IMPACT OF FERTILITY ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN UNDER THE SECOND-CHILD POLICY IN CHINA

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ABSTRACT

Promoting population growth to mitigate aging is one of the current policy priorities of the Chinese government. In 2015, China fully implemented the two-child policy. At the same time, it is unclear whether this policy shift will put more pressure on working mothers. A substantial literature documents that working mothers encounter systematic disadvantages in hiring, pay, and benefits relative to childless women. To study these effects on the Chinese labor market, this thesis will study the impact of fertility on selected employment outcomes of women under the second-child policy using the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) 2017. My findings show that women with two or more children are less likely to be employed. As expected, these effects are stronger among women at a lower educational level or higher household income level. My results underscore the unequal distribution of socio-economic burdens – putting women at disadvantage – that result from this policy. From a policy perspective, this implies that the Chinese government might consider complementing this policy shift with offering additional child care or maternity benefit and protective labor regulations to reduce the burden of motherhood.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

According to the Population Report of China, the population aged 65 and over accounted for 12.6% in 2019. China's development has benefited from the demographic dividend, but with the decline in fertility and aging problem, the labor shortage has become more and more serious leading to an increasing social burden. In 2015, China fully liberalized the second-child policy, encouraging every family to have two children.

The Chinese government is the main political actor in terms of fertility policy. Under the one-child policy, the Family Planning Office played an important role in implementing the policy. After the implementation of the second-child policy, the National Healthcare Security Administration (NHSA) assumes the responsibility of the Family Planning Office, which is currently not the core function of NHSA. Compared with the mandatory enforcement during the one-child policy period, the second-child policy mainly relies on propaganda and media, encouraging young couples to have two children.

But this second-child policy did not contribute much to rising birth rates. The effect of the second-child policy was outstanding in the year of implementation, with the birth rate rising from 12.07 per 1,000 in 2015 to 12.95 per 1,000, but the effect of this policy was only temporary, and the birth rate dropped sharply to 10.94 per 1,000 in 2018 (Wang, 2019). At the same time, more and more women's career development issues are beginning to emerge in social media or other platforms. There is a term associated with this social problem which is the motherhood penalty. "The laboratory experiment found that mothers in the workplace were penalized on a host of measures, including perceived competence and recommended starting salary" (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007, p. 1297). The time and physical costs of childbirth for

women can have a negative impact on their employment. Compared to the one-child policy of the past, the motherhood penalty may be more pronounced under the second-child policy in China.

My thesis will try to explore the possible long-term impact of this new policy on women employment. Using data from CGSS 2017, I found that women with two or more children are less likely to be employed. As expected, these effects are stronger among women at a lower educational level or higher household income level. From a policy perspective, this implies that the Chinese government might consider complementing this policy shift with offering additional child care or maternity benefit and protective labor regulations to reduce the burden of motherhood and encourage childbirth.

LITERATURE REVIEW

First, I will introduce the concepts of the one-child policy and the second-child policy. The one-child policy means that a family can only have a single child. But there are exceptions. Most ethnic minorities (non-Han ethnic Chinese) are permitted to have two or more children. Besides, a couple is permitted to have a second child if the first child is a girl or disabled in rural area (Fang et al. 2013). The second child policy was introduced in 2015, which means every family can have two children now.

Moreover, I will introduce some core concepts in my analysis. "Female employment" here refers to employment status. "Employment status" indicates whether a woman has a job or not. Regarding the fertility, I will include "women with two or more children" as the indicator since the change brought about by the two-child policy is the increase in the number of children.

Motherhood Penalty refers to having fewer employment opportunities or less income in the labor market due to childbirth, a phenomenon that is documented in a large literature (Budig, Misra, and Boeckmann 2012). Angrist and Evans's (1996) findings suggest that childbearing may have a significant negative effect on female labor force participation, and that this effect is greater and more pronounced among women with low levels of education and low spousal income. Also, the higher the number of children, the lower the likelihood of labor participation (Angrist and Evans 1996). Correll, Benard and Paik (2007) matched samples of job applicants with the same gender, the same qualifications, and different fertility statuses. They found that evaluators always believed that women with children were less able to work and less suitable than women without children (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). People usually believe less skilled women with lower wages are more vulnerable. However, "in the case of highly skilled

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white women with high wages, what is striking is that they have the highest penalties despite the fact that they have the most continuous experience of any group of women, which, other things being equal, would reduce their penalties" (England et al. 2016, p. 1180). Besides, one of the latest studies finds that "the effects of childbearing on mothers' labor supply is less negative in countries with smaller gender wage gaps, and declines in a country's gender wage gap are strongly associated with reductions in the motherhood employment penalty" (Chu, Cuffe, and Doan 2020, p. 4).

