# PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC POWER: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE PREVALENCE AND WOMEN'S POLITICAL POWER

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## ABSTRACT

The turn of the millennium marked a rise in the global development agendas and legal frameworks aiming to address the ambitious goal of gender equality, including targets for reducing violence against women and increasing women's participation and representation in political processes and public institutions. However, the pathway between private power and political, or public, power is underexplored within the context of developing strategies for more meaningful power and equality for women despite feminist theory acknowledging this pathway as being critically interrelated. In this study, I explore the relationship through a conceptual framework that begins with intimate partner violence (IPV) prevalence as a proxy for private power. Based on the literature, I include the individual, household, and community level effects of IPV through to the possible public or political sphere effects on women and specifically focus on the community-level effects as a pathway for the relationship between IPV and political power. I use a custom country dataset and multiple imputation methods in three OLS step-wise regression models against six measures of women's political power set forth in the Council on Foreign Relations' Women's Power Index and the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database. This study aims to contribute to the literature both on violence against women and gender equality by exploring the relationship between intimate partner violence and political power through community effects and as moderated by legal frameworks and conflict and security.

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# CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

There is no shortage of statistics that tell the horror story of a woman's high likelihood of experiencing violence at some point in her life. Globally, approximately 35% of women will experience physical or sexual violence in their lifetime; 38% of women murdered die at the hands of their male partners; and one in three women who have been in a relationship will experience intimate partner violence (World Health Organization, 2017).

At the turn of the millennium, a series of global legal frameworks and commitments set forth ambitious plans for women's equality – including addressing violence against women. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) (United Nations, 1993), Beijing Platform for Action (United Nations, 1995), the adoption of the United Nations Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda (Security Council resolution, 2000), and the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2000) declared global targets for reducing targeted violence against women and for increasing gender equality, including increased leadership and participation as both an objective and a strategy within the equality framework. But there is an unexplored gap between how violence against women in private spheres – reflective of an intimate 'disempowerment', caused by domestic or intimate partner violence (IPV) - may relate to the achievement of meaningful equality and power for women in the public sphere.

The goals of CEDAW, Beijing, MDGs, and SDGs often rely on "empowerment" and "equality" rhetoric. Feminist theory often challenges this framing of 'empowerment' or 'giving' power to women, due the contradiction it creates between advocating for women's participation and agency, while simultaneously perpetuating the role of women merely as victims of the inequality or violence inflicted upon them. Practically speaking, this framing and approach to

gender equality programming prioritizes saving women one problem at a time rather than removing the systemic barriers preventing women from fully realizing their inherent agency and power. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Interim Report, noted that "development policies that fail to take gender inequality into account or that fail to enable women to be actors in those policies and actions will have limited effectiveness and serious costs to societies. The reverse is also true: the achievement of Goal 3 [Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women] depends on the extent to which each of the other goals addresses gender-based constraints and issues" (WHO, 2005).

Following the conclusion of the Millennium Development Goals framework in 2015, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set forth an updated agenda for the next fifteen years. The SDG framework aimed again for gender equality, this time by 2030. Currently, SDG 5: "Achieve Gender Equality and Empower All Women and Girls" (United Nations, 2015), is one of the most visible and widely adopted global 'gender equality' objectives.

The definition of gender equality has evolved over time to acknowledge the varied spheres where women continue to face barriers to their agency such as education, health, and labor (Grown, 2005) and this is reflected in the new global SDG framework. Within Goal 5 are nine targets that aim to capture this broader continuum of gender equality. Target 5.2 to "Eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation" speaks to the original MDG target which focuses on women's experiences as victims of violence. Target 5.5 to "Ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life" began to expand its definition of equality to include agency for women in public spheres.

Yet the indicators for each of these targets within the umbrella Goal for gender equality demonstrates a dissonance in strategy. For example, the indicators for Target 5.2 refer to the number of women 'subjected to' violence. The framing of this indicator, in effect, ignores the principles and objectives of subsequent Target 5.5, which aims to ensure participation and agency for women, by perpetuating the role of women merely as victims of the inequality or violence inflicted upon them. Beyond this theoretical disconnect, the global community is starting to recognize that no country is on track to meet the SDG targets by the 2030 deadline (Edmond, 2019). Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that the existing strategies for both reducing violence against women and increasing women's political participation and leadership are not working, at least in terms of achieving its self-proclaimed targets.

Women's participation and power is often defined and measured at the highest level of public institutions, such as the number of women in parliament or whether a woman has been the leader of a country. Yet the ways in which women are capable of exercising power in the spaces outside of the most elite institutions in the country, whether at the community level or within their own homes, continue to be under-measured or are not studied using a framework of gender and power. IPV, while being a stark violation of a woman's rights in and of itself, is also indicative of a lack of power in one of the most private spheres of a woman's life. While definitions vary in terms of the types of violence that are included when measuring IPV, it is the notion of 'intimacy' that makes this category of violence useful for the purpose of this study's central discussion by providing a contrast to the public sphere of politics and representation.

Much of the existing research and interventions addressing violence against women frames the violence as a private issue with direct and individual effects on the woman via mortality and morbidity. Specifically, when referring to physical violence against a woman, there are certain

obvious physiological effects on a woman due to direct injuries linked to the act of violence. There is also substantial evidence and causal frameworks for understanding short- and long-term health effects, including physical and psychological effects and mortality linked to IPV (World Health Organization, 2013).

Some broader studies have also attempted to capture the economic costs of violence against women (European Institute for Gender Equality, 2014) to capture the losses to the labor force for women who must treat injuries or to reflect the costs to the public health systems to treat injuries. However, it stands to reason that violence against women does not only harm women on an individual level nor that it only harms society on an economic level. I propose that the cost is multi-level and that the community- and institution-level implications for political participation and empowerment are some of the least explored effects of this gendered violence.

The objective of this study will be to provide insights the possible relationship between a seemingly 'private' form of violence against women and their participation and empowerment in the perceived 'public' sphere of political institutions and processes. Exploring the relationship between violence against women in a so-called 'private' sphere and the political empowerment of women, or the possible indirect effects within a 'public sphere', for a subset of countries would offer insight into alternative approaches toward both addressing violence against women and increasing their political power.

# CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

## Not Just Women

Before continuing to review the literature on IPV effects on women, it is important to note that persons of all genders may be victims of IPV. The same systems and norms which may repress reporting of IPV by women are just as strong, if not more egregious, for men and non-binary individuals experiencing partner violence. My choice to explore IPV more narrowly as a phenomenon that specifically correlates with *women's* political power builds on the feminist perspective that – despite the fact that persons of any gender may experience IPV as a victim – IPV remains a highly gendered issue presenting unique social problems for women.

Statistically, women experience substantially higher rates of domestic or intimate partner violence (NIJCDC, 2000; WHO, 2021). Additionally, researchers have proposed that when women do perpetrate violence against a partner, it may be in self-defense or as a result of experiencing prior violence from that partner (Cascardi and Vivian, 1995). In the broader Literature Review, I will discuss further some of the assumptions underpinning the feminist arguments that IPV is a gendered issue and that men are primary perpetrators of IPV as a result of their patriarchal conditioning.

Regardless, there is a need for better disaggregated data collection globally in order to both more accurately capture the effect of IPV on persons of all genders and to then offer better services and redress to all victims. Indeed, my data and results chapters consistently reference the broader underreporting bias and infrequent data collection of IPV prevalence as a key limitation of attempted IPV analysis, regardless of gender.

For the purposes of my macro-level study, I will continue to largely explore IPV as a gendered issue affecting women at the individual, household, community, and – ultimately – the political level. But before proceeding, I want to acknowledge the painful experiences of all victims of IPV and the controversy in exploring this gendered issue solely through the lens of one gender.

**History of Intimate Partner Violence Research**

Studying IPV or domestic violence against women in any quantitative capacity is a historically difficult task due to underreporting, lack of legal redress for women to report crimes against spouses, lack of consistent definitions of a 'partner', and a lag in sex disaggregated data more broadly in development and social welfare (Skinner and Malos, 2005). To counter these challenges, human rights advocates have leveraged qualitative data, and particularly women's experiences, to bring stories to the attention of policymakers and simply establish that the problem of violence against women exists in their constituencies. This qualitative data foundation evolved over time to include descriptive statistics to demonstrate the scale of the problem and then later heavily utilized survey research and health facility records to capture the nuances of the women and the violence they experienced (Skinner and Malos, 2005).

The majority of international research on the topic of violence against women has been conducted from 1995 onward, possibly due to the increased attention and funding to IPV following the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1993, and IPV's inclusion in the MDGs and SDGs. Much research on IPV and its person effects on women considers partner violence as a single over-arching construct, while other frameworks separate IPV into categories such as physical violence, sexual violence, stalking, and psychological violence (CDC, 2015). Because this study is interested in IPV as a power dynamic versus specific health outcomes and

interventions, IPV will be considered as a single overarching construct, consistent with how it is measured by the WHO in the country data.

In observing the effects and outcomes of violence against women in the private and public spheres, there are four key categories that inform this study: 1) individual health and financial impacts of IPV on women; 2) multiplier effects of IPV on communities; 3) targeted and gendered violence against women in political office; and 4) the direction of correlation and causation between broader women's empowerment norms and the prevalence of violence against women.

**Individual Effects of Intimate Partner Violence: Health and Financial Stability**

Intuition might inform us that IPV has immediate impacts on women's health outcomes. A 2008 study conducted by the WHO using a pooled data analysis of 24,097 interviewed women in ten countries affirmed this intuition through its finding that – across country contexts – 19-55% of women who experienced lifetime IPV were directly injured in the experience. The same analysis also found significant association between lifetime IPV and self-reported poor physical health (Ellsberg et al, 2008). The women interviewed reported IPV-related physical health challenges such as difficulty walking, difficulty completing daily activities, vaginal discharge, memory loss, dizziness, and pain. Women who experienced IPV also reported a higher association with mental health issues, specifically emotional distress, suicidal attempts, and suicidal thoughts, than non-abused women (Ellsberg et al, 2008).

Broader reviews of literature on IPV health outcomes find that a majority of studies explore women's mental health outcomes or a mix of their physical and mental health outcomes (Dillon et al, 2013). While the aforementioned 2008 WHO study indicates a significant association between IPV and mental health challenges using self-reported data, substantial research also demonstrates mental health outcomes using a measurement of IPV disease burden.

