

DESTIGMATIZING US-JAPAN TIES AFTER 1960

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Many thanks,  
Alok Ranpise

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## **Introduction**

The renewal of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan in 1960, on renegotiated terms, was intended to be a triumphal mark on Nobosuke Kishi's career as a politician. The prime minister and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) may have expected this renewal to be relatively innocuous and bipartisan, as it ameliorated the "semicolonial" nature of US-Japan relations (*Japan at the Crossroads* 11). It set a ten-year renewal deadline, provided a defense guarantee, called for more consultations on troop movements and trade policies, and ostensibly reduced the US' ability to interfere in Japanese domestic security and politics ("Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security"). Hypothetically in a modified geopolitical and domestic political climate, these promised improvements over the prior decade of US-Japan relations may have mollified critics. However, public mistrust specifically towards Kishi was compounded by widespread nervousness about letting Japan be implicated in American foreign policy, whether in ideological orientation with "American imperialism" or in a pragmatic sense with the American camp that could drag Japan into a nuclear war (*Japan at the Crossroads* 15). Kishi did succeed in passing the new treaty through the National Diet, but this inflamed a domestic protest movement that cost him his position as prime minister and pushed US-Japan relations to a nadir with the cancellation of President Dwight Eisenhower's 1961 visit (which would have made him the first sitting US president to visit the country, and had also been timed by Kishi to auspiciously meet the procedural ratification date of the treaty)(Jesty). The protests are usually referred to as the "Anpo" protests, an abbreviation for Anzen Hoshō Jōyaku (Japanese for 'security treaty')(Schieder 30). Understanding how the passage of the treaty descended into such a political crisis for Japan's ruling class and

for US-Japan relations is an important background before addressing my research question. In this paper I hope to explore the political fallout of the Anpo protests, and potentially answer how the cabinet of Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato (serving from 1960-64) were able to conjure the domestic political space to improve ties with the new Kennedy administration in the US. This was achieved despite the deep domestic antipathy towards the US evinced up to the Anpo protests, the related toppling of the Kishi cabinet, and the perceived risks and drawbacks of Cold War alignment (*Japan at the Crossroads* 22). I hope to provide a satisfactory answer to this dilemma for the Ikeda-Kennedy relations period in the early 1960s, but will refrain from making generalizations about any lasting thaw, owing to the complicated relationship at the end of the same decade, that saw a popular Japanese movement against the Vietnam War (*Japan at the Crossroads* 272).

### **Postwar roots of anti-American sentiment**

The American occupation authorities initially sought to empower left-wing politicians and organizations in Japan as an opposition to check the imperial period's ultranationalist, statist sensibilities. However, the rising temperatures of the Cold War led to a reversal in these policies (*Japan at the Crossroads* 9). Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan) directly antagonized leftist politicians and organized labor in Japan, suggesting the Japanese Communist Party did not deserve its constitutional protections (Gerteis 14), perhaps owing to its factions with respective clientelist relations with Soviet and Chinese communists (*Japan at the Crossroads* 128-129). SCAP also supported the conservative Japanese establishment in engendering a mass 'Red Purge' of communists from their jobs, the undermining of anti-trust initiatives against the former 'Zaibatsu' conglomerates, and the return to power of government figures

implicated in the war (*Japan at the Crossroads* 9). The hold of the LDP on power was cemented through an uneven playing field, marked significantly by the funneling of “secret campaign funds” from the American Central Intelligence Agency to the LDP, as principals of American foreign policy saw it as essential for US interests to prop up a “conservative political hegemony within Japan” (Beckley et al). This American patronage of one party in Japanese politics incited the animosity of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), and organized labor in Japan, who eventually adopted the exit of American troops from the country as one of their goals (Gerteis 14). At a 1953 “Peace Economy Conference”, heads of the Sōhyō (General Council of Trade Unions) declared the need for economic independence from the United States (Gerteis 17).