Literature in China focuses more on the policy background which is the Chinese fertility policy, arriving at conclusions similar to those in other countries. Fertility reduces female labor participation and labor income. The greater the number of births, the lower the possibility of female labor participation and the lower the labor income (Xu 2020). This impact is especially significant for the migrant women population in China (Zhang 2020). Existing evidence also suggests that the two-child policy exacerbates the labor market discrimination of female graduates, which explains the employment dilemma of women after childbirth from the perspective of employers (Cooke 2017). Besides, there are many factors affecting this impact. The influence of the number of children on female childbearing age groups is different under different family structures. The number of children has a greater impact on urban childbearing age groups than on rural childbearing age groups. (Qi 2014) Also, the level of position and the nature of the company have a significant inhibitory effect on wage reduction. (Wang 2019)

Compared to prior work, one highlight of my thesis is that I will use the latest version of CGSS dataset (CGSS 2017) which was released in October 2020. Since the second-child policy is widely implemented in 2015, this dataset will include some families that have children after

the policy. It is possible for us to consider this type of family separately. Besides, I want to introduce a new factor which is the gender role attitude. A lot of work has been done regarding the relationship between the social gender role attitude and the female employment. The gender role attitude most strongly and negatively associated with female employment rates (Fortin 2005). The default role status of women as family care providers and family labor bearers constitutes an obstacle to female employment and aggravates the family-work conflict of professional women (Guo 2020). However, not many people have studied the influence of women's self-perception of gender roles on women's employment after childbirth. The findings of Fischlmayr's (2002) study strongly suggest that "the women themselves can be partly blamed for their under-representation in international management" (Fischlmayr 2002, p. 782). To some extent, this suggests that women's self-perception of gender role attitude can affect their employment. In CGSS 2017 questionnaire, there is a small module regarding the gender role attitude including 5 questions. I plan to use this as the indicator variable of gender role attitude and explore its influence on the impact of fertility.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS PLAN

Previous studies have defined a concept called "Motherhood Penalty" which means generally women will have fewer employment opportunities or less income in the labor market due to childbirth (Budig and England 2001). Also, the greater the number of children, the greater the impact is likely to be.

Independet variables	Impact Process	Dependent variables
• Women with two or more children	•Fertility can lead to career breaks for women. •The more children they have, the more time women will devote to their families. •Social attitudes in China tend to place more responsibility on women for childcare	• Women are more likely to give up the employment opportunity.

Control Variables

Age; Education; Gender Role Attitude; Spousal Education and Employment status; Family Economic Level.

Figure 1. Theory of Change Process

Fertility can lead to career breaks for women. Urban women providing more than 20 hours per week of family care can have difficulty balancing family and work, resulting in career interruptions. (Zhang and Wang 2017) The more children they have, the more time women will devote to their families. Also, traditional social attitudes in China tend to place more responsibility on women for childcare. The childcare resources are expensive and insufficient, which makes it less likely to be the preferred choice for families.

Besides, I select some control variables to describe whether the impact will be the same among different groups. Based on the above literature review, I hypothesize that the impact is likely to be smaller for women with higher education levels. Also, the impact is likely to be smaller for those who are more inclined to gender equality. Women with higher education levels are more competitive in the job market.

Currently, there is no definitive model of change in the effect of age on the female labor rate. In Japan, the female labor force participation rate shows a clear M-shaped pattern by age, with two peaks around the ages of 20 and 40, reflecting the tendency of women to leave the labor market after having children and return to the labor market when the children are older. (Oishi and Oshio 2004) Age has a nonlinear effect on female labor force participation and this effect is generated through the role of marriage and childbearing, so it is included as a control variable. The default role status of women as family care providers and family labor bearers constitutes an obstacle to female employment and aggravates the family-work conflict of professional women. (Guo 2020) So I assume that women who are more inclined to gender equality are more likely not to give up the chance to work because they will not accept the default role status of women as family care providers and family labor bearers. But regarding the family economic level and

spousal education and employment status, the academic community does not have a unified

conclusion. Some believe that a higher family economic level will reduce women's labor

participation since the spouse's income is sufficient to support household expenses (Yao and Tan

2005). Some believe that as spousal or family income increases, the female labor force

participation rate increases because they will see the return on their labor as greater than the

return on the family. (Zhao 2019). And this effect is most significant for low-income households

and less significant for high-income households. And if husbands have higher education levels,

they likely have a higher income or they may be more inclined to gender equality, then the

general conclusion is uncertain.