In the US, burden-of-disease figures have attributed over one third of depression cases, over one-quarter of anxiety diagnoses, and over 10% of suicide instances to IPV (Dillon et al, 2013; Vos et al, 2006). Surveys underscore the toll of IPV on mental health: over half of women in domestic violence shelters were found to be depressed, compared to less than 3% of general US female population (Dillon et al, 2013; Helfrich et al, 2008). Significant associations have also been found between IPV and mental health, as previously characterized, in other country contexts including India (Dillon et al, 2013; Vachher and Sharma, 2010), Paraguay (Dillon et al, 2013; Ishida et al, 2010), and Bangladesh (Dillon et al, 2013; Naved and Akhtar, 2010).

The literature is fairly conclusive in associating IPV with poor short- and long-term physical and mental health outcomes for women who are abused. Additional individual-level research has examined the personal financial impact of IPV by assessing survivors' ability to sustain employment. Studies have found that women who have experienced IPV struggle to maintain employment, spend less time on the job, and that these effects can last up to six years after the experience of abuse has ended (Adams et al, 2013; Crowne et al, 2011). Indeed, this relationship between financial stability and IPV may be bidirectional based on studies in developed countries that compare women whose finances are controlled by a partner to women who maintain separate finances (Showalter, 2016).

It is notable that this effect on women's earnings is not directly tied to a predictable relationship between a woman's experience of IPV and the decision to work outside the home, as demonstrated by a study between Chile and Nicaragua. However, the same study confirmed that there was a consistent and unidirectional relationship between abused women and lower earnings, despite earnings not being a statistically significant predictive factor in the equation estimating a women's likelihood of experiencing abuse (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). This suggests there is a

unique relationship between the decision to work and IPV. It is also likely this would vary across countries due to cultural norms related to women's work outside the house and other factors affecting access to the labor market.

The literature exploring individual-level outcomes for women tends to focus on determining the prevalence of health conditions among women experiencing IPV and how those health outcomes may mediate financial stability in order to identify trends and make recommendations for health policies and providers to improve support for women. While these are critical insights for policy recommendations, these works often do not aggregate those personal outcomes to the broader analysis of IPV's impact on women's political capabilities and power. This study aims to examine and fill the fap between individual and macro-level outcomes of IPV.

**Community-level Impacts of Intimate Partner Violence: Multiplier Effects**

An extension of the individual-level impact of IPV on women explores the social and economic multiplier effects of IPV. The economic multiplier effects translate certain individual-level financial or health effects to societal and national economic costs.

While there are certain immediate and direct 'costs' stemming from IPV, such as emergency room or social services, studies of economic *multiplier* effects evaluate costs to the economy in the form of increased healthcare costs and the cost of reduced labor market participation and lost productivity. Early studies of costs to health insurance companies use regression analysis to compare healthcare costs of smaller subsets of battered women to a sample population at a selected hospital in a pseudo-randomized controlled trial. These analyses compare the increased healthcare costs to battered women over the course of months to a year and demonstrate that those costs are not significantly linked to emergency room visits or anomalistic

incidences of physical abuse – or the aforementioned 'direct costs'- but are driven by longer term costs from mental illness that lingers in battered women long after abuse (Wisner, 1999).

Building upon the literature on individual employment stability effects on abused women, economic multiplier effects reflect this loss as a macroeconomic impact. For example, a study from Chile indicated that domestic violence reduced women's earnings by $1.56 billion over one year in 1996, and that in Nicaragua earnings were reduced by $29.5 million. In both countries, women that were abused earned significantly less than other women, even after controlling for factors likely to affect earnings (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). Economic multiplier effects also extend to an assessment of the negative impact of domestic violence on the educational attainment of children of abused women. This is linked to an overall negative impact on children's future earning potential.

In addition to the impact of IPV on children survivors' future earning potential, social multiplier effects examine the intergenerational transmission of violence as a practice from parent to child. Research has shown that children who grow up witnessing abuse or experiencing abuse themselves are more likely to be involved in some form of interpersonal violence whether by perpetrating or experiencing domestic or social violence as adults (Widom 1989 from Morrison and Orlando, 1999).

Social multiplier effects identified in the same study also suggested an erosion of social capital experienced by victims of domestic violence. This erosion of social capital was presumed due to the very intent of an abuser to control women and her communication and contact with the world which reduces a woman's quality of life and her capacity to engage in economic or social activities outside the home (Widom 1989 from Morrison and Orlando, 1999).

There is little in the way of an empirical body of research to build out this extension of social effects. However, it is this 'social multiplier' assumption that a battered woman experiencing poor health and economic outcomes may have limited capacity to engage in social and democratic processes outside the home that drives portions of this study's conceptual pathway between the experience of IPV and a woman's ability to exercise political power.

## Political Violence: Violence Against Women Seeking or Currently Serving in Political Office

While there is not a body of research on the relationship between 'intimate' partner violence and political power, the relationship between 'social' violence against women and political participation has been explored through research on targeted violence against women who are running for or elected to political office or to prevent women from voting in elections (Biroli, 2016).

These investigations have used case studies to explore profiles of individual women leaders that are targeted for assassination or intimidation, as well as to identify policies or perceived 'feminist' identities as being triggers for this type of violence against women in office (Biroli, 2016). This specific case study methodology and focus on targeted violence does not align with the approach of this paper which seeks to link a more common and private violence to women's political power and participation at all levels. But the nuances captured by the focus on singular stories of women who rise to office and negotiate their identities against these threats provide rich insight into mediating and moderating factors for the conceptual framework of this study.

Krook's 2017 article, *Violence Against Women in Politics*, further highlighted that - while intimidation, harassment, and violence may be levied against politicians in the public spheres in any election - such violence is levied against women in the public and private spheres. Krook's

study looked at violence which is more intentional in its goal of stymying women's access to political events and spaces, while this paper seeks rather to examine the possible indirect relationship between sustained levels of violence against women in private spheres and the political power that they are able to realize and wield.

## Examining the Direction of the Relationship Between Violence Against Women and Political Power

Within the wider discussion on violence against women and women in politics, there has been some discussion as to the nature and direction of the relationship between equality in society and trends in violence against women. For example, one seemingly intuitive theory proposes that societies regarded as more 'gender-equal', have both high levels of women's political participation and lower levels of violence against women by virtue of this greater 'equality'.

Yet this intuition is not always supported by country data and is most strongly contradicted by the so-called "Nordic Paradox". The paradox refers to the findings of a survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights which showed that "the lifetime prevalence of IPV in the three EU Nordic countries (Denmark: 32%; Finland; 30%; Sweden: 28%) to be higher than the EU average (22%; with 13% being the lowest prevalence in the region), despite these countries ranking the highest in gender equality" (Ivert, 2020).

Supplemental research into the Nordic Paradox offers two explanations for this anomaly of intuition: information bias due to high levels of reporting in more gender equal societies or a backlash effect where conflicts arise in domestic partnerships as women become more equal and attempt to assert greater authority and male partners lash out at women in response (Gracia and Merlo, 2016). This finding does not suggest that there is no relationship between a country's level of gender equality and IPV prevalence, but rather suggests that there is an opportunity to further

investigate the pathway and nuance between macro or societal norms and indicators of gender equality and IPV prevalence.

A multilevel analysis of individual heterogeneity and discriminatory accuracy (MAIHDA) on country-level gender equality and IPV (Ivert et. al, 2019) aimed to add this nuance by proposing and investigating three possible relationships between gender equality and violence against women, with gender equality as the independent variable:

> *"1) 'amelioration' – increasing gender equality decreases violence against women;*
> *2) 'backlash' – increasing gender equality increases violence against women;*
> *3) 'convergence' – increasing gender equality makes men and women more similar both in experience and perpetrating violence" (Ivert et. al, 2019)*

The initial analysis compared eighty studies that exhibit findings across this spectrum of relationships and did not affirm any concrete conclusions about the existence or the direction of the relationship between macro-level equality and violence against women (Roberts, 2011).

After concluding their literature review and asserting that existing studies do not point to any concrete conclusions regarding the relationship between VAW and women in politics, the MAIHDA study proposes a new methodology which goes beyond solely evaluating an association between a woman's country of residence and individual experience of IPV to include the ability to discriminate between women with and without experiences of IPV.

Despite this new methodological approach, the author's conclusions matched the existing literature which did not support any of the three relationship hypotheses above. The authors suggested that this does not preclude a relationship between gender equality and IPV, but rather indicates the limitations of using an aggregate global gender equality index (GEI) as an independent variable paired with country-level data on IPV as a dependent variable in their cross-

national comparison (Ivert et. al, 2017). The MAIHDA study's recognition of these limitations offer an opportunity to avert these pitfalls in this study's conceptual framework and in selecting the indicators of interest for cross-country analysis.

# CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The relationship between personal versus political power of women became a central point of contention during the second wave of feminism. Power was dichotomized as paternal power, which governed the home and private sphere, versus political power in the public sphere. While feminism in its earlier iterations focused on increasing equality of political power, perhaps best exemplified by the suffragette movement, second-wave feminism challenged the acceptance of paternal power as innate or 'natural' and sought to link it as a product of the same social relations in the public sphere (Pateman, 1983). More colloquially, second-wave feminists sought to proclaim that "the personal is political" (Rogan, Budgeon 2018).

Whether or not current proponents for women's equality and political participation are intentionally wading into this particular debate regarding the public and private power dichotomy, by seeking to change the nature of women's political empowerment, advocates must confront the same questions regarding women's agency amid paternal and political powers that be.

To conceptualize a practical framework for what may be considered a highly theoretical question, Figure 1 begins with the private sphere, where IPV is represented as women's level of private power.




**Figure 1: Conceptual Framework**

The literature review section outlined the many ways in which IPV has a measured, unidirectional, and detrimental effect on a woman's physical (Campbell, 2002) and mental (Wisner, 1999) health. This is consistent with the typical framing of IPV as a health issue versus a power issue. Some research expands this framing to explore the relationship between the

experience of IPV and economic activity over time (Crowne, et al, 2010; International Center for Research on Women, 2004).

There is reason to believe that reduced employment stability and financial security resulting from IPV has some relationship with political power and participation. However, the costs and community impacts are most frequently calculated in strictly economic terms, such as loss of productivity in work and home environments, cost of health expenses to the woman, and the cost of public health and domestic violence programs to taxpayers more broadly (International Center for Research on Women, 2004).

There is myriad literature (Cole, 2018; Vale, 2000; Acemoglu et.al., 2007) – theoretical and research based – proposing the links between economic inequality and political influence or power. Therefore, it is not a far jump to propose that economic instability and loss stemming from the direct and indirect costs of IPV would have a unique effect on women's political power in this framework.