The Anpo protests arose from far more than just organized labor’s initiative though. Over the period from 1959 to 1960, about a third of the country’s population participated in protests (*Japan at the Crossroads* 1). Doubtless some of this number could have been unconnected to the Security Treaty, and it may be excessive and unnecessary to paint an overly minute demographic profile of the protestors. Nevertheless, understanding the major constituents of the Anpo protestors is useful towards later unpacking how and why the Ikeda administration was able to destigmatize and improve US-Japan ties, without major opposition from these quarters. The two other groups that stand out in this period are women and students involved in the protests. In the literature consulted for this paper, the politicization of Japanese women into skepticism towards American actions around Japan occurred along two major lines. The first was as female students, who were finally allowed in far greater numbers into higher education as more universities became coeducational. In their drive to enter new positions of academic and professional achievement, they strove

(with mixed success) to achieve positions of equality outside the domestic sphere, in this instance as participants in student activism (elaborated below). Though prior scholarship has articulated the gendered limits placed on these female activists even in supposedly subversive student movements, this work has also cautioned against gullibly believing the “masculine monopoly over the memory of the moment” that erases female students’ contributions to these movements (Schieder 1-3). Tokoro Mitsuko was a student who participated in the Anpo demonstrations, and she gained fame and following in later years for her political writings; notably, they outlined the unique stake of women students in opposing the “economic rationalization” that characterized the US-supported postwar order. Tokoro’s writings and own lived experiences as a student depicted how such rationalization was a blinkered resort to older forms of organization where women were restricted to households (“the domestic sphere”) so support male’s participation in the “capitalist accumulation happening outside (Schieder 51, 53). This perhaps should not overshadow the contributions that women made to protest movements until Anpo even from within the domestic sphere, with concerns that were oriented towards family safety. Activism relating to nuclear fallout and food safety motivated agitation based “on their identity as caregiver(s) and protector(s) of the family” (Jesty).

The next significant subgroup in the protests was university students, who were often the most radical and violent partakers (Jesty). The roots of postwar student activism lay in Occupation authorities controversial attempts to reform the university system, and the resulting discontent led to the formation of the Zengakuren (an abbreviated form of the Japanese phrase for ‘All Japan League of Self-Governing Student Associations’). Students were involved in protests “opposing American imperialism” across the nation, especially

in anti-base protests culminating in the largest such instance at Sunagawa from 1955 to 1957 (*Japan at the Crossroads* 15). One key aspect of the Zengakuren coalition was its splintering into various factions, and that different factions were responsible for different protest events or flashpoints before and during Anpo. Factions claiming independence from the JCP made up the majority of the Zengakuren, and they prioritized targeting the forces of “monopoly capital” in Japan, manifesting this entity in agitations at the Diet or the Prime Minister’s residence. However, students aligned with the JCP targeted the US embassy as they saw the US as the main culprit behind the Anpo intrigues (*Japan at the Crossroads* 147). SCAP pressure during the occupation period had changed from imposing a pacifist constitution to advocating for Japanese rearmament and the indefinite stationing of American bases, owing to Cold War security contingencies (Gerteis 16). This had abruptly turned the United States into a perceived adversary for Japanese advocates of pacifism and opponents of prewar militarism and imperialism. The JCP aligned minority was behind the ‘Hagerty Incident’, where the visiting White House press secretary saw his car surrounded by thousands of protestors and vandalized, and he had to be rescued by US Marines (*Japan at the Crossroads* 148). This was perhaps the most prominent diplomatic incident of the Anpo protests, along with the cancellation of Eisenhower’s visit. However, it was the majority group that were prone to more violence, and who ideologically permitted the use of force (*Japan at the Crossroads* 147-148).

Beyond the motivations of these groups, there were also economic aspects of the bilateral relationship that were drawing the ire of Japanese citizens across the political spectrum. Forty percent of respondents to a newspaper survey in 1952 said they “felt Japan was not an independent country”, even after the end of the occupation (Jesty). The nature

of the relationship was still hamstringing the Japanese economy in certain ways, even after the restoration of sovereignty. The Korean War had provided a procurement onus for growth to the Japanese economy, but it also led to high inflation and shortages. It also skewed the Japanese economy towards certain specific exports in the 1950s, and mid-decade pressure from the United States coerced Japan into adopting so-called “voluntary export restraints” (Beckley et al). Discomfort with the nature of relations between the two countries was repeatedly voiced by Japanese envoys but was usually imperiously ignored or denigrated by American counterparts such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles or Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II. Secretary Dulles often proactively intervened to reduce President Eisenhower’s communication time or exposure to Japanese leaders, to maintain his own privileged position in guiding the relationship. The diplomatic slights did not go unnoticed and were acknowledged openly and “bitterly” by Japanese leaders and newspapers such as the Asahi Shimbun (“Mending the ‘Broken Dialogue’”). Thus the public tenor of a subordinate, coercive relationship was already revealed even in the public eye, and whereas in its latter year the Eisenhower administration acknowledged the flagging relationship, and sought to make amends through various means, the base of anti-American activism had already been provoked. Some of the ameliorative measures since 1958 included increased cheap loans to Japan, American ascent towards drastic Japanese cuts in defense spending, the facilitation of greater Japanese exports to the US, and the formation of a Joint Committee on US-Japan Trade to promote more consultative dialogue on trade (Beckley et al). Indeed, the presence of these sops from 1958-60, consented to by the Eisenhower administration specifically to save the declining relationship, feeds into one of my following arguments about how concessions and conciliatory attitudes by the

American side were insufficient in mitigating the anti-American fervor of the Anpo protests.

