.
CHAPTER ONE:
THE SEARCH FOR A NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Ronald Reagan came to power with a comprehensive critique of détente’s failures and a basic premise for the revival of American strength. The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), to which Reagan belonged, had organized the intellectual and political assault on détente as an attack on Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. Foreign and defense policy played an unusually prominent role in the 1980 U.S. presidential election. One in three voters named national defense as the most important issue for Americans to consider at the polls. Within that category, arms control and the expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to confront the Soviet Union ranked as top issues. On these issues, candidate Reagan framed President Carter as a weak and ineffective executive, capable of only reactive responses to Soviet strategic challenges. Reagan cast himself as a strong leader by framing his plan to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal to extract political concessions from the Soviet Union, known as peace through strength, as the best path to security but also as a moral imperative.

Once in control of U.S. foreign policymaking, Reagan and his national security team faced the challenge of translating their campaign rhetoric into an actual program for

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East-West relations. Reagan’s election simultaneously seemed to validate peace through strength and fan antinuclear sentiment that had been tempered by détente and arms control. While criticisms of détente distinguished candidate Reagan from incumbent President Jimmy Carter, they did not equate to an overarching strategy for managing geopolitical confrontation with the Soviet Union. Reagan, along with the 30 plus CPD members and dozens of other neoconservatives and hardliners that he appointed to senior defense and foreign policy posts in his administration, faced the problem of the stubborn popularity that arms control retained with the American public.\(^5\) Neoconservative criticisms of détente had hinged on the idea that arms control eroded American strength vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, but in November 1980, a Harris poll recorded that 84 percent of the American public favored an agreement to limit the size of Soviet and American nuclear arsenals. A running poll conducted by NBC from January 1978 to October 1980 showed that support for a new arms control agreement had never dipped below 62 percent.\(^5\) The neoconservative critique laid out measures to rebuild American strength, but few of its adherents devoted much energy to thinking about the actual parameters of a U.S.-Soviet arms control settlement because they believed that arms control provided the Kremlin a means to manipulate Western public opinion.\(^5\)

In response to this problem the Reagan administration transformed its campaign strategies into a public diplomacy operation to maintain and develop popular support for its still undefined arms control policy. The administration’s emphasis on public diplomacy in turn shaped the broader contours of nuclear diplomacy over Reagan’s two terms, as the moral crusader rhetoric that Reagan and his surrogates proclaimed in public hampered superpower dialogue and pervaded the rationales that supporters later used to justify an expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.\(^{61}\) The degree to which Reagan’s nuclear agenda should determine broader developments in U.S.-Soviet relations became a point of contention in the Reagan administration’s early days.

How Reagan viewed deterrence is apparent in his public diplomacy, and of central importance to the scholarly debate initiated by Paul Lettow and others over the president’s alleged nuclear abolitionism.\(^{62}\) For Reagan nuclear weapons were means, not ends. He and many neoconservatives abhorred mutual assured destruction (MAD), which had become the unofficial deterrence paradigm of the United States during the period of détente. Reagan rejected MAD not because of a deep belief in the need to abolish all nuclear weapons, but rather out of disdain for the feared vulnerability that accompanied U.S.-Soviet strategic parity codified by the nuclear arms control agreements of the 1970s. The underlying consistency between Reagan’s rhetoric, nuclear arms-build-up, his unwavering commitment to strategic defense, and arms reductions later achieved with Gorbachev is that they all brought the United States closer to a return to strategic


\(^{62}\) Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest To Abolish Nuclear Weapons.
superiority over the Soviet Union. Reagan officials recognized the political drawbacks of publicly stating strategic superiority as the administration’s goal, so they relied instead on ambiguous terms such as enhanced deterrence or symbolic phrases such as peace through strength.

The European dimension to arms control posed a second dilemma. In December 1979 the United States and NATO allies committed to a “dual-track decision” to deploy theater nuclear weapons in Britain, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands to counter Soviet deployments of intermediate range SS-20 missiles targeting Europe and simultaneously open up arms control negotiations to reduce the stock of both sides’ weapons. NATO allies remained insistent that arms control negotiations were essential to the political feasibility of deploying new theater nuclear weapons. These would be rebranded Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) negotiations to ameliorate Europeans’ displeasure with being considered a primary theater for nuclear war. The Soviet Union also drew a direct connection between strategic arms control and INF. The European issue divided the Reagan administration between those who maintained the United States should honor prior commitments to NATO allies and those who argued that the dual-track decision inhibited the pursuit of U.S. nuclear superiority.

Margaret Thatcher’s government played a critical role in breaking this bureaucratic stalemate. British officials fostered an alliance with the U.S. State Department, and together, they focused the Reagan administration’s attention on the problem of public opinion. They promoted arms control solutions to mitigate the looming political fallout over the president’s arms build-up. In the years to follow, the partnership between the British government and the U.S. State Department evolved into a critical
check on the most hawkish elements inside the Reagan administration. While State Department officials worked within the administration to craft arms control proposals acceptable to Europe, British diplomats persuaded West Germany and other major NATO allies to remain committed to the deployments of INF weapons in the face of very high levels of public opposition.

Early in his administration, Reagan’s public diplomacy experienced significant growing pains. These subsided as Thatcher’s government gradually helped the president and his administration reconceptualize their audience on nuclear issues as a transnational public. Reagan’s subsequent emphasis on public diplomacy incorporated considerations of the British government and public into the process of constructing U.S. nuclear policy. It also reinforced the special nuclear relationship, which initially had been revived by the U.S. sale of the Trident C-4 missile to the United Kingdom in July 1980 and invigorated further still with the Reagan administration’s March 1982 decision to provide Britain with the upgraded Trident D-5 missile on equally generous terms.63

The origins of Reagan’s and Thatcher’s reputations as ideological soul mates can be found in the Thatcher government’s emergence as the Reagan administration’s pivotal NATO partner in managing the connections between strategic arms control and arms build-up, the dual-track decision, and public opinion. As the 1980s progressed, the moral rhetoric present in Reagan’s public diplomacy campaigns at home were refined in public diplomacy operations in the United Kingdom in part because many of these themes had much earlier been molded to promote Anglo-American unity in combatting fascism in

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World War II and communism in the early Cold War. British feedback helped shape public diplomacy messaging for European audiences.

**A Retreat from Arms Control**

Late in the summer 1980, candidate Reagan reintroduced the slogan peace through strength as his principal vision of the U.S. role in the world while accepting the endorsement from the U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars at a Chicago convention hall. Until that point, Carter still enjoyed an advantage among voters concerned with foreign policy despite the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Iran hostage crisis and botched rescue attempt, and the failed ratification of the second iteration of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) that the president had signed with the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. After his rollout of peace through strength, Reagan made significant gains in voters’ approval of his foreign policy platform.

Putting a post-Vietnam War spin on the idea that helped establish his national political profile in the 1960s, Reagan promised that peace through strength meant revival of U.S. economic, military, and strategic advantages to restore the country’s margin of safety. On the campaign trail he claimed that Carter’s weak-willed leadership, cuts to U.S. strategic capacity, and poor relations with allies diminished the country’s prestige and invited assault on American interests in both the Third World and in Europe.

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Carter’s own diagnosis of U.S. problems in the world, often derided as a “crisis of confidence” played into Reagan’s use of rhetorical binaries to further align the New Right with American exceptionalism. On the strategic front, Reagan deemed the deployment of the MX ICBM, and the accelerated production of the Ohio-Class Submarine and Trident missile, the B-1 Bomber, and the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (neutron bomb) necessary to rebuilding American strength. He claimed these advancements also served to tighten alliance bonds and were thus essential prerequisites to the resumption of arms control with the Soviet Union on equal terms.

In fact, the Carter administration initiated or accelerated many of the weapons initiatives and programs that Reagan associated with peace through strength. The Trident weapons system and MX missile were both Carter programs. Carter did so, however, without the rhetoric that made it an ideological imperative and without much support outside of his administration. The Carter administration proposed multiple protective shelters (MPS), mocked as a racetrack option, for basing the MX missile. MX systems housed in transporter/erector/launch vehicles (TEL) would travel around 200 ring-roads at up to 30 mph to one of 23 shelters on each road. Pentagon planners promised that the mobility of TELs across a total of 4,600 shelters provided enough targeting uncertainty to

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allow the U.S. ICBM force to survive a Soviet first strike.\textsuperscript{71} The racetrack scheme failed to win allies in Congress and served as impetus for renewal of the antinuclear movement in the western United States that suppressed the peace movement’s support for Carter.\textsuperscript{72}

This turn toward more confrontational policies and abandonment of his earlier dovish rhetoric undermined the president’s standing with the political left and appeared politically reactive and disingenuous. Illustrating this view further, the leak of presidential directive 59 (PD-59), signed on 25 July 1980, appeared to be an attempt by Carter to reestablish his anti-Soviet bona fides after staking out a less hawkish demeanor in his tight primary victory over peace candidate Ted Kennedy.\textsuperscript{73} The directive embraced a number of neoconservative concepts, most notably the argument that the Kremlin believed in the possibility of fighting and winning a nuclear war once the Soviet Union achieved nuclear supremacy. The document also seemed to suggest the possibility of using a nuclear first strike to decapitate the Soviet leadership.\textsuperscript{74} Prioritizing the Soviet political bureaucracy and nuclear command and control structure as targets generated concern inside and outside of the administration. Critics suggested such policies could provoke the Soviets to launch a pre-emptive attack in times of heightened tension. On this point, reporters caught newly confirmed Secretary of State Edwin Muskie off-guard.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{72} Matthew Glass, Citizens Against the MX (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1993): 1-25.
\end{flushright}
and uninformed. The episode brought further attention to the divisions among Carter’s foreign policy advisors, and thus additional charges of ineffective leadership.  

Détente and the appearance of progress in arms control negotiations had dampened antinuclear enthusiasm in the 1970s. With both of these processes jeopardized by Carter’s policies and Reagan’s rhetoric, an antinuclear impulse emerged in American society. In the span between Vietnam protests—which consumed the attention of the peace movement—and the election of Reagan, antinuclear activity usually grew out of regional environmental concerns or reactions to nuclear power issues. At the national level, antinuclear activism could be broken down into four wings: expert groups such as the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Council for a Livable World (CLW), and the MIT-based Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS); professional organizations such as Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) revived by Helen Caldicott; pacifist associations such as the Quaker oriented American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), the interfaith-based Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom; and a small number of groups like SANE (National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy) that were specifically devoted to nuclear disarmament. While the segmented antinuclear activism of the 1970s produced few tangible results, deep roots in

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78 Meyer favors a three-part division. I separate nuclear specific groups from the pacifist and expert groups, being that they incorporate some element of both. See David S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 149.
local communities across the United States and the sustained tradition of expert dissent provided the necessary institutional and intellectual foundations for the antinuclear wave of the 1980s.

These groups expressed limited support for Carter. His decision with NATO allies to deploy intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe and to upgrade U.S. strategic nuclear forces provided the impetus for defense expert Randall Forsberg to issue a “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race” in an address to roughly 600 activists at a meeting hosted by the antinuclear alliance Mobilization for Survival in December 1979.79 Forsberg, who had developed her expertise over several years working as nuclear analyst with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, based her appeal on the notion of a nuclear freeze. The brilliance of the freeze concept lay in its simplicity, and the fact that it could be broadly applied to any and all parts of global nuclear arsenals. The first plank of the freeze recommended a bilateral agreement to halt testing, production, and deployment of nuclear missiles and aircraft. A second, unverifiable plank, called for a halt in warhead manufacturing and production of fissile material. The freeze bypassed the unintuitive definitions and accounting of weapons systems that arms controllers on either side used to justify the retention of their favored nuclear systems. Forsberg argued that a freeze would lock in existing levels of nuclear parity and touted an estimated 100 billion dollars savings each for the United States and Soviet Union, which could be invested in the economic conversion of the defense industry as a step to further deescalate the Cold

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79 Randall Forsberg, “Call to Halt the Nuclear Weapons,” April 1980, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. Regarding the Mobilization for Survival, it had been Modeled on the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and began coordinating opposition to nuclear power and nuclear weapons on a national scale beginning with a conference in Philadelphia attended by 49 organizations in April 1977.
Much of the early support for the freeze came from veterans of the anti-Vietnam War movement and voters who Carter had courted in 1976 by promising to recast American foreign policy in moral terms. Four years later, Carter no longer had the support of the peace electorate and failed to replace it with those in favor of a more aggressive approach to U.S. security.

According to Sean Wilentz, “at home, Carter’s newfound bellicosity further alienated liberal Democrats….Among conservatives and neoconservatives, Carter’s foreign policy, no matter how hawkish, would always pale beside the robust cold war militancy proclaimed by Ronald Reagan and the Republican right.”

Carter’s attempt to explain his new thinking on foreign and nuclear policy in the context of a conversation with his teenage daughter in the late October 1980 presidential debate only reinforced Reagan’s portrayal of the 39th president as a foreign policy naïf. By then Carter’s edge over Reagan on foreign policy issues had shrunk to a mere one percent, a remarkable number for a domain in which the incumbent president believed he possessed the greatest advantage over his rival. Reagan and conservative allies had touted the premise of peace through strength for decades, but in Carter’s inconsistency they at long last found the perfect foil. Reagan’s peace through strength rhetoric and proposed strategic posture were ideologically consistent with the broader New Right agenda on social and economic issues that came to dominate the Republican party.

80 Randall Forsberg, “Call to Halt the Nuclear Weapons,” April 1980, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies.
82 Ibid., 124.
In an election that observers have deemed unusual for the lateness of voters’ selection of their preferred candidate, exit polls confirmed the success of Reagan’s peace through strength premise. A *New York Times* exit poll showed that a significant majority of voters desired a tougher stance toward the Soviet Union, and of that majority Reagan earned 70 percent of the votes. Carter, in contrast, won 64 percent of voters who did not approve of a hawkish approach to U.S.-Soviet relations.  

Peace through strength was an effective political strategy for Reagan to undermine voter’s approval of Carter’s leadership and the peace vote certainly no longer viewed the ousted president as a foreign policy reformer, but Reagan’s campaign rhetoric also appeared to revive antinuclear sentiment as a potentially significant political force on the national stage. A freeze on superpower nuclear arsenals had already been put forward as a grassroots’ organizing principle before the start of the 1980 election. In 1979, Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR) drew support from such peace groups as the Fellowship Of Reconciliation, Pax Christi U.S.A, and Sojourners for his amendment to SALT II that called for a freeze in strategic forces. Hatfield’s freeze amendment inspired veteran peace activist Randy Kehler to bring the freeze to the ballot box in Western Massachusetts. The Harvard educated schoolteacher turned peace activist founded the Traprock Peace Center and based it in Deerfield, Massachusetts in 1979. From the peace center, Kehler launched a nine-month campaign to put a bilateral freeze on the ballot in three congressional districts and 62 towns in Western Massachusetts. The bilateral freeze initiative carried all three districts and 30 of the 33 towns where Reagan

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85 Mason, “The Domestic Politics of War and Peace,” 263.
won the popular vote.\textsuperscript{87} Kehler’s success in Western Massachusetts demonstrated the freeze had political potential and also appealed to the veterans of the peace movement. The simultaneous success of the freeze on local ballots and Reagan’s election victory laid the groundwork for nuclear war to become a defining issue of his presidential politics. One organizer quipped that “every time Reagan opens his mouth, the freeze campaign doubles in size.”\textsuperscript{88} The regular breach of conventions on public nuclear discourse by Reagan and his allies galvanized many more people than just peace movement veterans.

Reagan did not have a unified foreign policy when he entered office or a full appreciation of the undercurrent of antinuclear sentiment; rather, he had perfected a grand critique or master diagnosis of Cold War conditions. Nevertheless, he pinpointed elevated Soviet military spending as a cause of its ailing economy and also believed the Soviet military build-up was a key part of preparations for their political ambitions in Europe and the Third World.\textsuperscript{89} With regards to nuclear issues, Reagan’s grand critique lacked a plan for managing the nuclear politics and publics of the United States and its allies, directives for his top level defense and foreign policy bureaucracy, a sense of how to reboot the two sets of nuclear arms control negotiations that he inherited from Carter, and


a sufficient understanding of the policy details that could transform his diagnosis into an overall strategy.\textsuperscript{90}

What Reagan did have was a view of the presidency as a primarily inspirational office. Raymond Garthoff argues that, “Reagan conceived of the president’s role as essentially that of an actor.”\textsuperscript{91} To accept Garthoff’s view of Reagan as an actor in the role of president does not deny the authenticity or conviction of Reagan’s approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, but it does prompt a reconsideration of how the president constructed policy. With an actor in the office of president, public diplomacy assumed a major role for the Reagan administration in formulating nuclear policy by leading officials to place greater emphasis on how the president might communicate nuclear ideas to the public.

Early in December 1980 and invigorated by their recent victory, Reagan’s most prominent foreign policy advisors gathered to discuss the incoming administrations’ initial course for Soviet-American relations. The meeting included Reagan’s first National Security Advisor Richard Allen, his future CIA Director William Casey, his eventual arms control negotiator Paul Nitze, and other prominent members of his national security team. They believed that the Soviets had achieved military superiority and that this was a result of the “deep-seated moral and intellectual failure” of U.S. foreign policy elites.\textsuperscript{92} Apart from a “quick-fix” rearmament program to preserve an American second-strike capability, the group did not present a plan for managing arms control, much less the wider range of Soviet-American relations. Having witnessed the failure of the Carter

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 7.
administration to gain congressional support for its arms control policies and the prior public opposition to U.S. policies for Vietnam, Reagan understood the importance of foreign policy to the president’s broad political agenda and success. State Department aides insisted on the urgent development of a political program to offset growing antinuclear sentiment in the West, which they largely attributed to an effective Soviet peace offensive.93 Before the administration could disseminate its nuclear policy to regain allied confidence and build public trust, it first had to define it.

The Reagan administration delayed in putting forth arms control policies over its first two years. Widespread agreement existed within the administration on the need to modernize weapons before negotiating limits or reductions with Moscow, but bureaucratic infighting over the philosophy the White House should adopt to govern its relations with the Kremlin became a cause for delay.94 During this time, the administration relied on moral critiques of the Soviet to justify its retreat from arms control.95 Nine days into office during his first press conference as president, Reagan confirmed his administration’s intention to back away from arms control all together. In an answer to a question from White House correspondent Sam Donaldson, Reagan claimed that the Soviets “have openly and publicly declared that the only morality they recognize is what will further their cause, meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that, and that is moral, not

immoral, and we operate on a different set of standards. I think when you do business with them, even at a détente, you keep that in mind." Reagan’s statement reflected his belief that rhetoric should play a significant role in U.S. foreign relations. Moral condemnations, Reagan officials believed, had the desired effect in making the Kremlin averse to engage Reagan based on the sincerity of his ideological conviction, and thus fulfilled the administration’s objective to delay arms control.

Emerging centers of bureaucratic power debated not just arms control strategies, but their actual utility for U.S. national security. Some officials, especially those loyal to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and his top aides, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs Richard Perle and Undersecretary for Defense Policy Fred Iklè, fundamentally opposed arms control or any treaty that constrained U.S. military power and limited pathways to regain strategic superiority. Yet even in the hawkish Reagan administration, arms control still had its backers. Cautious arms control proponents included Secretary of State Alexander Haig and his deputies Richard Burt and Lawrence Eagleburger, who supported arms control in part because of its importance to NATO allies. The eventual confirmation of ACDA officials further complicated matters. ACDA Director Eugene Rostow’s appointment of CPD and arms control veteran Paul Nitze to lead INF negotiations satisfied neither Haig’s State Department, or the anti-

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arms control contingent that took root in the Pentagon and the staff of the National Security Council. Nitze’s initial opposition to the dual-track decision and then subsequent determination that the United States should adhere to the agreement to demonstrate its reliability to the alliance it professed to lead challenged the impulses of both sides of Reagan’s foreign policy team.¹⁰⁰

As the interagency debate began to unfold, U.S. officials searched for a rationale to shut down arms control channels. The State Department in particular seized on the concept of reciprocity, accusing Moscow of failing to provide U.S. diplomats with the same privileged access afforded to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and other emissaries.¹⁰¹ In the days of SALT, the relationship between Kissinger and Dobrynin emerged as the key back-channel between the White House and the Kremlin. That relationship effectively sidelined Secretary of State William Rogers.¹⁰² Haig’s revocation of Dobrynin’s special State Department access on 29 January 1981 was the first of a series of steps intended to curtail the Soviet ambassador’s influence in Washington and also signal the administration’s hardened approach to Soviet-American relations to Moscow.¹⁰³ Arms control policymakers cited a second motive for closing off Soviet-American channels. They feared that the continuity in the Soviet foreign policy system

¹⁰⁰ Talbott, Deadly Gambits, 43-52.
provided its officials with a superior knowledge of arms control negotiating history, which put U.S. officials at a significant disadvantage in early stage talks. Additional State Department claims of unequal exchanges on a range of issues were cited to justify the administration’s retreat from arms control talks and the abandonment of détente as the primary objective in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The degree to which arms control should be insulated from or interconnected to the broader range of U.S.-Soviet relations served as the focus of the arms control policy debate inside the administration. Neoconservatives inside the Reagan administration viewed an interconnected arms control policy as an opportunity to restore American power under the moral cover provided by a focus on human rights issues and regional conflicts. Continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Moscow’s support for leftist groups in Africa and Central America, and its attempts to suppress civil resistance organized by the Solidarity movement in Poland all were causes around which the administration’s hawks made their case to withdraw from arms control talks. The few who professed a desire to isolate arms control from other aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship soon lost power in the administration. Richard Allen’s status as the lone senior advisor advocating the separation of arms control negotiations from other issues left him without allies in an

administration roiled by bureaucratic rivalries and his isolation contributed to his forced resignation on 5 January 1982. Allen’s staff were among the staunchest advocates of situating arms control within the broader U.S.-Soviet relationship as a way to delay its progress. Prominent historian and neoconservative Richard Pipes, who served on the NSC, advocated such a strategy. Pipes’ analysis of Soviet defense mentalities had been foundational for the neoconservative assault on arms control in the 1970s. His best known contribution was his leadership of the flawed “Team B Intelligence Experiment” that undermined the CIA’s assessment of Soviet military and strategic motives, upon which the Ford and Carter administrations had based their détente policies. Moreover, Reagan intentionally privileged cabinet secretaries and watered down the national security advisor’s influence in policymaking. Allen’s break from his staff and advice to decouple arms control from regional conflict left him entirely vulnerable to the administration’s anti-arms control cabal.

Haig, Weinberger, and other national security principals believed that arms control represented one aspect of a wider policy toward the Soviet Union. Weinberger asserted in the spring 1981 NATO ministerial meeting that the United States planned a

robust linkage strategy to manage its relationship with the Soviet Union. Rostow linked arms control to the containment of Soviet geopolitical expansion, advocating in his late June confirmation hearing a “policy which would link arms control to the effective revival of the Truman doctrine and the acceptance of the Soviet Union of the rules of the Charter of the United Nations regarding international use of force.” Haig’s mid-July speech on arms control principles maintained that the administration’s third principle of arms control (out of six) “is that we will seek arms control bearing in mind the whole context of Soviet conduct worldwide.” Reagan’s early correspondence with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, as well as Haig’s meetings with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Dobrynin, confirmed that the Soviets opposed arms control being linked to other issues – and thus proved its strategic legitimacy in the eyes of top policymakers.

**Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, British Influence, and the Public Opinion Problem**

What saved arms control from being a casualty of broader U.S.-Soviet geopolitical differences? European allies interpreted the linkage of arms control to other East-West issues as an insidious plot to block progress. Their concerns carried added

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111 “NATO Ministerial: Final Communique,” 5 May 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 18, Folder “NATO NAC.”
political importance given that one of Reagan’s primary campaign attacks targeted Carter’s supposed mismanagement of NATO, suggesting that as president he could restore allied confidence in U.S. leadership. NATO allies agreed on the severity of the Soviet nuclear threat, but they disagreed with the Reagan administration that arms control should be an area for punitive action in response to Soviet human rights violations or “adventurism” in the Third World. To allied leaders, U.S. willingness to make arms control contingent on these issues overestimated the political durability of Europe’s commitment to the dual-track decision.

Reagan inherited a connection between the dual-track decision and strategic arms control that Carter had forged out of political necessity. At the beginning of Carter’s term in office, NATO allies began voicing the concern that strategic arms control unleashed a process of “decoupling” Western European security from that of the continental United States. Without preponderant strategic nuclear capabilities and in a position of assumed conventional and theater nuclear inferiority on the European continent, would the United States be willing to risk its own safety to defend Western Europe from a Soviet invasion? In exchange for European support for SALT II Carter agreed in December 1979 to the dual-track decision to deploy INF weapons and simultaneously begin negotiating the reduction of American and Soviet INF systems in Europe. In theory, separating INF systems from strategic arms control and placing them in their own set of negotiations

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guaranteed that the United States would not sacrifice weapons designed for European deterrence in order to retain certain strategic advantages in a grand deal with the Soviet Union. With little time or political capital left, however, Carter left INF negotiations to be largely defined by Reagan’s administration.

The alliance politics involved in negotiating European support for strategic arms control led the Reagan administration to consider a second nuclear arrangement held over from the Carter years. The United Kingdom had faced its own important set of decisions at the end of the 1970s as to whether it could afford to remain a nuclear power. The minority Labour government of James Callaghan leveraged British support for SALT II in exchange for the U.S. provision of its premier strategic weapons system, the Trident C4 submarine launched ballistic missile and Ohio-Class/Vanguard-Class nuclear submarine. Already close nuclear collaborators since the days of the Manhattan Project, the Trident deal renewed the link between the American and British strategic arsenals. For the Reagan administration, this meant that any change to the U.S. nuclear modernization program or alteration to its arms control posture that might jeopardize the production and operation of Trident had to be negotiated with London as well, or the United States risked losing British support in NATO politics. This level of cooperation provided Whitehall an additional source of influence in Washington, not least of all because Britain’s own nuclear status provided its officials with an appreciation for the

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118 The British Vanguard-Class nuclear submarine is based on designs of the U.S. Ohio-Class submarine. The Vanguard-Class submarines were constructed in the United Kingdom and had some slight variances from the Ohio-Class.
connections between strategic arms control and modernization and INF negotiations and deployments.¹¹⁹

NATO allies turned to the British to convey the seriousness of the public opinion dilemma in Europe to the Reagan administration because of its special nuclear relationship with the United States. Even before the prospect of Reagan’s nuclear buildup stoked the anxieties of European publics, antinuclear opinion had begun to factor into the Thatcher government’s calculations concerning alliance politics, nuclear modernization, and arms control. The British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) membership activity had initially picked up in response to NATO’s neutron bomb political crisis in 1978, expanding to 102 local chapters and over 3000 members.¹²⁰ The dual-track decision provided a second impetus for revival, leading veteran CND activist and prominent historian E.P. Thompson to launch the European Nuclear Disarmament movement (END). CND and END had jointly developed into a formidable organizing network for European antinuclear movements capable of mobilizing hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in coordinated protests in London and across Europe’s major cities by the time Reagan began fashioning his INF plan in 1981.¹²¹

Only the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany wielded enough clout to warrant serious consideration from Washington on matters of nuclear policy. The smaller European states alone could not effect a change to U.S. strategic priorities on the

¹²¹ This revival is the focus of the following two chapters. For a brief explanation of the sources of European antinuclear anxiety in the 1980s, see E.P. Thompson and Dan Smith (eds.), Protest and Survive (London: Monthly Review Press, 1980); John Minnion and Philip Bolsover, The CND Story: The first 25 Years of CND in the words of the people involved (London: Allison and Busby, 1983), 56-80; Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, 23, 64-5.
continent, and since France remained outside of NATO’s integrated military command it had little say in the nuclear decision making of the alliance. Viewed by the Reagan administration as the most reliable ally of the United States, Britain’s restrained diplomacy resonated with Washington more than urgent West German pleas for immediate movement on arms control which only deepened the anti-European sentiment held by civilian hawks in the Pentagon.122

Throughout the summer of 1981, the U.K. delegation to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group produced the critical analysis of Europe’s antinuclear movement and the Soviet peace offensive that impressed upon the U.S. delegation the scope of opposition to INF.123 What made British diplomats uniquely effective as arms control managers in the alliance is that the future of their own independent deterrent related directly to the Reagan administration’s comprehensive review of strategic forces. In negotiations with the Reagan administration to obtain the more advanced variant of the Trident SLBM (D-5) from the United States, British officials gained greater insight into both the acrimonious interagency debate over nuclear policies and the emphasis that Washington placed on strategic modernization as essential leverage in East-West relations.124 British diplomats’ appreciation of both the problem of public opinion in Western Europe and the nuclear modernization questions under consideration in Washington allowed them to manage the pace of the NATO debate to reflect both priorities.

122 Talbott, Deadly Gambits, 51.
124 Eames, “The Trident Sales Agreement.”
Rapport between British representatives and Secretary of State Al Haig made him their primary channel to the Reagan White House on the INF issue.\textsuperscript{125} Managing both elements of the dual-track strategy had special significance to Haig. He grew especially sympathetic to Europe’s decoupling fears during his time as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe from late 1974 to July 1979. His trust in European partners lay behind his advocacy for early negotiations to alleviate public pressure on NATO governments preparing for INF deployments. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, in contrast, opposed early negotiations on any class of nuclear weapons, seeing the withholding of arms control talks as the primary means for the United States to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union’s international behavior.\textsuperscript{126} Weinberger’s deputy, Richard Perle even organized an internal campaign to dissolve U.S. commitment to the dual-track decision all together.\textsuperscript{127} INF negotiations conducted within the SALT framework initially had been promised to the Europeans to alleviate decoupling concerns. The compromise put in place between the administration’s rivals made the relationship between INF and strategic arms as ambiguous as possible. Intelligence assessments suggested to policymakers that the administration could delay negotiations on strategic weapons by relying on INF talks as a favorable stand-in to satisfy the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{128} General Edward Rowny who hoped to lead both strategic and European arms control negotiations after being passed over as ACDA director, forfeited the INF portfolio to Paul

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\textsuperscript{125} U.S. NATO Mission Cable to Secretary of State, “TNF: October 26 SCG, Summary Report,” 27 October 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 4, Folder “NATO SCG, October 81.”
\textsuperscript{127} Talbot, \textit{Deadly Gambits}, 43-61.
Nitze upon the decision to split talks. By September 1981, Haig and Gromyko had committed their governments to the commencement of INF negotiations in late November in Geneva.

Ahead of INF talks, Reagan announced that the administration had completed its comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear forces. The administration claimed the review unified its strategic posture, modernization requirements, and arms control aims. The President’s five-point modernization program introduced in early October included: construction and deployment of 100 B-1 Bombers and the deployment of cruise missiles on existing bombers; the development of the Trident D-5 SLBM and sea-launched cruise missiles; completion of MX missiles deployed in a yet to be determined basing mode; improvement of command, communications, and control systems; and the revitalization of U.S. strategic and civil defense. Reagan claimed that the 180 billion dollar modernization package restored a “margin of safety” and closed the “window of vulnerability,” a sloganized version of accusations of strategic inferiority that neoconservatives had leveled against arms controllers in the 1970s. Observers interpreted Reagan’s attachment to the window of vulnerability despite his apparent confusion over its meaning as proof that the president had come to fully conceive of strategic modernization as a technological manifestation of American righteousness.

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130 “Meeting between Secretary Haig and Minister Gromyko with their Delegations,” 23 September 1981, (RRPL) William Clark Files, Box 3, Folder “Haig/Gromyko Meetings.”
rather than a security imperative.\textsuperscript{133} U.S. nuclear targeting posture articulated in NSDD 13 produced a second unwelcomed outcome for INF negotiations. NSDD 13 officially superseded Carter’s directives in PD-59, but it retained and reemphasized the targeting of Soviet leadership and military targets to prevail in the event of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{134}

The modernization and posture announcements were not intended to soothe public anxiety over the opening INF talks, but rather to provoke outright rejection from Moscow. U.S. arms control principals agreed on the fundamental premise that no conceivable INF deal could be reached by Washington and Moscow. Instead, U.S. officials set their sights on using negotiations to limit the effectiveness of Soviet peace propaganda in Europe. The real debate between the Defense Department on one hand and ACDA and the State Department on the other, came down to a commitment to the “zero-option.”\textsuperscript{135} The zero-option came from West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt’s suggestion of \textit{Null-Lösung}. Perle took ownership over the zero-option concept within the administration, believing it a clever way to prevent an INF agreement without upsetting NATO allies given its West German origins.\textsuperscript{136} Under this framework, Reagan offered the Soviets non-deployment of all intermediate range nuclear missiles in exchange for the complete dismantling of equivalent Soviet systems.\textsuperscript{137}


\textsuperscript{135} Sven Kraemer to Richard Allen, “NPSG - Agenda Item on TNF,” 5 November 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files Box 9, Folder “NATO TNG IGs;” Chief of Arms Control Intelligence Staff to Director of CIA and Deputy Director of CIA, “National Security Council Meeting on TNF scheduled for 12 November,” 10 November 1981, (CIA-ERR).


Reagan initially questioned the validity of the zero-option on strategic grounds. He feared that it would leave NATO vulnerable to Soviet conventional superiority. The president came to favor the idea only after Haig had assured him of the idea’s German origins and Weinberger had promised that it would “capture world opinion.”

Haig, though, cautioned in opposition to Weinberger that an immediate turn to the zero-option without first advocating for some low and acceptable level of reductions could set a bad precedent for the future but then separate negotiations on strategic arms reduction talks (START), which replaced SALT, by allowing the Soviets to push for zero on a range of other systems that comprised the core deterrent force of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The final NSC meeting determining the administration’s first-round INF proposal exemplified the administration’s dysfunction. Reagan indicated his desire for sincere negotiations but had little sense of the issues dividing his chief policymakers. Weinberger stood by his view that arms control existed solely for public diplomacy purposes. Rostow claimed that INF negotiations “primary objective is the unity of our Alliance, not getting an agreement,” but rejected the idea that allies should have a voice in U.S. arms control policy; Weinberger loyalists agreed that Europeans must not constrain U.S. nuclear policy. Haig demonstrated his preference for orienting INF talks around robust European consultations. On this point he asserted his belief in the State Department’s supremacy in foreign policy, snapping at fellow cabinet level officials, “I have to decide how we conduct diplomacy with our allies.”

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139 Ibid.
cabinet level revealed Haig’s ferocity. Haig’s disregard for Reagan’s attempts to reconcile the cabinet’s attitudes on INF marked the beginning of his decline and eventual dismissal as secretary of state.

Reagan and fellow NATO heads of state faulted Europeans born in the postwar years for the surge in antinuclear opinion that threatened the political foundations of the dual-track decision. NATO officials framed the conversion of these antinuclear generations into deterrence believers as an alliance security objective.\textsuperscript{142} Nuclear statements from Reagan and his aides, however, emboldened antinuclear youth in the United States and Europe. Britain’s Minister of State for Europe, Douglas Hurd, commented, “the danger about the rhetoric now coming out of Washington is not that it will upset the Russians but that it will upset our own opinion in Europe.”\textsuperscript{143} Symptomatic of his less than thorough understanding of NATO’s deterrence dilemma, the president had unintentionally suggested that nuclear war could be confined to the European theater in late October following the announcement of modernization plans and targeting posture. His comments reignited decoupling concerns across the Atlantic that played directly into the hands of the Soviet peace offensive.\textsuperscript{144}

Less than a week later, a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament rally in central London caught Thatcher’s government off-guard. Suddenly, the realization of Thatcher’s political vulnerability hit both Whitehall and the U.S. State Department.\textsuperscript{145} Several more

\textsuperscript{142} U.S. NATO Mission to State Department, “NAC Ministerial Communique,” 30 November 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 4, Folder “NATO Meetings.”
\textsuperscript{145} U.S. Embassy in London to State Department, “Anti-Nuclear Weapons Demonstration,” 27 October 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 3, Folder “NATO-antinuclear.”
public diplomacy gaffes from the Reagan administration continued to fuel the European antinuclear movement, highlighted by a press dispute between Haig and Weinberger over the validity of firing a “nuclear warning shot” over Europe in the event of Soviet aggression.146 Thatcher’s vulnerability presented a serious problem for U.S. officials, who considered a Conservative Party government in Britain to be one of two key European pillars upholding the dual-track strategy.147 Richard Allen warned Reagan, “we must make a greater effort to appeal to British and European public opinion….Thatcher’s domestic position….is getting more vulnerable, and the possibility of a Tory defeat, with the present government replaced by a coalition government, cannot be discounted.”148

For public diplomacy to be a successful component of nuclear policymaking, Reagan had to conceive of the public in transnational rather than national terms. This conceptual reworking made public diplomacy a form of political communication distinct from campaign rhetoric. Nonetheless, it also had to remain consistent with campaign rhetoric to avoid an impression of a disorganized and reactive administration.

Acknowledging the direct link between U.S. statements on nuclear war and rising antinuclear sentiment amongst the British public that jeopardized Thatcher’s political standing was the first step to effecting a change in the way the administration conceived of the public when discussing nuclear politics. These considerations shaped the president’s first major address on arms control, given to the National Press Club on 18 November 1981, in which he embedded his offer of the zero-option in visionary rhetoric.

147 The other pillar being a government in the F.R.G willing to see through deployments of INF missiles on West German soil.
to target a younger generation in Europe. The zero-option speech had even been given at 2 pm U.S. eastern time to have it reach European audiences in prime-time. Thatcher, who was in Bonn for talks with West German leaders, celebrated the speech as the most significant of the Reagan presidency. For the prime minister, the president’s offer of a zero-option demonstrated not a negotiating position, but rather a serious commitment to the task of public diplomacy.

**The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks – Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Connection**

With negotiations underway, Reagan officials deliberated how much internal policy considerations should be conducted with an eye toward public relations in the United States and in Europe. British arms control specialists urged their American colleagues to consider public opinion not just a European issue, but a broader transnational phenomenon, noting, “we have been pointing out for months to members of this administration that it is an illusion to imagine that anti-nuclear sentiment is confined to Europe.”

By spring 1982, the zero-option’s public diplomacy impact had been upstaged by a series of high-profile antinuclear events. Jonathan Schell’s masterpiece on nuclear war, *The Fate of the Earth*, provided the U.S. antinuclear movement its first big publicity

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break with its release in March 1982.\textsuperscript{153} New connections between the American antinuclear movement and the rapidly growing international peace movement, the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution demanding a freeze on strategic weapons, and the administration’s inability to avoid public-relations gaffes sustained momentum for antinuclear organizing and raised demand for more than a cosmetic approach to arms control. The most sensational public-relations failure came when a \textit{Los Angeles Times} reporter revealed in spring 1982 the details of a conversation with the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces T.K. Jones, in which Jones stated that all that was needed for protection from nuclear war was a hole in the ground, a door to cover the hole, and two feet of dirt on top of the door. The press and antinuclear movement widely disseminated his ill-informed quip, “everybody’s going to make it if there are enough shovels to go around.”\textsuperscript{154} United States Information Agency Director Charles Wick reported a sharp decrease in support for U.S. security policies in Europe, falling twenty to thirty percent since the days of the Carter administration.\textsuperscript{155}

In his final weeks as Secretary of State, Haig impressed upon Reagan the importance of strategic arms reduction talks (START) for arresting the spread of antinuclear sympathies in Europe.\textsuperscript{156} He reestablished the linkage between START and INF, which had been made deliberately ambiguous in the earlier development of the zero-option proposal. Haig’s public assertions provided Reagan with a roadmap on how to best


frame the administration’s arms control approach, modernization efforts, and obligations to European allies. New weapons systems met the technological requirements of deterrence in a post-détente world, but the psychological, moral, and social dimensions of deterrence needed reframing. MAD represented an interest-based realist philosophy and rested on a bargain with the Soviet Union that supposedly compromised the moral values of the West. Strategic superiority on the other hand rested on the political will among Western publics to build and deploy weapons that granted an advantage over the Soviet Union. In essence, Haig desired the contract for deterrence to be between Western governments and their publics rather than between the United States and Soviet Union by shifting to strategic superiority and away from MAD.

In his speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown, which heavily informed the president’s later address on arms control, Haig asserted, “deterrence…is the essential political bargain which binds together the Western coalition…deterrence, is the only effective intellectual, political and moral response to nuclear weapons…sustaining deterrence, we protect values of Western Civilization - democratic government, personal liberty, and religious freedom.”

Haig’s reference to these principles as the foundation of Western civilization in the context of an alliance commitment to deterrence reflected a pervasive view in the Reagan administration that the West’s moral superiority should define its approach to nuclear policy. Quoting the long-favored theologian of the American foreign policy community Reinhold Niebuhr, in stating that, “the highest possibilities are inextricably mingled with the most dire perils,” Haig implied that human nature required that the most morally righteous of political

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157 Alexander Haig, “Address to Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies,” 6 April 1982, (RRPL) David Gergen Files, Box 7, F “Nuclear Freeze.”
systems—Western democracy—inherently demanded the deadliest of weapons
systems—nuclear arms—for its defense.  

Haig was far from alone in emphasizing a Western moral imperative as both a
public defense of deterrence and a rational basis for formulating nuclear policy. Top
advisors frequently made similar arguments in their analysis of U.S.-Soviet relations.  
For example, veteran diplomat Tom Melady advised White House Chief of Staff James
Baker “our position is the moral one for a responsible major power in an imperfect world,
where aggressive communists – atheist forces are out to destroy Judeo-Christian
values.”

In private, Haig stressed to the president that the Europeans were likely to reject
INF deployments without the commencement of START negotiations. Plausible arms
control, Haig argued, matched the anti-Soviet crusading rhetoric that the president
frequently deployed and ardently believed. “We need a dramatic proposal to reverse the
momentum of the peace movement and put you on the side of the Angels,” Haig
implored of Reagan in late April 1982.

Among the most telling indicators that public diplomacy became Reagan’s
preferred mechanism for crafting his nuclear strategy was the increased focus on the
policy details exhibited by the president when the prospect of a public speech came

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158 For the source of the quote, see Reinhold Niebuhr, “Our Moral and Spiritual Resources for International
along. Haig recommended to Allen’s successor as National Security Advisor, William Clark, and Reagan that the president’s arms control address serve as the centerpiece of a comprehensive plan to instill a favorable narrative regarding the president’s handling of nuclear policy in regional and major media markets in the United States and overseas, in leading newspapers, and among opinion makers and expert forums such as the National Academy of Sciences. On 9 May 1982, Reagan introduced the broad outlines of the administration’s START proposal to a host of college graduates and their families at the commencement ceremony of his alma mater, Eureka College in Illinois. In a show of alliance unity, Reagan connected INF negotiations to the commencement of START talks on the basis of a defense of Western values. A speech rich in illusions to rich harvest plains and the primacy of Western culture underscored the moral rhetoric that justified peace through strength.

In advocating the link between INF and START, Haig exhausted both his patience for bureaucratic infighting and his political capital within the administration. Rumor that Haig’s pro-NATO advocacy was partially responsible for his ouster from the State Department in early July circulated throughout the press only days prior to the beginning of START talks. Others questioned if Haig’s dismissal meant that Perle’s

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162 Department of State Memorandum for William Clark, “Public Affairs Strategy in Support of Administration’s Nuclear Policy,” 5 May 1982, (RRPL) Robert MacFarlane Files, Box 1, Folder “’’Arms Control/Nuclear Freeze.’’”


164 A variety of issues, in addition to disagreements on nuclear policy, contributed to Haig’s dismissal. These included the Siberian Gas pipeline, the Falklands War, and the U.S. involvement in the Lebanon War. See Haig, Caveat, 303-316; Michael F. Hopkins, “Ronald Reagan’s and George H.W. Bush’s Secretaries of State: Alexander Haig, George Shultz, and James Baker,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 6 (2008): 228-245.
anti-European forces had swung the tide in the interagency battles over arms control.\textsuperscript{165} Haig’s departure meant the loss of a tireless champion of European interests in the Reagan administration, but the initial U.S. START proposal nonetheless represented a hard-fought compromise between the administration’s anti-arms controllers and its NATO-minded policymakers.

British officials worked together with the West German delegation to NATO to prevail upon their U.S. counterparts to open START talks.\textsuperscript{166} Having monitored the cutthroat interagency debate over the preceding eighteen months, they were pleased to see many of their recommendations incorporated into the opening U.S. position - especially the placement of the throw weight issue into a second phase.\textsuperscript{167} Phase one of the proposal called for a mutual reduction of 7,500 warheads fielded to 5,000 deployed in no more than 850 ICBMs and SLBMs with a 2,500 warhead cap on land-based missiles. Reductions would be spread over a five to ten year period. U.S. policymakers designed phase two with the intention of equalizing the massive Soviet throw weight advantage. Their hidden aim was to draw throw weight levels down to 2.5 million kilograms, which was the current capacity of the U.S. ICBM force. The administration directed U.S. negotiators to protect its lead in long range cruise missile technology by tying possible reductions to throw weight equalization. This meant curbs to the U.S. advantage on cruise missiles came only after the Soviets acceded to gutting the core of their strategic force in phase one. Most importantly to NATO allies, Washington remained adamant in its refusal


\textsuperscript{166} “Record of Discussion Between the Secretary of State for Defense and F.R.G. Minister of Defense,” 19 March 1982, (TNA) PREM 19/1244 f337.

\textsuperscript{167} David Gilmore, “Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START),” 14 May 1982, (TNA) FCO 46/3079.
of Soviet demands to include British and French systems in strategic arms control negotiations.\textsuperscript{168}

The U.S. proposal struck at the heart of the Soviet strategic arsenal. The Soviets offset their technical inferiority on missile accuracy, cruise systems, multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, and deficit in sea-based weapons by fielding a massive land-based ICBM force of some 5,500 to 6,000 warheads with a superior megatonnage and roughly three to one throw weight advantage.\textsuperscript{169} Strategic experts in the West framed ICBMs as destabilizing weapons due to both their accuracy and their inherent vulnerabilities. Whereas SLBMs could operate undetected and bombers could deploy rapidly or even continuously in times of heightened tension, ICBM silos were vulnerable to a strike from the blue. The potential elimination of ICBMs in a surprise attack presented the “use ‘em or lose ‘em” dilemma, which U.S. officials identified as destabilizing element in the deterrence relationship. The logic of “substantial reductions” that the administration relied on to rebrand strategic arms control only truly applied to the Soviet obligations of the American proposal. Every avenue for nuclear modernization featured in the plan rolled out by Reagan in October 1981 remained open.\textsuperscript{170} Aircraft were not considered a unit of account in the proposal, allowing for the production and deployment of the B-1 Bomber and the Advanced Technology Bomber (B-2).

Modernization of the ICBM fleet and the addition of 100 new MX missiles also easily fit under the cap proposed by the United States. The planned retirement of some 3,000

warheads on Poseidon missiles made space on the sea-leg of the strategic TRIAD for the introduction of the Trident I and II SLBMs. Tactical and submarine launched cruise missiles—an important U.S. technological advantage—received no mention in the administration’s proposal. Critics condemned the proposal as a “false START,” devised by the administration’s hawks to fail.¹⁷¹

A week prior to the opening of START negotiations Gromyko stated that the imbalances in the American proposal reopened a debate previously resolved by the 1974 Vladivostok Accords. If Washington demanded a cut to the Soviet lead on heavy ICBMs then Moscow would insist upon the inclusion of U.S. grey area systems stationed on forward bases in Europe.¹⁷² In other words, Gromyko proposed to include INF systems directly in START talks, a significant threat given that those systems had long delayed Carter’s negotiation of a SALT agreement before they had been separated into their own set of arms control talks. His warning on INF followed Brezhnev’s response to Reagan’s Eureka College speech, in which Brezhnev raised the possibility of a freeze on strategic systems. Elaborated upon at the beginning of START negotiations in late June, the Soviets extended the freeze to include INF systems as well.¹⁷³ START stalled almost immediately just as the civilian hawks in the Pentagon intended. With INF officially linked to START by both superpowers, strategic arms control negotiators had little time to reach a tentative agreement before scheduled U.S. deployments of INF weapons arrived in Europe at the end of 1983 derailed both negotiations.

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¹⁷² Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, 279.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 280.
Paul Nitze was determined to lead serious negotiations rather than a public diplomacy offensive. Neither the American zero-option proposal tabled in February or the Soviet counter proposal in May for a reduction to a level of 300 mixed-force ceiling brought the two sides closer together. By the beginning of the second round of INF negotiations in the summer, Nitze had become so disillusioned with the continued commitment to a zero-option due to bureaucratic infighting, that he approached his opposite number Yuli Kvitsinsky to work out a compromise of their own making. “The Walk in the Woods Proposal” finalized by the two men on a hike in the mountains of the Western Alps permitted the Soviets to retain 75 of their SS-20 launchers and allowed the U.S. to deploy an equal number of cruise missile launchers in Europe.\textsuperscript{174} Nitze’s proposal caused a firestorm in the administration, and opponents lambasted him for “straying off the reservation” and setting “bad precedent for future negotiations.”\textsuperscript{175}

NATO again prioritized its management of the INF-START relationship once the U.S. and Soviet Union indicated a clear linkage between both sets of negotiations. Despite the upheaval in Washington over Nitze’s backchannel proposal, the administration planned to sell it to NATO allies as much desired proof of U.S. flexibility. During his autumn tour of Europe, Rostow revealed that Washington and Moscow had rejected the plan and that the elimination of Perhsing II missiles had been its key provision. European allies considered those missiles the most effective component of counter deployments responding to Soviet SS-20s. Rostow offered his most thorough briefing to the British government, which was dismayed that the Reagan administration

neglected to keep its foremost ally informed on perhaps the most important alliance task in its history.\textsuperscript{176} The press picked up on the proposal’s rejection from German and French sources.\textsuperscript{177} USIA Director Charles Wick, who led the public diplomacy campaign in Europe, informed his superiors “we have lost ground since ’79 in resolve and political capacity to convince electorates,” adding that “locker rooms at Eureka College and American anecdotes don’t appeal to Europeans.”\textsuperscript{178}

Washington expected Whitehall to rally European allies given the level of U.S. cooperation that ensured the modernization of the British deterrent.\textsuperscript{179} U.S. consideration of British public opinion in timing the announcement of the dual-track decision and the commencement of INF negotiations showed respect for the Conservative Party’s political position. Moreover, the Reagan administration’s spring 1982 agreement to supply the far superior Trident D-5 submarine launched ballistic missile on terms as beneficial as the original agreement on the C-4 missile built up good favor with the Thatcher government.\textsuperscript{180}

The need for British diplomacy in NATO became even more acute following Rostow’s tour.\textsuperscript{181} British arms control specialists enumerated several potential problems in defending the Reagan administration’s handling of the relationship between INF and START. Arms control cynics deemed an agreement on INF far less likely than an agreement on START. They assumed that parallel negotiations served to “equalize the

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\textsuperscript{176} Francis Pym to Margaret Thatcher, 25 October 1982 (TNA), PREM 19/693 f67; Minutes of the Full Cabinet Meeting CC(83), 20 January 1982, (TNA) CAB 128/76 f22.
\textsuperscript{177} Talbott, \textit{Deadly Gambits}, 148.
\textsuperscript{179} David Gilmore, “Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START),” 14 May 1982, (TNA) FCO 46/3079.
\textsuperscript{180} Eames, “The Trident Sales Agreement.”
\textsuperscript{181} Rostow to Reagan and Shultz, “Observations on Talks in Europe about the Kvitsinsky/Nitze Initiative,” 27 October 1982, (RRPL) NSC Subject Files, Box 23.
\end{flushleft}
bargaining chips” between the United States and the Soviet Union, which might encourage Washington to protect its sacred strategic cows by trading away INF systems deployed for the security of Europe.182 Allied anxiety peaked over the possibility that the U.S. might offer concessions in INF talks to generate progress on START based on Reagan’s need to create political momentum for the 1982 mid-term elections. Moreover, an agreement on START prior to INF deployments threaten to enflame public opinion in Europe on the basis that INF talks simply bought time for the U.S. to modernize its strategic weapons.

In the autumn of 1982, the coordination of British and German INF views emerged as Whitehall’s chief diplomatic mission for keeping the dual-track strategy on course. German officials asked for British help in three ways. The first, to delay the basing of cruise missiles in the United Kingdom till a later date synchronous with deployments of Pershing II missiles on German soil. F.R.G. defense officials reasoned that summer deployment preparations in the United Kingdom might otherwise support the charge in German public debate that the Americans sought to modernize weaponry before giving arms control a chance to succeed.183 Second, the Germans wanted the British government—riding high from victory in the Falklands War (Guerra de las Malvinas) with Argentina—to adopt a highly public and resolute position on deployments to the set the tone for nuclear discourse throughout Europe.184 Lastly, Bonn prevailed upon Whitehall to use its influence with the Reagan administration to persuade the president to moderate the U.S. INF negotiating position to mitigate the effects of

widespread European disillusionment with American arms control efforts.\textsuperscript{185} Mindful that Washington expected Whitehall to lead the European public diplomacy campaign, British officials organized discussions with the Germans and Americans on the scope of the future Montebello decision in October 1983. They planned the reduction of the NATO stockpile of warheads in Europe by a count of 1,000 to demonstrate positive unilateral action in the pursuit of disarmament.\textsuperscript{186}

British diplomacy persuaded European leaders to hold the line on deployment. By year’s end, however, bureaucratic politics in the Reagan administration had sabotaged arms control negotiations so thoroughly as to enflame public opinion to the point of crisis. On START, the administration’s inept public diplomacy contributed to the election of a Congress in the 1982 elections much less in favor of Reagan’s nuclear policies. Even the more favorable lame-duck Congress rejected the “dense pack” basing mode of the MX missile, which the administration sold in its modernization program as key to closing the “window of vulnerability.”\textsuperscript{187}

On INF, Nitze pleaded desperately with his superiors to demonstrate some flexibility in anticipation of the upcoming British and West German elections. He wrote Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam, “Public opinion in Europe, and most significantly in Germany and the UK no longer supports the zero/zero; what they want is a negotiated settlement that makes US deployments unnecessary.”\textsuperscript{188} Nitze argued that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{185} “Meeting Minutes between German Defense Minister and the U.K. Delegation to NATO,” 30 November 1982, (TNA) PREM 19/979.
  \item \textsuperscript{188} Nitze to Dam, “INF Status and Future Strategy,” 10 December 1982, (RRPL) NSC Subject Files, Box 23.
\end{itemize}
Moscow’s adaptability on INF improved its public approval. Moreover, the NSC acknowledged that Yuri Andropov’s ascension to the Soviet premiership on 12 November 1982 posed a potential public diplomacy challenge. In his previous role as chairman of the KGB Andropov had devised and implemented much of the Soviet peace offensive. Nitze insisted the public diplomacy challenge could only be met through the adjustment of the administration’s arms control approach. Rostow’s resignation deprived Nitze of his best advocate in the interagency debate, however. Rostow’s insistence on campaigning for the Walk-in-the-Woods proposal, despite the renewed emphasis on the zero-option from Reagan himself, alienated the ACDA chief from the rest of the administration. His departure in January 1983 represented the loss of another administration official who NATO allies had come to value.

The departure of Haig and Rostow made room for a better equipped bureaucratic warrior and more skilled diplomat in the person of newly appointed Secretary of State George Shultz, who became the most important administration ally of both Nitze and the Thatcher government for the rest of Reagan’s time in office. Shultz’s December 1982 visit to London advanced his rapport with senior British officials, resulting in Shultz’s advocacy for greater consideration of European public opinion on INF in national security planning meetings. An incoming Congress dictated a new political reality far less receptive to Reagan’s nuclear agenda, which refocused the president’s attention on

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189 Kraemer to Clark, “Summary of Ambassador Paul Nitze Meeting with the President,” 22 July 1983, (RRPL) NSC Subject Files, Box 23.
public diplomacy during the critical year of INF deployments in Europe. Vice President George Bush’s early 1983 visit to key NATO countries represented the opening salvo of a revitalized public diplomacy campaign. British officials welcomed the shift in the administration’s thinking. Thatcher’s cabinet anticipated Bush’s visit as an opportunity to elevate public diplomacy for they expected that “public opinion will undoubtedly be a third party at the negotiating table in 1983 – and perhaps beyond.”

CHAPTER TWO:
THE BRITISH NUCLEAR DEBATE:
DISARMAMENT, DETERRENCE, AND DEMOCRACY

“It [C.N.D] is now supported right across the spectrum, by academics and trade unionists, Liberals and Labourites, ecologists and Welsh nationalists, Church men and women, feminists, and by the youth culture in the popular music world.”

– E.P. Thompson

Three events directly triggered the sharp increase in British nuclear fear that led to an antinuclear revival headed by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). British nuclear anxiety first spiked with the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in 1976 and NATO’s December 1979 announcement of the dual-track decision, which accepted the basing of nuclear armed cruise missiles on British soil as a response to Soviet actions. Second, the agreement to purchase Trident SLBMs from the United States to upgrade the British nuclear deterrent, revealed during a defense debate in January 1980 in the House of Commons, raised public concerns about the inertia of the arms race and the United Kingdom’s involvement in it. Third, the public reveal of the civil defense pamphlet “Protect and Survive,” a ham-fisted attempt by the Home Office to convince British citizens that simple precautions could ensure their survival in the event of nuclear war, engendered criticism of the government’s ability to truly grasp and manage the nuclear threat. In addition to these three events, U.S.-European disagreement over the neutron bomb, the collapse of the SALT II agreement, controversial developments in U.S. nuclear targeting policy, and Ronald Reagan’s anti-Soviet rhetoric validated peace movement claims that incremental progress in arms control had failed to produce a safer world.

Inspired by CND, professional organizations, church parishes, women’s groups, producers of popular culture, the scientific community, the Labour Party, and the internationally minded European Nuclear Disarmament campaign (END) joined in advocating for unilateral British nuclear disarmament. The dramatic growth of the British antinuclear movement can be attributed to an unprecedented public science diplomacy campaign and a transformation of the political left that made it more receptive to calls for disarmament and dependent on peace movement public diplomacy operations.

Antinuclear politics in 1980s Britain is an exemplary case study for defining the features and demonstrating the political significance of public science diplomacy. Scientists professing to be “toolmakers for the peace movement” integrated local and scientific knowledge when communicating their analysis of nuclear Britain. This practice encouraged widespread municipal opposition to the nuclear policies of Thatcher’s government, which had come to power in May 1979. Public science diplomacy also informed a municipal and religious internationalism that established firm transatlantic ties to antinuclear politics in the United States.

From 1979 to the end of 1982, the disarmament debate intensified the contest in British society between Thatcher’s Victorian values that appealed to a “strong current of moral traditionalism” and the shifting domestic values of the political left that had been infused with elements of radicalism as a result of Labour Party reforms and the revival of antinuclear activism.\textsuperscript{194} Nuclear debates became a forum in which the political left

articulated a new vision of what leading left-wing firebrand Tony Benn referred to as “moral democracy.” The political left intended for this new vision of British democracy to replace the fractured postwar social-democratic consensus and commitment to class politics. At its core, moral democracy demanded transparency, the equal participation of an informed citizenry, and social solidarity through the empowerment of local government and constituencies. Success for both democracy reform and the antinuclear agenda hinged on CND’s ability to channel the efforts of scientists, Christian ethicists, radical women protestors, and trade unions into a cogent public diplomacy campaign.

In response to the antinuclear revival, the Thatcher government initially relied on organs of the Conservative Party and a transatlantic network of private think tanks to develop the pronuclear public diplomacy plan. Thatcher’s Conservatives believed they could exploit the Labour Party’s adoption on unilateral disarmament for political gain by suggesting the opposition had been overtaken by leftist radicals. As the British deterrence debate became more entangled with developments in the United States, the Thatcher government’s cooperation with the Reagan administration on public nuclear diplomacy proved essential to the president’s moral case for nuclear deterrence that he brought before the American people and the transnational public sphere.

To Protest and Survive

In October 1979, famed English historian and first wave CND member, E.P. Thompson sat unsettled in his living room having learned from the television news of...
American cruise missiles coming to the United Kingdom. A few months later, Ken Coates from the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation phoned Thompson to propose that the two co-author an appeal for a nuclear free Europe. Out of their collaboration—along with substantial input from University of Sussex science policy expert Mary Kaldor, CND leaders Bruce Kent and Dan Smith, and the pre-eminent historian of the Chartists and wife of E.P. Thompson, Dorothy Thompson—came an “Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament.” Flanked by leading Labour Party MP Tony Benn at a press conference from the House of Commons on 28 April 1980, the authors opened their appeal with the warning that, “we are entering the most dangerous decade in human history.” They proceeded to condemn designs for limited nuclear war, the moral bankruptcy of the superpowers, the bipolar framework of the Cold War, and argued for a nuclear-free zone from “Poland to Portugal.” Advanced endorsement of the appeal by over 60 members of parliament, powerful union leaders such as Moss Evans and Arthur Scargill, and an impressive list of respected academics, bishops, and artists spoke to the organic rise of antinuclear sentiment across the country.

The appeal was instrumental in reviving the antinuclear movement. It brought Thompson into public view as a disarmament intellectual just prior to the publication of

http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_30B5C742B3FF4FAFB5B4A282CC0C1644
197 Bertrand Russell, a mathematician and philosopher, was among the most prominent antinuclear leaders of the first wave. He served as the first president of CND and he authored the famed Russell-Einstein Manifesto that was the impetus for the creation of antinuclear institution such as Pugwash and SANE.
his exegesis of British nuclear policy. Only two months before the appeal, the press had exposed Home Office plans to release a revised version of the 1950s civil defense pamphlet *Protect and Survive*, drawing critical attention to the broader campaign being pursued to assuage rising public fear of nuclear war.\footnote{201} This revelation followed an impassioned plea for the government to provide more public and robust civil defense guidelines from the respected Oxford military historian Michael Howard in the 30 January edition of *The Times*.\footnote{202}

Thompson, who had been working on concepts of militarized and police states in his academic work, found civil defense planning to be a thinly veiled attempt to marginalize dissident voices.\footnote{203} His goal in the pamphlet *Protest and Survive*, a direct challenge to *Protect and Survive*, was to rebut nuclear war-fighting assumptions made by Howard in his call for increased expenditure on civil defense. Howard, argued Thompson, deliberately employed the coded language of nuclear strategists whose intent was to persuade the general public to accept the premise of nuclear war without thinking through the moral implications of NATO’s nuclear posture.\footnote{204} Thompson concluded:

> The deformation of culture commences within language itself. It makes possible the disjunction between the rationality and moral sensibility of individual men and women and the effective political and military processes. A certain kind of ‘realist’ and ‘technical’ vocabulary effects a closure which seals out the imagination, and prevents the reason from following the most manifest sequence of cause and consequence. It habituates the mind to nuclear holocaust be reducing everything to a flat level of normality. By habituating us to certain expectations, it not only encourages resignation – it also beckons the event.\footnote{205}


\footnote{203} War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, “Zero Hour,” Interview with E.P. Thompson, 10/15/1987, WGBH Media Library & Archives. Last accessed 10 June 2019. [http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_30B5C742B3FF4FAFB5B4A282CC0C1644](http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_30B5C742B3FF4FAFB5B4A282CC0C1644)

\footnote{204} Thompson and Smith, *Protest and Survive* 22.

\footnote{205} Ibid., 26.
Thompson reached his conclusion through a careful evaluation of the importance of cruise missiles, Polaris and Trident second-strike capabilities, and the strategic doctrines—such as limited nuclear war—that underpinned notions of deterrence. For ordinary Britons, *Protest and Survive* had a similar effect to the freeze appeal on Americans. It demystified nuclear knowledge and offered a simple solution: a European nuclear free zone.\(^{206}\)

Both the “Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament” and *Protest and Survive* established an international dimension to British nuclear protest that made it distinct from the movement’s more parochial first wave in the 1950s and 1960s. CND had fractured over the question of joining international opposition to the Vietnam War, causing the more left-wing elements of the movement to desert the organization which contributed to its decline in the 1970s.\(^{207}\) Peggy Duff, a CND founder, left the organization to establish a more internationally minded peace group. However, the END appeal healed the divisions between CND and the internationalist camp of Britain’s peace movement as both Duff and CND secretary Bruce Kent took on END leadership roles.\(^{208}\) CND and END deftly handled potential competition by adopting complimentary organizational structures. END founding members agreed that it should provide a “European alliance to CND,” while the former was left to cultivate a vigorous national membership and support the creation of local antinuclear groups.\(^{209}\) In cases where overlapping membership or

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\(^{207}\) Burkett, “Re-defining British morality,” 200.


\(^{209}\) “END – The Next Steps: A Discussion Paper,” 20 April 1980, London School of Economics Special Collections (LSE), European Nuclear Disarmament records (END), Box 1, Folder 1.
protests did occur, local groups were expected to devise a solution. CND thus served as the national clearinghouse for the antinuclear movement and END operated as the international umbrella group for European activism.

A revitalized CND came as a result of one of Britain’s proudest political traditions, the protest pamphlet. In addition to Protest and Survive, best-selling antinuclear pamphlets condemned the pernicious effects of civil defense on multiple levels of society ranging from the family to local government. Technical misrepresentations by the Home Office spurred a political reawakening of the scientific community through protest of civil defense. Ensuing anti-civil defense campaigns pursued by scientific experts contributed to local governments’ reflection on their own complicity in the nuclear status quo. They questioned whether to aid the central government in upholding its deterrence relationship with the Soviet bloc; or, respond to the moral demands of their constituencies by rejecting civil defense regulations in favor of alternative defense policies. Because civil defense was a highly visible and local manifestation of Britain’s nuclear status that pervaded the entire country these criticisms were devastating. Civil defense non-compliance from local authorities rejected Thatcher’s nuclear agenda. It also represented a last gasp of municipal Britain against Thatcher’s successful drive to consolidate governing power in Whitehall, which ultimately transformed the United Kingdom into one of the most centrally governed states in the Western world.

The devolution of civil defense responsibilities to local authorities in the postwar period set the conditions for a showdown between Thatcher’s central government and

\[210\text{ Ibid.}\]
municipal Labour governments in the 1980s. Britain’s original provisions for nuclear
civil defense emerged out of the anxiety produced by the 1948 Berlin Crisis and Joint
Intelligence Committee Report predicting the future use of a limited Soviet nuclear
arsenal in a European war during the 1950s.211 The 1948 Civil Defense Act, based on
recommendations from the Royal Observer Corps, mandated a designated minister to
organize and equip civil defense forces; train and incorporate local authorities, fire
brigades, and police forces into civil defense planning; instruct the members of public on
civil defense; oversee the stockpiling of equipment and provisions for civil defense; and
oversee the build-up of civil defense infrastructure. Under this new structure of civil
defense planning, the central government relied extensively on cooperation from local
authorities to carry out required preparations.212

Over the following twenty years, the Korean War, Suez Crisis, the second Berlin
Crisis, and a series of influential government reports including the 1955 Strath Report
and the 1957 Sandys’ White Paper, ensured that civil defense continued to preoccupy the
official mind. In that period British civil defense transformed from a program for life-
saving measures for the public in the event of an atomic war into a valued component of
deterrence under the assumption that it decreased the likelihood of a successful
thermonuclear assault on the United Kingdom.213

Key changes to civil defense planning in the years of détente centered on
definition, expertise, and funding. First, the Home Office promulgated a new definition in

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http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo6/12-13-14/5/body/enacted
213 Grant, *After the Bomb*.
1973 under the term “Home Defense,” which added the securing of the country from internal threats and emphasized alternative machinery for the continuity of government to the responsibilities laid out in the 1948 Act.\textsuperscript{214} Funding cuts resulted in the gradual elimination of the civilian staffed Civil Defense Corps in 1968 and the 1976 dissolution of the Standing Advisory Committee on Home Defense, which had been comprised of 100 scientists who provided much needed technical analysis.\textsuperscript{215} Officials justified these cuts by claiming that local governments now had larger staffs and resources to draw up and supply their own civil defense plans and preparations.