This study's framework also proposes a relationship between IPV prevalence and women's status in their local communities. Heise's (1998) social ecological model suggests a close relationship between abuse at the individual level and societal level rigid gender roles, toxic masculinity, and overall acceptance of violence against women. Heise's model suggests that the pathway between IPV prevalence and women's status in their communities may be a highly interactive relationship wherein both influence each other over time. The World Health Organization builds on the Heise model to detail the nature of direct health effects and psychological effects, such as fear, control, and limited reproductive autonomy (World Health Organization, 2013).

In addition to the socioecological models, the MAIHDA study also indicated that the direction of the community-level pathway between IPV and political power may be bi-directional or simultaneous. This is illustrated in the conceptual framework through two-way arrows and will be operationalized in the model via the inclusion of community effects as controls and interaction terms to test for different dynamics and moderating effects of this relationship.

The moderating factors within this framework also influence the relationship between IPV and women's political power in direct and indirect ways. Legal frameworks protecting women's rights at the country and community level often define whether or not IPV is, first of all, a crime, and second, whether there are redress mechanisms for women to report IPV or be protected from their abuser after reporting.

Research demonstrates that living in countries with explicit legislation against gender-based violence (GBV) reduces women's likelihood of experiencing IPV and that legal sanctions and consequences for perpetrators of GBV and domestic violence modestly reduce the likelihood of perpetrators re-abusing (Sanz-Barbero et al, 2018). However, cultural norms and stigma also mediate the effect of legal frameworks on IPV prevalence by influencing the likelihood or social acceptability of women seeking care or redress, regardless of the legislative protections that may be available (Liang et al, 2005).

At the other end of the pathway, legal frameworks also moderate women's political power by establishing women's rights to participate in formal political processes such as running for office and voting. Due to their potential for influence on GBV trends and access to political processes, legal frameworks are likely to moderate the relationship between IPV and political power.

Conflict and security at the country level also affect IPV and political power in complex ways. Within the proposed framework, research supports the assumption that women in conflict-settings are at higher risk of IPV both due to their likelihood of experiencing outsider-violence (Wako et al, 2015), the risk of displacement which exacerbates tension with partners due to economic instability and rapid shifts in gender roles (Cardoso et al, 2016), and the increased likelihood of partners having engaged in violent actions against other outsider men (Black et al, 2019). Political stability and the capacity for all citizens to participate in political processes is also affected in conflict settings where elections may be delayed or distrusted and where it may not be safe for citizens to openly participate in public assemblies or voting.

Based on the proposed conceptual framework in Figure 1 and prior findings, this study hypothesizes that:

1. Higher intimate partner violence rates are associated with less political power for women.
2. The moderating factor of country conflict will impact the magnitude of the associated reduction in political power: an increased presence of conflict will correlate with greater reductions in political power.
3. The moderating factor of legal frameworks that support women's voting rights and prohibit IPV will inversely impact the magnitude of the reduced political power for women: the presence of such legal frameworks will correlate with lesser reductions in political power.

# CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS

The estimate of the relationship between political power and private power at the country level draws from macro-analytic approaches to two fields of study: political participation and violence against women. This study will analyze the relationship between a proxy for women's level of private power, represented in the data by national IPV lifetime prevalence rates, and women's political power, represented by six proxies for gender parity and representation in national and local government.

Referring to the conceptual framework, the moderating and mediating variables through which this relationship may manifest are also included both to control for country context and to understand how the phenomena affect the relationship between IPV and political power. The effects of IPV at the individual and household level that were identified in the literature review and represented in the conceptual framework are also included as controls, while the community effects are included as both controls and interactions to assess the strength of the community-level pathway between IPV and political power.

## Data

I created a custom dataset to include the spectrum of independent, dependent, moderating, IPV causal pathways, and control variables as described above. Within the dataset, the analytic unit is the country, and 88 countries are included in the analysis based on the country-level data available for the primary IPV prevalence indicator.

The dataset selection process aimed to ensure that each country entry had data available for key dependent variables reflecting political participation and for the key independent variable of IPV prevalence. This selection process did lead to an under-representation of countries from the

regions of Middle East and North Africa and Russia and Central Asia in the dataset (Table 1) which may bias results if there are regional factors that both influence the national reporting of IPV and political power data and which also influence the incidence of IPV and political participation. However, despite the potential regional skew, the dataset does contain countries on a spectrum human development from 0.397 to 0.955 (UNDP, Human Development Index 2019).

***Table 1: Regional Distribution of Countries Included in Analysis***

| **Region** | **Obs.** |
|---|---|
| Americas | 15 |
| Asia and the Pacific | 11 |
| Europe | 31 |
| Middle East and North Africa | 2 |
| Russia and Central Asia | 2 |
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 27 |
| **Total** | **88** |

*Note: Regional designations adopted from World Bank.*

Data for this study has been extracted from a range of datasets including the Council of Foreign Relations: Women's Power Index; the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA); the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP): Human Development Index (HDI); the World Bank World Development Indicators and Governance Indicators; and the International Parliamentary Union (IPU).

## Variables

### *Dependent Variables*

Political power and participation occur on a spectrum. For this reason, the dependent variables in this model reflect women's representation in sub-national local government bodies; registered candidacy in national legislature elections; representation in national upper and/or lower

legislative bodies; whether there has been or currently is a female head of state; and broader political parity at the national government level.

Often, women's political power is reflected solely at the national level by counting the number of women parliamentarians or assessing whether there is – or has ever been - a female head of state. This approach is critiqued for its emphasis on achieving 'equality' through tokenistic policies that include quotas for women – a country policy which will still be controlled for in this study's models - but no supplementary policies or processes enabling or translating that representation into meaningful participation or political power. Additionally, the significance of attaining this gender representation at the leadership level may be obscured in a country where male and female members of dynastic families dominate the political landscape or where a parliament has no decision-making power.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Women's Power Index is a composite ranking that does account for the more 'tokenistic' head of state and parliamentary representation, but also includes local and community representation, as well as political parity. For my dataset, I broke down the composite index into its separate indicators in order to measure correlation against each form of political power. However, I ultimately omitted the 'current head of state is a woman' dummy and the 'numbers of female heads of state since 1946" from my analysis and models due to the lack of variation in values and the overall conceptual unreliability of these variables as true measures of political power.

Local representation and participation in the political process are measured by the percentage of elected seats held by women in local government bodies ("Local Legislature") and the percentage of registered candidates for national legislature elections ("National Legislature Registered Candidates". Political parity is also included and is measured on a scale of 0 to 100,

where achieving a score of 100 indicates that women have attained at least 50 percent representation in all levels of government with available data.

I supplemented the CFR Index with the OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB) measure for "Political Voice: Practice" which measures the percentage of seats in a unicameral or lower legislature body held by women. This varies slightly from the CFR Index measure of national legislature seats held by women which reflects a percentage of *combined* representation in the upper and lower legislatures where a country has a bicameral legislature system.

***Table 2: Dependent Variables in Dataset***

| ***Dependent Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| **Cabinet (%)**<br><br>*(Source: CFR: Women's Power Index, 2020)* | Percentage of ministerial positions held by women |
| **National Legislature (%)**<br><br>*(Source: CFR: Women's Power Index, 2020)* | Percentage of seats held by women in lower and upper houses of the national legislature |
| **National Legislature(s) – Registered Candidates (%)**<br><br>*(Source: CFR: Women's Power Index, 2020)* | Percentage of registered female candidates in the most recent elections to lower and upper houses of the national legislature |
| **Local Legislature (%)**<br><br>*(Source: CFR: Women's Power Index, 2020)* | Percentage of elected seats held by women in local government bodies |
| **Political Parity (0-100)**<br><br>*(Source: CFR: Women's Power Index, 2020)* | The political parity score is an aggregate measure of the representation of women in a country's government. A score of 100 represents women having at least 50 percent representation in all levels of government with available data. |
| **Political Voice: Practice (%)**<br><br>*(Source: OECD GID-DB, 2020)* | Percentage of women in the total number of representatives of the lower or single House of the Parliament. |

*Sources: CFR - Women's Power Index 2020, OECD Gender Institutions and Development Database, 2020*

### *Independent Variables*

The key independent variable indicating the start of the conceptual framework pathway and representative of the level of 'private power' being examined is national IPV prevalence. IPV prevalence measures the proportion of ever-partnered women and girls aged 15 years and older that have been subjected to physical, sexual, or psychological violence by a current or former intimate partner in the 12 months prior to collection (Goal 5, SDG, 2020).

The alternative method of measuring IPV is incidence which measures the number or rate of new cases in a population. The choice to use prevalence is based partially on the constraints of the available and consistently collected cross-national data, but also because it more closely aligns with the other measurements of population proportions used in some of the socio-demographic variables included in the model. The country IPV prevalence rates are estimated by the World Health Organization using household surveys with women and are the same metrics included in the SDG indicator database.

### *Variables: Moderators*

Other macro socioeconomic and demographic indicators were sourced for this analysis specifically to assess the two moderating factors affecting political power and intermediary effects of IPV as identified in the conceptual framework: legal frameworks and conflict and security.

The legal frameworks incorporated in the dataset are those which specifically reflect the openness of political processes to women and the redress mechanisms for violence committed against women. The OECD usefully provides data on various themes of gender equality in their Gender, Institutions and Development Database (GID-DB). Each thematic area the database

provides a “Practice”, “Law”, and “Attitudes” metric to capture different components of a theme of gender equality.

From the OECD GID-DB “Violence Against Women” (VAW) thematic area, I have included their VAW: Law indicator which is a rating of a country’s legal frameworks that do or do not protect women from domestic violence, presented as values 0, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0. These values have slightly counter-intuitive interpretations where the legal frameworks weaken along the spectrum from 0 to 1, with 1.0 indicating that there is no law offering legal protection to victims of domestic violence and a value of 0 to indicate that there is full legal protection for women against all violence with no exceptions.

Similarly, the “Political Voice” thematic area includes a measure for “Law” with a ranking of 0 to 1 which rates a country’s legal access for women to voting rights, public office candidacy and appointment, and any discrepancies in such access for women versus men such that 0 reflects a country where women equal access and rights to the political process and 1 indicates that men and women do not have the same right to vote. For reference, the OECD’s “Practice” component for the “Political Voice” thematic area is the indicator referenced and included in the set of dependent variables, as well.

Moderators for Conflict and Security were more difficult to narrow down given the breadth of study and composite data on conflict and security made available from a more conventional national defense lens. I ultimately narrowed down proxies for this moderating phenomenon to a combination of indicators that specifically capture physical security for women (Freedom of Movement: Practice reflecting women’s feeling of safety walking alone in their community) and also reflect a country’s general level of security (Homicide Rate; Political Stability with a focus on absence of violence or threat of terrorism).