### **What provoked the escalation of the Anpo protests?**

Even among literature consulted for this paper, characterizing the Anpo protests as primarily anti-American would be a controversial and perhaps reductive decision. As in the instance of the split factions of the Zengakuren, the sheer volume of the protests indicated their ability to attract a wide subsection of Japanese agitators, with varying political goals and interpretations of the movement they were partaking in. As highlighted before, the Kishi administration may even have expected the renewal and new terms of the Security Treaty to be domestically uncontroversial, but aspects of Kishi's background and political conduct served to catalyze agitation both against perceived subordination and alignment to America in the Cold War and against his own administration. Kishi was a former Class A war criminal for his actions in the second world war, who had been rehabilitated by the American occupation's "depurge" that sought to cement a conservative, anti-communist establishment. Despite his excessively controversial reputation in Japan, Kishi earned plaudits and appreciation from American diplomat for his perceived role as a dependable, anti-communist stalwart (Beckley et al).

In the year prior to the introduction of the renewed Security Treaty bill, Kishi and his LDP introduced a bill seeking the powerful redefining of police powers to enable "warrantless search and seizure". Beyond the bill itself serving as an indicator of a revisionist, unaccountably statist orientation of the LDP government, it was also Kishi's proclivity towards parliamentary maneuvers that restricted debate and sought to pass controversial measures in "snap votes" at the end of sessions, that rose the specter of

parliamentary democracy being sidelined and subverted (*Japan at the Crossroads* 18). In the infamous ‘May 19 incident’ from 1960, Kishi and the LDP orchestrated the eviction of protesting opposition parliamentarians from the Diet, and then had the lower house of parliament pass the Anpo bill in their absence. Kishi’s resort to such parliamentary maneuvers both during the deliberations over the (withdrawn) Police Duties bill and the (successful) ratification of the Anpo treaty, inflamed protests beyond their note of Anti-Americanism or neutralism towards civic nationalist claims of protecting procedural democracy in Japan. However, Kishi’s maneuver (perhaps too smugly) timed the Anpo renewal so it would come into effect precisely at the same time as Eisenhower’s planned visit, and this controversially tied Kishi’s betrayal of procedural democracy directly to the presidential visit (*Japan at the Crossroads* 23-24). These parliamentary antics spread the discontent over the Anpo renewal to an even broader cross-section of Japanese society, as influential voices in the public sphere such as university professors began to speak out of the protest movement (*Japan at the Crossroads* 155). The emergence and proliferation of mass media during this period, with increasing household television ownership as well as print media circulation, ensured that households were witnessing a narrative of police brutality and suppression against the protests, in a series of images and videos that the state could not control. In particular, the death of the student protestor Michiko Kanba (the “conflicting accounts” of her death place blame roughly in the hands of a police advance on protestors or on the ensuing stampede) associated her as a figure of “particular vulnerability” that “inspire(d) sympathy” among the public (Schieder 22.).

These various factors demonstrate the stigmatization and ostensibly popular villanization of US Japan ties in the Japanese popular imagination. This trend reached its

zenith during the culmination of the Anpo protests and the final days of the Kishi administration. Given the previous evidence that conciliatory US diplomatic and economic policies from 1958-60 could not preempt the massive, destabilizing protest movement, it may be reasonable to surmise that the successor administration under Ikeda Hayato would also see its political horizons hamstrung by an enduring Anti-Americanism, but this was manifestly not the case. I believe this posits a puzzle as we try to understand how the Ikeda Hayato cabinet were able to destigmatize relations with the United States and pursue improvement, despite the immediately preceding antipathy. I will attempt to present and argue against two alternative explanations of the thaw, before elaborating and defending the explanation I perceive as most convincing. Like the actions from 1958-60, the two alternative explanations prioritize American diplomatic agency (afforded either through the optics of a presidential turnover, or the rationalistic explication and propagation of a recalibrated foreign policy towards Japan) in shaping and guiding the relationship. The explanation I privilege, however, emphasizes the role of Japanese domestic political trends nominally independent of American policy, in creating the room for the Hayato cabinet to improve relations. (I use the term “nominally” here, owing to the prior cited evidence and admissions by American diplomatic figures of CIA financial involvement in Japanese politics, at least until 1969) (Beckley et al). It is pertinent beforehand to briefly outline the new, positive tone of the relationship.