By the end of the 1970s the prohibitive prospective costs of a public shelter program resulted in a policy of “shelter in place” to compensate for the severe cuts to civil defense infrastructure, expertise, and management. Shelter in place guidelines aligned with the ideology of New Right Conservatives touting the value of individualism and self-reliance and the need for the public to break its dependence on the state. Shelter in place policies, however, demonstrated just how limited the strategic utility of civil defense had become in an age of rapid technological advances in offensive systems. Thus, the evolution of civil defense in the détente years left the country ripe for political controversy between central and local government, and completely vulnerable to a nuclear attack.

“Operation Square Leg,” a military and civil preparedness exercise coordinated with the NATO war game “Operation Crusader,” laid bare how the intensification of the arms race had exacerbated the political challenges and problems of physical

infrastructure facing emergency planners. The scenario began just after 12 noon on Thursday 19 September 1980 when over 120 nuclear bombs packing an explosive power of 200 megatons rained down on Britain. Wave one struck Britain’s military infrastructure, the most densely packed in the world. U.S. cruise missile bases at Greenham Common in Newbury and Molesworth in Northampton were utterly destroyed. Monitoring and communications stations linked to the submersible second strike were annihilated. Bombs dropped on nearly every other target of strategic importance. From 1 pm to 3 pm, a second wave detonated over Birmingham, Newcastle, Sheffield, Liverpool, Leeds, and other important urban-industrial centers. Oddly enough, the lightly targeted City of London survived though covered—like nearly every square mile of country—with radioactive fallout. Parliament had been suspended a week prior under threat of nuclear war and in its aftermath, civil defense authorities struggled to maintain social control from 12 decrepit bunkers spread across the United Kingdom. Police rounded up CND activists and radical elements of the Labour Party deemed to be “Red Peace Trotskyists” in the name of maintaining “law and order.”

When the Square Leg target list and complete disrepair of civil defense bunkers and facilities first came to public attention thanks to Duncan Campbell’s October exposé in the New Statesman it vindicated public scrutiny of Home Office civil defense guidelines throughout the preceding year. In March 1980, the BBC documentary If the Bomb Drops presented civil defense as contribution to deterrence and as a system to retain government legitimacy rather than a program to protect Britons from the

consequences of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{218} Square Leg also validated Thompson’s earlier criticisms of the targeting assumptions that supposedly justified the survival recommendations in \textit{Protect and Survive}. The inadequacy of Home Office measures borne out by the Square Leg scenario lent credibility to Philip Bolsover’s arguments in CND’s best-selling pamphlet, \textit{Civil Defense: the Cruelest Confidence Trick}, first released in 1980 and then again in 1982. Bolsover argued that spending on civil defense demonstrated the Thatcher government’s greater concern for suppressing dissidence and persuading the public of the winnability of nuclear war rather than addressing pressing social problems such as the funding crises confronting the National Health Service, the education system, and the housing industry.\textsuperscript{219} CND chair Joan Ruddock attributed the significant boost in the antinuclear movement’s recruitment during 1980 to the revelation of Square Leg and the regular clip of civil defense criticism.\textsuperscript{220} The development of disarmament as a local political issue would become a determining factor in the Labour Party’s electoral reforms at the end of 1980.

The anti-civil defense campaign and corresponding Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) movement that grew out of the “Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament” generated momentum for two large demonstrations that enabled CND to increase its political clout at the national level. CND’s resurgence exacerbated Labour’s civil war ahead of its annual party conference in October 1980. In January 1980, Defense Secretary Francis Pym revealed that the Callaghan government had pursued the procurement of

\textsuperscript{218} BBC “If The Bomb Drops,” \textit{Panorama} (1980).
Trident and authorized the Chevaline project—a secret 1 billion pound modernization of the British deterrent—despite a public commitment to the 1974 Labour manifesto that renounced next generation strategic weapons.\textsuperscript{221} The nuclear modernization issue perfectly suited Benn’s advocacy for a democratization of Labour Party to make its officials more accountable to constituents, hence, his featured role at the END appeal in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{222} An early test of CND’s rising strength came in June during a conference held in London’s Wembley stadium, during which 20,000 people protesting Trident and cruise missiles loudly derided pronuclear speeches from Callaghan and his former Foreign Secretary David Owen. Tony Benn, on the other hand, drew a standing ovation for his call for disarmament.\textsuperscript{223} The conference clarified that defense would be a core issue dividing the left and right wings of the Labour Party.

An 80,000 strong October rally in Trafalgar Square—Britain’s biggest in twenty years—brought local groups across the United Kingdom into CND’s organizational network and provided yet another indication of the extent of the antinuclear revival.\textsuperscript{224} CND’s structure, which closely resembled that of a political party, allowed it to dominate the British antinuclear movement. Member-led specialist sections that reported to the national council organized lobbying activities with the major political parties, Christian churches, trade unions, environmentalists, young voters, international organizations, and entertainers. Full time employees staffed out committees devoted to projects and demonstrations, parliamentary elections, finance and fundraising, and organization

\textsuperscript{224} Interview with Bruce Kent, 11/26/1987.
membership. The re-launch of CND’s monthly magazine *Sanity* provided a publication of record for the antinuclear movement and a tool for expanding its donor base. Thousands of semi-autonomous local chapters built out the CND donor network and provided the grassroots infrastructure that informed antinuclear sentiment in every corner of the British Isles. Other groups also emerged, such as the Greenham Common Women (GCW), Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA), the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW), Clergy Against Nuclear Arms, Teachers for Peace, and Journalists Against Nuclear Extermination, but many if not all of these had deep ties to CND either via an overlap in leadership or shared membership.\(^{225}\) As a result of CND’s hegemonic influence over the antinuclear movement it dominated the disarmament debate; a position defined by demands for the unilateral cancellation of Trident, the elimination of the independent deterrent, eviction of U.S. nuclear forces from the British mainland, and coercion of NATO to adopt a non-nuclear defense policy. Arguments for total unilateral disarmament left no room for moderate unilateral reductions or genuine multilateral disarmament.

CND’s 1980 October rally generated significant support for unilateral disarmament during a period of transitional reform for the Labour Party. To the chagrin of former Labour Prime Minister James Callaghan and the Party’s right wing, Labour adopted a three-branch electoral college voting system comprised of the parliamentary Labor Party, trade unions, and the Constituent Labor Parties (CLP). The new voting system—which took power from Labor Party leaders and redistributed it to Labour Party members—passed by the slimmest of margins during the annual conference in autumn.

\(^{225}\) Wittner, *Toward Nuclear Abolition*, 133.
The electoral weighting of these branches remained undetermined until a special conference in January 1981. Callaghan abruptly resigned as party leader during the intervening months in an attempt to empower his protégé Dennis Healey under the old system of selecting a party leader through parliamentary ballot before Benn could challenge for leadership through the new electoral college.\footnote{Tim Heppell and Andrew Crines, “How Michael Foot Won the Labour Party Leadership,” \textit{The Political Quarterly} 82 (2011): 82.} To the surprise of many, Healey ultimately lost his bid for party leader to latecomer Michael Foot. A veteran of CND, Foot emerged as the party’s unity candidate – a surprising label considering his reluctance to join previous Labour cabinets and twenty plus years of backbench antagonism toward party leadership. Foot’s highest rate of support came among MPs favoring unilateral disarmament, accounting for 95 out of his 139 endorsements.\footnote{Ibid., 91.}

Mindful of his support among unilateralists and aware that the electoral college reforms gave more power to constituency Labour Parties that were increasingly influenced by the growing number of local CND chapters, Foot made disarmament a top party priority. From his victory stump, Foot exhorted, “the dismantling of those weapons is essential for the survival of our world.”\footnote{Ian Aitken, “Labour picks Foot to heal party splits,” \textit{The Guardian}, 11 November 1980.}

Adding to CND’s influence over Labour Party politics as a result of the crusade against civil defense and Foot’s prioritization of unilateral disarmament, trade unions increasingly came to accept antinuclear ideas as the basis for their political and economic positions. CND renewed its courtship of trade unions in 1975 with the establishment of its trade union specialist section (TUCND) amidst a resurgence of union power. Trade unions’ growing strength came from a rising membership and Prime Minister Harold
Wilson’s implementation of the “social contract” policy throughout the 1970s.\(^{229}\) Gaining union support had been a key aim of CND in the 1950s and 1960s, but widespread union endorsement of unilateralism remained a difficult sell considering the British defense industry ranked among the largest sectors of employment for union labor. Industrial decline throughout the 1970s compelled union shop leaders to rethink their reliance on defense production. In 1976, shop stewards at Lucas Aerospace drew up designs to reorganize factories for industrial production to meet social needs instead of retaining redundant capacities that all but guaranteed layoffs in defense and aviation industries. Lucas Plan proponents emphasized social utility of goods rather than exchange value to create a more equitable and sustainable economy that freed industry of the detrimental effects of command management and design required by weapons production.\(^{230}\) Similar plans appeared on shop floors throughout the U.K.’s defense industry, including in the factories of premier contractors such as Vickers and British Aerospace.\(^{231}\)

Initially encouraged by Tony Benn during his tenure as Secretary of State for Industry, the Lucas Plan served as the inspiration for the creation of the Centre for Alternative Industry and Technological Systems. At the center, work on conversion planning rapidly gained the attention of union representatives, most notably the leaders of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU).\(^{232}\) The center’s emphasis on production for social utility and human needs at the expense of exchange value ran directly counter to Thatcher’s free-market principles while aligning with the moral focus

\(^{231}\) Wainwright, “The Women who Wire up the Weapons,” 141.
of many in the peace movement. By 1980, Trade Union CND and the END trade union committee joined with TGWU to promote the compatibility of defense conversion and unilateral disarmament.\textsuperscript{233} Conversion councils were set up across the United Kingdom through coordinated efforts between universities, scientists, NWFZ authorities, CND, and trade unions. The most significant of these being the Conversion Council of London, funded to the level of 75 million pounds. As the Director of the Conversion Council of London, Bill Nevin explained, conversion councils “provide the bridge from the peace movement to labour.”\textsuperscript{234} Disarmament politics helped unions remain relevant during the Labour Party reforms that cutaway at union influence and at a time when public polling and rhetoric from both major parties indicated the decline of class tension as a political motivator in British society.\textsuperscript{235}

TGWU relied on the work of conversion councils and peace movement allies to aid its efforts to push through a motion for unilateral disarmament at the 1981 Trade Union Congress (TUC) annual general meeting. CND fringe meetings swamped regional and national conferences of unions and the Labour Party, leading to disarmament measures dominating the political agenda.\textsuperscript{236} As the largest constituent representative of the TUC’s nearly 12.5 million members, TGWU brought along several other major unions including the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), National Union of

Mineworkers (NUM), and the Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) to demand an unequivocal declaration on disarmament and economic conversion from the Labour Party.  

Foot’s election and Labour’s shift leftward on disarmament at the local party level and among trade unions led to several high-profile defections from the center of the parliamentary party’s leadership in 1981. David Owen, Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, and William Rodgers—the “Gang of Four”—cited unilateral disarmament as one of the primary motives for splitting from Labour to form the pro-multilateral disarmament Social Democratic Party (SDP). Labour Party leaders who favored the retention of Britain’s nuclear capability on the basis that disarmament should only be pursued multilaterally encountered two prongs of opposition within the party. While the secession of several of Labour’s ex-cabinet ministers and over 20 MPs put antinuclear activists in a stronger position to influence Labour Party policy and organization, it simultaneously complicated CND’s long-term electoral strategy.

Following Labour Party reforms at the Blackpool conference in 1980 and the subsequent split that resulted in the creation of the SDP, Thatcher’s political advisors identified unilateral nuclear disarmament as one of three weaknesses of Labour’s incoming leadership to exploit. In Michael Foot’s ascension to Labour leader, the Conservative Research Department (CRD)—the strategy arm and policy nursery of the larger party—perceived a hostile radical takeover of the Labour Party. CRD’s anti-CND

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campaign had two parts: prevent unilateral disarmament from becoming the policy of the United Kingdom, and to marginalize the Labour Party in Parliament by branding it as a group of unilateralist radicals. Using the issue of disarmament to frame Labour as a batch of radicals became a goal shared by the Thatcher government and Reagan administration after the Labour Party officially adopted unilateral disarmament as its policy.\textsuperscript{240}

Whitehall aimed to create the impression of popular support for pronuclear policies. It monitored antinuclear media coverage and developments, but initially outsourced much of the operation against the antinuclear movement to pronuclear think tanks until the critical year of 1983. This policy encouraged a significant transatlantic dimension within the conservative campaign aimed at countering antinuclear sentiment, to emerge in the private sector and government associated think tanks. Heritage Foundation, a new and influential conservative American think tank, conducted joint studies with CRD to analyze the origins of disarmament arguments, bases of antinuclear support, and financial conditions of peace groups. The joint study focused specifically on antinuclear public diplomacy tactics and their impact on public opinion, especially on youth and religious communities, to inform the development of a right-wing counter campaign.\textsuperscript{241} Heritage also funded programs to bring British and European personnel opposing the antinuclear movement to the United States to participate in counter campaign activities.\textsuperscript{242}

British organizations supporting peace through strength policies cultivated influence with the Thatcher government both as an end in itself, and as a means for


\textsuperscript{242} Peter Shipley to Scott Hamilton, 16 March 1982, (WLSC) CPA/CRD 4/18/11.
establishing rapport with American allies. Tony Kerpel who worked as a speechwriter for independent presidential candidate John Anderson in 1980, went on to serve Thatcher in the campaign against CND. In early 1981 he advised the Conservative Party to use its own organizations to block CND from gathering influence in other spheres of public life, warning of damage not just to deterrence but to the entirety of the Thatcher vision. To that end, in 1981 Kerpel established the Coalition for Peace through Security (CPS), at times referred to as the Coalition for Peace through Strength, to link local campaigns supporting nuclear deterrence with the national and international narrative coming from Whitehall, Washington, and NATO allies. Whitehall encouraged the Reagan administration and conservative contacts in Washington D.C. to warmly receive CPS and support its mission to combat the peace movement. CPS expanded upon these contacts to lobby Capitol Hill and the Reagan administration to invest more and more resources in shaping European nuclear attitudes for years to come. CPS in turn helped implement the Reagan administration’s public diplomacy schemes in the United Kingdom.

**Toolmakers for the Peace Movement**

Pronuclear advocates recognized early on that a moral case for deterrence should be a component of their public diplomacy campaign in light of the Church of England’s July 1979 decision to form a working party to explore a theological debate concerning

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244 Peter Blaker to Margaret Thatcher, “Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons,” 5 October 1981, (TNA) FCO 46/2745.
245 Peter Blaker to Tony Kerpel, September 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 3, Folder NATO/UK.
246 Sven Kraemer to Robert Schweitzer, “Meeting with British Group ‘Coalition for Peace through Strength,’” 1 October 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 3, Folder “NATO Countries-UK;” Dennis Blair and Jim Rentschler to Janet Colston, Meeting with British Group ‘Coalition for Peace through Strength,‘” 2 October 1981, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 3, Folder “NATO Countries-UK.”
disarmament. The decision set off a broader discussion over the impact of nuclear weapons on the relationship between Christianity and democracy. John Austin Baker, who would be elevated to Archbishop of Salisbury by the time the working group published its findings, chaired the group which met 11 times from July 1980 to April 1982. Officials from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, and other government departments served as project consultants. Government representatives drew on the arguments produced by a transatlantic network maintained by Michael Quinlan to promote the morality of their position.

Quinlan immediately began dealing with nuclear matters when he entered the civil service in 1954, the very year the Britain fielded its first operational nuclear weapon. By the 1980s, Quinlan had established himself as the “high priest of deterrence” among his colleagues. He served in numerous positions within the defense establishment, including the director for defense policy related to arms control, counselor to Britain’s NATO delegation, deputy undersecretary for policy and programs in the Ministry of Defence during NATO’s drafting and acceptance of the dual-track decision, and ultimately permanent undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Defence. The Jesuit educated Quinlan also strongly identified as a Catholic. His moral views of deterrence effectively became Whitehall’s policy when he wrote an essay defending Britain’s commitment to NATO’s nuclear policy against the peace movement’s criticisms in the

government’s 1981 *Statement on Defense.* The Ministry of Defence and the CRD agreed that a resolution to the religious debate demanded a decisive moral argument.

In addition to being a moral contest, CRD considered the antinuclear dilemma to be a generational struggle for British politics. They estimated that 50 percent of Young Conservatives—a training ground for Party leaders—had joined the antinuclear movement because of the effectiveness of CND materials and cultural strategies. Thatcher’s government initially looked to the British Atlantic Council (BAC) to coordinate the various components of the conservative counter campaign, providing hidden government funds for staff and pronuclear activities. BAC would organize the messaging of dozens of other organizations including CPS, Young Conservatives, and the Council on Arms Control in conjunction with the Ministry of Defence’s and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s public affairs strategy.

Conservative Party strategists soon judged the BAC incapable of mounting a modern public diplomacy campaign against the antinuclear movement only months after being entrusted by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to do so. BAC did not have the authority, staff, or expertise to dictate tactics or messaging to its peer groups. CRD found the group incapable of producing leaflets and audio-visual materials, and unable to

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develop other strategies to reach local audiences and citizens who had not yet been radicalized by antinuclear sentiment. CRD summarized, “the BAC is old fashioned, too establishment, uninspiring and dreary and isolated.”\textsuperscript{255} Wedded to an outdated form of international diplomacy focused on elites, the BAC’s inability to adopt to a new form of public diplomacy ushered in by the information age hindered the anti-CND campaign in its early stages.

Disarmament proponents framed unilateralism and the discarding of nuclear deterrence as an essential component of a “moral democracy” which they offered up as an alternative to the Thatcher society.\textsuperscript{256} They made this argument by seeking to influence the moral exploration of deterrence occurring in religious circles, by attempting to clarify the role of expertise in British society within the context of the nuclear debate, and by claiming that increased public participation in antinuclear demonstrations was in itself a moral improvement to British democracy.

In the first two instances, the political reawakening of the scientific community seemed essential to bring about a moral democracy out of the debate over nuclear weapons. E.P. Thompson acknowledged that in preparing his assault on the Thatcher government’s nuclear policies he had relied on the expertise of American scientists who kept alive antinuclear analysis during the years of détente. In contrast, he had found Britain’s scientific community to be relatively silent in public discourse on nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{257} This began to change when the Church of England and other groups began looking for technical counsel to inform their moral deliberations. Joseph Rotblat who was

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{255} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{256} Michael Foot, \textit{Another Heart and Other Pulses: The Alternative to the Thatcher Society} (London: Collins, 1984), 56-95.
\item \textsuperscript{257} Interview with E.P. Thompson, 10/15/1987.
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a leading voice of science diplomacy in his capacity as the leader of Pugwash, several prominent academics who held antinuclear views, and SDP leader and former Foreign Secretary David Owen who advocated for some form of disarmament consulted with the Church of England working group examining deterrence and disarmament.\footnote{Report of the Working Group under the Bishop of Salisbury, \textit{The Church and the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons and the Christian Conscience} (London: CIO Press, 1982), vi-viii.} Martin Ryle, a Cambridge Radio Astronomer awarded the Nobel Prize in physics in 1974, stood out among his colleagues as one of the few British scientist who looked to bridge scientific and humanistic expertise by arguing for the co-dependent goals of disarmament and democracy. In bridging both intellectual traditions, Ryle argued that appeal “to the principles of democracy, and to moral and humanitarian feeling, is to accept terms which (for better or worse) have, in our political culture, and among the working class at least as much as among the middle class, far greater currency than do the terms of class war.”\footnote{Martin Ryle, “Nuclear Disarmament Democracy and Internationalism,” \textit{Radical Philosophy} 29 (1981): 6.}

Ryle couched his insistence that antinuclear morality could transcend traditional divisions in British society within discussions on the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) movement and new thinking about the place of science in democracy. Tony Benn carried these themes forward in his arguments for democracy. In his view, scientists had an essential role to play in the revitalization of British democracy at all levels by unpacking the black box of nuclear deterrence. Benn maintained that, “They [scientists] must not mystify, for that establishes a new religion. They must not oversimplify, because that misleads and deceives. Their role is to clarify the choices for society. To
offer leadership through education, but not to dominate through expertise or power. Decisions, in a democratic society, must ultimately be made by the people as a whole.**260**

The group Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) enacted Benn’s ideas, which led to the development of new methods for public science diplomacy. SANA, established by Mike Pentz, a CND council member and founding Dean of Sciences at the Open University, provided the underlying technical analysis for the campaign opposed to Thatcher’s civil defense plans. Pentz first proposed the creation of SANA on 6 December 1980 at a meeting with nine of his scientific colleagues from Imperial College, Cambridge University, University of London, Manchester University, and Open University.261 The group officially formed in January at the Friends House in London with the backing of 16 Royal Society fellows, reaching 250 active members in just over a year.263

Pentz and his colleagues were initially wary of finding the proper place for SANA within the broader peace movement. Pentz, a South African communist committed to anti-elitist principles, did not wish to make SANA another form of British Pugwash. That venerable body of scientific citizens founded in 1957 had structured its efforts to combat the arms race largely around meetings between prominent scientists and high-ranking government officials.264 Pentz also did not wish to see the credibility of scientists

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261 At this point, Imperial College was part of the University of London system. In 2006, Imperial College disassociated from the University of London.
262 Mike Pentz to Dorothy Hodgkin, “Scientists Against Nuclear Arms,” 8 January 1981, Weston Libraries Special Collections at Oxford University (WLSC) Dorothy Hodgkin Personal Papers, Folder MS.ENG.C.7955.
attached to the complex politics of an organization such as CND. SANA settled on taking no official stance. Instead SANA opted to be “toolmakers for the peace movement,” acting as group of independent consultants for CND, END, and likeminded organizations. Though Pentz and other SANA officers were deeply involved with CND and END, maintaining no official stance provided the group with flexibility to attract British scientists who wished to work on select issues while not necessarily endorsing the polarizing issue of unilateral disarmament. SANA scientists agreed at their inaugural conference in March 1981 to establish a series of working groups to provide technical assessments of the most common issues championed by the peace movement. Civil defense drew a special focus.265 CND immediately began encouraging local chapters that were coordinating NWFZ campaigns with municipal governments to rely on SANA’s expertise.266

The third argument for antinuclear activity being essential for moral democracy was that it fostered a vibrant and expanding public sphere, which was necessary for society to hold the state accountable to democratic principles. Women in particular took advantage of the antinuclear moment to elevate their voice in the public sphere. Over the preceding twenty years, British women had become more independent and better equipped from a legal and educational standpoint to challenge the nuclear establishment. The number of women with higher level degrees had quintupled from 1960 to 1980, despite only modest increases in the total British population.267

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had declined during the late 1970s and early 1980s, women’s employment enjoyed a steady trend upwards. Moreover, a series of legislative developments including the 1970 Equal Pay Act, the Sex Discrimination Act and the Employment Protection Act in 1975, provided a legal remedy to major gender inequities in British society.\(^{268}\)

Despite these advances in equality between the sexes, the meaning of a women’s only camp and single-sex protest emerged as a major point of contention in the peace movement. Women at Greenham Common argued that feminist principles could set a new moral course for political progressives and British society as a whole. As women moved to the forefront of antinuclear media coverage, peace movement leaders bristled at the radical image associated with Greenham Common Women’s (GCW) embodied rhetoric, symbolic action, and non-violent direct action (NVDA). GCW contributed to the Labour Party’s increasingly radical reputation, but they also served as a progressive anchor that led to the modernization of British views of gender roles, family values, and collective morality.

Women’s peaceful occupation of the territory surrounding the Greenham Common RAF base gradually became a site of vast contention reflective of the disarmament debate’s larger impact on British social values. Initially constructed on a strip of common land during WWII near the affluent and conservative market town of Newbury, RAF Greenham Common served as a forward base of operations for the U.S. military throughout the Cold War. Its selection as the base to receive the first deployment

of cruise missiles made it an ideal site for antinuclear protest. Ann Pettitt began thinking of a march to Greenham Common after coming across an advertisement for a woman led peace march from Copenhagen to Paris during the NWFZ campaign in her hometown in Wales. Pettitt had not been especially active in the peace or women’s movements. By her own admission she prioritized raising her three young children over social and political causes, but her mounting nuclear fear compelled her to organize a demonstration.\footnote{Ann Pettitt, \textit{Walking to Greenham: How the Peace Camp Began and the Cold War Ended} (London: Honno Publishers, 2008).}

On 28 August 1981, Pettitt set out with forty women and a handful of men on a 110 mile “Women for Life on Earth” march from Cardiff to Greenham Common. Four women chained themselves to the fence surrounding Greenham Common air base upon arrival and demanded a debate with representatives from the Ministry of Defence. The chaining action, which was a deliberate reference to suffragette tactics, along with the use of suffragette colors in peace camp signs, signaled that GCW viewed disarmament to be as much a social and political imperative as women’s right to vote.\footnote{The Greenham Factor (London, 1983); Barbara Harford and Sarah Hopkins (eds.), \textit{Greenham Common: Women at the Wire} (London: The Women’s Press, 1984), 19.}

Foot’s election as Labour leader and his early spotlight on disarmament throughout 1981 further developed antinuclear ideas as a feature of the British public sphere, while pronuclear enthusiasts who appeared to reside among the ranks of the elites, government officials, or the “silent majority” seemed more interested in constraining public discourse on nuclear weapons. Reagan’s October 1981 modernization announcements further stoked support for the antinuclear cause at a critical juncture. Mass demonstrations such as the annual CND October rally in 1981 that drew 250,000 protestors to Hyde Park and tripled the number of the previous year’s participation...
confirmed the soaring political importance of antinuclear empowerment.\textsuperscript{271} Impressive as these mobilizations were, the movement’s long-term health depended upon an adoption of unilateralism as the official policy of the Labour Party and the defeat of the Thatcher government’s pronuclear initiatives.

Conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic envisaged a worst-case scenario in which a mishandled pronuclear public diplomacy campaign could undermine Thatcher’s broader political agenda and return the Labour Party to power with Michael Foot as prime minister. Peter Shipley, the CRD strategist in charge of the anti-CND campaign, advised, “the unilateralist case reaches a much wider audience than the political left. The disarmament movement also represents an emerging radical movement, the aims of which extend far beyond the immediate question of nuclear weapons… it represents a cultural awakening against the establishment and in favor of democracy…”\textsuperscript{272}

\textit{Public Diplomacy and Protest: The Anglo-American Connection}

Organizations participating in the anti-CND campaign identified a strong current of anti-Americanism in the United Kingdom as one of the reasons the BAC could not effectively function as a pronuclear umbrella organization.\textsuperscript{273} The Carter administration had reformed public diplomacy and began rebuilding communications infrastructure in Europe, but messaging and operations received little presidential attention and produced at best mixed results in Europe.\textsuperscript{274} Infighting in the Reagan administration delayed the

\textsuperscript{271} Wittner, \textit{Toward Nuclear Abolition}, 131.
\textsuperscript{272} Peter Shipley to Howarth, 26 October 1981, (WLSC) CPA/CRD 4/18/11.
\textsuperscript{273} Keith Britto to Alan Howarth, “CND,” 9 November 1981, (WLSC) CPA/CRD 4/18/11; Peter Shipley to Alan Howarth, 6 November 1981, (WLSC) CPA/CRD 4/18/11.
\textsuperscript{274} Cull, \textit{The Cold War and the United States Information Agency}, 360-398.
development of a coherent public diplomacy strategy aimed at Europe as well. Though the Reagan administration discounted anti-Americanism in the United Kingdom, it nonetheless accepted the warnings coming from Whitehall and the private anti-CND campaign that it represented a real threat to Thatcher’s position. National Security Advisor Richard Allen wrote Reagan in late fall 1981, “Thatcher’s domestic position. It is getting more vulnerable, and the possibility of Tory defeat, with the present government replaced by a coalition government, cannot be discounted.”

The Reagan administration responded to the problem of European opinion with the autumn 1981 launch of “Project Truth,” an initiative to counter the Soviet peace offensive and restore the confidence of international publics in the purpose and direction of U.S. foreign policy. Led by Reagan’s long-time friend from the film industry and head of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Charles Z. Wick, the initiative was supposed to be a Hollywood makeover for U.S. public nuclear diplomacy. Wick’s plan for European public diplomacy revolved around promoting the zero-option proposal through the various tools at the disposal of the U.S. Information Agency, while also framing the needs of the European pronuclear campaign as a justification to the administration and Congress for increased funds to bring USIA’s technological capabilities up to date. Reagan’s zero-option speech on 18 November 1981 in fact had been the centerpiece of the development of U.S. public diplomacy operations in Europe, providing cause for the expansion of live satellite broadcasting capabilities that increased the visibility of the

USIA’s complementary efforts on arms control such as the broad dissemination and readout of its bulletin “Soviet Military Power.” Yet, the gains of the British peace movement in 1982 for the most part debunked the zero-option as a reasonable approach to arms control.

A key component to the administration’s public diplomacy effort was a presidential tour of Europe, with a final stop in London prior to the NATO summit. As American diplomats in London prepared for Reagan’s visit, they informed the White House of disquiet among the British public over the nature of Britain’s relationship with the United States. They cautioned, “The United States has not fared well in British public opinion over the last year. This is evident in the polls, in the rhetoric of the Labour Party, in the growth of the ‘peace movement’…there is a perceptible shift in thinking toward skepticism about the U.S. connection – a sense that the West has reached the end of an era.” CRD strategists and their counterparts in Western Europe complained in the spring of 1982, “U.S. propaganda and intelligence agencies were not matching up to the Soviet Union’s.” On the nuclear issue specifically, more than half of British citizens wanted U.S. nuclear bases off of U.K. soil and over sixty percent believed Reagan’s foreign policy made nuclear war more likely.

Activists at the women’s only camp at Greenham Common were among the most effective and controversial antinuclear voices resisting the U.S. nuclear presence in

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280 Peter Shipley to Scott Hamilton, 16 March 1982, (WLSC) CPA/CRD 4/18/11.
281 Ibid.
Britain. Beginning in 1982, GCW clashes with local government over the right to occupy land surrounding the RAF base illuminated the arguments against nuclear oppression that justified a women’s only camp. GCW responded to an initial January legal warning from Newbury district councilors to vacate their camp by pointing to a historical record of male constructed morality underwriting unjust laws. Women of the camp represented their space as site of moral evolution, writing in return to district councilors, “The Law is not a creature which exists independently. Laws have been wrong and they have been changed. When laws clash with the developing moral standards of the time then these laws are put aside – ignored. Human beings make, break, change laws and ignore laws that are morally wrong.”

Threats of eviction led to a February decision to make the camp a women’s only space for non-violent direct action. Activists who opposed the single-sex approach argued that it divorced the women’s movement from the peace movement, alienated “ordinary women” from antinuclear action, created a false image of violent male activists and an unsupportive CND, and provoked internal divisions that weakened the peace movement. Those activists most strongly in favor of women’s only space viewed coed arguments as suspect so long as men in residence pushed for a camp hierarchy, confrontational demonstration tactics, and violent interactions with authorities. Men’s presence in the encampment thus undermined the root of the GCW argument that male-dominated patterns of social organization, law, and governance had created a society that accepted violence as a legitimate form of power which inevitably led to the harboring of nuclear weapons. Recollections of the violent reaction of the

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camp’s men in residence to the decision only justified the move in the mind of activists supporting a women only space.\textsuperscript{284} Some women went so far as to remove men from their daily vocabulary, the word women replaced with “wimyn,” or “wimmin,” to symbolize independence from men.\textsuperscript{285}

Founding member Helen John and former CND national organizer Sally Davison defended the women-only peace camp as positive-discrimination toward women that allowed for a feminist, non-violent, and humanistic innovation to answer the moral questions that the Labour and Communist parties had failed to resolve. Through the creation of a women’s only space, GCW modeled how alternative social patterns could benefit the prospect of peace. In 1982, a young single mother gave birth to a child in the camp who would be collectively cared for by the women as a demonstration of positive alternative family structures. News of the child’s birth and rearing horrified locals in Newbury whose family politics were representative of Conservative Party supporters throughout the United Kingdom. GCW, however, viewed the transformation of family structure as a peaceful first step to breaking the existing social order that legitimized the patriarchy’s nuclear obsession.\textsuperscript{286}

GCW viewed non-violent direct action (NVDA) as the most effective means for drawing attention to alternative arrangements for peace. They also used NVDA to demonstrate the value of feminism to the broader cause of disarmament. Greenham scholar-activists Gwyn Kirk and Alice Cook best summed up the GCW aim in writing,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{285} “January News of Green and Common Womyn’s Peace Camp,” Undated, (LSE) Jayne Nelson Papers (7JAN) 2012/16, Box 3; “September, All of October, and a Tiny Bit of November News of Green and Common Womyn’s Peace Camp,” Undated, (LSE) END 19/33.
\end{itemize}
“Only through nonviolent means can we create the moral and political climate where such things [nuclear warfare] become unthinkable.”

The NVDA campaign against nuclear patriarchies centered on the reclamation of spaces and symbols to reimagine them in a way that supported a narrative of moral growth. Regular evictions led to the spread of the peace camp from its original setting outside the main gate to multiple locations outside each gate of the base. A non-hierarchical structure of the encampment symbolized the relationship between equality for women’s voices and the production of peace in a moral democracy. Colors of the rainbow differentiated camps at eight gates, all of which developed their own identity. For example, Green Gate earned a reputation for queer sexual orientations and intellectuals; Indigo Gate represented itself as the “forgotten” gate; Red and Orange Gate hosted artists and musicians; Blue and Violet Gate had religious orientations; women at Yellow Gate, the main gate, aligned themselves with the anti-racist agenda, eco-feminism, and favored provocative displays of homosexuality.

Each of these gates contributed to the construction of what Sasha Roseneil has described as an unwritten ethos; or rather, a moral and political framework demonstrated through NVDA, radical anarchism, and ecological symbolism. The anarchic gate structure of the peace camp channeled competing feminisms into productive protest. Radical demonstrations included “keenings,” or “die-ins,” where women acted dead on

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290 Ibid., 78-82.
the ground in front of the House of Parliament on several occasions. Occupation of
sentry towers, dances atop missile silos, blockades of the base, and the tracking of cruise
missile movements (cruisewatch) were all non-violent actions that showed how the
banality of nuclear weapons led to their vulnerability. GCW paired radical tactics with
symbolism derived from nature-based myths. They identified snakes as a symbol of
moral growth because they shed the constraints of old skin to grow into a new form,
spider webs represented the power of collective action to deny traditional hierarchies,
while depictions of serpents swallowing their tail represented a reflection of life’s
beginning and end.

Positioned around the perimeter of the base, activists utilized the nine-mile fence
separating them from the military installation as a tool for symbolic action. On the inside
of the fence military personnel preparing for war enjoyed the amenities of modern life.
Women on the outside of the fence housed in small polyethylene makeshift tents with no
access to running water likened their living conditions to trench warfare. GCW viewed
these conditions as a necessary part of the fight for peace that required a remaking of
family and gender practices. Sarah, a camp resident explained, “I’ve been accused of
being cruel and hard-hearted for leaving my children behind, but it’s exactly for my
children that I’m doing this. In the past, men left home to go to war. Now women are
leaving home for peace.”

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292 Ibid.
293 “Rainbow Serpent’s Return,” Undated, (LSE) 7JAN 2012/16, Box 3.
GCW’s very existence—out of the home and away from children—brought out the sharp ideological contrast between Thatcher’s promotion of Victorian values and feminist principles under debate at Greenham Common. The emergence of New Right rhetoric by the late 1970s and its emphasis on “Victorian values” altered the intersection of morality and nuclear politics. Thatcher infused the British New Right with pride in individualism as she took control of the Conservative Party. She heavily relied on moral rhetoric to condemn Britain’s permissive period in the 1960s and alleged cultural degeneration in the 1970s while offering the restoration of Victorian values as the solution to British social ills. When Thatcher first accepted the term Victorian values as a metaphor to unify her core political themes of self-reliance, stability, God-fearing nature, thrift, pride in country, and the sanctity of family life under the banner of British traditionalism she did so while also demeaning the values of British protestors, specifically the Greenham Common Women. For Thatcher, nuclear weapons were thus both essential to protecting “our way of life,” and part of her Victorian socio-economic vision for Britain’s future.

Thatcher’s set of Victorian values were precisely the themes that public diplomacy officials hoped President Reagan would deploy in his tour of Europe to rally support for the implementation of the dual-track decision. Public diplomacy officials beseeched the president to alter his rhetoric for European audiences amidst a particularly tense point in U.S.-NATO affairs. In the United Kingdom specifically, Wick’s staff

insisted that the president discard his cowboy image during the upcoming visit.\textsuperscript{298} Other tensions in U.S.-U.K. relations complicated the integration of Reagan’s speech into coherent public diplomacy in Britain. Reagan’s commitment to gas pipeline sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to the Polish Crisis and Washington’s foot-dragging on lending support to Whitehall during the Falklands (Malvinas) War in early spring 1982 both ran afoul of Britain’s security and economic interests.\textsuperscript{299} Making matters worse, the White House initially mishandled an invitation from Thatcher and the Queen for the president to visit London. The White House only agreed to add London to its tour of Europe after significant pressure from the U.K. Ambassador Nicholas Henderson. Controversy followed still, as the Reagan administration leaked its plans to address a joint session of Parliament, which traditionally required consent from the opposition leader but had not yet been granted by Michael Foot. However, Whitehall and the White House, anticipating a wide viewing in the United States and throughout Europe, found common ground on the speech’s content. Reagan had to check anti-Americanism with his performance in Westminster.\textsuperscript{300}

Just after noon on 8 June 1982, following a morning riding horses with the Queen around the grounds of Windsor Castle, Reagan took to the floor of the Royal Gallery to address a joint session of Parliament. It was his first state visit to the British Isles and first public address to the British people. Reagan contrasted the proud tradition of British

democracy to the authoritarian philosophy of the Soviet Union, which he declared destined for the “ash heap of history.” In essence, the president offered a British version of peace through strength. Before his parliamentary audience, Reagan refined the rhetoric that he would offer in his famed “evil empire” speech given several months later and repeatedly throughout the 1982 mid-term election season in the United States. He swapped out allusions to the American moral tradition with references to Victorian virtues and a Churchillian sense of duty that characterized Thatcher’s own pronuclear language. Reagan worded his key peace through strength appeals nearly exactly as he would in his evil empire speech in March 1983, proclaiming, “our military strength is a prerequisite to peace, but let it be clear we maintain this strength in the hope it will never be used, for the ultimate determinant in the struggle that’s now going on in the world will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial of spiritual resolve, the values we hold…”

Reagan’s parliamentary address had different effects in the United States and the United Kingdom. Peace through strength advocates in the United States credited Reagan’s address to British Parliament as the impetus for the administration’s move to prioritize public diplomacy, later outlined in NSDD 77 in January 1983. Leading neoconservative intellectual, Richard Pipes, later identified the speech as a turning point in the administration’s moral framing of the Soviet and Western systems. The president’s allies continued to cite the speech as a foundational rhetorical component of

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peace through strength well into the 1984 presidential election and in arms control
debates throughout the remainder of the decade.\textsuperscript{303} Thatcher’s welcoming of Reagan’s
peace through strength address to Parliament speaks to how interchangeable the two
leaders viewed American conservative morality and British Victorian values.

In Britain, Reagan’s emphasis on defending a conservative vision of Anglo-
American values with firm resolve played into Thatcher’s own efforts to reap the benefits
of a victory in the Falklands (Malvinas) War. Six days after Reagan’s visit, Argentinian
forces surrendered in the South Atlantic. Britain’s victory thousands of miles away from
home seemed to vindicate the pro-defense mentalities of Thatcher’s Conservatives and
temporarily suppressed the nuclear dilemma in the public consciousness and the problem
of anti-Americanism along with it. Research funded by the Conservative Party targeted
the need for leadership with a strong moral drive as one of three fundamental beliefs held
by British citizens. The Falklands affair provided a clear example of Thatcher filling that
role.\textsuperscript{304}

Some scholars have pointed to the Falkland’s (Malvinas) War as the turning point
in Thatcher’s political fortunes during her first term. Drawing a straight line from
Britain’s victory in the Falkland’s War in June 1982 to Thatcher’s victory in the general
election in June 1983 overlooks the historical contingencies of antinuclear protest during
that period, which Thatcher’s own advisors identified as the most serious threat to her
political future and vision of British society. It is true that the events in the Falklands
allowed Conservative Party strategists to craft an image of Thatcher as a resolute

\textsuperscript{304} BJM Research Partners, “Life in Britain: Exploratory in-depth Research Findings,” 13 August 1982,
(WLSC) CPA, Conservative Central Office (CCO), 180/25/1/31.
defender of British values and prestige that would dramatically increase her popularity and chances of a general election victory in 1983.\textsuperscript{305} This image did not emerge overnight and remain unchallenged; rather, it required deft crafting within a public sphere increasingly conditioned by disarmament ideas that were widely disseminated by a resilient antinuclear movement.

Reagan’s June visit to the British Parliament also invigorated the antinuclear movement. Thus, in Britain, the net effect of Reagan’s speech was an intensification of the deterrence debate rather than a turn of momentum in favor of pronuclear ideas. Reagan’s visit served as antinuclear organizing event, 250,000 protestors gathered in Hyde Park to protest the dual-track decision and the Trident program on the eve of the president’s address.\textsuperscript{306} The makeup of the crowd suggested that antinuclear ideas appealed beyond the radical wing of the Labour Party and that disarmament could potentially swing an election in favor of the party most committed to disarmament. As many as 65 percent of the 250,000 protestors had no political affiliation.\textsuperscript{307} At the same time, the number of British citizens attracted to disarmament ideas and simultaneously skeptical of the Labour Party created the possibility for discord in the Labour-CND alliance. The work of CND specialist sections for the new SDP Party, Liberals, and even for Conservatives heightened the suspicions of both sides of the Labour-CND alliance.\textsuperscript{308}


The publication of the Church of England’s reassessment of deterrence and the culmination of the “Hard Luck” campaign in October 1982, along with GCW’s high profile December demonstration, amounted to an acute moral challenge to Thatcher’s domestic political and geostrategic aims. As Matthew Grimely has outlined, Thatcher viewed morality as inextricably linked to religion and frequently likened morality without religion to a flower detached from its roots. The Church of England represented a potential strategic asset for Thatcher’s nuclear agenda not just because of its moral authority, but because organized religion revolved around fundamental practices of public diplomacy. Sunday sermons, for example, were a trusted and routine communication for followers, and symbolic themes and events such as holiday celebrations were the foundation of religious worship. Historically close relations between the Church of England (CoE) and the Tories underpinned Thatcher’s appeal to Christian morality, but the rise of the New Right coincided with the transformation of the Anglican clergy into a far more liberal body as a result of its declining recruitment from the upper middle-class where Conservative mentalities reigned. Thus, the potential alignment of Anglican bishops, Catholic leaders, and parish councils across the United Kingdom with unilateral nuclear disarmament robbed Thatcher of the moral mantle that she intended to support New Right Conservatism and denied the prime minister a valuable public diplomacy advantage.

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310 Thatcher herself identified as a Methodist, having been a lay preacher before entering politics.
The moral case for deterrence argued for by Quinlan’s network appeared to be losing out to the antinuclear ideas produced by a multi-faith project to reverse the arms race. British Methodist leader Dr. Kenneth Greet and other respected CND contacts in the British Council of Churches, the umbrella organization of religious institutions in the United Kingdom, created a peer climate of religious condemnation of nuclear weapons and deterrence in which the Salisbury group operated.312 Claiming that “peace is not just the absence of war,” Pope John Paul II’s Pentecost sermon in May 1982 in Coventry urged British Catholics to reject deterrence as a form of peace and partake in a broader Christian and interfaith mission for finding peaceful means to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.313 CND leadership relied on its largest specialist section, Christian CND (CCND), and its widespread network of aligned parishes to pressure the Salisbury group from the bottom up.

The widespread examination of nuclear morality took place in the context of the broader NWFZ movement overtaking much of municipal Britain, a phenomenon fueled by the Hard Luck campaign. Evaluating the technical merits of Whitehall’s civil defense planning provided opportunities for scientists to inform acts of civil disobedience and opposition to civil defense that CND relied upon to relate the antinuclear movement to other issues confronting British society. Thatcher’s belief in monetarism had gone hand-in-hand with her desire for a strong central government, leaving the five county councils and the Greater London Council (GLC) under siege from Conservatives eager to chip away at municipal democracy. In rejecting civil defense exercises, local governments

fought back against Thatcher’s drive for centralization. The Lothian Regional Council’s refusal to participate in the Square Leg exercise modeled a nuclear free Europe on a local scale.

In the fall 1981, CND and municipal governments had begun coordinating their opposition to the next civil defense drill planned for the fall of 1982, named “Hard Rock.”

Dozens of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) representatives gathered in Manchester in late October to draft programs for public education and counter exercises. The important county seats of West Yorkshire and South Yorkshire along with local governments in Bradford, Manchester, Cleveland, Derbyshire, and dozens of others subsequently announced their refusal to participate in civil defense exercises. The number of local authorities declaring themselves a NWFZ climbed to 125 by March 1982. All five county councils, the primary bureaucracies for civil defense operations, declared themselves NWFZs by April and pledged participation in CND’s counter operation termed “Hard Luck.”

Hard Luck succeeded largely because SANA experts undercut the technical credibility of the Home Office. Mike Pentz and SANA colleague Owen Greene joined CND’s Hard Luck working group in the spring, leading to the decision to have SANA guide all municipal governments and local chapters rebelling against the Hard Rock exercise. Early in the campaign SANA scientists observed major discrepancies

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317 Bolsover civil defense pamphlet.
between casualty rate studies conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense and Office of Technological Assessment and the Square Leg casualty estimates produced by 12 scientists who staffed the Scientific Research and Development Branch of the Home Office.\textsuperscript{320} The Home Office’s lack of a clear methodology, and especially odd calculations for blast effects, provoked SANA scientists to set their sights on building a transparent casualty model for all of the United Kingdom based off the targeting assumptions employed in Square Leg.

The London After the Bomb Working Group (LATB) provided the most devastating assault on Home Office casualty estimates. SANA’s prediction of 5 million dead in the London area dwarfed the Home Office number of only 600,000.\textsuperscript{321} LATB findings were immediately more credible than those of the 12 unnamed scientists working in the Home Office. For one, LATB relied on the U.S. Department of Defense and Office of Technological Assessment methodologies for calculating blast effects, which were based on data collected from the pre-1963 above ground testing era and from damage surveys of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Blast fatalities provided by the Home Office were 2.5 times less than those calculated by U.S. authorities and came with no explanation on method of computation.\textsuperscript{322} LATB subjected shelter guidelines recommended in civil defense pamphlets to their projected blast effects. It also took account of the time, space, and financial constraints limiting the majority of Londoners from erecting suitable protection from the prolonged after-effects of radiation, which the


\textsuperscript{321} “SANA and Hard Rock,” SANA Newsletter #5, November 1982, (WLSC), Hodgkin Personal Papers, MS.ENG.C.5688.

Home Office deliberately overlooked. The group’s realistic assessment of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) bursts and damage done to emergency services provided a more accurate assessment of fatalities suffered due to weakened immune systems and lack of medical care.

The credibility of anti-civil defense reports such as the LATB study provided one of municipal Britain’s last parting shots against the forces of centralization. GLC leader Ken Livingstone, or “Red Ken” and bane of Thatcherites in Whitehall, directed resources and guarded knowledge of civil defense plans to help LATB reach conclusions. Nobelist Maurice Wilkins, Pugwash founder Joseph Rotblat, and Tom Kibble the SANA vice president known world-wide for his pathbreaking contributions to quantum field theory, served as the most notable commentators on the project. Several local governments, including those in Brighton, Bristol, Cheshire, Cumbria, Leeds, Manchester, Merseyside, Sheffield, and municipalities in the West Midlands, cooperated with teams conducting studies similar to the LATB report. CND’s publication Sanity released SANA’s national figures compiled by a purpose-built computer program that analyzed nuclear attack variables and casualty rates for every 10 by 10 square kilometer of the United Kingdom. The projected casualty total for the whole of the United Kingdom reached nearly 39 million dead with over 4 million more severely injured. The liberal use of

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323 Ibid., 45-55.
324 Ibid., 51-52; 64-67
325 Ibid.
SANA studies by local governments involved in the Hard Luck campaign led to non-compliance with civil defense measures from 20 of the 54 government entities scheduled to participate in the Hard Rock exercise in September and October 1982, while 7 more expressed the bare minimum commitment.\textsuperscript{328}

Instead of participating in civil defense planning and drills, dozens of municipalities hosted street art competitions, public vigils, and antinuclear theater and music performances. Sheffield City Council found a loophole to underwrite grants for peace groups with municipal funds. Local authorities in Bradford opened up civil defense bunkers to press and media in the name of public education. Leicester sponsored a “Nuclear Free Festival” during the days Hard Rock had been scheduled for. The city of Manchester hosted a NWFZ conference which produced the Manchester Resolution, a commitment to challenge the power of civil defense authorities and to explore what municipal governments could do with foreign contacts to lower the risk of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{329} Within one week, 129 local authorities came out in support of the Manchester Resolution.\textsuperscript{330} Labour’s National Executive Committee encouraged such activity, imploring local authorities to expose civil defense as an exercise in “brainwashing.”\textsuperscript{331}

The extent of non-compliance compelled the suspension of the Hard Rock exercise. Conservatives blamed Labour, which controlled all non-compliant governments, for

\textsuperscript{330} Coates, The Most Dangerous Decade, 82-85.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., 82-83.
The press, however, for the most part scored the suspension of Hard Rock as CND’s biggest win yet.  

Figure 1: From Bristol City Council, “Bristol and the Bomb,” (1981, 1984).

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The effect of the NWFZ movement’s influence over Constituent Labour Party politics revealed itself at the annual party conference in October. A majority of delegates supported unilateral disarmament at the Labour Party conferences in 1980 and 1981, but the two-thirds majority needed to officially adopt the policy had not yet been reached. The combined efforts of the TUC, CND and END, and Nuclear Weapons Free Zone activists flooding Constituency Labour Parties (CLP) persuaded 72 percent of delegates at the annual general meeting in 1982 to support the inclusion of unambiguous language regarding unilateral disarmament, cuts to military expenditure and economic conversion, and the closure of US nuclear bases in the 1983 general election manifesto.334 Support for

unilateralism at the 1982 Labour Conference drew 222,000 more votes from union delegates alone than it had in 1981.\textsuperscript{335}

The extent to which the antinuclear climate of ideas influenced the Bishop of Salisbury’s working group became quite clear when it published its report, \textit{The Church and the Bomb} in October 1982. The report highlighted several elements of the nuclear establishment that ran counter to the spirit of Anglican morality and British democracy. The report claimed Parliament received nuclear decisions as a \textit{fait accompli}. It also sanctioned the activities of the antinuclear movement in supporting “the place of moral legitimation in controlling what governments do, and the specific legitimation involved in seeking endorsement for their policies from the electorate.”\textsuperscript{336} The working group further argued that, “to accept in general that governments have fateful choices to make as part of their responsibilities does not entail the conclusion that they are the sole judge of the justice or wisdom of that choice.”\textsuperscript{337} Salisbury’s group took issue with government campaigns to mislead on nuclear developments. They labeled civil defense a “misnomer” since heightened publicity did not correspond to the real state of preparations. They also rejected the proposed “zero-option” position in INF talks as a non-negotiable proposal designed to soothe European opinion and do nothing more.\textsuperscript{338}

Similar to the drafting of the pastoral from the American Catholic Bishops, Salisbury’s group grounded their theological discussion in an analysis of the applicability of Just War theory to nuclear conflict. Salisbury’s group concluded that nuclear war

\textsuperscript{335} Bruce Kent, “General Secretary’s Report to the CND Conference,” 26 November 1982, (LSE) CND/ADD 1/1/2.  
\textsuperscript{336} Bishop of Salisbury, \textit{The Church and the Bomb}, 59-60.  
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid., 60.  
\textsuperscript{338} Ibid., 62; 132.
could never be considered just based on their view of proportionality and collateral harm; the unrealistic chance of success; and the increased reliance on automated technology potentially leading to the subversion of the decision-making process of state leadership.\textsuperscript{339} Disenchanted by the lack of progress in multilateral initiatives to eliminate nuclear weapons, Salisbury’s group advocated for unilateral disarmament but stopped short of a total pacifist platform by confirming the importance of NATO and non-nuclear defense.\textsuperscript{340} Nonetheless, objections raised by Salisbury’s group presented several problems for the Thatcher government and an equal number of opportunities for the peace movement. For one, the report suggested the Thatcher government could not rely on the Church of England to help legitimize its policies. As the state church, the recommendations of the Salisbury group raised yet another challenge to the concept of centralism touted by Thatcher’s Conservatives. John Austin Baker had been appointed as Bishop of Salisbury by Thatcher in 1981 because he was believed to be a keeper of the conservative status quo in the Church of England who would help resuscitate the historic Tory-Anglican alliance. Baker’s moral endorsement of the antinuclear position provided a telling indicator of how poorly British pronuclear public diplomacy had fared throughout 1982.\textsuperscript{341}

The success of the Hard Luck campaign and the release of \textit{The Church and the Bomb} on the heels of Reagan’s address to Parliament and the now unpopular U.S. commitment to the zero-option, led the Thatcher’s government to two conclusions. First, British officials judged Washington’s public diplomacy insufficient because the Reagan

\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., 95-98.  
administration struggled to reconcile the message it developed for domestic purposes with the message its disseminated to British and European publics. Second, cabinet members suggested that the well-being of the broad Conservative agenda hinged on the government’s ability to bring antinuclear opinion under control. Defense Secretary John Nott warned Thatcher of the potential collateral political damage of rising antinuclear sentiment in October 1982, “the experience of the last 3 years suggests to me that in our original decision we under-estimated the problem of possible public opposition…we may find that public opinion runs away from us. If this happens we will lose our strategic deterrent – and much else.” A new sense of urgency on the need to scale up the British pronuclear public diplomacy campaign accompanied these observations in Whitehall.

Though Labour had adopted unilateralism as a campaign plank, CND remained skeptical as to whether it should go all in on the political partnership. The fragility of the Labour-CND alliance would become the primary target of the Thatcher government’s revitalized public diplomacy operation. CND leadership and local chapters remained divided over the sincerity of Labour’s commitment to unilateralism and the prospect of electoral victory. Consequently, CND thinly spread its organizing efforts, rather than endorsing the Labour Party and campaign on its behalf. Upon the formation of CND’s Parliamentary and Elections Committee, which was created to bring an antinuclear Parliament to power, peace strategist Neville Pressley wrote to the national council, that

“it would be rather stupid to base our hopes on an improbable Labour victory and an optimistic hope that a Labour government would deliver all its promises.”

Before the Thatcher government could set a new direction for pronuclear public diplomacy, the Greenham Common women brought further attention to the radical and transatlantic dimensions of the deterrence debate on the third anniversary of the dual-track decision. From 12-13 December 1982, 30,000 women participated in the “Embrace the Base” protest that blockaded every point of the nine-mile perimeter of the Greenham Common RAF base. GCW tactics were an explicit replication of the 1980 Women’s Pentagon Action demonstration in Washington D.C. and they rallied around feminists anthems written by indigenous American women.

The fence surrounding the Greenham Common RAF base became a focus of the “Embrace the Base” demonstration. GCW viewed the fence as physical symbol of the systemic structural obstacles associated with the nuclear establishment that ensured only a small male dominated-elite could partake in decisions regarding the state-sanctioned use of force and the future of life in Britain. Many of the women’s actions against the base had been structured around fence cutting, fence climbing, fence chaining, or the transformation of the fence into a peace display. Bolt cutters, known by women in camp as “black cardigans,” became staples of protest. A woman from the camp named Theresa claimed that taking down the fence was an expression of “No. No to the machine

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and the barriers it creates….to those invisible ones that keep us so alienated, East from West, black from white, heterosexual from homosexual, barriers of class, religion, barriers of privilege and deprivation.”348 Women activists displayed images of family members along the fence to show they fought for peace in the name of family unity and security. The barbed fence fell in three places, drawing dozens of arrests as several women endured broken bones at the hands of the police. Confrontation with mostly male police had been a tactic of GCW all along, suggesting that the police’s rough handling of women activists illustrated the proclivities of male-dominated governments for using violence as a political tool.349

Violations of the fence, or “de-fencing,” generated a conversation about the authenticity of the peace camp’s commitment to NVDA tactics. In defense of de-fencing, a camp circular read “that whole fence and its purpose is violence, against us and against the land….If you are strongly arguing for respect and non-violence and uncompromisingly opposing nuclear weapons and male violence in the streets, you suddenly find people accusing you of violence.”350 When the radical actions of GCW drew media attention, the press interpreted their tactics as violent confrontation and thus provided a viable counterattack strategy for the pronuclear public diplomacy campaign.

GCW protests and responses to it reaffirmed that the deterrence debate had become a proxy for the ideological competition between the political left and right, and had the potential to produce a generational realignment in British politics. From 1982 to 1983 alone, CND added nearly 10,000 national members to reach nearly 60,000 and

counted nearly 300,000 members affiliated with local CND chapters. Conservative cabinet officers lamented the problem for the government’s agenda of “thousands of people coming into active politics for the first time through the peace movements.” With this in mind the Thatcher government set out to revamp its public diplomacy. Lord Max Beloff, an influential conservative historian and political advisor, advised the prime minister one day after the GCW demonstration to “abandon the kid-gloves approach” to taking down the antinuclear movement. He considered CND so great a moral threat as to promise, “I shall not be content until it becomes as hazardous to wear a CND badge on the streets of London as it would be to sport a swastika in Tel Aviv.” Thatcher’s chief press secretary, Bernard Ingham, commented, “the main problem remains divided responsibility and the lack of adequate campaigning resources. We have been – and to some extent still are – fiddling while Rome burns.”

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CHAPTER THREE:
AN ANTINUCLEAR AWAKENING

“A sleeping giant of public opinion had suddenly awakened, including not only peace activists, but a broad new constituency reflecting America as a whole.”

– U.S. Senators Ted Kennedy (D-MA) & Mark O. Hatfield. (R-OR)

Awakened by Jimmy Carter’s turn to more hawkish nuclear policies and then incited to mass mobilization by Ronald Reagan’s quest for nuclear superiority, the U.S. antinuclear movement of the 1980s distinguished itself from its predecessor by adopting different tactics for coalition building. Amidst the collapse of the New Deal Order that had long organized the left and center of the U.S. political spectrum, the antinuclear cause provided a coalition building experience for women’s groups, civil rights activists, and labor interests to coalesce into a progressive movement. Learning the limits of radicalism from the anti-Vietnam War movement, the freeze movement recognized the benefits of criticizing Cold War militarism from the mainstream.

The emergence of an alliance between the mass antinuclear movement and the scientific community conferred a new degree of legitimacy to disarmament positions. In the 1970s, a convergence of innovations in scientific practice, the marginalization of government science advising, and Vietnam protest that brought the scientific community into closer contact with progressive political elements portended the public turn in science diplomacy that occurred in the 1980s. Practitioners of public science diplomacy sought indirect influence over nuclear policy by mobilizing public opinion to their positions through a variety of educational campaigns, op-eds, and mass communication

tactics, and by providing underlying scientific analysis for publicly touted disarmament concepts. This strategy recognized the value of using scientific knowledge to inform grassroots activism to effect change on an international scale.

Women established themselves as tactical innovators in both the peace movement’s public diplomacy and public science diplomacy. They sought to establish a transnational dimension to antinuclear protest by representing themselves as local, national, and global actors. William Moomaw has argued science diplomacy is most effective when a synergy exists between scientists who act as diplomats (diplomat scientist), and diplomats who draw on scientific knowledge (scientist diplomat). In the case of the peace movement’s public diplomacy, women antinuclear leaders often modelled the scientist diplomat role while developing a critique of deterrence that transcended national boundaries.

As in the United Kingdom, organized religion, specifically the Catholic Church, contributed a source of moral legitimacy to antinuclear positions that enhanced their credibility within the political mainstream. U.S. Catholic bishops’ moral condemnation of deterrence directly undermined Reagan’s use of moral arguments to justify his nuclear buildup. The pairing of Catholicism’s moral legitimacy with scientific knowledge made for an especially potent argument in favor of the antinuclear movement, and multiplied the effect of both public science diplomacy and the American Catholic Church’s reevaluation of its accommodation of Cold War militarism.

Scientific and moral counter-claims to Reagan’s quest for nuclear superiority both empowered and benefited from interactions with the progressive antinuclear coalition.

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Public diplomacy approaches to the communication of symbolic themes led to the incorporation of groups into the antinuclear movement that were historically suspicious of the antinuclear cause, specifically organized labor and racial minorities in the United States.

The freeze channeled these developments into an impressive level of financial, operational, and intellectual support for Democratic candidates for Congress running in the 1982 mid-term elections. Success in that election solidified the place of antinuclear ideas in American politics.

The Reagan administration initially proved ineffective in responding to the antinuclear movement and resigned itself to a defeat at the hands of congressional candidates supported by the freeze in the 1982 elections. Nonetheless, in 1982 the Reagan administration laid the groundwork for an effective public diplomacy campaign to emerge in 1983. Reagan organized his public diplomacy on the domestic front around the message of peace through strength, which emphasized a specific set of conservative moral arguments to support his plans for a nuclear build-up. Supplementing the administration’s efforts, private initiatives organized by the burgeoning political operations of the New Right and a fast emerging network of conservative think tanks broadly disseminated Reagan’s message of peace through strength.

*Elements of the Nuclear Peace Movement*

Looking back over the 1980s, University of Notre Dame President, nuclear expert and Catholic luminary, Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, identified the emergence of “a wider moral consciousness” across American society rooted in the existential anxiety brought
on by the heightened nuclear fear at the start of the decade.\textsuperscript{359} The antinuclear movement’s development as a public diplomacy campaign that simultaneously challenged the rationality of deterrence and promoted coalition-building in the United States and overseas contributed to the emergence of the wider moral consciousness to which Hesburgh referred. That process involved the freeze clarifying its broad moral authority as a step to establishing its political legitimacy, while simultaneously channeling the enthusiasm generated by radical symbolic protest to create a climate of ideas that could restructure mainstream thinking about nuclear weapons.

Prior to the development of the freeze as the primary antinuclear organizing concept in the United States, religious institutions in the United States—specifically the Catholic Church—had become more involved in nuclear debates and less accommodating toward Cold War militarism. From the 1950s to the 1970s, a series of political transformations and reforms prepared American Catholic clergy to leverage their moral authority in the nuclear debates of the 1980s. Since John F. Kennedy’s presidency from 1961 to 1963 and the Second Vatican Council from 1962 to 1965, the American Catholic Church had become more democratic in its leadership and more inclined to engage publicly on social issues. Opposition to the Vietnam War and protest of the 1973 \textit{Roe v. Wade} decision put Catholic clergy at the center of the public policy debate. During the 1970s, the American Catholic Church grew more progressive thanks to Jean Jadot, the Vatican’s apostolic delegate in the United States. Jadot handpicked 174 American bishops, roughly 60 percent of the Church hierarchy. Most of these bishops were younger, more progressive, and more committed to social issues than their

Moreover, the Church shed its identity as an organization for immigrants; by 1980, 25 percent of Americans identified as Catholics. They helped bring 142 Catholics into Congress in 1982, the largest representation of any religious denomination in U.S. history. More liberal and more diverse than their Protestant counterparts, the rise of Catholics to political power corresponded to the fact that Catholics’ political preferences more accurately reflected broader American public opinion than any other major religious group.

By the late 1970s, many religious groups began to prioritize disarmament as the chief social issue of the day. The release of a U.N. report that pegged the cost of the arms race at $400 billion in 1978 alone inspired Pax Christi, an international peace group run through the Catholic Church, to prioritize a campaign for disarmament in Christian publications and within the church hierarchy. Over 70 churches across the country replicated the seminar model devoted to reversing the arms race developed by William Sloane Coffin Jr., the well-known activist minister of Riverside Church in New York. Prominent rabbi and future U.S. Ambassador David Saperstein of Washington D.C. endeavored to rally antinuclear sentiment in the Jewish community. Jimmy Carter’s own congregation, the First Baptist Church in Washington D.C., spoke out in favor of disarmament as the flaws in SALT II became apparent. Jim Wallis, editor of the evangelical publication Sojourner, made significant inroads into conservative churches with calls for disarmament. Even the National Association of Evangelicals, the audience for Reagan’s famous “Evil Empire” speech which eventually adopted the president’s

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peace through strength position, called for “Christians everywhere to acknowledge that their trust is in a sovereign God rather than superior armaments.”\textsuperscript{363} To the surprise of many, Billy Graham, perhaps the best known evangelical at the time, encouraged followers to back disarmament measures.\textsuperscript{364}

Judeo-Christian institutions’ examination of nuclear war produced new trends in Church-state relations, substantial interfaith dialogue, and contributed to a revival of morality as a feature of politics. The steady rise of Catholic political influence in the United States corresponded to the growing frequency of leading clergy reacting to the moral predicament presented by nuclear deterrence. In Catholic thought the menace of nuclear war not only represented the advent of more deadly technologies, but also reflected a broader moral crisis in political culture.\textsuperscript{365}

The first U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in May and June 1978 and the ratification fight over the SALT II Treaty in winter 1979-1980 awakened the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops to the need to integrate scientific and technical perspectives with moral considerations if they were to wield influence over nuclear policy.\textsuperscript{366} The neutron bomb controversy further incited bishops to speak out against the arms race. At its core the moral debate came down to a question of means versus ends. Could the threat of indiscriminate killing itself be considered morally acceptable if it caused much of humankind to live in a constant state of terror? Even should this state of terror be judged a necessary evil, could one expect deterrence to be a permanent and

stabilizing force, or would it inevitably lead to a nuclear war that encroached on the
divine’s power to make and unmake civilization?