***Table 3: Variables: Moderators***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| ***Legal Frameworks*** | |
| Political Voice: Law<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures whether the legal framework promotes women's equal political representation as men:<br><br>**0:** Women and men have the same rights to vote and to hold public and political office in the legislature and executive. There are special measures to promote women's political participation at the national or sub-national levels. Customary, religious and traditional laws or practices do not restrict these rights.<br>**0.25:** Women and men have the same rights to vote and to hold public and political office in the legislature and executive. There are special measures to promote women's political participation at the national or sub-national levels. However, some discriminatory customary, traditional or religious practices or laws restrict these rights.<br>**0.5:** Women and men have the same rights to vote and to hold public and political office in the legislature and executive. There are no legal quotas nor special measures nor incentives for political parties to promote women's political participation.<br>**0.75:** Women and men have the same rights to vote. However, women face discrimination against their rights to hold public and political office in the legislature or executive.<br>**1:** Women and men do not have the same rights to vote. |
| Violence Against Women: Law<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures whether the legal framework protects women from violence including intimate partner violence, rape and sexual harassment, without legal exceptions and in a comprehensive approach:<br><br>**0:** The legal framework protects women from violence including intimate partner violence, rape and sexual harassment, without any legal exceptions and in a comprehensive approach.<br>**0.25:** The legal framework protects women from violence including intimate partner violence, rape and sexual harassment, without any legal exceptions. However, the approach is not comprehensive.<br>**0.5:** The legal framework protects women from violence including intimate partner violence, rape and sexual harassment. However, some legal exceptions occur.<br>**0.75:** The legal framework protects women from some forms of violence including intimate partner violence, rape or sexual harassment but not all.<br>**1:** The legal framework does not protect women from violence nor intimate partner violence nor rape and sexual harassment. |

***Table 3. (cont.)***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| ***Conflict and Security*** | |
| Homicide Rate<br><br>*(Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2019)* | Per hundred thousand people: Intentional homicides are estimates of unlawful homicides purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups of up to several hundred members and is thus usually excluded. |
| Freedom of Movement: Practice<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Percentage of women in the total number of persons declaring not feeling safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live; Measures the gender gap in security feeling. |
| Political Stability (Absence of Violence & Terrorism)<br><br>*(Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019)* | Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism (-2.5 to 2.5). |

### *Variables: IPV Effects: Individual, Household, and Community Level*

I referred to the World Bank (World Bank, 2020) and OECD GID-DB (OECD, 2019) for data on the individual, household, and community effects of IPV – or the central section of the conceptual framework in Figure 1. These variables include the individual level health and economic outcomes for women, health outcomes for children, and community effects that capture harmful gendered practices and community gender norms and attitudes. The variables, detailed in Table 4, capture the range of IPV effects within the conceptual framework as a primary concern but were also selected over other possible proxies due to the ways in which these particular metrics may interact with women's political capabilities in society, where appropriate.

***Table 4: Individual, Family, and Community Effects of IPV***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| ***IPV Effects: Individual*** | |
| Maternal Mortality Ratio<br><br>*(Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2019)* | Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births): the number of women who die from pregnancy-related causes while pregnant or within 42 days of pregnancy termination per 100,000 live births. |
| Women's Access to Financial Institutions (%)<br><br>*(Source: OECD GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures the prevalence of women among bank account owners: percentage of women in the total number of people aged 15 years and above who have an account at a financial institution (by themselves or together with someone else). |
| Estimated Earned Income, Female ($)<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Estimated earned income (PPP US$), female |
| Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (%)<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the female population ages 15 and older that is economically active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. |
| Wage and Salaried Workers, Female (%)<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | Wage and salaried workers, female (% of female employment): wage and salaried workers (employees) are those workers who hold the type of jobs defined as "paid employment jobs," where the incumbents hold explicit (written or oral) or implicit employment contracts that give them a basic remuneration that is not directly dependent upon the revenue of the unit for which they work. |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female (%)<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | Vulnerable employment, female (% of female employment): Vulnerable employment is contributing family workers and own-account workers as a percentage of total employment. |
| Reproductive Autonomy, Unmet Contraceptive Need (%)<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures prevalence of unmet need for FP: percentage of currently married or in-union women of reproductive age (15-49) who want to stop or delay childbearing but are not using any method of contraception. |
| ***IPV Effects: Household/Family*** | |
| Under-Five Mortality (per 1,000)<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year. |
| Neonatal Mortality Ratio (per 1,000)<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | Neonatal mortality rate is the number of neonates dying before reaching 28 days of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. |

***Table 4. (cont.)***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000)<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | Infant mortality rate is the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. |
| Child Marriage (%)<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures the prevalence of girl child marriage: percentage of girls aged 15-19 years ever married, divorced, widowed or in an informal union. |
| ***IPV Effects: Community*** | |
| Access to Justice: Judicial Confidence (%)<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures the gender gap in trust feeling in the judiciary: percentage of women in the total number of persons declaring not having confidence in the judicial system and courts of their country. |
| Violence Against Women: Attitude (%)<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures the social acceptability of domestic violence: percentage of women aged 15–49 years who consider a husband to be justified in hitting or beating his wife for at least one of the specified reasons, i.e., if his wife burns the food, argues with him, goes out without telling him, neglects the children or refuses sexual relations. |
| Missing Women: Ratio of males versus females, age 0-4<br><br>*(Source: OECD: GID-DB, 2019)* | Measures whether the population has a preference for sons over daughters: Sex ratio (number of males per 100 females) for the age group 0-4. |

***Control Variables***

The additional control variables included in each model reflect the sociodemographic characteristics of each country and of electoral systems and voter turnout. The full list is available in Appendix: Annex 1 and the variables were sourced from the World Bank (World Bank, 2020), United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Index (UNDP: HDI, 2019), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2021), and the International Parliamentary Union (IPU, 2021).

While including sociodemographic characteristics as country controls is fairly common practice for macro-level country analyses, the addition of a national and subnational gender quota dummy variable and voting turnout is unique to this study. Some countries institute percentage reservations or legal quotas that require a certain percentage of electoral seats to be held by women. As has already been mentioned, such quotas are controversial, and for the purpose of this study they may also artificially inflate political representation as measured by my dependent variables. There was little correlation (<0.15, see Table 14 in Appendix) between quotas (IDEA, IPU, Stockholm University, 2021) and the OECD Political Voice: Law variable, indicating that the additional information on legal frameworks beyond quotas captured in the OECD indicator differentiated it from the simple binary measure of whether a country does or does not have a constitutional or legal quota for women in national and subnational legislatures.

**Methodology**

This study aims to test whether IPV relates to women's political power across a subset of 88 countries, and whether that relationship is moderated by legal frameworks and/or conflict and security within a country. The study will also include models which explore further the causal pathways that may offer the strongest explanation or bridge between IPV and political power as proposed by the conceptual framework in Figure 1.

As mentioned in the literature review, IPV prevalence is typically explored qualitatively and at the individual level, versus at a macro country level analysis, and IPV is rarely explored alongside political representation as an independent variable of interest. Due to the layers within my conceptual framework, the relative newness of this approach, and the limitation of only having

point-in-time data for IPV consistently available, I elected to use a stepwise OLS regression approach.

I will use three models for each proposed dependent variable, using the base equations as below.

$$[1]\ \hat{Y}_{1\text{-}6} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IPV\_Prev + \beta_2(Moderators: ConfSec) + \beta_3(Moderators: Law) + \beta_4(IPV\_Indiv/HH/Comm\ FX) + X + \hat{e}$$

$$[2]\ \hat{Y}_{1\text{-}6} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IPV\_Prev + \beta_2(Moderators: ConfSec) + \beta_3(Moderators: Law) + \beta_4(IPV\_Indiv/HH/Comm\ FX) + \beta_5(IPV\_Prev*Moderators: ConfSec) + \beta_6(IPV\_Prev*Moderators: Law) + X + \hat{e}$$

$$[3]\ \hat{Y}_{1\text{-}6} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 IPV\_Prev + \beta_2(Moderators: ConfSec) + \beta_3(Moderators: Law) + \beta_4(IPV\_Indiv/HH/Comm\ FX) + \beta_7(IPV\_Prev*\ IPV\_Comm\ FX) + X + \hat{e}$$

Within this set of models, $\hat{Y}_{1\text{-}6}$ indicates the unit of change for the series of 'political power' dependent variables in Table 2, measured as a percentage point change for the political power of women in each country.

*IPV_Prev* is the primary independent variable of interest: intimate partner violence prevalence. The moderators are reflected as *ConfSec* and *Law* as controls in Model [1] as a baseline regression, which also includes the IPV individual, household/family, and community effects as controls (*IPV_Indiv/HH/Comm FX*), and the country level sociodemographic controls [*X*]. Model [2] adds the moderators as interaction terms and Model [3] retains the moderators as controls and instead adds the interaction term (*IPV_Prev* IPV_Comm FX*) to observe trends in the community-level causal pathway between IPV and political power.

Due to the variation in consistency of data collected across all 88 countries, the number of observations for controls and independent variables of interest also varied. If I had used an OLS

approach without adjusting for missing data, many countries would have been dropped entirely from the regression. While the data is technically missing at random (MAR) based on the missing data summary, there is still an associated risk of bias in dropping those countries entirely due to possible shared characteristics amongst countries that do or do not have more robust data collection and reporting practices.

To mitigate this possibility, I conducted a multiple imputation within Stata, using an MVN algorithm to create 10 imputed datasets, before running the five models above for each of the six dependent variables. While not ideal, I also imputed data for two of the dependent variables – women's representation in local legislatures and the percentage of women candidates in national legislature elections. This introduces some uncertainty into the models that use these two proxies as the dependent variable, but it is not uncommon and may still offer comparative results against the other four proxies which did not require imputation.

## CHAPTER 5: RESULTS

In Table 5 below, I provide the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum value of each variable of interest within this dataset.