There is one dependent variables in my models, which is labor participation status. Since

labor participation is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if this woman are employed

and 0 otherwise, I will use both LPM and logit regression models. The key independent variable

is "women with two or more children" which is an indicator variable generated by the number of

children.

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \sum_{i=2} \beta_i X_i + \varepsilon$$

Y is the dependent variable "Non-farm labor participation". It is a binary variable. If this

participant has a non-farm job at the time of completing the survey, the value will be 1. If this

participant doesn't have a job, the value will be 0.

X_1 is the independent variable "Women with two or more children". It is a binary variable. If

this female participant has two or more children, then the value of the variable is 1. If not, the

value will be 0.

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X_i refer to control variables including age, education, spouse's Education, spouse's labor participation, comparative household economic level, gender role attitude, province fixed effects. Control variables are selected based on the variable list in the dataset and the previous literature. Age is a control variable which is 2017 minus birth year. Education is a variable ranging from 1 to 5. 1 is lowest level which is "Lower secondary education and below". 2 is "Upper secondary education and equivalent vocational education". 3 is "Post-secondary education". 4 is "Undergraduate". 5 is "Master's degree and above". Spouse's Education follows the same formulation rules as Education. Comparative Household Economic Level is also a variable ranging from 1 to 5. This variable is created based on a question saying, "What is your family's financial status in your location?". 1 is the lowest level which is "Well below average". 2 is "Below average". 3 is "Average". 4 is "Above average". 5 is "Well above average". Gender Role Attitude is based on 5 questions related to gender role attitude. The questions are attitudes towards 5 sentences which are "Men are career-oriented, women are family-oriented." "Men are inherently more capable than women." "A good job is worse than a good marriage." "Women should be fired first in a recession." "Husband and wife should share household chores equally." For the first four sentences, participants receive five points if they completely agree and receive one point if they completely disagree. For the last question, participants receive five points if they completely disagree and receive one point if they completely agree. Therefore, those who get the highest total points are the people who are less inclined to gender equality.

The data set that I plan to use is CGSS 2017. Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) is launched by the Department of Sociology of the Renmin University of China and the Survey Research Center of Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. CGSS is aimed to

systematically monitor the changing relationship between social structure and quality of life in both urban and rural China. The latest version is CGSS 2017, which was released in October 2020. CGSS 2017 is a national survey with a sample of 12582.

DATA DESCRIPTION

What I am interested in is the female population between the ages of 18 and 55. Under 18 are minors in China. And age 55 is currently the latest legal retirement age for women in China. Also, I want to focus on the impact on women with non-farm jobs and without jobs.

Descriptive Statistics

The descriptive statistics show that there are more women with one child or without child than women with two or more children. The proportion of employed women with one child or without child is greater than the proportion of employed women who have two or more children. Also, the characteristics of these groups of women are also different based on the control variables. Women who do not have children or have one child, on average, younger, have a higher average level of education and the average level of education of their spouses, have a higher economic level and a more egalitarian gender role attitude. Besides, "women with two or more children" is negatively correlated with labor participation.

Basic Regression

Considering the dependent variable is "labor participation" which is an indicator variable, LPM and logit model can good options. Model 1 is a simple bivariate model. Model 2 controls the individual factors. Model 3 controls the individual factors and household factors. Model 4 controls the individual factors, household factors and province fixed effect. Individual factors involve age, education and gender role attitude. Household factors involve spouse's education, household economic level and labor participation of spouse. As mentioned in the Conceptual

Model and Analysis Plan, these control variables affect labor force participation not only directly, but also indirectly by affecting fertility. Therefore, controlling for these variables can make the coefficients of the independent variables more accurate.