Catholic intellectuals—as a result of their rigorous study of logic and theology—
were ideally suited to critique the defects in deterrence philosophies that justified a
nuclear build-up. Deterrence experts have often been compared to the priesthood because
their areas of expertise are rooted in analysis of abstract or unseen phenomena.\textsuperscript{367} San
Francisco Archbishop John Quinn, Denver Archbishop James Casey, and Jesuit
theologian Francis Winters suggested that the unique capabilities of nuclear weapons
precluded the application of Just War theory, the dominant Catholic teaching on war and
violent conflict since the days of Thomas Aquinas.\textsuperscript{368} Much of the Catholic criticism of
deterrence centered on its inherent instability as a result of its narrowing of available
choices to surrender or destruction, which obscured humanity’s moral obligations to each
other and the sanctity of life. Thus deterrence limited the free will granted by the divine.
Only the most conservative Catholic pronouncements accepted deterrence as a morally
defensible position on the condition that states move away from the strategy through
political negotiation and not through technological end-runs.\textsuperscript{369}

The Catholic clergy had reluctantly supported arms control in the late 1970s
because it reinforced the principles of mutual assured destruction, although it did not
meet their preference to see the U.S.-Soviet security dynamic organized around

\textsuperscript{367} Fred Kaplan, \textit{Wizards of Armageddon} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991); Ron Robin, \textit{The Cold
War They Made: The Strategic Legacy of Roberta and Albert Wohlstetter} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2016).
\textsuperscript{368} John Quinn, “Remarks as President of National Council of Catholic Bishops, On President Carter’s
decision to defer production of neutron warheads,” 14 April 1978; James Casey, “Another Holocaust? The
Nuclear Arms Race,” 29 April 1978; Harold Ford and Francis Winters, \textit{Ethics and Nuclear Strategy}
\textsuperscript{369} Kenneth Himes, “Deterrence and Disarmament: Ethical Evaluations and Pastoral Advice,” \textit{Cross
something other than nuclear weapons. Cardinal John Krol of Philadelphia argued in his September 1979 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, “it is impossible to regard [SALT II] Treaty as a spectacular achievement in the field of arms control,” reasoning that deterrence could not be considered a long-term moral solution because it guaranteed continued nuclear competition.370 Speaking on behalf of the 350 American bishops who comprised the United States Catholic Conference, Krol suggested that the very existence of nuclear weapons actively harmed humanity in that their cost directly deprived the poor and hungry in the United States and around the world.

The progressive transformation of the American Catholic clergy coincided with changes in the women’s movement that allowed for antinuclear ideas to become the foundation for cooperation between both groups which had historically opposed each other on key public policy issues. At the onset of the nuclear 1980s, women’s activism exemplified what scholars of feminism today consider a range of transnational and collaborative activities with other causes and identities that made them “women in movement[s],” rather than exclusively a “women’s movement.”371 Since its beginnings in the 1960s, the defining feature of second wave feminism had been its radical protest of the systematic suppression of women rooted in a criticism of the social, economic, environmental, intellectual, and governing structures that maintained the dominance of the white-male power elite. This wide-ranging approach made antinuclear women particularly effective coalition-builders, as they repeatedly demonstrated the ability to

371 The “wave” model of periodizing feminism has been called into question by leading scholars, but it has retained its value. Barbara Molony and Jennifer Nelson, Women’s Activism and ‘Second-Wave’ Feminism (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017), 4-5.
incorporate various forms of public diplomacy such as radical pacifism and scientific knowledge into a larger project to construct a disarmament language that exposed the flaws in deterrence thinking.

Helen Caldicott embodied the intersection of feminism, antinuclear ideas, and public science diplomacy. Caldicott first became concerned about nuclear issues as a teenager living in Melbourne, Australia when the film *On the Beach* depicted the psychological trauma of impending death from radioactive fallout in her hometown. She soon pursued medical studies during the peak of the nuclear testing era and was moved to join the antinuclear cause when she became pregnant with her first child in 1963. Caldicott was awakened to the “satanic brilliance” of the nuclear weapons complex by Randall Forsberg. From that moment on, Caldicott channeled her energies into arresting the arms race, first with her book *Nuclear Madness* and her campaign to revitalize Physicians for Social Responsibility beginning in 1978.

Caldicott staked the credibility of her antinuclear opposition on the three pillars of her identity: mother, pediatrician, and woman. It is worth noting that despite Caldicott’s overt feminist logic and her own acknowledged identification as a feminist since 1971, she avoided the feminist label in public fearing the delegitimization of her hard-earned expertise. Formerly a practicing doctor on the Harvard medical faculty, Caldicott enjoyed public credibility especially when speaking about the medical consequences of nuclear war. She orchestrated the revival of Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) beginning

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in 1978, believing that doctors had a special role to play as experts and scientific communicators most familiar and trusted by the general public.

Treating the earth as her patient in her standard antinuclear stump speech, Caldicott laid out the effects of the nuclear arms race on the earth’s health in a format similar to an exchange one would have with their family doctor. This act of scientific translation proved both inspirational to other practitioners of public science diplomacy and effective regardless of the local, national, or international context.375 As a pediatrician and mother, she appealed to the political mainstream and epitomized the nurturing, healing, and life-bearing qualities of women celebrated by cultural feminists.

At the same time, radical feminists welcomed her public rhetoric through which she contrasted women’s inclination for peace with the male dominated nuclear establishment. Many historians have commented on how the state managed nuclear fear and expertise as a means to inculcate citizens into the Cold War project, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. 376 Caldicott reclaimed both fear and expertise and turned them into tools for grass-roots recruitment for the antinuclear movement.

By 1980, the women’s movement and religious organizations became fertile ground for shows of civil disobedience that sought to expand nuclear security discourse beyond the deterrence paradigm by exposing the vulnerability of the nuclear establishment. The Catholic hierarchy’s growing concerns about the arms race had made civil disobedience a more acceptable recourse for reconciling pacifist views, Catholic

morality, and the obligations of American citizenship. Two controversial priests, the Berrigan brothers, launched a civil disobedience campaign during the Vietnam War that helped initiate the process of bringing the Church out of its nationalist orientation and in line with the critical view of state power associated with the New Left. Daniel Berrigan observed that legitimacy afforded to civil disobedience by Catholic leaders empowered the antinuclear movement, explaining that “in the 1960s we went to jail alone…Now there are bishops at our side and Jesuits putting up bail.”

Support from the Catholic hierarchy emboldened the Berrigans, their Jonah House organization, and their following. The Berrigans inspired sensational acts of religiously justified civil disobedience. A group known as the Plowshares Eight broke into a General Electric plant in September 1980 in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, poured their own blood onto Minuteman III missiles and took hammers to the weapons to symbolize the biblical call to turn swords into plowshares. Their action became a model for similar demonstrations throughout the 1980s, and the subsequent trial became the subject of a 1983 film titled *In the King of Prussia* featuring Hollywood star Martin Sheen. Radical protest thus became a more accepted expression of religious attitudes in the nuclear age.

The diversity of feminist critiques revealed themselves in a variety of women-led acts of civil disobedience that simultaneously made such tactics a respectable feature of mainstream progressivism and established women as leaders of the antinuclear movement. As Wesley Phelps has argued, the ecofeminists behind the Women’s

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Pentagon Action (WPA) instilled a radical edge in the 1980s peace movement.\textsuperscript{379} In mid-November 1980, just after Reagan’s election, the Washington Peace Center organized 2,000 women for discussion and non-violent direct action against the Pentagon. They devised a “unity statement,” which emphasized the negative and interconnected effects of the nuclear enterprise for women’s rights, scientific research, racial justice, and international relations.\textsuperscript{380} Organizers framed the complexity of these issues in an approachable literary style to make their protest of nuclear arms accessible to ordinary, non-political women.\textsuperscript{381} Staged in four parts, the following protest action performed mourning, rage, empowerment, and finally defiance at which point women encircled the Pentagon and blocked the entrances with their bodies and webs of yarn to symbolize both the interconnectivity of life on earth and their ability to ensnare the military-industrial complex.\textsuperscript{382} Of the 140 women arrested, the 31 who pleaded guilty were given sentences ranging from 10 to 30 days. Press reports suggested that the U.S. attorney’s office had arranged the harsh sentences with four separate judges overseeing the cases to deter future acts of civil disobedience.\textsuperscript{383}

The WPA accelerated the transatlantic circulation of disarmament language and ideas. WPA women left Washington D.C. intent on reproducing radical action in their local communities.\textsuperscript{384} Their activities served as a direct a source of tactical inspiration for

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\item[\textsuperscript{381}] T.V. Reed, \textit{Fifteen Juggles, Five Believers: Literary Politics and the Poetics of American Social Movements} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 126.
\item[\textsuperscript{383}] Phelps, “Women’s Pentagon Action,” 347-350.
\item[\textsuperscript{384}] Claiborne and Martin, “Women’s Pentagon Action.”
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the women’s peace encampment at Greenham Common in the United Kingdom, which in turn became a model for new women-led protests in the United States and around the world.385

American antinuclear organizers began laying out their own program for translating the pockets of radical antinuclear activity and anxiety into a mainstream public diplomacy operation to influence nuclear policymaking. Religious groups including American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC), FOR (Fellowship of Reconciliation), Sojourners, the Presbyterian Church, and the Riverside Church dominated the freeze interim steering committee that emerged to build a national movement around Randall Forsberg’s 1979 call for a freeze and the local success that Randy Kehler experienced when putting the freeze on the ballot in the 1980 elections in western Massachusetts. Women too had an important early voice in shaping the freeze agenda, with Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and PSR under the direction of Caldicott playing a major role in the planning process.386

The nascent freeze movement’s intention to maintain close ties with the European antinuclear movement reflected the international activities of women antinuclear activists such as WPA’s engagement with women-only peace camps overseas and the founding of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which drew inspiration from Caldicott’s revival of PSR.387

Freeze strategists at the 1981 national conference mapped out a two to five year, five-part organizing plan aimed at the middle of the political spectrum. Phases one and two targeted local, regional, and national endorsements specifically from unions, religious institutions, minority groups, academics and students, businesses, and expert associations with targeted messages that appealed to the core political concerns of each. Organizers planned to build on these endorsements by using them in local and statewide resolutions and referenda, thereby generating involvement at the grassroots level. The selection of Randy Kehler to head the official freeze campaign in December 1981 based on the success of his referendum drive in western Massachusetts guaranteed a shift toward mainstream politics. Unlike other peace movement veterans, Kehler emphasized electoral and legislative processes rather than the type of radical actions that defined the anti-Vietnam War movement.\(^{388}\)

Congressional politics kicked in during phases three and four with an emphasis on defeating MX legislation and blocking deployments of INF weapons as a way of linking the European and American peace movements. An introduction of freeze legislation in Congress early in 1982 would provide visibility to the issue ahead of the second special session on disarmament in the United Nations scheduled for June 1982 and the autumn congressional elections. Lastly, the freeze prioritized science diplomacy, calling on non-government groups of experts such as the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and PSR to explore Soviet and international support for the freeze through experts, while the

\(^{388}\) Rod Morris to Randy Kehler, 11 March 1981, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 7; Interview with Randy Kehler, 11/10/1987; Waller, *Congress and the Nuclear Freeze*, 36-37.
national office continued to work through Congress to legislate its positions into U.S. arms control proposals.\textsuperscript{389}

Reagan’s first year budget, which appeared to prioritize military spending above all else, played into the hands of freeze messaging that aimed to make antinuclear ideas universally appealing to a broad range of political constituencies. The critiques of Cold War militarism from more radical voices within religious institutions, the scientific profession, organized labor, and minority communities gained traction with more mainstream elements of those constituencies when Reagan’s budgets indicated that the pursuit of nuclear superiority would take priority over other needs deemed urgent by much of American society.

Reagan justified the high cost of aggressive Cold War policies paid for by deficit defense spending by arguing that it also helped abate U.S. economic decline. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger sold the policy as “the most important social welfare program” and as “the second half of the Administration’s program to revitalize America,” with the tax cuts being the other half.\textsuperscript{390} These claims reflected the widely-held assumption that defense dollars produced economic benefits, a belief that dated back to World War II and the early Cold War when military spending and the U.S. economy grew hand-in-hand. The efforts of SANE, a legacy antinuclear organization established earlier in the Cold War, had led to a series of new studies in the 1970s and early 1980s showing the negative effects of defense spending on the U.S. economy. These studies


provided antinuclear leaders with the analysis and data needed to challenge the welfare logic of Reagan’s Keynesian military budgets.\textsuperscript{391}

In the 1970s, SANE began analyzing the economic burdens of the arms race as part of its campaign to lobby for a conversion from a defense economy to a peace economy. Seymour Melman, a professor of industrial engineering at Columbia University, accepted a position as co-chair in 1970. Melman had made a name for himself in academia by analyzing the effects of the permanent war economy on society.\textsuperscript{392} His expertise underpinned SANE’s new focus on economic conversion that made the organization the hinge in an emerging labor-peace alliance. In 1975, SANE began airing its award winning nationally syndicated program “Consider the Alternatives,” and sponsored a major national conference “The Arms Race and Economic Conversion.” Both blamed military spending for runaway inflation. Two years later the same theme spawned SANE’s bimonthly newsletter, \textit{The Conversion Planner}, intended as a union resource. Melman and fellow SANE board member and Columbia colleague Lloyd Dumas even authored the Defense Economic Adjustment Act introduced to Congress in 1978.\textsuperscript{393} With SANE making the case for economic conversion a peace phalanx expanded in organized labor as several major unions moved closer to the progressive movement.

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Elected as president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) in 1977, William Winpisinger welcomed a platform of economic conversion and commissioned a study in 1978 that found machinist employment declined in direct proportion to increases in military spending. Winpisinger joined SANE as a co-chair in 1979 and initiated a peace movement among traditionally pro-defense labor leaders.394

When Reagan announced his first budget, pragmatic leaders in charge of the freeze and SANE stressed the connection between the economic and social crisis at home to increases in the military budget as part of their efforts to cultivate the African American community.395 Some in the black community who worked for disarmament had felt neglected by the movement. Gary and Brenda Johnson, a husband and wife team who founded Blacks Against Nukes (BAN) in 1981, rejected the argument that black Americans were too concerned about putting food on the table to worry about nuclear war. Rather, they argued that the largely white antinuclear movement made no effort to address nuclear issues from the black perspective or to actually work within the black community.396 The dominant perception held by the black activist community that the antinuclear cause was a “white issue” stemmed from the obstinacy of dogmatists in the peace movement who valued purity of purpose over coalition building.397 Qualifying his

support for the freeze movement, Barack Obama, then a young Columbia University student, summed up the issue, “one is forced to wonder whether disarmament and arms control issues, severed from economic and political issues, might be another instance of focusing on the symptoms of the disease itself.”

Reagan’s policies made the new emphasis on the economic dimension of antinuclear activism more consequential to the black community. Impoverished urban black communities were hardest hit by Reagan’s first term budgets that cut beneficial social programs by 140 billion dollars to finance an increase in military spending by 181 billion dollars. With black jobless rates nearly twice that of white Americans, the gutting of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, which provided for job training and placement assistance for the unemployed, exacerbated the crisis facing African-American communities. During the first twelve months of the Reagan administration, the real median income of black families fell by over 5 percent.

Reagan’s budget also appeared to vindicate the warnings of radical scientists, whose political voice—like that of Catholics, women, and minorities—expanded over the late 1960s and 1970s as they developed the public critique of the military-industrial-academic complex. Fear of the militarization of space and opposition to the Vietnam War on university campuses created an environment where Marxist and socialist critiques of science’s role in U.S. foreign and defense policy could exist. Radical scientists were

399 Intondi, African Americans Against the Bomb, 93.
emboldened in their campaign against the military-industrial-academic complex by the revelation in the Pentagon Papers of the contributions of the JASONs, an elite group of non-government scientists who advised on the value of military technologies in the Southeast Asian conflict and on numerous other scientific and technological questions related to national security.403 Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action, which later became Science for the People (SfP), published a condemnation of the JASONs in 1972 and used the ensuing controversy as a platform to nudge established institutions of science toward a more critical evaluation of U.S. defense policies and engaged in wider discussion with the general public.404

With Reagan’s budget indicating an acceleration of the arms race, SfP emerged as a public science diplomacy innovator. In the nuclear 1980s, SfP’s monthly magazine served as a routine source of disarmament ideas that reimagined a range of critiques into a transnational antinuclear community. Its avowed Marxist outlook aligned it with historically marginalized voices on the left that were gaining political influence as a result of their opposition to Reagan’s nuclear policies and budgets. Ronald Dellums (D-CA), a leader of the Congressional Black Caucus and arms control advocate, highlighted warnings of military control of research and development published by SfP in summer 1981. SfP analysis centered on making science a tool for racial, gender, and economic equality. Going further than mainstream scientists appeals for greater civilian R&D funds, they echoed SANE in their call for the economic conversion of U.S. national

laboratories with a special emphasis on the nuclear weapons facilities at Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos.405

The continued decline in support for science from the White House also alienated
the mainstream scientific community. Reagan had delayed in selecting Edward Teller’s
protégé, George Keyworth, as his chief science advisor. When Jimmy Carter’s former
science advisor and newly elected president of the National Academy of Sciences, Frank
Press, invited 100 leading scientists to a symposium to confront Reagan’s representatives
on the proposed 12 percent budget cut to science funding and agencies, Keyworth
exacerbated concerns by publicly refusing to lobby the White House on the behalf of
science.406 Hardest hit were funds for social sciences, science education, university
fellows and equipment, and programs to encourage women and minorities to enter
science and technology fields. All of these cuts threatened the pipeline for pure research
that scientists considered essential for economic innovation and military strength.407 The
scientific press condemned the prioritization of defense over civilian research and
development needs, focusing on the fact that the United States spent 50 percent of its
R&D budget on military projects while industrial competitors West Germany and Japan
spent 12 percent and 2 percent respectively.408 Industry representatives also rejected the
administration’s claims that a tighter partnership between private industry, universities,

405 “Militarism in Science,” Science for the People, July/August 1981; Gail Shields, “The Economic Impact
406 Christopher Joyce, “Cuts could do ‘irreparable damage’ to US Research,” New Scientist 5 (November
407 Bill Aldridge, “National Science Foundation’s Other Mission,” Science 212, 3 April 1981; Shirley
Plan,” Public Interest Report: Journal of the Federation of American Scientist 34 (June 1981); Robert
and the national laboratories in support of defense research would simultaneously create the necessary support for basic and non-military research.\textsuperscript{409}

Though scientists remained engaged in activities to directly influence government officials and senior policymakers, they initially enjoyed limited success in the early 1980s. These efforts became significantly more effective when paired with public approaches to science diplomacy. Scientists recognized that indirect influence over nuclear policy by way of using their expertise to mobilize public opinion had been an underappreciated strategy for halting the arms race.

Richard Garwin proved especially adept at pairing public and private approaches to science diplomacy to advocate for a moderation of Reagan’s nuclear policies. Garwin could do so because he embodied the military-industrial-academic complex due to his numerous roles as a defense consultant for national laboratories and the Pentagon, senior scientist at IBM, and Ivy League professor. Garwin argued that Reagan’s budgets reflected the thinking of a “nuclear mafia” who viewed nuclear weapons as a panacea to the problems facing American power. This mafia also sought to reassert monopoly control over nuclear knowledge and other technical defense information that formed the basis of the deterrence black box.\textsuperscript{410}

The Vietnam War broke the military-university research link, resulting in a 50 percent decline in defense funding for universities throughout the 1970s. Reagan’s first two budgets returned defense funding for universities to two-thirds of pre-1969 levels (constant dollars). Garwin’s interpretation of the nuclear mafia’s vision that nuclear

\textsuperscript{409} Joyce, “Cuts could do ‘irreparable damage.’”
\textsuperscript{410} Richard Garwin, “Are Defense Dollars Good for University Research,” Sipriscope (September/October 1982).
weapons could defeat the Soviet Union and simultaneously revive the economy rested on his concern that defense funding would coerce academic scientists, and universities in general, to once again accept Cold War militarism.\textsuperscript{411} Reagan’s revised budget submitted in fall of 1981 mandated still more cuts for non-military research in the national laboratories, lending credence to the growing sense that the new administration planned to restore the subservience of science to the interests of national security and its regime of secrecy.\textsuperscript{412}

The authority of scientific experts made them vital to the mainstreaming of antinuclear positions. In the critical early days of the freeze, the strategic, medical, and biological dimensions of nuclear war were examined at a series of well-attended symposia in major U.S. cities organized by PSR and the Council for a Livable World (CLW), the expert antinuclear organization formed in 1962 by the Hungarian-American physicist Leo Szilard who—with Albert Einstein—had first brought the possibility of an atomic bomb to the attention of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939.\textsuperscript{413} Likewise, a future physics Nobel laureate affiliated with the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Henry Kendall, put the full weight of the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and its 110,000 nationwide sponsors behind the freeze. Kendall had cofounded UCS while at MIT with fellow physicist Kurt Gottfried in response to the anti-ballistic missile treaty debates in the late 1960s and early 1970s.\textsuperscript{414}

\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} Interview of Henry Kendall by Finn Aaserud, 26 November 1986, Niels Bohr Library & Archives, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD USA, (NBLA). Last accessed 10 November 2019. \url{https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/4704-2}
Expert-led education and awareness campaigns launched in opposition to Reagan’s nuclear policies created an effective track for public science diplomacy. On Veterans Day in 1981, 100,000 students participated in “teach-ins” hosted by UCS, PSR, and the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) that drew 500 experts to speak about solutions to the arms race at 150 college campuses across 42 states. Teach-ins inspired the formation of United Campuses to Prevent Nuclear War (UCAM), which grew to 500 college chapters and helped develop dozens of courses on nuclear issues and carried out annual actions for many years.\footnote{Paul Walker, “Teach-ins on American Campuses,” \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists} (February 1982); “Nuclear Issues Are on the Agenda of Many Colleges,” \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education}, 23 March 1983.}

Radical and mainstream public science diplomacy invited moral, cultural, and political authorities to participate in the scientific community’s own self-reflection on who bore responsibility for the past, present, and future of the arms race. Frank Barnaby, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, blamed the professional ambition of defense scientists for the creation of the “military technological tail [that] wags the political dog.”\footnote{Frank Barnaby, “Military Scientists,” \textit{Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists} (June 1981).} The United Nations acknowledged in its comprehensive report on nuclear weapons that, “it is widely believed that….technology on its own impetus often takes the lead over policy, creating weapons for which needs have to be invented and deployment theories readjusted.”\footnote{United Nations, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, \textit{Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons} (New York: Autumn Press, 1981), paragraph 67.} Conversely, Wolfgang Panofsky, a past member of the Presidential Science Advisory Committee and director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, argued that the arms race continued unabated due to a failure of
politicians to understand the technical aspects of strategic weapons, rather than the inability of scientists to understand the political dimensions of nuclear weapons.418

The scientific community’s public diplomacy benefited from cooperation with other institutions with international reach, specifically the Catholic Church. The pairing of scientific knowledge and the moral authority of the Catholic clergy enhanced the legitimacy of antinuclear claims. Pope John Paul II offered a solution to the moral dilemma arising from the relationship between science, politics, and nuclear security during his visit to Hiroshima in 1981, declaring that “science and technology are the most dynamic factors of the development of society today,” but only through a closer binding with other cultural institutions could science avoid the three most serious pitfalls of aimless, inequitable, or power serving technological development; science must serve culture and culture serve science.419

The pontiff’s emphasis on the need to incorporate scientific claims into daily life in the context of nuclear issues increased the effect of public science diplomacy by making it a focus of religious teaching at the community level.420 This represents an important aspect of public science diplomacy, making scientific knowledge a basis for local actors to formulate opinions about national and international issues. The pope’s appeal to the scientific community for moral introspection also encouraged the American Catholic hierarchy to in turn rely on scientific counsel during the drafting of the Pastoral

Letter on War and Peace, creating an environment of mutual respect between moral and technical authorities.

The Catholic Church’s recognition that nuclear deterrence presented a nexus of moral, social justice, and scientific problems motivated its elevated involvement in public debate. Reagan’s pronuclear and anti-Soviet rhetoric compelled the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) to establish an ad hoc committee to compose a pastoral letter on nuclear war. The unprecedented disparities between defense spending and social spending advocated by the Reagan administration in its first year offered further proof to Church leaders of the necessity of intervention. Forsberg, Kehler, and other freeze leaders viewed religious involvement in deterrence debates as essential to developing a climate of antinuclear ideas, and cultivated the American Catholic Church as a source of authority that could confer a degree of mainstream political legitimacy to the antinuclear movement that it had lacked in earlier years.

Archbishop Joseph Bernardin of Cincinnati, widely respected for his skill in reconciling the views of conservative and progressive Catholics, chaired the committee. He built a committee out of the extremes, selecting the founding president of Pax Christi U.S.A. and Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit, Thomas Gumbleton; and conservative Auxiliary Bishop John O’Connor, who served the Military Vicariate based out of New York. Bishop Daniel Reilly of Norwich, Connecticut and Auxiliary Bishop George Fulcher of Columbus, Ohio joined the committee as moderates, key to establishing a middle ground

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421 The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) and United States Catholic Conference (USCC) eventually merged in 2001 to form the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB).
between the two extremes represented by Gumbleton and O’Connor.\textsuperscript{424} Father J. Bryan Hehir, author of Krol’s 1979 congressional testimony and other treatises on ethics and foreign policy, came aboard as the chief staff writer for the committee.\textsuperscript{425} Hehir had been with the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops since 1973 as the director of their Office of International Affairs after earning degrees from St. John’s Seminary and Harvard University. The committee met 14 times from July 1981 to July 1982, gathering input from former Defense Secretaries Harold Brown and James Schlesinger, former deputy director of the CIA, Herbert Scoville, and Reagan administration officials including Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Eugene Rostow, and Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.\textsuperscript{426} Additional meetings with European bishops and Vatican officials were held to coordinate the international Catholic response to the nuclear crisis.\textsuperscript{427}

Opposition to the arms race provided a vehicle for Catholic leaders to distinguish their moral principles from those of Reagan’s evangelical supporters on the basis of a consistent approach to the sanctity and dignity of life. Reagan’s nuclear rhetoric had been part of a concerted effort to craft himself as a defender of Western-Christian values to appeal to the eight million strong Moral Majority voting bloc.\textsuperscript{428} Prominent Catholic leaders pointed to the moral hypocrisy of expanded budgets for military hardware at the expense of social programs. Georgetown University President Timothy Healy summed

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\textsuperscript{427} McBrady. “The Challenge of Peace,” 144.
\textsuperscript{428} Fitzgerald, \textit{Way Out There In the Blue}, 19-41; Wittner, \textit{Toward Nuclear Abolition}, 193.
\end{flushleft}
up the mood of many Catholic leaders when he accused Reagan and his Moral Majority allies of promoting the “rhetoric of condemnation” rather than supporting the well-being of American citizens. President of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB), Archbishop John Roach of Minneapolis-St. Paul, empowered the ad hoc committee to compose a pastoral letter on war and peace in part to respond to the increased use of morality as a political tool. Speaking in support of rapidly emerging Catholic opposition to the arms race in the November 1981 conference of American bishops in Washington D.C., Roach became the first NCCB president to criticize evangelicals’ use of morality in public policy discussions by pointing out their inconsistent approach to the sanctity of life and other political issues.

The Bernardin committee’s two year consultation and drafting process produced public diplomacy innovations that made it a proxy battle for the broader conflict between deterrence and disarmament ideas between July 1981 and May 1983. Bradford Hinze has argued that the Bernardin committee set a new precedent for deliberating pastoral issues by expanding the consultation process beyond church circles to include scientists, government officials, and other experts and by publishing drafts of the pastoral letter that made it more responsive to the wider public debate.

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430 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb, 40.
Nuclear Politics and the 1982 Mid-term Election

The rapid growth of antinuclear ideas and corresponding public diplomacy operations in 1982 and 1983 influenced both moral, technical, and political developments in American society involving the pastoral letter, nuclear modernization, and the 1982 mid-term elections. Public science diplomacy animated these developments through a series of new treatises on nuclear war that demonstrated how the problem had been shaped by a small band of defense intellectuals and why a bridge between scientific and humanistic thinking was needed to construct a better solution to nuclear conflict than deterrence. The effect of public science diplomacy for integrating scientific expertise and non-scientific knowledge claims into a coherent and widely disseminated critique of deterrence made disarmament advocacy in the 1980s distinct from antinuclear activity in the 1960s. This argument can be substantiated by a comparison between Herman Kahn’s controversial book published in 1960, On Thermonuclear War, and Jonathan Schell’s best-selling collection of essays released early in 1982, The Fate of the Earth.432

Kahn intended that his massive volume, written in a prose reflective of his place in the cold culture of nuclear analysis rooted in mathematical calculation and the physical sciences, would galvanize society to think about the “unthinkable” – life on earth after a nuclear war. His disinterested and statistical assessment of a post-nuclear war future drew heavy criticism for being devoid of any humanistic or moral substance.433 To many, Kahn’s work perfectly illustrated the disturbing trend illuminated by C.P. Snow in 1959 regarding the widening gulf between literary and scientific cultures that produced

incomprehension and hostility.\textsuperscript{434} In this regard, \textit{On Thermonuclear War} was the archetypal expression of the technical priesthood’s limited approach to defining and resolving the problem of nuclear war and survival.

In contrast, Schell, a veteran columnist at the \textit{New Yorker}, propelled the antinuclear movement forward by reconciling science and literary cultures in his best-selling volume \textit{The Fate of the Earth}. After five years of extensive consultations with the scientific community and thorough study of a series of recent reports on nuclear war from the Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Office of Technology Assessment, the National Academy of Sciences, and many other government offices and independent scientific institutions, Schell developed an amalgam of scientific and humanistic arguments to demand that the unthinkable should also be “undoable.” Schell explored nuclear war’s transformation of the physical environment in conjunction with an analysis of its effects on the cultural, emotional, and psychological realms that comprised human society to provide as many access points as possible for people to grapple with the consequences of the arms race and deterrence. By expanding the types of arguments and thinking that could be used to grapple with the problem of nuclear war, Schell effectively unpacked the black box of deterrence in both the United States and in the United Kingdom, where 80,000 copies of \textit{Fate of the Earth} were sold in its first week in British stores.\textsuperscript{435}

Schell’s best-selling \textit{Fate of the Earth}, published only three weeks before the freeze hosted its second annual conference in Denver in late February 1982, was credited for dramatically increasing the event’s attendance which lent the appearance of a vibrant

\textsuperscript{434} Charles Percy Snow, \textit{The Two Cultures} (London: Cambridge University Press, 1959).
\textsuperscript{435} Hogg, \textit{British Nuclear Culture}, 137.
movement.\textsuperscript{436} Congressional staffers representing Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA) and Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) scouted the conference in preparation for a joint congressional resolution in March 1982.\textsuperscript{437} On 10 March 1982, following Markey’s House resolution for a nuclear moratorium, Kennedy and Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) introduced their joint resolution for a nuclear freeze to much fanfare at American University.\textsuperscript{438} Between Kennedy’s resolution, Schell’s best-seller, and the ground game of the freeze that produced a measurable electoral impact in the Northeast, national media outlets began paying significant attention to the antinuclear movement.\textsuperscript{439}

Schell’s work drew attention to the impact that eloquently communicated scientific knowledge could have on the deterrence debate, especially in regard to the ecological effects of nuclear war. Carl Sagan emerged as a pivotal figure on both of these fronts in the nuclear 1980s. Recognized as the premier science communicator following his Pulitzer-winning 1977 book on the future of human intelligence, \textit{Dragons of Eden}, and for his hit television series \textit{Cosmos}, Cornell University astronomer Carl Sagan quickly became a Democratic darling in Washington. Senators Edward Kennedy (D-MA), William Proxmire (D-WI), Alan Cranston (D-CA) and Congressmen Al Gore (D-TN) relied heavily on Sagan’s analysis of nuclear war and hailed his authority and that of his esteemed scientific contacts in publicizing the first freeze resolution in March 1982.\textsuperscript{440} They and other Democratic lawmakers gradually encouraged Sagan to

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\textsuperscript{438} Interview with Randy Kehler, 11/10/1987.
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contextualize his scientific assessments of nuclear war in more political, social, and strategic arguments, thereby making him a leading practitioner of public science diplomacy.\textsuperscript{441} Those lessons would shape the preparation and presentation of what would become known as the TTAPS study, a reference to the initials of its authors, which Sagan was in the midst of leading on the environmental and biological consequences of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{442}

The public defection of scientists from the nuclear security establishment accelerated the growth of the antinuclear movement by legitimizing antinuclear arguments and attracting media attention.\textsuperscript{443} Roger Molander’s 1982 best-seller, \textit{Nuclear War: What’s In It for You?}, brought public attention to divisions among what he referred to as the “technical priesthood” of nuclear experts, the very same group Garwin had referred to as a “nuclear mafia.”\textsuperscript{444} Molander had been a member of this select group.

After earning a Ph.D. in nuclear engineering Molander joined the National Security Council where he worked on arms control issues for the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. His criticism of the nuclear establishment to which he once belonged represented a trend of defense scientists and technical elites publicly challenging the administration’s deterrence justifications for an increase in nuclear armaments.


\textsuperscript{442} In order of authorship, R.P. Turco, O.B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, Carl Sagan.

\textsuperscript{443} Patricia Williams to Randy Kehler, 22 March 1983, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 2.

Molander’s propagation of this trend increased concerns in the Reagan administration of the antinuclear movement’s growing technical and scientific legitimacy.  

Figure 3: Map of Ground Zero Groups as of 25 March 1982. (SCPC) Physicians for Social Responsibility Records (PSR), Box 48-A S2.

The Reagan administration’s anti-arms control rhetoric accelerated Molander’s launch of a nuclear education program to stimulate informed public debate from his Ground Zero organization, which he had founded with his wife and a small band of experts late in 1980. Planned to coincide with Easter, the turnout for Ground Zero week from 18-25 April 1982 kept the focus on antinuclear sentiment heading into the summer that featured the United Nations’ Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) running from June to July, and into the fall mid-term elections. Despite early fundraising struggles, Ground Zero organizers received a significant boost from the antinuclear events of February and March. When Ground Zero week arrived, nearly one million

people participated in activities ranging from peace runs and bike rides to academic seminars across 2,000 municipalities and 350 college campuses, draining the tank of qualified speakers nearly empty.446

Molander’s Ground Zero week provided the motivation for a significant public science diplomacy innovation that would influence the deterrence debate for the remainder of the decade. Inspired by Ground Zero week, numerous scientific organizations devoted to reversing the arms race prioritized nuclear curriculum design for school age children. This new focus created a point of cooperation between scientists and women that helped to instill antinuclear ideas in the public conscience. Ground Zero developed curriculums for elementary school and high school students with the backing of National Education Association, the American Association of University Women, and the National Council of Churches among other groups. FAS launched the Nuclear War Education Project to train teachers and experts on how to educate children about the complexities of the nuclear age.447 With women dominating the ranks of primary and secondary school teachers as well as the 5.3 million strong Parent Teacher’s Association that determined guidelines for teaching nuclear issues, they were able to use nuclear curriculums to structure conversations about civic life to reflect the values of the peace movement.448

Anxieties regarding motherhood and child rearing in the nuclear age, which had shifted from earlier concerns about the effects of radioactive fallout on the physical

447 Stephanie DeAbreu, “Mounting Concern over Nuclear War Begins to Involve Nation’s Schools,” Education Week, 7 April 1982.
development of children to the psychological trauma caused by the arms race, factored into educational concerns. Psychiatrists John Mack of Harvard and Eric Chivian of MIT were deeply affected by Helen Caldicott’s activism. Chivian had even helped reestablish PSR and served in a leadership capacity with the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which would win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985. Thanks to their access to both American and Soviet children, Mack and Chivian concluded that children’s preoccupation with nuclear war caused long-term psychological trauma.

Compared to American children, Mack and Chivian found Soviet children more aware of nuclear weapons and less likely to believe they could survive nuclear war. Soviet children also reported higher confidence in the potential for the superpowers to avoid nuclear war than their American peers. Mack, Chivian, and their Harvard-based team chalked up the differences in children’s views to Soviet curriculums that covered nuclear issues.

Psychological assessments of children’s nuclear fear contributed to the public turn in science diplomacy. Organizers seized on the Harvard study’s findings to lobby for a reform of primary and secondary school curriculums to meet the intellectual and emotional demands of the nuclear age. Informed by ongoing research at Harvard and in response to the FEMA pilot program “Emergency Management Instruction” that taught 80,000 students that nuclear war was survivable, Roberta Snow and Tony Wagner


launched Educators for Social Responsibility (ESR) in 1982 using the same model as PSR. The group quickly grew to over 10,000 members and supporters with more than 100 chapters in well over 30 states and Canada.

Emphasizing U.S. moral superiority over the Soviet Union had been envisioned as a main component of the Reagan administration’s nuclear public diplomacy plan, but White House officials simultaneously acknowledged the difficulties in selling an image of moral clarity considering the effect of public science diplomacy, growing Catholic opposition to deterrence and, the variety of social justice issues tied into the antinuclear movement. Top advisors outlining the public nuclear diplomacy campaign against the freeze in April 1982 feared antagonizing and alerting antinuclear opponents. National Security Advisor William Clark wrote his colleagues, “In no way do I wish to foster a ‘we/they’ syndrome, where in we become antagonists with Roger Molander of Ground Zero, or Billy Graham, or 40 Catholic Bishops, or the Mayor of Pella, Iowa.”

The administration’s public diplomacy strategy relied on an official line pushed from the White House, State Department, and the Pentagon; but perhaps more importantly by private sector initiatives, whose organizers could expand upon the conservative moral case for nuclear superiority free from the burdens of officialdom. An impressive network of think tanks that increased their influence with Reagan in the Oval

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Office, and televangelists and conservative activists at the peak of their power spearheaded the moral aspect of public nuclear diplomacy.456

The multiple drafts of the pastoral letter appeared to reflect the evolution of the deterrence debate, but it remained focused on two Catholic traditions: Just War theory and pacifism. Several Catholic bishops raised the national profile of nuclear pacifism through acts of civil disobedience. Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle, who referred to the Kitsap naval base that harbored Ohio-Class nuclear submarines as the “Auschwitz of Puget Sound,” had urged members of his diocese to withhold half their income tax to protest military spending.457 His antinuclear advocacy strongly opposed one of the Senate’s most hawkish members, Henry Jackson (D-WA), in his own backyard and emboldened local organizers. In 1982, Hunthausen helped organize “Target Seattle,” which aimed to elevate the nuclear dilemma in people’s minds and enjoyed the participation of 67 community organizations, 200 churches, most of the city’s public schools, and brought 25,000 people to the Kingdome for an antinuclear rally.458

Hunthausen’s activism inspired Amarillo bishop Leroy Matthiesen’s tax resistance and protest of the nearby Pantex plant, the primary nuclear weapons assembly site in the United States.459

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458 Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, 171.

Bookending a period of heightened intensity in the deterrence debate, versions one and two of the pastoral letter—submitted in June 1982 and November 1982—stirred public interest and responses from the Reagan administration and the Vatican. For the most part, American bishops—with some notable exceptions—held firm in their conviction and pushed for a stronger condemnation of Reagan’s nuclear policies and an implicit endorsement of the principles of a nuclear freeze.\footnote{McBrady, “The Challenge of Peace,” 130-131, 148-49.} Bernardin’s committee faced the challenge, however, of not pushing too hard against Reagan’s nuclear policies. Pope John Paul II, an avowed anti-communist, worked closely with the White House on other Cold War problems.\footnote{John Paul II, of Polish origin, worked very closely with the Reagan administration to aid the solidarity movement, which had undermined communist rule in Poland. See Marie Gayte, “The Vatican and the Reagan Administration: A Cold Warrior Alliance?” The Catholic Historical Review 97 (2011).} Given the impact on the domestic debate and on foreign publics, Reagan’s public diplomacy operations focused intensely on rebutting the arguments of the peace bishops through the drafting stages of the pastoral letter.

Pro and antinuclear activities planned to coincide with the second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD) running through June and July 1982 ensured that the nuclear debate would become a major issue of the 1982 election cycle. Momentum from the Ground Zero week carried into summer demonstrations, which set the backdrop for a series of critical votes in Congress on nuclear issues.\footnote{Across the country there were antinuclear demonstrations conducted in solidarity with the SSOD march. Including 100,000 people gathered in the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, CA. See “100,000 Jam Rose Bowl for Disarmament Rally,” The New York Times, 7 June 1982.} For nearly 18 months freeze leaders prioritized organizing for the SSOD demonstration, which they considered an important component of their congressional strategy. They hoped to build-on its momentum to organize for mid-term elections to bring legislators inclined toward
disarmament to Capitol Hill.\footnote{Steve Ladd, “National Freeze Strategy: Broadening the Base and Increasing Our Political Influence,” 3 January 1981 (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 7.} On 12 June 1982, New York’s Central Park played host to the SSOD rally which drew a crowd between 750,000 and 1,000,000 people, the largest demonstration in American history up to that point. Popular cultural icons—among them Bruce Springsteen, Pete Seeger, James Taylor, Harry Belafonte and Orson Welles—drew the attention of the national media.\footnote{Paul Montgomery, “Throngs Fill Manhattan to Protest Nuclear Weapons,” \textit{The New York Times}, 13 June 1982.} The press captured the impressive show of progressive unity, but failed to cover the content of antinuclear speeches given by leaders, who offered an array of critical perspectives on U.S. power.

In Herman Kahn, the infamous larger-than-life director of the Hudson Institute and controversial author of \textit{On Thermonuclear War}, the Reagan administration found an ally willing to make the moral case for a nuclear arms build-up from an expert’s perspective.\footnote{Red Cavaney to Robert MacFarlane, “Nuclear Freeze Private Sector Resources,” 30 April 1982, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 6, Folder “Nuclear Freeze.”} In a \textit{New York Times} editorial entitled “Thinking About Nuclear Morality,” published the day after the record-breaking Central Park antinuclear rally, Kahn sought to debunk the strategic arguments employed by the freeze movement to advocate for disarmament.

Kahn’s mix of rhetoric, cultural imagery, expertise, and moral arguments encapsulated the goals of the Reagan administration’s anti-freeze campaign. He reclaimed the cowboy criticism of Reagan and turned it into a positive; framing the president not as an uninformed rogue, but rather as a compassionate leader who could make the tough decisions required of an American president in a nuclear world. He wrote “‘Reagan the cowboy,’ really does seem to understand that skillful diplomacy and
negotiation are as important as military defense."\textsuperscript{466} Identifying himself as a futurist concerned with the well-being of all humanity, Kahn’s faith in Reagan’s arms build-up defined the president’s peace through strength rhetoric as a visionary promise for world peace. He accepted the antinuclear movement’s premise of a no-first-use policy, a position the president had rejected a month earlier, only to argue that such a policy generated a moral imperative to enhance deterrence at both the conventional and nuclear level. According to Kahn, no-first-use did not imply disarmament, but actually required the rearmament championed by the Reagan administration. Consequently, Kahn conjectured, “Nowhere is it written that weakness is a virtue, and a nation which does not have high moral visions (a no-first-use policy) – accompanied by practical planning (an adequate war-fighting capability) – is weak. An appropriate national posture is to be strong both morally and military.”\textsuperscript{467}

The administration and its allies strongly emphasized the morality of deterrence in their public diplomacy operations throughout the summer of 1982 in response to the peace bishops’ drafts and in anticipation of the mid-terms. George Will, ascendant among the ranks of national pundits, agreed with Kahn that the positions of the antinuclear movement—specifically those put forward by the peace bishops and Bernardin’s committee—demonstrated not moral revelation but a bankrupt intellect. Ernest Lefever, a Christian ethicist who earlier had served the neoconservative cause by assaulting the prestige press, now turned his efforts to organizing the moral case for rearmament around the premise of the apocalypse – a theme soon expanded upon by televangelists.\textsuperscript{468}

\textsuperscript{467} Ibid.
Fresh off her successful battle to block the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly took on the freeze movement as the focus of her next campaign. The empowerment of progressive women and their values through the antinuclear movement represented a potential threat to all that Schlafly achieved. She had also been a key voice in the neoconservative assault on the intellectual foreign policy elite in the 1970s. Her books, coauthored with the staunchly conservative retired rear admiral Chester Ward, highly sensationalized Kissinger’s alleged betrayal of U.S. national security interests. Schlafly and Ward attributed all the geopolitical challenges to U.S. hegemony to the original sin of arms control—specifically Kissinger’s SALT policies. Their best-known diatribe, *Kissinger on the Couch*, written in a style reminiscent of a slanderous gossip column featured “translations” of nuclear jargon into “non-intellectual American language” to demonstrate the retreat of elites in the face of growing Soviet nuclear power.469 Almost a decade later, at event in Washington D.C.’s Shoreham Hotel celebrating her defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment in summer of 1982, Schlafly announced a campaign against the freeze movement as the next challenge for protecting conservative womanhood. Declaring a new era for her 50,000 strong Eagle Forum, Schlafly exclaimed, “The Atomic Bomb is a marvelous gift that was given to our country by a wise God.”470 The statement perfectly encapsulated the moral element of the Reagan administration’s public diplomacy plan.

Reagan also appealed directly to conservative Catholics whose views of geopolitics and moral convictions appeared more in line with his administration’s positions rather than those espoused by the peace bishops. In his address to the Knights of Columbus in August 1982 he applauded the 8,000 strong fraternal organization for its consistent defense of deterrence. As part his administration’s concerted effort to coopt freeze rhetoric, Reagan reiterated his commitment to the pseudo freeze resolution sponsored by his allies on defense, Senators Henry Jackson (D-WA) and John Warner (R-VA). The resolution endorsed a freeze only after a sharp mutual reduction to strategic weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union.471 The resolution did not result in changes to negotiating positions or modernization plans that might bring reductions more rapidly. Though the American Catholic hierarchy had become more progressive since Vatican II, Reagan’s speech to the Knights of Columbus sought to court the still substantial conservative Catholic population.

Exploiting inter-Catholic conflict between conservative and liberal followers, Theresa Keeley reveals, became a key component of the Reagan administration’s broader public diplomacy plan to roll back communism.472 Developing Reagan’s pronuclear agenda became an impetus for the creation of several new organizations through which conservative lay Catholics challenged the progressive heading of the American Catholic hierarchy. The American Catholic Committee and the Catholic Center for Renewal, launched by the Heritage Foundation Director of Studies Philip Lawler, sought to


mitigate the influence of the peace bishops on lay Catholics by arguing that the clergy should not involve themselves in foreign policymaking.\footnote{Marjorie Hyer, “Influencing the Catholic Bishops,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 15 November 1982.}

Like the president himself, Reagan’s most prominent Catholic ally, Michael Novak, had also completed a journey from New Deal Democrat to conservative darling. During his graduate studies at Harvard, Novak began examining the place of morality in international relations when he came under the mentorship of Reinhold Niebuhr. As Reagan increasingly emphasized the extraordinary moral role of the United States, Novak found himself more aligned with the man he claimed to have voted against in California gubernatorial contests.\footnote{Colman McCarthy, “The Crossing of the Bishops: Michael Novak, Catholic Critic: His Journey From McGovern to Reagan,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 11 May 1983.} In competition with the progressive U.S Catholic clergy, Novak sought to establish a pastoral tradition for conservatives rooted in the Christian realist framework. Formally a seminarian, Novak had emerged as one of the most prominent lay theologians in the United States by the early 1980s while serving as the religious editor for \textit{The National Review}. As conflict between the peace bishops and the Reagan administration deepened, Novak’s importance grew as an informal advisor to USIA Director Charles Wick’s public diplomacy operations and to the White House’s public messaging on nuclear issues.\footnote{Nicholas Cull, \textit{The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 405.}

From his post as a resident-scholar at the leading conservative think tank, the American Enterprise Institute, Novak nearly single-handedly launched the public diplomacy campaign that supported conservative Catholic resistance to the peace bishops across the pages of \textit{Commentary, The Wall Street Journal, The National Review, Time}
Magazine, and several other high-profile publications throughout 1982. Novak argued that the bishops’ arguments against deterrence lacked theological sophistication, which he blamed on their eagerness to turn nuclear anxiety into a pastoral opportunity. He took issue with both their tactics and supposed political goals. He reserved his most adversarial tone for his claim that the bishops unethically marshaled their moral authority to support their actions as citizens and thus opened divides within Catholicism that could only favor the Soviet Union’s Cold War aims.\footnote{476}

Going a step further, other writers sought to discredit the freeze and the broader transnational peace movement as mere agents of the Kremlin. Against the backdrop of the historically massive antinuclear rally in Central Park in June 1982, the husband and wife team of Erich and Rael Jean Isaac published, “The Counterfeit Peacemakers,” in the American Spectator. The Isaacs contended that Soviet fronts—specifically the World Peace Council and U.S. Peace Council—had taken hold of the peace movement during the terminal decline of pacifism in the United States. Soviet control of the peace movement in turn produced an “adversary culture” that turned public anxieties into a “weapon to prevent achievement of the Reagan administration’s keystone effort: the restoration of U.S. defense capabilities.”\footnote{477}

In fact, the freeze movement from its beginning had distanced itself from these organizations precisely to avoid such accusations. John Barron’s September Reader’s Digest article, “The KGB’s Magical War for Peace,” in the best-selling magazine in the


United States, escalated the assault on the freeze movement.\textsuperscript{478} Without any concrete evidence, Barron argued that the freeze and parallel antinuclear movements in Europe owed their existence and superior organization to the KGB.\textsuperscript{479} These articles were in a sense literary counter-punches to Schell’s \textit{Fate of the Earth}, which had helped antinuclear protest reach its zenith in the summer and fall before the 1982 mid-term elections. Reagan’s citation of these articles to back his claims that the antinuclear movement had been the pawns of the Soviet peace offensive intensified the antagonistic dynamic that the anti-freeze planning group aimed to avoid.\textsuperscript{480}

Rather than reverse the antinuclear trend in American politics, the administration and its allies initial public diplomacy efforts only widened the moral and ideological gulf on arms control and deterrence. Peace through strength advocates did not make significant inroads in liberal states, or establish the necessary rapport with skeptical women, minorities, and Catholics.\textsuperscript{481} The administration and its allies simply could not marshal the expert speakers, moral paragons, and mix of sensationalist and astute reporting and op-eds to counter the grassroots strength of the antinuclear movement. Late in the summer, freeze activists finally got a scorecard on where legislators actually stood. A freeze initiative fell 204-202 in the House of Representatives; parliamentary procedures would have resulted in the bill’s passing in the case of the tie. The freeze now

\textsuperscript{481} William Clark to James Baker, “Nuclear Freeze,” 16 August 1982, (RRPL) David Gergen Files, Box 7, Folder “Nuclear Freeze.”
had a one vote motto and map of representatives to challenge in the coming mid-term elections.  

Scientists added technical merit to the political momentum of the freeze. FAS had become the most assertive scientific organization advocating for arms control after Stanford trained mathematician Jeremy Stone took over as the organization’s director in 1970. In fact, Stone had developed the concept of a nuclear freeze himself as far back as 1969 during a trip to Moscow. Stone’s FAS had been the primary organization of experts pushing back against the neoconservative assault on SALT I and II during the years of détente. FAS conducted and publicized its own series of freeze hearings in the leadup to the 1982 elections and again in 1983 to parallel those on Capitol Hill. FAS also provided the technical expertise necessary to not only fill out the details of a freeze verification, while working through its contacts to bring other defense experts on board in promoting the idea. Comprised of some 5,000 scientists including dozens of distinguished defense experts and at least 50 Nobel Laureates, FAS’ commitment to the freeze aligned many influential members of the American scientific community with the progressive antinuclear coalition supporting mid-term election challenges to pronuclear conservatives.

Scientists also emerged as conduits between the antinuclear movement and congressional Democrats. In Carl Sagan, Al Gore (D-TN) identified a resource for challenging the deterrence claims advanced by the Reagan administration to pursue an

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expansion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. In Gore, Sagan found a powerful ally to help make new scientific knowledge the basis for political and behavioral solutions to the arms race. In September 1982, Gore led a hearing of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Science and Technology on the consequences of nuclear war for the global environment. Gore intended for the hearing to link the emotional, political, and socio-cultural elements of antinuclear sentiment to a scientific and technical case for constraining Reagan’s nuclear expansion. Schell’s work had foreshadowed this connection, in part because his emphasis on the likely ecological demise of the earth resulting from nuclear war had been informed by the same preliminary research from nuclear winter experts informing Gore’s nuclear politics. This focus on the ecological effects of nuclear explosions naturally intensified the environmental movement’s opposition to nuclear weapons.

Based on the findings of that hearing and advanced knowledge of nuclear winter theory, Gore would eventually table a congressional resolution calling for a year of international research on the environmental effects of nuclear war. Introducing the post-hearing resolution, Gore explained, “what [scientists] seem to be saying is that not only might life after a nuclear war be ominously difficult, but that nature, itself, could conceivably wither under a major nuclear attack.”

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Mounting scientific involvement in the antinuclear movement motivated members of the “nuclear mafia” to intensify their lobbying of the administration to focus on technological fixes to the political problems posed by the freeze. Operating out of the Heritage foundation from 1980 to 1983, a select group of conservative defense enthusiasts with deep ties to the White House science advisor and Reagan’s inner circle of political advisors and donors had petitioned the president to prioritize ballistic missile defense. Edward Teller served as the most prestigious expert on the Heritage Committee. A member of the team that developed the first hydrogen bomb and notorious Cold War hawk, Teller had been the first to capture Reagan’s imagination with the concept of strategic defense during a tour of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories in 1967.487 Teller’s professional home at Livermore had been subjected to extensive antinuclear demonstrations during the first term of the Reagan administration.488 This no doubt informed Teller’s animosity toward the antinuclear movement and his attempts to disarm it. In a one-on-one meeting with Reagan on 14 September 1982, Teller pulled together the various strategic and technical arguments for ballistic missile defense into a political framing that could alleviate the president’s problems with both Congress and the antinuclear movement. The Heritage Committee and the associated High Frontier Project on strategic defense, which had been directed by retired general and CPD member Daniel Graham, had succeeded in showing how technical advances in ballistic missile defense

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could improve area, or “point,” defense of MX deployments in existing ICBM silos. The MX issue had dogged Reagan’s broader modernization program in Congress and had been the focus of opposition for many antinuclear organizations, most notably SANE.

More importantly, Teller focused specifically on how strategic defense could rebut the antinuclear movement and the threat they posed to national security by shifting the terms of the deterrence debate. 489 Teller had proposed to Reagan earlier in summer 1982, that strategic defense constituted “a uniquely effective reply to those advocating the dangerous inferiority implied by a ‘nuclear freeze.’” 490 Indeed, Teller’s and the Heritage group’s lobbying on Capitol Hill and with the president had grabbed the attention of the antinuclear movement. Antinuclear organizers’ fears that “High Frontier would turn the grass-roots nuclear freeze movement inside out” validated Teller’s political instincts. 491

Teller also found in Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, a sympathetic ear on strategic defense. Watkins was a devout and practicing Catholic. He began publicly touting a moral framework for deterrence soon after he became Chief of Naval Operations to combat the influence of the disarmament movement in the Navy. After seeing Teller’s skillful advocacy for BMD development on Firing Line in June, Watkins commissioned a study on strategic defense in late summer 1982. 492

Summer developments on strategic defense suggest that the political and moral implications of ballistic missile defense were becoming more important to the

administration than the technical and strategic aspects. Nonetheless, the numerous technical complications associated with the prospect of launching a major strategic defense program remained significant enough to prevent the Reagan administration from using the idea to counter the freeze movement’s political momentum heading into the 1982 mid-term elections. Even in the NSC, home to the strongest advocates for ballistic missile defense, officials did not consider a major research and deployment program a realistic option. In August, NSC aide Sydell Gold recommended, “at this time, the knowledge base is not sufficiently developed, and the applications are not clearly enough defined, to support a decision to go all out on the explosively driven x-ray laser.”

National Security Advisor William Clark wrote Reagan in mid-September 1982, “although some scientists believe the class of technologies that Dr. Teller is endorsing holds great promise, a number of studies indicate that applications are now too ill-defined and there remain too many technical uncertainties to justify any crash program.”

By the end of summer, Reagan officials had resigned themselves to a freeze victory in November. Following the long antinuclear summer of 1982 that began with Ground Zero Week, peaked with the Central Park Rally, and concluded with a final national demonstration in October, fifty-six percent of voters said they would vote against a congressional candidate who favored an escalation to the arms race even if they

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493 Sydell Gold to William Clark, “Letter from Edward Teller to the President,” (RRPL) Edwin Meese Files, Box 5, Folder “NF-CFOA 415.”
agreed on all other issues. The electoral activities of antinuclear organizations played a significant role in the Democratic Party’s 1982 congressional comeback and established a blueprint for the 1984 presidential elections. The freeze enlarged its national staff to include minority and labor coordinators, and the national committee opted to include more representatives from the state and municipal level to better reflect the nation’s mood on disarmament. These organizers were key to successful voter and petition drives that propelled freeze allies to victory. Unemployment offices in particular, disproportionately filled with minorities and those disillusioned by Reagan’s policies, became popular sites for freeze drives. Antinuclear organizations played a key role in developing fundraising operations to counter the impressive New Right donor network supporting pronuclear candidates.

Efforts to transform antinuclear ideas into political power extended beyond the freeze organization. In 1982, Caldicott transformed Women’s Party for Survival (WPS), which had been an independent party that counted over 6,000 members in 1981, into Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND). WAND’s goal was twofold. WAND first sought to establish common ground between mainstream and radical antinuclear women; second, it aimed to develop that alliance into a viable political force to support congressional candidates that recognized the connection between nuclear politics and family politics, especially women candidates. WAND’s protest activities

497 Randy Kehler, “Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting,” 28 September 1982, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 2.
centered on spreading Mother’s Day freeze rallies throughout the country, which succeeded in integrating women that had been drawn to antinuclear protest by the maternal focus of Caldicott’s demonstrations with radical elements from groups like WPA that had been traditionally wary of maternally oriented tactics because of its reaffirmation of patriarchal family structure.500

By August, 48 states and more than 315 congressional districts reported varying levels of freeze activity.501 Much of this activity had been in preparation for the hundreds of freeze referenda at the state, county, and municipal levels, which had been coordinated by the national office throughout the summer. In total, nearly a third of the country’s electorate voted on a freeze referendum – perhaps the closest the United States had come to a national plebiscite on a single issue in the twentieth century.502 Mid-term voter turnout increased for the first time since the 1960s and in favor of Democrats who added 6.1 million votes compared to an additional 3 million for the Republican Party.503 Other factors driving voter turnout, notably the poor state of the economy and a political rebuke of Reagan from black and Hispanic communities, caught the attention of antinuclear groups designing their 1984 election strategy based on results from the 1982 mid-terms.504

501 Thomas Graham Jr. to Robert Dean, “Freeze Resolutions and Referenda,” 17 August 1982, (RRPL) Robert McFarlane Files, Box 1, Folder “Arms Control; INF.”
502 Randy Kehler to Executive Committee, “Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting of 13 August 1982.” 8 September 1982, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 2; Randy Kehler, “Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting,” 28 September 1982, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 2.
504 Barbara Roche to Executive Committee, 29 March 1983, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 2.
Results of the mid-terms illuminated the political power of the freeze; eight of the
nine states with the issue on the ballot and D.C. voted in favor of the freeze, 34 of 37
counties passed the freeze, and the hundreds of municipal elections that included a freeze
referendum passed it with a 3:2 margin. Pro-freeze candidates won in 38 of the 47 races
where nuclear issues were of concern according to Markey’s calculations. Judging
against the Congressional Quarterly’s predictions, antinuclear efforts led to 4 upsets,
swung 6 of 11 undecided contests for freeze candidates, wiped out the company of hawks
on the House Armed Services Committee, and moderated the effects of redistricting that
moved 17 seats from the liberal Frostbelt to the conservative Sunbelt.505

Scientists, January 1983; Waller, Congress and the Nuclear Freeze, 165.
CHAPTER FOUR:
RESCUING THE DETERRENCE AGENDA

“The Atomic Bomb is a marvelous gift that was given to our country by a wise God.”506

- Phyllis Schlafly

Responding to the rapid growth of the peace movement over the preceding three years, Reagan and Thatcher reorganized their public diplomacy in preparation for critical legislative and electoral challenges in 1983. In Britain, the outcome of the general election would determine if the country would accept U.S. cruise missiles later in the year. U.S. and British officials thus considered a Conservative Party victory a lynchpin in maintaining the credibility of extended deterrence for European security and NATO’s INF negotiating strategy in talks with the Soviet Union. Conservative’s pronuclear public diplomacy exploited emerging tensions within the peace movement and in the CND-Labour Party alliance.

In the United States, pronuclear public diplomacy developed a strong moral dimension that made the acceptance of deterrence part of the New Right political program. The introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative disrupted the antinuclear campaign against Reagan’s nuclear agenda. The moral case for deterrence and Reagan’s dealings with congressional Democrats staved off cancellation of the MX missile, which the Reagan administration considered key to reestablishing nuclear superiority so as to negotiate from a position of strength in strategic arms control talks with the Soviet Union.

Though the British and American antinuclear movement failed on both the electoral and legislative fronts, progress in coalition building and the further refinement

of public diplomacy tactics primed both movements to develop disarmament concepts in the transatlantic public sphere.

**The Deterrence Debate and the 1983 British General Election**

Anticipating general elections later in the year, Michael Heseltine’s replacement of John Nott as Defense Secretary in the reshuffling of Thatcher’s cabinet in January 1983 indicated how seriously the prime minister viewed the challenge of antinuclear opinion. In a January meeting of the relevant cabinet ministers, Thatcher placed Heseltine in charge of the government committee to garner support for its nuclear policies and counter CND’s activities.\(^{507}\) Heseltine’s operation subsumed the existing government steering group run by Douglas Hurd, Peter Blaker, and Patrick Mayhew that had coordinated the activities of the MoD, FCO, CRD and pro-deterrence pressure groups.\(^{508}\)

With Heseltine in charge, the public diplomacy contest in the months before the general election became a battle over authority in the public sphere. The pronuclear campaign observed internal fractures within the antinuclear movement that could be exploited for the Thatcher government’s gain, especially the persistent fragility of the Labour-CND alliance and unease over radicalism. In 1983, British pronuclear public diplomacy suggested that the public sphere, pervaded by antinuclear themes, did not accurately represent the views of the British people. Heseltine devised a strategy that framed antinuclear advocates as interlopers in British public life and foreign affairs, which he suggested was properly the reserve of elected officials. Rather than defend


individual initiatives such as the Trident modernization or cruise missile deployment or civil defense reforms, Heseltine organized the government campaign around the defense of deterrence. Pushing the nuclear debate to focus on vague concepts rather than concrete developments also dovetailed with efforts to structure the broader defense debate around patriotic themes that capitalized on the public’s positive impression of Thatcher’s leadership during the Falklands affair.

To implement the new public diplomacy approach, the British cabinet focused on women. Greenham Common women threatened not just Thatcher’s policy of deterrence, but the “Victorian values” around which Thatcher organized the entire political philosophy of the British New Right. The pronuclear campaign invested heavily in reestablishing traditional gender roles in an effort to put antinuclear radicalism on trial. By January 1983 over half of British respondents to a MORI poll stated that GCW had made them think more seriously about nuclear disarmament, yet only 8 percent of CND supporters prioritized the radical NVDA tactics deployed in GCW protest. The GCW “Embrace the Base” demonstration had generated significant anxiety among Thatcher’s public relations staff on how to combat the effects of antinuclear women on broader public opinion, especially with other women. Based on polling data showing women and mothers to be more receptive to unilateral disarmament arguments, advisors

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511 Ingham to Coles, 17 December 1982, (TNA) PREM 19/1690.
recommended that Thatcher issue a call to support deterrence in either a popular
women’s magazine or an address to a major women’s conference.\footnote{Peter Craine to Coles, 16 December 1982, (TNA) PREM 19/1690.}

In a highly anticipated live broadcast interview on 16 January 1983 with the
prominent British journalist and former Labour MP, Brian Walden, Thatcher
incorporated pro-deterrence logic into a broader program for restoring Victorian values.
Her interview struck at the defining features of the Greenham Common peace camp. She
defined Victorian values as a respect for private property, which contrasted the
communal living of Greenham Common women on publicly owned land. She framed
protests as fundamentally selfish acts that placed undue burden on British ratepayers and
limited true equality of opportunity for those in the “silent majority,” another defining
feature of Thatcher’s Victorian values. In this vein, she spoke to the same public
dimension of deterrence that Michael Quinlan recognized as the source of arms control
asymmetries between East and West. She argued, “I do wish people who brought
pressure on Greenham Common and everywhere else would understand there’s no public
opinion in the Soviet Union…If they truly hated nuclear weapons as much as I do …
they’d want them down in the world as a whole…I am the true disarmer. I keep the peace
and freedom and justice with it.”\footnote{Interview of Margaret Thatcher by Brian Walden, “Victorian Values,” \textit{Weekend World}. 16 January 1983.}

Thatcher’s focus on Greenham Common as the most effective method for
branding antinuclear advocates as dangerous extremists pitted views of womanhood held
by Thatcher’s New Right against those promulgated by radicals expanding their influence
over the Labour Party. Thatcher made a habit of rejecting feminism, once stating “the
battle for women’s rights has been largely won. The days when they were demanded and discussed in strident tones should be gone forever…I hated those strident tones that you still hear from some Women’s Libbers.”514 Accusations of a hysteria leveled against the antinuclear feminists of Greenham Common replicated Victorian era logic that undermined the moral and intellectual authority of women in the public sphere. In contrast, Thatcher regularly identified herself first and foremost as a mother and housewife as a strategy to connect with the ordinary woman voter.515 Her appeals aimed at the forty percent of the British population who believed it impossible for women to maintain a career and a family.516

The Thatcher worldview implied that women did not in fact need more rights or to be politically engaged, but rather the opportunity to keep the home and family according to the idealized standard of the Victorian era. Maintaining this standard required discipline and resolve. The British New Right claimed these Victorian nuclear values represented the wants of a “silent majority,” who desired the revival of standards, discipline, and individual enterprise that could restore British prestige.517

British officials also began organizing their public diplomacy campaign to influence the Reagan administration’s revitalization of its public diplomacy efforts in Europe, and to support NATO allies confronting their own domestic opposition to nuclear weapons. On 14 January 1983, Reagan had signed NSDD 77 on the Management

of Public Diplomacy Relevant to National Security in anticipation of general elections throughout Europe and heightened antinuclear opposition in NATO basing countries to the first round of U.S. INF in 1983. The directive highlighted the importance of international opinion to the administration’s foreign policy aims. In advance of the directive, National Security Advisor William Clark stressed to Reagan the public’s role in augmenting deterrence, writing, “The Soviets make all their strategic decisions—whether to advance or retreat—on the basis of their assessment of... the adversary’s strength of moral-political conviction.”

Establishing a stronger moral case for deterrence became one of the critical tasks for Anglo-American pronuclear advocates in 1983 given the Church of England General Synod debate in February and the expected release of the final draft of the American bishops pastoral in the spring or summer. Britain’s Catholic bishops also grappled internally over whether to issue a pastoral letter on nuclear weapons similar to the one being drafted by their American counterparts. In meetings with FCO civil servants and cabinet officers in January 1983, British Catholic bishops shared their concerns regarding the outcomes of the Church of England’s General Synod debate on the Salisbury report. David Goodall, deputy secretary of the cabinet, stressed to colleagues making the public case for deterrence, “the arguments to concentrate on in dealing with the Roman Catholic Bishops are the ones repeatedly emphasized by Michael Quinlan.”