In the January of 1963, Ikeda Hayato addressed a session of the National Diet, and called Japan the third pillar of the Free World alongside Europe and the US (“Ikeda Outlines”). Before we note the domestic political ramifications of such a proclamation, we can note how it was received in an memorandum from American the embassy in Tokyo.

Despite recognizing the inherent nationalist posture in the statement and explicitly tracing its development to the imperialistic nationalism of the 1930s, the cable still approvingly notes this development as one favorable to US interests, as it portends Japan taking on a “big power consciousness” and adopting the “corresponding responsibilities” (“Ikeda Outlines”). The memorandum then admits that this prestigious posturing will manifest more in economic aid to developing countries rather than imminent defense spending, but the conciliatory and supportive attitude to the Ikeda administration is apparent (“Ikeda Outlines”). This contrasts handily with the patronizing attitude of former secretary of state Dulles, and suggests an American willingness and need in the 1960s to see Japan as a nominally equal partner.

Kennedy’s positive relationship with Ikeda had manifested in other forms over the preceding years. In a 1961 summit in Washington, Kennedy promised Ikeda a more consultative relationship where the US would discuss sensitive policy decisions with Japan well in advance of taking them or announcing them to the world (the most significant instance of this was the informing Ikeda of the resumption in American nuclear testing in 1962, in response to the Soviets doing the same). The success and spirit of partnership evinced by the summit meeting (more of its achievements will be outlined in the arguments below) led Ikeda to jubilantly claim that US-Japan ties were now a Pacific equivalent of the US-Great Britain partnership (“Mending the ‘Broken Dialogue’”).

### **Why was the Ikeda Hayato cabinet able to improve and destigmatize US-Japan ties?**

#### Alternative explanation 1: President Kennedy renouncing Eisenhower era policies

The advent of the Kennedy administration in America signaled not just a political party change at the White House, but a generational shift in the country’s politics.

Kennedy's youth in comparison to Eisenhower had been used on the campaign trail to signify vitality as a leader. Transmitting this impression of vitality to his administration's foreign policy, as the failure at the Bay of Pigs and Kennedy's disappointing Vienna summit with Nikita Khrushchev provoked a different age-related metaphor, of "immaturity" (Shannon). Fortunately, US-Japan relations provided a more receptive template for an agenda of renewal. The conduct of the bilateral relationship by Eisenhower and MacArthur II was labelled as "old-school"(Lind) by one of Kennedy's appointees to the Tokyo embassy, and the determination to pursue change was quickly evident. The figures guiding the relationship under Eisenhower saw the Anpo protests as an outcome of domestic misgovernance in Japan and saw "no need for any change" in the US approach ("Mending the 'Broken Dialogue'"). Kennedy appointed as ambassador the Harvard professor Edwin A Reischauer, a prominent critic of the Eisenhower administration's diplomacy with Japan and their response to the Anpo protests; the professor had travelled around Japan following the protests, and had his own ideas on revitalizing the relationship by engaging more with Japanese citizens and politicians ("Mending the 'Broken Dialogue'"). Some of the changes he implemented at the embassy seem small but intuitive: whereas MacArthur II had discouraged Japanese language learning among the embassy staff, over concerns over "going native", Reischauer hired staff that were already familiar with the language and society. American diplomatic cables of the time frequently repeated concerns over Japan going neutral in the Cold War ("Visit of Prime Minister Ikeda"), and Reischauer's new policy symbolized the "equal partnership" the Kennedy administration would now strive for (Lind). Kennedy hosted Ikeda in Washington in the summer of 1961, and the summit produced numerous desired results, such as committees on trade, "cultural

and educational exchange”, and “scientific cooperation”, and Ikeda repaid the hospitality with a promise that Japanese trade with China would not be expanded under his administration. Both leaders made mutual offers of trade concessions, in a two-sided display of “low postures” which handily contrasted with the postures of the previous era (“Mending the ‘Broken Dialogue’”).