Table 1. Coefficients of LPM Models

Dependent Variable	Employment (Labor Participation)			
LPM	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Women with two or more children	-0.146*** （0.022）	-0.058** （0.024）	-0.060** （0.023）	-0.052** （0.025）
Age		0.004** （0.0017）	0.002 （0.002）	0.002 （0.002）
Education		0.082*** （0.010）	0.113*** （0.014）	0.116*** （0.014）
Gender Role Attitude		-0.016*** （0.003）	-0.014*** （0.003）	-0.013*** （0.003）
Spouse's Education			-0.026** （0.023）	-0.028** （0.011）
Household Economic Level			0.041*** （0.013）	0.040*** （0.013）
Labor Participation of Spouse			0.277*** （0.036）	0.259*** （0.035）
Province FE				√

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .1 **p < .05 ***p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)

Table 1 and Table 2 show that for both the LPM and logit model, the coefficients of the key independent variable "women with two or more children" in model 1 are significant at 1% level while the coefficients of "women with two or more children" in model 2 and model 3 are significant at 5% level. The coefficient of "women with two or more children" in model 4 for the logit model is significant at 10% level. All of them are negative, which means the labor participation of women with two or more children will be reduced compared to women without or with one child holding others constant.

Table 2. Coefficients of Logit Models

Dependent Variable	Employment (Labor Participation)			
Logit	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Women with two or more children	-0.604*** （0.088）	-0.238** （0.103）	-0.261** （0.107）	-0.226* (0.120)
Age		0.020*** （0.007）	0.010 （0.008）	0.009 (0.009)
Education		0.382*** （0.054）	0.620*** （0.082）	0.644*** (0.086)
Gender Role Attitude		-0.069*** （0.013）	-0.064*** (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.015)
Spouse's Education			-0.136** (0.061)	-0.144** (0.061)
Household Economic Level			0.210*** (0.065)	0.203*** (0.203)
Labor Participation of Spouse			1.25*** (0.176)	1.19*** (0.177)
Province FE				Yes

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .1 **p < .05 ***p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)

In the logit model, the calculated average marginal effects are slightly lower than those in the LPM model. Compared to a woman without or with one child, the probability of having labor participation predicted by the logit and LPM model will be reduced by around 5 percentage points if a woman has two or more children holding others constant.

Comparative Statistics

As mentioned in the literature review, the magnitude of motherhood penalty can be different across different subgroups. Angrist and Evans (1996) believe that the magnitude of the motherhood penalty is related to the education level and spousal income. If we can understand what kind of women are more likely to experience the motherhood penalty, then policies can be

tailored to help these groups. Therefore, I will run the logit model again within different

subgroups using CGSS 2017 and compare the outcomes to see whether the conclusion from

Angrist and Evans is applicable to China.

Table 3. Coefficients of Different Household Financial Condition Subgroups

Dependent Variable		Employment (Labor Participation)		
Logit		Below Average	Average	Above Average
	Model 1	-0.549***	-0.568***	-0.739***
Women with two or more children	Model 2	-0.224	-0.313***	-0.698*
	Model 3	-0.46	-0.275**	-0.657
	Model 4	-0.251	-0.221	-0.601

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p<0.01$ (two-tailed tests)

The first set is "household financial condition" which includes three subgroups "Below

Average" "Average" "Above Average". Compared to spousal income, using household financial

condition can be better to describe the family financial level in China. I assume this is because

income levels vary from region to region in China (Pedroni and Yao 2006), while many families

have a lot of assets rather than a high income due to some historical reasons. Table 3 shows that

some coefficients of "women with two or more children" are not significant, which means the

penalty effect may not always be significant for "Below average" and "Above average" groups.

Even though some coefficients are not significant but based on the magnitude of the coefficients,

it is worth noting that this effect tends to be stronger when the household financial condition is

better. This could because women have to find a job when their income is important to support

the family while women can easily give up jobs without financial burden if family financial condition is better, which is consistent with the opinion of Yao and Tan to some extent.

Table 4. Coefficients of Different Education Subgroups

Dependent Variable		Employment (Labor Participation)	
Logit		College and above	Below College
Women with two or more children	Model 1	1.023**	-0.562***
	Model 2	0.376	-0.272***
	Model 3	0.378	-0.311***
	Model 4	0.118	-0.272**

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .1 **p < .05 ***p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)

The second set is education background "College" which includes "College or above" and "Below college". For those "Below college", the coefficient is always negative and significant. And compared to the coefficient in the basic logit model, the magnitude is larger in models 2, 3 and 4 which means the penalty is higher if the education level is below college.