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520 Ibid.
The Pembroke Group, an association of British Christian strategic experts founded by the chaplain of the *HMS Pembroke* earlier in the decade, provided a proving ground for Quinlan’s moral arguments for deterrence.\(^{521}\) Goodall, Quinlan, and other Pembroke thinkers who formulated the moral arguments for Whitehall’s campaign for deterrence such as retired Army general and defense advisor Hugh Beach, did so in private conversation with peers across the Atlantic.\(^{522}\) Quinlan’s correspondence with influential American nuclear strategist Albert Wohlstetter and prominent Jesuit theologian Francis Winters at Georgetown University in particular anchored the moral thinking of the Pembroke Group. Through his exchanges with Winters, a key figure shaping the American Catholic Church’s teachings on nuclear war, Quinlan hoped to influence the U.S. peace bishops thinking on deterrence and contain their effect on the debate among British Catholics and in the Church of England.\(^{523}\)

Quinlan’s anxiety over the transatlantic moral dimension of the debate peaked when he learned from Winters of his recommendations to categorically condemn nuclear weapons and deterrence to the Bernardin committee drafting the pastoral on war and peace. Winters made his recommendations with the hope that it would shape concurrent debates in European church hierarchies.\(^{524}\) Quinlan and Wohlstetter co-crafted arguments in response to Winters recommendations and the drafts coming out of the Bernardin committee. Their defense of deterrence ultimately provided the Thatcher government


\(^{522}\) Ibid., 147-166.

\(^{523}\) Ibid., 140-150.

\(^{524}\) Ibid., 142-43; Francis X. Winters, S.J., “Nuclear Deterrence Morality: Atlantic Community Bishops in Tension,” *Theological Studies* (September 1982).
with a persuasive case to feed allies in the Catholic Church and the Church of England ahead of the General Synod debate in February 1983.\textsuperscript{525}

What arguments did Quinlan and his Pembroke Group associates share with Whitehall and religious leaders to defend Britain’s deterrence stance? In a 1984 essay sent to Thatcher, Quinlan summarized the moral arguments that had guided the British pronuclear campaign in the earlier years of the decade. He framed the stability of deterrence as a matter of practical ethics and criticized the U.S. peace bishops’ arguments about proportionality, their flawed acceptance of “no first use,” and the logic of pacifism. Quinlan dismissed accusations that Whitehall accepted the possibility of 100 million fatalities or “megadeath” as an outcome of a retaliatory strike, arguing instead that totalitarian adversaries who embraced countervalue strategy read their own assumptions onto those of the U.K. defense establishment due to its ambiguous targeting doctrine, thereby providing a deterrent bonus not actually reflected in British nuclear war plans. In other words, Quinlan claimed that Britain’s nuclear ambiguity lured Soviet strategic planners into the trap of mirror-imaging. Most importantly he insinuated that the peace bishops themselves acted immorally by undermining the stability of deterrence. In condemning deterrence, the bishops recognized that their “views on these matters inevitably have an importance reaching out beyond their country.” He argued that this created further asymmetries in the deterrence relationship between the West and the Soviet Union, for “in democracies where security policies, to be dependably effective, must command a certain level of general public assent.” Whereas the Soviet Union need only contemplate deterrence in technological terms, the functionality of the weapons

\textsuperscript{525} Ogilvie-White, \textit{On Nuclear Deterrence: The Correspondence of Michael Quinlan}, 149-164.
themselves, and in psychological terms, the mental capacity of leaders to manage a nuclear conflict. The West, Quinlan argued, grappled with a third dimension, civil society’s will to accept the premise of deterrence. Opposition from religious leaders thus undermined the Western will.\textsuperscript{526}

In combination with the moral case for deterrence, British officials promoted an adjustment to the zero-option as a position around which the United States could organize its public diplomacy campaign in Europe. The proposed adjustment to the zero-option helped the Thatcher government on the domestic front and in its task to reinforce allied resolve in Europe to see through the dual-track decision. In 1983, Thatcher’s Conservatives contended with more than just the radical unilateral disarmament advocated by the Labour Party. Mass defections from the right-wing of the Labour Party and a few stray moderate Conservatives formed the Liberal-SDP alliance, which advocated neither unilateral disarmament nor the inevitability of INF deployments portended by the zero-option. The Liberal-SDP alliance touted serious defense credentials as well. Former Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins and former Foreign Secretary David Owen crafted a detailed plan for multilateral disarmament for the alliance’s policy platform.\textsuperscript{527} Pressed on realistic paths for arms control by Jenkins in parliamentary session on 18 January 1983, Thatcher responded “in the absence of the zero-option, we must have balanced numbers. The place to get balanced numbers is at the negotiating table at Geneva.”\textsuperscript{528}

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\item\textsuperscript{527} CRD Briefing for Margaret Thatcher, “Alliance Manifesto 1983,” 16 May 1983, (CAC) THCR 2/7/3/16 f20.
\item\textsuperscript{528} Margaret Thatcher, House of Commons PQs, 18 January 1983, vol. 35, cc. 166-170.
\end{enumerate}
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Running parallel to the Thatcher’s government revitalization of the domestic campaign in favor of deterrence, British diplomats lobbied their U.S. counterparts to take a new public diplomacy track mindful of European opinion.\textsuperscript{529} The prime minister’s emphasis on “balanced numbers” reflected ongoing coordination with West German officials to advocate an “interim solution” for INF with officials in Washington.\textsuperscript{530} New Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov’s December 1982 proposals to reduce numbers of Soviet missiles in Europe down to the combined numbers of British and French ground launched nuclear forces registered positive approval among Britons and Europeans not quite in favor of unilateral disarmament, but nevertheless committed to reduced nuclear arsenals. For Thatcher and newly minted West-German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the interim solution represented a middle ground that could appease public opinion prior to both countries coming elections but leave open the goal of a zero-option.\textsuperscript{531}

In February 1983, Anglo-American pronuclear public diplomacy at last appeared to arrest the momentum of the antinuclear movement in the United Kingdom. Vice President George H.W. Bush visits to prospective INF basing countries in late January and early February 1983 was the first major joint initiative on nuclear issues between the Reagan administration and Thatcher government following their decisions to revitalize government directed public diplomacy. Crucially, the visit preceded the highly anticipated debate on the Bishop of Salisbury’s report in the General Synod of the Church.

\textsuperscript{529} U.S. Embassy in London to State Department, “Public Affairs Handling of Security and Arms Control Issues, 10 February 1983, (RRPL) NSC Executive Secretariat, United Kingdom Country Files, Box 46.  
\textsuperscript{531} The value of the interim solution meant more politically to Kohl’s coalition partner Hans-Dietrich Genscher, see U.K. Embassy in Bonn to FCO, “Visit of Chancellor Kohl,” 2 February 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1037 f211.
of England later in the month. In their post-visit debrief, British diplomats assessed Bush’s visit to be the deciding factor in Reagan’s management of the dual-track strategy in the critical months ahead of winter deployments. U.S. officials resolved to demonstrate a greater degree of flexibility on INF specifically to give Thatcher and European allies more room for maneuver in their pronuclear campaigns.

Bush opened his trip 30 January 1983 with a dinner reading in West Berlin of Reagan’s open letter to Europe which included an invitation to Andropov to engage in a bilateral summit. Whitehall considered Reagan’s offer a cunning political move to swing public opinion back in favor of the dual-track decision. Bush pleased Thatcher and Kohl throughout his trip with frequent indications of the Washington’s willingness to consider interim restraints and alternative INF negotiating positions. British officials also took note of the weight Bush placed on moral arguments for deployments and deterrence, which appeared to reflect the thinking of Quinan’s transatlantic network.

Following Bush’s visit, close consultations continued between Whitehall and Washington on the nature and timing of a new announcement on a U.S. INF proposal. Shultz’s State Department in particular pressed the British line on balanced numbers and an interim solution. Reagan wanted his speech to the American Legion on 22 February

to reflect and support British and West German thinking on an interim INF solution. He spoke warmly of a deep sense of values and political community shared by the NATO alliance, and of the importance of Bush’s recent tour in reaffirming these bonds. On substance, Reagan rejected Andropov’s proposal to include British and French forces in negotiations and insisted on a global deal. He also noted his directive to Nitze to explore all possibilities consistent with NATO’s principles to indicate a new degree of flexibility in the U.S. position.

In contrast to the Reagan administration’s new flexibility on INF, which appeared to validate Thatcher’s arms control program, Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine found opportunities to play up a frighteningly radical image of the antinuclear movement. During Heseltine’s February 1983 visit to Greenham Common, women activists cut down large portions of the fence to clear the way for woven snakes and serpents to wind their way through the base while gate blockades stalled Heseltine’s entrance. The press overlooked these actions to instead focus on the humiliation of Heseltine’s masculinity. Peace activists and government officials disagree on the events that transpired on the morning of February 7, but press coverage depicted a mob of angry women dragging Heseltine into the mud. The press picked up on Heseltine’s nickname “Tarzan,” earned from his mace wielding antics in parliament, to frame the visit as a show of masculinity under assault from the aggressive feminism of GCW. The following morning the *Daily Mirror* labeled the confrontation, “Tarzan’s War.”

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in *The Sun* two days later captured much of the angst in the peace movement: Heseltine and the police depicted as victims of burly women attacking under the banner of CND. An allusion to Prince William’s bunker spoke to the inherent inequalities of civil defense recommendations which required significant personal resources. Characteristic of broader media coverage, *The Sun’s* mashup of the antinuclear projects of GCW, CND, NWFZ movement, and SANA depicted in mob like behavior sought to undermine the peace credentials of GCW and the antinuclear movement more generally.

![Cartoon of Prince William's anti-terrorist bunker with people attacking it](image)

*Figure 4: Stanley Franklin, “For God’s Sake Let Me in Willie,” The Sun, 9 February 1983.*

The sensational and derogatory nature of GCW press coverage complicated the relationship between the women’s camp and the broader peace movement. The difficulty for the press in covering GCW was that their structure and tactics did not conform to standard media narratives.\(^{541}\) Reporters could not interview leaders and spokeswomen due to a non-existent camp hierarchy. Various sub-cultures across gates and the transient nature of the activists themselves complicated narrative construction and the women

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themselves often failed to cooperate with the press, who they viewed as a tool of the nuclear patriarchy. The press regularly mocked the theatrical tactics of GCW and paid attention to their deviation from social norms rather than the social alternatives they proposed.

The Heseltine incident incited many within the peace movement to question whether GCW’s polarizing image helped or hurt the antinuclear cause. They debated if GCW was a distraction that diverted attention from the nuclear dilemma onto feminists who were seeking to radically restructure British family life and sexuality politics; or, were they successful in bringing more citizens to think deeply about the moral legitimacy of the state’s monopoly on violence as a step that led people to identify nuclear weapons as an issue of social, political, and moral consequence for all of the United Kingdom.

When the Church of England came together to debate the conclusions of the Bishop of Salisbury’s working group in late February 1983, public perception of deterrence had dramatically shifted since the initial release of *The Church and the Bomb* due to the effectiveness of Heseltine’s pronuclear campaign. Much to the chagrin of Quinlan’s opponents such as Winters and the British moral philosopher Walter Stein who helped him refine his arguments in private exchanges, Quinlan’s arguments proved decisive in the Church of England’s General Synod debate in February 1983.\(^\text{542}\)

Anxious about potential backlash over openly participating in the church debate, the Thatcher government prized Quinlan’s network as a source of influence over important religious leaders to successfully outmaneuver the Salisbury group in the

Relaying Quinlan’s arguments, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Birmingham in particular carried the motion to defeat the unilateralism proposed by the Salisbury report. Other religious leaders who played a significant role in fashioning the moral justification for deterrence in the General Synod debate underscored the importance of the practical ethics that Quinlan insisted upon. The Archbishop of London and Thatcher ally, Graham Leonard, bridged the practical ethics of deterrence with the Christian realist logic that pervaded the pronuclear moral rhetoric coming out of the United States. Leonard spearheaded the argument against the Salisbury group’s unilateralist recommendations. In rejecting the pacifism of the Salisbury report, Leonard’s position echoed Quinlan’s arguments. Leonard anchored his pronuclear advocacy in the view that nuclear weapons could not be dis-invented thus leading to deterrence as the only morally logical position in a fallen world of immoral actors. He argued that while pacifism called for a rejection of force as a moral good, it could not be applied to a government body with the responsibility for collective defense. Neither could deterrence and pacifism be considered moral opposites; rather than being the use of force, Leonard argued that deterrence represented the “control of force.” While the rejection of force could be considered a moral right, and the use of force a moral wrong, the control of force could be interpreted as morally permissive.

A compromise put forward by the Bishop of Birmingham and agreed to by the Synod disappointed antinuclear activists for it accepted the general principle of the

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government’s responsibility for deterrence. The first motion declared, “it is not the task of the Church to determine defense strategy but rather to give a moral lead to the nation,” and sanctioned deterrence and NATO’s defensive posture but simultaneously rejected the first use of nuclear weapons that underpinned the strategic doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance. An expressed urgency to negotiate the reduction of nuclear arsenals throughout the world rang hollow considering all sides claimed that their positions advanced the possibility of genuine negotiations. Motion two instructed Church of England dioceses to further study the nuclear dilemma in order to offer informed moral and theological contributions to the debate.\textsuperscript{546} Judging from the televised portions of the debate, CND activists judged Runcie—who they hoped would prosecute the moral case against deterrence—to be most concerned with “mending broken fences to Downing Street.”\textsuperscript{547}

Thatcher’s government believed that the General Synod debate and resolution played an essential role in enhancing the public’s acceptance of deterrence.\textsuperscript{548} The Catholic hierarchy in England and Wales, unlike those in the United States and Europe, ultimately backed away from issuing a unified statement on deterrence based on the persuasiveness of Quinlan’s ethical interpretations of deterrence.\textsuperscript{549} Later in 1983, Cardinal Basil Hume, the archbishop of Westminster, went so far as to reproduce Quinlan’s arguments in his op-ed “Towards a Nuclear Morality” for \textit{The Times}. Hume’s

\textsuperscript{547} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{548} Francis Pym to the General Synod of the Church of England, 24 February 1983, (TNA), PREM 19/1690 f116.
editorial accepted possession of nuclear weapons as the lesser of two evils and opposed the activities of his ecclesiastical subordinate, CND leader Bruce Kent.\textsuperscript{550}

With the moral sanctioning of deterrence by the Church of England set against increasing public unease over GCW radicalism, the Thatcher government took an increasingly aggressive approach to ostracizing disarmament ideas in public discourse. In March, Heseltine established DS-19 to centralize the management of the government’s public nuclear diplomacy. The secrecy of Heseltine’s public diplomacy unit engendered controversy of its own when a former British intelligence agent went public to accuse the seven-man unit of illegally monitoring CND activists.\textsuperscript{551} Heseltine’s group and the network of Conservative Party organs and pro-deterrence groups determined that the alliance between the Labour Party and CND appeared at best tenuous heading into the general elections.

Their suspicions were confirmed by the leak of Labour Party draft manifesto to the press in March 1983, which contained no specifics on unilateral disarmament. CND belatedly recognized that the obstinacy of MPs in favor of multilateralism rather than unilateralism prevented disarmament from becoming the focus of the campaign.\textsuperscript{552} By that time of the leak, CND’s work with trade unions, Labour leaders’ use of unilateralism as a tool to move the party further to the left, and Thatcher’s campaign to depict Labour as a group of antinuclear radicals had been sufficient to tie the fates of Labour and CND together.

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Disagreement over disarmament as a political priority prevented national CND, the Labour CND specialist section, and the Labour Party from building a coherent campaign that tied together the radical energy and social critiques found in the mass peace movement with Labour’s broader populist policies. Labour CND’s dysfunction represented the more general disunity between the party and the peace movement. Fundamentalists within CND quixotically believed unilateralism to be significant enough an issue to determine voter behavior on its own. A number of CND strategists even considered running independent candidates in parliamentary elections across the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{553} Those devoted to the single cause of disarmament feuded with Foot loyalists on the committee who circumvented local chapters and the national office in hosting CND events for Labour Party purposes rather than design Labour Party events to raise awareness of unilateralism.\textsuperscript{554} This discord led to CND’s greatest tactical failure, the decision not to endorse the Labour Party. CND national council members concluded against explicit endorsement of the Labour Party on the basis that it might be accompanied by a decline in membership, smaller demonstrations, and thus less political clout overall.\textsuperscript{555}

Disjointed CND and Labour Party efforts resulted in the squandering of opportunities that might have reestablished antinuclear momentum ahead of the general elections. In 1981, the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW) had requested that the prestigious and outwardly non-aligned British Medical Association

\textsuperscript{555} “Meeting Minutes of the CND Council,” 15/16 January 1983, (LSE) CND/ADD 1/1.
(BMA) conduct an inquiry into the effects of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{556} The press rallied around the rejection of Home Office assumptions by another group of experts. The BMA estimated up to 38.5 million dead compared to official estimates of 20.5 million expected fatalities. Nominally conducted by the BMA and endorsed by the British medical community, roughly half of the report—especially those sections dealing with the direct effects of nuclear explosions—had been authored in secret by SANA scientist Philip Steadman.\textsuperscript{557} Conservative officials found the BMA report, released in early spring 1983, damning enough to concede to rebellious local authorities and permanently put Hard Rock to rest for fear of political fallout hanging over the 1983 general elections in June.\textsuperscript{558} Yet CND and Labour failed to use the report to reestablish unity and respectability for the disarmament movement, allowing the radical image of antinuclear activism created by Heseltine’s campaign to persist in the public mind. CND also missed its opportunity to bring young voters into the Labour Party via the disarmament issue. Youth CND had successfully expanded its influence among young voters through music and youth festivals, the largest being a 70,000 strong demonstration in spring 1983.\textsuperscript{559}

With the Labour-CND alliance in disarray, Heseltine implemented a deterrence double-speak strategy to further confuse the case against nuclear weapons. He repeatedly claimed throughout the spring of 1983 that the antinuclear movement and Labour Party allies “hijacked” the term “peace movement.” He argued that since successive British

\textsuperscript{556} Patrick Mayhew to Downing Street Staff, “Report of the BMA Inquiry into the Medical Effects of Nuclear War,” 3 March 1983, (TNA) HO, 322/1027.
\textsuperscript{557} Philip Steadman, email message to author, 6 April 2018.
governments since Clement Atlee’s time in No. 10 endorsed deterrence, those in Whitehall represented the “peace movement, the real peacekeepers, the people upon peace depends.” ThATCHER also consistently referred to the British government as the “true peace movement,” and Whitehall assailed CND and the Greenham Common women as “peacemongers,” intent on using disarmament as a vehicle for other political ends. HESELTINE capitalized on the opportunity presented by the alleged February assault on him by the Greenham Common women, which THATCHER’s media allies aggressively sensationalized, to undermine the credentials of the peace movement and substantiate the logic of THATCHER’s criticisms of antinuclear feminism. The sensationalized Greenham Common assault also provided HESELTINE a pretense for dodging invitations from CND chairwoman Joan Ruddock to publicly debate Euromissile deployments.

HESELTINE’s view of the debate controversy exposed a deeper division in 1980s Britain over a citizen’s right to engage the government. Comments from THATCHER, HESELTINE, and the rest of the government confirmed their rejection of collective social action as a legitimate form of political power and insistence on maintaining the public consensus upon which deterrence stood. HESELTINE explained away his campaign against CND, END, and their supporters by arguing, “the task of the politician is merely to remind people of what people strongly believe.” On the thought of debate with Ruddock, HESELTINE recalled with disdain, “The idea was preposterous. The idea that the

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563 Ibid.
British secretary of state, a member of the British cabinet, a representative of the British government was going to be matched evenly with a group of people who represented nobody, a mob on the street, was unthinkable."\(^{564}\)

Easter season put into stark contrast how effectively coordinated transatlantic pronuclear public diplomacy had become and how much internal contentions had undercut the peace movement. Thatcher exercised her influence over Reagan particularly on the issue of the zero-zero precondition and on the timing of the new INF announcement.\(^{565}\) Taking into account Thatcher’s concern that the more flexible INF negotiating positions should be announced before Good Friday to allow for national European papers to publicize the news ahead of the traditional Easter antinuclear demonstrations. Quickly following his speech announcing SDI, Reagan moved up his press conference with NATO officials introducing the new U.S. arms control principles.\(^{566}\) Reflecting Whitehall’s preferences, the revised INF negotiating principles issued in NSDD 86 stated, zero-zero remained the most optimal outcome; without an acceptable agreement U.S. deployments would continue on schedule; an interim agreement could be reached based on equal levels; any agreement must be global in scope; a willingness to negotiate an interim agreement without the precondition of a final zero-zero outcome.\(^{567}\) Reagan administration officials acknowledged that Whitehall’s

\(^{564}\) Ibid.

\(^{565}\) Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, 21 March 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/979; Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher, 23 March 1983, PREM 19/979.


input on the latest INF position was a valued source of concrete ideas that assisted the political management of the nuclear debate in both the United States and Europe.\footnote{William Clark, “National Security Planning Group Meeting,” 18 March 1983, (RRPL) National Security Council Executive Secretariat, National Security Planning Group (NSPG), 1981-1987, Box 91306.}

Surviving Easter weekend in early April, prime time for antinuclear protests, proved to Conservative party strategists that they had persuaded the public to accept the government’s nuclear policies. Positive public reactions to Heseltine’s visit to the Berlin Wall on Easter weekend, where he reiterated peace through strength logic, and Thatcher’s subsequent statements on deterrence confirmed to Conservative leadership that it commanded the nuclear narrative.\footnote{War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, “Zero Hour,” Interview with Michael Heseltine, 04/11/1987, WGBH Media Library & Archives. Last accessed 10 November 2018.} To further distract women and mothers from the climactic Easter day demonstrations at Greenham Common the Thatcher government prioritized coverage of the infant Prince William’s world travels during the Lent season.\footnote{Bernard Ingham to P. Ledlie, “CND and Easter,” 17 March 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1846.} By April 1983, constituents’ antinuclear petitions sent to the government fell by half the number of January’s totals and continued to drop as the June election moved near.\footnote{R.B. Bone to A.J. Coles, “Letters from the Public on Nuclear Disarmament,” 31 March 1983, (TNA), PREM 19/1690 f100.} The preceding three years of refining the moral arguments for deterrence and constructing a New Right network of pronuclear organizations paved the way for a speedy escalation of efforts to overcome a troubled alliance between the Labour Party and the antinuclear movement.

Two demonstrations on Easter weekend, one near the home of Britain’s nuclear submarines in Scotland and the other close to the base hosting Britain’s initial
deployments of cruise missiles in Berkshire, earned substantial media coverage.\textsuperscript{572} A 14-mile long human chain connected the blockade around the Greenham Common Royal Air Force base in Newbury to demonstrations at the Aldermaston Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) and the nuclear ordnance factory in Burghfield. CND claimed 80,000 people participated, while police placed the number of demonstrators at 40,000.\textsuperscript{573}

The Easter demonstrations had been intended to inspire unity among the issues underlying the strength of second wave antinuclear activism. Christian themes of togetherness and the dignity of life central to the Easter holiday were joined with the anti-militarism of feminists who had established a peace camp at Greenham Common. The connection of demonstrations across the country spoke to the decentralized, grassroots public diplomacy campaign pursued by CND to foster opposition at the municipal level on up. As cooperation grew tighter between various elements of the peace constituency, however, it triggered internal strife over appropriate roles in the antinuclear movement. One activist from Greenham Common complained, “the worst day I ever had was the Easter hand-linking. I think that might have put off more women than any other day…. I arrived and see all these men…. Haven’t they heard that this is a women’s action?”\textsuperscript{574}

Organizing around a resolute commitment to peace through deterrence and family values served as a guiding principle for pronuclear groups that emerged in direct response to the Greenham Common women. These groups commonly depicted Greenham


Common women as lesbians who flouted their family responsibilities. Lady Olga Maitland’s Women for Defense,” later “Women and Families for Defense,” founded in opposition to 1983 springtime activities of the Greenham Common women quickly gained an international profile. In contrast to Greenham Common peace camp, which voted to exclude men from permanent residence, Women and Families for Defense (WFD) expanded its name to be reflect its decision to include men in the organization.575 WFD primarily organized counter-protests and counter-vigils in an attempt to demonstrate Britain’s silent majority’s passion for defense.576 WFD’s counter-demonstrations provided opportunities for local pronuclear activists to join the larger New Right political network of think tanks and pressure groups. The group Ratepayers Against the Greenham Encampments (RAGE) emerged out of counter-protests organized by WFD members. RAGE’s particular issue with the alleged sexual deviance of the Greenham Common women gained them support from both the pro-deterrence campaign and from a variety of pressure groups concerned with the restriction of homosexual influences in primary schools and other family settings, which emerged as another feature of Thatcher’s New Right social agenda. Chris Moores, who analyses the connection between RAGE and the national pro-deterrence organizations such as WFD, argues that they “sought to subvert the gender politics of the campers by emphasizing women’s enthusiasm for nuclear defense and security policy.”577

The rhetoric and tactics of the pro-deterrence lobby in Britain were similar to the methods employed by the moral crusaders enlisted in the U.S. pronuclear campaign, due in large part to the proliferation of contacts between the American and British New Right. Maitland fostered extensive contacts with the Reagan administration and the peace through strength lobby in the United States. Dinner and cocktail parties with Phyllis Schlafly, Republican chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, John Tower, and countless other members of the American New Right made her a darling of conservatives on both sides of the Atlantic. She considered her regular trips to the United States a necessity to ensure the support of the American peace through strength lobby for her cash-strapped organization.\textsuperscript{578} Thatcher’s government also worked with U.S. public relations firms on the messaging for its pronuclear campaigns.\textsuperscript{579} Reagan’s administration directed its public diplomacy staff and think tank allies such as the Heritage Foundation to focus specifically on creating transatlantic linkages with churches, scientists, women’s organizations, student movements, and other influential groups “to help activate the silent majority” in Britain.\textsuperscript{580} Funded by the U.S. Information Agency, Ernest Lefever, a leading conservative intellectual making the moral case for peace through strength, ran a series of seminars in the United Kingdom and Europe to build support among moral leaders and religious communities for U.S. nuclear policies.\textsuperscript{581}


\textsuperscript{579} “Unclassified Summary of Public Positions on INF, 31 January 1983, (RRPL) National Security Council Subject Files, Box 23.


\textsuperscript{581} Nuclear Times, January 1983.
Heseltine later recollected that it only took six weeks to turn the nuclear issue around in favor of deterrence.\textsuperscript{582} On 10 May 1983, only after Conservatives believed the turnaround complete, Thatcher issued a call for general elections to be in held June - eleven months before the end of her five-year term. Conservative Party officials believed the division within the Labour Party and SDP-Liberal alliance over the nuclear issue was directly responsible for the return of Conservative parliamentary majorities and Thatcher to No. 10.\textsuperscript{583} According to CRD, “The truth is that Labour’s so-called defense policy was not devised as a rational policy for the British people. It was devised as a cloak to cover the rampant and rancorous divisions in the Labour Party.”\textsuperscript{584}

CND leaders accused their Labour Party allies of “strategic misjudgment… compounded by fudging and betrayal.”\textsuperscript{585} Though nearly 30 percent of Foot’s speeches during the 1983 election season focused on disarmament, most Labour MP candidates remained poorly versed on unilateralism. The Labour Party failed to articulate a clear connection between the moral imperatives of disarmament and other issues like economic recovery, women’s equality, and municipal democracy that CND had championed alongside TGWU and major unions, Greenham Common Peace Camp, and diplomat scientists dedicated to the NWFZ cause. Labour MP candidates’ poor performance on disarmament reflected the continued disunity on the issue from party leaders.

For their part, CND undervalued its alliance with the Labour Party. CND leadership stubbornly held on to the idea that people might decide their votes solely on

the issue of disarmament. Only after unilateralism suffered its biggest setback with Labour’s defeat in June 1983 did CND’s General Election unit accept the argument from veteran organizer Meg Beresford’s that, “once an election has been called it becomes almost impossible to ask people to use their vote in support of our policies without becoming embroiled in party politics.”  

Labour’s precipitous collapse in the polls in the second half of the 1983 election campaign coincided with the frontbench fallout on the issue of disarmament. Political analyst W.L. Miller’s view rings true, the election did not so much show that unilateralism was unpopular but rather that Labour had no single unified defense policy that drove voters away. Foot’s own history as a divisive backbench critic made him ill-suited to unify the party. Leading MPs Robin Cook and Neil Kinnock joined Foot in continued support for unilateral disarmament. The right of the party remained committed to Callaghan and Deputy Leader Healey, while Foot’s own left-wing credentials took a beating thanks to his mismanaged position on the Falklands and handling of Tony Benn’s failed run for deputy leader. Callaghan continued to repudiate unilateralism.

Denis Healey, having failed in his quest for party leadership in part due to his defense of the independent deterrent, straddled the line between multilateral and unilateral disarmament. Thatcher’s government had deemed Healey, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer and Defense Secretary, as both its most politically competent opponent

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and the member of opposition leadership most at odds with his party and CND. Never truly a unilateral disarmer, Healey’s rigorous critique of cruise missile deployments on British soil and simultaneous wavering on the retention of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent capability fell perfectly into Heseltine’s public relations trap. So long as Heseltine could justify the principle of deterrence, distinctions between specific weapons could easily by blurred by sophisticated nuclear jargon. Healey’s own meetings with the Reagan administration shortly ahead of the elections impressed upon him the importance of hedging on Labour’s nuclear policies even while out of power.

Figure 5: To the Left: Stanley Franklin, “Labour’s All Behind You Michael,” The Sun, 27 May 1983; To the Right: Peter Brookes, "Labour Leaders and the Left," The Listener, 23 September 1982.

Exploiting divisions among its rivals on the question of unilateral versus multilateral disarmament enabled Thatcher’s government to check the power of the CND without provoking its grassroots network. The success of Heseltine’s anti-CND campaign rested on its persuasion of its political opponents to downplay the disarmament issue and cede the narrative to the peace through deterrence lobby. In addition to Labour’s ineptitude on the nuclear issue, the SDP-Liberal Alliance, which cut deeply into Labour’s vote margins, ultimately failed to present a unified stance on the issue of multilateral disarmament as well. Former Foreign Secretary and Deputy Leader of the SDP, David Owen, held fast to the Polaris nuclear submarine as a feasible deterrent into the 21st century. His statements contradicted Liberal Party Leader David Steel’s commitment to rid the country of Polaris in the first year of an alliance government. Only the Conservative Party presented voters with a unified position on deterrence and disarmament.592

Unilateralism left Labour candidates with no room for nuance which contributed to the adoption of contradictory positions. While not endorsing unilateralism, the Liberal-SDP alliance defense policy which called for the cancellation of Trident, the inclusion of existing British nuclear systems in arms control talks, and declaration of “no first use” of nuclear weapons policy, alongside a reaffirmation of NATO’s purpose provided just enough room for candidates to “fudge” on the defense issue.593 Labour’s poorly articulated position on unilateralism thus made them too radical for moderates and conservatives, but not radical enough to inspire the far left elements of its constituency

592 Conservative Research Department, “People in Glass Houses” 28 May 1983, (CAC) THCR 2/7/3/22 f64.
593 Liberal-SDP Alliance 1983 Manifesto: “Working Together for Britain.”
and the peace movement. With only 27.6 percent of the vote share in 1983, Michael Foot oversaw Labour’s worst defeat in the postwar period. The party barely beat out the Liberal-SDP alliance, which secured 25.4 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{594} Polling evidence initially suggested that Labour’s nuclear policies were broadly responsible for the desertion of its voters.\textsuperscript{595} Given, however, that the alliance advocated for Nuclear Weapons Free Zones and for the cancellation of Trident, at least 53 percent of voters accepted some form of a disarmament as the policy of the next government.

The desertion of disarmament in the 1983 election exposed the Labour leadership’s fear of the antinuclear movement’s radical transformation of political progressives. Relinquishing the defense narrative to Thatcher’s government allowed Conservatives to win a higher approval on the issue than any other top issue, a clear political miscalculation considering that exit polls showed defense to be the second most important matter facing the British electorate with 38 percent of voters ranking it a top two issue.\textsuperscript{596} Moreover, the election totals reflected disillusionment with disunified leadership rather than general principles and values. A BBC/Gallup survey taken shortly after the election showed that 38 percent of the electorate generally identified as Labour supporters, compared to 16 percent for the alliance that chipped away at Labour’s vote totals.\textsuperscript{597} While Labour produced several contradictory defense policies, Thatcher successfully integrated her pronuclear position into the broader set of policies underpinning the New Right morality project. The press had a field day with the ironic

\textsuperscript{594} Labour, however, won far more seats than the Liberal-SDP alliance and did not fear for its status as the “official opposition.
\textsuperscript{596} 72 percent of poll respondents named unemployment the most important issue. See W.L. Miller, “There was No Alternative: The British General Election of 1983,” \textit{Parliamentary Affairs} 37 (January 1984): 378.
\textsuperscript{597} Ibid., 365.
twist that Labour’s leader, who had been perhaps the most internally disruptive MP in the preceding two decades, now fell victim to the same party dissension he once sought to foment.

Thatcher’s electoral victory did not equate to a popular mandate for her nuclear policy. Even her Conservative Party earned a smaller share of the vote total than it had won in 1979 with 42.4 percent in 1983, which marked a decrease by 1.5 percent.

Considering all the handwringing from Labour’s leadership over the potential negative impact of peace movement radicalism on the party’s electability, it is worth noting that Conservative’s traditional advantage with women voters shrunk in 1983. This happened despite Labour losing a tremendous share of its vote and with women voters being the primary audience of the most radical element of the peace movement, the Greenham Common Women. By the next general election, the gender gap disappeared entirely. 598

Labour and CND went into a period of soul searching immediately following the general election. Michael Foot quickly resigned as Labour leader, only to be replaced by the avowed unilateralist Neil Kinnock. Under Kinnock, Labour united behind unilateralism and pursued the development of a credible non-nuclear defense policy. With Healey remaining as deputy leader, Labour reached a compromise of sorts to give unilateral disarmament its full commitment one last time to see if it could in fact be a successful electoral strategy. Political observers and many historians have suggested that the 1983 election ended the peak of CND appeal in the United Kingdom. It did not. Instead, the election results persuaded CND to develop a more pragmatic unilateralism.

that agreed with a shift toward an international perspective and cultural focus. One CND national council member despaired, “the 1983 election was disastrous for CND…. it also damaged the credibility of nuclear disarmament by Britain as a rational option and as a vote winner.”\(^{599}\) CND voluntarily distanced itself from the Labour Party and pursued a new strategy focused more on creating a British cultural affinity for disarmament linked to the broader international peace movement.

Despite Thatcher’s confidence, the 1983 general election still had not produced a popular mandate Conservatives’ policy of nuclear rearmament. Conservative’s won a smaller percentage of the vote in 1983 than they had in 1979, with only 42.4 percent, though they increased their number of seats in Parliament by 58 to a majority total of 397 due to the impact of a strong third party showing from the Liberal-SDP alliance. The combined vote totals of the Labour Party and the Liberal-SDP alliance reveal that 53 percent of Britons accepted some form of disarmament. Two days before the election, only 36 percent of voters approved of cruise missiles while 50 percent remained opposed; public opinion on Trident was evenly divided. Distinguished Oxford University professor of international relations, Adam Roberts, later observed, “Beneath the superficial appearance of a landslide result for Mrs. Thatcher, evidence of public unease about nuclear weapons remains. It deserves a better articulation from our political leaders.”\(^{600}\) Unilateral nuclear disarmament may have failed to match the popularity of deterrence at the polls, but some version of British nuclear disarmament remained politically viable given that Conservatives and their pronuclear agenda earned less than majority approval.


Moral Combat and U.S. Nuclear Politics

Fresh from success in the mid-term elections in 1982, freeze coordinator Mark Niedergang mused, “the freeze provides progressives with an opportunity to criticize political and economic relations from within the mainstream.”601 With a pro-freeze House of Representatives and less hostile Senate, many antinuclear leaders felt confident pursuing a disarmament agenda in Congress. Buttressing the congressional strategy, the antinuclear movement expanded its political operations in an attempt to use disarmament ideas to organize a broader progressive coalition for the 1984 election. Electoral fortunes clearly favored the freeze, but two questions persisted: were they a result of pervasive antinuclear sentiment or its alignment with a broader range of anti-Reagan issues, and would a more freeze friendly Congress yield legislative victories?602

Immediately following the mid-term elections, the freeze movement appeared poised for a significant victory in Congress. Reagan had sold deployment of MX missiles as critical to restoring a “margin of safety” for the United States, but by the end of 1982 the missile had become an albatross hanging around the neck of the administration’s nuclear policy. Reagan had dropped the racetrack basing scheme in late 1981 out of the need to differentiate his strategic vision from that of his predecessor. His proposed interim solution of hardening existing minuteman and Titan missile silos to house 100 MX missiles proved a non-starter, when Congress demanded the president propose a

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more viable permanent basing mode by December 1982. Weinberger likened the task to “asking NIH to come up with a cancer cure by December 1.”

In mid-December 1982, the administration endorsed “dense-pack” or closely-spaced basing. Dense-pack, ridiculed as “dunce-pack,” relied on the concept of nuclear fratricide. Theoretically, spacing MX missiles in super-hardened silos 1,800 feet apart created a problem for Soviet planners. The blasts created by the first round of warheads would destroy late arriving missiles. Dense-pack proponents also argued that a small target area channeled Soviet missile trajectories into a narrow corridor susceptible to improved missile defense systems, foreshadowing the desirability of a future deployment of area missile defense systems to increase survivability. Additional diversion silos added at a later date provided an even greater degree of survivability.

Criticisms against dense-pack had circulated in the expert community for several years and had been disseminated amongst the antinuclear movement and its congressional allies. Several defense scientists, most notably Richard Garwin, had already laid out easily achievable means—primarily simultaneous detonation and time-spaced attacks—by which the Soviet Union could overcome densely packed hardened silos. Critics suggested the strategic implications were destabilizing. They cited launch under attack as the only option for MX survivability, which they argued incentivized the Soviets to launch a preemptive strike of their own. On this basis congressional

603 Wren, Congress Rejects MX Dense Pack.
606 Ibid.
opponents swiftly rejected the December dense-pack proposal as folly, marking a second victory for the freeze on the heels of positive gains in the mid-term elections.609

Freeze victories in the mid-terms and in Congress validated the antinuclear movement’s organizing abilities and legislative clout, making it a sought after partner in other efforts to draw attention to progressive issues. Having also observed the freeze movement’s voter drives and the launch of its “Black Participation Project,” civil rights leaders in late 1982 and early 1983 invited peace movement partners to help organize the 20th anniversary events commemorating the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom to be held the following summer. Writing on behalf of Coretta Scott King, Jesse Jackson, Joseph Lowery, Benjamin Hooks, John Jacobs, and Stevie Wonder, Washington D.C. Congressmen Walter Fauntroy appealed to antinuclear leaders with a new “Call to the Nation” that emphasized jobs, peace, and freedom. In their view, there were “three critical conditions in our society—insufferable unemployment, an escalating arms race, and the denial of basic rights and programs which ensure freedom.”610

Civil rights leaders organizing for the march suggested a reimagining of the public sphere around a “New Coalition of Conscience” built from the five core non-violent movements of social change: civil rights, peace, women, labor, and religion.611 The purpose of the New Coalition was to resurrect Martin Luther King Jr.’s call that “all humans are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality…whatever affects one indirectly affects us all” in preparation for the 20th anniversary events.612 With antinuclear

611 “Minutes of the National Planning Council: Martin Luther King Center for Non-Violent Social Change,” 13 January 1983, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 4.
leaders including Randy Kehler, Leslie Cagan of Mobilization for Survival, and William Sloane Coffin of Riverside Church serving on the National Planning Council for the anniversary march, preparations for the event served as an overarching public diplomacy tactic to convince the black community to accept nuclear issues as core political concerns by attaching disarmament concerns to the symbolic power of Martin Luther King Jr.’s legacy and struggle for civil rights.\textsuperscript{613}

In January 1983, the freeze movement set out to define the political debate for the coming two years. The freeze movement expanded its fundraising and field organizing operations to leverage a Democratic Party desperately short on manpower and money to embrace the freeze as one of its primary issues.\textsuperscript{614} The freeze strategy task force began work on project ’84, which evolved into Freeze Voter ’84 (FV 84) and became the political arm of the freeze campaign. FV 84 outlined an ambitious set of initial goals. They included leading voter registration drives, especially in concert with minority, women, and labor focused efforts; integrating freeze activities into the MLK Twentieth Anniversary March; establishing a powerful fundraising operation by raising ten million dollars from small local donations channeled into a national apparatus; influencing delegate selection for the national political conventions and recruiting candidates with a consistent progressive moral compass on issues of race, gender, and economic equality; creating a system for directly pressuring and monitoring candidates; and spreading the freeze across the country by partnering chapters from high-activity congressional districts with those from low-activity districts, allowing for a smooth transfer of volunteers and

\textsuperscript{614} Ibid.
resources. In considering the rapid expansion of the freeze movement’s operations, Democratic leaders adopted the view of Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd who regarded the antinuclear movement as the most substantial stock of “political muscle” available to the party.

Responding to mid-term defeats, the growing political operations of the antinuclear movement, and a potentially more hostile legislative environment, pronuclear advocates structured their public diplomacy around new techno-political solutions and comprehensive development of the moral case for deterrence. Rejection of dense-pack had placed the administration’s strategic modernization plan on life support. Weinberger spent the remainder of his credibility on Capitol Hill on the failed dense-pack proposal. Congressional Democrats grew emboldened in their demands for a new approach to arms control strategy when news broke of Rowny’s correspondence with ACDA Director nominee Kenneth Adelman over their disapproval of negotiators genuinely pursuing common ground on START. With both the Defense Department and ACDA unable to marshal the political capital to continue the MX funding fight, Deputy National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane took charge of forming a commission of defense luminaries from previous administrations to broker a solution that appeared technologically robust and politically feasible.

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617 Talbott, Deadly Gambits, 300-314.
618 Fitzgerald, Way out in the Blue, 192-197.
On 3 January 1983, the first day in session for the supposedly freeze friendly 98th Congress, Reagan established The President’s Commission on Strategic Forces under the direction of former National Security Advisor General Brent Scowcroft. Reflecting its goal of a techno-political solution, the commission’s bipartisan composition included previous Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig and former Secretaries of Defense Melvin Laird, James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, and Harold Brown. Former CIA directors and high-ranking officials rounded out the group.

At the same time, McFarlane also began work on the public presentation of a program for strategic defense. After the MX controversy made for an especially tough series of public events, McFarlane informed Reagan that he had been working on the strategic defense concepts sold by Teller and the Heritage group for the president to use to outflank the peace movement. In January 1983, following Reagan’s direction to speed up work on the issue, McFarlane assigned NSC aides Admiral John Poindexter, Major General Richard Boverie, Colonel Bob Linhard, and Al Keel to dedicate themselves to work on strategic defense. Keel and other aides assigned to the issue maintained their technological skepticism, but McFarlane carried the issue forward with allies on the JCS.

From January to March, those in the Reagan administration who worked on SDI focused on its potential to disrupt the moral arguments against the administration’s quest for nuclear superiority. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral James D. Watkins, proved instrumental on this front. White House Science Advisor George Keyworth later stated

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619 Baucom, Origins 358.
620 Ibid.
621 Ibid., 358-360.
that Watkins possessed no clear understanding of the technical concepts, but that the admiral liked “the ethical and moral implications of SDI.”622 Speaking to the issue of morality within the context of SDI, Watkins later professed, “you have to think in terms of what American people think, and basically we are founded on a Judeo-Christian ethic in this country…it’s very important that you think in those terms, too, about your decisions, because that is the political reality…And we had to find an alternative rather than going down the tubes on unilateral disarmament.”623 He also linked his views on morality to the asymmetry of the social component of deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, “That [public opinion] doesn’t exist in the Soviet Union. They just turn the button and squash that whenever they want to. So, they don’t have those kinds of obstacles.”624 Watkins in fact agreed with McFarlane that the nation’s moral values undermined mutually assured destruction and necessitated a shift to assured survival. McFarlane explained, “for our president to have no other option than to destroy society and to expect our own would also be destroyed is not credible for a Western Judeo-Christian leader.”625

Watkins emerged as the key advocate for strategic defense among the Joint Chiefs, who were split on the issue. Shortly before the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) met with Reagan to review strategic modernization in February 1983, Teller met with Watkins to discuss how the admiral could raise the issue of strategic defense with the

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624 Ibid.
Watkins’ pairing of his own moral advocacy for strategic defense with Teller’s technical arguments in the JCS February meeting with the president helped persuade Reagan to move forward with strategic defense. The chairman of the JCS, General John Vessey Jr., joined Watkins in recommending a new strategic vision. Sources disagree, but either Vessey or Watkins posed the question: “wouldn’t it be better to protect the American people rather than avenge them?” The phrase triggered Reagan’s rhetorical instincts, he replied “don’t lose those words.” Immediately after the meeting, Reagan directed McFarlane to speed up his work on strategic defense and incorporate the rhetorical question that had so effectively captured his attention into plans for the public presentation of the new initiative.

The Reagan administration’s internal moral and technological adjustments to its nuclear modernization project built on developments in the reinvigorated pronuclear public diplomacy campaign. Conservative activists had interpreted defeat on the freeze issue in the mid-term elections and the obstacles to MX deployment as a sign that the president’s public nuclear diplomacy had to be better coordinated with perspectives from the religious right in order to mount an effective defense of peace through strength. The Heritage Foundation collated past proclamations from religious leaders to advocate for deterrence and suggested that the peace bishops’ understanding of mutual assured destruction as U.S. policy invalidated their teachings. Reagan’s modernization programs, Heritage claimed, promoted counterforce strategy, which prioritized military targets and

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627 Baucom, Origins, 375-380.
628 Ibid., Origins, 375-380.
thus kept civilian populations safe from nuclear annihilation. Phyllis Schlafly, a Roman Catholic, also expressed her concerns to the White House over the moral consequences of the peace bishops’ activities. She underscored that the lack of coordination among religious communities benefited the peace movement in the midterm elections.

Michael Novak responded to mid-term defeats by issuing his sharpest attack on Catholic arguments against deterrence in early March 1983, expanding upon his earlier theological and secular arguments against the peace bishops in the magazine *Crisis*. Novak and Ralph McInerny had founded *Crisis* to respond to what they considered to be a civil war in the Catholic Church. *The National Review* found Novak’s two-part article “Moral Clarity in a Nuclear Age,” so compelling that it issued a reprint in a dedicated issue in April. Novak sought to rebuild the wall of expertise insulating strategic policymaking from public debate, going to great lengths to detail the complexities of deterrence to argue against the growing pacifist leanings of the U.S. Catholic hierarchy. Despite inconsistencies in logic, and its bland restatement of deterrence rationales and claims of force imbalances, Novak’s article became the preeminent argument for framing deterrence as the will of God on earth on the basis that it had upheld the United States’ moral leadership of the world. Apocalyptic scenarios, argued Novak, featured regularly in the biblical tradition upholding Just War theory. Stressing these apocalyptic continuities,

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630 Dee Jepsen to Red Cavaney, “Nuclear Freeze,” 16 November 1982, (RRPL) Elizabeth Dole Files, Box 40, Folder “Nuclear Freeze.”
Novak suggested that nuclear war did not alter the Christian obligation to defense at all and in fact only strengthened it.631

Best known for the phrase “evil empire,” Reagan’s speech before the National Evangelical Association on 8 March 1983 integrated peace through strength rhetoric into the broader vision of the United States as a Christian nation compelled to act in a fallen world. The administration approached the president’s speech as a public diplomacy operation in support of arms control negotiators abroad. Only a day before Reagan’s remarks to the National Association of Evangelicals, chief START negotiator General Edward Rowny cabled Washington from Geneva, “negotiations on reducing strategic arms will be made immensely more difficult, if not impossible, by passage of a freeze resolution.”632

Through historical references to the founding fathers and early observers of U.S. democracy the president linked faith in God to American exceptionalism. Reagan praised the expression of faith in the form of school prayer and restriction on abortions to demonstrate U.S. moral superiority over the forces of “modern-day secularism” extending across the globe. Reaffirming statements from his first days in office, Reagan argued that the subordination of faith to class warfare made the Soviet Union fundamentally immoral. The issue of faith thus demarcated the line between good and evil. He cast the freeze concept as a “dangerous fraud” and the movement as an ally of the Soviet cause because it dared to suggest a moral equivalency of the two superpowers.

632 Rowny from the U.S. Mission in Geneva to Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, “START: Congressional Freeze Resolution,” 7 March 1983, (RRPL) Sven Kraemer Files, Box 16, Folder “Nuclear Freeze Resolution.”
Reagan argued instead “that we must find peace through strength.” He drew upon references to the works of C.S. Lewis—whose fiction popularized modern day faith in the white Christian Anglophone moral ordering of the world—to convey the need to join the heroic struggle between good and evil. He urged Americans to “speak out against those who would place the United States in a position of military and moral inferiority,” and concluded with the claim that “the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs, rockets, and armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one; at root, it is a test of moral will and faith.”

Reagan’s speech provoked criticism from the antinuclear left, further dividing the American moral climate that he had at one time hoped to unite behind peace through strength. On the same day back in Washington D.C., eighteen prominent religious leaders condemned Reagan’s budget for denying spending on social programs in favor of military overkill. The juxtaposition of the two events perfectly illustrated the moral discord in American society.

Antinuclear advocates—especially those involved in minority outreach—observed that Reagan preached an exclusively white Judeo-Christian morality to defend his administration’s costly nuclear programs. In contrast, freeze minority outreach coordinator Patricia Williams observed, “No other peace group in history has had the advantage of working for an issue that can potentially unite us all.” Her optimism reflected the growing alliance between the antinuclear movement and the civil rights

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movement under the banner of the New Coalition of Conscience, which increasingly made nuclear issues a focus within the traditional centers of black moral contemplation and political power.636

Churches and ministries spotlighted the subject of black economic displacement exacerbated by the expanding cost of upholding nuclear deterrence. In early 1983, the Black Participation project—initially launched by Judy Pennington and Larry Bailey a year prior—flooded black radio stations with antinuclear advertisements, programs, and guest speakers offered a cost-effective means for reaching a wide audience in black urban communities. Pennington and Bailey selected Detroit as the test case for using ministry and radio tactics for alerting black Americans to the ill-effects of the nuclear economy due to the city’s large black population working in blue collar jobs, which figured to be the perfect setting for making nuclear disarmament synonymous with jobs and racial justice.637

Rather than court support from an unlikely demographic, Reagan intended for his focus on morality in his program for peace through strength to assist his most influential religious allies make their own case for a nuclear arms build-up. Reagan’s televangelist allies stressed the president’s role in preparation for the apocalypse. Reagan originally drew Evangelical support by professing a common belief that social justice issues should be informed by religious beliefs. He effectively captured the Evangelical block when he hired Robert Billings to be his 1980 campaign’s religious advisor away from the Moral Majority, the organization primarily responsible for mobilizing Evangelicals and

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636 Patricia Williams to National Committee, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, “Freeze Coalition Work with Black Communities,” 3 February 1983, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 4.

For Evangelicals, this brand of morality politics prepared the nation’s soul for the second coming of Christ and pre-figured His thousand-year reign on earth, known as the millennial kingdom. Evangelicals, however, considered victory in the apocalyptic battle for the millennial kingdom far from a preordained conclusion. Billings’ co-founder of the Moral Majority, the Revered Jerry Falwell, merged apocalyptic rhetoric with the policies fed to him by the administration. The White House valued Falwell’s support so much that they deemed it appropriate not only to enlist him in the fight against the freeze, but also reportedly provided him with classified nuclear briefings in the Oval Office in early 1983.\footnote{Robert Freidman, “The Bomb and Jerry Show,” \textit{The Nuclear Times}, August/September 1983.} Falwell launched an eighteen-month anti-freeze campaign across his platforms of influence soon after his briefing at the White House. Much of this campaign took place on his show \textit{The Old Time Gospel Hour}, a syndicated series of televised sermons that at its peak in the mid 1980s reached nearly 400 network stations and drew in over 2 million donors that generated revenue reaching nearly $100 million in its highest grossing years.\footnote{Ibid.}

Falwell’s sermon “Nuclear War and the Second Coming of Jesus Christ,” which aired on 20 March 1983, generated the highest donor response yet recorded on \textit{Old Time
Gospel Hour. He and other televangelists such as Pat Robertson on the Christian Broadcasting Network interpreted the book of Ezekiel as a prophecy of Soviet aggression sweeping into Israel made possible by Soviet nuclear superiority. Pronuclear televangelists denounced social dynamics associated with the rise of the antinuclear left, such as an increased focus on liberalism and humanism in universities and the creeping influence of secularism on world institutions represented by developments such as the second Vatican council, as the pre-conditions that invited the Soviet Union to launch and win a nuclear war. For these reasons, Falwell considered the anti-freeze campaign his top moral priority, even more so than his anti-abortion and school-prayer campaigns.

Falwell explicitly depicted antinuclear advocates as moral agents of the Kremlin. He declared them “freezeniks” with the same values as Soviet leadership in full page attack ads in the Washington Post, New York Times, and 70 other newspapers in addition to regular denunciations appearing in the Moral Majority Report.

Neoconservatives, conservative Catholics, and Evangelicals found a measure of compatibility in the defense of deterrence. Moral arguments cited by Novak to defend Reagan’s nuclear build-up, provided a common foundation for neoconservatism and a vision of conservative Catholicism. Reagan’s rhetoric, however, provided continuity between Novak’s perspective and the prophecies preached by the president’s televangelist allies. The moral criticisms at the core of Reagan’s anti-freeze operation, especially Novak’s contributions, proved marginally successful in pushing Cardinal

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Bernardin’s committee to moderate its language before issuing the third draft of the pastoral letter on war and peace.644

The March 1983 uptick in moral arguments for nuclear weapons corresponded directly to the resumption of arms control talks and imminent deadlines for critical votes on key components of Reagan’s plan for nuclear modernization, specifically the funding of the MX missile. The assaults on the peace bishops’ morality, Reagan’s citation of questionable reporting on contacts between the freeze movement and KGB, and a commitment to the deterrence status quo failed to move the public and Congress to embrace peace through strength. If anything, Reagan’s aggressive rhetoric had only further persuaded those outside of the New Right bloc that the president intended to sabotage arms control.645

On 23 March 1983, Reagan sought to reverse the negative momentum of his administration’s public nuclear diplomacy operations in a primetime address to the nation. In addition to the culmination of moral rhetoric and peace through strength commitments Reagan offered something new, the possibility of assured survival. In calling for accelerated development of advanced ballistic missile defenses to make nuclear war with the Soviet Union survivable, Reagan claimed that the requirements for deterrence had changed. He called upon the nation’s scientific and technical talent to bring about advances in ballistic missile defense to make “nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” Reagan urged the country to marshal its industrial strength to the cause of national security. He followed up his argument that a freeze would make nuclear war

more likely with the question posed to him by the Joint Chiefs, asking the nation, “wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them?” The president promised a new age of assured survival, guaranteed by deterrence rooted in ballistic missile defense rather than the threat of nuclear annihilation.az

Steven Rearden wrote in his report for the Department of Defense on the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) and Congress, that “as time went on, SDI became practically as much a symbol of conservative Republican politics as Ronald Reagan.”

In stressing the president’s leading role in drafting the speech, Keyworth recalled, “SDI definitely draws from the President’s views of morality and views of long-term, endurable history.” Frances Fitzgerald frames the president’s eagerness to promise assured survival through ballistic missile defense as a prime example of his everyman image. This characterization accounts for the fusion of rhetoric that positioned Reagan as a defender against evil communism and a paragon of virtue in a corrupt capital.

Congressional reaction on 24 March to Reagan’s speech demonstrates the widening ideological divergence between progressive Democrats and conservative Republicans on nuclear matters. Reagan’s opponents pejoratively renamed the president’s initiative Star Wars.” Walter Mondale, hoping to court freeze voters for his presidential campaign, explicitly condemned the president for making nuclear issues a public

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647 Steven Rearden, Congress and SDIO, 3.


diplomacy exercise. A leading member of the House Appropriations Committee, Les AuCoin (D-OR), criticized Reagan’s views as simplistic and disparaged the president’s “fixation on doomsday weapons and military spending.” Veteran Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), who had become known for his attacks on wasteful government spending, commented, “this is an appealing proposal, but it actually could be a dangerous development.” Congressman Tom Downey (D-NY), condemned strategic defense as “most appalling and ridiculous.” Conservative Republicans on the other hand, hailed the president as a visionary who compelled science and statesmanship to follow his moral lead. Ken Kramer (R-CO), called Reagan’s plan “the greatest hope for mankind.” Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), a leading voice of the New Right, claimed that the president had “turned a historic page…away from the incongruous doctrine known as MAD.”

The scientific community likewise split along ideological lines. In attempt to court the scientific community, Reagan invited twelve renowned scientists who had made outstanding contributions to U.S. national security over the course of their careers to dine with him at the White House on the evening he announced the new priority for defensive systems. Edward Teller praised the president for providing the “needed basis

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652 Ibid., 50-52.
653 Ibid., 50-52.
654 Ibid., 50-52.
655 Ibid., 50-52.
656 Ibid., 50-52.
for a stable, lasting peace.” Jerome Weisner referred to the speech as a “declaration of a new arms race.” Hans Bethe predicted that the impractical proposal would greatly increase the difficulty in reaching new arms control agreements and thus impeded the prospect of nuclear peace.

Throughout his speech of 23 March, Reagan appealed to Americans to make the sacrifices that a wartime economy demanded. Those appeals fell on deaf ears in the peace movement, which had argued all along that one of the most sinister aspects of deterrence was that its constantly evolving requirements had permanently militarized the U.S. economy and thus robbed minorities and working-class Americans of opportunities for social mobility that could be found in a peace economy. The peace economy message further consolidated the emerging antinuclear-civil rights alliance, and created new prospects for transatlantic cooperation with the British disarmament movement.

The spotlight on the arms race as a source of economic injustice motivated the Jobs with Peace Campaign (JWP) to generate local resistance and legislative progress at the municipal level. The freeze recognized that JWP’s early success in passing antinuclear referendums in major cities made it a potential bridge into urban minority communities. By April 1983, JWP had developed the organizational capacity to host activities in over 200 communities across the country for its “Jobs with Peace Week” and minority groups were instrumental in building the coalitions that made the week of action possible. Mexican-American groups developed a partner organization in San Antonio.

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659 Rearden, Congress and SDIO, 49.
660 Ibid., 49.
known as Trabajo y Paz that worked with Catholic leaders to raise awareness about the negative consequence of a militarized economy. Latino organizations also organized church groups to distribute Spanish language material for JWP referendums across Wisconsin in 1983.

African Americans and Latino Americans accounted for 25 percent of delegates attending the spring 1983 JWP convention in Atlanta cosponsored by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.\(^{663}\) One of the reasons JWP selected Atlanta to host the conference was to draw attention to the South, where the campaign’s leaders could best elucidate the role of racism in militarism and conservative economic ideas about self-reliance as a key to strong moral character. Manning Marable, a member of the National Coordinating Committee and Director of the Race Relations Institute at Fisk University, argued that “any concession to blacks are viewed as concessions to the welfare state, to liberalism. People favoring a massive build-up in military spending are the same people against civil rights for blacks and an end to the Second Reconstruction.”\(^{664}\) In Marable’s view, a central mission of JWP was to connect the socio-economic analysis and moral views of black elites to the grassroots of the unemployed, noting “simply winning Coretta Scott King, Joe Lowry, Jesse Jackson, doesn’t mean we’ll really get local SCLC leaders to throw their forces behind our motion.”\(^{665}\) JWP’s close work with black and Hispanic communities and strong ties with local unions, especially in the South, motivated the freeze to devote more resources to minority outreach. Local freeze and JWP chapters

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\(^{665}\) Ibid.
worked together extensively on economic conversion, municipal budget reforms, and
civilian job creation strategies.666

The focus on peace and jobs within the municipal context enabled the New
Coalition of Conscience to gain organizing momentum from a second wave of black
mayors who wielded political power that could be tapped for mass demonstrations and a
huge number of potential voters.667 Various state conferences of black mayors and the
National Conference of Black Mayors were among the early supporters of the freeze
campaign and were influential in persuading other black civic organizations to co-found
Citizens Against Nuclear War, a collection of civic and peace groups with non-nuclear
primary missions but concerned about nuclear war nonetheless.668 To strengthen their
own coalitions, many African-American mayors seized on the connection between
economic injustice, which registered with minority voters; and nuclear adventurism,
which concerned white middle-class voters. Robert Arrington Jr. remained a vocal
antinuclear proponent, having crafted the freeze call into a proclamation during his ride
into the Birmingham mayor’s office in 1979.669 Elected as Chicago’s first black mayor in
April 1983, Harold Washington, urged black voters to recognize that domestic stability
was being sacrificed to finance the production of “Armageddon devices.”670

(SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 4; Patricia Williams to Randy Kehler, “Exit Memo,” 23 March 1983,
(SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 2; Jim Lopez, to Pam McIntyre, “Minority Update,” 27 July 1983,
(SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 4; Jim Lopez to National Committee Members, “Minority Outreach
Program within Asian, Hispanic, an Native American Communities,” 1 February 1984, (SHSMO/WHMC)
NWFC, Box 4.
Over the spring freeze activists had been developing an antinuclear strategy with the Congressional Black Caucus, the Martin Luther King Center for Social Change, the National Association of Black State Legislators, the National Urban Coalition, and several other organizations. Leaders of the freeze’s Black Participation project succeeded in convincing black elites that they should make a stronger intellectual basis for linking the needs of jobs, peace, and freedom ahead of the twentieth anniversary march on Washington. Conferences sponsored by Fisk University, the National Education Association (NEA), Citizens Against Nuclear War, Jesse Jackson’s Operation Push, Trans America, and influential faculty at Howard University stimulated a discussion on rolling back the arms race as a tactic for easing minority oppression. Black intellectuals made the case to antinuclear organizers that nuclear expansion had a direct relationship to American neo-imperialism because resources consumed to reinforce nuclear deterrence were disproportionately collected from the Third World and minority communities in the United States.

Cooperation between the American and British antinuclear movements helped to shape public ideas about nuclear weapons around ideas for converting the war economy perpetuated by deterrence into a peace economy made possible by disarmament. Generating solidarity between movements, E.P. Thompson’s tour with freeze founder Randall Forsberg on a “Quest for Peace in Europe and America” in April 1983 focused

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Ron Todd, who helped organized CND’s trade union division, consulted on the Alternative Defense Commission, and served as a high-ranking official in the United Kingdom’s largest union (TGWU), also led an industrial conversion tour in the United States to promote an Atlantic link on the creation of socially useful and peace-oriented jobs.\(^{674}\)

The suggestion that a peace economy could create more jobs than a defense economy compelled many labor leaders to rethink their traditional support of Cold War policies. A significant challenge for antinuclear activists had been to avoid disrupting the more established alliance between organized labor and the civil rights movement, both of which the peace movement hoped to enlist in the fight for disarmament. AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland had been a founding member of the Committee on Present Danger and remained firm in his orthodox view that more defense spending equaled more jobs. Kirkland pressured AFL-CIO affiliates and allies to suppress antinuclear positions, even threatening to revoke charters of local affiliates that sympathized with the freeze.\(^{675}\)

The A. Philip Randolph Institute, which in cooperation with the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists stood as the authority on black labor issues, initially lobbied against the 20\(^{th}\) anniversary march before eventually committing to the event because of the financial pressure exerted by Kirkland’s AFL-CIO.\(^{676}\)

Even Kirkland’s influence had its limits, however. Outside of civil rights leaders, organized labor dominated the list of conveners for the 20\(^{th}\) anniversary march, which included William Winpisinger, Murray Finley of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textiles

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\(^{675}\) Bruce Shapiro, “Movement Looks for the Union Label,” *Nuclear Times*, April 1983.
Workers Union (ACTWU), Mary Futrell of National Education Association (NEA), Addie Wyatt from the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW). Freeze activists prioritized establishing contacts with these unions and labor groups during planning for the 20th anniversary march, pushing their message of economic conversion. They touted estimated savings from a freeze, which hovered around 100 billion dollars over five years, and roughly 380 billion dollars by the year 2000 as a key source of funds for job creation programs. The Congressional Budgetary Office projected that 10 billion dollars invested directly into the civilian economy could create 250,000 jobs compared to 210,000 jobs should the same amount be spent on the defense. The three largest defense contractors, which accounted for 40 percent of the Pentagon purchases, created fewer jobs per dollar than the average industrial manufacturer. Moreover, military spending also created more high-skilled and technical jobs rather than blue collar union jobs when compared to civilian investment.

The economic justice message thus doubled as outreach to both the black community and organized labor, both domestically and abroad. Planning for the 20th anniversary march brought a wave of labor support from United Auto Workers (UAW) who lobbied Congress for a freeze; the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) which spoke out in support of the freeze; and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the Communications Workers for America (CWA) which voted to endorse the freeze despite opposition from their presidents.

678 Hartung, *The Economic Consequences of a Nuclear Freeze*, 1.
681 Ibid., 14-15.
682 Shapiro, “Movement Looks for the Union Label.”
Dozens of other unions either worked directly with the freeze campaign, provided financial support, or endorsed some variation of an antinuclear agenda. The combination of growing antinuclear sentiment amongst unions and desire to remain close to a black community once again active on the national stage ultimately compelled the AFL-CIO, overruling the objections of its president Lane Kirkland, to support the 20th anniversary march and a vote to endorse the freeze in the following year at the 1984 biennial convention.

Arms Control, Public Diplomacy, and Congressional Bargaining

Though politicians, scientists, and activists offered early judgments of SDI’s implications, the debate over the program went into what future SDIO Director General James Abrahamson labeled as a “quiescent period” for the remainder of 1983. Reagan officials quickly backtracked on the more ambitious technical goals associated with the president’s speech. The administration swiftly announced that it had commissioned three exploratory studies as a means to defuse criticism while it developed its own narrative and plans for SDI.

684 “Minutes of the National Planning Council: Martin Luther King Center for Non-Violent Social Change,” 13 January 1983, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 4.
Though lacking in programmatic details, Reagan’s vague promise that SDI would usher in an age of assured survival provided public cover for the Scowcroft Commission’s recommendations. Many experts and activists questioned whether ballistic missile defenses would protect American citizens or facilitate nuclear war-fighting by protecting ICBM missile silos, specifically the deployment of MX missiles. Against the long backdrop of the MX debate ranging from the 1970s and into the 1980s, Donald Baucom considered growing political support for ballistic missile defense through the lens of Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm shift, claiming that “the old pattern of thinking about strategic nuclear systems and how to deter nuclear war seemed to be breaking down as the United States failed to reach a national consensus on a response to what some perceived to be a strategic imbalance.”

Released on 6 April 1983, the Scowcroft Report’s introductions and recommendations stressed the need for political unity and noted the geopolitical consequences of partisanship complicating arms control and modernization, but reaffirmed “our task as a nation cannot be understood from a position of moral neutrality toward the differences between liberty and nationalism.” In this regard, the commission accepted Reagan’s diagnosis that ensuring the moral mission of the United States required nuclear superiority, but also recognized the impropriety of casting antinuclear proponents as Soviet sympathizers. The solution for MX? Interim deployment of 100 missiles in existing silos and continued research on hardened silos and mobile systems were to be readied for development by 1987. With regards to ballistic missile

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defense, the panel commented, “applications of current technology offer no real promise
of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century.
An easier task is to provide ABM defense for fixed hardened targets, such as ICBM
silos.” Scowcroft’s report signaled to MX skeptics in Congress that the ballistic missile
defenses touted by Reagan could improve the survivability of MX silos. The commission
offered an olive branch to members of Congress in close contact with antinuclear leaders,
an unequivocal endorsement of genuine arms control efforts rather than propaganda and
anti-freeze rhetoric.