This favorable impression of a resurrected relationship was further compounded the following year by a public relations initiative in the form of attorney general and presidential brother Robert F Kennedy visiting Japan. Therefore, official visits only occupied a day of the attorney general’s time, and the remainder of the trip was spent engaging with Japanese “youth and student groups”, to portray through Kennedy America’s new “dynamism, youth, and vigor” (Shannon). Kennedy’s speeches and performance were very well received in the mainstream Japanese press, with special exception given to a conversation he held on the stage with a student heckler; the student Yuzo Tachiya raised the issues of American imperialism and occupation of Okinawa, and Kennedy deflected by comparing American freedoms and democracy to Soviet dictatorships. He criticized governance by ideology (implicitly chiding the student protestors) and extolled the “maturity” needed to partake in a deliberative democracy. Prominent newspapers carried the desired messages of youth, vigor, and “courage” attributed to Kennedy, and indirectly to the new US presidential administration (Shannon).

Evidently the efforts towards better optics and reshaping the popular Japanese narrative about America’s global role worked to an extent, in terms of suggesting generational change and even an element of glamor. The Americans were not even genuinely pushed to answer questions about imperialistic dominance and the occupation

of Okinawa, but President Kennedy did promise in 1962 to return the islands to Japan. This policy of public relations by the Kennedy administration does acceptably explain why some Japanese may have had a more positive view of them, but it falls short of convincingly explaining why Anpo agitators would have dropped their apprehensions about risky Cold War alignment. Moreover, it gives excessive agency to American interlocutors and politicians in influencing the domestic direction of Japanese politics, while supposing that Anpo agitators would suddenly become a passive and receptive audience for the Kennedy's crafted narrative.

Alternative explanation 2: American prioritization of the relationship, for burden sharing and regional geopolitics

This explanation would posit that the American side pursued a more positive diplomatic relationship with the Japanese, owing to a multiplicity of foreign policy considerations in East Asia, and the need for increased contribution by Japan to its own defense expenditures, under a framework of burden-sharing. This increased urgency of ameliorating the post Anpo movement relationship was undertaken considering increased suspicions of Chinese aggression in the hemisphere (held by the US), and concerns regarding conflicts in Southeast Asia and Japan as a viable supporter of the US efforts in that region (held by both Japan and the US) (Yoshitsugu). Japanese support was also needed at the United Nations, where the US perceived potentially increasing support for the recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the correct Chinese member, which would remove the US-favored Government of the Republic of China ("GRC") in lieu of a two-China presence. Though the Japanese ambassador Asakai Koichiro (1957-63) expressed doubt that the US could keep the PRC out of the UN through a moratorium, he

said that the Japanese government would support alternative methods that block PRC accession (such as insisting on GRC inclusion at the UN even following PRC accession, in which instance the PRC would lose interest) (“Discussions Between Secretary of State Rusk and Japanese Ambassador Asakai”).

To maintain favorable relations with Japan, the United States believed it was essential to stabilize the tendency towards internecine conflict within the LDP and secure the position of a dependable (and relatively uncontroversial) conservative leader such as Ikeda. In a June 1961 telegram, American ambassador Reischauer articulated that Ikeda’s political fortunes and his ability to retain his office would depend on the optics of his upcoming visit to Washington, and whether the visit was seen as a success from the Japanese leadership’s perspective. He emphasized the stakes as “indispensable” and added that improving “trade accounts” between the nations would help (“Ambassador Reischauer’s Discussions”). An American strategy document for Ikeda’s visit was also remarkably accommodative of Japanese requests, calling for the formation of the US-Japan Joint Economic Committee, offering mutualistic trade concessions, and “reaffirm(ing)” Japan’s nominal sovereignty over Okinawa (“Prime Minister Ikeda’s Visit”).

In a February 1963 memorandum recording the proceedings of US embassy meeting, featuring Ambassador Reischauer and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, the mutual accommodation and positive tenor of the relationship and defense deliberations were still clear. Gilpatric noted that Japanese cabinet members were clearly aware of the current balance of trade favoring the US, and of the large value of “rent-free facilities and installations and properties” that the US occupies in Japan, but still chose to make no mention of these in bilateral meetings. He also noted positively the Japanese

manufacturing of weapons of war and puzzled over how the US could sell them more of its own. Ikeda appeared to be living up to American hopes, with Kilpatrick's recollection of the meeting noting Ikeda's quick compliance and "determination" in accord with American defense proposals, with the caveat that the Japanese would adopt them as quickly as politically possible. Reischauer and Gilpatric both noted that any further pressure on the Japanese towards heightened defense spending would be futile or counter-productive, and the current direction of the relationship was highly satisfactory. American interests would reportedly be better served by setting up the "consultative mechanism" and committees that their Japanese counterparts had advocated for ("Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's and Ambassador Reischauer's Summary").