Table 5. Coefficients of Different Spousal Education Subgroups

Dependent Variable		Employment (Labor Participation)	
Logit		College and above	Below College
Women with two or more children	Model 1	-0.716***	-0.424***
	Model 2	-0.604*	-0.213*
	Model 3	-0.664**	-0.224**
	Model 4	-0.901**	-0.165

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *p < .1 **p < .05 ***p<0.01 (two-tailed tests)

The third set is education levels of spouses. I assume the education levels of spouses can partly reflect the income and the gender role attitude of spouses. The outcomes show that the penalty of women whose spouses received a higher degree of education is higher and also larger than the coefficients of the basic logit model in magnitude. I find this interesting because I assume those spouses with a higher degree of education are more likely to support gender equity and encourage their wives to get a job. I think part of this can be explained by the similar reason of the "household financial condition" group. The higher the level of education, the higher the income or the wealthier the parents of the spouse. Women do not need to get a job to support their families as quickly as possible or even be able to become full-time housewives.

Table 6. Coefficients of Different Gender Role Attitude Subgroups

Dependent Variable		Employment (Labor Participation)		
Logit		$4 <$ gr_score < 12	$12 \leq$ gr_score < 18	$18 \leq$ gr_score < 25
	Model 1	-0.345***	-0.593***	-0.109
Women with two or more children	Model 2	-0.160	-0.366***	0.219
	Model 3	-0.239	-0.429***	0.565**
	Model 4	-0.229	-0.358***	0.295

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *$p < .1$ **$p < .05$ ***$p<0.01$ (two-tailed tests)

The fourth set is "gender role attitude". I introduce these subgroups because I assume that women's self-perception of gender roles is likely to affect the magnitude of motherhood penalty. Previous literature believe that traditional gender role is negatively associated with the female employment and traditional female gender role concentrates more on being a wife and a mother. The lower the gr_score is, the more likely it is to support gender equality. The average gr_score

is 12. However, only the coefficients of the middle group which is slightly above the average are significant but larger in magnitude compared to the basic logit model.

Limitations

First, many of the variables I was interested in could not be included in the model due to data limitations. Because the household panel data section of this database was completed in a different year compared to other sections, it had to be dropped. Therefore, exploring the effects of family structure and children's age on the motherhood penalty could not be realized. It is also unfortunate that China's hukou reform abolished urban and rural hukou and converted them into unified residential hukou, which prevented me from incorporating the urban-rural distinction into the model.

Besides, the second-child policy has only been fully implemented for six years and the increase in fertility rate due to the policy is limited. Also, the latest survey data were completed in 2017. Given that the impact of fertility and childbearing may only be observed over a long enough period of time and with a large enough sample size, the analysis in this paper is still insufficient to accurately describe the likely impact of the second-child policy on female employment.

It looks like that there is a two-way causal relationship between fertility, number of births, and labor supply and labor income, so instrumental variables can be considered, but perfect instrumental variables cannot be found due to database limitations.

CONCLUSION AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS

For the Chinese administration increasing the fertility rate is a top priority. According to the China Fertility Report 2020, 12.6% of China's population aged 65 and over. China's economic development is very dependent on the number of laborers. Also, China has adopted a unified pension insurance system for urban workers. The consequences of aging population will be a larger pension burden, less labor and stagnation of economic development.

The comprehensive implementation of the second-child policy impacts society in many ways. Besides the fertility rate, it can affect every individual related to the policy and childbearing. Meanwhile, the choices made by these individuals will in turn affect the outcome of this policy. According to the China Fertility Report 2020 by Hengda Research Institute, China's birth population is projected to decline for the fourth consecutive year (2017-2020). Some observers see this effect as a fading of the policy or lack of effectiveness.