Stephen Kane cites the Scowcroft Commission and arms control developments
that emerged from its report as evidence that Reagan’s public diplomacy was less
effective for enacting his nuclear policy agenda than his congressional bargaining
strategy. Considering that Reagan preempted the Scowcroft Report release with the
announcement of SDI and that his administration later sold the developments that came
out of the Scowcroft Report to court public opinion, Reagan more likely understood
congressional bargaining and public diplomacy as part of a single political maneuver.
Victories and defeats in one arena determined the president’s leverage in the other.

In early May, the antinuclear movement appeared to swing the tide in the public
diplomacy battle. On 3 May 1983, one day before the House voted on a freeze resolution,
U.S. bishops approved the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace. Reagan’s argument in his
23 March speech that deterrence still worked as a permanent strategy contradicted Pope
John Paul’s previous statements on the acceptability of deterrence as a temporary solution

689 Ibid., 25.
690 Ibid., 22-25.
691 N. Stephen Kane, Selling Reagan’s Foreign Policy, 117-185.
that pronuclear advocates had relied upon to make the moral case for peace through
strength. Seizing on this point, the peace bishops condemned deterrence as the most
dangerous dimension of the arms race, arguing that “Good ends…cannot justify immoral
means.” 692 The Pope’s delegates in Washington applauded the leadership role played by
the American bishops on the question of nuclear deterrence. Bernardin’s committee
informed the Vatican’s own study on the issue. 693

Elements of Just War theory elaborated upon in the pastoral letter undermined
Reagan’s assertion of universal moral standards to defend his nuclear policies. The
concept of comparative justice articulated in the pastoral letter also undermined Reagan’s
nuclear rhetoric. The bishops argued that no state should act with the conviction of
absolute justice in a world where sovereign states recognize no single moral authority,
and that states must realize the limits of their “just cause” 694 Reagan’s public diplomacy
messaging claimed the exact opposite. He claimed his administration’s nuclear arms
build-up to be a just cause because the United States was a uniquely moral nation and the
Soviet Union a distinctly immoral state.

Regardless of possible alignment with other conditions of Just War theory,
probability of success and proportionality both made nuclear weapons incompatible with
Just War theory. Under Just War theory, only winnable wars or those that had a
reasonable chance of success could be considered morally acceptable. Reagan himself
acknowledged the incompatibility of preparations for nuclear war and Just War,

692 Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,”
694 Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, “The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise and Our Response,”
paragraph 218.
repeatedly stating that he considered nuclear war unwinnable ever since his accidental suggestion that Europe might serve as a nuclear battleground. In regard to proportionality, the stark reality that any nuclear attack would result in massive civilian casualties invalidated the morality of deterrence.

The other components of the pastoral letter prescribed Catholic morality as the foundation for civic responsibility and antidote to the general moral crisis they perceived in the United States, a very assertive step by the Catholic Church into the political realm. Stating “two purposes: to help Catholics form their consciences and to contribute to the public policy debate,” the bishops directed their guidance toward a “wider civil community, a more pluralistic audience, in which our brothers and sisters with whom we share the name Christians, Jews, Moslems, other religious communities, and all people of good will who also make up our polity.” During the drafting process the bishops alluded to the influence of non-violent civil action over their thinking on nuclear war, referring to examples set by St. Francis Assisi, Dorothy Day, and Martin Luther King Jr. Though not explicitly calling for civil disobedience, the bishops essentially sanctioned the pacifist tradition that inspired religious activists’ non-violent direct actions against the state. Political observers interpreted the replacement of a call to “curb” the arms race with a call to “halt” the arms race in the final draft as a tacit endorsement of the freeze and rebuke of Reagan allies who had claimed the Catholic Church supported the administration’s nuclear policies. Catholic bishops’ acceptance of moral pluralism and

697 Ibid., paragraph 16.
699 Castelli, The Bishops and the Bomb, 137-162.
pacifism in civic life and international relations as part of their judgment of nuclear deterrence directly countered the Reagan administration’s insistence on its exclusive moral mandate.

In their tacit sanctioning of pacifists’ acts of civil disobedience and reinterpretation of Just War theory as the official Catholic teaching on nuclear war, the American Catholic Church made a bold entry into the contested space of nuclear politics. Gestures to the freeze and pacifists engaged in non-violent direct action suggested that the American Catholic hierarchy had shifted from its earlier nationalism to a more nuanced view of its accommodation of the state and its militarism.700 Rolling Stone magazine went so far as to credit the writing of the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace as a process of reinventing what it meant to be an American Catholic.701 During a period of renewed political salience for morality, criticisms of the political evangelical organization Moral Majority from the Church hierarchy alongside overtures to a wider civil audience demonstrate that opposition to nuclear war aligned American Catholics with an emerging progressive coalition.702

The day following the approval of the Pastoral on War and Peace, the House passed a non-binding freeze resolution by a 278-149 vote on 4 May 1983. Though freeze advocates and congressional allies lamented how the legislative process had undermined the force of the resolution, the antinuclear movement nevertheless considered it a clear

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700 Au, The Cross, the Flag, and the Bomb, 249-268.
sign that its congressional strategy could and would produce major freeze victories of the Reagan nuclear agenda.\textsuperscript{703}

In the intervening week between the freeze resolution and the planned MX vote in Congress in late May, Reagan negotiated with key Democrats in Congress on the basis of the Scowcroft Report. The report recommended that 100 MX missiles be deployed in Minuteman silos to meet the administration’s desires and also the deployment of a much greater number of Midgetman missiles, to satisfy centrist Democrats. Les Aspin (D-WI), Al Gore (D-TN), and Norman Dicks (D-WA) in particular championed Midgetman on the grounds that it enhanced strategic stability by de-MIRVing the U.S. ICBM force.\textsuperscript{704}

In theory, Midgetman deterred a Soviet first strike by creating an adverse exchange ratio. The Soviet Union would have to use multiple warheads to ensure the elimination of one Midgetman, a single warhead placed in a fifteen-ton mobile missile with a range of 7,000 nautical miles and sufficient accuracy to eliminate Soviet hard targets. An MX missile on the other hand, armed with up to ten warheads inside of vulnerable silos, promoted strategic instability. By targeting the immobile MX missile with only one or two warheads, the Soviet Union could eliminate ten U.S. nuclear warheads, thereby producing a positive exchange ratio and tempting first-strike incentive.\textsuperscript{705}

Midgetman persuaded key members of the House to vote for MX alongside a commitment to the build-down concept, which captured crucial backing in the Senate for


\textsuperscript{704} Fred Kaplan, “Does Midgetman Fall Short?” \textit{Nuclear Times}, August/September 1983.

the administration’s strategic arms control plan. Retired Air Force General Glen Kent formulated the build-down proposal. In its simplest terms, the build-down proposed that a greater number of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles be retired when warheads on modernized strategic delivery vehicles entered into service. Build-down all but guaranteed that the MX would not be the future of the U.S. ICBM force, but merely an interim solution.

On 12 May 1983, Reagan promised Senators William Cohen (R-MA), Sam Nunn (D-GA), and Charles Percy (R-IL) conditional support for the build-down concept in advance of the 26 May vote in the Senate on MX, the final hurdle to establishing the administration’s approach in the sixth round of START negotiations. Backing from the “Gang of Six,” comprised of Aspin, Gore, and Dicks on the House side, and Cohen, Nunn, and Percy on the Senate side, for the MX vote came with one more caveat. They expressed a total lack of trust in START negotiator General Rowny and demanded Congress have its own arms control monitor to ensure build-down receive proper treatment in negotiations.

Victory on the MX vote in Congress negated the Reagan administration’s disappointment over the freeze resolution approved by the House earlier in the month. Aspin, Gore, and Dicks led a group of congressional Democrats to approve MX based on the impression that they had converted the Reagan administration into an honest partner on arms control. By creating a visible wedge between Democrats in Washington and

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707 Talbott, Deadly Gambits, 339.
their most politically active source of support in the freeze constituency, Reagan’s administration weakened the opposition and earned cover for his arms control policies. SANE Executive Director David Cortright, who led the organization that most aggressively targeted MX, stated the Democratic Party in Congress had “reverted to its old ways and betrayed the Freeze movement.”\(^{709}\) Randall Forsberg later suggested the vote for MX “tore up the Freeze movement” by demonstrating the shallow nature of Washington politics.\(^{710}\) The MX vote did not defeat the antinuclear movement as a force in the public sphere, but it did fatally weaken the freeze agenda in Congress.

The Scowcroft Commission and bipartisan developments in Washington instilled confidence in NATO allies that the Reagan administration could manage both strategic deployments and strategic arms control as well as the INF portfolio. R. James Woolsey Jr., who served on the commission and later became the congressional representative on the U.S. arms control delegation, stated “if we cancelled our only on-going ICBM program unilaterally that would deal a blow to NATO and to the notion of the American nuclear deterrent as part of NATO, that would be absolutely crippling. How in the world could we have asked the Europeans to deploy Pershing IIs and ground launch cruise missiles.”\(^{711}\)

Before the close of the month, Reagan led NATO’s most significant public diplomacy action on the INF issue to that point in time. In May 1983, the Soviet Union


\(^{710}\) War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, “Missile Experimental,” Interview with Randall Forsberg, 11/09/1987, WGBH Media Library & Archives. Last accessed 10 May 2018. \url{http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_F6CC542AF94B434FBC7E1DBE45F07024}

\(^{711}\) War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, “Reagan Shield,” Interview with James Woolsey, 10/13/1987, WGBH Media Library & Archives. Last accessed 10 June 2018. \url{http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_3ADA7199E4BA4FE0868D033808A6234D}
formally tabled a proposal for SS-20 launchers in Europe to equal the number of British and French nuclear systems.\textsuperscript{712} The Soviets apparently timed the tabling of their proposal to include British and French nuclear systems in INF negotiations to preempt the Group of Seven (G-7) Summit in Williamsburg, Virginia scheduled for late May 1983. Comprised of representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, West Germany, Canada, Japan, and the European Union, the G-7 Summit participants had been initially keen to focus on economic matters. They wanted to skirt arms control issues, consideration of which risked enflaming public opinion and alienating the NATO basing countries who were not present at the meeting.\textsuperscript{713}

As summit hosts, the Reagan administration felt compelled to use the gathering as an opportunity to make a unified statement on INF negotiations to help bolster ongoing public diplomacy efforts. Mindful of most participants’ reluctance to pre-author a joint statement on INF, American officials turned to Thatcher to introduce and guide an impromptu dinner discussion on INF on 28 May. They hoped dinner discussions would produce an agreement on a public statement to be issued at the close of the conference.\textsuperscript{714}

In preparing for Thatcher’s dinner round on arms control, British officials projected two potential dangers coming from the lack of visible progress on arms control. First, they feared a “renewal of impetus for the CND cause…[and] second, a temptation particularly among the less stalwart allies, to put the US under pressure to make further negotiating

concessions for agreement at almost any cost.” These concerns were particularly acute due to the attention NATO and nuclear politics received in the British general election, scheduled for the following month.

Thatcher strongly asserted Britain’s privileged role in the broader Western alliance dialogue on arms control at the G7 summit through bilateral meetings and dinner discussions. According to Shultz, Thatcher’s displeasure with Reagan’s performance at the Versailles economic summit in 1982 had led the State Department to make unusually extensive preparations for Williamsburg. Global limits on INF surfaced as a source of potential pressure on the U.S. negotiating posture that could be uniquely addressed in the G-7 forum. The Reagan administration stressed the need for global limits on INF deployments, arguing that SS-20 missiles were mobile systems that could be moved from the Asian theater to the European theater relatively quickly. Washington also could not afford to accept the export of the INF threat to the Asian theater, which would create problems for U.S. allies in the Pacific. In advance of the evening discussion on arms control on 28 May, Thatcher held bilateral meetings with the West German delegation and the Japanese delegation to ensure agreement on global limits. Thatcher agreed with Kohl that the acceptance of global limits, rather than only European limits, must come in exchange for more favorable trade practices from Japan. Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone of Japan appreciated the Western imperative to pursue a “collective peace

716 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 354.
717 No. 10 Record of Conversation between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, 28 May 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1009 f99.
offensive,” and proved willing to consider the linkage of trade policy to allied unity on arms control.718

In multilateral settings, Thatcher encouraged NATO leaders to take a cohesive approach to public diplomacy, advocating for positions on deployment that considered not just domestic opinion but also the attitudes of a transnational public. She pushed for a joint statement on INF to demonstrate a “steadiness of nerve” as NATO progressed toward deployments.719 Reagan remarked of the British prime minister’s firm approach in her dealings with the French and the Canadians, “I thought at one point Margaret was going to order Pierre [Trudeau] to go stand in the corner.”720 Reagan believed Thatcher earned her “Iron Lady” moniker in persuading the West German leader Helmut Kohl to support stronger language on INF deployment to ensure its consistency with her own domestic politics. She pressed Kohl, “I’m in the middle of an election. I bent over backwards for your election. Now it’s your turn. I have taken a strong position, and I want a strong position here.”721

At a press conference on 29 May, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz read the joint statement that came out of the Thatcher-led dinner discussion. The joint statement emphasized G-7 unity on the exclusion of British and French nuclear forces from INF negotiations and on the global dimension to arms control talks. Shultz considered the agreement on global limits important because they “identified Japan with the security system of the West, not just through the bilateral strategic partnership with the United

718 No. 10 Record of Conversation between Margaret Thatcher, Francis Pym, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Shintaro Abe, 28 May 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1009 f104.
721 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 356.
States.” Predictably, the statement castigated the Soviet Union for attempting to influence public opinion in INF basing countries. NATO reiterated this position in its final communiqué on the early June ministerial meetings. Reagan considered Thatcher’s leadership on INF and her election victory that closely followed as a welcomed “shot in the arm to the Western alliance.” Thatcher meanwhile viewed the summit as a valuable political tool to prove to British voters that her policies permitted Britain to play a leading role in world affairs.

Developing a unified nuclear message at the Williamsburg summit assumed added importance because the summit represented USIA’s first attempt to develop a new method for managing the European media. Alvin Snyder, who served as USIA’s television and film director under Reagan, considered Williamsburg a seminal moment for technological development in U.S. public diplomacy because it marked the first instance in which the agency directly fed live television and print coverage to Europe. USIA’s live satellite feeds provided cable access to the summit across the Atlantic, while simultaneously allowing U.S. public diplomacy staffers and foreign delegates to instantly monitor and respond to how European television news agencies covered the events. The increased reliance on cable and satellite television for public diplomacy in Western Europe set a new pattern of operations that would be further developed for future summits between Reagan and Gorbachev.

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722 Ibid., 186.
These technical and messaging developments allowed U.S. officials and Western allies to regain momentum for their own peace offensive during the spring/summer round of INF negotiations. At home, Reagan’s team reaped significant political capital from the summit’s results. The Washington Post declared, “The president will take political credit for his performance, and he has every right to.”\(^727\) According to Shultz, Thatcher and other G-7 leaders left Williamsburg far more confident in Reagan’s understanding of the key arms control issues than they had been before the arrival.\(^728\) Washington’s demonstrated flexibility on negotiating positions, which had already aided the victory of Kohl’s Christian Democrats in the March 1983 Bundestag elections in West Germany, helped Thatcher’s Conservatives in the June 1983 British general elections; both successes were prerequisites for maintaining political consensus for the dual-track decision.\(^729\) Key American allies in both Atlantic and Pacific worlds agreed on the need for global restraints. Most importantly for Whitehall, the exclusion of British and French strategic deterrents remained a firm NATO position. Nitze and the U.S. delegation in Geneva concluded at the end of the negotiating round that the Soviets now preferred no agreement at all to any agreement that sanctioned any deployments of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe.\(^730\)

The Reagan administration and Thatcher government succeeded in maintaining their preferred deterrence postures in arms control negotiations. They did so through effective public diplomacy and the successful management of the interactions between

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\(^727\) Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 357.
\(^728\) Ibid., 300-301.
\(^729\) West German elections were a scheme by Kohl to further legitimize his government, having initially succeeding Helmut Schmidt’s minority government on a vote of no confidence.
\(^730\) U.S. Mission in Geneva to Secretary of State, “INF: End of Round V Assessment,” 14 July 1983 (RRPL) NSC Subject Files, Box 23; Sven Kraemer to William Clark, “Summary of Ambassador Nitze’s Meeting with the President,” 22 July 1983, (RRPL) NSC Subject Files, Box 23.
U.S. Congress, the British general elections, and the NATO alliance. However, they had failed to stymie the growing influence of antinuclear ideas among the general public. If anything legislative and electoral losses channeled a greater share of antinuclear efforts into the task of reshaping the public sphere.

The moral worldview expressed in the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace was a boon for the antinuclear movement and its allies reeling from Reagan’s nuclear policy successes in May. In effect, the pastoral letter endorsed the premise of the New Coalition of Conscience. Both emphasized pacifism, civil disobedience, and freeze solutions to alleviate economic dislocation caused by alleged national security needs as essential to the betterment of society.

Planning for the march for jobs, peace, and freedom to commemorate the 1963 March on Washington generated much of the connective tissue between the antinuclear cause, civil rights movement, organized labor, and other progressive causes. Tensions existed within the nascent coalition. Labor continued to be divided on defense spending. Antinuclear purists remained skeptical of the New Coalition of Conscience, fearing that such a broad coalition would dilute their purpose. Minority communities and women still had not acquired equal status in the peace movement. Nonetheless, the public diplomacy practices employed to build an antinuclear coalition made both civil rights interests and antinuclear ideas major elements of mainstream progressivism and increasingly prominent issues in the public sphere.

Far surpassing the projections of cautiously optimistic organizers, the 250,000 to 400,000 demonstrators who sweated out temperatures over 90 degrees to march for jobs, peace, and freedom on 27 August 1983 demonstrated the durability of antinuclear ideas.
Historic churches in the District’s African American communities hosted overflow crowds the night before the march and in the morning Stevie Wonder galvanized the demonstrators who had been mobilized by peace and labor movement partners of the New Coalition of Conscience.\(^{731}\) Presidential hopefuls in attendance included Alan Cranston, John Lewis, and Jesse Jackson—whose speech earned a rejoice of “Run Jesse, Run!”—added political importance to the day’s events.\(^{732}\)


\(^{732}\) Ibid.
CHAPTER FIVE: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
AND THE UNDOING OF ARMS CONTROL

“If the U.S. is the first to have both offense and defense, we could put the nuclear genie back in the bottle.”

– Ronald Reagan

At the beginning of 1984, intermediate range and strategic nuclear arms control efforts lay in peril, with negotiations suspended indefinitely. The preceding year, Reagan’s and Thatcher’s public diplomacy operations proved tactically successful. The State Department supported Thatcher in organizing the critical discussions with European allies, specifically West Germany, that maintained NATO’s commitment to INF deployments. Reagan’s introduction of SDI added a defensive dimension to the U.S. nuclear build-up that enriched the moral element of his public diplomacy. The revival of moral themes in Reagan’s public diplomacy benefited from the tragic shootdown of a Korean airliner by the Soviet air force, which allowed the president and Thatcher to emphasize the moral contrast between the United States and the Soviet Union. Reagan’s most tactically effective maneuver proved to be his submission to congressional oversight of arms control, which blurred the distinctions between his positions and those of his Democratic presidential rivals.

Beginning in 1984, public science diplomacy disrupted Reagan’s public diplomacy efforts. Scientific critiques of SDI eroded its positive public diplomacy effect. The competing ideas for SDI from Reagan’s senior aides further complicated the program’s public presentation. The debate that unfolded between SDI critics and Reagan’s scientific allies illuminated a divergence in their philosophical perspectives on

the relationship between science and the state. Critics articulated a vision in which scientists should inform the public and apply their scientific knowledge to advance political solutions and international compromise; SDI proponents on the other hand perpetuated notions of American technological exceptionalism, claiming that scientists should supply the technologies that allowed the United States to be uncompromising in its foreign relations.

Despite occasional tensions, Thatcher’s and Reagan’s joint management of the repeated nuclear crises in the 1980s served as the foundation for their broader geopolitical partnership. Thatcher’s nuclear resolve would establish her as a powerbroker between the Kremlin and the White House by the time strategic, intermediate range, and space arms control negotiations resumed under the umbrella of Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in Geneva in early 1985.

**Walking Out**

Shortly after the G-7 Summit at Williamsburg and Thatcher’s electoral victory, the prime minister hosted Vice President George Bush at 10 Downing Street. Bush congratulated Thatcher on successfully managing the nuclear debate during her election, noting its importance for President Reagan in 1984. Thatcher told Bush that she no longer considered the antinuclear movement much of a threat, declaring that the Greenham Common women “had become an eccentricity.” She nevertheless anticipated a renewal in antinuclear activity to accompany the deployments of cruise missiles scheduled for the end of the year.734 Thatcher’s prediction proved correct. Having failed in the 1983 British

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734 “No. 10 Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and Vice President Bush,” 24 June 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/979 f153.
election and achieving mixed results in the 1982 U.S. mid-term election and on key votes in U.S. Congress in May 1983, the British and American peace movements devoted themselves to developing antinuclear ideas in the transatlantic public sphere to counter the pronuclear agenda.

“Should we go international or parochial? Should we emphasize U.S. or U.K. involvement?” In the summer aftermath of yet another electoral defeat in 1983, former CND chairman John Cox pressed the CND national council for new strategies to refresh an antinuclear movement that appeared destined to meet the same fate that brought an end to antinuclear enthusiasm 25 years earlier. From 1980 to 1983, CND had largely been content to let END lead the international dimension of the British antinuclear movement. After the election, national council members invested more energy into a global approach that firmed up cultural and activists’ connections between the American and British peace movement.

Likewise, as the American antinuclear movement matured in 1983 it increasingly sought to develop Anglo-American ties. Following disappointments in Congress and the announcement of SDI in spring 1983, the American antinuclear movement turned their focus to building a transnational public sphere out of disarmament ideas that could challenge deterrence assumptions that guided U.S. and NATO nuclear policymaking. At nearly every critical site of antinuclear discourse in the United Kingdom and the United States some form of public diplomacy linked the two peace movements. The replication and coordination of protest by the American and British peace movements globalized

their grassroots elements. These transatlantic links became crucial to reinforcing progressive politics in both countries.

Antinuclear women emerged as keen practitioners of public diplomacy by simultaneously representing themselves as local, national, and transnational actors. In summer 1983, the Women’s Encampment for a Future of Peace and Justice occupied a 51-acre plot adjacent to the Army Depot in Seneca Falls, New York, the storage site for intermediate range nuclear missiles bound for Europe. The location of the protest in Seneca county, the birthplace of the modern women’s rights movement in the United States, enhanced the symbolic effect of the protest and intertwined European antinuclear concerns with American feminism.

The peace camp’s immediate purpose was to draw attention to the continued escalation of the arms race, but the encampment had several other goals as well. They deliberately patterned the encampment on the all-women occupation of land surrounding the Greenham Common Royal Air Force base in the south of England, the first site for U.S. INF deployments in all of Europe. The Greenham Common Peace Camp had been established in summer 1981 and had developed a tight linkage between feminism and antinuclear views, while revolutionizing radical protest tactics. The Seneca Encampment built on the Greenham Common example, and took the nuclear debate as an opportunity to build a durable coalition with labor interests and the African American community. Most importantly, they hoped to unite competing feminist perspectives into a sustained and potent political force. Running from 4 July through Labor Day weekend in 1983,
the first summer of the peace encampment provided a forum for feminists to grapple with internal divisions through joint action.

Antinuclear opposition encouraged a reconciliation of feminist philosophies. Themes in Joan Cavanagh’s poem, “I Am a Dangerous Woman,” inserted into orientation materials by Seneca Encampment organizers to emphasize their unity mission, reflected the most prominent variations of feminism born out of the Women’s Liberation Movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. Speaking against militarized masculinity, Cavanagh’s affirmation that “we are of the same earth, Born of the same Mother,” resonated with ecofeminists who viewed humanity and nature as an interconnected web threatened by the deleterious effects of the nuclear establishment. The notion of militarized masculinity derived from the radical feminist view that gender socialization created violent men and timid women. For radical feminists, gender socialization that made men violent in personal interactions scaled up to the political realm. Socialist feminists identified with the passage, “To War, Made our Children go hungry, Made our Mothers whores, Made our bombs, our bullets, our “Food for Peace,” that eulogized the vulnerable masses marginalized and impoverished by the resource consumption of the military-industrial complex. Implicit and explicit connections between motherhood and forgiveness throughout the poem alluded to a celebration of female qualities that defined cultural feminism.

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739 Cavanagh, “I Am a Dangerous Woman.”
740 Ibid.
Greenham Common Women helped plan and participated in the establishment of nine “twinned” peace camps in the United States. Apart from Seneca, the most notable was at Puget Sound, which created a women’s occupation of multiple stages of the INF life cycle (Puget Sound: production; Seneca Falls: storage and shipment; Greenham Common: deployment). In both thought and action, British and American antinuclear feminism exerted a mutual influence on each other. Contemporary observers remarked that this engagement added nuance to the “little England” idea, by suggesting that a “smaller Britain” should expand its official and unofficial cooperation with the larger world. Familiarity with U.S. antinuclear debates, culture, and legal system from its interactions with Americans and American peace camps primed Greenham Common Women for their own direct action against the Reagan administration.


743 Snitow, “Holding the Line at Greenham.”
Cooperation between American and British antinuclear feminists revived arguments that no qualitative moral difference existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, especially when many British citizens expressed sympathy for the peace movement argument that extensive U.S. military infrastructure in the United Kingdom could be deemed an unwanted occupation of Britain. With the last round of INF negotiations quickly approaching in advance of November deployments of Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles to NATO basing countries, U.S. and British officials grew increasingly concerned that the peace movement had reestablished the moral case against Reagan and Thatcher’s approach to deterrence and arms control.

U.S. officials stressed that “key events, outside the negotiations, which represent either potential opportunities to be exploited or neutralized” should be used to steady the
nerves of potentially wayward allies.\textsuperscript{744} When the Soviets downed a Korean Air Lines (KAL 007) passenger flight from New York to Seoul on 1 September, both Reagan and Thatcher capitalized on the tragedy to depict the Soviet Union as a paranoid negotiating partner estranged from the community of civilized nations.\textsuperscript{745} The incident resulted in the death of the crew and all 269 passengers on board, including Congressman Larry McDonald (R-GA), the influential head of the virulently anti-communist John Birch Society.\textsuperscript{746}

The KAL 007 incident provided Reagan and Thatcher an unexpected public diplomacy opportunity, a clear example of the moral contrast between the Western world and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{747} Reagan, aided by Thatcher, organized a U.N. rebuke of the Soviet Union. The Soviets predictably used their veto to negate the censure. Reagan’s simultaneous insistence that arms control must press forward benefited NATO leaders, especially West German officials searching for proof of the sincerity of U.S. disarmament efforts.\textsuperscript{748} The U.S. Information Agency made KAL 007, and Reagan’s response, a feature of specialized public diplomacy materials and broadcast spots, releasing selective

\textsuperscript{746} For more on KAL 007, see Alexander Dallin, \textit{Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers} (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).
\textsuperscript{748} No. 10 Record of Conversation between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, 21 September 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1036 f54.
and at times misleadingly edited information to fuel the public perception of a moral

749 According to Raymond Garthoff, Reagan “seemed to enjoy again being liberated as a crusader against the evil empire,” because it allowed him to revive his critique of Soviet morality, which had keyed the president’s public diplomacy surrounding his administration’s pursuit of nuclear superiority.\footnote{Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), 127.}

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Reagan’s efforts culminated in his introduction of the revised U.S. INF approach to the United Nations General Assembly on 26 September. The New York Times observed that the president’s presentation of moral themes in a highly symbolic space for a massive international broadcast audience epitomized the administration’s pursuit of “new public diplomacy,” an exercise of soft power judged in the moment to be more effective for altering the balance of power than any category of military equipment.\footnote{James Reston, “Washington; Reagan’s Public Diplomacy,” The New York Times, 28 September 1983.} Citing the Kremlin’s responses to KAL 007 as a “timely reminder of just how different the Soviets’ concept of truth and international cooperation is from that of the rest of the world,” Reagan emphasized what he saw as U.S. flexibility and initiative on arms control in an effort to achieve equal reductions. The three new criteria offered by the president echoed the earlier discussion at Williamsburg. First, reductions must be achieved on a global basis. Second, the U.S. expanded negotiations to consider reductions in aircraft in
addition to missiles. Third, Washington accepted the possibility of mixed reductions bringing down the levels of both ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and the more threatening Pershing IIs. Reference to third-party nuclear systems were conspicuously absent from Reagan’s U.N. address, allowing for Britain and France to assert themselves as sovereign nuclear powers.

The combination of Washington’s increased emphasis on public diplomacy and its simultaneous credibility gap with much of Europe provided Britain an opening to become a more prominent actor in international security politics. British officials were in the midst of preparing for a critical conference on Anglo-Soviet relations at the prime minister’s Chequers country retreat when KAL 007 was shot down. At Chequers, British policymakers approved of new efforts to elevate Britain’s profile in East-West relations in order to gradually incorporate the Soviet Union into an Anglo-American world order, even if that meant little internal change in the Soviet system. The U.K.’s role in arms control topped the agenda, especially as officials contemplated Thatcher’s response to Andropov’s public letter of 27 August 1983 that insisted Britain include its nuclear forces in INF talks.

Thatcher asserted Britain’s role in Cold War politics and staked out a position of powerbroker between the United States, NATO, and the Soviet Union with her reply to Andropov. British officials hoped to curb the Soviet propaganda edge, suspecting the

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754 Michael Heseltine to Margaret Thatcher, “Britain and Arms Control,” 1 September 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/979.
Kremlin might publish the exchange of letters. In drafting the reply, British diplomats took the opportunity to consult with allies at the NATO working and ministerial levels to reinforce Western resolve, particularly in light of Greece’s recent disassociation from the dual-track strategy. West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed with their British counterparts that Britain’s reply to Andropov should defend its nuclear sovereignty and the exclusion of Britain’s independent deterrent from INF talks. West German officials reasoned that a show of nuclear independence by the United Kingdom in exchanges with the Soviet Union could help ease the pressure in the Bundestag debate by demonstrating Europe’s influence in arms control negotiations.\(^755\)

British diplomats delivered Thatcher’s reply to the Kremlin on 27 September 1983, one day after Reagan’s announcement of new U.S. positions on INF negotiations. Thatcher noted that the British strategic deterrent represented a mere three percent of the Soviet arsenal, and argued that intermediate range forces should remain the subject of negotiations. Britain’s willingness to join arms control talks only after the Soviet Union and United States drastically shrunk the size of their arsenals appealed both to Washington’s slogan of “deep reductions” and West German and Dutch audiences who wished for Europe’s nuclear powers to consider the inclusion of their own forces.\(^756\)

The end of September 1983 marked the beginning of one of the most critical periods in British nuclear diplomacy during Thatcher’s tenure. After talks with the West

\(^755\) No. 10 Record of Conversation between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, 21 September 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1036 f54; R.B. Bone to A.J. Coles, “INF,” 5 September 1983, (TNA), PREM 19/979 f65; R.B. Bone to Tim Flesher, “Mr. Andropov’s Message to the Prime Minister on INF,” 31 August 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/979 f76.

\(^756\) Margaret Thatcher to Yuri Andropov, 27 September 1983, (CAC) THCR 3/1/33 Part 1 f95.
Germans, she left for Washington, where she discussed American and British arms control efforts and the political scene in West Germany. Reagan’s and Thatcher’s Washington meeting foreshadowed a shift in the president’s arms control attitudes. Whereas Reagan remained largely uninterested in disarmament throughout 1981 and 1982, the nuclear politics in the years that followed provoked the president’s inner arms controller. Now engaged, Reagan sincerely agreed with Thatcher regarding the necessity of arms control, though he remained unwavering in his belief that the Soviets would only seriously negotiate after INF deployments.

Thatcher’s visit to the United States in fall 1983, especially her private meeting with Reagan on 29 September, was among the first steps to implementing the Chequers decision for the United Kingdom to play a larger role in East-West relations. The prime minister lectured congressional leaders on nuclear issues and asserted herself on other matters related to economic warfare and the Cold War in the global south. Her address at the Winston Churchill Foundation Award dinner in front of Washington’s political elite carried on the rhetorical line that Reagan had employed throughout September. She reheated the neoconservative claim of mirror-imaging, warning, “we must not fall into the trap of projecting our own morality onto Soviet leaders. They do not share our aspirations: they are not constrained by our ethics…their power is sustained by myth.”

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Increasingly visible public diplomacy coordination between Reagan and Thatcher presented the Anglo-American antinuclear movement with more opportunities for joint action. On 9 November 1983, thirteen women from the Greenham Common Peace Camp, including U.S. citizen Deborah Law, joined U.S. Congressmen Ronald Dellums (D-CA) and Ted Weiss (D-NY) in a lawsuit demanding that Ronald Reagan recall ground launched cruise missiles from the United Kingdom. Greenham Common women plaintiffs argued the cruise missiles violated the fifth and ninth amendments by making nuclear war inevitable. Dellums and Weiss added to the suit, claiming that deployment of cruise missiles violated the right of Congress to declare war and provide for the defense and welfare of the United States.\footnote{Greenham Women Against Cruise, “Latest News,” (LSE) 7JAN 2012/16, Box 3; Greenham Common Women Against Cruise, “American Court Case: Press Update,” 23 October 1983 (LSE) 7JAN 2012/16, Box 3; Greenham Common Women Against Cruise, “American Court Case,” 9 November 1983, (LSE) 7JAN 2012/16, Box 3.}

The purpose of the Greenham Common suit could not have been a highly unlikely victory in the courts—which surely would be overturned—but rather public diplomacy. The case featured elements of the new public diplomacy: engagement between government officials and foreign publics as well as arguments for specific security policies made by a variety of expert surrogates who endeavored to create a new language and logic for discussing nuclear war. It also is instructive of why nuclear politics in the 1980s fits the two-way model of public diplomacy—by which domestic and foreign citizens can make policy contributions—rather than propaganda’s unidirectional flow of government information for public consumption.

The plaintiff’s choice of witnesses was indicative of the transatlantic antinuclear movement’s concerted attempts to unpack the black box around deterrence imposed by
governments, specifically the executive branch. Witnesses included SANA members; MIT weapons expert Kosta Tsipis; U.S. based missile designer Micho Kaku; Robert Lifton, an American psychological authority on nuclear war; retired U.S. Admiral Gene Laroque; END co-founder Mary Kaldor as peace and technology expert; clinical psychologists and medical experts; leaders of the Church of England, Scottish Churches, Judaism, and the eminent head of British Methodism Dr. Kenneth Greet; and Sean MacBride, an international lawyer and Nobel Peace Prize winner. The filing of the suit coincided with a massive campaign led by Greenham Common women to blockade all 102 U.S. military installations in the United Kingdom on the same day. Antinuclear film, music, and poetry were key cultural tools for the mobilization of demonstrators across the United Kingdom as were the NWFZ that had twinned with many such zones in the United States.

Though the U.S. Southern District Court eventually dismissed the lawsuit in on the grounds that it sought judgment of a political question, the episode demonstrated the interconnectivity of the American and British antinuclear movements. GCW attempts to establish new channels for transatlantic nuclear dissent in foreign courts and replicate their peace camps abroad exemplified how antinuclear activists sought to reimagine political community by intellectual space instead of by geographical place.

Both Reagan and Thatcher were now fixated on preventing transnational protest communities from blocking INF deployments in NATO basing countries, especially in West Germany. Recent local elections in West Germany had emboldened antinuclear activists.

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761 Ibid.
762 Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. supp. 1332 (1984). Rudy Giuliani, the future mayor of New York City, served as lead defense attorney for the administration.
elements in the Bundestag and generated ten days of antinuclear protest across the country; these political winds culminated in over a million demonstrators pouring into the streets to challenge INF deployments set to arrive in a few weeks.763 In light of mounting antinuclear pressure, the Kohl-Genscher coalition government—which had been waveriing on the deployment issue since summer—accepted a Bundestag debate on 22 November to determine if West Germany would accept the basing of U.S. Pershing II missiles.

The Reagan administration’s credibility problems in Europe made British diplomacy in the final months of 1983 all the more important in shoring up West German resolve. In terms of public diplomacy, USIA officials identified the U.S. embassy in London as the critical European hub for its new WORLDNET television service, through which leading British journalists engaged in direct conversations with senior U.S. nuclear policymakers via satellite to foster a climate of favorable opinion.764 Thatcher took the lead on private diplomacy. She joined Helmut Schmidt during his preparations for his Bundestag address in support of INF. Though Schmidt retreated from the INF debate when he left office as Chancellor in October 1982 and stepped down as leader of the SPD, he retained influence through his seat in the Bundestag and as co-publisher of the respected national newspaper Die Zeit.765 His meeting with Thatcher confirmed the importance of an expanded British role in East-West relations for managing West German public opinion. Whitehall’s nuclear diplomacy compensated for the lack of

764 Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation, 82.
respect throughout West Germany for the American officials managing arms control, save for Shultz and Nitze.\textsuperscript{766}

The Anglo-German summit of 8-9 November 1983 served as the last major British diplomatic initiative on INF prior to missile deployments in Europe. October had provided a wealth of data points for the Kohl-Genscher coalition government to publicize in an effort to prove the West’s sincere commitment to reducing nuclear danger in Europe. Meetings of NATO’s high-level group and nuclear-planning group in late October 1983 produced the Montebello Decision, which called for the withdrawal of 1400 tactical nuclear warheads from Europe; the decision was taken with European publics and the looming Bundestag debate in mind.\textsuperscript{767} Paul Nitze presented the Soviets with a series of proposals in Geneva from late September into early November. Each received the same negative reaction.\textsuperscript{768} In late October, the U.S. invasion of Grenada—a Caribbean island nation that was a member of the British Commonwealth—once again tested European confidence in Reagan. Thatcher scolded Reagan for authorizing an invasion of a member of the Commonwealth of Nations without consulting the British government.\textsuperscript{769} American officials feared its impact on the INF consensus, but at the summit the British and West Germans coordinated their media response to ensure that Grenada did not become symbolic of a wider rift in the alliance.\textsuperscript{770} In private conversations, Kohl expressed to Thatcher that at the present moment what mattered

\textsuperscript{766} No. 10 Record of Conversation between Margaret Thatcher and Herr Helmut Schmidt, 7 October 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1246 f9.
\textsuperscript{767} The widely endorsed decision was part of Pierre Trudeau’s peace mission.
\textsuperscript{769} Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, 26 October 1983, (RRPL) NSC Executive Secretariat, United Kingdom Country Files
most was continued unity between Britain, West Germany, and France on the matter of deployments.\textsuperscript{771}

American and British officials believed that the failure of the Soviet strategy to use the INF crucible to divide NATO became apparent in late October and November 1983.\textsuperscript{772} Garthoff’s analysis of Andropov’s response to the West’s comments regarding KAL 007, and those from other senior members of the Politburo, reveals that Soviet officials found Reagan increasingly dogmatic in his hunt for nuclear superiority. Stepped-up U.S. and NATO military operations around the Soviet periphery accompanied the rhetorical recriminations delivered by Washington since Reagan’s inauguration. Both reached a zenith in late autumn of 1983, and Kremlin leaders, apparently, lost all confidence in the sincerity of their arms control interlocutors in Geneva.\textsuperscript{773}

The sharp rise in U.S.-Soviet tensions was a key part of the backdrop to Operation Able Archer, a joint NATO exercise in Europe simulating a nuclear war that coincided with the Anglo-German summit. According to Nate Jones, Able Archer alarmed the Soviet leadership so thoroughly that they nearly authorized a nuclear strike.\textsuperscript{774} Cruise missile deployments for Europe first arrived in the United Kingdom on 14 November.

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No. 10 Record of Conversation between Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Kohl, 9 November 1983, (TNA) PREM 19/1765 f227.


\textsuperscript{773} Garthoff, The Great Transition, 118-140.

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The first battery of Pershing II missiles came to West Germany less than 24 hours after
the Bundestag vote on 22 November. That same day, Soviet negotiators walked out of
INF talks with no proposals to resume negotiations in the future.

A Stop to Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

Soviet negotiators stayed true to their word. Andropov’s Pravda editorial of 2
January 1983 had noted that the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles would
invalidate any progress on START and lead to the cancellation of talks. Days before
Andropov’s warning, U.S. START lead negotiator General Ed Rowny had projected a
50/50 chance of reaching an agreement in an interview with NBC. In sharp contrast to
the amiable relationship between the Soviet and American INF ambassadors, the
dissonance between Rowny’s prediction and the Pravda critique exemplified how far
apart the White House and the Kremlin remained on strategic arms control in 1983.
Viktor Karpov, the veteran diplomat heading up the Soviet’s START delegation in
Geneva, concluded the fifth round of START on 8 December 1983 by declaring, “in view
of the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe, which has already begun, changes in
the global strategic situation make it necessary for the Soviet side to review all problems

775 James M. Markham, “First U.S. Pershing Missiles Delivered in West Germany,” The New York Times,
24 November 1983.
776 Kraemer to McFarlane, “INF – Summary of Round VI,” (RRPL) National Security Council Records,
Subject Files, Box 2, Folder; William Staples to Robert Kimmott, “Chronologies of US and Soviet
Reduction Talks (START) and Soviet Reactions to U.S. Proposals, by Lynn Rusten, 83-620 S (December
1983), 5; Hurd Call on General Rowny, 14 March 1983, (TNA) FCO 46/3514.
under discussion.” As a consequence of INF deployments, the Soviets left without agreeing to future dates for additional START talks.779

A week after Soviet suspension of strategic arms control negotiations, Nitze and Rowny sent a joint memo to the new head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Kenneth Adelman and Secretary of State Shultz on the future of arms control that concluded, “we do not believe that combining START and INF would be in the U.S. interest.”780 The two arms control ambassadors organized their assessment around the rejection of a merger of INF and START talks, an idea that had begun to appeal to many Western Europeans but that also could benefit the Soviet Union. Nitze and Rowny reasoned that a merger would undo the marginal gains achieved in Geneva, with allies, and in Washington over the previous two years. With arms control talks suspended, or perhaps even cancelled, it is not clear what gains had been made.

Nitze and Rowny argued that maintaining two separate tracks for arms control in itself represented an accomplishment because it allowed the United States to better manage its public diplomacy campaign against the Soviet peace offensive. Failure to ratify SALT II detached the issue of intermediate range forces from the strategic arms framework even before Reagan took office. The Soviet Union condemned U.S. forward based systems and insisted on the inclusion of British and French systems throughout 1983 as a major component of its peace offensive to sway Europe into pressuring the U.S. back into a single negotiation. U.S. negotiators believed the Soviets favored a single negotiation since it would benefit their negotiators by allowing them to blur distinctions

779 Talbott, Deadly Gambits, 342.
on strategic and INF weapons. Due to forward basing of INF missiles on European soil, both categories of U.S. weapons could strike the Soviet Union, but only Soviet strategic systems could strike the United States directly. Soviet insistence on merging talks occurred not just on the public diplomacy front, but also informally during the summer round of negotiations. Both the Dutch and Danish parliaments adopted resolutions calling for a unification of the talks, and the Italians gave it serious consideration.

Britain remained adamantly opposed to a merger of talks. Whitehall did not like the idea of the United States potentially trading away deterrence capabilities designed for European protection to retain strategic advantages, or the idea of allowing U.S. delegates to represent British interests in two-party talks. Nitze and Rowny also predicted future irritations for the alliance over the issue of consultation. The allies enjoyed significant input and consultations in crafting U.S. INF positions, especially through NATO working and ministerial groups. On START, however, the U.S. merely informed the rest of the Atlantic alliance of its approach. Asking NATO partners to moderate their consultative expectations in merged negotiations did not seem like a realistic option.

British interest in START revolved around the exclusion of its national deterrent from arms control and safeguarding present and future prospects for nuclear cooperation between the United States and United Kingdom. In addition to the matter of cooperation, the British recognized that contentious negotiations on START could negatively affect INF talks, which provided political cover for GLCM deployments in the United Kingdom.

782 Nitze and Rowny, “Combining INF and START.”
Kingdom. Whitehall also considered strategic arms control an essential element to the policy of “minimum deterrence” based on the “Moscow criteria.” British strategic planners based their comparatively low strategic force levels on the ability to destroy a small number of key cities and strategic targets, with Moscow at the top of the target list. The ability to penetrate the Galosh anti-ballistic missile defense system surrounding Moscow thus became a primary determinant in establishing the number of nuclear weapons in the British arsenal. Should strategic arms control fail, the Soviets might be inclined to develop more defensive systems to offset an unconstrained expansion of the U.S. arsenal. U.K. strategic planners would therefore be faced with the challenge of justifying an expansion the British arsenal to maintain confidence in the policy of minimum deterrence to an already skeptical general public. Mindful of these interests, British officials impressed upon American colleagues the importance of START talks.784

Whitehall remained committed to two separate negotiations based in part of the personalities of the men in charge of each. In comparing START and INF talks in March 1983, one British civil servant summed up to a colleague the general sentiment in Whitehall toward the two ambassadors, commenting, “Rowny… is no Nitze.”785 During SALT talks Nitze earned a reputation as a master of technical details and excellent judge of Soviet personalities. Moreover, Europeans widely considered his walk-in-the-woods proposal during INF talks in the summer of 1982 and other backchannel efforts to be a positive measure of U.S. sincerity in arms control.786 In contrast, Rowny’s already limited

784 On the activity of British officials impressing upon American colleagues the importance of START, S.W.J. Fuller to Oliver Wright, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington: START,” 24 August 1983, (TNA) FCO 46/3515.
credibility in Europe nose-dived after the early 1983 revelation of his plans to undermine James Goodby, who served as the number two diplomat on the U.S. START delegation. The anti-auts control cohort at the Pentagon identified Goodby as the delegate most interested in reaching an agreement with the Soviets. Rowny claimed Goodby wanted “an agreement at any price” in a memorandum the press labeled a “hit-list.”  

The Rowny memo served another reminder to European allies of the divide between Pentagon hardliners, represented by Rowny on the START team, and Shultz’s State Department which maintained closest contacts with Goodby. The United Kingdom and NATO allies much preferred the State Department approach in the interagency debate. Keeping INF under Nitze and unburdened by Rowny thus served Whitehall’s interests.

The most significant area of progress worthy of protection from a merger of talks came not between the United States and Soviet Union or with NATO partners, but rather between the White House and Congress. Reagan’s public diplomacy operations had provided enough leverage in dealing with Congress that the Scowcroft Report formed the basis of a fragile bipartisan compromise. In effect, the Scowcroft Report could be considered an arms control “treaty” reached by centrist Democrats and the Reagan administration. Senators Cohen, Nunn, and Percy along with Congressmen Aspin, Gore, and Dicks had led the bipartisan effort in Congress that permitted Reagan to introduce his preferred negotiating posture for START talks in NSDD 98 in June 1983. That

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negotiating position called for a cap at 850 on ICBMs and for constraints on throw weight to reduce the Soviet three to one advantage in that area.788

Deals with the Democrats in Washington did not translate into progress with Soviet negotiators, but protection of the bipartisan compromise nonetheless factored into arms control talks being held in Geneva. In response to the 8 June proposal, the Soviets argued that the new U.S. position still required unilateral Soviet disarmament due to the Reagan administration’s dedication to the throw weight criteria. Mindful of the need to demonstrate to Congress a good faith effort to break impasses in arms control, Reagan revised the U.S. position in October. In announcing the administration’s build-down modification to the START proposal on 4 October, Reagan also introduced R. James Woolsey Jr. as a delegate-at-large to the START talks. A former undersecretary of the Navy in the Carter administration and member of Scowcroft Commission who functioned primarily as a congressional liaison, Woolsey also advised Senator John Glenn’s (D-OH) early-stage presidential campaign. By the time of his appointment to the START delegation, Woolsey had firmed up his alliance with arms controllers in Congress.789 The build-down remained in step with the central negotiating plank of reduction to 5,000 ballistic missile warheads (not strategic delivery vehicles), and offered a course for five-

percent annual cuts. Under the proposal, the modernization of one ICBM warhead required the retirement of two; for SLBMs the trade-off was two for three.\footnote{790} 

TASS, the Soviet news wire service, carried the initial reaction from Moscow to the October proposal, which denounced the U.S. statement as a false promise of flexibility. \textit{Pravda} followed with a more comprehensive condemnation later in the month, accusing the United States of building a proposal solely to gain congressional consent for the “rearm America program.”\footnote{791} Though both the June and October proposals from the United States offered to “put everything on the table,” the Soviets argued that the focus on reducing land-based ballistic missiles and the marginal attention given to other strategic delivery vehicles exemplified American efforts to dictate Soviet force structure.\footnote{792} Soviet negotiators insisted on rehabilitating the SALT framework, pointing out that the SALT formula included a procedure for equating strategic bombers, land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range cruise missiles.\footnote{793} 

Western leaders hoped to wait out the aging Soviet leadership during the last days of the Leonid Brezhnev era, Andropov’s short tenure, and the brief period when Chernenko led the Soviet Union from February 1984 to March 1985. The Politburo may have also hoped to wait out Reagan’s time in office. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko characterized the Reagan administration as “the voice for the most extreme,

\footnote{792} Ibid.
aggressive circles, for their most reactionary, extreme wing.” In the context of arms control cancellation, Gromyko told Politburo colleagues, “they propose that we…sit at the table and calmly conduct negotiations. It’s clear that it is profitable to them…why would we help Reagan? Why should we hold him up by his elbows when he is climbing the stairway to the White House in connection with the presidential elections? This does not suit us.”

The Kremlin’s analysis matched the Reagan administration’s public diplomacy plan. What mattered to U.S. officials was the perception of being seriously committed to arms control, not necessarily negotiating specifics or progress on breaking the deadlock. What Reagan accomplished through the Scowcroft Commission and the ensuing compromises with the Gang of Six provided some insulation from domestic political fallout over a breakdown in arms control talks. Allies of the antinuclear movement in Congress considered the build-down proposal an effective public diplomacy vehicle to “muddy the freeze.”

Reagan’s submission to congressional oversight of arms control proved a tactically ingenious public diplomacy move. Democratic presidential rivals who backed the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission found themselves separated from the party’s most energetic source of organizing support in the form of the nuclear freeze campaign. Several of Reagan’s potential challengers from the Democratic Party had

either explicitly voted yes on MX and approved of the Gang of Six compromises or had direct links to those developments. Former Vice President Walter Mondale, one of the presumptive Democratic favorites for 1984, selected foreign policy advisors for his campaign who advocated for Midgetman deployment and Scowcroft Report recommendations.\footnote{Daniel Southerland, “Midgetman,” The Christian Science Monitor, 20 April 1983.} Mondale remained associated with the arms build-up that occurred late in the Carter administration, a program that included a push to develop the MX missile. Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), who emerged as Mondale’s chief rival for the Democratic nomination, struggled to explain his simultaneous support for the freeze and for the build-down concept. Hart’s claim that he had developed the build-down concept with Democratic colleagues only to have Reagan usurp the idea did not inspire confidence among disarmament activists and contributed to his reputation for being a man of contradictions.\footnote{“Meeting with Senator Gary Hart and Arms Control Activists,” 16 May 1984, (WHMC-SHSMO) NWFC, Box 2; Richard Cohen, “History Was on Gary Hart’s Side, But That Wasn’t Enough,” The Washington Post, 10 June 1984.}

Another potential Democratic presidential nominee, John Glenn, had relied on Woolsey to liaise with Congress while the latter served as a member of the Scowcroft Commission. Given these circumstances, Reagan judged that his reelection chances could survive a breakdown in START talks at the end of 1983.

British officials recognized the unlikelihood of START progressing in late 1983 while both sides concentrated on INF, but Whitehall managed to play a minor role in strategic arms control that autumn. In addition to countering NATO allies on the idea of reformatting arms control,\footnote{Prime Minister Trudeau launched a diplomatic initiative to create five-power nuclear talks that set global caps on strategic forces. See Prime Minister Trudeau to Margaret Thatcher, 18 November 1983, (CAC) THCR 3/1/34 f95 (T191/83).} Whitehall partnered with Shultz’s State Department to
mitigate the influence of hardline advisors in the Pentagon.\textsuperscript{800} Citing Thatcher’s outsized influence with the president, Shultz’s office requested that the prime minister emphasize to Reagan the importance of flexibility in the fall round of negotiations.\textsuperscript{801} She did so in her September meeting with Reagan, which coincided with the final hours of the administration’s negotiations with the Gang of Six that resulted in the incorporation of the build-down proposal for the autumn round of START negotiations.\textsuperscript{802} In the aftermath of the Soviet suspension of START talks, the U.S. State Department and Whitehall continued to pursue the shared goal of resurrecting negotiations throughout 1984.\textsuperscript{803} The State Department’s trust in the Thatcher government facilitated her ability to act as a superpower broker and keep strategic arms control on course. Whitehall relied on State Department assessments to correct the rosy picture of prospects for START that Rowny sold to the allies.\textsuperscript{804} As the Thatcher government and its arms control allies in Washington searched for backchannel diplomacy options and new approaches to reengage the Soviets on START, a clearer picture of the Strategic Defensive Initiative emerged to complicate both U.S.-Soviet relations and the Anglo-American nuclear partnership.

\textsuperscript{800} U.K. Embassy in Washington to FCO, “START,” 19 October 1983, (TNA) FCO 46/3515.
\textsuperscript{801} Derek Thomas to P.R.R. Wright, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington in September: START,” 11 August 1983, (TNA) FCO 46/3515; S.W.J. Fuller to Mr. Wright, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington: START,” 24 August 1983, (TNA) FCO 46/3515.
\textsuperscript{802} White House Record of Meeting between Reagan and Thatcher, 29 September 1989, (RRPL) Pete Sommer Files, Box 90424, Folder “UK 1983.”
Commenting on the state of arms control and nuclear anxiety, Congressman Gore wrote NSC Advisor Robert McFarland late in 1983, “you do not have enough political capital to risk weathering this storm by standing pat. The question is how to maneuver without wasting precious assets.”

Gore doubted that the fragile domestic political balance and allied unity could withstand the pending collapse of arms control. He pointed to the 100 million Americans who tuned in to watch ABC’s graphic nuclear war drama *The Day After* in November 1983 as evidence of the elevated influence of the nuclear freeze movement in American culture, politics, and life.

Gore also felt he had gained a new edge in negotiations with the Reagan administration on arms control. In late October and early November 1983, Gore’s political ally Carl Sagan had also introduced nuclear winter theory as a new dimension in the deterrence debate that undercut many of the base assumptions guiding Reagan’s nuclear build-up and corresponding arms control strategy. Developed by R.P. Turco, Owen Toon, Todd Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, and Carl Sagan (TTAPS), nuclear winter theory held that in the aftermath of multiple nuclear explosions totaling between 100 and 5,000 megatons, fine dust from ground bursts and smoke and soot from city and forest fires caused by air bursts would rise into the atmosphere. Within one to two weeks, dust and soot encircling the earth would reduce sunlight reaching the surface to a small percent of normal conditions. As a result, land temperatures would plummet to as low as

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negative fifteen to negative twenty-five degrees centigrade. Sub-freezing temperatures would likely persist for several months.\textsuperscript{806}

One day before the start of the conference over Halloween weekend in 1983 intended to promote nuclear winter theory as a foundation for deconstructing deterrence theory, Sagan published a brief article communicating the key nuclear winter conclusions to some 20 million American households in the popular magazine \textit{Parade}.\textsuperscript{807} The over five hundred participants in the Halloween conference—officially named The World After Nuclear War: Conference on Long-Term Worldwide Biological Consequences of Nuclear War—came from twenty countries and included scientists, public officials, religious leaders, environmentalists, members of the defense establishment, antinuclear organizers, and educators.\textsuperscript{808} Sagan’s \textit{Parade} article, which generated an “initial breaking news effect,” was at the center of a major public relations strategy for the conference run by its executive director Chaplin Barnes and the firm Porter, Novelli & Associates.\textsuperscript{809} Conference planners organized newspaper placements in dozens of major and medium size media markets. They secured special segments on national programming including on CNN’s \textit{Crossfire}, ABC’s \textit{World News Tonight}, and NBC’s \textit{Today}.\textsuperscript{810} Gore, who in late 1982 offered the full support of his office to make the Halloween conference a reality, partnered with Senator Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR) and Senator Charles Mathias Jr.

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\textsuperscript{808} Ehrlich et. al., \textit{Cold and the Dark} (1984), xviii.
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(R-MD) to urge fellow members of Congress to attend a special briefing given by Sagan and Paul Ehrlich on the morning of October 31.811

Sagan advanced nuclear winter as the basis for policymaking in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in early December 1983, ahead of the publication of the TTAPS study in *Science* later in the month.812 Sagan made the case for the immediate reduction of global nuclear arsenals below a number that would trigger a climatic catastrophe if used in a full scale nuclear war, which stood somewhere between 500 and 2,000 nuclear warheads.813 Sagan used nuclear winter theory to invalidate the strategic logic of ballistic missile defense, build-down proposals, technological improvements to missile accuracy and related modernization trends, and several other Reagan administration plans to establish U.S. nuclear superiority.814

Reagan officials agreed with Gore that the administration could not stand idle as arms control came undone – rather, it opted to accelerate that prospect. Unlike Gore who suggested a return to a SALT II model framework, the Reagan administration perceived an opportunity to outflank domestic antinuclear opponents, the Kremlin, and nuclear winter proponents by pursuing an ambitious agenda for the Strategic Defense Initiative. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, NSC Advisor Robert McFarlane, White House Counselor Ed Meese, and eventual Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative General James Abrahamson all attempted to generate congressional support and create a domestic

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813 Ibid.
814 Ibid.
consensus on SDI. Their efforts and commitment paled in comparison to those of the
White House science advisor, George Keyworth, who quickly transitioned from BMD
skeptic to true believer when tasked by the president to sell SDI. Eager to help reelect
Reagan, promoting SDI became as much a political campaign as a national security
objective for Keyworth. Managing allied reception of SDI and its role in nuclear
diplomacy fell to Secretary of State George Shultz and his Department, which proved a
problematic assignment for the skeptical elder statesman. Absent strong presidential
leadership, these administration factions promoted competing goals for SDI. Only the
need to discredit opponents united the administration’s SDI campaign.

After the initial reaction to the president’s speech on strategic defense, the debate
over SDI entered into a quiescent period while the press focused on the impending
demise of the INF and START talks and while the Reagan administration considered its
options. Director of the NSC Intelligence Directorate, Kenneth DeGraffenreid,
considered the unfocused SDI opposition in 1983 a blessing to the administration as it
prepared to wage the public diplomacy battle for strategic defense against liberal
opponents. DeGraffenreid believed the widening gulf between conservative and liberal
views represented the biggest challenge the administration faced in persuading the public
to accept SDI, arguing, “the most vocal adherents to MAD are almost exclusively people
who by and large do not believe the United States stands on a qualitatively different plane

815 George Keyworth to Ed Meese, “Campaign Issues,” 31 May 1983, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files,
Box 5, Folder “Meese Correspondence.”
816 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 249-250.
817 War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, “Missile Experimental,” Interview with James Abrahamson,
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_2FBA42E09B35472EBCC271799D1F92B3
from the Soviet Union, that our country is a ‘city set on a hill… they do not believe that there are ascertainable standards from which we can distinguish evil from good…”818

The Reagan administration’s public diplomacy plan sold SDI as a righteous unilateral action. DeGraffenreid’s comments suggested that cooperation between parties with dissimilar values could not produce a moral outcome, but rather a “false utopia.”819 SDI proponents considered the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Systems (ABM) Treaty of 1972 to be the quintessential false utopia. The treaty, which banned defensive systems, had earned widespread praise as a monumental achievement in superpower relations and yet the Reagan administration viewed it as a relic of détente. George Shultz reluctantly noted to Reagan late in November, “we will have to violate or renegotiate the ABM and other treaties. We will need to consider new measures to assure a smooth transition to a strategic balance relying more on defensive systems.”820

Contemplating the violation or withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) Treaty signified a raised degree of contempt for arms control by the Reagan administration. Though critical of existing arms control agreements, the administration had remained faithful to them – even the unratified SALT II agreement that Reagan and neoconservative allies used to criticize détente while Carter occupied the Oval Office. Perhaps more than any other agreement, the ABM Treaty epitomized the spirit of cooperation in arms control at both the domestic and international level. Within the Nixon administration, advocates for strategic stability who were wary of ABM

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819 Ibid.
deployments reached a compromise with proponents of strategic superiority in favor of ballistic missile defense systems. Both camps agreed on the two-base deployment option codified in 1972 agreement.821 Washington and Moscow, despite mutual misjudgments and miscalculations of the other side’s intentions, produced an effective record of cooperation. ABM negotiations had been delinked from SALT talks in the early 1970s to facilitate progress. Throughout its negotiation and upon its signature, the American and Soviet arms control communities considered the ABM Treaty an important confidence building measure supporting the ambitious goal of reducing offensive nuclear systems.822 Limitations on defensive systems removed the impetus to build more offensive weapons to achieve strategic superiority and thus closed one lane of the action-reaction cycle of the arms race.823

ABM negotiations succeeded in part due to the ambiguity of the treaty language. This ambiguity made the treaty vulnerable to Reagan administration attempts to undermine the agreement and depict the Soviet Union as non-compliant. For negotiators of the 1972 agreement, future technological developments emerged as a particularly difficult issue to resolve. Ironically, American negotiators under Nixon insisted that the Soviets accept Article V of the ABM Treaty, which forbid either party from future development, testing, or deployment of mobile-land, sea, air, and space-based ABM

systems or components that SDI now appeared to violate. The vague language of Agreed Statement D which stated that future ABM systems “based on other physical principles” would be subject to discussion in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) between the two superpowers. This provided the Reagan administration with broad interpretative flexibility particularly in the area of directed energy weapons.

Three studies completed in October 1983 underpinned Shultz’s assessment of SDI in relation to the ABM Treaty. The Reagan administration commissioned these studies in March/April 1983 to define the scope of a research and development program for SDI and evaluate its political and strategic significance. The Pentagon Defensive Technology Study, or Fletcher Report, evaluated the technical feasibility of the program for ballistic missile defense. Former NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher headed a study team of approximately 60 scientists and engineers including well-known figures such as former Los Alamos Director Harold Agnew, the Director of the Scripps Institute for Oceanography William Nierenberg, and prominent industrialist and veteran DOD official David Packard. Assessing the state of technology in six fields and the prospect of their integration, the Fletcher Panel deemed defense-based deterrence reliant on new technologies a realistic possibility in the next ten to twenty years. Those fields evaluated

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by the panel including target surveillance, acquisition, and tracking; directed energy weapons (DEW); conventional weapons; battle management, communications, and data processing; integrated systems and architecture concepts; countermeasures and tactics. Despite the prominence of its members, critics charged that panel drew solely upon conservative and hawkish defense experts deemed to be true believers rather than discriminating scientists.\textsuperscript{827}

Fletcher’s study proposed defense-in-depth, a multi-layered system for strategic defense that targeted three of the four phases of a modern ballistic missile trajectories. A multi-layered defense allowed a certain degree of leakage at each phase while maintaining a near perfect shield, thus lessening the technical challenges posed by reliance on a single layered system. During the boost phase, primary and secondary rockets lift the missile out of the atmosphere, emitting highly observable contrails and other launch indicators. Most importantly, the missile, its warheads loaded on multiple independent reentry vehicles, and its penetration aids remained intact. Interception in the boost-phase required only one interceptor action. Once in the second, or post-boost phase, penetration decoys and reentry vehicles break away from the boost rockets creating multiple targets. In the mid-course phase, the reentry vehicles and penetration aids travel along their atmospheric ballistic trajectories. Reentry vehicles and penetration aids reenter the atmosphere and reach their target in the terminal phase. Advancements in directed energy weapons—including those made by Teller’s protégés at Livermore—underpinned the Fletcher panel’s recommendation that ballistic missile defense merited a reassessment. Possibilities for midcourse interception improved due to new concepts in

radar, tracking, and multispectral sensors. These elements for target discrimination along with improvements in high velocity kinetic weapons increased the potential effectiveness of missile defense in the terminal phase. Making these systems survivable remained a critical and underexplored dilemma, but this issue in no way dampened the panel’s technological optimism.\textsuperscript{828}

Two teams conducted the Future Security Strategy Study that explored the implications for the U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship. Fred Iklé, one of the civilian arms control antagonists at the Pentagon, selected Fred S. Hoffman to lead the external study team. A veteran of the Johnson administration and RAND corporation who specialized in strategic studies, Hoffman and his group of experts framed the president’s strategic defense ambition as a moral directive that should drive technological development. The panel’s suspicion of arms control further motivated its endorsement of a search for a technological solution to Western nuclear vulnerability. Hoffman’s executive summary argued, “The Soviets have often used arms negotiations to pursue competitive military advantage,” and that “arms agreements, despite widespread Western hopes for them, have to date failed to prevent growing instability in the balance—and deterioration—in the Western position relative to the East.” They concluded that Reagan’s initiative should emphasize intermediate options that could enhance deterrence in route to the development of a population defense of the continental United States.\textsuperscript{829}


Intermediate missile defenses designed to mitigate the failures of arms control did so by raising the uncertainty factor of Soviet planners. Confronted with robust defenses of critical hardened targets such as U.S. missile silos or command, control, and communications systems (C3), Soviet planners would have to contemplate the limited effectiveness of an ICBM attack. Hoffman panelists reasoned, “uncertainty is a dominant factor in all combat, creating an unlimited demand for superiority in forces. Soviet planners seek ways to control uncertainty but, faced with uncertainty over which they cannot exercise a high degree of control, Soviet military action may be deterred.” Consideration of alliance relationships factored into the study’s purview as well. Among the recommended intermediate defense options, Hoffman’s panel intended the suggestion of anti-tactical missile defense to reassure NATO allies of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. Considering the focus on intermediate options, the reassurance of allies important to the INF mission, the uncertainty calculations, and a preference for unilateral technological action in response to the perceived failure of arms control to moderate Soviet behavior; one could interpret the Hoffman study’s proposals to “enhance deterrence” not as a call to gradually shift toward the assured survival promised by Reagan, but rather as a the revival of the search for strategic superiority.830

Both the Fletcher and Hoffman reports illustrate the administration’s intensified search for strategic superiority. The search for strategic superiority via defensive means meant violating the most successful arms control treaty in force and required a tightly controlled SDI narrative that stressed the moral promise of assured survival and Soviet bad intentions. The administration prohibited contacts between the approximately 60

830 Ibid.
members of the Fletcher panel and Congress. Executive branch privilege prevented Congress from examining the second report submitted under the auspices of the Future Security Strategy Study, which was the Interagency Working Group Study completed under the Director of Strategic Forces Franklin Miller of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.  