***Table 5: Descriptive Statistics***

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | St. Dev. | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Dependent Variables* | | | | | |
| Cabinet Positions Held By Women (%) | 87 | 25.64 | 15.33 | 0 | 66.67 |
| Upper & Lower National Legislature Seats Held By Women (%) | 88 | 26.20 | 11.41 | 0 | 55.66 |
| Registered Female Candidates for National Legislature(s) (%) | 54 | 26.52 | 10.79 | 5.68 | 46.92 |
| Seats Held By Women: Local Govt Bodies (%) | 66 | 27.98 | 10.54 | 2.8 | 50.47 |
| Political Parity | 88 | 31.20 | 15.62 | 3.6 | 69.6 |
| Lower/Single National Legislature Seats Held by Women (%) | 87 | 24.81 | 11.71 | 2.5 | 61.3 |
| *Independent Variable of Interest* | | | | | |
| IPV Prevalence | 87 | 28.42 | 13.79 | 8.2 | 78 |
| *Moderating Variables: Legal Frameworks* | | | | | |
| Political Voice: Law | 88 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0 | 0.75 |
| Violence Against Women: Law | 88 | 0.57 | 0.22 | 0.25 | 1.0 |
| *Moderating Variables: Conflict & Security* | | | | | |
| Homicide Rate | 80 | 6.75 | 10.44 | 0.27 | 52.02 |
| Freedom of Movement: Practice | 83 | 63.78 | 9.94 | 36 | 91.1 |
| Political Stability/Absence of Violence & Terrorism | 88 | (-0.16) | 0.89 | (-2.65) | 1.36 |
| *IPV Effect: Individual* | | | | | |
| Maternal Mortality Ratio | 88 | 191.97 | 254.88 | 2 | 1,140 |
| Reproductive Autonomy, Unmet Contraceptive Need | 86 | 16.28 | 8.61 | 4 | 39.1 |
| Women's Access to Financial Services (%) | 85 | 45.90 | 6.48 | 21.8 | 55.5 |
| Estimated Earned Income, Female | 85 | 7,782.89 | 8,753 | 191 | 30,976 |
| Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (%) | 88 | 55.61 | 14.08 | 14.40 | 83.95 |
| Wage and Salaried Workers, Female (%) | 88 | 53.09 | 32.34 | 1.05 | 97.7 |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female (%) | 88 | 44.94 | 32.60 | 1.58 | 98.77 |
| *IPV Effect: Household and Family* | | | | | |
| Under-Five Mortality (per 1,000) | 88 | 31.14 | 30.64 | 2.1 | 117.2 |
| Neonatal Mortality Ratio (per 1,000) | 88 | 13.58 | 10.77 | 1.1 | 39.7 |
| Child Marriage (%) | 88 | 13.66 | 12.77 | 0 | 60.9 |
| Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000) | 88 | 23.16 | 20.95 | 1.7 | 81 |
| *IPV Effect: Community* | | | | | |
| Access to Justice: Judicial Confidence (%) | 83 | 51.60 | 8.61 | 23.2 | 68.1 |
| Violence Against Women: Attitudes | 88 | 26.69 | 22.99 | 0 | 80.2 |
| Missing Women: Sex Ratio | 88 | 104.53 | 2.54 | 100.2 | 115.2 |

*Source: OECD Gender, Institutions, and Development Database; World Bank; World Governance Indicators; Council on Foreign Relations Women's Power Index; UNDP: Human Development Index*

My initial results indicate that an increase in IPV prevalence is positively correlated with various measures of women's political power, when controlling for other variables in the model, such that an increase in IPV prevalence by one percentage point would result in an increase in women's political power by varying magnitudes. The relationship between IPV prevalence and women's political power emerges in these models as largely *not* statistically significant across the six proxies and three models. The exceptions are in Model [1] for *National Legislature*, with a positive coefficient of 0.322, and *Local Legislature*, with a positive coefficient of 0.376, both of which are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

***Table 6: Coefficients and Significance Levels for IPV Prevalence in Models 1-3 for all Political Power Proxies***

| **Dependent Variable** | **[1]** | **[2]** | **[3]** |
|---|---|---|---|
| **CABINET (%)** | -0.160<br>(0.425) | -0.901<br>(0.732) | 1.806<br>(0.851) |
| **NATIONAL LEGISLATURE (%)** | **0.322**<br>**(0.018)**** | 2.150<br>(0.324) | 1.327<br>(0.800) |
| **NATIONAL LEGISLATURE: REGISTERED CANDIDATES (%)** | 0.037<br>(0.874) | 0.936<br>(0.648) | 1.327<br>(0.800) |
| **LOCAL LEGISLATURE (%)** | **0.376**<br>**(0.073)***** | 3.359<br>(0.110) | 0.781<br>(0.915) |
| **POLITICAL PARITY** | 0.174<br>(0.383) | 2.376<br>(0.310) | 0.128<br>(0.987) |
| **POLITICAL VOICE: PRACTICE (%)** | 0.246<br>(0.103) | 2.131<br>(0.329) | 2.038<br>(0.713) |

**Full results and output for each model are available upon request from author.*
***p<0.05 ***p<0.10*

In fact, the only instances where this relationship is negative – where an increase in IPV prevalence is correlated to a decline in women's political power – can be seen in Models [1] and [2] where the political power proxy is Cabinet representation. Neither coefficient is statistically significant, and the sign reverts to positive in Model [3] when community interactions are included.

Cabinet representation is also the only dependent variable for which the sign for the IPV prevalence coefficient changes across models, as the coefficient remains positive across all other models for the five other proxies. Since the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively small - ranging from -0.160 to 1.806 -and it is not statistically significant, it is likely that this is simply due to uncertainty or that this merely reflects that there is, in fact, no relationship between IPV prevalence and Cabinet representation. Table 6 outlines the coefficients and statistical significance for IPV prevalence across dependent variables and models in further detail.

***Table 7: Model 1-3 Results with 'Cabinet' as Dependent Variable***

| **CABINET (%)** | **MODEL 1** | **MODEL 2** | **MODEL 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| IPV Prevalence (%) | -0.16 | -0.90 | 1.81 |
| ***Moderators: Legal Frameworks*** | | | |
| Political Voice: Law | -16.27 | 26.02 | -24.17*** |
| Violence Against Women: Law | 6.13 | 21.62 | 6.08 |
| ***Moderators: Conflict and Security*** | | | |
| Homicide Rate | -0.07 | -1.23 | -0.13 |
| Freedom of Movement, Women | 0.12 | -0.71 | -0.06 |
| Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism | -3.77 | -16.02 | -6.48 |
| ***IPV Effects: Individual*** | | | |
| Maternal Mortality | 0.01 | <0.01 | 0.01 |
| Access to Financial Institutions | -1.25** | -1.62*** | -1.00 |
| Est. Earned Income, Female ($) | <0.01 | <0.01*** | <0.01 |
| Labor Force Participation, Female | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.31 |
| Waged/Salaried Employment, Female | 1.12 | -0.67 | 1.46 |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female | 0.94 | -0.96 | 1.26 |
| Reproductive Autonomy: Unmet Contraceptive Need | 0.71 | 0.01 | 0.36 |
| ***IPV Effects: Household/Family*** | | | |
| Under-Five Mortality | -0.38 | -0.01 | -0.68 |
| Neonatal Mortality | -1.04 | 0.37 | -1.05 |
| Infant Mortality | 0.41 | -0.39 | 0.95 |
| Child Marriage | 0.33 | -0.04 | 0.15 |
| ***IPV Effects: Community*** | | | |
| Access to Justice | 0.04 | -0.02 | <0.01 |
| Violence Against Women: Attitude | 0.02 | 0.36 | 0.31 |
| Missing Women | -1.70 | -0.35 | -0.31 |
| ***Interactions Terms: Moderators*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence *Political Voice: Law | | -1.72 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Law | | -0.79 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Homicide | | 0.04 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Freedom of Movement | | 0.03 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Political Stability | | 0.28 | |
| ***Interaction Terms: IPV Effects - Community*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence * Access to Justice | | | 0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Attitude | | | -0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Missing Women | | | -0.02 |
| ***N*** | 86 | 74 | 81 |

**p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10*

*Sources: World Bank Database; OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database; World Governance Index; Council on Foreign Relations Women's Power Index*

***Table 8: Model 1-3 Results with 'National Legislature' as Dependent Variable***

| **National Legislature (%)** | **MODEL 1** | **MODEL 2** | **MODEL 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| IPV Prevalence (%) | 0.32** | 2.15 | 1.33 |
| ***Moderators: Legal Frameworks*** | | | |
| Political Voice: Law | 5.51 | 2.04 | 6.68 |
| Violence Against Women: Law | -14.75** | -21.49 | -14.66 |
| Maternal Mortality | <0.01 | 0.02 | -0.01 |
| Access to Financial Institutions | 0.18 | 0.70 | 0.13 |
| ***Moderators: Conflict and Security*** | | | |
| Homicide Rate | -0.21 | -0.59 | -0.17 |
| Freedom of Movement, Women | 0.33 | 1.21 | 0.36 |
| Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism | -2.28 | 2.08 | -2.01 |
| ***IPV: Individual Effects*** | | | |
| Est. Earned Income, Female ($) | <0.01 | <0.01 | <0.01 |
| Labor Force Participation, Female | 0.36** | 0.10 | 0.36 |
| Waged/Salaried Employment, Female | 0.87 | 2.39 | 0.52 |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female | 0.71 | 2.57 | 0.43 |
| Reproductive Autonomy: Unmet Contraceptive Need | 1.01** | 1.67** | 1.10** |
| ***IPV: Household/Family Effects*** | | | |
| Under-Five Mortality | 0.36 | 0.52 | 0.74 |
| Neonatal Mortality | 0.13 | 0.31 | 0.10 |
| Infant Mortality | -0.81 | -1.29 | -1.20 |
| Child Marriage | 0.36 | 0.50 | 0.29 |
| ***IPV: Community Effects*** | | | |
| Access to Justice | -0.10 | 0.07 | 0.31 |
| Violence Against Women: Attitude | -0.25 | -0.58 | -0.44 |
| Missing Women | 1.33 | 1.11 | 1.17 |
| ***Interaction Terms: Moderators*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence *Political Voice: Law | | 0.23 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Law | | 0.35 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Homicide | | 0.02 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Freedom of Movement | | -0.04 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Political Stability | | 0.06 | |
| ***Interaction Terms: IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence * Access to Justice | | | -0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Attitude | | | 0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Missing Women | | | -0.01 |
| ***N*** | 87 | 75 | 82 |

**p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10*

*Sources: World Bank Database; OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database; World Governance Index; Council on Foreign Relations Women's Power Index*