These records show that American diplomats and statesmen prioritized forming positive, consultative relations with the Ikeda cabinet so they could achieve their own goals in regional defense and burden sharing in defense spending. It is a compelling explanation because as later records from 1963 depict, the American diplomatic effort appeared to have borne fruit. Relations had been transformed away from the testy and patronizing relations American diplomats had with the nationalistic cabinet of Nobosuke Kishi. Moreover, American desires for a genuinely cooperative Japanese attitude on defense, relations with the PRC, and Cold War alignment were all being met.

However, this argument only explains why the Ikeda cabinet was able to achieve more positive US-Japan relations, due to a mutual, pragmatic eagerness by the American side to keep a reliable ally. It does little to explain why the Ikeda cabinet was able to cultivate the domestic political space for such a breakthrough in relations, since it did not address the Anpo movement's concerns over risky Cold War alignment with the US. The

Americans were continuing to build a lasting relationship specifically with the conservative elites in Japanese politics, and this would have done little to solve the apprehensions of opposition movements in Japanese politics that already perceived an American complicity in subverting their democracy. Lastly, we can acknowledge that positive economic relations contributed to Japanese growth and prosperity in the 1960s. This does not posit a significant difference from the late 1950s, since the Eisenhower administration was already offering economic support such as cheap credit and was even accepting reduced Japanese defense spending at the time (Beckley et al).

Main explanation: Splintering, disunity, and loss of support among the opposition following 1960

The passage of the Anpo bill in April 1960 was interpreted and reacted to differently by the scores of different actors involved in the protests, with different groups drawing different messages and impetuses for continuation from the ostensible failure of the movement. As elaborated in the earlier section on postwar roots of Anti-Americanism, the major subgroups that will be focused on are political parties (the JCP and JSP), labor unions, student groups (in the Zengakuren agglomeration), women protestors (as included among students and intellectuals, but also as a distinct subgroup), and public intellectuals. However, before looking at subgroups, it may be helpful to describe more general trends in society and how the Ikeda administration was able to successfully divert attention away from the incendiary politics of 1960 (Schieder 53).

Towards this end of mitigating political strife through broad-based prosperity, Ikeda Hayato introduced the income doubling plan in 1960, and the years until 1968 saw growth rates consistently in excess of nine percent (Beckley et al). In the immediate

aftermath of the Anpo protests, the change of LDP leadership and the swing towards a boisterously ambitious economic program may have been the key factor in consolidating the LDP dominance in the 1960 election, despite their uniquely rocky year (*Japan at the Crossroads* 103). The measure proved domestically successful and politically viable in elections owing to its broad focus beyond just export orientation. Prosperity was to be undergirded with provisions for a stronger social safety net and domestic purchasing power, as well as measures addressing the rural-urban wealth gap and central government support for “Industrial Development of Under-Developed Regions. Along with these measures, simply the prospect of government commitment to largesse and a supposed guarantee against austerity instigated the confidence for heightened investment and growth in the private sector, with no major inconvenient, contractionary pressures during the Ikeda Hayato years (*Japan at the Crossroads* 104-105). The promise of prosperity perhaps attracted most disillusioned protestors (following their failure to block the Anpo treaty revision) to lives of non-agitative “consumerism” and “ennui born of middle-class affluence” (Gerties 7).

American diplomatic cables noted with apprehension the “added strength and prestige” that the Anpo protests imparted to the JSP but noted it as a “mixed blessing” that exhausted party members and unsettled the public, shaking their support bases (“Visit of Prime Minister Ikeda”). The virulence of the protests were responsible for the political split of the JSP, which was the major parliamentary opposition to the LDP. A moderate faction of the JSP was in fact anti-communist and anti- confrontational, and during the Anpo movement in early 1960, split away to form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). DSP leader Nishio Suehiro opposed “extra parliamentary united actions” and cooperation with