China has always promoted equal participation of men and women in the workforce. Family planning policies also encouraged late marriage and late childbearing, which led to a general societal belief that it is better for women to marry and have children around the age of thirty. Since most women start to work around the age of twenty in China, the ideal age for marriage, around thirty, happens to be an important time for women to advance in their careers. Under the one-child policy, the motherhood penalty is smaller because career interruptions due to childbirth occur only once. However, when women decide to have two or even more children, the motherhood penalty can be expected to be higher. When women become aware of this potential impact, they weigh childbirth against personal career advancement. My findings support the

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negative impact of fertility on women labor participation and indicate that a possible reason why young couples choose not to have two or more children lies in this negative impact.

To reduce the motherhood penalty for women, several policy options exist.

First, the maternity benefit system for women should be guaranteed by law; the legal labor rights of women of childbearing age should be guaranteed, and penalties should be imposed on companies or institutions where unjust treatment exists. For example, "from the mid-1960s to around 1980, Sweden extended its family policies that provide financial and in-kind support to families with children very quickly. The extension of the policy raised the level of fertility, shortened the spacing of births, and induced fluctuations in the period fertility rates" (Björklund 2006, p. 3). China's current maternity benefit policy is still at the stage where the government expresses its supporting position, but there are no clear benefits for the birth of multiple children, nor is there a clear proposal on how to protect women's labor rights after childbirth, especially after multiple births.

Second, it is recommended that a male maternity benefit system be introduced, where men can share more stress of childcare through maternity leave and other forms.

Some European countries such as Germany and Finland have adopted short or extended father-care leave with high income replacement. "In most nations, infant care decisions have historically been left for mothers and fathers to resolve in private" (O'Brien 2009, p. 209). Specifically, in China, mothers and grandparents play the main role of infant care. There is a gap in terms of father parental leave or other benefit in China. However, with the expectation of parents return to work after childbirth, women and men should have the same rights.

Finally, the government should encourage women to return to labor participation after childbirth. Women from families with better financial conditions are more likely to voluntarily give up labor participation for childbirth based on my thesis. However, the number of women in the workforce is also important. The government should encourage women's employment in public opinion and provide guidance for women's employment with the help of e-commerce and other platforms. In China, women's participation in work was strongly promoted in the 1950s and 1960s, which was very important for the advancement of women's labor status at that time. Now, while encouraging every family to have more children, the government and society should not ignore the importance of female workers.

Addressing the population issue is currently one of the most important goals of the Chinese government. But simply lifting the restrictions from the policy is unlikely to achieve the desired effect. There are many social and economic factors related to childbearing that influence each family's choice, in addition to the second-child policy. Among them, the cost of career advancement for women due to childbirth is particularly significant. Only when women's childcare burden is reduced and their labor rights are guaranteed will more families choose to have more children. Otherwise, the second-child policy will only have a very limited effect on China's population growth.

APPENDIX

Table A-1. Variable Table

	Var Name	Var Codename	
Dependent variables	Non-farm Labor Participation	lp	1= Yes 0= No
Independent Variables	Women with two or more children	w_morechildren	1= Yes 0= No
Control Variables	Age	age	
	Education	edu	1-5
	Spouse's Education	s_edu	1-5
	Spouse's Labor Participation	s_lp	1= Yes 0= No
	Comparative Household Economic Level	hh_econ	1-5
	Gender Role Attitude	gr_score	5-25

Table A-2. Independent and Dependent Variables Distribution and Correlation

Non-farm Labor Participation	Women with two or more children		
	0=No	1=Yes	Total
0=No	748	540	1288
1=Yes	1389	548	1937
Total	2137	1088	3225
Correlation coefficient	-0.1412		

Table A-3. Mean and Standard Deviation of Dependent and Control Variables

Variable Name		Mean
Labor Participation=1	Age	37.78
	Education	2.32
	Spouse's Education	2.21
	Household Economic Level	2.72
	Gender Role Attitude	11.26
	Labor Participation of Spouse	0.95
Labor Participation=0	Age	38.76
	Education	1.72
	Spouse's Education	1.59
	Household Economic Level	2.53
	Gender Role Attitude	12.69
	Labor Participation of Spouse	0.81
Women with two or more children = 1	Age	41.33
	Education	1.47
	Spouse's Education	1.49
	Household Economic Level	2.54
	Gender Role Attitude	13.04
	Labor Participation of Spouse	0.88
Women with two or more children = 0	Age	36.57
	Education	2.39
	Spouse's Education	2.27
	Household Economic Level	2.70
	Gender Role Attitude	11.22
	Labor Participation of Spouse	0.90

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