***Table 9: Model 1-3 Results with 'National Legislature - Registered Candidates' as Dependent Variable***

| **National Legislature – Registered Candidates (%)** | **MODEL 1** | **MODEL 2** | **MODEL 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| IPV Prevalence (%) | 0.037 | 0.94 | 1.33 |
| ***Moderators: Legal Frameworks*** | | | |
| Political Voice: Law | 5.41 | -0.11 | 6.68 |
| Violence Against Women: Law | -9.53 | -18.05 | -14.66*** |
| ***Moderators: Conflict and Security*** | | | |
| Homicide Rate | -0.11 | -1.04 | -0.17 |
| Freedom of Movement, Women | -0.04 | 0.70 | 0.36 |
| Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism | 0.49 | 11.43 | -2.01 |
| ***IPV Individual Effects*** | | | |
| Maternal Mortality | -0.02 | <0.01 | <0.01 |
| Access to Financial Institutions | -0.25 | 0.35 | 0.13 |
| Est. Earned Income, Female ($) | <0.01 | <0.01 | <0.01 |
| Labor Force Participation, Female | 0.33 | 0.06 | 0.36 |
| Waged/Salaried Employment, Female | 0.56 | 3.06 | 0.52 |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female | 0.51 | 3.16 | 0.43 |
| Reproductive Autonomy: Unmet Contraceptive Need | 0.06 | 0.63 | 1.10** |
| ***IPV Household/Family Effects*** | | | |
| Under-Five Mortality | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.74 |
| Neonatal Mortality | -0.07 | -0.77 | 0.10 |
| Infant Mortality | -0.25 | -0.08 | -1.20 |
| Child Marriage | 0.18 | 0.35 | 0.29 |
| ***IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| Access to Justice | 0.15 | 0.22 | 0.31 |
| Violence Against Women: Attitude | 0.03 | -0.39 | -0.44 |
| Missing Women | 0.74 | 1.75 | 1.17 |
| ***Interaction Terms: Moderators*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence *Political Voice: Law | | 0.37 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Law | | 0.27 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Homicide | | 0.04 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Freedom of Movement | | -0.03 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Political Stability | | -0.23 | |
| ***Interaction Terms: IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence * Access to Justice | | | -0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Attitude | | | 0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Missing Women | | | -0.01 |
| ***N*** | 87 | 75 | 82 |

**p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10*

*Sources: World Bank Database; OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database; World Governance Index; Council on Foreign Relations Women's Power Index*

***Table 10: Model 1-3 Results with 'Local Legislature' as Dependent Variable***

| **Local Legislature (%)** | **MODEL 1** | **MODEL 2** | **MODEL 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| IPV Prevalence (%) | 0.38*** | **3.36** | **0.78** |
| ***Moderators: Legal Frameworks*** | | | |
| Political Voice: Law | 2.00 | -26.58 | 3.85 |
| Violence Against Women: Law | -11.21 | -24.33 | -11.60 |
| ***Moderators: Conflict and Security*** | | | |
| Homicide Rate | -0.09 | -0.14 | -0.01 |
| Freedom of Movement, Women | 0.43 | 1.90** | 0.43 |
| Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism | 0.29 | 5.43 | -0.17 |
| ***IPV Individual Effects*** | | | |
| Maternal Mortality | -0.01 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| Access to Financial Institutions | 0.54 | 1.25*** | 0.44 |
| Est. Earned Income, Female ($) | <0.01 | <0.01 | <0.01 |
| Labor Force Participation, Female | 0.30 | 0.04 | 0.26 |
| Waged/Salaried Employment, Female | -0.67 | 1.65 | -1.14 |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female | -0.93 | 1.81 | -1.26 |
| ***IPV Household/Family Effects*** | | | |
| Reproductive Autonomy: Unmet Contraceptive Need | 0.83 | 1.79** | 1.05*** |
| Under-Five Mortality | 0.29 | 0.43 | 0.80 |
| Neonatal Mortality | -0.32 | -0.79 | 0.04 |
| Infant Mortality | -0.29 | -0.47 | -1.15 |
| Child Marriage | 0.38 | 0.58*** | 0.31 |
| ***IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| Access to Justice | -0.23 | 0.04 | 0.57 |
| Violence Against Women: Attitude | -0.11 | -0.58*** | -0.01 |
| Missing Women | 0.70 | -0.20 | 0.03 |
| ***Interaction Terms: Moderators*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence *Political Voice: Law | | 1.23 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Law | | 0.68 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Homicide | | 0.02 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Freedom of Movement | | -0.07*** | |
| IPV Prevalence * Political Stability | | 0.01 | |
| ***Interaction Terms: IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence * Access to Justice | | | -0.03 |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Attitude | | | <0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Missing Women | | | 0.01 |
| ***N*** | 87 | 75 | 82 |

**p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10*

*Sources: World Bank Database; OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database; World Governance Index; Council on Foreign Relations Women's Power Index*

***Table 11:Model 1-3 Results with 'Political Parity' as Dependent Variable***

| **Political Parity** | **MODEL 1** | **MODEL 2** | **MODEL 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| IPV Prevalence (%) | 0.17 | 2.38 | 0.13 |
| ***Moderators: Legal Frameworks*** | | | |
| Political Voice: Law | 0.94 | 22.67 | -1.74 |
| Violence Against Women: Law | -15.76 | -15.60 | -15.70 |
| ***Moderators: Conflict and Security*** | | | |
| Homicide Rate | -0.21 | -0.96 | -0.15 |
| Freedom of Movement, Women | 0.38 | 1.14 | 0.32 |
| Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism | -4.26 | -3.65 | -5.09 |
| ***IPV Individual Effects*** | | | |
| Maternal Mortality | 0.01 | 0.02 | <0.01 |
| Access to Financial Institutions | -0.31 | 0.09 | -0.46 |
| Est. Earned Income, Female ($) | <0.01 | <0.01 | <0.01 |
| Labor Force Participation, Female | 0.49 | 0.19 | 0.35 |
| Waged/Salaried Employment, Female | 1.21 | 2.59 | 1.09 |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female | 1.05 | 2.78 | 1.044 |
| Reproductive Autonomy: Unmet Contraceptive Need | 1.37** | 2.03** | 1.46** |
| ***IPV Household/Family Effects*** | | | |
| Under-Five Mortality | -0.19 | -0.12 | 0.04 |
| Neonatal Mortality | -0.56 | -0.21 | -0.40 |
| Infant Mortality | 0.09 | -0.27 | -0.21 |
| Child Marriage | 0.55*** | 0.56 | 0.42 |
| ***IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| Access to Justice | -0.04 | 0.05 | 0.70 |
| Violence Against Women: Attitude | -0.30 | -0.52 | -0.08 |
| Missing Women | 0.88 | 1.58 | 0.78 |
| ***Interaction Terms: Moderators*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence *Political Voice: Law | | -0.76 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Law | | -0.08 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Homicide | | 0.04 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Freedom of Movement | | -0.03 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Political Stability | | 0.13 | |
| ***Interaction Terms: IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence * Access to Justice | | | -0.02 |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Attitude | | | -0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Missing Women | | | 0.01 |
| ***N*** | 87 | 75 | 82 |

**p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10*

*Sources: World Bank Database; OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database; World Governance Index; Council on Foreign Relations Women's Power Index*

***Table 12: Model 1-3 Results with 'Political Voice: Practice' as Dependent Variable***

| **Political Voice: Practice (%)** | **MODEL 1** | **MODEL 2** | **MODEL 3** |
|---|---|---|---|
| IPV Prevalence (%) | 0.25*** | 2.13 | 2.04 |
| ***Moderators: Legal Frameworks*** | | | |
| Political Voice: Law | 0.43 | -5.28 | -0.86 |
| Violence Against Women: Law | -12.70 | -15.89 | -11.77 |
| ***Moderators: Conflict and Security*** | | | |
| Homicide Rate | -0.20 | -0.37 | -0.17 |
| Freedom of Movement, Women | 0.38*** | 1.21 | 0.39 |
| Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism | -0.17 | 3.11 | -0.18 |
| ***IPV Individual Effects*** | | | |
| Maternal Mortality | 0.01 | 0.02 | <0.01 |
| Access to Financial Institutions | 0.34 | 0.81 | 0.26 |
| Est. Earned Income, Female ($) | <0.01 | <0.01 | <0.01 |
| Labor Force Participation, Female | 0.47** | 0.18 | 0.39 |
| Waged/Salaried Employment, Female | 1.15 | 2.63 | 1.08 |
| Vulnerable Employment, Female | 1.15 | 2.98 | 1.17 |
| Reproductive Autonomy: Unmet Contraceptive Need | 1.20* | 1.63** | 1.24** |
| ***IPV Household/Family Effects*** | | | |
| Under-Five Mortality | 0.37 | 0.54 | 0.61 |
| Neonatal Mortality | 0.32 | 0.45 | 0.36 |
| Infant Mortality | -0.96 | -1.34 | -1.19 |
| Child Marriage | 0.42*** | 0.48 | 0.36 |
| ***IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| Access to Justice | -0.03 | 0.14 | 0.42 |
| Violence Against Women: Attitude | -0.27 | -0.44 | -0.22 |
| Missing Women | 0.37 | 0.15 | 0.59 |
| ***Interaction Term: Moderators*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence *Political Voice: Law | | 0.21 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Law | | 0.23 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Homicide | | 0.01 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Freedom of Movement | | -0.04 | |
| IPV Prevalence * Political Stability | | 0.05 | |
| ***Interaction Terms: IPV Community Effects*** | | | |
| IPV Prevalence * Access to Justice | | | <0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Violence Against Women: Attitude | | | <0.01 |
| IPV Prevalence * Missing Women | | | -0.01 |
| ***N*** | 87 | 75 | 82 |

**p<0.01 **p<0.05 ***p<0.10*

*Sources: World Bank Database; OECD Gender, Institutions and Development Database; World Governance Index; Council on Foreign Relations Women's Power Index*

Across the three models and six political power proxies, *Violence Against Women (VAW): Law* is negatively correlated with women's political power in every model except for the three *Cabinet* models. *VAW: Law* measures the strength of legal frameworks protecting women from domestic violence (0 – full protection, 1 – no protections), so a negative coefficient in this instance implies that as protections for women weaken, or move from 0 to 1, their political power drops, holding other effects in the model constant.

The negative relationship is only statistically significant in two models: *National Legislature*: Model [1] with a coefficient of -14.75 and in *National Legislature: Registered Candidates* Model [3] with a coefficient of -14.66. But there is consistency in the negative relationship and the larger magnitude of the coefficient for *VAW: Law* across models and dependent variables indicating that when women are not protected against violence then there is a substantial correlated drop in their percentage point representation at various levels.

The VAW legal framework was not statistically significant in Model 2 for any political power proxy, nor was its IPV interaction term. After post-test estimation using *mi* tests to confirm the regression results, there did not appear a statistically significant instance where the relationship between *VAW: Law* and political power varied by IPV prevalence.

The other moderating legal framework included is *Political Voice: Law*, which measures the strength of laws that protect women's participation in the political process. It ranges from 0 which indicates fully equal access to the political process and special measures for women through 0.25, 0.5, and 1 which indicates that women do not have equal rights to vote.