Reagan and his advisors resolved to develop a message of Soviet ABM Treaty noncompliance in a meeting of the National Security Council on 30 November 1983 in order to extract money from Congress to fund SDI according to the recommendations of the Fletcher and Hoffman panels. The pro-BMD faction of the National Security Council had encouraged CIA Director William Casey to establish grounds for accusing the Soviets of ABM Treaty noncompliance almost from the moment Reagan entered office in 1981. The intelligence community assessment as late as October 1982, however, had confirmed that the Soviet Union ABM activities remained compliant with arms control agreements. An interim intelligence interagency study delivered in September 1983 considered it “highly unlikely” that the Soviets would pursue a crash BMD program of their own in response to SDI. Despite these findings, Reagan directed the Defense Department, State Department, and CIA to put the Soviet ballistic missile defense program in the “context of overall Soviet efforts to possess a

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831 Rearden, Congress and SDIO, 70-77.
comprehensive strategic defensive capability.” In a review of the final interagency study three weeks later, the National Security Planning Group found seven potential areas of Soviet arms control non-compliance to emphasize in public. Only one of those possible violations—the Krasnoyarsk radar complex under construction—ran afoul of the ABM Treaty.

On 6 January 1984, Reagan issued NSDD 119 to authorize the formation of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) to see through the recommendations of the Fletcher and Hoffman studies. The SDIO reported directly to the Secretary of Defense, operating separately from the bureaucracies of the various branches of the armed services. Though the panels officially offered an optimistic picture of SDI technologies, Keyworth’s own consultations with the study teams revealed that no single technology deserved exclusive development. Therefore, multiple technologies ranging from Graham’s kinetic kill vehicle concept to Teller’s favored x-ray laser were to be pursued in competition with each other. The SDIO also gained authority over existing missile defense programs pursued by the Air Force and the Army so that demonstrations of intercept capabilities could generate political support over the course of the 1980s.

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Reagan’s public diplomacy strategy in pursuit of SDI involved making every aspect of arms control a publicly contestable issue. Quickly following the SDI decision, the White House introduced the seven compliance concerns to Congress and the public later in January 1984.\footnote{842 Ronald Reagan, “National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 121: Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements” 14 January 1984, (RRPL) National Security Council Executive Secretariat Records, 1981-1987, RAC Box 6.} Gerard Smith, the lead ABM negotiator, explained that the administration’s decision to level public accusations of Soviet noncompliance violated arms control norms and the spirit of the agreement. Under the terms of the ABM Treaty, the Special Consultative Commission existed to litigate potential treaty violations.\footnote{843 Gerard Smith, Paul Warnke, Herbert Scoville, “Alleged Violations of Arms Control Agreements,” 18 January 1984, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 1.} Critics clearly and correctly interpreted the administration’s report on Soviet noncompliance as a public-relations play to extract funding from Congress.

Reagan entrusted Keyworth to lead much of the SDI lobbying effort. Most of the senior national security officials who might normally take charge of a major defense initiative had exhausted much of their political capital advocating for other elements of the president’s modernization program. Keyworth also stood unrivaled among Reagan’s close advisors in his ability to explain the technical dimensions of SDI. He found that the disjointed rollout of SDI engendered difficulties with the two groups most essential to realizing the president’s vision: Congress and the scientific community. The administration needed Congress to fund the program and the scientific community to develop the exotic technologies required for an effective multi-layered ballistic missile defense. As a result of the stark moral vision offered to curry public and congressional favor, the NSC staff observed, “we are seeing a catch-22 developing as our efforts to
avoid adverse political consequences begin to cost the SDI support in DoD and the scientific community.”

Keyworth complained to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger that the JASONs—a long-standing influential body of external scientists advising on the technical dimensions of national security—“were faced with salesmen who were themselves not—too—sure of what they were selling,” which left the group with severe reservations. Keyworth argued that that the administration’s briefers sold the idea of a perfect or near-perfect population defense, which the president never once considered to be SDI’s endgame and thus generated substantial confusion.

In fact, most of Reagan’s advisors did not know what they were selling since the only obvious reasons for the program remained the president’s political needs and his moral sensibilities. Certainly, these reasons alone did not justify a revolution in ballistic missile defense research and development costing 26 billion dollars, the amount the administration proposed in funding for the first five years of SDI. As in INF and START, Reagan’s top officials pursued different objectives for SDI.

In the discussion of SDI in his memoirs, Weinberger blamed the ABM Treaty for establishing Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) as the deterrence paradigm accepted by Western experts. He contended MAD was inherently unstable because it depended on “an assumption as to how a little-understood enemy, governed by men whose values, attitudes and standards are utterly different from ours, would act…Perhaps the greatest assumption of all was that the Soviets also subscribed to MAD.”

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insistence on pairing SDI with offensive modernization while deprioritizing arms control typified the hardline belief that U.S. security should be achieved through the nation’s superior technological means, rather than by compromising American values in negotiations with an immoral adversary.\textsuperscript{847} Weinberger’s deputies, Perle and Iklé, also viewed SDI as an opportunity to break out of the ABM Treaty all together and usher in an end to the arms control era.\textsuperscript{848} They promoted Weinberger’s contention that “what we want to try to get is a system that will develop a defense that is thoroughly reliable and total, I don’t see any reason why it can’t be done.”\textsuperscript{849} Senator John Glenn (D-OH) later dressed down administration officials in congressional testimony over that statement.\textsuperscript{850}

Secretary of State George Shultz had opposed SDI, on both technical grounds and because of its implications for alliance unity.\textsuperscript{851} Now that it had become a defining presidential initiative, however, he privately endorsed the program as an arms control bargaining chip and aimed to ensure that the president remained committed to traditional concepts of deterrence.\textsuperscript{852} In March 1984, Shultz took control of both reopening arms control talks with the Soviets on U.S. terms and serving as the primary public spokesmen on the process.\textsuperscript{853} He considered SDI a potential arms control bargaining chip in a broader set of “umbrella talks” that dealt with limitations on both offensive and defensive forces.\textsuperscript{854}

\textsuperscript{847} Ibid., 291-329.
\textsuperscript{848} Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 257-260.
\textsuperscript{849} Ibid., 256.
\textsuperscript{850} Ibid., 250.
\textsuperscript{851} Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 249-250.
\textsuperscript{854} Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 257.
Just as Shultz received Reagan’s imprimatur to open new avenues for arms control, the president appointed General James Abrahamson to head the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization beginning on April 15. In Abrahamson the administration had yet another SDI promoter with a style at odds with that of the established cohort of nuclear advisors. Mike Havey, a military officer who Keyworth considered essential to SDI, wrote the president’s science advisor mere months after the formation of the SDIO, “Abrahamson’s management style is headed for disaster… There is absolutely no understanding of the larger Presidential issues.”

Lacking a unity of purpose from the administration, support from the scientific community and the buy in of defense experts jeopardized SDI’s fortunes on Capitol Hill. Normally staunch congressional allies of the administration chafed at the quality of briefings provided by low-level officials, and by the damning effect of the faint praise lent by military leadership. Abrahamson found himself thrust immediately into congressional hearings. Abrahamson implied the SDIO strove for a 99.9 percent effective five-layer defense, a position much closer to the High Frontier proposal rather than the more cautious statements coming from Keyworth’s office and the Fletcher study.

Assessing the failure of the administration’s witnesses to blunt technical and strategic criticisms from Democratic members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in open

856 Mike Havey to George Keyworth, “President’s Strategic Defense Initiative,” 1 October 1984, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 12, Folder “SDI.”
testimony, Keyworth considered the program to be in serious jeopardy. He implored the president, “your leadership is necessary to re-establish our basic objective.”

While Reagan remained relatively uninvolved in selling his own major initiative in the early part of 1984, proponents of strategic defense continued in a disorganized effort to win the public and congressional debate. As a result of the administration’s disunity on arms control, public diplomacy for SDI became less about the program’s merits and more about discrediting the opposition. The SDI allies that the president did have in Congress preferred a divisive approach to nuclear politics as part of their nascent efforts to draw ideological lines in Washington. Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-GA) had implemented a new level of obstructionist tactics to render the congressional freeze resolution ineffective. In dealing with SDI opponents he sought to undermine their credentials and the place of science in the public sphere. Retired Lt. General Daniel Graham, whose High Frontier group had been a leading promoter of BMD since the late 1970s, had insisted to Gingrich that SDI critics relied on pseudo-science to make their case. Gingrich accepted Graham’s view of scientific opposition as having an ideological bent, along with the view of a 1982 High Frontier political strategy memo that “BMD is primarily a ‘right-wing’ cause, because assent to pro-BMD position means subscribing to a whole array of other ‘conservative’ pro-defense arguments and programs.”

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859 George Keyworth to Ronald Reagan, 25 May 1984, (RRPL), George Keyworth Files, Box 11, Folder “SDI.”
Gingrich sought to manage the scientific debate before Congress, seeing an opportunity to raise support for SDI by discrediting nuclear winter theory, which had quickly become an effective criticism of the Reagan administration’s nuclear posture in 1984. Throughout 1984, Sagan had effectively disseminated nuclear winter theory to his peace movement contacts to reinvigorate opposition to Reagan’s nuclear agenda. He fielded frequent requests from the National Resource Defense Council, Women’s Strike for Peace, the Council for a Livable World, and many other like-minded organizations to draft warnings of nuclear winter to reflect their respective organizational values.862 Naturally, the environmental activists sought Sagan’s participation, which he obliged.863 He also met with leading representatives from the freeze, NEA, PSR, Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, Peacelinks, and fellow scientists opposed to the arms race on how to integrate nuclear winter theory into peace movement actions, domestically and internationally.864

Democrats in particular turned to Sagan to play a larger role in defining the party’s nuclear policies and image due to the elevated public interest in nuclear winter theory. In 1984, Sagan participated in meetings of the Democratic National Committee on party effectiveness, served on party platform writing committees, and advised several presidential candidates on nuclear issues.865 Prior to Gingrich’s attempt to organize the debate on SDI and nuclear winter on Capitol Hill, Senator Ted Kennedy had invited

Soviet participants of the Halloween conference to testify at the Kennedy-Hatfield forum on the climatic effects of nuclear war. After the forum, Kennedy remarked, “so the debate changes…The message of this panel is that the stakes are higher than we ever thought possible—what has been created is a doomsday machine.”866 Two members of the Soviet delegation—E.P. Velikhov, the Vice President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and Sergei Kapitza, a famous physicist and popularizer of science in the Soviet Union—appeared on the Today Show to make the case for nuclear winter.867

Gingrich and Congressman Tim Wirth (D-CO) invited Carl Sagan and Edward Teller to a debate on nuclear winter and SDI on Capitol Hill in front of roughly fifty lawmakers in mid-May 1984.868 As their debate unfolded on Capitol Hill, a frustrated Sagan asked, “why are the standards of evidence so slack in assuring us there was nothing to worry about, but now, when it looks like there is something to worry about, we are told: let’s not worry about policy implications until all the facts are in hand. All the facts will never be in hand.”869 Teller based his opposition to nuclear winter on work he had requested from scientists at Livermore laboratory.870 Though the research on nuclear winter at Livermore had been funded because of the attention to the issue brought by Sagan and his collaborators and had for the most part confirmed their findings, Teller distorted the Livermore findings to suggest that nuclear winter theory had been based on

867 Ibid., 1.
www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-library/oral-histories/40182

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assumptions that were incorrect and ideologically conditioned. He argued that the approximately dozen confirmatory studies of nuclear winter relied on the same assumptions, and thus came to similarly flawed conclusions. Teller also had the back-up of one of his protégés. Lowell Wood, who led SDI work at Livermore, criticized Sagan on nuclear winter, stating, “it was an excellent first cut which you have advertised as the last cut.”

Wood’s intervention in the debate shifted discussion to SDI debate, illuminating the distinct ways in which pro and antinuclear proponents conceived of the proper relationship between science, the state, and society. The debate touched upon the question facing the scientific community as to whether scientists should consider themselves public diplomats independent of government so as to mold politics and encourage international cooperation, or whether scientists should simply heed the political directives of government as the embodiment of society’s will. Sagan’s anti-SDI stance and promotion of nuclear winter spoke to a broader belief that science should inform the public and create a way of thinking that encouraged people to find diplomatic solutions to pressing social and political problems.

Teller, Wood, and their colleagues argued that science should create technologies that resolve social and political problems and enable the United States to be

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uncompromising in its management of foreign relations. They also deployed a common tactic used by the government defense experts to uphold deterrence claims by arguing that Sagan’s criticisms of SDI—despite being derived from Richard Garwin’s access to classified briefings—did not pass muster because he himself did not have access to the classified information, which Wood and Teller conveniently could not reveal in the debate forum.\textsuperscript{873} The tactic had long been one of Teller’s favorites.\textsuperscript{874} Teller and Wood stood by SDI as their answer to scourge of nuclear winter.

True to form, Teller came armed with a technological solution for nuclear winter should SDI fail to prevent multiple nuclear explosions in the event of war. He suggested firing rockets packed full of micron needles into the atmosphere that could let visible light through but at the same time trap escaping heat through infrared resonance.\textsuperscript{875} As the debate turned from dialogue to an ambush led by Wood, Gingrich pinpointed the issue, explaining, “both the right and left do almost exactly the same thing psychologically…the right tends to take nuclear war for granted…that we’ll somehow deter…On the other hand, I would say the whole reaction to the BMD [SDI]…are set piece arguments against it that fit exactly a certain model of thought.”\textsuperscript{876}

Two authoritative reports based on the classified knowledge that Teller and Wood refused to reveal damned the technical arguments for ballistic missile defense in 1984. One report came from the Congressional Office of Technological Assessment and the other from the Union of Concerned Scientists. The administration’s attempts to discredit

\textsuperscript{873} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{874} Gusterson, \textit{Nuclear Rites}, 88.
both reports initiated a broader anti-science campaign that appealed to long-simmering anti-elitist trends within the New Right and further eroded science as a source of moral authority for conservatives.

The task of rebutting the Fletcher Panel findings fell to Ashton Carter, an Oxford trained physicist and research fellow at MIT contracted by the Congressional Office of Technological Assessment (OTA) to evaluate the claims of the studies commissioned by the administration. Carter submitted his report, “Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space,” shortly before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing in April.\textsuperscript{877} Democrats used his findings to dispel the notion of a near-perfect defense that Abrahamson promoted. Carter’s blunt conclusion that, “the strategic goal of President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative calling for emphasized BMD research—perfect, near perfect, or less-than-perfect defense against ballistic missiles—remains unclear,” further illuminated the administration’s dysfunctional rollout and confused purpose.\textsuperscript{878} Carter clarified several unknowns in building devices needed for space-based BMD, and cast doubt on the potential survivability. He also noted the prohibitive cost of the nearly 1,000 space-based battle stations required to fend off a Soviet launch of 2,800 missiles equipped with known countermeasures.\textsuperscript{879}

Carter went on to a distinguished academic career at Harvard University before leaving in 1993 to serve in the Pentagon during the Clinton administration. His Pentagon career culminated with his appointment as Secretary of Defense from 2015-2017. In 1984 and still under 40 years of age, however, Carter had yet to make his reputation and his

\textsuperscript{878} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{879} Ibid., 20.
technical takedown of SDI made him a prime target of the Reagan administration and its allies. Abrahamson organized a press conference to highlight technical errors in the report. Carter suspected Abrahamson of encouraging DOD intimidation. Carter wrote to Carl Sagan and other allies in the scientific community that the Department of Defense warned him that any public refutation of the alleged technical errors would likely violate his security clearance agreement. An official review panel comprised of Nobelist and laser inventor Charles Townes, widely respected General Glenn Kent, and former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William Perry eventually confirmed Carter’s conclusions after the report drew technical criticisms from the Defense Department and a core of conservative scientists.880

The Heritage Foundation joined in the attack and expanded it to an assault on the OTA. Heritage did not question the technical merits of Carter’s work, but rather his political motivations. The think tank suggested that liberal champion Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) exercised a commanding influence over the board despite the equal number of Democrats and Republicans. Moreover, Heritage claimed that the OTA study on BMD originated from a seminar headed by critic McGeorge Bundy which included only one pro-SDI participant.881 In connecting the freeze and antinuclear motivations of Ted Kennedy to Carter’s study, Heritage attempted to subjugate science to partisan politics.882

882 Once elected Speaker of the House for the 104th Congress after a wave election for Republicans, Newt Gingrich orchestrated the abolition OTA in 1995 as part of his “Contract with America.”
Heritage cited Carter’s connection to the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and Carl Sagan—by this point a star of the antinuclear movement—as further evidence of the OTA report’s ideological and political origins.\textsuperscript{883} Henry Kendall and Kurt Gottfried had initially founded UCS on the campus of MIT in the late 1960s to organize a forum of experts expressly dedicated to combatting the proliferation of ABM systems and the militarization of science.\textsuperscript{884} Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin, who spearheaded the UCS response to SDI, had established themselves as critics of ballistic missile defense in the late 1960s as well. Garwin and Bethe first made their case against BMD in their 1968 article “Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems” in \textit{Scientific American}, which helped initiate the push in the United States for the ABM Treaty.\textsuperscript{885} Both men already enjoyed prestigious reputations. Garwin continued to accumulate influence in the defense science community after his role in designing the first hydrogen bomb, while Bethe received his Nobel Prize in 1967. Other experts on the UCS panels on BMD and the related discussion on anti-satellite weapons included renowned Cornell scientists Kurt Gottfried, Frank Long, and Carl Sagan, CIA scholar-in-residence Richard Ned Lebow, retired National Security Agency Director Admiral Noel Gayler, former CIA Deputy Director Herbert Scoville Jr., and distinguished MIT physics faculty members Henry Kendall and Victor Weisskopf. Their ASAT testimony in May 1983 and the release of their report on space-based missile defense in March 1984 became touchstones of the brewing SDI debate.

\textsuperscript{883} Warner, “Reassessing the Office of Technology Assessment.”
UCS compiled both the ASAT testimony and the SDI assessment alongside a historical overview of ballistic missile defense into a publication *The Fallacy of Star Wars*, which quickly sold over 50,000 copies after it appeared in stores in October 1984.\(^{886}\) Bethe, Garwin, Gottfried, and Kendall restated their case against space-based ballistic missile defense with an article in the *Scientific American* in October. Their analysis supported the findings of the OTA study. However, a minor calculation error provided an opening for a group of right-wing scientists.\(^{887}\)

A small coterie of conservative scientists succeeded in creating a picture of a scientific community evenly divided on the question of SDI feasibility. Robert Jastrow, the founding Director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies joined forces with William Nierenberg, the former Director of the Scripps Institution for Oceanography, and former President of the National Academy of Sciences, Frederick Seitz to discredit the Carter testimony and the UCS report. Seitz and Nierenberg came into contact with the Livermore BMD lobby while serving alongside Edward Teller on then candidate Reagan’s Science and Technology Task Force in the fall of 1980.\(^{888}\) In fact, Seitz had been Teller’s first recommendation for White House Science advisor before he endorsed Keyworth.\(^{889}\) Jastrow, Seitz, and Nierenberg wrote Senator John Warner (R-VA), a former Secretary of the Navy under Nixon, to point out discrepancies

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in the number of battle stations required for effective BMD recommended by Carter and the UCS report.\textsuperscript{890}

This small group of retired scientists—who went on to form the George C. Marshall Institute in September 1984 as a home for conservative science critics—operated in league with an ideological cohort of defense scientists at Livermore and Los Alamos who established themselves with the help of Edward Teller.\textsuperscript{891} Lowell Wood and Gregory Canavan, two leaders of the virulent anti-Soviet bloc respectively based at Livermore and Los Alamos National Labs supplied technical criticisms of the Carter Report and UCS study to the Marshall Institute scientists, who had no claim to BMD expertise that could rival Bethe and Garwin or even Carter.\textsuperscript{892} Garwin and UCS members corrected for the discrepancies in later testimonies to Congress, updated reports, and written appeals to Warner and other members of Congress on relevant committees.\textsuperscript{893} Nonetheless, the attack line stuck as the foundation for a broader criticism of sloppy and politically motivated science.

Marshall Institute scientists’ defense of SDI did not equate to a belief in population defense, but rather a commitment to strategic superiority as a moral imperative. Funding for the Marshall Institute came from the John M. Olin Foundation, whose president William Simon had served as Secretary of the Treasury under Nixon and strongly believed in individual sovereignty as the foundation for American society—a principle that buttressed unilateral action in nuclear affairs as an expression of national

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Robert Jastrow, William Nierenberg, and Frederick Seitz to Senator John Warner, 11 June 1984, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 11, Folder “SDI.”
\item Lakoff and York, \textit{A Shield in Space}, 269.
\item Richard Garwin to Senator Warner, 9 July 1984 (LC), Carl Sagan Papers, Box 818, Folder 3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
sovereignty. The neoconservative argument targeting liberal intellectuals as liable for U.S. strategic vulnerability during the trials over SALT II ratification raised Jastrow’s interest in nuclear politics. In March 1983, shortly before the announcement of SDI, Jastrow took to the pages of Commentary to trumpet the necessity of strategic superiority. Jastrow’s drawn out campaign against scientific critics in Commentary over 1984 endorsed BMD as a functional means to strategic superiority. In Jastrow’s eyes, American technology could succeed where diplomacy failed. Ironically, the set of historical case studies that Jastrow and fellow Marshall Institute scientists referenced to support their cause almost universally demonstrated that non-specialists—which they were—issued the untimely predictions on technological feasibility. Conversely, Garwin went to great lengths both domestically and internationally to highlight his specialized expertise.

The emergent technical debate—which intensified in the coming years—presented problems for administration officials who had little faith in SDI, but nonetheless recognized its potential importance to international diplomacy and domestic politics. Despite the administration’s claims of SDI’s high levels of public approval, the popularity of ballistic missile defense had significantly decreased once it became the subject of public scientific debate. The plausibility of SDI needed to be maintained so as to leverage the program in East-West relations, either as a pressure point in arms

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897 Richard Garwin to John Warner, 11 June 1984, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 11, Folder “SDI.”
control or as a new avenue for economic warfare. Moreover, the administration first needed to persuade allies of SDI’s technical validity before it could have any hope of resolving their accompanying strategic, diplomatic, and economic qualms.

Shultz endeavored to turn SDI into a bargaining chip to resolve his own doubts about the technical and strategic wisdom of the program. His misgivings were so severe that he denounced Keyworth as a “lunatic” to his face in front of the president because of the initiatives’ potential to destroy NATO.899 Shultz also recognized the genuine alarm in Andropov’s reaction to Reagan’s 23 March speech, and subsequent engagements with the Soviets confirmed to him the leverage SDI might provide in arms control.900

By the summer of 1984, the Reagan administration accepted Shultz’s push for umbrella talks considering some combination of INF, START, and SDI/space issues in 1985. These eventually became known as the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST). The Soviets accepted the idea during a plenary meeting occurring in late November. This put INF back on the table, but simultaneously included defensive systems. Similar to ABM and SALT I negotiations, separate delegations would conduct INF, START, and space talks in parallel with an understanding of the interrelationship between all three.

What motivated Reagan’s gradual acceptance of arms control? How was it that Reagan could both embrace Shultz’s push for umbrella talks and simultaneously trumpet SDI, which appeared to threaten what little confidence the Soviet Union and NATO allies had in Washington? Ironically, the public demanded both. Stabilizing arms control

900 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 264.
agreements remained stubbornly popular through the 1970s and the Reagan years. The administration’s lack of clarity regarding its goals for SDI reflected not only internal infighting, but a deliberate policy of ambiguity. Frances Fitzgerald’s analysis of polling data reveals that public approval of SDI tied directly to the notion that it could offer an impenetrable defensive shield rather than intermediate defenses of silos.

Reagan also, had begun to see the reversal of the arms race or even the abolition of nuclear weapons in totality as a potential boon to his presidential legacy. His frequent referrals to Hollywood nostalgia, stories of his boyhood years, and anecdotes of Western history’s most revered leaders demonstrates how legacy-crafting came to dominate his thinking. Several events made Reagan more sincere in his pursuit of arms reductions. The increased emphasis on public diplomacy beginning in spring 1982 drew Reagan’s attention to nuclear issues. Certainly, his own daughter’s commitment to the freeze encouraged deeper reflection on the antinuclear movement’s motivations. SIOP briefings on nuclear war in 1982 impressed upon the president the true scale and consequences of nuclear war, as did the graphic imagery from the 1983 film The Day After. The KAL 007 incident and nuclear war scare over Able-Archer helped the president comprehend the precarity of nuclear peace, as he took more seriously the notion that the Soviet Union might be arming itself out of fear of the United States rather than preparing for war with the West. By the time of the 1984 election season, he also came

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901 Fitzgerald, Way Out There In the Blue, 258-259.
902 Ibid., 258.
903 “Patti Davis, President Reagan’s Younger daughter, told a crowded…” UPI, 7 June 1982.
to accept nuclear winter as a serious policy consideration.\textsuperscript{906} The partial completion of his modernization and deployment plans also no doubt validated the president’s view that strength must come before peace. These developments supported Shultz’s and Thatcher’s combined efforts to persuade the president of the importance of arms control.

Reagan also remained attached to the peace through strength rhetoric that helped establish him as a paragon of the New Right. His public diplomacy plan for arms control had envisioned using nuclear themes to shore up his base of political supporters identified as politically conservative middle-aged Americans with lower to middle income, no college education, who lived in southern and rural areas.\textsuperscript{907} Various campaigns and political groups kept up peace through strength rhetoric throughout the presidential election in 1984. Reagan declared a National Peace through Strength week in the fall to recognize the support that the Coalition of Peace through Strength and the American Security Council lent to his campaign.\textsuperscript{908} Keyworth and other administration officials encouraged congressional candidates to stump for SDI throughout the fall.\textsuperscript{909} The Reagan campaign’s famous “Prepared for Peace” advertisement, better known as the “Bear in the Woods” commercial, illustrated central public diplomacy themes.\textsuperscript{910} Casting a brown bear as a representation of the Soviet Union, the commercial reduced the deterrence debate to a matter of preparedness while deliberately ignoring the costs of those

\textsuperscript{908} Garthoff, \textit{The Great Transition}, 163.
\textsuperscript{909} Jay Keyworth to Mike Schwartz, “SDI and Congressional Campaigns,” 31 July 1984, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 12, Folder “SDI.”
preparations to American society and superpower relations. Torn between the immediacy of politics and an increasing recognition of the need to stabilize the superpower nuclear relationship through arms control talks, Reagan continued to frustrate his advisors with his capriciousness.

Although foreign policy played a secondary role in determining the outcome of the 1984 election, the election was crucial to shaping Reagan’s nuclear policy. David Ryan writes that the election compelled the Reagan administration to “change the image of the Cold Warrior in U.S. culture” because foreign policy remained an area of political vulnerability.\(^{911}\) Voters in the 1984 presidential election made up their minds very early in favor of Reagan based largely on the revival of the U.S. economy. Nevertheless, the president—as one expects of any politician—still searched for ways to overcome his remaining political vulnerabilities.\(^{912}\) Paul Lettow quotes Reagan’s 1984 election day claim that SDI “could be the greatest inducement to arms reduction” as an indication of the president’s evolving strategy to apply economic pressure on the Soviet Union so as to produce the conditions for nuclear abolition that Reagan had long desired since his days in Hollywood. Though Reagan had given serious thought to the state of the Soviet economy in his first term, he and his top aides began to deliberate the economic effects of SDI for U.S.-Soviet competition after the president’s reelection.\(^{913}\)


Nuclear abolitionism was not a part of Reagan’s ethos, but politics were and the 1984 elections demonstrated that even Reagan’s charisma would not be enough to win a strong mandate for his nuclear agenda. Reagan’s willingness then to link SDI more closely to arms reductions during the 1984 election appears not so much as a veiled reference to a still undefined economic strategy, but rather as an acknowledgement of the domestic political realities that determined his bargaining leverage with Congress on debates over the levels of funding provided for defensive and offensive modernization.

The nuclear issue may not have been the major theme of the 1984 presidential contest, but its importance has been understated. Antinuclear ideas proved especially important to maintaining the “gender gap,” which Democrats placed their hopes on for defeating Reagan and his allies in Congress. For the primary election, Walter Mondale ultimately drew in support from antinuclear movement due to his lead in primary polls and outreach to women. The freeze and Mondale both prioritized women voters as a result of the 1980 election results where Reagan only outperformed Carter by one to two percent with women compared to his 17 percent margin of victory with men. In 1982, 4 million more women voted than men and by 1984 women accounted for 60 percent of registered voters.

The gender gap became the obsession of progressives and Democrats who viewed it as the key to a presidential victory. Mondale selected Geraldine Ferraro to run as the first female vice presidential candidate from either major party primarily as a strategy to

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capture the women’s vote. Women’s leadership inside the antinuclear movement identified the peace issue and reproductive health rights as the two core components of the gender gap.\textsuperscript{917} Groups such as Gender Gap Action Campaign, the Women’s Trust, and WAND worked hand-in-hand with FV 84 and other antinuclear groups on making disarmament a major election issue through the work of large scale volunteer field operations and voter registration efforts.\textsuperscript{918} WAND proved especially active on this front, launching a “Millions of Moms Vote for Survival ’84” campaign and a “Women Vote for Survival ‘84” campaign that specialized in registering women in impoverished communities.\textsuperscript{919} WAND formed its own political action committee ahead of the 1984 elections, supporting Geraldine Ferraro and 40 congressional candidates considered allies on women’s and nuclear issues.\textsuperscript{920} The group also set up a speakers training-course on nuclear issues for women, and launched a national poster campaign with the slogan, “Children ask the world of Us.”\textsuperscript{921}

Increased attention to the possibility that women could be swayed by antinuclear positions to vote for Democratic candidates brought greater consideration of the role of expert women in nuclear policymaking. Based on her experience on her time spent with the overwhelmingly male elite strategic community in summer and fall of 1984, Carol Cohn published a ground-breaking analysis that revealed the importance of setting a new paradigm for nuclear diplomacy. Based on her participation in strategic planning and

\textsuperscript{917} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{918} “Arms Control Education Project, “Disarmament Organizers’ Meeting” 8 June 1984, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 1.
\textsuperscript{920} “WAND PAC Update,” Fall 1984, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 8.
\textsuperscript{921} Diane Aronson to WAND Affiliates and Special Contacts, 1 June 1984, (SHSMO/WHMC) NWFC, Box 8.
analysis exercises, Cohn argued “the activity of trying to out-reason defense intellectuals in their own games gets you thinking inside their rules, tacitly accepting all the unspoken assumptions of their paradigms. You become subject to the tyranny of concepts. The language shapes your categories of thought.”

Her arguments echoed E.P. Thompson’s claims about the nuclear establishment’s deformation of language that had launched the transnational antinuclear movement in 1980 and the ongoing Anglo-American peace movement critiques of “nukespeak,” a term for governments’ Orwellian vocabulary that rationalized nuclear weapons relationship to peace.

Cohn believed the peace movement, and feminists in particular, faced a two-part task to correct the corruption of language that perpetuated the arms race. First, they needed to deconstruct technostrategic discourse which allowed for “militarized masculinity” to become the dominant voice of rationality. Second, Cohn argued that feminists faced a reconstructive project that required the development and recognition of alternative conceptions of rationality drawn from diverse voices so as to create “compelling alternative visions of possible futures.”

Cohn’s call to action exemplifies Castells’ view of public diplomacy, for she sought to “induce a communication space in which new, common language could emerge as a precondition for diplomacy.”

This was the focus of the first National Women’s Conference to Prevent Nuclear War, held in the Cannon Caucus Room of the House of Representatives in September.

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1984. The conference illustrated how far women had come as a political force since the
days where they were marginalized within the anti-Vietnam War movement.⁹²⁶

Conference luminaries highlighted how antinuclear aims and women’s
empowerment went hand-in-hand. Ellen Goodman, a Pulitzer Prize winning *Boston
Globe* columnist, argued that “our concern for peace is intricately related with the second
half of this movement for equality…It is our time to make our policy, hold on to our
values.”⁹²⁷ Former First Lady Rosalynn Carter and veteran women’s activist Mildred
Scott Olmsted, who had helped found SANE, echoed the same position.

Conference speakers demonstrated that women merited inclusion in nuclear
policy debates because of their expertise, not just because of their role as moral stewards
of the family. Randall Forsberg observed that only 50 percent of the nuclear issues
conferences included women, and that the rejection of women speakers for not being
well-known enough perpetuated a “super-star syndrome” that produced inequality within
the peace movement.⁹²⁸ In addition to Forsberg, formidable expert women who broke
down the technical dimensions and flaws in Reagan administration nuclear policy
included Ruth Adams, editor of *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*; MIT physics professor
Vera Kistiakowsky; Stanford professor of political science and future Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice; and of course, Helen Caldicott.⁹²⁹

The exclusion of expert women from elite forums for the discussion of nuclear
policy had consequently channeled their analyses of deterrence into the public sphere,

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⁹²⁶ Say Burgin, “Understanding Antiwar Activism as Gendering Activity: A Look at the U.S.’s Anti-
Center for Defense Information, 1984), (SCPC) PSR, Box 13-A.
Center for Defense Information, 1984), (SCPC) PSR, Box 13-A.
making them both influential political surrogates during election season and catalysts of the public turn in science diplomacy. Their cooperation with scientific experts in continuing the work of nuclear curriculum design into the 1984 election and beyond is a notable example of antinuclear women advocates stepping into the role of scientist diplomat in public. The League of Women Voters and the National Education Association partnered with ESR to produce nuclear curriculums such as *Learning Peace, Decision Making in a Nuclear Age, Choices, Perspectives and Participation* all focused on three topics: raising awareness about nuclear issues, conflict resolution and peace studies, and civic action. They took their most obvious political step with the curriculum *Elections*, designed to teach junior high and high school students about electoral politics.

Mondale in fact won a majority of voters in only two categories, voters concerned with foreign policy and nuclear arms control and those who based their votes on concerns for the poor. His lead in those areas reflected the persistence of a gender gap, women considered nuclear peace and the alleviation of poverty their top priorities in deciding who to vote for.

Antinuclear campaigns featured more prominently in congressional elections, helping down-ballot Democrats overcome the spillover effect from Reagan’s landslide victory over Mondale. Though not nearly equivalent to Republican fundraising efforts, antinuclear groups supplied an infusion of cash into Democratic campaigns. Overall,

peace groups led by organizations of antinuclear scientists raised 6 million dollars almost entirely in support of cash strapped Democrats. Freeze Voter 84 raised the second most money of any Democrat PAC with 3.4 million dollars, most of which went to putting 200 paid organizers in the field to help manage nearly 25,000 campaign volunteers. In many areas, the FV 84 dwarfed the Mondale campaign and comprised the backbone of volunteer operations in 10 states. Freeze field operations helped offset the massive gap in campaign spending, the GOP’s 225 million dollar fundraising haul quadrupled that brought in by the Democratic Party. New Senator John Kerry (D-MA), outspent by his Republican opponent to fill the seat left vacant by Paul Tsongas, declared in his victory speech, “I’m going to Washington to end the nuclear arms race,” as a thank you to the critical support provided by 3,000 Freeze volunteers in the field. Paul Simon (D-IL) relied on 50,000 freeze voters in a narrowly decided contest where he unseated Charles Percy (R-IL), the powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who had been one of the most stubborn freeze opponents on Capitol Hill.

In a sense, the 1984 election made Reagan more attuned to the value and limitations of his administration’s approach to public diplomacy in the United States. Congressional candidates supported by the freeze won 70 percent of their races and FV 84 identified one million voters who cast ballots based on the freeze. Antinuclear organizing efforts helped win two Senate seats for Democrats, and moderated the gains

934 Waller, Congress and the Nuclear Freeze, 294-296.
935 Ibid., 294-296
938 Waller, Congress and the Nuclear Freeze, 296.
939 Bill Curry to Freeze Voter ’84 Supporters, 16 November 1984, (SCPC) FV84, Box 2.
made by Republicans in the House of Representatives. These outcomes proved critical as Democrats in Congress succeeded in moderating Reagan’s approach to arms control during his second term.

Even before voters cast their ballots, national security officials had already begun to account for the effects of the potential outcomes of the 1984 elections on Reagan’s modernization program and its meaning for the administration’s arms control strategy. In a mid-September 1984 meeting of the National Security Planning Group (NSPG), Shultz alone advocated for leveraging SDI in arms control discussions, arguing, “We have more difficulty with the politics of modernization than they do. Reductions are to our advantage… The idea of holding simultaneous discussion of offensive and defensive systems is good. They are worried about our SDI program.”

Weinberger, CIA Director William Casey, ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff aligned against Shultz. Most in that group opposed reconvening arms control talks all together. Moreover, they managed to frustrate Shultz by effectively vetoing potential arms control resolutions by holding up the interagency review process. Controls on anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) developed into a point of serious disagreement in the meeting due to their substantial overlap with various SDI technologies. Shultz searched for a way to use an interim ASAT agreement to alleviate pressure on SDI and restart offensive arms control, stating, “we should use ASAT both as a stalking horse to protect SDI and as a way to get limits on offensive system.”

Opponents of arms control convinced the president that an interim resolution put the

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941 Ibid.
United States in a position to be trapped into a more extensive agreement limiting SDI options.\textsuperscript{942}

Shultz now had a sense of the unenviable spot that Nitze had occupied during INF negotiations. No consensus existed in the administration over the approach the secretary should take during the opening plenary round in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Vienna, for which he would be the lead U.S. representative. Between the initial talks in Vienna and subsequent meetings in Geneva in 1985, Shultz said in an NSPG meeting, “I am the person who is going to do the talking, but I don’t know what it is that I’m supposed to say.”\textsuperscript{943}

In four meetings from 30 November to mid-December, the NSPG articulated a possible role for SDI to play in arms control. CIA briefer David George brought Reagan’s attention to SDI’s impact on East-West economic competition. Although the Soviet Union retained a large military industrial base, expanding the U.S. lead in high-technologies through SDI represented a potential pressure point in arms control negotiations that dovetailed nicely with hardliners’ preference for pursuing economic warfare to condition Soviet behavior.\textsuperscript{944} Weinberger reasoned that SDI provided the best opportunity to mobilize the U.S. economy in support of national security objectives during Reagan’s second term.\textsuperscript{945} Reagan continued to vacillate between support for

\textsuperscript{942} Ibid.
Shultz’s position on leveraging SDI in arms control and the hardliner approach of keeping any talk of ASAT and defense off the table so as not to infringe on research developments and future deployment options. He shocked both groups by pressing the idea that the United States share defensive technologies with the Soviet Union.946

Reagan’s sustained aversion to commit to any one approach exacerbated confusion on SDI and arms control tactics in the final NSPG meeting before the United States and Soviet Union reconvened talks in Geneva in January 1985. Shultz insisted that the United States had to be prepared to trade away some advantage if the president truly wanted to reach reductions. Outgunned in earlier NSPG meetings and in the senior arms control policy group, Shultz elevated Paul Nitze to ambassador at-large for arms control within the State Department to aid him in top-level nuclear policy debates. Nitze, who genuinely pursued an INF agreement, in effect became the top arms-controller in the State Department now that he reported directly to Shultz and no longer operated under ACDA’s jurisdiction.947 NSPG principals did agree on two points, first, that SDI and the success of modernization brought the Soviet Union back to the negotiating table, and second that the Kremlin would revive its peace offensive to exploit the impulse of the political left to halt Western nuclear programs.948

Geneva represented the first real test of the administration’s public diplomacy for SDI. McFarlane organized the final preparatory meeting around the question of, “how to

It was one thing to sell the idea of SDI as a moral imperative while not involved in arms control negotiations, but quite another to publicly defend the program in the event of SDI being the one issue holding up meaningful arms reductions while in talks with the Soviets. “Geneva is going to be a public event,” Shultz reminded his colleagues. U.S. officials needed specific strategic, technical, and diplomatic justifications to defend SDI rather than vague promises of a world set free from nuclear terror. In anticipation of planning meetings for Geneva, McFarlane ordered the NSC to develop an “SDI Bible” to serve as the administration’s primary public diplomacy action plan.

During the compilation of the SDI Bible, Bob Linhard of the NSC Arms Control Directorate wrote McFarlane in frustration, “One of the most difficult problems we face with respect to SDI is to get all the various players singing from the same piece of policy music.” Authors of the SDI Bible recognized the depth of discord in the administration, but ultimately put forward an NSC position. Intermediate defense, as endorsed by the Hoffman Panel, was to be framed as a step along the way to a “complete SDI system.” They shrugged off the potential consequences of a U.S. violation of the ABM Treaty for the overall state of arms control. Contrary to State Department views the NSC staff insisted that, “SDI is not a bargaining chip for current arms negotiations.” For public diplomacy purposes, NSC authors recommended that emphasis be placed on non-nuclear systems in an effort to obscure public interest in research on several nuclear-powered concepts being conducted under SDIO management, such as Teller’s favored x-

949 Ibid.  
950 Ibid.  
ray laser project named Excalibur. Alongside this misrepresentation, the NSC encouraged special appeals to scientists and technical talent with promises of substantial “innovation” funding designed to overcome widespread skepticism in the scientific community.

The authors of the SDI Bible sought to nurture a theme of American technological exceptionalism to mitigate the serious technical criticisms from scientific experts and organizations. Experts who considered SDI a technological realization of America’s moral superiority often referenced the moon landing and the Wright brothers’ aviation achievements, followed by examples of famously invalidated predictions from scientific doubters such as Einstein’s skepticism about nuclear energy. Proponents of SDI, such as Robert Jastrow, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Max Kampelman, branded the program’s technological ambition and moral promise as fundamental elements of American exceptionalism. Daniel Graham made similar appeals to American’s technological exceptionalism in The Case for Space Defense with the depiction of an astronaut in Davy Crockett’s famous apparel.

Scientific critics of SDI argued that references to American technological exceptionalism distorted the challenge at hand. MIT nuclear experts, Jack Ruina and George Rathjens, who had both served in and outside of government, argued “SDI involves competing against a determined and resourceful adversary as well as unlocking

952 Ibid.
nature’s secrets and harnessing technology.” 956 Sidney Drell, director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator and longtime JASON, said, “I never doubted that we would put a man on the moon. Here in the ABM battle, we’re not talking about man against nature, which is a technological challenge. We’re talking about man against man.” 957 In their late 1984 article in Foreign Affairs article, four respected U.S. statesmen, McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith debunked the analogies to past technological achievements as well, noting in “the effort to get to the moon was not complicated by the presence of an adversary. A platoon of hostile moon-men with axes could have made it a disaster.” 958

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) observed this debate between proponents of technological exceptionalism and scientific critics as a representation of competing views about the obligations of science to domestic and international society. The first group, represented by Teller and his allies, viewed the arms race as a scientific contest that could be won with a technological solution, and believed in general that advances in technology could resolve the nation’s most pressing social and moral problems and help consolidate U.S. hegemony abroad. Critics who doubted the technical feasibility of SDI in part because it was a two-fold problem of man against nature, and man against man, made the implicit argument that science should be the foundation for public reason in their opposition to Reagan’s nuclear policies. 959

In the NSPG meeting in December 1984, both Shultz and Nitze challenged some of the more outlandish recommendations contained in the SDI Bible. They specifically tackled assertions from Weinberger, Adelman, and their NSC allies that SDI relied exclusively on non-nuclear systems. Shultz also harbored serious technical concerns about the program’s feasibility, and believed its value rested in its use as bargaining leverage rather than as a deployed system. State Department representatives searched for new approaches to reducing offensive weapons, arguing that the balance of nuclear forces had changed in favor of the U.S. in 1983-1984. NSPG participants claiming the non-nuclear purity of SDI wanted to provoke another Soviet walk-out and position the U.S. to earn the public diplomacy benefits from such an occurrence.960 Reagan found some of the cosmetic proposals made by Shultz and Nitze appealing, but on the true substance of negotiations he confirmed “we must be resolved among ourselves that SDI is not the price for reductions.”961

Shultz and Nitze found supporters for their views of the SDI-arms control relationship outside of the administration, most especially in the United Kingdom. NSC authors of the SDI Bible considered British officials the bluntest, yet the most articulate critics of SDI of all potential allied partners.962 U.S. officials had begun to claim allied support of SDI as an element of the administration’s public diplomacy plan. Allies’ relationship with SDI extended to potential technological collaboration on specific systems and concepts, managing high-technology trade between the East and West, and

961 Ibid.
grappling with the strategic implications of remaking the strategy of deterrence on which the NATO alliance depended. Of all the NSPG representatives, Shultz and Nitze had the best reputation with NATO allies. The formidable SDI criticisms of British diplomats derived from their own long history of managing an independent deterrent, and from close contact with Shultz and Nitze over the course of the preceding year. British critiques of SDI borrowed directly from Shultz’s own list of concerns. Five days after the final NSPG preparatory meeting for Geneva, Thatcher visited Camp David on 22 December to specifically discuss arms control and SDI. She enjoyed greater influence over Reagan’s position on arms control than anyone outside of the administration, and perhaps more than many within. In the months leading up to the Reagan-Thatcher meeting, Shultz appealed directly to British Cabinet officials and the prime minister herself to garner support for his view of SDI and arms control. The joint statement from Reagan and Thatcher linking SDI to arms control and reductions reflected Shultz’s effort to influence the already robust deliberations in Whitehall regarding Britain’s role in Reagan’s BMD plan. On the eve of Geneva negotiations set to begin in January, Reagan at last appeared to be swinging toward Shultz, Nitze, and moderates in the administration.

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964 David Roberts to Mr. Crabbie or Mr. Weston, “SDI,” 31 May 1984, (TNA) FCO 46/4108.
CHAPTER SIX: A BRITISH VIEW OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND NUCLEAR WINTER

SDI compelled the Thatcher government to reevaluate whether Britain’s deterrence priorities aligned with those of the Reagan administration. The United Kingdom had a vested interest in U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control and the deterrence status quo in order to guarantee the effectiveness of its own independent nuclear deterrent. Whitehall’s partnership with the U.S. State Department proved effective in convincing Reagan to pursue arms control with greater sincerity, especially with regards to the ABM Treaty, in exchange for Thatcher’s conditional support of SDI. Considering the demands that SDI placed on British technology, industry, and academia, Thatcher’s decision represented more than just a move to reinforce strategic arms control; it demonstrated her preference for close association with the United States, rather than tighter cooperation with Europe, to underwrite British prestige into the 21st century.

This decision carried significant political risks at home. Opposition to SDI sustained the British antinuclear movement, especially as the issue became entangled with the politics of nuclear winter. Contradictions in Thatcher’s response to the emergence of new nuclear knowledge in the form of SDI and nuclear winter revitalized science diplomacy in the United Kingdom. Private science diplomacy and public science diplomacy converged into a vigorous rejection of Thatcher’s nuclear policies and management of expertise when Pugwash and SANA assumed leadership of mass antinuclear politics in Britain.
Reagan’s March 1983 speech announcing SDI aroused immediate skepticism in Whitehall. Doubts concerning the technical feasibility of ballistic missile defense pervaded Thatcher’s government, making the possibility of increased security a non-factor in deliberations over SDI endorsement. Whitehall awaited the findings of the studies commissioned by the Reagan administration to determine the political, technological, economic, and security implications of SDI before considering its own position. The Hoffman Report and the Fletcher Report left the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) with more questions than answers, however.967

Beginning in November 1983, the British Embassy in Washington regularly requested additional consultations and information from the State Department to clarify outstanding technical issues.968 The continued effectiveness of the Trident ballistic submarine recently purchased from the United States and the impact on the existing ABM Treaty regime topped the list of British strategic anxieties.969 The U.S. Department of Defense emphasized that the ABM Treaty permitted BMD research so long as development and deployment did not follow. A more reserved assessment of the ABM Treaty from U.S. Department of State only contributed to British skepticism. Moreover, no one in Washington had answers to queries about the complexities of battle management software, vulnerability of space-based defense systems, power sources for

directed energy weapons, the geography of deployment, and a series of other pointed technical questions.\footnote{Roberts to Soutar, “UK Non-Paper on SDI: Questions, Answers, and Comments” 5 April 1984 (TNA) FCO 46/107.}

FCO officials found the technical evidence to support SDI so underwhelming that they dismissed the Fletcher report as mere propaganda.\footnote{David Roberts to John Weston and Mr. Crabbie, “SDI,” 14 May 1984 (TNA) FCO 46/107; M.A. Pakenham, “Ballistic Missile Defense: UK Policy towards the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),” 5 November 1984 (TNA) DEFE 24/2915.} In contrast, the Scowcroft Report and Carter’s OTA study in tandem with the impressive critique released by the Union of Concerned Scientists thoroughly convinced the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the FCO of the technical futility of SDI.\footnote{Pakenham to Wright, “DABMS,” 30 December 1983 (TNA) FCO46/3611.} Casting further doubt on American judgment, British intelligence debunked Reagan administration claims about the advanced state of Soviet BMD research and ABM Treaty infractions used to justify SDI.\footnote{Pakenham to Wright, “DABMS,” 30 December 1983 (TNA) FCO46/3611.} The Soviets lagged far behind the West in critical BMD research areas such as strategic computing, and the Krasnoyarsk radar system frequently cited as a violation of the ABM Treaty by U.S. officials closely resembled the American radar installation in Britain located at Flyingdales.\footnote{Michael Heseltine to Margaret Thatcher, “Strategic Defense Initiative,” 27 March 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1444 f87.} A Soviet paper hand-delivered to the FCO in November 1983 that demonstrated how easily a BMD system could be over-saturated with additional offensive systems added convincing evidence to the FCO’s and MoD’s case that Moscow had no intention of pursuing a strategic defense initiative of its own.\footnote{K.A. Bishop to John Weston, “Soviet Paper on ‘Prospects for the creation of a space-based anti-missile system and its probable effect on the military/political situation in the world,” 15 November 1983, (TNA) FCO 46/3611.}
Thatcher’s self-confidence in her own scientific abilities and previous exposure to BMD concepts offset the negative assessments of SDI offered by the FCO and MoD. Major General John Keegan, Chief of U.S. Air Force Intelligence, and Daniel Graham in his previous capacity as Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency had briefed Thatcher on the “death-beam gap” several times during her previous tenure as opposition leader. Within the British government, scientists embedded in the civil service were often isolated and their informed counsel rarely passed onto the desks of politically appointed officials. Scientific and technical civil servants had already been targeted by Thatcher in her attempts shrink the British bureaucracy and their influence continued to wane during earlier nuclear policy controversies. Thatcher instead preferred briefings from high-ranking U.S. personnel such as George Shultz and General James Abrahamson, and turned to technical assessments from the specialist press, most regularly from *Aviation and Space Weekly*. Ironically, Thatcher—an Oxford-trained research chemist—used her own scientific background to question the valid technical concerns about SDI coming from the FCO and MoD, later submitting that “Laid back generalist from the Foreign Office – let alone the ministerial muddlers in charge of them – could not be relied upon. By contrast I was in my element.”

Thatcher’s continued commitment to offensive deterrence and arms control that she staked out on SDI at Camp David in December 1984 indicate that she likely never believed in Reagan’s proposed timeline for research and development. Her willingness to utilize her scientific training to shield SDI from opponents signals an alignment with Shultz’s intention of maintaining the program’s technical plausibility in order to use it as an arms control bargaining chip.

Thatcher’s government viewed SDI as a potential public diplomacy crisis rather than a visionary program for mutual survival, and considered alliance unity, arms control, and economics as principal determinants of its policy on the issue. The nature of SDI also made these factors critical to the formation British technology policy, in addition to the customary concerns about the dynamics of regional collaboration, economic innovation, industrial and academic obligations, and European integration. The MoD and FCO sharply disagreed with No. 10 Downing Street on the opportunity costs of SDI participation to British science and industry. In interdepartmental discussions, Thatcher’s staff framed the anticipated 26 billion dollar SDI package as a potential source of supplementary funds for British defense research. Some U.S. officials estimated the complexity and scale of SDI to be eight times that of the Manhattan project, raising the possibility of R&D cost overruns beneficial to industry. Probable gains made in information technologies, material science, microelectronics, and several other fields were projected to drastically increase the gap between the United States and Europe in the high-technology economy and contribute to a qualitative differential across next

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generation weapons-systems. Non-participation would leave Britain susceptible to a brain
drain of its technical talent to the United States, while competitors might bolster their
own national research base should they opt to participate.982

Conversely, the MoD and FCO recommended that HMG not risk galvanizing
antinuclear sentiment by publicly supporting SDI unless the Reagan administration
outlined a plan to prevent an escalation of the arms race in space and clarify the scope of
allied participation.983 Washington indicated that prime contracts might be out of reach,
though sub contracts that offered little commercial opportunity and restricted technology
transfer might be attainable by British firms. The United Kingdom already faced
shortages in high-skilled labor and SDI participation threatened to divert scientific
manpower away from MoD and British industrial projects. At the same time, alternative
European schemes for industrial high technology development overlapped with SDI labor
needs. A renewed focus on European initiatives for technological development reset the
recent poor record of collaboration and generated an optimistic view of new integration
efforts.984

In 1984, leading technology firms and the European Community provided an
initial budget of 1 billion pounds for the European Strategic Program for Research in
Information Technology (ESPRIT) to sponsor research in commercial information
technologies that aided European integration.985 Many of Britain’s key technology firms
with large defense contracts including GEC Marconi, British Aerospace, STC, and

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982 David Roberts to Mr. Crabbie and Mr. Weston, 31 May 1984, (TNA) FCO 46/4108.
983 Ibid.
984 John Preston, “Technology Policy in Europe: Explaining the Framework Program and Eureka in Theory
985 Lynn Krieger Mytelka and Michael Delapierre, “The Alliance Strategies of European Firms in the
Information Technology Industry and the Role of ESPRIT,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 26
Plessey, were heavily invested in ESPRIT, which eventually spun off Research for Advance Communications in Europe (RACE) which aimed to standardize commercial European information technologies and muscle foreign suppliers out of the common market.\footnote{Ibid., 241-249.} ESPRIT also fed into the French EUREKA proposal for a European research consortium to match the SDI research program in fifth generation computing, directed energy technology, sensors, and other technologies which expanded the competition for high-skilled technical labor.\footnote{Howe to Heseltine, “Military Developments in Outer Space,” 14 June 1984, (TNA) PREM 19/1188 f197.} After directing the joint FCO/MoD interim study on SDI participation, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Geoffrey Howe, and defense secretary Michael Heseltine concluded that the opportunity costs of SDI participation to British science and the economy together with the potential political fallout and negative implications for arms control made it prudent to wait out the U.S. presidential election before defining the British position.\footnote{Michael Heseltine and Geoffrey Howe, “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): UK Policy Towards the US Strategic Defense Initiative,” 11 October 1984, (TNA) PREM 19/1184 f44.}

SDI posed a serious risk of reviving the British peace movement in part because the issue had become entangled with the politics of nuclear winter, which had quickly become a top priority for antinuclear activists. SANA and Pugwash, representing the public and private tracks of science diplomacy respectively, identified both SDI and nuclear winter as natural causes for scientists. These issues brought about a convergence of two tracks of science diplomacy in Britain, presenting a formidable antinuclear challenge to the Thatcher government. In comparing nuclear winter and SDI, SANA and Pugwash sought to illuminate the contradictions in the Thatcher government’s approach
to science and reform the relationship between expertise and the state.\textsuperscript{989} Pugwash members proved instrumental in plugging in a transatlantic network of scientists into the public diplomacy campaign managed for the most part by SANA.

Members of Pugwash initially held fast to its emphasis on private science diplomacy, characterized by the persuasion of elites through its prestigious membership in national and international settings. Since its founding in 1957, Pugwash’s reputation developed over time from a suspected communist front to the world’s most influential body of diplomat scientists.\textsuperscript{990} Pugwash structured itself as a confederation of autonomous national membership organizations in the interest of balanced participation across the Soviet bloc, the West, and non-aligned nations. Informal Pugwash diplomacy produced positive results in the case of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Biological Weapons Convention. Pugwash held a series of workshops on the INF problem from 1980 to 1983 with far less success.\textsuperscript{991}

Lord Solly Zuckerman exemplified the Pugwash approach to science diplomacy as he transitioned from his official capacities as an influential civil servant to a conduit for international science activism. He began his long government career conducting analyses of British bombing offenses and advising on civil defense preparations during World War II. In the 1950s, he helped guide the government on several issues including the expansion of higher education, agricultural innovation, energy policies, and

\textsuperscript{989} David Caplin to Will Hurd, “Civil Defense,” (TNA) HO 322/1085; David Caplin interview by author, Imperial College, London, 4 September 2017.


\textsuperscript{991} “Minutes of the Annual General Meeting,” 30 March 1982, (WLSC) Dorothy Hodgkin Papers, ms.eng c. 5864; “Statement of the Pugwash Executive Committee on the Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Forces in Europe,” 20 December 1982, (CAC) RTBT 5/2/7/7; “Minutes of the 62\textsuperscript{nd} Pugwash Council,” 8-9 July 1984, (CAC) RTBT 5/3/1/43; Rotblat, “Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: A Brief Description,” May 1985 (CAC) RTBT 5/2/2/47.

Zuckerman cultivated an impressive list of scientific and political contacts over his long career. His credentials made him an unimpeachable authority on the relationship between science and politics. He also participated extensively in Pugwash activities, eventually becoming a trustee of the British chapter.\footnote{Joseph Rotblat to Solly Zuckerman, 4 November 1987, University of East Anglia Special Collections (UEASC) Solly Zuckerman Papers (SZ) PUG/4/2/7 – SZ PUG/5.} He leveraged his reputation in support of nuclear winter research, making him a British node in the international network of technical experts grappling with the issue.

Outside of government, unofficial science diplomacy began to establish a track of opposition to SDI that contributed to a tighter coupling of public and private approaches to science diplomacy that eventually inhibited British participation. Garwin, who had become close friends with Zuckerman through Pugwash and other activities, had written Zuckerman in August 1984 to gauge the level of SDI awareness and opposition within Britain and the rest of Europe. Though Zuckerman noted that the initial response from the scientific community seemed to be hostility to a new technological twist in the arms race, he could not identify any government official or influential public figure who appeared willing or knowledgeable enough to stand up to U.S. technological ambitions given the current arms control climate. Seeking to alter this status quo with the aid of Garwin’s
expertise, Zuckerman orchestrated a covert campaign to persuade government officials to oppose SDI and “moderate the crazy technological battle between the USA and the USSR.”\textsuperscript{994} Beginning with overtures to former British Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington and members of the FCO and MOD, Zuckerman’s campaign supported a technological suspicion of SDI that continued to animate conflict in Whitehall.\textsuperscript{995}

Zuckerman’s extensive international scientific network developed through Pugwash, his time in government, and related activities had also brought him into Sagan’s orbit. Having served on technical and advisory boards for Sagan’s nuclear winter conferences, Zuckerman helped to bring attention to the issue in Britain. British members of Pugwash considered nuclear winter an opening for the organization to reassert itself in world affairs.

Zuckerman interpreted Whitehall’s dismissal of nuclear winter as another example of the Thatcher government’s anti-science attitude, which he worked feverishly to prevent from becoming entrenched in the civil service and the public conscience. He thus sought to publicize the issue as part of a broader effort to draw attention to protect and promote the use of scientific expertise in government decision-making. He joined the scientific advisory board of the newly formed Centre on the Consequences of Nuclear War in pursuit of these efforts.\textsuperscript{996} His mission in that capacity was the marketing of the study of the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment on the environmental effects of nuclear war (SCOPE-ENUWAR) as an objective and comprehensive assessment of nuclear winter theory, and he lent his fundraising talents to the cause by

\textsuperscript{994} Solly Zuckerman to Richard Garwin, 10 August 1984, (UEASC) Solly Zuckerman Papers, SZ/2/Gen 35/Box Garwin.
\textsuperscript{995} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{996} Russell Peterson to Solly Zuckerman, 19 June 1984, (UEASC) SZ 2/SUB/2/4.
helping channel funds to the Royal Society earmarked for further research on nuclear winter.\textsuperscript{997}

The authoritative SCOPE-ENUWAR study which helped resolve the scientific controversy pertaining to nuclear winter—though not its political issues—took place under the chairmanship of a British scientist and was overseen and administered by a British university made possible by an initial grant from the Royal Society of London.\textsuperscript{998} The project was a thorough synthesis of studies undertaken by scientists in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Japan, the Soviet Union, dozens of countries in Eastern and Western Europe as well as in the Third World.\textsuperscript{999} The study’s leader Sir Frederick Warner relied on Zuckerman to assist him in recruiting experts throughout the world and in the United Kingdom, especially those within government that could be convinced to participate in SCOPE-ENUWAR workshops.\textsuperscript{1000} Zuckerman’s endorsement of nuclear winter research in parliamentary debates and in private correspondence to Thatcher’s cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, lent credibility to the theory within official circles that SANA simply could not provide.\textsuperscript{1001} Informed by both Zuckerman and SANA, Deputy Labour leader Denis Healey sought to retain antinuclear support and marshal the scientific community to the side of Labour by critiquing the Thatcher government’s nuclear winter position to illustrate its anti-science attitudes.\textsuperscript{1002}

\textsuperscript{997} Frederick Warner to Solly Zuckerman, 27 March 1984, (UEASC) SZ 2/SUB/1-10; Solly Zuckerman to Frederick Warner, 4 April 1984, (UEASC) SZ 2/SUB/1-10.
\textsuperscript{999} Mark Harwell, Nuclear Winter: The Human and Environmental Consequences (New York: Springer Verlag, 1984), xii.
\textsuperscript{1000} Sir Frederick Warner to Solly Zuckerman, 20 March 1984, (UEASC) SZ 2/SUB/1-10; Sir Frederick Warner to Solly Zuckerman, 4 June 1984, (UEASC) SZ 2/SUB/1-10.
\textsuperscript{1001} Solly Zuckerman to Robert Armstrong, 12 October 1984, (UEASC) SZ 2/SUB/1-10.
\textsuperscript{1002} Denis Healey, “Beyond Nuclear Deterrence,” Fabian Autumn Lecture, 26 November 1985.
Zuckerman’s engagement with the politics of nuclear winter signifies its importance and transformative effect on British science activism and diplomacy. He had turned down the invitation from his fellow South African Mike Pentz to join SANA upon its founding on the basis of his belief that nuclear weapons had a small but important role to play in international security.\footnote{Exchange between Mike Pentz and Solly Zuckerman, “Scientists Against Nuclear Arms,” January 1981, (UEASC) SZ CSA/19/2.} Nuclear winter presented a shared goal for moderate opponents of the arms race such as Zuckerman and outspoken unilateral disarmers in SANA. Their combined support of nuclear winter theory helped override some of the initial concerns of Pugwash leadership that SANA might go too far to politicize science in an effort to unilaterally disarm.\footnote{“Minutes of Pugwash Executive Committee Meeting,” 19 May 1981, (WLSC) Dorothy Hodgkin Papers, MS. ENG. C. 5684.} Zuckerman’s offer to headline SANA’s nuclear winter speaking engagements reflected a broader willingness of Britain’s older scientific elite to involve themselves in mass politics, and a shared judgment of the sorry state of science advising in the British government.\footnote{Gil Booth to Lord Zuckerman, “SANA at UEA,” 13 December 1983, (UEASC), SZ/CSA/19/2.} The politics of nuclear winter initiated cooperation between Britain’s most substantial bodies of scientific activism, providing SANA with access to the international networks of experts and officials maintained by Pugwash, and Pugwash with new forums for engaging the British public.

CND leaders identified nuclear winter as “a very powerful campaigning tool.”\footnote{“The Nuclear Winter – A Framework for Campaign Planning,” 9 February 1984, (LSE) CND ADD 1/2.} Many of the scientists who had lent their expertise to the NWFZ movement now took on the role of public diplomat scientist, as they brought the issue of nuclear winter into service of British antinuclear protests and cultural criticisms of nuclear weapons. The Home Office had endeavored to control scientific advice available to local civil defense
authorities since the success of SANA’s Hard Luck campaign. Pressuring Parliament from the bottom up, SANA spearheaded the peace movement campaign to raise local awareness of nuclear winter by capitalizing on activist networks that they established during the anti-civil defense campaign and corresponding spread of the NWFZ phenomenon.

Opposition to nuclear winter and Britain’s involvement in SDI became the two issues sustaining SANA’s growth and authority with the NWFZ movement by the end of 1984.1007 Having learned of the findings of the April 1983 Cambridge conference from his scientific contacts, Mike Pentz immediately set upon devising a strategy to make nuclear winter a driver of antinuclear discourse. He produced a film on nuclear winter and disseminated it widely to his peace movement contacts, local governments, and antinuclear groups throughout Europe to serve as a tutorial on the issue.1008 The film and a corresponding nuclear winter conference attracted funding from the Greater London Council, West Midlands, Sheffield City Council, and the Strathclyde Council for U.S. nuclear winter experts Richard Turco and Paul Ehrlich to lead SANA scientists on a ten-day “Britain After Nuclear War” briefing tour in early November 1984.1009 The tour involved visits to twelve cities in front of thousands of attendees throughout the United Kingdom, including eight university seminars, nine public meetings, a day long scientific symposium of over sixty experts at Oxford University, parliamentary briefings for forty MPs, a consultation for the Greater London Council, and a colloquium on the moral

dimensions of nuclear winter held in Westminster’s Central Hall for representatives of Britain’s Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities.\textsuperscript{1010} The nuclear winter tour by American scientists was representative of SANA’s broader efforts to make science an anchor of peace movement public diplomacy, and also of its use of the nuclear winter issue to promote its expertise to local civil defense and emergency officials, and members of Parliament.

Nuclear winter also revitalized the cultural strategy of the British antinuclear movement, specifically British nuclear cinema. During the Halloween conference, Sagan and Ehrlich requested that Myers work up some plans for publicizing nuclear winter theory in the United Kingdom. Myers endorsed a speaking tour for various nuclear winter contributors, close cooperation with SANA, and emphasized spreading the word about nuclear winter theory through television. He wrote to Sagan and Ehrlich, “television producers clamour for graphic materials they can use on camera to illustrate the points made during discussion/confrontation with government officials, notably defense and civil defense people.”\textsuperscript{1011} Soon Myers, Sagan, and Turco, along with other scientists who participated in the nuclear winter conferences, advised the BBC production Threads, which offered the first on-screen portrayal of nuclear winter in September 1984. After Threads came On the Eighth Day, a companion documentary on the origins of nuclear winter theory. Paul Ehrlich and every member of TTAPS with the exception of Pollock appeared in the documentary.\textsuperscript{1012}

\textsuperscript{1010} January 1985, SANA Newsletter number 12, (TNA) HO 322/1085.
\textsuperscript{1011} Norman Myers to Carl Sagan, 16 November 1983, (LC) Carl Sagan Papers, Box 813, Folder 2.
Threads embodies the infusion of transatlantic expertise into the peace movement’s public diplomacy. Experts including Stanford-based Soviet expert David Holloway, SANA scientist Philip Steadman, and the investigative journalist Duncan Campbell who uncovered U.K. war plans, advised on the outbreak of war and civil defense.  

Eric Chivian and Robert Lifton, the American doctors who pioneered work on the psychological consequences of nuclear war consulted on the mental state the actors should inhabit. Pugwash co-founder Joseph Rotblat as well as the editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and MIT professor Bernard Feld provided general guidance for the film. The film’s portrayal of the effects of a nuclear holocaust on the locality of Sheffield so brilliantly captured the variety of concerns underpinning British antinuclear angst that it became a defining artifact of the decade’s mass movement politics.

Though the overriding message of Threads is a condemnation of pro-deterrence policies leading Britain to a post-nuclear apocalyptic world, the depiction of social and economic hardships befalling Britons in pre-apocalyptic Sheffield are shown to be the consequence of Thatcher’s broader neoliberal program for society that has led the United Kingdom into nuclear danger in the first place. By attaching its critique of local social and economic conditions to a global scientific exploration of the flaws of nuclear deterrence, Threads became emblematic of the local to global nature of peace movement public diplomacy.