the JCP, believing this had been hurting the public appeal of the JSP (*Japan at the Crossroads* 112). However, the political passions and animosities arising from the Anpo struggle left little political room and appeal for a middle of the road party such as the DSP, which lost Diet seats in the November 1960 election to the LDP and JSP, after having deprived the JSP of its parliamentary and extra parliamentary support in the closing stages of the Anpo confrontations (*Japan at the Crossroads* 113). American interpreters of the political situation nonetheless chose to portray an optimistic situation of a DSP still constructing its grassroots political apparatus, suggesting perhaps wishful hope given that the DSP was seen as the only contemporaneous “political opposition group in Japan firmly committed to the ideal of parliamentary democracy”. However, this election campaign also saw the post-Suehiro JSP distance itself from prospects of further extra-parliamentary agitation or violence, though American diplomats understood this as an election pretense after gauging public sentiment, rather than a genuine commitment (“Visit of Prime Minister Ikeda”). In 1961, the JSP was gripped by a debate on “structural reform”, where the scale and pressure instrumentalized by the Anpo protests was interpreted as a validation of the efficacy of extra-parliamentary protests, despite the non-achievement of the movement’s goal. This was disputed by counter-reformists who, though sympathetic, interpreted the Anpo failure as a negation of the extra parliamentary method. The scope of popular participation in Anpo engendered further controversy, within doctrinal quibbles about whether the party should remain a party of labor or become more inclusive towards the other subgroups involved in the movement (*Japan at the Crossroads* 117-123).

Organized labor’s disputes over the meaning of the Anpo agitation further diluted its legacy. Beyond just students, generational problems abounded within organizations

such as trade unions too, as the old guard within politics and labor perceived youth as “a significant threat to social stability” (Gerteis 2). Preceding the moderating influence of high growth in the 1970s, the 1960s saw younger unionists as more “in favor of political violence” than their predecessors (Gerteis 11), potentially marking a split between the tactical preferences of the older, directing generation, and the scores of younger protestors that actually spilled onto the streets, not content with merely executing their elder leaders’ directions. The dilution of aims and tactics in extra-parliamentary struggle were also exacerbated by Sōhyō leaderships opportunistic attempts to thematically link the Anpo struggle with the Mitsui Miike coal miners’ strike in Kyushu during the same period, believing that both issues could be merged into a major confrontation of labor against right-wing, capitalistic forces in Japan (Gerteis 18). Leaders in both the JSP and Sōhyō puzzled over whether the evident failure of both agitations could be attributed to inadequate integration, and this appeared privileged an ideological antagonization of domestic “monopoly capital”(*Japan at the Crossroads* 118) rather than a focus on scuttling US-Japan diplomatic relations. The ideological fixation on conceptualizing a grand, integrated struggle appears to have made Sōhyō eventually tangential to the labor movement, as its leaders realized the inefficacy and retreated from “workplace struggle(s)”. Sōhyō lost its prominence over the 1960s to more moderate union groups and independent private sector unions (*Japan at the Crossroads* 141-142).

As previously recounted, the split within the Zengakuren students’ organization preceded the Anpo protests and had to do with a disillusionment of radical students with the JCP’s 1955 retreat from a revolutionary line (*Japan at the Crossroads* 145). During the Anpo protests, the anti-JCP and pro-JCP sects of Zengakuren held protests and agitations

at different targets (anti-JCP at the National Diet and Prime Minister's residence, pro-JCP at the American embassy), and while both sides thoroughly resented the other for the non-cooperation, the JCP also vociferously criticized the violence perpetuated by anti-JCP student radicals at the Diet confrontations, and called for the overarching Anpo protest organizers to disown them (*Japan at the Crossroads* 148). Following the failure to block the security treaty, even these two major factions split into subgroups trading recriminations about who was responsible for the failure and which tactics had been inadequate. Pro-JCP students split away to form the Zenjiren (Japanese abbreviation for "All Japan Liaison Council of Student Governments"). Remaining sects within the Zengakuren refused to recognize each other, leading to an increasing number of weaker, smaller groups all laying claim to the same name, but not evincing the organizing potential and scale from the Anpo protests for many years hence (*Japan at the Crossroads* 148-150).