The only statistically significant in Model [3] for *Cabinet* representation with a coefficient of -24.17. Therefore, the statistically significant relationship between *Political Voice: Law* and

*Cabinet* in *Cabinet* [3] indicates that when women do not have equal access to the political process under the law, their representation in ministerial positions is reduced by about 25 percentage points.

Across all models and political power proxies, the *Political Voice: Law* (OECD: GID Database) coefficient was more inconsistent in magnitude and coefficient signs making it harder to draw any conclusions regarding the trends. However, since the *Political Voice: Law* legal frameworks affect political institutions and processes to varying degrees – depending on whether or not a public institution's representatives are chosen by voters, for example - it would be understandable that some of the political power proxies are more responsive to the strength of these frameworks than others. However, it is interesting that the dependent variable in the model in which *Political Voice: Law* was statistically significant was *Cabinet*, since typically ministerial positions are not considered politically representative bodies and citizens do not typically vote for the members in these positions.

The third moderator that emerged as statistically significant in the models was *Freedom of Movement* (OECD: GID Database) which measures the percentage of women in the total number of persons declaring not feeling safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live. *Freedom of Movement* was statistically significant in *Local Legislature* [2] and *Political Voice: Practice* [1]. Both coefficients are positive and relatively small. Interestingly, the interaction term for *Freedom of Movement* was also statistically significant in *Local Legislature* [2] and was negative.

A *mi* post-test estimate for *Local Legislature* [2] shows that the phenomenon of *Freedom of Movement* is positively correlated with political power, in the instances where the relationship is statistically significant. This implies that a percentage point increase in the gender gap of feeling

secure walking alone – or more women than men feel unsafe - is correlated with a percentage point increase in local legislature and lower/single legislature representation, holding other IPV effects, moderators, and sociodemographic controls constant.

Across models, the only IPV: Community Effect proxy having a statistically significant relationship is *Violence Against Women: Attitude* which measures the social acceptability of violence against women. In *Local Legislature* [2], *VAW: Attitude* has a coefficient of -0.58 indicating that a percentage point increase in the women that believe that their husbands are justified in beating them for a specified reason is correlated with a half point percentage reduction in women's representation in local legislatures, holding other effects in the model constant.

Another variable emerging as having a consistently positive, statistically significant relationship with political power was the IPV individual effect of *Reproductive Autonomy*, measured by unmet contraceptive need. The implication of this trend across models is that an increase in a country's unmet contraceptive need for women by one percentage point is associated with a one to two percentage point increase in women's political power, holding constant other IPV effects, moderators, and controls.

An increase in women's labor force participation was also frequently shown to be associated with an increase in women's political power, and particularly for national legislatures where the relationship was statistically significant. The magnitude of this relationship is only about one third to one half of a percentage point.

Finally, an increase in child marriage rates, an IPV household effect, also emerged as statistically significant and positively correlated with women's representation in national and local legislatures. However, the magnitude indicated that an increase in the percentage of child

marriages is associated with an increase of one third to one half of a percentage points in representation. The magnitude of this relationship is similar to the one between women's labor force participation and political power.

# CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION

In reviewing the results, some initial observations can be drawn regarding the three hypotheses set forth in the Conceptual Framework section.

**Hypothesis 1: Higher intimate partner violence rates are associated with less political power for women.**

Interestingly, this hypothesis was not affirmed by the models used in this study. In fact, all of the statistically significant relationships between *IPV Prevalence* and women's political power proxies were positive at magnitudes of (0.322) and (0.376). This implies that an increase in *IPV Prevalence* by one percentage point is correlated with about one third of a percentage point increase in the respective women's political power proxy.

However, the magnitude of the statistically significant coefficients for *IPV prevalence* is fairly small relative to other statistically significant variables. For this reason, it may be that the underreporting bias is at play. It is possible that there is an upward bias on the IPV coefficient such that it is just barely being pushed over the number line into positivity where in fact, a negative relationship may exist.

It may also be possible that the MAIHDA study's 'backlash' effect is at play, where increases in women's political power do, in fact, lead to more violence against women. The 'backlash' effect typically indicates an environment where political representation of women or gender equality policies are outpacing the change in gender norms at the community and societal level.

Regardless, the models reflected in this analysis cannot confirm this hypothesis and instead indicate the inverse: higher IPV prevalence is associated with higher political power for women.

**Hypothesis 2: The moderating factor of country conflict will impact the magnitude of the associated reduction in political power: an increased presence of conflict will correlate with greater reductions in political power.**

This study cannot decisively confirm this hypothesis based on the data and results available here. The results indicate two instances where conflict and security indicators are statistically significant, both for *Freedom of Movement,* and the relationship was positive rather than negative as hypothesized. This implies that an increase in the gender gap of feeling secure walking alone in one's neighborhood, with women feeling more insecure than men, was correlated with increased representation in the national and local legislatures, when controlling for legal frameworks and the individual, household, and community effects of IPV.

In *Local Legislatures* [2], the insecurity proxy of *Freedom of Movement* and its interaction with IPV was statistically significant implying that there may be a moderating effect. However, while this interaction did yield a higher magnitude relationship between IPV and political power, post-test estimation showed that the relationship became 'more positive' and therefore does not support this hypothesis that the moderating effect would reduce political power.

While this finding is inconsistent with my original hypothesis that increased levels of insecurity in a country exacerbates IPV and decreases political power for women, the results support an alternative theory that gender quotas and a shift in the social order may actually be easier in post-conflict societies (Tripp, 2016; Buss and Ali, 2017). This alternate theory posits that women can make gains in political representation in post-conflict societies, which would be reflected as less 'secure', due to the reduction in the male population during armed conflict, which may lead to shifts in gender norms as women take over as heads of household, and/or due to the increased space in the political process of reconstruction to establish quotas.

Thus, while the literature and conceptual framework supported my hypothesis regarding conflict and security, the lack of statistical significance for most of the conflict and security moderators and the unexpected positive coefficient for *Freedom of Movement,* may indicate that post-conflict reconstruction and gender quotas blur the causal pathways and any link between the community effects of IPV and political power.

**Hypothesis 3: Legal frameworks that support women's voting rights and prohibit IPV are correlated with lesser reductions in political power.**

This hypothesis also cannot be definitely affirmed by the results, but there is the most evidence supporting this hypothesis over the prior two hypotheses. As a reminder, *Political Voice: Law* measures the equality of women's access and rights to the political process on a continuum from 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.5, 0.75, and 1.0 with 0 indicating same rights, no discriminatory norms, and special measures for women's participation, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and through to 1 indicating that men and women do not have the same right to vote. *VAW: Law* measures the legal protection for women against violence on the same continuum (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0) with 0 indicating full protection for women against all types of violence, and along the spectrum exceptions are made legally or some violence is excluded from the legal framework, through 1.0 which indicates that women have no protection from violence under the law.

In the instances where the Political Voice and VAW legal frameworks have a statistically significant relationship, there is a strong relationship between worsening legal protections and reduced political power for women when controlling for country characteristics and IPV individual, household, and community effects in the model. Interaction terms are not significant for legal frameworks, where included in Model [2] across political proxies, indicating that the

strength of the relationship between the legal frameworks and political power may not depend on or vary by IPV prevalence.

**Policy Implications**

This study set out to explore the relationship between IPV prevalence and women's political power and set forth hypotheses based in the assumptions that violence and its immediate effects on women would reduce their agency and capacity to engage in the political sphere. Instead, the results and the positive relationship between IPV prevalence and women's political power imply that there remains a disconnect between the political power or representation that women may have achieved thus far and their intimate daily experiences.

This paper used a socio-ecological and continuum of power approach to examining violence against women. The results offer policy implications for the debate around gender quotas in politics and possible tokenism of women in the public or political sphere that may result from an over-reliance on quotas to reach equal representation (Jaquette, 1997).

The Nordic Paradox mentioned in the literature review is not the only gender equality paradox of relevance to this study. For example, Turkey's laws enshrining equality for women at the public institution level are relatively strong, particularly in enshrining business leadership quotas for women. However, the country has seen a rise in honor killings, and femicide writ large, even as these laws were instituted in the early 2000s (Petersen, 2018).

This trend speaks to the 'backlash' effect highlighted in the MAIHDA study and the risks of instituting leadership quotas without shifts in attitudes or concerted efforts to improve gender norms in the country. As Çiçek Tahaoğlu, editor of the "Bianet" website which tracks gender issues, notes in the Petersen article, "The solution is, first, we have to start seeing women as equals

– that is the first step that has not happened in Turkey. Without doing that, everything else is artificial and ineffective." She notes that the shift from a liberal government to the more conservative regime under President Erdoğan as a notable weakening of the policy approach accompanying the equality laws.

Previously, the Turkish government made concerted efforts to change the minds of people and achieve social change that matched the legal frameworks of the country. Without those supplemental social change efforts and an extension of legal frameworks from representation quotas to legal redress for women experiencing violence, overall outcomes for women at a personal level are less likely to match the pace at which they are achieving political representation.

Additionally, the results from this study offer insights into the ways in which rapid increases in political representation in post-conflict societies may skew the moderating effect of conflict and security on IPV and political power. Rwanda is often touted for its representation of women in Parliament, which is the highest in the world at 61% (Thornton, 2019). However, prior to the civil war in the 1990s, women's representation was only 18%, indicating a roughly forty percentage point increase over twenty years.

Despite the notably high representation of women in Rwanda's Parliament, this representation has yet to translate to actual power within the authoritarian government where women's issues are only permitted a platform when they align with the ruling party interests. In fact, the increase in political representation has paralleled a repression of women's civil society movements as civil society spaces close and movement leaders are elected to Parliament and silenced by the regime (Burnet, 2008).

The key policy implication for those organizations and individuals dedicated to gender equality is that while feminist theory may have deemed the personal to be political, the current strategies for achieving women's equality have yet to make the political personal. Gains in political power or gender equality tend to be uneven, with gains in one area often being accompanied by losses in another (Buss and Ali, 2017).

The strongest relationship across this study's models was between legal frameworks protecting women from violence and their political representation, even in comparison to the relationship between legal frameworks that specifically protect women's participation in politics. This reinforces the notion that a gender analysis of political opportunity and process with regard to political representation, as well as actual policy- and law-making outcomes, would yield more even gains for women across the private and political spheres. Political power and representation are critical to achieve equality, but not without shifts in gender norms and legal frameworks that address women's daily experiences and wellbeing.