The dual focus on nuclear winter and SDI in public science diplomacy brought more parliamentary attention in winter 1984-1985 to the issue of science advising and the

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British government, specifically under Thatcher. Antinuclear experts questioned why the
Thatcher government had neglected to study the issue of nuclear winter for itself given
the implications for deterrence, civil defense, and arms control. In raising the idea of
supporting SDI, the Thatcher government had suggested that Britain stood to gain from
involvement in the exploratory scientific work of ballistic missile defense. In contrast, the
Thatcher government declined to investigate the issue of nuclear winter for itself on the
basis that it was an untested theory and instead put its trust in American experts with a
clear conflict of interest.1014

The Home Office countered the public diplomacy of antinuclear scientists by
circulating a rebuttal to all emergency planning officers in the United Kingdom written
by Cresson Kearny, an American civil defense expert from Oak Ridge National
Laboratory who had been mentored by Edward Teller. In what became a familiar refrain
from defenders of deterrence, Kearny argued that external experts had no business
commenting on nuclear matters. Though he himself had no expertise in any of the
specialties associated with nuclear winter theory he asserted that his long career in the
defense establishment legitimized rather than compromised his assessment of
controversial nuclear knowledge. He concluded, “I am not alone in believing that it is
immoral for scientists working outside their fields of expertise to proclaim worldwide
climatic catastrophes before having several uncommitted, technically competent persons
check the validity of their assumptions…If in democratic nations such unbiased
information is not made widely available, then crucial defense and political decisions
cannot be made on a rational basis.”1015

Far from having a monopoly over nuclear knowledge, Whitehall displayed a significant deficit of expertise in the parliamentary debate over nuclear winter over. The Thatcher government proved inept at re-imposing a black box around deterrence. The Home Office’s failure to study the nuclear winter issue for itself provided members of the parliamentary opposition who had been informed by SANA an opportunity to attack the government’s ignorance. In the parliamentary debate, when antinuclear MPs challenged the Thatcher government to explain why it failed to update recommendations made in the government pamphlet “Civil Defense and the Farmer,” Home Office representatives simply stated that nuclear winter remained an unproven theory and that policy should not be made on such uncertain predictions. When pressed to identify members of the scientific community who doubted the validity of nuclear winter theory, Home Office officials carelessly listed the TTAPS authors and their ally Norman Myers.1016

**The Special Nuclear Relationship at Work**

Thatcher opted to trade influence over U.S. national security policy and superpower diplomacy for possible political blowback resulting from a modification of British technology policy that endorsed SDI participation to industrial and academic communities. Experience gained from the INF debates also persuaded Thatcher that her government could manage public attitudes toward SDI, especially considering how successfully Heseltine had transformed the INF issue into an electoral asset.1017 Reagan’s re-election in November 1984 increased the pressure on Whitehall to lay out its SDI

policy. Heseltine and Howe challenged Thatcher’s calculation that acceptance of SDI benefited Britain’s goal of keeping arms control as a fixture of the West’s nuclear policy. The cabinet agreed that Britain’s expressed commitment to arms control made nuclear modernization, of both Trident and INF, palatable to the public and upheld deterrence. Downing Street, nevertheless, insisted that the prime minister could temper Reagan’s rhetoric to make SDI compatible with arms control and deterrence so long as she laid out the British position prior to the president’s January 1985 inaugural speech, in which he might otherwise commit to a track not aligned with British interests.1018

British nuclear arms control objectives consisted of progress on INF negotiations, restricting anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and maintaining the integrity of the ABM Treaty and the overall arms control framework. On INF, British officials believed SDI might create unmanageable linkages between strategic and INF negotiations.1019 Past arms control talks had shown how new technologies spoiled potential agreements. On ASAT, Whitehall pushed for limitations because American and British intelligence relied more heavily on satellite information than their Soviet counterparts.1020 The fact that several of the candidate systems in SDI could be used for ASAT purposes reduced the likelihood of restrictions being accepted by the Reagan administration. Thatcher’s government had a vested stake in maintaining the integrity of the nuclear arms control

1019 Record of Meeting with the German Defense Minister Dr. Woerner, 18 January 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1764 f206.
framework. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty remained critical for the U.K.’s policy of minimum deterrence and the most effective nuclear arms control treaty in force.\textsuperscript{1021}

The timing of December meetings with Reagan at Camp David and with a Soviet delegation led by the ascendant Mikhail Gorbachev at the prime minister’s retreat at Chequers provided Thatcher an opportunity to lobby both sides to recommit to arms control.

Washington and Whitehall anticipated a new direction from Soviet leadership as far back as the Carter administration.\textsuperscript{1022} Brezhnev’s ill-health raised Reagan’s and Thatcher’s hopes early on that a younger, more amenable generation of Soviet leaders who came of age during the Khrushchev thaw\textsuperscript{1023} might be more willing to negotiate on Western terms than the Soviet old guard.\textsuperscript{1024} Konstantin Chernenko and Yuri Andropov delayed the arrival of the youth movement in the Kremlin, but in the months before Chernenko’s death in March 1985 Thatcher commenced courting the next leader of the Soviet Union.

In 1984, the Thatcher government began implementing its program for an expanded role in East-West relations that had been designed at the Chequers seminar the previous fall. British objectives for increasing bilateral contacts between the United

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item The “Khrushchev Thaw” refers to a period de-Stalinization under Khrushchev. Reforms during this time opened international trade, expanded foreign cultural and educational contacts, and provided for a degree of economic liberalization. See Vladislav Zubok, \textit{Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Kingdom and the Soviet Union centered on influencing the overall course of arms control.\textsuperscript{1025} By July of 1984, Geoffrey Howe had completed the first visit of a British foreign secretary to Moscow in over a decade and the FCO identified Mikhail Gorbachev as one of two likely successors to a clearly infirm Chernenko.\textsuperscript{1026} The other contender to become Chernenko’s successor, Grigory Romanov, used his position as the military industry secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to garner support from hardliners and the military. Romanov’s base of supporters in the Soviet military made him a far less appealing potential Soviet leader than Gorbachev for Western arms control advocates.\textsuperscript{1027}

Gorbachev’s biography impressed British officials. They believed that his reform impulses might serve Western interests should he rise to power in Moscow. His training at Moscow University and degrees in law and agronomy suggested to Whitehall leadership that he would be more erudite than most of the poorly educated and aging bureaucrats at the apex of the Soviet political system. Whitehall interpreted Gorbachev’s rise through the notoriously challenging ranks of agricultural management in the Soviet Union and his ability to curry favor with Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko while clearly signaling his desire for economic reforms as markers of his political acumen. Nonetheless, British officials also believed that the Soviet old guard’s acceptance of Gorbachev reflected his commitment to the Soviet system and worldview. They understood his calls for reforms were meant to encourage improvements to the system.

\textsuperscript{1025} No. 10 Minutes, “Policy on East-West Relations,” 12 September 1983, (TNA) freedom of information request to FCO by the Machiavelli Center, University of Pavia, 2007.
rather than change it outright. Gorbachev’s interest in economic reforms to increase the
long-term viability of the Soviet political system linked directly to his support for a new
era of détente. Gorbachev’s interest in economic reforms to increase the long-term viability of the Soviet political system linked directly to his support for a new era of détente.1028 Western observers judged his support for the reduction of Soviet military expenditure as key to persuading the Politburo to accept the renewal of arms control negotiations under the guise of Nuclear and Space Talks at Geneva in January 1985.1029

Gorbachev’s December 1984 visit to the United Kingdom, his first trip to the West since becoming a favored candidate for General Secretary of the CPSU, became a critical stepping-stone for the future of East-West relations. Both superpowers identified Gorbachev’s meeting with Thatcher as a preliminary reengagement between East and West prior to the prime minister’s Camp David meetings with the president later in the month and Shultz’s and Gromyko’s opening of the Geneva plenaries in January.1030

Whitehall expected Gorbachev to use the trip to raise his international profile to aid his case in the Soviet leadership competition. Mindful of the alternative to Gorbachev and the potential publicity traps he faced in his first major exposure to the Western press, British officials orchestrated a public diplomacy plan to create a favorable impression of him in Washington while safeguarding him from critics in Moscow.1031

When Thatcher hosted Gorbachev at the prime minister’s retreat at Chequers on 16 December 1984 she framed Whitehall as an essential conduit in East-West relations. She based her case on the United Kingdom’s unique relations with the United States and

its status as a nuclear power, which provided it with greater influence in NATO than any other member except for the United States itself. Rather than appear as a simple appendage of U.S. foreign policy, Thatcher explained British officials enjoyed the distinctive privilege of being able to raise concerns and objections in frank terms with American counterparts in a manner that no other country’s representatives could. She offered Gorbachev her insights on Reagan, framing him as a moral-driven man who could pursue arms control more productively having won reelection and consolidated his domestic base of support. Gorbachev displayed his soon to be signature intellectual elasticity and charm as he engaged Thatcher in her own pragmatic and yet bullish style of diplomacy.

“I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business together.” Thatcher’s cautious praise of Gorbachev the day after their meeting had been a pre-conceived bit of public diplomacy intended to produce the desired effect in Washington and the Western press. For most of the following week, the Thatcher-Gorbachev visit ran on the front page of almost all the major American daily newspapers. American press coverage universally accepted Whitehall’s view that the meeting served as a crucial confidence building measure to restore a conducive climate for superpower arms control.

As if Gorbachev’s visit to the United Kingdom did not provide enough evidence of a change in Soviet leadership, the old yet powerful defense minister Dmitry Ustinov

1032 C.D. Powell, “Record of the Meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev,” 16 December 1984, (TNA) PREM 19/1394 f56.
1033 C.D. Powell, “Record of the Meeting between the Prime Minister and Mr. Gorbachev,” 16 December 1984, (TNA) PREM 19/1394 f56; Also see Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 37.
died of cardiac arrest on what then became the final day of the Soviet delegation’s trip. 

Ustinov exerted a powerful influence over arms control by issuing the military requirements for security that conditioned the political feasibility of any potential agreement. He oversaw the massive nuclear arms build-up that Western opponents pointed to as proof of Soviet war-fighting intentions and had been a focus of USIA’s public diplomacy reports on Soviet military power. His death provided yet another opportunity for Gorbachev to assert himself as a statesman in front of the Western press, and created an opening for military reforms.

The Reagan administration made it known to Whitehall that it wished for an extensive review of British impressions of Gorbachev during Thatcher’s and Reagan’s retreat to Camp David for bilateral meetings later in December 1984. Summarizing her meeting for Reagan, Thatcher admitted, “I actually rather liked him,” as she asserted, “he was using me as a stalking horse for you.” On substance, Thatcher recorded Gorbachev’s emphasis on SDI and the ABM Treaty which she believed revealed a genuine fear of American technological supremacy, which had consequences for the arms race. Thatcher left unanswered what the Soviets might exchange for SDI, and whether that exchange might effect a positive change in the balance of power.

1039 Ibid.
Thatcher pushed her assessment of Gorbachev and Soviet nuclear anxiety to persuade Reagan to agree with her SDI platform. From her conversations with Gorbachev, Thatcher had ascertained that the Soviets would come to Geneva with serious proposals and an intention to target SDI as a lynchpin in negotiations. With SDI set to become a central focus of arms control, Thatcher considered it necessary that the Reagan administration consider orienting its SDI focused public diplomacy with an eye toward Europe. The disorganized public diplomacy campaign surrounding SDI in the United States that had emphasized the morality of assured survival and possibility of a non-nuclear world raised problems for European allies—most of all Thatcher—who had spent significant political capital on INF deployment.\textsuperscript{1040}

Thatcher pledged British support for SDI on 22 December 1984 out of a commitment to alliance unity and arms control.\textsuperscript{1041} British support came with four conditions. First, the U.S. committed to preserve East-West strategic balance in view of Soviet developments and not strive for superiority. Second, SDI deployment would be negotiated in observance of treaty obligations. Third, SDI must aim to enhance deterrence. Fourth, East-West negotiations should strive to achieve security through a reduction of offensive weapons by both sides.\textsuperscript{1042} In addition to the four-points, Thatcher stressed to Reagan that the research component must be the public message rather than

\textsuperscript{1040} “Record of Thatcher-Reagan Meeting,” 22 December 1984, (RRPL) NSC Records, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Box 90902, Folder “Thatcher Visit; “No. 10 Record of a Meeting Between the Prime Minister and President Reagan,” 22 December 1984, (CAC) THCR 1/10/78 f79; “Press Conference After Camp David Talks,” 22 December 1984 (CAC) Thatcher Archive, COI Transcript.


\textsuperscript{1042} “Record of Thatcher-Reagan Meeting,” 22 December 1984, (RRPL) NSC Records, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, Box 90902, Folder “Thatcher Visit; “No. 10 Record of a Meeting Between the Prime Minister and President Reagan,” 22 December 1984, (CAC) THCR 1/10/78 f79; “Press Conference After Camp David Talks,” 22 December 1984 (CAC) Thatcher Archive, COI Transcript.
moral appeals that had been the center of his SDI campaign. The four-point agreement proposed by British officials became the foundation for alliance solidarity for the coming Geneva negotiations and eventually the Reagan administration’s official policy on the public presentation of SDI.\textsuperscript{1043}

Thatcher’s insistence on eliminating the moral component of SDI’s presentation reflected the needs of European diplomacy and the surprising durability of the antinuclear movement. Selling the agreement, at least in Europe, required a strict emphasis on the research component and a discarding of moral themes that might give further impetus to the transnational antinuclear movement. By 1985, CND had become the second largest political organization in the United Kingdom, trailing only the Conservative Party in membership and leading the Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party-Liberal alliance in size.\textsuperscript{1044}

Morality, as framed in the SDI and nuclear winter debates, sustained the vitality of the British antinuclear movement. Embracing the role of public-diplomat scientists, Pugwash President Dorothy Hodgkin and highly respected SANA member Maurice Wilkins joined famed Irish international lawyer Sean MacBride and American political scientist Richard Falk in adjudicating the January 1985 London Nuclear Warfare Tribunal. Based on the Greenham Common Women’s legal challenge in the U.S. judicial system, the tribunal explored the legality of nuclear deterrence within the context of international law. Nuclear winter and SDI were key cases for consideration, perhaps the two most prominently featured issues. Drawing on SANA scientists and nuclear winter


\textsuperscript{1044} Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition, 132-138.
experts, American nuclear strategists, religious authorities, lawyers from various corners of the Anglophone world, the tribunal reimagined international law as an expression of global civil society’s shared moral values. Organizers of the tribunal, which included representatives from SANA, stated its priorities included the replacement of “deterrence with a system of international security responsive to law and morality.”

In its mission to elevate the place of transnational public opinion in international diplomacy, the tribunal pursued three important public diplomacy innovations that characterized disarmament advocacy in the nuclear 1980s. First, it sought to establish a normative practice in which international law could serve as a source of moral legitimization for public diplomats and transnational organizations, specifically those challenging the validity of deterrence. Second, it advanced an alternative logic for international security built upon a summation of moral, scientific, legal, and social arguments made by disarmament intellectuals who spoke to a set of interests not adequately represented in deterrence. Third, it further encouraged scientists to engage in public science diplomacy as a means to reverse the arms race.

Nuclear policymakers at the MoD and the FCO monitoring public science diplomacy and parliamentary polemics advised “we should be more active in combatting ‘Nuclear Winter’ propaganda…the anti-nuclear movement have seized upon ‘Nuclear Winter’ as a highly exploitable instrument.” Their solution appeared to be much the same as conservative American scientists: to make a “stronger case for casting doubt on the ‘Nuclear Winter’ hypothesis as it is currently interpreted in the public debate. It is not so much, in my view, a question of stimulating new research in the MoD, but now of pulling

together a well-argued case which would de-bunk the wilder statements. On the issue of SDI, Thatcher continued to press Washington to reframe its public diplomacy.

When Thatcher traveled to Washington in February 1985, she once again stressed that the moral and strategic implications of SDI posed significant problems for British interests, but that its technological ambitions could be spun as innovation opportunity for the United Kingdom. She emphasized the research aspects of SDI in her well-received address to a joint session of U.S. Congress on 20 February 1985 and used the occasion to express her desire to see British scientists share in the technical work.

The Camp David four-point agreement appeared even more important for East-West relations upon the death of Chernenko on 10 March and the elevation of Gorbachev to general secretary. In March, Thatcher arrived in Moscow a few days later for Chernenko’s state funeral as the most prominent Western leader. Reagan dispatched Vice President Bush in his stead. Bush, Shultz, and other State Department representatives confirmed to Thatcher that Reagan himself had adopted the four-point agreement as the line to take with allies and Soviet representatives. They encouraged Thatcher to do the same in her sessions with Gorbachev. Thatcher asserted the centrality of the four-point agreement in her side meeting with Gorbachev. Now empowered, Gorbachev sought to expand contacts between the Soviet Union and United Kingdom. He apparently

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1046 Michael Pakenham to Mr. Alston, “Nuclear Winter,” 20 February 1985, (TNA) FCO 046/4667.
1048 Margaret Thatcher to Joint Houses of Congress, 20 February 1985, (CAC) Thatcher Archive, COI Transcript.
1049 U.K. Embassy in Moscow to FCO, “Record of Meeting between the Prime Minister and Vice President Bush,” 13 March 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1656 f75.
depended on Thatcher to play proxy for Reagan as confidence between the two superpowers increased.\textsuperscript{1050}

In their early meetings, a diplomatic trade of sorts occurred between Thatcher and Gorbachev. In stating that she could do business with Gorbachev, Thatcher accepted the reality of Soviet communism and acknowledged a willingness to expand East-West contacts that could help revive the Soviet economy under Gorbachev’s reform-oriented leadership. Her credentials as one of the most anti-communist leaders in NATO made her cautious endorsement all the more valuable to the general secretary’s appeal to Western public opinion. What Gorbachev offered in return was recognition of the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, which Whitehall—especially the Thatcher government—identified as the greatest source of British diplomatic influence.

The FCO remained skeptical that Washington took Britain’s ranking of strategic priorities to heart. The Camp David Meeting and Thatcher’s address on Capitol Hill had pushed back Geoffrey Howe’s attempts to put the FCO’s position in public view. A speech before the Royal United Services Institute scheduled for March provided the perfect opportunity for Howe to go on record. He conveyed approval of SDI research and the four-points with the added condition of the “Nitze” criteria that stated any deployed system should be both survivable and cost effective.\textsuperscript{1051} Howe strongly cautioned against the abandonment of thirty-five years of deterrence doctrine, stating, “there would be no advantage in creating a new Maginot Line of the twenty-first century,” and that, “science

\textsuperscript{1050} C.D. Powell to L.V. Appleyard, “Meeting between the Prime Minister and the General Secretary,” 13 March 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1646 f37.

\textsuperscript{1051} Paul Nitze address to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, 20 February 1985.
may not be able to provide a safer solution to the nuclear dilemma of the past 40 years than we have found already.”\(^{1052}\) The press widely interpreted the speech as proof of dissension in Whitehall.\(^{1053}\) In point of fact, Howe submitted the speech for mark-up, but the funeral of Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko occupied the attention of those on Thatcher’s staff’s concerned with SDI.\(^{1054}\)

Howe’s speech generated varying levels of disapproval from Washington. The administration’s most vocal hawk, Richard Perle, strongly rebuked Howe’s naivété; George Shultz privately indicated his distress to Howe regarding doubts raised in the media about HMG’s uncritical support for SDI.\(^{1055}\) The Reagan administration became more attuned to disagreement over SDI in Whitehall as a result of Howe’s speech, but also recognized the political importance of drawing not just European support but participation as well. On the same day as Shultz’s letter to Howe, Caspar Weinberger notified allies of a 60-day deadline to outline research areas of interest for participation.\(^{1056}\)

Contention over SDI participation persisted because Whitehall could not confidently assess the impact on British science and industry without candid responses from Washington on technical outlook, funding arrangements, or even proposed system architecture. Reagan’s aides had yet to develop a consistent message on the technical, strategic, and political implications of the program to sell to allies.\(^{1057}\)

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1054 Kandiah and Staerk, “The British Response to SDI.”
1055 George Shultz to Geoffrey Howe, 26 March 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1444 f92.
1056 Caspar Weinberger to Michael Heseltine, 26 March 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1444 f84.
recognized that SDI deployment existed so far in the future that strategic implications were not of major concern, but the planned purpose certainly affected the pace and scope of research. They were attracted to the innovation funds set aside in the SDI budget for basic research.\textsuperscript{1058}

The prime minister’s office favored bilateral collaboration; Heseltine and the MoD argued for a united European response, which could potentially align with regional schemes for market-oriented technological innovation.\textsuperscript{1059} Thatcher’s staff pointed to the U.S. labor shortages in key areas such as microelectronics, software engineering, and material science as an opportunity for the United Kingdom to capitalize on areas of expertise equal to the United States.\textsuperscript{1060} Her top aides reasoned that the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement and the extensive history of collaboration with the United States could provide the United Kingdom with preferential access to American research and markets for spin-off technologies.\textsuperscript{1061} No. 10 viewed the European continent as Britain’s chief technology rivals, and insisted that the United Kingdom should ruthlessly exploit its status as the only country with a defense science and technology sector trusted and respected by the United States.\textsuperscript{1062} The fact that the Reagan administration stated its own preference for bilateral cooperation strengthened the arguments from the Prime Minister’s Office.\textsuperscript{1063}

\textsuperscript{1058} Robert Armstrong minute to No. 10, “Defense Scientific Adviser’s Minute on SDI Research Program,” 1 May 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f258.
\textsuperscript{1059} Powell to Thatcher, 27 March 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1444 f79.
\textsuperscript{1060} “Prep for Meeting between Robin Nicholson and Thatcher,” 10 July 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f214.
\textsuperscript{1061} Robert Armstrong minute to No. 10, “Defense Scientific Adviser’s Minute on SDI Research Program,” 1 May 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f258.
\textsuperscript{1062} “Prep for Meeting Between Robin Nicholson and Margaret Thatcher,” 10 July 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f214.
Disagreement over SDI between No. 10 Downing Street and the MoD and FCO revealed a conflict of geopolitical philosophies. Whereas Thatcher cultivated influence over Washington as the primary means to upholding British prestige; Heseltine considered tighter technological, scientific, and industrial integration with Europe to be the basis for British power in the coming century. Despite their reticence, the MoD and FCO also understood the unacceptable stakes of non-participation in SDI, with brain drain concerns the most pressing. The United States had ten times as many R&D scientists as Britain, and a full 25 percent of the 75,000 British R&D scientists already worked on defense.\textsuperscript{1064} SDI funding and specialized labor demands would surely lure research scientists to the United States and chip away at Britain’s science base. Heseltine preferred a joint European response to mitigate the further erosion of MoD’s research capabilities. The MoD and FCO contended that a joint European effort would enable each partner to share jointly developed technologies and research, thereby expanding British access to more research programs and prevent the United States from playing the interests of London against those of their shared allies. As a hub of Western science, especially in software and computer engineering, the United Kingdom might actually attract European scientists to work in British institutions on SDI projects. Coordinated European engagement could also bring greater political pressure to bear on the United States should the Department of Defense attempt to work around technology sharing arrangements as they had many times in the past. Lastly, spearheading a coordinated approach would allow the United Kingdom to claim technological leadership of Europe while keeping open the possibility of participation in ESPRIT, EUREKA, and RACE.\textsuperscript{1065}

\textsuperscript{1064} Robin Nicholson to Robert Armstrong, 17 April 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1444 f20.
\textsuperscript{1065} “UK Industrial Involvement in SDI,” Winter 1985, (TNA) FCO 46/4108.
SDI reversed U.S.-U.K. technical collaboration dynamics, providing Whitehall with unfamiliar leverage.  

For most of the Cold War the United Kingdom had relied on collaboration to preserve the quality of its own defense science and technology base. The 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement, 1982 Trident Sales Agreement, and various nuclear testing arrangements provided Britain with much needed technical assistance to maintain its independent nuclear deterrent. They also allowed the United States to set strict controls on jointly developed technology. With the United States now looking to Europe for its expertise, Nicholas Owen, a trusted political advisor to Thatcher, posited, “Our participation is worth a high price and the Americans expect to pay one. They value the quality of our research in the relevant technologies. The political value of our participation will be enhanced by the lukewarm or negative attitudes of other allies.”

U.S. officials identified eighteen areas where British research institutions offered particular value and seven for potential technology exchange. The indigenous decoy system for Britain’s independent deterrent developed during the 1970s to overcome Moscow’s ballistic missiles defenses known as Chevaline offered especially useful knowledge to meet the challenges of target acquisition. SDIO Director, James

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1067 Nicholas Owen to Thatcher, “SDI Research; UK Participation,” 10 July 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f201.  
Abrahamson, noted that knowledge gained from the Chevaline project and the U.K.’s long research history on ballistic missile defense permitted British experts to function as a “red team” on SDI system concepts.\textsuperscript{1069}

In the area of strategic computing British expertise was especially relevant, especially to the design of battle management software and for improvements to command, control, and communications. The United Kingdom had recently implemented the Alvey Program, a 350 million pound budget jointly funded by industrial partners and the MoD, Department of Trade and Industry, and the Science and Engineering Research Council of the Department of Education for research in advanced information technologies pursued by a partnership between universities and corporations. Launched in 1983 under the direction of Brian Oakley, the Alvey Program focused on four areas: very large-scale integration; software engineering; man-machine interface; and intelligent knowledge-based systems (IKBS), the program’s de facto effort to compete with artificial intelligence developments in fifth-generation computing.\textsuperscript{1070} Alvey’s aim was to make British information technology commercially competitive, but each of its major aims aligned with SDI’s essential needs, particularly in the field of computer architecture and software development, the latter acknowledged by SDI chief scientist Gerold Yonas as one of two critical areas suffering from substantial labor deficits.\textsuperscript{1071}

Private science diplomacy played a critical role in persuading skeptics in the Conservative Party to accept the U.S. invitation to participate in SDI. George Keyworth’s

promotion of SDI found a welcome audience in the Conservative Party through his friendship with Lord Chalfont. His standing and chairmanship of the House of Lords Defense Group made Chalfont an ideal proxy for SDI. He enjoyed significant political clout through his membership in the “Monday Club,” the highly influential pressure group that advocated for hard right policy positions on matters of economy and defense. Chalfont also previously served as the minister of disarmament. He put together a speaking circuit for Keyworth in 1985 to address policymakers and the think tank community on the value of SDI participation and its contribution to deterrence. Chalfont hosted several private dinners for Keyworth to persuade skeptical Conservative leaders, most notably Michael Heseltine, to support participation in SDI. Keyworth provided the technical information, and strategic and political arguments for Chalfont’s pro-SDI publications distributed by the Monday Club.\(^{1072}\) He also relied on Keyworth to help him prepare for parliamentary debates on SDI.\(^{1073}\)

Keyworth’s science diplomacy went far beyond Chalfont. He planted pro-SDI information in both public and private by supplying several other influential Conservatives with cleverly crafted technical arguments. Keyworth sought to establish a direct rapport with the British press, persuading the influential science editor of the Financial Times to come out in favor of SDI.\(^ {1074}\) Keyworth and U.S. intelligence operatives secretly cultivated Conservative Party activist, David Hart, to persuade Thatcher of SDI’s popularity with the British public. Thatcher trusted Hart’s political

\(^{1072}\) See Alun Chalfont, Star Wars: Suicide or Survival (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985).

\(^{1073}\) Keyworth and Lord Chalfont, 13 February 1985 - 20 February 1985, (RRPL) Keyworth Files Box 20, Folder United Kingdom; Lord Chalfont to Keyworth, 20 March 1985, (RRPL) Keyworth Files Box 20, Folder United Kingdom; George Keyworth, “Draft copy of forward for Lord Chalfont’s pro-Star Wars Book,” 13 June 1985, (RRPL) Keyworth Files Box 20, Folder United Kingdom; George Keyworth to Reagan, 5 December 1985, (RRPL) Keyworth Files Box 20, Folder United Kingdom.

abilities following his pivotal role in undermining the coal miners’ strike of 1984-1985. A Gallup poll which Hart commissioned and presented to Thatcher as an argument in favor of SDI participation appeared to be crafted by Reagan administration officials.1075 Hart went so far as to personally host Keyworth during his frequent trips to the United Kingdom in service of SDI’s European aims and facilitate meetings with key nuclear policymakers in HMG.1076

The Reagan administration also inserted its scientific supporters into its public diplomacy apparatus that had been developed during earlier debates on INF deployment. Teller and Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) advised a key British government report on the future of High Energy Physics in the United Kingdom, which among other items, considered the importance of SDI research.1077 Conservative MPs attended pro-SDI conferences with speakers from High Frontier, the Heritage Foundation, and the Moral Majority sponsored by the Unification Church of God.1078 The interest of British royals in SDI also received special attention in the Reagan administration.1079

In addition to alleviating British economic and technological concerns through science diplomacy, the Reagan administration sought to persuade the Thatcher government to act as its surrogate on SDI diplomacy in Europe. Acknowledged by both

1076 George Keyworth to U.S. Ambassador to U.K. Charles Price, 10 June 1985, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 20, Folder “United Kingdom;” Mr. Pakenham to Mr. Thomas, “Your meeting with David Hart and Dr. George Keyworth,” 12 June 1985, (TNA) FCO 46/4632.
1077 Robert Stella to George Keyworth, 26 July 1985, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 20, Folder “United Kingdom.”
1079 Jay Keyworth to Bud McFarlane, “Presidential Meeting with Prince of Wales,” 1 October 1985, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 20, Folder “United Kingdom.”
Reagan and Gorbachev as the third-party broker of superpower relations, the Thatcher government and U.S. State Department relied on Whitehall’s four-points on SDI as the key to generating NATO support for the Geneva process then underway. Shultz confirmed to Howe in June 1985 that the Camp David agreement represented “a strong and coherent allied position on which everyone could unite.” Though U.S. and British officials sensed a potentially productive opening for arms control with the emergence of Gorbachev, they also recognized that his charm and cosmopolitan demeanor made him a greater public diplomacy challenge and thus greater threat to alliance solidarity than his predecessors. Gorbachev’s public diplomacy challenge appeared especially acute given that the current signature nuclear issue—SDI—came not from an agreed upon alliance policy such as the dual-track decision, but rather from the president’s faith in American technological exceptionalism.

In Washington, significant anxiety emerged over the cold response from NATO leaders regarding the centrality of SDI to the goal of nuclear peace. Reagan’s indecisive preparations and failure to select directives for his Geneva negotiators, later framed by officials as providing the U.S. delegation with maximum flexibility, further engendered concerns among allies that Gorbachev seemed posed to outmaneuver the president. Surely Reagan’s guarantees persuaded Thatcher that he genuinely desired an arms control agreement, but it was the assurances of Shultz and his top aides in the

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1080 U.K. Embassy in Lisbon to FCO, “Secretary of States’ Bilateral Meeting with Shultz: Tete-a-tete,” 5 June 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1655 f55.s
1082 George Keyworth to Don Regan, 4 June 1985, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files, Box 13, Folder “SDI.”
State Department that convinced British officials that president had empowered the right people for the job.\textsuperscript{1084}

Believing that the State Department enjoyed the most influential position in the Reagan administration on SDI within the context of arms control, Thatcher utilized her credibility in Europe to support the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva.\textsuperscript{1085} West German chancellor Helmut Kohl accepted SDI based on Thatcher’s efforts to tie support for the program to continued progress on arms control.\textsuperscript{1086} British officials encouraged their French peers to accept SDI as they did, and to disregard the potential long-term implications for their respective national deterrents. Regarding SDI, one British diplomat explained to his French counterpart, “We saw the immediate priority as being rather to keep the disarmament negotiations at Geneva on the rails. This lent particular importance to the four-points agreed at Camp David...”\textsuperscript{1087} Thatcher at the same time led the persuasion effort to convince Reagan to continue U.S. observance of the limits set by the SALT II Treaty to demonstrate good faith to both the Soviets and Western Europeans.\textsuperscript{1088}

Thatcher had come around to the idea of British participation in SDI based on the prospect of technological gains and enhanced influence over superpower relations, but tensions within Whitehall continued to make SDI a difficult issue in U.S.-U.K. relations. Thatcher and her staff approached SDI as a source of innovation funds and immediate business opportunity to move high-technology research further into the industrial realm.

\textsuperscript{1084} Peter Carrington to Margaret Thatcher, 8 August 1985, (CAC) THCR MSS 13/16 f125.
\textsuperscript{1085} Oliver Wright to FCO, 8 March 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1442 f213; Peter Carrington to Margaret Thatcher, 8 August 1985, (CAC) THCR MSS 13/16 f125.
\textsuperscript{1086} “Prime Minister’s Meeting with Chancellor Kohl,” 19 May 1985, (TNA) PREM 191507 f188.
rather than solely a chance to revitalize MoD’s research base. This attitude fit with the philosophy of privatization that defined the economic precepts of Thatcherism. Heseltine, however, wanted SDI participation to establish new precedents for technological collaboration that were compatible with Britain’s envisioned role in Europe. Terms of technological collaboration that pumped new talent, equipment, and resources into vital sectors of Britain’s defense research establishments and production lines were essential to Heseltine’s view that a power with global interests should maintain its own functionally independent defense base.1089

Heseltine presented terms of participation designed to benefit the long-term health of defense science in Britain to Weinberger in their July 1985 meeting. The British defense secretary stated Thatcher’s preferred terms, notably the removal of procedural obstacles to contract bidding, clear ownership rights on intellectual and industrial property, and royalty free and unrestricted use of technology produced with U.S. funding.1090 These measures were intended to avert the opening of a civilian technology gap by minimizing the superior ability of the U.S. industrial base to exploit commercial applications of defense R&D. Moreover, Heseltine insisted on a guarantee worth 1.5 billion dollars in contracts alongside unrestricted two-way technology transfer to ensure that Britain collected as wide a view possible of the entire program.1091 A wider view

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1089 Kandiah and Staerk (eds), “The British Response to SDI.”
1091 Ibid.
benefited the MoD’s development of future defense technologies and kept British experts aware of emerging technologies that could affect arms control negotiations.\textsuperscript{1092}

Heseltine surprised American officials with the size and seriousness of Britain’s bid for participation. After months of monitoring the reluctance of the MoD and FCO, the Reagan administration expected the British government to seek limited participation.\textsuperscript{1093}

Throughout the fall of 1985 the United States and United Kingdom clashed over the size of guaranteed contracts to British firms, equal opportunities for prime-contracts, and the unhampered two-way flow of technical data.\textsuperscript{1094} For the DOD, these issues translated into potentially troublesome precedents for technological collaboration with the United Kingdom and other allies. For Thatcher’s government, especially after the Trident agreement failed to deliver promised employment opportunities and prime contracts to British firms, fighting for industrial prerogatives was the most important task in mobilizing support for SDI.\textsuperscript{1095}

By late November 1985, urgency surrounding SDI participation sharply increased. Initial meetings between Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in Geneva confirmed the President’s ideological attachment to SDI. At the same time, back-channel contacts informed Thatcher that any country interested in SDI participation must act fast before congressional politics and pressure from the U.S. armed services squeezed SDI funding for allied collaboration.\textsuperscript{1096} Heseltine and Weinberger

\textsuperscript{1092} Heseltine minute to Thatcher, “British Participation on SDI Research,” 23 July 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f160.
\textsuperscript{1093} MoD to No. 10, “SDI Research,” 30 July 1985 (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f145.
\textsuperscript{1094} Sam Wyman to Keyworth, “Current Status of US/UK SDI Cooperation,” 22 October 1985, (RRPL) George Keyworth Files Box 20, Folder U.K.
\textsuperscript{1096} Powell to Thatcher, “SDI,” 29 November 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f5.
signed the SDI Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on 6 December 1985. Press reports speculated on the agreement’s deficiencies.\textsuperscript{1097} Intellectual property rights and the scale of the U.S. financial commitment to the United Kingdom remained uncertain, though the United Kingdom managed to protect its right to participation in ESPRIT and EUREKA. The MoD and FCO hardly considered the DOD’s sweetener of a ten million dollar contract for a European computer architecture study to be a positive. Both departments feared that the study’s objective to assess technological and strategic implications of SDI for Europe placed Britain in an awkward position with the other NATO allies.\textsuperscript{1098}

The secrecy of the MOU’s provisions fueled public conjecture about Whitehall’s dysfunction on the grounds that Heseltine resented Thatcher for coercing him to accept an agreement that set bad precedents for future technological collaboration.\textsuperscript{1099} In effect, SDI represented another potential point of division between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Europe. The Thatcher government faced the task of reconciling the competing security, economic, political, and diplomatic aims of all three in order to maintain NATO unity and domestic support for peace through deterrence. In so doing, Thatcher expanded Britain’s role in East-West relations and reaffirmed her government’s partnership with the U.S. State Department; she simultaneously alienated Heseltine, who in future years would lead the insurrection against her leadership of the Conservative Party.

\textsuperscript{1098} Powell to Policy Unit, “SDI Architecture Study,” 1 November 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1445 f38.
CHAPTER SEVEN:
SUMMIT DIPLOMACY AND THE BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION

Shortly following the conclusion of the Washington Summit in December 1987, where the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the terms of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, a USIA study led by Heritage president Edwin Feulner offered lessons to be learned from the preparations for superpower summits. The study noted, “how summits are perceived fundamentally shapes these outcomes…public diplomacy should be treated as a primary strategic part of summit statecraft. It is, after all, the public component that makes summits unique and distinguishes them from other forms of diplomatic dialogue.”\(^{1100}\)

Including an analysis of public diplomacy in the study of superpower summits calls into question the framing of Reagan as a nuclear abolitionist, which is a component of a victory thesis that praises Reagan’s uncompromising vision as the key to ending the Cold War.\(^{1101}\) In arguing that Reagan was a Cold War prophet who foretold and forced the end of the Soviet Union, the victory school thesis undersells the dynamism of his administration’s foreign policy as it responded to rapid changes in public opinion, Soviet policies, and alliance security concerns.

A broadened public diplomacy focus also brings attention to the alliance between the Thatcher government and Shultz’s State Department. Contrary to claims that a weaker group of moderates in Reagan’s cabinet likely could not overrule the strength of

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hardliners to bring about a more conciliatory U.S. approach to arms control, a public diplomacy perspective and transatlantic view suggests that State Department moderates actually enjoyed a stronger position of influence over Reagan thanks to their effective partnership with the Thatcher government and trends in public opinion. Their alliance proved critical to ending the Cold War because they developed policy in view of its implications for public diplomacy, specifically in formulating a posture that made it possible to pursue arms control and SDI simultaneously. HMG’s partnership with the U.S. State Department identified Gorbachev as both the single greatest challenge to U.S. and British public diplomacy and the most amenable Soviet leader since Nikita Khrushchev. Archie Brown does not dwell on Anglo-Soviet engagement, but he reinforces what is evident in British and American sources, that Thatcher, not Reagan, first legitimized Gorbachev in the eyes of Western publics.

Though the peace movement challenge had faded significantly by the start of the summits and especially after the 1986 U.S. mid-term elections, the specter of the peace movement influenced U.S. public diplomacy planning. In the final years of the 1980s, Reagan’s approach to nuclear negotiations had to account for Western publics that had become better informed on nuclear issues, more attuned to public science diplomacy, and held favorable views of Gorbachev’s arms control policies.

Gorbachev proved an adept public diplomat in part because he recognized the importance of science as a source of legitimacy and its proven effectiveness for countering the Reagan administration’s public diplomacy. In the United States and United Kingdom, scientists opposed to the arms race still did not wield significant

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influence with either Reagan or Thatcher. What mattered is that scientists’ public diplomacy influenced public opinion and indirectly conditioned official policy. Western scientists meeting with Gorbachev were valued because of their influence on public opinion, and Western public opinion respected public science diplomacy even more because of its private contacts abroad. Scientists’ recognition of this effective pairing of public and private approaches to science diplomacy derived from the introspection brought on by engagement with mass antinuclear politics earlier in the decade.

The moral themes articulated in U.S. public diplomacy informed Gorbachev’s efforts to re-humanize the Soviet Union in the eyes of Reagan, a strategy that the general secretary referred to as the “human factor” in diplomacy. Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton emphasize that the human factor keyed the normalization of relations with the United States, a principal objective of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” in Soviet foreign policy, which he designed to provide political space for the domestic economic and civil society reforms known as perestroika and glasnost.  

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze’s implementation of this new thinking in his pre-summit efforts with Shultz that led up to the historic gatherings at Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow undoubtedly provided both Gorbachev and Reagan a sense of progress that could be accelerated by their meeting. Reagan for his part, as Melvyn Leffler notes, demonstrated an impressive emotional aptitude for negotiating with leaders of a system he had so vehemently condemned.

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Examining superpower summits through a transatlantic public diplomacy lens reveals that the scientific community, Thatcher and Eduard Shevardnadze—in addition to Reagan, Gorbachev, Shultz, and George H.W. Bush who James Graham Wilson identifies as the prime movers—played essential roles in bringing an end to the Cold War.\textsuperscript{1106} Thatcher’s response to Reagan’s increasing interest in the abolition of nuclear weapons strikes at the heart of the scholarly debate as to whether the prime minister should be labeled a pragmatist or ideologue.\textsuperscript{1107} Thatcher’s insistence on arms control but resistance to total disarmament reflected her ideological attachment to the idea that Britain should act as a great power, albeit one eclipsed by two superpowers. This paradox derived from Thatcher’s view of the Cold War as a structure that maintained Britain as a great power. The Cold War justified Britain’s possession of nuclear weapons, it allowed Whitehall to boost its international prestige by assuming the role of superpower mediator and consensus builder in NATO, and it kept Europe at the center of geopolitics. In practice, this meant Thatcher convinced Reagan to embrace summitry and also used her influence to extract assurances that deterrence and the special nuclear relationship would remain a cornerstone of the Atlantic Alliance.

Reagan’s right-wing allies, both his domestic supporters and pro-deterrence faction in the United Kingdom, harbored anxieties about his apparent propensity for nuclear abolition displayed at the superpower summits in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow. Their stiff opposition to Reagan’s departure from his earlier


\textsuperscript{1107} Richard Vinen, “Thatcherism and the Cold War,” in \textit{Making Thatcher’s Britain}, eds. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); In the same volume, see Andrew Gamble, “Europe and America.”
arms control posture speaks to how effective public diplomacy had been in coupling nuclear weapons with the transatlantic conservative ethos over the preceding decade. The president had done more than any single individual to empower this coupling of conservatism and robust defense mentalities, and yet the existence of large constituencies in the peace movement and an international scientific community that favored disarmament enabled Reagan to claim the legacy of peacemaker.

The reduction in nuclear weapons that came out of the superpower summits have led Paul Lettow and some other writers to the conclusion that Reagan had always sought to eliminate nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.\textsuperscript{1108} It is worth recalling what has been noted by Sven Kraemer, Reagan’s Director for Arms Control on the NSC. Reagan was not a nuclear abolitionist. He may have been an “idealistic” and visionary when he spoke of a world free of nuclear weapons in the distant future, but as a “realist” and determined negotiator Reagan refused to yield on the one system that he believed mattered most for returning the United States to a position of nuclear superiority: SDI.\textsuperscript{1109} The administration’s public diplomacy reflected that priority.

\textit{Progress in Geneva}

In advance of the summit in Geneva, major Soviet concessions left SDI as the main obstacle to attaining a far-reaching arms control agreement. Alongside the White House’s and Kremlin’s July announcement of a superpower summit to be held in November 1985, Gorbachev unveiled plans for an October visit to Paris in what became

\textsuperscript{1108} Lettow, \textit{Ronald Reagan and His Quest To Abolish Nuclear Weapons}.
\textsuperscript{1109} Kraemer, \textit{Inside the Cold War}, 318-319.
the opening salvo in a competitive round of pre-summit diplomacy. The influential French daily newspaper *Le Monde* termed Gorbachev’s visit “Operation Seduction.” The announcement of a new Soviet arms control initiative for the Geneva Summit in a Western-style press conference served as the primary component of Gorbachev’s Parisian seduction. Many of Gorbachev’s offers in fact came from the ongoing Geneva process; he simply sought to publicize them in attempt to seize the initiative. He called for a fifty percent reduction in strategic forces and separation of the INF and strategic issues while seeking a joint Franco-Soviet communiqué condemning SDI. He also made it known that the Soviet delegation in Geneva no longer demanded the inclusion of British and French nuclear forces in arms control talks. The Soviet withdrawal of the demand for the inclusion of third country nuclear systems removed the key unifying point for London, Paris, and Washington on arms control.

Soviet public diplomacy exacerbated nuclear tensions in the West, both among government leaders and the general public. Gorbachev’s well calculated arms control announcement contrasted with the Reagan administration’s rushed attempt to gather allies in New York to demonstrate solidarity to the public. The move exacerbated concerns about European discord since the White House announced the event prior to French

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The isolation of SDI as the lone impediment to nuclear peace played to the primary issue sustaining the transatlantic antinuclear movement. Though the diplomacy of George Keyworth, Edward Teller, and other scientific allies of the administration had helped draw Thatcher’s endorsement of SDI participation, an even more impressive public science diplomacy operation sustained by Richard Garwin, Solly Zuckerman, Pugwash, SANA, and the British Royal Society sustained opposition to SDI among a transatlantic public. Garwin appeared on the British television show “You the Jury” to debate Keyworth’s ally and Britain’s most assertive SDI supporter, Lord Alun Chalfont.\footnote{Solly Zuckerman to Richard Garwin, 3 June 1985, (UEASC) Solly Zuckerman Papers, SZ/2/Gen 35/Box Garwin.} SANA and British Pugwash cohosted anti-SDI conferences with scientifically oriented antinuclear organizations from the United States such as Council for a Livable World.\footnote{SANA and CLW, “Star Wars: A Policy Discussion of the Strategic Defense Initiative,” 16 October 1985, (LSE) END 15/12; “47th Pugwash Symposium: Strategic Defenses: Technological Aspects; Political and Military Implications,” 5-8 December 1985, (CAC) RTBT 5/2/2/47.} Zuckerman’s close friendship with Garwin helped secure key figures from the American debate on SDI such as Ash Carter, John Holdren, and George Rathjens to come address the scientific community in the United Kingdom.\footnote{Zuckerman-Garwin correspondence, (UEASC) Solly Zuckerman Papers, S2/GEN/35, Folder “Garwin;” Richard Garwin, interview by author, Washington D.C., 28 November 2017.}
The rapid advance of British scientific activism convinced antinuclear leaders to adopt the arguments of the scientific community in opposing SDI. In its search for new strategies, CND concluded in August 1985 that arguments about SDI’s negative impact on Britain’s technical base should be a new point of emphasis. With SDI in focus, the antinuclear movement proved to be an impressively resilient operation, still capable of shaping public opinion. A late September Gallup poll indicated that 46 percent of Britons still rejected a defense policy based on nuclear weapons and deterrence. In October 1985, over 100,000 demonstrators once again flooded into London’s Hyde Park to call for an end to the arms race.

The Reagan administration’s public diplomacy in advance of the Geneva Summit suggests that Washington heeded Thatcher’s calls for a more concerted approach to appealing to Western European public opinion on SDI. Reagan, more than most presidents, understood the nuances in using historical imagery as a political tool. By promoting a common Western heritage, Reagan sought to craft memories to define a distinct Western morality that justified his nuclear agenda as the cornerstone of a broader plan to rollback global communism. He directed his top aides to do the same. As CIA Director William Casey prepared to give a speech delineating the obligations of U.S. foreign policy in fall 1985, Reagan sent over a heavily marked up copy of conservative political scientist and Committee on the Present Danger member Adda Bozeman’s article, “The Nuclear Freeze Movement: Conflicting Moral and Political Perspectives on War and its Relationship to Peace.”

1120 “Minutes of the Meeting of the CND Executive Committee,” 3 August 1985, (LSE) CND/ADD 1/2.
Reagan’s annotations offer insight into the president’s views of how history should inform policy in the context of the Cold War. He emphasized Bozeman’s argument that the freeze movement’s ahistorical understanding of how the West came to comprehend the relationship between war and peace differently than Soviet, Islamic, and far Eastern cultures had led to its advocacy for “unilateral moral and military disarmament.” Reagan drew special attention to two other passages that summed up his view of the Cold War. The first segment read, “the foremost task for U.S. policy today consists in persuading the nation that mankind is not of one kind. Rather, it is distributed among diverse moral and political orders. Perspectives on war and its relation to peace should therefore be expected to differ—a truth corroborated by chronicles of world events.”

The administration’s public diplomacy sought to develop this historical argument to suggest that the Soviet Union viewed arms control treaties not as a sign of peace, but as a tactical maneuver in preparation for war. The second passage reflected the importance Reagan placed on maintaining the Cold War state of mind, in it, Bozeman concluded, “the ultimate stage or theater of our conflict with totalitarianism—the one, namely, on which victory and defeat will be decided for centuries to come—is the Western, more particularly the American mind.”

Moral themes and historical memory were merged with accusations of current Soviet nuclear escalation in the administration’s European public diplomacy leading up to the first summit in Geneva. In October 1985, the USIA resumed Voice of America’s

1124 Ibid., 303.
(VOA) English language broadcasting in Western Europe to target a younger generation that had no memories of World War II, and thus presumably less appreciation for the importance of American security guarantees. Events such as Reagan’s radio address to the nation on 12 October in which he examined Soviet treaty violations and strategic defense projects were rhetorical extensions of the moral and political claims based on the alleged differences between Western and Soviet cultures. Reagan’s address, his other foreign policy speeches, and a regular line-up of events featuring commentaries from top-level officials served as the core content for VOA and WORLDNET satellite broadcasts in Europe.1125

Reagan turned to Thatcher to press claims of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty and nuclear misconduct in both public diplomacy and in private meetings with NATO leaders in New York in late October. Thatcher’s engagement with Washington indicates that she feared public diplomacy overtaking, rather than informing arms control policy. She insisted the United States preserve the existing treaty regime, which meant continued observation of the un-ratified SALT II agreement in addition to sustained commitment to some version of the ABM Treaty. She pushed Reagan to consider the psychological impact of SDI on the Soviet leadership.1126 Thatcher’s emphasis on the Kremlin’s SDI anxieties fit a pattern dating back to the Able Archer war scare of fall 1983 in which she attempted to persuade Reagan of the authenticity of Soviet nuclear fear and of its significance to arms control talks.1127

Hidden amidst the pre-summit public diplomacy blitz was an opportunity for progress in East-West relations. Thatcher primarily used her influence to give a “fresh impetus” to moving talks forward.1128 In his conversations with Thatcher, Reagan agreed with her view and that of Shultz that Gorbachev appeared sincere in his interest in arms control no matter the underlying motivation. Thatcher’s assessment certainly contributed to Reagan’s view, as had his briefings with Shultz which revealed the president’s heightened sympathy for the nuclear anxieties of young people.1129

But what might be achieved at Geneva? Gorbachev’s charm campaign did not stop at public diplomacy. He had courted Thatcher on her terms and respected the significance of the special relationship to East-West relations. His visit to Paris and discarding of the third-party nuclear systems provision in arms control talks signaled Soviet recognition of the centrality of the Force de frappe to the French national identity and France’s importance in world affairs. Just as with West European leaders, Gorbachev’s early engagements with the president suggests that he hoped to first establish a personal rapport with Reagan that could be turned into a Soviet advantage in the future.1130

Gorbachev structured his personal diplomacy around a clear acknowledgement of his interlocutor’s fundamental sense of place in world affairs. His style in part masked Soviet intentions, but also engendered reciprocation and thus met the Soviet Union’s traditional goal of having its interests and political system recognized as legitimate by the

1130 Savranskaya and Blanton, The Last of the Superpower Summits, 10-12.
West. Upon his confirmation as General Secretary Gorbachev received a memo from his close advisor and former Soviet Ambassador to Canada Aleksandr Yakovlev that evaluated the key motives for Reagan’s approach to international affairs. They recognized that the president most wanted to be remembered as a grand peacemaker to solidify his legacy as one of the great Western leaders in history.\footnote{Yakovlev to Gorbachev, “About Reagan,” 12 March 1985, in The Last of the Superpower Summits: Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush. Conversations that Ended the Cold War, eds. Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton (Baltimore: Central European Press, 2016), 25.}

The tone of correspondence between Reagan and Gorbachev provided yet another indication of a change to Soviet diplomacy. Even in his first term, Reagan sought to establish a regular correspondence with Soviet leadership. Personal letters characterized the president’s preference for informal communication, which appealed to his own self-image of a man whose laid-back charisma enabled him to excel in private exchanges.\footnote{Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 339-341.} Both leaders relied on the correspondence to feel out the depths each other’s ideological commitment to their systems. A tacit understanding to take a pragmatic and constructive attitude toward negotiations emerged in their pre-summit correspondence.\footnote{Mikhail Gorbachev to Ronald Reagan, 22 June 1985; Mikhail Gorbachev to Ronald Reagan, 12 September 1985; Mikhail Gorbachev to Ronald Reagan, 12 October 1985; Ronald Reagan to Mikhail Gorbachev, 22 October 1985; Ronald Reagan to Mikhail Gorbachev, 31 October 1985; Ronald Reagan to Mikhail Gorbachev, 1 November 1985. All can be located in Jason Saltoun-Ebin (www.thereaganfiles.com). Las accessed 20 November 2019. https://www.thereaganfiles.com/document-collections/letters-between-president.html}

Gorbachev’s second track to reset U.S.-Soviet relations ran through the two people in favor of arms control who he believed wielded the most influence with Reagan, Thatcher and Shultz. Gorbachev made his boldest move yet to consolidate his power in moving Andrei Gromyko out of the post of foreign minister, a position he had occupied for decades. Referred to by some in the U.S. foreign policy community as Mr. nyet, most
analysts recognized Gromyko’s dominance over Soviet foreign policy as an obstacle to improved relations. Gorbachev shocked the Politburo when he chose not to fill the post of foreign minister with one of Gromyko’s hand-groomed successors, but instead selected a politician with a style similar to his own brand of personal and unscripted diplomacy. Eduard Shevardnadze’s elevation to foreign minister coincided with the announcement of the Geneva summit in July. Compared to Gromyko, Shevardnadze presented himself as a friendly sparring partner for Shultz. The new foreign minister worked his way to Moscow from the party ranks in Georgia and strongly supported Gorbachev’s leadership campaign. He represented precisely what Shultz anticipated of the change in Soviet leadership, a younger leader of provincial origin whose firsthand experience with the state’s failure on the periphery would motivate him toward a more dynamic East-West engagement as part of a broader effort for generational reform. Over the next three and a half years, the Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings became the key to progress on arms control.

Reagan and Gorbachev came to Geneva in mid-November 1985 with modest expectations for the first Soviet-American summit in seven years. Reagan’s caution stemmed from his concern for allied thinking and the esteem he held for Gorbachev’s talents as a public diplomat. Shevardnadze’s and Shultz’s preparatory visits to Washington and Moscow produced an understanding that the summit would set a constructive tone for future negotiations, but that little in the way of actual progress

1136 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 586.
should be expected.\textsuperscript{1137} Reagan appeared not to actually want to deal with substance. He refused Moscow’s request for a preconceived agreed upon statement, and in a personal memo he stated, “Let us agree this is the first of meetings to follow. That in itself will give an aura of success.”\textsuperscript{1138} Perhaps most surprising, but also indicative of his shifting attitudes, Reagan’s personal memo also suggests that for political reasons he wished to slow play summitry so as not to run afoul of the hardliners in his own administration.

Weinberger validated the president’s concerns. Shortly before Air Force One touched down in Geneva, the \textit{New York Times} received a Weinberger memo in which the secretary of defense insisted the president reject out of hand the possibility of any agreements with the Soviet Union. The press and the White House interpreted the leak as hardliners’ revenge for excluding Weinberger from the Geneva delegation and for the president’s decision to accept Thatcher and Shultz’s advice to extend observation of SALT II limits. The self-avowed morally conservative Senator Steve Symms (R-ID) decried the latter as “unilateral appeasement and disarmament.”\textsuperscript{1139}

Historians have understated the effect of Gorbachev’s appeal to Reagan’s Western values. At the time Reagan considered it a crucial step to putting East-West relations on a more productive course. The “Spirit of Geneva” widely touted in the press and subsequently in scholarship as giving a fresh impetus to arms control did not emerge out of any meaningful concrete agreements, but rather out of the success of Gorbachev’s

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gambit to emphasize the similarities between Soviet and American society. At dinner hosted by the Gorbachev’s at the Soviet mission on 19 November, the general secretary structured his conversation with Reagan around an approval of conservative family values, references to material conditions like ice cream parlors and coffee shops, and a review of the Moscow production of Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf. He capped his gambit with a biblical citation in his dinner toast. Reagan responded with his own biblical citation from the Acts of the Apostles, “we are all of one blood regardless of where we live on the Earth,” and a somewhat bizarre comment on the potential for an alien invasion to unite the peoples of the earth. The exchange is remarkable considering Reagan’s first term comments regarding the Soviets’ perverted conception of morality and his very recent correspondence with senior aides affirming those views.

When Reagan addressed NATO leaders at a special session of the North Atlantic Council immediately following the Geneva summit, he stressed that Gorbachev’s references to God made a very positive impression on him. Upon his return to Washington D.C., Reagan confided in White House aide Michael Deaver, “I honestly think he [Gorbachev] believes in a higher power.” Biblical citations and references to a distinctly Christian morality, as well as the occasional nod to an alien invasion, became a feature of Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s dialogues in subsequent summit meetings.


1143 Michael Deaver, Different Drummer: My Thirty Years with Ronald Reagan (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 118; Also see Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind.
Gorbachev’s correspondence following the summit reveals his strategy to isolate Reagan’s morality from technology; or, rather, to break apart the technological exceptionalism underpinning the president’s attachment to SDI. Gorbachev wrote to the president in early December that the spirit of Geneva emerged from the fact that both leaders overcame the psychological barriers that long hindered talks between United States and Soviet Union. In that spirit, Gorbachev wrote to Reagan regarding the applications of SDI for nuclear superiority, “I do not doubt that you personally may really have no such intentions.” Breaking with the confrontational and formulaic style that characterized his predecessors’ diplomatic communications, Gorbachev alluded to a genuine Soviet concern and fear of U.S. nuclear power at both Geneva and in follow up correspondence.\textsuperscript{1144} His expressions of fear, morality, and pragmatism over ideology appear indicative of his strategy to humanize the Soviet Union and its leadership in the eyes of Reagan.

NATO leaders praised Reagan’s statesmanship during the special session of the North Atlantic Council, but as Thatcher pointed out to Shultz, Geneva dramatically raised the stakes for future summits.\textsuperscript{1145} If the next meeting produced only pleasantries as well, it would be widely construed as a step backwards for East-West relations. Reagan’s unwavering attachment to SDI prevented even the slightest bit of movement toward an agreement on strategic force reductions. The summit did produce incremental progress in other areas. Washington interpreted Gorbachev’s openness to an interim INF agreement

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\textsuperscript{1145} “No. 10 record of conversation between Thatcher, Howe, and Shultz,” 10 December 1985, (TNA) PREM 19/1655 f6.
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as a concession to detach the INF process from SDI politics.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation, “Reagan-Gorbachev Summit: Meeting Three,” 19 November 1985, (RRPL) Jack Matlock Files, Box 92137; “Summary of the President’s NATO Consultations: Special Session of the North Atlantic Council,” 21 November 1985, (RRPL) Robert E. Linhard Files, OA 92178, Folder “Geneva Summit Records: November 19-21.”} The job of putting together a mutually acceptable INF agreement became the primary task for the Soviet and American NST delegations that had remained in negotiation in Geneva since January 1985 – a dialogue known as the Geneva process. Positive steps toward INF and the more concerted approach to NATO consultations brought allied goodwill that undoubtedly helped the United States persuade several European partners to participate in SDI, beginning with the United Kingdom in December 1985 to be followed West Germany in March 1986 and Italy in September.\footnote{“Strategic Defense Initiative Chronology: 1983-1990,” 19 March 1990, (DNSA); Other major allies agreed to participate in SDI research as well; including Israel in May 1986 and Japan in July 1987.}

The most promising agreements made at Geneva, however, were the guarantees made by Reagan and Gorbachev to host and attend summits in Washington D.C. and Moscow.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation, “Dinner hosted by the Gorbachevs,” 19 November 1985, (NSA). Last Accessed 10 September 2019. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc20.pdf} Another round of pre-summit public diplomacy commenced in the beginning of 1986 with both the White House and the Kremlin looking ahead to a second meeting. With the U.S. and Soviet delegations set to reconvene in Geneva on 15 January Gorbachev circulated a bold new public proposal to the Western press through the Soviet press agency. He called for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons on earth by 1999.

Gorbachev explained in his letter to Reagan written on 14 January 1986 that the impulse to make nuclear weapons “impotent” and “obsolete” should be directed toward mutual actions rather than technological solutions and called for intensive negotiations.
prior to their next summit. The new plan from the Kremlin consisted of several stages. In stage one, completed over five to eight years, each country would reduce nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other’s territories by fifty percent. No more than six thousand warheads could be mounted on delivery vehicles for either side by the end of the stage. A prohibition on testing and development of weapons, including those in space, would accompany stage one reductions. All INF weapons would be included, save the independent forces of the United Kingdom and France. In the second stage, beginning no later than 1990 and lasting five to seven years, the United Kingdom, France, and China would join disarmament efforts by freezing their arsenals. The elimination of tactical missiles with a range up to one thousand kilometers and bans on space weapons and testing would be subject to agreement by all nuclear powers. Beginning in 1995, the third and final stage would see the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons verified by both national technical means and onsite inspections.\footnote{Mikhail Gorbachev to Ronald Reagan, 14 January 1986. Last Accessed 10 September 2019. \url{https://www.thereaganfiles.com/19860114.pdf}}

Gorbachev’s expansive proposal included a temporary moratorium on testing that appeared to be an olive branch to the community of Western scientific activists. The Kremlin had hoped to exploit Western scientific opposition to SDI almost immediately following the program’s introduction, with Andropov making an “Appeal to all the scientists of the world” to reject an arms race in space.\footnote{John F. Burns, “Andropov Offers Ban on Space,” \textit{The New York Times}, 28 April 1983.} Gorbachev, benefiting from his extensive formal education, proved far more adept than his predecessors at courting the Western scientific community.
FAS Chairman Frank Von Hippel speculates that the interaction of FAS with the freeze movement and antinuclear politics made the organization of scientists an appealing instrument for capturing public opinion in the West to Gorbachev. Matthew Evangelista has thoroughly examined the effect of Von Hippel and other scientists associated with FAS and Pugwash in bringing Gorbachev to accept a test ban. In an unprecedented event, FAS had published an open letter to Gorbachev the month prior to his January 1986 proposal that called for the general secretary to be the key figure in arms control and use his unique gifts for personal diplomacy to break Reagan free from the body of conservative public opinion entrapping the president on his commitment to SDI and other hardline features of U.S. positions on arm control. This type of endorsement played directly into Gorbachev’s hand to gain legitimacy from Western science and use it as a tool for disorganizing Reagan’s public diplomacy on SDI. Gorbachev later recalled that “the activism of scientists…[was] also essential in overcoming the Cold War, primarily by pointing up the real dangers of East-West conflict and creating a spiritual climate for policies of détente, reconciliation, and retreat from confrontation.”

British officials sensed that Gorbachev had seized the initiative on both substance and public diplomacy and in so doing pressed the president to live up to his nuclear free world rhetoric. U.S. officials agreed that Gorbachev offered the proposal in order to

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portray himself as the man with the greater vision for peace. The coded appeals to the scientific community in particular drew the attention of public diplomacy planners who harbored concerns about the persistence of scientific opposition to key parts of Reagan’s nuclear agenda.\footnote{State Department officials, however, viewed the substance of Soviet proposals positively and found it perfectly acceptable to cede the image of peaceful visionary to Gorbachev if it meant he moved closer to U.S. positions.} State Department officials, however, viewed the substance of Soviet proposals positively and found it perfectly acceptable to cede the image of peaceful visionary to Gorbachev if it meant he moved closer to U.S. positions.\footnote{Gorbachev’s apparent public diplomacy edge appeared strategically significant to U.S. officials given what they perceived to be an accelerating transformation of international relations. The Geneva Summit elevated public diplomacy from a secondary theater of competition in East-West affairs to the primary area of statecraft, advancing the revolution in diplomatic practice. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy reported:}

Public diplomacy is part of a worldwide transformation in the conduct of international affairs. Traditional secret government-to-government communications have become less important as world leaders compete directly for the support of citizens in other countries…The Geneva Summit was as much a public diplomacy event as it as a bilateral encounter between two governments. No summit has been so extensively covered by the press, nor have the leaders and governments of both nations ben so solicitous of the media – and world public opinion – in shaping their agendas.\footnote{Control,” 22 January 1986, (TNA) PREM 1693 f226; FCO to Powell, “Gorbachev’s Proposals on Arms Control,” 24 January 1986, (TNA) PREM 19/1693 f208.}


\footnote{National Security Planning Group Meeting, “Arms Control: Responding to Gorbachev,” 3 February 1986, (CIA-ERR).}

Balancing public diplomacy and the substance of private negotiations became the crucial challenge for both Reagan and Gorbachev as the United States and Soviet Union prepared for summit number two.

Regression at Reykjavik?

How serious was Gorbachev? This question confounded U.S. national security principals, British officials, and other NATO allies. Soviet sources in fact suggest that Gorbachev really did embrace nuclear abolition by the beginning of January 1986.\textsuperscript{1159} Nonetheless, the interagency review of Gorbachev’s proposals for a nuclear free world by year 2000 produced the usual stalemate between the State Department and DOD.\textsuperscript{1160} Shultz took the position that in spite of the propaganda elements of the Soviet proposal, Reagan should “see this as an opportunity to transform Gorbachev’s concept so that it matches your own vision for achieving a non-nuclear world,” and adjust U.S. positions on INF, START, and space talks to take advantage of the new substance in Gorbachev’s proposal.\textsuperscript{1161} On the other hand, Weinberger argued, “Gorbachev’s proposal is a rather transparent attempt to divert the energy imparted to the Nuclear and Space Talks by your joint statement at Geneva.”\textsuperscript{1162} ACDA chief Kenneth Adelman contended “Gorbachev’s plan is largely propaganda, using your vision of a nuclear-free world as bait to stop

\textsuperscript{1159} Savranskaya and Blanton, \textit{The Last of the Superpower Summits}, 125; Mikhail Gorbachev, “Tasking for Assistants for International Issues,” 20 March 1986, (NSA).
\textsuperscript{1161} George Shultz to Ronald Reagan, “Responding to Gorbachev’s Arms Control Proposals,” 29 January 1986, (NSA).
\textsuperscript{1162} Caspar Weinberger to Ronald Reagan, “Choosing a Response to Gorbachev Proposal,” 31 January 1986 (NSA).
SDI.” U.S. Army Chief of Staff General John Wickham viewed Soviet proposals as a carefully timed effort to influence congressional budgetary decisions on SDI.

Reagan’s response to Gorbachev considered the growing sense within his administration that deterrence, whether based on offensive or defensive principles, required not just the president’s psychological fitness and the technological capacity to fight a nuclear war, but also Western societies’ assent to both of those conditions. The president opted not to refashion existing U.S. arms control positions to meet those put forward by Gorbachev. The important points about the U.S. position remained. A strategic agreement should include initial deep cuts of fifty percent of strategic arsenals and equal limits on comparable systems throughout the reduction process. INF systems would be eliminated completely in phases by 1989. Both agreements should be pursued independent of restrictions on SDI or third country nuclear systems. Reagan also chose to enhance messaging surrounding the promise of SDI so as to protect the initiative from the effects of Soviet propaganda.