In the works of the previously mentioned Tokoro Mitsuko, we could also see further attempts to grapple with the failure of the Anpo protests. Interestingly, in a published conversation with American activist Barbara Garson later in the decade, they ruminated on how larger protests had just led to larger "despondency", and the point of the endeavors should not have been to merely attract more people, but to pragmatically achieve their goals (Schieder 57). Tokoro was one of the advocates of a new form of "nonhierarchical" activism (Schieder 50) that resulted from students' disillusionment with the establishment left-wing's failure to coerce change in 1960. This later form of organization appears to have been "nihilistic" and "radically egalitarian", imploding in the late 1960s into intra-university riots rather than resurrecting the relatively "patriotic" activism in defense of Japanese democracy from 1960 (*Japan at the Crossroads* 153). This suggests the

ideological make up of student protestors itself transformed into new currents that prioritized addressing ethical contradictions in their immediate environments and lives as university students, rather than pursuing their more abstract role as Japanese citizens or proponents of world peace and anti-imperialism. In an interesting demographic distinction, a sociological survey of female Anpo participants revealed that the women who saw the Anpo movement as a failure were mostly students and “veteran” activists; “housewives and working women” who experienced the Anpo protests as their first taste of activism claimed that the newly learned political behavior did not cease for them, but empowered them to engage in new forms of localized, communitarian, or “civic” activism (*Japan at the Crossroads* 173). This is a positive development in terms of these women’s political participation and enfranchisement, but in the eyes of Anpo organizers hoping to sustain Anti-American or neutralist fervor among the population, it suggests a more ambivalent outcome. The behavior of protesting and defending constitutional rights clearly persevered in these women, but it dissipated away from geopolitical or diplomatic concerns towards more parochial, though no less important, ends.

Similar patterns of disillusionment and ambivalence towards the anti-American goals of the Anpo protests may be gleaned from the post-1960 reactions of public intellectuals who had supported the movement. Following the public discomfort and signs of animosity that arose towards the Anpo protest following the Hagerty Incident and the Diet attacks (“Visit of Prime Minister Ikeda”), and the failure in its goal to stop the treaty ratification, the legacy of the movement may have appeared more checkered. Considering this, we can take note of how other public intellectuals (in addition to Tokoro Mitsuko) critiqued the movement or distanced themselves during the Ikeda years. The philosopher

Yoshimoto Takaaki acted as an elder, ideological guide to Zengakuren students during the movement, but just months after its failure, he fiercely criticized the Anpo movement as a complete failure that had been restrained by the ossified, uncreative stewardship of the left-wing elite. He even compared the “communal illusion” of the 1960 Anpo protestors to the misguided nationalistic fervor in Imperial Japan, and espoused political indifference as a more virtuous alternative to cooperation with these groups (*Japan at the Crossroads* 155-158). A distinguished, “progressive” figure in the Anpo movement was the sociologist Shimizu Ikutaro, who served as a “theorizer” and occasional propagandist for the movement. His pronouncements were always focused specifically on opposing the security treaty ratification and alignment with the US, and he grew increasingly frustrated with the broadening of the movement into protection of democracy and the propagation of labor interests (such as supporting the Miike strike). He eventually blamed the movement's failure on this lack of focus and placed the fault at the feet of other intellectuals who had been complicit in this broadening, adding that he himself was indifferent to democracy (*Japan at the Crossroads* 159-162). Yoshimoto and Shimizu both fiercely critiqued the most prominent public face of the protests, the “political theorist” Maruyama Masao, for dissipating the anti-treaty focus of the protests into a pro-democracy catch-all, or for theoretical disagreements on their interpretations of postwar Japanese society and capitalism. Thus, Maruyama too was quick to claim distance from the movement, and that he only unwillingly participated, following pressure by others to use his public stature for the movement (*Japan at the Crossroads* 164, 166-167).

## **Conclusion**

In all these instances, we can perceive that anti-American and anti-treaty fervor that may have dominated in the 1950s and sparked the earliest disturbances of the Anpo movement, tended to dissipate with the scaling of the movement and the disillusionment following its end and failure. The scaling of the movement beyond ideological anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism brought in advocates for protecting the democratic process and for advocating labor and anti-capitalist interests. Ikeda's fortuitous success with the income doubling plan and facilitating faster Japanese growth dampened systemic critiques of Japanese capitalism and labor relations, reorienting trade unions' focus to annual, peaceful wage negotiations (*Japan at the Crossroads* 143-144). The exit of Nobosuke Kishi also allowed much of the concern about procedural democracy to be assuaged for the time being, and though fears of Cold War entrapment were not solved per se, the ratified Anpo treaty appeared to be less of a threat to Japanese sovereignty and democracy itself. Furthermore, it is evident that almost all the major forms of organized resistance to the Anpo treaty and US-Japan relations, in political parties, labor unions, and student movements, all splintered into smaller, often mutually hostile, entities that posed far less of an obstacle to the Ikeda government's policymaking than the Anpo movement had.

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