**Limitations**

One of the key limitations in this study is the smaller sample size and point-in-time data used due to the challenges in collecting consistent data over time for IPV and for women's political representation. The smaller sample size and use of multiple imputation, particularly in the *Local Legislature* and *National Legislature: Registered Candidates* models where imputations were made against the dependent variable, introduce uncertainty in the results and limit the ability to conduct full post-test estimations (He, 2010).

Though the missing data that was imputed appeared to qualify as Missing-at-Random (MAR), there may also be 'selection bias' in the data related to the initial selection of countries.

That is to say that the initial selection of countries may have omitted those that did not report consistent data, which may have introduced bias if those countries possessed other shared and non-random characteristics relevant to the study.

Additionally, IPV is understood to be an underreported phenomenon across countries either as a result of cultural norms that inhibit reporting by women or due to changes in laws which cause confusion about what constitutes IPV under national law. Due to this bias, we can expect that the magnitude of IPV as its own standalone measurement and when interpreting its coefficients across the Models may also be smaller than the actual IPV phenomenon and its effects would suggest.

Additionally, some countries include IPV as part of their census which may take place every four years, where other countries capture this data annually. I have attempted to mitigate this variance by only including election data for the most recent year reported within a four-year window from 2016-2020. But the variance in IPV data collection year do present a limitation for a point-in-time analysis.

Just as there are challenges in accurately measuring the scale of intimate partner violence, there remains a gap in measuring women's political participation and power in a consistent manner across countries. There are measures that are included in this study that reflect the right to participate in political processes – such as whether there is a law permitting or forbidding women the right to vote – or whether a woman reaches the highest level of the political sphere – such as whether a country has had a woman leader or the proportion of women in legislative bodies.

However, it would be more meaningful to have measurements of women's engagement in the spaces and processes in between, and a measure of the influence wielded by women who

occupy seats in their political and government bodies. Data is beginning to expand to include gender disaggregated measurements. This offers the opportunity to make available more diverse data on women's leadership in various sectors, the strength of women's movements in-country, or the allocation of funding to women's organizations or policies and programs advancing women's rights, as a means for better capturing the concept of political power.

**Future Research**

For future research, it would be useful to conduct more targeted analyses by selecting a subset of countries by region and using a time fixed effects or a period fixed effects model to explore the effect of national governments instituting certain legal frameworks on political power. For example, the strength of legal frameworks – particularly those related to violence against women – were most consistent in their directionality and magnitude across this study's models.

The key constraint in using *IPV Prevalence* as the key independent variable of interest was the infrequency of data collection and possible inconsistency in definitions by country, underreporting due to cultural norms, or lack of any data collection which omitted a country from this study entirely. By choosing to focus on the legal frameworks, it would be possible to explore trends over time and narrow down the subset of countries more intentionally to reflect similar cultural norms.

In a narrower region specific or country-specific study, it would also be possible to include data on available government safety nets, and more specifically, on the availability of victim support services. This data is not available more broadly at a country level, but it may be more readily available at the county or municipal level for some countries. Such data on support services would reflect both the immediate support available to women experiencing intimate partner

violence and the priorities of the government within which women would be seeking to exercise power.

In such an approach, the dependent variable for political power could also be narrowed down to the proxy which is most directly responsible for legislation. There is an opportunity to branch out from this specific IPV conceptual framework to add to the literature that women in power enact policies which uniquely address women's issues (Chattopadadhya and Duflo, 2004), by using the conclusions here that legal frameworks which support women's physical safety and access to politics similarly have a positive relationship with women in power.

Additionally, I would recommend exploration into different methodological approaches for exploring the causal pathway between violence against women and political power. My study chose a simpler and stepwise methodology for a more complex conceptual framework. The stepwise regression approach for this study was helpful in addressing the hypothesis across the bi-directional pathway of the conceptual framework and in testing multiple proxies for political power.

However, using a more complex methodology for a less complex framework could be applied to future research on this subject. I would recommend additional in-depth exploration of how the direct pathways between certain IPV effects at the individual, household, and community level may or may not be causally linked to political power or participation in the political process. For example, the consistent emergence of reproductive autonomy as a statistically significant individual-level IPV effect and one that is perceived as potentially highly political, offers promise as starting point for exploration using a more complex methodology to evaluate a more direct causal pathway.

Consistent with the late-wave feminist tradition of eschewing solely quantitative methodologies, I would also recommend supplementing further studies with qualitative research and evidence. Qualitative research and understanding processes underlying *meaningful* political power and the norms and unmeasurable aspects of intimate partner violence is critical to addressing and improving upon outcomes for both phenomena.

For example, the results for this study show that there is a disconnect between metrics and indices like the Council on Foreign Relations' "Women's Power Index" used in this analysis and actual 'political power'. The positive correlation between so many of the individual and household effects of IPV and women's political representation imply that more women in 'power' is not necessarily correlating with better daily or livelihood outcomes for women. A combination of the aforementioned alternative methodological approaches and the supplementation of qualitative evidence would better illustrate how an increase in women's political power affects women's experiences of IPV or the legal frameworks and social services established to address them.

# CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

This study aimed to explore the relationship between IPV prevalence, as a measure of women's power in a private sphere, and their political power, as a measure of power in the public sphere. I used a conceptual framework that extended the immediate effects of IPV on women at the individual, household, and community level and included legal frameworks and conflict and security as moderating factors for the relationship.

I tested the relationship using six proxies for political power derived from the CFR Women's Power Index and the OECD GID-DB and three models that used OLS stepwise regressions and multiple imputation. The models included IPV immediate effects and sociodemographic characteristics as controls, legal frameworks and country conflict as moderators, and IPV community level effects as moderators to test the strength of the community-level causal pathway.

My results did not support the hypothesis that there would be a negative relationship between IPV prevalence and women's political power, nor that conflict would negatively moderate that relationship. However, my results did support the hypothesis that the strength of legal frameworks to eliminate violence and increase political participation were positively correlated with women's political power, particularly in the case of representation in national and local legislatures. The results suggest that the proxies for political power may be insufficient as measures of power, and that political 'representation' may be outpacing the changes to gender norms or gains made at the individual level for women.

As the Sustainable Development Goals enter their sunset decade and COVID-19 threatens the gains in women's rights made since the rise of the development sector's gender equality

agenda, policymakers and development actors should consider how to ensure that gender equality is meaningful within the private and public spheres alike.

## APPENDIX

***Table 13: Sociodemographic Controls***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| GDP Growth<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. |
| GDP Per Capita<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. |
| Estimated Earned Income, Male ($)<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Estimated earned income (PPP US$), male |
| Unemployment<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2019)* | Unemployment, total (% of total labor force): Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. |
| Population<br><br>*(Source: UNDP HDI, 2019)* | Total population: De facto population in a country, area or region in millions of people |
| Voice and Accountability<br><br>*(Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019)* | Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media; Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) |
| Regulatory Quality<br><br>*(Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019)* | Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development; Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) |

***Table 13. (cont.)***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| Rule of Law<br><br>*(Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019)* | Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence; Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) |
| Control of Corruption<br><br>*(Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2019)* | Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests; Estimate of governance (ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance) |
| Human Development Index<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | A composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. |
| Life Expectancy, Male<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Life expectancy at birth: Number of years a male newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth stay the same throughout the infant's life. |
| Life Expectancy, Female<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Life expectancy at birth: Number of years a female newborn infant could expect to live if prevailing patterns of age-specific mortality rates at the time of birth stay the same throughout the infant's life. |
| Mean Years of Schooling, Male<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of education received by men ages 25 and older, converted from educational attainment levels using official durations of each level. |
| Mean Years of Schooling, Female<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Mean years of schooling: Average number of years of education received by women ages 25 and older, converted from educational attainment levels using official durations of each level. |

***Table 13. (cont.)***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| Refugee<br><br>*(Source: UNHCR via World Bank, 2019)* | Refugee population by country or territory of asylum: people who are recognized as refugees under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, people recognized as refugees in accordance with the UNHCR statute, people granted refugee-like humanitarian status, and people provided temporary protection. |
| Net Migration<br><br>*(Source: United Nations Population Division via World Bank, 2019)* | Net migration is the net total of migrants during the period, that is, the total number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants, including both citizens and noncitizens. Data are five-year estimates. |
| Access to electricity (% of population)<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) database, 2018)* | Access to electricity is the percentage of population with access to electricity. Electrification data are collected from industry, national surveys and international sources. |
| Fuel Exports<br><br>*(Source: World Bank, 2018)* | Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports): Fuels comprise the commodities in SITC section 3 (mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials). |
| Exports and Imports<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Sum of exports and imports of goods and services, expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). |
| Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows<br><br>(*Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital and short-term capital, expressed as a percentage of GDP. |
| Private Capital Inflows<br><br>(*Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2019)* | Net foreign direct investment and portfolio investment, expressed as a percentage of GDP. |

***Table 13. (cont.)***

| ***Variables*** | ***Variable Description*** |
|---|---|
| Health Expenditure<br><br>*(Source: UNDP: Human Development Index, 2017)* | Current health expenditure: Country spending on healthcare goods and services, expressed as a percentage of GDP. It excludes capital health expenditures such as buildings, machinery, information technology and stocks of vaccines for emergency or outbreaks. |
| Youth Not Employed and Not in School<br><br>*(Source: OECD, 2019)* | Percentage of people ages 15–24 who are not in employment or in education or training. |
| Voter Turnout<br><br>*(Source: International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, 2019)* | The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) divided by the number of names on the voters' register, expressed as a percentage. |
| VAP Turnout<br><br>*(Source: International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, 2019)* | The total number of votes cast (valid or invalid) divided by the Voting Age Population figure, expressed as a percentage. The voting age population (VAP) includes all citizens above the legal voting age. |
| Compulsory Voting<br><br>*(Source: International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, 2019)* | Dummy variable indicating countries that have a law that provides for compulsory voting. |
| Quota: National Legislature<br><br>*(Source: International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, 2019)* | Dummy variable indicating the presence of country-level legal, political, or constitutional requirements for quotas which allocate a number of seats in national legislatures for women. |
| Quota: Sub-National<br><br>*(Source: International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, 2019)* | Dummy variable indicating the presence of country-level legal, political, or constitutional requirements for quotas which allocate a number of seats in sub-national government bodies for women. |

***Table 14: Pairwise Correlations for Legal Frameworks: Political***

| Variables | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Political Voice: Law | 1.000 | | | |
| (2) Compulsory Voting | -0.071 | 1.000 | | |
| (3) Single/Lower House Quota | 0.020 | -0.070 | 1.000 | |
| (4) Sub-National Quota | 0.110 | -0.025 | 0.679 | 1.000 |

*Source: OECD GID-DB, International IDEA.*

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