Reagan’s aides recognized that the success of U.S. public diplomacy in support of SDI would shape U.S. deterrence policy in the immediate term and the president’s historical legacy in the future. In the National Security Planning Group meeting that determined Reagan’s reply to Gorbachev, Attorney General Ed Meese asserted that “SDI should become a moral imperative for future presidents.”

Fred Hoffman, who led one

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1167 Ibid.
of the original exploratory studies of SDI’s strategic impact, indicated in a memo for the National Security Council that public diplomacy must be considered a component of U.S. nuclear strategy and doctrine in long-term competition with the Soviet Union. He cited the “inadequate U.S. effectiveness in translating technological superiority into politically viable, usable, and affordable military power,” in noting that “these problems clearly transcend military strategy but pose important tasks for that strategy.”

The administration’s renewed focus on public diplomacy relied on a strategy that contradicted the content of similar efforts in Reagan’s first term. Reagan’s initial public diplomacy campaign emphasized a grand bargain as the only route to meaningful arms control. A freeze in the size of superpower arsenals, for example, did not guarantee the measure of safety promised by Reagan’s deep cuts. For the same reason the president disavowed the modest gains of the SALT II Treaty. Now that Gorbachev appeared primed to capture the mantle of visionary away from Reagan, U.S. officials promoted incremental improvements rather than a grand bargain as key to success in arms control. Responsible incrementalism is how officials justified the lack of new proposals in the U.S. reaction to Gorbachev’s call for a nuclear free world.

U.S. officials aimed to separate Gorbachev the man from the content of Soviet proposals to avoid relinquishing Reagan’s role of peaceful visionary. They framed the new concepts coming from Moscow as simply a response to U.S. ideas. Reagan argued that SDI brought the Soviets back to negotiations, and to undercut the program domestically would be to hamstring the president’s authority in arms control talks. Aware


Reagan also reformatted SDI public diplomacy to counter the Western scientific community’s more assertive leadership of the antinuclear movement, which undermined the president’s attempts to enlist NATO allies’ participation in SDI to help generate public support. E.P. Thompson stated in a February 1986 END strategy meeting, “the peace movement has tended primarily to moral and political aspects and has been somewhat divorced from the scientific community. [The] peace movement must not be too pushy, [and] must now listen to the scientific community and expert groups.”\footnote{END, “Anti-Star Wars Campaign Meeting,” 5 February 1986, (LSE) END 15/13.}

Developments in British science diplomacy had a significant international influence for science diplomacy more generally due to presence of Pugwash headquarters in London. Pugwash, SANA, and the peace movement’s co-management of opposition to SDI represented an opportunity for Pugwash to implement organizational reforms that it had originally considered when assessing its influence over the INF debate. The organization had consisted predominately of aging, white-male physicists and had seen a
significant decline in the number of Nobel laureates and prestigious scientists participating in Pugwash activates, all of which contributed to a temporary decline of influence with government elites. The success of SANA’s tactics and the public activities of figures such as Carl Sagan and Richard Garwin had generated a stimulus for Pugwash reform. The breadth of the SDI project represented an opportunity to diversify its membership to include scientists outside the field of physics and make new appeals to women experts. In addition to the traditional private forums prized by Pugwash, the organization now embraced day schools, radio spots, museum exhibits, television programs, improved media relations, and support for young scientists through organizations such as student Pugwash as tools for mobilizing public opinion and indirectly influence nuclear policy.\(^{1173}\) These strategies would eventually make Pugwash activities in the Soviet Union more effective.

Public science diplomacy proved especially important for strengthening the bonds between antinuclear communities in the United States and the United Kingdom. Susanne Schregel contends the NWFZ phenomenon, which in the United Kingdom based much of its legitimacy on SANA’s challenge to the state’s mismanagement of nuclear expertise, strengthened the antinuclear movement through the “semantics of thinking globally, acting locally.”\(^{1174}\) Given that antinuclear politics were dependent on the organizing


activities of progressive constituencies in both countries, the NWFZ connection therefore illuminates how the construction of progressive politics occurred as much within transatlantic protest communities—though separated by an ocean—rather than between antinuclear activists and their pronuclear opponents. The cultivation of scientific ideas to deconstruct the deterrence paradigm in connection with the dissemination of those ideas to local, national, and transnational environments also reflects Castells view of public diplomacy as a revision of communication styles to reorient power in the public sphere.\footnote{Manuel Castells, “The New Public Sphere: Global Civil Society, Communication Networks, and Global Governance,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 616 (March 2008), 91.}

The NWFZ movement in the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe inspired Hawaii County, HI and Garrett Park, MD to become the first U.S. municipalities to declare themselves Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in the 1980s and set-off a wave of similar municipal declarations.\footnote{Nuclear Times, October 1983; Note, Missoula, Montana had declared itself a nuclear free zone in 1978 in response to concerns about nuclear power.} Maryland became the first state to reject civil defense funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.\footnote{Nuclear Times, May 1983.} CND’s international committee conducted consultations on NWFZ with interested parties in the United States to generate increased enthusiasm for municipal internationalism.\footnote{Bruce Kent, “Annual Report to CND Annual Conference,” 23-25 November 1984, (LSE) CND/ADD Folder 2/4.} Though the U.S. NWFZ movement—which counted 165 municipalities and an additional 170 campaigns by 1990—failed to produce the same level of resistance to national government policies as its British counterpart, it nonetheless offered important symbolic opportunities for American antinuclear advocates to refresh opposition to Reagan’s nuclear agenda.\footnote{Luis Li, “State Sovereignty and Nuclear Free Zones,” California Law Review 79:4 (July 1991): 1171.}
The municipal internationalism inherent in the growth of the NWFZ movement posed a threat to both the U.S. and British governments’ ability to reinforce the black box of deterrence and maintain support for their arms control postures. Dozens of metropolitan areas contemplating NWFZ declarations by the end of 1985, including New York, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, as well as the states of California and Oregon, incorporated antinuclear curriculums designed by scientists and ESR for school age children and rejected pronuclear materials from the federal government.\(^{1180}\) Harold Washington, the first African-American mayor of Chicago who had made antinuclear opposition central to his political coalition, signed a bill turning Chicago into the largest NWFZ in the United States in March 1986. The press widely commented on the symbolic meaning of Chicago, the site of the first nuclear chain reaction and critical node in the Manhattan project network, declaring itself a nuclear free zone. State government officials criticized the specific references to London and other major nuclear free cities across the world that were included in the Chicago signing ceremony. Those references had been made to draw an explicit connection between Chicago’s municipal concerns and the international tide of antinuclear sentiment.\(^{1181}\) The nuclear free campaign in Berkeley, California throughout 1986 called for a rejection of the city’s atomic past, present, and future. The Berkeley declaration, which officially passed in November, commented on the need to reevaluate the moral complicity of atomic legacy institutions such as the University of California Berkeley, which served as


institutional steward of the Manhattan project and the premier weapons labs in the United States.  

British scientists cooperated with their American counterparts to intensify public opposition to SDI. Much of Britain’s scientific community’s opposition to SDI centered on the corruption of British science for the military aims of the United States. In fact, rejection of the militarization of science had been a feature of the broader transatlantic scientific debate on SDI. British Pugwash for example, replicated the highly successful anti-SDI work pledge that had circulated among U.S. universities and drew signatures from 56 percent of the top 14 physics departments and a total 3,700 hundred academic scientists by November 1985. The British version that circulated in March and April 1986 enjoyed similar success, drawing wide support from the relevant departments at Oxford, Cambridge, the University of London, Imperial College London, and 30 other major institutions of higher learning. The Greater London Council cultivated scientific experts to lead opposition to SDI, hosting John Pike from FAS and other U.S. scientists who spoke on the political dangers of American’s faith in technology. The criticism of SDI that blind faith in technology could lead to disastrous outcomes for humanity had gained traction in the aftermath of the January 1986 crash of the Challenger space shuttle. The late April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear power plant meltdown in the Soviet Union further vindicated that critique.

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The Chernobyl nuclear power plant meltdown reveals just how important public diplomacy had become to U.S.-Soviet relations and summit outcomes. In brief discussions with Reagan in early May, Thatcher pressed the president to take advantage of the opportunity to achieve favorable summit results. She noted that before the accident Gorbachev had been a “public relations star,” but had lost his public diplomacy advantage and appeared eager for progress on arms control. Despite the general secretary’s initial displeasure with Western reactions, Chernobyl produced an unanticipated opportunity to advance Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s mutual understanding of each other. Reagan sent a letter praising Gorbachev’s efforts handling the crisis and agreed with the need to take new steps to manage power plant safety on an international level in their personal correspondence. He remarked in a meeting of the National Security Planning Group that “Chernobyl has altered Gorbachev’s outlook on the dangers of nuclear war. The time is right for something dramatic.”

Reagan’s restraint on exploiting the event for maximum public diplomacy gain—as he had done with the KAL 007 disaster—proved to be a wise move in light of the nature of SDI criticisms. Chernobyl did not validate the Reagan’s claims about the Soviet Union’s nuclear intentions, but it did support a major criticism circulating the Anglo-American scientific and peace movement communities about the dangers of overreliance on technology for survival. Scientists’ parliamentary briefings had inspired Labour leader Neil Kinnock to launch the Coalition Against Star Wars in June 1986, bringing together

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1185 Memorandum of Conversation between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, 4 May 1986, (RRPL) NSC System Files.
nearly two dozen groups, comprised largely of organizations with a technological focus. The new coalition emphasized fears of a British brain drain, the dangers of overreliance on technologies and automation, and the importance of recommitting to arms control. END led the formation of Spacewatch, another coalition of antinuclear organizations devoted to advancing scientific arguments against SDI with the help of dedicated representatives from Pugwash, SANA, and Engineers for Nuclear Disarmament. The Spacewatch founding statement, “we believe that Star Wars expresses the inadequacy of technological fixes to deep-rooted political and social problems” reproduced the arguments of American experts who found Reagan’s belief in American technological exceptionalism to be misguided. Gorbachev fanned this type of opposition with comments such as the one he made to an international group of scientists in July 1986, that the “argument that science and technology can be developed only with the help of an arms race is absurd.”

Reagan’s approach to the Chernobyl disaster also signaled an earnest conviction in the possibility of progress in private discussion with Gorbachev. He directed the U.S. arms control delegation in Geneva to respond positively to Soviet proposals and rejected the impulses of those in his administration who advised a more ruthless exploitation of the Chernobyl disaster for public diplomacy purposes. Chernobyl altered the U.S.

1189 Ibid.
1191 Ibid.
perception of Gorbachev’s thinking on nuclear war to match the psychological shift toward abolition that had already taken place in the general secretary’s mind in the months after Geneva.

The newly shared belief between Reagan and Gorbachev that both leaders genuinely preferred total disarmament sustained U.S.-Soviet engagement when events threatened to un-do constructive relations. Domestically, Reagan yielded to conservatives in Congress and from the Pentagon pressuring the president to no longer abide by the limits of the non-ratified SALT II agreement.1194 The Daniloff affair provided further ammunition for hardliners. On 2 September 1986, Soviet police arrested Nicholas Daniloff, a U.S. News and World Report correspondent, in Moscow in what many interpreted as retribution for the U.S. arrest of a Soviet U.N. employee accused of stealing information related to military technologies. Ultimately, Reagan authorized the expulsion of dozens of Russian diplomats before Shultz and Shevardnadze found agreement for the terms of release of both men after several meetings.1195 Between these events and the initial hesitancy of the Reagan administration to respond positively to Gorbachev’s January proposal, preparations for a Washington summit in 1986 all but stalled. Gorbachev intervened to overcome the impasse through a note delivered by Shevardnadze during visit to the United States in mid-September 1986. Gorbachev’s note warned that arms control “will lead nowhere unless you and I intervene personally…in the very near future and setting aside all other matters, we have a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say in Iceland or in London, may be just for one day, to engage in a

strictly confidential, private and frank discussion…” Reagan accepted the invitation on the basis of the resolution of the Daniloff affair. The type of meeting proposed by Gorbachev appealed to Reagan’s preference for ad hoc, one-on-one diplomacy which he believed multiplied the effect of his charisma.

Gorbachev’s initial suggestion of London as possible meeting place reflected his confidence in Britain as a stabilizing influence in arms control. Beginning in April 1986, he had regularly sought Thatcher’s assistance in arranging a U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington. Thatcher’s arms control exchanges with Reagan throughout 1986 centered on sustaining U.S. commitment to SALT II, endorsing a summit meeting, and rebutting the influence of Department of Defense in an effort to support Shultz’s more conciliatory positions. On SALT II, Reagan disregarded British and European concerns, but on the other two points the Thatcher government proved successful. British support for Shultz helped the Secretary of State persuade the president to agree in principle to the extension of the ABM Treaty and non-deployment of SDI for a limited duration. Weinberger and his allies had vigorously opposed such a policy.

The British government very much viewed itself in league with the State Department against arms control antagonists in the Defense Department. The Pentagon’s attempts to circumvent the MOU signed by Weinberger and Heseltine on British participation in SDI had resulted in tension that reinvigorated the bond between the British scientific community and the peace movement. The alienation of the Thatcher

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1198 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 751-780.
government from the Pentagon reached its zenith when parliamentary outrage over the SDI MOU issue compelled the newly appointed British Defense Secretary George Younger to demand an apology from Weinberger.\textsuperscript{1199} Regarding the continuation of arms control dialogue, British diplomats in Washington reported that the Howe-Weinberger meeting in September 1986 delivered “a standard OSD performance…disturbing insight into right-wing attitudes on arms control…a vivid illustration of the problems Shultz faces in maintaining a constructive U.S. arms control negotiating position.”\textsuperscript{1200}

Thatcher’s comments to Reagan, which the president solicited shortly before the Reykjavik meeting, further emphasized the State Department approach and endorsed INF as the area most primed for agreement.\textsuperscript{1201} Neither the British government or most European allies expected anything more than Reagan and Gorbachev reaching an improved understanding to alleviate the pressures that both men faced domestically.\textsuperscript{1202} This was acceptable for Thatcher in the short term, her goal was stability through dialogue.

Though intended to be a private meeting to make progress toward a still undefined Washington summit, Reykjavik quickly assumed the importance and expectations of a summit in its own right. Agreement on a press and media blackout heightened public anticipation. On the evening before the meeting, Reagan reached an agreement with House Speaker Tip O’Neill that allowed the president to follow through on his decisions not to adhere to SALT II or accept a testing moratorium, while providing

\textsuperscript{1199} Paul Walton, “UK and Star Wars,” 12 August 1986, (CAC) RTBT 5/6/6/1.


\textsuperscript{1201} Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, 6 October1986 (TNA) PREM 19/1759 f146.

3.5 billion dollars in SDI funding for the coming year. Reagan succeeded in claiming that his hands should not be tied at Reykjavik as a pretext for pushing his nuclear posture through Congress shortly before the hotly contested mid-term elections. The last-minute deal boosted Reagan’s confidence that he could manage Democrats’ opposition to his nuclear agenda. The Reykjavik announcement on the heels of the Daniloff affair drew conservatives’ ire on the grounds that it betrayed the moral promise the president had made through his peace through strength polities and emphasis on human rights. In addition to increasing opposition from his own Defense Department, Reagan drew criticism from pundits such as George Will, Charles Krauthammer, and William F. Buckley Jr. who had previously supported his nuclear politics as an expression of conservative worldviews.

Reagan and Shultz perceived Gorbachev’s domestic position to be equally if not more complex. Gorbachev had largely consolidated power in the Politburo, and the upper ranks of the Kremlin, which gave him relative freedom to conduct bilateral relations. U.S. intelligence believed that disenfranchised senior military leaders harbored doubts regarding Gorbachev’s eagerness to sign a deal that could be translated into domestic political capital for economic and civil reforms. Rumors of desperate Soviet military leaders contemplating the assassination of Gorbachev reached Shultz and Reagan shortly before their first meeting in Iceland. Gorbachev needed to walk a political tightrope to

reach some deal to validate his policy that simultaneously appeased the obdurate elements in the Soviet defense establishment.\textsuperscript{1205}

Gorbachev and Reagan opened Reykjavik with different ambitions. Reagan, with Democratic pressure alleviated by the last-second congressional deal and yet still managing conservatives’ distemper, hoped to improve his mutual understanding with Gorbachev. Gorbachev sought an agreement, noting in their first session that failure to reach one would be scandalous.\textsuperscript{1206} He proceeded to outline a series of Soviet concessions. The Soviets conceded to the U.S. proposition for a fifty percent reduction in strategic forces, rather than their earlier position of a 50 percent reduction in nuclear weapons capable of reaching each other’s territory. In effect, this delinked FBS and INF issues from strategic arms control. Gorbachev committed to excluding British and French forces from an INF agreement and to an equal cap in Europe. He did, however, remain firm in the U.S.S.R.’s right to deploy INF in Asia. On the key issue of defense in space, the Soviets offered a ten-year guaranteed commitment to the ABM Treaty with a subsequent three to five year negotiating period to redefine the terms of the treaty. The Soviet interpretation now permitted research and testing in laboratories only. Gorbachev continued with a highly technical approach to negotiations into his second meeting with Reagan. Gorbachev’s highly technical program overwhelmed Reagan, who lacked a firm grasp of the technical details. The president retreated to elaborating on pre-formulated proposals through parable-based diplomacy to illustrate his nuclear philosophy.\textsuperscript{1207}

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\textsuperscript{1206} Memorandum of Conversation, “Reagan-Gorbachev First Meeting in Reykjavik,” 11 October 1986, (RRPL) Matlock Files, Box 92140.
\textsuperscript{1207} Ibid.
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For Reagan specific terms mattered, but the person making the offer mattered more. Gorbachev’s tactics changed midway through meeting two. Rather than attempt to express Soviet good faith through concessions on actual systems, Gorbachev acknowledged Soviet insecurities specifically related to the economic power imbalance vis-à-vis the United States. This confession related better to Reagan’s preference for reaching a shared understanding on philosophy, morality, and interpersonal communication while leaving the details to be ironed out by technical experts.\textsuperscript{1208} At the start of their third session, Gorbachev opened with a reference to the creation story in the biblical book of Genesis with the hopes of appealing to the president’s visionary impulses. In Gorbachev, Reagan identified a moral break in the historical trajectory of Kremlin leadership. He observed in Marxist ideology that, “the only morality was that which advanced socialism. And it was a fact that every leader but Gorbachev—at least so far—had endorsed in speeches to Soviet Party Congresses the objective of establishing a world communist state.”\textsuperscript{1209} Gorbachev’s response that he believed he could have a “man-to-man relationship” with the president in the interest of advancing toward nuclear peace prompted Reagan to joke that he looked forward to welcoming the general secretary as a member of the Republican party. When technical details stalled understanding between Reagan and Gorbachev, their return to a discussion of personal philosophies and morality revived the Reykjavik dialogue. Shultz and Shevardnadze departed from meeting three with instructors from their superiors to clarify points of

\textsuperscript{1208} Memorandum of Conversation, “Reagan-Gorbachev First Meeting in Reykjavik,” 11 October 1986, (RRPL) Matlock Files, Box 92140; Memorandum of Conversation, “Reagan-Gorbachev Second Meeting in Reykjavik,” 11 October 1986, (RRPL) Matlock Files, Box 92140.

mutual understanding on INF, strategic weapons, nuclear testing, and even on an ABM Treaty non-withdrawal pledge.\textsuperscript{1210}

By the final meeting at Reykjavik, the Reagan reversal appeared complete. No longer did Reagan consider Soviet leadership to be irredeemable, intransigent, and morally bankrupt; rather, he blamed hardline right-wingers, which he spent years empowering, as the major obstacle to an agreement. Reagan spoke warmly of a future in which he and Gorbachev would meet to eliminate the final nuclear missile on earth. Moving quickly from phased reductions of specific strategic and INF weapons, Reagan and Gorbachev reached a preliminary decision to have the Geneva delegation draft an agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons on earth. The president agreed to a ten-year non-withdrawal on the ABM Treaty, but he refused to go further. Appealing to Gorbachev as a politician, Reagan explained that the right-wing pundits were “kicking his brains out” over his alleged appeasement of the Soviet Union. In reality, Reagan relied on right-wing cover to excuse his own ideological attachment to SDI, which reflected his deep confidence in the pioneering American spirit as the ideal means to any end. Even in his nuclear abolitionism, Reagan expressed a preference for eliminating the threat of nuclear war through American technological innovation rather than diplomatic agreement. The chance for total disarmament emerged and crumbled in the closing moments of the Reykjavik summit on Reagan’s insistence of a liberal interpretation of the ABM Treaty that preserved the U.S. right to test SDI components in space.\textsuperscript{1211}

Reagan and Gorbachev, Shultz and Shevardnadze, Nitze and Marshal Akhromeyev (the

\textsuperscript{1210} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1211} Memorandum of Conversation, “Reagan-Gorbachev Fourth Meeting in Reykjavik,” 11 October 1986, (RRPL) Matlock Files, Box 92140
chief architect of the Soviet positions) all expressed a mix of regret and anger, as well as hope for the future as the summit came to a close without any agreement.  

Reagan’s apparent willingness to abolish all nuclear weapons at Reykjavik upset the expectations of allies and adversaries alike. U.S. military leaders largely opposed the idea of global zero that Reagan broached in Iceland. U.S. congressmen and diplomats, and NATO officials wondered if Reagan had walked right into a propaganda trap. After Reykjavik, Gorbachev could show the world that only SDI stood in the way of global nuclear disarmament. The Reykjavik news turned the administration’s public diplomacy plan in the United States and in Europe on its head. Thatcher’s private secretary wrote the prime minister, “one is tempted to say thank God for the Russians for having turned the proposal down.” Summing up widespread criticism of Reagan for forgetting his original goal of nuclear disarmament in favor of SDI, a Rolling Stone editorial labeled Reagan the “Christopher Columbus of arms control. The man who found a whole new world when he was looking for something else.”

Reykjavik also renewed Western European’s anxieties of their security becoming decoupled from that of the United States. NATO allies supported progress made on INF, but not in the context of a nuclear free world. According to some NATO officials, the elimination of strategic weapons and INF forces presented an environment in which the Warsaw Pact retained massive advantages in chemical and conventional weapons on the

1212 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 774-775; Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 232-233; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 393-394; Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation, 111-115.
1213 John Poindexter to Ronald Reagan, “Why We Can’t Commit to Eliminating all Nuclear Weapons Within 10 Years,” 16 October 1986, (RRPL) Alton Keel Files, Box 3, Folder “Reykjavik Briefing.”
1215 Charles Powell to Margaret Thatcher, 14 October 1986, (TNA) PREM 19/1695 f227.
European continent with no U.S. nuclear umbrella protecting Western European allies from a Soviet invasion.\textsuperscript{1217} Shultz briefed NATO allies the day after Reykjavik to shore up NATO unity, but also to make clear the president’s readiness to live up to the implications of a world without nuclear weapons no matter the allied response.\textsuperscript{1218}

Thatcher warned Reagan in their private call the day after Reykjavik that the elimination of all nuclear weapons “is the sort of thing that [Labour Leader] Neil Kinnock advocates. This would be tantamount to surrender.” The prime minister reasserted the United Kingdom’s intention to maintain its independent deterrent indefinitely as a hedge against Soviet conventional military might. She left the president with her view that Reykjavik appeared as a Soviet setup to isolate SDI as the one obstacle to nuclear peace.\textsuperscript{1219} Reykjavik also appeared to initiate new lines for public and private science diplomacy to work hand in hand. Public scientific opposition to SDI and Gorbachev’s courtship of the scientific community drummed up interest from official circles in Britain. After Garwin’s various appearances in Britain, Zuckerman arranged for covert meetings with Denis Healey, who was a leading figure in the Labour Party and its most authoritative voice on defense; as well as with M.A. Pakenham, a leading arms control expert in Thatcher’s government.\textsuperscript{1220} Thatcher feared the resurgence of the nuclear debate with a general election approaching in the United Kingdom given that the

\textsuperscript{1217} The issue of Warsaw Pact conventional superiority was debated in Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. While the Pact held massive advantages in some areas such as deployed tanks, NATO retained advantages in other areas such as combat aircraft. The asymmetries in conventional arsenals, and the Soviet Union’s unwillingness to share data on their conventional forces made it difficult to accept if one side truly could claim superiority.
\textsuperscript{1219} Reagan-Thatcher Telecon, 13 October 1986, (RRPL) NSC System Files.
\textsuperscript{1220} Solly Zuckerman to Richard Garwin, 11 November 1986, (UEASC) Solly Zuckerman Papers, SZ/2/Gen 35/Box Garwin.
president’s position now appearing closer to the non-nuclear defense policy promoted by the Labour Party and persistent frictions in Conservative leadership over the SDI issue.

Western European allies and the Soviet Union looked to Thatcher to rein in the president on arms control. France and West Germany in particular hoped to coordinate with Britain to block Reagan from advancing toward a world free of nuclear weapons. They turned to Thatcher in part because much of the Reagan administration appeared to be operating under the false belief that Reykjavik went well and that optimism pervaded negotiations. Gorbachev also appealed to Thatcher to open up a backchannel with Reagan after conversations between Shultz and Shevardnadze in Vienna fell flat in early November. The Soviet foreign minister left those talks questioning, “if we were not to be guided by the agreement to eliminate all nuclear arsenals…What then would be the result of Reykjavik?”

Thatcher put the European arms control uprising to rest in her rejection of French and West German overtures to coordinate their approach. On nuclear affairs, Kohl more readily followed the lead of the Iron Lady rather than that of the French President François Mitterrand. Thatcher relayed Gorbachev’s thoughts on arms control to the president on the quid pro quo basis of expanded diplomatic contacts between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union in attempt to exert a moderating influence. At her Camp

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1222 “Soviet Ambassador’s Call on the Prime Minister,” 10 November 1986, (TNA) PREM 19/3548 f123.
1223 U.S. Delegation to Vienna to State Department, 6 November 1986, (RRPL) National Security Council European and Soviet Directorate Files, Box 90902.
David meeting with Reagan in mid-November 1986 and in her subsequent correspondence with Gorbachev she pressed the president and general secretary to progress toward attainable steps, specifically the signing of an INF agreement separately from strategic and space issues.\textsuperscript{1225} Thatcher’s role in the post-Reykjavik discussion was to refocus Western Europe, the Reagan administration, and Kremlin leadership on INF.

Figure 7: Thatcher at Camp David with Reagan in November 1986 to discuss the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit. (Credit: Reagan Library).

Promise in Washington

British diplomacy lifted much of the uncertainty regarding the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet summit in Washington in 1987. The Geneva dialogue continued, but with no serious breakthroughs. Indications that an INF deal could be reached within the year
occurred only when Thatcher traveled to the Soviet Union in late March. Her visit marked the first official state visit of a British prime minister to the Soviet Union in over ten years. Gorbachev considered improved British-Soviet relations as the key to managing West European governments and thus a prerequisite to progress in superpower summitry. In review of Thatcher’s visit, Gorbachev stated to the Politburo, “It is in our interest to raise the British role in international affairs…Two things played a role here. Great Britain seems to be a sidekick to the United States. But Thatcher sees that Reagan is getting old, that Mitterrand is in opposition with Chirac, and that Kohl is in a sticky situation. So it is her chance to stand out.”

Thatcher and Gorbachev came to a meaningful understanding on substance as well. Britain’s position of clear military inferiority to the Soviet Union aided Thatcher’s successful persuasion of Gorbachev that Soviet military actions engendered authentic fear and anxiety in the West – a difficult task for U.S. officials who spouted peace through strength rhetoric. She also appeared to convince Gorbachev, despite the opposition of the Soviet military, to move toward an INF agreement that included the elimination of short-range nuclear forces as well, which had been a sticking point for NATO allies in Europe.

Thatcher’s visit created favorable conditions for the upcoming Shultz-Shevardnadze talks in mid-April. After the prime minister’s talks with Gorbachev, he indicated a willingness to isolate the INF issue and reach an agreement within the

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calendar year. Western media hailed Thatcher’s message to both leaders that a summit by the end of the year could produce real gains for arms control. The *Los Angeles Times* called the visit a “remarkable diplomatic event.”

A new impetus to meet in Washington in 1987 emerged from the Soviets willingness to delink INF from the broader arms control issues and the media coverage of Thatcher’s outreach to Gorbachev encouraging Reagan to continue with summity.

Between April and the Washington Summit in December, Shultz’s and Shevardnadze’s shuttle diplomacy sustained progress for an agreement. Shultz introduced the idea of “global zero,” the removal of all INF weapons around the world and not just in Europe, in the April meetings. His argument hinged on verification. The mobility of INF weapons made them difficult to verify proper numbers in specific regions. Global zero solved the problem. Despite U.S. attempts to extract additional INF concessions from the Soviet Union, Shultz managed to persuade Shevardnadze and Gorbachev of the sincerity of Reagan’s interest in an agreement. Gorbachev commented to the Politburo that “Shultz is a special figure,” who provided a historically unique opportunity for the Soviet Union and the United States to progress on very broad shared interests.

U.S. officials believed progress in the Shultz-Shevardnadze dialogue had to be supplemented with intensive public diplomacy efforts, less Gorbachev gain a public approval advantage over Reagan that he could leverage to shape the summit agenda or to coerce the United States into making concessions on INF. A February 1987 USIA survey

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1229 Margaret Thatcher to Ronald Reagan, 1 April 1987, (NSA); “Prime Ministers’ Visit to Moscow,” 6 April 1987, (CAC) THCR 1/10/117 f39.

showed that for the first time in 30 years of polling, the British public expressed a higher degree of confidence in Soviet leadership. In May, the USIA gauged that public opinion in Britain, France, and West Germany gave more credit to Gorbachev than to Reagan for recent progress in arms control. Those populations also feared that Reagan would agree to an INF agreement that would decouple U.S. and European security. In response to these developments, Charles Wick and U.S. National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci moved to institutionalize public diplomacy as a primary feature of summit planning. Carlucci funneled additional talent and resources into public diplomacy efforts. USIA stepped up INF programming on its satellite stations WORLDNET and EURONET, and renewed their efforts to cultivate elite and public understanding of what an INF agreement meant in the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Though mass antinuclear demonstrations in the United States and the United Kingdom had largely subsided by 1987, Reagan officials had come to identify scientists working to halt the arms race as increasingly sophisticated and effective public diplomats. In spring 1987, SANA began organizing media workshops to train scientists to advocate for antinuclear positions by using their specialist knowledge to break through what they believed was a media blackout of the peace movement’s public diplomacy. SANA forged new partnerships with the group Journalists Against Nuclear Extermination to help expand scientists’ presence in sympathetic national British newspapers such as The Guardian and The Independent and also seize on more local media opportunities.

These activities were pursued in coordination with the American scientific community, which continued to pressure Reagan on core parts of his nuclear agenda at home while pursuing new scientific and political contacts in the Soviet Union.\footnote{SANA Annual Conference, “Putting it Across,” 25-26 April 1987, (KCLA) MWP K/PP178/11/21/1, Folder “Scientists Against Nuclear Arms, 1987-1990.”}


Gorbachev’s foreign popularity likely helped consolidate his power over nuclear policy at home given that approval abroad could be used to support his positions in the increasingly open information environment in the Soviet Union. His acceptance of global zero, which he announced over the summer, reflected a dramatic change in the direction of Soviet foreign policy. Overcoming the objections of Ligachev, Dobrynin, and
Gromyko to go backwards on INF, Gorbachev insisted that Soviet foreign policy objectives revolve not around using the military threat to divide NATO; rather, they should create the political atmosphere friendly to doing business with Western Europe and to developing a “conception of economic relations with the United States.”

Eliminating INF weapons on U.S. terms, Gorbachev reasoned, would remove the “residue from our relations.”

Gorbachev’s eagerness to remove the confrontational component from U.S.-Soviet negotiations motivated his speedy concessions on INF in 1987. He continued the pattern of using Soviet-British dialogue as a precursor to summit activity. He stopped over in the United Kingdom in route to the Washington Summit and kept Thatcher exclusively informed on Soviet nuclear thinking throughout 1987. With the hardline right in the United States weakened from their culpability in the Iran-Contra scandal, Shultz executed a power play by refusing to discuss his negotiating strategy in the national security planning group. The move effectively cut Weinberger and his allies out of the arms control policymaking process, and reduced it to Reagan, Shultz, and the Geneva delegations. Moreover, Richard Perle left the administration in early June and his hand groomed successor, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs Frank Gaffney, was immediately sidelined by the State Department. George Will,

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1241 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 901-924; 983-1015.
Michael Novak, and other prominent journalists who established the moral and intellectual substance of peace through strength and held Reagan accountable to hardline nuclear diplomacy lost access to their main source of information leaks with Perle no longer in government.\footnote{Sidney Blumenthal, “Richard Perle: Disarmed but Undeterred,” The New York Times, 23 November 1987.}

The Kremlin concluded that Ronald Reagan represented their best chance to reach arms control agreements acceptable to Congress given that even he encountered right-wing opposition to his nuclear summitry.\footnote{Politburo Discussion, “About the Conversation with Shultz,” 16 April 1987, translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, (NSA) Electronic Briefing Book 238, “The INF Treaty and Washington Summit: 20 Years Later.”} In September meetings between Shultz and Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister urged his counterpart to speed up work on INF and other arms control agreements.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation between George Shultz and Eduard Shevardnadze, 15 September 1987, FRUS, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-1989, eds. James Graham Wilson and Adam Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2016), Document 67.} In a note delivered by Shevardnadze to Reagan, Gorbachev altered his assessment of the Reykjavik meeting to suggest that the president was correct in his feeling that optimism that pervaded their meeting in Iceland.\footnote{Mikhail Gorbachev to Ronald Reagan, 15 September 1987, (NSA) Electronic Briefing Book 238, “The INF Treaty and Washington Summit: 20 Years Later.”} The September meetings confirmed an agreement on the major principles of INF, only specific details on reduction processes and shorter range weapons remained to be ironed out during Shultz’s trip to Moscow in late October. Shultz arrived in Moscow in late October with orders to finalize treaty details.\footnote{Memorandum of Conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, 23 October 1987, translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, (NSA) Electronic Briefing Book 238, “The INF Treaty and Washington Summit: 20 Years Later.”} Rapid progress on INF benefited from Gorbachev’s growing impatience with the halting implementation of economic reforms, which a reduction in military spending to accompany arms control would buttress, and

from the overwhelming popularity of nuclear disarmament in Soviet society, a fact that became of larger significance in the crafting of Soviet foreign policy thanks to the *glasnost* reforms that expanded civil discourse.\textsuperscript{1247}

The Iran-Contra scandal put Reagan in a similarly desperate position for a political win to insure his own legacy and effectiveness in the final year of his presidency. Shultz quickly resolved questions of the West Germany’s continued deployment of U.S. short range Pershing 1A missiles. Soviet and U.S. officials came to a tacit understanding to sideline the difficult questions regarding ABM Treaty compliance and strategic weapons reductions.\textsuperscript{1248}

The accomplishments of the Washington Summit emerged from a mix of political urgency and moral understanding. Certainly, the Iran-Contra scandal and the onset of the lame duck period in Reagan’s presidency spurred him to a more activist position in arms control. Reagan’s trust in Gorbachev’s ideological softening and moral perspective explain why the president felt comfortable disregarding right-wing criticisms of arms control and CIA claims of Gorbachev’s sinister intentions to revive Soviet abuses of the détente environment.\textsuperscript{1249} At the opening of meetings in Washington, Reagan’s gift to Gorbachev of a pair of cufflinks depicting a passage from the biblical book of Isiah of swords being hammered into plowshares set another significant example of how the basis for summitry rested on the president’s belief that he had come to a moral understanding with Gorbachev. Reagan’s gift is also ironic from a cultural and social perspective given

\textsuperscript{1248} Ibid.
that the plowshares movement had been one of the most radical opponents of the president’s peace through strength politics.\textsuperscript{1250}

Reagan’s warming to Gorbachev at the Washington Summit is indicative of what Thomas Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya have pinpointed as a successful emphasis on the human factor in the diplomacy by the general secretary.\textsuperscript{1251} In his post-Washington Summit address to the Politburo, Gorbachev acknowledged that Reagan’s display of genuine interest in nuclear abolition undermined the Kremlin’s previous image of the president as “the embodiment of the most conservative part of American capitalism and the masters of the military industrial-complex.”\textsuperscript{1252}

The primary outcome of the summit was the INF Treaty, which banned all conventional and ground launched cruise and ballistic missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In addition to being the first agreement to reduce—rather than limit—nuclear weapons, the treaty also introduced a comprehensive verification protocol that included onsite inspections of missile sites and production facilities. Negotiators envisioned the verification protocol as the model for a future agreement on strategic forces. Alongside the INF agreement, Gorbachev pushed for greater reductions in conventional forces. The rapid pace of concessions spooked U.S. negotiators who insisted that NATO allies must be involved in reduction talks. The Washington Summit even spurred movement on the difficult issues of strategic arms reductions and defensive

\textsuperscript{1250} Memorandum of Conversation between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, 10:45 am, Washington D.C., (NSA) Electronic Briefing Book 238, “The INF Treaty and Washington Summit: 20 Years Later.”
\textsuperscript{1251} Savranskaya and Blanton, The Last of the Superpower Summits, 262-267.
weapons in space. START negotiations progressed due to a remarkable string of concessions from Gorbachev, which included Soviet agreement to include missile throw weight as a category for reductions and a bomber counting rule that favored the United States. Shultz conveyed to the North Atlantic Council that “we can now see the shape of an agreement….it is now clearly possible to achieve.”

The INF Treaty is the premier example of how public diplomacy actually shaped and secured arms control outcomes. Shultz claimed on 2 December 1987, that the INF agreement was, “an illustration…of the tremendous impact and importance of public diplomacy.” The zero-option policy eventually codified by the INF Treaty had been formulated explicitly to soothe European public opinion, but also had been designed with the intention and expectation that it not form the basis for actual progress on arms control negotiations. Moreover, the interim solutions for an INF agreement developed in early 1983 by Thatcher and Helmut Kohl were what ensured enough public support for the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles on West European soil. Lastly, it was the Reagan administration’s moderates such as Secretary of State George Shultz with aid from Thatcher’s government, in opposition to and exclusion of hardliners, that crafted the approach that led to the INF Treaty.

The criticism of Reagan from those who held fast to the goal of nuclear superiority demonstrates a remarkable depth to the connections between New Right mentalities and pronuclear attitudes – and also the inauthenticity of subsequent claims

1255 In Tuch, Communicating with the World, 161.
celebrating the success of a pre-conceived grand strategy. Prior to the summit, the
ideological right wing complained that Reagan’s attempt to revitalize his presidency
through superpower diplomacy amounted to the wholesale abandonment of their values.
Powerful conservative fundraiser Richard Viguerie commented, “they’re [conservatives]
concerned about abortion, pornography, busing, and economic issues, but at the core of
the criticism is anti-communism. Across the board he [Reagan] seems to be deserting his
anti-communist position.” Upon Reagan’s signature of the INF Treaty, Senator
Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) complained, “the Soviets have broken most every treaty they
have signed.” Senator Jesse Helms, who lauded Reagan’s first term arms build-up,
now warned, “the President doesn’t need to discard the people who brought him to the
dance.” Helms lined up testimony from Henry Kissinger, Al Haig, and former NATO
Supreme Commander General Bernard Rogers, to oppose treaty ratification. Senator Dan
Quayle (R-IN) and Senator Steve Symms (R-ID), who frequently equated arms control to
appeasement, praised Rogers’ criticisms of the treaty. The Conservative Caucus, one
of the New Right fundraising groups that grew rapidly during the Reagan years, also
picked up on the appeasement theme. It sponsored advertisements in conservative
publications such as the Washington Times that compared Reagan to British prime
minister Neville Chamberlain, infamous for appeasement of Hitler. Senate Minority
Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) hedged his bets in declaring the treaty ratification might require
amendments or qualifications. Dole appeared to open the INF Treaty up to criticism not

1256 Jack Nelson, “Reagan Seeks to Calm His Right-Wing Critics: Conservatives Say He’s Abandoned His
Ideals Over Arms Control, Central America Initiative,” Los Angeles Times, 6 September 1987.
1258 Ibid.
1259 Peter Grier, “Treaty critics aim beyond ratification. Conservative objections to the INF pact could
necessarily to undercut its ratification, but as strategy to curb progress on the next round of arms control dealing with strategic weapons. Preparing his own run for the GOP presidential nomination in 1988, Dole’s challenge was to find a position acceptable to mainstream Republican voters and to the right wing of the party that cherished nuclear superiority.1261

The foreign policy community’s view of Gorbachev’s domestic position post-INF Treaty cast further doubt on the prospects for strategic arms control. National security officials surmised that Gorbachev had exhausted his political capital in search of an INF agreement, and thus the United States could not expect to see further concession on START that might soften opposition on Capitol Hill. Fritz Ermarth, chairman of the National Intelligence Council, anticipated “a possible swerve of U.S. politics back to the Right….as the next president, of either party, sorts through the debris left by the failure to achieve a ratifiable START agreement in early 1988.”1262

_A Moscow Epilogue_

Gorbachev sought to maximize his investment in the human factor in U.S.-Soviet relations by pressing forward with talks until the final moments of Reagan’s presidency.1263 The dramatic revision of Soviet foreign and defense policy undercut right-wing critics of the INF agreement. In April 1988, Shultz and Shevardnadze signed an understanding on the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.1264 Nonetheless, the

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1261 Smith, “The Right Against Reagan.”
small but persistent opposition to the INF Treaty upheld ratification until late May 1988, just hours before Reagan met with Gorbachev in Moscow for their last formal summit from 29 May to 3 June.

The Reagan administration’s task turned from reaching an agreement to managing expectations for the Moscow Summit so as to ensure that Reagan’s successor remained politically capable of following a constructive course in U.S.-Soviet relations. Shultz and Shevardnadze resumed their regular meetings in early spring with an eye toward progress on a START deal and an agreement on defense and space issues. The two senior diplomats had met over two dozen times by the beginning of the Moscow Summit.\footnote{1265} Over the course of their spring meetings, they recognized that the United States and Soviet Union remained too far apart on critical issues to reach a START agreement before the end of Reagan’s term in office. Verification of mobile ICBMs, and the counting of air launched cruise missiles on strategic bombers proved especially difficult issues to resolve.\footnote{1266}

Two approaches protected the administration from significant political fallout in the absence of a START Treaty. The public line from the White House that the president would not accept a weak deal for the sake of treaty reflected the content of criticism that Reagan and his allies used against both Carter and Nixon in the final stages of their presidency.\footnote{1267} To their Soviet partners, the Reagan administration suggested that the signing of the INF Treaty proved that U.S.-Soviet relations had reached a more mature

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\footnotetext[1266]{Ibid.}
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stage that allowed for the focus to shift to the other aspects of their diplomatic agenda: human rights, regional conflict, and bilateral issues. This shift to focus on agenda items that had been downplayed in earlier summits brought on a more comprehensive approach to resolving the most significant non-nuclear issues perpetuating the Cold War.

One Week before the Moscow Summit, The New York Times raised the possibility that the Moscow Summit could lead to the end of the Cold War, quoting Princeton University Russian historian Stephen F. Cohen who argued, “the most important aspect of the trip is that the most right-wing president in our lifetime goes to Moscow, enjoys it, has a good time, makes something of it and completes the coronation of the idea that the Cold War has to end…It strips the Cold War of a lot of its ideological rationality.”

Though the Moscow Summit lacked the high drama of Washington, a series of minor agreements demonstrated a growing normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations that suggested the Cold War would soon come to an end. Reagan’s attachment to SDI remained the obstacle to reaching an agreement on strategic reductions, but further arrangements were made for joint verification experiments and test launch verifications protocols. Both sides agreed to greatly expanded cooperation in cultural, scientific, and economic spheres.

A friendly optimism characterized the exchanges between Gorbachev and Reagan, whereas even the earlier summits had moments of intense ideological displays from both leaders.

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The tone of public diplomacy in Moscow revealed a crucial change in both Reagan’s and Gorbachev’s view of the Cold War. American, Soviet, and European citizens were the primary targets for both leaders’ cooperative public diplomacy. When a Soviet citizen questioned Reagan if he still believed the Soviet Union to be an “evil empire” amidst a televised stroll with Gorbachev through the Moscow’s Red Square, Reagan responded firmly “No…I was talking about another time, another era.” The president’s answer shows that his memories of the early Cold War no longer dominated his approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. The summit provided Gorbachev an opportunity to achieve his foreign policy objective of creating a favorable impression of perestroika through the opening up Soviet society to foreign observation. In reviewing the summit’s outcomes for the Politburo, Gorbachev argued that Reagan’s willingness to correct his previously objectionable perspective of the Soviet Union and the coverage of Soviet life on American television vindicated his emphasis on the human factor in diplomacy.

Reagan’s stopover in London on his way back from the Moscow Summit proved a remarkable bookend to his public diplomacy campaign. In an early afternoon speech given at the famed great hall in Guildhall, Reagan reflected on his celebrated peace through strength manifesto given to parliament in June 1982 in which he called on the West to muster the moral fortitude to overcome Soviet nuclear expansion. Morality, memory, and technology had been essential foundations of the Reagan administration’s pronuclear public diplomacy, but now these components were being rearranged to promote the idea that the Cold War was fast coming to an end. Returning to the moral

themes in his earlier address, Reagan claimed victory and pronounced, “we are entering a new era in history, a time of lasting change in the Soviet Union.” The language Reagan used to describe his common understanding of Gorbachev revealed that the general secretary had humanized the Soviet Union and its citizens, making them worthy of a moral partnership in global governance with the United States.\footnote{Ronald Reagan, “Remarks to Members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London,” 3 June 1988, (The American Presidency Project). Last accessed 15 October 2019. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-members-royal-institute-international-affairs-london}

As David Painter and Thomas Blanton have pointed out, it is difficult to assess the singular effect of distinct developments in U.S.-Soviet relations for the end of the Cold War because multiple events are often conflated with that moment.\footnote{Painter and Blanton, “The End of the Cold War,” 479-480.} Before the revolutions that swept communism out of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, changes in American and British attitudes in 1988 as a result of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits suggested that many in the West accepted that the Cold War was coming to an end. Margaret Thatcher declared in a November 1988 interview with the \textit{Washington Post} and \textit{Newsweek}, “the Cold War is already at an end.”\footnote{Don Oberdorfer, “Thatcher Says Cold War Has Come to an End,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 18 November 1988.} Leading American pollster Daniel Yankelovich and political scientist Richard Smoke observed in the fall of 1988 that, “the American public is willing to experiment with winding down the Cold War” due to the INF Treaty producing a spirit of cooperation and acceptance of verification as an essential component to bilateral agreements.\footnote{Daniel Yankelovich and Richard Smoke, “America’s ‘New Thinking,’” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 67 (Fall 1988): 1.} Even when measured against the optimism of détente, these cautious attitudes appeared unique from those held by the American public at any other time during the Cold War in that
they embraced the idea that the Soviet Union was open to embracing fundamental changes to its society and relations with the United States.1277

Scholars have largely overlooked the transformation of public diplomacy as a cause of Americans’ and Britons’ cautious acceptance of the end of the Cold War. Ignoring the importance of the public diplomacy interactions between the peace movement, U.S. and U.K. governments, and the Soviet Union, contemporary hardliners instead established a victory narrative that supposed an ideological and strategic coherence in Reagan’s grand strategy that predated his presidency and culminated in the fall of communism.1278 The staunch neoconservative public historian Jay Winik immediately set upon crafting this victory thesis in the 1988 issue of Foreign Policy, noting “if the neoconservative heyday of the Reagan administration’s first 6 years is studied, the conclusion can be drawn that the sensible course for neoconservatives is to declare victory—victory in the sense that the logic of their views has largely been confirmed by the course of events.”1279

The victory school thesis, articulated early on by Winik and often repeated by others attempting to praise Reagan as a historically great world leader, actually does a disservice to the president’s foreign policy legacy.1280 It shows Reagan to be overly rigid and less dynamic in his response to world events than he actually was. The

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1277 Ibid., 1-17.
transformation of Reagan’s public diplomacy in his second term—especially the way he revised his use of morality and memory to achieve specific arms control objectives—reveals his overall foreign policy to be flexible and receptive to public opinion. The U.S. Public Diplomacy Advisory Commission argued in its 1988 report that this public diplomacy transformation was enormously important given that “since 1985 public perceptions have done much to change the bilateral relationship between the two superpowers.” The president’s consideration of public diplomacy requirements in response to the antinuclear movement, the scientific community, and Thatcher’s government made him a more empathetic negotiating partner to Gorbachev, which Melvyn Leffler has argued was his greatest contribution to summit diplomacy.1282

The effects of the public diplomacy revolution of the nuclear 1980s extend beyond its role in bringing about an end to the Cold War. The embrace of public diplomacy by the Reagan and Thatcher governments, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, the transnational peace movement, and the scientific community altered the institution of diplomacy itself. Diplomacy no longer could be considered the exclusive jurisdiction of government officials, and government officials could no longer expect geopolitical matters to be settled independently of world opinion. Congressional Research Service reports submitted in August 1988 and June 1989 examined U.S.-Soviet nuclear negotiations and summits during the nuclear 1980s and concluded that diplomacy had increasingly been conducted in public and with the public.1283 Mandarins of a bygone era

of diplomacy such as former top State Department official George McGhee declared that
the nuclear 1980s had led to the “twilight of diplomacy,” but in reality nuclear politics
had stimulated a revolution in diplomacy in which transnational publics asserted greater
influence over international relations.1284

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1284 For McGhee’s statement, see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Soviet
CONCLUSION

The nuclear 1980s produced a diplomatic revolution that elevated the role of the public in international affairs. Discontent with nuclear deterrence manifested itself in structural adjustments to the relationship between the U.S., U.K., and Soviet governments and global civil society. Governments, the transnational peace movement, and the scientific community initiated a “public turn” in diplomacy and science diplomacy that transformed diplomacy from a state-based institution for managing geopolitics in private into a global practice embraced by official and unofficial actors who brought nuclear policymaking into the public sphere by expanding the range of moral, expert, and social assessments of deterrence. This change in the diplomatic status quo generated profound changes in Anglo-American nuclear politics and superpower relations that played an overlooked role in the end of the Cold War.

The public diplomacy revolution and the nuclear 1980s were also co-dependent and cumulative historical processes. Repeated interactions between the multi-dimensional peace movement, the Anglo-American scientific community, and the U.S. and U.K. governments ensured that nuclear concerns permeated public anxieties, private life, and the space in between them. Though the idea of public diplomacy had existed in some form since the early Cold War, transnational public engagement with Reagan’s and Thatcher’s nuclear policies refined the tools, techniques, and objectives of public diplomacy and made it a top priority in nuclear policymaking. Public diplomacy contests involving the antinuclear movement on the one hand and the Reagan and Thatcher governments on the other were instrumental in sorting out how peoples’ beliefs about the Cold War informed their views on the morality and meaning of nuclear deterrence as a
governing principle for international security and as a social contract for American and British society.

Though the nuclear 1980s began in earnest in 1979 with the dual-track decision and the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, the impetus for the public diplomacy revolution lies in the election of Ronald Reagan. When Reagan’s election to the presidency brought anti-détente and anti-arms control advocates to power, they faced the task of transforming their critique of détente’s dangers into a program for governing U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union. Belief in the West’s moral superiority served as a key argument for specific approaches to arms control in the bitter interagency battles within the Reagan administration, and simultaneously represented a vital public defense of the president’s nuclear policies. Despite internal disagreements, the search for strategic nuclear superiority emerged as a unifying core aim for the administration. Reagan and his advisors relied on a mix of moral statements, modernization announcements, and the shut-down of diplomatic channels to provoke Moscow to become an even more hostile negotiating partner – and thus undermine the possibility of reaching an arms control settlement that might inhibit the administration’s quest for nuclear superiority.

The unique relationship between the U.S. and U.K. nuclear establishments made public diplomacy cooperation with the Reagan administration a geopolitical imperative for the Thatcher government. Britain staked its international prominence on its nuclear deterrent more than any other U.S. ally. In addition to their shared commitment to NATO’s dual-track decision, Britain’s acquisition of the Trident weapons system from the United States in the early 1980s to maintain the credibility of its own deterrent and various other areas of nuclear cooperation provided for a deeply intertwined nuclear
experience. The Thatcher government calculated that effective public diplomacy to reinforce Britain’s commitment to deterrence under the banner of U.S. leadership of the NATO alliance contributed to the political power of the Conservative Party at home and the influence of the United Kingdom in geopolitics.

Reagan’s early nuclear rhetoric and moral maxims did not resonate well with European publics. The Thatcher government’s most significant contribution to nuclear politics in the early Reagan years was to persuade the U.S. administration to conceive of its public audience in transnational terms rather than in the framework of an American political campaign. British officials repeatedly insisted that Washington view antinuclear sentiment in Europe as part of a transnational phenomenon that would soon manifest itself in American political life. Once Reagan officials accepted this reality, the frequency of public misstatements on nuclear issues lessened. European concerns, most effectively conveyed in Washington by the British, helped ensure arms control would not become a collateral casualty of other tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations. British officials aligned themselves with pro-European officials in the U.S. State Department to lobby Reagan to select plausible positions for arms control and link INF negotiations to START to soothe public anxiety. The Thatcher government’s persistence in raising the problem of public opinion to the Reagan administration laid the foundation for their future coordination of a highly ideological public diplomacy campaign to combat the transatlantic antinuclear movement and the Soviet peace offensive.

The Anglo-American antinuclear movement’s public diplomacy most closely resembles the forms identified by Manuel Castells and Nancy Snow, in which non-state actors conceive of themselves as cultural mediators pursuing group ventures or joint
projects to develop global communication structures for conflict resolution that reflect their interests.¹²⁸⁵ Though scholars no longer consider government involvement a prerequisite for public diplomacy, the case for conceptualizing the peace movement’s actions as such is made even stronger by the transatlantic cooperation that did occur between municipal authorities, judicial systems, and antinuclear advocates.

The American antinuclear movement of the 1980s achieved a greater degree of political legitimacy than its predecessors of the 1950s and 1960s. Scientists’ and Catholic leaders’ adoption of public diplomacy tools to disseminate their technical and moral objections to deterrence as a permanent state of security contributed to the mainstream respectability of disarmament and arms reductions arguments. Expert and moral critiques of deterrence helped to cement a diverse progressive coalition of women’s groups, civil rights advocates, and labor interests who found that preparation for nuclear war had perpetuated a state of inequality and insecurity for many American citizens. With Reagan maneuvering to return the United States to a position of nuclear superiority under the banner of peace through strength, the antinuclear movement dedicated itself to the related goals of arms reduction and the realignment of American politics to support the liberal wing of the Democratic Party.

Public diplomacy tactics underpinned the transnational orientation of the American antinuclear movement. Science diplomacy in particular transitioned to placing greater emphasis on mass politics and mass communication rather than focus solely on private forums for influencing elite opinionmakers and government officials. The drafting

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of science into the antinuclear cause reflected the growing estrangement of many scientists from conservative politics. These developments led to scientific knowledge becoming a fulcrum of the nuclear debate in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s. The antinuclear cause became instrumental to the establishment of a global public sphere as the international networks of science, Christianity, and women protestors representing themselves as local and transnational actors also intersected on the issue of disarmament.

Antinuclear arguments in Britain’s nuclear 1980s revealed an idealized form of progressive politics that privileged transparency and an informed citizenry, equal participation in democracy and an expanded public sphere, and the suspicion of central authority from a collective conscience that emphasized social solidarity. Disarmament intellectuals such as E.P. Thompson and scientists who helped break down the black box of deterrence were concerned with transparency and the education of the public. The British scientific community—working through SANA, Pugwash, and related groups—experienced a political reawakening as a result of their efforts to debunk the government’s misleading technical claims on the effectiveness of civil defense measures and other nuclear policies. Their political activation on nuclear matters proved essential to local authorities resisting the centralizing tendencies of Thatcher’s government.

Women who invigorated the antinuclear movement with the single-gender Greenham Common peace camp advocated for the right of equal participation in the public sphere and in governance. Those within the Church of England who rejected deterrence argued for moral norms to be uncorrupted by political and geopolitical imperatives, prizing the promise of life over the possibility of destruction. Industrial conversion plans sponsored
by union leaders and members demonstrated their prioritization of social utility over armament production.

Each of these elements contributed to the robust Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) movement and twinning phenomenon that sought to maintain the power of local governments as a critical check on Thatcher’s nuclear policies, and at the same time endeavored to establish municipal internationalism as a bedrock of the global public sphere.

From a domestic standpoint, British nuclear politics brought the whole of society into the political struggle between radical progressives and New Right Conservatives who had competed throughout the 1970s to implement a new social contract in place of the shattered social-democratic consensus. The left-wing insurgency within the Labour Party relied on nuclear policy critiques to emphasize how government decision-making had undermined the transparency necessary for the functioning of a moral democracy. MPs leaving Labour to form the Social Democratic Party removed many of the party’s conservative elements and left it more susceptible to the influence of the CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), the leading voice on disarmament in Britain. Increasing British nuclear fear invigorated CND grassroots appeal, which it leveraged to persuade the Labour Party to endorse unilateral disarmament. Labour Party leaders never truly came to an agreement on how to build an election campaign around disarmament and thus undermined its chance at victory by failing to capitalize on the grassroots power of antinuclear discourse. Instead the party ceded control of the nuclear narrative to Conservatives, whose margin of approval on defense far exceeded their lead any of the major issues facing the British electorate in 1983.
The antinuclear coalition’s defeat at the hands of the Conservative Party in the 1983 general election led to a reevaluation of its strategies for effecting change. The transatlantic turn in the peace movement’s public diplomacy relied on the scientific promotion of nuclear winter theory as a foundation for municipal internationalism. Through the widespread dissemination of nuclear winter theory, traditional and elite-centric forms of science diplomacy gradually gave way to an emphasis on making scientists “toolmakers for the peace movement.” The nuclear winter controversy in Britain further exposed the Thatcher government’s disingenuous approach to the use of science for governance, which would become a primary point of attack on future decisions regarding British participation in the Strategic Defense Initiative from antinuclear critics. Women’s judicial challenges to the U.S. and U.K. nuclear establishments, overseas labor solidarity, and coordinated Christian opposition to the arms race were aspects of the Anglo-American public diplomacy campaign against deterrence that animated the development of a global public sphere.

The unprecedented rise of the transatlantic peace movement provoked a response from Reagan and Thatcher that illuminated the common features of conservative politics in the United States and the United Kingdom. Both governments and their allies in the private sector conducted a transatlantic public diplomacy program that explicitly represented nuclear modernization respectively as an expression of British Victorian values and the virtues of a mythic version of American exceptionalism.

Beginning with minor efforts conducted by sub-cabinet level officials and a network of Anglo-American defense think tanks in 1980 and 1981, public diplomacy efforts expanded rapidly in anticipation of the 1982 U.S. mid-term elections and 1983
British general elections. The United Kingdom became a proving ground for Reagan’s peace through strength rhetoric, most notably during the president’s address to British Parliament in June 1982. The American pronuclear campaign also provided a significant measure of operational, financial, and intellectual support for its British counterpart. In 1983, Washington and Whitehall recognized public nuclear diplomacy as a national security priority in need of a more comprehensive political solution. Reagan’s and Thatcher’s extensive political investments in reclaiming the moral high ground from the antinuclear movement demonstrates the importance they attached to upholding deterrence, but also their recognition of morality as a primary source of legitimacy for public diplomacy.

The escalation of the peace through strength campaign paved the way for Reagan’s attempt to reclaim the moral high ground from the antinuclear movement with his March 1983 speech emphasizing missile defense and assured survival. In the United Kingdom, Thatcher’s conduct during the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas) War elevated her domestic reputation as a resolute leader. Her cabinet, especially Michael Heseltine, built on themes of moral fortitude to refocus the pronuclear campaign on peace through deterrence rather than elaborate on specific justifications for the deployment of cruise missiles, the retention of the Polaris submarine, and the acquisition of the Trident missile.

Both Reagan and Thatcher sought the role of moral authority to nurture support among what they believed to be a silent majority in favor of their nuclear policies. They functioned in lock-step on critical public diplomacy opportunities, especially in leading the international response to the KAL 007 disaster. They seized on the KAL 007 tragedy to emphasize a moral difference between the West and the Soviet Union. They
endeavored not to win over the peace movement, but to firm up support among the constituencies that had brought them to power. They confronted peace bishops and antinuclear women in particular because they represented two of the most serious moral challenges. Pronuclear proponents challenged the grounds on which these groups opposed deterrence, specifically questioning if radical women had the capacity to critically assess the arms race and whether clergy should speak with moral authority on nuclear issues.

The peace through strength program contained a significant paradox. On one hand it sought to delegitimize antinuclear opponents who made full use of the public sphere; on the other hand, the peace through strength lobby exalted open democracy as a source of Western strength in the Cold War competition with the authoritarian Soviet system. Deterrence advocates condemned peace bishops for inappropriately using their moral authority to comment on nuclear issues, and they relied on alternative moral justifications and on televangelists who framed the arms race as a prelude to the second coming of Christ to marshal support for the pronuclear cause. They openly questioned antinuclear women’s criticisms of the arms race because of their rejection of traditional gender dynamics, but celebrated the nuclear advocacy of women like Phyllis Schlafly, Olga Maitland, and of course Margaret Thatcher whose successes flouted Victorian family standards. As a result of public diplomacy programs and election campaigns, peace through strength became fully integrated into the broader New Right philosophy in both the United States and the United Kingdom.

Reagan and Thatcher’s pronuclear campaigns had significant implications for diplomacy in the information age. With nuclear policy being made in the public sphere,
traditional diplomats yielded much of their influence over foreign publics and opinion makers to public facing think tanks and media initiatives launched by the United States Information Agency (USIA) that connected officials in Washington to the press in London and other European capitals. Once considered a tool for selling polices after their formulation, public diplomacy became central to the process of policymaking in the nuclear 1980s. This new world of public diplomacy, forged through Anglo-American efforts to defend deterrence in public from 1980 to 1984, shaped the Reagan-Gorbachev summits that brought an end to the Cold War.

The public diplomacy ramifications of Reagan’s signature nuclear program, SDI, ultimately set the conditions for the U.S.-Soviet summits at the end of the nuclear 1980s. The Reagan administration developed SDI as means to reclaim the moral high ground from the peace movement and also to restore nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. The immediate effect of SDI was to jeopardize the ABM Treaty and public support for deployments of INF missiles to Europe, which led to the Soviet suspension of both INF and START talks in late 1983. At the beginning of 1984, the entirety of the U.S.-Soviet arms control regime lay in jeopardy. Though peace through strength advocates believed that these developments brought the United States closer to achieving nuclear superiority than at any other point in the president’s first term, they also presented the Reagan administration and the Thatcher government with their most formidable public diplomacy challenge yet.

Scientists’ rejection of Reagan’s scheme for nuclear superiority based on technical considerations effectively disorganized his administration’s public nuclear diplomacy. Throughout much of 1983 and 1984, U.S. officials could not agree on SDI’s
purpose, much less its presentation. SDI also caused difficulties for the British, who considered strategic arms control essential to maintaining the effectiveness of their own deterrent and questioned the potential negative impact of participation in the initiative on Britain’s technological and economic interests. Thatcher played a critical role in resolving these problems. Her four-point agreement on SDI would become the basis for the Reagan administration’s public presentation of the program as the president embarked on his years of summit diplomacy with his new Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev.

The summits at Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow together formed the penultimate episode of the Cold War. An arms control alliance between George Shultz and Thatcher laid the groundwork for these summits. The Thatcher government’s coordination of its arms control positions with Shultz’s State Department undercut the influence that the hardline right exerted over Reagan’s nuclear agenda. Thatcher and Gorbachev came to a diplomatic understanding of their own that improved East-West relations. In exchange for Gorbachev’s recognition of the United Kingdom’s special relationship with the United States and its unique position in European politics, Thatcher acknowledged the right of the Soviet state to govern its society according to its own principles and encouraged the success of the general secretary’s reform efforts. Through this relationship, Thatcher became an effective conduit for superpower relations in the months between summits. Shultz recognized the transformation of Soviet foreign policy aims earlier than any other senior national security official in the United States. His close work with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev underpinned his assessment that the Soviet Union sought to redefine its geopolitical strategy in order to reduce military spending and allow the Soviet Union to devote greater attention and more resources to internal renewal.
Gorbachev’s summit diplomacy effectively blended private and public tracks. The moral themes expressed in U.S. public diplomacy informed Gorbachev’s approach to humanizing the Soviet Union in the eyes of Reagan, what the general secretary referred to as the “human factor.” Gorbachev gained another source of Western legitimacy through science. The influence of science diplomacy appeared to go two ways, affecting Western publics and Soviet leadership. In response to SDI, science diplomacy organizations such as Pugwash had pursued reforms that created a tighter coupling between public and private tracks. Public diplomat scientists also assumed the leadership of the antinuclear movement in the aftermath of pronuclear victories in the 1983 British elections and 1984 U.S. presidential elections that diminished the frequency and effect of mass demonstrations and radical protest. Ultimately, Gorbachev built Western trust through the scientific community by demonstrating the effect of science diplomacy on his own thinking.

Reagan’s “emotional intelligence” represented his greatest contribution to summit diplomacy. Reagan succeeded in persuading Gorbachev that he really did desire peace, in spite of his stubborn attachment to SDI. Reagan never conceived of SDI as a bargaining chip in negotiations, but his views on its purpose evolved as he developed a personal rapport with Gorbachev. In 1983, Reagan valued SDI as a political and moral rebuttal to the peace movement’s public diplomacy and as a technological quest for reestablishing U.S. nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Five years later, Reagan remained committed to SDI as a hedge against right wing criticisms of arms reductions agreements he reached with Gorbachev. Ironically, the criticism that Reagan fielded

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when he did achieve agreements on arms reductions demonstrates the level of success that the president and his surrogates had achieved in their earlier efforts to make pronuclear attitudes a feature of mainstream conservatism.

The summits themselves were public diplomacy affairs that were designed with two goals in mind. The United States and Soviet Union first had to achieve an agreement that would in fact reduce the destructive capacities of their nuclear arsenals. The second and arguably more important objective was to persuade American, British, and Soviet citizens (as well as citizens of NATO and Warsaw Pact nations) to believe that the Cold War had actually come to an end. In the Anglo-American context, the latter goal was wholly a task for public diplomacy. Public diplomacy techniques that had initially been refined to counter the innovations of the antinuclear movement were deployed to full effect during the Reagan-Gorbachev summits to promote the idea that a new era of superpower relations had arrived, marking both the end of the nuclear 1980s and the Cold War.

The much debated question of whether or not the peace movement mattered to the end of the Cold War has often hinged on the effect of antinuclear ideas on the *substance* of superpower diplomacy. This approach indeed confirms that antinuclear ideas contributed to the peaceful end of the Cold War. Equally important, but largely unexamined, was the effect of the peace movement on the *form* of superpower diplomacy. Public diplomacy innovations proved critical to breaking the Cold War state of mind that perpetuated conflict between East and West.
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